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AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

It may be advisable, as we contemplate a survey of American foreign policy, to remind ourselves of the warning of the Scottish bard:

O wad some Pow'r the giftie gie us
To see oursels as others see us!
It wad frae monie a blunder free us
An' foolish notion.

You may recollect also that this is from the concluding stanza of a poem entitled “To a Louse, on Seeing One on a Lady’s Bonnet at Church.” Some critics of American foreign policy have suggested that there may be a louse on our diplomatic bonnet. If so, that fact should be taken into consideration, as well as whether the bonnet is in style and whether it serves the purposes of bonnets generally well or not.

This first suggestion to “see oursels as others see us” may perhaps bring to us the shocking consideration that, although there is probably no people on earth that would like to be universally loved as much as the American people, and although there is probably no people on earth which looks upon itself as so universally loved as the American people, and although there is in all probability no people on earth which exhibits more genuine generosity than the American people, we must be prepared to face the bitter fact that we are not universally loved throughout the world. We are the strongest power on earth; we are also the richest power on earth. We are also a power which is currently expanding its influence,
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particularly in the west Pacific area. Those things do not add up to love. They add up to envy, suspicion, and fear. It is usually the case that countries, like individuals, are inclined to point with pride to their most favorable national attributes. Other people, however, very often look at other sides of their character. It certainly cannot be denied that the armies of the United States have given away more stuff all over the world than any similar body has ever done in the history of mankind. The candy bars which have been generously handed out to the urchins of the far parts of the globe, if placed end to end, would doubtless reach to the farthest planet and back. On the other hand, there is some suspicion that all of the souvenirs brought home by our returning servicemen, if laid end to end, might reach an equal distance, and it seems to be a generally unhappy fact that the friendly countries in which our troops have been stationed look upon their leaving with little regret.

There is a second item which should be considered as a general proposition, and that is that foreign policies are not created in a vacuum. By the very term, a foreign policy means a policy in regard to foreign nations. It would seem quite evident, this being the case, that, to a certain extent, the foreign policy of any state depends on what other foreign nations do. It is perhaps unfortunate that the likelihood of this being true increases with the gravity of one state's relations with another state. In peaceful times one might consider ignoring the other nations of the world. In time of extreme crisis, however, foreign policy depends to a very large extent on what other countries are doing and who is fighting whom.

This point is raised because there seems to be a general presumption abroad that the State Department can outline a foreign policy without any regard to the other nations of
the world toward whom that foreign policy is directed. This is, of course, an impossibility. A foreign policy is part action and part reaction, and that part of it which is reaction to another nation’s policy must be improvised and subjected to change from time to time, depending upon the foreign policies of various other states. Moreover, in so far as details of a foreign policy depend on the acquiescence of another state, no one state ever gets all it wants all the time.

As a third introductory statement, I should like to digress a moment to speak about the machinery of our foreign policy. In fact, if it is not considered out of place, I should like to say one or two feeble words on behalf of the poor old State Department. My observations were all most modest. My relation with the State Department was strictly on a plane which we now have learned from the army to call the lower echelon. I do not speak from the Olympian heights, detached from and very noticeably above the State Department, occupied by the columnists and radio commentators. Mine was rather a lowly view, and I can assure you that that angle does not always give a picture which coincides with that of the superior attitudes acquired from above.

My first observation is that the planning and conduct of a foreign policy is a very complicated affair. As of December 1, 1946, for example, the United States was currently participating in twenty-three international conferences and meetings of various kinds. This participation had to be both planned in advance and supervised from time to time while in progress. The public has been led to expect our diplomats to draw up complicated peace treaties, for instance, in a shorter time than a group of businessmen can buy a railroad or a faculty group can work out a plan for general education in a great institution of higher learning.

My second observation regards the State Department it-
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self and it is that the department is not filled with nincompoops, nor is it filled with sinister men. Generally speaking, the members of the department are well trained and have been carefully selected. I think the department tends to send its men to too many different regions to become an expert in any one. The department suffers somewhat also from a failing common to any civil service organization, namely the tendency to base advancement on the ability to fight off disease, rather than on proficiency in the job.

On the other hand, we are just beginning to wake up to the fact that we are the most niggardly great power on earth in the conduct of our foreign relations. Only since the law of last August have Foreign Service officers been able to work up to a salary as high as $13,500 per year, the present top salary. In a social atmosphere where one has to do a certain amount of official entertaining and in locations that usually entail extraordinary expenses, as, for example, in the education of one's children, the salaries in the top jobs often do not pay the necessary expenses and the Foreign Service has not been in a position to lure many capable people away from either commercial or professional careers in this country. Prior to the recent war the State Department had a budget smaller than that of any other of the departments, annually operating on approximately the money required to build a couple of good cruisers. Such an expenditure for preventive medicine in the field of international politics is obviously inadequate.

In recent times the State Department has probably been the most generally criticized department in Washington. My own personal opinion is that this is often unwarranted, but there are a number of reasons for it which I think may bear some elaboration. In the first place, for certain reasons that become obvious when scrutinized, the State Department
must carry on its functions with greater secrecy than almost any other department. The secrecy arises from two causes, both justifiable. In the first place, much of the information of the State Department is not its exclusive property; that is, the negotiations and correspondence with any other country are as much the property of that other country as they are of the United States. Hence, if the other country desires secrecy, the United States can do one of two things, either acquiesce in the secrecy, or demand full publicity, in which case the other state will not divulge any information which it desires to keep secret.

In the second place, current negotiations often go more smoothly if they are not conducted in front of microphones and before the assembled press of the world. International covenants should be open and published, but the details of negotiations often are only impeded if they are subjected to full concurrent description. Some international agreements, like some business agreements, must be worked out in private in order to achieve any kind of an acceptable compromise. The degree to which details can be discussed in the public press is one of our unsolved problems, but it is evident that there are some dangers in too much publicity, even as there are some in complete and absolute secrecy. It may be appropriate in this connection to recall that in many cases the greatest real progress on the peace treaties just concluded was made after Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Molotov had spent a little time in a private huddle.

Now, since it is imperative that the State Department not unburden its soul absolutely to every reporter and commentator in the world, it is obvious that the State Department becomes the ideal object for Washington press and radio criticism. There are many things which the State Department does that make sense which cannot at the moment
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be explained fully, since the defense of the action can only
be a full and complete explanation of it; but the conclusion
is often drawn that, since no defense is made, the criticism
must be just. The result is that the State Department has
ceased trying to defend its every move when criticized. It
cannot do so without divulging information which it is not
free to discuss openly. Obviously the Washington corre-
spondents and commentators have long since found out how
delightful and safe it is to have at least one object of their
attentions which will not fight back.

One other item about the State Department should be
inserted here. Over the long run its sources of information
have been the best in the country, though they would doubt-
less be enhanced by the establishment of a general intelli-
gence agency. In addition to the normal sources available to
the ordinary person, the department daily receives several
hundred cablegrams and reports of various kinds from its
thousands of representatives scattered about the globe. By
the time any given incident of importance is relayed to Wash-
ington by the diplomat in that country, by the newspaper
correspondents in that country, and by the reports of the
diplomats of a half dozen other countries to their home cap-
itals, which are, in turn, reported on to Washington, the
coverage, although not perfect, is in most cases pretty fair.

During the war a definite improvement was made in the
State Department-Congressional relations in matters of for-
eign policy. Certain committees, including members of the
higher levels in the State Department and representatives
from the committees on foreign relations and foreign affairs
from the Senate and from the House, conferred together
regularly on broad, constructive elements of American for-
eign policy. Strangely enough, some such procedure was
recommended just at that time by some of the leading critics
of our State Department. There is no doubt that these committees aided a great deal in Congressional-executive cooperation in the administration of foreign affairs. This wartime precedent is certainly worth peacetime continuation.

There is one other item in regard to the administration of our foreign policy which apparently deserves an additional comment. In recent weeks there has been considerable discussion in the country about the continuity of our so-called bipartisan foreign policy, and we have occasionally repeated the adage that politics stops at the water's edge. This is a hopeful omen, but I should like to say a word here on behalf of not merely a continuity of foreign policy, but the continuity of the administrators of foreign policy. The record of the three years from the summer of 1943 to last summer shows two presidents, three different secretaries of state, and four different undersecretaries. In addition, the four to six assistant secretaryships were held by twelve different people, the special assistantships, usually about five in number, have been held by sixteen different men, and there have been changes in the high-ranking offices of legal adviser, economic adviser, and counsellor. Now we have another secretary of state, and although he is a highly capable person we again lose some valuable know-how, particularly in our dealings with the Russians, and further changes in the other departmental offices are likely to follow. Imagine what would happen to an institution of higher learning, or a great business concern, if there were two or more complete turnovers in all of the higher administrative positions in a similar period.

The British have attempted to solve this problem by instituting in their foreign office what they call a permanent undersecretary. Their secretary of state for foreign affairs, or foreign minister, comes and goes with the administration. A parliamentary undersecretary does likewise. But the third
ranking man in the foreign office is a permanent undersecretary, the head of the permanent service of the department, who maintains his position while administrations come and go. He is a non-political figure, but in him resides the collective wisdom and experience of the permanent service. He does not make policy. He rather is the embodiment of the traditions of policy and suggests, often very forcibly, as was the case of Sir Robert, now Lord Vansittart, the practical limits within which the foreign policy must function. It certainly appears that we could improve the administration of our foreign policy by establishing a new office of permanent undersecretary, an office of honor and prestige, to which the career men of the Foreign Service might ultimately aspire. It would, of course, carry with it all the dangers inherent in high bureaucratic office, but our lack of continuity in the control of foreign affairs cries out for some solution, and the British experience recommends itself as one worth our most serious consideration.

One final comment on the State Department will complete this digression which has already extended too far. The poor old department is from time lambasted for a foreign policy for which it is not responsible. On the matters of highest importance the foreign policy of the United States is determined by the president of the United States and the secretary of state. These are perfectly distinguishable figures and, if one does not like our foreign policy, he should lay the responsibility for it at the proper door. It is an unsportsmanlike habit to ascribe sinister motives to anonymous figures in the Department of State who are alleged to be diametrically opposed to the will of the president or secretary. In general, the function of the lower officers of the State Department is the suggestion of alternative methods of action for implementing the broad objectives on which everyone agrees. The
final determination in matters of importance is not within the competence of the lower, anonymous levels of the department. The president is ultimately responsible for our foreign policy in a very direct fashion. He has it in his power to override all the recommendations of the permanent service. Whether he does or not, it is his policy and we should put the responsibility for it squarely where it belongs.

In spite of this ultimate responsibility of the president and secretary, however, the chief shortcoming, I believe, of the department and consequently of our foreign policy is its lack of coördination and integration. The president cannot do this job. President Roosevelt was often referred to as his own secretary of state, but he was so busy with other things that although he directed foreign policy he could not take time to integrate it. President Truman is not his own secretary of state; so again the job is not performed by the president. Mr. Hull was primarily interested in certain parts of our policy and paid less attention to others. Mr. Byrnes, somewhat similarly, has been giving so much attention to the peace treaties and the United Nations that certain other things have naturally received less of his time. Both Mr. Hull, because of illness his last years in office, and Mr. Byrnes, because of prolonged trips away from Washington, have been absent from the secretary's desk too much for the good of the department. In spite of several departmental reorganizations, there doesn't seem to be any boss, with the natural result of contradictions in policy in the department, made worse by occasional ventures into foreign policy by other government departments, particularly the army and the navy.

Any analysis of a foreign policy involves a variety of approaches. In the first place, one might adopt what might be called the critical approach, and I do not mean construc-
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tive criticism. Most criticism of our foreign policy is not very constructive. It is directed usually toward certain minor aspects of the policy with which the critic does not agree, and which, in fact, may be things of which we sometimes are not very proud. At the same time, if that aspect of policy viewed with alarm is at the moment the best thing that can be done in a bad situation, that should doubtless be taken into consideration.

There is, secondly, what might be called the constructive approach to a foreign policy, which, in the most comprehensive sense, would mean drawing up a complete foreign policy for the United States. It takes a very hardy soul to attempt this approach, and most people who try it settle for less than a complete policy, rather indicating on a few varied fronts proposals thought preferable to the course currently being followed.

A third approach, however, offers itself and may be more valuable than either of the first two. It consists of measuring our words by our deeds, of studying our protestations of principle and the practice of our power politics. It ignores neither a sense of international morality nor the realities of world politics, and it is to be hoped that it may be more helpful in an understanding of how the United States is attempting to meet current world problems than either of the first two.

Such an approach involves at once the distinguishing of the various aspects of a foreign policy. A foreign policy is made up, first, of broad general principles, second, of specific applications of these broad general principles to certain geographical areas or special problems, and, third, of the methods and means which a state consciously chooses and plans to use in an effort to implement its principles and the specific applications of its principles. Such a dissection of a foreign
policy begins at once to clarify some of the problems. For example, are we clear and agreed on principles and do we disagree only on methods? To what extent do our methods implement the specific applications of our principles? To what extent do the applications of our principles follow the principles in fact?

The following analysis covers briefly the recent salient statements on foreign policy which have come from the leaders in the formation of our foreign policy—presidents, secretaries of state, and leading Congressional and administrative spokesmen who may be included in this category. It extends from that first comprehensive declaration of principles, the Atlantic Charter, down to the pronouncements of recent months.

The principles of our foreign policy in the various statements which have followed the Atlantic Charter have not in fact greatly added to, or deviated from, that excellent statement. It has become somewhat popular in certain circles in recent years to pooh-pooh the Atlantic Charter. I should like to state, however, that there is nothing wrong with the Atlantic Charter as a statement of general principles to which any democratic people can be proud to adhere. One of the most comprehensive statements was President Truman’s Navy Day speech of 1945. There are certain others of a more specialized nature, some of which shall be referred to in due course, but throughout the whole series there is a continuous thread of consistent adherence to the five following principles: freedom of the seas, self-determination, economic collaboration, the reduction of armaments, and the pursuit of a just and enduring peace.

The first of these has been least well-developed in terms of specific suggestions for application and methods of implementation. In certain respects this is understandable. Free-
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Dom of the seas is, in time of peace, a principle which creates no real international problem. We are not sure whether the former assumptions of the free use of the seas for neutrals in time of war, subject to the traditional limitations of visit and search, blockade, and seizure of contraband, can in fact continue in a world in which our concepts of war and neutrality are revised in favor of a new concept of aggressive war as a crime against humanity. It may well be that freedom of the seas, as we have known it, will be denied in the future to the international aggressor. Be that as it may, we still adhere to the principle, and, as possessors of the greatest navy that the world has ever seen, we seem relatively indifferent to any threat of its immediate challenge.

The second principle is one which after the First World War was referred to as self-determination. In the Atlantic Charter, and in subsequent statements of policy, that principle has been broken up into three phases. The first is the statement denying territorial or other aggrandizement, or territorial changes which are not in “accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned.” The other two are found in the third paragraph of the Atlantic Charter regarding the right of all peoples to change the form of government under which they live, and the restoration of self-government to those who have been forcibly deprived thereof. I must confess I can find no objection to these statements. They are spelled out more fully than in Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points in terms of principle, although not in terms of specific application.

On the other hand, these principles are probably the ones from which the great powers have deviated most in their attempts at the practical re-establishment of the peace and the reorganization of the world community. Since the signing of the Atlantic Charter, several territorial changes have in
fact taken place and several more are contemplated. Some of these give the impression of the old-time deal in international politics. They appear to be final. They will doubtless be sanctified by the peace treaties, but the fact remains that the United States, albeit perhaps against its desires, has apparently conceded to the Soviet Union the reacquisition of the Kurile Islands and northern Sakhalin, Port Arthur, Bessarabia, and that part of Poland east of approximately the Curzon line, and the acquisition for the first time of small territories in the Bukovina and that eastern tip of Czechoslovakia known as Ruthenia, or the Carpatho-Ukraine.

In the countries of eastern Europe the Soviet Union has been in the process of establishing what it calls a security zone. Our statements of policy here, however, have been clear. We have continuously pressed for free and unfettered elections from Poland to Bulgaria, and have protested in the infractions of that principle where they have occurred. This is an area in which we are not, in fact, in a position to impose either our will or judgment against that of the Soviet Union, nor is it an area in which we have any considerable bargaining power, since we did not discuss this part of Europe along with western Europe, or the Far East, in which our bargaining power is equal to, or better than, that of Russia. Walter Lippmann has made this point repeatedly, and he is quite accurate in his appraisal. We cannot argue on equal terms with the Russians in the Balkans and, in so far as we have let them isolate Balkan problems, we have tended to lose on Balkan issues. In the matter of these eastern European governments we are weak in our ability to implement our principles and Russia has carried her point in almost every case, but our position on those principles should not be in doubt in the mind of anyone. Our policy here has not been successful in application, but we have neither the force nor
the will to use the force necessary at the moment to impose our principles in eastern Europe.

In general, the only place into which the British since 1939 have moved and stayed is the former Italian-controlled territories of northeastern Africa. As Mr. Byrnes said in his speech of July 15, 1946, after his return from the Conference of Foreign Ministers at Paris, the United States advocated the restoration of Ethiopian independence and the establishment of a United Nations trusteeship over the former Italian colonies. However, Britain, Italy, and Russia all wanted all or part of this territory as a trusteeship. The subsequent peace conference was unable to resolve this question, postponing the final decision for a year from the signing of the Italian treaty, leaving the colonies meanwhile under British administration, and providing for a final decision by the United Nations Assembly in the event that the Conference of Foreign Ministers cannot come to an agreement. Here again the policy of the United States is both clear and sound, but we have been unable to gain the acquiescence of the other powers. There is fairly general agreement on the principle of trusteeship, however, and some solution along that line seems probable. The Italian draft treaty does accept our desire for the restoration of Ethiopian independence.

In demanding a trusteeship over a somewhat uncertain number of islands in the western Pacific, including those under the Japanese mandate and certain other unspecified Japanese islands, our own government has teetered precariously on the outside edge of this principle of non-annexation and non-colonization. There are three phases of this problem. In the first place, we have asked for a trusteeship. In the other cases of trusteeship the idea carries with it the principle of administration on behalf of the local inhabitants, the possibility of future independence, and free inspection
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by the proper agencies of the United Nations. But we have, secondly, precluded this freedom of observation and inspection by, in the same breath, designating our trusteeship as a strategic one. Now strategic trusteeships are something else again. In a strategic area inspections are not to be permitted, and the trusteeship, in terms of its original and general purposes, becomes something of a fiction.

In the third place, our attitude in this matter was somewhat softened—and obscured—by Mr. Dulles’ statement before a subcommittee of the United Nations Assembly Trusteeship Committee on last November 23. At that time he indicated that he felt the United Nations was not yet equipped to become a direct administrator of trusteeships, but that that did not mean the United States intended that the United Nations should play a minor role or become obscured by single-nation administrators. He added that trusteeship did not give sovereignty, that its objectives were peace, security, and the welfare of the inhabitants, and that if the United Nations demonstrated that its administration could best secure these ends it would be given increasing responsibility in the trusteeship system. As a result of the American view no trusteeship agreement for the Pacific islands was accepted when the other eight trusteeship agreements were approved by the United Nations Assembly on December 13 and the Trusteeship Council was set up the following day.

It is sincerely to be hoped that a trusteeship agreement for these islands may be worked out which will not do violence to the trusteeship principle and our advocacy thereof. Doubtless many disinterested states feel we are taking some liberties with the meanings of words when we refer to this area, so far from our mainland, as an American defense zone. Just what navy and air fleet are these bases to protect us from
anyway? And it is interesting that we apply to these islands the same concepts that the Russians apply to eastern Europe—strategy and security.

In spite of the fact that our foreign policy has been criticized most in terms of allowing our recent allies to take territories contrary to our principles, we have adhered to these principles nevertheless. We have not succeeded in securing their application by Russia in certain areas, but in a most critical spot, Trieste, a fairly satisfactory compromise settlement was worked out. Where the principles touch territory that we are interested in, unfortunately, we ourselves have not clearly and unequivocally applied our own principles. In so far as our desires are clear at all, they appear to run counter to our principles. It is certainly to be hoped that our ultimate handling of this problem will not contradict the principles we so stoutly profess.

The third major aspect of our foreign policy is economic. It has two objectives, namely, a wider access to the trade and raw materials of the world, and general economic collaboration among the various nations. Thus far, there has been no great progress along the line of freedom of access to the raw materials of the world. In the matter of international trade, however, two things may be said. In the first place, our government has stated that it does not intend to reverse the trend established by the reciprocal trade agreements program. Whether this trend may, in fact, be reversed under the pressure of the new Eightieth Congress is a matter which can be determined only in the future, but executive statements and action to the present moment indicate the past policy as a foundation for future international economic relations.

Amplifications of our objectives in this field are to be found in the State Department's Proposals for Expansion of World
Trade and Employment of November 1, 1945, and in addresses by Clair Wilcox, Director of the Office of International Trade Policy of the Department of State, and your own distinguished fellow-citizen, Mr. Clayton, Undersecretary for Economic Affairs, delivered respectively on last September 26 and November 13. These statements indicate that the major aspects of our trade policy involve, respectively, a general reduction of public and private restrictions, increase in volume, the carrying on of trade by private enterprise, the adherence to a multilateral rather than a bilateral approach to international trade, and a policy of non-discrimination. This policy was taken by the American representatives to the London meeting of the Preparatory Committee of the International Conference on Trade and Employment held in November of this last year, which agreed on most of a proposed international trade charter for an International Trade Organization. This meeting was reported by the New York Times on November 24, 1946, as one in which the American view on international trade was essentially accepted by the conference.

It appears that our general principles in the field of international trade and the efforts we have made to put these principles into practice are satisfactory within the limits covered. In this connection it is well for us to remember that the American market is one of the great American contributions to the international well-being of the world, not immediately on a wide-open basis, of course, but on a basis decidedly less restricted than in the high tariff days of the 1920's. In this connection it should be noted that probably the greatest single setback which the United States could give to world economic rehabilitation would be a reversal of the reciprocal trade agreements policy.

There remains the implementation of the principle of
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equal, or non-discriminatory, access to the raw materials of the world. Since we have practically never denied access to our raw materials for political purposes, and since our constitution prohibits export taxes which might lend themselves to discriminatory access to our raw materials, and since our economy demands an infinite variety of raw materials from all corners of the world, it may fairly be expected that our government will be in the vanguard of the procession in trying to make the raw materials of the world more freely accessible to all.

Incidental to international trade is the matter of international fiscal dealings, and it is quite evident that free access to raw materials and a policy of freer trade may be seriously impeded in the future, as they have been, in fact, in the past, by currency difficulties and by lack of adequate capital in many countries of the world, ready for and needing economic development. Mr. Truman told the Assembly of the United Nations when it convened in New York on October 23 that the United States has been solidly behind every measure sponsored by the United Nations to increase the world's economic well-being. We have loaned more money than any other country by direct loans, and we have long participated in the International Labor Organization, and, more recently, we have been instrumental in the establishment of the Bretton Woods Fund and Bank.

We should approach every one of these measures in a spirit of hardheaded business and statesmanship. Our share of capital and our voting responsibility in the Fund and Bank are almost thirty per cent in each case, and we certainly have a major interest in seeing that these two organizations function as they should. There is no reason, however, why international loans cannot be made and the Fund and Bank cannot be administered in a businesslike way without any
of the usual political aspersions that the United States is acting like either Santa Claus or Shylock. An intelligent loan, made either directly by the United States or through the international bank, should not be throwing money down the drain, on the one hand, and should be, on the other, if wisely made, a stimulus to the business of both the lender and the borrower. We have advanced to the role of the world’s banker, in part unconsciously. It would seem that the proper discharge of that role would involve all of the considerations which an intelligent banker should take into account. The decision regarding the time when, and the states to whom, loans should be made is not a philanthropic function, although among equally good risks I trust it has never been impossible, if one’s funds are not unlimited, perhaps to take one’s friends into consideration on something of a priority basis. Thus if a loan in the near future to Italy will help both its economic rehabilitation and its political stabilization, that is a double reason for extending the loan. As a general principle, our economic policy appears solid and, while we should be conscious that great power in this field, as well as in others, carries with it peculiar responsibilities, our government appears to be conscious of its responsibilities and actively seeking for proper methods for discharging them.

The fourth general principle of our foreign policy is that of the reduction of armaments. This is an extremely difficult and thorny problem, becoming, in fact, more difficult each day with the additional refinements which science gives to the art of war. In the first place, it should be indicated that the great nations of the world have already very materially disarmed in the process of demobilization. Our armed forces have been reduced about ninety per cent from the wartime peak. So have those of Great Britain. The Russian forces have been reduced by a smaller proportion, but the reduction
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has been a very considerable majority, nevertheless. For practical purposes the Germans and Japanese need not be taken into account at present. Italy is to be allowed something over 100,000 men by her peace treaty. In other words, the losers have been disarmed and demilitarized, and demobilized, and the states that presumably were the winners in the late war are in the process of cutting their armed forces down to the size they individually think they ought to be. The problem in the near future is the extent to which the armies and armaments, particularly of the super-powers, can be further reduced by international agreement.

If we may judge by past experience, naval disarmament is a less thorny problem than land disarmament. The naval powers are few in number and they have a comparable unit of measurement in tonnages, whether global or in categories. The general limitation of land armaments has hitherto defied solution. Units of the armed forces vary widely in fighting strength according to their equipment and organization. In the cases of the defeated states in the two recent wars, however, agreements were reached based on the total number of men permitted and the total allowed number of certain kinds of equipment, as, for example, planes. Some such point of departure may serve as a useful base from which to evolve the larger aspect of general arms reduction.

The recent discussions of the problem, however, have indicated how much more complicated it is than just the mere matter of men. The Russians have been persistent over many months in an effort to insert into the question a census of allied troops in non-enemy states. In late October we finally agreed, adding that the census should include all troops and a method of inspection thereof. The Russians soon agreed to enlarging the census thus, though they felt the number of troops in non-enemy states should be published
first, but they added that the census should include all equipment such as jet projectiles and atomic bombs. In time they accepted the principle of inspection, though at first they wanted that subjected to the old familiar veto.

Finally, the last week of the recent meeting of the United Nations Assembly, that body at last came to grips with the question. The degree of progress is in part indicated by the fact that disarmament had not even been on the original agenda of the meeting, but crept in as a result of the discussions just noted. The Assembly passed a resolution recommending prompt action in this field by the Security Council and the Atomic Energy Commission, and providing for a special session of the Assembly for the consideration of this question. The resolution further recommended an inspection system, a special disarmament organization, early placing of armed forces at the disposal of the Security Council, progressive withdrawal of occupation troops, immediate withdrawal of troops where located in other member states without the latter's consent, and finally the general reduction of all armed forces.

The epitome of the disarmament question is the atomic bomb. In this matter the American suggestion of June 14, 1946, for the most part appears not only sound but, considering that it comes from a nation that has bombs at its disposal, is as broadminded as any other powers have a right to expect. That proposal is for an international atomic energy authority with investigating power and with appropriate sanctions, which should have the exclusive right to own, control, or license the appropriate raw materials throughout the world and the processing plants for putting these raw materials into a form from which atomic energy may be made available. The Russians countered with a proposal merely to outlaw the use of atomic bombs. The two proposals were placed before
the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, which, as
has been noted, has been called upon by the Assembly to
fulfill its function as soon as possible.

After several months of discussion the American proposals
were in general those adopted in the first report of the Com-
mission last December 30. The chief argument at the end of
the meeting was between Mr. Baruch's demand that the
veto not apply in enforcement cases, and Mr. Gromyko's
claim that such a statement in fact amended the veto pro-
visions of the Charter. This matter will be referred to again
in a moment. Here we may merely note that Mr. Baruch won
his point in the Commission but that Mr. Gromyko can
probably win his later in the Security Council. The "either-
or" way in which Mr. Baruch put the issue apparently pre-
cludes a compromise, but a settlement of a kind may, never-
theless, prove possible. This is our most important specific
international question. We have come a considerable distance
in a few short months. A solution is imperative for the con-
tinuance of our civilization, and with the good will shown in
the last few weeks it is, in spite of very real difficulties, a
distinct possibility.

The final major principle of our foreign policy is that of a
just and lasting peace. Here, one of the first things that comes
to mind, of course, is the matter of the peace treaties which
have been negotiated and which are to come. As mentioned
in the first lecture, there is probably no such thing as a good
peace treaty. Boundary rectifications leave old political sores.
Reparations are a continuing source of national irritation.
So far, however, the peace treaties do not seem to have done
violence, as a general rule, to the principles of peace and jus-
tice. Considering the fact that the countries concerning
which, in the past months, we have negotiated peace treaties
were, less than two short years ago, actively joined with
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Germany against us in the greatest war in the history of man, and were states upon which the damaged victors certainly have some just demands, the peace treaties are probably as fair as they could have been. As Mr. Byrnes said on October 18 last in his report on the Paris Peace Conference, they are not the documents which we would have written, if we had had a free hand, nor are they the documents which other states would have written, if they had had a free hand, but as a result of the collective claims and charges against these satellite states, the peace treaties “are as good as we can hope to get by general agreement now or within any reasonable length of time.”

The second problem of the future peace is that of the defeated former great powers, with which peace treaties have not yet been concluded, Germany and Japan. We have repeatedly stated, particularly at Yalta and Potsdam, in the White House statement on Japan of September 6, 1945, and in Mr. Byrnes’ speech at Stuttgart September 6, 1946, that we are not interested in vengeance and that we have no desire to punish the whole German or Japanese people. Our interest is in the return of a peace-loving and self-sustaining Germany and Japan to a position of equality in the community of nations, but also in seeing that those states must be thoroughly demilitarized and thoroughly de-Nazified, including the punishment of their leaders, for a considerable period of time before such acceptance into the international community may become a possibility. The methods in pursuing these goals have not been equally acceptable to us and to our allies. General MacArthur’s apparently successful administration of Japan has two obvious advantages. It succeeded a functioning Japanese government and it is an undivided administration. The divided administration in Korea indicates the disadvantages that would have occurred in Japan had it
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been divided in the way Germany has been, but it was not possible for the United States or Great Britain to achieve a sole occupation of Germany, nor was it felt to the advantage of world peace to give the sole occupation of Germany to the Soviet Union. The control of Germany by zones, added to the utter chaos and political vacuum after VE Day, has made Germany an infinitely more difficult problem in terms of day-to-day administration than Japan. It probably will prove more difficult also in the long run, although it should be borne in mind that those who know Japan best are a little skeptical that the democratic osmosis which appears to be taking place is, in fact, giving that body politic a permanent complexion of democracy at the rate which appears to be the case.

It is an axiom of military men that there is no good military occupation. Occupations merely vary in degrees of badness. In Germany and Japan we are suffering from the headaches inherent in military occupation. Demilitarization is perhaps the simplest problem, and has been certainly taking place. De-Nazification is much more complicated, and can take place only slowly and over a generation, if at all. One is never entirely independent of the ideas inculcated over a period of ten of fifteen years in one’s youth, and we shall have to wait a long time, even if there is no further Nazi indoctrination going on, until the inhabitants of Germany, in the vast majority, no longer subscribe to those beliefs. The re-establishment of a viable economic base in both countries, which can be set up without heavy armament industries, particularly in Germany, is a serious problem on which we have been unable to establish detailed procedures acceptable to our allies; but the recent economic merger of our zone with that of the British, and recent references by the Russians of a return to the Potsdam agreement, at the moment give a
more favorable picture than at almost any time during the last year.

On the constructive side, apart from the peace treaties, we have the new United Nations Organization. Here again, from the very first the United States has advocated, and been instrumental in establishing, the new program. It is not as strong as the firmest advocates of international cooperation would have desired. It is certainly not an international government. Those who pride themselves on being practical men say that it is as strong an organization as the people of the world are now prepared for, and this is probably the case. It remains for us to utilize it to the best of our abilities, to back it in its operation, as opposed to instruments of national policy, without fail and with the greatest of energy. It is not strong enough, at present, for many conceivable international crises that may develop, but in criticizing it we should be clear in our own minds about how to get from the place where we are to the place where we want to be. At the moment, it is the United Nations, or nothing. There is little indication that the great nations of the world are willing to junk the United Nations, hold a great new international constitutional convention, and build a stronger organization. It seems that the wiser course is to strengthen the present organization as much as possible, and look forward to amending it at every early opportunity in terms of giving it greater strength and greater responsibility, as soon as the collective wisdom of the international community seems to warrant.

In this respect, there has been a great deal of discussion in recent months of the so-called veto. I do not like the veto. Any expert could have written a better charter without the veto, but no great power would have accepted it. President Roosevelt stated on March 1, 1945, in his address to Congress on the Crimea Conference that the veto was an American
proposal for resolving the question of voting in the Security Council, and that it was unanimously accepted by the other great powers as the solution to an otherwise insoluble question. The fact that the Russians have overworked it is deplorable, but we aren't done with the veto yet, and I think it may safely be predicted that before we have given it up, we shall have been very glad to use it a time or two ourselves. We commonly feel that the Russians have used it capriciously. It is doubtful if that is really the case. It is more probable, as Mr. Byrnes said of the powers at the peace conference at Paris, that they are voting their convictions. We don't have to be parliamentary experts to realize that the line between substantive matters and procedural matters is not a hard and fast line, and we are all aware of the way in which legislative goals may sometimes be blocked by procedural means.

The essential thing to remember about the veto is that it is a formal recognition of the power and responsibility of the great powers in the maintenance of peace. It requires that every effort be put forth to achieve unanimity of the great powers, for peace may only be maintained thereby. Enforcement of any decision against the will of a great power means war, which, presumably, it is the primary object of the United Nations to avoid. A great power bent on aggression will be far more interested in allies and a chance to win than in a technical veto on law-enforcement measures voted at a session at which it probably would not even be represented. That is why, at the last sessions of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission meeting the last of December, Mr. Baruch's insistence, opposed by Russia and Poland, and not at all concurred in by the British, French, and Canadian representatives, specifically to exclude the veto in the punishment provisions of the Commission's report was somewhat
beside the point. If a great power illegally makes atomic bombs after the controls are agreed to, it will not be a prank; it will mean war. The veto, insisted upon in general most strongly by the United States and the Soviet Union, implies in this case that it is better to preclude such illegal manufacture by persuasion and agreement than to launch a reciprocal bomb attack under the guise of enforcing the peace.

We are now members of the International Court. Here is a method for the settlement of justiciable disputes which in its early form, the World Court, proved to be a very helpful international agency. I am glad to say that we have accepted what is referred to as the "optional clause," the compulsory jurisdiction in the four stated categories of legal disputes. I regret more than I can say that we have arrogated to ourselves, rather than leaving to the Court, the determination of what is a domestic question, it being thoroughly understood, of course, that domestic questions do not come under the jurisdiction of the Court. There were other reservations to the optional clause of the old World Court, but they were merely time limits, or reservations regarding reciprocity by the other party in a case. Unfortunately, this American limitation is of a more substantial nature, cutting into the normal jurisdiction of the Court itself. I should like to think that we can look forward to the day when we shall remove this reservation from our adherence to the optional clause of the Statute of the Court, which was asked by no other nation, and not recommended by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee itself.

In addition to the general applications of our principles in regard to peace, there are three geographical areas in which we have instituted special applications of these principles. One such area is Latin America, where in recent years we
have been following the Good Neighbor Policy, which, in general, has made the Monroe Doctrine an inter-American policy. This policy has had its shortcomings and its tribulations, as witness, perennially, Argentina; but it seems to have been fairly satisfactory in view of world conditions in the last decade, and it seems unlikely that any decided reversal may be expected.

In the Near East Mr. Loy Henderson, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs of the State Department, last September 19 characterized our general policy as the prevention of rivalries and conflicts in the area developing into open hostilities. Our government feels that this can best be done by promoting the political and economic advancement of the local peoples and supporting there the principles of the United Nations. Specifically, we are supporting the political independence of the local countries, and are prepared to assist in the cultural, economic, or technical life there. In the economic field we insist on non-discrimination, and are promoting commercial relations and communications facilities with the area. One can hardly object to this policy, though its success is obviously limited by the future of the sterling bloc and the continuing conflict of the two nationalisms in Palestine.

Our policy in the Far East was outlined particularly in two statements by President Truman on December 15, 1945, and on December 18, 1946. Our hope is for a strong, united, and democratic China. Who can disagree with this? Certainly not Great Britain and Russia, who specifically agreed on December 27, 1945. The trouble is, and this has been specifically recognized by our government, this objective can be obtained primarily only by the efforts of the Chinese themselves. We have felt our best methods to assist in the attainment of this objective were in continued recognition of the National
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Government, assistance in repatriation of Japanese troops, and offers of economic assistance. We have apparently dangled one-half billion dollars (earmarked by the Export-Import Bank) in front of Chiang Kai-shek as an added inducement for national unity, but for the last nine months or so he seems to have desired unity by victory over the communists more than unity by compromise with them. Our army sale of surplus goods apparently fortified his resistance to our inducements, but the new constitution and reactions thereto recently appear to indicate he is again not so far from the agreements of last winter.

These are the leading aspects of our pursuit of a just and lasting peace. In the process there are many difficulties. Very often there seems to be a conflict between peace and justice. Unfortunately we have not yet advanced to the stage where international justice can be defined in every case by tribunals and international bodies entirely apart from the parties to the dispute. The result is that in many solutions of the world’s ills the word “justice” is used with a national accent. If the same problems, however, were answered in the opposite fashion, as other nations might wish, that would not necessarily provide justice either, but merely a different national accent. I think we should be prepared to understand that at the moment there is no such thing as “justice” for every person in Bessarabia, for example, whether it is in the hands of Russia or Rumania. We must remember that where there is an ethnic justice, great political or economic injustice may prevail.

There is one other detail of our foreign policy which I should like to commend. That is the fairly recent establishment of a division of cultural relations in our Department of State, an attempt to meet a basic problem, the growth in international understanding among the peoples of the world.
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I think we Americans should be clear that the expenditure of ten million dollars in this regard will be of greater importance than any given ten million dollars spent in national defense. Distinguished visitors are moving from country to country under this sponsorship, and more such visits should take place. The exchange of students is another aspect. Recent newspapers indicated that some thirty-six students of selected Eastern universities are spending what they call the junior year abroad. That is not enough. We should seriously consider sending at least ten per cent of all of the juniors in all our colleges for a junior year abroad. This may sound fantastic. It would cost perhaps one thousand or fifteen hundred dollars per student. There would be perhaps 40,000 or 50,000 eligible students under such a program annually. It probably would cost you more to keep that number of young men in the army and navy for a year, and I thoroughly believe the cause of international peace would be strengthened more by sending them abroad for international study.

We may summarize the outstanding issues of our foreign policy by suggesting that essentially the policy is right in principle. There can be hardly any disagreement in terms of our broad, general objectives. The disagreements arise in the application of these objectives to specific cases and in the methods used in these applications.

In terms of what has been referred to as self-determination, namely the right of peoples to choose their own forms of government, we are quite aware that political immaturity in many areas poses a specific obstacle. On the other hand, there are various areas in which the United States apparently has made exceptions to this principle in favor of the Soviet Union. Most of these areas, it is true, belonged to Russia at a former time, and in the Far East and in parts of Europe
we are agreeing to the reassumption of Russian rights of Tsarist days. The Far Eastern settlement came as a result of bargaining at Yalta, at which time our successes against Japan and the production of the atomic bomb presumably were not predicted and hence the need, and consequently the price, of real Russian assistance in the Far East loomed large.

In the so-called security zone of eastern Europe the Russian concept of democracy has prevailed over ours. This is due to two circumstances, first that these countries are located within a Russian sphere of influence and outside that of Great Britain and the United States, and second, since the treaties regarding this area were negotiated separately from the broader considerations of Germany and Japan, our bargaining power, compared to that of Russia, was obviously insufficient to obtain a result more in line with our desires.

In the one area in which we desire to acquire territory, our own application of principle varies rather considerably from the concept of trusteeship carried out in the agreements which have been set up for trusteeships. In general we may say that the applications of the principle of self-determination have been contrary to the principle in a number of cases, although it is true that the apparent conflict is mitigated to some extent by former historic connections, by ethnic groupings, and by a relation to peace, if one may view American strategic considerations as related to the peace of the world in general. In certain areas, on the other hand, we have obtained concessions even more favorable to our view, namely in Trieste, and perhaps the continued status quo in Iran and Turkey may be included in this category.

In the economic field in general our principles are sound and our applications satisfactory. The chief comment here is a reminder of the danger of a reversal of this policy in what may be a normal postwar reaction in this country toward
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withdrawing somewhat from world affairs, and the danger that the new Congress will make an internal political issue out of international economic relations, particularly the reciprocal trade agreements program. We can only hope that since the so-called good old days of 1929 this country has become convinced of the reality, which may be expressed by a paraphrase on the Biblical adage, that whatsoever a nation selleth, that must it also buy. This is not true qualitatively, of course, but it is true quantitatively, especially for creditor nations.

We have hardly made a dent in the problem of disarmament, but the slight beginning that has been made appears to point in the right direction. This will be a long, slow, involved, and irritating process. In the long run the handling of the atomic bomb may be more important than the place where any given boundary line is established. At the same time, we must remember, as Frederick L. Schuman has so cogently pointed out, armaments do not cause wars; wars cause armaments. Disarmament, then, must proceed hand in hand with the larger aspects of international peace.

In this last respect, the pursuit of peace, we are in the midst of short-run steps. The peace treaties negotiated so far are fairly satisfactory. We can only hope, and I think we may expect, that the remaining treaties will be about as satisfactory. Their negotiation will be difficult, doubtless, but with the spirit of agreement that has characterized the first treaties, in spite of very real differences of opinion and disagreements to begin with, the job can be done.

In the long run we must strengthen the international organization and assist it in performing its functions. It does not have a satisfactory foundation, however. Really lasting peace cannot dependably be based upon the assumption of sovereign states. The fact is, of course, that only the great
powers are at all sovereign in the old sense under the United Nations Charter and even they are not as sovereign as they used to be. We need, however, in the long, long run to revamp our international organization in favor of a kind of world federalism. We cannot say that this would be absolutely fool-proof. Most governments today are not, but the whole development of man’s successful political organization casts a doubt upon the presumption that sovereignty means anything but anarchy. History gives us no clue to the relation of sovereign states except a picture of recurring wars.

I should like to underline these conclusions because the hope for really lasting peace depends more than anything else on whether the American people can learn in time to understand the principles, conditioning factors, and current relations in the field of world politics, the unreality of sovereignty in the traditional sense, and the imperative necessity for great power agreement. This, and not any given treaty, is the really urgent matter of our time. As a teacher I am quite conscious of the general human resistance to learning, but I could not continue to be a teacher if I did not believe that the human mind is not absolutely impervious to new ideas.

As a practical matter, whether the problems are boundaries or economics, whether they are short-run or long-run, we keep recurring to the question of American-Russian relations. Whether in peace treaties, organizations, or atomic bombs, American-Russian agreement means peace; American-Russian conflict means the possibility of war. On the basis of the analysis presented in the previous lecture, and particularly in the absence of serious conflicts in spheres of influence or other vital territorial or other tangible interests, the evidence at present seems to indicate a better than even chance to avoid another major conflict, though, admittedly, a postwar era often gives little indication of a possible next prewar align-
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ment. There has been a sufficient spirit of conciliation and forbearance in evidence the past year to get us over some pretty high hurdles of difference of opinion and plain speaking, though we are beginning to realize that peace is like a century plant and we shall probably grow a lot more thorns before we get a blossom. Nobody got so mad at any of the 1946 conferences that he went home, though it looked conceivable a time or two. It is possible for us to be firm without becoming obnoxiously tough. It is possible to say no without impugning the motives of the Russians although they may call ours into question. Both sides have given in some, but that is the essence of agreement. This mutual conciliation is imperative, and if we can keep it up we may avoid the horror of World War III. There is just a chance, but it is our only chance.

It is clear that a peculiar responsibility rests upon all of us as American citizens. At the present moment it is only in the United States and a few other countries that the rank and file of the population can make known their desires to their governments in terms of international affairs. In only a few countries of the world does any such power rest among the citizens, but such power, like other political power, carries with it responsibility, the responsibility for intelligent participation and voting and action in the field of foreign affairs. This is not somebody else's job. It is not sufficient to let George do it. If we are to have any assurance that Houston and Cleveland, and New York and Chicago, and Pittsburgh and other centers of population and industry are not to become another Hiroshima and a Nagasaki, we must make the foreign policy of the United States one of our primary concerns, and be sure that our elected leadership in Washington carries out the most intelligent foreign policy that this great democracy can possibly formulate.