In any consideration of the relationships of the great powers, either for good or evil, certain elementary factors have to be taken into consideration. Among the first is the disparity of power between the various members of the so-called family of nations. The term "power" here is used merely in the general sense of the strength which enables a state to carry out its will, even if opposed by other states.

Within any given state the individuals that compose the political community also vary considerably in political influence, in economic wealth, and in social prestige. In these respects the span of variation between individuals at the extreme ends of the social spectrum may be about as wide as that between the power of great states and that of small states. The chief difference, however, is that in most communities of individuals the power and influence of any one person is usually a very small fraction of the power wielded by all of the individuals that compose the community, and usually is very small in proportion to the power wielded by those individuals collectively organized into the political entity called the state.

In the international community, however, the number of individual units is so much smaller than it is within any given state that we find not only a tremendous disparity of power between the greatest states and the smallest, but also that the power possessed by the greatest states is a very large proportion of the total power of all the individuals in
the international community. Moreover, the total power wielded by two or three of the greatest states is greater than all of the power wielded by the rest of the members of the international community. Finally, since in a world of sovereign states the individual nations are reluctant to turn over any great amount of power to an international organization, we find that the power wielded by the individual great states of the world is infinitely greater, in terms of ability to compel compliance and in the use of force, than that of any international organization heretofore established. In every other political organization, civilized or uncivilized, an early effort has been made to place more power in the hands of the government than in the hands of any given member of the state.

This fundamental problem of what is called the monopoly of coercion, when extended to the level of world politics, poses one of the most serious challenges in the current international scene.

It has long been customary to admit the existence of the disparity of power among states and to refer to a small select few, which are the strongest in the international community, as the great powers. This is not a twentieth-century term or a new concept. The distinction between the states of great power and the states of lesser power is one that grows from a factual situation and is so well recognized that the terminology and concepts have long been part of our political thinking.

It should be added also that, contrary to what we have been told by many writers in recent years, there is no particular virtue inherent in a state because it is small. The moral distinction that many have attempted to draw between the great powers which are wicked per se and the small powers which are all sweetness and light is not a distinction which has resulted from an observation of the facts of inter-
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national life. The British dominions, the Scandinavian countries, and the small neighboring states of western Europe are usually cited as examples of virtue inherent in states because they are small. On the other hand, we do not have such examples among the states of southeastern Europe, and our Latin American neighbors have varied greatly in their political virtues. In fact, it appears that it is sometimes possible for a small state, because of relative obscurity, to get away with things which in a big state would be much more likely to come under the scrutiny of the international press.

Now, it must generally be conceded that the matter of world peace is a matter of good relations between the great powers. Any conflict between the great powers which is allowed to proceed unchecked, to fester, grow, and draw in a larger and larger area of dispute will lead to a world war. That is not to say that great wars may not start as small wars, and it is quite true that major conflict may spring from such small power trouble areas as the Balkans, the so-called cockpit of Europe. If the conflict is confined to the small states, however, and there is no essential conflict between the great powers, general peace may be preserved, as it was to a considerable degree in the Balkans in the nineteenth century by the functioning of what we call the Concert of Europe.

Not merely does the peace of the world depend largely, however, on the equilibrium and lack of conflict between the great powers. It has often been observed that the equilibrium between the great powers becomes more and more sensitive with the decrease in the number of powers.

Prior to 1914 there were eight great powers of somewhat comparable strength. After 1919 Austria-Hungary disappeared. Of the remaining seven, the United States had grown greatly in relative strength, but it and Japan were both disinclined to play any great part in the area where world
politics had long been most competitive, that is, in Europe. But of the European great powers, neither Germany nor Russia was at that time in a position to fulfill the role of a great power. What had long been considered as the traditional responsibilities of the great powers thus fell upon a weak Italy, a weakened France, and Great Britain, which in fact were aided by a number of minor powers, some of which had been formed as a result of World War I.

Today the great powers have been further reduced in number. Italy, Germany, and Japan cannot be considered great powers at present. China, in some respects potentially the greatest power in the world for some future century, has as yet progressed so slowly technologically in proportion to its demographic and territorial strength that it cannot be considered on a par with the other great powers. France, due to the effects of the war, must also be considered a somewhat minor element among the great powers. There are, in fact, only three really great powers, and of these three Great Britain admittedly is considerably weaker in many of the elements of power than the United States and the Soviet Union. We must frankly face the perhaps unpleasant fact that for the first time in the modern era a vast majority of the elements of power possessed by all of the states of the world in fact lies within the control of only two members of the community of nations. These power relationships of the world have led William Fox, of the Yale Institute of International Studies, to refer to the situation as essentially bipolar, and to give the name super-powers to these greatest of the great powers.

Now, if the power situation of the world, as has been observed, becomes noticeably more sensitive when the number of great powers is reduced, it is clear that power relationships at present are infinitely more sensitive than before,
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with the predominance of the power of the world centering about only two separate entities. In a multipolar power relation one state may lose power to several states or to another single state without greatly affecting the comparative power relationships of the whole number of the great powers. But in a bipolar power situation it is evident that almost any change in power relationships in the world may accrue directly or indirectly to one or the other of these two super-powers and hence disturb the existing equilibrium between them.

In such a world it must be acknowledged that the birth of the United Nations comes at a most inauspicious time. On the other hand, it is quite clear that the success of the United Nations will depend primarily upon the good relations of the United States and the Soviet Union. Political scientists are in the habit of saying that power and responsibility should rest in the same place, usually meaning that sufficient power should be allocated to provide for existing responsibilities. This principle may work in reverse, however, and it should be clear to all that the United States and the Soviet Union have the power to make the United Nations function effectively, and should understand the resulting responsibilities which flow from the factual existence of that power.

The existence of the concentration of power in the great powers lies at the foundation of the establishment of what we have come to call in recent days the veto. Now the veto, with all its shortcomings, is an improvement over past practice, because one of the former assumptions regarding the sovereign equality of states was that a state could be bound only by its own consent, that is, that every state could veto any new international rule from having binding effect upon it. It must be admitted, of course, that we had maneuvered around this requirement extra-legally in certain cases, as, for example, in the systems of weighted voting in various inter-
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national administrative unions such as the Universal Postal Union, and in the actions of a limited number of nations, chiefly the great powers, in undertaking to regulate international waterways, partition Africa, or constitute new Balkan states. In the case of the small countries, frankly, their acquiescence sooner or later was forthcoming, or their consent was implied. But the general rule was the rule of unanimity, and in the League of Nations substantive matters could be vetoed in either the Council or the Assembly by any member, no matter how small.

Viewing the past, therefore, the so-called veto of the United Nations is an obvious improvement. No one state can block recommendations in the Assembly or the subsidiary organizations. Even in the Security Council, improvement in international affairs or the settlement of international disputes can no longer be prevented by a single state—if it is small. In an unhappy but practical recognition of the fact that the great powers must enforce the provisions of the Charter, however, the great powers have retained the historic right, once conceded to all, to block international action. This is not democracy as we know it. It is not, broadly speaking, fair and just. It certainly is not world government. It is merely a recognition of one of the present-day factors of international relations which many hope may be changed within our lifetime, but which, as of 1947, still persists. The veto, however, merely emphasizes the point that was first made. Unanimity among the great powers, and particularly among the super-powers, gives the United Nations a chance to perform its functions and work out its destiny. Vital conflict between the great powers reduces the United Nations to a nonentity and returns a sad and sickened world to the stark realities of the historical application of power politics.

Now, it may further be observed that the current existence
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and predominance of the so-called Big Three and many of the disturbing elements of their mutual relations are results of the recent war. The disappearance of the Axis states from the list of great powers, the admission of China to the charmed circle, the weakened position of France, and the tremendous increments of absolute and relative strength acquired by the United States and the Soviet Union are a direct result of the military occurrences of the last eight years.

Moreover, the Big Three, as well as France and China, had a major objective in fighting the war, namely in not being overcome by the threat of Axis domination. Self-defense, up until very recent times, has always been looked upon as a respectable and sufficient war aim. It is only within our time that we have added to defensive measures the hopeful war aims stating that out of the conflict good should come for the minor peoples of the world and for the standard of international relations prevailing generally. In its crudest form we may suggest that the primary aim of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union was not to get licked, and by not being licked they meant more or less a retention of the status quo, not always strictly in accord with the published war aims.

Historically, victory has also carried with it the possibility of the improvement of the victor’s prewar situation, a possibility which has confronted the Big Three after this war. Generally speaking, all are reluctant to give up anything which they possessed when they were brought into the war, and particularly the Russians and ourselves have been reluctant to withdraw from certain advances made as a result of the military situation. The fact is that high moral aims for general world welfare were not exactly the basis on which the Big Three entered the war, but sprang up as the war progressed and grew out of the hopes of victory and the propa-
gandist value of convincing ourselves and possible allies throughout the world of the good faith of our intentions.

Considering the general reluctance, therefore, in view of the power situation among themselves, of each of the Big Three and particularly each of the Big Two to give up anything which it possessed when it entered the war, and even anything which it may have acquired during the progress of the war at the cost, we are often reminded, of blood and treasure, it is quite obvious that the relationship of the great powers is one which has inherent within it the major difficulties which must be met in the near future. The great powers are aware of the fact that they have been instrumental in setting up a new world organization which will facilitate more peaceful relations of nations in the future. They have not turned over to that organization the settlement of the recent war. They are in fact going forward slowly and somewhat blindly, groping with one hand, apparently the left hand, for new procedures, new methods, new international solutions for the current problems which beset them. At the same time it is apparent that they still are grasping firmly in their right hands the used, tried, and time-honored elements of the application of state power, and it is understandable that they will be reluctant to relinquish what they now have in their right hands for something which they are not yet sure they have grasped with their left hands.

Little time will be spent upon a discussion of Anglo-American relations. Generally speaking, we have no outstanding territorial questions which would appear to create major friction between us. Each has conceded a lifeline to the other. We have not agreed what shall be done to the Italian colonies, and the British want a solution which it appears the Americans would be reluctant to concede, namely that the colonies would become a part of the British Empire, at least
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on a trusteeship basis; but I think we can assume that that question will not create an international crisis.

Generally speaking, we have no great ideological conflicts. Since the Revolutionary War we have tended to agree on the principles of democracy. The British view of the British Empire varies considerably from ours, but we have gotten used to its existence even though we are somewhat ignorant of its virtues, and the British have, to a degree, learned to tolerate our rather acid criticism of it; but again it seems that this issue will hardly create a national cleavage between our countries.

In the economic realm we have given each other a pretty good run for the money in a very literal sense. There has been sharp economic competition, and the fact that it may take a slightly different form under a socialist regime does not seem to make it likely that that will reduce the British effort to remain our strongest competitor in the struggle for world trade. Then there was the sterling bloc, which irritated us considerably during and after the war, and the question of Empire preferences still bobs up. The fact, however, is that this economic competition, as we believe in a competitive system, has probably been good for both of us, and, although the British are not sure that it will continue to be good for them, it seems this question also should create little cause for real international conflict.

It is perhaps even more significant that psychologically the Americans and British seem totally unprepared to drift into a situation in which they would be on opposite sides of a real international conflict. There have been scattered suggestions that with the new socialist government in England, one should be prepared to see the British drift toward a pro-Russian view and away from such a close relationship to capitalistic America. There has been little evidence of a trend
in this direction since the socialist government came to power. It has long been understood that differences of opinion between communists and socialists have often enjoyed more vigor than those between the two of them on one side and capitalism on the other. Likewise, in the field of world politics there has been little indication that Bevin and Molotov, both considerably to the left of center, are necessarily very close to each other in their ideas of the relationship of Great Britain as a world power and the Soviet Union as a world power.

In the matter of Anglo-Russian relations, there seems some reason for conflict. Territorially, the British and Russians rub against each other in many parts of the world. Ideologically, they do not see eye to eye. But if the British have as a primary concern collaboration with the United States on questions of major international significance, then perhaps the relations of the Soviet Union and Great Britain may in part, at least, be resolved in the question of Soviet-American relations.

Now in the matter of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union there are two or three preliminary considerations, the first two of which are axioms. The first axiom is the existence of the Soviet Union, a federal state of almost 200,000,000 inhabitants. It would be absurd to mention the existence of this sizable body of people thus politically organized, were it not for the fact that from 1917 to 1933 the United States did, in fact, officially assume that they did not exist. Since their existence is a fact and there is little likelihood that they can all be transplanted to the moon or elsewhere by a wave of a wand, it behooves us to remember their numbers and power, and to consider them not as obnoxious upstarts, but as a very real and consistent force in most of Eurasia. The second axiom is that Russia is a dic-
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tatorship, a thoroughgoing, doublefisted dictatorship. It will not be of any help to try to ignore this fact, or explain it away. Our real question is not whether this exists, but whether democracy, as we have it in this country, can exist on the same planet with such a dictatorship.

The Russians, as will be mentioned presently, occasionally cloud the issue by referring to their dictatorship both as a dictatorship of the proletariat and as a democracy. To them those terms are synonymous. To us they are not. It may be conceded that Russia does, after a fashion, consult her people by the method of elections, and at the local governmental and party level. In the administration, however, of national policy there is no leeway for minority rights and little apparent influence by public opinion on the carrying out of public policy. We might thus describe the Russian form of government as primarily an administrative dictatorship, rather than a dictatorship of the proletariat. This is not to say that this dictatorship is identical with the one in Germany, Italy, or Japan. In international affairs the existence of a dictatorship is of less consequence than the degree of aggressiveness of its foreign policy.

Now, as opposed to this very real problem of the Russian dictatorship, we have the historical fact that throughout our history and that of Russia both of the countries have gotten along with each other rather better than with the other great powers. Each has been aligned against the other less often than against any other great power. This is not, as will be observed in a moment, because we are so far distant from each other and have had no clash of interests in our recent history. On the contrary, there was friction after the First World War, and very serious questions were, at an earlier time, raised over our relations with Russia along the northwestern shores of North America. It is a fact, however, that
there are between the two countries practically no old historic grudges which would lend themselves to an inflammation of the chauvinistic spirit at the expense of their good relations.

The final preliminary consideration is the necessity to develop, in so far as possible, an objective attitude in viewing Russian-American relations. The very mention of the Soviet Union upsets a considerable number of our fellow citizens. Recollections of the original Bolshevik revolution, of the purges which have been held, of the machinations of the Comintern, of the obnoxious activities of American communists, are sufficient in the minds of many people to place the Russians beyond the limits of possible coöperation and the assumptions of international good will. But the imperative necessity of the maintenance of good relations with Russia, if at all possible, as the most critical element in the problem of world peace, demands that we minimize our emotions and study the difficulty with as little visceral disturbance as possible and with as clear and balanced a view as we can possibly muster.

In the analysis of United States-Russian relations we should separate two problems that appear to be separable, but which are often confused, and the confusion of them adds to our disturbance. We shall look at Russia first on a non-ideological basis, to try to study Russian actions of the present and the recent past without any relation to communism, but rather as the actions of any great power. Subsequently, we shall add the ideological factor and see what appear to be the things that Russia is doing because she is communistic. To put it very plainly, when we look behind the door to see if a Russian threat is there, we ought to know in advance whether we expect to find a soldier of the Red Army in full equipment, or a communist propagandist and agitator. Dis-
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covering the latter instead of the former raises the question of certain very different methods of defense; and, if both a Russian soldier and a communist agitator are back there, we ought to know that too.

As has been noted, the question of world peace during our time is the question whether the United States can live peaceably with Russia as a great power. In any consideration of present difficulties between these two nations, territorial questions are perhaps the first that come to mind. Now, it is of considerable interest that we appear to have the least friction with the Russians where our two countries are in fact in the closest territorial proximity. It should be recalled that our territorial limits at the end of the Aleutian chain are only a few miles apart, but the fact is that since our purchase of Alaska from the Russians eighty years ago, there has been practically no international difficulty in spite of our close proximity in that area. There were certain doubts raised in the minds of some, it is true, when the Russians reacquired the Kurile Islands at the end of the recent war, but, all things considered, there has been an amazing lack of disagreement between the two powers in the area where North America most closely approaches northeastern Asia. This is not to say that friction may not develop there. The aviation experts have already called attention to the fact that in an age of air power this bridge between our two continents constitutes a natural focus for future international airways. At present, however, our relationships in this area have been exceptionally good.

In Manchuria, contrary to the predictions of a great number of observers prior to the Chinese-Russian treaty of 1945, the Russians have not in fact annexed the territory. In that area the Russians have partially withdrawn except from Dairen and Port Arthur, positions used by them prior to the
Russo-Japanese war. In one respect the Russians have withdrawn in Manchuria too rapidly for the general good, as the Chinese government has not been in a position to take over the territory as the Russians withdrew. The selective confiscation of machinery by the Russians, however, will prove a very real deterrent to the economic rehabilitation of the area.

In Iran a year ago the Russians apparently intervened in an internal political squabble in the province of Azerbaijan. This was in an area in which the United States does not have well-developed specific interests of any kind, although it was in a country in which the British have long been vitally interested. In Azerbaijan, a province in the northern part of Iran within the area conceded by Great Britain in 1907 to be a Russian sphere of influence, the Soviet policy apparently went beyond what is naturally understood as a sphere of influence and actively aided in the establishment of an autonomous provincial government more friendly to Russia. In recent weeks, however, the Iranian government has reasserted its control in Azerbaijan without any noticeable Russian interest in the matter. The British have had a similar sphere of influence in southern Iran, but, although there was an alleged threat that they would move their troops in from Iraq in a somewhat similar fashion this last summer, they have not actively intervened in the same way. Through less direct means of pressure, however, the British have from time to time exercised a very real influence in the affairs of this Middle Eastern country.

The pressure that the Soviet Union has exerted on Turkey, both in regard to the provinces of Kars and Ardahan and for control of the Straits, is nothing new. For centuries the Russians have looked upon the Dardanelles as their first choice for a warm-water outlet from their country. They
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have always been peculiarly sensitive to an unfriendly control at Constantinople, but their aspirations have been upset oftener by the conflicting views of the other great powers than by the defensive strength of Turkey itself. Since the First World War the Russians have not appeared willing to use force to obtain this outlet. Unless their policy has changed in this respect, one may anticipate any change in control of the Straits to be the result of international agreement, rather than unilateral Russian action, although Russia probably looks upon this area as the major gap in the security zone of friendly states she is building about herself.

The most irritating extension of Russian control over territory has probably been in the eastern part of continental Europe, particularly in the Balkans. In this area Russia has in general not extended her power to any part that she was not in control of when she was drawn into the war, except as a result of the military situation. From Poland to Bulgaria, and westward to beyond Berlin, Russian troops are now located only in areas into which they moved as they pushed the Nazis back all the way from Stalingrad. Moreover, it might be added, as Walter Lippmann opportunely reminded us in a column of October 19 of this last year, we were more than pleased in 1943 and 1944 and 1945 to have the four hundred Russian divisions move westward through and beyond Russian territory. You may remember that we, as well as the Russians, were assailed by fears that our ally might make a separate peace with Germany, and we must give a full share of credit in the victory over the Nazis to the tremendous Russian manpower that was poured unstintingly into the eastern front and, in the nature of events, remained in occupation in Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, eastern Austria, and eastern Germany, and achieved an understandable influence in Poland, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia.
As pointed out in the previous lecture, this situation is not unique. American and British troops, also now scattered all over the world, are almost without exception in the areas into which they were drawn by the movement of the war. All three powers have withdrawn their forces to a very considerable degree, but the military need and the subsequent military occupation were the basic reasons for the Russian troops being located in countries in which we are irritated to find them. There are certain differences, however. It is abundantly clear that a major American interest is to get our soldiers home. The Russians have scarcely indicated a similar interest. Both countries desire to nourish political institutions like their own in the countries they occupy. In the Russian case the word "nourish" is perhaps not strong enough. Our task is easier and looks better, because in western Europe we are restoring former democratic regimes. Russia naturally refuses to restore the more or less fascist governments found before the war in most of eastern Europe, and is replacing those with Russian-sponsored communist regimes.

Another item of importance in the Russian predominance in eastern Europe is that this area is what has been referred to as a natural Russian sphere of influence. A word might be said to clarify this point, on which there is unfortunately too much ambiguity. There are two kinds of spheres of influence. One is the conscious political deal worked out between two great powers for the economic exploitation of a backward state, in which one power dominates in one part and the other power dominates in the other part, each achieving an economic monopoly in its own area, although the joint arrangement assumes the somewhat fictional continued political independence of the backward state itself. Probably the best-known example of this kind of an arrangement was
the Anglo-Russian agreement thus to divide Persia into Russian and British spheres in 1907.

There is, on the other hand, another kind of sphere of influence, which means just what the words imply, namely a zone lying about the great powers in which their influence predominates over that of other great powers more distantly located. This is as natural as the shade from a great tree, and the fact is that those living across a political fence may be brought periodically into the shade as the shadow moves about during the day. That the shade may in some cases be beneficent and in some cases quite uncomfortable does not invalidate the reality of the shadow. The truth is that there is a very persistent tendency for small states adjoining great powers to have to take into consideration the will of those great powers in the determination by the small states of their own foreign policy. Frankly, the Latin American states thus take into consideration our attitude toward the things they do. Similarly, the countries along the British life line have never been and cannot be oblivious to British desires in the countries adjoining that life line.

In the same way, eastern Europe is within the natural shadow of the Soviet Union. Doubtless, there are many inhabitants that find this shadow a cold and cheerless place in which to live. On the other hand, it is not at all clear that the heat of American and British political oratory can at all mitigate their discomfort. It would appear that it was this second kind of sphere of influence, rather than the first kind, that Mr. Wallace had in mind in his famous speech of last September. In this sense it is not inaccurate to admit the existence of predominant Russian influence in eastern Europe as one of the facts of international life. It is also evident that this influence now extends farther west than ever before as a result of the central European power vacuum described in the preceding lecture.
Russia's postwar technique in the countries to the west of her has not been so much one of annexation as of the consolidation of what she calls a security zone based upon a group of friendly governments. It is in part, although not in detail, a kind of Monroe Doctrine into which she is determined that the western political systems shall not be extended to the detriment of her own security. It may be that the security which she thus gains is entirely ephemeral. If she looks upon the establishment of this zone, however, as a security measure, any statement by us that that is not the case will be of no effect. On the other hand, it is entirely likely that any efforts we might make to force democracy, under our definition, into these areas will merely reinforce the Russian determination to keep the adjacent governments free from western control or influence.

This other word might be added about the eastern European area. We are still too close to the war to say that the present picture is a final one. As a matter of fact, Russian control already varies considerably in the different countries in eastern Europe, with a surprising degree of permeability in the so-called "iron curtain" in the case of Czechoslovakia. It should be pointed out also that the Balkan nations have been notoriously hard to govern from the outside and, furthermore, the Russian need for manpower at home makes likely a further reduction of Russian military power in the countries concerned. It would appear, therefore, that the situation in this area is still in a state of postwar flux and we cannot be at all sure that the lines of control which have existed heretofore will continue uninterruptedly over a long postwar period.

On the other hand, it must further be stated clearly that, in spite of the Russians' being partly drawn in by the military situation and the power vacuum in the area, they have clearly
Infringed what we conceive to be the spirit and the letter of the various agreements for the postwar plans for the Balkans. They have not noticeably been swayed by us in their ideas regarding the governments to be set up in eastern Europe and the degree of control which Russia shall extend over them. In fact, it appears that the Soviet Union's chief gain in this war has been the formation in these adjacent states of governments which the Russians hope will serve as reliable buffers against the capitalistic west. On the other hand, it must be noted, the Russian voice is less strong than ours in western Germany and particularly in Japanese territories, though in those areas we feel we are adhering to our agreements.

One might summarize the things which the Russians are doing to irritate us, to cause suspicion and fear on our part, in terms of their high degree of secrecy and seizure of machinery in their zones of military occupation from Manchuria and Korea to west of Berlin, in terms of their obvious interference in Iran, of their repeated pressure on Turkey, particularly regarding the Straits, of their domination of eastern Europe, and of their showers of rockets which have been reported from Sweden from time to time. On the other hand, it would only be the part of candor to admit that they can look with some trepidation upon our discovery and continued production of the atomic bomb, on our numerous reports in the press of successful experiments with rockets, on long-distance bomber flights from Australia to Columbus, and from Honolulu over the top of the earth down across Europe to Cairo, on postwar military and naval expenditures many times those of any previous peacetime period, on a current military establishment of some 1,300,000 in the army and 650,000 in the navy and marine corps, as compared with former peacetime figures of something like ten per cent of
those numbers, and on growing military standardization and collaboration with Latin America and Great Britain. It is quite clear that each country is taking steps in its national defenses which are highly irritating and appear quite unnecessary to the other. We are quite sure that what we are doing is not part of a policy of aggression. But the Russians also claim their moves are defensive in nature. In spite of these various frictions, it may be said that as a general rule we are really challenged by the Russian threat least in the area where our interests are greatest, namely in the Far East, and that we are being challenged more where our interests, historically, have been least, that is, in the Near East and in eastern Europe.

In our international economic relations, although we do not at all like the Russian economic internal policies, we have in the past run into rather less difficulty with the Russians than with the British. The Tsarist debts and the problem of dumping were very real difficulties in the early days of Soviet rule, but in international trade in general we have had less competition from the Soviet Union than from most of the other great powers. There are a number of complementary factors in our economies, and a major basis of potential economic relations is that of the Russian need of machinery and of international loans. We have been reluctant to loan to Russia in the past and it may well be that our major change in foreign policy since the last election will be an increase in our reluctance to loan abroad, which reluctance will probably apply more to Russia than to most countries. Our experience in international trade with Russia, however, has not been unsatisfactory, and our businessmen who have dealt with the Russians have often spoken favorably of their promptness in paying their bills and meeting their other obligations. Many countries, although in separate ways and
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in differing degrees, have been somewhat inclined to use economic and trade relations as a political weapon, and we shall have to anticipate Russian continuation of this attitude. In this field, however, even less than in the area of territorial frictions, a major source of real international conflict does not at present appear as imminent.

It is probably on the ideological level that we tangle most often and most consistently with the Russians. This ideological problem has a number of aspects in which that of semantics is certainly not the least. We are finding, to our daily dismay, that the Russians have built up a whole political vocabulary, using words which we habitually use, but with meanings and connotations far from those to which we are accustomed. To us democracy means the rule of the majority, but not to the extent of infringing certain fundamental rights of the minority. The Russians say that democracy is a matter of majority opinion which is reflected through the communist party and leadership, and is a matter essentially of economic welfare, rather than of abstract political rights. Similarly, we differ on what is a free election, and on almost every other common concept in political affairs. It might naturally be assumed from our point of view that the rank-and-file Russian and others in eastern Europe would be utterly dissatisfied with their present lot. In many cases, however, the people in these eastern European countries and in Russia are, considering the generally low standard of living in the area, better off now economically and politically than they have been in the past. From our point of view the Russian dictatorship is both real and abhorrent. There are countless millions, however, who probably have no great feeling of aversion to it, as compared with preceding regimes under such leaders as Tsar Nicholas, Pilsudski, Carol, Alexander, Metaxas, and Hitler.
In addition to a very real clash of opinion on the fundamentals of democratic government and self-determination, particularly in eastern Europe, we have been faced with the threat of an increase in communist strength in western Europe also. Considering the economic situation, the proximity of Russia, and the picture which the Russians have given all of Europe of the success of their system and their arms, a considerable increase in communist party strength was to be expected in Germany, France, and Italy. Certainly, after the difficult days of democracy, and the fascist developments in those same three countries, it was almost certain that there would be a pronounced swing to the left. The interesting thing about this tendency to the left, which has been very real and considerable, has been that the growth of the communist party was not proportionate. The parties of the right have almost disappeared. Almost all party strength is somewhat to the left of center, but the growth of a new Catholic socialist party in all three countries has indicated a pronounced resistance to a movement to the extreme left and is developing, or at least bids fair to develop, a political equilibrium, which, although considerably to the left of center, is definitely not predominantly communistic. We owe it to ourselves and to democracy to support politically and economically these non-communist parties of the left. We must not lump them with the communists and dismiss them all as a bunch of radicals. The future of democracy in western Europe may literally depend on how wise we are in supporting the non-communist parties of the left.

The ideological threat of communism in the United States seems to be of two kinds. In the first place, there is the question as to whether the communists can by legal, democratic, political means gain sufficient strength so that the party may ever be in a position to gain real political power. Their nu-
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merical strength, dwindling consistently for the last fifteen years, gives little impression of the imminence of a legal acquisition of political power by this method. We must be continuously on our guard, however, for the American communists will try in every way thus to gain power, if not through their own party then within some other political organization. They don’t play the game our way. They will make every effort to pack committees and steal positions of political influence. Their agreements have no validity as against a change in the party line at headquarters. They cannot in the least be trusted to participate according to the accepted rules of the American game of politics.

In the economic field, where a nuisance value can be created out of all proportion to the numbers of communists involved, it would appear more likely that the communists could at some future time create a problem of real significance. There is no doubt that to the best of their abilities they will continue to provide such a nuisance value. That is their theory and the history of their methods. It is not, however, a history of their successes. Such attempts as we have seen in recent years to stage a more or less general strike in this country have generally been directed toward gains in wages, hours, or working conditions and not toward seizing either factories or political power. On the ideological side, therefore, it would appear that the threat of a communistic revolution in this country is in inverse proportion to the health and strength of our own democratic and economic systems and the adequacy of our labor relations policy. The fundamental communist assumption that the people in a country ultimately shake down into the capitalist and labor groups is denied by the presence and vigor of those of us who look upon ourselves as members of the middle class. As long as the United States remains at peace and the vast majority of people in the
country look upon themselves, economically and politically, as the middle class, and as long as the economic base for that group is firm and its political principles sound, the danger from an internal communistic revolution would appear rather small.

These statements are not made as a soporific to lull anyone to sleep in the face of the very real competition which communism is giving democracy throughout the world in spite of the formal dissolution of the Comintern in 1943. There is hardly a better place than the United States, however, in which democracy can challenge this threat of communism. The communists are working for their ideology seven days a week, twenty-four hours a day. There is great likelihood that we shall assume that democracy can win singlehandedly against such competition on a kind of part-time basis, or maybe sitting down. There is much danger in this assumption. There appears to be no danger to democracy and our free enterprise system if those of us who profess them will give as much effort in trying to make them work as the communists give to their ideology. If we have faith in our democracy, if we can make it vital, if we have faith in our economic system and can keep it prosperous, we need not fear the outcome. We believe intrinsically in the superiority of democracy over any of the isms that have been put forth. The peoples of the world will be convinced of this superiority, also, if we make our democracy what it should be.

There are some who begin to wonder if we are not trying to buck a world trend. There are those who imply that the new wave of the future runs so strongly to the left that it will sweep all capitalistic democracy before it at an early date. There are doubtless many cases which appear to fortify this assumption. It is true that socialistic principles have reached a wide acceptance in many of the countries of the world,
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including some which we have habitually looked upon as
democratic. It may even appear that the whole world is going
socialistic, except ourselves. If such be the case, it need not
necessarily fill us with despair. A pertinent observation on
this picture was made by Gerald W. Johnson in the New York
Times Magazine of November 10, 1946, in which he said:

True, we are in the difficult position occupied by Lenin and
Trotsky thirty years ago—we are trying to maintain capital-
ism, as they were trying to maintain communism, in a single
country. But they got out all right; are we less ingenious?

Many of our questions, of course, lie in a realm in which we
ourselves cannot provide the answer. Do the Russians still
have their hearts set on world revolution, or will they be
satisfied with what Stalin himself has called communism in
one country? It seems clear that there are advocates of both
within the Soviet Union. As a matter of recent history, we
have seen Russian policy swing from the first of these ob-
jectives to the second, and, as the possible success of world
revolution diminished because of the hardihood of the de-
mocracies, or the threat of Nazi aggression, emphasis was
placed on getting along with the democratic world. If we are
vigilant in preventing the development of fertile soil for
communism in western Europe, the Far East, and the western
hemisphere, the Russians will have to give up world revolu-
tion as an objective to be achieved by ideological means. If
they try to reach this objective with the Red Army, it will
make little difference to us whether the objectives are ideo-
logical or not.

Now, the interesting thing about the foregoing analysis is
that imperialism, and the territorial and military threats
which many think they see in the policies of the Soviet
Union, are in fact most un-communistic ideologically. Theo-
retical communism is anti-imperialistic, but in recent years
Russian foreign policy has shown far less concern with communist theory than with the practicalities of national interest. As a matter of fact, certain of our critics of current Russian foreign policy were admirers of the original Bolshevik “experiment” and their present unhappiness stems from the fact that Stalinism, as they refer to it, has deserted orthodox communistic plans and has gone nationalistic in a big way. They say, very frankly, that Stalin patterns his actions after Peter the Great and Catherine, and not after Marx and Lenin. We are brought back, then, to the earlier query. Are we threatened by a Red soldier in full battle dress or by a communist agitator, who, in all likelihood, will speak English with an American accent? As a matter of fact, are we, at the moment, vitally threatened by either? We are extremely irritated by both. It does not appear, however, that our real and vital interests, much less our national existence, are in fact at the moment thus endangered.

We must repeat our original question, as world peace in our generation depends upon it more than anything else. Can we live with Russia? There are those that assume we cannot. Hardly any responsible governmental spokesman, however, comes out clearly for the corollaries which follow from such a negative answer. Many people talk in an offhand fashion of another war, but we are preparing in far less than a halfhearted way for that possible contingency. We have not yet really convinced ourselves of the necessity of taking the steps which must naturally follow if a war with Russia is inevitable, and there is no indication that our national foreign policy is based on that assumption.

If, on the other hand, we can live with the Russians, then we should survey our international actions to see what steps we are taking that make more difficult the matter of living with Russia on the same planet on which we both, for better
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or worse, find ourselves. We must determine in our own mind what is the difference between getting pushed around, as many refer to it, and, on the other hand, as others say, continuously carrying a chip on our shoulder. Our preparations for one or the other of these answers shall naturally receive consideration in the third lecture.