RICE UNIVERSITY

Mediating the EU: Deciphering the Transformation of Turkish Elites

by

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ABSTRACT

Mediating the EU: Deciphering the Transformation of Turkish Elites

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Reporting the European Union (EU) is the mother of all political coverage in Turkey even if the actors deny it. In mediating the EU, senior journalists, editors and columnists act not as spokespersons of other elites but become a group of elites that organize, produce, mediate the existing Republican rule whose foundations are directly linked to the founder, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Their role appears through the formation of a political assemblage, which I call the EU Process Assemblage. Even if a journalist has a pro-EU stance personally, overall journalistic production tends to be anti-EU because of their embeddedness in this assemblage. This particular assemblage formed during a political party, AKP, which did not have traditional Republican credentials, came to rule. Senior journalists acted against the political authority fiercely, even this meant not good for business. In republican history, journalists are known to oppose government policies but there was never such an ideological stance against the civil authority before. By senior journalists, I particularly think of those who are based in the giant media conglomeration, Doğan Media Group (DMG). There
are exceptional, mostly 'liberal' columnists in DMG or some others in the growing media power of pro-AKP press corps. However, most of the journalists I think come to have a homogenous ideological formation despite their personal differences. Along with and sometimes independently from military, judiciary and some other bureaucratic sectors, they acted as the guardians of the Kemalist order.
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showed me tenderly insider ways of accessing the world of journalism: Cengiz Aktar, Yavuz Baydar and Zeynep Göğüş. I remember being called by Mr. Aktar right in the middle of Beşiktaş' away game. I remember trying to talk to him despite the loud singing of fans.

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Chapter 1 – An Introduction

A Description

The research is an ethnographic study of the role of Turkish journalists as the leading conceptualizers of the European Union (EU) in Turkey. My study of the process of producing news about the EU in Turkey will reveal how and in which directions the EU is transforming contemporary Turkish cultural politics. More specifically, my research has two objectives: (1) to examine how Turkish journalism articulates and gives shape to changing understandings of Turkish modernity, (2) to examine the process by which journalists have gradually come to displace traditional Turkish policy elites in shaping these understandings. To explore these objectives, I focus on two main themes of Turkish modernity that is subject to EU influences and that influence journalistic production: a) a secularization process that keeps religion under state control; b) a strong nationalism with an imaginary of being surrounded with external and internal enemies. I had started by seeking to answer the following exemplary questions and I believe I provide some answers in the end: Is there a correspondence between these themes and the EU news? What kind of changes do these themes undergo? What kind of metaphors and schematizations of the EU emerge and what kind of interest struggles are there behind these? What is the network of sources and institutions that generates EU news?

My research period started in the most tense period of Turkey’s membership application to the EU: After waiting for more than 40 years (this is the longest waiting period for membership for a would-be member in EU history) Turkey was expecting a date by the end of 2004 to start formal negotiations for membership. After another
tense EU summit, Turkey could start formal negotiations on October 3, 2005. Turkey’s application to the Union for membership has gradually become a litmus test for both Turkey and the EU. The timely declaration of Giscard d’Estaing, the former French president who is currently supervising the writing of a European constitution, just before the 2002 Copenhagen Summit is instructive. Giscard d’Estaing stated that Turkey is a Muslim country and it is thus culturally different from the rest of the members. This statement carried enough force that the decision on Turkey was postponed until the end of 2005. It remains to be seen whether the self-acclaimedly secular EU can conceptualize ‘Muslim’ Turkey as a member.

At the same time, the domestic politics of Turkey had its own particular tension since the 1990s which made the EU process even more complicated: By the 1990s, it seemed as if the Turkish republic was back in the 1920s and 1930s, once again facing the twin challenges that had defined its founding years, political Islam and Kurdish dissent. And despite a radically different international context, “Ankara’s response took a classic Kemalist form: an authoritarian determination to reject any cultural or political compromise. The result was the lost decade of the 1990s—a decade of war with Kurdish separatists, polarization between secularists and Islamists, economic turmoil, and systemic corruption.” (Taspinar, 2007: 121)

Since the 19th century Turkish journalists have played a leading role in interpreting and articulating cultural and political transformations in the country. Their relations with Young Turks (mid 19th century), Committee of Progress and Union (early 20th century), early Republicans (1920-1930s) and Turgut Ozal’s liberal party (mid-1980s) are well documented. Even in mid-1990s, "Kemalists' sense of
insecurity" with the rise of Islamist Welfare Party was conceptualized and promoted by the "secularist" press (Taspinar, 2007; 122).

In fact, the Welfare Party and Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan hardly broke from mainstream Turkish political practices. "The party did try to plant its sympathizers in the ministries it controlled, but so had many previous governments. Still, the secularist press rang the alarm, warning of an imminent Islamist revolution. On February 28, 1997, the military—*in a concerted effort with civil-society organizations and the secularist press*—forced Erbakan and his party out of power. (122)" [emphasis added]

Today, Turkish journalism has once again emerged as a venue that displays and reflects the cultural and political struggles of a new period in Turkish modernization policy. While the European Union herself has begun to attribute journalism a political role as a means of resolving the democratic deficit problem ["the Commission mobilized a European Communication White Paper 2006, which belatedly discovered the need to bring the mass media on side to advance the EU integration process" (Statham, 2007; 432)], this probably did not mean to ascribe journalism such an active political role as that happened in Turkey.

The EU portrays itself as a quintessentially enlightenment project, and Turkey praises herself as the most successful modernization project among the Muslim peoples. Joining the EU is considered to be the natural outcome of this long project (which started in the early 19th century but was aggressively executed after the formation of Turkish nation state in 1920s, led by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk) and the process has already begun to change the structure of Turkish policy elites. Formerly, high status army officials and bureaucrats had influenced the outcome of news
production but today political parties, big business, NGOs, the academy and the media conglomerate itself increasingly challenge them and this dissertation is a documentation of this ongoing struggle through the field of journalism.

**My fieldwork** experience differed from what I had expected. I had planned to conduct fieldwork in the newsroom of Turkey’s best selling and one of the oldest newspapers, *Hurriyat* [Independence], which belongs to the largest media conglomerate in Turkey, Dogan Medya Grubu (DMG). Another plan was to have a shorter fieldwork in TUSIAD’s (Association of Turkish Businessmen and Industrialists) Brussels office, which seemed to be one of the most important sources of information for Turkish media. All of these planned activities would be incorporated into a field practicum: I would become part of the news team of a well-known journalist, Mehmet Ali Birand, who is well know journalist on the EU news and who works in the same media conglomerate. Mr. Birand forgot the promises he made and during my fieldwork years, he had a major transformation in the way he practiced journalism. I eventually pursued a more fragmented fieldwork which is justified extendedly in the next chapter. I would once name it as a detective work and in the quest for the knowledge of the EU I would be out of the newsroom and be in touch with PM advisors or other news sources.

**Contextualizing the study in previous research**

There are three relevant literatures from which my research project derived theoretical inspirations and to which it can contribute:

1. Media studies with a special emphasis on journalism
2. The anthropology of the European Union
3. Social scientific and journalistic studies on Turkey

Although it is not as major as the three first ones, relevance of a fourth literature emerged eventually:

4. Mass media and European Union

Aside from these literatures, a group of anthropological studies of modernity forms a basis for a narrative approach to Turkish modernity. Faubion's (1989) discussion of 'possible modernities', Gaonkar's (2001) and Gupta's 'alternative modernities' (1998) and Gole's non-western modernities (1999) are especially relevant. While the script of modernity in Zambia is industrialization and urbanization (Ferguson, 1999), development in India (Gupta, ibid) and secularization and nationalism in Turkey occupy similar roles.

Although the reader is served a long discussion of literature in this chapter, I would like to state that reading the relevant works continued throughout the research period and many more recent writings are discussed in other chapters when they have particular relations to particular topics. Focusing on a particular culture producer group meant continuous follow up of their intellectual work or the works on them.

Media studies with a special emphasis on journalism

News producers

In media studies literature I limited myself to the theoretical works that would inform my project and to a recently growing literature within anthropology (see Spitulnik's review, 1993 for an earlier evaluation). My research focuses on editors and sources of information, which are relatively overlooked in the literature but
have a central role in deciding what makes news. The significance of sources is cited in Schudson (2003), who states that there have been few studies that looked at whole development of a news story, starting with the news source rather than the news reporter. He even describes the sources as parajournalists (for an earlier emphasis on sources see: Sigal, 1970). However, the key work here is Pedelty's ethnographic study (1995) on war correspondents. This is an invaluable work on understanding the news production before the newsroom phase and the influence of sources in shaping the outcome of journalistic process.

As an analytical starting point, Pedelty prefers a concept of 'disciplinary apparatuses'. The former part of the term is borrowed from the Foucauldian analyses and serves as a more productive tool than mere censorship mechanisms. 'Whereas regimes of censorship attempt to silence the dissent (and usually fail), disciplinary regimes overwhelm, co-opt, incorporate and transform it (ibid, 6). The apparatus is used to highlight what post-structuralist narratives miss: a sense of organizational efficacy and political economy that regulate the power of the press (6). Pedelty lists the main disciplinary apparatuses as such and then begins to focus on them chapter by chapter: military press controls and targeted violence; the hierarchical structure of the corps [journalists]; elite sources; reporting conventions, myths and rituals; the standard news narrative; and news organizations (6).

Pedelty argues that the actual site where the event of the news happened is not the primary site for news making. 'Because of the editorial mandates and the narrative structure of news writing – particularly the emphasis on elites- journalists conduct most of the business in press offices, conference rooms and local restaurants' (39). Non-newsroom formations are also effective. In his case, even if most of the
journalists deem an event as newsworthy institutionalized ethnocentrism and military obstructionism would kill the story (38). However, as he points out as an exception, many freelance journalists could escape those institutional impacts by parachuting on the event instead of part of an ongoing newsmaking process in the area (57). In general, there are two types of journalists in the field: Team A includes staffers of prestigious news organizations who graduated from prestigious universities. On the other hand, Team B members, who are called stringers, graduated mostly from less prestigious universities. They are young and their future in journalistic occupation is uncertain (72-3). Pedelty argues that 'a combination of factors – motivation, experience and social environment- conspires to provide stringers with a more liberal outlook than their higher status colleagues' (76). This liberal outlook shapes their news production but in order to move up in the occupational hierarchy they gradually have to accept editorial discipline, which is in turn disciplined by non-newsroom formations.

Whatever the journalist on the site reports, the editor in the newsroom will shape it, sometimes to a large extent. In addition to actively being involved in the reporting process, the editors perform the difficult task of writing headlines. 'Headlines are an extremely influential framing device that summarizes, contextualizes and even replaces news reports as hurried readers breeze through the morning paper (92). While they are part of the newsmaking, editors may not have much knowledge about the site. Pedelty states that most of the editors had nothing to do with Latin American politics and they were very Eurocentric in their ideas. Moreover, whatever the level of editor knowledge, public governmental attention (but not the covert governmental actions) would determine the level of priority for an international event (92). Furthermore, even the journalists on the site may not be
actually on the site: most of them ground their reporting on the press releases they receive at their offices or homes (118). The Salvadoran army and government besides the American embassy and other major institutions fed the journalists before at their table. Another substitution to seeing the actual site is the press conference. Pedelty names it drama in which a pseudo-event is created to be newsworthy (122). Even interviewing, which is a favorite newsmaking source, can be preventive: Instead of archival research, observation and other information techniques, which are more difficult and time-consuming, journalists tend to valorize interviews (123). Finally they are cut off from the audience. Not the public but the critique from well-placed persons shapes the news. They do not get much reader feedback (97).

My main objection to Pedelty's work can out outlined as such: Although one can find many clues about his ethnographic work, he does not discuss the methodological questions and he basically focuses on a critique of American journalism's objectivism. This unfortunately may result in a kind of reductionism with which media studies are already afflicted. Pedelty writes '… to presage the punch line of this study, I have concluded that reporters play a relatively small role in the creative process of discovery, analysis and representation involved in news production. Instead, they are mainly conduits for a system of institutions, authoritative sources, practices and ideologies that frame the events and issues well before they, the mythical watchdogs, have a change to do anything resembling independent analysis and representations' (24). In the last analysis, Pedelty's account does not provide any space for the journalists' subjectivities. Why do news organizations send correspondents to Salvador if there is no individual intervention? In order to hide the truth of newsmaking? Maybe in other contexts such a conspiracy theory would work but not necessarily here? In fact, Pedelty's fragmentary accounts provide enough clues
of journalistic innovation on the site and how that site is conceived and how a
personal contribution is always possible. However, Pedelty would like to reduce them
to an overall organizational determination. I think this over-emphasis is partly due to
the fact that he is writing against a heroic narrative of war correspondents.

Contrary to majority of media studies in the discipline, my research does not
explicitly look at the reception side of mass media. However, this can be defended
at two levels: First of all, my research takes the journalists as audiences that are
subject to emerging discourses and social transformations during the European Union
process. Secondly, I agree with Ginsburg and Abu-Lughod (2002) and Spitulnik
(1993, 2002) that it is impossible to separate the ideas of audience from the process of
production. As Gans (1980) and Schudson (2003) state most of the times journalists
do not encounter with the audience while they cover the news, but an imagined
audience always influence the news writing. Besides, this imagination might be the
very source an audience’s existence as Anderson (1991) aptly demonstrates. Gupta’s
(1995) elaboration of national temporality on Anderson’s work and Appadurai’s
(1996) cues about how media imaginations can become social practices beyond the
national boundaries are all powerful ideas that inform some of my research questions.
Otherwise, agreeing with Hallin (1998), I argue that studying the production side of
journalistic work is justifiable for my research thesis: the study of production side can
provide a better understanding of power relations within a particular place than one
does with the reception.

Nation state etc.

Ginsburg and Abu-Lughod’s (2002) volume underlines the fact that even if
the actual production occurs in the news institution, broader social and cultural
fields shape it. Referring Hannerz (1992), Gupta and Ferguson (1997) and Marcus (1995), the authors highlight the need for multi-sited ethnography in media studies. My research follows this suggestion but my strategy is to demonstrate the broader fields of influence in the actual production sites, hence to maintain the situatedness of my ethnographic inquiry. In this context, I should also add that transnational studies tend to influence researchers to overlook the local influences; here I mean the national level of influences. For my own research agenda, I find Armbrust (2000) and Shryock (2000) relevant who argue that mass media are still situated in and shaped by the nation-state politics or interests.

Stroke (2000) is especially important because he concretely demonstrates how nation state politics are involved in media production in Turkey. Cultural producers such as the novelist Orhan Pamuk or the singer Bulent Ersoy in Turkey can be situated in a politics of forgetting and remembering initiated by the nation state. My aim here is not at all to ignore the ever-growing influence of transnational flows but to register the power of nation state, hence the local practices. Although I agree with Schudson (2003) who states that it is a mistake to reduce journalistic practices in a particular country into a single tradition, in a previous work he himself does not ignore the nation-state framework shaping the journalistic practices in American history (previous work 1978). Likewise, a very early Ph.D thesis on Turkish journalism registers its role in Turkish elites’ modernizing policies (Emin, 1914). Here, Armbrust and his collaborators need more attention. Some of the issues and themes outlined below demonstrated their significance in journalistic processes in Turkey:
The volume in general is very critical of the current globalization theories and the critiquing of globalization theories goes hand in hand with the attempt to locate mass media in the framework of the nation-state and modernization projects. In this sense, Armbrust is critical of both Baudrillard and Appadurai. The former had labeled the Gulf War as a media creation. However, Armbrust argues, it was just a result of a traditional conflict of national interests. Oil was at the center of conflict and that is not something new. Meanwhile, mass media, owned by the corporations that may be part of putatively transnational 'mediascape' (Appadurait, 1996), are still linked to national interests. That is, they have still centers in places governed by the nation states and their regulations are still the rule (28). Consequently, globalization is less about an interconnected world than it is about the complex ways that the world is apprehended from the States (7). Therefore, the dominating presumption in the discourses of modernity that global interaction will inevitably take precedence over all other frameworks for organizing social life is biased. It in fact serves the existing hierarchy of nations. The others are exoticized and only then can find a place in the advanced West. While sophisticated modern works of the non-West are discarded, the exotic and the folkoric are valorized (13-4). Thus, one can suppose that the Armbrust volume will focus on the local products of modernity that are emancipated from the existing hierarchy (which is recently reinforced by the disguise orientalist form as globalization... Although I agree with Armbrust in general, he may be overemphasizing the orientalist approach. What he thinks of as a failure of access to the western audiences may in fact be just due to the fact that the work lacks the quality. Ironically, his example on page 13 made me inspired this idea.

The volume attempts to restore the importance of nationalism and he explicitly suggests that this is more serious effort than focusing on globalization rhetoric (15).
Meanwhile, the book is concerned with the changes within capitalist organization and Marcus’s ‘Connected’ is criticized in this context since it ‘explicitly backs away from analysis of the great organizational changes within corporate capitalism that are accommodating technological changes’ (18). In footnote 20, (30) it is added that Marcus’ volume says almost nothing about the commercial aspects of the Internet. I would question the last argument from two angles; 1) One does not need to focus on every aspect of a phenomenon as long as it does not deny the other aspects. Marcus’ volume can be assumed as an exploration in a totally new area, the Internet. 2) Can the changes in corporate capitalism be subsumed into nation-state framework? There are certainly some qualitative changes in the framework that Armbrust may not want to see… This is also the case in another situation: Armbrust is also critical of the starting point of globalization: ‘the quick dissemination of the phenomenon well before the advent of digital media suggests that the often stated link between globalization and electronic media is over-hyped’ (21). There are many case of global flows dating back to pre-modern ages but again Armbrust may overlook the qualitative changes that have taken place in the last 2-3 decades.

Andrew Shryock elaborates the logic of the volume: how nation states are still a viable category: a) the commercial goods originate in places; b) Mass Media and international markets are fragile, highly complex forms of organizations that connect places; c) media and markets are secured by and dependent on and answerable to the power of the nation states, which govern the places; d) contemporary states are nationalist in design (33).

Martin Stokes’ essay starts with valorizing Istanbul (‘No place has had a more complex and crucial role in mediating the place of Turkey in the world than Istanbul’,
p. 225). Then he states that Istanbul is itself a counter-narrative to nation state’s narrative: ‘Istanbul this came to stand for the reverse: Ottoman/Pan-Islamic civilization as opposed to a national culture… The past as opposed to the Modern. Secrecy as opposed to clarity, hybridity as opposed to the purity, complexity as opposed to simplicity, hierarchy to egalitarianism, fantasy to reality and so on… (225-6). In his essay, Istanbul is the site of two cultural artifacts produced by two well-known Turkish cultural producers: Orhan Pamuk, a novelist and Bulent Ersoy, a singer. Although these are not directly related to journalism, they shape and are shaped by a public/audience, which is also the target of journalism. The public mentioned is active in the sense of changing the nature of cultural production and is shaped by the broader transformations that Turkey is passing through. ‘In a society in which the state of being modern is cast so insistently in terms of forgetting, and in which the modern is so organically connected to the institutions of the nation-state, remembering becomes both a problem and a matter of cultural elaboration. This is not because the state is not capable of making people forget but because the politics of forgetting paradoxically demands the preservation of a variety of things to demonstrate the necessity of their having been forgotten…’ (225). In this case Istanbul itself is the object of this complex politics of forgetting and as a hasty note one should note that not Ankara but Istanbul is the center of Turkish mass media. This suggests that mass media itself may be a suspicious institution in Kemalist elites’ eyes.

The historical moment is that the nationalist-modernist narrative of the nation-state is already in crisis/ questioned by differing milieus and Orhan Pamuk appears to be a significant cultural producer in articulating some of the oppositions. ‘Even the fans of Pamuk criticize his prose as being cold, distanciating sometimes simply difficult. But these are also the techniques by which he critically comments on the
norms of realism fostered in the Republic, which, as Pamuk implies, have been precisely responsible for the nation losing its literary memory... (230). Pamuk’s novel, The Black Novel, takes Istanbul as its subject and by problematizing the act of seeing in the city, Pamuk invites his readers to engage critically with the state’s tradition of realism (231). I wonder to what extent journalists may have similar writing techniques and discursive practices in their occupational practice. I have no doubt that these can even penetrate into objective news reporting.

Meanwhile, the medium itself has created/shaped or simply extended a social practice: ‘Shortly after the publication of Black Book in 1990, the novel was to be seen in the hands of people on boats... the remarkable physical presence of the text itself on the streets of the city... startling the fact that a novel could be a mass marketing phenomenon... This kind of secretive withdrawal from one’s fellow travelers is perhaps otherwise seen only in the reading of newspapers on Turkish public transport or murmured recitation of Quranic verses... (236). Besides, both Ersoy and Pamuk blurred the rather flexible notions of high and low cultures in Turkey (237-8).

Furthermore,

Traditionally one of the difficulties about reporting on European affairs was in the fact that it has been considered as part of foreign policy issues while its impact has been, to a large extent, visible at national level. This perception started to change with the success of the internal market programme in the late eighties and early nineties. The main change in awareness occurred following the crisis surrounding the negative Danish referendum vote on the Maastricht treaty in June 1992
and the subsequent narrow victory of the ‘Yes’ camp in France in September of the same year. At this stage a debate similar to today’s on the gap between Europe and its citizens, on transparency, better regulation and on a more appropriate division of labour between ‘Brussels’ and the member states emerged.

... All of this not only increased the awareness of European issues, but also has produced a more assertive approach to European affairs. Occasionally this makes it quite difficult for the domestic desks and journalists on the one hand, and Brussels correspondents on the other, to find a common language and approach on certain items like legislative proposals. The issue of globalization has also made it more difficult for the European layer to find its place between the national and global levels. Seen from a national point of view, Europe is often perceived as a vector which reinforces rather than tempers the forces of globalization. The EU is therefore often viewed as a threat and therefore reinforces protectionist and national reflexes in a number of member states. This tension is also reflected in the coverage of European affairs at national and European level (Terzis, 2008; 542)

Thus,

Against this background it is astonishing to find that politicians are still able to ‘play’ with the national audiences back home when it comes to assuming responsibility for decisions taken in Brussels – whether they are popular or not. EU correspondents can only continue to give the version of
events as they witness them and bring it to the attention of colleagues when a twisted account is given ‘back home’. (Terzis, 2008; 550)

**Media and modernity**

My interest to relate modernity to journalism occurs through particular history of Turkish nation state. Theoretically, Jensen (1990), Luhmann (2000), Thompson (1995) form the essential relation between modernity and mass media. I am inspired by Jensen who explains the criques of media as covert critiques of modernity. But I will reverse her argument and relate Turkish news writing to building of a project of modernity. The latter two sources are used to strengthen my position: While Luhmann highlights epistemological dimensions of the issue by stating that all our knowledge in a modern society comes from the mass media, Thompson states that media uncouples time and space that opens up outside intrusions to locality and to a large extent face to face relations are replaced by distanced and mediated ones. Changing relations of time and space in modern and postmodern times (Harvey, 1990) have direct reflections on the working of mass media. Here, I am especially interested in hegemonic determination and control of what masses imagine as time and space. Schudson (2003) points out that time, the world of surprises, is indeed ‘tamed’ by organizing planned intentional events such press releases, conferences and scheduled interviews. This point can be further emphasized with Hannerz (2004) and Liebes and Curran (1998). The former points out the analytical role of an event in news making and compares it with anthropology’s traditional dependence of routines. The latter states that the mediated events have social/cultural consequences, which in turn can change the routines (see more in Katz 1980). Finally, De Certceau (1988) discusses the same controlling mechanisms over time through
writing. The idea of writing in Certeau’s usage can be applied to news writing. Besides, de Certeau is more vocal in highlighting the power relations over the space-time determinations. Here are some more words on Jensen, Luhmann and Liebes and Curran.

**Joli Jensen**’s broader goal is ‘to figure out why contemporary cultural forms and practices are so mistrusted and so readily vilified’ (10). Mass media (MM) has been a significant target for such vilification and Jensen will focus on this topic. However, it is strongly stated that media criticism is part of a broader criticism of the modern world, ‘American media criticism proceeds in relation to ideas, values, beliefs about the possibilities of modernity and the relation between media and modernity is of global concern’ (14). For her, media criticism and social criticism are only different aspects of a more general discourse on modernity (15). As a strategy, Jensen prefers to ‘take the history of discussion of the influence of media on modern life to be more interesting and important than available analyses of ‘actual’ media effects’ (16).

Therefore, she starts to discuss four of the important media critical figures, MacDonald, to whom Jensen dedicates a chapter, ‘implicitly uses a metaphor of cultivation—we become what we are surrounded by (‘cultivation metaphor becomes the way to call for standards without sounding like an elitists’ (80) – in combination with a metaphor of ingestion—we become what we consume (25). He, moreover, argues that ‘mass society is an aggregation of individuals in modern social relations, bereft of communal relations that nurture and sustain aesthetic quality’ (29). However, although he prefers ‘high culture’ artifacts, his main point is not to forbid other forms but to prevent the transgression between the forms, Meanwhile, Boorstin’s concern is with the truth, unlike MacDonald’s emphasis on the cultural structuration of media
artifacts. Boorstin uses 'pseudo-events' to emphasize his point (31). The 'Graphic Revolution' exploded image production (32) and new images blurred our distinctions. Thus he mourns the loss of the 'ability and desire to distinguish between the reality and illusion' (33). Boorstin's argument is founded on the positing of a 'real world' that can be directly experienced and known (36) against a world of illusion created by MM. Its cure is to recognize the deception and as a solution, he offers the 'facts'. He believes that facts are inherently good and counter-deceptive (37). Jensen argues that Boorstin's final argument originates from the recurring nature vs. culture debate.

Another media critique, Stuart Ewen, provides a more leftist approach: MM functions as an ideological apparatus (38). MM and ideology of consumption shape the mass culture, that is, both are a form of social control (39). Ewen's analyses depend on an 'assumption that commerce and art are inherently separate realms and that commerce inevitably poisons and deforms art' (41). The final critique in Jensen's analyses is Neil Postman.

His emphasis is on television, for him, TV opened up a new era: Before, there was the print-based society, which was serious, coherent and rational. Now there is TV-based society, which shriveled and absurd (44). Jensen lists some of the main presuppositions in Postman's thinking: a) He argues for a pre-telegraphic Eden when politics, religion and news were serious, rational b) Content free influence of print: It is inherently linear and logical, automatically cultivating serious habits of mind (49). C) Finally his argument requires an unquestioned dichotomy between serious and amusing, between rational and irrational, between coherent and fragmented, as well as the maintenance of iron-clad distinctions between them' (50).
In summarizing the four critical voices in media studies, Jensen singles out some common perceptions of media. In these media studies, first of all, there is the transformative power of MM: They can transform at two levels: a) transforming the thing itself or b) transforming out perceptions. Thus in both cases we are transformed (53). This transformative power is mostly assumed to be tainting (53). In this line of thinking, the presumption is that 'we, the media audience, have some instinctual desire for stuff that is bad for us' (53) while this means to be that the MM is endowed with seductive power (54). Thus in the eyes of media scholars, the public is seen as media victims. However, this turns into an 'audience bashing' which is common, albeit obscure, undercurrent in media commentary (54). In the final analysis, for both the writers, the narrative of media influence is a Garden of Eden story: There was once something pure and valuable in humankind and society that the MM will/can/had corrupt(ed) (55).

After the focus on those four critiques, Jensen moves her attention to modernity and to relate it with the MM studies. She points out that 'modernity' exists only in relation to an assumed pre-modern time. [and in the] distinction between modern and pre-modern times, we are telling a story of major social and cultural change (59-60). 'It is predominantly conceptualized as a destructive outside influence (like the MM). [Both of them] are implicitly understood as being artificial 'others' that invade and subsequently transfigure a natural circumstance (61). However, in this story 'there remains a possibility of redemption: once the polluting influences of modernity are somehow neutralized' there will be a return to unpolluted moments of humankind (62). Hence the attacks come. Jensen argues that instead of more abstract modernity, the MM becomes the target. There are also some other reasons: Directly attacking the worth of the public and directly questioning the possibilities of mass
democracy, are dangerous. Thus the MM is more appropriate to attack (64), it becomes a scapegoat (65). Hence, Jensen claims that the critiques of the MM are due to the frightening aspects of contemporary life.

Jensen prefers to use social narrative instead of a theory based explanation and she describes the former as such: 'a social narrative, a discourse that has emerged in relation to particular historical circumstances... It lacks the logic and organizing principles of theory because it emerges in response to experienced ambivalences and contradictions... (66). The narrative themes that portray American modernity are then provided as in the following manner: [American modernity is] 'a colonial faith in the natural law, a western faith in individual mobility and an immigrant faith in an egalitarian new world of opportunity' (69). Therefore, I would speculate that unlike Europeans who were lamenting for the loss of age-old traditions in their narratives, the real tension in the American case was based on the promises vs. actualities (70) and the MM enters the scene as a highly possible reason for the unrealizable dreams. 'We get the image of the estranged, vulnerable media audience, awash in illusion and triviality' (71). As said before, the MM is a more plausible target: 'seen as alien forces imposed in society, the MM rather than the innate traits of 'the people' can be condemned (76). Moreover, 'locating the MM as inauthentic other supports a demonology where blame for all social and cultural ills can be placed on the media alone. Viewing the media as an invasive, inauthentic and destructive intruder, rather than as a contemporary social and cultural practice, allows blame to be located and circumscribed' (87). Therefore, Jensen initiates the unmasking of a dominant narrative surrounding the MM and presents them as a sheer contemporary practice.
Jensen's then attempts to deconstruct the MM as a social practice. According to her, three forms of MM inform, organize and underlie all the discussion on media. These are a) the media as an art form; b) as an information source and c) as an educational tool (101). 'The media will appear to be decadent, inadequate, homogenized or diluted versions of art, information or education when compared against an ideal formulation envisioned as flourishing in the past' (same page).

In the discussion of art form, Jensen argues that a view of 'art' as separate from 'life' is fairly common and the MM, which is to be located between life and art, is a structurally inevitable target for blaming (110). However, critiques differ ideologically: conservatives criticize the MM because of failing to include enough high culture while liberals are complaining that the MM fails to represent fully the varieties of 'taste publics' in the audience. Thus the media neither offer enough of the best from the past nor meet the various extant or potential aesthetic desires of the people (113).

This line of discussion points out several other assumptions about art: While the artist is romanticized (115) 'a natural, spontaneous and uplifting communal force is contrasted with a commercial, calculated, degrading and alienating force [media/modernity interchangeably] (116). American media criticism has an essentialist view of art: 'art' is something that inheres in particular objects and that has the power to transform and redeem everyday life. These power and possibilities can be diluted or deflected if the objects are popularized for mass consumption' (123).

Meanwhile, for those who assume the MM as an information source reality portrayal rather than the aesthetic worthiness is the key concern. Therefore, this line of analyses centers on news and journalism (127). The dominant model of
communication is a linear transmission model with distinct moments or phases (127) and it is positivists in its assumption that there is a reality waiting out there... to be accurately accounted (128). Jensen highlight that when this form of media is involved, a view of 'the people' as needing outside agencies to maintain their decision making abilities is also involved... 'The information model is a fundamentally modern conception, one that sees the world as made up of powerful institutions and increasingly powerless individuals, what sets you free is truth defined as knowledge, expertise, information...' (136-7). As a modern value, information is tied to the emergence of an individualist bureaucratic society in which the public is defined as mere recipients of information and the news as information is deemed to be a modern necessity to ensure the public has that information (139). Jensen states that 'faith in the inherent value of information runs so deep that it is almost impossible to question its usefulness in contemporary life' (140). The notion of information is also related to the hegemonic place of objectivism in American journalism: Information is not self-interested, it fosters a rational rather than emotional response, and it gives access to a neutral and reliable 'world out there' (140). Thus although Jensen does not state it here, I would argue that the notion of information is an important element of the discourse of objectivism. Information is trusted as is inherently worthy, while entertainment is mistrusted, at least partially, because it does not properly inform (145).

In discussing MM as an educational form, Jensen highlights a weakness of media critiques: usually only one technology at a time is deemed to be hypnotically powerful. In contemporary times this is the TV and Jensen questions why TV viewing is particularly disturbing for parents, teachers and media critics. Behind all, Jensen argues that an imaginary of children sitting silently in front of a TV feeds those
disturbing ideas of being heavily affected (151-2). Although there might be overt
messages in order to affect the audiences, Stuart Hall and other neo-Marxist scholars
state that the effect happens through MM's ideological structuring of values and
beliefs (153). Jensen underlines that whatever the position of the media critic, the idea
of 'hidden' or 'unconscious' meanings reappears in media scholarship (153).

Therefore, in the similar narrative of Garden of Eden, the MM become the
serpent that can seduce the audience. They blur the distinctions between good and
evil, truth and illusion and wisdom and foolishness. Jensen moves to elaborate these
themes: contamination (166), blurring boundaries (167), the pure and the polluting
(while reason and art are pure emotion and commerce are polluting: these dualities are
heritages from the Enlightenment, Jensen argues), transgression (172; media mingling
is itself a threatening for most critics).

Jensen concludes that the narrative strategies in most of the MM critiques
remain the same and these are tied to a broader critique of modernity in which media-
induced decline in American life is coeval with the notion of cultural decline in the
critiques of modernity (174-5).

Jensen's study is fourth-order observation in Luhmannian terms: she observes
the media scholars who observe MM who observe the society. Like Luhmann's work
that I will discuss this is an abstract level of discussion on the MM. Jensen's account
provides excellent ideas about how mass media is a product of modernity. However,
only in her discussion of themes, can the reader find more tools about the actual
practices. Still, the discussion goes on at an abstract level. Furthermore, I would
expect her to elaborate on how frightening aspects are reflected or actualized in the
mass media.
Luhmann (2000) starts his work by emphasizing the essential role of MM in our lives: Whatever we know about our society, or indeed about the world in which we live, we know through the MM...’ Luhmann suggests that the audience suspects in order to deal with this fact – as he later demonstrates the structural inevitability that one might be suspicious of MM while continuing to rely on them. However this is a matter of mystery since ‘modern society remains with stable mechanisms even when their genesis has been revealed (1). At the outset Luhmann underlines that the problem is not to deconstruct ownership relations or manipulation mechanisms that MM deploy. This work is not just another one in the unveiling literature on MM.

Maybe in order to develop his system thesis, he also underlines that in mass communication no simultaneous interaction is possible between the sender and receiver apart from some exceptional situations (2). Even if the target of MM’s observation is the society that does not necessarily man an interactive relationship with the society. However, like technology, there are various external structural conditions functioning as limitations of the scope observation. Technology is more than a limitation; it is a precondition for the existence of mass communication. But Luhmann moves quickly to downplay technology as the essential part of a systemic working: ‘not everything which is a condition of possibility of systems operations can be a part of the operation sequences of the system itself’ (3). Although he will not explicitly study the reception issue, he states that it is essential since communication cannot be possible if there is no reception. But we mostly cannot verify whether the target audience receives the message. Media producers have to assume. ‘Obvious presence has to be substituted by assumptions’ (4). In this field of assumptions, the person in relation to MM is a social construct. The individual who participates in communication is... simultaneously individualized and de-individualized. It is
addressed personally but at the same time it is standardized and fictionalized 'such that communication can continue to make references to individuals without being able to include the operations which cause each individual for itself to come into being as a unique, operationally closed system' (74). 'In the system of MM, this construction of the person reproduces the myth of service to the person. This person is interested in information; indeed he is dependent upon information in vital ways; so he must be informed. He is morally prone to temptations. So he must constantly be taught the difference between good and bad. He drifts out of control in the flow of circumstances; so he must be presented with a range of possible decisions' (75).

Luhmann assumes MM as an observing system and outlines its working: First of all, MM must construct another reality (other-reference) than their own (self-reference). Then all knowledge must be acquired on the basis of a distinction between self-reference and other-reference and this distinction must exist within the system itself (5). While Jensen disclaimed the existence of a particular reality, Luhmann focuses on the constructedness of reality. For him, 'reality is nothing more than an indicator of successful tests for consistency in the system... it arises whenever inconsistencies, which might emerge from the part played by memory in the system’s operations, are resolved' (6-7). Therefore, the question is not how MM distort reality since this question presupposes an ontological, available, objectively accessible reality (7). MM constructs its own reality and it is a reality of second-order observation. The society leaves its self-observation to the MM (85). Meanwhile, this position of observer leaves no room for the observation of itself, says Luhmann. "Media remain invisible to themselves as an observer... Thus they do not ask, 'how am I operating as an observer and why do I make distinctions in this way or another'" (118-9). However, I suspect the validity of the ideas about the impossibility of MM's self-observation.
Maybe they are true to the extent that mainstream journalists continue their observations without self-observation but there are already many institutions and publications, initiated by journalists themselves, that are about the MM, which means a kind of observation is going on.

From another angle, Kepplinger (2007) would describe MM as a subsystem of society:

Mass communication can be regarded as a subsystem of society that works according to its own rules (professional standards, news values, and attention cycles, among others). Through primary and secondary effects, the media are linked to other subsystems of society, such as politics, economy, and science. These institutions also work according to their own rules. An example is the connection between supply, demand, and price in economics. The effects of mass media can set in motion the specific dynamics of other subsystems of society, which would not occur without the input of the media and therefore have to be attributed to the media. For example, the media might falsely create the impression of a shortage of supply of goods, which will increase demand and prices. As a consequence, the effects of mass media on society ought to be discussed in conjunction with political, sociological, and economical theories. (p. 10)

I would suggest that Luhmann's work starts with what Jensen pointed out but did not elaborate: After focusing on the notion of reality, Luhmann shifts his attention to the relation between MM and modernity. MM is one of the function systems of modern society, which owes its increased effectiveness to the differentiation, operational closure and autopoietic autonomy of the system concerned (8).
Through the in-built distinction of references, MM do not detach themselves from the society even if it is a modern operationally closed system. The topics represent the other-reference within the MM (12-3). MM has a particular information/non-information code through which topics are contained within the system. Although Luhmann discusses this code at a highly abstract level, he provides invaluable insights about the working of the system. The code defines the distinction between information and non-information within the boundaries of the system. Luhmann warns that this should not be confused with the difference of the system whatever it produces (16-7). According to Luhmann, the code's relation to time is its most important aspect. Information cannot be repeated in this system; it becomes non-information (19). Some of the temporal characteristics provide direct links of media's modernity. The dominance of the past/future schema ['the connection between past and future is nothing but an artificially arranged chronometry...the present becomes the place where information solidifies and decisions have to be made... But the present is only the position of the observer distinguishing future and past' (83)], uniformization of world time, acceleration and extensions of simultaneity to non-simultaneous events precondition the society's temporal imaginary while MM's putting out new information every day (and thereby generating a need for a global judgment) may trigger society's need for self-assessments (21). In fact, this constant renewal of willingness for surprises and even disruptions results in restlessness and irritability on the part of society (22).

Meanwhile, MM in general and journalistic writing in particular have to play with temporality: 'the impression must be given that what has just gone into the past is still present, is still interesting and informative' (26). Moreover, it has to be seen as relevant and true in order to maintain the working of the system. But I wonder to what
extent this last statement is relevant for the MM. It seems that mistrust in MM is widespread and there have to be modifications of this statement. Maybe the New York Times style journalistic products set the standards in the western world and in countries such as Turkey, where people have no trust in local media at all, that can be compensated by referring to foreign media which are assumed to be more true (like CNN’s hegemony as a trustful media institutions in Turkey).

However, the code may not be enough since the work on what is information or what is not may turn into an infinite regress. A further distinction, programming, will halt such a regress (17). The selective range through programming will pre-structure what can occur as communication. Therefore, when the operational closure of a system takes place, there is also a closure of information processing (18). In order to demonstrate that there are more limitations than expected, Luhmann mentions selectors, which function to shape what is to be reported (27). Among these media emphasis on actors deserves attention. People serve society as tangible symbols of an unknown future. Although detailed information about a person can be presented, his actions cannot be determined and this produces inherent ambiguities for media production (32).

Early modernity experimented with two different responses in the face of all knowledge becoming contingent. Media productions contain both of the responses: 1) only what is new, surprising or artificial can be enjoyed (art theory’s response), 2) attention to the aspect of communication having to do with utterance and expecting interest there (political theory’s response) (38). Therefore although MM production is attractive and necessary for the audience, it is also inevitably suspicious. In fact, by
this last point I think Luhmann may be challenging himself with his emphasis on the necessary presentation of media reportage as true.

*News narration, reality creation*

I argue that narrative aspects and theme construction of journalism can provide a link between the situatedness of ethnographic work on mass media and the broader flows of influence. Hannerz's work (2004) on foreign news correspondents is significant in the sense that it relates the emergence of new themes and mediums in news writing to the political economic changes in the world such as the end of Cold War (see Marcus, 1996 in the field of local journalism). Moreover, discursive novelties (Chalaby, 1996), intertextuality (Schudson, 2003), rhetoric of journalism (Glasser and Craft, 1991) provide tools for textual analysis and forming links with the social practices. However, my research interests can be more related with a particular theme, that is, narration of reality. Schudson (2003) also deals with the narrative aspects but unlike Hannerz, referring Tuchman (1978), he relates the story telling aspects of journalism to reality construction (more in Luhmann, 2000 and Jensen, 1990). All these argue the constructed nature of reality and hence the discursive nature of news making. This relatively new literature makes the older and strong tradition of media criticism (such as MacDonald) that assumed an objectively accessible reality, obsolete. Since I am intending to relate news writing to a political project, I am assuming that journalists will be engaged in to construct a new reality.

*Liebes and Curran* volume is a tribute to Elihu Katz's works on communication. In sum, what Katz intended to do can be summarized as such: 1) Mass communication functions as a social binder; 2) how social groups have sustained
a sense of their own identity; 3) problematic ways in which society and its constituent elements connect to each other through the media (11). However, Katz is pessimistic about MM’s contemporary capacity as a binding institution. In this context, Todd Gitlin shares his pessimism and declares that ‘public sphere is subdividing into sphericules owing to the proliferation of media outlets, and the splintering of the mass audience’ (13). But Curran disagrees with him by referring to the contrary case of what happened in Britain.

A particular aspect of Katz’s work was reception studies. Katz seems to be one of the earliest ones who declared that audiences were active and critical and they were responding in divergent ways. As early as the mid 1950’s Katz concluded that the critical tradition had overstated the power of the media (14). According to Curran and Liebes the implication of Katz’s study was that the media should be seen as merely one of a number of inputs (and not necessarily a very important one) in a patterned flow of influence (15).

For the editors of the volume, Katz was less interested in content analysis: only in his later works did he begin to look for semiological analyses (16) and finally he ‘burst out of the “media effects” straitjacket in the late 1980’s by contextualizing both the media and the audience’ (17). Referring to an early work of Dayan and Katz, the editors conclude that MM should be though as a vehicle than as a source of influence.

A significant aspect of this volume is its engagements with civil society theories. For instance, Alexander and Jacobs argue that theories of civil society fail to consider how civil society works as a communicative space for the imaginative constitution and reconstruction of more diffuse, but equally important, collective identities and solidarities… (23). They argue, for instance, among others Lefort’s
reformist efforts still largely assume the same anonymous, passive mass subject (25). [a] Even if my focus is on the production side of MM, how the audience is imagined should inevitably be part of my concerns since this shapes the course of production; b) this is further important since my broader concerns are related to the integration to European Union, which in turn deals with the changing aspects of citizenship, nation state etc... ]

In this vein, the authors criticize Dewey and Habermas who emphasize formalist proceduralism which in turn emphasizes society’s regulative institutions but not its communicative ones. The inference, then, is that civil society is conceived as a sphere of power and decision making...[so] the media is critically important not as a forum for public information but rather for public influence, identity and solidarity... (25-6).

However, I wonder to that extent the communicative aspect is neglected. This curiosity is inspired by Gitlin’s comments in the same volume: ‘The public needs, in short, a way to take shape, to become itself. This is why the regular, freely circulating supply of information occupies a special place in the Enlightenment ideal of autonomous individuals engaged in the practice of self-government. At one end of the ideal stands the French Encyclopedia; at another stands the newspapers and coffee houses celebrated by Jurgen Habermas (168). [I also remember Habermas’ emphasis on communication so I wonder that what extent the author’s critique is relevant...] And finally Daniel Dayan points out and critically summarizes four contemporary theoreticians: Dahlgren (media clusters or micro public spheres?); Benedict Anderson (diasporas imagined by whom?); Schudson (the ‘resonance’ of proposed identities) and Appadurai (the changing site of ethnographies).
James Carey's particular line of arguments attracted my attention: 'Nations live not only in historical time but also in media time (44) … and nations exist not only in media time but also in media space' (45).

Daniel Hallin's point on reception analyzes is significant: 'Reception analysis by itself is not capable of distinguishing between democratic and authoritarian systems' (165). I think all the 'resistance' narratives have the same weakness. Hallin then points out the need for research on media production. He criticizes Tomlinson and Katz because of their claim that there is no need to study the production process. He argues that 'the story of media institutions hardly seems as easy as to summarize as Tomlinson suggests. This is a period of tremendous dynamism in media industries… with older organizational structure breaking down in the face of globalization… without analysis of these structures postmodern notions of horizontal exchange and active audience can become just as reductive, just as simplistic as much of the writing of the 60s and 70's seem to us' (166). Glasser and Craft's essay in the volume provides 10 divisions of the contemporary rhetoric of journalism. I find them useful for my research purposes:

1. Editorial functions vs. business side,
2. news vs. opinion pages,
3. facts vs. values,
4. those who make the news vs. who cover them,
5. truth telling vs. its consequences,
6. newspapers vs. other institutions because of its duty to report on them,
7. one day vs. the other day,
8. reality vs. rhetoric,
9. one’s professional identity vs. personal identity,
10. how you ‘feel’ vs. how you ‘report’ (203-4).

Norman Jacob’s (1992, new edition) classic edition summarizes the early approaches and points out the ever-existing issues in media studies. The book starts with historicization of the critiques of modernity. ‘All big heads, Comte, Tonnies, Spencer, Simmel, Durkheim, Weber, Marx point out the negative attitudes such as depersonalization of the individual, emergence of materialistic urban values… (5). The modern society emerges as an aggregate of powerless individuals and therefore, the will of the mass is prone to be manipulated. There is fear that in such a society traditional standards will be destroyed (a fear since the French Revolution) and democratic rights will be lost with the experience of fascist dictatorships (26). Consequently, a very powerful and simultaneous critique of mass society, mass media and ultimately mass culture emerged (6). Then ‘it is easy to see that critiques of mass society and mass culture are essentially two sides of the same discursive coin’ (8). [By extension, mass media will exist in both sides]. However, despite this inseparability of the concepts, ‘the study of mass media and culture had taken divergent paths in the post WWII period… The field of communications research was dominated by positivistic empirical research and the study of mass culture was relegated to a more philosophical and political role…’ (12). But Jacobs also adds that this divergence begins to change/disappear in middle 1970’s (17).

Meanwhile, Jacobs also argues that idea of mass society was received with more optimism in the States than in Europe. Like Jensen, Jacobs states that the critique of mass media is mainly Eurocentric and American scholars apply the critique
to the US context. However, this application entails problems. Since the context differs, application is more like an imitation than providing any novelty.

Edward Shils in the volume writes in a somewhat politically incorrect way that would not be in currency nowadays and although he is not explicitly critical about the 'mediocre' and 'brutal' culture, he defines them in relation to a 'refined' and 'superior' culture and he states that they are there as long as they function well for the lower classes. However, a recurring theme of transgression of boundaries can be seen in his writing as he implicitly laments the intermixture of superior, mediocre and brutal culture even in the elite media, which is a historically unique case (50).

However, Shils is also different from the many other critics Jensen mentions in his attempt to deconstruct the theories of decline. He downplays them and argues that artistic/intellectual production is even higher in modern ages (58). The problem is with the intellectuals: they are the ones whose positions are threatened by the changing conditions and they reflect their anxieties to the society in general (59).

Leo Lowenthal, in the volume, argues that contemporary blaming on electronic media is in fact misguided. The emergence of middle classes is the main reason for culture wars. Until the 1700's cultural activities were strictly segregated and there was no crisis of cultural decline. But when historical developments brought changes and the popularization of cultural activities with the emergence of the middle classes intellectuals began to write about the conflict (73-4).

Ernest von den Haag writes explicitly against Shils and lists nine negative characteristics of mass culture, which are refutable in my view but still available in media critique (100-2). He concludes that 'high or refined culture... can best be
preserved and developed by avoiding mass media... I should go further and give up some advantages of mass production for the sake of greater individualization' (102).

The next article by Leo Rosten can be thought as a reply to Haag's. I think he has a powerful argument when he states that most intellectuals attribute oversimplified motivations to those who own or operate the MM. They think that changes in ownership or control will necessarily improve the product (113). There is already a big literature about ownership relationships in MM. The monopoly/ or cultural imperialism thesis emerges from the fact that most of the MM are owned by a few Western conglomerates. However, these theses completely overlook the possible innovations and differentiations within the supposedly monopolistic media. Rosten also lists a group of negative characteristic that are attributed to the MM and refutes them one by one (114-123). I think these are still available discursive traits that inform the media studies:

1. Mass media lack originality,
2. MM do not use the best brains or freshest talents,
3. MM do not print or broadcast the best material that is submitted to them,
4. MM cannot afford to step on anyone's toes,
5. MM do not give public enough information about the serious problems of our times,
6. Aesthetic level of MM is appalling: truth is sacrificed to the happy ending, escapism is exalted, romance, violence and melodrama prevail,
7. MM corrupt and debase public taste; they create the kind of audience that enjoys cheap and trivial entertainment,
8. MM are what they are because they are operated solely as monde-making enterprises,
9. MM are dominated or too much influenced by the advertisers,
10. MM do not provide an adequate forum for minority views, for the
dissident and unorthodox.

State of studies on Turkish journalism

There are no ethnographic studies about Turkish journalists. An
interview-based comparative study (Tilic, 1998) between Turkish and Greek
journalism, remains to be the closest one to ethnography. The book shows how
nationalist designs are influential especially in case of foreign news making.
Otherwise this can be linked to a growing critical literature on Turkish journalism by
liberal and left wing circles (i.e. for the former, Kursat Bumin, 2000 and for the latter,
a CGD report, December 1998), which is inspired by especially Noam Chomsky’s
media imperialism thesis (1988). Particularly, these emphasize the repressive role of
the state in news making. There is also a ‘normative’ literature: Collected essays of
Demirkent (2000a and 2000b), who was a very respected journalist, could be the best
example. Without explicitly pointing out the turning point (that’s the emergence of
media conglomerations in the 1980s), Demirkent laments about the changing
journalistic traditions and writes about how a proper journalism should be. His ideas
are sometimes close to objectivism of American journalism but he does not fail to
mention inculcating aspects of Turkish journalism. The critical literature ignores
the nation-state framework in news making and the journalistic capacities to
interpret and mediate broad policy changes. The normative one fails to
contextualize the historical and political changes that shape journalism and
misses the changes at all since it looks for what ‘lacks’ from the ideal instead of the change itself.
The anthropology of the European Union

Until the very recent times the EU studies were monopolized by economics, international relations and political science disciplines. Involvement of social sciences gradually increased as the need for cultural policies has grown (Bellier and Wilson, 2000). My reading of newly emerging anthropological literature focuses on finding out themes that could be related to my research purposes and my ethnography of journalism.

Discursive formations of EU

Shore (2000 and 1997) and Holmes (2000) are especially helpful to demonstrate the importance of discursive processes in the making of the EU. The former relates journalistic representations to the building metaphors for the Union. He also demonstrates how the EU increasingly relies on cultural policies on architecture, higher education, women and history writing and thus depends on intellectuals like nation-states did before in order to promote herself (Shore, 2000). Meanwhile, Holmes’ study of integralism in Europe (2000) attempts to ethnographically link local developments to cultural politics of Brussels and demonstrate how they mutually shape each other. Besides, he underlines the discursive strategies and novelties such as the concept of subsidiarity to define the emerging new society. Borneman and Fowler (1997)’s earlier review of the literature tends to differentiate EU building and Europeanization, the latter being a broader and more cultural project. But more recent literature implies that these processes are merging to be a single process in which understanding of the EU only as a collection of political and bureaucratic institutions or simply an umbrella organization for the articulation of member state policies cannot be valid. On the Turkish side, Birand
(2001) highlights the density of EU imaginaries among Turks. From the outset, EU
triggered an imaginary of a new life at all levels of Turkish society. Eralp (1994) is
more interested in the grand narratives of the EU application and he situates EU
application as a logical outcome of Turkish elites’ modernization project. My interest
is in a way to combine these two approaches: to relate imaginaries of journalists and
policy elites to formation of a new modernization narrative.

**Ethnographical issues/interests**

Shore states that ‘far from being ‘closed’ the European Commission is
worryingly open to journalists, researchers, pressure groups and professional
lobbyists… I therefore found contacting officials remarkably easy… though certain
areas of discussion were out of bounds and one sense a considerable degree of self-
two cities as the would be centers of ethnographic attention: ‘while the capitals of the
member states assume by half-year rotation the presidency of the EU, two cities are
fighting for recognition as its permanent capital: Strasbourg in France I is the seat of
the European Parliament, Brussels in Belgium is the seat of most of the institutions.
They are where the action takes places and where the anthropologists of the EU
institutions do most of their fieldwork (59).

Quoting from Bach (1999), Weiss and Wodak (2000) highlight the importance
of experts as a focus of research: ‘a sociological analysis of the EU institutions has to
systematically elaborate on the specific rationality criteria of “expertises” that pretend
to be un-political but nevertheless have become an integral part of the policy making
process’ (76). The authors related this issue to globalization rhetoric which is in turn
marked by two constitutive discourse: 1) the depoliticization of socioeconomic fields
of activity (the role financial markets is especially important); 2) the passing of the nation-state which also means the passing of the welfare state (77).

According to Shore the study of the internal life of the EU’s own institutions is important because it highlights issues that are indicative of the wider problem of trying to build an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe (126). However, there are other recommendations for further research. Borneman and Fowler (1997), for instance, suggest five relatively unexplored domains of practice where the process of Europeanization might be fruitfully studied: Languages, money, tourism, sex and sport (498). Wilson’s interest is altogether different: the nation-state and its institutions are still valid objects of study because ‘in centralized states in the EU the institutions and policy making functions of the state take precedence over all major EU initiatives precisely because Europe building is filtered through state structures’ (153). Therefore, ‘an anthropology of the EU must explore the EU’s institutions and processes as they are experience in everyday life, at every level of the society and culture throughout the member states and even beyond the EU’s borders’ (same page).

Meanwhile, Bellier and Wilson warn about an epistemological trap: ‘...from above and below implies some sort of Platonic ideal, in which anthropologists, and other social scientists who employ this popular metaphor for studying large political and social institutions, like the state, approach an entity from opposite directions but they never reach their goal, never actually study it, or they only devise strategies to study its outline or its manifestations in the lives of people removed from its core or its head’ (4).

Whatever the orientations scholars may have, they have common ideals about the incomplete and future-oriented nature of the EU. Thus any ethnographic study
must take into account this state of affairs. Borneman and Fowler stat that ‘since Europe as an object of knowledge for research is still being constructed, we merely point out to ways in which this object in the making is and can be studied ethnographically’ (498) and they recommend dropping the search for a totalizing metaphor and the analogies such as a European superstate or US of Europe. Instead, they suggest dealing with the EU as a continental political unit of a novel order, and with Europeanization pragmatically as a spirit, a vision and a process (510). Bellier and Wilson are not very different in their suggestions: ‘instead of labeling it as a from, a federal union or a supranational level, it is our task to describe and analyze the cultural articulations between local, regional, national and EU levels’ (4). Finally, Abeles (2000) suggests that Europe has to be studied as a process. It is not a product, and it cannot be reified under the categories of community and of identity as in traditional anthropological works. Community in the EU is a dream or a metaphor rather than a concrete reality (51).

In this context, ‘old approaches to the EU are not very productive. Because the EU is not only a collection of political and bureaucratic institutions nor simply an umbrella organization for the articulation of member state policies, but is an arena of cultural relations, an entity erecting its own culture, sets of representations and symbols’ say Bellier and Wilson and I find Douglas Holmes’ work as one of the rare ones that satisfy the suggestion developed above. Holmes points three anthropologists that provided a framework for his fieldwork: Paul Rabinow: a compelling framework for critically evaluating the science, political economy and metaphysics of solidarity at the heart of the EU. Strathern: as the first one to theorize the very specific ways that fast capitalism (though she does not use the term) radically flattens those pre-existing frameworks of social meaning upon which our understanding of individual
democracies rest. Finally George Marcus: to engage ethnography with emerging
eresonances of society, with contours of a nascent social (5-6).

**EU and cultural politics**

EU’s special nature of emergence triggers cultural debates. It is an
institutionally and culturally open-ended process. It is a dream, it is strongly future
oriented (Bellier and Wilson, ibid; Shore, ibid; and Abeles, 2000). However, this
position is complicated with contrary claims: some policy elites see the EU as a result
of a three thousand year of European history [same sources]. More particularly,
Holmes lists Judeo-Christian religion; Greek/Hellenistic ideas of government,
philosophy and art; Roman law; Renaissance humanism, ideals of enlightenment,
scientific revolution, social democracy, rule of law (2000, 38) as themes of these
claims. In the end, Abeles argues that there is a symbolic deficit. My research is
interested in the study of the reception of this deficit in the Turkish side. This is
especially important because Turkey’s position has already started to complicate the
cultural debates within the EU and I will trace their reflections in Turkey.

**The nature of the EU**

The European rulers are strongly committed to reason, science, prosperity and
liberalism. The official policy rests in an unshaken belief in progress and rationality
and its tacit and sometimes overt assumptions about the superiority of ‘European’
civilization is a background for the EU claim to embody the ‘European legacy’
(Shore, 35). Therefore, ‘far from embodying the thinking of a new age in human
history [EU elites] seem to indicate an altogether more conservative current of 19th
century, that is, social evolutionism in their policy (‘EU historiography represents the
last three thousand years of European history as a kind of moral success story’, 57)’
(50). Shore concludes that ‘... European constitution is perhaps the last and possibly the greatest of the Enlightenment grand narratives (207). The Enlightenment roots of the EU project are too hegemonic especially at the moment of its birth but as the process continues, a more eclectic but Eurocentric worldview appears: Holmes (2000) lists Judeo-Christian religion; Greek/Hellenistic ideas of government, philosophy and art; Roman law, Renaissance humanism, ideals of Enlightenment, scientific revolution, social democracy, rule of law, etc. as characteristics attributed to the EU project (38). It will be interesting to see how Turks accommodate themselves to this worldview.

However, as Borneman and Fowler (BF) state there is a significant difference between the EU and the previous European states: ‘... there no imminent invaders, no new world, no colonies, no occupiers against whom Europe can take shape, ‘the mirror of man’ has been turned back to itself (488). But this is not really a very optimistic picture since some ‘others’ are already invented in the process. Refugees, Muslims, Turks are some probable others in the new scene. This will be an essential point to follow. The authors highlights an analytical separation: EU building and Europeanization are not the same processes. They do not necessarily overlap (490). The latter, especially its values of progress, liberty and freedom, may have worked with the nation-state formations but the EU ‘has neither fate nor plot to work with’ (492). As centralization increases, citizens of European nation-states may have a growing resentment in terms of democratic rights. However, at the same time Europeanization and the EU have strategic commonalities: both of them can appeal only to future-oriented narratives of individualism and the market. If people become European, their identities will no longer turn around categories of folk, religion or
national defense but around categories of exchange and difference value (492, quoted from Segal, 1991).

Moreover, despite the commonalities attributed to European civilization, the EU is not a completed entity. 'Building Europe' refers to an open-minded ontology...it is much about a state of mind and aspiration and an ethos as it is about concrete programs. Thus building is also a matter of 'imagining Europe' (Bellier and Wilson, 16). Abeles (2000) also underlines the openness and the structural uncertainty of EU's future (31). Many of the EU symbols, such as its anthem, with music but no words, or the empty space in the 12-starred circle, reflect and illuminate its symbolic deficit (38). In fact, this can all be attributed to the idea of Europe that wants to be synonymous or coterminous with modernism (39). That is, an entity always in the present tense and notorious for its lack of history (as Holmes portrays this as an advantage, 38). The method through which the EU progresses has strong modernist connotations: As Abeles describes it: 'each step in European integration is a preparation for the next one. This is called 'the spillover effect' and it is founded by and sometimes named after one of the fathers of the EU: the Monnet method: It is to initiate 'engrangement', an action trap in which once the agents are set in a specific course of action (they are obliged) to take further action which points them in a direction which they did not necessarily intend to go... But the method had an unexpected consequence: the political aim of the European project has never been clarified but what is more interesting for the anthropologists is that it must not be clarified' (35). Thus without a sophisticated sense of history and memory the Europe of the EU seems to be trapped in a cycle of successive take-offs and the re-cultivation of its roots. The community purposely denies history. They prefer the delights of a future whose contours they choose not to draw precisely (34).
However, this open-endedness that has strong relations with modernist thinking ends up being without a coherent set of political concepts and discourses (39). Thus, paradoxically, below the proclamation of rationality new concepts are generated which are the pure outcome of compromise. Abeles cites 'subsidiarity' and 'community interest' as two examples (45) of the compromises. These are not totally unrelated to the EU project since, for instance, the pursuit of a European common good, which is a merger between the French notion of general will and the British notion of 'liberalism' according to Bellier and Wilson (63), only makes sense in reference to the future (which is shaped by the EU project itself) (50).

Meanwhile, the process does not only end up with some paradoxical terminology. Wilson warns about the social consequences of the process: 'cultural deficit', a lack of fit between diverse European cultures and the elite cultures of member states' governments, multidimensional corporations and the institutions of the EU, both of which give impetus to the European project (137). European identity is about both 'being' European and 'becoming' European (139), which means there will be more struggles to define the project. The adjectives listed by Holmes at the beginning of this section are bound to be reconfigured throughout the process. Besides, a more imminent danger is pointed put by Holmes: Integralist aspirations are expressed in efforts to circumvent the alienating force of modernity by means of culturally based solidarities which would in turn disrupt the Enlightenment roots of the project (4). Holmes lists four strands of pluralism. The list both symbolizes the rather complex nature of the project and the inherent dangers causing integralism: 1) pluralism – idealized view of European civilization and pragmatic elements of Catholic social teaching; 2) Institutionalized, decentralized and socially progressive Europe of regions; 3) opposition to forces seen as hostile to the emergence of a
humane and tolerant European pluralism: racism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism and neo-Fascism; 4) cultural incommensurability, which is the road leading to integralism (32-3). In fact, the EU project does not totally ignore the possible social consequences. Holmes argues that most of the approaches tend to overlook the abiding social character of the European project, its deep preoccupation with society. French social modernism and Catholic social doctrine serve as a the symbolic frameworks that have sustained this wide-ranging political development (28). While the social modernist project was accompanied by a shift in rhetoric substituting contingent notions of ‘interdependence’, ‘participation’, ‘convergence’ for the monolithic ideal of ‘solidarity’ (44), the Catholic approach, rather than pursuing technocratic interventionism, seeks to foster an intricate moral discourse through which conditions of individual autonomy and ties of social interdependence are subject to ongoing analysis and facilitation (same page). What is more important thus is not that the EU project lacks social policies, but how they are enacted and work throughout the process.

Finally, Bellier demonstrates the new face of the project: it was seen for a long time as a conglomeration of foreign affairs handled by diplomats. But now it has become a domestic affair, handled by experts (59). Thus (European officials’) perception of being apart is due not only to their status as expatriates and the high level of their wages but also to their role in constituting an expert discourse as a means to overcome political divergence (66).

The working of the system

The EU institutions are surprisingly legalistic. There are details of legislations of every conceivable subject, e.g., concerning staff regulations. The legalistic aspect
might be attributed to the domination of the Commission by lawyers and economists. They undoubtedly shaped its character, style and ethos (135). Meanwhile, perhaps due to strong trade union resistance personnel law in the EC has been the least reformed part (174-5). But his goes hand in hand with too much informal violation and manipulation of the rules! (Shore, 2000: 132-3). In fact, informality is part of the system at different levels. For instance, the display of official and private identities is especially important in Brussels, where the non-official work is very much involved with the institutional arena at the receptions, clubs or meeting over cocktails (Bellier, 62). The European Commission seems to find in lobbies and in interlocutors other than national delegates the resources needed for the arbitrating the positions formulated by the member states (68). Meanwhile, one must also be aware of Holmes’ warning: ‘[senior cohort of politicians in EU parliament] institutionalized the EU’s agenda in layer upon layer of informal agreements that rarely come under journalistic or academic scrutiny or made their way into public debate... What is most prominent in the EU’s development is its commitment to a series of far-reaching economic agendas that conceal its underlying social and moral urgencies’ (27). Finally, the chronic lack accountability and ‘democratic deficit’ are characteristics of the institutions. Against the high-profile corruption charges in the late 1980’s, the European Commission leaders preferred the denial of responsibility and did not allow an open policy in the investigations (203). Shore states that this is just another case of the inaccessibility of the EU.

The working of the system leads to some more technical inaccess problem: the lack of linguistic unity depersonalizes the debates. Pluralism then becomes an important factor contributing to opacity... because each country’s political language mobilizes a different rhetoric, certain subtleties are almost impossible to translate
across linguistic and political cultural divides (Abels, 40). Thus the commission civil servants suffer... from the loss of references and the lack of elaboration of a new universe of representations (42). Bellier adds that [quoting from Clifford] once dialogism and polyphony are recognized as modes of textual production, monophonic authority is questioned (55).

A sense of urgency of deciding about complex subjects might make the system less intelligible to outsiders. Abeles notes that the European Commission is better at immediate short-term objectives. They like to work with a sense of urgency... in quiet times the atmosphere is darker with the flow of uncertainty and anxiety. There is also a deficit of tradition in this kind of working: there is no past for the commission...it represses memories of conflict, however recent they may be... There is a culture of uncertain urgency (32). 'The European institutions permanently work under the pressure of the calendar. To understand the omnipresence of the agenda, one should remember that most of the work done on the commission required the face-to-face interaction of several partners. Deadlines are compulsory in order to reach a conclusion on subjects, which are always very complex (33).

EU officials are the most respected public servants in Europe. They have semi-diplomatic rights, they have generous financial benefits and job security is extraordinary (Shore, 141). In turn, not only competence but also devotion to the 'European ideal' is required and recruitment is not based on national governments (140). They are in fact not like national public servants since they are more like 'policy makers, innovators, intellectuals, and architects of the new European order' and this is not only because they are power-hungry technocrats but also because it is an entailment of their responsibilities (145). However, an ethnographic inquiry will
portray a more complicated scene. According to Shore not the understaffing or other pretext but the competition between inter-governmentalism and supra-nationalism in the inner world of the Commission is the reason for a chronic lack of accountability and the absence of a coherent personnel policy (173). Neofunctionalist theory assumed a causal link between changes in the political behavior and shifts in normative social values... that is, 'functional spillover’ would cause cultural spillover but this did not happen (149). The ethnography of civil servants demonstrate that a pattern of cultivating personal networks within the organization is the only way to rise up in the bureaucracy (180) and most of these networks tend to run along national lines. Especially, the UK and the Nordic countries criticize the system for a southern/Latin bias and openness to patronage relations (192). In addition to regular staffing, the increasing use of non-statutory staff (especially auxiliaries) has resulted in the emergence of an almost parallel administrative regime with its own salary scales, promotion prospects and procedures... (197). The regular claim is that these growing staff members symbolize the nation-states’ intervention into the organization. However, this might be a necessary personnel policy since ‘much of the EU’s involvement in people’s everyday lives still occurs principally through national administrative channels’ (Bellier and Wilson, 3).

As Shore argues somewhere else, new-age management concepts like ‘career development’ and ‘human resource management’ are also absent in the organization (198). In fact, these problems are already identified by the 1979 Spierenburg report [as Ludlow (1991) states] but there have been no structural reforms in the personnel organization. Therefore, relative inefficiency of regulars due to high job security is compensated by the auxiliary, more nationalist-oriented personnel and this puts the organization in a state of constant conflict. However, I must add that Shore also argues
that even among the regulars one cannot suppose a self-evident transnational subjectivity. Transnational/European identity has not yet been founded even in the very regular staff.

**Nation state and policy elites**

In studies of the EU, nation state/nationalism remains to be an important analytical tool. Some scholars tend to think that the union policies explicitly remind nation-building strategies: Shore’s emphasis on monetary and citizenship policies, creation of symbols such as the EU flag and anthem and projects of rewriting history strengthen this position (2000). Bellier and Wilson (ibid) are not so enthusiastic to think in terms of nation state but they and some others in their volume do not ignore that nationalism is at work at several levels of Union building (see Wilson on Northern Ireland, Zabusky on ESTEC [European Space Agency] and Jenkins on Denmark). Nationalism/nation state is thus a legitimate analytical tool to start with for further inquiries. This especially gains currency when one looks at the citizenship policies of the Union. With their constructed and normative nature (Shore, 2000 and Neveu, 2000), these policies can reproduce the national fears or classifications of insiders/outsiders to a Union level. National debates (I found Jenkins’ study particularly helpful) have the potential to determine a higher (the EU) level.

**In terms of nation-state**

Shore tends to think of the EU’s emergence in terms of nation-state formation. He does not ignore the scholarly and political discourses that portray the EU as something different from the nation state but for Shore nation-state models are very influential at least in two aspects: a) the vanguard role of the intelligentsia in precipitating the rise of nationalism; b) developments in the domain of culture and
communication technologies in precipitating the rise of nationalist consciousness (2000; 32-3). Unlike the nation states, the EU lacks a 'culture' and the loyalty of citizens lies in embracing a culture (17-8). Therefore, the EU encounters a fundamental dilemma: The addresses of integration is the 'European Public' but his barely exists as a recognizable category. Except in some few areas, it hardly exists as a subjective and self-recognizing body (19). The existence of this dilemma has been recognized relatively recently as European leaders, under the heavy influence of neo-functionalism, expected that economic and legal integration would be followed by social and political integration (18, quoted from Pascal Lamy). When it was understood that this would not be the case, attention began to be directed to the area of culture. What is interesting is the deployment of the same policy of dirigisme as the new means of EU-making.

Accordingly, Shore lists four key sites where EU elites have attempted to invent Europe at the level of public opinion through the medium of culture and both of which resemble the nation-state formation of the previous ages: a) creation of new symbols; b) field of information policy; c) Europeanize higher education through the rewriting of history; d) identification of women as specific targets for EU culture-building activities (41). Among many others, the Euro design with its abstract architectural portrayals symbolized the openness and the process of state building (108). In symbols and in general historiography the process includes the appropriation and reinterpretation of national cultural icons as indices of a unitary 'European' history, which is called 'departicularization' by Alonso (1988) and the same strategy in nation-state formations is well documented in Foster (1991) (54).
Bellier and Wilson (2000) are not very enthusiastic about considering the EU in nation-state terms, but they are aware that 'since most of the EU officials ad leaders think of the EU in terms/language of the nation-state, we can use those approaches' (7-8). Moreover, nationalism is more important in the everyday life of Europeans. Wilson's essay deals with the fact that nationalism is more important to people in Northern Ireland than is 'Europe' and a European identity (154). Zabusky also refers to a joke she found that was posted on numerous bulletin boards through ESTEC:

Heaven is where Hell is where

Police are British German

Chefs French British

Lovers Italian Swiss

Mechanics German French

Organized by Swiss Italians! (186).

She argues that in order to find this joke funny, listeners and readers must share certain assumptions

About identity, European nations and work. The employees maintained their national identities in the institution and they were effectively cut off from the promises and perversities of local life in the Netherlands (189). However, there has also emerged a space where expertise talks, nation-ness became less important (187). In fact, a much more sought transnational identity can be found through the development of the language of expertise. Thus, as in the case of the campaign for the currency, the Euro, rendering the political into economic [and here into expertise]
might also be a strategy to pacify the concerns over the sovereignty of the particular nations [and national identities] (Shore, 104-6).

Bellier’s position can be contrasted with Shore’s: ‘the center of power has been progressively displaced from the nation-states’ capitals to Brussels, enlarging the space of action for political and administrative leaders and introducing multicultural perspectives in their national frames of references. As a consequence, the diversification of actors and interest groups that challenges the state’s representation in the policy making process’ (53). In fact, this is not ignored by Shore. What Shore doubts that is the increasing centralization will mean just a new super nation-state. Holmes’ discussion of subsidiarity, which has been employed to mediate a debate on issues of ‘sovereignty’ (50), might be helpful. The concept may never allow the same hierarchy of organization as we know in the nation-state (subsidiarity, which is derived from the Catholic church, basically requires that what can be done in a satisfactory way by a lower authority must not be taken over by a higher one… [Quoting from Tindemen in Holmes, 52].

Even the European Commission, which is normally an insular supra-national organization, is not exempted from nation-state politics as Robert Thomson states:

Commissioners’ country affiliations are an important guide to their behavior. This contrasts with the view of commissioners as being insulated from national pressures. However, it is consistent with research that finds that commissioners’ country role informs their actions more so than their party or ideological affiliations (Egeberg, 2006). Hooghe (1999a, 1999b, 2002, 2005) also finds national variation among commission officials’ orientations toward European integration. (p. 188)
Meanwhile, significance of experts in EU politics justifies my study of policy elites. Here I am particularly thinking the way that policies are made by above. Bellier and Wilson and Weiss and Wodak state that EU has become a domestic issue that is handled by experts. This forces EU official to frequently apply to informality to overcome the legalism and technical complexity (Shore, 2000). The reliance on experts can be a prime mover in the transformation of policy elites, that is, experts may replace some of the traditional actors. However, I argue that the struggle between informal and formal aspects of the Union will not allow a technocratic rule. At least in Turkish case I will demonstrate instances of possible alliances between experts and a new breed of non-expert policy elites. Here journalism acts as an interpreter between the experts and policy elites.
Social scientific and journalistic studies on Turkey

EU and Turkey

Mehmet Ali Birand, a Turkish journalist, evaluates Turkey’s position:

One of Birand’s constant journalistic interests is Turkey’s relation with the EU. I have read the eleventh edition of his book on the subject (Birand, 2001). In this last edition he covers 40 years of relations (1959-1999).

How Turkey is portrayed.

It is interesting to see how the description of Turkey’s weaknesses has changed since her first application. An EU report in 1960’s portrayed Turkey as such: the Turkish economy is weak/underdeveloped. It is based on a Mediterranean-type agricultural structure. Industries are heavily protected and profit is not used in investment... (71-3). The other disadvantages were the high population increase and foreign debt and the possible social chaos. Meanwhile, Turkey was a politically and militarily strategic country and her market was big. This portrayal would have its effect until the early 1980’s. Both parties, the EU and Turkey, tried to manipulate this basic scheme.

In fact, every coup d’etat is a break in Turkey-EU relations and this started with the 1960 coup. France lead boycotting of the negotiations with Turk. At the time, Germany used to have a more pro-Turkish stance than she has now (114-5).

In economic matters, towards the 1970’s the internal, ‘south’ and ‘north’ division in the EU would affect Turkey’s position. While industrialized northern countries would not object to Turkey’s membership, more
agriculturalist southern countries like France and Italy would see turkey as a rival who would be sharer of the related funds (132).

After 1980, perhaps also due to the fact that Turkey had already entered into a phase of the free market, human rights and democratic rights become the main concern of the EU. The standards in these issues had to be met. These were new preconditions. First the Kurdish question, the Armenian question at the end of Ottomans, democracy and human rights problem and finally the Cyprus crisis would dominate the agenda of the ever-ongoing negotiations (1984).

**Why does Turkey want to join the EU?**

Turkey’s immediate reason for the application was Greece’s application. Just after Greece applied, Turkey was knocking on the doors of the EU. In fact, these two countries were the first applicants for the original EU. Turkey was heavily interested in maintaining the strategic balance with Greece and she sensed that Greece’s membership would disrupt the balance at her expense (79). In 1961, Greece signed one of the initial agreements and she secured many concessions from the EU. Birand argues that this was due to the EU’s lack of experience at that stage. Moreover, the Greek economy was relatively small and that would not affect the EU significantly. Greece in turn had to give up some advantages but this was compensated by its sea and tourism industry. Turkey would refer to these concessions and would want similar ones but she could not afford to give any concessions in return since she did not have the sources to compensate (91). Turkey began to prepare its
own program after 1960 but it was still under the impact of the Greek model (104).

However, the official discourse for Turkey’s application was based on two reasons: to have closer relations with the West and to increase the amount of exports (80). In most of the encounters with the EU, the Turkish statesmen ignored the economic role and just insisted on the political aspect of the union. The EU marked a new phase in the history of the Turkey’s westernization (168-9). But Birand adds that the nature of Turkish policy, at least in the beginning, was just to cling to the Union. There were not many future plans, and everything would be solved eventually (158). This position is, of course, different from the open-endedness of the EU policies that are discussed above but, this makes for a interesting resonance.

Meanwhile, despite the restrictiveness of official desires, Birand portrays a larger imaginary about union membership. This goes from the familiar prosperity from agricultural production to the new citizenship rights, especially in context of free mobility (168-9).

Who is in charge?

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) monopolized from the outset. Its main rival would be the State Planning Office, a very respected office on occasions of state planning before the 1980’s. but it was not founded until 1960 and it took some time to evaluate this situation (87). When Turkish public was stunned with the coup d’etat and the execution of the prime minister by the army, neither the public not the mass media were interested in the negotiations with the EU.
The military regime ordered the Ministry of Finance (MF) to negotiate. The nature of the EU was economic at that time and the generals wanted that ministry to deal with all the foreign economic relations. However, MFA bureaucracy did not like the idea of and preferred to hide information from the MF. Thus for awhile, the relations with the EU were partially disrupted due to the rivalry between the ministries (100). Later the MFA would again monopolize the negotiations and they would even keep it in a kind of secrecy from other state institutions. The Planning Office, which eventually had cadres who opposed joining the EU, was keeping a low profile in opposition throughout the 60’s since it was still a new institution (154). However, at the end of 60’s a crisis between the two institutions finally emerged. The parties of the crisis accused the others of being traitors, or communists and reactionaries. But it seems that the MFA was strong enough to force the Planning Office to retreat (200).

Meanwhile, whoever got the power, joining the EU was a state policy and the military did not object to this process (101) and only a very few bureaucrats especially in MFA were to shape Turkish policy for decades. Until very recently Saracoğlu in Ankara and Ziya Muezzinoglu in Brussels, two bureaucrats, coordinated all studies and negotiations (200).

Turkish mass media’s first real attention to the subject was after the first application happened in 1961 when Greece-EU agreement was officially signed and it was more because of the traditional enemy, Greece, than the EU itself and it was not until 1968 with Milliyet daily that Turkish journalists would begin to try to cover the EU and put it on the agenda of public opinion.
Until 1961, the government never publicly claimed EU relations. Finally, deputy prime minister Feyzioglu declared the importance of the EU (122-3).

In the initial stages there were no Turkish technical experts who could calculate the impact of EU relations. The level of expertise in Turks’ behalf had been too low. Turks in technical matters basically copied from Greece’s agreement with the EU (119). Private sector and other business circles remained ignorant about the issue until very recently. Birand argues that domestic political issues would shape their approaches to the EU. However, this whole process of negotiations can be read as the emergence of a new knowledge regime. The wealth and resources of a country would be reconsidered and evaluated in novel forms and Turkey was really behind in this entire knowledge-making process (245). For instance, the debate whether cotton is an industrial product or an agricultural product and its changing answer may point to the changes of the society at several levels (266).

Meanwhile, a famous politician said ‘the EU issue depends on both a political and economic philosophy and the detailed knowledge of the problems of a country. In the EU, even an issue over tomato paste is discussed for several hours and hundreds of pages of textual material are produced out of it’ (305-6).

Deceptive encounters...

Turkey might rightly be accused of being irresponsible in the context of her promises to the EU. But the EU has also employed a policy of deception from its initial period. Most of the EU members acknowledge the significance of Turkey but they cannot think of her as a member in the foreseeable future. So they want to preserve the status quo by extending period by using different
labels. Thus, what was signed in 1962 becomes a good example. The treaty declares that after a period of preparation, Turkey will become a part of the customs union. But that condition of preparation had no deadlines and it would last forever (132). However, one should also add that Turkish governments eventually understood the EU’s policy and tried to benefit from it. It would allow the EU to be accused when the state could really not perform the duties she promised. So policy making as a whole began to be mutually manipulated and used as a cover against the publicly declared plans.

Who does not want the EU?

In the 1970’s the opposition against state policy concerning the EU crystallized in left- and right-wing circles: Rightists argued that Turkey would be christianized and the EU was in fact governed by the Jews, which implied a Semitic conspiracy. Meanwhile, leftists were against more relations with the NATO members, which were in turn the opponents of leftist movements and the USSR. In spite of the small size of these oppositions, it is interesting to see that they propagated their views more broadly in the mass media than one expects.

Eventually, governments in general began to play a more significant role in the relations. Thus a government’s position strongly affected the situation. The nationalist governments of the 1970’s retreated from the process. Later, center-leftist Ecevit would become the hope of the EU but he succeeded in showing that he was as concerned as the nationalists about the disadvantages of the union. Decades later, Ecevit would again become a
primer minister of a coalition, one of whose partners were extreme nationalists and the Turkey-EU relations would deteriorate.

Earlier studies

Early studies on Turkey dwell on a story of radical rupture from the past (the Ottoman past). Lerner (1958), Lewis (1961) and Kiray (1964) represent Turkey as a successful example of transition from tradition to modernity. The success story and its embodiment by the ordinary people can also be found in a relatively obscure book written for the American audiences just after the end of WWII (Ekrem, 1947). A series of fieldworks by Sterling et al (1993) in 1960s and 1970s among the Turkish peasants did not change or elaborate the existing schemes about Turkey. Turkey was seen as realizing a slogan of modernization: Modernizing social forces and material forms would have the universal effect of eroding local cultural differences (Comaroffs, 1993).

Later studies

However, recent studies question the radical break narrative (i.e. Schick and Tonak, 1987). They argue for continuity between the Ottoman past and the Republican period especially in terms of the role of the state in determining subjects’ lives. More particularly, continuity in the relations between regional elites the state (Meeker, 2002), continuity of authoritarian governmentality of the State in terms of state-led wide ranging projects (Mardin, 1973; 1989) and similarities in state’s treatment of opposition Akcam (1995) can be cited. Alongside the continuity thesis, autonomy of local cultural differences that were supposed to disappear during modernization is emphasized in the recent literature. Mardin’s early study of intellectual history of the first secular elites, Young Turks of 19th century (1973) is
followed by a study of local dynamics of an Islamic movement (1989). Mardin claims an un-breachable gap between the ‘center’ and the ‘periphery’ and the latter continues to exist because the former cannot produce the alternative everyday life values to replace the role of Islam in the periphery. Although I find both of his studies invaluable, I find the idea of incommensurability quite problematic since the majority of Turkish citizens did indeed adopted the Kemalist principles to considerable extents. Meanwhile, the New York Times’ former Istanbul correspondent Kinzer (2001)’s book can be seen the ultimate autonomization of the cultural differences. His book ‘Between the Star and Crescent’ represents Turkey as an in-between position between the values of East and the West. These are not to disappear but peacefully negotiate. I am close to a different branch of recent studies. These state that the ‘undesired’ parts and characteristics of the society (by the early Republicans) are not incommensurable with the modern. They are, in fact, the result of modernization project and thus they are part of what we see as the Turkish modernity. Thus, emergent Islamic movements in the way they mobilize and produce their own elites (Gole, 1997); lower class preference of ‘arabesk’ popular music (Strokes in Armbrust, 2000 and Ozbek, 1991) are products of the Turkish modern. I differ from these studies in the sense that I will be studying a rupture within the context of EU integration within the present history of Turkish modernization.

**Turkish elites and cultural production**

Another point of difference is in my focus on studying the policy elites and their mediators (journalists) who are behind the modernization project. The ethnographic studies of Turkish policy elites are nearly absent. Keyder (1987) and Gulalp (1980)’s studies are invaluable but these works study the elites in terms of
class policies. The elites are depersonalized and one cannot find any cultural characteristics or inner workings of these elites. Meeker’s study (ibid) is the most explicit and ethnographic study of a section of Turkish elites, but these are the local ones and they have no direct influence over the national policies. Some collective volumes produced after the 75th anniversary of the Republic (1998a, 1998b, 1998c) and Kasaba and Bozdogan (1997) are the closest ones to the study of elites but they focus mostly on the early periods of the Republic and they can mostly be classified as studies in the intellectual history. The idea of three dominant themes that informs my project (secularism, nationalism and women) in Turkish modernity comes from the latter. Many essays in Kandiyoti and Saktanber (2002) are about relatively current cultural production but again the emphasis is on public reception. Although it basically depends on a textual analysis Oncu’s essay (2002) in this volume is significant in the way it relates the media constructions to some possible social consequences. Finally, Sirman and Finkel’s volume (1990) is a very successful ethnographic work but its significance is based on demonstrating how representations of policy elites and state power reflect upon the daily lives of citizens. In this context, my study will be an attempt to fill in the gap in the literature by studying the contemporary Turkish elites through focusing on the cultural production.

Kasaba and Bozdogan (1997) volume needs more attention. Kasaba outlines the volume’s orientation as such: To the Turkish political elites Ottoman-Turkish society was a project and the people could at most be the object of their experiment. The underlying assumption was that once the environment was altered, the behaviour of individuals could easily be molded and made to fit the requirements of the newly created circumstances (23-4). It was not only what people wore but also where and
how they lived, what kind of music they listened to, and even what they ate that had to
conform to modern norms (25). This elite Jacobinism has two western constitutions.

a) Total admiration of science and b) the Enlightenment ideal of progress.
Their survival (synonymous with the survival of the state and the nation for them) was
contingent upon defining a homogeneous and unified community as the basis of their
rule and legitimacy. Science and the principle of progress would guarantee this goal
and obstacles would be eliminated. This goal, not very surprisingly, was excluding
Islamicity, which was associated with the ancien regime, and non-muslim minorities
(27-8). Moreover, elites were suspicious of anything related to individual initiative,
which was again related to the potential derailing of the modernization project. The
new regime curbed civil rights and personal freedoms and it ended up isolated from
society with a close-minded outlook. Generally, there is no need to disagree with these
arguments. However, one wonders about elites. Despite their role as prime movers
and present gatekeepers, the whole volume leave them unstudied. Although they are
depicted as followers of western concepts, they are portrayed not more than mere
imitators. Especially in thinking Faubion’s insight that sophistication in the handling
of the juxtaposition of here and there would be the work of those who have copious
possession of both social and cultural capital (Faubion, 1988).

Kasaba concludes his essay by dissociating the state-led project from the
modernity itself. He states that state-centered uniformist models may end but this does
not mean the end of modernity itself. Stripped of the artificial certainties and
uniformities of yesteryear, the world appears not chaotic and insecure but full of
possibilities (33).
Islam and Modernity

Keyder argues that in the last decade of the 20th century a deep sense of malaise gripped Turkish society (37). Keyder's is an elitist tone that claims to own the license to talk in the name of people. Moreover, the use of work malaise is more of a subjective preference than a social scientific fact. Keyder explicitly states his position: 'I share the Westernizers' position that the project of modernity cannot but be a total one and should seek to realize the Enlightenment ideals' (38). According to him those who look for a combination of the local with the modern declare the end of the modernization project. Instead of elaborating on such a combination and its possible outcomes, Keyder argues that it is the end of modernization from above but not also the project itself and the modernizing dynamic should be relocated in the society at large (39). It is significant that in the beginning Keyder does not argue against alleged anti-modernist approaches. His audience and objects of criticism seem to be scholars who do not support the Project. Furthermore, while Kasaba argues against the idea that modernity is dead, Keyder argues against the death of Enlightenment; he equates modernity with the West, which is similar condition with its political elites. But both of the turn their attention to non-state actors.

Keyder declared that the modernization project must be completed by the society. Modernizing elites who have state power have their own agenda, and in their hands the project will not be completed. Some necessary questions: Will the society not also have its own agenda? Will it buy Keyder's abstract westernist modernity? Who is the society by the way? And how can it grasp the power and lead the project?

Mardin is surprisingly explicit in criticizing the trends in Turkish social sciences. The scholars systematically neglect one of the main facets of social life:
people in face-to-face interaction and the wider social relations in which these activities take place: 'My target groups considers the second facet to be the only truly significant one. [Thus] they dismiss identity processes, the non-institutional bases of religion and personal histories as colorings of social processes... They would categorize many of these features as individual performances, bypassing the modern view that performance is itself a category for social analysis (66). Alluding to Weberian terms, Mardin argues that the new republican system broke with the Ottoman practice of establishing bridges that linked elites and masses through a recognition of the role of religion. By denying Islam it increased the distance between the educated and uneducated. Moreover, the old system tolerated heterogeneity since it accepted the social symbiosis within the discourse of religion, which promoted a form of solidarity and sociopolitical identity known as asabiyya, even though it had no place for the type of solidarity that is emphasized in modern nationalism (71). In the end, while the old system took ontology seriously, the new regime mostly considered it as residues of scholasticism and preferred a reductionist dialectic made up of two antagonistic postulates, science and reaction (71).

Some of Mardin's weaknesses can be listed as such: His insistence of the lack of everyday mapping in the Kemalist project is questionable. It is certain that an Islamic idiom/daily life organization was more successful than the secular one. But many of Kemalist reforms were directly related the daily lives of people and these must have some reflections on citizens. It is not known much to what extent these reforms could build secular subjectivities wholly independent from Islamic input. Surely, a total independence is improbable and unnecessary to look for but anyway, the Kemalist project seems to be more successful than Mardin suggests since many sections of Turkish society prefer to retain their secular identities. It is better to think
that there are several competing alternative everyday life schemes; some are more powerful in some contexts than others. Finally, Mardin tends to imply a homogenous popular religion. However, he also accepts in his other writings that it might have a fragmented nature and that although it seems to be united, it can become a source of conflict rather than conciliation. A genuine type of folk Islam – despite change and innovation – maybe trapped in essentialism.

Gole inserts Islamic/traditional elements directly into the modern and devotes her study to the particularistic analysis of modernization. The reconstruction of Western modernity in a Muslim context can help us comprehend competing legitimacies and the Islamic perspective on modernity. Such a cross-reading will assist in integrating what otherwise might be considered the oppositional notions of the East and the West, or Islam and modernity (82). However, the possibility of Islamism as a counter-cultural model is also accepted in later pages and, I believe, the tension between the initial arguments and the anti-modernity attributed to Islamic movements is not resolved throughout the essay.

A significant contribution of Gole is that she articulates her arguments on bod politics. She argues that a distinct sense of self and society in which the control (or self-control) of sexuality is at stake is constructed in this body politics. She then states that re-veiling in urban contexts is no more a replication of tradition but its reinvention and thus a maneuver within the modern. Gole limits herself to the Islamic movement and the veiling issue but points out that those strategies of the body are a modern phenomenon (90).

In Gole’s essay two main concerns of the volume come together: the concern over Islamism and gender. While Kandiyoti focuses on gender (but does not
completely ignore Islamism), Gole continuously attempts to focus on them together. For her, the critical point is how women become the objects of current ideological struggle. The female body is the symbol and battlefield for both the Kemalist project and Islamism.

An apparent problem in Gole (but not exclusive to her) is the use of a single Islam (or even Kemalism). Despite the emphasis on a particularistic analysis, there is not deciphering of what Islam constitutes, how it is used or to whom it appeals. Although she does not explicitly state this, Islam that is at issue comprises only the writings of certain contemporary Islamist writers in Turkey.

*Women and Modernity*

Arat’s interest is to problematize the relationship between the new generation of feminists in 1980’s and the Kemalist project of modernity. Although the existence of radical feminists is a relatively minor affair and not assumed to be a threat against the project, their rejection of a Kemalist ideology is surprising for Arat. The reason that this is surprising is that feminists owe their existence to the Kemalist project when the reform/revolutions aiming to liberate women are considered. Not surprisingly, women’s liberation was a very essential component of modern nation-building in many non-western contexts. However, radical feminists of the 1980’s dared to oppose several basic features of nationalistic demands on women: repression of sexuality, faith in professionalism (or education) and respect for the community over the individual (104). Besides, there are many non-egalitarian elements in the civil code that feminists contest (104-5). Arat argues that Kemalist project aimed at an ultimate male-female equality while overlooking the difference between the two. Women were required to behave like men. But now feminists emphasize their difference from men
while still striving for equality. Therefore, while focusing on difference, they still act within the framework of equality provided by the Project.

Arat implicitly criticizes feminists for their rejection of the Kemalist heritage. She also claims that the common framework of equality is also in danger. Against this state of betrayal, an older generation of Kemalist women adopted a new identity. Kemalist feminism that aims to acknowledge the benefits of the Kemalist project and consciously act for women’s rights in the framework of the project.

Arat’s focuses on certain groups that are the products of that Kemalist project of modernity. There is not much attention to the state of elites. The most ethnographic studies are more related to the lower classes while middle and upper classes remain unstudied. Kandiyoti will provide more ethnographic material about gender and modernity in Turkey, but at least Arat points out the discursive maneuvers of two sections of modernized women in Turkey.

Kandiyoti’s essay can be read as a response to Arat’s. her specificity rests in discourses about the modern family and the construction of gender. In the beginning, she defines two competing perspectives – that the reader is already familiar with: on the one hand, official Kemalism that equates modernization and nation building with progress and the irresistible forward march of civilization. On the other hand, critics of modernization who interpret this package as a totalizing and authoritarian project that marginalizes and even destroys the life-worlds of those purported to represent the traditional. But the latter, she argues, risks its position by bringing us full circle to positing notions of lost authentic indigeneity and inviting forms of neo-orientalism that are inimical to an understanding of complex historical processes (113-4).

Kandiyoti prefers to classify all the opponents of the Kemalist project of modernity in
the same category. By doing this, she does not valorize or give primacy to any perspective. Here Islamism is only one of the opponents.

Kandiyoti focuses on the Ottoman-Turkish modernization period in the early decades of the 20th century. Thus, she elaborates the period Kasaba has pointed out in his essay but did not elaborate. A crucial point is that in that period moderns were constructing their others, that is, an Islamic other mainly by insisting on the otherness of polygamy, adolescent marriages, joint families etc.. This was done despite several demographic facts Duben and Behar (1991) demonstrate: nuclear families and monogamy were widespread among Istanbul households and the marriage age was older (25s) than was assumed. She mentions that Duben and Behar were surprised about the difference between the discourses of early moderns and the actual practices but she explains it as the result of othering.

Moreover, she has an important contribution: She emphasizes the changes within the modernist discourse: throughout the late 19th century and early 20th century there were shifting attitudes from emphasizing the emancipatory potential of the modern (in contrast to the traditional Ottoman order) to a declaration of the dangers of excessive individualism, selfishness and narcissism (117). Women were the constant objects of these shifting tendencies. After the foundation of the new state, the moderns focused on the rural sites that were believed to have those who were repositories of the pre-Islamic egalitarian virtues of Turkish culture but were also the victims of local ignorance/traditional structures (117-8) (see Sirman, 1995).

A crucial point in the Republican period is the influx of masses from rural to urban sites. The flux resulted in myriads of life styles and more multiple than ever interpretations of the modern. Henceforth, Kandiyoti's attention shifts from ideational
positions to actual practices and from more elitist constructions to popular ones. However, she herself states that her remarks are somewhat introductory and that future ethnographic studies are needed.

Kandiyoti also proposes to look at masculinities. She prefers to study gender by looking at both men and women subjects. Masculinities in Turkey are rather unstudied subject and she is one of the first ones to bring them to the attention of readers. Modernity dethrones Turkish men from their absolute authority, hierarchical superiority and fixed positions, and the distanced relationship between spouses is replaced with emotional involvement coupled with closeness with children (121). Kandiyoti states that men were heavily subjected in the Project. One result perhaps is that the dethronement process would acquire an enduring aura of betrayal and disappointment that would be explicitly seen in the Arabesk songs of late 1970’s (123-4). Another more clear result is that uniformisation of male subjectivities became one of the factors that engender the difference between urban and rural populations. Although the nation state aimed at a homogenization at all levels, her heavy hand could be felt more effectively in urban contexts. Therefore, while urban males came closer to the project’s ideals, rural males increasingly represented the backward/old order of things and thus became the object of stereotyping, adding new enduring hostilities between the populations.

Meanwhile, by directing an ethnographic gaze to a series of arenas (football stadiums, mosque, coffee house…) where masculinities are constructed, reproduced and repositioned, Kandiyoti continues to emphasize the multiplicity of subject positions in a modern context and tries to evade a binary opposition. Another significant point: instead of dealing with the modern and the anti-modern
dichotomization, she focuses on the multiplicity of modern subjects. Instead of finding traditionality etc of some subjects, she casts as heterogeneity within a modern context.

Similar concern can be seen when she writes about women. Moreover, the reader can see several points ignored by Arat: While Arat emphasizes the benefits of Kemalist modernity for women; she overlooks class and spatial differences. According to Kandiyoti, while the new regime was influential in uplifting the status of some women, more of the female population, mostly in rural settings, was inevitably out of Kemalist modernity. They could not have similar access to modern institutions. Rural men, who were also affected, still had the advantage in access, and women were left more dependent on men.

Furthermore, Kandiyoti highlights the dilemma of modern women’s subjectivities on which Arat does not elaborate. That is, the public appearance of women’s formal equality on the agenda was not matched by significant changes either in the domestic division of labor or in sexual morality (126). Arat does not mention the increased burden and frustration especially among the latest generations of modern women. For modern women’s impasse, Kandiyoti cites a popular film character in 1950’s, Sofor Nebahat [Nebahat, the driver], a female driver who happened to be in a dominantly masculine occupation. Although she has formal access to the world of males, she was there only by behaving like a man. Only after she finds her ideal spouse, she initiates her sexuality but at the expense of her job by becoming a housewife. In less masculine contexts, women were welcomed through a kinship idiom. Women were fictive sisters, aunts, mothers etc. of male colleagues. Kandiyoti concludes that it is against this background that we must evaluate contemporary Turkish feminists’ attempts to assert themselves as both independent beings and
sexual beings. Most of the women found themselves uneasy in the classroom, office, on the street or the bus (127). Therefore, even veiling may mean not traditionalism but a soothing of the transition of some women’s positions although she does not insist on this statement but it only reinforces her claim that there may be different insertions into modernity.

In her concluding part, she attributes the lack of critical perspectives on modernity and its local specificities among Turkish social scientists primarily to the nature of local polemics but also to the hegemony of modernization theory and Marxism in the formative years of Turkish social sciences – thus in agreement with Mardin but in a milder form. Complexities on the ground would be assumed as transitional under the inexorable march to progress and thus dismissed from an analytical gaze.

*Popular Culture and Modernity*

Ozbek focuses on urban popular classes. She highlights a secular affective/moral vocabulary (taken from Geertz) of popular classes (relatively) independent from religion and the Kemalist project. Thus, she attempts to overcome the dualism of Islam vs. Kemalism. As a case study, Ozbek uses Arabesk, a hybrid form of music, Turkish classical and folk music blended with melodies from Egyptian popular songs. She argues that Arabesk, which is despised by educated upper classes, brought a new dimension of humanism for mass consumption against the human hosts and dehumanizing assaults of capitalist modernization (217). Ozbek signifies the possibility of a (secular) modern response to social developments.

Ozbek’s essay also provides complimentary notes on masculinity. Ozbek unmasksthe masculinist outlook of Arabesk (it is strongly associated with
moustaches, masculine friendships, raki-drinking, cigarette-smoking rituals) by stating the sense of self-doubt and of a self-devaluation under the gaze of a dominant other that pushes these men into a vulnerable status in society (223). Arabesk is another instance of the ambiguity of gender roles in modern Turkey.

Ozbek also traces the change within Arabesk and links it to the state of Turkish society. The subversive, underground and fatalistic tone of early Arabesk was transformed into a market-friendly, conservative music in the late 1980's. This was welcomed by the liberal-market policies after the 1980's and Arabesk music gained official legitimacy in these years. Ozbek refers to the then prime minister Turgut Ozal whose famous motto was that we have reached modernity and argues that such a logic helped official recognition of Arabesk: Since we have become modern now, there is not need to be anxious about adopting traditional or impure practices that would otherwise contaminate our modernization process. Although it is contestable and cannot be attributed to all elites, this logic makes sense in Turkish context and I would argue that when the ruling elites feel self-confident even the ban on veiling in Turkish universities will be abolished. Whatever the case, the sense of self-confidence among Turkish elites may change the face of modernization process/ the nature of public debates.

Finally, I would like to refine that Ozbek's following argument: She argues that it is not because the official, public sphere is very restricted that social conflicts have been increasingly expressed in the language of culture since 1980's; the politicization of culture itself has been a major factor in and consequence of the project and process of Turkish modernity from its inception (228). Having in mind the narrative aspect of modernity and being an anthropology student, I would not be
compelled to emphasize the politicization. One tends to think the cultural stories behind the foundation of Turkish Republic have been increasingly contested not because they were less cultural issues before but because the level of contestation and re-thinking in general has increased in the present.
Mass media and European Union

Koopmans (2007) sums up the relation between mass media and European Union:

More even than on the national level, the communication flow between the European Union (EU) and other European-level institutions and the public depends on the mass media. The media fulfil four crucial functions in the European policy process. First, in the absence of direct communicative links, European actors, issues and policies have to be made visible by the media, and it is in this public forum that they must gain public legitimacy (legitimation function). Second, with the partial exception of opinion polling – which provides only punctual, pre-structured and non-discursive access to the public opinion – European policy makers depend on the mass media for information about the concerns of the citizenry (responsiveness function). Third and conversely, the public can build its opinion about European institutions and the complexities of multilevel policies only to a small extent on direct personal experience and must therefore rely on how Europe becomes visible in the mass media (accountability function). Finally, participation of citizens in the European policy process usually requires access to the mass media. Although a small number of resourceful and well-organised actors have direct access to European policy makers (e.g., in the context of the Brussels lobbying circuit), most forms of citizens’ participation through nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), civic initiatives and social movements can influence policy makers only if they are able to achieve visibility in the mass media (participation function). (184)
Kunelius (2008) emphasizes journalism particularly:

Journalism is a particularly interesting focal point in the discussion about transnational democracy and the EU for a number of reasons. On the one hand, routines and practices of journalism have developed in a very intimate connection to local political cultures and systems, and we know there is remarkable diversity in Europe concerning these traditions (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). The EU, thus, faces many forms of journalism and many forms of professionalism. On the other hand, the EU as a political reality clearly challenges the existing forms of political journalism and vocabulary, creating new relationships and political alliances, new kinds of political rituals and events, and a changing landscape for political rhetoric. In two words, despite the diversity of nations and their journalistic traditions, the EU has become a ‘common problem’ for a continent of journalists. It is in this tension between traditional national ways of dealing with politics (and thinking about other nations) and the growing importance of the EU as a transnational field of power brokering that the research presented in this issue is situated. (p. 372)

and he goes on to say:

the EU represents a historically unique new field into which journalism – however still embedded in national systems and culture – has to adapt itself.

(372-3)

Ted Gour nelos (2007) states that The EU has officially dealt with culture and media since the Maastricht Treaty, which went into force on 1 November 1993.
As the Union reaches into all aspects of society, however, its cultural implications become not only impossible to ignore but also central to social policy (Chakravarty and Sarikakis, 2006 quoted here). As the EU expands and its members suffer civil disturbances or political unrest, such as the emeutes in France in late 2005, the growing popularity of far-right political groups, wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, debates over the cultural rights of refugees like ethnic Albanians and nomadic groups like the Roma, or tensions between religious and secular interests, culture has confronted the Union aggressively. ....... On a policy level the EU has become increasingly involved in the culture industry as well, opposing the United States on issues of cultural protection and lingual diversity, advocating its own concrete perspectives on 'intellectual property', the 'information society' and the audiovisual industries, and enacting complex programs intended to support and intertwine culture, digital technology, education and capital. (236)

After describing the major institutions of the EU, Schlesinger (1999) connects the place of communication technologies:

....... Thus, while the EU is a political space, we may also see it as the junction of a wide range of communications activities, including policy dissemination, lobbying, and reporting and commentary. In this sketch, I wish to underline the interplay between the communicative and political dimensions, as this is central to the development of the overall argument............
.... Communication about the EU is most obviously shaped by national political and cultural frameworks during European Parliament election campaigns and when referenda are held. Elections for the parliament do not
take place among a single European electorate. Rather, they focus on national political issues, are still almost exclusively fought by national political parties, and are reported through national media using the same reporting conventions that are used for national elections. Analogously, the information campaigns of the European Union have addressed national political, media, and public relations structures, and they are also increasingly focused on regional media and regional representative bodies within the member states.

Statham (2008) believes that "journalists would be able to adapt and 'Europeanize' to a greater extent if politicians improved their own communication efforts and made European governance more relevant to citizens" (p. 398) and thus the EU's institutional 'democratic deficit' is linked to, or partly caused by, a 'communication deficit'. (398). Statham found out that

Journalists overwhelmingly consider the political-communicative aspects of the EU's communication to be problematic. Typically, one journalist remarks: '(T)here is less openness, less transparency and I cannot see a clear political line' (Editor, Leipziger Volkszeitung). However, this overall negative view holds more for the Commission than the European Parliament, where the existence of political cleavages and party politicians helps journalists to report political messages: 'The people (means MEPs) who are motivated and understand how to sell politics, who are operating through the Parliament are very good. The (EU) institutions are bad' (Brussels Correspondent, Mirror). Interestingly, the opinions of journalists from transnational newspapers regarding EU communication did not differ from their colleagues. Overall, they considered this to be worse than national
governments, with the exception of the International Herald Tribune’s Brussels correspondent who compared it to the ‘equally bad’ US government.

Transnational journalists also hold strong reservations over the EU’s political-communicative performance. ........Overall, this shows that the EU’s media performance will not be improved simply by increasing the quantity of information flows and their supplylines, but that journalists of all types hold concerns about the suitability of its political contents for making news copy. (409)
Chapter 2 – A snapshot: Yol vs. Kapı¹: Journalistic

Metaphors in Understanding EU-Turkey Relations

Introduction

After waiting for more than 40 years (this is the longest waiting period for membership for a would-be member in EU history) Turkey finally got a date by the end of 2004 to start formal negotiations for membership and in 4 October 2005 negotiations started. Turkey’s application to the Union for membership has gradually become a litmus test for both Turkey and the EU. Giscard d’Estaing, the former French president who is currently supervising the writing of a European constitution, just before the 2002 Copenhagen Summit, stated that Turkey is a Muslim country and it is thus culturally different from the rest of the members. This statement carried enough force that the decision on Turkey was postponed until the end of 2004. It remains to be seen whether the self-acclaimedly secular EU can articulate ‘Muslim’ Turkey as a member.

Here, in this context, I focus on a particular day, October 4, 2005, when Turkey’s full membership negotiations officially started. My aim is to demonstrate how Turkish journalists make sense of this grand development in Turkey-EU relations. For the reasons outlined below I focus on metaphors available mostly in the first pages of major Turkish dailies.

¹ The road vs. the door.
Why metaphors?

A scholarly interest in metaphors as a tool for analysis has been seen recently in the studies of International Relations and European Integration (see Drulak, 2006, for an excellent literature review for mentioned disciplines and the use of metaphors and Chilton and Ilyin, 1993). Drulak states that metaphors play a connective role between the theories and agents’ practices in the field (2006, 500). He conceives the users of metaphors as members of a speech community “who interact frequently and who, through these interactions, develop a ‘shared body of verbal signs’ which distinguishes them from other groups (Gumperz, 1968/1972:219 quoted in Drulak, ibid) and accordingly he states that “a shared vocabulary emerged in the process of European integration” (ibid, 505). This study asserts that a shared vocabulary has also emerged among Turkish journalists who can be assumed to be a related speech community. However, despite an implication of a social structure, a focus on metaphors inevitably means a discursive study and as Drulak hints there are always non-discursive elements that shape the outcome of this political process (509). But, as long as the limitations of a discursive study are remembered, the results of such a study will be insightful. In following a discursive approach interpreted by Foucault (1977, 1982), the metaphors as elements of disciplinary discourses that make human subjects as objects of power become even more significant. I owe my initial interest in metaphors within the discipline of anthropology to Chris Shore’s seminal work on Metaphors of Europe (1997), which applies a Foucauldian interpretation. As he notes (p. 134) linguistic focus in anthropological writing indeed dates back to Benjamin Lee Whorf (1956) and “his intellectual ancestors Sapir and Boas” but a renewed interest in metaphors should be attributed to more recent theoretical developments. I agree with Shore who claims that “Foucault’s (1980) work in particular has helped sensitize...
anthropology and other social sciences to the fact that questions of language are inextricably linked to the questions of power” (ibid, 145) and finally Clifford and Marcus’s (1986) work brought upon a renewed sensibility on writing and text in ethnography.

As a reminder, this chapter does not focus on the classification of metaphors or claim to have an extensive analysis on metaphors. However, it is inspired by some of classificatory attempts. Zinken’s emphasis on “intertextual metaphors” is relevant here. He states that they are “the product of a specific cultural situatedness of the metaphor producer. They are motivated by the speaker’s adaptation to a certain cultural structure or substructure, which provides specific imaginative resources” (2003, 509). This idea of intertextuality serves well in imagining of cluster of metaphors that are outlined below. Another conceptual tool can be borrowed from Vedder (2002) who attributes a life cyclicality to metaphors and so metaphors emerge as unusual, become mainstream, established and then become clichés but these are “in turn the basis for the coming to be and recognition of living metaphors” (p. 208). Yol and kapı metaphors in this sense were to become clichés and the mediating clusters of metaphors had the potential to emerge as new poles as I summarize in the end.

I assume that metaphors play a significant role in the ideological interpretation of events “as social actors tend to incorporate new events by interpreting them metaphorically as some culturally salient phenomenon” (Zinken, 2003). What is good of metaphors is as Don Miller (2006) says “If metaphors perceive similarities in dissimilars, or relations between things before unapprehended, metaphor is nothing more or less than any thought which sees or makes relations, connections, classifications between things. Quoting Montaigne- metaphors are not ‘some rare and
fancy form of language – they apply to your chambermaid’s chatter’. Likewise they apply to your chambermaid’s thoughts and behaviour.”

Unsurprisingly not only Turkish press but even diplomatic talks in the process can be colored by metaphors. Aggressive metaphoric usage was reported during the coverage of tense December 2004 summit. Hande Culpan of AFP described PM Erdoğan’s approach as "hard-nosed" and reported that:

Erdoğan’s shrewd bargaining did not go across well with many EU leaders, however, with one accusing him of behaving like an aggressive “carpet trader.”

“We were gobsmacked,” Luxembourg Foreign Minister Jean Asselborn said, describing the mood. “What many colleagues say, (that) Turkish politicians still have things to learn, is quite right. We are not carpet traders here in Europe.”

In the mean time, Irish Prime Minister Bertie Ahern called the episode over Turkey a “bitter pill” to swallow for the 25 heads of government. (12/19/2004) [For an outline of "The Image of the Turks in European Art" see Gunsel Renda (2006)]

The nature of Turkey and EU relations resembles an assemblage like situation where temporariness and heterogeneous and unlikely actors are likely to occur frequently (see Marcus and Saka, 2006 and Delanda, 2006 for the idea of assemblage as a unit of analysis). The actual start of membership negotiations between Turkey and the EU produces tense and novel discursive positions. These positions could sometimes be paradoxical. The new political and cultural emergences are reflected on the metaphors as a new a basic division of political tendencies emerge in Turkey. This
division is not based on supposed political tendencies of particular newspapers. This division cuts through all Turkish newspapers, be it mainstream or not. In most cases, a newspaper includes both parties of the division in its headlines, news or columns. But the use of particular metaphors demonstrates which party is more influential within that newspaper. In this context, this paper modestly attempts to demonstrate how the use of journalistic metaphors could help to understand the evolving political process and claim that the existing explanatory journalistic metaphors and tropes are only partially relevant. As in Shore’s words metaphors are “cultural facts which serve as conduits for thinking and talking about new objects and ideas (1997, 135).

A brief note on methods

I have analyzed 24 national daily Turkish newspapers that were published on 4 October 2005. It was the day after the negotiations for Turkey’s EU membership started after an intense and dramatic EU summit. Only a few other dailies are not included among the analyzed 24 newspapers. But these are politically and discursively very similar to some already included and I don’t believe this makes a problem of sample validity. I focused on the first pages and headlines of these newspapers. In case some columnists were quoted in the first pages, I have extended my focus on these inside the newspapers. This is by no means a proper quantitative research. Except a few newspapers that were not available, I did intend to check all of national dailies without a prior classification. My purpose was to delineate major available discourses whose traces could be spread all over the newspapers in varying degrees.

However, I would later develop a more detailed focus on some of the dailies, which would represent particular political traits in the Turkish politics (the reader will read more on these dailies in next chapters): Hürriyet daily has a special place among
these Turkish dailies. During my fieldwork that lasted from 2004 to the second half of 2007, this daily preserved its status as the most effective daily in Turkish press. This belief was mostly due to having news sources from the high levels of political and military authorities. Owned by Doğan Media Conglomeration (DMC), which remains to be the biggest media conglomeration in Turkey, Hürriyet remained to be in the top 3 highest circulating newspapers (the others being Posta, a more tabloid daily owned again by DMC and Zaman, owned by the influential moderate Islamic group led by Fethullah Gülen). Hürriyet’s political position can be defined as center-right. However, the daily’s policies can rapidly shift to a more nationalist tone. It also promotes itself as staunchly secular.

Zaman daily, whose circulation rose gradually to be one of the most selling newspapers, is connected to Fethullah Gülen group. This daily of a moderate Islamic group hosts many liberal columnists and tend to be news oriented and prefers to refrain from political debates (However this would change during the first half of 2007, the daily began to be side with AKP during the election period).

Since the early 1980’s Cumhuriyet daily positioned itself as a staunch advocate of Kemalism, a reification of principles of the founding father of Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The ideological positioning became even more intense with the rise of Islamist politics.

Dünya daily is a financial news daily with a much smaller circulation rate than the ones above. It is a mainstream newspaper and is not associated with an any ideological position intensely.

None of the dailies are completely anti-EU but Cumhuriyet shows most signs of Eurosceptism while Hürriyet’s position changes frequently and radically: From
ardent pro-EUism to reactionary anti-EUism can be found in Hürriyet deadlines. In terms of homogeneity, Cumhuriyet columnists and senior journalists are more similar in sharing Kemalist ideas whereas Hürriyet’s people are located in a greater spectrum of politics. In the mean time, Zaman constantly maintained a pro-EU status and despite having non-Islamist liberal columnists, political approaches did not vary much via European Union and Dünya remained to be pro-EU in parallel to big business circles.

Findings: Three clusters of metaphors

I find three clusters of metaphors to dominate the discourse of news and commentaries.

In the center of the first cluster, yol [the road] is found. This is basically translated as way but also as path or as road has an hegemonic place and I state that yol and related metaphors and terminologies shape the overall news production and highlights the still dominant tendency towards EU membership among Turkish journalists.

"Turkey’s long road ahead phrase” can be seen in many news in English; the path, the journey, the passing another curve on the highway, the (historical) march, the adventure, a (giant) step forward are also frequently used. These all imply a movement ahead. Yol has a metaphorical value for a long time in Turkish language. Sezer (2003) says it was already in use in the first half of 8th century among the Turkic tribes in Central Asia. In a particularly well-known poem (Otuz Beş Yaş Şiiri) of Cahit Sitkın Tarancı yol means life. In a poem of İhâmi Bekir Tez (Duvar), yol means civilization. Yunus Emre (1238?–1320?), a Turkish poet and Sufi mystic of
14th century who has exercised an immense influence on Turkish literature, from his own day until the present, used the metaphor of yol several times. In his poems, yol implies a journey to go back to one's real homeland. A person exists to be in exile in one sense or another. One's target/destination should be going back home. Yunus Emre invites his disciples to start the journey. Of course, in his abstract-theological imaginary, this home means God, the creator but I take the liberty of extending this metaphor's usage. In their seminal study on metaphors Lakoff and Johnson (1981) states that a 'journey' defines a path (p.91) and related metaphors in news production implies the existence of a path.

Here, I would like to remind you that one of the first Turkish movies to remember as a success is Yılmaz Güney's movie which happens to be called Yol [translated as The Way]. The film won the Golden Palm at Cannes Film Festival and Internet Movie Database website describes the movie as “A harsh portrait of Turkey, its people and its authorities, shown through the stories of five prisoners given a week's home leave, and the problems they encounter in adjusting to the world outside.” Whenever, I hear the word Yol, I remember similar scenes and the uncomfort those prisoners had during the way to their homes. Air journey is a relatively new phenomenon and Turkish governments stopped developing the rail networks since the beginning of 1950s. Thus an average Turk had more than enough experience of long inter-city bus travels in a vast country that is covered with highways. My first impression on the metaphor of Yol in relation to EU news was to remember those uncomfortable travels and suppose that most of the journalists that were to produce those news would probably had the same annoying correlation between the developments in the EU process and their old inter-city travels. In fact, the ascetic aspects of a journey can already be seen in Turkey's EU process. A pro-
Turkish scholar José Casanova’s article is entitled as “The Long, Difficult and Tortuous Journey of Turkey into Europe and the Dilemmas of European Civilization” (2006). This metaphor has also penetrated into the discourse of EU citizens:

EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn (5/2/2008):

Turkey’s accession to the EU will be a long and sometimes difficult journey, during which Turkey will have to transform itself, to make fundamental freedoms prevail in all corners in the country and in all walks of life.

Cengiz Aktar (12/23/2005) quoting from a French Senate report:

The road Turkey has been on since 2001 is a road protected and facilitated by the EU and is as important as the eventual destination. While we consider ourselves as part of the divided and multi-polar global world, the objective should be defined solely as part of this country's geostrategic importance. No matter what happens, we believe Turkey and the EU have a shared future and destiny.

Thus, both the etymological and literary usages shown above and the analysis itself demonstrate that a pro-EU stance can be detected in these movements that imply road metaphors.

However, the second cluster around the *kaptı* [the door] metaphor seems to occupy the opposite direction and together with the former, it produces the discursive terrain of Turkish press in EU affairs. The discourse of press oscillates between two poles here represented by these two metaphors and this oscillation is indeed mediated by a third cluster of metaphors.
"Turkey is someone who waits at the EU's door" is a common portrayal to invoke whenever a pessimistic comment is made. A pro-EU columnist might invoke the door and its related metaphors whenever s/he mentions the obstacles or Euro-skeptic positionings and then shifts to the yol metaphor. Kapi related metaphors imply non-movement and waiting, crawling, begging and related annoying phenomena. Although the word is sometimes translated as "the gate", it is not used frequently. As I will state later, reference to Vienna gates are rarely used. In fact, a recent news content analysis also demonstrates that "the Turkish opposition virtually never resorted to clash of civilizations (i.e. Islamist) arguments" (Koenig et al. 2006). An average Turkish citizen's experience with "the door" is not that pleasant. It reminds me personally the bureaucracy or long queues in every kind of state offices, banks, concerts etc. In backgammon, which is a widespread male game in Turkey, it is a move to obstruct the opponent. In Ottoman times, The High Gate (The Sublime Porte) meant government. And kapi is still used to mean a government office. According to official Turkish Language Institution dictionary Kapi metaphorically means a place where one can get an income or a need that causes expenditure. In most of the cases, kapt is associated with waiting and that is what Turkey knows best in her membership process.

The tension of Kapi is alleviated by the third cluster of metaphors. This cluster is made up of mainly two separate metaphors but both function as mediators. Rüya [dream] calls upon EU fantasies such as more employment, mobility, wealth, welfare, better living conditions etc can all be classified under the dream (Mehmet Ali Birand, 2005) and mediates the tension towards Yol. The other metaphor, başımuz dik [standing with a head erect], invokes a stance full of pride and mediates the tension towards Kapi. As long as the country saves her pride, the march can continue. The last
metaphors here are contained in the nationalist opposition to the EU in Turkey frame in the Koenig et al study (p. 163). My point is not to oppose this argument particularly but to hypothesize that these all operate through a wide range of political spectrum. Overall, through this cluster of metaphors the oscillation between hope and hopelessness is maintained. Dreams and issues of pride perpetuate the going back and forth, movement and non-movement and the emerging political situations will first be played in this channel.

Particularly the third cluster of metaphors signifies the emotional aspects of the process which can be linked to Horolets’ discussion of “emotional deficit” in the EU (2003). “Democratic deficit” in the EU is already a well stated interdisciplinary issue in EU studies (just for a current discussion on the issue, see Habermas, 2001 and for an outline of democratic deficit issues in the EU, the United Kingdom and United Nations see the Wikipedia entry on democratic deficit). However, emotional aspects of a political entity building is an even more belated issue for the EU and “the calls for creating the European imaginary capable of capturing people’s emotions were [finally] emerging among the propositions for the democratization of the European Project (Macdonald 2000 quoted in Horolets, ibid). Metaphors demonstrate well how the political process is indeed emotionally built.

Motion related metaphors appear in other studies with similar meanings. Shore’s (1997) and Hooghe’s (1999) work among the European Commission officials, Drulak’s (2006) media discourse analysis during the recent constitutional debates, Horolet’s (2003) focus on Polish media during the accession to the EU period all find out a cluster of metaphor that function similar to Yol. In fact, in some cases near identical metaphors are seen. Shore states that “the process of European integration
was variously characterized as a ‘journey’, ‘road’ or ‘path’, leading inexorably ‘forwards’, away from a ‘Europe of nation-states’ towards a harmonious, post-nationalist future characterized by ‘peace’, ‘progress’, ‘prosperity’ and a more federal system of government” (ibid. p. 130). In the Polish case, “road aimed at the conceptualization of the process of integration. In order to describe negotiations process the words ‘gallop’, ‘rush’ and ‘drag along’ were used” (Horolets, ibid). Drlak contrasted MOTION against CONTAINER and EQUILIBRIUM OF CONTAINERS metaphors (metaphor names are written in capital in the Drlak article) and found out that motion related metaphors had the most frequent use. These metaphors included ‘new steps’, ‘leap forward’, moving forward’ etc (ibid, 517). He hypothesizes that the “discourse of transnational speech community relies on the sedimented metaphor of EU as a MOTION (p. 515) [which in turn relies on] a vocabulary of travel and unceasing change which makes the fluidity even more evident (p. 516). In this context, yt-related metaphors in Turkish case signify a striking parallel to other cases and personify Turkey as a person on her way to join the EU yet the road is not that stable.

**How these metaphors work?**

To specify what is argued above, *Hürriyet* could be a good case. It has the second best circulation among Turkish dailies but it is tacitly accepted among the media literate Turks that this newspaper has much more policy making impact on policy makers than all other newspapers.

*Hürriyet*, which allotted a spacious place for the EU summit, uses the gate metaphor in relation to Ottomans’ retreat from the Vienna gates and declares that now Turkey enters Europe through the path of peace and unification. The good news is
reported as the realization of a 42-year-old dream here. This is further strengthened with the Abdullah Gül’s statement that we started the negotiations with our heads erect and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan describes the situation as a giant step in our historical march. This newspaper includes all the basic metaphors I aim to demonstrate in its first page and by including them it implicitly confirms the main positions via the EU. Here, I would like to underline the fact that only Hürriyet used the Vienna Gates metaphors directly in its first page. An imperial nationalist ideology is always embedded in the discourse of this important mainstream newspaper.

Hürriyet’s chief editor Ertuğrul Özkök, quoting from a former president, Süleyman Demirel, warns that Turkish statesmen should not slam the door and leave the summit but keep on walking on this historical path. Mr. Özkök is a pro-EU columnist and journalist. On the other hand, his colleague in the same newspaper Oktay Ekşi, who is a senior and well-known columnist, as a Euro-skeptic, is suspicious about the negotiations and refrains from using road or door related metaphors.

a) One either uses both or none. If they are both used, it is used to demonstrate the contrasting positions.

b) Euro-skeptics may not use any of the metaphors to describe the process.

Bekir Coşkun, a staunch anti-EUist, uses “Victory” and “EU Conqueror” in quotes to parodize the process while another staunch anti-EUist Emin Çolaşan, relies on the door metaphor totally: According to him, Turkey “makes oneself crawl at the door”, begging at the EU’s door and what is really achieved is to make a step back. On the other hand, a pro-EUist Ercan Kumcu would say “The way is long and has
many curves. As long as one does not enter a dead end road from which a return is impossible, we should keep on going.

c) Though a columnist is pro-EU, he might use the door metaphor to imply the possible problems on the negotiations or those anti-TR leaders within the EU (i.e. Yalçın Doğan)

A major moderately Islamic newspaper Zaman uses “Turkey’s march towards Europe continues” in its headline. The subheading goes as “Turkey makes a step towards a new era. That is a historical point. A significant stage is passed behind in the EU march.” Zaman did not use any door metaphors and it is a pro-EU daily. One of the rare columns to be classified as pessimist used totally a different metaphor I haven’t seen in other writings: “Engagement with difficult terms that might prevent marriage... (Tamer Korkmaz)” The marriage, the couple metaphor is not unseen in EU related cartoons but at the time of my analysis this was not available and Mr. Korkmaz used these metaphors in a gender-neutral way.

While Dünya’s headline was “Breathless bargain; A new marathon begins after the 46 years of waiting”,

Radikal’s headline stated that “The Journey has started”. The latter, a pro-EU newspaper, emphasized the start of a journey a lot. In the column of its chief editor, İsmet Berkan, it is argued that “EU negotiations are always uncomfortable. There are no victories or losses. It is a long hard way to go. And we are glad our journey has really started.” When the door is mentioned, that is where we passed the door’s threshold. But the road between the hall to the living room is harder than the road that continues until the threshold of the door. Although Mr. Berkan is cautious, he is still happy and hopeful and sees the summit result as a progress.
There were two explicit anti-EU dailies: Milli Gazete and Yeni Çağ. The former represents a radical Islamist party which staunchly opposes the ruling moderately Islamic AKP. The latter is a far right nationalist daily. The latter claims that Turkey becomes a slave of the West and recommends the government that “instead of waiting at the EU door, turn your face to Islamic world where you can be the leader of all”. This daily uses all: “Austria represents the essence of Crusades. “This is process of submission…. On the other hand, Yeni Çağ uses neither the road nor the door but “impositions” and “submission”. What is signed is a document of submission. I suppose these two dailies can be connected to each other through the idea of submission.

Cumhuriyet’s position is curious. This explicitly Kemalist newspaper has a strong anti-EU emphasis. But its Kemalist westernizing origins do not allow this daily to follow the others’ track. It uses “Turkey’s EU journey” but to add pessimism continues stating that “she entered into a hard and indefinite process”. Then the daily accuses the government not giving enough information to the opposition parties but this would not lead to Milliyet’s more optimistic discursive line. As Milliyet states, the start of the negotiations reinforces Turkey’s direction towards the West that began with the foundation of the Turkish Republic by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. However, as followers of Atatürk, Cumhuriyet journalists cannot extricate themselves from the road/path. Initial states of Turkey’s EU membership application conceived the process as Turkey’s another step in westernization (Eralp, 1993). Despite the overall critical tone, this is an adventure (serüven- Cüneyt Arcayürek) or a tangle or a door to be unlocked (kördüğüüm, kilitlik - Ali Sirmen) and despite the government’ and EU’s obstacles, there will a road ahead.
What is not found and What is to come?

Curiously enough, some of the metaphors widely found in cartoons of previous years are relatively absent in these headlines: Here I rely on a very well done study of Erensü and Adanalı (2004). Among the 24 newspapers, there was not a single reference to trains. As a symbol of development and progress (Yapp, 1992), the train is used to symbolize EU. As Meltem Ahska argues ‘the train of Europe’ might have been perceived as the quickest and the easiest way to fill the “time lag”, which is “paradoxically immobile and stands apart from the constantly onward-moving chronological sequence of Western progress (Ahska, 2000: 354).” I gather that in the October of 2005, Turkish journalists tended to demand negotiations between equals...

During the early presentations of this paper, I was asked if I have not found out metaphors related to marriage. The question here implies Turkish elites’ masculinist lifeworld (see i.e. Sirman and Finkel, 2000 for the state and elite ideological formations in Turkey) but apart from a few cases, there was not enough evidence for a such a hypothesis here. Nevval Sevindi, an anthropologist and columnist in Zaman daily, states once it was the EU’s founding fathers who proposed to Turkey in the beginning but Turkey’s response was too delayed. Even in that case, as the proposer the EU assumes a masculine role. Unlike the Polish context where in some cases Polish journalists thought EU owes Poland for the latter’s help in history, Turkish journalists never thought to have the upper hand. At best, Turkey and EU were equals though the latter was stronger and asking for concessions.

The castle metaphor which is another popular symbol used to depict Europe in Turkish cartoons were absent in those headlines. “The ‘EU as a castle’ evokes some historical developments by pointing to a particular timeframe during which
conceptions of self and others underwent a significant shift. For a Turkish citizen it is almost inevitable not to associate ‘the EU as a castle’ icon with the great defeat of the Ottoman Empire at the gates of Vienna, an event claimed to be a turning point both for the European and Turkish imagination” (Burçoğlu, 1999: 194). Especially the aspect of “unconquerable-ness” is missed in recent narratives. Although sometimes it is evoked, unification rather than conflict is emphasized although I would not eliminate this option totally. Yet, in Ahiska’s words “The memory of the siege failure rather denotes a ‘subjectivity of the other in relation to Orientalism’ and reframes the meaning of the siege as the beginning of Turkey’s long and dramatic story in search of identity in Europe” (2003).

Another lacking cluster of metaphors is related to the Generalization: Identification of the West with Europe. The terms ‘West’ and ‘Europe’ are usually interpreted as identical and are used interchangeably in Turkey (Helvacioğlu 1998: 50). Erenşü and Adanalı state “As argued by many scholars: while this broad interpretation includes positive elements such as development, science, democracy, quality of life, it also connotes capitalism, exploitation, colonialism, imperialism, discrimination, hegemony, and war (Ahiska 2000: 353; Helvacioğlu, 1998: 50). This ambiguous depiction of the West leads to a reductive meaning. Malcolm Yapp suggests that especially before the 18th century, Ottomans coined different terms for different groupings of European states, e.g. the land of the Franks, Orthodox lands, Balkans, Spain and Scandinavia were perceived as differentiated entities (1992: 139). However, continuous wars in the 19th and 20th century, World War One and the following Turkish War of Independence led to an understanding of a unitary entity. The world order built up after World War Two strengthened this understanding of a united West. Now the configurations being made after the collapse of the cold war
order influence the Turkish imagery of Europe. Imagining EU as a monolithic entity is still there but interchangeable use of the west and the Europe is absent in the narratives. Singling out Austria in that case, and further strategic analyses will demonstrate diverse actors in the EU. I gather Turkish journalists are not that generalizing in present times.

Especially in the context of Cyprus problem, skepticism and mistrust and consequently an anti-imperialist discourse maybe employed. Erensi and Adanali stated that skepticism and mistrust towards the European Union and the West in a broader sense seems to be the dominant theme of a number of cartoons. I would say at this historical moment that this is true than ever. But EU representations seem to be reformulated frequently and at the time of negotiations started “national pride and an anti-imperialist discourse that were to be found either explicitly or implicitly in many contemporary Turkish cartoons” would indeed be exploited to strengthen the hope towards membership instead of an anti-EU stance. Only the extreme groups would equate the developments to selling the country to “Western Powers” (Çolasan, 2004).

An anxiety to be isolated from the West, due to the rejection of the ‘imperialist’ supremacy of the West was of course absent. A fear of being discriminated against or humiliated was not an issue. Turkey maintained her dignity, fought back and got what she deserved.

Finally, the bridge metaphor was about to emerge and had already emerged in some other sources but could only be found in some newspapers at that time. I believe that since October 2005, Turkish leaders depend on the bridge metaphor more than ever. That is, Turkey is the bridge between the East and the West, Islam and the rest or as a bridge between civilizations. Interviewee No 22 dismissed this bridge metaphor:
No! We are already West. We don't have a problem to connect the West with the East. What is East? There are several Easts. Middle East? What is the difference between the East and the West. Pre-Enlightenment. Rationalization. There has to be Enlightenment. What is the purpose of the Republic? To bring Enlightenment to Turkey. After Enlightenment there is no such thing as East. Anti-Westernism means being against civilization. Speaking of East- Arabs and Persians- we don't need to be a bridge between them and Europeans. I particularly state these so you will highligh- he laughs- This could be the case for Central Asia as they are closer to us. Our relations with Central Asia and Azerbaijan is as important as the EU!

A not unfamiliar metaphor that is attributed to Turks would gradually emerge during negotiations by Turkish columnists:

Negotiations are like "bakkal pazarlığı" [grocery store bargaining] (Aktar, 2003: 145)

Interviewee NO 18:

Current situation (early 2007) defined Turkey's EU negotiations as "zorla yaşatılmaya çalışılan bir hasta gibi!" [An ill person that is kept alive.]

Conclusion

Ever since I read Cris Shore’s Metaphors of Europe: integration and the politics of language (1997) article, I have been thinking of a parallel case concerning Turkey’s relation to the EU and this article is an attempt to conceptualize the
journalistic metaphors in Turkish press that focus on European Union negotiations. It should still be read with caution as Turkey and European Union relations continue to be an open-ended political process. The Union building itself is curiously an open-ended process (Abeles, 2000). There is a flow of information and discourses on the continuously changing positions of political and social actors. During my own fieldwork that lasted a three-year period, I have witnessed the emergence and disappearance of themes and actors in the process. Following Lakoff and Johnson, I argue that in this complicated context "new metaphors can have the power to define reality (1981). Despite the abundance of information and complicated situation, a weariness of ordinariness also dominates the field. Particularly in this context their quote from Aristotle is insightful: "ordinary words convey only what we know already; it is from metaphor that we can best getting hold of something fresh (Aristotle, Rhetoric 1410 b in Lakoff and Johnson, ibid, 190)".

My brief analysis through metaphors demonstrates that a basic division of political tendencies towards the EU membership can be detected. However, this division cuts through all Turkish newspapers and it is enacted not between newspapers but in every newspaper. The pro-EU stance, represented in the person of Yol, was hegemonic at the moment of analysis but signs of further change in unexpected dimensions were also apparent. Particularly the emphasis on pride related metaphors which then function as mediators have been becoming a new pole and future analysis will have to be re-designed accordingly. This work should be taken as a precursor for a future ethnographic study on the issue. However, even in this scope of analysis, it certainly highlights discursive positions and possible routes: After the 2007 parliamentary and presidential elections in Turkey, the political moods towards the EU are changing back to older positions held in the beginning of negotiations. Some
of the metaphors in the third cluster had gained more currency in the pre-election period within a nationalist reactionary political climate but they are rapidly ebbing away to older, limited positions. In the end, yol remains to be the main road sign for Turkey.
Chapter 3 - Blogging at the center of an ethnographic fieldwork

Prof. Rodriguez

On Thursday evening I met and had coffee with Prof Rodriguez from Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona and his company. That was a short and cordial meeting. There is a possibility of future cooperation. As I told before, this blog is the pretext to our meeting. Since then I have been super busy and we could not meet again, but they had a tight schedule too, as far as I understand. Our correspondence will continue online for a while... (June 26, 2005)

It was with an email message from Prof. Rodriguez I was encouraged to resume blogging again and it became an essential part of my field life. Until that moment, I had not realized the possibilities of blogging and I had not imagined any audience beyond my friends and department. Months later a journalism scholar (NO 18), after listing some of the reliable EU news sources and columnists, would state that s/he was using my blog most to learn about the EU affairs.... Towards the end of 2008 when I was about to finish writing up dissertation, I had already become the only Turkish national who regularly blogged about Turkish politics in English. I do not claim to have become a major news source but I had unintentionally become a reputable commentator on Turkey in blogosphere. Interestingly enough my blog hit Turkish press only in the very end only in one of the dailies, Milliyet, while I was already quoted in Financial Times, BBC Radio 5, NPR and Christian Science Monitor as well as in some major websites such as Global Voices, Dutch Sargasso, French Arte etc. My relative lack of blogger fame in Turkey would in fact be useful.
My gradually increasing democratic activism would cause problems in access. In the mean time, I was trying to cope with intense flow of data on my topic and the blog became the main organizing tool and a central methodological means in my research.

Ever since I started my doctoral study in anthropology, I have inevitably been thinking about the discipline’s now long lasting self-reflexive mood. My department’s particular position certainly leads my thinking to large extent, but I tend to believe that my own background in sociology and the emerging social phenomena all over the world with the increased pace of affairs would also lead me to a self-reflexive mood. Thus blogging combined a self-reflexive mood with organizing and research related techniques in my case. I there attempt to build up this chapter on methodology with a central focus on blogging.

I don’t mean to be argumentative in grand scales but I would like to imply that this new media tool might have larger consequences for the discipline of anthropology. Blogging could be a tool for the public presence of the discipline. I intend this part to be a contribution to Eriksen’s well written recent work on the public visibility of anthropology (Eriksen, 2006). But first of all, I would like to argue that blogging emerges as a new research tool for the ones, like me, who conduct ethnographic fieldwork. Although, I have to admit that effectiveness of blogging increases with such a journalistic topic I have in my research, most of new anthropological topics that are researched are now related to modern and complex societies and in that sense they might receive a media interest and wider audience in any case.

Lorenz from Anthropology. Info is one of the anthropologists who spared much effort on the relation between new media and anthropology. He is the one that
inspired the initial draft of chapter. I rely on his interviews with six prominent new media related anthropologists in addition to my own experience of blogging and a brief survey of the literature on blogging. As one commenter in the Savage Minds anthropology blog points out, those interviews are inspiring but not limited to blogging. I will attempt to shape and limit the discussion in terms of blogging. Furthermore, since I specialize on journalism during my fieldwork, I was better at finding a literature on blogging and journalism. In fact, one can easily claim that there are fewer sources that focus on anthropology and blogging. In any case, I would like to point out that although this literature speaks of journalism, they help to develop my arguments. Hence, there is a heavy reliance on journalism and blogging.

In the following part, I suggest the validity of blogging as a research tool in anthropology by focusing on some significant aspects of this medium and elaborate the role of blogging in my research. In the second part I will focus other methodological aspects of my fieldwork.
Part I - Blogging Blues

In between personal and public

In Savage Minds, Rex produces an excellent post, entitled as “C. Wright Mills on blogging”, in which he applies one of the latter’s texts (On Intellectual Craftsmanship) to blogging. He had changed none of Mills’s original language except for replacing ‘journal’ and ‘file’ with ‘website’ and ‘blog’:

“......that the most admirable thinkers within the scholarly community you have chosen to join do not split their work from their lives......... You will have often noticed how carefully accomplished thinkers treat their own minds, how closely they observe their development and organize their experience. The reason they treasure their smallest experiences is that, in the course of a lifetime, the modern individual has so very little personal experience and yet experience is so important as a source of original intellectual work. To be able to trust yet to be sceptical of your own experience, I have come to believe, is one mark of the mature worker. This ambiguous confidence is indispensable to originality in any intellectual pursuit, and the file is one way by which you can develop and justify such confidence.

By keeping an adequate blog and thus developing self-reflective habits, you learn how to keep your inner world awake. Whenever you feel strongly about events or ideas you must try not to let them pass from your mind, but instead to formulate them on your blog and in so doing draw out their implications, show yourself either how foolish these feelings or ideas are, or how they
might be articulated into productive shape. The blog also helps you build up
the habit of writing. You cannot "keep your hand in" if you do not write
something at least every week. In developing the file, you can experiment as a
writer and thus, as they say, develop your powers of expression. To maintain
a blog is to engage in the controlled experience."

Blogging occupies an interesting place between the personal and the public.
The moment one starts blogging, s/he becomes public. What might miss in the above
text is this overlapping moment. The consequences of this overlap are more than I
can deal with here. However, I would like to highlight some crucial consequences.
The fieldwork is a rite of passage for the would-be anthropologists. This rite of
passage is now publicly available. A personal development in the terrain of "care of
the self" (Foucault, 1988) evolves in the eyes of anonymous audiences. Because of
the nature of new media, one can never be sure of his/her audience unless s/he
explicitly closes the site to all strangers. The site/blog would then become a closed-
circuit affair and I guess this is somewhat against the nature of this medium...

Kirk and Borders (2005) lists three markers of blog-speech that are all related
to the very personal character of blogging citizens: First of all, blog-speech is short
and emotive. Kirk and Borders argue that the style of blog communication has its
roots in the journalistic tradition: The titles of entries resemble the headlines that
capture the attention of readers. If the readers are interested in the title, they decide to
read the rest. The latter reminds us a second marker of blog voice; the use of blogs
acts as a motivational tool. Whatever theme one blogs about, continuous feedback
and new contact emergences make him/her continue to blogging. If the interest does
not include any public opening, one's motivation to continue may not be as powerful
as there is during blogging. Finally, blogging provides a participatory outlet. This is related to the previous markers. However, Borders emphasize the participatory aspect in both authors and audiences for a cause. Political campaigns are in his mind but this can be extended to acts of participations to myriad numbers of social events. In fact, in this vein, I am going to argue for collaborative work later.

Wall (2005), in her work that focus on the relation of blogs and journalism, demonstrates two ways of personalization: First of all, this is achieved particularly through providing opinions and personal comments. Secondly, for some bloggers, the personalization comes through providing original information on real world happenings: “On Sgt. Stryker, John Stryker writes about being a soldier stationed in Iraq. ‘Awake at that point for 36 hours, I was almost too tired to care when a dozen artillery and mortar rounds exploded around the mobile howitzers I was travelling with’ (Stryker, 2003 in Wall, 2005).”

Mattheson (2004) also emphasize the personal and links it to the discussions of public sphere: “There is thus also a claim to a particular authenticity of the personal, of ‘people in their natural dialect, writing from the gut (complete with warts, typos and feelings), saying things that wouldn’t normally make it through the newsroom editing machine’ (Lasica, 2002a quoted in Mattheson). It is now widely accepted that although the Internet commonly acts as a source of information, it also serves as a communication medium and even as a virtual public sphere (Polat 2005) and experimental evidence supports the positive role of the Internet in facilitating civic discussion, revealing that individuals in online chat room discussions are more likely to express an opinion than individuals in face-to-face discussions (Ho and McL. 2008). In this context blogging’s role cannot be ignored.
MacDougall (2005) concludes as such: "Whatever their stated purpose, Web logs (or blogs) are funny things. Like no other communicative form, they blur the distinction between what is public and what is private, between the individual and the group, and between fact and fiction. But in addition to all of this, and particularly when devoted to political news, blogs open up the potential for a diverse set of perspectives that can broaden the public's knowledge base and essentially flatten the hierarchical feel of traditional, mainstream news outlets."

Personal experience has been increasingly embedded in recent anthropological production but this is still inscribed after the experience/ after the fieldwork part done and it is subject to varying levels of filtering during the phase of writing (Clifford and Marcus, 1986). I assume that since the publication of Malinowski's diary, the personality of the ethnographer is well visible (not necessarily in a positive manner) and anthropologists are not unfamiliar and uneasy with their own personal accounts, but this public/private act of blogging in the immediacy of experience is a challenging epistemological moment. A radical and sometimes mutually exclusive separation of personal and field notes are challenged at the moment of writing in this manner. The idea of a depressed and lonely ethnographer is lost and s/he shares the immediate feelings and raw ideas with an audience whose boundaries are hard to estimate. This of course will gradually lead to the formation of a new subject-position. It is never like writing for oneself. A more open self, not necessarily extrovert but certainly public-conscious self is dictated as long as one needs to maintain a successful blog. A public-conscious writing and thinking from the very beginning of the fieldwork has a transformative impact on the fieldworker's subject positioning.
In my early months, my colleagues and classmates were the best long-distance supporters in my depressed days. After three years in Houston, not Istanbul but I was transformed and I only felt a little relief that I was back home where I lived most of my life. Although I was grateful for their support, this did not alleviate my anxieties. When I stopped blogging sometime towards the end of Summer 2004, I received an email from a political science professor from Spain. It was about 10 days after I had stopped. He was asking why I stopped and he told me that he was sorry to lose a good source of news on Turkey. He had a project funded by Spanish Foreign Ministry and he arrived in Istanbul a little later and we met. He was friendly, sort of fatherly and he taught me how to use some of blogging tools before he left Istanbul. This was both a technical and personal encounter and it was one of the very first motivating moments.

Another major crisis in my rather long fieldwork occurred when I had learnt that I could no more postpone my mandatory military duty in the Turkish Army (the Army does not recognize PhD work in US as an official excuse after the fifth year). This was in November 2006 and I was supposed to start my 5-month duty in three weeks. In this world shattering moment, I happened to receive messages from readers whom I had no idea about. It was one of the moments when I had a better sense of readership all over the world. Not a big one, but a loyal/regular readership. It was again emotional support but I had also got some tips. Both online and offline tips at this period helped me to prepare a strategy to postpone my duty for a longer period. At this time of writing (November 2008), I still can postpone the duty without falling into a legal problem.
Immediate feedback from a wider audience

Blogging brings immediate feedback; not only from the limited scholarly circles but from a wider public/audience which in turn exposes the ethnographer to a much more effective accountability.

I am quite certain that any new ethnographic inquiry that takes place in a modern society will overlap with some other disciplinary inquiries. However, not only social scientific audiences, but even segments of ‘lay audiences’ will be interested in these inquiries. For instance, my dissertation in its broadest terms focuses on journalistic representations of Turkey and European Relations. Not only many anthropologists would challenge how anthropological my project is, journalists would keep an eye on my work constantly, and political scientists, at least, would be suspicious about the project. No doubt that I would also be exposed to scholars of communication and journalism. And mere citizens, by virtue of beings citizens whose futures might possibly be affected with the course of membership negotiations would challenge my ideas positively or negatively. In fact, the current nature of academia sheds new lights on the inner workings of any discipline, but under normal conditions, any product/publication goes through substantive editorial processes. What is new with the blogging is that your writings are mostly unedited/unintervened except your self-control. Instant publication precludes many mediators/gatekeepers and conveys one’s work with much less obstruction to a wider net-based community that is unhindered by the traditional gatekeepers.

This is of course a little bit of an ideal portrayal of blogging. Increasing number of anthropologists misunderstand the nature of blogging and continue to
write for fellow anthropologists as the main audience.² I agree with the caution that

2 As it is observed here:

"Anthropology in Public" by Strong in Savage Minds blog:

In connection with this debate at Savage Mind (SM), I noticed these observations at Open Anthropology: I wonder if much of what we as anthropologists engaged in blogging are in fact engaging in is public anthropology, or simply anthropology in public. I will not be naming names, and take the charge that I am criticizing a "straw man", to avoid any unnecessary skirmishes (I have enough battles on my hands already)–from what I have seen, most anthropology bloggers are in fact writing for an audience of anthropologists online, and the discussions, even when vibrant, retain a private quality. Sometimes the posts that are published fit in with narrow professional concerns that they could only be of very limited interest to a wider audience, apart from members of that audience who are curious to gain insights into academic professionalisms. We are not generally communicating anthropology to non-anthropologists, or drawing on non-anthropological blogs in our own conversations, or producing an anthropology that is less self-consciously anthropological because it is too immersed in the give and take of a public debate to pause and ask aloud: "I wonder what Ralph Linton would have said about this?" Some of us seem to be too busy trying to impress professional, even senior colleagues, as if blogging were a shortcut to professional prestige previously gained through print publications, knowing the "right people" and having the "right pedigree", and lots of hand shaking at conferences. The tone of assessments can resemble that found in the comments of anonymous peer reviewers in print journals, that is, sometimes rather elitist and haughty: "overly simplistic", "spurious argument", "specious", "outmoded dichotomy", not a good way to invite dialogue. In other words, it's as if "work" has followed me "home" when I read some of the blogs, when in my case I often seek a break, a refuge, and a space for doing something different, or something that goes against the norms of the workplace. Otherwise, the question I would be directing to myself is: what's the point of blogging when there's beer and television?
there cannot be attributed an intrinsic positive value to all forms of immediate feedback. The practicality of blogging is that one can stop or pause anytime s/he wants. It is the blogger who will decide in what frequency to post. Blogging can be a research tool and it is not intended to replace other possible ways.

To continue with my ideal type portrayal: However, this condition increases the level of individual responsibility for the blogging anthropologist. One of my earliest expositions to a lay public happened through a discussion on Kardak island crisis (see more: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kardak) between Turkey and Greece. I had summarized news related to former Greek PM Simitis’ book that included a section on the crisis. My post was quoted in in an online discussion forum and then I began to have more nationalist readers. This was a relatively passive encounter but Armenian genocide debate remained to be more contentious. I had spent incredible time to be neutral. Danish Cartoon crisis was just another one I had to be involved in one way or another. However, a relatively direct accusation came just recently. A neo-con blogger implied I was anti-American while I was a student in Texas... I felt quite helpless at that time since this accusation came without any evidence. I sincerely could not figure out how he reached such a conclusion. Since my research topic is involved in politics significantly, I am prone to be involved in any regional

.........Does all writing on the web have to be snappy and quick, tilted toward a general audience? Maximillian has captured something here, to be sure, but what I notice often elsewhere on many anthroblogs is simply collation of interesting articles about, say, hormones and risk taking, from the New York Times. Newsflash: we are all reading the New York Times online. We all saw that article. One thing I like about SM’s sometimes arcane discourse is precisely that it remains rooted in literatures that I find fascinating and that I frankly don’t really see discussed elsewhere on the web (could be my own fault though).
crisis. As the blog gains a wider audience, the responses also become more varied. In one year’s time, I got to meet new people/professors in the academia (not particularly in anthropology), journalists (mostly Turkish), graduate students, Turkey lovers through blogging and some of my students have become regular readers. The scope of my writings broadened not only due to the growing readership but the audience was certainly an important motivational factor. The blog has also become an ice-breaker and I used it to further my first time encounters in the offline world. But I mean not only personal encounters. Every encounter is a dialogic moment when I had to recalibrate my ideas. In strictly professional terms, this may not be needed. As long as your advisor and your readers do like what you write, you will pass but this does not help the ethnographer in dealing with other and larger audiences.

Among the interviewees of Lorenz, Friedman says blogging “has been highly rewarding. Although the number of regular readers on both sites is low compared with some of the major blogs (hundreds, as opposed to thousands, of visitors each day), most of our readers are interesting thoughtful people, and the discussion and exchange has been rewarding (well, most of the time ...). Personally, my blogging has changed a lot over time. Initially my personal blog was almost purely political. However, over time a number of truly wonderful political blogs emerged that were able to keep on top of the latest developments much better than I can. This freed me up to write more about personal and cultural interests. Now, with Savage Minds, I also have a forum to talk about more professional interests. I’ve also enjoyed meeting some bloggers in person, such as when I met with Taiwanese bloggers in Taiwan this summer.” Grzonka states that she “got no static personal website yet. The experiences with my blog are all positive so far. I got networked quickly, which means being read, being referred to, being quoted, being blogrolled, being
commented by a variety of people on my blog, being emailed and finally being mini-researched myself. *smile*" 3

The literature on blogs emphasize the audience agency. Although my survey is interested in journalism, observations there fruitful for my own purposes: In this context I would agree with Robinson (2006) who says ‘Readers are key sources in the blog world’. Even if the multi-authored blogs are ignored, one can see the one-man blogs already use theirs readers as sources and co-authors. Traditional journalism can be thought, and is indeed it is already, without direct audience participation but this is not imaginable for blogging. Each reader has the potential to contribute to the creating of the story. Some news sites dedicate entire blogs to reader input. So Robinson says ‘Citizens thus have the opportunity to react not only to what

3 Dale says:

“My blog(s) are a mix of anthropology and other topics, and it seems to me that it is much easier to get feedback on the stuff I write about which is not “anthropological”, that is, mostly, politics. Now my political views is flavoured by my interest in anthropology, of course, so in that respect it gets out there. However, feedback from anthropologists has been limited…” while Tad says “I have not had a lot of feedback but experiences have been positive. My students like being able to access handouts and images after class hours. My blog has generated some discussion on a few points. The most positive things to come from my website and blog are simply getting to know or know about a wider circle of (generally) young anthropologists. Without my participation in these discussions, I would not be aware of research going on in parts of the world that are outside of my research areas.”
has been written in the blog, but to ‘repair’ what the print publication published.’
Wall (2005) goes further to demonstrate technicalities of audience participation in
addition to emphasize the aspect of ‘relation’. She states that many of the blogs she
studied cultivate a relationship with the audience. Most of the standard blogging
software includes a link at the end of each post labeled ‘comments’ or some other
word inviting response. Here, audiences can link to other readers’ responses as well
as post their own. Wall quotes: ‘For example, Bob (2003 quoted in Wall, 2005), a
visitor to The Command Post, writes: ‘Allied warplanes are intruding into Iranian
airspace to execute air strikes against Basra and Baghdad regions. Iranians
responding with anti-air artillery fire.’ Thus, ‘Bob’ becomes not just a visitor but a
contributor updating the site with information.’ Sometimes a post produces so many
comments that this amount of commentary itself becomes an event. For instance,
Wall gives the example of Daily Kos that ‘received 1754 comments over a 4-day
period, although in other cases, no one responded to a blogger’s post…’ (2005).

In my case, most of feedback came through emails in fact. This is partly
because I post too much and this does give opportunity to discuss an issue
extensively in comments section. I should have encouraged that maybe but instead i
acted sort of egotistical and worked on building an archive instead of a more lively
discussion space. Because of fast flowing nature of my posts, this became impossible
in my case, and i would think that high volume of traffic occurred because of other
reasons such as the regularity, a level of professionalism, and the attraction of news...

In addition to comments, ‘The blogs that link to this post’ or ‘trackback’
options relate bloggers each other. Services like Technorati calculates the popularity
of a blog not only according to the number of visitors but also to the number of links
connected to the particular site. Therefore, and in most of the cases, citizen bloggers start a dialogue between each other or a blog post is distributed to the blogosphere through linkages between blogs. Wall (2005) says that this situation provides a sort of virtual town hall but one that can be and often is anonymous. Reader comments or other bloggers’ reactions creates an extended discussion and makes a blogger’s contribution public. She says ‘Like many chat room discussions, the comments ranged from the vitriolic to the thoughtful.

As stated above, hyperlinks then are important not just as part of a changing story form but in order to help establish credibility. Indeed, where bloggers promote social networks, mainstream media are more likely to place commercial content (Wall, 2005). Technorati Blog Search Engine, that could not yet be defeated by Google Blog Search, assess the blogs not only due to their visitor numbers but also and even more importantly to the extent that they are linked. For instance, although my blog, Erkan’s Field Diary receives more daily visitors (240) than two of my friends (Di: 75, Murat: 45) because of the level of connectivity, I am ranked way below than the latter in Technorati. [These statistics belong to two years ago and since then I have changed my address and daily visits I receive reached 1200 according to Sitemeter]

‘Links’ is a significant section for bloggers. In addition to hypertextual connections within the post bodies, explicit connection to friendly sites cannot be ignored. I am keen on classifications: “EU Related Links” consist of mainly links to mainstream media, think tanks or governmental sources. Besides EU bloggers like Europhobia and A Fistful of Euros are also added here. As my interests and connections grew, I have formed new folders of links: “Cyberculture”, “Football”,

and "Cool Links" in addition to a huge list of "Blog Etc" in which mere bloggers and personal websites are listed. There are several blogger directories such Bloglar Alemi and Blog Kardesligi in Turkish and Blog Shares, Bloggers Blog, Blog Rankings etc that are mostly found in these blogs. The new RSS code to subscribe makes it easier to follow blogs and Bloglines and Google Readers are quick to provide tools to bloggers. All these links connect a fieldworker to a larger audience. Not always one can attract attention from a wider audience but there appears an opportunity. Therefore, in order to be up-to-date with happenings, I developed a series of online sources which in turn created attention and provided off-line opportunities of connection. Here is a list of online services I rely on: "Bloglines, Google Alerts, Yahoo Alerts, Google's Related Pages service, EU Observer, EurActiv, ABHaber, EMM, Turkish Daily News, The New Anatolian as the English language Turkish Newspapers, Hurriyet, Turkish Digest, TurcoPundit, Turkish Torque, Amerikan Turk."

I should add that increasing authority of one's blog produces more access. In my own case, I remember being introduced to a chief editor by one of the columnists. The latter showed my blog to the former and he immediately asked my contact information (Alas, because of the change of ownership in that newspaper, I missed an opportunity of a good positioning) It is also amusing but also an issue of credibility that before you mention your blog, some interviewees already know it. This happened at least twice. As the authority of the blog increases, its visibility also increases in net searches. It is highly likely that a user who searches about Turkey and European Union issues will find my blog.
Here when I meant accountability, I meant accountable in the way that one's ideas are subject to constant testing. Open to a possibly larger audience scrutiny. My primary concern is the intellectual build-up of the research findings. And in the mean time, a regular blogger will eventually be discovered if s/he is not trying hard to hide. As noted, in some fieldwork context the identity of the ethnographer should not be disclosed to larger audiences and one can hide himself/herself and only the ideas will be exposed. but in other contexts, the archive one builds will eventually give clues about the identity. Not to all but to those who attempts to discover the anonymous poster. I remember reading somewhere that blogging in general gives more clues about personality than other new media tools as the blog archive develops...
Regularity; Potential for further Narrativity

Moreover, blogging urges to see motives in a more regular sense, thus creates a strong sense of regularity that forces the ethnographer to produce on a regular basis which in turn produces a constant appeal to narrate what would normally remain fragments of field notes.

One of the best expressions of what I want to argue here can be found in Cicilie’s account:

“After I started I have noticed that blogging sharpens the attention, just like taking a lot of photos (and probably painting) does; One starts to see motifs everywhere, and then one has to reflect on how to make the motif into a story so other people can understand what you want to tell them (in Cicilie among the Parisians; a blog from Cicilie Fagerlid’s fieldwork in Paris that contains many observations in this vein).

In connection to the previous section multi-vocality and multi-authorship potential of blogs should be emphasized here. I agree with Kirk and Borders (2005) who names blogs as ‘social narrative’. Some of the issues are already mentioned below. Here referring a more technical aspect, they quote from Kaye Trammell, a professor at Louisiana State University, who wrote her doctoral thesis on the political content of blogs (Glaser, 2004 quoted in Kirk and Borders, 2005): ‘She states that most of the beginning blogs included links to other sites, and blog editors often included additional comments. Weblog editors may provide context for an article by juxtaposing it against other articles or related subjects. Considered in this constructed context, the message may take on additional meaning or lead the reader to conclusions contrary to the reader’s initial suppositions’.
A further aspect of the social narrative, according to Kirk and Borders, is the study of how a message chains out in a population. The social activism of bloggers promotes "democratic self-expression and networking" (Kahn and Kellner, 2004). As blogs and those who monitor them become more sophisticated, their impact may become increasingly clear. Tracking conversations occurring in the blogosphere provides real-time insight into the rise and fall of conversation topics and the intensity of that discussion. As part of the social structure, blogs invoke the voyeuristic element of communication into the mix. As one reviewer writes, "People like to peek into others' lives" (Jensen, 2003 quoted in Kahn and Kellner, 2004).

In addition to the integral role of hyperlinks, which is given more space in the following section, blogging allows several other formats to be used. For instance, Robinson (2006) mentions minute-by-minute blogs that recount a specific event as it unfolds. The entries by themselves are mundane, but, as Robinson argues, when taken as an entire entity, a new form of newswriting seems to be occurring. As a specific example, Florida Today's space reporter in January 2003 who blogged on NASA's Spaceship Columbia mission is cited. The blog's target is a very specialized audience but once the shuttle blew up, this blog became 'news' in the traditional sense of action. In that case, "the climax is hidden among the clouding of weather patterns. On one level, the communicative model of news has suddenly become postmodern because meaning is obscured and a-contextual, and narrative of the event is essentially absent. On another level, perhaps this new form could also be considered intertextual as the blogger here is presuming readers' additional knowledge of the event from other sources such as television and radio. Either way, the format explodes the inverted pyramid of a comprehensive retelling of an event according to a traditional sense of importance that has hitherto been determined by
journalists.” I have mostly explored the interconnectivity of sites in blogging, but the impact of hyperlinks on the written text itself should also be noted. With the collapse of inverted pyramid model, the news itself resembles traditional storytelling with multiple entry points and several endings. All traditional no-nos (Superlatives, first person, contractions, questions with no answers, answers with no questions) are used without hesitation (Robinson, 2006). In Wendland’s terms “blogs are indeed supplying various interpretations of the day’s news, ‘unfiltered’ and ‘unedited’ (2003 quoted in Robinson, 2006). Mattheson (2004) says “The problem of journalism is rarely self-criticism, but more a difficulty in finding alternative modes of news writing that do not unravel its power to tell authoritative stories.”

I can explicitly declare that in my thesis writing process feedback and audience in general shapes what is written to a certain extent. In my case, I started like lamenting about being in the field, my initial failed attempts in field contacts, my unceasing depressive mood. Later, I began to add links to news sources and began to use my blog as a chronicle of related news events and commentaries. Then I decided to make my blog a web source to those who are looking for information on my thesis topic. Until then, I was kind of anxious whether I should limit myself to purely fieldwork themes or do more. I guess the nature of blogging and my own personal interests won the decision making process and I gradually personalized my blog, I mean in addition to my research topic, I did write about my hobbies, that include soccer, music, literature and a new research topic already emerged: cybertulture.

Free personal blogging tools are a bit minimalist. If one wants to do changes in the layout of the blog, s/he will need to gain some knowledge of html and CSS codes in addition to possible hardware needs. Every bit of knowledge produces more
possibilities of layout and writing techniques. After upgrading my blogging software and changing layout, my daily visitors increased by 100%. But what is more important is that individuals have the power to experiment with any kind of writing and visual representation and the knowledge that s/he will receive feedback for what s/he experimented sooner than later.

But I feel like I have shifted away from the main objective of this part. Inherently chronological order of blogging software is a strong tool of regularity. It is likely that a regular blogger like me will feel anxiety if regular posting ceases. This means that something might be wrong with the fieldwork itself. In order to produce, you have to be ever more alert, sensitive and also ready to write. This again seems to be an ideal type portrayal but this is most of the time what I felt about my fieldwork/blogging experience. Whatever happened, I found blogging the sign of my continuing existence in the fieldwork. With advanced tools which are all available for even users with not much technical expertise, the existence in the field could be narrated in the most resourceful way (from different writing techniques to audio-visual possibilities of representation). When all my willpower to interview or to intervene stopped, I could still continue with the flow of news and commentaries as a service to all interested parties.
Resolution of after the fact anxieties, Potential for collaborative work

Blogging might be a remedy to the anxiety of being in 'after the fact' that is shared by many anthropologists. Blogging takes place in the present tense while actively engaging with 'the fact', with the emergent phenomena unlike the later edited institutionally accepted monographs most of which become outdated.

Under normal conditions a fieldworker will keep his field notes to himself or to a limited audience. A process of publication takes too long and in most of the cases, those field notes or anthropologist’s remarks on a topic lose their actuality. If we just keep in mind the scarcity of anthropologists who are involved in public engagements, even most of the senior ones do react after the fact. Blogging could provide immediate engagement and powerful feedback can shape the output in a much more productive way.

Real time attributes goes hand in hand with non-linear potential of new media and hence the blogs. Some scholars had already seen the possibility of a new form of postmodern journalism developing online (e.g. Landow, 1997; Murray, 1997; Wall, 2005 all quoted in Robinson, 2006). For example, Murray (1997: 282) attributes 'kaleidoscope powers' to the computer: 'The ability to see multiple patterns in the same elements, might also lead to compelling narratives that capture our new situation as citizens of a global community.' Hyperlinks are a certain part of new media structure that 'allow readers to change endings (and even extend them indefinitely), establish a nonlinear story format and bring in other authors (Landow, 1997). Quoting from Wall (2004) Robinson (2006) argues that blogs could be classified as postmodern news in the tradition of New Journalism, in which a stable version of truth (or at least traditional notions of journalistic form) no longer exists. Although a
modernist line of critique can harshly oppose this relativism, I would like to think of this non-linearity a potential of resourcefulness for a fieldworker’s anthropological writing.

Mattheson (2004) is less assertive but instead of using a meta-theoretical label, he calls this heavy use of hyperlinks a journalism of connections. His has similar thoughts on the nature of journalist authority, however, he is more specific: ‘[This heavy use demonstrates that] what is happening in the world cannot be channelled exclusively through one news text. Instead, the weblog can be thought of as claiming a more contingent authority in its use of these multiple links. There is thus a mesh of authority, in which the site’s use of the article vouches for the text’s value, while the status of the Washington Post, Human Rights Watch or the quality of the reporting and writing reinforce the weblog’s authority’ (ibid). He then argues that, this kind of journalism is a journalism of linking rather than pinning things down, that is situated within a model of knowledge-as-process rather than knowledge-as-product. Accordingly, Pavlik writes: ‘This represents a new form of journalism that places stories in a much more historical, political and cultural context. ‘The fact that massive repositories of information are only a few mouse clicks away offers a richness of hypermedia that sets it apart from traditional media,’ conclude Fredin and David (Pavlik, 2001: 16, quoting Fredin and David, 1998: 35). Linking is also used in traditional journalism but here, Matheson argues, hyperlinks are integral to the way in which meaning is constructed: ‘The news weblog genre’s reliance on writers’ idiosyncratic choices – ‘our pick of online reads’, as the Guardian weblog sums up its status – and their practice of directing users away from the sites to other news or information sites (Blood, interviewed in Gallagher, 2000) make the genre considerably less inwardly-focused than conventional news.’
Matheson (2004) goes further to contrast blogs with 'another thread of
development in online journalism, personalized news services (Lasica, 2002b), which
do a similar job to the weblog in helping users to cope with the huge and increasing
amounts of material available online. However, 'if the risks associated with
journalists' stereotypical news values are replaced in such services; it is with the risk
of individuals not extending beyond preconceived world views. Part of the weblog's
appeal to critics and users appears to be that it has the potential to disrupt such
cognitive structures. The news weblog's particular mix of a heavy dependence upon
hyperlinks to a wide range of different kinds of text, its chronological rather than
hierarchical organization of material on the page and its less rationally codified pages
mixing news and opinion, domestic and foreign themes - its move, in short, away
from 'the established vocabulary of newspaper authority'.

Responding to emergences is a challenge for the fieldworker who normally
postpones more analytical interpretations to the write-up period. This extends writing
back right into fieldwork phase. It makes the interpretations assemblages that might
evolve into different patterns of interpretations. My ideas on Kurdish question varied
sometimes radically. This could be observed in my blog posts all over four years. In
understanding anti-Americanism in Turkey, I have renewed my arguments several
times, I have proposed new defenses for the hysterical anti-Orhan Pamuk discourses
and of course I have had myriad of ever-changing ideas on Turkey's positioning on the
EU membership process.

As a final note, I take 'after the fact' not as literal as it means. What I had in
mind was that to continue to analyze/interpret at the moment of becoming of events
that we claim to study. The EU-Turkey are relations developing/evolving right now.
No one can really predict what the outcome will be. And I write right in the middle of this open-ended process like experts in other fields. Maybe I produce my angry post after the 50th year ceremonies of EU to which Turkey was not invited. But in the larger scene, this is just another moment in the becoming of relations between Turkey and EU.

Blog writings are sometimes just fragments of data that have to be analyzed carefully and sometimes they are sub-arguments or analyses that structure the basis of a chapter. I had thought for a long time if I was just justifying my fun with blogging by declaring that I would use the stuff archived there. But when I started to write, I have relied on the blog archive much more than I ever intended in this respect.
As a Conclusion

A recent piece by Andy Guess covered an academic meeting on new media and anthropology and he stated that "... the implications of the Internet's openness and availability", "the issue of control" were mentioned and the panel speakers were quoted to state "while new media can foster participatory ethnography and enhance access, the panel seemed to suggest, it can also provide innovative means of investigating subcultures — and rich source material in and of itself..." (2007)

However, the role of blogging and new media in general is still contested in terms of academic authority. A recent post by Maximilian Forte highlight this. After quoting from another piece from Andy Guess in Inside Higher Ed titled, “Blogs and Wikis and 3D, Oh My!” (09 May, 2008):

... Scharf - keeping in mind the varying quality of blogs - said that he made sure to clarify his blog's intent and high standards by displaying awards that it had won and a prominent list of expert contributors "so that people were getting the sense that this was a very serious [effort], that these experts were well-qualified to be saying these things."

He argued:

Personally, I am a bit dismayed by the last paragraph. It relies on an appeal to authority as the basis for evaluating the credibility and validity of statements posted on blogs, which is a poor way to make a logical argument in any context simply because authorities can also be wrong....
Justifications for blogging continue in other spheres, too. A reliable blog that sits in between European Union politics and new media argues here ("Does blogging matter? The world has it say and we have ours"): 

Relating this to Brussels, the influence of blogs is one question we are increasingly having amongst ourselves and with others. There are a number of points that we keep coming back to that we thought might be worth sharing: 

1. Blogs are helping to shape the communications environment in which work 

Data from the likes of Ipsos MORI suggests that 1 in 5 Europeans are indeed reading blogs (Italy apparently comes top with 27% of Italians having read blogs). And while we have (currently) no data to quantify the numbers of policymakers, stakeholders and political media in Brussels reading blogs on a daily basis, if such actors reflect the population then blogs as a form of communication could be influential in shaping the debate around issues in the future. The number of journalists, Commissioners and MEPs that are blogging themselves would suggest that there at least some of the same are reading blogs. (Yes, we know, we need "facts, only facts" in terms of the levels of such readership. We are working on it.) 

2. Blogs can be used to amplify your message 

Monitoring blogs will of course only tell you what's going on, not what to do about it. However, it has already struck us (and thankfully some of the people we work with) that in some cases bloggers focused on specific issues of relevance to the policy debate may be fertile ground for what is known as "Online Editorial Outreach" for public affairs purposes. It's the online
equivalent of media relations with some subtle but important differences. Bloggers of course are not journalists...and there are some best practices we have developed as a company that take this into account.

In any case, seeking out expert bloggers, often with decent day jobs, that can amplify an organisation's message online could prove useful in a public affairs context where policymakers and those that influence them go online to find information and insights. Noise in the blogosphere may become as much a part of the mood music to policy debates in Brussels as articles in the FT. Is it going to change a vote, probably no. Is it going to help make people more receptive to a message, perhaps yes.

3. Blogger influence is more likely to be about quality rather than quantity

When thinking about monitoring or indeed outreach, it's the quality of the bloggers and their posts that is important rather than the sheer numbers of readers. Who are they, what do they know, how often do they post, who comments and who links to them? All questions to ask. On some of the obscure EU issues we love, the numbers are not likely to be great but the influence may be.

I believe that blogging could be a source for anthropologists' intervention to public debates. In declinist discourse on public intellectualism, the academy is blamed for erecting a wall between itself and the public (Park, 2006; 116). As it is argued or implied throughout this chapter, blogging is a tool to overcome this wall. Park emphasizes media in general as an imperative to overcome (116) and I could underline blogging here. Park in fact had already suggested in this direction: "Public intellectuals who have a difficult time gaining entry to television, radio, and
mainstream print publications may find the Internet a natural choice for the
distribution of their ideas" (122).

He continues:

This is directly applicable to the position of bloggers... Indeed, large number
of weblogs dedicated to issues of political and social importance could
represent an explosion in the number of public intellectuals. The blogger qua
public intellectual has prompted no small number of utopian hopes. Douglas
Turnbull claimed that blogging 'has restored the public intellectual sphere that
has been lost for most in America' (Turnbull, 2002) " (p. 123).

There are several other themes that needs further exploration. Although I do
not engage with archive issue directly, a few words should said. I believe digitalized
data is easier to transmit even if the technology at hand becomes quickly obsolete.
There will certainly be an IT place where the data can be recovered. It is of course
also easy to lose digital data irretrievably. Probably all of us had some kind of
experience of loss. This is a challenge with the coming of digitalization and we are
finding new ways of surviving (by backing up). The blog archive is just part of this
huge challenge and I believe its existence is more secure than what we personally
keep. If one is not exposed to a vicious attack, the servers of the hosting company
will keep the archive secure as long as you pay the bills.

I take information load not as literal as it means. What I have in mind is that
to continue to analyze/ interpret at the moment of becoming of events that we claim
to study. The EU-Turkey are relations developing/evolving at the moment. No one
can really predict what the outcome will be. And I write right in the middle of this
open-ended process like experts in other fields. Maybe I produce my angry post after
the 50th year ceremonies of EU to which Turkey was not invited. But in the larger scene, this is just another moment in the becoming of relations between Turkey and EU.

If one's research will end up producing a public material, one will have to deal with these anxieties in one way or another. I don't know why blogging is necessarily a threat to research ethics or security of researcher or informants. Anthropologists are probably one of the best equipped social scientists to resolve issues of privacy (or are they?). I have a long list of "blacklisted" journalists. I will disclose some of them towards the end of my research, and some will always remain buried. But can there not be a way to talk about your research without trespassing ethical issues? Then how are you going to discuss in the end? Same rules apply maybe with more caution in blogging. Because one has little time to reflect upon them. But these sensitive issues are always there to be resolved. I am very well aware that context of fieldwork will define the way one uses new media. and new media has a surprising number of tools to innovate. Every field-site has its own particular problems, one might be exposed to extremely strict ethical standards, one might be exposed to police subpoena etc and let me remind you that I would be exposed to the consequences of coup d'état (April 2007 Turkish Army "e-warning" to government)....

For some challenging issues of property, I don't have ready answers. Since a blog is not like a wiki system, it still brings upon the issue of ownership, the blogger can claim the generated knowledge. Here comes the higher levels of ethics. To what extent one should define the source of one's ideas/knowledge. But is this radically different from the feedback or discussion one gets, let's say in a conference? In the
questions and answers section. In my relatively limited experience of conferences etc I had always gotten good feedback and I used them in one way or another.

In most of my blogging experience, I do not write much about anthropology but I promote myself as an anthropologist. I am there, an anthropologist blogger, and I do not necessarily need to write about anthropology itself. It is more important to talk to others in their own fields and I think that worked so far.

There are not always advantages of being publicly visible. I did try to be neutral because of the prospect of my interviews. As I could manage to gather enough number of interviews, I could be more relaxed in preserving a level of neutrality. But secondly, I had an active activist student life, and I now feel regret to a large extent. I had a personal decision not to be too partisan even when I was extremely pro-EU [and that changed]. Thirdly, because I believe in my social scientific ideals, I was neutral because I did not know what to believe. In the mean time, I don't believe the necessity of neutrality. I do not believe in the existence of neutrality or objectivism. Once you enter the field, you become a part of the ongoing drama. In the complexities of the field, you tend to be more or less involved but involvement itself seems to be inevitable. My turning point in all this drama is the assassination of Hrant Dink - A Turkish-Armenian Journalist- in January 2007. Mr. Dink had a lovely personality. A good journalist, and politically conscious person who was by no means partisan. Just a week before his murder, I had interviewed a very well known intellectual and columnist. He had said he was expecting bloodshed because of the growing ultranationalist political environment. I had thought he was just fantasizing but a week after that interview, a good person was killed. After that I had decided to be more aggressive against ultranationalist tendencies in the
mainstream media or politics. I have not met an explicitly hostile case. I believe my own political standings would irritate some of my informants. I have become more hostile against some mainstream newspapers since the assassination of Hrant Dink last year. This also brought some negative publicity from more nationalist circles. Still political blogging in Turkey is just starting. My fame in abroad could not be transformed into domestic scene at the time of my fieldwork. This helped me though. If I were more popular as a political blogger, my interviewees would meet me with a more emotional approach and this would take the research into another stage. In the last analysis, blogging helped me immensely in organizing and analysing overflowing data, in accessing a few pro-EU columnists but did not interfere with the ways I conducted my contacts in general.
Cited web pages and blogs:

AB Haber: www.abhaber.com/

Amerikan Turk: http://americanturk.blogspot.com/

Antropologi.info: http://www.antropologi.info/blog/anthropology/


Blog Rankings: www.blogrankings.com/

Blog Shares: www.blogshares.com/

Bloggers Blog: www.bloggersblog.com/

Bloglar Alemi: www.bloglaralemi.com/

Bloglines: www.bloglines.com/

Cicilie among the Parisians: http://antropologi.info/blog/cicilie/

Di: http://womanwandering.blogspot.com/

EMM: www.einnews.com/

Erkan’s Field Diary: http://frazer.rice.edu/~erkan/blog/

EU Observer: euobserver.com/

EurActiv: www.euractiv.com/

Google Alerts: www.google.com/alerts

Google Reader: www.google.com/reader
Google Related Links: www.google.com/relatedlinks/

Hürriyet: www.hurriyet.com.tr/

Savage Minds: http://savageminds.org

Technorati: http://www.technorati.com/

The New Anatolian: www.thenewanatolian.com/

TurcoPundit: turcopundit.blogspot.com/

Turkish Digest: www.turkishdigest.com/

Turkish Torque: tork.blogspot.com/
A list of anthropology sites and blogs (which is by no means complete)

Afarensis-Anthro, Evolution, Science

After Culture journal

AlphaPsy

Anthropologica

Anthropologist Community (Live Journal)

Anthropology 2.0

Anthropology Matters

Anthropology of Food

Anthropology Review Database

Anthropology Works

Antropologi Blog Newspaper

Antropologi.info

Antropoloji.net

Antropyton

Berkay Dincer's Archeology Links

Blogazonia
Blogs in Anthropology

Boas Blog

Center for Anatolian Ethnography and Textile Studies

Center for Ethnography

Cecilia Fagerlid

Closer

Comunidade Imaginada blog

Contraposicion

Critical World Blog

Critically Cultural

Crossroads-blog

Cultural Anthropology - journal

Culture Groove

Culture Matters blog

Cultureby-Intersection of Anth and Economics

Daniel G. Bates

Dark Matter Journal

Denise Carter
Dienekes' Anthropology Blog

Digging Digitally

Digital Ethnography

Elina-becoming an anthropologist

Ethnodigitography

Ethnographic Database Project

EVIFA ? Virtual Library of Social Anthropology

Golublog-Alex

Hot Cup of Joe- blog

International Rhetoric Culture Project

Intute Anthropology

Intute Social Sciences Blog

Islam, Muslims, and an Anthropologist

John Hawks Weblog

John Postill blog

Jon Henrik in Ifugao blog

Julian Hopkins blog

Keywords- Kerim
Laboratory for the Anth.of the Contemporary

Linguistic Anthropology Blog

Locating Ethnography

Matter Out of Place

Museum Anthropology blog

Network of Concerned Anthropologists

Neuroanthropology blog

Nomadic Thoughts

Northern Waterways

Omertaa: Journal for Applied Anthropology

Open Anthropology blog

Open Range Anthropologist

Radical Anthropology Group

Remixing Anthropology blog

Rune in Brazil

Samarkeolog

Sarapen

Story of My Home
Tabsir - Insights on Islam and the ME

Tak - The Old Revolution

The Ethnographic Thesaurus

The Megacities Project

The Memory Bank

Thomas Hylland Eriksen

Türk Halk Bilimi (Turkish Folk Studies)

Understanding Race

Wanna be an anthropologist blog

warauduati (blog)

Webnography

World Anthropologies Network

xirdalam

Yann Klimenditis' blog
Part II - Apart from blogging...

Preliminary Studies

In the summer of 2003, I spent a month in CNN’s Turkish partnership, CNN-Turk. With the permission of Ferhat Boratav, the chief editor, I attended the two daily editorial meetings everyday (one in the morning, one in the late afternoon). I was also free to have access any departments within this news institution as long as I did not interfere with the working of professional life. I had two main intentions in doing research at CNN-Turk: a) To observe the daily working of a professional news institution which is part of Dogan Media Group, the largest media conglomeration in Turkey. By doing this, I would find out how to do research and what kind of methods to use in such a place. The research design outlined here basically has the empirical grounding of summer research. b) I planned to make further connections for my fieldwork for the next year. Among many important journalists, I met Mehmet Ali Birand, a famous Turkish journalist who specializes in EU news. Although he had promised to help me with my research and later ignored, my initial meeting with him was instructive. My acquaintance with Yalim Eralp was also important: He is an ex-consulate, who now regularly comments on EU politics and attends the CNN-Turk editorial meetings as a diplomatic advisor.

Aside from CNN-Turk research, I have had access to journalistic circles thanks to my old friend and Kurdish journalist Ferzende Kaya, who had previously worked in prominent Turkish dailies such as Sabah and Turkish Daily News as well as a famous pro-Kurdish daily, Ozgur Gundem. Mr. Kaya introduced me to many journalist circles. That included the Istanbul branch of the Association of Turkish Progressive Journalists. To highlight the importance of Mr. Kaya, I should add that his
biographical book on Ahmet Kaya [no kinship relation], a famous Kurdish protest
singer in Turkey, had become a best seller and his later biographical book on
Abdulmelik Firat, a famous Kurdish member of parliament, did also hit the best seller
lists.

I also had six months of work experience in a small but national newspaper,
*Yeni Gundem* before my PhD work began. My personal interest in media studies and
especially in journalism comes from this experience. I had worked as an assistant to a
foreign news editor in that daily and this is where I could see the politics of news
making. The political stance of the newspaper administration interfered with the way
we made news on a wide-ranging scale: Mr. Asad’s death in Syria, local Turkish
uneasiness towards the Turkish government in northern Cyprus, or peace negotiations
in Sri Lanka, etc.

Finally, I worked as a teaching assistant for a year in a prominent
communication school at Istanbul Bilgi University and when I came back to Istanbul I
would resume the same job I left. I later became a lecturer in Public Relations
program in the same school. Thus I have also been connected with the academic
aspects of journalism education. Furthermore, Prof. Aydin Ugur, the dean of the
communication school, who would later become the rector of the university, had
agreed to sponsor me. It was he who had introduced me to Ferhat Boratav and his help
continued throughout my fieldwork years.

I should add that I am also associated with a network of anthropologists who
study mass media that is connected with the European Association of Social
Anthropologists.
Apart from media experience and connections, I have relatively good experience in ethnographic techniques. My master's degree in sociology at Bogazici University, Istanbul depends on more than a year of episodic fieldwork in an electronic spare parts manufacturing factory in Istanbul. I have written a thesis on male unionist factory workers during the then current economic depression under the supervision of an anthropologist, Nukhet Sirman, in that department. I have employed many of the methods I have described above as well as the method of oral life histories (Briggs, 1996).

In the summer of 2002, I went to Rhodes, Greece to study the Turkish minority there. Under the supervision of Eugenia Georges and funded by Landes Foundation, I spent one month on the island and a few more days in Athens, Greece for archival research.

**Research methods. What was planned, what actually happened?**

**Focus group interviews**

Because of the nature of their work, it would be difficult to gather a group of journalists at the same time. However, this method can basically be applied to two journalistic contexts: a) two daily editorial meetings and b) gathering of journalists in any social occasion. As Tilic (1998) points out, journalists always talk about news events even in their leisure time. Schensel (1997b) makes a distinction between highly formal and highly informal focus group interviews. The former context can be seen as highly formal and the latter can be seen as highly informal. However, in the former case I cannot participate in any way and would remain as a complete observer. But the nature of these editorial meetings that are initiated by the chief editor are quite similar
to focus group discussions by providing productive brainstorming and conflicts of viewpoints. However, I relied on informal gatherings. Gossips, rumors happened to be more productive in most of the cases. I did not attempt to create formal focus groups discussions particularly as these never proved to be helpful. There were more than enough spontaneous occasions where journalists meet and talk and I could easily be involved.

**Ethnographic network mapping**

It is argued that the journalists and their sources form a group with weak ties, that is, their links can be characterized with lack of intimacy and infrequent contact (Trotter II, 1999) unlike kinship or peer groups. Among other types of network analysis, ethnographic network mapping (Trotter II, ibid and Friedman, 1995) of such a group is essential to determine social networks within which news production occurs. However, ego-centered/personal network research seemed to be more productive. It could be applied on some key journalists such as Mr. Birand (same sources) because of their personal significance in making of news. I did not formally attempt to use on mapping social networks of friendships and acquaintances (Angrosino and Mays de Perez, 2000) but from the early months, I noted the connections between journalists themselves and with their sources. The reader will see some of this noted connections in next chapters. In Turkish case, apart from the very new generation of journalists, I could argue that journalists acted like a kinship group.

**Participant Observation and Field notes**

As Werner and Schoepfle (1987) state, participation level varies according to research. Bernard (2002) lists three main levels: Complete participation, participant observation and complete observation. Boundaries of journalism did not let me into
complete participation much but I engaged intensely at the other levels. Since this 'method' is in fact the heart of anthropological fieldwork, the whole dissertation can be said to be about how I conducted the participant observation. The reader will read more about this in the next chapters. Bernard (2002) points out four types of note taking during the fieldwork all of which I had used. I agree with Sanjek (1990) about the importance of what he calls 'jotting and scratch notes'. Within the hurried life of journalism and of the ethnographer, taking scratch notes are invaluable. For disciplining my own routine, I believed in the importance of keeping a log and field notes (methodological, descriptive and analytical field notes) and I had already kept some descriptive and analytical notes from my preliminary study in CNN-Turk. The blog for which I devoted a full chapter then became the source of my publicly shareable field notes and a disciplinary tool to write regularly. However, not all notes could be visible publicly and I relied on more traditional techniques, too.

Archival and secondary data tools

Archival and secondary data research (Schensul et al, 1999a) constitute a significant part in this kind of research. Not only in the beginning but throughout the research I relied on archiving. However, a particular form of archiving was necessary. My research focused on the continuous present tense and my primary archive happened to be a new media tool I had not imagined before. The blog I started, among many other uses I extensively discuss in the next chapter, happened to be the best tailored archive when I started to write up. The research did not aim to be quantitative and I did not look for statistical data but even if that would the case, I would be helpless. There is not a single archival work that focuses on EU news particularly. The closest archival work could be found in EU Delegation in Turkey. I
had early realized that EU Delegation in Turkey invests for media watch on EU related news, whose details I will narrate in the next sections, but they denied to have it when I contacted them. For more scholarly and non-journalistic documentation, EU Studies center in Istanbul Bilgi University was adequate. Especially, in the early years after negotiations started, there was a flow of EU related books in Turkey. I had virtually bought all published books or added them in my shopping list thanks to Amazon.com like sites in Turkey (www.ideefixe.com; www.kitapyurdu.com)

**Sampling**

I planned to choose my informants according to purposive/judgement sampling as one of the non-probability sampling techniques (Strauss, A and J. Corbin, 1990; Bernard, 2002) or targeted sampling as one of criterion-based selection techniques (Schensel et al 1997a).

The initial major sampling categories would be determined accordingly:

1. Editors and senior journalists who are formally or informally empowered to participate in decision making in a newsroom have the highest priority.

2. Columnists occupy a much more significant role in Turkish journalism than in the US. There are at least 750 columnists on Turkish dailies most of whom write daily. I had already identified nearly 20 columnists who wrote on the EU more frequently than their colleagues do. [One later finding: these two categories are in fact intertwined.]

3. TUSIAD is the most powerful pro-EU non-governmental organization in Turkey. With a group of powerful NGOs it supports a very informative and daily-updated web site on Turkey-EU relations (www.abnews.com) and it has a permanent office in Brussels whose chief regularly writes commentaries to
Turkish newspapers about the EU developments. Several TUSIAD officials specialized on EU issues in Istanbul and Brussels including the head of Brussels office would be among my target informants. [I had overestimated TUSIAD's role. If the domestic political struggle would not be that intense, TUSIAD could have played a more significant role but its role is relatively weak at the end of my research period]

4. There have been a number of media watch internet sites in Turkey that are regularly updating news about Turkish journalism including www.haberturk.com; www.superpoligon.com; www.medyatava.com which I have regularly followed. An ongoing content analysis will determine which of those websites most frequently cover EU-related developments. I can expect to zero in on editors of 5-7 websites depending on my preliminary studies.

5. According to their role in news production a small number of policy elites would also be my target informants. This is the least accessible category of informants. From my personal experience in Turkey, I can state that bureaucracy and military are the least accessible institutional domains.

6. I was associated with the Communication School of Istanbul Bilgi University during my fieldwork and a number of professors, most of whom have experience in journalism or who are active journalists, would be my informants. Finally,

7. My preliminary archival work demonstrated that 15-20 American and European journalists have written/are writing on Turkey-EU relations. Since their Turkish colleagues keenly follow their coverage, I included them in my target list. [This was a rightly planned category but after a few cases, I decided to focus on local actors. I was more interested in the impact these caused on
Turkish informants.]

I had mostly followed these categories. A story of how I found my interviewees will give an idea of connectedness between these categories as well as ethnographic insights.

**Interviews**

Interview guides (versus interview schedules, see Bernard, 2002) would be developed for specific categories of people to produce data on my particular research objectives. Bernard (ibid) defines four types of interviews: informal, unstructured, semi-structured and structured interviews. In my preliminary study, I found that the first two types performed on-site are quite productive for time-pressed journalists. The last two types are more appropriate for elites and bureaucrats (Bernard, 2002; Schensel et al, 1999a and Arksey and Knight, 1999). These are also relevant for a second round of interviews with those who are willing to continue or whose interviews were relatively productive for the research purposes (Johnson, 1990). I have had the chance to talk to countless journalists in terms of informal and unstructured interviews. I had conducted 34 particular interviews that could be classified as semi-structured interviews. In my case, structured interviews would best be for those conducted through email correspondences. 3 more happened like this.

Interviews seems to be most visible tool I had used. However, I am satisfied with what I have done and accordingly I agree the way George Marcus (2005) situates interviews:

...deep knowledge in anthropology comes after long periods of presence (participant observation) in a community or among a group of subjects. While
interviews are useful, in anthropology, there is a suspicion of them, as such, unless they are embedded in relationships well established through fieldwork, and generally anthropologists like continuing conversations and dialogues rather than the 'data-hunting' questionnaire-like interview... (p. 177).

The story of 37 interviews can be found in the Appendix 2.

Research Locations

_Istanbul, Turkey._ While Ankara is the capital and center of bureaucracy and other state institutions, Istanbul has no rivals in being the center of Turkish mass media as well as big business in its commercial and financial forms, cultural production and sports. All the media conglomerations and smaller news corporations are located in Istanbul except the state news agency, _Anadolu Haber Ajansı_ [Anatolian News Agency], which is located in Ankara. Nearly every news institution has an Ankara office but only larger ones have offices in other cities.

_Ankara, Turkey._ This city is the capital of Turkey. I was planning to spend more time here but increasingly tense domestic politics, ironically, made Istanbul headquarters even more important. I paid some visits to Ankara to interview some Ankara based journalists or bureaucrats or government officials.

_Brussels, Belgium._ Symbolic and (increasingly practical) capital of the European Union. I paid a visit to TUSIAD's office as I had planned. But like Ankara, Brussels lost its significance in EU related news production. Istanbul headquarters overshadowed any Brussels impact. If domestic politics were not that dominant, Brussels could play a more significant role and I would have to spend more time there. Nearly all major Turkish newspapers and television channels have their
correspondents in Brussels. It was not the case five years ago but now all media organizations are keen to keep a journalist there. In a personal communication, a Turkish journalist told me that it was very easy to get in touch with EU officials and there in addition to 170,000 Turks living in Brussels, there were several Turkish originated ministers, MEPs and other officials. Despite all these sources, I have not observed a significant contribution through Brussels. Istanbul was just too strong.

Here is a general observation on Brussels:

Terzis, 2008:

The majority of the 1200 EU correspondents live within an expatriate community in Brussels and actively participate in the town life, as well as the creation of EU discourse. At the same time they have very little contact with the Belgium state, with the exception of course of the rare occasions when they need to report about Belgian politics and other events. (p. 537)

He continues:

Most of the events take place in a radius of less than one kilometre around the Rond Point Schuman in Brussels. Directly adjacent are the Berlaymont building of the European Commission and the main building of the Council of Ministers. The European Parliament’s premises are a couple of hundred meters away, a little bit further than the International Press Centre ‘Residence Palace’ which hosts a number of press conferences. (538-539)

**Home vs Field complications**
From the very beginning imagining what the field is emerged as a problem and it was discouraging. This is a early note from the summer of 2004:

**Home-Field**

An initial point about being at home and doing fieldwork can be summarized as such: If I started my fieldwork in Brussels, any deed or any utterance or any observation could be added to my field data. Being there could be enough for many justifications. However, in Istanbul I have to skip many ordinary life phenomena. They are just too familiar and I cannot think of justifying them in the name of my research. Then location itself loses its impact to a considerable degree and I need to zero in on an institution, a network or an idea etc. The fieldwork data goes through a harsh selection process before being inscribed as a field note. Of course, this has an advantage: The ethnographer is forced to be analytically clearer than ever. And this might have a disadvantage: The reader might want to see some 'ornaments', which were skipped just because they were too familiar...

In retrospect, this text contain fewer “descriptive” material than I normal see in other fieldwork based texts. However, this is not because I was at “home” but because of the research design and study-up problems.

Particular design targets had to be modified in the very beginning.

**Research Design**

Here is an outline of what happened in the very first months of 2004 summer:

My naive expectations were shattered in the very beginning. Without losing time, i had an appointment with Mr. Birand, whom i write about in my
proposal. He does not have a 'news team'. I had hoped that I could become part of a news team, maybe a passive one but still a member. But it seems that even if there are news teams, there is an existing structure of news making and you are not allowed to be part of it. I mean even if you just want to volunteer, there are still too many interns!! And they are supposed to do more work and to be obedient than a mere researcher. Anyway, this paragraph is still a speculative one. There might be better situations.

And what can I do in the newsroom? How am i to insinuate (!) into media organizations? This was a question to be answered. An ethnographer may not need to answer it, since ethnography will magically produce tasks to do but editors/officials in charge need an answer beforehand. And my answer is 'I want to attend the editorial meetings that happen at least twice a day. This is my answer to pass the gates, then i will find out what else i can do.

as a tactic, i began to reduce my research objectives to two tasks: to focus on editorial decision making processes and to focus on sources of network. I always add that my focus is in relation to EU news/commentaries. Inverted pyramid is not only a technique of news-writing but also a device of communication in the world of journalism. I have to communicate briefly and quickly. To warm up, I have started my personal newspaper archive: I follow 4 newspapers everyday: Hurriyet, Yeni Safak, Radikal and Referans. Hurriyet is the most selling newspaper. In addition to that, it has strong connections with Turkish policy elites. Yeni Safak is a moderately Islamist newspaper that has direct ideological connection to the ruling party: AKP. Radikal is a moderately leftist, strongly pro-EU newspaper. It is intellectuals' favourite
newspaper. Finally, *Referans* is a economy-focused newspaper. It has replaced Finansal Forum (Financial Forum). It describes itself as the newspaper of the EU process. As far as I can see, only this newspaper has a daily special page on European Union.

Here is a long quote from George Marcus here:

Research imaginaries and muddling through are part of the project design process... But what if the complex system of knowledge making and expertise is treated as an object of ethnographic thinking and inquiry from the outset? It is an essential medium of fieldwork and where it begins. I think this is increasingly required for projects that go beyond their monopolization by now near exhausted questions of identity that replaced the traditional topics of ethnographic investigation - kinship, ritual, myths, exchange systems etc. - dramatically waning from the 1980s onward........

So the facts that ethnography encompasses both systems of knowledge and sites of lived experience, and that the informing conceptual bases and ultimate receptions for its projects are more importantly and substantively outside rather than inside the professional disciplinary community of anthropologists, together suggest ways for rethinking anthropology’s distinctive training model and culture of emblematic method beyond it.

... Indeed, published ethnographies are messier (and more interesting) than ever (messy is a term that I used in the eighties to characterize their intentionally experimental nature). But messiness today, in my view, is
not a result of intended experimentation with textual forms as in the Writing Culture period. Rather, the messiness that one sees in ethnographies today are symptoms and fragmentary patch-ups that register a research model that, to be frank, is ill-designed for the range of questions that it has been addressing in the realm of apprentice research. [emp. added]

... (Mccarthy, Elise, and Valerie Olson, 2007)

I have developed a particular relation with one of my early informants and backers, Prof. Ugur:

I will write a note for the Dean, Prof. Ugur. I discovered that this is the most efficient way of communication with the Dean: One summarizes his request in a small note and gives it to the secretary, Zeynep and Zeynep gives it to the Dean. Prof. Ugur certainly looks at those notes and acts accordingly. This is better than to speak to him face-to-face or looking for an appointment in most of the cases. I will remind him that I am growingly anxious about life and he should better call Hurriyet's chief editor soon. I will also add Jim's letter to introduction.

(10 November 2004)

But still not easy:

I sometimes feel guilty, because i don't provide enough material about my 'fieldwork'. Dear all, let me tell you once again (just to relieve myself): I have already decided that a more intensive data collection will happen next year. If i have to describe the course of fieldwork, i would use my favourite metaphor: It is like a trench-warfare. My fascinating network of connections
to the Istanbul underground does not help much to study 'elites'. So day by
day, I try to meet new people that will provide me access to circles that I
cannot reach myself. Among these new people, I met Sedat Orsel, a television
programmer in State TV and Haluk Sahin, a leading communications
professor and TV journalist... It seems that a confident network of elite
connections will fasten my data collection, so here I am. I apologize once
again not providing more actual data collection adventures yet. (3 March
2005)

Towards the end of the first summer and as the big EU December Summit
was close, I was trying to cope with my revised research design:

**My agenda**

So here is my plan for the rest of the time before the December summit:

I will hopefully be visiting 4 newsrooms for nearly 20 days each and decide
later how to continue.

Yesterday, through Esra Arsan, I contacted Hakan Kara [never got back to
me] from *Cumhuriyet* newspaper. He will get back to me whether I can
observe editorial meetings. According to Kara's answer, Esra [I interviewed
her later and she gave me some advice as her own dissertation was on
European journalism and the formation of Public Sphere but she no
substantive aid in this scheduling work...] and Alper Gormus [too busy and
could not produce any real help] will be scheduling other three newspapers'
time.

This idea of 4 newspapers is a novelty. In my proposal, I proposed to study
only one of them, *Hurriyet*. In the long run, this is still my aim. But in the
short run, it seems, it is easier to have access for shorter periods. So far, I do need to use mediators to get in touch with editors. But in those short periods, I can create my own connections, I can get to know editors and then I can ask to stay for longer periods. This is particularly important in case of Hurriyet.

I am trying to take it easy. Things progress slowly. Interestingly enough, Europeans in general are not that punctual. I know this is a generalization but look at this: Today, I and Itir were looking at European parliament’s website in order to see if there is any call for voluntary activities for the summit. (This is one of the possible ways for me to be credited to observe the summit) But there is nothing posted yet. It seems it is early. There is calendar for only September events. But December is not that distant. I am surprised.

By the way, Itir is my office-mate. Now I am officially working as a TA. I will share an office with Itir. She is already a significant candidate for my acknowledgements list (!) She had her masters degree in Brussels and she will introduce me to several people in Brussels as my research develops.

(8 September 2004)

But September plan did not work well:

I could still not start my proposed newsroom ethnography. Hurriyet people told Alper Gormus that ‘he [I] will learn our secrets’ and rejected my application to attend editorial meetings.Cumhuriyet people did not even bother to say yes or no to my appeal. And at the moment Yeni Safak people are discussing my application. Now I am sure that my pilot study in CNN-Turk did not really provide the logic of access to media organizations. There
is not much political risk at CNN-Turk even if it partly belongs to Dogan Media Group (DMG). Interventions related to policy making occur through other well-established organs such as Hurriyet. In fact, I am still hopeful about the access. But I know now that it will take time and I will need higher level connections. I could still not use my main high level connection, Aydin Ugur. As I have told you before he had a heart attack in the middle of summer and just as he recovered, his father, a former minister of education, died. I am still waiting for his final recovery. (11 October 2004)

Meeting with Prof. Uğur would not produce immediate results either:

I could finally talk to Prof. Ugur today. It was a relatively productive one. He will talk to his friend Ertugrul Ozkok, Hurriyet's chief editor in these days. Otherwise, we will think about Referans. He thinks I can certainly start my newsroom ethnography at this newspaper but this is for plan B. In his busy schedule, Prof. Ugur will probably forget to call Mr. Ozkok. I will regularly remind him to call:) This is how it works. But let me not mislead you, Prof Uğur is certainly a helping hand. (14 October 2004)

....

Prof. Ugur seems to be warming up to call Mr. Ozkok. (30 October 2004)

Studying a EU related issue means one will trace a very extended of network of people:

This is a list of connections apart from what Prof Ugur promised me. I collected them since I arrived Istanbul.
from Kenan: Tribeca agency- Ms Ceylan - Agency has an interest in EU news. Ceylan used to be an activist in Revolutionary Way movement in pre-1980. She is a professional journalist who used to work in Milliyet foreign news service (She was a Middle East correspondent)

from Itir: NTV's correspondent in Brussels. She is a close friend of Itir.

from Ipek: Some DEIK officials - Ipék used to work for DEIK (Foreign Economic Relations Board), a non-profit organization. DEIK publishes a bulletin on TR-EU relations...

from Asena: Asena promised me to introduce some big-shot leftist journalists who are related to Birikim and Toplum ve Bilim circles.

from Saylan: 'You should get in touch with EU offices, i think they have a media related project'. Istanbul office is in Taksim, i will pay a visit there soon....(July 20, 2004)

In fact one of the problems was the abundance of data:

In other aspects of fieldwork, I feel that there is progress although this is overshadowed by the lack of newsroom ethnography. My problem with this research is that there is simply a burst of data in its most chaotic sense. From every type of mass media to the street talk, classroom discussions, family dinner chat, the EU is in the agenda. This is exciting and troubling. Day by day I realize that organizing this data is not that easy and several organizational sources in my mind seems to be useless. For instance, Economic Development Foundation whose reason of existence is Turkey's EU membership application and who is active since mid-1960s does not have a media archive! So I am working on classifying information sources and
evaluating the usefulness of ever-increasing contacts and I continue to read related material and establish my personal media archive. (11 October 2004)

For a touch of data load on the news flow:

Today, I visited the media-watch company- Interpress (www.interpress.com.tr). I will start writing my reports next week. I was given a password so that I could immediately access to the archive. To give an idea: Between October 1 and 14 (today), there are 2400 news pieces that are related to the EU in the Turkish press!! Texts and all technical information are included in the archive. They virtually follow every single Turkish press organ. What is more, TV and internet organs are also followed separately. So there have been 2585 news pieces on TV channels and 607 pieces in the internet news sites... (14 October 2004)

However, this Interpress based media archive deal would not work as hoped. In return for access, I would prepare a weekly report on the news related to EU-funded projects. This proved to be a waste of time.

I did not have time to talk about the 'ultimate media archive'. The good deal turned out to be not a very disadvantageous deal in terms of weekly report writing. My Fridays have become nightmarish because the weekly report proved itself quite difficult to prepare! However, today's report could finally be easily prepared thanks to Arseli from Interpress and Eda from Tribeca agency. (5 November 2004)

And I gradually agreed with Kathrine's point:
'One thought that occurred to me while reading the bit on your project proposal is this:

Is it necessary to retain a focus on the editorial process?? And if it is is the only way to observe it to be in on the editorial meetings?? It is simply because I was reminded of an anthropologist studying 'secret societies' and how he was obsessed with gaining access to the sacred objects that was the base of the society's power and then he realised that the sacred object is not what is important, it is the access, organisation etc....

Maybe it is worth reflecting or rethinking if your hypothesis (what is the plural?? - ei??) about discourse producers need to be seen through the lens of the editorial process - maybe your journalism friend has a better idea of how to get at it.' (Personal correspondence, 9 January 2005)

However, a bundle of personal and research method crisis would reach a culmination point on January 2005.

I would like to declare right now that I am thinking of some radical changes in my research strategy... I now certainly believe that Prof Ugur cannot help me directly. I now certainly believe that my primary strategy of attending editorial meetings are impossible and might be even ineffective. Here comes a small scale crisis:) (25 January 2005 blog note)

As some friends would response to my note, I would change my research direction as they were thinking. Interviewing had become a priority from then on.

Remember that from one research crisis new ideas can emerge and new strategies can be opened up. Editorial meetings were only one possible
strategy. Maybe interviewing some journalists will give you new ideas of where to participate and observe? (Posted by: Kathrine at January 25, 2005)

although i have not met katherine, i heard a lot about her. hi katherine!!! yes, i agree with her that interviewing certain journalists in turkey instead of trying to participate the editorial meetings might be a better idea. to be honest, i've always had this concern about your project. these meetings are probably regarded top secret and thus revealing some of the things going on in these meetings might be scandalous. (you know what i am talking about the connections between media, army, banks, government, etc...) by the way, why can not aydin ugur help you? (Posted by: Ebru at January 25, 2005)

As of December 2005, I had a particular framework in my mind:

While I was grading some of the papers written about the movie, *All the President's Men*, I remembered how I admired the way journalists 'followed money', how they assembled bits of evidence to construct an argument. I thought why not to play a detective in search of an entity called EU? The assembling process, that includes imaginary connections, that depends on assembler's authority, may not be appropriate in legalistic terms but can be appropriated in an ethnographic project...(12/12/2005)

Being an anthropologist...

I never thought before that being an anthropologist would be a cool thing in Turkey. However, this lasts until you tell what your research topic is! Most of the people who know something about anthropology do not like to think anthropology and journalism together. Knowledge of anthropology comes from two sources: 1) a
tradition of national anthropology blended with folkloric studies that emerged around
1930s in order to prove the race characteristics of Turks. 2) Recently translated
popular books that were written by anthropologists in the line of discipline’s
traditional subject matters, i.e. tribes, kinship etc”.
Even in the more knowledgeable circles, popular understanding of the discipline
becomes an obstacle for me. I thought I could not persuade Yalim Eralp for my need
to do ethnography in a newsroom. It was same for Prof. Galip Isen. He advised me to
do interviews and content analysis and that would be enough. Prof Uğur encouraged
me to do whatever I needed to do but I believe even he was not sure if I was on the
right track methodologically.

More on being an anthropologist

I am already a suspicious figure when I attempt to do ethnography in an
unexpected site. This idea of suspicion is supported with the perceived role of
intellectuals. Prof. Uğur hinted once why media people are not enthusiastic
about such a research: the ‘leftism’ of intellectuals. Media people are 100 %
sure that intellectuals have pre-judgements about the mass media and their
products can only be negative evaluations. I assured him several times that I
am not the type of ‘intellectual’ they imagine and I am sure Prof. Uğur
believes me but this idea of intellectual in the minds of many editors remains
to be an obstacle in accessing my research sites... (9-10 November 2004)

The notion of an intellectual is mostly used pejoratively. However, the core of
Turkish intellectualism has its own social class base. Here is a situation I lived with
one of the professors whom she knew me just too well. In journalists vs.
scholars/intellectuals polemics, I tend to favor the latter....
An evening phone talk is what made me very disappointed and angry. I called a former professor of mine, whom I admire too much, and confirmed our meeting on Sunday. She finally realized that I am working at Bilgi University. She seemed to be disappointed and implied that this was a wrong thing to do while I was in my fieldwork. I told her I did not get any grants yet. So I had to work until I found another source of funding. And she said that I never had confidence. Although I always had confidence problems, I don't think this has anything to do with confidence. I was indeed quite confident about my thesis project and proposal I prepared... Maybe this Sunday I will finally have courage enough to talk to her that her ideas/intellectualism and feminism are so class-based. How easy to be an intellectual while having an elite status with no financial problems...

(4 December 2004)

**Study up**

The problems of study up and possible ways to overcome also emerged immediately.

I began to live problems of 'studying up'. last week I had two appointment with well-known journalists. I wasn't that successful in expressing my research objectives but they weren't interested in at all! Today, I had a good and productive chat with Prof. Ugur. Hopefully, next week he will introduce me NTV's and Referans' chief editors. He also discussed my objectives so he will look/negotiate for a position for me accordingly! And in a less determinate future, he will talk to Ertugrul Ozoek, chief editor of Hurriyet, about me. So far, this newspaper, which is very significant for my research
objectives, has been inaccessible for me... [16 July 2004]

....In addition to being an anthropologist and perceptions of intellectuals, I should add a third issue that makes my life difficult: "Studying-up". I have a good past of ethnographic involvement but my current project does not look like any of my previous deeds. I am attempting to observe the "gods" of Turkish journalism in their working environment!

This evening Serkan, who is my dear friend from high school, came to visit me. He has a journalism MA degree from UT Austin and now works in Milliyet's economy department [Milliyet is another significant and one of the oldest national newspapers in Turkey. It used to be a serious center left daily but since mid 1990s, elements of yellow journalism transformed the newspaper's content under the ownership of Dogan Media Group]. Before starting to watch the documentary "Crumb" we chatted about lots of things including my research topic. He said it is basically impossible to attend Hurriyet's editorial meetings! And he then began to name the editors: Ertugrul Ozkok, Oktay Eksi" these are such big names and how they will care/ allow me to observe them? Yeah, that's a problem. I just began to feel what I had already rationally perceived. But it is all right. There is no point to be more disappointed than I already am. I will use my best sources, Prof Ugur, who is Mr. Ozkok's close friend, Ferhat Boratav, who is CNN-Turk's editor, to ask for access. If this does not work, I will finally give up the Hurriyet option and I will just look for other venues. I strongly believe I will be excused for giving up Hurriyet. I give two more weeks to resolve this access problem.

(14 November 2004)
Here is an intervention from Prof. Marcus:

I think the idea of elite studies as a specialty now in anthropology is belated. Most projects now begin or involve ethnographic engagements within sites or systems where knowledge and power are produced. So the study of elites is part of the fabric of work. For example, much work in science, technology, finance, and politics involve collaborations with elites, or as I like to say, counterparts. ‘Studying up’ is not so much the sense of working with elites today as studying ‘sideways’ - connoting shifting partnership/subject relations. Still, from a methodological angle, what the dynamics of relations with elite subjects are today in terms of the traditional models in use of anthropological fieldwork (which assume and desire solidarity with one’s subjects) is very worth consideration in the context of designing the sort of collaborative fieldwork in topologies of multi-sited space that I have been discussing. (McCarthy, Elise, and Valerie Olson, 2007)

**Istanbul as a site**

To start with, a short field note: EU standardizations in Anatolia

I have heard today from a small-scale trader that local authorities are quite strict in their executions of EU standards. Especially, in western Anatolia street bazaars are regulated and limited to designated areas and there are not many street vendors around... Even before the bird flu case, transportation of poultry even for other relatives, that is, for non-commercial cases, required a permit from the ministry of agriculture. I was told that Istanbul is so chaotic that EU standardizations take place slowly here...(25 January 2006)
Bernard Bouwman, a Western correspondent living and reporting in Istanbul, who reports for the Netherlands’ NRC Handelsblad daily and for Radio 1 from Istanbul for eight years (4/29/2008):

...in 2000, a post in Istanbul became available and, of course, I jumped on it. Why? Because Turkey was quite an interesting country; a journalistic heaven with its dynamic agenda, including Turkey-EU relations; the democratization process; the place of religion in society and the question of where it should be; the ethnic groups and how these groups should be integrated into the mainstream; natural disasters; and Turkey’s relations with its turbulent neighbors, like Iran, Iraq and Syria. Simply, whatever a journalist wants!...

What charmed you most when you started living in Istanbul as a reporter?

Taksim! Yes, Taksim really made me dizzy. I saw no difference between Taksim and Amsterdam. Well, of course, I know Turkey is not only Taksim, but before coming to Istanbul, unlike an average European, I had no images of “fez-wearing, camel-riding Turks” in my mind. And I really do not understand these European tourists who come to spend a few weeks in Antalya, but who, upon their return, keep talking about Turkey with the same clichés. One thinks that they do not know that Antalya is in Turkey! But, on the other hand, you Turks do not give a good image of your country. I recall that I was covering the pro-republic demonstrations in Çağlayan last year, and I was not the only foreign reporter there. They were interviewing the secularist Turks over there. One of these people said to the reporters: “Turkey must not become Iran!” Ok, well, but who in Turkey wants that to happen,
anyway? Foreign reporters do not know much about Turkey. Without offering
different viewpoints, they present exaggerated fears to their audience in
Europe. When an average European sits at home in the evening to watch the
news, he sees “a Turkey on the brink of Iranization.” Bullshit! Because this is
not true. One may say, “I am against Abdullah Gül’s candidacy for
presidency,” but if you make comparisons between Turkey and Iran, this is
just crude propaganda. Unfortunately, most Western reporters are not
informed enough about Turkey and swim in shallow waters.

I had the pleasure to meet him after that interview in a cocktail. It repeated his
ideas quoted above and it was also nice to test some of arguments with him, who is a
keen observer of Turkish press.

In the mean time,

*Istanbul as a field site is not easy to live*

In Istanbul, renting an apartment without furniture means there is really no
furniture. That is, you have to get a fridge, a water heater, an oven... I am
working on furniture stuff now... (July 20, 2004, fieldnote)

Increasing crime rate had his imprint on me immediately:

*Not a pleasant day at all*

My USB storage device is washed within a pocket of my pants. All files of
this year are gone. Probably most of the stuff can be retrievable but some is
certainly gone. But what is worse, my wallet was stolen last evening and i
have realized it just after the USB disaster. My texas id, SSN number card, 2
AMEX cards, 2 chase bank cards, turkish driving licence and Turkish social security card were inside it, not to mention some amount of money. life seems to be harder than ever today. [3 July 2004]

Although I assume Istanbul as my hometown, when a Rice friend visited me I had a better grasp of the city. I have to admit that I have never been to some places before Julie came.4

4 A 4-day Istanbul trip

Julie's 4 day visit to Istanbul made me look at my hometown through a touristic gaze. As Julie said guidance is like a job but thanks to her i myself had a 'taste' of Istanbul again! Eric, Elitza and Kevin are planning to come to Istanbul by August and hopefully other friends will be thinking about it. So the following notes should help the future visitors. Unfortunately, I am too lazy to detail them but i hope whatever i write will be informative...

Sunday: Sultanahmet (Blue Mosque) district: Hippodrome Square. the Museum of Islamic and Turkish Art-

This museum has a funny etnography section. There are models of Turkish family. From nomadic roots to Westernized Turkish family. oh by way, there are no men, change occurs through women!

Lunch at Sultanahmet. There were Texan tourist just behind us. We eavesdropped.

Hagia Sophia. i have been living here for 27 years and never visited until this day. i should have done it before!

Afternoon. Walk at Fatih (district). Women should be ready for stares. Especially Julie's loud talking got enough attention:) Fatih is a hidden treasure but quite a conservative neighbourhood. Have some locals (like me) when you are there.
Dinner: Hot Adana kebab. But the ultimate taste of the day: Kunefe dessert. You should taste this.

Cetin and his wife Sunduz accompanied us. If you come to meet me, you will certainly meet them.

Several tea breaks throughout the day.

Monday: My sister, Nurcan, accompanied us. I have never seen so many policemen together in my life (NATO summit). Our boat trip to Marmara islands or bosphorus boat tour are cancelled, because no boats were allowed to sail today.

*istiklal caddesi*. That's another must to see! We had tea at Mis Sokak in one of my favourite cafes. At the same time there was a small demonstration of Turkish Communist party. it was a peaceful one.

ice cream at Mado cafe.

Meatball and chicken wings at Otantik restaurant.

visit to a Catholic church.

Julie has been counting the call to prayers. except the first one which is at 4 am she could easily hear the other 4 calls since it is virtually impossible not to hear them. Julie's first visit to a Muslim country.

A good view of Bosphorus at Bogazici University south campus. i am depressed with nostalgia.

Walk at coast in Bebek. We found a pretty coffeehouse by the shore. expensive but no regret. Oh cetin is also with us now. he was wandering around at Istiklal street. he decided to come with us.

*Ortakoy*. Another nice coast district. more popular. Try kokorec. European Union bans this meat-food. but it is so delicious. i don't think Turks will give up Kokorec.

*iskembe* at Fatih. This smelly garlic intensive soup is optional! it is delicious but hard to live with. if you are brave enough to have it, then have also pastirma at breakfast.
A 4-day Istanbul trip (2)

When we were wandering around Eminonu on Wednesday, there happened a moment of truth. With the constant dynamism, ever flowing people, boats crossing from European side to Asian side of Istanbul etc I felt that it is an issue of pride to live in Istanbul. Yeah, it is so condensed and so crowded (12 million residents?) but it offers you so many enclaves, so many beautiful places to compensate...

Tuesday: I, Julie and Nurcan are in Grand Bazaar. I have never witnessed rug-bargaining before. Everything is so arbitrary. A seller decreased the price of a beautiful rug-carpet from $2500 to $820! I don’t regret to have this kind of experience. Sellers are angry because NATO people did not buy much yesterday... (Grand Bazaar was only open for them).

Spice Bazaar is next to the Bazaar. But it is closed today. But cheese and olive vendors in the premises of Bazaar are open and we taste delicious cheese samples.

As an appetizer in dinner we tried cig kofte. Then we had Buryan kebap. it is made up of lamb meat. Try that, too!

Cetin and Sunduz invited us for tea. That’s such a delicious tea session after another tiring day.

Wednesday: Topkapi Palace. You need to buy another ticket to see Harem section. This is a big place, don’t place to see Grand Bazaar and Topkapi Palace in the same day.

Spice Bazaar. Try the Turkish viagra.)

Lunch at Sirkeci train station. Orient Express Restaurant there has delicious food. it is a bit expensive but deserves to try.

you can have also tea at the cafes under the Galata bridge but we did not have time for that.

Julie’s first visit to Asia. We took the boat from Eminonu to Uskudar. Uskudar is a nice old district, too. But we did not have time so we took the cab and went to Camlica Hill.
Istanbul has become a "cool" place to come. Anna Sussman's NYT (7/9/2005) article is one of the earliest to promote Istanbul:

After getting a green light in December to negotiate entry into the European Union, Turkey is buzzing with change. Turkey has reinvented its currency as the new lira, opened a new modern art museum and is feeling a new burst of confidence. Shakeups at the political level have led to a merged Ministry of Culture and Tourism and larger budgets for the arts, a move designed to push Turkey's cultural profile into the international news, even as Istanbul grabs headlines with its human rights reforms.

I have listed all articles I could find about Istanbul as a tourist attraction in this online bookmarking address: http://delicious.com/sakaerka/istanbul

It has a nice view of Istanbul. We had tea and looked at Istanbul from top. But i must admit there should be many other hills for sight-seeing. This hill is so family oriented. I got bored quickly.

Dinner at home. You should taste mum's cooking, too!

What Julie missed? Night life in the Istiklal street; a local fast food: lahmacun; Dolmabahce Palace. Next time, Julie! [1 July 2004]
Ethnographer's habitus

Settlement, Financial Difficulties, Anxieties

I have started a personal diary - traditional paper and pen kind - in order to balance my ups and downs. It works so far (July 20, 2004)

This did not work. However, eventually, I have discovered the benefits of blogging as I devote the next chapter. I can easily claim that without my blogging activity this thesis would be harder to organize and get done. Before more on blogging, it should be added that the complications of home and field confluence/confusion had also produced some benefits. I gradually built up a living environment based on my habits developed in Houston:

I kept reading Deleuze in a way to compensate intellectual degradation due to heavy exposure to newspaper commentaries [to my intellectual defence, I have to add Virginia Woolf's Waves, J. D. Salinger's all published stories, Chris Shore's Elite Cultures, Todd Gitlin's Inside the Prime Time (I am about to finish reading this one) and Tim O'Brien's The Things They Carried] There are no Cactus or Blockbuster type stores. Pirate DVD sector, Bilgi University's library and a particular TV channel (CNBC-E) and of course theatres themselves are compensatory for finding movies to watch. (July 21, 2004)

The first summer's focus was settlement:

I was basically concerned with three issues throughout the summer: First of all there is the apartment issue. I have found a good one, in fact, this is the nicest apartment I ever had. It has a strategically great location, it is spacious
and thanks to mum and to my elder sister it has become really homey. So everyone that follows this weblog, you are invited to my one bedroom-three (small) rooms apartment!! I will not tell about the second issue but i have to talk about the third one, which is the very reason of this weblog.... (July 21, 2004)

And of course, funding was constant problem. I had to work to finance myself but the place where I worked was a Communication School and this has led to new connections. As you might have realized, many of my major interviewees were already teaching in that school....

How to fund the research?

I will become a TA in Istanbul Bilgi University by the end of August. After I get the disappointing decline from NSF (shame on the positivist panell!), working seems to be the only option to fund my fieldwork. But i should admit, TA job in the school of communication is the best possible job to have in my situation.

Dean of the school, Aydin Ugur, is a parental figure to me and he is my main source to have access to senior journalists. The chair of Media Studies, where I will be TAing, Asli Tunc, is also cordial and helpful. Nothing is certain right now but as far as I can see, i will not be able to use my workload as a pretext for procrastination (in relation to my project).

Things change so fast, and you get to know people better as you live with them. so the following ideas may change (!) but i can hopefully say that people in the School are exceptionally good people and that's a relief for me. From time to time, i will probably talk about them. Let me just mention Asli
Telli, who has just finished her Ph.D thesis. I am so happy to work with her. Bilgi University (www.bilgi.edu.tr) is located in the city centers and works with many independent intellectuals and scholars. It has a liberal working environment [i use 'liberal' in a positive, non-ideological manner whatever this means :) ]. It has one of the biggest communication schools and most significantly as an institution, it is an active intellectual contributor to the European Union process. Enough flattering for today! (25 July 2004)

This funding issue produced waves of discouragement and caused too much time spent throughout the fieldwork. But it also triggered me to find new ways of coping with feelings of failure. This note reveals my initial strategies of coping:

Another rejection

After learning the bad news, I swore to all organizations that rejected to fund my proposal, kept watching a soccer game and a few series of Simpsons interchangeably while having a quick look at a pile of old newspapers until my tea was ready. Meanwhile, I felt terrible and objectively anxious about my career in future. Then I had my tasteful tea which was simmering for more than an hour and began to read a fragment from Anti-Oedipus.

[The evening of November 3]
I just read the mail from Jim that tells me Wenner-Gren rejected to fund my proposal.

Kerry talks in the TV and congratulates Bush.

(3-4 November 2004)
I have sent my grant application to ARIT (American Research Institute in Turkey). I am grateful to Ebru who told me to apply. I had thought this was for only American citizens.

Now I am working on SSRC-IDRF application. I should send it soon.

I have a feeling that the result of Wenner-Gren application is not that positive.

So be it. (30 October 2004)

And Istanbul is an expensive city:

now I have an apartment

real estate agent fee: 750,000,000 TL = $500

rent: 550,000,000 TL = nearly $400

deposit: $500

I am grateful to my parents who are very helpful. We need to do some painting and cleaning before moving in... [17 July 2004]

At the time of writing up, after paying rent and credit card debts, I would have 50-100 dollars left for the rest of the month and after the 10th day I would rely on credit cards.

On 3 2004 July, I received the only grant for this research: Horowitz Foundation grant.

As the first summer came to an end, the ethnographer was dealing with a series of intertwined problems:

I apologize for all people who attempted to follow my blog recently but could not find anything. If there are no updates, this basically means I am having
some problems. I would not say I am depressed but I am constantly anxious about fieldwork issues. There is not a single day passed without being anxious about things. It seems I have customized the traditional saying that used to be found in many Turkish homes: What did you do for Allah today? - in my case replacing Allah with my thesis.)

Meanwhile, after being an anti-establishment guy for such a long time, I am so surprised to see myself ending up for discipline and order. I admit: I am sick of finding institutions and persons doing far away from what they have to do (an example given above); I am sick of my soccer team's players' lousy attitudes and constant failures (same for the national team); I am sick of Turkish women's never ending caprice productions, I am sick of nepotism in every single piece of life, I am sick of drivers who continually ignore traffic rules and so on.. Some say this is usual for people who come back to Turkey after living a bit in US. Or maybe I am just growing old... I don't know yet but my colleagues thinks that I am exceptionally calm and everything happens in my mind only and I cannot escape to be seen as a good family boy.

p.s. - I am grateful to Nahal who is a keen observer of the blog. see her last comment: http://frazer.rice.edu/~erkan/blog/archives/000091.html I will soon answer her questions in the same place.

p.s. 2 - I will compensate for the missing days soon. There are lots of commentaries, news and my personal notes accumulating...

p.s. 3 - I know I sounded a bit Orientalist towards the end of my entry. I honestly admire the success of Turkish modernization project, my disappointments are due to a comparative logic only... (11 October 2004)
However, the best way to fund myself, that is, having to work for Bilgi University would prove to be more than just a funding issue:

**Angela's Brown Bag**

I could finally read Angela's piece for the Brown Bag meeting she had a few weeks ago. I was expecting a theoretical text on her thesis but it turned out to be a good narrative on fieldwork experience. I must admit: I am jealous of Angela's busy field schedule. Everything she did served perfectly to her thesis project. It was probably exhaustive but at least provided her an excellent access opportunity. I think our miserable grant application results may have a good unintended consequence. *That is, our jobs to finance our field research can help us to find better access opportunities. By having related jobs, we start to have a partial insider identity that helps to persuade other insiders to arrange further access to other/high level insiders. Here it is cool to be a PhD student in a good American problem but this does not help much to have access. But as a faculty member of a good school of communication, I have a more confident base to ask for help from journalists...(22 November 2004)*

Living in the same city with **one's parents** could contribute in both ways:

My mother and elder sister came to start an extensive clean and order operation in my apartment. There will be Feast of Sacrifice in 10 days and housewives would like to have nice looking apartments. But of course in my case nobody will come to visit me and this mostly exhibitive practice do not apply to me. However, my mother reasoned differently and she just did what she wanted to do... (10 January 2005)
However, some field attractions would continue to soothe my anxieties:

I would like to introduce a strategy game that has dethroned Civilization's place in my heart: Football Manager 2005. Twins came and stayed in my apartment for two days during the bayram holiday. So Hakan brought me this game and now I can understand how he managed to fail in several classes. For the whole two days, we stayed together and played games, watched movies and Nurdan experimented some cooking which ended up leaving some strange odors in the apartment.

As in this game, even when I think I gather the ideal winning team of players, some things happen to disappoint expectations such as injuries, performances, ineligible situations, penalisations etc.. (25 January 2005 blog note)

A glimpse of my life in a spring day:

Another spring day. I heard that there will be cold weather until the weekend but today is an exception.

Last night, I hanged out with Çetin in the evening in Taksim. We now have a new joint in Taksim. A nice, clean and not expensive pub close to Russian embassy. Atlantik pub. This is where we decided to watch soccer games. Speaking of soccer, Besiktas; Galatasaray derby game was very disappointing. Besiktas; players played as nasty as they could and in the end they were defeated. All week I have waited to see this game...

On Sunday morning, I had to wake up early because there was a historical wedding in Saka dynasty. The first grandson to marry. I was supposed to be the one to marry but my uncle's son who is 4-5 years younger than me was
also faster than me. The night ended up with a glass of hurriedly drank vodka which helped me to doze off immediately.

And today started with a letter from SSRC. Another rejection but thanks god i won't have any more rejections:) No more applications, no more begging (March 07, 2005)

At the end of the first year, I was more optimistic:

End of the first year in the 'field'!!

Today is the very first year in Istanbul as an ethnographer. My brother Hakan reminded me that I landed to Istanbul a year ago in 4 June 2004. I am glad that at the moment of writing these lines, I feel very good and optimistic about life. Kat's 'logging' motivated me to record and to log more carefully. Today, I bought a cleaning tape for my camcorder, more durable batteries for my camera and AAA batteries for my digital voice recorder. I am looking for a more handy notebook to take immediate notes.

After spending some time in the Dolapdere campus, I have met with my brother, Hakan, who is too distressed with his incoming university entrance exam. While we were staying in an outdoors cafe with Cetin and Gokce, Hakan received a message and left us. We all assumed it was from his girlfriend whom he keeps as secret. Jale Tezcan, who is another dear friend from Houston, is visiting her parents in Istanbul and we had spent sometime together. She told me that all this happiness is due to the remains of prozac that I gave up a few weeks ago. Such a bad omen. I hope that's not the issue!! (June 04, 2005)
It was a vulnerable optimism:

Ebru's last comment broke my heart - but don't take it that seriously since my heart can easily be broken as an habit - so I stopped blogging! I strongly I felt I am deceiving my friends by not telling the 'actual' things, 'the actual field experiences' as Ebru wanted me to tell. I thought Ebru knew more than anyone else that so far I could not start what I had expected to start. That is, I could not have access to any editorial meeting routine of any newspapers. Of course, I did not try all the time for that. In fact, I never felt psychologically settled as I do now. The ideal is to live a year through in the field and go back to writing next year. But I take it real easy and I think no one can question what I do: There is no real funding from the department. I have to depend on my job here which is very demanding. My field of research is quite untraditional. It is so untraditional that no funding agencies and related institutions take it seriously blah blah blah.

to be continued! (11 July 2008)

Although I felt settled now, I wasn't sure about my methodological practices.

as of January 23, 2006:

What to do in a Snow Storm?

Stay at home, sleep, eat, drink tea, read, drink coffee, surf erotic sites, have a bath, reply emails, read, do grading, eat, fantasize, flirt online, drink tea, listen to music, do OkCupid tests, watch Tarkovsky, read fiction, have a nap, masturbate, have a shower, eat more, watch TV news, watch football
programs, drink coffee, smoke, doze, grading again, eat more, drink baileys, think a little about yourself, start a new story, pity for yourself, pray, drink more tea, continue blogging, make plans for future, wash dishes, tidy the study room, call people, have a nap, continue to watch Tarkovsky, do more grading, do more eating, drink more coffee with a sip of baileys, get depressed, listen to music, reply more emails, do reading, keep blogging!(23 January 2006)

Field attractions

In general what I called field attractions came to soothe my early anxieties.

I decided to go to the other campus earlier than usual and to reward myself to have a break from Faulkner's the sound and the fury and escape into the beautiful prose of McEwan (enduring love). While I was waiting inside the shuttle and was turmoil between my anxieties and beauties of the prose I am reading with my increasingly teary eyes, a Roman kid jumped into the vehicle and started a very nonsense dialogue with a student. This dialogue distracted me from my inner struggle. I felt my inner struggle was nonsense. I felt an increasing relaxation. (10 November 2004)

Soccer (football)

I had already discovered soccer (football) as part of the coping strategy as well as an inevitable cultural trait:

While I was waiting for the shuttle to go to the Dolapdere campus from the Kustepe campus, I happened ['happen to' is my favorite verb today] to eavesdrop chatting among the gypsy parking "employees". They
communicate through soccer. Soccer is a language for basic communication. Why no one studies soccer as a cultural practice in Turkey? I know there is a growing interest for soccer among intellectuals but I don't think there is still a good ethnographic work on the role of soccer in Turkey. With my growing interest in the subject, I see that I have an expanding ability to produce immediate communication with more people from different backgrounds. I know, I know this is a cliché topic and I do my own contribution to the cliché production. (2 November 2004)

***

2004-5 season was the very season in which I ever followed the Turkish soccer league with real interest. At the end of this year, Fenerbahçe declared its victory. Thanks to my dear friend Cetin, I watched most of the Fenerbahçe games throughout the season and despite my dislike for this team, I have to admit that they deserved the title. (May 22, 2005)

Politicians and their favorite football teams:

Do you know that politicians and the football teams they support rise together and fall together? Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's star shined in 2002. Kasımpaşa, the neighborhood he grew up in and the name of its local football team, was in the third league at that time. But it has risen fast since then. Rizespor, football team of Erdoğan's homeland Rize also jumped to the first league. And Fenerbahçe, the team that he is a fan of, became the champion. On the other hand, immediately after Bülent Arınç became Parliament speaker, Manisaspor, the football team of his homeland Manisa, rose to the first league. Similarly, two football teams from Kayseri, President Abdullah Gül's
birthplace, ascended to the Super League during the periods he served as prime minister and foreign minister. But all these happened in the past. Today, the situation is the reverse. The AKP is faced with a closure case and Erdoğan's teams Kasımpaşa and Rizespor have said farewell to the Super League. Arınç is not Parliament speaker anymore and Manisaspor is on the verge of relegation from the league. How interesting these coincidences are, aren't they? [Gökçe Bozkurt (5/3/2008)]

Politics by football terms:

Can Baydarol explains Turkey's status among the world politics through football terms:

1945-1989 - Turkey caught in offside...

1990-2001 - Turkey cannot be even among the substitutes.

2001 - Turkey is 'very, very' in the game now.

USA assumes Turkey to be an active agent in exporting stability... Most of Turkish politicians still think in terms of Cold War politics... (11/6/2005 - fieldnote)

When Turkey won the game against the European champions Greece 4-1 in their Euro 2008 qualifier:

But not a lonely soul any more...interactions with fellow anthropologists or professionals...

Especially in terms of intellectual connections. Istanbul attracted more and more events. The field does not only consist of informants but colleagues and other actors. And in some cases other anthropologists. I have always heard of Prof. Povinelli
Elizabeth Povinelli gave a public lecture last evening at Sabanci University. It was nice to meet her and have dinner with her and Prof Oneu, Dicle (Kogacioglu), Sibel (Irzik), Aysegul whom i could not get last name. As in the old days, i mean reading sessions with Prof Sirman, I just sat down and listened to the lively discussion. Sometimes i feel i am compelled to say something but what the heck. i am the youngest one and i just prefer to listen..

(3/16/2005 fieldnote)

During my field days, I met Jenny White, Hamid Naficy and Michael Fischer in Istanbul...

I could also make several academic trips.

Erkan is in NY until Sunday evening! This is a last minute event again- I attend annual meeting of Association for Study of Nationalism in Columbia University. Nice to be back in US again. I am accessible through my super cool mobile phone: +90-532-xxx-xxxx [4/14/2005]

I could once come back to Houston, and meet with one of my readers, George Marcus in Irvine, could go to Brussels, could attend AAA meetings, could meet with Mike Featherstone in London, and Media Anthropology Network members in Bristol, UK.

And academic and social happenings:
Heidegger Reading Group

Kaan Okten, for whom I am TAing for, is an expert on Heidegger and Ozge (Serin) and I decided to 'exploit' him. So next week on Monday we will start a Heidegger Reading Group in which Dr. Okten will lead us in reading Being and Time. Cetin, Ozge and I are the core members of the group but some other friends will also be attending to the group. I suppose we will not have time to finish the book but even starting a group like this exciting. (May 10, 2005)

Today's main agenda was to accomplish the first meeting of Heidegger Reading Group. We did it. Only three attended, me, Ozge (Serin) and Cetin, but Prof. Okten did not care and we had a productive session. I am glad that in every semester of my academic life, I find a scholar to fuel my intellectual curiosity. I am glad that field phase is not an exception in this sense. Starting with the second meeting we will record the sessions, and distribute the extra reading material to the participants. Four more people promised to attend the next meeting. I am also glad to see that Cetin and Ozge are becoming good friends. So that three of us can hang out:) (17 May 2005)

Erkan's duties as a citizen, as a lecturer....

Erkan's postpones his military service; last day of classes etc...

Yesterday, I spent some of my day in searching where the military office I am registered and getting the official document that I have postponed my
obligatory military service for next year. I have to do it again next year until I
finish my thesis. Then, if I don't start post-doctoral work, then I will be a
soldier for an amount of time I don't for sure. The Army is one of the most
universal and equal institutions in Turkey. And there is nearly no escape from
this obligatory duty. Of course, there might be some loopholes and all but
under normal conditions this is where traditional Turkish trickeries cannot
work much. So one day I know, I will be a soldier for sure as long as I am a
Turkish citizen... I guess even in case of EU membership, this might be the
case....

Bahcelievler Army Office has moved from Bakırköy to Yenibosna and I had
difficulty to find the new one. Anyway, I found it and got the necessary
document to submit to the particular department at Bilgi so that I could be
allowed to work. I think I am not that fond of Yenibosna, a recently emerged
town between Şirinevler and the Airport. What funny thing was I saw the spot
where I had to support a guy surrounded by many people when I was in high
school. That guy always remained grateful to me since all of his friends left
him at that moment and I was standing right behind him as a supporter. Of
course, they could kick the hell out of me if any fight had occurred...

Oh in the mean time, I know that I cannot become a special force member in
the army because of the myopia I have in my eyes. It is in my military report. I
guess my army days won't be that exciting (!). Meanwhile, I should remind
you that Turkish army function as a great modernizer institution throughout
the history of Turkish nation state. Nukhet Sirman and Mehmet Ali Birand are
two among few scholars or journalists to point out this. As a universal
obligatory service for male citizens, many peasant men learnt how to write and read in the barracks. It was again the army service through which many male citizens ended up seeing many towns and cities of the new nation state. So imaginary boundaries of the country had materialized in the eyes of those young people... Of course, through the eyes of a feminist, this means male citizens got the advantage of cultural capital, having more knowledge of the country than their female counterparts, which serves as a source of gender inequality...

Today was also the end of classes but i don't feel to write about it or any other issues... It is again a Friday night and right now i am stuck at home. I had some more exciting plans for the night and the evening started more socially but now i am at home, watching a Brian de Palma movie, and probably will reading a piece from Global Assemblages... yeah I know it is a bit loser thing to do these tonight but i guess i don't mind right now. This week seemed to be harsh on me and it might be better to have a rest. There is still tomorrow and other nights:)) (6 January 2006)
Writing-up- A different course of writing up

A different course had to follow up the fieldwork phase. So I had to re-think what Hammersley and Atkinson said:

"As the fieldwork progresses, however, the researcher becomes inescapably familiar with the setting, and the accumulated fieldnotes and transcripts represent a physical record of that familiarity. Before embarking on any major writing up, therefore, one has to undertake a further task of estrangement. If one does not distance oneself from them, then there is a danger of being unable to dismantle the data, select from them and re-order the material. One is left in the position of someone who, when asked to comment on and criticize a film or novel, can do no more than rehearse the plot. The ethnographer who fails to achieve distance will easily fall into the trap of recounting 'what happened' without imposing a coherent thematic or analytic framework." (Hammersley and Atkinson 1983:212-13)

This did not suit my own situation and my writing started in the field (and ended) and fieldwork continued even during the writing up.

How I drafted my chapters?

In the summer of 2007, in a hotel room in Maçka, Trabzon (a major city in Black Sea Region), I started to write in my brother's laptop (please see Appendix 3 for the field equipment I have used). It was 2-3 pages and it was about my very first ethnographic insights. It was about what I called "EU missionaries". In the next 5 days, I was on the road in a trip in Black Sea.
When I came back to Istanbul, I was still anxious about what to do and I had still many interviewees and to do lists in my mind. In the mean time, I had started to look at my old writings. After a little bit of editing the proposal could become the major introduction chapter in draft form. I had spent a full semester in preparing that proposal and even at the moment of finishing up the first full draft, that proposal remained to be the basis of research, most of the proposed tasks remained valid.

Gradually, I would integrate some of other older writings.

In the mean time, I began to have a look my blog archives. Until that moment I had doubts about the possible contribution of my blogging activity. That archive turned out to be very determinate tool. I had began to find out themes, subchapter topics or key ideas for the draft.

In addition to blog archives, I began to transcribe my already conducted interviews. These provided more clues along with the blog archive scan. I have had always done readings but with the beginning of my writing, I began to do more systematic readings on my topic. I have had a look all related published articles in major journals. These readings also gave me ideas and I had started new subchapters, section and sometimes chapters.

In order to access from all computers, I began to use an online collaborative writing program, Writely, which would be bought by Google and would be re-named as Google Documents. I worked in several chapters here.

In the early days of summer 2008, I began to issue weekly writing reports. Between 7 June 2008 to 20 September 2008, I have sent 16 writing reports to my dissertation committee members. In every writing report, I send one drafted chapter I
was working on. I have sent some chapters several times. A usual writing day included the integration of blog archives, transcribing the interviews and reading notes. The paper that is issued on 6 October 2008 happened to be the first full draft.

Throughout my writing and research activities blogging activity gradually became a very powerful tool.

Paul O'Hare (2007) says:

No matter how innovative the research, or the value it may hold to the sphere of academia to which it is related, it is through the thesis alone that we must record and present our efforts. It represents the culmination of at least three years of work and there is a huge responsibility, more often than not self-inflicted, to serve justice to what so much time and energy has been invested into. By consequence, the thesis and its composition also embodies a significant emotional investment. (p.1)

Although I agree with the basics of O'Hare's arguments, research blogging opened up new opportunities at other levels....
Chapter 4 - An outline of Turkish press

As of 3 October 2008, there are 2,459 newspapers and 258 TV stations in Turkey according to the Statistics released by the Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information (BYEGM). Fifty-five of Turkey's newspapers are national and 23 of them regional, while the country has 2,381 local papers. As for TV, there are 27 nationwide stations, 16 regional stations and 215 local stations. Sixty-five of Turkey's 258 TV stations broadcast via cable and 92 via satellite only.

According to the BYEGM statistics, 10,458 individuals hold press passes in Turkey. The number of magazines printed in Turkey is 2,522 and there are also 1,043 bulletins published periodically. The total number of periodicals in the country is 6,024. The number of radio stations in Turkey has reached 1,087; while 36 of them broadcast nationwide, 100 are regional and 951 of them are local stations. Turkey is also home to 24 news agencies and 33 communication faculties with journalism departments. Five thousand students receive education annually at communication faculties. (Musa Taspinar, 10/3/2008)

According to research conducted by DIE (the Government Statistics Institute) in June 2003, only 7.3% of the potential readers among the whole population are actual readers of any newspaper. In other words, not even one in ten people read a daily. In addition to those discouraging numbers, in the Corruption Report March 2001 published by TESEV (the Turkish Economic and Social Research
Foundation) journalism (27%) is at the bottom of the list of professions, ahead only of politics (10%) in terms of credibility and respectability. While teachers (79%) and soldiers (64%) are credited as the most respectable and trustworthy professionals, the least credible jobs are identified as those of 'politicians' and 'journalists'. Hurriyet was first, with a circulation of 471,647.]

there are only 17 dailies with a circulation exceeding 40,000. In those particular newspapers, there are a total of 408 columnists, of which only 46 are women (about 11%). [A.T.: Those data have been taken from a research done by Sensi Yücel, another columnist, Yenisafak, 17 June 2003. The distribution of columnists is as follows: In Cumhuriyet 42, Aksam 33, Radikal 31, Milliyet 28, Star 28, Yeni Safak 25, Milli Gazete 25, Zaman 25, Türkiye 24, Hürriyet 22, Vakit 20, Yarın 20, Sabah 19, Halka ve Olaylara Tercüman 19, Vatan 18, Dünden Bugüne Tercüman 17, and finally in Posta 12.] If smaller newspapers are taken into consideration, this number will reach 550. The boom in the number of columnists, however, did not happen overnight. Former diplomats, former politicians, bankers, academics, and even former models could not resist the appeal of writing at least a couple of days a week, and the media owners were ready to give them regular spots in their newspapers. The columnists, on the other hand, do not necessarily have the same opinions as their fellow columnists at the same newspaper, but they have to agree with the newspaper's political stance. (Ashi Tunç, 2003: 3-4)
In the history of Turkish journalism, even under the worst conditions some Turkish journalists were oppositional and when the party they supported rose to power, then the others began to be oppositional... So the press could always be a nuisance. In fact, only after 1980's, with the neoliberal openings in Turkish economy, Turkish press would become less oppositional in general. Media conglomerations, rise of new economic elites went hand in hand with policy changes, and the proprietors had become more determined to stop journalists critical of the political authorities because of their own economic interests. The key issue is although politicians seem to have lost power in some degrees, they are still the key actors shaping the new economy and although they seem to play not an active role, they still occupy the decision posts: crediting, taxation, licencing, making related legislation. Therefore, in order to understand present times in Turkish journalism, one should begin with the turning point in 1980s. The reader will see description of four turning points since 1980. However, despite the emphasis on formation of media conglomerations in the literature, this dissertation does not ground its arguments on ownership patterns. Ideological aspects of senior Turkish journalists will play a more influential role. Hence, no greater emphasis on media conglomerations.
Turning points

1980s. a Certain turning point

Aslı Tunç (2003) provides a brief history which reminds a "golden age" narrative:

In the traditional structure, lifelong journalists who were devoted to the profession for years were the owners or the editors-in-chief of a family newspaper. They were honorable members of the profession, more experienced journalists than their employees, and their income came only from journalism. In the mid-1980s, the traditional family business gradually faded away as a new corporate mentality swooped in. The profile of the new owner was a typical businessman, a stranger to the profession who actually accumulated his capital in a different sector aiming to use the media as a weapon to shroud or promote other business activities, to spread capitalist and consumerist values, and finally to exercise a different kind of power. Although the media sector was not very profitable in the first half of the 1990s, several businessmen’s entry into this sector accelerated. This radical shift in terms of organizational power resulted in the owners’ total control over editorial policies, resource allocation, employee salaries, promotion and dismissal of staff, and especially appointment of the editor-in-chief and other editors. Those ‘chosen’ editors-in-chief swiftly began to serve their bosses as managers, losing their independent journalistic judgments, enjoying their upper-middle-class lifestyles with astronomical salaries, and concurrently guarding the financial interests of their bosses and acting as spokespeople on their behalf. Throughout the 1990s, the Turkish media lost all their ethical codes, independence, and dignity as well as their watchdog role, since they
were bartering political support for financial advantages. [emphasis added]

(4-5)

In an interview a former media conglomerate owner Dinç Bilgin (2008) laments the fact that he had started to be involved in banking. He used to have good profit through his main newspaper, Sabah, but banking was profitable and also his friends encouraged him. Before that Sabah was a like 'floating mine'; when his sole business was journalism. Then with other businesses, newsmaking changed, more predictable, more business oriented.

Doğan Tilç (2001) also states that structural change in Turkish media in post-1980 period forces journalist become more conformist in relation to political and economic authorities. Many non-media originated persons had become media owners and their media institutions had become just another part of their business interests. Hence, media institutions became blackmailing tools in the hands of these new owners (p. 19). In the mean time some journalists were upwardly mobile in those new media institutions and had emerged as a new media management elite. Some journalists became 'stars'. These got extraordinarily high salaries. These now had more similarities with the owners than their colleagues. (p. 139) (An average full timer journalist got around $ 500-1000 while those 'star' journalists would get from $5000 to 100,000 salaries, p. 33) Tilç continuously laments the fact that as 'opinion makers' columnists ignores their vital roles and instead advertise the luxurious new products of consumer society such as classy restaurants. They promote consumerism among their readers (p. 71). He also quotes from Rifat Bali who has similar ideas (1999, 117). However, this can be thought as this newly emerged class' attempt of creating a distinction (Bourdieu, 2007).
28 February 1997

The 28 February 1997 operation in Turkey was the military overthrowing of the coalition government led by Necmettin Erbakan of the Islamist Welfare Party on February 28, 1997. Under the Turkish Military's pressure, Erbakan stepped down. For this reason, the events were labelled a "postmodern coup" by some some columnists. During this period, Turkish media in general supported the military operation. In a recent interview, Dinç Bilgin (2008) who was the second biggest media conglomerate in early 1990s claimed that he got lost of editorial control of his newspaper during the 28 February process. His family has followed DP tradition (Adnan Menderes) which meant to be more liberal and democratic and less statist than traditional CHP politics but during the 28 February period he said his newspaper, Sabah, had become statist. At that period, some newspaper representatives in Ankara would visit Chief of Staff office and would bring messages to chief editors stating: 'there are concerns about you, there are some files about you'. Hence come the embarrassing news and headlines...

2001. Another turning point

2001 economic crisis hit journalists hard, too. More than a thousand journalist were sacked at that year (a very detailed listing of unemployed journalists in various media groups can be found in Tılıç, 2001: pp. 17-34). However, quoting from the president of Türkiye Gazeteciler Cemiyeti (TGC) Nail Güreli, Doğan Tılıc (2001, 17) implies that there were political reasons behind the firing of some popular columnists and editors. Those were known to challenge corruption and bureaucratic and political authorities. A major restructuration had happened a few years ago in a relatively old center-left newspaper, Milliyet: Yalçın Doğan, Umur Talu, Zeynep Oral, Nilgün
Cerrahoğlu, Duygu Asena, Yalim Eralp and Sahin Alpay were all fired without any explanation during the 28 February Period... (132)¹

____________________________________
1 An ESI report gives a substantive idea of the crisis times and its consequences:

It was the economic crises of 2000-2001 that forced a dramatic cut with the policies of the past. Confronted with the full cost of its policy failures, the Turkish state began to dismantle the institutions responsible for 'development from above'. As Mina Toksoz wrote, "As 1999 ended, it seemed as if Turkey had waited fifteen years to begin to tackle all its issues – inflation, fiscal accounts, banking sector restructuring, agriculture, privatisation, corruption – all at once."

One response to the crisis was to cut the lifeline to loss-making public enterprises. Though privatisation schemes have existed on paper since the early 1980s, more public enterprises have been sold over the last six years (valued at US$6.1 billion) than in the previous 15 (US$4.6 billion). The era of state-led industrialisation in Kayseri, which had begun in 1925 when two-wheeled ox carts arrived with second-hand machinery imported from Germany for the construction of Kayseri's aircraft factory, ended in 2002 when Omer Altinay, last director of the Sumerbank textile factory, locked the gates and returned the keys to the Treasury.

The second response to the crisis was a drastic reform of agricultural policy. Hard budget constraints were imposed on state agro-processing firms and sales cooperatives. Between 2001 and 2003, agricultural input and credit
AKP Times. Emerging Ownership Structures

It seems that these times are the very first time the ongoing secularist tradition in Turkish press might be weakened. This research might have emphasized the role of that tradition which is has still a strong imprint on the journalistic production, but AKP times signifies a new era to come. The reader should be warned that journalists under new owners do not become (or are not) Islamists. What changes is the now

subsides were first reduced by 80 percent (bringing savings of $5.5 billion, equivalent to 2.7 percent of GDP) and then abolished. Savings of $3.1 billion were realised by cutting losses from state-financed crop purchases. State enterprises such as Turkseker were transferred to the Privatisation Agency in preparation for sale. Just as the giant Turkseker loosened its grip over the sugar industry, the Turkish Grain Board ceased to purchase the bulk of the country's wheat.

These reforms successfully put an end to Turkey's persistent macroeconomic instability, producing budget surpluses and lower inflation and interest rates. In 2004, a group of eminent economists concluded:

"After the deep structural reforms undertaken since 2001, the outlook for sustained macroeconomic stability has never been so favourable." (ESI-European Stability Initiative- report, 2005 "'Islamic Calvinists. Change and Conservatism in Central Anatolia")
predictable Kemalist patterns of news production. However, at the time of writing it is still to be seen if new ownership patterns can make a drastic change.²

Mustafa Karaalioğlu (4/28/2008):

There is great potential for change in the media, an area close to politics, in addition to the potential for change in the political sphere. The Çalık group took the first big step toward change in the media by acquiring the ownership of the Sabah-ATV Media Group.

It is understood from the intensity of attacks against the Çalık group since it stepped into the sector, that the media's senior members agree that Çalık will be successful. The recklessness and mindlessness of the attacks, particularly

² An anti AKP columnist, Mehmet M. Yılmaz (9/17/2008) described the newspapers that "Prime Minister likes": Sabah and Takvim are owned by whom PM says 'Our Çalık', Ahmet Çalık. CEO of the Çalık Group, is Berat Albayrak who is the son in law of PM. General Manager of Sabah-Atv group is the brother of Berat Albayrak: Serhat Albayrak. PM’s press advisor is also appointed as advisor in Sabah. In the meantime, Yeni Şafak is owned by Albayrak Group that became a bigger company when current PM was the mayor of Istanbul and Group had deals with the municipality. Star is owned by Ethem Sancak who is a former leftist, very sympathetic and entrepreneurial. He is a close friend of PM. It is not important who owns Vakit (an infamously fundamentalist paper), Mr. Yılmaz claims, since it the PM’s best. The owner of Pro-Fethullah Gülen Zaman is already related to Ahmet Çalık (brother-in-law).
their deliberate nature, show that the change Çalık will bring to the media will not be of the ordinary variety.

Comments on particular newspapers

* Turkish newspapers always claim to speak in the name of Turkish people!

* Turkish press is too nationalistic in general...(class discussion, 11/7/2005)

Hürriyet

* Hürriyet, for example, has a special place among these Turkish dailies. During my fieldwork that lasted from 2004 to the second half of 2007, this daily preserved its status as the most agenda-making daily amongst Turkish newspapers. This was mostly due to having access to news sources at high levels of political and military life. Owned by the Doğan Media Conglomeration (DMC), which is the biggest media conglomerate in Turkey, Hürriyet remained as one of the top 3 most circulated newspapers in Turkey—the others being Posta, a tabloid daily owned by DMC and Zaman, owned by the influential moderate Islamic group led by Fethullah Gülen. Hürriyet’s political position can be defined as center-right, yet the newspaper can rapidly shift into a more nationalist tone. Hürriyet also promotes itself as staunchly secular.

Meanwhile, Hürriyet claims itself as the 'newspaper of the State'. It is also a 'family' paper. Even in pre-1980 years where ideological rivalries turned
out to be pseudo-civil war, Hurriyet was the newspaper to be brought to family view. (class discussion, 11/7/2005)

Zaman

The daily newspaper Zaman, whose circulation has risen gradually to make it one of the best-selling newspapers in Turkey, is connected to the aforementioned Fethullah Gülen group. This daily, owned by a moderate Islamic group, hosts many liberal columnists, tends to be news-oriented and refrains from political debates. This, however, would change during the first half of 2007 when the daily began to side with the ruling AKP during the election period. On the other hand, since the early 1980’s Cumhuriyet has positioned itself as a staunch advocate of Kemalism: a reification of principles of the founding father of Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The ideological positioning became even more intense with the rise of Islamist politics. Finally, Dünya is a financial daily with a much smaller circulation rate than the previously mentioned newspapers. This daily prefers not to be directly linked with any political parties and supports a liberal economic worldview in general.

Zaman newspaper is the third bestselling newspaper in Turkey. Its circulation is around 500,000. Why this religious (dini) sells so much? 1- It depends on a religious movement (Fethullah Gülen’s group). 2- It has a different marketing system. It depends on subscriptions instead of newsrack sales. 3- The movements is a moderate Islamic movement. 4- It has too many columnists from a wide range of ideological perspective. 5- It has an award-winning page design. 6- The impact of a Islamist government. I wouldn't support the last one since these two movements who are classified as moderately Islamist have always been quite antagonistic in the world of Turkish islamism. Gülen
movement always support mainstream right parties...on the other hand, ruling party, AKP origins from a more political and radical Islamist Necmettin Erbakan movement...

Moreover, Zaman is the first online Turkish newspaper and as far as I know it is the only paper that is completely translated from Turkish to English. It is again the first newspaper that had an op-ed page in which antagonistic columnists wrote.... (class discussion, 11/7/2005)

**Cumhuriyet**

None of the dailies described here are completely anti-EU, but Cumhuriyet shows most signs of Eurosceptism while Hürriyet's position changes frequently and radically: from ardent pro-EUism to reactionary anti-EUism. In terms of homogeneity, Cumhuriyet columnists and senior journalists are more similar in sharing Kemalist ideas whereas Hürriyet's writers occupy a broader political spectrum. In the meantime, Zaman constantly maintained a pro-EU status and despite having non-Islamist liberal columnists their political approach did not vary much vis-à-vis the European Union, while Dünya remained to be pro-EU in parallel to big business interests.

**Referans**

I would like to point out a low-selling but very informative Turkish newspaper: Referans. Its daily circulation is around 10 thousand and it is accepted to be low even in Turkey's standards. It replaced a more economy focused newspaper in order to cover EU process in its political economical dimensions. Yes, it is still a financial news newspaper but it has more political news related to the EU process. I
follow it everyday to get a general overview of what goes on. It is less effective in policy making processes but provides more data input for the media literate reader to make sense of happenings. Unfortunately it has no English pages, I assume, the publisher don't find it profitable to do that, but for the Turkish speaking audience, I should add that it has a good, information-loaded website! Meanwhile, its acting chief editor, Eyüp Can, is Zaman's former editor... (12 November 2005)

Engaging with Journalists. Some initial ideas

In a talk with Prof. Nükhet Sirman (5 December 2004)

1) She reminded me not to ignore lower level journalists. 'these are what they, the editors, have. Production occurs in both ways'. The news policy was definitely determined by higher levels. What I got from the lower level journalists was in fact the substantive rumors about the production process. Elites do not talk much.

2) Traditional 'alaylı' journalists disappear in the conglomeration days. [Alaylı means whose education is not journalism but one who learnt journalism in practice] These guys had strict rules about what journalistic work meant but they are replaced by whom? That's a good ethnographic question. Because although that kind of 'alaylı' journalists disappear and replaced by journalism students, higher echelons of journalism, editors, emerge as a new wave of 'alaylı'. Hürriyet's and Radikal's chief editors - these are the first to come to my mind- did not have a journalism diploma... We decided that tracing journalist biographies would be productive... In the end, I have not pursued this decision directly, but I offer short biographies of some columnists I interviewed that give an idea about this new wave of alaylı.
From the very beginning, I rejected what Statham (2007) defines as the "conspiracy theory":

Newspapers owned by Rupert Murdoch including The Times and The Sun clearly have stronger direct editorial control over their European commentating than others. However, it seems simplistic to claim a ‘direct’ link between the proprietor and the newspaper’s commentating, as some do (Anderson and Weymouth, 1999). This ‘conspiracy theory’ unsurprisingly has salience among The Times’s commercial competitors. Instead, we consider that propriorial influence is more likely to be ‘indirectly’ mediated through the organizational culture. Thus The Times is not Eurosceptic because of Murdoch ownership. Murdoch ownership is part of The Times’s organizational culture, as is being linked to a Eurosceptic Conservative Party and a readership with Eurosceptic views, which adds up to a stricter editorial line over Europe, and less perceived opportunities for journalists to deviate. (476)

I argue that particularly at the level of senior journalists, there is much more agency found than ownership theories claim. Personal convictions and life stories signify how these journalists become of. Secondly, current conditions of production and patterns of production are more revealing. After a look of personal biographies, the rest of the chapter with portray these conditions and patterns.
Flow of careers

Some cases from my interviewees. Where the EU stands in their careers:

**NO18** was not a professional journalist but she had been writing for several newspapers and news organizations for a few years and she has had frequent media appearances during my field stay. She is a media scholar and is involved in the education of new generations of Turkish journalists. She is the chair of a media studies department. She graduated from a communication school in Istanbul and did her masters in a cinema-television program. She has worked in an ad agency in a writing job. She did her doctoral program in a respected communication school in US with a fellowship. After teaching there for a while she came back to Istanbul and started teaching in Istanbul. After the Istanbul period she started to be professionally interested in journalism and she started writing columns in an online news site. She has been writing there since 2001. She states that she is only interested in writing about media and unlike many columnists she does not attempt to write in every imaginable topic. She takes media in the broadest sense and she is looks at both local and global angles of media issues. She also regularly wrote a weekly column for a daily and a monthly for a monthly literary journal at the time of the interview.

As a bureaucrat **NO 22** stated that s/he had no particular desire to be where s/he is now. His position that is related to the EU process. It was an appointment and s/had had occupied current position for more than 4 years.S/he admits that s/he had no particular interest in EU but was just observing the process as a citizen. However, s/he states that he had not any radical change in approaching the EU process. S/he believes to be pro-EU is an historical and geographical necessity. There cannot be anti-EUism rationally. Interestingly enough, she is a known figure in literary circles. As a literary
critic, she published several books and she even earned literary awards. When asked if that is a problem in her role as a bureaucrat, she told me that as long as one isn't involved in daily politics, they are free to pursue their interests.

**NO 23** had nothing to do journalism directly. However, she was a civil servant in the Secretariat General for European Union Affairs of Prime Ministry (ABGS) and one of her direct roles to inform the press whenever she was asked for. Her exact role is to be an assistant expert in a department that is responsible for the preparation and coordination of National Program. She was employed in 2001 and she was to be the first in the entrance examination. All new entrees had to choose a field to specialize and she decided to have her expertise in National Program office.

She had received a Jean Monnet Scholarship (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jean_Monnet_Programme) and used that to have masters degree in Europe. She said she is more interested in global political economy but gradually this interest focused on European political economy and since the beginning of 2000 she has been following Turkish press on EU issues with special interest.

On her personal relations to EU, these statements are significant:

I graduated from Axxx Anatolian High School. There were not many Anatolian High Schools [these were better standard high schools, admissions only with nationwide examination after primary school]. I had my education in a high school supported by Germany. Geman instructors. Colorful textbooks that came from Germany. I grew up in German culture. I remember the smell of it. [emphasis added] I don't remember which lecturer I had but i remember the smell. Everything came from Germany. Since the beginning of school I had a desire to go to Germany. This language issue is something
divine. Learning a different language structures your thought system. I went to Germany as an exchange student later in high school. My German friend would then come to Turkey. Then something good happened. I got a fellowship from the German state. This fellowship aimed to gather all those German learners in Germany. So we had a Germany-wide trip. I think this activity was effective in my choosing International Relations as a program in undergraduate education. Of course, there were inevitably human relations emerging. I still have many friends from that trip. Later, I got other scholarships and went to Austria. Thus I grew up with these personal relations.

But of course feelings are not absolute. Yes, I grew up in a particular cultural setting. Then came the British school as I had my MA in LSE. So I grew up both in continental European culture and in British culture. The latter also influenced me. I made several trips. But there are no absolute love or hate issues here. I grew up within but I can criticise some aspects of them as well as I admire some other aspects. I love them, I have a sense of belonging since I know their language since my childhood. However, we should be investigative on the enlargement process. We should the self-protective instinct of EU in this process. But this does not necessarily make you hate them. I believe my standing is good. I like them and I feel a strong sense of belonging.

NO 28:
I am not a journalist. I have a column. I have been writing weekly columns for Vatan and Turkish Daily News. This is my connection to media. But of course I am talking to many electronic, audio-visual media organs frequently. That's how I am connected. I started to be interested in EU when I was a graduate student. I had audited a course on EU economy in Paris. The lecturer was the then French minister of Foreign Affairs and a former member of the EU Commission. I had completed a dissertation on the Westernization of Turkey back in 1970s. Of course then it was not EU but Europe.

Since 1989, I am actually involved with EU affairs. First of all, I had worked in UNHCR (The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees). Between 1989 and 1994, I worked as a vice president in an advisory committee that focused on immigration and asylum issues. I was the UN representative in Slovenia between 1994-1999. Back then EU Commission had no idea about enlargement. We did the actual work. We had helped the EC to prepare the harmonization laws. We even used UN funds to help Slovenia to get prepared. They were following us as we were doing the actual work. Since 1999, I am interested in Turkey's EU process. Hence I have a substantive relation with the EU.

NO 35:

Graduate studies in Brussels. Then journalism, country publicity business, working for TRT for Turkey ads in the world.

A research grant. Back to Brussels after 5 years. Correspondent for a Turkish news agency there. She has been following EU institutions since 1982. When she got back in 1985, she was an expert on EU affairs.
She was unique in Turkish press. While all other EU expert journalists were in Brussels, she was in Turkey.

One serial on the EU every year.

She has the first columns on Turkey's acceptance of ECHR regulations.

In 1985-7 annual trips to Brussels and research papers for newspapers. "I am somewhat a pioneer"

I started weekly columns for Milliyet. That was due to my specialization on the EU. That was my biggest gain.
Conditions of Production

Economic insecurity is an essential part of ordinary Turkish journalists. The new media moguls such as Aydin Dogan forced all their employees to sign a clause (No. 1475, Labour Act) of the law governing relations between employers and employees, instead of clause 212 (Act on Labour-Management Relations in the Press) of the same law that grants special benefits to journalists, such as early retirement and high minimum wages (Ashi Tunç, 2003; 9).3 Ironically, though, aside from the media conglomerates devoid of union and social rights, union organization does not exist in more radical or marginal leftist and Islamist publications or broadcasting outlets either. (9)4 Thus when an economic crises hit media such as what happened in 2001 in

3 Clause 1475 basically reduced all journalists to the level of ordinary labourers and invalidated the privilege of being a journalist. In other words, Aydin Dogan as the owner of two major newspapers, Hürriyet and Milliyet, pressured his employees to resign from the union, pointing out that the terms and definitions of Law 212 used by the union to recruit journalists were ‘too generous’. [Ashi Tunç quotes from “International Federation of Journalists/European Federation of Journalists 2002 Report, ‘Journalism and the Human Rights Challenge to Turkey: Putting Union Rights and Press Freedom on the Agenda’.] (8-9)

4 In this totally de-unionized environment where there was no job security for journalists, one of the severest blows that hit the media sector came on 27 February 2001. More than 3,000 journalists, including prominent columnists, correspondents, editors, along with the technical staff, were laid off in a mere two months. AT: Catherine Collins, ‘Economic Crisis Taking Toll on Turkey’s Media’, Chicago Tribune, 2 April 2001, p. 4. (9) [But that seems to be true.] Given the fact
Turkey, many journalists will find themselves unemployed. However, political pressures is a bigger threat for higher level journalists and columnists.

Politicians occasionally condemned restrictions on press freedom, but they have found myriad ways of justifying the persecution of journalists. Besides, Turkey has already a notorious record of journalist assassinations. On 7 March 1990 Çetin Emeç, the editor-in-chief of Hürriyet, was gunned down in his car on his way home. Musa Arter, a journalist for the pro-Kurdish newspaper Özgür Gündem [Free Agenda], was killed in Diyarbakır in 1992. Finally, on 24 January 1993, Ugur Mumcu, a reporter and columnist for Cumhuriyet, was blown up by a car bomb outside his home. A staunch defender of secularism, he had long been a target of Islamic fundamentalists. His murder has remained unsolved to date. Before his death, he had been researching the alleged connection between the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Turkish Intelligence (MIT). (Tunç, 2003: 6) Assassination of Hrant Dink during my field years is unfortunately another example of a series ofkillings.

Although, the tension between press and AKP government is more complicated, PM Erdoğan's constant accusations on media signifies the ongoing tension. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan repeatedly had his criticism of Turkish media, accusing them of exaggeration and even fabricating stories. In this context, a seemingly EU related legal change worked against journalists (March, 2005):

that there were more than 3,000 laid off media workers, this number was only one percent. The reason for the reluctance of filing charges was the general hope of going back to the media sector after the financial crisis was over. Those who returned to the sector, however, were mainly columnists. (9-10)
Turkish press groups have launched a campaign to halt the implementation of a new European Union-backed penal code, warning that it could severely restrict freedom of the press. The new penal code may result in "many arbitrary prosecutions ... and pack prisons with journalists," some 15 professional press organizations wrote yesterday in an open letter to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. They also stressed that the new law would deal a great blow to freedom of the press and cause regression in the sector, which they said is already suffering from censorship. The push to suspend and amend the law comes only two weeks before it is to come into force, on April 1. /Aksam/

April 2005 Penal Reform brought revolutionary implications for Turkish women. However, Turkish media was anxious:

Jonny Dymond (4/1/2005):

It is the media that are protesting now. They say that several clauses are so vaguely worded that they are left open to legal action from some of Turkey's rather zealous prosecutors.

In particular they point to a clause which bans publication of material that might be contrary to Turkey's "fundamental national interest".

An explanation of what this fundamental national interest might be gives the example of "propaganda" promoting the withdrawal of Turkish troops from northern Cyprus or acknowledgment of the heavily disputed "genocide" of Armenians during World War I.
There are other problems too. The old press law forbade criticism of certain state institutions; the new penal code has a clause, albeit rewritten, that does much the same thing. And journalists believe that a clause on obscenity could be used against them in ways which it is impossible to foresee.

2007 was not a good year for Turkish journalists. In fact there was a worldwide decline in press freedoms and Turkey was not an exception. Freedom House's annual press freedom report categorized Turkish press as 'partly free' (see footnote for the excerpts from the report).

5 While efforts to meet European Union (EU) membership requirements have resulted in the passing of positive reforms, including a new Press Law in 2004, the greater national debate over Turkey's accession to the EU has fueled a nationalist movement that is driving a legalistic crackdown on free expression by journalists and writers. Constitutional provisions for freedom of the press and of expression exist but in practice are only partially upheld and have been increasingly undermined by the more restrictive measures of the new Turkish penal code, which came into force in June 2005.

According to Bianet, a Turkish press freedom organization, the number of prosecuted journalists, publishers, and activists rose to 293 in 2006 versus 157 in 2005. The same organization reports that 72 individuals were tried in 2006 under the new penal code's especially controversial Article 301 alone. This provision allows for prison terms of six months to three years for "the denigration of Turkishness" and has been used to charge journalists for crimes such as stating that genocide was committed against the Armenians in 1915, discussing the division of Cyprus, or writing critically on the security
forces. Book publishers, translators, and authors have also faced prosecution for "insulting Turkish identity." Among the most prominent cases is that of Hrant Dink, editor of the Armenian weekly Agos, who was prosecuted for a second time under Article 301 in July 2006 following an interview with Reuters news agency where he confirmed his recognition of Armenian genocide allegations. In a more hopeful development, charges brought under the same article against Orhan Pamuk, the Nobel Prize–winning Turkish novelist, were dropped in January 2006. Article 277 of the penal code was invoked to charge several journalists covering controversial court cases with "attempting to influence court decisions," including Hrant Dink and four of his Agos colleagues for their coverage of a judge's decision to ban a conference on the Armenian genocide. Article 216 penalizes "inflaming hatred and hostility among peoples" and has been used against journalists who write about the Kurdish population. Human rights groups report that nationalist lawyers groups, such as the Turkish Union of Lawyers and Unity of Jurists, are leading the push for prosecutions.

Pressure from the EU and international press freedom watchdog groups prompted Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan to declare his commitment to revising Article 301 in September, but at year's end no progress had been made on this. Erdogan himself continued to launch defamation suits against members of the media, however, filing a total of 59 cases in 2006. Rights groups report that the total number of defamation cases increased from 2005, along with the fines issued as punishments. Convictions against journalists are made much less frequently than are prosecutions, but
trials are time-consuming and expensive. A total of seven convictions were made for charges under Article 301 in 2006.

Causing further alarm, the Parliament approved amendments to the Antiterror Law in June that allow for imprisoning journalists for up to three years for the dissemination of statements and propaganda by terrorist organizations. The new legislation raises concerns that the broad definition of terrorism could allow for arbitrary prosecutions, particularly for members of the pro-Kurdish press who are sometimes charged with collaborating with the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK). For example, Rustu Demirkaya, a reporter with the pro-Kurdish news agency DIHA, was charged with collaborating with the PKK in June and then with disseminating terrorist propaganda for covering the return of an army private who had been kidnapped by the PKK in August. Journalist İlyas Aktas, reportedly threatened by the police previously, was shot amid violent clashes between Kurdish demonstrators and security forces in southeastern Turkey in April and died a few weeks later.

The Supreme Council of Radio and Television, whose members are elected by the Parliament, has the authority to sanction broadcasters if they are not in compliance with the law or its expansive broadcasting principles. It is frequently subject to political pressure. Censorship is not explicit, but editors and journalists practice self-censorship out of fear of violating legal restrictions; Turkish press freedom advocates contend that self-censorship has become even more prevalent as a result of the onslaught of prosecutions under the new penal code. Further, media are highly concentrated in four major conglomerates, which subtly pressure their editors and journalists to refrain
Therefore, Turkish press was under continuous pressure from the political authorities. However, editors-in-chief of the quality (mostly mainstream) newspapers have also served as ideological gatekeepers and they have forced journalists to practice self-censorship and at times (Ash Tunç, 2003; 8), sometimes in line with the government but most of the time in line with more ideologically motivated state institutions such as the army.

from reporting that will harm their business interests. This could include avoiding criticism of the government or potential advertisers, both of which could have contracts with other arms of the companies.

Turkey’s broadcast media are well developed, with hundreds of private television channels, including cable and satellite as well as commercial radio stations. State television and radio provide limited broadcasting in minority languages, including Kurdish; this marked a major step forward for freedom of expression, although critics say that the broadcasts are too restricted and quality is poor. The quality of Turkish media is low, but independent domestic and foreign print media are able to provide diverse views, including criticism of the government and its policies. An estimated 21 percent of the Turkish population was able to access the internet in 2006, and the government refrains from restricting the internet, although on occasion it has accessed user records in the name of national security. Police must obtain permission from a judge or higher authority before obtaining such information.
Ways of production

Before dealing with explicitly EU process related material, I must warn the reader that in the general conditions of production that I describe in the previous section, public debates in particular sensitive topics occur through media products indirectly. In many cases a popular TV serial will work through a sensitive topic such as Turkey-Greece relations or Extralegal state apparatus. I would suggest the reader to have a look at the Appendix 4, entitled as a “Media Products as Public Debates”.

An observer of Turkish press will be surprised that even after the start of negotiations, EU news did not become an easily observable pattern.

At one level, it seems that general frustration and unevennes of EU news production is not peculiar to Turkish press. Statham (2008) finds the same for European Press in general:

Newspapers have responded to the challenge of reporting European affairs in an ad hoc way. They try to incorporate Europe as a topic into pre-existing news gathering and reporting practices. New posts for European correspondents tend to occur as a branch of foreign affairs. Changes within the organization to cover Europe are usually at the initiative of a few key individuals and not a response to perceived institutional concern. Overall, the limited innovations have been responsive and evolutionary rather than pro-active and transformative of journalists’ practices.

Thus "although national media cultures are distinct, deriving from specific relationships between media and political systems (Hallin and Mancini, 2004), it
seems that journalism over Europe is emerging as a common transnational experience and practice (Stathman, 2008; 418)

As a general observation NO 28 stated that:

The question of coverage on EU which was not tackled properly in Turkey. This country is in touch with EU since 1959. During 40 years, the EU matters were kept in close hunting area of ministry of Foreign Affairs. (MFA) Because it was understood as a foreign issue. Although it is not a foreign issue! Until 1999 it hasn't been realized that we cannot continue like this. Some very timid explanation/communication/information type of activity started to take place. but always from a governmental and stately angle. Never public was put into big picture. So today EU is a strange animal for Turks and EU is something bizarre and foreign. When we look globally who has done what MFA on the heading of ABIG is the effort of organization at a level poorly done. What they do is limited to some TV shows, which has no attractiveness. and worse than anything, down to earth programs are not taking place. Regarding private TVs. They were always interested in the bad news. Departing from the principle. Good news no news. EU was always subject to news when there was a clash between Turkey and EU.... In the course of 7 years, since 1999, very few journalists who can be considered as specialized on EU. EU process is drifting away. Socially drifting more. It never reached the public anyhow. Journalists need specializing to inform public properly.

But of course, conceptualizations of the European Union continued:
Conceptualizing the EU

One of my inquiries was to find out the reason why an older discourse disappeared in the present tense. When Turgut Özal government applied for full membership in late 1980's, EU was promoted as the last chain of Turkey's long westernization/modernization process. I have not found any similar argument in more recent literature or in journalistic production.

NO 18 believes that that discourse was strategically employed:

Mr. Özal had to create a standard. A target. At that time, there was an incredible level of ignorance. Now we know more about the EU. In late 1980's we had to talk about the last chain of modernization etc. Now it is seen that this is not the case. That discourse looks funny now. But at that time it was considered normal.

"Since its inception, Turkish modernity has been, and still is, a primarily and essentially a state-centric political project" says Keyman (2007) which suits well

6

It is in the primary role attributed to the state that the political nature of Turkish modernity comes into existence. Since its inception, Turkish modernity has been, and still is, a primarily and essentially state-centric political project. This has been so insofar as, in Ernest Gellner’s words, the Kemalist elite viewed both ‘the modernization of the polity and society’ and ‘the legitimacy and the justification of political modernity’ as ‘linked to the nation-state’ and in terms of the ‘strength which it bestows on the state’ (Gellner, E. 1995:83; "Encounters with Nationalism". Oxford: Blackwell, 83) (p. 221)
into the EU membership application. I was quite surprised to see that this instrumentalist approach to membership was internalized by many EU-sceptic journalists. It is supported as long as there is need.  

Thus it is not surprising that nearly all senior journalists are pro-EU “in the last analysis”. But in the intellectual/ideological equations portrayed in the previous section, their more practical approaches to the EU process change. In the EU process assemblage most of are located in the opposing roles.

Cengiz Aktar remained to be in the minority of journalists/columnists who believes that EU process could change the way society would be modernized. Cengiz Aktar agrees with Fuat Keyman whom I just quoted. Modernization project is state-centric. Aktar employs Westernization in a particular way in Turkish in order to

5 If only people could understand this. This is the theory of the Republic. To transform Turkey to a Western country. All dress related revolutions...

Everything was made to make Turkey European. A country which is already in Europe has to join EU. You might cite Norwegia or Switzerland as counter examples, but their standards are already over the EU standards. They are already related. They don't join because they don't want to pay. EU is a project for the survival of Europe. Turkey cannot survive alone. On the one hand there is the EU, on the other hand there is China or Russia.

However, there is not progress but regression in Turkey. Look at the education system. Or look at Istanbul which was a more western city before. When Turkey signed Ankara treaty, she was one of the 20-25 democracies. We were relatively closer to Europe by then.
emphasize the forced manner of change. However, he strongly believes that EU process can initiate a society-centered modernization. He goes further to claim that EU process will collapse if it remains to be an elite project\(^6\). What Mr. Aktar misses

\(^6\) Aktar (2003) uses the term 'Westernization' [instead of Batılılaşma, he uses Batılışıma in order to emphasise the 'forced' manner] in Turkish in a way to emphasize the elite-directed nature of the process. He had already claimed that this Westernization did not really 'touch' the society (Aktar, 1986) and he hopes that the EU process will start the westernization of the society itself. the EU represents the most advanced points in many social issues in the West and by joining this political entity, Turkish society will westernize without being imposed by local elites. So it is now time of active Europeanization instead of the older passive Westernization (3).

Aktar (2003) states that there cannot be a specific date for accession. Those who are pessimistic about 10 years of negotiations are in fact ignorant. EU membership is not like applying for an internation institution that will remain useless. It is a fundamental change and integration of social and political dimensions (123).

Cengiz Aktar:

EU can materialize only with the help of societies not states. It is not an external but internal web of relations. It is a 'toplumsal şantiye'/ social workshop, that includes visible and concrete daily life issues. European Union is a project that can only more understandable and more concrete web of values and techniques. (Cengiz Aktar, 2003; 175).
is that this society-centered ideal of modernization may not be on the agenda at all. Therefore, he remains to be in the minority.

Honest attempts to understand and conceptualize the EU mostly end in stereotypings that damage the pro-EU positionings. As it is stated in the previous chapter, some unresolved diplomatic issues can easily be used to explain EU's (and Europe in general) hypocrisy. Some EU member states' approaches to Armenian
genocide claims can be cited as a good example. While Cengiz Aktar (2003) stated that AKP government forces Europe to face her age-old stereotypes on Islam (134), domestic conceptualizations and stereotypes would be a bigger problem for AKP.

And Mr. Akyol cries: This is Europe! (Taha Akyol, 2006, 249)

[Which Europe/West]

Quoting Ahmet Riza Bey's "the Moral Collapse of West's Eastern Policy" (1922): European power never had morality in their minds. Hungary and Bulgaria were never exposed to a treaty like Sevres. Because they are Christians."..."European states never had a sincere relationship with Ottomans.... Now the times change and 17 European states are acting moral and rational towards Turkey. However there are still remains of the older attitudes. [France and Germany implied] 55-56

Is Europe sincere? She is still influenced by the Crusader mentality (309). Crusader unconsciousness continue to exist (340).

[Europe as an hypocrite]

There are sometimes good "facts" about the European hypocrisy thesis. Before the Copenhagen summit, the secret talk of Danish PM Rasmussen and German Minister of Foreign Affairs Möller was televised and had caused a big scandal. There, Mr. Möller says The question of whether the EU should offer membership to Turkey was one of the most controversial on the EU's agenda when the film was being made.

"Did I tell you that Joschka Fischer had three different points of view in less than 12 hours on the question of Turkey's application?" Mr Möller asks Mr Rasmussen.
"First he told me that Turkey would never be a member of the European Union, then that we needed some form of membership. And finally (he said): 'No, no forget about it, those were just ideas,'" Mr Moeller is shown saying.

Mr Rasmussen says: "There is not a complete match between what they (Germany) say in public, and their real attitude."

Breach of confidence

There was an outcry in the Turkish media, including a front-page article in the Hurriyet newspaper, after the film was shown on Swedish television earlier this month.

(http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/low/europe/2967287.stm)

Oktay Ekşi (5/4/2005) seconds Mr. Akyol in harsher mode (his column's title:

'Lawless Europe':

Last year on May, Yusuf Halacoglu attended a meeting where he insisted that the Armenian 'genocide' claims are baseless and false. However, Swiss law considers it a crime to reject the 'genocide' claims. Therefore, a legal investigation was begun into Halacoglu. Assuming the reverse, what if a Turkish court had opened an investigation against a citizen of Switzerland?

There's little doubt what would happen. We'd be getting letters of protest from Europe complaining, "There's still no freedom of speech in Turkey. The Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly would condemn the decision of Turkish courts, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) would eagerly wait in line to take their shots at Turkey. We'd be listening to European Parliament members lecturing us on learning the rules of the Union, and most of us would be thinking they were right..........each day we witness another double standard in our relations with the EU, so we shouldn't really expect Europe to come up with a fair ruling.
There are of course several attempts to break down these stereotypes or discursive distinctions. One is to advise Europeans. "The EU should be a project beyond a "unity among diversities". In fact, EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn\textsuperscript{10} warns off to have a simple timeless formula on what European is and leaves space for Turkish membership in one of his statements.

8 Not the best example here but to give another idea:

Taha Akyol (2006) talks about "a Peyami Safa novel, the Easterner pet cats and the Westerners pet dogs. (Fatih-Harbiye) Cats are lazy, dozes around, wants comfort. Dogs are dynamic, alert. (357-358)"

9 However, the EU is not a 'European Culture' and it shouldn't get stuck in a 'European identity'. The EU should be a project beyond a "\textbf{unity among diversities}". It seems that the EU is working for this, therefore I think that it should give Ankara a date for accession talks. (Oya Berberoğlu, 9/14/2004)

10 Olli Rehn (5/2/2008):

The EU Treaty says that any European country which respects the values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law may apply for EU membership. However, this does not mean that all European countries must apply, or that the EU has to accept all applications. It is not an automatic process, but one where conditionality is the key.

The EU has consolidated its enlargement agenda. Our energy now focuses on South-East Europe, i.e. the Western Balkans and Turkey. They have a clear accession perspective, provided they fulfil the necessary conditions. We have to be cautious of taking new commitments, at the same time I don’t think we should set in stone the EU’s final borders. The term 'European' combines
Another one is to blame Europeans or EU. Fuat Keyman (2007) believes there is "ambiguity and ambivalence embedded in the connection between religion and secular European modernity."\(^{11}\) Constitutional crisis is frequently used as Europe's Weakness\(^{12}\.

geographical, historical and cultural elements which all contribute to the European identity. The shared experience of ideas, values, and historical interaction cannot be condensed into a simple timeless formula and is subject to review by each succeeding generation.

11 The recent public reactions to the process of European enlargement, the headscarf debate, the increasing prejudice against different religious identities and the calls for security-based restrictions on existing migration policies, to name a few, are all illustrative examples of the ambiguity and ambivalence embedded in the connection between religion and secular European modernity. (215-216)

12 As the French decision to reject Constitution looms Muhsin Abay (3/30/2005) in "Europe's Weaknesses":

However, the possibility of the latter is higher than we'd like. Those who believe that Europe has natural geographical borders don't want it to go beyond the Balkans. Those who believe that the Union must be a Christian club are even more conservative. These people want neither Turks nor Muslim Albanians and Bosnians in their community. I wish that the ideal of a more democratic, transparent, effective and powerful Europe wasn't a dream, a mere fairy tale!
Another is a technocratic solution: Taha Akyol (2006) thinks of the East-West divide when he said "PM resolved the crisis with a rational planning. No emotions were involved (24).

Another attempt includes trivialization of current politics. An expert in Ottoman-Russian relations İlber Ortaylı (2007) quotes an old drawing of European stereotypes (14-7) in which Ottomans and Greeks are used interchangeably. This 18th century drawing that is found in the Ethnography Museum of Vieanna is a good example of historical constructedness of ethical identities. Ortaylı states that Orthodoxy was always excluded in western European politician and cultural alliances. (11) "Christian club" metaphor is wrong in both angles then. (9) 13 Similarly, "Parliamentary democracy as we know it is an Anglo-Saxon tradition. Germans and French political traditions are different. Europe is not one single whole at all... (280).

13 Probably Ortaylı is one of the few persons to have substantive knowledge of Greek Orthodox Patriarchy in Turkey. He extensively explains that the claims of ecumenical authority is groundless as the other Orthodox countries already launched their own Churches. Moreover, there are historical reasons that Ottomans were very helpful in the re-foundation of Patriarchy. Of course, as a historian Ortaylı misses the potential of political exploitation of these issues (76-80) Some anecdotal information is insightful in other respects. Ortaylı states that Gregorian Armenians were the very first to protest Protestant missionaries in 19th century as the latter would threaten the community of the former. (84)
Another attempt is to imagine Europe as an ideal. All other aspects are ignored and for instance a European is imagined as an individual who lives in the boundaries of law.\textsuperscript{14}

In another attempt, Turkey's involvement in European institutions are underlined and Huntington's theses are refuted.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{14} The idea of 'European', NO 18 believes, an individual who lives in the boundaries of law.

Human rights occupy a significant place in his/her life. In contrast to injustice or belated justice dominant in Turkey, European identity is a solution. But of course the EU herself is having an identity crisis. Backstabbing, diplomatic games, reopening the messy pages of history are all done in the name of EU. Thus, in the eyes of Turks, the EU lost its European identity! In the old days, joining EU would mean to become a completely European. Now this is not the case any more. "We can preserve our Turkish identity and we can still be European-whatever it is-. Even Bulgaria with her high level of corruption became a member. And nothing much changed in Bulgaria. That core European being is being lost now. In my personal belief, justice is the foundation. Whenever appears the lack of justice, we meet with all these problems. But of course, to speak of European identity one has to deal with debates on civilizations and what civilization is...

\textsuperscript{15} In May 2005, Samuel Huntington, the controversial American author of "The Clash of Civilizations," came to Istanbul and told CNN Turk that Ankara's bid
But these openings are always closed with new generalizations and grander stereotyping.

I was surprised to hear that many of interviewees accepted the fact that EU was a Christian Club. Most did accept as a sociological observation, but even their pro-EU positionings reified the supposed distinctions between Turks and EU.

Sami Kohen (5/26/2005) commented on his statements:

It's very interesting that Huntington came to Turkey and offered striking remarks on the country's EU membership bid just when anti-Turkish circles in the bloc have also started to raise their voices. His messages were clear: Europeans don't want you. They'll do everything they can to keep you out.... One of our options is to continue our path without deviating from our goals. Let's not forget that Turkey is already a member of basic European institutions such as the Council of Europe and the European Parliament. We're also part of most of the European cultural and sports organizations. Therefore, Huntington is mistaken, as he sees the picture from a single perspective. Our second option is, as Huntington suggested, to give up on our EU aspirations and seek new alternatives. Honestly speaking, Huntington's suggestions are way behind Turkey's targets and almost certain not to work. He's insisting on a theory based on the clash of civilizations, and I think he's trying to find examples to back it up. However, in the international community you'll find many people who believe in and strive for the compromise of civilizations.
societies. Prof. Ortaylı (2007), in an essentialism of grand scale, declared that both Russians and Turks are always excluded from the political union plans that were devised. That's the original and truthful skin of Europe (237). Contemporary Turkish culture is different, too. The way of doing things in Turkey and in Europe is

16 NO 22 believes European emphases on religion does in fact means that:

We have grown up with Judeo-Christian culture, with Ancient Greece culture. But the others grew up with other cultures. Therefore they are not like us.

Turkey's strategy is the project of Republic. We don't have inferiority complex because of our Easternness but we won't quit our Europeanness. Thus, a secular, modern and well educated Turkish citizen is already European. A person who grew up with Republican culture is already in demand for Europe. S/he even wants Europe more than Europeans themselves because s/he also knows what the East is. There is nothing else then Republican culture in fact.

17 Turkey in Europe

One of the basic ideas conveyed throughout the book is that Turks have always been in relation with Europe. So nothing new. A project of political union in Europe seems to be a novel idea but even that has happened several times. Relying on a grand history Prof. Ortaylı trivializes the present political relations. In an essentialism of grand scale, he declares that both Russians and Turks are always excluded from the political union plans that were devised. That's the original and truthful skin of Europe (237)
too different, says another columnist. Some EU-originated concepts also fueled the anti-EU discourses in Turkey. Some like “Conditional Yes” and “Privileged

Meriç Kıyaturası (5/25/2005):

I'm not opposed to the EU. However, the Turkish nation's culture and way of doing things are very different from those of Europe. In addition to different cultures, if you add the EU's double standard, full membership seems a pipe dream to me. However, neither senior nor new Turkish politicians, nor our social structure are enough for us to take steps by ourselves. We enact certain measures under pressure from the outside and just because the IMF or EU wants us to. Therefore, I think the process of full EU membership negotiations will be beneficial for Turkey. Even the fact that our negotiations will start in October has made Turkey more attractive in the eyes of investors. Turkey's harmonizing its penal law and commercial law to EU norms and its adoption to the Maastricht criteria are also very good developments. I hope the work of Ali Babacan and his staff goes smoothly.

Conditional Yes

A definitional struggle goes unabated. In my early days German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder started to use "conditional Yes" for Turkey (Katik, 2004; see also a collection of columns debating Schroeder's words, Erkan's Field Diary, 2004 "A new concept tailored for TR: 'Conditonal Yes'.")

The European Commission, in a report issued October 6, expressed a "qualified yes" to Turkey's desire to join the European Union. Though it
Partnership[20] targeted Turkey and their creators intended to derail the process. Digestion Capacity[21] or Copenhagen Criteria[22], in the mean time, were not marks a major step forward for Ankara's EU membership drive, the commission's go-ahead comes with conditions attached, leaving open the possibility that Turkey's accession efforts will ultimately be rebuffed.

The commission, the executive branch of the EU, recommended that the 25 member states open accession negotiations with Turkey, but it provided no indication of when such talks should begin. According to the commission report, the start of accession talks would be linked to the implementation of legal reforms. The negotiations could also be suspended if EU officials determined that Turkey wasn't upholding European human rights standards. Commission Chairman Romano Prodi said an extensive monitoring network would need to be established to verify "what the situation [in Turkey] is actually like." Given the benchmarks that Turkey must still meet, Ankara's eventual membership in the EU is not, in Prodi's words, a "foregone conclusion." (Katik, 2004)

20 Privileged Partnership

Yigal Schleifer (6/14/2005):

One scenario that could gain ground in Europe is that of a "privileged partnership" being offered to Turkey. This would enlarge Turkey's role in the EU's commercial and foreign-policy activities, but keep Turkish workers out of Europe and give Ankara little say in European domestic affairs. Angela Merkel, leader of the German Christian Democrats, has been a strong
advocate of this kind of arrangement. Turkey has said that it would not accept anything other than full membership in return for fulfilling the EU's requirements for joining the bloc.

Craigh S. Smith (6/11/2005):

Some European politicians have started talking openly about offering a "privileged partnership" instead of full membership, something roundly rejected here. The idea, first suggested publicly three years ago by the former French president Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, has most recently been taken up by German's Christian Democrats, whose leader, Angela Merkel, is expected to run against Chancellor Gerhard Schröder in September. Ms. Merkel's party has stated unequivocally that it will try to block Turkey's membership if it comes to power.

NO33:

... We have to realize our position. Nobody explicitly says no to Turkey- We have reached to that level. But they offer "privileged partnership" etc. I used quite an aggressive definition: "These attempts are idiotic. Rejection of Turkey is a harakiri for the EU. In fact, the EU has already all the cards. In 32 chapters there are more than 70 possibilities to say No to Turkey. They have always a right to stop the negotiations. Even if you approve all chapters, even a single rejection in country-based referendums will deny Turkey membership. So you have nothing to lose. You win in all ways. There is 80 million strong market to join you. A young population. An army than
can provide security of the EU. How come you can say no? If you are not ready you can say no anyway.

21 Digestion capacity

When Turkey was announced as a candidate country, the EU pointed out that the process would be conducted in terms of "fairness" and "equal treatment". Moreover, the enlargement commissioner at the time, Günter Verheugen, underlined that the EU would apply the same criteria and methods towards Turkey as to other new candidate countries. But when you review the negotiation framework which established general principles of the negotiation process, many new issues were added - for example, the term "digestion capacity" wasn't brought into the foreground as much before as it is in Turkey's negotiation process. (Demiralp, 2007)

Digestion capacity had negative connotations and "absorption capacity" began to be used gradually. The concept first appeared in official texts in the conclusions of the Copenhagen summit of 1993, which stated:

The Union's capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the momentum of European integration, is an important consideration in the general interest of both the Union and the candidate countries'.1 [emphasis added] European Council Meeting in Copenhagen, 21-22 June 1993, SN 180/1/93, p. 14. Emerson et al., 2006; [p. 1]
The concept, however, resurfaced in the European debate in 2005. This revival has strongly been linked to prospects of further enlargement, particularly to the most sizeable candidate, Turkey, along with Western Balkans as well as to the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by the referenda in France and the Netherlands, which was perceived by the political elite as part and parcel of the dissatisfaction of the public with the functioning of the European project. This re-emerging of the concept in the public sphere eventually took an official turn with the November 2005 Enlargement Strategy Paper of the European Commission which defined it as the “capacity to act and decide according to a fair balance within institutions; respect budgetary limits and implement common policies that function well and achieve their objectives”.3 The European Parliament was soon to follow in February 2006, with a resolution on the Commission’s enlargement strategy paper, underlining the importance of the concept and inviting the Commission to submit a report by 31 December 2006 that sets out the principles defining the concept.4

The debate reached a peak with the June 2006 European Council Summit where ‘absorption capacity’ became one of the most controversial issues of the meeting. With Austria holding the Presidency, Germany, the Netherlands and most particularly France were the key countries that pushed for the debate in the Council meeting and that backed the labelling of the concept in the conclusions as an additional criteria for the candidate countries to enter into the Union. Draft conclusions referred to the concept as an
'additional criteria' for entry, but they were however watered-down in the final text by opposition primarily from the UK, Spain, Italy and the new member states.5 While stating that the 'pace of enlargement must take the Union's absorption capacity into account', the final conclusions broadly identify political, financial and institutional dimensions to the concept and invite the Commission to provide a special report (with the terms of reference quoted above).6 The member state that has played a key role in the recent triggering of the 'absorption capacity' debate in Europe has undoubtedly been France.7

An analysis of the state of the debate in France reveals that there is a high degree of consensus on both the right and the left of the French political spectrum opposing any future enlargement – after Croatia’s accession9 – without a substantial reform of EU institutions and decision-making, a strong budget and an agreement on the nature of the European project with the approval of the European people.10 The limitations imposed by the institutional, financial and political dimensions of the ‘absorption capacity’ are perceived to apply especially to Turkey, which is considered as a serious threat to the institutional balances in the Union with its large number of inhabitants, likely budgetary impact and unpopularity with a large majority of European publics.11 The discussions over Turkish accession reveal yet another dimension of 'absorption capacity', that of 'cultural' and 'social' absorption, which are directly related to the 'identity' of the Union. Jean-Louis Bourlanges, an MEP from a French centre-right party vocal on Turkish accession, has argued that the accession of Turkey will not only have a huge economic impact on the EU, but will also introduce a great deal of cultural
and social heterogeneity that will endanger the formation of a solid and democratically organised political community. The Union's 'absorption capacity' also has a high salience in the enlargement debates in Germany. The Coalition Agreement's section on enlargement opens with the claim that "a circumspect enlargement policy, which does not overtax the European Union's capacity to absorb new members, constitutes an important contribution to peace and stability on our continent". After welcoming the opening of accession negotiations with Croatia and confirming the 'European perspective' for Western Balkans as established in the declaration of Thessaloniki, the document re-emphasises the importance of 'absorption capacity' with respect to the EU's relations with Turkey, a country considered to pose "a particular economic, demographic and cultural challenge" for the EU, hinting at the need to develop a policy of 'privileged partnership' should the EU not have the capacity to absorb the country.12 The 'absorption capacity' debate in Britain is very different from the state of the debate in France and Germany both in terms of content and intensity. The European affairs minister, Douglas Alexander, refrains from suggesting any limits to enlargement and supports further enlargement on condition that membership criteria are fully met by the candidates. The failure to adopt the Constitution is not perceived as an impediment to further enlargement.13 While institutional, financial and policy reform is recognised and viewed favourably, the concept of the absorption of enlargement by the publics, the position advocated strongly in France and Germany as well as the notions of 'cultural' and 'societal' absorption are strongly opposed in Britain.14 Hence for both the Labour and the Conservative Party, absorption capacity refers to no more than
the ability of the candidate to take on obligations of membership and also of
the Union to adapt to, to assimilate the candidate. 9 Croatia is understood to
be the last candidate state not to be caught by the amendment to the French
Constitution in 2005 requiring ratification of all future accessions by
referendum.

3 European Commission, 2005 Enlargement Strategy Paper, COM

Enlargement Strategy Paper,

5 Kirsty Hughes, “Constitution Casts Shadow over EU”, BBC news online
(retrievable from


7 The term ‘assimilation capacity’ is often used interchangeably with
‘absorption capacity’ in the French
debates.

10 European Parliament, debate on the ‘Results of the Informal
Council of Foreign Ministers (10-11

11 Interviews by the authors with French UMP MEPS and French
bureaucrats.

12 Coalition Agreement, Section IX, Germany as a Responsible Partner in
Europe and the World.
Emerson et al describes ‘Absorption capacity’ as a vague and ill-defined, but the problem here is that it is being used in official texts of the EU, whose language should have precise legal, economic or political meaning. At present the expression is being used at times as a seemingly objective cover for general political sentiments that are hostile to further enlargements. (1).

Emerson et al believe that,

On the whole, the opinion polls show that the European public is not against the strategic and political logic behind enlargement and is grossly misinformed about the economic, financial and social consequences of enlargement. EU citizens recognise the importance of the process for the democratisation and economic development of the less developed European countries, but they see it as favouring primarily the EU new and future member states rather than
the EU as a whole. (6-7)

Mass communication in Europe is seen as a solution: Research on political communication and its effects on public support for enlargement has shown that public opinion is very sensitive to the way enlargement is presented and reported by the media – as an opportunity or as a risk for Europe. 33 Less-knowledgeable segments of the society are particularly vulnerable to the framing effects of enlargement news. To avoid the formation of misperceptions about enlargement, it seems imperative to initiate a pragmatic discourse about enlargement where opportunities and risks are discussed in a balanced and neutral fashion. The responsibility of EU leaders for engaging their national publics in such a frank debate on enlargement is obvious.


finally,

The vague term ‘absorptive capacity’ is better de-constructed into more precise and objective components, with each to be discussed in relation to the hypothesis of a continuing enlargement process.

• The capacity of the EU’s internal market and eurozone to absorb new
member states is positive. The tendency in some public debate to confuse the positive economic effects of enlargement with the much more problematic challenges of globalisation need to be corrected by effective communication.

- The labour market has seen some bubbles of migratory flows to those EU states that opened their labour markets from the new member states without delay. However this is already translating into labour shortages in the countries of emigration, which will lead to positive self-correcting adjustments, including rising wage levels in the new member states. By the time the EU’s labour market might become completely open to a major further enlargement (i.e. beyond 2020), the EU will be confronted with very serious demographic problems of labour shortages and social security deficits, for which some immigration could be helpful, with Turkey as the only plausible source among potential accession candidates.

- The EU’s budget is allocating about 1/3% of GDP to redistributive policies in favour of the poorest regions (especially those with GDP per capita under 75% of the EU average). Since the new member states are growing fast and therefore catching up at an appreciable rate, there is no reason to be alarmed at the prospect of a gradual continuation of the enlargement process on account of the budget. Of the recently acceding countries, several are already graduating out of the poor category, as Greece, Portugal and Spain have done in the last twenty years.

- The failure of the Constitution may have held back some useful institutional improvements, but in its absence the EU’s decision-making processes have not run into a state of gridlock. Partial improvements under the Nice Protocol case the problem of enlargement for the Commission and Parliament, and in
the Council there are some signs of adaptation to the new situation with many
more member states. Various improvements (e.g. for the Foreign Minister)
now have widespread support, and efforts should be directed to finding astute
solutions to a number of the outstanding institutional issues in due course,
well before any major next enlargement.

• Society’s capacity for absorbing immigration is today under tension in a
climate of fear of terrorism, Islamophobia and uncertainty over Europe’s
models of multi-culturalism. Particularly with regard to the new Turkish
minorities, public opinion appears at present to overdo the Islamic
identification, since these communities are largely secularised, and sources
neither of Islamic radicalisation nor terrorism, while Turkey at home is a
strong democracy. In due course, European public opinion should become
better informed about these objective facts, while the pursuit of new positive
models for European multiculturalism has to go on.

• The EU’s capacity for assuring its strategic security is also at stake in any
discussion of ‘final frontiers’. For the Balkans reneging on the Thessaloniki
commitments would mean renewed threats of inter-ethnic conflict. Deep
integration of EU and Turkey’s foreign and security policies with Turkey is of
exceptional importance, given the evident hazards in Turkey’s
neighbourhood. For Ukraine denial of its European aspirations would
undermine the prospects for democracy, already shown to be fragile with the
failure of the Orange revolution, and encourage hegemonic tendencies in
Russia. (21-2)

22   Copenhagen/Ankara criteria
As the negotiations turned sour gradually, AKP officials began to declare that if negotiations stopped completely, they would still continue for reforms, making Copenhagen criteria Ankara ones.

NO33:

My only wish is to make this country more liveable. In order to achieve this, the country should be "free". Even earning money needs freedom. I don't know what happens in 10-15 years' time but we should not lose the current perspective. Our B plan is, if we could not obtain a date for the start of negotiations, Copenhagen Criteria would become Ankara criteria for us and we would continue our reform policies.

The Copenhagen Criteria, formulated during the European Council of June 1993, have become an important reference point in determining a country's eligibility for membership. The Copenhagen Criteria stipulate that, in addition to having a functioning market economy, a country that wishes to become a member of the EU must prove that it "has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities," and furthermore that it is able to adhere to these obligations (Council 1993: § 7). These criteria have since been incorporated, in a slightly adapted form, into article 6 of the Treaty of the European Union and in the Charter of Fundamental Rights. It has also been incorporated into the 90,000-page (and growing) accession acquis, where the criteria concerning democracy, legal order, and human rights constitute what are referred to as political criteria. (Parslow, 2007; 3)
Turkish efforts to adapt the Copenhagen Criteria happened to be the Turkey’s National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis (Avrupa Birliği Müşteşebatının Üstlenilmesine İlişkin Türkiye Ulusal Programı, NPAA). The NPAA was initiated by the Turkish Government in March 2001, and has been revised once to adjust to an evolving acquis. In fact,

As a whole, the NPAA is a remarkably broad program, comparable in significance to the two previous large-scale reform movements in Turkish history, the Tanzimat of the mid-nineteenth century Ottoman Empire, and the Kemalist reforms of the 1920s and 1930s (Barchard 2005). quoted in Parslow, 2007; 5.

But sometimes these criteria would be used to protest US:

EU candidate countries must comply with the following political criteria:

- The existence of a stable and institutionalized democracy - Respect for human rights - A state of law and the rule of law - Respect for human rights - Protection of minorities 

Do you think the US could ever join the EU? Will the Sept. 11 criteria or the Copenhagen criteria take precedence? The US has no friends except for a handful of countries which it protects. It has no intention of becoming real friends with any country. (Fatih Böhürler, 2/25/2005)

Aktar (2003) summarizes an elegant strategy to downplay these criteria by the anti-EU people in Turkey. According to his account, it was argued that these criteria were designed for post-communist Eastern European countries, and their application
particularly about Turkey but the EU assemblage in Turkey gradually incorporated and manipulated these concepts. Supposedly, Turkey was intended to be humiliated and ordered by European powers.

**EU Missionaries**

One of the first definitional concepts to emerge during the field in this seemingly fruitless production regime was EU missionaries. Towards the end of a one-month seminar held by Can Baydarol as part of the MA degree program in EU Studies at Istanbul Bilgi University, I named Mr. Baydarol as a EU missionary in one of those night seminar sessions. During a 2-hour session with us, Mr. Baydarol kept his cell phone on and answered at least two different TV programmers' inquiries in EU related issues.

What do I mean by a missionary? When I talked about this concept of "EU missionary", a lecturer in philosophy thought somewhat different from what I did mean.

In Wikipedia:

The word "missionary" is derived from Latin mittere, literally "to send," the equivalent of the Greek-derived word apostle "messenger". In predominantly

in Turkey, whose political and social situation was different from the latters would jeopardize Turkey's unity (25). While, Eser Karakaş (2004) believes that this criteria are not obstacles but helpers for Turkey to have an open society. In order to stop this move towards an open society, some anti-EU officials are leaking selected documents in order to misinform the public. (225).
Judeo-Christian cultures and their languages, such as English, the term is most commonly used for missions to propagate Biblical faiths, but it applies just as well to any proselytizing creed or ideology.

I use the latter, secularized meaning and imply that Can Baydarol and several other personalities like act like missionaries to proselytize people to become pro-EU.

This category is still different from those labeled as pro-EU columnists in journalistic circles. i.e. Hadi Uluengin is an enthusiastic pro-EU columnist. Mr. Baydarol lives like a missionary. Although he also lectures in universities, he is not known to be a lecturer, and though he writes regularly for newspapers, he is not known to be a columnist. He frequents EU related seminars all over the country, he is continuously quoted in news articles both in Turkey and abroad, is frequently called at night by TV people in the middle of a EU related program. However, he was rarely found too credible by my interviewees when I asked whom they think has an expert voice in EU-TR relations but he is always there available in the scene to promote Turkey's membership to the Union. At the time of my talk (sometime in March 2007) with that Philosophy lecturer, Turkish popular opinion on EU membership had changed drastically and the initial optimism had been replaced by pessimism of different varieties. The concept of missionary was not welcome at that point and conservative-ultranationalist anti-EU front had been gathering strength and spreading at that time. A missionary priest in Trabzon and two missionaries in Malatya had been killed and missionaries had been portrayed harbingers of EU-led colonialism. This ideological construction will later be decoded but my point here is that the lecturer did not understand what I did mean and associated religious connotations with European
Union membership. He was not supporting anti-EU sentiments explicitly but his association demonstrated the then dominant mood in intellectual circles.

The second most significant person to be called an EU missionary should be Cengiz Aktar. In the introduction to one of his books which consists of selected articles on the EU process he says:

Since the Helsinki Summit in December 1999 when Turkey's candidacy was officially accepted by the EU, my aim is to use every public space and every means of mass communication I can find in order to state that EU membership is a good thing and it can only be achieved if all citizens participate the process. I intend to attract public's attention and share all my knowledge and experience with Turkish citizens. (2003, 1).

Cengiz Aktar prepared a TV program after the Helsinki Summit which was called: Euro-Vision: An Informative Project on the European Union. This could not find any sponsors but NTV gave a chance. He worked with Alper Görmüş [NOKTA], Alev Er [TARAF] and Defne Asal. This program that was mostly informative and only little commentary lasted from February 2001 to the end of 2002. He presented the program with Oğuz Haksever. They produces 13 episodes. In Açık Radyo, he had a radio program with Ömer Madra and Şerif Erol since November 1989 and it was called 'Towards Europe' This was to continue at the time of his writing (2003). He also produced a page for Radikal's book review magazine with Rana Birden on EU related books.

Either because of changing political mood or due to some intra- mean time, there were only likes of Can Baydarol in the field who kept propagating Turkey's membership like a missionary. Their nomadic manner of promoting the EU could
also be parallel to the interest in EU in Turkey. The assemblage like process produces continuous ups and downs. Even the start of negotiations did not change the pattern so far.

NO 28 says when there is no specialist, generalists emerge.

I personally am very annoyed with that. 'EU expert' is misnomer. It is like a 'world expert'. People are very annoyed with those people who are blindly pro-EU. This is counter-productive. People hate this.

People may hate that but without these "experts" EU news could not explicitly be existing. When political groups hesitated to support the process, it would be the "EU missionaries" that would lead the stage again. Many of my interviewees were not too optimistic of educational programs such as a recent one (reported here: [http://www.euractiv.com.tr/ab-fonlari/article/ab-fonlari-ile-120-medya-calisanina-egitim-verilecek]): With the fund received from the EU, Antalya Association of Journalists prepared an educational programme called, Antalya Press Academy Project, and 120 active journalists from the cities of Antalya, Isparta, Burdur ve Afyonkarahisar were invited to attend. Some of these journalists will probably take EU process as a personal project and will be sensitive for EU news.

When there is not a systematic effort "internal motives" will be more operational and i believe this is related to the emergence of new EU missionaries:

The ideology can play both ways. Republican journalists have increasingly became anti-EUists but NO35 who has a similar social background thought her secular, Westernist education motivated her to be interested in EU. In the early 1980s
while her colleagues were making fun of her for specializing on a rather dull subject, that is EU, she would move ahead with being internally motivated.

Internal motives might also mean specializing on the EU affairs is an individual process. When NO 35 began to work on EU affairs she was alone. None of her editors encouraged her. With her personal insistence and efforts, she continued to produce EU-related features during the 1980s. She states that not only she had no encouragement but her colleagues were making fun of her for her specialization.

In the mean time, NO 18 believes that citizens will benefit from the EU negotiations and she declares herself to be pro-EU. She describes a columnist who frequently wrote on EU issues as such:

Before she was fired from Hürriyet, she was writing on EU issues in her column there. It was then 'luxury' to write about EU. But she was still writing. Because she had a vision, she was French educated, she knew Europe. So she could determine her own targets. I know how people around her reacted her dismissively, I know how she was teased because of our personal friendship. They were asking why she wrote about EU! The others claimed they had different agendas than EU issues. Then one day she was fired. She began to write in Akşam. She has substantive knowledge on the issue. I really benefit from her. But her career is ended by Aydın Doğan media. Because of newsroom struggles, some really valuable journalists are out of journalistic world now and they still cannot enter that world.

Hierarchical of sources

There can be many actors and institutions. But how do they actually contribute? Whose voice is louder than others?
State institutions, of course. Ministry of Foreign Affairs comes first. The news comes from Brussels but they are filtered in Ankara. Before presenting to public, journalists first get advise from MFA, big business in Istanbul and think tanks.... Among the think tanks, IKV and TEPAV are particularly effective.

Many studies demonstrate that political institutions play a central role as news resources. It is unsurprisingly the case here, too. However, an advisor to the PM (NO 33) admits that the government could not lead a successful communication policy towards the Turkish citizens. He says:

Not only in EU affairs, but our party has a problem of not explaining itself in many issues. I don't think we did enough in terms of a communication strategy. We have even made big mistakes indeed. If I don't know of any substantive policies around, then there are really no policies around. This incapacity to explain ourselves is the source of most of the recent reactions to our government (Spring 2007)

He might sound arrogant, but he is known to be a very influential advisor in government circles. His statement highlights the fact despite some structural patterns in terms of news sources, EU news flows are not necessarily centrally organized.

NO 18 said most of the EU news came from agency news. Rarely journalists used their personal connections and produced special news. More specialized news came through crisis news. For instance Cyprus issue brought more specialized
features. In general, there are very few expert columnists and journalists and this leads to dependency on agencies.

NO 23, a civil servant, emphatically says s/he doesn't like Bahadır Kaleağası and Cengiz Aktar. It looks like popular figures in EU news are not liked by bureaucracy... She added that in general news producers rely on Ankara. She believes her own institution (ABGS) informs the press to a large extent.

I came to believe that as the disjunction between elite journalists and government increased, the political authority lost its lead. News flows at a technical level might have repeated the often found pattern of news sources but the editors increasingly dominated the outcome, increasingly independent of actual news sources. Cases of "Interventions" in the last chapter are examples of this current situation.

**Actual Production Practices**

*Excessive editorial mistakes*

Despite growing awareness of the EU process, most of the editors' knowledge of EU is surprisingly minimal. Depending on the political climate, mistakes are tuned to favor or oppose the EU. I came to believe gradually that some of the mistakes may be intentional. Political climate might be the source of some 'mistakes'.

Political actors always become good news sources. A high level Eurocrat's statement on Turkey can make the headlines the next day. But the problem is that without the proper knowledge of the internal hierarchy and workings, it is not easy to calculate what that statement might mean for the negotiations. A well-known MEP's statement may not have any direct influence on the relations but all these persons are mostly treated as equal and then sometimes they are also misinterpreted.
NO 35:

In a TV program a few months ago, a psychiatrist woman who had a good social standing was invited along with me and some others. She cried that "Europe wants us to ban Atatürk pictures!" There is not such a decision. No one has the power to do that. A liberal MEP in the European Parliament had stated that "it is hard to understand having Atatürk pictures in all official places" and she interprets this as such. When I was working in Sabah, a foreign visitor asked my boss if that [ Atatürk's picture] was his grandfather. Well, a belonging to a figure like father is a relaxing idea as long as this is not exploited or exaggerated. Things will normalize I believe...

NO 18 believes that there haven't been satisfactory developments at the editorial preparation level.

There are few journalists who are specialized on EU. There are rarely news that people will be interested in. And now comes the election year. There will be more and more domestic politics. War in Iraq. Presidential elections. EU will be out. Turkish media changes its agenda too quickly. There is no effort to keep information flow constant in order to educate the public. The press is not visionary. There are not many reliable journalists. Knowledgeable, equipped individuals are lacking... And I don't see communication schools are better at education journalism students.

Eser Karakaş (2004) lists five common mistakes about the Customs Union agreement with the EU. These were not peculiar to press but were also made by the latter. Another interesting point is that one may never be sure if these are really mistakes or elements of disinformation campaigns as they shape the public opinion in
precedent levels. In fact, Prof. Karakaş already declares these as 'lies'. Here are the five common mistakes (or lies) Prof Karakaş lists:

1. Turkey is not ready for the Customs Union and the agreement was signed without preparation.
2. Weak conditions of our industries are not suitable for Customs Union.
3. Our industry is based on small-scale businesses and they cannot compete with European firms.
4. Customs Union is a violation of Turkey's sovereignty since Turkey is not involved in decision making mechanisms of the EU.
5. We should not start the Customs Union before easing our macroeconomic imbalances. (p. 98-100)

NO 28:

In fact editors etc. most of them are well educated. why are useless? not working on EU.

First reason is laziness. no one interested in homework. 2) the EU issue is always taken for granted. they got in only whatever will bring something. opinionmakers ets are all into it: general political attitude is brinkmanship? they need us. they need our young population. as though there were no younger population all over the world. you don't need to make a country a member because of its young population. noone wants to understand that.

In "the Perspectives of Turkish Youth on the European Union" is a research project conducted under the ARI Movement with Infakto Research Workshop. In
what has turned out to be the biggest ever youth research project in Turkey, 24571 high school students, between the ages of 14 and 18, participated from 20 provinces in Turkey:

There is a need to provide Turkish youth with objective and factual information regarding the EU, as opposed to negative or positive propaganda, which should be undertaken in educational institutions by experienced teachers. Our advice is the further development of work that has been carried out in recent years which includes all educators. Similarly given the critical role of television in this context, there is a need to have a serious debate about the accuracy of such information. For instance, at the timewhen Turkey gained candidacy status, the story that made headline news was that a popular Turkish dish, kokoreç (roasted sheep’s intestines), would be banned by the EU and the media was split between those who were willing to forgo kokoreç and those that were not. Thus instead of such trivialization of EU matters, the media has a responsibility to provide objective and factually based information. (4)

Source of information on matters related to the EU:

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Friends

[Emre Özdemir, "The EU in the Eyes of Turkish Youth", p. 6]

Futurology

EU process makes journalists to produce future scenarios. Some early expectations:

This process will accelerate when Turkey gets a date for EU membership negotiations. Foreign factors will weigh more, and the US-EU rivalry will grow sharper. The Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) will be the institution most influenced by this process. Its function will be gradually limited to security only, and its influence on the decision-making process will shrink. The interests and aims of the US and the EU meet in wanting to exclude the TSK from the decision-making process. The US considers the TSK an obstacle to the role of "moderate Islam." The US thinks it can more easily direct an army which is excluded from the decision-making process. The EU has also stated that it considers nationalism an obstacle to bringing Turkey into the Union. It prefers and supports political and social organizations which further its goals. These approaches agree with the ruling Justice and Development Party's (AKP) policies towards the TSK. However, the US and EU viewpoints on the "Islamic identity" issue differ. The US is emphasizing this identity, but the EU doesn't care for it. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) recent decision on headscarves is based on this view. In other words, the EU doesn't consider the strengthening of a political movement with religious leanings favorable to its interests. On the basis of the EU's support for the AKP, there's no point in laying a religious groundwork for the
"reconciliation of civilizations," but rather only limiting the TSK's function and role with the AKP's political power. (Yıldız, 2004b)

But of course the nature of the process forced all agents to utter expectations. the PM Erdoğan was expecting a date and the then European Parliament President Pat Cox was hoping that Turkey's European Union achievements to date would not be disregarded by EU leaders in their December decision to grant whether or not Turkey gets the go-ahead for entry talks (Erkan's Field Diary, http://erkansaka.net/blog/archive/2004/07/04-week/)

Oya Berberoğlu (09/14/2004) was less optimistic as she outlined the reasons:

....It is clear that Turkey has made progress in the required political criteria in terms of legislation. However, as Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has said, it is impossible to change practices and mentalities wholesale overnight. This will be completed in the accession period mentioned above. Turkey will have to harmonize in 31 different areas. And will the accession talks begin? Of course we hope that the EU leaders will make a positive decision.

There are many reasons why the EU is reluctant about Turkey's membership, its culture, religion, population and so on. If a date for talks is given, then there won't be any return for either side. I think the EU is caught between accepting and not accepting. What we must do is increase pressure on public opinion both within Turkey and without. The government and members of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) believe that the EU will give Turkey a date for accession talks this December. I'm not so optimistic, but I hope I'm mistaken.....
NO 35 was hopeful for the July 2007 elections. She stated that it was still an open-ended process and there was no hope from MHP and CHP but Erdoğan had just declared a future plan targeting 2023 to reach the level of contemporary civilizations and she highlighted that this was a sign for intensification of EU-Turkey relations after the elections:

Turkey will again be on the to the EU at full gallop! [for more future scenarios, please see the footnote33]

NO 33:

Ok. Ok. I will not deny we failed to some extent. But this should not be an excuse. I am one of the most keen insiders what we failed to do. Inshallah next time [AKP won the next elections]

Most of the French interventions lead to predictive attempts. Taner Korkmaz of Zaman (3/9/2005):

France has already planted a "referendum mine" along Turkey’s path to the European Union. Ankara didn’t even raise a word of protest.

A package of constitutional changes accepted by the French Parliament and approved by President Jacques Chirac last week aims to block Turkey’s European Union membership. The decision announces that new members will not be admitted into the Union without the French public’s consent after 2007. It’s obvious that the resolution aims to block Turkey’s path. [Turkey is currently the only EU candidate projected to join after 2007]
Even if Turkey successfully completes full membership talks in the
next decade, the fate of Turkey's membership will be decided by the French
people.

Cengiz Aktar calls for mobilization:

Netherlands is a very skilled country as a negotiator. Although she is
not as powerful as Germany and France, we have to win them as their
Presidency starts soon. Denmark worked very well at the expense of Turkey.
Netherlands can do the opposite. ...

There has to be an initiative towards Vatican who might produce a
statement that there is not a religious obstacle against Turkey's membership. ...

Among the Turkish political parties only CHP has some international
links though limited. They are part of Socialist International – [but in 4 years
CHP would move to a sort of politics which would force SI to warn and even
think of stopping the party's membership...] And Kemal Derviş has some
personal connections.

... AKP does not have a EU wide institutional network yet.

... TÜSİAD's opening of a Berlin office is a positive sign in this respect
(Aktar, 2003: 170)

NO 18 was very pessimistic at the time of interview. S/he was hopeless.
Unless Cyprus issue is resolved- that is a big obstacle- Our playground is so restricted now. I would be more positive if this interview took place last year [interview took place in early 2007]. Now domestic politics, polarization, nationalism, competition to get nationalist votes, nobody [no political parties] dare to have radical steps. Election years are always lost years particularly on this critical juncture. Iraqi war, Kerkük. EU is not on the agenda any more.

In late 2002, Esra Karakaş commented on what expected AKP (the ruling party).

Türban related freedoms or economic impasse are hard to resolve. The best field of maneuver is in EU process. AKP should postpone some demands by its core constituency and be brave (Cyprus etc) and in the short and middle term, it should focus on the EU process (2004, 272-3).

In May 2008 Mehmet Ali Birand (5/1/2008) was extremely anxious about the future of Turkey

I am so troubled by the present course of events that I might seem to be too pessimistic to some of you. I assure you that I am not. I am seriously scared of how all this might end. I believe that for the first time, Turkey is in danger of being divided. If the Constitutional Court decides to close down the AKP (Justice and Development Party) and the pro-Kurdish DTP, the days that follow might easily see Turkey involved in a civil war. Some of us are so
optimistic. “Come on, stop exaggerating. If the AKP and the DTP are closed, they will immediately found other parties under different names and continue,” they say.

Then why are we closing the present parties? Why do we need all this tension? Things will be different this time. That's why I'm frightened, and I want to frighten you, too. For I'm sure that you won't do anything unless you're scared.

“You,” the secular and the nationalist... “You,” the religious, the bigots and the Kurds...

I want to call out to you and shout: “You are on such a dangerous course that none of you will survive the consequences if this country is overtaken by war tomorrow. It will be your end as well as ours.

Antonia Ruiz Jimenez (2008) in what to do to better Turkey's image in Europe:

Promoting Turkish Accession

This unresolved European identity issue notwithstanding, there seems to be a fix for Turkey's image problem in the EU. According to the 2006 poll, Europeans who do not see large cultural differences between EU citizens and Turks tend to strongly support Turkey's candidacy. When an EU citizen sees more similarities than differences between the Union and Turkey, the probability that he or she will support Turkey's accession increases from 12 to 89 percent.
To promote cultural understanding, the U.S. government could work with Turkish embassies, and the Turkish government could work with EU elites (Eurocrats, national politicians, academics, journalists) to educate European citizens about the shared values between Turkey and the EU. Such a strategy should also emphasize that Turkey remains a secular state to overcome at least some European fears of a "religious" state entering the union.

In this regard, EU elites have an important role to play. They can help disentangle the question of Turkey's accession from the fear of Muslim immigration, which would help Turkey's accession prospects. The language of the debate on Turkey's accession should focus on Turks, not Muslims. Many Turks in Germany complain, for instance, that whereas before the September 11 attacks they were referred to as "Turks" by German opinion makers and media, after September 11, they suddenly became "Muslims." Turkey and European elites should also work with Turkish organizations in the EU to promote associations that reassure Turkish Muslims about the compatibility of Islam and national loyalty to European governments, while promoting civic obligation and national attachments. In addition, the history of EU enlargement should be recounted; the anticipated mass migrations from large and relatively poor countries, such as Spain and Poland, never materialized because employment opportunities and incomes increased as they entered the EU, creating reasons for their citizens to stay at home.

Most relevant of all, the unspoken role of religion within the EU must be openly discussed at some point as a way to educate EU and Turkish citizens
about religious tolerance. This discussion should be promoted by all parties, including Turkey, the EU Commission, and the U.S. government.

Cengiz Çandar (4/30/2008):

Two possible outcomes of the "closure case" that everyone can easily think of are:

1) A faltering economy because of dynamited Turkey-EU relations;

2) Worn-out relations between the southeastern Anatolian region and the country's "political center," Turkey dragging itself into "political instability" and multiplying "security issues" nurtured by the discomfort in the Southeast.

This aspect unveils dimensions of the issue and the significance of Turkey that goes beyond the country and beyond the internal affairs of the country. A Turkey getting unstable has the impact of an "earthquake" for the EU, due to geopolitical and humanitarian aspects. In order to fence this out, the EU exerts efforts and the reasons are so very understandable.

Mehmet Y. Yılmaz (11/14/2005) predicts AKP's moves against the Constitutional Court:

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his close circle say that "one day without doubt" they will take care of the "turban" problem in Turkey.
Use of polls

I do not cite most of the polls here yet but emergence of survey results always hit the newsroom. Some are particularly produced by editorial decisions. Others are produced by NGOs and if they find relevance, they are immediately covered by newspaper with editorial interventions. Eurobarometer polls is also constant agenda maker. A reader should be alert to the polls as sources of EU related news.

Let's do a bit of "brain gymnastics" today to figure out how it is they will do this. ........

The Turkish Parliament could come out with a law leaving students free to wear headscarves at universities, and with protest, this law could make its way to the Constitutional Court. The Court could then cancel its previous decisions, and the new law would be ready to be implemented.

So, I guess this means we should expect the AKP government to attempt to influence the workings of the Constitutional Court sometime in the future. This must be what the PM was referring to when he referred to "institutional accord" in the past.

Don't be at all surprised when you hear arguments that the Constitutional Court should be "reconfigured according to today's conditions" start to pop up in Ankara.

24

Antonia Ruiz Jimenez (2008) reports:

Shrinking Support for Turkey
Public opinion in the EU typically varies at the prospect of new member states, but in Turkey's case, there is particularly strong opposition. According to surveys collected by the European Commission's "Eurobarometer" -- a compilation of EU national surveys -- public support for Turkish membership has fallen 18 percentage points since negotiations opened in 2005. Furthermore, in 1996, opponents of Turkey's accession outnumbered supporters by 8 percentage points, while in 2006 the difference had grown to 35. In this context, it seems possible that in the long-term, accession referendums proposed by some EU member states (France and Austria among others) will fail, blocking Turkey's bid to join the EU even if it fulfilled all other necessary conditions.

Perceived cultural differences are the main reasons for the lack of popular support for Turkish membership in the EU. In a 2006 Eurobarometer survey, 61 percent of EU citizens stated that these differences were "too significant," and in countries where popular support for Turkey's accession was the lowest, this perception was particularly high: 74 percent in Germany and 79 percent in Greece.

Cultural and Religious Differences

Given these shared values, Europeans' perception of "cultural difference" seems to be rooted in their fear of Muslim -- not necessarily Turkish -- immigration into their countries. In fact, 85 percent of Europeans who believe the cultural differences between Turkey and the EU are "too significant" also fear that Turkey's accession will bring more Muslim immigrants.
On a theoretical level, Joke Hermes (2006) states that:

To read polls as describing a given state of reality, argues Justin Lewis (2001), is to allow them to continue to be a cultural practice that confirms a conservative hegemony. Understanding them as constructing that reality (as a research format), and of being put to specific purposes in professional media practice is more useful. Polls can help, when read attentively, to show how the democratic contract is changing. Currently, we can see that at the heart of parliamentary democracy hegemony is a cynical disengagement from

The Pew Center's 2005 and 2006 Global Attitudes Polls suggest that EU member states with high percentages of Muslim immigrants hold negative attitudes toward people practicing Islam. For example, 20 percent of British, 35 percent of French, 54 percent of German, and 62 percent of Spanish citizens have such views towards Muslim immigrants. These Europeans believe that Muslims are unwilling to assimilate and will cling to their Islamic identity -- tendencies that Europeans consider foreboding for their nations' futures.

For them, the possibility of 70 million Turkish, mainly Muslim, people becoming part of the EU poses a cultural threat. Turkey is far above the EU average on the personal importance that its citizens attach to religion: 29 percent select this among the three most relevant values compared to 7 percent in the EU15. Both secular and devoutly Christian citizens in the EU seemingly oppose Turkish accession for particular reasons: the former fears the influx of more religiosity, while the latter sees a greater number of Muslims as a threat to their faith. Both perceptions reflect the EU's current struggle to define the nature of a still unformed European identity.
bureaucratic government fed by individualist ideology that governments themselves like to promote. Such a paradoxical result makes any notion of everyday citizenship, defined as a reciprocal relationship of responsibility and trust between the nationstate and its nationals, patently ludicrous. (299) Most newspapers refer to at least one poll a day, and the more populist newspapers are more likely to use poll results as independent news items. (299-300)²⁵

To take an example, Eser Karakaş (2004) evaluates a poll whose findings were released in 2002:

70 % of citizens are pro-EU but only 4 % claims they are knowledgeable on the EU process. Some circles stated that this was a very negative finding as it proved that pro-EUism is not based on information and it can easily be manipulated by the opposing camps. Pro-EUism is based on emotions and

Polls in the news Opinion polls are now used on an unprecedented scale. News media like to report on them. But do they provide a conduit for audiences to become publics? The utopia of such early pollsters as George Gallup was exactly that. The use of scientific method would deliver true knowledge and democracy (Glynn et al., 2004: 68–9). Citizens and government officials would be perfectly informed about each other via the press. Technically, such consultation of citizens has come within easy reach. There is no need to organize national voting over individual issues. Such information is readily gathered and delivered. But this is hardly what happens. Taking my cue from Dutch practice, opinion polls appear to have little political meaning or impact. They may inform citizens about each others’ views and ideas but only in the most cursory of manners, and with few visible results. (298)
intuitions....However, we should not show emotions as primitive values contrary to information/knowledge. Although many do not know/understand the working mechanisms of the EU- which is also the case for many EU citizens in fact-, they might have a healthier expectation from EU. They want a more qualified life. They believe they will have better social security and they and their children will have better working conditions...I think communication strategies should be based on these healthier understandings (264-5).

Columnists and academics a like would derive conclusions from the poll results\textsuperscript{26} and poll findings are framed into news reports and used tactically... Etyen

\textsuperscript{26} Muharrem Sarıkaya (5/01/2005) pointed out the negative developments in the EU process:

But when we look at the recent surveys, there is a backlash in Turkish people's support to the country's EU accession.

Economic Development Foundation conducted a survey in 23 cities of Turkey in June 2004. According to this survey, 94.5 percent of people stated that 'We should be a full member of the EU'. Only 4.4 percent of people who joined the survey said 'no' to the EU, while 1.1 percent of them had no opinion on the issue. Eastern cities such as Erzurum, Sivas and Van supported fully Turkey's membership to the EU. The situation is different now. There are four separate surveys conducted recently. One of them was conducted by Justice & Development Party (AK Party). AK Party leader and Prime Minister Erdogan earlier noted that more than 75 percent of Turkish people supported the country's EU accession. The last survey by AK Party noted that this ratio was reduced to 63 percent.
Another survey was sponsored by Turkey's Secretariat General for EU. It said that Turkish people's support to EU accession fell to 60 percent. 40 percent of the people who support EU membership said that 'I believe that we should join the EU, but the union will not accept Turkey.' When we consider the reasons for decrease in Turkish people's support, we can list three points:

1-Cyprus and Armenian issue: Despite promises made last year that the blockade imposed on Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) would be lifted, EU has not taken any step on this matter. Worse, some decisions taken by EU on so-called Armenian genocide allegations put pressure on Turkey.

2-Expectation: A great expectation on EU was created by the government before December 17th. However, most of expectations were not met.

3-Nationalism: Activities of nationalist groups strengthened nationalist feelings.

Prof. Ali Çarıoğlu and Prof. Kemal Kirişçi's survey shows that from all walks of life Turkish citizens are pro-EU. Taha Akyol (2006) uses the survey results to state his demand: In order to be a EU member, there must be the preconditions for religious and thought freedom (347-348)

Robert M. Entman and Susan Herbst's survey found that "news media reports rather than polls provide the most important source for executive branch elites' perceptions of "public opinion" (211). In fact "scholars claiming to represent public opinion through their research data and analyses also engage in framing. Since they have no way of truly capturing public thinking in all its dimensions, they actually employ selected aspects of public sentiment captured by polls - they use mass opinion
Mahçupyan (5/2/2008) would observe the results of a poll published by mainstream media that state that "during a process in which turmoil is not fabricated, a coup has to be justified by relying on the "danger of Shariah" or "separatism." Allegations need to be based on evidence and supported by solid facts. More importantly, in the event that a substantial part of society does not find the allegations accurate, it should be expected that there may be some problems with regard to the legitimacy of the coup.\textsuperscript{27}

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as a surrogate for public opinion, and this creates difficulties for empirical theory and normative judgement" (211)

\textsuperscript{27} This will create disagreement among coup organizers. For this reason, the attitude of the media will become determinative in the event of a coup because it is generally accepted that the media represent the stance of the public.

There is no doubt that the media are very eager to perform this function. It is already known that the dominant media outlets, which are closely affiliated with the state, are always inclined to support coup attempts. These days there are certain attempts to ensure that this function will be performed. For instance, according to the results of a poll conducted for Kanal D, the people hold the Republican People's Party (CHP) and the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) responsible for the current coup environment. However, I doubt that the survey included the judiciary as a choice. The same poll also asserts that the support base of the AK Party has declined to 44 percent and that the society is divided into two camps with regard to the closure case. We understand from this poll that there are attempts to give the
Other countries as news sources

Another way to produce EU-related news is use other European countries as a pretext. Just to give an example:

There is of course, Croatia, whose negotiations started together with Turkey. What happened there caused comparative news:

Foreign Ministry Spokesman Namik Tan yesterday predicted that this week's European Union decision to delay its negotiations with Croatia would not affect Ankara beginning its own accession talks. He added that he hoped Croatia would meet the EU's expectations as soon as possible and begin its accession talks. (Aksam- 3/18/2005)

message that people are at least ambivalent and confused and disagree in an atmosphere where it is impossible to support a coup.

There are other public surveys as well. For instance, according to a poll by a company which might be considered close to the government but may also be regarded as reliable because of its record in the past, the public confidence in the judiciary has declined to 49 percent. A full 24 percent say they are now more confident in the judiciary. Of all respondents, 56 percent state that they believe the closure case is purely political while only 14 percent hold that it is legal. Overall, 72 percent note that the AK Party should not be closed — four times as many as those who say it should be banned from politics. From one perspective it could be said that 25 percent of the electorate would support a coup staged to ban the AK Party while 50 percent of the electorate would object to the closure of the party.
Attending a meeting yesterday at the Customs Undersecretariat with State Minister Kursat Tuzmen, European Commission Representative in Ankara Hansjoerg Kretschemer said that the European Union decision to delay its negotiations with Croatia was separate from Turkey, adding that the accession talks with Ankara would begin on Oct. 3, as planned. (Cumhuriyet- 3/18/2005)

The start of negotiations - a turning point or not?

Despite a general pessimism among many journalists, NO 35 believes negotiations triggered an interest in mass media. This was a very optimistic account:

At least at the level of State: I did the very first program on the EU in TRT [Turkish Radio Television- State radio and television institution]. This program continues. CNN Turk had a program called Kriter. It was particularly significant just before the start of negotiations. Hürriyet started an EU page but later discontinued. It was right. There was no need to have a particular page. There are already too many stories on the EU in the general number of news [really?]

She also stated that

though they are not particularly EU correspondents there are more correspondents who are interested in the EU. These are mostly connected to
World Affairs pages. There is not much ignorance on the EU as it used to be. However, older prejudices continue to remain in the field.

Maybe her last point could be used to alleviate her difference from many others: Though the level of knowledge increased, older skeptic approaches usually led to misinterpretations.

NO 33, the PM advisor, has his own perspective on the other hand:

I haven't seen anything related to the EU. Only negative, pessimistic news.

Could we talk about a serious EU journalism. But I do have hope.

In the mean time, NO 18 does not seem to be affected by the start of negotiations. It was her return from US in 2001, s/he fell into the public debate and was attracted to the idea of EU.

NO 23 believes since the beginning of negotiations, there has been a great polarization.

It is like supporting football teams and of course this is not good for the EU process. There are intense quarrels between the columns. There are pro-EU columnists to the dead and there are anti-EU columnists to the dead and we lose reasonable debating at some moments.

I could not verify the impact but what NO 23 mentions could be critical:

At the beginning of negotiations, a tracking and orientation committee. The head of ABGS, a senior official from DPT, an undersecretary from Prime Ministry, two undersecretaries from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, our ambassador for EU were the members of the committee. These had regular
meetings since the beginning. This is an ad hoc organization, not created by legal regulations. But all critical decisions are made there. That's the brain of negotiation process!

More than quantitative output, polarization plays a role here. Actual start of negotiations have meant to all sides that phantises of Europe might indeed be materialized. In the mean time, what negotiations meant continued to be conceptualized:

**Nature of negotiations**

EU Ambassador Marc Pierini warns Turks that negotiations is a complex and technical process. This is an approach used by bureaucracy be it from EU or Turkey or some of the pro-EU columnists. There should not be emotional reactions and the process should just go ahead. A bureaucrat chastises media for doing EU news in a

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28 EU Ambassador Marc Pierini (5/1/2008):

Turkey can further its European Union membership process with reforms, said the head of the delegation of the European Commission in Turkey Tuesday. Speaking at a seminar held in the Black Sea province of Trabzon, Ambassador Marc Pierini said the accession process to the EU is a complex and technical one that cannot be understood easily by the citizens of member states.

29 NO 23 [a state civil servant] believes that:

This is a long process. There must be some changes. Process in fact means process indeed. What we have to do is to be reasonable (*Akl-ı Selim*).
political sense. He sees that as a problem.\textsuperscript{30} Using the theme of "moderate Islam" in the post-September 11 environment cannot be trusted according to the bureaucrat\textsuperscript{31}.

The government should keep the negotiations at a technical level.

\begin{quote}
There shouldn't abrupt emotional reactions. Be it positive or negative. We shouldn't personalize. In this respect, Media directly reflect society. They take everything personally. 'EU did this to us, EU does not want us or EU wants us' etc. I can observe this kind of taking it personal even in major newspapers.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{30} As a bureaucrat NO 22 sees the process mostly \textbf{technical}.

EU news is always in the agenda but always politically motivated. However, EU is a technical process. The press only focuses on the political controversies. In order to reach EU standards, we have to make changes in every aspect of our lives. Hence it is a sort of technical process.... This process does only belong to Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Therefore experts from all ministries are involved in ABGS. There has to be a technical mobilization. In 2008, EU will ask for a National program. If we are not engaged with it, we will be lost.

\textsuperscript{31} NO 23:

I have been to subject religion related questions in EU countries. They have prejudices about us. Whether they know us or they do not, it doesn't really change. September 11 just intensified this situation. The image of Islam got become more negative and in the mean time this idea of 'good muslims' emerged. We use this idea, too. But my personal thought is this is not a good idea. We shouldn't use this Muslim country discourse in EU matters. As if we
But a guide that is aimed at informing the public on European Union lists these issues that will dominate the negotiations [Cyprus issue, Turkey's demography, * Turkey's geographical position, * Cultural and Religious differences, * Human Rights and fundamental rights and freedoms, * Financial cooperation between EU and Turkey. (Palabiyik and Yildiz, 2007: 94-101)] signifies the weakness of "technical" emphasis on negotiations.

Some reject the emphasis on technical. 32 Sovereignty issues inevitably makes the process political. 33 Some define a two-stage system of negotiations. If there is a

will fix the problems of the Middle East. EU Process should be based on the principle of mutual benefit. Turkey will benefit from the process. EU perspective will contribute to us a lot but this discourse should not be based on religion. We should be able to say: 'We had promised you and here we are democratised' Not that we should say 'see We are Muslims. If you make us a member, we will fix your problems about Islam. We will be your hand in Middle East. Turkey will resolve the clash of civilizations'. This kind of approach is mistaken.

32 Cengiz Aktar (2003, 168): Negotiations are not technical but political!

EU process is political not technical. [This is totally the opposite of Mr. Demiralp's argument] (Aktar, 2003: 168)

NO18 says it is the process itself that is more important. Maybe EU will vanish but the reform process will be beneficial to citizens. There are already many missed opportunities but still this process is important. It provides a target, a framework, a standardization. In this respect Turkey and her citizens will benefit
technical level, there is still a second level that is involved in politics. In fact, even some EU officials are aware of that. Think-tank based scholarly works are also aware of the situation.

from the EU. So far, we always did something for others. This is a process in which we do something good for us.

NO 22:

When you enter international relations, absolute sovereignty ends. If you are anxious about your sovereignty, you have already lost it by signing up for European Human Rights Treaty (EHCR). There is Strasbourg over the national judiciary. Turkey is of 12 countries that signed up that treaty and she had signed up that in 1950!

But of course, there are issues that EU wants to deceive us, unfortunately. Cyprus. Armenian genocide claims. But these are all a reality of life. International Relations happen like this. There has to be struggle against these, too. This is life. Nobody wears only white or black.

Ali Bayramoğlu (5/11/2005) defines two stages of negotiations:

On their path towards European Union membership, many candidate countries first fulfilled the political criteria and then the technical ones. The Copenhagen criteria make up the initial phase for candidate countries through which their democracies are harmonized with the EU's understanding of the rule of law. In the second phase, negotiations cover technical, social and economic issues. Naturally, it is always the first phase which sees the most
intense discussions in the candidate countries, as they feel that their national sovereignty is being threatened.

However, this hasn't been the case in Turkey. Despite two years of radical reforms, significant discussions on the country's national sovereignty have been absent. Opposition to reforms has come from bureaucrats and certain small groups only.

On the other hand, a reactive atmosphere is dominating our country in the runup to Oct. 3 when our membership negotiations are expected to begin. This attitude is of a political and social nature, reminding me of sovereignty discussions. Although these reactions don't refer to a clear opposition to EU membership, they rather signal a more inward-looking national attitude. The closer we get to the EU, the more we try to box ourselves into our own boundaries

Hansjoerg Kretschmer (6/21/2005):

When you start to negotiate, there is no guarantee that the negotiations will succeed. But in my view it is now in the hands of Turkey and Turkey alone; if Turkey manages to convert into a liberal democracy following the European model, if it manages to comply to adopt and implement all the acquis communautaire, I personally don't think there will be a major obstacle to the membership of Turkey. It really depends on Turkey. There were the referendums, there's the possible change of the political situation in Germany, but Turkey shouldn't distracted by these. Turkey should focus with determination on the task ahead which is a very difficult task, many things
have to be done. [There are] nine years between now and 2014, which is the first possible date of accession - it may look long, but in light of what has to be done in this period, it isn't very long. Every moment should be used for moving ahead of these reforms and transformation. These skeptical voices to Turkey's membership, they have always been there.

Katinka Barysch (2005), CER's chief economist, recommends Turkey what to do in negotiations:

Do take a positive attitude to the accession talks. Turkey needs to reconfirm again and again that it will do whatever it takes to join the EU. It should not threaten to walk away from the negotiations and thus throw their outcome into doubt - it is enough that EU governments talk about their 'open-ended' nature. The more levelheaded Turkey manages to be, the more unreasonable its opponents will appear.

* Don't expect real 'negotiations'. The accession process is mostly about Turkey adopting EU rules and regulations. The acquis is a body of law that has grown over decades and often embodies fragile compromises among the EU countries. It is not up for negotiation. So real negotiations will be the exception rather than the rule, and they will be mostly about transition periods.

* Don't oppose the EU's new idea of 'benchmarks'. The EU has decided to set down objective criteria that must be fulfilled, before each chapter can be opened or closed. During the talks with the East Europeans, the EU's decision to close a chapter often appeared arbitrary and political. So Turkey may be better off with benchmarks.
* Do streamline your negotiation team. Turkey's current negotiating set-up with the central team having little sway over the relevant ministries and departments - is a recipe for infighting and delays. The East European countries wasted valuable time before they realised that the chief negotiator needs clear authority over line ministries.

* Don't wait until the EU presents you with a common position. Turkey should try to influence politicians, parliamentarians, NGOs and the media in each member-state, before the EU comes up with a common position. By the time 'Coreper' (the member-states' EU ambassadors) or the Council of Ministers has reached a common stance, it may be too late to extract concessions.

* Do ensure that the whole of Turkish society backs EU accession. Those East European countries that had a strong national consensus in favour of EU membership made the fastest progress towards it. Turkish politicians should not depict EU accession as a 'battle' that needs to be won. Instead, they should explain the benefits of EU membership to the Turkish people.

* Don't present yourself as a special case. It is true that Turkey is strategically more important for the EU than many previous candidates. However, geostrategic advantages do not count for much at the negotiating table, and will not help to erode opposition to Turkish entry. For smooth negotiations, Turkey needs to prove that it is an effective and trustworthy partner. To win over EU public opinion, it needs to present itself as a 'normal' European country.

* Do remember the people of the EU. Turkey's accession will depend not only on reaching agreement with the Commission and the EU
Eser Karakaş implies that by emphasizing technicalities, anti-EU personnel hopes to bargain on some political issues. But in any case, the negotiations are turned into a matter of sovereignty in which EU interferes Turkey's authority. Hence governments but also on convincing EU electorates, some of which will vote yes or no to Turkey in referendums. So far, Turkey's public relations efforts have alternated between being non-existent and inept. Turkey needs a centrally-driven PR strategy, designed to win the hearts and minds of European citizens. Turkey should spare no expense to invite influential journalists, parliamentarians and leaders of NGOs to visit the country.

37 Eser Karakaş (2004):

Some circles because they are anti-EU or have some pragmatic reasons, believe that they can 'bargain' with EU. Because of that belief Accession Partnership Document and National Program have big differences while many other candidate countries just relied on the latter and did not make much changes in the latter. (p. 254-5).

38 Gökhan Bacık (5/2/2008):

The criticisms underline that the critical stance of the EU institutions in regards to sensitive issues, including party bans and amendments to the controversial Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code (TCK), is simply unacceptable because it is inconsistent with the idea of national sovereignty. Additionally, those who have attracted the attention of some external actors, including the European Union, to Turkey's affairs are also being criticized and
accused of taking action in compliance with external instructions. The
discourse of "there is interference with domestic affairs" is turned into
political rhetoric, which is presented to the public in excitement. This
discourse is problematic for a number of reasons; moreover, it presents a
falsified version of politics and the world to the people in Turkey.[emp. Mine]

Above all, it should be stressed that the EU membership bid refers to
accession to a new structure that seeks to become a supranational actor. The
EU integration process seeks to achieve a comprehensive integration between
member states that includes adoption of a new umbrella constitution and use
of a common currency. Currently, a French citizen is entitled to run for
membership in the EU Parliament in Denmark. By virtue of the EU structure,
a Portuguese EU Commission president is able to interfere with the affairs of
the member countries. Therefore, interaction and mingling of people and
countries is inevitable in the EU, which is rapidly transforming into a
supranational entity. The EU is evolving based on the idea of connecting and
combining the interests of all European people. Brussels interferes with the
affairs of member countries in regards to virtually all matters. Even strong
countries like Germany and France may not be considered exempt from
interference by the EU. In regards to economic, defense and cultural issues,
the EU relies on a new logic of politics based on an approach distinct from
traditional ones.

Asking "Why does the EU interfere with Turkey's affairs?" shows a
failure to appreciate the modern international system and the current
dynamics and factors in the making of foreign policy. It is inevitable for the
comes the alliance between Turkophobes in the EU and anti-Europeans in Turkey.\textsuperscript{39}

This does not need to be organic but discursive alliances would be adequate to

EU to interfere with Turkish affairs in regards to any matters considering that there is an ongoing process of membership talks between the parties. During this process, Turkey too will begin interfering with the EU and other member countries. It is irrational to propose that an entity which has abolished the local currencies and the boundaries between members not interfere with Turkey, which is eager to become a member in this entity. Besides, those who interpret the notion of interference within the context of 19th century colonialism suffer from belief in an incurable anachronism.

39 Bahadır Kaleağası (4/28/2008):

We see a strange alliance between Turkophobes in the EU and anti-Europeans in Turkey. What they are doing provokes mutual distrust, especially among young people, and it shows itself in aggressive behavior and even violence....... while anti-Turkey Europeans say Turkey will destroy Europe's economy, society and identity, anti-Europeans in Turkey use similar tactics: "They use the element of fear very well. But what is striking here is that just switch the words Turkey and Europe and you will find the same discourse among anti-Europeans in Turkey.

Do you think a lot of anti-European feelings in Turkey are generated by Europe itself?

Exogenous factors are important in that regard, but not enough to explain the whole picture.
strengthen anti EU people (i.e. use of concepts such as 'privileged partnership'). Hence the sphere of anti-Europeans enlarges into a larger whole and many journalists flocked into it. What former Chief of General Staff Gen. Huseyin Kivrirkoglu told to a journalist, Fikret Bila, becomes a matter of patriotism for many others located in EU assemblage including media personnel: "...the conditions stipulated by the EU on Turkey weren't stipulated on other countries and that it seems the EU is giving orders and we're obeying them." In fact, some pro-EU actors actually believe this but thinks

Yes, anti-Turkey trends in Europe provoke anti-Europeanism in Turkey, but there are problems in Turkey, too. Among these problems, I can list a lack of political leadership. Another thing in Turkey is the way the political agenda has been shaped in the last two years. There is a lack of tangible policies, a lack of plans to address issues and a lack of political will to implement reforms. Political debates revolve around certain concepts, including nationalism, sovereignty, liberalism and conservatism, without focusing on real global and local issues. It's easy for a politician to say something about nationalism or sovereignty, but not easy to propose a plan, for example, to address problems in health care.

Semih İdiz (1/2/2006):

We saw our confusion on this issue when former Chief of General Staff Gen. Huseyin Kivrirkoglu told my colleague Fikret Bila that the conditions stipulated by the EU on Turkey weren't stipulated on other countries and that it seems the EU is giving orders and we're obeying them. In fact the EU has stipulated different conditions for each candidate country. For example, it told Hungary to solve the problem of minorities, and asked
it is good for Turkey. EU's soft power or soft imperialism is preferred for more
democratic change.\footnote{41} In the mean time, assuming EU process as a social process
remains to be a minority viewpoint and trivialized.\footnote{42}

\begin{quote}
Romania and Bulgaria to overcome the problem of chronic corruption. In
addition, the EU intervened in Austria's domestic affairs and prevented
extreme rightist Joerg Haider from coming to power, even though it's an EU
member. In short, the EU has never applied a standard template to a candidate
or member country. What is applied isn't a double standard, but a multiple-
standard. However, we also see that there's a general parity on basic political
principles which lead the EU and which it seeks for everybody to abide by.
The basic issue is whether the order in Turkey is sufficient to suit this parity.
We'll see this better in the year to come.
\end{quote}

\footnote{41} Ergun Babahan (6/3/2005):

\begin{quote}
The biggest argument European politicians used against the use of
brute force by the United States was the ability to change communities by the
promises of the EU project.

We've seen this in Turkey too. With the influence of this soft power,
we've achieved reforms which couldn't even be dreamt of just three or four
years ago. We've made sweeping developments in the areas of human rights,
democracy and the law.

But are these enough? Of course not... However, our determination to
continue with reforms is up to the EU leadership's stance: It should not slam
the door in our face.
Understandably, a very important document, National Program\textsuperscript{43}, is trivialized in this political context. Cengiz Aktar (2003) defines the National Program as

In order to prevent Turkey and the Balkans from becoming unstable and great sources of threat, the EU should claim to be the owner of what it signed last Dec. 17 and start our membership talks this Oct. 3.

NO 28:

most achieved form of political conditionality. you go thru this reform and change process and we will make a member state. this is the soft power, soft imperialism. a set of values and principles that need to be implemented by the candidate country and its contrary to hard imperialism which is the american way of doing things. democracy stability by force which no avail.

EU by extending the scope of peace and prosperity into its neighbours it guarantees prosperity.

42 NO 28:

The key thing is ownership. EU process is profoundly a social process. How the EU legislation to be implemented by end users or public at large. if it is not an issue that stops at the legislative process, the EU issue is how to apply and what benefits are- these principles for public at large. if people do not see the advantages, they will never agree with it.

43 NO23 says
equivalent to Republican Revolutions despite many deficiencies in the former (p. 61). When a country becomes a candidate, she has produce a document that is called accession partnership document. It is about political, economic, and regulations in general. It is a framework document and it is prepared for every country. It includes the most fundamental issues. However, candidate countries have to produce their own National programs. These are more detailed documents. Its preparation is slow and civil society is excluded from the preparation process and journalists are not interested in much. Many related journalists or columnists did indeed mention National Program but only as a pretext to attack government. Last but not least even for the government, this Document would mean lesser as apart from a complex number of issues, it has chosen a new foreign policy in which EU was not the priority.\textsuperscript{44}

\begin{quote}
When a country becomes a candidate, she has produce a document that is called accession partnership document. It is about political, economic, and regulations in general. It is a framework document and it is produced for every country. It includes the most fundamental issues. However, candidate countries have to produce their own National programs. These are more detailed documents. Turkey first prepared it in 2001 and revised it in 2003. Now we are working on the third revision. First one after the Helsinki and and second revision was after the Copenhagen summit. 2002 was a productive year for European Council and Turkey.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{44} \textbf{Strategic Deepness}

Taha Akyol (9/7/2004) quotes Ahmet Davutoğlu's concept of \textit{Strategic Deepness} and says
Our historic heritage is passing through a social modernization process and becoming the elements of a global mission. Of course there will be rises and falls but Turkey is fulfilling this mission very well.

Ahmet Davutoğlu (2007) was never a very high profile figure but he is undoubtedly the architect of Turkey’s AKP-era foreign policy. His best selling book entitled as "Strategic Deepness" [my copy is from the 22nd edition- first published in 2001] outlined earlier the future possible choices of AKP foreign policy. He also attempt to draw continuities from a larger past- Ottoman past- and offers four main political lines in contemporary Turkey:

1. Neo-Ottomanism: Eclectic and pragmatic politics that aims to cope with rising ethno-nationalisms but still aiming the unity of the state. Former president Turgut Özal was the contemporary representative of this movement.

2. Neo-Colonialism and Islam: Popular reactions (and their political implications of) against the Bosnia crisis in early 1990s could be classified in this category.

3. Enlightenment and Radical Secularism: Post 28 February era.

4. From Turkism to Neo-Turkism: The rise of DSP in 28 February period. Religiously toned MHP is gradually replaced by more secular nationalism...

(p. 85-90)
When negotiations started

Despite the intellectual/political pessimism, negotiations actually started and journalistic production was involved in conceptualizing the actual negotiations. Foreign press observed the process as a process of ironies. “Finally, the European Union may be about to give Turkey the prize it has sought for a half-century: a promise of full membership in that organization and thus in Europe. Yet the prize is being given to an Islamic, partly Islamist, party rather than the secular nationalists.

No doubt to mention here, the first political line is favored by Prof. Davutoğlu.
who have long striven for that goal” said Bary Rubin\textsuperscript{45} while AKP’s attempt to criminalize adultery was widely criticized and was described as ironic\textsuperscript{46}. It was all

\textbf{An Israeli point of view produces a different set of dilemmas:} Barry Rubin (THE JERUSALEM POST Aug. 23, 2004) says:

History is ironic. Finally, the European Union may be about to give Turkey the prize it has sought for a half-century: a promise of full membership in that organization and thus in Europe. Yet the prize is being given to an Islamic, partly Islamist, party rather than the secular nationalists who have long striven for that goal.

[1] If in December the EU finally assures Turkey of eventual admission and sets a timetable, the ruling party will benefit in consolidating a more Islamic Turkey. In short, after many years of stalling Turkish membership for fear of having an Islamic-oriented state inside Europe, the EU is actually promoting that outcome.

[2] A second irony is the results of Europe’s "democratization" program in Turkey. Of course, Turkey was already a democracy but the EU demanded as a membership price further moves in that direction. Laws were revised expanding citizen rights, while the military’s power was reduced. This lowered the army’s ability to act as guardian of a secular republic, removing a major constraint on the government’s Islamicizing program....

[3] A third irony is the unintended result of a pro-Turkey US policy. For years, when the EU was cold on Turkish membership and harshly critical of that country, Washington championed Turkey’s right to enter the EU. Now,
ironic because democratic legal reforms at large helped undermine the authority of
traditional elites.

However, Turkish journalists were first busier with calculating **pros and cons**
of the membership\(^47\). Since Turks would always be portrayed as needy part of
negotiations, many journalists attempted to show how EU would benefit from
Turkey's membership. Although some immediately questioned geo-strategical
importance claims\(^48\), Turkish journalists liked to play with instrumentalist approaches

However, it is clear that success is damaging US-Turkey relations and
strengthening those in Turkey most hostile to US interests.

46 AKP's adultery law legislation attempt was portrayed as ironic in the foreign
press:

> There is a dark irony surrounding these events, because this
government has done more than any other to bring Turkey to the edge of EU
membership. It forced the military to relinquish privileged positions within
government. It applied pressure to persuade the Turkish Cypriots and the
military to accept a compromised Cyprus reunification plan. Jonny Dymond,
09/12/2004)

47 [An academic paper relevant for this section: "see Ali M. S. Fatemi's
'Turkey’s Membership in EU -Pros and Cons']

48 NO 28 challenges some pro-arguments:

We are geo-strategically very important country. but there are other
countries geo-strategically important. geo.imp can also be a disadvantage. No
so they could easily rely on these claims. Independent Commission on Turkey report was probably behind the pro-Turkish initiative of the pros and cons struggle in the early years of my fieldwork.49 Turkey would give more to Europe than take from it one thinks about that. No one really makes the effort to understand EU. EU is a political project that aims to vanish war from the continent. Who is really working on these lines? This country lost deadly war in 1919 in Dardanelles. We don't really appreciate the importance of peace. Young generation in Europe also don't appreciate by the way.

49 Taha Akyol (9/7/2004) summarizes the report prepared by the Independent Commission on Turkey (9/6/2004):

Turkey is becoming a corridor of energy between Europe and Asia. With its link with the Turkic republics and geopolitical location, Turkey could help Europe with reaching the oil in Caucasus and Siberia. In addition, Turkey is a determining factor in terms of the water problem in the Middle East countries. * Anatolia is one of the cradles of the European civilization.

The Ottoman Empire was one of the important elements of the European politics. Certain communities which were under pressure in Europe took shelter in the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman sultans started the modernization and Ataturk established the modern Turkey. Meanwhile, the public adopted a liberal secularism. * Turkey's EU membership would save the EU from being a closed Christian club and prove the reconcilability of Islam and democracy. Turkey is the example of finding a solution for the dilemma between religious traditions in the Islamic world and modern universal values. Turkey is
would bring to the EU. EU would not be 'complete' without Turkey. Thus even an Arab columnist would advise French President Nicolas

directed towards Europe. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) has carried our more reforms than those made in the last ten years.

50 In a lecture, a prominent journalist Haluk Şahin to gave a lecture on Turkish media to a visiting group of Danish high school students and after declaring 'I am not a nationalist in the narrow sense of the word, let me say I am a patriot' he told the audience that 'I am one of those who think Turkey will give more to Europe than take from it'. With an aging population, difficulties in restructuring its industrial bases and having 'lost the ability to generate new ideas of life' Europe needs Turkey for cross-fertilization. The professor cited German-Turkish director Fatih Akin, novelist Orhan Pamuk and Istanbul's musical scene (by referring to the recent Newsweek cover story on Istanbul) to support his ideas. (10/13/2005).

51 A little while Hurriyet states: "In an interview with German daily Bild yesterday, British Prime Minister Tony Blair predicted that Turkey's entry into the European Union would boost stability and security in the region and bring advantages to all of Europe" (10/16/2004)

52 "Brussels which discussed Turkey again on Wednesday hosted a different meeting. Turkish women explained Turkey's new image in this meeting organized by "Woman Initiative for Turkey". They said, "Europe will not be complete without Turkey." (Radikal, 10/14/2004)
Sarkozy who opposed Turkey's membership. Energy has become precious attempt to market Turkey's role. Energy Minister Hilmi Guler would declare that the issue of

53 Amir Taheri (5/2/2008) writes against Sarkozy's opposition to Turkey, underlining the benefits EU might get:

......Sarkozy's key argument is based on geography. He insists that Turkey is not “in Europe”. However, the EU is an economic and political club, not a geographical one. Geographically, Switzerland is in the heart of Europe but not in the EU. Norway and Iceland are also European in terms of geography but neither wishes to join the EU. Albania, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro, Moldova and Ukraine are all geographically in Europe and wish to join the EU but cannot because membership requires something more than geography. Belarus is in Europe but the EU would not touch it with a bargepole because it lacks the minimum political qualifications.

As far as the conventional geographical description of Europe is concerned, only five per cent of Turkish territory is European. But Europe is not always defined in such narrow terms. Turkey is a founding member of the Council of Europe, a body that includes countries such as Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Kazakhstan that have no geographical connection with the continent...........

Turkey's historic ties with Europe are even stronger.

Several of the earliest European states, including those of the Hittites and the Greeks, were located in Anatolia. For many centuries, the Ottoman
Empire, based on present-day Turkey, was a major European power with a leading role in the Balkans. In the 19th century, when Western Europeans called the Ottoman Empire "the sick man of Europe", they never questioned its place in the continent.

Furthermore, ethnically, Turkey is predominantly European. The majority of the population are from Lydian, Hittite, Greek, and Thracian stock with addition from Slavs, Armenians, Caucasian nations, and, of course, Turkic peoples from central Asia. If Turks were "Asiatic" as Sarkozy implies, they would look like Kazakhs, Uzbeks or Koreans rather than southern Europeans......

Sarkozy might point out that the Turkish language is not European.

That is true. Turkish belongs to the Altaic family of languages while all but three European languages come from the Indo-European family. The EU, however, is not a linguistic club either. If it were, Finland and Hungary, whose national languages are not Indo-Europeans, would be excluded. France itself, along with Spain, is home to the Basque language that is also "alien" because it is not related to any European linguistic family.

In any case, there are already more Turkish speakers within the current EU than there are Bulgarian, Catalonian, Czech, Danish, Estonian, Finnish, Gallic, Greek, Hungarian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Portuguese, Swedish, or Slovenian speakers. ....

Islam is already the second religion of the EU in terms of the number of its adepts. France itself is home to some six million Muslims. In 22 of the
27 current EU members, Muslims represent the largest religious minority. Islam may also be the fastest growing faith in EU in terms of demography. Some scholars project Islam to become a majority faith in Europe within the current century.

However, the EU is not a Christian club either. If it were it would have to exclude its 2.5 million Jews as well as its 20 million Muslims, not to mention millions who practice no faith at all. Should Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina, where Muslims form majorities, never become EU members? Both have already started the preliminary stages of applying for membership...... The EU is Turkey's largest trading partner. It is also the biggest foreign investor in the Turkish economy. Some 80 per cent of visitors to Turkey come from the EU while the EU is the number-one destination for Turks doing business, receiving education or holidaying abroad. It is not only by adopting the Latin alphabet that Turkey has tried to draw closer to Europe. It has adopted the democratic system, is building a secular republic and promoting a culture of pluralism. Trying to meet EU conditions, Turkey has reformed its cultural, social, and economic policies, and judicial system (the process is known as mise-a-niveau or bringing up to standard). Today, Turkey is closer to EU standards than many of the current members.

As already mentioned, Turkey is a founding member of the Council of Europe. But it is also a founding ember of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and provides its second largest army. No so long ago, Turkey led NATO's efforts to stabilise post-Taliban Afghanistan..............

Prime Minister R. Tayyip Erdoğan quoted in Ferai Tunç (11/8/2005):
energy will be Turkey's greatest advantage in our EU membership talks. US-Turkey relations would also be critical in protecting energy lines. Turkey would then again

Could the protests that have exploded across France spread to other European countries? And what can Turkey do about this? "We don't want this type of event to spread," says Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan. "We have always told our friends in Europe that the path to clash between cultures should not be opened up. We have got to work for an alliance between cultures and civilizations. The Christian and Muslim worlds have a huge responsibility on this front. We told Europe. But France did not pay attention. They didn't listen to us."

Here is part of what he said:

"The decision to ban headscarves in French schools is what detonated these events. There has never been anything like this before in France. Last year, I spoke about this with a group of French businesspeople and intellectuals. There is a lot that we as Turkey can do to help prevent these developments. We can help in the alliance of civilizations."

54 Murat Yetkin (4/8/2005):

According to Energy Minister Hilmi Guler, the issue of energy will be Turkey's greatest advantage in our EU membership talks. In his statement on our energy policy, Guler noted that Turkey has already become an important corridor through which energy reserves are transferred, and explained why the issue of energy plays such a significant role in our relations with the EU: "Turkey has strategic importance both as a corridor and as a terminal for energy. Ceyhan is already a significant energy terminal. When the Baku-
have its strategical role for the West in general like in the days of Cold War. Thus opening of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline prompted several articles and Turkish columnists declared the even as a turning point.\textsuperscript{56}

\underline{Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline is complete, we will further strengthen our position on both ends. By the end of June, we'll have gotten oil flowing from Georgia to Turkey.}

55 Murat Yetkin (3/31/2005) said:

\begin{quote}
Unlike the Turkish public, both he US and the European Union are focused on protecting energy resources and securing the paths of energy transmission. This is their priority. The EU supplies 50 percent of its energy from sources outside the Union. This ratio is expected to climb to 70-80 percent by 2020. Therefore, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline holds crucial importance for the EU. The pipeline will be the first to transport Caspian oil to world markets without the direct intervention of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and Russia.

The US once argued that the pipeline would best be under the protection of the West (that is, NATO). The assurance of this protection would be the Incirlik Airbase, since it's located close to both the port of Ceyhan and ports in Mersin and Iskenderun. As US Envoy to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad pointed out long ago, the base has an operational range of 1,000 miles (1,600 kilometers).
\end{quote}

56 A significant move was the \textbf{Baku-Ceyhan pipeline}. In May 2005 a BP-led group loaded the first Azeri oil into a pipeline to Turkey which will unlock the
Caspian Sea's riches and reduce Russia's stranglehold on export routes from the region. (For more information on this pipeline: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan_pipeline)

The pipeline opening prompted many columnists to write about it. Here are two examples:

Ferai Tınç (5/29/2005):

There have been so many harsh conflicts in the 11 years that have passed since the signing of the first agreement on Caspian oil. So much bargaining was done and such bad tricks were played that, as a journalist who observed this process closely, I had also lost my hope and started to ask myself: "Is this just a dream or a legend which can never come true?"...However the dream finally came true. Caspian oil will reach Western markets through Turkey. When Iraqi oil is also added to this at full capacity, our port of... This is a real 21st century legend which shows that the BTC oil can also be shared over negotiation tables instead of battlefields.

Erhan Başıyurt (5/27/2005):

Turkey has become an energy route for Iranian and Azerbaijani gas and Iraqi and Caspian oil, and Turkey's strategic importance rose for the EU. Now transferring natural gas to Europe through Greece isn't a dream anymore. In addition, the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) is a partner of the projects with a share of 6.5% and for the first time, Turkey is signing a partnership with international companies with oil and natural gas fields of this scale.
But Turks were not only altruistic, they would have benefits: "European integration plays an important role in the creation of a democratic secular imaginary in Turkey."\textsuperscript{57} Kurdish problem could be solved.\textsuperscript{58} Turkish State will share its sovereignty with the society and other states.\textsuperscript{59} There would be economic benefits\textsuperscript{60} in general.

A policy brief by an EU funded think tank also points out in that direction (Hatto and Tomescu, 2008). The authors see Turkey as the second most important country after Russia in Wider Black Sea Region and they anxious about the closer relations between these two countries. They point out that EU hesitation for more enlargement makes Turkey distance itself from EU (p. 3).

\textsuperscript{57} Keyman (2007):

European integration plays an important role in the creation of a democratic secular imaginary in Turkey. In the same vein, a democratic and secular Turkey with a predominantly Muslim population has the potential to make a significant and positive contribution to the recent debates in Europe about multiculturalism, religious pluralism and democratic secular governance. Moreover, the accommodation of a democratic and secular Turkey in Europe as a full member of the EU brings about a strong possibility, not only of the construction of European identity as a democratic and multicultural self, but also for the emergence of Europe as a global actor capable of creating an effective democratic governance in our highly insecure and conflict-ridden world. (229)
Structural reasons in Turkish journalism, there was never a systematic and full-scale engagement with the news of Negotiations. Even the journalists, columnists or editors who happened to have an expertise or interest in EU issues gave up producing EU related journalistic material and focused at best other issues. In the

58 Akyol (2006) stated "EU process might solve the Kurdish problem. But the way is clear: through economic development and democracy under the umbrella of a unitary State. (162) Turkey's membership will improve religious pluralism and prevent fundamentalism. (315) Based on observations in Athens before the Olympic Games: "EU will bring discipline and a new way of life!" (251)

59 Aktar (2003) said:

In Turkey, the State is the sovereign. She does not like to share its authority with citizens. The process promises a political entity in which the State will share its sovereignty with the society and other states... (4)

60 Abdurrahman Yıldırım (4/1/2005) focused on the economic benefits:

We have finally surpassed China in successive growth rates, thus becoming the fastest-growing economy in the world for 2004. This is also the highest rate we've achieved since 1966. The expectation that Turkey will eventually get a date for EU membership talks also had a positive effect on all aspects of our economy, including the financial markets and real estate.
Chapter 5 - The EU process; an assemblage of ideas, events and agents

The EU process as an assemblage

The study proposes that it is not because of "ill-intentions" of journalists or their "ignorance about the EU and membership process" that the EU process is not "properly" reported. It is because of their embedded role in Turkish political and intellectual scene. With the official start of negotiations between Turkey and European Union in 2005, a political assemblage which I will call "The EU Process Assemblage" emerged in Turkey and the moment EU appears as a reportable issue, the journalist is already ascribed an actor-role in a political assemblage and the issue is re-calibrated to be reported through some other issues that define the contours of the assemblage.

The EU itself is rarely an isolated political event or process. Apart from the over-significant moments like the EU summits (and reports on Turkey), when the EU itself becomes an object of concentration, the EU always become a metaphor to facilitate domestic political debates. It is used against or for maneuvering political positions. A separation of domestic vs. EU issues is hard to maintain since all are increasingly more intertwined and the latter is always integrated into what I call EU process assemblage in Turkey.

I gradually decided to imagine Turkey's EU process as an assemblage. I am inspired by Rabinow (2003) and Marcus and Saka (2006) later elaborates the idea a little further. In a more abstract level Manuel Delanda (2006) describes that "an assemblage implies that despite the tight integration between its component organs, the relations between them are not logically necessary but only contingently
obligatory: a historical result of their close coevolution\textsuperscript{61} and stabilization and destabilization between different dimensions appear continuously.

As De Landa argues parts of the assemblage are self-subsistent and articulated by relations of exteriority, so that a part may be detached and made a component of another assemblage (18) and every part/component might involve complex mixtures of causes, reasons, and motives. (24). With the formal start of negotiations between Turkey and European Union, the EU assemblage emerged in Turkey being historically contingent, individual. (40) and may disintegrate any moment in near future. In fact, there are signs of disappearance already. We might witness the emergence of another assemblage keeping most of the components singularly existing by their owns. It is also important to note that components maintain their singularity and hence their heterogeneity and their irreducibility to one another. (48) It is because of the irreducibility, even Turkey was moving forward confidently, age-old Cyprus issue stopped the movement despite the momentary homogeneity in purpose among the assemblage’s components.

I am inspired by this rather abstract idea and my particular use might still have theoretical problems. However, the concept still has merits. My portrayal of journalists trapped in a political assemblage may remind underdevelopment theories in which peripheral countries were systematically underdeveloped no matter what they did (Andre Gunder Frank, 1971). Most of the journalists I talked to declared

\textsuperscript{61} "...the concept of assemblage is defined along two dimensions. One dimension or axis defines the variable roles which an assemblage’s components may play, from a purely material role at one extreme of the axis, to a purely expressive role at the other extreme. These roles are variable and may occur in mixtures, that is, a given component may play a mixture of material and expressive roles by exercising different sets of capacities. The other dimension defines variable processes in which these component become involved and that either stabilize the identity of an assemblage, by increasing its degree of internal homogeneity or the degree of sharpness of its boundaries, or destabilize it. The former are referred to as process of territorialization and the latter as processes of deterritorialization." (12-13)
themselves as pro-EU citizens but overall journalistic production and discourses pointed out the opposite of their personal convictions. In this sense, logic of underdevelopment theories seem relevant. However, I would argue against that because of the latter's pre-deterministic tendencies. In my case, I do not propose that journalistic production will always end up in anti-EU positions. It is the present configuration of the assemblage that leads to that direction but a difference in configuration could yield different results.

I also thought about Luhmann's systems theory for which I devote a long space of discussion in my literature review. In some ways, my portrayal of media resembles media as a system in Luhmann's terms. So that any outside element is incorporated and integrated into the media system and overall production does not radically change. However, heterogeneity of components of an assemblage signifies an open-endedness of the media production. It may mostly end up in yielding the same discourse but there is still a potential of intervention from external elements. In fact, my chapter on metaphors signifies a moment when overall journalistic production campaigned for pro-EUism.

As I will try to explain in the next chapter, the components of assemblage is not just a random collection of elements found or observed in the field. There are political, cultural or intellectual "structures". But what is new within the idea of assemblage is that a) these structures are likely to produce different and sometimes unexpected alliances, configurations b) a structure, let's say, the Turkish army, might have totally different functions (such as being pro-Islamic in early 1980s against against the communist wave and being anti-Islamic in 1990s), c) potential of absolutely new "structures". Besides, a strict structural analysis may ignore the power
of events (i.e., American intervention in Iraq), discourses (i.e. Kemalism), long lasting issues (i.e. Cyprus) or individuals (i.e. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan).

My last points in the last paragraph also solves the problem of agency. My overall arguments in this thesis seem to ignore a role for agency but some of the components in the assemblage I propose signifies the inevitability of agency. Seemingly deterministic entrapment of journalists can only happen by their active willpower and most of the successes and failures of AKP rely on its leader's (Recep Tayyip Erdoğan) acts.

Finally, Paul Rabinow's distinction between apparatus and assemblage is helpful. Current formation of an assemblage I attempt to describe rely on age-old apparatus elements of Turkish state and politics, but it is the temporary existence of a particular configuration I focus on. Because of this particular focus my conclusions cannot be taken to name a permanent situation. It is near future's power relations and practices of agents that are part of the assemblage will decide where this formation will lead to.

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In order to substantiate my arguments more, I hereby offer more processes of interpenetration within the boundaries of EU assemblage. "External" factors are not unique to Turkish journalists. Statham (2007, 464) mentions several external factors that intervene the editorial writing and when it comes to Turkish journalism, even at the level of news topics EU news are inherently related to other topics. As again Statham quotes from Hallin and Mancini (2004) cross-national variations in newsprint landscapes are largely shaped by, and constitutive of, differences in countries' political systems. Specific media systems, their newsprint landscapes and press
cultures, are products of, derived from and constitutive of specific types of liberal democracies, reflecting their important political cleavages." (475). The list below then might help to outline contours of the EU Process assemblage in Turkey.

During my fieldwork, several items of news intervened the process. As Terzis (2008) admitted, domestic relevance and conflict were probably still the main criteria for EU news selection (p. 542):

*Constant themes of Turkish foreign policy* which have increasingly been transformed into domestic issues:

Cyprus; Armenian Genocide claims; Kurdish insurgency [Orhan Pamuk and Hrant Dink cases in relation to Armenian and Kurdish issues]; uneasy relations between Turkey and the US. However, the long elections process (when presidential election in the parliament failed due to interventions from the army and the judiciary in April 2007, the government decided to start the election process for the new parliament. After this election in 23 July 2007, the new parliament elected the new president in August 2007), concluded the emergence and strengthening of a new political assemblage.

*Intra-EU issues* also had impact on the process: (Im)migrancy, free movement issues; EU Constitution debates and crisis; the state of Muslims in Europe; differing policies of EU presidencies; growing racism and related problems in Europe, the rise of center-right wing governments, particularly Sarkozy and Merkel governments in France and Germany; ups and downs in the European economy;

*Some tormented issues that affect both the EU and Turkey:* EU's Foreign policy decisions including approaches to Middle East; growing energy and
environmental problems; changing enlargement policies (The Turkish President Abdullah Gül's speech (3 November 2007) delivered at The Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly is an extensive summary of Turkey's entanglements mentioned above. One could read it as a report to European Union although the Council is not a direct organ of the EU).

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**[Legal developments]**

First and foremost among them has been the **human rights policy**. One pillar of this policy has been assuming new obligations by becoming party to core international instruments on fundamental rights and freedoms. I am pleased to inform you that Turkey is now party to all of the seven principal international human rights treaties of the UN. Turkey is also party to a large number of Council of Europe conventions and protocols, including Protocols No. 6 and 13, abolishing the death penalty in all circumstances.

The second pillar of Turkey's policy has been **legislative reform**. In this field our progress has been significant. Existing laws and regulations have been revised in the light of our international and European commitments. The case-law of the European Court of Human Rights and the recommendations of the international monitoring mechanisms have been taken on board. Nine legislative packages and substantial constitutional amendments have been passed by our Parliament. Amendments on the Political Parties Law and the Anti-Terror Law, the adoption of the new Civil and Penal Codes and the new Law on Associations are among the benchmarks of our legislative reforms.

In this context, gender equality is enshrined as a constitutional principle with an emphasis on the obligation of the state to ensure such equality. All forms of discrimination are banned. Legal and constitutional guarantees on the right to association and assembly are reinforced. Limits that can be imposed on freedom of expression are reduced in line with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. Cultural and religious rights have been upgraded.
Fight against torture and ill-treatment has been another priority. The zero tolerance policy against torture yielded impressive results. We have put in place an effective legislative and regulatory framework for combating torture. In the words of the former President of the European Committee for Prevention of Torture, today it is difficult to find a Council of Europe member state with a more advanced set of provisions in combating torture than Turkey....

[Turkey in Europe]

The political reforms in Turkey were accompanied by sweeping economic reforms, financial discipline and structural changes in economy. Thus, economic growth and dynamism was substantially boosted. Reforms have also led to the flourishing of cultural, literary and artistic life in Turkey. Istanbul's designation as the cultural capital of Europe for 2010 and Turkey's designation as the focus country of international Frankfurt Book Fair in 2008 are some of its indications....

[the New constitution]

Now, a very lively and wide debate has been taking place in Turkey on the elaboration of an entirely new constitution or a comprehensive amendment of the current one. This broad public debate is continuing with the participation of all political parties, NGOs, professional associations, universities, think-tanks, intellectuals, media and citizens. I am confident that this debate will culminate in improving Turkey's constitutional norms in line with the requirements of the 21st century....

[Turkey as an ally, as a bridge]

This is why Turkey co-sponsored, together with Spain, the initiative on the Alliance of Civilizations under the auspices of the United Nations, with a view to promoting dialogue and cooperation among different cultures and religions. Turkey, given its historic multicultural experience, its strong links with a vast geography and home to many civilizations, is fully aware that interaction among different cultures is necessary, possible, fruitful and enriching.
Years before negotiations started Eser Karakaş (2004) outlined seven possible sources of crisis. As it turned out, all of these listed source would indeed complicate the negotiations:


(p. 2-13)

Turkey's own experience is testimony that secular democracy can flourish in a predominantly Muslim society...

[Cyprus]

Cyprus remains the oldest unresolved conflict in Europe. The overall settlement of this conflict could have been achieved during the simultaneous referenda which were held on the island on 24 April 2004 on the UN settlement plan. However, that chance was missed due to the rejection of the plan by the Greek Cypriot side.

Had this opportunity been seized then Cyprus now could have been a reunited island and represented as such in this Assembly. Isolations imposed on the Turkish Cypriots would have been lifted. The Turkish and Greek Cypriot property issues would have been resolved. The military presence of Greece and Turkey would have reached an agreed solution. A negotiated settlement in Cyprus would have transformed the eastern Mediterranean into a hub of regional cooperation between Turkey, Greece and island of Cyprus.

[Situation in Iraq]

The situation in Iraq is also of direct relevance for Turkey's security due to the challenge it poses in combating terrorism. The terrorist organization PKK continues to use the north of Iraq as a safe haven and perpetrate violent acts across the boundary. ...
In another manner, Koopmans (2007) offers a view of multiplication of issues related to EU. It could be a case of integration of singular components. "First, actors and institutions from the European level (e.g., EU commissioners or the European Parliament) may become more prominent as speakers in public debates in national news media.......Second, claims made by national actors in national media may increasingly refer to European institutions, issues, legal frameworks, norms and identities. Many EU policies as well non-EU forms of European integration (e.g., in the context of the Council of Europe or the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe) have an intergovernmental rather than supranational basis. This may lead to increased media attention for actors from one European country in the national news media of another country.......In an intergovernmental polity, other member states can no longer be treated as foreign countries whose internal politics are not relevant for one’s own country. ... if Germany liberalises its naturalisation policies, this is immediately relevant for other EU Member States because, once naturalised, immigrants from Germany can freely travel to and take up work in another EU country. (185-186)

A Prime Minister advisor who was influential in government’s EU policies is a good case of how different parts combine and collide during the process:

.... Well we are accused of losing momentum. They are right but at the same time the EU leaders do not know what they are doing. They change their attitudes towards us daily. I am one of those who can objectively observe this situation. I heard with my own ears: Our current PM when he was a party leader then, in September 2002, accompanied by Abdullah Gül and me only, asked the leaders of UK, Germany and France in Copenhagen, "but then there
will be Cyprus, what about then?" They replied:

"No worries. There is the Annan plan. Cyprus issue will be handled."

I heard this with my own ears. In fact, justice will be given: Both Schorceder and Fischer published their ideas. They first told us there would not be any other political criteria. Then they tried to insert the Armenian genocide claims. They they understood the seriousness of the situation and they retreated. Then came Cyprus issue. Our beliefs began to be shaken. So what for we were trying? Even I, a pro-EUist than many others, I ask this now.
Components of the Assemblage

This is by no means a complete portrayal of the EU process assemblage in Turkey. However, an adequate description of major components can be found here.

The present working of the EU process assemblage as a protector of status quo cannot be possible without particular ideological and intellectual discourses and their embeddedness in some of the institutions. Reactions to Orhan Pamuk, which is provided as a case in the next section, which triggers a closing off against further membership process can only be understood how journalists are entrapped intellectually, too. It becomes clearer then how Turkish journalists, who work hard to identify themselves as parts of traditional secularist Turkish elites, then, emerge as a group of actors to conceptualize the emerging times and to have a leading role among the traditional Kemalist/Republicanist elites. It is here to know what kind of modernization is desired.

In order to be modern (the army should be persuaded)

When I was 13, Turkey applied for full membership to EU (in 1989). It was a big event and an issue of celebration. When I look back to writing of those years, be it academic or not, the membership was seen to be the last and maybe the final step in Turkey's modernization. Two decades later, this is a not an hegemonic discourse any more. Most of the journalists laugh at this kind of claim although some had believed in that 20 years ago.

There are traces of this belief, that is, EU is a must of modernization and liberal minded pro-EU columnists fight for it. A highly influential columnist and editor Taha Akyol (2006) quotes from the then Chief of Staff, Gen. Büyükanıt who
sees the EU as a must for Atatürk's civilization project. However, time has changed, and majority of Turkish bureaucracy, civil or military, believes otherwise: The retired general Suat İlhan and "Atatürkist" Chief Prosecutor Vural Savaş believes that the EU membership is a treason. (380) The army's role is singled out and despite the circles of "Atatürkists" who are all against market economy, foreign capital, integration, globalization, liberalization of law etc. the army in principle accept these in order to modernize. In Taha Akyol's eyes "in fact there is no other model of modernization at present." Thus in order to modernize, the army should reform Kemalism (380). Taha Akyol also provides pragmatic reasons that not only because of economic reasons but also because of geo-political reasons, the military in fact, accepts the necessity of EU membership (118) and he then tries to calm down the army officials. Religious fundamentalism is not the primary risk for Turkey. Economic development and urbanization will make even the most religious circles more secular….Radicalism will be softened. The generals need not to be anxious. (368)

As a journalist, Mr. Akyol writes about more political-practical issues but sometimes he gives clues about what his ideal society should look like. He thinks a Peasant based society depends on State provisions whereas urban society is more individualist, dynamic (360). But this does not change the fact, his ideal society can only be realized after state institutions approves the change-- again a kind of state provision?-. In the civil sphere there is only the Justice and Development Party (AKP) that can lead modernization in parallel to State approvals. Whatever the case, because AKP represents a civil modernization, hence it gets voter approval both in the western and eastern parts of Turkey (328).
Being modern, keeping Islam

However, speaking of AKP, brings out Islam on the agenda and this is certainly a point of tension between staunchly secularist army and Islamist originated ruling party. With the rise of AKP, and in the post September 11 political climate, Islam and modernity and Turkey's role to bridge Islam, modernity and Europe became issues that could not be ignored. But even before that religion remained to be political topic to be debated endlessly. Taha Akyol (2006) quotes Mesut Yilmaz, a former primer minister, who said Turkey is a universal example of how Islam, democracy and modernism can be in harmony. (112) What is new is that Islam has a substantive power now. It was a more abstract issue before; an issue that was dealt with in the early Republican years when the victory of secularism was declared. In the last 4-5 decades of intellectual debates, Islam was always treated as something in the process of coming back. Now, it has already come back.

A widely distributed and quoted report by ESI (European Stability Initiative) entitled as "Islamic Calvinists. Change and Conservatism in Central Anatolia" points out this come back. The report concludes that economic success and social development have created a milieu in which Islam and modernity coexist comfortably. "It is the Anatolia shaped by these values that is now pressing its case to join the European Union." (ESI, 2005)\(^{63}\) In some other words, "Turkish Islam"\(^{64}\)

\(^{63}\) More from the report:

Today's governing party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) of Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Abdullah Gul (Kayseri's most prominent politician), and its political philosophy of 'democratic conservatism', are very popular in Central Anatolia. AKP's Kayseri headquarters was one of its first to be established, and in the 2004 municipal elections in Kayseri it won an overwhelming majority of 70 percent, its highest in the country.
Democratic conservatism embraces many goals reminiscent of centrist political parties across Europe. (ESI, 2005)

With economic development has also come a new political confidence. Central Anatolia is the electoral base of Turkey's AKP government, and home to some of its most influential figures, notably Abdullah Gul, the Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister. The AKP government is in many respects a political reflection of the values and ambitions that have shaped the Anatolian Tigers. Understanding its social and economic roots can help to shed light on one of the paradoxes of contemporary Turkey which has puzzled observers, both within Turkey and abroad: how a government which is Islamic and conservative in its origins can nonetheless pursue such a vigorous pro-business and pro-European agenda.

This report explores these processes of social and economic change in one Central Anatolian province – Kayseri, home to one million people. Our goal is to take the debate on Turkey and its two identities beyond the clichés that have so long informed it, by introducing this Central Anatolian revolution to a European audience. The report is written for all those who wish to consider Turkey and its European aspirations in the light of current realities. (emphasis mine)

.. Strikingly, a number of people in Kayseri describe their community by reference to Calvinism and the Protestant work ethic. The former metropolitan mayor of Kayseri, Sukru Karatepe, compared his fellow 'Kayserilî' (people from Kayseri) with hard-working 'Protestants', and informed us that "to understand Kayseri, one must read Max Weber" (a reference to Weber's celebrated 1905 essay, "The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism", which argued that the "this-worldly asceticism" of Calvinism provided the spark for the rise of modern capitalism). Celal Hasnalcaci, owner of a textile company and branch manager of the Independent Industrialists and Businessmen's Association (Musiad), explained: "The rise of Anatolian capitalists is due to their Protestant work ethic. No personal waste, no speculation, reinvest your profits."
Over the past decade, these individualistic, pro-business currents have become increasingly prominent within Turkish Islam. The literature of the Musiada association, in which Anatolian businesses are strongly represented, enthusiastically promotes the links between Islam and free-market capitalism. Its booklet *Homo Islamicus* describes the life of the Prophet Mohammed as a merchant, and refers to religion to argue for limiting state intervention in the free market. Leading religious figures have argued that the search for profit in the service of the Muslim community is on an equal level, in terms of religious practice, with prayer and fasting. Esad Cosan, former leader of the largest wing of the Naksibendi religious order, called on his disciples to study foreign languages, use computers and travel abroad to acquire their knowledge.

"Trade is real and permanent in an individual's life... The most pragmatic and realistic people are businessmen and merchants. If a businessman is also a Muslim, he is most in tune with his religious station in life" ...

Democratic conservatism embraces many goals recognisable from centrist political parties across Europe. It defends macroeconomic stability and fiscal responsibility. It is pro-business, and in favour of individual charity and private associational life. It supports increasing the powers and resources of local government, from which many of its key figures have emerged, and believes in the potential of development from below. It is socially conservative, but nonetheless pragmatic on many of the issues that continue to divide Turkish society. It is also pro-Europe, and has taken on a number of political taboos in its quest to eliminate obstacles to the EU accession process.

This agenda continues a tradition established by another Central Anatolian, Turgut Ozal, who was born in Malatya, went to high school in Kayseri, and became Turkish Prime Minister and President in the 1980s. Ozal, who had worked for the World Bank, promoted the opening of the Turkish economy to the outside world, and submitted Turkey's application to the European Union in 1987. He was also the first Prime Minister to go on the Hajj to Mecca, and legalised the establishment of Islamic banking in Turkey. Ozal was (and remains) very popular in Kayseri.
It is therefore not surprising that AKP, established in 2001 with a platform that revived many of Ozal's policies, should also prove popular in Central Anatolia. The party's Kayseri headquarters was one of its first to be established, and in the 2004 municipal elections in Kayseri it won an overwhelming majority of 70 percent, its highest in the country. As the only non-AKP member of the Turkish parliament from Kayseri, Muharrem Eskiyapan, explains, "today Turkey is governed in the way in which Kayseri was governed during the last 15 years".

Economic success has created a social milieu in which Islam and modernity coexist comfortably. It is the Anatolia shaped by these values that is now pressing its case to join the European Union. (ESI- European Stability Initiative- report, 2005 "'Islamic Calvinists. Change and Conservatism in Central Anatolia")

64 Turkish Islam

Sedat Laçınler (3/24/2007):

- Turkish Islam did not evolve in a conflict environment.

- Self-confidence towards the West is a striking characteristic of Turkish Islam.

- Turkish Islam is more critical. It is remarkably apt in seeing its own deficiencies at the root of its problems.

- Turkish Islam is more liberal in interpreting religious dictum.

- Turkish Islam has an embracing attitude towards other branches of Islam.

- Turkish Islam ruled over other religious groups in accordance with Islamic principles quite vividly and intensely until recently.

- Turkish Moslems do not equate Christianity with the West and Judaism with Israel. They have
learned through experience that religion has a larger meaning than political factions. Since a
significant proportion of the population was Christians and Jews during Ottoman times, these
religions are not alien to Turkey.

- Turkish Islam does not interpret worldly affairs solely through religious dogma. The Turkish
tradition is noted for its pragmatic and practical approach.

- Turkish Islam was the first mainstream Islamic interpretation to contact modernity.

- Turkish Islam was the first mainstream Islamic interpretation to witness the conflict between
modern political thinking and religion.

- Turkish political life is demarcated from religion. While clerics do not intervene in politics, the
latter views religion as a realm mostly to be respected and to be protected.

- Turkish Islam is not the result of a project. It is not artificial or fabricated by certain individuals
or groups. It has evolved over a long duration and as a result of certain geographic and historic
developments.

Thus, Sedat Laçiner quotes Navroz Udwadia (10/18/2004):

"Turkey’s impending accession to the EU has the power to bridge the chasm
between Islam and Christianity and bring hope to millions in the Islamic world… Within this
tortured context, surrounded by a seemingly endless wave of dark news, the outcome of
Turkey’s efforts to enter the EU are vitally important – not just to Turkey and the EU, but to
us all, citizens of the world as we may be… The symbolism of a large Muslim population
knocking patiently on the doors to the hitherto exclusive Christian club that is the EU should
not be overlooked. In an age aching for understanding, for a rise above suspicion, enmity and
would be highlighted. This argument that Turkish version of Islam is more tolerant and open to progress is not new. It appears and disappears in the history of Turkish intellectual history. Because it is mostly associated with nationalist thinking that intends to separate Turks from other Muslims, AKP is not too vocal about Turkish Islam but in these times, AKP is shown to be the best representative. It has emerged

loathing, the possibilities offered by the ascension of Turkey to the EU would be ground-breaking...”

65 **AKP's Protestant Capitalism**

Cengiz Aktar (3/5/2008):

This ferocious and unprincipled growth approach does not pay regard to workers but neither to the environment: Environment-unfriendly golf courses, skyscrapers, coal plants, indiscriminate mineral exploration and irrational hydraulic dams are all over the country. As a beginner in economic affairs, the AKP's foolhardy development approach against the human and nature gives the impression that we're living in the 18th century! Today the hardline of Cemil Çiçek, government spokesman, dominates the government as more as it implies concessions to the status quo, subservience to the state, looking sympathetic thanks to crude nationalism and a tendency toward labor-hostile cliches of the state. A political movement like the AKP deriving from the periphery of the center adopts this attitude enthusiastically; that's pathetic and dangerous. The AKP didn't understand that its legitimacy derives from its social and reformist action, not from the stately reflexes. The more it closes up to the state, the more it loses its character....

Cliches like “the man who works hard wins,” “God will be generous toward hard workers,” or another one by the prime minister who suggested to a complaining man to “work harder” are in line with the tradition of allegiance in Islam and being resigned to God. However, to what degree is the allegiance recommended to people convincing when compared to the skyrocketing fortunes of pro-AKP business circles? Besides, one can ask, “Is there a job that you want me to work hard in?” The AKP's pro-status quo deviation clearly emerged in the
again in order to placate anti-Islamist anxieties. But dissemination of these reports and sympathetic coverage of AKP’s pro-EU moves frustrate many other columnists as well as Kemalist bureaucracy at large. The concept of Secularism is inserted into these debates. Secularism is the keyword for counter arguments.

**No modernization without Secularism**

Fuat Keyman (2007) employs Michel Foucault’s concept of governmentality in understanding Turkish use of secularism and states that the state uses it as an ‘effective technology of the government of the self’. In order to do that the Turkish State creates a boundary between the public sphere and the private sphere, in which religious claims to identity are confined as private, individualistic and particular. Early Republican period did intensely attempted to prevent the claims to religious identity and group rights from entering into the public sphere (p.219).

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Kurdish issue, and now the hostility toward the left and workers is being added on top. The prime minister, who has never uttered the word “left” before, pronounced it recently with a negative connotation in connection with the leftist opposition to the Social Security Law. And recently he let another extremely unfortunate and unnecessary cat out of the bag.

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66 In the process of making, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk: . . . took up a non-existent, hypothetical entity, the Turkish nation, and breathed life into it. It is this ability to work for something which did not exist as if it existed, and to make it exist, which gives us the true dimensions of the project on which he had set out and which brings out the utopian quality of his thinking. Neither the Turkish nation as the fountainhead of a ‘general will’ nor the Turkish nation as a source of national identity existed at the time he set out on this task. (Mardin, 1981: 208–9, see also 1997: 13–14) Nevertheless, Atatürk and the Kemalist elite set out the process of making modern Turkey by attempting to establish necessary political and
cultural institutions both to break with the Ottoman past and to reach the contemporary level of (Western) civilization. Insofar as the Kemalist elite regarded the Ottoman Empire as a traditional political order with an Islamic social ethos, the making of a modern nation had to be founded upon the top down imposition and the possible dissemination of Western secular reason and scientific rationality into what was then viewed as traditional, backward and Islamic social relations (Kazancıgil and Özbudun, 1981). (220)


It should be pointed out, however, that the separation between the state and religion was so strict in the Turkish case that it involved not only the total removal of religion from state affairs, but also, and more importantly, the absolute institutional and constitutional control of religious activities by the state (Turhanlı, 1993: 18–19). Moreover, this control included both the public realm and the private realm. By approaching secularism as a constitutive element of modernity and a political project for the rapid transformation of Turkey into a civilized nation, the Turkish state attempted to outlaw the presence of religion in public affairs and eliminate it from private and cultural life preferences and identity-formations of its people through initiating a set of regulations, from educational reforms to new dress codes. In this sense, secularism took the form of 'laicism', a concept that indicates not only the 'official disestablishment of religion' from the state, but also the 'constitutional control of religious affairs' by the state. Thus, as it was introduced into the Constitution by the Republican People's Party in 1937, laicism operated both as a constitutive principle of the party and as a constitutional basis for the regulation of religious activities. The Kemalist elite believed that it was through a constitutionally founded and supported principle of laicism that
attempts to this day include control over religion, especially the majority Sunni Islam. However, since early 1980s control over religion does not seem to be

both a modern mode of social cohesion for Turkish society could be established and a necessary level of social consciousness for civilization could be raised (Mardin, 1981: 211).

(222)


67 Religious Affairs Directorate: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diyanet_%C4%B0%C5%9Fleri_Ba%C5%9Fkan%C4%B1%C4%9F%C4%B1) Eser Karakaş (2004) states that despite the fact that it is funded with taxpayers' money, only Muslim citizens can benefit from this institution (221).

The creation of the Directorate of Religious Affairs and the constitutionally recognized status of laicism were precisely intended to achieve the aim of controlling and privatizing religious activities. Thus laicism has defined the modus vivendi of Turkish secularism not only as a defining element of Turkish modernity but also as a vital political project for the governing of society. However, as Casanova argues, ‘ultimately the project of constructing such a (secular) nation-state from above is likely to fail because it is too secular for the Islamists, too Sunni for the Alevi and too Turkish for the Kurds’ (emphasis mine),14 and, moreover, ‘a Turkish state in which the collective identities and interests of these groups cannot find public representation cannot be a truly representative democratic state, even if it is founded on modern secular constitutional principles’ (2001:}

The problematic structure of the Directorate of Religious Affairs with regard to the rights of religious communities has recently been suggested by the 'European Commission Report on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession' (Commission of the European Communities [CEC], 2004: 54, 166, 175). According to the report, 'although freedom of religious belief is guaranteed by the Constitution, and freedom to worship is largely unhampered', Alevi and non-Muslim religious communities (mainly Armenians, Greeks and Jews) 'continue to experience difficulties connected with legal personality, property rights, training of clergy, schools and internal management' (2004: 54). Thus, the very structure and organization of the Directorate of Religious Affairs creates problems and difficulties connected to the rights of these religious communities (1) to have 'representation' in the Directorate, (2) to have freedom to worship and (3) to receive financial support from the funds of the Directorate. This means that there is a need to enact appropriate legislation to remedy these difficulties and to grant these rights to Alevi and non-Muslim religious communities, which will reform and democratize the institutional structure of secularism in Turkey. Commission of the European Communities (2004) Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession. Brussels: CEC.

Interestingly enough, then, these journalists share the two ideologies that the foundational elites had as Taspinar (2007) describes:

Partly as a result, Kemalism promoted two ideologies that continue to divide Turkish society today. The first was radical secularism. The Kemalists' "civilizing mission," as it might be called, was strongly influenced by the French Revolution, its Jacobin leanings, and especially the French anticlerical tradition of laïcité, a particularly aggressive form of state-
working properly to protect the boundaries drawn by secularism. In all my life, secularism in Turkey has been portrayed as in a crisis but only after the

enforced secularism. In both France and Turkey, religion became a symbol of counterrevolution and opposition to the republic. Militantly committed to assuming progressive roles against reactionary enemies, the proponents of both French laïcité and its Kemalist equivalent, laïklık, were keen on taking religion out of the public sphere. For them, laïklık was the dividing line between enlightened and obscurantist, progressive and conservative, modern and traditional. Instead of formally separating state and religion (as France did in 1905), modern Turkey monopolized religious functions and incorporated religious personnel into the state bureaucracy. To this day, the government-controlled Directorate of Religious Affairs supervises and regulates Islam throughout Turkey, appoints and pays the country’s imams, and issues standardized sermons to be read out in thousands of mosques each Friday. (119)

The second divisive ideology promoted by Kemalism was assimilationist nationalism. Modern Turkey pursued an active policy of assimilation of its Muslim minorities. “Turkishness” came to be defined as a common national, linguistic, and territorial identity. Taking France as its model again, the Kemalist regime rejected the concept of multiculturalism; no communal structure would stand between the republic and its citizens. Unlike the Ottoman elites, the Kemalists rejected multiethnic and multinational cosmopolitanism and banned Armenians, Greeks, and Jews from holding government jobs. Thus, ironically, the “secular” Turkish republic turned out to be less tolerant toward its non-Muslim minorities than the “Islamic” Ottoman Empire had been, partly because Turkishness was associated with being Muslim. [emphasis added by me]

Today, just as it is not possible to analyze Turkish politics without reference to Islam, it is equally impossible to understand the Turkish political economy without taking into account Islamic capital and its institutional structure, or the cultural sphere without recognizing the symbolic and sociological power of Islam (Keyman and Koyuncu, 2005). In fact, the resurgence of Islam has been one of the defining and constitutive elements of the
changing nature and formation of Turkish modernity since the 1980s, and this has had a
significant impact on Turkish secularism by causing its recent crisis (Davison, 1998;
Keyman, 1995). It has become clear that while it has been successful in establishing and
maintaining objective secularization both institutionally and constitutionally, Turkish
secularism has been weak in creating a secular social ethos strong enough to achieve
subjective secularization. Turkish secularism and the laicist national identity it has attempted
to create face a serious challenge and legitimacy crisis stemming from its inability to respond
effectively to the various Islamic identity claims to recognition and cultural-group rights.
Thus, instead of secularization, Turkish society has recently been witnessing the processes of
sacralization and de-privatization in which the presence of Islam is felt strongly in the
different spheres of societal relations. The processes of sacralization and de-privatization are
operating effectively in such a way that: (1) despite the constitutional ban on Islamic
parties, political Islam carried out by these parties is still representing a plurality of Turkish
voters; (b) without state support, economic Islam is functioning effectively, its role being an
articulating principle between the free market and local communities by providing medium
and small-sized enterprises with a powerful network based on trust relations; and (3) contrary
to the orientalist belief that Islam is anti-modern, cultural Islam is still acting as a powerful
symbolic and moral force for identity-formation, but now it is coexisting with postmodern,
highly globalized and consumptionist cultural patterns, as in the case of the headscarf affair
and the problem of religious sects (Keyman and Koyuncu, 2005; Özbudun and Keyman,
2002). In this sense, to speak of the crisis of Turkish secularism is to recognize and come to
terms with the importance of the processes of sacralization and de-privatization of religion in
understanding the changing nature and formation of Turkish modernity (Mardin, 1995). (223-
224)

University Press.
the Political Economy of Turkey’, Review of International Political Economy 12(1):
intensification of EU process, this portrayal of crisis turned into an alarming situation in the eyes of seculars.

The flood of commentaries and headlines, and secularist interviewees all carried an alarming tone as my field years progressed and AKP got more powerful. Modernization and democracy have become secondary concepts to be determined by secularism. When European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso visited Turkey, he had felt to make clear that secularism could not be imagined without basic democratic rights such as human rights, individual rights and freedoms, right to education, right to assembly, freedom of expression and freedom of religion and conscience. But his remarks would be accepted as new evidence by the Eurosceptics in Turkey that the secularism in Turkey was threatened.


As the EU becomes closer and more familiar with the nature of the Turkish political system, it realizes that Turkey will be unable to make progress in its EU bid as long as it maintains the status quo’s criticisms of the Turkish model of secularism and his request to
In an interview, Istanbul based Dutch journalist Bernard Bouwman (4/29/2008) observes the fact that this kind of secularism that intensely attempts to exclude religion from public life becomes the source of distinction between Kemalist elites and average Turkish citizens. When democracy debates intensifies, AKP introduce democratic and civilian reforms within the notion of democratic secularism may be taken as a signal for a probable change of approach and understanding in the relations between Turkey and the EU.

The filing of a closure case against a political party as unacceptable. The differing views between the EU and Turkey in relation to secularism stem from a diverse approach vis-à-vis the matter. The EU and the Turkish political system have a serious disagreement over the state authority in regards to the issue of secularism. No European state claims that the state should be entitled to secularize society. In contrast, in Turkey it is assumed that the state has a natural obligation to modernize and secularize society. This is why Turkish secularism has turned into a type of laicism or in the words of Kadir Cunzay, a laicacy.

Barroso's statements on secularism imply a serious disagreement between Turkey and the EU over the matter. In Turkey, secularism is strongly emphasized and treated as the only source of legitimization and truth. The discourse about a "secular republic" implies that secularization is considered an absolute value and judgment. From an EU perspective, secularism is not a criterion that should be emphasized on its own. The EU Constitution does not include the notion of secularism. Instead of putting a special emphasis on secularism, the EU makes references to human rights, individual rights and freedoms, right to education, right to assembly, freedom of expression and freedom of religion and conscience. The notion of democratic secularism coined by Barroso refers to a liberal-democratic secularism that is based on these fundamental values.

On the contrary, I believe that religious people have started to lead a more liberal and relaxed life and that in 10-15 years time they will become like Europeans!

...The secular elite in Turkey once said: "We are the elite, we believe in democracy and in this
benefits from Kemalist conceptualization of secularism and promotes itself as the major leaders of democratization.

**Democracy vs. Secularism**

So when many influential gatekeepers in Turkish press do not seem to be pro-democratic, it is not a matter of much surprise. Increasing struggle over the definitions of democracy in the EU process helped AKP as the bearer of democracy whereas secular journalists and nearly the rest of all secular elites were left with defending secularism against democratic developments. This would end up being against the EU process which promised more democracy and modernization which could not be explicitly rejected by secular elites whose existence relied on Westernization in the beginning.

Fuat Keyman (2007) notes that in the history of this strictly secular nation-state, "the more secularism is used by the state elite as a political project to control religion, the less pluralistic and democratic the state has become in governing its system being religious is something bad." And you, as an average citizen, see that things are not going well in the country and hold this elite responsible for that. And you say, "These people are elite and not religious, then I must be religious!" This is a normal reaction.

...We can define secularism in two ways. The first one is that the state is neutral in regard to all religions and does not interfere in any way. People are free to practice their beliefs, which is actually what we understand from the way of Western European secularism. For example, in my country, the Netherlands, the government supports all religious schools financially.

And the second way of defining it is to say: "We do not like religion. But people may be religious. Then we keep religion under control..." That is how Atatürk interpreted secularism. But I think now it is time for Turkey to move from the latter to the former."
society.” (216)71. In the EU process, democratization was equaled to Islamization in the eyes of many secularist journalists72. As the army was singled out as the most

71 Turkey is nevertheless a Muslim society with a strictly secular nation-state. It is a social formation whose course of modernization and democratization has always faced the problem of establishing a delicate balance between politics and religion. The more secularism is used by the state elite as a political project to control religion, the less pluralistic and democratic the state has become in governing its society. Throughout Turkish contemporary history, the criticism of secularism has been generally about the way in which the state governs its society through the regulation and administration of religious communities. As will be elaborated in this study, this means that the institutional separation of religious and political domains has been a generally accepted norm in Turkey. However, this should not lead us to ignore the crucial fact that the state’s top-down act of creating a secular national identity by initiating strict political and institutional regulatory mechanisms on religious communities has always been challenged by Islam and its powerful symbolic and cultural role in the constitution of societal relations and social identity formations of Turkish people (Keyman and Içduygu, 2005). It is in this context that a delicate and conflict-ridden balance between religion and politics has been one of the defining features of Turkish modernity and its contradictions since its inception in 1923.


72 I responded to a Dutch blog’s questions on current democratization issues I mention above.

Dear Erkan,

I am a dutch blogger of the collective blog Sargasso (http://www.sargasso.nl), we are actually one of the biggest blogs in Netherlands writing on a daily basis about politics, science and culture. We have around 5000 unique visitors per day and this results in lively
discussions every day. In the beginning of October we are planning to have a "Turkey & Democracy" week on our blog, coinciding with the International Week of Democracy (http://whydemocracy.net/home).

We do this in cooperation with VPRO Tegenlicht (http://www.vpro.nl/programma/tegenlicht): a Dutch television station, they will broadcast their documentary "The Democratic Dilemma" on the 8th of October. In this documentary the journalist Fareed Zakaria and prime minister Erdogan make some propositions on the issue of EU membership, the role of Islam and democracy in Turkey. In the days before and after the documentary Sargasso wants to arrange a list of people (politicians, writers, opinion makers) to react on these propositions. To inspire some Turkish-Dutch blog discussion we also want to invite Turkish bloggers to react on these propositions (for this purpose we will write in English, while we normally write in Dutch).

Because your blog is part of the Turkish blogosphere I want to invite you to react on eight propositions of Zakaria, Erdogan and Gul (scroll down). You can send your reactions to me and I will place them online on a specific day before or just after the broadcast of the Dutch documentary. If you like I will keep you updated on this project and you are free to forward these messages to other Turkish bloggers. Hopefully we can arrange an online discussion that crosses borders.

The Turkish bloggers and expat bloggers in Turkey I contacted for this project are:

http://erkansaka.net/, http://www.talkturkey.us/
http://weblog.angelvox.org/ (still looking for an email address)

http://istanbulexpat.blogspot.com/ (still looking for an email address)
http://jamesinturkey.blogspot.com/ (still looking for an email address)
http://carpetblog.typepad.com I hope to hear from you.

best regards,

Carl Konigel
(Chief editor of Sargasso.nl)

and my answers:

THE PROPOSITIONS TO REACT ON:

2004:
Elections alone are not enough
1. ‘Elections don’t mean democracy. Elections can be very dangerous in young democracies if held in a wrong way and at a wrong time: it will appeal to a people’s hatred instead of to its hopes’. I fully agree with this proposition. However, elections are irreplaceable tools of democracies. Until a better tool is discovered, a democracy that claims the rule of people cannot avoid elections which seem to be one of the most powerful tools to represent people’s choices. I hear this argument from time to time in Turkey who is older than 75. There cannot be postponement. In the building of democracy elections should go hand in hand with other features of democracy. Thinking of elections again, they are so inherent part of the democratic process that any flourishing of democracy cannot happen without. Besides, Turkish Republic cannot be excused any more for her young-ness. It has already survived nearly for a century. This proposition is an elitist status quo proposition when it is thought in a social/political context. But as an abstraction, it cannot be rejected.

2007
Democracy has to grow
2. ‘Democracy can spread around the world, but it has to be a process of organic development from within societies. You have to be modernizing the country’.
Democracy can never be a completed project. In relation to change, there have to be frequent tunings to the democratic system. Some of the European countries have the oldest and most mature democracies, yet there are rising forces of extreme right etc and there is the growing number of Muslims which seem to be a different sort of minority (or the weakening of welfare state system which causes new problems for the lower classes) and these old and mature systems are struggling with these new social/economic and cultural developments.

In Turkish case, our democracy is not even much mature yet. And although I understand the secularist reaction against AKP's rise, the problem is that the secular forces have long given up building the democratic system. Early Republican practices are admirable to a large extent but for decades Turkish state had been regressing from democratic aspects of the nation building. Turkey's human rights record is just one of the signs of this regression. Current Republicanist tendency has no wish for more democratization. As the elite educated, Westernist sections of society lose interest in democratization, Turkey's way of democratic growth turns into unexpected routes.

But this tendency seems to have contradictory assumptions. "organic development from within societies" may challenge "you have to be modernizing the country". In cases of no development from below, the state can intervene from above in behalf of the democratic development. Turkish Republic did that to a certain extent in early years. I believe there cannot be a priori judgements here. The social and political context will deliberate which way to go and the best is a mixture of both (the below and the above).

Are islam and democracy compatible?

3. 'The problem is not religion. It is the social-political context in which the religion exists.
You can't change the religion, but you can change the social-political context. It becomes a very hostile relationship with the 1.2 billion Muslims to tell them: the problem is your religion....'
In theory, the EU enlargement policies have already made this question unnecessary. Obey the rules, i.e. Copenhagen Criteria, and join the Union. Interestingly, contemporary problematization of religious difference emerges within the EU. Islamic opposition to EU membership led by Necmettin Erbakan's parties is a well known phenomena but AKP, whose origins go back to his parties, from the outset started a new route towards the EU. 4-5 years ago Turkish public opinion was dominantly pro-EU and I have not heard any challenge related to the religious difference in the public debates. However, Giscard d'Estaing's notorious anti-Turkish statements, September 11 and many other related obstacles triggered the problematization of religious difference.

Europe and people with different views

4. Recep Tayyip Erdogan: 'Is Europe a home for an alliance of civilizations or is it a Christian club?'

Aside from the fact that I am not too keen on the idea of civilization, this is a rhetorical counter-attack. Well, you see we are Muslims and we are not threatened with living with others but can EU do that, too? Once I believed the EU was the most secular political entity in the world, now I have doubts. Not because of the EU elites per se but the right-wing populist politicians like Merkel and Sarkozy encourage a Christian imaginary for the EU.

Fear of Islam

5. 'If your fear is about Islam – you already got it. You already have millions of Muslims within your borders'.

Well, of course to begin with this is an illuminating proposition and a surprising move rhetorically. However, culturally concerned fears of Islam is not altogether irrelevant as Turkey's entry might have real consequences in the demographics and social formation of the EU populations. So far Muslims are fragmented minorities in many European countries but with the entry of Turkey, Muslims will become one of the not minor but major actors in the
EU social life. Of course, if Germany and France, who has larger Muslim minorities, could have devised some fundamental ways of welcoming their minorities in the past, the future expectations would not be that grim. In the end, I understand very well the anxiety relating to Muslims, but when it is raised to the level of "fear" then some other global and national discourses appear. I will vote for 9/11 and rising right-wing politicians as the causes of "fear". When I interviewed a PM advisor, he said there would be a major take on Turkey's EU communication strategy after the elections and now I am waiting to see what will emerge. AKP's new strategy should target both the domestic and EU scenes...

Tyranny of the majority?

6. 'If you end up with a situation where people forget that there are other, large minorities in the country, that feel differently than you and you try to impose your will on them, then, yes, you have De Toqueville's problem of the tyranny of the majority and that tyranny is as bad for a minority as it were a dictatorship'.

But democracy is not the rule of majority per se. It is a common sensical belief that democracy means the dominance of majority but in fact, democracy is the protection of rights of both the majority and minorities. One of the ideas behind democracy is the idea of citizenship and this idea, in theory, includes all those without any discrimination. However, the social conditions we live in necessitate representative democracy in which elections and all tend to give majorities a notion of hegemony. Hence comes the possibility of tyranny of the majority. This could only be prevented with even stronger culture of democracy which by default aims to protect the rights of all citizens without any discrimination...

Turkey in the EU: a missed chance?

7. 'Europe can afford to deny Turkey a membership. You know, the world will go on - the world always goes on. And Turkey will survive, Europe will survive, but it will be a great missed opportunity. For both. And it will be a great tragedy because it would mean that Europe would have missed this opportunity to really use its influence and power to shape up the modern world. In many ways as I say, I think, to help itself economically.....by injecting
This new, young nation into its midst, but most fundamentally, to take the central problem of our time, which is to take the one civilization that has not yet found its way into the modern world, and to make it happen. And wouldn't it be fascinating if despite the fact that we live in an era of American unipolarity, it was Europe that actually led the path in that process. It has that opportunity....it just needs the political will. And courage, and generosity of spirit to recognize that it will be helped and it will help the world by doing it'...

Most of the narratives concerning TR-EU relations depend on Turkey's dependence on the EU. However, I hear more and more that the dependence could be mutual. Even without Turkey, the EU can be a leading power in world politics but not a superpower. Some characteristics of Turkey which have so far been portrayed as obstacles are now emerging as contributions to the EU: its strong army, young and dynamic population, proximity to energy sources... Even the religious difference could be a benefit in the long run. EU will not be an alien force in relation to Islamic world...

Democratisation = islamization?

8. Abdullah Gül: 'As Muslim societies democratize, you will see greater religious expression everywhere in society. It is a consequence of democracy'

This is in fact an ironic Turkish case so far. Association of authoritarian attitudes with staunch secular politics led the way for oppositional politics a more democratic standing. Not only Islamism but Kurdish nationalism and most of the leftist tendencies claim to offer more democratic futures. In fact, these could never practice what they preached but thanks to authoritarian official policies, they could portray themselves positively. This is of course a shallow abstraction, but depending on my experiences and (somewhat insider) knowledge I believe my abstraction has some truth. However, with the emergence of AKP, Islamist politics leaped forward to a quite different terrain of politics. I don't believe this was really what they planned. The lack of sound secular parties left all the policy making to AKP and the latter believed that the political survival could only occur with more democracy (think of the three parties banned by the State with which most of the founding fathers of AKP had been affiliated). Most of the Islamists probably realized the virtue of democracy even before
powerful backer of the secularist front, it would not be too hard to locate this front as anti-democratic.

It is in this intellectual context, older concept of Westernization is replaced by newer Europeanization and EU is conceptualized:

**Europeanization**

Metin Heper (2005) replaces Westernization with Europeanization:

The starting point of Europeanization in the Ottoman Turkish polity was the Europeanization of identity. This emerged at first as state Europeanization rather than societal Europeanization. This in turn led to political Europeanization or the Europeanization of political processes. The state version of the Europeanization of identity could only lead to the consolidation of democracy, or democracy becoming the ‘only game in town’. Turkey’s attempts to gain accession to the EU made possible considerable progress towards the next stage of democratization, that is, that of deepening democracy. (43)

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AKP, in the middle of headscarf ban crisis. They witnessed that they were virtually powerless in opposing the ban. Only in a more democratic society, they could live as they desired. But of course, one should not forget that alternative routes (like a more revolutionary approach) did not work in Turkey whereas in many Middle Eastern countries armed and revolutionary Islamic groups would flourish. The nature of politics and society in Turkey oriented the major Islamic forces which in turn chose democratisation a more appropriate venue.

*All these responses along with other contributors’ were published in Sargasso blog (http://www.sargasso.nl/index.php)*
Societal Europeanization and democratization remain to be an ideal that is not shared much in real politics as I describe in above sections. A columnist, Mr. Yıldız still talks of "Europeanizing Strategy" at the level of states and institutions. In fact, Metin Heper's statements represent the first two years of AKP when democratization reforms did sweep the Turkish political scene. However, as Şaban Kardaş states that

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73 In the meantime, Yıldız (2004) discusses "Europeanizing Strategy":

"...The Enlarged Europe project is based on a "Europeanizing Strategy," that means to, a) Spread legal and institutional responsibilities in accordance with the rules of the Council of Europe and the EU, b) Steer the formation of economic structures towards the EU's interests, c) Harmonize identity, expectations and beliefs with EU policy. As the Union emphasized in its new security strategy document, its aim is to nip in the bud problems beyond its borders before they can lead to damage in the EU itself. The priorities of this strategy are the problems of refugees and illegal immigration. Certain circles believe that these problems can be solved through establishing close economic ties. The plan is to establish a Pan-European Free Trade Area (PEFTA) to be open to countries of Enlarged Europe and the Greater Middle East towards this end, thus expanding the territory of the euro. The EU's security strategy shows Turkey as a part of Enlarged Europe. Discussions on Europeanizing are focusing on bringing Turkey closer to European values, the differences between the Turkish and European identities and the possibility of Turkey's succeeding in its efforts to become an EU member. Considering the relations between the US & EU geopolitical initiatives, the EU is the actual actor in the Enlarged Europe and Washington is the dominating power in the GME. In this equation, Turkey is located on the border between the EU and US spheres of influence, that is, at the center of the GME and Enlarged Europe. Istanbul being chosen for the NATO summit is an indication of this. This situation is the requirement of Turkey's role in terms of the Middle East issue. This role is the Eurasianizing strategy of the US versus the EU's Europeanizing strategy."
'the consensus' was gone as the EU assemblage had been shaped already. AKP led reforms stopped after the first two years and there was talk of Ankara-ization, which

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Șaban Kardaș (4/28/2008):

It is widely believed that the transformation of Turkish politics was a result of the synergy between two sets of factors: external -- the dynamics of Turkish-European relations in the post-Helsinki period -- and internal -- the AK Party government's reformist agenda at this critical juncture. On the one hand, the changes in Turkey, particularly steps in the political realm taken toward further democratization, presented a successful example of Europeanization, i.e., as a candidate country moves toward closer integration with the EU, its national institutions, policies and identity also come to approximate European norms and standards. On the other hand, the AK Party manipulated successfully the reform process compelled by the EU accession to further transform domestic politics, curb the power of the secularist establishment and carve a space for its constituents in Turkish politics. [Against the new reform wave:]

At the current juncture, domestically, the balance of power has shifted. Whereas a pro-reform coalition dominated intellectual and political debates before, today Euroskeptics and neo-nationalist and isolationist forces have regained some of their positions. Previously, the military and the secular establishment were more acquiescent, if not sympathetic, to EU-driven reforms. This situation even led some to argue that the rapid pace of Europeanization was a product of a grand inter-elite bargain between the military and civilian institutions, for the top leadership of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK), despite internal differences of opinion, came to view membership into the EU as the culmination of the Kemalist goal of modernization. This "consensus" is now gone, partly because the secular establishment was worried that Europeanization went hand in hand with a "creeping Islamization" of the state, and their concerns about national sovereignty further bred an increasingly inward-looking and anti-Western mindset. Though the people's support for EU membership remains significant, overall the EU no longer represents the unequivocal "wave of the future." Justified or not, the
meant that AKP started to become similar to previous center right parties and left

idea of unfair treatment during the negotiation process twisted the public opinion in a more
critical attitude toward the EU.

On the international front, the ability of the EU to act as a powerful force in domestic
politics hinges more on delivering in specific policy areas than issuing statements of intent for
furthering democratization. In particular, the EU institutions and European leaders could
expand the government's room for maneuver to the extent that they will be sensitive toward
Turkey's interests in Cyprus and other issues, and take courageous steps to break the deadlock
in the membership process. Absent such a determination on the part of the European actors to
compromise, coupled with the neo-nationalist surge, the ability of the government to use the
external dynamics as leverage to shape domestic politics will be constrained.
democratization behind. 75 A state-led institution-based Europeanization strategy is not in essence different that Westernization policies Turkey had from the outset. As the

Mustafa Akyol (5/3/2008):

This is not what I want to talk about today, though. What I have found particularly interesting in this whole May Day war was the rhetoric used by some officials. The AKP (Justice and Development Party) government, which itself is currently under the threat of our all-powerful state, praised “state authority” in the face of workers. “The state will not accept being challenged,” declared Justice Minister Mehmet Ali Şahin. “No, the state does not allow being challenged.” And two weeks ago, Prime Minister Erdoğan had created a controversy by arguing, “The foot should not mess with the head.” He had sounded as if he were one of the classical Ankara bureaucrats who look down upon the unwashed masses.

I believe Erdoğan must be sorry with what he said. But this whole Taksim affair, along with other signs such as the much-debated decline in AKP’s reformism in the past two years, tell us something. My sense is that a process, which can be called the

"Ankara-ization" of the AKP, is at work. The party, which actually represents Turkey’s “periphery,” is coming to the “center” and internalizing some of the latter’s illiberal attitudes. The belief in “state authority” starts to ascend over social and individual liberty.

... It might be worthwhile to recall Ibn Khaldun here, the medieval Muslim scholar who is sometimes considered as the forerunner of sociology. One of Khaldun’s famous analyses was about the barbarians of the desert who conquered sophisticated coastal cities. Before their conquest, and right after, these barbarians had a strong zeal and impetus. But once they settled and became masters of the cities whose elites they had overthrown, they started to internalize the established habits. Then, eventually, the former barbarians were conquered by a new set of barbarians, who would repeat the process.

...Of course the “Islamic proclivities” of AKP would be hardly impressive if they were an extension of Milli Görüş — the Islamist line of the Erbakan tradition, that AKP had in fact denounced. They were rather the expressions of a synthesis between Islamic values and
AKP backed from explicit moves of democratization, some chief editors such Ertuğrul Özkök began to praise AKP leader Tayyip Erdoğan\textsuperscript{76} again.

liberal politics, which has a history in Turkey dating back to the late Ottoman Empire. In politics, it was Turgut Özal who put this "Islamo-liberal" synthesis in action between 1983-93. And after ten years in the wilderness, the same tradition had come back to life with AKP’s incumbency in 2002.

...Therefore those who are asking from AKP to de-Islamize its value system and replace it with the orthodoxy of Ankara are dead wrong. That would make AKP just another dry, boring, and reactionary party. The people who love such parties already go for the CHP or the MHP. Why would they prefer a quasi-illiberal AKP to the fully illiberal ones? Moreover, it is obvious that the real citadel of illiberalism, the state establishment, will never like the AKP folks no matter what they do. It is just an unnecessary effort to try to become a part of their club — as evidenced by the closure case. So, the only way out is to change the definition of the club, and even disband it. Thus the AKP folks indeed should keep their distance from the Ankara orthodoxy, but make sure that their commitment is toward the Islamo-liberal synthesis, not to Milli Gorgtş. This means that the party should be more open-minded in issues relating to the rights of Kurds, Alevi, Christians and other cultural minorities. They also need to be bolder in their stance for the freedom of speech, and they should prove that they are in favor of pluralism in the media.

\textsuperscript{76} Cüneyt Ulsever (4/29/2008):

And let me ask a sincere question: What if Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is not banned from politics? Though we do not voice this openly, we know that the real target of this case is Erdoğan! And everyone knows that Erdoğan is the AKP’s power generator; he, as an authoritative leader, steers almost all policies of the party. Plus, we all are aware that Erdoğan creates policies without strategy and with his diplomatic weaknesses. The prime minister’s biggest shortfall is that he makes no cost-benefit analysis in detail and gets into the game, so no one can predict what he is up to. And everyone, including his friends in the
Turkish Army—once again

Turkish army, after keeping low profile (especially during General Hilmi Özkök’s term between 2002–2006), became more vocal again towards the 2007 Parliamentary elections. When millions took to the streets in anti-AKP demonstrations before the April parliamentary election, some of the streets were orchestrated by retired generals (Taspınar, 2007). However, the army in the person of high level generals intervened regularly. There were early signs of future interventions. Sedat Ergin’s column (2004) summarizes the high level generals’ position towards the end of 2004:

...Gen. Yalan stated that Turkey had made efforts to shape its foreign policy and security policies following the Cold War in line with the wishes of foreign powers. Yalman also believes that Atatürk's principles and revolutions are being discussed under the influence of foreign dynamics. He also cast a very suspicious eye on Turkey’s recent reform process. He called them ‘certain initiatives which are painted as reforms’ and asked whether they could ruin Turkey’s character and national integrity. We can deduce that Yalman means the steps taken in our EU membership bid and public administrative reforms. In this respect, Yalman’s most critical message is this: ‘We should keep our concerns about the regime in the foreground.’ Meanwhile, Buyukanit [who would become the Chief of Staff later] said that the TSK couldn’t retreat from its mission to protect the regime. These statements indicate that disagreements between Turkey and the EU will gain prominence in the months and years to come. The EU is aiming to limit the army’s role in the regime as much as

“West,” admits that he failed to carry the momentum of the landslide election victory in the July
possible, and the two land forces commanders emphasized their determination to protect the regime.

At this point, the TSK has a dilemma. In spite of all its suspicions, the TSK also has its EU aim. For example, Gen. Ozkok displayed its vision for the EU membership goal, saying, 'Turkey was able to reach its current state thanks to Ataturk's concrete goals, ones he determined with his unique foresight, and it has taken important steps towards becoming a prosperous EU member country and reaching modern civilization.' Clearly, there is a dilemma in the TSK's simultaneous EU membership goal and its worries about possible problems as a result of it.

From 1960 to the present, the military has taken power into its own hands three times (1960–61, 1971–73 and 1980–83) and on another occasion obliged a government to resign (1997). In each of those instances, the military did not conceive of its intervention as an anti-democratic act. The 1961 Constitution institutionalized the (guardianship) role of the military by creating the National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu-MGK). The membership of this council consisted of the president of the Republic, prime minister, and ministers of foreign affairs, defence, and interior affairs as well as the chief of staff and the commanders of the army, navy, air force, and the gendarmerie. The Council was saddled with the responsibility of acting as an advisory body to the government on internal as well as external security threats to the country. (Metin Heper, 2005, 35). [Thus], in all subsequent intervention, juntas argued that they were fulfilling a legal obligation (Sakallhoğlu 2002).
However, "the 1999–2002 coalition government and in particular, the post-
November 2002 AKP government displayed strong political will to re-structure the
Turkish legal system and politics in accordance with the Copenhagen criteria with the
aim of opening accession negotiations with the EU. Among other things, the civilian
governments in question removed the military member from the State Security
Courts, increased the number of the civilian members of the MGK, and more
significantly rendered the MGK into a body that no longer 'recommended measures'
but 'conveyed its views upon request'. But in the last analysis, former Chief of Staff
Hilmi Özkök said:

...the TSK had played a pioneering role in the modernization of Turkey.
Thus, the TSK always favours Turkey's becoming an EU member (Milliyet,
10 January 2003). And according to Büyükanıt, the TSK is: an unyielding

77 Meanwhile, the government did not "give priority to" but 'assessed the views conveyed to
it'. Thus, the secretariat of the MGK was deprived of its executive powers, such as requesting reports
from government agencies on how they were dealing with the threats for which the MGK had
recommended specific measures. These reforms were important examples of 'political
Europeanization'. (37)

Did the generals who had such strong reservations about the EU also object to Turkey becoming a full
member of the EU? At least Kilinc, on an earlier occasion, had given the impression that he was
against Turkish EU membership. At a seminar, attended by both civilians and officers, he had
suggested that 'Turkey should perhaps seek other alignments with such countries as Iran and Russia'
(Hürriyet, 16 May 2003). Later, however, Kilinc, pointed out that that he was not against the EU as
such. General Yalman, too, pointed out that his views should not be taken to mean that he was against
the EU. (39)
defender of... a secular and democratic state. This fundamental stance of the military is in full concert with the EU worldview (Sabah, 30 May 2003). (41)

It is this “in the last analysis” approach that seems to dominate the beliefs of many generals and also other sections of skeptic elites. A recent book by a well-known Turkish journalist and columnist in Milliyet daily, Fikret Bila who is known to have good access to generals outlines major generals’ approach towards the EU membership78. Despite all developments, one could argue that Turkish army as an

78 Fikret Bila’s Komutanlar Cephesi (Generals’ Front) (2007) is a collection of interviews with high levels generals, some of them used to be Chief of Staff, and a former President, Süleyman Demirel. The main topic is the struggle with the PKK. The interview starts with Kenan Evren, the head of the coup d'état in 1980) who had witnessed the first PKK armed activities in his reign. The interviews with the the Generals are mostly related to the Kurdish question and the way they handled the armed rebellion of PKK. However, I was more concerned with how generals approached the EU process...but nothing surprising really. Here are my quick notes:

Kenan Evren admits that the banning of Kurdish language was a mistake (11)

"Abdullah Öcalan" should have been executed but because of the EU process we could not execute him. I am not against execution. (15) The political authorities hesitated to execute Öcalan because the US and the EU (17).

Suspicious relations between US, PKK and American Peace Forces in Southeastern Anatolia in 1991. (19-20) Repeatedly civil political authorities are criticised: Özal government was indifferent to the PKK threat. Army officials should not be held responsible (23). However, Mr. Bila underlines the responsibility of both army and civil authority at the rise of PKK. (26-7) Mr. Bila quotes M. Ali Kıslalı, probably the most pro-army columnist in Turkish press. Mr. Kıslalı claims that there was a lack of army strategy in the early years of PKK (27-9). Summary of Army strategy (32). An army based on the Cold war strategies of conventional warfare.
Doğan Güreş [who is a very respected chief of staff who initiated the counter-insurgency
tactics against PKK] In the context of the region, he states that US always wants more but "when you
show your will, US will retreat (37) Even the shift from martial law to State of Emergency (OHAL) in
Southeast was not welcome. With the introduction of civil authorities, "the commanding hierarchy
became loose" (42). ["OHAL" in Southeast started with The 1983 State of Emergency Law and ended
in 2002. For more information on OHAL like legal regulations against terrorism see Administrative
reforms against terrorism (Republic of Turkey) in Wikipedia.]

Mr. Bila later quotes the memories of General Sarızeybek (2006) who claims that every squad
raised money to buy more advanced weapons to use against PKK guerillas (64). Despite the
significant rate allocated for the army in the annual state budget, high level generals implied the
indifference of politicians again. Gen. Güreş also states that reform legislations in relation to EU
process encouraged PKK (79). Again, this time Gen. Necati Özgen states that soldiers did what they
were supposed to do but politicians did not. (99). He also points out that the EU Progress reports
continuously mentioned minorities. In one of them, he saw that the word, minority was used 63 times.
the EU's approach seems to encourage terrorists (100). Ismail Hakkı Karadayı and Hasan Kundakçı
also accuse politicians (94-8 and 123 respectively) The former complains about the external [mostly
Western] support for PKK and talks about American weapons at PKK members [This was a big issue
this year but Gen. Karadayı points out that American weapons were an issue even in mid-1990s.]

Generals repeatedly insist on the claim that PKK had move advanced weaponry than the
Turkish army had. (133,138) Only in around 1994, politicians, (Süleyman Demirel, Tansu Çiller)
started to support the army directly. (142) Lieutenant general Hasan Kundakçı also laments for the
situation that Öcalan was not executed because of the EU reforms (152) and explicitly claims that
"USA helped PKK as part of BOP [the Greater Middle East a political term invented by the current
Bush government in US and widely quoted in Turkey to argue for imperialist American plans in the
Middle East, see Wikipedia entry on the Greater Middle East] (153). [Generals mostly imply this
strongly but here Gen. Kundakçı did not bother for implying.]

Most of the generals believe that the parliamentary decision in 1 March 2003 not to approve a bill
allowing in American combat troops to open a northern front against Iraq was a big mistake (see more
in "Turkish American relations", Wikipedia). "Turkey lost the initiative against PKK when she did not execute Öcalan and when American soldiers began to flow in the region. [if Turkey acted with US, Turkey could control the Kurdish areas easily] (154). "If 1 March bill was approved by the parliament, PKK would cease to exist" (155).

General Aytay Yalman lists 10 turning points in the struggle against PKK 203-4)

1- PKK's first gendarme post ambushes in 1984.
2- the fall of Berlin Wall, 1989.
3- the collapse of USSR, 1991
4- the First Gulf War, 1991
5- Turkish army begins to take the initiative in its struggle with PKK, 1994.
8- Öcalan is captured, 1999
9- 1 March bill, 2003

[As can be seen most of turning more immediate turning points are related to the US influence]

Hilmi Özköç mentions the "hood event" (see more "Hood Event" in Wikipedia). "An event that stunned the Turkish pride (242-243) but he also seems to downplay the event as "American soldiers sometimes do very stupid things". Among all the interviewed generals, Hilmi Özköç has a uniquely democratic standing. During his term as the Chief of Staff, he was constantly criticised by the Kemalist circles for being too tolerant for the Islamist government. He is the only one who has a positive approach to EU membership. "Support for PKK will cease as we become members" he believes (for more of Gen. Özköç's approach to EU see Fikret Bila's 1 October 2007 column in Milliyet) [Taha Akyol (2006) also praises Gen. Özköç: "Hilmi Özköç is also an intellectual. He follows social changes like a civilian who has a good knowledge of social sciences. He makes sociological analyses.
important agent kept its skeptic distance the process but not left it. However, this
distanced approach shaped the outcome of EU process assemblage current
positioning towards the EU membership.

Other Institutional actors

When the body of journalism does not exclusively focus on EU news,
institutional actors take over. Bahadir Kaleağası (6/16/2007), who writes weekly
informative columns in Radikal and who represents TUSIAD in Brussels lists a group
of institutions that work for "true" information on the EU against the disinformation
campaigns:

There are many initiatives in Turkey. In the official side ABİG (AB İletişim
Grubu) restarted its campaign. Now domestic communication is also in their

... Özök is aware of the changes in the stock market.... He symbolizes the move from the
ideological to professional...383]

General İlker Başbuğ has been a vocal army leader. He both warns US and laments for the
Turkish-American relations (298-9)

Mr. Bila gives some clues about the the last interviewee, general Yaşar Büyükanıt who is the current
chief of staff (302). Gen. Büyükanıt has a high presence in media and Mr. Bila states that Gen.
Büyükănıt used to be in charge in army press offices during his long career. He also has an academic
side as he has written several books to be used in Turkish military schools. Büyükănıt continues the
line of arguments that seemed to be disrupted in Gen. Özök's term.

As Mr. Bila concludes, all these staunch guardians of Turkish nation state now accept the existence of
"Kurdish reality" (321). However, only Gen. Özök remains positive for the EU membership while the
others hold varying positions ranging from sceptical to hostile...
agenda. Avrupa Birliği Genel Sekreterliği works on the harmony between state institutions. More than 50 thousand Turkish citizens participates the EU education and youth programs directed by Turkish National Agency. Many ministries and state institutions and local governments begin to have institutional experience in the EU process. There are more and more scholars who are specialized in EU in Turkish universities. There are several academic specialization and research programs in these universities. EU Commission’s information centers and their activities are spreading all over Turkey. Private sectors, trade unions and NGOs increase their sphere of influence in Turkey and in Europe.

Despite this optimistic portrayal, I was expecting a more significant role NGOs would play. NO 35 says they at least create an awareness and do not find the roles of NGOs totally irrelevant. But she adds that educating EU experts is a long-term project and short term NGO activities are not enough for this. In a more negative way NO33 points out ASAM (an NGO formed by former intelligence community members and function as a pro-state, pro-military advisory board- unofficially) as a significant contributor to debates. As a politician I suppose he was more interested in NGOs which have statal connections.

The Secretariat General for European Union Affairs of Prime Ministry (ABGS)

NO 33 explicitly denied a significant role for the Secretariat General for European Union Affairs of Prime Ministry (ABGS). This institution is supposed to be a pseudo ministry that coordinates the negotiations. I have always heard an uneasiness between ABGS and the government as the former was in fact a deed of the previous
coalition. When I said I visited ABGS when I went to Ankara, he asked teasingly whether there was such a place. ABGS's location is among a few other state institutions that includes National Security Council's grand headquarters just outside of Ankara city center. It has a low profile building and I was not even properly searched when I entered the premises. NO 33 downplayed ABGS:

    Well, there was nothing before. Hmm ABGS, its building is about to be completed. In fact, every ministry has to have its own branch for European Union affairs.

In a recent interview, current head of ABGS, Oğuz Demiralp (2007) summarized its official role:

    Regarding the EU objective, what is the road map of the Secretariat General for EU Affairs, which recently became a part of the foreign ministry?

The Secretariat General for EU Affairs (EUSG) was formerly linked to Chief Negotiator Ali Babacan. After he was appointed as the new foreign minister, EUSG also became a part of foreign ministry. EUGS had operated under the foreign ministry between 2003 and 2005, but this change in status didn't affect EUSG's responsibilities and activities during the EU membership process.

As you know, the negotiation process is conducted by the Monitoring and Orientation Committee (MOC) which consists of the prime ministry, foreign ministry, State Planning Organisation and EUSG.

EUSG will continue to execute its mission under the MOC and be the basic institution which is responsible for coordination of the negotiation process.
EUSG will also follow its mission as secretariat of the MOC and undertake the necessary operations in order to help the public institutions to benefit from EU financial aid and technical support mechanisms in the most effective way.

NO 23, who is an expert assistant in National Program field, stated that she was employed along with a group of expert assistants in 2001 and that was the last time the Secretariat ever employed new cadres. She stated that there was indeed need for more personnel but the Secretariat had to work with experts with temporary contracts. She outlines the structure of this state institution as such:

There are two main offices. Financial Affairs Office and National Program Office. These are horizontal offices that work to perform general coordination. There are also sectoral offices such as offices for agriculture and fishing; there are regional offices and there are other offices such as environment and transportation or single market offices.

National Program office's main duty is the preparation of national program. Our office is also responsible with the coordination of necessary administrative capacity.

.... Administrative capacity: It has multi dimensions. There are nearly 120 thousand page long of regulations. Of course these have to implemented. This was not a criteria in 1980s but by 1993, Copenhagen Criteria declared that these regulations have to be adopted. In 1995 Madrid summit, it was decided that not only adoption but implementation was necessary. This implementation issue was raised to Turkey's agenda in Helsinki Summit. EU is a learning process. Enlargement, too. Regulations are redefined after every enlargement move. Especially the last enlargement phase went through a
concept of 'conditionality', which you will see in the literature a lot. There are always new conditions and these conditions are always redefined.

In the framework of Turkey's candidacy this is highlighted even more. You will see in the media, Turkey passes the political criteria test but fails in implementation.

Where are there failures in implementation? Because you don't have capacity to implement. This is called administrative capacity. An administrative institutionalization that will succeed to perform the implementation.

Administrative capacity includes many aspects. Investment in infrastructure is another aspect.

When I asked if the institution had a sanctional power, I was told that this was not a direct issue here but since all necessary documents were prepared through the coordination of ABGS, and in terms of administrative capacity, since National Program was the most important document, ABGS had certainly a significant role. She continued to point out that ABGS might have an indirect power:

It suggests how much administrative capacity is needed and reports are sent to the Prime Ministry and we always report comparisons between what was suggested in national program and what was actually performed.

When I question her if ABGS has a more direct propaganda role, she doesn't answer my question at first. I found all these offices 'technical' and I had asked if there were office more related to political and cultural issues. She asked me to look at their website for the whole organizational structure. I was told that there were also 'political' offices but what she meant was an office related to Judiciary issues. When I asked what they were doing against rising anti-EUism:
In fact, we have a mission of communication. We continuously attend information meetings in universities, for beginners in Public sector, governors etc. I had lectured on ABGS and Turkey's EU process for a long time. Recently, I have lecturing on Turkey's negotiation process. People always confuse use with the Delegation. People calls us and swear at EU. Although EU Delegation has EU Information Centers but we still receive many questions about EU funded projects. But of course Delegation is in more face-to-face relation with citizens. We never refuse citizens and we have a mission to inform anyone who inquires. [However, we are more into informing civil servants]

We don't have a specific angle in informing media. Our press spokesman sends bulletins to journalists (mostly those stationed in Ankara). However, our informative services towards media is not systematic. In general our highest level officials inform the media. In fact, Ali Babacan (Minister of Foreign Affairs) directly informs the media [that seems to be the most significant way of communicating with media].

NO 22 believed that the state of this institution relied on the political will. It needed political power behind to be strengthened administratively.

Aktar (2003) had also urged this institution to have a more central coordinating role between state institutions. ABGS should become "a clearing house" between several institutions, ministries (78).

In a recent news, Mr. Demiralp declared to a parliamentary commission that the Secretariat was understaffed, he needed at least 30 experts and because of lack of legal experts, he could not follow properly legal developments concerning EU
relations (Euractiv Turkey, 12/27/2007). He also stated that 3 out 4 vice secretarial chairs are also not appointed by the government yet.

Chief Negotiator

After a wait of months, Justice and Development Party (AK Party) declared that Ali Babacan would be first Turkey's Chief Negotiator in 2005. In his first speech Mr. Babacan thanked Prime Minister Erdoğan who chose him for the position of Chief Negotiator. Mr. Babacan would also continue his work as the minister in charge of economy and this would be criticized by many who thought two positions were overwhelming and EU negotiations did need a Chief Negotiator who would be only focusing on the process.

Meriç Köyataş (5/25/2005):

As a young politician, Babacan has taken on a heavy burden. He conducted relations with the International Monetary Fund following our economic crises very well. He also showed a very harmonious working relationship with Finance Minister Kemal Unakitan in terms of steadily implementing the economic program. I hope he will show the performance expected of him during the negotiation process as well. However, this time he has quite a difficult task. Germany's decision to hold early elections and the strong possibility of anti-Turkish Christian Democrat leader Angela Merkel's becoming chancellor and Sunday's French referendum on the EU Constitution could hold up Turkey's full EU membership and the negotiation process. However, what I mean by difficult concerns other issues.
Cüneyt Ülsever (5/25/2005) congratulated both Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan who has finally appointed the chief negotiator for accession talks with the European Union and Ali Babacan for his new and very important mission. And he advised:

In order to fulfill this important task, Babacan must leave the economic mission he presently carries out. Otherwise, he won’t be able to be productive in a mission which will take up all his time. I hope the new minister for the economy will also be somebody who doesn’t make any concessions, like Babacan. One of Babacan’s duties is of course to choose assistants and sub-negotiators in consultation with the government. These tasks are also very important. In selecting people for these posts, Babacan has to stop being a politician and act like a statesman. It is natural that the chief negotiator is a politician from the party in power, but in selecting the other negotiators, some values cannot be ignored.

At the time of finishing up, Mr. Babacan’s position was still questioned. He occupied both the Ministry for Foreign Affairs position and Chief Negotiator. More and more columnists thought Chief Negotiator should not have other positions. However, since negotiations were always handled with hand in hand with other processes, events, and issues, a Chief Negotiator with no other political position could not have had any power at all. As the final days in the field demonstrated, relative lack of power for the seat of Chief Negotiator was probably a consequence of political assemblage.
State Planning Office

This office (DPT) had always competed with Ministry for Foreign Affairs with less success. With the appointment of Ali Babacan as chief negotiator, this office was planning to have an active role along with others:

According to a draft, the top negotiator will have four deputies: State Planning Organization (DPT) Undersecretary Ahmet Tiktik, Secretary-General for EU Ambassador Murat Sungar, and one member each from the Foreign Ministry and Justice and Development Party (AKP). The "core institution" for negotiations will be the DPT. It will be restructured; EU experts and translators will reinforce its staff. Law and translation offices will be opened. Meanwhile, NGOs, universities, employer-labor circles will lay down their views through an "Advisory Board" to be formed. Organizations such as The Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen Association (TUSIAD) and Turkish Union of Chambers and Stock Exchanges (TOBB) also want to be involved in the negotiation delegation. TUSIAD President Omer Sabanci, meeting with Gul yesterday, conveyed this wish one more time. Babacan, speaking at a dinner last night, said there will be no delay in the negotiation process (Süleyman Kurt, 5/28/2005)

It did not eventually occupied a more significant role. It was one of the many competing state institutions.

Ministries

Murat Yetkin (3/11/2205) highlights the role of some ministries here:
What do the EU leaders mean by "implementation" anyway? It's nothing but a clear demand that Ankara act in line with its new legislation. Brussels is demanding that Ankara take action and make moves in step with its own reforms. It must be disheartening for a government to hear this but still be unable to do anything about it. The EU's so-called "to-do" list is full of issues which are directly under the jurisdiction of the Interior and Justice Ministries.

.... If the current negative atmosphere changes, it will be Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul who will be the most relieved, because it's always the Foreign Ministry which takes the blame the mistakes and missteps of the Interior Ministry on the international stage.

Most of the EU-led reforms were lost in the maze of ministries by being improperly implemented. Ministries of Justice and Interior Affairs gained importance in the EU process and there will be much to talk when I discuss Turkish Judiciary.

**Delegation for European Council**

Compared to ABGS, Delegation for European Council has a more visible though smaller place in Ankara's one of classy districts, and more importantly, information centers in many major Turkish cities. The latter beats the former in website's design and productivity, too.

But NO 33 had also admitted the government's failure:

Well, it is difficult to handle EU Affairs with Economy itself. I refer to Ali [Babacan]. He is like my brother but it was impossible for him to handle all together. But we had no alternative at the time. I don't know what will happen in the future but we need a special ministry.
The Delegation did already weave its net of information centers in major Turkish cities. My first impression came through my short-term association with Tribeca PR Agency:

Tribeca official Eda who is responsible for the report i am preparing on Fridays invited me and Mr. Hasan from Interpress for a meeting...

On our way, Mr. Hasan told me that Tribeca Agency had already been a prestigious public relations company. Now they coordinate 'European Commission's Communication Project' in Turkey. This project is supported by the Delegation of the European Commission to Turkey. It aims to open up European Union Information Centres. When I saw a center in Taksim I thought it was an official EU center. It could be official but indirectly... there is no sign related to Tribeca, but it is this company that coordinates these centers, not a political entity.

Of course what strikes me is that they fund my 'ultimate media archive'. I learnt that they are now beginning to prepare reports on columnists and on many other categories, not only EU funded projects.... SO i think this agency has become a legitimate ethnographic site in my research. There will be more to say how European Commission organizes the flow of its official information! (7 November 2004)

However, Cengiz Aktar (2003) finds Delegation's activities fruitless:

There is not enough budget allocated from EU to Delegation in Turkey. Communication Strategy includes a plain bulletin, and dialogues limited to Kurdish groups and some valuable but non-representative intellectuals. We shouldn't forget that the most suitable public space for public communication
in Turkey is not associations but mosques and Turks learn more from TV than other media (89). Moreover, it wasn't supplied with enough manpower until 2002 (141). He did not act like a neutral technocrat and did not hesitate to produce statements about a candidate country, Turkey that went beyond intentions of neutrality (167).

**EU's Joint Parliamentary Committee with Turkey**

I believe this committee had always been over-represented in Turkish press. Recently notorious with Joost Lagendijk has similar communication strategy problems according to Mr. Aktar:

The committee is mistaken in targeting audiences. In the end most of its visits turn out to be tourisy visits because of lack of communication between interested parties. (2003, 89)

Mr. Lagendijk got married to a Turkish TV news journalist later and began to live in Istanbul in much of his time. He was keeping a low profile after he has been targeted in Turkish media.

**Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation**

The Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation is an independent think-tank which focuses on current policy issues facing Turkey in the main areas of governance and transparency, democratization and foreign policy and International relations. Its English language website provides information on its aims and recent activities. It includes free access to a selection of online working papers and reports. Key topics include Turkish EU relationship (including coverage of Turkey's application to join the European Union)
relations between Turkey and Greece concerning Cyprus.

http://www.tescv.org.tr/eng/ (Source: Intute: Social Sciences)

This NGO is one of the most institutionalized NGOs in the field. Its reports or other publications immediately hit the news agendas and many columnists relied on these. However, this well funded NGO became the target of anti-EU circles and began to have a low-profile visibility in the public debates. Still, it continues to support several EU-process related researches.

**Turkish-EU Consultative Committee**

The Turkish-EU Joint Consultative Committee was established in November 1995 and is made up of European Economic and Social Committee members and civil society representatives from Turkey.

The joint committee has been working on a wide range of topics from Turkey-EU energy relations to the social impact of the customs union, migration and women's rights. It meets normally twice a year, once in the candidate country and once in Brussels.

Involved in the joint committee are the Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodities Exchanges (TOBB), the Turkish Confederation of Employers' Unions (TİSK), the Turkish Banks Union (TBB), the Confederation of Turkish Labor Unions (Türk-İş), the Labor Confederation (Hak-İş), the Turkish Public Workers' Labor Union (Kamu-Sen), the Turkish Tradesmen and Artisans' Confederation (TESK) and professional organizations, all representing a large segment of the Turkish population.
The 20th meeting of Turkey-EU Joint Consultation Committee (JCC) will be held in Brussels between Nov. 28-29, it was reported on Sunday.

Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB) said today that the Turkish side of JCC would be represented by a crowded delegation from employers and employees trade unions. Turkey's accession negotiations will be discussed in details at JCC meeting, TOBB said.

Turkey-EU JCC Co-Chairmen Suleyman Celebi and Jan Olsson, EU Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn, Turkey-EU Joint Parliamentary Committee Co-Chairmen Aydin Dumanoglu and Joost Lagenduk, Turkey's and Britain's Permanent Representatives to EU Oguz Demiralp and John Grant and Committee for External Relations (RELEX) member Roger Kaliff will deliver speeches on Monday. On the last day of the meeting, TOBB President Rifat Hisarciklioglu and Olli Rehn will have a bilateral meeting. The Turkish delegation will return to Turkey on Nov. 29th. (Source: Turkish Daily News (11/27/2005)

However, it was not cited neither in news nor in my interviews. Its direct intervention to news or opinion making is very limited.

Retired generals

Speaking of army, one should not forget the retired army officials. Their public visibility highly increased in my early years. In the beginning, there was no mention of retired generals directly but at a later stage even the Office of General Staff ordered them to be less vocal:
In a very ironic case, both Prime Ministry and the Office of General Staff (who are rarely found to have similar political views) were anxious with the retired generals some of whom were very vocal in mass media. One of the possible reprimands would be that they would not be allowed military buildings any more. At first sight this was an act of censorship but these retired officials were talking for more democracy but they sort of attempted to organize the public for a more militarized society and in the mean time some of their speeches caused uneasiness with the then current military command.

Nearly all newspapers covered this order including the Radikal piece by Rifat Başaran (11/18/2007) I quote here. Taspinar describes the general role of retired generals as such:

The pressing domestic problem facing Turkey today is not Islamization, as both the Kemalist establishment and some anti-Islamic Western groups fear, but a growing nationalist frustration with Europe and the United States. An interesting paradox is emerging. The conservative AKP government, despite being a party with Islamic roots, has done much more than the previous secular governments to improve Turkey's chances of joining the EU. But even as these former Islamists have become enthusiastically pro-Western and pro-globalization, the Kemalist establishment is increasingly turning inward. In fact, today, retired generals are leading Turkey's neo-nationalist, anti-NATO, and anti-Western revival partly by advocating a pro-Russian and pro-Asian foreign policy orientation as an alternative. Herein lies Turkey's "Kemalist paradox": an ideology designed to westernize the country is now increasingly turning anti-EU and anti-American because the Kemalists consider the EU and
Washington to be the main supporters of Kurdish nationalism—in their eyes, an existential threat to the republic. (2007: 128)

**Retired officials**

Other kinds of retired officials gradually became "experts" for media and they were highly quoted. For instance:

Kurdish insurgency even determines Turkey's Northern Iraq policy. The anxiety is reproduced by some columnists. Tufan Türenç (2/21/2005) quotes extensively from a former diplomat:

I know that Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his staff will ignore the suggestions given by Sukru Elekdag, the experienced diplomat who once served as Turkey's ambassador to Washington. However, the Turkish public should hear his vitally important suggestions. Elekdag recently said, The elections in Kirkuk had many defects.

Retired or not statements of military bureaucracy on EU related issues become a trump for those who do not want Turkey as a member within the EU (Aktar, 2003: 132).

**TÜSİAD**

Aktar (2003) says not the left wing circles who are supposed to be more open to EU process and who know better what kind of obstacles against Turkey, but TÜSİAD (Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association) is the only power center that had supported Yılmaz's EU initiative against Chief of Staff Office declarations and TÜSİAD continues to organize EU centered activities and this
creates a synergy between them and Yılmaz government (73) (An extensive discussion of the state of NGOs in Turkey can be found in Boztekin, 2004). TÜSİAD remained to be most influential and concerned NGO in Turkey's EU process.

NO 23 believed that TÜSİAD backed AB Haber news site was the most popular website for EU news.

Vincent Boland (12/27/2005):

If Umit Boyner gets her way, however, foreign perceptions could change. Tusiad, the association for Turkey's largest companies, has asked the articulate and passionate retail executive to spearhead a 10-year campaign to transform the country's image in Europe by convincing people to look beyond old stereotypes.

The Tusiad initiative is independent of the Turkish government, which sometimes appears indifferent to the damaging effect of domestic developments: Orhan Pamuk, Turkey's most celebrated novelist, is on trial for "insulting" the state; a brawl between its national football squad and Switzerland's may lead to the team being banned from the 2010 World Cup; and the government is struggling to persuade citizens that it does not support an attempt by some Islamist local authorities to ban the sale of alcohol.

The Tusiad campaign involves using the arts, business, civil society and especially women to highlight the country's diversity and the talents of its people.
Academia

In terms of knowledge production, academic circles maintained an important place and fed the journalistic production as experts. However, most of this contribution took place not in terms of institutional participation but in personal attempts from academia who had anti-EU agendas. The bookshelves were occupied with skeptical books (although they cannot be classified as academic, one should note the intensive Eurosceptic email campaigns during this period. The reader can see in Appendix 5, the range of these email messages).

But of course, there were also pro-EU developments in academia. Communication School at Istanbul Bilgi University instituted a senior year mandatory course on EU Journalism. This was a unique case. Although students were annoyed with such a course, it was one of their few chances to get an idea about how EU institutions functioned. 12 selected students among nearly 50 students were taken to Brussels as a class trip which was funded by EU Parliament. This was directly a result of Greek lecturer's (Ariana Ferentinou) personal connections in Brussels. A Greek MEP would invite this body of students. Thus this class trip would not be systematic but based on personal networks. This invitation by a Greek MEP was a sign of friendship and he in turn got appreciation in the parliament. Whatever the source of funding, 12 students had a unique experience. As their lecturer stated:

They have walked in the halls of EU Parliament. They have witnessed the making of history. At that time there were debates on Cyprus. Students were like in a dream. In fact, that course should have been structured like that all along. EU is not in the text books but it has to be conceived as a project that will affect students' futures. Our kids asked good questions. MEPs were
influenced by our students' flexibility, tolerance, calm and objectivity. There were no big quarrels. We as a group was very interesting. The Greek MEP will invite us again.

However, after two years, the 'boss' of the university would tease the existence of such a course and it would be eliminated from the program... This was in fact another sign of decreasing popularity of EU in Turkey...

Turkish citizens are increasingly benefiting from Europe based academic programs and scholarships.

NO 23:

Jean Monnet scholarships. They are in fact for Public Service civil servants but private sector and universities are also benefitting from them. It is a financial aid for receiving MA degrees abroad [in Europe]. When I got it in my senior year, I wasn't asked what to study. But now they are used to develop administrative capacity. Those who apply for Jean Monnet scholarships are demanded to do some studies in one of Acquis communautaire (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Acquis) topics. The goal is to educate bureaucrats in order to develop administrative capacity during the EU process. Administrative capacity can be developed by academic education or training.

Jean Monnet scholarships focus on academic education.

Erasmus program, another academic aid program (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ERASMUS_programme) is coordinated by National Agency and State Planning Office.
University programs worked frequently with NGOs in order to produce EU-related events:

The German Marshall Fund of the United States and The Center for European Studies of Istanbul Bilgi University organized the a panel entitled as "Europe and Turkey: Is There a Common Future?". The invited speaker Jean-Christophe Filori from the Cabinet of EU Commissioner for Enlargement, Olli Rehn could not come but the other two speakers were available: Nathalie Tocci (European University Institute in Florence) and Borut Grgic (Institute for Strategic Studies in Ljubljana). GMF Ankara Office director Suat Künkhoğlu and Prof. Kemal Kirişçi also contributed to the panelists' discussion.

There were not cameras or photographers around but I could see there were several senior journalists including Sami Kohen and a young but very successful diplomacy journalist, Barışın Yinaneç. She said I could call later to talk about my thesis... So that's a plus from that meeting...

International Relations and political science people dominated the meeting. I did chat with many IR assistants whom I see around at Bilgi but not much chance to talk. They are a bunch of good people there. Ayhan Kaya was also cordial as usual...

Short notes from Ms. Tocci: EU's own credibility in TR's accession process was harmed last year... Turkish statesmen should give up bargaining like 'we promise to do...while they already have to do those'. She also said it was time for internal push for more TR reforms.... In the mean time, I found her main suggestion to distinguish between technicalities and politics in the negotiation process to be too naive. It seems that politics will inevitably step in every stage
of the process....Anyway, Mr. Grgic argued that Turkey can increase its significance by providing new energy routes... Well, though EU can find some herself I guess TR can play a role. I agree with him. He argued that EU has internal problems so there cannot be a EU perspective in near future so TR should take the initiative... TR should/can act as a stabilizing force... Energy security could be the way for TR's entrance... I guess there could be more focus on Mr. Grgic's talk but since Turks like to zero in hotter topics Tocci had more to say about Cyprus issue... (25 February 2006)

**Turkish law/ judiciary**

While many observers were busy with the role of Turkish army, a new actor emerged forcefully in the recent years of Turkey's EU process: Turkish Judiciary. There was always a footnote on the conservativeness of judiciary but not many thought Judiciary would strike back at the EU process with such a mighty force. As of 2006, Turkey's judiciary was already accepted as the biggest obstacle against EU membership as the following quotation highlights:

Gareth Jones (2/28/2006):

To its critics, Turkey's judiciary is the biggest obstacle on the long road to the European Union -- rigidly conservative, unaccountable, hostile to human rights and often corrupt. But to its supporters, the judiciary is the front line in the daily battle to preserve the secular, unitary Turkish state from its many enemies, ranging from Islamists to Kurdish separatists. The judiciary is the civilian guardians of the Kemalist order," said Cengiz Aktar of Istanbul's Bahcesehir University, referring to the secular system of government established by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, revered founder of the Turkish
republic. "But their conservatism does not fit with this modern world of European rules and regulations, with the European Convention on Human Rights. They are thousands of miles away from the EU." The judiciary has been trained to put the interests of the state and the nation before individual citizens, he said. Many experts agree the judiciary is too conservative. "It is not easy to change. Old attitudes are strong, it takes time," said Hikmet Sami Turk, a former justice minister and now a law professor at Ankara's Bilkent University. "The government passes new laws but implementation is to some extent not up to EU standards," he told Reuters.

Thus, in everyday life matters, Turkish law emerged as a more grave source of problem than the Army did. Both at the level of government and at the level of judicial personnel, law issues signified as a problem.

A TESEV survey by Mithat Sancar and Eylem Ümit on Turkish judges provide important clues on the nature of Turkish law implementers. 73% of judges and prosecutors do know any foreign languages. Again 73% of them were born in villages or towns. Only 2% of them participated NGO activities during their college years. (8-9). When asked whether the interests of the state or justice have priority, most answered for the former (10). They had sceptical approach towards ECHR and other international human rights institutions; most of them believe new legislation for more rights are impositions (18-19). There is a high level of confusion over the EU process and ECHR. They did not follow EHCR decisions regularly, and learnt about them through mass media (65%) (20). 63% of them believe ECHR decisions are prejudiced against Turkey (21).
Penal reforms came in waves. Mostly close to deadlines. August 3 penal reforms just before 12-13 August 2002 summit were in fact had revolutionary dimensions. Aktar (2003) believes that some of these new laws were keys to unresolved legal problems since Lozanne Treaty. Property rights of minorities, capital punishment, education in mother language etc (114) were all included in the reform packet. Aktar underlines that these reforms are made despite centralist, nationalist and militarist forces and their significance should never be underestimated (130).

However, Nihal Boztekin (2004) reminds us the fact that whatever changes happen in penal codes, there is a substantive intervention by the bureaucracy. 'Bureaucratic resistance' prevents the implementation of EU reforms (107). What is more challenging is like in the case of minority foundations, even the Constitutional Court decisions act against the EU based reform laws (119). political conservativeness could be realized in the implementation of EU reforms. But closure case on AKP would signify not only resistance but also assault against the process, as some would call it a judiciary coup. 79

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Turkey has embarked upon a new process of intervention, called a "judicial coup" by the international community. The judiciary contributes greatly to this, but the Republican People's Party (CHP) is also among the actors with a hand in this process.

Having secured the support of a certain part of the country's intellectuals, the CHP is trying to interrupt the democratic regime as the party of potent elites. Intellectuals in Turkey always lean toward the CHP because of its elitist character instead of supporting the Democratic Party (DP) and its extensions, the Justice Party (AP), the True Path Party (DYP), the Motherland Party (ANAVATAN) and the National View (Milli Görüş) parties. These intellectuals sometimes keep silent during military interventions and sometimes support them.
Mümtaz'ı' Türköne (5/3/2008):

.... If the judiciary assumes the duty of "protecting the secular republic" instead of exercising law, this means that the judiciary has been taken hostage by ideology. This is because the "secular republic" is an ideological construct developed with a view to protecting the state. Everyone can make their own idiosyncratic definition of "secular republic." The words of Savaş are important in that they represent the approach taken in preparing the indictment. Departing from an ideological duty of "protecting the secular republic," the indictment defines secularism not as a legal principle, but as a lifestyle or a positivist philosophical belief. .... **This closure case will see the confrontation between the narrowly constrained totalitarian circles and the libertarian and open pluralistic approaches in Turkey.** This case will be concluded not when the AK Party is closed down or not, but when Turkey makes its choice between law and ideology in its future. [cmp. mine]


The Constitutional Court: Some political observers still believe that the court will not close the AK Party down. Yet the history of the court clearly indicates that whenever it accepts such a case for review, they end up closing the political party in question. No exception to this has been recorded yet.

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Most importantly, they invite the military to take over the administration whenever urbanites and public officials make demands that relate to Islam. Their preference for secularism as a general principle over democracy and fundamental freedoms can be explained with this in mind.
Unless some powerful measures are taken to limit the court's ability to close political parties, it is very likely that the court will shut down the AK Party government. The court decision may be influenced by the shifts in military leadership and the new leadership's attitude toward the government. The media: Major newspapers and TV channels seem to be confused by all these unknowns. The media would like to take sides by considering who the winners and losers will be. At this point it appears that the media, too, is waiting for the upcoming military leadership to crystallize its position toward the AK Party government.

AKP was not closed but many including me suspect that there were new alliances with AKP forged so that the party would not shift much from the status quo. Many pro-EU columnists and others expected a fast-paced EU process after the closure case's end. Instead AKP slowed down the process and began to make moves towards center-Right political positions that included a more hostile attitude towards the Kurdish question.

**Kurdish Insurgency**

PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) guerrillas are fighting against Turkish State since 1984. With the capture of its leader, Abdullah Öcalan in 1999, their guerrilla activities waned until the last few years. Kurdish politics in general supported Turkey's EU membership process since this would mean more cultural and ethnic rights for Kurds. PKK certainly has an impact in Kurdish Southeastern cities of Turkey. Only AKP could challenge PKK's hegemony in the region in the last elections. However, as the EU process was stalled, PKK increased its armed operations which in turn caused nationalist reaction among Turks which could easily
be manipulated by nationalist parties and bureaucracy. AKP had to give in and
Turkish army's cross-border operations in Northern Iraq were supported by most of
Turkish elites and citizens. That, of course, signified more tension in US-Turkey
relations. Most of anti-Americanism had already originated because of American
intervention in Iraq that caused de facto formation of a Kurdish State in Northern Iraq.
American objection to any cross-border operation did trigger anti-Americanism in
Turkey. However, American authorities seemed to have agreed for limited scale
operations, began to share intelligence and a consensus could be achieved. This had
immediately lowered the rate of anti-Americanism in polls and pro-American
sentiments among columnists. Towards the end of my field days, AKP showed signs
of a shift and its leader PM Erdoğan began to use a familiar nationalist rhetoric. This
signifies more alienation among many Kurdish citizens but consolidation of the
assemblage...

Now I will attempt to portray how assemblage can work through a particular
case.
Orhan Pamuk/ Armenian Genocide Claims

Armenian Genocide claims remain to be a continuous diplomatic crisis. In later stages of my fieldwork, Turkey's relations with France and US would be substantively threatened. It might surprise some but official EU Commission documents never used these claims as an obstacle to Turkey's membership. However, this caused friction with major EU members such France and Germany and gradually this turned out to be a domestic issue and went in hand with diplomatic frictions. When novel prize winner novelist Orhan Pamuk entered the scene, he was overwhelmed with a complex set of issues but he also embodied a pole in the assemblage. A distant, diplomatic issue was entangled with a particular Penal Code Article (301) which meant to punish those who insulted Turkishness. Orhan Pamuk who could otherwise be used by Turkey to promote Turkey globally has turned into a traitor because he stated that there was indeed Armenian Genocide. Article 301 targeted him and this in turn triggered a domestic political/intellectual debate on nationalism.

Before the shaping of the assemblage, one could see several news items in which Turkey officially targeted other countries:

Turkey condemned a ruling yesterday by the lower house of the German parliament criticizing Turkey for not recognizing the alleged massacres of Armenians by Ottoman Turks in 1915. "Such a decision, coming from a country such as Germany that has always been considered a friend and ally, hurts the Turkish people deeply," the Foreign Ministry said in a written statement late yesterday. "We would like to point out that it will have a negative effect on our relations." (Mark Bentley, 6/17/2005)
[With the entrance of Orhan Pamuk] Taha Akyol (2006) says: "He is sued with the allegation that the insults Turkishness but in the end his trial makes the international headlines and shows Turkey negatively. (p.102) He agrees with the judges that Orhan Pamuk really did upset millions of Turks however his case makes it even worse. (105-106) and he states “Let's discuss the Armenian issue but France here is ill-intentioned. It was "mukatele" (mutual killing) not genocide. The guilty party that triggers the crisis is Armenian diaspora (227). Akyol argues that this genocide claim is a pretext to stop Turkey's EU process and historical prejudices are employed to reach present political aims. In two world wars Europeans killed more than 60 millions of their own citizens. But the crusader mentality continues... (233-234) Against the French initiative on Armenian genocide Bernard Lewis' work is used frequently for counter-arguments. (ie 240) Even historian Halil Berktay who had become a scapegoat during the organization of Armenian conference in Bilgi University is praised for his efforts to persuade Martti Ahtisaari and his friends in not inserting genocide article to the Turkey report. (235-6) Taner Akçam is a fanatic (236); not good for a reasonable debate on genocide claims.

In early 2005, there was some hope. According to a report by Yigal Schleifer (3/17/2005) taboo was lifting over past treatment of Armenians. He described that "Despite the lack of official relations, a growing number of nongovernmental Turkish groups - from academics and businessmen to musicians and women's organizations - are now meeting with their Armenian counterparts, in the process helping to redefine the debate in Turkey and ease the enmity between the two nations." He also quoted Hrant Dink who would be murdered in a few years: "Slowly we started to ask what happened to the Armenians," he says. "Now we're at the point of telling what happened." He also stated that “Until recently, the Turkish state's official version of
events was all that could be aired publicly. But observers say that democratic reforms - many of them the result of pressure by the EU - have created more space for public debate on the topic”.

In fact, the EU Process had already entered the taboo to be discussed. Orhan Pamuk’s entrance would accelerate and polarize the discussion. In the mean time, Turkish columnists continued to promote the official discourse. Here, Yılmaz Öztuna (3/8/2005) of center right conservative Türkiye sums up this discourse:

..... In 1915, the total number of Armenians living under Ottoman rule was 1 million. During that time, Armenians living in Istanbul and western Anatolia were barely touched. Those living in the east, southeast and central parts of Anatolia were exiled to other regions of the empire such as Lebanon, Syria and Iraq. During their departure, Kurdish tribes, who had suffered great losses because of them, constantly attacked the Armenians. The number of Turkish soldiers assigned to guard the Armenians on their way was inadequate. Therefore, they could not prevent Kurdish assaults on the Armenians. Some 10,000-15,000 Armenians died during those attacks. No more than that. However, the death toll reached 200,000 with losses due to epidemics and poor conditions. The rest of the Armenians settled in Arab lands. After World War I, they emigrated to France, America and the rest of the world. If all of them had been killed, there wouldn't be any Armenians in these countries now.

Turkey has never had a governmental policy of ridding itself of any religion, sect, race or group. But our country treats people who challenge the state, assault its security forces and kill innocent citizens the same as any civilized
country. True, 200,000 Armenians died during the exile. But the number of
Turks, Circassians and especially Kurds that lost their lives was even greater.
You don't come across events in our history similar to what the US did to its
Japanese citizens during World War II, how Eisenhower treated the
surrendering German Army, or what France did in Algeria.

During the same time, Hasan Pulur of Milliyet also elaborated on the official
version (3/9/2005 and 3/14/2005), just to give more examples. Thus some of these
columnists felt a duty to do historical analysis or just re-represent the historical
arguments. The basic tactical move is that "there is indeed an Armenian problem but
it is not like what is argued the Diasporic Armenias claim. It was more like
communal strife started by Armenian's betrayal who were deceived by Imperialist
powers.

Small scale initiatives could be ignored, a minority member columnist, Hrant
Dink, could be marginalized and academic studies could be trivialized but Orhan
Pamuk was just too visible and was hard to ignore. There was a full scale reaction.
Just to give an example from a small town case:

**Turkey probes official who ordered novelist's books destroyed**

ANKARA (AFP) - The Turkish interior ministry is reportedly investigating
an official who ordered the seizure and destruction of works by novelist
Orhan Pamuk for making a reference to the massacre of Armenians.

...Deputy governor Mustafa Altinpinar of Sutculer in the Mediterranean
province of Isparta, issued a circular ordering all copies of Pamuk’s books to
be confiscated from local libraries and bookstores and destroyed. "The author
has made baseless, slanderous and injurious accusations against the Turkish nation," the circular said.

An American historian became the beloved by some columnists at this time. An otherwise ignorable academic event became the source of tense moments: 'Armenians Conference'. The Minister of Justice publicly accused the conference holders. Some columnists began to argue how could a state funded university would hold a conference in which anti-Turkish ideas would be promoted. The conference would take place in Boğaziçi University, which is one of the most significant state

80 Tufan Tunç (3/28/2005) in Justin McCarthy: A one-man army:

It's obvious why we can't disprove the Armenian allegations, because we don't know what happened in the years 1915-16. Moreover, unlike the Armenians' fervent belief in their allegations, we don't have a strong belief in the fact that we are right. As with every issue, we are so lazy that we prefer to stay silent instead of fighting. I was thinking about this when I was talking with Justin McCarthy from the University of Louisville after his conference at Marmara University. "The Armenian allegations are a great lie and their documents are false. Turkey has to fight these slanders, but I have to admit I'm not positive that it will do so," he told me.

I asked McCarthy how he began his research on the issue. As a Ph.D. student at the University of California Los Angeles in 1976, McCarthy found out that 3 million Muslims had been killed in the Balkans and Turkey, and he started to look into this. His studies drove him to research the Armenian genocide allegations. "I have to say that until then I also believed the Armenian genocide allegations, but as I looked deeper into the issue the truth came out," he said frankly. "As my research continued, I found out that the documents of the Armenians were fake. The Turks were facing a great lie and slander." McCarthy came under pressure. He was threatened with losing his job if he continued his research. His family had to get police protection. This didn't intimidate McCarthy.
universities in Istanbul. Due to pressure, the conference was canceled which would in
turn become a fiasco for Turkey. This had triggered a myriad of columns and
headlines from various ideological positions. 81

81 Oktay Eksi (5/26/2005) would comment:

The conference on "Ottoman Armenians During the Fall of the Empire," which had
been scheduled for this week at Bogazici University, was a misguided attempt, because it was
made without taking into consideration the context in Turkey.

It would be wrong to hold this conference to disprove the views of those who argue
that the Armenian genocide never took place.

Moreover, the subject should be handled in an objective manner and though
scholarly discussions. For example, those who represent the opposing view should also be
represented there equally. That this wasn't done was probably the biggest mistake.

However these were not the only mistakes made... Justice Minister Cemil Cicek
accused those who planned the conference of "stabbing Turkey in the back" and after that
made statements a good democrat should never make: He accused them of treason. This was
the biggest mistake of all.

I don't find the government's reaction democratic, but in fact very wrong, as I wrote
above. I wish that the conference had been held and we could find the answer to these two
questions: 1. Could you hold the opposite version of this conference 'which could not be held
because Turkey is not democratic enough in Armenia? For example, could a conference on
"The Armenian Genocide Allegations Are Based on Lies" be held in Armenia? 2. Those who
say that the Armenian genocide is real, when in some European countries laws were passed
making denying the allegations a crime, did you oppose this with even a single breath?

A liberal journalist, Sahin Alpay, defines his position (4/28/2008):
Let me first explain my position on the "Armenian genocide." I have deep-felt sympathy for the hundreds of thousands of Ottoman Armenians who were punished collectively by deportation to the Syrian desert for the crimes of Armenian nationalists who sided with Russia against the Ottoman state during World War I and perished on the way due to killings by members of security forces and gangs, starvation and disease. I am, however, not convinced that the great tragedy that befell the Ottoman Armenians was a "genocide" ("the first genocide of the 20th century") that was "planned and carried out" by the Ottoman state. Nor are all historians that specialize in late Ottoman history convinced. The dissolution of the Ottoman Empire by revolts and wars did not, on the other hand, result only in the mass sufferings of the Armenians (and other Christians) but also of Muslim-Turkish subjects of that empire.


The government is promoting democratic reforms that will one day, it hopes, allow Turkey to join the European Union. In the process, old taboos, like admitting the "possibility" that the Christian Armenians were the victims of genocide, are falling. Whether steps like restoring the Akhtamar Church will ease Turkey's entry into the European Union, however, is far from certain.

To outsiders, it sometimes seems that Turks cannot decide whether they want to embrace the standards of human rights and free speech that the European Union demands of its members. In fact, however, many Turks say fervently want their country to meet those standards. So, on most days, does the government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. But defenders of the old order, including prosecutors, judges and officials with influence in the army and bureaucracy, fear that steps to open Turkish society will weaken national unity, and they are trying to suppress them.

Nationalists have tried to prevent serious investigations into incidents like a recent bombing
EU process lead opening could discursively be narrowed down to Orhan Pamuk who came to, supposedly, question the very identity of Turkishness.

There are traces of a construction of Pamuk image in my otherwise naïve note from those days:

in the southeastern province of Hakkari, which was made to look like the work of Kurdish terrorists but turned out to have been carried out by police agents... Participants had to walk through a gauntlet of angry protesters, but once they found their seats, and began to speak, they observed no limits to their debate. Their papers had titles like "What the World Knows but Turkey Does Not" and "The Roots of a Taboo: The Historical-Psychological Suffocation of Turkish Public Opinion on the Armenian Problem."

Longer version of the post:

Erkan needs to write a few words on Orhan Pamuk

It is a pity that literary contributions of Pamuk remains limited in Turkish public. It is surprising to see that anti-Pamuk front has a wide range of membership. I resist to comment on his recent political manoeuvres, some of which are annoying if i have to state, but i need to underline how important he is in my own reading tastes. When I first began to read his novels, I finally had confidence to think that there could be 'good' Turkish novelists. Of course, there are many and I eventually discovered others but this does not overshadow Pamuk's significance in the history of Turkish novel. Anti-Pamuk strategy has always been meant to use his political remarks to obscure his literary talent. If this was the case for the recent media coverage, I would admit that there could be some truth for the anti-Pamuk front, but this has always been like this. The day I know Pamuk, I began to hear anti-Pamuk commentaries... that was years and years ago... Why is this the case? I don't have any ready answers. I can only speculate. For instance, I believe, he is well beyond the gatekeepers
Erkan needs to write a few words on Orhan Pamuk

It is a pity that literary contributions of Pamuk remains limited in Turkish public. It is surprising to see that anti-Pamuk front has a wide range of membership. I resist to comment on his recent political manoeuvres, some of which are annoying if I have to state, but I need to underline how important he is in my own reading tastes. .........He does not have any particular political allegiances. He is too elite to be liked by leftists, too modern to be liked by Islamists, too liberal to be liked by Kemalists, too westernist to be liked by nationalists.

Orhan Pamuk's case became one of the most highlighted example of Article 301 and it was immediately tied to Turkey's EU process by the one of the highest level EU official:

"It is not Orhan Pamuk who will stand trial tomorrow, but Turkey," said the European Union enlargement commissioner, Olli Rehn, who oversees Turkey's entry talks with the bloc. "This is a litmus test whether Turkey is seriously committed to the freedom of expression and reforms that enhance the rule of law," he said in an unusually strong statement. Mr. Rehn said the trial of a novelist expressing a nonviolent opinion cast a shadow over accession talks, which began Oct. 3.

of Turkish literature, that is, he is difficult to classify and analyze. He is successful, he managed to be a best selling but unread novelists. So there must also be an element of jealousy. He does not have any particular political allegiances. He is too elite to be liked by leftists, too modern to be liked by Islamists, too liberal to be liked by Kemalists, too westernist to be liked by nationalists... OK. enough for tonight! (12/7/2005)
and others added:

European Union skeptics who contend that Turkey is too big and culturally different for Europe to absorb will seize on the trial as proof that Turkey still does not respect basic human rights, said Can Baydarol of Istanbul's Bilgi University.

Turkey's judicial establishment is the front line of resistance to changes urged by Europe, many Turks say. "The Pamuk trial shows us one of the most urgent aspects of our E.U. accession process is transforming the judiciary," said Mehmet Dulger, the chief of Parliament's foreign affairs commission and a member of the governing Justice and Development Party. (12/16/2005, New York Times "Popular Turkish Novelist on Trial for Speaking of Armenian Genocide")

Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn has voiced his "serious concern" about the Pamuk case. He said that a possible conviction against Pamuk would have important ramifications on Turkey's EU accession process.

The European Parliament is sending a delegation to Istanbul to observe Pamuk's trial. According to delegation leader MEP Camiel Eurlings (EPP-ED, NL), "freedom of expression is one of the fundamentals Turkey has to respect. It's essential for Turkey's accession to the EU, and cases such as the ones filed against Orhan Pamuk, Hrant Dink and Burak Pekdil or against the publishers Fatih Tas and Ragip Zarakolu are not in line with the European Convention on Human Rights and could have a negative effect on Turkey's accession process".
Orhan Pamuk's statements in a foreign news organization was tied to a particular Turkish Penal Code article (301) which was aimed to prosecute who insulted Turkishness (see appendix for more on Article 301) when he was under trial.

According to Human Rights Watch, the Turkish judiciary must promptly acquit Pamuk and drop all charges against him if the country wants to prove its commitment to free expression. Human Rights Watch will send observers to the 16 December trial.

Amnesty International has expressed "extreme concern" at the frequent use of Article 301 in Turkey. In a statement, AI said that Article 301 poses a direct threat to freedom of expression, as enshrined in Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and in Article 10 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR).

Reacting to the "international pressure groups" lobbying for Pamuk, Turkey's Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has said that "I do not think the way they act is very proper in this case". He recalled his own experience when as the mayor of Istanbul he was jailed for ten months and banned from participating in elections for reciting a poem. "At the time when I went to prison, there was no one who came to talk to me about respect for the rule of law or human rights", Erdogan said, accusing the international human rights groups of applying a "double standard". Erdogan also said that he had read Pamuk's novel and urged people to wait for the outcome of the case. "The result may very well be that he will be acquitted," he said. "It will be up to the judicial process to take its course."

Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul has expressed his confidence that the charges against Pamuk will be dropped.

Nobel prize winning writers Jose Saramago, Gabriel Garcia Marquez and Günter Grass have issued a written statement offering support to Pamuk over the charges he is facing (EurActiv, 12/14/2005, "Turkey: Novelist Pamuk's trial draws international concern")
(another note from Orhan Pamuk's trial\textsuperscript{84} ) But this was then linked to the state of Turkish Judiciary which would gradually be an unexpected political actor in the next

84 Pamuk trial triggered a burst of articles on Turkey and EU. Some of them directly focus on the trial itself and some contemplate on the fate of negotiations... It is so difficult to propose an argument, because you will immediately be labelled by the opposing parties. In-between positions are hard to hold. A critique of the trial does not mean to start despising Turkey and its human rights record. Turkey is a good, livable, modern country. It doesn't mean I support the genocide claims when I criticise the government or the State politics. But it also doesn't mean I support the latters... All positions are politically loaded and I don't think I belong to any of the major sides...(12/19/2005)

Orhan Pamuk (2005) himself wrote in the New Yorker:

In Istanbul this Friday—in Şişli, the district where I have spent my whole life, in the courthouse directly opposite the three-story house where my grandmother lived alone for forty years—I will stand before a judge. My crime is to have “publicly denigrated Turkish identity.” The prosecutor will ask that I be imprisoned for three years. I should perhaps find it worrying that the Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink was tried in the same court for the same offense, under Article 301 of the same statute, and was found guilty, but I remain optimistic. For, like my lawyer, I believe that the case against me is thin; I do not think I will end up in jail.....

The hardest thing was to explain why a country officially committed to entry in the European Union would wish to imprison an author whose books were well known in Europe, and why it felt compelled to play out this drama (as Conrad might have said) “under Western eyes.” This paradox cannot be explained away as simple ignorance, jealousy, or intolerance, and it is not the only paradox. What am I to make of a country that insists that the Turks, unlike their Western neighbors, are a compassionate people, incapable of genocide, while nationalist political groups are pelting me with death threats? What is the logic behind a state
months (for instance, Closure case of the ruling party, AKP). Drafting a new
constitution would always be on the agenda from now on when articles like 301 were
debated. State of existing minorities in Turkey would be highlighted. But

that complains that its enemies spread false reports about the Ottoman legacy all over the
globe while it prosecutes and imprisons one writer after another, thus propagating the image
of the Terrible Turk worldwide? When I think of the professor whom the state asked to give
his ideas on Turkey’s minorities, and who, having produced a report that failed to please, was
prosecuted, or the news that between the time I began this essay and embarked on the
sentence you are now reading five more writers and journalists were charged under Article
301, I imagine that Flaubert and Nerval, the two godfathers of Orientalism, would call these
incidents bizarries, and rightly so.

In an interview Orhan Pamuk (the Paris Review, 2005) said,

After the mid-nineties, when my books began to sell in amounts that no one in
Turkey had ever dreamed of, my honeymoon years with the Turkish press and intellectuals
were over. From then on, critical reception was mostly a reaction to the publicity and sales,
rather than the content of my books. Now, unfortunately, I am notorious for my political
comments—most of which are picked up from international interviews and shamelessly
manipulated by some Turkish nationalist journalists to make me look more radical and
politically foolish than I really am.

85 Minorities in general

Taha Akyol (2006)

Minorities are always a problem caused by external forces since the 1699 Treaty of
Karlowitz. Like Orsayh, historicisation. (140) Talk of minorities always causes an angst that triggers
an historical background. When the Patriarchate acts ‘politically’, it causes big public conflicts. (322)

But Law Implementation though was a bigger problem in the longer run. An early report by
AFP suggested that (see “Turkey grapples with implementation as clock ticks away to key EU
And among the crowded news topics there comes special occasions, where Turkey's EU process gain an exclusive interest from the journalists: EU summits and EU reports when when particularly they focus on Turkey's situation. i.e. Annual progress reports related to Turkey's membership negotiations attract enormous attention. i.e. EU's 50th year celebrations to which Turkey was not invited. It was certainly a disappointment for Turkish political circles. i.e. Reports related to the state of Turkish women....

As the negotiations continued, there would be more and more foreign newspaper reports on minorities in Turkey. Karl Vick (4/5/2005) focuses on Yazidis for instance:

Of about 5,600 Yazidis who lived in the area in the 1980s, only 15 are left. Midyat, a town that predates Christianity and Islam, once reflected the deep diversity of a region where faiths overlapped and conquering armies advanced and retreated. Scholars say its very name may be a mix of Farsi, Arabic and Assyrian that translates as "mirror."

But what this town of 57,000 reflects these days is a growing sameness. The Armenian Christians who built many of the old city's medieval stone buildings disappeared in the early 20th-century conflict that Armenians and many historians have called genocide. The Assyrian Christians who long accounted for the majority in Midyat have been reduced to just 100 families. ... In some ways, present-day Midyat reflects the founding principles of modern Turkey. Rising from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, an Islamic sultanate that tolerated religious minorities as second-class citizens, the Turkish republic was founded on a fierce assertion of national identity. The concept of Turkishness rooted the new nation-state firmly in the hills of the Anatolian peninsula once known as Asia Minor. But it also denied the notion of any other identity existing there.

More than 80 years after the republic was formed, anti-minority feelings can run close to the surface. Last year, an ultranationalist literally tore to pieces a human rights report on minorities before television cameras. In eastern Turkey this month, unemployed youths
were hired to portray Armenians in a civic skit depicting a conflict with Turks that was more even-handed than history suggests; municipal workers reportedly had refused to take part. .... "We tried to be out of it," said Isa Dogdu, an Assyrian standing in the doorway of a church that dates from the 7th century. As a religious minority, however, the Assyrians felt pressure both from the Kurdish guerrillas and from Turkish Hezbollah, radical Islamic guerrillas whom the government secretly armed as a proxy force. When government officials showed up at the church, said Dogdu, a religious instructor, they asked why young people in its annex were not being taught in Turkish. Assyrians, who in the 1st century formed the world's first Christian community, still learn a version of Aramaic, the language Jesus spoke. .... As a condition for joining the European Union, Turkey recently passed new legal protections for minorities. But Bakir, who fled to Germany for several years, said he and his wife came home primarily because of homesickness, not faith in new laws.

Turkey differs with the European Union on the definition of minority, insisting on its definition of nationhood grounded in Turkishness. Baskin Oran, a University of Ankara political scientist active in minority human rights, discounted the new laws as "a revolution from above. It's more or less easy to change laws. But it is much more difficult to change the mentality of the people."

A better news:

Katherine Zoepf (4/1/2005):

**Turkey Allows a First New Year for a Tiny Minority**

Like many other expressions of minority ethnic identity, the Assyrian New Year, or Akito, had been seen by Turkey as a threat. But this year, the government, with an eye toward helping its bid to join the European Union, has officially allowed the celebration by the Assyrians, members of a Christian ethnic group that traces its roots back to ancient Mesopotamia. ... "Turkey is showing itself to the E.U.," Mr. Begtas said. "When we asked the authorities for permission to celebrate this year, we knew it wouldn't be possible for them to deny us now. Turkey has to show the E.U. that it is making democratic changes."
Hansjoerg Kretschmer (6/21/2005), former head of the European Commission Representation in Ankara, said:

that in accordance with the European Union’s political criteria there is one big project still pending for Turkey, the Foundations Law (revisions to which would aim to return properties to minorities), and added: “In our view, further improvements must be done on the draft, but I’m sure the Parliament will open its ear to our concerns. It is so regrettable that Heybeliada Seminary has not yet been opened.”

KRETSCHMER: The Foundations Law, which is apparently in the Parliament. But the draft we have been analyzing very carefully needs further improvements in order to make it compatible with the European Convention of Human Rights and European standards. I’m sure the Parliament will open its ears to our concerns.

The Heybeliada Seminary is one element which is considered among the important political criteria relevant to religious freedom, and it’s so regrettable that the seminary has not yet been reopened.

All anxieties were materialized with actual killings. An Italian Catholic priest has been shot dead outside his church in north-east Turkey...

Mehmet M. Yılmaz (2/10/2006):

I am sure no one expects us to believe that a 16 year old boy, from a Trabzon family just on the edge of poverty, went out on his own and bought a 4 thousand dollar gun, because he wanted revenge for the Danish caricatures. If there are those out there who hope that we believe this, let me tell you know, you will never convince us!!

So, who put this gun into this kid’s hand? Who told him where to go, and who to target with the bullets?

We have to find out these details, just as we need to find out who the real culprits are behind this murder.
Ahmet Hakan (2/10/2006):

If you confuse the minds of people in a country with statements like "The Fener Greek Patriarchate will be ecumenical, and the goal of these people is to set up a second Vatican in Istanbul......" And if you provoke the masses with comments like "Turkey is on the verge of being overwhelmed by missionaries," or "There are thousands of churches which have been set up in apartments....." And if you spread the feeling around the society that "Everyone is against us....the only friends Turks have are other Turks....." And if you make gaffes like saying "The blame lays entirely with those that have tried to set up dialogues between religions.....": Well, of course, the result is what we have now. The seeds of enmity and strife have been planted.

My fieldnotes from a TESEV event on minorities issues:

Erkan's exclusive: Notes from TESEV's new publication announcement meeting

[I am sorry I cannot provide any photos for this event. I got a great hangover and I forgot to bring camera with me:) Drinking raki without water and taking pills might be quite interesting but not if you have a meeting to attend the other day. If i am mistaken in anyway below, please forgive me!]

TESEV, (Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundations) introduced its new publication to the public today by a conference-like meeting in Bilgi University. The book is entitled as "Tûrkîye'de Öğünûk ve Azmîîk Tartışmaları: AB Sûrecinde Yurttaşlık Tartışmaları" (Majority and Minority Debates in Turkey: Citizenship Debates in the EU Process). It is edited by Prof. Ayhan Kaya and Prof. Turgut Tarhanlı. Kaya and Tarhanlı lectured during the meeting and after their brief talks, there was a question and answer session. As usual in this kind of meetings, some question owners of anti-EU descent intended to turn this session into a polemical discussion but the speakers were more than cool and
answered the questions as if they were meant to be asked. The first person to ask was a reporter from a nationwide TV channel (but not one of the most mainstream ones):

- You are the one who is also holding the *Kurdish Conference on March 11*? [Meanwhile, I see that word is out already. You can find a preliminary program of this conference here.]

- No, although some Bilgi instructors will be speaking there, this is organized not by Bilgi University or TESEV.

His second question:

-[After quoting some arguments from the introduction of the book, which he apparently thought anti-nationalistic] Can you tell me again what your main arguments are without using academic parlance, in a way I can understand?

Prof. Kaya and Tarhanlı really answered this question although this was clearly a vicious one. I admired their coolness. The reporter by forcing to re-state theses, intended a presentable reaction from both the speakers and from the nationalistic audience to emerge but this did not happen... Three old Kemalist ladies sat down in the corner and asked polemical questions, too. I could eavesdrop (!) their saying that "oh he didn't like our questions and he is running away" when journalist Etyen Maşçupyan (a well known journalist/columnist Turkish citizen of Armenian origin) left the room. Let me not mistaken: He was just leaving as many others were leaving. It wasn't a particular reaction, it was just the end of meeting. The ladies were in a state of self-indulgence...

**Here are some notes from Kaya's and Tarhanlı's speeches...**

Prof. Ayhan Kaya announced that this book is the most interdisciplinary work at the moment in Turkey. An analytically significant aspect of this work is that unit of analysis is not the concept of minority but the relation between majority and minority. These terms are relationally defined but narrow minded emphases on the term of minority misses the point and dominates the literature. Kaya is particularly highlights the fact that these terms have relevance not only legally but also socially and anthropologically. By analyzing minority/majority issues in terms of sociological relevance, one will escape from the entrapment of cultural, ethnic and religious orientations. As a source of resolution Kaya offers
"constitutional citizenship". A sociologically understood political concept of constitutional citizenship will replace ethnical, cultural and religious portrayals.

According to Prof. Kaya, the problem of nationalism disappeared for Turkey since the EU's Helsinki Summit in 1999. Those anti-EU organizations and people who are especially vocal nowadays do not represent majority of Turkish citizens. Kaya, then, questions the regime of representation in order to support his thesis. He argues that mass media overrepresents the nationalists and it seems that they are more powerful and effective than they really are.

Among other things two more quotes from Prof. Kaya:
* "There is always misunderstanding in the use of laicism and secularism...I believe religion can be incorporated to a secular life is possible."
* "Modern society is built on trust. We can achieve trust by dialogue between citizens..."

Prof. Turgut Tarhanlı gave special emphasis to the place of law in society. He stated that minority and majority relations are based on a constellation of power relations and law is needed for a just governance. Law limits or teaches rulers how to govern.

[My hangover became more effective and could take less notes]

More notes from his talk:
- Cartoon row in Denmark is understood by Europeans in terms of modern European values. However, we are living in a state of post-modern era. Freedom of speech has its limits. In the name of free speech, 200 hundred thousand Muslims living in Denmark might be offended...
- Minority laws about non-muslims in Lozannes Treaty treats them automatically as foreigners. [I am not too sure about this quote at all. Please make sure if it is what he means before starting speculation] (16 February 2006)
Turkishness itself would also be debated albeit silently. Turn of events alerted EU officials and later progress reports included the Orhan Pamuk's trial and

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86 Turkishness

Eser Karakaş (2004):

When I hear the statements of statesmen of Republic of Turkey over Northern Iraq Turcomans, I feel like I am deceived in all my life. What constitutes a Turk? Since primary school Atatürk Nationalism was inculcated and according to that nationalism, whoever is a citizen of Turkey whatever ethnicity or religiosity s/he has, it is a Turk. But those statements imply as if those Turcomans are also our citizens/Turks like us. (303-307)

Two Turks make Time's top 100 for 2008

Alongside Robert Gates, the Dalai Lama, Oprah Winfrey and Facebook creator Mark Zuckerberg, two Turks were praised by Time magazine for their lifetime achievements one in the area of leadership, the other in the field of science.

In Time magazine's annual Top 100 Most Influential People issued last week, Fener Greek Patriarch Bartholomeos, born and raised in Turkey, and Mehmet Öz, a cardiothoracic surgeon and award-winning author born to Turkish parents in Cleveland, Ohio were recognized for their contributions to humanity.

...In his article on Bartholomeos, Archbishop of Canterbury and head of the Anglican Church Rowan Williams praised his commitment to the environment through his insistence that ecological questions are essentially spiritual ones. "Probably more than any other religious leader from any faith, Patriarch Bartholomeos, 68, has kept open this spiritual dimension of environmentalism," wrote Williams.
Oz, a well-known name in the United States thanks to his appearances on Oprah's daily show and his best-selling books on health made his mark for his compassion and ability to communicate the importance of health to a wider public. "He is a man of extraordinary compassion and strength, remarkably suited both to caring for his own patients and to carrying a message of health to a larger world," wrote Eric Ripert, co-owner of Le Bernardin in New York City. "Perhaps when you've had the powerful experience of opening human hearts, you find it a little easier to open your own," he wrote of Oz. (Turkish Daily News, 5/2/2008)

"I am a bit late on the issue but I guess it is still valid for my research purposes. Three metaphors got my attention in defining Turkish society during the hot media debates triggered by PM Erdogan's recent speeches in which he used the metaphor 'cement'... A young and prominent novelist Elif Şafak offered the term ebru- traditional Turkish marbling- that is supposed to describe the nation best.

Meanwhile, Erkan Mumcu the general leader of the opposition Motherland (Anavatan) Party, has criticized Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan for his recent comments about primary versus secondary identity. "These arguments are nothing but 'a shirt of insanity' that someone is trying to make the country wear," warned Mumcu. The opposition leader also reserved sharp words for PM Erdogan's recent comment about "religion being a cementing bond between the different ethnicities in Turkey": "Not in a political or legal sense, but in a cultural and social sense, religion is a 'cement.' But only if you remove your (addressing Erdogan) hand from it," said Mumcu. Mumcu had one point offered the sherbet as a better metaphor to describe Turkish identity... [Sherbet is a traditional middle eastern drink. According to Merriam Webster: a cold drink of sweetened and diluted fruit juice] (12/29/2005)

Ertuğrul Özkök wrote on the 'cement' metaphor (12/17/2005):
consequences. Wave of events triggered by Orhan Pamuk statements was enclosed in a larger discursive field: Rising nationalism. Ultranationalist views and actions spread and influenced the domestic scene. It showed its face in bestselling conspiracy books, Hitler's book, 'flag frenzy' that ended up decorating public spaces with huge Turkish flags and finally Turkish army's explicit attempt to shape government policies. 87 Two major opposition parties, MHP88 and CHP89 had already been

Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan says "Religion is a cement." Many people, rightly so, are angry about this. Where does Erdogan use these words? At a moment when he doesn't believe that the concept of "Turkishness" is enough of a cement to bind the people of this country. But, is our shared religion, "Islam," really a cement? Let's look at our eastern borders. Despite that it has been torn apart, the shared religion in Iraq is Islam. But this shared religion doesn't seem to have any effect in terms of bringing peace. And as the most fiery defender of the thesis that in fact the European Union is not a Christian club, Turkey then presenting its primary identity as Islam doesn't seem very realistic. If this is the case, we need a stronger cement to hold the Turkish Republic together.

87 Secularist/ Nationalist backlash until the July 2007 elections

The Ergenekon operation would demonstrate complex but powerful network of ultranationalist mobilization. But the social fabric were already tuned to be exploited.

Here is another early sign narrated by Amberin Zaman (3/16/2005) of Los Angeles Times:

Hitler Finds an Audience in Turkey

"Mein Kampf," Adolf Hitler's notorious work outlining his anti-Semitic world view, has become a bestseller in this officially secular but mostly Muslim nation. Its sudden rebirth has alarmed the country's small Jewish community and raised concern among officials in the European Union, which Turkey aspires to join. ...... Like several other vendors here, Oznur insisted that the newfound popularity of "Mein Kampf" was a factor mostly of price. Sales soared after several new translations were published at
the beginning of the year and priced at about $3.50 a copy. Most books of a similar length cost nearly double that.

Some analysts say the appeal of “Mein Kampf” probably has to do with the rising anti-Americanism here, a result of the U.S.-led invasion of neighboring Iraq. Among the work’s chief rivals on the bestseller lists is “Metal Storm,” a gory thriller that depicts a U.S. invasion of Turkey. The hero, a Turkish spy whose training includes shooting his puppy, avenges his homeland by leveling Washington with a nuclear device. In a country where conspiracy theories are commonly used to explain international politics, “it is accepted wisdom in some circles that Israel dictates U.S. policy,” said Dogu Ergil, a Middle East expert at Ankara University. Thus, his theory goes, anti-Americanism morphs into a hybrid strain of anti-Semitism that in turn arouses curiosity about Hitler.

Others say Turks are drawn more by the book’s nationalistic message than its anti-Semitic rants. Nationalist sensitivities have been sharpened by European Union demands that Turkey ensure greater freedom for the country’s religious minorities and restive Kurds as conditions for its membership in the alliance. “Nationalist reflexes have been triggered, there are fears the country will be dismembered,” said Nilufer Narli, an Istanbul-based sociologist. [emphases mine]

Yigal Schleifer (4/5/2005) provides instances of of rising nationalism at the same period.

Flag Frenzy in March 2005

Jonny Dymond (2005/03/24):

Turkey is in the grip of something close to a flag frenzy - with demonstrations across the country to show support for the Turkish flag.

Trade unions have been handing out flags, and municipalities have been organising flag
displays. The moves follow an attempt to burn a Turkish flag in the south-eastern city of Mersin, during the festival of Newroz earlier this week. The white crescent and star on a deep red background is a very common sight.

Outside petrol stations, in banks, on local government offices, hanging from residential buildings, the flag of the republic is often seen fluttering. But this week's fervour is different. It springs from an attempt by two young men to burn the Turkish flag during the festival of Newroz - a time when Kurdish nationalist passions rise. As news of the attempt spread, so did the outrage. Nudged by the state broadcasting authority, all the country's television channels are broadcasting with a small Turkish flag in the corner of the screen. Tens of thousands have attended demonstrations. In the city of Isparta, an effigy of the Kurdish paramilitary leader, Abdullah Öcalan, was burned.

Akyol questions DEHAP's position (3/23/2005)

The real issue is that chauvinistic emphasis still exists in this movement and they still insist on a different flag. Thus their claim of a 'common flag' is unconvincing. A different flag has only one meaning: partition. Of course people are protesting this. Even Kurdish citizens don't vote for them. Turkey is improving its democracy. The DEHAP movement also has to abandon its ethnic nationalist and totalitarian character and transform itself into a movement of democracy and cultural pluralism. Hiding behind deceptive maneuvering isn't the same thing.

One of the ideological sources of current nationalism comes from left wing circles. In the name of patriotism, many left wing movement identified themselves as "milici" in 1970s. Elements of the same discourse could be found in current anti-EU discourses:

Eser Karakaş (2004) questions this kind of nationalism and outlines these elements:

At the time of these leftist discourses (1970s and 1980s), power elites of Turkey were the main beneficiaries of protectionism and its incredible scale of profits and public
banking scandals, and monopolistic State economic enterprises, agricultural subventions.
Still, leftists defended all in the name of patriotism. (116-7). This means these leftists were either incapable of analyzing power structures properly or they were the protectors of dominant economic and political rentier relations. It seems like the latter is the case... (119).

A staunch AKP opponent Bekir Coşkun would see that with the victory of AKP (3 November 2002 elections), Turkey's EU dream actually ended. One should note that despite his continous anti-EU ranting, Mr. Coşkun employs a different tactic here and in fact signifies the bitterness that not traditional elites but AKP leads the EU process:

You (The Turkish people) have refused to join the European Union (EU) on the election day, November 3rd, 2002.
At that period, there were two roads for Turkey.
The first road was about joining the Western civilization as a democratic, contemporary country.
The second was about going back.
You went to cast your votes and chose the second road.
You have refused to join the EU on November 3rd.
Instead of providing pictures from the modern Turkey, we have displayed pictures that resemble Iran.
Turkish women, who received certain rights before most of the women in European countries, got displayed wearing their headscarves on western newspapers. A prime minister who does not speak a foreign language talked on Islamic life style and the Sharia law.
Secular Republic of Turkey began to be called moderate Islam in the West.
The Turkish media and business community got into a tent of lies and made people believe these lies.
You have seen the result:
The European people do not want Turkey in their union. No matter what any one may say, the "no" vote in France on the EU Constitution is in fact a "no" to Turkey's EU membership.
Turkey’s EU dream is over.
There is no EU alternative for Turkey any more.
The tent of lies has collapsed...our dream of a civilized society has collapsed. Because, you chose to refuse (such a civilized life) on November 3rd, 2002.

Mr. Coşkun proved to be one of the most vocal columnists in secular/nationalist backlash and although not implicated in Ergenekon case, he did more damage to AKP and arouse nationalist tensions then many others who were implicated.

**In the mean time,**

**Bağımlı imposes ban on ultra nationalists**

Recent incidents of violence in universities, lynch attempts against Kurdish-origin people in Sakarya province in western Turkey, and other acts on the streets have caused anxiety within the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) since all those acts were committed by ultra nationalists.

These scenes prompted the MHP’s leader, Devlet Bahçeli, to give a democracy lesson to the ultra nationalists forming the main supporter group of his party. He also ordered all Ülkü Ocakları (spots where members of the youth wing of the ultra nationalist MHP gather) in neighborhoods and districts in big cities to prevent ultra nationalist youth from getting involved in any kind of “provocative” events. Ülkü Ocakları Education and Culture Foundation President Harun Öztürk sent a “circular” to those spots that are 52 in number in different neighborhoods of Istanbul. Now, 20 of them are being closed. Also, the number of Ülkü Ocakları in İzmir will be reduced to five and the ones in Ankara will be limited as to allow only one per district. Bahçeli also ordered last month the closure of the MHP’s provincial organization in Antalya after it was understood that some MHP members were involved in violent acts at a university in that province. Following the incidents in Antalya, Bahçeli issued a circular and gave the directive that “no matter how big the provocation, nationalists will never be on the streets.” [Gökçe Bozkurt (5/3/2008)]

Ulusalcılar (neo-nationalists): Since 2002 neo-nationalist groups have been tirelessly working to harm the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government's ability to govern. Ulusalcıs have implemented several strategies, including plots for a military coup and the promotion of the Constitutional Court case to shut down the AK Party. Despite the fact that Operation Ergenekon deeply affected the Ulusalcı strategies for creating chaos to create "reasons" for a military coup, there are still many supporters of the Ulusalcı movement that would harm the AK Party government and Turkish democracy through creating chaos. The Ulusalcı activists at this point, however, are dedicating their efforts to influencing court cases related to Operation Ergenekon and the Constitutional Court case against the AK Party. If they win the former cases, it would give a big boost to anti-AK Party and anti-Western campaigns, enabling them to mobilize people for street demonstrations.

April 2007- E-warning

NO 28:

Recently with the cooling down of the relations thanks to the efforts of both Turkey and EU-EU is no more an issue in Turkey. Probably best example: EU doesnt mean anything not relevant any more. Take the military statement. If Turkey was in negotiation like Croatia that statement would never happen. Military would never dare to do that. (emphasis added) Military acts like that because it sees EU perspective isn't there any more.

What is MHP?

Cenap Çakmak (5/1/2008):

While it [MHP] remained the sole representative of the far right for a long time, the movement was later joined by other actors who adopted an approach based on the rejection of
integration efforts with the outer world, globalization, making alliances with foreign actors and promoting strong nationalistic views. Unlike conservative nationalists, the new actors of the far right clearly and meticulously exclude religion and religious values. Mostly for this reason they are dubbed "ulusalcilar" in the Turkish press in reference to the word "ulus," which literally means "nation" but is mostly preferred by non-conservatives over "millet," the Arabic equivalent. To make a distinction between the two, English-based press refers to conservatives as nationalists and non-conservatives as ultranationalists.

.....The Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), which has remained the sole representative of the far right in Turkey for a long time, is being paid attention to because of its recent political moves. The party is careful to ensure that it is not considered a natural ally of the strong nationalist front committed to the idea of opposing Turkey's European Union membership bid. While the alliance of ultranationalists, which includes a variety of actors with different ideological and political backgrounds, has relied on a strategy to undermine the administration led by the Justice and Development Party (AK Party), the MHP has made some surprising moves to ensure that this administration enjoys a greater sphere in governing the country.

Despite strong statements used by the MHP leadership during the election campaign to politically surpass the AK Party, the MHP has adopted a more lenient and constructive approach after gaining seats in Parliament in the July 22 elections. First, it indirectly contributed to Parliament's electing Abdullah Gül as president when it decided to be present in the plenary session. This move was risky and equally controversial given that in the event of their absence at the meeting, it would have been impossible to complete the election process. Second, the MHP also supported the government's attempt to lift a long-standing headscarf ban through a constitutional amendment.

.....

This visible transformation notwithstanding, the MHP still remains committed to its core values and ideological roots. It has recently made it clear that it will remain opposed to any attempts to amend the controversial Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code (TCK). But it should be noted that this opposition does not contradict with its new stance simply because its
discourse on this matter is not in breach of core democratic principles. In other words, it consistently takes action to promote democratic values while not wavering in its ideological positions vis-à-vis some controversial issues.

......But in any case, there is a visible and concrete outcome of the strategy: that the MHP may not be considered part of the ultranationalist alliance. In other words, the party leadership has successfully presented itself as distinct from this movement.

89  What is CHP?

The Economist commentary:

Mr Baykal might at last step down. Since taking charge of the party in 1992, the American-trained economist has not won a single election. In 1999 the CHP failed to win any seats at all—a first for the party, which was set up in 1923 by modern Turkey's founding father, Kemal Ataturk. Yet despite loud calls for his retirement (there is even a website called "Baykal resign" at www.baykalistifact.net), Mr Baykal was re-elected as CHP leader this week for a tenth time at his party congress. With the rules rigged to benefit him, his lacklustre rivals never stood a chance. ..... 

When the generals threatened a coup last year to stop Abdullah Gul's election to the presidency, the CHP didn't utter a peep. Mr Gul, previously foreign minister, was deemed by secularists to be unfit for the job because his wife wears the Islamic-style headscarf. When he then won a first round of parliamentary voting, the CHP asked the constitutional court to overturn the vote on the debatable ground of the lack of a quorum. The court agreed. It was thanks to such shenanigans that AK raised its share of the electoral vote by a whopping 12 points in July—and Mr Gul duly became president. The CHP failed to win a single seat in 36 of Turkey's 81 provinces (many largely Kurdish).

The CHP still wants military intervention in northern Iraq. This week it unsuccessfully fought against an AK-sponsored bill to amend Article 301 of the penal code,
which has been used to prosecute hundreds of writers and academics for insulting Turkishness. Tarhan Erdem, a CHP veteran who quit the party eight years ago, observes that, in a country where more than half the population is under 30 and more than half the women cover their heads, the CHP is “increasingly irrelevant and out of touch, leaving millions of pro-secular Turks with nowhere to turn to.” The CHP’s xenophobia has also led to calls for this nominally leftist party to be booted out of the Socialist International. Its Teflon leader could not care less. (Turkish politics | An ineffective opposition | Economist.com.)

İbrahim Kalın (5/1/2008):

The current CHP leadership seems to be happy with the small yet comfortable position they have in the Turkish political spectrum. The CHP does not claim to live up to the standards of a social democrat, let alone leftist party. Labor, justice, equal distribution of wealth, environment, political participation, in-party democracy … none of these figure into the current CHP political discourse. Instead, you have a very narrow and dogmatic interpretation of Kemalism and laicism. In all issues of freedom versus security, the CHP is to be found on security’s side. And it is security for the state, not for the people.

The CHP’s political dogmatism is another paradox. The core philosophical values of the CHP’s political ideology are based on the Enlightenment, reason, science and the questioning of all dogmas. While the CHP accuses others of being irrational, dogmatic, religious, conservative, etc., it prisons itself within high walls of true beliefs and unquestionable premises. Keeping up with the age is not a political virtue in the CHP manual. Reading the trends and improving itself is seen as betraying its fundamental ideology. The result is an ideological block, not a political party.

In his book, titled "An Attitude-based Inspection of Political Participation" published in Ankara in 1970, Baykal gives the difference between the two political streams: "There is a political understanding designed to regulate the society in accordance with certain sets of principles. ... The importance carried by these principles in terms of an abstract value is particularly significant. And in order for such an assessment to be made, an intellectual activity is necessitated. The CHP's bond with the elite groups in society stems from this.

"The political understanding that underlies the CHP movement has been mobilized to regulate the society based on certain principles employed for their compatibility with certain abstract values. And this situation makes it more sensitive toward social groups that favor these values. On the contrary, the political understanding that underlies the movement in line with the DP tradition does not target regulating the society in terms of certain principles. Rather, this is a political understanding born in society as a reaction. Its principles are, therefore, not predetermined principles aimed at manipulating political activities, but are principles that were naturally born out of a certain activity. According to this understanding, politics is a result of the social balance; it is not an instrument with which to change that balance. Accordingly, the AP is more sensitive toward the demands and pressures likely to come from the social base, not toward those who favor abstract values. Its election successes are a result of this." (pp. 117-118)

In his book, Baykal talks about five differences between the CHP and the parties of rightist masses:

What matters in the CHP tradition is the rational validity and abstract value of any solution. Whereas, in the AP-DP tradition, the social feasibility, the balance between the demand and possibilities -- namely, the functional value -- matters. 2. Although the political understanding of the CHP is systematic and utopian, the DP-AP tradition's is empiric and pragmatic. 3. The political understanding of the CHP is elitist, but that of the rightist parties is populist. 4. The fundamental approaches of the party staff are different. The political staff of the CHP consists of missionary-like people, whereas the AP-DP tradition's staff consists of people called political
positioned as right-nationalist and left-nationalist respectively and AKP had finally showed signs of nationalist reactions and retreated from his distinctive policies. In brokers. 5. The attitudes of these two different groups of people are also different when it comes to needs. While the CHP tradition always seeks to delay satisfying needs and prioritizing long-term needs, the DP-AP tradition seeks sudden and short-term satisfaction.


I recently interviewed Dutch Turkophile Erich Jan Zürcher, who said: ‘Turkey needs a real leftist and liberal party. The lack of opposition is no good for Turkey.’ Do you agree?

Yes, I do. Turkey needs such a party. The Republican People’s Party (CHP) is never something like that. [CHP leader] Deniz Baykal acts just like a dictator. If I were a Turkish leftist, I would set about starting a new party.

90 What is AKP?

This is a blog entry of first impressions:

If Erdoğan wants to cheat, he will do it perfectly, he is a natural born merchant and opposition’s and mainstream media’s move to attack him is no more than a trivial manoeuvre in actual domestic political settings.

2) Like many people other citizens, I am becoming impatient of the ruling government not because of Erdoğan’s ‘wealth’ but because of open or covert moves against secular lifestyles.

3) Any critique of government that is based on some social group’s capital accumulation is futile if this is especially done by some other mainstream political
this newly shaped scene, we would have witnessed an assassination of a Turkish-Armenian journalist, Hrant Dink. It is not entirely a secret plot. Local military actors, be it the opposition or be it the media itself. Unfortunately Turkey is not very good at the transparency league and I guess very few of the actors have clean sheets in their background. This is exactly why the main opposition party, CHP lost all its credibility in the eyes of citizens: In the knowable corruption history of Turkey, CHP municipalities topped in corruption scandals in 1990s...To be continued.... (31 January 2006)

[by 2008,]


The AK Party: The AK Party has two problems. The first problem is the looming threat of Abdullahi Şener, a former deputy prime minister who may split the party in the days ahead. Political observers in Ankara say Şener may convince as many as 50 deputies to resign from the AK Party. Thus, the AK Party leadership needs to keep the party intact. The AK Party may need to introduce legislation that will require a referendum, but to hold the referendum card in its hand the AKP needs to maintain its absolute majority in Parliament.

The second problem, of course, is figuring out how to dance between issues like a new military leadership, the EU process, upcoming local elections and the constitutional court decision. In small towns in Anatolia the election campaigns have already started. Possible candidates are starting to make decisions about their political parties. Possible AK Party candidates, however, are confused about the possibility of party closure.

Given the fact that in small Anatolian towns people base their votes on promises given to them by potential candidates, the ambiguity surrounding the AK Party's future is becoming a major disadvantage for it. If such uncertainty continues, the AK Party may lose the rural Anatolian towns where it previously maintained its stronghold position.
officials and bureaucracy were involved in that assassination. This is already
officially reported by Prime Ministry investigators and although Şemdinli trial did not
yield a positive result, ongoing Ergenekon trial already demonstrated how many high
level state personnel were involved in a plot for coup d'etat. Towards the end of
writing period two retired generals would be arrested- this is the first time in Turkey's
history- because of their alleged involvement in that coup d'etat attempt. Hence the
state of Turkish army would always touch upon the process started with Orhan
Pamuk's statements. But speaking of army in Turkey means the Kurdish insurgency
whose implications could lead to new ways of entanglement within the assemblage.

What I attempt to do in this last section is that if one starts with another
event/component such as Turkey-US relations (see appendix) there will be another
chain reaction of events in which a journalist will end up trapped in the political
assemblage. It is time in this context of political assemblage to have a focused look
on journalists at work.
Chapter 6 - Turkish Journalists: Independent political actors?

I have always thought of many senior Turkish journalists as both receivers and producers of political discourses during their mediative practices. However, towards the parliamentary and then presidential elections in Turkey (particularly the first half of 2007), mainstream Turkish press seemed to have acquired a more active and independent political role. It has always been argued that mainstream media actors, in the context of media conglomerations, are allies of the ruling party. However, as the disjuncture in political beliefs between the ruling party- its moderate Islamism- and senior journalists -staunch secularism- widened, the latter acted strongly against the political authority. This seemed to ignore widespread arguments of commercial interest. That is, since the early 1980's conglomeration period, Turkish press went hand in hand with the political authority.

After surveying the historical course of Turkish elites and theoretical role of media in political purposes, I intend to describe journalistic production that shaped the frame of political mediation during the presidential election time in 2007 in Turkey. This chapter is particularly interested in several instances of conceptual appropriations from social sciences in order to frame the political debate. In this context, appropriation of a well-known social scientist's, Şerif Mardin's, understanding of "peer pressure" is particularly significant. Senior journalists started a debate that lamented for the "Malaysification of Turkey", which is an exclusive outcome of a media campaign, through the use of Şerif Mardin’s arguments. Hence, these focal interests will substantiate the efforts to locate the social and political condition of Turkish journalists. This discussion here is indirectly related to Turkey's EU membership
process. At one level, as the metaphor chapter demonstrates, all senior Turkish journalists support the EU process. However, the election process shows how their subject-positions as political actors are inherently opposed to Turkey's EU membership process.

As a brief methodological note, once again, when I speak of Turkish journalists I mean editorial-level journalists or highly established columnists who have an impact on the overall newspaper policies. Besides, these journalists are mostly employed by the biggest media conglomeration in Turkey (Doğan Media Group) and their newspapers are among the most selling mainstream newspapers. My research and literature survey demonstrated that only this section of Turkish journalists can be classified as part of the Turkish policy elites. Another worthy note is, as it is stated in Chapter 005, Turkish press is in a major transformation at the moment with the rule of AKP and we do not know yet where it will lead to. However, this group of journalists still occupy a leading role at the current state of Turkish press.
A brief history of Turkish political elites

In order to situate where senior journalists stand in the political spectrum a brief outline and history of Turkish political elites to this date might be useful. An encompassing center-periphery divide in ideological terms is argued for in several major works on Turkish society (see, Heper 1985; Mardin 1978). “The “center,” represented by the nationalist, republican, centralist, statist tradition of Kemalism, has identified closely with the bureaucracy, state, and Armed Forces, and has been extremely suspicious towards what it sees as the centrifugal forces of the “periphery.” The “periphery,” in turn, refers to the ethnically and culturally heterogeneous masses, originally rural but increasingly urbanized, who have been defined by the “center” as backward-looking, traditionalist, and, if openly hostile, as reactionary (irtica). The result of this divide has been an unstable party system, characterized by high levels of conflict. The close identification of certain parties with the “center” has made the preservation of the secular and monocultural state their overriding principle of legitimacy, at the detriment of the procedural legitimacy associated with democracy. The “periphery,” in turn, has at times reacted to the lack of venues for participation with violence, creating an atmosphere of “politics as war.” Between the major parties, elections have often been viewed as zero-sum games over the control of the entire state apparatus, rather than just over governmental power. This has inevitably provoked the military into action, making it a central, if reluctant, political actor (Parslow, 2007; 7).

It has now been argued that this center-periphery division have been increasingly disrupted since the 1980 coup d’état. Rising actors that were previously excluded from the center could now appear and shape the public sphere (Keyman and
Özbudun 2002; Toprak 1995) Against the traditional state elite, "counter-elites" have emerged as formidable contenders, building on significant economic and cultural bases (Göle 1997). An even more contemporary development is Turkey's European Union membership process and it has been argued that the economic and political conditionality of the EU has become the decisive factor in reshaping Turkey's political culture Müftüler-Bać 2000).

In the mean time, since the 19th century Turkish journalists have played a leading role in interpreting and articulating cultural and political transformations in the country. In many historical and political turning points of the country, such as the Young Turks (in the mid-19th century), the Committee for Progress and Union (early 20th century), the early Republicans (1920s-1930s) and Turgut Özal's liberal party (mid-1980s), journalists allied with the ruling power elites. In another turning point, that is, during the present negotiations process with the European Union, the leading journalists seemed to have fallen apart from a rising powers of the society which could be represented in the person of Justice and Development Party (AKP).
The effect of EU in domestic politics

Meltem Muftuler-Bac (2000) states that “There are basically two mechanisms that enable the European Union to play such a role; Turkey's Association with the European Union and the Turkish aspirations for full membership.” (p. 159).

When Turkey signed its Association Agreement with the EC in 1963, it automatically accepted the supervision of a higher authority over its political system; this of course was not so apparent to the Turkish policy-makers then. The realization of the obligations Turkey put itself under through the agreements it signed with the Council of Europe, EC/EU and OSCE became obvious in the 1980s.

A turning point for Turkish-EU relations is the September 12, 1980 military take-over in Turkey. The European Community reacted promptly to the military take-over and issued a Declaration the following day, stating that it expected the return to civilian rule as soon as possible. In 1981, the Community decided to suspend the Fourth Financial Protocol, as foreseen by the Association Agreement, in response to arrests of the leaders of the political parties, specifically to the leader of the Social Democrats, Bulent Ecevit. Finally in 1982, with a European Parliament resolution, the Community decided to freeze the Association with Turkey in the light of no political change, i.e., the restoration of democracy. (p. 164).

In mid 1990s EU’s objections on the issue would continue:

From the EU perspective, a major problem of Turkish politics is the omnipresent role of the military in civilian politics. In its Agenda 2000 Document, the Commission stated that "recent developments in the administration and education system, while intended to strengthen secularism,
nonetheless, underline the particular role of the military in Turkish society...there are ambiguities in the Turkish legal system with regard to civilian political control of the military..." (p.168)

The AKP government started a legal reform in unprecedented and unpredictable level. Not only the military but all the strongholds of secularist elites were affected by this process. (However, one should bear in mind that it was not only legal reforms, but the rise of new economic elites, so-called Anatolian tigers, and emergence of new education classes that were allied with AKP’s rise did upset the whole balance of power in the country).

In terms of Keyman (2007) these changes can be described in three sections:

The interconnection between politics and religion has become much more delicate in Turkey since the 1990s, as a result of the rise of Islam politically, economically and culturally. The formation of Turkish modernity has radically changed as Islamic identity claims become more (1) politicized, giving rise to political Islam realized through political parties, the most recent example being the success of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in the 3 November 2002 national election and its formation of a single-party majority government; (2) economically grounded, as Islam has begun to function as ‘a powerful network based upon trust relations’ among small and medium economic enterprises, establishing a very powerful economic actor, that is, the Independent Business and Industrialist Organization (the MUSIAD), which aims to promote a morally loaded economic modernization, founded upon a combination of free market and traditional religious values;
and (3) culturally loaded recognition demands, as in the case of the 'headscarf affair' and religious sects. (216-217)

Therefore,

Today, just as it is not possible to analyze Turkish politics without reference to Islam, it is equally impossible to understand the Turkish political economy without taking into account Islamic capital and its institutional structure, or the cultural sphere without recognizing the symbolic and sociological power of Islam (p. 223).

At a more theoretical level a recent study by Koopmans (2007) demonstrates that "European integration has remained a project by political elites and, at least in as far as discursive influence is concerned, also to the benefit of political elites .......

and as a general rule, actors who are less influential in Europeanised public debates tend also to be more critical of European institutions and less supportive of the integration process than actors whose voices are more prominent in Europeanized public debates (205-206).

As a result of both domestic and EU powered rise of AKP, the latter began to be the target of aggrieved sectors. What Koopmans state in EU-scale media mobilizations well suits our case:

.... First, power and prominence are important news values that structure the way in which media select a few 'newsworthy' claims for coverage and discard many others. Media professionals’ knowledge of who is important and influential in European policy circles will therefore structure their news selection, with the result of a convergence between discursive and policy-
making power. Second and conversely, influence in the public debate may translate into policy-making power. Successful mobilisation of media attention directly influences policy makers and has the potential of influencing the attitudes of the public at large, which in turn may affect policy makers’ positions and the relative standing and power of actors in the policy process (Koopmans, 2007; 207).
Journalists as political actors, a brief theoretical background

There is a considerable amount of work on the media effects theories but a recent article by Hans Mathias Kepplinger (2007) was particularly helpful. Although his purpose is somewhat different, that is, to create a “framework for the analysis of reciprocal effects of mass media—in this case, their impact on subjects of media reports, especially on decision makers in areas of politics and business (3)”, his findings help me to situate my own arguments. In criticizing previous media effects theories Kepplinger states that:

[they] neglect the direct influence of the media on politicians (or alternatively, also on entrepreneurs, artists, and athletes). This entails considerable consequences for research. Because the main focus of studies on the political relevance of the media is their influence on the population (agenda setting, voting behavior), researchers often fail to adequately consider the media’s influence on decision makers. In essence, therefore, studies on the responsiveness of politicians to media are studies on their responsiveness to the opinions of the majority as shaped by the media. The media, however, are not really granted a direct role in the political process. [emphasis added] (p. 4)

Borrowing from the work of Kurt and Gladys Engel Lang (1953) that studied on reciprocal effects, Kepplinger continues to argue that “Examples of direct effects are explicit judgments about the accuracy of the reports, positive and negative emotions in subjects, the attribution of motives and objectives to the journalists, phone calls, and letters to the editors. An example of indirect effects is the consequence of media subjects’ phone calls to the editor of a newspaper about the
author of a report, which may affect the latter's subsequent coverage. Another example would be how changes in policy made by decision makers who are responding to media coverage affect those who would benefit or suffer from decisions made or not carried out. (p. 7) These examples prove to be a good ethnographic insight, and in my brief ethnographic encounters with senior journalists I got the sense for further research need on these "direct effects" cases. In the mean time, Herbst (1998) and Peter (1998) also find that "because political decision makers and journalists value and rely on prestigious papers and personally profit from their coverage, these papers exert a relatively stronger influence on decision makers in these fields than would, for example, TV" (quoted in Kepplinger, 2007; 10) What media can directly achieve is that by framing of the issues, they can draw the boundaries for legitimate action Thus they can have a constraint on political actors (Linsky, 1986). However, even in this "direct effects" literature media people, i.e. journalists are not assumed to be independent political actors. They are at best allied mediators. What I want to draw attention is that leading Turkish journalists are not mere mediators but might be one of the explicit political actors in Turkish politics. This is a speculative area as Page (1996) states an answer to the question "Do media further their own policy stands through news stories" is "hotly disputed" (21). However, by using Page's definition of what a "political actor" is, one still could have ideas to speculate on: "the concept of "political actor" applied to the media or anyone else, implies observable action that is purposive (though perhaps functional rather than consciously intended) and sufficiently unified so that it makes sense to speak of a single actor" (20). Thus "operating within their newspaper's editorial line, they have opportunities for taking up 'advocate' (Janowitz, 1975) and As political commentators, journalists attempt to promote opinion-formation processes among
their readerships, and thereby exert influence (Eilders et al., 2004). Statham argues that Newspapers could even institutionalize their political role by running European campaigns or including Europe as a key part of their editorial line (413-4) and that is the exact case that took place in late September, 2007 could be the substantiation of this definition. However, before focusing on the particular case, more should be said on the state of Turkish journalism. Thus I agree with Pfetsch et al (2008) and "focus on the media as political actors (Page, 1996; Pfetsch and Adam, 2008) who among other actors like governments, parties, interest groups or civil society actors make their own contributions to public debate and in their editorials legitimately raise their own voice about European integration" (466). It is already known "from empirical studies that news commentators have a significant impact on public opinion (Page et al., 1987)" (in Pfetsch et al, 2008; 466).

Referring to a very old study, I would also claim that social control in the newsroom (see Breed, 1955), which is not explicitly but commanded and directed by superiors, here in my case the editors could be mentioned, can even make journalists a monolithic power and can erase the differences. The power of the group I focus here becomes even more with this monolithic-becoming power.

In an interview, Hansjoerg Kretschmer (6/21/2005), former head of the European Commission Representation in Ankara, said:

KRETSCHMER Well I've got the impression that certainly the printed media market is very alive. I think very divergent views are being presented. [For instance] the views from the classical state-oriented attitude if you take [daily newspaper] Cumhuriyet, than on the other side Yeni Safak and Zaman you have the middle of the road, but we have certain concerns in two respects.
One, the provisions in the [new] penal code which potentially could restrict the free expression of opinion and we will have to observe how their implementation goes practically. That's one side, the other side is that the media is not properly informing and perhaps sometimes intentionally disinforming by publishing some articles which have no basis in reality.
The nature of an elite formation

Until the 1990s, Babiali was a synonym for Turkish press. Since the late 19th century, Babiali was a certain district in Istanbul where nearly all Turkish newspapers and publishers were located and it was also the place where the Ottoman government happened to exist. Thus, unlike its counterparts located close to the financial areas such as Fleet Street in London and La Bourse in Paris, Babiali was located near the political establishment during the Ottoman Empire (Duran, 1996). Aslı Tunç (2003) states that “The reason for the choice of this location depended mostly on the Ottoman press’s financial dependency on the government and, moreover, the location’s convenience for government control and censorship over all kinds of publications.” Tilç (2001, 136) highlights the fact that the first Ottoman journalists were indeed state servants who were paid by the state. They voluntarily adopt to role of teaching reforms and new political moves to the ignorant public.

However, “After 1980, however, the need for upgrading printing technology and finding more space for machinery and employees initiated a trend of moving newspaper buildings from Babiali to the pompous high-rise buildings at the outskirts (Ikitelli and Günesli) of the city (Dogan Kologlu, 1998; quoted in Aslı Tunç, 2003).

By the mid 1990s, traditional journalism district in Babiali was replaced by several main locations. In speaking of a journalism meeting, Orhan Kologlu (1998) describes three shuttles that would carry journalist from three separate districts:
1st shuttle: journalists from Inter Star, Sabah, Günaydın, Hürriyet [district: Güneşli];
2nd shuttle: journalists from Zaman, İhlas Group (Türkiye), Milliyet, Dünya [İkitelli];
3rd shuttle: Kanal 6, HBB, Nokta, Kanal E, TRT [Ortaköy]; Kanal D, TRT Harbiye Radyo evi; Flash TV [Tepebaşı] (p. 8)
This spatial move is a sign of newly gained economic independence from the political authorities. But this does not mean to overlook intertwined and interdependence relations between journalists and other power actors though.

These new places were described by Tunç as such:

This new media world of the 1990s had a great impact on the employees of those newspapers. Most of the journalists who work in those high-rise buildings with high security systems felt isolated from their readers and lost their human contact with the ‘real world’ in this almost ‘surreal’ environment. Those estranged journalists, literally trapped in their high-tech buildings, have gradually lost their ability to reflect and report the problems of their readers. (2003:11)

Although I disagree with some of the portrayal Prof. Tunç makes, this quote still demonstrates the emergence of a new press. The spatial distance from the lower classes is now completed. These heavily protected and controlled habitats now symbolize the power these senior journalists have. Hürriyet building in Güneşli is probably the best example here. There are special security guards with heavy guns in front of the building. Before the offices of the senior columnists or editors, there are extra security guards. If you happen to be accepted for an interview, you will appear before the Journalist after being checked twice and be under constant surveillance due to cameras all over the building that includes elevators (see more in Keyder, 1987 for the development of class relations before and after 1980s). The Turkish press has gained relative autonomy from the executive power, but remained to be part of the established policy elites with a new vigor.
In the mean time, an aspect of the elite foundation can be found in journalists’ access to other policy-making elites. It certainly generates a social capital that consolidates their positioning. A dimension of senior journalists’ power comes from their access to policy elites:

Kittilson and Dalton (2008) on social capital:

Although scholars generally agree that social interactions within traditional social groups build social capital, they debate the benefits of a virtual civil society (Johnston and Kaye 2003; Shah et al. 2002; Wellman et al. 2001; Scheufele, Mattnew and Nisbet 2002). Putnam (2000: 176) argues that the face-to-face interaction within traditional social group activity is the most conducive to generating social capital, because it is through direct contact, social interaction, and sustained involvement that social capital develops (also see Putnam and Feldstein 2003). Others claim that the importance of face-to-face communication may be exaggerated (Hooghe and CSD Center for the Study of Democracy An Organized Research Unit University of California, Irvine, www.democ.uci.edu 2 Stolle 2003). (p.1)

The linkage between associational life and social capital has a long history in social science research (Granovetter 1973; Coleman 1990). Scholars maintain that the civic attitudes, shared trust and reciprocal norms that make up social capital are rooted in social interactions. Robert Putnam’s (2000) research highlights the benefits of social capital for cultivating democratic norms and habits, and ultimately for effective democracy. Interaction in social groups presumably engenders social trust, and these sentiments provide a foundation for other positive social and political norms
Taha Akyol (2006) writes on a meeting with Eneco Landaburu along with a group of journalists. Mr. Landaburu was a commissioner of Enlargement and Mr. Akyol could talk to face to face with one of the most important members of European Commission on issues of ethnicity as the former was ethnically Basque (Spain) which sensitized the talk of ethnicity. (125-126) He could again talk to a high level diplomat directly. "I asked Uğur Ziyal, an extraordinary diplomat in Foreign Ministry, how Cyprus negotiations go and he says it could not be better... (183) He also writes about the access power of others:

After the AKP government, Cumhuriyet frequently relied on military sources for its headlines. Akyol believes that the Ankara office chief of Cumhuriyet, Mustafa Balbay is a reliable journalist. Therefore, he really gets

(Putnam 2000; Howard and Gilbert 2008; Uslaner 1998). Civil society activity also should develop the norms of civic engagement, such as the belief in an active citizen role, and other such orientations. Participation in civil society groups can produce social and organizational skills that are vital for a participatory democracy—much in the tradition of Tocqueville’s image of democracy in America. The development of these social norms and skills is the prime argument of the social capital theory. In addition, a wealth of research concludes that social capital encourages political participation (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995; Putnam 2000, 2002). Organizations educate, build civic skills, and plug members into networks for recruitment. Scholars often point toward unions, churches and political parties as particularly strong mobilizers of electoral participation (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). (p. 2)
news from soldiers. However, sometimes these news are defied by the office of General Staff. (2006, 375) State ministers Nimet Çubukçu and Mehmet Aydın were having breakfast with the Press. (363)\(^2\)

\(^{92}\) In some other exemplary instances,

Former Chief of Staff, Gen. Hilmi Özkök sends an email to columnist Fatih Çekirge (7/12/2008) to correct some statements attributed to him.

Hasan Cemal (5/1/2008): During lunch with one senior AK Party official on Tuesday...

Murat Yetkin (5/1/2008): Gregory Schulte, U.S. ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency, was in Ankara Tuesday to meet with officials from the Foreign Ministry and the General Staff to discuss the Iranian nuclear program. Ross Wilson, U.S. ambassador to Ankara, hosted Schulte and a group of journalists for breakfast at his residence. He had answers to some of our questions yet some remained unanswered. "I do not want to answer this," said Schulte to a particular question. It's better if I give you a summary of the entire conversation in order to express why we were not able to have an answer to that question.

Ahmet Hakan (11/14/2005) describes a trip with PM Erdoğan:

**Notes on traveling with PM Erdogan**

***Attention...attention....: Please pay no mind to journalists who announce proudly "I flew with the PM on trips abroad." Whatever they say, let the truth be known: There is no excitement in racing from one country to another, sitting in misery in some anonymous hotel lobby.
The first stops on our journey are two hot, soulless, and unentertaining Gulf countries: Qatar and Bahrein. After that, we're on to Denmark, which is, unlike the first two stops, a cold and entertaining Western country. Just think: summer and winter clothing have to fight for equal space in our suitcases.

We journalists have had the opportunity to see up close and personal how PM Erdogan was affected by Turkey's loss in the Turkey-Switzerland match from a few nights ago. It was clear that the person most devastated by the match results, which he watched on a giant screen, was Erdogan. He left the salon where we had watched the match right afterwards.

The press corps decided that the world's most boring city is Doha. For those on their way to Doha, let me warn you now: The sole opportunity for amusement in Doha is in the City Center mall. I would describe Doha's City Center as being like a joyless version of Istanbul's Akmerkez mall.

I am pleased to not that Erdogan's crew, as a result of his frequent trips abroad, has become expert at the organization of such endeavors.

There are two other very important members of the government on this trip: Vecdi Gonul, Minister of Defence, and State Minister Kursad Tuzmen. Neither of them are receiving much attention from the press, which leads me to note this: The Prime Minister dominates the attention of whatever group he is in.
Ertuğrul Özkök (12/17/2005): Recently, I was speaking with one of Prime Minister Erdoğan's advisors, Omer Celik............

Mehmet Ali Birand (3/27/2007): I dined and chatted with Olli Rehn, the EU Commissioner for Enlargement. According to what he said to Kriter Magazine, which is summarized below, Turkey-EU relations have not been 'derailed,' contrary to what is widely believed, nor are they frozen. The technical work being conducted, he argues, is proceeding at an even faster pace than last year's. I will elaborate on this in tomorrow's article.

Cengiz Candar's portrayal of Central Park walk with the President is impressive:

Cengiz Candar (9/24/2008):

We are walking in Central Park in New York. President Abdullah Gül is in the middle; I am on his left and Star daily's Mehmet Altan on his right. People who have been to the United States and New York before will understand very well what a big security nightmare it is for the U.S. Secret Service if a state president wants to walk in Central Park, in the middle of New York, on a Sunday afternoon. Gül doesn't like fanfare and doesn't want to see officials around him in his private life. And that doubles the tone of the security nightmare.

As we are walking in Central Park, 20 to 30 meters ahead of us are the security chief and a female American secret service officer, a tall male American secret service officer on my left-hand side and a Turkish security officer ahead of him, accompany us. A circle of a couple of Turkish and
American officials are behind us. We are passing through thousands of Americans jogging, or laying on the lawn or around the pond at the park on a beautiful Sunday.

We are not in formal attire to make people consider that “There must have been a Turkish delegation -- members of which are in black suits.” We are dressed casually. Almost one of every two cart drivers at the park is a Turk. They are approaching us and we start talking and taking pictures. The drivers say that it is an honor to see Mr. President there and offer him a tour of the park. If Gül had accepted one, I think American secret service agents would have fainted right there.

Walking in the park...

Turkish cart drivers are showing Gül to Americans in the park. People are turning around and looking at us but no one knows us. We enjoy walking in Central Park; Gül in the middle, I on his left and Altan on his right.

We are talking about America, the U.S. elections, capitalism, socialism, global financial turmoil and whether or not the system can handle it.

When Gül returned from a meeting with Kemal Derviş, UNDP administrator, we were on our way out. “What are you doing?” he asked. Without waiting our answer he said, “Wait for me. I will go upstairs and change. Let's go for a walk in Central Park.”
However, mid-90s witnessed another social and political rise and upset the existing power balance. A widely cited ESI (European Stability Initiative) report names this new phenomenon as the Islamic Calvinism (ESI, 2005). Older elites that included the leaders of Turkish press did feel apart from this new wave of political identification which was heavily associated with the now ruling party, AKP. This disjunction became even more intense with AKP’s unexpected involvement with the EU process. As AKP has become the most reformist part in relation to EU membership process, this distance between the senior journalists and the party yielded awkward consequences. There seemed to be a paradoxical situation: some of the most modernized, westernist sections of Turkish society began to lead the anti-EUism in Turkey while a party of moderate Islamic origins leads the EU process.

In fact this paradox in a broader political level had already been described: In terms of EU membership, the republican elite finds itself torn between “longing and

Gül said that Derviş is pessimistic about the financial crisis spread around the world from the U.S. “What is Derviş saying about the impact of the crisis on the Turkish economy?” I asked. When Gül replied, “He says that Turkey has a strong financial infrastructure and not worried about much,” Altan took his turn,” After all, he created that infrastructure.”

I told Mr. President that before I headed to New York, professor Güven Sak was a guest in our televised program titled “Global Look,” which I co-host with Şahin Alpay on TRT, and Sak is extremely optimistic that we have started to overcome the crisis as of Monday.
resentment" (Keyder 2006: 75) as the desire to continue the modernization and Westernization envisioned by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in the 1920s, and the equally strong need for centralized control dictated by their discourse of national pride and sovereignty. The position of Islamist elites are also equally paradoxical: They must negotiate a position between the anti-Western sentiments of Islamic fundamentalists, and the promise of religious freedom implied by the Copenhagen Criteria (Dağlı 2005). (Dağlı’s observations are in fact part of a larger phenomenon: Partha Chatterjee, 1994, talks of this paradoxial political positioning in terms of nationalism in postcolonial situations).

A reflection of this paradoxical situation in elite journalistic positioning was demonstrated even after the landslide election victory of AKP:

**Bad Cop/Good Cop**

Mainstream Turkish press played "the bad cop" before the elections and now they are playing "the good cop". Influential columnists like Ertuğrul Özkök, not threatens directly any more but asks Mr. Gül to do a favor for the "nation". the PM is now accused of not keeping up his "promise" which is that there would be 'consensus' in electing the President. One of course should ask since when there was a "consensus" in presidential elections? Most of the presidents were generals and all civil presidents were chosen by their own parties, i.e. Özlü, Demirel with even fewer votes than Mr. Gül will probably get, and the current President Mr. Sezer's election is a fruit of a coalition government which was formed after the February 28 coup. The establishment party, CHP, once again attempts to fetter the elections and establishment spokesmen in the press become more vocal.
There are lots of points to be discussed but this idea of consensus needs more thought. In a modern society, in a regime of representative democracy, I am not sure a type of consensus like the one propagated now for the presidential election can ever be achieved. Politics make strange bedfellows and we witness it daily but a full-scale consensus ever possible? Will CHP, the embodiment of status quo, ever agree to dismantle the higher education council (YÖK)? No.

This emphasis on "consensus" was a discursive strategy by some sections of power elites and some journalists were already masterminding the strategy. In the immediate aftermath of elections in April, some columnists produced self-critical essays about their positions, but a few months later when the time came for the election of next presidents, these journalists moved back to their old positions. This then becomes a partial answer to why there was no systematic orientation in newspapers towards the EU process. A seemingly paradox is decoded when one delves into the analysis of a social class (From a fieldnote, 10 August 2007).

A very well-known journalist and columnist, Cengiz Çandar (8/31/2007), who does not seem to act with his own class, provides some insights here:

...The republic has qualifications to generate its "new elite" 80 something years after its foundation. These "new elite" raised among the common people are able to constitute a "class of administrators" through democracy. This is another meaning of Gül's rise to Cankaya, and in my opinion, the most important of all. Coming from a background of the traditional "elite" in Turkey, I am saluting such a splendid development with joy. This is because,
though I belong to the traditional elite of Turkey, I am also a member of a
generation born into a head-spinning period of change, and I stand with those
of the elite who always stand with the aggrieved....

An advisor of the current primer minister I interviewed seemed to downplay
all this tension:

I don't know why they are so against us. What is the biggest paradox, you
know? This so-called intellectual women declare that they are Kemalists in
those demonstrations (Spring 2007). They are pressing on Turkish citizens as
if there must be a polarization between secularism and democracy. I have just
received a report on the state of Turkish women. They should see that. I really
don't understand. They have so many prejudices

This seemingly naïve approach disguises the elite conflict but at the same
time challenges the traditional elites in the monopolization over the modernization.
de Bellaigue (2007) describes the takeover as such:

Gül is not a member of Turkey's establishment. He is the first Turkish
president in decades to have come from neither the armed forces nor the
bureaucracy; his father was a machine worker in Kayseri, a provincial town in
central Turkey that is known for both its piety and its entrepreneurial spirit.
Compared to the outgoing president, the socially awkward secularist Ahmet
Necdet Sezer, Güls seems worldly and cosmopolitan. He studied in England
and, in the 1980s, worked for eight years as an economist for the Islamic
Development Bank in Jeddah. He is an affable man, with a reputation for
probity, and he is popular abroad.
In the specific context of Malaysification debates which I focus on below, Vincent Boland (11/21/2007) would include Istanbul press part of the Republican Turkish elites.

...It reflects what Omer Taspinar, an academic and commentator based in Washington, recently described as "a sense of Kemalist malaise": a deep anxiety among Turkey's entrenched republican elites, which broadly includes the Istanbul media, about the political and social changes the country is now witnessing. "Kemalism" is the ideology bequeathed to the nation by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Its principles are secularism, nationalism, statism, populism, republicanism, and "reformism" (usually understood as modernity). For several generations it has underpinned the way the country is governed - with a strong and even authoritarian centre ruling over a dispersed periphery....

Therefore, this paradoxical situation can be extended to even larger sections of political elites as Taspinar (2007) describes:

...an ironic role reversal: just as the AKP and its supporters have become more pro-Western and pro-globalization, the military and the Kemalist establishment have become more insular and more nationalist, and resentful of the eu and the United States. (116)

This, then would lead to this dramatic situation:

Countries eyeing membership in the European Union do not usually come to the brink of a military coup. Yet that is precisely where Turkey found itself on April 27 of this year, after weeks of a pitched battle between the country's
generals and the ruling Justice and Development Party (known as the AKP).

(Taspinar, 2007: 114)

One case of conceptualizing the elite upbringing and paradoxical position vis-
a-vis Western powers can be seen in NO35. As a pro-EU columnist she states that
from the outset she had no prejudices. When asked what that meant she referred to
her family first of all. She graduated from an elite high school in Ankara which she
described as one of the founding schools of Republican ideology. She cited her
westernized education there and she also portrayed her family as the one open to the
West in the context of lifestyles. Her parents had adopted the republican ideology
without any doubt. And of course European Union project was connected to this
grand Westernist project. "At least at that time" she said as we had all known most of
those republican families had turned against the EU process recently. She describes
the paradoxical relation in a historical perspective:

Turkish intellectuals had always a love and hate relationship with the West.
This is nothing new. Only this has become more apparent recently. I relate
this anti-EUism of those intellectuals who are devoted to the principles of
Republic to some external factors. The principles that make the Republic
itself are threatened by the EU. Particularly in the approaches to the place of the
Army and Kurds. These created suspicions among those intellectuals. But let
me underline: these suspicions were always there indeed. They were existent
in the time of Ecevit [in pre-1980s] - and let me add Ecevit of that time was
much more social democratic than today's CHP. Mr. Ecevit as also against the
EU: "they are the partners and we are the market" he would say. This saying
belongs to Ecevit and his circle. [but later this saying would mostly be
attributed to legendary Islamic persona, Erbakan] In fact, the history repeats itself.

All this leads a curious question: Can there be a media monopoly despite the apparent hegemony of Doğan Media Group? Most of the critics of Turkish media imply that the interests of Doğan Group leads mainstream Turkish press to a pro-government position. In the Republicanist meetings before the July Elections protesters highlighted this issue. However, the secularist, elitist subjectivity of major journalists and columnists create a disjuncture here and challenges easy generalizations on monopoly claims. I have realized this even more after the Bekir Coşkun case. When Hürriyet’s controversial columnist Bekir Coşkun declared in his column to reject presidential candidate Abdullah Gül as his president if Gül is elected, the PM Mr Erdoğan reacted strongly and told Coşkun to renounce his citizenship then. A media protest led by Hürriyet ensued the PM's reaction. During the heated words of exchange, columnists and editors of major newspapers attacked Mr. Gül and Mr. Erdoğan viciously. It is then questionable if Doğan Group's apparent hegemony guarantees journalistic allegiance. Reminding Gans’ study of journalistic values, two major attributes of Turkish state seemed to be source of allegiance: Secularism (against Islamists) and Nationalism (against Kurds basically). When the rising elites differed in values then these journalists gave up their possible allegiance.

Thus, being pro-government cannot be taken for granted for these journalists despite the growing business oriented journalism. They become pro-government when their metanarratives parallel with the meta-narratives of the government. And in AKP’s case there were certainly problems and this disjuncture produced several
waves of media campaigns. It was not only exchanging words but some went beyond that. Some journalists acted as organizers and spokespersons of the Republicanist meetings. Their opposition lasted even after Mr. Gül was elected. A curious work of "symbology" was employed as some will be mentioned in the next section. Especially Hürriyet attempted to interpret every little detail during the ceremonies to demonstrate that the generals were not easy with the ex-Islamist president. Although generals' distaste of Islamists is a very-well known fact, through an act of interpretation these journalists attempted to create or enhance a particular mood and political crisis.

In this context, journalists are active agents of a political struggle. This positioning highly differs Turkish journalists from their European counterparts: In a recent study Paul Statham (2007) found out that "to the extent that they take on an advocacy role at all with regard to Europe, journalists see themselves as adopting an educational mode of raising public awareness, more than a political 'partisan' or 'ideological campaign' mode" (p. 461).

An intervention. Peer Pressure and Malaysification stories

Gadi Wolsfeld describes political waves as "sudden and significant changes in the political environment that are characterized by a substantial increase in the amount of public attention centered on a political issue or event. (226) He continues to state that "... While the news media play an important role in defining and amplifying such waves, they rarely initiate them. It is critical to understand how political actors initiate such waves and how they and the public react to them. (227) What I argue here is Turkish Press indeed initiates political waves through media events."
In late September 2007, mainstream press led by Hürriyat appropriated "peer pressure" and "Malaysification" (by the latter, Islamisation policies of Malaysia are meant\(^\text{93}\)) in order to raise opposition against AKP, the ruling party and the newly

\(^{93}\) In fact, other countries are frequently used as models/ examples by Turkish journalists. But use of Malaysia is the best example for the role I ascribe to Turkish journalists. **Other countries as guidelines**

*Malaysia or Egypt*

Mümtazer Türköne in Malaysia or Egypt?

**Malaysia: A wrong match**

Everything began when former US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke described Turkey as "the second moderate Islamic country" during his visit to Turkey last month. Different papers in Turkey have been drawing different and even contradictory Malaysia portraits for days. The newspapers "calling for a coup" depict Malaysia as a country forcibly gravitating toward Shariah law, previously being a democratic country. This is the message they are trying to communicate: "If Turkey sticks to the current democratic system it has, the Islamists may establish a Shariah state by seizing control of the state through democratic means." And this is the target of this assumption as of today: The Justice and Development Party (AK Party) arrived in power with the people's votes. And now it will amend the constitution to clear its path and eliminate the secular system in Turkey; just like Malaysia."

It has not been adequately appreciated yet that this is a total mismatch. In order for those looking for a palpable proof for the "Shariah danger" to completely exploit this example and then throw it into garbage, a little more
time needs to pass. The generalization bias is the effort of people, who lack detailed information, to reach their target through a shortcut. Turkey and Malaysia are not two countries we can compare and contrast because their historical experiences and social structures differ. Malaysia is a country that successfully perpetuates the multicultured structure, which it took over from British rule, in a mutual atmosphere of tolerance. A multi-cultured structure and tolerance are vital elements because its ethnic structure is so diverse. However, Turkey is a country that implemented, without any compromises, the model of a unitary state and the project of creating a nation based on this model after the Ottoman experience. Malaysia's difference from Turkey is that it is a country whose democracy has never been suspended since it was founded in 1963. It's impossible for Shariah rule to be established in Malaysia, as it would trigger a change in the multi-cultured structure of the country and its balances, because even attempting to found such an administration would be tantamount to precipitating a disaster no one could ever imagine. Comparing the Malaysian experience with Turkey is wrong, both historically and socially; what's more, it's unfair to both of the countries.

The most suitable example, to which Turkey can be compared, and from which we can draw beneficial conclusions, is Egypt. Comparing Egypt to Turkey could provide important clues in understanding Turkey's today and tomorrow because there are wide areas of intersection between the Egyptian and Turkish societies and the Egyptian and Turkish histories, going beyond simple similarities.

**Will Turkey become Egypt?**
This question amounts to another question: "Will democracy be suspended?" May Turkey ever become a country where liberties are limited and under control, like in Egypt? To provide an accurate answer, we can briefly compare the two countries.

The populations of Egypt and Turkey are nearly the same. Also the difference between the income per capita figures of the two countries is not significant. Turkey is a little better in terms of the justice in income distribution. Moreover, you can feel like you are in Istanbul while touring the streets of Cairo; it has the same excited people, the same anxiety, and the same traffic manners. Egypt is an amalgam of races and cultures like Turkey. It also has an ethnic problem similar to the one in Turkey. Christian gypsies comprise 10 percent of the population. It has a very ancient history and thus possesses a very rich historical-cultural heritage. Anatolia is a cradle of civilizations, whereas Egypt is a very important center that dominated the world alone through the half of the known history of humanity, thereby affecting all the cultures that came after it.

Let's move on to the political-religious comparisons. Article 2 of the Egyptian constitution dated 1971 says, "Islam is the religion of the state," and adds the phrase "The main source of the legislation is Islam's Shariah" to the same article. Article 19 says, "Religious education is among the fundamental courses of general education programs." In the introductory paragraph of the constitution, a practice similar to the one here, it is written that they started drafting the constitution with the "guidance of Allah," and "by remaining devoted to His message." Briefly, we must put our constitution of 1982 and
the indispensably secular structure of our "new constitution" on one side, and this religious structure of the Egyptian constitution on the other.

Let's compare their modernization histories. Egypt remained an Ottoman state for a long time; however, there was never a period when the central authority was wholly established in this prosperous country of the time. In the modernization of Islamic societies, Cairo was always a step ahead of İstanbul. The first newspaper in the Islamic world was published in Cairo, the first modern Muslim intellectuals like Tahtavi set about spreading new ideas in Egypt. We should emphasize that the first modern army was that of Egypt's Mehmet Ali Pasha, that the first modern educational institutions were opened in Cairo before İstanbul, and that the first central administrative, financial and judicial systems started to be established in Egypt. The precedence of Egypt in the field of modernization is so striking that the inspiration for most reforms that comprised the Tanzimat (the administrative reforms of 1839) of Sultan Mahmud II came from there. Let's recall another common denominator of the two centers in those years. Mehmet Ali Pasha, still cherished as the most important figure in modern Egyptian history, is a man who spoke to his own people through a translator since he did not speak any other language other than Turkish. The pioneer of the first democratic-intellectual movement of our history was the Egyptian Prince Mustafa Fazıl Pasha. Egypt maintained its precedence even under the British occupation. The opposition and thought center during the reign of Sultan Abdüllhamid II was also in Cairo. The student of Jamaluddin Afghani -- Muhammad Abduh -
- influenced many Turkish intellectuals with different predispositions in Cairo, from Mehmet Akif to Mehmet Emin (Yurdakul) to Ahmet Ağaoğlu.

In the near history, there was just another zone of influence where Egypt impacted Turkey. The sole inspiration source of the May 27, 1960 coup was Egypt. We must know without fail that the tradition of military coups in Turkey finds its one and only source of inspiration in Egypt. Col. Nasser's "Young Officers" movement affected even the structure of the May 27 Junta. When the Young Officers staged a coup in Egypt, they asked retired Gen. Necip to assume their leadership as their ranks were not high enough; just like that, our coup-stager colonels asked for Cemal Aga's help.

The source of our coup tradition stems from Egypt; yet it is another fact that the religious streams in Turkey obviously don't see the Muslim Brotherhood, which is very influential in Egypt, as a role model. An interesting conclusion emerges from this comparison. The drafters of the constitution are those who came to power following a coup. Since they decided to stay, unlike ours, they were able to put the phrase the "Religion of Islam" in the constitution. This is a very crucial point. The Shariah-based structure of the Egyptian constitution is the work of coup stagers, not that of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Let's continue with the comparison. This last March in Egypt there was a debate over the constitution, narrower than Turkey's, followed by a referendum. The referendum was conducted to limit liberties. The Mubarak administration has been in power for the last quarter century by sweeping at least 90 percent of the votes in every election so far. Democracy is
perpetuated in a very limited and controlled way, and a little owing to
American pressure.

There is only one result we can reach after this comparison: the secular regime
comes under threat only when democracy is suspended. The dictatorships in the
Islamic world try to base their legitimacy on Shariah law. Then, we can safely
conclude: The religious Muslims in Turkey will accept neither administrators who
don't change and cannot be inspected like the ones in Egypt, nor a phrase that will
determine the "official religion" of the country in the constitution. 9/29/2007

France

Taha Akyol on France (2006):

France is a country of democracy, Enlightenment but at the same time
a country that had the most Stalinist Communist party in Europe. A very
fragmented, inherently contradictory political structure. So he is not surprised
that Le Pen's far right party rises (247).

France is obsessed with Turkey (277-8)

"Arrogant Brussels bureaucracy is bad but French is worse. (275).

In fact, there are lots of political similarities between France and
Turkey. But why France is opposed to Turkey? France has unsubstantiated
paranoia. The article is entitled as "Grouchy like France". Quoting from Anna
Saadah, French system of thought is 'unstable, sceptical, exclusive' (256)
French chauvinism a la Giscard style (257) French chauvinism is used several times (another case here, p. 264).

Other European countries are analyzed in order to comment on domestic politics. French Jacobinism is criticised which directly implies Turkish centralist policy which is very similar to French case. This reminds me liberalism’s intervention on State policies in the sense of what State should do or not do. (266)

Others:

Social problems will be solved with economic development and that’s why Blair had won again.

Turkey should prefer the Anglo-Saxon way instead of French Jacobinism. Turkey should give up the centralist republicanist French model. (272-274)

[Against military:] real-politik and history can be used in Cyprus issue (377).

History should be re-thought. In relations to Greece or UK (281; 289-90)

What is left, what is right? AKP is in fact social democratic party but classified with the Christian Democrats in Europe. (311).

Turkey incorporated the principle of secularism into its Constitution before France, which did so in 1948. Turkey has been inspired by France in using the notion of secularism; however, in terms of implementation, there is no similarity between Turkey and France. While France implements the principle of secularism to separate the spheres of religion and the state, Turkey relies on the same principle to ensure that the state controls religion, that religion is limited to people's consciences and that a secular society is created. In France, the religious groups, sects and communities are allowed to be active in the fields of education, health and social affairs. In France, which is supposedly similar to the Turkish experience, individuals may be exempted from military service based on their religious beliefs. Individuals are also allowed to wear their religious clothes at institutions of higher education and they are not denied their right to education because of their religious symbols.

... The model of secularism as implemented in Turkey has nothing in common with the models in France and other European countries. We could view the Turkish style as a bad copy of the laicism developed in France following the revolution.

Croatia

Erdal Şafak (3/18/2005) on Croatia:

Turkey is now concerned over its European Union membership talks since Brussels decided to postpone entry talks with Croatia due to its failure to arrest a top war crimes suspect. "Will this decision be a precedent for other
candidate countries?" our diplomats are now asking. According to our Foreign Ministry, the issue has nothing to do with Turkey's membership talks.

However, the international community has interpreted the decision as a powerful signal to other would-be EU members that they must fully respect human rights. For example, French Foreign Minister Michel Barnier said that the EU's decision is a precedent for Turkey, proving that Brussels would never give any ground on human rights. In addition, Joost Lagendijk, the co-president of the Turkey-EU Joint Parliamentary Commission, stated that Turkey must take the decision to heart.

**Albania**

*Tam bağımsızlık* discourses are based on Enver Hodge's *Albania* model (Aktar, 2003: 97).

**Hungary, Czech Republic, Poland**

Eser Karakaş (2004):

Other candidate countries, Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland doubled their GDP per capita between 1995-2002 (302).

**Spain**

İlter Türkmen (5/24/2005):
A number of Spanish participants underlined interesting similarities between Turkey and Spain as they shared their experiences with us.

First of all, both countries have a legacy of once-great empires. As Spain cannot ignore Latin America in its policies, Turkey cannot turn a blind eye to the Middle East. Both countries' foreign policies are multidimensional. As some now question whether or not Turkey belongs in Europe, fierce debates were once seen on whether Spain is European. Once, Spain was a Mediterranean country in the eyes of most Europeans. They believed that Europe ended at the border of Spain. In addition, Spain was also hanging under the threat of terrorism like Turkey today, and it also had to deal with double standards on this issue.

In an economic sense, there are both similarities and differences between Turkey and Spain. Today our country's national per capita income is approximately 30% of the European average. Spain's was about 68% before it joined the bloc. However, there are certain structural similarities between the two countries... Agriculture was a very important problem to Spain, which on the other hand had to struggle with high inflation. Spain was largely dependent on foreign countries for energy. ...The Spanish participants yesterday also underlined that a “no-concession” policy on the Turkish side during accession talks would harm us very much. According to them, Turkey must not seek reciprocity on every issue. Ankara should be ready to compromise with Brussels. Ultra-nationalism can never fit with the EU principles. As Francois Mitterand once said, “Nationalism means war.” EU
membership talks might be hard to handle, but it's much better to be a part of
the bloc than shut out of it.

Germany

Cengiz Aktar (3/27/2007):

1957, Germany joins Western Europe: However, Germany is the
country to understand and assess the importance of Turkey's integration with
the EU more than any other member countries. In the postwar era it was
common to consider that the authoritarian and militarist Germany who was
inclined towards the East before 1945 and always acting with the
consciousness of her anti-Western mission, was alien to the Western political
culture. In fact, the reasons set for the exclusion of Turkey today were exact
copies of the arguments employed at the time to exclude Germany from a
unified Western Europe. Indeed today some German historians such as Hans-
Ulrich Wehler and Heinrich August Winkler who are against Turkey's EU
membership point at the incompatibility of political cultures.

The same historians argue that postwar Germany was as well alien to
the Western political culture due to its weak bourgeoisie and frail civil
society. But none makes any efforts to draw parallels for Turkey from the
difficult but successful integration of Germany and Europe and its rewards for
the peace and prosperity of the Continent. On 5 July 1958, the day the treaties
initialized on 25 March 1957 were ratified in the Bundestag, Monnet writes:
Therefore, the risk of Germany's drifting apart from the Continent receded
elected president, Abdullah Gül, who was a former minister of foreign affairs in the previous AKP government, who were attempting to produce a new more civil constitution. Even before late September, leading media organs were on the offensive as a liberal columnist, Etyen Mahçupyan, sums up:

Abdullah Gül’s presidency exposed some of the personal problems in Turkey. Media organs that have taken up ridiculous forms for the sake of preventing Gül’s candidacy are now attempting to express through tabloid attacks the shock of having lost. (9/7/2007)

First came the fears of Malaysification. Ergun Babahan, himself a Sabah columnist, who criticizes the mainstream media, explains the emergence of this fear:

Alongside questions over the new constitution in Turkey, news of a public eating ban, imposed during Ramadan in a district of Malaysia, brought out further fears within Turkey; people have asked, “Will we ever become like Malaysia?” Each country’s cultural features, legal system and history are different. The past determines each country’s future as it does its present state.

and the German public opinion that exhibited an unclear attitude for long seems to have adapted a stance in favor of the West.” Just like the dilemma Turkey faces today. But with a crucial difference: The father and mothers of today's EU deepen Turkey's dilemma and do everything in their power to break apart Turkey from Europe.
This country owes its modernization project to centuries of work. At times the Japanese model has come up on the agenda within the project; however, Malaysia has never been a model for Turkey -- it cannot be. Although Turkey has been imitating the West's laws, clothes and music, it has not been able to become like Britain or France. (9/26/2007)

This 'Malaysification' itself was appropriated from Richard Holbrooke's recent article:

Richard Holbrooke, the architect of the 1995 Bosnia peace, proved his success in provoking thought with his description of Turkey and Malaysia as two examples of 'moderate Islam' that the U.S. and Europe wanted to see nourished in the Islamic world. The remarks of Holbrooke, in the July 26 edition of the New Perspectives quarterly (NPq), were of course based on the former U.S. diplomat's personal perception of the place of Turkey and Malaysia in the Islamic World, whereas, social dynamics and cultural background of the two countries are so different that comparing the two is just ridiculous. (Yusuf Kanli, 9/27/2007)

Interestingly enough the campaign would be started by the leading newspaper of Doğan Media Group (DMG) who also owns the newspaper Mr. Kanli writes for. Although some circles of Turkish elites were not happy with constitutional development, the particular crisis-like situation was started by the chief editor of Hürriyet, Ertuğrul Özkoğ.

Ayşe Karabat describes the beginning:
This discussion started yesterday when daily Hüriyet’s Editor-in-Chief Ertuğrul Özkök wrote in his column that if there was a freedom allowing for the wearing of headscarves at universities, this freedom, in some places, could be used as leverage on students who don’t want to wear headscarves to conform to the style of their covered peers. Özkök underlined that although he wants freedom for those who wear the headscarf, for the reason which he mentions he cannot defend this freedom fully. According to him, the people’s fear is rooted in the possible tyranny of peer pressure. (09/19/2007)

The appropriation of Serif Mardin’s use of “peer pressure” has taken place like this according to Fatma Disli who quotes from Mustafa Karaalioğlu of Star daily:

Star columnist Mustafa Karaalioğlu agrees that there is an attempt among certain media organs to manipulate whatever anyone says about the new constitution as being against it, disregarding the speaker’s intentions. “The news, remarks, sentences -- even gestures -- are distorted. The purpose of adopting such a stance cannot be a constitution that will be prepared with the contributions of all. Because, by acting this way, those media organs are denigrating and devaluing participation in the drafting of the new constitution,” he contends. Karaalioğlu argues that these media organs or newspapers highlight a certain part of speeches by the people they ask an opinion from. He cites Professor Serif Mardin’s interview, recently published in the daily Hüriyet, as an example, noting that some of Mardin’s expressions were emphasized and others ignored. In that interview Mardin said he was confident about the need to remove the headscarf ban in Turkey.
When asked about the likelihood of Turkey becoming a Malaysia-like country, the renowned sociologist said neither yes or no, but Hürriyet has launched a campaign since then to convince its readers of the likelihood of Turkey’s eventual turning into a Malaysia-like country. [emphases added] (9/28/2007)

Pro-Islamic and pro-government newspaper, Zaman, columnist Mustafa Ünal would frame the started debate in larger class terms:

The idea of a constitution is on Ankara’s agenda. Those working for a new civil constitution that could meet modern needs and befit a country applying for full EU membership are on one side, while others resisting in order to protect the status quo are on the other. The groups that define themselves as “modern and contemporary” strongly oppose the change and aren’t very interested in the direction. (09/20/2007)

The terms of debate might be reconsidered and the intentions can be questioned here but my purpose is to demonstrate that the initiators of that particular debate were some senior journalists and they would frame the debating parties’ positions.

The power of this framing is underlined by Fatma Dişli:

Now it is certain that Turkey’s 20-year-old quest for a more democratic and civilian constitution has been reduced to the headscarf issue. Some circles have created a big fuss about the possibility that the new constitution will lift the obstacles faced by headscarf-wearing students in search of higher education. The basic argument of these circles is that any removal of the headscarf ban at universities will be the beginning of a slow but inexorable
move towards forcing all women to cover their heads in public, under the influence of so-called peer pressure. (09/20/2007)

In this framing attempt, Turkish press employed a great semiological incentive. Although written before the particular crisis I mention above, Burak Bekdil in his “World’s most semiotic nation?” article describes the components of this incentive:

The politics of semiotics in the year 2007 dictates us to have a careful eye on whether a general addressed the president as “My esteemed president,” or as “Esteemed president,” whether the military chief saluted the parliament speaker who has a wife without a headscarf while the couple was leaving a reception, but not the president or the prime minister whose headscarf wearing wives had not been invited to the same reception.

Or whether the top brass attended the president's cocktail reception oddly in the morning hours of the day, why the president chose the morning hours for a reception that traditionally takes place in the early hours of the evening, or whether alcohol was served at that reception. Or whether the men in uniform shook hands with the men in civilian attire that we assume are locked up in a cold war. Or how many men in the cabinet and in Parliament have headscarf wearing wives, how many don't, and what is the percentage change from the previous term of legislation.

Eighty years ago, the founder of the republic had an obsession about the semiotics of headwear. Eighty years after, more than 70 million Turks apparently have an obsession about the semiotics of every little detail that just make up trivialities in every other place on earth. Sadly, the Turks in 2007 are
almost always right in “detecting the enemy” through semiotics, just like in the 1970s. (9/7/2007)

However, there is an inevitable rhetorical twist in this excerpt. Writing in Turkish Daily News, part of DMG, Mr. Bekdil describes these semiotic interpretations as part of nation’s daily efforts. However, every one of the listed detail above was in the headlines of Hürriyet during those days. Although, he signifies an interesting phenomenon of Turkish lives, these details were first broadcasted and thus amplified and spread to the public. During my days in the field, not the ordinary citizens but journalists seemed to interpret the details as a friction between power elites.

Another pro-government columnist Ali Bulaç contextualized the current situation in a wider historical perspective in one of his op-eds. His wording is strong as he claims that these journalists are pro-coup and he does not mention sources for some of his claims but his arguments should be read to substantiate the alliance between secularist power elites:

While military officers took the limelight when they intervened in civil politics, some civil groups assumed important roles prior to the intervention to encourage and prepare the groundwork for the military intervention. This is a point that is often overlooked when assessing intervention processes. Looking back, we can identify the efforts to pave the way of two weekly magazines, Akbaba and Yankı, for the bloody May 27 military intervention. Erol Simavi, the previous owner of Hürriyet, one of the most influential newspapers on domestic politics, had said: “The media are known as the fourth estate. The media is one estate. I prepare the military for the interventions, then I step aside and drink my coffee.” More importantly,
Kenan Evren, the general of the Sept. 12 military coup, had said, “Do not upset me or else I will announce the civil institutions that encouraged us to make an intervention.” Evren made this comment in response to civilians who had blamed the military alone for the coup, which at that time had ended and the military administration had become subject to harsh criticism. When criticisms began, those who prepared the coup switched over to the “civilian side” and adopted a democratic, human rights and civil political stance as if they were not the instigators of the coup.

We experienced a similar situation, but more openly, during the presidential election. Despite Abdullah Gül’s election, those who push the military into politics are still insisting on their plans. That is why the military chief is constantly in the limelight, why his words are interpreted differently and why provocative questions are asked.... Journalism has absolutely no place becoming the spokesperson for coup leaders or collecting allegations and rumors from military circles. [emphases added] (9/4/2007)

Ergun Babahan would describe the situation in terms of powersharing:

Removing the headscarf ban at universities was an issue almost everybody agreed upon. However; when a constitution capable of changing the balance of power came to the agenda, those formerly saying yes to elimination of the headscarf ban started to say: “It is not time yet. It is early.” (9/26/2007)

Engin Ardiç would be stronger in words but he would also contextualize the situation in terms of power balance anxieties:
For the time being, they are getting ready to make flag producers rich while on the other hand they keep attacking Professor Ergun Özbudun and their distortions of Serif Mardin’s words that even deceived Serif. The new constitution will open individuals currently in the bureaucratic monopoly to justice, so they are scared. The new constitution will have the rectors elected by the universities, in other words, even [President] Abdullah Gül will not interfere; why does this not suit their intentions? Everybody connected to the Turkish Republic through citizenship will be called a Turk without any religious or racist discrimination. Is it this that they do not like? [emphasis added] (9/25/2007)

In challenging these liberal and pro-new constitution columnists, the peer pressure and Malaysification campaigners relied on individual cases in order to justify their campaigns and anxieties. The editor of Turkish Daily News, Yusuf Kanlı says in this context:

However, I would just cite an example that may help Minister Aydın understand better the realities of the Turkey we are living in. In an Ankara neighborhood this weekend a non-fasting Turk, I have no idea about his ethnic background, nor to what sect of Islam he belongs and indeed whether he is a Muslim, was apparently defying the neighborhood pressure and smoking in public at a coffee house in the early hours of Saturday. The fasting crowd, particularly the owner of the shop next to the shop of our non-fasting Turk warned him that it was Ramadan, people were fasting and they could be tempted to break their fast seeing that he was smoking cigarette. The non-
fasting Turk, equally adamant like millions of other Turks, replied them 'mind your own business' and continued smoking.

The end result? The ensuing battle between smokers during Ramadan and those abiding by the rules of Islam by fasting resulted in 15 people being hospitalized, with no serious wounds.

Now, I want to ask Minister Aydîn? What was this, if not neighborhood pressure and indeed oppression? Could anyone in that neighborhood continue defying the demands of the majority and remain an individual, as Minister Aydîn thinks the Turks have become? (9/25/2007)

However, he does not directly reject the new constitution:

Thus, in writing the new constitution, due attention must be attached to the protection of the basic values of the secular Turkish democracy without burying ourselves into a controversy over a piece of cloth or some exaggerated paranoia.

Mr. Kanli’s arguments would be more logical if he explains what exactly he demands to protect the basic values of the secular Turkish democracy. Those who are appointed to prepare the new constitution are a group of respected secular law professors.

On 23 September 2007, a relatively objective and multi-sided discussion led by Rusen Çakır in Vatan classified the 'peer pressure' as part of the debate on whether Turkey would become like Malaysia. However, on the same day, one of the most powerful newspapers, Hürriyet would continue its agitative tone declaring that Malaysification of Turkey was underway. Its correspondents 'went to the field' and
observed the change in streets. A serial about the change would start the next day. *Cumhuriyet*, the staunch Kemalist, would also start its own Malaysia serial the other day. In the mean time, in an even more agitative way, Akşam would call for mobilization in its headlines: “Women will be on the streets again. In fact, some correspondents were even sent to Malaysia: For the “Malaysia impressions series”, reporters took daily life photos, spoke with different figures in the country, by showing these hard evidence, they insisted that Turkey may end up like Malaysia soon (Fatma Disli, 9/27/2007).

A Reuters press release quoted by Turkish Daily News towards the end of September (9/29/2007) would demonstrate the lack of public support for campaigning Turkish journalists. This at least shows that journalists do not necessarily voice the general public’s concerns and a month long campaigning has other purposes. Despite a month long campaigning the majority was not concerned with peer pressure or Malaysification:

The survey, conducted on Sept 21-23 by A&G research company and the 32 Days news program, showed 61 percent of Turkish women wore the headscarf, a drop of nearly 3 percentage points from a poll 3-1/2 years ago....

Some 74 percent of poll respondents said the headscarf ban in universities should be lifted. Only 19 percent said they regarded the headscarf as a political symbol....

Slightly more than half of those polled said they backed the government's plans to reform Turkey's constitution that dates back to a period of military rule in the early 1980s. Twenty-one percent said it should not be changed....

Reuters, 9/29/2007
A Brief Conclusion

An older article by Ali Çarkoğlu (2003) demonstrates well how political configurations change so fast. Basically, he would argue that only pro-Islamist Felicity Party (SP) would oppose EU among major parties (186) and rise in the education level led to EU support (173). In later years, educated elites would lead the anti-EU front. In fact, Cengiz Aktar points out that even in 2000 "Official Turkey does want EU and hints the future but still unpredictable level of anti-EUism. (Aktar, 2002).

Aktar (2003) states that by the year 2002, anti-EU and pro-EU sides were quite solidified (p. 95). However, anti-EU front seemed to be better integrated and organized. Nearly all political circles are Hakimiyeti Milliyeciler [National Sovereignty front] Turkish left, apart from some exceptions, are all tam bağımsızlıkçı [Complete Independence, which practically means protectionist anti-Western stance in diplomacy], based on unrevised 19th century ideas and notions of anti-imperialism. These hakimiyeti milliyeciler are looking either to be tools of US in the Middle East or to be utopianist tam bağımsızlık. (p. 96) On the other hand, pro-EU front is not well coordinated (p. 97). There must be strategic coordination between loosely available pro-EU establishments such as liberal intellectuals, NGOs like TÜSİAD, TOBB, AEGEE, İKV, TESEV, DISK, HAK-İŞ, KESK, some columnists in the press, some TV channels such as NTV, CNBC-E, CNN-Turk, HADEP, some ministries that are congruent with ministers' policies, most of the Foreign Affairs, many state institutions that are involved with the EU process and of course majority of citizens. Small partner of coalition government (ANAP) should also be integrated (97)
That was in 2002 and more organized anti-EU front seemed to have conquered the political space in later years despite the fact that emergence of AKP meant two years of intense reforms. Cengiz Aktar (2003) portrays the anti-EU columnists:

1) Aims for change but believes that internal social dynamics are not ready for a change towards EU level of life. Accuses pro-EU for being interventionist from above. 2) Nation formation still continues. EU process damages this formation. 3) Aims for EU level of life but believes this can be done without the EU intervention. (p. 33-35) Aktar continues to claim that EU process is a necessity. It has no alternatives. All these perspectives did not help Turkey to reach the level of life intended and there are no concrete alternatives to look for (36-38).

This portrayal in fact covers most of the columnists in Turkey. Most of them are proud Westernists but the working of politics turn them into anti-EU positions and supporters of status quo. One of my interviewees state that with the rise of nationalist backlash, polarization really happened. Polls already demonstrated the anti-EU sentiments. Even in his/her own family, there are anti-EU people. Modern urbanized citizens have become anti-EU and this is not a mere reaction.94

94 NO 22:

In fact, Euro-scepticism is natural. EU is not our friend. There are people inside the EU who works against Turkey’s membership. But of course we won’t quit trying just because they want so and there is no need to give concessions by absolutely desiring to become a member. To be consistent is
I tend to reject claims of ignorance about the process. For instance these statements by a popular historian who intended to approach Turkey's process from an historical angle do not make much sense:

Turkey has had the most bloodless westernization project though it lasted a bit longer. (13) However, a major difference from Russia and Japan in westernization is that the latter knew what the West was while Turks did not! (38)..... Our lack of information prevents us to see that European education system itself has major problems, becomes backward now. (136-7)..... Until very recently, cultural ramifications of EU process were only debated in low circulating leftist or Islamist press [of course in a more ideological sense here] and this lack of debate by the mainstream costs us dear. (119-120)..... With

the most important goal.

NO 28:

nationalism. I would rather qualify this as 'nankör' [ungrateful]. They are 'nankör' [those anti-EU journalists in Turkey] I notice very few people ready to recognize the benefits the EU process brought regarding public liberties, freedom etc. rights They take it for granted. Because probably these rights, new climates of freedom is not something for which people were looking for. They were not really fighting for it. Even for those for fighting, they are not ready to recognize that this is by the help of European soft imperialism.
the exception of Atatürk era, a generalized lack of knowledge on Europe continues. There is high level of ignorance about Europe. We do not need to enter EU but we should know Europe. (286) (İlber Ortaylı, 2007).

All senior journalists in high level positions in Turkey are exceptionally well-educated. It is the ideological/intellectual formation they are in that makes them downplay the role of EU membership process. Like in Malaysification debates they turn into guardians of establishments. Tactical changes are all welcome in this role. For instance a definitely anti-labor paper, Hürriyet, can be pro-labor when its editors want to hurt AKP leadership. Or any foreign policy move that touches upon sensitive issues like Kurdish questions will be reprimanded by the Press.

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95 Mainstream media prefers not to tease security forces and Hürriyet is a definitely anti-labor paper. But it turned to be pro-labor on May 1, 2008 in order to develop another strike at the government. Although disproportional use of police force is not excusable, unions knew that there would be violent scenes and instead of designated areas for demonstrations, they declared days before to send their workers to areas, such as Taksim square that police would react....Here are some Hürriyet photos with teasing edited material:
"if only i catch you"

Ve günün sözü Emniyet Müdürü Çetin' tan geldi

The head of Istanbul police says no considerable problems occurred today.
"thanks to policemen, Taksim square has no litter today."

96 Tülin Daloglu (2/27/2006):

Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul has accused his country's media of hampering whatever strategic gain Turkey has with this meeting. The press has harmed Turkey's national interests by doing what he calls the irresponsible thing and comparing Hamas to the Partiya Karkerana Kurdistan or Worker's Party of Kurdistan -- better known as the PKK. "This comparison has not taken any place in the Israeli media," he said. "You can't even find one single word. But the Turkish media wrote about it." The Turkish Foreign Ministry has not explained why he believes the comparison fails, except to say that Hamas is a democratically elected group.

.........The media, however, is hardly blameless in the situation. Yılmaz Polat, a journalist for more than three decades, also takes a look at the Turkish press. "If there is any manipulation on foreign news, there is also manipulation on domestic national news as well," he said. Mr. Polat notes how some members of the Turkish media received Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's meeting with the president at the White House. "Instead of focusing on the real substances, they used Mr. Erdogan's picture sitting next to Mr.
The press starts a blaming mechanism here and any groups that may disrupt the current political assemblage is targeted. Liberal pro-EU intellectuals, who in turn blame politicians\(^\text{97}\), are constantly blamed for weakening Turkey's political/intellectual structure\(^\text{98}\). It is not a surprise that a fundamental critique of

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Bush, his legs crossed and seeming taller than the president, as if it is something to be proud of," he said. The bottom line, he says, is that Mr. Gul's statement targets only the journalists Mr. Gul and his political party used to be able to manipulate.

\(^\text{97}\) Eser Karakaş (2004) declared that the sole culprit behind the unstable relations between Turkey and European Union was the successive governments of Turkish Republic (p. 165).

Eser Karakaş (2004):

Thanks to our glorious statesmen like Süleyman Demirel and Bülent Ecevit foresights, we were out of EU integration process. In the mean time, Greece tripled Turkey in terms of per capita GDP... (309)

\(^\text{98}\) Ertaşrul Özkök (1/2/2008):

[Intellectuals] attach AKP's 46.5% vote more significance than it deserves. Our intellectuals think this is a 'silent people's revolution' against our Republic. How quick we forgot that Ecevit got 42% of votes in 1970s. How about the 400% increase in those who visit Anıtkabir [Atatürk's mausoleum] Aren't there any AKP voters among those visitors? That anti-Republic revolution thing you say is in
Turkish Republic's ideologies by a group of columnists under the rubric of "the Second Republic" was harshly criticised and these columnists were labeled as traitors.\footnote{A group of well-known columnists was at the heart of the Second Republic debate. In my time, this debate rose prominence again.}

...your minds. My last words: some intellectuals attribute extreme meanings to 46.5% and they give damage to the country, to AKP and its supporters.

Gündüz Aktan (5/5/2005):

Following World War II, Turkey was in the Western world, but the West couldn't overcome historical prejudices and didn't consider Turkey a Western country. Following the Cold War and during our EU membership process, this situation became clearer. If the West had been fair, would the Armenian issue be treated this way? Meanwhile, many 'liberal intellectuals' in Turkey claim that Turkey should do everything requested by the West in order to become Western. Western countries use these intellectuals' lack of identity. The number of academics dealing with foreign policy problems was very small. In addition, the number of lawyers and historians in the fields of genocide, terrorism and the rules of war is insufficient. As a nation, we also want conflicts to be solved immediately. We can't feel enmity over long periods. We shouldn't forget that solving conflicts in a short period of time requires making concessions.
In his critique of İlhan Selçuk who declares that 2nd Republicanism is not different from Sevres Treaty mentality, Eser Karakaş (2004) states that 2nd Republic debates did not appear coincidentally. It was when Turkish Republic was in an impasse at any angle. Guerilla warfare in Southeastern and Eastern Anatolia could not stopped; there was the worst economic crisis in Republican history, a very bad network of foreign relations; two major cities were governed by a party whose political programme was not promising in terms of democracy etc. This debate intended to open up new ideas in this massive systemic impasse (120).

Eser Karakaş defined the basic arguments of Second Republicanism:

1. Existing nationalist and statist education system should be left and a more competitive, contemporary, open to world model of education has to be implemented,
2. The principle of secularism and Religious Affairs Directorate should be left behind and a new model that based on trusting citizens should be implemented
3. National Security Councile, which is the fruit of coups, should be abrogated or should be limited to military affairs,
4. Unitary or federal state models are not taboos. Federal states such as Germany, USA or Switzerland are still integrated,
5. All state archives should be open to public as the Republican history is our common history,
5. A globalized free market economy model should be adopted. Customs Union, privatization are inevitable. EU membership is a social goal. In this respect, Turkey should acknowledge the role of supranational institutions. (120-1)

Eser Karakaş (2004):

I think the success of Mustafa Kemal lies on the fact that he preferred the rising notion of nation-state instead of Ottoman romanticism or other adventerous political projects in the early 20th century (240).
Statham (2007) describes the way journalists can become political actors:

Commentating is a crucial consideration for ‘media performance’ because it constitutes journalists’ most direct form of political intervention into the mass-mediated public discourse (p. 462-3) However, when they commentate on events [rather than mere reporting], journalists intervene more directly into public debates, and have greater opportunities for focusing attention on interpretations of issues and thereby a greater potential for influencing the way that the public understands and forms opinions on such issues. The visibility of editorials in the public domain allows journalists a special status as an ‘actor’ in the mediated public debate. Subsequently, their mobilized opinions and arguments may potentially contribute to public deliberation and opinion-formation processes. (463-4)

I have speculated even further and argued that journalists could explicitly become actors by using all every means of journalistic production possible. This happens in Turkish case when the fundamental values they have begin to conflict with the political authorities. Although I seemed to side against these acting journalists, I find it exciting to see the emergence and formation of an acting elite group. In a country where the average formal education year is lower than 5 years, leading Turkish journalists are way beyond the average Turkish citizen and it is a future interest to watch how the interpretation of Turkish modernization will evolve against a pro-Western Islamic political authority. Turkish Republican experience had been a significant and to a large extent successful social engineering project in the Islamic
world and the future articulations of this project will only produce new and
unpredictable articulations.\textsuperscript{100}

\textsuperscript{100} Although not journalists, a recent reaction of a group of Turkish authors
might give an idea of elitism among Turkish cultural producers:

Thomas Seibert (9/13/2008):

The clash between secularists and Islamists in Turkey has spread to
the country’s art world, as a group of writers plans to boycott one of the
world’s most important book fairs in protest at what they see as government
efforts to showcase secular Turkey as a country of “moderate Islam”. Turkey
will be official Guest of Honour at this year’s Frankfurt Book Fair in
Germany, which runs from Oct 15 to 19 and brings together authors, agents
and publishers from around the world. About 200 Turkish authors, including
Orhan Pamuk, a Nobel laureate, were expected to attend. But in Istanbul,
critics of Turkey’s government are enraged. “The government that is in power
right now is not in a position to represent Turkey’s culture and literature,”
said Fusun Akatli, an academic and literary critic in Istanbul, who is one of
the leading voices of the boycott movement. So far, about 20 authors, some of
them well-known in Turkey, have said they will not travel to Frankfurt in a
show of protest.

While the Kemalists represent Turkey’s traditional elites in the army,
judiciary, bureaucracy and art world, the Anatolians have started to challenge
long-held positions such as the headscarf ban at Turkey’s universities. Last
February, Mr Erdogan’s government passed a law allowing female students to
wear the scarf on campus, but the Constitutional Court annulled the decision.
A well-known journalism professor Ashi Tunç (2003) uses Philip Meyer's social influence model (see below) for the newspaper industry in order to demonstrate the lack of credible media in Turkey. She comes to the conclusion that "This approach is an apparent quest for creating a credible medium that can also keep advertising support. Unfortunately, however, this is not the case in Turkey. (2) She provides a different line of argument what I would like to propose is that these journalists do not care that way of social influence. Especially hard-core secularist journalists sincerely stated that they are more interested in what some high level bureaucrats think. What is more, a journalist I talked to told me that an ordinary journalist or an editor first of all assumes his/her colleagues as the main audience. His column was shifted from Monday to Saturday when there would be more reader attention but he was unhappy because his own colleagues don't read newspapers at weekends! He was sorry because he gets prestige when he makes a good news and this is recognized by his colleagues. This conception of audience is just another evidence the elitistic manner of journalistic production.101

... Ms Akatlı suspects the government wants to use the Frankfurt Book Fair as a stage for its beliefs. She seemed especially outraged by the notion that non-Kemalist authors could be presented on a par with Kemalist writers.

101

Societal Influence Model for the Newspaper Industry
Pfetsch (2008) states that "Most social scientists today agree that a pan-European public sphere involving the average citizens is unrealistic (de Vreese, 2007: 8). Instead, such a European public sphere relies on national mass media and their ability or willingness to contribute to the Europeanization of national public spheres (Neidhardt et al., 2000: 466)". However, it could be a wrong idea to rely on Turkish media to Europeanize the Turkish public sphere. Turkish media has become an element of a newly emerged political assemblage in Turkey whose existence is to ensure maintaining nation state formation and is an obstacle to more Europeanization.

\[\text{Content Quality} \rightarrow \text{Credibility} \]

\[\text{Societal Influence} \rightarrow \text{Circulation} \]

\[\text{Profitability} \]
Appendices
Appendix 1 - Research Goals

I Is there a correspondence between the themes of Turkish modernity and the EU news?

Until the mid 1980s, Turkish journalists’ interest in the Union remained strictly limited. When there was a story about it, it had to be directly related to Turkey. News continued to focus on the political aspects of the country’s application (especially in the context of rivalry with Greece). Even with strictly economic issues, the nature of debate was rendered political and served the interests of domestic power players. However, since the mid-1980s, Turkish journalism has had a growing interest in increasingly diverse aspects of the subject. Not only issues directly related to Turkey but also anything about the EU itself is increasingly covered. Moreover, the coverage is not limited to the pages of politics and diplomacy. EU-related news can also be seen in other sections of newspapers as Terzis (2008) describes the confluence of boundaries at a European level:

It was not so long ago that the EU Brussels correspondent used to place his or her articles in the international pages. Some papers even had European News pages and page editors. Today with the EU acquis communitaire exceeding 80,000 pages, and its influence on the national legislation of member states and the everyday lives of EU citizens becoming overwhelming, EU news is an essential ‘ingredient’ of a large number of national news stories. The EU correspondent is thus increasingly becoming a national correspondent, rather than a foreign correspondent who needs to complement the stories written by the national reporters and also has to compete with them for space or airtime when he or she wants to pitch a topic for a story. (p. 537)
Whatever the case my initially planned questions remained valid and throughout my research I asked these questions: Do the central themes of Turkish modernity organize news production and thus link the EU membership process to Turkish modernization? What are the emergent themes that might displace the central themes? Who are the actors to give new meanings to these themes? What are the ways journalists respond to all developments that are outlined in this research goal?

II What is the network of sources and institutions that generate EU news?

Because of its technical complexity and expanding political consequences, journalists are believed to increasingly rely on outside sources and institutions when they cover the EU. I had these questions in my mind: Is there a significant change in the outside sources? Do competitors attempt to shape the outcome of public debates? Ethnographic analysis of news production network focused on demonstrating how journalists articulate the changes in the structure of Turkish policy elites along with these questions: What is the role of non-domestic players such as the EU itself through its representatives and the EU-related or EU-funded organizations in Turkey and international media sources and institutions? Are their roles as sources increasing? Does an increase in these sources mean a growing influence of transnational decision making structures? My track of interviews in the next chapter will give an idea of these networks.

III What are the emergent metaphors about the E.U. and schemes of similarity and difference about the internal dynamics of Turkish identity that Turkish journalists invent and deploy?

EU officials rely on metaphors intensely not only to explain the future and nature of the Union but also to determine them. 'Our common European house' or former German Chancellor Kohl’s ‘convoy’ metaphor criticize British government’s slowness in EU issues (Shore, 1997) or more widely used ‘family’ metaphor
(Borneman and Fowler, 1997) are instructive here. My research examined the local metaphors employed by Turkish journalists to the EU process. What new metaphors/images are replacing the older ones? For instance, Islamists once labeled EU a ‘Christian club’ or made word play with the Turkish equivalent of ‘common market’ to show the detriments of membership: ‘They are the partners and we are the market [waiting to be exploited]’. Mainstream media used these metaphors from time to time but now these are not used any more. Similarly, traditional schemes of internal minorities (i.e. Kurds) and external enemies (i.e.) Greece are subject to change. In addition to methods already mentioned, rhetorical and discourse analysis are especially needed to answer the following questions: What are these metaphors and schemes used for? Is a post-national identification emerging? What kinds of tropes will be produced for those domestic objects of perennial official suspicion such as Kurds? How do journalists treat the field and the home in this process, what are the metaphorical changes in defining these? Answers to these questions are particularly important to see the shifting cultural definitions and policies around the central themes of Turkish modernity. I devote a full chapter on EU metaphors. It does not provide answers to all these questions listed here. Some are ignored, some are debated not in a metaphorical level but intellectual and non-metaphorical journalistic level. The reader will have an idea about them in several chapters.

IV How to define contemporary Turkish modernity?

Although Turkish elites disagree over the terms of membership, the majority of them do not reject the idea of membership. Even the Turkish army is ready to give up some of its powers in the interest of membership because of its close association with realizing the next phase of national modernity. In the Turkish Foreign Ministry’s website Turkey is portrayed as an intrinsic part of the European system of democratic
values and it is claimed that European integration will be incomplete without Turkey: ‘Turkey’s membership in the EU is a historical mission both for the EU and Turkey that will reaffirm the common values that constitute the very basis of the EU and usher in a new era in world affairs’ (www.mfa.gov.tr). Metaphorically, Turkey’s modernization is a journey to the West and this journey will end with membership in the EU. However, even if this is a relatively common expectation among the Turkish policy elites, disagreement about the terms of membership suggests a set of questions: What kinds of definitions of modernity compete with each other? What interests underlie the consensus favoring EU membership? Will conflicts of interest disrupt the integration process? How do journalists operate between these conflicts and a common interest in EU membership? Because of their connectedness with the policy elites, columnists are particularly important to answer these questions. Personal network analyses of these columnists, in-depth interviews with them and textual analyses of their columns remained to be the main methodological approaches. However, when I first posed these questions, I did not expect such a level of disagreement I document here. I did not really expect a real disruption in the process. The EU process began to disrupt common attitude towards EU membership. Some sectors of elites became explicitly opponent. In order to understand what is to come, another brief look is necessary:

**Turkish modernization project is a curious social experiment.**

A more radical form of westernization came on the eve of World War I under the Young Turks and after the war under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal (better known as Atatürk), the founder, in 1923, of the Turkish republic. In the 1920s and 1930s, the Kemalists, mostly military men who had been
exposed to Western-style positivist education in Ottoman military academies, adopted a top-down project of radical modernization for the new Turkey. In an ambitious drive to import European civilization wholesale, the republic disposed of the caliphate, the Arabic alphabet, Islamic education, and the Sufi brotherhoods. It adopted Western legal codes from Germany, Italy, and Switzerland, together with the Latin alphabet and the Western calendar, Western holidays, and Western measuring systems. The country's social history and language were reworked. A new education system glorified pre-Islamic Turkic civilizations at the expense of the country's more recent Ottoman past, and many Arabic and Persian words were purged to create an "authentically" Turkish vocabulary. In the name of secularism, even the Arabic *azan*, the Islamic call to prayer, was translated into modern Turkish. The traditional Ottoman headgear, known as a fez, was banned. Women were prohibited from wearing the Islamic veil in public. And Western clothing became the new compulsory dress code for men. (Taspinar, 2007: 118)

However,

Despite such ambitious reforms, however, Kemalist secularism barely infiltrated Turkish society at large. The rural and pious masses of Anatolia remained largely unaffected by the cultural re-engineering taking place in Ankara; it was the military, the government bureaucracy, and the urban bourgeoisie who adapted most readily to Kemalism's thorough westernization. Winning hearts and minds in the countryside would have required the use of traditional and religious symbols, but those were anathema to the Turkish republic's founding fathers. In short order, the cultural gap
between the Kemalist center and the Anatolian periphery had become insurmountable. As a CHP slogan from the 1920s put it, the Turkish government seemed to rule “For the People, Despite the People.” (Taspinar, 2007: 118) [This same narrative of disjuncture between the elites and the citizens has been studied previously by Serif Mardin (1973 and 1989)].

Thus seemingly paradoxical approach to the EU process by many senior journalists can then be attributed to this basic disjuncture which will extendedly be discusses in later pages and later chapters.
Appendix 2

How the ethnographer found his interviewees?

[In chronological order:]

My very first interviewee was Serkan Arman who was my classmate in high school. Serkan saved me from my anxieties by constantly informing me up on developments in Turkish media. This was a warm up interview but not without merit. When I was doing my coursework in Houston, he was having a MA degree in Austin, TX. At the time of the interview, Mr. Arman was working in the economy department in Milliyet. He later had a weekly column. It was never named as a column, but he had built a reputation with his writings there.

Sedat Ergin: Chief editor of Milliyet. My friend and my first interviewee Serkan Arman fixed and scheduled the interview. He even gave a ride to the newspaper. Mr. Ergin is a high profile personality in Turkish press. He used to Hürriyet's Washington, DC correspondent and chief of Ankara office before starting his position in Milliyet.

Here is a blog note after this first high profile interview:

My dear audience, I had a great relief yesterday. You could feel how I was stressed. Then in a state of relief, I had a nap at Çetin's place and watched, the movie Transamerica at night and read in the middle and was happy to hear that Fenerbahçe, our arc-rival in soccer, lost first time this year. Mr. Ergin not only talked to me sincerely, he invited me to come and continue our interview
next week at the same hour. He had told me he could spare only half an hour because of his busy schedule and I said ok. But now it will be a longer one.

(19 February 2006)

I would like to drop a line on Sedat Ergin, Milliyet's chief editor. When on Monday I stopped by his office to say hi, he asked me how my dissertation goes and offered help for new contacts. Well what can I say? Despite his busy schedule, and despite being in such a high position, he spares some time for me and provides actual help. I am glad to meet him in person. he is a candidate to occupy a high place in my acknowledgements! (20 April 2006)

**Turgay Olcayto**: The interview was scheduled without any mediator. I had attended a panel in which Mr. Olcayto spoke. After the panel, I asked him if I could interview him and he invited me to the TGC center. I later learnt he knew many of my colleagues/former journalists at Istanbul Bilgi University and maybe that helped in his acceptance. Here is a blog post on the circumstances of the interview:

* Turgay Olcayto (L) in a panel in Istanbul University

Istanbul has been rainy for two days. It is cloudy and gray. My mood and the weather seem to be in positive correlation. However, there is still something soothing about it. While I was walking in Çağaloğlu under the rain this afternoon, I felt good. I had an appointment with Turgay Olcayto, General Secretary of Journalists' Association of Turkey (TGC), with whom I met last Friday. I will soon upload my notes from that panel since it was one of the most productive panels I ever attended during my fieldwork.
Mr. Olcayto had been too kind and invited me to come to the TGC Building to talk about the possible contacts he would recommend... That recommendation session turned into an interview. I asked if I could record what he said and before I realize I had started my third interview in the field... He was just too kind to help me find my way. After the meeting I would be quite satisfied...

TGC has a nice building in a very nice district. Çağaloğlu used to be the mecca of Turkish press and publishers. That had changed after conglomerations in 1980s but you can still find traces of a golden era. The building itself is located near the Iranian Counselate and Governorship of Istanbul. A thousand years ago, when I was a high school kid, I had watched a demonstration there where police treated protesters very harshly and I sat down in a corner and cried. It was the very first time I had seen a clash scene live between police and demonstrators. In fact I was supposed to be a demonstrator too but nobody would take a kid too seriously... Anyway, after a bit of nostalgia, I wandered around in the narrow back streets of Çağaloğlu after the interview and ended up in a publisher friend's newly opened and decorated office. During breaks, I continued to read Hasan Cemal's Cumhuriyeti Çok Sevmisti and at night I watched the movie, Hostel. I am in the very beginning but I would recommend the former. Hasan Cemal's candid writing provides great ethnographic insights about newsroom life. However, I would not recommend the latter if you are in the same mood :) Despite the legends about me spread by Aylin, and despite a very successful interview and new leads for my interviewee quest I was still sad in the end....(14 March 2006)
Nilgün Cerrahoğlu: I met her in the same panel on Turkish media. Like Mr. Olcayto, I asked her if could interview her. She accepted. She was a high profile journalist before she was fired from Doğan Media Group newspapers. She was then working for Cumhuriyet.

Ms. Cerrahoğlu in an interview with Daniel Cohn Bendit.

In a nice cafe that is close to the high school from where I graduated (Nişantaşı, same neighbourhood Orhan Pamuk frequently mentions in his novels) I interviewed Nilgün Cerrahoğlu yesterday. As usual I got new leads to follow in addition to having a candid and informative interview content. I had also marked several cafes to hang out later. Despite my overwhelming sadness, yesterday seemed to be quite a productive day. Besides reading and uploading field notes, we released the 8th issue of Milli İstirahat, and I had a talk to a very old friend who is thinking of publishing a weekly news magazine. We had planned thousands of projects before but this seems to be most concrete one to realize... We will see... (19 March 2006)

Haluk Şahin: A communications professor and TV news producer. He was teaching at Bilgi U. so it wasn't hard to have access to him. Mr. Şahin remained to be one of my blog’s most loyal followers. He would also help me to fix other interviews.

(From left to right) Sedat Örzel, Haluk Üçel, Gülen, and Haluk Şahin. My colleagues together.

This interview was done last week. Prof. Şahin spared his time for me to produce a cordial interview. He invited me to come back whenever I want. I
wish all interviewees would be like this but I know this is only a fantasy of the ethnographer. (17 April 2006).

**Murat Belge:** He is the head of Comparative Literature department at Bilgi U. A regular columnist. An indisputable intellectual in Turkey. He was harder to reach but still he could be found in the campus. I asked him directly to interview him.

**Yavuz Baydar:** It was Mr. Olcayto’s suggestion to talk to Mr. Baydar. I already know about him and he in my list but Mr. Olcayto called him and fixed an interview in the middle of his own interview. Among the names so far listed, Mr. Baydar might be the busiest one. So it still took a while to conduct the interview.

I interviewed Yavuz Baydar, *Sabah*’s ombudsman and a columnist in *The New Anatolian*. [He later began to write for *Today's Zaman*. The interview took place in Sabah. The newspaper is located in Barbaros Bulvari, Besiktas. Some of my old readers might remember that I would conduct a short-term newsroom research in Sabah’s newsroom last summer. But the change of chief editor had shattered my plans. Anyway, Mr. Baydar is quite well-known with his contributions to the institution of news ombudsmanship in Turkish media. I would like to thank for his kindness to accept my interview request during his vacation time... (3 August 2006)

My relation with Mr. Baydar continued. He always remembered me whenever he saw me in a gathering, meeting etc. He recommended me for a project for Open
Society Institute and Newsweek's Turkish edition. (Unfortunately, change of
ownership issues prevented the publication of Newsweek's Turkey edition).

**Toktamış Ateş:** A leading Kemalist thinker and scholar. He also writes for
dailies such as Bugün. However, he acted to be moderate person and in the tense
polemics between pro-AKP people and their opponents, he decided to be stay back.

Prof. Ates is a scholar in the History of Turkish Revolution and in Economics
in Istanbul University and currently a regular columnist in Bugün daily. He is
immensely known in Turkey as a prolific Kemalist thinker. I am grateful to
him to accept my request in short notice. He has an office in Istanbul Bilgi
University since he is a member of this university higher council of education
(in fact I don't know how to translate Mutevelli Heyeti for sure...). The
interview took place in that office in this afternoon. A short bio of him in
Turkish can be found here. (August 10, 2006)

**Zeynep Atikkan:** Another journalist (like Nilgün Cerrahoğlu) who was the
victim of interest clashes with Doğan Media Group. My then chair Prof. Aslı Tunç
was her close friend and that was how the interview was fixed.

I had the pleasure to talk to Mrs. Atikkan yesterday. She is not only a veteran
journalist in general, but also a real expert journalist on the EU. I am grateful
to Aslı Tunç who introduced me to her. The interview took place at her home
and Prof. Bülent Gultekin of Wharton School of Business also contributed to our discussion. Mrs. Atikkan wrote for Hurriyet for many years until she had to live the newspaper a few years ago due to conglomerative reasons. She is getting ready to write a book on EU-TR relations and her recent publication on September 11 gets positive reactions from the critiques in Turkey.

p.s. This is the only photo I could find. I wish I had taken a photo myself...

(October 10, 2006)

**An editor in AA (Anadolu Ajans):** She used to work in a daily in Istanbul. She had interviewed with a group of bloggers a year before. I was writing for a multi-authored Istanbul blog and she found us through that blog. Later she moved to work for Anadolu Agency in Istanbul but accepted my request for an interview in turn.

**David Barchard:** A web connection. Mr. Barchard found out my blog in its early stages and send me emails from time to time. One day I emailed him in order to schedule an interview. The interview took place in Nişantaşı at a classy travel magazine’s office. He was also writing for that magazine.

**Hasan Cemal:** Sedat Ergin introduced me to him and it was then easy to schedule the interview.

_A younger Hasan Cemal. I should say he hasn’t changed much..._

The interview took place at Mr. Cemal’s office in Milliyet newspaper. The grandson of Ahmed Djemal (Cemal Paşa), a senior and notably pro-EU journalist and columnist. Chief editor of Cumhuriyet for years. He publishes journalistic books regularly and most of his books cause hot debates in the
Turkish cultural and political life... Special thanks goes to Mr. Sedat Ergin and my dear friend Serkan Arman...

Today I tried the public bus to reach the newspaper building. It seems that the area where major newspapers are located is not an isolated place any more. Shantytownish development goes hand in hand with business related developments. I guess the basic logic of moving away from the downtown loses its meaning the city now grasps once isolated districts like Bagcilar/Ikiteller....(December 05, 2006)

**Kürşat Bumin:** A well known media critic, staunch left liberal. Kürşat Bumin is a regular contributor to *Yeni Şafak* for more than 10 years and he has also been writing for the weekly news magazine, *Nokta*. He teaches history of Turkish press in Istanbul Bilgi University. So it was easy to reach him directly.

**Emre Demir:** Mr Demir, Strasbourg correspondent of *Zaman* daily, who accepted an online interview and who gave sincere answers. I met Mr. Demir through my blog and he helped me to get in touch with other *Zaman* correspondents in Europe...

**Esra Arsan:** Esra Ersan has been a journalist and in the end she preferred to stay in the academy. She teaches journalism classes at Bilgi University and recently submitted her PhD in Communication School of Marmara University and became an assistant professor in our departmen. Her thesis topic is: EU and Journalism; The formation of EU Public Sphere. Cases of Greece and Hungary....

**Erdal Şafak:** Erdal Şafak is one of the major columnists in *Sabah* newspaper. I was introduced by Yavuz Baydar in his office.
Ergun Babahan: He was the chief editor of Sabah at the time of writing. Yavuz Baydar introduced me but he also knew me through his contacts at Bilgi University. He is a close friend of head of Board of Trustees at Bilgi University.

Ash Tunc: She had been my chair for three years at Media and Communication Systems department at Istanbul Bilgi University. She is a media scholar but she also writes regular columns on media in the press. She had been a keen follower of my blog.

Selcuk Gultasli: Thanks to Mr. Demir for his introduction, Selcuk Gultasli replied my questions online. Mr. Gultasli is currently Brussels Representative of Zaman daily and is a well know correspondent in the field. I was recommended to get in touch with him by several of my interviewees....

Mehmet Barlas: Yavuz Baydar introduced me to Mr. Barlas, who is a very well known columnist and journalist. At the moment he writes for Sabah.

Apart from being a regular Sabah columnist, Barlas and secularist sociologist Emre Kongar produces a highly rated daily news commentary in NTV news channel where two clashes quite harshly in their viewpoints....

Sami Kohen: Another gentleman of Turkish Journalism. A senior foreign affairs columnist of the Turkish Press. He has been writing in Milliyet since the beginning of the newspaper! That is, he has been a columnist since 1955 in the same
newspaper writes five days a week... The interview took place in his office at Milliyet. Sedat Ergin introduced me to him.

Oğuz Demiralp: Under normal conditions, it would be impossible to arrange an interview with Mr. Demiralp, whose bureaucratic status is close to a minister. It all started with a "clash" between two boys for a girl. I was about to start dating a girl and the other boy was also trying hard. In the end, in less than a month, the girl disappeared and two boys became friends gradually. It turned out to be that the other boy's uncle was Mr. Demiralp and his use of uncle-nephew relation helped arranging an interview.

The interview took place in the ABGS building. After the interview Mr. Demiralp introduced me several officials there and asked a EU expert who was working there to talk to me. That's how I could interview Elif Kurşunlu. I later found out that Ms. Kurşunlu was a friend of a colleague in the Bilgi EU Center.

Taha Akyol: Another Sedat Ergin introduction.

I interviewed Taha Akyol in his office at CNN-TURK today. He is one of most senior columnists of Turkish press. At the moment he regularly writes for Milliyet and produces a weekly political interview/commentary program for CNN-TURK. He is also the vice president of the latter at the moment. Mr Akyol gave me his autographed book. That's a selection of his published articles that were related to EU-TR relations... (2 April 2007).
**Yalçın Doğan:** A long term *Hürriyet* columnist. He was accessible. I mailed him, his secretary replied and we had fixed the interview in his office at *Hürriyet* building.

**Yahım Eralp:** Mr. Eralp had worked for years in Turkish Foreign Ministry, being an ambassador among many other posts and after his retirement, he had been an advisor to two gov'ts and currently he works as a political commentator for CNN-TÜRK, teaches at Kultur University and is involved in activities of TESEV. He is one of the key observants of Turkey's EU process from the outset... I had met him in my preliminary work and it was easy again to schedule an interview when I came back.

**Şirin Payzin:** A secretary I met in my preliminary work asked for me for an interview. Şirin Payzin is a high profile correspondent for CNN Turk. She is the one that reports from Brussels in summit times.

It looks like in ordinary school weeks, my Mondays and Wednesdays are becoming dissertation days as i can skip some classes these days. In recent weeks, i had been to CNN-Turk and Milliyet buildings frequently. It takes a
public bus to arrive those buildings from Mecidiyeköy. Buildings are next to each other. One building complex includes all Dogan Group TV Channels that also include CNN Turk and the other building include Milliyet and Posta. After some re-scheduling Şirin Payzım (on the right) spared some time from her really busy schedule. The interview took place in a car on the way between Bağcılar to Ortaköy. I am thankful to her. A bio of hers can be found here in Turkish. She is a senior world news correspondent and recently she is making news programmes for CNN-Turk. She is one of the visible figures among Turkish journalists in Brussels at the time of summits... (20 April 2007)

Melih Aşık: A well known Milliyet columnist. I called his secretary and he replied me back sending his cell phone number:

On Wednesday evening, I have conducted another interview. Melih Aşık met me in The Marmara and I have had one of my most playful interviews! He is a regular columnist in Milliyet and he is known to have a sceptical approach to the EU process. His column has a bitter discourse against AKP gov’t but his talk is sweet. Thank you Mr. Aşık! (20 April 2007)

Cengiz Aktar: Although he is quite famous, he is very accessible. I sent an email to him and he replied me back with sending his cell phone. Prof. Aktar told me that he knew me through my blog and we kept in touch after the interview. He even asked me to be his assistant next year but i had a better job offer and became a lecturer in Public Relations program in Istanbul Bilgi University.
One of the rare productive events of the last week was the interview with Cengiz Aktar. I met him in his office at Bahçeşehir University and conducted a candid interview. I would like to thank him for his kindness and accessibility. Prof. Aktar is a significant figure who contributes regularly to the Turkish Press. He was also quoted several times in this blog... I would say he is one of the most knowledgeable columnist on the EU-TR relations... (30 April 2007)

Osman Uğan: Another contact through secretaries.

Just interviewed Osman Uğan, a regular columnist in Milliyet and the author of Tepki Cephesi [the Reaction Front - against the EU]. However, his focus in that book is mostly the opposition within the EU borders. We discussed more about the Euroscepticism in addition discussing my regular interview questions. Another playful and more than an hour interview that took place in the Marmara Cafe in Taksim... (16 May 2007)

Eser Karakaş: Prof. Eser Karakaş is the vice president of Bahçeşehir University and he frequently contributes to Turkish dailies on the EU process. I first realized his writings at Referans but he currently writes for Star. I contacted him through his secretary.
Cüneyt Ülsever: I emailed him (through his email adress that is found in his columns) and he replied me back sending his cell phone and describing where he lives. He lives in a villa in the Anatolian side of Istanbul. He was very welcoming and helpful and certainly kind.

Glad to interview another well-known columnist, Cüneyt Ülsever. The interview took place at his house at the beginning of this week. His columns in Hürriyet can be found here.

Some unexpected technical problems occurred this time. The batteries ran out but fortunately I had just bought extras. After replacing them, the recorder gave alerts that the memory was full. How come it was full, I had no idea and I deleted some older material. But then an anxious thought grasped me. What if I deleted some recordings I hadn't saved to my PC yet? It got worse when it came to signal of full memory again. I deleted more and got anxious more. In the mean time, Mr. Ulsever watched me fixing the stuff. He was kind enough not to increase my anxiety:)

p.s. 1- There is no lost in recordings. 2- I later found out that the digital recorder in my bag recorded 6 hours of silence when I had forgotten to use the hold button... (26 May 2007)

Emre Aköz: I emailed him, he emailed me back. He admitted during the interview that he thought I was an intelligence agent as he could not make a connection between anthropology and media.
While on my way to meet Mr. Aköz, I was wondering when someone will harshly point out my methodological problems. Well, Mr. Aköz did that.

Questioned me whether I was really doing media ethnography and honestly in some respects I would have to agree with him. Mr. Aköz has a substantive sociological background. Like me he graduated from the sociology department of Boğaziçi University and stayed there as a TA while he was doing his masters degree. Sometime later he became a columnist at Sabah and his intelligent but aggressive style caused headaches in TV discussion on popular culture etc. He is a chess fan, by the way. A chess set is ready in his office and he frequently plays chess online. After disorienting me with his questions, he offered me great insights, I have to admit and I offer my thanks here once again... (30 May 2007)

H. Cuneyd Zapsu: PM advisor. A notorious one. Very hard to reach. His daughter was my student and she helped me to arrange the interview.

Weather and workload seems to be obstructing my dissertation work but in the mean time I have conducted two high profile interviews. In 18 June, I had been to Mr. Zapsu’s house to conduct the profile. He is an advisor to PM Erdoğan, and his official status is "special assistant and data coordinator for the Party Chair". My special thanks goes to Ayşe who mediated the scheduling. Mr. Zapsu was sincere in most of the interview and I believe his comments will certainly contribute to my thesis. When you google him, you
won't find much positive stuff about, he is a constant media target:) (28 June 2007)

**Zeynep Göğüş**: She is a columnist. She was also a part-time lecturer at Bilgi. There were several people who knew her but I directly phoned her at her PR Agency and after some email exchanges I went to her Agency in Gayrettepe and interviewed her. She is a very knowledgeable person on EU-TR issues and she has a EU-TR related agency in Brussels.

**Etyen Mahçupyan**: Through my friends in TESEV (an NGO I describe in other sections) I could schedule the interview.

Just came back from TESEV's headquarters in Karaköy. After the Hrant Dink assassination, Mr. Mahçupyan became the chief editor of the Armenian Turkish newspaper, Agos. He was a regular columnist for *Zaman* daily, and before that he contributed to *Radikal* and he now writes for *Taraf*. He is known to have radical democratic views and according to a Vikipedi entry his polemic with liberal scholar Atilla Yayla a few years ago was one of the most of productive intellectual exchanges in recent times. Anyway, he is also in charge with some TESEV projects and I visited him there. The interview was one of the least productive ones I ever conducted. He was in a hurry and he did not think he could be helpful. Even the very short exchange of views is a gem for me but I was quitely disappointed, I have to say. (6 July 2007)

**Oktay Ekşi**: Mr. Ekşi rejected my interview request twice. Then I asked Prof. Haluk Şahin, who is a friend of Mr. Ekşi, fixed the interview for me. He invited me to his office in Hürriyet building and we had a relatively successfull conversation. Among
the interviewees, he was one of the most Euro-sceptic columnists. Though this was particularly what I wanted to achieve. Mr. Ekşi a very well established columnist in Hürriyet and he is also currently the head of the Turkish Press Council....

**An expert in ABGS:** She was introduced by Mr. Demiralp. Months later I learned that she is a friend of a friend. However, I don't think I could have access to her. She was friendly and he underlined that since she is a state servant, she had to be anonymous. I received more data from her than many other more popular figures I interviewed. At first, Mr Demiralp took me to an office where he was expecting to find a head of a department but she was not available. Then he introduced me to this relatively young expert and very probably she was more talkative than the head would be.
Appendix 3

Field Equipment

Computers

Two desktops. One at home, one at the office. My home desktop gradually collapsed. The latter had also collapsed but it was renewed. Before I decide to buy a laptop, I relied on my office desktop. My laptop in Houston was exceptionally annoying. It was heavy and had continuous hardware problems the Compaq customer service could never solve. So I had decided to get a desktop which is supposed to be more reliable. It was indeed. As my life got busier, and I was more mobile, and as I became a more online person, having a laptop was now urgent. Would it be a PC or Mac? Despite the design and security lures, I decided to stay with PC, ending up buying a Sony Vista laptop. I decided to learn technicalities of Apple later and also I thought only softwares for PC were more available at the time of writing. The writing up went between the office desktop, which has no brand name, and Vista through Google Documents files. When it was time to prepare the first full draft, I shifted to Open Office Writer software in my laptop and began to write in my laptop exclusively. Still, some files remained in Google Docs for updates and I continued to use the office desktop. Because I had an online presence in writing heavily until the last two months, I could easily other computers. My brother Hakan's and my friend Çetin's laptops have a significant role in this respect.

I ordered my new desktop computer this evening. Suleyman took me to a computer store and I guess I got a good deal. I have been trying to decide whether I should buy a laptop or desktop for three months and my final decision is a desktop. I sure show signs of long term settlement. A DVD-writer included in the set. No need to mention the computer capacity so that i
can easily play any strategy game I want. It will around $800. That costs less than I expected but still too much. But that's a need:)

An office

"The office" is an extremely significant place for various operations. The study room at home would still be contained by the apartment living but I would frequently find refuge in my office:

So I have been in my office since late morning: 1) Grading, which is still not done. 2) Working on a few corrections in my weekly report on EU funded project news in Turkey. 3) Emailing 4) Flirting through MSN messenger 5) Learning the benefits of my new Google account! So i have become one of the cool people who have a gmail account. But I am satisfied with my existing accounts. So you will not receive a notification on email address change. 6) newspaper archiving. 7) I reconfirmed my ticket booking. (11 December 2004)

An apartment

I have a large apartment in a central place in Istanbul. Good for visitors, good for storage, very good for peaceful work.

I got a fileholder and all fancy stuff for my study room. I have this doubt that I won't start to be more productive after all this spending and investment on the study room. whatever...

Next step is to have fast internet connection and produce some business cards etc for my fieldwork relations. (11 January 2005)
More work on my apartment. I bought a few pieces of furniture last weekend.

It is now certain that I will be staying in Istanbul next year. I have been
investing for my study room. I am building a very good home office. I hope
this will correspond to a more productive fieldwork. (10 January 2005)

A Cell Phone

Nokia N95. This relatively expensive cell phone is an invaluable tool. In some
journalist sites, it is one of the recommended equipments. In addition to basic phone
use, it has a 5 Megapixel camera, it has wireless internet connection and recording
tools. It has other tools but these were the main reasons I benefitted from.

Before N95, I was using another Nokia model in the beginning which had the
most advanced tools at that time.

Email

I heavily rely on Google products, and Gmail is one of them. Its usage is easy
and its storage facility is good for contious archives of the written material or flow of
correspondences. I sometimes felt to be more formal, and in my research
correspondence I used my institutional email account at Bilgi University but after a
few mail exchanges, I shifted back to Gmail. I also categorized all my related
correspondences using the 'labels' function there. I rarely used my Rice account which
remained active. Using the Google Alerts service, every new item in the web about the
relevant persons or thems in my research was daily sent to my Gmail account.

Browser

I am a keen Firefox user. It is quick and effective. There are some sites that
refuse to comply to web standards, so I had to use Internet Explorer from time to time.
I did not find Google's new browser Chrome to be better than Firefox and my blog software did not work properly with the latter so I stayed with Firefox.

Text Editing

I do not have Microsoft Office in my laptop and instead I use Open Office programs including Writer. My office desktop has the Word program and when I am online I rely on Google Documents. However, the final stage of the dissertation is written Writer.

Blogging

Prof Kelty offered me Movable Type software, which is classified by Yahoo hosting system as the professional blogging system, and I stayed with that. I also used two most popular blog software: Google's Blogger and Wordpress. Until now I could not choose which one is better. Blogger seemed to be more practical because it was related with my Google Account but I could play with the template easier than Wordpress' but still both have their benefits but for my major blog I stay with Movable Type, which is not the most practical any more. Probably after the defense, I will begin to think using Wordpress.

Social Networks

Facebook has no rivals. I have all sorts of connections in one basic platform. I had used Facebook to gather information or to ask for other kinds of help. It worked. Many internet rumor mails were sent to me after my call at Facebook. I am also in
LinkedIn, which is supposed to be a more professional networking site, but it was not much useful for my research purposes.

Folksonomies

I have used Delicious heavily. There were many categories of interest that I would use at the time of writing.

Photos

For photo manipulation, I used a free software: PAINT.net

RSS Reader

I have been using Bloglines and I could not decide to move to Google Reader. Without Bloglines I could not follow more than 300 sites and grasp the information flow.

A car

Istanbul is a difficult city for drivers. Oil prices are also higher. Still, in this mega city a car helps to be more mobile. When a famous columnist says, "Ok let him come NOW", only with a car, I could jump in and drive in half an hour. The car was a present from my parents when I became a lecturer in my last year in the field. However, oil costs did upset my already wrecked budget.

A job

Even if I got enough research funding, I would still be working. It is not only for income. A not too demanding job structures fieldlife. As I note in previous pages, a strategic job provides more connection and better settlement in the field. My job was demanding but I had too many benefits to cope with that demand.
Google Documents

This online writing software has a significant role in the writing of this dissertation. More will be told in the write up section.

Bibme

A simple online bibliography builder (www.bibme.org). It might not be adequate in the end but during writing, it is very practical.

Kitapyurdu

Turkish equivalent of Amazon.com. I followed news of publication of every book that was relevant for my research. (www.kitapyurdu.com)
Appendix 4

Media products as public debates

Media products also worked to indirectly debate critical issues. Several soap operas, such as Valley of the Wolves, Hatırla Sevgili, had this role. Here is an AFP piece:

**New Turkish soaps probe politics, national identity**

The eastern city of Gaziantep, the location for several scenes of "The Foreign Groom," has a crush on blond and beefy Niko, the child of Greeks who fled Turkey in 1964 and who must now face prejudices on both sides of the Aegean to win his true love. With a Turkish father-in-law who refuses a transfusion of Greek blood to Greek parents who insist on a church wedding with his Muslim Turkish bride-to-be, Niko's adventures top the ratings every Friday night.

... "The aim of television is to allow society to take a look at itself," commented Unsal Ozkay, a popular culture specialist at Beykent University here. "To sell ads, the networks must now address the problems of the metropolitan suburbs, where all kinds of minorities abound." ... "Turkey's bid to join the European Union (news - web sites) from the year 2000 required a number of legal reforms" that changed the national mood and led people to confront issues once considered taboo, explained Nilüfer Timisi, a professor of communications at Ankara University.

... A series with the unwieldy name of "Lacework Roses on My Headscarf" deals with the years of near-civil war in the 1970s when clashes between
right- and left-wing militants left dozens dead daily in the cities of Turkey, while "February Cold" looks at the rise of Islam that continues to shock Turkey's dyed-in-the wool secularists. But is Turkey ready to deal with such vital issues in such a format? Gul Dirican, who scripted "Time of the Dawn," a Romeo-and-Juliet saga set against a backdrop of sectarian tension between majority Sunni Muslims and minority Alevi -- a long persecuted Turkish version of Shia -- recalls some trepidation during the shoot. "The Alevis were worried when we filmed an Alevi funeral," she recalled in an interview with the daily Aksam. "They said, 'This is the first time Sunni society sees us like this -- is this a good thing?''"

But despite these times of openness, the Kurdish question remains a hot potato. "The Exiled Woman" tells the tale of a family from the southeastern province of Urfa, with mysterious "bandits" (read Kurdish tribesmen) lurking in the mountains; the lovers in "June Night" bear the Kurdish names of Barran and Havin, but never mention that they are Kurds. "No series so far has dealt openly with the question of ethnic Kurdish identity because it is still too serious a problem for the state," Timisi said. "The shows speak of (Turkish) easterners only in generalities, in terms of feudalism, land conflicts and vendettas." Barran tells his love interest that his name means June Night, but discreetly avoids mentioning what language it is in.

There was a provocative bestseller in early days:

Amberin Zaman (3/16/2005) of Los Angeles Times:

**Hitler Finds an Audience in Turkey**
“Mein Kampf,” Adolf Hitler’s notorious work outlining his anti-Semitic world view, has become a bestseller in this officially secular but mostly Muslim nation. Its sudden rebirth has alarmed the country’s small Jewish community and raised concern among officials in the European Union, which Turkey aspires to join.

Though nationwide sales numbers are not available, the number of publishers releasing editions of “Mein Kampf” in Turkey has grown to 13. One of them, Manifesto, announced a press run of 50,000 for its version, which jockeys for shelf space with such titles as “Hitler’s Secretary” and “The Unknown Hitler.” The German dictator’s work appears prominently in most bookstore displays here.

Some analysts say the appeal of “Mein Kampf” probably has to do with the rising anti-Americanism here, a result of the U.S.-led invasion of neighboring Iraq. Among the work’s chief rivals on the bestseller lists is “Metal Storm,” a gory thriller that depicts a U.S. invasion of Turkey. The hero, a Turkish spy whose training includes shooting his puppy, avenges his homeland by leveling Washington with a nuclear device.

In a country where conspiracy theories are commonly used to explain international politics, “it is accepted wisdom in some circles that Israel dictates U.S. policy,” said Dogu Ergil, a Middle East expert at Ankara University. Thus, his theory goes, anti-Americanism morphs into a hybrid strain of anti-Semitism that in turn arouses curiosity about Hitler.

Others say Turks are drawn more by the book’s nationalistic message than its anti-Semitic rants. Nationalist sensitivities have been sharpened
by European Union demands that Turkey ensure greater freedom for the country’s religious minorities and restive Kurds as conditions for its membership in the alliance.

"Nationalist reflexes have been triggered, there are fears the country will be dismembered," said Nilufer Narli, an Istanbul-based sociologist.

[emphases mine]

An AFP (3/31/2005) report:

When Turkey invades the US: new parody targets best-seller lists
A new novel telling the tongue-in-cheek tale of how a group of Turkish nationalists -- and some extra-terrestrial friends -- invade the United States is targeting best-seller lists in Turkey, in the midst of a boom in anti-US books.

"America Is Ours" hits the bookshelves this weekend with its cover depicting the Statue of Liberty sporting a handlebar mustache -- the Turkish macho symbol par excellence -- and the US flag's stars replaced by the triple-crescent symbol of the Turkish far-right. The parody in political-fiction starts off with an alien suddenly showing up as a young Turkish nationalist says his prayers.

The spaceman grants the wish of the young Turk, exasperated by US interventionism in the Middle East and furious at the (fictional) secret crossing of the Istanbul Bosphorus by two US warships, and helps him invade America thanks to a machine that controls people's minds.
The occupiers immediately bring things Turkish to their new land, organising "cig köfte" (a spicy Turkish delicacy made of raw hamburger) parties at the White House, proclaiming Turkish the official language and transforming Madonna into a belly dancer. "There is some anti-US sentiment at the bottom of the book, but it's really not a war story because no one gets killed," Erdogan Ekmekci, one of the two co-authors of the book, told AFP.

It is the first novel by Ekmekci, a 27-year-old Istanbul resident and a former sales representative.

Of all mentioned, the best selling novel Metal Storm would be the most sensational and agenda making. The novel will also be discussed in Turkey-US relations section since the novel mostly focused on that and it had an annoying effect on American diplomats.

Deliso (2005):

What is most remarkable is the degree to which the authors' viewpoint coincides with that of the public at large. Turna echoes the mentality of Turks I and others have spoken to recently when he declares that

"Turkey can be and should be a superpower in the world. We have all the resources and historical background for that. The EU would benefit from us but there is little benefit we can take from them. Turkey is a must for Europe's future, if they want to stay as one, but they are not a must for us."
As every reader of futuristic, high-velocity fiction knows, only time will tell.

......The book of which Turna speaks, Metal Firtina ("Metal Storm" in Turkish) has become a runaway bestseller in Turkey over the past couple months. A thriller in the style of Tom Clancy, the novel (by Turkish authors Turna and Orkun Uçar) has been attacked for its alleged anti-American elements and conspiracy theorizing.

The plot describes how a flare-up between Turkish and American troops in northern Iraq leads to an out-and-out war, resulting in the American bombing of Istanbul and Ankara and a Turkish detonation of a nuclear bomb in Washington in response.

Is such a war possible? And is there any precedent for U.S.-Turkish hostilities? Very few would wager money on the former scenario. It is far more likely that any future disaster in Istanbul, at least, would be caused by an earthquake or accident in the congested Bosporus. But Burak Turna does believe there is an example of the latter. "We foresaw that American policy is turning against Turkey, which would lead to a clash between sides," he told me recently. "Such an event occurred after we started to write the book in Sulaymaniyah [northern Iraq], where U.S. soldiers captured 11 Turkish soldiers. If we had resisted, a war would have broken out."

The event of which Turna speaks caused indignation across Turkey. On July 4, 2003, around 100 U.S. soldiers "stormed the barracks," arresting 11 Turkish soldiers who were allegedly planning to assassinate the Kurdish governor of Kirkuk. Turks were outraged not only by this aggression from a longtime ally, but also because the Americans had actually handcuffed the soldiers and put
bags over their heads "as if they were al-Qaeda terrorists." This incident had been preceded by a similar (but hushed-up) one on April 22, which saw the U.S. arrest Turkish soldiers in civilian clothes who were escorting an arms shipment into northern Iraq. Such ugly events go a long way toward explaining why such distrust has arisen.

**Salkım Hanım'ın Taneleri** (Mrs. Salkim’s Diamonds) (for more film information: http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0156038/)

A Turkish movie based on a mainstream politician's (Yılmaz Karaköyünlu) novel. The script was written by the journalist Etyen Mahçupyan, a Turkish Armenian journalist. As Eser Karakaş (2004) mentioned Nationalist Action Party (MHP) immediately reacted to the film as it was focusing on the notorious Wealth Tax (Varlık Vergisi) of Turkish Government in 1942 which was particularly aimed at non-Muslim minorities. Nationalist reactions were high profile and Eser Karakaş pointed out this intolerance (p. 250). (More information for Wealth Tax: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Varlik_Vergisi)

**Babam ve Oğlum** [My father and my son]

As usual, I was determined not to do what everyone does while watching this movie, but I couldn't resist myself when the second half of the movie started...This movie is probably one of the best cultural artifacts to represent the sentimental complexities related to the 1980 coup and afterwards. Çağan Irmak, the director, and many of the cast members who work with him are
already successful in show-biz and I really appreciate their work and this movie might be their best. The movie has become a blockbuster in Turkey and I think it deserves this. I suspect most of the movie-goers are not that interested in the political engagement but find something that touch their sentimental systems... Oh my literal translation of the movie title is: My Father and My Son. For more information, the movie has an official site and there are many comments in the imdb site (1/15/2006)

Valley of the Wolves

A Turkish man looks at a poster of the film 'Valley of Wolves - Iraq' at a big shopping mall in Ankara February 1, 2005. Polai Alemdar is the hero of 'Valley of the Wolves - Iraq', a new Turkish action film that capitalises on a rise in anti-American sentiment in Turkey since the Iraq war and turns a spotlight on relations between the NATO allies. REUTERS/Umit Bektas
Erkan comments on the 'Valley of the Wolves' (Kurtlar Vadisi Irak)

I finally watched the movie. It wasn't crowded as I was hoping. A gang of 5-6 youths forced a group of long-haired boys to leave their seats for other seats and, in my part, a family union requested me to change my seat. Well, what can I say, families always win in Turkey. The theatre employees told the audience that they could sit wherever they find but when late comers did not like the remaining seats, they wanted ours... We had to give in, this was a valley of the wolves situation and I had just had my shave in my favourite barbershop... I did not look as tough as I did yesterday....

Anyway, these are all my not-to-be-taken-seriously speculations: This movie is a sequel to the best-seller, Metal Storm 1. The major enemy is same: The US forces in Middle East. The narrative now moves back to Iraq. What fascinates me is that the author of the script collects pieces of mediated facts and assembles them into such a narrative that the film itself becomes an explosive nature. Conspiracy theories always have factual touches, but this kind of narrative seems to be qualitatively different. In one it is very realistic, some Turkish soldiers in Northern Iraq were arrested, Kurds treat Turcomans not appropriately and forces them leave their territories, the American and Kurdish alliance is well known, American forces from time to time attacks civilian activities such as weddings. There is the Abu Ghraib prison scandal.. The rising power of evangelical christians in the US.. The only issue I havent heard about before is the organ transplantation stuff. A Jewish American military doctor, in the film, guides the organ transplanted to rich buyer in the West...

What the narrator does is to juxtapose all these and to construct villains to
execute these juxtapositions. I would like highlight the fact that in both Metal Storm and the Valley of the Wolves, the villain agents do not particularly represent the Americans or American governments. These are rich/capitalist, bad guys who happen to dominate the government or local forces that produce human right violations. Though ordinary watchers might take the film as an anti-American move, I think it is quite apparent that the film producers create scapegoats to attack, not the Americans themselves...

Two more issues to mention:

* This film reverses somewhat a Hollywood mode of production: Action films with ethnically stereotyped villains defeated by American heroes. Here comes a moment where the villains are stereotyped Americans and heroes are from somewhere else...

* I will now speculate with not much substance at all: I think while Babam ve Oglüm articulates the collective feelings of more left oriented citizens this film is a reply from more right wing citizens. It is an articulation of many fears related to national identity...

Anyway click here for the film's website. (2/9/2006)
Appendix 5

Internet Urban Legends on the EU

There is no way to calculate the impact of the email trafficking related to EU affairs on news production but these what one would call urban legends on the EU had made certainly had affected public opinion. This is particularly relevant as even the Turkish military used the web for its "e-coup" in April 2007:

The generals had just staged the country's first "e-coup," as a dumbfounded Turkish press called it, by posting on the Turkish military's official Web site a warning that "if necessary, the Turkish Armed Forces will not hesitate to make their position and stance abundantly clear as the absolute defenders of secularism." Given Turkey's history--the country has known four military interventions since 1960--the note was a thinly veiled threat that a more conventional coup might be in the offing. (Taspinar, 2007; p. 115)

Even some senior educated citizens are duped with these emails and they don't think of looking at proper European Commission sites check what they are told. NO 35:

In one email was spreading among the educated circles in which it was claimed that European Commission decided to separate Turkey. How could one believe this outrageous lie? There is a trust problem here, too. And no one intends to research and look the EC commission website.

İlter Türkmen (7/5/2005):

As for the media, it should be kept in mind that following exciting headlines and supporting false views tends to mislead public opinion. Informing Turkish public opinion on the EU and winning over EU public opinion will be
important. The Turkish public is a bit impatient and is quickly influenced by bad news. It has understandable historic doubts and is generally suspicious. Public institutions and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) of both the EU and Turkey should keep these characteristics in mind at all times.

A sample of these "disinformation" emails is found in a column of Bahadır Kalezağası (06/16/2007):

An email message circulated 3 or 4 times in the last two years. Every time it circulated, it aroused emotional reactions. The message refers to a particular EU Council decision which states that Turkey will be separated. It is so wrong in terms of international law and politics that there should be no need to talk about it. Besides, as if Turkish diplomacy will ignore such a decision and Turkish public can learn it via internet. In fact, in this respect, this message is an insult to Turkish national pride. In another email message which is entitled as "Here are the evil intentions of the EU" there is a map attached that demonstrates a separated Turkey. These emails are circulating in the mailing lists of alumni or occupational associations and they produce angry commentaries against the EU process.... In fact, this map was produced by a European society that focused on the preservation of local languages. It was a map of local languages and not only Kurdish but many other local languages in Europe were used... In another mail, it was claimed that EU demanded
hang off all Atatürk photos in official buildings [the message starts with an intense eulogy for Atatürk and then begins to attack EU process\textsuperscript{102}]
Evladi olmayan bir yetimin, duygularını anlatın... Anlatın ki, o yetimin,
evlatarınma zaraтки hediyanın kıymetini anlasın evlatlarınız.

Cumhuriyet, çocuklara anlatıldığı gibi, folklorik bir müsamerre coşkusundan
ibaret değil çünkü...

Anlatın ki, kökeninde barınan derin hüzünü kavrasınlar.

İşte liste yukarıda.
Kısacık ömürden bir insana başına ne felaket gelebilirse, gelmiş...

Bunu anlatın.
Diren... 
Teslim olmayan ruhu anlatın.

**Korkmasılar engellerden.**

**Korkmasılar valınız kalmaktan.**

**Korkmasılar işsizlikten.**

**Korkmasılar parasuzluktan.**

**Korkmasılar arkadaşdan.**

**Korkmasılar doğrulardan.**

Yürek dediğin...

**Sadece organ değil arkadaş.**

Bunu anlayın!!!

AB Uyum yasaları gereğince devlet dairelerinden Atatürk resimlerinin
kaldırılmasını protesto ediyoruz!
Ulusal bilincimizi yavaş yavaş yok
etmelerine izin vermek istemiyorsanız, iletebileceğiniz kadar iletiniz!

İzmir kurtulmuş, çok tatlı bir yorgunluk, Ankara'ya hareket edecekler...
Trene binerler ve kompartimanın çekilirler.

Ertesi gün, yaveri, Atatürk'ün kompartimanın kapısını çalar. Atatürk, yorgun, bitkin bir halde kravatını yıkamaktadır.

Yaveri: 'Pasam bu ne hal, hiç uyumadınız herhalde; niye böyleсинiz', der.

'Çocuk, kompartimanıma yastıkla battaniye koymayı unutmusunuz, kolumu yastık yaptım agırdı, setremi yastık yaptım üstündüm,
uyumadım kalktım', der.

Yaveri: 'Aman Pasam! Birimize haber vereyiniz;
hemen size bir yastıkla battaniye getirirdik', der. Ve bir ülke kurtarmaktan dönün komutan tarihi bir cevap verir:

'Geç fark ettim, hepiniz en az benim
kadar yorgundunuz, hiç biriniz kıyamadım. Önemli olan benim uyumam değil;
milletin rahat uyuması!'

ATAMIZ SAYESİNDE NE KADAR RAHAT UYUYORUZ KI; HALA UYANAMADIK ?

Bir sürüş saçıma maili 10 kere birilerine gönderip dileklerinizin
gerçekleşmesini bekleyeceginize, lütfen bunu iletin !!!!
Erdal Şafak (10/27/2005) mentions similar emails:

One message claims that according to the article 23 of Framework Document, “in case Turkey is separated into several states during negotiations, negotiations will also continue with these newly formed states”. The framework documents has 23 articles and the last article is not like this at all...

Even the president of Ankara Chamber of Trade Sinan Aygün believed in this claim in another circulation email: “the EU demands that the administration of lands on the east of Euphrates and Tigris rivers should be taken over by an international board”. Different versions cited different official EU documents but none really had such an article..

Bugün Milletin rahat uyumasi için ömrünü harcayan Ulu önderin mezarına gitmemek için Ankara yeine Istanbula gelen ve ayağına çok çok değerli devlet büyüüklerimizi çağırıran İran Cumhurbaşkanı Ahmedinecad için yollar kapanıyor..

Tek bir söz söylenir..

YAZIKLAR OLSUNN
These emails were so powerful that the then minister of foreign affairs Abdullah Gül had to speak in the Parliament and refuse these allegations. But a day later an AKP MEP (from Mr. Gül's own party) would voice these claims again in a conference located in an university.

An Akşam columnist Şakir Süter (11/3/2003) quoted a circulating email message on "EU demands from Turkey". He doesn't state that it was a circulating email message but "we have received a list of EU demands from Turkey". In fact, his column is a political parody column, so his intention could also be parodizing the anti-EU circles but a sort of ambiguity prevented me to unravel his real motive. But maybe this was what he intended...

Preconditions for EU Membership:

1. Give islands of Büyükada, Burgaz and Heybeliada to Greeks,
2. Solve Iraq question without sending troops,
3. Sing the national anthem not in Turkish but in Sanskrit,
4. Apologize and give each Armenian a hundred thousand dollars,
5. Release Abdullah Öcalan and make a MEP........

103 The full list in Turkish:

- Büyükada, Burgaz ve Heybeliada'yı Rumlar'a verin.

- Irak’a asker göndermeden, Irak sorununu çözün.

- İstiklal Marşı’nı Türkçe değil, Sanskritçe okuyun.

- Alfabetizdeki harfleri 95'e çıkartıp A ile değil, W ile başlatın.

- Apo'yu İmrali'dan salın, Meclis'e sokun.
Elite beliefs; a mix of misinformation and deliberation

Deliso (2005) sums up the elite beliefs at large:

- Lülyazi Zana'yi Türkiye'nin 2. Hanrı Başıkanı yapın.

- Ermeniler'den özür dileyip her Ermeni'ye 100'er bin dolar ödeyn.

- Talat'ı KKTC'ye Başkan, Denktay'ı da Kars'a vali yapın.

- Erkek çocuklarımızı 18'inden önce sünnet ettirmeyin.

- Öflüerinizin ardından mevlit okutmayın davul-zurna çaldırın.

- Ramazan'da oruçlarınızı Fransız şarabı ile açın.

- Bütün kadınlarınız türban takın, erkekler mutlaka etek giysin.

- Arabesk kesinlikle yasak, bütün Türkiye gitar konertosu dinlesin.

- Televizyon'ı kaldırım, spor yorumcularımız 'sevgili' sözçüsünü yasaklıyım.

- Gece yatmadan önce, sabah kalktuktan sonra 'Ne Muhu AB'liyım diyene' diye bağırm.

- Horozlarınız ötmesin, tavuklarınız yumurłamamasın.

- Trafünün yönünü değiştirip, bütün araçlarınızın direksiyonlarını sağa alın.

- Tayyip Erdoğan ile Abdullah Gül bıyıklarını kessin.

- Nil Demirkaçak AKP'yi bırakıp derhal Genç Parti'ye transfer olsun.
The Self-Sufficiency Argument and the EU Backlash

It is interesting that many of these views are shared by the Turkish "elite."

The Australian article, for example, cites young Turks who point out
America's support for Israel as a prime factor behind tensions in the region.
And the author cites a young academic who says, "[W]e're worried about the
way America is attacking countries in the region and we might be on the list."

On a second front, the complex issue of potential EU membership, Turks are
again incry. A young airline executive cited denounces the EU countries as
"liars and hypocrites" bent on denying Turkey EU membership through
subterfuge and deception. "Of course they are racist and prejudiced against us.
We don't need Europe."

I have noticed these attitudes growing for the past couple years, as Turkish-EU
negotiations have intensified and Turkish exasperation with the union has
grown. As the European states wound Turkish pride by threatening to keep
them out, Turks are beginning to invoke the argument for self-sufficiency and
national pride. Turkey is a major textiles and agricultural exporter; has
developed industries in areas such as chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and
automobiles; and boasts a growing tourism industry as well. As for mineral
resources, the country possesses the world's largest boron reserves (64
percent), as well as 40 percent of the world's marble and large quantities of
other natural resources, including magnesites, coal, chromite, and copper.
Urban Turkey offers shopping malls, airports, hotels, and convention centers
as modern as anywhere in the world. Don't these things count for anything,
Turks ask? Says Enver, "Turkey has everything it needs to be one of the
richest countries in Europe. It doesn't need the EU, though the politicians keep saying that this is our only choice."

Akyol (2006) quotes Yılmaz Öztuna who says EU membership is a necessity for Turkish nationalism while Altemur Kılıç claims that it is a treason, a second Sevres. 18-9 Such differing notions of nationalism. However the latter one gained power in recent years.

Nationalist reaction to EU process frequently relies on conspiracy theories. (288-289) When Taha Akyol stated that the UK was a friend to Turkey (in relation to EU process), he was reminded the British involvements in the of the Ottoman Empire (289).

The context for conspiracy theories was already ripe. Çarkoğlu (2003) stated that:

A significant reason for such fragility of EU support in some constituencies is expected to be lack of information about the EU membership process and policy requirement of EU membership. Accordingly, despite mass public support for EU membership, the polarized elite resistance to membership finds ample opportunities to manipulate the public agenda. Segments within the political elite can easily accomplish their objective of melting mass support for EU membership by providing misinformation to the public and strategically shaping their rhetoric around the sensitive issues; this is especially the case concerning cultural rights of citizens of Kurdish origin and the abolition of death penalty, which is linked to the Kurdish due to the fact that Abdullah Öcalan, the PKK leader, is currently on death row. (187)
However, according to a disarming Hürriyet news [12/20/2007 (http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/7897046.asp?m=1] Not Turkey is sold but Turks buy more land abroad than foreigners buy in Turkey.

İlter TÜRKMEN (4/15/2008):

The memorandum of March 2006 apparently prepared by a unit of the General Staff has been a subject of dispute for certain sections of the media for some time. Written by a marine captain and presented to his superiors, this memorandum incorporates a lot of generalisations and evaluations based on incorrect information and conspiracy theories. I personally think that the possibility of this memorandum having been taken seriously by any chief of staff officer occupying a position of responsibility is non-existent. Officious functionaries who wish to impress their superiors have been known to prepare unreal and unreasonable reports and documents from time to time, especially if they happen to be employed by institutions that deal with intelligence, research or planning. Such reports or documents are usually left to gather dust on shelves.

Internal and external enemies:

The importance of this memorandum lies in the frightening mentality it reveals. The writer of this memorandum has believed every rumor, gossip or cooked-up news that he heard or read in the media, and has taken for reality the drivel fabricated by sensation-seeking complot theorists who ridicule commonsense. He has placed people from vastly different schools of thought in the same basket and has drawn diagrams that reflect an incredible
web of relations to depict Turkey enslaved by internal and external enemies. In addition, he adopted a racist attitude without hesitation as he included a group he named “Sbetaist” (Jewish converts) while exposing these enemies. Did he bother to gather information on the people he assumed to be part of this group? No, he did not. If he had, he would have realized -maybe with shame- that some of these people had done Turkey enormous services throughout history....(the end more here)

104

The writer presents Costas Carras as the founder of the Turkish-Greek forum that he qualifies as dangerous. The slightest research, however, would have revealed that the Turkish founder of the Forum had been the late and ex Commander of Naval Forces General Güven Erkaya and that the Turkish Foreign Ministry had also assisted this group in the performance of its tasks. After the decease of Erkaya, I also joined this forum and remained a member until very recently. I know Carras very well. He believes in Turkish-Greek friendship, supports the settlement of the Aegean issues through reasonable solutions and advocates Turkey's European Union membership. Yes, his views on Cyprus conflict with ours and he was against the Annan Plan. Actually, doesn't the memorandum writer also qualify that plan as 'demonic' and accuse TESEV of conducting a study, which summarizes that plan? In the meanwhile, one must not forget that the Cypriot Turks gained an important advantage by registering their right to self-determination when they voted for the Annan Plan at the 2004 referendum.

The sins of Soros:

The memorandum names civil society as the greatest internal menace. This qualification envelopes many thought centers as well as some of the most prestigious universities in Turkey. Main external sources of threat are NATO, which is our ally, the U.S. and the EU, which we are trying to join, and the Open Society Institute financed by George Soros. The sins of Soros are too many to enumerate. First of all, he is of Jewish origin. Secondly, he's a big speculator in international markets. He also has an enormous fortune. He has "furtive" political targets. For example, he's trying to prevent Georgia from buckling under Russian pressure by promoting democracy in that country! The Open Society Institute also has a branch in Turkey. It supports the International Crisis Group which
Here is a case of conspiracy saturated 'progressive' Turkish:

Hasan Kanbolat (12/14/2008):

I had dinner with a classmate of mine from my university years the other night. We talked about the crisis in Georgia and its aftermath. My friend said: "I oppose the US. What business do they have in the Black Sea?" adding: "The US is an imperialist and occupying state. And human rights and NGOs are made up by the US; they are their vessels." My friend may have been right, but he didn't stop there:

"I am opposed to Gül going to Armenia. It was a lost cause. I am against the European Union, too. They are interfering with our internal affairs. We can't even smoke comfortably. The roads are infested with radar systems. It's killing us. I don't like the West. And just because I dislike the West doesn't mean I like the East. Take a look at Africa -- a continent of cannibals. All that comes Turkey's way from Africa is filth, ignorance and narcotics. I don't understand why we are trying to invest in Africa. And the Middle East is a whole different can of worms. Were they not the ones that stabbed us in the back after World War I? And Israel is real pain as well. The same goes for Iran. Filled with mullahs. We should close off our borders with the Middle East. The Chinese are our national enemies. They did a lot of damage to

has become the most famous thought centre in the world and which lends continuous support to Turkey's EU membership and tries to help lift the isolation of the Cypriot Turks!

Turkey is going through a very difficult phase at the moment. It's not certain how it will manage to emerge from this present crisis without harming its democracy, economy, social peace as well as its position within the region and in the world. What we least need now are such absurd theories to shake Turkey's self-confidence.
Turkey in the past. These are documented on the Orkhon memorials. And nowadays cheap Chinese products have flooded our markets. India is the land of stench. And the Japanese look down on Turks. The Russian Federation and Ukraine exported call girls to Turkey in order to ruin our moral fabric. We earn our money and the calls girl pocket it. And have the Russians not been threatening our straits in the Black Sea region for centuries? What we should actually do is limit Turkey's relations with outside countries. We should never leave our country, nor should be let anyone enter ours. Furthermore we should ban the use of digital satellite dishes. While we're at it we should do away with the private sector. They are sucking us dry. We should exile the Christians -- they are working as missionaries, as servants of an imperialist system. I am against Alevis and Sunni Muslims, too. Alevis act like they are a separate religion altogether. The Sunnis are turning the country into state of religion. I am against different ethnic backgrounds, as well. They are all partisans."

"So do you have any solutions to offer to that," I said.

"Yes," he said. "If we get rid of Christians, Alevis, Sunnis, all different ethnic groups and the private sector, what remains will be decent enough for Turkey. This way, happiness and peace would arrive in Anatolia."

I couldn't stand it, so I said: "You have done such elimination that you didn't leave people in Turkey or any countries in the world. I think you should stand in front of the mirror first and take a look at yourself. Although you might not like the West, you went to school in the US. You got married in Paris. Your daughter is currently going to school in Germany. Your son is an executive in
a US-based finance company and he is conducting sales transactions in global stock exchanges. You visit Europe, the Far East or the Russian Federation a couple of times a year either for business or travel. Despite all this, you are against Turkey opening up to the world and integrating with it more deeply? When you can benefit from the luxuries of the age, you would rather have Anatolia suffice with the minimum resources that remain in the heartland? Isn't this a strong contradiction? How do you describe yourself for God's sake?"

He looked me in the face and said, "I am progressive."

Mustafa Akyol (7/24/2008) in "Why the CIA funds me and other nonsense" argues against some common conspiracy theories that could also be found in those emails:

If there is one thing that the Kemalists never lack, that is imagination. They can make up, and then believe in, all sorts of fantasy. Their pundits have recently created a vast range of conspiracy theories from the lunacy that "Islamist" Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is in fact a crypto Jew who serves the Elders of Zion to the more popular nonsense that the U.S. government aims at establishing a "moderate Islamic republic" in Turkey (the rest of the column here 105).

105

I am used to seeing such bilge in the crude side of the Kemalist camp, but these days even their most sophisticated representatives seem to follow a similar line. My column neighbor, Yusuf Karlı, a most articulate and respected writer, surprised me by doing so just two days ago. In his column titled "Muslim Democrats" he wrote, "'Muslim democrats,' some people on the payroll – or who were on the payroll – of some foreign
intelligence agencies... are conducting psychological warfare against the patriot and Kemalist Turks through a
disinformation campaign in the media outlets."

I think the real question here is how Mr. Kanlı "knows" that Turkish commentators like me are "on the payroll" of some secret and wicked powers. The "knowledge" that lies behind this accusation is, actually, a
presumption that the Kemalist ideology has installed into the minds of its believers. Since Kemalism became a
state-ideology by wiping off all political opposition in 1925, it has blamed all dissenters, which were labeled as
"internal enemies," to be the agents of "external enemies." The Islamo-Kurdish revolt of that year was explained
as a "British conspiracy," although there was never ever any evidence to support such a claim. Over the years,
"the external enemies" who supposedly finance and tutor the non-Kemalist groups (conservative Muslims, Kurds,
liberals, the democratic left) diversified by adding on the United States, Armenians, "Zionists," Iraqi Kurds,
Arabs, the European Union or even individuals such as George Soros.

This line of thinking brings intellectual poverty on the Kemalists. Instead of trying to understand their
critics, countering them with reason and inferring some self-criticism, they shut down the debate by simply
blaming them as "traitors." And when they feel threatened by the democratic power of these "traitors," they call
the state powers (the military, the high judiciary, and even "deep state" gangs like Ergenekon) to save "the
Republic," which has become a euphemism for oligarchy.

............... for example, he has reminded us that Hitler came to power through popular vote. What we
should infer from that must be something thus: Hitler came to power by elections. So elections are untrustworthy.
So we don't need to respect election results. Facts such as that Hitler's dictatorship was based on not election
results but that he had a paramilitary force (the SA) and that he wiped off all political opposition by using
violence, are, of course, not what Mr. Bekdil reminds you.

Another beloved example of Mr. Bekdil is the "yes" vote the Turkish people gave to the 1982
Constitution. "Did 92 percent of our 'enlightened' nation not vote for the 1980 coup, its Constitution and leaders
as untouchables," he was asking yesterday, as he has done again at least a dozen times, in order to imply how
dumb the Turkish nation is. Yet he was carefully avoiding telling you that the 1982 Constitution was also a ticket
from military rule to free elections. Had people said "no" to the constitution, the military regime would probably
be extended indefinitely.
Patterns of conspiracy

Before dealing with specific patterns of email messages, I will focus on a single message that includes many of the conspiracies in itself. The message is dated as 12 April 2008.

This message sent as a powerpoint file starts with:

1

UYAN!

EY MILLETİM...

UYAN!!!

WAKE UP!

MY DEAR NATION...

WAKE UP

2

BU E-POSTAYI

SAKLAYIP;

SAKİN BİR ORTAMDA

OKUDUKTAN SONRA
SAVE THIS MESSAGE, READ IN SILENCE, THEN EVALUATE IT

It starts with Anti-American tirade:

FORMER MINISTER OF FINANCE ADNAN KAHVECİ STATED THAT

"We should be independent from US and IMF"

HE WAS KILLED IN A TRAFFIC ACCIDENT TWO DAYS LATER

Bedri İnce Tahtacı, MEP, said:
'US is the biggest obstacle for this country. It is the one what decides who will become a PM or President.

He died in a car accident five days later.

It goes on like this with other names who died after they have made claims against the US or US politics (or something bad happened in Turkey), then it shift to corruption. After listing how the State misses taxes from oil companies (both national and international) it focuses on Dogan Group (DG). DG is a media conglomerate so the case of oil tax corruption was not reported in the media. Then the focus shifts to a totally difference subject. Turkish nation's fertility is under threat because of the agricultural/industrial seeds used. These seeds are mostly produced by Israeli companies and the long term target is to de-fertilize the Turkish nation. (here is the full text in Turkish$^{106}$)

$^{106}$

5

Turgut Özal CUMHURBAŞKANI

Dedi ki:

"Musul ve Kerkük bizimdir. Alacağınız"

10 gün sonra öldü.

Former President Turgut Özal said,

"Musul and Kerkur are ours. We will get them."

He died in 10 days.
6
Eşref Bitlis

JANDARMA KOMUTANI

Dedi ki:

"Amerika'nın İncirlik'ten kalkan uçakları PKK'ya yardımında bulunuyor".

4 gün sonra (-eksi 60 dereceye kadar dayanıklı olan uçak ile Siirt'e giderken ) uçağı düştü ve öldü..!

Kaza nedeni ise;

UÇAK MOTORLARININ BUZLANMASI!

Oysa o sırada Siirt'te hava -11oC idi.

7

Recep Yazıcıoğlu

DENİZLİ VALİSİ

"Bundan sonra Denizli ilinde; CAFE ve benzeri İngilizce isim kullanılmayacak. Yani CAFE değil KAHVE yazılacak." Dedi.

Vee.. 1 hafta sonra Ankara'ya giderken trafiğe kazasında öldü.

8

TBMM

1 Mart tezkeresine red oyu verdi.

"3 gün sonra İstanbul'un göbeğinde bombalar patladı."

Yaklaşık 50 kişi öldü,
400’ den fazla kişi de yaralandı!

NASIL UYUTULUYORUZ!.. Medyaya yansıyan ATO (Ankara Ticaret Odası) raporu, çarpıcı bir verinin altını bir kez daha çiziyordu.

VE Ridley:

"TBMM Akaryaktı Kaçakçılığı Araştırma Komisyonu’nun çalışmasına göre, yalnızca son iki yılda Türkiye’ye sokulan kaçak akaryaktın miktarı 7 milyon 814 bin ton. 7 milyon 814 bin ton !.

Dile kolay... 780 bin küsur karayolu tankeri yükü! .."

10 Yani, yaklaşık 10 milyon m3... Yani, 10 milyar litre.

Yani, 1 500 000

(bir bucuk milyon) arabanın deposunu İKİ YIL süresince haftada bir doldurmaya yetecek kadar akaryaktı. Muazzam bir rakam değil mi?
İki yılda 780 bin (ya da günde ortalama iki bin kusur) tanker yükü yakıt, Doğu'daki kaçakçılığın kattrı
surtunda;
ya da İrak'a gidip gelenlerin kamyonlarının gizli bölmelerinde sokmuş olmaları mümkün mü?
Peki, ülkeye bir şekilde girdikten sonra, nasıl pazarlamabilir ki?

12
Gizli gizli, yol boyu mendil satan çocuklar eliyle pet şişelerde ya
da kentin arka sokaklarında tekelerele satılacak bir miktar değil ki... Miktarın büyüklüğünü bakınca,
insanın aklına bu yakıtın ancak benzin istasyonları aracılığı ile pazarlanmış olacağı geliyor.
İnsanın aklına gelen, neye ki, Devlet'in de aklına geldi.

13
Bu kaçakçılıktan iki yılda 10,7 milyar YTL (bir-iki rafineri ve demir-çelik tesisı özelleştürme bedeli
kadar) vergi kaybı olduğunu saptayınca, ülke çapındaki benzin istasyonlarında büyük çaplı bir
operasyon yapıldı.

14
Toplanan yakıt örneklerinin tahlii sonucu henüz belli değil.
Ama... "LİSANSSİZ" istasyonlara, daha önce uyarılmış olmalarına rağmen, halâ yakıt vermeye devam
eden dağıtım şirketlerine bu kanunüştı davranışları nedeniyle ceza kesildi.

15
Kesilen cezanın toplamı; 1 milyar 666 milyon 935 YTL. Rekor ve bu
özelliğiyle tarihi bir ceza...1 milyar 666 milyon 935 YTL...

16

Dağıtım şirketlerinin "YÜΡÜΤMENİN DURDURULMASI"
istemiyile Danıştay'a yaptıkları başvuru reddedildi... Ve ödeme için kendilerine verilen 30
günlik sürenin dolmasıyla birlikte, EPDK şirketlere haciz uygulanması için Maliye Bakanlığı'na
başvurdu.

17

Şimdi gelelim konunun

"BAM TELİ "ne... Bu ülkede birilerine (gecikme faizleri hariç), 1.000.000.000 (bir milyar) ABD
dolarını aşan ceza tahakkuk ettiirecek ve bu cezanın tahsili için harekete geçilecek, ama
GÜNDEM BUNUNLA ÇALKALANMAYACAK.

18

BU KONU, bir kadının, Hülya'nın müzünun kızı Kaya 'dan yavrulması ya da Pınar'ın en son
kiminle kültür-fizik yaptığı kadar haber olmayacak! Aklimızın bu durumu hazzetmesi için, ceza yiyen
akaryakit

dağıtım şirketlerinin belli başlıklarını sralayalım:

19

46 milyon YTL : Shell
60 milyon YTL : Termopet
62 milyon YTL : Total
65 milyon YTL : BP

20
88 milyon YTL : Aytemiz
100 milyon YTL : Erk
113 milyon YTL : Turcas
ve ... ve...
499 MILYON YTL.
PETROL OFISI

21
Petrol Ofisi gibi üçüncü sradaki Erk'in de AYDIN DOĞAN 'ın olduğunu dikkate alırsanız, bu olaman
capma kıyaslın MEDYAMIZ TARAFTINDAN
neden bu kadar sessiz geçştirilmeye çalışıldığını anlayabilirsiniz.

22
KISIRLAŞTIRMA BOMBASI
ATILDI.
Tek tip boğucu gündemden uzaklaştı
satur aralarına gönderilen ve ulusal güvememiz üzerinde birinci
dereceden tehdit algısı yaratan bir konuyu dikkatinize sunarak,
ilginizi çekmeyi başarın; sonucu değiştirmek adına daha
fazlasını isteyeceğim bugün sizden...

23

EY AKSİYONER OKUR!

Bu öyle bir konu ki, yaratacağı ekonomik yıkımdan dışında,
Türk neslinin KIŞIRLATIRILMASI, tedavisini imkansız olan ölümcül alerjiler, bilinmeyen hastalıklar
ve doğadaki görülmemiş değişimler tehlikesini içeriyor.

24

Geçtiğimiz dönem Meclis'ten geçen TOHUMCULUK YASASI'ndan bahsediyorum.
Bu yasayla devlet tohumculuk alanından tamamen çekiliyor. Piyasa
başta ISRAILLI FIRMALAR, Syngenta, Pioneer, Monsanto gibi çoklulu tohum şirketlerine teslim
ediliyor. Çiftçimiz sizlere ömür.
Ve biraz önce belirttiğim gibi hepsinden önemlisi ise;

25

YASA ILE;
GENETİĞİ DEĞİŞTİRILMİŞ TOHUM ları (GDO) girişine ve ekimine imkan tanınyor. BÖYLECE
İNSAN SAĞLIĞI ÖZERINDE; başta kısaltık, alerjik reaksiyonlar, bağımsızlık sistemi zayıflığı gibi
hemen ve uzun vadede öngörülemeyen ciddi sağlık riskleri yaratıyor.
26
Yasannın arkasında GÜNEYDOĞULU VEKİLLER LOBİSİNİN
önde gelen ismi,
TARIM BAKANI
MEHDI EKER
durmakta ve...

27
Bu arada hemen eklemem gerekiyor; Avrupa Birliği, Genetiği
Değiştirilmiş Organizmaların (GDO'lu) AB'ye girmesine
İZİN VERMEMEKTEDİR.
Peki ya KISIRLAŞTIRMA, neslimizin tüketilmesi ve diğer
tehlikeler altında olan
YÜCE TÜRK MILLETININ EVLÂTLARI
şimdi ne yapmayı planıyorsunuz?

28
KONUYA FARKLI BİR UZMAN YORUMU GETİRELİM;
Hafta sonu çok değerli
biri çiftin konuşu oldum. Özbekistan'ın sorgundeki muhalif lideri;
Muhammed SALİH ve eşi Dr. Biyolog Aydın SALİH Hammefendi ile uzun uzun sohbet ettik.
Nereden nereye ?..
29

AYDIN HANIM,

Genetiği

Değiştirilmiş Organizmalar ve Tohumculuk Yasamızın içerdiği tehlikeler

ve

yakın geçmişten günümüze tespitlerle dolu önemli bir

yorum yaptı.

30

... "Son dönemde zaten Türkiye tarım ürünleri (sebze, buğday, mısır, ayçiçeği vs.) tohumların %

80'ini dışarıdan ithal etmeye başladı. Her

GENETIK OLARAK DEĞİŞİRİLMİŞ

tohum, içinde mutlaka

TERMINATÖR

geni bulundurur.

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Bu TERMINATÖR kendi neslini yok etmeye programlanmış. İşte bu nedenle de genetik olarak

değiştirilmiş tahlim verdiği ürün tohumu KISİRDİR.

Yani, her ekim yah/mevsimi için yeniden tohum almak gerekecektir.

Bu durum, sadece gıda açısından daş kaçınılmaz hale getirmekle kalmayacak çok daha vahim sonuçlar

doğuracaktır".
32

Dışarıdan bakıldığında salt ticari amaçla yapıldığı sanılan bu işin arkasında ise çok vahim bir stratejik hedefin yer aldığı görüülüyor. Bu tip tohum politikasına bağlı olan Türkiye, sadece ekonomik değil, genetik tuzağa da düşmüş olur.

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Genetik olarak değiştirilmiş tohumları İSTENİLEN OLUMLU YA DA OLUMSUZ YÖNDE programlamak mümkündür. Ve böylece GDO'lu ürünlerle, istenilen her toplum yönlendirilebilir.

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Bu yöntem bir milleti ve onun yaşadığı ortamı yok edebilecek kadar tehlikelidir. Mesela bu program, KISIRLAŞTIRMA (STERILIZASYON) erkek ve kadınlarda KISIRLAŞTIRMA programı olabilir.

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"KONU TÜRK DÜNYASI OLNCA HEPİMİZ TEK SES OLURUZ" diyerek bu stratejik konu ve ulusal tehdidin boyutu
Anti-American

Because of the possible reasons outlined in the next chapter, Turkey and US relations deteriorated during my field years. Anti-Americanism became a more valid and tangible discursive weapon and even if one intended to focus on anti-EUism, it came with a package of Anti-Americanism. In most of the cases, these messages had a

Sayın AYDIN SALIH’ın
incelemesinden aynı şekilde aktarılmıştır...

36
UYAN PAŞAM UYAN BİR BAK.
DERT BİR SÜRÜ NASIL SAYAK.
GREVDEYİZ YALIN AYAK,
UYAN PAŞAM UYAN HAYDI,
MEMLEKETTE ÇİVİ KAYDI,
MEMLEKETTE TEMEL KAYDI...

37
SAKİN BİR ORTAMDA
OKUYUP DEĞERLENDİRDİYSENİZ
BU E-POSTAYI ARKADAŞLARINIZA DA
GÖNDERİN...
general 'West' in their mind, American being the big brother, EU being the younger brother of this abstract 'West'.

George Bush's "Broader Middle Eastern Project" that aimed to support democratic processes in the Middle East was repeatedly used as an evidence of US meddling in Turkish state and politics. In this respect US support for the ruling moderate Islamic AKP government was also used an evidence. Cooperation between US and Turkish government was seen by secularists as an attempt to destroy secular republic.

Mustafa AKYOL 4/19/2008 demonstrates that these conspiracy theories influence Turkey's high judiciary:

One of those gifted human beings is Turkey's chief prosecutor, Abdurahman Yalçınkaya. As a man with grey hair, and a robust posture, his eyes shine with the "light of science and reason" that Turkey's ruling elite has received from Atatürk, our founder, since the 20's. And thanks to that exceptional wisdom, he has uncovered the hidden American plot that I mentioned. He unearthed the stunning fact that Turkey's incumbent AKP (Justice and Development Party) and the U.S. government has been actually conspiring together to put the nail on the coffin of Atatürk and his legacy.

...I am all serious. And, apparently, the chief prosecutor is, too. In the indictment he submitted to Turkey's Constitutional Court on March 15, he has the following paragraph:

"The accused party has eroded Turkey's image in the international community as a secular country... Turkey has started to be perceived as a 'Moderate
Islamic Republic.' This perspective has especially been reflected in the relation with the United States of America, and even in the official rhetoric. Former U.S. Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, and many other US officials, have ignored the fact that Turkey is a secular, democratic and social state of law, and rather defined our country as 'Moderate Islamic Republic.' It is obvious that they have taken this offensive audacity from the rhetoric of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who very often reiterates that he is the co-president of the 'Broader Middle East Project', which is a U.S. project aimed at ruling the related countries via moderate Islamic regimes."

In the early days of Ergenekon case (portrayed extensively in other chapters) anthropologist Jenny White (4/18/2008) pointed out the place of conspiracies and anti-Americanism:

Given these continuing revelations covered in all the media, it has been rather shocking for me to encounter public opinion. People on the street seem to believe that all of Turkey's recent problems (everything from the PKK to Ergenekon, the success of the AKP, as well as the case to close the AKP) have been caused by the CIA. Why would the US (or the EU, also a popular evildoer) want to do these things? The usual answers are: "Outsiders are trying to break Turkey apart"; "They want our land"; or "The US wants to turn the whole region into an Islamic state". No reasoned argument based on actual geopolitical considerations (for instance, that more countries becoming Islamic would be against US interests in every conceivable way, given its current sensitivities) makes any inroad into these explanations.
When I asked people about internal factors that might be creating some of these problems, there was no interest whatsoever in self-reflection. The CIA plot scenario is so self-evident, satisfying, and all-explanatory. But I also discovered that people (young people, in particular) don’t listen to or read the Turkish news. They get their ideas from other people. “Lots of people told me that…” was a common explanation for how they knew their scenario was correct. One young man genuinely, it seemed to me, had never even heard of Ergenekon. More surprising to me, though, is that the all-encompassing CIA explanation is also widespread among well-read, well-traveled professionals, including university professors, people who DO read the news. Is Ergenekon a fiction of the CIA’s imagination? Is the CIA plot a fiction of the Turkish public’s imagination?

Existence of American soldiers in Turkey is a direct threat. A widely circulated email claimed that a NATO base would be relocated from Italy to İzmir, Urla. It meant 4000 American soldiers in “our beautiful İzmir”107.

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ÇOK ÇOK ÖNEMLİ
İZMİRDE!!!
İtalya Napoli'deki NATO üstü İzmir Url'a taşınıyor...

4090 amerikan askeri Url'da ev tutmaya başladı bile.

BİP (Büyük İşgal Projesi) sebepsiyle ise doğuya kaydırılıyor.

Tehlikeli kısm bir havaalanı inşaatının da Mordoğan'da başlamış olması...

Adana-incirlik üstü Irak ve/veya Suriye ateş Menzilliinde olduğu için ana hava üstü İzmir olacak...

Tepemizden bomba yüklü bir sürtü uçak geçecek her gün...

Daha sonraki aşamada 6. Filen'nün ana üslerinden biri olabileceği söyleniyor...

Uzun adanın da kullanlacağını (ki şu an zaten kullanılıyor) öğrenilmiş...

TSK rahatsız ama hükümet her şeyi okeylemiş anlaşmalar yapılmış. Adamlar evlerini tutturup bile. Url'da emlak işi yapanlara teyit etirebilirsiniz...

Kimisi aman gelsin iş olur para kazanmış derken, sağ duyulu vatandaşlar bunun ilerde çok büyük sorunlara yol açacağına farkında...

Güzelim İzmir yada ülkenizin herhangi bir yerı, kasıca biz bu işe alet olmadık...

Stratejik olarak Uzun adan, İzmir körfesi çıkışını tutan yer. Burayı kontrollünde tutan donanmayı körfeze hapseder...

Güney Deniz Saha Komutanlığı merkezi de abdulkaya alınmış oluyor ileriki aşamalar için...
American companies might be biologically threatening. In a mail sent by a faculty member to the academic mailing list in Bilgi University, it is implied that Coca

Satılmış medyamız bunu ufak bir haber olarak verdi...

Amerikan'ın Yeni Dünya Düzeni projesinde çok önemli bir söz var...

Diyor ki düşman zaten düşmandır, belirdir önemli değil... Önemli olan dost/müttefik ülkenin ordusunun önemli komutanlarını/komuta merkezlerini ele geçirerek kontrol altına almaktır. Projeye inandırmak için, boyun eğdirmek itanık yapmak... Bu işgal projesinde sara bize de gelecek... Şimdiden milli refleks vermelıyiz... İşlerini kolaylaştırmamızı engellemeli geçitlimeliyz...

NATO üstüne hayır kampanyası için İzmir'de pazartesinden itibaren bilgilendirme amacıyla afiş, el ile ve her türlü yolu kullanmaya başlıyoruz... İzmir yada başka şehir fark etmez bu ülke hepimizin...

Sizde üzerinde düşen görevi yapın ve bu maili mümkün olduğunu çok kişiye gönderin.

Çaresizseniz...

Çare, Sizsiniz...

ANLADINIZ SIZ ONU....

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TURKUAZ & AQUAFINA Suları hakkında

> Bu yazı Y.Doç.Dr. Cemalettin CAMCI tarafından hazırlanmıştır

> Dün gece eve dönerken su almak üzere markete uğradım, göreveyi şöyle

> sordum:

> 1,5 lt. su var mı? Ama Turkuaz dışında fütten

> Turkuaz çıktığından beri bu şekilde su alıyorум artık.
> Para verip kötü su içmeye hiç niyetim yok! Marketteki adamın dediğlerini aynen aktarıyorum:

> - Abi, ben o sudan satmıyorum. İnan ki gelen müşterilerden onda dokuzu senin söylediğin şeyi söylüyor.

> Peki, neden hala satıyorlar? diyse sordum.

> - Abi, Turkuaz suyu, marketlere bedava veriliyor, sataarsan kara geçiyorsun, satamansan öylece duruyor. Ama ben satmıyorum, çünkü alan yok.

> Ayrıca CocaCola satanın Turkuaz da satma zorunluğu var, hatta Başka su sattırmamaya çağıyorlar.

> Uzun söze gerek yok, hiç kimse almazsa, hiç kimseye satamazlar...

> Lütfen okuyun, okutun! Bir şeye dikkatınızı çekmek istiyorum.

> Türkiye'de bazı şişeli içme suları doğal kaynak suyu değil.

> Doğal kaynak sularında devlete para ödenmeniz gerekir, aru bu tesislerin yatırımı maliyeti çok yüksek.

> Dolayısıyla CocaCola ne yapar,

> kaynak suyu araştırmalarının maliyetlerini çok yüksek bulduğu için

> Bursa/Kestel ovasındaki CocaCola fabrikasında derin kuyu pompalarıyla ovanın suyunu çekerek bunu da termosan geçirip filtre ederek hem CocaCola meşrubatını hem de Türkuağı şişelemeye başladı.

> Türkuağın etiketinin üst ve altındaki Kahverengi şeritlere dikkat edin:

> 'Sofra İçeceği' yazar. Devlet, CocaCola'nın uyanıklığını kanuna uyumak ve uyanıklığa yapılabacak itirazların bertaraf etmek için böyle bir kural çıkardı!

> Binlerce dönümlük tarım arazisinin bulunduğu
> ve CocaCola hariç

> hiçbir işletmeye 'derin kuyu pompası' çakma izni verilmeyen Kestel ovasında,

> yeraltından çektiren su, filtre edilip daha sonra içine bazı mineraller katılduktan sonra

> Türkiye'nin en.ucra kasabalara bile satılıyor ve İlk İlk içiliyor.

> Bazı yazılk kasaba ve köylerde neredeyse Turkuaz hariç içme suyu bulunmazsaiz çünkü

> dağıtım ağ çok güçlü. Bayilere başka bile olduğu yolunda duyular aldım.

> Turkuaz içmeye Devam edeceksemiz, unutmayın, yapay bir su içiyorunuz.

> Duyarlı bir vatandaş olarak konuya dikkatini z ceşirim.

> Her tarafı doğal kaynak sularıyla dolu memlekette, millete kuyu suyunu zorla ve de üstüne para alarak içiyorlar.

> İçmeini arkadaşlar!

> Gönderenin Notu:

> Kolon'nın Ülkesinin 1960 yılından,

> Özellikle ilkokul Öğrencilerine Ücretsiz süt tozu, balık yağı ve peynir yardımcı yapmışım,

> bu tarihlerden sonra Anadolu tarihinde ilk kez çocuk felci vakalarının görüldüğünü

> ve de sonrası Çocuk felci aşısının 'rütin aşılarm' arasma sokuldu-ğını,

> bu aşların bizlerde büyük paralarla satıldığıma HATIRLAYIN VE UNUTMAYIN..
Cola’s drinking water brand, Turkuvaz, is artificial and it might include some dangerous chemicals as “it was done before by other American companies”.

George Soros, a famous financial speculator, is frequently used in anti-American messages. Ultimately, he works for American interests since he is an American, too.

> Küba gibi bir ülkenin ‘insan sağlığıyla ticaret olmaz’ diyerek,

> (ABD de bile patent aldığını) kanser aşısı,

< FONT face=Verdana color=#993300 size=5>
> yoksul ülkelerle ilacı,

> isteyen Ülkelerde de patentini Ücretsiz verdiği,

>buna karşın tüm AB / ABD / İSRAIL’in yaygın hastalıkları hazinemizi ve sağlığımızı endiklerini

> BİLİN VE UNUTMAYIN.

> Ücretsiz’ adımda söylemeneyen bu malum firmalar,

> ‘Ücretsiz su veriyorlarsa’

>bunun nedenini DÜŞÜNÜN VE BULUN!!

> Yazan

> Y.Doç. Dr. Cemalettin CAMCI

> Fırat Üniversitesi Genel Cerrahi Elazığ-Türkiye

> Lütfen bu mailı gonderebildiginiz kadar kişiye gönderin..............
Anti-Soros mails were circulated so extensively that his foundation's Turkey branch (OSIAF Turkey) had to release a widely circulated letter denouncing these claims (the letter in Turkish here\textsuperscript{109}). However, I frequently heard anti-Soros claims.

109 Komplo Teorileri ve Biz

Acik Toplum Enstitusu, egitimde firsat esitliginden namus cinayetlerinin onlenmesine; gorme ozurluler icin internet kutupanesi tasarlanmasindan, zihinsel engellerin topluma katilimina kadar çok sayıda projeto destek saglamis bir kurum. Ancak, Acik Toplum Enstitusu’nun destekledigi projeler kadar, son derece sig komploteorileri ile de gundeme gelmektede.

Acik Toplum Enstitusu, pek çok kisinin bildigi uzere, yatirimci George Soros’un kurdugu ve kaynaklarini sagldigi uluslararasi bir kurulus. George Soros, zengin, ancak, servetini çok luks bir yasam gordurmeke yine, “acik toplum” ideali icin harcayan iradesi biri. Bugune kadar vakiflarina, 6 milyar dolar civari bir para aktardı; servetinin kalaniyi da vakiflarina kullanilmaya karari. Soros, alisik oldugunuz zenginlerden farklı, iradesi biri oldugu için etrafinda soru isaretlerinin olusmasi bir naktaya kadar anlasilabilir birsey. Ancak temelsiz komple teorilerinin bugun geldigi notka, en genis hayalguclu sinirlarini bile zorlamaktadır.

George Soros ve Acik Toplum Enstitusu hakkında kompol teorileri dort temel iddia cevresinde bicimlenmektede.


Komşo teorileri, benzer şekilde, Acık Toplum Enstitusu Türkiye Temsilciliği’nin vatandaslık geliri, herkesin sağlığı hismeti gibi en ileri sosyal talepler dile getiren Sosyal Politika Forum’unun kurulmasına destek vermesini ve enek piyasasında en kotu durumda olan özel sektör maden isçilerinin durumlarının belgelenmesi için Dev. Maden Sen’e destek vermesini de açıklamaya çalısarmakta.


onemini ve ‘Turkiye’nin AB yenilginin yararlanma anlatmak için gönul olarak emek ve zaman harcayan Finlandiya eski Cumhurbaşkanı Martti Ahtisaari, Hollanda Dışişleri eski Bakanı Hans van den Broek gibi isimlerin parayla satın alınabileceğinin ima edilmesi bile çok acı ve ayıptır.

Aynı sekilde, 2003’ten beri destekledigimiz, “Ebru” da tamamen gönülük halasına dayalı olarak hayata geemis bir proje. Türkiye’nin kendi kulesel cesitligini endienden uzak ve samimi bir şekilde kucaklaması amacıyla projeye 7 yılini veren, 250.000 km yol yapan, 20.000 kare fotoğraf cezen Attila Durak ya da projenin kitabına olağanüstü yazılar yazan insanlar, emeklerinin karşılgında tek kurus para almamilar. Bu değerli insanlara ve projelere, bu ter kor suphecilikde yakalanan kisilerin kendilerine “Türkiye’yey hizmet ni ediyoruz, yoksa daha güzel bir Türkiye icin gönul olarak çalışan insanların hevesini mi kırıyoruz?” sorusunu sorması gerekmektedir.


particular anti-Soros email circulated after the Armenian Conference that took place in Istanbul Bilgi University. All rectors were targeted as “intellectuals of Soros”. All liberal minded universities that got Soros funding (Istanbul Bilgi, Sabancı and Boğaziçi Universities) and were involved in the conference organization were targeted. Liberal minded, pro-EU intellectual who contributed to the conference were also targeted. In fact, any scholar who is out of official discourse and who works on minorities in Turkey is immediately classified as a Soros intellectual. Names are listed with photos one by one with the fundings they received. (This particular mail in Turkish can be found here) Sometimes mails became pure insult, obscenity and

Acık Toplum Enstitusu, dünaya kusup, içine kapanmak yerine adaletsizliklere karşı etkili cevaplara geliştirme yolunu tercih ediyor.

Acık Toplum Enstitusu’nun faaliyetleri hakkında bilgi almak isteyen kişiler
www.aciktoplumenstitusu.org.tr adresine giden bilgi edinirler ya da kurumun her yıl güncellenen faaliyet raporunu talep edebilirler.

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SOROS’UN
AÇIK TOPLUM ENSTİTÜSÜ

1. Eylül 2001’den bu yana Türkiye’de faaliyette
2. Soros’un Türkiye’ye ayırduğu para, şimdilik 5 Milyon Dolar
3. Soros’un Türkiye’ye ilgisi Aralık 1999’da Helsinki Zirvesi ile başladı
TAYYİP ERDOĞAN'DAN İTİRAF

1. Erdoğan, 2003 yılında Davos Zirvesi sırasında Soros'a "Türkiye'nin açık toplumcuları biziz" dedi.

Ermeni Sempozyumu'nu düzenleyen üç Üniversite Yönetiminin
Soros'la İlişkileri

ATE Türkiye Direktörü Hakan Altunay: "Bilgi, Boğaziçi, Sabancı destek
verdiğimiz üniversitelerdir"
SOROS'UN SABANCI ÜNİVERSİTESİ'NE VE TÜRK ORDUSUNA BİÇTİĞİ ROL

1. “Orta Avrupa Üniversitesi, Doğu Blok'unun yıkımasında önemli rol oynadı. Türkiye'de de köklü değişim ve reformlar için bu üniversiteye çok iş düşecektir.”

2. Soros, Orta Avrupa Üniversitesi ile Sabancı Üniversitesi arasındaki işbirliği girişiminin mütevelli heyeti başkanı.


SOROS'UN DESTEKLEDİĞİ ÜNİVERSİTELER ve PARA ALDIKLARI PROJELER

- Sabancı Üniversitesi Eğitim Reformu Girişimi,
- Sabancı Üniversitesi İstanbul Politikalar Merkezi'nin Avrupa Birliği İzleme Projesi,
- Sabancı Üniversitesi'nin Toplumsal Duyarlılık Modelinin Yayınlanması Çalışmaları.
- “Euro-Türk diyaloğu” projesi için AB'den 500 bin euro alındı.
SOROS'UN DESTEKLEDİĞİ ÜNİVERSİTELER ve PARA

ALDIKLARI PROJELER

- Bilgi Üniversitesi'nin Avrupalı Türkler Araştırması
- Bilgi Üniversitesi Sivil Toplum Kuruluşları Eğitim ve Araştırma Birimi
- Bilgi Üniversitesi İnsan Hakları Merkezi
- Bilgi Üniversitesi'nin 20 İlde İnsan Hakları Filmleri Gösterimi

SOROS'UN DESTEKLEDİĞİ ÜNİVERSİTELER ve PARA

ALDIKLARI PROJELER

- Boğaziçi Üniversitesi'nin Çeşitli Araştırma Projeleri
- Boğaziçi Üniversitesi'nin Sosyal Politika Forumu
- Soros'un TESEV'i ile birlikte gerçekleştirilen "Türkiye'de rüşvet araştırması "(2002)
- "Teknoloji temelli eğitim ve Yetenekli insan kaynakları geliştirme" projesi için AB'den 1.800.000 euro alındı.
SOROS'UN DESTEKLEDİĞİ EĞİTİM ÇALIŞMASI

- Tarih Vakfı'nın ders kitaplarını gözden geçirme çalışması

Ermeni Sempozyumu'nun Düzenleyicileri

SOROS'UN AYDINLARI

SOROS'UN AYDINLARI

- Oğuz Özerden
  Bilgi Üniversitesi
  Mütevelli Heyeti Başkanı
Türkiye'de faaliyete geçtiği 2001 yılından bu yana ATE'nin Danışma Kurulu Üyesi

SOROS'UN AYDINLARI

- Prof. Dr. Ayşe Soysal
  Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Rektörü
  Ermeni Sempozyumuna ev şahipliği yapan Soysal, 2004-2005 dönemi ATE Danışma Kurulu Üyesi

SOROS'UN AYDINLARI

- Prof. Dr. Tosun Terzioğlu
Sabancı Üniversitesi Rektörü

Konferansın ertelenmesinin ardından yaptığı tehdit:

"Bu sonucun önümüzdeki dönemde Türkiye için uluslar arası alanda da önemli bir ayak bağı olmasından endişe ediyorum"

25.05.2005, BIAB

SOROS'UN AYDINLARI

2. Prof. Dr. Üstün Ergüder

Boğaziçi Üniversitesi eski rektörü, Sabancı Üniversitesi

- 2001-2003 yılları arasında ATE'nin Danışma Kurulu üyesi.

- Aynı zamanda ATE tarafından finanse edilen Sabancı Üniversitesi İstanbul Politikalar Merkezi'nin ve Eğitim Reformu Girişiminin başında bulunuyor.
SOROS'UN AYDINLARI

• Prof. Dr. Murat Belge
  Bilgi Üniversitesi Öğretim Üyesi
  Sempozyum Hazırlık Komitesi Üyesi

• Açık Toplum Enstitüsü'nün 2001-2003 yılları arasında
  Danışma Kurulu Üyesi

• Başkanı olduğu Helsinki Yurtaşlar Derneği'nin 2004'te düzenlediği
  “İnsan Haklarında Yeni Taktikler” Sempozyumu için ABD, İngiltere ve Hollanda Dışişleri Bakanlığından 1.5 milyon dolar aldı.

SOROS'UN AYDINLARI

• Doç. Dr. Halil Berktay
  Sabancı Üniversitesi Öğretim Üyesi
  Sempozyum Hazırlık Komitesi Üyesi

• "İzmir'in yakılması'nın yarattığı sosyal travmalar" projesi için ABD'den 84.000 avro.

• "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Toplum" dersleri projesi için Avusturya ve İsviçre hükümetlerinden 74.000 avro.


SOROS'UN AYDINLARI

• Prof. Dr. Çağlar Keyder
  Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Öğretim Üyesi

  Sempozyum Hazırlık Komitesi Üyesi

• ATE'nin mali desteği ile Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Sosyal Politika
  Forumu'nun Yönetim Kurulu Üyesi

• Projeleri ATE ve Avrupa Komisyonu tarafından desteklenen Boğaziçi
  Üniversitesi Avrupa Çalışmaları Merkezi Merkez Kurul Üyesi
SOROS'UN AYDINLARI

- Prof. Dr. Ethem Eldem
  Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Öğretim Üyesi
  Sempozyum Hazırlık Komitesi Üyesi

ATE’nin en fazla destek veren 15 kuruluş listesinde yer aldığı
Tarih Vakfı’nın Yönetim Kurulu Üyesi

SOROS'UN AYDINLARI

- Doç. Dr. Cemil Koçak
  Sabancı Üniversitesi Öğretim Üyesi
Sempozyum Hazırlık Komitesi Üyesi

ATE’nin en fazla destek veren 15 kuruluş listesinde yer aldığı
Tarih Vakfı’nın yayıladiği Toplumsal Tarih dergisinin yayın politikasını
belirlediği açıklandan dört kişiden biri

SOROS’UN AYDINLARI

- Yar. Doç. Dr. Akşin Somel
  Sabancı Üniversitesi Öğretim Üyesi
  Sempozyum Hazırlık Komitesi Üyesi

- ATE’nin en fazla destek veren 15 kuruluş listesinde yer aldığı Tarih
  Vakfı’nın yayıladiği Toplumsal Tarih dergisinin Danışma Kurulu Üyesi

- Rockefeller Vakfı’nın finansmanını karşıladığı ve Tarih Vakfı’nın çok
  sayıda ilde yürüttüğü “Yerel Tarih Grupları” projesinin başındaki kişi.
SOROS'UN AYDINLARI

- Dr. Taner Akçam
  Alman İstihbarat'ın
  Ermeni soykırımını
  araştırma masasının yönetimindeki Hamburg İncelemeler
  Enstitüsü görevlilerinden.

- Hasan Yalçın, Döneller kitabında Taner Akçam'ın "bilimsel" uzmanlık alanı şöyle saptamıştı:
  "Türkiye düşmanlığı profesörü"

- Alman gizli servisinin Kafkas Masası Şefi Tessa Hofmann ve Türkiye masası Şefi Udo Steinbach tarafından yetiştirildi.
• Prof. Dr. Baskın Oran

Ankara Üniversitesi öğretim üyesi, Azınlıklar Raporu'nun hazırlayıcısı

Ermeni Sempozyumu konuşmacısı

“Türkiye'de Azınlıklar” adlı kitabı ATE'nin finansörliğinde TESEV Yayınlarından çıktı.

SOROS'UN AYDINLARINDAN

“SOYKIRIM” YALANLARI

• Prof. Dr. Selim Deringil

Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Öğretim Üyesi

Ermeni Sempozyumu Hazırlık Komitesi Üyesi

“Kendimize artık güvenelim, ciddi şekilde tarihle yüzleşelim.”

3 Mart 2005, Cumhuriyet
"Ama öte yandan adına hukuken ne derseniz deyin, sistemli bir yok etme var. Ermeniler bütün bu coğrafyadan şu veya bu şekilde sürülmuş, sağ çıkımları imkansız bir yürüüşe zorlanmıştırlar."

14.04.2005, Hürriyet

SOROS'UN AYDINLARINDAN
"SOYKIRIM" YALANLARI

- Doç. Dr. Halil Berktay

"Ermeni kayıpları, küçültüle küçültüle 450 binden 20-25 bin dolaylarına çekilmeye çalışıldı."

Radikal, Tanka Işık'ın röportaji

"İzmir çevresinde yarı gizli şekilde Rumlara etnik temizlik yapıldı. Bu olaylar Ermeni katliamının silahsız provasıdır."

Milliyet, 07.03.2005
"Tehcir Kanunu başlı başına bir etnik temizlik... Ermeni olduklarını için tehcir ediliyorlar. Günümüzde öldürme unsuru hariç bu kadarı dahi 'jenisit' tanımına giriyor"

Milliyet, 07.03.2005

SOROS'UN AYDINLARINDAN

"SOYKIRIM" YALANLARI

Yalan: "Mustafa Kemal'in Ermeni tehcirini savunan tek bir demeci yoktur"

Halil Berktay, Milliyet, 07.03.2005

Gerçek: "Dünya kamuoyu, Ermeni ahalinin tehcirı hususunda almaya mecbur kaldığımız karar için bize karşı haklı bir ithamda bulunamaz"

M. Kemal, 26 Şubat 1921
SOROS'UN AYDINLARINDAN

"SOYKIRIM” YALANLARI

- Prof. Dr. Murat Belge
  Bilgi Üniversitesi Öğretim Üyesi


26 Nisan 2005, Milliyet
threat. In a personal note, OSIAF Turkey director Hakan Altunay told me how depressed he would become with these mails.

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SOROS'UN AYDINLARINDAN

"SOYKIRIM" YALANLARI

- Dr. Taner Akçam:

  "Türkiye'nin haksız bir devlet olduğunu kanıtlayacağım"

  [www.his.online.de/mitarb/akcam.htm](http://www.his.online.de/mitarb/akcam.htm)

  "Ermeni soykırımı olmasaydı ulusal Kurtuluş Savaşı diye bir şey olmazdı."

  Türkiye'yi Yeniden Düşünmek, s.58

- Patronundan övgü:

  "Taner Akçam, aferin, Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı'nın, ulusal devleti kuran savaşın aslında bir soykırım olduğunu bir Türk olarak ispatlamıştır."

  Tessa Hoffman

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-----Original Message-----

From: ahmet doruk [mailto:ahmetdoruk1921@hotmail.com]

Sent: Monday, January 15, 2007 2:58 PM

To: info@osiaf.org.tr

Subject: Sonuna Kadar Okuyun
Mrb. siz ki bizim şanlı tarihımızı para uğruna satan çarefiz satılmış köpekler

siz ki soroz piçinin kanatları altında saklanan namussuz yavaşlar

siz ki halkımızı cahil sanıp onu kandırmaya çabalayan dolandırıcılar

siz ki ümit satıcılığında nemalanmak isteyen vatan hainler

siz ki parayı insandan daha değerli olanı işปızı sapızı alacaklar

siz ki avrupadan üfleyince burada ses çıkaran düdükler

BU SÖZLERİM SİZEDİR. SİZİ DEVİRECEK CESUR BİR HUKUMETİMİZİN

OLMAYISINDAN FAYDALANDIĞINIZI VE BU GÜCÜ DE SOROZ ARACILIĞIYLA ABD-DEN ALDIĞINIZI BİLİYORUM. SİZİN O KUŞ BEYİMLERİNIZE BUNU ANLATMAK ZOR OLSA DA BİR ÜMIT DENİYORUM. GELİN BU İÇİNDE BULUNDUĞUNUZ "GAFLET VE DELALLETTE"

ÇIKIN. AKSİ AKTİRDE BÜTÜN SÜLALERİNİZ YERYÜZÜNDE SİLMEK İÇİN CAN ATAN BİNLERCE "VATANSEVER TÜRK GENCİNİN" OLDUĞUNU BURADAN BELİRTİRİM. ANANIZI
AVRADINIZI SIKEYİM SİZİM. OROSPU ÇOCUKLARI.

YIYIYORSA BENLE İLETİŞİM İÇİN

CEP NUMARANIZI YAZIN. BU ARADA SAKIN OLA KOCAEĞİ
ÜNİVERSİTESİNE KONFERANS

İÇİN FİLAN GELEYİM FİLAN DEMEYİM HEPİNİZİN
KAFASINA SIKARIM HABERİNİZ

OLSUN. HAYATIN TA AMINA KOYİM SİZİN GİBİ
SEREFŞIZLER MEMLEKETİMİ BİİİL

İŞGAL ETTİKTE SONRA... SİZ ANCA PARA SATICISI
SOROZ.ÜN KİÇİNİ YALARSINIZ.

PIÇ OĞLU PIÇLER... AKILLI OŁUN  BU MEMLEKET
HEPİMİZİN, BİZİ TEKRAR SAMSÜN.A

ÇIKARTMAYIN. BU SEFER GERÇEK TEN SOYKIRİM
UYGULARIZ. GERÇİ O BİZE YAKIŞMAZ

AMA SİZİN GİBİ SATILmiş KÖPEKLERE MÜSTAHAKTIR. O

kadar...
allowed. This last situation also demonstrates another characteristics of these emails. Sometimes a column itself would be put to circulation. Especially columns of staunchly secular columnists would be included in these emails.

TÜVİRİNİSDESOROSÇUISTEMİYORUZ

1) Türbana, bir yasaklama aracı olduğu için karşıyım. Türban bir yasaklama aracıdır, çünkü her şeyden önce kadın satışa yasak getirmektedir. "türbana övgüî" demek, "kadın yasak getirin" demek olduğu için türbana karşıyım.

2) Türbana, kadına bir hakaret olduğu için karşıyım. Çünkü türban, kadını erkekten aşağı gören, kadını ikinci sınıf insan kabul eden, kadını bir günah sembolü olarak aşağılayan erkek egemen, çağdaşa, arkaik bir anlayışın sembolüdür.

3) Türbana, erkeğe bir hakaret olduğu için karşıyım. Kadın türban takmazsa, erkeğin şehvet duygularına esir düşeceğini varsayan ve bir erkeğin gelişmemiş, ilkel güdülerinin esiri bir yaratık olarak kabul eden bir zavallı anlayışa karşıyım.

4) Türban serbestsin, laik demokrasiye karşı olduğunu için karşıyım. Demokrasinin temel direği laikdir._laik bir ülkede ise dinsel amaç veya gerekşimlere göre yasa çıkarılmaz. Türban serbestsi bu temel ilkeyi çıkmekte, laikliğe dolayısıyla demokrasiimize büyük bir darbe vurmaktadır.
5) Türban serbestsine, hukuk devletine karşı olduğu için karşıyım. Söz konusu düzenlemeye, tüm yüksek yargı kararlarına karşı bir kafa tutma anlamına geldiği için karşıyım.

6) Türban serbestsine, yalnızca ulusal değil uluslararası hukuk kararlarına karşı olduğunu için de karşıyım. Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi kararlarına ve dolayısıyla evrensel değerlere de kafa tuttuğu için karşıyım.

7) Türban serbestsine, dinsel ve/veya siyasi her türlü sembolün kamusal alanda kullanımına karşı olduğunu için karşıyım. Çünkü bu tür semboller ayrıştırıcı bir işlev görecektir ve gruplaşmalarla, bölünmelere, kaosa neden olacaktır.

8) Türbana negatif değil, pozitif özgürlük yanlısı olduğunu için karşıyım. Dinsel, ailevi ve benzeri baskılarla türban takmak zorunda bırakmış bir kozumuz, kendi özgü iradesiyle bu seçimi yaptığı aldatmacasına karşıyım. Türban takarak (veya takılarak) belirli bir ideolojiye teslim olmuş bulunan bir insannın, kişisel gelişimini tamamlaması mümkün olamayacağı için türbana karşıyım.

9) Türbanın üniversitede serbest bırakılmasına, üniversite ruhuna aykırı olduğu için karşıyım. Şu veya bu şekilde dinsel inancın girdiği bir üniversitede akıl, oraya terk etmek zorunda kalacaktır. Dinsel dogmaların değil akılın düşüncenin egemen olması gereken, laik düşüncein en gerekli olduğu üniversitelerde böyle bir uygulama düşünülemez.

10) Türbanın "yalnızca“ üniversitelerde serbest bırakacağı iddialarını bir kanırmaca olduğu için bu düzenlemeye karşıyım. Çünkü bu uygulama bir domino etkisi yaratacak ve sonunda her kadımdedeki öğretim kurumuna ve kamusal hizmet alanına yayılacaktır. Bunu görmemek için insannın ya aptal ya da kötü niyetli olması gerekir.
11) Bu serbestliğe, bizi çağdaş uygulıkların uzaklaştıracağı ve ülkemiz ilk ortaçağ zihniyeti yörüngesine oturtarak tüm kazanımlarımız yok edeceği için karşıyım.

12) Din devletine karşı olduğunu için türbana karşıyım. Günümüzde artık bir vicdan meselesi olması gereken dini, sembollerin üstüne topluma dayatılan, bu uğrada anayasal düzenlemeler yapabilme sürecini gösteren ve bugüne kadar yaptıklarıyla artık deşifre olmuş bu İktidaran nihai amacı bir din devleti olduğu artık anlaşılmalıdır.

13) Bu düzenlemeye, emperryalizme karşı olduğunu için karşıyım. BÖP ve ‘hüb İslam projelerinin bir uzantısı olan bu serbesti, emperryalizin Türkiye’yi İslam ülkelerine bir model ülke olarak sunma (bir başka ifadeyle laikliği sunanlıma) projesinin bir sonucudur.

14) İstismara karşı olduğunu için bu düzenlemeye karşıyım. Bu düzenleme, yıllardır acımasızca türbani bir istismar aracı olarak kullanan, halkın din duygularını sömüren siyasetçilerin onaylanmasını anlamına gelecek ve sömürü daha da ivme kazanacaktır.

15) Ve son olarak bir Atatürkçü olarak türbana karşıyım. Türban serbestiğine laik cumhuriyetimizin kuruluşu büyük Atatürk’e ihanet anlamına geldiği ve bu ihaneti kabullenemediğim için karşıyım.

Prof. Dr. Öğuz İNEL

Emekli Öğretim Üyesi

*Cumhuriyet Gazetesi yazan İlhan Selçuk’un yazısından derlenmiştir.
Islamization of Society

As the political tension increased and the pressure on AKP intensified and coup plots were prepared, anti-American and anti-Soros mails were replaced by email concerned with the Islamization of society. First came some humorous mails. In one case, there is a list where many Istanbul neighborhood names are replaced with Islamic names. This is what will happen in future because of the AKP rule. In another humorous case here the reading cards for primary school kids are Islamized.

Thru a former student. November 2007 AKP's influence in society....

İstanbul'da semt adları değişiyor!

Acıbadem..... Haçbadem.
Aksaray..... AKPsaray.
Arnavutköy..... Arapköy.
Ataköy..... Adakköy.
Avcılar..... Hacılar.
Ayşekadin..... Türbanlı Ayşe Kadın.
Bağlarbaşı..... Bağlabası..
Bakırköy..... Bakirköy.
Bebek..... Nurtopu.
Beyoğlu..... Yobazoğlu.
Çarşamba..... Cuma.
Doğancılar..... Erdoğançıl Garnı.
Etiler..... Emviler.
Etyemez..... Domuzetiyezm.
Fatih..... Vahdettin.
Fenerolu..... Ampulyolu.
Fındıklı..... Zındıklı.
Galata..... Galata-Port.
Habipler..... İmamhatipliler.
Harbiye..... Takıyye.
Harem..... Namahrem.
Haydarpaşa..... Haşama.
İkitelli..... İkifesli.
Kandilli..... Ampullü.
Kartal..... Deve.
Kurtuluş..... Kurtuluş İslam'da.
Kasımpaşa..... Tayyippaşa.
Kızıltoprak..... Yeşiltoprak.
Mahmutpaşa..... Mahmuthoca.
Mecidiyeköy..... Dolarköy.
Merter..... Mehter.
Moda..... Tesettür.
Nişantaşı..... Nûrtaşı.
Okmeydanı..... Recmeydanı.
Pangaltı..... Finans Kurumu Altı.
Paşabahçe..... Hocabahçe.
Paşalimanı..... Paşa Port.
Salıpzarı..... Çumapazarı.
Sarıgazi..... Sarıklıgazi.
Selamsız..... Selamünaleykümlü.
Sultanbeyli..... Şeriatbelli.
Tarabya..... Takunya.
Tarlabası..... Açmabaşı.
Ulus..... Ümmet.
Unkapanı..... Unakıtani.
Ümraniye..... Ümmetçiye.
Yedikule..... Seven- Towers.
Zeytinburnu..... Hurmaburnu.

FW: İlkokullarda okutulacak yeni fişler

kamuda turbanın serbest olmasını sonra okuma fişleri:

börteğül başını ört, ört börtegül ört.

bak berkecan ne güzel sarık, sende sar berkecan.
hedenur yakamı kapa, kapa yakamı kapa.

cemile mevlüte pilav yap.

ışık ılk zemzem iç.

koş kamuran koş, kuran kursuna koş.

oruç aç ali.

sadık hoca iftar topunu patlat.

oya çarşaf tak.

mülayim minareye çık.

tayyip yasa çıkar.

onayla apdullah onayla.

tayyip tabana oyna

kömür dağıt oy topla

dağıt ihale dağıt
sat sat sat

petek ip atlama!
kıcin gorunur sonra!
atlama petek atlama!

ali bana bak.

ipek başını ört

emel eve gel. hemen eve gel.

murat kadrolaş. aman boş durma.

tayyip amca seni çok severiz.

emrah camiye koş, koş emrah koş

ışığı ılıg süd iç, elhamdülillah de

gül abdullah gül.

uyu halkım uyu. uyu uyu yat uyu...
Fethullah Gülen, a leader of a massive Islamic movement, was a usual suspect. Before AKP, Mr. Gülen was the single most dangerous enemy in the eyes of secularists. Although not directly related to the EU process in the beginning but a concern on "secularist anxiety", Gülen related mails were effective in a creation of a certain mode of moral panic. Even a very well known woman novelist, Pınar Kür would forward a message to Bilgi University academic mailing list in 15 October 2007 with a note "Ürkütücü" [scary]. In that message, a detailed portrayal of how

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Aziz Dostlarım,

İs başında, GSL ve SBPli bir Büyükelçi arkadaşına ulaşan, onun da bana gönderdiği bir iletini, bilgi ve takdirlerinize ilişkide sunuyorum. Ben içeriğini ürkütücü bulduğum için tanığım üç gazeteci (Özgen Acar, Hulki Cevizoglu ve Emre Kongar) dostuma ayrıca gereg为我们 için gönderdim. Siz de lutfen çevrenize yayın ve uyanırdırın.

Selam ve sevgilerimle, Erdil Akay, 18 Eylül 2007 Salı

Sayın Abi Ablalarım,

1-2 haftadır kafamda yazmayı kurguladığım bir mail vardı. Hazır konusu gelmikten sizenle paylaşmak istedim. Her ne kadar direkt olarak Uskudar Sev ile
bir bağlantı yoksa da benim de son 4 sene içinde çeşitli tecrübelerim oldu.


1 - Dersanelerin rehberlik hocaları büyük misyon yüklenmiş durumda.

Ogrencileri haftasonları calısmaları için "abiler" diye nitelendirdikleri üniversite öğrencisi olan insanlara yönlendirmekte, onlarla ders calısmaktadır, çeşitli oyunlar oynamakta, hatta geceleri de o "abilerin" evinde kalınmaktadır. Odevini yapmayan öğrenciler "git abdest al" gibi saka yollu uygulamalar yapılmıştır, sabahları ise dini görevlerini yerine getirmeleri için cocukları uyandırmaktadırlar. Cocuklar ise arkadaşları ile birlikte bunu eğlenceli bir aktivite olarak grup uygulamaktalar.

3 - Bu abilerin evlerinde, abilerin ders disi dini uygulamalarına uymuyorum derseniz ne olyyor peki? Sizi dovuyorlar mı? Tabiki hayir. Ancak o hafta icinde rebberlik hocalarına not dusuluyor, ve ertesi hafta yatak kapasitesi yetersiz olduğu gerecesi ile kurlallara uymayan öğrenci yardımından mahrum bırakılıyor.

4 - Peki çocuk 8. sınıftarı bitirdiğinde ne olyyor? Rehberlik hocaları puanına göre onu munasip okullara yerleştiriyor, ve de yerleştirdiği okullarda cocuga yardım edebilecek olan "abiler" olduğunu aileyeye iletiyor. Hatta aile dersane ile iliskisini kesmisse bile hoca tarafından israrla aranıp her okulda yardımcı abilerin olduğunu israrla söylüyorlar. Gereken durumda (ilginctir ki her okulun yakınlarında) ucuz yurtlari var, ve cocukları buralara yönlendirmeye calisiyorlar.

5 - Herhangi bir dini gunde cocuklara topluca sinevizonlar izletiliyor, hikayeler anlatılıyor ve de ilahiler okunuyor. Sakin yanlis anlamayan, sadece dine yatkin insanların cocukları degil bunlar bu sene kim varsa o dersanelere kayitli herkese uyguladilar bunları.

Ehh.. bunlar eskiden beri olan seyler diye aklinizdan gecirms olayabilirsiniz belki.. Yalnız bu senenin gecen senelerden farklı olduğunu açıka hissettim. Geçtigimiz senelerde bu dersaneler faaliyetlerini fazlaca gizli yurutuyordlardı ve de sadece bilincisiz aileler ya da maddi durumu kötü aileler üzerinde uyguluyorlardı. Bu sene ise su sıralar hala devam etmekte olan OKS yerleştirmelerinde eksiksiz Tüm Öğrencilerini arayipスキルstirmaktalar. Herhangi
bir çekinceleri kalmamış gorunuyor. Ya da herhangi bir kistasları.

Gelelim BOGAZICI Universitesine...

4 senem bitti Bogazici Universitesinde ve de onumuzdeki sene 5. ve son senem olacak. (diye umuyorum en azından) Girdigim ilk sene muazzam kapi kontrollerivardi. YOK'un tum talimatlarina da uyuluyordu.


2004 senesi ile birlikte Okulun kapisindaki tum kontroller sona erdi. Turbanli ogrenciler (tabii bu da ayri tartisma konusu..dini simge..ozgurluk vs. taraf olmadan anlatmaya calisacagim) bir sure guvenlikten gecerken sapka takiyor, derslerde ve okul bahcesinde ise turbana geri donuyorlardı. 2004 senesinin ortalarinda kapidan da turbanli girisler basladi taa ki bir ogrenci bu olaylari cep telefonu ile kameraya cekip YOK e gonderene kadar... 2-3 ay YOK kurallari uygulandi, sonra eski hamam eski tas..

Ve yil 2007 Eylul;

1.'si super imkanlari olan yurtlarini tanitan brosur, ikincisinde ise Ayet var. Biz sizinle ilgilenecegim deyip duruyorlar.

Kisaca demek istedigim Bu Eylül itibari ile kistaslari sadece maddi sorun yasayan aileler ya da cuk bilinciz aileler degil, "Tum kesimler" oldu. Hem ortaokul bazinda, hem de universite bazinda. Bu yuzden cok da sasmadim "Cumhuriyet Gazetesi'ndeki yaziya...

Ingiliz gazetelerinin de dedigi gibi :

"Laik azinliga iyi davranırlar umarim."
Gülen movement recruits new members in high school and then in universities can be found. Its immense financial power is described in other messages. Some emails

Iyi günler

yusuf erkmen 2002

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FW: fettullahçılık

> Kanaltürk televizyonunda, Merdan Yanardağ'ın sunduğu "Yolsuzluk ve
> Yoksulluk" adlı programa katılan Nurettin Veren, "Cumhuriyet
> savcılarnın anlatacaklarını ihbar kabul etmesini istiyor. Bu
> davanın tanığı da sanığı da olmaya hazırın" dedi. Fethullah Gülen
> 'in 25 yıl boyunca başarıverliği ve kuryeliğini yaptığı belirten
> Nurettin Veren, "gizli bir örgüt" olarak nitelendirdiği
> "Fethullahçilar" in yüzünü anlattı. Veren, "Biz 12 kişi hayır
> için yola çıktık ancak örgütlenmenin devleti içten ele geçirme planı
> olduğunu anlayınca aforoz edildim. Gülen beni öldürmek istedi" dedi.
> Nurettin Veren devam ediyor;
> "Biz 1970 yılında 12 insan yoksul öğrencilerin okutulması ve hayır
> işleri için yemin ederek yola çıktık. Yıllar boyunca bu dava uğruna
> hasılar üzerinde oturdum. Küçük hayırlarla büyük finanslar elde ettik.
> Kaydı olmayan yardımlar Fethullah'a teslim edildi. Büyük ekonomik gücü
> ulaşınca 1993'te harekete geçildi. Bir cami nasıl milletin parasiyla
> yapıldıysa Zaman gazettesi ve Samanyolu televizyonu da aynı yeni oyle
> yapıldı. Ancak Zaman gazettesi 20 yıl boyunca banka reklamı almadi.
> Çünkü Fethullah banka reklamı gibi, kola içmeyi, kot giymeyi de haram
> kildi. Sonra Asya Finans'ı kurdum. Gazetesine banka reklamı
> almayan Gülen daha sonra Bank Asya'yı kurdurdu. Gülen Müslümanlara
> takipte yapıyor."
>
> Nurettin Veren, Fethullahçı örgütlenmenin 7.5 milyar dolarlık ekonomik
> gücü ulaşığı, Türkiye'de dershaneye giden 4 çocukta üçün
> tarihinin eline düşTriState dikkat çekti. Veren, ailelerce,
> "Çocuklarını terörden kurtarmak isterken Fethullah örgütüne teslim
> ediyorsunuz. Uyanın, gerçeği görün" diye uyarda bulundu.
>
> Gülen'in bütün şirketlerinin adını kendisinin koyduğunu belirten
> Veren, "Ama bunun belgesini bulamazsınız. Çünkü hiçbir illegal
> örgütün belgesi olmaz" dedi.
> Türbanı biz başlattık
> Nurettin Veren, Türkiye'de önemli bir sorun haline gelen türbanın
> Fethullah Gülen'in talimatıyla bir furyaya dönüşürtildiğinin ifade
> ederken şöyle konuştu: "Gülen'in talimatıyla birçok arkadaşımız 50
> yaşına kadar evlenmedi. 1970'lerde ve 1980'lerde Türkiye'de türban
> diye bir sorun yoktu. Bunu topluma biz enjekte ettik. Gülen, evli
> mürşerlerin eşlerini burunlarından topuklarına kadar kapatmalarını
> istedi. 'Siz başlatın gerisi gelir' dedi. Kadınlarnız da siyah
> gözlükler ve eldivenler taktı. Ben de eşimi oyle giydirdim. Toplum
> kamplara bölündü. Sonra da bu örgütlenme fark edilince cemaate, 'Başı
> açık kadınlarla evlenin' dedi. Bu yüzden cemaat içindeki başı kapalı
> kadınlar dul kaldı!"
>
> Gülen'in kendisini insanüstü, ileriği gören, her şeyi önceden bilen
> bir canlı olarak tanıttığını belirten Veren, "Kendisi 1941 doğumu
> olmasa karsın Atatürk öldükten sonra, 1938'de doğduğunu söyler ve
> kurtarıcı olduğunu ima etmeye çalıştı. Ancak tasavvuf ve gönül
> adamı, bir Mevlana ve Yunus Emre gibi takdim edilen bir insanın bugün
> Irak'ta 400 bin Müslüman'ın ölümüne yol açan Amerika'da ne işi var? Siz
> hiç 137 dönümlük arazide 8 villa içinde 100 hızmetkârla yaşayan bir
> Yunus Emre gördünüz mü" diye sordu.
> 
> Beni öldürtmek istedi
> Gülen'in gerçek amacının kilit noktalarda kadrolaşarak devleti ele
> geçirmek olduğunu belirten Veren, bu planı anladiktan sonra ikazlarda
> bulunduğunu, bu yüzden aforoz edildiğini anlattı. Veren şöyle konuştu:
> "1995'te fikren ve kalben koptuk. Hayır için yola çıkmıştık ama örgüt
> çatısı içinde kullanıldı. Gördük ki çatal biçak için kurulan bir
> fabrika, silah fabrikasına dönüştüyör. Devleti içten ele geçirecek bir
> plan olduğunu sonradan anladık. Tepki koyduk, ikaz edilince dış
> görevlere gönderildik. ABD'de 30 gün birlikte kaldı. 50 kişinin
> önünde beni öldürtmeye kalktı. Bu hücum ve cinnet karşısında canımı
> zor kurtardım. Gülen, 'FBI ve CIA'yı arayın, bu adamı öldürün' dedi.
> Sonra Türk devletinin görevlendirdiği polise 'Silahını çek vur bunu'
> diye bağırdı. İnsanlar itaat etmeyeceğine şömine demirile üzerine hücum
are exceptionally conspiratorial. A message being utterly anti-semitic connect Gülen Movement to Zionist plots that ultimately endanger Turkey. Confessions of a

> etti. Sonra New York'ta gece yarısı sokağa atıldım."
> Gülen'in gerçek amaçının dünyayı yönetmek olduğunu ve "hastalık
> yalanıyla ABD'ye kaçtığı" belirten Veren, sözlerini ağlayarak ve
> Atatürk'e övgüler dizerek şöyle tamamladı:
> "Gülen, Türkiye'deki örgütlenmesinin 2000 yılında kendini amorti
> ettiği söyledi. Yetiştirdiği vali, emniyet müdüri, kaymakam ve
> komutanlar var. Cumhuriyet gazetesi, 'Tehlikenin farkında mısınız?"
> diyor. Evet bu örgütlenme bir işgaldır, ihanet şebekesidir. Yargıta'y'a
> yönelik saldırıda birçok insan bir kare fotoğrafta görüldü diye zanlı
> oldu. Elimde yüzlerce fotoğraf ve belge var. Savcılara göre
> çağırıyorum. Kimse bir şey yapmyorsa demek ki Fethullah'ın
> dokunulmazlığı var

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HANS ÁBERG'Í: SIYONÍZMÍN TEPELERÍNDE GELEN EMIÝLE KOMPLO
UYGULANMASINÍN EN ÖNEMLÍ NEDENÍ:

HANS ÁBERG "ÇOK GIZLİ TUTULAN" FETHULLAH GÜLEN-SIYONÍZM
ILÍKISÍ ve İȘBİRLÎGİNÍ ORTAYA ÇIKARMIŞTIR!!!

"FETHULLAH GÜLEN TALMUD ÜZERİNE YEMİN ETMİŞ BİR
BİLDERBERG ÜYESİDİR"
Note: Her seneye değişik ülkelerde toplanı yapan "Bilderberg Group" gerçek


 Ayrıca gerçek Bilderberg üyeleri ancak "Yahudilerin kutası kitabı Taanu'd" üzerinde yemin ederek Siyonizme bağlılık yemin etmek zorundadırlar.

***

HANS AİBERG'İN E-MAIL YAZILARI YA SIYONİZMİN SİNSİ PLANI VE FETHULLAH GÜLEN'İN GERÇEK YÜZÜ:

Herzl deklare etti ve protokol olarak yemin edildi:

Arza Mev'ud 7 ülke üzerinde Nil-Fırat arasında, Toros yayısı ve bunun kuzey doğusunu olan "MURAT havzası=Aczmendi" ile güneyde Akabe ile Basra hattı boyunca ÇİZILMİŞTİR.

Bundan dönmemin HİÇBİR MÜMKÜNÜ YOKTUR. Bu yeminin ve sonuna kadar ilerletilecektir.

Aynı yeminli protokolde, Türklerin ve Arapların bu havzadan çıkarılmaları ve sadece "GOYİM" tabiatlı (Öküz de demektir) Kürtlerin Yahudi üretim ayak işlerini yapmaları için "Yudaik-Kürdlo" müstehcenlik kurulmasına imza atıldı. Bu protokol ayrıca "Zero-n" denen gelecekteki torunlarına da YEMİNLİ olarak iletilirdi.

Oynanan satrançta, Türk hakaniğinin içinde bu unsur korundu.
Wilson’a göre bu unsur "Pontus+Ermenistan+Kürdistan" üçlüsü bir federe devlet olmalydı.

İroni zaten bu planın bir Masonik parçasıydı ve "ABD mandası/mandate" HEMEN isteyiverdi. Yani Atatürk de aynı kafadan olsaydı, bugün Doğu Karadeniz ile Van gölünü tamamen içine alan, Ermenistan ile birleşik bir ERMENİ dominant, teba olarak da KURT halklarını içeren bir ülke oluşturulacaktı.


Misaki Milli içinde yer alan "Musul-Kerkük-Erbil-Süleymanije" dörtgeni için DAİMA SIYONİZİMİN ABD ile yandaş olan İngiltere imparatorluğunu, söz konusu bölgeyi işgal etti.

Sınısice Kudüs bölerini "1948’de kurulacak olan" İsrail için örgütlemeye ve ilk Yahudi göçmenleri oraya toplamaya başladı.


Fransa’nın şiddetli itirazları üzerine ASIL IRAK’tan koparıldı.
Suriye eyaletini ve Lübnan denen Hristiyan ağırlıklı devleti de bu meyanda oluşturdu.

Cetveller kondu ve düzgün sınırlar çizildi. Arapların tamamı
Osmanlı ordusunu arkadan vurdu ve şehitlerin sayısı milyona ulaştı.
Ürdün ve Irak ile Suriye-Lübnan dörtlüsü "MÜSTAKBEL ARZI MEVUT İÇİNDE yer almak üzere
kurulmuş, geçici devletlerdi. ZATEN
GEÇİCİLERDIR...
İngiliz müstehliseçiler sınırları oluştururken, uzanamadıkları
bölgelere doğru bilhassa "GOYİM" denen halkın geri ve miskin
olmalardan yararlanarak, Türk Misaki Millisini Lasuanne'a
götürmemek için "ŞEYH" isyanları tertiplədilər.

Bu kuzeyli 17 kadar şehirin tamamı KURT (Goyim) idi.
Bunların bir kısmını artık tanıyorsunuz (Yahudi Barzan'lar, Yahudi- kurdo Saddam vb. Saddam Kürt ve Türkmenlere yapılan tüm
saldırılarda ASLA VE ASLA YAHUDİ MALLARINA DOKUNMAMIŞ ve onları BUGÜNE
KADAR KORUMUŞ idi. Oysa onu Antisiyonist, İsrail düşmanı diye tanıyorsunuz ;))}

17 KURT (Goyim) Aşiret şehirleri oluşturulurken, ana fikir tıpkı
güneydeki gibi SALTANAT devletçileri kurnaktı. Bunların kimi açık
kimi de gizliydi (Tarafsız bölge devleti, İran'a bırakılan Şii Arap-
Khuzistan devleti vb.)

Bu 17 şehirlerden Üçü de Atatürk önderliğindeki TBMM hükümeti topraklarındaydı.

1. Kürt milliyetçiliği-ki şoven aşiretlerin şehirleri- (Bugün
Hadep-Kadık, PKK vb. diye anlatılan devletçiler)

2. Kürt milliyetçiliği YANINDA SÜNNİ MEZHEB adı altında DİNSEL
MİLLİYETÇİLİK dümeni yaratıldı. (Şeyh Saidi Kürdi) Burada amaç "KAFİR (I) MUSTAFA KEMAL'İE ALTERNATIF DEVLET" idi.

3. Türklerden yandaş bulunması için "Şeyh Saidi Kürdi-2 veya Saidi Nursi önderliğindeki SİNSİ ve UZUUUN HAREKET! Saidi Kürdi- Nursi'nin de diğerleri gibi ASIL AMACI, Kerkük ile aramızda "İSYAN"ları meşrulaştırarak, Türkiye'den koparma tiyetsizliyiydi.

Böylece üç hareketten birincisi başarlı oldu: Zap suyunundan Celal Talebani topraklarına kadar olan Misaki Milli toprakları "Irak"a bırakıldı ve Kürt isyanları "MEŞRU" sayıldı. Bu belgeyle Lausanne'a gidildi.

Buna rağmen Karabekir ve Çakmak ile yapılan kurmay toplantıda "Kerkük'den vazgeçilmeyeceği" karara bağlandı.

Saidi Kürdi'nin Kürdistan ayaklanması bastırildiğinde, Türkiye'nin "Soykırımı" olduğunu da tescil edilmişti. Lausanne'da bu gizli gündem veya gizli müceyyide kapalı kapılar arkasında Türk heyetine dayatıldı.

Üstelik bundan sonra KÜRT ŞEYHLERINE iyi muamele yapılması ve Türkiye BMM'sinde kendilerine "Milletvekilliği" hakkı verilmesi şart koşuldu.

Atatürk mozayagımızı biliyordu. Kürt Saidi(Nursi) meclise çağrıldı.

Ama Kürt Said'in tavrını şゅydu:

"Ben Kürdistan'ın TÜRK zindik cumhuriyeti içinde düşünmem bile..."

İngilizler ile işbirliği saptandı. (Karabekir anları)
Tutuklandi. Ve tutuklandiği hücrede kendisine bugün "Nur Külliyatı"
diye bilinen ASLI KURT ŞEYHLERININ gündemindeki "Sözde alimlerin hazırladığı" risaletler (adları
hiç değiştirilmeden Lema=Şualar
gibi) gönderildi.

Hitler'in Mein Kampf yazmış da HAPİŞANEDE yazılmıştı.
Atatürk'un NUTUK yazmış da "Dolmabahçe'de hiç dışarı çıkmayarak
hazırladığı bir eserdir.

Aynımız Saidi Kürdi de yazmıştır.

Fakat bir iki özgün laf ve dipnot dışında tamamı BAŞKALARININ
eserdir. Risalei Nur BİR KOPYADIR ve edebi ya da bilimsel olarak
beş para etmez bir kopyadır.

Amacı KURT bilincindeki bir TARİKATTEN başka bir şey değildir.

Bu tarih 8'e bölümümüş ve bunların dordu günümüzde geçerlidir.

1. NEV ASYA (Yeni Asya, Yeni Anadolu) Tarikatı: Amacı İsrail
suyu olarak öngörülen MURAT/GAP havzasi KURT MILLYETÇİLİĞİ altında tutmak. Günü
gelince GOYIM olmak üzere Büyük Arzı Mevzu'a teslim etmek. Bu tarihata son 25 yıl itibariyle Türk
almıştır. Ama aslı asıları ŞEH Mehmet KUTULULAR'IN komutasında olmak üzere
oluşturulmuştur.

2. NEV ASYA'nın eyaletlerinden biri olan ve ASIL KÜRDİSTAN
(ACZMENDIYE) ile birleşmek amacıyla kurulan ACZMENDİLİK denemesi de Saidi Kürdi'nin
vasiyyetindedir. Cübbesi, sanğı ve kalın sopasına kadar "KİTABINDA" sayılmuştur. Ancak beklenen
patlamayı
yapamamıştır.


a- Türk ve Kürt etnikler geniş ölçüde birbirlerine karşımıştır. Kimi de melezdir veya yansısrızdır. Yanlı olanlar arasında Kürt-Türk sorunu oluşturulması ve karşı karşıya getirilmesi. (Apo' nun varlığı nedenidır)

b- Kürtlerin Türkiye'yı pasif asimile olarak ele geçirme planı:

Aa Türkiye'deki türk nüfusun "doğum kontrolüne özendirilmesine karşın" Kürt nüfusun smarsız artırmasi için çalışmaların TC hükümetlerine mas ettirilmesi.

Türkiye'de "Kürtlik" böylece tescil ettirilmiştir.

Cc Apo'dan önceki dönemde, bizzet Siyonizm güdümlü süper devletler ve istihbaratlarla büyük bir karapara aksıyla ve özellikle SAHILLERDEKİ ya da Turistik ve eğlence dinlence alanlarındaki tüm ihalelerle el-altından para verilmiştir ve sahipleri kürt asıllı olarak TESCIL edilmiştir.

Üç yılı deniz olan Türkiye'de istediğimiz yere gidiniz ve bir bardak çay içiniz. Biraz muhabbeti deşiniz "Arkada Kürt patronları" yourselves. İstanbul’un göbeğindeki çay bahçeleri bile İSTİNASIZ kurt karaparacıklarının elindedir. Hatta Ülkücü Mafyası da kendi örneğinin ORTAKLARI DİR. Çünkü burada yapılan "Birlikte ORTAK uyumvirڍlu kaçakçılığıdür, menfaatler birleşmiştir" artık… (Tecrübe konuşuyor)

**Dd-Türkiye'de KADROLARIN ele geçirilmesi taysaronu ise FETHULLAH GÜLEN'E verilmiştir.**

Tescilli Bilderberg öyesi yani İPEK CÜBBESİ ile Gülen, tüm idari kadroları (Vali, kaymakam,
Emniyet Müdürlikleri, Hakimler vb.) ve stratejik zirveleri (Harb okulları, finans kuruluşları, basın-
yayın vb.) eline geçirme için "Masum İşç elerinden başlarak, dersaneciliği, buradan da kolej ve Üniversitelere kadar büyük bir ağ oluşturmuştur. Amacı Kendi ağından naklediyorlan;

"Teşbirc(Takıyve) ile 3 kusak boyunca bu
ekadroları verleştirm, GİZLİ SERİAT İHİTALİ yapmaktr."

Fethullah Gülen "Bilderberg yemini" yarparken, kendisine sunulan TEK KİTAP olan TALMUD’dan başkına yemin edemiyor. Sadece onların verdiği KAFATIYİ givebitir.

Ve şimdi o BİLDERBERG yuvasındadır.

**EN ALT'TAN ÜSTE SİYONİST YAPILANMA:**

1. **Altta LİONSAR (Mahalle komiteleri vb. Gene Leo (Lioness) kızlar ve genç Leon erkekler)**

2. **Bunun üstünde Rotaryenler.**

3. **Bunun üstünde Carbonary ve Masonry (Farmasonlar)**
4. Bunun üzerine yeni alttakileri emir verme yetkisine sahip

BİLDENBERG GROUP (Fethullah bunların içinde. Mason olacak kadar küçülmedi)

5. Siyonizm kuruluşları (Bunlar sadece Yahudilere. Diğer alt sınıflar ise "Yerli usak"lardır.

(Govim)

Fethullah Gülen Siyonizmin bir alt kuruluşlarından olan

Bilderberg'in (Ecveyt ve Yuluz ile birlikte) üç YÜKSEK üyesinden biridir. ABD'ye ömürboyu
transferi yapılmıştır.

Eğer Türkiye "Şii" devlet olsaydı, ÇOĞUNLUK gereği bu TİCARETİNI şia üzerine
sergileyecektii. Çoğunluga uyarak "Sünniliği" takriyye edinmiştir. Onun mezhepçiliği de sahtedir. Çünkü
Şii
ülkelere "Şiilik ağırlıklı özel okullar" kurmuştur. Hatta orada "genelde Sünniligin tekelinde olduğu
icin " o okullarda HADİS bile okutulmamaktadır.

Yatılı bölümlerdeki Atatürk büstü "Yüzüne tükürülmek" için
konsatür. Atatürk'ün adı ise KÖR DECCAL'dir. Okullarındaki Türk bayrağının öteki adı ise "Defiu
Haced bezidir" (Tuvalet kağıdı)

Bunları BİLE BİLE tüm hükümetler "OY POTANSİYELİ HESABI" tüm zamanlarda ve her partiden
(DSP'li Hüsamettin Özkan'ı anımsayız,
Baykal'ın kurnay listesindeki nurcuları ve DYP'in Tantan gibi nurcularını anımsayız)

Harbokulları için "Süpe minili degaje Nurcusu sosyetik kızlar ve
mankenler eğitilmiştir. Amaç onları "Harbokulu öğrenci veya
mezunlarıyla evlendirmek"tir.

Matahariler bununla da kalınmasıdır. Hiç evlenmiş olduğunu iddia
eden tüm nurcuların zinaci zevk malzemesi olmuşlardır. (Kurmayların
intiyazdır bu, öğrencilere ise harem selamlık yaparlar)

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Belçika Bilderberg ise kendine bağlı olan diğer Bilderberg'lere EMREDİYOR:

1. Fethullah Gülen'i HALIFE derecesinde ve türk seçimlerinde oy belirleyici gücü yapmak için arıza kadar gücü verilecektir. Fethullah Gülen'in BİLDERBERG'li olduğuna ilişkin ipeki Brece'lini (Hakim, savcı, Avukat, öğretim üyesi, öğrencinin mezuniyet kıyafeti, eski Haham cühbesi olan) KAFTANINI giymesi davasına olan sadakatını ŞEKLEN gösterecektir. Bu mukavehe içinde adı anlan iyemiz, ABD yurttaşları olarak ihdas edilecektir* (Türkiye'nin elindeki orijinalerden okuduklarını naklediyorum. Bunlar şu anda Ya oğul Tuğrul ya da eşleri Seval'de olabilir. Türkş "BUNLAR NE YAPMAK İSTİYORLAR??" diye sormuştu da ;-) 

2. AYDIN DOĞAN'ı ÖNEMLİ KILINIZ, arkasında KOÇ'un olduğu saklanmalıdır. (Türkiye İR zarfında üçüncü belge.)

3. YENİ ÜYEMİZ TURGUT&MESUT'u da...

4. (Dönemin) BAŞBAKANı Mr. Buelend Acevit'i (Böyle yazıyordu, ben yanlış yazmadım) Avrupa topluluğuna girmeye engel olması için .............

(Bürokratik açıvaz ve çıkılmazdanahl oluunuş 46 sayfa)

........

(Türkiye İşbankası yönetim kurulu başkanı......

Murahhas tsey Rachel (Roxanne, Raşzan)....

SONUÇ: Türkiye AB. girdiği ve şimdi de 20 yıl sonra girmeyi düşünüyor.

Ecevit, ileride, AB'nin Kibris dolayısıyla Yunan üslerinden Constantinopolis'e dek işgâf edileceğini de biliyordu.

Eğer AB'ye girseydi bu olmayacaktı. Ama girmemiz Ecevit engellemiştir ve Yunan ordusuna yani Batı
Avrupa birliği kollektif ordusına davetiye çıkarmıştır.

Siyasi boyutlar bir yana dursun, ekonomik boyutlar olarak da, KOÇ’un (Sabancı o dönem zayıft) tek ekonomik güç olması Türkiye’de corporation biçiminde tekelleşmesi ve Dünya Ekonomi imparatorları soydaşlarınız ile Chartelleşmesini kamufla etmek için, adları pek duyulmayan, Gülen-Kılıklar, Yılmaz Kardeşler ve ad hiç duyulmayan AYDIN DOĞAN diye birine GÜÇ verdiği artık dersfedir.

(Bunun altında minik burjuvalar olan İhlas, Al Baraqa=Faisal Finance vb. gibi somürgecilere de destek vermişdir. SINEKTEN YAĞ ÇIKARMAK bir türk değil, enternasyonal Yahudi özdeyişidir. Tevrat’taki adıyla Kralların memelerinden süt emmek!)

Yahudi elbette, uyuşturucu, porno, moda-marka, SINEMA ve BASIN endüstrilerini tekelleştirmiş ve kendi egemenliğini altına sokmuştur.
CNN gibi CNN Miliyet’e franchaise verdi, logo sattı!
DEMİREL gibi AYDIN DOĞAN da sadece bir gün içinde birden meşhur oldular.

Milliyet, Hürriyet vb. satın alındı. CNN Türk (İsme bakın isme! Bu kadar da Cartel belli edilmez ki!
Pes doğrusu!)

Doğan Grubu daha bir çok gazete çıkardı.

Arzi Mev'ud 7 ülke üzerinde Nil-İfrat arasında, Toros yayını ve bunun kuzey doğusu olan "MURAT havzasi=Aczmendi" ile güneyde Akabe ile Basra hattı boyunca ÇIZILMIŞTİR.
Bundan dönmenin HİÇBİR MÜMKÜNÜ YOKTUR. Bu yemindir ve sonuna kadar ilerletilecektir.
Aynı yeminli protokolde, Türklerin ve Arapların bu havzadan çıkartmaları ve sadece "GOYIM" tabiatlı (Öküz de demektir) Kürtlerin Yahudi irkının ayak işlerini yapmaları için "Yudaik-Kürd" müstəməkləsi kurulmasına imza atıldı. Bu protokol ayrıca "Zero-n" denen gelecekteki torunlarına da YEMİNLI olarak iletildi.

Oynanan satrançta, Türk hakaniğinin içinde bu unsur korundu. Wilson'a göre bu unsur "Pontus+Ermenistan+Kürdistan" üçlüğünü bir feder devlet olmazdı.

İnönü' zaten bu planın bir Masonik parçasydı ve "ABD mandası/mandate" HEMEN isteyiverdi. Yani Atatürk de aynı kafadan olsaydı, bugün Doğu Karadeniz ile Van gölünü tamamen içine alan, Ermenistan ile birleşik bir ERMEŅİ dominant, teba olarak da KÜRŢ halklarının içeren bir ülke oluşurulacaktı.

Herzl, Ermeni unsurunu istemediğini baştan belli ettiği için, Wilsan'ın Ermeni devleti oluşmadı ve Sevres'de kurulmak istenen "Kürdistan" da Kazım Karabekir ve Maraş, Urfa, Anteb milislerince engellendi.

Misaki Milli içinde yer alan "Musul-Kerkük-Erbil-Süleymaniye" dörtgeni için DAIMA SIYONİZMIN ABD ile yandaş olan İngiltere imparatorluğu, sözkonusu bölgeyi işgal etti.

Sinsice Kudüs yöresini "1948'de kurulacak olan" İsrail için örgütlemeye ve ilk Yahudi göçmenleri oraya toplama başladı.

Petrolun değeri o zaman da çok iyi biliniyordu. İşgal ettiği Osmanlı
toprakları üzerinde "Arap aşiret şeyhlerine" göre SALTANATLAR kurdurdu. Haşimi(Hişam)oğullarına ÜRDÜN'ü, Emeviye soyu olan Suudilere (Toplam 12 Emevi kablesinden en kalabalık olanı) Arabistan'ı ve diğer "PETROL" hassas bölgelerine de (Birleşik Arap Emirlikleri adıyla bilinen) sultanları attı. Petrolü olmayan bölgeleri (Aden/Hadramut, Yemen, Umman vb.) de diğer sultanlıklara paylaştırdı.

Fransa'nın şiddetli itirazları üzerine ASIL IRAK'tan koparıldı Suriye eyaletini ve Lübnan denen Hristiyan ağırlıklı devleti de bu meyanda oluştuardu.

Cetvelller kondu ve düzgün sınırlar çizildi. Arapların tamamı Osmanlı ordusunu arkadan vurdu ve şehitlerin sayısı milyona ulaştı. Ürdün ve Irak ile Suriye-Lübnan dörtlüsü "MÜSTAKBEL ARZI MEVUT" İÇİNDE yer almak üzere kurulmuş, geçici devletlerdi. ZATEN GEÇİCİLERDIR...

İngiliz müstemilekeçiler sınırları oluşturulurken, uzunmadıkları bölgelere doğru bilhassa "GOYİM" denen halkın geri ve miskin olmalardan yararlanarak, Türk Misali Millisini Lasuanne'a götürmemek için "ŞEYH" isyanları tertiplediler.

Bu kuzeyli 17 kadar şeyhlerin tamamı KÜRT(Goyım) idi.

Bunların bir kısmını artık tanıyorsunuz (Yahudi Barzan'lar, Yahudi-kurdo Saddam vb.Saddam Kürt ve Türkmenlere yapılan tüm saldırılarında ASLA VE ASLA YAHUDİ MALLARINA DOKUNMAMIŞ ve onları BUGÜNE KADAR KORUMUS" idi. Oysa onu Antisiyonist, İsrail düşmanı diyse tanıyorsunuz :)))

17 KÜRT (Goyım) Aşiret şeyhlikleri oluşturulurken, ana fikir tepki güneydeki gibi SALTANAT devletçileri kurmaktı. Bunların kimi açık
kimi de gizliydi (Taraftar bölge devleti, İran'a bırakılan Şii Arap-Khuzistan devleti vb.)

Bu 17 şehliklerden Üçü de Atatürk önderliğindeki TBMM hükümeti topraklarındaşdı.

1. Kürt milliyetçiliği-kı şoven aşiretlerin şehleri- (Bugün Hadep-Kadek, PKK vb. diye anlatılan devletçikler)


3. Türklerden yandaş buluşması için "Şeyh Saidi Kürdî-2 veya Saidi Nursî önderliğindeki SİNST ve UZUÜN HAREKET! Saidi Kürdî- Nursî'nin de diğerleri gibi ASIL AMACI, Kerkük ile aramızda "İSYAN"ları meşrulaştıracak, Türkiye'den koprma tiynetsizliği idi.

Böylece üç hareketten birincisi başarılı oldu: Zap suyundan Celal Talebani topraklarına kadar olan Mısır Millî toprakları "Irak"a bırakıldı ve Kürt isyanları "MEŞRÜ" sayıldı. Bu belgeyle Lausanne'a gitti.

Üstelik bundan sonraki KURT ŞEYLERINE iyi muamele yapılması ve Türkiye BMM'sinde kendilerine "Milletvekilliği" hakkı verilmesi şart koşuldu.


Ama Kürt Said'in tavri şuydu:

"Ben Kürdistan'ı TÜRK zindik cumhuriyeti içinde düşünmem bile..."

İngilizler ile işbirliği saptandı. (Karabekir anları)

Tutuklandı. Ve tutuklandığı hücrede kendisine bugün "Nur Külliyyatı"
diye bilinen ASLI KÜRT ŞEYLERİNİN gudumündeki "Sözde alimlerin hazırladığı" rüşvetler (adları hiç değiştirilmeden L.Ş=Şıollar gibi) gönderilirdi.

Hitler'in Mein Kampf yaptığı da HAPİSHANEDE yazılmıştı.

Atatürk'ün NÜTUK yaptığı da "Dolmabahçe'de hiç dışı çıkmayarak hazırladığı bir eserdir.

Aynı sun Saidi Kürt de yaptı.

Fakat bir iki özgün laf ve dipnot dışında tamam BAŞKALARININ eseridir. Risalei Nur BİR KOPYADIR ve edebi ya da bilimsel olarak beş para etmez bir kopyadır.

Amacı KÜRT bilincindeki bir TARİKATTEN başka bir şey değildir.

Bu tarikat 8'e bölünmüştür ve bunların dörtü günümüzde geçerlidir.

1. NEV ASYA (Yeni Asya, Yeni Anadolu) Tarikatı: Amacı Israil

sayı olarak öngörülen MURAT/GAP havzasının KÜRT MILLYETÇİLİĞİ altında tutmak. Günü

gelince GOYIM olmak üzere Büyük Arzi Mevd'a teslim etmek. Bu tarikata son 25 yıl itibariyle Türk
alınmıştır. Ama aşı astarı ŞEYH MEHMET KUTLULAR'IN komutasında olmak üzere oluşturulmuştur.

2. NEV ASYA'nın eyaletlerinden biri olan ve ASIL KÜRDİSTAN (ACZMENDİYE) ile birleşmek amacıyla kurulan ACZMENDİLIK denemesi de Säidi Kürd'in vasiyetindendir. Cübbesi, sarığı ve kahın sopasına kadar "KITABINDA" sayılmıştır. Ancak beklenen patlamaya yapamamıştır.


   a- Türk ve Kürﺗ etnikler geniş ölçüde birbirlerine karşımüşlardır. Kimi de melezdir veya yansızdır. Yanlı olanlar arasında Kür-Türk sorunu oluşturulması ve karşı karşıya getirilmesi. (Apo'nun varlığından nedenidir)

   b- Kürtlerin Türkiye'yi pasif asimile olarak ele geçirme planı:

    Aa Türkiye'deki türk nüfusun "doğum kontrolüne özendirilmesine karşı" Kürt nüfusun sunuz artırılması için çalışmaların TC
hükümetlerine mas ettirilmesi.


Türkiye'de "Kürtlük" böylece tescil ettirilmiştir.

Cc Apo'dan önceki dönemde, bizzat Siyonizm güdümlü süper devletler ve istihbaratlarınınca büyük bir karapara aksesula ve özellikle SAHİHLERDEKİ ya da Turistik ve eğlence dinlence alanlarındaki tüm ihalelerle el altından para verilmiştir ve sahipleri Kürt asıllı olarak TESCİL edilmiştir.

Üç yan deniz olan Türkiye'de istediğiniz yere gidiniz ve bir bardak çayınız. Biraz muhabbeti de Nhận "Arkada Kürt patronları" göreceksiniz. İstanbul'un göbeğindeki çaybahçeleri bile İSTİNASIZ Kürt karaparcalarının elindedir. Hatta Ülkücü Mafyası da kendilerinin ORTAKLARIDIR. Çünkü burada yapılan "Birlikte ORTAK uyuşturucu kaçakçılığıdır, menfaatler birleşmiştir" artık... (Tecrübe konuşuyor)

**Dd-Türkiye'de KADROLARIN ele geçirilmesi tasarunu ise FETHULLAH GÜLEN'E verilmiştir.**

Tescilli Bilderberg övesi yani İPEK CÜBBESİ ile Gülen, tüm idari kadroları (Vali, kaymakam, Emniyet Mütärlükleri, Hakimler vb.) ve stratejik zirvevi (Harb okulları, finans kuruluşları, basin-yayın vb.) eline geçirmek için "Masum Işık evlerinden başlayarak, dersaneciliği, buradan da koleji ve Üniversitelerde kadar büyük bir ağ oluşturmuştur. Amaç (Kendi ağından naklediyorum;"

"Tebir(Taksiye) ile 3 keşif boyunca bu

kadroları yerleştirip, GİZLİ SERİAT İHTİALİ yapmakta."

Fethullah Gülen "Bilderberg yeni'nin" yaparken, kendisine sunulan TEK KİTAP olan TALMUD'dan
baskasına yemin edemez, Sadece onların verdiği KAFTAĞI givebilir.
Ve şimdi o BİLDERBERG yuvasındadır.
EN ALT'TAN ÜSTE SİYONİST YAPILANMA:

1. Altta LIONS (Mahlale komiteleri vb. Genç Leo (Lioness) kızlar ve genç Leon erkekler)

2. Bunun üstünde Rotarynler.

3. Bunun üstünde Carbonary ve Masonry (Farmasonlar)

4. Bunun üzerinden yani alttaiklere emir verme yetkisine sahip
BİLDENBERG GROUP (Fethullah bunların içinde, Mason olacak kadar kaçtılmadı)

5. SİYONİZM Kuruluşları (Bunlar sadece Yahudilerdir, Diğer alt sınıflar ise "Yerli aşık"lardır.
(Govım)
Fethullah Gülen SİYONİZMIN bir alt kuruluşlarından olan
Bilderberg'in (Evcit ve Yılmaz ile birlikte) üç YÜKSEK öyesinden biridir, ABD'ye âmârboyu
transferi yapılmıştır.

Eğer Türkiye "Şii" devlet olsaydı, ÇOĞUNLUK gereği bu DİN TİCARETİNI şia üzerine
sergileyecaktı. Çoğunluğa uyarak "Sünülüği" takryye edinmiştir. Onun mezhepciliği de sahtedir. Çünkü
Şii
tülkelerde "Şiiilik ağırlıklı özel okullar" kurmuştur. Hatta orada "genelde Sünülüğun tekeline olduğu
için "o okullarda HADİS bile okutulmamaktadır.

Yatılı bölümdeki Atatürk büstü "Yüzüne tükürülmek" için
kommunstur. Atatürk'ün adı ise KÖR DECCAL'dir. Okullarındaki Türk bayrağını öteki adı ise "Defiu
Haced bezidir" (Tuvalet kağıdı)

Bunları BİLE BİLE tüm hükümler "OY POTANSİYELİ HESABI" tüm zamanlarda ve her partiden
(DSP'li Hüsamettin Özkan'ı anımsayız,

Baykal'ın kumay listesindeki nurcuları ve DYP'nin Tan'tan gibi nurcularını anımsayız)

Harbokulları için "Süpe minili degaje Nurcu sosyetik kızlar ve
mankenler eğitimlendirilir. Ama onları "Harbokulu öğrenci veya
mezunlarıyla evlendirmek"tir.

Matahariler bununa da kalmamıştır. Hiç evlenmemiş olduğunu iddia
eden tüm nurcuların zinaci zevk malzemesi olmuştur. (Kumayların
imitiyazıdır bu, öğrencilere ise harem selâmkt yaparlar)

***

Belçika Bilderberg ise kendine bağlı olan diğer Bilderberg'lerere EMREDİYOR:

1. Fethullah Gülen'li HALİFE derecesinde ve türk seçimlerinde oy belirleyici güç yapmak için
ardına kadar güç verilecektir. Fethullah Gülen'in BİLDERBERG'li olduğunu ilişkin ipekli
Breech'ini (Hakın, savcı, Avukat, öğretim üyesi, öğrenci mezuniyet kıyafeti, eski Haham cübbesi
olan) KAFTANINI giymesini davasına olan sadakatini ŞEKLEN gösterecektir. Bu nüvacehe içinde
adi anılan âyemiz, ABD yurtası olarak ihdas edilecektir" (Türkeş'in elindeki orijinalerden
okuduklarını naklediyorum. Bunlar şu anda Ya oğul Tuğrul ya da eşleri Seval'de olabilir. Türkççe
"BUNLAR NE YAPMAK İSTİYORLAR?" diye sormuştu da ;-)
(Türkiye İşbankası yönetim kurulu başkanı......
Murahhas üye Rachel (Roxanne, Rahşan)....

SONUÇ: Türkiye AB. girmedi ve şimdi de 20 yıl sonra girmeyi düşündüyör.

Ecevit, ileride, AB'nin Kıbrıs dolayısıyla Yunan üslerinden
Constantinopole deкрас içgal edileceğini de biliyordu.
Eğer AB'ye girseydi bu olmayaacaktı. Ama girmemiz Ecevit engellemişti ve Yunan ordusuna yani BATI
Avrupa birliği kollektif orduyasına davetiye çıkarmıştır.

Siyasi boyutlar bir yana dursan, ekonomik boyutlar olarak da, KOÇ'un
(Sabancı o dönem zayıftu) tek ekonomik güç olması Türkiye'de
corporation biçiminde tekelleşmesi ve Dünya Ekonomi imparatorları
soydaslarınız ile Chartelleşmesini kamufla etmek için, adları pek
duyulmayan, Gülen-Kutlu lar, Yılmaz Kardeşler ve ad hiç duylumayan
AYDIN DOĞAN diye birine GÜÇ verdiği artık desifredir.

(Bunun altında minik burjuvalar olan İhlas, Al Baraqa=Faisal Finance
vb. gibi somürgecilere de destek vermiştir. SINEKTEN YAĞ ÇIKARMAK bir türk değil,
eternasyonall Yahudi özedeyişidir. Tevrat'taki adıyla Kralların memelerinden süt emmek!)

Yahudi elbette , uyuşturucu, porno, moda-marka, SINEMA ve BASIN
düştürlerini tekelleştirmiş ve kendi egemenliği altına sokmuştur.
CNN gibi CNN Milliyet'e franchaise verdii, logo satti!
DEMİREL gibi AYDIN DOĞAN da sadece bir gün içinde birden meşhur oldular.

Milliyet, Hürriyet vb. satın alındı. CNN Türk (İsme bakın isme! Bu kadar da Cartel belli edilemez ki!
Pes doğrusu!)}
former disciple always popular and finally Gülen movement is connected to the rising political power, AKP. Cumhuriyet columnists are particularly useful.

Doğan Grubu daha çok gazete çıkardı.

Date: Sun, 13 Apr 2008 11:13:13 +0300
From: malcolmxelhacmalikellsahbaz@gmail.com
Subject: Gülen Cemaatinde abilik yapıyordum, şakirt diye anlıyordum

Kötüleşen zamanda kendini iyiliğe adanmış bir insan, İslam'a hizmet yolunda sınırlı tanımayan büyük lider, daha çocuk yaşta ilahi kitapla tanışmış büyük İslam alimi, sadece bir memur maaşı ile Türkiye'nin küçük ilçelerinde dahi yurt, dershane ve özel okul açan mükemmel insan.

Hadi canım sen bir dine hizmet edeceksin o dinin peygamberinin yaptığı yapmayacaksın. Üstelik o dine kendi özgürlüğünü sağlayabilen akh başında her ergene evlilik farz olduğu halde.


Bunlar sadece benim değil çocuklarına düşen her öğrencinin durumu. Düşünün doğunun bir ilçesinde bir yurt, bir dershane, bir özel okul açmış. Okulun 600 dershanenin 400 yurdun 200 öğrenci aldığını düşünelim. Toplam 1200 bir yılda
hadi diyelim 1000 benim gibi erken uyandığım gerçek yüzleri ile tanıtılanların sayısı
en fazla 50. Yani her yıl bir ilçeden 950 öğrenci Gülen yandaşı dolaysıyla
Cumhuriyet karşıtı olarak yetişiyor.

İki yıl boyunca bana bir Ayet veya bir hadis okunmadı. Elime verilen ilk kitap
Said Nursi ikincisi ise Gülen'e ait kitaplar oldu. Öğretmenlerim güzel örnekler
verirken Gülen'den kötü örnekler verirler onların deyimiyle sol terörün
üyelerinden bahsettiler. Hep bakın bu ülkede Müslüman olursan diye başlayan

Onlara göre Said Nursi Mesih, Atatürk deccalmış. Zaten içlerine girdikçe bu
görüşlerle karşılaşıyorsunuz. Eğer her yökiye onlara inanmışsanız artık
Atatürk düşmanı olmanız isten dahi olmuyor. Şükürler olsun atamı deccal
edecek kadar atama deccal dedirtecek kadar alçal Madım.

Bir gün dershanelde her hafta düzenlenen dini sohbete katıldım. Orada bana
Gülen'in videosunu izlettiler. Aradan yarım saat geçti bitmiyor. Sevmediğim bir
adâmin dinlemek istemiyorum. Çıktım dışarıda beklerken hocam geldi. Ben de
açık açık sevmiyorum dinlemicem dedim. Önce sen bilirsin dedi. Sonra ayıp
ettiğimi İslam için didinen bir insana bir saatimi ayırmadığımı falan söyledi.
Utanmaheim adeta.

Bir gün okuma programına katıldım. Hocam bana Fetullah Gülen'in yazdığı bir
kitap getirdi ve okumamı istedi. 'Hocam ben başka kitap okusam? Hayır. Ee bari
Kuran okusam' deince 'Kuran'ı her yerde okursun önce bir bunları oku'
dediler. Düşünün bir Müslüman ilk etapta Kur'an'a değil Gülen'le tanııyor.
Birileri de buna İslam hizmeti diyor.


Arkadaşımı internet cafede gören hoca ailesini arıyor. 'Öğrenciniz zamanın kirli oyunlarına alanmış ve kendini kaptırmış. Ayrıca ders çalışmayıp cafeye gidiyor. Artık bizim sorumluluğumuzdan çıktı. Kazanamazsa bilmeyiz.' Tabi babası
dershaneden alyor. Yani internet ve TV ülkmde de yasak. Haa Gülen'i anlatan kanal ve siteler hariç.


Bir tarih öğretmenin derste söylediği sözler her şeyi açıklar.


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Türkiye Barolar Birliği uyardıyor:

"Türkiye tehlikeli bir hesaplaşmaya gidiyor!"
Peki, AKP iktidarı tehlikeli hesaplaştığının neresinde?

Bana kalırsa tam göbeğinde!

Tayyip Bey'le, Ertuğrul Günay'la, Bülent Arınç'la, Dengir Fırat'la, AKP medyasıyla birlikte...

Oray Eğin Akşam'da Fehmi Koru'yu, Kürşat Bumin Yeni Şafak'ta Şamil Tayyar'ı çok iyi anlatmışlar...

Ortada bir "Ergenekon Çetesı" var ama sezik aydır savcı iddianameyi henüz hazırlamamış...

Son olayı anlatmaya gerek yok!..

İlhan Selçuk ve Prof. Dr. Kemal Alemdaroğlu 48 saat gözaltında kaldıktan sonra salverildiler...

İP Genel Başkanı Doğu Perinçek, Aydınlık Dergisi Genel Yayın Yönetmeni Serhan Bolluk, Ulusal Kanal Genel Yayın Yönetmeni Ferit İlsever ve gazeteci Adnan Akfirat ise gün sabaha karşı tutuklanıp cezaevine konuldular...

Elbet Türkiye'de hukuku, demokrasiyi tehdit eden ne varsa ortaya çıkarılmalıdır...

Burada başka bir şey var. Hukuku, demokrasiyi tehdit edenler değil Fethullah Gülen'e dokunanlar yanıyor, "çete" kılıflıyla Türkiye'nin bilim insanlarına, gazetecilere, savıçlarına, yargıçlarına, siyaslereine gözüği veriliyor:

"Fethullah'a dokunursan yanarsın!"
Kalp hastası yazar Ergun Poyraz suçunun ne olduğunu bilmeden tutuklandı ve sekiz aydır cezaevinde...

Ergun Poyraz neden tutuklandı ve hâlâ ortada niçin hiçbir iddianame yok?

AKP' nin Kültür Bakanı Ertuğrul Günay, devlet içine sizmiş çeteyle savaşım verdiklerini söyleyip ne demişti:

"Cumhuriyet Yargıtay Başsavcısı bunların yönelendirmesiyle AKP'yi kapatmak istiyor!"

Ardından İlhan Selçuk, Kemal Alemdaroğlu, Doğu Perinçek gözaltına alındı...

*****

Önceki gün Ankara'daydım...

Çete medyasının tetikçileri görev başındaydılar...

Mustafa Balbay'la konuşurken şöyle dedi:

"Erdoğan, ayrıntılarını yargılanan değil, çete medyasından öğrendiğimiz Ergenekon soruşturmamız 'Temiz eller' operasyonuna benzetti..."

Doğruydu !..

Ortada savcılık iddianamesi yoktu ama tüm bilgiler "çete medyası"na Fethullahçı Gladio tarafından sıçrilyordu...
DSP'den milletvekili olamayan, AKP'den seçilememeyen, düşünce
derinliğinden yoksun Şamil Tayyar'a bakın neler söylediysordu:

"Özellikle medya sektöründen çok sürpriz ve ünlü isimler gözaltına
ahlabilir. Aynı zamanda akademisyenler de olabilir. Veya bir başka yerden olabilir..."

Kürşat Bumin'in deyişyle, Şamil Tayyar gazeteci değil, operasyonun
her aşamasına ilişkin istihbarata sahip yetkili gibi konuşuyor...

Bu kişi Star gazettesinin Ankara temsilcisi...

İşte AKP medyasının durumu bu!..

Kürşat Bumin haklı olarak soruyor:

" Askerin demokrasinin emrettiği yerde kalması gerektiğini her gün
 tekrarlarken, bir de basınımıza aynı öneriyi tekrarlayan polis mi çıktı?.."

Fethullahçı Gladio duruma egemen...

İnternette kurmay albayların, yarbayların, binbaşıların, astsubayların,
askeri-sivil memurların, askeri okul öğrencilerinin "soy ağacı" çıkaran adres belli. O
adreste oturanlar kurmay subaylara, astsubaylara, askeri-sivil memurlara, askeri okul
ödrecilerine "TSK'ye sizmiş vatan hainleri" diyebiliyor...

Gerçekten ortada vahim bir fotoğrafturuyor... Türkiye tehlikeli bir
hesaplaşmağa gidiyor...

****
Then came melancholy for older, more secular days. A mail circulated a letter of Ahmet Nesin\textsuperscript{120} to his dead father, Aziz Nesin, a famous atheist author, complaining

\begin{center}
Eski Ankara Emniyet Müdürü Cevdet Saral, yardımcıı Osman Ak, İstihbarat Şube Müdürü Ersan Dalman, yardımcıı Zafer Aktaş, Fethullah yüzünden yanmadılar mı?
\end{center}

Ergun Poyraz, Fethullah için 1999'da DGM'ye suç duyurusunda bulunmamış mıydı?

Nuh Mete Yüksel'in, savcı Salim Demirci'nin başına gelenleri unuttuk mu?

Bu hafta Fethullah'ı Gladyo'yu anlatmayı sürdürüceğim.

Ne demiştim?

Kimse bizi yıldıramaz, susturamaz! Korkmuyoruz, yılmıyoruz!..

Hikmet ÇETİNKA\textsuperscript{YA}

\textsuperscript{120}

Subject: FW: Aziz NESIN'e mektup

\textendnote{120}{Subject: FW: Aziz NESIN'e mektup

> Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2008 16:21:01 -0700

> From: alpanlar2@yahoo.com

> >>> Subject: Fw: Aziz NESIN'e mektup

> >>

> >>

> >>

> >> SEVGİLİ BABACIĞIM...
> > Yazar Ahmet NESİN
> > Cümartesi, 05 Temmuz 2008
> >
> > Sevgili babacığım,
> >
> > Tüm tamına 13 yıl oldu görüşmeyeli. Herkes
> > bizi dargın
> > sanyor, bu kadar uzun zamandır görüşmedik diye. 13
> > yılda Türkiye'de
> > olaylardan uzaktasın biliyorum, ama sanki içimden bir ses
> > 'iyi'
> > 'görmedin,' diyor. Iyiki görmedin, çünkü hiç bu
> > kadar rezil, sefil,
> > traji-kornik bir duruma düşAĞımızı arımsamayorum.
> >
> > Türkiye ikiye bölündü baba. Yok, sandığın
> > gibi coğrafi
> > olarak filan değil, iki insan grupına bölündü. Ama
> > anlatması o kadar
> > zor ki, nasıl anlatacağımı bilemiyorum?
> > Karşıtırırsam beni uyar
> > lüties, Nereden mi bileeceksin yaşamadığın olayları?
> > Birirsin, çünkü
> > bütün anlatıklarım, zaten yıllarca yazdıklarımın
> > pratiğe dönüşmesi de
> > ondan.
> >
> >
> >> > İmam Hatip Lisesi mezunu, İstanbul eski Belediye
> >> > Başkan Recep Tayyip
> >> > Erdoğan vardi ya, hani şeriatçıktan hapis
yatmaştı, İşte o başbakan
oldu. Nasıl mı oldu, sankını hapiste demokrasiye
tutulmuş ben
solcuların yalancısırm inan. Hayır baba, yanlış
anlatmayorum, öyle
garip garip bakma bana. Şimdi Türkiye ikiye böldü
derken anlatmaya
çalıştım da bu zaten. Türkiye'de halk dineiler
ve laikler olarak
ikiye böldü. Esas mesele ondan sonra başladım zaten
baba. Bak şimdi
dilim dönügü kadar anlatmaya çalışacağım.
> > Müştümanlar var. Evet baba, dincilerle dindarlar karşı
> > karşıya.
> > > Dindarlar 'Laik bir Türkiye istiyorum!'
> > > derlerken, dinciler de
> > > 'Demokrat ve özgürl bir Türkiye istiyorum!'...
> > > diyolarlar. Avrupa
> > > Birliği'de, 'Siz zaten laik bir ülkesiniz'.
> > > dediğinden dolayı
> > > demokrat. Özgürlükçü, şeriatçı ve sözüm ona sol
> > > grubunun destek diyor.
> > > Bilsin bu Avropalılar, demokrasi ve özgürlük de,
> > > canlarını al.
> >>
> >>
> > > Laik kesimi doğal olarak CHP götürüyor. Yanında
> > > 'Bana sağlık cari yet
> > > i̇şiyor dedirtemezsiniz.' diyen demokrat Süleyman
> > > Demirel, Türk-Islam
> > > sentezinin temsilcisi MHP ve değişen başkanı Devlet
> > > Bahçeli filan var.
> > > Arasında da Kenan Evren kafasına çarpan dincilere
> > > karşı,
> > > 'Humnunun netikim.' diyen çok
> > > sert çıkışlar yapıyor. Son tezi
> > > çok önemlidi, zaten üzerine doktora yapmayı
> > > düşünüyorum baba. Türbana
> > > karşılık 'Allah kadınların saçının gözükmesini
> > > istemeseydi, kel
> > > yararlı." bilimsel açıklamasını yaptı. Evet
> > > evet, haklısan baba.
> > > Ressam olduğundan beri herşeyi çiçek görmeye
> > > başladı. Hatta geçen
> > > gün duyдум, elma, portakal ve muz resmi yapacakmış.
Meyvelerin

kabuklarını soymadan köydelar diye iki kişi isten

atılması. 'Siz soyun

onları, renklerini ben zaten biliyorum netekim.'
demış.

Şaka bir yana baba, bu iş o kadar basit değil. Laik

kesimim taraflı

Erdoğan'ın başkanlığın yaptığı AKP'yi

kapatmak için Anayasay

Malhemesi'nde dava açtı. Diğer kesim de karşı

taraflı darbecilikle

suçlayıp, önüne geleni içeri atmaya başladı.

Davanın adı kondu:

Erzengen. Ama dava yok hensiz. Neden mi yok baba, çünkü

tam iddianame

hazırlanyor, dava açılacak, yeni birilerini daha

altılar ve dosya

tamamlanmanmış oluyor. Geçenlerde İlhan Ağabeyi

(Selçuk) aldırlar.

Serbest bırakılar ama, o da hemen sonrası By-pass

ameliyati oldu.

Biliyorsan, şimdiki duruma göre senden yaş olarak

büyük artık o. Onu

bırakılar, ama bu kez de Mustafa Balbay'ı aldırlar.

Tanırsan

Cumhuriyet'in Anıtkara temsilcisi. Tam sana yazarken onu

da bırakmylär.

Evet gültüştenden anladım, hakkın, aynı öyle.

Balbay'ı albay

sannılar.
Bu arada, sen eski asker olduğundan sana bir şey
soracağım baba.
Fotokopisi çelik el bombasından parmak ızı alımı
ma?.. Hayır
babaciğim, sarhoş olan değilim. Bak sana anlatayım
olayın
komikliğini. Bu Ergenekon olayı bir geçkonduda yakalandı
el
bombalarından sonra başladı. Ancak, tesirini öğrenmek
için bütün
bombalar patlatılmışlar. Gülme baba, o bombalar birinci
dereceden
delil. Acaba diyorum, parmak izinin tesbiti için
fotokopilerini
çekişti midir?. Çünkü ilk araştırmada tek parmak
izı çıktı
bomba bombalar. Hayır babaciğim el filan değil, adamin
tek parmağı. Evet
aynen öyle, hepsini parmakların biri teker teker, aynı
kavun gibi.
Bomba parmaklarda uzmanı olabilir belki de. Ne anlarım ben
askeriye
işlerinden.

İşte böyle babaciğim. Solun büyük bir kısmı
dincileri desteklerken,
sağlarını ve dindiğiniz büyük bir kısmın da
laisizm ve demokrasiyi
about the current Islamisation and praising the good old days. Another letter is sent to Atatürk\textsuperscript{121}!

> savunuyor. Merak etme baba, ben iyiymi. Hem darbeye, hem de
> şeriatı
> karşı olduğumdan aznığın aznığı olarak
> yazılar yazıyoruz.

> Sevgiler babacığım. Merak etme, artık sana arasına
> mektup yazacağım.
> Son yazılarınız da çok güzel. Ali teker teker
> yazımlıyor onları.

> Son Günceller ( Pazar, 06 Temmuz 2008 )

> Yazların diğer yazılan için

> \texttt{www.ahmetnesin.com} dan ulaşabilirsiniz

> tüm dostlarınıza gönderelim forwart edelim

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\textbf{FW: Atam ile cocuk}

Çocuk, Türkiye ne durumda?

— ATAM. Her şey mükemmel gidiyor. Siz hiç merak etneyin.

— Yeni cumhurbaşkanını seçmişsiniz. Nasıl birisi peki?

— Süper bir insan. TC tarihinin en basarısız Dişleri Bakanı olarak kayıtlara geçti. Cemaat liderinin

avidundende.

Daha önce mensubu olduğu partiye yapılan devlet yardımının bir trilyon lirası kaysp, dava zaman

aşımından dolayı düştü. Siz hiç merak etneyin!
— Birinci kadın nasıl?


Daha önce düşleri konutunu da değiştirdi ve cubeye çevirmişti, çok zevkli biridir.

Bir kaç sene önce T.C devletini kendı türbünü için AHM şikâyet etti, ama soura şikayeti geri çevirdi.

Siz hiç merak etmein!

-Başbakan nasıl, başarılı mı?

-Hem de nasıl başarılı. Önine gelene küfür ediyor, gelmeyene ülkeyi terk et diyor. Gazeteler o veya hükümet aleyhinde tek keline yazırmıyor. Maddi durumun da fena değil, aldığı maas ile iki milyar dolar biriktirdi. Allah için çok tutunuldu ve akıllı! (Ben hesap ettim 20 yıl da aldığı maasın her kurusunu biriktirdi ve 1 milyon 225 bin TL’si ordu. Arada ki fark nasıl oluştu kendi de bilmiyor musu?)


-TBMM başkanı da değişmiş..

-Evet, ‘Anasını şeyettiğimin şeyi’ gitti, onun yerine kendisi gibi cemaat liderinin sağ kolu olan biri geldi.

Ana esi türbünüz değil. Siz hiç merak etmein!

-Ekonomi iyi mı?

-Hem de nasıl. Cumhuriyet tarihinin en zeki Maliye Bakam görevde. TL’den altı sıfır attı ve paramız çok değerlandı. Kendi çocukları artık trilyonlar geturemiyorlar, çünkü sıfırlar atılıdı ya, ondan...

Milyonlarla idare ediyor gariplerim. Borsa’nın %75’i yabancıların elinde. Amne bakanımı iyi yapıyor. Siz hiç merak etmein!

-Değerimiz var mı?

-Terör devam mı? önlem almıyor mı?

-Terör pek önemli değil artık. Herkes sadece konuşuyor, askerler şehit oluyor, kelle hesabi ile cenazeler kalkıyor. Liderlerinden 20 tanesi zaten elimizde.. Siz hiç merak etmein!

-Bu güzel haber, liderlerini onur boyu hapisten çıkarmasınlar.

-Ne hapsi ATAM. Biz onları milletvekili seçтик meclise getirdik. Artık herşeyi yasal yapıyorlar.
Dünyada sadece Türkiye'de teröristler milletvekili olabiliyor. Ve sadece Türkiye'de teröristlerin başı hapishanede her hafta avukatları ile görüşebiliyor, yanı her konuda birincişiz. Siz hiç merak etmein!

—Referandum kaｔilim oranı nedir?
— Bana göre sıfır ama hükümte göre %70. Referandum olduğu gün 12 askerimiz SEHİF edildi!
Herşeyin farkındayım ben. Siz hiç merak etmein!

— Cemaat lideri fallan diyorsun, hala var mı şeriat tehlikesi?

—Eğitim nasıl peki?
— 5 yıl önce göre ve gelen dinci hüküm zamanında ilkoku birinci sınıfı başlayan beleder, bu yıl 6'ya gidiyor. 5 yıl sonra 16 yaşını gençler olacaklar, bu beledilerin beyinleri yıkanıyor. Nasıl ki bizim zihnimizden SENİ silemiyorlar, bu beledilerin zihnimden de yobaozık silinemeyecek. Anlayacağınız 5 yıl daha rahatız. Siz hiç merak etmein!

— Biz Cumhuriyeti kurabilmecek için binlerce şehit ve gaszi verdik, siz Cumhuriyeti koruyamadınız. Ben Cumhuriyeti siz gençlerin emanet ettim. Siz ne yapıyorunuz?
—Sadece UTANIYORUZ. KAHROLUYORUZ ATAM!

— Ben esas şimdi öldüm.
Anti-headscarf/anti-veiling messages reached a critical momentum. These were both didactic and offensive. Hürriyet columnist, Bekir Coşkun's columns were always popular. He has devoted readership and his columns are forwarded frequently. One among many that was offensively didactic can be found in the endnotes.  

Bekir COŞKUN

Özgür kadın...

becoskun@hurriyet.com.tr

GERİCİ, özgür kadını istemez.

Çünkü özgür kadın onun sonudur.

Özgür kadın kültür demektir.

Özgür kadın; sanat, resim, edebiyat, dergi, gazete, heykel, sinema, tiyatro, müzik demektir.
* Özgür kadın; akıl demektir...

Öyle şeyh-meyh uçmaz...

Özgür kadın dürüsttür.

Şeyh uçmadığı zaman zaten 'Hani uçmadı... Niye uçtu diyecekmişim?...' der özgür kadın.

* Özgür kadın; modern yaşamdır.

Çatal-bıçak demektir.

Çağdaş kadın için; insanın karnında zikir edecek diye her gün bulgur yenilmez.

Ne de sadece erkeğin canının istediği bir cuma gecesi sevişmenin kerameti vardır.

* Özgür kadın temizdir.
Öyle kirli çorapları, kokan ayakları, turaşız yüzü, gülyağından parfümü olan erkeği sokmaz yatağına.

*

Özgür kadın demokrasidir.

Köle olmaz.

Mirasını ister, birey olarak tanınmak ister, söz hakkı ister, eşitlik ister.

Dayak yiyip, aşağılamıp, itilip-kakılmak istemez.

*

Özgür kadın çağdaşlığını.

Çünkü özgür kadının doğurup büyüttüğü çocuklar gericiye asla ümmet olmazlar.

Ne dergahlara müşteri çıkar özgür kadının yetiştirdüğü çocuklardan, ne tarikatlara mürit, ne de gericiye oy verecek saflar...

*
Müjde's "Reply to the Headscarfed Girl" was among the best-selling messages. In this column, Mr. Müjde focused on a female protestor who had carried a banner in which it declared that big 1989 earthquake was a punishment from God.

Bu yüzden; gerici özgürlü kilmedin sevmez.

Kadin özgürlü olsun istemez.

Ve onu örtmek, kapatmak, susturmak, bastırmak için çarşafa-türbana sarmak ister.

'Türban' diye tutturmalari bu yüzdendür.

Gericinin sonudur özgürlü kadın...

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Türban protestolarında depremi ima ederek 7.4 yetmedi mi diye pankart taşıyan türbani kıza
Gani Müjdenin cevabı.

7.4 Yetmedi mi

Bir hafta önce türban protestoları sırasında "7.4 yetmedi mi?" pankartını açan sevgili kardeşimle seslenmek istiyorum bugün... 20 bin insanın acısı ve cenazesi üzerine politika yapmaya kalkan "o güzel insana" bir çift sorum var.

Ey mantosu uzun, akhi kisa kardeşim benim. 7.0 yetmedi mi?

Senin okuduğun gazeteler yazdı mı biliyorum ama Amerika'nın, hani o gavur ve Haristyan Amerika Birlesik Devletleri'nin, hani o Sionistlerle iş birliği yaptığı için her yerde bayrağını yak淙ınız ABD'nin Los Angeles şehrinde 7.0
bükülüğünde bir deprem oldu bacım...

Neredeyse bizimkine yakın bir deprem. Bizde aynı şiddetdeki bir deprem 20 bin kişi ölüp 20 bin kişi sakat kalırken, gavur, Hristiyan ve Siyonist dostu Amerika'da sadece 2 kişi yaralandı güzel ablam. Şimdi türbanlı başını ellerinin arasına alıp düşünüyör musun acaba? Sakarya gibi muhafazakar bir bölge

Allah binlerce Müslümanı öldürürek cezalandırıyorsa eğer, Hristiyanlara ve Siyonist dostlarına niye kayak geçiyor? Seks shoplarından, porno filmleriley tüm dünyaya "seks","uyuşturucu" ve "günah" ihraç eden bu ülkenin Allah katında ayrıca ne olabilir ki güzel annem? Oysa adım gibi eminim Sakarya'da, Gölcük'te hayatlarını kaybedenlerin çoğu ölmeselerdi eğer, sabah ezanı ile birlikte camillerin yolunu tutacaklardı.

Üç aylarda oruç tutacak, Ramazan'ı da devrilmeyen minarelerin ışıklarıyla birlikte senin ağzına adı bile yakışmayan Allah'ın adı ile birlikte oruçlarını açacaklardı.

E noldu şimdi? 7.0 yetmedi mi güzel ninem? Eğer her coğrafya olayım, her doğal afeti bilimin ve akıl sızgécinden geçirmenden böyle yorumlar san bu ülkenin yarısı her deprem felaketinden sonra dinsiz olur güzel hala kizım... Fay hátında 10 katli binalara izin veren yapışal belediyeçilik anlayışım, deniz kemisdenden

insaat yapan edebiyatçı müteahhitleri, depreme dayanıklı konut üretme çabalarını,
hürşlari,ağursuzları bir kenara bırakıp her şey ilahi kudretin intikamı olarak açıklarsan bu deprem 10 yıl sonra gene aramızdan binlerce "dinsizi" alır gider güzel amca kızım...

Beyin var mı bilmiyorum, betonların altında inleyerek can veren 20 bin insanı, kadın, çocuğu ve beşeri bir kalemden günahkar diye sildip atan kus beyinni türbanın altında görmek mümkün olamıyor çünkü ama bence bu yazıyı oku ve bütün gece uyuşmadan düşün. Allah'ın kullanıra böyle cezalar verebileceği
hala düşünüyorsan da git Hristiyan ol...


Gani MUJDE
Anti-AKP

More left wing anti-Islamic mails also emerged. These had more informative but still highly ideological texts. These can be classified as Kemalist-left as they devoutly praised the Kemalist early ages and started the deterioration with the emergence of multi-party system in 1950. In a long list, an email message lists the turning points in the, first, rise of center-right politics and its evolution to more Islamic politics. The list ends with the Higher Education Council decision that lets headscarf allowed in the campuses\textsuperscript{124} (that decision would then be annulled by Constitutional Court in the

\textsuperscript{124}

\begin{flushright}
Date: Sun, 9 Mar 2008 21:15:50 +0200
\end{flushright}

From: bendemokrat@gmail.com

Subject: Karşı devrimin


22 Kasım 1952 Gericiliğe karşı yazılarıyla tanınan Vatan gazetesi başyazarı, Ahmet Emin Yalman'a Malatya'da başarısız suikast girişiminde bulunuldu.
1954 Celal Bayar: "Millet, CHP'nin Meclis'teki milletvekillerinin sayısını daha da azaltıp otuza indirmekle ne istedğini belli etmiştir. Artık, bundan sonra ince demokrasiye paydos."


20 Ekim 1957 Menderes: "İstanbul'u ikinci bir Mekke, Eyüp Sultan Camii'ni ikinci bir Kabe yapacağız."

19 Ekim 1958 Menderes, Said-i Nursi'nin yaşadığı Emirdağ'da hilafet ve saltanatı temsil eden yeşil bayraklarla karşılandı.

4 Mayıs 1959 DP'liler, İstanbul Topkapı'da, İnönü'nün otomobiline taş ve sopalarla saldıarak İnönü'yü linç etmek istedi... 

5 Haziran 1966 İnönü: "Milli mücadele sırasında da ortam böyleydi. Demirel, Said-i Nursi'nin halifes mi olacak?"

13 Ağustos 1968 New York Times gazetesi sahibi G. L. Sulsberger:

"Başbakan Demirel'e göre Türkiye gençlerin çoğunlukta olduğu bir ülkedir. Ve bu gençleri eğiten öğretmenler Amerika'ya karşı olduklarını taktirde yarımını kuşaklarının Amerika'dan nefret etmesi doğrudur. Onun için çok geç kalmadan probleme bir çözüm yolu aranmalıdır."


7 Temmuz 1969 Gericiler, Kayseri'de ayaklandılar.

6 Eylül 1969 Erbakan, "TCK'nın 163. maddesini değiştireceğiz" sloganıyla Konya'dan milletvekili adayı oldu.

8 Ekim 1969 Konya'da "İmanlı Büyük Türkiye Mitingi" yapıldı.

1974 MSP koalisyon ortağı olarak iktidarda.

1975 Kemalpaşa'da Nurcuların komando kampı ortaya çıktı.

31 Ekim 1976 MSP'li Devlet Bakanı Hasan Aksay, "Bu milletin evlatları maymundan
gelme olduğunu kabul edemez. Allaha şükrür bu sebeple kitapları değiştiriyoruz"
diyerek ders kitaplarından Darwin Kuramını çıkardı.

22 Aralık 1978 Maraş Katliamı. "Allah için savaşa" sloganıyla başlayan
katliamda 111 kişi öldü.

26 Aralık 1978 Demirel: "Bana sağlıklı ve milliyetçiler cinayet işliyor
dedirtemezsiniz."

12 Haziran 1979 Erbakan: "MSP, hafta sonu tatili Cuma gününe gelsin
diyor… Mühakerek mukaddes Cuma tatilini bırakmış, elin gavurunun Pazarını kendine
tatil yapmışlar. Nikahi müftüler kıyısını diyoruz. Mekteplere Kur'an dersi koyalım
diyoruz. Bu milletin mektep kitapları niye Allah adına başlamıyor?"

4 Temmuz 1980 Çorum Katliamı. Gericiler yine Alevilere ve ilericilere
soldu. Çoğu yakılarak 26 kişi öldürüldü. Yüzlerce kişi yaralı.

6 Eylül 1980 MSP'nin Konya mitingi. İkiki satan dükkânlar taşlandı,
turistler dövüldü. Yeşil çiçekler giyen kalabalık "Dinsiz devlet yıktılacak elbet"
sloganlarıyla yürüdü.

28 Nisan 1981 Bakanlar Kurulu bir kararname ile Türk imamlarına
Suudi Arabistan'ın Rabita örgütünün aylık bağlamasını onayladı.

23 Temmuz 1981 Evren: "Artık yeni aldığımız bir kararla ilk ve
ortaokullarda, liselerde mecburi din dersi konacaktır."
26 Mayıs 1983 "Şeriat gelmiş ve gelecek nizamların üstünde tek yoldur! diye hâkûrmanın hürriyetine malik miyiz?" diyen Şeriatçı şair Necip Fazıl'ın cenaze namazı, Turgut Özal'ın ön safla katılımıyla Fatih Camii'nde kılındı.

19 Mayıs 1984 Ankara Belediyesi Meclisi, Hitit Anıtı için "Bu camizlara kaldıracığız" diyerek imha kararı aldı.

4 Ekim 1984 Kenan Evren: "Hainleri asmayıp da besleyecek miyiz?"

18 Mayıs 1986 Devlet Bakanı Kazım Aksay: "Amacıımuz, her üniversiteye bir ibadet yerı açmaktır."

1987 Türk-İslam sentezi kabul edildi.


1 Şubat 1987 İslami anlayışa aynı hareket ettiği ileri sürülen taksi şoförü Zafer Toplu cigerleri sökülerek öldürüldü.

3 Mayıs 1987 Van 100. Yıl Üniversitesı öğrencisi Şirin Tekin oruç tutmadığı için öldürüldü.

10 Kasım 1987 Erbakan: "İktidara gelmemiz halinde başörtüsünü millî kıyafet
yapacağız, her ilçeye bir İmam Hatip okulu açacağız. Liseslerde din derslerinin yanı sıra teşsir ve hadis derslerini de okutarak manevi kalkınmayı sağlayacağız."

8 Mart 1989 Anayasa Mahkemesi Özal'ın çıkarıldığı türbanı serbest bırakan yasayı iptal etti.

9 Mart 1989 Şeriatçı terör örgütü Müslüman Gençlik, İstanbul Üniversitesi'nde başörtüsü eylemine başladı.


7 Mart 1990 Hürriyet gazetesi yazarı Çetin Emec, İstanbul Suadiye'deki evinin önünde öldürüldü.


6 Ekim 1990 SHP Parti Meclis Üyesi Doç. Dr. Bahriye Üçok, evine gönderilen bir paketteki bombanın patlaması sonucu öldü.


25 Ekim 1990 Üniversitelerde başörtüsü ile derse girmek serbest bırakıldı.


24 Ocak 1993 Gazeteci, yazar Uğur Mumcu

Ankara Bahçelievler'deki evinin önünde otomobiline yerleştirilen bomba ile öldürüldü.

2 Temmuz 1993 Sivas Katliamı. Şeriat isteriz diye ayaklananlar 37 kişiyi yakarak katletti.


17 Mayıs 1994 Cuma günü öğle tatillerinin namaz saatinde göre uygulanması teklifi meclise geldi.

28 Haziran 1996 Erbakan başbakan.
same year (2008). A shorter and more nationalist version with the same counter-revolution theme is here. In another mail, a local case of Islamist propaganda was


11 Ocak 1997 Erbakan, tarikat liderlerine başbakanlık konutunda iftar yemeği verdi.

Şubat 1998 Şeriatçı terör örgütleri üniversiteye türbanla girişin yasaklanması üzerine yeniden eylemlere başladılar. Sloganları: "İnanca saygı, düşünceye özgürlük."


Mart 2003 Tayyip Erdoğan Başbakan.

Temmuz 2007 AKP %47 oy oranıyla ikinci kez tek başına iktidar.

 Ağustos 2007 Abdullah Gül Cumhurbaşkanı.

Şubat 2008 Türban üniversitelerde artık serbest.
extensively discussed. How AKP influenced local bureaucracy was involved and how this contributes to Islamization is underlined.

125

Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2008 20:14:21 +0200

From: bendemokrat@gmail.com

Subject: Denizli'de skandal kitap

DENİZLİ'de eşi emekli imam olan ev kadını Fatma Durmuş'un yazdığı
'İlahilerle Hakka Çağrı' adlı ilahi kitabı ort袢ığı karıştırdı.

CHP İl Başkanı Ali Kavak ve CHP Merkez İlçe Başkanı Osman Bartal, Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı tarafından onaylanan, 10 bin adet bastırılan ve ücretsiz dağıtılan kitapta, halkın kin ve düşmanlığı teşvik edildiği, Atatürk'e hakaretlerde bulunduğu, Başbakan Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın Peygamber ve Allah gibi gösterdiği iddia styla Denizli Cumhuriyet Savcılığı'na suç duyurusunda bulundu.

Son dönemde İslami tarikat faaliyetlerinin artış gösterdiği iddia edilen Denizli'de bu kez ilahi kitabi krizi çıktı. Sevengerzı Beldesi'nde oturan ev kadını Fatma Durmuş'un yazdığı, Mahmut Koruk'un yayımcılığını üstlendiği 'İlahilerle Hakka Çağrı' adlı kitapta, Başbakan Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın peygamber gibi gösteriliş, ona karşı gelmenin Allah'a karşı gelmeye eş olduğu, şeriat devleti kurulması yönünde teşvik ve tahrikle bulunduğu, Atatürk'e, annesine, Atatürkçülere ve Cumhuriyet'e hakaretler edildiği, başı açık kadınların dinsiz olarak gösterildiği ve dinci bir ordu kurmaya yönelik çağrı yapıldığı iddia edildi. CHP İl Başkanı Ali Kavak ve CHP Merkez İlçe Başkanı Osman Bartal, kitapla ilgili bugün Denizli Cumhuriyet Savcılığı'na suç duyurusunda bulundu. Adliye Sarayı önünde bir açıklama yapan ve kitabi gösteren Ali Kavak, Fatma Durmuş'un yazdığı ve 10 bin adet bastırılan kitabın cami önlerinde vatandaşlara ücretsiz dağıtıldığını söyledi.

'DIYANET ONAY VERDİ'
Kavak, kitaba Diyanet İşleri Başkanı tarafından da 'olur' verildiğini ve yayılanması için teşvik edildiğini belirterek şunları söyledi:


'ERDOĞAN ALLAH'LAŞTIRILIYOR'

Kitapta Başbakan Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın peygamberle bir tutulduğunu savunan Kavak şöyle devam etti:


CHP'li Kavak, kitabın Sevindik, Karşıyaka ve Dokuzkavaklar mahallelerindeki camilere koliyle dağıtıldığı ve üzerine bırakılan notta vatandaşlara ücretsiz dağıtılmasını istendiğini ileri sürdü.

MÜFTÜNÜN HABERİ YOK

İl Mâftüsü Mehmet Köse de böyle bir kitabın camilerde dağıtıldığından haberi olmadığını, ancak bu tür kitapların dağıtımına izin vermelerinin mümkün olmadığını savundu, cami görevlilerini uyaracaklarını dile getirdi.

KITAP TAN BÖLÜMLER

179-182 Sayfalar 'Tayyibim' isimli şiirden:


183. Sayfa, 'Dinsizler Gülüyor' isimli şiirden:

-Dinimi sömürüyor bu kargalar, dinsizler güldüyör bense ağlarım. Yaşanan görüntüler büyük

119. Sayfa, 'Erkek Kardeşim' başlıklı bölümü:


174. sayfada 'Münacaat' şiirinin dördüncü katası:

-Soyunup sokaklara çıkınlara, arını namusunu unutlalara. Göster ya Rab, bu güzel şeriatı. Kararsız kalpleri yıka ya Rab.

175. Sayfa 'Münacaat' şiir:

-Kötülük yapanları görmeyenleri, müminlere saldıran azgınları, Atatürk'e sağınac anızileri, kararsız kalpleri yıka Ya Rab. Atatürk'ün annesi örtülü iken başı beli açıkları koruyup, başörtüümüze saldıranların kararsız kalplerini yıka Ya Rab. Bunca yapılanları unutup, ana baba köpekmiş gibi kaçanı, keyiflerince yaşayanalı kararsız kalplerini yıka Ya Rab.
Erdoğan’a kızmaya ne hakkınız var...

Özay ŞENDİR

Haber Türk

Ezamın Araçça okunması yasılığı 16 Haziran 1950'de kaldırıldı.
O zaman iktidarda Menderes vardı,Tayyip Erdoğan'ın doğmasına ise 4 sene...
Aynı Menderes "İstanbul'lu ikinci bir Mekke, Eyüp Sultan Cami'ni de ikinci bir Kâbe yapacağız." dediğinde sene 1957'yidi.
O zaman kadar ilk ve orta okullara din dersi konmuş,Kuran kurslarının öntü açılmış,köy enstitüleri kapatılmış,vekillere "Siz isterseniz hilafet bile getirebilirsiniz"denmişti.
Tayyip Erdoğan o zaman daha 3 yaşındaydı.
Menderes liselere de seçmenli din dersini koyduğunda takvimler 1959'u gösteriyordu.
İmam Hatip Okulları'na bitirenlere ilkokul öğretmeni olma hakkı tanındığında sene 1965'ti.
Tayyip Erdoğan o zaman sadece 11 yaşındaydı.
İmam Hatip Okulları'na bitirenlere üniversitelere girme hakkı ondan iki yıl sonra tanıdır.
Yani Tayyip Erdoğan 13 yaşındayken...

Milli Selamet Partisi ile CHP koalisyon kurduğunda Tayyip Erdoğan 20 yaşındaydı.
23 yaşına gelinceye kadar Türkiye'de 100'un üzerinde imam-hatip lisesi açıldı.
O dönemlerde Başbakan Demirel'in derdi laiklik değil, Milliyetçi Cephe Hükümeti'ni yürütebilmekti.
Tayyip Erdoğan 25 yaşına geldiğinde Türkiye'de "Hafta tatili Cuma olsun,nikahları müftüler kıysın" önerisi seslendirildi.
Başbakan Demirel, ortakları Erbakan ve Türkeş'ti...
Çok değil 2 yıl sonra, yani 1981'de askeri darbe lideri Kenan Evren Canakkale'de "muhterem din adamlarının elini öpeceğim" söylüyordu.
Erdoğan 30'una gelmeden camii imamı olarak yetiştirilenlere öğretmen olma yolunun açıldığını gördü.28 Aralık 1989'da üniversitelerde turban serbest bırakıldığında Oza'llı yılları yaşayorduk.

Tayyip Erdoğan o zaman 35 yaşındaydı.Demirel ise siyasetin dinin emrinde olduğundan söz
A more popular mail included a letter from an exiled Iranian\textsuperscript{127}. Although it had nothing to do with Turkish politics, the letter discusses how leftists first allied with ediyordu.

Sonnakti yıllarda en fazla imam-hatip lisesi açan lider olmakla övgüne Demirel'i de gördük, tarikat liderlerinden destek almak için el open genel başkanları da...

Sene 2008 oldu. Türban meselesinden dolayı Başbakan Erdoğan'a herkes kızgın.

Menderes demokrasi kahramanı olarak artık mezarında yatıyor.

Hemen yakınındaki bir başka anıt mezarda Turgut Özal.

Erbakan kayıp trilyon davasının sonuçlarıyla boşuşuyor.

Demirel "bir bilen" olarak hala siyaset sahnesinde...

Bir arkadaşım "Türkiye'de karşı devrim oluyor farklıda misin?" diye sordu.

"58 yıldır olandan farklı bir şey olmuyor" dedim.

Sizce kim hakkı?

127

Cok uzun ama lutfen okuyun ve okutun. Basımızdaki felaketi artık gormenin zamanı geldi de geçiyor bile.....

BİR İRAN'LININ MEKTUBU

Seygili Türk dostlarım ve kardeşlerim,

Devrim sırasında devrim muhafızları tarafından önce tecavüz edilip, daha sonra ipe gönderilen çok sevgili kız kardesim Mehtab'in
anisina...

Bu mektubu sizlere yazmamdaki neden bizim 30 sene kadar önce yasadığımız o tahlisiz ve karanlık günün Türkiye icinde yaklaşıyor olduğunu gormem ve bundan daha derin olarak kalbimde hissetmem oldu. Turban yasasının mecliste onaylandığı tarihın Iran İslam devriminin olduğu gune denk gelmesi kalbimde bunun ilahi bir gueten gelen uyari fisegi olduğu hislerini uyandırdı ve bu mektubu kaleme almayı karar verdım. Biliyorum hepiniz kalbinizde karanlığın otoritesini hissettiniz. Karanlık otorite gelmeden hissettirdi yaklastigını.

Iran İslam devriminden 1 hafta kadar önce Türkiye'ye gecen, uzun bir sure burada yasayan ve daha sonra Kanada'ya iltica eden ve halihazırda bu ülkede felsefe öğretmenliği yapan bir Iranlıyım. Atatürk'ün aydınlik Turkiyeyi çok seviyorum ve yureğim kan ağlayarak Iran'da 'O gün' gelmeden önceki olayların sanki bir tekrarını sinemada izliyorum gibi Turkiye'de görürüm. Yobaz karanlığında hunharca katledilen kız kardesim anisina sizlere yalvariyorum ki, sakin olmaz demeyin! Sakin Türk Ordusu olduğu surece olamaz demeyin cunkü asagıda anlataçığım gibi o gun geldiğinde tüm orduların eli kolu baglanabilir. Bizim ailemiz

Iran'da laik, sol goruslu ve aydın bir aile idi. Devrimden 1 ay önce bize bile soyleseler idi 1 ay sonra durum bu olacak diye bize guler gecerdik, 'delimisin?' diye sorardık belkide.Belkide Derdiki 'Sah'in bu guclu orduyunu nasıl yeneceklerde Seriat karanlığini getirecekler?".
Sizlere once Iran İslam devriminin nasıl gelistigini kisaca anlatmak istiyorum cunkü Turkiye'deki gelismelerle çok buyuk benzerlikler mevcut.

IRAN ISLAM DEVRİMİNİ BASARILYA GÖTUREN AYAKLAR:
askeri Kışlalar basıldı. Ellerinde Kur'an ile kışlalar ele geçirildi.

(BU AYAGA COY DIKKAT EDELİM CUNKİ DEVRİM SIRASINDA TURK SILAHLI

KUVVETLERİNİ ELE GECIRMENIN EN ANAHTAR AYAĞI BUDUR.)

damlasına kadar savasacak olanlarda bu konuda aydınlanmış Türk subaylaridir. Ama yukarıda bahsettiğim uzre onlar ordunun sadece ve sadece en fazla binde birini teskil ederler. Yani devrimin asıl savunucusu Türk ordusunun tümü degildir, sadece subay kademesidir ve erlerin durdugu ve etkisizleştirildiği noktada o subay kademesinin yok edilmesi kolay olacaktır. İran da ordu bu sekilde etkisiz hale getirilmistir.

'Er dusman isgali durumunda durmaz ve etkisizleştirilemez, sonuna kadardan savasır, ama büyük bir kudretle gelen kendi halkı karşısında durabilir.'

Su asamada aldıkları bu büyük ivme ve arkalarındaki çok büyük gucler ile onları normal yollardan durdurmak çok zor olacaktır. Ve bunların durdurulmadan hareket edecgi her gün ivme ve guclerini artıracak ve isi zorlastıracaktır. Silahlı kuvvetler ne kadar erken hareket ederse o kadar iyi olur. Sonra gec olabilir. Silahlı kuvvetlerin su veya bu neden ile eli kolu bagli ise ki oyle gorumuyor bu durumda silahlı kuvvetler 'O GUN'geldiginde kislarini nasıl muhafaza edeceginin planini çok iyi yapmalidir. Cünk ki kilit bu noktadir. Silahlı kuvvetler etkisiz hale getirelemedigi

muddetce devrim basariya ulasamaz. Bu nedenle her askeri kislaya normal erlerin haricinde kisilari kaninin son damlasina kadar savunacak 'ÖZEL CUMHURIYET DEVRİM MUHAFIZLARI BIRLIKLERI' olusturulmali ve bunların Boyle büyük bir halk hareketinearsi erlerden once devreye girip, erler saskinliklerini uzerlerinden atana kadar catismaya girmeleri
saglanmali ve burada kazanilacak vakit ile gerideki subaylar erlerin
dagilmasinin onune gecmelidir. Yani orduunun esas gucu ve govdesi olan
erlerin kontrolu kesinlikle kaybedilmemelidir. Iran ordusunun Boyle bir
hazirligi olmadigi icin gafil avlandi.

Olusturulacak olan 'OZEL CUMHURIYET DEVRIM MUHAFIZLARI
BIRLIKLERİ'
yobazlar ile catisirken, erlerde uzerlerindeki saskinligi atacaklar ve
subaylarin organizasyonu ile catismalara destek vereceklerdir.

Olusturulacak 'OZEL CUMHURIYET DEVRIM MUHAFIZLARI BIRLIKLERİ' cok
ozel
cigitimlenti vede Ataturk'e ve devrimlerine cani pahasina savunacak
sekilde inanmis olmalidirler. Aksi halde basarisizlik kacinilmazdir.

Cunku en son Lubnan'da gordugumuz uenze davasina inanmis bir kac yuz
Hibullah Militani dunyanin en iyi ordularindan birisi olan irasil
ordusunu agir zaiyatala yeniğiye ugratti.

Sevgili dostlar ve kardesler, elinden geldigince sizleri
bilgilendirmeye calismim cunki aydinligi savunmak durumunda olan sizler
Irans'in gectigi bu karanlik tuneli anlamak durumundasiniz. Iran'in bu
aci tecrubesi sizlerin uyanik olması icin bir sans olur umarim.

Asagidaki birinci linkte Iran'in devrimin hemen oncesi goruntuleri ile
hemen sonrası goruntulerini bulacaksiniz. Orada goreceginiz uenze Iran
devrim oncesi belki su anki Turkiye'den bile daha modern. Yani olmaz,
olmaz demeyin. Ikinci linkte ise Devrim lideri Humeymi'ye kadının
siir okumasi. O linki vermemin nedeni ise o koltukta bir gun bugun
fundamentalists and the latter later betrayed them narrative. This mail is a warning to
all liberals and other non-Islamists who have sympathy for AKP government. It also
implies that small changes lead to radical transformation soon. Unless some measures
taken, Turkey's future will be like Iran. An article of a respected and young

ABD'de ikamet eden malum cemaatin basi olan sahsin oturabilecegi
ihitalidir. Acı ama sanki tarih tekrerrr ediyor.

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gj1rSmQ5kvg>
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rO2rf8KPacl>

Benim coğ sevgili kiz kardesim Mehtab anisina yapabilecegin bu kadar.
Elinden geldigince sizleri bilgilendirmeye calistim. Ama sizin geride
kalan, aydınlik yarınlar bekleyen kizlarinizi, kardesleriniz
, cocuklariniz ve Mehtab'larinizi icin yapabileceginiz coç seyler var
karanlık 'O Gun'cokmeden once Ataturk Turkiyesine... Yapabileceginiz ilk sey bu
mektubu bildiginiz, tanidiginiz insanlara ulastirarak daha fazla insani
uyandirmak olabilir. O acı coğ büyük acı sevgili kardesler, anlatmak
istemiyorum icinizi kararltmamak icin ama sevgili kardesim Mehtab keske
bu dunyaya gelmemis olsa idide 'O gun' o acı sonu yasamamis olsa idi o
karanlık ve pis yobaz sehvetinin pencesinde. Allah sizleri ve Ataturk
Turkiyesini korusun o yobaz karanligin sevgili kardesim Mehtab'a
gosterdigi acı sondan. Anlatamiyorum onu yobazlarin nasil katlettiligini,
elim varmiyor yazmaya, dilim gitmiyor anlatmaya....

Mohsen Yazd
columnist, Can Dündar, was also circulated. The article is built on a former diplomat's wife who was stationed in Iran. It had the same logic.

Eski Tahran Büyükelçisi Korkmaz Haktanır'ın eşı Handan Haktanır'dan uyarı var:

"İran'da örtü okula sinşice girdi; 3 yılda herkes örtündü"

Önceki gece NTV'de akademisyenlerle türbanı tartışyorduk, ki internet adresimizce bir mektup düştü. Tahran'da yaşamış, "admin açıklanmasına istemeyen" bir diplomat eşı, İran'daki olmadığını konusundaki deneyimini aktarıyor, Türk kadınlarını uygun olmaya çağırıyordu. İsmi kontrol ettim; doğruydum.


Yayından sonra da kendisine ulaşıp mektubun tamamına bu köşede yer vermek için izmini istedi.

İşte Handan Haktanır'ın "turban uyarısı":

"Ruj süreni sopaladılar"

"Tahran'da görev yapmış bir diplomatın eşı olarak, türban konusunda düşündüklerimi bir iki cümleyle ifade etmek isterim:

Tayin vermiş olan Tahran'a uçğumuz inerken hicab'ımı başka çıçekirdimde kendimi şöyle teselli ediyordum:

'Nasıl olsa burası benim ülken değil. Birkaç yıl dişimi sıkar katlanırım. Çok süktür ki biz Atatürk kızlarınız ve böyle şeyler bizim başmuzu gelmez.'

Tahran'daki görev süremiz boyunca (gayrimüslümler de dahil olmak üzere) hicab'sız doşan tek bir kadın görmedim. Bir yabancı diplomatın eşı, şapka takarak bu yaşığı delmeye denedi, ancak devrim polisleri kendisini derhal ikaz ettiler.

Bir başkasının eşı ruj sürdüğü için karakola alındı ve ellerine sopalarla vuruldu. Bu hanım bir keresinde 'Eğer Müslümanlık buyssa, Hristiyan olduğum için çok şanslıım' demişti.
The claim that elections were rigged did not really work. That message that depended on some statistical calculations disappeared soon\(^{129}\). Anti-AKP actors were then

"Süreç 3 yılda tamamlandı"

"Tanınımızın ilk günlerinde İran hanım dostlarımız bana sürekli olarak Türk kadınlarının dikkati olmalarını ve erkeklerin bilinci altındağı güvensizlik duyularlarından ve endişelerden kaynaklanan bu uygulamının, sinsice ve adem adem geldiğini söylüyorlardı.

Bir gün okullarına gittiklerinde kapada 'Bundan böyle hicabsız derslere giremeyeceklerine' dair bir kağıt bulunmuştı.

Dedikleri kadarıyla, sürece tamamlanmasını üç yıl almıştı. Ondan sonra ise çok geç olmuştu.

İttiraz edenlerin sayısı giderek azalmış, sonuçta yıllar sonra bu ortam içine doğan kuzlar için 'hicab'ı olmak son derece doğal ve yerine getirilmesi gereken bir şart olarak algılanmaya başlanmıştır.


"Rüyamda korkuyordum"

Ancak, bir süre sonra vestiyerden 'hicab'ı alp taktuğumu, anchorsokağa çıktıktan sonra fark ettiğiimin ayarına vardım. 'Hicab', benim için de artık bir refleks haline gelmişti.

Öyle ki, bazı rüyalarda bile kendimi başa açık olarak gördüğünde korkuyla uyandıyordı. 'Devrim polisleri geliyor, ben ise hicabımı takmamışım' diye paniğe kaplıyordum. İşte o zaman, 'hicab'ın aslında buzdığının görünen parçası olduğunu; asıl amacım, kadının çözmesi, kontrol altına alınması ve korku altında yaşayan, ikinci sınıf insanların olduklarını inandırılması olduğunu anladım.

O nedenle Türk kadınlarının çok dikkatli olması ve son derece masumane bir şekilde, özgürlük adına altında gelen bazı uygulamaların, ileride çok daha başka bir rejimin ayak sesleri olabileceğini asla aklımdan çıkarmamaları gerektiğini anlıyordum.

En ıçten saygımla..."

can.dundar@e-kolay.net

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Son genel seçim sonuçlarının hiçbir zaman hilesiz, normal sonuçlar olduğuna inanmadım. Yıllardır tek parti hükümeti görmemiş ülkemizde, milyonlarca insanın meydanlarda toplanarak tepki gösterdiği bir partinin böylesine büyük bir oy farkı ile iktidara gelmiş olması mümkün olamadı.

Bu konuda, açıklayıcı olduğunu düşündüğüm bir alıntı gönderisi aldım ve sizlerle de paylaşmak istedim.

22 TEMMUZ SEÇİMLERİNİN SONUÇLARI
BİLGISAYARDA NASIL DEĞİŞTİRİLDİ....

22 Temmuz sonuçlarını AKP'nin ve Erdoğan'ın kendisi de beklemiyordu çünkü bu seçim sonuçlarını değiştirmeye sahtekarlığı onlardan habersiz yapıldı, sadece halk ve AKP bu
secim sonucuna Tarhan Erdem'in
sözde anket sonuclarıyla psikolojik olarak hazırlanıtı.
Türkiye genelinde Türkiye toplamının %25 oyları secimen
bitmesinin ilk bir
saatinde merkez bilgisayar üzerinden tamamen AKP'ye aktarıldı
ve AKP secime %25 oyla baslarken diğerleri sıfır oyla başladı ve
sonra normal dağılıma bıraktı.
Bu yüzden AKP'nin gerçek oyları %47 değil %22-%28' arasındadır.
Bunun en büyük kanıtı da benim ve birkaç arkadaşımın incelediği
tüm YSK
sonuçlarında hiçbir sandıka AKP oyunun %25 alta düşmemesidir.
Yani Türkiye'nin her sandık bölgesinde dört kişiden en az
birinin AKP'ye
oy vermesi mümkün müdur?
Özellikle Çankaya'da,Alsancak'ta ve diğer tüm Atatürkçü ve
milliyetçi
sandık bölgelerinde ve şehirlerinde, kasabalarında, semtlerinde,
köylerinde. HAYIR mantık olarak kesinlikle mümkün
degildir.
Secimden emperyalist güçlerin
istediği sonuçlar çıktı, Türkiye'nin verdiği
oylar değil!

SECİM SONUÇLARI NASIL DEĞİŞTİRİLDİ?
Secim sonuçlarının hızlı bir şekilde duyurulmuş olması 22 Temmuz seçimlerinin sonuçlarına gölge düşürmek için yeterli mı?

Ya da YSK'nin bu seçime kısmı bir bilgisayar sistemi ile girmiş olması?

Bize yeterli. Özellikle gizli servislerin dünyada birçok secime müdahale ettiği gerektiğini göz önüne alırsak ve bazı güçlere Gore bazı ülkelerin kaderini insanların demokrasi kandırıcısı altında attıkları oylarının seçim sonucunu haklı olarak değiştirebilmesinden haksız olarak değiştirmek daha akıllıca ve daha önemli ise ve o ülke diğer büyük bir ülkenin planlarının bas aktörü olarak yaralıyorsa sadece ve sadece bu nedenden dolayı bile yeterlidir.

İste biz yukarıda saydığınız bu olasılıkları inceleyip şu sonuca vardır.

Gizli servislerin seçimleri etkilemeleri 1948 İtalya seçimleriyle başladı, daha sonra Türkiye'de 1954 yılında Menderes'le devam etti ve birçok ülkede yapılan ve yapılmaya çalışılanlardan sonra bugünle gelindi. Bugün seçimlerin sonuçları değiştirmek bilgisayar ortamında daha kolaydır.

Türkiye'deki seçimde
hilenin nasıl yapıldığını su anda son aşamasında
inceledik ve seçim gecesinde tahmin ettğimiz gibi hile
yapıldığı olasılığı çok yüksektr ve bazılarınından dışında
bu müdahale yapılrken kimsenin ruhu da ne yazık ki
duymadı, hatta AKP'liler de hilenin nasıl olduğunu
bilmedikleri için seçimde başarılı olduklarını zannettler.
Su anda seçim sandık sonuçlarının çoğunluğunu tek tek
kontrol ettik ve
yüzdelerini dikkatle inceledik, bulgular tam tahmin
ettiğimiz gibi,
sonuçlar bilgisayarda saat 5:30'da ilk seçim sonuclarının
gelmeye başladığı zaman il il değiştirildi, AKP secime %25
fazla oyla
başladı, elimizde tüm sandık sonuçlarının imzalı belgeleri
olsa yapılan hile hemen görülebilir.
Su ana kadar gördüğümüz durum AKP'nin hiçbir sandıkt %25 alta
düşmemesidir. Her sandıktan en az %25 AKP'ye oy çıkması mümkün
müdür? Hayır çünkü çok partili demokrasilerde her
bölgeden aynı şekilde oy çıkması matematiksel olarak milyonda
bir olasılıktır ve mantıksal olarak mümkün değildir.
Peki bu %25'e tekabül eden
yaklaşık 7-8 milyon oy
nereden ortaya çıkmıştır? Nüfus kütükleriyle seçmen kütükleri
arasındaki 7 milyon farktan mı; yani muhalefet oylarının bir
kısminin yok edilmesinden mı? Yoksa diğer partilerin
oylarının seçim'in ilk saatinde sıfırlanıp AKP'ye
aktarılması ve seçimin diğer partiler %0 ile başlarken AKP'nin
%25 ile başlaması mı? Her ikisi de mümkün. Fakat bir gerçek var
ki kesinlikle gözardı edilemez.

Secimin ilerleyen saatlerinde oyları düşen bir partinin(AKP) %25
ile başlayıp secimi kaybetmesi imkansızdır.

İste hile de buradayır!

Hilenin sekti: Bizim Townsend beri tahmin ettığımız bu şekilde sandık
secim sonuçlarıyla bu iddiamız tamamen güçlendirdi.

Secim sonuçları YSK merkez bilgisayarından, Cihan (Fetullah'ın)
Haber ajanı aksam 6 dan sonra ilk seçim sonuçlarını açıklamadan önce,
ilk seçim sonuçlarının gelmeye başladıği saat 5:30 civarında 15-
20 dakika bir görevli tarafından değiştirildi veya hack edildi
ve AKP %25 oyla secim yarısına baslarken diğerleri de %0 oyla
başladı ve saat 6:00-6:30 arası o ana kadar alınan
sonuçların Türkiye'nin %50'si olduğu ilan edildi, bu
ayarlanmadan sonra AKP'nin oyları düşse de diğerlerinin yükselse
de AKP'nin secimi kaybetme ihtimali yoktu ve plan AKP'nin en az
367 milletvekili çıkaracak kadar yanı Türkiye'nin
en az %50 oyunu alabileceği şekilde yapıldı, oysaki ileriki
saatlerde
sonuçlar açıklanmadan müdahale yapılamadı ve bu yüzden
AKP'nin oyları düşmeye ve CHP, MHP'nin oyları yükselmeye
başladı, GP ve DP'nin oyları da sıfradan başladığından
oyları yükselse bile %10
barajını asma olanakları yoktu. Mantıksal ve matematiksel olarak
sonuçlarında ilk bir saatte Türkiye'nin %50 oyunu almayı
basarmış bir parti diğer yüzde ellilik oylar da okunduktan sonra
da ha da yükselmesi gerekmiyordu. Fakat öyle olmadı, merkez
bilgisayarı
sonuçlarına ilk bir saatte müdahale secimin sonucunu AKP lehine
tamamen değiştirdi. Dikkat ettiyseniz web sitesindeki secim
sonuçlarındaki pdf. dosyalı
dokumanlar Excel veya Access programından çıkma, yani ana
dokumanda
yapacağınız bir değişiklik otomatik man daha tüm il ve sandık
sonuçlarını değiştirebilir, sandık secim sonuçları
fotokopi (scan) yoluyla pdf dosya programı yapılmış bu da
şüphelerimizi tamamen
doğruluyor.
Bakınız İzmir'de AKP'nin CHP ile aynı sayıda oy alıp 5 er milletvekili
çıkarmaları olanaksızdı fakat ilk bir saatte müdahaleden
dolayısı AKP'nin (%25 + gerçek değer) olarak değiştirilen
oyları müdahale sonrası normal oyların gelmesiyle %30'a kadar
geriledi.
Yani tüm Türkiye sonuçlarına müdahalenin olmasına AKP'nin gerçek
oyları gerçekte %22+%6 veya %8= %28 veya %30 civarında olacaktır.
CHP ve MHP ve diğer partilerin oyları gerçekte ortalamada bir bucuk katlarına yakındı. CHP özellikle İzmir'de 1 milyon seçmen üzerinden oyların %60'ını alıp 5 milletvekili yerine 8-9 milletvekili çıkarcaktı ve AKP'nin İzmir'deki toplam oy oranı %13 olarak çıkacaktı.

Aynı oranı Türkiye'ye uygularsak AKP'nin gerçek milletvekili sayısı 190, CHP'nin 190 ve MHP'nin ise 150 olacaktır.

Artık eskisi gibi sandıklarda hile yapmaya gerek yok, basit bir bilgisayar müdahalesi bir ülkenin kaderini iste böyle çizebiliyor.

Bu konuda tek izlenecek yol; Anayasa mahkemesinin huzurunda tüm imzaları kontrol edilmiş sandık seçim kağıtlarındaki seçim sayılarının ve sandık seçim sonuçlarının YSK elektronik kayıtlarıyla tek tek karşılaştırılması...

YSK bunu yapabilir fakat yapmıyor (hatta sandık dokümanlarının aralarından 100 adedini seçip fotokopya yoluya elerindeki elektronik dokümanlarla birlikte web sitesine koyabilir ve karslaştırma bu şekilde yapılabilir fakat bunu yapmıyorlar ve sandık sonuçlarını elektronik doküman halinde web sitesine koyuyorlar, koymaları gereken
portrayed as victim. The pianist Fazil Say was to become a hero in these messengers' eyes. Same support would go for TV channel Kanal Türk. This channel was

Endişelendikimiz noktas yakında birileri bu isin

üzerine gidebilir ve gerçek ortaya çıkar diye merkeze getirilen
sandık resmi belgelerini elektronik kopyaları var mazeretyle imha
yoluna bile gidebilir...
Bu e-postayı lütfen
ulaştırabileceğiniz en fazla kişiye iletin..
Bir şeyler yapılmalı ve bir
yerden başlanmalı çok geç olmadan...
LÜTFEN..

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‘Onlar’ Gitsin Fazıl Kalsın

izinde, Atatürkümün açtığı nuru ufuklarda yürürüz, akılla, bilimle, aydınlıkla, gönençle.


Mücadeleye devam edelim, Milli Demokratik Devrim için çalışalım, gerekirse dağa çıkalım ama işğın, aydınlığın o eşsiz kırванçını kalbimizden, o kutsal akıllarımızdan, ortaçağ karanhığındaki güzel ülkmim, kandırılmış, cehalet içinde bırakılmış o yanaklarının sıkasınuz gelen, o güzelm, saf temiz Anadolu hükümün üzerine üzerine fişkırırmak ülkemizden vazgeçmemeyelim.

Türkiye rüyamız_buydu_hatırlasana._ Köylülerı_ keman_ çalan,_ gündelikçi_kadınların_cam_silerken_Sartre_okuduğu_o_güzel_rüyamız._ Balolardan_ çıkıp_belgesel_izlemeye,_ oradan_ çıkıp_laboratuarlarda_bilimin_o_billur_aydınlığına_hizmet_etmeye_koşuşan_insanların_yaşadığı_bir_ülke_rüyamızdan_ne_çabuk_vazgeçtim?_O_hayali_toplumun_milliyetçiliğini_bile_kanırtıcısına_yapamadan_daha.

Peki_ya_annen_ve_babanın_rüyaları_ne_olacak_Fazıl?_Baban_artık_kitaplarındaki_biyografisine_“Oğlu_Fazıl_Say’ın_müzik_egitimine_katkıda_bulunmuştur”_diye_yazıyor._Annen_“Müziğin_Doruğuna_Fazıl_Say_Yolculuğu”_diye_kitap_yazıp,_proje_çocuklar_yetiştirmek_isteyen_başka_iddiali_ailerler_çin_bir_kullanma_kılavuzu_bile_hazırladı._Bu_proje_burada_mu_biteceği._Yapma._Gitme._Yazık.

Sen_küçüktün_hatırlamazsın._12_Eylül’den_hemen_sonraydı._Özdemir İnce_Amcan_bir_gün_size_gelmiştir._“Nasıl_oldu_da_bizim_askerler_değil,_onların_askerleri_yapı_darbeyi”_diye_dağlanırken_babanla,_birden_“Fazıl_nerde”_diye_sordu?._Baban_“Maç_yapıyor,_kaleci_olmak_istiyor”_demişti._Çok_kızıştı ve çok_telsizlanmıştı Özdemir_Amcan,_“Piyanist_yapılacak_bir_çocuğun_kalecilik Yapmasına_inz_verilir_mı”_diye_çıktı_babana._İste_sen_böyle_geçектToUpper곖na_inanmadığımız_bir_acayip_iklime,_aşkın_diyaloğlar_dünyasında_özenle_yetiştirilmiş_bir_orkidesin_Fazıl._Terk_etme_bizi.

Yeter ki sen gitme Fazıl! Söz bundan sonra bir cep telefonu daha çalarlsa sen konser verirken tüm baz istasyonlarını kundaklayacak ‘iyi çocuklar’. Gitme Fazıl! Bu koncerto burada böyle bitmesin. Türkiye rüyasız düşün; Milli Demokratik Devrim olmuş bir gün ve sen televizyonda piyanonla bir Türkiye şarkısını çalıyorsun bir 10. yıl marşını. Gitme Fazıl!

Kanaltürk

AKP iktidarı, mecliste en büyütür. AKP iktidarı, cumhurbaşkanı, başkomutan, başbakan, Bakan, danışman, genel müdür, müdür, memur kadrolarını doldurduğuına göre devlet ne kadar büyükse, o kadar büyütür. Keyfine göre Anayasaaptarıgına bakılırsa, devletten de büyütür. Keyfine göre yargıç, savcı atadığına, istediği yasayı çıkarıp, var olanı keyfine uydurduğuına ve keyfine uymayan mahkeme kararlarına da uymadığına göre, hukuktan bile büyütür!

Medyanın yarısı AKP’li olup, diğer yarısı da susta durduğuına göre, AKP
iktidarı, medyadan çok daha büyüktür...

Ne var ki AKP İktidarı, büyükülüğune bir türlü inanmıyor, sindiremiyor, taşyangı, kendisini küçük görüşy ki hålâ Kanaltürk'le uğraşıyor.

Uğrastıkça da kendini küçüldüyor.

Kanaltürk nedir?

Bir avuç gözü kara "deli gönül"ün, varlarını yoklarını ortaya koyup, inandıklarını dille getirip düşündüklerini söylediğikleri, AKP'ye sert muhalefet yapılan, ama karşı görüşlere de yer veren, birbirinden donanımlı ve yetenekli insanlarım, beş aydır maş madadan, özeviyle çalışıkları bir televizyon kanalı. Bir özelliği var: Çok seyrediliyorum.

Vay sen misin etine buduna bakmadan AKP'ye kafa tutmaya kalkan dendi ve Büyük AKP İktidarı, küçükük Kanaltürk'ü "bitirme" planında önce Maliye'yi kullandı. Onlarca müfettiş bir yıldır ablukaya aldığı kanalı. Yetmedi, reklam verebilecek tek tek telefon açılındı, gözdağı verdirildi.


İnfazçı ncin RTÜK? Çünkü Tuncay Molloveişoğlu, ki bence Uğur Mumcu'dan sonra Türkiye'nin en iyi araştırmacı gazetecisidir, Yolsuzluk ve Yoksulluk programında Almanya'daki Deniz Feneri Derneği ve Kanal 7'ye yapılan baskınla tutuklanan yöneticilerini gündeme getirdi. Alman polisi,
used to organize against AKP and support for coup plot as the Ergenekon trial would later show. Some went for AKP’s neoliberal policies. It was not really people’s party.

Deniz Feneri’nin "yoksullara yardım" diye topladığı 14 milyon euro’nun kayıp olduğunu ve bu paradan 7 milyon euro’nun Kanal 7’nin Almanya şubesi Euro 7’ye aktarıldığım tespit etmişti! Ama Tuncay Mollaveisoğlu araştırmayı derinleştirince:

RTÜK başkanı Zahit Akman’ın Kanal 7’nin kurucuları arasında olup, bu görevinden ancak RTÜK üyesi seçildikten sonra 30 Eylül 2005’te ayrıldığı ve... Kanal 7 hisselerini Alman polisi tarafından tutulduğundan

Deniz Feneri Derneği Başkanı Mehmet Gürhan’a devrettiği, iddiasına da ulaştı. Hem de belgeleriyle!

Belgelerle destekli bu iddia, CHP’li Milletvekili Emin Koç tarafından meclis gündemine taşındı ve Devlet Bakanı Beşir Atalay’ın önünde soru önergesi olarak duruyor.

Zahid Akman’ın RTÜK’ü, İşte başkana yönelik bu yolsuzluk iddiası yüzden infaz ediyor, KanalTürk’ü. Ve iddianın ucu kim bilir kimlere dayanıyor ki kaybolan 14 milyon euro’luk "yoksul yardım" larda, Büyük AKP İktidarı da Kanal Türk batıncı rahat bir soluk alacak... mi dersiniz?

Fos büyüklük var, pos büyüklük var. AKP’ninki fos büyüklük. Yoksa bu kadar korkar mıydı, küçücük Kanal Türk’ün posundan?

LÜTFEN BUNU BİR KAMPANYA HALINE GETIRELIM VE ILETEBILDİĞİMİZ KADAR ÇOK KİSYE İLETELİM VE BU PSIKOLOJİK SAVASI BECERIKSİZ İKTIDARA KARŞI BİZ KAZANALIM...
İşsizlik kirli emekçilerin başının üstünde daha hızlı sallandırılırken, AKP hükümeti kağıt üstünde kurnazlık yaparak ülkeyi "zenginleştirme"ye çalışıyor. Ülkenin dolar milyarderleri listesi ise, AKP'nin asıl uzmanlık alanını milyarder yaratmak olduğunu ortaya koyuyor.

AB'ye uyum gereksçiyile milli gelir hesaplama sisteminini değiştiren TÜİK, yarım kişi başına düşen milli geliri 1750 dolar artıracak.

Kağıt üstündeki düzenlemeyele cari açığın milli gelire oranı yüzde 6'ya, bütçe açığı da milli gelirin yüzde 1,7'sine inecek. Kamu borçunun milli gelire oranı ise yüzde 55 seviyesinden yüzde 45'e gerileyecaktır.

Sermaye el çabukluğu değil, "yapısal" hizmet bekliyor

Öte yandan, Uluslararası kredi derecelendirme kuruluşu Moody's Başkan Yardımcısı Kristin Lindow, milli gelir revizyonunun kredi notunu değiştirmeyeceğini söyledi.

Yapılan revizyonun "kimse için sürpriz olmayacağını" belirten Lindow, kamunun vergi geliri oranının ne denli düşük olduğunu yeni GSYH seviyesinde daha da net göreceğini, vergi kaçağı konusunda ne kadar geri kalanlığının ortaya çıkacağını söyledi. Kredi notu açısından "ödemeigestergelerini dikkate aldıklarını" söyleyen Lindow, kredi notunun yükselmesinin "yapısal reformlardan somut adımlar atılmasından bağlı olduğunu" söyledi.

Gençlere umut yok

AKP, kağıt üstündeki değişikliklerle göz boymaya çalışırken, Türkiye'deki tablo halkın gelirinin yükselmesi bir yana, ülkedeki işsizliğin boyutlandığı gösteriyor.

privatizations, AKP has sold the country... Anti-Privatization messages can have their own places but since most of are related as AKP's sins. A message is too long

2006'da yüzde 9,9 olan işsizlik oranı 2007'de aynı seviyede kahrken, genç nüfustaki işsizliğin yüzde 18,7'den yüzde 19,6'ya çıktı.

Uzmanlık alan: Milyarder yaratmak
AKP hükümeti döneminde toplumsal eşitsizliklerde görülen suçrama, yalnızca işsizlik rakamlarından değil, "zenginleşme" rakamlarından da okunabiliyor.


Listede, Sabancı, Koç, Zorlu, Karamhmet gibi bilindik patronların yanı sıra, yıldızı AKP döneminde parlamış Çalık gibi AKP zenginleri de bulunuyor.

İşte Türkiye'deki eşitsizliklerden nemalanın ve ülkenin kaybagai yiyen dolar milyarderlerinin listesi:
Mehmet Emin Karamehmet 4,3 milyar dolar, Şaraf Tara 4,1 milyar dolar, Hüsnü Özyeğin 4 milyar dolar, Semahat Arsel 2,3 milyar dolar, Ahmet Nazif Zorlu 2,3 milyar dolar, Rahmi Koç 2,1 milyar dolar, Ferit Şahenk 2,1 milyar dolar, Aydın Doğan 2 milyar dolar, Suna Kıraç 2 milyar dolar, Tunçay Özilhan 1,9 milyar dolar, Mehmet Siman Tara 1,9 milyar dolar, Filiz Şahenk 1,8 milyar dolar, Kamil Yazıcı 1,8 milyar dolar, Erman Ilicak 1,9 milyar dolar, Faruk Yalçın 1,7 milyar dolar, Murat Vargo 1,6 milyar dolar, Ahmet Çalık 1,5 milyar dolar, Murat Ülker 1,5 milyar dolar, Ali İbrahim Ağaoğlu 1,4 milyar dolar, Bülent Eczacıbaşı 1,3 milyar dolar, Faruk Eczacıbaşı 1,3 milyar dolar, Muratız Gülbanoğlu 1,3 milyar dolar, Olgun Zorlu 1,3 milyar dolar, Hasan Çokaoğlu 1,2 milyar dolar, Ahşen Özokur 1,2 milyar dolar, Şevket Sabancı 1,2 milyar dolar, Turgay Ciner 1,1 milyar dolar, Serra Sabancı 1,1 milyar dolar, Yalçın Sabancı 1 milyar dolar, Vuslat Doğan Sabancı 1 milyar dolar, Hanzade Doğan Boyner 1, Begümhan Doğan Faralılah 1 milyar dolar, Sema İşıl Doğan 1 milyar dolar, Arzuhan Doğan Yalçındağ 1 milyar dolar, Deniz Şahenk 1 milyar dolar.
Yılmaz ÖZDİL

yozdil@hurriyet.com.tr

Taa 2036...

BANKALARI sattık.

Fabrikaları sattık.

Telefonları sattık.

Limanları sattık.

E hazra dağ dayanmaz...

Miras bitti.

Sıra çocuklarımızı geldi...

Onları satacağız.

*

Sosyal Güvenlik Yasası, budur.

*

Bakın, ne diyorlar bize?
"Tasarıyı taşı etme..."

Seninle alakası yok!

Taa 2036’da hayata geçecektir.

*

Nasıl olsa, "taa 2036’da hayata geçecektir" diyen arkadaşlara kimse sormuyor, "madem, taa 2036’da hayata geçecektir, niye taa 2035’te yapmıyorsunuz bu yasayı da, taa 2030'dan yapılıyoruz?"*

*

Böyle bu işler çünkü...

Faiz haram diyenlerin dünyann en yüksek faizini verdiği görmesen, üretmeden, satarak zengin olacağınızı zannedersen, sata sata borçunun büyüdüğüün farkında değilsen, kullandığın toplu eğne bile ithalken ithalatla övünürsen, kayıtlıının sırını sıvazlayanların emekçinin sırını coplamasına aferin dersen, kendin işsiz gezerken işsizliğin azalğına inanırsan, kaçında don yokken millî gelir 9 bin dolar diye sevinirsen... Bedeli olacak tabii!

*

Sat bakalım evlatları.

Çoktan çok, azdan az...

Bi tane olan, bi tane.
and lists all the privatized state institutions. AKP government is leader of privatization and it aims to sell every valuable asset of the state and country\(^{134}\). In a

Üç tane olan, üç tane.

134

Hangi Hükümet hangi kurumlarını satdı?


Hükümetlerin sattıklarının listesinin uzunluğu ya da kasasız ise, iktidarda kaldıkları süre ile ilgilidir.


Demirel - İnönü Hükümetinin sattıkları;
ÇAYBANK
İPRAGAZ
TAT KONSERVE
ÇAMSAN
RAY SİGORTA
POLİNAS
MEYSU
ŞEKER SİGORTA
ANKARA HALK EKMEK
TÜRK TRAKTÖR
TRAKMAK
Gaziantep Çimento Fabrikası,
İskenderun Çimento Fabrikası,
Trabzon Çimento Fabrikası,
Ladik Çimento Fabrikası,
Şanlıurfa Çimento Fabrikası,
Bartın Çimento Fabrikası,
Aşkale Çimento Fabrikası,
Denizli Çimento Fabrikası,
Çorum Çimento Fabrikası,
Sivas Çimento Fabrikası,
Niğde Çimento Fabrikaları,
ŞEKERBANK,
TOE,
ÇUKUROVA ELEKTRİK
KEPEZ ELEKTRİK
NETAŞ
GİMA
TAVŞANLI YEM SAN. A.Ş.
BALIKSAN A.Ş.
ÇUKOYEM LTD. ŞTİ
SÜMER HOLDİNG A.Ş. 291 Mağaza, 40 Adet Arsa, 1 Adet satış Mağazası ile 4 Şirketeki İştirak Hisserleri
SEK İzmir-Tire Süt Toplama. Merkezi
SEK Çatalca Süt Toplama. Merkezi.


Çiller-Karayalçın Hükümetinin sattıkları;
AEG - ETİ A.Ş.
İSTANBUL DEMİR ÇELİK FABRIKASI
TELETAŞ
GÜNEYSU
LAYNE-BOWLER
HASCAN GIDA
TOROS İLAÇ PAZARLAMA
AEG - ETİ
ALTEK
ÇESTAŞ
ÇANAKKALE SERAMİK
PANCAR MOTOR
FRUKO - TAMEK
TAMEK GIDA
MEKTA
Konya Şeker Fabrikası
NIMSA
HAVAŞ
SUNTEK
Adıyaman Çimento Fabrikası
KÜMAS
ÇİNKUR Celaldağ Maden Saha Ruhšt Devri,
ÇİNKUR Pozantı Maden Saha Ruhšt Devri,
ÇİNKUR Koyulhisar Maden Saha Ruhšt Devri
SİVAS Denir Çeltik T.A.Ş. Gaziosmanpaşa'da Bir Daire
PETKİM A.Ş. Bahçelievler Bina
PETKİM A.Ş. Gaziosmanpaşa Bina
Sivas Yem Fabrikası,
Bandırma Yem Fabrikası,
Kars Yem Fabrikası,
Çaycuma Yem Fabrikası,
Adıyaman Yem Fabrikası,
Korkuteli Yem Fabrikası,
Samsun Yem Fabrikası,
Acipayam Yem Fabrikası,
Bursa Yem Fabrikası,
Çankırı Yem Fabrikası,
Devrekani Yem Fabrikası,
Elazığ Yem Fabrikası,
Göksun Yem Fabrikası,
Yatağan Yem Fabrikası,
Konya I Yem Fabrikası,
Konya İ Yem Fabrikası,
Uşak Yem Fabrikası,
Kızıltepe Yem Fabrikası,
Adapazari Yem Fabrikası,
Erzurum Yem Fabrikası,
Siirt Yem Fabrikası,
Diyarbakır Yem Fabrikası,
Tunceli Yem Fabrikası,
Tatvan Yem Fabrikası,
Van Yem Fabrikası,
İstanbul Yem Fabrikası,
Kırklareli Yem Fabrikası,
Hilvan Yem Fabrikası
Muş Yem Fabrikası
KÖYTEKS A.Ş. Siirt Hazır Gıydım Tesisi
KÖYTEKS A.Ş. Yerköy Tesislere Ait 30 Arsa
EBK A.Ş. Ye ait Manisa Lojman, İslakmen'in Soğuk Depo, Gölbəşi-Oğulbey, Çerkezköy, Gölbəşi-Oğulbey Arsaları
EBK A.Ş. Ankara Et Kombinasyı,
EBK A.Ş. Afyon Et Kombinasyı,
EBK A.Ş. Suluova Et Kombinasyı,
EBK A.Ş. Malatya Et Kombinasyı,
EBK A.Ş. Kars Et Kombinasyı,
EBK A.Ş. Elazığ Et Kombinasyı,
EBK A.Ş. Şanlıurfa Et Kombinasyı,
EBK A.Ş. Tatvan Et Kombinasyı,
EBK A.Ş. Bayburt Et Kombinasyı,
EBK A.Ş. Bursa Et Kombinasyı,
EBK A.Ş. Kastamonu Et Kombinasyı
EBK A.Ş. Ağrı Et Kombinasyı
SUMER HOLDING A.Ş. Gebze, Karadeniz Ereğlisi ve İzmir Konak Arsaları
SUMER HOLDING A.Ş. SIFAS'daki İştirak Hisseleri
TURBAN TÜRİZM A.Ş. Kemer Marina, Çeşme Oteli ve Lojmanları ile İstinye'de 2 Parsel Arsa
SEK Adana Süt Ve Süt Mammüleri,
SEK Afyon Süt Ve Süt Mammüleri,
SEK Amasya Süt Ve Süt Mammüleri,
SEK Bayburt Süt Ve Süt Mammüleri,
SEK Çan Süt Ve Süt Mammüleri,
SEK Çankırı Süt Ve Süt Mammüleri,
SEK Erzincan Süt Ve Süt Mammüleri,
SEK Erzurum Süt Ve Süt Mammüleri,
SEK Eskişehir Süt Ve Süt Mammüleri,
SEK Hava Süt Ve Süt Mammüleri,
SEK Sıverek Süt Ve Süt Mammüleri,
SEK Yatağan Süt Ve Süt Mammüleri,
SEK Yüksekova Süt Ve Süt Mammüleri,
SEK Trabzon Süt Ve Süt Mammüleri,
SEK Solakli Süt Ve Süt Mammüleri,
SEK Sinop Süt Ve Süt Mammüleri,
SEK Bilecik Süt Ve Süt Mammüleri,
SEK Burdur Süt Ve Süt Mammüleri,
SEK İzmir Süt Ve Süt Mammüleri,
SEK Lalahan Süt Ve Süt Mammüleri,
SEK Muğ Süt Ve Süt Mammüleri,
SEK Adıloevas Süt Ve Süt Mammüleri,
SEK Sivas Süt Ve Süt Mammüleri,
SEK Bolu Süt Ve Süt Mammüleri,
SEK Çorum Süt Ve Süt Mammüleri,
SEK Elazığ Süt Ve Süt Mammüleri,
SEK İstanbul Süt Ve Süt Mammüleri
SEK Tunçeli Süt Teplama Merkezi
SEK'İN İsim Hakki

Tansu Çiller'in 25 günlük hükümeti, 52. hükümetin kuruluş hazırlıkları ile geçti.

52. Hükümet: Tansu Çiller - Deniz Baykal (30.10.1995-06.03.1996)

Çiller- Baykal (DYP-CHP) hükümetinin satırları;
TESTAŞ A.Ş. Aydın Tesisleri
KÖYTEKS YATIRM HOLDİNG A.Ş. Yerköy Tesislerine Ait 4 Arsa
KÖYTAŞ
THY 3 Adet B-727 Tipi Uçak
TURBAN TÜRİZM A.Ş. Elmaçoğlu Dağ Evi, Ilıca Moteli, İstinye'de 6 Partsel Arsa
SEK Diyarbakır Süt ve Süt Mamulleri İşletmesi,
SEK Adıyaman Süt ve Süt Mamulleri İşletmesi,
SEK Kastamonu Süt ve Süt Mamulleri İşletmesi,
SEK Devrek Süt ve Süt Mamulleri İşletmesi,
SEK Silivri Süt ve Süt Mamulleri İşletmesi
SEK Aydın Köşk Arasısı
ORÜŞ Aynacık İşletmesi
ORÜŞ Devrek İşletmesi
ORÜŞ Düzce İşletmesi
ORÜŞ Vezirköprü İşletmesi
ORÜŞ Pazarköy İşletmesi
ORÜŞ Ulupınar İşletmesi
ORÜŞ Bafra İşletmesi
ORÜŞ Antalya İşletmesi
SÜMERBANK
SÜMER HOLDİNG A.Ş. Adana Pançuklu Sanayi İşletmesi,
SÜMER HOLDİNG A.Ş. Erzincan Pançuklu Sanayi İşletmesi,
SÜMER HOLDİNG A.Ş. Eskişehir Bas. Sanayi İşletmesi,
SÜMER HOLDİNG A.Ş. Hereke Yünülü Sanayi İşletmesi,
SÜMER HOLDİNG A.Ş. Karaman Pançuklu Sanayi İşletmesi,
SÜMER HOLDİNG A.Ş. Nevşehir Pançuklu Sanayi İşletmesi,
SÜMER HOLDİNG A.Ş Şanlıurfa Yun Yapaçi İşletmesi
SÜMER HOLDİNG A.Ş. 88 adet Mağazanın devri

53. Hükümet: Ahmet Mesut Yılmaz (06.03.1996-28.06.1996)

Ahmet Mesut Yılmaz (ANAP) Hükümetinin sattıkları;
ÇINKUR
Elazığ Çimento Fabrikası
Van Çimento Fabrikası
Lalapaşa Çimento Fabrikası
Kars Çimento Fabrikası
PETROL OFİSİ A.Ş.
M.Öncü Tankeri ve Yedekleri
Niğde Arası
Konya / Beyşehir Arası
Batıman Arası (I), Batıman Arası (II), Bahkesir Arasaları (5 arsa)


Erbakan-Çiller (RP-DYP) Hükümetinin sattıkları;
GÜMÜŞHANE ÇIMENTO Fabrikası
ERGANI ÇIMENTO Fabrikası
PETROL OFİSİ A.Ş
PETLAS
ÇEMAŞ
ÇİMHOL
ANADOLUBANK
FİLYOS ATEŞ TUĞLASI
DENİZBANK
T.D.I. Hopa Limanı,
T.D.I. Tekirdağ Limanı,
T.D.I. Giresun Limanı,
T.D.I. Ordu Limanı,
T.D.I. Sinop Limanı
Talha Sabuncu Tankeri
KÖYTEKS A.Ş Gürünşehane Tesisi,
KÖYTEKS A.Ş Diyarbakır Tesisi,
KÖYTEKS A.Ş Yerköy Tesisi,
KÖYTEKS A.Ş 11 Mağazaların Devri,
KÖYTEKS A.Ş Erzincan Haz. Giyim Tesisleri
T.DENİZCİLİK İŞLETMELERİ Hasköy Bakım Atölyesi
ETİBANK Elazığ Sodyum Bikromat İşletmesi ve 21 Arsa

55. Hükümet: Mesut Yılmaz- Bülent Ecevit (30.06.1997- 11.01.1999)

Yılmaz-Ecevit (ANAP-DSP) Hükü metinini sattıklar:

ETİBANK

HAVAŞ
Kurtalan Çimento Fabrikası
SUMER HOLDING A.Ş. Denizli Paneklu Sanayi İşletmesi,
SUMER HOLDING A.Ş. Maraş Paneklu Sanayi İşletmesi,
SUMER HOLDING A.Ş. Soda Sanayii A.Ş.,
SUMER HOLDING A.Ş. Afyon Sincanlı Yapağı Ve Tıfik. Tops.
SUMER HOLDING A.Ş. Salihli Palmiye Ve Valeks İşletmesi,
SUMER HOLDING A.Ş. Manesman-Sümuer Boru Endüstrisi,
SUMER HOLDING A.Ş. Mersin Satış Mağazası,
SUMER HOLDING A.Ş. Mersin Konfeksiyon Tesisi,
SUMER HOLDING A.Ş. Mersin Depo Binası,
SUMER HOLDING A.Ş. Binyan Yüzdö Sanayi İşletmesi,
SUMER HOLDING A.Ş. Ergili Paneklu Sanayi İşletmesi,
SUMER HOLDİNG A.Ş. Sivrihisar Alım Ajansı,
SUMER HOLDİNG A.Ş. Bursa Bölge Müdurlüğü,
SUMER HOLDİNG A.Ş. Songurlu Yarnı Şuve Konfeksiyon Fabrikası,
SUMER HOLDİNG A.Ş. Erzurum Hazır Giyim Tesisleri
SUMER HOLDİNG A.Ş. Sivas Hazır Giyim Tesisleri
BOZÜYÜK SERAMİK A.Ş.
ORÜS A.Ş. Eskişehir İşletmesi,
ORÜS A.Ş. Kalkum İşletmesi,
ORÜS A.Ş. Yenice İşletmesi,
ORÜS A.Ş. Demirköy İşletmesi,
ORÜS A.Ş. Barın İşletmesi,
ORÜS A.Ş. Savsat İşletmesi,
ORÜS A.Ş. Bolu Emperyalıme,
ORÜS A.Ş. Arhavi İşletmesi,
ORÜS A.Ş. Artvin İşletmesi,
ORÜS A.Ş. Böceği İşletmesi,
ORÜS A.Ş. Dursunbey İşletmesi
ORÜS A.Ş. Kırklareli Demirköy'de Taşınmazlar, 78 Adet Gayrimenkul
TURBAN TURİZM A.Ş. Kemer Marina, Akçay Tatil Köyü, Kuşadası Marina, Bodrum Marina Tesisleri
ÇİTOSAN Öğütülebilirlik Laboratuvan
SİVAS DEMİR ÇELİK İŞLETMESİ
KONYA KROM MAN. A.Ş.
YARIMCI FORSELEN
DENİZ NAKLİYATI T.A.Ş. Üsküdar Binası
SEK Yenice Süt Toplama Merkezi
SEK Giresun Süt Ve Mammüleri İşletmesi.
PETROL OFİSİ A.Ş. Boray Tankeri, Pir Reis Tankeri ve Yedekleri
KÖYTEKS A.Ş. 21 Konfeksiyon makinesi ve 63 Örgü Makinası
K.B.I A.Ş. 246 Adet Arsa
T.D.I. Rize Limanı
T.D.I. Antalya Limanı,
Çeşitli illerde 6 Menkulü, Hopa, Giresun ve Rize Limanında 3 Kiralık Yeri
TÜSTAŞ A.Ş. Ankara A.Ö.C. Mah. 2 Binası
56. Hükümet: Mustafa Bülent Ecevit (11.01.1999- 28.05.1999)

Ecevit (DSP) Hükümetinin sattıkları;

TURBAN A.Ş. Ürgüp Moteli
EBK A.Ş. Kırıkkale Keskin, Sırt, Ankara Bala, Kırıkkale Çelebi de 4 Arasası
EBK A.Ş. Kayseri ve Erzincan'da Soğuk Depo Arsaları
EBK A.Ş. Malatya ve Sakarya'da Kombina Arsaları

57. Hükümet: Bülent Ecevit-Devlet Bahçeli-Mesut Yılmaz

(28.05.1999- 18.11.2002)

Sayın Enis Öksüz, Telecom'un satılmasına karşı direnmiş, Bakanlıkta ve üyesi bulunduğu MHP'den istifa etmiştir.

Ecevit- Bahçeli- Yılmaz (DSP-MHP-ANAP) Hükümetinin sattıkları;

ORÜS A.Ş. Cide İşletmesi ile ORÜS A.Ş. 38 Taşınmaz
SEKA Bolu İşletmesi, Sosyal Tesisleri ve Lojmanları,
SEKA Dalaman İşletmesi,
SEKA Dostel Alım. Sulfat Sanayi. A.Ş.,
SEKA İzmit Pompa İstasyonu Arasası, 1 Matbaa Binası,
SÜMER HOLDING A.Ş. BASF,
SÜMER HOLDING A.Ş. Boyabat Ayakkabı Fabrikası,
SÜMER HOLDING A.Ş. Dumlupınar İpliği Fabrikası,
SÜMER HOLDING A.Ş. İskenderun, Gökçeada, Hakkari'de Mağazaları,
SÜMER HOLDING A.Ş. Muş Mağaza Binası, Çeşitli illerde 11 Arsa, 18 Taşınmaz, 3 lojman, Dikmen'de Taşınmaz
TÜGSAŞ A.Ş. Ulusşyla Alç Tesis ile Gemlik'te Taşınmaz
ASİL ÇELİK Bursa Osmangazi'de 2 Taşınmaz
ÇANTAŞ
TUNGAŞ
ANKARA HALK EKMEK
ÖBİTAŞ
PANCAR EKİCİLERİ BİRLİĞİ
MAKSAN
DENİZ NAKLİYATI T.AŞ.
LIMAN İŞLETMETİ VE NAKLİYAT
MAN KAMYON OTO
DOSAN KONSERVE
BALIKESİR PAMUKLU DOKUMA
AYDIN TEKSTİL İŞLETMESİ
ÜLFET GIDA
KASTAŞ KARADENİZ ÇİM.
OYTAŞ İç VE DIŞ TİC.
MARS TİCARET
CEYHAN SAN. TİC.
GÜVEN SİGORTA
TOE TÜRK OTO.
ANKARA T. SİGORTA ŞİRKETİ.
EGE ET MAM.
İMSA
METAL KAPAK
TÜSTAŞ
ETÜDAŞ
ASIL ÇELİK
ROSS-Breeders- KÖY-TÜR
AYMAR YAĞ
TOROS GÜBRE
OLGUN ÇELİK
PETROL OFİSİ A.Ş.Blok Satuş
TURBAN A.Ş. Carlton Otelî Arasî, Abant ve Bolu Çev. Tur. A.Ş. Atik Paşalar Yalısı
T.Z.D. A.Ş. Diyarbakır İşletmesi,
T.Z.D. A.Ş. Osmaniye İşletmesi,
T.Z.D. A.Ş. Muş İşletmesi,
T.Z.D. A.Ş. Erzurum İşletmesi,
T.Z.D. A.Ş. Ürgüp İşletmesi,
T.Z.D. A.Ş. K.Maraş İşletmesi,
T.Z.D. A.Ş. İzmir Tire İşletmesi,
T.Z.D. A.Ş. Manisa Wp Kükürt İşletmesi
T.Z.D. A.Ş. 53 tasarım, 14 Arsa, 52 Lojman, 79 Depo, 5 Bekçi Evi,
T.Z.D. A.Ş. Şanlıurfa'da Sosyal Tesisi
KBI A.Ş. Murgul İşletmesi Asit Tesisi,
KBI A.Ş. Çeşitli ilerde 206 Adet Taşınmaz ve 2 arsa
EBK A.Ş. Sivas Et Kombinasi,
EBK A.Ş. Burdur Et Kombinasi,
EBK A.Ş. Eskişehir Et Kombinasi,
EBK A.Ş. Gaziantep Et Kombinasi ile çeşitli ilerde 134 Arsa
T. GEMI SANAYİ A.Ş. Eski İstasyon Tersane Arası
T.D.İ Alanya Limanı
T.D.İ Marmaris Limanı,
T.D.İ3 Taşınmaz ve 1 Gemi
PETKIM A.Ş. YARIMA TESİS, İzmir'de 1 Taşınmaz

59. ve 60. Hükümet: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (14.03.2003-)

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (AKP) Hükümetinin sattıkları;
T. TELEKOM
ERDEMR,
İŞDEMR,
Divriği Demir Madeni,
Hekimhan Demir Madeni,
İskenderun İdemir Limanı,
Ereğli Erdemir Limanı
ÇELBOR

KÖY HİZMETLERİ GENEZ MŰDÜRLÜĞÜ (Tasfiye Edilerek İl Özel İdaresine devredildi)

TÜPRAS Blok Satış,
TÜPRAS USAH Hissesi,
TÜPRAS 18 Taşınmaz

Amasya Şeker Fabrikası
Kütahya Şeker Fabrikası,
Adapazarı Şeker Fabrikası

ESGAZ, BURSAĞAZ

ETİ ELEKTROMETALURJI A.Ş.,
ETİ GÖMÜŞ A.Ş.,
ETİ BAKIR A.Ş.,
ETİ KROM A.Ş

ÇAYELİ BAKIR İŞLETMESİ A.Ş.

K.B.İ. A.Ş. Samsun İşletmesi
K.B.İ. A.Ş. Murgul İşletmesi

TDÇI A.Ş., Ye Ait Deveci Demir Madeni Sahası

KBL- Giresun'da 2 Maden ruhsatı işletme Hakki Devir
KBL- Sinop'da 1 Maden ruhsatı işletme Hakka Devir


K.B.İ. A.Ş., Ye ait 188 Arsa, 154 Taşınmaz, 41 Arsa, 89 adet Lojman, 3 Taşınmaz

SEYDİSEHIR ETİ ALÜMİNYUM A.Ş, Oymapınar Barajı, Antalya Madeni, Antalya Limanı, Eti Alüminyum'a

Ait 4 Taşınmaz

SSK Eczaneleri (Tasfiye Edildi)

T.D.İ. Çeşme Limanı,
T.D.İ. Kuşadası Limanı
T.D.İ. Trabzon Limanı,

T.D.İ. Dikili Limanı
T.D.İ. M/F Ankara Feribotu,
T.D.İ. Samsun Feribotu
T.D.İ. Karadeniz Gemisi,

T.D.İ. Nak. İnç. Tur. İh. Pazar A.Ş.,
T.D.İ. Şehir Hat. Hiz. ve Gemiler,
T.D.I. Turan Emekşiz Yolcu Gemisi,
T.D.I. İstanbul'da 21 taşınmaz ve Samsun'da eski acele binası
T.D.I- Yakut II Gemisi
T.D.I Samsun'da taşınmaz
T.D.I- Şehir Hatları Çanakkale Hizmetleri
T.D.I Çanakkale'ye ait 9 Gemi
SÜMER HOLDİNG -BUMAS
SÜMER HOLDİNG A.Ş.-MERİNOS HALİ MARKASI,
SÜMER HOLDİNG A.Ş.-ERYAŞ A.Ş,
SÜMER HOLDİNG A.Ş.-Adıyaman İşletmesi,
SÜMER HOLDİNG A.Ş.-Manisa Pamuklu Mensucat A.Ş.,
SÜMER HOLDİNG A.Ş.-Sarıkamış İşletmesi,
SÜMER HOLDİNG A.Ş.-Sarıkamış Ayakabı İşletmesi,
SÜMER HOLDİNG A.Ş.-Beykoz Deri Ve Kündura Sanayi İşletmesi,
SÜMER HOLDİNG A.Ş.-Yeşilova Hali Yün İşleri Ve Battaniye Fabrikası,
SÜMER HOLDİNG A.Ş.-Bakırköy İşletmesi,
SÜMER HOLDİNG A.Ş.-Çanakkale Şentetik Deri,
SÜMER HOLDİNG A.Ş.-Diyarbakır İşletmesi,
SÜMER HOLDİNG A.Ş.-Terçem, Merinos ve Akdeniz İşletmesinin Makine ve teşhiratları,
SÜMER HOLDİNG A.Ş.-İSTANBUL İMAR LTD. ŞTİ, çeşitli illerde 21 arsa, 115 Taşınmaz, 5 bina ve 16 dükkan
TEKEL ALKOLLÜ İÇKİLER SAN. VE TİC. A.Ş,
TEKEL-KAYACIK TUZLASI
TEKEL-KALDIRIM TUZLASI
TEKEL-YAVŞAN TUZLASI
TEKEL - TEKA ile Sigara Sanayi İşletmesi A.Ş.'ye ait puro mar. ve varlıklar,
TEKEL İstanbul Tütün Mamulleri San. ve Tic. A.Ş.
TEKEL'e ait 5 bina, 25 Daire, 12 arsa ve 332 Taşınmaz
TEKEL Tuzluca, Sekili, Yağışan, Kağızman, Çankır Kaya, Kaldırım ve Kayacık Tuzlaları ile Kristal Tuz Rafine
TEKEL İKİZ KULELER,
TEKEL Erciyes DSL, Bayındırlık, Karayolları Sosyal Tesisleri
TEKEL-Bodrum Tesisleri ve Taşınmazları
DİTAŞ
TAKSAN
GERKONSAN
TÜMOSAN İŞLETMESİ
T.Z.D A.Ş.
SAKARYA TRAKTOR İŞLETMESİ
SEKA Afyon, Bahkesir İşletmesi,
SEKA Yıbitaş Kraft Torba İşletmesi,
SEKA Çaycuma İşletmesi,
SEKA Aksu İşletmesi,
SEKA Kastamonu İşletmesi,
SEKA Karacasu İşletmesi,
SEKA Akköy İşletmesi,
SEKA'ya ait Çeşitli illerde 3 arsa, 7 taşınmaz,
Ankara Alım Satın Müdürlüğü Binası
HAVELSAN A.Ş.
ASPILSAN Askeri Pil San. ve Tic. A.Ş.
MEYBUZ A.Ş.
İstanbul ve Kütahya'da 3 Arsa ve çeşitli illerde 24 Taşınmaz
USAŞ Hissesi ve USAŞ'tın 11 Lojmanı
TÜGSAŞ A.Ş. GEMLİK GÜBRE SAN. A.Ş.
SAMSUN GÜBRE SAN. A.Ş.
İGSAŞ,
İstanbul Satın Alma Müdürlüğü Binası,
Kütahya Gübre A.Ş. Varlıklar,
Şanlıurfa depoları arazisi, Fatsa ve Tekirdağ Depolar,
PETKİM A.Ş.Çanakkale'de 1 arsa
PETKİM - Yanıma'la 5 taşınmaz
E.B.K. A.Ş. Manisa Et Ve Tavuk Kombinasi,
E.B.K. A.Ş. Çeşitli illerde 11 Mağaza, 23 büro, 12 lojman, 4 arsa, 4 Daire,1 Bina,131 taşınmaz, Samsun ve Mersin
Soğuk Hava Deposu
SÜTAŞ,
SÜTAŞ Malatya İşletmesi
SÜTAŞ Muhtelif yerlerde 6 arsa, 5 bina, 13 daire, 51 Taşınmaz, 1 dükkan
ORTADOĞU TEKNOPARK A.Ş.
Manisa Saruhanlı’da 1 turla, Adana ve Gebze’de 3 taşımaz, K.Maraş Elbistan’da 1 arsa, 1 bina, Konya Ereğli’de 1 arsa 1 bina, Erzurum’da 1 daire, Muhtelif İllerde 3 arsa, Konya’da 1 dükkân, Kırıkkale ve Manisa’da 2 Taşınmaz

KTHY

EBÜAŞ – 6 adet Taşınmaz

Deniz Nakliyatı T.A.Ş. 3 Tanker
 Başak Sigorta A.Ş.
 Başak Emeklilik A.Ş.
 TEDAŞ-Zonguldak’ta 19 pylon yerı
 TEDAŞ’a ait 144 taşınmaz
 TEDAŞ Manisa Kula’da ve İstanbul Beykoz’da 2 direk yerı,
 TEDAŞ USAŞ Hissesı
 Taşacu Limanı Tersane Alanı,
 İSKENDERUN LIMANI
 İZMİR LIMANI
 MERSİN LIMANI
 Ataköy Marina Ve Yat İşletmesi A.Ş.
 Ataköy Otelcilik A.Ş.
 Kuşadası Tatil Köyü
 Hilton Otelı
 Emekli Sandığı Çelik Palas Otelı
 Emekli Sandığı Büyük Ankara Otelı
 Emekli Sandığı Büyük Efes Otelı
 Emekli Sandığı Kızılay Emek İşhanı
 Emekli Sandığı Büyük Tatarya Otelı
 Araç Muayene İstasyonu I. Bölge
 Araç Muayene İstasyonu II. Bölge
 Ankara Doğal Elektrik Üretim ve Ticaret A.Ş.’ye ait Tercan Hidroelektrik Santrali,
 Ankara Doğal Elektrik Üretim ve Ticaret A.Ş.’ye ait Kuzgun Hidroelektrik Santrali,
 Ankara Doğal Elektrik Üretim ve Ticaret A.Ş.’ye ait Mercan Hidroelektrik Santrali,
 Ankara Doğal Elektrik Üretim ve Ticaret A.Ş.’ye ait İkizdere Hidroelektrik Santrali,
 Ankara Doğal Elektrik Üretim ve Ticaret A.Ş.’ye ait Çıldır Hidroelektrik Santrali,
 Ankara Doğal Elektrik Üretim ve Ticaret A.Ş.’ye ait Beyköy Hidroelektrik Santrali
 Ankara Doğal Elektrik Üretim ve Ticaret A.Ş.’ye ait Ataköy Hidroelektrik Santrali
Ankara Doğal Elektrik Üretim ve Ticaret A.Ş.'ye ait Denizli Jeotermal Santrali

AKP'nin satmayi planladığı kuruluşlar;

İhalesi Tamamlanmış Olanlar:
T.C.D.D. İzmir Limanı
TEKEL - 1 Taşınmaz
Petkim Petrokimya Holding A.Ş
T.C.D.D. Derince Limanı
Sümer Holding A.Ş. ve ait Mazıdağı Fosfat Tesisleri
Sümer Holding A.Ş. NITRO-MAK Makine Kimya Nitro Nobel Kimya Sanayi A.Ş. Sümer Holding A.Ş. Barıt
Öğütme Tesisı

AKP'nin satmayi planladığı yerler:
Edirne-İstanbul- Ankara Otoyolu
Pozanti-Tarsus- Mersin Otoyolu,
Tarsus-Adana- Gaziantep Otoyolu,
Teprakkale-İskenderun Otoyolu,
İzmir-Çeşme Otoyolu,
İzmir-Aydın Otoyolu,
Gaziantep-Şanlı ırfa Otoyolu,
İzmir ve Ankara Çevre Otoyolu.
Boğaziçi Köprüsü,
Fatih Sultan Mehmet Köprüsü,

Erenerji alanında;
Başkent Elektrik Dağıtım A.Ş.
Sakarya Elektrik Dağıtım A.Ş.
TEDAŞ İstanbul Anadolu Yakası Elektrik Dağıtım A.Ş.
TEDAŞ Engil Gaz Türbünleri: Edremit / VAN
TEDAŞ Denizli Jeotermal Santrali: Sarayköy/ DENİZLİ
TEDAŞ Ataköy Hidroelektrik Santrali: Almus/TOKAT
TEDAŞ Beyköy Hidroelektrik Santrali: Sarıçakaya/ESKİŞEHİR
TEDAŞ Çıldır Hidroelektrik Santrali: Arpaçay/KARS
TEDAŞ İkizdere Hidroelektrik Santrali: İkizdere/RIZE
TEDAŞ Kuzgun Hidroelektrik Santrali: Ilıca/ERZURUM
TEDAŞ Mercan Hidroelektrik Santrali: Ovacık/TUNCELİ
TEDAŞ Tercan Hidroelektrik Santrali: Tercan/ERZİNCAN
TEDAŞ Akdeniz Elektrik A.Ş. Antalya, Burdur, İsparta İl sınırları
TEDAŞ Aras Elektrik A.Ş. Erzurum, Ağrı, Ardahan, Bayburt, Erzincan, Iğdır, Kars
TEDAŞ Çoruh Elektrik Dağıtım A.Ş. Trabzon, Artvin, Giresun, Gümrükhane, Rize
TEDAŞ Dicle Elektrik Dağıtım A.Ş. Diyarbakır, Şanlıurfa, Mardin, Batman, Siirt, Şırnak
TEDAŞ Finat Elektrik Dağıtım A.Ş. Elazığ, Bingöl, Malatya, Tunceli
TEDAŞ Gediz Elektrik Dağıtım A.Ş. İzmir, Manisa
TEDAŞ Göksu Elektrik Dağıtım A.Ş. Kahramanmaraş, Adıyaman
TEDAŞ Çamlıbel Elektrik Dağıtım A.Ş. Sivas, Tokat, Yozgat
TEDAŞ Menderes Elektrik Dağıtım A.Ş. Aydın, Denizli, Muğla
TEDAŞ Osmangazi Elektrik Dağıtım A.Ş. Eskişehir, Afyon, Bilecik, Kütahya, Uşak
TEDAŞ Sakarya Elektrik Dağıtım A.Ş. Sakarya, Bolu, Düzce, Kocaeli
TEDAŞ Uludağ Elektrik Dağıtım A.Ş. Bahcesir, Bursa, Çanakkale, Yalova
TEDAŞ Vangölü Elektrik Dağıtım A.Ş Bitlis, Hakkari, Muş, Van
TEDAŞ Boğaziçi Elektrik Dağıtım A.Ş. İstanbul ili Rumeli Yakası
TEDAŞ İstanbul Anadolu Yakası Elektrik Dağıtım A.Ş. İstanbul ili Anadolu Yakası
TEDAŞ Yeşilırmak Elektrik Dağıtım A.Ş. Samsun, Amasya, Corum, Ordu, Sinop
TEDAŞ Trakya Elektrik Dağıtım A.Ş. Edirne, Kırklareli, Tekirdağ
TEDAŞ Toroslar Elektrik Dağıtım A.Ş. Adana, Gaziantep, Hatay, Mersin, Osmaniye, Kilis
TEDAŞ Meram Elektrik Dağıtım A.Ş. Kırşehir, Nevşehir, Niğde, Aksaray, Konya, Karaman
MİLLİ PIYANGO İDARESİ GENEL MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ (MPI)

TEKEL İşletmeleri;
TEKEL Adana Sigara Fabrikası Müdürlüğü
TEKEL Bitlis Sigara Fabrikası Müdürlüğü
TEKEL İstanbul Sigara Fabrikası Müdürlüğü
TEKEL Malatya Sigara Fabrikası Müdürlüğü
TEKEL Samsun-Balıca Sigara Fabrikası Müdürlüğü
TEKEL Tokat Sigara Fabrikası Müdürlüğü
TEKEL Kahns Türk Tütün End. Ltd. Şti.
TEKEL REYTEK Tütün San. ve Tic. A.Ş.
TEKEL Adana Yaprak Tütün İsl. Müdürlüğü
TEKEL Adıyaman Yaprak Tütün İsl. Müdürlüğü
TEKEL Besni Yaprak Tütün İsl. Müdürlüğü
TEKEL Kahta Yaprak Tütün İsl. Müdürlüğü
TEKEL Malatya Yaprak Tütün İsl. Müdürlüğü
TEKEL Akçaağaç Yaprak Tütün İsl. Müdürlüğü
TEKEL Akhisar Yaprak Tütün İsl. Müdürlüğü
TEKEL Aydın Yaprak Tütün İsl. Müdürlüğü
TEKEL Muğla Yaprak Tütün İsl. Müdürlüğü
TEKEL Mimas Yaprak Tütün İsl. Müdürlüğü
TEKEL Balıkesir Yaprak Tütün İsl. Müdürlüğü
TEKEL Batı Doğru Yaprak Tütün İsl. Müdürlüğü
TEKEL Kırıkkale Yaprak Tütün İsl. Müdürlüğü
TEKEL Kocaeli Yaprak Tütün İsl. Müdürlüğü
TEKEL Kastamonu Yaprak Tütün İsl. Müdürlüğü
TEKEL Erzurum Yaprak Tütün İsl. Müdürlığı
TEKEL Erzincan Yaprak Tütün İsl. Müdürlığı
TEKEL Erzurum Yaprak Tütün İsl. Müdürlığı
TEKEL Gümüşhane Yaprak Tütün İsl. Müdürlığı
TEKEL Hakkari Yaprak Tütün İsl. Müdürlüğü
TEKEL Hakkari Yaprak Tütün İsl. Müdürlüğü
TEKEL Hatay Yaprak Tütün İsl. Müdürlüğü
TEKEL İskenderun Yaprak Tütün İşl. Müdürlüğü
TEKEL Yayladağı Yaprak Tütün İşl. Müdürlüğü
TEKEL Alanya Yaprak Tütün İşl. Müdürlüğü
TEKEL İstanbul Yaprak Tütün İşl. Müdürlüğü
TEKEL İzmir Yaprak Tütün İşl. Müdürlüğü
TEKEL Cumhuriyet Yaprak Tütün İşl. Müdürlüğü
TEKEL Kırıkkale Yaprak Tütün İşl. Müdürlüğü
TEKEL Tuzla Yaprak Tütün İşl. Müdürlüğü
TEKEL Yalova Yaprak Tütün İşl. Müdürlüğü
TEKEL Manisa Yaprak Tütün İşl. Müdürlüğü
TEKEL Kula Yaprak Tütün İşl. Müdürlüğü
TEKEL Salihli Yaprak Tütün İşl. Müdürlüğü
TEKEL Sariyer Yaprak Tütün İşl. Müdürlüğü
TEKEL Selendi Yaprak Tütün İşl. Müdürlüğü
TEKEL Ovacık Yaprak Tütün İşl. Müdürlüğü
TEKEL Saruhanlı Yaprak Tütün İşl. Müdürlüğü
TEKEL Muş Yaprak Tütün İşl. Müdürlüğü
TEKEL Samsun Yaprak Tütün İşl. Müdürlüğü
TEKEL Tokat Yaprak Tütün İşl. Müdürlüğü
TEKEL Erzincan Yaprak Tütün İşl. Müdürlüğü
TEKEL Gümüşhacıköy Yaprak Tütün İşl. Müdürlüğü
TEKEL Taşova Yaprak Tütün İşl. Müdürlüğü
TEKEL Diyarbakır Yaprak Tütün İşl. Fab. Müdürlüğü
TEKEL Adana Pazarlama ve Dağıtım Başmuhtarlığı
TEKEL Afyon Pazarlama ve Dağıtım Başmuhtarlığı
TEKEL Ankara Pazarlama ve Dağıtım Başmuhtarlığı
TEKEL Antalya Pazarlama ve Dağıtım Başmuhtarlığı
TEKEL Aydın Pazarlama ve Dağıtım Başmuhtarlığı
TEKEL Buluk Pazarlama ve Dağıtım Başmuhtarlığı
TEKEL Bursa Pazarlama ve Dağıtım Başmuhtarlığı
TEKEL Çanakkale Pazarlama ve Dağıtım Başmuhtarlığı
TEKEL Çorum Pazarlama ve Dağıtım Başmuhtarlığı
TEKEL Denizli Pazarlama ve Dağıtım Başmuhtarlığı
TEKEL Diyarbakır Pazarlama ve Dağıtım Baş-monitorluğu
TEKEL Edirne Pazarlama ve Dağıtım Baş-monitorluğu
TEKEL Elazığ Pazarlama ve Dağıtım Baş-monitorluğu
TEKEL Erzurum Pazarlama ve Dağıtım Baş-monitorluğu
TEKEL Eskişehir Pazarlama ve Dağıtım Baş-monitorluğu
TEKEL Gaziantep Pazarlama ve Dağıtım Baş-monitorluğu
TEKEL Hatay Pazarlama ve Dağıtım Baş-monitorluğu
TEKEL İstanbul Pazarlama ve Dağıtım Baş-monitorluğu
TEKEL İzmir Pazarlama ve Dağıtım Baş-monitorluğu
TEKEL Kahramanmaraş Pazarlama ve Dağıtım Baş-monitorluğu
TEKEL Kars Pazarlama ve Dağıtım Baş-monitorluğu
TEKEL Kastamonu Pazarlama ve Dağıtım Baş-monitorluğu
TEKEL Kayseri Pazarlama ve Dağıtım Baş-monitorluğu
TEKEL Kocaeli Pazarlama ve Dağıtım Baş-monitorluğu
TEKEL Konya Pazarlama ve Dağıtım Baş-monitorluğu
TEKEL Kütahya Pazarlama ve Dağıtım Baş-monitorluğu
TEKEL Malatya Pazarlama ve Dağıtım Baş-monitorluğu
TEKEL Manisa Pazarlama ve Dağıtım Baş-monitorluğu
TEKEL Mersin Pazarlama ve Dağıtım Baş-monitorluğu
TEKEL Muğla Pazarlama ve Dağıtım Baş-monitorluğu
TEKEL Ordu Pazarlama ve Dağıtım Baş-monitorluğu
TEKEL Sakarya Pazarlama ve Dağıtım Baş-monitorluğu
TEKEL Samsun Pazarlama ve Dağıtım Baş-monitorluğu
TEKEL Sivas Pazarlama ve Dağıtım Baş-monitorluğu
TEKEL Tokat Pazarlama ve Dağıtım Baş-monitorluğu
TEKEL Trabzon Pazarlama ve Dağıtım Baş-monitorluğu
TEKEL Van Pazarlama ve Dağıtım Baş-monitorluğu
TEKEL Zonguldak Pazarlama ve Dağıtım Baş-monitorluğu
TEKEL Çamlıca Tuz İşletmesi Müdürlüğü
TEKEL Ayvalık Tuz İşletmesi Müdürlüğü
TEKEL AMBALAJ FABRİKASI MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ
Tunaş Türk Mühendislik M üşavirlik Ve M üteahhlat A.Ş.
Bumas-Karaman Bulgar Sanayi Ve Ticaret A.Ş.
Şeker fabrikaları;
Ağrı Şeker Fabrikası
Ağrı Şeker Fabrikası
Afşulu Şeker Fabrikası
Ankara Şeker Fabrikası
Bor Şeker Fabrikası
Burdur Şeker Fabrikası
Çarşamba Şeker Fabrikası
Çorum Şeker Fabrikası
Elazığ Şeker Fabrikası
Elbistan Şeker Fabrikası
Erciyes Şeker Fabrikası
Erzurum Şeker Fabrikası
Eskişehir Şeker Fabrikası
İğdır Şeker Fabrikası
Kars Şeker Fabrikası
Kastamonu Şeker Fabrikası
Kırşehir Şeker Fabrikası
Malatya Şeker Fabrikası
Muş Şeker Fabrikası
Sivas Şeker Fabrikası
Tunceli Şeker Fabrikası
Üşak Şeker Fabrikası
Yozgat Şeker Fabrikası
Afşan Makine Fabrikası
Ankara Makine Fabrikası
Erzincan Makine Fabrikası
Eskişehir Makine Fabrikası
Tunceli Makine Fabrikası
Elektromekanik Asgelters Fabrikası
2. AKP Hükümetinin planı: ‘Kamuyu bitireceğiz’

Kitap kaleme alındığında ıktidarla bulunan 2. AKP döneminin ilan edilen programı, Cumburiyet ekonomisinin yıkılması ve eyalet sistemine geçiş programı. Program başlığı olursa ABD ve AB emperyализminin istekleri, Dünya Bankası, OECD ve IMF’nin beklentileri yolunda daha ileri adımlar atılması olacak. Kamu sektöründen geriye kalanların tasfiye edilmesi, yabancı teknelerin egemenliği ve eyalet sistemine giden yolların hazırlanması olan bu programın, Özelleştirme idaresi tarafından ilan edilenleri bile, tehliken boyutlarını anlamaya yetiyor.

Özelleştirme İdaresi Başkanı Metin Kilici, 2009 yılından sonra özelştirilecek bir şey kalıramasını hedeflediklerini itiraf etti.

Telekom’da 45 hissenedir bir bölümünü de satıyoruz.

ÖIB Başkanı Metin Kilici, çoğunluk hissesini özelştirdidikleri Türk Telekom’un yüzde 45 kamu hissesinin belli bir bölümün de satışa verileceği açıklandı. Böylece Telekom’un tamamına yaklaşımın eski condicionesı olacak.

Otoyollar ve köprüler satılıyor


AKP’nin satmayı planladığı diğer otoyolları şunlar:


- Karayolları Genel Müdürlüğü’ bu otoyollar, çevre otoyolları, köprüler, bağlantı yolları, tesisler, bakım işletme ve ücret toplama merkezlerinin bakım onarımına devam edecektir, ama paraylı şirketler alacaktır.

Şeker Fabrikaları ve Telekom satılıyor.

Uncredil tarafından İstanbul’a düzenlenecek Uluslararası Proje Finansmanı Toplantısında ÖIB Başkanı Metin Kilici, hala 25 Şeker Fabrikasından kamunun elinde olan 24 fabrikanın özelleştirilmesinin yakın bir zamanda kapsamlı bir şekilde başlayacağını açıklıyor.
Devletin elinde liman kalıyordu.


Fosfat Tesisleri ve Sümer Hali;

AKP, Sümer Holding'e ait Mazadağı Fosfat Tesislerinin 4 işletme wahsati ve 3 arama wahsati ile bulunuluk haklarının, işletme ve arama sınırlandırılmış arazileri ve bunların üzerindeki alt yapı tesisleri, yerüstü yapıları ve bütünleyici parçalarını, Sümer Hali ve Sümer Holding A.Ş' in mülkiyetindeki Barış Öğütme Tesisini' satmak istiyor.

Yerli ahclar yabancıların piyano olarak ihaleye giriyor;

TEKEL'in alloc'tan bir birimi, Sümerbank ve Petrol Ofisi'nde olduğu sözde yerli ahclar, çok uygun koşullarda devlet desteğiniyle aldıkları kurulunun kısma süre sonra 2-3 katı fiyatına yabancılar sattılar.

Petrol Ofisi'ni 1,25 milyar dolara satın alan yerli konsorsiyum, kendine ait zarar eden şirketle birleştirdiğini, bu durumun Devlet'in her yıl 150 milyon YTL vergi kaybına sebep olduğu ve sonucu bir mikredir KDV borçları ödenmeyen milli kuruluşu yabancılar 5 milyar dolara sattığı biliniyor.

Akarsular ve GAP satılıyor!

Akarsu ve göletlerin kullanım hakkı 49 yıllığına özel sektörde devreديلcek. Enerji Bakanı Hilmi Güler, Kozlun'lu proje kapsamında alınmayacak planlandıkları söylüyor. Fıratın sularının üzerindeki Atatürk ve Keban gibi barajlara giden sular da bu özelleştirme kapsamı içinde olacak. DSİ'de yapılan ön çalışmalara göre, Fırat'ın 29 yıllık satış değerinin 950 milyon dolar, Dicle'nin 650 milyon dolar olacağı söyleniyor. Yani Fırat ve Dicle bir "fabrika" gibi duştunltuluyor"

Fransızlar, Türkiye'de Sabancı ile ortak olup Torosların suyunu Türklerле satıyor! Danone'nin Türkiye'de dördü su ve ikisi sültü ürünler olmak üzere 6 fabrikası var. Zaten Avrupa Birliği, Türkiye'den Fırat ve Dicle sularının uluslararası bir komisyondan yönetilmesini istemişti. İşte bu talebi, akarsuların özelleştirilmesi ile karşılayacaklar! Rahmi Koç da 1997 yılında Venizelos gemisinde düzenlenen toplantıda Boğazın yönetimini uluslararası bir komisyondan devredilmeli gerektğini söyledi.

15 Aralık 2004 tarihinde yapılan AB İlerleme Raporunda aynı şu ifadeler yeralıyor:
more readable message, Turkey is described as being sold fast to many countries from Arabic countries to Western ones. Not the specific buyers/companies but the

"Komşularıyla daha iyi ilişkiler kurması ve bölgesel istikraran korunması için Türkiye'nin bölgedeki ülkelerin su gereksinmeleri konusunda hassas olması, özellikle Irak ve İran'da bulunan Aşağı Mezapotamya sulak alanlarına verilen suyun Atatürk Baraj'ının yapılmasından sonra belirgin şekilde azaldığı göz önünde tutularak, komşularıyla kuraçığın çalıştığı grupları yoluyla, kaynakları Türkiye'de olan belli başlı nehirlerinin sularının eşit ve hakkaniyete uygun dağıtılmasını temini Türkiye'den istenir."

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VATANINI SEVEN BU E-MAILİ MUTLAKA ULAŞABİLDİĞİ KADAR ADRESE İLETSİN LÜTFEN.

VATAN UMURUNDA DEĞİLSE DE SILSİN ATSIN.

Ya hu...

biz ne kadar da

özel(LEŞTİRİL)mişiz

ÖÖÖÖ

Türk Telekom, Arap'in.

Telsim İngiliz'in.

Kuşadası Limanı İsraili'nin.
İzmir Limanı Hong Konglu'nun.

Araç muayene işi Alman'ın.

Başak Sigorta Fransız'ın.

Adabank Kuveytli'nin.

İETT Garajı Dubaili'nin.

Avea Lübnanlı'nın.

Petkim? Ermeni'nin. (Kazak'a sattık, dediler. Kazağı bir çıkardık..

Ermeni...)

Raki, Amerikalı'nın.

Finansbank Yunanlı'nın...

Oyakbank Hollandalı'nın.

Denizbank Belçikalı'nın.
Türkiye Finans Kuveytli'nin.

TEB Fransız'ın.

Cbank İsraili'nin.

MNG Bank Lübnanlı'nnn.

Alternatif Bank Yunanlı'nnn.

Dışbank Hollandalı'nnn.

Şekerbank Kazak'ın.

Yapı Kredi'nin yarısı İtalyan'ın.

Turkcell'in yarısı Finli'nin Rus'ün.

Beymen'in yarısı Amerikalı'nnn.

Enerjisa'nnn yarısı Avustralyalı'nn.

Garanti'nin yarısı Amerikalı'nnn.

Eczacıbaşı İlaç, Çek'ın.
İzocam, Fransız'ın.

TGRT(Fox) Amerikalı'ın.

Demirdöküm Alman'ın.

Döktaş Fransız'ın.

Süper FM Kanadalı'ın.

Hepsi TÜRK'tü.

Sadece 4.5 yıl önce.

Çok önemli....

ASIL DEGERİ 9 (DOKUZ) TRİLYON DOLAR DIKKAT 9 MİLYAR VEYA

9 MİLYON DEĞİL 9 TRİLYON DOLAR...

ABD SADECE 40 KIRK MİLYON DOLARA KAPATAÇAK.

YAZIKLAR OLSUN....
KAPTIRANA, VERENE SUSUP SEYREDENE....

ALTI USTU BİR MAIL GONDERMEKLE

BU İŞ OLMAZ DIYE DÜŞÜNMEYİN LÜTFEN.

VATANINI SEVEN
HERKESE GÖNDERELİM, HEPİNİZİN BİLDİĞİ GİBİ ETİBANK ÖZELLESTİRİLECEK..

(VE ALICISI AMERIKA :-) VE BOR İŞLETMELERİ ETİBANK

BÜNYESİNDE, KONULAN FİYAT

40 MİLYON $.

LÜTFEN BİR DAHA OKUYUN VE LÜTFEN HERKESE İLETİN... YASAĞIĞIN DÜNYAYI SORGULAYAMIQYORSAN, BARI ÜLKENİ SORGULA.....

Önemli! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!..

Borla çalıçan araba üretil di, Türkiye kiskacta. Arabayı bor madeniyle calistiracak patenti 600 proje olduğu ortaya cıktı.Turkiye, dünya
countries they are located are listed and readers are invited to defend their fastly
disappearing country as if an international crusada is invading Turkey. When one
talks about country's assets, the mineral Bor cannot be ignored. It is a frequent theme

rezervinin yüzde 70'ine sahip ve uluslararası teröristler Türkiye
uyanmadan

bu kaynagi ele geçirmeyi planlıyor.

Bu maili çoklu yollayarak en azından
bir toplum bilinci oluşmasına yardım edebiliriz...

ya da direkt silin..

TMMOB

ÇEVRE MÜHENDİSLERİ ODASI

İSTANBUL ŞUBESİ

!!!!!! Hızlı Bir Şekilde Forward Edelim !!!!!

Hüseyin Aygün
that Turkey is not allowed to use her immense Boron resources. Messages about Thorium resources were not as powerful as the Boron ones.

Çok önemli....OKUYUN ve OKUTUN... ASIL DEGERi 9 (DOKUZ)
TRiLYON DOLAR. DIKKAT 9 MiLYAR VEYA 9 MiLYON DEGiL ... 9
TRiLYON DOLAR...

ABD, SADECE 40 KIRK MiLYON DOLARA KAPATACAK...

ALTl USTU, BiR Mail GONDERMEKLE BU iS OLMAZ DIYE
DUSUNMEYiN...

LUTFEN, VATANINI SEVEN HERKESE GONDERiN...

HEPiNiZiN BiLDiGi GiBi ETiBANK OZELLESTiRiLECEK ..

(VE ALICISI AMERIKA:--) VE... BOR iSLETMEleri ETiBANK
BUNYESiNDE...

KONULAN FiYAT; 40 MiLYON S...

LUTFEN BiR DAHA OKUYUN... VE LUTFEN HERKESE iLETiN...

YASADiGiN DUNYAYI SORGULAYAMIYORSAN, BARi
ULKEni SORGULA.....

Önemli !!!!!!!!!!

Borla calisan arabasi uredildi, Turkiye kiskaeta.
Arabayi BOR madeniyle calistiracak patentli 600 proje oldugu ortaya ciktı...

Türkiye, dunya rezervinin yuzde 70'ine sahip...

Ve uluslararsi teroristler, Türkiye uyanmadan bu kaynagi ele gecirmeyi planliyor...

Bu maili çoklu yollayarak en azindan bir toplum bilinci olusmasına yardim edelim... Ya da hemen(!) silelim..

(TMMOB) ÇEVRE MÜHENDİSLERİ ODASI
İSTANBUL ŞUBESİ
İstiklal Cad. Koçtuğ Han. No:386 Kat:2 Tünel
Beyoğlu / İstanbul

(212) 245 89 15-16 <> (212) 245 89 17
http://www.cmo.org.tr <> cmo@cmo.org.tr

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Less frequently mentioned than Bor mineral and a scholar writes against Thorium fantasies (by Prof. Cengiz Yalçın at this Hürriyet page:

Thorium related emails emerge after a group of Turkish physicists died all together in a plane crash.
The next phase was the targeting of AKP leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Mr. Erdoğan gives more than enough means to be attacked. As it is stated elsewhere he is known to be a bold speaker and some of his statements are re-quoted with manipulation in order to demonstrate that he intends to transform the secular republic into an Islamic state. Weekly comic magazines were particularly mobilized against

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"Dikkatle okuyun lütfen..."

21 Ağustos 2001 günü gazetelerin birinci sayflarında

Başbakan Erdoğan'ın bir konuşması yayında

Madde madde diyor ki...

"Tutтурmuşlar laiklik elden gidiyor, diye!.. Yahu bu millet istediğten sonra laiklik tabii elden gidecek!.. Sonra nedir bu laiklik Allah aşıkna?.. Bu ne menem şey?.. Çıktııyor İçişleri Bakan, 'Devlet dine karşı' diyor. Eeve.. gerisini niye söylemiyorsun?.. Din devlete karşı demiyorsun!.."

"Laiklik tabii elden gidecek..."
"Laik ve Müslümanın olumuz.."

!

"Ya Müslüman olacaktın ya laik.."

"Egemenlik Allah'ındır.."

"Ben Müslümanım, diyenin tekrar yanına gelip
bir de aynı zamanda laikim, denesi mümkün değil.
Niye? Çünkü Müslümanının yaratıcısı Allah kesin
hâkimiyet sahibidir. 'Egemenlik kayıtsız şartsız milletindir'
lafi koskoca bir yalan!. Egemenlik kayıtsız şartsız Allah'ındır."

"AB'ye girmeyeceğiz.."

!

"Avrupa Birliği'ne girmek için koşulları veriyorlar.
Onlar da bizi almanınayı düşünüyorlar. Eeeee..
biz de girmemeyi düşünüyoruz. AB'nin asıl adı
Katolik Hristiyan Devletler Birliği'dir."
"Anayazayı sarhoşlar hazırladı."

!

"Kaptıkaçı mənəşkaçı, (Prof. Orhan Aldıkaçı) anayazayı hazırlıyorlar, adamlar ayık kafayla hazırlamıyorlar bunu;

sonra iki senede deliniyor."

"Ümmeçilik tutar."

!

"Yahu bu milletin bütününe 'Ne mutlu Türküm diyene' ifadestyle sağlanır mı? Osmanlı 30'u aşın etnik grubu ümmet düşüncesiyyle bir arada tuttu.

"Terör Meclis'te."

!

"Terörü Cudi dağılarında arıyorlar; terör Meclis'in içinde!

Orada kolledilmeli!.."
"Doğumları kadın yapracak.."

!

"Doğumevlerinde yalnız kadın doktorlar çalışacak!.. Öğretnenlikte yetişmiş başörtülü kızlarımız var;
şimdi işe alınmayan bu başörtülü kızlarımız anaokullarında
yavrularımızı yetiştireceğ.."

"Hazmettirecek gelyoruz.."

!

"Türkiye Cezayir ohr mu, diye sormyorlar. Biz hazmettire hazmettire
gelyoruz. Allah in ızniyle!.. Şimdi artık millet yalnız aktörleri değil,

senaryoyu da değiştirmeye talip!.. Bu çalışmalarımız senaryoyu

değiştirme çalışmalarındır. Biz onun için geliyoruz. Bu düzenin

koruyucusu olamayız; bu mümkün değil. Bu hukuku hazırlayanlar,


bu düzenin kaldırılmasıının mağası olacaklar.."


"Kıyam başlayacak.."
Mr. Erdoğan. Pejorative poems that looked like eulogy circulated. His misdeeds are listed and it is claimed that he himself thinks the people is ignorant because they

"Bir bucak milyar nüfuslu İslam âlemi Müslüman-Türk milletinin ayağa kalkmasını bekliyor...

Ayağa kalkacağız.

İşkileri gördük, Allah'ın izniyle kıyma başlayacak!.."

Peki, Erdoğan değişti mı?..

...

Tehlikenin Farkında nersiniz?

CUMHURIYETİ'NİZE

SAHİP ÇIKIN!

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FW: Tayyibe methiye
DiKKAT!! Resmin altındaki siiri atlamayın!

Leman dergisinden alıntı

Yazar: Mehmet Çagcag

ABIMSIN TAYYIB!

Seni bu memlekete Allah gönderdi
Ummetsiz sunnetsize dersini verdi
Laïkler de ortami gerdiğe gerdi
Tas-hakli liderin aslanım Tayyib.

Bulent Arınç bey meclis bulbulu
Allah göndermis sana Abdullah Gul'u
Tuzmen piyasalar yüzün guldurdu
Isini bilen devlet adami, supersin Tayyib.

O gun soferlerini dovesim geldi
Arabada kalısında içim çiz etti
İmdada yetisen balyozu opesim geldi
Mubarek balyozuna sap olan Tayyib.

Hazineyi Unakıtan abi paraya bogdu
Dersin ki anasından eknomis dogdu
Cuvalla doviz yurdu doldurdu
Sırtın yere gelmez Pehlivan Tayyib.

Amerikha israyıl, herkeshi kolladin
Kindar AB'yi bile yıkalıp yağları
Merkel gibi Türk düşmanının bagladın
Buyuk bağlamacı cambazisin Tayyib.

Tüm Türkiye senlen gurur duuyor
Gisganc layıklar kendin yollara vuruyor
Kısları karakolu selam duruyor
Siyasette Ozal'dan feristah Tayyib.

Sana gicik olan bir gicik muhalefet
Baykal, Mumcu ise eger siyaset
Korkma sonmez ampulun ilelebet
Yurru bee kim tutar seni, padisah Tayyib.

Bu arada evladin kosteri hayırlı olsun
İsleri cossun,allah paraya bogsun
Oyle evlatlara helaller kismetler olsun
Micoluga bile talibim, abimsin Tayyib.

Su gisganc insanlar seni karikoter yapıyor
Kah kedi, kahi ördek yılan kene ciziyor
Bu serefisizler madem kimseden korkmuyor
still vote for him. His early days as a merchant is claimed to be corrupt. Another way to attack Mr. Erdoğan was to claim that he is a man of US and in his trips to US

Göster kendini sunlara kaplansın Tayyib.
(Pardon abi kaplansın dedim ağzındankacti, dava acma.)

Farkindayım herkes kupunu doldurdu
Cemaatten olan hasilata elini daldırdı
Bir isaretin ile kimler, kimler kalkındı
İsaret parmaana denk gelem, babamsın Tayyib.

Diyorlar ki milyarlarca eurosu dolarları var
Calisip onlar da kazansın, emme buzukleri dar
Daha da çok versin onunde zamanların var
Sen bence gönünlük Karun'sun Tayyib.

Propogandani her gün bedafaya theypiom
Taksı gene en az yüz musteri bagliyom
Taksi plakasına inanki fitim soyluyom
Annadin sen onu kankamsın Tayyib

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Tayyip Diyor ki;

Ey benim okuyup araştırmayan halkım:
1- Şehidinize hakaret ettim, anlamadınız.
2- Ermeni yahudi demeden ülke varlıklarını sattıp, egemenliğimizi devrettim, anlamadınız
3- Kendi ülkeni bölen projenin Eş Başkan'ım dedim, anlamadınız
4- Türkiye yi katmerli bir borçun altında sottum, toprakları sattım, anlamadınız
5- Barzani ve Talabani ile kolkola girip kendi askerimizi dişladım, anlamadınız
6- Din, müslümanlık; islam dedik 4 yıl boyunca rekor sayıda kilise açtırdım, bu nasıl müslümanlık demediniz ve yine anlamadınız.
7- Oğluına açık açık gemi aldım, alenen 4 senede onu da trilyoner yaptım anlamadınız
8- Maliye bakeriyle elele verip yedi sülalemize yetecek paraları götürdük anlamadınız
9- Teröristbaşına sayım dedim anlamadınız
10- Ülkeyi en yüksek faizle borçlandırırım anlamadınız
11- 2002 deki seçim öncesi dokunulmazlıklarını kaldırcam diye yalan söyleyip sonra bi daha lafi mi bile etmedim anlamadınız
12- Derdini söyleyen vatandașa si... çektim anlamadınız.

2012

Üstüne üstlük bütün bunları tembel muhalefette size iyi anlatmayınca, sandıktan hooop ben çektim. Şimdi bir 5 yıl daha sizleri ben sevmeyimde kimler sevsin.
Bu 5 yılda da yapacağımı yaparım, ondan sonra ister seç ister seçme çok da göbeğimin bi karış altındaydı.

Nasıl olsa kalkıp yüzünüze sövsem yine %30 alırım.
Atalarımız ne demiş; Deveye diken, insanı seven.

Canım koyunlarım benim.

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Subject: FW: Sucuk Krali RTE

Sucuk Kralı!!! Benden iletmesi!

OKUDUM. SIZDE OKUYUN. LUTFEN ŞAŞIRMAYIN...!!!

Yıl 1984. Özal'ın ANAP Hükümeti ekonomiYahoo libere ederken et ithalâtına daizin çıkarıyor..

Bazları ayağa kalkıyor ve 'bu ithalât serbestisi hayvancılıgımızı öldürür' diye haykııyor ama bu haykırlara rağmen ithalât başlıyor..

Kopuzlar Gıda'ya (Mustafa Kopuz mehum) ait Elif Sucukları'nın muhasebe ve fabrika müdürlüğü (Fabrika Kağıthane'de) futbolculuktan gelme ve aynı zamanda Erbakan'ın genç bir müridi..

Çevresinde 'Lâik Devlete düşmanlığı' ile tanınp biliniyor..
Bu genç İslâmcı aynı zamanda Elif sucuklarının küçük bir hissedarı da...

Ve; adv: Recep Tayip Erdoğan.

İşte bu genç adam bir gün, yanında patronu Mustafa Kopuz da olduğu halde, ülkenin en büyük et ithalâtçısına gidiyor.

Vadeli çek verecekler ve ithâl et satın alıp, sucuk üretecekler..

Ancak ithalâtçı firma, ilkeleri gereği bu genç adamın ve patronunun taleplerini geri çeviriyor.. Vadeli çekle mal verseler bile mutlaka bir banka teminat mektubu istediklerini söylüyorlar..

Aradan birkaç gün geçtikten sonra Mustafa Kopuz, yanında Ankaralı ünlü bir müteahhit (aslen Rizeli) de olduğu halde et ithalâtı yapan firmanın yetkililerini ziyarete geliyor..

Ankara'dan gelen bu müteahhit konuk, et ithalâti yapan firmanın bağlı olduğu holdingin bir başka inşaat malzemesi şirketinin iyi bir müşteri.. Kendi çalıştığı bankalardan birinden teminat mektubu vermeyi öneriyor...

Et ihtilâtçısı firma yetkilileri de Elif Gıda lehine olmak şartıyla bu teklifi kabul ediyorlar..

Teminat mektubu ile birlikte çekler tanzim edilip ithalâtçı firmaya teslim ediliyor ve Danimarka'dan gelen (İslâmi Kurallara uygun kesilmiş olması mümkün değil) ithal etlerin sevkıyatı da başlıyor..

Çekleri, genç mühasebeci Recep Tayip imzalıyor..
Ve..

Günü geldiğinde çekler bir türlü ödenmiyor..

Recep Tayip alacaklı firmaya gidip karşılıkızı çıkan çekleri yeni çeklerle değiştirmeyi, nasıl olsa banka teminat mektuplarının olduğunu söylüyor.

Talebi bir seferde mahsus olmak üzere kabul ediliyor...

Ve..

O yeni çekler de ödenmiyor..

Teminat mektubu nakde çevriliyor. Ankara’da iş yapan Rizeli müteahhit ile Elif Gıda’nın arasına kara kedi giriyor.

Buraya kadar her şey normal çünkü çekler karşılıksız çiksa da teminat mektubunun paraya çevrilmesi sonucu tahsil edilmiş oluyor...

Ama asıl olaylar ondan sonra gelişiyor.

Aynı firma, o büyük et ithalâtçısından mal alamayınca bu kez piyasadaki başka küçük firmalara yöneliyor..

Ve bir sabah...

Tercüman Gazetesi şu başlıkla çıkıyor:

'Skandal.. Vabcdansızlar!.. Eşek etinden sucuk üretip halka satıyorlar'..

Gazetede, Recep Tayip beyin bir fotoğrafı yer alıyor..
he receives orders. The sender of the email is interesting:
malcolmxelhacmalikellsahbaz. This is the full name of an American black leader,

Tutulanıp götürülmüş.

İlerleyen günlerde Mustafa Kopuz ölüne Elif Sucukları (gizli olarak) Tayip beyin oluyor.

Ve Allah’ın; ‘Yürü ya Tayip’ emrini bu genç adam nasıl algıyor bilinmez çünkü yürümektense, yürütmeye başlıyor.
İstanbul Büyük Şehir Belediye Başkanı oluyor.
İstanbul Büyük Şehir Belediyesi çalışanlarına satışın bütün suçları Elif Sucuklarından alına başlıyor ve o satın alma halen devam ediyor.
Elif Sucukları günümüzde kapatlı devre çalışıyor.
Yani sadece İstanbul Belediyesi Büyük şehrin ihtiyaçlarını karşılıyor.
Ve elbette firma, Recep beyin üstüne kayıtlı değil.
Gazetelerin birinde Tayip Bey’in Kisikli’da toplam 6 milyon YTL değerinde 3 adet villası olduğunu ve ilk villa büyük oğlu Burak’ın taşınmak üzere olduğunu okuyunca bunları hatırladım.
Nazlı Hanım (Ilicak) şu haberin yer aldığı Tercüman Gazetesi’nin (eğer o günkü nüsha kaybolmamışsa) arşivden çıkarıp medyaya verse de biraz eğlensek.
Date: Sun, 13 Apr 2008 11:02:57 +0300

From: malcolmixelhaccmalikellsahbaz@gmail.com

Subject: Erdoğan’ın ABD seferi ve yansımaları

Mustafa Peköz

İslami̇c AKP hükümeti ve Genelkurmay eksenli gelişirilen konsept ile sistem kuvvetleri aralarındaki çelişkiler bir yana bırakıldı ve çok yönlü imha politikası uygulanmaya konuldu. Kürt realitesini kriminal bir sorun olarak gösterip, çok yönlü saldırılarına bir zemin oluşturmak için uluslararası destek bulmaya çalışıyorlar.

Türk devlet kurumlarının hemen her kademesiinde ortaya konulan 'kararlılık' bildirgelerinin arka planında aslında çok belirgin bir 'kararsızlık' ve 'başarısızlık' bulunmaktadır. Seçimlerden sonra ortaya çıkan tablo Türk devletinin iç politikada belirgin bir başarısızlığı ortaya çıkmış durumda. Kürt hareketi karşılarındaki pozisyonu aynı zamanda bölgedeki istikrarı sağlanmak için uluslararası destek bulmaya çalışıyorlar.

Seçimlerden sonra ortaya çıkan tablo Türk devletinin iç politikada belirgin bir başarısızlığı ortaya çıkmış durumda. Kürt hareketi karşılarındaki pozisyonu aynı zamanda bölgedeki istikrarını sağlamak için uluslararası destek bulmaya çalışıyorlar.


Erdoğan’ın heyetinde Genelkurmay 2. Başkanı Orgeneral Ergun Saygun ve Plan ve Harekât Daire Başkanı Tümgeneral Kenan Koçak’ın yer aldığı, karar merkezinin

Türkiye ve ABD tarafından 'düşman' kategorisinde görülen PKK'nın toplumsal bir kuvvet olarak tasfiye edilemeyeceği bilinmektedir. İzlenecek taktik esas olarak politik kabiliyet alanı darpılmış, askeri olarak kendi iç kabuguya çekilmiş bir PKK yaratmakta. Bunun içinde ABD'nin aktif desteğinde özellikle gerilla güçlerine karşı kapsamlı hava saldırıları ve nokta operasyonları çok yoğunlukla olarak yapılacaktır.

ABD ve AB'nin Türk devletinin PKK'ye yönelik operasyonların 'meşru' görmesi saldırıların kapsamlı çok daha boyutlu olacağına dair önemli veriler sunmaktadır.

ABD Savunma Bakanlığı sözcüsü Geoff Morrell'in verdiği brifingde, "Türklere, PKK ile savaş çabalarında bol bol istihbarat vererek yardımcı oluyoruz. Türklerin ihitiyaç duyuğu, U-2 uçaklarının kullanılarak elde edilen 'uygulanabilir istihbarat'ın Türklerre verildiğini" belirtmesi ve 'Uygulanabilir istihbarat', 'edindikten sonra operasyon düzenlemeye olanak veren değerli bilgiler' olarak tanımlanması ve '10 üst düzey PKK'linin ABD'nin en çok arananlar listesinde olduğunu' belirtmesi olası saldırıların boyutu konusunda, bize çok açık bir fikir vermektedir.

AKP ve Genelkurmay tarafından oluşturulan ortak heyet ile Washington-Pentagon arasında yapılan görüşmelerde ABD ve Türkiye ilişkileri bir bakıma yeniden

Malcolm X and he is a liked person among radical Islamists in Turkey. The EU process triggered unpredictable political alliances and some radical Muslims and nationalists with some leftists allied against AKP rule and EU process.

When the Chief Prosecutor opened a case to close AKP, secularist messages called for support for the prosecutor. High judiciary was the last bastion. Atatürk had

Peki, ödülün karşılığı nedir? PKK'nın tasfiyesinde aktif rol üstlenmek. 'Kürdü Kürde tasfiye ettirme' politikasına destek sunmanın hiçbir gerekçesi olmaz. Buna alet olmaya aday olanlar, Kürtlerin stratejik birliği için bin kez düşünmek zorundadırlar.

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SAYIN LAİK TÜRKİYE CUMHURİYETİ VATANDAŞI,

Laik Cumhuriyetimizin değerlerine sahip çıkmak için,

kendisine verilen görevin sorumluğunu korkusuzca yerine getiren

Cumhuriyet Başsavcısı

Sayan ABDÜRRAHMAN YALÇINKAYA'ya Destek vererek,

Başbakan ve Onun gibi düşününenleri Hukuka Saygılı olmaya davet eden

imza kampanyasına katılmışınız saygırimla arz ederim.
envisaged this. In a long quote from an ultranationalist Kemalist left magazine, “It was not anti-democratic act because AKP was dictatorial, it was itself anti-

T.C. Vatandaşı

Aşagdaki linki tıklayarak online imza kampanyasına katılabilirsin....

www.hukucumhuriyeti.org

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Subject: FW: Cumhuriyet Savcısı

'Neden sadece savcılara Cumhuriyet Savcısı denilir?

Lozan'da doktora yaptıklan sonra Atatürk tarafından 'Hukuk Reformu yapmakla' görevlendirilen Adalet Bakanı Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, savcılar için 'Cumhuriyet Savcısı' unvannın isim babasıdır.

Ata'nın huzurunda 'Hukuk Reformu' için fikir firtması yapılırken, Bozkurt çok tepki alır ve sıkıştırılır:

'Neden sadece savcılara Cumhuriyet Savcısı denilir?
Cumhuriyet Başbakanı,
Cumhuriyet Bakanı,
Cumhuriyet Müşteşarı,
Cumhuriyet Valisi,
Cumhuriyet Büyükelçisi olmuyor da,
Neden Cumhuriyet Savcısı?
Savcılara neden bu imtiyaz?
democratic". Some other long arguments stated that if Constitutional Court's
decision/warning on headscarf was understood by AKP, this closure case would not

Atatürk, Bozkurt'a 'Ne diyorsun?' diye sorar.

Bozkurt'un cevabı çok net olur:

'Çünkü öyle zaman olur ki, cumhuriyeti korumak için başbakanandan, bakandan,
müsteşardan, validen, büyükeğiden bile hesap sormak gerekebilir. İşte o hesabı
soracak olan Cumhuriyet Savcısı'dır.'

Atatürk, gülistan yere hoşnut kaldığını belli eder. 'Devam et Bozkurt' der.

Cumhuriyet Savcısının bu cumhuriyeti korumak ve kollamak yetkisi hukuk reformuna
ve Atatürk'in yorumuna kadar uzanır.

Bugün Cumhuriyet Başsavcısı üzerinde şimşekler çektrilirken, bu annın bir kez daha
yazılması gereklidi.

Bilen de bilmeyen de öğrensin.

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Demokrasimiz yara mı aldı?

Biliyorsunuz, geçen hafta Cuma günü gündemde bomba gibi bir haber
düştü. Cumhuriyet Başsavcısı AKP'ye bazı eylemlerinden dolayı kapatma davası açtı.
Mahkeme sahası başlamış olmasına rağmen bizim bu konuda fıkir yürütmemiz
mümkün ama ben bu davanın açılma haberinin yayılanması ile ilgili bazı kişi ve
kurumların tutumlarını ve beyanlarını değerlendirmek istiyorum. Doğal olarak; "Dava,
Cumhuriyet'in temel niteliklerini korumak, demokrasiyi yaşatmak için açılmıştır" diyenler olduğu gibi; "Demokrasilerde parti kapatmak büyük bir ayıptır, demokrasımızı yara almıştır" diyenler de var. Biz fikrimizi yazınca içinde somut verilerle açıklamaya çalışacağız. Şimdi bu söylemleri kimlerin kullandığına bir göz atalım.

Bir kısmın hukukçular, başta Anayasa Mahkemesi eski Başkanı Yekta Gungör Özden Bey olmak üzere, eski Cumhuriyet Başsavcılığı Vural Savaş ve Sabih Kanadoğlu gibi birçok tanınmış hukukçu, Cumhuriyet Başsavcılığını görevini yaptığı söylerken; AKP Genel Başkanı Başbakan Erdoğan ve AKP yöneticileri ile MHP, BBP, ANAP, DP, DTP gibi siyasi parti yöneticileri, medyanın büyük bölümü, TÜSİAD gibi kuruluşlar, AB ve ABD'li yöneticiler, liberal demokratlar Başsavcının yanlış yaptığı, hatta suç işlediğini ve yargılanması gerektiğini ileri sürüyorum. İleri sürulen gerekçe; "Demokrasilerde siyasi partiler yargılanmıyor ile kapatılmasız" şeklinde görülüyor. Şimdi konumuzu dönelim ve meydanı gümbür gümbür iletilen, attıkları zaman mangalda kül bırakmayan bu beylerin tezini inceleyelim.


Bulunsrsa kapatılır. Başsavcılığı iddiası, bir siyasi partinin, yanı AKP'nin özgürlikleri ortadan kaldırıma için eylemlerde bulunduğudur. Özgürlikleri yok etme özgürliği olamayacağına işaret eden Başsavcı, iddia ettiği suçları işleyen bir partiyeye kapatma davası açmıştır. Durum bundan ibaretir. Yüzde kırk yedi oy, özgürliklerin

Diktatörlük sevdalıları


Halk, oyunu, "ülkenin yönetimini bir siyasi partiye, programında yazılı işleri yerine getirmek ve özgürlükleri korumak, o ortamın devamını sağlamak" için verir. Ona istediğini yapma yetkisi vermez. Eğer bu tür bir yetki vermiş olsaydı, o zaman özgürlükleri, devletin temel niteliklerini korumak üzere kurulmuş onlarca kuruma
neden ihtiyaç duyulur? Demek ki, özgür ortamın devamı siyasi yaşam için vazgeçilmez koşullardan biridir, ayıncı siyasi partiler gibi...

Nasıl siyasi partiler demokrasinin vazgeçilmez unsurları ise, özgür ortam da demokrasinin olmazsa olmazdır. Özgür ortamı ortadan kaldırmaya yölenenler ister fert olsun, ister kurum olsun, ister siyasi parti olsun, o ortamı korumakla görevlendirilenler tarafından kontrol edilir ve haklarına gereklı yasal işlemleri yapılır. Bu işlem ferde yapıyorsa kuruma da yapılır; çünkü hukuk eşitlik ilkesine dayanır.


Başsavcılığın iddianamesinde AKP'nin özgür ortamı yok ederek faşist bir yönetim kurmaya çalıştığı, önekleleri ile anlatılmıştır. Burada yapılacak iş o savcının kızmak değil, yapılanları durdurmaya, siyasi özgürlük ortamını korumaya yönelmek; "Nerede hata yaptık?" sorusuna cevap aramak olmalıdır. Ama AKP yöneticileri bunu yapacaklarına toypökün Başsavcılığa saldırya geçmiştir. Yavuz hırsız ev sahibini bastırır örnek... Hem suç işleyecen hem de zeytinyağı gibi suyun üstüne çıkarya...
be needed. Former presidents Mr. Sezer was another heroic figure who resisted AKP's hegemony. He was modest, uncorrupted and patriotic.\footnote{146}


TÜRK SOLU

Sayın Ahmet Necdet SEZER

neden sevilmedi...!

ALINTIDIR

Ahmet Necdet Sezer Neden Sevildi??

Ya da biz kimi sevmeyiz?

SAAT
Halt

Kilim

Kalem seti

Gümüş tepsi

Taka

Şifoniyer

Kaftan

Vazo

Madalyon

Heykel

Biblo

Tablo

* Hepsini bırakmış Ahmet Necdet Sezer...

Kendisine verilen 1243 parça hediyenin, 1243'ünün de bırakmış... Günürmemiş.

* Bu benim cumhurbaşkanım olamaz...

* Zaten, kırmızı yaka durmasından beli idi... Kimse durmuyor ki, o niye duruyor? İsveç mi burası?

* Bakıyorum gazetelere...
94 parça gümüş,

22 vazo,

9 takt,

27 hatıra para,

4 tabanca,

83 parça değerli süs eşyası,

55 tablo,

86 porselein,

7 madalyon,

4 saat...

İnsanın içi gidiyor!

Al, görüy di mi... Bırakmuş, gidiyor.*

* Üstelik, liste eksik...

Kendisine tahsis edilen "kafana göre harca" denilen ödeniği de harcamadı.

Hediyeleri bıraktığo gibi... Papelleri de bıraktı.

46 trilyon liraçık! Ye, yemedi... Gez, gezmedi.

O zaman bırak biz yiyelim...

Ona da izin vermedi. "Yetim hakkıdır" dedi, görevi boyunca tasarruf ettiği 46 trilyonu, Maliye'ye iade etti... Kemal Abi'ye.
* Çocukları hálá memur...

First Lady desen... Bi Atı Kutoğlu'nu bile tammuyor...

Belediyeler, bizim paramızla simitçilere Cemil İpekçi'den köstüm hazırlattı; o hálá kendi cebinden giyiniyor.

* Aşçıyı, garsonu azalttı.

"Suyla çalışmıyor bunlar" dedi, 14 makam aracını geri verdi.

Okluk'taki yazılık köşke hiç gitmedi.

Oğlunu evlendirdi, elektrik parasına kadar cebinden ödedi.

Eşi düştü, bileğini kırdı; hastaneye sivil araçla götürdü, röntgen için kuşruğa girdi, sırı bekledi.

Annesi vefat etti, gene sivil plakayla gitti; flap flap flap, fors yapmadı...

Resmi yemekler hariç, kimseye davet vermedi. Mutfakta yerli ürün kullanırdı.

Şatafattan uzak durdu.

* Yeminini tuttu...

Hukuku üstün kaldı.

E halıyla... Sevildi.

Sevilmez.
Other targets

Of course, Armenians could not be ignored. Whenever genocide claims made the headlines, anti-Armenian messages circulated. One pointed the betrayal of Armenians in the WWI\(^{147}\). PKK was another usual target when terroristic activities

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feyziyurdagul@hotmail.com

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BU UNUTULUR MU????????????????!!!!

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BU UNUTULUR MU ? (Ama malesef unuttuk...)

Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nda İngilizlere, 150 bin askerimiz esir düştü. Bu askerlerden bir kısmı da Mısır'ın Iskenderiye şehri yakınlarında bulunan Seydibeşir Usare Kampı'na hapşedildi.


12 Haziran 1920'ye kadar iki yıl boyunca her türlü işkence, eziyet, ağır hakaret ve aşağılamaya maruz kaldular.
Bu insanlık dışı muamelemenin nedeni ise Ermeniler idi...

Kamptaki, Türkçe bilen Ermeni tercümanların yalan, yanlış çevirileri ve kışkırtmaları nedeniyle, kampların İngiliz komutanları, azab Türk düşmanı kesilmiştirlerdi. Savas bitmişti. Ancak, kamptaki ağır koşullar nedeniyle ölenler dışındaki askerleri teslim etmek, İngilizler'in işine gelmiyordu. Çünkü, olası yeni bir savasta, bu askerlerin yeniden karşılara çıkabileceklere, Ermeniler tarafından, İngilizlerin beyinlerine işlenmişti.

Ancak başını sudan kaldıran artık göremiyordu. Çünkü gözler yanmıştı...

Dışarı çıkanların halini gören sıradaki askerlerimizin direnişleri de fayda etmedi ve 15 bin askerimiz kör oldu. Bu vahset, 25 Mayıs 1921 tarihinde TBMM'de görüştü. Milletvekillerı Faik ve Şeref beyler bir önerge vererek, Mısır'da esirlerin krizol banyosuna sokularak 15 bin vatan evladının gözlerinin kör edildiğini, bunun faili olan İngiliz tabip, garnizon komutanı ve askerlerinin cezalandırılması için TBMM'nin teşekkür etmesini istedi.
intensified. Message producers were quick to draw connections between US interests and PKK activities\textsuperscript{148}. There were also pro-Kurdish and pro-Human rights messages.

Tabiiki yeni kurulan devletin bin türlü sorunu vardı. Bu hesap sorma işide unutuldu gitti.

Ama onlar unutmuyorlar...

Kendi ihanetlerini bile soykarım ambalajına sarıp, dünya kamuoyuna sunuyorlar. En üzücü olanı da malum birilerinin, bu karalama kampanyalarına çanak tutması...

\textbf{ŞEHİTLERİMİZE SAYGINIZ VARSA 3 dakikanızı almaz bu yazıyı arkadaşlarınızla göndermek.}

\textbf{ERMENİLER SOYKIRIM YAPILDI DIYE DÜNYAYI AYAĞA KALDIRIYOR BİZİM TARIHİMİZDEN HABERİMİZ YOK.}

\textsuperscript{148}

\textbf{HER GÜNÜM CENAZE HER GÜNÜM ŞEHIT}

\textbf{BUNLARIN SEBEBİ BİR İTİ OGŁU İTİ}

\textbf{UYAN TÜRK EVLADI UYUMA UYAN}
But these were more limited to particular activist groups and those who had sympathy for them. Besides, they did not reflect the views of anti-EU elites.

Surprisingly enough, net censorship did not trigger massive email campaigns as some website bans were because of insult to Atatürk (including YouTube). Anti-MHP (Nationalist Action Party) messages were not many and were limited to more leftist circles, since MHP at this historical juncture moved towards the center and began to ally with other secularist circles. There were also Islamic messages. They had their own lives too. Maybe an anti-Aydın Doğan (owner of Doğan Media Group) had reached a bigger circulation. After the polemic between PM Erdoğan and Aydı̇n Doğan, I received a very offensive message about Mr. Doğan on how he corruptly

OTUZ KUPONA ALINMADI BU VATAN

PKK'YA KARŞI BİR DAMLA BİLE OLSA DÜŞMANLIGIN VARSABA
MESAJI HERKESE İLET

Savaş resmen başlamış
bolumaktadır!!! Hala boğazından coca-cola geçebiliyorsa
hala mcdonald s ta hamburger
iyebiliyosan hala marlboro içiyosan!!
Lanet et kendine! Kökenin ne olursa olsun ŞEHİTLERİMİZE üzülüyor
Amerika ya para verip PKK'ya silah yollamalarına izin verme!!! Toplu
boykot hareketi zamanı hepimiz birlik olalım!!! Eğer biraz vatanını
seviyorsan şehitlerimiz için bunu herkese gönder!!!

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Yani kimse sirlərdən zəngin olmaq, olmaq!
Sırlərdən başqa ve Aydın Doğan gibi olməz. Ne məxəlın!
Ya Vehbi Koç gibi birinin çocuk olmaq lazımdı ona da kırılar içler yapmak.
Aşında onun geniş kimliği Aydın Doğan değil Aydın Koç.
PEKALA AYDIN DOĞAN HAKKINDA BUNLARI BILIYOR MÜSÜNUZ?
Keli şirin bir topak ağışının oğlu olan(?) ve çok genç yaşta İstanbul’da zahirecilik ve ecza deposu sahipliğinde ise hayatına başlayıp Aydın Doğan bu günkü çok popüler bir mavi haline gelmiş. Aydın Doğan’ın ardında katıldığını biliyoruz. Bu yüzden şirin bir topak ağışının oğlu olan(?) ve çok genç yaşta İstanbul’da zahirecilik ve ecza deposu sahipliğinde ise hayatına başlayıp Aydın Doğan bu günkü çok popüler bir mavi haline gelmiş.

Abdi İpekçi’nin kızı, bir kız olur, bir kız olur. Abdi İpekçi’nin kızı, bir kız olur, bir kız olur. Abdi İpekçi’nin kızı, bir kız olur, bir kız olur. Abdi İpekçi’nin kızı, bir kız olur, bir kız olur.
managed to build its wealth, his upbringing-the claim is he was an illegal child of an
Istanbul rich- etc had been circulated before by others. Islamists began to re-circulate.
This signifies another characteristic of these circulating messages....
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