U.S. Hesitancy Has Not Helped Crisis

By FRYAR CALHOUN

Dr. Francis Loewenheim, speaking before an intent audience in Wiess Commons although the Berlin crisis is of American policy—or lack of substantially to the situation,

Characterizing the great difficulty of the West as the lack of plan or principles of procedure, Dr. Loewenheim indicated that the United States, in order to be realistic, should realize that even the best possible agreement will be only temporary.

TRACING THE history of the division of Germany, he said that the present four-power control of Berlin was agreed to in 1944 because it seemed fairest at the time. The fact that access to Berlin, the essence of the current problem, was inadequately provided for was the result of an honest mistake by the Departments of State and Defense, and President Roosevelt was too busy running the war to prepare occupation plans.

Moreover, in the fall of 1944 there was much optimism in Washington about getting along with the Russians. There is no evidence, Dr. Loewenheim stated, that anybody—including the Republicans—saw what was happening.

RUP BY THE spring of 1945, U.S.-Russian relations were fast deteriorating. The problem was put to General Eisenhower and his chief political adviser, Robert Murphy. It is a documented fact, said Dr. Loewenheim, that both believed the West should adhere to the 1944 agreement, the ex-President's recent denials notwithstanding.

It became clear in the summer of 1945 that the U.S.S.R. would not adhere to the agreement. In June, 1948, came the Soviet blockade of Berlin. It is significant, said Dr. Loewenheim, that at this time the Russians did not tamper with the airlift or challenge the Allies' legal right to be in Berlin, but by 1949 the Soviets would not acknowledge this same Western right.

THEN CAME the years of indifference and idleness. In 1954-55, when East Berlin was made part of East Germany and East German troops took over occupation, all the U.S. did was to send notes protesting this violation of the agreement—with no effect.

In the fall of 1958, Khruschev began his final assault on Berlin by giving the Allies six months to "accept change or face the consequences." At first Eisenhower and Dulles refused to negotiate under his threats, but in May, 1959, Secretary of State赫ter was at Geneva for talks with Soviet emissary Andrei Gromyko.

The meetings closed in August after the West's conciliatory offer was rejected. At this point Eisenhower invited Khruschev to Camp David where, said Dr. Loewenheim, the premier's amiability resulted in hopes for settlement despite the fact that he agreed to nothing. Eight months of calm followed, shattered by the U-2 incident and the torpedoed Paris summit conference. In the summer of 1960, "time out" for the U.S. Presidential campaign ended the Eisenhower phase of the crisis.

THE ISSUE was reopened in the spring of 1961, climaxing with the "chilly" Kennedy-Khruschev talks at Vienna in May. Dr. Loewenheim continued that U.S. policy since then has been one of stalling and hoping. The latest development, of course, has been the wall through Berlin.

Dr. Loewenheim noted that the Allies have followed a policy of reaction to Russian moves, that our position has grown steadily (Continued on Page 10)
(Continued from Page 1) weaker, and that we have abandoned our stand on free elections for Germany.

The U. S., he said, has not tried hard enough to get the neutral nations to help—if they can. Progress in the U. N. now is especially tough; years ago, the presence of so many neutral—and sometimes hostile—nations was unforeseen.

**CHANCES FOR** a direct East-West agreement depend, Dr. Loewenheim pointed out, on the actual intentions of the Soviets. If they intend to drive the U. S. to the brink, nuclear war will result. But Khruschev is talking about economic gains, so there appears to be a chance of avoiding the holocaust. By now, it is clear—to us, at least—that the U. S. will fight if necessary.

If the U.S.S.R. wants peace, what are the possible terms? The outlook, said Dr. Loewenheim, is unpleasant. Almost certainly, the West would have to recognize the de facto existence of East Germany.

**IF INDEED** Khruschev wants a stable, quasi-independent East Germany, then Western recognition of the Communist regime would probably be enough to obtain temporary Soviet affirmation of Allied rights in Berlin. Dr. Loewenheim stressed, however, that all agreements are temporary in the Communist view—and that we can probably expect one Berlin crisis after another.

In the question-and-answer period, Dr. Loewenheim commented on the hesitancy and lack of direction of Western policy. He said that signs are not indicative of a U. S. offensive in the Cold War. He also noted that the Soviets seem to feel they would gain from the establishment of U. N. headquarters in Berlin, which would be made a free city.

Dr. Loewenheim concluded by saying that the country is bewildered, uncertain of how we reached this position—yet there is no general demand for a revelation of the events that brought about the situation. The press, he said, has no desire to air these facts, but it would be better for public morale to have the information presented.