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The Olszewski Cabinet

Justice: Zbigniew Dyka, lawyer, Zjednoczenie Chrzescijansko-Narodowe.

Interior: Antoni Macierewicz, historian, former KOR member, ZChN

Finances: Karol Lutkowski, SGPiS graduate, no party affiliation

Agriculture: Gabriel Janowski, head, Farmers' Solidarity

Work & Social Policy: Jerzy Kropiwnicki, ZChN

Foreign Economic Relations: Adam Glapinski, former Housing Minister

Defense: Jan Parys, sociologist, played a role in negotiating the Red Army's withdrawal from Poland

Health: Marian Miskiewicz, cardiologist, no party affiliation

Culture: Andrzej Sicinski, sociologist

Education: Andrzej Stelmachowski, former Speaker of the Parliament, no party affiliation

Environment: Stefan Kozlowski, KKO

Foreign Affairs: Krzysztof Skubiszewski (no change)

Transport: Edward Waligorski (no change)

Without portfolio: Artur Balazs, Farmers' Solidarity

This cabinet was formed by Prime Minister Jan Olszewski on December 23, 1991. [Source: Donosy, Dec 24, 1991]

New Names

Belarus (formerly Byelorussia)

Moldova (formerly Moldavia)

Kyrgyzstan (formerly Kirgizia)

Bishtek (formerly Frunze, capitol of Kyrgyzstan)

The newly formed states of the defunct Soviet Union have requested that these changes be made in English.

From the Editor:

One of the landmines which communism left in Poland is the present Polish electoral system. The 1989 "semi-free" elections in Poland produced a parliament where two-thirds of the seats were occupied by communist party candidates. This parliament threw a monkey wrench into the Polish legal processes by voting in (against the recommendation of, among others, Zbigniew Brzezinski) a proportional electoral system which virtually guarantees that no single party can gain a majority of seats. A distinguished commentator, Dr. Jacek Koronacki, deals with this and related problems in his essay. A leading Polish conservative, he spent the fall of 1991 in the United States as a visiting associate professor at Rice. His article was written in Warsaw upon his return to the Polish Academy of Sciences where he heads the Department of Statistics specializing in quality control.

Professor Witold J. Lukaszewski reviews the changing relations between Poland, Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary on the one hand, and the former Soviet Union on the other. His article was written before the USSR fell apart but, even if one substitutes "Russia" for "USSR," the article retains its relevance. With his customary caution, Lukaszewski points to the change of tone in Moscow upon the failure of the coup and, most recently, upon the assumption of power by Yeltsin.

Professor James R. Thompson's article touches upon the really important matter of how to raise productivity in Polish factories. In making his recommendations, Professor Thompson suggests that dysfunctionality of socialist industry was not random but planned, and its goal was to enslave the worker and deprive him of his dignity. Thompson's article, as well as Goodwyn's book discussed below, focus on the "real, all too real" world of Polish workers, whose presence in many academic studies has often been distorted by the intellectuals' own perspectives, biases and interests.

In our BOOKS section we review an unusual book, of which not enough has been said yet. In our judgement, Professor Goodwyn represents the best that the Left has to contribute to the intellectual debate of today. What he says about the misreading of the Solidarity labor movement should become common knowledge, and it should generate new studies of that epoch-making movement which has been trivialized, although in different ways, by Polish and foreign authors. What Professor Goodwyn says about mass movements and the extreme difficulty of generating them, appears to us to be of much significance not only as a comment on Solidarity but also as a prediction about future developments in Russia.

With this issue, we are initiating a new regular section, "The Sarmatian Recommends," to shower praise on those works of art or scholarship, or those educational initiatives, which the Editors find particularly worthwhile. This is a serious counterpart to our tongue-in-cheek Dead Carp Award. We start this rubric with Zbigniew Rybczynski's *The*

Orchestra, deemed to be a stunningly original artistic rendition of the history of communism. What a piece to show in your course on Slavic Cultures, or East Central European History, or Polish or Russian literature.

Among the problems of postcommunism is the issue of women's work and women's prestige outside the home. These issues are outlined in Professor Hetnal's able review of Francine du Plessix Gray's book. The originality of the Polish women's art is stunningly suggested even by our imperfect reproductions of four (out of 80) works of art shown at the National Museum of Women in the Arts in Washington, D.C., in October 1991.

In LETTERS, Professor Norman Davies says perceptive things about the exclusion of east European studies from the run-of-the-mill European history courses as taught in Europe and America. We do not share his scepticism toward the expression "western civilization," but we do look forward to his promised new book integrating the history of western and eastern Europe.

***The Sarmatian Review* Recommends....**

***The Orchestra*, by Zbig Rybczynski.** Produced by ZBig Vision Ltd. Distributed by WNET New York. Call Stuart Samuels at 212-560-2000 (information obtained from KUHT Houston, Texas, which aired the program in its Great Performances series on November 29, 1991).

A postmodern ballet-musical about the fall of communism. The music is traditional (Beethoven, Chopin, Ravel), but the dancing and props are strikingly original, and they convey better than any other work of art we know the bitter history of East Central Europe in this century, and especially since 1945. The magnificent final march to Socialism is a masterpiece of artistic invention. The preceding sections illustrate the fragmentariness of Polish history, the necessity to improvise, the lack of material stability which has been the curse of Polish families. Rybczynski's talent as producer and director shines. If anyone among our readers has a commercial video of this performance, please notify us.

To Our Croatian Readers:

The Southwest Chapter of Alma Mater of Croatian Universities (AMAC) is in the process of being incorporated. Persons interested in joining this chapter or other chapters please call Alemka at (713) 665-1979 or write c/o *The Sarmatian Review*. Please write AMAC on the envelopes.

Liberty and the Polish Intelligentsia

Jacek Koronacki

Until the last parliamentary elections, many among the Polish intelligentsia, both at home and abroad, desperately wanted to have their cake and eat it too, that is, they wanted to enjoy living in a democratic state as they envisioned it, and at the same time see the society at large eagerly and uncritically subordinate itself to two programs: the monetary reform as designed by Finance Minister Leszek Balcerowicz, and the "return to Europe" plan as envisioned by such members of the governing circles as Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski, former Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki, former Labor Minister Jacek Kuron, MP Bronislaw Geremek, editor of *Gazeta Wyborcza* Adam Michnik, and former Health Minister Zofia Kuratowska.

Alas, eating one's cake and having it too has not worked for most people most of the time, and the Polish intelligentsia are no exception. The problem is that no free society can tolerate a messianic (albeit perfectly secularized) zeal with which these programs were to be implemented. No free society can be expected to behave like a herd of sheep, ready to follow even the wisest ram without question. In view of the conflicting interests of different groups in society and the recessionary aspect of the Balcerowicz plan, it was naive to expect no challenges to that plan. As to the "return to Europe" advocated by the *Gazeta Wyborcza* ideologues, it amounted to an uncritical acceptance of the post-Christian strands in western culture. No wonder that such an interpretation of the "return" has been questioned by centrist and center-right parties such as Porozumienie Centrum [the Center Alliance] and Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko-Narodowe [the Christian National Union].

It should be noted here that this author likewise questions the left-wing vision of the "return to Europe." However, he regards the Balcerowicz program as the best that could have been conceived in the late 1980s.

The wishes of the intelligentsia were strongly supported by the western journals of opinion and western popular press. The *Sarmatian* readers need not be reminded that the fiercely secular left in Europe and in America is distrustful of the ability of the "unenlightened" Poles to live in a democracy without

being shown the way by an "enlightened" Polish secular minority. Characteristically, the left avoids using the word "liberty" in discussions. I have observed that almost any non-trivial political dispute in Poland was seen in the West as proof that Poles could not cope with their newly acquired democracy, or that democracy was in danger in Poland. On 11 December 1990, when Lech Wałęsa, an ardent Catholic, was elected President of Poland, it was amusing to read the hostile *New York Times* editorial questioning whether Wałęsa is truly a democrat at heart. As time went on, any kind of coalition-building in Poland was seen as a sign of instability, and any switching of sides by individuals and parties was treated as an occasion to bash Polish politics some more. It was even more disappointing to see similar interpretations offered by some members of the Polish intelligentsia.

Now, with the freely elected but fragmented Parliament, any wishful thinking concerning the necessity for left-wing leadership in the business of "returning to Europe" has to be abandoned. The ability of the left-wing Unia Demokratyczna to find solutions to problems has not been demonstrated; nor did the UD show itself able to gain the confidence of the majority of voters. Different solutions have to be attempted. To that effect, it is useful to take stock of present and past achievements and failures. At what point of the long climb up from the communist abyss are we now, and how did we reach that point?

To put it briefly and start from the most obvious:

1. Polish society at large is a civilized and wise society, and it has staunchly opposed communism as incompatible with common sense and Christian values. Faced with economic bankruptcy inflicted by the Soviet-controlled communists, the majority are wise enough to support the rejection of socialism as a viable economic option.

2. Seemingly paradoxically, much of the society is still subconsciously socialist, that is, in a kind of conditioned reflex, it favors the welfare state and takes for granted the state's obligation to provide employment for the citizenry. This is not surprising if one takes into consideration the fact that socialist rulers have assiduously bred in their subjects a sense of no responsibility for themselves and an abhorrence of economic initiative. Surrounded by an economically absurd economy, the subjects of the socialist state were for decades on pitiful welfare rather than being truly employed. In a sense, it was safe to live one's life in this feudal state, although the state was growing poorer day by day.

3. Poles today live in a state that gives its citizens the option to vote and it implements the rule of law. In this situation, the citizens' short-term goal is the same as that of members of any other free society: to be as well-off as possible, regardless of what party, or parties, are currently in power. The citizens feel that the basic goal, liberty and democracy, has been achieved, and the time has come to concentrate on private goals.

But here is the rub. Poles today live in a country that is making a transition from absurdity to reality. This fact of being in transition means rearranging thousands of institutions and millions of relationships. This necessity of rearranging everything accounts for many phenomena which outside observers find incomprehensible or shocking. One of them is the seeming inability of the Sejm [Parliament] to swiftly agree on who will participate in the government and in what capacity. The other is the issue of economic bankruptcy and the inevitabilities which it brings. The Soviet-controlled communists left the inheritance of a bankrupt state. One is familiar with bankrupt states in Africa or Asia, but not in Europe. The methods of making a relatively well developed European state bankrupt have not yet been studied by economists, sociologists, or historians. This fact of economic bankruptcy creates a great deal of social instability. Yet it has to be stressed that such a society (in transition and forced into the straightjacket of a bankrupt state) is not ungovernable; it only takes longer to get organized. At the same time, the transition from absurdity and bankruptcy to normalcy and economic viability is much harder than many had expected.

Thanks to Wałęsa and those from the Komitet Obywatelski przy przewodniczącym NSZZ Solidarność (Zdzisław Najder, Jarosław and Lech Kaczyński), a loose coalition of center-right Solidarity supporters, a true multiparty system was established in Poland, despite desperate efforts to monopolize power by the left-wing intellectual elite, in particular by those gathered around Adam Michnik's *Gazeta Wyborcza* and, at least in part, around Jerzy Turowicz's *Tygodnik Powszechny*. Early in 1990, when it became clear that Unia Demokratyczna would not be able to gain a majority in the Parliament, its members began to proclaim *urbis et orbis* that democracy was in danger in Poland. It was *Gazeta Wyborcza* that initiated the slandering of Jarosław and Lech Kaczyński, two brilliant twin brothers who were spokesmen for the center-right coalition.

Another issue to which the left coalition contributed in a negative way is the fragmentation of the current Parliament. That could have been avoided, or

substantially lessened, by enacting into law not a system of proportional representation based on national returns, but the American "winner take all" rule for each single member district. Those who live under national proportional representation systems are almost always doomed to government by shaky coalition.

One should ask the question of how the present proportional electoral system came about, and who supported it. Porozumienie Centrum, a political party organized by the Kaczyńskis, was at first in favor of the proportional representation but later, when its dangers were better understood, it opted for the majority rule. The party of the intellectuals, Unia Demokratyczna, went the opposite way. The parliamentary committee which came forth with the proportional representation system was chaired by a leading Unia Demokratyczna member. Along with the ex-communists, UD also opposed the holding of the elections earlier rather than later. There can hardly be any doubt that this stalling tactic was the result of the UD's fear of Lech Wałęsa and of the Porozumienie Centrum.

Owing to the disagreement between UD and PC, the ex-communists and their allies gained time to regroup and begin a counter-attack. These regrouped communists, emboldened by the loudly voiced opinions of UD members that democracy was in danger, managed to paralyze the former Parliament and make the work of the Bielecki government nearly impossible. While the society at large was becoming more apathetic owing to the hardships of reform, a few yielded to the revisionist propaganda of the ex-communists against the market reforms and their mendacious claim of defending the unemployed, retirees and the poor.

All in all, the outcome of the October 1991 elections was predictable. The first few weeks of the new Parliament's work show that the formation of a stable majority will not be easy. Prime Minister Olszewski has already proposed a new cabinet after the rejection of his first cabinet by President Wałęsa. The economy is still in deep recession and there is no discernible plan for getting out of it. It is likely that more realignments between parties will take place.

And yet, there is no reason to panic. The main players, Unia Demokratyczna and Porozumienie Centrum, are maturing quickly and they have relatively well-defined constituencies. UD is not yet a party in the strict sense of the word but rather a heterogeneous forum of personalities ranging from the anticlerical left to the Catholic left, with an admixture of the economically neo-liberal center-right. Its constituency should clarify soon. This author believes that the neo-liberals should leave UD as quickly as possible, for their agenda

is not really compatible with that of the UD leaders. The PC plays a very good game but its agenda is unclear to the public at large, possibly because a good information campaign has not been undertaken. Apart from the ideological differences, a general consensus on the ways to fight recession must be reached, and this is perhaps the hardest thing to agree upon. But it has to be repeated numerous times that there is no other way to normalcy than through political debate, fight and compromise.

So far as one can judge at this point, the political programs of most of the major parties in Poland are compatible with the democratic concept of the Polish state. Except for the ex-communists who had amply proven their hostility to free discourse, all can be expected to fight for a Poland they envision in their dreams. The Kaczyńskis are no farther apart from Michnik than Jesse Helms and Patrick Buchanan are from Ted Kennedy. The reason that their fights look incomprehensible from abroad is not because their political stances are all that different from those of the American politicians, but because Poland is not a normal and secure democracy. The Poles are afraid of their aggressive neighbors who invaded them numerous times in the past. This kind of insecurity is unknown to citizens of the United States, and it breeds shrill voices. Nor is Poland as yet an economically prosperous country. Foreigners seem to expect from the Poles the kind of absolute unanimity that is never obtained in western democracies.

Polish political leaders have a tremendous task ahead. It appears that the Polish intelligentsia also has special tasks: to abandon simplistic attitudes; to remain faithful to their own moral and political convictions; to promote these convictions through a democratic process in a free and open society; to try to explain to foreign observers the similarities and differences between the democratic process in countries burdened with the legacy of communism and insecure borders, and in countries such as the United States, where these factors do not play a role.

Dr. Jacek Koronacki of the Polish Academy of Sciences is a noted commentator on political events in Poland and Director of the Quality Control Task Force, a joint American-Polish venture.

Polish University in Vilnius

On 3 October 1991, the first Polish University in free Lithuania was inaugurated, under the presidency of Prof. dr. Romuald Brazis. 150 students are currently enrolled. Financial help is needed, visits of scholars from the United States are welcome. Checks and inquiries can be directed to Prof. dr. hab. Romuald Brazis, Post Office Box 823, 232055 Vilnius, Lithuania. Fax # 74-45-06. MORE IN THE NEXT ISSUE OF THE SR.

Security in the post-Soviet Era

Witold J. Lukaszewski

The relinquishment of its Eastern European empire by the USSR opened before the East Central European countries the opportunity to pursue their own international and domestic policies. Poland, Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary, the three most western-oriented and reform-minded of the former satellites, were confronted with the need to define their new status in Europe. Their first achievement was a successful dismantling of the Warsaw Treaty Organization which was disbanded on 1 April 1991 (the alliance itself was dissolved on 1 July 1991). Their future policies will depend on whether they continue to see themselves as flanked by two traditional enemies, Germany and Russia, or as "situated between the European community, with the FRG as a component, and the national states emancipating themselves from the Soviet Union."¹ In assessing these policies it should also be remembered that while the East Central European countries see the unfolding events as a success of historic proportions, many in the center of the former empire view them as a major setback.

While the domino-like collapse of the communist regimes may have alarmed Moscow, it did not motivate the Kremlin leaders, at least initially, to develop a set of clear-cut concepts for dealing with the situation and thus permitted a vacuum to develop in their relations with East Central Europe.² In the eyes of one Soviet commentator, it permitted Poland, Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary to form a consultative grouping (with the distinct anti-Soviet resemblance of a *cordon sanitaire*) and move closer to NATO.³ Also, the Soviet military was widely perceived as the principal opponent of the Soviet withdrawal from East Central Europe.⁴ Consequently, in the last two years Soviet foreign policy spoke with two voices: along with the policy of withdrawal from the occupied countries, there was also the assertion by General Dubynin that Soviet troops would leave Poland only when they were ready and by routes chosen by them.

Remembering their 1918-1939 experiences, Poland, Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary are trying not to be left again in the no-man's-land separating Germany and the USSR, or suffering the tragic fate of occupation by one of them. Their leaders have repeatedly asserted their commitment to a unified Europe. In the words of President Havel, this means "orienting ourselves toward western Europe, extending the space which ...has found its expression in functioning stable democratic political systems, the market economy, the social security systems made possible by those economies."⁵ Polish Prime Minister J.K. Bielecki asserted that "Poland's long-term objective is full membership in the European community and closer cooperation with European security structures, as well as increasingly better cooperation with NATO and the United States."⁶ East Central Europeans are open about the fact that, in the long run, they desire to join the NATO.⁷

Soviet sensitivity to East Central Europe's western

orientation showed itself in the so-called Kvitsinsky Doctrine and the Silayev Proposal. In a speech to the conference on "The Future of European Security" in Prague in April 1991, Yuliy Kvitsinsky, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, reportedly "made it unambiguously clear that Moscow has no intention of giving up its 'security interests' especially regarding its former satellites in Europe." The essence of this assertion subsequently appeared in the form of security clauses which the Soviet negotiators tried to insert into bilateral treaties with their former client states. The clauses required the signatories of the treaties to "rule out membership in mutually hostile alliances and the making of one's territory and infrastructure available to third states to the detriment of a neighbor."⁹ All three East Central European states rejected the demand as a sequel to the Brezhnev Doctrine, abridging their sovereignty and reserving the right "to people such as Kvitsinsky... to decide what were hostile alliances and thereby exert pressure on other states."¹⁰ A milder-sounding yet similar proposal was made by Prime Minister of the Russian Republic Ivan Silayev to the effect that in "the future economic union of the fifteen republics of the previous USSR [he] also sees a place for Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary."¹¹ Polish Foreign Minister Skubiszewski responded that "he does not see a place for Poland in that type of union with the USSR... Poland... looks for union in the west, through an association and then membership in the European Community."¹²

After the failed August coup which changed the situation somewhat, Soviet-Czechoslovak and Soviet-Polish bilateral treaties were initiated in early October 1991. Soviet government spokesman Vitaly Churkin announced that the Soviet combat forces would leave Poland by the end of 1992 and all Soviet Forces would be out of Poland by the end of 1993. Soviet armed forces had left Czechoslovakia and Hungary prior to July 1991.

This withdrawal does not solve East Central European security concerns, however. Foremost among them is the fear of being relegated to the status of a buffer zone, a neutral belt, a thinned-out security sphere. This fear is based both on historical memory and on some tendencies in western political life. According to the Czech Deputy Foreign Minister Z. Matejka, Professor Reiner K. Huber of the Bundeswehr University in Munich proposed that "it would be most beneficial" if an undivided Soviet Union and NATO remained as two main opposite poles. As the most convenient role for Czechoslovakia and other Central European countries Professor Huber singled out the establishment of a buffer zone separating the USSR from NATO.¹³ This is obviously unacceptable to the Central Europeans because it would perpetuate the division of Europe, albeit in a slightly modified form, and condemn East Central Europe to an economic, political and military vulnerability inviting flanking great powers to compete for influence and advantage in it.

The rejection by the three East Central European states of the Kvitsinsky Doctrine and the buffer zone project leaves the issue of security arrangements still partially open.

The issues which are to be resolved, or are at the point of being resolved, involve bilateral, two-tier, regional, European and North Atlantic treaties and agreements.

Bilateral treaty option was initially acknowledged by all former Warsaw Pact states as a means of defining and stabilizing relationships among themselves. At a security policy conference attended by Austrian, Bulgarian, Czechoslovak, Hungarian, Polish, Romanian, Soviet and Yugoslav representatives, all agreed that, following the dissolution of the WTO, "the member states would be able to guarantee their security through a set of bilateral agreements, and the countries should redefine their relationship with one another, the Soviet Union and the west European states."¹⁴ In spite of the influence on Soviet negotiators of the Kvitsinsky Doctrine and their resistance to the withdrawal of troops from Poland,¹⁵ the Soviet-Czechoslovak and Soviet-Polish treaties have been initiated; Hungary's treaty with the USSR is close to being finalized.

On the other hand, the three East Central European countries have strengthened cooperation. The Soviet view of that is not benign. F. Lukyanov suggests that Budapest, Prague and Warsaw "have decided to create something like an alternative 'triple alliance' that would resist Moscow's pull."¹⁶ Valentin Sharov detects "a theme of confrontation" in the Triangle as well as "the desire to pit Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia against the Soviet Union...."¹⁷ Genry Trofimenko views the Triangle principally in political-military terms as he wonders whether such a "new security arrangement in Eastern Europe will... reinforce the general security and stability in Europe or detract from it in view of the apprehensions it might generate in the Soviet Union...."¹⁸ Historically, Russia/Soviet Union has been opposed to any coalescence of forces anywhere on its periphery, and strove instead to destabilize its neighbors.

Polish, Czechoslovak and Hungarian leaders have no illusions about the ability to deliver of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. They are aware of the fact that European security could not be assured without NATO. "The North Atlantic Treaty has become a part of European security in any - I stress - in any part of the continent," said Krzysztof Skubiszewski in his address to the Sejm on 14 February 1991.

It is with regard to the utility of the intermediate organizations, such as the Triangle and NATO, that the Soviets and the Central Europeans differ most sharply. In *Pravda* (7 July 1990), T. Koleshichenko and A. Lyuty argued that "the groundwork for a future effective system of European security could be laid... by holding regular consultations at the level of heads of state and government of the CSCE...." They complained that in London, "The basic emphasis was put on the NATO bloc and its role in Europe's future." In an even blunter way, G. Arbatov recently said that NATO is a symbol of militarized Europe and a remnant of the Cold War.¹⁹ The Moscow leaders have consistently supported bilateral and multilateral relationships instead of those of which they are not part. They have tried to retain their sphere

of influence in East Central Europe through security clauses and economic enticements. In doing so, the Soviets are pursuing contradictory objectives: they try to avoid isolation from Europe and divide it at the same time.

Notes

1. Zdzislaw Najder, "Jak widziec swiat?" *Polska w Europie*. Warsaw. The Senate Center for International Studies, 1990, p. 41.

2. Aleksandr Yakovlev, Czecho-Slovak Rozhlas Radio Network, 11 June 1991. FBIS-EEU-91-113, 12 June 1991.

3. A. Kaznacheev, "USSR - East Europe: Hopes and Illusions," *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 17 April 1991, as quoted in Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Selective Global Commitment," *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1991, p. 11.

4. Anufyev, Second Secretary of the Kazakhstan CC CPSU [Second Secretaries in the republics have traditionally been Russians. *Ed.*] is said to have complained that Gorbachev's policies had permitted the demolition of 'our buffer zone' in Eastern Europe. A. Michnik, *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 20 February 1990.

5. President Vaclav Havel, Prague Rozhlas Radio Network, 9 June 1991; FBIS-EEU 91-112, 11 June 1991.

6. Interview given to M. Zdziech and T. Mitek, "About Polish Security," *Polska Zbrojna*, 1 September 1991. Translation from FBIS-EEU-91-112, 4 September 1991.

7. Istvan Kormende, head of the European Department of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, *Magyar Hirlap*, 28 February 1991. FBIS-EEU-91-032, 15 February 1991; K. Skubiszewski, Address to the Sejm on security issues, Warsaw Domestic Service, 14 February 1991. FBIS-EEU-91-032, 15 February 1991.

8. Ivan Horsky, "There is no single recipe," *Narodna Obrona*, 30 April 1991. Translation from FBIS-EEU-91-088, 7 May 1991.

9. Vitaly Churkin during a briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists. *Izvestiya*, 7 May 1991. *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. XLIII, No. 10.

10. Jiri Dienstbier, Czecho-Slovak Foreign Minister, Prague Rozhlas Radio, 29 August 1991. FBIS-EEU-91-169, 30 August 1991.

11. *Rzeczpospolita*, 7-8 September 1991.

12. *Rzeczpospolita*, 6 September 1991.

13. *Mlada Fronta Dnes*, 7 March 1991.

14. MTI Radio, Budapest, 24 April 1991. FBIS-EEU-90-080, 25 April 1991.

15. Even after the Polish-Soviet negotiations on the bilateral treaty had been completed in early October 1991 and the official statement concerning the timing of the Soviet troop withdrawals from Poland had been issued (see Churkin's statement in fn. 9), the Soviet ambassador in Warsaw let it be known that Soviet combat troops would remain in Poland until 1993. The Polish Foreign Ministry replied that, unless the original date, 1992, for the withdrawal of all Soviet combat troops is kept, the bilateral treaty would not be signed. *Donosy*, #642, 22 October 1991.

A Glimpse at the Dark Side of Socialist Industrial Planning

James R. Thompson

A few years ago, as the Soviet grip on Poland began to weaken, my colleague Jacek Koronacki and I tried to come up with a plan of quality improvement for Polish industry in the event that the communist system was overthrown. An adaptation of shortcourses in quality control (based on the philosophy of W.E. Deming) I had given over the years to American businesses was written in Polish and used as lecture notes for training foremen in Polish factories. During the summer of 1991, we formed a team of ten Polish Ph.D.'s (named the Quality Control Task Force), led by Koronacki, to work in teams at ten demonstration factories. On site training of the QCTF by members of the Rice Department of Statistics (Kimmel, Lawera and Thompson) was an integral part of the operation of the group.

The Polish example of production is one which shows an outdated array of manufacturing machines producing, all too frequently, goods which conform to Stalinist politically correct models of heavy industry rather than to the demands of a free market. Because of "poison pills" embedded within the factories of People's Poland, many enterprises are simply not salvageable even if both the plants were retooled to state of the art and modern methods of quality control were instituted. But in the case of enterprises producing items for which generic demand exists, improvement in the quality of goods to competitive levels is generally possible if appropriate versions of the Deming process control paradigm are instituted, even though funds for retooling are not available.

Our model for establishing modern methods of quality control in Polish manufacturing involves retraining a small proportion of the work force (typically a quality sensitive industry might devote between two and five percent of its work force to quality control). Inasmuch as personnel costs are currently at very low levels in Poland and inasmuch as the work force is generally very well educated, the build-up of quality control teams within enterprises is very feasible. Furthermore, the fact that these quality control workers might very well otherwise be riffed, their retraining to execute quality control procedures enables the saving of experience and skills for Polish industry which might otherwise be wasted. In Poland, labor is inexpensive and intelligent. Capital for retooling is scarce.

Space does not permit the careful delineation of the history to date of the QCTF nor of the quality control techniques they employ. It is perhaps sufficient to note that our team is not shy about claiming that a 50% reduction in the rate of defectives is to be expected in a few months if the rather simple techniques it utilizes are employed. Rather, I would like to point out some of the anomalies we discovered in the system of socialist production which surprised me and were outside the experience of quality control workers in the West or in Japan.

The defunct Ursus Tractor Factory in Warsaw (parts of which will hopefully reopen soon) was probably one of the better managed industrial enterprises in People's Poland. It produced 17 different models of tractors, requiring altogether 15,000 different parts. The Ursus plant employed 600 persons (4.3% of its work force) in "quality inspection." This paradigm, common in socialist countries, purports to achieve product quality by end product inspection. That means that bad units are to be found and removed from the market output. Unfortunately, as has been the case generally with end product inspection, the products produced have had a high proportion of defectives. For example, in the Massey Ferguson production facility at Ursus (the best in the plant), the Perkins engines produced were checked 100% by production workers. Of these, 30% were sent back for reworking. Finally, from the pool of "satisfactory" items, a "random" sample of 15% was examined by the "quality inspection" team. Of these, 10% were still found to be defective in some fashion.

Thus, by management's lenient definition of "defect," Ursus, in its best submodule was sending at least 10% defectives into the market. The mean time between failures for Ursus tractors is only between 80 and 150 hours (Massey Ferguson), a figure far below that of tractors produced in the West. Polish farmers (who represent around 35% of the work force) find the Ursus tractors so bad, that they choose to buy even Russian tractors in preference. Such terrible quality assurance differs in degree of incompetence from that at General Motors, but GM does the same kind of ridiculous end inspection. The replacement of end inspection by modern modular time based inspection of the entire system can, and hopefully will, be achieved at Ursus. But there are serious problems in the Polish system which do not exist in Detroit. Among these are those policies which clearly have as their only purpose the planned dysfunctionality of Polish industry. Time only permits discussion of two of these poison pills.

First poison pill: numerous, monopolistic and geographically remote subcontractors

Beyond its own internal difficulties with quality, approximately two-thirds of the 15,000 parts (representing roughly one-fourth of the total cost for parts) employed in Ursus tractors were acquired from subcontractors. Over 50% of the warranty rework of Ursus tractors is due to the poor quality of subcontractor parts. There were over 250 of these subcontractors, and each was generally the sole source for one or more parts. The median distance of a subcontractor from the Ursus factory was 200 kilometers. This artificial creation of a network of sole source contractors at distances remote from the primary assembly plant is common for Polish industry generally and represents one of the most effective of the "poison pills" put in place long ago by the communists. In a free market setting, the entire factory is put at the hazard if even one of the contractors goes bust. Such a bizarre network makes no economic sense, but is an effective means of damning any free market government of Poland to severe trauma, including massive layoffs, as the logistics get sorted out. Anyone who still has the notion that communism was a wrong headed system with noble intentions, needs only examine the situation at Ursus. Some rather clever people spent a great deal of time and energy in designing what amounts to a punitive system of industrial production, which guaranteed goods of terrible quality produced in insufficient quantity to handle even domestic demand.

Second poison pill:

state-sponsored pornography

As another example of an institutionalized pathology, pornography is de rigeur in all Polish factories, having been instituted some 20 years ago. Explanations as to "why the naked women on the company advertising and on the factory walls" included vague references to a desire to exploit the Arab market. In actuality, it was doubtless another attempt at demoralization of the deeply Catholic worker. In the depressing structures of Polish factories, this pornography still remains undisturbed. In the summer of 1991 I have been in workrooms in a valve factory in which women outnumbered men by a ratio of more than ten to one. Fading posters of naked big busted women still adorned the walls. In the wretchedness of unheated rooms with black asphalt floors and with wages which average under \$100/month, no one seemed to notice the pornographic legacy of the former socialist masters of People's Poland.

Space does not permit an extensive cataloguing of the institutions in Polish industry which make no sense in any economic system which has as its goal a

SOVIET WOMEN WALKING THE TIGHTROPE

By Francine du Plessix Gray. New York: Doubleday. 1990. 213 pages.

Adam A. Hetnal

Francine du Plessix Gray is a novelist-essayist and author of several books relating to feminism. She has taught at Columbia, Princeton and City University of New York, has won several book awards, and could be described as a feminist. Some among her ancestors were forced to flee Russia because of the Bolshevik Revolution. Her father was French.

Gray has made several trips to the USSR. During one of them, in the initial years of *glasnost* and *perestroika*, she was a guest of a Soviet state publishing house. She was provided with a guide and enabled to tour the USSR.

The author examines the USSR in transition. Her book deals with promises, expectations, and the reality of Soviet women from 1917 into the 1980s, with references to a more distant past. General issues are intermingled with specific matters. The book is buttressed with many Soviet statistical data. It contains interviews with individual Soviet women (occasionally also with men), or whole groups of women (e.g., female students, and factory workers).

Communist society was to be based on the emergence of a new human being, a generous and noble creature always ready to sacrifice his or her selfish interests to advance some general goals. This proved nothing but an illusion. In spite of that, Gray evaluates positively the Soviet initial decisions regarding women. For the first time in recorded history, a government took specific measures to introduce full legal equality between the sexes, she claims. Divorce became a simple formality, abortion was legalized, homosexuality was decriminalized, and conditions were created (daycare centers, kindergartens, plant cafeterias) to enable women to join the workforce where they were needed.

One should add that Lenin, like Marx, opposed the destruction of the family advocated by some extremists, but wanted to build it on some new and, he believed, sounder foundations. The founder of the USSR abhorred the views of those who advocated free love. The best known representative of that position was Alexandra Kollontai (1872-1952), who later became a Soviet diplomat.

According to Ms. Gray, under Stalin family, fertility, motherhood and discipline were stressed, divorce became more complicated, and homosexuality and abortion became illegal. In the post-Stalin era some liberalization was introduced, though feminism (never popular within the USSR) was discouraged. Abortion was legalized again and divorce was facilitated. Yet under Brezhnev, the once excellent (she claims) social and medical services began to deteriorate beyond recognition. In addition, the Soviets were forced to spend an increased amount of time to purchase food

and other consumer goods. Involved in a deadly arms race with the West, the Brezhnev administration never developed a consistent policy with regard to women. On the one hand, the Kremlin began to worry about the declining birthrate among Russians, and on the other, it worried about the Soviet economy collapsing without a massive female work force. Besides, the standard of living within the USSR was so low that most Soviet women had to work for economic reasons. Under such circumstances, Soviet women were too exhausted physically to wish to have more than one or two children. Probably no other group, Gray implies, greeted *glasnost* and *perestroika* with more hope than Soviet women.

Only Russians are represented in Soviet Women: a common failing of American authors.

Some statistical data illustrate the Soviet women's contribution to the Soviet economy. Women represent 51% of the Soviet work force; 92% of Soviet women are fully employed. The teaching and medical professions are largely dominated by women (80% and 77% respectively). Their work ethics are often superior to those of their male counterparts. Some employers are proud of their female employees and refer to them as "our Japanese," which is highly complimentary. Others, however, consider women to be an "unstable work force."

Gray would like to see more Soviet women reach managerial and important political positions. Her data indicate that Soviet women are largely underrepresented at all decision-making levels. During the period when the Communist Party was fully in charge, only two Soviet women were coopted into the ruling Politburo (one under Khrushchev and the other under Gorbachev). When the author expressed her astonishment that Soviet women represented only 5% of the Central Committee, one Soviet woman replied: "Thank God there are so few of us on the Central Committee. Let the guys fight it out up there with their power games, why should we bother with such junk?"

The author is correct when she argues that Soviet women have different priorities than many of their US counterparts. Whereas many American feminists want women to assume new responsibilities, Soviet women would be glad to have fewer. One out of five Soviet women would gladly stay home if the husband earned enough to sustain the family. Soviet women do the impossible to dress well (particularly to wear something foreign-made), and they take good care of their hair. They dream about a small apartment with a balcony instead of a communal one with a shared kitchen and bathroom. Life could be considerably easier on women if husbands shared their burdens. Most husbands, however, operate according to a Russian proverb: "Women can do everything, men can do the rest." Most Soviet women go to bed late and get up early. Little wonder that they hardly enjoy life, consider sex to be a burden, seek or accept divorce, but are ready for any sacrifice relating to the welfare and

future of their children. Once upon a time, the three-generational family made it easier to cope with all the requirements of life. As many older women continue to work, this is largely no longer the case.

Soviet statistics: between five and eight abortions for each live birth.

According to statistical data and Gray's own findings, the USSR has had the highest abortion rate in the world, some five times higher than the United States. There apparently have been between five and eight abortions for each live birth. Some women undergo up to fourteen abortions during their childbearing years. Infant mortality is on the increase, and before it disintegrated, the USSR apparently was at the bottom among UN members regarding sex education. This was not so much related to a deliberate government policy, or lack of it, as to prudishness. The Russians do not discuss intimate matters with others, and are reluctant to confide in their doctors on matters relating to sexual intimacy. Birth preventive methods are often primitive and dangerous to health; in addition, there are not enough of them. There is a shortage of products specifically needed for female hygiene, e.g., tampons.

The Russians, the author writes, confront a serious identity crisis. Prior to the Bolshevik Revolution, Moscow was the Third Rome, and after 1917, was the center of what was supposed to be a perfect society of the future. Now the grey days of communism are gone and capitalism has many enemies. Under such circumstances, the increasingly apparent "Russianism" finds an outlet in some form of religion. Before it disintegrated, the Communist Party had members who baptized their children and female members who wore crosses around their necks. Even before the recent events, priests and religious topics were increasingly visible in the written and spoken media. However, as Gray argues, this religious revival is not so much a spiritual awakening as a search for their national heritage.

Soviet women are jealous of the numerous possibilities that their US counterparts have to look healthy and in shape. Many Soviet women find Russian males boorish and lacking good manners. At the same time, they admire the youthful look, constant smile and gentle manners of the American males with whom they have contact.

One examines Gray's book with mixed feelings. As a militant feminist, she is emotionally involved in making her point. She is selective, biased and lacks depth and to some extent also expertise. As the author is a writer and not a scholar, one can hardly expect a professional distance and impartiality from her. Her background on the USSR, particularly with regard to pre-1917 history, is poor. The title also promises much more than Gray delivers. Only Russians are represented in *Soviet Women*. One hardly finds anything relating to the Ukrainians, though with some 40 million people, they are the second largest nationality of the USSR.

Also, "Soviet women" at the bottom of the social ladder are hardly given any attention at all. The value of Gray's book would have been considerably enhanced if she paid attention to the less educated and less articulate women since they represent an overwhelming majority.

Gray is an American woman, unable to understand that Russian women have different ideals and priorities than their American counterparts, and many of them are primarily interested in reaching an easier and more prosperous life. She seems unfair to that exceptional and tormented writer Leo Tolstoy (1828-1910). He constantly evolved in his own behavior and writings. The once dashing officer and womanizer came to consider sex as evil. This was a conclusion he reached after much reflection and not an unexamined prejudice. Contrary to what Gray suggests, neither *War and Peace* nor *Anna Karenina* can be authoritatively declared as showing Tolstoy's prejudices against women.


Gray also fails to understand and appreciate the power of love and the readiness to sacrifice of Soviet women. For example, she is unable to understand a distinguished Soviet writer Tatiana Tolstaya, who devotes her life to her family and only writes at night. Whenever someone's opinions do not coincide with hers, Gray takes it as an anti-female stand.

At the same time, Gray's book raises questions that pertain to all societies. An unresolved and controversial matter is whether a different physical shape and biological functions are the only differences between men and women or whether there is much more to it. Women are divided on this issue, and so are men and experts of both sexes. Relations between men and women have differed to some extent in various ethnic groups and they have evolved over time. E.g., women in the western world acquired legal equality with men. To some extent, this has happened also in other parts of the world. Our Founding Fathers were relatively conservative with regard to women's place in society. Women's emancipation began during the Enlightenment. It was then that modern feminism originated, though it remained marginal for some time. However, western feminists in general and their American counterparts in particular are far from being satisfied with their gains.

Adam A. Hetnal is Associate Professor of history at New Mexico State University in Las Cruces and author of numerous articles on East Central Europe, Poland, Russia and Ukraine.

Illustrations on the opposite page:

Four works from *Voices of Freedom: Polish Women Artists and the Avant-Garde, 1880-1990*, an exhibition of eighty paintings, sculptures and mixed media works from collections in Poland and the United States, hosted by the National Museum of Women in the Arts, Washington, D.C., in October 1991. Curated by Dr. Agnieszka Morawinska and sponsored by Danuta Walesa, First Lady of Poland. Reproduced by permission of the National Museum of Women in the Arts.



Anna Bilinska-Bohdanowicz (1857-1893)
Portrait of a Young Woman with a Rose in Her Hand, 1892
 Oil on canvas, 58 x 38½ in.
 Collection National Museum, Warsaw



Katarzyna Kobro (1898-1951)
Spatial Composition 6, 1931
 Painted steel, 25¼ x 9¼ x 5½ in.
 Collection Museum of Art, Łódź



Magdalena Abakanowicz, b. 1930
Figures, (1986-1987)
 Mixed media with canvas and polyester, 14 pieces, ea. 63 in. high
 Collection National Museum, Warsaw



Olga Boznanska (1857-1893)
Portrait of a High School Student, ca. 1890
 Oil on canvas, 71 x 39½ in.
 Collection National Museum, Warsaw

BOOKS BOOKS AND PERIODICALS RECEIVED

***Breaking the Barrier: the Rise of Solidarity in Poland*, by Lawrence Goodwyn.** New York-Oxford. Oxford University Press. 1991. xxx + 466 pages. Hardcover. \$27.95.

Easily the most significant book on Solidarity, and one of the best books we have encountered in recent years. Unlike most accounts of the Solidarity labor movement, whether comprehensive or detailed, this one offers an interpretation, and a most original one at that. The final essay, "Ways of Seeing: A Critical Essay on Authorities," deserves to be reprinted in anthologies of socio-political writings on East Central Europe. "The thought that unions independent of the party could be realized in the Gdańsk manner-through a strike of production workers-was not something that Warsaw intellectuals had ever really anticipated. So remote was the world of the workers from the milieu of the intelligentsia that the topic of broad-scale industrial activism to create independent social structures was off the scale of discussion. In the new political context created in Poland by the coastal mobilization, this way of seeing became an absolutely central circumstance. For not only was Solidarność a trade union, it was a singularly adventurous conception of a trade union."

The book makes the following point, rarely seen in Polish scholarship: that virtually all Polish and foreign scholarship on Solidarity claims that after the worker strikes (some say riots) at Ursus and in Radom in 1976, the Committee for the Defense of Workers (KOR) was organized by Warsaw intellectuals, to help defend the workers and teach them how to run protest movements. Conventional wisdom says that it was this Committee's theses that formed the basis of the workers' demands in Gdańsk in 1980. But this Committee had nothing to do with the origin and development of the social movement called Solidarity, argues Goodwyn. Solidarity's real movers and shakers were the participants in the workers' strikes whose names did not even get into the books written by intellectuals about intellectuals. Goodwyn's field research (interviews etc.) revealed that the workers were organized in a sophisticated way, one that was unique to Poland. They formed "interfactory strike committees," and they used sit-in strikes, which in Poland go by the name of "occupation strikes." These skills "had become the property of the Polish working class long before KOR was founded." (p. xxiii) The Warsaw intellectuals had no idea how to organize such committees and how to coordinate sit-in strikes. All this was done by workers. The essence of social movements, argues Goodwyn, is not what can be "seen from afar" but what actually happens during the "movement building" when people are moved into action. "If three months

before KOR was ever formed, workers across Poland had mounted a series of occupation strikes, they obviously had acquired this knowledge from precincts other than those occupied by Warsaw intellectuals." (xxiii)

The research on Solidarity has been subject to "an error in the premise; [it] endeavored to understand a self-generated social formation without recourse to research inside the formation itself." (xxiv)

Goodwyn points out that most descriptions of social movements take a "view from afar" and concentrate on what had been written and said about such movements, rather than on their participants. Under the communist regimes, an additional difficulty was created by the communist police's monopoly on all information about participants (this information was hidden in the police archives). Thus the only persons available for interviews were the intellectuals external to the movement. Goodwyn claims that an archaic scholarly methodology combined with police conspiracy produced a misleading account of what actually happened in the Solidarity labor movement. Indeed, as one peruses books on Solidarity, one encounters there dozens of names of intellectuals but only a few names of workers.

It might be added here that there was a third ingredient to this conspiracy of silence concerning the real actors in this social movement. It was the Polish intelligentsia's habitual ignorance of, and indifference to, the working class. To write about the working class, to instruct them etc., is fine; but to actually treat them as individual human beings, whose minds and ideas are no "worse" than those of the intellectuals is another matter. Members of the Polish intellectual class display indifference to persons whose occupation is productive labor on assembly lines. The idea that one might gain something from talking to workers, that the workers are worthy companions for say an outing in the country, or a trip abroad, is simply beyond the comprehension of the intellectuals. This situation is true all over Eastern Europe and emphatically so the Soviet Union. The intelligentsia are notorious in that respect.

Do we recommend you buy the book? You bet.

East-Central Europe and the USSR. Edited by Richard F. Staar. New York. St. Martin's Press, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10010. 1991. 320 pages. \$49.95.

The book is based on the plausible assumption that the revolutionary events which took place in East Central Europe in 1989 took Moscow by surprise. It deals with "The Future of Soviet-East Central European Relations" (Ch. II by Christopher Jones), "The Framework of Soviet East Central European Economic Relations in the 1990s" (Ch. II by Bartłomiej Kaminski), and individual countries.

***East Central Europe: from Reform to Transformation*, by Judy Batt.** New York. Council on Foreign Relations Press. 1991. 129 pages. Paper. \$14.95.

This slim volume claims to be the first scholarly analysis of three countries of East Central Europe: Poland, Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary, since the post-communist governments took over in 1989. The Appendix has tables detailing the 1990 elections (1989 for Poland). The style is scholarly. The author is a lecturer in Soviet and East European Politics at the University of Birmingham. Ideologically, it is of the liberal left variety, which means it is ever so slightly biased in favor of the political forces in Czecho-Slovakia as opposed to those in the strongly Catholic Poland.

Głos z nad Niemna. Pismo Związku Polaków na Białorusi. Editor: Włodzimierz Małaszkiwicz. 230005 Grodno, ul. Dzierżyńskiego 90a. [sic-Ed.] Republika Białoruska. Tel. 2-96-14. In Polish.

We received Vol. II, No. 6(8) (June-July 1991). A most impressive, newspaper-format bi-monthly published by the Association of Poles in Byelorussia, the USSR. It has articles on Polish writers Eliza Orzeszkowa, born and raised in Belarus, and Henryk Sienkiewicz, an excerpt from Orzeszkowa's novel *Nad Niemnem* and other serials, and information about the recent ingress of Grodno's Roman Catholic bishop Alexander Kaszkiewicz (with photographs). It also has local information, excellent reporting and letters; much of this is heart-rending. Jan Ejsmont writes the following from the island of Sakhalin, where he was deported in 1950:

...For forty years now, I have appealed to the city of Grodno's authorities to sell me an apartment in Grodno. In 1985, the city fathers answered me that my name was put on the waiting list for a cooperative apartment. But only ten apartments per year are available to people on that list, and my name is #296. Thus I would have to wait thirty years. I am over 60; in Sakhalin, the average lifespan is 60-62. The snow is on the ground for 8 months, and the sun shines 60-70 days per year. The "leaders" of Grodno ignore me [because I am Polish]... In 1950 my ploughed and seeded field was taken away from me; also horses, cattle, livestock, everything. This took place in the village of Prokopowicze near Grodno. Since 1955, I have lived in Sakhalin. I spent my life here. I only want to die on my own soil, near a holy Catholic church. I beg you to help me.

Would those readers who are not yet overwhelmed with helping others address themselves to this case? Letters to the Grodno City Soviet and to others might help. Would anyone care enough to take a trip to Sakhalin to help this man purchase an apartment? Mr. Ejsmont's address, in Russian script, is as follows: 694 460 Оха на Сахалине, ул. Карла Маркса 28/1, кв. 37, Эйсмонт Иван Георгиевич.

On our part, we wish to note that it is the lifetime's of forced labor of such non-Russians as Mr. Ejsmont that built the strength of the Soviet empire in Siberia. Thousands of lives of non-Russians were ruined so that the Russians could now claim the ownership of Siberia and derive profits from its natural riches.

The Eternal Moment: The Poetry of

Czesław Miłosz, by Aleksander Fiut. Translated by Theodosia S. Robertson. Berkeley, CA. University of California Press. 1991. 240 pages. Hardcover. \$25.00.

An introduction to Czesław Miłosz's poetry written by a professor at Jagellonian University who had produced another book on Miłosz. The translator, Professor Robertson of the University of Michigan-Flint, teaches Polish and English subjects. A rare volume on an author whose remarkable achievement has generated too few critical works.

Language Bridges Quarterly. Vol. 3, No. 3 (Summer 1991). Polish-English literary magazine. P.O. Box 850792, Richardson, Texas 75085-0792. Editor: Eva Ziem. 24 pages. \$20.00 per year.

A completely bi-lingual magazine featuring poetry, prose and useful information. A wonderful help in learning either English or Polish.

PACN (Polish American Cultural Network) Newsletter. No. XXXVI (Summer 1991). 24212 Park Street, Torrance, CA 90505. Telephone or Fax: 213-375-8471. Editor: Artur Zygmunt. 34 pages.

Guaranteed to dispel anyone's doldrums regarding the daily functioning of American Polish groups. It is witty, informative, and totally upbeat without that false enthusiasm which so mars many other newsletters. We have been receiving this wonderful publication for some time now, and want to bring it to the attention of readers.

Emily's Year, by Charles Merrill. San Diego, CA. MHO & MHO Works (Box 33135, San Diego, CA 92163). 1991. 189 pages. \$7.95. Paper.

The story of Emily Morawski, a Polish American-teenager, who behaved with heroic courage to save others (one such feat landed her a call from President Reagan) but was ignored by those in the media who decide what is going to receive publicity and what will get the silent treatment. A most eloquent indirect condemnation of media and society prejudice against Polish Americans, and an inspiring story of youthful courage. For teenage readers. [Review to appear in a forthcoming issue of the *SR*. Ed.]

Znicz: Wiadomości Harcerskie. No. 34. December 1991. Polish Scouting Organization, Connecticut District. Bethlehem, CT 06751. 36 pages. Supported by donations.

A scouting magazine in Polish. A lovely shoestring enterprise for children and teenagers. Could be used in Polish schools in this country. *Znicz* is distributed worldwide, and we have learned from it that Polish scouting organizations exist in Argentina, Brazil, Czecho-Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, England and France. *Znicz* is run according to the ancient Polish precept of *Bóg, Honor i Ojczyzna*.

Announcements Received

A Plea from Mohylov, Belarus

On 13 July 1990, the city authorities in Mohylov gave back to the Catholics the Roman Catholic cathedral. This 300 years old baroque building is, however, in ruins and basically consists of walls and a leaking roof. The organ, altars, paintings, benches and the sound system have all been destroyed. Only some ceiling frescoes have survived. After the October Revolution, the cathedral was used as a silo and later was made into an archive.

The Catholic Church is now returning to Eastern Belarus. At present, priests are already working in the towns of Lelczyce, Mozyr, Momieli, Polotsk, Vitebsk, Lepiel. From Mohylov, Catholics used to travel to the parishes in Orsza (80 miles) and Borysov (98 miles). Every few years or so, Catholics also traveled to Vilnius to meet Christ in the Holy Eucharist there.

The liturgy is said in three languages: Polish, Belarus, and Russian. There aren't many Catholics in these territories, because after the October Revolution they were systematically persecuted, and many were shot or sent to Siberia. Mohylov's population is 350,000 but there are only 350 practising Catholics. This is why I have imposed upon you, to perhaps find some friends who might want to help in the restoration of the cathedral, because both the people and the material means will come mainly from Poland and Poles.

We have both a zloty [Polish currency, *Ed.*] account and a dollar account in Poland. The zloty account has the following number: B.S. Slesin k/Konina 931173-99059-170-1 Mohylev. POLAND

The dollar account number is as follows: 10128772 USD Avista, Bank PKO SA, Kalisz, ul. Gornoslaska 35, POLAND.

I thank you in advance for your interest in the problems of practising Catholics in Eastern Belarus.

[signed] *Slawomir W. Blin, Pastor, Mohylov, Belarus*

Have You Driven a Cinquecento Lately?

On 19 December 1991, Fiat Motor Company introduced a new minicar, Cinquecento. Its 2-cylinder version is produced exclusively in Poland's former FSM car factory in Bielsko Biala. According to *Donosy* of 17 December, 27,000 Cinquecentos will be sold in Poland in 1991, at the price of 59 million zlotys each. Of the 160,000 to 240,000 Cinquecentos eventually scheduled to roll off the assembly line each year, 50,000 to 80,000 will be sold in Poland and the rest are targeted at the international market. Cinquecento will replace the tiny Fiat 126, also produced in Poland. Known under the affectionate name "Mikrus," Fiat 126 has been the first car middle-class Poles have been able to afford. According to *The New York Times* (Dec 10, 1991), the Fiat Motor Company has invested \$560 million in the Bielsko Biala plant, and it plans to invest an additional \$800 million over the next six years.

Letters to the Editor

Time to integrate East Central Europe into European Studies

Your editorial on the Sonnenfeldt view of the world (*SR*, September 1991) and the accompanying collection of university syllabi were extremely welcome. However, I can't help noticing that all the courses you list seem to be intended for teaching separately, and not as an integrated part of European Studies. Unless I am mistaken, this only adds weight to Sonnenfeldt's thesis, suggesting, as he would like to do, that countries such as Poland, Hungary, or Czechoslovakia have nothing much to do with the 'A' team of countries, namely 'the West.' Surely, the right thing for all teachers of east European Studies is to withdraw their courses from the programme unless their colleagues will agree to them being taught as part of, or in conjunction with, wider based courses on all-Europe.

To my mind, the really persistent and pernicious enemy to any sort of real progress in our field is the deeply grounded belief in the superiority of something called 'Western Civilization.' This belief automatically relegates to the 'B' team anything beyond the Oder, the Adriatic, and the Irish Sea. It underlies an intellectual scheme, invented in the late 19th century by the Germans, English, and French as part of their imperial pretensions. It is losing much of its currency in Europe, although it is still kicking. Unfortunately, in the USA, it seems to be the norm.

Norman Davies, London

The writer, Professor of History at the University of London, is the author of *God's Playground: A History of Poland*, 2 vols. (Columbia University Press, 1984) and of many other books. He also writes political commentary for *The Independent* and *The Daily Telegraph*.

Compliments Department

The syllabi in your last issue (*SR*, September 1991) are, indeed, excellent models to be considered by anyone contemplating the teaching of a course on Poland or Eastern Europe.

Joseph W. Wiczerzak, New York

The writer is Professor of History (emeritus) at Bronx Community College, CUNY.

Are back issues of *The Sarmatian Review* available? I thoroughly enjoy reading each issue.

Rev. Walter J. Rakoczy, Whiting, Indiana

What editor would not be grateful for letters like that? *Ed.*

A Book Plug

With reference to your recent review of Jan T. Gross's *War Through Children's Eyes* (*SR*, September 1991), a related book has recently appeared. *Isfahan, City of Polish Children* (1989) contains the translated Polish texts and two reports by Col. A. Ross in their original English. A copy can be obtained from the Association of Former Pupils

of Polish Schools in Isfahan and Lebanon. Write to Mrs. J. Lewicka Howells, OBE, 63 Victoria Drive, London SW19 6HN, Great Britain.

Danuta Batorska, Houston

The writer, Associate Professor of Art History at the University of Houston, is one of the Polish children deported to Siberia by the Soviets after their attack on Poland on 19 September 1, 1939. Her trek to the United States led through Isfahan, Iran.

Thompson, *Dark Side of Socialist Planning*

(Continued from Page 104)

steady improvement in productivity. But there can be no doubt that dark, intelligent and faceless forces worked hard to guarantee dysfunctionality of Polish industry.

It is always "better to light a candle than to curse the darkness." The goal of establishing modern means of production in Poland is one to which some of us will be devoting a substantial part of our energies for the rest of our lives. We do this realizing that Poland can expect little help from the United States.

But one should not turn a blind eye to the crimes against the Polish people which have seriously damaged the lives of three generations. It should be a part of the policy of President Wałęsa to investigate the paradigm of socialist production and its facilitators much as one investigates war crimes. There are few greater criminals than the socialist commissar who ties the worker to a wheel of futile existence in which he must daily see his labor wasted, his faith mocked, and his children brainwashed.

Thompson, a Professor of Statistics at Rice University and a fellow of the three major statistical societies, is the recent recipient of the Wilks Medal for excellence in statistical research.

Lukaszewski, *Security in the post-Soviet Era*

(Continued from Page 103)

16. "Warsaw Pact's Fate Being Decided," *Izvestiya*, 23 January 1991.

17. "Troika in Central Europe," *Pravda*, 25 January 1991.

18. "The Soviet role in post-Cold War European security arrangements," an unpublished paper presented at the International Studies Association Convention, Washington, D.C., April 1990.

19. Farewell to the Cold War," *Pravda*, 7 July 1990; Prague Domestic Service, 26 April 1991. FBIS-EEU-91-082, 29 April 1991.

Witold J. Lukaszewski is Associate Professor of Political Science at Sam Houston State University in Huntsville, Texas. An extended version of this paper was read at the Annual International Security Studies Meeting, Annapolis, MD, November 7, 1991.

BOOKS

(Continued from Page 109)

Remaking the Balkans, by Christopher Cviic. New York. Council on Foreign Relations Press. 1991. viii+ 113 pages. \$14.95. Paperback.

This late but timely arrival offers a concise history of Balkan countries since the Soviet-sponsored communist took them over after World War 2. It was written before the civil war between Serbia and Croatia broke out, and before the Soviet Union disintegrated. Its author is a British Croat who has interpreted international events for many years now. Recommended as a reliable guide to who is who in the Balkans, what is happening there and what might happen.

INDEPENDENCE FOR CROATIA AND SLOVENIA

Score a point for the Catholic Slavs, after so many months of fighting. Croatia and Slovenia became independent republics, and Germany led the way in gaining international recognition for them. Although there is little contact between Poland, and these two former provinces of Yugoslavia, and although the Croats can do little for the Poles and vice versa and although there is little love lost between the Croats and many of their neighbors - mark this one off as a victory for the ideals of Solidarity and the idea of the nation-state. Come to think of it, the Serbs were the only Slavs to whose rescue the Russians ever came - no doubt influenced by that old Russian idea of an Orthodox Slavic empire where Russians, Serbs, Bulgarians, partly Ukrainians and Belarusses - would "stick together" because of their common interests. Catholic countries never developed this kind of clannishness. Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Croats and Slovenes together form that part of the Slavic world that historically belonged to the West and had its cultures shaped by western influences - even though the West cared little about them. (SB)

In Memoriam

A longtime friend of *The Sarmatian Review*, Dr. Konstantin Kolenda, died on December 5, 1991 of a heart attack at age 68. Born in Poland, Dr. Kolenda received his education at Rice University, and later joined its faculty to become Carolyn and Fred McManis Professor of Philosophy and Chairman of the Philosophy Department at Rice. His life's *opus* includes numerous books, among them a popular textbook, *Philosophy's Journey*.

Dr. Kolenda was a *Sarmatian Review* subscriber and writer. His most recent contribution was a review of Julian Siedlecki's *The Fate of Poles in the USSR, 1939-1986* (*SR*, Vol. IX, No. 3 [1989]).

Konnie will be sorely missed.

PIASA MEETING

Time: February 7, 1992 (Friday), 7:30 PM

Place: Residence of Mr. & Mrs. Jan & Hanna Karon

9206 Ilona, Houston, Texas 77025

Take South Loop feeder road west. Pass Timberside and turn right on Linkmeadow. Turn right on Sun Valley and take next right on Ilona.

Or: go south on Stella Link, turn right on Wood Valley before you reach South Loop, turn left on Linkmeadow, take next right on Sun Valley and next right on Ilona.

Speaker: Professor Witold J. Lukaszewski

Moderator: Ms. Marla K. Burns

Topic: Political Rearrangements in the Former Soviet Bloc

Witold J. Lukaszewski teaches political science at Sam Houston State University. Marla K. Burns is a partner in Burns & Associates.

Attendance limited to *Sarmatian Review* subscribers and spouses. The only exception is students with valid ID cards. Delinquent subscribers can renew their subscriptions at the door. New subscribers welcome.

We would like to thank the following persons for their generous donations to *The Sarmatian Review* in October-December 1991:

Carol M. Ashton, M.D., Mr. & Mrs. Edward Demny of the Demny Enterprises, Mr. & Mrs. Vassil & Roza Ekimov, Mr. & Mrs. Carl & Katherine Evans, Agnes M. Guthrie, M.D., Joseph A. Jachimczyk, M.D., Col. Francis C. Kajencki of the Southwest Polonia Press, Ms. Irene T. Lawyer of the Polonia Boutique, Professor & Mrs. W. J. Lukaszewski, the Rev. Walter J. Rakoczy.

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
The Blikle pastry shop is one of the finest in Warsaw.

AWARD!

This special Award is offered to the public figures and institutions who have displayed gratuitous hostility to East Europeans. This time, the Dead Carp Award goes to *The New York Times*. On November 12, 1991 the *NYT* carried on Page One a lengthy article detailing corruption in Poland's fledgling capitalist economy ("Poland's New Climate Yields Bumper Crop of Corruption"). In the same issue, the masthead editorial urged the United States and the West to help Russia, because Mr. Yeltsin has announced a program of reforms ("Wake Up to Reform in Russia"). Signal: don't invest in Poland, they may have the basic capitalist laws in place, but they have no banking or accounting system to make your money safe, and corrupt officials abscond to Israel [says the *NYT*] with whatever money they can lay their hands on. Go instead to Russia, where we see half-measures and promises of reforms, and a continuing enormous expenditure on armaments.

This is but a typical instance of the insistence of the *NYT* that the American taxpayers shore up Russia's super-power status. Since November, literally hundreds of articles, testimonials and appeals have appeared in the *NYT* urging us to help the crumbling Eurasian empire, and virtually none urging a similar kind of help to East Central Europe. On December 12, 1991, the *Houston Chronicle* reported that Mr. Yeltsin was given a 241 carat diamond recently dug up in Yakutia. Perhaps instead of asking American taxpayers for money, Mr. Yeltsin should sell his diamond to *The New York Times*. The proceeds could feed half of Moscow for a month.

AWARD!



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