


THE SARMATIAN REVIEW

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The Dialogue that dare not speak its name

A Polish-Jewish conversation resumed



Leopold Tyrmand (1920-1985).

His book, *Tu w Ameryce, czyli dobre rady dla Polaków*, inspired *The Sarmatian Review*.

Photo courtesy of the Rockford Institute.

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From the Editor

This issue contains papers given at the second Polish-Jewish dialogue held at Houston's Holocaust Museum on 29 March 1998. We return to the issue of Polish-Jewish relations with much anguish but also with gratitude. Gratitude to the Houston Holocaust Museum for allowing us to speak freely about issues that are of concern to us. We are keenly aware of the fact that the agenda for the Polish-Jewish dialogue cannot be shrunk down to the issue of anti-Semitism. Poland was not a country with a tiny percentage of Jews, like Holland or Denmark or Bulgaria. The number of Jews in Poland was larger than in all the countries of Europe taken together, excluding the USSR. The percentage of Jews in the Polish population was 10-11 percent: by comparison, the American Jews constitute two percent of the United States population. Under such circumstances, the Jewish population of Poland had an effect on political, economic, social, psychological and religious issues in ways that simply cannot be compared to the situation in England or Sweden or Denmark or Holland or Bulgaria. Given the fact that until World War I, Poland was itself colonized and dominated by hostile empires, the history of Polish-Jewish relations assumes aspects that have not yet been articulated or addressed. The issues were further complicated by Jewish non-assimilation. What in the sixteenth century was a sign of progress and confidence in the multinational Polish *Res Publica*, the Jewish separateness, under conditions of foreign domination in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries became a drawback for Poles and Jews alike. While a certain percentage of Jews did assimilate and entered the mainstream of Polish culture (Dr. Abraham Peck mentioned some in his paper, and so did your Editor), the majority stood apart. Polish political attitudes, conditioned by generations of equating Polishness with Catholicism, did not help either. Poles did not regard all Jews as Poles, only the assimilated ones. The unassimilated Jews did not feel loyalty to Polish aspirations to sovereignty or to the Second Polish Republic. These are issues that call for further in-

vestigation. In conditions of economic backwardness and political insecurity, a large unassimilated minority was virtually certain to arouse hostility and to respond in kind. The secularism of some Jews and Roman Catholicism of the large majority of Poles were bound to arouse mutual suspicion as bread was scarce and foreign armies all too visible. The Soviet conquest and exacerbation of ethnic animosities which ensued brought the final parting of ways. In the meantime, World War II, the Holocaust and the unprecedented destruction of the Polish Catholic population and statehood by Nazis and Soviets had to be coped with. To explain these intensely tangled relations just by invoking the cliché of anti-Semitism is like saying that winter is caused by falling snow.

The two review essays by Professors Cienciala and Wilczek deal with two books which differ widely in quality. Professor Stokes' collection of essays wins hands down over Pollard's. An old adage says that those who lose are always in the wrong; but even so, similarities between the successful acquisition of liberties by English and Polish nobility are striking, as Professor Cienciala points out. The powers-that-be in Europe cultivated the image of Poland as a kingdom of darkness for reasons that had much to do with their greed for Polish lands. As Professor Wilczek shows in his review, Alfred Rambaud's *History of Russia* (derived partly from Russian historiography) was one of the sources for the extremely biased assessment of Polish religious debates in A.F. Pollard's book on Jesuits in Poland. As one traces back numerous inaccuracies and falsifications concerning Poland in this book and in others, one realizes that they have moved from book to book, and with each move they acquired more credibility and prestige, until a virtually impenetrable body of discourse was created which is now the task of postcolonialist scholars to penetrate.

Last but not least, Judith Olsak-Glass' review of Tadeusz Piotrowski's *Poland's Holocaust* is worth noting. This magisterial book brings together a great deal of material that otherwise would have had little chance to be noticed by English-language scholars. Δ

Sarmatian Review Index

Health

Number of cases of diphtheria in the Russian Federation since 1990: 140,000. Number of deaths: 4,000.

Source: A study published on 8 September 1998 by the Center for Disease Control and Prevention in Washington, DC, as reported by Agence France-Presse, 8 September 1998.

Number of people suffering from tuberculosis in the Russian Federation in 1998: 2.5 million.

Percentage increase in the first 10 months of 1998: 8.5 percent.

Source: Russian health ministry official on 16 October 1998, as reported by AFP, 17 October 1998.

Country which has the world's highest adolescent suicide rate: Bulgaria.

Suicide rate in Bulgaria among the general population: 18.2 suicides per 100,000 people.

Source: AFP, 10 September 1998.

Estimated number of alcoholics in Ukraine: over five million, or ten percent of the population.

Source: Lily Hyde of RFE/RL (Kyiv), 16 September 1998.

Percentage decrease in the consumption of alcohol in Poland over the last ten years: 33 percent, to eight liters per person.

Source: *Donosy*, 5 October 1998.

Economy

Amount of money which Moscow's American business community lost in August-September 1998 due to economic crisis in Russia: \$463 million.

Source: John Varoli in Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 28 September 1998.

Estimated value of losses by private creditors and banks in the August-September financial crisis in Russia: \$100 billion and \$50 billion, respectively or, to quote Fitch's, 'the single largest credit loss ever imposed on private sector creditors.'

Amount of foreign debt which the Russian government promises to honor but which it is in danger of defaulting on: \$155 billion, of which \$66 billion is held by private creditors.

Source: Credit rating agency Fitch IBCA, as reported by AFP, 8 September 1998.

Amount of money 'conned' from Western financial institutions by Russia in Spring 1998: \$20 billion.

Source: Anatoly Chubais in an interview published in the Russian daily *Kommersant*, 8 September 1998, as reported by Richard S. Paddock, *The New York Times*, 9 September 1998.

Percentage fall in Russia's oil revenues over the first seven months of 1998 compared to the same period last year: 26.7 percent.

Revenues from Russia's oil sales through July 1998: \$5.886 billion.

Countries which are Russia's most profitable customers as oil consumers: Germany, Poland and Italy.

Source: AFP, 10 September 1998.

Amount of rubles in circulation as of 1 September 1998: 158 billion.

Amount of rubles in circulation as of 21 September 1998: 170.3 billion, or \$10.7 billion.

Source: Russia's Central Bank, as reported by *Russia Today* (<http://www.rossiya.net/index.htm>), 11 September 1998, and Associated Press, 25 September 1998.

Daily trades at the Moscow Stock Exchange in January 1998: around \$100 million.

The Russian stock market index in January 1998: around 410.

The Russian stock market index on 16 September 1998: 58.86.

Source: AFP, 15 and 16 September 1998.

Daily trade at the Moscow Stock Exchange on 25 September 1998: \$163,350.

Source: AP, 25 September 1998.

Capitalization of the London Stock Exchange at the end of 1997: \$1,500 billion.

Source: Alan Cowell, "Plotting the Center of the New Europe," *The New York Times*, 21 October 1998.

Percentage of state revenues in the Russian Empire that came from vodka sales in tsarist times: 50 percent.

Percentage of recorded state income in the USSR (before the 1980s when gas and oil became big moneymakers) that came from vodka sales: 35 percent.

Estimated percentage of state revenues in the Russian Federation that come from vodka sales (after President Yeltsin's liquidated the state vodka monopoly in 1992): four percent.

Source: Michael Wines, "Yeltsin Tries to Turn Back Tide of Vodka," *The New York Times*, 26 September 1998.

Decrease in Russian-Chinese trade between 1997 and 1998: from \$6.12 billion in 1997 to \$5.5 billion in 1998.

Source: An unnamed Chinese economist interviewed by ITAR-TASS, as reported by RFE/RL, 6 November 1998.

Economy continued

Percentage of factories in the Russian Federation which were unprofitable in 1992 and 1996, respectively: 7.2 percent and 44 percent.

Number of factories in the Russian Federation in 1990 and 1996: 20,998 and 14,934.

Source: Judith Matloff, "Making Do in Russia Means Not Making TVs," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 20 October 1998.

Percentage increase in Russian military production between September 1997-September 1998: 15.4 percent.

Source: Interfax, as reported by RFE/RL, 30 October 1998.

Estimated Russian total foreign debt as of November 1998: \$170 billion, or 2.6 trillion rubles at the November 5 ruble exchange rate (more than 80 percent of the GDP).

Source: The MFK Renaissance financial group, as reported by Mark Rice-Oxley of AFP, 5 November 1998.

Russia's 1999 budget, as presented by the government on 10 December 1999: \$29 billion [*sic*].

The United States Federal Budget for 1999: \$1.7 trillion.

Projected fractional repayment of foreign debt as envisaged by the Russian budget; \$9.5 billion (of \$17.5 billion due).

Source: Michael Gordon, "Russia Offers 1999 Budget," *The New York Times*, 11 December 1998.

Demography

Percentage of 'foreigners' in the German population: nine percent, or seven million people.

Source: *The New York Times*, 16 October 1998. NB: these are not actual foreigners but persons of non-German ancestry to whom the German political system has so far denied German citizenship.

Population decline on the island of Sakhalin in the Russian Federation's Far East between 1992-1997: 12 percent (from 720,000 to 632,000).

Drop in life expectancy on Sakhalin between 1992-1997: from 68 to 55 years.

Source: Victor Mote, *Siberia: Worlds Apart* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1998), 192.

Percentage decrease in population of the northeastern part of the Russian Federation since the early 1990s: over ten percent, or 800,000 persons.

Source: ITAR-TASS on 9 November 1998, as reported by RFE/RL on the same day.

Crime

Number of cars stolen yearly in the United States (according to FBI files): 1.4 million.

Of these, number of cars that end up in Poland: two thousand.

Source: *Donosy*, 18 September 1998.

Agriculture

Russian grain harvest in 1998: 50 million metric tons (the lowest in 41 years).

Russian grain harvest in 1997: 88 million metric tons.

Amount of grain consumed by Russia yearly: 70 million metric tons, of which 22 million is used for food and the rest for cattle feed and seed.

Source: US Department of Agriculture, as reported by the *New York Times*, 10 October 1998; the *NYT*, 11 November 1998.

French estimate of the Russian grain harvest in 1998 (delivered by an agricultural consultant to the French embassy in Moscow, Jean-Jacques Herve): 40 million tons.

Value of food which Russia imported in 1997: \$12 billion.

Percentage fall in the Russian farm production over the first nine months of 1998 compared to the same period in 1997: 9.4 percent.

Percentage fall in the potato harvest: 10.7 percent.

Number of cattle in Russia counted on 1 October 1998: 31.5 million.

Source: AFP, 10 October 1998.

Politics

Turnout in the 11 October 1998 local elections in Poland: over 46 percent.

Turnout in the 1994 local elections in Poland: 34 percent.

The winner: AWS (Solidarity Electoral Action, or a center-right coalition of Solidarity-based parties and groups) which got 16 percent of the vote and 10,613 of 63,765 seats in local councils, municipal governments and regional as well as provincial legislative assemblies.

Source: Jan de Weydenthal, RFE/RL, 26 October 1998.

Voting patterns in the 3 November 1998 House elections in the United States: Protestants 45 percent Democrat and 58 percent Republican; white Protestants 35 percent Democrat and 65 percent Republican; Catholics 53 percent Democrat and 47 percent Republican; Jewish 79 percent Democrat and 21 percent Republican.

Source: *The New York Times*, 9 November 1998.

‘The Two Saddest Nations on Earth:’ Poles, Jews and Memory

Abraham J. Peck

Our Jewish tradition asks us to remember. We are a people of memory. But what happens when that memory remains fixed on the most awful moment in our collective experience? What happens when we are so traumatized by the events of that memory—of the Holocaust—that we cannot look backward to a more ambiguous past or to an unknown and unknowable future?

In the United States, any form of dialogue between the Polish Christian community and the former Polish Jewish community has, in the words of Eva Hoffman, ‘taken on the form of a moral war and has proceeded in escalating rounds of accusation and counter-accusation, exaggeration and denial.’

Is this how multicultural debate takes place in this most multicultural nation and city, in a nation whose Christian-Jewish dialogue is advanced beyond our greatest expectations?

The Polish Jewish poet Antoni Słonimski wrote in his epic poem, “Elegy for the Jewish Villages” the following:

*Gone now are those little towns where the shoemaker was a poet,
The watchmaker a philosopher, the barber a troubadour.
Gone now are those little towns where the wind
joined Biblical songs with Polish tunes and Slavic rue
Where old Jews in orchards in the shade of cherry trees
Lamented for the holy walls of Jerusalem.
Gone now are those little towns, though the poetic mists,
The moons, winds, ponds, and stars above them
Have recorded in the blood of centuries above the tragic tales,
The histories of the two saddest nations on earth.*

And we meet here today aware that the paths of the two saddest nations on this earth have parted forever.

All we have left is a memory. All we have left is the knowledge that we cannot understand who we were and who we have become without understanding each other.

You, Polonia, gave us the opportunity to be the largest and greatest Jewry the world had ever seen. We

came to you a thousand years ago and we continued to come because your nobility saw in us something worth having. And we saw in you a tolerance that we saw nowhere else in Europe. We created a legend about you, we called you *Polin* because in our sacred language Hebrew the two words *po* and *lin* mean ‘Here shalt thou lodge,’ in the exile from the Land of Israel. Poland was a place, as the great Polish Jewish novelist, Sholem Asch, described it, where ‘Satan has no power over the Jews and the Torah [the most sacred of Jewish texts] is spread over the whole country. There are synagogues and schools and rabbinical academies. God be thanked.’

Not that everything was peaceful. When we Jews fled the countries of Western Europe during the epidemics of the Black Death seeking shelter in Poland, we came in great numbers. Soon we settled in Lwów [Lviv], Sandomierz, Kazimierz near Kraków, as well as in many cities in Great Poland, Little Poland, Kuyavia, and Red Ruthenia.

In 1454 anti-Jewish riots flared up in Wrocław and other Silesian cities. A papal envoy, the Franciscan friar called John of Capistrano accused us of profaning the Christian religion. In Silesia, his words cut deeply and we were banned from Lower Silesia. But when John of Capistrano sought to incite the Catholics of Kraków and other cities, anti-Jewish unrest was much less.

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*We meet here today aware that the paths of
the two saddest nations on this earth have parted
forever.*

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By the end of the sixteenth century there were 500,000 Jews living in Poland. Not only the Ashkenazim from the German persecutions, but Sephardic Jews who were driven away from Spain and Portugal during the Inquisition.

We could not believe our good fortune. When we looked around at the rest of Europe and we looked at our lot in Poland, we knew the words *Polin* meant something. In many Polish towns Jews were given complete freedom in carrying out trade and crafts while in a few towns Jews still could not settle permanently. And even though our economic activities were appreciated by the *szlachta*, the Polish nobility, because we served as an alternative to a viable middle class which could rival them, we also joined in the first of many joint struggles with Polish burghers against an often oppressive Polish gentry. In a 1589 agreement with the municipal authorities of Kamionka Strumiłowa, the councilors of the town ‘accepted the Jews into their own laws and freedoms while the Jews undertook to carry the same burdens as the

burghers.’ The latter promised that they would ‘defend those Jews as our real neighbors from intrusions and violence of both the gentry and soldiers. We will prevent all harm done to them... since they are our neighbors.’ There was no parallel anywhere else on the face of the earth.

And you allowed us to govern ourselves. In the sixteenth century the structure of Jewish self-government had no equal in all of Europe. The Va’ad Arba Arazot, the Diet of the Four Lands, was called into existence by Stephan Bathory in 1579. It was headed by a Marshal General and included a Rabbi General, Scribe General and Treasurers General. This was a diet that represented all the Jews. It carried out negotiations with central and local Polish authorities through its liaison officers called *shadlanim* who sought to influence the decisions concerning Jews taken by the Sejm, the Polish parliament, and the diets of the gentry.

There were times of common suffering as well. In 1648, the Cossack uprising led by the Ukrainian *hetman*, Bohdan Khmelnitzky, was directed at both Poles and Jews. It was a time of great suffering and death for us but also for you.

And we were not strong enough to withstand the forces of partition. We lost what we knew as Poland to Russians, Austrians and Prussians.

Europe knows that there is none braver than the Polish soldier. In 1794, under the hero of the American revolution, General Tadeusz Kościuszko, you honored us by creating a separate military unit composed of Jewish volunteers in the uprising against Tsarist Russia. ‘Nothing can convince more the far away nations about the holiness of our cause and the justness of the present revolution,’ he wrote in a *Statement on the Formation of a Regiment of Jews*, ‘than that, though separated from us by their religion and customs, they sacrifice their own lives of their own free will in order to support the uprising.’ The Jewish regiment under Colonel Berek Josielewicz took part in the battle to save Warsaw. Josielewicz lost his life in a later battle.

If in the eighteenth century you called us comrade in arms, in the nineteenth you called us brother. Your great poet, Adam Mickiewicz, created Jankiel the Jewish tavern keeper in his epic poem *Pan Tadeusz*. It was written in exile in 1834 after the failure of the November 1830 Rising against Russia.

Jankiel is a dignified traditional Jew who acts as a spy for the Polish landed gentry who seek to exploit Napoleon’s conflict with Russia to restore Poland’s independence. Your great national poet has Jankiel the Jew play the Dąbrowski March (“Poland has not yet perished”), the tune that would later become the Polish national an-

them.

And it is with Mickiewicz that the Jew in Poland was seen as the older brother of the Poles. It was a belief that only in alliance with its older brother could Poland, the new chosen nation, fulfill its divine mission to free European nations from the yoke of authoritarianism. ‘For your freedom and ours’ became the cry of the Polish insurrectionists.

‘I believe that a union of Poland and Israel,’ Mickiewicz wrote, ‘would be a source of spiritual and material strength to us. We would most efficiently prepare Poland’s rebirth by removing the causes of its eclipse and reviving the union and brotherhood of all races and religions that regard our motherland as their home.’

Romanticism gone mad, perhaps. But there were Jews, Ukrainians, Germans, Belarusians, Armenians and even Scots who were a part of the motherland and a part of a multicultural possibility.

By the beginning of the twentieth century, much of this thinking had changed. Other, more inward looking, forces sought to find different ways to create a free Poland, one that was Polish in a geographic but also in a linguistic and cultural sense. Poland for the Polish Christian, said Roman Dmowski, the founder of the National Democratic Party, the *Endecja*. His *Endeks* did not see us as an older brother but as an economic, religious and cultural Other. We no longer were the *Żydki*, the little Jews of Polish literature, crafty to be sure, but wise and often extraordinarily useful. We were the epitome of the suspicious Other, who stood in the way of a true nationalist revival.

When a free Poland emerged from the shadow of the First World War, we were not seen as a partner in the creation. Indeed, in the interwar years, more than three-quarters of us listed our nationality as Jewish not Polish, and Yiddish as our mother tongue.

What had happened to the *Polin* of our dreams, a dream you helped us to nurture by saying to us through poem and edict— you are different but you are our neighbor and we will defend you? Now you murdered the multicultural dream and you did not defend us from the gun of the Nazi murderers. You said we were the Other but you knew us well. You played with us, traded with us, shared the growing impoverishment of the Polish nation with us. You outlawed our ability to work on Sunday, your holy day of rest, but not ours. You took away from us the right to prepare our food in a religious manner through ritual slaughter. You barred us from the university and certain professions while claiming we controlled Polish society and wanted to create a Jewish nation within the Polish nation. You accused us of favoring the Communist

Russian enemy, of siding with him against you.

But we admit that many of you did do what you could to save a Jewish family. We could not have survived the Nazi war against us, the few of us who did, without you. We could not stand in your shoes when the Nazi murderers threatened to kill you and your families for hiding us. But you did and hundreds of you were murdered. We could not stand in your shoes when the Soviets murdered you although they in many instances deported and impoverished us as well.

You, Polonia, gave us the opportunity to be the largest and greatest Jewry the world had ever seen.

Let me tell you this — in the consciousness of the Jews who left Poland and settled in various parts of the world, there is a deeply embedded feeling of wrong suffered during the pre-war years, during the Nazi occupation and during the post-war period. We know you feel the same about us.

You gave us decades, no centuries, of a freedom and a sense of belonging we found nowhere else. Even when things got bad, for us there was good. As late as 1939, our newspapers and journals were published in the hundreds, our culture and religious life continued nearly unimpeded.

Some of your radicals attacked us in word and in deadly physical violence. Your church leaders and your politicians did not speak out. We expected more from you.

Not all of us were Jews living within *halacha*, the world of Jewish law and observance. Some of us became ‘Poles of the Mosaic persuasion,’ and we loved the Polish language and its literature.

It is these Polish Jews who suffer the trauma of unrequited love. Many Jews of this last generation, nearing its close, cannot erase from their hearts this country where ‘they were born and grew up;’ where, as our greatest poet and perhaps yours, Julian Tuwim, wrote of them, ‘In Polish they confessed the disquiet of their first love and in Polish they stammered of its rapture and tempests, where they loved the landscape, the language, the poetry, where they were ready to shed their blood for Poland and be her true sons.’ That this was evidently not enough leaves them broken-hearted.

We Jews are gone from Poland’s heart. Do you miss us? You gave us the opportunity to be the greatest concentration of Jewish creativity the world had ever known. Did you take pride in this? You saw us murdered in the millions, more than three million to be exact. What and how did you feel?

But if we are to engage in a true dialogue you must ask similar questions of us. We must, both Poles and Jews, look at our own relationship, one to the other. We must speak fully and openly about our own histories, one to the other.

What will we say to our children when they ask us about their Polish heritage? Will you mention in passing our part in that heritage? Will we mention what the privilege of living in your nation gave to us, but what a terrible price we paid for it when that privilege was no longer ours to keep? Must we remain the two saddest nations on earth? Δ

This paper was read at a Polish-Jewish dialogue held in the Holocaust Museum Houston, 29 March 1998.

The Disabling Mode: Poles in Jewish Discourse

Ewa M. Thompson

Let me say at the outset that as I understand it, we are engaging here in a secular and not a theological conversation. We are meeting here as two ethnic groups, Jews and Poles - both Americans. It is the secular aspect of our identities that is the focus of our encounter.

From our American Polish standpoint, there are three segments of Jewish-Polish relations which need correction and further discussion. The first has to do with **independent Poland between the two world wars**. The Soviet-inspired interpretation of interwar Poland as a country fast descending into fascism is common at American universities today, but it is poignantly false. Until the outbreak of World War II, the party in power in Poland was that of Józef Piłsudski, beloved by the Polish Catholics and a friend of the Jews, as Dr. Abraham Peck pointed out in his presentation on March 1. While tensions between the majority population and the country’s minorities increased in the 1930s, no anti-Semitic party ever gained power in free Poland, and Catholic anti-Semitism, although deplorable, was substantially different from what was going on in neighboring Germany, a fact which the March 1998 Vatican document, “We Remember: A Reflection on the Shoah” also stresses. Until World War II broke out and Poland was overrun by Nazis and Soviets, Polish universities employed Jewish professors, Poland had a flourishing Jewish press, Jewish members of parliament, Jewish heroes such as Wilhelm Feldman.

As the Jewish American historian Joseph Rothchild wrote, ‘interwar Poland’s faults and weak-

nesses were many...but Though badgered, the opposition parties operated legally...though harrassed, the... press remained independent and active; outspoken enemies of the regime continued to teach at the universities and to publish their criticisms; the autonomy of the judiciary from the administration was preserved.' (*East Central Europe between the Two World Wars*, 72) Thus to say that pre-war Poland was ripening for the Holocaust is untenable. And yet, such false views have become entrenched in American discourse. On the eve of this discussion, i.e., on 28 March 1998, the *Houston Chronicle* printed the following in the note advertising our meeting: 'The panel will cover the history of the Jewish community in Poland and the rise of anti-Semitism that lead to the Nazi Auschwitz concentration camp.' The suggestion that it was Polish anti-Semitism that led to the creation of Auschwitz is an outrageous lie. For the first two years of its existence, Auschwitz was used primarily for the execution of Polish Catholics by the Germans. Over the years, Poles have suffered scores of such indignities with no attempt from the Jewish side to correct the mendacities of an anonymous provenance.

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Polish Jews were not only victims of history, but also actors in history.

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The second segment of the Polish story that has disappeared from Jewish memory is **World War II itself**. Few people wish to remember that Poland was attacked by Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia, and that the first two years of war brought unspeakable destruction to the Polish population and culture. The deportations of one and a half million Poles - mostly Catholics - to the Soviet Gulag traumatized the entire Polish nation—and that happened before the Shoah. Polish Catholics were on the death lists of the Soviets just because they were Polish Catholics. Polish children were starved and gassed, Polish parents were taken to Germany and worked to death as forced laborers. The nation was brutalized to the point which I am afraid would have been incomprehensible to secure middle class Americans even if they learned about it from textbooks — which they have not, for this section of history has been excised from American memory as well. Have we ever heard from Jewish organizations any words of sympathy for the unspeakable tragedy, suffering and losses that befell the Jews' Polish brethren in World War II?

It was in these conditions that the Shoah took place. True, the Shoah overshadows Polish suffering. But it does not wipe it out. Between three and four million Polish Christians were killed during World War II by two

sides, Nazis and Soviets. In a book titled *Maus*, a Jewish American cartoonist, Art Spiegelman, presented the Polish people in World War II as secure pigs, who looked indifferently at Jewish suffering. That such a racist and mendacious book is taught in American schools and universities today is a great injustice to Poles. And this is happening today, even as we speak, and not in some remote point in the past; and it is perpetrated by educated and supposedly responsible people, teachers and university professors. This book is also prominently displayed in the Houston Holocaust Museum's bookstore.

In spite of the terror imposed on Poland in World War II, there was no systematic collaboration with the Nazis. None. Zero. There were no SS units composed of Poles. There was in Poland no Vichy government. You cannot find any document written by any member of the exiled Polish Government or the underground resistance that condones or encourages turning in Jews to the Nazis. This was rather exceptional in Nazi-occupied Europe, but it has been elbowed out of American Jewish memory.

The third segment of Polish history which needs correction in American Jewish memory has to do with the **Polish-Jewish relations under the Soviet occupation in 1939-41 and then again, in the decade following World War II**. A book published by Princeton University Press and titled *Revolution from Abroad: the Soviet Conquest of Poland's Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia*, says that when the Soviet army attacked in September 1939, it was met, consistently and repeatedly, by friendly Jewish crowds. After these greetings there took place arrests, executions and deportations to the Gulag of persons who were predominantly Polish and Catholic. Poles expect the responsible members of the Jewish community to recognize that there took place, in the first two years of World War II and after the war, a massive collaboration of Jewish Poles with the Soviet occupiers, a collaboration which contributed to numerous Polish Christian deaths and family tragedies. Joseph Stalin appointed Jakub Berman as the virtual dictator of Poland between 1945-1953. How many Polish Christian lives did Jakub Berman waste, only God knows. Sources speak of 30,000 Polish patriots who were arrested and killed under his supervision. Have we ever heard any Jewish organization condemn Jakub Berman and express sympathy to Poles who suffered under his terror for nine long years?

Polish Americans urge the responsible members of the Jewish community to recognize that Jews were not just victims of history, but also actors in history. They made choices, acted, and sometimes committed crimes. The crimes committed against the Polish nation by people like Jakub Berman in the years of Stalinism, between

1945-1953, are a blank page to most Americans, Jewish and Christian alike. They are now being slowly uncovered by the courts of independent Poland. It is too late to punish the perpetrators: many of them are dead, some have emigrated.* *But those who committed such crimes cannot be recycled as victims of anti-Semitism.* Being in denial of these issues is not going to build bridges between the two communities. I urge my Jewish colleagues to understand that I am mentioning these facts not in the spirit of accusation, but in the spirit of understanding. The responsible members of the Polish community understand Jewish fears, they understand that fear of the Right of which Professor Michael Wyschogrod spoke in his lecture on March 1. This fear of the Catholic Right undoubtedly contributed to the choice many prominent Jews made, of siding with the Soviets rather than with Poles. I think one area of Polish-Jewish cooperation might be the nurturing of the kind of the Polish Right that is not inhospitable to Jews, the kind of the Polish Right represented by Pope John Paul II. But in turn, the Jewish community has to understand Polish fears, Polish bitterness at that deafening silence surrounding the crimes of people such as Jakub Berman on the one hand, and on the other, the defamation of Poles in the American media by such individuals as Art Spiegelman, Alan Dershowitz and countless others.

That so many Jews lived in Poland for centuries was not due to the fact that Poles were anti-Semitic. It was due to the fact that the Jews found in Poland, by comparison to other countries, more willingness to tolerate the Other than in other European lands. As Iwo Pogonowski said in his book, *Jews in Poland*, it was in Poland that Jewry found its modern voice, it was in Poland that it built itself into a modern nation, it was in Poland that it experienced a historically unprecedented demographic growth (between 1340 and 1772, the Jewish population of Poland grew 75-fold, while the Christian population grew only five-fold). While the Holocaust decimated Polish Jewry, the offshoots of this tremendous growth and of this modern nation had already moved to other countries, to flourish and develop there. The role of Poland in preserving and strengthening the modern Jewish identity is something most Poles are proud to remember.

Many Poles have noted that there prevails in this country a nearly total impenetrability to Polish discourse among many Jewish intellectuals. The authority of hundreds and thousands of books, articles, movies, speeches and artifacts has weighed heavily on Polish ability to enter the discursive mode. The unwisdom of constructing a world view from which Poland and Poles have been ex-

cised need not be elaborated here. A monologue in a dialogic form is just another utopian scheme that will not work.

I would like to conclude with a quote from the Foreign Minister of Poland, Dr. Bronislaw Geremek, who said during a recent NewsHour interview: 'When you see a man who is a survivor of the Warsaw ghetto becoming Foreign Minister of Poland, how does one dare to speak of Polish anti-Semitism?' Indeed. I hope that these discussions will enable us to look forward in a way that will be productive for both communities. On behalf of the Polish Catholic community in Houston, I would like to express my thanks to Bishop Joseph Fiorenza and to Dr. Abraham Peck for making these discussions possible. Δ

*Chief Military Prosecutor Helena Wolińska who in 1950 ordered the arrest of the hero of Polish Resistance, Home Army General 'Nil' Fieldorf (subsequently executed); who also ordered the arrest of former Polish Foreign Minister Władysław Bartoszewski's father, left Poland with her husband in 1968 alleging that the reason was anti-Semitism. Efforts are under way to extradite her to Poland for questioning about the crimes of which she is accused. *Rzeczpospolita OnLine*, 15 October 1998, <http://www.rzeczpospolita.pl>; BBC, 27 November 1998.

This paper was read at a Polish-Jewish dialogue held in the Holocaust Museum Houston, 29 March 1998.

BOOKS BOOKS

Constitutions, Elections and Legislatures of Poland, 1493-1993, by Jacek Jędruch. Foreword by Norman Davies. New York. Hippocrene Books (distributor). 1998. V + 487 pages. Index, bibliography, tables, appendices. Hardcover. \$35.00.

A useful collection of commentaries and primary sources that are hard to find in English translation. As Norman Davies says in the Foreword, 'the English-speaking world has often been unaware of parliamentary traditions other than their own...' Davies mentions Scotland, Wales, Ireland, the Scandinavian countries, Novgorod, and Poland as representatives of parliamentary traditions that have been ignored. Poland 'had established the principle of *Habeas corpus* nearly three centuries before England and had accepted the idea of "No taxation without representation" long before England's American colonies had even been founded.' Tables and appendices include a list of Polish constitutional arrangements since 1550, a list of hereditary and elective kings confirmed by the Sejm, lists of bills passed by the Sejms, and many other facts and figures. At the very least, this book sensitizes the reader to the complexity of the Polish parliamentary tradition of which elements such as the *liberum veto* were only a small part.

Frona: A Quarterly. Nos 4/5(Spring-Sum-

mer 1995), 9/10 (Fall 1997), 11/12 (Spring-Summer 1998). Each issue ca. 400 pages. Editorial offices: ul. Reymonta 30/61, 01-842 Warszawa. Email: fronda@it.com.pl. Web address: www.webfabrica.com.pl/fronda. ISSN 1231-6474. In Polish.

This is the most amazing periodical we have seen in a long time. It is medieval, in the sense that its highly intellectual authors totally ignore the phenomenon of the Enlightenment, reverting instead to Thomism and scholasticism in their search for rationality and principles of reasoning. Topics discussed are likewise politically incorrect. Among books which the *Fronda* Editors have reprinted, one notes those by Chateaubriand and Chesterton, The authors writing in *Fronda* belong to the generation of the 1960s: it is a publication run by young people. There are many of them, literally dozens in each issue. Nor are they all unknown: we spotted in *Fronda* well known scholars and writers who also publish in *Rzeczpospolita*, *Życie*, *Arcana*. They are authors of books and teachers at universities. They live all over Poland, another amazing fact in the life of journals which are usually run by people living in one locality. Each issue contains dozens of articles on an wide range of topics. Surprised at this *embarrasement de richesse*? We were.

What else is medieval about this periodical? It contains a tongue-in-cheek, or maybe just an ambivalent *index librorum prohibitorum*. It prides itself on being clerical, although among authors we have not noticed any clergy. It takes an interest in the entire gamut of human spirituality. It loves controversial topics. The periodical is the opposite of dull. Contact them about a subscription which, in a medieval fashion, is not spelled out in dollars.

***Treny - Laments*, by Jan Kochanowski.**

Translated and edited by M.J. Mikoś. 2nd edition. Lublin. Norbertinum <norbertinum@norbertinum.com.pl>. 1998. 101 pages. A bilingual edition with Notes. Paper.

The first bilingual edition in Poland of the sixteenth-century poet Jan Kochanowski's *Threnoids*, or *Laments*, written after the death of his daughter Ursula. The nineteen *Laments* represent an early example of Polish lyrical poetry. They have been aptly translated by Professor Michael Mikoś.

***Stalin Against the Jews*, by Arkady Vaksberg.** Translated by A. Bouis. New York. Knopf. 1994. 308 pages. Index. Hardcover.

Vaksberg demonstrates that Stalin conducted a personal vendetta against the Jews, and that he used as his hatchet man against them a Jew, 'the infinitely hypocritical and sadistic Lazar Kaganovich.' Vaksberg details campaigns against Jews such as the drummed-up 'doctors' plot,' and he ends his book with a bitter reminder that anti-Semitism is not yet dead in Russia. Books of that kind raise the perennial question of the cultural identity of a people who, unoccupied by a foreign

army, allowed a monster like Stalin to acquire and hold onto power, and this for thirty years. Vaksberg tries to identify a strand in the Russian cultural identity that needs to be studied more closely.

***Pears on a Willow Tree*, by Leslie Pietrzyk.**

New York. Avon Books. 1998. 272 pages. Hardcover. \$23.00.

A novel about four generations of Polish American women by a Polish American novelist. Perhaps it is not accidental that the most readable novels about Polish Americans have so far come from the pens of women (Suzanne Strempek Shea, and now Leslie Pietrzyk). We have always held that those minorities who are in some way discriminated against — and Poles in America have certainly been so discriminated! — survive thanks to their women....

***Życie surowo wzbronione* (life is strictly forbidden), by Antoni Marianowicz.** Warsaw. Czytelnik. 1995. 324 pages. Numerous photographs. Paper.

Antoni Marianowicz, a Polish Protestant of Jewish background who did not perish during the Holocaust and who retained the name under which he was hiding on the 'Aryan' side of Warsaw during the German occupation (his father's name was Berman, no relation to Jakub), told the present reviewer that his family, including a sick father, went voluntarily to the walled Warsaw Ghetto established by the Germans. 'Why?' I asked in amazement. 'Because conditions there were better for us,' Marianowicz said. He added that his family was very well to do, and in the Ghetto they could find doctors and servants of a better quality than on the 'Aryan' side. But his father died nevertheless, and then the family moved out of the Ghetto. 'How?' I asked, again in amazement. It turned out that it was not that difficult to cross to and from the Ghetto, if one had money and was willing to take the risk....

Marianowicz's book takes the form of an interview conducted by a literary critic Anna Baltyn. The book occasions many a good laugh. It records Marianowicz's youth, much of it spent in 'luxuriant conditions' (so he says) during World War II. For those who do not know him, he is a humorist writer who for many years was president of ZAIKS, or the Association of Polish Authors, an organization which looks after the authors' financial interests. His present upper middle class lifestyle is supported by his prudent selection of job assignments: he translated into Polish the text of the musical *Fiddler on the Roof*. The musical was a hit in Poland as well, and Marianowicz's bank account swelled.... The book's unique contribution is to adumbrate the situation of rich Jews in Poland before and during World War II. It also contains a wealth of information about the Polish elite, Christian and Jewish, before and after the war. Marianowicz's family belonged in that circle.

Other Books received:

Zagłada Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej, 1945-1947 (the destruction of the second republic, 1945-1947), by Aleksander Gella. Warsaw. Agencja Wydawnicza CB (02-495 Warsaw, ul.

Kolorowa 1). 1998. 236 pages. Index, photographs. Paper. In Polish. A review to follow.

Thaddeus Kościuszko: The Purest Son of Liberty, by James S. Pula. New York. Hippocrene Books (171 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016). 1999. 357 pages. Notes, bibliography, illustrations. Hardcover. \$29.95.

Bitter Glory: Poland and its Fate, 1918-1939, by Richard M. Watt. New York. Hippocrene books. 1998. Numerous illustrations. 511 pages. Paper. \$16.95.

This is one of our favorite books on Poland, and we are delighted that Hippocrene reprinted this magnificent work originally published in 1979. A review to follow.

New Horizon. October 1998. Published by Bicentennial Publishing (333 West 38th Street, NY, NY 10018). Subscription \$30/year. Founder and Publisher: Boleslaw Wierzbianski. Associate Publisher: Jacek Galazka. 16 pages.

A middlebrow Polish cultural monthly that wishes for a broad readership.

(Continued on Page 607)

Poland's Holocaust: Ethnic Strife, Collaboration with Occupying Forces and Genocide in the Second Republic, 1918-1947

By Tadeusz Piotrowski. Jefferson, NC and London: McFarland & Company 1998. xiii + 262 pages. Appendix, notes, bibliography, illustrations, index. Hardcover. \$55.00.

Judith Olsak-Glass

For 123 years, Poles lived under Russian, Prussian, or Austro-Hungarian rule. During World War I, all three of these imperialist empires collapsed. Seizing an opportunity, the Poles declared independence on 11 November 1918. A plethora of daunting problems immediately confronted the war-ravaged Second Republic of Poland. Author Tadeusz Piotrowski posits that along with a struggling economy, two problems above all others would ultimately contribute to Poland's holocaust in World War II: Poland's borders and Poland's sizeable minorities.

By 1921, after a series of armed conflicts with neighboring states, Polish borders were finalized. Although the process resulted in territorial gains, especially in the east, it also fostered much hostility and open resentment both within and outside Poland. Besides the

enmity of Germany and the Soviet Union, Poland was forced to contend with rising minority discontent. As Piotrowski points out, 'the political objectives of all radical nationalists were, after all, separatist.' (5) Thus, the yearnings for an independent 'greater Ukraine,' a reunited Belarus or a Jewish state within the Polish one smoldered relentlessly. When war erupted in 1939, 'the radical members of these minorities, rather than supporting Poland in its hour of need, chose to side with the enemy and vied with one another in their support of the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, hoping thereby to achieve their objectives at Polish expense.' (6)

Continuing along the lines of his previous work on interwar Poland, Polish-Ukrainian relations and Ukrainian nationalism, Tadeusz Piotrowski presents a detailed examination of collaboration with the Soviet and Nazi occupation forces of the ethnic minorities living mainly in the eastern provinces of pre-World War II Poland.

The first two chapters, titled 'Soviet Terror' and 'Nazi Terror,' provide a brief overview of Poland's subjugation. Zones of occupation and their ethnic composition are likewise discussed, as are Soviet and Nazi occupation policies and practices. Citing a comprehensive list of Soviet crimes and misdeeds, from the Katyn massacre to the 1945 Moscow show trial of sixteen kidnapped political leaders of the Polish underground, Piotrowski argues that from the very beginning, it was Stalin's aim to ensure that an independent Poland would never reemerge in the postwar period. The prisons, ghettos, internment, transit, labor and extermination camps, roundups, mass deportations, public executions, mobile killing units, death marches, deprivation, hunger, disease, and exposure all testify to the 'inhuman policies of both Hitler and Stalin' and 'were clearly aimed at the total extermination of Polish citizens, both Jews and Christians. Both regimes endorsed a systematic program of genocide.' (32) Such large-scale operations needed helpers. As a final segment to this preliminary examination, Piotrowski defines 'collaborator' and 'accomplice' to mean voluntary complicity with the Soviets or Germans for the express purpose of destroying Poland, its citizens, or its underground Home Army. He reminds the reader that collaborators were only a small percentage of Poland's 35 million pre-war citizens, but because of their cooperation with Soviet or Nazi forces, over six million Polish citizens were murdered, both Jews and Christians—all of them, he reiterates, victims of Poland's Holocaust.

As a self-described 'naturalized American citizen of Polish descent who happens to be a sociologist,' Professor Piotrowski teaches Sociology of the Holocaust at the University of New Hampshire. He broadens the

scope of the term 'Holocaust' to include all Polish citizens who were murdered as a result of both Nazi and Soviet genocidal policies and practices. Although the Jewish exclusivity of the Holocaust is generally accepted, this comprehensive approach offers a broader and more accurate account, lending itself to a deeper understanding of an extremely complicated period. As the book demonstrates, the ethnocentric goals of collaborators meant a death sentence for ordinary Polish citizens. Also, with the ebb and flow of Soviet and Nazi forces over Poland's eastern territories, loyalties often switched back and forth in order to insure the fulfillment of various political agendas.

All aspects of collaboration by Jews, Poles, Belarusians, Lithuanians, and Ukrainians on Polish soil are painstakingly presented in their own densely packed chapters. Piotrowski's narrative tells the story of complicity through eyewitness testimonies, memoirs, diaries, military field reports, periodicals, hundreds of secondary sources as well as his own insights and interpretations. The book does an excellent job of integrating scholarship on the subject, much of it of recent vintage. Almost one hundred pages of notes provide much more than mere citations. Besides 15 tables within the text, ten tables illustrating population losses and deportations appear in Piotrowski's text; it also includes a discussion between scholars over the intent of the Polish Home Army General Bór-Komorowski's Order No. 116—was it aimed against Jewish partisans or against bandits, some of whom may have been Jewish?¹ As detailed as the notes and text are, the book assumes some background knowledge; for example, the positions of major personalities, such as Józef Beck or Józef Piłsudski, are not explained on first mention, nor is the 30 July 1941 Sikorski-Maisky agreement. Such instances are rare and ultimately do not detract from the presentation. The Appendix with thirteen documents (e.g., the 1919 Minorities Treaty, the NKVD Instructions Relating to 'Anti-Soviet Elements,' Beria's letter to Stalin on the execution of thousands of Polish prisoners of war, and the UB [Soviet-controlled Communist Security Police] chronology of the Kielce Pogrom released in 1989) are included along with four maps, although sites mentioned do not always appear on the maps. The Bibliography is extensive and state-of-the-art, but its full value might be limited to those who read Polish or Ukrainian. The Index is excellent; particularly good are the cross references. Finally, the copy editor and proofreader deserve credit for a virtually flawless text.

Each chapter seems designed to stand on its own, closes with an assessment of responsibility and fixes blame squarely on those who colluded with the enemy to the

detriment of the Polish state and the Polish people.

The chapter on Jewish collaboration is provocative, yet it has important implications for Polish-Jewish relations and the historiography of the Holocaust. Acknowledging the existence of anti-Jewish sentiment in Poland, ranging from benign to murderous, but never state-sponsored before and during the war, Piotrowski questions its causes and its extent. Part of the responsibility, he argues, 'must surely rest on the shoulders of the Jews themselves.' (36) In the interest of truth and fairness, he asserts that 'to single out and humiliate Poland for its real or manufactured anti-Semitism is, therefore, grossly unfair.' (38) His aim is not to excuse or justify wrongdoing, but to give a full accounting of circumstances surrounding events which have poisoned Polish-Jewish relations and led unjustly to blanket charges of Polish anti-Semitism.

Among the factors which negatively affected perceptions and experiences are Jewish ethnocentrism and aloofness; limited contact with Poles due to voluntary isolationism; failure to assimilate; unfulfilled political expectations; immigration of persecuted Jews from Nazi Germany to pre-war Poland; and socioeconomic conflicts. Addressing the correlation between the deterioration of Polish-Jewish relations and the Soviet invasions of Poland in 1919-1920, 1939-1941, and 1944-1945, the author states that 'some Polish Jews became co-participants in the Soviet reigns of terror.' (36) It is significant that Poles in the eastern provinces vividly recall Jews kissing Soviet tanks in 1939 and, as survivors, again in 1944. Many Poles were victims of Jewish-Soviet collaboration, targeted as they were for deportation or execution by lists drawn up partially by Jews. The author demonstrates that Jewish communists within the Soviet apparatus were quite numerous and visible in 1944-1948, holding key positions at the national and local levels. It is not hard to imagine how this situation affected Polish sensibilities. To explain is not to justify nor excuse, but serves to illuminate human failings on all sides. To bring the picture back into balance, noting that life was often difficult for Polish Jews, Piotrowski readily admits that the overwhelming majority of Jews were not communists, nor did they side with either the Soviets or the Nazis. However, during the Nazi occupation, some Jews were willing collaborators and the remainder of the chapter on Jewish collaboration describes their role in the Polish Holocaust.

The chapter 'Polish Collaboration' under Soviet and Nazi occupation might be familiar material to some, yet Piotrowski does much to strip away the myths surrounding these terrible times. He questions the accuracy

of the often repeated allegations that the Polish underground, including the Home Army, were guilty of collaboration with the Nazis and of committing anti-Semitic atrocities. One treatment of this question focuses on the events at the *shtetl* of Ejszyszki (now in Lithuania), an alleged 1944 pogrom near Wilno [Vilnius]. On 3 April 1995, an article defaming Poles in that connection appeared in the *U.S. News & World Report*. It was followed up with an extensive piece in the *New York Times* on 6 August 1996. Piotrowski also deals with the activities of the Polish National Armed Forces (Narodowe Siły Zbrojne), a right-wing military organization which aligned itself, for the most part, with the Home Army in early 1944, but was never under its control. The chapter continues by relating the Soviet attempts to liquidate the Home Army, the assistance given to the Warsaw Ghetto revolt, the role of the Polish 'Blue' Police in the murders of Jews, civilian complicity, Polish assistance to the Jews, and the post-World War II years.

In his final chapter, Piotrowski examines Soviet and Nazi involvement with Ukrainian nationalists to explain how the policy of ethnic cleansing in Western Ukraine evolved and was carried out. Based on personal recollections and recent scholarship, Piotrowski brings to light a grim period of savage barbarity, one to which most English-only readers have not yet been exposed.

Overall, this book makes a valuable contribution to several fields of study. Students of the Holocaust, of wartime collaboration, of Polish, Central European and Russian history will be well served by Piotrowski's volume. Δ

¹ *General Bór-Komorowski's Order reads as follows: Well-armed gangs ramble endlessly in cities and villages, attack estates, banks, commercial and industrial companies, houses and apartments, and larger peasant farms. The plunder is often accompanied by acts of murder which are carried out by Soviet partisan units hiding in the forests or by ordinary gangs of robbers. The latter recruit from all kinds of criminal subversive elements.*

Men and women, especially Jewish women, participate in the assaults. This infamous action of demoralized individuals contributes in a considerable degree to the complete destruction of many citizens who have already been tormented with the four year struggle against the enemy.

The [German] occupier has not basically opposed the existing state of affairs. When German security organs are sometimes called in, in the more serious instances, they refuse to help, avoiding the bandits. Often the reverse occurs - the greater act of banditism calls down repression upon the innocent population.

In order to give some help and shelter to the defenseless population, I have issued an order- with the understanding of the

chief Delegate of the Government - to the commanders of regions and districts regarding local security. I have ordered the commanders of regions and districts, when necessary, to move with arms against these plundering or subversive bandit elements. I emphasized the need to liquidate the leaders of bands and not efforts to destroy entire bands. I recommended to the local commanders assuring the cooperation of the local population and of the representative of the Government's Delegate in organizing self-defense and of a warning system. (Piotrowski 324)

Jesuits in Poland according to A.F. Pollard

A. F. Pollard, *The Jesuits in Poland*. [The Lothian Essay, 1892] New York. Haskell House Publishers Ltd. Publishers of Scarce Scholarly Books. 1971. 98 pages. Hardcover.

Piotr Wilczek

It seems to be an easy and perhaps unnecessary task to write a critical essay about a historical book published more than a hundred years ago, even if such a book is full of mistakes and misunderstandings. The situation changes, however, when such a book is reprinted with no corrections, no introduction or appendix, and no indication that its content has long been superceded by serious scholarship. This is the case of A. F. Pollard's work on Polish Jesuits.

At the end of the twentieth century the book may be scarce but it is not scholarly. It was originally published by Blackwells at Oxford and major libraries have copies available for those interested in curiosities. In addition to this work, the author has written numerous books on early modern history. The *Encyclopedia Britannica* calls him 'the leading Tudor scholar of the early twentieth century.' He was 23 when he wrote the essay on Polish Jesuits, having just started his subsequently brilliant career. A year later, he was appointed to the editorial staff of the *Dictionary of National Biography* for which he wrote 500 entries. Still later he wrote studies which are considered models of careful and enduring work: *The History of England from the Accession of Edward VI to the Death of Elizabeth, 1547-1603* (1910), *Thomas Cranmer and the English Reformation* (1904), *The Elizabethans and the Empire* (1921), and *Wolsey* (1929). He is also the author of several selections of source documents, including *The reign of Henry VII from contemporary sources* (1913).

A reader acquainted with Pollard's historical scholarship might expect *The Jesuits in Poland* to be another carefully researched work. Quite the contrary. First, an author who elsewhere displays expertise in locating sources writes a book on Polish history with no knowledge of either the Polish language or sources in Polish. He quotes a few Polish sources in Latin, but most of them have been proven unreliable. He makes no effort to acquaint himself with any books or documents not available at the Bodleian Library which even now, at the end of the twentieth century, is not the best place to study Polish history and literature (as this reviewer can personally attest). With what amounts to blatant contempt for a nation that lacked political sovereignty at the time, Pollard seems to take advantage of his potential readers' total ignorance of Polish history, and he regales them with stories and interpretations unworthy of a great scholar that he otherwise is. At the turn of the twentieth century, one would hope that no scholar involved in serious research on Polish history can afford studying that history without knowledge of the Polish language and basic primary and secondary sources published in Poland. Alas, the authors of general histories and of some historical movements, like the Reformation, still think that they can write whole chapters on the Polish Reformation with no knowledge of Polish. *The European Reformation* by Euan Cameron (Oxford 1991) is a case in point.

Pollard's erudition is limited to three kinds of sources. First, some printed Latin pamphlets, most of them anti-Jesuit, so there is no chance of response by Jesuit authors. Second, two works by Polish Protestants, Walerian Krasiński and Andreas Vengerscius (Andrzej Węgierski). Krasiński's *Historical sketch of the rise, progress, and decline of the Reformation in Poland* (1838), the largest book on the subject available so far, was written in English by an amateur Polish historian, a Calvinist whose objective was to show the growth and significance of Calvinism in Polish history. Krasiński overestimated both the negative role of the Jesuits and significance of the antitrinitarian movement which emerged as a result of a split in the Calvinist Church. *Slavonia reformata* by Węgierski is a biased account of Reformation history written from the point of view of an antitrinitarian. Again, the role of this denomination is overestimated and the Jesuits are shown as uniformly evil figures. The third group of sources consists of various histories of Russia and works on Polish history published in French or English mostly by Russian historians.

Pollard's book was written 20 years after the publication of a fundamental work dealing with issues of the Reformation in Poland: Rev. Stanisław Załęski's *Czy*

jezuici zgubili Polskę? [Did the Jesuits ruin Poland?] in which the author mentions the major 'enlightened' criticism of Polish Jesuits and attacks them convincingly with an apologetic verve and scientific accuracy. This work was the cornerstone of his fundamental five-volume work *Jezuici w Polsce* [Jesuits in Poland] published a few years after Pollard's essay appeared in print.

In Pollard's work, even basic facts of Polish history are incorrectly quoted. Mieszko I's wife Dobrawa ('Dombrowka') becomes a daughter of the king of Hungary, although she was of course a daughter of Bolesław I, a Czech prince since 935 and a great supporter of Christianity. This significant mistake proves that Pollard had no idea of the circumstances in which Poland accepted Christianity. His only concern is that Poland unfortunately did not accept it from the East. He overestimates the significance of early medieval contacts between Poland and Eastern Christianity. He says: 'There are however traces of it in Poland as early as in the seventh century, when Poland formed part of the great Slavonic State which was converted by Cyril and Methodius.' (7) This of course is nonsense. The underlying assumption of Pollard's book is that Poland (in 1892 under Russian and also Prussian and Austrian partitions) was, is and should always be a part of Russia. That his book is written from the point of view of Russian imperial interests is indicated by the following quotation from a colonialist French historian Alfred Rambaud's *History of Russia*: 'This complete [Polish-Lithuanian] state plays the same part in Russian history as the Burgundy of Philip the Good and Charles the Bold in that of France. Made up in a great degree of Russian as well as Polish and Lithuanian elements, it was many times on the point of annihilating Russia in the same way as Burgundy, composed of French, Batavian, and German provinces, had been on the point of annihilating the French nation.' (7) I do not think this indication of a colonial approach towards Poland needs any comment. Alas, this view has circulated in the textbooks of Russian history before and after it appeared in Rambaud's and Pollard's works.

The book keeps silent about Russians who partitioned Poland at the end of the eighteenth century. There is no mention of the partitions, although they had major-consequences for the Jesuit Order. However, there are allegations that Poles wanted to partition Russia as early as the tenth century: 'The extension [in Bolesław Chrobry's times] was carried on at the expense of Russia whose internal struggles frequently led to Polish intervention.' (3) By the sixteenth century 'Poland, starting from the West, was adding to itself province after province that had once been ruled by Russians.' (2) The pre-

sumably sophisticated Pollard treats dynastic acquisitions of pre-Reformation Europe as if they were armed attacks against nation-states in the twentieth century. In his view, the situation worsened (from the Russian and from Pollard's point of view) in the seventeenth century: 'Again and again the Poles took advantage of the weakness of Russia and meditated its partition.' (79) One wonders what partition he had in mind? In the seventeenth century, the rulers of Muscovy were busy conquering Siberia and annexing territories to the south and west of ethnic Russia. The following quotation indicates that, from Pollard's standpoint, the Russians were right to participate in the partitions of Poland: 'The history of Lithuania presents a somewhat similar development. Originally the Poles and the Russians belonged to the same race; it was their development that turned them into different and hostile nationalities.... Most of the territory afterwards called Lithuania was united with Russia under the Varangian princes St. Vladimir and Iaroslav the Great, whose empire centered round the glory of Kiev.' (5) Again, Pollard's lack of historical sense is amazing. By his logic, the English would have the right to subjugate the French because some time in the remote past they were all one.

According to Pollard, Eastern Christianity had many advantages for the Slavs: 'The choice of a Church which put forth no pretensions to governing the State saved Russia from struggles between the secular, a national power, and the spiritual, a foreign power. (9) Roman Catholicism, on the other hand, is a power responsible for the final decline of Poland. This was written at the time when the Russian Church was treated as little more than one of the ministries of the Russian empire. The Roman Catholic Church, led by the Jesuits, this 'evil power' according to Pollard, managed to keep the spiritual and the worldly separate. But according to Pollard, the Jesuits - although they did some useful work - were generally insidious and Machiavelian figures. With this assumption both British/Protestant and Russian/Orthodox prejudices concurred with the prejudiced ideas of some of the 'enlightened' philosophers of the eighteenth century.

In fragments of the book devoted to the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Jesuit history in Poland, mistakes are less common, but still disappointing. Contrary to what Pollard writes, Stefan Bathory was not a Protestant when he was crowned a Polish king (25) and King Jan Kazimierz was never a Jesuit (87), although he considered becoming one. Pollard claims also that in the mid-sixteenth century Protestants 'outnumbered the Roman Catholics' in Poland (23) which is far from true. A remark about the Protestant Brest Bible (*Biblia Brzeska*) of 1563 is very significant: 'There is a copy in Bodleian, but it is extremely

rare, two copies only being existence.' (15) The implication is that it was burnt by zealous Catholics. First, there were several copies of this Bible extant in Pollard's times; the Catholics were not that zealous about burning Bibles. Second, we can see again how the role of the Bodleian Library is overestimated: a source exists when it is available at the Bodleian.

The main problem however is Pollard's consistently one-sided view of the role of the Jesuits in the early modern history of Poland. When Pollard accuses Jesuits of crimes and ruthless conduct, there are no sources quoted. On page 43, he says: 'it was at their instigation that the church granted by the king and Diet to the Lutherans had been set on fire. At Polock, in Lithuania, they robbed priests of their livings.' Or: 'Physical force was not, however, the only method resorted to by the Jesuits: they exhausted all the arts of sarcasm and ridicule to bring Protestant ministers into contempt.' (38) A footnote says: 'A. Wengerscius gives a long catalogue of outrages all over Poland, which it would be wearisome to recapitulate.' Unfortunately his source is itself a work of advocacy rather than of scholarship. It was obvious even in Pollard's time that both sides used similar methods of polemic, sometimes difficult to accept for a modern reader.

There is no mention in the book of religious tolerance in sixteenth-century Poland. This exceptional historical fact was appreciated even by Poland's enemies. Pollard presents Poland as an intolerant country, referring to some eighteenth-century events: 'two instances of persecution occurred about this time, which showed that Poland had become the most intolerant country in Europe.' (92) This after the religious wars in Germany and the bloody takeover by Protestants in England. Pollard does not accept the fact that most European countries at that time should have been called intolerant and Poland was neither an exception nor the worst example. The 'enlightened' rule of Stanisław August Poniatowski in the second half of the eighteenth century is presented as progress: 'at least it was an advance upon the state of darkness and ignorance which had prevailed since the time of Sigismund III.' (94) The stereotype of Sarmatian Poland as a country of 'darkness and ignorance' is not a surprise in a nineteenth-century book but there is no reason to present it as a work of scholarship to modern readers.

The account of relations between the Jesuits and the Greek Church is accurate from the point of view of nineteenth-century scholarship, but again Pollard's bias is unmistakable: a reader will have no doubts that Pollard is openly against any Roman Catholic influences in the East, including the Union of Brest.

The Jesuit involvement in Polish internal and foreign policy is decisively assessed as damaging. In the author's view, the Jesuits were simply agents of Rome whose main task was to put countries like Poland under foreign control: 'It has always been one of the disadvantages of Roman Catholic countries, that their foreign policy has been liable to interference from a power which looks not so much to the particular interests of each nation as to the general interests of a would-be universal Church From the time when they gained firm hold of the government of Poland, that country ceased to be much more than the northern agent of Rome and the house of Austria.' (75) Whether or not the Jesuits really had a decisive influence on Polish policy is an issue to be debated, but to say that they 'gained firm hold of the government of Poland' is an obvious exaggeration, even in the case of Sigismund III Vasa. In Pollard's opinion Sigismund was a 'feeble imitation of Philip II of Spain [who] possessed all the bigotry and zeal of his model without his abilities or strength of character. In all that he did he was ruled by the Jesuits.' (31)

However, the worst evil was not Jesuit preaching, its effect on ignorant folks, or Jesuit influence on Polish policy. Pollard claims that there was nothing more damaging for the Polish nation than the Jesuit influence on education. Had Poland been Protestant, intellectual life would have developed: 'Whatever be the merits of the Protestant and Catholic Churches as religious ideals, Protestantism has at least been invaluable as an intellectual stimulus, and no country was ever in more urgent need of an intellectual stimulus than Poland.' (18) But the whole educational system was in the hands of the Jesuits: 'More than once they had deluged the city with innocent blood, and soon all true learning would be abolished and all knowledge lost.' (56) This sentence refers to their struggle with the Academy of Kraków over establishing a Jesuit university. This whole issue was far more complex than what one can learn from the anti-Jesuit polemical pamphlets quoted by Pollard. But the university is only one of the issues. According to Pollard the whole educational system 'failed to produce any enlightened statesmen, and it failed to overcome the invincible ignorance and blind prejudices of the ruling caste.' (57-58)

The Jesuits are even blamed for the fact that 'the classical productions of the sixteenth century were not reprinted for more than a century, during which period there was no national literature.' (57) It is of course not true that 'there was no national literature' in Poland in the seventeenth century; many outstanding achievements can be mentioned and some of their authors were taught by the Jesuits who somehow did not deprive them of writ-

ing skills, intelligence and classical education. This was easy to ascertain even at the end of the nineteenth century.

Twenty years after Załęski rhetorically asked *Did the Jesuits ruin Poland?* Pollard answered the question as his 'enlightened' French and Russian masters had done before him: yes, they did or at least they significantly contributed toward that purpose.

In the Conclusion Pollard writes: 'Their complicity was due rather to sins of omission than sins of commission; that, with the influence they possessed in Poland, literature languished, education was paralyzed, reform burked, and Poland remained as ever "for the noble a paradise, for the peasant a hell" is no light testimony, not to what the Society did to ruin Poland, but to what it failed to do to save it. Still more serious was its share in producing the indifference of the Dissidents to the fate of their country; this was directly due to the dark and intolerant form of Catholicism which animated the reaction in Poland, and of that reaction the Jesuits were the pioneers and master-types.' (98)

It would be impossible to analyze Pollard's book from the point of view of contemporary historical scholarship. The book does not possess any merits that would justify such a treatment. My aim was to show how unnecessary modern reprints of such books are. Pollard labored under a colonialist assumption that small and medium-sized nations should naturally be conquered by the large ones, and that their historical sources and languages are not worth studying. From this point of view, the languages and sources provided by the conquerors are sufficient research tools for historians. Δ

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On Interpreting 'East European' History

Reflections on Gale Stokes' *Three Eras of Political Change in Eastern Europe*¹

Anna M. Cienciala

Despite the extraordinary changes in what used to be called Eastern Europe, and the coming expansion of NATO into part of this region, few American university students know much if anything about it and history courses offered are few. Key reasons for this state of affairs were given by Alex Kurczaba in the September issue of the *Sarmatian Review*.² Since it is clearly in the

interest of the nations involved that Americans should know more about them than the fact that after the collapse of communism they can eat at MacDonald's almost anywhere, historians should work out a consensus on how to teach and write about this history. The following comments on a recently published book have this goal in mind.

Gale Stokes, Professor of History at Rice University since 1968, is a specialist in modern Serbian and Yugoslav history. He has published over forty articles and six books, the more recent of which are: *From Stalinism to Pluralism: A Documentary History of Eastern Europe since 1945* (second edition, Oxford 1996), and *The Walls Came Tumbling Down: The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe* (Oxford 1993). His newest book, *Three Eras of Political Change in Eastern Europe*, is designed for use in courses on East European history. However, as stated in the publisher's summary: 'his interpretations of East European history, as well as his optimistic assessment of the region's future, are sure to provoke debate.' Indeed, while his optimism about the future seems justified, some of his interpretations of the 'East European' past are either misleading or controversial and thus call for a lively debate.

First of all, there is no clear definition of what the author means by the term 'Eastern Europe.' Sometimes he applies it to the whole area, at other times he seems to limit it to Southeastern Europe. Still, though he uses the terms 'Eastern Europe,' 'East Central Europe,' and 'Southeastern Europe,' as well as 'Eastern Europe,' interchangeably throughout the book, he declares at the outset that 'Eastern Europe is a distinct historical entity, perhaps divided into northern and southern parts, with its own identifiable characteristics.' (3) The word 'perhaps' is debatable to say the least, though it is true that there is as yet no consensus on how to call the region and its different parts. Hopefully the term *Central Europe*, long used by its denizens and now sanctioned by the United States State Department, will find general acceptance. By this definition, *Central Europe* consists of Austria, Germany, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary, though some scholars would also include the Baltic States and western Ukraine (former East Galicia), for they have always been more Western than Russia. As for the term *East Central Europe*, which used to mean Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary but has been used to denote these three countries as well as the Balkans, it is now applied to Ukraine and Belarus, while *Eastern Europe* is sometimes used with respect to these two countries and European Russia. The terms: *the Balkans*, or *Southeastern Europe*, are not controversial; they have

been used for a long time to mean Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, and the republics, now states, of former Yugoslavia. The inclusion of Greece is, however, debatable, since it is generally viewed as a Mediterranean country, and was also the only noncommunist state in the region between the end of World War II and 1989. Thus, one of the tasks facing scholars of the whole region is to agree on how to name it, as well as its different parts.

The author is not troubled by terminology, and he has his own definite interpretation of the region's past. He states in the introduction that in his view 'confronting economic backwardness has been the fundamental theme of modern East European history.' (xi) Of course, the same can be said of large parts of the world outside the United States and Western Europe. Stokes writes that since his first visit to the region (Yugoslavia) in 1954, 'I have centered almost all of my work on the question of how East Europeans, Yugoslavs, and specifically Serbs have coped with the great transformation from agrarian to industrial societies.' (*ibid.*) He acknowledges that in discussing this process, he has excluded Poland, but does not explain this omission. In the articles written between 1990 and 1995 which constitute this book, one would expect equal treatment of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but he barely mentions the inter-war period and does not deal with the traumatic experience of World War II, or the equally traumatic Stalinist terror in the region. Finally, his interpretation of the background to the 1989 revolutions is interesting but not original. He should be congratulated for emphasizing the fact that in the processes leading to revolution and during revolution, people with ideas were more important than economics, and that people with ideas make history (162), though this seems to contradict his view that modern 'East European' history was determined by economic factors.

Returning to the author's definition of 'Eastern Europe' as a distinct historical entity, it should be noted that he sees the following unifying factors for the whole region: (1) its peripheral location with regard to Western Europe, hence the 'derivative' character of its political thought, institutions, and culture, and (2) various degrees of economic backwardness. These views are not new, for the peripheral theory of economic development was first formulated by Emmanuel Wallerstein, and has come to be generally accepted by historians who have also extended it to politics and culture.³ However, while some European countries clearly led the way in cultural, political and technological development as compared with others, it can be argued that all countries are 'peripheral' to some particular center at any given time. Thus, all coun-

tries were peripheral and derivative from fifteenth-century Italy as the center of the Renaissance, which was itself derivative from ancient Greece and Rome. Likewise, Lutheranism derived from some sixteenth-century German states as the center of the Protestant Reformation. The France of Louis XIV was the model for culture, government, and military science for much of seventeenth-century Europe, and Paris was the cultural center of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe as well as the center of revolutionary thought and revolution, beginning with the French Revolution of 1789-99 and ending with the Paris Commune of 1871. As far as economic development is concerned, the poverty of Portugal, Spain, and southern Italy, which are clearly Western, placed them until recently in the economically backward category, and some of their regions can still be so described today. Thus, it might be safe to say that the one obvious factor defining Europe as a whole is that it forms a distinct geographical unit stretching East-West from Ireland to the Urals, and North-South from the tips of Norway and Finland to Greece. Other factors such as culture and political thought extended from the west to include Central Europe, as well as parts of Southeastern Europe and East Central or Eastern Europe, though most of the countries of the last two to three areas have adapted Western models to their own traditional politics and culture. As for economies, it is true that these have been historically less developed east of the Elbe River than west of it, but they have always been more developed in Central than Southeastern and Eastern Europe.

It is surprising that Stokes does not mention another recognizable characteristic of the region, that is, long foreign domination and the struggle against it, especially in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This struggle inspired and shaped the national consciousness of its different peoples and influences them to this day. It is debatable, however, whether the term 'postcolonial' can be applied in modern times to all the countries of 'Eastern Europe.'⁴ Thus, Hungary and Austrian Poland in the period 1867-1914 can hardly be seen as Austrian colonies, nor can Bohemia though it did not enjoy similar status, for it was the industrial workshop of the Empire. The term might apply to Slovenia under Austrian and Croatia under Venetian, then Austrian rule, also to the Balkan states conquered by the Ottoman Empire. As for the Soviet period, the 'East European' satellites of the USSR might, except for Czechoslovakia in 1945-48, be categorized as colonies in the period 1945-56, but after that most of their communist leaders managed to become partners rather than puppets of Moscow, even though none of them was able to go as far as Josip Broz Tito who made Yugoslavia

an independent communist state in 1948.

After these general remarks, it is time to get down to details. The book is divided into three roughly equal parts: *I. The Origin of East European Politics; II. The Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia. III. 1989: Prologue, Lessons, Prospects.* The author has, however, much more to say about his special area, Serbia/Yugoslavia, than about other countries. This deprives the countries of Central Europe of their due share of attention before 1989. This gap is most visible in Part I, Chapter 1. Stokes does a good job of describing 'Eastern Europe's Defining Fault Lines,' that is (1) the religious differences: Catholic and Protestant in Central Europe on the one hand, and Orthodox, Eastern Catholic, and Muslim in the Balkans (except for Catholic Slovenia and Croatia) on the other; (2) the cultural differences between Western or Austro-German influence on Central Europe on the one hand, and the long era of Ottoman rule in the Balkans on the other; and (3) the economic fault line that runs east of the Elbe river and south to Trieste. However, one looks in vain for some description of the cultural-political differences between the Balkans and Central Europe, such as the remarkable development of parliamentary institutions by the nobility and gentry of Poland, Hungary and the Czech lands, the last two cut short by Ottoman and Habsburg conquests respectively, also their cultural achievements, and the significant development of their medieval towns and trade.⁵

Stokes admits in the Introduction that he does not deal with Poland in Part One, but makes some brief and misleading comments. Thus, the reader learns that the Polish landowning class succeeded 'in establishing its rights and privileges over against those of the king,' and that while Poland's neighbors, especially Prussia and Russia 'were becoming more powerful by rationalizing their military and administrative structures, the Polish nobility kept their king weak and their administration minimal.' Therefore, the Polish nobles ruled an increasingly weak state which was partitioned at the end of the eighteenth century, so that there was no Polish state at all by the time of *Napoleon* (p.12, emphasis added, spelling as in text). This is misleading in a major way. The Polish 'noble republic' was the opposite of its two strongest neighbors, Prussia and Russia, which 'rationalized' their administration by establishing militarized, absolutist states. (Stokes omits the Austrian Empire, presumably because it was less successful.) One might wonder whether, according to this theory, Britain failed to 'rationalize' itself in the early modern age because it did not develop a strong military and administration. Indeed, after the strong governments of the Tudors, the English

had a Civil War (1640-49) and even beheaded a king (Charles I). Furthermore, in 1688, the English nobles carried out the 'Glorious Revolution,' dethroning James II, crowning William of Orange, placing the control of the budget in Parliament - that is, in their own hands - and issuing a charter of rights. It is not generally known that by 1572, Polish nobles achieved most of the above, plus religious toleration. Perhaps the 'unruly' English nobles avoided foreign intervention thanks to the English Channel?

Thus the reader remains unaware of the fact that the Polish parliamentary system worked well as long as the crown was financially strong under the Jagiellonian dynasty, but began to fail during the devastating wars in which Poland was involved for most of the seventeenth century, the wars that soon bankrupted the crown. Thus, the Elective Monarchy and the *liberum veto* were less the causes than the symptoms of the decline of royal power to the advantage of the nobles. Nor does the author mention the enlightened reforms carried out between the first and second partitions in 1772-1793, culminating in the Constitution of 3 May 1791, or the second written constitution in the world (after the United States) voted in by a parliamentary assembly.⁶ (The French constitution was voted in in August 1791). It was this reformed state that Russia, Prussia and Austria partitioned in 1793, and eliminated altogether in the third partition of 1795. As for the economy, the reader is told that Poland - which provided grain to Western Europe in the fourteenth to seventeenth centuries after the discovery of America shifted European trade to the Atlantic - 'saddled' itself 'with a backward social and agricultural system that greatly widened the already economic gap between it and Western Europe (14). The reader, especially the student reader, may think that the landlord-serf system was a Polish choice, though the author admits elsewhere that it was characteristic of all agrarian societies.

Among various controversial statements in this chapter, one deserves special attention. The author justly says that in the inter-war period 'East Europeans' had no control over the international [and] economic situation due to the rise of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, and so should not be blamed for being unable to focus on policies that might have brought stability to the region. But he also says that 'the inter-war years in Eastern Europe were dominated by several conflicts the East Europeans could have controlled if they had found the wisdom.' (19) The author does not specify, but it may be said that most were inevitable for the peoples on both sides of each conflict were just emerging from long foreign rule and therefore passionately opposed to leaving

any of their countrymen outside their borders. In this psychological context, public opinion in each state claimed the disputed territories on combined ethnic and historical grounds. In any case, wisdom is the product of experience, which requires time, and this was not vouchsafed to these countries in the short inter-war period. (Stokes returns to the nationalist theme later in Chapter 8.) Finally, in this section the author should know better than to say that in [March] 1939 'the British unilaterally guaranteed the integrity of Poland..' (21) It was not the territorial integrity but the independence of Poland that was guaranteed, for the British government aimed to deter Hitler from further aggression and persuade him to obtain his demands from Poland peacefully, with her assent, which would have made her dependent on Berlin.⁷ The Poles did not, however, agree to become the vassals of Germany and Hitler attacked Poland, thus beginning World War II.

Stokes then goes on to discuss the social origins of East European politics (Chapter Three). The reader who might be hoping for some discussion of the development of national consciousness and political parties, will find instead a discussion of Barrington Moore's paradigm of European political systems as set out in his *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston 1966). In the author's able summary of Barrington Moore, modern politics are the outcome of the relationship between three main classes when a given society confronts industrialization. Thus, if there is a strong capitalist - or bourgeois - class, it seizes power and the result is democratic capitalism. If there is no such class, or if it is not strong enough, the landed class sponsors the commercialization of agriculture while taking control of the state, and the result is fascism. If the landed class fails to commercialize agriculture before industrial relations affect the countryside and if the peasant-landlord relationship is weak, the likely result is a peasant revolution. The last case is likely to produce a communist society headed by the intellectual elite which organized the peasant revolution. (37) In Barrington Moore's view, the first case is exemplified by Britain and France, the second by Germany and Japan, and the third by Russia and China.

Stokes does not discuss the fact that this seemingly brilliant paradigm does not really fit the nations concerned. Thus, Britain had a strong middle class by the late eighteenth century and was the premier country to industrialize, but the landed class dominated the House of Commons until after the First World War, and did so despite a large and dynamic middle class with which it intermarried to some degree. In France, the nobles who together with high-born churchmen made up about two

percent of the population began the revolution, but were crushed by the 'Terror.' Nevertheless, as in Britain, French noble families still set the tone of society and held important posts in diplomacy and the army until the turn of the nineteenth century. As for Germany, its growing middle class did not ensure full democracy before 1914, nor prevent the establishment of the Third Reich in 1933. In Russia, the beginnings of parliamentary government in 1906, growing industrialization, and the agrarian reforms under Stolypin which began at that time, were all cut short by the outbreak of World War I, which caused the breakdown of the Russian economy and led directly to revolution in 1917. China was even more backward than Russia; here again, the war with Japan, which broke out in 1937, cut short the reforms begun by Chiang Kai-shek. In both countries, the 'liberators' of the peasants subjected them to a serfdom as bad, and sometimes worse than what had existed before the 1917 revolution in Russia, and the 1949 communist victory over the nationalists in China.

Stokes admits that in inter-war 'Eastern Europe,' the previously noble-dominated societies of Poland and Hungary evolved toward authoritarian rule but not fascist dictatorship, while the largely peasant societies of the Balkan States saw varying degrees of authoritarian government in both the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The author chose five countries: Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Serbia to demonstrate the inapplicability of the Barrington Moore paradigm to the region - but not Poland, even though it provides the most striking negation of this paradigm. Indeed, Polish history is full of paradoxes which defy paradigms. Similar to late eighteenth-century France, it was a noble-led state, whose King, enlightened nobles, and some high churchmen worked to reform it, only to be crushed - the French nobles in the 'Terror' launched by Robespierre, and the Poles by the military might of their neighbors. In the nineteenth century, Polish nobles - mostly gentry - led the two great revolts against Russia in 1830-31 and 1863-64. In Russian-occupied Poland, the period 1864-1914 saw the development of industrialization, urbanization, also a small Polish middle class and a working class, but not freedom and democracy, though the reforms which began in the Russian Empire in 1906 might have improved their chances, given time. In this period in the Polish lands occupied by Austria and Prussia, Polish nobles succeeded in working out a *modus vivendi* with Austria but not with Prussia-Germany. There, however, the Polish gentry-intelligentsia led a successful struggle to develop mass national consciousness. The Hungarian nobles and gentry played a similar role in their

country; the enlightened gentry struggled for the country's self-government and then led the revolution and war of independence in 1848-49.⁸ In the inter-war period, Poland was ruled by gentry-descended intelligentsia, though there was also a peasant Prime Minister, Wincenty Witos. The country experienced a chaotic multi-party parliamentary system followed by an authoritarian one - but it was an anomaly because of the legal existence of opposition parties and a free press. Thus, the omission of Poland in this chapter leaves a gaping hole in the panorama of nineteenth- and twentieth-century 'Eastern Europe.' Furthermore, even the history of the countries discussed is presented within the Barrington-Moore paradigm, that is the narrow context of industrialization or lack thereof, and of their political systems. Thus there is no significant discussion of the development of nationalism, political thought, and culture except for the Serbs and, to some extent other Balkan peoples. As for Central Europe, Stokes notes only that the Czech part of former Czechoslovakia came very close to approximating Barrington Moore's bourgeois-democratic model, while the Hungarian magnates came close to the landowner-dominated German [imperial] model. He should have added that in the period 1867-1914, the latter can also apply to Austrian Poland, then called Galicia.

Stokes points out that in the Balkan countries it was the modern state which shaped their political life. (66) Yet even here there is an exception. Stokes quotes Barrington Moore's view that Romania, despite its landowning class, showed democratic tendencies after World War I, both because the 'boyars' (magnates) had failed to take control of the state before 1914, and because there was a promising urban class, especially members of the free professions and state employees who constituted the liberal intelligentsia. The conclusion is, however, that: 'Unable or unwilling to find a way to change the peasants into something else than smallholding sharecroppers, the Romanian state bureaucracy simply left them for the post-World War II regime to digest, which it found extremely difficult.' (57) One may well wonder how the Romanian state, as well as other states in the region, could have accomplished in the twenty year inter-war period the task of transforming peasants into landowners or urban dwellers, a process that took about a century in Western Europe and did not succeed everywhere, as witness Portugal, Spain, and southern Italy. In fact, except for the Czech lands, parts of the Kingdom of Hungary, also to some extent in the Russian-occupied part of Poland and Slovenia, the peoples of the whole region that Stokes calls 'Eastern Europe' missed out on the key nineteenth-century developments of Western Eu-

rope and Germany, that is: industrialization, intensified urbanization, and the experience of parliamentary government. It is true that the latter existed in restricted forms (as compared with France and Britain) in the Austro-Hungarian Empire after 1867, Imperial Germany after 1871, and in the Russian Empire after 1906, but it did not give equal benefits to all of their peoples.

The best part of the book deals with "The Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia" (Part Two), for most of it is based on the author's proven expertise in this area. It consists of five short chapters (pp. 67-154) which are written clearly and concisely and can be recommended as readings for students who know little or nothing about these topics, provided they are interested in political history as distinct from today's fashionable trends such as 'Gendered' or Women's History and Environmental History. Chapter Four ("Nineteenth Century Serbia: So What?") traces the development of the Serbian state and concludes that it acted not as a mediator between social entities (classes?), nor as a surrogate for one of them, 'but as an actor in its own right, one that behaved a good deal like a dominant class.' (82) This is certainly true, for the Serbian state was staffed by educated bureaucrats who formed a class of their own; but what other kind of state could be expected in a poor, agrarian country lacking either a noble or a middle class? Chapter Five ("Yugoslavism in the 1860s") deals with the rise of Yugoslavism, that is, the idea that the southern Slavs (Yugoslavs) formed one nation. Unfortunately, as Stokes points out, the Serbs believed the future Yugoslav state should be dominated by them, while Croat nationalists believed that they should rule it. Also, the Serbs thought the Croats were really Serbs gone wrong, and vice versa. In this chapter, moderate Croat politicians get the short end of the stick, though they get their due in Chapter Six ("The Role of the Yugoslav Committee in the Formation of Yugoslavia"). This is a fine piece of diplomatic history and should delight its embattled *aficionados*, who are downgraded nowadays as 'elitists.' Here Stokes writes sympathetically about moderate Croat politicians who hoped for a real federation along the lines of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, but united with the Serbs in the struggle for a South Slav Kingdom during World War II. In this essay, originally published in 1980, the author concludes that as the war was coming to a close and the National Council (*narodno vijeće*) came into being in Zagreb, the Yugoslav Committee made up of Croats and Slovenes could have offered the new Yugoslav state its military forces and formal recognition. He thought this would have resulted in either two South Slavic states, or the Croats could have used their assets to secure a mutually satisfactory agree-

ment on equal terms instead of a Serbian-dominated Yugoslavia. (107) However, Stokes changed his mind in a chapter included in a book published in 1993, reprinted here as Chapter Seven ("The Devil's Finger: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia"). Here he offers a more realistic conclusion, namely that the National Council of Croats and Slovenes in Zagreb had little choice but to link up with the Serbs 'since the alternative was to create an independent country, which would have faced powerful Italian claims, a victorious Serbian army, and none too-sympathetic Great Powers.' And so, 'Late in November 1918, the delegates from various councils gathered in Belgrade, and on December 1, 1918, King Alexander of Serbia announced the formation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.' (111)

In this chapter, Stokes barely mentions inter-war Yugoslavia. He focuses on the disintegration of the country, beginning with Tito's decentralization or devolution of power to the republics in 1966-76, which was the prologue to the events of the 1990s. He justly blames Slobodan Milosevic for his manipulation of Serb nationalism, beginning with the abolition of Kosovo's status as an autonomous region in 1987, and going on to the use of the Yugoslav (really Serb) army to support the goal of a large Serbia in wars against Croatia for Serb possession of Krajina, and then against the Muslims for possession of all of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This chapter is an excellent concise presentation of a very complex piece of history, but one may dissent from the author's view that what made war inevitable was international recognition, sparked by Germany, of Slovenian and Croatian sovereignty in December 1991. (42) From all that is known about both Milosevic and other Serb nationalists, this recognition probably just hastened their military support of the Krajina Serbs against Croatia. They did not really try to crush Slovenia.

Part Two concludes with a broad discussion of nationalism, responsibility, 'the concept of people as one,' and possibilities for peace in the former Yugoslavia (Chapter Eight, first published in 1994 and titled "Nationalism, Responsibility, and the People-as-One: Reflections on the Possibilities for Peace in the former Yugoslavia"). This is rather too much for one chapter to cover, especially for students unfamiliar with the region's history. It also includes some statements that are misleading or controversial. Thus, Stokes writes of the death of perhaps as many as 1.7 million Germans during their 'expulsion' from former German territories awarded to Poland (147). In fact, most of these poor people died while fleeing ahead of the Russian armies, and only a small number lost their lives during the organized expulsion that

took place just after the war. At that time, conditions were so disordered that expelled Germans, traveling on trains going west, were often attacked by bandits who robbed and sometimes killed. Also, some Germans were imprisoned, mistreated and killed in Polish concentration camps by Poles who sought revenge for the ruthless, almost six-year-long German occupation of Poland.

In this chapter, Stokes writes again about nationalism in the inter-war period. In his view, once East European 'nationalists' gained power (late 1918), 'in every East European country the dominant national group used its position to confront enemies and benefit its own members.' (150) This blanket condemnation of inter-war 'Eastern Europe,' as if all the countries were characterized by extreme nationalism, blots out the great difficulties faced by governments and some real achievements. It should be borne in mind that all of the states in this region, except Hungary and to some extent Bulgaria which had a small Turkish minority, still there today, had very mixed ethnic populations. While in most countries ethnic minorities were ill-treated, one should mention the very liberal treatment of these minorities in the Czechoslovak Republic. In Poland, where some 65-69% of the population was ethnically Polish, the German, Ukrainian, Belarusian and Jewish minorities did suffer various degrees of discrimination, but were free to develop their cultural life to a greater extent than ever before and incomparably more so than in the USSR.⁹ Furthermore, like most Western historians, Stokes seems to underestimate the pernicious effects of state-sponsored germanization and russification policies on the non-German and non-Russian peoples of Central and East Central Europe, also of magyarization on non-Magyar peoples in Hungary in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Resistance to these policies nurtured a strong nationalist response, which carried over into the insecure conditions of inter-war 'Eastern Europe.' In Yugoslavia, of course, the Serbs ruled the roost, stoking up the anger of non-Serbs, especially the Croats. The author writes that Nazi and Soviet invasions cut short the nationalists' rule, and so permitted them to 'evade responsibility for their errors.' Later, unlike the Germans and West Europeans, who had time to reassess their nationalist sins, he writes that the 'East Europeans' had no 'zero hour' (*stunde null*, 151). This is not really true. First of all, the drastic changes in social, economic and political structures forced on the countries by communist regimes, coupled in some with great devastation, were in many ways similar to the *stunde null*, or Germany in 1945. Secondly, the Germans did not begin to confront their past, particularly the Holocaust, on any significant scale until the late 1960s and early

1970s. Thirdly, vociferous communist condemnation of nationalism at first met with broad approval in Poland and Hungary, and the same seems to have been true at least of educated people in Southeastern Europe, especially in Yugoslavia, which had seen dreadful internecine strife between Serbs and Croats. The problem was that even people who agreed with this condemnation in principle, soon began to see their national cultures repressed or distorted under communist rule, and thus began to resent the policy of the latter in this regard, as in others.

Stokes praises the Poles who, after the collapse of communism, concluded treaties with their neighbors, thus putting behind them 'one of the underlying causes of instability in Eastern Europe throughout the twentieth century.' (148) This is welcome praise, but such a policy is possible mainly because Poland is now an ethnically homogeneous country and has no territorial quarrels with her neighbors. It is true that there is a nagging concern for the Polish minority concentrated in the Vilnius region, Lithuania, and occasional tension with a vocal Ukrainian minority over church property and monuments to Ukrainian national heroes in southeastern Poland, but these are minor problems. Above all, Poland and the Czech Republic do not now have their sizable prewar German minorities, which Hitler claimed for his own in order to undermine and then destroy Germany's eastern neighbors. The Hungarian minorities in Slovakia, Romanian Transylvania, and Yugoslav Voevodina are still irritants in relations between those countries today, though unlikely to cause war. The Russian minorities in two of the Baltic States, Latvia and Estonia, can be manipulated by Moscow to serve its own ends. Bosnia still requires United Nations supervision while the Yugoslav/Serb oppression of the Albanians in Kosovo is a time bomb that could set off war in the Balkans. All in all, however, most of the region called 'Eastern Europe' is much more stable now than it was in the interwar period.

While Stokes's condemnation of *extreme* 'East European' nationalism, both in the interwar period and today is justified, the same cannot be said for his view of the beneficial effects of the American system of government. He claims that the American constitution abandoned the monistic concept of the 'People-as-One' in favor of limited government with sovereignty apportioned among various public entities (149). As is well known, however, the American constitution and system of government did not prevent the genocide of the Indians in the nineteenth century, nor the emergence of a White, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant (WASP) ruling elite in both federal and state government, as well as in big business. It is only recently that WASP domination has given way to

the concept of equal rights for ethnic minorities in the job market and entrance to universities (affirmative action, quota systems) and to 'multiculturalism' in education. Both concepts have now reached extremes in their implementation provoking a backlash, as witness California legislation against affirmative action and the growth of 'Aryan' and other racial groups throughout the country. Alex Kurczaba's article cited earlier is a good illustration of the effect that a distorted application of multiculturalism in American universities has on Polish Studies, as well as studies of other 'East European' countries except Russia.

"1989: Prologue, Lessons and Prospects" (Part Three), is the weakest of the three parts of the book. Stokes is right to say in the Introduction to this part that the existence of a civil society is only a partial explanation for the upheavals of 1989, for it works best for Poland and applies to some extent to Hungary but not to other 'East European' countries. He is also right that economic failure was a significant but not decisive factor (157). However, Chapter Nine on "Modes of Opposition leading to Revolution in 'Eastern Europe'" is rather disappointing. Can one really call Polish Solidarity a 'self-activating workers' movement (162), when it owed so much to intellectual dissidents, especially KOR (*Komitet Obrony Robotników*)? Three previous worker revolts: in 1956, 1970, and 1976 were, indeed, self-activated and due to economic grievances, but not the great revolt of August 1980 which saw the birth of Solidarity. Indeed, at the end of the same paragraph, Stokes says the political mobilization of the masses in the early 1990s 'proceeded not primarily by means of the self-activation of individuals forming primary groups but through appeals to the citizenry to join this or that political party formed and led by elites.' (*ibid.*) This also applies to the work of the Polish dissident elites in the period 1976-89, although they were seconded and supported by workers' revolts. The idea of an independent trade union was not, as Roman Laba claims and Stokes believes, first invented by the dock workers of Szczecin in January 1971 (171). He really ought to know better, since he selected the Kuroń-Modzelewski *Open Letter to the Party* [late 1964 rather than early 1965] as one of the documents in his earlier book, *From Stalinism to Pluralism*. Toward the end of this *Letter*, the authors wrote: 'The possibility of [workers'] defense must be guaranteed by *trade unions absolutely independent of the state with the right to organize economic and political strikes*.¹⁰ As for the tactics of the occupation strike and the interfactory strike committees characteristic of Solidarity in 1980, the Szczecin leaders did not invent them in 1971, since sit-down or occupa-

tion strikes were used in Italy in 1920 and at least once in the United States in the 1930s, though it is not clear whether they knew this and if so, whether this knowledge played a role in their strategy. Thus, the one new feature in the Szczecin strike was probably the interfactory strike committee, replicated in Gdańsk and elsewhere in August 1980. It should also be mentioned that the Baltic and Silesian 'Free Trade Unions' which arose as underground organizations in the late 1970s were headed by dissident intellectuals who taught workers how to organize themselves and distribute their literature. Thus it is not surprising that 'Solidarity's position was also the position of the intelligentsia,' (171) for the dissident intelligentsia helped train worker leaders including Lech Wałęsa. The dissidents realized that political change could only come with mass support. This was not a new idea, for it had been espoused by Józef Piłsudski when he was a leader in the PPS (*Polska Partia Socjalistyczna*) founded in 1892. He published a newspaper for the workers titled *Robotnik* which was distributed illegally in Russian-occupied part of Poland. Interestingly enough, KOR also published a paper with the same name for Polish workers.

Stokes is right that the movement for political reform in Hungary had little or nothing to do with the growth of alternative forms of ownership that opened up its internal market, and to foreign trade, both of which furthered its 'embourgeoisement (162). The movement for political reform in Poland and Hungary was, as the author rightly claims, a matter of men and ideas and not economics, for 'It is people with ideas who make history, not the ideas themselves.' (163) Of course, the Gorbachev factor played a key role in 1989, but can one say that without his reform program in the USSR and his forbearance the 'East European' revolutions would have been unlikely? (163) After all, Gorbachev was not in power in 1980, and yet Solidarity was born and existed for a period of 14 months. It was crushed not by Soviet troops but by Polish forces on the orders of general Wojciech Jaruzelski. (It is still debated whether he did this to prevent a Soviet invasion or simply to stay in power.) As for Poland in 1989, the people showed their rejection of communism in the elections of 4 June. It is clear that a Soviet invasion would have meant the collapse of Gorbachev's carefully constructed 'détente' with the United States, and probably a renewal of the Cold War. Furthermore, the events in Hungary, East Germany and Czechoslovakia, also Bulgaria and finally Romania, showed that the process was unstoppable once the threat of Soviet intervention was removed, as it was by public Soviet statements. Gorbachev could have crushed it with large-scale military action, but he was in no position to

use force because, as mentioned above, he did not want a renewal of the Cold War with all its consequences. He seems to have hoped that more popular communist leaders would come to power who could loosen the reins but retain control of their countries. Poland was most likely to be the laboratory for this experiment but it failed there, though it worked in Bulgaria and Romania where reform communists came to power and held it for a considerable time. Certainly Gorbachev helped the collapse of communism in the region by not intervening with force, but given the limitations and dangers he was facing, could he have done otherwise?

As mentioned earlier, Stokes does not discuss the immediate postwar period which was characterized by brutal repression. Instead, he writes that not only communists welcomed the charge to transform 'Eastern Europe,' thereby implying at least some popular sanction for the new regimes. In support of this view, he quotes two American scholars of Hungarian origin: Charles Gati (who claimed that about 50 percent of the Hungarian electorate was ready for radical change), and G.M. Tamas (who said that people were ready for communist dictatorship). (164) One should note, however, that in Hungary the one radical reform people wanted above all was land reform. After that, the Hungarian Communist party only won 17 percent of the vote in the election of November 1945, the one truly free election held in the whole region. Furthermore, despite terror tactics, the communists won only 27 percent of the vote in Hungary in 1947. In Poland, the January 1947 'elections,' held in an atmosphere of terror, were won by the independent Peasant Party led by Stanisław Mikołajczyk but, as some Polish communists admitted even before 1989, the ballots in its favor were removed and destroyed. Thus, while people in Poland and Hungary wanted some radical reforms, including socialist ones, they wanted them within a democratic system. Even in Soviet-friendly Czechoslovakia, the communists won only 35 percent of the popular vote in the first postwar election, though this constituted the largest single bloc of votes. However, the coalition governments in which they held key positions lasted only as long as they suited Stalin and communism was imposed on the country in February 1948. As for the Romanians and Bulgarians, they had no say regarding Soviet-imposed communism, while Tito imposed communism by force on Yugoslavia before he found out that independent communism was not to Stalin's taste. There is, in fact, overwhelming evidence that in 1945 to 1948, widespread desire for radical change in 'East European' countries did not mean a desire for communism, and Stokes can be faulted for not explaining the difference.

The author does discuss Poland in the postwar period but fails to appreciate some significant factors. Thus, when discussing the 'Polish October' of 1956, he should have emphasized that it marked a real break from Stalinism and the beginning of a process of liberalization that would continue with ups and downs over the next three decades until it reached fruition in 1989. He should have discussed the role of the Church and the intelligentsia in opposing the regime before 1976. His theory that there were two main traditions, that is, the tradition of opposition and the tradition of survival (162), does not explain the background of the dramatic events of 1989 in the whole region, for these two traditions have always existed and continue to exist in countries with oppressive governments. Nor should political passivity be equated with complicity in the actions of governments. The fact that most people found ways to live under oppressive regimes did not mean, as the author writes, that they became 'complicit in the totalitarian project.' (192) As the author admits elsewhere, a non-political existence was often the only way to live an honest life, and anti-politics can also be a devastating form of opposition (170).

In speaking of the social roots of political parties and movements, it would be appropriate to note that the tradition of active or armed opposition was strongest in the formerly noble-led societies of Poland and Hungary. Thus, in summer 1981, Solidarity adopted the motto of the Polish nobles who used it in defending their rights against the King: 'Nothing about us, without us,' that is, the government should not make policy without their consent. Indeed, if one looks for the social roots of Polish and Hungarian revolutions of 1989, as well as of contemporary Polish and Hungarian politics, the influence of the old noble-gentry model should be given its due. Some of its ethics code and language, taken over by the Polish and Hungarian intelligentsia, trickled down through them to the working class of these two countries. This was certainly evident in part of the Solidarity Program of 1981, as cited by the author:

What we had in mind were not only bread, butter, and sausage, but also justice, democracy, truth, legality, human dignity, freedom of convictions, and the repair of the republic....Thus the economic protest had also to be simultaneously a moral protest. (171)

Much more could be said about the book's last chapters, but this would take too much space, so this review will conclude with a few brief remarks. One may well wonder why the 'East Europeans' should be criti-

cized, as they are by Furet and presumably by Stokes, for the lack of 'new ideas.' (185) Most of them wanted freedom, which they equated with western democracy, so why should they try to invent something else? Furthermore, the reader should not be left with the impression that all these peoples just went back to their 'old ideas' (*ibid.*), presumably meaning extreme nationalism, for this really applies to former Yugoslavia. It is strange for Stokes to claim that, 'The primacy of the cold war paradigm...hindered the development of investigations in the West that were not overtly political or economic' (161) and that the [American] academic community was preoccupied with cold war concerns in regard to the USSR and 'Eastern Europe.' (185) Some scholars no doubt fit this category, and it is true that the Cold War led to federal support for developing centers of Slavic, then Russian and East European Studies. However, their teachers and graduates produced a great deal of valuable, objective scholarship, including that of Gale Stokes, which were far more important than a few typically Cold War productions.¹¹ It is true that research on certain aspects of communist societies was either very difficult or simply unfeasible, but this was due to political constraints imposed by the governments of Soviet-occupied countries. Lech Wałęsa did not conduct a politics of accommodation when he was President; nor is it true that 'The Soviet troops simply got on their trains and went home.' (188) Wałęsa did much to fragment the Solidarity movement which brought him to power, while lengthy negotiations were needed, especially in Poland, before the Red Army entrained for Russia.

The author's conclusion on the extraordinary events of 1989 is hardly original: 'The basic lesson of 1989, then, is that the twentieth century is over, with both antirationalism and hyper-rationalism having proved to be political, economic, and moral dead ends.' (189) The twentieth century is chronologically drawing to a close everywhere, though much of the world has yet to experience its achievements. The use of the term 'irrationalism' for Nazism or Fascism is acceptable, but the use of 'hyper-rationalism' for Soviet-style communism begs the question. After all, the pursuit of the planned, centralized, economy even when it brought ever diminishing results, was the result of dogma which is contrary to rationalism, while the semi-religious cult of Lenin and Stalin had nothing to do with rationalism, hyper or otherwise. The author is to be congratulated for being optimistic about the future of 'Eastern Europe.' though he is surely wrong in insisting that the region is *not* in 'transition.' (202) It may not be in transition as far as politics is concerned, but it certainly is so in economics, for the

change from a communist to a truly free market economy clearly requires more time than the nine years that have elapsed since the revolution of 1989, and this is true even of the more developed states of Central Europe.

In conclusion, Gale Stokes' essays on 'East European' history provide as many useful insights as misleading statements and interpretations. The chapters and parts of chapters dealing with Yugoslavia can be useful to undergraduate students, but other parts of the book are unreliable and unbalanced. A particularly glaring omission concerns Poland. Historians of Central Europe (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary) and of South Eastern Europe (the Balkans) usually keep to their own regions of expertise. A really good history of the whole region demands collaborative work. Let us hope this will come soon. Δ

NOTES

¹ New York-Oxford. Oxford University Press. 1997. xiii + 240 pages.

² "East Central Europe and Multiculturalism in the American Academy," *SR*, XVIII:3 (September 1998), 563-567.

³ Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century* (New York 1974); Daniel Chirot, ed., *The Origins of Backwardness in Eastern Europe. Economics & Politics from the Middle Ages until the Early Twentieth Century* (Berkeley, CA 1989).

⁴ The term is discussed in relation to literature by Roumiana Deltcheva, "The Difficult Topos In-Between: The East Central European Cultural Context as a Post-Coloniality," *SR*, XVIII:3 (September 1998), 557-562.

⁵ For a broad survey of all European parliaments to 1789, see A.R. Meyers, *Parliaments and Estates in Europe to 1789* (London 1975). For the best comparative history of the peoples of East Central or Central Europe, see Piotr S. Wandycz, *The Price of Freedom. A History of East Central Europe from the Middle Ages to the Present* (London-New York 1992).

⁶ Samuel Fishman, ed., *Constitution and Reform in Eighteenth Century Poland. The Constitution of 3 May 1791*, (Bloomington, IN 1998), and Adam Zamoyski, *The Last King of Poland* (London 1992). See also: Andrzej Walicki, *The Enlightenment and the Birth of Modern Nationhood. Polish Political Thought from Noble Republicanism to Tadeusz Kościuszko* (Notre Dame, IN 1989). Walicki argues persuasively that the Polish nobles developed a modern national consciousness in the late eighteenth century, and that the republican Kościuszko bridged the Enlightenment and the Romantic periods of Polish history.

⁷ Anna M. Cienciala, "Poland in British and French Policy in 1939: Determination to Fight - or Avoid War?" *The Polish Review*, 34/3 (1989), 199-226; reprinted with abbreviations in Patrick Finney, ed., *The Origins of the Second World War*, Arnold Readers in History (London-New York-Sydney 1997), 413-434.

⁸ Stefan Kieniewicz, "The Revolutionary Nobleman: An East European Variant of the Liberation Struggle in the Restoration Era," in: Jaroslaw Pelenski, ed., *The American and European Revolutions, 1776-1848: Sociopolitical and Ideological Aspects* (Iowa City, IA 1980), 268-286; Istvan Deak, "Progressive Feudalists: The Hungarian Nobility in 1848," in Ivo Banac and Paul Bushkevitch eds., *The Nobility in Russia and Eastern Europe* (New Haven, CT 1983), 123-136.

⁹ Jan T. Gross points out that despite the systematic polonization of the school system and various degrees of discrimination, the material, spiritual, and political life of the national minorities in interwar Poland was richer and more complex than ever before or since. He also points out that they had incomparably more cultural freedom than their brothers and sisters in the Soviet Union. In interwar Poland, there were numerous Ukrainian, Belarusian, Jewish (Yiddish and Hebrew), and German publications. In Wilno (Vilnius) alone, 30 periodicals were published in 1931 in Belarusian, Yiddish, Hebrew, Russian, and Lithuanian, while 68 were published in Lwów (Lviv) in Ukrainian, Yiddish and German. Jan T. Gross, *Revolution from Abroad: The Soviet Conquest of Poland's Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia* (Princeton, NJ 1988), 6-8.

¹⁰ Gale Stokes, *From Stalinism to Pluralism. A Documentary History of Eastern Europe since 1945*, 2nd ed. (Oxford 1996), 114. Italics in text.

¹¹ Robert F. Byrnes, *A History of Russian and East European Studies in the United States: Selected Essays* (Lanham, MD 1994), especially Chapter 12 on Gerald T. Robinson, founder of Columbia University's Russian Institute who is a particularly striking example of an objective approach to Russian studies.

Thaddeus Kosciuszko Military Engineer of the American Revolution

By Francis Casimir Kajencki. El Paso, Texas. Southwest Polonia Press (3308 Nairn Street, El Paso, TX 79925). 1998. xv + 334 pages. Illustrations, maps, index. Hardcover.

James R. Thompson

This book is unusual in that the title fairly describes its content. The author does not attempt a thorough biography of Kosciuszko. Rather, the attention is directed to Kosciuszko's fortification of West Point, his engineering work during the southern campaign, and his fortifications during the invasion of Burgoyne.

For those familiar with the traditions of the United States Military Academy, Kosciuszko's twenty-eight months' work constructing fortifications to prevent

passage of the British forces along the Hudson River is well known. Every plebe at West Point must needs commit to memory the chronicle of this work. A major goal of the British was to cut New England from the rest of the Colonies. Moreover, it was British strategy to facilitate combined operations of their Canadian-based forces with those operating out of New York. Kosciuszko's utilization of natural terrain to facilitate an efficient and relatively inexpensive choke point at West Point circumvented both these British plans. As a measure of its effectiveness, we recall that the British tried, unsuccessfully, to take Kosciuszko's impregnable fortifications by risking their most important intelligence asset, the traitor Benedict Arnold.

The best part of the book is in its first chapters, those dealing with Burgoyne's march to take Albany. Kosciuszko was an early exponent of the 'take the high ground' maxim, for artillery in the late eighteenth century had already become a potent weapon. Although he argued strenuously for fortifying Mount Defiance, as a clear threat to Fort Ticonderoga, Kosciuszko was overruled, resulting in the capture of the Fort by the British. This victory of Burgoyne caused the British general to throw caution to the winds and plunge into the wilderness separating him from Albany. This presented Kosciuszko the opportunity for what might well have been his most important contribution to the American war effort.

Fixed fortifications to deprive an enemy of an assumed line of march is dangerous in the extreme. If the fortifications admit of being flanked, then they are to no avail. We need look no further than the Maginot Line as an example of such a failure. How much greater the danger when the defenses must be constructed swiftly, lightly and without lengthy planning. Essentially, Kosciuszko built a series of wood and earth defenses, which funneled the British army into a killing ground where it was surrounded and destroyed. The battle was won by relatively inexperienced troops against some of Europe's best soldiers. The Battle of Saratoga thus won by the Americans in September of 1777 brought the French into the war on the side of the new Republic. Without Kosciuszko's use of spade and ax, it is difficult to imagine that Burgoyne would not have succeeded in his plan to split the infant Republic. Kosciuszko's demonstration of the importance of good military engineering was so impressed upon the Americans that they made engineering a centerpiece of military education at the United States Military Academy at West Point.

Unlike Lafayette and von Steuben who came from the high aristocracy of powerful military powers, Kosciuszko came from the petty nobility of a country

whose glory had peaked 100 years earlier and which was in the process of being dismembered by its neighbors. He had no connections, no ambitions, nothing but his intelligence, his principles and his honor. Colonel Kajencki has provided a valuable source work describing the nuts and bolts of Kosciuszko's monumental military contributions to the United States.

Kajencki worries that Kosciuszko is given too little honor by the Americans. Perhaps. But the record of Kosciuszko is an integral part of the training of the officer corps of the most powerful military power in the world. And in the South, particularly, where honor is valued above riches, he is remembered and will be remembered through the ages. One recalls that the two southern officers, M.C. Cooper and Cedric Fauntleroy, who founded the Kosciuszko Squadron in 1919 together with their American comrades did so in gratitude to this modest gentleman who had come from a far country to use his blood and intellect in the defense of freedom. The Kosciuszko Squadron was key in stopping the Cossack General Budyonny's Konarmya at Lwów in 1920, preventing its juncture with northern army of Tukhachevsky, enabling Piłsudski's victory east of the Vistula. A significant downpayment of American gratitude. And in 1989, when Reagan's military pressure brought an end to Russian occupation of Poland, all Americans could in some measure claim to have redeemed their debt of honor to Kosciuszko. Finally, 'For your freedom and for ours,' had come true for Poles as well as for Americans. Δ

Other Books Received cont. from Page 591:

Samoidentyfikacja mniejszości narodowych i religijnych w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej (self-identification of national minorities in East Central Europe), **edited by Andrej Czarnocki**. Lublin. Instytut Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej. 1998. 119 pages. Paper. In Polish.

Samoidentyfikacja mniejszości narodowych i religijnych w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej: Problematyka atlasowa (self-identification of national minorities in East Central Europe: the mapping problem), **edited by Jan Skarbek**. Lublin. Instytut Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej. 1998. 191 pages. Paper. In Polish.

Samoidentyfikacja mniejszości narodowych i religijnych w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej: Problematyka prawna (self-identification of national minorities in East Central Europe: the legal problems), **edited by Monika Płoska**. Lublin. Instytut Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej. 1998. 87 pages. Paper. In Polish.

A collection of papers (given at a conference in 1994) on the problems of areas which identify themselves as inhabited by a minority nationality. Introduction in English; papers mostly in English but also in French, Belarusian, Czech and Polish.

Sprawy międzynarodowe (international affairs). A quarterly edited by Henryk Szlajfer. January-March 1998 issue. 182 pages. Summaries in English; also published in English as *The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs*.

Contains articles on NATO enlargement by Bogusław Winid, on Russian transformation by Włodzimierz Marciniak, and on Poland and Germany by Jerzy Kranz. On par with the best.

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Letters

I read the September 1998 issue of the *Sarmatian Review* with great interest. Congratulations on your brilliant editorial work. I particularly liked Alex Kurczaba's "East Central Europe and Multiculturalism in the American Academy." Nevertheless I have to object to his statement on p. 566 that "The collapse of the Soviet empire [was] an event no American Slavist predicted (Zbigniew Brzezinski being a rare exception)." For the sake of historical accuracy, I have to state that already in 1970, I gave a lecture titled "Death of the Soviet Regime" at the Russian Research Center at Harvard University. The same lecture was delivered at Cambridge University in England in 1971 and 1979. The text of the lecture (titled "Death of the Soviet Regime: a Study in American Sovietology. by a Historian") was published in *Studies in Soviet Thought*. In 1980, I updated this study and delivered it as a paper at the International Slavic Congress at Garmish; titled "The Future of Soviet Russia," it was published in *Coexistence: An International Journal* (Glasgow 1982).

M.K. Dziewanowski, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee

The author's most recent book is the Chinese edition of his *History of Soviet Russia* (1996, 5th edition).

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