

The Rhetoric of Disputed Lands: A Lesson from the Camp David Accords to Create Peace in  
Kashmir

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“For where does one run to when he's already in the promised land?”

-Claude Brown

Abstract

The complex adversarial relationship between Israel and Egypt has seen dozens of failed negotiations, cease-fires, and peace agreements (Fisher 50). Incompatible cultural and political ideologies, a history of violence, militant allies, and a plethora of other reasons make peace building a desirable, but immensely difficult, task between these two nations. The Camp David Accords of 1978 were arguably the most successful peace agreement brought between these two nations, but not because this compromise simply addressed political ideologies. This agreement respected of each nation's rhetorical logonomic systems. Such an understanding provides remarkably analogous insight into the conflict between Pakistan and India regarding Kashmir. This paper explicates the complex logonomic systems of Israel and Egypt, and how the Camp David Accords helped bring peace between these warring nations. Evidence is then provided to demonstrate that the conflict over Kashmir between India and Pakistan represents an immensely similar logonomic relationship, thus suggesting that maxims present in the Camp David Accords could help structure a peace agreement between India and Pakistan.

Some nation-states voluntarily relinquish cherished lands to avoid conflict. Other nation-states readily, sometimes even eagerly, compel denizens to combatively protect land. However, some nation-states address contentious matters and attempt to resolve the issue peaceably. Jared Diamond, professor of geography at the University of California in Los Angeles, addresses the causes of international conflict and asserts that proper dispute resolution resides in getting warring nations to abdicate their most expendable, yet peace-inducing, resources: Most European nations have given up economic sovereignty to cooperate with one another to challenge the economic authority of the United States and China with the formation of the European Union; Japan forsook hundreds of years of military tradition to advance technological development to compete with the West; and Australia abandoned its once prideful isolationist foreign policy to develop global infrastructure for greater influence within the South Pacific area (Diamond 434). For many quarreling nations, their conflicts and mutually exclusive ideologies travel so far back that any hope of a simple solution (or one at all) seems impossible. By identifying the elements that each nation could both fairly sacrifice, and ask for, in negotiations, I believe peace between Pakistan and India can be reached regarding Kashmir. This paper is not meant to offer a comprehensive theory for peace in Kashmir, but identify the necessary stipulations for a successful international agreement. My research is based off the Camp David Accords (1978) which, although addressing a conflict on the other side of Asia, represent an agreement that satisfies a logonomic system remarkably similar to that of India and Pakistan over Kashmir.

I will begin this paper by first addressing what a logonomic system is and how the logonomic system exercised by Israelis, Palestinians, and Egyptians made the Camp David Accords successful in 1978. Then I will address the conflict in Kashmir and how a similar logonomic system exists for Pakistanis and Indians, thus suggesting several similar strategies for

peace building in Kashmir.

In *Social Semiotics* (1988), Robert Hodge defines a logonomic system as a set of cultural regulations that govern the production and reception of signs. Logonomic rules dictate how and when signs are to be read and understood, and by whom. The simplest example of a logonomic rule can be found in a joke. The primary (literal) meaning of a joke is a true, false, or hyperbolic statement. But the secondary (underlying) meaning of the joke, shared by the members of a particular group, can only be appreciated with an understanding of the culture, situation, history, or other underlying factors which permit the members to comprehend the level of absurdity implicit within such a statement (4). The motivation and interaction of each underlying factor is considered a logonomic rule.

For example, assume a Jew is telling an anti-Semitic joke to a group of Jewish friends, and the friends laugh after the punch line is revealed. This hypothetical situation includes a variety of factors suggesting the joke is appropriate and funny: the narrator is Jewish, the listeners are Jewish, the joke is self-deprecating, and the group finds the joke funny. Now imagine that the narrator is not Jewish and (expectedly) the Jewish listeners take offense. The logonomic factors in this situation are: the narrator is not Jewish, the listeners are Jewish, the joke is NOT self-deprecating but derogatory, and the listener's take offense to the joke instead of laugh. Thus, the logonomic rule presented is that members of the same distinguishable group can poke fun at one another because their love of the group is known. But an outsider is not granted this right, because the outsider's love of the group is unknown. A logonomic rule is thus not explicitly stated or fully conscious to the members of a group or culture—it is beneath consciousness, unarticulated by the group but governing their actions and communication (Two Lectures 93).

The significance of logonomic systems reaches immensely further than just jokes and simple conversation. They structure every individual's interaction with other people (superiors, inferiors, and equals) and physical structures such as buildings, temples, hospitals, etc (Hodge 5).

Hodge explains:

Ideological complexes are constructed in order to constrain behavior by structuring the versions of reality on which social action is based, in particular ways. Since ideological complexes exploit contradictory semiotic forms as a means of resolving contradictions in attitudes and behaviors...we need, therefore, to invoke a second level of messages which regulates the functioning of ideological complexes, a level which is directly concerned with the production and reception of meanings. (3-4)

Hodge's argument asserts, quite sensibly, that we can choose from thousands of often contradictory belief systems. Furthermore, we can interpret signs from a plethora of possible and often mutually exclusive meanings. We end up choosing our beliefs and meanings behind signs (such as fighting in war signifies a brave and virtuous act or it signifies a breach of humanitarian principle) based on the logonomic systems that govern our ideological complexes. Examples of other logonomic systems could be as follows: validate yourself through consumerism, only those who dress or speak like X are worthy to speak to me, etc (Lloyd 1). These messages become shared by members throughout a culture. They hold these values latent in their discourse, and these values spread as we communicate and persuade one another (Adorno 34).

We utilize logonomic systems because we lack the time and energy to directly access reality in its purest form—we cloud our perception with what are nothing more than prescriptive metaphysical and ethical presumptions of how we and others should live our lives. To

comprehend all the rules and motivations that direct our actions and interactions would be too costly in time and effort. Logonomic systems provide heuristics designed to guide behavior with efficiency and consistency. Although many individuals may have insight into the reasons why they feel compelled to do a particular action (such as dress and speak a certain way, react to certain enemies, treat coworkers, etc), no individual has the ability to understand the depth of all his/her actions and interactions. (Tractatus 1.0-2.0 Wittgenstein in Stroll 71 (Tractatus 1.0-2.0), Wittgenstein in Hodge 25 (Tractatus 4.01-4.021), Barker 85).

So what then do logonomic systems have to do with the Camp David Accords and how do they apply to the Kashmiris living between Pakistan and India? I believe the Camp David Accords were signed because they addressed the conflicting logonomic systems underlying the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Egypt to both the Egyptians and Israelis (Small Arms 8-9).

The Camp David Accords emerged from increasing conflicts between Israel and Egypt. The Yom Kipur War of 1973, arms trades to Palestinian terrorist organizations, Israeli's right to exist, refugees crossing into Egyptian borders, and the Israeli occupation of the Sinai Peninsula only partially comprise a very long list of causes motivating the conflict (What Were 1). But, the logonomic relationship between the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the Sinai Peninsula comprised the crux of the conflict, and thus the focal point of the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt (Tell 1). The West Bank, Gaza Strip, and the Sinai Peninsula were not merely pieces of hospitable land for both Israel and Egyptians and other Arabs, but carriers of immense symbolic importance. Carter and his negotiators understood the symbolic powers of these lands for the logonomic systems of both the Israelis and Egyptians.

At the time of the agreement, the Egyptian government organized attacks on Israel from funding and arms trade with Syria, the Palestinian Liberation Organization, and various Arab

terrorist organizations. Israel currently occupied the Sinai Peninsula (Egyptian territory), the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank. Israel and Egypt each carried out their initiatives with different interests (Black 1):

Israel's chief concern was protection and safety. As a new and independent nation, having fought countless conflicts before and after the formation of their nation-state, protection and duration for the future of Israel became paramount. The West Bank to Israel contained important cities to the Jewish people: Hisham's Palace, Jerusalem, and Bethlehem (Mueller 63). The Gaza strip contains zero holy cities, but was occupied to ensure that Egypt and other Arabs could not have land access to the Israeli mainland from the Mediterranean Sea. For a similar reason, Israel occupied the Sinai. By controlling the most direct land route from Egypt to the Israeli homeland, Israel was granted an extra measure of protection from military advancement. Above all Israel was interested in *preservation*. Full autonomy over all Israel's desired lands were negotiable as long as peace permeated through the Israeli mainland and the venerated West Bank. Essentially, Israel occupied the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the Sinai for slightly different reasons but they were all related to national preservation (Fisher 51).

However, Egypt's chief concern was sovereignty and posterity. Egypt's homeland was not threatened nor was the existence of Egypt as a nation-state in jeopardy. But, Egypt's most traditional areas on the Sinai (like the pyramids of the pharaohs) were. Egypt battled foreign "invaders" for centuries on the Sinai: the British, French, Turks, Romans and Greeks. They were not ready to give it up to the Israeli's (nor the Palestinians) especially since they believed they had a right to the land since the time of the Pharaohs (Fisher 50).

Theo Van Leeuwen in *Introducing Social Semiotics* (2005) refers to this process as *segregation*. Segregation refers to the phenomenon when a single territory: 1) holds two

mutually exclusive meanings for different parties, and 2) these incompatible interpretations span two different issues (13). For example: Segregation does *not* occur when a person believes territory Z belongs solely to party X because X was there first, while a different person believes territory Z belongs solely to party Y because Y was there first. Although these definitions are mutually exclusive (condition 1 is met), they span only one issue (possession of territory justified by primacy). Now imagine that a person believes territory Z belongs solely to party X because party X claimed it first, while a different person believes territory Z belongs to party Y because a conglomerate of international nations believes Y should have it. This issue now involves mutually exclusive interpretations of territory Z (territory Z cannot both belong solely to X and solely to Y) *and* the compatible interpretations span two different issues (possession justified by primacy and possession justified by external support). This understanding may seem trivial, but this understanding is necessary to understand how the Camp David Accords solved the Egyptian-Israeli conflict (15).

The segregation presented regarding the Israeli-Egyptian conflict deals specifically with the three territories of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the Sinai Peninsula. Israeli claimed sole ownership of the West Bank because the presence of numerous holy lands for the Jewish faith and culture made the West Bank as much a part of Jewish identity as the mainland. The West Bank to Egypt was seen as a territory belonging solely to Arabs and Palestinians. Although Egypt did not have an interest in the region for itself, Egypt received significant funding from the Palestinian Liberation Organization in exchange for pressuring Israel to give up this land. While Israel claimed the West Bank for reasons of preservation, Egypt claimed this land for Arab and Palestinian sovereignty (Fisher 50)

However, Israel had different motivation for occupying the Gaza Strip. Gaza has zero



holy cities for Israel. Although Israel benefits from about 360 square kilometers of more land by possessing Gaza, Gaza represents more of a security investment than a constituent of Jewish identity. By possessing the last of the land bordering the Mediterranean Sea that connects to the Israeli mainland, Israel gained a strategic advantage in mitigating any military advancement from Egypt. Egypt's only motivation in this land is to cede it to its Palestinian supporters funding the efforts of Egypt (Oren 181). Once again, the segregation over the possession of Gaza occurs because Israel looks to enhance preservation, while Egypt seeks sovereignty for the Arab world.

As previously addressed, Israel occupied the Sinai to prevent military mobilization of Egyptian forces. This was a matter of promoting safety for Israel. Egypt grew enraged from this action because the Sinai Peninsula contained lands pertinent for Egyptian sovereignty. Without peace with Egypt, Israel felt occupation of the Sinai was necessary for its preservation. Without the Sinai, Egypt felt it lacked the sovereignty over some of its most cherished lands.

The agreement struck in the Camp David Accords stipulated Israel to have possession of the West Bank, with an autonomous region in the West Bank and Gaza in exchange for withdrawal of troops from the Sinai (Camp David 1 and 5). Israel also agreed to demilitarize the West Bank and Gaza in exchange for Jordan and Egypt's end to supplying Palestinian rebel forces with arms (Camp David 2). Egypt also granted full recognition to Israel as a nation-state (Camp David 4).

The Camp David Accords represented an *integration* to the segregation previously identified. An integration occurs when differing interpretations of disputed semiotic signs (land in this case) become permissible to the warring parties, without the meaning being changed or shared (Van Leeuwen 12). The Camp David Accords did this for the West Bank, Gaza, and the Sinai Peninsula for both Israel and Egypt. The West Bank was still the promised land of the

Jewish people. Allowing a couple sections to be autonomous still gave Jews access to this area and the ability to maintain their strong presence (and thus influence) over the region. Egypt felt the Arabs in the West Bank and Gaza deserved legal autonomy, and happily accepted the new self-governing regions in the West Bank and Gaza. The now semi-autonomous West Bank and Gaza represented a huge advancement for Arab Sovereignty, while a semi-autonomous West Bank plus an established right to exist comprised an immense milestone in Israeli preservation. The Sinai also became the land of Egypt once again. This preservation of the multiple meanings of a sign allows multiple cultures to feel respected without dominated (Barker 85). Since integration occurred, the lands were able to fulfill their physical semiotic functions to both the Egyptians and Israelis. Although the lands symbolized different things, such integration allowed each culture to hold onto the “meanings” they gave it.

According to Donald Preziosi in *The Semiotics of the Built Environment* (1972) a building, or any physical place, contains a primary function for a populace: governmental, residential, and religious are only a few of the many possibilities (63-64). To Preziosi, how a populace spatially interacts with its environment determines which primary function a space will adopt. Furthermore, people and their interactions can change the meaning of a space. Aesthetic and textual forces become secondary. A temple or church may symbolize religion, but its importance stems from the spatial ability it gives people to practice religion. But for others, its importance stems from the spatial ability to provide a place a family might gather after a busy week to be with one another (Architecture, Language 15).

Carter in the Camp David Accords integrated the protection and residential concern for Israel and the sovereignty concern of Egypt. Israel wanted a home to feel like a home with the freedom from fear. The Camp David Accords granted Israel this. Syria, Egypt, and Jordan

agreed to stop fueling attacks on Israel and cease funding of Palestinian resistance. Israel did NOT have to give up any land to its enemies; they just had to cede a portion of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank for its own autonomous regulation (Camp David 5).

Carter in the Camp David Accords also integrated the governmental and military concern for Egypt. Egypt wanted to feel they had complete control over the Sinai Peninsula they originally possessed in the times of the Egyptian pharaohs. Egypt had to agree to not engage in conflict with Israel, whose borders returned to the other side of the Sinai. Each side learned the geographical significance of the Sinai, the West Bank and Gaza. Each party preserved their interests and that of the other party within this integration, precisely because (a la Preziosi) a space's semiotic function is not fixed.

Michel Foucault articulates the importance for segregated regions for the creation of identity, in "Questions on Geography" (1980). While at one location, you are constantly reminded of the places that are similar to it and the places that are not. A Westerner in China is affected by China as far as the Westerner can see China as similar/different to the West. A new geography carries the meaning of the old location, as well as the new location with it. The Camp David Accords were crafted with a firm understanding of the importance of geography to the two parties. The re-acquisition of their territories reminded them each of where they had come. With the West Bank and Gaza soon to be partially autonomous, but NOT under the control of an Arab regime while the Israeli mainland became fully recognized, the Israelis were reminded of their origin and new earned belonging in the Middle East. With the Sinai again under Egyptian control, Egypt was reminded of its heritage. Both parties felt like they had gained much, without gaining any new territory, because their identities became consolidated (Carter 2). The Camp David Accords brought this integration of the logonomic systems.

Thus far, we have considered the logonomic systems of the Israeli's and Egyptians driving the Camp David Accords. We see how the Camp David Accords created a compromise integrating each logonomic system. Now we are left to consider: What about the Camp David Accords helps us understand the logonomic systems of Pakistan and India to create peace in Kashmir? Before I can address this question, I must unpack the logonomic systems of Pakistan and India and a brief history of their conflict that created such logonomic systems.

The Israeli-Arab conflict involving Egypt goes back hundreds of years, but the Israeli state was NOT created from the land of Egypt. But, the Pakistani nation-state and Kashmir region was created out of the Indian state. The Israelis and Egyptians were fighting each to protect their homeland—no one was looking to acquire new or old territory (at least not in the Camp David Accords agreement). But, India and Pakistan are fighting to govern a new territory called Kashmir (Jina 91-92).

“Kashmir” refers to the semi-autonomous regions of Kashmir and Jammu (Kashmir EU 1). Both Pakistan and India are allowed to influence domestic and fiscal policy within areas of Kashmir, but each exercised their share of violence to the other regions (Kashmir: Origins 1). Until the era of British domination, Jammu and Kashmir were independent states. 80% of the Kashmiri people consider themselves Muslim, but the British appointed Hindu (Indian) Maharajas to govern the area during British control (Azad Jammu 2). India and Pakistan have had two official wars over the possession of Kashmir after India and Pakistan earned their independence (Azad Jammu 3). Currently, India, Pakistan, and the Chinese government all help govern different regions in Kashmir, but India and Pakistan hope to attain all of them (UN Resolution 307 1). Although there has been no official war since Kashmir was split into spheres, there are attacks made between regions costing the lives of several hundred thousand (United

Nations Military Observer 1).

The history of Kashmir is important because it represents a phenomenon at the crux of the logonomic systems of both India and Pakistan: extensional transference. In *Beyond Culture* (1976), Edward T. Hall describes extensional transference as preferring the symbol to the referent (25). For example: We utilize walls, doors, and locks and consider this moral behavior as opposed to helping create a society that does not need such devices. We idolize people instead of learning and copying the desirable attributes we find in them. Hall states:

Extensions only permit man to solve problems in satisfactory ways, to evolve and adapt at speed without changing the basic structure of his body. However, the extension does something else: it permits man to examine and perfect what is inside the head. Once something externalized, it is possible to look at it, study it, change it, perfect it, and at the same time learn important things about oneself.

The full implications of the extension as lesson and extension as mirror have not been fully realized yet. (25-26).

Kashmir represents an extensional transference for both Pakistan and India. Kashmir does not serve military purposes, contain valuable resources, or anything of economic or marketable importance. Kashmir only serves to help India and Pakistan feel like a truly sovereign and respectable nation because to give it up would be to give up something their nation deserves (Koechler 4). Although the Israeli-Arab conflict is very complex, the Camp David Accords dealt specifically with the homeland of Israel and Egypt. Each party was negotiating for securing what they had. India and Pakistan are fighting over something new. Neither state since their independence has held Kashmir, but both want it (or at least want it to operate autonomously under certain self-favoring guidelines).

This understanding of extensional transference provides the crux that allows us to identify the logonomic systems of India and Pakistan regarding Kashmir. After referring to the official opinions of both the Pakistani government and the Indian government, I have identified seven reasons that underlie the Indian desire for Kashmir as well as its hostile and militant approach toward Pakistan that comprise the extensional transference:

First: When India earned independence in 1947, the Maharaja signed the Instrument Accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India. This act “legally” granted India complete control over Kashmir and represents a legitimate piece of international law, and is thus irrevocable.

Second: The Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir, made up of Kashmiri members, unanimously ratified and pledged support to the Instrument Accession in 1947.

Third: the two-nation theory, which divided Pakistan and India along borders to separate the Muslim from the Hindu majorities, was not supported by India. India reluctantly witnessed as Pakistan earned autonomy. Thus, the argument that Kashmir belongs to Pakistan because Kashmir contains a Muslim majority holds no weight to India (The Jammu and Kashmir Issue 1).

Fourth: Pakistan believes that according to UN Resolution 307, India must hold a plebiscite for the denizens of Kashmir to determine their autonomy, whether self autonomous or under the jurisdiction of Pakistan or India. India believes they do not need to respect this resolution because the resolution did not respect the Constitution of India. The Constitution of India promised Kashmir significant autonomy and arguably has given Kashmir such independence in Article 370 of its constitution. Because the United Nations accepted the Constitution of India when they accepted India into the United Nations, they had no right to further declare that India must hold a plebiscite (Akbar 1-3).

Fifth: India blames Pakistan for the insurgency and terrorism in Pakistan, India, and China's regions of Kashmir, while even bringing this concern to the international community at the United Nations (Pakistan, India Meet 1, World: South Asia, 1).

Sixth: Pakistan has been caught publishing anti-Indian propaganda against India. India believes Pakistan now represents a significant and unpredictable threat to the world and cannot be trusted with Kashmir (Pakistan's Anti-Indian 1).

Lastly: The strong support among Kashmiri's to become part of Pakistan or independent is insignificant. India represents the world's largest democracy. Dissent has become so natural throughout the nation that India plans to treat this as a domestic issue: accommodate the needs of the people, without granting them autonomy (The Jammu and Kashmir Issue 1).

Extensional transference provides a nexus among the many reasons India has given why they deserve Kashmir. Insecurity about identity and a desire to fuel nationalism motivates India to seek full jurisdiction of a barren region full mostly of Muslims. In the mind of the Indian Parliament, they cannot lose this battle because they would lose validation of India as a well respected nation. Furthermore a victory over their international combatant, Pakistan, would only heighten the feeling of strength and love of India. To India, they are entitled to and have legally acquired Kashmir. India has already ceded regions to Pakistan and China. And more relinquishment would threaten the principles India was built on. To lose Kashmir would be an embarrassment to themselves and the international community. India's extensional transference exists because Kashmir is a symbol of what India deserves and Pakistan does not. All seven reasons gyrate around the idea of sovereignty. Namely, India deserves to govern Kashmir while Pakistan does not.

After referring to the official opinions of Pakistan, I have found five reasons that underlie

Pakistan's desire to annex Kashmir, as well as its militant and hostile approach to India:

First: Before Britain's colonization of India, Kashmir held complete autonomy. Therefore it was not Britain's jurisdiction to give the land to India. Kashmir should return to autonomy and decide its future from there (Kashmir Dispute 1).

Second: The United Nations understands the controversial history of Kashmir, and serving as a third party negotiation, passed Resolution 307, which grants Kashmir a plebiscite to determine Kashmir's future by democratic majority vote (United Nations Resolution 307 1).

Third: Pakistan supports the two-nation theory, which gave rise to both India and Pakistan. The logic of the two-nation theory asserts that people are given a right to self-determination based on their religion. Since Kashmir is 80% Muslim, had Britain and India not struck a corrupt deal, Kashmir would belong to Pakistan (Kashmiris Want 1).

Fourth: India has been making unlawful accusations of Pakistan, and therefore an unlawful government, undeserving of the Kashmir region (Kashmir Dispute 1).

And, lastly: India cannot be trusted with Kashmir, because India has neglected maintenance of their Kashmir sector (which comprises the majority of Kashmir). Just recently India has spent \$30 million on a road system for India's mainland without addressing the needs of the Kashmiris (Life in India's 1).

Extensional transference also provides the nexus among all of the reasons Pakistan has identified why they deserve Pakistan. Pakistani homeland is not threatened by India's occupation of Kashmir: the Pakistani government has not once hinted that Indian controlled Kashmir would lead to violence against Pakistan or even the Muslims within Kashmir. Pakistan feels that without Kashmir, they are not validated. To Pakistan the international community made it clear that Kashmir should be autonomous or vote on their future (which would probably lead to



inclusion in Pakistan). To give it to India would be a slap in the face of Pakistan. The rights of religious culture and the ideology that created the separate nations of Pakistan and India in the first place would be violated and would thus demonstrate unfair support for Pakistan's enemy. To lose Kashmir, would be to be disrespected in a plethora of ways. The five reasons motivating Pakistan's extensional transference has to do with what is *good* for the people of Kashmir and thus the *preservation* of Muslim identity (and thus Pakistani identity) in southern Asia..

With this understanding, we can now more fully explicate the logonomic systems of India and Pakistan regarding Kashmir. Just like Egypt, India places the primary meaning of the geography of Kashmir at the governmental level, one of the possible primary functions of geography (Preziosi 63-64). India does not see a longtime history with Kashmir and Kashmir does not support the residences of many Indians nor Hindus. There are no religious cities, resources, or anything of instrumental use. The only meaning given to Kashmir is that it should be governed by India for legal sake, and thus the fulfillment of India's sovereignty. India feels its sovereignty would be greatly undermined by giving Kashmir away. Just as Egypt felt undermined by the occupation of its country by the Israeli military, the young nation of India would feel undermined by Pakistan's control of the region. India has neglected maintenance of the roads and structures of in Kashmir precisely because the people of Kashmir are not its concern, but the land is. The simple possession of land underlies the extensional transference of India because it is what the people of India (and Egypt) deserve (Life in 1, Pakistan's Anti-India 1).

Just like Israel, Pakistan places the primary meaning of Kashmir at the residential level, another one of the possible primary functions of geography. Pakistan satisfies its external transference by earning validation through upholding the two-nation theory and disseminating

information that Indian control is cruel (Pakistan, India Meet 1 and Kashmiris Want 1). By providing a home for Muslim brethren away from India's cruel and arguably unfair jurisdiction, Pakistan would feel vindicated. Dick Hebdige in *Subculture: the Meaning of Style* (2005) provides an added insight into this phenomenon. A subculture, resisting mainstream domination, creates their identity and source of validation by changing the meanings of signs in the dominant culture. Resignifying symbols (like a safety pin becoming a piece of jewelry) become symbols of triumph (3). Pakistan may arguably feel empowered by the acquisition or autonomy of Kashmir because Kashmir would take on a new meaning as a separate or Pakistani region. Such meaning would be a triumph for Pakistan and a way to publicize to the world that Muslim identity in southern Asia is a strong force worth respecting. Pakistan can earn the esteem and respect it has been seeking since conflicts arose with India from the day Pakistan gained independence. This esteem comes from protecting the Muslim community (the warrant behind the two-nation theory).

Now we are left to wonder: If Pakistan resembles Israel, and India resembles Egypt, how can the Camp David Accords apply to Kashmir so that both India and Pakistan feel as if they won? According to Roger Fisher, Israel was persuaded to grant the West Bank and the Gaza Strip autonomous regions and demilitarize Egypt if their nation was officially recognized and the violence stopped. Egypt was persuaded to refrain from fighting Israel and supporting the efforts of other national combatants if Israel pulled out of Egypt (50).

Israel would never have been willing to give up both the West Bank and Gaza strip entirely, especially because of terrorist threats from Palestine fueled by supplies from Syria, Jordan and Egypt (Black 1). But, Israel was persuaded because Israel only had to give up part of that region, and that part would not go to Palestine, but become autonomous (Fisher 50). Maybe

India could be persuaded the same way. India is permitted to keep part of Kashmir (perhaps the section they own or China's section as well) and the remainder of Kashmir could be autonomous. The plebiscite would not be held, out of fear that they vote to join Pakistan. Pakistan could hold onto their section or grant it autonomy too. Although it may seem like Pakistan loses out on this deal, they really gain a great deal. The autonomous region of Kashmir is mostly filled with Muslims and thus Pakistan would gain a national ally. I believe that the Camp David Accords show that with warring parties who value disputed territory very similarly, partial autonomy and accommodating the nation who has the most legal authority in the area is the best solution.

This option would satisfy all of the qualms of both the government of India and Pakistan. The multiple legal issues on India's side may dissolve if India is allowed to keep their region and perhaps the section of another and if the remaining territories are promised independence not Pakistani control. The two nation theory would still not be upheld in India's eyes, because Pakistan is not gaining any new territory. Additionally, India would not have to take back their accusations about Pakistan. Since Pakistan is not gaining any territories, there is no problem.

Pakistan gains an autonomous neighbor that is NOT India, governed by the dictates of its predominately Muslim population. Kashmir also returns to a (mostly) autonomous nation, resembling its existence before British control. And, although not through a democratic plebiscite, one of the ideas behind UN Resolution 307 (self-determination) is upheld. Furthermore, although India can read this arrangement as the dissolution of the two-nation theory, Pakistan can interpret this sign with the opposite meaning—the triumph of the two-nation theory. Although India is not being divided into Muslim and Hind populations again, the self-determination philosophy underlying the two-nation theory survives: The Muslim populations of Kashmir are permitted to govern themselves by Muslim law if they so choose.

Although this solution does not satisfy all of India's seven identified reasons for external transference, nor Pakistan's four, hopefully India and Pakistan could be persuaded to forget about their other reasons in hopes of an end to war and the deaths of thousands in the region.

Of course all of these suggestions are contingent on the assumption that the Kashmiri's would support such a decision. I believe that such an assumption is fair. Many of the Kashmiris who are not officially Muslim or Hindu, practice an amalgam of Islam and nomadic practices such as the Dards, Ladakhis, and Gujjars. They trace their heritage to Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and Azerbaijan (Major Ethnic 1, The Region 1). The Kashmiris only have peace to gain, and do not have to identify with a new national Kashmir identity (Kondo 29, 31-32, and Fong 29).

This paper is not meant to offer a thorough and implementable theory for the dispute in Kashmir, but to illustrate what the Camp David Accords can offer as possible stipulations to guide peace in Kashmir. Such an approach becomes warranted after identifying the similar logonomic systems governing Israel and Pakistan, and Egypt and India. Israel viewed their occupation of various lands primarily as the means to preservation. Thus Israel was willing to cede portions of very holy land to autonomous regulation in exchange for peace. Egypt desires the sovereignty of the Sinai because it constitutes the source of Egyptian history and culture. Thus Egypt is willing to make peace and recognize its enemy's right to exist for the posterity and sovereignty of its nation. The Kashmir conflict represents an extensional transference, because the region holds symbolic value, not practical value to the nations of Pakistan and India. With that understanding, plus the official opinions of both the Pakistani and Indian governments, we can see that: 1) Pakistan can satisfy its extensional transference through ceding part of Kashmir to India and the rest to an autonomous nation for the majority of Muslims in the subcontinent. And, 2) India can satisfy its extensional transference through the mostly autonomous state of

Kashmir with India granted some of the territory, just like many signed treaties had promised, while Pakistan would have zero legal control over the region. Such an agreement would appease Pakistan's need for Muslim preservation (similar to Israel's logonomic sytem) and India's desire for appropriate sovereignty in the area (similar to Egypt's logonomic system).

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