

Reported speech and thought in Kavalan

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Abstract

One of the amazing characteristics of human language is self-reference, that is, referring to itself by means of itself. This language-with-language phenomenon is most evident in reported discourse, where speech, thought, and perception tend to be interconnected. Hence, this paper investigates reported speech (RS) and reported thought (RT) in Kavalan, an endangered Austronesian language, by focusing on the quotative marker *zin*, which frames either a speech event or a mental event. Based on our present corpus, it is found that in narratives reported speech is nearly twice as frequent as reported thought, with instances of reported speech almost exclusively framed by third person pronouns. In conversations, however, the situation is reversed, namely, reported thought is twice more frequent than reported speech, with instances of reported thought almost exclusively framed by first person pronouns. Our study shows that self-report of thought is the norm in conversations while other-report of speech is predominant in narratives.

Keywords: reported discourse; quotative maker; Kavalan; Austronesian languages

1 Introduction

In characterizing the nature of general semantics, Korzybski (1995) points out that “a map is self-reflexive”, employing a “map-territory” metaphor. To put it another way, a “map”, or any form of representation, is capable of self-reference, that is, referring to itself by means of itself. This recursive nature of representation, or specifically of language, is thought to play a crucial role in human adaptation and cognition. The reflexive nature of language is especially evident in reported discourse (used here as a broad term), which bears duplex structures and is described as language within language (Janssen and van der Wurff 1996). The investigation of reported discourse may thus reveal us a window on how cognition processes two (or more) levels of representation.

Broadly speaking, reported discourse includes reported speech, thought, and perception since they are often intertwined together within or/and across languages. For instance, Shona, a Bantu language, has a quotative maker *-ti*, which may denote a mental activity (e.g. to think) or a verbal one (e.g. to say) (Fortune 1955:346). A more impressive example comes from Kambera, an Austronesian language, where the generic verb *wà* can report mental events (e.g. thought and intention), audible events (e.g. sound and speech), and even visible events (e.g. motion and sight) (Klamer 2002).

*This paper was first intended as a term paper for Syntax II at National Taiwan University, taught by Prof. Shuangfan Huang, to whom I am deeply indebted. Also, I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to our Kavalan informants, including *abas*, *ngengi*, *Raciang*, and *buya*. Without their assistance and patience, this paper could not appear. All errors of course remain my own.

Like in Shona and Kambera, speech and thought are reported by a common morpheme in Kavalan, an endangered Austronesian language in Taiwan. To illustrate, the quotative marker *zin* reports a speech event in (1) whereas it reports a mental event in (2).¹

(1) Reported speech

naRin sazay zin-ku ci buya pa-ipil timaikuan
 NEG sing QUOT-1SG:GEN PNM PN CAU-listen 1SG:LOC

‘I told Buya not to sing to me.’ (lit. Don’t sing and make me listen,’ I said to Buya.)

(2) Reported thought

mautu=ti sayza zin-ku ci utay
 come=PFV think QUOT-1SG:GEN PNM PN

‘I think Utay has come.’

In this paper, we shall investigate the reported speech and thought in Kavalan, specifically by looking into the instantiations of *zin* in both spontaneous narratives and conversations. In addition to linguistic context, the syntactic structure of reporting and reported clauses is also expected to provide language users with enough clues for them to distinguish reported speech from reported thought.

Aside from the introduction in Section 1 and conclusion in Section 5, the organization of this paper is as follows: Section 2 reviews some important issues and findings in reported discourse; Section 3 explains the methodology and data; Section 4 presents the results and discussion.

2 Literature review

Discussions of reported discourse in the literature can be roughly classified into two groups: (a) the syntactic relationship between reporting and reported clauses; (b) the grammatical distinction between direct and indirect report.

2.1 The syntactic relationship between reporting and reported clauses

The reported utterance is traditionally assumed to be an object complement of the verb of speech (Lyons (1968:253), Rosenbaum (1967), Givón (1980), Noonan (1985), among others). The analysis, however, is not unproblematic since the speech verb exhibits a more intact relationship with its subject than with the reported utterance that is claimed to be the object (see McGregor (1994:65)). Moreover, Longacre (1985) notices the singularity of the syntactic structure in reported speech, such as discontinuity and exceptional word order of direct report in English, and thus suggests that the syntactic relation might be something like “sentence”, rather than “clausal syntagms”.

¹Kavalan examples in this paper come from two sources. One is from my fieldwork notes for the purpose of this present paper, and the other from National Taiwan University Corpus of Formosan Languages. The orthographic conventions for Kavalan are identical to IPA except: **e** for schwa, **b** for voiced bilabial fricative, **d** for voiceless alveolar fricative, **l** for alveolar flap, **y** for palatal glide, **ng** for velar nasal, **R** for uvular fricative, and **'** for glottal stop. Finally, abbreviations of the gloss are as follows: **1**: first person; **2**: second person; **3**: third person; **SG**: singular; **PL**: plural; **IPL**: inclusive plural; **EPL**: exclusive plural; **NMZ**: nominalizer; **PN**: proper noun; **PNM**: personal name marker; **CLF.NHUM**: non-human classifier; **AF**: Agent Focus; **PF**: Patient Focus; **NAF**: Non-Agent Focus; **NOM**: nominative case; **GEN**: genitive case; **OBL**: oblique case; **LOC**: locative case; **NEG**: negation; **PFV**: perfective; **IRR**: irrealis; **CAU**: causative; **IMP**: imperative; **QUOT**: quotative; **EXT**: existential; **INT**: interjection; **DM**: discourse marker.

A more extensive account comes from Halliday (1985), who proposes that the relationship between reporting and reported clauses is “paratactic” in direct quotes and “hypotactic” in indirect quotes, with both being tactic relationships. He also suggests both types of quotation are involved with *projection*, one of the two logico-semantic relationships singled out by him (with *expansion* being the other).² Projection refers to “the phenomenon whereby some clause is projected as a piece of wording or meaning, either spoken or thought.” (McGregor 1994:66) For illustration, the paradigm for projecting speech and thought in both direct and indirect quote is given in Table 1 below.

	<i>paratactic</i> (direct quote)	<i>hypotactic</i> (indirect quote)
reported speech (RS)	Percy said “I’m running away.”	Percy said he was running away.
reported thought (RT)	Percy thought to himself: “I’ll run away.”	Percy thought he would run away.

Table 1: Halliday’s (1985:197) paradigm for projecting clause complexes (with examples from McGregor (1994))

In response to Halliday’s analysis, McGregor (1994) puts forward eight points to argue against the dependent relationship between reporting and reported clauses. A critical argument is that it is the reported clause, rather than the reporting clause, that should be viewed as the main clause, considering its freedom of occurrence. Also, the reporting clause is dependent, rather than independent, in the sense that it modifies the reported clause by specifying the source and the type of speech act of the utterance (e.g. a question, demand, or answer, etc.). As an alternative, McGregor analyzes the relationship between reporting and reported clauses as *framing*, taking into consideration the fact that they are capable of independent occurrence and at the same time structurally related with each other.

The greatest difference between dependence and framing relationship is that the former is a part-to-part relation while the latter a whole-to-whole one, that is, “syntagmatic relationships involving grammatical items which are themselves whole units” (McGregor 1994:76). Framing is in fact a brilliant metaphor that compares the relationship between a reported and reporting clause to that between a picture and its frame. The picture (the framed clause) is the “demonstration” of a referent world while its frame (the framing clause) serves as a “description” that demarcates the picture from the background setting (see Clark and Gerrig (1990)).

2.2 The grammatical distinction between direct and indirect report

Reported discourse is traditionally classified into two types of modes: direct and indirect report.³ The decisive factor that distinguishes one mode from the other has always been coreferential nominals. Pike and Lowe (1969) establish a set of explicit rules to deal with this issue, which are shown in (3) and (4) (taken from Lowe and Hurlimann (2002:71–72)), where QC refers to the quoted clause and X to a third party who may or may not participate in the conversation between a speaker (S) and a hearer (O).

²In expansion, “one clause expands on the meaning of another by elaborating it (restating it), extending on it (adding to it) or enhancing it (providing circumstantial modification)” (McGregor 1994:66).

³Other types of modes are also identified, such as Free Direct Speech, Free Indirect Speech, Narrator’s Report of Voice, and Narrator’s Representation of Speech Act (see Leech and Short (1981)).

- (3) **direct speech:**
- a. Subject (S) of ‘say’ verb (speaker) is coreferential with first person pronoun in QC
 - b. Object (O) of ‘say’ verb (hearer) is coreferential with second person pronoun in QC
 - c. Third role (X) of ‘say’ verb (bystander) is coreferential with third person pronoun in QC
- (4) **indirect speech:**
- a. First person of ‘say’ verb is coreferential with first person pronoun in QC
 - b. Second person of ‘say’ verb is coreferential with second person pronoun in QC
 - c. Third person of ‘say’ verb may be coreferential with third person pronoun in QC

For example, John (S) is coreferential with the first person pronoun “I” in (5a) below, but with the third person pronoun “he” in (5b). In addition, the first person “me” (O) is coreferential with the second person pronoun “you” in (5a) but with the first person pronoun “me” in (5b).

- (5) a. John said to me, “I’ll call you tonight, when everything is ready.”
 b. John said to me that he would call me tonight when everything was ready.

Hence, (5a) is a direct quotation while (5b) is an indirect one. These rules may seem superfluous as well as complicated at first sight, but it is the orthographical convention in English that makes the distinction in (5) straightforward. For the study of languages like Kavalan, where a standardized writing system is absent, these rules are in fact quite useful.

However, it is not infrequent that coreferentiality is difficult to identify, especially when only third person nominals are referred to. In this case, other symptomatic features have to be looked for. First, tense, aspect, or temporal adverbs are helpful in deciding whether the time in question refers to the speech situation (in the reporting clause) or to the referent speech situation (in the reported clause). Second, direct speech may be discontinuous while indirect speech may not be (McGregor 1994:74). For instance, the direct reported clause in (5a) can be rendered as (6a), where the reporting clause intervenes between two parts of the reported speech, but this is not possible for the indirect reported clause in (5b). Third, the quote in direct speech may precede or follow the framing clause, as in (6b) and (5a), whereas the quote in indirect speech almost always follows the framing clause, as in (5b); in cases where it does not, it shows up like an afterthought (McGregor 1994:74).

- (6) a. “I’ll call you tonight,” John said to me, “when everything is ready.”
 b. “I’ll call you tonight, when everything is ready,” John said to me.

A question that follows from the distinction between direct and indirect quote is whether there is a preference of one over the other. Generally speaking, unlike reported speech, reported thought tends to be expressed indirectly (McGregor 1994:85). On the other hand, in studying the reported discourse in Mandarin Chinese, Lin (1999) concludes that direct thought, rather than indirect thought, is favored when the first person pronoun refers to the thinker. In the present study, we also aim to discover whether there are any correlations among the person of the subject of the framing clause, the mode chosen in the reported discourse, and the alternation between reported speech and thought.

3 Methodology and data

The Kavalan data employed here come from a database collected in 2003 and owned by Graduate Institute of Linguistics & Multimedia Center at National Taiwan University. They consist of two conversations between a male and a female speaker as well as six narratives. The conversations

are about going back to one's hometown and about a Kavalan speech contest, while four of the narratives are Frog stories (Mayer 1969) and the other two are Pear stories (Chafe 1980). The number of Intonation Units (IUs), the number of tokens of the quotative marker *zin*, and the total duration of utterances are listed in Table 2.

	Number of IUs	Tokens of <i>zin</i>	Length (min.)
Conversations	243	51	11:08
Narratives	430	29	25:15
Total	673	80	36:23

Table 2: Basic information for Kavalan data

As seen in (1) and (2), the speaker or thinker of the quotative marker *zin* is marked as genitive in Kavalan, so for the convenience of the readers a complete paradigm of genitive personal pronouns is given in Table 3 below.⁴

	First Person	Second Person	Third Person
Singular	<i>-ku</i>	<i>-su</i>	
Plural	<i>-ta</i> (incl.); <i>-niq</i> (excl.)	<i>-numi</i>	<i>-na</i>

Table 3: A paradigm of genitive personal pronouns in Kavalan

Although eighty tokens of *zin* exist in the data, only seventy-four are used. Six tokens are excluded either because of the ambiguity between reported speech and thought, or because of their mysterious functions in the discourse. For example, the *zin* in (7) may well mean “to think” or “to say”, either way being equally plausible since no symptomatic features (see Section 2.2) are available:

- (7) *tita-an-na muaza sinsuli-na nengi=ti ala-an zin-na nani*
 see-PF-3SG:GEN many plum-3SG:GEN good=PFV take-PF QUOT-3SG:GEN DM
 ‘He saw many plums (on the tree), and thought/said it’s time to pluck them off.’ (pear_buya, IU 3, 2003)⁵

Another example that has been left out is (8) below. Since it appears in a narrative throughout which only the narrator is speaking, it is unknown to whom the *-su* ‘you’ is referring. Even though it refers to anyone who is listening to the story, either ‘you think’ or ‘you say’ would be appropriate in this context. The *zin-su* here may have other discourse functions, and to clarify this issue more data are required.

- (8) *pasi yau tayan biat ’nay zin-su nani*
 likely EXT there frog that QUOT-3SG:GEN DM
 ‘The frog might be there.’ (frog_buya, IU 33, 2003)

⁴Table 3 only shows personal pronouns relevant in this study. For a complete paradigm of the pronominal system in Kavalan, please refer to Jiang (2006:14) and the references therein.

⁵In the examples, “pear_buya” refers to the Pear story told by the informant *buya*. Similarly, “frog_buya” means the Frog story told by the informant *buya*. Since there are two types of data used in this study, the sources from which a particular example is drawn are indicated by the format X_Y, where X refers to the genre of the data (either Pear/Frog stories or conversations) and Y to the name of the speaker.

4 Results and discussion

In the seventy-four tokens investigated, the “subject”⁶ of *zin* is almost exclusively restricted to first person singular (*zin-ku*, 46%) and third person singular/plural (*zin-na*, 50%), with only three tokens coupled with first person inclusive plural (*zin-ta*, 4%). The distribution of reported speech (RS) and reported thought (RT) across different subjects is shown in Table 4, where only conversations are counted, in Table 5, where only narratives are counted, and in Table 6, where both types of data are counted.

	<i>zin-ku</i> (1SG)	<i>zin-na</i> (3SG/PL)	<i>zin-ta</i> (1IPL)	Total
RS	3	1	0	15 (33%)
RT	29	1	1	31 (67%)
Total	32 (70%)	13 (28%)	1 (2%)	46 (100%)

Table 4: Distribution of RS and RT across subjects in conversations

	<i>zin-ku</i> (1SG)	<i>zin-na</i> (3SG/PL)	<i>zin-ta</i> (1IPL)	Total
RS	0	18	1	19 (68%)
RT	2	6	1	9 (32%)
Total	2 (7%)	24 (86%)	2 (7%)	28 (100%)

Table 5: Distribution of RS and RT across subjects in narratives

	<i>zin-ku</i> (1SG)	<i>zin-na</i> (3SG/PL)	<i>zin-ta</i> (1IPL)	Total
RS	3	30	1	34 (46%)
RT	31	7	2	40 (54%)
Total	34 (46%)	37 (50%)	3 (4%)	74 (100%)

Table 6: Distribution of RS and RT across subjects in conversations and narratives

According to Table 4, in conversations 70% of the tokens of *zin* are coupled with a first person singular subject and predominantly involved in reported thought. Moreover, the total instances of reported thought are around twice as many as those of reported speech (cf. 31 and 15 tokens). Interestingly, the result in narratives is rather different, but the skewness in distribution is equally obvious. According to Table 5, 86% of the tokens of *zin* are coupled with a third person singular/plural subject and mostly involved in reported speech. In addition, the total instances of reported speech are roughly twice the instances of reported thought (cf. 19 and 9 tokens). When conversations and narratives are examined collectively, instances of a first person thinker nearly equal those of a third person speaker (cf. 31 and 30 tokens), as shown in Table 6.

As for the distinction between direct and indirect report, all instances of reported speech appear in the form of direct report. For instance, in (9) below the subject *-na* ‘they’ in the framing clause is

⁶Since the speaker/thinker coupled with *zin* is marked as genitive, the term “subject” is problematic. For lack of a better choice, here it refers to the speaker/thinker specified by the genitive pronoun.

coreferential with the first person plural pronoun *-imi* ‘we (exclusive)’ in the framed clause (underlined). Hence it conforms to the one of the rules set up by Pike and Lowe (1969), and can be counted as direct quote.

- (9) *qa-wiya=ti-imi* *zin-na*
 IRR-leave=PFV-1EPL:NOM QUOT-3PL:GEN
 ‘They say, “We are leaving!”’ (frog_buya, IU 98, 2003)

In spite of the claim just made, there seems to be one possible counterexample. The *tangi* ‘today’ in (10) below, according to the situational context, refers to the speech situation time, rather than the referent speech situation time, which is expected of direct report:

- (10) [*qautu*] *'nay= sudal 'nay tangi zin-na qia*
 come that paper that today QUOT-3SG:GEN INT
 ‘(Mother) said that the (official) papers would arrive today.’ (conversation_buya.imui, IU 56, 2003)

Since it is not impossible for *tangi* to be intended as the time in the referent speech situation, more data are required to confirm whether (10) is truly a counterexample.

The claim that reported speech in Kavalan is direct report is further supported by its discontinuity. As shown in (11) below, the framed clauses are intervened by the framing clauses, which are noted here in bold.

- (11) a. *bula-ika tu babui tu u-siq ci buya zin-ku ci imuy*
 give-IMP:NAF OBL pig OBL CFL:NHUM-one PNM PN QUOT-1SG:GEN PNM PN
 ‘I told Buya to give Imuy a pig.’ (lit. “Give one pig,” I said to Buya, “to Imuy.”)
 b. *bula-ika zin-ku ci abas tu u-siq babui ci siulan*
 give-IMP:NAF QUOT-1SG:GEN PNM PN OBL CFL:NHUM-one pig PNM PN
 ‘I told Abas to give Siulan a pig.’ (lit. “Give,” I said to Abas, “one pig to Siulan.”)

On the other side, for reported thought it is difficult to distinguish direct report from indirect report since neither nominal coreferences nor symptomatic features are available. For example, in (12) there is no coreference between *qaniyau* ‘they’ and *-ku* ‘I’, and in (13) *-ita* ‘we (inclusive)’ is partially coreferential with the first person and the subject of the framing clause at the same time, which satisfies the coreferential rule for both direct and indirect report.

- (12) *supaR ma qaniyau zin-ku ka*
 can DM 3PL:NOM QUOT-1SG:GEN DM
 ‘I think they are better (at speaking than I am).’ (conversation_buya.syulan, IU 125, 2003)

- (13) *qa-mai=ti-ita tu sikawma-an zin-ku Ranaw*
 IRR-NEG=PFV-1IPL:NOM OBL speak-NMZ QUOT-1SG:GEN SO
 ‘Afterwards, I think we will lose our language.’ (conversation_buya.syulan, IU 151, 2003)

However, we do find an example of reported thought that may qualify as direct quote. As illustrated in (14), the framed clause is intervened by the framing clause in bold:

- (14) *qa-ngasan-iku= qa-ngasan-iku zin-ku= manan*
 IRR-late-1SG:NOM IRR-late-1SG:NOM QUOT-1SG:GEN AF:return
 ‘I think I might return late.’ (conversation_buya.imui, IU 102, 2003)

Finally, a few remarks can be made about the reference time of the predicate *zin*, although Kavalan has no tense maker that distinguishes the present from the past. The reference time for the reported thought of the first person is nearly always identical with the utterance time while the reference time for the reported speech of the third person is exclusively anterior to the utterance time. This result is predictable since self-report of thought is simultaneous while report of other people's speech is possible only after they have spoken.

5 Conclusion

In this preliminary study, we have investigated reported speech and thought in Kavalan, specifically by looking into the instantiations of *zin* in both spontaneous narratives and conversations. We have found that in narratives, reported speech is nearly twice as frequent as reported thought and is almost exclusively framed by third person pronouns, while in conversations the situation is reversed, with instances of reported thought almost exclusively framed by first person pronouns. Our analysis reveals that self-report of thought is the norm in conversations while other-report of speech is predominant in narratives. Moreover, instances of reported speech are almost exclusively direct report, while the reporting mode in reported thought is yet unclear due to the limitations of the data currently available. We speculate that the distinction between direct and indirect report (even between the reported speech and reported thought instantiated by *zin*) in Kavalan might not be as straightforward or significant as that in most Indo-European languages. To some extent, these two modes of report may be fused together in Kavalan, and this state of affairs is in line with Güldemann and von Roncador's (2002) generalization that direct and indirect report are not two clear-cut categories, but instead extreme poles on a continuum of various types of reported mode.

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