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The Social Self: A Heideggerian Account of Intersubjectivity

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ABSTRACT

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This work demonstrates that one can accept Heidegger's radically new conception of human subjectivity without being committed to the negative social ontology that is often deemed to be its direct consequence. Heidegger rejects traditional theories of intersubjectivity because they characterize the self as a type of isolated, independent substance that is required to 'bridge the gap' to reach or recognize others like itself. In contrast, Heidegger argues that the self is defined by a fundamental sociality expressed by its immersion in shared public roles and norms. In doing so, however, he opens himself up to a long-standing critique: namely, by simply stipulating subjectivity's sociality, Heidegger grants it the status of an a priori category which cannot accommodate immediate experiences of others in their concrete particularity; others are simply interchangeable tokens whose uniqueness is subsumed under the generality of the established category. By engaging in an analysis of the nature of the a priori in Heidegger's work, I demonstrate that this 'social category' is in fact a responsiveness to the other in her unique temporal particularity. On this basis, I am able to provide a Heidegger-inspired account of respect and the origins of normativity. My dissertation thus provides a significantly different approach to Heidegger interpretation, and compensates for shortcomings in contemporary theories of intersubjectivity.
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INTRODUCTION

This discussion analyzes the implications of Heidegger’s critique of subjectivity for his conception of the social nature of human existence. Heidegger famously recharacterizes human existence in terms of ‘being in the world’ – a transcending immersion in the world that is grounded in our fundamental care for who we are to be. Gone is the substantial self, the thinking ‘thing’ that characterized modern pictures of subjectivity; the Heideggerian ‘subject’ is no object, but a transcending ‘between’ that attempts to overcome this distorting dichotomy. In transforming these ‘Cartesian’ pictures of subjectivity that condemn us to the solipsism of the cogito, Heidegger introduced a notion of social subjectivity that accommodates the profoundly other-directed nature of the self. For Heidegger, the self is defined by its ‘being-with-otherness,’ and he characterizes this fundamental sociality in terms of our immersion in shared public roles and norms.

Though Heidegger rejects traditional theories of intersubjectivity because they portray human subjectivity as a self-enclosed, independent substance, he fails to fully elaborate the implications of this rejection for theories of intersubjectivity – or provide his own worked-out alternative. Indeed, the manner in which Heidegger characterizes the individuated and social dimensions of selfhood in the absence of this traditional ‘substantial’ view of the self seems to commit him to a characterization of intersubjectivity that has been the subject of a great deal of critique. Since the Heideggerian self is immersed in the world and understands itself and others through its public, general meanings and categories, in what way can one such self directly
encounter this or that other person in her concrete individuality? Indeed, by simply stipulating that human being is a ‘being-with’ others, Heidegger seems not to solve but exacerbate the problem by moving this generality, anonymity, and mediation to the level of an a priori category that characterizes my very way of being. This is the criticism that Jean-Paul Sartre levels against him in Being and Nothingness: by simply defining human subjectivity as fundamentally characterized by ‘with-others-ness,’ Heidegger seems to be guilty of advocating a position in which we can only ever encounter other persons as representative types able to trigger particular pre-existing categories – be they ontic social categories or the overarching ontological category ‘being-with,’ or Mitsein. The individual persons do not play a role in constituting or developing these categories, but are simply interchangeable instances whose uniqueness is subsumed to the category by which I know them. But as Sartre argues, simply stipulating that a self is always ‘with’ others cannot do justice to the social encounter in all its particularity – the role that being with this or that other person plays in the very constitution of the self.

In attempting to avoid Sartre’s claims about Heidegger’s position, commentators have traditionally focused on the individuating role that angst and authenticity play in Being and Time, arguing that Heidegger makes room for the possibility of direct encounters between individuals because of the individuating nature of the conditions picked out with these concepts. But characterizing the possibility of any concrete encounter between individuals in terms of a required prior authenticating individuation will condemn social encounters to an extremely rarefied status, since Heidegger is clear that these are not the norm. Though authenticity and the capacity for authenticity will be important aspects of the intersubjective encounter, my purpose is to show that concrete
encounters between individuals are possible from within the confines of everyday existing. In doing so, I will demonstrate that such intersubjective encounters are not contingent on a prior – and rare – authenticity, but can in fact be conducive to it. Though Heidegger’s work tends to encourage these views insofar as he fails to flesh out in detail how concrete, individual others are encountered as such, his position nevertheless contains the resources with which to do so. I will demonstrate this by expanding on the social implications of Heidegger’s notion of selfhood in the following steps:

Chapter I outlines the reasons for Heidegger’s reformulation of human subjectivity and explains the terms and concepts necessary for understanding his account of the structures that define this new conception of selfhood. According to Heidegger, my way of being is a transcending immersion in the world that is grounded in my care for who I am to be. This care structure is defined by the fact that 1.) I find myself in a situation in which things matter to me, 2.) I must address myself practically to different possibilities of response in the face of the world’s mattering to me, and 3.) I am never alone, but always find myself with others and understand myself – and them – in terms of the public norms and practices that we share.

In Chapter II, I show that, despite the anonymity and averageness that this conception of the self seems to entail, Heidegger has room for an everyday understanding of the first-personal, individuated ‘mineness’ of the self, without having to restrict this individuated selfhood to the condition of authenticity. Though the capacity to experience authenticity involves existential structures that are essential conditions for my everyday way of being ‘mine,’ they need not be authentically grasped or appropriated as such for them to manifest themselves in my everyday way of being. Because my primary concern
here is our everyday existence as social selves, the extremes of authenticity and authenticity will not be addressed in detail until Chapter VII.

Chapter III illustrates how, based on Heidegger’s reformulation of traditional concepts of subjectivity, a Heideggerian account of intersubjectivity faces the objection articulated above. I provide the details of this objection through the lens of Sartre’s critique as it is articulated in Being and Nothingness. Sartre argues that Heidegger’s view cannot account for concrete encounters with individual others because these others can only ever be ‘types’ falling under the category. Heidegger’s characterization of the fundamentally social nature of human existing fails because it simply stipulates an a priori category specific to others, without explaining how the subjectivity of these others could be directly encountered as such: he cannot move from the ontological to the ontic, so to speak. As I will show, however, Sartre’s account itself falls victim to a difficulty that Heidegger’s does not: namely, his emphasis on the facticity and contingency of the intersubjective encounter will not allow him to account for the fact that such encounters leave a trace – that the public nature of the world and the structures of subjectivity itself continue to speak of the presence of others even when they are not concretely present. In his failure to accommodate this, Sartre essentially cannot move from the ontic to the ontological. In light of the difficulties that the Sartre discussion raises, it will become clear that Heidegger’s existential category ‘Mitsein’ must not only preserve its ability to explain this ‘residue’ of social presence – which remains despite the absence of concrete others – but it must do so while avoiding the danger of losing the individual other to the anonymity of an a priori category.
Chapter IV addresses this issue by turning to an analysis of the manner in which Dasein’s structures can be understood as *a priori* categories. I argue in this section that Heidegger’s existential analytic is essentially a reformulation of traditional transcendental aprioricity aimed at both maintaining the categorial nature of human experience – the view that our way of being contributes to what and how something is experienced – and preserving a type of realism whereby what is encountered *shapes* the categories of experience. In following this path, I will argue that Heidegger’s reconception of the *a priori* both follows Husserl in its recognition of the fundamental *responsiveness* of the categories to the concrete existences in which they are operative, and follows Kant in characterizing the existences to which these categories are responsive in terms of *temporality*. The authority of the categories – how they permit us to immediately encounter things other than the self – will therefore lie in their ability to allow things encountered to be experienced in their particular temporal mode of existing. On this basis, I will show that Heideggerian *Mitsein* must allow one ‘self’ to directly encounter another because it is a category *responsive* to the other in her *temporal* particularity.

Chapter V will explain the structure of such an encounter. According to Heidegger, understanding our way of being in the world demands that we recognize the unique temporality on which it is based. This temporalizing existing is characterized by an ecstatic relationality to otherness which accounts not only for the fact that time has a duration relating the present to past and future, and that my temporalizing can be indexically tied to worldly events and meanings, but time’s relational structure also involves the direct encounter of one temporalizing self with another. Through the mutual accommodation that occurs in this shared temporal presence, the public measures and
meanings of the world are constituted. Because these encounters occur on a level prior to anonymous public categories and involve the direct acknowledgment of the other in the particularity of her temporalizing care, they cannot be understood as simple subsumptions of the other's particularity to a pre-existing general category.

On the basis of this analysis, Chapter VI will turn to an elaboration of this temporal recognition of the other, articulating how all modes of human social encounter fall within a continuum of 'solicitude,' which is characterized by this recognition. Though it is possible to act in ways that subsequently contradict the immediacy of the acknowledgement that occurs when I recognize another as a person, I show in this chapter that we cannot but first recognize them as such. I compare Heidegger's position in this regard to Kant's person/thing distinction and examine the manner in which this type of acknowledgement can be considered a type of respect. This chapter concludes with an analysis of discourse and other modes of 'being-with' in which this minimal acknowledgement of the other's personhood discloses itself in an everyday way.

Chapter VII considers not the everyday modes of interaction, but the extreme modes of the solicitude continuum. I demonstrate first why even the most reifying and abusive - 'deficient' - modes of being toward the other can still be deemed modes of temporalizing accommodation despite their deficient character. In doing so, it will be necessary to examine why Heidegger dubs such modes of being-with inauthentic. The answer will be their tendency to treat the other in terms of temporal categories appropriate to things, thereby covering over the role that they play as temporalizing co-constitutors of the shared space of world time. The opposite pole of the social continuum designates those attitudes and behaviors where the recognition of the other in all her
temporalizing complexity is taken as one’s guiding principle. Because such a mode of being toward the other demands an explicit awareness of this temporalizing way of being – an awareness resistant, therefore, to the inauthentic tendency to interpret persons using temporal categories appropriate for things – Heidegger characterizes such relationships as authentic. This chapter will consider objections to the view that relationships between persons can genuinely be understood as authentic on Heidegger’s view, considering the many interpretations of Heideggerian authenticity as a form of solipsism. The discussion will conclude by examining some of the moral implications of this type of relationship, focusing particularly on the call of conscience: the way in which authenticity manifests itself qua discourse, and the manner in which another person can thereby summon me to a greater fullness and responsibility in being.

Though much of what I will be arguing about the nature of Heideggerian intersubjectivity is not explicitly articulated by Heidegger, the purpose of this account is to provide what I believe Heidegger would have to say – and regularly gestures toward saying – if he were to trace out the implications of his own position. Why he failed to do so – whether out of profound moral bankruptcy or out of an interest in examining only the conditions for the possibility of the solitary task of philosophizing – will not be considered here. Nor will I address criticisms of Heidegger’s fundamental project, focusing, instead, on determining what the consequences of this project must be. Though it will be impossible to avoid importing aspects of my own interpretive agenda, I hope to avoid doing violence to Heidegger’s work and to provide, instead, a fuller account of what the implications of his work on subjectivity must be for characterizations of intersubjectivity. To this task we now turn.
CHAPTER I:  
The ‘Subject’ of Inquiry

The question of intersubjectivity – how we encounter and experience other subjects like ourselves – has been a major topic of investigation throughout the philosophical tradition. In addressing this issue, philosophers have typically focused their energies primarily on the so-called ‘problem of other minds,’ in which our encounters with other subjects are characterized as ultimately involving an ability to know that particular types of objects in the world *are* other ‘persons’ or ‘subjects’. Understood as such, the problem becomes an epistemological one; how do I know that these others have an ‘inner life’ analogous to my own, when I only ever have access to my own inner life?

Taking such an epistemological orientation, however, ultimately means that the ‘problem of other minds’ is in essence a derivative of the ‘problem of the external world’; an investigation into the reliability of our knowledge of that which is other than the thinking self. Rooted in modern skepticism, both the problem of the external world and the problem of other minds rely on a conception of the self as a type of autonomous subject that can be radically isolated and distinguished from the world, the others who share this world, and even the thinker’s own body. Such a picture of selfhood is often referred to by Heidegger and others as ‘Cartesian,’ since it finds its most profound
expression in the self-enclosed independence of Descartes' \textit{cogito sum}. Having established at the outset such a gulf between self and world, then, the philosophical game is to 'prove' that the gulf is not unbridgeable.

This illusion of a prior separation between one human being and another is reinforced by the philosophical dogma that man is initially to be understood as subject and as consciousness, that he is primarily and most indubitably to be given to himself as consciousness for a subject...The theory...basically arose from quite different intentions and perspectives in connection with Descartes and...has come to pervade all philosophy in the modern age.\footnote{Heidegger's critiques of such a 'Cartesian' view of consciousness can be found, for example, at \textit{Being and Time}, p. 60, 61, 62, 136, 137, 146, 162, 204, 205, 206, 273, 288, 289. (Joan Stambaugh, ed. Albany: State University of New York, 1996. Henceforth referenced as \textit{BT}, with the German pagination cited first, followed by the English translation's pagination). Attributing such a picture of the self to Descartes does not entirely do him justice, however, since Descartes' system relies on the presence of something other than the self – God – in order to 'get the world back' so to speak. Nevertheless, Descartes' work powerfully influenced the distinctively modern shift toward emphasizing the independent, individual notion of the self, and in this regard, he is taken as a representative figure. I am indebted to Tristram Engelhardt for bringing this point to my attention.}

Even in cases where an explicit proof of the external world or of other minds is not the primary purpose of the philosophical analysis, however, the tendency has not been to dismiss the demand for such a proof as illegitimate and misguided, but to assume that it has been or will be achieved. Such a tendency continues to take the isolated subject and its 'inner' life as its philosophical starting point, from which the nature of its social or political interactions and understandings are then to be determined.

This is evident, for example, in social contract theory's attempt to characterize the nature of the political state on the basis of a particular understanding of 'state of nature' individuals. Beginning with a conception of the 'rational individual' struggling for survival thus leads to a characterization of the nation-state as an institution designed to maximize the effectiveness of this struggle. The social arena becomes simply a reflection...\footnote{Heidegger, Martin. \textit{The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude}. William McNeill and Nicholas Walker, trans. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995., p. 208. Henceforth referenced as \textit{FCM}.}
of the inner life of the self-enclosed subject. Similarly, positions that define
'subjectivity' in terms of the individual's capacity for self-reflective rationality generally
result in characterizations of intersubjectivity that are defined primarily by reason.
Theories of empathy also demonstrate this orientation toward characterizing the
'sociality' of the self in terms of the individual's 'pre'social qualities or capacities that
are then read into a social context.

The often quoted psychological theory of empathy...starts by imagining an Ego in
a purely Cartesian sense – an Ego given by itself in the first instance who then
feels his way into the other – thus discovering that the other is a human being as
well in the sense of an alter Ego. Nevertheless, this is a pure fabrication\(^3\).

Empathy is therefore meant to be not only a particular way of existing in terms of some
other specific human being – as in 'Neil was empathizing with her sorrow' – but also the
condition for acting toward other humans qua humans at all. Empathy is supposed to
"provide the first ontological bridge from one's own subject, initially given by itself, to
the other subject, which is initially quite inaccessible" (BT 124/117).

The difficulty with such approaches, however, is that they obscure the constitutive
role that intersubjectivity plays in the development of subjectivity itself. Beginning with
a particular characterization of an 'a'- or 'pre'-social form of human existing means that
the 'capacities' by virtue of which we recognize and interact with other people will be
assumed in advance of a descriptive analysis of the ways in which we do engage with
other human beings, and the role that such encounters play in structuring and developing
these capacities. As Frederick Olafson notes,

Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2001., p. 111. Henceforth referenced as ZS.
In such an approach, the philosophical inquirer is assumed to be already situated in and familiar with a world that lends itself to the kind of comprehension that eventually finds full expression in the sciences of nature. At the same time, however, he is supposed to be in a position that enables him to raise doubts as to whether there is any other being that is like him in this respect.

These two demands are contradictory, however, insofar as the situated familiarity with the world characteristic of the first assumption is dependent on the very others that are brought into question in the second. Engaging in an inquiry regarding “the theoretical problematic of understanding the ‘psychical life of others’” (BT 124/117) implies the capacity to treat this question as just another ‘fact’ to be ascertained in the absence of any recognition that the endeavor itself – with its public, inherited language of inquiry and its collaboratively determined conceptions of proof – presuppose this very existence.

It is this type of theorizing, Heidegger argues, that encourages distorted characterizations of intersubjective encounters as a type of ‘bridging’ of the gulf between two isolated self-enclosed subjects. Theories that begin with such an autonomous self, however, can only result in a solipsism that they cannot hope to overcome. As Heidegger notes, “a mere subject ‘is’ not initially and is also never given. And, thus, an isolated I without the others is in the end just as far from being given initially” (BT 116/109). Rather than accounting for how one isolated subject encounters another, this endeavor must be dismissed as a dramatic misrepresentation of human subjectivity. The existence of the external world and of other minds are only problematic insofar as we engage in a highly theoretical characterization of subjectivity that is modeled on the existence of things; a characterization in which one ‘subject’ is trapped in its cabinet-like self with no key to the ‘cabinet doors’ of others.

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Heidegger’s approach to the problem of other minds and the external world is a break with the tradition, a refusal to engage in the characterizations of subjectivity that allow these topics to appear as ‘problems’ at all. Contrary to Kant’s claim, Heidegger argues that “The ‘scandal of philosophy’ does not consist in the fact that this proof [of the external world] is still lacking up to now, but in the fact that such proofs are expected and attempted again and again” (BT 205/190). Jean Greisch notes that Heidegger thus...accuses all philosophies of consciousness and reflection (including Husserlian phenomenology) with simultaneously under- and over-determining the essence of subjectivity. The underdetermination is that the self-founding and self-determining autonomous subject of modernity does not require the other in order to achieve its self-understanding. At least on the level of understanding, it has enough in itself. The over-determination is that the lacking relation to the other must be compensated for, (i.e., overcompensated for) through a theory of intersubjectivity, or more modern still, of ‘communication’.

The only way to escape these false problematics is to refuse to engage in a characterization of the self as mental substance ‘containing’ mental representations and requiring ‘proof’ of – and access to – that which is ‘external’ to it.

Heidegger’s account of human subjectivity offers a rich alternative to such a Cartesian subject; an alternative, I will argue, that provides equally rich resources for understanding how such non-Cartesian subjects encounter each other as other subjects.

As a Heideggerian account of the self will show, the problem of the demonstrability of external reality is impossible to answer “not because its consequences led to inextricable impasses, but because the very being which serves as its theme repudiates such a line of questioning” (BT 206/191).

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6 The term Heidegger uses – Dasein – is meant to escape the traditional connotations of terms such as selfhood, subject, etc. and I will be using it throughout this text.
This ‘very being’ – human being – repudiates demands for proofs of external reality because its way of being is itself ‘external’. To exist humanly is to be in terms of the world; human subjectivity is comprised of the worldly activities, successes and meanings in which it is immersed. The everyday way we are is always already an existing ‘in’ the world and with others; we do not need to account for how such access is somehow achieved. Human beings must be understood as always already embedded in a condition of intersubjectivity and selfhood is itself this engagement in worldly things, encounters and practices.

Heidegger’s answer to the ‘problem of other minds,’ then, will involve a dramatic re-characterizing of human selfhood: no longer self-enclosed and complete in the absence of the world, the self is only insofar as it is worldly. I am what I do, and what I do is always an intersubjectively meaningful event in a shared world.

**Being-in-the-World**

For Heidegger, then, to be human is to be open to or transcend toward the world. Such a self is not a particular type of object – a substance that does or does not bump into other ‘stuff’: “Dasein is not a ‘thing’ like a piece of wood nor such a thing as a plant – nor does it consist of experiences, and still less is it a subject (an ego) standing over against objects (which are not the ego). It is a distinctive being [Seinendes] which precisely insofar as it ‘is there’ for itself in an authentic manner is not an object”\(^7\). Human selfhood is a way of being, a pattern or mode of existing: “the ‘substance’ of human being is not the spirit as the synthesis of body and soul, but existence” (BT

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This mode of existing specific to humans Heidegger terms being-in-the-world. Though the notion of something ‘being in’ generally conjures images of distinct inside and outside realms, Heidegger uses the term ‘being in’ to characterize the way in which human beings do not live ‘outside’ the world, only to find their way ‘into’ it. Rather, we are immersed in it and understand ourselves in terms of it. Thus when Heidegger compares Dasein to Leibniz’s concept of the ‘windowless monad’ he claims that they are ‘windowless’ “not because they do not need to go out, rather because they are essentially already outside”⁸. Being-in-the-world – the way of existing specific to human beings – is fundamentally characterized by this intentionality, relationality, directedness; in Heidegger’s terms: transcendence.

It is important to note, however, that by ‘transcendence’ Heidegger does not intend the popular philosophical meaning according to which ‘to transcend’ means for something to exist outside or beyond the immanent sphere of subjectivity. Such characterizations simply return us to the isolation of the Cartesian thinking thing. The original meaning of ‘transcendere,’ Heidegger claims, “signifies literally to step over, pass over, go through, and occasionally to surpass”⁹. Transcendence is the stepping over or beyond the ‘borders’ of subjectivity to be with or at the thing towards which it is directed; “the transcendens, the transcendent, is that which oversteps as such and not that toward which I step over” (BPP 299). The ‘something’ existing outside or beyond the immanent sphere of subjectivity is not an occasional activity of the self, but the very essence of subjectivity itself. Heidegger’s notion of transcendence articulates how

human beings exist in such a way that they are never confined to some inner sphere, but are in their very essence directed towards things, engaged in particular relations with them, intentionally oriented to them. As Charles Guignon notes in *Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge*, “Instead of regarding the self as a substance...being human is treated as a relation”\(^{10}\).

This relationality or being-directed-toward is not an activity that human beings may or may not be engaged in; ‘directedness’ is the very nature of human existing itself. Selfhood, subjectivity, consciousness – though these terms pick out different things, they all designate dimensions of a way of being defined by the stepping beyond the self that Heidegger calls transcendence.

The Dasein does not exist at first in some mysterious way so as then to accomplish the step beyond itself to others or to extant things. Existence, instead, always already means to step beyond or, better, having stepped beyond....The transcendence, the over-and-out-beyond of the Dasein makes it possible for the Dasein to comport itself to beings, whether to extant things, to others, or to itself, as beings (BPP 300).

The fact that we are able to be intentionally directed toward this or that thing, then, is a consequence of our fundamental way of existing as a directedness toward and immersion in the world. Thus Heidegger claims that ‘transcending’ “does not only and not primarily mean a self-relating of a subject to an object; rather, transcendence means to understand oneself from a world” (BPP 300).

It is largely the philosophical tradition’s emphasis on detached observation and contemplation that has allowed us not only to falsely characterize knowing as ‘inside’ and what is known as ‘outside,’ but to characterize all human activity on this subject-object model. Such an emphasis on detached knowing, argues Heidegger, obscures its

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\(^{10}\) Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1983., p. 86.
basis in our practical engagements with the world. Our encounters with things are not “a rigid staring at something merely objectively present. Being-in-the-world, as taking care of things, is taken in by the world which it takes care of” (BT 61/57). Though our capacity to achieve the detached stance of a disinterested observer is an important and fascinating aspect of human existing, it is only a derivative of our basic oriented, directed ways of being. Immersion in the world is grounded in the concern for one’s way of being; the fact that one cares about how one is to be.

It is in this taking care of things that I primarily exist, argues Heidegger – brushing my teeth, mowing the lawn, doing my taxes – these are not the work or domain of a detached observer but are characteristic activities of a being whose existence is its activities and whose activities matter to it. I am taken in by the world, I am always transcending toward it, because I am a being whose worldly activities allow me to understand myself – as someone with healthy teeth, as a good neighbor, as a responsible citizen – insofar as I am meeting the standards and filling the roles that give these practices their meaning. Indeed, for Heidegger,

What we care for and about, what caring adheres to, is equivalent to what is meaningful. Meaningfulness is a categorial determination of the world; the objects of a world, worldly, world-some objects, are lived inasmuch as they embody the character of meaningfulness\(^\text{11}\).

It is this practical immersion in one’s way of being in the world that is definitive of human existing; detached, contemplative ‘scientific’ modes of being are derivative attitudes that must be accomplished, despite philosophy’s fondness for pretending that they are the norm. “On the contrary, this everyday having of self within our factual, existent, passionate merging into things can surely be genuine, whereas all extravagant

grubbing about in one’s soul can be the highest degree counterfeit or even pathologically eccentric” (BPP 160).

‘Care’ is the technical term that Heidegger uses to designate this specifically human way of existing as a being that understands itself from the world, from the context of activities and meanings through which it plays out the possibilities that matter to it. Care must therefore be understood as an ontological term; even those who are consumed with indifference and despair exist qua care. As Guignon puts it: “To be human just is to care about what it is to be human” (1983, 86). Heidegger is not indicating that we are all conscientious beings, but that we are all ‘suspended’ among possible ways to be in the world and we trouble ourselves with these possibilities that matter to us because they define who we are. As Kisiel notes in The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time, Heidegger’s use of the term ‘care’ derives from the Latin cura, which he translates early on as “Bekümmerung (distress, concern, the trouble of search)” by drawing on “a Latin etymological tradition which relates cura to quaero, seeking, and its concomitant tribulation or anxiety”\(^1\)

According to Heidegger, there are three fundamental dimensions characterizing this human way of being-in-the-world qua care: ‘thrownness,’ ‘projection,’ and being-with. These aspects of Dasein’s existing cannot be understood as properties of an objectively present thing, but are ‘existentials’: ways for Dasein to be. Though being-with will be our primary focus in this discussion, some clarification of what Heidegger means when he claims that human beings are ‘thrown’ and ‘project’ is in order before we can turn our attention there.

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\(^1\) Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993., p. 201.
Heidegger's claim that human existence is characterized by 'thrownness' refers to the sheer 'thatness' of existence, to the fact that one aspect of the way we are is to be always already cast into the world, burdened with the fact that we simply 'find' ourselves in possibilities not of our own choosing. This is not to say that my 'thrownness' is some concluded event that happened in my past — such as my having been born 'against my will,' as it were — rather, thrownness characterizes the sheer 'that it is' of existing that permeates its every moment. I cannot simply 'define' myself, but am always already defined by the situation in which I simply discover myself to be.

How this 'thrown' nature of my existence becomes manifest to me occurs through a particular mode of what Heidegger refers to as disclosure — Dasein's ways of revealing the world and its own way of being in it. By 'mode of disclosure' — we must understand Heidegger to be designating the particular self-referential ways of being characteristic of human existing. Each of the three fundamental dimensions of being-in-the-world has a mode of disclosure specific to it, though all three modes of disclosure — attunement, understanding, and discourse — simultaneously reveal the world and all dimensions of my being in it. Because Dasein's own mode of existing is itself a condition for the possibility of experiencing entities as meaningful and accessible, disclosing the being of entities involves a co-disclosure of this being-in-the-world itself. World-disclosure involves disclosure of self as discloser of the world. Thus the three modes of disclosure each reveal the being of entities in a particular manner, but they also disclose particular dimensions of Dasein's being-in-the-world; the conditions for the possibility of experiencing entities in these particular ways.
The modes of disclosure are the ways of being in the world from which specific abstract forms of ‘disclosing’ such as conceptualizing or communicating arise.

“Disclosed does not, as such, mean to be known” (BT 134/127). Disclosure is, rather, the condition out of which knowing happens; the nature of existing specific to human subjectivity that makes relationships such as knowing possible. As Heidegger’s re-characterization of subjectivity implies, any view that bases ‘knowing’ on the accumulation and subsequent categorization of raw perceptual ‘data’ must be rejected. Such a notion of ‘raw data’ is particularly repudiated in his account of Befindlichkeit, the first mode of disclosure that Heidegger considers, and the one most revealing of our ‘thrown’ way of being.

_Befindlichkeit_ is the term Heidegger coined to suggest how we always just ‘find’ ourselves in an existence we did not choose but were ‘thrown’ into. Variously translated as ‘attunement’, ‘mood’, ‘affectedness’, ‘state of mind’, ‘situatedness’ and ‘disposition,’ _Befindlichkeit_ is a technical term derived from the common German greeting “Wie befinden Sie sich?” which is translated, literally, as: ‘How do you find yourself?’ As Hubert Dreyfus notes, in translating this term one therefore needs “an English word that conveys being found in a situation where things and options already matter”\(^\text{13}\).

Understood as such, attunement is the way in which being-in-the-world as thrown is revealed to me. This mode of disclosure does not simply reveal Dasein’s thrownness, however; it also discloses the whole of being-in-the-world because it “assails Da-sein in the unreflected falling prey to the ‘world’ of its heedfulness” (BT 136/129). Dasein’s

very nature as a being that exists as thrust into a meaningful world of projects and roles – its way of existing as a whole – is thus disclosed in attunement. My being entranced with my worldly roles and projects therefore discloses the type of being I am; one who initially and for the most part exists immersed in the world into which I have been thrown.

Attunement reveals that the world I’ve been thrown into always has a particular orientation; I find myself in a situation where things and options already matter. I do not choose to be drawn to or repulsed by things; rather, the way I exist in the world is one in which I am “solicited and summoned”\(^{14}\) by it. A consequence of this disclosure of self and world through attunement, for Heidegger, is that it “first makes possible directing oneself toward something” (BT 137/129). Attuned existing means that things in the world are encountered primarily in a ‘circumspect’ way: as useful, attractive, frightening, and so on. These ‘subjective’ colorings are not somehow added on afterwards to raw data accumulated by an indifferent observer, but define my very experience of things as meaningful. Circumspective encountering is not just “a sensation or staring out at something. Letting things be encountered in a circumspect, heedful way has – we can see this now more precisely in terms of attunement – the character of being affected or moved” (BT 137/129). To exist humanly is to be moved by the world.

‘Project’ or ‘projectedness’ is the second of the three fundamental dimensions of being-in-the-world. Heidegger uses this term to refer to my capacity to live – or ‘project’ – into given possibilities, to take over and own them as my own, regardless of the fact that I was simply thrown into them. Project is the appropriation of this thrown ‘ground’

from and as which I *must* be, in light of that towards which I *might* be. Generally speaking, it designates the potential, futural and goal-directed nature of human existing whereby we can commit ourselves to different possible ways to be ourselves.

While attunement reveals Dasein’s being-in-the-world qua thrown, *understanding* reveals being-in-the-world in terms of projectedness; that Dasein’s existence is a ‘being suspended’ among possibilities into which it has been thrown and among which it must choose. As with attunement, understanding must be understood existentially – it is not a specific cognitive activity such as judging or explaining, but a *way* of being human that makes such cognitive activities possible. Understanding is the mode of disclosure from which ontic, existentiell derivatives such as everyday comprehension or cognition are derived. Through understanding Dasein’s existence is revealed qua *potentiality*: as balanced amidst possible activities of existing. Understanding is the mode of disclosure whereby I am able to address myself practically to the options that attunement has revealed to me as mattering. Understanding discloses the fact that I exist among possible ways to be ‘me’ and that I can choose to pursue or neglect these different possibilities.

It is important to note that for Heidegger, understanding does not disclose Dasein’s ‘being-possible’ in terms of definite options, however – “what is *not yet* real and *not always* necessary” (*BT* 143/135) – in other words, purely ‘logical’ possibility or the contingency of some objectively present thing. Understanding is, rather, a structure revealing Dasein’s existence as one in which its being is always still open and incomplete; as “a potentiality of being which is never still outstanding as something *not yet* objectively present, but as something essentially *never* objectively present” (*BT* 144/135, emphasis mine). Heidegger is articulating the sense in which a human being “is
what it becomes or does not become" (BT 145/136) and is thus always ‘more’ than it actually is. Dasein’s very ‘excessiveness’ to definition, its projection into possibility is, in a sense, what defines it. We are not simply passive observers in the face of our own possibilities; we are our possibilities and how with live them.

Each one of us is what he pursues and cares for. In everyday terms, we understand ourselves and our existence by way of the activities we pursue and the things we take care of. The Dasein does not need a special kind of observation, nor does it need to conduct a sort of espionage on the ego in order to have the self; rather, as the Dasein gives itself over immediately and passionately to the world itself, its own self is reflected to it from things. This is not mysticism and does not presuppose the assigning of souls to things. It is only a reference to an elementary phenomenological fact of existence, which must be seen prior to all talk, no matter how acute, about the subject-object relation (BPP 159).

Because Dasein has no fixed ‘essence’ – it is an entity “whose what is precisely to be and nothing but to be” (HCT 110) – Heidegger insists that we must be careful in our language; we cannot speak thoughtlessly of Dasein as ‘the entity with the mode of being of Dasein,’ for example, because this implies a thing on hand in the world to which this mode of being has simply been attributed like a property. We must speak of Dasein not as a ‘what’ but as a ‘who;’ “the authentic entity of Dasein, the who, is not a thing and nothing worldly, but is itself only a way to be” (HCT 237). ‘Who’ the self is, is fundamentally a matter of how I am to be – not what I am to be.

Insofar as Dasein’s nature can be defined, then, it is to be defined as possibility – as an existing that is refractory to definition.

As existent, the Dasein is free for specific possibilities of its own self. It is its own most peculiar ability-to-be. These possibilities of itself are not empty logical possibilities lying outside itself, in which it can engage or from which it could keep aloof; instead they are, as such, determinations of existence. If the Dasein is free for definite possibilities of itself, for its ability to be, then the Dasein is in this being-free-for; it is these possibilities themselves... It is the possibility it is only if the Dasein becomes existent in it. To be one’s own most ability to be, to take it over and keep oneself in the possibility, to understand
oneself in one’s own factual freedom, that is, to understand oneself in the being of one’s own most peculiar ability-to-be, is the original existential concept of understanding (BPP 276).

Heidegger goes on to note that by ‘understanding’ he means a competence or skill – a ‘know how’ by which we act into the attuned mattering of the world. Characterized thus, he can claim that “[i]f understanding is a basic determination of existence, it is as such the condition of possibility for all of the Dasein’s particular possible manners of comportment” (BPP 276). Understanding is not an abstract ‘observation’ of one’s logical possibilities – I am not ordering from the menu of possible selves – it is, rather, a skillful living into my possibilities: “To understand means, more precisely, to project oneself upon a possibility, in this projection to keep oneself at all times in a possibility” (BPP 277). It is just such a practical engagement with my own selfhood, argues Heidegger, that makes these possibilities ‘possible’.

Projecting has nothing to do with being related to a plan thought out, according to which Da-sein arranges its being, but, as Da-sein, it has always already projected itself and is, as long as it is, projecting. As long as it is, Da-sein always has understood itself and will understand itself in terms of possibilities...in projecting project throws possibility before itself as possibility, and as such lets it be. As projecting, understanding is the mode of being of Dasein in which it is its possibilities as possibilities” (BT 145/136).

Like attunement, understanding also discloses or appreents (HCT 211) the worldliness of Dasein’s being-in-the-world – it reveals not only Dasein’s ability to pursue different abilities to be, but the world itself as arena in which this projectedness finds its significance. The world is disclosed in understanding as a totality of meaningful references grounded in Dasein’s care for its possible ways to be its self. In understandingly pursuing one or another of the options that matter to me, I act in specific
ways that serve to differentiate the world into articulated contexts of relevance\textsuperscript{15}. Understanding thus discloses the situation in which my existence finds expression and significance, revealing both the worldly constellation of meaningful roles, things and activities, \textit{and} Dasein’s status as the ultimate ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ grounding the meaning of these referential structures.

John Searle makes a similar point in \textit{The Construction of Social Reality}, when he argues that the assignment or imposition of function on things – according to which they can be judged ‘good’ or ‘bad’ – is grounded in human intentionality; to claim that something has this or that function is to situate a set of facts “relative to a system of values that we hold”\textsuperscript{16}. On Heidegger’s view, this ‘imposition’ of function is definitive of human existing; things are meaningful in terms of projects of existing. Thus with Searle, Heidegger would claim that “As far as our normal experiences of the inanimate parts of the world are concerned, we do not experience things \textit{as} material objects, much less as collections of molecules. Rather, we experience a world of chairs and tables, houses and cars, lecture halls, pictures, streets, gardens, houses and so forth” (Searle 1995, 14). This meaningful context of things functions, for the most part, as an unthematized background; I do not explicitly attribute the function ‘driver of screws’ to the screwdriver; simply using the screwdriver to drive screws as part of my project helps constitute it as such. When I am absorbed in the projects of my existing, understanding self and world, this context of referentiality is merely a “\textit{pale and inconspicuous presence}” (\textit{HCT} 189). It is in terms of the absence or breakdown of tools useful to my

\textsuperscript{15} The classic Heideggerian example being the hammer, whose intelligibility \textit{as} a hammer relies on its location in a web of equipment that is ultimately grounded in my particular ways to be in the world – as a carpenter, for example, or as one who dwells sheltered from the elements. See \textit{Being and Time}, section 15.

projects that these tools become prominent or ‘conspicuous,’ a “distinctive disturbance” or “specific absence” that in turn “points to what underlies it as its possibility, that is, the always-already-there of a familiar continuity of references which is disturbed because something is missing, and which stands out through this specific absence” (HCT 189). For Heidegger, our everyday encountering of the world is in terms of this implicit context of reference that relies on – but does not make explicit – the fact that my being suspended among ways to be a self gives this context its shape and meaning.

It is this structure of the world as ‘background’ referential totality that is the essence of meaningfulness for Heidegger. Meaning is defined as

That in which the intelligibility of something keeps itself, without coming into view explicitly and thematically. Meaning signifies that upon which the primary project is projected, that in terms of which something can be conceived in its possibility as what it is. Projecting discloses possibilities, that is, it discloses what makes something possible” (BT 324/298).

Understanding therefore reveals not only Dasein’s nature as entrusted with its own ways to be in the world, but reveals it as being so in a context of references in terms of which particular things reveal their possibilities. In understanding, “the world, qua world, [is] disclosed in its possible significance” (BT 144/135) and so too “innerworldly beings themselves are freed,…freed for their own possibilities. What is at hand is discovered as such in its serviceability, usability, detrimentality. The totality of relevance reveals itself as the categorial whole of a possibility of the connection of things at hand” (BT 144-145/135-236). Meaningfulness, then, is this condition of there being specific connection possibilities, and does not refer to particular connections themselves.

It is important to note here that Heidegger describes understanding as freeing innerworldly beings for their own possibilities; though the condition of meaningfulness is
grounded in Dasein’s openness to possibility, this does not mean that Dasein simply ‘projects’ meaning onto things arbitrarily. Rather, Dasein’s ways to be in the world discover or reveal – disclose – potential connections among the things at hand. The potentiality of these connections means that they are characterized not only by openness to change and interpretation, but also by a certain limit or ‘resistance’ to my activities. But this concept of resistance, Heidegger claims,

...can only be understood in terms of meaningfulness. The authentic correlation of world and Dasein (if we can speak here of correlation at all, which is not my opinion) is not that of impulse and resistance or, as in Scheler, will and resistance, but rather care and meaningfulness. This correlation is the basic structure of life, a structure which I also call facticity. For something can be encountered in its resistivity as a resistance only as something which I do not succeed in getting through when I live in a wanting-to-get-through, which means in being out toward something (HCT 221).

What other philosophies are attempting to articulate with their concept of resistance, then, is the relationship between care and meaningfulness – the manner in which Dasein’s way of being gives rise to meaning in its encounter with that which it is not. Interpretation is the cultivation of these inherent possible connections of meaning, the making explicit of these freed possibilities of signification (HCT 260).

The degree to which meaning possibilities are defined by openness or closure can vary considerably; “The interpretation can draw the conceptuality belonging to the beings to be interpreted from these themselves or else force them into concepts to which beings are opposed in accordance with their kind of being” (BT 150/141)\textsuperscript{17}. Heidegger’s concern here is not simply the flexibility of meaning-possibilities, however, but the implicit condition of this flexibility: Dasein as the ‘ultimate-for-the-sake-of-which,’ as the entity for whom possibility is its very way of existing. The ‘meaning of meaning’ is,

\textsuperscript{17} Of course, the ‘openness’ of meaning to interpretation has received a great deal of careful attention in hermeneutics, but is beyond the parameters of the current discussion.
in a certain sense, *Dasein* – the being whose openness to possibilities makes their disclosure itself possible. It is for this reason that Heidegger ultimately defines the meaningful in terms of “Dasein itself, which has meaning in the primary sense” (*HCT* 211) and discusses a ‘secondary’ sense of meaning: the significance of innerworldly things based on their location in the referential totality and which only have meaning insofar as they occupy the ‘place’ of meaning. This ‘place of meaning’ is Dasein itself, understood in the *primary* sense of meaning: the “the formal, existential framework of the disclosedness belonging to understanding” (*BT* 151/142). This primary sense of meaningfulness thus designates Dasein’s way of being: its existing as the site of disclosedness:

Meaning is an existential of Da-sein, not a property which is attached to beings, which lies ‘behind’ them or floats somewhere as a ‘realm between.’ Only Da-sein ‘has’ meaning in that the disclosedness of being-in-the-world can be ‘fulfilled’ through the things discoverable in it. *Thus only Da-sein can be meaningful or meaningless*.....all beings whose mode of being is unlike Da-sein must be understood as *unmeaningful*, as essentially bare of meaning as such (*BT* 151/142).

As we will come to see in the following chapter, this way of existing qua primary meaning seeks to establish worldly or ‘secondarily’ meaningful ways in which it’s being-in-the-world can be ‘fulfilled’: “factual life develops ever new possibilities of meaningfulness in which it can bestir itself and can in that way be assured of its own ‘meaning’” (*PLA* 80). This distinction between Dasein’s inherent meaningfulness and the innerworldly things that are ‘unmeaningful’ – but are encountered as meaningful in terms of Dasein – will be crucial for this discussion, particularly in terms of understanding how we encounter the *other* primarily meaningful beings with whom we share the world. In what way do such encounters differ from encountering ‘secondarily’ meaningful things in
the world? The answer, we will see in later chapters, lies in the fundamentally different relationship to time.

**Being-with**

The notion of ‘Being-with’ is the third dimension of care and designates the fundamentally social nature of human being. For Heidegger, every possibility that human existence offers must be understood in terms of the presence of other people. Even when we are alone or solitary the others are present as an absence. Being-with does not mean that there are always others physically there with me, but characterizes the way in which being in the world is always already permeated with the presence of others; it is an “existential attribute that belongs to Da-sein of itself on the basis of its kind of being” (*BT* 121/113). Heidegger’s emphasis is therefore not on a spatial notion of ‘with,’ but on an existential one: we exist in such a way that we are never alone, but are always immersed in the presence of those who make our clothes, write the books we read, act as role models, and so on. And like the other existentials – thrownness and projection – ‘being-with’ must be understood not as a form of understanding human life, but as a dimension of existing it.

Dasein exists as an immersion in the world and all encounters with particular others must therefore be understood in terms of this ‘worldly’ way of being – not in terms of the inner confines of some self-enclosed subject. Jean Greisch thus notes that “It is this ‘outside’ which likewise forms the site of the true encounter of self and other” (2002, 105). Dasein’s encounters with others are an existing along with other Dasein in the
shared world. All varieties of being-with-one-another, then, are “understandable only if being-with-one-another means being-with-one-another in a world” (HCT 241).

Being-in-the-world means that “Da-sein initially finds itself” in what it does, needs, expects, has charge of, in the things at hand which it initially takes care of in the surrounding world” (BT 119/112). Similarly, Dasein ‘finds’ other Dasein in what they do and have in the world; they are encountered primarily from the world. Because I exist immersed in a “referential totality of significance” (BT 123/115) through which I pursue my projects of existing – all encounters with others occur in and through this referential totality. Encountering other people, even in “the most everyday of activities, passing by and avoiding one another on the street, already involves this environmental encounter, based on this street common to us” (HCT 240). I do not encounter others in the total absence of a shared background context of meaningful things and activities; they are always driving a car, eating some food, lounging on the couch. When we encounter this or that other human being, argues Heidegger, “this being of the others is not that of the ‘subject’ or the ‘person’ in the sense in which this is taken conceptually in philosophy. Rather, I meet the other in the field, at work, on the street while on the way to work or strolling along with nothing to do —” (HCT 240).

Like the self, then, experiencing others requires no ‘espionage on the ego’ to take them as its ‘object qua subject.’ Though we may treat them as such, others are never experienced as objects but only ever as other subjects engaged in particular practices, tasks and activities – the projects in which they pursue their possibilities. As William Schroeder notes, “[O]ne does not primarily see the Other’s body which hides his mind; one apprehends ‘what he is about,’ ‘what he is up to.’ For Heidegger, this is a direct and
lucid experience of the Other’s existence since his existence is his being-in-the-world—his being engaged in projects similar to my own. The physical actions of the other’s smiling and waving aren’t experienced as the mere ‘appearance’ of her inner desire to greet me – I see the smile and the wave as a greeting. To see the greeting as ‘behavior’ is to be engaged in a highly theoretical level of remove from our ordinary experience: typically, we do not see ‘bodies’ to which we attribute ‘minds’. Rather, I understand the others with whom I share the world just as I understand myself: as pursuing projects of being within a shared world.

Though we typically encounter others from worldly things and activities, this does not mean that I first encounter ‘stuff,’ and then infer that there are others who could also be using it. On the contrary, Heidegger’s point is that there is never simply ‘stuff;’ I only ever encounter anything against the background of meaningful contexts of relevance that are always already heavy with the presence of others; “the others who are ‘encountered’ in the context of useful things in the surrounding world at hand are not somehow added on in thought to an initially merely objectively present thing, but these ‘things’ are encountered from the world in which they are at hand for the others” (BT 118/111). The publicity and commonality of things in the world is definitive of them as the things that they are. This is particularly evident in the case of ‘institutional facts’ like money or traffic regulations, for example, whose very meaning demand that there be others.

Though such shared cultural meanings as monetary value demand the presence of others in a relatively obvious way, Heidegger’s claim is that even ‘solitary experiences’ – standing alone before a beautiful landscape, for example – involve the presence of others.

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19 See Searle, The Construction of Social Reality, Ch. 2 for his discussion of such institutional facts.
Others are ‘there’ as potential tourists, or as friends for whom you take a picture, or in the poem of which the scene reminds you – the presence of others is a feature of the experience, argues Heidegger, even insofar as I am delighted that there are no others there to ruin it – the others are present as absent. “The others, the fellow humans, are also there with the Dasein even when they are not to be found there in immediately tangible proximity” (BPP 289).

For Heidegger, then, co-existence with others is not simply a contingent feature of the world. Being-with does not refer to the fact that I am rarely alone in places with no traces of other humans; rather, “[b]eing-with existentially determines Da-sein even when another is not factically present and perceived. The being-alone of Da-sein, too, is being-with in the world. The other can be lacking only in and for a being-with” (BT 120/113). Thus human co-being with others constitutes a structural characteristic of human existence itself and is not “something which occurs at times on the basis of the existence of others” (BT 120/113). The with-one-another implied in being-with is not a type of spatio-temporal proximity as between physical things, or a contingent fact about particular encounters with this or that other – it is an ontological, rather than ontic or factual feature of my way of existing: “we ourselves are determined through a Being-with the other”20. Being alone is a deficient state for human beings, and, as Jean Greisch notes, “Only for this reason can solitary confinement in an isolation cell be perceived as a heightened punitive measure” (2002, 103).

Indeed, Heidegger claims that the presence of other Dasein in the world helps to determine the possible ways that I can be. Thus this “having to do with one another in

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the one world,” can also be described as a “being dependent on one another” (HCT 240). The publicity, commonality, and social interdependence of the world in which I exist are themselves essential features of my existing.

Das Man

In what way is this interdependence and ‘publicity’ of the world definitive for my way of existing? How am I affected by the fact that the background of referential totalities against which I play out my projects is shaped not only by my own meaningful practices, but by the presence and projects of other purposive human agents?

According to Heidegger, the everyday way that I exist in terms of the publicity of the world is fundamentally in terms of averageness. I understand myself and others in light of a context of social roles and meanings in which we are all, for the most part, engaged in behavior that is interchangeable and anonymous. “In utilizing public transportation, in the use of information services such as the newspaper, every other is like the next” (BT 126/119). This everyday form of existence – in which my way of being is simply the average way of being – Heidegger refers to as das Man. Variously translated as ‘the they,’ ‘the crowd’ or ‘one’, these terms are designed to illustrate the way in which human beings understand themselves in terms of anonymous social roles and practices infused with the ‘interchangeability’ of those participating in them. This is how ‘one’ plays soccer; ‘one’ attempts to make a quilt by engaging in these practices. Distinguishable and explicit ‘individuals’ do not, primarily and for the most part, differentiate themselves or others from these general social categories, meanings, and
standards through which they are encountered in the surrounding world. Thus Heidegger asserts that:

The others' does not mean everybody else but me – those from whom the I distinguishes itself. They are, rather, those from whom one mostly does not distinguish oneself, those among whom one is, too. This being-there-too with them does not have the ontological character of being objectively present 'with' them within a world. The 'with' is of the character of Da-sein, the 'also' means the sameness of being as circumspect, heedful being-in-the-world. 'With' and 'also' are to be understood existentially, not categorically. On the basis of this like-with being-in-the-world, the world is always already the one that I share with the others (BT 118/111-112).

As we have noted, Heidegger is keen to make us understand that this 'with' of being-with must be distinguished from objective co-presence, from mere 'spatial contiguity'. Thus my indistinguishability from the others does not mean that it is impossible to determine where I end and you begin; the sameness and indistinguishability of human beings existing in terms of das Man must be understood existentially: as a way of existing, as patterns of interpreting and behaving in the world that we all share. A loose analogy will help illustrate this point: if every human being were a different musical instrument, das Man refers to the same pieces of music that we can all play. The way of being of these instruments tends to be one that they have in common; this does not mean, however, that they are all the same instrument. Nevertheless, because we all participate in, and understand ourselves from, these average and public understandings, Heidegger is articulating a way of being in which the self is initially and for the most part not differentiated from the others.

Heidegger is not implying that a more personal and individual dimension of selfness is absent, then. He is merely articulating the fact that in an everyday way, self, others and world are experienced through the lens of shared meanings and practices that
are unquestioningly taken up. The existential nature of the way we are with others in terms of *das Man* refers not to some type of ‘group subject,’ but to the way in which communal standards determine our engagement in particular activities and how these activities are carried out. Since the understanding of subjectivity at work here is one emphasizing the *way* of existing, rather than characterizing subjectivity in spatial terms, it becomes clear how I can become a seemingly indistinct and anonymous one among many: because the activities that define my existence are determined by social norms. Thus ‘the They’ “are not *definite* others. On the contrary, any other can represent them” (*BT* 126/118). Insofar as I live out the standards of student, daughter, sailor, I too am ‘the they’. Everyday Dasein’s being-in-the-world takes the form of an engagement in the activities of its taking care, but these activities and the tools made use of are defined by the communal standards of what things are and how ‘one’ does things.

    We enjoy ourselves and have fun the way *they* enjoy themselves. We read, see, and judge literature and art the way *they* see and judge. But we also withdraw from the ‘great mass’ the way *they* withdraw, we find ‘shocking’ what they find shocking. The they, which is nothing definite and which all are, though not as a sum, prescribes the kind of being of everydayness (*BT* 127/119).

Anyone who has noted the profound conformity even within groups of those who are ‘rebelling’ against society – be they Goths, punks, hippies – will recognize the acuity of Heidegger’s characterization.

The creation and maintenance of averageness involves our tendency to adapt ourselves to the others. Humans are caught up not only in taking care of the different things and projects in which they are immersed, but also in taking care of *how* this taking care compares to that of other humans. We recognize the unspoken standard of how one does things, and constantly, unthinkingly modify our behavior to meet this standard, to
control this distance between others and ourselves. This tendency to ‘manage’ our ‘distance’ from others is what Heidegger refers to distantiality. While I pursue my projects in the world that I share with the others, there is

...constant care as to the way one differs from them, whether this difference is to be equalized, whether one’s own Da-sein has lagged behind others and wants to catch up in relation to them. Being-with-one-another is, unknown to itself, disquieted by the care about this distance. Existentially expressed, being-with-one-another has the character of distantiality (BT 126/118).

Though this urge to conform to the ‘normal’ and the ‘average’ can be quite explicit – looking for the ‘right’ kind of shirt that ‘everyone’ else is wearing – it generally operates on an unthematized level that infuses all of our activities: we immediately lower our voice if someone whispers to us, we wait in line if others are doing so.

The implicit nature of this constant adjusting to the public standards and understandings in which we are immersed is in keeping with Heidegger’s claim that we do not adapt to das Man standards only after we have become full-fledged independent subjects – that we in some sense autonomously choose to adapt to these standards. Rather, “In terms of the they, and as the they, I am initially ‘given’ to ‘myself’. Initially, Dasein is the they and for the most part it remains so” (BT 129/121). The they is a normative construction that determines the way in which one’s taking care can manifest itself; it “prescribes the kind of being of everydayness” (BT 127/119).

The manner in which das Man dominates my everyday way of being, then, involves its tendency to delimit and control the possible interpretations of self, world and others that are available. Though the characteristic of distantiality indicates a tendency to minimize and manage the difference between self and others in terms of the socially defined meanings and interpretations available, das Man itself determines their
availability. "Thus, the they maintains itself factically in the averageness of what is proper, what is allowed, and what is not. Of what is granted success and what is not" (BT 127/119). I do not decide what makes for a successful woman, philosopher, citizen; the social context that defines these roles and interpretations does. My everyday way of existing is determined on the basis of the easy and familiar patterns provided and encouraged by the public meanings and standards in which I find myself. This tendency for all possibilities to become average and general is what Heidegger refers to as leveling down.

Attendant on this feature of our everyday way of being is the tendency to conceal the 'possibleness' – the possible nature – of these average possibilities. The greater the extent to which leveling-down characterizes das Man's prescription of the range of acceptable meanings and self-understandings – what counts as normal – the greater the sense that these possible ways to be and the norms governing them have the determinate force of laws of nature. Under such an influence, we can lose our awareness of ourselves as entrusted with our own possible ways of being. Indeed, the structures of averageness, distantiality and leveling down – all of which together constitute what Heidegger terms 'publicness' – implicitly encourage the loss of this self-responsibility. The always already being-interpreted of the average and the normal – the everyday way I understand even myself – is “characterized by the fact that it is in fact not explicitly experienced, not explicitly present, it is a how of Dasein from out which [sic] and on the basis of which the Dasein of each is lived" (OHF 26). Thus the averageness of the everyday is conducive to what Heidegger refers to as an 'inauthentic' or 'fallen' way of existing – when averageness inhibits and conceals the particularity and responsibility of Dasein's
being. As Frederick Elliston notes in *Heidegger’s Existential Analytic*, “By prescribing in advance the way Dasein is to understand itself and its world, the public removes the burden each person has of deciding for himself”\(^{21}\). Everyday Dasein is not only unaware that it is responsible for choosing its way of being, but the way of being of das Man actively discourages, punishes, or covers over Dasein’s attempt to act on this responsibility.

This averageness, which prescribes what can and may be ventured, watches over every exception which thrusts itself to the fore. Every priority is noiselessly squashed. Overnight, everything primordial is flattened down as something long since known. Everything gained by struggle becomes something to be manipulated (*BT* 127/119).

Such a reduction to the common, the determined in advance, the average, results in a ‘phasing out’ of the possible as such. Though we are generally blind to this lack of possibility when immersed in our social context, looking back we can recognize that the self-understandings of a black person or a woman in the 1880’s, for example, would not have included as possible certain possible ways to be. Social roles, meanings and norms tend to conceal their own contingent nature. According to Heidegger, our tendency to inauthentic being in the world involves a blindness to possibility and a tranquilization with what is ‘real’; possibilities lose their ‘possibleness’ by being socially interpreted as ‘given’ in advance, as settled and pre-arranged.

Following Hubert Dreyfus’ classic account in *Being-in-the-world*, we can note, then, that there seem to be two senses in which Heidegger understands the role of *das Man*. There is the first, somewhat unproblematic understanding in which the they provides us with the possibilities of taking care from which we must choose our ways of

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being. How we understand ourselves is shaped by the fact that any possible self-understanding is acquired from public meanings and practices. However, there is also the sense of das Man as something that prevents us from being able to make choices about who we are to be. Thus Dreyfus claims that “Heidegger takes up and extends the Diltheyan insight that intelligibility and truth arise only in the context of public, historical practices, but he is also deeply influenced by the Kierkegaardian view that ‘the truth is never in the crowd’” (143).

Thus Heidegger claims that: “because the they presents every judgment and decision as its own, it takes the responsibility of Dasein away from it. The they can, as it were, manage to have ‘them’ constantly invoking it. It can most easily be responsible for everything because no one has to vouch for anything. The they always ‘did it,’ and yet it can be said that ‘no one’ did it. In the everydayness of Dasein, most things happen in such a way that we must say ‘no one did it’” (BT 127/120). Though this has chilling reverberations considering Heidegger’s Nazi involvement, its accuracy is attested to by this very involvement. The most frightening dimension of Nazi Germany is precisely the average person’s involvement in a monstrousness that had come to be ‘the norm’.

Putting aside the already well-hashed out discussion of Heidegger’s Nazi involvement, however\textsuperscript{22}, we can notice everywhere – not only in Nazi Germany – this tendency toward loss of individual responsibility in the face of the overwhelming inertia of socially accepted norms. This is evident, for example, in the way we fail to notice or protest the subtle climate of racism and sexism that still so often pervades our media, our

workplaces, our public life as a whole. We say nothing because it’s not I who am these things – it’s just ‘the way it is’. “Thus, the they disburdens Dasein in its everydayness. Not only that; by disburdening it of its being, the they accommodates Dasein in its tendency to take things easily and make them easy” (BT 128/120).

Characterized as such, das Man is seen as responsible not only for providing us with the possible interpretations of self, world and others, but also for encouraging us in our tendency to ‘fall prey’ to the temptation of simply being immersed in the world, of passively accepting the socially accepted public understandings and interpretations, rather than actively making them one’s own. It is tempting to fall into this inauthentic mode of being, argues Heidegger, because of the tendency of publicity to present itself as “having-seen everything and having-understood-everything,” which encourages

…the supplementation that the disclosedness of Da-sein thus available and prevalent could guarantee to Da-sein the certainty, genuineness, and fullness of all the possibilities of its being. In the self-certainty and decisiveness of the they, it gets spread abroad increasingly that there is no need of authentic, attuned understanding. The supplementation of the they that one is leading and sustaining a full and genuine ‘life’ brings a tranquillization to Da-sein (BT 177/166).

The certainty of rightness characteristic of das Man – that its ways of being are the only ways of being, or the only ones that matter – promotes our desire to have our existence determined for us from without, such that our own responsibility for this existence can be forgotten. “When Da-sein, tranquillized and ‘understanding’ everything, thus compares itself with everything, it drifts toward an alienation in which its ownmost potentiality for being-in-the-world is concealed” (BT 178/166).

According to Heidegger, this irresponsible drift or fall into such a condition of inauthenticity or ‘fallenness’ is ultimately rooted in the failure to distinguish different
senses of being; to interpret all ‘entities,’ instead, according to an understanding relevant only to ‘occurrence,’ ‘thingly’ entities. The insidiousness of ‘fallenness’ is that it takes its interpretive cues not simply from the public modes of interpretation, but that these public modes of interpretation take their cues only from the mode of being of things. “Absorbed in taking care of things, Da-sein understands itself in terms of what it encounters within the world... the understanding of being in general initially understands all beings as something objectively present” (BT 225/207). ‘Falling’ is Dasein’s tendency to live in this interpretative stance, the “tendency to understand itself primarily by way of things and to derive the concept of being from the extant” (BPP 272), rather than deriving the concept of being from Dasein itself.

The ‘phasing out of the possible’ – Dasein’s tendency to fall into thinking of itself as a settled, thing-like substance – conceals from Dasein its own way of being as profoundly finite, contingent and entrusted with its own having to be. The temptation to misunderstand itself in this manner derives from the fact that understanding itself as a type of thing allows Dasein to avoid recognizing the responsibility for being with which it is always entrusted. It is for this reason, Heidegger claims, that the fallen mode of Dasein’s self-interpretation is “only a mask which it holds up before itself in order not to be frightened by itself” (OHF 26).

Though the extent and motivation of Dasein’s ‘falling’ toward inauthenticity will be a theme to which we will return below, it is important to note that, though the two are intimately linked, fallen inauthenticity and average everydayness must be distinguished. While the latter is an immersion in the worldly, average, publicly-defined tasks that reflect me back to myself, the former is a self-misunderstanding rooted in the failure to
differentiate between the various modes of being. In this regard, the ambiguity of the term *das Man* — an ambiguity articulated in Dreyfus’ terms above — will encourage us to avoid it for the most part, emphasizing, instead, 1.) everydayness — in which Dasein is neither inauthentic nor authentic, but is immersed in average worldly activities with the others, 2.) falling — the tendency conducive to misunderstanding or cultivating this averageness in such a way that Dasein becomes 3.) inauthentic/fallen — a condition in which Dasein can avoid awareness of the contingency and responsibility of its being by using interpretive categories appropriate for things. These distinctions will be examined in much greater detail in Chapter VI, where I will explicitly argue against the many interpreters who argue that Heidegger simply *equates* average everydayness with inauthenticity.

If we are generally characterized by such a profound tendency to fall into average, anonymous roles and standards — a tendency rooted in the (illusory) lack of responsibility that such anonymity offers — then how can we accommodate our intuitions about the privacy of our first-person, ‘inner,’ lives? In what way can we account for the individuated first-person self-presence that we take to be definitive of selfhood? What kind of ‘self’ remains in the face of the anonymity of the *das Man* way of being? The following chapter takes up these issues. There I will argue that though Heidegger is indeed claiming that my everyday self-understandings are, in a certain profound way, *not* my own — since they are provided by the general inherited public meanings and norms according to which we *all* understand ourselves — he nevertheless leaves room for the fact that our everyday self-understandings are in some sense *always* our own.
CHAPTER II:
Mineness and the Practical First-Person

This chapter provides an account of what 'first-personal' selfhood looks like on Heidegger's account, despite his insistence that our everyday way of being does not consist of a distinct subjective 'inner' realm that exists in isolation from an objective 'outer' realm, but is defined, rather, by an intentional directedness that transcends sharp subject/object boundaries and finds shape for this intentionality in the pre-established forms of the shared social order. For Heidegger, a distinctive feature of such an intentional directness is a certain type of pre-reflective practical self-presence. This first-person self-presence that defines intentionality will allow us to recognize how Heidegger can accommodate our sense that selfhood remains despite Dasein's tendency to fall into averageness and evaded responsibility.

Clarifying this inherently first-personal nature of intentionality will bring us into dialogue with thinkers such as John Searle and Hubert Dreyfus, whose famous exchange on this point will provide us with an important context for understanding what Heidegger can contribute to this issue. Like Searle and Dreyfus, Heidegger understands intentionality as a directedness toward things in the world that in some sense establishes or responds to satisfaction conditions that designate what counts as success or failure. Though Searle and Dreyfus may disagree about the manner in which these satisfaction conditions are present to the actor while she acts, they, like Heidegger, acknowledge the normativity inherent in all intentional action. Heidegger recognizes, however, that intentionality is not simply the directedness toward the world and the standards by which this directionality is measured – rather, on the most basic level, it is a caring about
succeeding in measuring up that is present in every intentional act that I undertake. Intentionality demands that meeting those conditions matters to the agent. Understood as such, Heidegger’s characterization of intentionality will avoid both the overly conceptual Searlean reading – in which acting intentionally must involve an explicit awareness of the goal or the satisfaction conditions that it establishes – and Dreyfus’ overly ‘self-less’ understanding of intentionality, which lacks any sense of ‘mineness’ – the implicit awareness that whether I succeed or fail matters to me and says something about who I am.

It is this sense of committed, caring mineness that constitutes first-person presence to self for Heidegger; a self-presence that is inherent in every intentional act that I undertake, regardless of how steeped in averageness. This practical – rather than epistemic – notion of the first-person differs from most of the current literature on this issue, which champions some variety of an observational model of self-awareness in which the first-person is a type of ‘I think’ or ‘I reflect’ that accompanies all of my actions. On Heidegger’s account – an account that avoids the difficulties inherent in this observational model – the manner in which the self is present to itself is always and most fundamentally as ‘I care’.

Despite Heidegger’s characterization of our everyday way of being as a lostness in the anonymity and averageness of the public realm, then, he nevertheless notes that the very notion of the ‘I’ contains an indication of the solitude of the self; it suggests that “an I is always this being, and not others” (BT 114/108). Heidegger recognizes that there is a sense in which there is “nothing less dubious than the givenness of the I” (BT 115/109), but his deep concern is that this very obviousness deludes us into the notion that this self
is isolated from and independent of the world. Though the differentiation of ‘me’ from ‘you’ can certainly be understood simply in terms of the fact that my body occupies a different point in space and time, there nevertheless seems to be some way of being me that isn’t reducible to the occupation of this point in space and time – a sense to which thought experiments involving body-hopping ‘selves’ appeal. The question of import, then, is what differentiates my first-personal way of being from yours, if this being is not to be understood as ‘isolated in some self-enclosed substantive subjectivity à la Descartes. What makes it mine and how do I have ‘access’ to such a unique being?

Sydney Shoemaker – a philosopher who has done a great deal of work on the problem of the ‘first person’ – asserts in the article “First-person Access” and elsewhere, that in asking about the nature of the first-person, we are investigating “the mind’s epistemic access to itself…the view that each of us has a logically ‘privileged access’ to his or her mental states, and that it is of the essence of the mind that this should be so”¹. On this approach, self-awareness is taken to be a type of higher order attitude or comportment that each of us takes toward our own thoughts or activities. Though Shoemaker recognizes that the notion of ‘privileged access’ has been undermined not only by the Freudian subconscious but also by research showing how much of the mind’s activity is inaccessible to conscious inspection, he argues, nevertheless, that a weaker ‘privileged access’ thesis can be supported, requiring that one need only claim: 1.) That such states are “necessarily ‘self-intimating’: that it belongs to their very nature that having them leads to the belief, and knowledge, that one has them” and 2.) That a person has a “‘special authority’ about what such states he or she has” (Shoemaker 50).

The first interpretation of such ‘privileged access’ is clearly problematic: my everyday experience of self certainly does not seem to involve any ‘belief’ or ‘knowledge’ that I am experiencing my own thoughts; their nature is precisely one whereby such descriptions are ridiculous – there is never any doubt that my thoughts are my own\(^2\) and thus do not ‘lead to the belief’ that they are my own. The latter point – that the first-person involves a particular type of authority – was taken by Descartes to champion a conception of the mind as completely transparent to itself, as well as the corresponding infallibility of the self-knowledge that this transparency would allow. According to Shoemaker, however, complete transparency and infallibility are not necessarily claims that such a position must advocate. Viewing first-person access as involving a particular type of authority is at a minimum:

the claim that it is in some sense necessary that our beliefs about our mental states of these kinds be for the most part correct, and that a person’s belief that she has such a state creates a presumption that she has it, in a sense in which it is not true that someone’s having a belief that some other person has such a state creates a presumption that the other person does indeed have the state” (Shoemaker 50-51).

Such a claim again commits one to the view that self-awareness involves true beliefs about my having particular mental states, however, beliefs that I do not know to be true when applied to the mental states of others.

Such an epistemic orientation is representative of so-called ‘higher-order’ theories of self awareness\(^3\), which characterize self-awareness as being fundamentally a type of

\(^2\) There are, however, pathological cases in which this is not true. For an interesting account of the schizophrenic’s loss of his sense of the ‘mineness’ of his experiences, see Dan Zahavi’s *Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First Person.* Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2005., p. 74-77.

‘upper’ level of knowledge, emotion, perception, or reflection that takes a non-self-aware experience as its object and thereby grants it its first-personal feel. Thus Peter Carruthers claims in *Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory*, that “it is just such a manner of focusing which confers on our experiences the dimension of subjectivity, and so which renders them for the first time fully phenomenally conscious” (184). As Dan Zahavi notes in *Self Awareness and Alterity*, however, such accounts not only commit one to an infinite regress – whereby the ‘I’ reflected or ‘focused’ upon cannot account for the ‘I’ doing the reflecting – it also distorts the nature of the *immediacy* or *transparency* of self-awareness. My first-personal experience of the world does not seem to be a feature ‘added on’ through focusing or reflecting, but seems to be intrinsic to the ‘mineness’ of all of my experiences.

Though it is clearly possible to engage in a certain distantiation of self from self through explicit self-reflection, this type of objectifying seems to be derivative of a more immediate presence to self. And as Heidegger argues, such thematizing knowing is always secondary to the way in which we generally live in a self-understanding that arises unthematically through our immersion in the world.

We must first of all see this one thing clearly: the Dasein, as existing, is there for itself, even when the ego does not expressly direct itself to itself in the manner of its own peculiar turning around and turning back, which in phenomenology is called inner perception as contrasted with outer. The self is there for the Dasein itself without reflection and without inner perception, *before* all reflection. Reflection, in the sense of turning back, is only a mode of *self-apprehension*, but not the mode of primary self-disclosure (*BPP* 159).

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Rather than modeling our understanding of first-personal self-presence to self on some type of abstract reflection, we must start with this primary self-disclosure and base any analyses of abstract reflection upon it.

The incompatibility of such higher-order accounts with a Heideggerian view of the self is not rooted solely in its implicit invocation of the subject/object divide that Heidegger rejects; it also lies in the (related) fact that such accounts characterize the self-relationality of the first-person in the absence of its fundamental worldliness.

In the customary, psychological representation of the ‘I,’ the relationship to the world is absent. Therefore, the representation of the ego cogito is abstract, whereas the ‘I-am-in-the-world’ lets the ‘I’ be conjoined with the world, that is, as something primordially concrete [ur-konkret] (ZS 220/175).

The dearth of references to ‘consciousness,’ and ‘self-awareness’ in Heidegger’s work is largely motivated by his refusal to see his project as a continuation of what he took to be the Cartesian world-lessness of the transcendental phenomenology from which it evolved. As Michael Theunissen notes in *The Other: Studies in the Social Ontology of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre and Buber*, Heidegger does not explicitly name Husserl as his interlocutor, largely because he regarded “Husserl simply as a representative of the contemporary position in general. In such a perspective, transcendental philosophy appears primarily as the philosophy of the I”⁴. Thus Heidegger takes his stance in opposition not only to the Cartesian picture of the ‘self-enclosed’ cogito, but also to Husserl and to Kant, who he took to be Descartes’ intellectual children in this regard⁵.

Heidegger is therefore refusing to follow such thinkers when he queries “And what is less dubious than the givenness of the ‘I’?” and subsequently rejects the tendency arising

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⁵ For an account of why Heidegger believed Kant’s notion of the ‘I’ to be fundamentally Cartesian – i.e. substantial – see BPP 140-154.
from this givenness – a tendency that leads us to believe that if we aim to work this out
primordially, we must “abstract from everything else that is ‘given,’ not only from an
existing a ‘world’ but also from the being of other ‘I’s’ (BT 115/109). Such an approach,
Heidegger claims, will only lead the existential analytic into a “trap” (BT 116/109).

This characterization of transcendental phenomenology as starting with such a
solipsistic, ‘worldless’ self allows Heidegger to distance his fundamental ontology from
such a ‘traplike’ project; for him, understanding Dasein demands understanding it in
terms of the world. Thus he can claim in the Heraclitus seminar that “If you take
‘consciousness’ as a rubric for transcendental philosophy and absolute idealism, another
position is thus taken with the rubric ‘Dasein’”⁶. As Theunissen notes, however,
Heidegger rejects not only the Kantian ‘I’ – “because it exists only as ‘I think’ and not as
‘I think something’ – but he also objects to Husserl’s ‘intentional I’, “For according to
Heidegger, the approach through intentionality still leaves the projectively constructed
world out of account, a world that is presupposed by the intentional something insofar as
it is an inner worldly entity” (Theunissen 169).

Though it seems clear that Heidegger’s reading of Husserl does not do him justice
– though the manner and extent to which this is the case cannot be addressed here – we
can note that despite Heidegger’s refusal to follow what he takes to be a false separation
of the ‘I’ from the world in which it has meaning, nevertheless he too addresses the
problem of what it means to be an ‘I’ in terms of intentionality. Thus in Being and Time
he asserts that “Essentially the person exists only in carrying out intentional acts, and is

University, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1979., p. 125.
thus essentially not an object” (BT 48/44-45). The problem that arises, then, is understanding the manner in which Heidegger’s account of Dasein’s intentionality – and the co-disclosure of the self that it involves – can avoid ‘leaving the world out of account’ without falling into the subject/object dualism that distorts the nature of the first-person. For Heidegger, intentionality is characterized by three features that will allow it to both define this base-level selfhood we are terming first-personal self-presence, and avoid the separation of the ‘subject’ from the ‘objective’ world. These features can be termed directedness, normativity, and mattering.

In The Zollikon Seminars Heidegger claims that “Intentionality means: Each consciousness is consciousness of something. It is directed toward something” (ZS 226). Elsewhere he exhorts us to recognize that “the Dasein’s comportments have an intentional character and...on the basis of this intentionality the subject already stands in relation to things that it itself is not” (BPP 155). Though many contemporary discussions of intentionality speak of it in terms of discrete instances of directedness toward this or that thing, for Heidegger what is of primary concern is not the particular intentional act or thought, but the underlying relationality or transcendence of the actor that makes this possible.

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7 Heidegger makes this statement in the context of explaining Max Scheler’s position as a positive – though insufficient – move away from the traditional, substantive view of subjectivity. Insofar as Heidegger approves of Scheler’s move away from ‘psychical’ to intentional interpretations of personhood, this statement can be taken as representative of Heidegger’s view, though this is not to imply that he unqualifiedly accepts Scheler’s position; on the contrary, Heidegger feels that Scheler’s view fails insofar as it does not analyze what this ‘carrying out’ of intentional acts must be.

8 In the language of many discussions of intentionality, Heidegger is interested in what makes us the types of beings that have intrinsic intentionality; for Heidegger, not only are such secondarily intentional things like signs derivative of our way of being, but so too are our own particular intentional acts. For an excellent discussion of the intrinsic/derivative debate, see John Haugeland’s “Understanding: Dennett and Searle” in his Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998, p. 291-304.
Such a definition brings him clearly in line with contemporary definitions of intentionality as involving an ‘aboutness’ or directedness toward the world. This ‘directedness’ of specific intentional acts, for Heidegger, is rooted in the human way of being as an ‘openness to’ or ‘transcending toward’ the world. Human beings exist in such a way that they are never confined to some inner sphere, but are in their very essence directed towards things, engaged in particular relations with them, intentionally oriented to them. “To relate itself is implicit in the concept of the subject. In its own self the subject is a being that relates-itself-to” (BPP 157). Understood as such, we can note how this first feature of intentionality undermines sharp subject/object divides; human beings exist as a relationality, not as some subjective thing-self bumping up against some objective thing-world.

Claims about the directedness or aboutness of intentionality – aside from the conclusions Heidegger makes about the types of beings we must be in order to have this intentional directness – are fairly uncontroversial. So too is the claim that this directedness involves some type of responsiveness to norms that determine success or failure. This normative understanding of intentionality is at work not only in Searle and Dreyfus’ accounts, as we will see, but also in Galen Strawson’s recent article “Real Intentionality,” where he argues that intentionality entails an ‘aboutness,’ or ‘taking as’ that introduces the possibility of mis-recognition. In Heidegger, the normativity of intentional actions is evident in the fact that they are subjected to the social categories of meaning and use that determine whether these actions succeed in the activities towards

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9 For further elaborations of Heidegger’s understanding of Dasein in terms of this essential intentionality or transcendence, see BT 60-62/56-58, 136-137/128-129, 204-206/189-191.

which they are directed; thus in *Being and Time* Heidegger claims that “[w]hen we take care of things, we are subordinate to the in-order-to constitutive for the actual useful thing in our association with it” (*BT* 69/64-65). We are *subordinate* to it insofar as worldly things have a specific ‘for which’: their meanings *as* the type of things that they are involve established conditions for successful use or encounter to which our intentional activities are responsive. This responsiveness is evident, for example, in the condition that Heidegger termed distantaliality – wherein Dasein seeks to meet the norms of averageness by submitting its behavior to the accepted standards of normalcy. As we can see, this second feature of intentionality – its subordination and responsiveness to conditions of success and failure – reinforces the worldliness of Heidegger’s view of intentionality insofar as these conditions are primarily public and shared.

As we have already noted in our brief discussion of disclosure, Dasein’s transcending, intentional being is defined not only by norm-governed directedness to and immersion in the world, but also by a particular kind of self-presence. In *History of the Concept of Time* he will explicitly claim that “lived experiences themselves are as such intentional,” reinforcing the essential connection between intentionality and the ‘first-person’ (*HCT* 32). In *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* he will articulate this notion further:

To intentionality belongs, not only a self-directing-toward and not only an understanding of the being of the being toward which it is directed, but also the associated unveiling of the self which is comporting itself here. Intentional self-direction-toward is not simply an act-ray issuing from an ego-center, which would have to be related back to the ego only afterward, in such a way that in a second act this ego would turn back to the first one (the first self-directing-toward). Rather, the co-disclosure of the self belongs to intentionality (*BPP* 158).
It is clear from such statements that Heidegger is not advocating a type of higher-order theory of self-awareness; “The self which the Dasein is, is there somehow in and along with all intentional comportments” (BPP 158), and is not ‘added on’ through another intentional comportment. What remains to be determined, however, is what is meant by such a ‘co-disclosure of the self’. In what sense should we understand this first-person self-presence in Heidegger’s re-formulation of selfhood qua intentionality?

In order to answer this, we will turn first to John Searle and Hubert Dreyfus’ significant efforts to determine what type of ‘self-presence’ defines intentionality. As we will come to see, though both accounts describe important characteristics of intentionality, their disagreement is ultimately rooted in the need for a more basic existential account of intentional agency. By first pointing up the weaknesses in their accounts, we will be better able to recognize just what Heidegger’s view can provide in this regard.

In Jerome Wakefield and Hubert Dreyfus’ article entitled “Intentionality and the Phenomenality of Action,” the authors demand an account of human action that can accommodate the first-person phenomenological features of acting – what it feels like to be acting – that allow us to differentiate ‘bodily movements caused by reasons’ into those that are actions and those that are not. According to Wakefield and Dreyfus, John Searle’s notion of an ‘intention in action’ – which they take to be “a representation of the goal of one’s action that both causes the action and is directly experienced as causing the action” (259) – is meant to account for these features. However, since there appear to be bodily movements that should count as actions but are nevertheless without “the constant

12 The authors note that they take this definition from Donald Davidson.
accompaniment of representational states which specify what the action is aimed at accomplishing” (263), they argue that Searle’s account fails.

According to Wakefield and Dreyfus, activities of ‘mindless coping,’ such as brushing one’s teeth or driving to work, are actions in which no representation of the goal of the action causally shapes the action or persists throughout the acting. During such activities one is nevertheless ‘responsive’ in some way to the situation in which one finds oneself, and one’s response “may be ‘aimed’ in a functional sense at achieving some larger purpose” (Wakefield and Dreyfus, 264). This non-representational ‘bodily’ awareness accounts for the phenomenological distinction between voluntary and non-voluntary action, they argue, without requiring that all voluntary, self-aware action involve an “ongoing representation” of its purpose in order to regulate that activity (Wakefield and Dreyfus, 264). The authors thus distinguish between actions guided by representations of intentions and actions guided by the non-representational “tendency to return to a gestalt equilibrium” – a tendency that does not require that we are “explicitly aware of what we are trying to do” (265).

In response to such criticisms, Searle has argued that Wakefield and Dreyfus’ descriptions of what is supposed to be the absence of intention-in-action is precisely an example of what intention-in-action is for him13. In other words, because they speak of “a sense of deformation from and return to an optimal form or gestalt of the body-world relationship” (Wakefield and Dreyfus, 267, emphasis mine), they are already invoking intentionality insofar as ‘deformation’ and ‘optimality’ imply conditions of satisfaction that these actions have failed at or succeeded in meeting. On Searle’s account, both “are

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forms of Intentionality in the sense that they can succeed or fail. They have conditions of satisfaction” (Searle 1992, 294). According to Searle, then, a conscious experience of acting is an experience of action that “involves a consciousness of the conditions of satisfaction of that experience”\(^\text{14}\).

Wakefield and Dreyfus seem to agree with this account insofar as the optimality of one’s response to the situation demands some type awareness of one’s success or failure – or at least improvement and its lack – in responding to the situation in which one finds oneself. As Dreyfus articulates in “The Primacy of Phenomenology over Logical Analysis,” however, “in absorbed coping, the agent’s body is led to move so as to reduce a sense of deviation from a satisfactory gestalt without the agent knowing what that satisfactory gestalt will be like in advance of achieving it”\(^\text{15}\).

The difficulty, then, becomes one of articulating the sense in which these conditions of satisfaction – and the experience of one’s own efforts to meet them – are present to the actor while she is acting. Searle has already been forced to admit that certain types of action are intentional – responsive to conditions of satisfaction – without having to be explicitly before the mind as a representation of what that satisfaction would be like. He has granted “that in absorbed coping the agent need not have a representation of the end-state in order to be drawn toward it, and that the agent may find out what the final equilibrium feels like only when he gets there (Dreyfus 1999, 9). Nevertheless, Searle claims that activities of absorbed coping – while non-representationally intentional – only receive their intentionality – their directedness and their conditions of satisfaction


from an overarching representational intentionality. The ‘mindless’ activities that fall
under this umbrella intentionality “must be understood as nonrepresentational
background capacities that cause subsidiary movements that do not themselves have
conditions of satisfaction” (Dreyfus 1999, 5). Such actions are “governed by the
Intentionality of the flow, even though there is not, and need not be, any explicit
representation of the intentional movement” (Searle 1991, 293).

But why does Searle feel compelled to insist upon this umbrella representational
intentionality, faced with what Dreyfus takes to be a perfectly adequate account of a
‘body-intentionality’ type responsiveness to conditions of improvement or deterioration?
Searle is motivated to argue that background capacities only function when they are
“activated by genuine Intentional contents” (1991, 294) out of the necessity of
designating what would count as an ‘improvement’ or ‘easing’ of tension. For Searle,
what counts as appropriate must be determined on some level by an explicit articulation
of what something is meant to be appropriate for. The difficulty with Dreyfus’ account is
precisely here: he fails to elaborate on the basis of the normativity inherent in any talk of
the ‘improvement’ or ‘appropriateness’ of one’s actions, and thereby makes his account
of ‘mindless’ intentional action equally applicable to amoeba and to plants – or, for that
matter, to those tight-rope balancing toys that respond to changes in the environment in
order to return to a certain gestalt equilibrium. In other words, stripped of all sense of
purposive self-presence, Dreyfus’ account no longer strikes us as being about
intentionality.

\[16\] Galen Strawson discusses this danger in “Real Intentionality,” where he argues that unless you’re willing
to restrict intentionality not simply to ‘aboutness,’ but also to the “experiential realm,” the only way you
can distinguish such things as conscious human intention, a robot’s purposive behavior, and a plant’s
environmental responsiveness is through a “certain zoomorphic prejudice” (2004, 296).
Dreyfus himself seems to recognize this danger at points, insofar as he fluctuates in his opinion about the relationship between absorbed coping and explicitly intentional action. On the one hand he claims that absorbed coping requires that "the bodily movements that make up an action must, indeed, be initiated by an intention in action with success conditions," (1999, 10) but on the other he claims that generally no representational intentionality is required: "normally, absorbed coping does not need to be initiated by an intention in action, and so is more basic than intentional action" (1999, 11). Despite such confusion, however, it seems that Dreyfus is committed to the latter claim, that "[i]n general, when intentional action occurs, it is only possible on the background of ongoing absorbed coping...[which] is the background condition of the possibility of all forms of comportment" (1999, 11). For Dreyfus, then, an unthematic, mindless/bodily basic sense of coping ‘appropriateness’ underlies all explicit articulations of success conditions – including those of representational consciousness and social institutions – but we need not have any awareness of what will count as appropriateness in order for our activities to be intentional.

The problem becomes one of retaining any meaningful sense of the word intentionality when it encompasses both human action and equilibrium movements that also apply to ‘inanimate’ objects. Unless we want to say that even the balancing statue’s movements are intentional actions – since it’s ‘body’ is seeking equilibrium, though it does not have this equilibrium representationally present as a goal – there must be some middle path between Searle’s overly cognitive and Dreyfus’ overly bodily account of the manner in which the directedness and normativity of intentional acts are present to the actor while she acts.
This middle way is what Heidegger's account provides. Like Dreyfus, Heidegger does not believe an explicit representation of one's intent need accompany that intent in order for it to be intentional, but like Searle, Heidegger will attempt to offer a more thorough account of the intentional directedness underlying all human action—and the manner in which we seek to express this directedness—than Dreyfus' claim that the body seeks equilibrium. To fill this role, Heidegger's position must be seen as a shift from an epistemic to a pragmatic sense of first-personal self-presence: how what counts as success or 'appropriateness equilibrium' is present to the agent is not a type of knowledge; rather, these success conditions must instead be understood in terms of the manner in which they matter to the agent.

In *The Zollikon Seminars* Heidegger claims that "One does not have representations, but one represents" (ZS 226) — a statement that is definitive for his understanding of selfhood as a particular manner of intentional agency, not as an inner arena with a privileged type of self-viewing. So too must such a shift be applied to the Searle/Dreyfus debate: seeking equilibrium and striving to meet represented success conditions both presuppose a manner of practical self-presence rooted in the fact that I care about their fulfillment; I am never indifferent to my intentional actions, but am deeply invested in their success. Thus even when I am 'mindlessly' driving home, such an action is infused with an intentional directedness — not because my body is seeking equilibrium, or because I am consciously representing the successful goal of reaching home — but because I care about safely reaching home; my 'mindlessness' nevertheless includes an awareness of the import of this success for my existence, an awareness that is expressed in my failure to run red lights or pull into oncoming traffic. It is in this sense
that Heidegger can claim that all intentionality is experiential\textsuperscript{17}: not as a knowing of success conditions, but as a living them in terms of what they will mean for my life if I meet them.

If the Dasein projects itself upon a possibility and understands itself in that possibility, this understanding, this becoming manifest of the self, is not a self-contemplation in the sense that the ego would become the object of some cognition or other; rather, the projection is the way in which I am the possibility; it is the way in which I exist freely. The essential core of understanding as projection is the Dasein’s understanding itself existentially in it. Since projection unveils without making what is unveiled as such into an object of contemplation, there is present in all understanding an insight of the Dasein into itself" ($BPP$ 277).

For Heidegger, this deep investment in all of my actions and understandings is rooted in the fact that everything I do falls under my overarching responsibility for who I am. Each specific intentional action is encompassed by my ‘intention’ to ‘succeed’ at my own existence. “It is not the case that this being just simply is; instead, so far as it is, it is occupied with its own capacity to be….The Dasein exists; that is to say, it is for the sake of its own capacity to be” ($BPP$ 170). All explicit representational intentions to succeed and all implicit bodily intentions to improve are rooted in this fundamental directedness or purposiveness. As Heidegger notes in a lecture course from 1921-22,

\begin{quote}
...caring always exists in a determinate or indeterminate, secure or wavering, direction. Life finds direction, takes up a direction, grows into a direction, gives to itself or lives in a direction, and even if the direction is lost to sight, it nevertheless remains present ($PIA$ 70-71).
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{17} In keeping with this position, Strawson has argued that, contrary to popular interpretations in analytic philosophy, though intentionality entails aboutness, not all aboutness entails intentionality, but only that aboutness which is “a matter of cognitive EQ content” (2004, 306) – which he takes to be the first-personal, “experiential qualitative” or “what-it’s-likeness” of experience (2004, 289). In this regard I agree with Strawson’s argument, though I believe that his cut-off point for what counts as EQ content should not and need not be so cognitive, and expanding what counts as ‘EQ’ need not commit us to the realm of “intentional thermometers” (2004, 296).
Indeed, for Heidegger this overarching intentional investment in the things that I do just is the self that is present in all of my comportments. Heidegger’s emphasis is on the responsibility of ‘self-having’ – the fact that my way of being is normatively structured in terms of maintaining or losing, succeeding or failing at being this self that I am.

And furthermore, this being that we ourselves are and that exists for the sake of its own self is, as this being, in each case mine. The Dasein is not only, like every being in general, identical with itself in a formal-ontological sense – every thing is identical with itself – and it is also not merely, in distinction from a natural thing, conscious of this selfsameness. Instead, the Dasein has a peculiar selfsameness with itself in the sense of selfhood. It is in such a way that it is in a certain way its own, it has itself, and only on that account can it lose itself” (BPP 170).

For Heidegger, to exist humanly – as an ‘I’ or a ‘you’ – is to exist in light of a concern for what it means to exist humanly, a concern rooted in the fact that I am not guaranteed success and must therefore strive to achieve it. As Merleau-Ponty articulates this notion: “such is the lot of a being...who once and for all has been given to himself as something to be understood”18. I care about this being who ‘I’ am because I may fail at being it, and it is in terms of this that the normative conditions constraining my specific intentional acts are present to me as such.

Heidegger recognizes that such a reconception of selfhood is contrary to our everyday understandings of the self, however, when he notes that “if the self is conceived ‘only’ as a way of being of this being, then it seems tantamount to volatizing the true ‘core’ of Dasein” (BT 117/110). In other words, re-conceiving the self not as an inner arena that ‘knows’ the norms that constrain, but as a directedness that lives them in a self-aware yet non-representational way is foreign to the philosophical tradition.

Nevertheless, he argues that “such fears are nourished by the incorrect preconception that the being in question really has, after all, the kind of being of something objectively

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present, even if one avoids attributing to it the massive element of a corporeal thing” *(BT 117/110)*. On the contrary, the ‘substance’ of human existing is one’s way of being as a ‘having to be’ – as a commitment to my existence and the standards that allow me to judge my success in meeting this responsibility. This mattering that makes all my experiences be experienced *as mine* is what Heidegger designates *Jemeinigkeit*, or mineness:

The being which this being is concerned about in its being is always my own. Thus, Da-sein is never to be understood ontologically as a case and instance of a genus of beings as objectively present. To something objectively present its being is a matter of ‘indifference,’ more precisely, it ‘is’ in such a way that its being can neither be indifferent nor non-indifferent to it. In accordance with the character of *always-being-my-own-being* [*Jemeinigkeit*], when we speak of Da-sein, we must always use the *personal* pronoun along with whatever we say: ‘I am,’ ‘You are.’” *(BT 42/40).*

To characterize the caring self as simply ‘accompanying’ all of its actions and understandings distorts their nature; rather, actions and understandings only have the structure that they do insofar as they are infused with the normative weight that is the essence of selfhood

This understanding of the first-person as being initially and for the most part not an indifferent self-observation but a care for the self that manifests itself in the things that matter to it and in its struggle to meet the standards to which it is committed finds resonance in Richard Moran’s *Authority and Estrangement*, in which he launches a sustained attack on attempts to model “self-consciousness on the theoretical awareness of

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19 This profoundly care-based structure of our everyday self-presence is particularly evident when contrasted with schizophrenic cases. One young patient describes the distortion of the first-person nature of her experiences in the following way: “I am more and more losing contact with my environment and with myself. Instead of taking an interest in what goes on and caring about what happens with my illness, I am all the time losing emotional contact with everything including myself. What remains is only an abstract knowledge of what goes on around me and of the internal happenings in myself” Quoted in Frith & Johnstone 2003, 2, and found in Zahavi 2005, 74.
objects"\textsuperscript{20}. For Moran the first-personal nature of a belief or intention does not reside in the relation that I have to this intention, but to a quality or character of the intention itself. This quality is the role that it plays in my life as a whole:

The special features of first-person awareness cannot be understood by thinking of it purely in terms of epistemic access (whether quasi-perceptual or not) to a special realm to which only one person has entry. Rather, we must think of it in terms of the special responsibilities the person has in virtue of the mental life in question being his own (Moran 2001, 32).

The fact that my beliefs and actions are invested with the weight of their role in determining who I am to be is what gives them their particularly first-person feel, thereby accounting for the ‘authority’ of the first person to which Shoemaker alluded. This authority is not an epistemic one, however, but an existential one. I am not only in a position to avow that they are mine, but I experience them as being a statement – in the eyes of self and world – of what kind of person I am. As Moran succinctly puts it, “If it were simply a special immediate theoretical relation I have to this belief, then there would be no reason in principle why another person could not bear this same relation to my belief” (2001, 31). Because my beliefs and intentions express who I am, however, they are fundamentally characterized by mineness. Following Heidegger, then, ‘self-awareness’ must be understood as a way of living – not knowing or observing – one’s ‘selfness’. Indeed, as Kiesel notes, Heidegger was inspired by Dilthey in this regard, since he believed that “every psychic experience bears within itself a knowledge of its own worth for the whole of the psychic individual” (Kiesel 134).

It is important to note, however, that such responsibility for who one is to be is generally not explicitly acknowledged by the actor while she acts – the self-responsibility of existing comes explicitly to light only in the condition that Heidegger calls

authenticity. Because Heidegger distinguishes between authentic and inauthentic selfhood in this manner – whereby the latter is understood as a fallen ‘forgetfulness’ of self in the anonymity and averageness of das Man, and the former is a radical individuation accomplished through angst, being-toward-death, and conscience – most Heidegger interpreters tend to focus solely on the explicit self-presence that characterizes authenticity. I am in agreement with such interpretations insofar as they note that the mineness of existence – the fact that each of us is entrusted with the responsibility of existing – rests upon the existential structures underlying the possibility of authenticity.

If we are to provide an account of our everyday sense of first-personal self-hood, however, we cannot turn to limit cases such as angst – which reveals this existential care structure to us but thereby makes it impossible to simply live through it.

The manner in which this existential care structure is present in and through everydayness, I would argue, lies in Dasein’s commitment and responsiveness to norms – in the fact that meeting them matters. Though this everyday, first-personal self-presence depends on the structures analyzed in Division II of Being and Time, then – structures to which we will be returning in Chapter VII – their authentic, explicit self-grasping is not a necessary ‘pre-requisite’ for an individuated self-presence within everydayness. Rather, these existential structures and their affiliated self-presence simply manifest themselves in an unthematized way in my everyday intentional orientation to the things that matter to me. “‘I’ means the being that is concerned about the being of the being which it is” (BT 322/296). Though it is possible to achieve a heightened form of explicit self-grasping in which these structures are recognized and ‘owned’ as such, their activity in Dasein’s everyday way of being is no less prevalent for the absence of such explicitness.
It is for this reason that Heidegger claims that the everyday self understands itself from the world; it "initially finds 'itself' in what it does, needs, expects, has charge of, in the things at hand which it initially takes care of in the surrounding world" (BT 119/112). Heidegger does not mean that I understand myself from just anything that happens to be lying around – I understand myself, rather from those things with which I am concerned. "When we take care of things, we are subordinate to the in-order-to constitutive for the actual useful thing in our association with it" (BT 69/65). I understand myself from things by successfully subordinating myself to the norms of success inherent in the meaning of things and practices. Thus "The self that is reflected to us from things is not 'in' the things in the sense that it would be extant among them as a portion of them or in them as an appendage or a layer deposited on them" (BPP 161). Such an interpretation already indicates the wrong understanding of how we encounter things – not as meaningless 'stuff' but as part of our projects, as an 'equipmental contexture' that need not be explicitly recognized or thought as such in order for it to orient us: "'Unthought' means that it is not thematically apprehended for deliberate thinking about things; instead, in circumspection, we find our bearings in regard to them" (BPP 163). To 'find one's bearings' is to have access to the markers and measures by which to orient oneself. It is to have one's 'directedness' find signs that one is heading in the right direction. In this case, the 'directedness' under consideration is the intentionality that characterizes our way of being. We understand ourselves from the world because the world grants us standards by which to judge whether we are succeeding or failing at existing – whether we've gotten our bearings straight, so to speak.
The same reference to the world’s normativity is inherent in the language Heidegger uses to characterize encounters with others who ‘reflect’ me back to myself: I measure my success against them in terms of social standards of success. As we already noted in Chapter I, this is what Heidegger terms *distantiality*: “...there is constant care as to the way one differs from them...” (*BT* 126/118). What characterizes this arena of social normativity is that it maintains itself in this typicality of “what is proper, what is allowed and what is not. Of what is granted success and what is not” (*BT* 127/119). This shared subsumption of ourselves to the measures of what counts as success is what led Heidegger to claim that in my everyday way of being I am in a sense *not* myself. As the above discussion has shown, however, this must not be read as a sort of *absence* of self, but must be understood instead in terms of a distinction between the *care* for self that motivates putting oneself up for measure and committing oneself to the norms that our activities embody, and the *source* of the measure that allows us to understand ourselves. Though there is clearly an important difference between an everydayness in which I simply use the ready-made standards and interpretations that I find in the public sphere, and an authentic conscience in which I seek norms rooted only in my own self-responsibility, the *care* operating in and through these standards in the face of existential responsibility is the same. It is this ‘mineness’ of care that differentiates me from you despite the fact that in our everyday way of being the norms of behavior through which this care is expressed are the same for both of us.

It is this necessary feature of intentionality that both Dreyfus and Searle miss: that regardless of whether I am responsive to standards of appropriateness or explicitly trying to meet standards of success, I must be present in the striving as *a care for or*
commitment to being appropriate or successful. Dreyfus’ resistance to Searle’s attempt to abstract from indexical feelings of appropriateness in a particular context to formal social rules is likely rooted in this sense that intentionality is profoundly personal in this regard. Where Dreyfus’ account fails, however, is in neglecting to account for what type of normative responsiveness is operative such that ‘absorbed coping’ can be differentiated from the intentionless equilibrium-seeking that defines even certain types of toys. Though we do, in a sense, move to reduce bodily senses of ‘deviation’ without knowing what a satisfactory condition will be like in advance, it is an essential feature of our intentional way of being that we seek and establish worldly standards that will answer ‘what a satisfactory condition will be like’ and submit ourselves to them. Though these ‘right answers’ may not be codifiable in propositional form, they nevertheless fall under the overarching intentionality of a creature whose care for its own being drives it to seek equilibrium and measure the success of this seeking against public standards of success.

Unlike Searle’s account, then – in which the directionality of the particular ‘mindless’ activities must come from a propositional representation of some specific goal – Heidegger’s account allows us to recognize that normative conditions of satisfaction may be present to human action as an unthematic manifestation of care. And unlike Dreyfus’ account – in which this mindless coping is given no directionality other than a vague sense of ‘appropriateness’ – Heidegger articulates a clear sense of what grounds all manner of satisfaction conditions; Dasein’s overarching need to orient itself in the world according to clear norms of what will count as successful existing. It is in light of this overriding intentional directedness that Heidegger can make room for our sense of the
self as first-personal; as being radically and always present to self as my own, while
nevertheless claiming that this selfhood is fundamentally worldly.
CHAPTER III:  
Being and Otherness: Sartre’s Critique

Given this account of subjectivity, Heidegger seems to avoid the intersubjective difficulties associated with accounts based on traditional higher order or epistemic access views of subjectivity. For Heidegger, there is no private cabinet of consciousness to which others have no access – on the contrary, Dasein’s selfhood is defined by an existential self-responsibility that expresses itself in publicly articulated satisfaction conditions. Insofar as the Heideggerian subject is rooted in this mineness of self-responsibility, however – its Jemeinigkeit – it may be argued that his account of subjectivity still suffers from a type of existential solitude. Simon Critchley claims, for instance, that according to Heidegger, “...all relationality is rendered secondary because of the primacy of Jemeinigkeit”¹. Though this mineness only finds expression in the public arena of shared meaning, this arena is defined by Heidegger in terms of anonymity and averageness, undermining the sense that his reformulation of the Cartesian subject offers much in the way of resources for adequately characterizing interpersonal encounter.

The question remains, then, as to the nature of intersubjectivity given such a view of subjectivity; if Dasein exists as ‘mine,’ in what sense can I genuinely or ‘directly’ encounter others who are similarly defined by such a way of being? Is such a being in relation with others always ‘secondary’ to Dasein’s Jemeinigkeit? If such encounters always occur through the mediation of average and anonymous public roles and meanings, in what sense have I experienced the other in all her ‘mineness’? Are others

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only ever encountered, then, as interchangeable ‘representatives’ of the public norms and meanings through which we all pursue our particular abilities to be? Or, as Charles Guignon puts this view: “To the extent that our actions are always exemplifications or instantiations of common social structures, [do] we differ from one another...only ‘quantitatively’ and never ‘qualitatively’”? (1983, 114). Does this intersubjective anonymity and averageness derive from the fundamental anonymity and averageness of Dasein’s ‘social a priori’ – being-with?

Heidegger claims that the concrete encounter with the other on the street already involves an environmental encounter based on the commonality of the street. Does this ‘already’ therefore indicate that this commonality and publicity exist prior to any and every encounter with particular others? As we saw in Chapter I, Heidegger seems to explicitly claim this insofar as he asserts that Being-with belongs to Dasein regardless of whether others are actually present:

The phenomenological statement, ‘Dasein as being-in-the-world is a being-with with others,’ has an existential ontological sense and does not intend to establish that I in fact do not turn out to be alone and that still other entities of my kind are on hand. If this were the intention of the stipulation, then I would be speaking of my Dasein as if it were an environmental thing on hand. And being would not be a determination which would belong to Dasein of itself by way of its kind of being. Being with would rather be something which Dasein would have at the time just because others happen to be on hand. Dasein would be being-with only because others do in fact turn up (HCT 238).

If it is indeed the case that, for Heidegger, others are experienced merely as ontic instances triggering a prior ontological determination of Dasein’s being, how can he explain our sense that we can and do in fact encounter others in all their unexpectedness, uniqueness, and particularity?
Many thinkers have argued that Heidegger cannot account for the ability to encounter the other in all her otherness, and that this is, in fact, a – if not the – major flaw in his work. Jean-Paul Sartre’s critique in Being and Nothingness is representative here, not only because it was one of the first such criticisms, but also because it is one that has yet to be adequately answered. Though there are other important thinkers whose work is dedicated to analyzing and overcoming this weakness in Heidegger’s work – Levinas being an obvious example – this discussion will be focused on Sartre’s criticisms as they are articulated in Being and Nothingness. In this chapter I will outline Sartre’s critique; both by analyzing his interpretation of Being-with and the conclusions that he draws from it, and by considering the alternate account of intersubjectivity that he submits in its stead. As we will see, Sartre raises significant concerns that – if correct – would seriously undermine Heidegger’s position.

His own account faces equally severe difficulties, however – ones that Heidegger’s own position can avoid. By articulating how Sartre interprets – and misconstrues – Heidegger’s concept of being-with, it will become clearer that Heidegger has rich resources with which to account for concrete encounters with individual others. Though the details will only be articulated in the following chapters – once the temporal implications of Heidegger’s position are taken into consideration – it will become evident here that the nature of the Dasein-to-Dasein encounter is in fact much more complex than Sartre acknowledges.

Sartre’s assessment of Heidegger’s view is not all negative; indeed, he thinks that Heidegger made huge advances over his predecessors Hegel and Husserl insofar as Heidegger recognized that “my relation to the Other is first and fundamentally a relation
of being to being, not of knowledge to knowledge”2. Husserl is guilty of modeling the intersubjective encounter on the knowledge relationship, argues Sartre, tending as he does to “measure being by knowledge”; Hegel suffers from the same mistake “when he identifies knowledge and being” (BN 329). Heidegger’s position represents progress, Sartre argues, since he recognized that an adequate account of the experience of the Other must meet the following requirements: “(1) the relation between ‘human-realities’ must be a relation of being [and] (2) this relation must cause ‘human-realities’ to depend on one another in their essential being” (BN 330). In other words, the very nature of my being in the world must depend on other Dasein.

According to Sartre, however, a fundamental problem with Heidegger’s work is its failure to offer any account of how Dasein’s being is dependent on this ‘being-with’. Instead, it simply assumes it as an essential structure; “To say that human reality (even if it is my human reality) ‘is-with’ by means of its ontological structure is to say that it is-with by nature – that is, in an essential and universal capacity” (BN 333-334). For Heidegger, ‘you-ness’ just is equiprimordial with mineness, so to speak. Though Heidegger’s account therefore succeeds in its attempt to provide “a being which in its own being implies the Other’s being” (BN 333), it does so by simply asserting that “the characteristic of being of human-reality is its being with others” (BN 330). As Abraham Mansbach puts it, for Heidegger “the need to explain how the individual can be aware or certain of the existence of other individuals vanishes, because being with others is prior to knowing them”3. Though this allows him to avoid the difficulties associated with the

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traditional 'problem of other minds,' it seems to accomplish this by simply claiming that it is not really a problem, a solution that has left many feeling less than satisfied.

According to Nancy Bauer, Heidegger:

"...conceives of our Being-with others, primordially, as a simple, if fateful ontological fact: the world of any single individual just is, inevitably and through and through, a world shared with others. And indeed, this fact creates at least as many philosophical problems as it solves"4.

The consequence of stipulating being-with as an ontological feature of Dasein – of simply claiming it as an a priori category that belongs to Dasein qua Dasein – is that the presence or absence of other Dasein becomes irrelevant to whether or not my being-in-the-world is defined by sociality – since concrete instances falling under an a priori category do not affect its essence but only its concrete realization:

Even Dasein’s being-alone is a being-with in the world. Being-alone is only a deficiency of being-with – the other is absent – which points directly to the positive character of being-with. The other is absent: this means that the constitution of the being of Dasein as being-with does not come to its factual fulfillment” (HCT 238).

On Heidegger’s account, then, being-with will always be one of my ontological structures – regardless of whether I ever directly encounter other Dasein. “Being-with existentially determines Da-sein even when another is not factically present and perceived” (BT 120/113). But as Dan Zahavi notes in *Husserl and Transcendental Intersubjectivity*, the consequence of this view is that Heidegger “never draws attention to the actual transcendence and alterity of the other, for once being-with is introduced as a structural element of Dasein’s being-in-the-world, the radical otherness of the other is ignored“5.

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According to Sartre, this is possible because by characterizing sociality as such an abstract, universal and *a priori* structure of one’s being, Heidegger ultimately reduces the social dimension of being-in-the-world to a structure of the self. The experience of the ‘commonality’ of the street does not require there to be others experiencing this street in common with me; the self’s relatedness to others applies regardless of whether other concrete persons are ever encountered. For Sartre, this type of account can only reach the ‘abstract’ other and cannot give us others in their concrete presence.

Even if this affirmation [that the existential structure being-with belonged to Dasein] were proved, it would not enable us to explain any concrete being-with. In other words, the ontological co-existence which appears as the structure of being-in-the-world can in no way serve as a foundation to an ontic being-with, such as, for example, the co-existence which appears in my friendship with Pierre… *(BN 334).*

Though Heidegger initially appears to overcome the ontological solipsism of the Cartesian subject, then, this is ultimately an illusion, according to Sartre. Because being-with is merely an ontological structure belonging to Dasein’s way of being, it provides an *a priori* condition for the possibility of ontic encounters, thereby reducing the social dimension of being-in-the-world to a structure of the self. As Schroeder notes in *Sartre and his Predecessors*, “Sartre contends, if the existence of Others were constituted solely through being-with, then their existence would be wholly dependent on oneself, and this would simply be metaphysical solipsism in disguise” (Schroeder 1984, 147). My being-with this or that other is determined in advance by the *a priori* structure that allows the encounter to occur, thereby establishing its possible modes of manifestation in advance.

Because the Dasein is essentially being-in-the-world, projection unveils in every instance a possibility of being-in-the-world….This entails that along with understanding there is always already projected a *particular possible being with the others* *(BPP 278).*
The consequence of this shift to understanding the social as an *a priori* feature of Dasein’s being is profound, argues Sartre; the other is no longer experienced in terms of a direct ‘face-to-face’ encounter with otherness, but is experienced in terms of a ‘mute’ and anonymous co-existing in worldly activities:

> The original relation of the Other and my consciousness is not the *you* and the *me*; it is the *we*. Heidegger’s being-with is not the clear and distinct position of an individual confronting another individual; it is not *knowledge*. It is the mute existence in common of one member of the crew with his fellows...which will be made manifest to them by the common goal to be attained” (*BN* 332).

Interestingly, Sartre here uses ‘knowledge’ to characterize the direct encounter between individuals and to distinguish it from the anonymity of the Heideggerian mode of encounter. It was, however, precisely their use of *knowledge* as the model for intersubjective encounter that led Sartre to criticize Hegel and Husserl’s accounts. This is extremely instructive, as we will see below, for Sartre continues to rely on the subject/object model on which such philosophies of knowledge are based – despite his criticisms – and thereby undermines his own ability to meet the intersubjective criteria that he himself established: namely, that “(1) the relation between ‘human-realities’ must be a relation of being [and] (2) this relation must cause ‘human-realities’ to depend on one another in their essential being” (*BN* 330).

It is clear from his criticisms of Heidegger that Sartre takes the direct confrontation between individuals to be an essential feature of such a dependence-inducing relation of being. Heidegger fails by allowing the relation of being to be an *a priori* stipulation that, as a result, can only establish anonymous modes of encounter and dependence in which others are not ‘directly’ encountered but are only ever experienced through a type of “ontological solidarity” (*BN* 331) that is achieved in the mediums of
shared public norms and activities. Thus my relationship with this or that other person is not “a frontal opposition but rather an oblique interdependence” (BN 331). As a result, Sartre argues, it is not my relationship with this particular other person that my being depends on in its being, but the anonymous das Man presence of there being ‘others’ at all. As Levinas puts it:

Beginning with Plato, the social ideal will be sought for in an ideal of fusion. It will be thought that, in its relationship with the other, the subject tends to be identified with the other, by being swallowed up in a collective representation, a common ideal…This collectivity necessarily establishes itself around a third term, which serves as an intermediary. [Heidegger’s] Miteinandersein, too, remains the collectivity of the ‘with,’ and is revealed in its authentic form around the truth. It is a collectivity around something common. Just as in all the philosophies of communion, sociality in Heidegger is found in the subject alone; and it is in terms of solitude that the analysis of Dasein in its authentic form is pursued⁶.

Because Heidegger’s account characterizes the relation to the other in terms of a ‘we’ rather than a ‘you,’ argues Sartre, it “can be of absolutely no use to us in resolving the psychological, concrete problem of the recognition of the Other” (BN 334). Thus Heidegger only provides an account of the conditions for the possibility of sociality – immersion in a shared world through which we understand self and others – and does not account for its reality. By defining being-with as an ontological structure of my being, Heidegger cannot account for the ontic encounter with another Dasein in all the particularity of his Jemeinigkeit way of being.

Sartre’s Response

In contrast to Heidegger’s position, Sartre argues that it must be the very contingency of the encounter that testifies to the otherness and transcendence of the other

in all her particularity and immediacy. Though it is tempting to claim, along with
Heidegger, that we are always already defined by a social way of being in the world,
Sartre resists this in an effort to remain true to the fact that it is the existence of other
Dasein in their concrete particularity that grounds this social way of being in the world:

We encounter the Other; we do not constitute him. And if this fact still
appears to us in the form of a necessity, yet it does not belong with those
‘conditions of the possibility of experience’ or — if you prefer — with
ontological necessity. If the Other’s existence is a necessity, it is a
‘contingent necessity’...If the Other is to be capable of being given to us,
it is by means of a direct apprehension which leaves to the encounter its
character as facticity (BN 336-337).

What is the nature of such a ‘direct apprehension’ of the subjectivity of the other? It
cannot take the form of a relationship between a subject and its intentional object, argues
Sartre, for this would eradicate the other’s status as subject. The other’s subjectivity
cannot be experienced as subjectivity if it only appears as an intentional object of
knowledge. We can see here the above-mentioned difficulty that Sartre has with the
Hegelian and Husserlian views:

...the problem of Others has generally been treated as if the primary relation
by which the Other is discovered is object-ness; that is, as if the Other were
first revealed — directly or indirectly — to our perception. But since this
perception by its very nature refers to something other than to itself and since
it can refer neither to an infinite series of appearances of the same type — as
in idealism the perception of the table or of the chair does — nor to an isolated
entity located on principle outside my reach, its essence must be to refer to a
primary relation between my consciousness and the Other’s. This relation, in
which the Other must be given to me directly as a subject although in connection
with me, is the fundamental relation, the very type of my being-for-others”
(BN 340-341).

For Sartre, the other’s subjectivity is encountered through a perception that does
not objectify but refers — a relation that is not simply an empty reference to that which is
fundamentally beyond the possibility of encounter, some inaccessible ‘back-side’ of the
other's person. Rather, the other's subjectivity is directly encountered in such a relation of referral, and this occurs insofar as the perception of the other refers to the very relationship that springs up when I encounter another: "the appearance must be capable of revealing to us, at least as a reality aimed at, the relation to which it refers" (BN 341). In other words, Sartre is arguing that my concrete encounter with the Other involves a referral to the relation in which this encounter places me; the perception of the other refers by its very nature to a primary connection between me and the other qua subject.

This occurs, Sartre claims, through an experience of the other as a 'centering' of the world; the world seen by the other person presents a face that exists only from that person's perspective. And as Sartre's phenomenological descriptions so powerfully illustrate, what allows me to experience the other's subjectivity is an encounter in which I am placed in a relation wherein I experience myself as an object seen in the world, as having 'a face' – a dimension of the self – seen only by the other from her perspective. According to Sartre, such an experience of self as object must be understood as "a pure reference to myself....the look is first an intermediary which refers me from me to myself" (BN 347) – myself qua vulnerable, embodied, limited and exposed.

Sartre's description of shame is a particularly poignant illustration of the transformation of self experienced in the presence of the other's look. When I am simply absorbed in my project of spying on people through the keyhole, he argues, I am not aware of myself as object in the world – I am immersed in the task at hand and the events revealed by it. With the appearance of another, however, my act "has undergone a coagulation; it now has a unity, a character, a name"; I experience myself as a "defined

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7 For Sartre's famous account of the shameful spy, see BN 347
person: intruder, spy, traitor” (Schroeder 183). Being ‘caught in the act’ means I am ensnared in the other’s objectifying appraisal and defined by it.

The point of particular interest here is that this self that is object only for the other is nevertheless still me; the immediate, overwhelming experience of shame is, Sartre argues, a type of confession to this. “I do not reject it as a strange image, but it is present to me as a self which I am without knowing it….It is the shame or pride which makes me live, not know the situation of being looked at” (BN 350). The mode that I am this self, Sartre argues, cannot be modeled on an a priori structure of self that I must face up to and lay hold of in its ‘mineness’. “I am this being, neither in the mode of ‘having to be’ nor in that of ‘was’; I do not find it in its being; I can not produce it directly” (BN 351). Unlike the self-ownership advocated in the Heideggerian picture of Dasein qua Jemeinigkeit, Sartre’s emphasis is on experiences of selfhood that resist and destroy our capacity for self-ownership. According to Sartre, shame reveals a dimension of myself that I cannot determine in advance or completely appropriate as my own – it, in a sense, owns me. This is particularly evident in the fact that the experience of shame is an immediate unwanted experience of self that can only arise in the presence of another subject – it is in this sense both contingent and dependent. Not only does this type of encounter involve a direct referral to the primal relationship between myself qua object and other self qua subject, it is a relationship – and corresponding dimension of selfhood – that I must rely on the other’s presence to produce. Sartre argues that it is the very contingency and facticity of such encounters – the fact that they are conditional and dependent, and not a priori – that can account both for the freedom of the other’s subjectivity, and for the fact that the encounter with this freedom creates a particular
dimension of my being. In this sense Sartre believes he can account for "a being which in its own being implies the Other's being" (BN 333) without falling into the difficulties that afflicted Heidegger's position.

Living in a shared world therefore means I am always open to a determination of self by a subject other than the self. It is the passivity of the experience, Sartre argues – the uncontrolled and involuntary nature of the objectification – that points to the subjectivity of the other. The other's free subjectivity manifests itself as a limiting of my freedom, as the "solidification and alienation of my own possibilities" (BN 352) such that the possible ways for me to be are 'infected' with the presence of the other's possibilities.

Due to this fact my relation to an object or the potentiality of an object decomposes under the Other's look and appears to me in the world as my possibility of utilizing that object, but only as this possibility on principle escapes me; that is, in so far as it is surpassed by the Other toward his own possibilities. For example, the potentiality of the dark corner becomes a given possibility of hiding in the corner by the sole fact that the Other can pass beyond it toward his possibility of illuminating the corner with his flashlight. This possibility is there, and I apprehend it but as absent, as in the Other; I apprehend it through my anguish and through my decision to give up that hiding place which is 'too risky'. Thus my possibilities are present to my unreflective consciousness insofar as the Other is watching me (BN 353).

With the presence of another being that is defined by possibility – an agent suspended among possible ways to be – I no longer 'own' the situation. "I grasp the Other not in the clear vision of what he can make out of my act but in a fear which lives all my possibilities as ambivalent" (BN 354). Unlike Heidegger's emphasis on the averageness of the intersubjective arena – the tendency to engage in the predictable and the determined in advance, Sartre's highlights the other's unpredictability – her being engaged in projects that I cannot always foresee or control. Such freedom to deviate from the average and expected profoundly alters my own projects and transforms my
relationship to possibility. In the presence of the other my possibilities become mere probabilities (BN 354). I can no longer naively rely on my different ‘abilities to be’, but must take the other’s into consideration because his presence both opens up and closes down different ways for me to be. For Sartre, then, it is the presence of other beings ‘defined’ by possibility – able to transcend the situation toward another situation undetermined by the present one – that evokes a change in how I experience my own possibilities. “I perceive that these possibilities which I am and which are the condition of my transcendence are given also to another” (BN 352). Without these others the world would be present to me simply as malleable arena in which to play out my projects – all possibilities would be mine alone. Because of their presence, however, my possibilities are illuminated as possible because they are experienced as ‘only mine’.

**Sartrean Difficulties**

Despite the effectiveness of Sartre’s phenomenological descriptions, there are serious problems with his characterization of the intersubjective encounter. The fundamental difficulty with Sartre’s account is, unsurprisingly, the exact opposite of the problem that supposedly afflicts Heidegger’s position: namely, the inability to move from the ontic to the ontological. As we noted above, Sartre believes that it is the inability to move from the ontological category to the ontic particular that undermines the validity of Heidegger’s position. But Sartre himself fails to recognize that a view of intersubjectivity in which the contingency of the ontic is so heavily emphasized will face extreme difficulties if it attempts to claim – as Sartre does – that there is an essential ‘relation of being’ between the subjects of such an encounter. Sartre’s account cannot
justify the claim that these concrete, contingent encounters essentially shape and define one’s very mode of being. Indeed, as we will see below, his effort to establish such an essential relation of dependence between subjects very quickly leads him to make conclusions with a decidedly Heideggerian ring.

A major source of difficulty is the fact that, on Sartre’s account, the relationship between self and other can only ever be that of objectifying and objectified. Because of his adherence to the Cartesian legacy and its endorsement of the subject/object model for understanding the subject’s modes of encounter, Sartre only leaves room for an either/or picture of intersubjectivity: I am either transcending the other or suffering the other’s transcedence of me. In light of this, Theunissen claims that

On the whole, the alternative of action and passion is subjected to the domination of the subject-object split, from which, according to Sartre – this is the upshot of his observation – there is for me and the Others no escape: ‘It is therefore useless for human reality to seek to get out of this dilemma: either to transcend the Other or to allow oneself to be transcended by him. The essence of relations between consciousnesses is not Mitsein, it is conflict’ (Theunissen 240, embedded quote BN 555).

The consequence of such a view, however, is that in order to overcome my object status I must effectively strip the other of his subject status. Insofar as I refuse the other’s objectification of myself and transcend him toward my own projects, the other qua free subject is lost to me – he becomes merely object. As Theunissen puts it, the price “I have to pay for the recovery of my self is the loss of the original presence of the Other” (238).

But this leaves us with a highly unappealing account of the intersubjective domain, since it will essentially rule out the ability to recognize the other as a subject while simultaneously experiencing oneself as a subject. Such a view negates the possibility of any human relationship in which both members are present to each other as subjects – as
Sartre himself recognizes in his cynical characterization of love as an interplay between sadism and masochism\(^8\).

Even if one were willing to accept this conclusion, however – claiming that our belief in such subject-to-subject relationships is mere delusion, for instance – another, more significant problem still remains. If it were indeed the case that the presence of the other qua subject is stripped from the world the moment that I transcend my own objectification, it seems unlikely that Sartre can explain the possibility of a *shared* world in which objects and activities are imbued with references to other subjects. The residue of a multitude of subjectivities is necessary for explaining the *publicity* of certain meanings, artifacts, and activities – a publicity that obtains even when I am engaged in my subjective projects, free of the objectifying gaze of the other. Though Sartre criticizes Heidegger for characterizing the relationship among Dasein as simply ‘oblique interdependence,’ it is precisely this type of interdependence that explains our everyday communal immersion in shared worldly things and projects.

On Sartre’s position, how could artifacts in the world speak to me of the presence of others unless they were accompanied by a corresponding experience of objectification, since, for Sartre, that is what experiencing the presence of another requires? One can hardly claim that the boat on the shore or the farmer’s field produces a feeling of shame

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\(^8\) Sartre claims, for instance, that “my being-as-object is the only possible relation between me and the Other” (*BN* 476) and that “we can never hold a consistent attitude toward the Other unless he is simultaneously revealed as subject and as object, as transcendence-transcending and as transcendence-transcended – which is on principle impossible” (*BN* 529). Elsewhere, however, he claims that “grace reveals freedom as a property of the Other-as-object and refers obscurely...to a transcendent beyond of which we preserve only a confused memory and which we can reach only by a radical modification of our being; that is, by resolutely assuming our being-for-others” (*BN* 521). Based on the sharp dualism of his ontology, however, it is far from clear how Sartre can make such claims – though he must, if he is to provide an adequate account of the complexity of human interaction. By avoiding this dualism from the outset, Heidegger’s position offers a more promising starting place. Indeed, Sartre’s use of ‘resolute’ here seems to be invoking Heidegger.
in me. How, then, can there be a ‘residue’ of subjectivity clinging to public objects such that these communal spaces and things – the marketplace, the train – speak to me of the presence of other subjects who are nevertheless absent? The contingency and particularity of the Sartrean encounter makes the establishment and maintenance of such intersubjective areas and artifacts impossible. If the presence of the other qua subject is torn from me the minute I transcend it toward my own free subjectivity, then so too is the trace of that other’s subjectivity lost to me in transcending the objectification necessary to experience any dimension of foreign subjectivity. Sartre leaves no room for a middle ground in his radical subject/object dualism.

A similar difficulty arises when Sartre attempts to account for the possibility of being mistaken about whether another person is present. Sartre recognizes this problem and attempts to provide an answer, but in doing so it becomes evident that he illicitly imports Heideggerian solutions – while failing to acknowledge the implications of such a move. In Being and Nothingness Sartre examines a case in which someone suddenly hears a sound behind him while spying through a keyhole. He is frozen in an experience of shameful objectification, assuming that he has been caught in the act by the gaze of the other. In reality however, this ‘other’ who has ‘seen’ him is simply the wind.

Considering his emphasis on the radically a posteriori and contingent nature of the intersubjective encounter, one would assume that Sartre must dismiss this feeling of being objectified before another subject as ‘not really’ being such an experience after all – because there is in fact no other subject present. Though this would be a counter-intuitive conclusion – that despite all of the phenomenological evidence indicating it is the same type of experience, it cannot be an experience of objectification because the
concrete other actually looking at me is absent – it would be the conclusion most consistent with his position. Rather than dismissing the experience evoked by the sound of the wind as a false sense of being-seen, however, Sartre concludes that the experience is in fact one of objectification before another subject – but in this case the other subject just happens to be physically absent. Indeed, in the case of such mistaken experiences of being looked at, he claims,

Far from disappearing with my first alarm, the Other is present everywhere, below me, above me, in the neighboring rooms, and I continue to feel profoundly my being-for-others... if each creak announces to me a look, his is because I am already in the state of being-looked-at. What then is it which falsely appeared and which was self-destructive when I discovered the false-alarm? It is not the Other-as-subject, nor is it his presence to me. It is the Other's facticity; that is, the contingent connection between the Other and an object-being in my world. Thus what is doubtful is not the Other himself, it is the Other's being-there; i.e., that concrete, historical event which we can express by the words, 'There is someone in this room.' (BN 370).

But if the experience of another subjectivity does not require the concrete encounter with another factic subject, in what way has Sartre moved beyond Heidegger's account? Has Sartre escaped the critiques he has leveled against Heideggerian 'being-with'? It is far from clear that he has. Sartre himself eventually seems to fall into an a priori account of the experience of the other. As Theunissen queries, "How can the indubitability of the 'Other itself' be saved when the 'historical and concrete event' of being looked at sinks into mere probability?" (241). It is clear that the very contingency and facticity that differentiated Sartre's position from Heidegger's has been abandoned; "now, on the contrary, Sartre defends the indubitability of the subject-Other at the expense of its facticity" (Theunissen 241).

The possibility of denying that his position falls into a type of 'Heideggerian' social apriority may still be open to Sartre, however, if he characterizes such instances
of the residual or mistaken presence of other subjects as somehow remnants of a primal concrete encounter that inaugurates the experience of oneself as seen object in the world. The very first encounter with the factually present other’s look may grant me a dimension of the self that was unavailable to me without it, but the encounter changes me such that this dimension is henceforth always present in some manner, regardless of whether there is a concrete other looking at me right now. In other words, the ontic encounter has ontological implications.

In order to adopt such a position, however, Sartre’s position would be required to change rather significantly – he would have to renounce his characterization of the intersubjective encounter as a type of constant oscillation between objectifying and objectified, and introduce the possibility of another type of encounter. Recall that it is the objectifying gaze of others that gives me a dimension of selfhood unavailable in their absence – a dimension of self whose contingency is therefore guaranteed by the dependence of my being on the presence of the other to produce it. In transcending and objectifying the other’s freedom, then, I lose all traces of the other’s presence qua subject – including this aspect of the self that bespeaks the encounter with another subjectivity. Sartre’s characterization of intersubjectivity along sharp subject/object lines means that the encounter with another subject cannot change me essentially: the ontic encounter has no ontological implications. His reference to the ‘presence’ of an Other despite her ‘absence’ in concrete facticity, then, is not a concept that is available to him.

Indeed, later in Being and Nothingness Sartre will characterize such either/or modes of understanding subjectivity – which involve a constant vacillation between passivity and activity, facticity and transcendence – as bad faith. According to Sartre, the
person in bad faith attempts to avoid coming to terms with a synthesis or acceptance of
both aspects of her existence by fleeing from one to the other; she remains in "perpetual
disintegration" so that she may "slide at any time from naturalistic present to
transcendence and vice versa" (BN 99). Human nature is such that it "must be what it is
not and not be what it is," and those in bad faith take advantage of this dual nature (BN
112). David Sherman describes the variations of bad faith as follows: "To flee into
facticity is to embrace those traits which one presently possesses at the expense of those
that one might possess; to flee into transcendence is to reject those traits that one
presently possesses in favour of those which one does not yet, and might never,
possess. Similarly, Sartre's account of the relationship with the other seems to simply
adopt a bad faith style this radical distinction between a pure transcending objectification
of the other and a purely passive being-objectified. His characterization of the encounter
with another subject condemns him to a type of intersubjective bad faith; indeed, he
himself seems to recognize the bad faith nature of his position when he characterizes
sadism and masochism as equally doomed attempts to believe oneself to be either pure
subject or pure object.

Despite his claims, then, that encountering the other necessarily involves a radical
bifurcation of the self into either subject-seeing or object-seen, his account nevertheless
retains the possibility of an encounter that is in 'good faith' – an encounter that
accommodates the simultaneity of our passivity and activity, our seeing and being seen.
This possibility is present in the ambiguity between facticity and freedom characterizing
the fact that experiencing oneself as object before the look of the other maintains

9 Sherman, David. "Camus' Meurault and Sartrian Irresponsibility." Philosophy and Literature, Vol. 19,
10 See BN 491-493, 517-528
subjective dimensions of self-consciousness – as we saw in shame – as well as the awareness of one’s capacity to reverse the objectification by turning the transcending look back upon the other. I am never pure object if I am able to recover my position of subjectivity by reversing the objectifying/objectified dynamic. Such a blurring of the subject/object divide demands a more complex characterization of the intersubjective encounter, however, than Sartre’s constant, mutually exclusive oscillation between subject and object status.\textsuperscript{11}

What, then, have we learned from the encounter with Sartre? It seems clear that the role of the freedom and contingency of the other in her particularity must be an essential dimension of the intersubjective encounter, if, like Sartre, we agree that “We encounter the Other; we do not constitute him” (BN 336). With notions such as shame, Sartre powerfully articulates this notion – that the presence of the other grants me a dimension of my being that is unavailable through my own constituting powers. But if such encounters are to involve a type of ‘dependence of being’ between subjects – such that my very way of being in the world is essentially, structurally altered by these encounters – their effect must have greater ‘staying power’ than Sartre’s position can accommodate. In its fleetingness and its ultimate lack of necessary connection to the concrete presence of the other, Sartre is ultimately unable to support his own claims.

By taking our cue from the above notion of ontic events of encounter that have ontological implications, however, we may be able to navigate a way between the extremes of Sartre’s pure contingent facticity – an account that cannot do justice to the ‘residue’ of social presence that remains despite the absence of concrete others – and the

\textsuperscript{11} Sartre himself seems to recognize this in his turn to Marxism, characterizing the relationship between agents engaged in a shared political project as a type of good faith. See *Search for a Method*. Hazel E. Barnes, trans. New York: Vintage Books, 1968.
danger of losing the individual other in the anonymity of \emph{a priori} categories. As I will argue extensively in the chapters to come, it is, in fact, just \textit{this} position that is the correct interpretation of what Heidegger means by \textit{Mitsein} – an ontological dimension that is ultimately dependent on ontic encounters. In order to demonstrate how a proper understanding of Heidegger’s ontological category ‘being-with’ will allow us to avoid these extremes, however, we must discover the sense in which this dimension of Dasein’s way of being is to be understood as an ‘\emph{a priori} category’ at all. As I will show in the following chapter, Heidegger’s existential analytic must be understood as a type of reformulation of the traditional concept of the \emph{a priori} – a reformulation that will allow him to more adequately characterize the other’s presence as what Sartre calls a “contingent necessity” (\textit{BN} 336). Kiesel notes this at the very beginning of \textit{Being and Time}:

\begin{quote}
Fundamental ontology is not to be developed from generic universals which indifferently subsume their instances, but rather from the distributive universals of ‘in each case mine’ (\textit{je meines}) according to the circumstances (\textit{je nach dem}). It requires universals which maintain an essential reference to their differentiation into ontic instances (\textit{SZ} 42). (426).
\end{quote}
CHAPTER IV:
Heideggerian ‘A Prioricity’ and the Categories of Being

We have seen that Sartre’s account of intersubjective encounters bases the recognition of the other’s subjectivity on one’s own experience of objectification, thereby leading him to fall into the same difficulty that he accuses Heidegger’s account of endorsing: namely, that I may have the experience that is supposedly unique to encountering another person in the absence of anyone’s concrete presence. Sartre accounts for the fact that my experience of the world is heavy with the presence of others by assuming a Heidegger-style position that takes a social dimension of experience to be a necessary condition of my very way of being in the world. Not only does Sartre fail to go beyond Heidegger’s position in this regard, but in the following sections I will demonstrate that the primary motivation for Sartre’s critique of Heidegger’s position – the fact that it seems to preclude the concrete immediacy of another person from being experienced as such – does not apply. In order to do so, I will show that the existential category through which I recognize others is itself responsive to and dependent on particular concrete encounter experiences.

Despite Heidegger’s claim that Dasein’s way of being grounds the frameworks of understanding through which the world has meaning, these frameworks nevertheless adapt in light of the way things are. As we noted in Chapter I, in Dasein’s disclosing of that which it encounters, “innerworldly beings themselves are freed,…freed for their own possibilities” (BT 144-145/135-136). Though Dasein encounters the world as meaningful through its projects, it does not simply ‘project’ meaning onto things.
arbitrarily, but is responsive to the way things are. But if Heidegger grounds the meaning of particular entities in referential totalities of meaning that are themselves grounded in human categories of understanding and projects of existing, can he legitimately claim such responsiveness to the thing’s kind of being?

Such difficulties are reminiscent of the powerful critique of Heidegger’s theory of truth that Ernst Tugendhat levels in his *Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger*. Tugendhat accuses Heidegger of being unable to account for how the thing known can act as a standard according to which the way of knowing it – the mode of ‘unconcealing’ – can be assessed for accuracy. According to Tugendhat, Heidegger simply equates ‘truth’ with ‘unconcealing,’ thereby dropping truth’s normative dimension, which demands that the latter – in order for it to be *true* – must reveal the thing as *it is in itself*, and not simply in whatever way one’s pre-existing horizons of understanding happen to reveal it:

…it is here a question not of bringing the subject-matter to givenness but of validating the givenness with reference to the subject-matter. Only through this second direction does the first acquire a validity, so that the revealing, which would otherwise be arbitrary, is directed toward the entity as it is itself (Tugendhat 1996, 234).

By defining truth as simple disclosure, argues Tugendhat, Heidegger is guilty of “giving up the regulative idea of certainty and the postulate of a critical foundation” (1996, 240).

The relationship between Tugendhat and Sartre’s critiques is evident: the latter claims that Dasein’s way of being may conceal or distort the person as she is in herself by subsuming her to established frameworks of understanding that are themselves not open to critique or revision in terms of their accuracy in revealing her. Though Tugendhat and

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those who follow him\textsuperscript{2} aim their critique at the arbitrariness and relativism of Heidegger's historically and culturally determined horizons of meaning – and Sartre's emphasis is on being-with as \textit{a priori} structure – Tugendhat merely expands on Sartre's fundamental point: that on Heidegger's account of experience, the way things are encountered – whether persons or otherwise – is not held to any standard whereby Dasein's categories and interpretive frameworks can and should get the things right \textit{as they are in themselves}.

The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that this fundamental point is not the case for Heidegger – whether it takes the form of the Sartrean or 'Tugendhatian' critique. Heidegger recognized that interpretive understanding can be more or less responsive to the way something really is; it can "draw the conceptuality belonging to the beings to be interpreted from these themselves or else force them into concepts to which beings are opposed in accordance with their kind of being" (\textit{BT} 150/141). Indeed, as Henry Pietersma notes, the former is what Heidegger means by 'letting be' (\textit{Seinlassen}): "An agent lets something be if he allows his actions to be determined by the nature of the things in the environment or world, rather than imposing his own preconceived ideas"\textsuperscript{3}.

Investigating the nature of this responsiveness and sensitivity of one's interpretations to the beings to be interpreted comprised a significant part of Heidegger's philosophical inquiry – particularly his early work – which is largely oriented toward finding a theory of categories that both accounts for the 'objective validity' of knowledge – its binding character – as well as its conceptual, 'subjective' status. Despite claims regarding the dependence of truth on Dasein, then, such as: "all truth is relative to the

\textsuperscript{2} See, for example, Christina Lafont's \textit{Heidegger, Language and World-Disclosure}. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

being of Da-sein” (BT 227/208), this ‘subjective’ element does not compromise truth’s
objectivity. For Heidegger, Dasein’s un concealing of particular beings through a priori
structures and historical frameworks of meaning is exempted from
the province of ‘subjective’ arbitrariness and brings discovering Da-sein before
beings themselves.... The ‘universal validity’ of truth, too, is rooted solely in the
fact that Da-sein can discover and free beings in themselves. Only thus can this
being in itself be binding for every possible statement, that is, for every possible
way of pointing them out (BT 227/208-209).

The problem, as Heidegger saw it, was one of navigating between a Kantian idealism and
an Aristotelian realism; both of which failed to adequately account for one or the other
feature of knowledge⁴.

Every experience is in itself an encounter and indeed an encounter in and for an
act of caring. The basic character of the object is therefore always this: it stands,
and is met with, on the path of care; it is experienced as meaningful. To interpret
what is meant by saying that the world ‘is there’ (i.e., to interpret the character of
the actuality of the world of factual life) is neither as easy as transcendental
theory of knowledge imagines nor so self-evident and unproblematic as realism
believes (PIA 68-69).

Heidegger thus clearly recognized both the need for – and the extreme difficulties
involved in providing – a theory of Dasein’s categories in which they are constrained by
the particular things known such that both ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ dimensions of
knowing are accommodated. In demonstrating that Dasein is responsive or “beholden”⁵
to the concrete particularity of the things known, the claim that Dasein cannot encounter
or learn from individual others as such is called into question. Though he did not analyze
the nature of ‘being-with’ in this regard, I will show both that Heidegger’s work develops

⁴ Crowell, Steven. Husserl, Heidegger and the Space of Meaning: Paths Toward Transcendental
⁵ This term comes from John Haugeland’s “Truth and Finitude: Heidegger’s Transcendental
Existentialism.” Heidegger, Authenticity, and Modernity. Mark Wrathall and Jeff Malpas, eds.,
a theory of responsive categories, and that it can be successfully applied to the case of being-with, though Heidegger himself failed to do so in detail.

**Encountering Things**

Before examining the social encounter, we will turn first to the way in which Heidegger most recognizably distinguishes between ‘subject-dependent’ and ‘subject-independent’ reality – between Dasein’s arbitrary subsumption of things to its categories, and the constrained responsiveness of the categories to the things themselves: his distinction between *zuhanden*, or available, ‘handy’ things; and *vorhanden*, objectively present, ‘occurrence’ things. The obvious emphasis on Dasein’s *zuhanden* way of being throughout *Being and Time* is largely responsible for the tendency to interpret Heidegger as claiming that all meaning is simply imposed on things in terms of their practical usability for Dasein’s projects, whether these projects are understood in terms of an individual constituting ‘ego’ (idealism) or socially determined roles and norms (pragmatism).

Despite Heidegger’s emphasis on our primarily *zuhanden* mode of encountering things, however, thingly encounters can nevertheless provide a resistance to Dasein’s interpretive categories and frameworks against which the truth of these frameworks may be measured. Taylor Carman makes note of this in *Heidegger’s Analytic*[^6], arguing that the distinction between *zuhanden* and *vorhanden* things allows Heidegger to acknowledge the reality of entities independent of human practice, and therefore to recognize that what motivates the realist/idealist distinction cannot simply be ‘done away with’. Similarly, argues Carman, these ontological categories of occurrence and

availability don’t stand in any metaphysical order of primacy. Though Heidegger stresses the zuhanden throughout Being and Time, this is due to 1.) a priority in the order of discovery and 2.) the fact that “our familiarity with available things…. is a condition of our interpretation of entities as having some definite, specifiable character, for example, as cognizable objects with determinate properties standing in objective relations” (Carman 2003, 196). Heidegger’s point is not that things cannot or do not exist independently of human meanings and practices; rather, his point is that recognizing or experiencing such independent existence will require an ‘unnatural,’ distanced, ‘apactical’ attitude toward these things – an attitude fostered, for example, in philosophy and the sciences: “Not free from prejudice but free for the possibility of giving up a prejudice at the decisive moment on the basis of a critical encounter with the subject matter. That is the form of existence of a scientific human.7

Such an attitude is secondary to the ordinary mode of practical engagement with the world, and must be recognized as a type of achievement. Heidegger recognizes the possibility of a stance toward the world characterized by such a “critical encounter with the subject matter,” but argues that such ‘ideally objective’ world interpretations only arise through the bracketing or loss of the practices that ordinarily give things their meaning. Though experiencing things in abstraction from our ordinary contexts of relevance is not our ordinary way of encountering them, then, it is not impossible. Indeed, as Charles Taylor notes in “Engaged Agency and Background,” the legacy of modern philosophy has been to ‘ontologize’ this ability; “The disengaged perspective,

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which might better have been conceived as a rare and regional achievement of a knowing agent whose normal stance was engaged, was read into the very nature of mind”

Heidegger’s distinction between zuhanden and vorhanden modes of experience is similar to John Searle’s distinction between ‘institutional’ and ‘brute’ facts; the former being characterized as facts that “require human institutions for their existence,” while the latter “require no human institutions for their existence” (1995, 2). Unlike Searle, however, who takes ‘brute facts’ to be primary because institutional facts must have some physical realization, Heidegger argues that understanding ‘brute facts’ as such is the consequence of a particular type of practical breakdown that allows me to recognize the radical independence of things from how I understand them – it provokes a shift from zuhanden to vorhanden modes of being. Heidegger’s well-worn example of such breakdown is of the damaged hammer that interrupts and resists my practical activity of hammering, requiring me to stop and assess the hammer in terms of its objective, occurrent qualities. Such breakdown need not always result in a shift from zuhanden to vorhanden however – I may simply adapt to what is broken or missing or getting in the way and continue with my projects. According to Heidegger, however,

The more urgently we need what is missing and the more truly it is encountered in its unhandiness, all the more obtrusive does what is at hand become, such that it seems to lose the character of handiness. It reveals itself as something merely objectively present, which cannot be budged without the missing element. As a deficient mode of taking care of things, the helpless way in which we stand before it discovers the mere objective presence of what is at hand (BT 73/69).

In every case, however, this deficient, helpless mode is a derivative of my everyday practical coping. Depending on what is normally ‘at hand’ as a thing available for my projects – be it ‘brute’ physical things such as rocks, or social things such as

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money – there are various ways in which these modes of caring engagement can become
deficient. In the case of ‘brute’ physical reality, this type of practical distance and its
corresponding recognition of occurrent independence is precisely the mode of
comportment that is nurtured in the physical sciences. Indeed, because of the primary
role that the physical sciences play in our social self-understandings, the derivative nature
of the *vorhanden* from the *zuhanden* – of the theoretical from the practical – is often
obscured.

The role that our own body plays in the practical context of knowledge, for
example, is generally masked by a scientific understanding that takes our physical size,
orientation and makeup as foundational for knowledge – but without acknowledging it as
such. The ‘physical world’ is experienced as being composed of a certain set of ‘brute
facts’ taken to be ‘independent’ of us because we have already dealt with the ‘brute fact’
of being endowed with particular types of bodies. We encounter ‘medium-sized’ objects
as objects – but we have a much harder time experiencing quarks or planets as such.
Experiencing things like ‘mountains’ and ‘snow’ only makes sense “against the
background of this kind of embodiment….the nature of this experience is formed by this
constitution, and how the terms in which this experience is described are thus given their
sense only in relation to this form of embodiment” (Taylor 319). Though experiences of
resistance and breakdown may be more difficult to achieve for such foundational and
generally unrecognized practical interpretive frameworks as those of embodiment, they
too are possible. This is evident, for example, not only in quantum and Einsteinian
physics, but in types of ‘abnormal’ experiences accomplished in meditation, illness, or

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substance abuse. For Heidegger, the most extreme form of such ‘loss of handiness’ in engaging with the world arises through angst, being-toward-death, and the call of conscience – the modes of disclosure whereby worldly significance itself falls away\(^\text{10}\).

Though the primary way that one understands things on Heidegger’s account is in terms of their practical usability, then, this practical priority does not therefore commit him to antirealism. Underlying all of my practical engagements is the threat of a resistance ranging from broken hammers to broken worlds\(^\text{11}\). Despite this eternal threat of failure, however, the groundedness of cognition in human practical care for its own existence indicates that ways of understanding things other than as ‘available’ for projects will be secondary or derivative modes of understanding. As Chapter II’s discussion of mineness and Dasein’s worldly self-understandings indicated, however, it is precisely the possibility of failure that gives success its meaning. It is just this point – that Dasein cares for its own existence, and measures its success in expressing this care through worldly engagements – that will allow us to recognize the normative dimension of the world’s resistance to my practical modes of comportment.

Though the mere resistance of things to certain practical interpretive frameworks will demonstrate that Dasein’s frameworks are not all-powerful or unquestionable in terms of meaning-constitution, then, the question remains as to whether there is some standard according to which one interpretive framework can be deemed more accurate.

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\(^{10}\) Carman argues that in angst even occurrent entities are experienced through a kind of breakdown that reveals their strangeness and radical otherness, which demonstrates that Heidegger must be read as a variety of realist: “Anxiety thus reveals what Dasein always already understands about occurrent reality, namely, that it is radically, stubbornly, awesomely independent of us and our abilities, our hopes, our fears, indeed the very conditions of our interpretations of things at large” (2003, 195).

than others in the face of practical breakdown. Recall that to overcome Tugendhat’s
critique, it is not enough for there to be mere resistance to arbitrary ‘unconcealments’; the
resistance must be normatively determined by the nature of the thing as it is in itself.
Though the appropriateness of a mode of concealing will generally depend on the
practical context for Heidegger, in the case of breakdown there will invariably be cases in
which the appropriateness and truth of the entire practical framework of interpretation is
itself called into question.

As John Haugeland articulates in his article “Truth and Finitude: Heidegger’s
Transcendental Existentialism,” the issue is such that

...if there is to be a significant distinction between ‘getting an entity right’ and
failing to do so, there must be some way – some feasible and nonarbitrary way –
of telling it in particular cases....Comportments in themselves, however, do not
wear their ontical truth on their sleeves. Therefore, something else, some further
comportment or comportments, must be involved in telling whether they are true
or not. So the question at this point resolves into these: how can some
comportments impugn the ontical truth of others? And, supposing they can, how
can the choice among them be nonarbitrary?12.

Haugeland addresses himself to this problem by arguing that “Dasein’s self-disclosing is
“inseparable from a disclosing of the being of other entities,” (2000, 58) because “in
knowing how to be me, I must know how to deal with the entities amidst which I work
and live – indeed, these are often just two ways of looking at the same know-how” (2000,
58-59). This claim recalls us to the discussion of mineness, where Dasein’s care for its
own being pushes it to seek standards of self-assessment within its practical engagements
with worldly things. Though Dasein tends to ‘take it easy’ by simply accepting the truth
of these worldly standards, the close relationship between self and world-disclosure

12 “Truth and Finitude: Heidegger’s Transcendental Existentialism.” Heidegger, Authenticity, and
brings with it a requirement that those who dismiss Heidegger as an idealist or a relativist
tend to overlook; namely, because I assess myself in terms of the entities with which I am
engaged, I need to know if I am getting them right in some sense.

If ontical truth, 'getting the entities right,' is a distinctive possibility and aim of
ontical comportment," argues Haugeland, "then there must be a difference between
those comportments that are true in this sense and those that are not, a difference that
depends on the entities themselves, and that the comportments undertake to be on one
side of. The effect is that comportments must be, in a distinctive way, beholden to
the entities toward which they are comportments (2000, 54).

On Haugeland's view, the gauge for determining the accuracy of one's
interpretive schemes is their mutual compatibility; comportments throw the truth of each
other into question when they are mutually incompatible, when the entities themselves
would be impossible if both comportments have 'gotten it right'\textsuperscript{13}. Being a good Satanist
and being a good sister cannot both be true, since sisterhood involves norms of kindness,
generosity, forgiveness, etc. that are directly antithetical to Satan worshippers (or so I
understand). An important aspect of the ability of one comportment to impugn the truth
of another, however, is that the person involved is immersed in an orientation bent on
truth-finding; an orientation in which conflicts and impossibilities are unacceptable.
Such unacceptability encourages one to make a choice between the incompatible
interpretations and to engage in procedures of confirmation and clarification such that
this choice is not – or not completely – arbitrary.

But why are such ostensible impossibilities unacceptable? As we noted above, since
my ability to be depends on the possibilities specified by social norms governing the way
I comport myself in the world, how I deal with entities – the truth of my comportments

\textsuperscript{13} Hubert Dreyfus and Charles Spinosa similarly argue that it is the conflict of incommensurable worlds
that allows us to recognize that things exist independently of our interpretive or experiential frameworks
(See "Coping with Things in Themselves: A Practice-Based Phenomenological Basis of Robust Realism."
toward them – directly relates to my ability to be me. The consequence of understanding
the relationship between the disclosure of world and the disclosure of self in this way –
their mutual implication, so to speak – allows Haugeland to recognize some important
(and often misunderstood) aspects of Heidegger's position.

My self understanding, therefore presupposes that I understand the being of the
entities amid which I live....But, if my self-understanding depends on my
understanding of the being of other entities, then I must be able to project those
entities onto their possibilities. This ability, therefore, belongs essentially to my
ability-to-be me. My ability to project those entities onto their possibilities is not
merely another possibility onto which I project myself, but is rather part of my
ability to project myself onto my own possibilities at all. In other words, my self-
understanding literally incorporates an understanding of the being of other
entities (2000, 59).

Our engagements with things are definitive of who we are, and we care about who
we are; the result being that we care about the consistency and appropriateness of our
engagements with things. Getting things right is one of the most fundamental ways of
ascertaining whether, loosely speaking, we have gotten ourselves right. Though the
achievement of a disinterested knowing whereby we can explicitly test the consistency of
our practical, interested knowing is a derivative mode of being, it is nevertheless a
permanent possibility based on the world's resistance to our practical frameworks and the
fact that we care about what this resistance says about who we are. One's care about
getting something right – care for the truth and consistency – is rooted in the fact that one
is entrusted with the mineness of one's own existence. The possibility of the
disinterested knowing that this self-responsibility allows undermines the dictatorship of
Zuhandenheit's subsumption of worldly things to the category of usability.
Encountering Others: The *A Priori* Nature of Being-With

Though resistance to Dasein's interpretive categories is evident in the possibility of the *Vorhanden* interrupting the *Zuhanden*, and the re-engagement with the practical seems to be constrained by Dasein's desire to reach an accurate world and self-understanding, it is not yet clear how this will help us solve Sartre's difficulty, since Heidegger explicitly claims that the occurrent and the available are not modes of being that can apply to encountering *other Dasein*\(^\text{14}\). Being-with is essentially different than the worldly categories of practical interpretation; indeed, its nature qua *a priori* grants it a radically different categorial status. This fundamental distinction between being-among things and being-with others is evident in his claim that "being-in-the-world is with equal originality both being-with and being-among" (*BPP* 278). Heidegger elaborates further by articulating how encounters with the other are worldly but nevertheless not *thingly* – i.e. occurrent or available – because others are themselves Dasein:

Taking care of things is a character of being which being-with cannot have as its own, although this kind of being is a *being-toward* beings encountered in the world, as is taking care of things. The being to which Da-sein is related as being-with does not, however, have the kind of being of useful things at hand; it is itself Dasein (*BT* 121/114).

Note the unequivocal claim that Dasein *cannot* encounter others as it does things. Not only is the mode of being of the others different from that of things, then, but so too is the manner in which I encounter and interact with them.

\(^{14}\) In *Ethics and Finitude: Heideggerian Contributions to Moral Philosophy* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000) Lawrence Hatab argues that the interruption of empathic engagement with others – an interruption that occurs in the deficient modes of Fürsorge – can be taken as analogous to the breakdown of *Zuhandenheit* that gives rise to *Vorhandenheit*. See pg. 65-66,143-145. However, despite his claim that "Empathy could then serve as an existential exemplar, as a kind of measure for a significant range of ethical matters" (145) he fails to offer an account of how this type of normal empathic 'going-along-with' is to act as a normative constraint. We will return to this in Chapter VI.
Commentators have argued that such claims, though present in Heidegger, are nevertheless undermined by the priority that his work consistently gives to zufinden and vorhanden – thingly – existence. As Michael Theunissen articulates, “regardless of the declared fact that Dasein-with cannot be traced back to the ready-to-hand [Zuhanden]” (181), Heidegger’s emphasis is nevertheless on the experience of the other as mediated by the ready-to-hand. The point, argues Theunissen, is not “the dependence of one kind of being upon another but of the inner order of the event of encountering. However, for Heidegger, in this order (and this must be firmly grasped) equipment is the first to be encountered” (181). Heidegger’s claim that we encounter others through the world indicates, for Theunissen, that despite all claims to the contrary, being-with others has a derivative and secondary status to being-among things.

It is far from clear that this is the case for Heidegger, however; though equipment may be the first to be encountered in Being and Time’s analyses, this does not mean that Dasein’s existence is fraught with this priority – that I first encounter stuff and then infer the presence of others. Heidegger explicitly denies this: “The others who are ‘encountered’ in the context of useful things in the surrounding world at hand are not somehow added on in thought to an initially merely objectively present thing, but these ‘things’ are encountered from the world in which they are at hand for the others” (BT 118/111). Though Heidegger begins his discussion of being-in-the-world with an analysis of the way that things exist, he indicates that he does not address the being of other persons at this point not only because he wants to simplify the initial discussion, but
...above all, because the kind of being of the existence of the others encountered within the surrounding world is distinct from handiness and objective presence [Zuhandenheit and Vorhandenheit]. The world of Da-sein thus frees beings which are not only completely different from tools and things, but which themselves in accordance with their kind of being as Da-sein are themselves 'in' the world as being-in-the-world in which they are at the same time encountered. These beings are neither objectively present nor at hand, but they are like the very Da-sein which frees them – they are there, too, and there with it (BT 118/111).

Encountering others ‘in’ the world does not mean that there is some sort of equipmental screen thrown up between me and others – the other is not simply "mediated by equipment," as Theunissen claims (182); equipment is ‘mediated’ by the other. Though I may experience the ‘presence’ of others despite their absence in terms of equipment — in the cultivated field, for example – the encounter is experienced as ‘personal’ insofar as particular dimensions of the equipment are salient. I do not recognize the other through this or that expanse of dirt – I recognize her in terms of its relevance (BT 118/111): in the trace of her purposive activity, in the fact that this expanse of dirt is cultivated.

These others do not stand in the referential context of the environing world, but are encountered in that with which they have to do, in the ‘with which’ of their preoccupation as the ones who are preoccupied with it. They are encountered as they are in their being-in-the-world, not as chance occurrences but as the ones who till the field” (HCT 240).

This is a point to which we will be returning below. It is important to be clear, however, that worldly encounters with others do not preclude directly encountering these others because their worldliness is somehow taken to grant priority to Dasein’s thingly modes of encounter. For Heidegger, the thingly does not have priority over the social dimension of worldly encounter. Indeed, it will become clear that the priority is precisely the opposite in the ‘inner order of the event of encountering’ – though this priority is forgotten and concealed in our everyday way of being. As we will come to see, without encountering
the others with whom this world is co-constituted, the inner-worldly things that Dasein encounters in Zuhandenheit or Vorhandenheit modes would be inaccessible.

Despite the tendency of ontological interpretations to equate our equipmental, zuhanden mode of thingly encounter with the indifference of our everyday modes of being-with, then, Heidegger is clear that “ontologically there is an essential distinction between the ‘indifferent’ being together of arbitrary things and the not-mattering-to-one-another of beings who are with one another” (BT 121-122/114). For Heidegger, the way in which the being of other Dasein is disclosed differs fundamentally and categorially from the way in which things are disclosed, despite the tendency of ontological theorizing to reduce all to the same: “…being-toward-others is ontologically different from being toward objectively present things. The ‘other’ being itself has the kind of being of Da-sein. Thus, in being with and toward others, there is a relation of being from Da-sein to Da-sein” (BT 124/117).

If the encounter with other Dasein is fundamentally different than the zuhanden and vorhanden modes of engagement with worldly things, then, the above discussion regarding the thingly resistance that evokes the shift from the former to the latter will not allow us to meet Sartre’s criticism, though it will become clear that in both cases – the thingly and the social encounter – Dasein’s self-responsible way of being qua mineness plays an essential role. To refute Sartre’s critique we must demonstrate that individual others offer some principled resistance to the a priori category being-with. In order to do so, we must first determine how Heidegger’s existential analytic characterizes the a priori categories of experience in general.
The Heideggerian *A Priori*

In contrast to traditional characterizations of the *a priori* as an unchanging, complete set of categories, Heidegger’s aim in *Being and Time* is to ground the *a prioricity* of the ‘I’ in its particular existence, emphasizing the fact that the *existence* character of the ‘I’ is precisely what cannot be bracketed. The existential analytic’s shift away from traditional accounts lies in its insistence on recognizing that the *'a priori'* categories are only ever found within this or that Dasein’s particular, finite existing. Thus Heidegger asserts in the first pages of *Being and Time* that questioning the meaning of being cannot simply be assumed as an abstract ability belonging universally to all things of the type ‘human,’ because the attitudes and activities of inquiry are “themselves modes of being of a particular being, of the being we inquirers ourselves in each case are” (*BT* 7/5-6). In other words, such abilities cannot be understood in abstraction from the concrete context of the particular life in which they come to be, but must be profoundly responsive to it in its concrete particularity:

> These investigations have the peculiar character of leading out form the discipline [of phenomenology] to a peculiar connection of phenomena: existence. Becoming free from the discipline for existence itself. This ‘becoming free means seizing the possibilities of making this existence itself the theme of a research determined by existence itself’ (*IPR* 81).

So too, then, must questioning the meaning of social encounter be grounded in the modes of Dasein’s concrete existing. If we are to fully understand the implications of Heidegger’s shift to the existential analytic, we must examine the manner in which the ontological categories determining Dasein’s way of being – including being-with – are themselves shaped by the ontic existence in which they play their interpretive role. To take seriously the fact that the mode of being of Dasein is always this or that finite,
factual existence involves recognizing that the categories are themselves *dependent* on the particular beings encountered in that existence. For Heidegger, ontic encounters reveal and evoke the ontological categories operating within my existence; they initiate and enrich them. Heidegger’s claim that “Ontology has an ontical foundation” (*BPP* 19) means not only that the question of the meaning of being arises in the ontic existence of concrete Dasein; it also points to concrete encounters as the necessary condition for the possibility of an ontological category’s meaning *holding* for what it does. This does not mean that there must always be concrete particulars present if the category is to be operating – since this would return us to Sartre’s difficulty in explaining residual traces or false alarm experiences – but they must have been present at some point if this category is to be at work in a particular Dasein’s existence. Dasein’s categories of being cannot easily be defined as ‘ontic’ or ‘ontological,’ then, insofar as they designate a constitutive ontological dimension of being-in-the-world that nevertheless stipulates an ontic condition – a type of ‘contingent necessity.’ To exist as a finite being is to always already exist in certain determinate possibilities that involve encountering concrete particulars.\(^{15}\) The implication of this claim is that if I had never encountered another Dasein then the category of understanding specific to others would be unavailable, since it is dependent on the intuited beings that exist in their own right. In other words, in the complete absence of particular instances of concrete encounter, there could be no genuine ‘being-with’.

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\(^{15}\) This claim is reminiscent of Paul Ricoeur’s critique of analytic thought experiments about the nature of selfhood – particularly in Derek Parfit’s *Reasons and Persons*. Ricoeur argues that “What the puzzling cases render radically contingent is this corporeal and terrestrial condition which the hermeneutics of existence, underlying the notion of acting and suffering, takes to be insurmountable” *Oneself as Another*, Kathleen Blamey, trans. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992. p. 150. In the case of *being-with*, what the ‘hermeneutics of existence’ takes to be insurmountable is not the concrete fact of embodiment and rootedness on the Earth, but the concrete fact of encounters with individual others.
This is a somewhat controversial claim, considering traditional notions of the *a priori* and the fact that Heidegger’s views seem to be ambiguous at points – he claims, for example, that despite ontology’s ontic foundation, “being and its attributes in a certain way underlie beings and precede them and so are a proteron, an earlier” (*BPP* 20). This appears to be a clear statement of the ontic’s ontological foundation, and those who interpret Heidegger as advocating a type of uncomplicated transcendental idealism understand such statements as making just such an assertion.

Though we will be examining the relationship of Heidegger’s characterization of the *a priori* to insights he takes from Kant, it is first important to note that his thought was profoundly affected by Husserl’s work in this regard, whether explicitly acknowledged or not. Heidegger’s intent was to reformulate the categories, and in doing so he followed Husserl in his rejection of the Kantian assumption that a complete, pre-established set of categories could simply be deduced from a logical architectonic or taken over from the philosophical tradition. As László Tengelyi notes, “Husserl’s main contention, on the contrary, is that the categories, far from arising through reflection upon certain intentional acts, have their origin in the fulfillment of some intentional acts”16. Heidegger continues this Husserlian notion of the *a priori* as originating in particular modes of encounter. He expands on it, however, by emphasizing the manner in which such modes of encounter are deeply implicated in who it is to be me:

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...the 'problem of facticity' is not that of the transcendental determination of the individual out of ultimate logical laws. For the original facticity is not an absolute consciousness...but rather a primal reality ever to be experienced, the self in the actualization of life-experience...It is to be experienced not by taking cognizance of it, but by vital participation in it, being distressed by it, troubled and put out of case, so that the troubled self who 'minds' or 'cares' is continually affected (betroffen) by this affliction (Kisiel 135).

Heidegger also differs from Husserl by maintaining a crucial aspect of the Kantian approach – as we will examine further below – by demonstrating that these modes are all types of responsiveness to temporal intuition, which provides the horizon within which all category-initiating and enriching encounters may occur. Thus Theodore Kisiel will note in *The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being & Time* that, for Heidegger, philosophy’s...investigative ‘how’ is the interpretation of life’s sense of being in terms of its fundamental categorial structures, that is, the ways in which factic life temporalizes itself and so speaks with itself...its chosen object has entrusted it with the original ontological conditions of possibility of any worldview, as something to be interrogated and made manifest only in strict research. These conditions, understood categorically, are not ‘logical forms’ but rather the genuinely accessible possibilities drawn from the actual temporalization of existence (259).

In the course of this discussion it will become evident why the relationship between the ontic encounter and the *a priori* ontological structure of being-with cannot be characterized as a simple priority of the latter over the former. Though the ontological cannot be reduced to the ontic, the pitfalls of a reduction in the other direction must also be avoided:

No understanding of being is possible that would not root in a comportment toward beings. Understanding of being and comportment toward beings do not come together only afterward and by chance; always already latently present in the Dasein’s existence, they unfold as summoned from the ecstatic-horizontal constitution of temporality and as made possible by it in their belonging together. As long as this original belonging together of comportment toward beings and understanding of being is not conceived by means of temporality, philosophical inquiry remains exposed to a double danger, to which it has succumbed over and over again in its history until now. Either everything ontical is dissolved into the
ontological (Hegel), without insight into the ground of possibility of ontology itself; or else the ontological is denied altogether and explained away ontically, without an understanding of the ontological presuppositions which every ontical explanation harbors as such within itself (*BPP* 327).

As we saw in the last chapter, it is precisely this failure to understand his own ontological presuppositions that afflicted Sartre’s ontical explanations. So too does Heidegger reject the very position that Sartre accuses him of accepting, however, for he recognizes that without concrete encounters with other Dasein, the ontological category ‘being-with’ could not ‘unfold as summoned from the ecstatic-horizontal constitution of temporality’. The ontic encounter is what ‘summons’ the ontological structure to ‘unfold’ or come into concrete existence. Or, to speak more plainly, if one were born and raised in complete isolation, the social dimension of selfhood would be an ontological structure of my way of being that could not find enactment or expression in my ontic existence. Heidegger’s shift to the *existential* analytic allows him to claim that the categories of meaning only ever arise in this or that existence and are responsive to its concrete texture\(^\text{17}\). Heidegger does not want to claim that Dasein’s essential structure qua being-in-the-world means that Dasein necessarily exists – rather, he says that “If Dasein in fact exists, then its existence has the structure of being-in-the-world” (*MFL* 169). My related claim is that if Dasein in fact exists, then other Dasein also in fact exist or once existed and it is only in inaugural encounters with them that the existential category ‘being-with’ comes into being.

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\(^{17}\) Lawrence Hatab makes a similar claim about concrete ethical terms: “I want to suggest a certain feedback loop between ethics and ontology, where ethical terms imply a situated involvement that keeps ontology in concrete existential territory, and where ontological terms drawn from, and pointing back to, ethical senses can ‘ontologize’ ethics in such a way as to surmount certain doubts, restrictions, or demotions that have been part of modern moral philosophy” (Hatab 2000, 80).
One might read such an approach to the *a priori* as a direct inheritance from Husserl – though it is likely Heidegger would be unwilling to recognize it as such. Though the Husserlian epoché is often taken to distance Husserl’s account from the concreteness and contingency of being-in-the-world, Husserl’s reformulation of the Kantian *a priori* was itself an attempt to accommodate it. Tugendhat makes this point when he describes Husserl’s *a priori* as ‘hypothetical’ and ‘relative’ in character – as opposed to the absolute universality that characterized its traditional understanding. This does not undermine the necessity of its nature, but it becomes, so to speak, a *conditional* necessity, a necessity dependent on the contingent presence of things at a particular time: “Husserls Apriori an sich zwar absolute gilt, aber nur relative auf die jeweilige Sachhaltigkeit, die selbst nicht notwendig ist” (Tugendhat 1967, 165).

Thus Husserl characterizes the relationship between the intuition of individual and essence as follows:

...intuition of essence has as its basis a principle part of intuition of something individual, namely an appearing, a sightedness of something individual, though not indeed a seizing upon this nor any sort of positing as an actuality; certainly, in consequence of that, no intuition of essence is possible without the free possibility of turning one’s regard to a ‘corresponding’ individual and forming a consciousness of an example.\(^\text{18}\)

Husserl addresses this issue in the Sixth of his *Logical Investigations* with his notion of categorial intuition, which he characterizes as a type of *perception* of meaning objectivities – not simply of sensory data – which, qua perception, depends on concrete fulfillment experiences.\(^\text{19}\).

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\(^{19}\) See, in particular, sections 44-52, pp. 346-359 in The Shorter Logical Investigations. J.N. Findlay, trans., Dermot Moran, ed. New York: Routledge, 2001. Klaus Hartmann argues that phenomenology’s reliance on self-evidence in this regard is entirely unsatisfactory because “we do not know why, or on what grounds,
It is as a result of this discovery of categorial intuition, Heidegger claims, that the “original sense of the a priori” becomes intelligible, which, along with intentionality and categorial intuition, together comprise what Heidegger dubs the three “decisive discoveries” of Husserl’s phenomenology (HCT 27). This is instructive for our account, since Heidegger acknowledges that “everything categorial ultimately rests upon sense intuition” (HCT 69), as long as we understand that Sensuousness is a formal phenomenological concept and refers to all material content as it is already given by the subject matters themselves. This is to be contrasted with the proper concept of the categorial, that is, of the formal and objectively empty. Sensuousness is therefore the title for the total constellation of entities which are given beforehand in their material content (HCT 70).

Heidegger goes on to clarify that the categories are ways in which to “bring out” the “content of a subject matter” (HCT 71) and are “not something made by the subject and even less something added to the real objects, such that the real entity is itself modified by this forming. Rather, they actually present the entity more truly in its ‘being-in-itself’” (HCT 70).

Though such a category/entity or Being/beings distinction may appear to maintain the traditional Platonic and Aristotelian ‘two world’ theories of Idea/reality and Form/matter, then, for Heidegger this distinction is meant to maintain their insights while overcoming the deep divide that such theories establish; it resists the tendency to ‘ontologize’ meaning – to pass on as ‘fact’ what is really a matter of validity. As Heidegger clarifies in The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic:

thought holds of being. To claim self-evidence, and on various levels of constitution at that, does not really solve this overriding problem” Studies in Foundational Philosophy. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1988., p. 52. Hartmann does admit, however, that in the absence of a Hegelian-style approach, with Husserl’s phenomenology “what we have is much: a theory which tries to come as close as possible to wedding the quest for certainty to foundational, transcendental, and thus theoretical philosophy” (52).
Kant tries to understand the essence of categories in such a way that categories can be real determinations of objects (of appearances) without having to be empirical properties (of appearances). If determinations of being are not ontic properties of the things that are, in what way do they still belong to realitas, to the what-content of objects? Their reality, their belonging to essential content, is a transcendentality, reality, a finite, horizontal-ecstatic reality (MFL 65).

As Steven Crowell articulates in *Husserl, Heidegger and the Space of Meaning*, Heidegger followed Emil Lask – another student of Husserl – in arguing that we “grasp the category as form – not as itself an existent, but as a moment of validity”\(^{20}\). Like Lask, Heidegger understood category or ‘form’ not as mental entity ‘imposed from without’ but that which ‘holds’ for the material of which it is the form; as Crowell articulates, “if there is a plurality of forms (a ‘table’ of categories), the principle of differentiation must lie in the material itself” (2001, 101). From this – “Lask’s principle of the ‘material determination of form’ – it follows that the discovery of categories will be, as Heidegger demanded, an empirical phenomenological affair (LP 63)” (Crowell 2001, 101).

This ‘empirical phenomenological affair’ is precisely the analysis of the *a priori* in full awareness of its synthetic, contingent nature. As Tengelyi and Tugendhat note, the breakthrough of the phenomenological approach to the *a priori* – a breakthrough that Heidegger clearly followed – has to do with the origin of the categories; they cannot be deduced from a prior metaphysics, but must be attentive to the manner in which they operate in and through particular encounters in concrete existence. For Husserl – and, I would argue, for Heidegger – even “the categories of pure logical grammar are rooted in

the things present to consciousness. They are not purely formal; nor are they innate principles of mind...that are imposed upon a formless material”

According to Heidegger, the three decisive discoveries of phenomenology can ultimately be understood as determinations of the first discovery – intentionality – since “categorical intuition is just a concretion of the basic constitution of intentionality” (HCT 72) and the nature of the a priori depends on these other discoveries. This point is instructive, for it reminds us that the a priori categories and the categorical intuition on which they are based are rooted in the fundamental structure of Dasein’s way of being as transcending toward the world. It is for this reason that Heidegger will claim that the clarification of the sense of the a priori “presupposes the understanding of what we are seeking; time” (HCT 27); a claim that is only made good – and to which we will be returning below – in his discussion of the relationship between the a priori and Dasein’s fundamental temporality in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics.

Heidegger’s elaboration of the notion of categorical intuition confirms his indebtedness to Husserl in recognizing the responsiveness of the categories to intuition. As Kisiel notes, it is through such influences that Heidegger develops “a sense of intentionality and categorical intuition which allows him to move toward a new sense of the apriori, that of the facticity of historical meaning, which finds its norms in experienceability instead of knowability” (35). It is not only the case that the ontological is dependent on the ontic insofar as the latter provides an ‘opportunity’ for the former’s application, then, but the a priori is itself rooted in a type of beholdenness to ontic encounters in their experienceability. As Tugendhat notes of this Husserlian – and, I

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believe, Heideggerian – understanding of the “synthetische Apriori”: “...bei Husserl gilt das Apriori überhaupt nicht mehr direkt von Seienden oder den Gegenständen unserer Erfahrung, und so ergibt sich die Möglichkeit einer offenen Pluralität der Erfahrungsweisen, jede mit ihrem eigenen Apriori” (Tugendhat 1967, 165). This is not to imply that the transcendental conditions of meaning and possibility can be reduced to or are entirely subservient to the ontic realm of entities. But the interrelatedness of these ‘realms’ indicates that whether a category ‘holds’ of something is deeply dependent on the particular things through which this meaning is initiated and enriched, and recognizing the interrelatedness of the two is part of Husserl’s rich legacy to Heidegger.

Even if we are to speak of concrete ontic encounters as evoking, enriching and inaugurating the categories through which they are understood, however, one may argue that such an interpretation must account for the fact that one must have the potential to exist in the mode of orientation particular to other Dasein. In other words, one must have some innate category ‘being-with’ that is simply ‘triggered’ by this or that other – otherwise they could never be recognized as such. Though concrete others may be necessary as triggers, then, the innate idea or ability is already there, waiting for the inaugural instance of concrete otherness to ‘summon’ it into ‘unfolding’. What type of priority must operate here? Does the presence of ‘potential’ categories ensure that Heidegger falls victim to Sartre’s claim that his position cannot account for direct, unmediated encounters with others?

The difficulty with such an objection is its illicit use of the notion of subjectivity that Heidegger has rejected; it substitutes a ‘substantial’ self – with an established set of attributes – for the relational self that is constituted through its activities of existing.
Dasein does not exist in such a way that it can have a possibility simply waiting to be triggered, a “free-floating potentiality of being” (BT 144/135). On the contrary, “It is the possibility it is only if the Dasein becomes existent in it (BPP 276). In other words, the possibility of understanding in terms of this or that category is only a possibility insofar as the category is ‘actualized’ through a concrete encounter with the particular that inaugurates it. Thus in Division I, Section V of Being and Time, Heidegger's further elaboration of Dasein’s way of being acknowledges - but rejects - the temptation to view the features of being-in-the-world as an unyielding grid we impose upon it: “it must have seemed that being-in-the-world functions as a rigid framework within which the possible relations of Dasein to its world occur,” (BT 176/165). Heidegger distances himself from such interpretations, however, which make use of this notion “without the ‘framework’ itself being touched upon in its kind of being. But this supposed ‘framework’ itself belongs to the kind of being of Da-sein” (BT 176/165). The framework in which the possible relations of being-in-the-world occur is itself relational, changing, incomplete. In light of this, Sartre’s characterization of being-with as a mere abstract structure of my own being fails to recognize that the existential analytic has rejected the notion of ‘abstract structures’ in favor of a picture of human being as immersed and responsive to its concrete worldly situation.

As Heidegger notes in the Aristotle lecture course of 1921-22, interpretive categories "can be understood only insofar as factual life itself is compelled to interpretation" (PIA 66). Factual life is compelled to interpretation by my being thrown into a situation in which I must respond to it – I am ‘condemned to existence’ and my categories of interpretation must be understood as responses to this condition:
The categories are not inventions or a group of logical schemata as such, 'lattices'; on the contrary, they are alive in life itself in an original way: alive in order to 'form' life on themselves. They have their own modes of access, which are not foreign to life itself, as if they pounced down upon life from the outside, but instead are precisely the preeminent way in which life comes to itself (PIA 66).

The categories through which we understand the world are not dead things imposed from without – they are living orientations and responses evoked by the world-immersed living of the beings that we are. Heidegger makes explicit the vehemence with which he refuses to separate the ontological from the ontic in this regard:

...these categorial nexuses are alive in genuinely concrete life and are not merely trivial and arbitrary observations...Furthermore, it must be understood that they are alive in facticity; i.e., they include factual possibilities, from which they are (thank God) never to be freed (PIA 74).

Heidegger elaborates on this notion of 'living categories' in his discussion of 'The Task of Definition,' where he argues that for philosophy to understand a 'principle' – "that on the basis of which something 'is' in its own proper way" (PIA 18) – it cannot be characterized as an established universal that encompasses all of the particular objects known. Rather, every object of knowledge "is always in some sense a principle, something which is at issue and which, with respect to and for something, has 'something to say'" (PIA 19).

Anything that I can encounter exists in a regulating and enriching relationship to the categories through which it is encountered. Analyzing the relationship of the understanding to the thing known – such that the object of knowledge is recognized as both speaking its 'something to say,' and as speaking it to me – is the heart of Heidegger's enduring effort to find a middle way between a naive realism and a simplistic idealism. It is this aim that must be kept in mind as we explore more fully
Heidegger’s account of the relationship between spontaneity and receptivity, understanding and intuition, *a priori* and particular. We will look in particular at Heidegger’s work in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, because it is here that he explicitly addresses the claim that “Finite intuition sees that it is dependent upon the intuitable as a being which exists in its own right”\(^{22}\). In doing so we will be able to achieve a more nuanced reading of how Heidegger thinks different types of beings become available to the understanding in such a way that Dasein does not simply impose established *a priori* categories on the raw data it encounters in the world.

**Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics**

The transcendent project in both Kant and Heidegger lies in articulating the ontological knowledge that makes comporting oneself toward particular ontic beings possible; the quest for the synthetic *a priori* is a quest for the pre-existing conditions of finite knowing that are nevertheless responsive to the being itself. “Because our Dasein is finite – existing in the midst of beings that already are, beings to which it has been delivered over – therefore it must necessarily take this already-existing being in stride, that is to say, it must offer it the possibility of announcing itself” (*KPM* 19). This invitation to self-announcing – the immediate presence of the being we intuit or ‘take in stride’ – is limited by the finitude of the one who opens herself to its arrival; nevertheless, this limiting must be understood as a restricting, not a simple failure, of accessibility\(^{23}\).


\(^{23}\) Note that, for Heidegger, such a total failure is also possible in the complete breakdown of the world’s meaning in angst.
The being 'in the appearance' is the same being as the being in itself, and this alone. As a being, it alone can become an object, although only for a finite [act of] knowledge. Nevertheless, it reveals itself in accordance with the manner and scope of the ability that finite knowledge has at its disposal to take things in stride and to determine them (KPM 22).

The manner in which we know things will only ever be finite and partial; this does not preclude accuracy in the way the thing is revealed in finite knowing, but this accuracy will never be 'complete'; there is no god's eye view from which such completion could be accomplished. Pining for the-thing-in-itself is a consequence of the failure to accept our radical finitude; we are yearning for an infinite knowing that would allow all aspects of the thing to be unconcealed simultaneously and forever, but this knowledge is necessarily unavailable to us and cannot even be proved as such from within the confines of our own finitude:

It is therefore a misunderstanding of what the thing in itself means if we believe that the impossibility of a knowledge of the thing in itself must be proven through a positivistic critique. Such attempts at proof presuppose the thing in itself to be something which is presumed to be an object within finite knowledge in general, but whose tactical inaccessibility can and must be proven. Accordingly, the 'mere' in the phrase 'mere appearance' is not a restricting and diminishing of the actuality of the thing, but is rather only the negation of the [assumption] that the being can be infinitely known in human knowledge (KPM 23-24).

It is in light of this that we can recognize that Heidegger is not advocating a simple idealism, he is not claiming that the things known just are the way in which they are known; rather, his claim is simply that the things known cannot be known in the absence of the way in which they are known – as our discussion regarding vorhanden and zuhanden ways of being has already indicated – and conflating the two will only obscure the complexity of the interaction.

According to Heidegger, readers of the Critique of Pure Reason have typically failed to recognize the unity of this text, a unity that lies in its demonstration that the two
seemingly opposing sources of knowledge – receptive intuition and spontaneous understanding – are themselves rooted in the finite subject’s simultaneously receptive and spontaneous imagination. Though the accuracy of Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* has been the object of debate, here I will be examining this work solely for the positive elaboration of Heidegger’s own views found therein, and leave the accuracy of his attribution of these views to Kant for another discussion\(^{24}\). It is clear, however, that the position Heidegger advocates in this text is profoundly shaped by what he takes to be the essence of Kant’s insights on this issue – that intuition and spontaneity spring from the same source in finite subjectivity – and Heidegger’s interpretation is aimed at articulating this insight:

> The power of an idea which shines forth must drive and guide the laying-out [*Auslegung*]. Only in the power of this idea can an interpretation risk what is always audacious, naming, entrusting itself to the concealed inner passion of a work in order to be able, through this, to place itself within the unsaid and force it into speech (*KPM* 141).

The ‘concealed inner passion’ of Kant’s work, according to Heidegger, lies in the recognition that the categories must be differentiated from ‘notions’; the former are applied by the understanding to content received through sensible intuition, while the latter are “Concepts which are also given their content [*Inhalt*] a priori” (*KPM* 37-38). In other words, notions are not directly answerable to intuitions, but are “pure” of any such connection; as such, however, they are unable to account for the essential relatedness of thought and sensibility. Only when we recognize that “thinking is merely in the service

of intuition” (KPM 15) can we understand the responsiveness of the categories – and derivatively, the notions that are based on them – to sensible intuition. And the relatedness of thought and intuition – this responsiveness of the former to the latter – springs from the nature of human subjectivity as profoundly finite. This essential connection between finitude and intuition becomes particularly evident in Heidegger when we recognize that temporality is the form that all Dasein’s intuition must take; that it is to temporality that the categories are in service. The authority of the categories – “the proof for the possibility of the a priori ability of pure concepts to refer to objects” (KPM 60) – lies in their ability to allow things encountered to show themselves in their particular temporal mode of existing. Thus the categories – insofar as they are grounded in temporality – are both responsive to intuition and ‘given their content a priori’. Thus Heidegger claims that the categories

...are not notions, but rather pure concepts which, by means of the pure power of imagination, refer essentially to time. To the extent that they are this essence, however, they constitute transcendence. They are formed with the letting-stand-against-of....For this reason they are, in advance, determinations of the objects, i.e., of the being insofar as it is encountered by a finite creature (KPM 61).

We can see here the origin of the categories in the finite creature’s responsiveness to concrete encounters with objects; they are formed with the “letting stand-against-of.”

The manner in which this ‘standing-against’ nature of objects – their independence – can be understood depends on the function of receptivity and its relationship to the ‘advance determinations of the objects’ attributable to the knower; a relationship, Heidegger argues, that is rooted in the original unity of the faculty of imagination and its essentially temporal nature.
The Imagination

Heidegger (and Kant via Heidegger) is interested in the essential possibility of ontological synthesis – whereby “pure intuition and pure thinking should be able to meet one another a priori” (*KPM* 49) – which is, for Heidegger, what grounds the very possibility of any transcending toward particular beings:

The problem of the transcendental, i.e., of the synthesis which constitutes transcendence, thus can also be put this way: How must the finite being that we call ‘human being’ be according to its innermost essence so that in general it can be open to a being that it itself is not and that therefore must be able to show itself from itself? (*KPM* 30).

Note here the use of Heidegger’s language: the encounter must involve the being showing itself *from itself* – a stipulation that undermines Sartre’s claim that Heidegger’s account of being-with prevents this showing by subsuming the other to the anonymity of the category.

Heidegger will go on to show that the particular combination of categorial subsumption and passive receptivity that allows for transcendence – for finite beings to encounter the thing as it shows itself from itself, despite this finitude – is rooted in the synthesizing unity of the imagination: a unity that must itself be understood in terms of the essential unity of “the subjectivity of the human subject” (*KPM* 144). This will allow Heidegger to make sense of Kant’s recognition that this essential unity is fundamentally the unity of time. Because human being is temporal, Heidegger will argue, the unity of intuition and understanding lies in the particular temporal structure of human existing. Thus Heidegger will claim that
If a-prioricity is a basic characteristic of being, and if a prioricity is a time designation, and if being is connected with time in such a way that the understanding of being is rooted in the temporality of Dasein, then there is an intrinsic connection between the a priori and temporality, the being-constitution of Dasein, the subjectivity of the subject (MFL 149-150).

While Kant did not explicitly trace out the existential structure of the finite knowers that we are, he nevertheless recognized this unity of thinking and intuiting – a unity necessary for a finite being to “be open to a being that it itself is not” (KPM 30) – to lie in the prior unity of temporality-determined subjectivity, which he here terms the pure faculty of the imagination. As Stephan Käufer notes in “Schemata, Hammers, and Time: Heidegger’s Two Derivations of Judgment,”

Time is the form of inner sense, for Kant, i.e. all representations occur in time. Hence categories, which condition the original synthetic unity of consciousness, must unify consciousness in such a way that it can synthesize the representations it has in time. The original unity provided by the categories, then, must in some way bear on the unity of time. Kant traces this connection in the schematism chapter, but he is notoriously unclear about / the connection this chapter has to the deduction. But precisely this connection is key to Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant, which focuses on the underlying role of time in synthesis all along (81-82).

According to Heidegger, Kant characterizes the original synthesizing faculty of imagination as “the unity-forming medium” that is “holding it together” (KPM 62). To illustrate this original unity of intuition and understanding, Heidegger argues that Kant engages in two ways of analyzing the relationship between them; the first way starts with the latter and demonstrates its dependence on the former, the second way reverses this approach; in both instances “what is essential here is perhaps not a connection of two faculties thought of in a linear fashion, but rather the structural elucidation of their essential unity” (KPM 54).

Early on in the text, Heidegger argues that this essential unity lies in the fact that both intuition and thinking share the same ‘species’: that of ‘Representation in general,’
which “has the broad, formal sense according to which one thing indicates, announces, presents another” (*KPM* 16). Both intuition and understanding announce or present an object: “The former relates immediately to the object and is single; the latter refers to it mediately by means of a feature which several things can have in common”\(^{25}\). Both announce that which they allow us to encounter – the former directly and the other by means of a shared feature. What unifies these two varieties of representation – intuition and understanding – is their mutual representing of unity: each contains an inner reference to the other that is characterized in its pure form in terms of a representation of unity. This unifying is fairly obvious in the case of the conceptual representations of the faculty of understanding, which “gives in advance that which is contrary to the haphazard. Representing unity originally, namely, as unifying, it represents to itself a connectedness which in advance rules all possible gathering together” (*KPM* 52). As Heidegger articulates, however, characterizing this faculty of rules as that which “regulates[s] in advance all that ‘intuition’ brings forth” seems to imply that it is being expounded “as the supreme faculty” (*KPM* 53). In order to make good on the claim that intuition and thinking are interdependent and that “[a]ll thinking is merely in the service of intuition” (*KPM* 15), this conceptual representation of unity must be shown to be dependent on the *a priori* representation of unity found in intuition: the unity presented or announced must be recognized as that of the temporal immediacy of intuition.

The very receptive capacity of intuition is thereby structured such that it may announce or present a unity – but this presented unity is not a function of spontaneity. On the contrary, that which is to be unified through conceptual representation must be

\(^{25}\) Heidegger quoting Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*, A320, B376f., (*KPM* 16).
given unbidden to the understanding, and given piecemeal; "The represented unity first awaits the encountered being; and as such awaiting, it makes possible the encountering of objects which show themselves with one another" (*KPM* 56). The intuition's representation of unity is a type of passive awaiting or reception, and in order for there to be such an 'awaiting' of that which can be connected or unified;

If what comes along is to be capable of being encountered as something which stands within connectedness, the sense of something like 'connection' must be understood in advance. To pre-present connection in advance, however, means; first of all to form something like relation in general by representing it (*KPM* 58).

This is the intuitive sense of representing, an original a priori experience of relation in general that nevertheless must not undermine its nature as intuition; i.e. as an immediate receptivity of the object in its singularity (*KPM* 16), a relationship that is not arbitrary or imposed from without:

Taking-in-stride, however, if it is to be possible, requires something on the order of a turning-toward, and indeed not a random one, but one which makes possible in a preliminary way the encountering of the being. In order for the being to be able to offer itself as such, however, the horizon of its possible encountering must itself have the character of an offering. The turning-toward must in itself be a preparatory being-in-mind of what is offerable in general (*KPM* 63).

This prior horizon of intuition against which things can be experienced as transcendent – as 'standing against' me – is offered in such a way that it is "immediately capable of being taken in stride by intuition" (*KPM* 63). The horizon against which particular intuitions can be received – the 'pre-presentation' of unity in general – is itself received in the manner of an intuition, and this horizon of intuitability initially makes possible the empirical receptivity at work in particular intuitions (*KPM* 63). As Martin Weatherston characterizes the Kantian forms of intuition
Space and time are not merely the *means* of receiving intuitions, but also they can themselves be *intuited*, and consequently they are *intuitions*, namely *formal intuitions*, which have their own character. Space and time are not merely featureless receptacles, but on the contrary have a characteristic way of receiving impressions (55).

Dasein’s intuition announces or presents an object by representing a unified horizon in terms of which all possible particular intuitions may be received. Depending on the type of intuited concrete particular being given to/through intuition – be it numbers, rocks, persons, etc. – a corresponding horizon will be given in terms of which this concrete particular may be ‘taken in stride.’ What unifies all of these particular horizons of intuition is the very structure of all Dasein’s intuition – temporality. As Robert Dostal notes, “each of the categories, initially presented independent of time, is in the end nothing other than a form or configuration of time”\(^\text{26}\). This unification of the structure of intuition is not a function of conceptualizing spontaneity but is characterized by the passivity and particularity of intuition; features of Dasein’s finite temporality.

The receptivity of the pure horizon of intuition also requires, however, that “[t]he finite creature which turns-toward must itself be able to make the horizon intuitable, i.e., it must be able to ‘form’ the look of the offering from out of itself” (*KPM* 63-64), and we can see here the interdependence of pure intuition and pure understanding mediated through the imagination. Simple ontic intuiting “means the taking-in-stride of what gives itself,” while “Pure intuition, in the taking-in-stride, gives itself that which is capable of being taken in stride” (*KPM* 122): in other words, the pure power of the imagination lies

in its simultaneous forming and being offered of the general horizon of intuition –
temporality – that makes specific empirical intuitions possible\textsuperscript{27}.

This structure of ‘active passivity’ or ‘passive activity’ Heidegger here refers to as
a “pure self-affection” (\textit{KPM 132}) which “lets-(something)-stand-in-opposition” and
“allows a space for play” in the “letting-stand-against of” the object (\textit{KPM 50-51}). It is
this ambiguous middle ground between action and passion that Heidegger took from
Kant’s characterization of the temporalizing imagination:

It was thus Kant’s way of getting on the inside of intuition, of sensing the
infrastructure of temporality operating at the interface of receptivity and
spontaneity, that ambivalent middle voice at the heart of experience which now
speaks imaginatively and schematically...that first caught Heidegger’s critical
fancy (Kisiel 409).

This simultaneously active/passive structure of the middle voice will be a recurring theme
in Heidegger’s work, turning up in formal indication, authenticity, conscience, hearing,
and the impersonal grammatical structures familiar from ‘es gibt’ and ‘es weltet’. It
operates here on the most fundamental levels of Dasein’s being in the world qua
temporality. As we noted above, it is the structure of Heidegger’s notion of \textit{Seinlassen},
in which Dasein enables that which it encounters to present itself from itself. As Olafson
notes, “It follows that in the existentially conceived subject, there can be no spontaneity
without the receptivity implicit in any letting-encounter, although the prefix verb ‘to let’
still asserts an element of agency even in this passivity” (Olafson 1987, 93). The ‘middle
voice’ refers to those verbs in which one cannot distinguish between the active and
passive elements of a particular happening or event. “The middle is distinguished from
the passive in that the subject participates in this enactment, or is implicated in it, rather

\textsuperscript{27} For a more detailed discussion of the extent and manner in which the unity of the form of intuition is
itself intuitively given – and the “rather tortuous reading” of Kant that Heidegger engages in on this point,
see Weatherston 2002, 50-66.
than being wholly at the mercy of another agent. There is neither a clearly demarcated agent, nor a receptive object. It is in this way that Dasein can encounter a being that ‘it itself is not’: through the imagination’s middle-voiced spontaneous receiving. Thus Frank Schalow will note that, for Heidegger, the imagination’s

...schema stands as the intermediary between the content of intuition and its determination by the signifying act of the category. Insofar as time is essential to the formation of this intermediating bridge, and the category’s applicability to objects hinges on its ‘translation’ into temporal terms (i.e. schematism), Heidegger argues that schematism charts the trajectory of finite transcendence.

As we can now see, this imaginative interplay between spontaneity and receptivity – a mode of encounter which is “less that of causing than enabling” – is the essential structure not only of all of Dasein’s encounters, but of Dasein’s very existence as ‘finite transcendence’. This middle-voiced structure is present throughout these modes of encounter because they are all grounded in the active-passivity of Dasein’s way of being qua temporal ‘thrown project,’ spontaneous intuising.

Heidegger’s method – the existential analytic’s emphasis on the inability to abstract away from or bracket Dasein’s way of being – demands that the synthesis of the faculties rooted in temporality must itself be understood in terms of our way of being as simultaneously passive and active, thrown and projecting. We exist through these synthesized faculties such that transcendence is possible, such that “the finite being that

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30 Llewellyn, John. *The Middle Voice of Ecological Conscience*. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991. p. 87, emphasis mine. Llewellyn notes that “Heidegger has problems avoiding an exaggeration of either the activity or the passivity in the attempt to describe this ‘relation’ which is neither just the one nor just the other” (87). Insofar as he attempts to navigate such a middle ground, however, Llewellyn refuses to “follow Levinas in stressing as much as he does the place of practical power in the interpretation of Heidegger’s ontology” (87), especially since Levinas himself suffers from a similar difficulty in exaggerating only one dimension of such a relation.
we call ‘human being’ [can] be according to its innermost essence so that in general it can be open to a being that it itself is not and that therefore must be able to show itself from itself” (*KPM* 30). According to Heidegger, the selfhood of this finite being that is defined by transcendence – the synthesis of activity and passivity, intuition and understanding – is original time.

The interpretation of the transcendental power of imagination as root, i.e., the elucidation of how the pure synthesis allows both stems to grow from out of it and how it maintains them, leads back from itself to that in which this root is rooted: to original time. As the original, threefold-unifying forming of future, past, and present in general, this is what first makes possible the ‘faculty’ of pure synthesis, i.e., that which it is able to produce, namely, the unification of the three elements of ontological knowledge, in the unity of which transcendence is formed (*KPM* 137).

We can here recognize the manner in which Dasein’s understanding is responsive to the givenness of intuition: the *a priori* categories are themselves dependent on the manner in which unities of experience may be given in terms of the fundamentally temporal dimensions of Dasein’s intuition. To respond to Sartre’s critique, then, to understand how Dasein can encounter particular others as such, will be a matter of determining the mode of intuition – of *temporal* givenness – according to which concrete encounters with other Dasein are articulated.

In *Ontology – the Hermeneutics of Facticity*, Heidegger is engaged in a discussion of knowing as a particular kind of comportment, claiming that “This ‘typifying’ comportment at the point of departure…takes up what has already been made available (in a readymade characterization) in the comportment of that curiosity which is pulled along by its objects” (*OHF* 47). Heidegger does say that this ‘point of departure’ for classifying grasps what is known “…in advance in terms of its types, its essential generalities. Only when the concrete has been defined in advance in *such* a manner does
it have the conceptual makeup as an object which is necessary for it to be able to enter in any manner into a context of classification" (OHF 47). As Heidegger points out, however, "the work of classifying does not tarry here, but only begins there, i.e., it moves on" (OHF 47). This later ‘work’ of knowing is then taken to be the true essence of knowing, and the ‘transitional stage’ whereby the concrete becomes available to classification is quickly passed over and “remains conspicuously undefined in philosophy” (OHF 47).

In keeping with his interpretation of Kant, Heidegger argues that this ‘transitional stage’ at the ‘point of departure’ – the stage in which the concrete is grasped such that it is made available for conceptualization – must be understood in terms of temporal articulation. In other words, as the temporal horizon against which particulars are encountered. What is defined ‘in advance,’ he argues, is “the temporal itself, within the concrete” (OHF 46). Though today’s philosophers may recognize the departure point as the temporal, Heidegger argues, they nevertheless miss the point insofar as “their point of departure is characterized as an object” (OHF 47) – they assume its objectivity without analyzing how it becomes so from out of the concrete. What is of interest in this type of ‘knowing’ attitude becomes simply the filing away itself – not the basis on which such filing is itself possible: “something concrete is considered to be known when one has defined where it belongs, the place within the totality of the classificatory order whereinto it is to be inserted – something is seen to be defined when it has been put away” (OHF 48).

In contrast to this short-sightedness of knowledge, argues Heidegger, we must recognize the ‘temporal in the concrete’ without assuming its status as object but as
horizon for all knowledge. "Time must be brought to light and genuinely grasped as the horizon of every understanding and interpretation of being" (BT 17/15). As our analysis of Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics has illustrated, this temporal horizon is the self-given openness or orientation to receptivity that makes possible the transcendence of Dasein's way of being. Dasein's primordial temporality is the condition for the possibility of the encounter with that which it is not, a transcendence characteristic of its way of being: "Temporality is the primordial 'outside of itself'" (BT 329/302).

As Frank Schalow notes in "Kant, Heidegger and the Performative Character of Language in the First Critique," Heidegger thus characterizes the imagination and it's schematizing as "a way of reconfiguring the categories – of adjusting their precision and scope of application – according to a procedure harmonized with time" (2003, 170). As we can now see, Heidegger thereby makes use of the Kantian orientation to time in order to further the Husserlian notion of the responsive, conditional a priori:

General logic presumes that the common ancestry each of the categories has in thought provides the basis for its grammar. The procedure of schematism, however, demonstrates this commonality by uncovering time as the one source from which the categorial determinations of objects spring (Schalow 2003, 172).

Following Kant's understanding of time as an original single intuited unity – of which particular temporal experiences and horizons are simply limiting domains – Heidegger can characterize the unity of Dasein as temporality, but as a temporality that is fundamentally open to articulation. And following Husserl's understanding of the a priori, Heidegger can characterize this articulation as a responsiveness to that which is given within the temporal horizon that defines the very subjectivity of the subject. Understood as such, Sartre's understanding of the categorial status of the Heideggerian existentials is off the mark. Though Heidegger is, as Kisiel notes, interested in "the
interpretation of life’s sense of being in terms of its fundamental categorial structures” this means the conditions under which “factic life temporalizes itself and so speaks with itself... These conditions, understood categorically, are not ‘logical forms’ but rather the genuinely accessible possibilities drawn from the actual temporalization of existence” (259).

This point brings us to Division II of Being and Time, where Heidegger clarifies and deepens his analysis of Dasein’s care structure by demonstrating the way in which Dasein’s very subjectivity must be understood most primordially in terms of temporality. To this analysis – and the role that others play in it – we will now turn.
CHAPTER V:
The Temporality of Care

*Being and Time*’s division II engages in a temporal reformulation of its initial characterization of Dasein’s care structure, demonstrating that interpreting Dasein’s being in terms of temporality will offer a deeper understanding of what grounds and unifies care: “The primordial unity of the structure of care lies in temporality” (*BT* 327/301); it “makes possible the constitution of the structures of care” (*BT* 331/304). As William Blattner notes in *Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism*: “Heidegger is not introducing an independent, unifying scheme to explain care; he is showing how care’s internal structure is inherently unified because originally temporal” (1999, 124). As R. Philip Buckley articulates in *Husserl, Heidegger, and the Crisis of Philosophical Responsibility*, “Heidegger is searching for that which makes possible authentic Care in its fully articulated structure. The answer is temporality”\(^1\). Heidegger emphasizes that these structures must not be understood in terms of our ordinary conception of time as a sequence of undifferentiated and anonymous ‘nows,’ without beginning and without end” (*BT* 329/302). This ordinary conception of time is itself based on ‘originary’ or ‘primordial’ time – on the essence of Dasein’s subjectivity as temporal. As Heidegger claims in *History of the Concept of Time*, “Dasein itself – as we shall later see – is time” (*HCT* 197).

Instead of occupying particular regions of the linear sequence of undifferentiated ‘nows,’ past, present and future must be understood as lived dimensions of Dasein’s being-in-the-world. Dasein’s projectedness – and the understanding that discloses it – is

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rooted in a fundamentally *futural way of being*, from which we derive everyday concepts of ‘not yet now.’ Thus Heidegger claims: ‘‘future’ does not mean a now that has *not yet* become ‘actual’ and that sometime *will be* for the first time, but the coming in which Dasein comes toward itself in its ownmost potentiality-of-being....Dasein, *as existing*, always already comes toward itself, that is, is futural in its being in general” (*BT* 325/299). The ‘for-the-sake-of-itsel’ that characterizes Dasein’s projecting – the purposiveness of its pressing into possibilities that are worked out in terms of some possible way for it to be – is to be understood as a ‘futural’ way of being.

“The ‘before’ and the ‘ahead of’ indicate the future that first makes possible in general the fact that Da-sein can be in such a way that is concerned *about* its potentiality-of-being. The self-project grounded in the ‘for the sake of itself’ in the future is an essential quality of *existentiality*. *Its primary meaning is the future*” (*BT* 327/301).

Similarly, the originary meaning of ‘already’ is not some ‘now’ that was once objectively present but is present no longer, but refers, in its most fundamental sense, to Dasein’s thrownness or facticity and the attunement that discloses it. As we will recall, thrownness relates to the sheer ‘that it is’ of existing that permeates every moment of this existence. I cannot simply ‘define’ myself, but am always already defined by the situation in which I simply discover myself to be. This dimension of existence is the primordial meaning of the ‘past’ – the conditions from out of which my understanding must always arise: “In *attunement* Da-sein is invaded by itself as the being that it still is and already was, that is, that it constantly *is* as having been. The primary existential meaning of facticity lies in having-been. The formulation of the structure of care
indicates the temporal meaning of existentiality or facticity with the expressions ‘before’ and ‘already’” \( (BT\ 328/301) \).

Heidegger is clear that Dasein’s futurity and having-beenness do not themselves occur in ordinary time:

If the expressions ‘ahead of’ and ‘already’ had this temporal meaning, which they can also have, then we would be saying about the temporality of care that it is something that is ‘earlier’ and ‘later,’ ‘not yet’ and ‘no longer’ at the same time. Then care would be conceived as a being that occurs and elapses ‘in time.’ The being of a being of the nature of Dasein would then turn into something objectively present. If this is impossible, the temporal significance of these expressions must be a different one \( (BT\ 327/301) \).

In this originary sense of time as that which constitutes the very subjectivity of the subject, then, Heidegger distinguishes the ‘past’ and the ‘future’ from the everyday way in which they are understood: as occupying particular regions of the linear sequence of undifferentiated ‘nows’. My ability to experience the future or past is not referring to the fact that I once lived in a ‘present now’ that is over or will live in a ‘present now’ that is not yet – it refers to the fact that every ‘present now’ is always weighted with a past and directed toward a future.

**Blattner’s Critique**

William Blattner argues that it is not clear how exactly this shift to temporality will clarify the care structure, however, since the meaning of ‘time’ with which Heidegger is working in his discussions of ‘originary temporality’ does not seem to bear

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\(^2\) As Steven Crowell notes in “Facticity and Transcendental Philosophy” \( (From\ Kant\ to Davidson: Philosophy\ and\ the\ idea\ of\ the\ transcendental.\ Jeff\ Malpas,\ ed.\ New\ York:\ Routledge,\ 2002.\ p.\ 100-121) \) simply interpreting this temporal dimension of facticity as historicality has resulted in many narrativist conceptions of the Heideggerian subject. But as Crowell argues, the interpretation of Gewesenheit on which they rely – translating it as ‘having been’ – “is misleading, since the term names something that is ‘not chronologically prior in any sense’...Gewesenheit indicates not a tense but an aspect: the ‘a priori perfect’...It is what I always already am” (114).
any real resemblance to what we ordinarily mean by time—namely, a sequence of undifferentiated nows. By grounding ‘care’ in such an unfamiliar conception of time, what is being gained? Why should originary time be considered ‘time’ at all, since it’s missing a— if not the—main quality we associate with the word ‘time’—namely, sequentiality? What justifies Heidegger’s claim that he’s talking about ‘time’ at all?\(^3\) As Blattner notes, “It is possible, after all, to violate the terms of a concept so egregiously that we are justified in claiming that one is using the wrong word or concept. The notion of nonsuccessive time might seem to be such a violation, for we do ordinarily think of time as essentially sequential” (1999, 94).

Heidegger himself recognizes that he must earn his claim that primordial time is really ‘time’:

> We must clarify how and why the development of the vulgar concept of time comes about in terms of the temporally grounded constitution of being of Da-sein taking care of time. The vulgar concept of time owes its provenance to a leveling down of primordial time. By demonstrating that this is the source of the vulgar concept of time, we shall justify our earlier interpretation of temporality as primordial time (\(BT\ 405/372\)).

According to Heidegger, the “vulgar” understanding of time does in fact consist “among other things, precisely in the fact that it is a pure succession of nows, without beginning and without end, in which the ecstatic character of primordial temporality is leveled down” (\(BT\ 329/302\)). This ordinary understanding of time, Heidegger argues, originates in a more primordial temporality that is then inauthentically temporalized to produce ordinary time. By showing the dependence on and origination of ordinary time in

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\(^3\) Interestingly, this objection has the same structure as Tugendhat’s critique of Heidegger’s notion of truth, which, as we mentioned above, argues that by defining truth as ‘disclosure’ and jettisoning the claim that truth discloses the thing as \textit{as it is in itself}, what we mean by truth as critical standard of evaluation is lost. According to Tugendhat, “Instead of broadening the specific concept of truth, Heidegger simply gave the word truth another meaning” (1967, 236).
originary time, Heidegger believes he is justified in calling the latter ‘time’. We can note here the relationship to his Kant project; Heidegger is attempting to show that by understanding the fundamental horizon of Dasein’s being to be ‘rooted’ in temporality, he can account not only for the ecstatic, non-sequential care structure, but also for the ordinary, sequential sense of time and the ‘within-timeness’ of worldly things. Heidegger will unify these seemingly antithetical ‘branches’ by showing that both arise out of originary, ekstatic time – and in particular, how ordinary, sequential time does so: “Thus if we demonstrate that the ‘time’ accessible to the common sense of Dasein is not primordial, but arises rather from authentic temporality, then, according to the principle a potiori fit denomenatio, we are justified in calling the temporality now set forth primordial time” (BT 329/302). Blattner clarifies:

Originary temporality and ordinary time are not two otherwise unrelated phenomena, one of which happens to explain the other. Rather, we shall see, originary temporality modifies itself – its own features – so as to yield the more complex phenomenon that is ordinary time. The conceptual features that define ordinary time are derived from originary temporality insofar as originary temporality can be modified to make them up (1999, 95).

As Blattner argues, however, Heidegger faces serious difficulties in his attempt to link the non-sequential originary temporality that grounds the care structure with the sequence of undifferentiated ‘nows’ that characterizes ‘ordinary time’. Indeed, Blattner argues that Heidegger ultimately fails in his attempt to show “that originary temporality is ordinary time stripped of one of its disunifying features” (1999, 126).

The reason that Blattner reaches this conclusion, however, lies in his own failure to take into account the unique temporality of being-with that explains the transition from
originary time to ordinary time *through* ‘world-time’⁴. Blattner’s own neglect is likely rooted in Heidegger’s failure to articulate the implications of his own position, however, and to the obfuscation and confusion in which this results. In what follows I will demonstrate the route that Heidegger – and Blattner – should have taken in tracing the origin of ordinary time, an interpretation that recognizes the pivotal role that the shared temporal nature of a community of Dasein must play in the establishment of world and world-time.

Accounting for the originary temporal sense of the ‘present’ – the temporal horizon established when multiple temporalizing Dasein encounter each other – will be essential for doing so. In mapping Division I’s care structure onto the temporal structures of past, present, and future, Heidegger equates ‘having beenness’ with thrownness, and futurity with projection. When it comes to the present however, Heidegger claims that, unlike the past/thrownness and future/projectedness connections, “such an indication is lacking for the third constitutive factor of care: entangled being-together-with” (*BT* 328/301). Though Heidegger does not directly address the reason for this lack, I will argue that it arises from two related phenomena: 1.) Heidegger’s confusion of being-with and fallenness – a tendency that becomes increasingly pronounced as *Being and Time*

⁴ Edgar C. Boedeker, Jr. argues in “Phenomenological Ontology or the Explanation of Social Norms?” (*Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, Vol. 84, No. 3 (2002) 334-344) that Blattner reaches this conclusion because he is operating under the mistaken assumption that Heidegger’s project is meant to have originary time explain ordinary time – as opposed to engaging in a phenomenological description of the conditions that make meaningful encounters in ordinary time possible. It is the emphasis on explanation, argues Boedeker, that leads Blattner to claim that Heidegger was trying – and failing – to endorse an idealist conception of time. Whether this position fails or not is immaterial, however, according to Boedeker, since Heidegger was not in fact endorsing it; “whereas Heidegger is trivially an ‘idealist’ about originary temporality, which surely depends on Dasein, he need not be read as committed to taking any stand – either realist or idealist – on the origin of ordinary time *per se*” (342) particularly insofar as Heidegger insisted that “his own position is beyond both realism and idealism” (342). To a large extent I agree with Boedeker’s arguments, but I will be focusing, here, on how Blattner’s failure to give due weight to being-with undermines attempts to account for the relationship between originary and ordinary time – regardless of whether this relationship should be characterized as an ‘explanation.’
progresses; and 2.) the resulting masking of the complexity that will be required of Heidegger’s position if he is to genuinely account for the manner in which multiple temporality-defined Dasein will interact with each other. This confusion and oversimplification becomes evident when he attempts to move from originary time to ordinary time through world time.

**Being-with or Fallenness?**

Though the claim that being-with is not necessarily fallen or inauthentic is, as we can recall from Chapter I, obviously a controversial one, in what follows, I will show that there is an ambiguity in Heidegger’s understanding of the relationship between being-with and fallenness – an ambiguity with which any interpreter must come to terms. Despite contradictory textual evidence that could be marshaled against this view, I argue that Heidegger’s account would be more structurally coherent if he maintained the distinction between Being-with and fallenness by designating the former as the modally indifferent existential that is expressed in either an authentic or inauthentic – fallen – way. Such an interpretation is more in keeping with the general structure of Heidegger’s characterization of Dasein’s fundamental suspension between authentic and inauthentic ways of being. As we will see, though the manner in which I encounter other Dasein may encourage falling – one’s *tendency* toward inauthenticity – this is not structurally necessary and their distinctness must be maintained.

Early claims in *Being and Time* indicate that Heidegger’s original sense of the care structure take Being-with, and not Fallenness, as the fundamental existential specific to encountering other Dasein: “Da-sein is essentially constituted by being-with” *(BT*
“Being-in is being-with others” (BT 118/112) he argues; “the understanding of others already lies in the understanding of being of Da-sein because its being is being-with” (BT 123/116). Elsewhere, however, he will explicitly claim that “the third constitutive factor of care, falling prey, has its existential meaning in the present” (BT 346/318) and that “The fundamental, ontological characteristics of this being are existentiality, facticity, and falling prey” (BT 191/178). This ambiguity leads Blattner to claim that “Textually it is a little unclear how to fill out the structure of care” (1999, 34). As we will note below, Blattner’s account will turn out to be equally unclear insofar as he tends to follow Heidegger in equating Being-with with fallenness, despite his claim that “Given that the term ‘falling’ moves around in Heidegger’s architectonic, it is best to treat it as an ambiguous term and to sort out the various phenomena to which it equivocally applies” (1999, 55). John Haugeland also notes Heidegger’s troublesome ambiguity when he argues – in terms of the modes of disclosure specific to dimensions of the care structure – that “Heidegger is not consistent about this…sometimes falling is substituted for telling [Haugeland’s translation of Rede, or discourse] (SZ, 349), and other times all four are given (SZ, 269, 335)”.

Such a blurring of the fallenness/Being-with distinction is present at BT 328/301, for example, where Heidegger points to the lack of a clear indication of the connection between temporality and the third constitutive dimension of care, which he here describes as: “entangled being-together-with”. This is not supposed to mean, he continues, that “falling prey is not also grounded in temporality,” (BT 328/301). The suggestion here being that ‘entanglement’ – and not modally undifferentiated ‘being-together-with’ – is to

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be taken as the third dimension of the care structure. In contrast, however, he thereafter claims that “Resolute, Dasein has brought itself back out of falling prey in order to be all the more authentically ‘there’ for the disclosed situation in the ‘Moment’ [Augenblick]” (BT 328/301-302), which he defines elsewhere as the authentic present (BT 338/311).

But if ‘falling prey’ is a constitutive dimension of the care structure it is not clear how Dasein can be ‘brought out’ of falling prey to reach the authentically temporal Moment. Indeed, grouping ‘falling prey’ with throughness and projectedness would seem to make authenticity structurally impossible, since authenticity is not an ‘escape’ from Dasein’s care structure, but a different mode of existing in terms of it. Heidegger’s early position recognizes this: “Angst takes away from Da-sein the possibility of understanding itself, falling prey, in terms of the ‘world’ and the public way of being interpreted” (BT 187/175): if falling prey were an equiprimordial existential in the same way that projection and throughness are, it would not be possible to ‘take it away as a possibility’.

Indeed, Heidegger even claims at BT 186/174 that “The turning away of falling prey is rather based on Angst which in turn makes fear possible”. If falling prey and attunement were equiprimordial dimensions of the care structure, how could falling prey be based on angst – a particular attunement? Similarly, the third mode of disclosure – discourse, the one specific to the third dimension of care (whatever that turns out to be) – is characterized, along with understanding and attunement – as having particular fallen modes (idle talk, curiosity, ambiguity) which would seem to indicate that discourse is a modally indifferent disclosure that is then modified by falling prey.

If the original characterization of the care structure as thrown, projecting being-with is maintained, Heidegger can avoid the difficulty that the authentic/in authentic
modalities pose to any account that includes falling prey as a fundamental dimension of care. This interpretation is supported by the fact that even authentic Da-sein will ‘be with’ worldly things and persons – just in a different, non-fallen mode. “Authentic being one’s self is not based on an exceptional state of the subject, a state detached from the they, but is an existentiell modification of the they as an essential existential” (BT 130/122). Though Heidegger does acknowledge that the modification of being-with that occurs in authenticity will be extreme, he does not claim – as he does with falling prey – that Dasein will be ‘brought out’ of it. Thus he will claim that “In Angst, the things at hand in the surrounding world sink away, and so do innerworldly beings in general. The ‘world’ can offer nothing more, nor can the Mitda-sein of others” (BT 187/175) – but note that it is the particular innerworldly way of being that stops being meaningful in a particular way; angst cannot be understood as “transposing an isolated subject-thing into the harmless vacuum of a worldless occurrence” but instead as bringing “Da-sein in an extreme sense precisely before its world as world, and thus itself before itself as being-in-the-world” (BT 188/176). As he notes in The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic:

In choosing itself Dasein really chooses precisely its being-with others and precisely its being among beings of a different character. In the express self-choice there is essentially the complete self-commitment, not to where it might not yet be, but to where and how it always already is, qua Dasein, insofar as it already exists (MFL 190).

If we recognize being-with as a constitutive dimension of being-in-the-world, Heidegger can make room for being-with both in its authentic and inauthentic modes of being.

The question of why Heidegger increasingly elides the distinction between being-with – a dimension of the care structure – and falling – the tendency to succumb to its inauthentic manifestation – cannot be addressed here; for now, I will simply assume that
such a distinction can be made, and that a reformulation of Dasein’s care structure in terms of temporality must therefore map being-with — understood as modally indifferent existential — onto the originary present. In doing so, I will therefore take this originary present — like the originary future and past — to be modally undifferentiated with regard to authenticity and inauthenticity.

Originary temporality is, as the essence of selfhood, more primordial than the authentic and inauthentic modes in which it will necessarily manifest itself: “only because this being is, in its essence, defined by selfhood can it, in each case, as factical, expressly choose itself as a self. The ‘can’ here includes also its flight from choice” (MFL 189). Blattner also endorses this interpretation, arguing that Heidegger’s authentic/inauthentic distinction implies a basic structure of temporality that is then modified by these different modes:

Heidegger begins his treatment of Dasein’s temporality by focusing on authentic temporality. However, in order to understand how authentic temporality is possible, he must show how it is a mode of a more basic sort of temporality, the sort of temporality that Dasein cannot help but have, the sort of temporality that characterizes Dasein’s being as such….authentic temporality is merely one mode of originary temporality (1999, 99).

This is not an uncontroversial view however; there appears to be a fundamental ambiguity in Heidegger’s texts regarding the relationship between original temporality and authentic temporality, and some readers question whether the two are in fact equivalent. Margot Fleischer’s Die Zeitanalysen in Heideggers ‘Sein und Zeit’: Aporien, Probleme und ein Ausblick⁶ argues that Heidegger wants “in der Zeitlichkeit ein Seinsgeschehen zu fassen, das gegen die Seinsvollzüge der ‘alltäglichen’ und der eigentlichen Sorge wie das Fundierende vom Fundierten abzugrenzen wäre” (25) — and

yet fails to consistently maintain this distinction, blurring the relationship between ‘das Fundierende’ and ‘das Fundierte.’ The distinction is clear in texts such as Being and Time paragraph 16 of section 65, she argues, where Heidegger implies that originary temporality is the condition for the possibility of authentic temporality: “Temporality temporalizes, and it temporalizes possible ways of itself. These make possible the multiplicity of the modes of being of Da-sein, in particular the fundamental possibility of authentic and inauthentic existence” (BT 328/302). In paragraphs 7-9 of section 65, however, Heidegger seems to conflate the two, according to Fleischer, since he seems to repeatedly equate resoluteness with the general structures of temporality – having been, making present, and futurity.

Daniel Dahlstrom disagrees with Fleischer’s claim that Heidegger distinguishes originary from authentic temporality, arguing, on the contrary, that Heidegger does not explicitly use the term original to refer to this temporality that is the condition for the possibility of the authentic and inauthentic modes. Though Dahlstrom admits that this does not rule out her claim that Heidegger characterizes originary time as the condition for the possibility of authentic time, he argues that “the fact that Heidegger so explicitly and constantly links original and authentic temporality should give one pause before endorsing Fleischer’s interpretation” (1995, 112). This linkage is particularly evident in Being and Time’s multiple references to “primordial and authentic temporality” (BT 329/302-303). As Dahlstrom notes, “These claims represent a substantial hurdle for any

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interpretation asserting that Heidegger implicitly considered or, on his own understanding of original temporality, ought to have considered it something indifferently instantiable as authentic or inauthentic" (1995, 113).

It is important to note, however, that these references linking primordial and authentic temporality occur immediately after the above-mentioned claim that temporality makes possible the inauthentic and authentic modes – thereby implying that the discussion that follows is simply an elaboration on the authentic mode. And in refusing the distinction between authentic and originary time, Dahlstrom does not want to deny that Heidegger has some account of Dasein’s temporality ‘in general’. He admits that Heidegger

...does characterize temporality in a rather neutral way as the unified phenomenon of this future ‘having been presenting,’ but temporality, so characterized, is not identified with original temporality. If the characterization needs to be labeled, it would seem to be an account of ‘the temporality of Dasein in general’ (1995, 111).

According to Dahlstrom, however, this characterization of temporality ‘in general’ is so abstract and barren that it cannot be understood in terms of the richness and power that Heidegger attributes to notions of origin. Indeed, Dahlstrom claims that it is particularly evident that this ‘temporality in general’ cannot be equated with originary temporality insofar as

Heidegger explicitly sets out to establish that inauthentic time is ‘not original and instead is springing away (entspringend) from authentic temporality’. In other words, not only is inauthentic temporality in no way originary temporality, it also does not directly spring, strictly speaking, from original temporality, but rather from authentic temporality (even though authentic temporality is in some way originary temporality) (1995, 112-113).

To argue that inauthentic temporality is not originary temporality, however, does not allow us to conclude, therefore, that authentic temporality is. As I will be arguing
below, Heidegger's position is that neither authentic nor inauthentic temporality can be equated with original temporality. Though inauthentic temporality does not directly 'spring' from original temporality, neither, I will argue, does authentic temporality; rather, both are modifications of world time – and it is world time that arises out of original temporality. Though inauthenticity may be characterized as a 'springing away' from authenticity, then, this does not allow us to conclude that authentic temporality just is original temporality. Rather, both are modifications of original time's worldly expression.

Though Dahlstrom's distinction between authentic/originary temporality and an abstract, general sense of temporality underlying its modal manifestations allows him to both accommodate cases where Heidegger appears to equate originary and authentic temporality and to allow for an underlying, modally undifferentiated temporal structure, it appears to be a rather artificial distinction. This is evident, as Blattner notes, insofar as

...the term (überhaupt) that Dahlstrom translates as 'in general' in 'temporality in general' can also be read, as I do, to mean 'at all.' So, when...Heidegger states that Dasein can be 'authentically futural,' only in virtue of 'coming toward itself überhaupt,' he can mean, and I think it makes more sense to read him as meaning, that authentic futurity depends on futurity at all, that is, the futurity in virtue of which Dasein is in any way futural....Heidegger states that 'coming toward itself überhaupt' makes possible the authentic future. So temporality überhaupt is an originary phenomenon, one that makes possible authenticity (1999, 100).

Though it cannot be denied that there are cases in which Heidegger appears to equate original and authentic time, these cases are better understood, I believe, as ambiguously phrased attempts to emphasize the authentic manifestations of original time. Focusing on points at which Heidegger does clearly articulate the relationship between authentic/inauthentic temporality and the modally undifferentiated primordial temporally underlying it will help keep this in mind:
If resoluteness constitutes the mode of authentic care, and if it is itself possible only through temporality, the phenomenon at which we arrived by considering resoluteness must itself only present a modality of temporality, which makes care possible in general (BT 327/300).

Such a claim, as well as his statement at BT 350/321 that “The disclosedness of the There and the fundamental existentiell possibilities of Da-sein, authenticity and inauthenticity, are founded in temporality” seem to be a strong indication that Dasein’s basic temporal structure cannot be characterized as authentic or inauthentic.

The strongest justification for my interpretation, however, is found in the general structure of Heidegger’s project. Like the refusal to equate being-with and fallenness, Heidegger’s characterization of Dasein as fundamentally suspended between authentic and inauthentic ways of being supports the distinction between modally neutral temporal structures of selfhood and its authentic manifestation. Structurally, Dasein is not just authentic or inauthentic, but is defined in terms of the underlying ontological makeup that makes both modes possible. Though Dasein will only ever exist concretely in terms of these modes, reducing one to the other will not help elucidate their shared structure.

For this reason, in clarifying the nature of the originary present, I will bracket considerations of the explicitly authentic and inauthentic manifestations of Dasein’s present. Heidegger refers to the former as the Moment [Augenblick] and the latter as a type of abstract and distorted ‘now’:

...the vulgar understanding of time sees the fundamental phenomenon of time in the now, and indeed in the pure now, cut off in its complete structure, that is called the ‘present’. One can gather from this that there is in principle no prospect of explaining or even deriving the ecstatic and horizontal phenomenon of the Moment that belongs to authentic temporality from this now (BT 426-427/391).

Rather than examining the Moment or the ‘present,’ I will isolate the now “in its complete structure” – the modally indifferent temporality from which they are derived. I will
similarly avoid Heidegger’s discussions of historicity, since they invariably speak only of authentic historicity, and thereby fail to isolate the general underlying structures\(^8\).

Indeed, Heidegger indicates that Dasein’s historicity is itself a function of its underlying temporality: “the temporality of Da-sein, which constitutes this being as historical” (BT 417/383), and it is this that needs to be analyzed.

The Originary Present

It would seem, then, that the originary present is the modally indifferent primordial temporalizing that enables the being-with dimension of Dasein’s care structure. But what exactly are we to understand by the ‘originary present’? The basic structures of originary time underlying both authentic and inauthentic time are difficult to discern because of Heidegger’s tendency to explicate them only in terms of their modal manifestations. Nevertheless, we can see hints: one indication is found at BT 328/302, for example, where he articulates the basic structures of originary time as follows:

“Future, having-been, and present show the phenomenal characteristics of ‘toward itself,’ ‘back to,’ and ‘letting something be encountered’” (BT 328/302). Later, he claims that “making present always...temporalizes itself in a unity with awaiting and retaining, even if these are modified into a forgetting that does not await” (BT 407/373-374). Elsewhere, he claims that we can characterize this “being toward presencing things as a holding in

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\(^8\) As Blattner notes, the main reason for “largely bypassing Heidegger’s discussion of historicality [not just because it relies on already working out what originary temporality and ordinary, sequential time are] is its unclarity; it slips quickly into a treatment of authentic historicity at the expense of that historicity that is modally indifferent” (1999, 29). Based on the individuation characterizing authenticity, it also seems evident that ‘authentic volk’ is not a notion to which Heidegger is entitled if he wishes to remain consistent. R. Phillip Buckley makes a similar point in “Martin Heidegger: The ‘End’ of Ethics.” *Phenomenological Approaches to Moral Philosophy.* John J. Drummond and Lester Embree, eds. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002., p. 197-228.
attendance or, more generally, making present” (MFL 202). The originary sense of the present can thus be understood as a temporalizing 'enpresenting' or making present in unity with awaiting and retaining that lets something be encountered. Such a characterization is clearly reminiscent of the imagination’s simultaneously passive and spontaneous temporality from our earlier Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics discussion.

But in what way does such ‘letting something be encountered’ occur? According to Heidegger, the modes of disclosure belonging to the care structure – understanding, attunement and discourse – are themselves derivatives or manifestations of the expressive nature of the temporal disclosure that is the essence of Dasein. Dasein’s primordial temporality always expresses or interprets itself in time:

If in saying ‘now’ we are not addressing ourselves to anything extant, then are we addressing ourselves to the being that we ourselves are? But surely I am not the now? Perhaps I am, though, in a certain way....The Dasein, which always exists so that it takes time for itself, expresses itself....it utters itself in such a way that it is always saying time. When I say ‘now’ I do not mean the now as such, but in my now-saying I am transient (BPP 259).

Dasein’s interpretive expression of its temporal structure is not an occasional activity but the subtext of all its activities: “Time is constantly there in such a way that...in all our comportments and all the measures we take, we move in a silent discourse” of now saying (BPP 259). According to Heidegger, the now is “nothing but the ‘expression,’ the ‘speaking out,’ of original temporality in its ecstatic character” (BPP 270). Time as we understand it in an everyday way is a derivative of temporality’s self-disclosure: “The making present that interprets itself, that is, what has been interpreted and addressed in
the 'now,' is what we call 'time'" (BT 408/375). Temporality expressed is time, and this expression is the very selfhood of Dasein's being-in-the-world.

Dasein’s self-expressive time-determinations are characterized by four features: spannedness, datility, publicity, and significance (BT 416/382). These features demonstrate the ecstatic nature of originary temporality – that in ‘speaking itself out’, Dasein is constituted by certain types of relationality. As Heidegger notes in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, “Temporality as unity of future, past, and present does not carry the Dasein away just at times and occasionally; instead, as temporality, it is itself the original outside-itself, the ekstatikon. For this character of carrying-away we employ the expression the ecstatic character of time” (267). Levinas himself recognizes this temporal structure in Heidegger’s thought:

Without being cognition, temporality in Heidegger is an ecstasy, a ‘being outside oneself.’ This is not the transcendence characteristic of theory, but it is already the leaving of an inwardness for an exteriority...indeed it is he who has grasped, in its deepest form, the ultimate and universal essence of this play of inwardness and exteriority, beyond the ‘subject-object’ play to which idealist and realist philosophy reduced it. What is new in this conception is that this ecstasy is seen to be more than a property of the soul; it is taken to be that through which existence exists. It is not a relationship with an object, but with the verb to be, with the action of being. Through ecstasy man takes up his existence. Ecstasy is then found to be the very event of existence.

Each of the four features of ecstatic temporality – spannedness, datility, publicity, and significance – demonstrates a particular type of ‘outside itself,’ of ecstatic relation to otherness. In the case of spannedness, the present maintains itself in terms of a relation to

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9 Kisiel notes Heidegger’s indebtedness to both Dilthey and the Christian tradition in this regard: through them he was able to articulate the ‘paradox’ of subjectivity (though Kisiel’s formulation still uses quite loaded language) – “that this outwardness of inwardness at once makes it accessible” (103). The condition of the ‘inner world’ is that “it is at once a historical world which as such can be understood...a life which is understandable because it always spontaneously expresses itself” (103-104).

past and future. In datability, the now is ecstatically related to a pragmatically-weighted thing or event. In publicity, it is the originary temporality of the other Dasein to which the now is ecstatically related. And in significance, the now speaks itself out into relation with the significance-constituting norms or measures that characterize what Heidegger calls ‘world.’

*Spannedness* receives very little attention from Heidegger, but he characterizes it as a type of temporal stretch – the lasting or enduring quality of time. Time’s ‘stretched’ character essentially draws the past and the future into relation with the present such that the duration ‘from then until then’ can be experienced as such.

...expressed time, the now, is dimensionally future and past...each now stretches itself out as such, within itself, with respect to the not-yet and the no-longer. The transitory character of each now is nothing but what we described as the spannedness of time (*BPP* 273-274).

In spannedness, the now accomplishes what Heidegger elsewhere calls “the ecstatic unity of future and having-been-ness” (*MFL* 207). It seems in this regard that Heidegger is indebted to Husserl’s account of internal time consciousness, which engages in an exhaustive examination of how the experience of time as enduring indicates that retention and protention “extends the now-consciousness”\(^\text{11}\).

Like the other three features, spannedness “has its basis in the fact that the now is nothing but the ‘expression,’ the ‘speaking out,’ of original temporality in its ecstatic character” (*BPP* 270). And also like the other features, spannedness is deeply entwined with the meaning and expression of the other features. Thus Heidegger will note that the span’s breadth is “variable” depending on the manner in which it is *dated*: “But every ‘then’ is *as such* a ‘then, when...’; every ‘on that former occasion’ is an ‘on that former

occasion when...'; every 'now' is a 'now that...'. We shall call this seemingly self-evident relational structure...*datability*" (*BT 407/374*). Thus the duration of some now – its span – will depend on what is occurring 'within' it: "The diversity of this duration is grounded in concern itself and in what has been placed under care for the time being. *The time which I myself am each time yields a different duration according to how I am that time*" (*HCT 231*).

Because the temporal nature of Dasein’s ‘speaking-itself-out’ is one of ecstatic transcendence it is defined in terms of these ‘relational structures.’ With datability, Heidegger claims, “In the en-presenting of a being the en-presenting, intrinsically, is related ecstatically to something" (*BPP 269*). This ‘something’ is some worldly thing or event of encounter. Datability is temporality’s expressive relatedness to some instance of such making-present:

If I say ‘now’...I encounter some being as that by reference to which the expressed now dates itself. Because we enunciate the now in each case in and from an en-presenting of some being, the now that is thus voiced is itself structurally en-presenting. It has the relation of datability, the factual dating always differing in point of content....In other words, time in the common sense, the now as seen via this dating relation, is only the index of original temporality" (*BPP 269*).

This mode of temporality’s ecstatic relationality or indexicality – its self-locating in terms of a particular thing or event – plays a central role for Heidegger, since Dasein does not necessarily ‘index’ or ‘date’ the now according to an objective calendar time – indeed, Heidegger notes that “The dating can be calendrically indeterminate” (*BPP 262*). Rather, the things and events according to which dating occurs are generally determined on the basis of Dasein’s practical projects. Datability is therefore the primary temporal expression of Dasein’s practical way of being. Though this will be further articulated in
terms of significance, datability expresses Dasein’s purposive character by tying its temporal self-expression to the events and objects that are made salient by its practical projects: “…the now itself guides and pushes us forward to that which is just transpiring there in the now…the now is, in its essence, a ‘now when this and that…,’ a ‘now wherein…” (MFL 200). All of the examples Heidegger uses to demonstrate this sense of the now’s being indexed to a ‘this’ or a ‘that’ make reference to particular projects or events with which Dasein may be engaged – lecturing, discovering that one’s book is missing, etc. “When we say ‘now,’ we are not focused thematically on the now as an isolated now-thing,” (MFL 200) he notes; “We are, rather, occupied with things, related to them…” (MFL 201).

It is for this reason that the future ecstasis of originary temporality is of such importance in understanding the temporal structure of Dasein’s way of being qua care; it is the basis of Dasein’s projective ability to understand itself by pressing forward into different possibilities, and thereby accounts to a large degree for the fact that expressed temporality is dated. Temporality is tied to particular things or events – it receives connotation – because of Dasein’s ability to express itself in terms of possible ways of being-in-the-world. It is important to note that these possibilities are not to be conceived of as some ‘not yet nows’ that are waiting to be actualized, however. This is, for example, the interpretation of Dasein’s ‘purposiveness’ that Mark Okrent gives in Heidegger’s Pragmatism12: “…understanding consists in projecting an end or purpose for oneself in terms of which those things other than Dasein have a significance, and that one’s understanding of oneself is as an end to be accomplished” (30).

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Okrent repeatedly makes use of this idea of ‘accomplishment’ or ‘realization’ in reference to Dasein’s projecting: “.the self-understanding of Dasein itself as an end to be realized” (1988, 35); “To understand myself as existing is to understand myself as an end that is not yet actual but that I grasp as my possibility” (1988, 35); “To understand myself it is necessary that I intend myself as a possible end to be realized” (35); “I understand myself as an end which is possible and to be attained” (39). The problem with such language, of course, is its implication that Dasein’s being-toward itself is something that could be ‘realized’ or ‘attained’. This picture contradicts Dasein’s nature as open-ended and incomplete, however. Such ‘realization’ or ‘actualization’ is in principle not possible, according to Heidegger, because Dasein is “always already its not-yet as long as it is” (BT 244/227). Thus projection and the future ecstasy in which it is rooted cannot be characterized as Okrent does since “the constant being-ahead-of-itself, is neither a summative together which is outstanding, nor even a not-yet-having-become accessible, but rather a not-yet that any Da-sein always has to be, given the being that it is” (BT 244/227).

Theodore Schatzki makes note of a similarly misguided trend in narrative theory, which tends to characterize the teleological structure of action in terms of states of affairs that are not yet now but are somehow waiting to be actualized – to be ‘made’ now through action. But since teleology or purposiveness is an existential feature rooted in Dasein’s way of being qua originary temporality, the ‘components’ of teleology must, Schatzki argues, “instantiate nonsuccessive dimensionality and not form a succession. For example, the end at which an action aims…must be its end as long as the action is performed. The end achieves this by being a possible way of being pursued by the actor.
The end (or purpose) of an action is not something that occurs after the action; it is not a state of affairs that does not yet obtain”\textsuperscript{13}.

Heidegger makes this point in emphasizing that the structure of expressed temporality is a unity of the ecstases and cannot therefore focus on futurity in isolation from the other ecstases:

The then, which is utterable and arises in making-present, is always understood as ‘now not yet’ (but rather: then). Whichever then I may choose, the then as such always refers in each case back to a now, or more precisely, the then is understood on the basis of a now, however in explicit. Conversely, every formerly is a ‘now no longer’ and is as such, in its structure, the bridge to a now. But this now is, in each case, the now of a particular making-present or retention in which a ‘then’ and a ‘formerly’ is, in each case, uttered (\textit{MFL} 202).

The futural ecstasis of originary temporality operates in and through \textit{this} now – not some yet to be actualized now – and in datability, it does so by allowing particular things or events that are made present to achieve a particular import for Dasein’s self-understanding. Thus Heidegger claims that Dasein is constantly ‘dating’ the now in everything taken care of: “First, because in addressing itself to something interpretively, it expresses \textit{itself} too....And secondly because this addressing and discussing that also interprets \textit{itself} is grounded in a \textit{making present}, and is possible only as this” (\textit{BT} 407-408/374). As we will note in our examination of the remaining features of expressed time – publicity and significance – it is not \textit{necessarily} the case that the content of specific datings are determined by Dasein’s practical projects, however. Indeed, we will come to see that the public dimension of expressed time results in a mode of dating the

now that is not tied to my particular projects, but establishes measures by which dating can be shared.

Before turning to these remaining features, however, we must note, first, that the expression of spanned, dated – ecstatic – temporality is only rarely explicit, despite its omnipresence. For the most part the now is expressed, according to Heidegger, "unthematically," and "latently" (MFL 201). Despite our tendency to overlook it, however, the ecstatic relationality of the expressed now plays a crucial role for Heidegger: in spannedness it establishes and maintains the movement whereby originary temporality ties itself or locates itself within a specifiable present, while simultaneously managing to maintain its reference and openness to the past and future ekstases.

Similarly, datability's "relational structure" (BPP 262) establishes an ecstatic link between Dasein's originary temporality and worldly things or events. In both of these cases the ecstatic structure of the now is characterized by what Heidegger calls a particular type of "double visage": its relational structure both maintains that which it expresses – originary temporality – while simultaneously granting it a type of detachment through its relation to otherness.

The now has a peculiar double visage....Time is held together within itself by the now; time's specific continuity is rooted in the now. But conjointly, with respect to the now, time is divided, articulated into the no-longer-now, the earlier, and the not-yet-now, the later....The now that we count in following a motion is in each instance a different now....The ever different nows are, as different, nevertheless always exactly the same, namely, now (BPP 247).

In saying 'now,' Dasein thus expresses a temporal moment that encompasses both sameness and difference: all nows are expressive of Dasein's original temporality, but this interpretive self-expression comes in the form of a temporal articulation that is
always defined in terms of “otherness, being-other” (BPP 247). Thus in characterizing
the ‘then’ – the expression of originary temporality’s futurity – Heidegger will ‘locate’ it

Neither in objects nor in subjects (in the traditional conception), neither here nor
there but, as it were, on the way from the subject to the object! But we are
already acquainted with this ‘on-the-way,’ as the stepping-over, as transcendence.
This on-the-way is only a reference to the ‘location’ where, in the end, that ‘is’
which we utter as time character (MFL 202).

Thus the now occupies a pivotal role: using admittedly dangerous language, considering
Heidegger’s attempts to overcome this dichotomy, it brings the ‘subjective’ into the
‘objective’ – while maintaining it subjective nature by first giving it a relational context
for self-interpretive expression. This constituted context is the essence of what
Heidegger means by world-time:

World time is more ‘objective’ than any possible object because, with the
disclosedness of the world, it always already becomes ecstatically and horizontally
‘objectified’ as the condition of the possibility of innerworldly beings….But
world time is also ‘more subjective’ than any possible subject since it first makes
possible the being of the factual existing self, that being which, as is now well
understood, is the meaning of care (BT 419/384-385).

World-time is thus the context in which Dasein – the factual existing self – first becomes
possible. Dasein’s temporality ‘speaking itself out’ into time is what first constitutes the
horizon in terms of which Dasein can understand itself as existing qua factual self – and
results in the context in terms of which things can be encountered as existing ‘within’
time at all. Thus Heidegger will claim that: “The relationship we have to time at any
given time is in no way tacit [or] something negligible, but is precisely what sustains our
dwelling in the world” (ZS 85-86/66-67). Indeed, he makes explicit note of this ‘order’
of temporal constitution: “temporality, as ecstatic and horizontal, first temporalizes
something like world time that constitutes a within-timeness of things at hand and
objectively present” (BT 420/385). Originary temporality expresses itself in a world time which then constitutes the intratemporality definitive of things.

This dependence of the intratemporal on world-time is clear: “That time should hold-around beings, contain them, in such a way that we recognize what it holds as intratemporal, is possible and necessary because of the character of time as world-time” (BPP 274). Emphasizing the distinction between ordinary time and world time – and characterizing the former as founded on or derivative of the latter – differs from interpretations such as Frederick Olafson's, which consistently equates the two14. Such an interpretation is clearly opposed to Heidegger’s distinction between them, however: whereas world-time is explicitly characterized by significance, datability and publicity, in vulgar time these are concealed and forgotten: “The vulgar interpretation of time covers them over” (BT 422/387).

It is true, he acknowledges, that it is possible to conceive of time in terms of that which is nearest to us – zuhanden things – such that we characterize the now in terms of undifferentiated objective presence. This is the essence of the vulgar concept of time: since “…the common understanding of time is aware of being only in the sense of extant being, being at hand….time gets interpreted also as something somehow extant….The nows appear to be intratemporal” (BPP 272). Despite this ‘intratemporal’ model for characterizing the now, however, we also recognize it as that ‘within’ which the intratemporal occurs. Heidegger will consequently characterize the now as both articulated ‘in time’ and as unifyingly constitutive of within-timeness. Though we generally overlook the complexity of this ecstatic structure, and think of it merely in

14 See Heidegger and the Philosophy of Mind, Ch. 4, especially p. 75-84.
terms of ‘vulgar,’ undifferentiated instants, he is clear about the necessary complexity and order of priority for any adequate characterization of Dasein’s being-in-the-world:

Which is the ‘true’ time? Let us suppose that time were merely given to us as a sequence in which the aforementioned characteristics – datability, significance, extendedness, and publicness – were all leveled down to an empty ‘now’ sequence. Affected only by time represented in this way, we would become deranged (ZS 63-64/50).

This world time context within which intratemporal things are encountered – and within which Dasein can first exist qua factual self – is essentially constituted not only by the ecstatic relationality of spannedness and datability, but by the remaining features of time to be considered: publicity and significance. Though the ordinary sense of time takes its understanding from thingly within-timeliness, by analyzing the role that significance and publicity play in constituting world-time, we can recognize the ontological priority of encounters with other Dasein. These encounters co-constitute world-time and therefore have priority over the zuhanden and vorhanden encounters with things that occur within this constituted world-time. This intersubjective world-constitution thereby refutes critics such as Michael Theunissen who argue that Heidegger’s claims regarding the difference between encountering things and encountering other Dasein is undermined by the priority that his work consistently gives to Zuhanden and Vorhanden – thingly – existence.

Contrary to Theunissen’s claims, “the inner order of the event of encountering” (181) does not, in fact, prioritize the latter, since thingly ‘intratemporal’ encounters are dependent on the publicity of time and the context of significance that this helps to establish.
Publicity

In Dasein’s expression of its primordial temporality it ‘speaks-itself-out’ into a now that both indexes and manifests Dasein’s ecstatic nature, thereby granting the now a ‘peculiar double visage’ – a temporal ekstasis that is nonetheless tied to a datable present. Encounters between several such temporalizing beings navigate this complex structure of sameness and difference:

...several people can say ‘now’ together, and each can date the ‘now’ in a different way: now that this or that happens. The ‘now’ expressed is spoken by each one in the publicness of being-with-one-another-in-the-world. The time interpreted and expressed by actual Da-sein is thus also always already made public as such on the basis of its ecstatic being-in-the-world (BT 411/377).

The import of such a claim is profound, for it characterizes the encounter between temporality-defined Dasein on the most fundamental level. The capacity to express my originary temporality in a now indexically tied to an event of making-present for me – a now that is nevertheless also a now that is accessible for you – and is thus simultaneously an expression of your originary temporality – will be the essence of a Heideggerian response to Sartre’s criticism. “Although each of us utters his own now, it is nevertheless the now for everyone” (BPP 264). In simultaneously ‘speaking-themselves-out’ into a common now – a temporal structure defined by both commonality and difference – multiple Dasein encounter each other as beings defined by originary temporality.

Fourth, the datable, significant, and extended ‘now’ is also never initially a ‘now,’ merely referring to me. This erroneous opinion could impose itself insofar as at any given time I am the one who says ‘now.’ In each instance that very ‘now’ I just said is the ‘now’ we say; that is, in each case, without reference to the particular I who says ‘now,’ we all jointly understand it immediately. It is a ‘now’ that is immediately commonly accessible to all of us talking here with each other. There is no need to mediate between the individual egos through an [act of] reflection as if they said ‘now’ separately and only subsequently agreed with each other that they were referring to the same now. Therefore, the ‘now’ is neither something first found in the subject, nor is it an object which can be found
among other objects, as for instance this table and this glass. Nevertheless, at any
given time the spoken 'now' is immediately received-perceived jointly by
everyone present. We call this accessibility of 'now' the publicness
[Öffentlichkeit] of 'now' (ZS 60-61/48).

This publicity that is definitive of temporality's self-expression points us again to
Heidegger’s claim that nowness is always “otherness, being-other” (BPP 248) – the now
is a paradoxical structure in that it is a context of sameness that nevertheless expresses
difference. The type of ecstatic relation to otherness characteristic of the now is not only
the temporal reference to past/future or to worldly event, however, but also involves an
intrinsic ecstatic relation to the multiple voices saying now, the many Dasein engaged in
expressing their originary temporality. The ekstasis definitive of making present, then,
cannot be understood simply as a ‘standing out’ from future and past, but must be
characterized in terms of the ecstatic encounter with the other Dasein’s originary
temporality. This allows Heidegger to escape a criticism that Fleischer puts forth in Die
Zeitanalysen in Heideggers 'Sein und Zeit': Aporien, Probleme und ein Ausblick; namely,
that Heidegger's turn to temporality is unnecessary since the analysis of care essentially
already accounts for Dasein’s way of being: “Wird Zeitlichkeit dem Dasein nicht als sein
Sein zugrunde gelegt, dann nach meiner Auffassung, wie ausgeführt, für die Ganzheit der
Sorge kein Schaden” (39)\textsuperscript{15}. Contrary to Fleischer’s claims, however, the move from
care to its underlying basis in temporality demonstrates the manner in which the
encounter with other selves – the being-with dimension of care – operates despite the
inauthentic tendency to misconstrue the otherness that defines this encounter. The
ecstatic nature of the now has its ‘vector’ of ecstasis not simply in terms of the temporal

\textsuperscript{15} Dahlstrom makes note of this in “Heidegger’s Concept of Temporality,” and argues that a similar
position could explain the neglect of Division II displayed by Dreyfus and Okrent (1995, 99).
extension of my own being, but primarily in terms of the others with whom the intersubjectivity of world-time is established and maintained.

Heidegger seems to recognize this intersubjective nature of the establishment of world-time—"Fellow humans...join in constituting the world" (BPP 297). This shared and yet individuated nature of expressed time is what allows for the constitution of intersubjective world-time: allowing Heidegger to ask—though he does not pursue—"How is the simultaneity of different things possible?" (BPP 237). This question is, he recognizes, "more precisely, the question of the possibility of an intersubjective establishment of simultaneous events" (BPP 237). Though the intersubjective nature of world-time is not explored in detail, it nevertheless accounts for his move from originary temporality to ordinary time. As Heidegger notes, "'Public time' turns out to be the time 'in which' innerworldly things at hand and objectively present are encountered. This requires that we call these beings unlike Dasein beings within-time" (BT 412/378). Beings like Dasein, however, are the ones who constitute public time—or "the" time that provides an 'objective' context within which things can be encountered. This objectivity is established through intersubjective encounters with others whose basic ontological structure is also originary temporality 'speaking-itself-out.'

Heidegger's failure to elaborate on this essentially public nature of originary time may explain Blattner's failure to recognize its import. In order to support his claim that Heidegger cannot account for the shift from originary to ordinary time, Blattner must show that the move through world time will not provide the sequentiality that is present in ordinary time, but absent in originary time. By ignoring the role of publicity, however, Blattner misses Heidegger’s solution to this problem. Namely, that the first step in
achieving sequentia lity is in recognizing that, though Dasein's primordial temporality is not itself sequential, in the encounter with other such Dasein its expression is limited and relativized. Sequentiality depends on the recognition of times other then my own – nows other than this now. The bringing into relation or taking account of time in terms of the temporality of other Dasein – which we will examine further in our analysis of significance – is essential for the arrangement or ordering of Dasein's temporal expression and thereby a necessary precondition for the completely ordered arrangement of sequential 'vulgar' time.

Blattner focuses, instead, on what he calls "pragmatic temporality," which is intended to link originary time and world time:

Dasein's experience of world-time is grounded in its originary temporality.... First, one understands world-time by reckoning with time. Time-reckoning is the mode of understanding in virtue of which Dasein is able to encounter and to understand world-time. Second, time-reckoning depends upon pragmatic temporality.... Third, pragmatic temporality depends upon originary temporality (1999, 135-136).

This relationship is due, Blattner believes, to the fact that "Pragmatic temporality makes possible Dasein's understanding of world-time, because world-time is based on its understanding of the pragmatic Now" (1999, 149). Thus "Pragmatic temporality turns out to be an elaboration of originary enpresenting" (1999, 161) which somehow collapses or express the three dimensions of originary temporality within the present: "the entire pragmatic framework belongs to the originary Present" (1999, 162).

This is in keeping with our earlier discussion of the datability of the now and the manner in which Dasein's practical projects – including their future and past ecstases – are expressed in the now. Blattner's problem arises when he notes that
The structure from the awaiting to the retaining is the understanding of the Now. But it is essential to the Now that it is part of a sequence of Nows. An understanding of a sequence, however, is in no way represented in the structure depicted here. To get the understanding of a sequence, Dasein must interpret the structural unit that ranges from the awaiting to the retaining as iterated (1999, 162).

With his emphasis on the pragmatic Now, however, Blattner overlooks the feature of Dasein’s temporality that allows this iteration: its publicity. The iteration required for sequentiality cannot be accomplished from within the private parameters of a ‘pragmatic temporality’ but depends on the recognition of a multiplicity of temporalities—of times that are not my own. Without the other Dasein speaking out their ‘now’ it would not be possible to recognize a ‘now’ other than the one within which my own originary temporality is always expressed.¹⁶

That the role of other Dasein has essentially dropped out of consideration is evident in Blattner’s interpretation:

How can world-time be the way in which time shows up in our ongoing, everyday activity, if it is a sequence of Nows, and if everyday activity is a form of absorption in work? After all, if one is absorbed in work, one does not confront a sequence of Nows. Other Nows are not at issue. As Brown lectures, absorbed in her task, there is only the Now, when she lectures, and its boundaries, the former and the then (1999, 149).

¹⁶ This is very much like the position that Levinas came to advocate: “How indeed could time arise in a solitary subject? The solitary subject cannot deny itself; it does not possess nothingness…the absolute alterity of another instant cannot be found in the subject, who is definitively himself. This alterity comes to me only from the other. Is not sociality something more than the source of our representation of time: is it not time itself? If time is constituted by my relationship with the other, it is exterior to my instant, but it is also something else than an object given to contemplation” (Existence & Existents. Alphonso Lingis, trans. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1988., p. 96). According to Tina Chanter, Levinas believed Heidegger to belong with the rest of the tradition insofar as he “always conceives of time in a solitary subject” (27-28). I hope to have shown, however, that though Heidegger did not examine these issues in sufficient—or at least comparable—detail, such an accusation is false, and Levinas’ own account must be seen as a continuation of—rather than a break with—Heidegger’s characterization of temporal diachrony. For further discussion of the Levinasian understanding of such diachrony, see his examination of the notions of ‘paternity’ and ‘fecundity’ in Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, especially pages 267-269 and 274-280. (Alphonso Lingis, trans. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969). Levinas also finds this temporal alterity in the distance between the ‘saying’ and the ‘said’ (See Chap. II, Section 3: “Time and Discourse,” in Otherwise Than Being Or Beyond Essence. Alphonso Lingis, trans. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1998).
Note Blattner’s claim that “Other Nows are not at issue”. The fundamental feature of temporality’s publicity, I argue, is precisely the fact that in encountering other Dasein it is ‘other nows’ that are at issue. Indeed, the example Blattner uses is precisely one of conflicting interpersonal now-saying – the disruption that is caused when the significance of the now of one person comes into conflict with the significance of another’s, when the other’s desire for a coffee break interrupts Brown’s lecture – but Blattner fails to recognize its import for Heidegger’s position. Though he emphasizes the datability, spannedness, and significance of Brown’s now, all he says of its publicity – its temporally *intersubjective* dimension – is that “Finally, all this is public, humorously available to all the students in the class” (1999, 151).

According to Heidegger, however, temporality’s essential publicity is not as superficial as Blattner indicates. That Blattner overlooks the crucial importance of the intersubjective dimension in Heidegger’s account is evident in his virtual dismissal of Heidegger’s account of discourse, which is, as we will discuss further in the following chapter, the mode of disclosure specific to being-with. According to Blattner, “Heidegger offers nothing distinctive to say about the temporality of discourse,” since he “passes this project off into a promissory note” (1999, 122). This ‘promissory note’ is Heidegger’s claim that

...our analysis of the temporal constitution of discourse and the explication of the temporal characteristics of language patterns can be tackled only if the problem of the fundamental connection between being and truth has been unfolded in terms of the problematics of temporality. Then the ontological meaning of the ‘is’ can be defined, which a superficial theory of propositions and judgments has distorted into the ‘copula.’ The ‘origination’ of ‘significance’ can be clarified and the possibility of the formulation of concepts can be made ontologically intelligible only in terms of the temporality of discourse, that is, of Da-sein in general (*BT* 349/320-321).
Heidegger’s explicit commentary on the temporality of discourse is admittedly sketchy and does seem to arbitrarily defer *its* analysis – but not that of the temporality of understanding or attunement – until after the being/truth connection has been clarified. The reason for this is Heidegger’s own failure to fully elaborate on the intersubjective dimension on which his account is based. Whether he was unwilling or unable to acknowledge the complexity demanded of his account if it were to fully accommodate world-constituting encounters with other temporality-defined Dasein, or whether he simply failed to *recognize* the essential supporting role that this intersubjective dimension was playing in his own account is unclear. It is evident, however, that this role is overlooked by Blattner – as well as many others. Thus he interprets Heidegger’s claims that “discourse does not temporalize itself primarily in a definite ecstasy” and that “*making present* has, of course, a *privileged* constitutive function” (*BT* 349/320) as being evidence that Heidegger “does not say much, after all” (1999, 122). On the contrary, I believe that discourse’s mode of temporalizing is not limited to a determinate ecstatic because it is the mode in which other Dasein qua temporalizing beings – i.e. *beings unlimited to one definite ecstasy* – are disclosed.

**Reckoning and Significance**

According to Heidegger, the profound publicity of time that is articulated in discourse “does not occur occasionally and subsequently” (*BT* 411/378) – rather, the intersubjective nature of temporality’s expression structures all of Dasein’s comportments:
...since Da-sein *is* always already disclosed as ecstatic and temporal and because understanding and interpretation belong to existence, time has also already made itself public in taking care. One orients oneself toward *it*, so that it must somehow be available for everyone (*BT* 411/378).

This 'orienting toward time' such that "time taken care of" is made intersubjectively available, occurs when Dasein 'reckons' with time – a reckoning that is essentially "*time measurement*" (*BT* 415/381). In this reckoning time-orientation, Dasein

...initially discovers time and develops a measurement of time. Measurement of time is constitutive for being-in-the-world. Measuring its time, the discovering of circumspection which takes care of things lets what it discovers at hand and objectively present be encountered in time. Innerworldly beings thus become accessible as 'existing in time' (*BT* 333/306).

It is this time-measure that establishes world-time – the *shared* arena of significance, datability and duration necessary for innerworldly beings to become accessible. Dasein submits itself to standards of temporal ordering that are available to all and thereby establishes a public 'arrangement' of time – a point essential for the transition from ecstatic original temporality to sequential ordinary time. Through measure, the multiplicity of nows are brought into an ordered alignment. In developing these orienting measures that are available for everyone, Dasein essentially builds on its intersubjective co-temporality to create an established context that is more explicit, efficient, and inclusive by looking for objects or events (such as sunrise) by which it can engage in shared 'datings' of the simultaneous now-saying. In such cases, Heidegger claims, "That which dates is available in the surrounding world and yet not restricted to the actual world of useful things taken care of...everyone can 'count on' this public dating in which everyone gives himself his time. It makes use of a *measure* that is available to the public" (*BT* 413/379).
Note that the event or thing chosen for public dating is not restricted to the practical projects of a particular Dasein’s understanding, contrary to the emphasis that Okrent, Blattner and others place on the essentially pragmatic nature of expressed temporality. Indeed, Heidegger explicitly claims that “That which dates is available in the surrounding world and yet not restricted to the actual world of useful things taken care of” (BT 413/379). Instead Dasein establishes a measure for indexing its originary temporality that is in a certain sense independent of its pragmatic abilities-to-be. Indeed, Heidegger clarifies that datability must be understood primarily in terms of this ‘reckoning’ mode of dating, the mode of dating characteristic of temporality’s publicity:

Although taking care of time can be carried out in the mode of dating that we characterized – namely, in terms of events in the surrounding world – this always occurs basically in the horizon of a taking care of time that we know as astronomical and calendrical time-reckoning. This reckoning is not a matter of chance, but has its existential and ontological necessity in the fundamental constitution of Da-sein as care. Since Da-sein essentially exists entangled as thrown, it interprets its time heedfully by way of a reckoning with time. In this reckoning, the ‘real’ making public of time temporalizes itself so that we must say that the thrownness of Da-sein is the reason why ‘there is’ public time (BT 411-412/378).

Dasein dates the now primarily in light of the others with whom it must ‘share time’ by developing an ecstatic relation to public norms or standards of time-reckoning according to which all Dasein orient and order their different temporalities. Dasein is ‘heedful’ of the others by submitting itself to measures that allow for a shared temporal space.

Contrary to many interpretations of the normalizing role that these public measures play in Heidegger’s work, this self-subsumption to shared norms is not inherently inauthentic. Heidegger notes that reckoning with time does not necessarily result in an inauthentic now: “the pure now, cut off in its complete structure” (BT 426-427/391). Rather, Heidegger explicitly claims that in such a measuring orienting-toward-
time, “the now is always already understood and interpreted in its complete structural content of datability, spannedness, publicness, and worldliness” (BT 416/382).

Nevertheless, temporality’s self-expression in terms of measure is conducive to Dasein’s understanding of the now in a truncated and distorted way – i.e. inauthentically – since such ordered now-saying involves encountering a temporality other than one’s own, and thereby opens the possibility of interpreting temporality as completely unowned. This may explain Heidegger’s tendency to elide fallenness and being-with. This distortive consequence is not a necessary result of Dasein’s tendency to orient itself toward time in terms of publicity and measure, however. Such distortion occurs only when Dasein loses sight of the nature of its measure-taking, subsuming itself to interpretations appropriate to intratemporal, thingly being.

Properly understood, however, ‘reckoning’ or time measure does not involve Dasein subsuming itself to thingly being – the clock or the sun – but to some intersubjectively shared ‘making-present’ that establishes parameters for temporality’s self-expression in dating the now. Thus “what is ontologically decisive” in measuring lies not in the thing against which something is measured, but

...in the specific making present that makes measurement possible. Dating in terms of what is objectively present ‘spatially’ is so far from a spatialization of time that this supposed spatialization signifies nothing other than that a being that is objectively present for everyone in every now is made present in its own presence. Measuring time is essentially such that it is necessary to say now, but in obtaining the measurement we, as it were, forget what has been measured as such so that nothing is to be found except distance and number (BT 418/383-384).

What is definitive is not the thing measured or used to measure, but the shared measuring. Thus Heidegger will claim in The Zollikon Seminars: “we say ‘now’ when we speak to each other. In so doing, the ‘date’ is used in the original sense of the word as
‘that which is given’; in our discussion the ‘now’ refers to this ‘givenness.’” (ZS 47).

Indeed, in a discussion of Leibniz from History of the Concept of Time, Heidegger indicates the necessity of the ‘compresence’ of multiple Dasein for measuring (HCT 235).

This making-present through co-giving of measure includes an implicit acknowledgement of the other Dasein engaged in temporalizing now-saying – others with whom Dasein establishes shared (present-for-everyone) standards according to which Dasein can orient itself. These shared standards against which Dasein can “signify to itself its ability to be” (BPP 295-296), is what “we call significance….the structure of what we call the world in the strictly ontological sense” (BPP 295-296). The world is the normatively structured public context defined by significance: the fourth feature of expressed originary temporality. As Kisel notes, “The dynamics (and so the temporality) of this signifying milieu will tend to be obscured by an abstractive categorizing when it is reiterated over the years that meaningfulness, significance, is the central and primary character-of-being of the world” (329). Early on, however, Heidegger more clearly recognizes the ‘dynamic’ temporalizing of the many Dasein involved in constituting this signifying milieu.

This context of appropriateness relations is co-constituted by the many Dasein who orient themselves in terms of communal measures of temporal expression. The world – this shared normative space – is accomplished through temporality’s ecstatic ‘speaking itself out’ through the now’s relation to the temporal ecstases, to worldly things and events, to others defined by temporality, and to the norms of measure according to which multiple Dasein can orient themselves. It is for this reason that Heidegger can
claim that “Time is essentially a self-opening and expanding into a world” (MFL 210).

Primordial temporality speaks itself out into an intersubjective time of shared
significance through reckoning, measuring and ordering with the others – thereby
constituting the context of sequentiality and significance in which Dasein finds
meaningful standards for orienting its way of being in the world. “We see then the
peculiar productivity intrinsic to temporality, in the sense that the product is precisely a
peculiar nothing, the world” (MFL 210). This ‘product’ is co-constituted with the others
through shared measures that accommodate the temporal way of being of many Dasein.

“If the time we take care of is ‘really’ made public only when it gets measured, then
public time is to be accessible in a way that has been phenomenally unveiled” (BT
414/380). To understand this making-public through measure, Heidegger demonstrates
its rootedness in norms of appropriateness and inappropriateness:

When the ‘then’ that interprets itself in heedful awaiting gets dated, this dating
includes some such statement as: then – when it dawns – it is time for the day’s
work. The time interpreted in taking care is always already understood as time
for….The actual ‘now that so and so’ is as such either appropriate or
inappropriate. The ‘now’ – and thus every mode of interpreted time – is not only
a ‘now that…’ that is essentially datable, but is at the same time essentially
determined by the structure of appropriateness. Interpreted time has by its very
nature the character of ‘time for…’ or ‘not the time for…’. The making present
that awaits and retains of taking care understands time in its relation to a what-for,
that is in turn ultimately anchored in a for-the-sake-of-which of the potentiality-
of-being of Dasein. With this relation of in-order-to, time made public reveals the
structure that we got to know earlier as significance. It constitutes the worldliness
of the world. As time-for…, the time that has been made public essentially has
the nature of world (BT 414/380-381).

For Heidegger, then, world is the context in which Dasein enacts its ability to be
according to public norms or measures. These measures are characterized by reliability –
they are something “everyone can ‘count on’” (BT 413/379) and they are uncontroversial
and accessible – they are “for ‘everyone’ at any time in the same way so that within
certain limits everyone is initially agreed upon it” (BT 413/379). Indeed, Heidegger will claim that “The idea of a standard implies unchangingness” (BT 417/383) and thus is available “at every time for everyone” (BT 417/383).

The public measuring that constitutes world is normative not only because the standards it institutes are unchanging and universally accessible, however, but because they are constraining; they are “binding for everyone” (BT 417/383). The other is a necessary condition for the possibility of the world qua context of normative significance, then, insofar as the measures of appropriateness in terms of which I orient my temporalizing would not achieve obligating force if the others did not require me to accommodate my temporalizing to their time through the establishment of binding public standards. “One orient[s] oneself toward it, so that it must somehow be available for everyone” (BT 411/378). This point allows us to recognize that Heidegger’s account makes room for a claim that the other makes on me prior to and as a condition for these public norms. Though he fails to examine the implications of this – especially the ethical implications – his position clearly involves such a moment of claim; all of Dasein’s time-reckonings, regardless of its care-driven projects, “must still be in conformity with the time given by the others” (BT 418/384). We will be returning to this issue in the following chapters.

The primary arena in which Heidegger analyzes the normativity of the public sphere, is, however, in the functionality of tools and equipment, where the being of the tools used is determined by their “specific equipmental function” (BPP 292). Things encountered in the world are understood in terms of what they are for; an understanding with an inherent recognition of the normative possibilities of succeeding or failing.
"Each individual piece of equipment is by its own nature equipment-for – for traveling, for writing, for flying. Each one has its immanent reference to that for which it is what it is. It is always something for, pointing to a for-which" (BPP 163-164). Dasein’s everyday immersion in things cannot obscure the fact that their meaning is determined by normative functionality relations, and that these functionality relations are themselves grounded in Dasein’s way of being qua originary temporality – which includes the ecstatic relation to the other Dasein.

Letting-function, as understanding of functionality, has a temporal constitution. But it itself points back to a still more original temporality. Only when we have apprehended the more original temporalizing are we able to survey in what way the understanding of the being of beings – here either of the equipmental character and handiness of handy equipment or of the thinghood of extant things and the at-handness of the at-hand – is made possible by time and thus becomes transparent (BPP 294).

The emphasis on the role of the others in co-constituting the world should not obscure the profound emphasis that Heidegger places on the ‘for-the-sake-of’ grounding the world’s context of significance however. Though the others are essential for establishing the publicity and bindingness of worldly significances, the commitment with which Dasein submits itself to them is rooted in its way of being qua jemeinigkeit. In “On the Essence of Ground,” for example, Heidegger explicitly claims that interpreting being-in-the-world requires “starting from the ‘for-the-sake-of’ as the primary character of world”17. This point returns us to Chapter II and the nature of Dasein as a being defined by a mineness that drives it to seek objective standards according to which it may measure its ‘success’ at existing. “If temporality constitutes the primordial meaning of being of Dasein, and if this being is concerned about its being in its very being, then care must need ‘time’ and

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thus reckon with ‘time.’ The temporality of Da-sein develops a ‘time-calculation.’” (BT 235/217). We note here how deeply this way of being runs – Dasein does not simply establish this or that standard of measure, but always expresses itself to and with the others such that world-time and the corresponding context of normative significance – world – can be. This urge to measure – the very manner in which time becomes public – is, according to Heidegger, the essential structure of all of Dasein’s comportments:

All measuring is not necessarily quantitative. Whenever I take notice of something as something, then I myself have ‘measured up to’ [an-messen] what a thing is. This ‘measuring up’ [Sich-anmessen] to what is, is the fundamental structure of human comportment toward things. In all comprehending of something as something, for instance, of the table as a table, I myself measure up to what I have comprehended (ZS 130/100).

Underlying the norms and measures characterizing world is Dasein’s nature as a being-entrusted with its own being, a self-responsibility that manifests itself in the commitment to these norms and measures. Recall the discussion from the last chapter, where it was shown that the interruption of the Zuhanden could be overcome in a principled manner insofar as Dasein is committed to getting itself right – and therefore cares about getting its encounters with things right. This existential self-responsibility is a necessary condition for understanding the world as normative context of significance, since Dasein must care about how it is to be in heeding the other’s temporal claim and committing itself to shared measures. The appropriateness relations definitive of the public arena depend on the fact that this appropriateness matters to Dasein. Thus ‘speaking itself out’ into world – Dasein’s mundanizing temporal self-expression – must be understood as directed by the profound mineness of the way in which this self-expression is accomplished.
This measured expression into world – in which Dasein both expresses the mineness of its being, and accommodates that of the others – is neither chosen nor avoidable: “This reckoning is not a matter of chance” (BT 411/378). Rather, such mundanizing temporalizing is an essential consequence of Dasein’s way of being “...the fact that transcendence temporalizes itself as a primordial occurrence, does not stand in the power of this freedom itself. Yet impotence (thrownness) is not first the result of beings forcing themselves upon Dasein, but rather determines Dasein’s being as such. All projection of world is therefore thrown” (“OEG,” 135). The unique structure of world is such that it is both constituted by Dasein and yet first provides it a context for being: in “On the Essence of Ground” Heidegger defines Dasein’s temporalizing transcendence as “that surpassing that makes possible such a thing as existence in general” (108) and as that which “constitutes selfhood” (108); he further claims that ‘Dasein transcends’ means: in the essence of its being it is world-forming, ‘forming’ [bildend] in the multiple sense that it lets world occur, and through the world gives itself an original view (form [Bild]) that is not explicitly grasped, yet functions precisely as a paradigmatic form [Vor-bild] for all manifest beings, among which each respective Dasein itself belongs (“OEG” 123).

We can see here profound echoes of our earlier discussion of Heidegger’s indebtedness to Kant and Husserl: the active-passive structure of the fundamental horizon of intuition – expressed temporality’s world-forming – is evident here. Dasein ‘speaks itself out’ in a responsive, relational transcending toward the world that is both constituted by, and makes possible, Dasein’s way of being. Though such a structure may appear to be somewhat paradoxical, it is important to be clear that this is a transcendental claim and cannot be understood as a type of occurrence that takes place in time: “‘Time’ is neither objectively present in the ‘subject’ nor in the ‘object,’ neither ‘inside’ nor ‘outside,’ and it
'is' 'prior' to every subjectivity and objectivity, because it presents the condition for the very possibility of this 'prior'' (BT 419/384-385). There is not first a worldless, originary temporal Dasein and then, through it's temporalizing, world is formed. Rather, Dasein is always already worldly and as such it is always already sharing this world with the others. What is being articulated is the condition for the possibility of a shared intratemporal world – within which the finitude and mineness of Dasein's originary temporality is nevertheless expressed.

Husserl faces this same problem in the fifth of his Cartesian Meditations, insofar as he starts from the immanence of the transcendental ego and attempts to demonstrate how it is always already intersubjective. There are serious difficulties with his approach insofar as he nevertheless seems to cling to the solipsism of the 'primal ego'. The details of Husserl's account cannot be addressed here, however, it seems clear that Heidegger is both indebted to Husserl's account and attempts to escape its difficulties by reversing the order of precedence. He starts with our worldly, intersubjective way of being and attempts to demonstrate that the finitude and mineness of originary temporality is a condition for its possibility.

The role that others play in this shared world-constituting – the finitude and mineness of their way of being qua co-constitutors – can be acknowledged to varying degrees. It is possible to encounter other Dasein not only in terms of their originary temporality to which I must accommodate my own, but also as innerworldly,
intratemporal beings. Indeed, this is how the distinction between Mitsein and Mitdasein is best understood – not as a difference between a category and a particular, but as a difference between dimensions of intersubjective encounter – world-constituting and innerworldly. Thus Heidegger claims that “we must not overlook the fact that we are also using the term Mitda-sein as a designation of the being to which the existing others are freed within the world” (BT 120/113). Mitda-sein refers to the mode of being of Dasein insofar as they can be considered worldly, the “everyday innerworldly Mitdasein of others” (BT 121/114). Though others can be encountered as co-constitutors of the world – insofar as they have a unique now-saying to which I must accommodate my now-saying – they can also be encountered in terms of the innerworldly context that is established through these measures. Heidegger’s comments indicate that the term ‘Mitda-sein’ designates only the latter, innerworldly mode of being and encounter. So, for example, Heidegger will claim that Mitdasein is a kind of being of “something encountered within the world” (BT 140/131-132). Note also his claim that “Mitda-sein characterizes the Da-sein of others in that it is freed for a being-with by the world of that being-with. Only because it has the essential structure of being-with, is one’s own Da-sein Mitda-sein as encounterable by others” (BT 121/113). Mitda-sein is the innerworldly or intratemporal manifestation of the other’s being, which is made possible by the very world that presupposes – and is established on the basis of – being-with: “Our analysis has shown that being-with is an existential constituent of being-in-the-world. Mitda-sein has proved to be a manner of being which beings encountered within the world have as their own” (BT 125/117). He elaborates further on Mitda-sein as the innerworldly manner of being-with:
The world not only frees things at hand as beings encountered within the world, but also Da-sein, the others in their Mitda-sein. But in accordance with its own meaning of being, this being which is freed in the surrounding world is being-in in the same world in which, as encounterable for others, it is there with them (BT 123/115).

Like the others, I too am encountered as Mitda-sein when I am encountered as an innerworldly entity, and such innerworldly being is made possible by the world. What this means is that I am encountered – and I encounter others – in terms of the public norms and measures that define this intersubjective sphere. Thus Dasein’s everyday way of encounter with others is delineated by public, worldly roles and meanings: “One’s own Da-sein, like the Mitda-sein of others, is encountered, initially and for the most part, in terms of the world-together in the surrounding world taken care of” (BT 125/118). What this does not entail, however, is that I only encounter other Dasein as ‘innerworldly’ – intratemporal and public – though the fallen tendency to focus solely on the innerworldly tends to this interpretation. It is the more primordial dimension of intersubjective encounter – a mode forgotten and yet operative in everydayness – that establishes and maintains the ‘world-together’ that is presupposed in all innerworldly Mitda-sein encounters.

To what extent does this account overcome Sartre’s critique? Though the fact of Dasein’s being-in-the-world indicates that there must be other Dasein with whom such a world is co-constituted, to what extent are these others encountered as individuals? Have we merely reiterated being-with as an *a priori* category – though complex and temporal – under which – individual Dasein are subsumed? Recall that in order to avoid the conclusion that the shared nature of the world is only experienced when concrete others are present – the problem that afflicted Sartre’s account – it must be the case that the
world *itself* contains references to the others with whom I share it. Once a public, shared
time has been established based on communal standards of measure, the intratemporal
things encountered therein will point to the other Dasein who can potentially encounter or
use a thing. Thus Heidegger claims that "In the kind of being of these things at hand, that
is, in their relevance, there lies an essential reference to possible wearers for whom they
should be ‘cut to figure’" (*BT* 117/111).

This characterization of things as defined by a type of horizon of reference to
possible others is deeply reminiscent of Husserl’s analyses of the intersubjective nature of
the objectivity of objects. Every perception of an object refers to a horizon of
anticipations of further possible perceptions, including perceptions that belong to other
possible perceivers. A difficulty arises, however, when we recognize that this horizon of
reference is anonymous and unlimited. As Dan Zahavi notes in *Husserl and
Transcendental Intersubjectivity*,

As a transcendent object, it possesses an infinite diversity of coexisting and
compatible profiles, and my experience of it naturally does not presuppose that
each of its profiles is simultaneously perpetually intended by a subject, which
would presuppose an infinite plurality of foreign I’s who are currently actually
perceiving it (and who are perceived by me as so doing). Although not only the
appresentation but also the horizontal givenness of the object (i.e., the *appearance*
of the object) seem to presuppose some sort of relation to foreign subjectivity, it is
neither a matter of the relation to one foreign I alone, nor a matter of the relation
to the factual existence of several I’s (2001b, 50).

In other words, the horizontal reference to other subjectivities implicit in the encounter
with worldly things seems to be a reference to a type of thematic or *a priori* other – the
other ‘in principle’ – and not to the factual experience of this or that other concrete
subjectivity. According to Zahavi, Husserl’s account therefore demands that one
distinguish between several types of experiences of others. On the one hand,
perception’s anonymous structural reference to possible others points to “an infinite plurality of possible others, which Husserl occasionally characterizes as the open intersubjectivity” (Zahavi 2001b, 50). On the other, “It is only the concrete experience of others that permits the self-mundanization of the transcendental I and the thematic experience of validity-for-everyone” (Zahavi 2001b, 59). In this regard, one could characterize ‘being-with’ as Heidegger’s version of this type of ‘open intersubjectivity’\textsuperscript{21}. This interpretation seems to be implied in comments such as Heidegger’s claim that “The Dasein is, as such, essentially open for the co-existence of other Daseins” (BPP 296).

Does this simply return us to our original problem? Should all of our everyday encounters with other Dasein be characterized as a type of primal co-constitution of world, or simply as innerworldly, anonymous encounters that merely rely on the previously established intersubjective realm? There are a number of points that must be kept in mind here. First, the ‘openness’ and anonymity of the intersubjective reference at play in the thing’s referral to possible others is dependent on the concrete encounter with another Dasein’s temporal particularity. The reason for this is that the recognition of another now that is simultaneous but transcendent to my own – the type of transcendence essential for establishing a shared world-time – could not be accomplished as a type of imaginative variation on my own now. Acknowledging another now is inherently acknowledging a foreign temporality-defined subjectivity. The initiation into co-temporality must be accomplished in the concrete encounter with other Dasein expressing their originary temporalities. A similar point is made by Tugendhat in regard to

\textsuperscript{21} Zahavi considers this point, but argues that because Heidegger always seems to base his analyses on the utilization of the \textit{Zuhanden}, being-with seems to be better characterized in terms of the anonymous publicity of what he takes to be a third Husserlian mode of encounter (See 2001b, 128-129). In this sense, Zahavi is echoing Theunissen’s (mis)interpretation whereby the thingly encounter has priority.
Husserl’s account of intersubjectivity; namely, that if others were not encountered as foreign co-constituting subjectivities, their role as co-constitutors would be impossible:

Transzendentalt heißt also nicht nur jede egologische Sphäre für sich, sondern transzendentalt heißt gerade auch die intentional-konstitutive Gemeinschaft, die Intersubjektivität (CM 158 u.ö.), obwohl dieser, als einer durch reales Sein vermittelter, weder für mich noch für den Anderen die Zweifellosigkeit der Urgegebenheit zukommt (1967, 224)\(^{22}\).

On the basis of this inaugural encounter with another subjectivity, the transference of this co-presentation to other encounters may occur in terms of the shared world that results – in other words, the world may refer to a type of ‘open intersubjectivity,’ such that the trace of ‘some other Dasein’ is present in the cultivated field or the encountered artifact. Nevertheless, the order of precedence prioritizes the inaugural encounter with concrete foreign temporalities. Though the presence of other Dasein can be encountered through anonymous worldly roles and norms, then – a situation necessary to account for the publicity of worldly things and spaces – the condition for this possibility is the primal encounter with the foreign now that evokes or initiates shared roles and norms. The category being-with is operative qua category, but it is characterized by a temporal responsiveness to the concrete encounter – as our discussion of Heidegger’s debt to Husserl and Kant in this regard has indicated. Like the other existentials, being-with is in the service of temporal intuition; but in the case of being-with, intuition does not give intratemporal things, but ‘foreign’ originary temporalities – other Dasein.

\(^{22}\) Zahavi claims that insofar as Tugendhat’s understanding of constitution here relies upon the traditional “opposition between epistemic and ontological priority” that the transcendental reduction was meant to overcome, “his suggestion misses the point” (2001b, 107). The extent to which this is an accurate account of Husserlian constitution cannot be addressed here – the relevant point for our discussion is that the experience of the other as co-constitutor – as originary temporality speaking itself out into the world – cannot simply be a moment of my own originary temporality but is precisely an encounter with another now.
Since Dasein’s way of being is temporalizing, encountering another Dasein involves encountering a temporalizing being expressing itself in time. The ‘with’ of being-with is a constant speaking out of my ‘now’ to the others such that we come to share a particular temporal now and thereby establish a common space of measured meaning. Because my encounter with the other who says ‘now’ is a direct experience of her originary temporality — the fundamental expression of her concrete care-defined way of being — such encounters are not simple subsumptions of the other to an *a priori* category, as Sartre claims.

Simultaneous ‘speakings out’ of temporality into world time — expressions that first institute the possibility of ‘simultaneity’ — are concrete encounters with others unmediated by abstract categories or worldly interpretations. Other Dasein are given in the particularity of their temporal self-disclosure — their expressive now-saying — and it is only thus that we can co-constitute the world. Though our fallen tendency to take our understandings from intratemporal things encourages distorted characterizations of the condition in which we find ourselves, the fact that the shared space of world-time and significance is accomplished in the co-now-saying of multiple Dasein cannot be completely elided: “somewhere and somehow time breaks through, even if only in the common understanding or misunderstanding of it. Wherever a Da, a here-there, is intrinsically unveiled, temporality manifests itself” (*BPP* 307).

The manner in which the other’s temporalizing way of being is experienced as such will be elaborated in much greater detail in the following chapter. There I will demonstrate that, for Heidegger, the recognition of others as co-constituting the world is always present in and through every innerworldly encounter.
The Social Self: A Heideggerian Account of Intersubjectivity

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CHAPTER VI: 
Encountering the Others: Transcendental Intersubjectivity and Solicitude

Heidegger refers to the specific way of being toward other Dasein as Fürsorge, which has generally been translated as ‘solicitude’ or ‘concern.’ This type of care is not the same as ‘taking care’ of things – our way of being toward the objects we encounter – “although this kind of being is a being toward beings encountered in the world, as is taking care of things” (BT 121/114). Though ecstatic transcendence or ‘being toward’ characterizes both taking care of things and solicitude for others, the fact that in solicitude it is another Dasein to whom I am related – a being that differs fundamentally from the innerworldly things experienced in zuhanden and vorhanden modes of encounter – means that there is an insuperable difference between them. In solicitude “the being to which Da-sein is related as being-with does not, however, have the kind of being of useful things at hand; it is itself Da-sein. This being is not taken care of, but is a matter of concern” (BT 121/114).

For Heidegger, Fürsorge designates this way of being toward the others who share my way of existing qua temporalizing being-in-the-world. This concern is the mode of encounter specific to those who do not exist merely as innerworldly, intratemporal things, but also as beings expressing their originary, ecstatic temporality in a co-constituting of the world. The other Dasein’s co-constituting care – it’s Mitsein being – is operating in and through the innerworldly – Miida-sein – modes in which I encounter it. But how do I experience it as such?
Open Intersubjectivity

As we already noted above, the encounter with the originary temporality of other Dasein is acknowledged in the very fact that there are public standards to which I submit myself. The existence of ‘foreign nows’ to which I must accommodate my own originary temporality is a necessary condition for the bindingness and publicity of the norms and public structures of meaning that characterize what Heidegger means by world. It is for this reason that worldly structures and objects speak to me of the presence of others, a point that allows Heidegger to overcome the difficulty that faced Sartre regarding how the world is experienced as shared, even in the absence of concrete others. I experience a type of Dasein-presence through worldly things – in the cultivated field, for example – and the encounter is experienced as ‘personal’ insofar as particular dimensions of these worldly things are salient. I do not recognize the presence of other Dasein simply through this or that expanse of dirt but in the trace of her purposive activity; in the fact that this expanse of dirt is cultivated and thereby succeeds in meeting particular standards of purpose:

These others do not stand in the referential context of the environing world, but are encountered in that with which they have to do, in the ‘with which’ of their preoccupation as the ones who are preoccupied with it. They are encountered as they are in their being-in-the-world, not as chance occurrences but as the ones who till the field (HCT 240).

Other Dasein and the traces of their work are not encountered as ‘chance occurrences’ but as practical agents expressing their attuned, projective being-in-the-world through purposive worldly roles and activities. I do not simply encounter others as part of the

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1 Recent studies in developmental psychology support this distinction in our way of ‘being-toward’ things vs. ‘being-toward’ persons: as young as six months old children attribute intentionality and goal-directedness to the movement of a human hand – evident in anticipatory eye movement – but not to similar movements when the ‘agent’ is a machine or not visible (Vittorio Gallesse, “Intentional Attunement: Neural
referential context of meaning delimited by my projects – as another ‘part’ of the world. Rather, I encounter them “as they are in their being-in-the-world” (HCT 240): thrown into the world and committed to projects that ‘center’ meaningful contexts of reference. These equipmental contexts, these roles and activities, are manifestations or expressions of the care that makes them meaningful as publicly significant equipment or action. Without others who exist in this heedfulness to one another and the public measures evoked by such heedfulness, the world qua context of significance would not be possible as such.

This being-there-too with them [the others] does not have the ontological character of being objectively present ‘with’ them within a world. The ‘with’ is of the character of Da-sein, the ‘also’ means the sameness of being as circumspect, heedful being-in-the-world. ‘With’ and ‘also’ are to be understood existentially, not categorically. On the basis of this like-with being-in-the-world, the world is always already the one that I share with the others. The world of Da-sein is a with-world (BT 118/111-112).

On the basis of this like-with the world is one I share with the others, not vice versa. Though the order of priority is clear – the world as public, normatively binding context of significance depends on the intersubjective encounter with particular others – we have nevertheless not yet shown that the encounter with every other Dasein involves a ‘being-toward’ the other qua originary temporality. The worldly shared space of significance demands that some others be recognized as such – it requires an ‘open intersubjectivity,’ as we noted above – but in order to completely refute Sartre’s critique, we must show that every other is encountered as such – at least on some minimal level.

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Correlates of Intersubjectivity” paper presented at the Subjectivity, Intersubjectivity, Objectivity conference held at The Center for Subjectivity Research, The University of Copenhagen, September 23, 2006).
Specific Intersubjectivity

Fürsorge is Heidegger’s answer to this requirement: it is a way of being toward particular things in the world, but insofar as it is the way of ‘being toward’ specific to Dasein as such, it is a mode of encounter that inherently acknowledges every Dasein’s distinct way of being qua originary temporality\(^2\). For Heidegger there is a continuum of such acknowledgement – the extremes of which he characterizes as ‘leaping-in’ and ‘leaping-ahead’\(^3\). Though one pole of the Fürsorge continuum involves such a minimal level of Dasein-acknowledgement as to encompass all sorts of abuse and disregard, every point on the continuum registers the other Dasein as a being defined by originary temporality, despite the tendency to forget this in light of everyday, ‘vulgar’ time. In the following chapter we will be examining the extremes of this continuum to demonstrate how leaping-ahead involves taking the other’s status as temporally particular ‘mineness’ as one’s guiding directive – thematically or practically – in one’s being-with-the-other,

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\(^2\) The term ‘recognition’ has an enormous philosophical history rooted in Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* (A.V. Miller, trans. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), where he characterizes the “process of Recognition” in terms of the fact that “Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged” (111). Though an investigation of Hegel’s influence would clearly be important and relevant for this discussion, the enormity of this task demands that it be bracketed. In light of this, my use of the term ‘recognition’ is simply meant to designate the manner in which one subject experiences another subject as such, and not to invoke all of the Hegelian implications of this term. I will also refer to this mode of subject-encounter using the term ‘acknowledgment’ – taken not only from Hegel, but from Stanley Cavell’s *The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality and Tragedy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979). The use of this term is particularly helpful insofar as it has fewer ‘cognitive’ implications and it also seems to indicate a moment of accommodation inherent in the encounter. However, as Axel Honneth notes in “Self-Reification: Contours of a Failed Form of Self-Relationship,” (Paper presented at the Subjectivity, Intersubjectivity, Objectivity conference held at The Center for Subjectivity Research, The University of Copenhagen, September 23, 2006) the German word for recognition – *Anerkennung* – does not have such a cognitive tone, and also includes a sense of normative affirmation. For Honneth’s most famous examination of the meaning of recognition for understanding intersubjective encounters, see *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts* (Joel Anderson, trans. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1996).

\(^3\) Theunissen characterizes the interpretation of leaping-in and leaping-ahead as extremes on a continuum as “bizarre,” and claims that “It is certainly not to be assumed that ‘bypassing one another, not-being-involved with one another,’ provides the mean between the solicitude of leaping-in and leaping-ahead” (note 32, p. 397). If we consider the fact that these extremes are to encompass the entire range of human interaction, however – including murderous cruelty and self-sacrificial love – then characterizing the mean between them as bypassing one-another in an indifferent state that is neither profoundly negative nor positive does not sound so ‘bizarre’.
while leaping-in is the most minimal – yet still operative – mode in which the other
Dasein is recognized as such. The focus of the current discussion, however, will be on
analyzing the underlying structure of Fürsorge to determine what type of Dasein
acknowledgement characterizes every intersubjective encounter. This chapter will
discuss the everyday ways in which the other is typically encountered as co-Dasein, and
will end with a discussion of discourse – the mode of disclosure specific to Fürsorge.

Though the term Fürsorge or ‘solicitude’ seems to indicate a genuine involved
connection between two people, this is a technical term that Heidegger uses to
characterize the range of possible ways of being toward others. Thus behaviors and
attitudes that we would characterize as indicating a lack of concern are themselves
different modes of concern on his account.

Being-for, against-, and without-one-another, passing-one-another-by,
not-mattering-to-one-another, are possible ways of concern…. These modes
of being show the characteristics of inconspicuousness and obviousness
which belong to everyday innerworldly Mitda-sein of others, as well as to
the handiness of useful things taken care of daily. These indifferent modes
of being-with-one-another tend to mislead the ontological interpretation into
initially interpreting this being as the pure objective presence of several subjects.
It seems as if only negligible variations of the same kind of being lie before us,
and yet ontologically there is an essential distinction between the ‘indifferent’
being together of arbitrary things and the not-mattering-to-one-another of beings
who are with one another (BT 121-122/114).

Even in behaviors and attitudes where the other is treated callously – as if he were a thing
– this ‘as if’ can never completely conceal the profound ontological difference between
things and persons experienced in every encounter with other Dasein: “the Dasein
understands, in equal originality with its understanding of existence, the existence of
other Daseins and the being of intraworldly beings” (BPP 279). Note here that when
Heidegger refers to Dasein’s ‘understanding of existence’ he is not referring to some
thematic ‘existence in general’ but to the concrete having to be of Dasein’s existing here and now. Note also that he distinguishes the *existence* of Dasein – mine and the other’s – from the ‘*being of intraworldly beings*’. Instances in which our indifference toward others may *seem* to be the same as the indifference felt for objects – or simply a ‘negligible variation’ thereof – are in fact radically, “essentially” distinct modes of being. There is a fundamental difference in kind between intraworldly beings and world-expressing Dasein.

Heidegger’s basic distinction between persons and things – his characterization of the intersubjective encounter as involving an ontologically-based *inability* to experience the other as a thing – points to the ethical implications of Heidegger’s position. Indeed, several commentators have noted Heidegger’s similarity to Kant in this regard. Thus Sonia Sikka argues in “Kantian Ethics in *Being and Time*” that

Heidegger’s agreement with Kant’s practical philosophy is not limited to some cursory remarks about ‘solicitude’ which might seem merely to qualify, or attenuate, the dominant tenor of his descriptions. Rather, a retrieval of central Kantian ideas… is present in *Being and Time*’s account of the basic structure of Dasein and the world. As a result, *Being and Time*’s emphasis on the situated character of human judgment is supplemented by a definition of appropriate behaviour toward all entities possessing a certain character, where this definition is grounded in the most fundamental elements of Heidegger’s ontology⁴.

Like Kant, Heidegger offers a characterization of encounters with other persons as profoundly different from encounters with things, a difference that is grounded in fundamental elements of Dasein’s ontology. Many commentators have attempted to read a type of Kantian moral injunction into such a distinction.

⁴ *Journal of Philosophical Research*, forthcoming, p. 3.
Building on the fundamental Kantian distinction between persons and things, Heidegger has differentiated that circumspective concern we display to the things about us from our solicitous comportment toward other persons. Only through solicitous behaviour do other persons enter into our experience qua persons (instead of things). It is toward them that we are able to exhibit moral responsibility. Reminiscent of Kant’s injunction that the prime moral responsibility is to treat them qua persons and to enhance their own free self-development, Heidegger abjured the domination of others because it fringes on their own sovereignty of care.

The tendency of most interpretations, however, is to recognize the ethical implications of Heideggerian Fürsorge solely in its authentic manifestations. Interpretations typically only emphasize the manner in which leaping-ahead and authentic modes of solicitude echo Kantian notions of respect, thereby failing to characterize the specific other-directedness of all modes of solicitude – regardless of where they fall on the authenticity or Fürsorge continuums – as involving a type of minimal level of ‘recognition respect’ in their acknowledgement of others as ontologically distinct from things. This seems to be the case above when Sherover implies that others only appear in my experience as persons when I treat them solicitously – but I could treat them, and thus, apparently, experience them, otherwise. Lawrence Vogel’s reading also fails to recognize the type of Dasein-acknowledgement that is operative in all modes of Fürsorge, emphasizing instead only the authentic mode of being-with and its possible interpretation as an ‘existential basis for the second version of Kant’s categorical imperative’. In a similar approach, Julian Young counts merely authentic solicitude as a ‘moral relationship...for what it amounts to is the fundamental Kantian principle of respect: never treat humanity either in

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6 Steven Darwall makes this type of distinction between appraisal and recognition respect in his "Two Kinds of Respect" (Ethics, Vol. 88 (1977) 36-49): the former involves esteeming someone’s life or character as successful or worthy, whereas the latter is not a kind of esteem, but respect granted on the basis of the dignity of persons as such.
your own person or that of another as a mere means, but always as an end-in-itself”

(1997, 104).

The problem with such comparisons to Kant’s notion of respect is not only their failure to consider the extent to which the entire Fürsorge continuum involves a being-toward the other qua Dasein, but their related tendency to collapse several different morally relevant dimensions of intersubjective encounters under a single term. In failing to differentiate the basic structures of solicitude from one of the modes in which it can be realized, such accounts confuse the following essential moments: 1.) the immediate recognition of the other as a being with a way of existing different from that of things, 2.) the corresponding obligation or claim that I limit or accommodate myself to the other who is so acknowledged, 3.) the responsiveness to the claim – the degree and manner in which the claim is heeded or evaded through self-limiting or its lack, and 4.) the role that explicit self-ownership and responsibility play in all of the above. Despite the tendency in discussions of the moral implications of Heideggerian intersubjectivity to give pride of place to 4.), this approach is misguided. Though Heidegger’s own interest in authenticity seems to justify this emphasis, I will argue below and in the following chapter that the degree to which this other-responsiveness requires a prior authenticity is highly questionable, and should not simply be included as a necessary condition for elaborating the moral dimensions of the intersubjective encounter. The reason for this is that basic aspects of the moral encounter – the acknowledgement of the other’s Dasein status as fundamentally distinct from a thing, and the moment of claim inherent in this acknowledgement – lies deeper than authentic/inauthentic ways of being in the world:
indeed, the temporal accommodation that constitutes the acknowledgement of the other Dasein’s claim on me is the very basis on which world has its being.

Though the requirement of a prior authenticity is an issue to which we will be returning, then, the other requirements seem to be necessary structural dimensions of the minimally ethical encounter: recognizing the other’s personhood, the immediate claim that the other’s personhood makes on me, and the capacity to respond or avoid responding to this claim. “I respect you” means that I not only acknowledge your ontological status as another Dasein and am obligated in some way in and through this acknowledgement, but that I take on this obligation through self-limiting. The ability to subsequently deny or turn away from the initial acknowledgement of the other’s claim – i.e. the possibility that one can fail to meet one’s moral obligations – is what makes the relation normative and one for which someone can be held responsible. Such turning away can only be understood as a failure, however, insofar as there is a preexisting claim that is first acknowledged as such on some level. Though there is more to morality than acknowledging the other’s humanity and experiencing a certain type of limit or claim in light of this acknowledgement, then – one must respond to this claim appropriately in order to be moral – the foundational elements of acknowledgement and claim within the intersubjective encounter are necessary dimensions of morality. These elements characterize the entire Fürsorge continuum, however, and not just the authentic forms in which the responsibility for an appropriate reply to these claims is explicitly owned as such.

For the purposes of the current discussion, then, we will be focusing on these structural elements and examining the relationship between acknowledgement and claim
in order to come to a better understanding of the extent to which Heidegger’s account of Dasein-specific modes of encounter involve a call for one Dasein to accommodate itself to another. Such a limiting moment must be a necessary dimension of all Fürsorge if we are to show that every encounter with the other involves an immediate – though often subsequently forgotten – acknowledgement of her concrete temporal particularity. As Olafson puts it in *Heidegger and the Ground of Ethics*, we have to show how others subject us to constraints “from which we cannot release ourselves simply by choosing to do so” (1998, 49). Even in instances that appear to be cases of this self-release, the claim and its acknowledgement must be shown to remain on a minimal level.

It will become evident in our discussion that Heidegger’s general hostility to the language and approach of traditional ethics is not a failure to recognize or accept this obligating dimension of the Dasein-to-Dasein encounter. This is a common interpretation of Heidegger, however, of which Herman Philipse’s claims are representative:

Heidegger locates all moral norms on the ontical level. His ontology of human existence cannot contain a substantial ethical theory because, he says, it merely investigates the ‘existential condition for the possibility of the ‘morally’ good and for that of the ‘morally’ evil’.8

Contrary to Philipse’s assertions that Heidegger’s hostility to lists of particular moral laws precludes him from providing a genuine ethics, such hostility must be seen as arising from the tendency to characterize such laws in terms of a type of objective presence that is incompatible with Dasein’s way of being qua temporalizing care. Thus in *The Essence of Human Freedom* Heidegger will claim that:

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What is crucial for understanding the moral law, therefore, is not that we come to know any formula, or that some value is held up before us. It is not a matter of a table of values hovering over us, as if individual human beings were only realizers of the law in the same way that individual tables realize the essence of tablehood. What he rejects in his renunciation of ‘ethics’ is the philosophical tradition’s attribution of an inappropriate ontological status to these moral laws and the beings who are meant to realize them. As Olafson argues, the tradition “simply postulates that there is a model – an archetype – of some kind to which our actions are to conform. As it is typically understood, this model has a distinctly thinglike or vorhanden character” (1998, 49). Though Olafson intimates that the problem with this model is the understanding of temporality with which it is operating – since it cannot account for the character of repetition at work when ethical norms direct one to repeat “the same action in the same circumstances” (1998, 49) – he fails to examine these temporal dimensions in any detail.

In the following discussion it will become clearer how the appropriate model for understanding the ontological constraint that the other’s presence places on me – a constraint from which I cannot simply choose to be released – is based on Dasein’s originary temporality coming into ecstatic contact with the temporality of the other.

How, then, do we experience the fundamental thing/person distinction, and in what way does the encounter with the latter always involve both a dimension of profound particularity and a type of unavoidable claim? Heidegger’s reference to the difference between a living other and a human corpse is interesting in this regard, for it demonstrates both his general failure to discuss Dasein’s embodiment and, perhaps, why he feels justified in doing so: the distinction between the corpse and the living other seems not to be a physical difference, but a profoundly ontological one. In death the way

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of being of the other – the presence of the other qua Dasein – is gone. And the objectively present bodily remains provide – perhaps better than anything else – a profound example of the immediate experience of the difference between Dasein and thing. When the other dies

...their being-in-the-world is as such no more. Their still-being-in-the-world is that of merely being on hand as a corporeal thing. The unique change-over of an entity from the kind of being belonging to Dasein, whose character is being-in-the-world, to a bare something which is still only on hand is especially evident here. This ‘still being on hand’ is the extreme counterinstance to the foregoing kind of being of this entity. Strictly speaking, we can no longer even say that something like a human body is still on hand. We must not deceive ourselves. For with the dying and the death of others, an entity is indeed still on hand, but certainly not their Dasein as such (HCT 310).

The corpse’s ‘on-handness’ provides an “extreme counterinstance” to its prior way of being, but what exactly distinguishes the two? It cannot be movement, since any horror-movie fan can attest to the fact that moving corpses do not a person make. Indeed, the example of horror movies may help us, interestingly, since what horrifies us in the spectacle of animated corpses is precisely the amalgamation of thing-like body with the remnants of meaningful behavior. They are engaged in purposive action, but it is no longer anchored in the finite care that gives it its human meaning. The source of discomfort in this type of horror movie, I would argue, lies precisely in its violation of this profound ontological distinction between person and thing.

Horror movies aside, we can see that Heidegger follows Kant quite closely in answering the question of what distinguishes Dasein from things: it is not its body or its status as ‘rational animal’ – i.e. simply its capacity for purposive action, as the zombie example indicates. Rather, the corpse and the person are differentiated primarily by the existential self-givenness – the care-defined first-person having to be – that leads Kant to
characterize persons as purposive ‘ends in themselves,’ and prompts Heidegger to describe Dasein in terms of ‘mineness’ – or being-for-the-sake of itself:

The essence of person, the personality, consists in self-responsibility. Kant expressly emphasizes that the definition of man as rational animal does not suffice, for a being can be rational without being capable of acting on behalf of itself, of being practical for itself (EHF 261-264/179-180).

Heidegger is in profound agreement with Kant on this – as on so many things\(^\text{10}\) – noting that it is only in the structure of the for-the-sake-of that Kant can gain the possibility of “distinguishing ontologically between beings that are egos and beings that are not egos, between subject and object” (BPP 138). It is this character of jemeinigkeit that accounts for the sharp distinction between persons and things.

The Dasein exists; that it to say, it is for the sake of its own capacity-to-be-in-the-world. Here there comes to be the structural moment that motivated Kant to define the person ontologically as an end, without inquiring into the specific structure of purposiveness and the question of its ontological possibility (BPP 170).

For the most part, then, Heidegger agrees with Kant’s person/thing distinction and the basis on which he makes it – Dasein’s purposive mineness. At the end of the day, however, Heidegger has difficulties with Kant’s failure to examine the underlying structures of this existential responsibility and as a result he reaches the conclusion that “Though Kant means to present the person as quite different from natural entities...he does not, according to Heidegger, adequately sustain the distinction. Ultimately the person is treated as a different sort of natural entity” (Dostal 1993, 160). Heidegger’s analyses in Being and Time are aimed at overcoming this failure by showing Dasein’s status as an ‘end in itself’ to be grounded in its ecstatic, finite, temporal particularity.

\(^\text{10}\) Kant’s profound influence on Heidegger’s thought is well-chronicled in Kisiel’s The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time, where he describes Being and Time as having “a Kantian overlay and impetus” from the start (411).
The finitude and particularity of Heideggerian self-responsibility is therefore in sharp contrast to the anonymity of Kant’s lawgiver – universal rationality. John Llewellyn notes that:

...the Kantian account of personality is given in terms of reason and a moral law which, far from inflating the ego, deflects it to the point of impersonality. Levinas aims to show that such impersonality is inconsistent with the ethical. This is one reason why Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant is so significant. It offsets the threat of anonymity by underlining Dasein’s *Jemeinigkeit* and being towards death (1991, 80).

Though an adequate interpretation of Kant’s moral theory may be able to answer these accusations – something that cannot be addressed here – Heidegger clearly recognized both its profound strengths and its seeming weaknesses. His reinterpretation aims at maintaining these strengths while avoiding the difficulties associated with an anonymous account of Dasein’s status as ‘ultimate for the sake of which’: the fact that such a position 1.) cannot offer a compelling account of why one would or should take on self-responsibility for universal rationality, and 2.) it undermines the ability to respect the other in the concrete particularity of her being – rather than simply as an instantiation of universal reason. In this latter sense, Heidegger’s reformulation of Kant can succeed in overcoming the very difficulty that Sartre finds in Heidegger’s own position. By pointing out the temporalizing finitude that underlies Dasein’s status as ‘end in itself,’ Heidegger provides a more ‘personal’ understanding of this self-givenness – attempting, thereby, to continue and deepen Kant’s fundamental insights regarding the personhood that distinguishes us from things\(^{11}\).

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\(^{11}\) There are those who read Heidegger’s ‘call of care’ or ‘call of being’ as being equally anonymous; François Raffoul claims, for example, that “The call of care, that Heidegger will later designate as the call of Being, manifests the otherness which lies at the heart of Dasein’s self-appropriation. Dasein can belong to itself only if it takes upon itself a gift of Being which is so to speak impersonal, and at the very least pre-personal. This gift of Being is for Dasein otherness itself, even if Dasein constitutes itself on the basis of
The Mineness of the Other

It seems clear that on this account of the person/object distinction I am able to make such a distinction when the person under consideration is me — since I am this jemeinigkeit way of being — but in what way can I experience the ‘mineness’ of the other? The very notion seems profoundly paradoxical. Though it seems contrary to claim that I may somehow encounter the other’s ‘mineness,’ Heidegger is clear that he does not mean ‘mineness or ‘I-ness’ to refer only to me but not to you. Rather, he is interested in articulating the structures of selfhood that characterize both the ‘I’ and the ‘thou’. Thus in Metaphysical Foundations of Logic he claims that

The object of inquiry is not the individual essence of my self, but it is the essence of mineness and selfhood as such. Likewise, if ‘I’ is the object of ontological interpretation, then this is not the individual I-ness, of my self, but I-ness in its metaphysical neutrality; we call this neutral I-ness ‘egoicity’...I-ness does not mean the factual ego distinguished from the thou; egoicity means, rather, the I-ness at the basis of the thou, which prevents an understanding of the thou factically as an alter ego...a thou is what it is, only qua its self, and likewise for the ‘I’. Therefore I usually use the expression ‘selfhood’ [Selbsttheit] for metaphysical I-ness, for egoicity. For the ‘self’ can be said equally of the I and the thou: ‘I-myself,’ ‘you-yourself,’ but not ‘thou-I’ (MFL 188).

Though he does not pursue the matter in any detail, to experience another Dasein as Dasein involves experiencing him as a self. Thus, I must in some sense encounter the concrete and particular ‘having to be-ness’ of the other’s existence. This does not mean, then, I apply some abstract category ‘selfhood’ to the other and attempt to ascertain if she meets its parameters. Nor does it imply that I must experience the individuating mineness of the other’s existence as in some sense ‘mine’ — just as I do not experience it.” (“Otherness and Individuation in Heidegger,” Man and World, Vol. 28 (1995) 341-358., p. 346). Though the case may be made for such an anonymous and external source of Dasein’s subjectivity in the late Heidegger, it seems to directly contradict the early Heidegger’s entire project — namely, to force us to recognize that abstract and anonymous ways of speaking about subjectivity are meaningless except in terms of the concrete particularity of Dasein’s existing.
the equipmentality of equipment by existing in some sense as equipment. Such talk of egoicity and selfhood – the structures of Dasein’s ‘mineness’ – also cannot be read as amounting to a Cartesian subjectivism that Heidegger simply failed to escape, as thinkers like Jacques Taminiaux have argued. While Taminiaux acknowledges that Heidegger’s critique is aimed at overcoming the weakness of Descartes’ approach – he notes Heidegger’s recognition of the fact that there is a “nonradical element remaining in the Cartesian sum… the character of ‘mineness’ of the sum, its Jemeinigkeit, is somehow neutralized”\(^{12}\) – Taminiaux nevertheless claims that Heidegger fails to radicalize this ‘nonradical element,’ despite his efforts to do so. Though such efforts include favoring Leibniz over Descartes as an intellectual predecessor, because of the former’s emphasis on the appetitive aspect of existing, Taminiaux claims that Heideggerian fundamental ontology remains a “reinforcement of the Cartesian legacy” in which Dasein is a type of exclusively self-directed transcendental subject (1991, xxi and 174).

But emphasizing that ‘mineness’ characterizes the selfhood of both the ‘I’ and the ‘thou’ – that both you and I exist in a first-person having to be in the world – does not amount to reinforcing the solipsism of the Cartesian legacy. If this were indeed the case, it would be impossible to experience the other as such. But the nature of the individuation that the notion of ‘mineness’ picks out does not signify that “Dasein is always engaged in the care of itself, and of itself alone, and that Dasein wills itself exclusively” (Taminiaux 1991, xxi). Indeed, Heidegger argues that interpreting the claim that Dasein exists for the sake of itself as a type of solipsistic egoism is to completely misunderstand his meaning: “In fact, if this were the sense of the claim of the ontology of

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Dasein, then it would indeed be madness. But then neither would it be explicable why one would need an analysis of Dasein in order to assert such outrageous nonsense” (MFL 186).

As we have shown in the previous chapter, Dasein’s ‘mineness’ – its existential self-responsibility – can only be understood in terms of the temporal structures that define its way of being, since “temporality makes possible the Dasein in its ontological constitution” (BPP 280), and “every character of the being of Dasein is governed by this fundamental determination” (HCT 154). Thus Heidegger not only uses the term jemeinigkeit to refer to the fundamental character of Dasein as mineness, he also uses the term ‘jeweiligkeit’ in order to more explicitly articulate its temporal meaning:

The fundamental character of the being of Dasein is therefore first adequately grasped in the determination, an entity which is in the to-be-it-at-its-time. This ‘in each particular instance’ [je], ‘at the (its) time’ [jeweilig], or the structure of the particular while’ [Jeweiligkeit] is constitutive for every character of being of this entity. That is, there is simply no Dasein which would be as Dasein that would not in its very sense be ‘at its time,’ temporally particular [jeweiliges]. This character belongs ineradicably to Dasein insofar as it is (HCT 153).

As we have already noted, however, this temporal specificity is far from being solipsistic in structure – on the contrary, it is defined by a sameness brought into ecstatic relation with the otherness of past and future, of worldly events, of other Dasein, and of structures of significance. Though time is, for Heidegger, the “true principle of individuation”\(^{13}\) – it is an individuation that occurs in relation not only to the finitude of its being-towards death, but also in relation to the alterity of other Dasein. Indeed, Heidegger makes clear at the very outset of Being and Time that Dasein’s being is an ecstasy that nevertheless permits individuation: “the transcendence of the being of Da-sein is a distinctive one

since in it lies the possibility and the necessity of the most radical *individuation*" (*BT* 38/34).

Understood in terms of temporality, then, it becomes clearer how it is possible for one transcending Dasein to an encounter another being so defined by temporalizing *gemeinigkeit*:

...facticity and individuation are grounded in temporality, which, as temporalization, unifies itself in itself and individuates in the metaphysical sense, as *principium individuationis*. But this individuation is the presupposition for the primordial commerce between Dasein and Dasein (*MFL* 209).

Indeed, Heidegger will claim elsewhere that this temporal particularity is what differentiates a ‘who’ from a ‘what’: “Belonging to this being, called Dasein, is the *temporal particularity of an I* which is this being. When we ask about this entity, the Dasein, we must at least ask, *Who* is this entity?, and not, *What* is this entity?” (*HCT* 236-237). Encountering the temporal particularity of another now-saying I – and the world-constituting manner in which I take heed of such encounters – are endemic to Dasein’s most basic temporal structures. Thus in *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, Heidegger attempts to answer three questions – “What is world? What is individuation? What is finitude?” (*FCM* 171) – all of which turn out to be unified because “our three questions themselves reach back into the question concerning the essence of time” (*FCM* 171). And since these temporal structures are characterized by both individuating originary time and by the temporal self-expression that brings this individuated selfhood into ecstatic contact with otherness, Taminiaux’s interpretation of existential ‘mineness’ is off the mark. Dasein is a particular finite way of being in time that is always already heedful of the presence of other particular finite beings in time. As Alfred Schutz notes in his analysis of the mutual immediacy of the we-relationship, there is the “pure
awareness of the presence of another person. His presence, it should be emphasized, not his specific traits\textsuperscript{14}.

Though I meet others through the worldly activities and objects with which they are concerned – their specific traits – they do not thereby take on the ‘innerworldly’ within-timeness that characterizes things – “they are not encountered as objectively present thing-persons,” (\textit{BT} 120/113). They are defined, rather, by the transcending, world-expressive ‘toward which’ of Dasein’s ecstatically temporal way of being: “These others do not stand in the referential context of the environing world but are encountered...in the ‘with which’ of their preoccupation (field, boat) as the ones who are preoccupied with it. They are encountered as they are in their being-in-the-world” (\textit{HCT} 240). Others are resistant to being encountered as ‘innerworldly’ entities, and Heidegger is quite explicit that this is so – that their Mitda-sein never fully eclipses their Mitsein:

...the worldhood of the world apperents not only world-things – the environing world in the narrower sense – but also, although not as worldly being, the co-Dasein of others and my own self (\textit{HCT} 241-242, emphasis mine).

This being of others, who are encountered along with environmental things, is for all that not a being handy and on hand, which belongs to the environmental things, but a co-Dasein. This demonstrates that even in a worldly encounter, the Dasein encountered does not become a thing but retains its Dasein-character and is still encountered by way of the world (\textit{HCT} 239).

...the others, though they are encountered in the world, really do not have and never have the world’s kind of being...The possibility of the worldly encounter of Dasein and co-Dasein is indeed constitutive of the being-in-the-world of Dasein and so of every other, but it never becomes something worldly as a result (\textit{HCT} 242, emphasis mine).

The other Dasein always retains her Dasein-character – her way of being as originary temporality speaking itself out in a shared world-forming – despite being encountered

from the world, because the world itself is “what happens in being-with-one-another” (*HCT* 278). This distinction between the innerworldly thing and the world-constituting other who is nevertheless encountered in the world is what ensures the ability of one Dasein to encounter the other in its selfhood – in its temporalizing being-entrusted with its own way of being in the world.

This characterization of Dasein as simultaneously world-constituting and innerworldly brings to mind Kant’s distinction between noumenal and phenomenal dimensions of the self, and returns us to our previous discussion regarding respect and the relationship between recognition and claim in *Fürsorge*. In keeping with our earlier comments regarding the tendency to over-emphasize authenticity, commentators have attempted to map Heidegger’s notions of authenticity and inauthenticity onto these Kantian notions of the noumenal and the phenomenal. But if we consider Kant’s characterization of persons as both “intelligible beings determined by the moral law (by virtue of freedom), and on the other side as active in the sensible world in accordance with this determination”\(^{16}\), it seems more in keeping with my distinction between Dasein’s innerworldly (*Mitda-sein*) and world-constituting (*Mitsein*) dimensions, both of which are features of the first-personal structure of Dasein’s temporalizing particularity that precede and make possible its authentic and inauthentic manifestations. In light of the fact that “Mineness belongs to existing Da-sein as the condition of the possibility of authenticity and inauthenticity” (*BT* 53/49), these two modalities are better understood as ways of being-toward this fundamentally ecstatic, complex structure of Dasein’s worldly and world-expressive existence. Experiencing the distinction between persons and things

\(^{15}\) See, for example, Sikka, forthcoming, 7 and Llewellyn 1991, 73.

cannot be dependent on a prior authenticity, then, despite the tendency to equate the world-constituting nature of *jemeinigkeit* with authenticity. As Raffoul notes in *Heidegger and the Subject*, “Authenticity, choosing oneself, and inauthenticity, fleeing oneself, are both possible on the basis of primordial selfhood, which is therefore neutral with regard to them” (1998, 243).

For Heidegger, as with Kant, this having of oneself to be defines Dasein’s existence regardless of whether we have explicitly and authentically taken over or lived up to this way of being. Indeed, very few beings will succeed in counting as persons if the distinction between persons and things is limited to those beings displaying or experiencing authentic self-responsibility. It is for this reason, Allen Wood notes, that in *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone*, Kant designates humanity as an end in itself — and not moral personality. This seems bizarre since “Personality seems ‘higher’ than humanity in that it has essential reference to moral value, moral responsibility, and the ‘positive’ concept of freedom, where humanity includes none of these”\(^\text{17}\). Kant characterizes the fundamental distinction between persons and things on the basis of humanity, however, because our obligation to preserve and respect rational nature is unconditional; it applies even when self or other is acting contrary to this rational nature. Thus Wood notes how “Kant must deal with the fact that rational nature apparently comes in degrees”: his response is to designate “anything possessing the capacity to set ends and act according to reason as an end in itself, however well or badly it may exercise the capacity” (1999, 121). It is important to note the similarity of Heidegger’s language in this regard: his emphasis is on beings capable of explicit self responsibility and accountability – not only on those displaying its actualized form but on those whose

\(^{17}\) *Kant’s Ethical Thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999., p. 120.
way of being allows for the possibility of such ‘owned’ self responsibility. This condition of being able to succeed or fail at living up to my self-responsibility – having myself to be, whether responsibly or irresponsibly – just is Dasein’s way of being qua jemeinigkeit.

The foregoing discussion regarding respect and the distinction between capacity and realization brings to mind John Drummond’s work on phenomenological approaches to respect, where – like Darwall – he distinguishes between respect for meritorious persons and respect for persons as such. According to Drummond, “Respect for meritorious persons is an affective response to the other as a rational agent committed to freely chosen and true – or at least defensible – goods,” while “Respect for persons as such is an affective response to the presence of a rational agent capable of such a commitment.”\(^{18}\) The respect we feel for persons as such, Drummond argues, is derivative of “the value of the realized authentic life [which] is so estimable and central to our shared humanity that it would be incoherent not to respect the mere possession of the capacities without which that life is impossible” (2006, 20). In both kinds of respect, argues Drummond, we recognize the other as either potentially or actually a “rational free agent possessed of certain capacities for authentic thinking, feeling, and acting” (2006, 21), and we engage in respectful behavior because we value this nature. On Drummond’s account, though Dasein’s way of being toward the other is not limited to those who have actualized their potential for a self-responsible, authentic life, this being-toward is dependent on recognizing their capacity to do so.

Drummond's distinction between esteem-based and person-based respect echoes Darwall's distinction between appraisal and recognition respect mentioned above. Though both Darwall and Drummond make a similar distinction between such modes of respect, however, they articulate a profoundly different relationship between the two, and the connection between recognition and claim operative within them. Drummond characterizes respect as a response to certain "cognizable, descriptive features of the other" (2006, 14-15), and 'persons as such' are owed respect only on the basis of their capacity – however unrealized – to live what is truly valuable: the actualized self-responsible life. In Heideggerian language, this would imply that my obligation to respect the other is not due to her being another Dasein, but due to her potential for achieving authenticity. Darwall emphasizes, in contrast, that there is no set of 'features' that could justify the respect that we owe to persons. This allows Darwall to avoid Drummond's somewhat counterintuitive conclusion about recognition-respect being derivative of esteem-respect. According to Darwall – advocating a position that is highly reminiscent of Levinas – recognition respect is not derivative of some other condition but is an immediate acknowledgment of the other's status as such. Recognition respect is not a consequence of the potential authority of the other person's esteem-worthy lifestyle, but a second-person acknowledgement of the actual authority of the other to make particular types of claim on me. Contrary to Drummond, who considers the other's authority to be derivative of the recognition of her potential to actualize what is truly

19 Darwall, Steven. "Respect and the Second-Person Standpoint." Presidential Address, Central Division, Proceedings and Addresses of the APA, Vol. 78, No. 2 (2004) 43-59. As Levinas notes in "Diachrony and Representation," "The order concerns me without it being possible for me to go back to the thematic presence of a being that would be the cause or the willing of this commandment. As I have said, it is again not a question here of receiving an order by first perceiving it and then subjecting oneself to it in a decision I take after having deliberated about it. In the proximity of the face, the subjection precedes the reasoned decision to assume the order that it bears" (Time and the Other (and additional essays). Richard A. Cohen, trans. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1987., 97-120., p. 112. Henceforth referenced as "DR").
valuable, Darwall argues that acknowledging the other’s status as co-Dasein cannot be
dependant on some theoretically – but not actually – realized capacities, but must arise in
the concrete immediacy of the encounter with the other as she *now* is. In this sense,
Darwall’s reading is more in keeping with Kant’s distinction between humans and things,
which is not based on the capacity for moral exemplarity, but on the reality of rational
humanity. In contrast to the ‘third person’ tenor of Kant’s account, however – the
anonymity of the universal rationality that characterizes this human/thing distinction –
Darwall is advocating a type of ‘second-personal’ picture, insofar as the other’s dignity
cannot be equated with the possession of a certain nature (with Drummond’s capacity for
realizing the valuable life of autonomy, for example) since this “misses the authority to
demand or ‘exact’ respect” (Darwall 2004, 44). In other words, it does not account for
the first-person experience of being-claimed that characterizes the encounter with the
other: “…the dignity of persons consists, not just in requirements that are rooted in our
common nature as free and rational, but also in our equal authority to require or demand
of one another that we comply with these requirements” (Darwall 2004, 44).

Knowing on a theoretical level that the other belongs to a particular category –
person, transcendental subject, etc. – is not a prior condition for experiencing him as a
being who demands that I heed his temporalizing presence. Rather, the experience of
being claimed is itself constitutive of the recognition. The manner in which recognition
respect operates, then – the acknowledgement of the other’s personhood – concerns “not
how something is to be evaluated or appraised, but how our *relations* to it are to be
*regulated* or *governed*. Broadly speaking, to respect something in this sense is to *give it
*standing in one’s relations to it*” (Darwall 2004, 49). Darwall thus articulates the way in
which encounters with another person involve a moment wherein my way of being-toward that other must ‘take him into account’ or ‘give standing’ to his way of being.

This moment of claim is prior to him meeting certain criteria that could be recognized from a third-person perspective; it involves, rather, an immediate experience of the limit posed by his presence. As Levinas puts it in “Is Ontology Fundamental?” “The other (autrui) is not an object of comprehension first and an interlocutor second. The two relations are intertwined. In other words, the comprehension of the other (autrui) is inseparable from his invocation”\textsuperscript{20}.

As is no doubt clear, my contention is that Heidegger falls much more firmly in the Darwall/Levinas camp than the Drummond, despite the many interpreters – including Sartre – who read him as claiming that the other Dasein’s claim to intersubjective partnership is only justified insofar as she possesses the set of qualities that allow her to be subsumed to the category ‘being-with’. As we have already indicated, however, Dasein’s categories must be understood in the concrete texture of Dasein’s existing, and this means that the nature of encounters between Dasein cannot be elaborated solely in their ‘third-person’ aspect. While Heidegger recognizes that it is possible to engage in such abstract characterizations of Dasein and its being-in-the-world – including an articulation of the qualities through which the other is experienced as other Dasein – his intent in the existential analytic is to provide a thorough phenomenological examination of Dasein’s existing in its first-person particularity. Understood as such, a third-person

account of the Dasein-to-Dasein relationship is insufficient; what is needed is an analysis of how the other is actually experienced in the immediacy of an encounter in which this particular Dasein meets the particularity of the other. This, as we noted above, is evident in Heidegger’s attempt to ground Kant’s person/thing distinction in the concrete temporal particularity of this Dasein. Though Drummond may be right that there are aspects of the other’s nature that account for or justify the fact that I recognize her as other Dasein and not as innerworldly object – namely, her way of being qua originary temporality speaking itself out into the world – such justification is secondary; it is neither necessary nor sufficient for recognition to occur in the immediacy of encounter. The immediacy of the Dasein-to-Dasein acknowledgement, when characterized in terms of ‘justification’ misleads us into the belief that it involves some type of inferential judgment that the other belongs to the concept or category ‘person’. Nothing could be further from the truth: as Heidegger notes, “when the others are encountered personally or, as we can most appropriately put it here, ‘in the flesh,’ in their bodily presence, this being of the other is not that of the ‘subject’ or the ‘person’ in the sense which is taken conceptually in philosophy” (HCT 240). Rather, the other’s way of being qua other now-sayer can only be understood insofar as it is lived through a second person being-limited or relativizing of my own now-saying.

The Other’s Claim

Recall from the previous chapter the manner in which the ecstatic encounter with other Dasein occurs on the most basic level: in the mutual taking heed of the other’s temporalizing in the originary present. Other Dasein require me to accommodate my
temporalizing to their temporalizing through the establishment of binding public standards. "One orients oneself toward it [a public measure], so that it must somehow be available for everyone" (*BT* 411/378). Dasein’s temporalizing essentially involves an ecstatic encounter with the temporalizing of the others whose now-saying I must take into account. All of Dasein’s time-reckonings, regardless of its care-driven projects, “must still be in conformity with the time given by the others" (*BT* 418/384). For Heidegger, then, the other’s presence involves a type of demand that I accommodate myself to it, and this experience of claim is prior to, and a condition for, public norms and universal definitions of human nature. Indeed, the heedfulness characteristic of the intersubjective encounter – shared temporal measure – is responsible for instituting the very publicity and universality that such third-person accounts make use of. The immediacy of recognition that occurs on the most fundamental level of the Fürsorge encounter does not involve an explicit cognizing or reflection, then, but occurs in the very way we navigate time in light of the other’s presence. The limitation of the I by the other occurs in the most primordial dimensions of Dasein’s ecstatic temporality, in its pre-reflective and immediate taking heed of the other’s temporal expression. This limiting and relativizing of my now-saying by the other is, we can recall, the essential requirement for the establishment of the sequentiality of everyday time, since sequentiality depends on the recognition of times other then my own – nows other than this now. Experiencing a now that is simultaneous but transcendent to my own could not be accomplished as a type of third-person imaginative variation on my own – since this presupposes the very temporal alterity that is instituted in the encounter with the other.
On Heidegger’s account, then, such encounters involve a type of immediate claim to temporal acknowledgement, an acknowledgement that involves some minimal degree of heedful self-limiting. The notion of limit is fundamental here, for it allows us to reconcile the dimensions of recognition and obligation mentioned above. What distinguishes the encounter with the other Dasein is the experience of the other as a particular type of check or boundary: “What constitutes the nature of the person, its essentia, and limits all choice, which means that it is determined as freedom, is an object of respect” (BPP 138). Such an interpretation is echoed in Heidegger’s invocation of Kant’s notion of the personalitas moralis, where he quotes Kant: “rational beings are called persons because their nature…singles them out already as ends in themselves, as something which may not be used merely as a means, and hence in this degree limits all arbitrary choice (and is an object of respect)”\(^\text{21}\). Respect, for Heidegger, is a type of encounter that involves an openness and responsiveness to the experience of being limited and claimed: thus Heidegger will characterize “Kant’s notion of ‘having respect for’ as being-open for the Ought as the moral law’s mode of being-encountered” (EHF 22). I experience the other person as a person through the limiting of my own temporal expression in the face of her temporal alterity, and respect is the name of this experience.

This is an uncommon way in which to read Heidegger, considering the many Levinas-inspired interpretations claiming that, despite Heidegger’s assertions to the contrary, Dasein’s fundamental egotism is evident in the solipsism of jemeinigkeit. As Levinas claims, for example,

\(^{21}\) Heidegger quoting Kant’s Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, Werke, (Second Section) Vol. 4, Cassirer, ed., p. 286 (BPP 138).
In the finitude of time the 'being-toward-death of Being and Time sketches out—despite all the renewals of handed down philosophy that this brilliant book brings—the meaningful remains enclosed within the immanence of the Gemeinigkeit of the Dasein that has to be ("DR," 115).

I hope to have shown that this is a false reading of Heidegger’s position, however; a falsity, one may argue, that is likely rooted in a hyperbolic effort on Levinas’ part to distance himself from a position that was in many respects similar to his own.

Understanding the encounter with the other as involving temporal alterity has profound similarities with Levinas’ idea of the ‘time of the other’ and diachrony—the fact that the other has a past that will never be available to me as a present. As Levinas claims of the relation to the other in “Diachrony and Representation,” “…this way of being avowed—or this devotion [to the other]—is time. It remains a relationship to the other as other, and not a reduction of the other to the same. It is transcendence” (115). If we recall the profound debt that Levinas acknowledged that he owed to Heidegger’s thought, these similarities no longer seem so bizarre. Though there are clearly significant differences between Heidegger and Levinas’ positions, it is my contention that despite the many attempts to portray them as profoundly at odds with each other—both by Levinas and by others—Levinas and Heidegger (and indeed Husserl) should be understood as existing much more on a continuum characterized not by unbridgeable divides but by a gradual progression toward understanding the nature of time as ‘a relationship to the other as other’. Heidegger’s relationship to Levinas’ notion of the diachrony of the intersubjective encounter becomes an area for further investigation, then, once we recognize that the Heideggerian self must be understood in terms of a temporal particularity in heedful relation to the temporal particularity of others—despite Levinas’ many attempts to portray Dasein as fundamentally solipsistic. Though these are clearly
controversial claims that cannot be adequately argued for here, Heidegger’s position can and should be read as advocating a position on temporality somewhat similar to Levinas’ own: namely, that “...time itself refers to this situation of the face-to-face with the Other.”

Though Heidegger’s characterization of the encounter with other Dasein as a type of *originary limit* on my temporal self-expression is still a far cry from a fully articulated sense of moral obligation, he falls into the Levinas/Darwall camp – though on a much more minimal level, admittedly – insofar as he characterizes the intersubjective encounter as an experience of always already having responded to the claim that I accommodate my temporalizing self-expression to that of another. Despite the tendency to conceal the particularity of Dasein’s way of being behind the anonymity of general standards, then, this particularity is evident in every encounter with other Dasein. This is clear insofar as we are limited by the presence of the other’s temporal alterity and seek to overcome this limitation through establishing and maintaining public measures to level-down the difference – the most obvious being vulgar time’s imposition of clock-regulations for all life. Despite such efforts, however, the other’s originary temporality always continues to speak itself out in and through these worldly norms.

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22 Levinas, Emmanuel. “Time and the Other.” *Time and the Other (and additional essays)*. Richard A. Cohen, trans., Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1987., 39-94., p. 79. Indeed, following “Diachrony and Representation”’s discussion of the proximity of the other as a ‘putting into question’ of the subject’s claim to perseverance, Levinas himself notes that “Here is an indiscreet – or ‘unjust’ – presence, which is perhaps already an issue in ‘The Anaximander Fragment,’ such as Heidegger interprets it in *Holzwege*. It puts into question the ‘positivity’ of the esse in its presence, signifying, bluntly, encroachment and usurpation! Did not Heidegger – despite all he intends to teach about the priority of the ‘thought of being’ – here run up against the original significance of ethics?” (“DR” 108-109).
Everyday Modes of Acknowledgement

Such heedful acknowledgement of the other’s temporalizing does not generally involve explicit cognizing or reflection, but occurs in our very relationship to time in light of the other’s temporalizing presence. This ‘being-limited’ by the other’s now is evident not only in the world-constituting establishment of worldly norms, but insofar as all of Dasein’s worldly activity is structured by temporal ecstatic. As James Mensch notes in *Ethics and Selfhood: Alterity and the Phenomenology of Obligation*, each of us is unique in our temporal particularity, in the past experiences and the future anticipations that these experiences generate:

His past as remembered by him is not available to me. Neither is his future taken as a projection of this past, i.e., as an anticipation based on what he has already experienced….While his objective being in space seems to open up the possibility of predicting his behavior, these nonappearing determinants undermine this possibility. The most I can do to compensate for their hiddenness is to project my past and anticipated future on him….Since he is like me, he will probably behave the same way. This attempt at predicting his behavior is never completely successful. If it were, the other would be my double.23

Dasein’s selfhood lies in the finitude and uniqueness of this temporal ecstasy – and though this originary temporality always speaks itself out into the shared world, its ecstatic character as always being its past, present and future ‘at once,’ are encountered and heeded in and through the temporal tenor of its worldly being. If we recall our discussion of temporal self-expression from Ch. V, we can note that Dasein’s temporal transcendence had a type of ‘double visage’ encompassing sameness and otherness – foreignness that brings itself into sameness – thereby allowing predictability despite alterity. Mensch’s point allows us to accommodate this; experiencing the other’s refusal to be perfectly ‘predictable’ implicitly acknowledges a temporal stretch that is not my

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own. This temporal alterity gives the other’s projects and attunements a foreignness and
unpredictability constitutive of my experience of her as something other – and as
something other than mere thing in the world.

In the case of another person whose actions I can never completely anticipate, this failure becomes an ongoing experience of decentering. My experience of the other is, in fact, this experience of decentering....His presence thus makes it impossible for me to be a center unambiguously defined and fixed by an environment. Thus the fact that the determinants of this action – his memories and anticipations – do not appear prevents me from reducing the anticipated future to my projections of my past. His presence in other words, is that of the future in the sense of the new. It is that of the contingency and openness of the future (Mensch 2003, 162).

Such a characterization is profoundly reminiscent of Sartre and the manner in which the contingency and alterity of the other subject creates a shift in my relationship to my possibilities. In this case, however, we can recognize that it is a *temporal* alterity that is responsible for this experience – the other speaks her ‘now’ out into the world, but this speaking out continues to be expressive of her ecstatic and incomplete subjectivity, contrary to Sartre’s claims regarding the necessity of objectification. As Mensch claims in “Givenness and Alterity,”

In its ‘excess,’ we have, in fact, the phenomenological ground of three mutually implicit concepts: alterity, freedom, and futurity. Alterity shows itself in the fact that the other shows himself as other than what I project from my perspective. He or she exceeds the intentions that are based on this. As just noted, this very exceeding manifests the openness of the future. Freedom is implicit here, since as other than what I can determine or predict from my perspective, the other shows himself as free from my control\(^{24}\).

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\(^{24}\) *Idealistic Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 1 (2003) 1-7., p. 3. Adrian Johnston provides a reading of Heidegger along these lines in “The Soul of Dasein: Schelling’s Doctrine of the Soul and Heidegger’s Analytic of Dasein” (*Philosophy Today* (2003) 227-251) defining Dasein in terms of sameness and alterity that brings him in line with Schelling: “For Schelling and Heidegger, an adequate theory of subjectivity demands the paradox of thinking together both transcendence-potentiality and immanence-actuality at one and the same time, of positing that human beings are simultaneously immersed within a situated worldly reality as well as being constantly ‘in excess’ of this situation, continually stretching beyond the given-ness of the ‘there’” (241).
In opposition to Sartre’s position, then, Heidegger’s emphasis on the ‘double visage’ of time accounts for a Dasein-to-Dasein experience of the other’s ecstatic subjectivity that does not require a corresponding experience of objectification. Though such an encounter is an experience of one’s temporality being limited and placed in relation to the other, this is not a destruction of my status as ecstatic subjectivity, but an essential element of its structure. I encounter the others as ones who I must heed in my temporal self-expression – but in so doing this expression finds the richness of shared time and worldly meaning. The others do not objectify me, but help create the very arena in which my subjectivity can be meaningful; the arena of shared time that “first makes possible the being of the factual existing self; that being which, as is now well understood, is the meaning of care (BT 419/384-385).

Because we are, so to speak, ‘at the mercy’ of the others qua temporal co-constitutors of the world – they make a claim on me that I must accommodate, and my very way of being depends on them to find its worldly expression – Heidegger often uses the language of ‘binding’ and ‘dependence’ to characterize being-with others:

Being-with is not being on hand also among other humans; as being-in-the-world it means at the same time being ‘in bondage’ [hörig] to the others, that is, ‘heeding’ and ‘obeying’ them, listening [hören] or not listening to them. Being-with has the structure of belonging [Zu(ge)hörigkeit] to the other...This listening to one another, in which being-with cultivates itself, is more accurately a compliance in being-with-one-another, a co-enactment in concern. The negative modes of enactment, non-compliance, not listening, opposition, and the like are really only privative modes of belonging itself (HCT 266).

We will be analyzing the notion of a ‘co-enactment in concern’ in our discussion of discourse below, and examining the ‘cultivation’ of being-with that occurs in listening in greater detail in the following chapter. The point of import here, however, is that on the most fundamental level the others are present in and through the public sphere as those
who one must heed; those to whom one is obligated – ‘in bondage’ – and upon whom one is ‘dependent’. “The existential relationship cannot be objectified. Its basic essence is one’s being concerned and letting oneself be concerned. [It is] a responding, a claim, an answering for, a being responsive on grounds of the clearedness of the relationship” (ZS 232/185). Indeed, Heidegger explicitly notes that it is this immediacy of involvement or dependence that distinguishes the concrete presence of a particular other from mere ‘open intersubjectivity’:

The distinction between a personal meeting and the other’s being gone takes effect on the basis of this environmental encounter of one another, this environmentally appresented being-with-one-another. This with-one-another is an environmental and worldly concern with one another, having to do with one another in the one world, being dependent on one another (HCT 240).

For the most part we do not explicitly acknowledge the other’s temporal alterity or the manner in which we are dependent on it. Just like everybody else, we engage in the worldly structures that give our behavior the very predictability that allows for the smooth, uncomplicated interaction that defines our everyday practices. We drive immediately into the intersection because the light has turned green, for example – trusting our lives to the fact that others will stop on red (except in Houston). It is, in fact, extremely rare for others to escape our predictions in such a way that we are explicitly forced to acknowledge their temporal alterity.

For Heidegger, this is not because this originary temporal particularity and unpredictability does not characterize Dasein’s being, but because we specifically design standards and practices to accommodate and manage it. Heidegger therefore generally characterizes our dependence on the others in terms of the anonymity and averageness of public norms – ways in which we have institutionalized this dependence to such an extent
that we no longer recognize it as such. Though we often fall into an inauthentic way of thinking that encourages us to view these standards – and ourselves – as thinglike and unchanging, however, they do not thereby achieve a law-like hold that necessitates conformity – despite the inauthentic belief that they do, or Heidegger’s own hysteria over the recalcitrance of the average. Underlying this averageness is the alterity of the other’s temporal ecstatic, and it is the very foreignness of the other’s experience, memory, anticipations, motivations – rooted in the finite particularity of his way of being qua jeweiligkeit – that necessitates the imposition of these public standards.

It is not only in these public standards that my contact with the temporal alterity of the other occurs, however, and in this sense Heidegger is at odds with views that sharply distinguish between ‘private’ time and ‘public’ time – wherein the former is completely inaccessible to others. Such views are versions of the Cartesianism that Heidegger’s being-in-the-world qua temporal ecstatic was designed to overcome. As Mensch articulates such positions:

For a Kantian, objective time implies the necessary order of perceptions required for assuming a common world... It is the temporality of the causality of nature. Inner time, by contrast, corresponds to the I can move myself this way or that and, hence, to the I can experience sequences of perceptions this way or that... To the point that it dispenses with necessary sequences, inner time corresponds to my freedom. For Kant, one temporality rules the other out. I must abandon the perspective of inner time in order to enter the objective, common world. In fact, even in the realm of ‘inner sense,’ my freedom, given its noumenal character, cannot appear (2003, 160).

Mensch contrasts his position to such a view, arguing, as I do, that the common world presupposes others and the ‘accessibility’ of their ‘inner’ temporality. Nevertheless, I disagree with his claim that “In the common world, inner time gives itself as not being able to be given. It gives itself as something that, from the perspective of the common
world, appears as a disruption of the given” (2003, 160). Mensch characterizes the
temporality of the other in terms of ‘disruption’ because “the temporality of the ‘I can’ is
based on elements that cannot appear in the objective world” (2003, 160).

On the contrary, for Heidegger the ‘objective’ world just is those elements of
temporality that are spoken out into a shared space of time and meaning. The other’s
temporalizing particularity – her mineness – can be experienced in and through this world
as more than a ‘disruption,’ and if we recall the discussion of intentionality and mineness
from Chapter II, it will become clearer how we should understand this everyday way in
which the world-constituting presence of the other shines through the common world and
its anonymous public roles. Just as Chapter II distinguished between the individuating
mineness that is the source of Dasein’s commitment to norms and the public meanings
and measures that provides these norms with their form and content, so too is this
distinction operative in Fürsorge. Though the other is encountered in terms of the
publicly available roles and meanings delineated by the shared world, the existential self-
responsibility that is a necessary condition for the binding force of these norms – the fact
that the other Dasein is committed and responsive to them – is an expression of that
individual’s care for who she is to be. “‘I’ means the being that is concerned about the
being of the being which it is” (BT 322/296), and this concern is expressed in the other
Dasein’s purposive commitment to the various meanings and measures that will allow it
to assess its success in being.\textsuperscript{25} As we noted in Chapter II, Dasein’s subsumption to these

\textsuperscript{25} This notion speaks to the type of selfhood that Paul Ricoeur characterizes as ispe in Oneself as Another, where he notes that human selfhood implies “a form of permanence in time which is not reducible to the
determination of a substratum... which is not simply the schema of the category of substance” (118). Instead, selfhood involves a type of constancy achieved through commitment. Though Ricoeur recognizes Heidegger’s contributions in this regard – “Heidegger is right to distinguish the permanence of substance from self-substinance (Selbst-Ständigkeit)” (123) – Ricoeur simply equates the Heideggerian originary
temporality of selfhood with authentic temporality – “it is not certain that ‘anticipatory resoluteness’ in the
shared norms must not be read as a sort of absence of self in everydayness – either of the self, or of the other.

The other’s responsive commitment to the same public measures allows one to recognize that they too orient their behavior according to standards of appropriateness – a possibility grounded in Dasein’s basic way of being as an entity that strives to meet, maintain and develop these standards because it cares about succeeding in its having to be. Robert Brandom makes a similar claim regarding the role others play in establishing and maintaining public norms in his “Heidegger’s Categories in Being and Time,” when he notes that to recognize other Dasein as such is to treat the other’s behaviors and responses as equally authoritative over “appropriateness boundaries”\textsuperscript{26}. Olafson’s account in Heidegger and the Ground of Ethics also interprets Heidegger’s notion of Mitsein as involving the fact that “we must see in another human being someone whose observations are in principle relevant to a determination of truth (and falsity) in just the way our own are” (31). Experiencing the other Dasein’s responsive commitment to meeting and establishing norms of appropriateness that can be publicly instituted – and that do not simply flow from the ‘private’ constraints of a means/ end rationality – is the everyday way in which I can experience the other Dasein’s jeweiligkeit – not just as a disruption of the world, but as a creative source of its significance. Recognizing another Dasein as Dasein does not arise through a perception of some actor ‘behind’ the actions,

however – it involves understanding particular events as actions, as commitments to possible ways for this other to be his or her own self.

It is important to be clear that it is not simply through conformity to public standards that one Dasein encounters the other as such – since this might imply that those who challenge or subvert accepted standards are unrecognizable as other Dasein. Rather, a distinction must be made between the care for self that commits one to public norms, and the source of the norms to which one is committed. This distinction is evident not only in the self, but also in the encounter with all other Dasein. Though our everyday way of being encourages unthinking interpretations of self and others in terms of ready-made public measures and meanings, and the inauthentic tendency is to simply focus on the content of these standards – the responsive committedness that operates in and through these standards is the public, worldly expression of the other’s existential self-responsibility and the temporal particularity on which it is grounded.

Indeed, this responsiveness to others as beings committed to public standards is evident even when Heidegger speaks of distantiality – that tendency to seek and maintain averageness. Even as representatives of das Man, the co-Dasein of others and their efforts to succeed in living out their own care are recognized on some minimal level. Distantiality generally involves a heedfulness to particular others in light of anonymous public norms:

The others are environmentally there with us, their co-Dasein is taken into account, not only because what is of concern has the character of being useful and helpful for others, but also because others provide the same things of concern. In both respects to the others, the being-with with them stands in a relationship to them: with regard to the others and to what the others pursue, one’s own concern is more or less effective or useful; in relation to those who provide the exact same things, one’s own concern is regarded as more or less outstanding, backward, appreciated, or the like (HCT 244).
In other words, Dasein assesses itself not only in terms of generalized standards of success and failure, but always in terms of the comparative successes of the particular others who are also attempting to live up to these standards. Though it is true that to a certain extent these ‘others’ just are ‘the They’ comprising these generalized standards, it is important to be clear that Heidegger differentiates between the averageness comprising these generalized standards, Dasein’s impulse toward averageness, and the ‘distance’ from the average that Dasein can assess in itself and the other individuals it encounters. Indeed, despite his emphasis on the ‘averageness impulse,’ he discusses people who are motivated by ambition and intent on maintaining themselves in not being average (See HCT 244-245). Such an acknowledgement of the particular other’s striving to meet a public norm need not be positive, however, in order for it to count as such acknowledgement:

At first and above all, everyone keeps an eye on the other to see how he will act and what he will say in reply. Being-with-one-another in the Anyone is in no way a leveled and indifferent side-by-side state, but far more one in which we intensely watch and furtively listen in on one another. This kind of being-with-one-another can work its way into the most intimate relations. Thus, for example, a friendship may no longer and not primarily consist in a resolute and thus mutually generous way of siding with one another in the world, but in a constant and prior watching out for how the other sets out to deal with what is meant by friendship, in a constant check on whether he turns out to be one or not… (HCT 280).

It is because the other individual’s self-responsible commitment to these shared standards is always maintained in this regard that it is possible to be with another as other – despite the averageness of the roles through which we encounter each other. Thus as Heidegger notes of the Dasein-to-Dasein encounter in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, which he there characterizes in terms of ‘self-transposition’ into the other’s being,
...self-transposition does not mean the factual transference of one existing human being into the interior of another being. Nor does it mean the factual substitution of oneself for another being so as to take its place. On the contrary, the other being is precisely supposed to remain what it is and how it is. Transposing oneself into this being means going along with what it is and with how it is...[but] this self-transposition does not mean actually putting oneself in the place of the other being and displacing it in the process (FCM 202).

The other remains other in the being-toward that grants access to her, and this self-transposition into the other – accomplished, generally, with the help of the averageness of public meanings – is a "fundamental feature of man's own immediate experience of existence" (FCM 205) because "Insofar as human beings exist at all, they already find themselves transposed in their existence into other human beings" (FCM 205). It is important to be clear, then, that such talk of 'transposition' does not mean some type of 'projection' of oneself into the other – this is precisely the problem with traditional theories of empathy: "the ideas of empathy and projection already presuppose being-with the other and the being of the other with me. Both already presuppose that one has already understood the other as another human being; otherwise, I would be projecting something into the void" (ZS 207/162). Rather than explaining how or why such projection into the other is possible or necessary, they tacitly presuppose the status of the other as a subject into whom such projection is possible – thereby assuming what they pretend to prove.

This conception of self-transposition, one which is also widespread in philosophy, contains a fundamental error precisely because it overlooks the decisive positive moment of self-transposition. This moment does not consist in our simply forgetting ourselves as it were and trying our utmost to act as if we were the other being. On the contrary, it consists precisely in we ourselves being precisely ourselves, and only in this way first bringing about the possibility of ourselves being able to go along with the other being while remaining other with respect to it. There can be no going-along-with if the one who wishes and is meant to go along with the other relinquishes himself in advance (FCM 202-203).
As we will discuss in the next section, ‘going along with’ the other in shared attempts to meet, maintain and institute worldly meanings and measures – a going along with in which we always ‘remain other’ – is definitive of the mode of disclosure that Heidegger refers to as *discourse*. Discourse is the everyday way in which a type of shared being-in-the-world with other Dasein is accomplished; a sharing in which the profound temporal particularity and commitment of the participants is nevertheless implicitly respected and maintained. I understand the other through the world in which I encounter her, but because of her status as co-constitutor of this world and its “remarkable possibility” – “that it lets us encounter Dasein, the alien Dasein as well as my own” (*HCT* 242) – I understand her as *more* than worldly. It is for this reason that Heidegger will say, in critiquing theories of empathy:

I do not understand the other in this artificial way, such that I would have to feel my way into another subject. I understand him from the world in which he is with me, a world which is discovered and understandable through the regard in being-with-one-another (*HCT* 243).

As our discussion of discourse will demonstrate, the world itself is made available to me – it is discovered and understandable – through my being with other Dasein.

**Discourse: Disclosing *Mitsein***

If we recall that Heidegger’s characterization of understanding is *practical* – i.e. to understand something is to be skillfully engaged in ‘dealing’ with it – then understanding others in this manner is grounded in the active encounter with them as such. Thus Heidegger’s claim that we ‘meet the others at work,’ means in some sense
that we must be ‘working’ or \textit{participating} in this way of being with them\textsuperscript{27}. This need not simply apply to those who are engaged in the same 'career' that we are, however, but refers to all those participating in the same shared practices – those who sell me bread, go to the same movie, take their turn at the stop sign.

Dasein-with means not only: being also at the same time, even simply qua Dasein, but rather the mode of Being of Dasein first brings authentic sense to the ‘with.’ ‘With’ is to be grasped as participation, whereby foreignness as participationlessness is only an alteration of participation. The ‘with’ therefore has an entirely determined sense and does not simply mean ‘together,’ nor the being-together of such that have the same mode of Being. ‘With’ is a proper way of Being\textsuperscript{28}.

My everyday way of being with others is to participate in their \textit{being or existing like} I do: I take part in the other’s temporal self-expression through shared worldly activity.

Such a characterization is essential for understanding what Heidegger means by discourse – \textit{how} particular Dasein are disclosed as concrete individuals co-constituting the world. The notion of \textit{participating} in the other’s purposive, committed way of being is precisely what characterizes discourse, which, along with attunement and understanding, together form Dasein’s three modes of disclosure. To more fully articulate the everyday way in which one encounters others in solicitude, then, we must examine Heidegger’s account of discourse as a type of \textit{co-participation in the other’s being-in-the-world}.

Heidegger seems to imply at times that discourse is not one of three equiprimordial modes of disclosure; he says in the introduction to the section on discourse, for example, that “the fundamental existentials which constitute the being of

\textsuperscript{27} As Brandom argues, “recognition must not be taken to be a mental act, but…must be given a social behavioral reading in terms of communal responsive dispositions” (1992, 53).

the there, the disclosedness of being-in-the-world, are attunement and understanding” (BT 160/150). Indeed, he frequently refers to being-in-the-world simply in terms of these two modes of disclosure, which leads one to doubt that we can simply assume that discourse is one of three modes of disclosure equiprimordially disclosing the same thing. He claims, for example, that “it is only because being-in-the-world as understanding and concerned absorption appresents the world that this being-in-the-world can also be concerned with this appresentation of the world explicitly...” (HCT 211). Does discourse, then, fail to ‘appresent the world’ as understanding and ‘concerned absorption’ do?

Elsewhere, however, he does specifically say that “In our previous interpretation of attunement, understanding, interpretation and statement we have constantly made use of this phenomenon [discourse], but have, so to speak, suppressed it in the thematic analysis. Discourse is existentially equiprimordial with attunement and understanding” (BT 161/150). Though each of these different modes of disclosure – attunement, understanding and discourse – are equiprimordial dimensions of Dasein’s unified care structure and are thus intimately linked, they can be thematically teased apart insofar as they disclose differently. They all disclose Dasein’s being-in-the-world, but they bring this to light in different ways – if this were not the case, Heidegger would have no basis for differentiating disclosure into three modes. Considered in a thematic separation that emphasizes this differentiation, we have so far noted that attunement is the mode of disclosure belonging most specifically to Dasein’s thrownness, while understanding discloses being-in-the-world primarily in terms of its character as project and possibility.
As we will see, the disclosure specific to discourse is of human being-in-the-world qua being-with.

Heidegger describes discourse as the “articulation of intelligibility” (*BT* 161/150). ‘Articulation’ generally means expression, verbalization, communication, as well as marking or being marked by joints. These meanings can be unified; an ‘articulate’ person pronounces or expresses words or ideas such that distinguishable parts are clearly defined or communicated. Since intelligibility is holistic for Heidegger – each particular thing is meaningful in terms of its place in a system of reference – the articulation of intelligibility will involve disclosing the particular thing under consideration as well as the referential context that makes it intelligible as the thing it is. “Making manifest through discourse first and foremost has the sense of interpretive apperception of the environment under concern” (*HCT* 262).

Heidegger also claims that discourse is the “*existential-ontological foundation of language*” (*BT* 161/150), while language is its worldly mode of being. To understand discourse, then, requires showing how it both 1.) articulates holistic contexts of meaning and 2.) provides the basis of language. Before proceeding to these matters, however, I will first discuss readings that mischaracterize Heidegger’s notion of discourse by over-emphasizing only *one* of these two requirements. Such interpretations either reduce discourse to language or simply assimilate it to Heidegger’s concept of understanding. This results, I believe, from a failure to give due weight to the communicative dimension of discourse, which makes it possible to *share* with others the intelligibility that arises through one’s practical, affective activities – a sharing that is rooted in the other Dasein’s status as temporal co-constitutor of the world. In this sense, discourse is the foundation
for language – though irreducible to it – because it makes possible the ‘co-appropriation’ of meaning necessary for the publicity of the world’s significance and the linguistic forms in which this is normally communicated. “There is language only because there is discourse” (HCT 265).

The close connection between language and discourse has led some to simply identify them. In Heidegger, Language, and World-disclosure, Cristina Lafont argues that language is itself the articulation of intelligibility: ‘Dasein’ always understands itself and the world in terms of possibilities, and because there is “a symbolic medium that ‘controls and distributes’ (BT, p.211) the realm of determinate possibilities,” 29 – namely, language as a system of sign-relations – this understanding is fundamentally linguistic. Lafont seems to believe that Heidegger’s claim that Dasein’s ‘originary mode of being’ is understanding implies that “Dasein has a symbolically mediated relation to world (or that it ‘is’ in a symbolically structured world)” (2000, 33fn27). Because Dasein always understands itself and the world in terms of possibilities, and “owing to the existence of a symbolic medium that ‘controls and distributes’ (BT, p.211) the realm of determinate possibilities,” (2000, 47) this understanding must be articulated through this symbolic medium: language as a system of sign relations. In a footnote to this claim, Lafont argues that “there is no doubt that ‘possibilities’ can be ‘given’ only in a symbolic medium: ‘Being free for…’ [u]nderstood as ‘being open upon possibilities,’ can arise only on the level of culture, which is characterized by symbolic structures” (2000, 47fn). In other words, Dasein’s understanding always encounters entities as a this or a that, and this ‘as’ is constituted by symbolic language structures – sign referentiality – that stipulate all the possible ‘thises’ or ‘thats’ according to which an entity can be encountered.

Lafont argues that Dasein’s capacity to intend objects ‘as’ must be understood as a symbolic, linguistic articulation of the world and that there is no ‘understanding as’ that can be characterized as a type of pre- or even non-linguistic practical articulation of the world. Indeed, Lafont claims that ‘world’ – the articulated totality of significance – just is language for the later Heidegger:

the most important point is that meaning is always already articulated, that it constitutes a totality of significance that is given to Dasein, and with respect to which Dasein comports itself ‘understandingly.’ This system of sign-relations (which Heidegger here calls ‘world’ and later will call ‘language’) is not reducible to the subject-object schema of the teleological model of action (Lafont 2000, 42-43 fn. 40).

But as Mark Okrent correctly notes, even if such linguistic idealism is consistent with the later Heidegger, it is not present in Being and Time. There Heidegger explicitly rejects the idea of world as a system of sign relations. Instead, “Heidegger analyzes signs as a determinate kind of equipment,” 30 that is, as something that depends upon the world as a context of significance. In response, Lafont claims that characterizing signs as ‘equipment’ cannot account for a sign’s public, worldly meaning. Linguistic significance differs from pragmatic significance, she argues, since it does not derive from the activities of particular agents. The pragmatic reading therefore fails, according to Lafont, because it characterizes intelligibility as “something brought about by the individual” (2000, 41).

Lafont’s response misconstrues the pragmatist position, however. My arbitrarily treating a book as a desk does not turn it into one. For Heidegger, equipmental reference – like linguistic reference – relies on worldly contexts of meaning: “to be a hammer is fixed by how it...is to be used....Such holistically integrated functional systems of tool

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types are articulated independently of and prior to the activity of any given agent...[by] the system of assignments which define how we are supposed to act with what things in which situations” (Okrent 2002, 201). The normativity of appropriate use inherent in the significance of particular things is not determined by my activities, but by inherited public practices and institutions establishing how ‘one’ ought to do things. As we have seen, Heidegger generally refers to this public normativity delineating possible ways to be and do – and the intelligibility arising through them – as das Man (the ‘one’ or ‘the they’), a term meant to capture the anonymous publicity of these shared meanings. What Lafont has not shown, then, is that the public possibilities articulating norms of appropriate use and meaning can only be ‘transferred’ through the symbolic medium of language.

Since discourse is the ‘articulation’ of structured intelligibility, and this articulation need not be linguistic, it is tempting to follow John Haugeland and Hubert Dreyfus in translating Rede not as ‘discourse’ but as ‘telling,’ which has “to do with distinguishing, identifying, and even counting – such as telling apart, telling whether, telling what’s what, telling one when you see one, telling how many, and so on;” as Haugeland claims, “These latter senses clearly echo the image of articulation, and are plausibly prerequisite to the possibility of putting things into words” (2000, 52). And as Dreyfus notes, one ‘manifests’ these prior articulations “simply by telling things apart in using them” (1991, 215). Understood in this sense, we can clearly see how discourse is an ‘articulation of intelligibility’ that grounds – but is not reducible to – language.

On such a view, however, discourse becomes indistinguishable from Heidegger’s notion of understanding; we note, for example, how Dreyfus claims that ‘ontological telling’ “refers to everyday coping as manifesting the articulations already in the
referential whole which are by nature manifestable” (1991, 217). Such a pragmatic reading of ‘telling’ obscures a distinction Heidegger makes between an articulation inherent in understanding itself – which he calls ‘interpretation’ – and the kind of articulation that belongs to Rede as distinct from understanding. The former is the cultivation of meaning possibilities disclosed through understanding. Of this latter sort, Heidegger says that through it “the meaning highlighted in interpretation becomes available for being-with-one-another” (HCT 268). The distinction is clear when Heidegger claims that “The mode of enactment of understanding is interpreting, specifically as the cultivation, appropriation, and preservation of what is discovered in understanding. The meaningful expressness of this interpretation is now discourse” (HCT 265). For this reason Haugeland and Dreyfus’ reading of discourse as ‘telling’ things apart cannot be right; it does not do justice to the connection with telling others about this ‘telling apart’.

In a variant of the pragmatic reading, Blattner’s Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism attempts to accommodate this social dimension of discourse. Blattner notes that the elements essential to discourse are “the about-which,” “what is discoursed as such,” and “communication” (1999, 71)31. Dasein’s activity delineates a particular context of significance based on possible ways for it to be in the world; elements of this context are that ‘about-which’ discourse discourses. Differentiating and relating the elements in the particular way characteristic of this discoursing is ‘what is discoursed as such’.

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31 In footnote 51, p.71, Blattner indicates that he has grouped ‘making known’ (Bekundung) under the heading ‘communication’ (Mitteilung). Though Heidegger differentiates them (see Being and Time, Section 34), Blattner finds it hard to tell any real difference between the two, and therefore analyzes them as one phenomenon. We will be returning to this point below.
The communicative element of discourse is of particular import for our discussion, however, since it distinguishes discourse's differentiation and interrelation of the context of significance from that belonging to understanding. Though Blattner acknowledges that “Communication is a more difficult element to grasp,” he nevertheless argues that because “Heidegger links communication with ‘making known’ or ‘making manifest’ (Bekundung),” we can conclude that “To communicate is simply to make something publicly available” (1999, 72).

The problem here is that there is nothing ‘simple’ about the ‘making publicly available’ that discourse accomplishes. Indeed, it is precisely this communicative dimension of discourse as making public that has been consistently overlooked or misunderstood by Heidegger scholars, primarily because it seems to conflict with the view that the intelligibility to be articulated is already public insofar as it is delineated by worldly norms and meanings. But as we have noted, the motivation and manner of this making public are in fact rooted in the most fundamental level of encounter with the other Dasein’s expression of originary temporality. In other words, this ‘making public’ only seems simple when ‘publicity’ has already been assumed.

This is evident, for example, in Blattner’s example: “As Smith walks on the sidewalk...[h]e differentiates sidewalks from roads...[t]he very act of walking on the sidewalk offers the differentiation publicly....Every act of walking on the sidewalk tends publicly to communicate, that is, make known, that sidewalks are to be walked upon” (1999, 73). On this reading, walking on sidewalks is a form of discourse. Indeed, everything I do must be discourse: insofar as my activities differentiate the world, and these activities always occur in the public realm, all my actions ‘offer the differentiation
publicly'. On such a view, we have not escaped the reduction of discourse to understanding that afflicted Dreyfus and Haugeland\textsuperscript{32}. Emphasizing the communicative moment in discourse is right, but Blattner misses this point by confusing communication’s ability to ‘make public’ with the idea that “communication requires a public domain” in which to ‘affirm’ the articulations that are essentially already public (1999, 73).

How are we to understand this making public – discourse – without reducing it to the mere ‘endorsement’ of some dimension of what is already public – the articulated possibilities available to understanding? The answer emerges if we recall that, for Heidegger, “[a]ll discourse…is, as a mode of the being of Dasein, essentially being-with. In other words, the very sense of any discourse is discourse to others and with others” (\textit{HCT} 263). Discourse is not simply the articulation of the intelligibility of being-in-the-world, it is an articulating of intelligibility to and with and in terms of others that reveals my existence as always imbued with the presence of others who share in this intelligibility. It is this presence that I actively share in discourse in an everyday way.

“Being-with is ‘explicitly’ \textit{shared} in discourse, that is, it already \textit{is}, only unshared as something not grasped and appropriated” (\textit{BT} 162/152). Heidegger observes that “Discourse as a mode of being of Dasein qua being-with is essentially \textit{communication}, so that in every discourse that about which it is, is \textit{shared with} the other through what is

\textsuperscript{32} Blattner distinguishes his position from theirs by arguing that “Discourse does not limp along after significations but, rather, institutes them in the first place….words do sometimes accrue to significations. But language does sometimes itself institute differentiations” (1999, 74). Nevertheless, he implies that this is simply a feature of understanding \textit{our particular} world, and is not fundamental to understanding discourse.
said" (HCT 263). The saying is merely the medium through which communication – sharing with – is accomplished\(^{33}\).

What is the nature of this ‘sharing’? As we have already indicated, it involves a type of participation in the other’s way of being qua meaning-responsive and norm-committed world co-constitutor. It cannot, therefore, simply be understood as people experiencing something in the world simultaneously. Though this is certainly possible, it is not communication if we just happen to be directed toward the same thing. Sharing makes possible a co-directedness toward the same thing: for Heidegger, communication

...means the enabling of the appropriation of that about which the discourse is, that is, making it possible to come into a relationship of preoccupation and being to that of which the discourse is....The understanding of communication is the participation in what is manifest. All subsequent understanding and co-understanding is as being-with a taking part (HCT 263).

It is precisely this co-participation in what is manifest that characterized the publicity of temporal expression – Dasein speaks itself out into a shared world-time by participating in the other’s reckoning with time – and everyday instances of communicative encounter demonstrate this same structure of taking part in the world’s meaning together.

As we saw in Chapter V, in Dasein’s taking care is “essentially determined by the structure of appropriateness...the character of ‘time for...’ or ‘not the time for...’” (BT 441/381). My attuned understanding orients me to a particular situation such that certain options matter and certain aspects of the context become particularly salient. For me to share with another my orientation to a particular situation – its being time for this and not time for that – therefore involves a type of a “co-enactment in concern” (HCT 266) such

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\(^{33}\) As Lawrence Hatab notes, for example, in “Dasein, the Early Years: Heideggerian Reflections on Childhood,” (paper presented at the 2004 Heidegger Circle Conference, New Orleans) “The phenomenon of pointing, a precursor to language development, is unique to humans...and it also exhibits an intersubjective structure because when infants point, they look back at adults to see if they notice it too (a ubiquitous feature of child behavior called ‘social referencing’)” (9).
that the other’s care is in some sense oriented toward the same things that matter; determined by the same ‘structures of appropriateness’. Our *jemeinigkeit* can be ‘brought into alignment’ so to speak.

Imagine I run into the room yelling ‘where is my baseball bat?’ followed by a huge strange man. There are a number of different orientations to this situation that are available: you can assume that I am keen to play ball with my new friend. You can assume I am being threatened by a sinister character and am desperate for a weapon. Communication is the way of being in the world together such that I *enable* your participation in my stance or orientation to the particular situation so that you share my sense of what would count as an appropriate response. The terror in my face, the jerky speed with which I stagger about the room, the hostile look of the stranger – among a thousand other ‘cues’ attuning you to my situation – provoke you to turn immediately toward the room as a context offering or failing to offer weapons or safety. I have communicated to you the sense that it is ‘time for’ defensive action – and not time for a game of croquet or cribbage. Note that your participation in my orientation need not involve language; my panicked flailing about would be enough to provoke a shared orientation such that we both experience the situation as *mattering* in a particular way.

This creation or evocation of co-orientation is what Heidegger means by the communicative moment in discourse; communication is “[d]iscourse expressing itself. Its tendency of being aims at bringing the hearer to participate in disclosed being toward what is talked about in discourse” (*BT* 168/157). This participation in disclosure – the sharing of the “actual mode of attunement,” what *matters* in a particular situation – is generally accomplished through ‘expression,’ which is found in “intonation, modulation,
in the tempo of talk, in ‘the way of speaking’” (BT 162/152). When I whisper I express to you that it is ‘time for’ secrecy, intimacy, caution – that a certain way of being in the world together is now appropriate. In so doing, we can understand the fourth element of discourse that we mentioned in note 137 above: bekundung – making manifest, or making known. Despite Blattner’s equation of this element with the communicative, Heidegger is clear that there are four structural moments characterizing discourse, and in the fourth – manifestation – “Dasein itself and its disposition are co-discovered. Discouraging with others about something as speaking about is always a self-articulating. One oneself and the being-in-the-world at the time likewise become manifest, even if only in having the disposition ‘manifested’ through intonation, modulation, or tempo of discourse” (HCT 263). Thus I do not just act with you in terms of some public, anonymous standard, but share an orientation to which standard is desired and why it is appropriate. In discourse we don’t just experience each other through some public role or norm; rather, we share with each other our way of being as responsive to such roles and norms.

Such sharing can only occur because Dasein is not an isolated Cartesian subject ‘broadcasting’ information from its inner space, but is always ‘speaking itself out’ in the world in such a way that others can participate in its way of being: “Da-sein expresses itself not because it has been initially cut off as ‘something internal’ from something outside, but because as being-in-the-world it is already ‘outside’ when it understands” (BT 162/152). Thus discourse does not simply ‘point’ to particular entities in a context of significance, but enables Dasein to inhabit or exist in specific worldly modes of transcendence together; it “brings about the ‘sharing’ of being attuned together and of the understanding of being-with” (BT 162/152). In communicative discourse I share not only
the particular worldly entities under consideration, but the particularity of the attuned, understanding way of being that allows this consideration to occur. Note Heidegger’s assertion that in the self-articulating that characterizes manifestation, the temporal specificity of one’s “being-the-world at the time” is what becomes manifest. Discourse is a mode of disclosure that makes known not only the worldly thing under consideration, but Dasein’s way of being-in-the-world in its specificity.

Such a characterization of discourse allows Heidegger to accommodate our intuition that it involves a type of sharing of the unique particularity of one’s being with the other, without falling into the pattern of conceptual schemes in which communication must someone give some ‘access’ to the inherently private domain of my mental cabinet. On the contrary, discourse is a sharing of one’s being-in-the-world, and “is not to be regarded as if it involved a reciprocal relation to one’s own inner experiences, which somehow become observable through sounds” (HCT 264).

Because communication – and the self-manifesting that is its correlate – is “a situation where the being-with-one-another is intimately involved in the subject matter under discussion,” (HCT 263), what I am given to understand also cannot be characterized as neutral ‘information’ – the matter communicated receives a particular shape and meaning through communication. In other words, how I am with somebody deeply affects what they mean – and communication includes the sharing of the ‘how we are together’.
Communication does not mean the handing over of words, let alone ideas, from one subject to another, as if it were an interchange between the psychical events of different subjects. To say that one Dasein communicates by its utterances with another means that by articulating something in display it shares with the second Dasein the same understanding comportment toward the being about which the assertion is being made. In communication and through it, one Dasein enters with the other, the addressee, into the same being-relationship to that about which the assertion is made, that which is spoken of. Communications are not a store of heaped up propositions but should be seen as possibilities by which one Dasein enters with the other into the same fundamental comportment toward the entity asserted about (BPP 210).

We can see now that the understanding given in discourse – understanding in Heidegger’s sense of ways for me to be in the world – can therefore be characterized as a type of participation in the other’s meaningful, committed activities of existing.

Particular ways of being in the world are therefore not mine, but ours. Thus Heidegger asserts that being-with ‘belongs’ to discourse, “which maintains itself in a particular way of heedful being-with-one-another” (BT 161/151) that allows the articulated intelligibility of the world to manifest to us because of our shared involvement in this manifestation.

Discourse is being-with made explicit, and the ‘explicitness’ refers to how I am this being-with as particular ways in which I “take part” (HCT 263) in the existing of particular others as co-constitutors of the world and its meaning.

Though we are often attuned to particular situations in the same way, then, this is not necessarily so, and attunements can and do change. We do not always control such changes – I cannot simply ‘choose’ to be exultant rather than terrified, for example – and attunements can be changed for us, as the communication of my fear in the above

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35 This does not address Heidegger’s discussions regarding shared understandings and attunements of entire historical communities. Though such shared world-orientations will certainly affect the manner and extent of sharing available to me, this does not change the fact that I exist in a wide variety of changing orientations to specific situations.
example indicates. Thus the sharing of attuned understanding accomplished in discourse is often a ‘giving’ or ‘receiving’ of orientation – a point that will have particular import for understanding the call of conscience and authentic being-with in the following chapter. This ‘communicability’ of one’s orientation in the world is quite common; we seek out people in a ‘good mood’ to ‘infect’ us with theirs; we avoid restaurants with oppressive atmospheres, etc. Our behavior manifests an implicit awareness of the way others enable changes in our orientation to the world\textsuperscript{36}. It’s abundantly clear that others ‘infect’ us with their orientations, and this possibility of infection is necessary not only for the communication of mood, but also for the entire normative structure of significance that constitutes world. The essence of discourse is to place us “in the dimension of understandability...[d]iscourse gives something to be understood and demands understanding” (FCM 306).

This emphasis on social participation that acknowledges the relationship between individual care-laden responsiveness to norms and the publicity and anonymity of these shared measures allows us to account for the fact that these norms must and can be learned: that children are socialized into responding to particular standards of meaning and behavior\textsuperscript{37}. The notion of specific shared orientations between particular Dasein therefore points to a way in which we can better understand how Dasein achieves access to these particular das Man understandings, a difficulty that has received insufficient attention in the literature. Communication’s ability to ‘orient’ others toward particular

\textsuperscript{36} Max Scheler offers powerful phenomenological analyses of the varieties of such communication or communion in his On the Nature of Sympathy (Peter Heath, trans. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1954). Though Heidegger critiques the traditional notion of subjectivity present in Scheler’s work, his analyses are still some of the best available on the varieties of ‘being-with’.

\textsuperscript{37} For an example of one such discussion, see Hatab’s “Dasein, the Early Years: Heideggerian Reflections on Childhood,” 2004.
ways of being in the world can go a long way toward understanding how children ‘grow into’ themselves as Dasein. The articulation of intelligibility that defines discourse, then, is not the same as the articulation of meaning contexts that arises through the practical roles and activities of understanding. Though public norms will determine the possible ways in which communication succeeds as such, communication is governed by different norms than understanding. The difference in these domains of normativity demonstrates how Dasein can help others achieve access to das Man understandings without having to presuppose that they are already available or operative. This interpretation agrees with Lafont in refusing to follow the pragmatic reading in claiming that language is governed by tool norms. Rather, both language and equipment have a unique normative structure. This is not to say that discourse is governed by language-norms, however, as she claims. On the contrary: discourse norms govern language, since it is language that is grounded on a more basic norm-sharing and co-instituting that defines the publicity of world. Indeed, Heidegger will claim in Introduction to Phenomenological Research that the very unity of the world lies in its potential to be shared with others:

Only on the basis of possible communication can one succeed at all to make a unitary fact of the matter accessible to several individuals in its unitary character. The λόγος is at work here as a communicating λόγος. By means of it, the world becomes accessible in its unitary articulation. That is the primordial function that the λόγος has insofar as it communicates. If I make an assertion about a specifically perceived fact of the matter, doing so in the public world of existence, then 'com-munication' [Mit-teilung] in the precise sense means making what is spoken of so accessible to someone else that I share it with him [mit ihm teile]. Now we both have the same thing. Attention should be paid here to the middle-voiced meaning of ἀποφαίνεσθαι. (IPR 21).

38 Taylor Carman makes this point in Heidegger's Analytic: “There are norms not just for doing, that is, but also for showing and saying…” (2003, 235).
Though language is the form of such communication *par excellence*, its efficacy rests in the structure of the types of creatures that we are – beings defined by the presence of the others who share the world and understand its meaning through temporalizing commitments and comportments that we can come to share.

The key contribution of discourse lies, then, in this: it discloses the everyday way in which we participate in the other’s way of being qua existential selfhood. The public world designates which public, average roles, norms, and contexts of meanings it is generally *possible* to share, whereas the communicative dimension of discourse refers to the actual *sharing itself*, a sharing that brings to light the other’s shifting commitments and stances on these possibilities – as well as the selfhood that makes such norm-responsiveness possible. In order to communicate that *now* it is the ‘time for’ this or that – to communicate to the other the appropriateness of my orientation to a situation – I must experience her in the temporal specificity of a being who says *now* and cares about the appropriateness of its expression, a care rooted in the other’s commitment to her own existence.

Though the other is encountered in terms of the publicly available roles and meanings delineated by the shared world, then, the other’s existential self-responsibility for these norms – the fact that the other Dasein is *committed* and *responsive* to them – is a necessary condition for the sharing of world that is the defining feature of Fürsorge and the discourse that is its everyday expression. Recall the baseball bat example; though fleeing coward, indifferent observer, or courageous defender are all worldly possibilities available for me to be, I *am* only one of them through my commitment to the norms of appropriateness inherent in the chosen role, and I share this commitment with the others.
to whom I communicate my way of being in the world. The innerworldly categories and meanings through which I encounter the other thus reveal self and other in the particularity of our existential commitment to our own being in the world. Because such commitments are rooted in the fundamental self-responsibility or mineness that expresses Dasein’s originary temporality, in the encounter with the other’s commitment to his own existence I encounter him in his concrete individuality.

**Idle Talk**

Despite such a unique relationship between language and discourse, Heidegger clearly believes that language in some sense *encourages* us to misconstrue the nature of its ontological grounding in discourse – distorting our everyday way of discoursing by covering over its communicative dimension and concealing the recognition of other Dasein inherent within it. The reason for this, Heidegger claims, is because within language

...lies an average intelligibility; and in accordance with this intelligibility, the discourse communicated can be understood to a large extent without the listener coming to a being toward what is talked about in discourse so as to have a primordial understanding of it...what is talked about is understood only approximately and superficially (*BT* 168/157).

Heidegger refers to this superficial discourse as ‘idle talk,’ in which I am ‘given’ the matter under consideration without engaging in a prior genuine orientation toward it. This ontological ‘uprootedness’ of discourse from the communicative element grounding it in particular attuned understandings leads Heidegger to describe idle talk as “disoriented” discourse (*HCT* 269) in which Dasein is “cut off from the primary and primordially genuine relations” (*BT* 170/159) to self, world and others.
Language is the mode of discourse particularly prone to obscure its communicative and self-manifesting dimensions by playing up the other constitutive factors – what discourse is about and what is said as such. As Heidegger notes, “[s]ome of these factors can be lacking or remain unnoticed in the factual linguistic form of a particular discourse” (BT 163/152). In our everyday way of being, the factors that most often go unnoticed are the communicative and the self-articulative. In *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, Heidegger specifically examines *apophantic* discourse as the mode of shared understanding dedicated to ‘pointing out,’ and thus that which forms the basis of propositions and statements. This mode of discourse is the subject matter of logic and the majority of philosophies of language, and because of this, Heidegger analyzes it in more detail. Indeed, he often seems to equate *all* discourse with apophantic discourse, and much of the confusion regarding the nature of Heideggerian discourse is a failure to recognize that apophantic sharing is only one type, and the type most conducive to the groundlessness of idle talk.\(^{39}\)

The danger of idle talk’s linguistic form lies in the fact that it allows us to *assume* that it succeeds as communicative discourse – since in its structure “Speaking in itself makes a claim to communicate” (*IPR* 29) and implies that there has been a genuine “giving to understand” (*BT* 271/251) of the situation – whereas it only takes the *form* of doing so. “For what is said is initially always understood as ‘saying,’ that is, as discovering. Thus, by its very nature, idle talk is a closing off since it *omits* going back to the foundation of what is being talked about….because it presumes it has understood” (*BT* 169/158). So, Heidegger claims, “while the matter being spoken of thus slips away

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\(^{39}\) His claim that “the examination of these λογοί belongs to rhetoric and poetics” (*FCM* 310) may be partially responsible for this.
with the absence of the understanding relation of being...what is said as such – the word, the sentence, the dictum – continues to be available in a worldly way” (*HCT* 268-269).

Language allows an ‘empty’ co-orientation to the words – not a full sharing of the affective, practical stance — such that only a residue of genuine communication remains, and it encourages Dasein to be complacent in this emptiness: “Even when Da-sein repeats what has been said, it comes into a being toward the very beings that have been discussed. But it is and believes itself exempt from a primordial repetition of the act of discovering” (*BT* 224/206). Such a “free-floating interpretation, which belongs to everyone and no one” (*HCT* 270) is, as we will see in the next chapter, characteristic of inauthenticity, in which the ‘unowned’ now of vulgar time forgets the world-time on which it is based – including world time’s structures of intersubjective normativity.

Though language’s ability to enable shared orientations without demanding a ‘primordial repetition of the act of discovering,’ or a complete acknowledgement of the other Dasein, is conducive to inauthenticity, it does not condemn us to it. The ability to communicate in the absence of a fully shared orientation also allows for modes of ‘giving to understand’ across time and distance in a way that would be otherwise impossible.

Christina Lafont makes note of this in a recent article, arguing that despite the common tendency to do so, one need not conclude that “there is a necessary connection between social externalism and inauthenticity in Heidegger’s account of linguistic communication”⁴⁰. According to Lafont, Heidegger recognized that some concepts are not individuated by layman but by experts, and “though everyday communication requires this structure of deferral of authority...by its very nature it opens up the possibility of Dasein’s inauthenticity” (2005, 520). Nevertheless, though the deferral of

authority ‘opens up the possibility’ of inauthenticity, it does not amount to condemning us to it. Indeed, characterizing such forms of communication as a ‘deferral of authority’ indicates the type of basic – though unrecognized – intersubjective acknowledgement of other Dasein operative even here.

Though linguistic giving can tend toward a superficial, inauthentic giving to understand, it is not always or necessarily so – and it can, in fact, serve the opposite tendency: “The discoveredness of Dasein, in particular the disposition of Dasein, can be made manifest by means of words in such a way that certain new possibilities of Dasein’s being are set free. Thus discourse, especially poetry, can even bring about the release of new possibilities of the being of Dasein”41. The fact that language ‘gives understanding’ to others in this way therefore opens up the possibility of expanding the opportunities or manifestations of genuine appropriation available to other Dasein. Indeed, as we will note in the following chapter, leaping-ahead and its corresponding modes of discourse – hearing and acting as the call of conscience for the other – is the mode of encounter that explicitly acknowledges and encourages the other to appropriate existential responsibility of her own selfhood. In this sense, it is a communication that acts as a “release” of the most profound possibility of the being of the other Dasein.

The understanding found in discourse – understanding in Heidegger’s sense of ways for me to be in the world – is therefore a type of participation in the other’s existence that can make available to others particular ways for them to be in the world – authentic or inauthentic. Discourse’s structure as a sharing in the other’s being in the

world means, however, that even in the most inauthentic modes of encounter – in which the communicative, Dasein-manifesting dimensions of encounter are overlooked or ignored – these dimensions and the Dasein-acknowledgement they express are nevertheless always operative: “The four structural moments belong together in the very essence of language, and every discourse is essentially determined by these moments. The individual moments in it can recede, but they are never absent” (HCT 264).
CHAPTER VII: 
Authenticity, Inauthenticity, and the Extremes of Fürsorge

Considering Heidegger’s descriptions of the type of being-toward others that characterizes leaping-in – one pole of the Fürsorge continuum – one may be tempted to doubt whether the radical distinction between things and persons articulated above genuinely exists on his account. In its extreme forms, leaping-in seems to involve no acknowledgement of the other qua world-constituting self. Though I have defined both leaping-in and leaping-ahead in terms of a structurally minimal recognition of the other’s way of being qua Dasein, what characterizes the former seems to be the extent to which my understanding of and behavior toward the other is based on the categories applicable to things. But if the distinction between person and thing is a fundamental ontological dimension of my very being in the world and always involves such minimal recognition, in what way can I treat the other ‘as if’ he were a thing? Stanley Cavell makes a similar query in The Claim of Reason: “Many people, and some philosophers, speak disapprovingly of treating others, or regarding them, as things. But it is none too clear what possibility is envisioned here. What thing might someone be treated as?” (1979, 372).

For Heidegger, however, the answer is clear – the other might be treated solely as if she were an innerworldly and intratemporal thing – in other words, in terms of a vulgar conception of time that conceals or forgets the original recognition of the other’s ecstatic originary temporality. This is possible because Dasein have both a ‘worldly’ and a ‘world-constituting’ dimension, so to speak – dimensions that we designated in the above
distinction between *Mitsein* and *Mitda-sein* modes of being. In treating the other as a thing, I treat him *only* in terms of the worldly – i.e. intratemporal – face that he shows me. As we noted earlier, Heidegger recognizes that Dasein’s interpretations “can draw the conceptuality belonging to the beings to be interpreted from these themselves or else force them into concepts to which beings are opposed in accordance with their kind of being” (*BT* 150/141). In such reifying modes of being-toward, the problematic concept into which the other is forced is not simply some worldly aspect of the other’s being – the fact that he can be defined in terms of social categories or is a physical object in space. Rather, insofar as I treat him *simply* as an innerworldly entity and not *also* as temporal co-constitutor of the worldly space of meaning – as *Mitda-sein* but not also as *Mitsein* – I am forcing him into a simplistic category opposed to his kind of being. In doing so, however, I do not thereby destroy the distinction between persons and things – I never encounter the other *as* a thing, or succeed in changing him into an entity that is no longer defined by this status of temporal co-constitutor. Rather, it means that I have fallen into a narrow mode of thinking and acting toward others primarily in terms of their intratemporality, forgetting the fact that underpinning this worldly dimension is a world-constituting self, expressing its committed, temporalizing having to be in a way that I always immediately recognize.

The extent to which we tend to focus on either the other’s innerworldly being, or on the other’s temporalizing mineness or *selfhood*, represent the poles of the concern continuum within which the different ways of being toward others may fall. “Between the two extremes of positive concern – the one which does someone’s job for him and dominates him, and the one which is in advance of him and frees him – everyday being-
with-one-another maintains itself and shows many mixed forms" (BT 122/115)¹. Even at the extremes of this continuum, however, both dimensions are always present; one can never encounter the other purely in terms of her intratemporal or her temporalizing dimensions. Leaping-in and leaping-ahead merely articulate the ways in which we can overwhelmingly emphasize Mitda-sein at the cost of Mitsein, or reverse this priority.

**Leaping In**

At the innerworldly-focused end of the spectrum is that minimal mode of solicitude Heidegger terms ‘leaping-in’. In this extreme mode one Dasein ‘does the other’s job for him’ – a way of being-toward the other that encompasses domination and abuse. Leaping-in, he argues, is when my being-toward the other person takes “the other’s ‘care’ away from him and put[s] itself in his place in taking care, it can leap in for him” (BT 121/114). Notice that Heidegger puts ‘care’ in scare quotes here, to indicate that we must always understand care to be what is radically my own – the first-person self-responsibility I have in living into different possible ways for me to be. He recognizes, however, that certain ways that I am oriented toward others can make it more difficult for someone to recognize or act upon this mineness – on this responsibility for his own existence: “the other can become one who is dependent and dominated even if this domination is a tacit one and remains hidden from him” (BT 122/114).

Frederick Elliston notes that leaping-in is a mode of solicitude that requires a ‘placing of oneself in the other’s shoes,’ and in keeping with Heidegger’s practical orientation, this occurs “in practice, not in imagination: I literally take over the other’s

¹ It is here that Heidegger (frustratingly) claims that their “description and classification lie outside the limits of this investigation” (BT 123/115).
task, rather than merely picture myself doing so” (1978, 67). The most extreme forms of this displacement and interference in the other’s care include instances in which the tasks I take from the other are basic to her very survival, as in cases of torture or murder. In an everyday way, however, leaping-in exists in more subtle forms – higher up on the concern continuum, so to speak.

In all instances of leaping-in, however, there is an element of ‘displacement’ of the other, whereby the other’s expression of his care for who he is to be is inhibited.

Concern takes over what is to be taken care of for the other. The other is thus displaced, he steps back so that afterwards, when the matter has been attended to, he can take it over as something finished and available or disburden himself of it completely. In this concern, the other can become one who is dependent and dominated even if this domination is a tacit one and remains hidden from him. This kind of concern which does the job and takes away ‘care’ is, to a large extent, determinative for being with one another and pertains, for the most part, to our taking care of things at hand (BT 122/114).

The notion of displacement is essential for understanding leaping-in, for it characterizes the interchangeability of one Dasein for another, an interchangeability that can be assumed only when the individuality of the world-constituting temporality of the other is overlooked in favor of worldly, thing-appropriate categories: “In the case of leaping-in, the emphasis falls not on the person but on his world” (Elliston 1978, 67). Indeed, such a mode of being-toward the other seems to involve forgetting one’s own mode of world-constituting temporality – one’s ‘person’ in favor of one’s world. A certain degree of ‘symmetry’ in forgetting is therefore necessary, since taking over the other’s possibilities as my own requires me to forget the uniqueness and mineness of my own possibilities and the way of being through which they arise. Instead, I focus solely on possibilities – the other’s and my own – as if they were merely innerworldly on-hand things, somehow separable from the particularity of the life that is to live them. This leads Theunissen to
characterize the displacement characteristic of leaping-in as a type of domination of both self and other: "By putting myself in his place, I make his possibilities my own. The Other is ‘thrown out of his place’" (191-192). Leaping-in is correlative a type of self-domination, however, insofar as it involves subsuming an appropriate understanding of my way of being to an innerworldly characterization of possibilities as objects for trade.

This leaping-in can only be a domination insofar as it is at the same time a being dominated. In everyday inauthentic being-with-one-another, Others exercise a domination over me in that they dissolve me in their kind of being. I am dominated by the Others in everyday solicitude in that I act in place of the Other or as an Other....By putting myself in his place, I make his possibilities my own (Theunissen 191-192).

One may argue, in fact, that this type of self-forgetting is in fact the purpose of such domination and abuse, since it creates the illusion of an infinity of bald, free-floating possibilities – it allows the abuser to believe herself free from the temporal particularity that anchors her to the responsibility (and limits) of her having to be. Simone de Beauvoir makes a similar point in *The Ethics of Ambiguity* about those who suffer abuse: she argues that there is, ironically, a certain feeling of safety that can come with being treated as a thing. Things cannot be held responsible for their own existence or feel the anxiety associated with finite freedom – namely, having to act into some possibilities and thereby choose to forfeit others.

The (II)logic of Deficient Modes?

Such characterizations of modes in which I ‘acknowledge’ the others as non-things, but treat them as if they were, has led Klaus Hartmann to criticize Heidegger’s position of displaying a fundamental incoherence. Not only does Heidegger want to claim that we always already experience others as persons through our being-with them
in the world, but he also seems to want to claim that this ‘always already’ can somehow accommodate instances of the (seemingly) total absence of recognition that this involves. In “The Logic of Deficient and Eminent Modes in Heidegger,” Hartmann notes that Heidegger defines Dasein as characterized by existentials with different modes of existentiell manifestation. The problem, Hartmann claims, is Heidegger’s tendency to claim certain ‘deficient modes’ as manifestations of their existential structures – despite the fact that they appear to be negations or absences of the very structures they supposedly instantiate. The difficulty is that

...a deficient mode appears to be the negation in concreteness of what the existential pre-ordains in abstraction. The deficient mode, overtly the flat denial of the existential, is subject to the existential of which it is the denial, for it is still a mode of what it denies (130-131).

In other words, how can Heidegger claim that participatory acknowledgement of the other’s being-in-the-world is an essential feature of my very being, and yet that there are cases in which I appear to directly contradict this acknowledgement? How can leaping-in be a mode of the Mitsein existential, if it amounts to the denial or destruction of the other’s status as co-constitutor of the world, and we have defined all modes of Mitsein as involving degrees of acknowledgement of this status? As Hartmann notes, “Clearly such a ‘logic’ is paradoxical as a species cannot be the denial of its genus” (131).

A fruitful way of understanding a ‘deficient’ mode may be achieved by comparing it to Heidegger’s discussion of the manner in which the animal is ‘poor’ in world, or ‘deprived’ of world in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. There he distinguishes between the deprivation or poverty of world that characterizes animals and the worldlessness that characterizes the stone: “both represent a kind of not-having of

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world...[but] the possibility of being deprived of world requires further considerations” (FCM 196). Heidegger defines the animal’s deprivation as “not having, yet being able to have” (FCM 209), and “not-having in being able to have is precisely deprivation, is poverty” (FCM 211). The animal’s possibility of having world, but not having it, is a different type of lack than the stone’s absence of ability – it is a sort of absence in presence.

So too must the deficiency of solicitude that characterizes leaping-in be differentiated from the absence of this possibility that characterizes the encounter with things.

For it is part of the essential constitution of human Dasein that it intrinsically means being with others, that the factically existing human being always already and necessarily moves factically in a particular way of being with...; i.e., a particular way of going along with. Now for several reasons, and to some extent essential ones, this going along with one another is a going apart from one another and a going against one another, or rather, at first and for the most part a going alongside one another. It is precisely this inconspicuous and self-evident going alongside one another, as a particular way of being with one another and being transposed into one another, that creates the illusion that in this being alongside one another there is initially a gap which needs to be bridged, as though human beings were not transposed into one another at all here, as though one human being would first have to empathize their way into the other in order to reach them (FCM 206).

On such a reading, a deficient mode that may appear to be a complete absence of a particular condition cannot be read as its total absence – and may indeed be the positive manifestations of another mode. Hartmann seems to recognize some variation on this possibility insofar as he notes that Heidegger “rejects the idea that a deficient mode is no more than the denial of an existential structure. It is something positive, too” (134). The example that Hartmann gives to demonstrate this is the shift from the zuhanden to the vorhanden mode of encounter with things; though just staring at something is a ‘deficient
mode' of tool use, it too is a way of being toward the thing, a positive mode of encounter. Understood from the perspective of practical orientations, the vorhanden mode of encounter is deficient — but it is not thereby an absence of encounter; from the perspective of disengaged observation, it too is a positive mode of being-toward the object. Note that both of these modes of engagement are ontological categories specific to the encounter with innerworldly things, and represent a type of continuum that allows Heidegger to both claim that the vorhanden is a positive mode of encounter with the object and that it is deficient in terms of the zuhanden. Thus at BT 75/70 Heidegger notes that when tool use is interrupted "what is at hand becomes deprived of its worldliness so that it appears as something merely objectively present". Nevertheless, "The character of objective presence making itself known is still bound to the handiness of useful things" (BT 74/69). It is still a positive manner of being-toward an object, but its deficiency lies in the fact that it fails to be Dasein's normal mode of being-in-the-world qua immersion in practical coping. It fails, thereby, to be a manner of being-toward objects that is consistent with the ontological category through which they are primordially encountered. In other words, the zuhanden and vorhanden represent the poles of the continuum characterizing the possible ways of being-toward objects — in terms of their usability or in terms of their objective presence, respectively — and though the former represents the ontologically primary orientation against which behaviors emphasizing the

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3 Hartmann argues that Heidegger's claims about derivative status, in the case of the encounter with things, simply relies on his assertions regarding the priority of the "pragmatic world view" (138), whereas a Hegelian or "speculative (logico-transcendental) account" is not "only posited" and therefore "might have satisfied the interests of a unitary theory" (138). Comparing the relative pros and cons of Heideggerian and Hegelian methodology is beyond the scope of this discussion, but needless to say, Heidegger believes that his phenomenological descriptions of the everyday way of being make a greater claim to legitimacy than bald assertion, allowing him to characterize the everyday as having a certain normative 'default' status — his existentials designate a range of possible existentiell manifestations, of which some — the 'everyday' — are considered normal and others deficient.
latter are deemed deficient, the entire continuum is characterized by a positive transcending toward the object.

An analogy can perhaps be drawn, then, between the *zurhanden*/*vorhanden* in regard to encountering things, and leaping-in/leaping-ahead in regard to encountering others. Leaping-ahead and leaping-in represent the poles of the continuum characterizing the possible ways of being-toward others – in terms of their co-temporalizing or in terms of their intratemporality, respectively – and though the former represents the ontologically primary orientation against which behaviors emphasizing the latter are deemed deficient, the entire continuum is characterized by a positive transcending toward the other. Lawrence Hatab makes a similar point when arguing that the norm in encountering others is a type of 'empathic care,' and its absence is analogous to a transfer from a zuhanden to a vorhanden mode of encounter with things:

I suggest then that we take empathic moments to be primal, and that indifference (or worse) is noticed as 'negative.' Here is an analogy to Heidegger's analysis of Zuhandenheit, where a breakdown in tool function is noticed as a disruption, which accordingly illuminates the meaning of the more primal mode of involvement. If we notice disengagement as a deviation (recall Heidegger's description of indifference as a deficient mode of Fürsorge), we might have phenomenological evidence for the primacy of empathic concern (Hatab 2000, 144-145).

Hatab's characterization of the everyday, default mode of encounter as 'empathic care' is perhaps too strongly 'ethical' in tone, but his emphasis on a certain primordial mode of being-toward other Dasein – and the fact that generally our behavior's deficiency is judged as such based on whether it is consistent with the other-acknowledgement inherent in this mode – is correct. So too is his recognition of the analogy between the *zurhanden*/*vorhanden* and the attunement/disengagement continuums that characterize the encounter with, respectively, things and persons. It is important to note, however, that
care must be taken in using such an analogy insofar as Heidegger indicates that the
normal way of being-toward objects is simply an immersed practical coping, whereas our
everyday encounter with other Dasein falls somewhere closer to the ‘middle’ of the
Fürsorge continuum. Thus Heidegger claims that

Just as circumspection belongs to taking care of things as a way of discovering
things at hand, concern is guided by considerateness and tolerance. With
concern, both can go through the deficient and indifferent modes up to the point
of inconsiderateness and the tolerance which is guided by indifference (BT
123/115).

This point comes immediately after his observation that everyday being-with maintains
itself in mixed forms, and though he does not examine them further, this point seems to
indicate that these everyday mixed forms of being-toward the other should be
characterized as varieties of considerateness and tolerance – a point that can further
support our earlier analyses of temporal accommodation and discursive sharing of the
world. Heidegger will later claim that “‘Inconsiderate’ being-with ‘reckons’ with others
without seriously ‘counting on them’ or even wishing ‘to have anything to do’ with
them” (BT 125/118). But despite such reckoning being deficient in a genuine
acknowledgment of the other, this inconsiderateness is nevertheless still reckoning – the
manner, we will recall – in which world-time is instituted with the others. Thus
Heidegger will claim that even inconsiderateness occurs “only by a definite being with
and toward one another” (BT 125/118). In light of this, the fact that everyday being-with
manifests itself in mixed forms does not undercut the implicit temporal acknowledgement
of the other underlying these forms, or prevent Heidegger from judging one pole of the
continuum as a deficiency in light of this acknowledgment.
It is for this reason that Heidegger generally characterizes the deficient modes as extremely minimal and concealed manifestations of a condition – not as the condition’s complete denial or destruction, despite Hartmann’s claims. Thus Heidegger notes that “The deficient modes of omitting, neglecting, renouncing, resting, are also ways of taking care of something, in which the possibilities of taking care are kept to a ‘bare minimum’ (BT 57/53). Indeed, this is the meaning of the word deficient – not an absence, but a failure to fully live up to what is standard or required. It is in the same way that leaping-in must be understood as a deficient mode of Fürsorge – not as an absence of this way of being-toward specific to other Dasein, but as a way of being-toward the other that fails to fully live up to the standard of acknowledgement that is set in the immediacy of Dasein-to-Dasein recognition⁴. In leaping-in Dasein both registers the other as a being defined by co-temporalizing care, and subsequently acts toward him solely in terms of the intra-temporal manner in which he manifests himself in a worldly way. This way of being toward, Heidegger claims, is a type of profound inconsistency in my way of being that undermines the manner in which my care expresses itself in the world. Thus in Introduction to Phenomenological Research, Heidegger will note that

Neglecting can be characterized as deficient caring. A being is deficient if, in the manner of its being, it is detrimental to what it is with and to what it, as an entity, is related. The neglecting is thus itself a care and, indeed, a deficient care, in such a way, that the care cannot come to what, in accordance with its own sense, it is concerned about (IPR 65).

⁴ One could argue that there is a type of human deficiency that is closer to the stone’s worldlessness than the animal’s – in which the other’s claims completely fail to register as such. In these cases – in autism, perhaps, and in in sociopathy, certainly – the individual is not held to be deficiently responding to a normative claim that he implicitly acknowledges, but is recognized to be in some sense incompletely human, insofar as he has no access to this claim or its normative force. Thus William S. Hamrick claims that “Empathy, like the solidarity to which it contributes, is normative to the extent that its total absence is inhuman” (“Empathy, Cognitive Science, and Literary Imagination.” Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, Vol. 31, No. 2 (May 2000) 116-130., p. 118.
Such deficiencies are essentially an existential discrepancy in which Dasein’s behavior contradicts its fundamental structures of care; a way of being in which it fails to live into the appropriate modes in which care ‘comes to’ what it is concerned about. In the deficient modes of being-toward, care does not lose its concern or cease to relate to the object of its concern, but it ceases to do so in a way that ‘accords with its own sense’. This is the reason that Heidegger characterizes leaping-in as inauthentic: leaping-in is defined by a profound inappropriateness, insofar as that towards which Dasein transcends is recognized as having a particular type of being, but the mode in which this transcending finds worldly expression is distorted and inconsistent with this way of being — a discrepancy that is both harmful for the other Dasein (“it is detrimental to what it is with” IPR 65) and prevents one from fully encountering it (the care cannot come to what...it is concerned about” IPR 65). Joel Shapiro describes such discrepancy as a type of “existential-ontological bankruptcy”\(^5\)

This, then, must be the response to Hartmann’s objection regarding the deficiency of these modes of being-toward the other: namely, that they are the most minimal manifestations of the Dasein-acknowledgement that characterizes the Fürsorge continuum, and are characterized as deficient in terms of a model of existential consistency within which Dasein’s behavior and its ontological commitments would better coincide. Before turning to an examination of what such coincidence would look like, however – the mode of being-toward others that Heidegger dubs ‘leaping-ahead,’ we must examine further Dasein’s tendency to fall away from behavior consistent with the

always already operative structures of its being – including the acknowledgement of other Dasein that characterizes being-with.

**Inauthenticity**

Leaping-in involves a type of turning away from the world-constituting dimensions of the intersubjective encounter in favor of its *innerworldly* dimensions – a turning away that involves a mischaracterization of Dasein’s nature as a temporalizing possibility-being. This mode of solicitude is ‘inauthentic’ because it disguises Dasein’s genuine nature by focusing only on the worldly, intratemporal aspects of Dasein’s being and tending to assume that this worldly dimension simply makes Dasein the *same* as worldly things. Such a thing-oriented interpretation of Dasein’s being – in both self and other – inhibits the full recognition of this way of being and therefore results in behaviors that are inadequate to it. As François Raffoul notes of leaping-in:

This solicitude is clearly inauthentic, in at least three respects: first, because it treats the other Dasein as something ready-to-hand (as Heidegger notes at GA 2, 122); second, because it consists in *taking the place* of the other, such a substitution representing for Heidegger an inauthentic relation to others; and third, because it disburdens the other Dasein of his/her care, a third characteristic which represents for Heidegger inauthenticity *par excellence*, if it is the case that inauthenticity consists of a fleeing of Dasein in the face of its own existence and of its weight (1995, 351).

Inauthenticity is the tendency to live in an undifferentiated and anonymous way in which one is simply one among many – a tendency enabled and enforced by the interpretation of self and other as *thinglike*, because it allows us to understand our possibilities not as ‘mine to be,’ but as interchangeable qualities accruing to me and to you like predicates. In such a condition, possibilities are experienced “not for me as me, not for you as you, not for us as us, but for one. Name, standing, vocation, role, age and fate as mine and
yours disappear" (FCM 136). By this Heidegger does not mean that you and I suddenly disappear into an undifferentiated super-subjectivity, or a "universal ego in general" (FCM 136). The averageness structures of das Man "does not comprise some abstraction or generalization in which a universal concept ‘I in general’ would be thought” (FCM 136). Rather, Heidegger claims that the self’s individuating, temporally particular mineness is forgotten and thus not explicitly lived as such. Nevertheless, this condition of mineness – the existential responsibility of selfhood – continues to operate as such, though Dasein looks away from this toward its own worldly manifestation.

This is evident in Heidegger’s point about the manner in which time is lived inauthentically: “one feels timeless, one feels removed from the flow of time” (FCM 141). In inauthenticity these temporalizing structures do not disappear or stop functioning – I do not become an ‘I in general’ – but I do not live in light of them, in light of my way of being qua mineness: “…fate as mine and yours disappear” (FCM 136, emphasis mine). Possibilities are no longer mine and yours – given to us by the temporal particularity of our having to be, our ‘fate’ – they become bare, ‘general’ possibilities disassociated from the particularity of our existences. In this way, inauthenticity allows Dasein to forget its responsibility for having to be; it “relieves Dasein of the task…to be itself by way of itself. The Anyone takes Dasein’s ‘to-be’ away and allows all responsibility to be foisted onto itself” (HCT 247).

Because of this forgetfulness of Dasein’s jemeinigkeit, leaping-in is sometimes characterized as involving a ‘category mistake’ – in which the other is treated in terms of a model of time and possibility appropriate only for innerworldly things, rather than one adequate to her temporalizing having-to-be. Though this is correct, it is important to be
clear that characterizing it as a category mistake over-simplifies what is a very complex structure. In the Dasein-to-Dasein to encounter I always already experience the other as both temporalizing and intra-temporal, but by becoming too focused on the intra-temporal dimension, I can slide into a way of thinking and acting that treats Dasein like the other intra-temporal things that I encounter. Dasein is essentially intratemporal and innerworldly – it is always expressing itself into a world time that relativizes and publicizes its originary temporalizing, but this in itself is not enough to inauthentically mischaracterize Dasein as being only this. The distortion characteristic of inauthenticity lies in its tendency to take an interpretive stance equating Dasein’s way of being with things because in focusing only on the worldly dimensions of Dasein’s existence, it forgets or ignores that this worldly dimension does not simply make it the same as worldly entities.

Because by its concept understanding is free self-understanding by way of an apprehended possibility of one’s own factual being-in-the-world, it has the intrinsic possibility of shifting in various directions. This means that the factual Dasein can understand itself primarily via intraworldly beings which it encounters…It is the understanding that we call inauthentic understanding (BPP 279).

A problem arises once we recognize that Heidegger sometimes seems to imply that it is not only this innerworldly dimension but the inauthentic stance that is an inevitable aspect of our being-with-one-another – namely, that all being-with is inauthentic. His talk of das Man certainly encourages this interpretation. As a result, articulating authentic modes of being-with – which Heidegger explicitly designates as a possibility – becomes extremely hard to reconcile with this implicit view that being-with-one-another
is inherently inauthentic. As we have already shown in Chapter V, Heidegger is in fact extremely inconsistent on this point, and the difficulties in interpretation that this produces are profound. As Michael Theunissen notes: “Heidegger, regardless of his recognition of authentic being-with-one-another, very often simply equates the inauthentic everyday with being-with-one-another” (189).

Though we have already discussed this difficulty somewhat, it will be fruitful to return to it here, now that a fuller picture of Dasein’s way of being qua intersubjective temporalizing is at our disposal. As I argued above, the assumption that all being-with is inauthentic is rooted in Heidegger’s general failure to adequately maintain his own distinction between being-with – the existential – and its inauthentic manifestation. By maintaining this difference we can take Heidegger at (some of) his own words and maintain a more logically consistent position. In light of this, the modal indifference of average everydayness must similarly be maintained, despite the fact that, in placing so much interpretive emphasis on authenticity and inauthenticity, Heidegger encourages us to overlook the range of everyday ways of being that fall between these extreme modes in

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6 A common accusation leveled against Heidegger is, so to speak, the flip side of the authenticity/inauthenticity coin – namely, the view that “For Heidegger, authentic existence remains a private world, structured by Dasein’s concern for its own Being. The negativity and isolation associated with Dasein’s achievement of authenticity excludes a positive existential mode of being-with-others in Being and Time” (Roger Frie, Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity in Modern Philosophy and Psychoanalysis. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Ltd., 1997., p. 84). For some of the earliest formulations of such a critique, see Karl Löwith’s Das Individuum in der Rolle des Mitmenschen (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1969) and Ludwig Binswanger’s Grundformen und Erkenntnis menschlichen Daseins (Zürich: M. Niehans, 1953). I will be arguing against this interpretation in following sections.

7 See also Phileps, for example: “It seems, then, that Heidegger’s existential of das Man in Sein und Zeit has two aspects that cannot easily be reconciled. On the one hand it is a fundamental structure of everyday life that is constitutive of the cultural public world; it is the mode of Being in which we live ‘proximally and most of the time’. On the other hand, Heidegger’s description of das Man is loaded with negative connotations” (1999, 451).
which being-with can be instantiated\(^8\). Being-with and its average everyday expressions are not equivalent to inauthenticity, but are modally indifferent conditions that can become authentically or inauthentically differentiated.

This move to separate everydayness and inauthenticity is somewhat controversial, considering Heidegger’s tendency to speak of it in terms of inauthenticity – such as his claim that Dasein tends to plunge “into the groundlessness and nothingness of inauthentic everydayness” \((BT\ 178/167)\). Such inconsistencies between the logical demands of his position and his careless forms of expression lead thinkers like Theunissen to note that “the relationship of inauthenticity to ‘everydayness’ is extremely problematic” \((193)\) – even going so far as to describe it as the “murkiest point in Being and Time” \((193)\). As Dreyfus argues, these two aspects can be recognized in Heidegger’s work,

But unfortunately, in Being and Time Heidegger does not distinguish these two issues but jumps back and forth between them, sometimes even in the same paragraph. This is not only confusing; it prevents the chapter from having the centrality it should have in an understanding of Being and Time \((1991, 144)\).

Despite Heidegger’s tendency to blur the difference between the two, making sense of his position as a whole requires that everydayness is understood as a modally indifferent condition that can be modified in a movement toward inauthenticity (through falling) or in a movement toward authenticity (through resoluteness). Indeed,

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\(^8\) As Rudi Visker queries: “Is there no way then for Being and Time to keep to the promise of its opening pages where it was suggested that everydayness need not be inauthentic…? What elements in Being and Time are responsible for its apparent failure to stick to this promise, for the fact that throughout the book more often than not everydayness is simply equated with the inauthentic?” (“Dropping – the ‘Subject’ of Authenticity: Being and Time on Disappearing Existentials and True Friendship with Being.” Deconstructive Subjectivities. Simon Critchley and Peter Dews, eds., Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996., 59-83. p. 79). Visker appears to consider the position I am advocating – namely, that the responsibility for this failure lies in Heidegger’s tendency to move toward understanding such relations as a simple dualistic opposition between two possible aspects, rather than adequately maintaining his initial insight into their nature as a continuum. In Visker’s case, however, these aspects are ‘truth’ and ‘untruth’: “What if ultimately the responsibility lies with the way Heidegger here conceives of a-letheia as a simple opposition between truth and untruth…?” \((79)\).
‘indifference’ is a term Heidegger seems to use at points to explicitly designate this ‘between’ of everydayness: “Mineness belongs to existing Da-sein as the condition of the possibility of authenticity and inauthenticity. Da-sein exists always in one of these modes, or else in the modal indifference to them” (BT 53/49). And elsewhere he will note: “This indifference of the everydayness of Da-sein is not nothing; but rather, a positive phenomenal characteristic. All existing is how it is out of this kind of being, and back into it. We call this everyday indifference of Da-sein averageness” (BT 43/41).

The priority of this everyday ‘indifference’ – which is then ‘differentiated’ in the direction of either authenticity or inauthenticity – is further supported by his claim in Division II that “…this potentiality-of-being that is always mine is free for authenticity or inauthenticity, or for a mode in which neither of these has been differentiated” (BT 232/215). We can further note Heidegger’s tendency to understand Dasein’s existence as a continuum in which everydayness is stretched between the poles of authenticity and inauthenticity when he claims that “Authenticity is only a modification but not a total obliteration of inauthenticity” (BPP 171). Indeed, though he generally tends to equate the worldly range of possibilities articulated by das Man as essentially inauthentic, this too must be understood as modally indifferent: as Heidegger notes in Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity: “The ‘every-one [translating das Man] has to do with something definite and positive – it is not only a phenomenon of fallenness, but as such also a how of factual Dasein” (OHF 14).

Dasein essentially expresses itself into a worldly temporality and significance that relativizes and publicizes its originary temporalizing, and it is this fact, I would argue, that Heidegger is attempting to articulate with such claims. This notion is more clearly
expressed, however, when he characterizes inauthenticity and authenticity as modified grasps of the more basic average *everydayness*: “...authentic existence is nothing which hovers over entangled everydayness, but is existentially only a modified grasp of everydayness” (*BT* 179/167). There will always be a dimension of self and other expressed in the intratemporality of the world, and though this worldly averageness is an unavoidable aspect of Dasein’s being, this does not allow us to equate average everydayness with an inauthentic stance in which this averageness is characterized in terms of thingliness⁹.

**Falling.... Not Fallenness**

Despite his confused formulations, then, the everyday worldly modes of being with others are not inherently *fallen* but merely display a tendency – a *falling* toward – inauthenticity. In this tendency toward inauthenticity “there is a peculiar *non*explicitness, in that the care *falls prey* to the object of its concern. The care as such has no time for any sort of deliberation as to whether what it is preoccupied with is not in the end determined by *it* itself” (*IPR* 61). It has “no time” for such deliberation because having such time would required *taking it* – and thereby acknowledging its way of being qua world-constituting originary temporality. It is, instead, tending toward an absorbed fascination with the intratemporal things of the world itself. In this falling “*away from itself*” (*BT* 176/164), Dasein “drifts toward an alienation in which its ownmost potentiality for being-in-the-world is concealed” (*BT* 178/166). As we have seen, falling

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is a covering-over of Dasein’s being-in-the-world that “operates by way of reinterpretation” (*HCT* 316) – a reinterpretation of oneself and other in terms of categories inappropriate for Dasein-being. Falling is a “tendency of being” (*BT* 313/289) or “kind of ‘movement’ of Dasein” (*BT* 178/167), and inauthenticity – or fallenness – is essentially the extreme condition of self-alienation that is accomplished when Dasein has given in to this “constant temptation of falling prey” (*BT* 177/165).

This interpretation allows us to make more sense of Heidegger’s seeming confusion regarding the relationship between everydayness and inauthenticity. Namely, everydayness is a condition in which the *temptation* to inauthenticity – the tendency toward falling – is always present. This does not allow us to conclude, however, that everydayness is therefore inherently inauthentic. “Although Dasein is always exposed to this tendency to fall, it does not always give in to this tendency” (Visker 1996, 80). Though everydayness is defined by the *temptation* of inauthenticity, of itself it is neither authentic nor inauthentic.

The notion of inauthenticity as temptation brings to mind Dreyfus and Rubins’ discussion of Division II of *Being and Time*, in the appendix to Dreyfus’ *Being-In-The-World*. There they claim that “there are two versions of falling in *Being and Time*” (333). One is a structural story, in which Dasein’s absorbed coping in the world tends to “turn Dasein away from confronting itself,” and the other version is a “motivational story that Dasein *actively resists*” the call to authenticity (Dreyfus and Rubins 1991, 333-334). The consequence of this, they argue, is
...a double contradiction; inauthenticity becomes both inevitable and incomprehensible. On the one hand, if one holds that falling as absorption is motivated by fleeing, i.e., that absorption is a way of covering up Dasein’s nullity, then, since absorption is essential to Dasein as being-in-the-world, Dasein becomes essentially inauthentic. On the other hand, if facing the truth about itself leads Dasein to equanimity, appropriate action, and unshakeable joy, resoluteness is so rewarding that, once one is authentic, falling back into inauthenticity becomes incomprehensible (1991, 334).

As Taylor Carman argues, however, falling and fleeing must be understood as a difference of degree, and in this sense his view agrees with my interpretation of inauthenticity as one extreme of a continuum. Carman designates ‘fleeing’ as a condition in which one is, so to speak, further gone in the temptation to be inauthentic, but the two are, “from a practical and phenomenological point of view wholly continuous, differing only in degree. Anxious flight is not just some random psychological aberration, but an ‘intensified’ or ‘aggravated’ modification of falling (SZ, 178)”

10. According to Carman, it is the fact that we “inhabit the shared social and semantic space in which entities are collectively intelligible to Dasein as the things they are” (2000, 19) that accounts for the falling of everydayness; the “generic drift” of this public arena pulls Dasein away from recognizing its own concrete particularity, thereby accounting for its tendency to fall further and further toward the completely self-forgetful banality of fallenness. Indeed, Heidegger implies that such inauthenticity is just the cultivation of this generic drift:

Insofar as there is in Dasein the tendency to take and do things lightly, this unburdening of being which Dasein cultivates as being-with obligingly accommodates it. In thus accommodating Dasein with this unburdening of its being, the public maintains a stubborn dominion (HCT 247).

Dasein’s everyday way of being is always already characterized by such a ‘generic drift’ insofar as it encounters a now-saying other than its own; another now that relativizes its
own. In the Dasein’s encounter with another ‘mineness’ – and its move to express itself through shared worldly measures evoked by this encounter – Dasein’s way of being opens the possibility of losing itself in the encounter. “Dasein presents itself with the possibility in idle talk and public interpretedness of losing itself in the they, of falling prey to groundlessness” (BT 177/165). This possibility is merely presented as a ‘temptation,’ however – a temptation that Dasein may be prone to act on insofar as it wants to flee the awareness of its own responsible finitude. Acting on this temptation involves cultivating this unburdening; moving from the relativization of possibility inherent in publicity toward the displacement of possibility that this allows.

Even when we give in to this temptation of forgetting and concealing, however, we can never completely elide the status of self and other as Dasein – as temporalizing co-constitutors of the world. This is evident in the fact that Heidegger speaks of inauthenticity as something that inhibits or conceals the fundamental structures of selfhood and its temporal heedfulness – structures that are nevertheless always operative: falling “has the functional sense of suppressing the Dasein in the Anyone” (HCT 278) such that “Being toward the world as well as toward others and itself is disguised” (HCT 280). Despite such ‘suppression’ and ‘disguise,’ however, Dasein – myself and the other – continue to be characterized by selfhood: inauthenticity’s “‘not I’ by no means signifies something like a being which is essentially lacking ‘I-hood,’ but means a definitive mode of being of the ‘I’ itself” (BT 109/116). Note here the similarity with our discussion of ‘deficiency’ and ‘lack’ as a type of minimal or suppressed form of that which is standard or required. Inauthenticity is not a lack of these structures or a total lack of awareness of them – since we must be aware of that from which we are fleeing in order to cultivate
stances of avoidance — it is, rather, a way of being that fails to fully live up to the standard of acknowledgement that is set by the structures of its existing.

**Ontological Imperatives**

Heidegger is clearly aware that we are capable of such ontological inconsistency — that we can focus our behavior solely on the innerworldly ‘thing-like’ dimensions of self and other, despite the constant implicit acknowledgement of our mutual status as world-constituting co-Dasein. But there is nevertheless a certain ontological imperative to appropriateness that generates an obligation to follow through on the immediate Dasein-recognition to which I have always already responded; to act in a way consistent with the always-operative recognition of other Dasein as such. This imperative to appropriateness is, we can also recall from Chapter II, grounded in Dasein’s having itself to be — and the manner in which it attempts to succeed in its being by meeting standards of appropriateness. This is a defining impulse of Dasein’s transcending *jemeinigkeit* — an impulse that motivates its heedfulness to public norms, to the temporalizing others, and to its own ontological structures in measuring the success of its having to be.

But if Dasein *cannot* experience the other as a thing, and this other-recognition *necessarily* involves responding in terms of temporal accommodation and self-limit — in what way can such ontological constraint be characterized in normative terms such as ‘respect’ or ‘obligation,’ and in what way am I further compelled to do more than rest easy with this minimal level of acknowledgement inherent in all encounters? What compels me to seek, rather, a response that is *more* appropriate or consistent with the other’s way of being?
As we have characterized the Fürsorge continuum, any answer to the other counts as a response to the other’s claim on me, since all encounters involve an accommodation of their temporal claims to a shared now. But as James Mensch notes in *Ethics and Selfhood*:

...ethics involves more than responsibility – i.e., more than just responding to the other. The necessity for something further comes from the fact that this response need not be ethical in any recognizable sense. I can, for example, respond to the need of the other by turning away....[but in ethics the others] do not just call on me to respond, they also raise the question of my response. They invite me to examine its adequacy (2003, 111).

The apparent absence of minimal conditions for what counts as acknowledging the other is a problem that also afflicts Levinas’s philosophy, argues Bernard Waldenfels. If all responses count as a response, how can we get from this seemingly empty form of responsibility to genuinely ethical constraint? By turning to a brief discussion of possible Levinasian solutions we may find a way toward an answer.

László Tengelyi takes up this concern with the unavoidability of the Levinasian ethical claim in *The Wild Region in Life-History*, where he questions the nature of an ethics in which “one cannot but answer”; an ethics, therefore, that “has nothing to do with any kind of moral ought” (120). The answer to this problem, Tengelyi argues, lies in Levinas’ articulation of an “ineluctable appeal” that is irreducible but nevertheless deeply related to such ‘moral oughts’: it is “the source of a responsibility which is not limited by any law, right, or measure” (120) but is instead presupposed by moral law as “the ultimate source of its own sense” (131). For Levinas, intersubjectivity is characterized by a certain type of paradox, rooted in the fact that the ethical appeal does not take place in the closed relationship of the I and thou, but is always already witnessed

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11 *Antwortregister*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1994., p. 357.
by others – third parties – whose human presence also demands an ethical response. This fundamentally ‘public’ context of my ethical selfhood demands that my immediate, infinite ethical responsibility to one alters to encompass an infinite responsibility to all.

Two conflicting forms of responsibility are required, the responsibility of the face to face encounter, articulated in the ethical relationship, and the responsibility of justice – which accommodates this multitude of others. As Levinas says in “Peace and Proximity,”

The first question in the interhuman is the question of justice. Henceforth it is necessary to know, to become consciousness. Comparison is superimposed on my relation with the unique and the incomparable, and, in view of equity and equality, a weighing, a thinking, a calculation, the comparison of incomparables, and, consequently, the neutrality – presence or representation – of being, the thematization and the visibility of the face in some way de-faced as the simple individuation of the individual...".

Because of the multitude of others that I am called to answer, infinite ethical responsibility demands, paradoxically, that public institutions and meanings be established that can act as shared measures to mediate these infinite responsibilities; measures in terms of which we may navigate this public space of shared presence.

In this sense, my account of Heidegger’s establishment of world-time – shared significances according to which we can heedfully accommodate the temporal expression of all the others – is not so different from Levinas’ requirement that justice temper ethics. Both thinkers articulate the necessity of establishing public measures to accommodate the

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multitude of beings whose way of existing is nevertheless irreducible to such comparison and measure. As Tengelyi describes it:

...although wild responsibility cannot be traced back to the moral law, it still requires this law as a principle which provides its boundary and measure...although the moral law cannot be derived from wild responsibility, either, it still presupposes this kind of responsibility as the ultimate source of its own sense (126).

In the same way, we can understand the fact that, for Heidegger, Dasein’s temporalizing way of being demands expression into a world time that accommodates the many now-sayers by establishing shared standards of measure. Understood as such, these worldly standards have their ultimate source of sense in the heedful encounter of Dasein to Dasein. Nevertheless, their very worldly mode of being qua average and intratemporal means that they can become harmful and inappropriate for understanding and navigating this Dasein being. In such cases, Dasein’s care for consistency and appropriateness in its way of being provokes it not to strive to meet such public standards, but to resist them because they are inconsistent with Dasein’s most basic ontological structures – including the recognition of others as profoundly different from things, despite inauthentic tendencies to interpret them in thingly terms. Sonia Sikka thus argues that despite the common view that Heidegger completely rejects all “transhistorical norms for ethical

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13 Axel Honneth notes that both Gadamer and Löwith emphasize the danger of such universalizing for distorting or concealing the genuine intersubjective encounter: “The idea that the greatest danger to any real intersubjectivity consists in the destructive power of reflection presents the most obvious type of connection between the two” (“On the destructive power of the third: Gadamer and Heidegger’s doctrine of intersubjectivity.” Philosophy and Social Criticism, Vol. 29, No. 1 (2003) 5-21, p. 13). The difference between them, however, lies in their views on the significance for the formation of interpersonal relations of the third-person reflexive stance and the generalized norms arising therefrom. “While the former seems always only to recognize in reflexive acts the negative side of distanciation or externalization, Löwith sees structured within them the chance for a decentering of the ‘I’, which presents a necessary presupposition for intersubjective interaction” (16). As I am hoping to show, both moments are essential dimensions of the intersubjective relationship for Heidegger as well.
conduct,” (forthcoming, 1) Heidegger’s ontology in fact defines “appropriate behaviour toward all entities possessing a certain character” (forthcoming, 3).

Though these public meanings and measures can permit inappropriate interpretations of the other that will nevertheless still count as a ‘minimal’ — though distorted and concealed — recognition of her way of being, Dasein’s overarching concern for existential consistency will militate against this: local, contingent and distorting standards of appropriateness will be rejected — *themselves* deemed inappropriate — according to the most basic standards established by Dasein’s temporalizing way of being. Indeed, as Heidegger argues, we commonly feel distress over the ways in which our inauthentic modes of solicitude inhibit our genuine encounter with the other; we feel “burdened by our inability to go along with the other” (*FCM* 206), registering the tension between public standards of interpretation and the immediacy of Dasein recognition that is their grounding purpose. This feeling of lack is so upsetting, Heidegger notes in the *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, that overcoming it results in “a new sense of elation in our Dasein each time we accomplish such going-along-with in some essential relationship with other human beings” (*FCM* 206).

Though Levinas initially appears quite far away from Heidegger’s position, then, upon closer inspection we can recognize significant similarities. Levinas’ notion of *infinite* responsibility, for example, may appear to be a significant difference from Heidegger’s view, but insofar as this notion is essentially a refusal to recognize such ‘finitizing’ third-person institutions of measure as *prior* to the second-person relationship of claim characterizing the Dasein-to-Dasein encounter, their views do not differ as much as Levinas’ hyperbole appears to indicate. And though it is often acknowledged that
Levinas’ characterization of the ethics/justice relationship is one of paradox or “alternating movement” (Tengelyi 122) between these different orders of responsibility – the need for third-person comparison vs. Dasein’s resistance to such comparison – Heidegger also recognizes that public norms are infected with a type of contingency or limit for this very same reason, a contingency that is most fully and explicitly brought to light in anxiety, being-toward-death and the call of conscience. In light of these considerations, we can understand leaping-ahead as a mode of solicitude aimed at nurturing this ‘second person’ other who both subtends and interrupts these third-person measures.

**Leaping Ahead**

In contrast to the inauthentic tendency of leaping-in, in which I acknowledge but subsequently conceal or turn away from the other’s temporalizing care by focusing only on intratemporal modes of existing – leaping-ahead “recognizes this ontological difference” (Elliston 1978, 68). It is a way of being-toward another Dasein that takes the complexity of his way of being as its guiding principle. Unlike leaping-in, which conceals, distorts and resists the other’s status as co-constitutor of the world and the temporal taking-heed that implicitly recognizes it, leaping-ahead explicitly acknowledges and nurtures it:

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14 Robert Dostal claims that “The very term with which Heidegger designates both forms of positive solicitude is not adequate to the phenomenon. ‘Leaping’ (Springen) mitigates against togetherness and mutual reciprocity. The verb suggests that one leaps ahead, or in place of, or even behind. Leaping is a decisive action that requires great exertion; ‘being together’ is contrary to it” (“Friendship and Politics: Heidegger’s Failing.” Political Theory, Vol. 20, No. 3 (1992) 399-423, p. 407). Nevertheless, I believe the term is simply meant to evoke the particular ecstatic intentionality that characterizes Dasein’s way of being qua transcendence.
...there is the possibility of a concern which does not so much leap in for the other as leap ahead of him, not in order to ‘take’ care away from him, but to first give it back to him as such. This concern which essentially pertains to authentic care; that is, the existence of the other, and not to a that which it takes care of, helps the other to become transparent to himself in his care and free for it (BT 122/114-115).

Leaping-ahead involves a more explicit concern for the other in the full complexity and particularity of her being, a concern that builds on the most basic structure of recognition that characterizes all Fürsorge: as Heidegger says in The Letter on Humanism, “Every affirmation consists in acknowledgment. Acknowledgment lets that toward which it goes come toward it”¹⁵. In leaping-ahead, this acknowledgement is an affirmation that frees the other to more fully be the type of being that I have always already recognized her to be. I help to “disentangle the other from his world, and thereby reveal his nature to him” (Elliston 1978, 68) – this ‘nature’ being the other’s world-constituting originary temporality that is the condition for these innerworldly categories. In contrast to leaping-in’s deflection “away from the individual towards the objects of his concern,” leaping-ahead “emphasizes the person” (Elliston 1978, 67). In this ‘emphasis on the person’ Heidegger claims that one Dasein can ‘give’ the other her care back to her – ‘free’ her for it. But insofar as care is the very way of being of Dasein as such, how can it be ‘given back’ to Dasein? As Walter Brogan queries, “What kind of exchange is this that gives the other what it already is – its being as possibility?”¹⁶ There is a clear correspondence here between Heidegger’s talk of ‘freeing’ the other and his claims about authentic Dasein ‘untangling’ itself from the world to free itself for its own possibility, and it is for this reason that he designates leaping-ahead as an authentic mode of Fürsorge. The

problem of how one is to ‘free’ the other for her own finite and self-responsible way of being, however – and its relationship to the self-freeing of authenticity – is one that we must examine.

In doing so it will become clear why it is inaccurate to characterize being-with other Dasein as inherently preventative of authenticity, insofar as other Dasein can in fact serve as a motivating or enabling force for provoking the move toward authenticity. It is the discursive manner of authentic disclosure that is of the greatest import here, for it is qua discourse that the authentic mode of being-with explicitly manifests itself. This will become clear insofar as conscience is the discursive mode through which Dasein’s way of being is revealed to it in its mineness and wholeness – as both worldly and world-constituting. It is in terms of the communicative sharing or ‘giving to understand’ of this Dasein way of being that Heidegger speaks of one Dasein acting as the ‘call of conscience’ for another. He is articulating the possibility of a type of authentic discourse whereby one Dasein can bring the other into an orientation toward her own way of being which enables and promotes its authentic grasping. Though only the other Dasein can herself take on the self-responsibility of her own authenticity – I cannot be authentic for another – acting as her call of conscience can bring her into a position that makes this possible. This is the real meaning of leaping-ahead – I bring the other into an orientation toward her way of being that frees her to exist in light of it.

Before we can examine the manner in which one Dasein can act as the call of conscience for the other, however, we must first understand authenticity as a realization of the other tendency characterizing Dasein’s way of being – not the movement of falling in which Dasein understands itself in terms of innerworldly and thing-appropriate
interpretive categories – but the resolute tendency toward an appropriate grasping of Dasein’s way of being in its wholeness. This resoluteness is evoked and instantiated not only in conscience, but in the other modes of disclosure specific to authenticity as well – angst and being-toward-death.

Heidegger’s discussion of authenticity begins by questioning how Dasein can drag itself out of its tendency toward ‘falling’ such that it achieves a more adequate understanding of its way of being. He questions how Dasein can get a grip on itself as a ‘unified whole,’ despite the fact that its very nature is one of ecstatic transcendence characterized by both worldly and world-constituting dimensions. Dasein is not an intratemporal ‘finished’ thing that can simply be grasped and defined; its ecstatic temporal expression into world-time means that

...something is always still outstanding in Da-sein which has not yet become ‘real’ as a potentiality-of-its-being. A constant unfinished quality thus lies in the essence of the constitution of Da-sein. This lack of totality means that there is still something outstanding in one’s potentiality-for-being (BT 236/220).

In answering how Dasein can comprehend itself in the face of this ecstatic incompletion, Heidegger cannot resort to an understanding of the self as simple, monolithic ego – as he makes clear in his rejection of the Cartesian cogito. Nor can this explicit grasping of Dasein’s way of being – authenticity – simply be equated with the existential self-responsibility that Heidegger dubs ‘mineness,’ since “it is only because Dasein in essence is in each instance my own that I can lose myself in the Anyone” (HCT 309). What differentiates authenticity from inauthenticity is not the mineness of Dasein’s existence, but the manner in which Dasein lives this condition of temporal ecstatic and existential self-responsibility. In authenticity, Dasein takes this jeweiligkeit upon itself – making
itself responsible for its having to be, so to speak – while inauthentic Dasein gives in to the temptation to flee it.

In keeping with Heidegger’s characterization of the self as way of being – not as a substance with properties – authenticity must therefore be understood not as ‘having’ this ‘information’ about one’s complex ecstatic structure of being, but as a particular way of existing in light of it. To demonstrate this, Heidegger examines the specific manifestations of the three modes of disclosure that evoke and attest to this way of existing: angst, being-toward-death and conscience. These are the authenticity-specific manifestations of attunement, understanding and discourse, and as such each is a way of being that testifies to and instantiates the possibility of existing in an explicit grasping of one’s way of being qua temporally particular having-to-be. They disclose a mode of existing that takes Dasein’s temporalizing mineness as its guiding principle, in contrast to the inauthentic tendency to model Dasein-understanding on the temporal categories appropriate to things.

**Being Towards Death**

The condition through which the temporality and mineness of one’s existence most powerfully asserts itself is mortality, and it is for this reason that Heidegger’s analyses of authenticity focus on ‘death’ in articulating these aspects of Dasein’s being, describing it as one’s “ownmost nonrelational possibility not to be bypassed” (BT 251/232). It is important to be clear that for Heidegger, ‘death’ is not some future event, however, – the moment of my demise – but is his term for the omnipresent possibility of one’s absolute impossibility. Though many commentators misinterpret Heidegger’s use
of ‘death’ to mean the end of life\textsuperscript{17}, Heidegger’s intent is to designate an existential condition of radical contingency and finitude that infects all of the possible ways for Dasein to be. As inauthentic Dasein, I conceal from myself the fact that my finitude is “essentially and irreplaceably mine,” (BT 253/234) by fleeing into the anonymity of interpretive categories that belong to innerworldly things – precisely because they operate with a vulgar, non-temporally particular notion of time. This applies even when speaking of the event of one’s own future dying; though it is in fact possible at any moment, inauthentic Dasein conceptualizes its ‘possibility of impossibility’ as a locatable event in a linear sequence of undifferentiated nows. Such inauthenticity allows Dasein to focus entirely on the worldly tools and projects with which it is absorbed, thereby concealing the existential responsibility – the \textit{jemeinigkeit} – on which the intelligibility of these projects is based.

In not wanting to think about it, however, Dasein bears witness in its being in death itself. Conversely, death is not first in Dasein because it by chance thinks about it. That before which Dasein flees in its falling flight in everydayness, even without expressly thinking about death, is nothing other than Dasein itself, specifically insofar as death is constitutive of it (HCT 316).

In \textit{authentic} being-toward-death, however, Dasein grasps the profound contingency of its existence: “in such being-toward-death this possibility must not be weakened, it must be understood as \textit{possibility}, cultivated as \textit{possibility}, and \textit{endured as possibility} in our relation to it” (BT 261/241).

In other words, Dasein can exist its radically possible, unfinished and contingent way of being as such by cultivating, enduring, and understanding itself as being the type of being it is, a condition of explicit self-grasping that Heidegger sometimes characterizes in temporal terms with the word *anticipation*: “*Anticipation reveals to Da-sein its lostness in the they-self, and brings it face to face with the possibility to be itself*” (*BT* 266/245). In authentic being-toward-death, the *non-thinglike* temporal particularity and possibility of Dasein’s being is illuminated in an anticipatory understanding of “the possibility of the impossibility of existence” as possibility (*BT* 262/242), thereby enabling an appropriation of this groundlessness, and hindering the fallen interpretation of this groundlessness simply as future ‘event’ waiting to be actualized. This anticipatory appropriation enables a “kind of being of Da-sein in which it can be *wholly as Da-sein* (*BT* 259/239). Grasped “wholely” as Dasein, I understand my being not only in the worldly, intratemporal dimensions I have in common with things, but also in my temporalizing having to be.

**Angst**

Despite Dasein’s best efforts to forget this condition of responsible finitude by immersing itself in the inner-worldly and intratemporal, awareness breaks through from time to time. Angst is Heidegger’s term for this disruptive attunement that discloses the fact that Dasein “has to take over solely from itself the potentiality-of-being in which it is concerned absolutely about its ownmost being” (*BT* 263/243). What angst reveals is that “Death does not just ‘belong’ in an undifferentiated way to one’s own Da-sein, but it *lays claim* on it as something *individual*” (*BT* 263/243). This ‘laying claim’ individuates by
pulling Dasein out of the self-forgetfulness of inauthenticity and bringing it face to face with its own condition as temporally particular having-to-be. This does not mean that Dasein was not an ‘individual’ prior to authenticity – Dasein is always a self defined by mineness; rather, in angst Dasein is called to an explicit awareness and appropriation of its nature as such: “The fact that Da-sein is entrusted to itself shows itself primordially and concretely in Angst” (BT 192/179). As Haugeland puts it, “Heidegger says that anxiety individualizes Dasein. This does not mean that Dasein is not, in each case, already an individual, but rather that, in anxiety, a person’s individuality is ‘brought home’ to him or her in an utterly unmistakable and undeniable way” (2000, 65). This ‘unmistakable’ experience reveals to Dasein the different possible ways it can exist in terms of itself – it discloses the possibilities of self-recognition or self-delusion of which it is capable and thereby undermines its ability to focus only on the fallen possibility of self-forgetting. Angst, Heidegger claims, “takes away from Da-sein the possibility of understanding itself, falling prey, in terms of the ‘world’ and the public way of being interpreted” (BT 187/175); it “fetches Da-sein back from its falling prey and reveals to it authenticity and inauthenticity as possibilities of its being” (BT 191/178).

Despite Heidegger’s talk of the world ‘falling away,’ however, we must recall that Dasein is “not a subject or consciousness, which only incidentally provides itself with a world” (HCT 305). We cannot interpret the ‘distance’ from world that angst induces as a retreat into the autonomous confines of the solitary self, since its transcendent being-in-the-world is precisely that about which Dasein is anxious.
*Angst* individualizes and thus discloses Da-sein as ‘*solus ipse*’ This existential ‘solipsism,’ however, is so far from transposing an isolated subject-thing into the harmless vacuum of a worldless occurrence that it brings Da-sein in an extreme sense precisely before its world as world, and thus itself as being-in-the-world (*BT* 188/176).

What characterizes anxiety is that Dasein’s relation to the world itself – the manner in which the world comes to be the meaningful context of Dasein’s temporalizing – becomes a matter of concern, and *not* the particular meaningful things found within this context. Indeed, the “utter insignificance” of innerworldly beings is revealed in angst, but Heidegger is clear that this does not thereby “signify the absence of world,” rather, it means that this attunement reveals the insignificance of the particular innerworldly things that normally fascinate and absorb us because for the first time “the world is all that obtrudes itself in its worldliness” (*BT* 187/175). Anxiety thus reveals the conditions and context in which care normally operates by placing the particular instances of its operation out of play and allowing the *structure* of its normal functioning to become evident. In angst Dasein is anxious *for* its being-in-the-world – including the fact that this being-in-the-world is defined by a being-with that makes possible the very world in which it normally finds meaning: “this ‘there’ is first of all being-there-with-others, which is the publicly oriented there in which every Dasein constantly remains, even when it withdraws completely into itself” (*HCT* 254). As Phillip Buckley notes in characterizing resoluteness – the opposite tendency of falling:

> While resoluteness is clearly the opposite of an escape into the ‘They,’ it is at the same time not an escape *from* the ‘They.’ This may seem surprising, for the notion of being a true self, an *autos*, suggests a totally self-sufficient entity, and ego apart from the world. Heidegger makes very clear that resoluteness does not detach *Dasein* from the world. Indeed, if *Dasein* is ‘being-in-the-world,’ then to remove it form the world would be to deprive it of its very nature (1992, 171).
Heidegger’s talk of the ‘worldlessness’ of angst and the ‘non-relationality’ of being-toward death make it easy to interpret him as advocating a type of solipsism in which the Dasein-to-Dasein relationship is destroyed or bracketed, however, and many people read him as articulating just this position. This interpretation is supported by such Heideggerian claims as: “the nonrelational character of death understood in anticipation individualizes Dasein down to itself....It reveals the fact that any being-together-with what is taken care of and any being-with the others fails when one’s ownmost potentiality of being is at stake” (BT 263/243). When understood in context, however, it becomes clear that the ‘being-with-others’ to which Heidegger refers in such instances is the worldly, mitda-sein mode of encounter.

But if taking care of things and being concerned fail us, this does not, however, mean at all that these modes of Da-sein have been cut off from its authentic being a self. As essential structures of the constitution of Da-sein they also belong to the condition of the possibility of existence in general. Dasein is authentically itself only if it projects itself, as being-together with things taken care of and concernful being-with..., primarily upon its ownmost potentiality-of-being, rather than upon the possibility of the they-self. Anticipation of its nonrelational possibility forces the being that anticipates into the possibility of taking over its ownmost being of its own accord (BT 263-264/243).

Insofar as we recall that the world in its worldliness is dependent on the encounter with other co-temporalizing Dasein, however, Heidegger’s characterization of the ‘utter insignificance’ of the innerworldly becomes less open to interpretations that emphasize the solipsistic tone of anxiety’s individualizing. This is supported by his explicit claims emphasizing the continuing presence of the others despite authenticity: “the authenticity

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18 Simon Critchley claims, for instance, that according to Heidegger “...the fundamental experience of finitude is non-relational, and all relationality is rendered secondary because of the primacy of Jemeinigkeit” (2002, 169). Lawrence Vogel similarly claims that “...the fact remains that authentic being-with-the-other is characterized by indirectness. In other words, the authentic self is achieved without the positive cooperation of ‘Dasein-with.’ Authentic Dasein is not constituted through relation with the other” (84). Recall our earlier discussion of this from note 153.
of Dasein...the self that Dasein can be, such that it does not really extricate itself from this being-with-one-another but, while this remains constitutive in its being as being-with, it is still itself” (HCT 248). In angst, then, it is in terms of the specifically innerworldly manifestation of being-with – Mitda-sein – that the others ‘fall away’ and ‘lose significance’.

In Angst, the things at hand in the surrounding world sink away, and so do innerworldly beings in general. The ‘world’ can offer nothing more, nor can the Mitda-sein of others. Thus Angst takes away from Da-sein the possibility of understanding itself, falling prey, in terms of the ‘world’ and the public way of being interpreted. It throws Da-sein back upon that for which it is anxious, its authentic potentiality-for-being-in-the-world (BT 187/175-176).

The normal roles and measures through which we take heed of the others lose their meaning and familiarity because the entire context of meaning and my commitment to it has come into question. As Rebecca Kukla notes,

> In cutting off my capacity for unreflective, fallen action, the uncanny reveals that everyday practices never did simply determine my actions as the laws of nature can determine my movements. I was bound by the norms of the everyday in virtue of my free commitment to them rather than by compulsion, even if this free commitment is only available through hindsight.¹⁹

What angst reveals to me is not that all norms are meaningless or make no claim on me – but that I am implicated in the fact that they do make such claims. Thus Heidegger’s statements about the ‘non-relationality’ of death can be understood as a realization of the contingency of the worldly standards of significance and measure with which we normally operate. Eric Sean Nelson notes, therefore, that ‘death’ for Heidegger is a

possibility that is "non-relational in that it can not be ordered in the relationality of the world but places relationality itself into question"\textsuperscript{20}.

This point returns us to the above discussion of the relationship between general standards and particular others in Levinas, in which we noted that, for both thinkers, though the norms governing public life are generally taken to be settled and law-like, they are nevertheless haunted by a profound contingency due to Dasein's way of being. In the anxious experience of this contingency of all particular innerworldly norms, Dasein's way of being – the condition for the possibility of these norms obtaining – is first disclosed. What is revealed is Dasein's thrown projecting being-with: the fact that its responsive, understanding sharing of time with others is what makes innerworldly significance possible as such.

Though he says, then, that "being-with the others fails when one's ownmost potentiality-of-being is at stake" he also notes that this "does not, however, mean at all that these modes of Da-sein have been cut off from its authentic being a self. As essential structures of the constitution of Da-sein they also belong to the condition of the possibility of existence in general" \textit{(BT 263/243)}. What fails in my being-with the others are the specific \textit{inner}worldly roles and measures that have been instituted to accommodate our mutual temporalizing. Though these are the manner in which we normally encounter other Dasein, \textit{through} their failure the others can become evident as co-constitutors of world and world-time. As Phillip Buckley notes,

For Heidegger (as well as for Husserl), authenticity has something to do with thematizing properly that which remains unthematized in both everyday and scientific life, with making explicit what was only implicit. For Heidegger, what goes totally unnoticed in everyday, indifferent existence is the ontological meaning of Dasein as temporality (1992, 202).

Because Dasein’s ontological meaning as temporality essentially involves an accommodating openness to the others with whom it constitutes the world, the authentic realization of this meaning necessarily involves an explicit recognition of the role of others in creating and maintaining this context of significance. In authenticity Dasein recognizes the way of being specific to Dasein – but this recognition is not restricted only to its own Dasein being.

The temporal nature of authenticity’s Dasein-realization is evident not only in understandingly being-toward-death in anticipation; it is also evident in authentic attunement. This becomes particularly clear when we consider Heidegger’s discussion of profound boredom, which, along with angst, is a fundamental attunement that allows Dasein’s structures of significance – rather than particular significant things – to become a matter of concern. In his analyses of fundamental boredom, he explicitly characterizes the temporal horizon as his focus, but here too he is articulating the sense in which we can recognize that which “holds beings as a whole open and makes them accessible in general as such,” (FCM 147) an accessibility, Heidegger notes, that involves the way in which the temporal horizon “must simultaneously bind Dasein to itself and entrance it” (FCM 147). This normally happens in terms of particular innerworldly things, but in authenticity, this temporal horizon itself grips Dasein – its own temporalizing way of being is disclosed to it as such, thereby inhibiting its engagement with the intratemporal things that this temporalizing enables.
Time entrances [bannt] Dasein, not as the time which remained standing as distinct from flowing, but rather the time beyond such flowing and its standing, the time which in case Dasein itself as a whole is. This whole time entrances as a horizon. Entranced by time, Dasein cannot find its way to those beings that announce themselves in the telling refusal of themselves as a whole precisely within this horizon of entrancing time (FCM 147).

Fundamental attunements such as angst and profound boredom interrupt the everyday functioning of world and world-time such that their role as the horizon “which properly makes possible” (FCM 148) becomes evident as such. This authentic awareness that interrupts the everyday entrancement of time to reveal temporalizing itself is, according to Heidegger, “able to rupture it, insofar as it is a specific possibility of time itself” (FCM 151). Heidegger characterizes this temporal possibility of rupture as the authentic now, or the ‘Augenblick’ (FCM 149). But as we will see in the next section, it is the third authentic mode of disclosure – conscience – that accounts for the rupturing quality of the authentic now; it calls us into this moment of authentic time and demands authenticity of us.

The Call of Conscience

After discussing Angst and being-toward-death, Heidegger asserts that “The question hovering over us of an authentic wholeness of Dasein and its existential constitution can be placed on a viable, phenomenal basis only if that question can hold fast to a possible authenticity of its being attested by Dasein itself” (BT 267/246). The call of conscience is the mode of discursive disclosure that attests to the possibility of authenticity such that Dasein in the whole of its existing can be brought into the existential fore-having necessary for understanding this existence. Understood as discourse, then, we can recognize that conscience articulates the intelligibility of the
basic structures of Dasein’s way of being; the call *gives to understand* Dasein’s
temporalizing existence in all its mineness and particularity.

Because inauthentic Dasein resists this self-understanding, authenticity demands
that Dasein be brought back to itself from its fallen immersion in worldly understandings,
and “this bringing-back,” Heidegger says, “must have the kind of being *by the neglect of
which Da-sein* has lost itself in its inauthenticity” (*BT* 248/231). As we noted, it is
neglect of the temporalizing mineness and finitude of existence that leads Dasein to take
its interpretive guidance from intratemporal things that are not defined by possibility and
self-responsibility. In doing so, Dasein fails to live into these possibilities *as* its own,
drifting along instead in the anonymous and inherited roles and interpretations that have,
so to speak, chosen it. Inauthenticity lulls us into going along with the roles that are
given to us such that we not only fail to choose specific possibilities as genuinely our
own, but also fail to recognize our way of existing as beings capable of such self-
responsible choice. Grasping its own potentiality of being cannot, therefore, involve a
straightforward choice to resist fallenness. Heidegger realizes that Dasein cannot simply
‘decide’ to be authentic, since this *capacity* is itself concealed and evaded in fallenness.
Conscience therefore has the task of uncovering — awakening — the very *potential* for
authenticity that is ordinarily forgotten. The difficulty, as Heidegger recognizes, is how
this neglected capacity for responsibility can become a possibility for actualization if
Dasein has given in to the tendency to fall away from itself: how to choose choice when
the capacity for choosing has been forgotten?

The answer involves a certain type of ‘self-finding’: “because Da-sein is lost in
the ‘they,’ it must first *find* itself. In order to find *itself* at all, it must be ‘shown’ to itself
in its possible authenticity" (BT 248/231). But what is the form of this authentic self-showing that can, paradoxically, occur 'from within' inauthenticity? Heidegger points the way forward in querying:

How is the authenticity of existence to be defined at all if not with reference to authentic existing? Where do we get our criterion for this? Obviously Da-sein itself in its being must present the possibility and way of its authentic existence, if such existence is neither imposed upon it ontically, nor ontologically fabricated. But an authentic potentiality of being is attested in conscience (BT 234/216).

Conscience plays the role of giving Dasein's way of being to it to be understood, but insofar as existential understanding is a way of being and not simply an abstract knowing, bringing Dasein's potential authenticity into the space of understanding must be an initial or inaugural authentic existing itself. This, indeed, is the reason 'attestation' is the term used to describe the role of conscience: attestation generally means a substantiation or corroboration of something. Conscience attests to Dasein's potential authenticity by first 'demonstrating' or 'manifesting' this possibility – by first existing it.

The call that brings Dasein back from its fallenness must reverse the neglect of this capacity by first engaging it, then, but it must do so in a way that doesn't illicitly presuppose that this reversal has already occurred. It is for this reason that Heidegger describes inaugural instances of authenticity as "making up for not choosing...choosing to make this choice" – deciding for a potentiality-of-being, and making this decision from one's own self" (BT 248/231). The possibility of Dasein inaugurating an authentic way of being despite the fact that this very authenticity seems necessary to resist falling – a seemingly vicious circle – lies in the nature of conscience as call. In conscience one is summoned to one's own structure as temporalizing care in a type of double movement, a 'calling back that calls forth': "forth to the possibility of taking over in existence the
thrown being that it is, back to thrownness in order to understand it as the null ground that it has to take up into existence’ (BT 264/247). Understood as such, Heidegger makes room for an initial choosing of one’s being in the face of the groundless conditions out of which all such choices must be made, and the self-forgetfulness that this motivates. Conscience is a self-summoning to responsiveness that creates the very responsiveness that it needs in order to be heard. As Rebecca Kukla puts it in ‘The Ontology and Temporality of Conscience’:

...this call discloses Dasein, by uncovering the implicit normative structure of Dasein’s fallen dealings, but in doing so it also constitutes Dasein in its individuated being. While fallen, Dasein has ‘forgotten’ that it is not merely the They, and it must remember this through its recognition of conscience’s call. But since, in a chronological sense, we are ‘first’ lost in the everyday, this remembering has to be of a funny sort.

This ‘remembering’ occurs through conscience’s unique structure as a calling of the self to a resolute choosing of the way of being that it nevertheless must always be.

**Hearing the Call**

What is it about the call of conscience that allows for this initial ‘making possible’ of Dasein genuinely living into its way of being in its wholeness? The answer to this question lies in the fact that Heidegger understands conscience as a discursive call. The notion of ‘the call’ is a recurring theme in many of Heidegger’s works – in “Language,” in “Letter on Humanism” and other texts it plays a recurring role. In *What is Called Thinking?* Heidegger plays with the verb ‘to call’, exploring other verbs that it evokes – summon, demand, instruct, direct, command – as approximations to its meaning. He

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clarifies that the sense of call with which he is concerned does not just imply demand, however, but “rather implies an anticipatory reaching out for something that is reached by our call, through our calling” (WCT 386). The nature of such an ‘anticipatory reaching out’ is clarified further when he asserts that to call is ‘to command’, which “basically means, not to give commands and orders, but to commend, entrust, give into safekeeping, to shelter” (WCT 387). Understood in this manner, conscience is a type of anticipatory reaching out and evocative nurturing of one’s ability to live in light of one’s being qua worldly and world-constituting mineness. These explorations are also instructive in that each characterization of ‘calling’ involves a type of bringing into relationship; calling is a summoning and granting ‘bringing together’ – a relation, indeed, in which the relata are not clearly reducible to ‘agent’ and ‘recipient.’

The call is precisely something that we ourselves have neither planned for nor willfully brought about. ‘It’ calls, against our expectations and even against our will. On the other hand, the call without doubt does not come from someone else who is with me in the world. The call comes from me, and yet over me (BT 275/254).

Such a ‘middle voice’ structure is particularly evident in Heidegger’s emphasis on the dimension of hearing that belongs to conscience. Further examination of the ‘choice’ that makes choosing possible leads Heidegger to argue that such an inaugural authentic existing is essentially a certain type of ‘hearing’ or responsiveness in the face of the call that grants Dasein an understanding of its way of being. Dasein’s being in its wholeness qua worldly and world-constituting can be disclosed, however, when the capacity to ‘hear’ the disclosure has been awoken. Conscience’s status as call both grants Dasein an understanding of its way of being, and evokes the type of open listening that makes it capable of receiving such a ‘giving to understand’.
Da-sein fails to hear itself, and listens to the they, and this listening gets broken by the call if that call, in accordance with its character as call, arouses another kind of hearing which, in relation to the hearing that is lost, has a character in every way opposite. If this lost hearing is numbed by the ‘noise’ of the manifold ambiguity of everyday ‘new’ idle talk, the call must call silently, unambiguously, with no foothold for curiosity (BT 271/251).

Heidegger’s account of conscience as ‘alternative’ hearing allows us, then, to clarify the structure of this inaugurating instance of a forgotten or hidden capacity, a structure that he first characterizes with his claim that conscience calls Dasein to choose choosing. Better: conscience calls Dasein to hear its own forgotten way of being.

Interestingly, the use of the concept of ‘hearing’ is not experienced as being nearly so circular, and its greater palatability lies, I believe, in our inability to conceive of ‘choice’ as anything other than explicit, self-conscious, willful act. The concept of choice resists the middle-voiced structure that Heidegger attempts to attribute to it – the reason, perhaps, that he is so often accused of a willful decisionism. But if we look at BT 347/300, for example, Heidegger explicitly notes that Dasein’s resolute ‘taking action’ in authenticity “must be taken so broadly that ‘activity’ will also embrace the passivity of resistance”. Thus Buckley argues that “authenticity is not something to be achieved, but rather something that one ‘undergoes’” (203). The concept of hearing as an existential openness to the discursive giving to understanding of Dasein’s way of being more adequately captures this notion than ‘choosing to choose’ can. Its ambiguous status as a type of active receiving or passive activity is more appropriate for characterizing this

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23 See, for example: Herman Philipse’s “Heidegger and Ethics,” in which he claims that “Heidegger proclaimed free individual decisions as the ultimate ground of ethics. He is a moral sceptic within the foundationalist tradition, because free decisions cannot justify moral rules” (1999, 468). Others who accuse his philosophy of decisionism and/or moral nihilism include: Pierre Bourdieu in The Political Ontology of Martin Heidegger, Jürgen Habermas in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (Frederick G. Lawrence, trans. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1990), Karl Löwith in Martin Heidegger and European Nihilism, Ernst Tugendhat in Self Consciousness and Self-Determination (Paul Stern, trans. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1986), Richard Wolin in The Politics of Being, and Julian Young in Heidegger, Philosophy, Nazism.
inaugural instance in which Dasein allows itself to resist the tendency toward falling. It is for this reason, I would argue, that Heidegger describes hearing as the most “primary and authentic openness” (*BT* 163/153). As John Llewellyn notes:

The voice of conscience is a middle voice, akin to the Greek voice that Heidegger finds most suitable to express the mood of the phenomenological thinking called for in *Being and Time*, a thinking which must be cooperative and vigilant listening obedience. ‘Listening-to…is Dasein’s existential way of Being-open as Being-with for Others’ (*BT* 163). Here and in the paragraph immediately following this sentence in *Being and Time* the words used are hören and horchen, where along with the idea of hearkening there are overtones of heed, gehorchen (1991, 81).

As we will argue below, this notion of heed – a concept we have seen before in terms of accommodating the foreign temporality of the other – applies not only to the self-calling of conscience, but characterizes the other-calling and responsive openness characteristic of leaping-ahead.

What Heidegger is articulating here, however, is a self-calling characterized by a type of unity of activity and passivity evident in his claim that despite the fact that the “tendency toward disclosure of the call lies [in] the factor of a jolt, of an abrupt arousal” it nevertheless only reaches “him who wants to be brought back” (*BT* 271/251). Understood as such, we can understand conscience not simply as offering Dasein the possibility of authenticity, but summoning it to live in light of this disclosed way of being. Such a summoning accounts for the manner in which conscience differs from angst, which simply “fetches Da-sein back from its falling prey and reveals to it authenticity and inauthenticity as possibilities of its being” (*BT* 191/178). Conscience is not simply a revelation, however, but a type of invocation and demand. Thus in introducing the discussion of conscience, Heidegger notes that
...we must investigate to what extent at all and in what way Dasein bears witness to a possible authenticity of its existence from its ownmost potentiality-of-being, in such a way that it not only makes this known as existentially possible, but demands it of itself (BT 267/246).

Conscience is the mode of disclosure in which Dasein’s possible authenticity is given to it as a certain imperative, an imperative whose ‘content’ is not given by the particular worldly roles and measures that have been called into question, but by the very structures of Dasein’s being qua temporalizing mineness. In this sense the call of conscience is the normative injunction that I live in light of the way of being that I have to be, rather than fleeing it into thingly-interpretations. Though authenticity is not, in this sense, a worldly or a contentful norm – it does not tell me specific things to do – neither is it empty. Instead, it demands that I meet my potential of taking responsibility for these worldly norms by recognizing and acting consistently with my way of being as a shared world-constituting with other Dasein. In this regard, it counteracts falling’s tendency toward inauthenticity.

Thus Rebecca Kukla notes that conscience’s call is “such that hearing its call constitutes subjects as responsive and responsible negotiators of normative claims” (1). As Kukla makes clear, however, we always already are responsive negotiators of normative claims – the claims of everyday standards of appropriateness, and, on a more fundamental ontological level, the claims of attuned understanding and the temporal constraints of the shared now. This responsiveness is always operative in our everyday way of being with others, though it is not recognized and ‘owned’ as such.
...this responsiveness could not exist if we were fully and irretrievably fallen. The problem is that if we were merely carried along by the everyday, then our relationship to it would not be normative at all. The norms of the They would function for us like laws of nature, compelling us immediately at the level of blind impulse, rather than binding us in virtue of our recognition of their force and our commitment to them (Kukla 4).

It is for this reason, argues Kukla, that Heidegger’s project must be understood as a transcendental one: he is “arguing from the existence of normative responsiveness to the conditions of its possibility, not proving the possibility of such a responsiveness from a starting point that makes no appeal to it (4). What conscience articulates, then, is a demand for a type of existential consistency in which Dasein explicitly recognizes and takes responsibility for – lives in light of – these always already operative existential structures of being-in-the-worldly space of significance.

If existence is essentially determined as Zu-sein, having-to-be, then it is constituted in and by a certain obligation, a certain ‘call of Being’… The mineness of existence must thus be thought on the basis of this call, which Heidegger treats in Sein und Zeit as the call of conscience (Raffoul 1998, 225).

Because Dasein is subjected to this summons to resolute existing, we can recognize the source of the demand that I act in ways consistent with my way of being, an imperative that appeared problematic when we considered the fact that on a minimal and unavoidable level, Dasein is always acting in ways consistent with its way of being – since it cannot help but do so.

As Bernhard Radloff notes, with this notion of a ‘having to be’ that I both always am and yet must ‘live up’ to being, Heidegger is demonstrating the profound influence that Aristotle had on his thinking: “Heidegger – following his retrieval of Aristotle – understands this being of a being as the movement (kinesis) of a being into its own proper
limit and form, as determined by the principle of unfolding (arche) inherent in it.\textsuperscript{24} Unlike Aristotle, however, Heidegger's only articulation of this 'proper limit and form' is in the structure of its temporal ecstatic qua thrown projecting being-with. Heidegger may thus offer a middle way between a robust perfectionism and a pure formalism: in the call of conscience, "rising to the occasion of existence" (Kisiel 203) is demanded of Dasein, but meeting this norm occurs only by Dasein taking responsibility for the constraints that are, qua existentials, always already operative.

If Dasein does so, he will "successfully" and adequately "respond to what presses upon him as a necessity, namely not acting counter to what is essential in Dasein. Not acting counter to the essential here means being held to oneself" (FCM 174). With the notions of authenticity (self-holding) and inauthenticity (self-forgetfulness) Heidegger makes room for the fact that Dasein can succeed or fail at a being that it nevertheless cannot help but be:

Yet do we not all know this? Yes and no. We do not know it to the extent that we have forgotten that man, if he is to become what he is, in each case has to throw Dasein upon his shoulders; that he precisely is not when he merely lets himself set about things in the general fray, however 'spirited' this may be; that Dasein is not something one takes for a drive in the car as it were, but something that man must specifically take upon himself....Man must first resolutely open himself again to this demand (FCM 165).

Successfully responding to what 'presses upon him as a necessity' therefore requires that Dasein is in a certain sense 'held to himself' such that the response is adequate to the appeal. This being 'held to oneself' – a formulation that doesn't entirely capture its

middle-voiced structure of a self-holding/being held – is the essence of authenticity, in which Dasein takes on the responsibility of the claims inherent in its having to be.

**Ethical Implications**

The foregoing points allow us to better understand our earlier discussion of the Levinasian ‘ineluctable appeal’ of ethics – a claim to which I cannot help but respond, but for which my response can nevertheless be deemed inadequate. It returns us to Kant, as well, since he defined the human being in terms of a fundamental rationality whose claims one is still blameworthy in failing to meet. Heidegger is further in agreement with Kant insofar as he ties the moral status of an action to the degree to which Dasein takes explicit responsibility for the original claims of its having to be: “Self-responsibility is the fundamental kind of being determining distinctively human action, i.e. ethical praxis.” *(EHF 262-264/180)*. Heidegger’s appreciative interpretation of Kantian ethical theory finds particular expression in *The Essence of Human Freedom*, where he examines this essential dimension of existential self-responsibility that is its heart:

Unless pure willing, as the genuinely actual of all ethical action, actually wills itself, a material table of values – however finely structured and comprehensive – remains a pure phantom with no binding force. This willing is allegedly empty, but at bottom it is precisely this which is most concrete in the lawfulness of ethical action. The ethicality of action does not consist in realizing so-called values, but in the actual willing to take responsibility, in the decision to exist within this responsibility *(EHF 190-191)*.

Unlike Kant, however, Heidegger takes this self-responsibility to encompass all of the dimensions of ecstatic being-in-the world – not just Dasein’s rationality. For Heidegger, authentic resoluteness is Dasein deciding to ‘exist within the responsibility’ of its way of existing as attuned, understanding and in relation with others – an existing that it is
always already compelled to be. He therefore makes room for appropriating dimensions of Kantian theory and rejecting others when, in his analysis of the will as "nothing other than practical reason and vice versa" (EHF 187) he claims that

...to actually will is to will nothing else but the ought of one's existence. Only in this kind of willing is that actual within which the fact of the ethical law actually a fact...The factuality of this fact does not stand over against us but belongs with us ourselves such that we are claimed for the possibility of this actuality, not just in this or that way, but in our essence (EHF 196).

Insofar as Heidegger understands the ought and the essence of one's existence differently, he is not a Kantian, but the structure of claim and responsibility-taking is similar, as he recognizes: "this fact of an unconditional obligation may well exist, and if so is obviously connected with what we call 'conscience'" (EHF 197). Thus despite the fact that talk of self-responsibility and 'self-binding' has led some to accuse Heidegger of reducing norm-responsiveness to a type of arbitrary self-relation, he is clear that the claims to which I must bind myself are not accidental or objects for selection, but essential dimensions of my being-in-the-world – including the fact of being heedful to the other Dasein's temporalizing being-in-the-world. Self responsibility is "to bind oneself to oneself, but not egotistically, i.e. not in relation to the accidental 'I'" (EHF 199).

Characterizing such claims in the absence of this moment of self-responsibility would turn them into a type of natural law that simply compels obedience. On the contrary, "...a genuinely normative call must serve as an authoritative source of action, but it must not complete the determination of the action, so that it leaves its target free to responsibly and authoritatively respond to its authority" (Kukla 18). Normative claims can always be refused, evaded, covered over – as Dasein's tendency to 'falling' makes
clear. In the absence of this responsibility-taking such claims will not cease being obligations – but they would fail to bind me to them:

Transcendental conscience discloses the normative demands made upon us as binding, rather than leaving them to sit passively in experiential space, as some perhaps do for the psychopath, who is perfectly capable of internalizing moral rules in the sense of memorizing them, but for whom they have no binding force. Hence such conscience commands nothing, not in the sense that there are no legitimate, concrete commands that bind subjects, but in the sense that the responsibility for responding to these commands, which this conscience must instill, is never reducible to or explicable by an appeal to mere exposure to yet a further set of commands (Kukla 9).

This being free to take on or turn away from my obligations is, Heidegger claims, “not a property of man but is synonymous with behaving ethically” (BPP 141). Such a characterization of self-responsibility recognizes that the essence of obligation is to compel and summon – but not coerce.

It is important to be clear, then, that Heidegger is not asserting the ‘unbounded’ or ‘unlimited’ nature of Dasein – that we are not subjected to any claims until we decide to make something into a claim. Rather, he is articulating the necessary conditions for explicitly responding to claims as claims – namely, that Dasein must take part in committing itself to them as such:

Letting something stand-over-against as something given, basically the manifestness of beings in the binding character of their so- and that-being, is only possible where the comportment to beings, whether in theoretical or practical knowledge, already acknowledges this binding character. But the latter amounts to an originary self-binding, or, in Kantian terms, the giving of a law unto oneself. The letting-be-encountered of beings, comportment to beings in each and every mode of manifestness, is only possible where freedom exists (EHF 205).

My obligation to respect a certain claim cannot make me act in light of it unless I take responsibility for who I am to be in the face of such claims. “Freedom makes Dasein in the ground of its essence, responsible [verbindlich] to itself, or more exactly, gives itself
the possibility of commitment" (MFL 192). In understanding what it means for Dasein to take responsibility for the possibility of normative commitment, we can agree with Steven Crowell’s suggestion in “Facticity and Transcendental Philosophy,” that “to recognize my responsibility in the existential sense is to understand that the being normative of norms, their functioning as norms, is grounded in my concern for normativity as such,” and this concern for normativity as such “rests on what Heidegger calls an ‘ontological’ basis, namely, on the existential circumstance that a concern with normativity constitutes selfhood” 25.

But as we have shown, my concern for normativity is rooted not only in my desire to meet adequately the constraints of my way of existing, but also in my desire to accommodate the temporalizing having to be of the other Dasein. This deep intertwinement of my having to be with that of other Dasein is most evident in the fact that the others can themselves be the source of this summons to adequacy. In this sense, it seems clear that concern for the other is not a simple derivative of authentic self-responsibility, since the latter is often secondary to the former. By acting as the other Dasein’s call of conscience, I can summon her to take over her responsibility for having to be. This is the essence of the mode of Fürsorge that Heidegger dubs ‘leaping ahead’: it is a mode of being-with in which I disclose and nurture the other in the wholeness of her existence qua worldly and world-constituting having-to-be, and it finds its voice in the call of conscience.

The Call of the Other

It is important to note from the outset that when he claims that Dasein can become the conscience of others he uses ‘scare’ quotes to convey the sense that Dasein can only act as a conscience-like phenomenon for the other: “Resolute Da-sein can become the ‘conscience’ of others” (BT 274/253). Dasein can function like the other’s conscience, but it cannot in fact be the other’s conscience – there remains a significant difference between conscience’s self-calling, and this conscience-like ‘being called’.

A major difficulty with the claim that I may be the recipient of a silent call from another Dasein that evokes an authentic hearing demonstrates this difference. Namely, the coincidence of caller and called ‘within’ the same articulated Dasein seemed to be essential to the unified existing that characterized authenticity. Since conscience is both the call to another hearing and the first instance of this hearing itself, it thereby provides a type of inaugural instance of responsiveness to my responsibility for being, evoking my authentic existing. If this is the case, however, how can we talk about this inaugural authentic hearing without the call coming from – and simultaneously triggering responsiveness in – my own Dasein?

It is here that we must rely on Heidegger’s use of scare quotes regarding the other’s ability to act as the call of conscience. Conscience can – qua discourse – allow others to give me an understanding of being in its mineness through a communicative sharing in which what I had previously fallen away from – an awareness of my way of being – is made explicit to me. Though the other’s call can therefore summon me to a responsive self-understanding of this way of being qua having to be, it cannot fulfill the other dimension of conscience: the responsibility-taking that accounts for it being a
genuine inauguration of authenticity. The others cannot take responsibility for this being in my place. Indeed, the other’s belief that he can take responsibility for my being in my place was precisely the misunderstanding and distortion at the root of leaping-in. The other who calls me with the voice of conscience gives me a self-understanding that I did not previously have, but it is a giving that summons me to take responsibility for my own having to be.

A potential problem that arises with this interpretation lies in the fact that the summoning quality of conscience appears to rely on the fact that it is a self-calling from out of our everyday tendency toward inauthenticity. The possibility of such a breach or interruption of falling, argues Heidegger, lies in being summoned immediately, and this character of immediacy is attributable to conscience because it is Dasein calling itself. Though our initial understanding of the call of conscience seemed to require that the Dasein presenting the possibility of authentic existing is the same Dasein as the one to whom this possibility is attested, however, nothing in Heidegger’s account requires that we reach this conclusion. Indeed, he never offers any argument for the claim that Dasein’s potentiality-for-being-a-whole can only be triggered by a self-calling. This is not the only way to understand this immediacy, however: note how he claims that the call of conscience is necessary for Dasein to be brought back from its lostness in the they “if this is to be done through itself” (BT 271/250, emphasis mine). Such an ‘if’ implies that one may also be called back from this lostness by something – or someone – other than the self. Though he emphasizes the necessity of conscience being the ‘self calling the self’ to its ownmost possibilities if the immediacy of the call is to achieve its ‘jolting’ disclosure, then, Heidegger seems to simply assume that the call must be from my
authentic self if it is to succeed as a call to be this authentic self, particularly when the call cannot be from “someone else who is with me in the world” (*BT 275/254*). Thus he asserts that

> When the caller reaches him who is summoned, it does so with a cold assurance that is uncanny and by no means obvious. Wherein lies the basis for this assurance, if not in the fact that Da-sein, individualized to itself in its uncanniness, is absolutely unmistakable to itself? What is it that takes away from Da-sein so radically the possibility of misunderstanding itself from some other direction and failing to recognize itself, if not the abandonment in being delivered over to itself? (*BT 277/256*).

Wherein lies the basis of *this* assurance? Why must the absolute immediacy with which the call takes away the possibility of misunderstanding imply that it could only have come from me? Since communicative discourse is the sharing of new orientations and understandings, it’s very structure allows for this possibility. Nevertheless, it cannot have come from ‘someone else who is with me in the world,’ since “In its who, the caller is definable by nothing ‘worldly’. It is Da-sein in its uncanniness, primordially thrown being-in-the-world, as not-at-home, the naked ‘that’ in the nothingness of the world” (*BT 276/255*). As we have already shown, however, the others, too, are characterized by a dimension that is ‘nothing worldly’; something which accounts for the fact that the world’s structures of significance and measuring are *constituted* in Dasein-to-Dasein encounters.

If we are to take seriously Heidegger’s claim that I may be the recipient of a conscience-like call originating in another Dasein, then, this call would have to originate in the world-constituting temporalizing mineness of the other Dasein – and not in the other’s ‘worldly’ mode of being. Thus in noting the fact that “hearing the call depends
on the very abilities it is supposed to constitute” (Kukla 16), one can conclude that the
temporality of the call

...cannot be that of placement within chronological succession, since as an
ontological moment it comes ‘before’ events that are chronologically earlier than it. It is this sort of consideration...that led Heidegger to insist upon the non-
primordiality of chronological time (Kukla 17-18).

Sources of this primordial claim must therefore be irreducible to the innerworldly,
intratemporal dimension. As Heidegger notes in The Essence of Human Freedom, the
reality of a natural thing has its ‘what-content’ “in the actual objects of spatio-temporal
experience” (EHF 185). Since freedom is not like this, but is nevertheless still a fact,

the reality of freedom must be capable of intuitive presentation in a mode other
than that applicable for natural things. The reality of freedom requires another
kind of actuality than that exhibited by natural objects, i.e. the reality of freedom is not an objective reality (EHF 185).

Since other Dasein meet this criterion, it is not only my own voice of conscience that can
be a source of such ‘extratemporal’ and ‘otherworldly’ calling claims. In being called by
the other, I am also called with such a voice. Heidegger makes room for this possibility
because of his emphasis on hearing as the discursive manner in which conscience
summons and provokes in Dasein an understanding of its way of being. The very same
structure characterizing openness to my own call of conscience is what characterizes the
most essential openness to the other Dasein:

Listening to...is the existential being-open of Da-sein as being-with for the other.
Hearing even constitutes the primary and authentic openness of Da-sein for its
ownmost possibility of being, as in hearing the voice of the friend whom every
Da-sein carries with it (BT 163/153).

The implication here is that Dasein’s responsiveness to its own potentiality of being is
primarily constituted through the very same receptive moment of discourse that discloses
Dasein’s essential being-with others.
This mention of 'the voice of the friend whom every Da-sein carries with it' brings to mind current discussions of the 'internal' self-relational dimension of ethics as a type of 'internalized other'. Such concerns led Levinas to query, for example, whether the self-calling nature of conscience is — qua discourse — derivative of other-calling: i.e., discursive being-with:

...one must ask if this very discourse, despite its allegedly interior scissions, does not already rest on a prior sociality with the Other where the interlocutors are distinct. It is necessary to ask if this forgotten but effective sociality is not nonetheless presupposed by the rupture, however provisional, between self and self, for the interior dialogue to still deserve the name dialogue ("DR," 102).  

The question of whether conscience is derivative of 'conscience' or whether the self-oriented and the social modes of authentic discourse are equiprimordial cannot be further addressed here; nevertheless there is certainly a case to be made for the former interpretation, despite the decidedly 'Levinasian' slant that this would give Heidegger. If we recall that discourse is the mode of disclosure belonging essentially to being-with, however, this interpretation does not seem so foreign:

This capacity to listen to the other with whom one is, or to oneself who one is in the mode of discoursing, where it is not at all a matter of utterance in the sense of external speaking, is grounded in the structure of being of the original being-with-one-another (HCT 266).

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26 See, for example, Paul Ricoeur's Oneself as Another, and James Mensch's Ethics and Selfhood.  
27 See also Simon Critchley: "On my picture, conscience would be the ontic testimony of a certain splitting of the self in relation to a Faktum that it cannot assimilate, the lifeless material thing that the self carries within itself and which denies it from being fully itself. It is this failure of autarky that makes the self relational. The call of conscience is a voice within me whose source is not myself, but is the other's voice that calls me to responsibility. In other words, ethical relationality is only achieved by being inauthentic, that is, in recognizing that I am not the conscience of others, but rather that it is those others who call me to have a conscience" (2002, 173).
Silence

If the other is to act as the call of conscience for me, they must trigger this other hearing, and they must call in a mode that is other than worldly, intratemporal modes of discourse; their call cannot take the form of ordinary calling. Instead it must “call silently, unambiguously, with no foothold for curiosity” (BT 272/251). It is for this reason that Heidegger analyzes the essential possibility of discourse correlating to authentic hearing: keeping silent. This is a form of communicating, he argues, that is not an ‘external speaking,’ but which can nevertheless ‘let something be understood’ by the other person (BT 164/154). Despite its silence, such a call “loses nothing of its perceptability” (BT 273/252). This perceptible yet silent ‘something’ that I let the other understand, Heidegger claims, “makes manifest and puts down ‘idle talk’” (BT 164/154).

What is this ‘something’ that can only be understood outside the domain of idle talk? According to Heidegger, keeping silent implies that Dasein is in “command of an authentic and rich disclosedness of itself” (BT 165/154). One can conclude, then, that in such communicative keeping silent, what I give the other to understand is Dasein-being and the potentiality of authentic existing implied therein – certainly topics outside the domain of idle talk. Thus Heidegger goes on to say that ‘keeping silent’ implies that Dasein has something to say but refrains from doing so, and that this reticence “articulates the intelligibility of Da-sein so primordially that it gives rise to a genuine potentiality for hearing and to a being-with-one-another that is transparent” (BT 165/164).

This primordial articulation, this ‘silent communication’ that grants transparency, is a

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28 As Crowell notes of the hearing that corresponds to this silent ‘perceptability’: “The word he uses here is Vernehmlichkeit. To perceive in this way – vernehmen – is indeed to hear, but it is a hearing whose acoustic dimension is subordinated to a responsiveness to meaning”, (‘Subjectivity: Locating the First-Person in Being and Time.” Inquiry, Vol. 44 (2001) 433-54., p. 445).
clear echo of the structures of conscience – but in these passages the indication is that such a silent communication is possible not only between my authentic and inauthentic ‘selves’ but between my authentic self and another Dasein.

Indeed, by claiming that it ‘gives rise to a genuine potentiality for hearing’ – a genuine hearing that, being authentic, I myself have supposedly already achieved – Heidegger clearly indicates that authentic Dasein has the capacity to ‘awaken’ this potentiality in other, inauthentic Dasein. The capacity to engage in such a mode of silent, yet communicative – *shared* – discourse is the essence of the discursive nature of the call of conscience, which establishes the authentic mode of being-with that Heidegger terms ‘leaping-ahead’.

Before we can turn to the final section of this discussion – in which we will articulate the implications of these analyses for understanding leaping-ahead more concretely – we must face two final objections arising from the fact that Heidegger and most interpreters insist that only previously *authentic* Dasein can act as the call of conscience that establishes the authentic Dasein-to-Dasein relationship. First, if a prior authentic resoluteness is required for leaping-ahead, it seems that such authentic being-with will not only be extremely rare, but it will only take the form of refusing to treat the other in terms of thing-appropriate categories. Many commentators argue that insofar as authenticity is inherently isolating, it cannot account for the entire range of human relationships that we hope to encompass within the leaping-in/leaping-ahead continuum, such as love and justice. Thus Theunissen notes, for example, that from a positive standpoint, that such a ‘letting of the other be,’ “stands for the recognition of the ownmost being of Others, [but] is, from a negative standpoint, the dissolution of all direct

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29 See, for example, Frie, 80-82.
connection between Others and me. Others can only be freed \textit{for themselves} inasmuch as they are freed \textit{from me} (191). Dan Zahavi takes a similar stance when he claims that this ‘helping’ the other to authenticity – which appears to characterize the authentic relationship for Heidegger,

\ldots is a merely negative kind of help. I cannot individualize the other; I can only help the other by not confirming the other in his inauthentic existence. Thus at best, the only way I can help is by \textit{not} taking the other’s care away from him, but simply leaving the other in his own potentiality-of-being (SuZ 298). It is therefore not at all the case that genuine being-with-one-another as such could somehow help the Da-sein who is living in everydayness make the transition to a genuine relation to being: Da-sein cannot profit \textit{positively} from being in some specific relation to me; it must attain its authentic self non-relationally (2001b, 135).

On these interpretations, leaping-ahead can only be described as a \textit{lack of interference}, and the extremes of the \textit{Fü尔斯orge} continuum would therefore be meddling interference and respectful distance. Loving justice and passionate concern do not appear to be described in such a picture.

As I have already shown, however, authenticity does not destroy or prevent Dasein-to-Dasein encounter; it merely calls its innerworldly and intratemporal forms of expression into question. And as we will see in the final section, Heidegger’s use of ‘hearing’ and ‘keeping silent’ – the non-worldly and temporalizing modes of authentic Dasein-to-Dasein encounter – can indeed provide an account of the most positive forms of human togetherness. Before doing so, however, we must first respond to the accusation that Heidegger’s position is profoundly \textit{contradictory} insofar as the call of conscience requires a prior authenticity; this requirement means that it assumes the very authenticity that the other’s calling is supposed to help me accomplish. “If Da-sein is first free for the Thou by individualization, how can this authentic relation to the other be
the very relation that helps Da-sein become individualized? (Zahavi 2001b, 135). By reversing the terms of the statement that authentic Dasein can act as the call of conscience for another, however, we see that a prior authenticity cannot be the case for both parties. Though the one calling may require a prior authentic understanding of Dasein’s way of being in order to communicate this to another Dasein, the one being called by the other’s conscience-like summons cannot already be authentic or the other’s communication could not act as call; the idle chatter of das Man would already have been interrupted, another hearing would already be in place. Zahavi himself notes that:

The contradiction disappears, however, when one sees that for Heidegger, authentic being-with-one-another is not a reciprocal relation. If I am already individualized, I can help the other to confront himself with his own possibilities of being (2001b, 135).

Though Zahavi concludes that this ‘help’ is not much help at all, he recognizes, at the least, that the relationship of caller and called is a complex one in which genuine concernful being-with is not simply a derivative of a prior authenticity on the part of both Dasein. The recipient of the call clearly cannot be in a prior state of authentic resoluteness if the disruptive, disclosive nature of the call is to succeed in interrupting the fallen modes of Dasein interpretation. In this sense, at least one of the parties first has the possibility of authenticity communicated to her through this relationship.

Indeed, I would even argue that calling the other in the voice of conscience need not always require that Dasein achieve a prior authentic resoluteness. The reason for this lies in the very same lack of reciprocity or exact symmetry defining the relationship. Namely, the weight of responsibility for my own being tends to provoke the fall toward self-misunderstanding and inauthenticity, but when it is the other’s way of being that I come to understand in all its temporalizing having to be, this anxiety-inducing dimension
of self-responsibility is not so pressing. I may be able to see more clearly in the other
what I cannot or will not recognize in myself. Indeed, I believe that the authentic
relationships that are established on such a basis can act as a type of feedback loop in
which Dasein help each other toward greater self-understanding. Indeed, it is for this
reason that we can argue that the authentic Dasein-to-Dasein relationship need not be
such a rare thing, since it does not require a prior authenticity in at least one of the
parties, and it may not require it in either. By examining how this notion of ‘calling the
other’ can allow us to understand the authentic leaping-ahead relationship that it
establishes in terms of the most positive modes of human interaction, we may be able to
support these claims more fully.

Love, Justice and Giving the Other Time

In order to demonstrate that the most positive human relationships are
encompassed within Heidegger’s notion of a ‘leaping-ahead’ that frees the other and the
call of conscience that is its voice, we must note that, despite the scarcity of the text
available in which Heidegger explicitly addresses these themes, he is characterizing a
type of relationship in which one person takes the growth and well-being of the other as
its guiding principle, which means “helping to bring it [another Dasein] to itself” (FCM
202). Recall that in What is Called Thinking, Heidegger defines ‘calling’ in terms of an
‘anticipatory reaching out’ that brings together and establishes a relationship in which the
relationship of caller and called is “to commend, entrust, give into safekeeping, to
shelter” (WCT 387).
Such a description of the Dasein-to-Dasein relationship that is established when I act as the call of conscience for the other does not imply a respectful distance – simply leaving the other alone – but characterizes a type of nurturing concern. This is supported by Heidegger’s analysis of what it means to ‘free’ someone in *Building, Dwelling, Thinking*:

To free actually means to spare. The sparing itself consists not only in the fact that we do not harm the one whom we spare. Real sparing is something *positive* and takes place when we leave something beforehand in its own essence, when we return it specifically to its essential being, when we ‘free’ it in the proper sense of the word into a preserve of peace\(^{30}\).

Such a relationship, in which one’s behavior toward the other is oriented toward a positive nurturing that returns the other to peace in its “essential being,” characterizes all of our most positive modes of human interaction. Though such language seems somewhat schematic and abstract when we realize that Heidegger is essentially talking about *loving concern*, this is indeed what he is talking about:

To embrace a ‘thing’ or a ‘person’ in its essence means to love it, to favor it. Though in a more original way such favoring [*Möglen*] means to bestow essence as a gift. Such favoring is the proper essence of enabling, which not only can achieve this or that but also can let something essentially unfold in its provenance, that is, let it be (*LH* 220).

Heidegger’s talk here of ‘enabling,’ and ‘letting be’ invokes the same middle-voiced structures that we have seen throughout. In this case, however, we can note their explicitly ethical implications: if the other that I seek to protect and nurture is defined in her very being by an ecstatic openness and incompleteness, respecting her essence will require me to give her the necessary space and time in which to realize it herself. For Heidegger, freeing beings for their own possibility means that the “character of

possibility always corresponds to the kind of being of the beings understood” (BT 149/139). The character of possibility pertaining to the other Dasein is one of temporalizing mineness expressing its being-in-the-world. To correspond to this character of possibility demands a nurturing heedfulness that not only permits but enables the other to pursue his own care.

Kenneth Gallagher better articulates this conception of love in “Intersubjective Knowledge,” where he argues that “My love calls forth the being of the other” (393). Love is essentially a call to the other’s inner potential to be herself – a self that I have put myself in the service of evoking. In the relationship between the lover and the beloved,

He knows her in a manner that only one who loves her can know her. For her ‘being’ or her ‘person’ is not an already realized objective reality viewed by him from a more advantageous perspective: it is a creative category. The boy’s love is the creative invocation of her being: it is a participation in the mystery of her uniqueness (392).

Such a creative invocation is the essence of what Heidegger means by leaping-ahead – a summoning of the other’s being in its wholeness that is given voice in conscience and articulated in behaviors that instantiate this being-in-service to the other.

An example will help us illustrate the manner in which everyday behaviors can manifest this mode of Fürsorge in which I act as a summons to the other to live fully into his being. My nephew and I are going to go to the park. He is just learning how to tie his shoes, and as I watch him struggle with the task, I find myself increasingly motivated to take the thick awkward laces from his little hands and do it myself – it is getting dark, I must be back to make dinner, and indeed he very much wants me to do it for him. The goal – having tied laces – may be more important, I think, than dedicating the time to enabling the boy to master the activity of lace-tying. But as I watch him struggle, I

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admire his sheer will to achieve this ability in spite of continued frustrating setbacks, and I restrain myself from taking this opportunity to practice from him. I even resist the immediacy of his desire that I do it for him, because I recognize – and desire to nurture – his existence in its wholeness. I do not leap in and take over this careful struggle to be from him – I hold myself back in a type of restraint that is nevertheless characterized by a hovering attentiveness, a silent co-willing, an expressive encouragement and recognition of his struggle. Such a restraint cannot be adequately described as simply freeing the other from my interference, as Zahavi and Theunissen suggest. A genuinely patient orientation toward another person does involve a type of ‘holding oneself back,’ but it is by no means easy or indifferent – patience can be an incredible effort in the service of the other that nevertheless fails to make much of a ‘worldly’ appearance. It is, for the most part, a silent communication.

In such an everyday example of patience one can see a stance toward the other that recognizes the achievement of the ability as more important than the goal itself. In such a stance one is oriented toward the successful expression of the other’s being in its complex temporal entirety – not just now, but in all future lace-tying. Though such a situation could be described as a simple case of one of my desires overriding another – for my nephew to practice shoe-tying rather than for the shoe to be tied as quickly as possible – the orientation at work in this overriding is profoundly other-directed. In the case of the latter desire – that the shoe be tied immediately – I am interested in accomplishing some particular goal as a step toward achieving a situation I desire: going to the park. In the former case, however, though my desire includes an interest in accomplishing the tied shoe so we can go to the park, my intention is directed primarily
toward the *other* person’s achieving of this goal. Though both desires are aimed at the same end result, in the case of patient leaping-ahead, I fundamentally alter or qualify this desire such that it is only genuinely satisfied if the *other* person is the one who has brought it about. In this sense my guiding principle is the other person’s ability to be as such.

This accounts for the fact that we can, for the most part, tell the difference between the person who is being genuinely patient, and the person who is merely tolerating us. Though the external behavior may be virtually indistinguishable between the two, I can sense on some implicit ‘Dasein-to-Dasein’ level whether the other is silently sharing an orientation to my task and its purpose, or if she has simply removed herself mentally so as not to interfere with the situation. From a third-person perspective the ‘worldly’ manifestations of this difference will often be extremely hard to distinguish, but the recipient of patience will not find it so: the silent, summoning communication that characterizes leaping-ahead can be heard by the one who receives it.

The profoundly temporal aspect of the leaping-ahead relationship is also obvious in patience: the patient person says ‘take your time’ – a curious expression in itself – but one that clearly indicates the type of explicit recognition and accommodation of the other’s temporalizing having to be that characterizes this pole of the Fürsorge continuum. Thus Heidegger notes that in such a stance, “when Dasein places itself in the reticence of carrying things through, its time is different. Publicly regarded, its time is essentially slower than the time of idle talk, which ‘lives faster’” (*HCT* 279). The impatient person, on the contrary, feels that the other person is ‘taking too much time’ – an expression that indicates a desire not to have to deal with the fact that I am always already in a situation
of accommodating the temporalizing of the others. Underlying the impatient desire seems to be the belief that the time required for you to express your being in the world is taking time from the expression of mine.

Indeed, this idea of ‘giving the other her time’ is profoundly related to how Heidegger defines justice in his reflections on the Anaximander Fragments. The famous fragment, which reads: “Whence things have their coming into being there they must also perish according to necessity; for they must pay a penalty and be judged for their injustice, according to the ordinance of time”\(^{32}\) is interpreted by Heidegger as indicating a type of deep relationship between temporality and justice. In his analysis of this text, Heidegger wonders “How is it that what presences, staying, stands in injustice [ἀ-ὁξία]? What is unjust about the thing that presences? Does it not have the right to stay awhile, from time to time, and so fulfill its presencing?” (“AS,” 267).

The conclusion he reaches is not that temporalizing expression into the now – or ‘presencing’ – is itself unjust, but that in certain modes of presencing things are out of joint, not right, unjust. “What presences is what stays awhile,” Heidegger claims, and “The while presences as the transitional arrival in departure. It presences between coming hither and going away. Between this twofold absence presences the presencing of all that stays” (“AS,” 267). As we have seen, this jeweiligkeit that is the essence of Dasein’s being is defined by presence and absence; its temporalizing is ecstatic and fundamentally related to otherness. Here Heidegger refers to it as ‘jointed.’ The ‘disjointure,’ by which he refers to the fundamentally temporal structure of injustice, arises from the fact that Dasein can seek to resist or subvert its fundamental structures of

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ecstatic relationality in order to maintain itself in a type of constant presence: "What has arrived may even insist on its while, solely to remain more present" ("AS," 267). Dasein tries to insist on "pure persistence in duration" as Reiner Schürman puts it:

The 'unjust' entity disjoints itself from the finite flow of absencing-presencing-absencing and 'holds fast to the assertion of its stay.' The present insists on its presence, consolidates it, persists against absence...This essence of the will by which it is set on constant presence stands in agreement with conceptual, i.e., 'grasping' thought...It is that force which seeks to establish the self as permanent and time as lasting.\textsuperscript{33}

This grasping refusal to recognize the ecstatic finitude of temporality – by refusing to acknowledge its passage or the others with whom it is shared – is the fundamental root of all injustice. Injustice is, for Heidegger, insisting on my time – my now – and refusing to heed the coming to presence of anyone or anything else. According to Heidegger, this attempt to maintain oneself unjustly in presence – usually at the cost of others – primarily takes the form of falling into interpretative stances that use temporal categories appropriate to things. In doing so, Dasein can believe itself to exist in time the way a stone sits in a field – fundamentally unchanging and independent of that which surrounds it. Thus Kisiel notes how Heidegger characterizes "'falling' as the drag of substantive fixity characterizing possession, the reifying tendency wanting to maintain the constancy of presence" (407).

Despite the schematic language, we can recognize how such a stance can be the essence of all human injustice. Indeed, talk of going to any means to "try to prolong and solidify its stay; having arrived into presence, it can insist on its presentness"\textsuperscript{34} brings nothing to mind so much as a corrupt incumbent politician. Though completely refusing

\textsuperscript{34} Fred Dallmayr. The Other Heidegger. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993., p. 122.
presence to others is in principle impossible, injustice is the attempt to do so – generally by denying them social or physical modes of manifestation, by leaping-in and taking their projects and opportunities for care from them. Justice is, on the other hand, the stance in which I share presence with the other. In its more extreme forms, such a ‘leaping-ahead’ can take the form of a love in which I not only share presence with the other, but encourage him to ‘take his time,’ granting him presence at the expense of my own. In this mode of Fürsorge, I offer the other my care and silently summon him toward a greater self-flourishing.
CONCLUSION

By reformulating traditional concepts of subjectivity in terms of temporalizing, caring, being-in-the-world, Heidegger grants a central position to the social dimension of existence. Though many have been initially drawn to this new understanding of human being, Heidegger’s lack of an articulated account of this social dimension of the self – and the seemingly problematic form it would have to take as a result of this reformulation – has been off-putting for many. In this work I have shown, on the contrary, that one can accept Heidegger’s account of selfhood without being committed to the negative social ontology that is often deemed to be its direct consequence. Though Heidegger himself did not develop a detailed theory of intersubjectivity to correspond with his new understanding of subjectivity, he clearly provides the resources with which to do so, and indicates the direction in which this development must occur. Using these resources and following these indications, my project has been to provide a Heideggerian account of intersubjectivity that is most consistent with Heidegger’s texts, with his general project, and with the social ‘things themselves’. In doing so, it has become evident that a much more complex position must be attributed to Heidegger’s account than is generally recognized.

Developing a Heideggerian theory of intersubjectivity required us to directly respond to the long-standing critique of Heidegger’s notion of Mitsein. This criticism – first given voice in Sartre’s Being and Nothingness – argued that Heidegger simply stipulates ‘being-with’ as an a priori category of Dasein’s being, a category which – due
to its categorial status – cannot provide for immediately experiencing others in their concrete particularity because they are always simply interchangeable tokens whose uniqueness is subsumed under the generality of the established category.

In order to demonstrate that Heidegger is *not* committed to such a picture of intersubjectivity, it was necessary to first indicate how it is possible to understand Dasein as an individual self, despite the fact that definitions in terms of substance are no longer available to Heidegger, and in the face of the fact that he seemed to characterize our everyday way of being in terms of a kind of selflessness. Though Heidegger scholarship tends to interpret the possibility of Dasein’s individuation solely in terms of achieving authenticity, I have shown that such a position is both unnecessary and untenable. Dasein’s individual, first-person selfhood is always already its way of being – even when it is *inauthentic* – and this is the meaning of the existential *mineness* that Heidegger emphasizes throughout. Despite its inauthentic tendencies, then, Dasein is always already a self individuated by its existential commitment to its having to be.

In determining how I can encounter *other* such selves, it was necessary to 1.) examine being-with in terms of how Heidegger understands the status of the *a priori* in general, and 2.) analyze the implications of this understanding for characterizing Dasein-to-Dasein encounters. My argument proceeded by showing that the existential analytic follows Husserl in its phenomenological approach to the *a priori* as responsive to particular encounters in concrete existence. I further demonstrated that Heidegger also maintains a Kantian approach, however, insofar as these *existentials* are all a type of responsiveness to *temporal* intuition, which provides the horizon within which all category-initiating and enriching encounters may occur.
This temporal responsiveness of Dasein’s being was worked out in detail in Chapter V, where I showed that the temporality of being-with occurs most fundamentally in the transition from originary to world time, wherein Dasein speaks itself out into a time that it heedfully shares with the others. All of the structures of temporalizing – spannedness, datability, publicity and significance – are defined by this transcending that establishes and maintains Dasein’s relation with otherness. In publicity and significance, this relation takes the form of an accommodation of the other’s temporalizing expression through the establishment of common meanings and measures. In this discussion it became evident that the most fundamental level of intersubjective encounter is unmediated by worldly categories because it is through such encounters that the standards of significance and measure characterizing world are first constituted.

Like the other existentials, Being-with is responsive to temporal intuition; in the case of Being-with, intuition does not give intratemporal things, but announces the presence of ‘foreign’ originary temporalities – other Dasein. And because this originary temporality is the fundamental expression of the other’s concrete care-defined way of being, such encounters are not characterized by categorial anonymity but direct particularity. Though Dasein generally experiences other Dasein in terms of shared innerworldly and ‘intratemporal’ roles and meanings, then, the other Dasein’s responsive commitment to these worldly norms bespeaks the fundamental jemeinigkeit of another self. In the encounter with the other’s commitment to his own existence I encounter him in his concrete individuality.

This recognition of the other can be forgotten or concealed to varying degrees, but it is never entirely absent. Despite the false self- and other-interpretations with which
Dasein may operate, it nevertheless continues to be characterized by the temporalizing structures that define its selfhood and necessitate the implicit acknowledgement of the other qua Dasein. Even when I ‘leap in’ and take over the other’s ‘care,’ I must encounter him as a being defined by it, though this acknowledgement occasionally occurs in such a way that simultaneously obfuscates or even destroys this way of being.

Though Heidegger recognizes this possibility of refusing to behave in a manner consistent with the ontological status of the other Dasein co-constituting the world, failing to meet this norm of appropriateness specific to our being-toward others does not undermine the recognition of the other underlying it. In this sense, the ethical resources that Heidegger’s fundamental ontology offers are not Platonic in bent; to know the good does not guarantee its performance – to encounter the other as Dasein does not ensure that one will act consistently with this acknowledgement. Though Dasein’s care for who it is to be propels it to act appropriately in light of the basic standards – both ontic and ontological – against which it can measure its success in being, the anxiety produced by this responsibility can also have the opposite effect – it seeks to flee understanding of its way of being. The possibility of the opposing, authentic stance – in which I acknowledge my way of being and explicitly take responsibility for it as such – is revealed in each of the modes of disclosure specific to authenticity. It is the call of conscience, however, that it takes the form of an enabling summons. This calling is not only a self-calling, but can also occur between Dasein in such a way that one helps another resist the tendency to avoid responsibility for its existence. This calling of the other involves granting her the time and meaningful space in which to live more fully into her being, demanding that I resist the unjust tendency to insist on my own constant presence. Understood as such, we
can recognize how – despite typical interpretations to the contrary – a Heideggerian account of intersubjectivity can indeed accommodate the entire range of human relationships, from murderous to loving.

There are, of course, many questions that remain. The role of the body is an obvious absence in Heidegger’s work and one that I could not address here. A further concern relates to the status of my desire to succeed at having to be – the desire underlying the sense of appropriateness that makes Dasein a norm-following being in everydayness, and an authentic being in the face of the ontological inconsistencies of inauthenticity. Is this desire for consistency simply a derivative of the desire to succeed in being – and therefore a type of variation on Spinoza’s conatus? The implication of such a conclusion would be that my heedfulness of the others – my desire to treat them appropriately and thus not as worldly things – would therefore be derivative of my overarching desire to succeed in my own being. Such an interpretation would be more in keeping with most Heidegger interpretations. I hope to have shown, however, that despite the questions that may remain, reaching this traditional conclusion requires one to oversimplify and ignore a great deal of what Heidegger has to say. Insofar as the other is present as a partner on the most basic levels of temporalizing worldliness – and can act as a summons to my desire and ability for self-awareness and consistency – the other’s claim that I heed her temporalizing presence appears to be at least equiprimordial with Dasein’s care for its own appropriateness in being. Ultimately, I think that Heidegger’s reference to the joy that one can feel in accomplishing a connection with another person points to the profound fact that the desire for a genuine ‘being-with’ others just is definitive of our existence. This, indeed, is the heart of what it means to be a thrown being-in-the-world –
simply put, the world matters to me because I am a creature for whom things can matter, a mattering that does not arise from me choosing that they do, but comes from my responsiveness to the ways in which I am solicited and summoned. And in the case of the other persons with whom I constitute the temporal landscape of the innerworldly, these summons matter to me very much indeed.
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