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PRESENCE IN THE WORK:
BAROQUE AESTHETIC & ITS 20TH-CENTURY RETURN
IN FRENCH THOUGHT, ARTS & LETTERS

Volume I: Religion

by

ELIZABETH SCALI PEASE

A THESIS SUBMITTED
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
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ABSTRACT

PRESENCE IN THE WORK:
BAROQUE AESTHETIC & ITS 20TH-CENTURY RETURN
IN FRENCH THOUGHT, ARTS & LETTERS

by

Elizabeth Scali Pease

Movement, change, inconstancy; sinuous line, saturated space, elliptical, open forms; elaborate metaphor, narrative dislocation, excessive affectivity — this familiar topology of the Baroque work all serves to disorient and seduce its reader, beholder and spectator, eventually absorbing him as living presence in the work. In contrast with the perfected distance of Renaissance/Classical constructions, epitomized philosophically by René Descartes (+1596,-1650), such Baroque absorption of spectatorial presence plays out its tension best in French culture. Prior to the French Classicism and Philosophical Modernity which served to suppress it, a 20th-century return within the Postmodern reactions against the rational legacy is made by the Baroque in its concern with presence.

Our analyses situate various facets of Baroque presence in the work, in both its historical period and beyond, through the disciplines of Religion, Philosophy, the Arts and Letters. An initial study of St. Ignatius of Loyola’s Spiritual Exercises (1548) examines the positional evolution of the spiritual exercitant, from a subject before, to a subject within and, finally, to an ambulating Homo Baroccus of the Gospel narrative, or in a passage from perspective to transjective’s double stance of Immensity (being-in) and Inhabitation (possession by). These stages of the Baroque subject exercised through the open Baroque work serve to guide the following cross-
century analyses: from Descartes' distance to the philosophical proximities of Pierre Gassendi, Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty; from transgressed boundaries of the art work in the Baroque painting of Simon Vouet and Eustache Le Sueur to the metacritical treatment of pictorial framing by René Magritte; in actorial/spectatorial transgression from Baroque theater of martyrdom to "Theater of Cruelty"; in figures of sacrificial madness from Jean-Joseph Surin to Antonin Artaud; from the soldier's epic war narrative of Agrippa d'Aubigné to 20th-century post-war narratives of Blaise Cendrars and Claude Simon. Here, presence -- problematic, painful, and even comic -- fills the work, draws others into its ethos, in a way that allows us to qualify these works of the 16th, 17th and 20th centuries as exemplary of Baroque presence and its Postmodern return in French culture.
This work is dedicated to my beloved husband,

Dr. Andrew J. Pease,

and to the marvel in our lives, our newborn son

John William
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PRESENCE IN THE WORK:
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The first point is to see the persons [...] I will make myself a poor and unworthy slave looking upon them, contemplating them and ministering to their needs, as though I were present there.  
St. Ignatius of Loyola, Spiritual Exercises

INTRODUCTION: THE BAROQUE AND ITS AESTHETIC -- CORPORALITY, AFFECTIVITY, PRESENCE

Metamorphosis and inconstancy; illusion and precarity; life and death of the body as a moving spectacle of passion and exaltation, of abjection and horror, of ascension and ecstasy; that is, extreme, improper affectivity or a sensual mysticism; massively-scaled, slow and forcefully building ostentatious representation, architecture and sumptuous display magnificently shaped into sinuous line and elongated elliptical

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form, mysteriously lit from within the darkness, to echo the newly-shaken universe,\footnote{In reflection of the Copernican and Keplerian astronomical revolutions, and Giordano Bruno’s concept of the infinite universe.} and to celebrate the Divine Right of the monarch as well; forms in torsion about absence and the unknown, inviting of presence to overwhelm and draw us into their infinity and distant light, already saturated with such presences; unpredictability in excess of full comprehension; irregularity in intuition of the chaotic referent; richness of precious materials and color where art is "dépense improductive,"\footnote{This is George Bataille’s terminology, in \textit{La Part maudite. Précéde de La Notion de dépense} (Paris: Minuit, 1967).} the saturation of space to distort and fold up linear time; multi-polar, decentered representation, dynamic and open in form, and working as an organic whole constructed beyond the stasis of perspectival code; elaborate, twisted metaphor traversing uncommon distance; narrative dislocation, imbrication, and excess; representation and language as seduction, surprise, delight and marvel for the senses of an inebriated, passively impassioned spectator -- all of this in a fusion of the arts of architecture, sculpture and painting, which provide a theater to the arts of prayer and contemplation, poetry and narrative, and personal testament, intended to disanchor the spectator/adresssee as wondrously lost in the new universe and distance to God, and absorb him as \textit{living presence} into the representation. For the Baroque work is never one which encourages serene contemplation, but rather an active, agitated participation on the part of the spectator. These are the topological and thematic elements which make up the Baroque. Here the Humanist/Modern subject finds itself bewildered and
threatened, ill at ease or perhaps refreshingly moved outside of himself — metaphorically as well as physically moved; that is, mentally and emotionally affected. Baroque aesthetic, which lasted in France from approximately 1580 to 1670,⁴ problematizes existence with its many elements whose main objective is to capture and house ephemeral, in-process and becoming — even if often weightily-portrayed — corporeal presence. That is, to capture and house presentation in representation as disclosure, sensual presence, incarnate being or resurrected body. And ultimately, in a grand inversion, to harbor representation within corporeal presence.

*

Before continuing with our perspective on Baroque aesthetic, it would be appropriate to review the concept of the Baroque as it appears in various disciplinary, historical, and critical treatments, as well as the core books on the Baroque as a returning 20th-century phenomenon.⁵

The term "baroque" was not applied to the period during its historical time, and was used perjoratively later, taken from the Portuguese jeweller’s vocabulary, as of 1531, for designating the novelty of an irregular pearl, imported from the Americas. It also designates the reasoning of the fourth mode of the second figure in

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⁴ Some estimates date as early as 1540 and prolong the Baroque to the end of the 17th century.

⁵ We shall indicate here the authors and titles of the books reviewed, and refer the reader to the second segment of our bibliography entitled “The Baroque” for full citations.
the Scholastic nomenclature of syllogisms,⁶ considered perjoratively as a pedantic sophistry in the 17th century. It is found in the French Le Dictionnaire de l'Académie, since 1694, and in the figurative sense since 1740. Victor-L. Tapié traces the literal sense back to Furetière's 1690 dictionary. "Baroque" in its figurative sense thus designated art forms which departed from the Renaissance/Classical norm, and which were considered bizarre and ridiculous. According to Germain Bazin, in Baroque and Rococo Art, Baroque artists of the period were not necessarily conscientious about adopting a "Baroque" style, and felt themselves to be respectful of Antiquity and not to have developed any new rules, so a certain bipolarity holds for many French works of the art of the 17th century, as many readers of the Baroque shall confirm, and as we shall see in more detail with the painting of Eustache Le Sueur in particular. These artists did, however, know themselves to work in the "Roman style"; for example, Simon Vouet initially painted in the style of Caravaggio. As pluridisciplinary studies of the period have come to light, the term is used today in an epistemological sense which colors all aspects of the culture, indicates the historical period, and is in fact a vision of the world and of life. But even at the beginning of this very century, "Baroque" style was hardly spoken of.

As an historical period, the Baroque is outlined by the schism of the Protestant Reform and the Catholic reaction, reform, or "Counter-Reformation" as detailed by the Council of Trent, and this schism is brought into vivid relief in France by the bloody wars of religion, from 1560 to 1610. Although not exclusively so, many of

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its aesthetic expressions and structures came out of this new era, which demanded a new sensibility to which the Renaissance style could no longer reply for both Catholics and Protestants alike. Its aesthetic presents a softening and voluptuousness in comparison with the forms of the Renaissance, as if to gather the people in a maternal bosom which was being torn asunder elsewhere, as is expressed so vividly in the imagery of Agrippa d’Aubigné’s *Les Tragiquest*. As an historical period outlined by religious schism, it has its political dimension as well as its geographical contours beyond national borders, in the works and tensions between kings, nations, and religious and secular empire. The situation of France, torn between Protestant and Catholic wills during the wars of religion, torn between the confirmation of its own nationhood and the monarchy, and its allegiance to the Roman pope, is a most interesting terrain for this study. The resulting cultural production can in one light be characterized in schismatic categories, and does not fail to be elaborated in the many religious Orders established during the Counter-Reformation, and their hold on cultural production and visions of Spirituality, from the obvious Jesuit and Jansenist opposition, and their concomittant religious philosophies.\(^7\) Thus the first two volumes of our work herein are devoted to studies in Religion and Philosophy.

The Baroque historical period has its cultural production and aesthetic works, much of which is a European phenomenon adopted for a time in France as well, as

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\(^7\) Yet, for example, we cannot simplistically equate Jesuit architecture and style with that of the Baroque, for the Jesuits were fascinated with the panoply from perspectivism and beyond. One example is the construction of Rome’s "Il Gesù", anchored in a former architectural style yet decorated and painted in the Baroque style, and as the stages of our following analysis of the *Spiritual Exercises* in pictorial terms shall show as well.
we shall argue, lingering longer and rearing its head more frequently than the narrative of French Classicism — educational as well as cultural and national — would have it. Pierre Charpentrat, in *Le Mirage Baroque*, concludes:

Après avoir opposé violemment *baroque* et *classicisme*, voici que l'on tend, en France, à établir entre eux des liens organiques, sinon à les assimiler. «Le classicisme, court instant sur un fond de baroque durable», nous redisaït-on très récemment.8

Quite a statement which, although Charpentrat does not totally go along with it, stands nonetheless! Such a Baroque presence is visible in architecture, sculpture and painting, in literary production in poetry, theater and spectacle, all of which can have a strong rhetorical purpose that does not leave the spectator indifferent, unaffected or unmoved, nor as a mere cerebral presence, and which all remains as monuments to a certain exercise of power.

Such aesthetic production has its themes and motifs, which our opening statement has synthesized, and these in turn their structural implications, seen subjectively in a phenomenal capturing of and transformation or conversion of the subject as a carnal presence *within* the work, with correlations molded by aesthetic and literary production. In fact, the Baroque is initially made most precise through an aesthetic approach which privileges an architectural and spatial examination. Even Jean Rousset’s study of French Baroque literature begins and ends with the model of Roman Baroque architecture. Thus our final volume herein is devoted to studies in the Arts and Letters.

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Underlying these themes and motifs are questions we shall not fail to raise, about the subject’s alterity and status as *Homo Baroccus*, his experience of trauma, the iconophile exuberance which harbors the Baroque subject, the role of the feminine dimension in taking such a subjectival stance, and the question of history versus presence and futurality. These all concern the situation of the subject facing Baroque history, aesthetic and its return, as such a subject is reinforced again in the reawakened consciousness behind world events and the religious, philosophical and aesthetic production of our 20th century, with specific structural and phenomenological ramifications. A Structuralist and Phenomenological approach to the Baroque is little seen, for much of the existing critical work in the aesthetic and literary domains takes either an exhaustive or a selective thematic approach, and many analyses of the NeoBaroque in 20th-century works apply such thematic guidelines. This is the first contribution of our study, and one which the comparison with 20th-century works permits. The second contribution is the working and sampling analyses herein, which traverse and compare works across two separated historical periods -- the Baroque and the war-framed first half of the 20th-century -- to argue for a distinctive 20th-century Baroque return, and to nuance thereby the philosophical concept of the Postmodern.

Let us begin our review then — by no means exhaustive of the immense Baroque bibliography available, but certainly representative, and inclusive of the situation in France — with aesthetic studies which tend toward a thematic analysis and inventory. Such now-classic and representative analyses are extremely helpful. For
Emile Mâle, in *L'Art religieux de la fin du XVIe siècle, du XVIIe siècle et du XVIIIe siècle. Etude sur l'iconographie après le Concile de Trente: Italie-France-Espagne-Flandres*, and *L'Art religieux du XIIe au XVIIIe siècle*, Baroque art is a transnational, European phenomenon following the Council of Trent and the Catholic Church's reaction against specific iconoclast Protestant injunctions, with the real presence in the Eucharist (an emblem for the conceptual backbone to our study), the veneration of the Virgin, saints and martyrs, and the general usefulness of the religious image. Baroque art has served to specifically define and defend Catholic dogma, and it worked in hand with Theology as its propaganda, in a rechristianization of the aesthetic terrain which had been given over to paganism during the Renaissance. E.Mâle then goes on to emphasize such themes as vision, ecstasy, death, and the iconographic canon of figuring the Annunciation, the Nativity and the Flagellation of Christ, and repentance and death of the sinner, as well as a new-sprung devotion to the Guardian Angel. We shall, however, see that the Baroque does go beyond these initial Catholic, Tridentine associations.

Heinrich Wölfflin's now classical oppositions, in *Renaissance and Baroque*, distinguish the Renaissance style from the Baroque in the areas of the arts and particularly in architecture, based upon the major Baroque motifs of movement and massiveness. Where the Renaissance places emphasis upon line and design, the Baroque uses the "painterly" style to emphasize color, excess, movement, and light and shade. Where the Renaissance uses the flat plan, the Baroque uses spatial depth and softened shapes; where the Renaissance articulated the individual, self-contained
form and the closed frame, the Baroque presents an incomplete articulation of masses, the open form and the frame transgressed or burst asunder. This latter opposition fits well with the slender figure of light ease and grace of the Renaissance, versus the Herculean figure of solemn effort, darkness, grandeur and importance of the Baroque. Thus Renaissance unity is opposed to Baroque plurality; absolute clarity and reason is opposed to a relative measure of clarity; and proportional relationships (Leone Battista Alberti) are opposed to far-fetched relationships which are based upon a bravado confidence with the new fascination with geometry (Andrea Pozzo). These categorical distinctions are extremely helpful and, while they do hold, they tend to offer too much leeway in interpretation for a reading of a 20th-century NeoBaroque, which our own conceptual development and emphasis upon the absorption of the reader/spectator/addressee as real presence into the Baroque work shall restrain and more carefully define, particularly for the insertion of the NeoBaroque in a certain phase of Philosophical Postmodernity/Aesthetic Modernity. Wölfflin does, however, give the example of the shift, analogous to that of the astronomical revolution, from the symmetrical and round plan of the Renaissance church to the longitudinal plan of the Baroque. This elongation moves the churchgoer through the nave towards the absorbing light that filters down from the dome before and above him. Thus the architecture of the Baroque church becomes a kind of spiritual guide! We take this as an emblem for the Baroque work in general, religious or secular, as it seduces, moves and absorbs the excitant, reader or spectator into itself and as a real-measure confirmation of itself. Wölfflin does not, however, examine historical reasons for
why such a style should have evolved and shut out that of the Renaissance. His type of schematic oppositions, also practiced by James Lees-Milne, give rise to the kind of wide-open reading of Eugenio d'Ors, in *Du Baroque*, where the Classical and the Baroque are part of a perpetually recurring cycle which scands human history. Henri Focillon, in *La Vie des formes*, reads three stages in the evolution of each artistic style!, the third phase of which would be Baroque.\(^9\) While an interesting theory, this would too easily superimpose various stages of aesthetic periods, in our opinion. And while we would not contest such readings, we have preferred to examine the Baroque with a greater measure of nuance and specificity, particularly around the topic of presence, and the framing about Philosophical Modernity, as we shall illustrate. The Baroque is for us not only a style, but an ideological category,\(^10\) and a subjectival attitude, which makes for a certain kind of life in the world.

Germain Bazin, in *Baroque and Rococco Art*, examines the Baroque from country to country in the wealth of each nation's artistic production, to include the decorative arts. After a cursory review based upon Heinrich Wölflin's opposing categories of the distinctiveness of Baroque art in difference from the Classical, he goes on to review Baroque production by country, often contemporary to Classical impulses in art. He chronicles particularly a France of artisan production and the architecture of Versailles.

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\(^10\) R. Wellek himself concludes, "The most promising way of arriving at a more closely fitting description of the baroque is to aim at analyses which would correlate stylistic and ideological criteria". *Concepts of Criticism*, 108.
Bazin dismisses easily the contribution of Gian Lorenzo Bernini’s design to Louis XIV’s competition for the Louvre façade, however Victor L. Tapié, in *Baroque et Classicisme*, presents a more nuanced account, to see a transfer of the vision of Bernini’s rejected design to surface in the design of Versailles by the commissioned architects’ Charles LeBrun, Louis LeVau and Claude Perrault. Thus the Baroque flourished more in France and in this very hallmark edifice than is customarily acknowledged. V.-L. Tapié thus characterizes the French Baroque as a constant wavering, much in movement and as ephemeral as its own motifs. Yet he estimates that half of what was appreciated in France during the 17th century was indeed of Baroque style, as each style constantly betrayed the other, and thus provided a mutually-enlivening tension! Two other Baroque holds on French artistic production were the funeral pomp and provincial church retables, all cultivating of popular piety, with emphasis upon local saints, typical themes and dogma of the Trinity, the Redemption of man, scenes from the life of Christ, the Eucharist, the Ascension and the Assumption. Nonetheless, Tapié’s reading never resolves itself in a facile dichotomy of styles,

> Si bien que, dans un pays comme la France, ou il y a, à la fois catholicaisme et monarchie, régime seigneurial et monde rural, mais aussi bourgeoisie nombreuse et minorité protestante puissante, la solution ne pourra pas être simple.\(^{11}\)

The French need for logic and clarity, and the move towards positivism in the sciences, did nevertheless give way to Baroque splendor and mystery, particularly in situations of the pomp and circumstance of court pageantry. French Classicism, in

fact, can also be considered to arise out of, and chronologically after the French Baroque, whereas the early Renaissance style is seen to have decomposed into the Baroque.

In the literary domain, Jean Rousset's now classical studies on the Baroque in French literature also tend towards a thematic inventory. His *Anthologie de la poésie baroque française* gives an itinerary for the unstable work in the themes of inconstancy in both its light and dark aspects, metamorphosis and illusion, inconstant, chaotic and delightful forms such as clouds, soap bubbles and birds, the fascination with changing water and mirrors that turn the appearances and the real topsy-turvy, chiaroscuro play, and finally death as spectacle. In *La Littérature de l'âge baroque en France. Circé et le paon*, published in 1953 prior to his Anthology, similar themes are examined, with emphasis upon the mythical figures of Circe and Proteus as examples of metamorphosis and disguise.¹² Rousset asks the Baroque question, "L'homme peut-il se connaître?" The peacock becomes the emblem of ostentatious appearance. The theme of mobility in Baroque literature includes that of the reader as well. Rousset's review of literature covers the use of moving and changing metaphor in French poetry, inconstancy and play-within-a-play techniques in theater, and the general attitude of ostentatious spectacle. It is not difficult to see how these themes would play out well within the theater of Baroque architecture Wölfflin describes so well. In fact, theater becomes the all-encompassing Baroque model. As Rousset concludes with his sense of the dates of the Baroque, buffered as it is by

¹² Proteus is a lighter version of our *Homo Barocus*, which shall have the added dimension of ethical engagement as the rationale behind the change in persona.
Renaissance style before it and French Classicism afterwards, it is interesting to note
that he qualifies this latter Classicism, as did Wölflin, as nonetheless colored by the
Baroque, as well as to say that the Baroque period in France was by no means
perfectly homogeneous towards this style. In *L'Intérieur et l'extérieur*, Rousset
guards against limiting definitions of the Baroque which speak negatively or in a
depreciatory manner of excess, irregularity and irrationality alone to the belittlement
of the marvelous work of Baroque structure, such as in the study *Storia della età
barocca in Italia: Pensiero, poesia e letteratura, vita morale* by Benedetto Croce and
his emphasis upon the Baroque -- a period and etiquette he nonetheless admits across
the cultural board -- as the decadence of the Renaissance.

René Wellek, in *Concepts of Criticism*, reviews the evolution of the concept
"baroque" from its own time and throughout critical usage, primarily through German
scholarship which he reads as the instigator of the "Baroque" etiquette movement,
from the etymology of the term to its application to the arts to to its final designation
of 17th-century culture. He notes that as a literary term it gathers to itself various
epithets such a "Marinism", "Gongorism", "Conceitism", "Metaphysical poetry", and
so on, and did not become a popular term until this century. Part of the renewed
interest in Germany was due to a perceived affinity with the postwar aesthetic of
Expressionism.

The Baroque is also read historically and politically. Our own summary of
French reception of the Council of Trent and of the Jesuit Order, in our chapter
herein on the *Spiritual Exercises*, gives an example of a socio-political reading. Ours
is specifically a religious reading to begin with, which uses the angle of Jesuit Spirituality in an eventually broad way. In both cultural, historical, political and intellectual contexts, we can examine the following studies.

Anne-Laure Angoulvent’s *L’Esprit Baroque* takes an approach different from many of the works we have considered here. Rather than to attempt to define the concept "baroque", her historical, political and cultural approach examines the entirety of the age from 1540 to 1700, and traces the baroque threads therein in all the complexity of their presence, much in line with P. Charpentrat’s belief in an organic whole which encompasses the Baroque and the Classical. In Angoulvent’s reading, the Baroque and the Classical are contemporary, they contaminate each other, divulge each other, control each other. Thus on the Metaphysical level, Cartesian dualism and Pascalian recourse beyond the rational each surprisingly divulge a Baroque facet with or against which these authors struggle, or which they use as well. Although we do not altogether disagree, we ourselves shall adopt a stricter demarcation with respect to dualism. On the political level, the apparently stable "Raison d’Etat" of the monarchy conceals a constantly changing policy to accommodate all (lies) necessary, and by its appearance consoles, for a time!, the age’s insecure citizen, much as does the belief in the omnipresence of God. In the realm of the ever-more precise sciences and arts, a measure of Spirituality and mysticism is not forsaken. Because of this study’s full engagement in the complexities of the real terrain where the historical Baroque took place, we can
qualify it as phenomenological (although not in the conceptual sense of our own study's phenomenological perspective on presence in the Baroque work).

Severo Sarduy's *Barroco* uses the angle of the astronomical revolution and Kepler's elliptical motion of the planets to link the pictorial, architectural and literary forms of the Baroque, and to generalize about the Baroque symbolic form. He then further links this to 20th-century astronomy's relativity and Big-Bang theories to suggest a NeoBaroque prolongation there.

Gilles Deleuze, in *Le Pli. Leibniz et le Baroque*, presents the Philosophy of Leibniz in terms of the operating concept of evermore interior folds, not unlike the sculptural "drappeggiamento" as practiced by Bernini, which captures the more common notions of multiperspectivism and relativism, and which Merleau-Ponty, whose thought we shall consider as a major part of the conceptual basis to our study, will interpret in his term of the "chiasm". Deleuze uses this image of the fold to link Leibniz' work to the Baroque in the areas of Mathematics, Mechanics, Physics, Architecture, Art and Philosophy. This interior folding can be likened to our conception of the Baroque work and its recipient, as we shall develop and present them. The recipient of the Baroque work in a final stage enters into its enveloping, enfolding structure as a measuring presence, and is ultimately folded up by and permeated by it, in another stage, where Deleuze speaks in terms of the soul itself as being pleated!, to finally go on to seduce others in turn as an ambulating Baroque

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work, something akin to "]Il faut mettre le monde dans le sujet, afin que le sujet soit pour le monde".\textsuperscript{14}

Michel Foucault's study of the "épistémè" of western culture -- the phases of mentality, or knowledge or understanding, which subtend all cultural production, frame of mind and perspective on man -- in \textit{Les Mots et les choses}, takes an interesting, if brief, turn towards the Baroque epistemological shift with his examination of the literary figure of Don Quixote. According to Foucault, the Renaissance comes to an end with Don Quixote and, in his terms, writing ceases to be "la prose du monde" where each sign is inscribed upon the things of the world. For Don Quixote is the hero who enters the medieval text of chivalry to bring a real dimension to the sign and to confirm it; in our own words, Don Quixote brings a presence to the text, not unlike our own image brought into Velasquez' painting "Las Meninas" which Foucault so astutely analyses as the opening to his book. This presence to the sign is necessary, according to Foucault, because of the lost faith in the marking of words upon the things of the world and in the verity of the text, as the Renaissance regime of resemblance has turned to that of errancy, and the whole sense of the sign has begun its shift that will last into our 20th century. Indeed, words and all cultural forms turn to artifice in the Baroque age, but in a sense of play which is not quite that of the 20th-century errant signifier, in our opinion, but a seductive signifier just as much a part of the 20th century which beckons (our) presence to it, our pound of flesh in place of a lost idealism or sure transcendence.

\textsuperscript{14} G.Deleuze, \textit{Le Plis}, 37.
Foucault fails to mention the comical and tragi-comical aspects pervading Cervantes' tale, published in two parts in 1605 and 1615, which we read as the humorous version of the mystical journey of St. Ignatius of Loyola's own life and works. Nonetheless, in the face of such a beckoning crisis in representation, there are two outcomes or possible classifications -- either "man is dead", a dead fossil, or "man is a monster".15 We opt for the latter as part of the Baroque/NeoBaroque vision, but both illustrate, as we shall see, two eventual versions of 20th-century Postmodernity, one the legacy of Classicism and Rationalism, the other the legacy of the Baroque.

From a clearly contemporary point of view, Mitchell Greenberg, in Detours of Desire. Readings in the French Baroque, makes no effort to hide how the 20th-century preoccupation with Psychoanalysis permits a fruitful rereading of the Baroque, where he himself opts for a Lacanian reading of desire as well as a gendered reading. The literary Baroque becomes a "grammar of the unconscious" where lack places desire in motion. In hand with such "detours of desire", the Baroque is read in a feminine register which has fallen away from the unifying, imperative "Father's Law" of the Classical order.16 In a political sense, Greenberg states:

Perhaps in France more than elsewhere, these profound revolutions -- all of which can be reduced, metaphorically, to the revolt against the One, against a certain Law, and against a certain representation of the Law -- were brutally actualized in the dissension of civil war. The myth of unity, which had


16 This corroborates our insistence in the following analyses upon the necessary role of the feminine dimension in facilitating the stance of the Homo Baroccus.
presided over the destiny of the nation and informed the parameters of its mental structures, was rent. As if to symbolize more acutely this state of strife, this breakdown of one-world order, we can look at this period of almost one hundred years without being able to locate a single effective political presence capable of assuming in itself, and projecting outward, the symbolic criteria of the Father. From the death of Henri II in 1559 to the assumption of power by Louis XIV in 1660, there is a power vacuum, an effective absence of a forceful, central model.  

As a returning phenomenon in the 20th century, the NeoBaroque is read aesthetically and culturally by Pierre Charpentrat, Christine Buci-Glucksman and Guy Scarpetta. V.-L. Tapié himself, in Le Baroque, signals how the first World War alone, as it threatened security in a culture of Modern reason, served to renew an interest in the Baroque.

In Le Mirage Baroque, Pierre Charpentrat finds, like Tapié, a certain interest in the Baroque awakened from the 1950's on in a post-war reaction against rationality. He opens with a sense of the NeoBaroque as a critical perspective awakened by a multitude of artistic, literary, cultural and societal events, from France and Europe to the United States. For Charpentrat, it has been time for the term "baroque" to leave the regime of specialists and to enter into that of common culture.

In Christine Buci-Glucksman’s La Raison baroque, De Baudelaire à Benjamin, a gendered reading of Philosophical Modernity and Postmodernity, of Antiquity, Classicism, Baroque and NeoBaroque, a Baroque return is followed from the 19th century, with the poetry of Baudelaire, up to the figure of Walter Benjamin, himself a scholar of Baudelaire and of German Baroque drama, through the angle of

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their use of myths of the feminine and the imperative of the gaze upon the feminine, as the very angle through which the Baroque does in fact return into aesthetic Modernism, to finally ask "Pourquoi la civilisation n’est-elle pas devenue féminine?"\footnote{Christine Buci-Glucksman, \textit{La Raison baroque. De Baudelaire à Benjamin} (Paris: Galilée, 1984) 163.} This shall accord with our emphasis upon the feminine dimension as part of the passage into the Baroque stance. Such a feminine is both mediation towards corporality, the real dimension and dwelling place, and paradoxically is also the devouring subject/object, dark, mortriferous side to a Eucharistic Inhabitation we shall emphasize as the final stage to Baroque presence, and evident in the perversity of figures such as Salomé. Her \textit{La Folie du voir} uses the contemporary perspectives of Psychoanalysis and Phenomenology to examine the balance of absence and presence within the contours of Baroque art.

We conclude ourselves that such Baroque themes and motifs in cultural, historical and philosophical reviews subtend in fact an all-pervading Baroque épistémè, mentality or spirit, which surpasses limitations of these authors’ studies to particular disciplinary angles, and which we characterize primarily, and more simplistically, by a complex, and not irrational, configuration of the moving, unstable work which disorients and absorbs the subject as a real and measuring presence within it, exercizing and transforming him ultimately \textit{from within} towards the stance of the \textit{Homo Baroccus}. This has results for life, ethical engagement, identity and the sense of gender, and vision, not to mention for a defense of the arts, and outlines a structure that can be read beyond the historical period, and across a surprisingly long
duration. The following introductory summary is meant to present how such an act of presence to the Baroque work can take place, as well as to situate this Baroque sensibility intellectually. Each individual study which follows is meant to emphasize this basic Baroque structure, and to illustrate how such a stance relates time and again to the various dimensions and disciplinary expressions of the well-known Baroque elements and themes.

These elements point to the Baroque as the provision of spectacle in a theatrical architecture, whether to the eye or the mind’s eye, whether plastic or linguistic, whether historical event, myth or fiction. A spectacle and architecture which, by its combination of theme with technique, disanchors the stability of the spectator’s stance to involve him in much more than the distanced, Renaissance/Classical act of seeing. A spectacle which goes beyond its own defined bounds of "anything, particularly of large scale, presented to sight", housed in an architecture which allows it to do so. For Baroque spectacle, once seen before the eye or imagined before the mind, is engaging and dangerously subversive; manipulative of the perceiving subject, it throws him into the infinite universe and the whirlwind of matter, it decenters him from himself, it impassions and moves him to action and service. Its objectives can engage religion, Philosophy, politics, and morality. This spectacle, offered to maximum perception by the five senses, as ἡ αἰσθητικός indicates, and as a "seeing" beyond the mere use of the eyes, privileges representation of the impassioned body, in a transitional state or in the throes of
emotion, to persuade the addressee to be educated to it, to take upon himself its particular affectivity, and finally to imitate the scene and thereby move as an actor with wonderment into the depth of its aesthetic, architectural space. In the process, both subject and object can be moved and changed. Thus the objectives of Classical rhetoric, from Aristotle to Ciceron to Quintilian -- to move (moveare), to educate (educare) and to delight (delectare) -- are most effectively realized in the expressions of the Baroque and their reception. This Baroque aesthetic movement, when successful, is a liberation from subject to object, from the self to the other, and is a complete, affective involvement of the subject in the situation of the other/object, to include an acting out of the situation of the other, feeling and suffering what they feel and suffer, and has spiritual union as an important possibility and elaboration of its structure.

A marvelous theatre of persuasion very much concerned with its reception, Baroque representation in general -- rhetorical, plastic, poetic and narrative, for example -- is molded according to the metaphor of spectacle, theater and theatrical architecture. Its techniques, based upon the objective of engaging a particular affective involvement in the other/object, privilege sensual representation of the corporal to suggest the addressee’s body and affectivity as well, and to ultimately

19 By affectivity, we mean synaesthetic involvement of the senses along with the corporal results and symptoms of, caused by, or expressing emotion. That is, affectivity is the combination of sensation with emotion, and maintains both. Affectivity, as we shall argue, is essential to Baroque representational stance, or “Baroque reception”, with its ultimate objective of persuasion. We shall examine in further detail how Baroque elements in both plastic and literary representational scenes elicit such affectivity.

20 Of course, a particularly Baroque spiritual union. We shall discuss this further in the context of Ignatian Spirituality.
realize the desired communication or spiritual union for him, be it with God or otherwise. The cathartic response to Baroque representation is meant to be a radical and life-changing one! The addressee, drawn into the work, no longer retains a distanciated, perspectival and conceptual stance before it, but rather a transpectival stance from within, a stance surrounded and enveloped by the phenomenal situation, or as in a trompe-l'oeil representation where a reverse perspectivism reaches out to engage and include the spectator; that is, an "as though I were present there" as St. Ignatius of Loyola says. This stance, in counterance to the distanciated one of the Renaissance/Classical tradition, has moved from surface to depth, from vision to synaesthesia, from the intelligible to the sensible, from distance to proximity, from absence to presence, from the conceptual to the phenomenal, from perspective -- a vision before -- to transpective - a vision from within, and it often involves a passage through death to self to be with the other, and often can involve death with the other or in their place as well. The reception of the Baroque work becomes in some cases an interactive participation in the work itself as a contribution to its constitution, or as an aesthetic conditioning for living, or even a behaviorism, moral direction or spiritual exercise.

As such, Baroque representation is centered around involvement of the body as presence -- that excessively represented, and that receiving the representation and ultimately in dialogue with it. Here we can sharpen the connection between the visual and the linguistic. For in the Baroque terms of excessive figuration, the aesthetic,
transcendental stance begs to be communicated, it calls for its linguistic expression, whether through prayer, oratory, poetry or narrative. The text struggles to represent from within an evenemential situation, to speak from the depth of existence, in order to make its particular represented presence resound and, by the contagion of corporal stance and desire, to call the other into this presence. Thus "Presence in the work" is not a metaphorical call, nor the achievement of a transcendental ego-subject, but rather a resounding, existential one of perpetual dialectic exchange. This creates a "chain of representations" ad infinitum, Jean Rousset’s "flot d’apparences" or succession of many realities, which involve an affective, rather than mimetic, reenactment and renewal each in their turn of presence, and replaces a series of illusions, which can altogether have a trompe-l’œil, anamorphic effect as the real spectator becomes part of the artifice (in two aesthetic stages), the artifice or representation having served as a form of mediation to his presence. This "chain of representations" can also be a problematic oscillation about unstable presence, which perpetuates the need in the search for presence for figuration, metaphorisation, representation and communication in excess. In other cases, the chain of such Baroque representations includes at some point within it the pretention of speaking as if from the site of God, as we shall see with the use or travesty of Scripture by such

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22 This can in turn be a reenactment of an historical/mythical origin, particularly in the religious Baroque, as in Jesuit drama, but can also be a call to feel a new vision of the world and matter in a non-religious context, in which the spectator/addresssee becomes in turn a representation of the material, existential Baroque, thereby causing a chain of representations, of a différence from presence to presence which is not the errance of the Derridian sign, but actual and perpetual incorporations which supplement the text.

23 We could speak here of an ethos of the text as pragrammatic tool. What happens to faith and scriptural verity in such a conception?
as Agrippa d’Aubigné, Antonin Artaud, Blaise Cendrars and Claude Simon, for example. In the context of discourse, this is pragmatic language embedded in a situation which engages flesh and blood speakers and contextual meaning, even when separated by time and death thanks to the chain of representations. The subject -- exercitant, spectator or lector -- becomes a locus for presence in a process of exchange which is dialectical and horizontal, rather than transcendental and vertical. Thus a real situation is preserved, as this presence is not a transendant or metaphysical one.

None of this excludes illusion as in the feigning of presence in order to capture the real presence of the addressee into the very mechanisms of the feigning. Nor does it shy from the tactics of rhetorical device and literary trompe-l’oeil such as tricky narrative perspective, and open connotation. Language’s grammatical closure on the morphological, syntactical and narrative levels opens up as subject and object are in dialogue and mutual exchange, and the chain of representations and reenactments continues to come alive. In psychonalstic terms, we could speak here of the psychodramatic phenomenon of "transference" of desire, and of cathartic contamination, here between the representation and the recipient, where the recipient’s participation in the representation becomes a projection of his own psychic needs or fantasm. Thus, whereas presence and corporality can be problematic for representation, and indeed are just what is lacking before the visual or linguistic sign, in the case of the Baroque work they are supplemented by the presence and
corporality of the recipient. It is this kind of body presence, and the synaesthetic relation it entails, that we shall seek to analyze in the Baroque work.

Baroque representation is attached to real corporal situations, from which it takes up dynamic communication. This real is a treasure to be perpetually imagined and detailed and is not only an aesthetic rule in the Baroque, but also involves the perceiving body itself in its capacity to be the referential or treasorial depth. This treasorial exchange between representation and recipient passes through the life of Christ, for example, through a Philosophy of engagement and presence, an overwhelming architecture, a trompe-l'œil painting of figures in excess and in spatial transgression, or through the vertiginous depth of the poetic word. We shall see this across a vast spectrum, from the contemplated, imagined real in St. Ignatius of Loyola's Spiritual Exercises, to much later in the overcoded real of the 20th-century Surrealist movement. The treasorial exchange of the real transgresses the Symbolic in the sense of fixed, codified, disaffected representation and language where the imaginary is confined in an ideal, codified and established situation, to give way to a language of the real connected to the imaginary. This is the work and language in flux, as perpetual invention, aided by the imagination as it encounters the marvelous, changing, ephemeral treasure of the real—and, ultimately, the self. Here, Jean-Joseph Goux's "Symbolic Economy" takes a shift away from the prominence of the effective, efficiently circulating symbol in concordance with Philosophical Modernity, to face a constant, even violent confrontation and dialogue between the imaginary and the real that language cannot exhaust—like the continuous whirlwind of the very
Baroque forms and matter themselves engaged in the inefficient, perpetual work of capturing and producing presence. To further interpret this Baroque status in terms of the sign, the signifier is liberated from its attachment to the signified and the referent, a liberation which takes the signified from an ideal to an imaginary, open position and allows invention of the combinatorial possibilities for it with the referent (or real, or addressee), and ultimately for renewing the signifier or, to be more precise, for instilling and renewing an affective relationship to it. Surrealism, for example, does this with the image and language. Likewise painting is detached from codified symbols (Middle Ages art) or technique (Renaissance perspective), and is liberated in the creative attempt to capture presence and renew the image in relation to man, yet not in chaotic fashion nor without recourse to elaborate technique. This is a description of the Semiotic process itself, particularly evident in the context of Baroque aesthetic and sense-making. In the Postmodern context, this is not merely

24 See "Numismatiques" in Jean-Joseph Goux, Freud, Marx: Economie Symbolique (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1973); Les Montagnes du langage (Paris: Editions Galilée, 1984); and the article "Catégories de l'échange: Idéalité, symbolicité, réalité" in L'Encyclopédie universelle de philosophie, ed. André Jacob, et.al. (Paris) 227-233, as well as terminology for the real as treasure, the symbolic as token and the imaginary/ideal as archetype, in Oedipe Philosophe (Paris: Aubier, 1990). We can also look at the triad of "symbolic economy" in Trinitarian terms, where the Symbolic corresponds to the Father, the Real to the Son, and the Ideal/Imaginary to the Holy Ghost or to Spirituality. This would place the religious Baroque’s emphasis upon the dynamics between Spirituality and the Christ, which corresponds to the particular spirituality of the Jesuit Order, as presented by Joseph de Guibert, S.J., The Jesuits. Their Spiritual Doctrine and Practice, trans. William J. Young, S.J. (Chicago: The Institute of Jesuit Sources, with Loyola University Press, 1964), among others. J-J. Goux associates, in monetary terms, the circulation of gold money with the regime of realism. See "Catégories de l'échange", 233. The Baroque’s overly coded real would then correspond to the excessive aesthetic use of gold and precious materials beyond utilitarian circulation, in George Bataille’s sense of "dépense improductive".

25 We are referring here to the Saussurian concept of the sign as composed of signifier, signified and referent. The Symbolic would correspond to the signifier, where the Imaginary becomes ideality in the context of the signified in a fixed code, and the Real corresponds to the referent.
the errant, disaffected sign of Derridian thought, as we shall show, but is rather a comprehensive step which goes beyond it.

What we are talking around here is the Classical/Counter-Classical tradition. The dynamic, inexhaustible exchange of the treasorial real, in the "chain of representations" from reception to production in Baroque representation, breaks down not only perspectival stance, the Symbolic order, and the stasis of the sign, but the Modern subject as well in the Cartesian Philosophical sense,\textsuperscript{26} a subject which lasted through to 19th-century Realism. Thus a cross-century reading of the Baroque folds it into the Postmodern menace to the subject, however we shall need to nuance further exactly how this is. In France, Classicism followed the Baroque and opposed itself to it, thus by traditional accounts giving it a short life span. The roots back and prolongations forward of French Classicism and Classical Western order allow the grouping together of Renaissance Humanism and religious Reformation, and its prolongations through to 18th-century Enlightenment and to 19th-century Realism. Renaissance Humanism privileged the individual subject's innate intellectual capacity, particularly in the context of reading Scripture, and thus sparked the religious Reformation and planted the seeds for the encyclopedic appetite for accumulating knowledge, up to the 18th-century beliefs, although elitist, in the innate human capacity for intellectual and moral perfection, individual self-sufficiency,

\textsuperscript{26} See Jean-Joseph Goux's "Descartes et la perspective" for the association between the philosophical sense of the Modern subject, and aesthetic perspective. \textit{L'Esprit créateur} (Spring 1985): 10-20.
worth and structured place in the world before God and men, to include Voltaire's concept of a since-disinterested God who once mechanically set creation in motion. This faith in the flights of the individual intellect without mediation spurred both Reformation, Classicist and 18th-century denigration of sensual, overly figural representation in the religious, plastic and literary contexts, metaphorical excess and rhetorical appeal, spiritual direction, mediated religious fervor, and corporal, sentient investment therein and passage thereby, that is, through representation, to include denigration of the "passions of the soul" as means to knowledge, or to faith. This denigration of the sensual, corporal and emotional can be seen in the very tactics of Descartes' exercise toward the Cogito (1637), as well as in the counsel of Boileau's Art Poétique (1674), not to mention Rousseau's later criticism of science and the arts.

We can further focus Renaissance/Classical order and virtually iconoclast tactics upon the figure of René Descartes. For what Descartes put aside and mystified in order to establish his Cogito was the body with its passions in the context of the world. This affected body, so privileged by Baroque aesthetic and literary representation as the means to God, truth, ecstasy, or simply existence, that is, the affected body as an exaltation of the "I am", is put aside with Descartes, and a kind of Baroque existence with it, for the meager existence of the "I think" and bare, disaffected reason. Descartes' mind/body dualism, prolonged in the Classical/Modern tradition, regulates and represses the affected body as a thing severed from its visions of man, social order, measured representation, and utilitarian, disaffected language, to

27 And shall allow later disclosure of the very fragility of the intellectually-established subject.
eventually include the errant sign at play. Because of Descartes’ influence, the Classical/Baroque tension is most keen, plays out its tension best, and is therefore most readable in the context of French thought, arts and letters, and it is there that we can see the Baroque return with the rage with which it was repressed.

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With the 19th-century crisis in Modernity — in the Modernist subject, the Symbolic order, and representation -- in French thought, arts and letters, the Baroque finds the opportunity for its disinterment and return. However the association of the Baroque with the Postmodern must be carefully nuanced in our opinion. Since our approach is an aesthetic one based upon sensorial expression, sentient, affective reception, and corporal presence, we shall begin with an examination of the crisis in Modernity in the context of space, before time, through pictorial representation. This crisis at the end of the 19th century is usually demarcated by the work of Cézanne as he manipulated the laws of perspective to disregard the harmony of Realism in the assuring, distanced place assigned to the spectator and the pictorial unity created by the single vanishing point.28 Cézanne’s general linear disorder, combination of shifting viewpoints and fragmentation of perspectival focus, and his organisation of the object in terms of a dislocated subject, led to Cubism’s multiple geometrical

28 The initiation of this crisis is not attributed to Impressionism which, though imbued with painterly, subjective affectivity, does not in principle disrespect perspectival laws regarding form. See Pierre Francastel, Peinture et société. Naissance et destruction d’un espace plastique, de la Renaissance au Cubisme (Lyon: Audin, 1951).
figures of fractured volumes in motion. This step into the liberation from ordered form, coupled with Freudian theory of the subconscious and dreamwork, led to Surrealist, oniric, "liquid" and anamorphosed refigurations of the real. On the other hand, and at approximately the same time as that of the development of Surrealism, the aberrant, disintegrating consideration of the laws of perspective and excessive linear order without consideration of any referential attachment led to Abstract Art.

We can look at these various schools in French art which have come out of the crisis in representation and their particular manipulations of perspective and modes of perception, in the triadic terms of the Real, the Imaginary/Ideal and the Symbolic of "Symbolic Economy", as each one emphasizes one aspect of the triad over the others without, however, ever negating the wholeness of the triadic structure nor, thereby, communication. For example, Abstract Art isolates the Symbolic aspect of codified, perspectival art and is even a metalevel for such codification, while bracketing out its realist representation, which neglects the Imaginary and the Real dimensions (although

29 See, for example, Marcel Duchamp's "Nude Descending a Staircase" and Pablo Picasso's disharmonious visual planes, most evident in his portrayals of the face.

30 Our review here is meant to be schematic and pedagogically useful, and to emphasize French artistic movements, rather than to be exhaustive from the viewpoint of Art History, as we have left out of our considerations Art Nouveau, Fauvism, Expressionism, Dadaism, and Futurism.

31 "Ce qui importe est donc de déterminer pour chaque mode historique de l'échange, économique et signifiant, à tous les niveaux que nous avons montrés ailleurs comme solidaires la manière dont l'archétype, le jeton et le trésor jouent leur rôle dans la logique des métabolismes sociaux. Ainsi il apparaîtra qu'il y a plusieurs économies possibles de l'équivalent général et que ces différences, qui ne sont pas seulement économiques, mais affectent l'échange en général, le statut de la valeur et du sens, permettent d'analyser les aspects essentiels du "mode de symboliser" d'une formation sociale, et entre autre, le statut de ses représentations sociales ou religieuses. [...] C'est le dé-tressage des trois fonctions que l'on verra intervenir au début du XXe siècle." J.-J.Goux, "Catégories de l'échange", 230-232. Emphasis is our own. This kind of analysis will allow us to make further homologous bridges to the status of subjectivity and of language, particularly in light of the legacy of Saussure's concept of the sign.
they are nonetheless present in the ultimate arrangement of forms, choice of colors and materials, and so on). Cubism emphasizes some aspects of geometrical codification, and of the movement and precarity of the Real, while keeping the Imaginary in the background. As such, it makes sense as an initial breaking point in the representational crisis before the bifurcation and developments into Abstract Art and Surrealism. Surrealist art privileges aberrant vision and excessive metamorphosis which exploit the infinite, treasorial aspect of the Real, and thus combines the Imaginary with it, to the neglect of a Symbolic codification of forms. This "surreality" is troubling in its representation of the real as problematic, precarious and in constant metamorphosis. In homology with these aesthetic mappings, we could likewise consider the poetic and narrative.

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This nuancing of the results of the 19th-century crisis of representation according to the categories of Symbolic Economy allows us to fine-tune a 20th-century reemergence of the Baroque, there where the Real is treasorial presence -- albeit often troubling, precarious and problematic. That is, an excessive real beyond that of Realism, its perspective and mode of perception, beyond any sedate existence of the subject (or Philosopher!) at perspectival distance, beyond any motivation of the sign as in pre-Saussurian concepts of language. The presence of this excessive real maintains a particular relationship with Saussure's concept of the arbitrary quality of the sign; however, not on the side of the errant signifier and detached Symbolic forms, it is rather on the other side of this arbitrariness, with the moving, changing
concept and referent, or Imaginary and Real together in the process of perpetual presence, invention and the search for meaning. For in this treasorial real the imagining subject risks to invest his vision, his corporality and affectivity, that is, his very own presence, to find them engaged, exchanged and transformed. In Baroque aesthetic fashion, then, this treasorial real engages both the representation and the recipient. Thus we might find a Neo-Baroque in Surrealism, for example, and also in Art Nouveau’s fantastically figured, natural forms and Expressionism’s emphasis upon subjective affectivity expressed and called forth through the use of color. By extension, where in literature the representational and imaginative work with referentiality and depth of meaning through use of metaphor and metonymy, to include a semi-autobiographical role on the part of the narrator, where reader perception and presence are drawn into the text by its rhetorical powers to move and persuade, where the treasure of corporality, sensibility and affectivity -- that is, the present body-subject -- are at risk and involved in the (Philosophical) dialogue between narrator, representation and perceiving subject, where symbolic language is constantly renewed by the real, imaginative and subjective investment into it, there we shall seek a return of the Baroque. In effect our "histoire à longue durée" thesis of a return of the Baroque, in the representational wrestling with referentiality between production, reception and presence, brings to light a more nuanced perception of the Postmodern in the terms of the Imaginary and the Real, rather than in terms of the Symbolic or errant sign. This perception within the vast category of the Postmodern has hardly been emphasized, and breaks down, classifies and enriches the concept.
This allows us to put aside 20th-century theories of Derridian
"Deconstruction" and "différence" in their extreme use of a Symbolic severed from
the Real, and in their concepts of privileging "Ecriture" and the pure play of language
and forms beyond subjectival investment and corporal and affective involvement.
Much like Abstract Art's isolated play with geometric formalism and distanciated
subjectivity, these theories are in this light more of an "Ultramodernism" in the now-
falling heritage of Descartes and Classicism, than a Postmodernism. Both Derridian
"Ultramodernism" and NeoBaroque Postmodernism emphasize the fragility or
ephemeral quality of the subject and the free play of language as captured in the
Saussurian concept of the arbitrary sign, from the slippage between signifier and
signified, to syntactical disturbance and evacuation of the (linguistic) subject. But
while "Ultramodernism", the Structuralist school, and Derridian "différence" and the
cross-disciplinary phenomenon of "Deconstruction" as well, have fallen on the
Symbolic side of Modernity's crisis and fracturing -- as much a reworking of Platonic
forms, yet floating without a God and thus more tokens than archetypes -- the
Baroque finds a space for return on the Real/Imaginary side of the very same
fracture. The "ultra" in "Ultramodernism" exposes the fragility of the geometrically-
constituted modern subject severed from the real, to evacuate it rather than remedy it
while retaining the play of Symbolic formalism or errancy, wherefrom the
Foucauldian "death of the fossilized subject"! As if these have buried and forgotten
this residual subject in the real. Thus both "différence" and Abstract Art can be
qualified as iconoclast: a formalism or errancy which encounters little or no material resistance, or message, beyond its own medium severed from both subject and object.

The Baroque return in the 20th century considers as well the fragility and passivity of the subject severed from meaning and presence, and even the subject's abjection and mortification, particularly in the context of the horrors of world war, as a symptom of an inability to be contained within a geometrical, perspectival, socially codified constitution, or simply within the notion of "subject", because of the excess of the corporal and affective investment of subjectivity in objectivity, of self in the other, in the world, in representation and in language, as all these are captured by the notion of the presence of a treasorial, problematic, traumatized and traumatizing real beyond the capacity of any possible rationalist accounts. Rather than to evacuate this exhausted cadaver of a subject, the Baroque vision of man remedies his Modern fragility by restoring an affective and corporal relation to others, to language and to representation, yet maintains this subject as problematic and chaotic in its delimitations, that is as a life contaminated by death, and vice versa. From theories of "différance" to our concept of the NeoBaroque in their implications for the subject, these representations of the subject are menaced in distinctly different ways. The investment by and into the subject is encouraged and exercised by Baroque representation. Thus associations of a 20th-century NeoBaroque with Derridean

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32 This corresponds with 16th and 17th century visions of life and death; see, for example, Francisco de Quevedo's Visiones. It also corresponds with 20th-century theories of chaos and irregularity as signs of life, with regularity as a sign of imminent death. The heartbeat would be an example. See Gary Taubes, "The Body Chaotic", Discover 10.5 (May 1989): 62-67. The Baroque indeed had an intuition of chaos. And today's theories of the chaotic are another sign of the return of the Baroque as well as a scientific space for rereading it.
différence\textsuperscript{33} are not thorough enough in their considerations of the status of the subject, the possibilities for presence, and the factors involved in linguistic and representational play.

In summary, we can say, in the terms of Symbolic Economy, that the Renaissance, Classicism, Modernity and Ultramodernism are concerned with the Symbolic, as historically it engages and passes from a strong, Humanist subject, through a geometrically and reductively-constituted one, to a fragile, overwhelmed and finally buried and evacuated one or, schematically speaking, as it passes from archetype to token; where the Baroque, at its primary historical moment and in its return within our parameters within the Postmodern, is concerned with the Semiotic, as it engages and passes from a passive, transformed subject to one of incredible strength and life force, who is capable of investing himself within and accommodating the world, and exchanging his very flesh for it, of braving death, that is who has given up the self as treasure in real exchange for the other.\textsuperscript{34} Both are sign systems we can examine in light of Symbolic Economy and Saussure’s theory of the arbitrary sign, yet each is of a differing economic emphasis. The Semiotic is expansive and open, it uses the Imaginary/Real combination to allow for free linguistic association and sense-making like that found in the lyricism of Baroque metaphorical invention

\textsuperscript{33} Such as Guy Scarpetta’s L’Artifice, among others.

\textsuperscript{34} We could say that Classical vision represses death and keeps it at a distance ultimately meted out by fear, whereas Baroque vision fearlessly treads through its valley.
and Surrealist emancipation of images and signs; 35 whereas the Symbolic is restrictive and closed, it uses the signifier in a mode which functions according to a codified exchange system that privileges established form and social structure. The Semiotic, concerned with the infinite possibilities for sense-making or renewal of the Symbolic aspect of communication, is thereby concerned as well with the infinite possibilities for representational extension, as in the "chain of representations", in the form of unlimited semiosis and intertextuality, and also in the form of human investment in sense-making, in line with our emphasis upon the importance of reception and the open, cathartic event in Baroque representation. The Symbolic, on the other hand, is concerned with infinite combinations of or play with coded elements which ultimately risk becoming inconvertible, severed from human investment, and calling forth no cathartic experience, as in the senseless frenzy of Capitalist exchange, the bombardment of rapidly-changing images, and the proliferation of the printed and electronic word beyond the capacity for its reception. Both involve excess, but distinctly different types: the Baroque's excess is one of perpetual human investment, the Ultramodern's that of perpetual human alienation and loss. Thus Michel Foucault

35 Julia Kristeva speaks of Semiotics as "une chance d'accéder à ce refoulé du mécanisme social qu'est l'engendrement de la signification. La Révolution du langage poétique. L'avant-garde à la fin du XIXe siècle: Lautréamont et Mallarmé (Paris: Le Seuil, 1974) 11. Emphasis is our own. In the light of semiotically-engendered "significance", we do not wish to suggest here that the NeoBaroque position in the fissuring of Symbolic Economy leads to an impossibility for linguistic expression, which cannot escape passage through the Symbolic. We do wish to suggest, rather, that this position rearranges the hierarchy of Symbolic Economy's Symbolic-Ideal-Real arrangement to favor corporal-affective coloring by the Imaginary and the Real together, to constantly renew the Symbolic in the face of perpetual presence. This shall become more evident within the context of iconophile Ignatian Spirituality.
explains what he calls "Modernity" twice,\textsuperscript{36} with a vision of a possible synthesis of the two:

Ce qui explique bien la double marche du XIXe siècle vers le formalisme de la pensée et vers la découverte de l’inconscient — vers Russel et vers Freud. Et ce qui explique aussi les tentations pour infléchir l’une vers l’autre et entrecroiser ces deux directions: tentative pour mettre au jour par exemple les formes pures, qui avant tout contenu s’imposent à notre inconscient, ou encore effort pour faire venir jusqu’à notre discours le sol d’expérience, le sens d’être, l’horizon vécu de toutes nos connaissances. Le structuralisme et la phénoménologie trouvent ici, avec leur disposition propre, l’espace général qui définit leur lieu commun.\textsuperscript{37}

We shall emphasize within Foucault’s synthetic view of the Postmodern "l’effort pour faire venir jusqu’à notre discours le sol d’expérience, le sens d’être, l’horizon vécu de toutes nos connaissances". That is, we shall add to Semiotics the role of Phenomenology, to elucidate the NeoBaroque.

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The Baroque challenge to the severe sevrage of man’s being from itself and from language of a prominent Symbolic order which represses corporal and affective expression, takes place in two moments in our opinion, one reaching back to the past, the other forward to the future, and thus allows the folding-up of time called for in order to establish a "Baroque return". The first is the Counter-Reformation Baroque as captured by the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius of Loyola and the type of relationship between the imaginary and the lived real they establish. St. Ignatius of Loyola (+1491,-1556) was founder of the Jesuit Order and a prime mover in the

\textsuperscript{36} "Modernity" in aesthetic terms, "Postmodernity" in philosophical terms.

\textsuperscript{37} Michel Foucault, \textit{Les Mots et les choses}. 312.
Counter-Reformation; he and his Order not only had a major influence upon the
religious Baroque, but he also used it in hand with his own principles. St. Ignatius'
Spiritual Exercises as a text outlining a method meant to be put into practice by an
exercitant under the direction of a spiritual director, rather than merely to be read,
capture the Counter-Reformation attitude, and in a religious context circumscribe in
our opinion the many elements of Baroque aesthetic as we have already enumerated
them. The following are some of the main ways in which they do so. The
historical/mythical, incarnate life of Christ to which St. Ignatius is devoted is figurally
and sensually imagined, with infinite possibilities for embellishment of its details.38
Through these exercises, the exercitant responds to Scripture and Christian
History/Myth by joining the textual to the visual, via means of the imaginary. In so
doing, he approximates a "surreal" overcoding of the narrated "real", in a process
where he uses all the senses and joins affectivity to them, as St. Ignatius encourages
it, to invest himself as an actor within the scene of the life of Christ.39 That is, as a
Presence in the work.

38 Joseph de Guibert, S.J. emphasizes St. Ignatius' strong imaginative powers and his
devotion to the humanity of Christ, as well as his ability to serve in the real world, in contrast with his
weak symbolic imagination. The Jesuits, their Spiritual Doctrine and Practice, 32.

39 As indicated by the often-recited Anima Christi, particularly the verse "Within Thy wounds
hide me". This progression is seen in the Preludes, which move in three steps, from recalling the
factual details of the life of Christ to, secondly, a perspectival, geometrical construction and imagining
of the decor and setting — land, roads and home, for example, as St. Ignatius suggests — for the
factual/mythical details of the life of Christ to, thirdly, the request that God grant what the exercitant
desires. This third moment in effect calls for the affectivity necessary to the exercitant in order to
plunge himself into the particular Christic scene, and to move thereby from a perspectival stance to a
transpectival one. To further reinforce such affectivity, St. Ignatius often follows this third Prelude
with exercises in the "Application of the Senses".
This radical response to sacred text as a kind of pliant material to be imagined and ultimately relived is what we would qualify as a particularly "Baroque Hermeneutic". This life of Christ is a *fabula*, a bare bones narrative open to unlimited semiosis, in Umberto Eco's semiotic terms, or a *génotexte* open to the depth of poetic connotation which begins the "intertextual" process, in Julia Kristeva's terms. This exercise in meditation, prayer, even behavior, and in fact one in interpretation on the part of the excitant, involves an investment of self which can be a giving up of the self as well as a reworking and redefining of the experience of the self. In Roland Barthes' terms, the text opens up a space for "jouissance", it is seduction which beckons forth the reader and his pleasure.\(^{40}\) It is this unlimited semiosis which gives liberty to the reader to elaborate his individual affectivity as part of his aesthetic and religious reception of, response to, and investment within the text. Thus the book, and by extension the Baroque work, is at once the unstable work and the uncertain self.\(^{41}\)

\[\ldots\] in order to be more like Christ our Lord, I desire and choose poverty with Christ rather than riches, insults with Christ filled with them rather than honor, and desire to be considered worthless and a fool for Christ Who was so considered rather than to be esteemed as wise and clever in this world.\(^{42}\)

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\(^{41}\) Ignatian use of Scripture is analysed by Jacques Rouwez, S.J., as "la composition d'un récit dans le récit", reconstructed as it is by the use of intertextual quotations, the addition of commentary and other elements. "Pour un récit Ignatien de l'Evangile", *Les Exercices spirituels d'Ignace de Loyola*. Un commentaire littéral et théologique (Brussels: Éditions de l'Institut d'études théologiques, 1990) 455-475.

Ignatian Spirituality involves and makes primary use of the bodily and affective faculties of sense and sentiment. A perfect example is his technique of "rythmic prayer", where the exercitant in effect pauses to fill in on his own and in his own way the spaces between prescribed words! Thus the exercitant's stance before the imagined life of Christ uses the metaphor of the spectator before the spectacle, and is facilitated by imagination, corporal presence, physical discipline and affective engagement as well. This imagination ultimately becomes, through mediation and spiritual exercise, an imitation, which continues the "chain of representations", and which involves the affective responses and motivates desire -- the engagement of all the senses and their corporal reactions -- necessary to identification with the life of Christ, and is a necessary step to Jesuit service in the world. This is an action guided by passion. It is here that we could speak in terms of a Baroque qualification of Catharsis. The spectacle of the life of Christ also has a wondrous appeal to the spectator, and thus awakens his passions, puts him into movement and pulls him into the scene. In his own life, he perpetually lives the corporal and affective elements of the life of Christ; at best, he lives out the height of cathartic feeling.

Such affective responses are a sign of the dissolution of the distanciation and limits of the self, and they are what manipulate the perspectival relationship to space, in a move towards Baroque representation. They can menace the decorum of socially

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43 J.de Guibert uses Monseigneur Saudreau's qualification of Ignatius as a "seraphic mystic": "In them the infused gifts do not concentrate in such a manner as to unite only and exclusively the spiritual faculties of the mystic to God. Instead, they affect both the spiritual and the bodily faculties, thereby including such powers as the memory and imagination which serve for execution. Thus these infused gifts impel the mystic both toward union with God and toward service." The Jesuits, their Spiritual Doctrine and Practice, 55.
appropriate behavior, to move from a presence before the scene and a reader before the text to a presence within the scene and a presence in the text. This transcorporeal experience and transpectival stance -- Ignatius' "as though I were present there" -- can claim for the mystical transports and transfigurations of the saints, often embarrassing to their immediate community. The historical life of Christ is thus embellished in Baroque fashion, to make a chain of representations, and thus to be relived at once mimaetically and, with difference, affectively in the present, as past becomes present, presence. And presence begets presence in the Baroque work; in turn, "being in" the work or the world of representation extends itself into that of life, and vice versa, life into representation. Presence and its feigning go hand in hand! as each begets the other. And the treasorial real is not only a once-lived fabula now rich with possibilities for semiosis, but ultimately the exercitant/addressee reading himself. The spectator is the measure of presence; the subject/lector/exercitant is the real.

However not with the hubric of the Modern subject, but rather with the abjection, mortification and humility, the awe and love borne of admiration, of what is the religious Baroque subject, who has become "worthless and a fool for Christ" -- that is, an empty signifier for the plenitude of the Christ. This excessive communication of love is a giving of oneself to the life of the other, and is exemplary of Baroque

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This motion without repression, or pure drive to speak in Freudian terms, is like that of the passion of admiration, a passion essential to Baroque aesthetic which Descartes places above all others. See herein our work on Descartes' Traité des passions.

It is this seduction towards a corporal and affective "presence in the text/spectacle/work" which distinguishes Baroque religious spectacle from the Passion and Miracle plays of the Middle Ages. The corporality and affectivity of the Baroque has a more plastic quality, as it is capable of transcending a specific mimetic context to become an atemporal "acting out".
excess. The Ignatian Colloquies are the perfect examples, as exhortations to imagine oneself in direct and intimate communion with the Christ. Ultimately, this "Baroque" communication is communication of the annihilated self with the infinite, and imitation through metaphorical and metonymical use of langage (as in the Ignatian "Ways of Prayer") is best suited as the means to bring together the separated, and thereby to create a discursive space for presence.

Ignatius' structure is the Trinitarian one, or in lay terms one of "Symbolic Economy" albeit we must qualify this economy as we have in our analysis of the Postmodern break. In the triad Symbolic-Ideal/Imaginary-Real, or in Trinitarian terms, Father-Holy Spirit-Son, Spirit and Incarnate Christ take precedence, and one revered aspect of their combination, the visited flesh of the Holy Virgin. The exercitant himself becomes finally the Symbolic, or prayerful desiring voice and manipulator of signs who must through the Exercises try to make his language speak from the place of his imagining, and ultimately to make his very flesh the (feminized) receptacle for Spirit and Incarnation, and thereby approach communication with the Symbol of the Father. The path towards this communication is in effect open and

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46 As stated, Ignatius' Spiritual Exercises emphasize the mutual interaction of the imaginary and the real: "Sémiorologiquement, l'image entraîne toujours plus loin que le signifié, vers la pure matérialité du référent. Ignace suit toujours cet emportement, qui veut fonder le sens en matière et non en concept [...] vers son référent, qui est la croix matérielle [...]" Roland Barthes, Sade, Fourier, Loyola (Paris: Le Seuil, 1971) 68.

47 In Psychoanalytic terms, we could speak of the recipient/exercitant's fantasm of the real, where the signified, normally repressed by the signifier, or in Lacanian terms the "Thing of the Mother" repressed by the "Law of the Father", find themselves ecstatically on one plane of communication, which is to say that the Semiotic and the Symbolic find themselves working together. See Jacques Lacan, "Le complexe d'Oedipe", Les complexes familiaux, 49-75, and Le Séminaire Livre XX: Encore (Paris: Le Seuil, 1975). St. Ignatius of Loyola's Spirituality, contemplations and graces are focused around the Eucharist and the Trinity, to which leads the sacrifice of the Mass. Thus the
sinuous, which Ignatius took himself and along which he gives guidance and gives other spiritual directors the methods for guidance, thus continuing the representation and experience.

St. Ignatius' Spiritual Exercises are emblematic for the involvement -- corporal, affective and transjective -- called forth from the addressee on the part of Baroque representation, profane and secular as well as that religious. As Baroque representation, through the infinite mirroring and affective contagion of the chain of representations, extends itself into life and life into it, Ignatius' exercises use the past time of historical/mythical factuality and detail, made present through imagination and lived, affective corporality, and future through the body as a spiritually-stamped symbolic equivalent. The affected body-subject becomes in effect a receptacle for God's presence -- sign, space, house, dome, temple, tabernacle, Eucharist, tomb, womb -- a Baroque work and space himself, an Homo Baroccus. Thus presence

imagination, meditation, and reenactment of Christ's Passion brought him to a vision of the Trinity and to communication with the Father. For St. Ignatius, access to the Trinitarian synthesis was possible only through a spiritual living of the humanity and suffering of Christ. This passage involved humility and abjection, the attitude of the servant, physical mortification and total abnegation of self, which go in hand with becoming a (feminised) space for presence. Let us recall St. Ignatius' exhortation, "All should love poverty as a Mother." For this reason, Ignatian and Jesuit spirituality conclude with the call to service and works, once again in the world. See J.de Guibert, Chapter 1, "The Personal Life of St. Ignatius", The Jesuits, their Spiritual Doctrine and Practice, 21-73, 149.

48 This is a particular kind of meditation, which is not merely penitential, purgative and ascensional, but subsequently returns to earthly commerce, presence and invitation to others. It has its particular discursive qualities, which we shall analyse. By extension, all of Baroque aesthetic can be seen as a meditative form seeking to provoke a particular kind of transformation and conversion in the subject. Jean-Luc Marion sees this participation of the ego-subject in the act of representation (of the Divine Other) -- "Représenter implique toujours se représenter [...] moi-même comme la condition de, possibilité de toute autre représentation" -- as an ecstasy, which we can understand as a breaking out of the Cartesian stasis and isolation of the self. He sees this ecstasy in Husserl's "intentional consciousness" and in Heidegger's Dasein. See "Le Cogito s'affecte-t-il?", in Questions cartésiennes (Paris: PUF, 1991) 153-185, particularly 159. However, where Marion sees ecstasy as a sign of separation, we see it as a sign of mystical union.
called forth in Baroque fashion is continually opening itself to further occasions for presence.  

49 Presence becomes evacuated and thereby a holy space for successive occasions for presence. This is the annihilation and martyrdom most wished for by the Jesuits, particular during the 16th and 17th centuries. The affected body subject thereby becomes a unit of signification in the process of communication with God.  

51 Thus Baroque representation provides and practices for plastic and discursive spaces for Presence -- from Church architecture to sculpture and painting, to text, to theater and actor, with implications for cinema and even technological developments -- to the recipient body itself as a receptacle, or even tomb, for the Christ. Here the image of the Virgin and the metaphor of the womb become appropriate for Baroque representation as both feminine and maternal. The mother is metaphor, or paradigm, for space, and the making of a space, whether plastic or linguistic, is ultimately a figuration of the mother. In fact, Ignatius speaks of his own experiences as "mystical invasion", that is as if he were a receptacle for God's presence. We could see the move from "being a presence in" to "becoming a space for presence", what we shall

49 Christine Buci-Glucksmann sees Baroque art as "travaillé du vide", or worked through by absence whose contours are traced by the Baroque's sinuous forms. See La Folie du voir. De l'esthétique baroque. (Paris: Galilée, 1986).

50 The establishment of religious sites is contained in this very process.

51 "le chiffre immédiat du désir, c'est, bien entendu, le corps humain; corps sans cesse mobilisé dans l'image par le jeu même de l'imitation qui établit une analogie littérale entre la corporeité de l'exercitant et celle du Christ, dont il s'agit de retrouver l'existence, presque physiologique, par une anamnèse personnelle." R.Barthes, Sade Fourier Lovola, 67. Emphasis is our own. This can also indicate infused contemplation, with corporal signs.

later examine in the religious terms of "Immensity" and "Inhabitation", in terms of gender, as a move from the phallic and masculine, to the uterine and feminine. Thus this becoming of a feminine space accommodates both the masculine and the feminine subject, and we can say with Claude-Gilbert DuBois that, "Alors que les anges gothiques étaient asexués, ceux du Baroque sont sursexués."\textsuperscript{53} This space as metaphorized by the maternal and uterine, is not only one of transpective, but is also one of \textit{an exchange of flesh}. Both are facilitated and indicated by corporal affectivity — tears are the most frequent example in the case of St. Ignatius, and are among what he considers his signs from God. To speak \textit{from} (presence in) and \textit{as} (vessel for) this space\textsuperscript{54} would then be \textit{to speak with the language of the mother}, of sorts.\textsuperscript{55}

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Baroque representation as a space for an exchange of the flesh, and as the means thereby to knowledge of self and other, Mother or God, leads us forward 300 years to consider the second most important place, in our opinion, for a challenge to


\textsuperscript{54} The study of prepositional usage and flux in Baroque mystical and religious discourse and from presence to space to the renewed beckoning forth of presence — for example, from following the Christ, to being with Him and suffering His corporality, to following Him again — will be of great interest and should prove useful for mapping the transition from perspective to transpective. Let us further note that in Ignatian Spirituality and Baroque literary aesthetic, it is never a question of the iconoclast, mystical silence, of the prayer of quiet, or of the impossibility of figuration.

\textsuperscript{55} Legend has it that the \textit{Spiritual Exercises} were dictated to Ignatius of Loyola by the Virgin Mary, in the grotto at Manresa. The symbolism of this unproven popular belief, often depicted in painting, is evident here. Paul Dudon, S.J., \textit{St. Ignatius of Loyola}, trans. Wm.J. Young (Milwaukee: Bruce Pub.Co., 1949) 203. The Kristevian notion of the \textit{chora} will prove useful here. The \textit{chora} as a kind of pre-Oedipal, pre-linguistic receptacle, based upon the corporal relation to the mother and physico-motricial drives towards object(s) of need or desire, while of problematic or ephemeral presence, is yet the eventual source to the Semiotic and the Kristevian sense of the subject. See \textit{La Révolution du langage poétique}, 22-30. We might also consider here the discourse of hysteria.
Cartesian mind/body dualism and corporal and affective repression, and which provides a focal point for the NeoBaroque aspect of the Postmodern rupture, in the thought of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (+1908,-1961).

With Merleau-Ponty's Philosophy of Phenomenology, we find ourselves once again directly within French thought. Phenomenology, as the difficult search for Dasein,\textsuperscript{56} disclosure, sensual presence, the spectacle of incarnate being or resurrected body, is conceived by Merleau-Ponty in terms of the conscious, lived body which invests itself in a world of things, situations and representations through the very act of perceiving them, and which is invested by them in turn. He qualifies the perceiving subject as a fold of flesh for the object of its perception, and as a malleable texture for the world in which it engages itself and with which it is in constant metamorphosis:

Je suis des yeux les mouvements et les contours des choses mêmes, ce rapport magique, ce pacte entre elles et moi selon lequel je leur prête mon corps pour qu'elles y inscrivent et me donnent leur ressemblance, ce pli, cette cavité centrale du visible qui est ma vision.

And "comme les choses visibles sont les plis secrets de notre chair, et notre corps, pourtant, l'une des choses visibles".\textsuperscript{57} This corporal exchange with the objects of perception engages the urge to speak. Starting from the distanciated vision of the realist and perspectival situation, the viewer uses his real situation and imagination to cross over to touch and the other senses, and is thereby corporally engaged, and


ultimately affectively engaged, as a sentient object amidst that which he attempts to discover, never finished with the task of perception as well.\textsuperscript{58} This involvement of the body in the objects of its perception, "dans le grand spectacle" as he says,\textsuperscript{59} in the search from within the visible for knowledge, or even for fragile, otherly, death-circumscribed presence, is captured by Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the \textit{chiasm}.\textsuperscript{60}

The perceiving body-subject risks the unity and delimitation of self to know the other, entering even death’s tomb to know and to find presence. When it sees, it is seen; when it violates the other’s space, its own is violated in turn; when it finds being, that being is also its own; when it reaches out to save the other, it saves its lost itself. This phenomenological search through loss of self in the other and in the transgression of form is a chiasmic engagement which involves the body with the mind, and involves the complexities of the real.\textsuperscript{61}

The sensual, chiasmic exchange or relation of perceiving body to world and others is not only an urgent call to linguistic expression, but is facilitated by language as well, as dialectic is a means of transcendence beyond the limits of self and of exchange with the other. According to Merleau-Ponty, words are proferred with an intended signification, yet once spoken and received, they profit from available or


\textsuperscript{59} \textit{Le Visible et l’invisible}, 83.

\textsuperscript{60} Merleau-Ponty, \textit{Le Visible et l’invisible}, 152-3, and particularly the entire chapter “L’Entrelacs–le chiasm”, 172-204.

\textsuperscript{61} Merleau-Ponty, \textit{La Phénoménologie de la perception} (Paris: Gallimard, 1945) 269-70, 365. Paradoxically, this chiasmic engagement can provide a space for the criminal and the traumatic, as well as for the ethical.
possible significations as if from a fortune or treasure. In this manner, communication via language, from emission to reception, calls forth the investment of being, others and living sense: "la parole [...] cette ouverture toujours recréée dans la plénitude de l'être", and also "les mots fraient un passage dans le corps". Thus linguistic expression works out of and back into the real of corporal existence and sensual perception for all parties to the communication.

Merleau-Ponty’s critique of Descartes’ dismissal of the body in attaining the *Cogito*, his reintegration of the body into perception, his Philosophy of the *chiasm*, carnal exchange and dialogue between flesh and world, and self and other, all serve to break down the Classical delimitations of the subject/recipient, his mode of perception, and his opinion of and attitude towards the use and functionings of language. In our opinion, Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology can thereby be brought together with Baroque vision, and reopens a space for a NeoBaroque. Thus our nuancing of a Postmodern path that takes the way of the problematic investment into the real as an homologous space for Baroque aesthetic is best focussed upon and expressed in terms of Merleau-Ponty’s thought, which provides what is for us the Philosophical basis for confirming a return of the Baroque.

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From St. Ignatius of Loyola to Maurice Merleau-Ponty, the step is a long one. However, it is their types of integrations of the body, its affectivity, the world and

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referentiality in its myriad senses which make cohesive sense of the many elements of Baroque aesthetic with whose enumeration we have begun, and their objective of capturing presence, thus providing the conceptual parameters for our studies herein. We shall show throughout the following analyses of Baroque aesthetic and its return, these elements in relationship with the status of the body and its affectivity both represented and addressed; the body’s and perception’s stance in perspectival to transpectival terms and the place of the body and affectivity in perception, cognition and knowledge; the manipulation of this place by the artwork; and finally the play between the imaginary and the real in the creation of a textual space for presence. We shall see the specifics of Baroque corporality and affectivity, in contexts from the religious to the philosophical to aesthetic to the rhetorical to the poetic, through such authors and artists as René Descartes, Pierre Gassendi, Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jacques Lacan, Julia Kristeva, Jacques Derrida, Jean-Joseph Goux, Jean-François Lyotard, Simon Vouet, Eustache Le Sueur, René Magritte, Agrippa d’Aubigné, Blaise Cendrars and Claude Simon.

The spatial folding up of time on the part of our transsecular vision of Baroque aesthetic brings us to several critical considerations upon the use of History: the historical overview of a cyclical, waxing and waning order similar to Hegel’s portrayal in his Aesthetics; Foucauldian epistemological shifts, or "histoire des mentalités"; the Annales School’s "histoire à longue durée"; and the technique of St. Ignatius’ spiritual method itself, in its implications for historical practice, with its
imaginary focus upon, plunging into and ultimately acting out to make carnally and affectively present past moments in the history and myth of Christianity.

In both St. Ignatius’ meditative method and Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical vision, Classicism, its roots and its prolongations are all circumvented in such a way as to allow us to better understand Baroque themes and techniques around the focal points of corporality, affectivity, gestuality, and physical, existential engagement, as ways of calling forth presence in all the manners we have developed it to this point -- from God to the Christ to the material world and existence, to the individual, corporal, affected self -- and transpectival participation with presence, from within presence, and as presence. These authors privilege carnality and affectivity as access not only to the past and to the future, but to a present as a living, a reliving, and a representing which captures all three temporal modes, thereby spatially condensing the passage of time. The Baroque work, concerned with its dynamic reception, calls out to presence and the referent, and to the provision or sacrifice of the self as referent in the reception of the work and ultimately in the work, as problematic and precarious as these may be. This is a call to the problematic and wonderful vibrance of life, to the contagion and reliving of fervor and feeling, to the passion of Being, even when couched in death, and particularly so, as there the search for Presence is most difficult and crucial, and affectivity is there most engaged and unleashed. We shall even venture to say that transpectival starce necessitates the passage through death.
With St. Ignatius of Loyola and Maurice Merleau-Ponty as our parameters, we would like finally to say that Baroque aesthetic and reaction to it creates a string of body-points -- corporal attitudes, carnal risks, situational and affective engagements, spatially or linguistically-gestured affectivity -- towards knowledge and experience in successive presencing, or a "chain of representations". We can trace such Baroque corporal attitudes as beckoned by a chain of representations, throughout French thought, arts and letters in the Baroque age and in the 20th century. Such tracings of representationally-embedded corporal attitudes serve in effect to illustrate an unending chain of representations, or intertextualities, or readings which work with the very torsions of Baroque forms, with the errancy of traversing infinite distance via the acrobatics of metaphor, metonymy and form, and with the chaotic motion of the perpetual phenomenological searching for Presence -- a search at once Baroque and Postmodern -- in the work. Let us then embark upon this Baroque peripety.
I. SPIRITUALITY & THE BAROQUE: ST. IGNATIUS OF LOYOLA'S (+1491,-1556) SPIRITUAL EXERCISES (1522-1548)¹

Since the fifth century, Spirituality has been considered, in a religious sense as opposed to a carnal or an animal sense, as the relation of the realities of life to the spirit of God, and the elaboration of a real presence to this spirit. As presented by Hughes de St. Victor (†1147), the practice of Spirituality can involve activities such as cogitation, or the consciousness of spiritual life, meditation, or the practice of living this life, and contemplation, or the passive beatitude which comes from this life lived.² Well before Christianity and back so far as Antiquity, Spirituality has been considered a way of being, a way of knowing or philosophizing, and a way of living or an ethos. The elaboration of a spiritual relation can take purgative, illuminative and unitive paths, as illustrated by St. Bonaventure (†1274). For St. Thomas Aquinas (†1274), Spirituality is an asceticism -- a practice of mental focus and physical privation or control, and it can be the basis for establishing social order. It can be traced along a theoretical and dualistic path, from Indian spirituality, to Plato, to

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¹ A condensed version of this study was presented under the title "Spatial Appropriation and Aesthetic Manipulation in Ignatius of Loyola's Spiritual Exercises", in Dr. Albert S. Cook's session "Appropriations of Renaissance Space" at the 1996 ISSEI Conference on "Memory, History & Critique: European Identity at the Millennium", August 19-24, Utrecht, The Netherlands.

² Spirituality as a meditative activity will particularly concern us, as we analyze and form our method of examining the Baroque and its return through Ignatius of Loyola's Spiritual Exercises.
Plotinus, to the Stoics, to Augustine, to the monastic practice of the Middle Ages, through to Protestantism, and to René Descartes and Johann Fichte. One important question we shall ask and address in considering Spirituality within the religious Baroque context is whether and to what extent Spirituality must be an asceticism which rejects the body and its affectivity, and even engagement in human society, as in the Christian monasticism of the Middle Ages, and how the use of the corporal and the affective become part of a Baroque Spirituality. For Spirituality can also be seen, inasmuch as it is a state applied to life, as how the body is affected by the spirit, and how corporality can cultivate such spiritual affection — a definition which menaces any dualist conceptions of Spirituality. And finally, the particular vision of Spirituality influences of course the activities and type of relations which are put into relief.

In the Baroque period in France, such a panorama concerning the question of the spiritual life was captured by the Jansenist versus the Jesuit controversy which revolved around the question of grace, as a God-given gift which comes down and imposes itself upon the life of the elect, and around the question of the freedom to act, that is of the role human will and existence play in forging a relation to God and in actively inviting grace, as well as by the controversy concerning Quietism and abridged, quick-and-easy methods to spiritual union. The following spiritual positions vis-à-vis salvation, in reappearance and elaboration in the 16th century during the Lutheran and Catholic Reforms, and in debate at the first session of the Council of Trent from 1546 to 1547, are telling: where Lutheranism, Calvinism and Jansenism
from within French Catholicism, all based salvation upon grace alone, and where at
the opposite end of the spectrum Pelagianism, which began in fourth-century Rome,
based salvation upon the natural force to act alone, regardless of the gift of grace,
_Catholicism as strengthened through Tridentine reform efforts, based salvation upon
the mutual and cooperative workings of grace with worldly acts._ This is significant
as Tridentine Spirituality would transform the tradition of the spiritual hermit of the
Middle Ages at a distance from society, as in the _Devotio Moderna_ of the 15th
century which, although it did not refuse the spiritually active and engaged life,
nonetheless hierarchised the contemplative life over it, a tradition which was inherited
by Jansenism, and which is even seen by some as a precursor to Protestant reform.
The Tridentine transformation, to include worldly acts in the forging of the spiritual
relationship, was all the more needed as many clerical orders had fallen into
neglectful and abusive practices, resented by the general society, abuses which Luther
would seize upon and severely criticize, and which Catholicism would address,
although not totally solve, in advance of the distinct Counter-Reformation effort.
Tridentine reform brought Spirituality into the midst of the people, into ministry, into
everyday life. Where the monastic asceticism of the Middle Ages was a conquering
of the flesh in order to put it aside, _Tridentine, Baroque Spirituality, as the Ignatian
practice shall exemplify it, conquered the flesh in order to use it._ As we shall see, St.
Ignatius of Loyola’s meditative practice, so much a behaviorism, and his religious

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One of the major criticisms by the Protestant movement began by attacking external religious gestures,
rites and habits of reverence such as fasting, pilgrimages, veneration of relics, invocation of saints and
the sale of indulgences, and extended itself into an attack upon acts of worldly service and charity.
order accomplish this step into a new religious era, which both comes from and
profits from, and yet supplants the *Devotio Moderna* of the 14th and 15th centuries.
Indeed the Jesuit Order garnered men in order that they might serve Catholic culture
on a worldwide basis.

These various Christian positions on a spiritual life aimed at salvation reveal
differing conceptions about man -- conceptions which influence Philosophies of
perception and knowledge, and the cultural production of the Arts and Letters, as well
as Spirituality. On the one hand a dualist conception divides man along the lines of
spirit (soul and mind) versus corporality and existence, and on the other a monism
finds a spirit united to corporality and existence. The Protestant influence and
position on grace takes one side of the dualist position, whereas the Pelagian, almost
libertine materialism takes the other. It is the monist view of man upon which the
Catholic reform is dependent as its very philosophical and spiritual basis, a view
justified by its foundation in the Humanity of Christ. This view works with the
Thomist vision of man which it revived along with all of Aquinas' work, and with the
Jesuit Philosophy which best implements it, and which shall be integral to a
Tridentine, religious Baroque vision.

Beyond these panoramas, positions and controversies, the following general
questions can be asked in order to evaluate the topic of Spirituality throughout
religious contexts and historical periods: What is the position of the subject towards
God or the spiritual other/object? What does love do to this subject? What faculty or
sense knows the spiritual other/object? Is it an intelligence devoid of corporality? Is
it an organ of perception? Is it a combination of the two? What would it mean to be 
spiritual with the body, or without it? What is the relation between perception and 
Spirituality? Do the aesthetics of religion and culture educate manners of perception 
and of Spirituality? And if so, how so? That is, how do Art, Discourse and Religion 
facilitate not only each other, but a spiritual life? Do some manners of perception 
lead more persons to a Spirituality and to God than others? Is spiritual perception 
culturally taught, or individually chosen? What kind of relations and reverberations 
exist between sensible perception and spiritual perception? What does it mean to say 
that "Dieu se proportionne à l'âme qui le reçoit"?4

In this general overview of the topic of Spirituality, what we wish to be able to 
establish is that there is a specific Baroque Spirituality, and what its particularities are 
as established and begun by St. Ignatius of Loyola in the wake of the Counter-
Reformation. A Spirituality whose particularity is cultural, pedagogic, aesthetic, 
discursive, to include imaginative tactics and a corporal behaviorism. A Spirituality 
which is a way of knowing, a way of loving, a way of representing and receiving, a 
way of writing, reading and speaking, and a way of acting towards others. And a 
Spirituality which can also transcend time and place and religious context to possess 
the individual, despite societal norms.

And thus we shall keep in mind the following questions throughout our 
analysis: How do the Spiritual Exercises put into place an Ignatian Spirituality?

4 See the articles "Spiritualité" and "Sens spirituels", in Dictionnaire de spiritualitéascétique 
et mystique, sous la direction de Marcel Viller, S.J., assisté de F.Cavallera, et J.de Guibert, S.J., 17 
What is this Spirituality? How is it a continuation of the Christian spiritual tradition of the Middle Ages? How does it bring something new to this spiritual tradition, particularly to the meditative genre? What is its relation to Renaissance Humanism? Are the Spiritual Exercises the practice of an asceticism, or of a sensualism? To what extent, where and how? In what specific way do the Spiritual Exercises focus upon the imitation of the historical-mythical life of Christ, from canonical closure to imitative "ouverture"? What relation do they pose between History and Presence? What does the imitative practice they put forth do to the subject, to his cognitive perception and his sense of the real, to his existence and to his emotions? Is their practice an aesthetic experience? What does it do to the subject's imaginary capacities and sense? Does it put into place a rhetoric and a poetics? Does it teach love? Does it teach an ethics? Do the Spiritual Exercises, in summary, put into place a culture? If so, what are the modes of communication (production and reception), the techniques and the topoi of this culture? How do they work with Counter-Reformation efforts and the pronouncements of the Council of Trent? How are they essential to the constitution of the Baroque épistémè? And finally, how can we take these beyond the arena of Jesuit Spirituality and Catholic faith?

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5 The question of presence in Spirituality remained a focus in 16th-century spiritual writing, we would like to think in part because of the influence of the Spiritual Exercises, but also because of some of the issues raised by religious schism and by the Council of Trent. This focus upon presence gave many results, from the prayer of Quiet and abridged spiritual practice, to the emphasis upon corporality, affectivity and love, as seen in the Spiritual Exercises, and later in the works of St. François de Sales. See the article "Présence de Dieu", in Dictionnaire de spiritualité.
A. Ignatius of Loyola's Beginnings & the Writing of the *Spiritual Exercises*

Ignatius of Loyola (+1491, -1556) began his vocational life as a chivalrous soldier of the Spanish nobility, valiant in his physical exploits and motivated by the tradition of courtly love. His lifestyle was one straight out of the tradition of the Middle Ages. In May of 1521 as a participant in the military occupation of Nájera for its duke, he led a garrison of troops to Pamplona. There, as he defended the castle against siege by the French, he was gravely wounded in the right leg. It was poorly set by the French doctors who were readily available, and would have to be broken again and reset during a long and extremely painful convalescence at the town of Loyola, during which time he was given the last sacraments. He asked for reading material to pass the time, hoping to obtain some of the chivalrous romances such as *Amadis of Gaul* (14th century) that were then in fashion, romance comparable to his own lifestyle until then and which served him as a textual model for imitation.

All available to him, however, was devotional reading -- the lives of the saints by Jacobus de Voragine (*Flos Sanctorum* or *The Golden Legend*, 1255) and the *Vita Christi* (14th century) of the Carthusian Ludolph of Saxony. His imitative relation to and reception of the text would remain, nonetheless -- initially spanning a Middle Ages and Renaissance aesthetics of mimetism and realism -- and provoke within Ignatius a conversion: his life vocation would henceforth be to imitate the lives of the saints and, as the saints had done, of the Christ. His ill health forced a meditative rhythm of study upon him: short bouts of reading, with intervals of rest where he
could contemplate a fragment of text. And his relation to the text would become more arduous and arderous than ever, as the texts concerned were no longer fictionalized accounts, but historical ones to the man of faith, which he would seek to make present through his own life, from history to presence, and from the temporal to the spatial, via the imagination. His objective was to live within the parameters of the example of Christ, particularly with a consciousness of His Passion, death and a sacrifice of self that would be redemptive of others. This objective, indeed, was to be in the life of the Christ, thereby to be in the text, as the result of a great love, and a love which leads to charity.

This relation to religious and saintly texts would form Ignatius' own work, the Spiritual Exercises, in which he would put into place the very techniques of practice which, based upon his own experience, encourage what is initially an imitative relation to the narrated life of Christ, a relation which parallels that of the saints whose lives he read. This is in effect a lived meditation of the Evangelical word, almost as an actor taking up a role. Ignatius detailed his own experiences during the reading spent while convalescing in a fashion which makes them a systematic practice revolving around the story of the life of Christ, and a practice to be given to others. He would draft the essential entirety and substance of the Spiritual Exercises during the next two years following his convalescence, not as a learned man of books, but while living a life of ascetic privation, penance and prayer at Manresa.

En route to Manresa from Loyola, he sojourned in March of 1522 at the abbey of Montserrat, where he would offer his weapons at the altar of the Virgin, and where
in the abbey’s fervent atmosphere he also became familiar with its methodic
meditation in the tradition of the *Devotio Moderna*, a practical, hierarchised mysticism
exemplified by Thomas à Kempis’ *Imitatio Christi* (1418), and with the *Exercitatorio
de la vida espiritual* (1500) of García de Cisneros. This latter practice was
transmitted to him under the spiritual direction of Jean Chanones, who was of French
origin, and with whom he would remain in contact. Thus Ignatius underwent his first
spiritual exercises -- those of Cisneros -- at Montserrat.6 García de Cisneros, the
abbot of Montserrat’s Benedictine Monastery who had passed away before Ignatius’
passage there, had also been involved in the publication and distribution of foreign
spiritual writings. Although Ignatius could not read Latin at the time of his stay at
Montserrat, and his stay was short as well, he could nonetheless have been exposed to
further authors than we can detail here, or have received suggestions for further
reading from Chanones himself and from Cisneros’ work.7 Cisneros recommended
the notation of spiritual matters and details during the practice of his exercises; in
effect his text was generative, as it gave a formula for the writing of one’s own

6 “En aquesta atmosfera densa d’ascetisme i saturada d’amor a l’oració metòdica penetrà
Ignasi l’any 1522. Feia just dotze anys que havia traspasset el gran abat Garsias de Cisneros. Cada
dia era més venerada la memòria de les seves virtuts i més estimat el record del seu mestratge. Pere
de Burgos, més que deixeble predilecte, germà menor de Cisneros, presidi el moment àlgid de
l’espiritualitat montserratina; segà la messa que sembrà el seu mestre i amic.” Anselm M. Albareda,
*Sant Ignasi a Montserrat* (Barcelona: Monestir de Montserrat, 1935) 109.

7 See Henri Watrigant, S.J., “La Genèse des Exercices de St. Ignace de Loyola”, *Etudes
religieuses* 71 (avril-mai-juin 1897): 506-592; 72 (juillet-août-sept 1897): 195-228; 73 (oct-nov-dec
1897). On García de Cisneros and his sources in particular, (73) 199-211. Watrigant goes so far as to
suggest that Ignatius probably read Gérard de Zutphen’s *Ascensions spirituelles* and Jean Mombaer’s
Rosetum. See also Pierre Grout, *Les Mystiques des Pays-Bas et la littérature espagnole du seizième
suggests that Ignatius read the Rules of St. Benoit, the *Vita Patrum*, St. Gregory, the *Flores Sanctorum*,
the *Vita Christi* of Ludolph the Carthusian, and most certainly the *Exercitatorio* of Cisneros. *Sant Ignasi
a Montserrat*, 131-136.
exercises. Ignatius dutifully followed this suggestion by noting in a small book which meditations provoked within him the greatest contrition, and thus the writing of his *Spiritual Exercises* was inspired and begun.⁸

Embarrassed by the attention and reverence his exceeding penitence and spiritual nature was being given by the monks at Montserrat, Ignatius would move on to the peace and quiet of Manresa, where he lived on his own in a cave, to finish the practice and accomplish the task of writing what would ultimately be his own text of spiritual method. Thus we can say that the *Spiritual Exercises* were begun by the relation to the text as mediation to God, and by a gesture of great humility. Ignatius’ writing as well as his exercises were supervised and directed by Chanones, and thus he avoided any errors to which his lack of theological education might have led. During the following years of study at Barcelona, Alcalà and Paris, Ignatius would continue to work upon, embellish and organize the basic text of his *Spiritual Exercises*, and several manuscript versions were written until approximately 1540. The text was given in a vulgate Latin version to the Roman censor for review and its first printing with a preface by Polanco, in 1548.⁹

The following schematic representation of the remainder of Ignatius of Loyola’s life shows the results of his radical relation to the religious text and to the

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narrative of the life of Christ. After the probable composition of the *Spiritual Exercises* in 1522 at Manresa, as well as a *Treatise on the Trinity*, he left for Jerusalem, a pilgrimage which would take from 1523 to 1524. According to Codina, he took a writing tablet with him and possibly continued the writing of the *Spiritual Exercises* there. Upon his return, from 1524-1527 he studied Latin and Grammar in Barcelona and then Philosophy at Alcalà, where he began to give his exercises and to teach on theological matters. Afterwards he would go on to Salamanca. During this time, he was arrested twice by the Inquisition, in Alcalà and in Salamanca. Although no fault was found with the *Spiritual Exercises* themselves, he was required to study Theology and to become officially diplomaed, and was until then denied permission to further give the exercises and to teach. It was then, in September 1527, that he promptly left for study at the University of Paris. In Paris from 1527 to 1534, the first friends and followers formed around him, and received from him the *Spiritual Exercises*. In August of 1534, they all took vows of a life of poverty and chastity at the chapel at Montmartre. They also swore to make a pilgrimage to Jerusalem; but should this not have been possible, to give direct and immediate allegiance to the Pope. And this is indeed what happened, in Rome in 1538. Thus the first group formed about Ignatius on Parisian soil, and his spiritual mission found its direction, more than ten years after his conversion, vocational change, and the initial drafting of

10 Tradition has it that they were dictated to him by the Virgin Mary, of whom Ignatius had a vision with the infant Jesus in her arms at the cave of Manresa.

the Spiritual Exercises. In 1535, he would be obligated to leave Paris and return to Spain for health reasons. He was ordained as a priest in Venice, in 1537; and it would take him 18 months of preparation before he would allow himself to say Mass. His experience with the sacrifice of the Mass, particularly interesting for the recounting of his affective engagement in spiritual life, is told in his Spiritual Diary.

On September 27, 1540, Paul III officially approved the Society of Jesus. Attainment of this approval had proven to be quite a difficulty, given the Vatican's reluctance to create new Orders in light of the atmosphere of heresy and criticisms of corruption and decadence amidst the clerics. On March 10, 1541, Ignatius began the drafting of the Constitutions of the Society, which were finished from 1542 to 1544. He wrote his Spiritual Diary from February to March of 1544, and dictated his autobiography from 1553 to 1555. July 30, 1556, marks the date of his death. He was canonized by Gregory XV on March 12, 1622, was proclaimed the patron of spiritual retreats on July 25, 1920, by Benedict XV, and was proclaimed the Patron Saint of all Spiritual Exercises and related works by Pius XI on July 25, 1922.

1. The Meditative Genre

It would be appropriate to generally examine the Christian tradition of the meditative genre here, before going on to analyze St. Ignatius' Spiritual Exercises, in order to best situate and highlight the specific factors at work in his practice of meditation. As an important kind of spiritual activity, meditation is a set of practices -- an askesis\textsuperscript{12} or an "acting out" -- such as methodic prayer and discursivity,
visualisation, physical and mental techniques of discipline and their effects, all of which foster the spiritual relationship, particularly in the work of man as presence towards God, and in the terms of a mutual presencing between man and God.

*Spiritual exercises*, which in the Christian context shall be embodied and defined by the Ignatian practice, *practice or "act out" a presence to God*. They can be the account of the author's meditation, while also a guide for spiritual directors and for the reception and practice of others.

Unlike the practice of mysticism, which aims at emptying out all mental activity and images, meditation *fills* the mind with guided or specific images, activity, and language, and maintains a sentient connection. Meditation can also lead to a mystical state or union, and in many such meditative practices -- those considered "ascensional", aimed at mystical union while negligent of the goal of charitable service -- the use of the image, language and prayer is considered to be a crutch for beginners, to be left behind once the objectives are easily attained.\(^\text{13}\) In the Judeo-Christian context, a meditatively-conditioned awareness privileges Scripture and

\(^{12}\) *Askesis* is the greek root for "exercise", however, by the term "ascetism" derived from this root we specifically refer to the Middle Ages concept of spiritual exercise and monastic rigors as a *privative* discipline which punishes and represses the corporal, and flees the relation to others and society.

\(^{13}\) This is the case for the 17th-century practice of the facile mysticism, known as Quietism in France, which had its roots in Spanish Illuminism, and against which Bossuet spoke. During Ignatius' early elaboration and use of his *Spiritual Exercises*, the Spanish Inquisition, wary of Illuminism as heretical, feared Ignatius' practice to be in the same vein. In such times of confusion and variance about Christian doctrine, all new spiritual practice was suspect, and its enterprise of heroic proportions. Each of the two times Ignatius was brought before the Inquisition with the manuscript of his *Exercises*, any intimation of a heretical, facile mysticism was quickly dissipated. In fact, the subordination to and address of the *Spiritual Exercises* to directors already chosen by the Church dispersed suspicion of libertine or individualist factors prominent in Illuminism and Quietism.
particularly the life of Christ by keeping present to mind and heart Scriptural word, narrative and scene, and is eventually aimed at their imitation and incarnation by the personal life and self, whence the Eucharisto-centric concept of "la manducation de la parole" -- an actual digestion, incorporation and incarnation of the Word as physical presence within the recipient. The individual person as a propitious place and space for the discovery of and forging of a relationship to God is important. A meditation upon the spiritual life is optimally a practice not only towards, but ultimately of this life, and a practice which entails personal abjection,\textsuperscript{14} although not a complete negative moment of dispersion and annihilation of the subject as in Eastern meditation.

The spiritual Baroque subject in particular is present in a radical practice of alterity. Varying degrees of the meditative aim, such as practical steps taken beyond cognition and contemplation, become important considerations when the monastic Orders of the Middle Ages are compared with the practice of pre-schism and pre-Tridentine clerical reform\textsuperscript{15} and of the new Orders of the Counter-Reformation, of which the Jesuit Order and Ignatian Spirituality are an exemplary part.

\textsuperscript{14} See the article "Méditation", in Dictionnaire de spiritualité ascétique et mystique.

\textsuperscript{15} Such reform was practiced at the Dutch Monastery of Windesheim, for example, whose spiritual authors Thomas à Kempis, Gérard de Zutphen and Jean Mombera influenced Ignatius directly, as well as his immediate sources, such as Cisneros, as we shall examine shortly.
2. The Heritage of Spiritual Writings and St. Ignatius’ Sources

We can trace the heritage of the meditative practice of the Middle Ages and its spiritual exercises as they came down to Ignatius of Loyola, not only through his direct reading, but in the heritage of these authors in turn as well. From St. Bonaventure (†1274) to Jean de Caulli or Pseudo-Bonaventure’s *Meditationes Vita Christi* of the end of the 13th century, to the Carthusian Ludolph of Saxony’s (†1374) *Vita Christi*, which was influenced by de Caulli; from Thomas a Kempis’ (†1471) *Imitatio Christi*, to Garcia de Cisneros’ (†1510) *Exercitatorio de la vida espiritual*, this general heritage contributed to the genre the regular and methodic consideration of the scenes of the life of Christ, in order to encourage a presence to this life.\(^\text{16}\)

Regular, methodical considerations of the life of Christ began to go beyond monastic walls and to enter into the everyday life of Christians of the late Middle Ages, with such practices as the Stations of the Cross, the recitation of the Rosary, preparation for and reception of the Sacraments, and exercises of piety such as regular prayer, confession, holy pilgrimages and visits, and so on -- the very practices the Lutheran reform would question and criticize! The *Spiritual Exercises* were an important part of extending methodical spiritual practice even further, and were addressed to all the faithful, with the spiritual director’s discretion. The question to be kept in mind as we move on to an analysis of St. Ignatius’ *Spiritual Exercises* is how they counselled such considerations of Christ’s life, considerations which are also centrally present to the Ignatian practice, yet in a very specific way. As Pius XI’s proclamation

\(^{16}\) The meditation of the life of Christ was initiated by Bernard de Clairvaux and St. Bonaventure.
confirmed it, St. Ignatius’ practice would prove to be the summit encompassing all others, appropriating to itself the term "spiritual exercises".

Based upon this heritage, we can further examine the genesis of St. Ignatius’ Spiritual Exercises, although it is not within the scope of this study to compare and contrast at length the various sources to his text.\textsuperscript{17} We do know that the style of texts such as the \textit{Vita Christi} and the \textit{Exercitatio}, which are scholarly and almost anthological compilations of the previous heritage of Church authors’ Gospel exegesis, is typical of the erudition of the Middle Ages where the usefulness of the text took precedence over any glory of authorship. P. Dudon points out that Ignatius of Loyola was not himself a savant, nor a cultured student drawn to books at the time of the basic outlining of the \textit{Spiritual Exercises} at Manresa, and that he did not hesitate to glean from work prior to his own.\textsuperscript{18} With the continued elaboration of the exercises throughout Ignatius’ period as a student of Theology and his habit of noting down all that was useful to him in his own continuing spiritual experience, the \textit{Spiritual Exercises} resulted in a practical work, easily accessible to the

\textsuperscript{17} Some of this work has already been done, particularly with Cisneros' \textit{Exercitatio}. See "Fontes Externos: Cisneros Exercitatorium" in \textit{Exercitio Spiritualia Santi Ignatii de Loyola et Eorum Directoria}, ed. A. Codina, (Madrid-Rome: MHSI, 1919); and H. Wattrigant, "La Genèse des Exercices de St. Ignace de Loyola", no. 73, 201-207. Some textual comparisons with the \textit{Flos Sanctorum}, the \textit{Vita Christi}, and the \textit{Exercitatio} can also be found in Codina, 134-140, 145-142, 223-244, 265-282.

\textsuperscript{18} P. Dudon, \textit{Ignatius of Loyola}, 201. P. Lainez stated that the substance of the \textit{Spiritual Exercises} was written at Manresa, and embellished afterwards, as noted by Cândido de Dalmases, S.J., "Histoire de la rédaction des \textit{Exercices Spirituels}, 1522 à 1588", in Ignace de Loyola, \textit{Texte autographe des \textit{Exercices Spirituels}} (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1986) 14. Jeronimo Nadal also confirms this, as remarked by H. Pinard de la Boullaye, \textit{Les Etapes de la rédaction des \textit{Exercices} de St. Ignace} (Paris: Beauchesne, 1950) 6-7. According to Nadal, the \textit{Spiritual Exercises} were not even outlined at Manresa; rather, Ignatius used a compilation of excerpts from P. LaPuente, Cisneros, Mombaer, and other spiritual authors. In A. Codina, \textit{Los Orígenes de los \textit{Ejercicios espirituales} de S. Ignacio de Loyola. Estudio Historico}, 68. Unfortunately, Ignatius’ notebooks have never been available.
director/reader, and meant to be used and to lead to engagement and service. It did not result in an erudite theological treatise aimed at a contemplative reception and a monastic, ascensional Spirituality. P.Dudon affirms, "We can be certain that there is not a notation made by Iñigo of the text of Ludolph, or of Thomas à Kempis, which has not been proved by his own personal experience."19 At the end of the Middle Ages, and at the beginning of a new religious age, not to mention a new vision of the world, what Ignatius brought above all to the tradition of meditation was the true exercise in spiritual exercise: the living, present reception of and entering into the spiritual, meditational text. Radical reader response -- being in the text, presence in the work -- begins with Ignatius of Loyola's work, and follows not only linguistically but spatially as well in the Baroque aesthetic it initiates. Let us keep this in mind, as we examine in more detail the spiritual heritage present in the Spiritual Exercises.

Jacobus de Voragine's The Golden Legend (1255) is a compilation of the lives of the saints and the events of the life of Christ drawn from earlier collections. Popular for three centuries, it was a successful tentative to bring Theology to the people and to put forth the ideal of Christian life. De Voragine's childlike faith in the miraculous and priviledging of the marvelous often supplants the erudite or scientific account, yet this is reflective of late Medieval piety, culture and the art which it inspired. It awoke a fervor in the cult of the saints, which in the wake of Humanism would be severely attacked by Protestants and Calvinists. It inspired Ignatius himself

19 P.Dudon, Ignatius of Loyola, 208.
to imitate these exemplary lives which had lived in the path of the life of Christ, and
to borrow Gospel references for his own exercise as well.

Ludolph of Saxony’s *Vita Christi* (mid 14th century) is one of the strongest
sources to Ignatius’ own spiritual practice and exercises. We know that while
recuperating at Loyola, Ignatius copied extensive extracts from the *Vita Christi*, and
carried them with him on to Manresa. The *Vita Christi* inspired and represented the
affective style of piety of the 14th century. It was the most thorough compilation and
popularization thus far of Gospel and Biblical exegesis and teachings of the Church
fathers, to include Bonaventure and Bernard of Clairvaux, and even makes reference
to Cicero and Seneca, all of which Ludolph combined with ascetical teaching and
practice. M.I. Bodenstadt has called it a *Summa Evangelica*, complementary to
Aquinas’ *Summa Theologica*. It was both a technical and a practical document, and
its main objective was to renew and refigure the image of God in man through
techniques such as rememoration, imagination and the visual and aesthetic technique
of "Composition of Place", whose linguistic correlate is the narrated scene. All of
this recalls Ignatius’ technique of presencing in the Christic narrative scene through
the visual and imaginative technique of "Composition of Place", a technique he
borrows, along with Ludolph’s own Gospel references. Ludolph also interrupted
quite long chapters with prayer or *oratio* — contemplative pauses, in which the reader
was to actually practice meditation, to see and marvel at the particular narrated scene,
to affectively engage with it, and to speak with the Christ and other sacred figures,
such as the Virgin Mary, therein.
Thomas à Kempis' *Imitatio Christi* (1418) was exemplary of the movement of the *Devotio moderna* which gave Middle Ages mystical and ascetic spiritual practice a pragmatic dimension. This contemplation and imitation of the life of Christ, which included affectivity, colloquies, and mystical union, along with contempt of worldly things, and yet with ends such as world service in mind, would greatly influence Ignatius. He suggests its reading to the exercitant of the *Spiritual Exercises*, along with the Gospel and the lives of the saints, from the second week on [II.100].

Garcia de Cisneros' *Exercitatorio de la vida espiritual* (1500), also a Christocentric work, was written to encourage monastic reform at Montserrat as well as to form novices and to direct souls, however, in difference with Ignatius, with contemplative ends in mind. It particularly emphasized the habit of meditative practice according to the purgative, illuminative and unitive ways, with specific daily meditations, in contrast with Ignatius' rather open weeks, which emphasize the Passion as the foremost subject of the unitive way of prayer. It retained an erudite scholastic style and an anthological type of presentation, using Gerard de Zutphen's *Ascensions spirituelles* and summarizing such texts as Jean Mombaer's *Rosetum* (1494). This text in particular was key in introducing Ignatius to the heritage of spiritual writers who lead up to methodical meditation.²⁰

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²⁰ "Cisneros estudià fondament els autors ascètics, fins els seus contemporanis. La biblioteca de Montserrat era rica en literatura ascètica-monàstica. Sabem que contenia obres dels sants Augusti, Gregori, Anselm, Bernat, Tomàs; les *Vitae*, les *Collationes i Institutiones Patrum* de Cassià; obres de Cassiodor, de sant Joan Clímac; obres originals o atribuïdes a sant Bonaventura; escrits d'Huc i de Ricard de Sant Víctor, de David d'Augsburg, d'Enric de Palma, de Joan Gerson, de Gerard Zerbolt, de Joan Mombaer, de Joan de Nieder, i moltes d'altres. La selecció de tota aquesta literatura produí l'*Exercitatorio de la vida espiritual*. En aquest llibre no hi ha tres ratsles següides originals de l'abad de Montserrat; però la tria és tan ponderada, l'articulació dels múltiples fragments tan precisa, la fusió global tan perfecta que resulta una obra original, síntesi admirable de tots els mètodes d'oració.
Other techniques and focal points which Ignatius borrowed from the spiritual practice of the Middle Ages are Christocentrism, the examination of conscience, the discernment of good and evil spirits, the election of a way of life, and the use of the Colloquy. Most important for our emphasis upon Ignatius’ practice as a Baroque practice shall be the importance of visualization, imagination, sensation and affectivity to establish the Baroque eclipse of distance, entrance into the Christic immensity, achievement of presencing, and Inhabitation of the self by the Christ. For Ludolph, as for Ignatius, the pious man is one who always keeps in the mind’s eye the image of Christ, and Ignatius’ pilgrimage to Jerusalem most probably came from Ludolph, who suggests this experience of the real decor as a more effective aid to meditation. A second desire for pilgrimage to the Holy Land with the first followers was thwarted, and likewise we can distinguish that while Ludolph’s piety was a part of the 14th century’s tendency towards mimetism and realism in both devotion and art, which fed into the perfected realism of Renaissance perspective, Ignatius compensates for the technical difficulties of visiting the sacred historical site, by stretching the limits of this mimetism and realism to transgress them by placing an even stronger emphasis upon imagination, sensation, affectivity, and the work of corporal-imaginal passage and acting-out, via the excitant’s affectivity, into the realist scene.

insinuats, abocetats o excessivament atomitzats fins al seu temps; amb una segona part pràctica, successió de meditacions ordenades sistemàticament; els exercicis espirituals de Cisneros."

A.M. Albareda, Sant Ignasi a Montserrat, 105-106.

It is not clear, however, that because Jean Chanoine gave Cisneros’ exercises to Ignatius, that Ignatius necessarily read Cisneros’ text, not to mention his sources. And Ignatius did not at the time master Latin. A. Codina himself emphasizes the differences between Cisneros’ and Ignatius’ exercises, listing in particular important activities in the Spiritual Exercises which do not exist at all in Cisneros’ work. A. Codina, Los Orígenes de los Ejercicios espirituales de S. Ignacio de Loyola. Estudio Historico, 173.
trespassing in trompe l'oeil fashion the borders of its frame, so to speak. Realism or the burden of the real shifts thereby from the object to the perceiving, exercizing subject. This makes the very passage from perspective to transpective, from a distance before a real site, to a being within the scene of representation. This is a transition from the mimesis of one focal point — as in Renaissance perspective or the Middle Age’s cruder realism — to the inhabitation from within a multiperspectival immensity, with two focal points and beyond, or from the centered circle to the decentered or pluricentered ellipse which rather mischievously translates itself into a proximity of the two englobed into one single totality, rather than a distance from the one isolated in its circular self.\textsuperscript{21} The excitant is enveloped by the immensity of the Christic scene where he now dwells, and at the same time paradoxically carries it within his inhabited self. "Immensity" and "Inhabitation" are therefore two key concepts for the two phases of the excitant’s and the Baroque stance of presence in the work.\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{21} Let us note the challenge to Renaissance representation to be found in the prominence of the elliptical form in Baroque art, which opens up to enshroud the spectator as second focal point. This passage from mimetism and realism to trompe-l'oeil and anamorphic dwelling from within recalls the double practice within anamorphic art, highly practiced during the period of the historical Baroque, where two representations are encoded into one — one image corresponding to a frontal, perspectivist viewpoint, and an altered image corresponding to either an extremely angled or a mirror-distorted viewpoint from within, which can appear as if by magic as the spectator moves about or exits the room, seems to capture him within its production and representation, and is usually reserved for the more mystical element. See Jurgen Baltruišaitis, Anamorphic Art (New York: Harry N. Abrams, Inc., 1977). Such a doubled representation can account for the transition which takes place in the Ignatian meditative practice, in the transition from the geometrical imagination of decor to Christic presence, particularly via Composition of Place and affective practice. The two and more englobed in one single totality is not unlike the composition of the Baroque dome, whose circular form is filled with the hosts of the many. We are thinking particularly of Correggio’s "Assumption of the Virgin" in the dome of the Parma Cathedral, as well as those of Gaulli and Pozzo in Rome's Il Gesù.

\textsuperscript{22} See the article "Immensité" in Catholicisme, Hier, aujourd’hui, demain, G.Jacquemet, direction (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, ) vol.5, and the article "Inhabitation" in Dictionnaire de spiritualité
We can examine this mystical Ignatian phenomenon in the linguistic terms of signifier/signified/referent, and the homologous trinitarian terms of Symbolic Economy's Symbolic/Ideal-Imaginary/Real, terms further elaborated in the structuralist bent of Jacques Lacan's work in Psychoanalysis.\textsuperscript{23} The closure of the fixed, narrated life of Christ on the level of the signifier or the Symbolic, is opened by the transition from an Ideal to an Imaginary realm, thanks to the practice of imagination, sensation and affectivity by the exercitant in his real presence. This contamination of the Symbolic by the Imaginary and Real, in the transition of Gospel narrative from a closed to an open work, is in effect based upon the exercitant who in faith takes upon himself the burden of the real, exercises the imaginary and enters with them both into the signifier/Symbolic realm.\textsuperscript{24} Its verity is in the experience of his presence to it. The exercitant himself becomes the mediator between the referent and the signifier, between the Symbolic and the Real. This a most unusual Semiotics! as the real shifts to the status of the subject, that is, \textit{the Ignatian subject is himself the Christic real}, who explodes a centered, simplistic, distanciated realism.\textsuperscript{25} His act of ascétique et mystique, for the religious sense of these terms.


\textsuperscript{24} In Realist, Renaissance or Classicist representation, such an eclipse of distance would be impossible, without entering into Baroque terrain. The Symbolic becomes in this case an open, semiotic field. See Julia Kristeva’s chapter "Sémiotique et symbolique" of \textit{La Révolution du langage poetique}, (Paris: Le Seuil, 1974) 17-100, for a comprehensive view of her theory of the Semiotic, as well as its relation to the feminine.

\textsuperscript{25} Thus Ignatius of Loyola came through an "ascetic aesthetic" of distance which repressed the mimetic subject, to establish a new subject who takes upon himself the burden of the sacred real, and edification shifted from the object to the subject. This is analogous to 20th-century, post-"death-of-the-subject" efforts at an aesthetics of proximity, as Hans Robert Jauss states them, and further supports
memory is an act of the presencing of his very self; he becomes the religious spectacle.

Once Ignatius’ Spiritual Exercises were in place, they were brought to Cologne’s Carthusian monastery by Pierre Favre, who conducted them there and left with them the manuscript he had at hand. From then on, the relation between Carthusian and Jesuit Spiritualities became a confraternal one. For what the heritage of Ludolph of Saxony’s Vita Christi takes away from Ignatius’ originality, the specificity of his practice gives back in resuscitating, reinforcing, amplifying and extending Medieval piety and Renaissance vision at a very needed historical moment and ushering in, along with Baroque art, the hosts of the faithful themselves in the measure of the Christic real and Christian presence. We can say that the Vita Christi lives on in the Spiritual Exercises, and becomes extended into a world-scale project in the work of the Jesuit Order. In summary, what Ignatius brought to the Flos Sanctorum and the Vita Christi, to the Imitation of Christ and the Exercitatio was not so much a rupture with the Christian Spirituality of the Middle Ages and Renaissance vision, as a passage and adaptation into a new religious era necessary to face the atmosphere of Renaissance Humanism and Protestant reform, and a carrying of such factors as imaginative, corporal, sentient and affective Spirituality beyond monasticism and towards a society and service-oriented pragmatism whose spiritual

our reading of the Baroque and its return. See Aesthetic Experience and Literary Hermeneutics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982) 88.

26 M.I.Bodenstedt, SND, AM., The Vita Christi of Ludolphus the Carthusian (Washington: Catholic UP, 1944) 76; article "Ludolphe de Saxe", Dictionnaire de spiritualité ascétique et mystique.
burden had shifted to the subject, with great consequences for thought, culture, art and letters.

3. The Purpose, Presentation and Reception of the *Spiritual Exercises*

In light of Ignatius of Loyola's sources in the spirituality and meditative practice of the Middle Ages, it is then of interest to us to examine firstly the purpose of the *Spiritual Exercises* themselves. As for Ignatius himself, they are meant to lead the exercitant to make a vocational choice or "election", and one in harmony with the ideal and mission of a Christian life -- to give service and glory to God and to save one's soul. At best, they recruit to the Jesuit Order itself, and to its apostolic mission. And they were meant to reform clerical life by their own irreproachable example, a mission important in light of the troubles within Catholicism and with the Protestant Reform and its caustic criticism of the Catholic clergy. They were also meant to help the exercitant to distinguish between good and evil, and to withstand life's physical and spiritual trials.

As a meditative practice opposed to monastic exhortation, they use concrete factors such as perception, visualization, sensation, corporality and ultimately affectivity to realize the individual presence to the enveloping immensity of the life of Christ and inhabitation both within this life and this life from within the exercitant's presence, and to realize the objectives of vocational choice. It is this ultimate emphasis upon *the historical reality of the life of Christ, presence to it, and the*
manner in which this presence is realized which made the Spiritual Exercises an important tool not only to cause to further evolve the Spirituality of the Middle Ages and to challenge and extend Renaissance religious representation and its concommittant Humanism and Reform, but also as a tool for Counter-Reformation efforts. The importance of the real aspects of sacramentality and missal sacrifice, and presence to these realities, the iconophile belief in representation as means to the Spiritual, the merit of both ritual practice and charitable acts in hand with this belief and in relation to grace are all important factors in the Council of Trent’s pronouncements. These factors, attacked by Protestant Reform, are already in place and upheld by the practice of the Spiritual Exercises, which were approved shortly after Trent’s opening. Where Protestantism is about a spiritual passivity and intellection isolated from the world, Trent’s pronouncements and their Ignatian support are about Catholic performance and world-embedded spiritual intellection, that is, an engagement in the spirit of Christic presence.
The Spiritual Exercises were addressed to spiritual directors to read, embellish with brief narration according to Scripture, and administer to the faithful. They consist of four weeks of prescribed meditations. As such, they do not exactly correspond to the Middle Ages tradition of a tripartite division into the purgative, illuminative and unitive paths, although the first week of meditations which focus upon sin constitute a purgative way, the second week, which focusses upon the active life of Christ, from his birth up to Palm Sunday, is an illuminative way after which a vocational election is to be made in light of the life of Christ, and the fourth week, which revolves around the Resurrection and Ascension, uses the three methods of prayer, and appeals to presence, the Holy Mother and Trinitarian unity, is clearly a

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27 In our quotation of the Spiritual Exercises, we shall use the English translation of Antonio T. DeNicolas, in Powers of Imagining, Ignatius of Loyola (New York: State University of New York Press, 1986) 97-173. This translation is based upon the Autograph text edited by A. Codina in 1928. Our quotations shall refer to the weeks and standard paragraph numbers of the text. The Autograph text, prepared by another hand probably about 1544 and embellished with 32 corrections or additions by Ignatius himself, has always been considered by the Jesuit Order as the base text for the Spiritual Exercises. It would not be published until 1615, as Ignatius wished that only limited copies of the Spiritual Exercises circulate amidst the hands of chosen spiritual directors. Editions of the Autograph text can be found in: Sancti Ignati de Loyola, Exercitia Spiritualia, Monумента Historicа Societatis Jesu, V.100 (Rome: Institutum Historicum Societatis Jesu, 1969). This is the first volume of a new edition of the Exercitia Spiritualia by the MHSI. San Ignacio de Loyola, Obras Completas de San Ignacio de Loyola, editado y anotada por Cándido de Dalmases, S.I. (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristiano, 1963); this Autograph text uses modernized orthography conformed with the 1928 Codina edition. Introduced by Ignacio Iparraguirre, it includes excellent notes and bibliographical references, particularly for studies in French and Spanish; these are systematically repeated in the DeNicolas translation. Ignace de Loyola, Texte autographe des Exercices Spirituels et Documents contemporains, 1526-1615, présentés par Edouard Gueydan, S.J., Collection "Christus" No.60 (Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1986). This edition contains an excellent prefatory text by Cándido de Dalmases, S.J., "Histoire de la rédaction des Exercices spirituels, 1522 à 1548", 11-35. An excellent recent French edition of the writings of Ignatius of Loyola is Ignace de Loyola, Ecrits, traduits et présentés sous la direction de Maurice Giuliani, S.J., Collection "Christus" No.76 (Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1991). The presentation of the Spiritual Exercises is most helpful, as three French translations, based upon the Autograph version of 1544, a 1541 Latin version entitled Versio Prima by Ignatius with the annotations of others, and a final, improved Latin version, or the Vulgate, commanded in 1546-47 once Pontificial acceptance of the Exercises was obtained, of the French Jesuit André des Freux or "Frusius", are juxtaposed, and accompanied by helpful editorial notes.
unitive way. It is the third week, which is focussed about the Passion, which remains ambivalent and can be seen as tending either towards an illuminative or a unitive way. The Exercises begin with annotations to the spiritual director, after which the prescriptions for each week follow. As Ignatius indicates to the spiritual director [I.4, 18], the total duration of the exercises is to last approximately 1 month, however, the duration of each week is loosely prescribed, as for example in the second week, twelve days of exercise and meditation are given! On the other hand, as Ignatius indicates, the first week could visibly be shortened, as the same exercises are to be repeated each day.

Each week of the Spiritual Exercises is comprised of several exercises, usually five, organized throughout the day. Each exercise is to take one hour in time, and to be repeated throughout the days of the week, with variation upon the theme of meditation from day to day, and with entry into Biblical narrative and history after the first week. After this first week of purgation of sin, the term "exercises" is replaced by "contemplation", although we consider Ignatius to use the term loosely. At the end of the four weeks are several lists of "Rules" which provide mental, spiritual and practical guidance to serve throughout the exercises.

28 There is controversy about how to situate the third week. See Jacques Rouwex, S.J., "Le Passage à la troisième semaine de l'Élection à la Cène", in Les Exercices Spirituels d'Ignace de Loyola. Un commentaire littéraire et théologique (Bruxelles, Editions de l'Institut d'Études Théologiques, 1990) 339-345.

29 St. Ignatius also indicates that the number and extent of the exercises be adapted to the exercitant's age, education, capacity and situation in life [I.18-22], and many are only to go through the first purgative week with an aim to increasing the confession of sins and the frequency of communion.
The individual exercises or meditations are basically structured as follows: a preparatory prayer focuses the exercitant's attention upon the proper purpose of the Exercises; up to three Preludes follow, which include the task of historical rememoration of New Testament events (from the second week on), this is a task for narrative memory; a Composition of Place which is the visualization and imagination of the scene or decor to such events, this is a task for visual and spatial reasoning; and an affective request to connect appropriately with the events and scene, often to include a methodic application of the five senses, and in which we learn that each affect has its place, this is a task for emotional will, direction of desire, or impassionment. These steps are to precede all meditations [I.49]. These three steps are analogous to the three powers of the soul of memory, the intellect and the will, and Ignatius is indeed invoking them in the structure of the exercises. The will is the moment which elicits affections [I.3], and is comprehensive of all three powers, to ultimately overtake them all.\(^{30}\) It is in the Preludes that Ignatius gives an important role to spatiality, and directs its appropriation and manipulation. Within the Preludes are several points, or sometimes notes, varying in number, which direct the meditation about the theme and intensify the practice of the Preludes. After the fifth exercise of the first week, they include an application of the five senses to, and thus a corporal investment into New Testament events and the narrated, visualized decor.

After the practice of the Preludes through the various points, a Colloquy is to take place wherein the exercitant engages in direct discourse with the imagined divine

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figure. Here the visualized Christ moves from a third-person, imaginal position to a second-person, discursive position to which the exercitant is immediately and personally accountable in a first-person voice. It is here that the exercitant finds a most stable subjectival position, however the conditions of such a position are to be examined. Language thus comes only after historical and narrative (Real), and spatial and affective (Imaginary) situations and ties are established by the exercitant, although once these ties are in place Ignatius indicates that they can be used at any time. The Colloquy is a final, coded, and reasoned (Symbolic) confirmation of the position of the exercitant-subject, who has in the period of one exercise made a triadic, Trinitarian passage from the Real, to the Imaginary to the Symbolic dimensions of faith which maintains a copresence of all three dimensions. Not surprisingly, the Colloquy always ends with the confirmation and seal of language, and a recuperation (which is not a suppression, and not a Protestantism!) of the Real and the Imaginary within a Symbolic and Patriarchal order, with the recitation of the "Our Father".

Although the Spiritual Exercises could be practiced directly by the reader, they are meant to transmit the heritage of a particular spiritual relation -- an Order, a hierarchy, a patriarchy and filiation -- by those who have already practiced such a relationship and understood it under previous direction and supervision. Thus reading and reception of the Spiritual Exercises is a causal relation. As such, Christ is to the reader/director as the reader/director is to the exercitant and, ultimately, as Christ is to the exercitant. This relation is homologous to that of Catholic Church hierarchy. It supports a belief in the revelation of Church tradition and the teaching of the
Church fathers as equivalent to that of Scripture, and works in hand with such Tridentine affirmations. It is also a pedagogical relationship: a belief in mastership and discipleship which echoes the relation of Christ to his apostles. As a textual relation, it is in direct opposition to the Protestant espousal of Biblical Humanism, and its democratic aspects of individual exegesis and a "priesthood of all believers".

The Spiritual Exercises are also a seduction into a practice and imitation, they have rhetorical objectives to impassion the exercitant-subject, and as such they mean to change his behavior and transform his character and will. As St. Ignatius says, "I can find God whenever I will". And further, Ignatius' charismatic and forceful personality gave him the ability to call forth the best of others to Jesuit service. A theatrical model of the good actor's relation to story, scene, the character's development and relations, and reverberation of all this amidst the spectators, is appropriate to understanding how the Exercises work, where in this case the theatre is set in the life of Christ. The exercitant then receives the text of the Spiritual Exercises by acting them out; his textual understanding of them is performative, and they in turn are a textual understanding of the Gospel. His accomplishment is to find the fruit of the text in works. Let us examine then exactly how this performance of the text takes place.

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31 As quoted by A.G. Dickens, The Counter-Reformation (London: Thames & Hudson, 1968) 81. See also the Autobiography, in DeNicholas, Powers of Imagining. Ignatius de Loyola, 296.

32 We shall examine the theatrical model inherent in the Spiritual Exercises in relation to Baroque theater, particularly for the use of decor and character development, and for the question of catharsis and spectator reception. The degree of engagement of the "good" actor in his role shall become a question of debate from Diderot on.
B. An Analysis of the *Spiritual Exercises*

And now let us ask in expectation of more detail questions to which we have already begun to sketch the beginnings of an answer: How are the Spiritual Exercises a continuation and evolution beyond the spiritual practice of the Middle Ages? How did they support the Catholic Reform and Counter-Reformation efforts? How are they an asceticism, in the privative sense? How are they more than an asceticism, that is, how are they a sensualism in the sense of *askesis* or of acting out? How did Ignatius take such factors as rememoration, visualization and imagination of the narrative scenes of the life of Christ, and factors such as a focus upon the humanity of Christ through corporal, sensual and affective presence to it, into the beginnings of a Baroque Spirituality and world vision, much like the exacerbation of artistic perspective and realism of the Renaissance takes these into Mannerist and Baroque art? *How, indeed, are the* *Spiritual Exercises* *Baroque, or how do they create a Baroque vision?* A relation often admitted if not assumed, but little explained and rarely explored before our analysis. We shall begin by examining point by point five factors in the Ignatian spiritual practice found on the level of the individual exercise, and how they establish a Baroque *épistêmè*: historical rememoration; imagination and Composition of Place; sensation, affectivity and desire in relation to the Christ; subjectival stance; and, finally, discursivity.
1. Historical Rememoration

Historical rememoration of the life of Christ is not only the task of Christian faith, but is also an essential part of the Ignatian objectives of a vocational election in harmony with the Christian life. It is primarily tied to the recollection and contemplation of Gospel narrative, and takes place in the first of the three Preludes to the various exercises after the first week, which enter into the life of Christ. It is the spiritual director’s task to read to the exercitant the brief Gospel passage which corresponds to the Prelude. This rememoration is a first step in the total task of the three Preludes, and in the exercises as a whole, to render present the past in which one has a credence as historical and factual, and to exist in that presence. Yet it goes beyond the historian’s task, as Ignatius always uses it in combination with the second Prelude, which resorts to the wilful imagination and the practice of visualization to effect the presence of the exercitant to historical narrative and to the Christ. Thus there are implications firstly for memory’s trompe-l’œil entrance into the scene, and secondly for an anamorphic projection of sacred memory upon the present environment, as we shall see. For the historical practice does not stand alone in the Ignatian practice, as it is always spatially situated rather than temporally situated; this is radically significant for historical practice as it intersects with

\[\text{This existing or basking in the plenitude of presence is aesthetically anchored, and ultimately has little to do with the passage of time, and more to do with simultaneity and spatiality. Its image retains a kind of sparkling, open, ever attractive quality which the very personal act of imagining can at each turn activate and renew, and thus transcends chronology for a structural “histoire à longue durée” in the sense of the Annales School, or a crystallization about the image. To follow H.R.Jauss as he looks to Baudelaire and Proust, remembrance is the modern form of aesthetic (Aesthetic Experience and Literary Hermeneutics, 82-84), and an aesthetic which we see precluded in Ignatius of Loyola’s Spiritual Exercises.}\]
religion. The discursive engages with both the spatial and the figural, as Ignatian memory (like Proustian memory!) revolves around the image -- and not only the image seen, but also that sensed -- heard, tasted, smelled and felt. And the exercitant becomes involved in a poiesis or making, between Gospel narrative, scene and figures, and the self and his environment. Between the past and the changing present, he perpetually constructs sense and meaning, he is a literary architect who gives the text presence, and incarnate Being. Neither the text of the Spiritual Exercises nor the Bible are left with the exercitant, but he cannot be deprived of his (visual) memory. The Biblical text is in effect constructed and received by the exercitant who engages this process with his present environment, thereby learning to carry it with him, much like a priest who in his role reconstructs the Passion in the Missal sacrifice wherever he might be, and there prepares reception for the Christic body.

2. Image & Imagination
   a. Between History and Place

   St. Ignatius’ particular kind of use of the imagination in the second Prelude is to be found in the visualization technique of "Composition of Place", a technique which is not exactly new by the time it appears in the Spiritual Exercises. Yet while other spiritual directors such as St. François de Sales emphasize the presencing of

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34 A poiesis -- which we shall also see as an aesthesia and technè -- which clears a space for presence, being and dwelling, which we find establishes a bridge between the Ignatian practice and Heideggerian Phenomenology. See Martin Heidegger’s "Building, Dwelling, Thinking" in Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. A.Hofstadter (New York: Harper & Row, 1971) 143-161, and also, particularly on the topic of "Enframing" in "The Question Concerning Technology" in The Question concerning Technology & Other Essays, trans. Wm.Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, 1977) 3-35.
Christ, not all resort to visualization, and while Ludolph of Saxony refers to visualization, he makes only vague references to the details of qualities. It is Ignatius who gives Composition of Place the greatest primacy, as the very prelude to meditation. For where others such as Ludolph only make vague references to qualities, Ignatius also adds geometrical indications and a third dimension, thereby establishing a definite space, which suggests the very techniques of Renaissance perspective that are soon to be transgressed. After this step into and transgression of Renaissance perspective, he fills the space by making references to such factors as light and dark, ambiance and the sense of touch. The Ignatian emphasis upon imagination is an emphasis upon the establishment of a space in order to call forth therein images with a corporal referent, and in turn an emphasis upon the imitation of the very humanity of Christ; the image, or arifite, mediates the relation of the exercitant to the Christ as real, as historic, as flesh and blood, it is a representation which calls forth a reception on the part of the exercitant-spectator that engages the present, and it is permissible because of the Incarnation and a perpetual belief in Christic presence. And indeed, the sense of the real is often the image we have of it, although this can priviledge the sense of sight. Thus for Ignatius, who makes a

35 See for example the work of the Jesuit architect, Andrea Pozzo (+1642,-1709), where painting’s two-dimensional illusion moves into architectural dimensions and, thereby, into spectatorial space. See also his treatise *Perspectiva pictorum et architecturam Andreeae Putei* (Rome: J.J.Komarek, 1693). On the complexity of the combination of Pozzo’s trompe-l’oeil illusionism with the real, and real conversion, “L’illusionismo di Pozzo implica una complessità molto maggiore del semplice scambio del falso con il vero; la relazione tra opera e spettatore è fondata sull’attivazione, in quest’ultimo, di una serie graduale di concatenati situazioni psicologiche: immergersi nell’artificio, comperedere l’organizzazione, persuadersi della sua autonoma, consentire alla sua perfezione e, infine, pervenire ad un convincimento ed esprimere una fede.” Vittorio de Feo, *Andrea Pozzo. Architettura e illusione* (Rome: Officina Edizioni, 1988) 13.
particular kind of intersection between the word and the image, historical
rememoration of the life of Christ resorts not only to linguistic and narrative memory,
but also and importantly to a visual memory and capacity, or a kind of controlled
day-dream work, with implications for the visual and literary arts. In light of the
Protestant Reform's reaction against the religious image, this is an exceptional
practice of the reception of the image and of the use of the imaginary, which will also
later be at work in the Council of Trent's formulations on this very topic, in hand
with a cultivation of piety amidst the faithful, which does not exclude those who are
illiterate. 36

The religious image serves to fix and give parameters to the soul and mind's
concentration, as an entire scene engaging affective, real investment of the self, a
scene to which the exercitant gives historical and real credence, and to which his very

36 "The images of Christ, of the Virgin Mother of God, and of the other saints are to be
placed and retained especially in the churches, and that due honor and veneration is to be given them;
not, however, that any divinity or virtue is believed to be in them by reason of which they are to be
venerated, or that something is to be asked of them, or that trust is to be placed in images, as was done
of old by the Gentiles who placed their hope in idols; but because the honor which is shown them is
referred to the prototypes which they represent, so that by means of the images which we kiss and
before which we uncover the head and prostrate ourselves, we adore Christ and venerate the saints
whose likeness they bear. [...] Moreover, let the bishops diligently teach that by means of the stories
of the mysteries of our redemption portrayed in paintings and other representations, the people are
instructed and confirmed in the articles of faith, which ought to be borne in mind and constantly
reflected upon; also that great profit is derived from all holy images, not only because the people are
thereby reminded of the benefits and gifts bestowed on them by Christ, but also because through the
saints the miracles of God and salutary examples are set before the eyes of the faithful, so that they
may give God thanks for those things, may fashion their own life and conduct in imitation of the saints
and be moved to adore and love God and cultivate piety. But if anyone should teach or maintain
anything contrary to these decrees, let him be anathema." Canons and Decrees of the Council of
Emphasis is our own. In light of this pronouncement, we see that Ignatian Composition of Place takes
due veneration of sacred images one step further, to interior imagination projected by the exercitant
subject about himself. The object of veneration is not the image itself, but a sacralisation of the
recipient's – the exercitants, the faithful's – reception of it, positionality within it, and finally the
cultivation of piety in him.
own imagination makes a personal contribution, indeed, gives construction. This personal involvement in the composition of the Christic scene in effect includes within it the excercitant’s presence to and reception of the scene, and goes beyond the mimetic technique around single focal points of the story in succession, as practiced in the Middle Ages. The two-dimensionality of Middle Age religious art, restrained by fear of idolatry to relief and stained glass, shall be taken into three-dimensionality by the Spiritual Exercises and their aesthetic implications, with a return to sculpture, use of trompe-l’oeil and anamorphosis, and the combination of painting, sculpture and architecture, to create artistic spaces into which the spectator may step, thus making a transgressive, transectival passage into the work. This transition suits the immensity of the enveloping religious scene. Baroque art shall further portray transectival passage into presence with an emphasis upon movement and instability, upon the present, ephemeral, marvelous and miraculous moment, upon the trespassing of borders as various arts are used in combination and in depth -- for example, as painting spills upon stucco work and across its frame into architecture for a trompe-

37 And thus the image is not used in the Orient’s manner of a meaningless mantra or singular and arbitrary focus.

38 The incorporation of the recipient within the scene shall become evident in artwork from the late Renaissance into the Baroque, from, for example Fra Angelico’s San Marco Cells to Bernini’s Capella Cornaro and on to the work and conceptualizations of Pozzo, to include the techniques of trompe-l’oeil and anamorphic manipulation.

39 This transition, and its relation to memory and presence, is captured by Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological description of perception: “Se souvenir n’est pas ramener sous le regard de la conscience un tableau de passée subsistant en soi, c’est s’enfonce dans l’horizon du passé et en développer de proche en proche les perspectives emboîtées jusqu’à ce que les expériences qu’il résume soient comme vécues à nouveau à leur place temporelle." La Phénoménologie de la perception (Paris: Gallimard, 1945) 30. Emphasis is our own.
l’œil effect, or as architecture places artwork and statuary within a theater and situation of reception, all of which engages the spectator into the space of the representational scene. These shifts in religious art from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance to the Baroque are inherent in the implications of the Spiritual Exercises themselves which comprehend them all and begin the Baroque. They also include implications for Baroque theater, a virtual cinema, and contemporary imaging technologies!⁴⁰

By means of Composition of Place, the exercitant gives himself up as an actor to the religious scene, he begins the process of connecting corporally, sensorially, affectively and personally with it, within it, and with the Christ; he takes for his own this memory despite the lack of original experience, making for himself a kind of faux original, and is changed by it. Thus memory calls forth presence, it is that part of the soul to which presentation appertains.⁴¹ This temporal feat is accomplished by the spatialization of history, and the opportunity for reception this spatialization provides to the exercitant, which can also be carried out outside of a religious context. There are now two focal points within the scene as the exercitant participates in its immensity to dwell in it, for as he gives himself to the spectacle (as actor) and as the spectacle (as decor), he is both figure and space, letter and page, and the experience

⁴⁰ The multifarious perspectival turns of the moving image suggest a subjectival stance from within, as for example in New Wave cinema.

⁴¹ See Aristotle, De Memoria et Reminiscencia. A.DeNicolas, in his translation of the Spiritual Exercises, refers to the translation of "principio" in "Principio y Fundamento"[I.23], which begin the basis to all the exercises, as not only "principle" but also as 'origen" — the origin upon which memory and the work of imagination base themselves. DeNicolas, Powers of Imagining. Ignatius de Loyola, 101-102.
of such presencing can be ecstatic! To speak from such a place would be to speak in the first person. And we shall see that the Spiritual Exercises resort to suggesting the use of language with implications for Baroque letters only after such techniques of visualization of the Gospel text and their consequences have been practiced.\footnote{Not surprisingly, Ignatius’ meditative techniques have been used in contemporary times as a basis for actor’s exercises.}

\footnote{The work of Jacques Lacan on the \textit{imago} in “Le Stade du miroir” presents the infant’s first constitution of a sense of self, as a visualization in effect, at the moment of a “mirror stage” which captures not only the child, but his entire phenomenal context—the mother who carries him, the background, etc., and which produces an effect of jubilation in the child. In effect, this constitution of the self is also a fantasmatism or imaginary dissolution of the self in the alternate focal point of the mother and in the feminine, distanced image. Corporeality and sensation are henceforth tied to the feminine image which the subject narcissistically assumes, in a relationship which is one of desire. The subject is always in a relationship of discord, alienation and even possible aggression to his \textit{imago}, and is always deformed or in a process of anamorphosis on the path of desire towards it. We can interpret this, in Baroque religious terms, as a desire virtually aimed at mystical union, and always mediated by the \textit{Imago}/(M)Other and its desire, for example like that of the Christ/son for the God/father. Thus such ambivalent Lacanian statements to the effect that the subject’s thought and language are never where he is, that desire is always mediated by the desire of the other, should that be desire belonging to the \textit{Imago}/(M)Other/Object of desire, or desire in the subject for this object. In summary, there is never desire without a trajectory and objective which disperses, decenters and recenters the subject. Lacan further qualifies this relation as one between nature and culture, which desire and love are constantly reworking, and thereby also constantly reforming the subject, who in turn reforms his self through active loving (although Lacan himself speaks in terms of desire alone). “Le Stade du miroir comme formateur de la fonction du Je”, \textit{Ecrits} (Paris: Le Seuil, 1966) 93-100.

We could say then in Lacanian psychoanalytical terms that the Ignatian subject through the \textit{Spiritual Exercises} is actively desiring and loving, and is reliving and renewing this “mirror stage” and desire itself by projecting and reforming a visualized and affective self in and into the imagined and fantasized Christic historical scene—that is, he is breaking through to the image, which is at its origin a maternal and maternizing generative to the production of all images (whence the feminized, Baroque portrayals of the Christ of the Passion, for example). Thus the question concerning the portrayal of the feminine is to be found at the basis of all iconoclast or iconophile tendencies in culture and art. In turn, we can say that this Lacanian stage conforms with our description of the Baroque subject in terms of the Imaginary and the Real, for Lacan does not refer in this work to the Symbolic order, except to say that the Imaginary-Real relation can rework culture.

Where Luce Irigaray sees a Christic Symbolic replacing and repressing the feminine in Lacanian theory as a whole, this remains ambivalent in our opinion in “Le Stade du miroir” and is definitely not the case for the Christic figure in Ignatian Composition of Place, as the Ignatian image remains an open field (although the feminine is limited to the maternal) which is not fixed at a perspectival distance. Thus the Ignatian “specularisation” in “Composition of Place” deconstructed perspective and initiated the Baroque, thus deconstructing Renaissance/Classic representation and ideology much sooner than Irigaray and others as well have suspected it! This deconstruction of the Symbolic order is true in general of the Baroque, which favors an emphasis upon the Imaginary and the Real, a recourse to the Semiotic, and a weakened or open Symbolic order, and the theatrical.
There were however reactions against the technique of Composition of Place, and by certain Jesuits themselves following soon after Ignatius. Spiritual directors complained of exercitant with poor imaginative capacities, of the technique as a stumbling block, and of the need for concrete exterior images such as painting. Some directors even went so far as to skip this task and to elude the Preludes entirely in giving the Spiritual Exercises... perhaps those who were themselves poor at it! However legitimate such complaints might be, such shortcuts directly to Colloquy suggest the influence of Protestant and Jansenist, Illuminist and Quietist beliefs in spiritual passivity, in the immediate and graced rather than mediated and exercised priviledging of, for example, decor and spectacle over narrative, so characteristic of Baroque theater. This shall be further demonstrated in the Ignatian use of language in the Colloquies, when we examine discursivity in the Spiritual Exercises. From whence does the Ignatian exercitant-subject speak?

44 Ignatius had Jeronimo Nadal commission a series of engravings to accompany and facilitate the practice of the Spiritual Exercises. Neither Ignatius nor Francis Borgia would ever see the completion of what was to be an unfinished effort, resulting nonetheless in 153 Flemish engravings, entitled Anotationes et Meditaciones in Evangelia quae in sancroanctae Missae sacrificio toto anno Aguntur (Anvers, 1593). See Alexandre Brou, S.J., Ignatian Methods of Prayer, trans. Wm. J. Young (Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1949) 106-107. See also Pierre Antoine Fabre’s assessment of Jerome Nadal’s aborted effort to establish a fixed iconography for the Spiritual Exercises, in Ignace de Loyola, le lieu de l’image (Paris: Vrin, 1992), particularly Chapters IV & V, 162-262, and the subsequent analysis of melancholy before what Fabre has seen as the essential impossibility of the constructive task of Composition of Place, in the constant reprisal and reworking of the project by Nadal. We, however, have seen this "beginning" quality of the task of Composition of Place as an open prescription of perpetual, present perception tailored to the individual exercitant. While we recommend the reading of Fabre’s study for those interested in Composition of Place and Counter-Reformation iconography as it comes out of the Spiritual Exercises, the reader should keep in mind that Fabre’s analyses, under the influence of Derridean deconstruction, constantly point towards absence and melancholy, and an unrealizable figuration in face of a Symbolic order which, in the perspective of a 20th-century return, is finally and most subtly symptomatic of the concerns and legacy of the Protestant Reform!

45 Louis L. Martz notes general reaction, in France and elsewhere, against the techniques of Ignatian meditation as cumbersome for the "simple, devout soul". The Poetry of Meditation (New Haven: Yale UP, 1954) 56-58. See also Alexandre Brou, Ignatian Methods of Prayer, particularly ch.4, "The Preludes", 94-108.
relation to God which can be seen to limit and color the practice of the *Spiritual Exercises*, particularly in France.\(^{46}\)

Let us then examine when and how Ignatius uses the technique of Composition of Place, and compare the various visualizations suggested. Given this, what are the consequences for historical rememoration, for the topic of the image, and finally for the Baroque épistémē?

\[ \text{b. Composition of Place} \]

Composition of Place as a task of one of the Preludes does not take place at the same moment in each of the exercises of the various weeks. In the weeks which use historical rememoration and refer to New Testament narrative of the life of Christ -- namely weeks two and three -- Composition of Place is the task of the second Prelude, immediately following the historical rememoration of the first Prelude and directly tied to the historical context to be remembered. But in the first, purgative, and final, illuminative weeks, there is no Prelude of historical rememoration, as both sin and union find themselves beyond temporal bounds, and only two Preludes take place for each exercise, the first of which is the task of Composition of Place. This task outside of a historical context which both begins and ends the *Spiritual Exercises* is a most curious one, particularly for the images about which it revolves, which are distinct from those of the New Testament narration, and engage the exercitant-subject in a new and distinctive way. We shall examine the progression of the Preludes

\[ \text{\footnote{For general background on all of these matters, see the articles "Composition de lieu"; "Humanité du Christ"; "Imitation du Christ"; and "Mémoire" in Dictionnaire de spiritualité ascétique et mystique.}} \]
which require Composition of Place in their order of presentation, however these
proximities between weeks one and four, and between weeks two and three, are to be
kept in mind, and will soon show their significance, particularly in relation to
affectivity and transpectival passage, and the position of the subject.

In the first exercise of the first week’s meditation upon sin and particularly
remembrance of personal sin, the first Prelude of Composition of Place demands a
visualization of the excitant’s own body as a lodging for the soul:

In meditation on sins, the composition will consist of imagining and
considering my soul imprisoned in its corruptible body, and my entire being in
this vale of tears as an exile among brute beasts. (By entire being) I mean the
whole composite of body and soul. [I.47]

This lodging is to be seen as a prisonhouse in a state of corruption, situated in a
savage land of exile, sorrow and tears. The excitant’s very body is transformed
into a horror unworthy, even incapable, of lodging its own soul, as he finds himself
in a most unhappy dualism. The excitant finds himself there, inhabiting an
inadequate, shoddy space of which he may not have been fully aware prior to this
meditation.47 This exercise, Prelude and visualization are to be repeated four times

47 In the recent French translation of the Spiritual Exercises, the excitant’s body is viewed
as alienated in this Composition of Place. Unlike our reading of the Spiritual Exercises, the editors do
not see the eventual passage of the excitant into the visualized scene because of this interpretation.
Note to I.47, in Ignace de Loyola, Ecrits, ed. Giuliani, et al., 79-80. The same interpretation is put
into linguistic terms by P.A.Fabre, according to whom the excitant as composer does not see himself as
composed, and as a result of this interpretation the task of Composition of Place is considered
duplicitous and deceptive. Ignace de Loyola, le lieu de l’image, 30-34.

We disagree. This first Composition of Place involves the excitant’s body as presence to the
infernal scene, which is further confirmed by the fifth exercise’s Application of the Senses to the
visualized site of Hell [I.66-70], and is part of the Spiritual Exercise’s call to the excitant’s corporal
presence, which shall eventually be called to the Christic scene, where the excitant most magically
and joyously finds himself — in the imagined work and as its primary recipient. Fabre’s reading in
particular of the Spiritual Exercises’ Composition of Place and of the excitant’s role comes out of an
Ultramodernist, Post-Saussurian and Derridean reading of the sign and its implications, which is
inclusive of the work of Louis Marin, which directly influences him, where the real or referential
throughout the days of the first week, with a progressive intensification of the excipient's affective connection to it of shame and confusion [I.48], as he shall learn as the exercises continue to construct a worthy space for Christ.

In the fifth exercise of the days of the first week, a new Composition of Place is demanded, consequential to the first four exercises — to imagine Hell in its length, breadth, and depth [I.65]. Here Ignatius introduces a simplified version of the type of directions typical of the *Spiritual Exercises*' calls to visualization -- firstly, a demand for geometrical precision on the part of the excipient's imagination, or a spatial construction in a Renaissance aesthetic fashion, based upon the intellectual capacity for reasoning; and secondly, a demand to fill that space with elements and qualities which shall call forth the use of all of the excipient's senses, in Baroque aesthetic fashion -- in this case fire, heat and smoke, the wailing of tortured bodies, and so on, and which lead to the systematic practice of the Application of the Senses in the points which follow. Given all this, it is to be kept in mind that the prescription of Composition of Place remains rather open: *exactly how the excipient executes the geometry or enacts the sensation is up to him*. Nonetheless, a general precision in the demands of the Composition of Place shall become more important as the historical scene increases in temporal distance from the life of the excipient, as it shall facilitate the eventual transpectival eclipse of such distance and the corporal presence of the excipient to the scene. In the first week, both Compositions of Place concern

component is evacuated and placed under the regime of absence or "vide", and the signifier, ruled by the motifs of absence, emptiness and the invisible, is placed under the regimes of errance and artifice. Thus a conclusion which finds the task of Composition of Place to be duplicitous. We shall further challenge this viewpoint in our reading of the Baroque through the optic of Merleau-Ponty's work.
either the present body of the exercitant or the Christian myth's atemporal site of
Hell. In summary, they revolve about the corrupt vessel of sin -- either Hell, or the
exercitant himself, whose sinful body is seen to be the homologous measure of the
space of Hell itself. These visualizations are outside of historical rememoration, and
concern ultimately the immediate presence of the exercitant-subject. This corrupt
subject and carnal horror shall be put aside in the second and third weeks, as the
transition to sacred history and Incarnation is made, and the exercitant-subject himself
shall not be fully recuperated until the fourth week of the exercises.

Ignatius gives Additions at the end of the first week of exercises [I.73-86]
which are to help the exercitant in his task. The 75th and 76th additions are of
interest for Composition of Place. They position the exercitant-subject so as to direct
him to his own most profitable stance: "If I find what I am seeking while kneeling I
will not change my posture", etc., and they place him in the space of the Divine gaze,
as he does not see, but knows himself to be seen: "I will consider that God our Lord
sees me, etc.". This precludes the exerciant's own presence to the visualized scene.

As the second week begins with the entry into New Testament narrative of the
life of Christ, the term "exercise" changes to that of "contemplation" as visualization
moves away from the self and to the sacred. The first task of visualization is to see
all the places which were inhabited by Christ and from which he preached --
synagogues, villages and castles [I.91]. While homologous with those of the first
week insofar as they are inhabited spaces, these are different in that they are not only
spaces for men, but spaces for the Incarnate Christ as well. Once these general
scenes inhabited at once by men of sin and Incarnate Christ are established, the
visualizations of the second week enter into the ordered events of the life of Christ,
beginning with the Incarnation. The first historical rememoration and Composition of
Place of the first day's contemplation on the Incarnation are cosmic in scope. The
historical rememoration of the first Prelude is directly tied to Biblical narrative and is
more of a visualization than a narrative recollection, as the tripartite Divinity is to be
seen looking down upon the expanse of the earth and the corrupt humanity contained
therein, which was already contemplated on the individual level in the first week
[I.102].\footnote{In fact, the Preludes of historical rememoration are presented by Ignatius in terms of
visualization as well, which is further augmented and rendered technical in a Renaissance manner by
the technique of the Preludes of Composition of Place.} The Composition of Place of the second Prelude is an extension of this, as
the movement of a sweeping panorama from cosmos to a humble home in Nazareth,
from macrocosm to microcosm, is suggestive of the astronomical revolution of the
age, of a space-travelling exercitant, or even of cinema and the swift passage of
computer-generated imagery:

Here it will be the great capacity and \textit{space of the world}, where dwell so many
and different peoples; equally, then, the particular city of Nazareth in the
province of Galilee, and the \textit{house and room} where our Lady lives. [II.103,
emphasis is our own]

It is at the moment of a sweeping, plastic visualization in movement that
spatial transgression is invited on behalf of the exercitant: it takes place in the third
Prelude in the affective request, "that I may better love and \textit{follow Him}" [I.104,
emphasis is our own]. Now that such an empowerment is given to the exercitant capable of imagination and visualization, the Composition of Place shall become ever more complex -- descriptive, technical, and immense. From the story of the Nativity to Palm Sunday, a succession of eleven narrative moments and their sites, such as the birthplace of Christ, are first to be recalled, and then to be imagined geometrically in their length, breadth and height, largeness or smallness, and the roads that lead to and from them as well, down to the details of their very curvature. A three-dimensional theater of sorts is thereby erected and set, and there is absolutely no shame in the recourse to artifice! And its decor is to be furnished as well, as can be seen in the example of the visualization of the Nativity:

Here I will see with the sight of the imagination the road from Nazareth to Bethlehem, considering its length and breadth, and whether it is level or winding through valleys and over hills. I will also behold the place or the cave of the Nativity, how large or how small, how low and how high it may be and how it was furnished. [I.112]

It is in the second week that we can most clearly see a complete aesthetic progression captured in and realized by the Spiritual Exercises, from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance to the Baroque style. The Middle Ages are represented by the successive, as if enframed, recollection of New Testament scenes, a practice of chronology and memory, as was practiced in some of Ignatius’ sources and in the

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49 P.A. Fabre, in his analysis of Composition of Place in the Spiritual Exercises, fails to see beyond a perspectival, distanciated, and even cubist construction of the image, and surprisingly in particular for this very sweeping, moving composition. Ignace de Loyola, le lieu de l’image, 47-51. In general, where Fabre sees Composition of Place as a transcendental technique of liberation from the real, we see it ultimately as a technique of engagement with the exercitant’s real and existential environment. Fabre remains within a Renaissance/Classical mode of thought and its Ultramodernist prolongations in his reading of the Spiritual Exercises. He, like others such as Jeronimo Nadal whose iconographic work he documents, does not receive the Spiritual Exercises beyond the frame of the Renaissance. This is in our opinion the cause of the failure of Nadal’s project.
Flemish iconography commissioned for the Spiritual Exercises by Jeronimo Nadal. The Renaissance is represented by the recourse to geometrical precision in imagining, also present in the Flemish engravings. The Baroque is to be found in the final spatial, corporal and affective entry -- a transgressive and transpectival entry -- as presence into the immensity of the visualized scene: that is, a presence in the work, whose origin is the text.\textsuperscript{50}

The marquable notes given to aid with the practice of the Preludes of the first day [II.127-131] are in harmony with the Baroque conclusion of the Spiritual Exercises' aesthetic progression and explicate it further, for here Ignatius suggests in the Composition of Place task the integration of the excercitant's imaginative capacities with his immediate environment! The importance of the open prescriptive aspect of Composition of Place becomes immediately evident here:

The sixth addition will be to bring frequently to memory the life and events of Christ our Lord, from the Incarnation to the place I am now contemplating. The seventh addition will be that the excercitant should take care to make use of darkness or light, of good or bad weather as much as he feels that it can be useful in helping him to find what he desires. [II.130, emphasis is our own]

A similar addition was given for the first week, to facilitate Composition of Place and affective connection with respect to sorrow for sins: "I will deprive myself of all light, closing the shutters and doors when I am in my room, unless I need the light to say my prayers, to read, or to eat. [I.79] Furthermore, the excercitant is to project the scene of contemplation in superposition upon his personal environment, "to place

\textsuperscript{50} We can examine this aesthetic passage from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance to the Baroque in analogy with a temporal passage from past to present to a future-oriented presence, and also with implications for narrative configurations as well.
before me, immediately on awaking, the subject of contemplation which I am going to make; he is "to bring frequently to memory the life and events of Christ our Lord" from the Nativity up to the moment he is contemplating, or to totalize in the mind's eye Christ's narrative history; and he is to act in a manner appropriate to the visualized scene, that is, to enter into it, "the excercitant must conduct himself according to the demands of the events that he is contemplating" [II.130, emphasis is our own]. This change in the excercitant's behavior and repeated projection and superposition of the life of Christ upon the backdrop or virtual cinematic screen of his immediate surroundings (and not as if upon a blank space) charges these surroundings, whatever they might be, with an anamorphic capacity, it exploits the process of hallucination, consciously directs the phantasmic process, or day-dream work, in the psychoanalytical sense, and projects it outward, and takes trompe-l'oeil passage into a Renaissance construction one step further via the overlay of anamorphosis into a Baroque construction. It takes construction of the world into

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51 A similar note is given in the fourth week's contemplation upon "How Christ our Lord appeared to our Lady", where the excercitant is virtually in the place of Mary, "I will see in front of me the contemplation that I am about to make", and is to use to his advantage his own environment, "to take advantage of light and the comforts of the season, for example, coolness in summer, and the warmth of the sun and of heat in winter, in so far as the soul thinks or can presume that these things may help it to rejoice in its Creator and Redeemer" [IV.229, emphasis is our own]. To summarize, Ignatius' aesthetic integrations revolve around chiaroscuro and the sense of touch, two important factors in Baroque art. (There is however little reference to color in the Ignatian Composition of Place.) Albert Flocon sees chiaroscuro as an anamorphic superposition upon a perspectival composition which has been already organized according to natural light. La Perspective (Paris: PUF, 1963) 67. This explanation works well with the anamorphic superposition of the Christic scene upon the excercitant's environment.


53 What first comes to mind is Andrea Pozzo's manipulation of space. This is also suggestive of panoramic representation, a cylindrically-organized painting practiced at the end of the 18th and in
existential experience and description of the real, and makes a Baroque excess of this real, and furthermore shows that Baroque excess is ordered rather than, as is often thought, disordered. Ignatian visualization and the total practice of the **Spiritual Exercises** is not a mere entry into an inner, fantasized world; it is, rather, a transformation of the exterior world, a projection upon it and a making of it, a perpetual engagement of past history with it, and a behavior in it.\(^4\) This passage or Baroque usage of space is rounded off with the exhortation, "I will call to mind where I am going and into Whose presence" [II.131] and evokes the eventual Ignatian conclusion for the successful exercitant, "I can find God wherever I will".

Ignatius interrupts the progression of New Testament scenes [II.132-208] on day four of the Second week with the "Meditation on the Two Standards" [II.136-148], which demands a visualization of two vast kingdoms, one of Christ and the other of Lucifer, and a "Meditation on the Three Classes of Men" [II.149-157], which demands a focalization upon the self while imagined before the presence of God. It is

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the 19th centuries, in which the horizon could attain 360°. The panorama also was a precursor to spectacular cinema. A. Flocon, *La Perceptive*, 70-71. The panorama's use of the cylinder technique recalls certain types of anamorphoses which are reconstructed perspectivally by the placement of a cylindrical mirror in the center. It is also suggestive of religious "immensity" -- of Being-in, of transceptive -- where the subject is in the place of the cylinder (metaphorically speaking, and through synaesthesia) and responsible (as the reconstructing mirror) for the vision, or in a position of admiration.

\(^4\) We have seen the exercitant-subject's contemplation in the first two weeks to move from cosmos to self, with the transcendal participation of the self returning back again into the cosmos. This transition is homologous with that of the astronomical revolution, as Alexandre Koyré has put it, "From the closed world to the infinite universe" -- a universe rendered infinite in the context of the **Spiritual Exercises** by the exercitant's participation in it and constant projection upon it. This initially visual relation to the external world is captured in part by the ancient opticians' concept of *lux*, in which vision was of a psychical order with its origin in the perceiving subjectual eye. This was complemented by the concept of *lumen*, in which the object perceived was the source and initiator of vision. A. Flocon, *La Perspective*, 8.
in this meditation that presence of the exercitant moves directly into the Composition of Place [II.151]. This is remarquable progress for the constructive moment and indicative of spiritual growth, and it is significant that it takes place within an ego-centered meditation upon and construction of man, rather than in a visualization projected outward. A proximity to the self is given in place of the typical practice of the Application of the Senses which increase affectivity. At the same time, this is a meditation where the subject begins to evolve. [II.158-189]

Also included in the second week are descriptions of three progressive forms of humility [II.165-167]. Once again, visualization travels across these three meditations from macrocosm to microcosm, from cosmos to self, but the self is in a clearly abdicated position and in a Baroque state of "immensity" and Being-in. This is part of the conclusion of the second week, which is to be the exercitant's election of a way of life, hopefully suitable to the evolved subjectival position from within the cosmos, before the Christ, and from an abdicated self reinforced by the understanding and practice of humility. Ignatius gives further information on when it is most appropriate to make such an election -- on how to discern moments of proximity to God, on understanding the movements of one's own spirit, and on tranquility [II.175-177]. These techniques of discernment teach the exercitant consciousness of a subjectival position within a Christic immensity; they are the completion of the aesthetic progression to be made in the practice of the first two weeks of the Spiritual Exercises.

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55 Presence was first mentioned in the Affective Prelude [I.114] after a precise Composition of Place task; we shall examine this next.
The third week of contemplations spans the narrative of Christ's life from His entry into Jerusalem through to the Passion. The careful demand for geometrical precision in the Preludes of Composition of Place are maintained, as they are all in this week of places and spaces -- road, room, garden, houses -- which lead finally to the loci of the Cross and sepulcher, and ultimately conclude in the house of Mary. The final day demands a visualized recapitulation of the entirety of the Passion. The accompanying affect in the third Preludes accordingly requests intensification in sorrow.

It is most appropriate that the final visualization of the third week be the worthy house of Mary, as the Fourth week shall open with a visualization of the appearance of Christ to her there, where her home is to be visualized as well in great detail after that of the sepulcher for Christ's body [IV.220]. During this week, affectivity turns to joy and gladness. The house of Mary and the person of Mary herself can be seen as engrammatic for the task of Composition of Place and for the objective of the Spiritual Exercises in their totality as well, as a space propitious for Christic presence. Such is the very goal of the Spiritual Exercises for the body and the being of the exercitant: to be like Mary.

We shall next look at the topic of Affectivity and the technique of the Application of the Senses, and the conclusion to the remainder of the fourth week in its "Contemplation to attain Love", as this contemplation uses all four moments of the

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56 The M.Giuliani edition of Ignatius' Ecrits notes here that Ignatius took this traditionally recounted moment which is not in the Gospel either from Ludolph of Saxony's Vita Christi or Garcia de Cisneros' Ejerctoria, 165.
exercises in a simultaneous and conclusive manner which leads the exercitant to a position of "Inhabitation", where, as for Mary, the Christ dwells in his breast.

3. Sensation, Affectivity, Desire and the Christ

Affective contemplation has been a part of the Christian tradition since Augustine. In the Spiritual Exercises, the Prelude of Affectivity takes place after the first or second Prelude, as it may be, of Composition of Place. In this Prelude, the exercitant is "to ask God for what I want and desire", "lo que quiero y deseo". That is, he is to ask for the appropriate affective attachment and disposition of the soul to the scene visualized -- whether that be shame, tears and sorrow, or joy -- and to engage his will and corporality in this request.\(^{57}\) The verb "to desire" further points to an interpretation of Composition of Place in terms of directed phantasm, where a present subject accomplishes the figuration of a desire.\(^{58}\) This request for affective attachment is in effect a request for grace -- the gift of proximity to the Christ and to Divinity, and of plenitude of the soul.Successful affectivity is the sign of grace and is the feeling of presence to the Christ; it is the crucial step which accomplishes the transpectral passage of the exercitant as inhabitant into the immensity and panorama

\(^{57}\) From the Middle Ages to the 17th century, the heart as seat of affect was often associated with the will. This became even more important in the rationalist 17th century, as will was reduced to reason and to the Cartesian search for truth. This was countered, however, by the belief of many such as Blaise Pascal, Madame Guyon, St. François de Sales, Louis de Lallemant, and Jean-Joseph Surin, that the heart transcended intelligence. See the article "Cor et Cordis affectus", particularly for the 17th century, in Dictionnaire de spiritualité. We situate Ignatius' use of the affective will as precursor to both reason and truth, and as an application upon and further aestheticization of the rational dimension of Composition of Place. Thus the willful, cognitive dimension maintains its place within Ignatian affectivity, which circumscribes it.

of the visualized Christic scene, and it is the measure of the reality of this scene and means to knowledge.⁵⁹ Under the watchful gaze of the spiritual director, it is successful affectivity which determines the precise length of the weeks of the exercises. This is what makes the passage from a Renaissance construction to Baroque presence, as we shall further demonstrate it. Affectivity is also extraordinary in the context of the Spiritual Exercises, as the disposition towards grace is presented in the realm of a corporal and sensorial practice towards the image by the free will; affective grace is effective grace! and sensorial practice is the way to knowledge.⁶⁰ That grace should manifest itself in the individual free will to forge an affective relation to the image is extraordinary, and we can look to Ignatius’ Spiritual Journal for the elaboration of his own mystical experience upon this. This is furthermore to be found in the Spiritual Exercises’ use of the Application of the Senses, which always follows the Prelude of Affectivity in a series of points, and which reinforce its call for the exercitant’s desire and presence to the Christ.

⁵⁹ Alexandre Brou implies the image is grace, and we wish to nuance here exactly, transpectively how that is. Ignatian Methods of Prayer, 151. Along with Brou’s implications, we can ask whether or not grace always implies the image and the sensible realm. The first meaning of χάρις in its etymological evolution is "the charm of beauty". Also, χάρις is above all considered to be Christ in his humanity, a gift from God in divine communication with man. That is, χάρις is what has made God accessible to the image, and to us. And finally, in permitting a transpectival passage into Immensity and subject-transforming Inhabitation, the supernatural aspect of grace and of the image is also to be noted.

⁶⁰ It’s extreme can be found in the Pelagian belief in the capacity of the natural human will to the point of a pagan Humanism. See also Pascal’s Les Provinciales (1656) for the Jansenist version of the polemic against the Jesuits on the question of grace, particularly in relation to acts and free will. In Spain, Illuminist and Molinist and, later in France, Quietist beliefs in a passively graced, unitive contemplation also participated in the controversy.
The first Prelude of Affectivity (of the first week's first day) requests that the exercitant successfully feel shame and confusion at his many sins [I.48]. This is followed by several points which aid in the practice and amplification of the particular affect, by involving both rememoration and visualization. In this particular case, these are rememoration of the sins of the angels, and of Adam and Eve, and imagination of the sins of the damned, and finally remembrance of those of the self [I.50-52]. In all, the Preludes of Affectivity involve all three of the traditional Augustinian powers of the soul -- memory, intelligence, and will, with the particular emphasis upon the final step of the will, as memory and intelligence have already been employed in the first and second Preludes, respectively.

In the second exercise of the first week, the Prelude of Affectivity demands further intensification of the same affects [I.55]. It is followed by points which request the rememoration of personal sins and their measure, and likewise the measure and abasement of the exercitant's subjectival position. This leads to a final affective connection, that of the exercitant's amazement at the gift of his life: "esclamación admirative con crescido afecto" [I.60]. Admiration, as the summit of all the affects, has an amplificatory effect upon any particular one of them, and this is accordingly the last of the points which elaborates upon this Prelude.

In the fifth exercise of the meditation on Hell, the affective connection with the pain of the damned [I.65] is reinforced by points which make a systematic and imaginative application of each of the five senses [I.66-70], a technique which shall be used in connection with the Affective Preludes. However, before going on to the
second week, Ignatius gives "Additions" which are to help in general with the practice of the Exercises. These are remarkable, not only for precisions on the task of Composition of Place, but also with respect to the Affective Preludes. We learn therein that each affect has its time and place [I.78], and its atmosphere [I.79], which we have already examined in the context of the integration of Composition of Place into the exercitant's site. Each affect has its corporal discipline as well in positioning the body and in penances which chastize the flesh. [I.80-86] Affectivity -- and ultimately openness to grace -- is controlled through the body. Sensuality is reigned in, while sensualism is used to a spiritual and a rational advantage [I.87]. This is ultimately a behaviorism, a technology of the body. For when the affective connection is arid and unsuccessful, Ignatius suggests in further observations on penance, that the penance -- that is, the corporal discipline -- be changed, and perhaps prudently rendered more severe! And thus affectivity is directly linked to subjectival stance and corporality, and ultimately transpectival passage; causally this passage moves from corporality\(^{61}\) to affectivity to presence. Thus concludes, in the area of affectivity, the first week of the Exercises.

With the second week of Exercises, and entry into New Testament history, the affective connection necessarily changes, to promptitude and diligence to do Christ's will [I.91], in order to know, love and follow Him [I.104]. Here, the humanity of Christ is emphasized in the points following the Affective Preludes -- that is, in His

\(^{61}\) Corporality is essential to Composition of Place's visualization and its engagement with memory -- an intellectual task -- and affective practice through the Application of the Senses. In summary, there can be no spiritual exercise, nor grace, without it!
corporal presence and His discursive engagement with the exercitant-subject. [I.92-94]
And along with this moment of Christ's humanity, where anthropomorphism and
imitation become most possible, spatial transgression of the exercitant-subject towards
transpectival stance begins to accompany affectivity as the exercitant moves in his
very own being into the scenes of the Gospel mysteries and towards proximity with
the Christ.

In the points which follow the affective call to know, love and follow the
Christ, an Application of the Senses is doubly made which moves, as does its
Composition of Place, from man and earth, to Divinity and heaven, and back again.
What is startling here is that the vision of the earth is not that of a microcosm as in
the Composition of Place, but is rather that of a vast panorama over the earth, as if
from a celestial point of view. Extraordinarily, the exercitant's eye is placed there,
further encouraging his spatial transgression and proximation to the Divine,
considered to be so far above. Thus as he sees, hears and considers the acts of men,
virtually with senses like those Divine, does he also see, hear and consider those of
the Trinity and Mary at work upon the Incarnation. And in the following
contemplation on the Nativity, the Affective Prelude pushes the exercitant-subject into
transpectival presence, with the appropriate sentiments of modesty and reverence:

I will make myself a poor and unworthy slave looking upon them,
contemplating them, and ministering to their needs, as though I were present
there [como si presente me hallase], with all possible modesty and reverence.
[I.114, emphasis is our own, Spanish text is from the Autograph]

This is the first time in the Spiritual Exercises that the term "presence" is used. And
the scene is back upon earth again, in a humble stable, as Christ begins a human life.
Even though the eyes of the exercitant have returned to earth, they are now manipulated and exercised and are to remain those virtually divine -- transformed, close by and no longer at a perspectival distance. Once again, we see how the exercitant-subject's position has begun to shift, here in the affective context.

a. The Application of the Senses

In the fifth contemplation before supper of the second week's first day [II.121], the Application of the Senses is methodically given as the very objective of the contemplation, with a repetition of previous visualizations of the week on the Incarnation and the Nativity, where a successful affective attachment to Christ's humanity is most important, and is to be practiced over and over again. This exercise elaborates best upon the Application of the Senses, as it gives general direction for their use. Up to now the Application of the Senses, a systematic practice of all five senses in relation to Composition of Place, has been practiced three times, and after this it is practiced systematically from the fifth Exercise on, always towards the end of the day after good visualizations have been made and are in place. It is after this careful direction on the Application of the Senses that follow general notes which encourage integration of the Composition of Place into the exercitant's site; for not until appropriate affectivity and the implications for present, accompanying subjectival stance are successful is such a projective, virtually hallucinative practice allowed to the exercitant and trusted.

The aesthetic practice of the Application of the Senses both begins and reinforces affectivity and grounds affectivity in corporality by working further upon
the meditated terrain established by Historical Rememoration and the Composition of Place. 62 The movement is one from historical/Biblical narrative to image to affect to grace, and through the analogous levels of the soul from memory to intelligence to will. This entire structural passage is encompassed by the will itself as activated by the practice of the Application of the Senses. A.Brou suggests the practice of the Application of the Senses cannot even truly and effectively take place unless it is already practiced from within the presence of the greatest affect, love: "And how is it that we have dared to touch and to kiss... if it is not because we have loved? We are now in the midst of affective prayer." 63 The Application of the Senses exercises all of the senses in hand with grace. And as an exercise of affectivity, it avoids any accusation of Illuminism or of the passive prayer of Quiet. The passage realized by the Application of the Senses works to realize the human dimension of a Baroque and Phenomenological presence of the exercitant to the Biblical scene by directing sensual and emotional perception of it and thereby fixing it most securely in memory. This leads to sensorially practicing the humanity of Christ, with implications for the scene's presence and form as well, as further aestheticization of the Renaissance regime leads to transgression into its pictorial framework and composition. 64 It takes

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63 Ignatian Methods of Prayer, 153-4.

64 The Application of the Senses has been interpreted in conflicting ways from the time of the Directory on, as either a moment of rest inferior to intellectual contemplation, or as a way to higher contemplation. That the 1599 Directory slighted the task was in prudent reaction to the accusty toward climate of Illuminism and Quietism. See Jean Maréchal, S.J., "Notes sur la méthode d'application des
cognitive perception and construction of Historical Rememoration and Composition of Place and adds to them, as if in a superposed, anamorphic, transparent layer, affective perception.\textsuperscript{65}

Not only does the aesthetic practice of the Application of the Senses realize this transgression and passage, but also it accordingly shifts the aesthetic accent from the work — text or image — to its reception by the exercitant and to his position in the process of this reception. Likewise, reception cannot be divorced from aesthetic practice. \textit{Aesthetic practice is a conditioning of behavior and a pragmatics of reception}. The importance of the meditated scene is the exercitant’s reception of it, his participation within and dialogue with it, and ultimately his performance of it.\textsuperscript{66}

We can liken this moment of aestheticization of the image to one of trompe-l’oeil, as the representation moves beyond its frame to capture and participate in the real space of presence. The image of the exercitant as an actor entering upon a stage and, beyond this, of carrying with him a virtual projective decor (and phantasm), is not unreasonable here. This accent upon the exercitant’s reception and his theatrical

\textsuperscript{65} I.Waynbaum refers to such cognitive and affective perception as "ideoemotional". When affect is tied to surprise or wonder, it is considered "perceptual-emotional". The combination of the two — that is, when a cognized situation still inspires wonder — is the richest in affect. This is the case in St. Ignatius' "Contemplation to Attain Love", where the exercitant finds his very own self transposed into the field of the image of perception.

\textsuperscript{66} Linguistically, the emphasis is shifted from enunciation (Biblical narrative) to interlocution; this shall become evident in the following practice of the Colloquies.
participation in the scene is exactly what perturbs a fixed, Symbolic dimension -- the
cognitive perception of history and the image -- with an affective, Semiotic one where
the Image and the Real take precedence over the Symbolic through the excercitant's
imaginative projection and the sensorial practice of his own real presence.\textsuperscript{67}
Perception here has become equivalent to reception, in that perception is evaluated in
terms of reception. The image, as it can pertain to both the Symbolic and the
Imaginary realms, is pulled by the Application of the Senses out of a fixed, Symbolic
domain -- its aesthetic and epistemological place in the Middle Ages and early
Renaissance -- and into the fluid Imaginary and Real domains -- its place in the
Baroque. This shall have further implications for language as well, as we shall see
shortly in our evaluation of the Ignatian practice of Colloquy. The excercitant's
position here is one of Immensity within a treasorial decor; it is a masculine, figured
position, one which we shall consider as the first stage of transpective, being-in, or
presence in the work.

The importance of a theory of reception at this moment of the Spiritual
Exercises also has implications for the ethical domain, as the Application of the
Senses of the second week precedes the elections, where the excercitant is henceforth
to project the image and act in the world, as if in a Gospel theater, from within the
context which he has made propitious through the care of his vision and meditation
for the presence of the Christ/Other, offering the treasure of this decor to others
should they be able to see it and profit from it. We can liken this to an anamorphic

\textsuperscript{67} Jean Maréchal is also one who suggests that the practice of the Application of the Senses perturbs the Symbolic domain.
projection upon the world, capable of transforming it.\textsuperscript{68} In this moment there is a simultaneous retrieval and representation of the past (memory), and a perception of the present (sensation, presence and presentation), or a memory/sensory matching, as well as a folding up of space and time.\textsuperscript{69} Spiritual method and practice is also and finally an ethical practice and ultimately a giving up of the self in affective engagement for love of the Other and of others, as the exercitant's very own figure becomes space. He both carries with him and is the affective decor — now a symbolically-stamped equivalent of the Symbolic domain (of History and the Image) he entered into, and in effect he offers his own corporality in a Christic, mediating fashion to the other,\textsuperscript{70} capable of interiorizing alterity as in J.-J.Goux's transvestivist subject,\textsuperscript{71} becoming a dispossessed, selfless, choratic space for their presence.\textsuperscript{72} This

\textsuperscript{68} Père A.Gardeil speaks of "un transparent ou mieux un foyer virtuel". \textit{La Structure de l'âme et l'expérience mystique}, vol. 2 (Paris: Librairie Victor Lecoffre, 1927) 151.

\textsuperscript{69} See Sylvan S. Tomkins, \textit{Affect, Imagery, Consciousness}, vol.1 (New York: Springer Pub.Co., 1962) 16. Tomkins considers this a "feedback system" managed by an image, on the individual, emotional level. We can elaborate upon this system in light of the practice of the \textit{Spiritual Exercises} as a back and forth, dialectic movement, in part an intentional consciousness, between the Ideal or Imaginary and the Real; between the past and the present; between history and the work of remembrance; and between the Referent/Signed and the Signifier, where the real, the present, remembrance, and the signifier are all in the domain of existence and action. The objective of this dialectic is union — perceptual, mystical — and with implications as well for an eclipse and wholeness in the stages of the structure of the sign. This is the living, acting, present exercitant in a state of Inhabitation, and as a symbolically-stamped equivalent ready to act in the world. Thus the religious experience is both highly structured, and synthetic.

\textsuperscript{70} And also in a Merleau-pontian and Phenomenological fashion as, for example, when he speaks of vision: "je leur prête mon corps pour qu’elles [les choses] s’y inscrivent et me donnent leur ressemblance, ce pli, cette cavité centrale du visible qui est ma vision." \textit{Le Visible et l’invisible} (Paris: Gallimard, 1964) 192.

\textsuperscript{71} Our work is indebted to Jean-Joseph Goux for the term "transvestitive", which he uses to describe the subjectivetal situation of Oedipus at Colonus, and goes on from there to elaborate a post-perspectival and Postmodern return to the Symbolic dimension, yet with an open code which maintains perspective while at the same time going beyond it, and a Postmodern, non-unitive subject who interiorizes alterity, where "il y a de l'autre en lui-même". See \textit{Oedipe Philosophes}, particularly ch.10,
is a second and final stage in transjective, that of a feminine, charismatic space -- of χάριζ, of the charm of beauty in the feminized image of Christ, whose very use of the senses with that of Mary is to be imitated in the most extreme Applications of the Senses. [IV.247-8] It is also the space of Grace and of Trinitarian wholeness as the gamut of the Symbolic, the Imaginary and the Real has been run and relived, in the stance of Inhabitation. Thus the aesthetic, affective practice rules reception, pragmatics and Ethics.⁷³ All of these stages through disciplinary realms indicate the shift to propitious spaces for reception, for Inhabitation, for presence. Thereby both Middle Ages and Renaissance aesthetic and epistemological spaces have been appropriated by the practice of the Spiritual Exercises and further manipulated, as the signs are changed, into the Baroque.

"Le Testament d’Oedipe" (Paris: Aubier, 1990) 187-203. According to Goux, we have had a "deconstruction" of perspective with abstract art, of realism and referentiality with Saussurian linguistics, and of Western Metaphysics since Plato with Derridian Philosophy, but have not quite elaborated a 20th-century transyectivist construction and its subject. We consider that this transyectivist construction and subject can be found in the NeoBaroque grounded in real presence, as we have elaborated it.

⁷² The term chora, taken from Plato’s Timaeus, has been further explored by both Julia Kristeva, in La Révolution du langage poétique (Paris: Seuil, 1974) 30-37, and entire chapter "Sémiotique et symbolique", and Jacques Derrida, in Khôra (Paris: Galilée, 1993). We further associate it with the position of transjective and of Inhabitation. In the Timaeus, the chora permits a cosmo-ontology, a way to think both the world and the self as a maternal space for presence and dwelling. Both Kristeva and Derrida use the concept in the linguistic domain as an unstable receptacle for psychic and linguistic traces, thereby joining spatiality, materiality and affectivity to language in Kristeva’s analysis, but remaining an empty, unmarked vessel for Derrida’s analysis which maintains the errancy of the linguistic sign. For Kristeva, the chora is already a space which accommodates representation, albeit pre-linguistic, such as that of corporeal, gestural and affective vocalisation. (24) She names this the “Semiotic”, and via the chora shall go on to demonstrate how from a matriarchal position it perturbs the Symbolic, patriarchal order to invest it with the body and affect. This shall be of importance to us again in the examination of Ignatian Colloquy.

⁷³ Thus the work of the contemporary French philosopher, Emmanuel Levinas, who links the image (in the "face of the other") with the Ethical practice.
After this precision and perfection in the technique of the Application of the Senses, the remainder of the second week is appropriately given to the exercitant's vocational election. This includes "A Meditation on Two Standards", "The Three Classes of Men", and "The Three Forms of Humility". It is an important determination in the exercitant's subjectival stance, as proximity to the Divine is now to be carried with oneself and to be projected into acts and upon the world -- the most important dimension of the Jesuit Order's mission. We shall examine this more carefully in our consideration of the exercitant's subjectival stance.

In the third week of the contemplation of the events of the Passion, sorrow is the affective focus; thus in the first contemplation of the first day, "Here it will be to ask for pain, compassion, and confusion because the Lord is going to His passion on account of my sins." [III.193] The causal connection of the meditation of the Passion to the first week's meditation upon sin is underlined, and this likewise has its interest in the determination of affects. For where in the first week the exercitant was to feel shame or sorrow and confusion at his sins, here he is to feel the same, with the addition of the affect of compassion: "dolor, sentimiento y confusión" Ignatius writes. This additional affect indicates the possibility at this late moment in the exercises of proximity to and imitation of the Christ. The points which augment this affective connection emphasize the summit of Christ's humanity as it is found in the Passion, and likewise the summit of the exercitant's sorrow in grieving and tears. [III.195] As sadness and grieving dominate the week, the exercitant is to integrate the Passion into his own site, "I will strive while rising and dressing to arouse
sentiments of sadness and grief within myself" and "I will rather awake myself to sorrow, suffering, and anguish frequently, calling to mind the labors, burdens, and sufferings that Christ our Lord bore". [III.206]

It is in the seventh day's contemplation of the entire Passion that a remarkable link is made with affectivity. Instead of the two repetitions and the Application of the Senses to be made in this day's exercises, the exercitant is to replace this affective practice with a consideration of the suffering corporality of Christ: "consider as frequently as possible throughout the entire day how the most Sacred Body of Christ our Lord remained separated and apart from His Soul, also where and how it was buried." [III.208] A Composition of Place is worked in with the consideration of Christ's tomb. And further, the immediate connection of the Son's (entombed) body in the context of a Composition of Place is made with that of the Mother's affectivity: "Consider likewise the loneliness of our Lady, her great grief and weariness, also that of the disciples." [III.208] Thus the emblem of affectivity and of how the exercitant himself should feel once again takes on a feminine and maternal image, as did the emblem of Composition of Place as a site for Christic presence. It is only after this hierarchy and passage through the feminine that the grief of the disciples is allowed, and subsequently that of the exercitant. Thus the suffering body is directly linked with the height of sorrowful affectivity; such corporally-linked sorrowful affectivity is further linked to that of the Mother as origin and matrix to it; and by extension, a serious consideration of corporality and passage through the feminine and maternal is linked to grace and to transpectival presence. Suprisingly or not, it is at the height of
sorrowful affectivity linked to suffering corporality and the humanity of Christ that Ignatius introduces further corporal discipline, in the "Rules on Food as a means of self control".

Heightened affectivity moves from sorrow to joy in the fourth week's contemplation of the Resurrection, which begins with a consideration of "How Christ our Lord appeared to our Lady". [IV.218] Again, heightened affectivity begins with Mary, and in the elaboration of the affective request Christ is seen as the great consoler and friend who transforms all sadness to joy. [IV.224] It is in this final week that an entire exercise, the fourth before supper, is to be entirely devoted to the Application of the Senses, with directions to the exercitant to pause there where he garners the greatest spiritual fruit and consolation. [IV.227] In this instance, appropriate affectivity is to be recognized by the exercitant as a sign to pause in the midst of presence, for it is the sign of presence. Affectivity is thoroughly, corporally and intentionally practiced here. It is after this practice that the "Contemplation to Attain Love" takes place, and Ignatius insists that this greatest of all affects is to take place in deeds rather than words [IV.230], it is to be effective as well as affective. Thus Ignatius' imaginative, performative, practiced askesis has lead well to this final transpectival and unitive moment where affectivity encompasses all of the soul's powers -- of memory, the intellect's composition, and the will's desire -- in the gesture of the gift of the self to the Other. We shall examine this contemplation in conclusion to our examination of affectivity.
b. The Fourth Week's Conclusion: the "Contemplation to Attain Love"

The "Contemplation to Attain Love" [IV.230-237] takes place after the contemplation of Mary and her home [IV.218-225], this perfect space for presence and joy, and before moving on to contemplations of the Gospel mysteries [IV.261-312], which Ignatius does not quote but rather synthesizes briefly. Like the contemplations of the first week, there is no historical rememoration to begin this contemplation, as it is begun in a state of pure affectivity! Affectivity begins and generates history; in the recollection of the gifts of creation it generates space, the site for acts and, ultimately, the self as offering, as it joins itself to the Composition of Place. [IV.234] And so the visualization to this contemplation is a composition of the self in a state of presence, "Here it is to see how I stand in the presence of God our Lord and of the angels and saints, who intercede for me." [IV.232] The "I"-exercitant-subject now stands in the moments of History and of Composition of Place, he is that moment, he is the origin to his consciousness, he is not only its figure, but its space as well as he constitutes its visibility and materiality, its very possibility in the final stage of transceptive and Inhabitation where all three phases of the Preludes and all three parts of the soul are one. Thus we see how the three Preludes have realized a subjectival passage from perspective to transceptive.

The exercitant in the "Contemplation to Attain Love" is not only so much seeing and seen, but touching and touched as well, in the synaesthesia of the mirror of representation through his own presence and performance. As all of this he offers
a space for exchange, for resonance and engagement with the object of his contemplation, and furthermore for others to see and to engage with him in a "chain of representations":

love consists in a mutual interchange by the two parties, that is to say, that the lover give to and share with the beloved all that he has or can attain, and vice versa the beloved toward the lover. Thus if he has knowledge, he shares with the one who does not have it; if riches, they equally share riches, and vice versa. [IV.231]

He sees the totality of his existence -- liberty, memory, understanding, will, possessions -- as a gift, as χάρις, as part of a circular and perpetual relation with the Divinity, one which is based upon a God of perpetual creation and presence, and to whom it is not only possible, but necessary to be present through the total action of the self in the full and rich deployment of the soul. And thus the exercitant abdicates in a negative moment the totality of self to the point of poverty and death which he even desires as rite of passage, to the Other with the affective engagement of inner knowledge, enlightenment and gratitude, in order to truly recuperate himself anew as the treasorial plenitude of "Love and grace": "Vuestro amor y gracia, que ésta me basta" [IV.233, 234]. The objective of the Exercises [I.21] has been reached as all desires and sensible practice are here unified in Devotion, Love and Grace, and as the exercitant both situates and abdicates a subjectival postion.74

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74 It is in such a spirit of abdication that Ignatius wrote his Spiritual Journal. It is also out of this space that we shall be able to find a bridge between the obedient Jesuit, "a soldier for Christ", and the subject in war narrative, with all of its ethical implications. Let us also note a homology between the status of the subject, and the decentering of the newly-shaken universe and its scientific revolution. Jean Mouroux presents the affective union and its result in charity as both a decentering and a finding of the subject in the Other and in others: "La vie chrétienne n’est connaissance de soi que pour être connaissance de Dieu". L’Expérience chrétienne. Introduction à une théologie (Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, 1952) 270-1, 371. In the gift of self to the O/other, the exercitant has moved from being a figure within a sacred spatial construction, to a space himself propitious to the other’s being and
Unlike the first Composition of Place of the meditation on sins [I.47], which was both a projection and a rejection of the image,\textsuperscript{75} this final step is one of a projection and recuperation of the image, an engagement within the object of perception and a participation in the spectacle. Desolation is positively recuperated in the fourth week. Composition of Place as the construction of an object or image from out of the text, by the subject has now become the object wherein the subject constructs, finds and ultimately receives the Other and subsequently others, in exchange for himself. This is a true communion. A Renaissance/Classical perception has shifted to one which is phenomenal, transeptival and Baroque: where the exercitant-subject is Being in the text, presence in the work. Composition of Place is a composition of the subject! and a foundation for being. The exercitant-subject embedded in the work is finally his own work of art.\textsuperscript{76} Ignatius does not attain nor presence. He is here in a state of transeptivite and Inhabitation. J.-J. Goux has situated transeptival, with the example of Oedipus at Colonus, as a moment of true initiation and sacred elevation where the subject passe from abjection to a treasorial status of gift to the other, and which he also likens to a Christic position, and which we liken, further, to Mary. This is the true status of mankind, with all of its feminine qualities. \textit{Oedipe philosophe}, 190-1, 194.

\textsuperscript{75} Here we find an obvious reason behind the melancholic relation to the image upon which P.A. Faber insists.

\textsuperscript{76} See, for example, Michel Foucault’s analysis of Velasquez’ “Las Meninas” in \textit{Les Mots et les choses}. C.G. Jung examined the \textit{Spiritual Exercises}, mostly in their practical application after Ignatius’ time, for his interest in the “active imagination” and its ability to transform the self, most pertinent here. However, under the promising aegis of lectures on “The Process of Individuation”, he came to a fundamental shortsightedness about the \textit{Exercises}, as he only saw their inculcation of allegiance to the universal Catholic Church, and not the individual existential dimension cultivated and allowed within the bounds of such allegiance. Likewise, he examines through Erich Pryzwara’s contemporary interpretation (1938), how the \textit{Exercises} accommodate a presence to the Christ, or what we have qualified as Immensity, but does not see as far as Inhabitation by the Christ and how this indeed transforms the self. The Process of Individuation. \textit{Exercitia Spiritualia} of St. Ignatius of Loyola. Notes on lectures given at the Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule, multigraphed for private circulation (Zürich: June 1939-March 1940) 45-47, 141-142.
aim at an ascetic purification of the image; rather, the sensible realm and a corporal, carnal confirmation and further embellishment of it is maintained where the investment of the self is the measure of the real which subtends the image.\footnote{77}

The image is thereby ultimately projected about the exercitant, and this is needed in order for there to be an exchange with others and an ethical outcome to the\textit{ Spiritual Exercises}. As Maurice Merleau-Ponty would say, the exercitant is "un tangible-étalon",\footnote{78} engaged in the realm of exchange, with all the implications for instability, for perpetual performance and presencing, and for the perpetual task of sense-making such an "étalon" holds. We have already seen this space of the corporal exercitant-subject in analogy with the body of Mary. We shall also examine such an exchange of the self in Merleau-pontian terms as the\textit{ chiasm}.\footnote{79} This is the

\footnote{77} It is this inclusion of the recipient as an affected body-subject within the work which "changes the signs", to speak in the terms of Albert S. Cook, from the Renaissance to the Baroque. See his \textit{Changing the Signs. The Fifteenth Century Breakthrough} (Lincoln: U.of Nebraska Press, 1985).

\footnote{78} Maurice Merleau-Ponty, \textit{Le Visible et l’invisible}, 181.

\footnote{79} Thus works the perceiving body-subject: "Mon corps comme chose visible est contenue dans le grand spectacle. Mais mon corps voyant sous-tend ce corps visible, et tous les visibles avec lui. Il y a insertion réciproque et entrelacs de l’un dans l’autre. Ou plutôt, si, comme il le faut encore une fois, on renonce à la pensée par plans et perspectives, il y a deux cercles, ou deux tourbillons, ou deux sphères concentriques quand je vis naïvement, et, dês que je m’interroge, faiblement décrits l’un par rapport à l’autre." M.Merleau-Ponty, \textit{La Phénoménologie de la perception} (Paris: Gallimard, 1945) 182, emphasis is our own. We call special attention to the rejection of perspectival perception in order to attain a reciprocal and corporal or tangible subject/object relation. Furthermore, the Merleau-pontian body subject is affectively resonant with the object/Other/Christ of its\textit{ chiasmic} exchange: "En somme, mon corps n’est pas seulement un objet parmi tous les autres objets, un complexe de qualités sensibles parmi d’autres, il est un objet sensible à tous les autres, qui résonne pour tous les sons, vibre pour toutes les couleurs, et qui fournit aux mots leur signification primordiale par la manière dont il les accueille." \textit{Le Visible et l’invisible}, 273, emphasis is our own.

P.A.Fabre finds this exchange, erroneously in our opinion, a part of the invisible and the iconoclast, particularly in the context of the saintly intercession referred to by Ignatius in his\textit{ Spiritual Journal}. Ignace de Loyola, \textit{le lieu de l’image}, 71. Indeed, the exercitant’s presence gives a real measure, of visibility, to the composed and contemplated Christic scene, however this scene is already in the visible. Again, Fabre’s transcendalist reading slights in our opinion the \textit{Spiritual Exercises’}
Baroque subject -- proximate, present, affected, decentered from the self, in the
Other, offered and sacrificed, hollowed-out, opened up to the Other in him, immense
and inhabited, from screen to panorama to figure, he takes a Christic position -- ecce
Homo Baroccus.\(^{80}\)

From this moment of the "Contemplation to Attain Love" on, the exercitant-
subject is transformed; not only can he take a place within the visualized Christic
scene (a move from perspective to transpective and Immensity), but he becomes the
scene and vessel for Christ, a feminized bride for Christ (a move from transpective
and Immensity to Inhabitation), once again spanning the distance from cosmos to self,
to finally attain and harbor the Christic image:

to consider how God dwells in His creatures; in the elements, giving them
being; in the plants, giving them life; in the animals, giving them sensation; in
men, giving them understanding. So He dwells in me, giving me being, life,
sensation, and intelligence [animando, sensando, y haciéndome entender], and
thus making a temple of me, since He created me to the likeness and image of
His Divine Majesty. [IV.235, emphasis is our own]

\(^{80}\) It is perhaps significant to our constatation of a Baroque return in French letters and
thought to note that the Contemplation to Attain Love, emblematic for Baroque subjectival stance, was
probably added to the Spiritual Exercises by Ignatius during his Parisian period. See H. Pinard de la
Boullaye, S.J., Les Etapes de la rédaction des Exercices de St. Ignace (Paris: Beauchesne, 1950) 32-
36.
It is this subjectival position — at once choratic (discursive), charismatic (imaginal), and chiasmic (knowledgeable and ethical) — which shall render him worthy and capable of contemplating the Gospel mysteries of the life of Christ, the very phenomenality of Christic presence, which St. Ignatius summarizes and also embellishes with the highest quotient of direct discourse to be found in the Spiritual Exercises.

c. St. Ignatius' Spiritual Journal (February 2, 1544 to February 27, 1545)

Ignatius himself experienced heightened affectivity, particularly manifested in the gift of abundant tears, which happened at all moments and most often when he was saying Mass. This affective sign assailed him to the point of threatening his sight and health. He also experienced other affective signs and corporal feelings, and this is documented by Ignatius in his Spiritual Journal, written during one year where he sought to decide whether or not the Order should receive revenues.\(^1\) According to A. DeNicolas, the Spiritual Journal is an example of the practice of the Spiritual Exercises, and a verification that they work in the passage from spiritual practice (of the Preludes) to the election on how to act in the world.\(^2\) The Spiritual Journal also confirms that heightened affectivity is engagement with the Other and others, and is

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\(^1\) Ignatius' own example recounts his experience when being led away to imprisonment by the Inquisition, where he sees Christ not as a separate vision but as a life to which and upon which he, Ignatius, is present: "On the way the pilgrim saw a kind of representation of Christ being led away, but this was not a vision like the others. He [Ignatius] was taken through three main streets, and he went with joy and contentment instead of sadness." Autobiography in Powers of Imagining, Ignatius de Loyola, DeNicolas trans., 270.

an essential part of the elective choice of how to act with others in the world; it is also the confirmation that there is no ethical dimension without love and without trespass beyond the cognitive dimension.

As the expert practicant of his own Spiritual Exercises, we can assume that Ignatius' subjectival position is, in general, a transpectival one of Inhabitation and presence. The Autobiography states that he could find God always, and at anytime he wanted to find him.\(^3\) For this reason, it is interesting to note the structural progression which scads the Spiritual Journal. Ignatius in fact begins with the corporal and affective practice, from there he often has further sentiments and affective signs, and often, subsequent to positive affections, visions of the Divine persons or figurations of his desire. He also often routes his affections through Mary as intercessor, and even considered how this might or might not be pleasing to God, to conclude that she is "as someone who is a part, or the doorway, of so much grace that I felt in my soul. ([At the Consecration she showed that her flesh was in that of her Son.])" [31] As we have seen in the Spiritual Exercises, passage through (Immensity) and subjectival stance (Inhabitation) in the mode of the feminine and maternal is the most fruitful, even necessary, for transpectival presence. It is after this emoted and visualized practice that Ignatius is able to test the possibilities for an election and to orient his future decision. This passage, which repeats itself throughout the days in the Journal, is the exact opposite of that of the three Preludes in the Spiritual Exercises! Ignatius begins with affectivity and corporality, he receives

\(^3\) *Autobiography*, 99.
the image, and finally he chooses a particular action in the world. *Where there was Historical Rememoration of the Gospel in the Spiritual Exercises, there is now action in the present world.* As an expert exercitant, St. Ignatius is capable of this. We can further interpret this in fact as the adaptation and presencing of History through its contextualization in the matter at hand; for the Gospel past has implications for and a life in the present, if the Spiritual Exercises are conducted correctly.⁸⁴ Thus feeling and sensing take precedence over understanding through cognition and rationality in the Ignatian route to decision. This is the most dependable practice for the dwelling and Inhabited subject.

4. Subjectival Stance

   a. From Ignatius to Descartes, from Modernity to Postmodernity

To speak in our analysis of the Spiritual Exercises in terms of subjectivity is to look back upon Ignatius' vision with a critical apparatus forged by the Philosophical Modernity to follow his work approximately 100 years later. We can then take an anachronistic but helpful moment to compare the Ignatian subject to the Cartesian

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⁸⁴ This phenomenological engagement of the entire, sentient person in the election has important implications for the understanding of history, and for the understanding of life, society and ethics as well. In light of history, whether Evangelical or otherwise, of concern is the gamut from its imitation to the awareness never to repeat it again. Both paradoxically are part of the Ignatian practice with Evangelical history: Christic abdication of self is to be imitated, and the weight of sin behind the Passion is to the best ability not to be incurred again. Thus we conclude in general that the Spiritual Exercises put into place such a particular model for the reception of the past, and perhaps even for the writing of history: through the individual's phenomenological engagement with the past whatever it may be, history is made presence, society is regulated, and the generosity of the ethical dimension is offered.
subject, whose Philosophical stance we shall study at length in a following chapter, and to consider to what extent both Modernist and Postmodernist elements of subjectivity are present or at seed in the Ignatian anthropology.

For both Ignatius and Descartes God is one of a perpetual creation — He is present and His presence perpetually maintains life just as created. Each individual life then is to be considered a perpetual gift from God which is dependent upon Him. As man’s life is an act and a gift of God in His presence, it is also man’s spiritual task to be present to this gift in his acts, thought, memory, desires and speech. That is, he is to be present to this gift in the plenitude of his being. Thus the importance of pragmatics in the subject’s stance, of his performance, discursive and otherwise, and of the perpetual contextualization of faith in the present, as anchored in the belief of a God of perpetual creation.

Like the Cartesian and Modernist subject, the Ignatian exercitant-subject under spiritual direction is important as an individual. He constructs his own visions as part of his spiritual growth, and he is free to imagine for the most part on his own. The potential for a *mathesis universalis* is there in the very techniques of illusion from the individual Composition of Place to the successful exercitant’s immense and inhabited world, that is from imagined idealization to illusion to the real, exemplified in the aesthetic domain by the work and vision of the great Jesuit architect and master of

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85 This concept of God can be found in the "Contemplation to attain Love" of the Spiritual Exercises, and in Descartes’ *Le Monde* VI, *Discours de la méthode* IV, V, and *Méditations métaphysiques*, III.
trompe-l’œil, Andrea Pozzo, and his legacy.\textsuperscript{86} We can see how this must have influenced the young Descartes, educated at the Jesuit College de la Flèche and who probably attended retreats which adapted use of the Spiritual Exercises, and its implications for Philosophical Modernity in the establishment of the ego-subject and faith in his rational vision.

Unlike the Cartesian subject, however, the Ignatian exercitant-subject is directed, subservient and obedient, and learns above all abdication to the O/other in his spiritual development. The greatest freedom allowed to him is that of the treasure of his imagination in elaboration around Gospel narrative. From within this, the exercitant-subject goes beyond the perspectively-situated task of construction, to be proximate, present and performative in his presence to the Christ. In the Cartesian subject, such a performative presence is limited to the enunciation Cogito, ergo sum, projected upon itself and conscious of itself alone as it anchors the ego-subject and reduces the desirous soul to the single dimension of intelligence. The Cartesian subject’s concern returns to itself and its own enunciation, preoccupied with a search

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\textsuperscript{86} It is from within this constructive, voluntaristic or anthropomorphic moment of the exercitant that many theologians and critics, particularly in France, categorize the Spiritual Exercises and its task of Composition of Place, and criticize the Spiritual Exercises and the Jesuit Order’s status in France. Alexandre Brou, S.J. brings up such a criticism by Henri Bremond and "L’Ecole française", and goes on to state the parameters of the problem: "And could we not do without this voluntarism? If we overemphasize it, we run the risk of falling into naturalism, although the danger may be somewhat remote. But if we minimize it, are we not likely to wind up in Quietism?" Furthermore, Brou goes on to say that "the rationalists have made too much of it", that is, the neo-Cartesians have made too much of this moment which we liken to the Cartesian subject and his natural reason. Ignatian Methods of Prayer, 93, 96. See our further treatment in the segment of our chapter on Descartes and the Baroque herein, "The Discours de la méthode and the Méditations métaphysiques: Pulling the Subject out of Doubt and God out of the Subject". The relation of both Descartes’ and the exercitant’s practice to perspectival construction is also a factor of likeness. See J.-J. Goux, "Descartes et la perspective". Once we examine the tasks of the Spiritual Exercises beyond their perspectival and constructive moments, as we have done, the problems of such criticism are surpassed.
for a true foundation to knowledge. God's perpetual creation maintains a static
reason with its perspectival rules for Descartes. The mind is all of the soul for
Descartes, as performance revolves about this alone, and language is limited as the
text is reduced to zero. There is no orientation towards others, nor ethical
implications in this subjectival postion and search for a true foundation; thus morality
remains both borrowed and provisional in the Discours de la méthode. This is the
Classical, Modernist subject, it shall work in hand with the Protestant side of the
Great Schism and its legacy as far as into the 2oth century.

In the Ignatian subject, however, performance towards God, through the steps
of the Spiritual Exercises and the full use of the soul beyond cognitive practice, is
projected upon an everchanging "Lifeworld" (to use a Husserlian, phenomenological
terminology) in consciousness of others, with implications for philosophical
Postmodernity and for ethical works. The full treasorial dimension and beauty of the
soul is engaged in this performance: knowledge and presence to God -- its memory
(Historical rememoration), its intelligence (Composition of Place) and its will
(Affective practice), as exemplified in the affect of love. In the "Contemplation to
Attain Love", the totality of the exercitant's being is given to God, and this brings
life, knowledge and transformation to the Evangelical text, thereby making it an open
work. This subjectival position is both inclusive of and greater than that of
Cartesianism and of Philosophical Modernity, for its position is charismatic and for

87 Intentional consciousness in the transpectival moment is all of this and, we find, for
Husserl as well.
the good of others — χάρισμα, "pour le bien de la communauté".\textsuperscript{88} And it shall work in hand with the Catholic and Tridentine side of the Great Schism, and with its legacy in the Baroque and in the NeoBaroque Postmodern.

b. The Elections

Let us look further at the Ignatian subject, in the context of the elections. As we have noted, it is after the perfection of the technique of the Application of the Senses and of the general affective practice at the end of the second week that the exercitant is to make a vocational election or, in other words, to determine his subjectival stance. To nuance this further, it is after he has made the exercises through the three Preludes, deploying the full powers of the soul in the passage from perspective to transperspective, and into Immensity and Inhabitation, that he should now be ready to situate his subjectivity — to find the degree of his life with the Christ and to choose where in the Lifeworld and with others to project this fully mastered vision, this life with the Christ.

The exercitant’s elections take place at the moment where he shall begin to contemplate Jesus’ departure from Nazareth and his baptismal entry into the world and into acts, up to Palm Sunday. [II.158-161, 12th day] This follows a meditation on the "Three Classes of Men" wherein the exercitant-subject establishes his exact position between material possessions and God, to situate a position in the world. Of course, complete detachment is the best position, and Ignatius means at best to bring the exercitant to evolve towards this. The "Three Forms of Humility"[II.165] which

\textsuperscript{88} See the Article "Charismes", in Dictionnaire de spiritualité.
follow the contemplation of the active life of Christ also work upon this. The exercitant is to abase and humble himself, to render himself obedient, and to neutralize desires towards the material world, and finally to imitate the Christ in all aspects of his abnegated humanity. *Spiritual growth is subjectiv al stance* as it evolves towards a Christ-like abnegation. As the exercitant prepares himself for life in the world, we are far here from an ego-posed subject.

Thus follows the "Introduction into making election of a way of life" [II.169-174], the parameters of which are the praise of God and the salvation of the soul. Ignatius discourages any inordinate or intermediate attachments in attaining this goal. He then goes on to signal the moments appropriate to making a successful election [II.175-178] — in times of presence, tranquility and discernment.89 Then the election itself is to be contemplated [II.178-188], to include a visualization of oneself practicing the vocation and an evaluation of advantages and disadvantages for service, and the garnering of souls, as well as for how the exercitant would wish to be accountable for his life.

It is after the exercitant’s election and into the third week that contemplation can now move into the story of Christ’s Passion. Thus Christ’s own abnegation and sacrifice can influence the exercitant’s vision of carrying out his own vocation, "that

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89 It is apropro that discernment in light of a vocational election is required after the affective practice, wherein emotions and the entire being of the exercitant begin to fall under the control of the will. In the Rules on Discernment at the end of the Spiritual Exercises, Ignatius indicates which affects and their signs are to be relied upon. [IV.316] These are based upon the affective consolations and desolations he found in his own experience, and which are noted in his *Spiritual Journal.*
will and self-interest." [III.189] This position is one for God, for his soul and for the souls of others. Thus goes subjectival stance in the position of transpective and Inhabitation.

Does this *Homo Baroccos* in his opposition to the Cartesian, Modern subject, correspond with the Postmodern death-of-the-subject, to allow us to situate where we can qualify the Postmodern as Neo-Baroque? We will say no, on several counts. Firstly, insofar as the Postmodern death-of-the-subject comes out of and is an extension of the Modern subject in the *failure* of his reason, insofar as he exists in a picture from which is removed the God to whom the Cartesian subject should perform from out of his intelligent soul or "âme pensante", and insofar as a result of this he remains errant, disaffected and distanciated from life and from the depth of language. The Baroque and NeoBaroque subject is *not* there where negative theology and its implications find their exhaustion. And secondly, insofar as the Ignatian abnegated subject is most active in his abnegation, he is *not* the Postmodern dead subject, for the giving up of the soul to God is to be its fullest and most performative vocational deployment. This subject is in constant motion — a Baroque *topos* — and is in constant engagement and giving of self to the other — again an element of the Baroque *topos* in its treasorial and affective aspects. There exists no greater a vigorous, affect-enriched, engaged life and, we shall see, treasorial use of language as well from within.
5. Discursivity

The Colloquies are conducted from within the life of the Christ, for only after the three Preludes have been traversed using the three powers of the soul and when a particular subjectival status is reached does Ignatius allow discursivity to the exercitant. That is, not until the exercitant is in a position of the "tangible-étalon", of the fully deployed, exercised and renewed Symbolic of Inhabitation where affect is joined to intellect and from whence he can speak as the space of the chora, may he speak to the Divine persons whose presence he is now most humbly able to accommodate, by using both Colloquy and techniques of prayer. The topic of language has already arisen in the consideration of the first prelude of Historical Rememoration, which resorts to a synthesis and conflation of Evangelical narrative. Now, however, we can examine not only that the exercitant has permission to engage in the speech act and thereby render it present and performative (which has already been done on the imaginal level), but how he does so.

a. The Colloquies

Let us examine systematically the practice of Colloquy, and how speaking is to occur therein, before going on to examine the "Three Ways of Prayer" and general instances where speech is mentioned. Although it is stated in Ignatius' Directory to the Spiritual Exercises that the Colloquy can take place at any time, in general it takes place in each exercise after the three Preludes and the points which elaborate upon them, that is, after the moment where the exercitant is to dwell within the particular image of Evangelical history. The Colloquy is to be spoken in an intimate and
trusting fashion, as a friend speaks to a friend, and it always also includes a formal, prescribed prayer to the Divine person addressed; thus the use of language is both open and closed, both free and directed. All of the Colloquies end in fact with the "Our Father", thus placing a Symbolic and patriarchal seal upon the cycle of a particular exercise. *This is of particular interest as the Symbolic, patriarchal enunciative act takes place from within a matriarchal, subjectival postion -- that of space, of Inhabitation and of the chora.* There are several ways in which we can interpret this, although we shall not conclude upon any one interpretation until we have examined the methods of prayer. The Semiotic and Symbolic find themselves in union, or the Symbolic dimension finds itself opened up as a kind of living word transformed by the individual presence of the excercitant, where the Father is in fact transformed. Or, by another interpretation, the Semiotic dimension (of Son, Spirit & Mother) finds itself, in the end, inhabited and colonized, so to speak, by the Symbolic, patriarchal order which triumphs once again. Let us keep these possibilities in mind as we further examine the excercitant's engagement with language as prescribed in the *Spiritual Exercises.*

The first Colloquies are addressed only to the Father, and conclude with the recitation of the "Our Father". In the Meditation on Sin, however, a triple Colloquy is introduced, where first Mary, then the Christ, and finally the Father are addressed. In each Colloquy, the appropriate prayer is recited, the "Hail Mary", the "*Anima Christi*"\(^{90}\) and the "Our Father", respectively. The first two of the triple Colloquy are

\(^{90}\) The *Anima Christi*, a prayer which dates from the late Middle Ages, was particularly dear to Ignatius, and was indulged by Pius IX in 1854 with the title *Aspirationes S. Ignatii ad SS.*
to be used as intercessions for grace to attain ultimately communication with the
Father. This triple Colloquy is used again in the "Meditation on the Two Standards"
and the "Three Classes of Men", where the terrains of good and evil, and human
behavior are to be considered. It is also to be used in the meditations upon the active
life of Christ from his Baptism up to Palm Sunday, that is, up until the week of the
Passion. Each time the triple Colloquy is used, sin and its overcoming are in
question, as well as action in the world. The passage through Mary, in particular,
emphasizes the need for grace and concomittant affective practice in these matters.
Also, these triple Colloquies all lead up to the election of how to act in the world.

*Thus speech leads to act*, for let us not forget that the *Spiritual Exercises* are not to be
read, but to be given to an exercitant who *enacts* them. And once the election is
made, the exercitant is to turn once again to prayer.

In the third week's contemplation of the Passion and focus upon the gift of
Christ's humanity, the Colloquy is limited to address firstly the Christ, and then the
Father, ending with the "Our Father". This is to be the Colloquy throughout this
entire week. In the fourth and final week, celebrating the Resurrection and joy, and
where affect is at its height, the Colloquy is to be liberally given, according to the
subject matter, but as always to end with the "Our Father". In the "Contemplation to
Attain Love", however, it is limited to addressing the Father. On the one hand

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*Redemptorist*. Ignatius' particular spiritual practice and methods of prayer appropriated the prayer,
even though he was not its author. See Herbert Thurston, "Notes on Familiar Prayers. VII. The *Anima
Christi*", *The Month* 8 (May 1915): 493-505.
performative language becomes most fluid where there is greatest feeling, and on the
other most focussed where there is greatest love.

b. The Three Ways of Prayer

Before the following entry into contemplation of the mysteries of the life of Christ, Ignatius prescribes "Three Ways of Prayer". According to DeNicolas, these can be used either as an introduction to prayer for the beginner before undertaking the Spiritual Exercises themselves, or for those exercitants who are already proficient at the Spiritual Exercises. They also serve to expand upon the technique of Colloquy practiced throughout the Exercises. We like to think them in a parallelism with the three Preludes, as deploying successively the three powers of the soul. In the first method, a prescribed recitation of prayers is to revolve around the individual memory of sins in relation to the Commandments, the seven Capital sins, and in the use of the three parts of the soul and the five senses. In this method using the first power of the soul, a fixed Symbolic order and series of signifiers are emphasized, language is utilitarian, and the site of enunciation is masculine. In the terms of J.-L. Austin's Speech Act Theory,91 this would be the "locutionary" act of saying something.

In the second method of prayer, the exercitant is to recite the prescribed prayers in such a way as to consider one by one each word, its meaning, the comparisons it suggests, the relish and consolation it offers. The exercitant is to spend one hour on a prayer, and is not to rush the process, as long as the

contemplation of a word gives fruit. This is in fact an exercise in semantics and metaphor; it is a cognitive and intellectual task using the second power of the soul, but also an imaginative one, as both the ideal and imaginary, or signified aspects of the signifier are emphasized, and used to open up the dimensions of the signifier and of the Symbolic order into connotation and a feminine site of enunciation, and to reach beyond the limits of the text, expanding thereby its Immensity. Here the Verb becomes inexhaustible in its reception. In the terms of Baroque rhetoric, this is known as ingegno, where the power of conceiving, judging and reasoning is tested by the lack of immediacy in thought of the extreme use of metaphor, and where celerity of mind and spirit in the ability to transfer concepts from one context to another is tested as well. \( ^{92} \) Ultimately all meanings are brought to a synchronic, saturated surface, transforming the temporal into the immediacy of the spatial, and the diachronic into the synchronic. In the context of Immensity, we find this metaphorical method of prayer allows traversing spatial distance, from the past decor of the Gospel to the exercitant’s present decor, a crossing of boundaries which we have spoken of in terms of trompe-l’œil. This is the first linguistic correlate of being-in, here a being in the text. In the terms of Speech Act theory it is an "illocutionary" act in saying something: saying traverses distance.

\( ^{92} \) See Renato Barilli, Rhetoric, trans. Giuliana Menozzi (Minneapolis: U. of Minnesota Press, 1989) 70-74. Barilli brings out how ingegno was in opposition to the slowly methodical geometric method of reasoning of Descartes and of the Cartesianism and Rationalism to follow him (in such as the thought of Port Royal, and of Locke), which kept to the utilitarian use of language alone, the linguistic correlate to perspective in painting.
In the third method, the exercitant is to pray mentally the prescribed prayers one word at a time, between each physical breath. This is known as rhythmic prayer; it corporally engages the exercitant in the process of meaning and invests his very flesh, breath and life in that meaning. Language thus traces a passage in the flesh. In this manner, the exercitant becomes a referent to the signifier and signified, their denotation, a metonymic part of them, their anamorphic other, the Real dimension to the Symbolic and Ideal/Imaginary orders, a "tangible-étalon", a moving meaning. Corporally and affectively exercising the will, the exercitant becomes a breath which gives life to the signs, and also a chora-tic space which accommodates their sense and confirms their presence.  

The exercitant prays as a "tangible-étalon" from a matriarchal position of Inhabitation; this is furthermore within the realm of rhetoric, of speech act and of pragmatics. We have here the second linguistic correlate to what we have until now examined for the most part from a spatial, pictorial, affective and corporal point of view as "being-in". And thereby we conclude, that in the Ignatian Colloquy and methods of prayer, as intentionality and phenomenality combine, the Symbolic order finds itself opened up to its dimension as Living Word, transformed by the individual presence and speech act of the exercitant as he breathes it anew, being from the text, with the text, and the text in him. The Father is in fact transformed; it is not only His image and His act, but His verb as well which are now

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93 The implications for linguistic performance and speech act in all arenas are tremendous here.

94 Rhetoric is speech which is meant to have a sensual and affective appeal as well as an intellectual one. Its objective is to persuade, and it does not necessarily pretend to contain a truth value.
in the flesh of the exercitant, a new vessel for the Christ and a new Christ. His subjectivity is constituted as he constructs a context for meaning in the performance of a prayerful speech act. This is a "perlocutionary" act, or performance in saying something as feeling and corporal gesture invest themselves in the word and, likewise, the word invests itself in the flesh, and in the world.
C. From Ignatian Spirituality & the Baroque, to the Postmodern

Herein we shall summarize the results of our analyses of the Spiritual Exercises for their ascetic and sensualist dimensions with respect to the image and the implications for reception of the Jesuit Order in early Modern Europe, for the religious concepts of Immensity and Inhabitation, and for their structural deployment with implications for the well-known Baroque topology and how this deployment permits a novel approach to the Baroque. This shall allow us to go on to examine the new épistémè of this Baroque, as it has been shown to us, and its affinity for late 19th-century and 20th-century aspects of Postmodernism, particularly in the French context, as a program for aesthetic perception. From there, we shall finally work towards the implications for a return of the Baroque, which we shall then go on to examine both in the historical Baroque’s philosophical, aesthetic and literary production, and in contemporary French thought, arts and letters.

1. An Asceticism or a Sensualism?: the Question of the Image

Let us examine the polemic of an asceticism versus a sensualism in a quick review of the Preludes and Colloquy in the Spiritual Exercises, firstly with respect to the image, for it is the image which is at the crux of the question of ascetic versus sensualist appeal. The practice of the image in the second Prelude exploits and further embellishes the particular moment of Evangelical memory requested by the first Prelude, it has an initial place in the Spiritual Exercises’ unhesitating recourse to the visual through the technique of Composition of Place — to the practice of
visualization, imagination and construction. It is essential to the exercitant’s reception of and elaboration upon Gospel history, in a practice of unlimited semiosis encouraged by the fact that the exercitant remains without a written text. Within the construction, it is the image of the incarnate Christ and all that surrounds Him which takes precedence, for the image is primarily Christocentric in the Spiritual Exercises.

Secondarily, in the theological sense of man made in the image and likeness of God as elaborated from Augustine on forward, we can say that in the Spiritual Exercises this anthropomorphic moment of image as likeness to God is not fully reached until the fourth week of the exercises, when the exercitant renders back to God what within himself was always His, that is in His image, and thereby finds spiritual union. Although there are hierarchical steps in Ignatius’ work through the levels of the soul, insofar as man is made in God’s image there is a consideration of the whole person. There is no ascensional movement to be found as man approaches the image, as is the case in the Neoplatonists and Augustine, but rather there is an intentionality which is combined with phenomenality or the passivity of the individual existence. Indeed, the exercitant becomes most human, in the image of the humanity of Christ, in this stage. For it is Christ’s humanity which brought the image to the Verb, and the image remains in the absence of His human figure. And although there is an emptying out of the subject towards the presence of the Other/others, this is not to be seen as a negative, iconoclast or disincarnate moment on the way towards

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95 Whether this is this due to the material scarcity of the printed book at the time in history, or to the importance of the image and its technical deployment in the exercitant’s spiritual progression is an unsolvable question. Both explanations are pertinent, however the second is of greater significance to our study.
union. Man remains present in his totality, in his corporality and in his sensualism, and the forms are not left behind. *The image and its relation to corporality and affectivity is not a barrier on the path toward resemblance to and union with God, nor a trick in place of the real; it is rather an essential and indispensable part of the way.* Also, not only does the image come from God to man, as in the metaphor of an impression of a seal upon wax, but in the Ignatian system man as a successful exercitant projects the image, anthropomorphically and without shame, through his corporal and affective state, upon the particular context of his world and all about him. It is primarily and finally this projected image which occupies the Spiritual Exercises.  

From these two Ignatian stages of the image, the first of which can be called the Imaginary stage, and the second the anthropological stage of *Homo Baroccus*, we can state several things. In the Spiritual Exercises Ignatius has overcome the theological tendency to identify man in the image of God in his intellectual capacity alone where an ascensional, ascetic mode leaves the corporal, the sentient and the affective behind. The metaphor and perceptual reality which is overcome here is that of distance and separation; it is replaced by that of proximation and presence. Man in God's image is all of man, in all of his capacities, and the image is active, constructed and projected by the individual exercitant. Here the Baroque épistémè has begun; out of the Renaissance, it shall remain lurking to counter (and counterbalance) Cartesian Rationalism and its legacy in Philosophical Modernity. From Composition

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96 For general background on the theological sense of the image, see the topic "Image" in *Dictionnaire de spiritualité*, vol.7.2, 1401-1536.
of Place to the exercitant's abdication to God in Christ's image, the imaginary, the image, and Spirituality along with them remain terrestrial, horizontal and spatial, synchronic, simultaneous and atemporal, sensualist and cohabitational.

The exercitant's production of the image engages a corporal and affective practice as well, as is seen in the third Prelude. This practice is what renders the image, and the exercitant, mutually present to each other in the exercitant's own recipient flesh and life. The image is sensed in all of its virtual dimensionality, and felt in all of its affective depth from within; it becomes an inhabitable space of Immensity as the exercitant moves into it. Thus corporal and affective practice take place from within the image, and neither image, body, nor emotion are left behind as the exercitant moves toward union with God. In the Colloquies and Ways of Prayer, the exercitant gives both imagination (metaphor) and corporality (metonymy) to the task of prayer, thereby opening up the sign and rendering to language and the Symbolic order its full rhetorical, semiotic dimension through his own presence to it, and thereby presence to God. And finally, the exercitant in his affective state becomes in turn a space for the image, for the Christ, for others -- a corporal, sensual, spiritual space of Inhabitation, a symbolically-stamped receptacle or equivalent. Spiritual union in the concept of the Spiritual Exercises maintains a sensualist dimension, albeit an exercised and controlled one and, without excluding them, is never limited to an ascetic or intellectual dimension alone. In fact, we can go so far as to say that the sensualist dimension goes beyond the merely intellectual in knowledge of God. This is a Counter-Reformation, Baroque aesthetics and a
Philosophy of Knowledge as well, with direct implications for a pedagogy. It is from this understanding of the structure of Ignatian Spirituality that we can go on to take a moment to examine the early history of the Jesuit Order within the context of the Catholic Reformation, its power therein and what we can call "a politics of the image", and the vicissitudes of recognition and reception of such in France.

2. French Reception of the Council of Trent and of the Jesuit Order

The power accorded to the Society of Jesus by Pope Paul III's acceptance of the Order on September 27, 1540, was a power which went in hand with the universal apostolic mission of Catholicism. That is, it was a power which transcended national boundaries, permitting the liberty to act towards the goal of garnering soul's for Christ, in the image which Ignatius himself used of the constitution of an army under the aegis of Catholicism, held by the Pope. This power answered in theory to the Pope alone, and it would serve him well during the Council of Trent (1545-1563) and the period of implementation following its pronouncements. Of the Orders who worked in hand with Trent, the foremost were the Jesuits who worked out of the mold of the Spiritual Exercises to develop, maintain and perpetuate the religious Baroque

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97 Thus the significance of the name of Paul III's Papal Bull Regimini militantis Ecclesiae, and later to be reiterated in a second Papal Bull by Paul III, and by a third of Pope Jules III. L. Cristiani, L'Eglise à l'époque du Concile de Trente, 315.

98 Fathers Laynez and Salmeron in 1546, and later Fathers Canisius and LeJay served as theologians for the Pope himself at the Council of Trent; three of these were among the first Jesuits. L. Cristiani, L'Eglise à l'époque du Concile de Trente, 317-8.
épistémè, founded as well in Counter-reformation efforts and the Council of Trent’s pronouncements, and their emphasis upon the Real and Imaginal aspects of faith, over the Symbolic aspects which were exclusively emphasized in the Protestant domain.\(^9^9\) Such emphasis went in hand with the whole, sensualist dimension of Ignatian Spirituality. Real and Imaginal aspects are apparent in the beliefs in an incarnate Eucharistic presence, in the reality of the sacrifice of the Mass, in all the sacraments as sentient signs of grace, in the role of the priest as a representative of Christ, in the image of Christ seated within the Catholic church, in the reverence of Mary and the saints as examples of Christic presence, in the veneration of relics and images -- all matters attacked by Protestantism. Without concerning themselves directly with Protestant heresy, the Jesuits sought firstly to reform clerical life, to combat slander upon it by their own example, and to bring all to a Christian life, as well as to the premises of their philosophico-spiritual method and beliefs.\(^1^0^0\)

Needless to say, in a France whose concept of nationhood was being progressively established from François I to Henri IV, to culminate in the monarchical figure of Louis XIV, the transnational mission of the Jesuit Order did not sit well, nor its cultural control through the image, the sentient, the corporal and the

\(^9^9\) "Toutefois, pendant que les abus persévéraient et que Luther tonnait contre eux, non toujours sans raison, la vraie réforme, évangélique, prenait naissance obscurément avec l’oratoire du Divin Amour, à Rome, avec la naissance des Théatins, puis avec l’apostolat d’Angèle Merici et de ses Ursulines, avec Ignace de Loyola et ses compagnons, avec Jérôme Emilien et les Somasques, Antoine-Maria Zaccaria et les Barnabites, avec de saints évêques tels que Giberti et Jean-Pierre Carafa, avec Matthieu de Bassis et les Capucins, avec Thérèse d’Avila et le Carmel." L.Cristiani, L’Eglise à l’époque du Concile de Trente, 30.

\(^1^0^0\) See Piet Penning de Vries, S.I., "Protestants and other Spirituals. Ignatius’ vision and why he took this position," Archivum Historicum Societatis Iesu 80 (dec. 1971): 463-483, who argues that Ignatius did not directly concern himself with the polemic details of combatting Protestant heresy.
affective. In particular, Eustache du Bellay, Bishop of Paris as of 1540, prolonged his animosity towards the Order in countless refusals to recognize the Society in France, in hand with his refusal to accept a Papal decision which would take hold in France without consultation of French Catholic officials. This was the same mentality which would long oppose France to Trent’s pronouncements.\textsuperscript{101} Truly, the Catholic France which Eustache du Bellay symbolized was one which wanted its own Catholic Church; this was the very spirit of Gallicanism at work. Thus the animosity in France towards the Jesuit society can be attributed essentially to the maintainance of power Paris felt was necessary to counter Rome. The constant polemic and pamphlets issued fed the development of the art of rhetoric in France from all sides. This would soon splinter into a rhetoric of excess — that Baroque, and a rhetoric of restraint — that of Boileau and of Classicism. And by extension, the religious Baroque épistémè in its totality — as a structured religious mode, as a political and social power, as a culture, aesthetic and manner of perception — could be said to threaten the French concept of nationhood.\textsuperscript{102}

\footnote{\textsuperscript{101} General French reaction against the Council of Trent and all this reaction implied went accordingly, well into the 18th century and in conflation with Enlightenment values and their amplification of Philosophical Modernity. L. Cristiani, \textit{L'Eglise à l'époque du Concile de Trente}, 227.}

\footnote{\textsuperscript{102} We would not compare this threat to that of the French Revolution, which grew out of prolongations of Cartesianism and attacked the Monarchy, while maintaining French sovereignty, national identity, culture and hegemony. The Baroque épistémè in whose establishment the Jesuit Order played an important role relatively supported French Monarchy, insofar as it was in alliance with Papal power. On the other hand, however, another connection, between the exaggeration of absolute Monarchical authority to counter Rome and the eventual reaction of the Revolution to this exaggerated power, can be seen, as Victor Martin states it: "Et même l'on peut dire sans exagération que, dans le bilan des causes de la Révolution française, l'une des plus profondes a été la résistance de l'autorité royale à cette disposition fondamentale du concile de Trente." \textit{Le Gallicanisme et la réforme catholique. Essai historique sur l'introduction en France des décrets du Concile de Trente (1563-1615)} (Paris, 1919; Genève: Slatkine Reprints, 1975) x-xi.
Distinct nationhood as a reason and motive for strife would however quickly evolve and complexify itself, as an internal fracture that would further accommodate religious controversy as well. Under Charles IX and the Queen Mother Catherine de Medicis, the French Parliament was ordered several times to accept the Society.\textsuperscript{103} Now, not simply was national sovereignty at stake, but national cohesion, threatened by the religious schism and the cause of Protestant Reform, itself exacerbated and growing ever more problematic in hand with the political scene. For many Parliamentary members refused to recognize the Jesuit Society out of fear of angering Protestants, or out of their own Protestant sympathies.

In contrast, Catherine de Medicis' own favoritism towards the Jesuits did not blind her to political motivations and opportunism, which brought her to make many concessions to the Protestants in hand with a general politics of tolerance in what she presented as the hope of joining peacefully the two religious factions, to include the refusal to recognize the pronouncements of the Council of Trent, which would not be published in France until 1615, and the later arranged marriage in 1571 of her daughter Marguerite de Valois to Henry of Navarre, the future Henri IV. This would paradoxically combine with the horrible event of the the St. Bartholomew massacre, to reveal how impossible indeed were her wishes and her efforts for peace.

France's difficulties with receiving Trent's pronouncements went beyond bruised sentiments of national sovereignty, which it wished to see backed by the sovereign power of the Universal Church, just as Luther had advanced it, rather than

\textsuperscript{103} To include at the Colloque de Poissy of the 9th and 16th of September, 1561.
by the Pope, whose favoritism for Spain after the Council through Charles V, the Holy Roman Emperor, left France insulted. Firstly, France’s expectations from the Council were singular and perhaps unreasonable given its late start since Luther’s separation from the Church, elaborated from 1517 to 1530. Where France hoped its pronouncements would reunite the factions under one faith, Pope Pius IV wished merely to attend to the needs of the suffering and disconcerted Catholic population, with dogmatic precisions concerning the Catholic faith itself. There was certainly no sympathy at Trent towards the Protestants nor towards reunification of Christians, and the council served in actuality to confirm the schism.

Overall, what possessed Catherine de Medicis was on the one hand the pragmatic reason of fear of bloodshed in France, as well as a politic of deferral until Charles IX should come of age and take upon himself any such decisions. Thus her constant opportunism sought to reconcile Catholics and Protestants, as well as to maintain French hegemony. And to politics as well she had to subordinate her heart, which opted for the Catholic practice of her childhood, and she personally suffered for not being able to fervently practice it.\footnote{See V. Martin, \textit{Le Gallicanisme et la réforme catholique}, particularly chapters 1 & 2, 1-87, for an overview of French reception of Trent and royal politics. Upon visiting Jesuit colleges in Lyon and Avignon years later during the period of civil war and strife, Catherine de Medicis would be moved to tears by the students’ demonstrations of piety. See Henri Fouqueray, S.J., \textit{Histoire de la Compagnie de Jesus en France}, 2 vols. (Paris: Librairie Alphonse Picard & Fils, 1910) vol.1, livre III, ch.xiii.} She was warned by Rome as early as 1561 that the concessions she was making were equivalent to losing the cause of the Catholic faith in France, and to leave such negotiations with the Protestant Reform to the Council of Trent. And indeed Catherine de Medicis’ politics of vicissitude,
Despite any worthy wishes for peace behind them, would backfire upon France, as attested to by countless religious wars, beginning in 1562 with the massacre of Protestants at Vassy, to include the St. Bartholomew massacre, which has been shown to have been premeditated, and deployed at the moment when Charles IX was of age to accept responsibility, yet young and weak enough to remain under the possession and manipulation of the Queen mother.

Further complexities behind the wish for French sovereignty involved pedagogy and education. The growth of Jesuit colleges in France was seen by Gallican partisans such as Etienne Pasquier, the lawyer for the University of Paris in 1565, in a contestation with the first French Jesuit College de Clermont, established in Paris in 1550, as a further medium for the exercise of Papal authority in France, particularly upon its youth, without the consent, direction, or influence of the French Parliament. And indeed, the propagation of Jesuit education and the opening of many colleges in France worked in hand with the pronouncements of Trent: it was a way to get the reinforced Catholic doctrine across despite its lack of official acceptance there. Along with the Dominicans, the Jesuits reawakened an interest in Thomism and Aristotelianism to support Trent’s pronouncements in the domains of the Real and the Imaginal dimensions of faith. And the method of St. Ignatius’ Spiritual Exercises gave the psychological tactics and practice necessary to inscribe Trent upon the heart and body, so to speak. In effect, the Jesuits were there and available at a time when many Catholic religious could not be counted upon for presence in their parishes, let alone services, and could even be heretic from within; they indeed served as soldiers
for Christ and the Church, answerable only to the Pope, and instructed not only the youth, but the adult population as well. Their talent for instruction would later be recognized by Henri IV, who would have the famous College de La Flèche built under his patronage. The opening in October 1564, a year after Trent's closure, of theological courses at the College de Clermont, and their extreme success beyond the bounds of the college population to the point of undermining student confidence and loyalty at the University of Paris, served to deepen the type of animosity Pasquier represented.\textsuperscript{105} The will to power of the French state had brought forth already, well in advance of the 18th and 19th centuries, the question of a laicised versus an ecclesiastic education, and student population in the Jesuit colleges would wane after the reign of Louis XIV.

Thus French animosity towards the Society of Jesus was an internal and lasting fracture -- the kind of fracture symptomatic of a larger epistemological change, one which demarcates at once the Imaginary and Real from the Symbolic, the Baroque from the Classical, Catholicism from Protestantism, the Jesuits from the Jansenists, the Aristotelians from the Platonists, Aquinas from Augustine, the Materialists from the Cartesians, the Phenomenologists from the Neo-Cartesians and Ultramodernists, the sensualism which captures the whole human being from the asceticism which

\textsuperscript{105} By the 1570s, the College de Clermont would be internationally famous, with approximately 3000 pupils, headed by the famous humanist theologian Maldonat. A.G. Dickens, \textit{The Counter-Reformation} (London: Thames & Hudson, 1968) 86. For a detailed history of these developments in the area of Jesuit education in France, see Henri Fouqueray, S.J., \textit{Histoire de la Compagnie de Jesus en France}, 2 vols. Pasquier, in harmony with Gallican sentiment like that of Eustache du Bellay, was particularly outraged by the fourth vow of the professed in the Jesuit Order, to recognize the Pope above all other authority. Because of this vow, Papal support of the Order since Paul III was attributed by Jesuit enemies and Gallican partisans alike to political motives. (397).
limits man and God as well to the *ego cogito*. It is a fracture which reaches back to the very frontiers established by the early expansion of the Roman Empire, and about which many problems would congregate and crystallize,\(^\text{106}\) and which reaches forward, as we shall see, to be complexified by power and politics in the areas of nationhood, religion, reform, culture, aesthetics and education. Let us go on to establish what are for us the defining concepts of the Baroque side of this schism.

3. Immensity & Inhabitation

Up to now we have used the terms of "Immensity" and "Inhabitation" (also known as "Indwelling"), in the context of our analyses, without giving them an *a priori* definition. This has been done purposefully, for we are of the opinion that the terms find their enrichment and full definition in the context of the *Spiritual Exercises* and its practice of Presence or Being-in. Let us, however, before concluding, take a moment to examine the terms, firstly in light of the evolution of the exercitant-subject of the *Spiritual Exercises*, with implications for aesthetic and philosophical passages from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance to the Baroque, for the passage from Perspective to Transpective, and for perception and knowledge. Secondly, we shall examine the terms in the manner in which they are generally conceived as religious concepts.

\(^{106}\) See Marc Bloch, *Apologie pour l’histoire, ou Le Métier d’historien* (Paris: A. Colin, 1974), who explains "l’histoire des mentalités" as it tracks social institutions, and transcends present event and individual will and acts to privilege structural factors at play. It is this type of practice of history which governs our reading of a return of Baroque aesthetic in the contemporary time.
We have seen in the Spiritual Exercises the image and concommittant corporality, affectivity and union in two moments of transpectival passage which are part of Presence, Dasein, and Being-in. The first transpectival moment is that of "Immensity" -- the construction of a vast space and decor, initially in Renaissance perspectivist terms, but ultimately as a space from within which the excitant, in the image of Christ's humanity, shall eventually speak, emote, move and be. This moment is closest to that required in the Prelude of Composition of Place. In Trinitarian and Structuralist terms, the constructive aspect of Immensity would correspond to the Imaginary (or signified), and the excitant's presence within it to the Real (or referent). We have further seen Immensity in the Spiritual Exercises in the excitant's corporal Application of the Senses to the image in order to enter into it as an inhabitable and vast decor, and as if he were present within its dimensions. The linguistic correlate to this is found in the second Method of Prayer, where each word is given its full metaphorical dimension, and textual depth is thereby explored, as in Baroque use of metaphor. As a theological term, "Immensity" is a prerequisite condition to "Inhabitation". It is the vast and infinite presence of God as dwelling place, sanctuary and sustenance to all He has created; it is also both a textual and theatrical space from within which history is recorded and from which memory, the image and presence are enacted.\(^\text{107}\)

The second transpectival moment is that of "Inhabitation" -- once the excitant-subject is situated from within the "Immensity" of the Gospel scene, he

becomes in his very corporality and individuality, through the final affective step of
the third Prelude, a Baroque decor for Christic, Gospel and Trinitarian presence, a
holy, charismatic space, an exchange of flesh, a maternal, choratic receptacle,
tabernacle and tomb which is chiasmic, inhabited. The exercitant, finally, has
constructed himself, in a moment where affectivity has its image! This image is at the
moment of an achieved and perfected structural deployment and Trinitarian passage,
as the Symbolic is reached and saturated by the Imaginary and the Real (or as the
signifier finds itself in a horizontal relation with the signified and the referent which
have saturated it). At this stage, discursivity is most fully possible. However it is
no longer a masculine-centered discursivity of the Symbolic order, as the subject has
now assumed an abdicated, feminine and maternal position, and has won for this
abdication a status equally capable of exchange, what P. De Letter, S.J. calls "an
economy of grace", and which brings remarkably with it the Imaginary and Real,
the body and affectivity. The linguistic correlate to this in the Spiritual Exercises is
the third Method of Prayer, where the exercitant opens up his own life and breath to
the presence of the word, and places himself in dialogue with it, as both its affected

108 Affectivity in relation to the image and in the image were also a part of Middle Ages
piety and representation, however the affective representation of Divinity remained in an archetypal
mode and did not capture the real and imaginary dimensions as it does in the Baroque, which is in our
opinion necessary for the full experience of Inhabitation.

109 In our opinion, the structure of the Spiritual Exercises and our analysis as such do give a
formal reason to the delicate theological question of Inhabitation. See the article "Inhabitation" in
Dictionnaire de spiritualité, 1748. In fact, we shall go so far as to say that Inhabitation finds its full
structural deployment within the Baroque and its general secularisation in the Baroque beyond the
religious context. In terms of the sign, the saturated signifier of the Baroque overcomes Derridean
erancy, and historically returns as both its parallel and counter-discourse.

recipient and a blessed space which proffers it. *The exercitant in a situation of Inhabitation enacts the Word and its Image from within himself.*

As a theological term, "Inhabitation" expresses the Trinitarian presence within the soul as that which carries the image of God, as if a seat or theater to His presence. He who is in a state of Inhabitation is beautiful (Origène), illuminated, charitable, wherefrom the image. It is an intersubjectival and communal relation with the Divinity, and it is one of both intentionality (consciousness) and of ontology (being), of both knowledge and of love, as it is through the loving gift of the humanity of Christ that man himself receives an ontological promotion. Inhabitation is mostly a phenomenon of the New Testament, related to the direct intervention of God through the Incarnation and through the Word in the human and personal history of salvation. And it realizes itself in the image; it is the gift of the image (St. Thomas Aquinas, Pius XII). Inhabitation is also likened by A. Gardeil to the subject’s transparent projection of the Christic scene upon the "screen" of his immediate, existential surroundings, yet he qualifies this model of perception in the context of faith as both intentional and obscure.¹¹² Inhabitation reposes in both the soul and the

¹¹¹ Spiritual union has been expressed in many ways by the saints, in such terms as illumination, as darkness, as image and resemblance, as the projection of the soul towards God, as mystical marriage, as light, love, presence and vision, proximity and friendship, as a feeling of immersion, or as located at either the summit or the absolute center of the soul. Both Theresa of Avila and Maria of the Incarnation spoke of spiritual union in the terms of Inhabitation. St. Theresa used the image of the soul as a castle, with evermore interior, inhabited rooms. Maria of the Incarnation found reception of the Eucharist in particular as a means of experiencing Inhabitation. Both saints used the metaphor of mystical marriage as well. See the article "Inhabitation", *Dictionnaire de spiritualité*, in particular 1759-67.

body, it does not leave either the body or the image behind. And the inhabited subject wants not only to see God, but to touch and to feel him with all his senses.113 As such, Inhabitation is experiential; through imagination, affective engagement and acts the subject finds himself in relation not only to the world and himself, but to God as well, as the eternal is expressed in time.114

Philosophically, we liken Inhabitation to a Phenomenological position, where man is in exchange with and in copresence with the objects of knowledge, and in chiasmic exchange with the flesh of the O/other, all of which are part of his existential and preethical experience, and which are also, along with him, in constant flux. Wherefrom the question, is Inhabitation a static or dynamic experience? A question which does not fail to recall anew the Jansenist-Jesuit polemic concerning the questions of grace, liberty and justification, and to bring to mind as well aesthetic motifs of Classical stasis versus Baroque movement and dynamism. This further suggests that there are both Classical and Baroque models of Inhabitation. J.Mouroux and we as well opt for the Baroque model of Inhabitation: "l'attitude catholique ne boucle pas, elle s'achève dans un élan qui la jette au mystère de Dieu -- c'est à dire qui ne s'achève jamais".115 This we would liken to our "chain of representations",


115 J.Mouroux opts for the Baroque, dynamic model, suggestive of Kierkegaard's existential fear and trembling, wherein man through his acts (and spiritual practice) finds himself in an [Inhabitation] relation with God. The subject is to enter into the image each day. Thus the Council of Trent rejected any such thing as constraining evidence of justification. L'Expérience chrétienne, 25,
wherein the exercitant opens himself in charity to others, where act and affect combine — "une affectivité crucifiée" as Mouroux calls it — to perpetuate the life of the other in the bosom of the inexhaustible image and within the insoundable Word as they have transformed the body of the inhabited subject, and are offered to continue the chain of representations and presencing. The relationship of spiritual union and of Inhabitation to God is also a corporal and affective relation to the image and to the text; it is a Being in the text and, by extension, a Presence in the work, with implications for Philosophy and theories of knowledge, for art and the practice of theater, for language and the practice of literature, for the full implications of memory and the writing of the self, and for the practice of history.

A structure, a practice, an affective and charitable way of life which walks amidst men and carries God with it from within, projecting the image and the text, a sensualist, existential mode and not an ascetic, detached one — let us examine further the implications of this Spiritual Baroque structure.

33-4, 47. We can conclude that although Ignatius' Spiritual Exercises give a structure to the status of Inhabitation, they give no guarantees, but only direction for perpetual practice or habitus, action, charity, and life in the world.
4. The Baroque Structure deployed in the *Spiritual Exercises*

The obvious triadic structures to be found in the *Spiritual Exercises* and which have directed our analysis to lead up to Immensity and Inhabitation, and ultimately Presence and Being-in, are those of the three Preludes and, within the contours of Colloquy which follow, the Three Ways of Prayer. We have analyzed the implications of the successive deployment of these methodical steps; the following table schematizes and summarizes the results of our analysis:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Preludes</th>
<th>First, History, Memory</th>
<th>Second, the Image Composition of Place</th>
<th>Third, Affect Application of the Senses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Soul</td>
<td>Memory</td>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>Will, Desire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychoanalysis</td>
<td>Superego</td>
<td>Ego</td>
<td>Id</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Trinity</td>
<td>Father</td>
<td>Holy Ghost</td>
<td>Son</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>Protestantism</td>
<td>Catholicism - Immensity</td>
<td>Catholicism - Inhabitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spirituality</td>
<td>Memory of God</td>
<td>Imaginative practice of God’s presence</td>
<td>Real, Corporal, Affective practice of God’s presence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbolic Economy</td>
<td>Symbolic/token</td>
<td>Imaginary-Ideal/archetype</td>
<td>Real/treasure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhetoric</td>
<td>docere</td>
<td>movere</td>
<td>delectare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discourse</td>
<td>Utilitarian</td>
<td>Metaphorical</td>
<td>Metonymical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Sign</td>
<td>Signifier</td>
<td>Signified</td>
<td>Referent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speech Act Theory</td>
<td>Locutionary act</td>
<td>Illocutionary act</td>
<td>Perlocutionary act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aesthetics</td>
<td>Middle Ages - Symbolic &amp; Mimetic representation</td>
<td>Renaissance - Perspectival representation &amp; Realism</td>
<td>Baroque - Transcendent 2, anamorphosis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spatiality</td>
<td>Closed framing</td>
<td>Ellipse</td>
<td>Eclipse, open framing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjective Stance</td>
<td>Distance</td>
<td>Presence 1 The Subject from within</td>
<td>Presence 2 From within the subject, Homo Baroccus</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Jean-Joseph Goux’s analysis of "Symbolic Economy" would place the signifier or the Symbolic Order and the Father in homology with the Phallus and Money as well, all domains of the "masculine".\textsuperscript{116} We can then ask in the context of gender and economy, what happens to the phallic and the monetary in a Baroque or a NeoBaroque regime, where the gender qualification is feminine, and exchange becomes treasorial? Another shift which this schematic presentation brings to light is the lining up of the Symbolic, paternal order with the signifier, or the token. This shift from the Symbolic and paternal of an archetypal and ideal dimension, to one of a floating interchangeable and errant dimension, is found in the work of Jacques Lacan, of J.-J. Goux, and is implied as well in the Derridian concept of the sign. In our opinion, it is a product of dualism in Western thought -- the severage of mind and body with results in the sevrage of the Imaginary from the Ideal, which pushes the Ideal into the domain of the token and the signifier. This patriarchal legacy from Platonism, NeoPlatonism, Augustinism, Cartesian Modernity and contemporary Ultramodern concepts of the errant sign are resolved by such structures as the Baroque which bring the Real and Imaginary dimensions up to the Symbolic surface, thereby "feminizing" the domain of its order.

This structure of the \textit{Spiritual Exercises} and their implications have elucidated the structure of the Baroque, a structure which we consider conceptually prior -- particularly in the emphasis upon the Imaginary and the Real -- to the all-familiar Baroque topology which springs therefrom. To schematize the Baroque topology

further, in the terrain of the exercitant’s Imaginary, in the realm of the image we find illusion, metamorphosis, trompe-l’oeil of the image, massively-scaled fantasy and an excess of matter and color which saturate space; and in the realm of language we find elaborate, curiously puzzling and most seductive metaphor. All of this is circumscribed by the situation of Immensity. In the terrain of the Real, and in the realm of the corporal exercitant-subject, we find inconstancy and the precarity of corporality, and anamorphosis of the image in its perception, the themes of corruption and decay, of life and death, of vanitas and memento mori, affectivity and irregularity of matter; with implications for a language of surprising metonomy and a Semiotic order which accommodates corporal and affective investment, and a dislocated syntax which accommodates the excess of the real. All of this is circumscribed by the situation of Inhabitation.

Our table can also be read as schematizing the Grand Schism, relegating Protestantism to the Symbolic order, with implications for perspective and asceticism, and Catholicism and the Baroque to the Semiotic domains of the Imaginary and the Real, along with sensualism, transcriptive, Immensity and Inhabitation. It places Presence, Being-in, Phenomenology, spiritual union and prayer from within the subject’s position of Immensity and Inhabitation in the Semiotic domain; placing poetry with them, as well as the body, things and their images. It thereby situates a Phenomenological position for subjectivity and perception, at the end of the Spiritual Exercises, and after the full and totalizing deployment of structure, and not, as is

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117 Which is not to say that individual Protestants were not capable of nor did not produce from Baroque vision; to the contrary.
often thought with respect to the chronology of the movements in this 20th century, as a naive point of departure for knowledge prior to the Structuralist point of view. *The Baroque indeed brings Phenomenology up from the naive semiotic depths, so to speak, and into the Symbolic domain, to overwhelm it!* This is the dimension of Rhetoric and Poetics, versus that of utilitarian or utopian communication. It also overturns the contemporary emphasis by Derrida in the wake of Saussure, upon the sign and in particular the realm of the signifier or token, to the exclusion of the remaining triadic structure. It is the counter-discourse to the time of the errant sign, which provoked poetic symptoms of malaise in Baudelaire, and which was practiced in full-blown style by Mallarmé. It is the counter-discourse to what is thought of as Postmodernist, but what is actually the Ultramodernist era of the ill, dying and absent Cartesian subject of an efficacious, utilitarian language, an "Ultra"-modernist era because, after all, it is the *Cartesian* subject who is dying, and who indeed makes way for another subject who, all along, was always there. As this counter-discourse, we find it to be present in the Postmodern, as the NeoBaroque. We shall now go on to examine the affinity of the Baroque for certain present -- be they neglected or misread from within the context of Post-Saussurian formalism -- aspects of contemporary Critical Theory and of Postmodernism. *Indeed, the NeoBaroque is Postmodernism's other text, its other subject.*
D. Conclusion: The *Spiritual Exercises* as a Program for Baroque Reading & Reception

How is this Baroque / NeoBaroque elucidated through the *Spiritual Exercises* a program for reading or receiving the artwork? We can say that above all the *Spiritual Exercises* teach and put into practice a perspective upon and aesthetic response to Gospel narrative, by mobilizing in the exercitant access to the Imaginary and Real dimensions; they are a book about the book, and the particular way in which they are such presents a *model of aesthetic response which we qualify as Baroque, and ultimately as an aesthetic reception in the mode of Inhabitation*. It is an aesthetics of reception which has implications for aesthetic production, to include the concept of the text. It is a way of knowing and perceiving new and necessary for the Baroque épistémè, and worthwhile once again to us today, not only as we look back to the neglected or negatively-received Baroque, more capable now than ever of receiving its works particularly in a post-Derridean age and particularly in the context of French Studies, but worthwhile for maintaining and creating from a new, NeoBaroque aesthetic model. *If in the "time of the sign" the referent has escaped us, and the imaginary has been either eclipsed into an ideal, or into the (pretended) refusal of all ideology, as is the example of the impossible referentiality of Gospel narrative, then it is up to the exercitant-reader-recipient himself to assume the role of the referent, to be the measure of the real, and to be the dimensionality of meaning in the enactment of his reception of the text or work through his very own presence to it. And the aesthetic work must allow him to do so; it must allow him to exercise himself, it must*
provide for this pragmatic and ethical dimension. The exercitant is, in his individual and particular existential situation, the truth value of the text.

The Spiritual Exercises and the Baroque they elaborate are in fact a program for reception which we extend beyond Gospel history, there to where the work of art -- painting, sculpture, architecture, theater, text -- is open to existence and allows the subject to dwell in it, to be in the text, and to experience its mode of being for an inhabited exercise and modification of his own life in the present and for the future, and where the exercitant is up to this task; there where the Philosophy of Phenomenology allows and acknowledges the presence of the perceiving subject in its account of knowledge; there where religion begs for participation in its narrative, and witness to its story.\textsuperscript{118}

But how exactly is the work open to Immensity and Inhabitation? Aren't all aesthetic works to a certain extent, and by their very definition? While all aesthetic works are open to reception, not all are capable of a Baroque Immensity and final Inhabitation. In its excess of metaphor and metonymy, in its poetry, in its urgent call to the image and to imagination, in its narrative dislocation, in the fusion of life and death and its urgent call to affectivity, in its massive, open and demarcated spaces, in

\textsuperscript{118} Wherein the malaise of some before Baroque art, text and culture -- of those who prefer to keep their distance. Is the conclusion here that Gospel narrative belongs to a category such as PreBaroque letters? Perhaps not, but we can go so far as to say that the Gospel is rich and open to a number of interpretations and subjectival stances, whose summit is the Indwelling stance of love, and that the Spiritual Exercises focus upon and foster this interpretative stance of the Gospel as an aesthetic work to be met with feeling and presence. Mikel Dufrenne's assessment of such reception of the aesthetic work where perception becomes communion breaks this reception down into three stages of presence, representation and reflection, which would correspond to the transpectival stages of Immensity, Inhabitation, and finally (beatific) contemplation which does not reject either presence or feeling. The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience (1953), trans.Edward S. Casey (Evanston: Northwestern UP, 1973), particularly part III.
its lack of immediate transparence and reference, that is, a referentiality which, problematic in the 16th-century world of the newly shaken universe, and problematic once again in the era of Post-Structuralism and Post-Death-of-the-subject, begs the exercitant-reader-recipient to step in, with feeling, even if it be temporarily.\(^{119}\) Mikel Dufrenne speaks of the aesthetic object’s ability to seduce the body of the perceiver, Umberto Eco of the "open work", Wolfgang Iser of the "overdetermined" text, and Edith Wyschogrod of agitated, active "radical reader response".\(^{120}\) Stylistically these are texts and works of excess which give room to the reader to interpret, to imagine, to act out and experience, and to dwell within them, to enter into the work and its play, and finally to incarnate and realize it, in a final stance of Inhabitation. The Spiritual Exercises themselves are not an ornamental text which demand themselves such Baroque interpretation. They are, however, a directive manual sprung from Ignatius’ own experience as a reader, which teaches a spiritual Baroque reception of Gospel narrative, of canon prayers and, by extension, of the work, religious or not.

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\(^{119}\) In his account of reader response, Stanley Fish gives the example of "kinetic art" as a changing, no-object-at-all, and considers literature to be a kinetic art; these are propitious works for receptive response. He further concludes that the interpretation of the text, or its reception, should never "come to the point", that is, end. Whereby the ephemeral and problematic aspects of the reader-referent. "Literature in the Reader: Affective Stylistics", \textit{New Literary History} II.1 (autumn 1970): 140, 148, 160.

\(^{120}\) Mikel Dufrenne, \textit{The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience}, 339; Umberto Eco, \textit{L’Opera aperta} (Milano: Tascabili Bompiano, 1976); Wolfgang Iser, \textit{The Act of Reading. A Theory of Aesthetic Response} (Baltimore: John Hopkins UP, 1978) 48-9; Edith Wyschogrod, \textit{Saints & Postmodernism} (Chicago: U of Chicago Press, 1990). W.Iser’s text is particularly illuminating for the situation of the reader who inhabits the work of fiction, which situation he presents from a Husserlian, Phenomenological perspective by using particularly the concept of "passive synthesis" to elicitate the work of imagination, expectation and memory. E.Wyschogrod interprets thus the response begged by saintly hagiography. This type of "open" text, like the Ignatian Spiritual Exercises which require performance, and analogous to the saintly body, is imperative, demands inscription, and a "supplement", a Derridian term here taken in a fleshly interpretation. See in particular chapter 6, "Language without Alterity", 165-187.
The models of receiving and reading in such a way such works and texts are given already by Ignatius in the Three Preludes and in the Three Ways of Prayer, particularly in the second and third of each, where the exercitant's imagination, sensation, corporality and affectivity are brought forth to receive the work, to contribute to the work (here the Gospel narrative) and to its verity, and to finally revitalize the W/word and the work. Lest aesthetic criticism linger in the first of these, in the memorization of history and in its recitation, and in a canonical acceptance of a given truth value of the text and artwork, and a fixed, Renaissance site of reception, the work must have aesthetic appeal -- an affective and corporal call, a sensual, rhetorical dimension, a fecundity, so to speak. Wherefrom the reader and spectator, along with the artist, the Philosopher and the faithful, is received, brought to full being and birthed to presence, and can in turn receive and transform his world, never forgetting, corporally and affectively trained, ready to visualize, to speak, to be from within the text and the work, which is now within him. Let us go on to examine such works from the French terrain, in the Baroque and in its return.
RICE UNIVERSITY

PRESENCE IN THE WORK:
BAROQUE AESTHETIC & ITS 20TH-CENTURY RETURN
IN FRENCH THOUGHT, ARTS & LETTERS

Volume II: Philosophy

by

ELIZABETH SCALI PEASE

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DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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II. CORPORALITY, AFFECTIVITY, PRESENCE: THE BAROQUE & CONTEMPORARY CRITICAL THEORY

We situate this segment of our study not so much as to read the *Spiritual Exercises* and their implication for the Baroque through contemporary Critical Theory, but rather to confront the two and to read contemporary theory in light of the Baroque, as well as to situate the authors who influence our own acts of reading. We shall then go on to select thereafter three philosophers, René Descartes and Pierre Gassendi, of the historical Baroque and Classical period, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty of the 20th century, which allow us to situate the Baroque, its tensions and its 20th century reconsideration most directly from a Philosophical point of view. Within Structuralism and its wake in 20th-century French thought, we can reconsider the themes which have directed our elaboration of the Baroque through a reading of the *Spiritual Exercises* -- those of corporality, affectivity and the real dimension of presence.
A. From the Symbolic to the Semiotic: Jacques Lacan & Julia Kristeva

To speak of presence -- the real dimension of experience -- brings us to what is to speak all around it, of all but it, of re-presentation and of meaning, and the triadic structure which encompasses all of this. Reawoken by the Saussurian concept of the sign, in the terms of the signifier, the acoustic or written image, the signified, the concept or idea referred to, and the referent, the thing in itself, and in its qualities as arbitrary with respect to the referent and differential within its own coded system, Jacques Lacan, in his work in the area of Psychoanalysis, has used this structure and taken it further into the parallel terms of the Symbolic, the order of language as a literal web and socially recognized code, the Imaginary, the order of idea, ideal image or meaning, and the Real, the order of the thing in itself, or unconscious, originary desire, prior to any language or symbolisation.¹ Lacan does not take the Symbolic in the sense of a dictionary of symbols, a mythology, or archetypes which direct dream interpretation, or a coded iconography; Lacan's Symbolic becomes rather a mere iconoclast letter.² It is the passage from the signifier to the Symbolic and the triadic parallelism which Lacan shall use to modify the traditional Middle Ages meaning of

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¹ With respect to the Saussurian sign itself, Lacan introduced certain modifications, such as reversing the order to the signifier over the signified, and limiting in a Psychoanalytical reading of Saussurian linguistics the outline which demarcates signifier and signified together to what he shall call "le point de capiton" or isolated signifiers, an important one of which is the "Law of Father", taken from the Oedipus complex. Outside of these fixing posts, Lacan conceives of the signifier and signified in a fluid relation, which shall permit him to speak of the "chain of signifiers". See Joël Dor, Introduction à la lecture de Lacan. 1. L'inconscient structuré comme un langage (Paris: Denoël, 1985) 48-49.

"symbol" by overinterpreting the signifier towards a reading of patriarchal order in Western culture. It is also this very triadic structure which comes to term with our own analyses of the Baroque, albeit with different emphases, prior to, and structurally subtending any thematic considerations of the Counter-Reformation, its culture and aftermath; and we mean here not so much to psychoanalyze the Baroque, as to "baroquize" Psychoanalysis and to illustrate what it has taken, purposefully or not, from counter-Classicism. We here review, principally through the thought of Jacques Lacan and, in his wake, of Julia Kristeva, their various stances on what Jean-Joseph Goux has termed "Symbolic Economy", the definitions and weight of each term of the triad in the context of their various considerations, in order to explain our own use of these and to situate possibilities and consequences for an emphasis upon the real, as the dimension of presence. ³

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Jacques Lacan, in "Fonction et champ de la parole et du langage en psychanalyse" (1953), establishes discourse, rather than the ill and silent body-object, as the object of Psychoanalysis. In his "Séminaire sur «La Lettre volée»" (1955) which analyzes Edgar Allen Poe’s The Purloined Letter, he applies the terms of the Saussurian sign to conclude how the signifying chain, in the concatenation of signifiers or written images severed from sense and reference, errantly move beyond

³Jean-Joseph Goux, Freud, Marx, Economie et symbolique (Paris: Le Seuil, 1973), particularly "Numismatiques", 94-102; "Catégories de l’échange: Idéalité, symbolicate, réalité", Encyclopédie Universelle de Philosophie, T.1 (Paris: PUF) 227-233. In Oedipe Philosophe (Paris: Aubier, 1990), Goux further qualifies the triad differently as "archétype" or the idealized imaginary in a strong Symbolic order, as "jeton" or errant token of the Symbolic order, and as "trésor" of the Real dimension, wherefrom we refer in our own work to the "treaorial real".
subjectival agency to circumscribe and master us, to machinize us, even to construct our subjectivity, thus evacuating subjectival agency. In "L'Instance de la lettre dans l'inconscient ou la raison depuis Freud" (1957) Lacan continues on the theme of the signifying chain and goes so far as to say that the unconscious itself is structured like a language, an unconscious which metaphor with its unsaid fourth term, for example, can possibly access. He shall extend this supremacy of language and, more specifically, of the signifier as the realm of analysis, over the entirety of the sign and over the subject to what shall be the Lacanian sense of the Symbolic order, in his study on "Le Stade du miroir comme formateur de la fonction du Je" (1949). In a rereading and reworking of Freud's Oedipal complex, Lacan places the violent sevrage or castration of the child's symbiosis with the mother -- the real relation captured by the imaginary realm in the ideal, jubilatory "Gestalt" of the mirror image of the child held by its mother -- ultimately under the agency of the father, who thus canalizes desire and ropes off or "forcludes", indeed castrates, an entire dimension of the subject and relegates it to the unconscious along with the imaginal, the feminine and the matriarchal, or the "Choise de la mère", as well. The feminine, then, along with an entire dimension of the subject, lives out this exclusion.

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4 The influence of Surrealist "écriture automatique" can be seen here.


6 *Ecrits*, 93-100.

7 Jean-Joseph Goux shall examine in detail, in the manner of "une histoire à longue durée", this foreclosure of the feminine and its results for Western culture, in *Oedipe philosophe* (Paris: Aubier, 1990), which we shall examine shortly.
From here, Lacan shall speak more in terms of the Imaginary and Real rather than of the unconscious, and even subsumes the unconscious as speaking in the free play of the signifier. This iconoclast paternal agency is symbolized as the "Law of the Father", and is further notated by the symbol of the phallus, or Φ, as that which the mother is for the father and his desire, mother with whom, and as whom, the child would wish to be. No longer a father in the flesh, this father is a dead, even unconscious, and yet organizing factor at the basis of the Symbolic order of language and social pact, and even replaces God, all of which in turn reinforces exclusion of the above. In a manner, language makes or fashions God, "le dire ça fait Dieu". 8 This is the only symbol, in the traditional sense, in the Lacanian Symbolic order. 9 Lacan terms the subject of symbiosis with the mother, of the "imago", "Gestalt" or form, corporal image and specular self as the "moi", and the subject under the father's law or social self as the "Je"; according to him, the two shall remain disjointed, each is a fragment, yet he shall give primacy to the social subject and the Father's law: "l'exigence de l'Un" is "l'exigence de l'infinitude" where the subject is only "la fracture, la cassure, l'interruption de la formule de l'être sexué". 10


9 "The Lacanian axiom that the pure signifier, an element of the symbolic order, ultimately governs all the operations of the imaginary, is not simply a description; it is first of all a prescription. This axiom is the translation of a normative requirement that is ethical and theological: the monotheistic regulation of desire." J.-J. Goux, "Lacan Iconoclast", 61-62. Such a regulation takes upon itself and replaces a theistic role, as Lacan expresses it: "Pour moi, il me paraît sensible que l'Autre, avancé au temps de l'"Instance de la lettre" comme lieu de la parole, était une façon, je ne peux pas dire de laïciser, mais d'exorciser le bon vieux Dieu." Le Séminaire XX. Encore. 1972-1973.

10 Le Séminaire XX. Encore. 15-16. Might not, however, the union of "moi" and "Je" not only render man whole, but also explain, in Psychoanalytic terms, mystical man?
This boundary is more ambivalently marked by the Freudian statement "Wo Es war" soll Ich werden", translated in English as "Where the Id was, there the Ego shall be".\textsuperscript{11} For Lacan, successful experience of the Oedipal stage begins the child’s entry into language and (patriarchal, western) society, as signifier for another signifier,\textsuperscript{12} whereas an unsuccessful experience or yearning for the mother and for the matriarchal realm fissures and complements in unorthodox, inefficient, errant and repetitive fashion a token relation to desire. Such is a perpetual and infinite search, in chaotic line and heterogenous time, for an origin, disruptive of the subject’s use and experience of language and participation in the entire representational dimension with its institutions, into which we are born and within whose bounds we, by force, must live. That is, while the "Je" holds its prescribed place in the web of language’s "signifying chain", or as the "sujet d’énonciation", a certain subjectival presence, or the "sujet de l’énoncé" -- that tied to corporality, affectivity and presence -- is missing, exiled outside of the calculation of the sign, the order of society, or its

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\textsuperscript{11} Lacan critiques and comments extensively upon this statement. He reads it in terms of the patriarchal imposition, where we read it as a kind of seepage of the matriarchal and unconscious desire into social relations.

\textsuperscript{12} Julia Kristeva’s reading explains this clearly in terms of the sign: the mirror stage, as a separation between self and other or object, mimics syntactical structure as well as that of the sign from signifier to signified. Where the mirror becomes the barrier between signifier and signified, the subject thus finds himself alienated (as "Je") in the signifier who is always object or other, and which henceforth manipulates him in the social, linguistic domain. Thus the entry into language is accomplished with the castrating sacrifice of separation from the mother. Likewise, sacrifice within the confines of religion is, in Kristeva’s reading, in fact a theologisation of the "thetical" or syntactic. \textit{La révolution du langage poétique}. L’avant-garde à la fin du XIXe siècle: Lautréamont et Mallarmé (Paris: Le Seuil, 1974) 76.
science, or even dead. So Lacan explains in linguistic terms Philosophical
Modernity's subject, mode of knowledge and dualism, from Descartes to Hegel.

These two situations are not, however, quite so polarized as it may seem or
Lacan may will them to be, as his thought gravitates towards a strict patriarchal,
Symbolic order: the Freudian analysis of the little boy's "fort/da" game explains play
with both absence and presence (of the mother) while linguistic mastery is gained and
maintained; Lacan himself explains such play or reworking, "A ce point de jonction
de la nature à la culture [...] la psychanalyse reconnaît ce noeud de servitude
imaginaire que l'amour doit toujours redéfier ou trancher." Culture's Symbolic
realm allows room for play and redefinition; nonetheless, the "Law of the Father" as
its base fabric remains. Such is a limited freedom.

Thus our own interests situate how the Baroque can work against a strict
Symbolic order in its Lacanian sense, while maintaining structure, to attain the Real
and Imaginary realms, to touch base with the matriarchal order, and yet to avoid a
cornucopian, archetypal network of imagery in the Jungian sense, or a proliferating
mythology. Rather, our rereading of the Baroque refers to the "technique of the
image" we have found in the Spiritual Exercises. Our study reconstructs, within the
confines of a structuralism yet without strictly espousing the structuralism of Lacan, a
relation of presence to the image, and our emphasis therein upon the Imaginary and
Real shall allow us to join Merleau-pontian Phenomenology.

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13 Ecrits, 802.
14 Ecrits, 100.
Based upon such a schematization, Lacan establishes a double subject or schizophrenic "sujet clivé", notated as "a" or "moi" prior to societal determinations, yet in relation to "a'" or others, a situation of the subject who embeds himself in the world behind the various masks of the self, and which Lacan attributes to the Imaginary realm which is ultimately based upon the originary "imago" with the mother.\textsuperscript{15} And he establishes a subject notated as "S" or "Je" in relation to "A", or the great Other, where the subject in the realm of the ego and the intelligible is forever distanced from the object of desire, as in the matheme $S \diamond A$, the "fading du sujet" or "aphanisis", as a measure of the subject falls away into the (non-)sense of the great Other.\textsuperscript{16} This subject and his relation is a most complex one: "S" or "Je" is the subject at the moment where he experiences the mirror stage and enters into the Symbolic order as socially determined, he is the Cartesian subject as well. The complexity lies herein: his relation to "A", the Other, guarantor of signification, is a plurilinear relation of desire and pleasure to Father, Mother, Phallus "$\Phi$", treasorial real and God, allowing much slippage in Lacan's own discourse on the Other, and revealing ultimately a feminine face to God. One God is the reverse "other face" of the other; the passage to the one ("vers l'Un") demarcates the other; one's force of repression rises in face of the pleasure of the other:

\textsuperscript{15} It is this subject "a" which becomes involved in the case of hallucination, as we shall examine it shortly.

Cette jouissance qu'on éprouve et dont on ne sait rien, n'est-ce pas ce qui nous met sur la voie de l'ex-sistence? Et pourquoi ne pas interpréter une face de l'Autre, la face Dieu, comme supportée par la jouissance féminine? Comme tout ça se produit grâce à l'être de la signification, et que cet être n'a d'autre lieu que le lieu de l'autre que je désigne du grand A, on voit la biglerie de ce qui se passe. Et comme c'est là aussi que s'inscrit la fonction du père en tant que c'est à elle que se rapporte la castration, on voit que ça ne fait pas deux Dieu, mais que ça n'en fait pas non plus un seul.  

That Lacan both reduces these to the Father symbol alone, conflates them and evacuates the matriarchal, gives matter for consideration. And this relation is not a neat or even possible one, for the Other is also barred, excluded or refused to the speaking subject, wherefrom the matheme S(A), with implications for the chain of language, and with grave implications for spirituality and the relation to God. No longer ideality and archetype in an onto-theological sky, the Lacanian Father has become, or been reduced to, the token sign that causes the unending, forever-errant flurry of all other signs, in which can be deciphered the unresolved, forever-to-be-written discourse of desire.

To summarize, then, the Symbolic order is the realm of the "Law of the Father", family governance and, by extension, societal and linguistic order, to include the signifying chain of language's usage; the Imaginary is the totalizing, albeit illusory, vision of human relations based at best upon the ideal image with the mother and in transgression of the incest prohibition, and the Real is the now inaccessible, archaic relation to the nurturing mother, as the final, impossible term of all desires subtending "a" and "A"'s relations combined — and only there is the subject whole. As Lacan's "theology" deprives the Father of an archetypal position, it seems by

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17 Le Séminaire XX, Encore, 71. Emphasis is our own.
displacement that it is the impossible real mother that holds this place in his vision, although he does not speak much of the matriarchal to soften the Symbolic order's supremacy until the late seminar, Encore. It is the third term of the Real, with its importance for the feminine and for presence, which interests us in our examination of the Baroque. Before further examining Encore, however, this brings us to Lacan's analysis of Psychosis, which is entirely concerned with the field of the real, and is where the real finds its problematic importance in the face of both the father and the mother. We can almost say that from a Psychoanalytical point of view, the Baroque is the mode of Psychosis. Let us examine this with him.

Several things take place in Psychosis. The real relation to the Other -- as archaic, desired mother the subject wishes to be and desiring father of which he wishes to be the phallus or desired object -- is refused in a way which Freud terms "Verwerfung" and Lacan terms "forclusion". This is not a conscious effort realized by repression ("Verdrängung") or denegation ("Verneinung") so as to result in neurosis, but rather is an originary refusal and blindness of that which never attained consciousness nor the Symbolic, is a refusal of the supreme Signifier of the "Law of the Father", and is thereby a failed passage through the mirror stage, to language and to the entire Symbolic order, to include civil order and its canalization of violence. What happens in such a case is the forcluded, past reality of the subject's desire returns in the controlled form of a hallucination projected upon the present, real, at-hand environment of the subject's perception, an environment within which he would wish to dwell, to create a complex "being there", a repetitive acting out (and not a
narcissism) or presence which warps space and time to remake the current real and to recode language. Thus what is refused on the Symbolic level resurfaces in the Real dimension in what is an erotic relation, as the "moi" joins the "Je", or the small subject "s" joins the capital subject "S" and speaks through him, in what is a linguistic correlate to the visual hallucination of Psychosis: "[…] et le sujet identifié avec son moi (a) avec lequel il parle, et c'est comme si un tiers, sa doublure, parlait et commentait son activité".\textsuperscript{18}

This is the problematic expression of desire; problematic because "que le désir soit articulé c'est justement par là qu'il n'est pas articulable".\textsuperscript{19} This expression of desire is not merely the situation of fantasm, which Lacan codifies as S ◦ a, and where the subject perpetually works through the chain of signifiers towards its "imago" or ideal self; but is rather an expression aimed at (spiritual) union with the Other, where S (asymptotically) approaches A. This produces a complex situation, where the subject "Je" finds itself eclipsed by the demand or cry of its desire, notated as S ◦ D, and where the Other as well is barred before the subject's pleasure in union, with a strong patriarchal figure or Symbolic order, or S(A). The third Lacanian graph of desire, labelled "Che vuoi?" or "What do you desire?", illustrates these two moments as analogous to the signifying anchors of the overwhelming Law of the Father and the emergence of the social subject. In the latter instance of the barred Other, however, Lacan proposes that love can recuperate


\textsuperscript{19} Ecrits, 804.
this Other, along with a recuperation of the "moi", or subject left behind by reason's Symbolic order, all in recognition by this other half, the "Je". In our opinion, it is this situation that would produce the language of presence, the language of love:

[...]Mais d'où provient cet être qui apparaît en quelque sorte en défaut dans la mer des noms propres?
Nous ne pouvons le demander à ce sujet en tant que Je. Pour le savoir il lui manque tout, puisque si ce sujet, moi, j'étais mort, nous l'avons dit, il ne le saurait pas. Qu'il ne me sait donc pas vivant. Comment donc me le prouverai-Je?
Car je puis à la rigueur prouver à l'Autre qu'il existe, non bien sûr avec les preuves de l'existence de Dieu dont les siècles le tuent, mais en l'aimant, solution apportée par le kérigma chrétien.20

Lacan gives the simple example of the uncanny "déjà-vu" as a primitive moment of desire hallucinated upon the real. This relation jumps from the Symbolic to the Real, without Imaginary mediation and its tendency to idealize and eclipse the real; rather it produces an imaginary in the form of a hallucination. This is an imaginary which participates in the triadic structure and is not an imaginary of narcissism.21

The topic of hallucination also brings us to Lacan's analysis of the "Illusion of the upside-down flower vase" and to reconsider the mirror stage. In this illusory trick, a hidden upside-down vase is refracted off a spherical mirror to appear right-side up in a facing vertical plane mirror, thus containing the upright bunch of flowers above it which is reflected directly in the vertical mirror. Lacan shall compare this spherical mirror to the retina of the human eye, a nervous fiber which precisely does inversely capture the object of vision and transmit it to the brain, and the hidden

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20 *Ecrits*, 815-817, 819. Emphasis is our own.

21 *Ecrits*, 69.
upside-down vase to the "real" or forcluded object of desire repressed as in the case of Psychosis, which is then projected upon the real environment at hand by the subject in a hallucinated form of perception. This projective perception illustrates the ideality of the "imago" or mirror stage and ties this stage to the unconscious and originary real as "une prématurité perceptive inscrite dans une discordance du développement neurologique". 22 What is more disquieting is that Lacan links this illusion trick to "techniques du corps" and "cette obscure intimité" manipulatory of the individual: "au coeur d'une technique où le praticien se conçoit comme obtenant effet de ce qu'il incarne lui-même cet Idéal". 23 And this oh-so-dangerous Ideal is also the Other, the Father's Law, and God.

In the hallucination of Psychosis, the subject's desire is in effect inversely reprojected back to him through his exterior, projected perception of it, like a consciousness which seizes itself in the process, 24 much like the upside-down vase between the spherical and vertical mirrors. Lacan further examines this phenomenon

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22 Ecrits, 672-683, particularly 675. Lacan further explains this phenomenon as both joining the real dimension, and shifting it to the imaginary: "Je vous ai déjà expliqué le phénomène physique de l'image réelle, qui peut être produite par le miroir sphérique, être vue à sa place, s'insérer dans le monde des objets réels, être accommodée en même temps que les objets réels, voire apporter à ces objets réels une ordonnance imaginaire, à savoir les inclure, les exclure, les situer, les compléter. [...] la coïncidence de l'image avec un objet réel la renforce, lui donne corps, incarnation. A ce moment, des comportements se déclenchent, qui guideront le sujet vers son objet, par l'intermédiaire de l'image." This last moment of visualization and behaviorism coincides with the Ignatian exercitant's projection of his practiced visualization upon his immediate environment, and his according action and ethical engagement; Lacan further elucidates this in terms of the reflecting mirror in the upside-down flower vase trick, "Pensez que ce miroir est une vitre. Vous vous voyez dans la vitre et vous voyez les objets au-delà. Il s'agit justement de cela – d'une coïncidence entre certaines images et le réel." Le Séminaire I. Les écrits techniques de Freud, 1953-1954 (Paris: Le Seuil, 1975) 158-159, 161. (Emphasis is our own.) A "Magritte" moment as well, as we shall see!

23 Ecrits, 678.

24 Le Séminaire livre XI. Les quatre concepts fondamentaux de la psychanalyse, 71.
of desire's visible invisibility, on both a pictural and discursive level, with an examination of anamorphosis and communication with the Other. Anamorphosis is in fact the technical, pictural description of hallucination, and as a pictural technique it imposes hallucination (and, by extension, a form of Psychosis, and its violent desire) upon any viewer, sending a message back to them beyond their own sense of their own desire. In anamorphic portrayal, a trick image is painted upon a perspectival one -- often a landscape -- which can serve as its background, and this trick image is not always immediately apparent to the viewer from the standard perspectival position with respect to the painting.\(^{25}\) The mysterious image can appear from non-traditional positions, such as when the viewer enters the room to see from a forshortened viewpoint a painting along one of its lateral walls, or as he shifts his position, or from a prescribed peep-hole. So the subjectival stance in anamorphic perception is unstable, in movement and uncertain. Catoptric or mirror anamorphoses cannot be constructed without the use of the prescribed mirror of conical, cylindrical, convex or spherical form. The Baroque and early Modern age was fascinated with optical tricks, to convey the magical, the spiritual, but also to test reality against the world of appearances.\(^{26}\) The Order of the Minims on the Ile de la Cité, in close relation with their Order in Rome, was fascinated with the practice of anamorphic art, and

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\(^{25}\) The Surrealist paintings of Dalí and Tanguy, for example, exploit more overtly this technique, by using a typical perspectival background which fades from sand to sea to sky, as the backdrop to bizarrely deformed objects.

decorated chapels, vaults and convents with mysteriously appearing figures.\textsuperscript{27} The anamorphic figure appears reconstructed perspectively once the position of vision towards it is found, in the meanwhile, the painting’s undulating, restless surface, untypical of a strictly perspectival painting, seduces the spectator into something other than the apparent painting, and suprises him by revealing the unexpected -- it is this aspect of the aesthetic reception of anamorphic art which fascinated Lacan. Lacan interprets that as the visible painting discloses an invisible image, the spectator sees his own gaze in effect gazed upon, the perspectival "œil" subverted by the reverse "regard". As his desire and corporality looks back at him, his subjectivity as "Je" is eclipsed, as in the matheme $\textcircled{S} \cdot \text{D}$, yet he is nonetheless structurally supported, and he is ultimately captured within the image, as in a Merleau-pontian chiasmic perception and as in the moment of the third Prelude of visualization in the Ignatian Spiritual Exercises, and what we have called a first stage of the transpectival stance. Such a carnal gaze masters and reworks the ego subject, the "Je", the disincarnate self, and is the very terrain of the Baroque: "Le baroque, c’est la régulation de l’âme par la scopie corporelle".\textsuperscript{28}

Many of the themes of anamorphosis are spiritual or occult figures, a background of life against an appearing foreground of death, the Vanitas and Memento mori. The secondary reconstructed representation -- a kind of representation

\textsuperscript{27} Members of the Order such as Marin Mersenne and François Niceron studied elaborate perspectival and anamorphic techniques. P.J.S. Whitmore, The Order of Minims in 17th-century France (The Hague: Martinus Nihoff, 1967); J.Baltrušaitis, Anamorphic Art, 50.

\textsuperscript{28} Le Séminaire XX. Encore, 105.
of a representation which has its linguistic correlate in the unending Lacanian chain of signifiers — reveals to the spectator according to Lacan a subject who sees the ideality of his self being seen, and so an uncanny unveiling of his own desire and its mechanisms. This gaze which gazes upon our own gaze, exactly the inversion of perceptual perspective, is explained by anamorphosis.²⁹ As such, it projects back to the viewer an "Idéal du moi" which is both desirous and speaking, which is both "moi" and "Je", just what our perception has deformed to obtain such a vision. In understanding of the Lacanian schema, then, therein lies the passage of the mirror stage, through incest, castration and death of this "imago" subject.³⁰ In fact, anamorphosis captures the spectator in the painting, in the "spectacle du monde" as Lacan says, and likewise the act of self-perceiving consciousness is to inscribe oneself in the image in such a fashion, in a manner to overlap two perspectival directions which conflates seer and seen, in the Merleau-pontian sense of the chiasm.³¹ So anamorphosis harbors both desire and violence: Lacan’s choice of an example is the death skull worked in an erect phallic shape into the represented wood-tile in Holbein’s "The Ambassadors" (1533). As anamorphosis opens up the realm of the "imago" and the matriarchal, and as perspectival, patriarchal regulation is left

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²⁹ Le Séminaire XI, 81.

³⁰ And for Lacan, the anamorphic image is at best a "fantôme phallique". Le Séminaire XI, 82-83.

³¹ Séminaire XI, 86-92, 94, 97. Lacan speaks here again on the topic of the retina, to distinguish further the point of the fovea centralis, or clearest spot of vision with respect to the remainder of the retina where the image is distorted. Thus he examines physiologically the realm of anamorphosis. Lacan also speaks metaphorically of a blind spot in vision, but fails to mention the anatomy of the "optic disk" which corresponds to this.
behind,\textsuperscript{32} we can see as well that such portrayal might be used to seduce and manipulate the spectator.

To summarize, psychotic hallucination and anamorphosis create a subjectival stance under the feminine imaginary and feminize the subject, turning him to "Immensity" and "Inhabitation", and at the limit bring him to think that he is in commerce with or union with the great Other, God, in the very context of his existential situation.\textsuperscript{33} So the subject becomes in his delirium an earthly, carnal mediator of relations with the Other, a body dead to self and inhabited apparently despite himself by such relations, and can have such delusions as to mediate Deic presence and word, to have an extraordinary sense of perception,\textsuperscript{34} to redeem the others of the world, to be the (abused) spouse of God and all men, and to engender others, as was the case with Daniel Paul Schreber analyzed by both Freud and Lacan, and is also the case, at least in part, with Jean-Joseph Surin and Antonin Artaud, whom we will examine in turn. Schematically speaking, Lacan confirms in Psychosis an eclipse of the double subject, where "Je" and "moi" are identified with one another, where the relation to the Other -- God, Father, Mother and symbolic Phallus -- is happening on earth and in the real dimension as, in our opinion, the subject here

\textsuperscript{32} Although Lacan suggests it without an in-depth examination (Le Séminaire XI, 81), the relation between perspective, the patriarchal and regulation by the Symbolic order and its law is elaborated by Jean-Joseph Goux, "Descartes et la perspective." \textit{L'Esprit créateur} (Spring 1985): 10-20.

\textsuperscript{33} "D'une question préliminaire à tout traitement possible de la psychose", \textit{Ecrits}, 531-583; Le séminaire livre III. Le Psychoses.

\textsuperscript{34} "Il m'a été donné des lumières qui sont rarement données à un mortel", Daniel-Paul Schreber, quoted in Le Séminaire III. Les Psychoses, 41.
realizes an incredibly empowering suprasexuality which has a will and force gained through an originary moment which did not go the way of the "Father's law". There the "Idéal du Moi" or "imago", displeased with following any fatherly commandment, joins the "Moi-Idéal", now so eager to please him and obtain his love. Except that here, the Other seems to slip or to change its visage, to the feminine face.

As Psychosis, hallucination and anamorphosis access the Real and Imaginary dimensions, the "imago", and the matriarchal, Lacan himself opens up to this register in Le Séminaire XX, Encore, in a consideration of the subject, the feminine, and love. In a dualist opposition between the themes of "jouissance" (as pleasure, but also as mystical union) and law, analogous to the opposition between the Matriarchal and the Patriarchal, Lacan organises his thought around the topic of the feminine, and mostly maintains this Matriarchal order separate from the Patriarchal and the Symbolic. The Matriarchal order is the realm of the Real and the Imaginary, of the unconscious, of the subject "a", of the body, of love, of an obscenely excessive, iconophile Christianity, of a carnal relation to God and his feminine face which is symbolized by the "A", of the unconscious, and of "lalangue" -- a language which has an excessive and pleasurable use value, but no exchange value in societal commerce. And so, what is evident in Lacan's system, is the severe separation of the two realms; the feminine register does not perturb the Patriarchal, Symbolic order. Indeed, within it, "la femme", in relation to the capital "S" Subject is barred, exiled, inexistant, unknowledgeable, outside of the Cartesian system and societal commerce; and there,

there is no knowledge of union, nor sign of love, nor means to express its experience -- there is no real recuperation of the feminine.\textsuperscript{36} That is, there is no room in Lacan's system for the feminine to perturb the masculine dimension and its Symbolic order -- although this is somewhat continually belied by Lacan's discursive style! and its perpetual metaphorization of the "fort/da" -- and all remains within the iconoclast realm of writing and the letter, while the real remains inscribed under lack. Yet the attention Lacan gives to the feminine dimension, to which he accords love and the New Testament God of love, rather than the Old Testament God of the Law, is interesting for two reasons. Firstly, for the qualification of Baroque he gives to the feminine dimension, to feminine sexuality and spirituality, to the realm of "jouissance" and union, of the image and its relation to the maternal, of Christ and his history, what Lacan ambivalently calls, "la petite histoire",\textsuperscript{37} and of corporal exhibitionism and the gaze upon it as the means to regulate the soul, as does take place in the \textit{Spiritual Exercises}.\textsuperscript{38}

This is radically different from the regulation \textit{away} from the image/"imago" performed by the Father's law! Rather, it is a regulation which works \textit{through} the image. The entire realm of the corporal, the affective, and presence itself seems to

\textsuperscript{36} "Là où ça parle, ça jouit, et ça sait rien", \textit{Le Séminaire XX. Encore}, 90, 95, 125.

\textsuperscript{37} "Petite" here refers to "l'objet petit "a"" in Lacan's own terminology, or the "imago" as focus of our own small, personal, banal love story of the relation to and severance from the mother. This is the very object of hallucination. It is also the "petite histoire du Christ" because we can insert ourselves in it. This is precisely what "saves God" according to Lacan. \textit{Le Séminaire XX. Encore}, 97, 98. And heretically places the Oedipal complex, the mirror stage and the Name of the Father, or the Psychoanalytical science, on a par with Christianity.

\textsuperscript{38} "Le Baroque, c'est la régulation de l'âme par la scopie corporelle", where "âme" includes the register of the intellectual and language. \textit{Le Séminaire XX. Encore}, 105.
be relegated there, and repressed. And yet, for a cursory moment, Lacan suggests its return:

"Il y a là un trou [We interpret, a gap in the repressive bar] et ce trou s'appelle l'Autre [...] l'autre en tant que lieu où la parole, d'être déposée [We interpret, the site of castration where language was deposed] [...] fonde la vérité, et avec elle le pacte qui supplée à l'inexistance du rapport sexuel, en tant qu'il serait pensé, pensé pensable autrement dit, et que le discours ne serait pas réduit à ne partir [...] que du semblant."

Here Lacan does indeed speak of the possibility of anchoring language and the signifier in the "A" other, that is, in the feminine, and in love, exactly what is lacking in the patriarchal realm of the errant chain of disengaged signifiers. And this would also be exactly where the body would regulate the soul. So he insists that, particularly within circumscription of Counter-reformation Baroque aesthetic, it is here that the body has saved God, indeed, saved him from the phallocratic, patriarchal order and its castration, and has indeed feminized Him as the most startling God of pleasure or "un Dieu qui jouit". And secondly, this initial work on Lacan's part allows others to further belabor the feminine dimension, and to return

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39 Le Séminaire XX. Encore, 103. Emphasis is our own.

40 Le Séminaire XX. Encore, 70. In the chapter "Ronds de ficelle", Lacan examines the one-in-three aspect of the Borromean knot, where the undoing of any of the three circles disentangles all three, to suggest consideration of an equilibrium between the Symbolic, the Imaginary and the Real, by comparing this triad to the theology of the Trinity. Le Séminaire XX. Encore, 107-123. Thus Lacan brings back an equilibrium to Symbolic Economy, a homogenisation of the three factors with no privileged point in the chain, in his use of the Trinitarian image. This might lead us to conclude within our consideration of the Baroque that, whereas the Baroque insists upon real presence, as do the Ignatian Spiritual Exercises, and yet where the Spiritual Exercises, like other Baroque forms, for example, nonetheless use the Symbolic order — in obedience, patriarchal hierarchy, and the Imaginary, in the call through it towards the real — then these Spiritual Exercises can be read to use the emphasis upon the real to balance out the triad, before the French Classical period and in face of the Protestant Reformation's emphasis already upon the Symbolic dimension in faith. Likewise, in the 20th century, Lacan's theory considers the entire triad to privilege, in a reflection of the consequences of Philosophical Modernity, the Symbolic order, yet his "NeoBaroque" conclusion in Encore, in its consideration of the real dimension and the feminine, balances out Symbolic Economy as well.
through it to an emphasis upon the Real and Presence. Meanwhile, outside of Lacan's study of Psychosis and the Schreber case, and what is for the most part a maintenance of the sevrage between the Matriarchal and Patriarchal register, Lacan greatly neglects the category of the real. It shall be Julia Kristeva's work which adventures itself therein, taking language along, to elaborate her concept of the "Semiotic".

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Julia Kristeva coins the term "vréel" to capture Jacques Lacan's category of the real exiled before a strong Symbolic order, to capture the truth outside the bounds of Modernity's reason, and the discourses of madness, mysticism and poetry. As such, "le vréel" resolves and renders flexible Lacan's strict Symbolic order.41

Of great interest is her inquiry into the discursive strategies which allow this "vréel" to speak, to enter into and to perturb the Symbolic domain. Where we have spoken of the Ignatian exercitant, the Baroque spectator, reader and writer who step in to guarantee by their own presence the truth value of the text, and have used Lacan's examination of Psychosis, hallucination and anamorphosis to emphasize the relation to the Real in Symbolic Economy, Kristeva also refers to discourse, which for her is not to be limited to that from the asylum alone. In Psychosis, which Kristeva explains, much like what we have gleaned from Lacan's treatment, in the terms of Freud's second theoretical version of the psychic apparatus, the self is pulled towards the region of the Id or the unconscious and away from reality, only to

reconstruct this reality according to a projection upon it of his delirium or fantasm, to include sensorial and affective displacement.\textsuperscript{42} This imaginary projection is an exterior return of what was repressed or forclosed, now submitted by the subject to the criteria of the real.\textsuperscript{43} This moment of delirium is equivalent to the Ignatian excercitant’s projection of the Gospel scene upon his immediate environment, as we shall see. Kristeva qualifies Psychosis’ projection as the very mechanism of hysteria, where the imaginary, as a forclusion of the signifier’s ability to capture one’s desire, nonetheless \textit{interferes with the Symbolic domain in place to demand the image and the real dimension of the desiring subject}. This is the pictorial, sensorial and affective dimension of "le vréel". On the linguistic level, this rejection and refashioning of the Oedipal relation of desire and of the mirror stage places nonetheless a certain faith in the Symbolic order, insofar as its truth value can be supplemented by the excercitant-subject as the measure of it as real, that is, insofar as it is \textit{open} to what would be a Baroque reception:

\begin{quote}
La psychose procède par désaveu de la réalité et \textit{demande au signifiant d'être réel pour être vrai}. Une combinatoire indéfinie des signes s’ensuit, au-delà des conditions de vérité spécifiées par la science: \textit{s'y déchiffrer l'expansion des confins du Moi et donc du perceptum}.\textsuperscript{44}
\end{quote}

Kristeva particularly signals the \textit{deictic} use of langage as points for intersection of the self, and where mystery (of the flesh brought to the word?) defies Grammar’s logic:

\textsuperscript{42} Kristeva’s reading, in its critique, complement and extension of Lacan’s, also makes its own return and fidelity to Freud.


\textsuperscript{44} "Le Vréel", 21. Emphasis is our own.
[...] le psychotique, forçuant la réalité, explore la "vérité" ("historique", mais on peut dire aussi "linguistique", "scientifique") du signifiant, notamment la virtualité du déictique d'enclencher le placement du sujet de l'énonciation dans divers espaces enonciatifs.\textsuperscript{45}

This is not unlike the exercitant who uses his very self and existence to explore Gospel verity. It is here that Kristeva’s reading of Psychosis brings more than that accomplished by Lacan, wherefrom she goes on to circumscribe the feminine dimension opened up by Psychosis as the realm of the "Semiotic". In further opening up the Psychotic discourse itself to realms of mysticism and poetry, her vision reads perturbations of the Symbolic order by the very carnal self of the madman, mystic and poet more liberally than do the schematizations of Lacan, and takes this far beyond any Psychoanalytic diagnosis.\textsuperscript{46} We, in turn, would like to extend such carnal investment to the very reader, listener and spectator, as well.

Unlike language of the Lacanian Symbolic order which speaks from the enunciating subject "Je" in accordance with the Law of the Father and normative societal order, as well as in repression of the relation to the "imago", the maternal and the feminine, the Kristevian Semiotic speaks from a stance inclusive of relations

\textsuperscript{45} "Le Vréel", 27. Emphasis is our own.

\textsuperscript{46} Michel de Certeau, astucious as Semiotician and Psychoanalyst, reads such a rupture of the Symbolic order in an analysis of the Ignatian Spiritual Exercises, through desire as speaking in the interstices between the exercitant's ordered imaginal constructions, when addressing itself to the grand Other. It is his problematization of such a discursive moment as it nuances Kristeva's stance on the power of the Semiotic which interests us: "La rupture ouvre aux désirs un espace dans le langage établi: paroles et fêtes révolutionnaires. Tout le problème est de savoir si cette parole née de la coupure sera complètement déliée (ab-solue) de l'ordre qui vient ou revient ensuite, et donc "oubliée" comme une fête sans lendemain, ou bien si et comment il est possible d'articuler sur un autre "lieu" et sur un ordre nouveau ce qui a parlé dans l'entre-deux, au moment du transit." "L'Espace du désir, ou le "fondement" des Exercices spirituels", Christus 77 (1973): 118-128. This is indeed a question concerning the very tenacity of Baroque forms and stances.
to the "imago", the maternal and the feminine, yet without excluding language of the Symbolic order nor its initiatory passage through the Oedipal/mirror stage. Both codes meet in the terrain of signification, and both subjectival positions, of the "Je" and the "moi" are accommodated, as in the case of Psychosis and its discursive correlate. As such, the Semiotic circumscribes the Lacanian Symbolic sense of language as its very basis, it outstrips it and refreshes it, appearing through it to put stasis into process, to disrupt syntax allowing for the language of presence, or of love, as we have called it. Kristeva herself uses this to examine poetry as revolutionary language. For as the Semiotic can speak from a stance prior to the mirror stage, it includes corporal and affective signification, what Kristeva refers to as "représentation d'affects" (inscriptions psychiques mobiles, soumises aux processus primaires de "déplacement" et de "condensation"); as (self-)engenderment, pleasure, corporal impressions and psychic, energetic drives, inclusive of the death drive, and yet always through language.47

Kristeva goes on to qualify these mobile Psychic drives and traces ("sèmeion") which disrupt Symbolic order from the other side of the social barrier as venturing from a chora or receptacle, borrowing the term from Plato’s Timaeus. Thereby she moves language into its spatial correlate, yet one which is prior to all space and time.

coordinates, and prior to signification as well. Prior to figuration and specularization, prior to the separation of the Real from the Symbolic, the Semiotic is rather vocalic, kinetic, rythmic and gestural, that is, the process itself leading to signification and which functions in a synchronic, simultaneous manner beneath language, modelled upon metaphor, what Kristeva calls a "génotexte" at work beneath a "phénotexte", not without disruptive violence or aggression or flux, or a "Mystère dans les lettres" to quote along with Kristeva the title of Mallarmé’s poem.\(^48\) The process of signification in such a text is "plurielle, hétérogène et contradictoire, embrassant le flux pulsionnelle, la discontinuité matérielle, la lutte politique et la pulvérisation langagière."\(^49\) Such a synchronic, simultaneous language opens a space for presence in the text, for the reader as well as for the writer, in the terms of our readings of the Baroque, and such a gestural stance recalls the Ignatian exerçitant as he moves into the realm of representation, as well as the effects of such a stance upon gender. The Semiotic also orients the subject towards the mother, where is rejoined in fact the Freudian unconscious and the stage prior to the mirror in Lacan’s presentation. So Kristeva accepts Plato’s further qualification of this space as nurturing and maternal, and open to the imprint of form or "eidoi".\(^50\) This "chora sémiotique maternelle", then, is not so much a space in the subject, as a stage or place from which to be and to speak, a positioning for subjectival stance or posture from which a new

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\(^{48}\) *La Révolution du langage poétique*, 28-29, 83-84.

\(^{49}\) *La Révolution du langage poétique*, 85.

\(^{50}\) *La Révolution du langage poétique*, 24-25.
enunciation, denotation and syntax take place,⁵¹ in opposition and even in dizzying multiplicity to the site of the Lacanian mirror stage and its place in Philosophical Modernity’s order.

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Within the confines of Symbolic Economy’s triadic analysis from the Symbolic to the Imaginary to the Real, language and its spatialization can be resituated in a shift from the space of the Lacanian Symbolic order to the Kristevian Semiotic, there where it privileges the Imaginary and the Real, and is an in-process search to blur the Classical oppositions between the sensible and the intelligible, nature and culture, the maternal relation and the incest tabou, and so on. This shift is in fact a passionate quest on the individual level -- for a lost, impossible origin whose lure of love, of plenitude and of full being is based upon a certain loss, or death, there in the place of the mother.... It is this shift as quest towards the origin -- even so far as a joyous living of decenterment from and towards it, happily dependent upon the artifice and masks of the voyage, not without recourse to discourse -- which contributes to define the Baroque, its profusion of form, its lyricism and signifiers, as a call to the Real dimension of our own corporality, affectivity and presence, insofar as we can will it, that is, as we live it. Here, passion is all. It is the shift of life, a life with risk, to a place as intenable as perhaps it might be, wherefrom one might live, be and dwell. This brings us to our next consideration, of 20th-century discourses of dwelling where presence is, in various ways, in question, in Martin Heidegger’s concepts of the

⁵¹ La Révolution du langage poétique, 60-61.
artwork and *Dasein* and their role in the act of dwelling, in Jacques Derrida’s concept of "le supplément" called forth to representation’s lacks and absences, and in Jean-Joseph Goux’s concept of "transpective" as a new relation to perception, representation, spatiality and life therein, in a mode we can qualify as one of presence and Inhabitation.
B. Dwelling & Presence in Question: Martin Heidegger, Jacques Derrida, & Jean-Joseph Goux

Martin Heidegger's (+1889, -1976) conception of the work of art as that which "clears a space for Being" and for unconcealed presence, a presence which is ultimately that of man himself as embedded being or *Dasein* within the realms of time and world, invites precisely a consideration of the Baroque work, as we view it, as that which brings the other to presence. Here, our sense of the Baroque confronts Heideggerian thought. Heidegger considers the work of art -- both pictorial and poetic -- as opening a space for "Being" and dwelling primarily in the collection of late essays *Poetry, Language, Thought*. We shall begin our inquiry into Heidegger's conception as that which the Baroque work, above all, accomplishes, primarily through these texts. That the thought of this great 20th-century Philosopher who has so influenced French intellectuals should allow us to do this further corroborates our reading of a 20th-century Baroque return in French thought, art and letters.

In "The Origin of the Work of Art" (1950), we learn that Heidegger considers the work of art to reveal things portrayed in their "Being". What this means is that no longer is the object relegated to its mere use-value, as "equipment" engaged in the "earth", but that the object is now a "thing" at work whose place and being in a "world" has been cleared for it out of the sheltering earth and is maintained thus by the art work. This explains the sense of the Heideggerian transition from "beings",

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53 "The Origin of the Work of Art"; see also the article "The Thing" (1950), *Poetry, Language, Thought*, 17-87, 165-182.
as objects of a technical use-value, to "Being" or "thing" at work. So Heidegger writes, "the art work opens up in its own way the Being of beings".\textsuperscript{54} The famous example he gives is the Van Gogh paintings of peasant's workboots. Another example is how language as a naming process pulls the object into the realm of "thingness". This power of the work of art gives the object a new force, precisely that which "clears a space for Being" and transports us as well, as spectators, beholders or readers, along with it, out of the realm of the ordinary and even into the realm of the uncanny.\textsuperscript{55} The art work's "thing" has the force to enthrall us, and bids bring us forth in turn, as it has been by the work, to presence, into the realm of phenomena as that which shines forth, or, metaphorically speaking with Heidegger himself, brings us forth from entombment to resurrection. This is similar to the concatenating "chain of representations" moving from director to exercitant and so on, through the work and its visualization which we have found in operation in Ignatian, Baroque spirituality. Thus the art work gives us the occasion to measure the fleshly value of our own life as Dasein, as "Being-there", and real, "thrown" or engaged, existing presence, in a manner even beyond our own agency. Ultimately, the art work is not only a space for us, but is equivalent to a temple for, indeed allowing, God's presence. As such, it "frames" (Gestell), outlines, calls forth, assembles and orders, and even restructures presence anew, and is also the parameters from within


which presencing can take place. This places the use-value object into the chain of beings and representations, embedded in place and time, and us along with it. This is the truth which the work of art allows to happen, and Beauty is one way of this bringing forth to Being and grounding of truth. Art, artfulness, and art as technē, then, is not a process of mystification and illusion for Heidegger, but is that which reveals truth... ultimately about and confirmed in our own Being and presence, much as the Baroque work realizes real presence as well. Technology potentially can, then, work in hand with the image, action and grace. This shall raise our further interest in Heidegger’s writings on technology.

Heidegger distinguishes two moments of technē, one which reaches back to the Greeks, and another which is confined to modern machine-powered technology, which we could situate from 17th-century beginnings of Physics in the Cartesian will towards a Mathesis Universalis of the res extensa. The technē since Plato is meant as an act of bringing forth, poiésis and revealing, to include the activities of craftsmen, the arts of mind and the fine arts, and is not meant in the sense of a manufacturing. This is in contrast with the contemporary reduction of technē to technology, which is not a revealing but is rather a challenging set upon nature by man’s will to both order, control and stock it, what Heidegger calls the "standing


57 In the sense of Plato’s Ion, from which Heidegger takes up his own discussion. Indeed, can art even be divorced from technē and, by extension, from technology?

reserve". Within modern technology, he captures this aspect of technology with the term Gestell or enframing. Gestell is of a complex nature, however, as it is both a dangerous blocking or concealing of the truth in its ordering of nature, but also harbors a saving possibility that would make man the safekeeper of nature, and of truth. Paradoxically, one engages the other, and as men engaged despite ourselves in modern technology, the saving possibility can only come as we stare into the dangerous possibilities. So we might consider in the Early Modern period Baroque art, engaged as it is with using and perturbing to and beyond the limit the techniques of perspective, illustrated as early as in the work of Andrea Mantegna (+1431,-1506), to the Jesuit architect Andrea Pozzo (+1642,-1709), and on, and Baroque spirituality in the Spiritual Exercises with its precise techniques of mind and body, as well as moments for a Baroque return in the contemporary technological age, as all engaged in technique and technology, and which also open spaces for being and redemption beyond all quantification. Such a possibility is the hopefulness of Heidegger for dwelling that his thought brings to the precarious age in which we live. In this hopeful aspect of Gestell, he returns to art and poetry as akin to technology, and here comes full circle to return to the thought expounded in "The Origin of the Work of Art". And it is here, perhaps, that we have an illustration of Dasein as care, which we can take in the Baroque spiritual context as far as χάρις, beauty and the image, and the final Prelude of the Ignatian Spiritual Exercises which begs firstly for a transpectival presence in the image, and the dimension of grace or care as ethical engagement.
Although Heidegger himself does not examine any Baroque works of art or letters, he does consider the Philosophy of the Baroque and Classical period, in Descartes, for example. In our reading of the Baroque, the Heideggerian analysis fits well the Baroque work as its openness invites our presence and dwelling within it, just as the Ignatian visualization is to become our existential decor, in the sense of religious "Immensity". To bring our studies into this light, where Descartes' Philosophical distance represses corporality, Pierre Gassendi’s and Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s materialist and corporal proximities and exchange engaged in the process of Philosophical inquiry reveal Classical/Baroque tensions in their Philosophical dimensions; Baroque and NeoBaroque theater and art can use architectural and

59 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe interprets Heidegger's references to art and to techné as ultimately based upon a backward-looking mimesis of the ideality of Classical Greek Antiquity, and further goes on to qualify this stance as one in alliance with Nazism. From here he coins the terms "nationalisme-esthétique", to explain that Heidegger’s aesthetic indeed has its political dimension, and that it is upon such an aesthetic that a historical people should ground itself. La Fiction du politique, Heidegger, l'art et la politique (Paris: Christian Bourgeois, 1937). Nonetheless, it is perhaps important to distinguish the Classical realism of which Heidegger was fond as well as his constant return to Greek Antiquity, from the larger compass of his Philosophical discourse on art which does not necessitate a conclusion in exactly the Classical kind of representation. It is the latter discourse, on Being and presence, which interests and engages our own inquiry. Although it is not the scope of this study to examine the possible political or fascist dimensions of aesthetic, Lacoue-Labarthe’s inability to see the counter-Classical Baroque vision inherent to an emphasis upon Being and Dasein as presence and engagement, handicaps, in our opinion, his conclusions. Furthermore, whatever historical period of art and poetry is chosen, that art should offer a grounding place for a historical people can also be interpreted in light of a political agenda and Nazism. See Jean-Joseph Goux, "Politics and Modern Art — Heidegger's Dilemma", Diacritics 19.3-4 (1989): 10-24, particularly 21. Richard Wolin further situates the state as the supreme work of art and Dasein's historicity in the Nazi context. The Politics of Being. The Political Thought of Martin Heidegger (NY: Columbia UP, 1990). However, his reading together of Heidegger's opposition to a technology which comes out of Philosophical Modernity since Descartes, with aesthetic Modernism which reacts against the legacy of Philosophical Modernity, is somewhat confused given the final socio-political interpretation. For, Heidegger’s personal biography aside, such aesthetic "grounding places", in our opinion, already imply movement, change, a portability and an instability, much as in the case of the Ignatian exercitant, Jesuit missionary or Homo-Baroccus. As Heidegger states it himself at the conclusion to "Building Dwelling Thinking", artistic construction and poetizing are a ceaseless, searching activity, and dwelling is a constant, open project, and not a static construction of the state.
theatrical configurations to provoke visualization, "suture" and dwelling as they invite our own presence to the image; Jean-Joseph Surin's fleshly measure of spirituality and Antonin Artaud's integral corporal presence to his theatrical, poetic and personal enterprise leave us trembling in turn; and Agrippa D'Aubigné's, Blaise Cendrars' and Claude Simon's experiences of trauma and visions of death plunge our own depth along with those of earth, sky and mortality. No Being, Dasein or truth is left unmoved, as it is brought to dwell in surprising contexts -- texts, images and works -- which do not lack in their measure of the divine, that is, of grace. And so Heidegger himself writes, "The nature of art would then be this: the truth of being setting itself to work".60 Furthermore, if the art work clears a space for Being, truth, presence and the real, is that so unlike a visualization process which permits our own hallucination, and hallucinatory participation?

In "What are Poets for?" (1946), it is poetic language which, above all, provides the place for Being -- "Language is the precinct (templum), that is, the house of Being"61 -- much like a kind of choratic or maternal locus, as we have seen through Kristevian theory, although Heidegger fails to qualify it so.62 Although

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61 "What are Poets for", Poetry, Language, Thought, 91-142, particularly 132.

62 As Jean-Joseph Goux explains it, the entire gendered dimension of dwelling as represented by the feminine form of the goddess Hestia or Vesta is lost in the Heideggerian discourse on dwelling, presence and Being, and with it, a certain sacred dimension as well. "Vesta, ou le sanctuaire de l'être", in L'Interdit de la représentation (Paris: Le Seuil, 1981) 63-87. See our review of the feminine dimension to God in the chapter on Jean-Joseph Surin and Antonin Artaud, "The Birthing Body of Homo Baroccus". For Heidegger, the Semiotic and Symbolic would be together and simultaneous, just as "equipment" and "thing" at work are one and the same, except for the context of their aesthetic presentation and reception.
Heidegger speaks in the wake of Friedrich Nietzsche's thought, in terms of a "default of God" who no longer gathers men and things unto His Being,\textsuperscript{63} giving over this place to the art work and the artist (so evident in the cases of Antonin Artaud, Blaise Cendrars and Claude Simon, where the authorial/narrative voice takes on a sacerdotal role, and in curious question in Magritte's painting "Mémoires d'un saint"). This is a way perhaps of stating what is also Heidegger's and the contemporary century's blindness towards the feminine dimension as what, in our opinion, leads him to conclude that we live in a destitute, ungrounded time and, taking the clue from Hölderlin, that it is the role of the poet to reach into the "Abyss" or "Abgrund" (indeed, the very \textit{chora} of the maternal relation) to remedy this, as Heidegger later states in the article "Poetically Man Dwells".\textsuperscript{64} Heidegger then turns to Rainer Maria Rilke's poetry to qualify this poetic effort, no longer as a grounding, but as a \textit{venture} with all the elements of uncertainty, risk, cosmic disorbiting, centering, and even death, and the ceaseless effort all of this implies. This too recalls the Baroque work in its ceaseless call to presence and unending provocation of a "chain of representations" without resolution or cathartic closure. He who is in the "venture", or Baroque work, must bid others to join him, and those must also bid others in turn. The engagement in this venture is a \textit{wilfullness}, but a will which in a passive sense "lets happen [...] the advent of truth".\textsuperscript{65} For Rilke, this venture takes place in the

\textsuperscript{63} "What are Poets for", \textit{Poetry, Language, Thought}, 91.

\textsuperscript{64} \textit{Poetry, Language, Thought}, 213-229.

\textsuperscript{65} "What are Poets for?", \textit{Poetry, Language, Thought}, 82.
"Open"[ness of Being], but man is not by nature there, as he "stands over against the
world", and must go with it by his will. This will does not fail to recall the third
Prelude of the Spiritual Exercises, where the exercitant asks God for what he wills
and desires, and corporally exercises himself through the affective "Application of the
Senses" towards this, nor their entire technique, often qualified as a "technology of
the will". This is not the death-ridden will of self-assertion, however, but rather the
generous will which gives up the self to Being.

Ultimately, for Heidegger, dwelling shall rest upon the poetic, and yet there
never is an exact mastery over Being, but rather a wavering process of concealment
and unconcealment of its truth. Heidegger goes on to state in "Building Dwelling
Thinking" (1954), "The real dwelling plight lies in this, that mortals ever search anew
for the nature of dwelling, that they must ever learn to dwell." As the foundation to
dwelling is untenable and unstable in Heidegger's thought, the work itself, as well as
our relation to it -- like the Baroque work and our reception of it -- is in flux,
movement, metamorphosis. Such a stage for the Ignatian exercitant and Homo
Baroccus is solved by his ambulating state of "Inhabitation", as a portable, indwelt

takeoff on the negative side of Heidegger's view of intenable Being, the ungrounded "Abyss", and the
role of language in it can be seen here. Derrida's thought takes this further by using the Saussurian
concept of the sign.
70 This refutes, in our opinion, any Nazi interpretation of "grounding" in Heidegger's
thought.
decor within the very self; however we find that Heidegger’s thought never goes beyond the possible comparison with the concept of "Immensity" to reach that of "Inhabitation". Nonetheless, in both Heidegger’s thought and the Baroque, this ground is now renewed -- it is real, in our participation in it, and it is imaginary, on the part of the work of art; in the realm of Philosophical Existentialism, it is no longer ideal nor symbolic. For Heidegger, it is poetry above all which makes such a dwelling livable, and a site -- the aesthetic -- which if one cannot appropriate and guarantee, at least to which one can return.71

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To the question of language as a space for dwelling -- indeed of a presence in the text -- comes the particular answer of Jacques Derrida’s thought, in his concept of "le supplément" called forth to confront representation’s lacks and absences. Elaborated in the wake of 20th-century Structuralist preoccupations with the Saussurian composite concept of the sign as signifier or acoustic image, signified or concept, and referent or thing in itself, and its arbitrary motivation from signifier to signified and referent, this critical corpus questions the plenitude of language and its implications to provoke a linguistic turn in contemporary French thought where presence to language, referentiality, and the real dimension are not only in question, but in grave doubt. As we found it in Lacan’s thought with the severe Symbolic order of the "Law of the Father", this is found as well in the very errancy and severance of the Derridian signifier away from the signified and referent. In response

71 An example might be the splendor of the Baroque church as refuge and participatory space for the poor masses of people. Victor L. Tapié, Baroque et Classicisme (Paris: Plon, 1957), 134.
to this and along with a reading of Rousseau's *Confessions*, Derrida suggests the concept of "le supplément" -- which there would not need be had an originary presence to and plenitude of the sign in a secure onto-theological context been preserved. Indeed, this shift of the sign since Nietzsche's "God is dead" is not unlike what took place in the 16th century's earth-moving and erring Copernican revolution, as the celestial fell to earth and the Christian hierarchy of the heavens was shaken; it further echoes this revolution, and this shift is the very time of the sign. This is also a motion, which is a *passion* in perpetually "ever learning to dwell", to speak in Heideggerian terms, and also decentering of the Baroque chain of representations or successive presences ever forged anew. From origin to passion to decentering, this movement from sign to supplement is also that of the *Spiritual Exercises'* Preludes from historical rememoration to its reconstruction in a temple of artifice, to the final moment of its Immensity and portable Inhabitation, as we too become house and temple to Gospel history, as well as errant (although not severed) sign of the passion which fills and moves us. Before continuing into Derrida's thought, however, let us distinguish that where for him absence begets presence, *in the Baroque context it is presence which begets presence*. It is the final emphasis upon or take on presence which encourages us to read Derrida, his concepts of the sign and "le supplément" in confrontation with the Baroque.

In a critical and partly psychoanalytic reading of Rousseau's *Confessions*, a reading which indeed uses Rousseau against himself, Derrida elaborates this concept

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of the supplement as that which compensates for presence's (onto-theological) instability or absence, and speaks as well on the topic of presence in relation to Husserl's Phenomenology in La Voix et le Phénomène. To carefully situate our work with respect to Derrida's critique of presence, we shall examine his presentations and arguments point for point in comparison with our Baroque angles on reader reception, presence, and "the chain of representations" as we have elaborated them. Where for Derrida and the authors he examines, presence is a return of the onto-theological same, or an essence, in the Baroque context of presence as reception, it is the infinitely individual and variable, or existence. There is not necessarily any effort in the Baroque to return specifically to an origin -- natural, terrestrial, maternal, spiritual, sacred, incestuous or pleasurable -- but rather the twisted route of a presently contextualized, constantly changing, impassioned, sensual and perpetual reenactment. In this sense, Baroque presence can be thought in Derridian fashion to defer an originary presence and to decenter itself from it, but it can also be thought to call forth additional presence, in a spiritual or occult sense. We prefer to see Baroque presence in this way, as a spiralling, ever-nearing process towards presence in general, from ellipse to virtual eclipse, even if the return is not originary, rather than as a distanciation. Since in the Baroque spiritual and perceptive experience it is the subject who confirms presence, presence is not then, as Derrida sees it, the perpetually deferred ideal of the archetype of Symbolic Economy's triad. Rather, it is

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a Being-there, a _Dasein_, a situational engagement. Derrida also speaks of presence as intersubjectivity, where the self is opened up to the other, as if upon a stage; this theatrical metaphor is appropriate to the Baroque engagement with presence as entry into the realm of representation, and ultimately subjectival presence in the Baroque experience as the creation of a space which is to be found in the self. This is captured by the transpectival concept of "Inhabitation" which we have examined through St. Ignatius' _Spiritual Exercises_.

The faults in presence call forth the play of "le supplément", and it is Derrida's concept of the sign which allows and permits a space for supplementarity. In the chapter "Le Puits et la pyramide" Derrida examines his concept of the sign in light of Hegel's thought in his _Aesthetics_. The sign, as an economising gesture which reduces it to the signifier alone and to the intelligible realm, leaves behind in a violent gesture an "abyss" or "puits", a nocturnal, labyrinthine and deadly depth, which is also the space of metaphor,\(^7^4\) which does not fail to recall the abandoned feminine dimension of Lacanian Psychoanalysis, and the Kristevian _chora_, as well as Hölderlin's "Abgrund". Using Hegel's imagery, then, the sign becomes for Derrida a kind of monument, or pyramid, to death, or hiding death's depth beneath it (in the realm of the referent and real, we add). In light of this severence, the sign and its intelligible realm tries to capture the originary sensible realm its gesture has left behind, in a second revolutionary return to the sensible, and there the sign captures not so much the sensible realm as origin, as it does its arbitrary, deformed

\(^7^4\) _Marges de la philosophie_, 88.
representations. This is a kind of reverse version of the Hegelian "Aufhebung". The origin has now been reduced to artifice, to a Baroque "representation of a representation". And the sign becomes a monstrous repetition, subversion, and perversion towards it, to think it tragically, or rather a pure play, to think it comically. So is Derrida's writer, much unlike Heidegger's poet, or rather like the dark, unachieved side of Heidegger's poet, "désespérée par la répétition et joyeuse pourtant d'affirmer l'abîme, d'habiter le labyrinthe en poète, d'écrire le trou".75

The Derridian sign maintains its lack, and for Derrida "le supplément" always addresses itself to a lack as a negative Heideggerian "opening" or "clearing", is necessitated by it, and is taken negatively by Rousseau as writing which replaces the vibrance and true presence of speech. In the Baroque, individual, supplementing presence always adds itself to presence, to create what we have called a "chain of representations" where there is a continual plenum of presence. Like the Derridian supplement, the Baroque "chain of representations" does not complement and totalize presence, but rather is a perpetual addition to it. Yet where "le supplément" is exterior for Derrida, in the Baroque it ultimately becomes an integral participant in that to which it joins itself; for example, the importance of the Gospel story is that we receive it and live it. Derrida sees supplementarity to be both humanity's chance, and humanity's perversion; both seem equally possible in the Baroque context as well. But finally, and most importantly, where Derrida interprets "le supplément" as sign, writing and metaphor, we interpret it as a carnal subject, or as the "tangible-étalon"

of Merleau-Ponty, as an engaged and even birthing body which is capable in turn and in mediating fashion of bringing forth the presence of the other. Where Derrida sees language as a (problematic) supplement to both presence and the evacuated, distanciated subject at distance and evacuated, we see the Baroque subject — the exercitant, the reader, the spectator — as a present and perpetual supplement to the text's depthless treasorial plenitude.76

Both modes of the supplement to the sign remain plays with a representation which precedes them, however Derrida hardly speaks in terms of the work's reception. From there, he brings out Rousseau's worst fear, that in a cultural context all is turned upside down, and it is nature that must supplement art and society, by taking upon itself the role and the place of artifice, and losing its "originary" quality. We can read the Baroque subjectival, reception-oriented presence as such: the subject brings the nature of his own existence in a stance of play-acting to the artifice of the text, word, or cultural work to give it a mediated measure of truth value, and the "originary presence" has become the feared Baroque thing of artifice amidst further artifice, which forms and encourages the subject indeed as an Homo Baroccus engaged in representation. The evil or occult implications so feared by Rousseau of such an "unnatural" participation make sense for his initial vantage point from Calvinist Geneva, hint as far back as Jansenist critique of Counter-Reformation

76 It is precisely because language can no longer be taken as archetype — guarantor of a sacred presence — that it is taken as the supplementing token, in Jean-Joseph Goux's sense. Such slippage is part of Modernity and its results in Capitalism, for example, which in our mind calls for the Baroque return where individual presence in turn must need supplement the errant, severed token. We have stated this as a shift from the Ideal to the Imaginary, and as a liberation of the Imaginary and the Real, or of the signifier and the referent, to their creative, combinatory power.
spirituality, and take Derrida’s *différence* and *supplément* in their lack of emphasis upon reception back to Jansenism and Cartesian Modernity as well! And also, the occult possibilities for the Baroque stance, its spirituality and its mode of perception here reveal themselves. That all should be seen in its proper perspective!

In both Derrida’s context and the Baroque/Neo-Baroque context, presence has its chimerical, illusory, play-acting qualities. But the objectives of such play-acting and engagement in the chain of representations are ultimately more important for the Baroque than the illusion itself, and Derrida himself says it satisfactorily for us: "En s’affectant soi-même d’une autre présence, on s’altère soi-même." And he takes it so far as to say that *to read is to alter oneself*, without neglecting the meaning of pleasuring oneself, appropriate to Rousseau’s confessions of reading practice. Reading as self-alteration can, however, have its correlate in spiritual union, and in the sense of the third rhetorical goal of *delectare* as well. For both Derrida and the Baroque, Ignatian practice, the text calls forth presence, however where such a text dissolves before some transcendental meaning in the Philosophical and Classical sense of reading, or remains disincarnate and truthless before a "deconstruction" style of reading, *in the Ignatian spiritual practice and in the Baroque, the text, word or work remains to both harbor and inhabit the flesh*, in a perpetual and mutual engagement, which is exactly why we can take the word as flesh. The "*supplément*" and, to some extent, "*différence*" then are interesting concepts for our own work on the

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77 *De la Grammatologie*, 221.

78 And which is also part of why the Index held its repressive power in place, there where reading is serious business. We have here a sense of a Baroque hermeneutic.
Baroque and bring enrichment to it, but rather than to situate a current critical perspective upon the Baroque within an inadequate or limiting Derridian enclosure, they allow us to gain further perspective, by marking our reading as "Post-derridian".

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What the sign has left behind and the Semiotic or supplementarity seek to fill (Lacan, Kristeva, Derrida); where Being seeks to presence itself in the clearing of the work of art and poetic language which fearlessly reach into the abyss (Heidegger), there Jean-Joseph Goux examines through Greek mythology and the Oedipus trilogy the feminine figure of the sphinx, and particularly Oedipus' relation to it. It is in the aesthetic stance of "transpective", which Goux relates to the final stage of Oedipus at Colonus and his very intimate experience of "le féminin mortifère", where the subjectival stance of presence, the relation to the art work and Inhabitation are in question in his thought.79

Jean-Joseph Goux reviews the Oedipus trilogy as an aberrant version, incorrectly insisted upon by Freud, of the Greek "monomythe", where the hero is to successfully vanquish, in a symbolically self-castrating gesture of matricide, the monstrous feminine which in itself has the power to regulate incest without patriarchal intervention. This passage is a transfiguration of incestuous desire and the initiation towards manhood, wherefrom the hero wins his bride and establishes the foyer of home. This is the successful initiatory passage to manhood and the result of normative desire; we can allign it later with Modernity, Classical and Realist art,

Bourgeois culture and successful Capitalist exchange, which is emblematized here by the winning of the bride, although the Oedipal and Freudian versions continue to have their role as well in this Modernity. This is far from Sophocles' tale, where the monstrous feminine is the bride of the twisted desire of Oedipus the king, and violence shifts to the perversion of patricide, albeit unbeknownst to Oedipus.80

Oedipus' initiation, which we can also qualify in Lacanian terms as a passage into the "Law of the Father", is a failed one as he remains in fact without mastery and in a state of incest within the matriarchal domain, and blind in his response to the sphinx, who is carefully qualified by Goux as the feminine "la sphinge". The Western cultural complexities camouflaged since Freud are evident here, in a wavering between, or conflation of, the patriarchal and matriarchal regimes, or perhaps moreso an eclipse of the feminine dimension and its role in initiation. This shall, however, give a certain quality to Oedipus' subjectivity, and subjectival stance or posture, which is ultimately not without its aesthetic correlates. Let us begin by examining Goux's reading at this moment, in the aesthetic domain, with the transitions from aspective to perspective to transpective, before we go on to examine how Oedipus at Colonus can illustrate this final position.

We have already examined in our analysis of the Spiritual Exercises how successful affectivity on the part of the exercitant, who indeed goes through a form of spiritual initiation, places him as presence within the "Immensity" of the visualized

80 This is emphasized by Freud, as he forgets the monstrous feminine. We could say then along with Jean-Joseph Goux that Modernity is based upon the death of the Father and insurrection of the individualist son (to which the Christian myth brings its own answers). See in particular "Mythe régulier et mythe dérégulé" and "La psychanalyse et le meurtre", Oedipe philosophe, 11-44.
Christic scene, or in the work. This we have qualified, in borrowing from Goux's terminology, as a "transpectival" stance of the subject -- the subject, spectator, recipient, addressee or exercitant is no longer absent, or evacuated from the work in the manner of a fantasm, as in aspectival construction, an example of which is the art of Ancient Egypt, or the drawings of children, and is represented in the Historical Rememoration of the Spiritual Exercises' first Prelude. Nor is he at a fixed and respected distance as ego-subject from the work, as in a perspectival construction such as those of Alberti and the Renaissance, and as in the Composition of Place task of the second Prelude. But rather, he is in the work, in suture or chiasm with it, in a spatial transgression which further aestheticizes and transgresses Renaissance space. This is seen in the third stage of the Affective practice of the third Prelude, precisely as it calls forth the being and participation of the subject, to include projective perception and presence, constructive, corporal, affective and ethical participation, and is the objective of the technology and architecture of the Baroque work itself. A quality of the Baroque work which is so evident pictorially in the use of trompe-l'oeil, anamorphosis and art combinations of painting, sculpture and architecture; evident in the extreme use of metaphor, carnal description and boundless syntax in the literary context; and described by materialist, corporal and chiasmic engagement with the object of knowledge in the philosophical and particularly phenomenological context. We have also illustrated how in the Spiritual Exercises this transpectival moment is a result of a heightened affective practice which necessarily passes through the feminine
in the image of the dolorous affectivity of Mary at the death of Christ.\textsuperscript{81} This is, finally, an \textit{empowered} affectivity, capable of its own contextual construction, to include construction of the self, and the regeneration of history with a futural vision.

In a partly psychoanalytic reading, Jean-Joseph Goux relates the three aesthetic stages to the parts of the soul or the Freudian grades of consciousness. Aspectival representation would be the representation of dreams, the unconscious and interior life; it is the Symbolist and magical art of Ancient Egypt, and is found in children's drawings as well; drawn after memory rather than nature, and without depth, it is representation for the all-seeing viewpoint of the gods and not for any singular human point of view; mythologically it corresponds to the hero's passage through fear in affronting the monstrous and normative initiation.\textsuperscript{82} Perspectival representation would be the representation for an anchored ego-subject, singular point of view, a consciousness such as that of the moment of achievement in the Philosophy of Descartes who answers \textit{ego} and from there moves on to a \textit{mathesis universalis} will for dominance over nature; it corresponds to the hero's anxiety as a residue from affronting and avoiding the monstrous by intellect alone. This corresponds to the stage of Oedipus' intellectual response "man" to the sphinx, as he prefigures the passage from aspective to perspective.\textsuperscript{83} It is the domain of the rationalizing gesture and man as its singular point of view, wherefrom the repression, interiorization and

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{81} See in particular §3. "Sensation, Affectivity, Desire, and the Christ" and the subsegment "The Application of the Senses" in our analysis herein of the \textit{Spiritual Exercises}.

\textsuperscript{82} \textit{Oedipe philosophe}, 132-134.

\textsuperscript{83} \textit{Oedipe philosophe}, 136.
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blindness particularly of the feminine dimension of the sphinx, or a perpetual "suicide of the sphinx", as the traditional stages of initiation are avoided. Likewise both libidinal and aggressive aspects of the soul and share of man are repressed and interiorized in a faulty humanism and ego-centering that Goux shall later find in the very elements which, refused and repressed, resulted in Oedipus' crimes. And finally, transpectival representation corresponds to a subject who, after the crimes of Oedipus, is conscious of his alterity, of the presence of the sphinx or of the monstrous feminine in him, of a kind of chiasmic (we qualify) seepage of self in this presence of the Other/other in him, and who lives out the deadly, self-sacrificial consequences.\(^{85}\)

How does Oedipus at Colonus, having suffered the extremes of his "perspectival" choices, finally find himself in a "transpectival" position? Once man avows to himself and even wishes for himself his monstrous and feminine dimension, his inhumanness, the non-self in self, his decentering, disorientation and even loss of self reflected in the final disparition of Oedipus' tomb, that is, his alterity, only then does the passage beyond perspective and its "humanism" take place, along with a new sense of corporality, affectivity and ethical engagement. Given Oedipus' perspectival gesture, which Goux goes on to demonstrate as that by force of all men in Western culture, this monstrous dimension is no longer an exterior sphinx or monstrous mother, but is interiorized within the self. The trick is to know it. It is this very

\(^{84}\) Oedipe philosophe, 44.

\(^{85}\) Oedipe philosophe, 200.
interiorized alterity which could also be the Divine reflected in the religious concept of "Inhabitation" achieved in the culmination of the Spiritual Exercises, thus conflating the feminine with the Divine.\textsuperscript{86} For Oedipus, this knowledge takes place at his moment of greatest downfall, complete deprivation and abjection. Having suffered to extreme poverty and blindness the tragic limits of perspective throughout the entirety of his lifetime, he now becomes truly a man, but one emptied-out, purified and given in his ritual death at Colonus with its obedience, instruction and humility as a foundational, charismatic, treasorial and terrestrial gift to others, with all the futurality this implies. Death, at the end of a life of one prolonged, painful and aberrant initiation, is his passage into transpective, and only after this painful passage can he reach this conclusion. And so in the Spiritual Exercises as well, the affective practice of the third Prelude and the Inhabitation it achieves needs must follow the perspectival construction of the second Prelude's "Composition of Place", and includes a death to self to make room and home for the other. J.-J. Goux presents Oedipus at Colonus as a kind of saintly and Christic figure who redeems Modern man within the harboring spatiality of his own long and tragically suffered alterity, and who saves Modern man from the painful initiation that was his, and that continues to belong to our society, Classical and Baroque, much like the Homo Baroccos dead to self and hollowed out to accommodate the presence of the other. Oedipus' final destiny at Colonus is our own, and the Homo Baroccos within the Ignatian tradition is a successful Christian example, necessarily rejected and repressed in turn by Classical

\textsuperscript{86} Indeed, by feminizing being, Goux has gone beyond Heidegger's limitations at the stage of Immensity.
culture's continuing perspectival blindness.\textsuperscript{87} That this remain a mystery to us in our culture, however, like Oedipus' atopic tomb, symbolic of his complete deprivation and abjection, and like the unseen presence and grace of the \textit{Homo Baroccus}, is understandable. At the same time, the aspatiality of such presence permeates all.

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It is Jean-Joseph Goux's reading of the Oedipus myth and coinage of the term "transceptive"\textsuperscript{88} which reaches the farthest back of the critical authors we examine and appropriate here, to the cultural foundations subtending their thought, and their need to speak in terms of the Semiotic plenitude of language as well as its projection over canonized perception and experience of the real, of Being's full presence brought forth in man as \textit{Dasein} by the work of art, of the "supplement" perpetually necessitated by representation's lacks. All of these are calls to corporality, to affectivity and to presence in its feminine dimension to enter within the rational realms of representation and intersubjective communication; they complete the limitations of Western man of whom Freud had sketched out anew the structure and illustrated the struggles,\textsuperscript{89} and whom Goux has traced back to Oedipus as the mythological version of the Philosopher, and they also give us a picture of the effects of the Baroque work and the subjectival stance or posturing of the \textit{Homo Baroccus}.

\textsuperscript{87} For the entire development on Oedipus at Colonus and the term "transpective", see "Le testament d'Oedipe", \textit{Oedipe philosophe}, 187-203.

\textsuperscript{88} \textit{Oedipe philosophe}, 198, and following.

\textsuperscript{89} However, Freud's mistake is to situate the Oedipal injunction against incest with the Father, rather than with the monstrous feminine. As Goux states it, Lacan shall begin to uncover this in his work; however, it is Goux's work which takes this to its full clarity and achievement. \textit{Oedipe philosophe}, 185-186.
This call to enter within the rational realm, to complete and revolutionize it, clearly signalled by Jean-Joseph Goux’s rereading of the Oedipus myth to its consequences and conclusion also found in the transpectival, affective, Inhabitational stance of the Homo Baroccus, is also the call to a revolution of Philosophical Modernity through a presence and plenitude of the self/subject inclusive of the imaginary and real dimensions, thus completing the intellectual and Symbolic order of Western Classicism. This is exactly the space of the Postmodern wherein, with nuance, we situate a Baroque return in French thought, arts and letters. This brings us to our final examination here, of the concept of the Postmodern, particularly as elaborated in the work of Jean-François Lyotard.
C. The Baroque, Jean-François Lyotard’s Postmodern, & the NeoBaroque

The Postmodern is a complex notion not all of which shall suit a Baroque return, but within which we shall be able to demarcate an important NeoBaroque territory and, we find, strengthen and clarify the definition of the Postmodern in turn. Generally, the Postmodern is considered the era ushered in by a reaction against Philosophical Modernity, demarcated from Descartes on with its ego-subject, positing of objects and their mathecization, and implications for a Symbolic economy which emphasizes the signifier. The endpoint of Modernity and initial Postmodern reaction is most often situated in the 19th century with such thinkers as Nietzsche, Freud and Marx. It is also a reaction against realism and perspectival representation which had been elaborated alongside Modernity, a reaction to be found in Cézanne, abstract or "Modern" art⁹⁰ and Surrealism, and in stream of consciousness narrative and the French New Novel, for example, whose narrative style spans from minimalism to excess. The Postmodern is situated in a general way in perpetual aesthetic "Modernist", avant-garde tendencies to counter subject-centeredness, a strong Symbolic order and realist representation. The Postmodern is also an era defined by the fascination since Saussure with the errant sign, separated from its referent, which is the linguistic correlate to the reaction against realism, and which is in fact a kind of formalism homologous with geometrical abstract art where the signifier in a menaced and sickly Symbolic order is detached from the referent and used in a state of pure

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⁹⁰ Abstract art comprehends several gestures in revolution against realism in painting; on the one hand, an abstract geometry, and on the other, an art of rhythm, gesture and affective effusion.
play.⁹¹ And yet, this errancy of the sign is in fact a result of the exacerbation of an anchored ego-subject wherein reason and intellect are priviledged, and the imaginary and real are neglected, repressed, in fact disanchored. We consider the Postmodernism of the errant sign to be, in fact, Modernity’s illness, and an "Ultramodernity". And then there is the Postmodern which, aware of the repression effected by Cartesianism, rather than to focus upon the illness of the signifier, returns to the Imaginary and the Real, priviledges the signifier and the referent, and by doing so recuperates subjectival and signified corporality and affectivity, to include subjectival presence and the plenitude of transpectival stance. This Postmodern does not, however, make a simplistic and, frankly, impossible return to the realm of representation in its return to the body, to affect and to the Real; rather, it returns to the real in a second phase, or to a second nature, with all it has gained, to include the arbitrary Saussurian sign, in the mode of the Surreal. It is particularly in this Postmodern, post-Saussurian, post-sign, resurrected post-death-of-the-subject return to the real from within and after the rejection of the real, wherein we find a NeoBaroque whose emphasis is the real as supplementing reception. Our reading of a Baroque return within the Postmodern nuances in this manner the concept of the Postmodern.

In Jean-François Lyotard’s sense of the Postmodern,⁹² the postmodern subject would make history present through the practice of memory (anamnesis), as does the Inhabited exercitant in the Spiritual Exercises, and then would project this history

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⁹¹ This also has repercussions in the economic domain, into which we do not enter in this study.

forward to future possibility. This future possibility is found in the temporal concept of "le futur antérieur", which term Lyotard uses, where the past is always, in a positive sense, the unforgotten past of a future and, perhaps most paradoxically, particularly for a history of martyrdom and sacrifice, to be lived again. For Lyotard, that future would be a totalizing, Modernist moment, which would make the Postmodern, at least for the practice of History, a fold within the Modern which he calls a perpetual "future on the run". This gives a further sense to Postmodernity as ontologically prior to Modernity, and supports our detection of a Baroque return, the Baroque having been prior to Classicism in France. Postmodern History is both against and prior to the Hegelian totalizing narrative and its perspectival vision. The Postmodern practice of History is an individualized contextualization of it by the historian and, in turn, the reader and beholder, which renders it not an a priori prescription of what we know must have happened, but rather a pragmatic practice from within of what happened, a corporal and affective tinkering -- "bricolage" as Lyotard calls it -- from within the past with hope for the future, wherein the influence of Phenomenology upon Lyotard can be seen. We find this corporal and affective reception and practice of History to be the source of the relativity of Lyotard’s incommensurable différand, which opens avenues for a pluralism. History and narrative construction are at once totalizing and renewable, as each story -- to include

93 This Postmodern mode is for Lyotard most crucial after periods of great crime. And how can we not think of the horrors of this century’s world wars, as they have influenced Lyotard’s thought, and those of the 16th century’s religious wars as well?

94 Le Postmoderne expliqué aux enfants, 28.
the Gospel as well, as treated in the *Spiritual Exercises* — is ultimately *many stories*, and in its reception is to be relived as such. *What is important in the practice of History and of story is not the free play of language, but the serious reception of narrative, affective engagement with it, and acting out its ethical consequences*, just as the Ignatian exercitant through the practice of the *Spiritual Exercises* taps into the Imaginary and Real dimensions to receive, emote with, embody and project the Gospel narrative upon the present at hand and with intentionality for a future through the actorial plasticity of an ambulating presence of the Gospel scene, and of the Christ, and in the implications for corporal and affective presence, as the real joins the image. The exercitant’s surroundings become in this manner the matter of his own art work. And, vice-versa, could the Postmodernist practice of History today be, indeed, considered a guide for spiritual and ethical practice; that is, could Lyotard’s call ultimately be for the sacralisation of the open historical text? This would be an active, engaged and ethical practice, already attached to the text by Ignatius of Loyola, and we find it reappears in the thought of Lyotard on historical and narrative practice in the Postmodern era, as well.

The Ignatian exercitant himself is a fertile space for the presence of History wherein the text, Verb or the work takes seed. In light of the universal mission of the Jesuit Order, this holds some paradoxes for seeking a return of the Baroque, whose origins can be situated in Jesuit spirituality, in the Postmodern, particularly as this Postmodern places an accent upon pragmatic and existential diversity. We can answer as follows: the Ignatian exercitant in a state of Inhabitation is both formed *a*
priori by Gospel narrative and in a universal objective, and is also free to adapt this narrative to his own individual, existential situation, wherefrom the readiness of the Jesuits to go into the world wherever they might be commanded. There is at once a prescribed universality, and an elasticity of existential openness and individual experience, in the vibrancy of history and memory enacted as presence. And yet, the missionary order of the Jesuits, the occult aspect of anamorphosis and technologies for a manipulation of the will, and the plasticity of the excitant can have implications for invasion, colonisation, manipulation and oppression of the other; for a privative recuperation of the feminine dimension; for the rhetorical use of art and language, or a "terrorist sophism", as Lyotard would say. What we can answer to counter this is that the Jesuit Order has a history of working with other cultures, superposing their vision upon what already exists in them (from symbols to dress), thereby adding further imaginary and real, or Semiotic dimension to them, and not annihilating them. There is present in this Jesuit gesture both an element of a Modernity and of a Postmodernity, just as Lyotard's Postmodern is a future anterior pursuing a future, a Postmodernity folded within a perpetually deferred Modernity. And the Baroque as well, as it both manipulates the Imaginary and Real aspects of corporal, affective being; and yet by so accessing them, liberates them into the realm of the Classical and the Symbolic, which it thereby captures, reworks and transforms.

95 Much as the sacrifice of the Mass may be (enacted and) made anywhere. See Teilhard de Chardin's Le Prêtre, whose work we hope to examine in future study.

96 Discours, Figure (Paris: Klincksieck, 1971) 15.
D. Conclusion: From Critical Theory on to its Philosophical Underpinnings, in a Baroque Light

The themes of corporality, affectivity and presence which circumscribe our reading of the Baroque find a space for consideration, both denigrating and valorizing, in 20th-century critical thought -- its Structuralism, its Semiotics, its Phenomenology, its Anthropology, and its characterization as "Postmodern". Much of this contemporary French Critical Theory and the trans-continental concept of the Postmodern revolve around and struggle with the legacy of Cartesian Modernity. We shall now step back to the first historical period in question in our study, to examine René Descartes' (+1596, -1650) work in depth, indeed to reveal the progression of his own struggles with the development of his thought and with the borders between Baroque and Classical tendencies in the domains of the Sciences, Philosophy and Theology. From this problematic foundational moment in intellectual history, we shall examine the stance of three other important Philosophers for a consideration of the Baroque, one in the historical period and the others in its return -- Pierre Gassendi, Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Before going on to do the above, we shall begin with a preliminary review of the task of philosophizing with the Baroque.
III. PRELIMINARIES: KNOWLEDGE, THE BODY & AFFECTIVITY, 
PHILOSOPHIZING WITH THE BAROQUE 

We open this segment on a Philosophical approach to the Baroque with an assumption about knowledge, for the Ignatian Spiritual Exercises have their correlate in ways of knowing: thinking takes place synesthetically with the body and with affectivity, for the body and affectivity of the subject move into or are even absorbed into the objects of knowledge, and can be ultimately possessed by them. This is our sense of the Baroque épistémē, which gathers together Aristotelian, Materialist, Empiricist, Sensualist and Libertine thought. This Baroque assumption about knowledge -- which holds place in the historical period of the Baroque, with such thinkers as, initially, Michel de Montaigne (+1533,-1592), whom we might qualify as a pre-Baroque, Manierist philosopher for the wealth of his inquiry yet its lack of systematization, seen in the continuing diversity of the essay form he adopted. And thinkers such as Pierre Gassendi (+1595,-1655), Savinien Cyrano de Bergerac (+1619,-1655), and the Jesuits as a whole, and makes a 20th-century return as we shall argue -- this Baroque epistemology, brings us to a consideration of the status of the observing subject and the observed object, and to the question of Being and presence there where essences are bound to existence -- that is, a Baroque epistemology brings us to Phenomenological considerations of Ontology and Metaphysics. To consider, then, Presence, Being, and knowledge in a Baroque
context is to examine Presence or Being as attributed both to the perceiving subject and to God, and how exactly it is joined to subjectival presence, to matter and to the object. *The Baroque épistémè demands a particular stance on Metaphysics insofar as Metaphysics is a Rationalism: it demands the paradoxical, it demands Metaphysics' incarnation.*

The Baroque as we have examined it in the terms of Ignatian Spirituality has given us a particular subject-object relation, with an eye to the corporal and affective status of the subject in relation to the object. These very relations are of prime importance in Philosophical considerations as well, for knowing God is a model for knowing, even though Philosophy need not necessarily bend itself to theological prescription, and this brings us to look at the Baroque which we have initially examined in the religious realm in a Philosophical context. Throughout our study of the intersections between Philosophy and the Baroque, we shall focus upon the evolution of the subject-object relation, particularly with respect to presence of the body-subject. We consider the subject to be both perceiving, therefore sentient and corporal, and knowing, therefore conscious. Furthermore, the perceiving, sentient body-subject is the knowing subject, but this must be nuanced in light of each author we consider. Ultimately, what is in question with the Baroque is the extent to which the subject-object relation, perception and knowledge involve a corporal and affective investment on the part of the subject in its perception and knowledge of the object -- what we have called "subjectival stance", and what the object is in turn capable of
calling forth from the perceiving subject, that is, its capacity to seduce, engage, absorb and perturb the perceiving and knowing subject.

To better orient our study, let us take a cursory look at the evolution of Philosophical thought in light of the subject-object relation, perception and knowledge in the Western Philosophical tradition. The subject-object relation can also include the relation of the perceiving subject to the totality of the self, which is of relevance in the context of mind-soul/body dualism. In Philosophical Antiquity and Platonic thought, forms are transcendental objects of fixed knowledge, essences beyond time separated from the perceiving subject, and best intuited through Mathematics, particularly Geometry. Despite Thomistic Aristotelianism, and despite the thought of the sceptical French Philosopher Montaigne who saw the world in constant turbulence and transition and its objects of knowledge as well as the knowing subject as intenable and in flux, this model of transcendental forms continued to have a certain hold upon Renaissance Scholasticism and upon René Descartes (+1596, -1650), in particular, who was educated by the Jesuits in the Scholastic tradition. Although the forms are constituted by the subject, they are placed in an ideal realm as if outside of and superior to him, and the focus is not at all upon subjectival agency.

With Cartesian Modernity and the establishment of the Cogito, the ideal realm of transcendental forms remains, however this realm is placed in relation to the

\[\text{\footnotesize 1 Appropriately, Mathematics was the last and an ascensional step of sorts in the progression of study at La Flèche, where Descartes received his education, with Logic and Morality studied in the first year, Physics and Metaphysics in the second, and finally Mathematics in the third. Alfred Espinas, Descartes et la morale, 2 vols. (Paris: Ed. Bossard, 1925) 20. Astoundingly, Descartes' oeuvre shall make an inverse progression through these disciplines.}\]
Cogito as their intellectual foundation -- the perceiving, thinking subject that constitutes them by the rational gesture of his pure and mathematically-disciplined thought. And by grace as well for the Christian Cartesian, such as those of Port Royal, however this factor shall easily fall aside in the 18th century. The ideal forms are within the subject’s intellect, as innate ideas and an ideal starting point of certitude. However this does not quite bring them down to earth, as the subject in this case has been drastically reduced by the Cartesian method of doubt to the single dimension of a thinking mind -- the Cogito ergo sum -- severed from the totality of the corporal and sentient self, tied to a God of imagined perfection and, because of this, not fully existing. In this sense the Cartesian subject, reduced to a thinking subject by the task of certitude, is a metaphorical "seeing, fleshless eye" -- which sense Descartes does priviledge -- that is perceptive of the forms while at a perspectival distance from their corporal, worldly manifestations which thereby have been quantified, mathesized and purged of all qualitative matter. These forms include God, but a reduced God that Descartes has pulled out of a reduced subject. This perspectival distance to mathecised matter and to God is what universalizes the place

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2 The argument between Antoine Arnauld and Nicolas Malebranche on Malebranche’s concept of the "Vision in God" illustrates two 17th-century outcomes to the legacy of Platonism: a Christianisation of the Platonic forms as exteriorized and God-instituted for Malebranche, versus forms seen as constituted by an act of the subject, as the Modern element brought by Cartesianism to Neo-platonism, followed by Arnauld. See Charles Jourdain, "Notice sur les travaux philosophiques d’Antoine Arnauld", Logique de Port Royal (Paris: Hachette, 1865) xxii-xxxii. Indeed this polemic fissured Descartes’ own ideas, illustrating two outcomes to them: that which is within the subject, and the greater perfection which is believed to exist outside the subject. See Descartes, Méditations métaphysiques, "Préface de l’auteur au lecteur", in Oeuvres philosophiques, Ferdinand Alquié, ed., 3 vols. (Paris: Gallimard Frères, 1963) vol.2, 391. Referred to henceforth as OP.
of the *Cogito*.³ We can look at Modernity as both a prolongation of the Philosophy of Antiquity insofar as the transcendental realm of thought is preserved, and in rupture with Antiquity insofar as the subject is capable of intuiting itself the ideal forms. This concept of a subject capable of intuiting transcendental forms apart from the sentience of the world of things is consequently a dualist subject, severed from the totality of his very self. At the same time, this is a subject which can know very little: "Je suis une chose qui pense, [...] qui connaît peu de choses".⁴ In the trajectory from Philosophical Antiquity to Cartesianism a distanciated subject-object relation remains, in accord with a dualist, severed subject and a particular kind of consciousness.⁵

Both Thomist thought, prior to Descartes, and Libertine thought and Philosophers such as Pierre Gassendi (+1592,-1655) contemporary to Descartes, clung to the idea of a union between the body and the soul and of a "thinking matter" as the modes for knowledge, perception, and representation. Pierre Gassendi's empirical Philosophy and atomistic science which reaches back to Epicurus gave a material dimension to knowledge and a corporal presence to its objects of inquiry, ...

³ See the association between Rationalism and artistic perspective's unique point of view, and this perspectival site as a place offered to all, in Jean-Joseph Goux, "Descartes et la perspective", *L'Esprit Créateur* (Spring 1985): 10-20. This astute analysis facilitates making a bridge between Philosophical Modernity and Renaissance/Classical Aesthetic, and offers a general method for establishing homologies between Philosophy and Representation. In hand with the universalized, perspectival point of view, Descartes offers his method to others — his serious readers — as a meditative practice that can be undertaken. See herein our analysis of Descartes' method as meditative form, particularly in light of the Ignatian tradition.


⁵ Our generalizations about Descartes' legacy in Cartesianism as it has crystallized about the *Cogito* shall find more subtle shadings in our following study of his work.
thus revolutionizing the foundation to knowledge. This Gassendist Philosophy of "thinking matter" -- in fact an Empiricism and a Sensualism -- refused the sovereignty of a logic of innate ideas severed from experience and world, and elaborated its own materialist perspective on logic.

Edmund Husserl's (+1859,-1938) work returns to reexamine the subject's transcendental consciousness in Philosophical Modernity. On the one hand, the details of his examinations always seem to conclude within the transcendental philosophical tradition from Antiquity to Cartesianism. On the other hand, the meticulousness of his reexamination of this terrain leads him to qualify the intuiting subject as an intentional consciousness, embedded in a "Lifeworld" as he calls it, a corporeality, a time and a history, and likewise finding the objects of his consciousness with him, in his very world as horizon. In Husserl's considerations, surprisingly not unlike Gassendi's "thinking matter", the reduced Cartesian subject has been reamplified, his dual nature unified. With Husserl, the transcendental has truly come down to earth.

We can see how this leads to Martin Heidegger's (+1889,-1976) subsequent considerations of embedded being or Dasein, within the realms of time and world, attached to the excess of the presence of an existing perceiving subject. This Philosophy has cast aside the forms or essences of the transcendental realm, and detached them from subjectivity. On the one hand, the work of the French Philosopher Jacques Derrida has seized upon these left-overs, symbolizing them under the term of "Écriture" and other analogous appellations (such as "Arché", trace,
"différence", errancy, and so on), thereby prolonging Modernity's concerns into a kind of "Ultramodernity" which, at this turn in the History of Philosophy, is devoid of the subject, to include the Cartesian subject and the Cogito's God, yet not of this subject's objective relations and perceptive results. On the other hand, a subject-down-to-earth shall be taken up by the Heideggerian terrain and be privileged in the individualist Existential and Phenomenological thought of such as Jean-Paul Sartre (+1905,-1980), Gabriel Marcel and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (+1908,-1961).

In summary, from Edmund Husserl's thought forward we have retrieved both a unified mind/soul-and-body-subject combined with the object, and a dualistic subject severed and exiled to extinction away from the errant object and signs. It is the unified subject that shall interest us, particularly in the context of the Philosophy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty as it branches off from that of Husserl, is parallel to the thought of Pierre Gassendi of the 17th century and, in our opinion, reaches back to give a certain achievement to this thought and to open a NeoBaroque space within its own, contemporary to that of Existentialism from Heidegger to Sartre. In Merleau-Ponty's Philosophy, the constituting subject is not only in the Lifeworld, but in a fleshly exchange with the objects of its perception, constituting them by the very means and presence of its own corporeality -- an excessive, inefficient relation which Merleau-Ponty terms the chiasm, and which recalls the religious concept of "Inhabitation". The subject-object relation has here reached its completion, and what was the perspectival distance between them of Modernity is here not merely a materialist proximity, but the actual transpectival eclipse of distance and exchange in
a relation of Inhabitation of a particular kind of Postmodernity. What was the
timeless superiority of a transcendental realm reached only through a body-severed
mind is here the daily living and simultaneity of a fleshly world which is also the
world of transcendental wonder, attained through the mind in hand with the body.
The concept of God in this context would be of both a real and an ideal God, a fully
existing God. The movement in the evolution of Western Philosophical thought of the
subject towards the object, along with the qualification of this subject as non-dualist,
as incarnate, as one of mind, soul and body altogether, and one with the objects of its
perception, is a manner of leaving the Ontological project of pure essences to state the
Phenomenological project in Philosophy of existence with essence, already at seed in
the work of Epicurus, and necessarily begun anew in our century with the work of
Edmund Husserl and at its lyrical achievement in the vision and formulations of
Maurice Merleau-Ponty. As Trần Đức Thao has summarized it, "The merit of
Phenomenology was to have subjected it [lived experience and, we add, the subject] to a methodological description of a rare precision, and its conclusion that the sensible
is the foundation of all truth." ⁶

We can also look at the subject-object relation in terms homological with those
of affectivity. As the subject and object become more and more proximate, and the
corporal involvement of the subject with it, so does the subject’s affectivity become
engaged in the object of its perception and knowledge, to the point where we may
qualify the object as an object of wonder, of desire or repugnance, of love or hate,

⁶ Phenomenology and Dialectical Materialism, trans. Daniel J. Herman & Donald V. Morano
and so on. Affectivity is of no consideration in the Cartesian *Cogito ergo sum*, however its consideration completes the subject-object trajectory as Baroque, as the desiring subject becomes present to and engaged with the object, with corporal, affective signs,\(^7\) and allows the possibility of qualifying certain aspects of Phenomenology as Baroque.

The subject-object relation can also be seen in the linguistic terms of the relationship between the signified and the real and the establishment of meaning. In the Cartesian system where the equivalent to thought: on language can be found in Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole's *La Logique de Port Royal* (1662), meaning is arbitrarily established, exists in a realm of ideas and is separated from any subjectival or real investment. In the Phenomenological view of language, on the other hand, meaning is a progressive sedimentation of (subjectival) presences, of cognitive impressions and of corporal and affective investments, which include the individual subject's usage, contextualization and relativization of language.\(^8\) Here, language's and the signifier's grammatical closure are opened up to the multi-faceted treasure of the dialectical signified-real relationship, and *a priori*, universal meaning is subordinated to the practice and experience of lived language.\(^9\)

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\(^7\) As we saw with St. Ignatius, *tears* were the affective sign of subjectival being with, in both the senses of Immensity and Inhabitaton, the object of desire and love, that is, the Christ.

\(^8\) Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "Sur la phénoménologie du langage", *Éloge de la philosophie* (Paris: Gallimard, 1953, 1960) 94-100. This pragmatic view of language does not necessarily reject the arbitrary quality of the sign.

\(^9\) On an epistemological level, this recalls the Gassendist view of knowledge as made up of individual, repeated perceptions, experiences and sensations, among many possible perceptions, which collect themselves as cognitive impressions (*prolepsis* or pattern recognition) to lead to individual perceptions of meaning and judgments.
The subject-object relation is also a model or metaphor which facilitates analysis in terms of reception theory -- for example, the relation between the spectator/beholder and representation in the area of the plastic arts, the relation between the spectator and actor in the area of the performing arts, the relation between the word and thing or between the signifier and referent in the area of Language and Literature, between the self and other in the area of Ethics, and the relation between man and God in the areas of Religion and Spirituality. Thus we can find homologies between the evolution of the subject-object relation in Philosophy and these other disciplines in terms of how the object is not only perceived and represented by the subject, but also how it is received.

The subject-object relation has not so much evolved more and more towards a proximity as it has oscillated throughout the history of Western Ideas. This shall become more evident when we compare a Philosophical overview with moments in Spirituality and Aesthetics. In summary, the subject-object relation as a Baroque Philosophical achievement where subject and object are one, is exactly a Phenomenological inachievement and goal, based on the living subject involved in the perpetual beginnings of sensing and sense-making in the perception and knowledge of objects, self and others. This subject is one of Presence and Being, of consciousness with body and heart, a fully-participating spectator, who has moved from a perspectival position to a truly transpectival one.

What we have left out in this historic gloss over Western Philosophy is the Ignatian, Baroque vision or stance, as one not only Spiritual and Aesthetic, but
Philosophical as well. The subject of such a vision, like Merleau-Ponty's *chiasmic* subject, maintains and uses its corporal existence and affectivity in its perception, intuition and knowledge of the object, to the point of becoming -- with the entirety of its being and not with mind alone -- a scene, backdrop or fleshly horizon to objectival and otherly existence, as in the religious concept of "Inhabitation", for which the model is service to others by maintaining the presence of the life of the Incarnate Christ in the living-out of the self. Thus we can see here the conflicts between Classical, Cartesian Modernity, and Baroque vision seen with Merleau-pontian, Phenomenological Philosophy, in the measure of corporal involvement -- *from distanciation to proximity to a "being-within" to an "Inhabitation" by --* in the subject-object relation, in perception and in knowledge.\(^\text{10}\) Also, by examining the Classical/Baroque tension in a Philosophical light, the Modernity/Postmodernity problematic takes on a different configuration: we can say that the Postmodern, insofar as we may define it as a revalorisation of the real, of corporality, of affectivity, of materialism, of sensualism, of existence, of transition, of change and of presence in the relation to the conceptual and the forms, found a first elaboration in the Baroque, and that in the 20th century this particular Postmodernity is a resurgence and continuation of this Baroque.

\(^{10}\) In all of these cases, we can also think of the position of the subject as an *anthropomorphism*, or degree of projection of the self upon the other or, inversely, of the other upon the self, which we could call a *morphoanthropism*. One projectional direction would result in the subject and transcendental forms, the other, in a self embedded in and ultimately fashioned by the object and others.
By thereby examining perception, knowledge and the body together since the Rennaissance and Classical periods, we are looking not so much at how the body has been an object of knowledge, but to what extent and how the body, sensation and affectivity are partners and subjects engaged in perception and in the constitution of knowledge in the physical, conceptual and metaphysical realms, as well as in the spiritual, ethical, aesthetic and literary realms, and likewise how a particular establishment or corpus of knowledge can seduce and engage the presence, participation and emulation of the recipient subject.
IV. RENÉ DESCARTES’ (+1596,-1650) PERSPECTIVE ON KNOWLEDGE, THE BODY & AFFECTIVITY: DISTANCE PHILOSOPHIZING WITH THE BAROQUE

[...] personne n’ayant encore pu comprendre votre raisonnement, par lequel vous prétendez avoir démontré qu’il n’y a point de mouvement corporel qui puisse légitimement être appelé du nom de pensée. Car pensez-vous avoir tellement coupé et divisé, par le moyen de votre analyse, tous les mouvements de votre matière subtile, que vous soyez assuré, et que vous nous puissiez persuader, à nous qui sommes très attentifs et assez clairvoyants, qu’il y a de la répugnance que nos pensées soient répandues dans ces mouvements corporels?
Sixième objection aux Méditations métaphysiques,
par divers théologiens et philosophes¹¹

Descartes’ thought is basically taught in the terms of his method towards the
Cogito — a subject of pure spirit where mind and soul are reduced to one and the same, and the body is left behind. From the starting point of this Cogito Descartes goes on to find God. The Cartesian philosophical method thus leaves behind existence and time, along with the body and its affectivity.

The body, as in the presence of a body-subject to the sensible world, and its affectivity become moot points in light of Descartes’ method. That is, Classicism poses a body problem. Why then should we bother to even examine Descartes in light of a Baroque vision? We could simply shelve his thought away in the

NeoPlatonic, Augustinian tradition it has inherited, and be done with it.\textsuperscript{12} Yet this would deprive us of the leisure of outlining well the Baroque problematic, and Descartes' own problems from having lived from within it. And it would deprive us of knowing the Baroque in all its historical tensions.

What we shall then attempt to do is look at the totality of Descartes' work, its evolution, its reception, and his correspondence, in an historical context. For Descartes did live during the period of Baroque culture in France.\textsuperscript{13} To what extent did he remove himself from this culture? On what points could he not? These are questions to be asked. We shall examine as well the objections to his thought, both in formal responses to the \textit{Méditations métaphysiques} and in correspondence, and the controversies and polemics he was drawn into. For it is particularly in the reception and criticism of Descartes' work that the neglected points of corporality and affectivity, and subsequently of the present body-subject and the sensible world, and the rejection of Aristotelian and Thomist beliefs -- points and beliefs important to a Baroque vision -- become thorny issues. An examination of these very tensions puts both Classicism and the Baroque into better relief.\textsuperscript{14} Also, exactly how Descartes and


\textsuperscript{13} Ettore Lojacono, "Descartes e le culture barroche: Appunti su alcune recenti interpretazioni", \textit{Giornale critica della filosofia italiana} XI (1991): 1-14, particularly 7. This article particularly addresses Descartes' relation to the Baroque motifs of incertitude, wakefulness vs. the dream-state, and theater, motifs which the author points out Descartes often calls up in order to refute their Baroque status. We shall see this in our analysis with Descartes' use of the metaphor of theater in order to explore mastery over the passions. Germain Bazin presents details of Descartes' biography as the very image of the \textit{Homo Baroccus! The Baroque, Principles, Styles, Modes, Themes} (NY: Thames & Hudson, 1968) 51.

\textsuperscript{14} As we find is the general case for examining the Baroque in the context of French thought, culture and letters.
the Cartesian legacy throughout the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries stamped out the
Baroque in France helps us to better outline the Baroque and the areas of its return.
And finally, it is in several important moments of Descartes’ responses to his
correspondents that another rather non-Cartesian Descartes is revealed -- a Descartes
who for a moment thinks with the body, a Descartes who is Baroque!
The questions which shall guide our examination are: How does Descartes
both use and refute his Jesuit education and Scholasticism? In what concepts of man
and God does this result? How does he learn from and use in his own way a
meditative method which, based upon a belief in Incarnation, makes use of a present
body-subject, imagination and affectivity? Does he, wittingly or unwittingly, travesty
the Ignatian meditation he learned and practiced at the College de La Flèche? How
can the Eucharist and Incarnation be understood in light of Descartes’ Metaphysical
thought as it challenges corporal presence? How are the areas of the passions and
morality to be considered when the body is rejected? Must the body be reconsidered
in these areas, and knowledge as well? What aesthetic stances are engaged by these
considerations?
All of these questions bring to light how Descartes’ work and thought lived
and breathed in its time, how it engaged issues across the lines of a Baroque/Classical
dichotomy, and the importance of these issues beyond an evaluation of Descartes’
own work for a study of the epistemological dimension of the historical Baroque in
France. And finally, how perhaps Descartes’ thought in this context is not quite so
simplistic and pure of spirit as he wished it to be.
A. Reading Descartes in Reaction to his Jesuit Education: How Descartes reaches the concept of God

1. Descartes' Early Work: From Mechanist Man to Dualist Man

Descartes addresses the topics of perception and knowledge in all three realms of Physics, Metaphysics and Ethics throughout his work. His early, physicalistic work on man, in L'Homme (1633)\textsuperscript{15} presents the human body as a machine, created by God, prepared to receive the soul,\textsuperscript{16} and thereby a site for the understanding. The concept of the "pineal gland", which Descartes introduces in L'Homme, is that of a central receiving site for all sensible perceptions, which leave their trace there.\textsuperscript{17} This concept is modelled after the sense of vision -- this most noble of the senses as Descartes considers it, and symbol of the intellect -- which has replicated upon it as if on an inner screen or mirror the impressions received by the optical organ or by the

\textsuperscript{15} An extension of Le Monde, ou le Traité de la Lumière, in OP, vol.1, 305-480. This project and its publication were abandoned, because of the possibilities of dangerous reception in the light of the recent condemnation of Galileo.

\textsuperscript{16} Descartes shall later argue, subsequent to the Méditations métaphysiques, that he does not mean to present an angelic concept of man -- which would be the inhabitation of the body by a distanciated spirit -- and that the soul is indeed one with the body. This shall be hard to accept in hand with his dualistic vision of man.

\textsuperscript{17} "GLANDE, ou Glandule. subst. fem. Terme de Medecine. C'est une chair molle, spongieuse et grasse, qui sert à conserver et à affermir la séparation des vaisseaux, à boire les humeurs superflues, et à en humecter d'autres. [...] La glande pineale où M. Descartes met le principal siege de l'ame, est une glande qui est dans le cerveau, faite en forme de pomme de pin". Antoine Furetière, Dictionnaire universel, Tome 2 (Genève: Slatkine Reprints, 1970).
other senses, as he explains in *La Dioptrique* (1637). These mimetic impressions are based upon the orientation of the body and its nervous system toward the object, which object in reciprocation further orients the body. Here the body approximates an insertion into the object of its perception, similar to that which takes place in Merleau-Ponty’s *chiasm*:

«Notre connaissance de la situation de l’objet ne dépend pas seulement de la direction du rayon lumineux qu’il envoie vers l’œil, mais de la prise de conscience de l’attitude de nos membres» et de la façon dont «le corps s’insère dans le monde qui l’entoure».

One would think that with this presentation of a sensitive pineal gland Descartes, in contradiction with the later development of his thought which reduces by doubt the role of the body in perception and knowledge, is presenting a body which thinks, or at least which voluntarily participates through sensation in the thinking process. However, this inclination of the corporal organ in the process of perception and thought is for Descartes also a source of the imaginary and of dreams which repeat and distort the day’s perceptions and thought. Furthermore, too many simultaneous

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18 *La Dioptrique* (1637), in *OP*, vol.1, 651. This mechanical reception does not address the question of consciousness or the *Cogito*. We can imagine the pineal gland as a kind of stage setting for a "theater of the real". The themes of spectrality, theatricality, mimesis and acting out, so important to the Baroque, to Ignatian Spirituality, and to Merleau-Pontian carnality, are equally important in Descartes’ thinking. It is in the measure of corporal investment in these areas that we can make distinctions.

19 *La Dioptrique*, in *OP*, vol.1, 704. This recalls contemporary theories of a "feedback system" in memory and sense perception. See Silvan Tomkins, *Affect, Imagery, Consciousness* (NY: Springer Pub.Co., 1962), particularly the chapter "Consciousness and Affect in Behaviorism and Psychology", 3, 27. Whereas affect and memory have become a consideration in the study of perception today, these were of little or no concern to Descartes in his idealistic descriptions of perception.

20 Editor’s note, quoting an M. Simon, *La Dioptrique*, in *OP*, vol.1, 704. Emphasis is our own.
sensations exceed the pineal gland’s capacity to register them and disturb voluntary action that could result from perception. In summary, at this point this gland is nothing more than a mechanism for Descartes, and is not really a part of any corporal or affective engagement in knowledge. Along with reduction by doubt in the later work of the Discours de la méthode (1637) and the Méditations métaphysiques (1641), this shall contribute to discount corporal and affective engagement in perception,21 which shall not be recuperated until the later work of Les Passions de l’âme (1649), and with conditions upon it which we shall later discuss. Quite unlike the transpectival involvement and exchange of the body in the process of Baroque perception and spirituality and, we shall see, in Merleau-Ponty’s vision of perception, for Descartes the body does not become involved in the mimetic process nor in things perceived as it is simply a registering mechanism at a perspectival distance from them.

Descartes dual, severed vision of man is evident, from his physicalistic work and mechanist view of man, to the method aimed at circumscribing thinking man, which we shall further elaborate upon, from the Règles pour la direction de l’esprit (1628), to the fable of the Discours de la Méthode, and throughout his metaphysical work in the Méditations Métaphysiques. In the Règles pour la direction de l’esprit, an early work generally dated around 1629, Descartes traces more carefully and methodically what he sees as the traditional hierarchical process of intellection, from sense perception to deduced truths, attained by the mathesizing abstraction away from

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and dismissal of all superfluous representation. The truths thus obtained are then to
be used like the axioms of a geometry to move into theorems, and so on, and finally
to return to the world of things which are available for a universalizing mæthesis.\textsuperscript{22} In
general, Descartes presents a back and forth movement of the intellecting subject
between things and truths which, although privileging abstraction, does not neglect
the material world nor the use of the imagination and the figural to facilitate it. Here
Descartes is not quite so severely dualistic as he shall be in the Discours de la
métode and the Méditations métaphysiques, where the sensible realm and the body-
subject are outright neglected and eclipsed by his amplification of the moment of
abstraction. We can then look to the Règles for a certain early appreciation by
Descartes of sensible perception that shall soon exit his work.

As a whole, understanding and knowledge, though lodged in the body, are not
attained by means of, nor in a form of carnal exchange with the body in Descartes'
work. In the Discours de la méthode, this very body shall be left behind in the
rejection of his education and of Scholasticism, and in the reduction by doubt towards
sole certitude in the search for a true foundation to knowledge. Even the work of
abstraction from the sensible realm presented by the Règles shall be camouflaged out
of the process of knowledge. Furthermore, this doubt which eliminates the role of
the body can by the same extreme turn eliminate the God of perpetual creation and
faith in Him,\textsuperscript{23} when Descartes places God’s existence on a parallel with the certitude

\textsuperscript{22} Règles pour la direction de l’esprit, trad. J. Brunschwig, OP, vol.1, Règle XII, 134-158.

\textsuperscript{23} Méditations métaphysiques, OP, vol.2, 389, 868.
of the *Cogito* and of mind-soul/body dualism which results from it. We can look at this as a direct reaction against the importance of corporality in Jesuit education and education towards faith and service.

Likewise, Descartes' conceives of the sign as arbitrary, and of perceptions, in homology with the sign, as potentially arbitrary indications of the objects perceived -- that is, he sees a possible distanciation and distortion between perception, mental image and the real.  

This arbitrary relation shall permit him to dismiss Scholasticism's recourse to Aristotelian "substantial forms" or what Descartes shall term "attributes", as the anchor for knowledge, which shall become a thorny issue in the polemic on the Eucharist. Furthermore, he also sees affections or passions as structured by experience, habit and even arbitrary association with objects or situations.  

*Me proposant de traiter ici de la lumière, la première chose dont je veux vous avertir est qu'il peut y avoir de la différence entre le sentiment que nous en avons. C'est-à-dire l'idée qui s'en forme en notre imagination par l'entremise de nos yeux, et ce qui est dans les objets qui produit en nous ce sentiment, c'est-à-dire ce qui est dans la flamme ou dans le Soleil, qui s'appelle du nom de Lumière. Car encore que chacun se persuade communément que les idées que nous avons en notre pensée sont entièrement semblables aux objets dont elles procèdent, je ne vois point toutefois de raison qui nous assure que cela soit; mais je remarque, au contraire, plusieurs expériences qui nous en doivent faire douter.

*Vous savez bien que les paroles, n'ayant aucune ressemblance avec les choses qu'elles signifient, ne laissent pas de nous les faire concevoir, et souvent même sans que nous prenions garde au son des mots, ni à leurs syllabes; en sorte qu'il peut arriver qu'après avoir ouï un discours, dont nous aurons fort bien compris le sens, nous ne pourrons pas dire en quelle langue il aura été prononcé. Or, si des mots, qui ne signifient rien que par l'institution des hommes, suffisent pour nous faire concevoir des choses avec lesquelles ils n'ont aucune ressemblance, pourquoi la Nature ne pourra-t-elle pas aussi avoir établi certain signe, qui nous fasse avoir le sentiment de la lumière, bien que ce signe n'ait rien en soi qui soit semblable à ce sentiment?* Le Monde, ou le Traité de la lumière, in OP, vol.1, 315-316. Emphasis is our own.


themselves. This separation and arbitrary association confirm Cartesian dualism as a precursor to Derridean errancy and différence, wherefrom proceed analyses of a "Cartesian code" such as those of Jean-Luc Marion. That is, for Descartes passions are structured like a language and can be just as easily manipulated. On the one hand this is a subtle critique of the Ignatian Spiritual Exercises, inasmuch as they manage, reroute and direct perception and affectivity in line with Catholic faith. On the other hand, Descartes' stance comes through an understanding limited to arbitrary, structural or geometrical associations and the habit of social institution. All of this confirms his radical sevrage of meaning, mind and soul from the existing body and from affectivity.

To extend this thought to the theological realm, a Philosophy such as that of Descartes which reduces and eliminates the role of the corporal in knowledge fragments the unity of the Trinity (in homology with the fragmented sign and arbitrary passion), and renders Incarnation problematic -- what today we can interpret as a "deconstruction" of the triadic unity of the Symbolic, the Ideal/Imaginary and the Real. This is the very Incarnation which is essential to

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27 See Jean-Luc Marion's semiotic presentation of Cartesian perspectival perception, both linguistic and visual, as a disfiguration and dissemblance, in "L'établissement du code: la perception comme (dé-)figuration", Sur la théologie blanche de Descartes (Paris: PUF, 1991) 231-263.

28 "[...] qui dirait que le Fils et que le Saint-Esprit sont essentiellement distingués du Père ou qu'ils peuvent être séparés de lui? De même on ne vous concédera jamais que la pensée, ou plutôt que l'esprit humain, soit réellement distingué du corps, quoi que vous conceviez clairement l'un sans l'autre [...]" Sixième Objections aux Méditations métaphysiques par divers théologiens, OP, vol.2, 857. Emphasis is our own. Later in Descartes' life, Princess Elisabeth shall ask the same kinds of questions as those of Arnauld, Gassendi and other theologians who reacted to the Méditations métaphysiques, about the difficulty of understanding mind-soul/body dualism. Descartes shall respond to her with much greater generosity. See the assessment "The Substantial Union & Princess Elizabeth" in Vance G. Morgan, Foundations of Cartesian Ethics (NJ: Humanities Press, 1994) 75-81.
Roman Catholic faith particularly in the context of the Counter-Reformation, to Baroque spirituality and its aesthetic stance, to Jesuit pedagogy, to Materialist and Libertine Philosophy and to the *chiasm* of Merleau-Ponty’s Philosophy in which we see a Baroque return. Descartes elaborates such triadic fragmentation despite his religious beliefs! The consequences of Descartes’ thought shall place him under extreme scrutiny in this period of Western religious dissent. What are the implications of Descartes’ thought not only for the role of the body in knowledge, but for the context of the Christian faith in which he lives as well?

2. The *Discours de la méthode* (1637) and the *Méditations métaphysiques* (1641): Pulling the Subject out of Doubt, and God out of the Subject

Car je vous prie, jusqu’où pensez-vous que fût allée votre connaissance si, du moment que vous avez été infus dans le corps, vous fussiez toujours resté les yeux fermés, les oreilles bouchées, et sans l’usage d’aucun autre sens extérieure, en sorte que vous n’eussiez du tout rien connu de cette universalité des choses et de tout ce qui est hors de vous, et qu’ainsi vous eussiez passé toute votre vie méditant seulement en vous-même, et passant et repassant chez vous vos propres pensées? Dites-nous, je vous prie, mais dites-nous de bonne foi, et nous faites une description de l’idée que vous pensez que vous auriez eu de Dieu et de vous même.

Cinquièmes objections de Gassendi aux *Méditations métaphysiques*

It is the transition from the First to the Second of the *Méditations métaphysiques*, from doubting things, which as we shall further elaborate can be seen

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29 Descartes, *OP*, vol.2, 750.
as an important strategic factor in Descartes' rejection of his Jesuit education,\textsuperscript{30} to the
certainty of the human spirit, that demonstrates the dualist vision of man as a direct
result of the Cartesian search for certainty, and the fear of confusion, the obscure,
change and time, through the negative method of reduction by doubt of the sensate
and imaginary realms of self, others and world.\textsuperscript{31} This dualism is elaborated again in
the Sixth Meditation, with the additional emphasis upon the personal body of the
cogitating subject:

Et quoique peut-être (ou plutôt certainement, comme je le dirai tantôt) j’aie un
corps auquel je suis très étroitement conjoint; néanmoins, parce que d’un côté
j’ai une claire et distincte idée de moi-même, en tant que je suis seulement une
chose qui pense et non étendue, et que d’un autre j’ai une idée distincte du
corps, en tant qu’il est seulement une chose étendue et qui ne pense point, il
est certain que ce moi, c’est-à-dire mon âme, par laquelle je suis ce que je
suis, est entièrement et véritablement distincte de mon corps, et qu’elle peut
être ou exister sans lui.\textsuperscript{32}

\textsuperscript{30} See the openings to both the Discours de la méthode and the Méditations métaphysiques,
and the critique of dialectical argumentation towards "truth" in the Règles pour la direction de l’esprit,
as well as in the dialogue La Recherche de la vérité par la lumière naturelle (1641?/1647?), where the
rejection of Scholasticism reaches an almost farcical level. Scholasticism, as based upon Aristotelian
Thomism, privileged a realist Philosophy, mind-soul/body unity, and sensible engagement in the
process of intellection. Jesuit pedagogy and the Counter-Reformation shall align itself with Thomism.
Its implications for scientific method and for knowing God shall be followed by both Materialists and
Libertine Philosophers alike, but shall be rejected by Descartes. The Jesuits as Thomists and
Aristotelians, shall in fact prefer Libertine thought to that of Descartes! Descartes on the one hand
thereby aligns himself by his science and method with Lutheran rejection of the theologisers of
Aristotle.

\textsuperscript{31} According to Thomist teaching, human knowledge has corporeal realities as its privileged
object. Knowledge of God or Spiritual entities can only be obtained by a negative method, and
Descartes' doubt performs just that.

\textsuperscript{32} Méditations métaphysiques, 6è, OP, vol.2, 488. Some have read this sixth meditation as a
moment where Descartes resolves a dualism only temporarily established. We do not see how such a
conclusion is possible, except that Descartes' work was read in light of a Scholastic mentality, and
Descartes had written with such readers in mind by, for example, speaking of ideas in the Scholastic
terms of being and existence to preserve the Thomist accent upon the resurrection of the body as a
metaphysical imperative, and bringing in the term res cogitans in place of Thomas' anima while
otherwise maintaining Scholastic language. See E. Gilson, Études sur le rôle de la pensée médiévale
dans la formation du système cartésien, 214; H. Gouhier, La Pensée métaphysique de Descartes (Paris:
This same reduction by doubt is what reduces the subject himself to a mere thinking being, preserving Descartes from a complete scepticism, and in the Third Meditation Descartes shall situate the idea of a superior, perfect God from the point of view of this *Ego Cogito* as the idea which remains after his mental house has been swept out by doubt. This perfect God is at once immutable, indivisible and simple, a God outside of time, change and sensation, a truth not dependent upon existence and a God not incarnate. And likewise, Descartes' Metaphysics shall forcibly be severed from his Physics, as his God is from earth and his thinking man is from his own body, and this shall color his Physics in a particular kind of way. Despite the reduced subject as a necessary priority to deducing and perceiving such a God, the subject remains at a distance from Him. Any kind of Cartesian unity with such a God — and this unity would be questionable — is of a contemplative state only. A real and sacramental mystical union escapes Descartes, who leaves such a vision to the order of faith. Also, knowledge of this distant, disincarnate God becomes a base to perception in general and to the method of scientific knowledge, wherefrom the attempt to return to things. Yet this knowledge and this return to things shall continue to spring from a reduced spirit of severed, geometrical vision which mathesizes the world and distantiates itself from corporal existence, to the point of its total neglect:


33 *Méditations métaphysiques, 3e, OP*, vol.2, 452, and entire meditation.
Et ainsi je reconnais très clairement que la certitude et la vérité de toute science dépend de la seule connaissance du vrai Dieu: en sorte qu'avant que je le connusse, je ne pouvais savoir parfaitement aucune autre chose. Et à présent que je le connais, j'ai le moyen d'acquérir une science parfaite touchant une infinité de choses, non seulement de celles qui sont en lui, mais aussi de celles qui appartiennent à la nature corporelle, en tant qu'elle peut servir d'objet aux démonstrations des géomètres, lesquels n'ont point d'égard à son existence.34

By extension backwards and by analogy, we can see that the fundamental knowledge of God taken out of the Ego Cogito to be of a God of a geometrical order -- quite a self-vindicating discovery! In a letter to Colvius dated November 14, 1640, Descartes addresses a comparison between Augustinian Ontology and his own Cogito, to blatantly state that where for Augustine Ontology leads to a scientific understanding of the Trinity, for Descartes himself, that is, for his soul ("moi" or Cogito, for the mind is the soul for Descartes) Ontology leads to the certitude of a disincarnate, dualist subject, without any understanding of the mystery of the Trinity.35 Descartes considers the understanding of the Trinity to be in the realm of grace (and dogma, dare he say it) rather than that of reason. Yet for Descartes, grace and faith probably do not involve the senses which Descartes sees as an obstacle to knowledge.36 This reasoning towards the self and rejection of the Trinity further implies a rejection of the humanity of Christ, of Incarnation and of Transubstantiation. Thereby the source of the Cartesian polemic concerning the Eucharist is not merely based on the

34 Méditations Métaphysiques, 5e, OP, vol.2, 479. Emphasis is our own.
definition of substance, but is to be found in the very fabric of Cartesian thought based in the Cogito itself.

In the fifth objection to the Méditations métaphysiques, the materialist Philosopher Pierre Gassendi shall qualify the Cartesian version of the human spirit as one weak and limited, by playing with Descartes' notion of the disincarnate soul as a kind of measuring point which has no parts, which lacks extension, or attributes. Gassendi draws out the scandalousness of Descartes’ thought not only for the Materialist point of view and for the scientific knowledge of corporal things, but also for belief in an Incarnate Divinity. For the Materialist scientific mind, there is no hierarchy of being in the gradation from spirit to matter; for Thomas Aquinas himself the properties of matter are found in the soul;37 and for Aristotle certainty of mind is based upon certainty of the senses. Such a hierarchy would break any possibility of the communication of knowledge:

Mais, pour dire en un mot, cette générale difficulté demeure toujours, qui est de savoir comment ce qui est corporel se peut faire sentir et avoir communication avec ce qui n’est pas corporel et quelle proportion on peut établir entre l’un et l’autre.38

Obviously, Descartes' rejection of the corporal breaks down communication and knowledge with it, which Gassendi's Materialism wishes to see preserved. Descartes' retort to Gassendi's difficulty with the Cartesian spirit is to treat, incorrectly so, his emphasis upon the body as the other side of dualism: "Ô chair avez-vous si peu de

38 Méditations métaphysiques, 5e Objection, OP, vol.2, 706, 710, 778-9, 784.
commerce avec l'esprit?" He refuses to understand Gassendi's epistemological monism, and continues the dialogue on his own terms. Also, Descartes shall try to balance the fury his disincarnate soul has evoked with the surprising example of substance and attributes in unity.  

Despite the problems for Philosophy and Theology, geometrical, perspectival perception is of certitude and comfort to Descartes; it is perfect knowledge for him. Descartes cannot see God otherwise, or not until he finds the God of admiratio of Les Passions de l'âme. Descartes' logic and method presents a "cogitated" God limited by the cause of hyperbolic doubt as its efficient cause, whether he sees it or not, and the orthodox Thomist theologian Caterus points this out accordingly in the first objection to the Méditations métaphysiques. For a self-subsisting God is infinite and unlimited beyond the conception of man's ideas, and Caterus concludes must necessarily include real existence.

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40 Méditations métaphysiques, Rép. au 5è Objection, OP, vol.1, 801-802. Thus far we have seen how often the topic of substance and attributes becomes a symptomatic point where Descartes, quite unlike himself, revokes dualism. F. Alquié points out that Descartes continually contradicts himself on the topic of substance, and never quite clears up the confusion. Editor's note, 807.

41 "Car, je vous prie, quelle cause requiert une idée?" Caterus also quotes from Suarez: "Toute limitation vient d'une cause; car une chose est finie et limitée, ou parce que la cause ne lui a pu donner rien de plus grand ni de plus parfait, ou parce qu'elle ne l'a pas voulu; si donc quelque chose est par soi et non par une cause, il est vrai de dire qu'elle est infinie et non limitée." And further, "encore que l'on demeure d'accord que l'être souverainement parfait par son propre nom emporte l'existence, néanmoins il ne s'ensuit pas que cette même existence soit dans la nature actuellement quelque chose, mais seulement qu'avec le concept, ou la notion de l'être souverainement parfait, celui de l'existence est inséparablement conjoint. D'où vous ne pouvez pas inférer que l'existence de Dieu soit actuellement quelque chose, si vous ne supposez que cet être souverainement parfait existe actuellement; car pour lors il contiendra actuellement toutes les perfections, et celle aussi d'une existence réelle." Méditations métaphysiques, Premières objections, OP, vol.2, 508, 512, 517. Emphasis is our own.
Given the logical and simplistic enactment of Descartes’ Méditations, it is the manner in which Descartes further elaborates upon the concept of God, often in reaction to his critics, which seems to put wrinkles into his concept. For Descartes speaks of God in terms of an infinite, eternal, immutable, independent and all-knowing substance, in the Philosophical sense of that which is unchanging and self-subsisting.\footnote{Méditations métaphysiques, 3e, OP, vol.2, 445.} The qualification of God as substance is not surprising given the laborious effort of his method to sever himself from all which is sensible, material, corporal and imaginary. And yet a substance greater than his "substance pensante" must necessarily be more than "pensante". And so, in responding to the first objection to the Méditations métaphysiques, Descartes accordingly changes and amplifies the manner in which God is known, avowing that his method attains a limited, imperfect and distant knowledge. In this avowal, he includes a whole picture of man as not only thinking, but impassioned as well. The reference to St. Thomas Aquinas is telling about Descartes’ change of mind here:

De même j’avoue avec tous les théologiens, que Dieu ne peut être compris par l’esprit humain et même qu’il ne peut être distinctement connu par ceux qui tâchent de l’embrasser tout entier et tout à la fois par la pensée, et qui le regardent comme de loin: auquel sens Saint Thomas a dit, au lieu ci-devant cité, que la connaissance de Dieu est en nous sous une espèce de confusion seulement, et comme sous une image obscure; mais ceux qui considèrent attentivement chacune de ses perfections, et qui appliquent toutes les forces de leur esprit à les contempler, non point à dessein de les comprendre, mais plutôt de les admirer, et reconnaître combien elles sont au-delà de toute compréhension, ceux-là, dis-je, trouvent en eux incomparablement plus de choses qui peuvent être clairement et distinctement connus, et avec plus de facilité, qu’il ne s’en trouve en aucune des choses créées. […] Pour moi, toutes les fois que j’ai dit que Dieu pouvait être connu clairement et
distinctement, je n’ai jamais entendu parler que de cette connaissance finie, et accommodée à la petite capacité de nos esprits.  

Appropriately, Descartes reduces the hubris of his own cogitated perspective upon God to adjust it in terms of admiration. It is only in this light that Descartes can move away from a limited, disincarnate concept of God to admit a God of excess and, by extension, admit the limitations of the Cogito. His correspondent Marin Mersenne shall say the same in the Second Objection to the Méditations métaphysiques.

In the idea of God as a self-subsisting substance, Descartes finds his thought surpassed, and this topic shall come up again to haunt him in the Fourth Objection to the Méditations by the theologian Arnauld, to open a most delicate and dangerous polemic on the Eucharist. Furthermore, Descartes’ insistence upon the God of continuous creation as a perfect, immutable substance which continuously preserves a static creation is opposed to the later idea (of a Teilhard de Chardin, the controversial 20th-century Jesuit who lived from 1881 to 1955, for example) of a God of a creative evolution.  

The sense of a living, evolving God open to the peculiarities of individual lives is however already to be found in the Baroque insistence upon the living Christ, and in Ignatian Meditation as a preparation towards imitating this historical life in the evolved context of the present and through individual presence. We could look at this taking upon oneself of the life of Christ as a submission of self to an established mold for existence, or as a morphoanthroposism, or a trompe-l’œil

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44 Cf. editor’s note, OP, vol.2, 448.
reversal of perspectival projection. Descartes' vision of God, despite the excuse of an idea of something greater than himself lodged in his *Cogito*, is an *anthropomorphism*, or an egotistical projection of the limited capacities of the self upon the image of God. Here there is no program for life, except to maintain the static condition of one that is isolated and ego-centered (which the later biographical details of Descartes' life show, in his constant flight from others). The nuance between these two visions is to determine which is the seal, and which the wax, in the efforts to perceive and know God, and to live. The Cartesian God bent to the image of the *Cogito*, and the accompanying priority of a limited consideration of world and man, will be unacceptable to and unteachable for the Jesuits, and materialist Theologians.

3. The *Discours de la méthode* (1637) & the *Méitations métaphysiques* (1641), written and read with and against St. Ignatius' *Spiritual Exercises*

a. Review & Criticism of various comparisons between Descartes' and St. Ignatius' Methods

A consideration of Descartes' method as meditative is often overlooked in light of Philosophical and logical considerations. In the *Méitations métaphysiques* in particular, the call of his readers to meditation is clearly stated in the preface to the reader:
je ne conseillerai jamais à personne de le lire sinon à ceux qui voudront avec moi méditer sérieusement, et qui pourront détacher leur esprit du commerce des sens et le délivrer entièrement de toutes sortes de préjugés.45

The style of Descartes’ presentation and method in both the Discours de la méthode and the Méditations métaphysiques is a meditative one. And at once we must acknowledge that the meditative mode must be further nuanced according to the genre’s many factors and the degree to which they are present -- factors such as asceticism and detachment from the world, body-to-spirit hierarchisation and ascension, purgative and penitential, illuminative or unitive paths, discursivity, corporality and presence, and affectivity along such paths, and so on. In general, the varying factors of the meditative genre have the same aim -- a bringing-to-presence of the self and of God, and a unification of the two beings. And this self is at once both the author and the reader, for the meditative genre is above all concerned with its reception and practice by the reader, whom it seeks to change. It is in this light above all that we analyze the genre. It is how this is done, or the meditative mode, where important distinctions are to be made. Let us keep in mind along with Amélie Rorty, "A philosopher's choice among the varieties of meditation signals his conception of the nature of his philosophic enterprise."46

Insofar as meditative method is to be considered, we are reading particularly against the backdrop of the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius of Loyola. It is our contention that Descartes' meditative style, much like the superficial imitation by the

45 Descartes, OP, vol.2, 393.

Principes de philosophie (1644) of the format of scientific manuals used in Scholastic education, is in part an imitation of the Ignatian meditative mode, yet an imitation which masks a deep-down rejection of it and of its important aspects of working with corporality and affectivity. As such, the Méditations métaphysiques in particular are part of Descartes’ separation from Jesuit Spirituality and from Scholasticism, and could be seen as perhaps the most outrageous ploy by Descartes to combat these. For this reason, it is of interest to look at the proliferation of readings of Descartes’ style and method as meditative, and particularly at comparisons with Ignatian meditation.

Descartes’ style of meditation, particular method and presentation in the Discours de la méthode and the Méditations métaphysiques have been compared to that of St. Ignatius of Loyola in the Spiritual Exercises, most often to conclude that Descartes imitated Ignatian method and psychological strategy with similar goals in mind.47 The first basis for such a comparison is Descartes’ years of formative education at the prestigious Jesuit College de La Flèche, where he was most certainly exposed to and probably practiced St. Ignatius’ Spiritual Exercises, given in the reduced format compiled for students by François Véron in 1608 during one-week

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retreats, particularly at Holy Week. Furthermore, in "Le Libraire au lecteur" which precedes the *Méditations métaphysiques*, the reader is advised to take the author as a schoolboy. Descartes himself as we have begun by quoting him, intended that the *Méditations métaphysiques* be comparable to spiritual meditations, as an ascetic effort made to turn oneself away from the world and the distractions of the senses, with the objective of changing the life of the exercitant. He even hoped that his texts on method would be accepted for study in the Jesuit Colleges, particularly the *Principes de philosophie* which are written and presented in the Scholastic format.

48 A. Thomson, "Ignace de Loyola et Descartes", 62; and Vendler, "Descartes' Exercises", 194.

49 *OP*, vol.2, 397.


51 Marjorie Grene, *Descartes among the Scholastics* (Milwaukee: Marquette UP, 1991) 9. Any possible cynicism behind this hope is to be considered, for perhaps it was more of a machination than a pure desire. In Descartes' letter to Mersenne dated July 13, 1640, he foresaw the ensuing dispute with Jesuit thought and Scholasticism, and tried to head it off by arranging for theological approval elsewhere, namely from the Sorbonne theologians: "Je n'ai pas encore fait imprimer mes cinq ou six feuilles de métaphysique, quoi qu'elles soient prêtes il y a longtemps. Et ce qui m'en a empêché est que je ne désire point qu'elles tombent entre les mains des faux théologiens, ni dorénavant en celles des Jésuites (avec lesquels je prévoie que je vais entrer en guerre) que premièrement je les ai fait voir et approuver par divers Docteurs, et si je puis, par le Corps de la Sorbonne. [...] et je vous prierai d'en être le distributeur et protecteur, et de ne les mettre qu'entre les mains des théologiens que vous jugerez les plus capables, les moins préoccupés des erreurs de l'Ecole [...]" *OP*, vol.3, 252-3. And further, in a letter to same dated December 22, 1641, "Je m'étonne que les Révérend Pères de la Compagnie de Jésus aient pu se persuader que j'ai l'intention d'écrire contre eux [...] j'avoue qu'il s'y [Le Traité de philosophie] trouve bien des choses fort différentes de ce qu'on a coutume d'enseigner dans leurs colleges." Descartes, *Correspondence*, ed. Ch. Adam & G. Milhaud, vol.5 (Paris: F. Alcan, 1936) 89-94. Despite a wish on the one hand to gain Jesuit favor for his work, Descartes hoped on the other to combat Aristotelian Scholasticism through sly persuasion of his readers into a dualistic vision of man: "que ces six méditations contiennent tous les fondements de ma physique. Mais il ne faut pas dire, s'il vous plaît; car ceux qui favorisent Aristote feraient peut être plus de difficulté de les approuver, et j'espire que ceux qui les liront, s'accoutumeront insensiblement à mes principes, et en reconnaîtront la vérité avant que de s'apercevoir qu'ils détruisent ceux d'Aristote." Letter to Mersenne, February 18, 1641, *OP*, vol.2, 316-7. (Emphasis is our own.) By the summer of 1642,
One generalization we can make about Cartesian scholars who have drawn out such parallels, and which facilitates their drawing out, is the limited interpretation of meditation in general, and of Ignatian spirituality and mysticism in particular as exclusively ascetic and contemplative in its objectives, in the legacy of Christian Neoplatonism and to the neglect of Christianised Aristotelianism, and the emphasis upon corporal and affective existence. It is our contention that such a facilitating interpretation is both partial and faulty — a limited and dangerous reading of Ignatian Spirituality principally backward through the lense of Cartesianism, but also their reading as the legacy of Medieval and even Antiquity’s spiritual practices. And it masks the types of conclusions that should be made about Descartes’ borrowings from the method for Jesuit spiritual training. Ascetic elements of contemplation in solitude, of privations, of self-discipline and focus, and of indifference to worldly cares are an important and even essential part of the Spiritual Exercises, given the legacy of Medieval Spirituality. Likewise, the Scholasticism of the Renaissance inherited by the Jesuit colleges carried on in part to its students the transcendental mindset and objective, from Platonism to Stoicism to Augustinianism to the few Platonic elements to be found in Thomism, with the separation of mind and soul from the body, with a hierarchisation of the soul, with the belief in ideal forms, and the effort to place faith

Descartes shall be seen as an outright enemy of the Jesuits and Scholasticism.

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52 Ascetic in the primary Philosophical sense of mental focus and vigilance, and secondarily in the consequential sense of physical suspension or privation. W.J. Stohrer, in particular, insists upon Ignatian spirituality as ascetic. Gary Hatfield, however, appropriately interprets Descartes’ meditative form in the Augustinian tradition. "The Senses and the Fleshless Eye", in A.Rorty, ed., Essays on Descartes' Meditations, 45-79.
in accord with reason, and vice versa. According to Etienne Gilson, Descartes saw Calvinism as an inevitable outcome of Aquinas' thought, and in effect was unfavorable to overall Scholastic Theology with its Aristotelian heritage as defended by Ignatius in his "Rules for thinking with the Church". The NeoPlatonic influence upon the young Descartes, not to mention that upon some of his Jesuit instructors as well, probably colored and limited his own reception and extended use of the Spiritual Exercises. This would allow him to contest them, perhaps much unwittingly, particularly as we see it in the Méditations métaphysiques.

Ascetic elements are are not the only essential ones for the Ignatian Spiritual method. For example, Stohrer correctly cites the Spiritual Exercises' call to indifference to the world as a method "preparing and disposing the soul to free itself of inordinate attachments", in line with Cartesian separation from, or rather banishment of the world, others and its own senses and corporality. What Stohrer fails to pursue, however, is the neurotic aspect of Cartesian solitude, and that while for Descartes it is represented as a part of leading his readers towards a belief in

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54 See E.Gilson, René Descartes, Discours de la méthode, Texte et commentaire (Paris, 1947) 132-3. Of course we can seriously question the filiation Descartes sees from Thomism to Calvinism.

55 A.Thomson, "Ignace de Loyola et Descartes", 81-82.

56 For example, through the reading of Suarez. E.Gilson, Études sur le rôle de la pensée médiévale dans la formation du système cartésien, 32-33, 46.

57 W.J. Stohrer, "Descartes and Ignatius Loyola", 19.
dualism and isolating the mind, and is as such an objective in itself, for Ignatian Spirituality the freeing process it entails is a step towards the reattachment of will and affectivity to the Christ in preparation for engagement in the world and relations with others as a life choice to serve in Christ’s name and in His imitation.

The Spiritual Exercises’ manipulation of the corporal from sensation to affectivity to will does not refrain from resorting to illusion, and calls to imagination and sensation in the Ignatian Preludes, which could very well constitute the "malin génie" and "Dieu trompeur" Descartes so fears. And yet, by the same token, can we not see Descartes’ isolation of the intellect as an illusory technique? Given such technologies of illusion on both sides, Ignatius’ meditative project aims at a refinement of the senses, where Descartes' aims at snuffing them out. Ignatius’ spirit returns to flesh and world — a necessary step in Spirituality — where Descartes’ spirit does not, for his meditation stops at an ascensional point, and this is what he perceives as mediation’s objective.58 In Cartesian solitude, all imitation of received ideas, dogma, prejudice — and perhaps even Scripture and the Life of Christ are implicated here, and certainly any knowledge of the heart — is rejected as Descartes makes the effort to found and base all knowledge in a particular kind of self and, from this self, in God.

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The Ignatian subject is painfully taken from the world and conquered in a cathartic process, but only to be newly replaced in it. Ignatian Spirituality also uses corporal and sensual elements not only in its method but as part of the ultimate incarnate, living and active missionary relationship to God and others. Indeed, the Ignatian exercitant practices the heavy task of penitential abjection and death to self in exchange for the treasure of life with the O/other, in accord with the model of performance of and for the life of the O/other. This model emphasizes not the style of the Spiritual Exercises, as Descartes imitates it, but the acts of the exercitant, as the performance the Ignatian text calls forth. In the Cartesian system of meditation, however, all such intersubjectival relations and affectivity are totally repressed. The conquered Cartesian self is a world and a body buried.\footnote{An "unconscious" terrain for world and self is established here, that shall make its reappearance with the Freudian revolution, opening a space for a return of the Baroque. Wherefrom Jean-Joseph Goux’s analysis of Oedipus Rex in hand with Cartesian Philosophy.} What remains is an individual Cogito ergo sum, much in love with itself in this mode of existence, and unburdened of cares and calls to engagement with others. Caring is never an issue in the Cartesian vision, and only the life of the cogitating self matters. Where the Ignatian text is about the opening up the uncertain self, and eventually accommodating this self to others, to the truth it has found and in Colloquy with the Christ, the Cartesian text is about the closure of a radically reduced, certain self, eventually excluded from all harboring space, even that which is textual, left with only the abstraction of geometrical space to inhabit, and with only himself with which to
dialogue. Unlike the Ignatian subject, the Cartesian subject cannot speak, not with the Mother, not with her language, nor with the Christ. This self-absorbed, inactive quiet is what, above all, transgresses the objectives of the Spiritual Exercises.

Z. Vendler's comparison of Descartes Méditations métaphysiques with Ignatius' Spiritual Exercises is expertly done, particularly on the levels of outlining similar organization into days of meditations, separation from the world and its concerns, the self-activity of solitude, and so on. Vendler identifies these structural similarities with an ascetic objective and the denigration of the corporal, as he too has read Ignatius both backwards in the limited light of Descartes' transcendental and dualistic conceptions of knowledge and man, as well as in the legacy of previous spiritual practice. This Cartesian transcendental reading of the Spiritual Exercises carries through in slighting or dismissing interpretations of important moments in the Spiritual Exercises which involve corporality, sentience, affectivity and imagination, as we have outlined them.

Let us compare Vendler's reading of the Spiritual Exercises which lead to his interpretation of parallels in Descartes' work, with our own reading of the Exercises. Vendler emphasizes the strategies and organisation of the Exercises over their content and objectives, such as manipulative psychological devices, the aim to change the will, structural organisation of the meditations, voice and style, from which Descartes has learned and profited greatly. Although not inappropriate for a general reading of

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60 Let us mention here the first-person format of meditative writing. In Ignatian meditation it leads to dialogue (the Colloquies) where in Cartesian meditation it leads to monologue and quiet.

61 Z. Vendler, "Descartes' Exercises", 194.
meditation in Descartes, Vendler overemphasizes Stoicism, Asceticism, and references to mind-soul/body dualism in Ignatius’ text and directives, elements central to the meditative genre up until Ignatius’ contribution, but to the total neglect of the importance of subjectival corporality in the Ignatian spiritual relationship, and the physical discipline it engages not in order to repress the body but rather to train it into further world service.

Vendler takes such neglect further in Cartesian fashion to slight aesthetics, the role of the senses, and imagination as an essential part of being with the Christ, in his interpretation of Ignatius’ Second Prelude of imagination’s "Composition of Place" as a mere disciplinary trick to control imagination and fancy, when in fact these tactics, initially perspectival and geometrical in construction with respect to the scene of representation for presence, are essential to transgressive, transpectival passage to and eventual corporal "being-with" the Christ, at which point such imagination and sensing continues. He denigrates the "Application of the Senses" of Ignatius’ Third Prelude as a mere opportunity for rest from the "more demanding" ascetic mental exercises! Of course, such "mental" exercises are more demanding only by interpretation biased towards a dualistic and hierarchical view of man. In our interpretation it is this very sense-oriented moment of the Third Prelude and the following "Application of the Senses", which takes the entirety of the subjectival being of the exercitant and what he has prepared up to that moment into a corporal and affective mystical union with the Christ. It is perhaps the refusal of or blindness towards such a possible union which prejudices the analytical reading here.
In fact, all of the authors who have pursued Cartesian parallels to Ignatian *Spiritual Exercises* along with many readers of St. Ignatius fail to see the progression through the Three Preludes as one from an Asceticism to a Sensualism. This error in reading the Exercises can even be found outside of any comparison with Descartes -- a testimony to the tacit hold of Cartesianism, as the legacy of Platonism and Augustinism, over the Western mindset since the 17th century and of its repression of the Baroque! Where Ignatius first applies the senses to a meditation on Hell, Descartes imitates this with a piece of wax! And where Ignatius uses the senses as an important part of the means to spiritual union, Descartes mistrusts them. Of course, the Hell to be imagined is one of great chaos, commotion and movement, the sensations of which would be in flux, and this disturbance of the senses and mind is part of the very process of persuasion that Ignatius wishes to have take place. Descartes by his own personal nature could not withstand consideration of so much in flux. The very difficulty Descartes encounters with both the sensation and imagination of a piece of wax is its infinite mutability, and it is this mutability that he analyzes away from its essential form. This becomes part of Descartes' move to distrusting both the senses and the imagination. Where the Ignatian exercitant's mind shall flee the horrors of mutability towards a giving up of self in a world-embedded, active service of Christ in order not only to attain one's own eternal life, but to garner other lives in the same kind of service as well, the Cartesian mind shall flee such horrors as extended everywhere, in the world, others, time and change, as the "malin génie" or deceptive God, so far as to include death to the world. From Hell
to a piece of wax, Vendler makes an astute comparison without seeing the obvious undermining fear on the part of Descartes! This extreme rationalism of mistrust counters Baroque, Ignatian Spirituality, but Vendler does not suspect it. Descartes' habit of avoiding error and his penchant for will-controlled judgement is a direct critique of the Ignatian method — not to mention perhaps a critique of all of Christian meditative practice as such — of belief, imitation, reliving and making-present of a fixed myth, here the life of Christ. Finally, Vendler, along with Stohrer, recognizes Descartes would not nor could not reveal the influence of or reference to the Ignatian Spiritual Exercises, yet they both misread the most crucial reason for this dissimulation — that the Méditations métaphysiques as exercises which call the exercitant to hyperbolic doubt undermine the objectives of what such exercises imitate in Ignatius' work of established Christian life and dogma, or that they were constructed as a subtle wish to obviate the Ignatian practice.

A. Thomson's earlier reading is more sober and restrained. Where he sees an imitation on Descartes' part concerning method and Psychology, he sees as well a great divergence in the domains of religion and morality where Descartes rejects the truth-value of established dogma. This makes it clear that it is the mental discipline of the Spiritual Exercises which Descartes found so attractive. Yet Thomson misunderstands Descartes on two points in comparing his method and thought to that of Ignatius: on that of mind-soul/body dualism, and on the point of imagination and sensation of extended material substance. Both of his points turn around the topic of res extensa. A. Thomson thinks Descartes finds a mind-soul/body union in this
concept, when it really is one of the factors which facilitates the separating out of mind in the work of the *mathesis* of nature and the ensuing reduction of the real. From this, Thomson contradicts himself when he turns to the topic of material substance in the context of imagination and sensation of extension in the Ignatian Preludes, by comparing it with Descartes' emphasis upon material substance to proceed with *mathesis* as his imaginary counterpart. The mistake Thomson makes, like Vendler's, is his blindness to imagination and sensation as valorized moments in the procedure of Ignatius' method and ones which favor transgression of geometrical limits and a mind-soul/body union, whereas for Descartes they are aids to devalorizing and reducing the real and, again, of separating mind from a body and obscure matter to be discarded once the separation and belief is attained. This misunderstanding of the severity of Descartes' dualism leads Thomson to misunderstand the important step of Ignatius' "Composition of Place" and the ultimate transgression of perspective well beyond the mathesizing sciences with which perspectival representation is harmonious and homologous. This shall come up again in the polemic on the Eucharist. Thomson's reading has trivialized a difficult topic of ultimately dangerous theological consequences.

Thus the misinterpretation of our critics goes back to Descartes himself and to the Philosophical tradition from Antiquity along with its own meditative practice, onward to the blindspot created by any transcendentalist tendencies remaining in Scholasticism, and outside of it. Despite Descartes' imitation of the style of the Ignatian method, which with Thomas, Stohrer and Vendler's analyses we can well say
he does, the results of Descartes’ process of doubt and remaining elements of
certitude undermine the Incarnate God of space, time and historical myth, to be
imitated, relived and made present by the exercitant under the spiritual guidance of
those who have already more perfectly lived the elements of the life of Christ. This
Cartesian, transcendental misreading of the Spiritual Exercises is not only to
misunderstand St. Ignatius’ spiritual Philosophy and the religious Baroque as it
springs therefrom, but is a blindspot as well to the important, subtle and otherwise
seductive strategy of Descartes, in hand with his rejection of Aristotelianism, the
strongest current in Scholasticism — to combat and disarm Ignatius’ Spiritual
Exercises and Ignatian, Baroque spirituality particularly in their use of the body,
sensual perception and imagination on the path to spiritual union.62

The undermining results for Jesuit Spirituality of Descartes’ use of Ignatian
meditative method and the ends to which he takes it, are further confirmed by the
ensuing problem and debate in the Jesuit reception of his work. It was probably very
upsetting to them that Descartes could so well use the general meditative practice of
spiritual exercises, and unavowedly imitate the Ignatian exercise structure while taking
it so far away from the Ignatian objectives through the sharp Cartesian mind-
soul/body dualism that obviates the need for an Incarnate God and for a way of life in
imitation of the Christ. Descartes’ use of the method to different ends also discloses

62 Z. Vendler writes symptomatically of his own blindspot to the Ignatian/Descartes
comparison and contrast: “Descartes would not have wanted, and would not have dared, to give the
impression that he actually imitates Ignatius. Like a shrewd politician, he went ahead, but in such a
way as to preserve “deniability”. And as the subsequent tradition shows, he has succeeded all too
a weakness in the Ignatian meditation as a behavioristic, Psychological method that can be manipulated, and does not inherently, as method, lead towards any particular direction prescribed by faith. Any naïve indebtedness on Descartes’ part to his teachers and forebears would have been for the method alone, which he learned from them, and some Jesuits contemporary to Descartes as well as the critics reviewed here were able to accept Descartes’ thought based on methodical resemblances alone. As Vendler concludes,

Thus the *Meditations* were not intended by their author to be a summary of his philosophy. [...] This work has a special place and a higher purpose: it does not merely call upon the public to read and understand, but challenges them to the "once in a lifetime" enterprise of reforming their whole way of thinking by means of the "exercises" he prescribes.⁶³

In this light, these prescribed meditations are dangerous to the Jesuit order and Catholic hierarchy, and were consequently to be later placed on the *Index* (1663, 1666). In light of the polemic on the Eucharist and the question of Incarnation, into which Descartes shall enter after having written the *Médiations métaphysiques*, this comparison with the Ignatian method as we have critiqued and further pursued it is all the more grave.

Our reading of Cartesian/Ignatian methodological parallels as working against the objectives of the *Spiritual Exercises*, the Jesuit order and Catholic hierarchy, can be seen as a subtle continuation of the more simplistic and outright criticism by Descartes of his Jesuit education at the Collège de la Flèche in the first part of the *Discours de la méthode*, and again at the beginning of the *Médiations métaphysiques*,

and his critique of the manner in which imitation, repetition, and representation of established knowledge and traditions — what Descartes saw as a feigning of truth and of presence, and as evil gods — offended Descartes’ desire to establish a foundation to knowledge which would begin at absolute zero with the individual contemplating subject. Furthermore, and in conclusion, the Jesuit reaction to the Discours de la méthode and the Méditations métaphysiques and the subsequent banishment of any teaching of Cartesian thought from the Jesuit colleges, gives further credence to a reading of the Méditations métaphysiques along with the reduction to the Cogito and the kind of God Descartes pulls out of it as a misuse of Ignatius’ Spiritual Exercises. Descartes replaces the Ignatian objectives with the empowered rational individual, capable in his solitude of finding truth, in prolongations of Humanism and much like the Reformist, Protestant subject capable of reading Scripture without interpretative guidance, and needless of the directives of Church Fathers. This would obviate the need for spiritual direction, guidance and exercise, and for the Jesuit practice of garnering souls for Christ... that is, for the Jesuit Order itself. Thus we see Descartes’ correspondent the Jesuit R.P. Mesland, who also had enough of a blindspot to the Ignatian objectives to support and attempt to propagate Descartes’ thought, sent away from France (along with other Jesuit sympathisers to Cartesianism) by the Jesuit Order, to be missionary in the New World where he would find his death... but long after Descartes’ own.  

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64 Descartes’ response to Mesland at the news of his imminent departure, while on the surface referring to the Cartesian God pulled out of the force of will of reason, can also be read to dissimulate an acerbic critique which could very well be sarcastically meant for those “athées” who would refuse his method of reason. It thus hints of the depth of Jesuit opposition to his Philosophical
b. The Tradition of Spiritual Exercises, traced back to Philosophical Antiquity

We have examined these comparisons which affirm similarities between Ignatius' *Spiritual Exercises* and Descartes' *Méditations métaphysiques* and how they have come out of an interpretation of the *Spiritual Exercises* through the heritage of the ascetic and mentally-focused spiritual practice of the Middle Ages and even of Philosophical Antiquity, which is to slight the specificity and the novelty Ignatius brought to the genre, particularly in the areas of using corporality and affectivity.

What has been overlooked is indeed the very novelty of the *Spiritual Exercises* which had an essential role in establishing Baroque vision.

Our conclusion, that the *Méditations métaphysiques* differ seriously from what is in our opinion most specific and Baroque about the Ignatian *Spiritual Exercises*, even to the point of their contestation, begs for another look at the tradition of spiritual exercises in Western culture, what this tradition was, how and where it came about, and how it evolved. Although the term "spiritual exercises" are above all identified with their Ignatian practice, and defined about this practice as its model and writings, and of the opprobrium in which Descartes held this opposition: "...et encore que votre dessein de convertir les sauvages soit fort généreux et très saint, toutefois, à cause que je n’imagine que c’est seulement de beaucoup de zèle et de patience, dont on a besoin pour l’exécuter, et non point de beaucoup d’esprit et de savoir, il me semble que les talents, que Dieu vous a donnés, pourraient être employés plus utilement à la conversion de nos athées, qui se piquent de bon esprit, et ne veulent se rendre qu’à l’évidence de la raison." Letter of 1645 or 1646, *OP*, vol.3, 629.

An interesting review of the meditative genre and reading of the *Méditations métaphysiques* against any significant interpretation as spiritual exercises is done by Bradley Rubidge, "Descartes' *Méditations* and Devotional Meditation", *Journal of the History of Ideas* 51.1 (Jan-March 1990): 27-49, particularly 46-48. Rubidge fails to see the dismantling of the meditative genre (as it was understood in the seventeenth century) which we find in Descartes' *Méditations*. Similar conclusions to our own can be find in the 1690 satire by Gabriel Daniel, *A Voyage to the World of Cartesius*, mentioned by Rubidge, however he rejects these as well.
achievement, it should be considered how a different practice may have been transmitted to Descartes, aside from the Ignatian practice and its Baroque specificity.

The thesis of Pierre Hadot is extremely helpful in these considerations, as he traces the origins of spiritual exercises back to Philosophical Antiquity, particularly from Platonism to Stoïcism, to qualify Philosophy itself as in fact spiritual exercise, or as a formation based upon relations of mastery and discipleship rather than information. Hadot argues that in Antiquity asceticism, or askesis was not so much a denial of and separation from the body and a practice of physical privation, as it was a mental practice of vigilance over the soul, thought and the will, based upon consciousness of the presence of Divinity, perfection or an image or memory of God within the self, and upon the vigilant presence of such a conscious self to the living moment as a form of liberty from all circumstance. Such mental practice does indeed neglect physical factors, and restrains the imagination. This is particularly exemplified by the Stoïc practice of such exercises, as well as by the Platonic practice, which involved the exercise of death through a constant consciousness of death's imminence and a fearlessness before it, and the flight from the corporal, whence the notion from Seneca to Montaigne of the practice of Philosophy as learning how to die. This practice of a godlike presence to the moment shall remain throughout the tradition, as we shall see in the pragmatic and pedagogic aspect of such exercises and in performative examples of language such as the Cogito ergo sum.

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65 Pierre Hadot, Exercices spirituels et philosophie antique (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1987), particularly chapters 1, 2 & 10. See also the article "Ascèse, Ascétisme" in Dictionnaire de spiritualité ascétique et mystique, vol.1.
Philosophy was not only spiritual exercise in its Western origin, but spiritual exercises were in their origin then a *Philosophical way of life*, a love of wisdom and of moral perfection, and a cultivation of the divine in man.

We can look at the Cartesian practice of spiritual exercises in the *Méditations métaphysiques* as one which aligns itself best with the Stoic one, particularly for the importance placed upon the vigilant conscience to the neglect of the corporal, the sensible, and the affective, for the elements of an interiorised intellectual sense of divinity and perfectibility without any recourse to the sensible realm, and for the perpetual presence of such a consciousness while maintaining a distance from worldly things and from the passions provoked by such engagement. Such distanciation and disaffection can even be traced back to Buddhist practices of meditation.

Early Christianity as it recuperated the genre of spiritual exercises from Philosophy was thus also characterized as a Philosophy of life and a religion of effort, and we can see the beginnings and borrowings of Christian practice and the specifically Ignatian practice in Philosophical Antiquity, particularly in the exercise of spiritual vigilance or combat, as well as misinterpretations or limited interpretations particularly of Ignatian practice within the sole terms of Philosophical Antiquity's practice, as the dossier of criticisms we have followed has shown. On the one hand,

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66 Moralist work since the 16th century attempted to revivify and Christianize Stoicism. Descartes was exposed to this, most probably upon leaving La Flèche. E.Gilson, *Etudes sur le rôle de la pensée médiévale dans la formation du système cartésien*, 33.

67 *Ascèse, Ascétisme*, Dictionary of Spiritualité, vol. 1, 963-983. This clarifies the opposition of the Church to movements such as Jansenism and Quietism, which stamped out all spiritual practice, effort and deeds to favor a passivity towards God-given grace.
this recuperation of what had been Philosophical terrain caused a transition in the way Philosophy would be viewed from then on, based upon what was left to it -- as discourse and theory. This view of Philosophy would be maintained throughout Scholasticism, ruled as it was by Theology, and the vision of Philosophy as a life-practice would not be recuperated back from the theological terrain until authors outside of the University system such as Descartes, Spinoza, Malebranche and Leibniz in effect worked against Scholasticism and once again in the Ancient Philosophical tradition,\(^{68}\) and not until various Philosophers' turns towards Ethics. On the other hand, Christianity brought its own specificity to the genre. What was a vague God of perfection became a God of love, for the objective aim of the soul had changed. What had been a love of wisdom and an exercise, vigilance and perfection of self towards it was now a vigorous, adamant love of God, and of the Incarnate Christ, in imitation of or in effect in exercise towards His life and His image in the self and in charitable service to the other. What was an exercise towards death became a participation in Christ's Passion and a Spirituality found through human suffering. Thus what had been a control and even a repression of the passions became a directed use of the passions -- nothing exemplifies this more than the Ignatian Spiritual Exercises, and thus the gravest misinterpretation of reading the Spiritual Exercises in purely philosophical terms is risked here. The recuperation from the 16th to the 18th centuries by Descartes and others of spiritual exercises back

\(^{68}\) Ph.Hadot, *Exercices spirituels et philosophie antique*, 222-3.
to Philosophy was necessarily and historically in contrast and in combat with this
terrain renewed and reworked by Christianity.

Descartes' Philosophical and Stoic sources in the practice of spiritual exercises
could disdulpate him from any wilful subversion of the Ignatian practice, revealing
him as a purist whose turn to a more ancient tradition preserves the Philosophical
discipline's autonomy from any particular theological concerns. Yet this seems
contradicted by the dedication of the *Méditations métaphysiques* to the theological
faculty of the University of Paris, where Descartes places precisely theological
concerns within the realm of Philosophy:

J'ai toujours estimé que les deux questions de Dieu et de l'âme étaient les
principales de celles qui doivent plutôt être démontrées par les raisons de la
philosophie que de la théologie.

The God of natural reason and reasonable Theology, that is, the Stoïc divinity and
Philosophical spirituality, he further argues, would best persuade the infidel. Thus
Descartes' remark aims at the missionary task. Were not, then, Descartes' intentions
with the *Méditations métaphysiques* evangelisation through "natural" reason? And as
his practice is historically situated, it can also further confirm his opposition to the
Christian and particularly Ignatian contribution, and in many minds perfection,
brought to such spiritual practices, and all that they imply, to include the tremendous
missionary task of the Jesuit Order.
B. The Polemic on the Eucharist & the Incarnation: Descartes Rewrites the Consequences of his Thought

Given that Descartes has pulled God out of the *Cogito*, and separated them both by the same gesture from all world, corporality and affectivity, what comes into question is the possibility of sensing the Divine, or of an aesthetic relationship to the Divine. This question lies behind several polemics, both scholastic and theological, in which Descartes shall become embroiled. Père Bourdin of the Society of Jesus shall place the entire Order in opposition to Descartes' work for its rejection of Aristotelian and Thomist elements in Scholasticism, particularly in the teaching of the Sciences. The Cartesian rejection of Scholasticism shall also be behind the "affaire Régius", where Descartes' overly enthusiastic disciple Regius, professor at Utrecht, shall be bitterly opposed by Voetius of the same University who further takes advantage of the situation to heap numerous and varied slanders upon Descartes' head. In this case, Descartes is at once accused of being both a disciple of the Jesuits and an atheist! This is not to mention the later souring of Descartes' relationship with Regius, particularly around the question of dualism and Regius' extreme interpretation of it, to Descartes' horror.\(^{69}\) This type of interpretation of Cartesian dualism is also behind the polemic on the Eucharist, where the outcome of Descartes' thought for Catholic doctrine on Transubstantiation obliges him to take some rather uncartesian

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twists and turns. Descartes shall even need to counsel Regius in the meanwhile to teach the union of soul and body! In all, the juxtaposition of these various arguments paints quite an absurd picture. Nonetheless, by the summer of 1642, Descartes shall be seen as an outright enemy of Aristotle and the Schools, and consequently as an enemy of Catholicism from the ranks within. Indeed, what is at work behind all of these difficulties is the role of material, corporal and affective factors in subjectivity as it is involved in knowledge, in pedagogical method, and in religious faith. And perhaps more seriously in question is the influence of Catholic faith and even the manipulations by Catholic faith of the domains of knowledge. For overall, the legacy of Cartesian thought shall align itself theologically with Jansenism and Protestantism rather than with Catholicism.

In the fourth objection to the Méditations, the Jansenist Theologian Antoine Arnauld (+1612,-1694) critiques Descartes' method of reduction by doubt because, although it confirms elements of certitude, it does not touch upon existence -- which Descartes neglects -- as a globality to which certitudes should be thought to belong as a subset, rather than certitudes as a dominating category as they are for Descartes. Descartes is thereby at fault to limit existence to certitudes alone. It is out of this

70 See Desmond M. Clarke, Occult Powers & Hypotheses. Cartesian Natural Philosophy under Louis XIV (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) 12-13, and 22-27, for a general overview of the question of the Eucharist. He places emphasis upon variants on Descartes' arguments, whereas we focus here upon the entanglement with Antoine Arnauld.

71 Although materialist, corporal and affective investments in knowledge do not necessarily imply the Catholic faith as a backdrop, as attested to by Libertine thinkers who valorised such factors as part of the process of intellection, it is true that Libertine thought was preferred by those such as the Jesuits who followed the Aristotelian tradition. See François Bouiller, Histoire de la philosophie cartésienne, 2 vols. (Paris: Ch.Delagrave, 1868), particularly vol.1, ch. XXVII, 571-591.
reduction by doubt that Descartes has reached the idea of God, and to follow
Arnauld’s critique, Descartes’ God is thereby severed from existence, corporality and
Incarnation; in effect, the Father is separated from Son, and relegated to the lifeless
gometry of certitude. Arnauld further critiques Descartes’ proof of the existence of
God in the terms of effective cause and existence of cause in the second Meditation.
These criticisms point to Cartesian contradictions and a symptomatology whereby
Descartes reduces and eliminates the role of the corporal paradoxically by the very
means of arguments such as cause-and-effect which depend upon the body, existence
and attributes to make their point.

Descartes shall use the Philosophical term "substance" to address this problem
while maintaining his Philosophy and method. Substance, by which he means that
which subsists by itself, an abstraction or form, of which the res cogitans is an
example, is necessary to the existence of its attributes of figure, extension and
movement -- the res extensa -- which belong to it. He exemplifies this definition with
the piece of wax in the Second Meditation. The prime example of substance is God,
but the Cogito is also an acceptable example as it is in need of God alone to subsist. 72
Substance is the subject or formal cause of its accidents (figure, mode, species), and
as such it is immutable. That is, all that is Baroque is removed! A substance can be
body as well as soul, which also are considered to depend upon God alone to subsist,
and we see that substance can indeed be immaterial. 73 Any other dependencies upon

72 OP, vol.2., 663, 580.

73 "Le sensible, comme irréductible à la figure [matheiscised form], reste hors-jeu de la
substance are considered its attributes, much as a verb is dependent upon its subject. Each substance is thought to have a principle attribute: for example, thought is the attribute of the soul, while extension is the attribute of the body.\textsuperscript{74} This concept of substance is counter to that of Thomas Hobbes (+1588,-1679) and Pierre Gassendi, who take their cue from Aristotelian Empiricism and Thomist thought, where substance is considered a substrate hidden beneath attributes perceived through the senses, and connected to them, as for example the soul is to the body for St. Thomas Aquinas.\textsuperscript{75} And indeed Descartes does admit that it is easier to know a substance through its attributes.\textsuperscript{76} What needs to be kept in mind is that Descartes' Metaphysics and his dualism in particular precede and condition his Physics, and thus his concept of substance. Thus Descartes' substance is based upon an essence/existence polarity and sevrage. Where for Descartes God is an \textit{a priori} essence severed from nature, from Aristotle to Thomas to Hobbes to Gassendi, God is an \textit{a posteriori} deduction, in analogy with sensible nature as in the Medieval-Renaissance mentality.\textsuperscript{77}


\textsuperscript{75} H.Gouhier, \textit{La Pensée métaphysique de Descartes}, 396. Descartes' affront to Aristotle and Aquinas is clearest when we look at his examination of wax in the second Meditation as a critique of monism, and compare this to a quote from Aristotle's \textit{De Anima} II.i.412b 6, made by Aquinas: "The Philosopher says: 'We need not ask if the soul and body are one, just as neither do we ask if wax and its shape are one". \textit{Summa Theologica}, VI.7.


\textsuperscript{77} E.Gilson, \textit{Etudes sur le rôle de la pensée médiévale dans la formation du système cartésien}, 177, 255.
The Cartesian view of substance and attributes dangerously implies for
Arnauld and various other Theologians the impossibility of Transubstantiation, or of
Incarnation.\textsuperscript{78} Their arguments are based upon the Thomist, Scholastic belief in the
priority of attributes in the process of perception, which places an empirical, sensorial
accent upon them. In the context of the Christ, His trace or accidental, real features
are understood to remain indefinitely after the material Eucharist is gone, as God is
infinite and is not tied to corporal manifestations, even though as substance God is
first understood through the perception of his attributes. Arnauld's position expanded
from refusing Descartes' cogitated God as nonexistent, to include demanding within
the context of the Eucharist and surprisingly in accord with Scholastic thought on
substance and attributes \textit{a presence} (accident) \textit{without essence} (substance).\textsuperscript{79} This
position even contradicts Port Royal's espousal of the NeoPlatonic and Augustinian,
rather than Thomist, tradition, thus priviledging the Symbolic, static and atemporal
concept of God typical of Protestantism, and of the Calvinism which influenced
Jansenism.

Descartes points out the scandalous consequence of Arnauld's argument, which
is in effect to call God an "accidental feature"! For Descartes, this outrageous

\textsuperscript{78} "Quatrièmes objections, faites par Monsieur Arnauld, docteur en théologie", \textit{Méditations métaphysiques}, in \textit{OP}, vol.2, 632 - 656. See in particular 656 and editor's note 1. A similar argument is made by various Theologians in the seventh scruple of the Sixth Objection to the \textit{Méditations métaphysiques}.

\textsuperscript{79} Not to mention in accord with Hobbes and Gassendi, who nonetheless are all attacked in \textit{La Logique de Port Royal} (1662).
conclusion is part of what provoked the schism in Christianity. As H. Gouhier summarizes, "en revenant à une théologie simple, les hommes verront quelle est la part du mystère et quelle est la part de la raison dans l’enseignement de l’Église. . . . en même temps que le rôle "d’une physique mal assurée" sera dévoilé. [...] c’est la fausse physique des Docteurs scolastiques qui a pourri la théologie eucharistique, au point de troubler les âmes et de semer l’hérésie; c’est la vraie physique qui permet à Descartes de donner à la transsubstantiation toute l’intelligibilité compatible avec le saint mystère et de répondre victorieusement à ceux qui accusent le catholicisme d’enseigner des doctrines contradictoires. La Pensée religieuse de Descartes (Paris: Vrin, 1924) 257-258.

"qui ne pense que ce Corps de Christ est précisément contenu sous la même superficie sous le pain serait contenu s’il était présent, quoique néanmoins il ne soit pas là comme proprement dans un lieu, mais sacramentellement, et de cette manière d’exister, laquelle, quoique nous ne puissions qu’à peine exprimer par paroles, après néanmoins que notre esprit est éclairé des lumières de la foi, nous pouvons concevoir comme possible à un Dieu, et laquelle nous sommes obligés de croire très fermement. [...] Car, de vrai, l’Église n’a jamais enseigné (au moins que je sache) que les espèces du pain et du vin, qui demeurent au Sacrement de l’Eucharistie, soient des accidents réels qui subsistent miracleusement tout seuls, après que la substance à laquelle ils étaient attachés a été ôtée"; "que l’opinion qui admet des accidents réels ne s’accommode pas aux raisons de la théologie, je pense que cela se voit ici assez clairement; et qu’elle soit tout à fait contraire à celles de la philosophie, j’espère dans peu le démontrer évidemment" — that is, the material substance is necessary to the existence of attributes; and "C’est pourquoi, s’il m’est ici permis de dire la vérité sans envie, j’ose espérer que le temps viendra, auquel cette opinion, qui admet les accidents réels, sera rejetée par les théologiens comme peu sûre en la foi, éloignée de la raison, et du tout incompréhensible, et que la mienne sera reçue en sa place comme certaine et indubitabile". "Réponses aux Quatrièmes Objections", Méditations métaphysiques, in OP, vol.2, 699, 701, 704. Emphasis is our own.

Also in hand with the Council of Trent’s pronouncements, Descartes refuted suggestions that only part of the substance of bread is transsubstantiated. As for the criticism that Descartes has placed God who is infinite into that which is finite, from which comes Arnauld’d criticism based upon the need for infinitely existing attributes without the substrate of material substance, Descartes maintained that firstly, as God is infinite, he would be capable, secondly, of a finite manifestation. By placing Incarnation within both material and ideal, or the philosophical sense of substance, Descartes is by no means placing a finite God before an infinite one. See Jean-Luc Marion on "Substance et infini", Sur le prisme métaphysique de Descartes (Paris: PUF, 1986) 230-246. Marjorie Grene sees Descartes’ view of the substance/attribute relation, while overthrowing Aristotelian, Scholastic belief on the
illustrated by Descartes’ fourth response, Descartes’ change in the view of substance saves his Roman Catholic faith and espouses a monism, while somewhat recuperating his Physics. And it shows how his educators, the faithful Scholastics and Thomists, in fact betrayed their faith on this point. A unified man is indeed an outcome of this changed view. And Descartes’ Metaphysics, limited by Catholic dogma, undermines on this point his Physics insofar as it is the will to geometrize, despite his efforts to ground his Physics there. This Physics is maintained insofar as he applies his concept of substance, with all of its Symbolic and dualistic implications, to the Eucharist. Within such contradictory oscillations, Descartes’ Metaphysical foundation is not so foundational after all.

But in fact Descartes finally does separate out attributes by refuting the importance of accidents, just as he refutes the importance of the sensible. For accidents cannot be thought capable of corrupting the subject, in analogy with a "cogitated" God in whom there can be neither attributes nor accidents. Even Descartes’ solely substantive incarnate God remains immutable, more Symbolic than

subject, as a way of preserving the unity of man. This view is not, however, the case in Descartes’ Physics, for in order to geometrically mathesize form, it must be separated from matter, and so consequently and by analogy, mind from body, and substance from attribute. Nor is it apparent to us that Descartes at the time of the Méditations métaphysiques sought to defy his methodically sought-after dualism to return to a unified man. Grene’s reading does not address this contradictory passage in Descartes’ thought. See Descartes among the Scholastics, 32, 40.


83 Descartes, OP, vol.2, 901. See also St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I.iii.6, "Whether in God there are any accidents". Thus God’s name, "I am who am", which does not permit of attributes, as the reduplicative grammatical structure illustrates.
Eustache Le Sueur, La Messe de Saint Martin (Paris, The Louvre)
Real. To consider further the details of Descartes’ argumentation, he had begun by refuting Arnauld’s critique with what seems like a minor embellishment, by further nuancing the notion of surface — that which is sensed — as folding infinitely into both material and ideal substance, and thus Transubstantiation with it in the case of the Eucharist.\(^{84}\) Thus all of which is sensed in the Eucharist is the Christ. This insistence upon the surface of substance privileges the sense of touch above all the senses in the context of belief in an Incarnate divinity. In this case Descartes left his typical mold of privileging the sense of sight, an integral part of the logic of dualism, and moved from a perspectival, distanciated relationship as the mode of knowledge, to a transpectival relationship where the fleshly exchange of "Inhabitation" is the mode for knowledge, to include sensing the Christ.\(^{85}\)

Thus Descartes redeemed himself vis-à-vis Roman Catholicism and the pronouncements of the Council of Trent, and reasoned with his Physics and its concept of substance to join faith. Despite the general thorniness of the debate, Descartes takes leave of his basic frame of thought in speaking of the Eucharist — for

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\(^{84}\) In *Les Principes de la philosophie* (1644) II.10, Descartes applies corporality as extension, which facilitates the application of *mathesis* to interior as well as exterior bodies. *OP*, vol.3, 155. This recalls Leibniz’s "fold", as elaborated by Gilles Deleuze, *Le Pli. Leibniz et le baroque* (Paris: Minuit, 1988). It also suggests some of the problems with assessing topography addressed by contemporary Chaos theory, which we see as a way of mathesizing Baroque as well as other forms.

\(^{85}\) Aristotle privileges the sense of touch as the model for all the other senses, as Descartes quotes him from *De Anima* in his response to Arnauld, *OP*, vol.2, 698. We can see placed together here carnality, the primacy of the sense of touch, Transubstantiation, and transjective. The senses of touch and taste are privileged in the knowledge of Divinity as Incarnate; that of sight in the knowledge of Christ Transfigured. See the article "Sens spirituels", *Dictionnaire de spiritualité ascétique et mystique*, vol.14, 603.
a moment he is Baroque! Although as we mentioned, his God always remains more Symbolic than Real, here Descartes’ God is no longer the timeless, fleshless God of the *Cogito*. In his letter to Père Dinet of the Society of Jesus, written subsequently to the first printing of the *Méditations* and to quarrels with the Jesuits particularly in reaction to his Physics, Descartes astutely juxtaposed both Catholic and Protestant reactions oriented by Thomist thought -- those of Père Bourdin, his severest Jesuit critic, and those of Voetius and the Protestant Ministers -- to subtly point out that theological objections to his Philosophy could not fit into the religious controversies of his day, but rather crossed their barriers of separation and opposition, and turned them all to absurdity. Furthermore, in linking the concept of substance in his Metaphysics and Physics and his defense of it to the Council of Trent’s pronouncements on the Eucharist, he not only presented himself as a champion of Counter-Reformation efforts, but also put Jesuit opposition to his system in a bind. A cynical reading could perceive this as Descartes’ main objective, as he usually avoided such subtlety in theological matters, since in general for Descartes, reason must not contradict faith, but it does not necessarily need to work to directly support

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86 Where some see a failure of Descartes’ mechanics to explain the Catholic doctrine of the Eucharist, we see a Baroque wrinkle in Cartesianism. For the mechanical explanation, see Richard A. Watson, "Transubstantiation among the Cartesians", in *Problems of Cartesianism*, ed, Th. Lennon, et.al. (Kingston & Montreal: McGill-Queens UP, 1982) 130.

87 Descartes, *OP*, vol.2, note, 1090.

88 H. Gouhier, "Un Echantillon de la théologie cartésienne", *La Pensée religieuse de Descartes*, 245-258.
it: "[...] qu’il y a au contraire plusieurs choses dans la philosophie vulgaire qui en effet ne s’accordent pas avec celles qui en théologie sont certaines." 89

Descartes thus sought a neutral conceptual ground. He also sought the liberty to fragment at will epistemological harmony, and did not always support a strong reason-faith connection. We, however, read Descartes beyond his wish for such neutral ground. For the theological implications of Descartes’ Philosophy as a whole, of his Metaphysics and method of doubt, would lean towards a Protestant, Calvinist emphasis upon a Symbolic, perspectival if we may say, and consubstantiate Eucharist, rather than towards the incarnate, transpectival and transsubstantiate one affirmed by the Council of Trent. 90 Yet Descartes changes his Philosophical mold by reasons of faith -- and politics, history, and common-sense survival in the defense of his Physics and his entire system of thought -- to stay with the latter emphasis. While Descartes’ logic explains away the general presence of God Incarnate to the world, it solves the problem of qualifying the Eucharistic presence as accidental, by replacing it with his concept of ideal substance, which sometimes shifts to include substance in the material sense. What should not be forgotten in this sleight-of-hand argumentation is the immaterial overtones of the Cartesian concept of substance, which camouflages


90 "Dans la première démarche de la Méthode, la critique de la connaissance sensible a pour but manifeste de préparer le triomphe de la raison transcendant et elle est déjà orientée vers la vue des Idées. Elle suppose la foi préalable en l’existence de Dieu et de l’âme. Il est très probable même qu’elle tient compte surtout des exigences de la théologie révélée en ce qui concerne le sacrement de l’Eucharistie. Il fallait, pour justifier le dogme sur ce point, que le témoignage des sens sur les espèces matérielles, sur le pain et le vin devenus le corps du Christ, par leur transsubstantiation, pût être révoqué en doute et que le croyant fût sommé de s’en rapporter, ici comme ailleurs, non aux yeux de la chair, mais aux yeux de l’Esprit." Alfred V. Espinas, Études sur l’histoire de la philosophie de l’action, Descartes et la morale. (Paris: Editions Bossand, 1925) 143. Emphasis is our own.
the incarnate deity important to the Eucharist in the Catholic faith. Thus Arnauld's critique remains nonetheless as a general intuition over the entirety of Descartes' thought. For in reading Descartes, the paradox is tacit — how can he defend Roman Catholic faith which privileges and maintains as essential sensing the Divine, when Philosophically he denigrates sensation's role in knowledge and the determination of existence? His work shall consequently be placed on the Index, by the Fathers of Theology of Paris in 1663, and by Rome in 1666.91 In hand with this, the Philosophical Modernity his thought has launched, with its sources in Platonism and Stoicism privileges through to the 20th century Ideality, the transcendental, a being without body, the Symbolic severed from the Real and the flesh, a surhuman sense of mortal progress towards perfection in mastery over nature and the imaginary, the errant sign and the disaffection of arbitrary passions. And Descartes shall continue to protest — too much -- his Roman Catholic faith.92 For despite all arguments, Descartes' dualism, whether applied to substance and its attributes or not, or whether applied elsewhere, renders the modes of Incarnation and of knowledge with the body - of which in the Christian context Transubstantiation is a type -- unthinkable. That is, God, Being, knowledge or the knowing subject are unthinkable with the body. Which takes us back to Descartes' trick in both the Discours de la méthode and the Méditations métaphysiques, of pulling God out of the Cogito. Despite his polemical position on the Eucharist, he can't seem to top that one.

91 It remained on the Index until its last publication, in 1948. Clarke, Occulte Powers & Hypotheses, 11, note 1. The Index was abolished by the Second Vatican Council, 1962-5.

C. Descartes' *Les passions de l’âme* (1649) and Letters to Princess Elisabeth: Affectivity & Morality, Occasions for a Turning Point?

Up until now we have looked at Descartes through the Baroque lense of concern with the treatment of corporality in his thought. With a reading of his late work where Descartes, inspired by his correspondence with the Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia, considers human experience in the terms of the passions and morality, we can add affectivity to our perspective. The topic of the passions was popular during the late 16th and the 17th centuries, and is of prime importance to our Baroque reading through Ignatian mysticism, since for St. Ignatius illumination or cognition by the soul and the intelligence are accompanied by corporal involvement and affective signs. The topic of the passions, and the appropriate exercise and moderation of the passions, shall lead Descartes — and it is most of all Elisabeth who leads him — into considerations of morality and an ethical code for action. What we would like to examine is how corporality and affectivity hold up in the movement of Descartes' thought through his correspondence and work, from 1643 until the publication of *Les Passions de l’âme* in 1649. We shall begin by examining how Descartes treats the topic of the passions, emphasized in his treatise, and then move on to the topic of a morality, based upon his Philosophy and his vision of the passions, which is emphasized in his correspondence.

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1.  *Les Passions de l’âme*: The Place of the Body in Knowledge, Revisited with Affectivity

It shall not be until his late writing and work on the passions and morality in *Les passions de l’âme* (1649), based upon concerns inspired by the queries of his friend and correspondent the Princess Elisabeth for whom it was written, that Descartes shall seek a union of body and soul under the theme of the passions, and along with this union a moral reflection upon action and intersubjectivity. One question of importance is how long will this union hold ground in his thought? And will Descartes’ correspondence with Elisabeth, the increasing importance of obligations to his faith and further prudence in addressing theological matters, and the formulation in the *Les Passions de l’âme* render divinity and knowledge thinkable with the body?

The soul, which Descartes has reduced from the tripartite conception of the Middle Ages to a one-dimensional "âme raisonnable", is what perceives, understands and knows for Descartes, and in *Les Passions de l’âme* he shall join it to the pineal gland as that curious organ which facilitates its inhabitation of the body, and shall practically render it equivalent to the pineal gland for all functional purposes! 94 Thus he has further expanded the definition of the pineal gland, since *L’Homme*, beyond a mere mechanism. 95 The soul is joined to the body via this gland, and thereby

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94 Blaise Cendrars will speak of the "troisième oeil" of the mythical Lemuriens, which we shall trace to the elaboration of Baroque structures and motifs in his *Le Lotissement du ciel*. This "third eye" is exactly the pineal gland! which continues to be linked to the Baroque physiological condition of the subject. See our study, which follows herein.

95 See Articles 31 and 32 of *Les Passions de l’âme*, in *OP*, vol.3, 977-979.
perception and even refining or reducing perception through doubt to perception by
the soul alone leads not only to knowledge (of self and of God) as seen in the
Discours de la méthode and the Méditations métaphysiques, but to sensation and
ensuing sentiment or passion, as well. Thus Descartes shall situate the passions not
in the heart, but in the mind. That is, the soul/body connection and cooperation
functions aesthetically in the process of perception. And this circuit for knowledge is
never devoid of mental image, sensation or affect. Descartes had also spoken of
"esprits animaux" in L'Homme, and of "les plus subtiles parties du sang qui exhalent
des vaisseaux qui les environnent" -- that is, infinitesimal organisms, or humors as
in Furetières' definition, which circulate throughout the body and through to the
pineal gland to facilitate motor functions and responses. In Les Passions de l'âme,
these "esprits animaux" and "parties subtiles" become more powerful and significant:
circulating between the pineal gland and the body, and directed by the will, they
connect body and soul. In summary, Descartes' vision of man in the Les Passions

96 It might be asked, to what sensations and sentiments might the Cogito ergo sum lead?

97 Letter to Mersenne, Dec. 24, 1640, OP, vol.2, 299. Descartes' understanding of the
motion of the blood shall influence his physico-medical description of the passions. See Jean-Maurice
Monnoyer's introduction, "La Pathétique cartésienne" to Descartes, Les Passions de l'âme (Paris:
Gallimard, 1988) 48-64, particularly 50.

98 G. Rodis-Lewis points out in her introduction to Descartes' Les Passions de l'âme, that the
rationalist Spinoza saw this explanation not only as unreasonable, but as occult. See the introduction to
the fifth segment of his Ethics. Descartes was very much involved in the practice of dissection when
he conceived and undertook the writing of Les Passions de l'âme. He was very disappointed to never
find the pineal gland in human dissections; this concept was based upon his finding in the dissection of
the brain of sheep, and which he assumed to exist in the human brain as well. J.-M. Monnoyer, "La
Pathétique cartésienne", 53, 63-5. David Farrell Krell compares Descartes' conclusion about its
fragile, ephemeral qualities in the human brain to the "fugitive soul itself", in "Paradoxes of the Pineal:
From Descartes to Georges Bataille", in Contemporary French Philosophy, ed. A. Phillips Griffiths
de l’âme, as he entitled the first part "Des passions en général et par occasion de
toute la nature de l’homme", has evolved since that from L’Homme to the
Méditations métophysiques. Although man’s dualistic nature is not resolved, it works
more according to a cooperation rather than a tension.

Needless to say, perceptions by the soul which both come from and lead to
sensations, evolving into sentiments in the interim, remain confused in contrast with
the perception reduced by doubt of the Cogito. Descartes further separates such
confused perceptions into inaffective sensations of the outer body, and interior,
affective sentiments.99 These interior perceptions and sentiments can touch either the
body, or the soul. The passions are specifically interior perceptions — that is, the
impression of corporal sensation or of imaginings upon the interior soul — and the
accompanying interior sentiments which affect the soul, and can subsequently further
affect bodily sentiment and action in turn.100 It is these passions which concern
Descartes most of all, as a form of intellection which takes into account the body and
its sensations. In all cases these perceptions proceed from a body/soul union.101 The
soul’s passions are bi-directional; they both proceed from and actively engage the
body, just as the pineal gland is oriented by the object of its perception, and in turn

99 Accordingly, by the term affect we mean interior passions which engage the soul with the
body, its sensations and its actions, and thus perturb or affect — in the valorised sense of "make their
mark upon" — rational or structural expressions, such as judgment, language usage, and so on. They
are also a sign of the transgression of perspectival distance.

100 The structure of the Symbolic (the soul), the Imaginary (inner perceptions) and the Real
(corporal or imagined sensation) all come into play here. This structure is fragmented, and the
Imaginary, practically absorbed into the Symbolic, becomes Ideal when in the context of a dualistic
vision of man.

further orients the body to it, to best perceive the object, seek its needs, or protect the self. Thus the soul is both active and passive with the body.\textsuperscript{102} And likewise, all actions, except for motor responses, involve affectivity.

Let us look more carefully at how Descartes describes the soul/body/affectivity triangle throughout \textit{Les Passions de l’âme}, relations which were indeed methodically left out of the process of the \textit{Cogito}, for this varied description is part of the act of confused perception he alludes to. Passions are at once the \textit{action} of the body upon the soul,\textsuperscript{103} a \textit{sign} of body/soul union or mutual impact where an \textit{affect} comes about, and a clouding of the "âme raisonnable" by bringing themselves, imagination and the body into the mind-soul’s considerations. This shall particularly influence Descartes’ morality, as he shall counsel that one should not make use of the soul when imaginings are present and it is so affected.\textsuperscript{104} For Descartes the affects which come

\textsuperscript{102} Pierre Mesnard’s schematic presentation of body/soul union is helpful: where the body affects the soul, it is a passion of the soul, and where the soul affects the body, it is a voluntary act. See \textit{Essai sur la morale de Descartes} (Paris: Boivin & Cie, 1936) 88. We add that in the Cartesian context the voluntary act, the wilfully perceiving soul is at a perspectival distance from the objects of sentience and there is no affective involvement. Descartes’ \textit{La Dioptrique}, for example, deals exclusively with voluntary perception. Whereas in the passions of the soul, the soul is transpectively immersed in and penetrated by, or in other words in \textit{chiasmic exchange} with the object of its perception with, of course, affective signs.

\textsuperscript{103} “Mais nous avons tort de penser que sa cause est également dans l’âme. Cette cause, comme pour les états précédents, est dans le corps. La passion est donc une perception dont on ignore la cause, et dont on croit à tort que la cause est dans l’âme elle-même”, and “Les passions sont des états de l’âme, causés par le corps, mais dont la cause, ignorée, est à tort rapportée à l’âme même.” Editor’s notes, \textit{Les Passions de l’âme}, in \textit{OP}, vol.3, 973.

\textsuperscript{104} This is in direct contradiction with the Ignatian \textit{Spiritual Exercises}, where imagining (of the life of Christ) and affects are an essential means to the mystical flight of the soul, as well as its return to experience and ethical engagement.
about because of a particular body/soul encounter shall be arbitrary, as we shall see, and based upon habit and even infantile experience.\textsuperscript{105}

Inasmuch as the \textit{Cogito} becomes involved in a call to action, then, it is not merely the soul which thinks such action out, but the soul with the body and its affectivity.\textsuperscript{106} All such willed actions are in part an emotional manifestation or catharsis of such emotions, or their manipulation, use and control, and thus the passions have an active component which engages them morally.\textsuperscript{107} The soul in coordination with body and affect is the seat of the will for Descartes, and he renders this will equivalent to perception:

\begin{quote}
[...] que nous ne saurions vouloir aucune chose que nous n'apercevions par même moyen que nous la voulons; et bien qu'au regard de notre âme ce soit une action de vouloir quelque chose, on peut dire que c'est aussi en elle une passion d'apercevoir qu'elle veut.\textsuperscript{108}
\end{quote}

The will then wants the passion to perceive or sense, that is, it \textit{desires} to perceive or sense, and one desires to perceive that which one desires. Perception is the first step towards obtaining what one perceives to be good for oneself and necessary to preservation of the self, and the passion to perceive is the passion privileged here!

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{105} Descartes elaborates here an anticipation of Psychology. See Letter to Chanut, Feb. 1, 1647, \textit{OP}, vol.3, 714.

\textsuperscript{106} That Descartes' method of reduction through doubt and the \textit{Cogito} could indeed be an imaginative effort on his part has been considered by Michèle LeDoeuff, \textit{Recherches sur l'Imaginaire philosophique} (Paris, Payot, 1980). Descartes does however say at the beginning of the 4th part of the \textit{Discours de la méthode}, "et que je rejetasse comme absolument faux, tout ce en quoi je pourrai imaginer le moindre doute". \textit{OP}, vol.1, 602.

\textsuperscript{107} Letter to Elisabeth, 21 May 1643, \textit{OP}, vol.3, 19. This would accord with the use of directed affectivity in the Ignatian \textit{Spiritual Exercises} as a means to identification with the Christ, and as an incentive to missionary action and world service.

\end{flushright}
Yet perception seems to be a rather perturbable, tautological process. Even the *Cogito* as a form of will could become in this sense a willed means, and a sentient and affective means, to "perceive" God, without however leading to or through a specific sensate perception, for Descartes' God shall remain, Christianity aside, Iconoclast.\(^\text{109}\)

In accordance with this wilfull soul or desire as the passion to perceive, to sense and to emote, Descartes shall elaborate the foremost of and foundation to all the passions -- that of admiration. The etymology of "admiration" contains both *se mirer*, from the French, to look at oneself, to be reflected (as in a very specific kind of self-projecting, self-reflecting perception), and *mirari*, from the Latin, to look attentively, to wonder at, to admire. The objective of admiration is the knowledge of that which the subject admires, which astonishes him, and which seems rare to him -- as such, this object focuses best above all perceptive attention, and thereby disciplines the pineal gland, a focus and discipline which are in themselves an aesthetic and pleasurable experience.\(^\text{110}\) It encourages the pursuit of scientific knowledge, it

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\(^{109}\) As J.-L. Marion puts it, "L'ego [...] s'affecte de l'apparition immanente." *Questions cartésiennes* (Paris: PUF, 1991) 169. Perception and thinking are sensation, and to sense is to be affected.

\(^{110}\) Art.94, *Les Passions de l'Ame*, in *OP*, vol.3, 1025. Luce Irigaray likens the effect of admiration upon mind and memory to Freudian mental inscriptions, which are new and about which mental energy or "pulsions" congregate, from mental image to action, to repeat and confirm them. *Ethique de la différence sexuelle* (Paris: Minuit, 1984) 79-80. Admiration is the only passion capable of such an impression, and because of this it can rework mind/body experience with affective associations and can take on a behaviorist role to enforce an ethical code. In the Ignatian *Spiritual Exercises*, surprise, wonder, and subsequently awe, desire and submission, have a role before the image, and this shall also be true for the Baroque manipulation of pictorial and sculptural representation, as well as architectural space. We can also ask how the mechanism of this utmost passion compares to that of traumatic experience, and how efforts at its representation can be a part of Baroque aesthetic technique.
stimulates memory, and in excess it can also pervert reason.\textsuperscript{111} Unlike love and hate, it does not determine either the good or harmful worth of the object, and thus does not move the heart nor the blood, and is prior to these passions and judgments.\textsuperscript{112}

The ultimate objective of admiration’s wilfull search to perceive and to know is the knowledge of God, and is like the highest form of love, traversing the terrain from the physical to the metaphysical.\textsuperscript{113} Thus to know God is to love Him.\textsuperscript{114} This kind of knowledge of God is much different from that of the God Descartes pulled out of the \textit{Cogito}! As a knowledge attained through the primacy of passion, it involves the body’s physiological response and affectivity -- the investment of the perceiving subject’s carnality and emotion. It is perhaps the passion which is most manipulative of the subject. The body-subject has an investment and role in knowledge, and this knowledge via admiration is the most vitalist of Descartes’ Philosophy -- it can attain the world of existence and action, ethical relations to others, in time and history, and an incarnate God as well: the God of emphasis in the Counter-Reformation and in the Baroque. This is the God of passion and sensation as well as the God of reason, for the God of admiration is a God of \textit{excess}. Accordingly, admiration is not founded on

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{111} Articles 71, 75, 76, \textit{Les Passions de l’âme}, in \textit{OP}, vol.3.
\item \textsuperscript{112} If we take this as a model for the passions, this non-judgmental moment illustrates the possibility for occult outcomes to the use of the passions, for no ethical directive can take hold of the passion of admiration.
\item \textsuperscript{113} Editor’s note, \textit{Les Passions de l’âme}, in \textit{OP}, vol.3, 1011. But does the \textit{Cogito} lead to the love of God? Descartes’ correspondent Chanut shall ask this very question.
\item \textsuperscript{114} \textit{Méditations métaphysiques}, Reponse aux 6è objections, \textit{OP}, vol.3, 870.
\end{itemize}
utility or economy.\textsuperscript{115} By priviledging the passion of admiration, Descartes has
allowed for a full pragmatic response of the subject -- a mirroring of self in other, a
response out of an existential situation -- and has balanced the severity of the
perspectival \textit{Cogito}/God relation where the body and its affects are stoically severed
from intellection, with a transpectival passions/God relation where the body and its
affects are an essential part of intellection. Thus Descartes qualifies his former
metaphysical thought: "Je dis qu'on peut connaître par la raison naturelle que Dieu
existe [...] Et je n'ai rien dit touchant la \textit{connaissance} de Dieu".\textsuperscript{116} For knowledge of
God must involve the body and affectivity.

This brings us to the question of Descartes' correspondent Chanut, who asks
"si la seule lumière naturelle nous enseigne à \textit{aimer} Dieu, et si on le peut \textit{aimer} par la
force de cette lumière".\textsuperscript{117} For it is not evident that the God pulled out of the natural
reason of the \textit{Cogito} can be the object of any love. Descartes' response is curious in
that he plays both with and against the passions. We have noted how the imagination
has an effect upon inner sentiments and mind, and is a means between mind and body
when there is no external stimulus. It is the imagination which becomes incapacitated
before a God whose totality is far beyond any of our sentient capacities. Descartes'
God is indeed Iconoclast, and the only love he initially admits possible is not sentient

\textsuperscript{115} Art. 53, and editor's note, \textit{OP}, vol.3, 999.

\textsuperscript{116} Letter to Père Mersenne, March 1642, \textit{OP}, vol.2, 924. Emphasis is our own. This
comment was written by Descartes in response to reactions to the \textit{Méditations métaphysiques}, and
before undertaking the work of \textit{Les Passions de l'âme}.

love, but intellectual love where the connection of mind to body is not a
consideration. But then Descartes continues — forcibly so — to consider the Christian
God, who because Incarnate allows of sentient love. Thus it is implicit in Descartes’
response that natural reason, such as that of the Cogito, does not lead to nor permit of
love, but that the Incarnate, Christian God does, and perhaps even that knowledge
through passions, such as is possible with admiration, necessitates an incarnate
God. Yet at the same time, we must ask if the greater perfection of God which the
Cogito perceives — or imagines — isn’t a case of admiration? And a form of love.
Yet Descartes’ answer to this would be no, for risk of hubrice:

Même, à cause que notre connaissance semble se pouvoir accroître par degrés
jusques à l’infini, et que, celle de Dieu étant infinie, elle est au but où vise la
nôtre, si nous ne considérons rien davantage, nous pouvons venir à
l’extravagance de souhaiter d’être dieux, et ainsi, par une très grande erreur,
aimer seulement la divinité au lieu d’aimer Dieu.¹¹⁹

Knowledge in a Cartesian mode, and in the mode that shall be that of 18th-century
prolongations of Cartesianism in notions of scientific progress and of the ever-
perfectible encyclopedic accumulation and totalisation of knowledge — against which
Descartes surprisingly warns! — cannot be placed on equal ground with the passionate
love of God. The much sought-after reason-faith link breaks down in the context of
Christianity as long as concepts of knowledge themselves refuse any corporal and and
affective role. And it is above all in the context of admiration, most of all before
God, that knowledge remains joined to the body. Thus admiration becomes an

¹¹⁸ The epistemological connection between Philosophy and Spirituality makes itself apparent
here.

affective version of the Cogito. In Descartes' science the passions shall not be considered, and in his morality the passions shall be controlled differently.

We shall see that it is only in the context of the love of God or worthy human love that Descartes shall allow outright use of the passions.\textsuperscript{120} Let us go back to the passions for a moment, to ask what measure of admiration is Baroque? Why, all of it! Particularly as in the Baroque concept of meraviglia.\textsuperscript{121} Astonishment and wonderment for the surprise and delight, or even horror, of the spectator at the exotic, the bizarre, the unknown, meraviglia is a prime objective of Baroque art, in the vertiginous effect produced by the instability of its twisted forms, for example, and of its poetry and rhetoric, in the strange contrast of extreme metaphorical juxtaposition, or "il concetto". This passion of admiration which the Baroque deliberately incites engages the moving desire to know, and begins the process of the chain of representations, "being-in", and the transpectival stance of ultimate investment of the emotions, the senses and the self in the theater of the object admired -- from imagining and wonder, to familiarity with the object of wonder, to acting out, to affective reliving, and to knowledge and mastery of the elements of wonder. It is admiration that fills the moment of the Spiritual Exercises where desire is to be with the Christ mentally, physically and emotionally. Here the admiring gaze moves from a perspectival stance into a transpectival one of emulation and corporal investment to include the other senses. Here love becomes the love of self-annihilation, if need be,

\textsuperscript{120} See the closure to his letters to Elisabeth.

in order to be with the O/other, in an ultimate devotion, a knowledge never completed, a wonder never mastered, and far from the *hubrice* Descartes warned about whose starting point was the Cartesian *Cogito*, as the 18th-century reception of the Cartesian legacy shall demonstrate. For *meraviglia* incites the desire to know through the senses, corporally and affectively, and ultimately to laboring an always-open path to knowledge that invites the participation of others. The Baroque uses the passion of *meraviglia* to seize knowledge via the body. Baroque knowledge is aesthetic, sentient knowledge.

As a passion coupled with knowledge, *meraviglia* or admiration is the passion that Descartes prefers above all the passions. However, we cannot go so far as to say that Descartes privileges knowledge when coupled with the passions. Furthermore, what remains problematic in this picture of knowledge coupled with the senses, corporality and affectivity is Descartes' perception of the passions, in homology with language and in anticipation of Saussure, as *arbitrary* in combination with thought and action, and as formed by habit and repetitive association:

[...]*qu’il y a une telle liaison entre notre âme et notre corps, que les pensées qui ont accompagné quelques mouvements du corps, dès le commencement de notre vie, les accompagnent encore à présent, en sorte que, si les mêmes mouvements sont excités déréchef dans le corps par quelque cause extérieur, ils excitént aussi en l’âme les mêmes pensées, elles produisent les mêmes mouvements; et enfin, que la machine de notre corps est tellement faite, qu’une seule pensée de joie, ou d’amour, ou autre semblable, est suffisante pour envoyer les esprits animaux par les nerfs en tous les muscles qui sont requis pour causer les divers mouvements du sang que j’ai dit accompagner les passions.*

\[122\] Letter to Elisabeth, May 1646, in *OP*, vol.3, 650. Emphasis is our own.
And also:

Et ce n’est pas merveille que certains mouvements de cœur soient ainsi naturellement joints à certaines pensées, avec lesquelles ils n’ont aucune ressemblance; car, de ce que notre âme est de telle nature qu’elle a pu être unie à un corps, elle a aussi cette propriété que chacune de ses pensées se peut tellement associer avec quelques mouvements ou autres dispositions de ce corps, que, lorsque les mêmes dispositions se trouvent une autre fois en lui, elles induisent l’âme à la même pensée; et réciproquement, lorsque la même pensée revient, elle prépare le corps à recevoir la même disposition. Ainsi, lorsqu’on apprend une langue, on joint les lettres ou la prononciation de certains mots, qui sont des choses matérielles, avec leurs significations, qui sont des pensées; en sorte que, lorsqu’on oït après derechef les mêmes mots, on conçoit les mêmes choses; et quand on conçoit les mêmes choses, on se ressouvent des mêmes mots.\textsuperscript{123}

Thus the passions are structured like a language, to rephrase Lacan. The nature of the passions is psychological, for associated to objects and corporal movements and thoughts by habit, they can thereby be reworked, and structured according to a moral code.\textsuperscript{124} We could see this arbitrary behaviorism as a reaction to the education Descartes received at La Flèche, and to the manner in which the Ignatian Spiritual Exercises manipulate affectivity ultimately towards desire to be with the Christ, and like the Christ in world service for the Church. This would give further credence to our reading of Descartes’ method in attaining the \textit{Cogito} and God as a manipulation of the Ignatian method in hand with radically different affects and towards radically different ends -- those of thinking as a thing separated from the body, in the soul’s serenity of solitude from others and the world, in the calm of the soul’s certitude --


\textsuperscript{124} See editor’s introduction to \textit{Les Passions de l’âme}, in \textit{OP}, vol.3, 944. For Ignatius the passions are also \textit{signs} of body/soul relations, yet important ones.
and ends for which Descartes had his own personal passion. A personal passion which brings into question perhaps the kind of relation Descartes had to his own sickly body and its needs.

Yet if the passions are associations of habit which can be manipulated, what happens to certitude insofar as admiration is a means to knowledge, and to knowledge of God, and a means not to be excluded? In reducing the tension of dualism, in examining soul and body together, the foundational certitude of the Discours de la méthode and the Méditations métaphysiques has been placed on a relative, encumbered, wondrously moving, living, changing, and quite Baroque ground. The Baroque and the passions are not primarily about the egotism of certitude and its necessarily accompanying unconscious anxiety over the excess it has repressed -- the excess of existence, as Arnauld would see it. They are rather about excess and the corresponding depth and dimensionality of the soul whose levels are not hierarchised as in the Platonic conception of soul and in Medieval Spirituality, but are all valorised. And a part of this Baroque is wonder before the perpetual unknown. Is this to know less, or to know God less? Or is it the basis to the very scientific spirit itself? And where, in the subject, is knowledge seated -- in mind, in soul, in body? This is the Baroque challenge. It is also the very challenge implied by Descartes' Passions de l’âme, a challenge to Descartes' very own method and Metaphysical thought which plunges him not only into a new way of knowing and a new subjectival stance, but into a new aesthetic.
2. Letters to Princess Elisabeth: from the Passions to a Morality

Descartes' correspondence with the Princess Elisabeth makes the transition from an analytic of the passions to an application of this analytic to actions and relations with others in the form of a morality.\textsuperscript{125} This correspondence is of interest for reviewing his position on dualism, on affectivity such as admiration, and thus his position vis-à-vis the Baroque accent upon corporality, affectivity and presence of the body-subject, particularly in the domains of judgement and action. To do so we shall ask several questions, such as how does Descartes see a transition between the Metaphysical meditations he advocates and daily human existence? What advice does he give in response to Elisabeth's intellectual interrogation and questions on personal difficulties concerning the use of the passions? How does the correspondence with Elisabeth evoke a Moral Philosophy from Descartes, and what is this Philosophy? What is the feminine role in such a consideration and how is this role both used and revoked? How does this advice compare with what is written in \textit{Les Passions de l'âme} itself? Does Descartes' morality have any effect upon the concept of knowledge, the process of intellection and the vision of man?

One of Descartes' first moments of advice to Elisabeth concerns the \textit{Méditations métaphysiques}. He considers it unhealthy for daily human existence to remain constantly in a meditative mode -- one which in advocating a severe dualism certainly separates mind from all else of life! And he counsels Elisabeth to consider

\textsuperscript{125} Descartes' \textit{Les Passions de l'âme} was elaborated while he corresponded with Elisabeth, and out of this correspondence. Because moral application logically follows an understanding of the passions, we have chosen to look at this correspondence after our examination of \textit{Les Passions de l'âme}.
the outcome of the *Meditations métaphysiques* as an acquired vision which can remain with the person as he or she is engaged in worldly work.\textsuperscript{126} This sounds like the objective of Ignatian meditations as well, and we shall see that the worldly engagement of which they both speak clashes severely with the intellectual stance acquired from the Cartesian meditations. Let us look at Descartes’ own words:

> Enfin, comme je crois qu’il est très nécessaire d’avoir bien compris, une fois en sa vie, les principes de la métaphysique, à cause que ce sont eux qui nous donnent la connaissance de Dieu et de notre âme, je crois aussi qu’il serait très nuisible d’occuper souvent son entendement à les méditer, à cause qu’il ne pourrait si bien vaquer aux fonctions de l’imagination et des sens; mais que le meilleur est de se contenter de retenir en sa mémoire et en sa créance les conclusions qu’on en a une fois tirées, puis employer le reste du temps qu’on a pour l’étude, aux pensées où l’entendement agit avec l’imagination et les sens.\textsuperscript{127}

What is important for daily life is that work be understood with imagination and the senses, that is, that the Symbolic engage the Imaginary and the Real, and that the whole human being be taken into consideration. Now we know that the course of the *Méditations* do not help with this at all, and a Cartesian "clivage" about which Elisabeth in effect complains, remains! In effect, Descartes wavers between a strong Symbolic, which has absorbed the Imaginary into the Ideal and has all but forgotten the Real at a perspectival distance from it, that is, a fragmented Symbolic Economy (the meditative conclusions from the process of doubt, or a dualist mentality), and a Symbolic which works with and tempers the Imaginary and Real (worldly work, or a

\textsuperscript{126} However we must ask if Descartes might have altered the severity of his meditative prescription in consideration of his gentle and troubled correspondent.

\textsuperscript{127} Letter to Elisabeth, June 28, 1643, *OP*, vol.3, 48. Emphasis is our own. Note the structural wholeness of the Symbolic, Imaginary and Real, in the progression of "pensées", "imagination" and "sens" in Descartes’ conclusion.
wholist mentality). What is of interest and what can also be examined in terms of Symbolic Economy is what Descartes does with the passions in this transition from a Cogito-God relation to a self-others and self-world relation.

He gives advice on how to exercise the passions, and this advice shall waver, particularly about the bipolar situation he has established between meditative conclusions and worldly work. Firstly, his advice shall congregate around the person who is capable of maintaining in mind his meditative findings, and of disengaging himself from his surrounding world, as if it were merely a theatrical space.

Mais il me semble que la différence qui est entre les plus grandes âmes et celles qui sont basses et vulgaires, consiste, principalement, en ce que les âmes vulgaires se laissent aller à leurs passions, et ne sont heureuses ou malheureuses, que selon que les choses qui leur surviennent sont agréables ou déplaisantes; au lieu que les autres ont des raisonnements si forts et si puissants que, bien qu’elles aient aussi des passions, et même souvenirs de plus violentes que celles du commun, leur raison demeure néanmoins toujours la maîtresse, et fait que ces affictions même leur servent, et contribuent à la parfaite félicité dont elles jouissent dès cette vie. [...] Elles font bien tout ce qui est en leur pouvoir pour se rendre la fortune favorable en cette vie, mais néanmoins elles l’estiment si peu, au regard de l’éternité, qu’elles n’en considèrent quasi les événements comme nous faisons ceux des comédies.

Descartes is advocating a stoic practice of detachment of the passions from exterior events — that is, from anything outside of the "spirit" of the Cogito. The pain of others can call forth compassion, even imagined subjectival involvement, but must

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129 The metaphor of world as theater, however one in which we are engaged, is common to the Baroque Imaginary.

then necessitate detachment: "Ainsi, ressentant de la douleur en leurs corps, elles s’exerçent à la supporter patiemment, et cette épreuve qu’elles font de leur force, leur est agréable." The exercising of the passions is in effect their exorcising. The metaphor of the theater which he uses gives us the Cartesian aesthetic correlative implied by his Metaphysics and his Morality, and thus preserves the Discours de la méthode and the Méditations métaphysiques' mode of knowledge -- it is an aesthetics of perspectival distanciation and of stoic detachment. Any feelings of compassion or catharsis of emotions serve only their mastery in swift detachment from them, and living out of a dualistic nature. All emotion is placed in this theater, and the curtain is to be closed upon it. And theater is never for Descartes a theater of the real, for even the real has come under the umbrella of theater, thanks to the process of doubt. This Cartesian aesthetics of detachment relegates the body to its former place where it is repressed by a dualistic vision, and any overcoming of dualism realised by Les Passions de l’âme is revoked in Descartes’ stoic moral reflexions. Without elaborating at great length his own morality, he shall refer to a reading of Seneca’s De Vita beata to be shared across the epistolary exchange with Elisabeth. This Stoicism and detachment would be the stance of the exercitant who had undergone the Cartesian meditations. Accordingly, his aesthetic is in complete opposition to the


132 For a detailed analysis of Descartes’ aesthetic as one of perspectival detachment, see Jean-Joseph Goux, "Descartes et la perspective".

Ignatian and Baroque aesthetic where the model and metaphor of theater -- albeit a controlled theater in the imaginings directed by the *Spiritual Exercises* -- play an important role of engaging and retaining the spectator's affectivity, acting out and presence to the stage, the scene and the other -- what we have called a transpectival presence and eventual process of Inhabitation of the subject. Likewise, the aesthetic which was a result of admiration and the moral correlate of generosity toward and involvement with the other lasted only briefly in Descartes' thought, and is now swiftly revoked. For Descartes' "grande âme" would not be capable of sustaining the "theatrical inhabitation" the Ignatian *Spiritual Exercises* and Baroque aesthetic require.

This advice shall prove to be too much for Elisabeth, whose theater of the real in the events that befall her family is too close, too painful, too troubling... she cannot close the curtain upon them, as subsequent correspondence and advice shall indicate. Descartes then changes his meditative and aesthetic prescription from a contemplation of the real as tragic theater, to the concerted effort to contemplate only things of light beauty, pleasure or "agrément", and of inconsequence for the contemplator. And thus he counsels her to ward off her sadness thus:

[...] un seul remède, qui est d'en divertir son imagination et ses sens le plus qu'il est possible, et de n'employer que l'entendement seul à les considérer, lorsqu'on y est obligé par la prudence.\(^{134}\)

This is an exercise as well in placing aside the imagination and affectivity, in order to focus upon understanding alone and to thereby "deliver the spirit", and as such its objective is similar to that of the Cartesian meditations which he at first advocated she

\(^{134}\) Letter to Elisabeth, May or June, 1645, *OP*, vol.3, 571. Emphasis is our own.
put aside, an advice he now contradicts. Thus Descartes’ morality at the end of his oeuvre is no longer provisional as it was in the *Discours de la méthode* to follow the freshly-found *Cogito*; it now comes strongly and squarely out of his Metaphysics. He continues in this vein,

 [...] il se faut entièrement délivrer l’esprit de toutes sortes de pensées tristes, et même aussi de toutes sortes de méditations sérieuses touchant les sciences, et ne s’occuper qu’à imiter ceux qui, en regardant la verveur d’un bois, les couleurs d’une fleur, le vol d’un oiseau, *et telles choses qui ne requièrent aucune attention, se persuadent qu’ils ne pensent à rien*. Ce qui n’est pas perdre le temps, mais le bien employer; car on peut, cependant, se satisfaire par l’espérance que, par ce moyen, on recouvrera une parfaite santé, laquelle est le fondement de tous les autres biens qu’on peut avoir en cette vie.’

As Elisabeth cannot practice perspectival aesthetic and emotional detachment,

Descartes advises an aesthetic of the inconsequential -- she should plunge herself into that which is pleasing but does not matter to her. What he may not foresee is that that which is of no consequence -- colors, forms and texture, scent, sounds and movements -- could very well either find overcoded meaning in terms of the factors of sadness in her life, or could provoke a melancholy and depression due to complete disaffection that could extend itself into all aspects of her life. In light of Elisabeth’s call to a consideration of her passions as not only a personal one, but as a feminine one as well, we could say that Descartes trivializes the feminine relation to sensation, intersubjectivity, and subsequent affectivity and further action, rather than to valorize it in the establishment of a life Philosophy and Morality. The affective is of very little use for Descartes. We could project that an Ignatian counsel would be to effect a *reworking (or manipulation) and exercise (without exorcising) the passions*, and a

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valorisation of the feminine relation to world and others — whether this feminine relation be that of a man or a woman — through the use of imagination and concomittant affectivity rather than their repression, and their use in relation to a life with the Christ and in His service. This would be a Baroque Ethics — very far from Descartes’ Morality. In summary, the circuit of the passions of the soul, from imagination to affectivity to corporal and active results, works for Ignatian Spirituality there where it is a clouding of reason and an impass to virtuous action for Descartes.

Descartes’ main moral principle is to not act under the influence of the passions, and the exercise of the inconsequential he gives to Elisabeth is an intermediary step towards dispassionate, reason-ruled action. For Descartes, in grand stoic fashion, the exercise of reason — nonchalance, no desire, and wilfull direction of spirit — is the technique of happiness. And he thus rejoins the "grandes âmes" who control their passions before life equally well as before a tragic representation. Along with Descartes’ perspectival aesthetic, he has espoused a static morality and advocated anew a dualistic man, and even gone so far as to forget the dynamic, involved forces of the passion of admiration, falling again into single admiration by spirit — imagination and affectivity aside — of perfection. It is almost as if his thought betrays his love and admiration for his dear and very human correspondent, for even from her he exercises and maintains his distance.
D. Conclusion: Reading Descartes with the Baroque

Our analyses of Descartes in a Baroque light and against St. Ignatius’ *Spiritual Exercises* have moved through the topics of education, meditation, Incarnation, the passions and Morality. And we have see that Descartes’ thought must be pursued both intellectually and pedagogically from the *Discours de la méthode* and the *Méditations métaphysiques* through to *Les Passions de l’âme*. Descartes’ model from mechanist man to dualist man must be looked at, for the moment when meditation as he uses it somehow turns on itself and refutes the triadic Christian God, for the moments when Metaphysics becomes by necessity connected to a Physics, as in the case of the Eucharist. The *Cogito*, certitude and atemporality must be followed through to their correlates in *Les Passions de l’âme* of the very Baroque themes of the passions, incertitude and temporality, particularly temporality as in futurality, incertitude and change, and where knowledge includes considerations for living, living well, and living well with others. From the point of view of the *Cogito* and its trajectory to God, the passage is based upon logical reduction to and deduction from the starting place of the ego. This Cartesian ego is an interiorized alterity separated from the world of others, with the accompanying factors of certitude and atemporality, and its reduced image of God -- a God who is Ideal, exclusive of any incarnate possibility, static, geometrically and perspectively placed by the ego as above yet strictly connected to all I/"eye". From the point of view of the passions, particularly that of admiration, to God, the passage is based upon the wondrous other, upon physiological deduction from the starting place of a kind of superego — a self
which moderates the self to live well, in the incertitude and instability of a corporal life set in time and of judgments upon past, present and future actions. This path attains a full image of God — a God aesthetically available who is real, alive, incarnate, of indeterminate concept,\textsuperscript{136} and yet not exclusive of the Symbolic, Ideal or Imaginary God; a God who excessively surrounds us, wondrously overwhelms us, and is transpectively placed about us, to be ultimately within us. And, yes, a God who — because of a link to the sensible realm, to illusion, error, even to madness\textsuperscript{137} — does not exclude the possibility of being a "malin génie" or "Dieu trompeur".\textsuperscript{138} One is a God of the subject's vision; the other, of the subject's synaesthesia. One is a God of \textit{anthropomorphism}, where the reduced subject projects himself, his concepts and his geometry upon the image of God, much like the Platonic fashioning of the transcendental forms; the other, a God of "\textit{morphicanthroposism}"', where the subject gives himself up, as a sentient and sensitive wax, to be formed by God's living

\textsuperscript{136} According to J.-L. Marion, and in harmony with our reading, it is the God of substance who shatters the Cartesian determinate concept of God. \textit{Sur le prisme métaphysique de Descartes} (Paris: PUF, 1986) 230.


\textsuperscript{138} In recent neurological considerations, the factors of sensible perception and affectivity have been shown to be essential to the functioning of reason and reasonable behavior, and perception lacks clarity and distinction without them. In light of such research, Descartes' vision of pure reason was in fact incorrect. See Antonio R. Damasio, \textit{Descartes' Error}. \textit{Emotion, Reason, & the Human Brain} (NY, G.P.Putnam's Sons, 1994). Sensible perception and affectivity have also been shown to enhance memory. Margaret M. Bradley, "Emotional Memory: A Dimensional Analysis", in \textit{Emotions. Essays on Emotion Theory}, ed. H.M.Van Goozen, et.al. (NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Assoc.Pub., 1994) 97-134.
image.\textsuperscript{139} One is a virtually Iconoclast God; the other, a sensual, figured God. In the context of 17th-century atheist or libertine thinkers, we could analogously look at these subjectival stances in relation to the Other, to Nature, to World or Universe, or in the later Husserlian terms of a surrounding "Lifeworld" which the subject’s consciousness "intends". In summary, the Descartes who considers the Eucharist, and the Descartes who considers the passions is another Descartes, moved to know differently, influenced by his Jesuit education and Catholic faith, attracted by the plenitude of a knowledge and an existence not limited by the reduction of doubt and the certitude of reason, but rather mixed with uncertainty, with a measure of madness and unreason, with a measure of dreams, imagination and illusion, with a measure of passion and of the body! This is the counterpoint of a Baroque Descartes -- a Baroque subject and a Baroque Being -- pre-Modern in this sense, wise in his considerations,\textsuperscript{140} able to use and moderate and see and sense through and with the context of the sensate rather than to reject it outright, Postmodern in relation to himself.

\textsuperscript{139} See the traditional image of "le cachet et le cire" which Descartes uses to describe sense impressions and cognition. \textit{Règles pour la direction de l'esprit}, OP, vol.2, 136-139. This image further serves him in the description of the functioning of the pineal gland.

\textsuperscript{140} Descartes concludes concerning the control of the passions: "Mais la sagesse est principalement utile en ce point, qu'elle enseigne à s'en rendre tellement maître et à les [les passions] ménager avec tant d'adresse, que les maux qu'elles causent sont fort supportables, et même qu'on tire de la joie de tous." \textit{Les Passions de l'âme}, Art.212, in OP, vol.3, 1103. Emphasis is our own.
V. MATERIALIST PROXIMITIES & BAROQUE ECLIPSE OF DISTANCE:
PHILOSOPHY FROM PIERRE GASSENDI (+1592,-1655) TO MAURICE
MERLEAU-PONTY (+1908,-1961)

In opposition to Cartesian Rationalism and its mode of perception, we would like to examine here Philosophies of "thinking matter" and of the body, perpetuated as Empiricism and Philosophies of Sensualism, in light of Counter-Reformation, Baroque, Reformist and Rationalist perspectives on corporality, affectivity and presence, in the thought of the great 17th-century French Philosopher Pierre Gassendi (+1592,-1655), who was also a scientist, a naturalist, an astronomer and a theologian, to illustrate exactly what is the epistemological dimension of the Baroque era. From there, we shall go on to illustrate that this Philosophy finds its achievement in the thought -- both in full heritage of Cartesianism and Philosophical Modernity and in the 20th-century amplitude to critique it -- of the Philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty (+1908,-1961). This shall allow us to characterize a Baroque epistemology as well as to situate in the contemporary Philosophical domain a Baroque return, and to qualify there Merleau-Ponty's thought as a particular kind of Postmodernity, a Baroque Postmodernity, and Merleau-Ponty as a Baroque philosopher. A Philosophy where materialist proximity and corporal presence to objects of knowledge, indeed materialist and corporal transcendence over the realms
of consciousness and knowledge in an Empiricism and a Sensualism, eclipses all
distance established by Cartesian thought, its perspective and Rational philosophy, not
without strong implications as well for the domains of Spirituality, the Arts and
Letters. Each of these Philosophers has grappled with Rationalism as expressed in
Descartes' thought in particular, and the subjectival distance necessitated by its
epistemology, to demand Metaphysics' incarnation in Philosophies as well as scientific
convictions based in Empiricism, Atomism, Sensualism, Behaviorism and the theory
of the chiasm. It is here that we will begin the current study, to establish possible
parallels between Gassendi's Epicurean Atomism and Merleau-Ponty's Philosophy of
the body and theory of the chiasm, and finally to argue for a Baroque epistemology
and science in its 20th-century return.

For Pierre Gassendi, whose work we shall follow mainly in its Philosophical
and Epistemological dimension, the polemic with Descartes lasted for six years, from
1641-1646. This can be followed in the fifth objections to Descartes' Médiations
métaphysiques, which we have already examined in our study of Descartes.
Gassendi's Disquisitio metaphysica (1644), a work which stands on its own to respond
to the Médiations métaphysiques, was written initially at Marin Mersenne's request in
the form of Instantiae as a direct response to Descartes' reply to Gassendi's initial
objections published with the Médiations.¹ As such, it is not a systematic
presentation of Gassendi's thought on knowledge, but rather a point-for-point response

¹ Olivier Bloch, "Descartes et Gassendi", Europe. Revue littéraire mensuelle 594 (oct.
to Descartes' work, and we shall not spend much time examining it here. The *Exercises in the form of Paradoxes Against the Aristotelians* (1624, Grenoble), an unfinished work which grew out of his lectures as Chair of Philosophy at the University of Aix-en-Provence, was Gassendi's first work for publication, is strongly based in Scepticism, and critiques belief in the existence of universals outside of sense experience. This precedes Gassendi's engagement with Epicurean Atomism. Also, the first part on Logic of the major work the *Syntagma philosophicum* (1649-55; †1658), Gassendi's view of knowledge, deals with both the origin of ideas and logic and rejects deductive method and its Philosophy from Plato to the thought of Descartes, to favor the inductive method, the use of the senses and refusal of innate ideas. These two works shall be of first concern to us. At its basis, they represent a Philosophy of Sensualism, which would be continued by John Locke (+1632,-1704) and Etienne Bonnot de Condillac (+1715,-1780). In fact, in his great influence upon

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2 Today, it is mostly for this opposition that Gassendi is remembered, but in his own day his own theories prevailed over those of Descartes, and more intellectuals considered themselves Gassendists than not.

3 This work is a third version revision of an initial version entitled the *Animadversiones* (1649) which was begun as early as 1626, and which was in turn the result of a dismembered manuscript version of his *De Vita et Doctrina Epicuri*.

4 Organized according to Epicurus' tripartite division of Philosophy, the following two parts of this work deal with Physics, offering a mechanistic explanation for nature and sensation, and Ethics, on the question of happiness and the final goal of human life. The second segment on Physics is the largest bulk of the work. We have access to both the *Exercises in the form of Paradoxes against the Aristotelians* and the Logic of the *Syntagma philosophicum* in translation and selection, in *The Selected Works of Pierre Gassendi*, edited and translated Craig B. Brush (NY, London: Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1972).

English thought, Philosophy and science of the 17th and 18th centuries, we can consider Gassendi as the first Empiricist.

For Maurice Merleau-Ponty, such engagement with the Philosophy of Descartes and Rational thought as it represses the material and the corporal, to result in his own Philosophy of the body, takes place on two levels. Firstly, in Merleau-Ponty’s discipleship to the father of Phenomenology, Edmund Husserl (+1859,-1938), despite Husserl’s attachment to the a priori mode of Philosophy and the lingering Cartesianism in his thought. It is particularly Husserl’s concept of noesis, the pretheoretical and the preobjective, and their role in the Cogito which reworked the "rational" terrain to amplify and restore a certain dimensionality to the Cartesian subject, to pave the way for priviledging the role of the body as locus in the act of cognition and in the "Lifeworld", and thus to serve as contemporary Baroque points of departure in 20th-century Philosophy. And secondly, Merleau-Ponty’s engagement with Descartes and positing of the body-subject takes place in his concern with the process of perception throughout his work, but particularly in La Phénoménologie de la perception (1945), L’Oeil et l’esprit (1960), and the posthumous work taken from class notes, Le Visible et l’invisible (1964), followed by his concern with nature, aesthetics and the sign.
A. Pierre Gassendi and Thinking Matter

"Thinking matter" is not so much a matter which thinks, or a thinking which moves through matter as its conduit, as it is an indissociable relation between thought and matter reflective of a monist philosophy of the human being and in rejection of any separate existence of the world of ideas, or of innate, a priori ideas prior to sense perception as seen from Platonism to Cartesianism. This is a concept of thought as wholly material, of a Je suis une matière qui pense, involving human corporality in the cosmic picture, indeed on a corpuscular level in the science of Gassendi's atomistic world view, and as an epistemology, where Metaphysics has its Physics. It needs must refuse the Philosophical distinction between substance and accident, as the latter is all we can know by sense perception. On the spiritual terrain which Gassendi frequented as priest and theologian, however, such a "monism" might be seen as virtual rather than absolute, where the body participates to a far greater extent in the spiritual relationship, yet without negating a belief in the life of the spirit. From here, Gassendi replies to Descartes on the question of the Eucharist that Transubstantiation must be relegated to the realm of a mystery which supasses us, and that the Divinity is immense and comprehends all. His difference with Descartes

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6 This opposition between an intellectual and a sensory-based epistemology goes as far back as the discussion in Plato’s Sophist, from which Thomas M. Lennon takes his title The Battle of the Gods and the Giants. Legacies of Descartes & Gassendi, 1655-1715 (Princeton University Press, 1993). He thus views this opposition as ahistorical and copresent to Western Philosophy, in what we see as a Baroque/Classical tension which Eurgenio d’Ors, for example, views as cyclical, in his Du Baroque. Trans. Agathe Rouart-Valéry. (Paris: Gallimard, 1968).

7 Such a conflict in the use of the term "monism" in a spiritual context, with its suggestion of a libertine materialism, is at the very heart of the religious dimension of our thesis which seeks to present a Baroque, materialist spirituality. The perplexing character of Gassendi as a philosopher and as a priest is a very example of this conflict on a personal level.
came out of his Atomistic, and not spiritual, Philosophy, for as Gassendi replied to Descartes’ dualism, how can what is foreign to the material world and not of corporal existence have an impact upon it? Such a subject would be truly present to the objects of its perception, examination and knowledge. For Gassendi’s Physics developed alongside his Philosophical Materialism.

Gassendi’s atomistic view issues from his revalorisation of the Greek philosopher Epicurus (c.341-270 B.C.) in three erudite works, much of which are compilations, published from 1647-1649. In fact, Gassendi considered himself to be an Epicurean philosopher from 1628, or even as far back as 1626 on. Epicurus taught that all sensation, images and appearances are real, and that all relation or communication is an interconnection, if we dare not say a "chiasmus", of atoms. This view can be further followed in the work De rerum natura of Epicurus' faithful disciple Lucretius (c.100-55 B.C.), through which Epicurus’ thought became known to early Modernity through Poggio’s discovery of the text of Lucretius in 1417. But it was not until Gassendi that his Atomism was truly revived and proposed, for Lucretius’ work had been appreciated initially for its poetic value. From this, comes

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9 “The only primary texts available to Gassendi would have been the letters and sayings of Epicurus preserved in Book X of Diogenes Laërtius. There was also the De rerum natura of Lucretius, whose manuscript had been rediscovered in the fifteenth century and printed in a notable edition by
Gassendi’s Empiricism and Logic -- all that we know by necessity springs *a posteriori* from material experience, and mind itself is matter -- and his refusal of the Cartesian mode of axiomatic, deductive, *a priori* knowledge used to mathesize the material realm. For Gassendi, errors in thought came not from faulty logic, by from inadequate experiential inquiry: "If it should happen that someone made an error in some matter, you will observe that the cause is not that he did not know logic, but he had not examined the thing thoroughly enough."\(^{10}\) In his affront to Cartesian thought in the *Disquisitio metaphysica*, Gassendi’s basic premise is the valuation of sense data as the source of our knowledge, from which point he ridicules what he calls Descartes’ *artifice* in divesting himself through hyperbolic doubt of all worldly experience to move towards a "pure *Cogito*". For Gassendi, such a vacuous context is impossible, as well as any thought from within it. An exposition of Gassendi’s empirical position can be found in his *Exercises in the form of Paradoxes against the Aristotelians* (1624, Grenoble), where "paradox" is meant as counterance to the rather frozen Aristotelian dogma taught by the Scholastics and the Jesuits as well, which he

\(^{10}\) *Exercises in the form of Paradoxes against the Aristotelians*, The Selected Works of Pierre Gassendi, 35. Gassendi does however neglect the question of mathematics in favor of the study of exterior material things. For him, mathematics necessarily circumvents the sensible realm. As François Bernier summarizes it, the geometrization of matter is clearly opposed to the atomistic view and to the recourse to sense perception and world; that which is facile in the geometrical realm is not always so in the physical realm; and finally, mathematization should only be introduced where it corroborates the discoveries of Physics. Where for Descartes the essence of matter is extension, for Gassendi it is its solid and impenetrable atomism which comes first to preclude extension. *Abrégé de la Philosophie de Gassendi*, 7 vols. (Lyon, 1684; Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1992) vol.2, 101-105, 333.
felt betrayed Aristotle's spirit of open, ongoing inquiry. Gassendi's severe critique of Logic and its uses can be found as well in Part One of the Syntagma Philosophicum, a work in which he clarifies his own view of knowledge.

1. Gassendi's Views on Knowledge, Logic and the Sign

Gassendi's logic, as presented in the first part of the Syntagma philosophicum, begins with a general view of knowledge and method towards truth as the practice of Philosophy. That is, logic's goal is this art of correct thinking. Gassendi believes that knowledge of sensible appearances or attributes and sense impressions is possible but, with a residue of the scepticism with which he started out, that the inner nature of things, or the essence or substance, is unknowable. In fact, essences are inseparable from existence for Gassendi. This knowledge based on sensible appearances and sense impressions is also provisional, progressive and historically tied, as technical developments (such as the vision-oriented telescope and microscope in Gassendi's era) can arrive on the scientific scene to bring more information to sense perception. Thus in Gassendi's Empiricism of an open-ended, inductive logic, absolute certitude belongs to a futural horizon towards which we progressively move.
with probable truths. Unlike certitude as the beginning point in Cartesian Philosophy and method, in Gassendi’s Philosophy certitude is the hypothetical end of the practice of logic, the search for truth and perception. Furthermore, there is a certain given faith in perception, something we shall see with Merleau-Ponty as well, even though perception is practiced over and over again. Thus knowledge is limited by and relative to its place and time. It engages continuing inquiry and presence to the corpus and objects of knowledge, just as we have signalled the chain of presences to representation as characteristic of the Baroque épistémè in all its manifestations. This Empiricism is thus not an irrationalism.

This empirical, in-process search for truth brings us to Gassendi’s discussion of the sign which leads to it, taken from Epicurus and as presented in Chapter 5 of the Syntagma, which also presents his media via between Scepticism and Dogmatism. In Gassendi’s logic, the truth can be hidden by nature, or hidden for a time. It is here that the sign has its role. A sign can be indicative of that which is hidden by

12 Edmund Husserl’s world or horizon of experience finds a premonition here. Let us also note that this progress in the accumulation of knowledge is not the Enlightenment sense of “progress” in the development of human spirit. Olivier R. Bloch, La Philosophie de Gassendi (La Haye: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971) 73.

13 H.T.Egan, Gassendi’s View of Knowledge, 155. In an historically grounded review of Gassendi’s contribution to Philosophical Modernity which considers the English terrain to rebalance the picture away from Descartes, G.A.J.Rogers qualifies the Modern as “the abandonment of the certain in favor of the probable as the accepted epistemic norm”. “Gassendi and the Birth of Modern Philosophy”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 26.4 (dec.1995): 686. We can go on to extend this épistémè of probability into the spiritual realm, with the virtual Inhabitational stance of the Ignatian exercitant, and the presence of spectator, beholder and reader in the aesthetic, theatrical and literary work, whose futural horizon would be the certitude of being-there, and whose existence would be constant exercise towards it, in a positivistic Pragmatism.

nature, necessary to it and thus reveal it, and such signs of the invisible, while
beginning at the sceptic’s starting point of sensation, 15 challenge sceptical limitations
to appearances alone, and take sense data further to point towards an Atomistic view
of nature, as atoms lie below the range of our senses. Thus Gassendi’s Empiricism is
not so naïve. Gassendi’s constant example is of how sweat reveals the existence of
pores in the skin. This oft-used example becomes an image for Gassendi’s Atomistic
view of science. The sign and its relation to Atomism is initially presented by
Lucretius. 16 This is the type of sign which most concerns Gassendi, and which the
Sceptics, tied to the knowledge of appearances alone, do not accept. A sign can also
suggest that which is hidden for a time, as in smoke which reveals the presence of
fire. 17 In these cases, the sign brings what is hidden to presence. Gassendi also goes
so far as to say that signs in the universe can indicate the artisanship of God, even
though they may not reveal His true nature. As the highest science for Gassendi,
logic is a species of theology, for knowing is ultimately to know God. 18

The sign also illustrates how Gassendi’s method is not devoid of reason, but
rather joins reason to sense perceptions or what Gassendi calls the image, and to

15 Descartes’ refutation of scepticism, however, began by refuting this very sense-oriented
starting point. Both Sceptics and Descartes distrusted sense appearances, however the Sceptics felt
themselves to be limited to it. Stanley G. Kane, “The Beginnings of Modern Thought: Philosophy &

16 On the Nature of the Universe, trans.&introd. R.E.Latham (Baltimore: Penguin Books,
1951) 35-37, 69.

17 H.T.Egan, Gassendi’s View of Knowledge, 77.

intellect.\textsuperscript{19} The image is to Gassendi what the idea, criticized by him, is to Descartes’ thought. Gassendi’s Philosophy pulls ideality towards the imaginary and treasorial real, just as we have examined the sign in the Baroque religious context. For Gassendi, the imagination is simply perception and understanding which works through the sensual image. From here, perception, composite and divisional organization, and dialectic take place.\textsuperscript{20} Thus there is no process of intellection without the basis of sense perception. And also, reason leads where sense perception or image alone can grant it access, and Gassendi’s Philosophy cannot be qualified as one of irrationalism, nor is mind simply reduced to matter. It is simply that the sensate image begins the logical process even as revealed through the sign; \textit{all ideas, then, come from the images where they originate}.\textsuperscript{21} This indissociable relation, which is essentially one of a mind and body monism on the epistemological terrain, keeps Gassendi from a total Scepticism which wallows in sense appearance alone.\textsuperscript{22} The image is a clear, often-repeated impression or pattern of sensation of the object upon the mind. It is the starting point in Gassendi’s logical progression from ideas to

\textsuperscript{19} The image, as sense perception, could be joined to the concept of the image as grace offered to the Inhabitational stance of the exercitant-subject.

\textsuperscript{20} F. Bernier, \textit{Abrégé de la Philosophie de Gassendi}, "Les fonctions de la phantaisie", Vol.6, book iv.

\textsuperscript{21} For Gassendi there is however more of a separation or interlude between sense perception and intellection than there is for Epicurus, where sense is mind and Physics is knowledge. David K. Glidden, "Hellenistic Background for Gassendi’s Theory of Ideas", 420.

\textsuperscript{22} H.T. Egan places Gassendi’s thought in a middle way or \textit{media via} between Scepticism and Dogmatism. Gassendi’s View of Knowledge, 125, what R.H. Popkin calls a “constructive scepticism”. The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979) 141.
propositions to syllogism to method, there where the concept is the starting place in Cartesian thought, as represented in *La Logique de Port Royal* (1662).\(^{23}\) For Gassendi, nothing is in the intellect which does not have its origin in the senses, there are no innate ideas, and this offended the thought of Port Royal. This belief is particularly based upon indicative signs from which Gassendi concludes that the whole of truth cannot be known, but some of it can, and that this truth is about appearances, and not about the absolute inner nature of things.\(^{24}\) This is Gassendi’s final epistemological position. His goal is to make as much as possible of truth directly accessible to sense perception.

Also of interest in Gassendi’s view is that as knowledge is based upon the image or clear sense perception and, furthermore, as perception is from a multiple, indeed Baroque viewpoint for Gassendi, unlike the singular point of view of Cartesian perspectival vision, various perceptions can lead to differing judgments by different individuals, and thus Modernity’s singular subject as in the Cartesian "un seul" is exploded:

\(^{23}\) Where Descartes however moved from a mechanistic to a dualistic vision of man, Gassendi’s mind/body monism and materialism of mind maintains his view of man within the mechanistic vision, which can imply an isolation of nature from God and an eventual Atheism, as many have seen in his thought despite its orthodox corrections, and despite his personal life as parish priest.

\(^{24}\) "[...] and let it be enough if we say that not every truth can be known by the mind, but at least some can concerning something otherwise hidden, or not obvious to the senses themselves." *Syntagma Philosophicum: The Logic*, in *The Selected Works of Pierre Gassendi*, 336.
Since the judgments of different men about the same things as they are first perceived by the senses are so very different, what other conclusion can one draw except that it is legitimate for each man to label things the way he sees them?25

The empirical search for truth must by force have recourse to new and multiple sense perceptions of sensible appearances, which is in fact an advocacy of an excess of the image, and fits the Baroque épistémè.26 In cases of conflicting relations between reason and sense, it is sense data which must always receive the focus of the final judgment, but here a sense data tested over and over again and cleared from the uncertainty of any possible deception.27 Experience has primacy and it is to this that natural logic is applied.28 We shall see a similar logic at work behind Merleau-Ponty’s theory of the sedimentation of meaning.29


28 "But when it sometimes happens that reason seems to be in conflict with the senses, Aristotle teaches most strikingly that we must decide more on the basis of the senses than on the basis of reason." *Syntagma: The Logic*, *The Selected Works of Pierre Gassendi*, 372.

29 This passage from Gassendist Empiricism to contemporary scientific method demonstrates that a critique of Cartesian, Philosophical Modernity does not necessarily lead to a critique of contemporary science and technology, as is in current critical fashion, and is even erroneous. Indeed, this critique should lead to a revalorisation of thinkers such as Gassendi, the entirety of Empiricism and its consequences, both scientific and philosophical, to this day. See, for example, G.A.J. Rogers, "Gassendi and the Birth of Modern Philosophy", 683. Edmund Husserl further confirms the neglect of
2. Gassendi’s Atomism, as an intuition of Merleau-Ponty’s *Chiasm*

Gassendi’s Atomism is the physical correlate to his Epistemology and logic of the sign or image. A true Humanist, Gassendi revived classical Atomism in the 17th century, yet by coloring its Paganism with Christianity. As Lucretius’ *De natura rerum* was his principle source for the Atomism of Antiquity,30 we shall begin by summarizing this work’s main concepts before going on to distinguish Gassendi’s modifications or differences.

*De natural rerum* begins by positing the concepts of signs of the invisible, indivisible, hard and permanent atoms below the range of our senses which compose all matter, the void, and the existence of atoms in a limitless universe which nonetheless has a center. We have already seen such a concept of the sign of the invisible elaborated in the *Logic* of Gassendi’s *Syntagma philosophicum*. Following Lucretius, Gassendi himself shall make further comparisons between the properties of language and Atomism, to which we shall return. For Lucretius, the atoms are in constant motion and swerve unaccountably into one another for myriad combinations in a chaos of unpredictable brownian movement uncontrolled by any god31 -- what is known as the *clinamen*. They consist of a limited number of different shapes and forms, each of which is infinite in quantity, is colorless, tasteless, odorless, without sound and temperature, although there is no effort, either in Lucretius or in Gassendi,

30 See note 8 herein.

31 The relation to Chaos theory here was first suggested by Alexandre Koyré.
to enumerate them exactly. Altogether, these atoms are the imperishable foundation to all matter.

In such a concept of the universe, man is a unified being, as mind is a material part of man and is imbricated in his corporality. As such, mind’s vitality resides in the body as a whole in what Lucretius pictured as infinitesimally subtle atoms without weight; the mind grows with the body’s very vitality and dies with it as well, and it cannot survive outside the body.\textsuperscript{32} From this, comes the conclusion that there is no immortality of the soul, wherefrom death should be nothing to us and we should live life without fear and in happiness. In actuality, this is not so much a Hedonism, as a life well measured towards simple, frugal pleasures. Thus Materialism joins Atheism. This shall provide crucial conflict with Gassendi’s Christianizing viewpoint, and one which he shall not resolve directly, thus maintaining a monist Philosophy.

To this Classical doctrine which comes from Parmenides that all materially contains all, that nothing which exists can pass into the nonexistent, and that all matter is composed of atoms,\textsuperscript{33} Gassendi, in addition to repeating and reviving such beliefs, also made some Christianizing changes,\textsuperscript{34} which we have followed mostly in Craig B. Brush’s translation and selection from the lengthy \textit{Physics} of the \textit{Syntagma}.

\textsuperscript{32} We shall find this copresence of mind and soul to body in Merleau-Ponty’s thought as well.

\textsuperscript{33} A doctrine that could certainly encompass the religious concepts of Immensity, where all is in the all, and Inhabitation, where this all can become a very part of us.

\textsuperscript{34} Francis Bacon (+1561,-1626) initially accepted and then rejected Atomistic doctrines, Galileo (+1564,-1642) himself believed in atoms and the void, while in 1624 the Sorbonne condemned Atomistic doctrines. Craig Brush, translator’s introduction to the \textit{Physics}, \textit{The Selected Works of Pierre Gassendi}. 
Philosophicium, and also in François Bernier's 1684, seven-volume Abrégé de la Philosophie de Gassendi, which gives a more accessible digestion in French of the unwieldy Syntagma. Where in Epicurean and Lucretian thought atoms are of eternal essence, Gassendi posits created ones; where the universe is infinite, Gassendi posits a finite one; and where atoms move according to the laws of chance, Gassendi views them as functioning according to the laws of Physics integral to a finite universe constructed intelligently to fulfill God's goals. Thus an infinity of matter or worlds is refused by Gassendi. And all that we understand can come from sense perception of an intelligible universe. Nonetheless, the movement of atoms remains a premise part of a mechanistic universe, however this movement is either thought, or simply corrected out by necessity by Gassendi, to be incited by God in His act of creation. Also, the spirit, still material and intelligible, composed of the most subtle of matters and coextensive with the body, is considered by Gassendi to be capable of survival beyond the body, even to be part of a world spirit or "Ame du monde", a spiritual correlate to the foundational atoms which compose all of the material world. It is here that the use of the term "monism" is restricted in the Gassendist context. Thus Gassendi's Atomistic system, while taking the mechanistic view from Epicurus, must need leave behind the extreme Paganism of its Materialism. Yet, prior to and despite these christianizing concessions, Gassendi's Philosophy and Science do resolve dualism without recourse to the concept of God.

35 But not by his libertine student, Savinien Cyrano de Bergerac.

In Book Five of the *Physics*, Gassendi speaks on the movement and change of atoms. As does Lucretius in Book I on the "Movement and Shapes of Atoms", so Gassendi compares their finite forms, combination and progression to the progression of logic, and furthermore to the combinatorial aspect of language:

And as the same two letters or more when they precede or follow each other in different order suggest different words to the eye, the ear, and the mind [...] and so on endlessly as those who play anagrams know; so the same atoms in various transpositions display different qualities or appearances, to the senses.\(^{37}\)

Given the absolute elementism of the atom itself, it is in reality the combinatorial relation of atoms which ultimately interests both Classical and Gassendist Atomicism. This type of comparison not only links Gassendi's Epistemology to his Physics and vice-versa, but also returns to the Epicurean and Lucretian chaos of atomistic combinations despite the option for a Christianized view of a God-constructed, God-driven universe. This Atomism of matter in motion is also related to Gassendi's Ethics which opts for human freedom in opposition to Divine Providence in man's acts and their relation to grace, distinguished as both sufficient and efficacious.\(^{38}\) It is in such moments that, once again, Gassendi's own theism comes into question.

\(^{*}\)


The combination of atoms, found in the monist philosophy of mind and body and in the process of atomistic exchange and mutual permutation, and also found in the Baroque subject and his stances of Immensity and Inhabitation, as well as an open process of perception, sense making and truth seeking which refuses universals and places certitude on the futural or virtual horizon of experience, is, we find, echoed and further elaborated on the 20th century terrain in Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Philosophy of the "chiasm" and its inherent logic of perception, presented in La Structure du comportement (1942) and La Phénoménologie de la perception (1945), but particularly as elaborated in Le Visible et l'Invisible (†1964). In this work, perception becomes an act of carnal overlap and exchange between seer and seen, between subject and object, much like what is captured in the religious stances of Immensity and Inhabitation, and much like the process of a thinking matter within the horizon and constitution of that which it observes. As such, Merleau-pontian perception brings an affective coloring to what was first elaborated in Classical Antiquity as an Atomistic scientific doctrine and Philosophy of Knowledge. This overlapping or "chiasm" as Maurice Merleau-Ponty calls it, has inherent to it a logic

of perception and an Epistemology which he has elaborated in previous work from 1942-1945 and 1960, on behavior, perception and aesthetics, and the position of consciousness as body-subject, works which also engage with the issue of Cartesian subjectivity and the question of perspective since the era of Philosophical Modernity. Merleau-Ponty's own position comes out of the direct influence upon him of Edmund Husserl's work on the place of the subject in the cognitive act. We shall begin our examination of what we envision as a prolongation and 20th-century achievement of the outcomes of Gassendi's Atomism and its Epistemology in the thought of these two philosophers, with Edmund Husserl as the point of departure for the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. With Merleau-Ponty we shall examine areas of perception, the concept of the *chiasm*, the world, aesthetics and the sign.

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40 Merleau-Ponty never thinks himself back to Gassendi and other 17th, 18th and 19th century Empiricists, keeping his debate and engagement with Classical Philosophy, a lapsus which is evident in this quote from *La Phénoménologie de la perception*: "Il est frappant de voir que les philosophies transcendales du type classique ne s’interrogent jamais sur la possibilité d’effectuer l’explicitation totale faite quelque part." (Paris: Gallimard, 1945) 74.
B. From Edmund Husserl (+1859,-1938) to Maurice Merleau-Ponty: Baroque Points of Departure

It is in Merleau-Ponty’s reading and assessment of Edmund Husserl’s thought on opening up the conceptual realm to look at consciousness and the perception of phenomena that we can see his sources for a Philosophy of the body and its role in perception and aesthetics, in alterity, in Metaphysics and belief, and in meaning as particularly Baroque in aspect, all of which is not with out resonance for Heidegger’s thought on presence in Being & Time (1927). Not only can we link surprisingly this Philosophy back to that of Pierre Gassendi, but also Merleau-Ponty’s manner of reading Husserl and his points of departure from Husserl’s thought bring us to consider Merleau-Ponty exemplary as a contemporary Baroque philosopher.

Merleau-Ponty pays particular attention to Husserl’s Ideas I, II & III, (1913, 1950 & 1952, respectively), and significantly to the constitution of the natural and spiritual worlds discussed in Ideas II, to Husserl’s theory of the senses and apophantic logic in Formal & Transcendental Logic (1929), and to The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (1936, 1954), particularly parts II and III which address the combinations of Phenomenological Transcendentalism with Psychology to definitively break with a Philosophy of essences and scientific mathematization to join a Philosophy of experience and world, and to revamp the foundations of Modern reason, scientific perception, approach and

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practice along with this entire Philosophical endeavor.\footnote{See also H.L.
Van Breda’s review of Merleau-Ponty’s relationship with the Husserl
Archives and his consultations there of unedited texts, in “Maurice
Merleau-Ponty et les Archives-Husserl à Louvain”, Revue de métaphysique et
de morale no.4 (oct.-déc.1962): 410-430.} Let us then quickly review
Husserl’s thought in these texts, as well as in the Cartesian Meditations
(1929),\footnote{Husserl would never release publication of the Cartesian
Meditations in German, and meant the text of the Crisis as a favored replacement for them. Editor’s note, The Crisis of European
beyond Merleau-Ponty’s immediate use of Husserl in order to see the NeoBaroque
directions potentially traced out by this Philosopher of the everyday Lifeworld, and to
permit us, in conclusion, to loop the loop with the Philosophy of Pierre Gassendi.
We shall thus review Husserl with our Baroque axis of reading as it examines the
topics of the body, affectivity and sensibility, the real, the realm of experience,
perception, consciousness and world, the metaphor of spectacle, spatiality and
presence, and subjectivity and language, even to take us as far back as Ignatian
Spirituality. In this manner our analysis here aims to illustrate the Husserl-to-
Merleau-Ponty trajectory as Baroque.

Merleau-Ponty speaks of the task of Phenomenology in the context of his
evaluation of Husserl’s thought, as the effort to unveil the level which is
pretheoretical to idealizations of both matter and spirit, or in other words to unveil the
relation between us and the world.\footnote{This is different from Husserl’s view of transcendental Phenomenology’s concern with the
acts or intentions which constitute the world for pure consciousness. These would be noematic acts. We shall nuance
Husserl’s various positions shortly. Elégie de la philosophie, 253; La Nature. Notes, Cours du Collège de France (Paris: Le
Seuil, 1995) 103.} It is exactly Husserl’s concepts of noesis, layers
of perception or modifications of attention, and neutral consciousness which he uses to understand not only the pretheoretical (in the realm of Philosophy), but the prethetic and the preobjective (in the realms of Logic, Language and Aesthetics) as well. That is, there where subject and object, noesis and noema, or Husserl’s matter with sensibility and the concept come together and overlap; as Merleau-Ponty states it, "la distinction du sujet et de l’objet est brouillée dans mon corps, et sans doute celle de la noèse et du noème". This meeting and overlap takes place in precisely the corporal site, which is evident in Merleau-Ponty’s thought and formulations, but firstly we must find how it can come out of Husserl’s thought -- despite his reactions against British Empiricism reduced to its elements of radical scepticism -- that the body is integrated as locus into perception, belief or Cogito, and into concepts concerning being, presence and knowledge.

Husserl emphasizes the aesthetic experience of object and the other, and the affectivity and volition involved in such experience, as modes of consciousness and belief. It is in this emphasis upon the aesthetic that body, materiality and sensibility find an important role. Let us then examine how Husserl situates aesthetic experience and, consequently, affective experience, in his system of the noesis and the noema, in

45 Eloge de la philosophie, 257.

46 This is an appropriate critique of David Hume’s thought, which attacks the building up of concepts. Merleau-Ponty as well shall reject the lack of sophistication of Hume’s Empiricism of brute sensation. Gassendi was not against an accumulation of knowledge through continuing sense perceptions or, as Husserl himself would say, in variations of perspective which progressively enrich meaning and open up world horizons, and can also leave unnoticed horizons in the form of the incomprehensible. In fact, Husserl marvels at the fact that such accumulation hasn’t taken place in the face of what he calls "naïve-object science". Despite his critique, then, Husserl in fact revalorizes radical British Empiricism’s motif of shaking a pure, "naïve" objectivism. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, 59, 83-86, 158, 181, 198-9.
his distinctions of belief or *Cogito*, and in the outline of a place for Being and the subject, or the *ergo sum*.

It is in the context of explaining what Husserl calls "intentional consciousness" or the "experiencing of something",\(^47\) that is, in the context of perception or acts of thought, that he uses the categories of *noesis* and *noema*.\(^48\) In the context of our Baroque reading of Husserl, it is the concept of *noesis* which interests us the most. The *noesis* is the real object, *wανη* or matter, and that which is often bracketed out of the conceptual in traditional Metaphysics, Cartesian thought, and Logic, and by Husserl as transcendentalist as well, as reduced phenomena and world to be suspended. It is the real factor in normal perception, and as such it can have many incalculable perceptual layers or facets when approached by the perceiving subject, or even modalities throughout the process of recollection, and can capture feeling, desire or appetite, and will, that is, *affective intentions* and *aesthetic stance* on the part of the perceiving subject, what Merleau-Ponty shall later pick up on as the "constitution" of perception, and what we have captured in speaking of "subjectival stance". This stratified formation of perception is what situates intentionality in a context and history, and what enriches, develops and renews meaning, or the *noematic*. The

\(^{47}\) This comes from Franz Brentano's thought: consciousness is always a consciousness of something, perception is always perception of something and, likewise, an object is always an object for a perceiving consciousness. See Jean-François Lyotard's assessment in *Phenomenology*. Trans. Brian Beakley (Albany: State University of NY Press, 1991) 43, 65.

noema, then, is the domain of meaning, intentional factors in consciousness, mental glance, Ego, or the perceiving subject as well. Both noesis and noema work together and come into play in the act of perception, which expresses man as a free and knowing being:

The Ego [...] "lives" in such acts. This life does not signify the being of any "contents" of any kind in a stream of contents, but a variety of describable ways in which the pure Ego in certain intentional experiences, which have the general mode of the Cogito, lives therein as the "free essence" which it is. The expression "as free essence" refers, however, to nothing more than such modes of life as the going freely out of oneself, or going back upon oneself, spontaneous doing, experiencing something from objects, suffering, and so forth. 49

Thus we see a kind of back and forth process between noesis and noema which recalls the subject-to-object/Other relation in Baroque aesthetic, to include affective acting out, "being-in" as in Heidegger's presentation of the relation to the beckoning work of art, or abdication of self as in the example of suffering which Husserl gives. Indeed, perception and consciousness can be considered aesthetic tasks. Husserl further nuances the concept of the Cogito according to this partnership, in terms of positional and neutral belief. The positional, or doxic Cogito corresponds to the noema, as belief, meaning, and thetic positioning. The neutral modification of belief -- what we understand as prethetic, and what Husserl calls "positings only not of the doxic kind", 50 and therefore prior to the distinctions of affirmation and negation -- corresponds to the noesis, and includes affect, volition and fancy, and the aesthetic. Here there is potential for belief, and myriad possibilities for being, which open up the

49 Ideas I, §92, ¶6, 249 (225-6). Emphasis is our own.

50 Ideas I, §17, 303 (279).
conceptual, the linguistic, and the perceptive or aesthetic.⁵¹ In fact, Husserl asks
"how new noematic characterizations (good, beautiful and so forth)" — that is,
noemata forged anew through aesthetic judgments — "stand to the modalities of
belief."⁵² That is, how neutral consciousness or the reflective attitude (as opposed to
the theory-oriented judging attitude), and how corporality and affectivity affect Belief
or Cogito, and, vice versa, how Belief, the Cogito, and the Psychic embed themselves
in corporality; or, in other words how each, in turn, is an organ for the other.⁵³ Thus
Husserl goes on to nuance further the concept of Cogito, and takes formal logic into
the realm of corporal existence and practice, a task which would be pleasing to Pierre
Gassendi:

Cogito can signify "I perceive", "I remember", or "I expect" — modes of
consciousness that indeed belong in the doxic sphere, though not in the sphere
of predicatively determining thinking. But it can also signify: I exercise
"valuing" emotional activities in liking or disliking, in hoping or fearing, or
volitional activities or the like. [...] Thus the formal logic of certainties can
not only be enriched by taking in the forms of the <doxic> modalities, but
can also absorb, in a certain manner, the modalities of emotion and volition.
These observations enable us to foresee that the spheres comprising extra-
doxic acts can likewise be considered formally. This has great significance,

⁵¹ Jean-Paul Sartre characterizes the Husserlian Cogito as transparent, as opposed to an

⁵² Ideas I, 303.

⁵³ Formal and Transcendental Logic. Trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1969) 133; Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. Second
the soul finds the body, and their totality finds its meaning in real experience in the Lifeworld. From
this point, perception is considered the "natural attitude". The Crisis of European Sciences and
Transcendental Phenomenology, 206-212.
because it opens up the possibility of broadening the idea of *formal logic to include a formal axiology and a formal theory of practice.*

And we shall go further as to say that the Baroque finds a space for return in this very realm of affective and volitional impact upon Belief and, consequently, Being, which incessantly invites sense experience and renews meaning, opens up the thetic, the syntactical and, for Husserl as well as for Gassendi, formal logic -- not with the exclusion of body, affectivity and desire, but rather by means of them. The affective and volitional dimensions Husserl adds to the knowing subject further round out the Gassendist sensing subject.

And yet, with respect to consciousness, let us note along with Paul Ricoeur an important separation between Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. The transcendental Husserl will move from what he calls the "natural attitude" -- the realm of corporal existence and "Intentional Being" -- towards the transcendental constitution of world by a process of reduction which involves a Cartesian-like disconnection, bracketing off and rejection of the natural world, and a limitation towards the self, or towards "Absolute Being". Merleau-Ponty, on the other hand, will find a world initially along the same path as Husserl, yet which never necessitates such a final Husserlian reduction, and rather maintains the "natural attitude’s" wonder, strangeness and paradox of a mutual

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54 *Formal & Transcendental Logic*, 135-6. Emphasis is our own.

55 While Gassendi’s thought on desire and passions is summarized in the sixth volume of François Bernier’s *Abrégé*, he in fact ventures little into the role of affect in relation to sense perception.
presence between self and an all-encompassing world, not to mention it as source of truth.\textsuperscript{56}

The transcendental view of the world is, ultimately, Husserl's point of view for Phenomenology.\textsuperscript{57} On the way to such disconnected transcendentalism, however, Husserl does pass through the consciousness which has a correlate in the natural world, or "Intentional Being" and corporal existence, parallel to the connection between \textit{noesis} and \textit{noema}, which shall be just the path Merleau-Ponty will focus upon and follow. He refers to this unity of consciousness and body as a "linking on" or "apperception" in which consciousness really forfeits nothing of itself. Wonderfully enough for our reading of Phenomenology along with Baroque aesthetic, this "linking on" of consciousness to body \textit{cannot be} contained by the realm of strict perspectival vision, nor by its subject/object relationship and representation:

Corporal Being is in principle a Being that appears, declaring itself through sensory perspectives. The consciousness that is naturally apperceived, the stream of experiences, given as human and animal at once, in close empirical connexion with corporeality, \textit{does not itself become of course through this apperception something that appears perspectively.}\textsuperscript{58}

Nor does consciousness sever itself from the corporal upon leaving perspective, the perspective which Husserl associates with Realism as the representation of corporal experience. It is exactly \textit{this} particular combination, of the corporal and real with a


\textsuperscript{57} \textit{Ideas I}, §54, 151 (127).

\textsuperscript{58} \textit{Ideas I}, ¶3, and all of §53, 150 (125).
transgression or distortion of perspectival Realism, which is important for our sense of a Baroque analysis. Likewise, in the realm of affectivity -- Husserl uses the example of joy -- affectivity loses all meaning when rendered purely transcendental and severed from the corporal, natural situation and, likewise, affectivity in turn cannot be contained by perspectival representation. Within Husserlian Phenomenology, then, the corporal, affective, real attachment goes beyond perspectival representation or stance; it "holds on to the world", as he would say, in opposition to a Cartesian stance which does not.59

Thus we see from the beginnings of Phenomenology and Phenomenological investigation in Husserl, even if it is not his preferred Phenomenological endpoint in the first book of Ideas, that consciousness which trespasses perspective does indeed engage Baroque aesthetic, precisely, and paradoxically for the familiaris of Realism, by its particular kind of aesthetic link with the body, existence and affectivity.

In the prolongation of his project towards a pure Phenomenology, Husserl expands beyond a consideration of the theoretical attitude to make other considerations of the process of perception and its role in the constitution of the object. Here, in contrast with the development in the first book of Ideas, body and matter and, by extension, affect, do not become bracketed away in a movement towards transcendental consciousness. In a distinction of two types of perception -- one towards cognition, the other towards enjoyment -- Husserl focusses upon perceptions of enjoyment, and in general upon how affectivity involves a kind of perception

59 The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, 326.
distinct from that of theory and cognition. The senses and emotions maintain an
important role, particularly in the context of the constitution of what Husserl calls the
"value-Object" or judgment of value: "[...] each consciousness which originally
constitutes a value-Object as such, necessarily has in itself a component belonging to
it in the sphere of feelings." This is feeling in which the Ego lives -- that is, it is an
existential condition, habitat and world which rejoin the pretheoretical, and,
consequently, the pretheoretical and the preobjective. This is also an Ego in motion, not
merely towards, but with the object, and not unlike a mutual Atomism!:

[...] at times an Ego-ray, launched from the pure Ego, goes out toward the
Object, and, as it were, counter-rays issue from the Object and come back to
the Ego. That is how it is that in desire I find myself attracted by the desired
Object [...] Or, as Husserl writes, in "e-motion"! Life prefers this state -- particularly in the
context of joy for example and in general in the rapture of emotion -- to the
theoretical attitude or transcendental disconnection which deafens or stamps out
feeling and the body as well. It is in this context where "new objectivities are

60 Ideas II, 11.

61 Ideas II, 104. This recalls the actor-subject's relation to spectacle in what we have termed
"Baroque aesthetic reception" and examined with the case of Rotrou's Le Véritable St. Genest, and on
to the actor of Artaud's "Theater of Cruelty". It is an intersubjective, ethical Ego in the process of
exchange.

62 Tadashi Ogawa renders Husserl's "Ego-ray" equivalent to a metaphorical body-limb, in
Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, Analecta Husserliana, Vol.16 (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company,
1983): 84.
always being constituted", which recalls noesis' stratified, multi-faceted formation of perception.\textsuperscript{63}

In summary, the body as the field for affectivity and sensibility maintains cognition and consciousness as a moving process and maintains its object as open, or in other words as a mutual aesthetic process. This is not unlike factors of futurality in Gassendi's vision of experience's work towards truth. This cognition-in-motion is not only to be found in the objects perceived or the "motivated" as Husserl says, but in the perceiving or "motivating" subject as well. This "motivating" subject or body is both free and is responsible for the constitution of spatiality, and the "body is coexperienced as functioning in perception."\textsuperscript{64} That is, in the terms of our study, the motivating subject or body is present to and in the object, and has a role in constructing the space of mutual, subject-to-object "co-presence", to speak like Husserl. At the same time, much of the body remains hidden:

Only very little of the Body actually comes to appearance at any given time [...] whereas very much can be "supposed", co-apprehended, and co-posed in a more or less indeterminate-vague way.\textsuperscript{65}

This leads us to the following consideration of the body's investment in perception.

In Husserl's Cartesian Meditations (1929), this supposition beyond the visual plane of the totality of the object or other is termed "apperception". This apperception involves the Psyche, to constitute a psycho-physical, intersubjective

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\textsuperscript{63} Ideas II, 10, and all of §5.

\textsuperscript{64} Ideas II, 63, 76-7. Emphasis is our own. This can also be seen in Ignatius' desire to be "as though I were present there".

\textsuperscript{65} Ideas II, 253.
perception which recalls the Baroque "Being-in" or transjective, and what we would call an existential type of transcendence. Husserl goes further to relate this to empathy, as the mode of perception of the world.66 Jean-Paul Sartre, in his comments upon Husserl, attributes empathetic perception and affective intersubjectivity to the "Ego" and maintains it as an interior process, yet analogous to the world as horizon to things and as source to poetic production.67 Furthermore, it is in the realm of affective, existential cognition by and of the body that phantasy also comes to play a role. Here where material or sense determinations are missing, insufficient or open, an invitation to affective projection, anticipation and new objective constitutions according to desire, will and fancy in the sense-making process -- that is, the aesthetic -- is risked. At the same time, the richness of perceptive possibilities is called forth, far beyond any wondrous technical facilitation of such. Whether it is a "formal essence" or phantasy which completes sense determinations is an important question.68 That is, in the terms of our study, does the Symbolic or the Imaginary complete the Real? Do geometrical or sensuous qualities and factors of desire complete perception? In the Ignatian context, they both do! These questions are of utmost importance for the consideration of transitions from perspectival to transpectival perception and variations in subjectival stance. For our study and vision of the Baroque, it is the transpectival perception and stance, affectivity, and the sensuous


67 La Transcendance de l'Ego, 60.

68 Ideas II, 43-8.
qualities and factors of desire, as we have stated them, which are of concern, and which are the elements we qualify as Baroque as we find them considered in Husserl’s Philosophy. Thus we can add to Baroque spirituality, vision and stance the dimension of phantasy, where the Imaginary and its relation to individual psychic needs completes the Real. By virtue of the emphasis here in terms of the elements of Symbolic Economy, it becomes clear that phantasy joins Husserl’s conception of the psychic or spiritual realm of the soul, the soul’s role with the body which it fills through and through and which is its expression, and its role in determining the Ego as lawful, ethical intentionality. This is again a situation where the object of perception remains open.

This raises anew the question of how corporality and affectivity play a role in consciousness, and whether such a "linking on" can be acceptable in the desire for knowledge or, in more careful Phenomenological terms, for "Being-in". Is affective, existential cognition exclusively phantasy? Certainly not. And further, do we, as limited corporal beings, have any other means to take? How exclusive is, after all, the theoretically-established object from the value-Object? Is it even possible to completely suspend emotions, desires and will from the necessary initial use of the senses? This affective consideration puts a new spin indeed on Pierre Gassendi’s own multiple perspectives and judgments. In the context of the reader’s relation to the text, the beholder’s relation to the work, or the exercitant’s relation to the mythical,

69 See the third moment in the Preludes of Ignatius’ Spiritual Exercises, DeNicholas translation, note 27.

70 Ideas II, 252, 259, 231.
imagined sacred life, can emotive, affective presentation, perception, reception, and interpretation be monitored, or avoided? We reach here the realms of Rhetoric and Pragmatics. Is then the absence of a rhetorical dimension and staging in a text or work -- from the scientific document to the aesthetic works of poetry, drama, literary narrative, oratory and prayer -- even possible? Or are there degrees of affective involvement and rhetorical play, based upon the relationship and stance towards the object? And so the question remains -- what does affectivity and the aesthetic have to do with consciousness, knowledge, relation to the object and to the other/Other? How Baroque are these relationships? We can very well conclude they have everything to do with consciousness, knowledge, relation to the object and to the other, and in a very Baroque fashion as well.

Husserl’s review in The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology of Descartes’ thought process in attaining the Cogito allows him to consider in his own way the position of the subject. Husserl names Descartes’ reductive process of doubt and bracketing suspension of worldly engagement in moving towards the Cogito the Cartesian "epoché", in which the "I" which carries out the process of the epoché remains.71 Husserl takes issue with Descartes’ qualification, as he sees it, of the Ego once attained: it is what Descartes bracketed into the epoché and out of the Ego -- an arithmetization of it which essentially empties it of meaning,

and ultimately of living, a thetic, or formal logic that excludes body, affectivity and desire\textsuperscript{72} -- which troubles Husserl, as he says:

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[\ldots] \text{Then he [Descartes] excludes the living body -- this, like the sensible world in general, falls under the epochē -- and thus the ego becomes determined, for Descartes, as \textit{mens sive animus sive intellectus}.}
\]

But here we have several questions. Is not the epochē related to the totality of what is pregiven to me (who am philosophizing) and thus related to the whole world, including all human beings, and these not only in respect to their bodies? Is it not thus related to me as a \textit{whole} man as I am valid for myself in my natural possession of the world [Welthabe]?\textsuperscript{73}

For Husserl, the human subject and world community are part and parcel of the Ego which is carrying out the epochē, as well as of that which this epochal process brackets out, what in Gassendist terms would be "the all is in the all". That is, there is a mutual contamination of subject with the object, of sensible experience with theoretical, logical and mathematical constructions. Descartes' flaw, for Husserl, was to have opted for an Ego categorized exclusively within the theoretical realm, without examining the other possible outcome of the epochē -- that is, a doubly-positioned subject which is paradoxically both \textit{in} and \textit{out} of the realm of sensible experience.

These Husserlian considerations of subjectival stance can be read in terms of the transition from perspective to transpective: the Ego exclusively in the theoretical realm is one of perspectival stance, whereas the Ego on both sides of the process of the epochē is capable of the transition into a transpectival stance from \textit{within} the objects of its very own sensible experience and its objectival considerations as well.

\textsuperscript{72} We can think back here to Husserl's concept of \textit{noesis/noema} with respect to the \textit{Cogito}.

\textsuperscript{73} \textit{The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology}, 79.
This doubly-positioned Ego-subject takes us back to Husserl's concept of "Intentional Being".

In fact, we could read §3, "Evidence and the Idea of Genuine Science" of the first book of Husserl's *Cartesian Meditations* (1929) as an image of a Descartes-Gassendi polemic! Here Husserl emphasizes the relativity of day-to-day truths, the constant modification of scientific horizons, the importance of evidence and his penchant for the question of beginnings to knowledge and new beginnings to Philosophy. Husserl's emphasis upon evidence as Phenomenological theme, as the locus for "abiding being", and as a part of unfulfilled anticipations engrained in the march of time also beg for comparisons. Not only does this recall Gassendi's emphasis upon the primacy of sense perception, but it points towards the directions from Husserl that Merleau-Ponty himself shall follow. Husserl's *Cartesian Meditations* are not so Cartesian after all, using their master and source and a foundational technique of beginnings to actually turn him on his head, and in fact mirror the project of Gassendi's own *Disquisitio Metaphysica*.74 Finally, despite Husserl's critique later in the *Crisis* of Locke's and Hume's sceptical Empiricism, the Ego finds in this elaboration multiple ways of being which span the subjectival stances from perspective to transcriptive.

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74 *Must not the only fruitful renaissance be the one that reawakens the impulse of the Cartesian Meditations: not to adopt their content but, in not doing so, to renew with greater intensity the radicalness of their spirit, the radicalness of self-responsibility [...] In a quasi-Cartesian fashion we intend, as radically beginning philosophers, to carry out meditations with the utmost critical precaution and a readiness for any — even the most far-reaching — transformation of the old-Cartesian meditations. Seductive aberrations, into which Descartes and later thinkers strayed, will have to be clarified and avoided as we pursue our course." *Cartesian Meditations*, 6.
These multiple ways of being of the Ego all belong to each other, and are part of a we which belongs to a "Lifeworld"[Lebenswelt].\footnote{The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, 108.} This concept is a locus for Merleau-Ponty in La Phénoménologie de la perception, and for a Baroque perspective on Husserl's and, subsequently, Merleau-Ponty's thought, as it echoes back to Gassendi's Empiricism. The "Lifeworld" is the pregiven world of sense-experience in which the presence of being is verified.\footnote{As such, it is more expansive and encompassing than the polar concept of "noesis" found in Ideas I.} In a paradoxical relationship with the "true scientific" world as Husserl calls it, the "Lifeworld" is its "grounding soil" common to all knowledge, being and intersubjectivity, as well as to all of Philosophy, as he shall say. Although it cannot itself be known in any totalizing way, the "Lifeworld" nourishes the life of thought such that "the objective is precisely never experienceable as itself", and thereby it encompasses all objectivity, without, however, negating the scientific world. It is also against the context of the Lifeworld that intuitions and self-evidence can take place.\footnote{The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, 128.} According to Husserl, and particularly in light of Cartesian Rationalism, Philosophy's "scientific world" has been without such ground, and he finds it his task to give it this one, carried out by the radical gesture of reduction, and to thereby enter into what he curiously calls, quoting Goethe, the realm of the "mothers of knowledge".\footnote{The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, see all of §34, and 153. A realm which echos the maternal resonance of Ignatius' Inhabitation of/b by a feminine space or facilitated by a relation to the feminine, as well as the Kristevian concept of the "chora maternal" and the mythological and religious roles of Hestia/Vesta, the Sophia Aeterna and the Shekina, which we}
Husserlian transcendental fashion as he did in attempting to formally consider "extra-
doxic" and "noetic" acts, he will look for the essence of this "Lifeworld", in the act
of a Philosophical suspension which however does not negate or lose the being of this
natural "Lifeworld".79

This concept of the Lifeworld is particularly of interest for the concept of the
subject with respect to both meaning and alterity. The subject as an Ego full of
intentionalities or intentional perceptions, constitutes in "noetic" fashion the formation
of the meaning of Being, or Presence. These meanings as successively constituted
constantly open up the horizon of the Lifeworld, paradoxically at once pluralizing
themselves while also tending towards a unified meaning which is greater than the
sum of its parts, much as sensorial experiences towards versions or approximations of
truth accumulate through time and continued observation in Gassendi’s Empiricism.
It is here that Husserl himself questions the possibility of making absolute scientific
pronouncements based upon the Lifeworld. Let us add that as the Ego-subject is an
object in the world as well, this elaboration of meaning and opening of horizons does
not exclude the (aesthetic) elaboration of the self. For at the same time, this horizon-
opening constitution of meaning is part of the process of alterity in which the "I"
becomes another, that is, it is the self-alienating process of empathy which Husserl
calls depresentation, and which he associates with the subject's entering into the
temporal realm. Thus he establishes a bridge between the Ego and the "world for

79 The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, 152.
all". That is, a bridge between the self and the verification of self-transcending
Presence and Being which recalls the *Homo Baroccus* in a stance of both Immensity
and Inhabitation. Such a Philosopher loses nothing of the being of the natural
world. 80

By thus grounding Philosophy, Rationality, objectivity, meaning, knowledge,
cognition, *Cogito*, the subject with the object, and intersubjectivity in this
"Lifeworld", much as Gassendi grounded all ideas in the image or sense perception,
Husserl in effect gives these domains their transpectival, Baroque counterpart
bordering on the final Inhabitational stance. Merleau-Ponty shall not fail to lack great
enthusiasm for this important aspect of Husserl’s thought, and in general it shall take
Merleau-Ponty to profit from the sensitivity of the Husserlian analysis of
consciousness and of that which is pretheoretical to Cartesianism and idealization, but
in fact an outcome of post-Cartesian tensions, 81 thus taking this Husserlian path
indicated and what Merleau-Ponty believed to be the second and final phase of
Husserl’s thought, to reverse the hierarchy away from a transcendentalism which
represses the corporal, to retain "Intentional Being" in the process of sense-making
and the elaboration of meaning and world and in intersubjectival relations, to keep the
notion of the "Lifeworld" without resorting to a transcendentalism, and to further
address the above matters in terms of corporality and affectivity, in order to place and

80 *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, 133, 151-152, 169,
185-6.

81 *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, 214.
maintain every more strongly the Phenomenological accent upon existence and incarnation.
C. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Baroque Philosopher

The following summary by Merleau-Ponty of the consequences of the audacity of Husserl’s thought for a world vision leads us into the Baroque, and thus serves as a key text for our subsequent reading of Merleau-Ponty’s work:

Bon gré mal gré, contre ses plans et selon son audace essentielle, Husserl réveille un monde sauvage et un esprit sauvage. Les choses sont là, non plus seulement, comme dans la perspective de la Renaissance, selon leur apparence projective et selon l’exigence du panorama, mais au contraire, debout, insistantes, échorchant le regard de leurs arêtes, chacune revendiquant une présence absolue qui est incompatible avec celle des autres, et qu’elles ont pourtant toutes ensemble, en vertu d’un sens de configuration dont le «sens théorétique» ne nous donne pas idée. Les autres aussi sont là (ils étaient déjà là avec la simultanéité des choses), non pas d’abord comme esprits, ni même comme «psychismes», mais tels par exemple que nous les affrontons dans la colère ou dans l’amour, visages, gestes, paroles auxquels, sans pensée interposée, répondent les nôtres — au point que quelquefois nous retournons contre eux leurs mots avant même qu’ils nous aient atteints, aussi sûrement, plus sûrement que si nous avions compris —, chacun prégnant des autres, et confirmé par eux dans son corps. Ce monde baroque n’est pas une concession de l’esprit à la nature: car si partout le sens est figuré, c’est partout de sens qu’il s’agit. Ce renouveau du monde est aussi renouveau de l’esprit, redécouverte de l’esprit brut qui n’est apprivoisé par aucune des cultures, auquel il est demandé de créer à nouveau la culture. L’irrelatif, désormais, ce n’est pas la nature en soi, ni le système des saisies de la conscience absolue, et pas davantage l’homme, mais cette «télologie» dont parle Husserl — qui s’écrit et se pense entre guillemets —, jointure et membrane de l’Etre qui s’accomplit à travers l’homme.  

A savage world which harbors a savage spirit, a world of renewal which renews the spirit — this is for Merleau-Ponty a "Baroque world" which the thought of Edmund Husserl and his reworking of the Rationalist terrain of cognition has helped to reawaken.

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82 *Éloge de la philosophie*, 286-7. Emphasis is our own.
Merleau-Ponty first brings us to understand this world in aesthetic terms -- it is a world where Renaissance perspective is transgressed, and where subject and object, self and other are not distanciated and mutually exclusive, but rather, in what is almost a war of engagement each with the other, are in an unresolvable battle of presences which refuses the possibility of an absolute, distanciated consciousness, and where theory is simply not enough, despite Husserl's transcendentalist wishes. This is a world of intersubjectivity -- existence, involvement and copresence where others are there in affect rather than in "spirit" -- which suspends time to privilege presence in an atemporal, spatial simultaneity and relationship filled with affectivity and gestuality, and their outcome in language. Much like Husserl's maternal "Lebenswelt", which is home to intersubjectival relations, personal history and meaning sedimented through time, this corporal, existential and affective world of intersubjectivity nourishes the world of thought, just as matter is thinking for Pierre Gassendi as well. The topic of intersubjectivity, elaborated by Sartre as well in L'Etre et le néant, is further found in Gassendi's world vision.

Thus the conceptual realm and language are tied to the emotional, corporal, gestural, intersubjective world in an atomistic overlap; that is, they are tied to the real. This "incorporated language" is everywhere -- as Merleau-Ponty says, meaning is everywhere, much like the image or sense impression is everywhere for Gassendi, even if perhaps not always an efficient, utilitarian meaning, in the excess of this overly-figural, Baroque world, and in every aspect of existence that fills it -- "c'est partout de sens qu'il s'agit". The Baroque world, through Merleau-Ponty's vision,
does not fall into a chaos of excessive matter, but rather into the wonder of meaning perpetually renewed through experience and intersubjectival relations, and spirit renewed with such material development as well. Neither world, language, meaning, nor man fit into the Classical antinomy of nature versus a dominating culture, or a body versus a dominating mind. This is the premiss for Being, as absolute concept, in man; and man, as absolute flesh and presence, as a participant in Being and in its textual or aesthetic form, thus giving Being the dimension of presence. Being is incarnate and not merely conceptual.83

This results in the Homo Baroccus, with his perceptions and his process of cognition, his representations and ultimately his works, in which he represents his existence and situation, and goes on to engage that of others. It is only inasmuch as a lone "Absolute Consciousness" that, since the 19th-century crisis in representation and its prolongations into the 20th century, he is an evacuated subject; but the far more complex Baroque, Gassendist and Husserlian subject involved in all things is alive and well! We see that man with his cognitive capacities is not severed from the world and on an absolute plane above it, but is with the world and engaged in all the

83 Jacques Derrida's critique of Husserl's transcendental tendencies as a Metaphysics of Presence, in Le Voix et le phénomène (Paris: PUF, 1972), does not apply to Merleau-Ponty's vision, although his originates in the terrain Husserl's thought has worked over, precisely because Merleau-Ponty maintains Being or Presence as incarnate and existential. Nor does Derrida's critique of the Metaphysics of Presence apply in turn to our use of the terms Being and Presence, even though these are not exclusive of a Baroque religious Spirituality which is based upon faith in an incarnate presence which is transcendental at the same time. As our analysis of St. Ignatius' Spiritual Exercises shows, such faith and practice represents and re-represents a (mythical, narrated) origin to the point of displacing it and its transcendence from the center of significance. Ignatius' Exercises open up this treacherous terrain. Thus the infinitely repeatable representation of transcendental presence, as Derrida calls it (75-6), opens a space for the perpetual modification and deference/difference of presence. Unlike the errant and severed Derridean sign, this deference/difference is based here upon the real, successive presences of the flesh in the written text and aesthetic work.
meaning there. This supports the schematic example of Ignatian mystical passage into
the work (the work as the primary testament to experience, cognition, knowledge and
meaning) as a real space in which to dwell, and to his subsequently becoming an
inhabited space in turn for further meaning and spiritual persuasion/edification of
others. Once again, this can be seen as analogous to the Epicurean/Gassendist "all is
in all". For Merleau-Ponty in particular, it also comes out not only of a Postmodern
reaction against the dualism and distanciation of Cartesian Modernity, but out of a
second, reinforced Philosophical Postmodernity, in the post-war experiential,
existential reaction against the terror wrought by Ideology.\footnote{See Edward W. Said, "Labyrinth of Incarnations. The Essays of Maurice Merleau-Ponty", \textit{The Kenyon Review} XXIX.1 (Jan.1967): 59. We shall follow such a reaction -- one of monism, incarnation and Baroque aesthetic -- in our study of war narrative.}

But firstly, let us look at Merleau-Ponty's work in the stages his text on the
Baroque world has outlined for us, in comparison with Gassendi's logic based in
sense experience and the premisses of his atomistic science; with Husserl's
"Lebenswelt" or Lifeworld, nature and world; with the terms of subject-to-object
relations, perception, perspective and consciousness; with the terms of affectivity and
aesthetics; and with the terms of cognition, language, intersubjective relations and the
world. In this manner we can detail the materialist proximities as well as counter-
Cartesian eclipse of distance found in his thought.
1. Consciousness and Nature

Before fully considering perception in *La Phénoménologie de la perception* (1945), Merleau-Ponty, in what was his doctoral dissertation, *La Structure du comportement* (1942), examines the relationship between consciousness and nature by reviewing scientific thought on man’s behavior. Through his review he challenges the Platonic and Classical concepts of form, intellected away from all material or corporal attachment, with a sense of form which neutralizes the Classical antinomies of the intelligible versus the sensible, of perception versus sensation, of mind versus body, to opt for a being which is neither thing nor consciousness, neither nature nor idea, and which rather synthesizes such polarities. This synthesis is based upon Behaviorism’s findings of the coextensive measure of corporal investment in conceptualization, sense-making and meaning. Consciousness is no longer, for Merleau-Ponty, a perspectival, "spectator-stranger" subject. It is sensible and, as such a comportment towards objects, it underlies their structure and meaning, as a subject intimate to and present to them. It can move towards the object of its

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86 *La Structure du comportement*, 199.

87 It is to be examined how the Merleau-pontian sensible body-subject measures against various considerations of the "subject". As a body-subject, it is not a pure, transcendental Ego, Spirit, nor a je pense, but rather a Cogito or conscience embedded in existence and corporality. Not only je, then, it is also a moi, that is, a Psyche — a psychological subject not reduced to an opaque and blind focal point of consciousness such as the transcendental ego, but rather involved in affective states, qualities and actions — however it remains to be seen how Merleau-Ponty uses the concept of the unconscious. In advance, we consider Merleau-Ponty would be for a manifest unconscious in the form of the body-subject, rather than for a repressed unconscious. For his Philosophy takes away repression (of the Classical order) and therefore the need for an unconscious. As a subject, it is also an object, which shall bring us to the concept of the chiasm in *Le Visible et l’invisible*. 
perception in any (brownian) number of ways, much as vision is perturbed away from the line to the perspectival horizon point in Baroque art: "une conscience, un être singulier qui ne réside nulle part et peut se rendre présent partout en intention".\(^{88}\)

The body, then, is invested in the process of cognition, sense-making and meaning and, vice versa, knowledge and language are tied to the real and to the individual. Thus Phenomenology redefines transcendental Philosophy and concepts such as "Being" and "Presence" by the integration of the dimension of the real.\(^{89}\) Here there is a basic, first-premiss faith in perception. "Structure" in the context of Merleau-Ponty’s thought then is neither such an abstract geometry (from Plato to Husserl) nor floating "token" (from Saussure to Derrida) after all. Likewise, language of a purely Symbolic aspect is challenged by Merleau-Ponty, not by resorting to material motivation of the sign, but rather by emphasizing the importance of existence, situation and affectivity -- that is, individual experience and comportment -- to the use of language, in the play with structure and for the elaboration of meaning. We shall return to Merleau-Ponty’s considerations of language and the process of conceptualization further on, after having looked more carefully with him at corporality, perception, perspective, world, affectivity and aesthetics.

In La Phénoménologie de la perception (1945), Merleau-Ponty goes on to more strongly state that perception, the object and its space are inseparably grounded in the flesh of the perceiver, that essences are grounded in existence, and that the

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\(^{88}\) La Phénoménologie de la perception, 47-48.

\(^{89}\) La Structure du comportement, 241.
Cogito has its individual, historical situation, as the perceiving body assumes the object of its perception and its space in a comprehensive field of sensation. All knowledge comes from such human, mutual investment; what Merleau-Ponty even calls communion and, vice-versa, existing ideas are turned into corporal entities through their reception. This body-perception is a naive contact with the world and what Merleau-Ponty qualifies as a non-thetical consciousness. Here the body of the individual perceiver transgresses the space of the object, transgresses perspectival limits and virtually negates the realistic referent through his own plastic presence to the object of investigation as matter impacts upon matter. The perceiving body-subject is, ultimately, where everything dwells. In this place, he becomes a sort of referent to object and signifier in its scene, a part of its spectacle and a plastic actor in its space of being, its place of feeling and thickness ["épaisseur"] or existence.

For Merleau-Ponty, consciousness is a body-subject, and is thereby presence. This turns the perceiving body-subject itself into a work of art, where perception is a

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90 La Phénoménologie de la perception (Paris: Gallimard, 1945) 191-192.

91 La Phénoménologie de la perception, 61.

92 La Phénoménologie de la perception, 230.

93 La Phénoménologie de la perception, 64, 180, 272. Merleau-Ponty’s idea of perception emphasizes space over time, in the form of atemporal, mutual presences (even warring with each other, as stated in the initial quote we selected from Eloge de la philosophie). However, he shall go on in La Phénoménologie de la perception to use the example of myriad perspectival perceptions of the object in space as a model for perceptions stretched out along the successive points of time and change and, when totaled, as an image of the spatial compression of time, which does not fail to recall the artistic techniques of Cubism, later studied by Merleau-Ponty in Cézanne’s work, as well as themes of temporality in Surrealist painting: "La multiplicité des "points" ou des "ici" ne peut par principe se constituer que par un enchaînement d’expériences où chaque fois un seul d’entre eux est donné en objet et qui se fait elle-même au coeur de cet espace." La Phénoménologie de la perception, 119.
fully aesthetic process which forms him. This same relationship of the perceiver with the technical object of perception, or work (Heidegger) can take place as well. In addition, each perception begins anew the process of intellection and the invention of knowledge, and the Baroque multiplicity of gazes penetrates all of its depths in a process of perpetual beginnings and unfinished syntheses towards a futural horizon, much as in Gassendi’s process of knowing. Furthermore, this concept of perception can lead to the invisible depths which outstrip the Classical mathesis of surfaces and exterior world, and does not fail to recall the Lucretian and Gassendist belief in perceivable signs of the invisible. Merleau-Ponty explains it thus: "Mon corps est la texture commune de tous les objets et il est, au moins à l’égard du monde perçu, l’instrument général de ma compréhension", and he further states in Le Visible et l’invisible (†1964):

La pellicule superficielle du visible n’est que pour ma vision et pour mon corps. Mais la profondeur sous cette surface contient mon corps et contient donc ma vision. Mon corps comme chose visible est contenue dans le grand spectacle. Mais mon corps voyant sous-tend ce corps visible, et tous les visibles avec lui. Il y a insertion réciproque et entrelacs de l’un dans l’autre.

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96 La Phénoménologie de la perception, 176.

95 As Merleau-Ponty signals, this Baroque multiplicity of gazes can take place temporally as well as spatially. Unlike the fixed vision/horizon point of linear perspective, this temporal and spatial flux of moving multiple perspectives which intersect one another suggests not only Cubism, but techniques of Baroque and Surrealist painting from trompe-l’œil to anamorphosis of the perceptive field and its object, not to mention cinematic motion. La Phénoménologie de la perception, 54, 83, 119, 330. In reviewing the thought of Brunschvicg, Merleau-Ponty describes such a spontaneous understanding in his thought in terms of the mystical figure of Proteus, the god of change and metamorphosis favored by Jean Rousset as a figure of the Baroque. M.Merleau-Ponty, La Nature, Notes. Cours du Collège de France, 47; Jean Rousset, La Littérature de l’âge baroque en France. Circé et le Paon (Paris: José Corti, 1985) première partie.

96 La Phénoménologie de la perception, 287, 296.

97 La Phénoménologie de la perception, 272.
Ou plutôt, si comme il faut encore une fois, on renonce à la pensée par plans et perspectives, il y a deux cercles, ou deux tourbillons, ou deux sphères, concentriques quand je vis naïvement, et, dès que je m’interroge, faiblement décentrés l’un par rapport à l’autre.⁹⁸

Here Merleau-Ponty speaks in terms beyond the body-subject itself, of its being contained within the immensity of a spectacle, as the scene of perception is within the world, context and horizon of the thing perceived, as a sphere within a sphere or other overlapping geometrical figures. This would be a stage of Immensity which ultimately leads to that of the subject’s Inhabitation. He conceptualizes this mutual exchange, communion or sacrament⁹⁹ of seer and seen in the process of perception as the chiasm — a carnal exchange which plunges the subject into the visible realm of its investigation and search for knowledge in transgression of perspectival limits and to the point of the subject’s modification by the scenario of his observation. This is an enigma of the body "pris entre des choses", losing itself, changed in its existence and in its perception of space and object with which it dialogues, as "Le regard [...] enveloppe, palpe, épouse les choses visibles" and "les choses visibles sont les plis secrets de notre chair, et notre corps, pourtant, l’une des choses visibles".¹⁰⁰

The chiasm represents the madness of vision¹⁰¹ which is also a madness of bodies and which thereby does not exclude affectivity, and it is precisely with this concept of the chiasm that Merleau-Ponty brings in affectivity. As such, perception is


⁹⁹ La Phénoménologie de la perception, 247.


¹⁰¹ Le Visible et l’Invisible, 106.
never finished,\textsuperscript{102} and by extension meaning is never exhausted, much as for Gassendi and for Husserl as well knowledge has a continuing futural horizon and, as in the Baroque process, others are perpetually brought anew into the chain of representations, presencing and sense-making. Each perception is an occasion for new experience, new knowledge and renewed meaning, emphasized also by Husserl in his concern with beginnings: "que chaque perception [...] recommence pour son compte la naissance de l’intelligence et a quelque chose d’une invention géniale".\textsuperscript{103} As for Gassendi as well as for Husserl, so for Merleau-Ponty certitude would be at the virtual end of this continuing process.\textsuperscript{104}

Consciousness then becomes existence and feeling with and within the objects of perception within a world’s horizon; touch is prioritized over vision as the model for perception, and as a sensation which permits an eclipsing reciprocity and intersubjectivity, for what is touching becomes in turn touched, as in the example of hands which grasp one another, to provoke consciousness of self as well as of a self copresent to the other, and vice versa:

\textsuperscript{102} Signes (Paris: Gallimard, 1960) 65.

\textsuperscript{103} La Phénoménologie de la perception, 54.

\textsuperscript{104} In Husserl's case, see the Cartesian Meditations, particularly §3, discussed above. Also, the discussion of evidence in §28 is particularly approximate to Gassendi's emphasis upon sense perception, and gives it further elaboration. As to an evolving world horizon to knowledge, Merleau-Ponty himself refers to A.N. Whitehead's concept of a nature which evolves quantically through time. La Nature, 102-103.
[...] il y a empiètement, enjambement, non seulement entre le touché et le touchant, mais aussi entre le tangible et le visible qui est incrusté en lui, comme, inversement, lui-même n'est pas un néant de visibilité, n'est pas sans existence visuelle.\footnote{Le Visible et l'Invisible, 175-177, 185; La Nature, 107. This example of the self-seizing \textit{Cogito} certainly preserves body-presence to rework and undo the Cartesian path to it!}

Both senses work together, and touch becomes a model on an almost corpuscular level for understanding the true process of vision. In perception such an eclipsing reciprocity, the very fleshly quality of body is of prime importance: "l'épaisseur du corps, loin de rivaliser avec celle du monde, est au contraire le seul moyen que j'ai d'aller au cœur des choses, en me faisant monde en en les faisant chair."\footnote{Le Visible et l'Invisible, 178.} This is a body which is not only sensing as a passive, brute object thing \textit{in} itself ["en soi"], but is actively sentient of otherly existence \textit{for} itself ["pour soi"] as a particular kind of subject.\footnote{Le Visible et l'Invisible, 180.} This is the body which is a "tangible-étalon" or carnal equivalent of all things it knows, which lends its corporality to object and other like the \textit{Homo Baroetus} in a state of Inhabitation,\footnote{Edith Wyschogrod uses the Merleau-pontian concept of the "carnal general" to present the extreme corporality and alterity of the saintly or ethical figure, in \textit{Saints and Postmodernism: Revisioning Moral Philosophy} (University of Chicago Press, 1990). She extends this figure to the hagiographic text, which is considered "open to inscription" to demand reader response, much as we have gone on to consider the implications of "presence in the work".} and which thereby turns the \textit{world} to sentient \textit{flesh}, thus rendering the invisible visible.\footnote{This "tangible-étalon" or real and fleshly investment in perception and knowledge not only rebalances \textit{Symbolic Economy}'s "general equivalent" \textit{away} from the signifier, and toward the referent, but it also gives \textit{incarnation} to the general equivalent and functions thus as real measure as well as \textit{value}.} Such is the effect of the progress of
knowledge! and a process which Merleau-Ponty even goes so far as to qualify as **magical**.\textsuperscript{110}

These modes of consciousness as corporal engagement are a part of knowledge, experience, sensation and desire, as the baggage the perceiving subject brings to these, to include the history and culture which precedes and harbors him, all unified under what Merleau-Ponty calls "l’arc intentionnel".\textsuperscript{111} Thus consciousness loses its purely transcendental qualities, as the conscious subject is shown to be a part of its existential situation — "toute pensée de nous connue advient à une chair"\textsuperscript{112} -- without losing the aspect of a centralizing vision and perception, for the body, and not the object, is locus for perception. The foundation in Merleau-pontian Philosophy is a total self and world, no longer transcendant, no longer at the distance of a Cartesian Spirituality, as he calls it, nor zero point of being or mere "pineal gland" as a reduced locus for monism,\textsuperscript{113} but is intersubjectival, is self engaged with other, touching and touched, and what has been in question for Merleau-Ponty, even more than it has been for Husserl, has been the behavior and conditions of such a situated consciousness. Such a system which places the entire monist, soul-and-body subject within the practice of knowing and as consciousness obviates the need for the

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\textsuperscript{110} *Le Visible et l’Invisible*, 182, 192. But perhaps this magic of the chiasm is neither very precise nor scientific. One philosophical problem which we encounter here and which perhaps Merleau-Ponty does not resolve is the problem of engaged being’s naïve irreflexion, or of the "natural attitude". This is firstly Husserl’s own problem. Merleau-Ponty attempts to resolve it by positing in axiomatic fashion the monist subject as capable of consciousness, and expounding lyrically from there.

\textsuperscript{111} *Le Visible et l’Invisible*, 158.

\textsuperscript{112} *Le Visible et l’Invisible*, 191.

\textsuperscript{113} *Le Visible et l’Invisible*, 152, 159.
demarcation of a repressed, subtending unconscious as elaborated by Freud at the endpoint or crisis point in Philosophical Modernity, which Freud’s work can be seen both to corroborate and to challenge. For this unconscious space is created by the Cartesian sevrage of the subject from itself and from its objects of inquiry as in the Husserlian "noema" and disregard of the entire Cartesian "époché". This finds its correlate in Merleau-Ponty’s refusal of a vertical transcendence towards God, as the incarnate God is in a horizontal relation to man.\(^\text{114}\) Merleau-Ponty’s Philosophy would come, rather, under a horizontal regime, as does the Baroque, particularly evident in its treasorial aspect. Such thought can be seen as a Philosophical correlate to Christianity, whether or not it addresses religion specifically. Finally, all is experience or potential experience, potential "flesh" and feeling, and coextensive to life in Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology, as knowledge and consciousness work noetically, through the body and with the world.\(^\text{115}\)

\(^{114}\) *Signes*, 88.

\(^{115}\) So J.-B. Pontalis synthesizes Merleau-Ponty’s thought on the subject of Psychoanalysis and the unconscious, without failing to refer back to the origins of Philosophical Modernity: "Ces questions de Merleau-Ponty, cette irritation aussi parfois, ont une toute autre portée. Elles expriment d’abord une suspicion légitime à l’égard d’une philosophie qui ne nierait les pouvoirs de la conscience que pour les remettre multipliés à un inconscient extra-lucide et malin génie; mais aussi — et c’est ce point que nous aimerions discuter maintenant — parce qu’il lui semblait sans doute qu’une fois abandonnée la notion de conscience constituant l’objet au bénéfice de ce que faute d’un meilleur terme il appelait conscience perceptive, ce que les psychanalystes projettent dans le vocabulaire d’inconscient ressortissait à cette démonologie dont Freud lui-même a cherché à préserver ses lecteurs.” J.-B. Pontalis further extends this lack of demarcation of the unconscious to Merleau-Ponty’s vision of language as part of the openness to being. This reading contests Jacque Lacan’s situating the unconscious with respect to the constraints of a Symbolic order. In conclusion, Merleau-Ponty’s is "une philosophie qui évacuerait la signification de l’inconscient sur les significations d’un champ intentionnel comme d’une tentative qui les tiendrait pour deux ordres sans allers et retours incessants." "Note sur le problème de l’inconscient chez Merleau-Ponty", *Les Temps Modernes* no.184: 296-297, 301-302.
2. Aesthetics

Merleau-Ponty extends this into the aesthetic realm by examining Cézanne's work in particular, in the terms of *oeil* and *esprit* — what does this type of perception and representation hold for our idea of spirit and, by extension, for the Ego, the subject and his consciousness? For Merleau-Ponty in *L'Oeil et l'esprit*, where he gives an aesthetic application of his Philosophy of perception and of the *chiasm*, the art of painting in particular renders visible the very mystery of perception as corporal openness and chiasmic engagement with the object and the other, and which sounds its being in a "respiration dans l'Être", in its very site, living and circumscribed within the Immensity of its world horizon, for the painter must be corporally present to the act of painting.¹¹⁶ As such, technique and, by the same token, science, are not abdicated, but rather are engaged and situated in a grounding world of interest. In the painting, the painter has invested, in a gesture of reversal or exteriorization, his own fleshly substance and presence, "au nombre des choses" and "du milieu des choses", as Merleau-Ponty says, and likewise the painting beckons such engagement and presence on the part of the spectator.¹¹⁷ Here he reviews the thought of P.Schilder, where for Merleau-Ponty the mirror represents vision as it exteriorizes itself:


¹¹⁷ Merleau-Ponty signals that the opposite of this "haunting of the visible" can be found in Descartes' *Dioptrique*, which reduces all to extension and surface, and consequently robs the image of its power. Nonetheless, Merleau-Ponty feels his own vision to have profited from Descartes' initial idealization of space, and to reject or supplement Descartes' unfortunate dimensional reduction or "flattening" of the subject. *L'Oeil et l'esprit*, 19, 36-39, 48.
Le fantôme du miroir traîne dehors ma chair, et du même coup tout l’invisible de mon corps peut investir les autres corps que je vois. Désormais mon corps peut comporter des segments prélevés sur celui des autres comme ma substance passe en eux, l’homme est miroir pour l’homme. Quant au miroir il est l’instrument d’une universelle magie qui change les choses en spectacles, les spectacles en choses, moi en autrui et autrui en moi.\textsuperscript{118}

Through his vision, the painter takes part in a magical act of transubstantiation and carnal measure of the art work, he is in a manner perpetually born to the object and art work which finds its echo in him, it is his interiority where he is its exteriority, and in this process of exchange he is absent to self,\textsuperscript{119} to recall the ethical, inhabitational stance as well as the more obvious stance of Immensity, a stance which comes out clearest in Merleau-Ponty of all the Phenomenological philosophers. This gives infinite possibilities to the gaze or oeil, translated into the work, and as such the visible poses the enigma of its individual subjectivity, where such a vision is virtual, unlivable madness, as Merleau-Ponty presents it in Cézanne’s case.\textsuperscript{120} In turn, this art work beckons the spectator to open himself to a new mode of being, much as in the Heideggerian concept of the art work as creating a space for presence and dwelling, and as in the chain of presences to representation we have signalled as characteristic of the Baroque, of its art work, letters, religious elaborations and ways of knowing. So Merleau-Ponty can conclude, "les créations [...] ont presque toute leur vie devant elles", and likewise Philosophy as well is yet to be practiced.\textsuperscript{121} This futurity of

\textsuperscript{118} L’OEIL ET L’ESPRIT, 33-34.

\textsuperscript{119} L’OEIL ET L’ESPRIT, 16, 21-26, 29, 69, 81.

\textsuperscript{120} L’OEIL ET L’ESPRIT, 27.

\textsuperscript{121} L’OEIL ET L’ESPRIT, 60, 93.
Merleau-Ponty’s Philosophy, clearly presented here in an aesthetic context and its myriad possibilities of vision and engagement, works well with the Empiricism of Gassendi. And in the optic of this Philosophy, such painting is not only a material engagement, but also eclipses artistic and spectatorial distance to blur the Classical antinomies of inside and outside, of essence and existence, of visible and invisible, of fleshly eye and spirit, and the vision from is as if by a third eye,\textsuperscript{122} what we would call the eye of transpective, and which is also found in Gassendi’s use of the sign or sensory image.

Once these antinomies, which are the very ones which subtend Classical perspective, are neutralized, the process of vision and artistic production moves from the singular fixed point of view devoted to surfaces and what Merleau-Ponty sees as a Realist illusionism, to the multiple and moving point of view which plunges depth, contemporary to the elaboration of the cinematic art and to seizing various moments without giving priority to one over another, as Merleau-Ponty marvels at the development of his Philosophy of consciousness and world in the time of the cinematic age.\textsuperscript{123} This produces works of many-faceted appearances synthesized through time into a cumulative, simultaneous experience, a superposition of transparent surfaces, and a space and time travelling where three-dimensionality and its volume is supposed through the surface and incarnated by our presence to it, which never exactly alligns itself with the mathesized object of consciousness, and

\textsuperscript{122} \textit{L’Oeil et l’esprit}, 24, like the all-seeing pineal gland, and the Lemurien’s third eye as access to Baroque forms, as Blaise Cendrars shall illustrate it.

\textsuperscript{123} \textit{Sens et Non-Sens} (Paris: Nagel), 105-106.
leaves the world as polymorphous and open to perpetual perception and investigation, as in Gassendi’s Empiricism.\textsuperscript{124} Merleau-Ponty speaks of how the “excès de l’œuvre sur les intentions délibérées l’insère dans une multitude de rapports”.\textsuperscript{125} This is a savage, Baroque, non-prescriptive world and work, as well as a Baroque stance towards it. As Michael B. Smith says, there is in perception an ecstatic experience grounded in the process of the body-subject’s intentionality which moves, trespasses and circumscribes mere consciousness to reach the world.\textsuperscript{126} Also possible is consideration of a series of artists’ works under a similar theme (we think here of the practices of Cézanne, Picasso, Delaunay, Duchamp and Giacometti, for example) which can in fact go beyond the visible surface to capture the invisible depths. For through such a process of totalization and simultaneity the invisible is made visible, and a secret presence is revealed as the unconscious becomes manifest as well. The traditional Realism of perspectival technique is replaced by this new, chiasmic Realism.

Merleau-Ponty, illustrates such a Philosophy of painting in both its production and reception with the work of Cézanne (+1839,-1906), in his 1945 essay, published in the same year as \textit{La Phénoménologie de la perception}, "Le Doute de Cézanne"\textsuperscript{127} and, while quoting the likes of artists such as Rodin, Delaunay, Ernst, Klee and

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{124} \textit{L’Oeil et l’esprit}, 29, 65, 68.
  \item \textsuperscript{125} \textit{Signes}, 85.
  \item \textsuperscript{126} "L’Esthétique de Merleau-Ponty", \textit{Les Études Philosophiques} (janvier-mars 1988): 81.
  \item \textsuperscript{127} \textit{Sens et Non-sens} (Paris: Nagel, 1948) 15-44.
\end{itemize}
Matisse, in *L'Oeil et l'esprit* as well. For Cézanne, a latecomer to Impressionism and precursor to Cubism and its subsequent branches into both Abstract and Surrealist art, as well as to Fauvism, it was necessary to refuse the external geometry of objects alone to plunge the object's depths, something he earnestly sought to do,\(^{128}\) and his colorism as well needed be liberated to give a vibratory motion, instability and sunlit, instant-to-instant life to the image, to awaken and even *birth* the object along with the particular subjectivity of the artist himself, all something quite surprising for the imposing granite of "La Montagne Sainte-Victoire" he repeatedly painted towards the end of his life! At the same time, his use of colors beyond the Impressionist palette allowed him to give the object a copresent solidity behind the vibrating atmosphere, a conception simultaneous with painting the paradox of a stable instability,\(^{129}\) what Emile Bernard called "Cézanne's suicide", of an order and a geometry not refused by but rather imbued with nature, of the absolute in the relative.\(^{130}\)

This paradox is a Baroque motif as well, despite Cézanne's different use of color and line, and the fact that we cannot really completely call Cézanne himself a NeoBaroque painter but for these elements.\(^{131}\) This is, in fact, the metaphysical dilemma to reorder perspectival space that also subtends the Baroque's perturbation of

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\(^{128}\) *L'Oeil et l'esprit*, 64.

\(^{129}\) "*Le Doute de Cézanne*", 35, 61-5.

\(^{130}\) As Merleau-Ponty states in *La Nature*, 108.

\(^{131}\) According to Forrest Williams, this paradox is behind the very impetus to Husserl's Phenomenology, to preserve a certain idealism all the while going "back to the things themselves". "Cézanne, Phenomenology and Merleau-Ponty", *The Merleau-Ponty Aesthetics Reader. Philosophy and Painting* (Illinois: Northwestern UP, 1993) 165-173.
perspectival lines or point/coordinate system, and the Baroque's primary engagement with presence. Cézanne's line was neither a lack of outline as with the Impressionists, nor a strict outline, but a synthesis of various perceptions in volume modulated by color, and in what Merleau-Ponty would call "la logique allusive du monde" as opposed to Classical painting's patient reconstruction of appearances and textures.\textsuperscript{132} For Cézanne, color took precedence over line. Both outcomes of Cubism, in its combination of various facets, and Fauvism, in the precedence of color over form and as form, can be seen here. A certain synaesthesia beyond vision alone is captured as well, as the movement of trees, the varying sounds of the wind through them and against the mountainous angles, and the fragrance they disengage are translated into light, color, line and presence, to sound our own fleshly depth, presence and feeling of the moments of life and the engagement in the world. So Merleau-Ponty speaks of the use of line in particular as "un certain forage pratiqué dans l'en-soi".\textsuperscript{133} This revolution in art is also a revolution in the subject and the locus of his consciousness, most himself when abdicated as carnal general to the futural life of the work.

\textsuperscript{132} La Prose du monde (Paris: Gallimard, 1969) 91.

\textsuperscript{133} L'Oeil et l'esprit, 76.
3. Language

From here, we can ask what happens with communication and language in the context of such subject-object, aesthetic relations? Language, then, comes out of the corporal, gestural, affective relation to others and to the world. This intersubjectivity is an openness to the other in the active/passive reciprocity of exchange or chiasmic relation and even in a mode of mutual Inhabitation. It is an openness to meaning in situation, and meaning's renewal against any possible dogmatism. In Saussurian terms, here the signified overwhelms the signifier and its canonic meaning as the interlocutor takes possession of language through his own usage. Each word choice for the speaker or writer in fact hesitates amidst a myriad of choices, from whence comes the notion of style, whose semantic thickness could be sounded synchronically before the final choice. This is as much of an adventure for the speaker as for the recipient, as situational expression brings new meaning to language, indeed is, like the art work, "une déformation cohérent imposée au visible" where signification is never ending, an analysis Merleau-Ponty applies in particular to the novel. This is not unlike hallucinatory or paranoid outcomes superimposed upon the meaning and structure already (canonically) in place, and so Cézanne himself questioned the correctness of his vision and his sanity. Finally, we add, the real situation

134 In a comparison which relates painting to language, Merleau-Ponty ties this to the undetermined gestures of the painter in a slow-motion film taken of Matisse at work. The synchronic variation prior to word choice could also be compared to children's drawing which sometimes separates out the various facets of perception of a single object in a series of representations, up to Cézanne's very use of color and contour. \textit{La Prose du monde} (Paris: Gallimard, 1969) 62-64, 206-211. It also recalls the Ignatian second way of prayer, what we have called "semantic contemplation".

overwhelms the signifier as well. Language itself carries not only the sedimentation of a culture and a history, a linguistic context which is already constituted, is given to us and perforce surrounds us, but also the individual's sedimentation of meaning through repeated and various personal experiences, much as in the Gassendist empirical search for truth. Our perception and language usage which starts here reworks the already-given.\textsuperscript{136} This is, for Merleau-Ponty, truth and "la présence de tous les présents dans le nôtre".\textsuperscript{137} It is here, in the individual experience with language, that there is a corporal investment in it, and a linguistic investment in corporality as well, for "les mots frayaient un passsage dans le corps".\textsuperscript{138} This language is never simple, direct and univocal; rather it is a language of excess and lyricism, and a language capable of accommodating the existential situation. Here words do not translate the situation as much as they participate in its incarnation -- "le langage [...] doublure de l'être".\textsuperscript{139} To use the Saussurian distinction, in the context of Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of language, usage and "parole" reign over "langage".

Thus language is a way of celebrating the human body, and it opens up this body as infinite flesh and existence in the process of communication, where signification is a birthing process of both elaboration with a message's emission, and

\textsuperscript{136} \textit{La Prose du monde}, 174-175.

\textsuperscript{137} \textit{Signes}, 120.

\textsuperscript{138} \textit{La Phénoménologie de la perception}, 272.

\textsuperscript{139} \textit{La Prose du monde}, 10.
treasorial sense in its reception. Language in relationship to bodies is one of infinite wonderment, for between body and word, and between interlocutors, there is mutual reinscription, as in the chiasmic relationship of perception. Here the subject risks his own being, not in a permanent way, but rather in the phases of mutual exchange. In this light, the concept of "presence in the work" and, more precisely, "being in the text" make more sense, as the body gives itself up to, or as a space for meaning, and often otherly or new meaning, much as the Ignatian exercitant gives himself up as an actor in the playing out of Scriptural sense and its narrative logic. The opening up of the subject to meaning is an opening up to others and to the world, not as an historically-given common world of established universal meaning, but as a futural tending towards one meaning and one world. This corporal relation to meaning echoes that of artist and spectator to the aesthetic work, and that of the Philosopher before knowledge.

140 La Phénoménoologie de la perception, 203, 218; and "je deviens celui que j'écoute", La Prose du monde, 165.

141 La Prose du monde, 29.

142 La Phénoménoologie de la perception, 465-8; Le Visible et l'Invisible, 26-7.
D. Conclusion: Materialist Proximities and Baroque Eclipse of Distance

In conclusion, we can say that there is a Baroque Epistemology. It begins with Materialism, whose initial sources are a Montaignian Scepticism, later to be surpassed in the Philosophy of Pierre Gassendi. This Materialism comprehends a monist union of mind and body, a Baroque presence to and communion with the objects of investigation and faith in this perceptive presence, thinking matter, an Empiricism where knowledge is based in sense experience, an Ideality pulled towards the Imaginary and the Real, knowledge as both a cumulative progress grounded in history, and as an open, continual process based in wonder. It is a way of knowing rather than a doctrine. It is opposed to Cartesian dualism, mathesis of matter bracketed away from the distant, uninvolved vantage point of mind or of Cogito, and is opposed to the geometrical model of foundational certitude cleared by doubt at the beginning of the process of intellection.

This Baroque épistémè finds its way scientifically through Empirical method, socio-politically in dialectical materialism, and philosophically in the Phenomenological school in its thrust "towards the things themselves" and in its openness to matter and world as the fields of perception and the shifting horizons of knowledge, with implications for aesthetics and language. At face value, this last pathway may seem incongruous, given Phenomenology's -- particularly Husserl's and Merleau-Ponty's -- rejections not only of Idealism, but of Empiricism as well, particularly in its sceptical British versions in the thought of Locke and Hume. This can be resolved by taking Gassendi's particular Empiricism, combined as it is with
the mutual permutation of atomistic exchange, and tempered as it is by Christiannity, by perceptive faith -- indeed, other words for intentionality and "ek-stasis" -- and by belief in the accumulation of knowledge over time. We have traced here this Phenomenological school from the thought of Edmund Husserl, as the source to its most lyrical 20th-century NeoBaroque achievement in the thought of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Here participation in the world we know is characterized as a chiasmic relation, which is not so unlike the atomistic one seen as its early intuition, where all meaning involves an affective, transpectival investment of our own flesh, where sense-making is treasorial and continuing, and the intersubjective relation becomes an Ethical, Inhabitational one. In fact, such Philosophies find in Merleau-Ponty's work their full aesthetic and literary dimensions.

It is Merleau-Ponty's Philosophical elaboration which connects best not only with material proximities but with the radical eclipse of distance as well, as it is nuanced through the concepts of Immensity and Inhabitation. Where Philosophy from Materialism to Phenomenology captures Baroque presence in the work and in objects of knowledge through the concept of Immensity, from the belief which finds its source in Epicurean Atomism and is followed through to the Husserlian "Lifeworld" where all participates in all, it is not until the precision of Merleau-Ponty's concept of the chiasm with its participation and harboring of the other in the abdicated self that a contemporary epistemological correlate is given to the concept of Inhabitation and the

143 This ethical dimension to Phenomenology is perhaps best elaborated in the thought of Emmanuel Levinas, whose work is not within the scope of our current study here.
ultimate stance of the *Homo Baroccus*. This is the very subjectival stance practiced
and advocated by the Baroque Philosopher himself.
RICE UNIVERSITY

PRESENCE IN THE WORK:
BAROQUE AESTHETIC & ITS 20TH-CENTURY RETURN
IN FRENCH THOUGHT, ARTS & LETTERS

Volume III: Arts & Letters

by

ELIZABETH SCALI PEASE

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That the art work can clear a space for a presence which is, ultimately, our own; that it can beckon and even oblige our presence to it, as in a gesture of persuasion and conversion, is evident in the French masters of Baroque painting with their theatrical techniques and manipulation of perspective, all supported by an architectural or framing dimension, who we select and examine below. That this presence and its techniques are at once selected, quoted and placed into question in the Surrealist art of René Magritte (1898–1967) in particular presents us with a 20th-century return of the Baroque with a strange twist that by no means negates the return, but rather brings to it the complexities of a post-theic era which both refuses and yet accommodates its heritage. Let us examine these Baroque aesthetic spaces in their specificity, in their impact upon us, each in juxtaposition with the other.
A. Franco-Belgian Surrealist Art: René Magritte (+1898, -1967)

A cylindrical section suspended in mid-air against a nondescript background is fissured open frontally towards the eye of the spectator, to present its inner lining. In the style of theatrical decoration and trompe-l'oeil trickery as well as the shock-value and curiosity of Surrealist dislocation and juxtaposition common to the work of René Magritte, the outer edges of the fissured cylinder are represented as the parted curtains -- shaded deep red, as Baroque painting receives a first clin d'oeil -- opening to what appears to be an inner stage. A stage which gives the spectator expectations for imminent appearance and presence, and whose opening not only demarcates space, but also invites trespass and entrance. ¹ An architecture for space, a geometric section where perspectival technique gets its clin d'oeil as well. Magritte, very much against pure abstraction, espoused realism for reasons of verisimilitude. Nonetheless, in his work, the rational loses its apparent function in a wavering between the mathematical and the affective, poetic object, in an uncanny response to the spectator's expectations. Within this cylindrical stage of curtains unmoved by any spirit, however, is painted no figure, but rather the backdrop of an idyllic blue sky and placid, perfect, floating clouds -- not the sky of Poussin's Arcadia, nor the tormented, windswept sky in motion of Baroque representation. Neither perspectival, nor transpectival, this representation fixes no precise place for us, neither beckons nor refuses us, and gives us no distinct subjectivity in an empty dream where desire has no cathexis. A sky in doubt, or one whose framing is broken open towards us, as it

¹ It is typical of Magritte's work, like that of Simon Vouet's which we shall examine shortly, to set frames with which he plays within the painting's canvas.
René Magritte, Les Mémoires d’un saint (1960, Houston, The Menil Collection)
humoristically reveals itself in the upper right corner of the curtain folded back. How can such emptiness even be considered a work of art? The cylindrical form is set on a nondescript ground upon which our point of view gazes downwards, to a sky which has, in fact, fallen. Is this a sky for the viewpoint of the gods, a sky for child’s play, or for our own as, in Surrealist theory, we become capable of Gnosis and its supersensible view of reality?² For in the context of the Baroque "gloire" paintings which open out to heavens filled with saints in apotheosis before receptive Christian figures of father, son and saints, this is an uncannily empty sky presented on a vertical plane. In contrast with Baroque framing techniques around highly charged figures in forced perspective whose movement transgresses all demarcation, this is a serene and placid space whose bounds are seemingly untroubled. It belies Baroque technique, as we are left to imagine what might be above, what might be below, what might be within the isolated, narrow segment of a conical projection from earth to heaven. No presence sustains this presentation, except perhaps for the screen and scene it gives to our own dreams, fantasies or unwilled hallucinations, in invitation to paranoid imaginings.

Where is the body in its onto-theological sky, we ask before this space where Magritte allows no anthropomorphism. The title, then, of this 1960 painting -- casually opposed to its plastic element³ -- puzzles us: "Mémoires d’un saint".


³ The title serves as a visual non-sequitur, or what Michel Foucault calls a "heterotopia". Michel Foucault, This is not a pipe, trans. James Harkness (Berkeley: U of CA Press, 1982) 35. For Magritte, this is what constitutes the poetic title, best suited to painting in his opinion. "Question du titre", Œuvres complètes (Paris: Flammarion, 1979) 262.
"Mémoires" in the plural means memoirs, remembrances, life story, and a personal history which looks to the past as if it is present to eyes, senses and sentiment. A past which is absent to us, the spectator. But also the plural of "mémoire" can mean memories, that which is know "by heart" as we say, "par coeur" or "de mémoire" -- perhaps a frozen moment of (spiritual) ecstasy? And then there is good or bad memory, glorious or sinister memory, and that which is engraved in memory, "gravé dans la mémoire" (Robert & Collins), as well as Voltaire's "ce qui touche le coeur se grave dans la mémoire" (Petit Robert). This is affective memory, and of course what is in memory remains present to thought, vision and feelings. Is this tabula rasa sky of "Mémoires d'un saint" offered to our further personal emoting and engraving? And of course, we cannot forget the importance of memory in the practice of the Spiritual Exercises, as that which begins the eventual initiation into Gospel text and space. Memory is the first step which need must precede construction, affective engagement and, finally, a presence which includes us.

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4 Magritte's painting "Memory" (1938, Houston, The Menil Collection) represents a stone bust reminiscent of the art of Antiquity and its hold over the painter's and sculptor's academy, as well as the objects of their workshop, and illustrates as well the influence of the painting of Giorgio de Chirico (+1888,-1978) on Magritte's work. Yet the dislocation of the bust, next to a split sphere and against a seemingly functionless wooden wall and the backdrop of the sky, is uncanny. Moreso is the bruised and bleeding left temple of the bust. For how can stone bleed? And, furthermore, why would memory be sanguinary? Perhaps it is the bruised artistic canon, or a memory linked to trauma, and the ensuing dislocation and hallucination of Psychosis, as well as of Surrealist representation in general, before the war-torn 20th century with its horrors and its art. Likewise, time and history are in question in Salvador Dali's well-known 1931 painting, "The Persiscance of Memory" (NY, Museum of Modern Art), where the stable and secure object (the watch) and concept (time, which supposedly marches on) are presented in amorphous, decaying form.
These are also "Mémoires d'un saint". The appellation "saint" refers specifically to the Roman Catholic tradition of canonization through the Pope, established formally in 1234, of an individual who by their practice of holiness and virtue has exemplified the Christian life, and mediates the spiritual relation for others, through their own presence to God and their sharing in the eventual face-to-face Beatific Vision, often manifested by miraculous or wondrous acts. As such, the saints may be venerated by the faithful, a practice refused by the Protestant reformation, but reaffirmed by the Council of Trent (1545-63). In the early church, it was chiefly the disciples and martyrs who were venerated as saints, but with time this list was amplified to others, their life retold in the hagiography of virtues and miracles.

Canonization through the Pope was formally established by Gregory IX and became the only process as of 1234. It is however considered that there are far more saints than those who are formally canonized. Saints have assigned feast days, and often churches or shrines are dedicated to them, wherein their relics and images can be venerated.\footnote{Articles "Canonization", "Saints", "Saints, Devotion to", in Encyclopedia of Catholicism, ed. Richard P. McBride (NY: Harper-Collins, 1995).}

And finally, an archeological meaning presents "le saint" as the space before the most sacred part of a Temple, or the innermost sacred space itself of the Temple or another edifice (Petit Robert). Any space or place can possibly be remembered, and considered "saint". This spatializes the later corporal meaning of "saint" in the sense of a mystical "Inhabitation" of the body.
Yet before this painting, "Mémoires d'un saint", we are still forced to ask -- which saint? If we know not which, how can we discern his or her memoirs, memory, experiences, sacred or otherwise, acts, virtuous, miraculous or otherwise, the engrammic moments of his or her life, spiritual or otherwise, the locus of his or her heart? Indeed, the painting "Mémoires d'un saint" leaves us without any exterior anchor, despite its exterior art form, except for the presence and theater of our own individual lives which gaze upon it. "Saint" as adjective can also mean that which is sacred. And so by a different twist which places the burden of meaning upon us, "Mémoires d'un saint" could be thought to say "the remembrance of that which is sacred" -- which it is certainly our job to do and, furthermore, to project upon the sky-screen which might, on the other hand, comment ironically in its placid portrayal of absence upon our imaginal forgetting and neglect of that which is sacred! To find our own selves in the place of Christ or the saints can be seen as a decline of the Christian, sacred myth towards the profane which allows a measure of irony to overtake affabulation.⁶

As a child, René Magritte was fascinated by religious decor, its accouterments and mystery, often playing the role of the priest at saying a mock Mass. He would tend toward a certain hermetic quietism as a religious dimension in his painting which finds its model inwardly.⁷ This certainly comes through in "Mémoires d'un saint",

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where stage and altarplace are conflated, yet nothing of the narrative or figurative 
order is communicated.

From Surrealism, the early twentieth-century movement in arts and letters 
initially influenced by Isidor Ducasse, the Comte de Lautréamont’s (+1846,-1870) 
Chants de Maldoror (1869), a text dear to the movement represented by André 
Breton’s (+1896,-1966) Manifestos of 1924, 1930 and 1942, Magritte’s own painting 
and Philosophy reflects the will to startle the spectator with dislocation and free 
association which braves simplistic realism and maintains the object in an irrational 
context, with the uncommon or extreme juxtaposition, with the wilfully ugly, and 
even the gesture of unchained violence. The Surreal is in effect the combination of 
real representation with its opposite, hallucination, of perspective with play, of reason 
with imagination, of waking life with the dream element, and of the everyday with the 
magical as these oppositions are annulled and placed on the same plane, as what is 
unreal could nonetheless be true. Thus the real dimension and world is not left out of 
existence and art, but rather becomes surcharged, overinvested with a meaning which 
goes beyond any human mastery or rational understanding in order to reveal the 
marvellous, so important to Baroque aesthetic as well. ⁸

Magritte himself did not cease to search for the marvellous in the everyday 
and its objects, and led himself a rather mundane bourgeois existence. For Magritte,

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⁸ Although in the case of Baroque art, this was accomplished through extreme manipulation of perspective, trompe-l’œil and anamorphosis, as in the work of Surrealist painters such as Magritte and Dali, and in literature through radical metaphorical juxtaposition. However, except for some outrageous or strange uses of metaphor, it did not go so far as Surrealist art’s irrational and bizarre juxtapositions.
art in fact in its revelation of the marvellous and the mysterious is what gives space and existence to life — in a manner of saying presence in the work: "la ressemblance est une pensée qui surgit [...] en devenant ce que le monde lui offre et en réunissant ce qui lui est offert dans l'ordre du mystère sans lequel le monde n'existe pas", and "Le mystère n'est pas une des possibilités du réel; le mystère est ce qui est nécessaire pour qu'il y ait du réel." This combination of the real and the marvellous does not fail to recall Salvador Dalí's "méthode paranoïaque-critique", oft cited by Breton, where a precisely-detailed realist representation — and Dalí himself studied the 17th-century Dutch masters — veers towards the uncanny by use of techniques of trompe-l'oeil and anamorphic distortions superimposed upon it, and recalls as well the entire category of hallucination and paranoia which we have linked with the process of Ignatian, Baroque visualization and its stages of Immensity (being-in) and Inhabitation (possession by). Marcel Duchamp's works on glass allow precisely this type of perception of ambient surroundings upon which the etchings and cracks of the work are superimposed. In place of the symbolic domain of metaphor, metaphor is pushed rather towards metamorphosis in Surreal painting, much like the figure Maldoror of Lautréamont's Chants who can take on any disguise. In Surrealist art, the image is the immediate and often disturbing experience of such metamorphosis. A certain practice of psychic automatism in both Surrealist writing and art, important to

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Breton's 1924 definition of Surrealism,\textsuperscript{11} is quickly left behind, for in the domain of painting and particularly in Magritte’s work, perspective is invoked, played with and betrayed in the mode of pastiche or irony, and any onirism is wilfully directed. Magritte himself never espoused such "organic" automatism which can be seen in the work of Matta, André Masson and Joan Miró.\textsuperscript{12} The artist such as Magritte or Dali ultimately "directs" such surreal combinations, in place of the roles of myth or cult, and sets the scene for the unconscious to rear its head and superimpose itself upon the real; he is a "Gnostic" of a higher understanding of reality who stands in God's place with the eyes of the gods, and beckons us follow him there, not unlike the spiritual director who engages the exercitant. The virtually "blank" screen of "Mémoires d'un saint" gives such room to the spectator, all the while using the spare codings of the demarcated space of stage, curtains and sky as well as suggestions of temple or tabernacle to show the way, which Magritte perhaps too easily pretends not to show.

And so, with "Mémoires d'un saint", we find that Magritte not only sends us back into sacred history, but particularly to the complexities of French Art History of the 17th century so preoccupied and in tension with the sacred, yet not (controversially) without recourse to the latest illusion techniques for distorting perspective, to fill in the empty proscenium.

\textsuperscript{11} A.Breton, \textit{Manifestes du Surréalisme}, 37.

\textsuperscript{12} S.Gablik, \textit{Magritte}, 70-71.
B. French Baroque Art: Simon Vouet (+1590,-1649) & Eustache Le Sueur (+1616,-1655)

1. Simon Vouet (+1590,-1649)

Born during the desperate years of religious war in France, the precociously talented painter Simon Vouet was able nonetheless to travel a great deal and established himself in Rome, then the mecca for artists, from 1613 on, and to return to France once his fame as a painter was established. Initially influenced by Caravaggio, he found his own style and was favored in Rome by Urban VIII (Matteo Barberini), Pope from 1623-44, who was enamored of reckless spending, and of leaving his legacy in Rome through discriminating building and art collecting. Vouet’s "Martyrdom of Saint Erasmus", begun in 1629 under commission for an altar in St. Peter’s, provoked great enthusiasm on the part of many, to include Gian Lorenzo Bernini, who was also at work for Urban VIII. Vouet was also able to perpetrate his work in France, where he was called back in 1627 by Louis XIII who favored his work as well, and remained there until his death, thus reigning over Parisian art for more than 20 years with incredible pedagogical talent and energy. He established an immense and continuing atelier, necessary for the large amount of work commissioned of him by the aristocracy for the decoration of numerous royal palaces, to include extensive work at St. Germain-en-Laye, Louis XIII’s favorite

13 Vouet’s style broke with the French school of the Renaissance and its Mannerism, exemplified in "L’école de Fontainebleau", as his formation in Italy detached him from this school. The youngest artists of Fontainebleau would play no role in French art of the 17th century. Louis Dimier, French Painting in the 16th Century (New York: Arno Press, 1969) 313-314.
residence. The great French painters of the age would pass through this atelier, to include disciples such as Eustache Le Sueur, who we also examine here, as Charles LeBrun and François Mignard. Many of Vouet’s works were in fact executed by his students from his drawings, and their own apprenticeship involved primarily practice through extensive drawing as well. Thus the Baroque was initiated in France, also engaging at approximately the same time the entirety of Europe. In 1630, Simon Vouet was the greatest living painter in France, and renewed painting for the century. Elements of his influence can even be seen in the works of Bouchon, Fragonard and Renoir.

Simon Vouet’s painting can be characterized as theatrical and in motion, in a monumental depiction of Herculean figure and saturated space which fills with agitation the surface plane, rather than to serenely measure into the depths as in Classical, perspectivist painting. This is complemented with a rich, vibrant and varied coloring and a signifying use of lighting, across sinuous line of whirling drapery and sensuous, full, twisted figures which diagonally traverse or transgress demarcated theatrical or architectural spaces to seduce the beholder into them.


15 Although much of his prodigious work was irrecoverably destroyed by Calvinist iconoclast sentiment and offense at sensuous portrayal, acts facilitated by the plunder of the religious wars, as well as blunders by 19th century “restoration” efforts.


17 Just as was the enchanting intention of Baroque theater and theatrical architecture of the period. Jean Rousset, L’Intérieur et l’extérieur. Essais sur la poésie et sur le théâtre au XVIIe siècle
spatial trespass is far better systematized than in the saturated surface of Mannerist painting, and is not found in the perspectival space of Classical painting where all contributes to a strict geometrical construction of space, the horizon point and the singular point of view to capture the total canvas without any inner framing, in analogy with the stance of the Cartesian Philosopher towards the object of knowledge.18 Vouet’s work is Baroque art at its finest as representation of a theatrical moment of Gospel, hagiographic or mythical narrative and participation in it, for the figures within the artwork as well as the spectators before it. An example is his "Cupid & Psyché" (1625, Lyon, Musée des Beaux Arts), where Cupid’s bed is a space theatrically demarcated by parted curtains and illumination, into which the

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18 Baroque architecture also used techniques of successive framing, to include recourse to trompe-l’œil, to engage the spectator in space and move him through it. We are thinking initially in terms of church architecture, as Baroque façade and exterior arrangements move the spectator from exterior to interior as, for example, in Bernini’s colonnade for St. Peters in Rome, as the dome of the elliptically elongated church moves the churchgoer through the nave. This Baroque conception and use of space not only to move the spectator but to accommodate a display and pageantry both religious and political lead to the planning of the capital city, such as Rome, Paris, and London, in the 17th century of the forming European nation-state, and worked in hand with a rhetoric and and ideology of power to persuade both citizen and foreigners who in fact became as such participants on a “world stage” of planned, articulated life. This would develop in turn into a certain Classical planification. In fact, there was a mutual influence between city and church architecture in the Baroque mode. The spectator of Baroque art could be just as moved and manipulated through space and ideology. The façades of churches and other buildings projected into broad streets or avenues which lead to open squares and edifices of engaging splendor. Here the role of the monument comes in; with its theatrical effects and ideological purpose, it can be extended to comprehend the church and even the city as monument. Some French Baroque examples of theatrical architecture are the inviting façade of François Mansart’s Church of Val-de-Grâce (1645-65, Paris) and the monument of François Blondel’s Porte Saint Denis (1672, Paris). Giulio Carlo Argan, The Baroque Age (NY: Rizzoli, 1989) 30-33, 41-49.
sinuous line of Psyché's body enters from out of the shadows, thus trespassing into
the lit space, putting the spectatorial eye into sinuous motion from left to right and
moving it along with the gesture of transgression into the forbidden theatrical space.
Vouet used such theatrical and in-motion techniques, to include rotations away from
frontal perspective, in religious portrayals as well. The use of voluminous curtains,
wind and motion-filled, and dramatically colored in their *drappeggiamento* effect, is
one of the obvious ways Vouet demarcates theatrical space, but he also often
accomplishes this with a row of heavily-winged outspread angels in flight, as in the
"Presentation of Jesus at the Temple" (1643, Paris, Musée du Louvre); another figure
can be used as framing, as in the outstretched Virgin over the Christ in "The
Entombment of Christ" (1644, Paris, Private Collection); even the wings and draping
about an individual figure are used to frame a sensuous, inviting corporality which the
spiritual often accommodates and takes along with it, as in the "Allegory of Wealth"
(1630/35, Musée du Louvre) and "The Repenting Madeleine" (1630, Amiens, Musée
de Picardie); or a bower of trees as in the "Allegory of Charity" (Paris, Musée du
Louvre) and the "Nymph struck by a cherub's arrow" (Nancy, Musée des Beaux
Arts), or architectural columns and arches, suggesting here Andrea Pozzo's type of
*trompe-l'œil*.

Of particular interest for the topic of presence are those paintings where the
Christ or another religious figure is in presentation, and we are invited through the
sinuous line of a motion which is often also the gesture of marvel, into this space of
Christic presence. Two such paintings are "The Circumcision" (1622, Naples, Museo
Simon Vouet, Allegory of Wealth (1630/35, Paris, The Louvre)
de Capodimonte) and the "Presentation of Jesus at the temple" (1643, Paris, Musée du Louvre).

In "The Circumcision", the presentation of a foreshortened Christ child by the open hands of Mary is set on an inner, second plane of the painting, and is framed by columns on the left, and heavy, crimson draperies on the upper and right hand side. The outer frame is composed of figures arranged in a partial perspectival direction leading from the left side to the central frame. Leading to and seemingly commenting upon the inner presentation of the Christ child, they mediate for the spectator -- in their gestures, sinuosity, arrangement and simple humanity -- presence to the Christic scene. This particular painting is considered by Thuiller to be very close to what will be typical of Vouet's production in France, although his coloring will lighten and lose the extreme chiaroscuro effect found here.19

Arranged in a similar fashion to "The Circumcision" yet with brighter coloring, the "Presentation of Jesus at the Temple" (1643, Paris, Musée du Louvre) for the Church "Saint Louis des Jésuites", portrays a combination of architecture, sculpture and painting to present a sottinsu foreshortened perspective from below to the figure of Saint Louis, so typical of Baroque art and its effect of overhead majesty, and in particular of the Baroque dome. Background columns suggest a circular place of presentation that is the temple itself, although Thuiller comments that this hint at Classicism could not really satisfy the most rigorous of the French NeoClassical

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Simon Vouet, The Circumcision (1622, Naples, Museo di Capodimonte)
Simon Vouet, The Presentation of Jesus at the Temple (1643, Paris, The Louvre)
Simon Vouet, The Presentation of Jesus at the Temple (1643, Paris, The Louvre)
painters. Figures in a balanced perspective on both the left and right sides of the lower third of the painting lead in their earnest gestures towards the central plane. This is framed overhead and to the left by large, adult-sized angels with outstretched wings.

We also include in this partial review of Vouet’s treatment of the theatrical presentation of the Christ figure his “Crucifixion” (1636, Lyon, Musée des Beaux Arts), one of the more original of Vouet’s treatments of this theme, and entirely of his autograph. Here the framing takes place through the bottom figures at the base of the Cross. Of particular interest is the figure on the left, whose outstretched arms and mannered hands and fingers reach towards the Cross in the top half of an "S" figure, while the heavy draping of the figure gives it an opposing tension, torsion and movement in the bottom half of an "S" figure, all of which attracts the distant eye of the beholder, who is perhaps more habituated to a placed frontal perspective, into proximity with the suffering Christ who here nears to him in a shifted perspective. This torsion and distortion of figure and Cross is not merely decorative, but has it purpose. To add to this effect, and of great interest, is the position of the Cross itself and the Christ figure upon it, where horizontal and vertical axes could be used to establish perspectival lines. As Thuiller remarks, the position of the Cross subverts the normative frontal perspectival representation,21 where Vouet rotates the vertical axis of the Cross to the left and forward, and the right wing of the Cross’s horizontal

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Simon Vouet, The Crucifixion (1636, Lyon, Musée des Beaux Arts)
axis forward. This is evident in the angle towards the top frame where a parallel line
might be expected. These ever-so-slight rotations or anamorphic distortions of the
scene are of great importance. The body of Christ is thus inclined in an "S"-shaped
curve towards the "S"-shaped outstretched figure and, ultimately, towards us,
implicating the spectator in a sinuous, dynamic "chain of representations" which
moves from below left towards the painting and the Christ.22

Other religious paintings of interest for the theatrical demarcation of space,
framing and presence are "The Birth of the Virgin" (1674, Rome, Church of San
Francesco a Ripa), with the Virgin and Saint Ann in the central scene and light
towards which gesture surrounding figures; and "The Martyrdom of Saint Eustache"
(1638, Paris, Church of Saint Eustache) where, in an architectural setting similar to
that of "The Presentation of Jesus at the Temple", is found the figure of Saint
Eustache in an interesting torsion. The perspectival balance of figures leading to the
central plane is shifted to the left, adding to the scene's sense of disequilibrium and
chaos. The figures on the right side, family members of mother and child
sympathetic to St. Eustache, are brought into the light, whereas those on the left
prepare violent gestures in the shadows. This complex painting includes three planes
of organisation; the spectator is surprisingly implied in the space on the left side
rotated towards him of the executioners' violent gestures, thus meting out personal
culpability for the gift given by martyrdom.

22 In comparison, in the earlier "Crucifixion" of 1621 (Genoa, Church of the Gesù), the
illumined figure of the Christ opens up towards the sky, as transcendence is emphasized over human
imbrication in the scene.
In addition to these theatrical depictions of space which harbor present figures, Vouet has several "gloire" paintings further illustrating Christian mysteries where a demarcated space -- such as the tomb -- is broken through and emptied out into the marvel of a transcendant space and presence above where, for example, saints in apophasis presented in foreshortened distance draw us to them. This is what Frederick Hartt terms "Baroque break through", at its best in the Baroque dome, or vault, which uses trompe-l'œil to open out into the heavens, as in Gian Battista Gaulli's "Triumph of the Name of Jesus" of Rome's Il Gesù (1672-85) and Correggio's "Ascension of the Virgin" in the Dome of Parma's Cathedral (1526-30). Vouet's examples of such apophasis are the retable in St.-Nicolas-des-Champs in Paris, of "The Apostles at the Virgin's Tomb" and "The Assumption of the Virgin" (1629), where the stages of absence gestured towards by the bodies and gestures and glances upwards of the apostles illuminated by the presence above are segmented into a lower and an upper painting within the altar's sections. Another example is Vouet's "Assumption" of 1644 (Reims, Musée St.-Denis). It is the absence represented in the demarcated theatrical space, such as the tomb, which raises for us the question of presence and its techniques in the Baroque aesthetic context.

It is this demarcation of a theatrical space in use with movement, sinuous line and vibrant coloring to produce a transgression which engages the beholder, and its enthralling displacement of absence and presence as well, which interest us as a call

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24 Unlike the traditional treatment of this subject in a single painting.
to the question of presence in the Baroque art work, in Vouet’s painting as well as that of his disciples, in particular Eustache Le Sueur. This in turn shall allow us to make a bridge with similar tactics of theatrical configuration and presentation, all be they played with, in contemporary art, particularly in the Surrealism of René Magritte.

2. Eustache Le Sueur (+1616,-1655)

Eustache Le Sueur lived his entire life in Paris, of which approximately ten years from 1634 to 1643 were spent in the atelier of Simon Vouet. This was during the very years when the atelier flourished, and Le Sueur probably participated in the many palace commissions of Vouet for interior decoration of mythological theme, a great deal of which is now lost except for etchings here and there. At the end of his formation, Le Sueur would free himself from attachment to Vouet. As a founding member of the "Académie Royale de Peinture et de Sculpture", he would become the foremost painter under the Regency of Anne of Austria. At his untimely death, Charles Le Brun would take his place in both prestige and influence.25

What is particularly interesting for our analysis is the use of framing technique in Le Sueur’s work, again done with draping effects or actual corporal figures as in Vouet’s painting. Yet where Vouet usually framed the Christ in presence and presentation, saints in agony or in apotheosis, or absence before glory, Le Sueur takes

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a greater liberty of play with the contents of the frame, often in a parallel move towards mythological subjects. Some examples are "Sleeping Venus surprised by Cupid" (San Francisco, Fine Arts Museum), comparable to Vouet’s "Psyché and Cupid", but here both Cupid and the opulent carnality of Psyché are within a much more opened and illuminated frame, and "The Rape of Thamar" (1636-38, New York, Metropolitan Museum of Art) where a heavily curtained bed sets the stage for an impending scene of violence and its gestures.

In "The Death of Raymond Diocrès" and "Raymond Diocrès speaking during his funeral services" to tell all of Paris that he had been damned, as the legend goes, both from the St. Bruno paintings (1645-48) and now in the Louvre collection, death, the macabre and the miraculous are all framed, respectively. "St. Bruno refuses the Arch bishopric of Reggio" (Paris, The Louvre) creates, between gestures of offer and refusal, a curious tension and perspectival horizon point in the framing set within the painting, as if to refuse a Baroque demarcation of space in order to opt for the Classical one, just as did St. Bruno in his life and for his Order, which refused the commotion of the world and its political arena for a life of Monasticism. The series of the Saint Bruno paintings, a commission which established Le Sueur's reputation for the Vauvert Monastery on the outskirts of Paris, are paintings mostly Classical in composition where the figures' deflated folds leave behind the breath and motion of Baroque spirit and presence for the Classical, serene figure reminiscent of the art of Antiquity, and where coloring is more nuanced and sober in gamut, rather than high

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26 A.Mérot, Eustache Le Sueur, 1616-1655, 192.
Eustache Le Sueur, The Rape of Tamar (1636-38, NY, Metropolitan Museum of Art)
Eustache Le Sueur, The Death of Raymond Diocrès (1645-48, Paris, The Louvre)
Eustache Le Sueur, Raymond Diocrès speaking during his Funeral Services (1645-48, Paris, The Louvre)
and vibrant in contrast. This is not inappropriate to the topic of St. Bruno and his Order. With this series of paintings and those he produced contemporary to it, Le Sueur is concerned foremost with perspectival depth and the rational construction of space from a singular point of view, and over any demarcated space of presentation, particularly evidenced in "St. Bruno and his companions distributing their possessions" (Paris, The Louvre). Inspired from Raphaël's "Death of Ananie" and perhaps also Domenichino’s "Cecilia distributing Alms", this painting presents half of a perspectival representation with a diagonal composition running from the lower left to the upper right of the painting, clearly indicated in the squared-off lines of the ground work. Further liberties with framing in favor of the total composition can be found in other paintings by Le Sueur in this same second period from 1645 to 1650.

Framing is not, then, of sole importance in Le Sueur’s style, as the tension towards Classicism and its emphasis upon the entire composition, an ideal panoramic setting and a frontal, more stable use of perspective breaks asunder the tight, highly-charged, forced perspective, and masterly effective framing composition with its entralling capacity for the beholder found in Vouet’s work. That is, in a second phase of Le Sueur’s production, geometrical construction and its calm arrangements begin to take precedence over agitated presentation and its plenitude, although panorama never becomes more than accessory and is not a subject in itself, as it is in Nicolas Poussin’s work. We might say that, in the relative context of a comparison

27 A.Mérot, 203.

28 The lack of prerelative, perspectival construction in the Vouet style is evident in this description of it as the typical method of Le Sueur in Paris, circa 1640: "Il attaque son tableau sans
with Vouet, and within the context of Baroque art, Le Sueur's work moves towards emptying out the frame, and opening towards the panoramic vista and scaled composition in the style of Raphael (+1483,-1520) and Nicolas Poussin (+1594,-1665), and thus gives to the beholder a greater measure of serenity. Some examples are "The Presentation of the Virgin at the Temple" (1638 or 1640-45, Leningrad, Hermitage Museum) where, although Mérot finds here the strong influence of Vouet, we see the diagonal movement from the young Virgin figure on the left to the figures with outstretched arms at the entrance to the temple as a shallow, almost horizontal and panoramic one of a calm, lethargic movement of the figures and their placid expression, particularly that of the Virgin, as well as the sense of a common, everyday scene, which begins the break with Vouet. This is particularly evident if we make a comparison of Le Sueur's "Presentation of the Virgin at the Temple" with the painting of the same title by Vouet's disciple Nicholas Chaperon (1639, Houston, Museum of Fine Arts), where three forced and highly-charged diagonal planes from the lower right to the upper left, which can also be considered social as well as mystical planes, give the entire composition a great movement and complexity with multiple points of view which almost surpasses that of Vouet's own work! A.Mérot gives Le Sueur's painting here, destined to Jean-Jacques Olier at the Saint-Supplice Seminary, as an example of Le Sueur's contribution to Catholic reform in the

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grande réflexion préalable, en s'aidant d'un recueil de modèles, d'un répertoire de figures qui circulaient dans l'atelier, et était commun à tous les élèves de Vouet, dont on sait combien il est difficile de distinguer les mains respectives*. A.Mérot, Eustache Le Sueur, 1616-1655, 76. A.Mérot finds this particularly illustrated by the gesture of the painter and the drawing he has begun, depicted in Le Sueur's "Réunion des amis" (Paris, The Louvre). In Vouet's Baroque style, the emphasis is upon the imposing presentation of the figures themselves, rather than a measure within a composed totality.
Nicholas Chaperon, The Presentation of the Virgin at the Temple (1639, Houston, The Museum of Fine Arts; Museum purchase with funds provided by the Laurence H. Favrot Bequest)
Jansenist sense. Thus Mérot cannot truly rank Le Sueur with the great propaganda artists of the Counter-Reformation, such as Rubens, Bernini or Vouet himself, for overall Le Sueur’s religious leanings remain very difficult to discern as he received and accepted so many diverse commissions. Another example of Le Sueur’s looser framing in favor of the entire composition is "The Deposition of the Cross" (Paris, The Louvre), where figures framing Christ’s body are somewhat loosely assembled so that a certain horizontality and the panorama of the entire composition takes over.

A.Mérot points out that in the last and final phase of Le Sueur’s work, there is a softening of geometrical form and a return to the suppleness of line in the Vouet style, with a return to surface saturation and decoration over perspectival depth, however not without a synthesis of his entire experience and experiment, both Classical and Baroque. Within the context of a Baroque and NeoBaroque study concerned with the topic of framing and presence/presentation in its religious dimension, then, we can go so far as to read Le Sueur’s painting as a transitional moment between Simon Vouet’s and René Magritte’s work, thus linking the French Baroque to an important dimension of 20th-century aesthetic style and preoccupations.

29 A.Mérot, Eustache Le Sueur, 1616-1655, 96-97.

30 A.Mérot, Eustache Le Sueur, 1616-1655, 99.

31 A.Mérot, Eustache Le Sueur, 1616-1655, 63.
Eustache Le Sueur, The Deposition of the Cross (Paris, The Louvre)
C. Conclusion: What does the "Saint" See, Remember and Feel?

In the Baroque "gloire" painting we see the saint in apotheosis heavenward in foreshortened perspective towards a ceiling or dome seemingly burst asunder, so far from us, yet drawing us to it, as for example in Giovan Battista Gaulli's "The Triumph of the Name of Jesus (1672-85, Rome, Il Gesù) and Eustache Le Sueur’s "St. Bruno est enlevé au ciel" (1645-48, Paris, The Louvre).32 But what does the saint see, and what does he or she remember, should memory be reduced to sacred union and ecstasy... if not, in the traditional iconography, the sky, its luminosity, its calm yet drawing presence to him who is not drawn in imperfection's great agitation, as we are, but who is already there. This brings us back to our contemporary era, for does "Mémoires d'un saint", then, place our eyes in the eyes of the saint, perhaps one step after St. Bruno is taken by Le Sueur's depiction to the heavens? And might not there also be some humor in this, on Magritte's part? We might say that Magritte's "Mémoires d'un saint" is not exactly beyond Baroque, but rather in the beyond to which the Baroque takes us, or to the final clin d'œil of all which, in light of the series of paintings we have discussed, cannot fail to make us smile, or outright laugh, in what is an irony of reception, and what we might call a "metabaroque" reception. Magritte's Baroque is one of humor which laughs in the face of technique, or rather with it, its trompe-l'œil and anamorphosis, placing the act of representation itself in question. The portrayal of sky and clouds which, in an extreme use of their

32 This latter painting is particularly interesting, for where in the preliminary drawing the emptied tomb depicted at the bottom of the sketch establishes the composition's perspectival lines, this bottom half is suppressed in the final painting as rapture is emphasized in isolation. See figures 201 and 202 in A.Mérot, Eustache Le Sueur, 1616-1655, 213.
Eustache Le Sueur, St. Bruno borne up to the Heavens (1645-48, Paris, The Louvre)
indeterminacy, trespass the borders between two representations and combine with tricks of framing, as in Magritte’s "The Oasis" (1925-27, Brussels, Mme J. Van Parys Collection), "La Victoire" (1939, Paris, collection particulière), "La Vengeance" (1939, Antwerpen, Koninklijk Museum voor Schone), "Le Beau monde" (1960, Brussels, private collection) where clouds become stage or window curtains, "La Lunette d’approche" (1963, Houston, The Menil Collection) and "Le Soir qui tombe" (1964, private collection), among others, are a main way in which Magritte illustrates trompe-l’œil trespass and the question between artifice and reality, between rational perception and the marvellous. On the use of painting to evoke the mystery of life, Magritte gave the very example of his depictions of the sky: "I see it everywhere, in what you call the commonplace. Is the sky not mysterious? You say "the sky above us", yet you are in the sky -- it is everywhere". Indeed, he places the painter’s entire academic formation in joyous play, as he ultimately works against the academic doxa, yet uses the various doxa in a polyvalent manner that is not always fully perceived.33

M. Yaari’s examples of the ironic in art are useful to us as we examine Magritte’s challenge to the painter’s doxa. The ironic work of art challenges the very techniques by which it stands, to the point of its questionability as representation and

33 Interviews de Houston, déc.1665, in Ecrits complets, 618. Just as clouds and sky can be virtually everywhere, so can other objects. See for example "La Bataille d’Argonne" (1959, NY, private collection). The theme of clouds was a favorite of Baroque poetry. See Jean Rousset, Anthologie de la poésie baroque française, 2 vols. (Paris: Armand Collin, 1964).

as art, as in the title of one of Magritte's paintings, "Jamais réel, et toujours vrai".

At the same time, Yaari finds, as we do, that the use, or "palimpsest" as she says, in borrowing the term from Gérard Genette, of many styles to be the essence of the ironic. If the "Postmodern", or aesthetic Modernism can be said to fall in the realm of an irony which is both literary and iconic, and perhaps even philosophical, we can then ask if the NeoBaroque we carve out therein uses the mode of irony as well as it goes back to reread Baroque and Classical tensions. And we can even go so far as to ask whether the Baroque itself, with its perturbations of perspectival play with spectatorial distance coming after the High Renaissance and as the "futur antérieur" to French Classicism, is not itself, to a certain extent, in an ironic mode.36

And yet, in light of this ironic mode, we still do not know which saint and whose memoirs, nor which mystery is truly concerned -- "le mystère reste ouvert, mais aujourd'hui, sur fond de ciel vide"37 -- unless it is the mystery of the workings of our own gaze upon the artwork, with the cultural and personal memory we bring with us. This is at once the ultimate lack, virtually an abstract art, and the ultimate presence, ours alone to see and to be as the saint sees the sky in glory, at the end of Baroque, and to remember this as we also project our own visions or hallucinations and transform them into sacred, or simply aesthetic, space. If there is to be a body,

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35 M.Yaari, "Ironies of Modern/Postmodern Art: Duchamp, Magritte, Adami", 543, 550.

36 Our only problem with the term "irony" would be that it takes as normative that which it comments upon, in this case Classical rationality.

our own eye cannot be fleshless, nor without e-motion moved beyond itself, as we must by force take up the burden and place ourselves and our memory, our affect and our own life story there. So Magritte himself states, "une image peut parfois mettre son spectateur en accusation grave". And the scene of Magritte’s "Mémoires d’un saint" contains an invisible host of spectators, a space for all along with their singular histories, as the sacred pervades the profane, or rather the profane pervades the sacred, much like the myriad faces depicted in Correggio’s Parma dome. So as beholders we superimpose ourselves upon and within the representation, much as if we were looking at all representation through a glass whose reflection captured faintly the traces of our own face, by a trick so ironically simple and everyday, as the facial features floating over the scenery of mountains and sky suggest in Magritte’s 1966 painting "Tous les jours" (Paris, Nesuki Ertegun). Such paranoid superposition comes out best in Magritte’s later work, contemporary to "Mémoires d’un saint". Familiar with Magritte’s work, we might even expect a couple of indistinct bowler-hatted men to float by "Mémoires" too perfect segment of sky, or rocks, or apples, to take some typical object of Magritte’s iconography, or other bourgeois, everyday beholders, so humoristic when juxtaposed against the religious iconography Baroque art presents to us. Indeed, Magritte was expert as well at the pastiche of his own

38 Quoted in Gablik, Magritte, 10.

39 See the paintings "La Reconnaissance de l’infini" (1963, private collection), "La Bataille de l’Argonne (1659, NY, private collection) and "La Carte postale" (1960, London, Mrs. Lionel Fraser), respectively.
work, where he used in various transformative and variant ways the same ideas and themes.\textsuperscript{40}

Beyond this fantasy, play or aberration, no belief, dogma, nor ideology of power is imposed — and for this reason, perhaps, Magritte has improved the Baroque, or attained a NeoBaroque structure which lacks the ideology of the Baroque. Nonetheless, we are brought to ask, what happens to cult around a common memory in the face of such 20th-century cultural expressions? Does "Mémoires d’un saint", and perhaps by extension much of contemporary art, propose a cult without memory, or in the face of a 20th-century memory which, too painful, launches us into versions of the Iconoclast and the personally incommunicable, or into a vision such as that of the 1938 painting "Memory" (1938, Houston, The Menil Collection)? Nonetheless, this is the point from which Magritte has most slyly resolved the Baroque/Classical tension by looping the aesthetic loop, to find where both styles can meet. This is indeed a mastery of styles, not unlike that of Eustache Le Sueur, and perhaps a mastery of Western religion’s facets as well. But it is only with an inclusion of the Baroque — aesthetic and religious — that we can truly think about Magritte’s "Mémoires d’un saint", if not about all his painting. And only in our 20th century, where the aesthetic has taken the place of the religious in a world where antinomies are abolished as the sky has fallen, much as the poet since the late 19th century has taken over the sacerdotal role;\textsuperscript{41} only in a 20th century in crisis after Philosophical

\textsuperscript{40} S.Gablik, Magritte, 155.

\textsuperscript{41} As we shall see with the work and life of Antonin Artaud as the most exacerbated example in 20th-century French letters.
Modernity where there can be a mode of critique as work, is such thinking possible, where presence once posed is also in question, and such paradox finds its reworked accommodation, albeit in parodic form, and solution. With Magritte’s art as our context, we might better speak then of a "MetaBaroque" rather than a "NeoBaroque". For it is this work of art, of initially apparent absence, banal objects, lost memory or time, which in fact realizes the miracle of a presence whose burden is ours, thereby bursting asunder all limits,\textsuperscript{42} along with a marvellous which finds its locus in us, with its time and history found anew in the sense of a "futur antérieur", even in the comforting familiarity of the theater and backdrop of what truly is a new sky.\textsuperscript{43}

\textsuperscript{42} As in the painting "La révélation du présent" (1936).

\textsuperscript{43} The day-lit sky of "L’Empire des lumières" where the scenery is set in night shadow, gives us a sense of Magritte’s "new sky". In comparison with Ricoeur’s analysis of the contemporary novel as it reworks old conventions while not forsaking them, as it needs must configure itself somehow, so perhaps can we examine contemporary painting such as Magritte’s, where from "sense" to "nonsense" in passage through the ironic a new meaning is found: "Car le jeu de l’attente, de la déception et du travail de remise en ordre ne reste praticable que si les conditions de son succès sont incorporées au contrat tacite ou exprès que l’auteur passe avec le lecteur: je défaits l’oeuvre et vous la refaites — de votre mieux. Mais, pour que le contrat ne soit pas lui-même une duperie, il faut que l’auteur, loin d’abolir toute convention de composition, introduise de nouvelles conventions plus complexes, plus subtiles, plus dissimulées, plus rusées que celles du roman traditionnel, bref des conventions qui dérivent encore de celles-ci par la voie de l’ironie, de la parodie, de la dérisoire. Par là, les coups les plus audacieux portés aux attentes paradigmatisques ne sortent pas du jeu de «déformation réglée» grâce auquel l’innovation n’a jamais cessé de répliquer à la sédimentation. Un saut absolu hors de toute attente paradigmaticque est impossible.” Temps et récit II, 43. Emphasis is our own.
VII. BRINGING THE OTHER TO PRESENCE: ANTONIN ARTAUD
(+1896,-1948) & THE BAROQUE

A. Antonin Artaud’s «Théâtre de la cruauté» as Baroque Catharsis

1. The Baroque, the Spiritual Exercises, and the Theater

The relation between the Baroque as a cultural aesthetic and the theater is an essential one. Not only has Baroque aesthetic and vision expressed itself through theater, but theater is in turn a trope of the other Baroque arts and a category of its thought and vision.

The Ignatian Spiritual Exercises as the initiation of a Trentine Baroque vision have both implications of theater within them and further implications for theatrical practice. Indeed, the Society of Jesus perpetuated theater throughout Europe, both in a pedagogical context and beyond. Both the Ignatian techniques of Composition of Place and the importance of body-presence exploit the images of theater, stage and actor, for the Ignatian spiritual director is a kind of stage director of the imagination, and the Ignatian exercitant is a kind of radical spectator whose imagination in meditative practice creates a Christic or Biblical theatrical scene into which he

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1 An earlier version of this study was presented at the 1996 ISSEI Colloquium "Memory, History & Critique. European Identity at the Millennium" in the session directed by Natalia Chechel, "The European & American Avantgarde, Visual Culture between the Two World Wars: Art, Theatre, Cinema", August 19-24, 1996, Utrecht, the Netherlands.
ultimately enters as actor in the religious mode of "Immensity". This was manifest architecturally and decoratively in Baroque theater's blurring of the boundaries between stage and auditorium, and the use of technical props such as moving stairways at the proscenium's edge to suggest to the spectator an invitation to join the actors upon the stage. Such Baroque theatrical manoeuvres are implied in the Ignatian Spiritual Exercises insofar as they manipulate and exceed Renaissance space and its theater of distance, scene/auditorium separation and autonomy, and use of perspective to maintain such separation and distance.²

The use of visualization and Composition of Place in the Spiritual Exercises, with the suggestion that all can be turned to image, has a correlation in Baroque theater's tendency to show all upon the stage, including blood and horror, rather than to replace it in the Classical style with a narrative account. Excessive importance is placed upon decor and spectacle in Baroque theater, to the point where Classical unity of place is disregarded. Likewise, complexity of action and a call to the senses are outcomes of the Baroque will to visualize and represent all, and to be there with it. In the Spiritual Exercises, this corresponds to the cultivation of an elastic imagination in the exercitant and a call to his senses. In turn, this provokes an elastic subject of questionable personality, an Homo Barrocos, who is not only capable of transgressing visual framings and boundaries to enter upon the scene of representation, but who can accommodate the Other, in a physical and ethical sense, and maintains an open stance

² Perspectival construction remained in Baroque theater and decor, however its extreme use with scene/auditorium blurring, a plurality of focal points (often three) in a single decor and multiple decors pushed it into Baroque space.
to the Other, ultimately to the Christ in the religious mode of "Inhabitation".
Likewise on the Baroque theatrical scene, the actor/hero is capable of persuading the
Other -- character or spectator or god -- into his space and place, to provoke in
edificatory fashion subjectival transformation and conversion, as stage and auditorium
become one architectural unit. That is, the other/Other is brought forth to presence
himself. In such an open relationship and concatenation of representation, the
cathartic process is begun, but, as we shall see, there is no closure to it.

2. From Baroque Drama to the Theater of Cruelty

In its Postmodern transgression of the norms of Classical theater, Antonin
Artaud's manifests and vision for his "Théâtre de la cruauté"3 lead us to ask the
question as to whether this transgression brings Artaud's theater close to Baroque
drama, sandwiched as it is in its own transgression after Renaissance space and before
French Classical theater. Yet by examining Artaud's theater in light of Baroque
drama of martyrdom, we mean in no way to neglect recognition of the many and
various influences and heritage which seized Artaud's imagination, ranging, for
example, from Buddhism to Balinese danse ritual to pre-Columbian Mexican culture,
to the Occult and to Gnosticism, which in themselves betray a complex relationship to
body-presence and Christianity with which he never ceases to grapple, despite
slipping into and out of Catholic faith and mystical periods. These themes have all

3 Antonin Artaud, "Le Théâtre de la cruauté" (Premier et seconde manifeste), in Le Théâtre
et son double (Paris: Gallimard, 1964). This Folio edition of Artaud's theoretical work on his theater
includes the two manifestos for "Le Théâtre de la cruauté"; in our references to this theater we shall
quote from this edition, indicated as TD.
been treated in various ways in critical work on the Artaudian corpus. We do mean, however, to bring a new optic to Artaud’s theater and perception of his person, one which in hand with the importance of body-presence in Artaud’s conception, elaborates a Postmodern terrain for the Baroque, and also works back to further enrich the concept of the Baroque as a circuit of difference within Western culture. What is more, Artaud’s fascination with the Occult and Satanism, and with the medical and healing practices of non-Western cultures have an affinity for the underside to the Baroque.

A cursory examination of some of the basic tenets of the Theater of Cruelty offers the glimmer of a Baroque dimension in Artaud’s would-be vision for the theater. Artaud seeks for his theater the proliferation of horror without resolution, not necessarily through an abundant portrayal of blood and violence, but moreso through an actor physically seized by the horror and whose gestures and cries are a kind of decor worth as much as his words and who is plastically open to the range of emotions, as a pestiferous, dangerous body-receptacle whose possession is incarnated upon the stage. This is meant in turn to provoke a trembling spectator who, engaged physically and affectively and having entered into the cathartic process, finds no relief at the end of such drama, but rather finds himself in dangerous sympathetic vibration with the actor. This sympathetic vibration is corporally amplified by Artaud’s constant wish to overpopulate the stage with people and cadavres. For example, he gives Paolo Veronese’s painting "The Marriage at Cana" (1563) as an example for the

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4 Indeed, Artaud’s writings are inexhaustible, and we have more to learn from him as his vision continues to nourish us than he ever had need of us.
staging of Les Cenci.\textsuperscript{5} This is the cruelty which involves the spectator and replaces an effective Catharsis, in the Classical sense, where cruelty is meant in such a large sense, and not merely as a sadism or violence. This cruelty is also a kind of philosophical rigor, a finely-tuned, applied consciousness, a voracious life drive much like fire and appetite, spurred on by evil. Physical cruelty is only a part of this, as metonymy for all which removes the lassitude of man's bourgeois comfort and repose -- mental and psychic as well as physical.\textsuperscript{6} This Theater of Cruelty also deploys a Philosophy of language usage which, unconcerned with elegance, augments malaise and horror through the immediate presence of material, visceral sounds, gestures and cries prior to intellection, tied to and dangerously perturbing of the body of both the actor and the spectator, and maintaining the moment of pity and fear at its pitch in a kind of sympathetic vibration or incantatory music "pour faire affluer nos démons".\textsuperscript{7} In fact, Artaud disliked excessive rehearsal in theater, as he preferred the brute presence and performance of language in a live, even atrocious, poetry-in-process.\textsuperscript{8} All of this is set by Artaud's design in an architectural configuration of stage and

\textsuperscript{5} Although part of the Italian Renaissance, Il Verenose's Mannerist interpretations, saturated pictorial surfaces and calculated use of foreshortened figures prefigures elements of Baroque art.

\textsuperscript{6} So Eugène Gegenbach, in a letter dated 13 may 1935, writes to Artaud following a representation of Les Cenci, "Vous jouez avec le feu... Autour de moi les spectateurs riaient comme des fous qui ont le fou rire du tremblement. Il s’est trouvé toutefois un docteur mal à l’aise qui voulait une explication, une résolution, une solution de toute cette fable démoniaque. Il voulait la paix. Mon pauvre Artaud, on ne peut plus rien pour vous." Oeuvres Complètes, 24 vols. (Paris: Gallimard, 1956-1988) V, 46. Further quotes from the Oeuvres Complètes shall be indicated as OC, volume and page.

\textsuperscript{7} TD, 92.

\textsuperscript{8} TD, 117, 121.
auditorium, a kind of reverse theater-in-the-round which would project the spectacle upon the backdrop of everyday life and the very audience itself, and which would further encourage the dangerous rapprochement between actor and spectator.

This will of the Theater of Cruelty towards the spectator has specific social and revolutionary ends, aimed at the spectator's conversion and return to a primitive way of life which circumvents Western culture and which Artaud himself thought to have found in pre-Columbian Mexico. In summary, what is defeated in Artaud's theater is the basic objective, theorized since Aristotle's Poetics, of catharsis, or, to speak metaphorically, of cleansing the earth of its monsters, and the spectator of his pity and fear, so that he might return home, renewed, calm and ready to continue his law-abiding role in Western society. Catharsis, in Antonin Artaud's Theater of Cruelty, on the other hand, is arrested and resonates at its moment of greatest fear, and there is no return to this culture. Along with this, the Classical unities of time, space and action are exploded, and the language of restraint in tension with tragic

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9 We can establish a relation between an open Catharsis, the feminine, patriarchal order, and counter-Western culture, in refusal of a Classical cathartic event and the patriarchal order of Western society. Jean-Joseph Goux has done this in his examination of the Oedipal myth and patriarchally-regulated incest as an aberrant version of the tradition of the "monomyth", where the "féminin sombre" regulates itself the incestuous relationship. "Mythe régulier et mythe déréglé", Oedipe philosophe (Paris: Editions Aubier, 1990) 11-29. See also Julia Kristeva on the relation between the matriarchal and "la souillure", or abjection. Pouvoirs de l'horreur (Paris: Seuil, 1980) 66-67, 79. Indeed, it is the "féminin sombre" which proliferates monstrously upon the earth, and which, as the generic object of desire as well, paradoxically maintains Catharsis at its terrifying, paroxistic moment.

By extension, the Baroque and the open structure of Ignatian imaginative practice, meditation and construction/transgression of spatial framing can also be qualified as of a feminine, counter-patriarchal order. In light of a Counter-Reformation Baroque, the religious Baroque brings to the patriarchal, ecclesiastical order of Catholicism a clearly feminine and transformative, if not subversive, dimension. Effeminate Baroque portrayals of the Christ are significant of this. And it is precisely this Baroque Catholicism which gave a certain place to the feminine in post-schismatic Europe and in the new world, which is logical in light of Protestantism's suppression of figuration, particularly of the feminine, reduction of the status of Mary, and strong patriarchal character.
transgression is replaced by a Semiotics of excess and violence which augments the horror.

I would like to suggest that the Theater of Cruelty recalls Baroque drama in a very specific way, namely the Baroque drama of martyrdom. Thematic, structural and architectural similarities are not the only ones which do so, as social and historical parallels are also present, for both theaters come out of a post-war need to see the horror — the religious wars of Christendom’s schism in the case of Baroque drama, and the tense social and economic period between two world wars for the Theater of Cruelty.\(^\text{10}\) As Artaud’s theater recalls Baroque drama of martyrdom, it is an important 20th-century space not only for a return of the Baroque, but for a continuing elaboration of it.

Before continuing, we should then itemize some of the general characteristics of Baroque drama. These include a disregard for the three Aristotelian unities of time, space and action, which are replaced by a complexity of action that often used a play-within-a-play technique; a multiplicity of place, with a mobile stage and complex succession of decors thanks to sophisticated techniques and machinery. The stage was used in its full spatioity, analogous to the use of the canvas in Baroque painting. To summarize, there was less emphasis upon discourse and a greater emphasis upon decor and spectacle, upon movement, machinery and marvelous effects. There was a

movement towards a unified theatrical space beyond the theater of the Renaissance, inclusive of the stage and the auditorium, thanks to architecture, machinery and extreme use of perspectival illusion. The arts were used in exuberant combination, to include poetry, painting, architecture, music, dance and mime. It was also the era of ballet and opera. There was a conflation of mythical, divine, biblical, historical and royal figures, comprehensive of all the cosmos, in stage-setting and costume, and a taste for New-World exoticism. Language, often in excess, used metaphor and allegory in exaggerated ways, and allegory was particularly important to Jesuit ballet. The stage abounded with portrayals of horror, madness, murder, sacrifice, transis between life and death, and cadavers; this suited the Baroque Philosophy, present in the Spiritual Exercises, of confronting and contemplating suffering and death. And finally, complex Baroque stage techniques were used indiscriminately from sacred to profane theater, and across all the theatrical genres.

Two Baroque dramas of martyrdom come to mind to help elucidate the connection of Artaud's Theater of Cruelty to the Baroque -- Pierre Corneille's Polyvucte (1642) and Jean Rotrou's Le Veritable St. Genest (1645). Both deal with the topics of religious conversion to Christianity and martyrdom. As Baroque dramas contemporary with and parallel to the elaboration of French Classical theater, they exceed Aristotelian unities, stretch the limits of the use of Catharsis and, using measures which span from the rhetorical to the architectural, play with the limits between stage and auditorium, between reality and illusion.

11 See the concept of the transis in the work of Philippe Ariès, Essais sur l'histoire de la mort en Occident, du moyen âge à nos jours (Paris: Le Seuil, 1975).
Given the aesthetic structures put into place by Ignatius of Loyola’s *Spiritual Exercises*, we shall see a relation in particular between the phenomena of persuasion and conversion, and its effects upon historical remembrance, imagination, spatiality and affectivity, as exemplified in St. Ignatius’ techniques of Composition of Place and the Application of the Senses, with their use of the theatrical, as well as pictorial, modes, and theatrical mise-en-scène, character progression, spatial and affective trespass, and discursivity. Jesuit educational drama, with its rhetorical and moral ends, which also grew out of the implications of the *Spiritual Exercises* as well as the Order’s *Ratio Studiorum* of 1584,\(^\text{12}\) also placed emphasis upon the drama of Christian martyrdom, particularly in view of converting youth to the Order and to dangerous missionary work abroad, and of encouraging active piety and a concomitant vision of grace in society at large, thereby maintaining an open, active cathartic effect.\(^\text{13}\) Both Pierre Corneille and Jean Rotrou were educated by the Jesuits. Their dramas in question were also initially important to Counter-Reformation efforts.

3. Pierre Corneille’s *Polyeucte* (1642)

Pierre Corneille’s (+1605,-1684) *Polyeucte* (1642) restored sacred tragedy to the theatrical scene. In his opinion, the sacred figures of the Bible and the lives of the saints in the context of martyrdom merited a portrayal both excessive and

\(^{12}\) The definitive version of the *Ratio Studiorum* dates from 1597.

\(^{13}\) This is however not to neglect the developments in their dramatic practice and diversions of opera and ballet, used to fill the intervals between tragic representation and particularly exclusive to the Jesuits.
enthusiastic. This went against the tenets of Classical drama since Aristotle of "la médiocre bonté", that goodness should be portrayed with moderation. Corneille sought out the extraordinary subject and hero, and he had cultivated a taste for Spanish theater of the Golden Age, for the bizarre, the Baroque excess of passion and violence, for torture and murder upon the stage. This taste for the Spanish Baroque is particularly evident in Le Cid (1636-7) and in the first half of Corneille's work. By the time of Polyeucte, Corneille had adopted the Classical style, although Baroque themes remained, and Corneille defended himself in this way against criticism in his own review of Polyeucte in 1660.\(^{14}\) It is particularly this excess and enthusiasm which carries the action of the play, in the embodiment of the character Polyeucte, whose conversion to Christianity and whose martyrdom in the final scene carries with him in affect, persuasion, and on to conversion the remaining characters of Pauline, Sévère and Félix. The space for Catharsis in this play is limited to the space for Christian conversion, and no peace is to be found outside these limits. Thus martyrdom communicates itself, and victimization is perpetuated, as the Christian sacrifice of the Mass purports it:

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\begin{align*}
\text{Un Dieu qui, nous aimant d'une amour infinie,} \\
\text{Voulut mourir pour nous avec ignominie,} \\
\text{Et qui, par un effort de cet excès d'amour,} \\
\text{Veut pour nous en victime être offert chaque jour.}\end{align*}
\]

\(^{14}\) Corneille reedited his work in this year. This is not to say that all of the tenets of Classical drama are disregarded by Corneille, who preserves rather well the three unities in Polyeucte, and who replaces portrayal of horrible action upon the stage with speech. In general, Corneille followed the theatrical tastes of his time, eventually moving towards a Classical streamlining of his theater.

\(^{15}\) Pierre Corneille, Polyeucte, tragédie (Paris: Librairie Larousse), V.iii.1659–1662. Emphasis is our own. Further quotes are taken from this edition.
This excess of sacrifice is founded after all upon an excess of love. Despite its Classical form, the drama is somehow without end, its containment broken, with consequences implied for the unities of action and space, as martyrdom and Catharsis, or conversion in this case, remain open and resonating events into whose space all might enter. Even the limits of personality are questionable, as all want to become good as Polyaeucte is good and, at the limit, like the Christ. Trespass becomes a positive thing; thus Pauline says, "Polyaeucte m'appelle à cet heureux trépas."¹⁶ Polyaeucte serves as a commentary upon the workings of grace, much in debate at the time,¹⁷ as both a divine gift and something which acts could foster and perpetuate, not only for the self but for the other as well. Grace has an ethical dimension in Polyaeucte. This active and ethical stance towards grace was in accordance with the Jesuit view of it,¹⁸ already suggested by the theatrical techniques of Ignatian Composition of Place and the affective practice of the Application of the Senses as a practice of spatial construction into trespass, as a human invitation to grace and to a presence at once human and Divine.

We shall see this particular kind of communication of martyrdom and open cathartic event carried further in relation to play structure, in the transgression of

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¹⁶ Polyaeucte, V.v.1733.

¹⁷ See, for example, Blaise Pascal's Les Provinciales (1656), which debated the question of grace according to Jansenist persuasion.

¹⁸ And eventually the Catholic view. The community of French Jansenists would dissolve after Pope Clement XI condemned their propositions in Unigenitus Dei Filius (1713).
Classical drama and the domain of the Baroque, with implications for Baroque theatrical architecture, in Jean Rotrou’s *Le Véritable St. Genest*.

4. Jean Rotrou’s *Le Véritable St. Genest* (1645)

Jean Rotrou’s (+1609,-1650) *Le Véritable St. Genest* (1645) is again a drama about Christian conversion and martyrdom, but here the story is marvelously set in a play-within-a-play structure. This structure has been seen before, with Corneille’s *L’Illusion comique* (1636), not to mention Shakespeare’s late comedy *The Tempest* (1613) and Calderón’s *La Vida es sueño* (1635), however Rotrou makes a rather astucious use of the manipulation of frames between reality and representation, between truth and illusion, in the context of Christian conversion and the workings of grace.

The pagan actor Genest, who plays the Christian martyr Adrian, from the play-within-the-play in *Le Véritable Saint Genest*, invokes, "Supréme Majesté […] represente avec moy" -- that God should break through the frames of representation to join him at his place upon the stage and attest to the truth of artifice.\(^{19}\) The play,

\[^{19}\] The entire quotation:

*Genest regardant le Ciel, le chapeau à la main*

Supréme Majesté, qui jettes dans les ames,
Avec deux gouttes d’eau, de si semblables flâmes!
Acheve tes bontez, represente avec moy,
Les saintcs progres des coeurs convertis à ta Foy!
Toy le pouvoir d’un Dieu, et moy le devoir d’un Homme;
Toy l’accueil d’un vainqueur, sensible au repentir,
Et moy, Seigneur, la force et l’ardeur d’un Martyr.

*Maximin*
Il feint comme animé des graces du Baptisme.
composed of three framings, portrays in the outermost frame Roman court spectators to the inner representation and their comments upon it; in the second frame the actors and stage hands involved in rehearsal and staging; and in the third and innermost frame the play performed for the court of the martyrdom of St. Adrian, played by the actor Genest. Everyone takes part within at least two frames, to include the Emperor Maximin who, in "real" life, condemned Adrian to death; spectator of the play-within-the-play, he is also portrayed within it.

If the beginning of Le Véritable St. Genest establishes the frames and limits of representation, the subsequent action, playing fully with the implications of Corneille’s Polyèbe,\(^{20}\) deconstructs these and all they signify, as Genest finds himself converted in his very being while playing the role of St. Adrian — significantly never finishing this inner play — to become St. Genest. The reality of representation is of such a power that Genest, out of character and ad-libbing the text, dares to invoke the presence of God upon the scene! *The real is not only disguised by artifice, but somehow produced by it, as artifice brings forth grace in Le Véritable St.*

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Valerie
Sa feinte passeroit pour la vérité même.

Plancien
Certes, ou ce spectacle est une vérité,
Ou jamais rien de faux ne fut mieux imité.

IV.vii.1275-1286


\(^{20}\) Encouraged by the success of Corneille’s *Polyèbe*, Rotrou borrowed the subject of the martyrdom of St. Adrian from the Jesuit Callot’s *Sanctus Adrianus*, and the story of Genest from Lope de Vega’s *Lo Pinguido verdadero*. 
Genest! As the actors realize Genest's transformation, Lentule cries to the proctor, "Hola, qui tient la Pièce?", Genest replies, "Un Ange", and later, "Il est temps de passer du Théâtre aux Autels".21 The divine world is usurping the human.22 And most wondrously in the next scene, the decorator arrives on stage! As character is breached and conversion begins, there is an interesting amount of meta-commentary upon theatrical architecture, structure and limits by the actors who occupy the play's middle frame.23 Decor is revealed as Baroque trompe-l'oeil, wherein the character/actor/subject shall be revealed an anamorphic Homo Baroccus. The spectators within the play, caught in the pretext of artifice, are tricked into believing it and are firstly persuaded and drawn into it, only to find themselves quite confused before a theater which has become too real: "Comme son art, Madame, a sceu les abuser!", Camille exclaims.24 Who is this questionable personality who calls God down upon the stage? Is it St. Adrian or Genest? Has he, obviously out of character, forgotten his lines? Is he satirizing the content of the play, as this pagan actor has by reputation been wont to do? For the moment does not lack in comedy. Is he serious? Where, then, is the site of martyrdom, and to what does the audience bear witness? For the moment lacks no less in marvel and miracle. The audience is disquieted:

What is their role as spectators? How to receive this play? What emotions should

21 Le Véritable Saint Genest, IV.vii.1298-1300; 1370.


23 Le Véritable Saint Genest, II.i.

24 Le Véritable Saint Genest, IV.v.1264.
they emote? These questions are posed and addressed within the play itself, which offers a model for its reception.

Maximen shall call for the actor Genest’s martyrdom at the "end" of the play. Where he expected to see himself represented, in reassuring mimetic style to provoke a distanced aesthetic response, he has in fact to present himself, to enter upon the stage and trespass into the image with all his existence, in the Baroque fashion of a radical aesthetic response, as the inner play reverberates and expands, and the Renaissance, perspectival place of the Prince is subverted, multiplied and thrown into orbit. As of old, theater has become again a thesaurus sacrum.25 However, the reverse of a theater sprung of religion, this Baroque thesaurus sacrum produces a religion where, by extension of conversion from role to actor, all are invited onto its happening scene, and God himself as well. The Classical limits of the "boîte aux illusions" are broken to become dangerously all-encompassing, as Genest/Adrian extends its space into that of life.26 "All the world's a stage", it is said in Shakespeare's Tempest. This theatrical revolution transgresses perspectively

25 See Per Bjurström, "Baroque Theater & the Jesuits" in R. Wittkower & I. Jaffe, eds., Baroque Art and the Jesuit Contribution (NY: Fordham UP, 1972), 99-110. Theatrum sacrum, part of spectacular Biblical pageants used by the Church to compete with carnival, was performed in combination with stage/auditorium blurring and perspectival illusion which appeared to continue infinitely from proscenium into stage decor and depth, as if one spatial unit, particularly in the context of representations held within Rome's Il Gesù. It extended church space by means of architecture, materials, painting, colors and lighting to give the illusion of a single continuous unit between stage and auditorium. In general, the contiguity of stage and auditorium as one single unit was characteristic of Baroque theater. Margarete Baur-Heinhold, The Baroque Theater. A Cultural History of the 17th & 18th Centuries. Trans. M. Whittall (London: Thames & Hudson, 1967) 135, 161. See also Jean Jacquot, who distinguishes a second type of Renaissance theater, "qui s'épanche de la scène dans la salle, puis refle vers la scène", "Les types de lieu théâtral et leurs transformations", in Le Lieu théâtral à la Renaissance (Paris: CNRS, 1964) 483, and César Molinari, "Les Rapports entre la scène et les spectateurs dans le théâtre italien du XVIIè siècle", in the same collection, 61-71.

26 See J. Morel's "De l'horrible danger de l'imitation", in Agréables mensonges, 189-196.
distanciated Renaissance limits of space and its implied Western metaphysics, along with subjectival centering and limits or outlines of personality, as stage and auditorium become one theatrical unit, and ultimately the spectator himself becomes another possible subject for martyrdom. This is the appropriate reception of this play, open to existence and programmed to provoke conversion.

This experience does not purge the spectator of pity and fear, but rather it contaminates him with emotion, drawing him into the arena of representation and actorial space, presence and feeling. The audience reverberates without end, at best representing Genest/St. Adrian/St. Genest in turn and repeating the moment of martyrdom; we are far from repression of the monstrous, adequate cathexis of malefic affect, circumscription of the unconscious, and closure! *Representation remains open, spatial and corporal limits are transgressed, sacrifice, horror and terror are isolated and exacerbated, as emotion is pestiferous* -- this is what we term "Baroque Catharsis".

Theater has flooded into the arena of life; for as Maximen steps upon the stage and St. Genest steps down from it, *the same drama is repeated*, as Maximen must threaten once again to put the subject to death, thus repeating and acting out his previous action, which was supposed to have been represented upon the now broken inner stage. Condemnation and martyrdom happen at least three times in *Le Véritable St. Genest*, reverberating just as the Passion of Christ and Christic presence is interminably and even simultaneously repeated throughout the life of the Catholic Church. Representation of the Baroque drama of martyrdom has enchained itself in a
concatenation of repetitions, the scene is without closure, and there is no return from disorder to order as in absolutist political drama of the period. The character/subject without bounds is even considered cruel, as Marcèle calls Genest. As persuasion and conversion break through all framings, Baroque drama of martyrdom calls upon an ethical dimension, aimed at edification like Jesuit educational drama, where the spectator's very being, in the image of the court spectators of Le Véritable St. Genest, is called into question, is asked to change and is brought forth to take its place upon the stage, to be on the site of the altar. The Baroque drama renews, even creates being as it brings forth the other.

This spiritual motion of trespass and its concomittent "Baroque Catharsis" is not far from the results of the Ignatian techniques of Composition of Place and Application of the Senses, and objectives for spatially transgressive subjectival stance, sentience, affectivity, and discursivity from within the composed Gospel scene. Nor is it far from the position of Artaud himself as the actor extraordinaire of his conception of theater and of life, and who assumes at the end of his life and in his life a Christic and martyred position. We shall see that this radical conception of the mise-en-scène and character development resurfaces within the 20th century's Theater of Cruelty, and is taken there even further.

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27 Le Véritable Saint Genest, V.iii.1618.
5. Antonin Artaud's (+1896,-1948) «Théâtre de la cruauté»

Let us now examine how Antonin Artaud's Theater of Cruelty in its manifestos of 1932 and '33, in its sole production in 1935 of Les Cenci, and in projected productions, opens up a space, both theatrical and vital, in the 20th century for a return of the Baroque, and takes Baroque Catharsis to its furthest extreme.

Firstly let us look at the actor of the Theater of Cruelty in contrast with the practice of Classical theater, to ask ultimately how the actor might be a continuation and radicalization of Polyeucte or Genest/Adrian. In Classical drama, the hero commits a horrible act, whether willingly or blindly, and the fury of the gods descends upon him. These are the moments where terror is evoked in the spectator. In both Polyeucte and Le Véritable St. Genest, the main protagonist commits a horrible act only insofar as he affronts the social and religious order of the day, and invokes the Emperor's vengeance. The persistence and wilfulness of such an affront extends the "horrible act" and the recompense of regal vengeance and physical torture and martyrdom, beyond the limits - architectural, linguistic and otherwise - of the Classical unities of action, space and time, as in the radical case of Le Véritable St. Genest. Artaud's actor and protagonist shall be a combination of these two in their radicality -- he shall be as monstrous in his acts as the heros of the drama of Antiquity, not to leave aside the hero of Senecan drama of the Renaissance which also had its influence upon Baroque tragedy, and as wilful in his acts as the saintly martyr

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28 Les Cenci was not considered by Artaud to be pure Theater of Cruelty, but to be preparatory for it. It held the stage only 17 evenings and was considered a financial failure. See OC V.5, 38.
of Baroque drama. He shall have no qualms about taking all with him into the realm of what in Artaud’s context has become a theater of damnation and, unlike the Classical hero, but much like Genest/St. Genest, maintains no distance from the other characters nor, ultimately, from the spectator. An example in Les Cenci, remarkably set in Counter-Reformation Rome, and which Artaud adapted from a true story that had previously been dramatized by Shelley (1819) and narrated by Stendhal in his Chroniques italiennes (1837), is the tyrannical, demonic father, whose image is joined to an avaricious and power-hungry Papacy. In a drama which is meant to be preparatory for absolute Theater of Cruelty, Artaud combines the enthusiastic outreach of Christendom with the unresolved proliferation of horror, which spills the monsters of Hell upon the earth. What was a positive outcome in Baroque drama of martyrdom is here a negative one. For as the abused daughter Béatrice of Les Cenci is now condemned to death for having exercised vengeance upon her horrific father, there is a certainty that she in turn has incarnated the horror he was, and no certainty that this horror should ever end, that the salutary effect of Catharsis should accomplish itself, nor life and death separate themselves:

Béatrice: Mes yeux, sur quel affreux spectacle en mourant vous vous ouvrirez.
   Quel est celui qui pourra m’assurer que, là-bas, je ne retrouverai pas mon père.
   Cette idée rend ma mort plus amère.

29 Artaud adapted Les Cenci from Shelley’s (1819) and Stendhal’s (1837) versions of this true story of mythic proportions; there have been other versions of this story as well.

30 Thus the proliferation of the "féminin sombre" of the monomyth in accordance with the open, matriarchal, Baroque work as presented by J.-J.Goux, and the relation between the matriarchal and "la souillure", or abjection presented by J.Kristeva.
Car j’ai peur que la mort ne m’apprenne que j’ai fini par lui ressembler.\textsuperscript{31}

Any salutary effect of \textit{Catharsis} -- even as limited to the realm of Christian conversion as in \textit{Polyeucte} and \textit{St. Genest} -- is evacuated here.

Artaud’s actor resembles the hero of the drama of martyrdom amplified in his moment of greatest physical torment, a \textit{transis} between life and death. He is not only hero, god and monster, but also the martyred, the pestiferous, the "spasme de vie" dans "un état transcendant de vie", "passionné et convulsif". Of a plasticity and dynamic force open to the range of emotion -- "un spectre perpétuel où rayonnent les forces de l’affectivité" -- his corporality, a usurped receptacle, accommodates all, in a cosmic sense, as his body "brutalisé les formes". We have seen the capacities of Polyeucte and \textit{St. Genest} to take others along with them. Likewise there is not only something contagious, but also something dangerous about the actor of the Theater of Cruelty, equally capable of taking others along with him: "l’agir qui est une cruauté", "immédiate et violente".\textsuperscript{32}

This wilfully monstrous hero speaks a language of excess which does not balance horrific action by addressing itself to the understanding alone, as in Classical theater; rather, "une atroce poésie", it \textit{augments} the horror. A Semiotics of violence, it accommodates the material, the sentient, the emotional and the visceral through cries, incantations and gestures. A spatial language in complicity with corporal

\textsuperscript{31} \textit{Les Cenci}, OC IV, Scene II, 210. Emphasis is our own.

\textsuperscript{32} \textit{TD}, 18, 132, 133, 189, 201.
presence, and of magical powers upon life and matter, it joins the arts of mime, danse, cinema, and music. Never a language of Derridian "différance" as distance, matter is brought to the sign and flesh to Metaphysics as this fully aesthetic, material and visceral language works through all the organs, and is accessible to all the senses, to the point of disturbing them and dangerously stretching corporality to its limits.

Through it corporal presence and affective engagement -- repressed by the language of Classical theater, Western culture and its Cartesian dualism -- is to be recuperated, as is done in Artaud's final writing from the asylum. This language, the actor's own existential trembling tied to his body as its first, and perhaps only, referent and measure of the real, provokes the same existential malaise in the spectator who seeks to receive the communication. As such, it breaks Classical, distinct theatrical space, spilling horror everywhere without bounds. An example in Artaud's play is the chanting "Cenci, Cenci, Cenci, Cenci", which amplifies the protagonist's horrible acts beyond all bounds. This is comparable to the language of Baroque drama:

Corneille's language is not exactly a language of horror, measured as it is in Alexandrine verse and often sublime in the Classical sense, but he did cultivate excessive expression and enthusiastic élan in his heros through alliteration, metaphor

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33 This was accent by the signifying use of lighting. Artaud referred to the use of lighting in Van den Leyden's (+1494, -1533) painting, "The Daughters of Lot", as "une lumière d'hallucination" which he tied to the idea of "un déchirement sonore" as an example of what he wished for his theater. TD, 51.

34 OC VIII, 192.

and imagery, a language he defended as most appropriate to martyred protagonists.\footnote{Baroque use of metaphor was one important form of excessive language. One of the most hideous examples is the speech attributed to the wound of Chimène’s father in Corneille’s \textit{Le Cid} (1636).}

Its eloquence in the mouth of the protagonist also served, although very differently, the same ends of persuasion.\footnote{The comparison of the language of the Theater of Cruelty, as a language of Surrealist shock value and sympathetic vibration, with the language of eloquent persuasion, brings us to the question — What would be a Postmodern rhetoric? And how does Artaud’s theater help us to begin an answer?} In both a NeoBaroque, Avantgarde rhetoric of shock value and a Baroque rhetoric of excessive eloquence, metaphorical monstruousity and surprise, the goal is indeed persuasion. Which brings us to the spectator’s reception.

In Corneille’s \textit{Polyeucte}, the characters are in essence spectators to Polyeucte’s conversion and martyrdom, and in the cases of Felix, Sévère and Pauline, persuaded spectators. In Rotrou’s \textit{Le Véritable St. Genest}, characters are actually placed as spectators upon the scene of representation through the play-within-a-play construction, the scene of representation becomes the scene of the "real", and all are invited upon it, as artifice mediates from one real dimension to another. The persuasive relation to the spectator, the breaking of the boundaries between the scene and the auditorium, and the measure of the "real" in representation are both important factors in the spectator’s stance towards the Theater of Cruelty as well. The spectator is to fully sense the agitation which possesses the actors and the scene, to the point where he feels himself to be the object of tragic vengeance and, in the context of a theater of martyrdom, the victim of sacrifice upon the scene, which approaches here a
theatrum sacrum. As force moves from body to body, the spectator is corporally and affectively educated into the throes of Baroque Catharsis and into assuming a tragic position in the decor and as the figure. The Theater of Cruelty’s purpose as that of Baroque drama of martyrdom and of the Ignatian Spiritual Exercises as well is in fact to educate the spectator into assuming this position. And in this approach of the spectator to the scene of representation, a measure of the real is given to artifice, and in turn a measure of theatrical art is given to life. Thus, "le théâtre doit s’égaler à la vie", et "Je ne conçois pas d’oeuvre comme détachée de la vie". A relation to Immensity within the composed scene and Inhabitation of the exercitan: by the scene in the Spiritual Exercises can be seen here. Thus the theater’s double is life and, likewise, the actor’s double is the spectator.

Artaud has this in mind in his wish for the architecture of the Theater of Cruelty, which takes one step further the unified space of late Renaissance to Baroque theater and the principal of fluidity from stage to audience and back again. He envisioned a reversed "theater-in-the-round", where the multifocal spectacle surrounds the spectators: "Nous préconisons un spectacle tournant, et qui au lieu de faire de la scène et de la salle deux mondes clos, sans communication possible, répande ses éclats visuels et sonores sur la masse entière des spectateurs", and "le spectateur placé

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38 As Jacques Derrida quotes Artaud, "Le Théâtre est un débordement passionnel, un épouvantable transfert de forces du corps au corps", in "Le théâtre de la cruauté et la clôture de la représentation", L’Écriture et la différence, 367.

39 TD. 180-1.
au milieu de l’action est enveloppé et sillonné par elle".40 Sound and music contribute to the feeling of being surrounded by the spectacle as well.41 Thus an Avant-garde, Postmodern, as well as Baroque, transgression of perspectivist space, to include the place reserved for the Prince in Renaissance theater, and an "eclipse of distance"42 take place in the very arrangement of Artaud’s theater. This same type of spatial transgression takes place as well in the Ignation Spiritual Exercises, in the transition from the second Prelude of Composition of Place to the third Prelude of Application of the Senses and affectivity. And the physical prepares for the spiritual,43 as Artaud uses the image of a church or temple, with the spectators situated in the ritual center or sacrificial altar, to reveal the gravity of involvement imposed upon the spectator, like that imposed upon the spectator of Christian martyrdom, the Ignation exercitant, or the attendant at mass.44 This explains Artaud’s desire to fill scenic space with masses of people, transis and cadavres, and the constant commotion of a macabre carnivale surrounding the spectator at the center of

40 TD, 134, 148.

41 "Dans mon spectacle, je cherche à mettre le spectateur au milieu de l’action, c’est pourquoi j’utiliserais les ondes Martenot, […] Le spectateur sera surpris devant ce décalage sonore et, si ses nerfs agissent, quelle magnifique possibilité de le faire participer à une action […]". OC V, 303. Emphasis is our own.

42 Thus a theory of reception based upon an eclipse of distance is built into the theatrical configuration of both Baroque theater and the Theater of Cruelty. On eclipse of distance as symptomatic of the Postmodern, see Gilles Lipovetsky, L’Ère du vide (Paris: Gallimard, 1983), 138-9.

43 OC V, 38.

44 "[...] je veux aussi que dans mon spectacle le public soit plongé dans un bain de feu, agité lui-même par l’action et cerné par le mouvement à la fois spectaculaire et dynamique de l’oeuvre. Quel bonheur pour moi si j’arrive à faire participer le spectateur à la tragédie des Cenci avec son âme et ses nerfs!" OC V, 307.
the tragic event and in the place of immolation: "et le public assis au milieu de la salle, en bas, sur des chaises mobiles". This position blurs not only the separation between stage and auditorium, but that between theater and the phenomenal context of everyday life, as if this theater is projected in cinematic fashion upon it, as its screen, to create an anamorphic conflation of personal life and suffering with tragic myth or history, and to renew (or render paranoid) the spectator's perception of his own life in superposition with it.

The Theater of Cruelty cultivates a particular perception of life and, accordingly, this produces a particular kind of existence which, at the limit of the livable, is in the space of the transis, not unlike Artaud's very own personal life. Thus the Theater of Cruelty finds its double in life, and in Surreal fashion its measure of the real. The spectator must then be "à la hauteur du monde catastrophique dans laquelle nous vivons"; what is for Artaud a post-war society suffering socially,

45 TD, 149. Also to be noted here is the reference to Paolo Veronese's painting "The Marriage at Cana" (1563), which Artaud used as an example for populating the stage.

46 This recalls Salvador Dalí's "méthode paranoïaque-critique", explained visually by the process of anamorphosis in painting for example, whereby another vision is projected upon the very sight of an underlying one, thus rendering it polyvalent. This is not only a trick of painting, or a mechanism of hallucination, but a symptom of paranoia as well, all fully anchored in a perception of the real. See Salvador Dalí, Oui. Pour une révolution paranoïaque-critique (Paris: Denoël, 1971). Artaud speaks of such a phenomenon further in "La Montagne des signes" of "D'un voyage au pays des Tarahumaras", OC IX, 43-48, where the mountainous rock formations serve as a projective background for a conflation of visions, Christic and otherwise, and of figures both fragmentized and whole. Artaud further speaks of affective perception and the hallucination and other-body sense provoked by such an experience. OC IX, 103.

47 We could say that the last resort of the Theater of Cruelty is a desperately ethical one — Artaud's effort to share, and thereby perhaps render more bearable, the existential condition of his own life.

48 TD, 132.
economically and morally from the exploits of colonization and imposition of its culture since the turn of the century. In face of this reality, the Theater of Cruelty finds its truth in the search for a primitive, pre-Western, pre-colonized culture, in which the religious and secular coexist and are one, particularly as envisioned in the epic spectacle of "La Conquête du Mexique" which Artaud would never see realized. In such an affront to culture, the spectator must be willing to risk his own life: "C'est là, dans ce spectacle d'une tentation où la vie a tout à perdre, et l'esprit tout à gagner, que le théâtre doit retrouver sa véritable signification."\textsuperscript{49} Thus theater finds its truth in this persuaded, fully participating spectator, who replaces the play's closure with a resonating, contaminating "ouverture" or openness that maintains a constantly virtual disorder, and which replaces representation with presence. The parallels with the embedded spectator response in \textit{Le Véritable St. Genest}'s play-within-a-play are extraordinary here, as the persuaded spectators are brought into the scene of representation of martyrdom, or to the "altar" so to speak, and also with \textit{Polyeucte}, where Félix, Pauline and Sévère in the very last scene of the play are brought to Christian conversion, thus replacing the play's closure with a resonating ouverture that attains all spectators. Which brings us to the topic of the spectator's Baroque \textit{Catharsis}.

Where the Theater of Cruelty remains open upon horror and violence, the Baroque drama of martyrdom remains open upon conversion. In common between the two theaters is the unconditional corporal giving of self, to the cause of a

\textsuperscript{49} \textit{TD}, 136.
Christian world menaced by schism and in need of Papal Empire in the context of Baroque religious drama, and to a catastrophic world menaced by dualist Western culture in Artaud's context. Whereby the paradoxical recuperation of a plenitude of the self, which was important to Artaud. He felt that Western culture compromised the plenitude of his existence by severing the body from the soul, and that a pre-colonial culture such as that of Mexico would allow him to recuperate a full presence. The corporal presence of the actor upon the stage was also a momentary resolution of this problem, and the Theater of Cruelty was also to be a means for the spectator to transform himself corporally, to transcend dualistic Western culture, and to prepare him to change it.

Both theaters find themselves in historical periods of crisis, which call for unresolved representation of horror. For Artaud's theater between two World Wars, in a period of disquiet and imminent catastrophe, a theater out of and prophetic for History, no resolve or Cathartic cleansing, no return to order nor peace is offered to the spectator, no purging of monsters is offered to the earth. Rather, this theater offers the condition of the world "as it is", where the tragic continues its premonitory trembling upon all possible scenes. Sacrifice and the sacred lose their therapeutic aspects, as Catharsis is reduced to its pitch moment of violence and despair, where in the image of Christian tragedy we all remain abandoned upon the Cross.\(^{50}\) In

\(^{50}\) And so Antonin Artaud's mythoman vision of himself and his own suffering. Where Ignatius of Loyola speaks of presence to and union with the Christ, and perception through this existential situation, Artaud uses the metaphor of malady and a usurped corporality to transgress space and time and thereby render present the mythical History of the life of Christ: "C'est moi (et non Jésus-christ) qui a été crucifié au Golgotha". OC I, 13.
Baroque religious drama there is no fear to accept this moment of abandonment. But for the Theater of Cruelty, the sacred is profaned, ritual is contaminated, "le divin est corrompu", and we participate in it helplessly, caught and implied in the suffering inflicted and still to come, without resolution. And yet, the drama of Baroque Catharsis -- open, unfinished, proliferating with emotion, suffering, malady and monstruosity, and ready for more -- is not without moral ends, for Artaud's theater is meant to prepare a particular counter-Western cultural revolution. The correlation to Baroque drama of martyrdom is that the martyrdom continues to reverberate and the play finds no closure, and that somehow the accomplishment of sacrifice in the Christian Passion is not a universal resolution of sin and suffering already accomplished by history, but rather a memory constantly to be not only re-presented, but to be relived, made present -- always the same and yet never resolved -- in earthly hand with the continued increase of Papal Empire. Such is the perpetual meditative focus encouraged by the Ignatian Spiritual Exercises, formative of the religious Baroque and its theater of martyrdom. And in both theaters' cases, not to mention the subjectival stance of the Ignatian exercitant, this reverberation, living and reliving of sacrifice in an eclipsed theatrical space is from a being, a presence, from within.

Baroque drama of martyrdom and the Theater of Cruelty both use "Baroque Catharsis" to route an education of the spectator's sensibility through suffering and violence, with complex ethical consequences. As a living of acute moments of Myth or History, these theaters render them present to the spectator, and open a memory

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51 TD, 13.
within him, without end, with its personal, physical, psychic and social consequences. A presence and a memory which change forever the tenor of Catharsis, as evidenced in the Avantgarde theater of Antonin Artaud, for our century and Postmodern time, from the Classical to the Baroque.

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The optic of Baroque drama of martyrdom allows us to see the position of Artaud’s actor and spectator ultimately upon the altarplace of tragic immolation and engaged as "man of cruelty" in all that should facilitate this. In the context of the Ignatian exercitant, as a primary model for the figure of the Homo Baroccus, this is the carnal and affective measure of the inhabited body which, having entered into and become the Christic scene, generously offers itself as receptacle to the Christ and to the other, to harbor them, so that the spiritual may continue and begin anew, without closure, in a supplementing, reverberating chain of representations which is at once trompe-l’oeil, anamorphic, and real. The Artaudian actor/spectator, ideally Artaud himself, has become an officiating Homo Baroccus who causes the (re)birth of the other: "Pas d’homme au bout de son rculeau qui ne sache trouver dans Artaud / de quoi se refaire une existence".  

Where Artaud’s Theater of Cruelty was an abortive failure, Artaud himself has come through to us, in his correspondence and extensive journal writing from the

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52 Artaud speaks thus of the actor who carries with him the decor, a concept continued in Jerzy Grotowski’s "Poor Theatre": "Le décor, il est dans ses bras, dans son corps, dans ses pieds, dans ses mains, dans son oeil, et par-dessus tout dans son visage aussi changeant qu’un paysage où des nuages s’amuseraient à cacher le soleil." QC VIII, 245.

53 QC XIV.ii, 137.
asylum, as the consummate actor and officiating "priest" upon the stage of his theater in the post-theic, Postmodern age where all Catharsis as Christian conversion is evacuated. Here he has run through and lives out its danger, so warned against by Diderot, in his own life. This is evident in Artaud's expression of how he lives out his corporality, in his fascination with the possibilities for the human will acted through the body, in an occult relation to nature, and in his radical practice of corporal mediation and alterity, diagnosed within the asylum as Schizophrenia, as both a possessed and remade body which he perceives as autogenitor of six daughters, generative of the self and by the self alone. As Artaud's own personal troupe, these daughters -- "les enfants de la mise en scène principe"\textsuperscript{54} -- are perhaps a late substitute for his failure in establishing a theatrical school.

\textsuperscript{54} OC XIV.i, 16.
B. The Birthing Body of *Homo-Baroccus*, from Jean-Joseph Surin (+1600, -1655) to Antonin Artaud

L'historien lui-même se ferait illusion s'il croyait s'être débarrassé de cette étrangeté interne à l'histoire en la casant quelque part, hors de lui, loin de nous, dans un passé clos avec la fin des «aberrations» d'antan, comme si la «possession» était terminée avec celle de Loudun.
M. de Certeau, *La Possession de Loudun*55

To examine Artaud's condition as a NeoBaroque space allows two things: to go back and reexamine the Baroque of the *Spiritual Exercises* in their flip side -- in the pain of corporal presence, in the fascist dimension of the manipulation of affect, of perception, and direction of will, in their malefic or occult dimension, in the magical use of language, and in the madness of hollowing out the self to accommodate in Protean changefulness and schizophrenic manner the multiple, possessing other. And it also suggests to our mind a comparison with a historical case of *Homo Baroccus* in the figure of the 17th-century mystic Jean-Joseph Surin (+1600, -1655), the Jesuit priest who was involved in the exorcism of the possessed Ursuline sisters of Loudun, France, to the point of risking his own person to save theirs. Surin's generous corporal gift of self for the redemption of the other in an extreme case of Inhabitation, possession and madness, in the role of assuming feminine identity and the task of birthing, his vertiginous adventure into the demonic realm, blasphemous spirituality and schizophrenia, his personal suffering, and the public, theatrical dimension of the entire episode and of his life, call for parallels with

Artaud's situation. For each has been dangerously involved in the birthing of the feminine other.

The cases of both Jean-Joseph Surin and Antonin Artaud are also interesting for their personal experiment to and experience of the Presence of God in the real and fleshly dimension, and the problematics of such an experience from an occult point of view. This is of pertinence to the question of Ignatian discernment, to the question of free will (or of a technology of the body, in the extreme sense) and worldly engagement, and to the more serious question of techniques of active grace in their relation to self-divinisation and occult practice.\textsuperscript{56} These concerns are pertinent to the case of Antonin Artaud as well, for his fascination with the occult, with the power of his own free will, and with (self-)engenderment. Both Surin and Artaud allow us to examine the discursive dimension of such concerns as well, of writing from the spaces of illness, madness, and possession or spiritual union, and of such writing as power. Where on the one hand Loudun's theater of corporally, violently gesticulated possession and exorcism is eventually brought to the cathartic closure of redemption, ushiring in the new Classical order, on the other hand Surin's madness continues the malefic reverberations, in the manner of a Baroque Catharsis, just as Artaud's theater gives no cathartic closure, but rather the same kind of contamination. Both experiences of the Presence of God, and the power — divinatory, illusory or otherwise -- it seems to give, are pestiferous, uncanny, disastrous.

\textsuperscript{56} From concern for others to self-divinisation, there can be read in Lacanian terms a virtual passage from the small subject s in relation to various a "autres" or others, to the large subject S in its relation to the divine Other.
Both highly personal theaters find themselves in periods of para-science: a pre- and a post- scientific Modernity where what would be repressed ran its course in the public eye, soon to give a sense of the socially excluded and the socially sanctified, to follow the readings of madness, medical practice and society made by such authors as Michel Foucault and Michel de Certeau. What then is interesting in the cases of both men is the blurring of the lines between Spirituality and demonology, between religion and sexuality. For both Surin and Artaud the same mechanism leads to both, to result in a severed subject ("un sujet clivé"), within their religious and social contexts. This damaging dualism is in effect a monism! for outside the structures and repression of culture and religion, these men would be whole, and it is this wholeness that they seek.\textsuperscript{57} Such subjectival severance, alienation, madness, problematic Inhabitation, or schizophrenia leads to the autogenitor's birthing of the feminine other out of a too-full presence and paradoxical self auto-generated in the search for a resolution to the maddening severance from his desire.

J.-J.Surin honestly attests, with his gifted practice of examination of conscience, to this split condition with doubt and fear, in a letter which, meant as a private confession, was circulated against his will. Thus he experimented and avowed it: Inhabitation is both salutary and malefic. This honesty outraged the Jesuit superior Vitelleschi, precisely because it brought the two Inhabitations together under the umbrella of one spiritual practice, and publicized it. Vitelleschi writes: "il se

\textsuperscript{57} So the "fools for Christ" are opposed to the "wisdom" of this world. J.-J.Surin, Guide spirituel, établi et présenté M.de Certeau (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1963) 241-3.
croirait possédé par le Verbe incarné autant que par le démon".\textsuperscript{58} Artaud, on the other hand, leads religion into sexuality, and Inhabitation into demonization and possession, purposefully, without any qualms, and with the insight of a visionary voice.

From Jean-Joseph Surin to Antonin Artaud, from the theater of possession to madness to schizophrenic alterity or, simply put, concerned with two spiritual or occult experiences, why are we in need of the etiquette "Baroque" to make a comparison of what seems evident to us today in the terms of Psycholanalytic diagnosis? The qualification of \textit{Homo Baroccus} in the cases of both men allows us to examine the full implications of Inhabitation and mutual spiritual presence, spanning from a historical and religious context to a contemporary, Psychoanalytic one, \textit{sans nous croire débarassé de la «possession», ni de l’«abberration»}, to paraphrase M.de Certeau. Both men found themselves and felt themselves to be in periods where saving was needed. We can thus go historically behind the Psychoanalytic terminology which has been applied by the contemporary critical corpus to both authors, to that which, prior to it, gave it its origin, and thereby read history in its "longue durée". As the science out of that which Classicism and Modernity repressed, do not the depths into which Psychoanalysis plunges itself have an affinity with the Baroque before the repression, as a different social and cultural spatialization

\textsuperscript{58} This letter is quoted by Michel de Certeau, and the consequences summarized, in \textit{La Possession de Loudun}, 299-306. It is included as Letter 52 in the \textit{Correspondance}, texte établi, présenté et annoté par Michel de Certeau; préface de Julien Green (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1966) 262-8. Further quotes from this correspondence shall indicate letter number and pagination.
of desire? Let us then examine these parallel cases of engenderment, as components of the *Homo Barocca*.

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Jean-Joseph Surin’s voluminous correspondence, much of which takes the form of spiritual direction, is significant for understanding his Philosophy and interpersonal relations. At best, when successfully received, it reenacts Christic presence through the text. We shall base our reading of Surin’s correspondence upon the best edition available, organized by Michel de Certeau. This edition contains 594 letters, which are separated into two segments, one prior to and the other following approximately 20 years of incapacitating illness which interrupted practically all communication by Surin with the outside world. The majority and most interesting of these letters for the topics of spiritual guidance, father-spiritual daughter relations and engenderment are written to women of religious orders, and one quarter of the entirety is written to Jeanne des Anges.

It is particularly in Jean-Joseph Surin’s relation to the prioress Jeanne des Anges that we can examine the peculiar father-spiritual daughter relations in Surin, and go on to compare them to those of Artaud with his "six filles". In Surin’s case, he begged of God that his body should be possessed and that he should know damnation, Hell and hysteria, in a corporal displacement, transformation, and exchange for the successful exorcism of the body of Jeanne des Anges, all of which took on public, spectatorial and theatrical dimensions.\(^\text{59}\) From which point his own

\(^{59}\) Claude-Gilbert Dubois’ reference to Artaud’s theater as comparable to the “theater” of public exorcism in 17th-century Loudun, and Surin’s own hysterical participation in it, furthers the
abjection, despair and madness. The peculiar passage of the evil, from the end of the plague's passage to Loudun, to the beginning of the possession, to the end of the possession of the Ursulines to the madness of Surin, corresponds to Artaud's sense of the microbial movement of evil and of Deic forces, beyond any cathartic closure or redemption.

Surin traverses the path from alterity to schizophrenia to paranoia and disability, to include a public hysterical practice. It is not until he accepts freely his damnation and abjection for others, and the humbling possibility that God might include therein his own redemption, that health and a free will over his existence return to him. Chosen for damnation, he was also chosen, with all the egotism, empowerment, and Jansenist coloring this implies, as his malady, paralysis and satanic side had their mystical correlate. We shall examine then Jean-Joseph Surin's relations particularly to women religious and to Jeanne des Anges and the Ursulines of Loudun in his correspondence, his own lyrical experience and communication of spirituality in the Cantiques spirituels (1657), his particular vision of spiritual practice in the Guide spirituel,60 and his experience and consideration of the occult in Triomphe de l'amour divin sur les puissances de l'Enfer (1663), as well as his particular perception of the power of love in these works.61


61 Michel de Certeau has begun an excellent analysis of this autobiographical text, "Voyage et prison: La folie de J.-J. Surin", in Voyages, récits et imaginaire, Actes de Montréal, Edités par
1. Corporality and Affectivity

Jean-Joseph Surin experienced his faith and life as a Jesuit priest in such a way that we can truly qualify him as an *Homo Barocus*, and hold him forth as an example with whose life Antonin Artaud's shall make a stupefying occult parallel. Surin's fragile health from a young age, and his tragic sense of a corporally mapped out subjectival division between good and evil, placed his psychological equilibrium in danger, and manifests itself in both extreme and lyrical fashion in the first period of his correspondence. But it is particularly his involvement in the exorcism of the possessed Ursulines of Loudun and the personal results of this involvement which draw him into the realm of the occult and make for a strong comparison with Artaud's own preoccupations -- Artaud's envisioned relation to Satan and to a malefic god, his belief in his "possession" by medicine, Western society and its institutionalized members, his conviction that his own "damnation" is for the salvation, remaking of self and birthing of others, and his relation to his six imagined daughters. In both cases it is the rejected half of the split Psyche which shall allow all of this.

Surin's body revulses him, it is the place of sin, and what must be ignored and left behind for the paradise of another world. Thus he counsels his correspondants who confess suffering the torments of the flesh:

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Souffrez le péché dans un lieu où il mérite d’être et qui est de son domaine. [...] N’aimons donc plus cette nature. Haïssez-la et la laisser souffrir l’humiliation que Dieu veut.62

The body, imperfect and bestial, is meant to suffer pain and damnation. Thus Surin’s correspondence, particularly the first 17 letters to unknown female correspondants, speak of a circulation and sharing of sufferings between them, of union in suffering, and even of a rivalry of particular torments. Surin shall reject his body to the point of paralysis and muteness; "s’ensevelir dans le tombeau avec Jesus-Christ," such is the image and the negative moment of Christ’s history which preoccupies him.63

Surin’s sharing of his suffering with those of the women he advises, is as much a spiritual sharing of his body with their body, a metaphysical commerce… and so, he believes, he can deliver them from evil, and give them a new life. His dualism uses the body well, to break through the walls of its entombment and trespass the realm of its damnation. This deliverance from the body is a purgative practice, for which Surin also uses the well-worn mystical image of fire which consumes the suffering body to burn out its last traces of sinfulness — the very fire which burned to ashes supposed witches and sorcerers in the 16th and 17th centuries. In the case of the mystic Marie Baron, who Surin appropriates to himself to describe, such a purgation prepares the body for harboring the image of Christ, that is, for Inhabitation, and shall ultimately become the burning passion of mystical union. It is a fire of suffering which inscribes, writes, creates:

62 Lettre 1, Correspondance, 114-5.

63 Michel de Certeau, ed., Correspondance, 139.
Sa peine allait toujours augmentant, sans trouver aucun remède, et Dieu faisait toujours son ouvrage, formant en elle l’image de Jésus-christ avec le feu et le marteau d’un amour fort comme la mort et dur comme l’enfer. Ainsi se façonnait et se polissait cette image afin qu’elle fût ensuite si belle qu’elle pût donner de l’admiration aux anges et charmer le coeur de celui qu’elle représentait.  

This passage to Inhabitation is not exactly that through which move the Spiritual Exercises. More interior and personal, the focus of the individual never projects itself exteriorly upon the decor of the outer world and of the other, to the extreme point of the neglect of one’s own body as part of this exteriority; Surin’s concern, rather, is with the soul which, severed from daily life and desire, wishes to become truly interior. His own alterity and altruism is limited by this.

Jean-Joseph Surin himself practices, however, a most courageous form of alterity in asking God to place upon him the possession and damnation of the prioress Jeanne des Anges, to spatialize the presence of the demon within his own corporality and thereby to remake his body and its relations, in exchange for her successful exorcism. He feels himself through his wilful sacrifice to have begotten her remade and graced life, and it is this generosity of the body which is most characteristic of the Homo Baroccus. In this context, grace has both an active and occult dimension in a reciprocal divinisation/damnation of the self. Jeanne des Anges is indeed brought back to health, whereupon Surin’s usurped self begins a mental and physical journey into madness, believing himself to be the crucified and the damned, severed from all others and yet for their redemption, severed from willpower over his own body, as is Artaud, nailed upon the Cross of paralysis, mutism and extreme suffering of dualism

64 Letter 27, Correspondence, 173.
or schizophrenia, and in fear of an angry God and his saints who at moments he believes persecute and torment him.

Surin’s paradoxical, schizophrenic Inhabitation takes him beyond death to redeem the other, and corresponds to Artaud’s perception of his electro-shocked body. Surin’s own body-localized illnesses, paralysis and mutism are paralleled by the corporal localization of the various demons which possess the Ursulines’ bodies.\(^{65}\) Their bodies in turn are empowered by such possession, as in Jeanne des Anges’ cure and tour of France to display to the highest social strata her sacred hand, miraculously engraved with the names of Jésus, Maria, Joseph and François de Sales as sign of her redemption.\(^{66}\) All of this is in inverse relation to Surin who shall progressively weaken until becoming totally immobilized within the fantasized sphere of his own damnation.

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So went Antonin Artaud’s own suffering, preoccupied with the coffins he constantly drew, and the ravaged faces he portrayed, to include many self-portraits, comparable alternate versions to the fire-engraved images Surin perceives in Marie Baron,\(^{67}\) and flip side to the purgative process. Out of his own torment Artaud births forth his daughters — the metaphor is real to his pain — and does his best to preserve

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them from God's evil. How then does Artaud live out his own long-suffering, sickly, pained, drug-dependent and further tortured body? And how and to what extent can we bring this into a Baroque vision of a spiritual and "Surinian" corporality?

A monist vision of the body as one with the spirit is most evident in Artaud's theater, where body-presence and its affective dimension take precedence over the word to mediate it, thus giving it its fleshly dimension. Theatrical presence was for Artaud a momentary, monist resolution of the painfully lived dualism forced upon him by European, Cartesian culture, and its medical treatment in objectification and harsh repression of the body in view of forcing out the spirit, not unlike Surin's rejection of the body. But Artaud refers to this severing as a deprivation of life itself, down to its organic, microbial fragments, and a living hell of corporal scission and slow abandonment by the faculties in a tortured, living conscience. All of this Artaud lived only too vividly in his addiction to drugs since a sickly youth, his experience of electro-shock treatments, and starvation in the asylum during the war years. Artaud also expresses such desired union outside of the context of the theater, in such statements from the text "La Position de la chair", where the cries of physical suffering, signs of the force of life, go far beyond the realms of thought to inscribe and incarnate thought in the corporal domain: "Je refais à chacune des vibrations de ma langue tous les chemins de la pensée dans ma chair", and "L'Esprit clair appartient à la matière". This text is key to Artaud's materialist monism, and


69 OC VII, 250.
can be even taken as a manifesto for it. And there are later statements which further corroborate his monism, such as "La conscience est un corps" and "Je n’ai pas d’invisible, / pas d’incrédé".70

Artaud further qualifies the fleshly presence of spirit to matter as occult, and gives it the image of the petrification of fire, or a kind of reverse alchemy or mysticism of spirit’s substanciation, of a fire which incarnates and renders whole, perhaps even realizing the substantiation of the witch: "Je suis le feu coeur / et j’ai des flammes âmes".71 In the text "La Question se pose de...", a type of cogitative search reduces all in a reversal of Cartesian thought to one certainty alone: that of the suffering body.72 Furthermore, this monist body is to be ressuscitated and glorious, like the "gloire corporelle" of the Baroque, as the never-broadcasted radio show "Pour en finir avec le jugement de Dieu" was to explain: "des consonances / qui invitent / l’homme / À SORTr / AVEC / son corps", and so on.73 This monism can be extended to a resolution of earth/heaven separations, masculine/feminine gender and even as a return to the "imago" of the Lacanian mirror stage. All of this brings to mind Gassendi’s materialism and Merleau-Ponty’s chiasm, as well as the necessary corporal and affective involvement in Ignatian spiritual growth, particularly when taken as a model for perception, relation to the image, and knowledge, and such

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70 OC I (1956) 234-237; XVIII, 222; XX, 174; XXIV, 400. Emphasis is our own.

71 OC XVII, 53.

72 "Pour en finir avec le jugement de Dieu", OC XIII, 95-6.

73 "À Wladimir Porché, Directeur de la Radio-diffusion", OC XIII, 131.
centrality to Baroque aesthetic. Artaud further extends his monist philosophy to language; since for those who have forsaken the way of intelligence through matter, the depth of language has been lost: "Mais il faut aller à pas lents sur la route des pierres mortes, surtout pour qui a perdu la connaissance des mots."\(^{74}\) Artaud brings language's originary fullness back to it, that is, presence back to the text.

Furthermore, Artaud further extends his fleshly Metaphysics of Being to affect, or from "sens" to "sentiment", and from "sentiment" to "ressentiment", that is into hypersensitivity's occult dimension, or into his "culte de la chair".\(^{75}\) This occult hypersensitivity is a kind of direct, through-the-viscera knowledge, envisioned in Artaud's "Un Athlétisme affectif" which puts into place "La chaîne magique".\(^{76}\) It is also to be found in the exalted nervous system of the Tarahumaran who practices use of Peyotl, what in Artaud's experience is a purgative rite which disperses, remakes and transforms the self. But this hypersensitivity is also a tragically incommunicable sense of pain and an unlivable subjectivity,\(^{77}\) much as the mad Surin himself lived and for which he was misunderstood. Such emotional eruption (of repressed desire) transforms matter into its measure: "Celui-là [ravi par le feu de l'émotion] sait ce que l'apparition de cette matière signifie et de quel souterrain massacre son éclosion est le prix. Cette matière est l'étalon d'un néant qui

\(^{74}\) OC I(1956) 236.


\(^{76}\) TD, 211.

\(^{77}\) OC I (1956) 237.
s'ignore.\footnote{OC I(1984) 119. This direct emotion-to-flesh impulse is later to be found in Jerzy Grotowski's theater, in the practice of unimpeded passage from impulse to action, tied to emotional interpretation of the soul, and vice versa. See Towards a Poor Theatre (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1970) 15-25.} Here again we have the Artaudian version of the Merleau-pontian "tangible-étalon" which we also found in the \textit{Spiritual Exercises}, but it is a measure to which most of Surin's and Artaud's societies refuse any value. The texts "Les Fragments d'un journal d'enfer" where Artaud expresses the lived suffering of his corporal separation, and "La Position de la chair" expressing the ideal monist relation of body and spirit he aspired to in the glorious body of the \textit{Homo Baroccus} and suffered, as did Surin, not to attain, are two remarkable texts for illuminating Artaud's sense of the body. What was left to him, practically, was a body to be rejected; but he did not live this as well, nor with the necessary resignation, as did Surin.

Artaud's monist will was part of suffering a dualist existence within its Western culture and, correspondingly, his asylum writings waver frenetically between the two positions.\footnote{Many critical authors, such as Florence de Méredieu, \textit{Antonin Artaud, les couilles de l'ange} (Paris: Blusson éditeur, 1992), interpret Artaud's position exclusively from a dualist, Neo-platonic, ascetic point of view as the desire to disengage from this creation.} Such wavering also carries over to Artaud's perception of human sexuality as that which, in a dualist position, he vilifies and rejects, but also as that through which, in a monist position, he vulgarly speaks. Artaud wished to discard and leave behind in a Gnostic gesture of hatred the dualistically demarcated body, suffering in an imperfect creation, and to remake this body anew as \textit{autogenitor} of self in a new creation. This is not really so different from the vilified, sin-ridden
body Surin wished for himself and advised to others to burn away and leave behind, and which led to the Inhabiting perfection of the image of the Sacred Other by force of wilful suffering, with implications for a certain perception of grace and self-divinisation, as we shall see. The act of creation for Artaud is made from the place of God from which he speaks, whose scepter he holds and for which, he believes, he shall be placed in the asylum because of the social threat of his true Divine relation. From here he goes on to rival the Christ, and to compare Pius XII to Pontius Pilate. In a supreme actorial gesture, he has assumed and usurped the place of God, what is for him and in accordance with Gnostic belief a God of an imperfect and evil creation to which he feels himself to be superior; for, as he complains, the incarnate Christ has not spent enough time being a body, and he, the long-suffering Artaud, has put in the time. Indeed, he scorningly accuses all Catholics as capable of remaking their own Christ: "et quel est le catholique incrédu [...] qui [...] n'ait appris, dis-je, à faire ou à refaire Jesus-christ." This astutely recalls the Ignatian exercitant's individuation of vision of the Gospel narrative and the accompanying ultimate refashioning of subjectivity and its relations in the use of active grace to the dangerous point of self-divinisation. This is the Artaud who wishes to leave behind the Western body as an abject refuse, and who yearns towards the glorious body of


81 OC XVIII, 234. The tormented, ravaged portraits drawn by Artaud in his last years at Ivry portray well-worn, time-inhabited flesh, and are far from the perfect, fire-engraved, grace-laden image of Christ Surin envisages in Marie Baron's body. If we take grace in its meaning of the image and as communication through the image, the variants on a corporally-anchored relation to grace for Surin and for Artaud are revealed in these examples.

the *Homo Baroccos*. In all, Artaud's subjectival vicissitudes swing between the poles of an ideal monism and a suffered dualism, and between the refusal of any imperfect monist attempt in this culture, and dualism espoused here as perhaps a deadly means to escape it. It is, however, particularly in the monist swing of the pendulum that we find Artaud's affinity with the Baroque.\(^{83}\)

Common to both paths is Artaud's delirious vision of his suffering body as usurped by the others of the world who feed upon it and with whom he must share it, to include God as vampire.\(^{84}\) Severed from consciousness upon the demand of Pius XII, in a drug-induced stupor and lucidity used for Buddhist extasy and greed, *he is a receptacle progressively emptied of its own life to accommodate the life of the voracious others*: "quand de la fiente de / mon moi / fut tiré / le sang / dont se dore / toute vie usurpée / dehors".\(^{85}\) Such is the plight of contemporary man, he concludes, in the comparison with Van Gogh, "le suicidé de la société": "Car c'est la logique anatomique de l'homme moderne de n'avoir jamais pu vivre, ni penser vivre, qu'en possédé".\(^{86}\) So Surin's own situation, and Loudun's "aberration" and "possession" live on. Masturbated, sucked and burned dry by the occult succubus of

\(^{83}\) See, for example, his fascination with the lived body both totally given and possessed, in "Le poème de Saint François d'Assise": "Je suis cet éternel absent de soi-même [...] Je n'ai plus honte de ma robe ni de mes mains; Qui m'appartiennent et vous appartiennent, mes frères; [...] Car mon corps n'est-il pas la merveilleuse cendre; Dans la terre est la voix par où parle la mort." *OC* I (1984) 175-6. Emphasis is our own.

\(^{84}\) *OC* XVII, 10-11.


\(^{86}\) *OC* XIII, 21. Emphasis is our own.
the world and its priests, as in the sorcerer’s punishment, he writes to Anne Manson: "j’ai déjà dit qu’on avait fait de mon un bûcher", and later refers to "ce corps où tout le monde s’est toujours servi". 87 Eroded by the cancer of the other, "Saint Artaud", as he calls himself, believes it is he who facilitates the missal transubstantiation and who most darkly replaces the Holy Spirit and the body of Christ, as at once presence and the nourishment of body and blood, in a delusional egotism from which Surin’s saving body and suffering is not very far, and in a chain of thought which traverses stolen seminal and cerebral fluids, to the life force of emotional drives, to the mystical symbolism of fire, to the incarnating transformation of spirit into matter. He felt this very life substance was taken from him and exhausted out of him each day, and used in the mystery of the Mass itself, not to mention by the fire-diluting and, by extension, consciousness-diluting waters of the Baptism he so much wished to refuse. 88 He accommodates the other with hatred, on the evil side of Homo-Baroccus, in a mode of corporal generosity which nonetheless revulses him, and yet which does not leave out the possibility of alterity as means to one’s own corporal and sexual pleasure, or redemption.

The case of the "corps-Artaud" is a strange and radical one of Inhabitation, a giving up and hollowing out of the self, in its very substance and materiality, through torture and beyond death, for the life of the other, yet with great resentment and hatred. Artaud’s suffering and physical deterioration corroborated this objectification

87 Letter of 10 aug 1937, OC VII, 250; XIV.ii, 140.

88 Letter of 10 aug 1937 to Anne Manson, OC VII, 250.
by the other's medical gaze and physical prodding, in a forced dualism so against his will. For where we have associated Inhabitation with a resolution of body-presence to spirit and the ability to give of the self from this spiritual plenitude, and with exorcism and redemption in the case of Jeanne des Anges, for Artaud it is the violation and stealing of his body, and recalls Surin's testament to the paradoxical evil of Inhabitation. But where for Surin it was "le Verbe incarné et le démon", for Artaud it is "le Verbe incarné est le démon". From this radical and disrespective position of Inhabitation went Artaud's delirium, as went Surin's, and his desire to recuperate a new self, to reinstate his presence, to retain for himself his imagined missal powers, thus usurping God's place and flesh and turning Inhabitation purposefully, where for Surin it was a willed passivity, to its occult dimension.
2. Spirituality and the Occult

Jean-Joseph Surin believed that his experience with exorcism and possession by the devil gave him insight into the mysteries and graces of God. This occasion given to him to practice or experiment with evil permitted a willed, and highly controversial, path to the presence of God which engaged corporal generosity, emotive effusion, and use of discourse. There is a spiritual *complicity* for Surin with the work of evil; and so Jeanne des Anges writes of him concerning his *Triomphe de l'amour divin sur les puissances de l'enfer*:

> Je sais bien que son dessein était de faire voir par son traité que la personne possédée peut beaucoup contribuer par ses actions bonnes ou mauvaises à fortifier ou affaiblir le démon qui la travaille. Il voualit encore faire voir comme quoi le malin esprit se sert des inclinations de la personne travaillée, et les voies qu'il faut tenir pour les soulager.

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91 Quoted in Jean-Joseph Surin, *Correspondance*, 468. Emphasis is our own. Of course, if we go beyond the Christian categories of good and evil, conscientiousness at the basis of such complicity can serve either mental equilibrium, or madness and social inadaptability.
Such conscientiousness is a labor of perceptive training given and acquired by the few, and Surin shall always remain grateful to have had the occasion to experience the occult. In his *Triomphe de l'amour divin sur les puissances de l'enfer*, the major themes explain how Surin viewed his privileged position. He felt that as an exorcist he was privileged not only to observe the movements of grace, but also to advantageously follow such movements through his own graced yet always free will. His own experience of demonic torment and possession is presented in the detailed clinical account of his own body's every specific pain, or its relent thereof. And so he further and very personally followed the movements of damnation and grace.

And finally, he explains his use of visualization technique, of the Virgin in particular, to ward off the advances of the demon. What is particularly interesting is the way he describes himself and the demon as well as playing with the visualization, mentally obscuring the apparition of the Virgin, in an imaginary correlate to pictural anamorphosis:

[... soudain que cette image était formée, je devenais insensible, et le démon sans vigueur [...]. Il occupait son industrie particulière à couvrir et envelopper cette image, opérant diversement en la fantaisie en en substituant d'autres superficiellement, imprimant et obscurcissant en telle façon l'esprit, qu'il n'y en paraissait aucun vestige [...]) mais soudain que l'Etoile de la mer paraissait, ce qui ne tardait guère, la tempête cessait.]

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93 *Triomphe de l'amour divin sur les puissances de l'Enfer*, 134.


95 *Triomphe de l'amour divin sur les puissances de l'Enfer*, 38.
Thus he explains "Occultes empêchements à la perfection" as the malefic influence of that which is imperceivable to the unpracticed or lacking in grace. In addition to such perceptive complicity, there is the mark of being chosen, which also serves as an excuse for aberrant behavior. Surin himself lyrically writes, in the tenth Canticle entitled "Triomphe de l'Amour":

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{C'est le train le plus ordinaire} & \quad \text{Que si parfois il les délaisse} \\
\text{De ceux qui sont plus favoris,} & \quad \text{souffrant qu'ils tombent jusqu'au} \\
\text{Endurer du mal, et s'en faire.} & \quad \text{fonds,} \\
\text{Pour cela sont-il[s] plus chères} & \quad \text{Secrètement il les caresse,} \\
\text{Par ses attraits il les soulage} & \quad \text{Ce qui fait qu'ils paroissent bons?} \\
\text{Pendant que l'Enfer les outrage} & \quad \text{C'est par ce merveilleux mélange} \\
\text{et leur état paroit étrange} & \quad \text{Que leur état paroit étrange} \\
\text{[...]} & \quad \text{Au dehors la peine est énorme;} \\
\text{Au dedans l'esprit se transforme} & \quad \text{Au dedans l'esprit se transforme}
\end{align*}
\]

Surin's perception of will in the spiritual labor towards the Presence of God is even more curious. He associates the motions of this will with those of a scientific parlor game which makes us think not only of the vagaries of Baroque movement, but also of contemporary Chaos Theory analyses:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Un globe mis sur une table} & \quad \text{Je veux aussi de même sorte} \\
\text{N'a pente vers aucun côté,} & \quad \text{Avoir ton coeur indiffèrent.} \\
\text{Allant comme il est agréable,} & \quad \\
\text{Par tout avec facilité,} & \quad \\
\text{Comme on le mène, on le ramène;} & \quad \\
\text{Ainsi qu'on veut on le promène,} & \quad \\
\text{Son repos se trouve partout;} & \quad \\
\text{Son allure n'a point de bout} & \\
\text{Je veux aussi de même sorte} & \\
\text{Avoir ton coeur indiffèrent.} & \\
\end{align*}
\]

96 Guide spirituel pour la perfection, 87.

[...]
C'est là le point le plus parfait,
D'être partout comme il me plaît.⁹⁸

As the scientific fascination of the day joins mystical language, the will towards the all-pervading Presence of God is free, like the movement and consumption of a fire, impredictable, even indifferent to divine motion, that is, to grace.⁹⁹ There is almost a kind of facile "anything goes" in Surin’s Philosphy. This has ramifications not so much for God as for the subject, and Surin takes an extraordinary liberty in the continuation of this same particular canticle to speak in the first person, to assume a God-like stance and take on a life-force, and to demand the same pliability in the will of his beloved, in turn:

Je veux que ton âme se mueve
Au moindre signe de mon coeur,
Que fort content elle se trouve,
Si je la tiens dans ma rigueur,
Que de ma volonté remplie,
A tout moment elle se plie
Au branle de tous mes vouloirs,
Esclave de tous mes pouvoirs

This mimicking continuation of the spiritual relation and the play of the forces of its presence gives us insight into Surin’s wish for the direction of his own spiritual daughters.¹⁰⁰ And so, paradoxically, this practice did not lack in a willed passivity, a


⁹⁹ This intuition of Chaos and its contemporary theories was revalent in Baroque poetics of movement and its natural objects, such as water, clouds, bubbles, etc.. See, for example, these elements in the thematic organization of Jean Roussel’s Anthologie de la poésie baroque française (Paris: Armand Colin, 1968).

¹⁰⁰ In speaking of Surin’s autobiographical Science expérimentale des choses de l’autre vie (1663) which recounts his experience of possession and infirmity, Michel de Certeau analyzes the narrative, wavering dualism between "je" and "il", where the "il" is the far away, alienated subject into
quieting of reason to be replaced by affective effusion, "une détermination dans la recherche et passivité dans l’acceuil" before "toute chose confusément en Dieu".\textsuperscript{101} Ultimately this is a will of silence, of perpetual openness to motion and of continual vision, as Surin wrote to his aunt, la Mère Anne d’Arrérac: "Tachez de ne point perdre cette divine présence".\textsuperscript{102}

Once upon the scene in Loudun, Surin neglected the public spectacle of exorcism, although he did not totally abandon it, and introduced a new technique, that of intimate, one-on-one dialogue and private ritual practice with the possessed Ursuline delegated to him, Jeanne des Anges. This practice of intimate dialogue engaged spiritual direction, approximate examination of conscience and the confessional, and bade speak "the devil" as two individual presences confronted one another to engage both occult and divine forces. Indeed, at Loudun, too much space, time and fascination was given to discourse by "the devil" who should simply have been purged and chased away, according to severe criticism by Church authorities, although the "theater" had its social purpose. Through such practice, Surin generously gave of his insight into the spiritual life; no wonder, then, that Jeanne des Anges would later think herself to be an expert in turn, as a certain power, exercised both through and against evil, was transmitted. Exorcism served in fact as a sort of

which the "je" adventures himself. "Voyage et prison: La folie de J.-J. Surin", 446-449. Where M.de Certeau maintains a metaphor of voyage and adventure, we speak of spiritual exercise and movement. In the \textit{Cantiques spirituels}, however, we find rather that the shift to "je" adventures itself into the spiritual realm of the Divine.


\textsuperscript{102} Lettre 72, \textit{Correspondance}, 313.
spiritual "moyen court"! So Surin says, in *Le Triomphe de l'amour divin sur les puissances de l'Enfer*: "Le Seigneur a voulu dans sa bonté que cette grande tragédie me donnât une science extraordinaire pour instruire les âmes dans les voies intérieures".\(^\text{103}\) Such whispered, intimate dialogue, soothing in lullaby rhythm and in the message of passive resignation it communicated, led to a kind of Quietism, gentleness and facility in spiritual means, of which we can accuse Surin as well as other lesser mystical figures prevalent in this period in France.\(^\text{104}\) Surin believed in prayer alone and above all as a power over nature and this life, and his prolonged paralysis would confirm a forced interior life upon him, without acts, conversation or engagement.

Indeed, Surin exercised in the practice of exorcism and spiritual guidance before Jeanne des Anges the pinnacles and depths of his own mystical life and corporal generosity. So he always counselled that sin and the sinful part of human nature was to be suffered in what preserved a dual nature: in indifference to the world, abandonment to the motions of God's will in the self (as in the image of the glass sphere), and continual mortification. In early correspondence he counselled one of his anxious spiritual daughters with words shown to be premonitory for himself:

\(^{103}\) H. Brémond, *Histoire littéraire du sentiment religieux en France*, t.v, 223.

\(^{104}\) Such a technique of dialogue approximates the sung spiritual poetry to be found in Surin's *Cantiques spirituels*. These canticles (44 in the 1664 edition) traverse the motions of spiritual direction, from the purgative to the illuminative to the unitive stages. Composed throughout the years of his illness from 1637-1654, they were a source of consolation to him and allowed him to maintain a dual nature: "au milieu même de mes plus grandes désolations, j'entendais ce luth et cette harmonie spirituelle qui n'interrompait pas le silence de l'âme et me donnait un esprit de cantiques". Quoted in M. de Certeau, "Les œuvres de J.-J. Surin, I", *Revue d'ascétisme et de mystique* XL.4 (1964): 458.
Souffrez le péché dans un lieu où il mérite d’être et qui est de son domaine. [...] N’aimons donc plus cette nature. Haïssez-la et la laisser souffrir l’humiliation que Dieu veut.

And later, he gives the same such advice to his father: "Une âme exercée à la résignation, à la victoire de ses mouvements et à l’obéissance intérieure à Dieu, laisse tout son extérieur à la discrétion du monde." This does not fail to recall Artaud’s body, forced to suffer the realities of asylum life. For Surin, such sufferings circulated, were shared, rivalled each in the other, in a kind of egotism of pain. So Surin himself, in his own schizophrenic and hysterical body, harbored Jeanne des Anges’ possession, all the while giving her a space for her own redemption.

Therein we also see the influence of Theresan mysticism, popular in 17th-century France and read at precocious ages by the "école mystique", of suffering the wounds of divine love. We also see the Ignatian type of anamorphic hallucination, that here conflates self and other and gender, as Surin advises one of his spiritual daughters:

Pour vous, soit que j’apprenne de vos nouvelles ou non, je vous regarde toujours sur la croix, aussi bien que moi, parce que je sais bien que c’est le lit où il nous faut achever le sommeil de cette vie.

Thus a mutual Inhabitation of each by the other’s suffering transforms and ultimately redeems the other and the self, outside and beyond the social order.

Ultimately, Jeanne des Anges’ life would be Surin’s passage through death, for he felt that by suffering her possession he did traverse death, and that such suffering

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105 Lettres 1, 37, Correspondance, 114-5, 215. Emphasis is our own.

106 After Jeanne’s "cure", Surin will be in fact the caretaker of the blessed ointment supposedly applied by St. Joseph to Jeanne des Anges’ ailing side.

107 Lettre 9, à une inconnue, Correspondance, 124.
and passage was an act of the greatest love. Unlike the practice of the Spiritual Exercises, Surin’s practice sustains the negative moment in which it drowns itself, it confines itself within the asylum of death. So he counsels la Mère Angélique de St. François:

Vous devez, ma chère soeur, pour le regard de tout ce qui vous touche, revenir en quelque manière dans votre néant. Dès le moment que vous vous sentirez vous même et votre être corrompu, vous souffrirez comme une damnée. Perdez-vous donc entièrement, laissant opérer cette grandeur qui vous absorbe. Ne vous entraînez de rien par vous-même, mais abandonnez-vous à cet attrait dominant qui vous conduira par amour, purifiant votre âme, l’illuminant et la transformant toute en soi.  

And so Surin considered himself during the years of his illness and belief in his own demonic possession, as irredeemably damned beyond the damned in a delirium of persecution, as holding by his own corporal measure and extreme subjectivity a place in Hell, as a Christ entombed with the Christ, for the life of others, particularly for Jeanne des Anges.  

*  

Artaud’s usurped corporality, like the actorial body-presence of the Theater of Cruelty and its intention to edify, is not without will and power, for it takes indeed a remarkable talent to consciously assume the Christic position where, in Artaud’s mind, the Christ and the God of creation become superseded objects of his will.  

What exactly is then Artaud’s fascination with the occult force of life, and how is this

108 Lettre 106, Correspondance, 369. Emphasis is our own.
109 To Michel de Certeau’s knowledge, Surin himself never received the rites of exorcism.
110 See QC VII, 281-2; XV, 173.
fascination with what is also the underside to the Baroque affective will and its free, active relation, routed through technique and artifice, to divine motion and grace, such as that seen coming from the practice of the Spiritual Exercises, and the power of Genest/St. Adrian/St. Genest?

We know in the Spiritual Exercises of the incredible amount of energy, concentration and force of will demanded of the exercitant to successfully come to the end of approximately four weeks of exercises and visualization tasks, not to mention the vigilance demanded of the spiritual director. We have examined how these exercises modify perception, affective bonds, wilful desire, subjectivity and action, the final point from which Surin's spirituality begins.\textsuperscript{111} Likewise, the Baroque and Artaudian actor, like Jean-Joseph Surin as spiritual director, dispenses with great energy his very life force to convert himself and the other to a new perception, conviction, culture and, ultimately, action. This life-force, envisioned also by Artaud in a fire symbolism which is not lacking in both mystical and demonic overtones, is best expressed in Artaud's text, "Le Théâtre et les dieux", where ideas are to be translatable into will and action, where spirit is matter, where life is magical in its powers, and theater can help in such realization.\textsuperscript{112} He believes to have found this in Mexican Indian rites, where life incarnates metaphysics, and life and death coexist, much as in the Visiones of the Baroque author Quevedo. The body as well can cultivate a consciousness of its nervous condition and of the very anatomical

\textsuperscript{111} And we have gone so far as to suggest that, out of context, such techniques could be used in hand with any iconophile regime of power, for better or for worse.

\textsuperscript{112} QC VIII, 121, 196-206.
localization of its affective thoughts.\textsuperscript{113} The drawings of Wilfredo Lam which accompany Artaud's text, and Artaud's own later drawings, illustrate the dangerous paradox of Artaud's position in bodies dislocated and fragmented by traversing vectors of force,\textsuperscript{114} not unlike Surin's body and will chaotically moved by the Presence of God and of the Demon. Indeed, life as force brushes with death and dismemberment, with its materialization as well as its dematerialization, with the visible and the invisible.

This concept of life-force continues in Artaud's fascination with Alchemy, whose process he likens to that of the Theater of Cruelty, to purify and reincarnate matter, "Le moyen spirituel de décanter et de transfuser la matière"\textsuperscript{115} -- what we have seen with Rotrou's Genest and the spectator of the Theater of Cruelty, as well as Surin transformed by a double Inhabitation. Although Artaud insists slightly more upon the separation from matter, a process which does pass from a dualist purification to a monist (re)unification and (re)incarnation accommodates Artaud's conflictual view of the body, and situates the resolution of such conflict within the occult dimension, whereas Surin continued to simply suffer such conflict. This is in effect a power over nature, in magical practice via the image and the word, and is illustrated by Artaud's interest in M.G. Lewis' Gothic novel, The Monk, which he translated,
and by his spell drawings, which bring an uncanny material realm to writing.\textsuperscript{116} Language is particularly capable of magical powers, and of entering into and influencing the material world for Artaud,\textsuperscript{117} like the language of Colloquy and the discourse of exorcism. His advocation for its use in his theater, in the extreme practices of intonation, cries and incantation, and his scriptural travesty of words and glossolalic compositions in his own writings, awakes, amplifies and changes the depth of language's meaning and, simultaneously, of the self as well. We can liken this visceral use of language to Ignatian rhythmic prayer, the third Way of Prayer which integrates text into life-breath and force to linguistically realize Inhabitation of the flesh of the exercitant by the text, and to Surin's practice of intimate dialogue, much like a displaced Ignatian Colloquy with the Divine figures. Language and nature thus have a mutual, magical relation.

The Baroque exercitant, director, Jesuit priest, saint, and the Artaudian actor and ideal spectator, are all most generously a body Inhabited for the other, given and yet of such a power which is indeed magical and transforming of others and of society, for good or for evil, for tradition or for Avant-garde revolt. This corporal openness, permeability and perturbation calls to mind correlates in Psychological terminology for states of Psychosis or hallucinatory projection/visualization -- for what is Psychology but the logic of the soul elaborated for a post-faith culture? -- in


\textsuperscript{117} OC VIII, 192.
the split and contradictory body for the other, schizophrenia and, in Surin to a certain extent and at Artaud’s limit, a superior god capable of creating others; in the purgation, exorcism and conversion of others, hysteria, the sympathetic vibration with otherly representation, problematic or otherwise, contamination, and the open cathartic event as we have presented it in light of Baroque martyrdom drama; and in the manipulation of perception and impulse towards action within the perceived arena, the particular Psychosis of paranoia, seen in Surin’s delirium of possession and persecution, and in Artaud’s perturbed perception of others and their relation to him, all very much grounded in the experience of the real. This Psychological panoply, also in place in Surin’s experience, is to be found in the full deployment of Theater of Cruelty in its Baroque dimension, from the actor’s alterity, to spectatorial Catharsis and involvement, to a permanent transformation of perception beyond the theater’s education, in the sense of a "voyante" who projects telling images upon the crystalline or luminous surface, and who, Artaud says, sets life on fire, of course with a mind to purging and transforming it.\(^{118}\) It is also structurally analogous to its sanctified dimension in the full deployment of Ignatian spirituality and its effects, from Immensity and Inhabitation (schizophrenia), to conversion and the chain of representations (hysteria), to the perceptive presence to God in the ethical will to act (paranoia). The linguistic correlates to the moments of this triadic structure would be polylogic and glossolalic speech, cries, and the metaphorical sounding of language’s depth, all of which is to be found in Artaud’s advocation for use of speech in his

theater and writings. Each aspect of this structure and the enactment of its totality challenges the Symbolic order of language and patriarchal law in place.

Given the failure of Artaud’s theater, and the contemporary refusal of such a structure even in its sanctified dimension, life as force and the sacerdotal role of the poet as criticism of and supplement to the lacks of the post-theic age is relegated back within the asylum walls, along with sanctity and magical practice in Artaud’s perception of himself interred therein. Artaud sees his confinement as an attempt to repress his powers, in the cycle of poems, "Et c'est donc comme prévenu d'être dieu...". He further sees no longer the dark night of Surin’s Hell, but the artificial creation of death as an institutionalized magic which both works against his own magic, but which he shall nonetheless be able to use in his favor, as we shall see with the engenderment of his daughters. This institutionalized magic is particularly found by Artaud in electroshock therapy, which annhilates the self all the while preserving it with the occupying presence of death, a nightmare of Inhabitation in absolute honor of a dualist Western society. Thus Artaud expresses the experience in a dialogue of the self with the voice of death which recalls Jean de Sponde’s *Stances et sonnets de la mort*:

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119 See, for example, Artaud’s variations on the word “conscience”, whose meaning and the society it implicates he turns on its head. *OC* XVII, 72.

120 *OC* XIV.ii, 144.

121 *OC* XIV.ii, 136-150.
Where *Surin holds a place in Hell*, *Artaud more radically maintains the space of Hell*; from here, each shall birth their spiritual/occult daughters. In the context of Artaud as *Homo Baroccus*, the Psychoanalytic phenomena in fact give "cultus" its divinatory abilities and eclipse of history,¹²³ its occult subversion in madness and malefic power, there where the consequences of Immensity and Inhabitation are followed through, as well as the bewitchment from actor to spectator to societal cohesion. Such a subject, fully-empowered when outside the asylum, is beyond the constraints of Renaissance and Classical space, and well outside the walls of the Republican city, or within the walls of its asylums and silent spaces. And yet he lives and breathes, speaks and writes, creates: his repression and death have become another one of his tools.

¹²² *Aliénation et magie noire*, OC XII, 64.

¹²³ *Je suis né à Marseille en 1896 et j'ai regardé toute l'histoire du ciel et des limbes de la terre et les anges m'ont martyrisé*, etc. OC XVII, 59. Emphasis is our own.
3. The Birthing Body of *Homo Baroccus*

In Jean-Joseph Surin’s stalwart belief in his damnation for others beyond all Christian redemption, evil is used as a means to experience Spirituality, and Surin indeed traverses what we can call a bad mystical experience of possession and physical disempowerment. He shall go so far as to harm himself physically -- seriously breaking his leg in a suicide jump from his bedroom window which would cause him to limp for the remainder of his life.

The willed nature of miraculous and demonic results, on Surin’s part, illuminates a Counter-Reformation, active relation to grace -- a Philosophy of spiritual practice initially lodged for the Jesuits in the Ignatian *Spiritual Exercises*, but refuted by the prolongation of Augustinian thought into that of Luther, Protestantism and Jansenism. This view of grace is later to be found as well in Artaud’s use of the will, and in a circumscribing Nietzschean, Postmodern context. Surin expressed this active

\[124\] *OC XX (1984), 58.* Emphasis is our own. The shifting narrative voice from speaking subject to addressed object and the voice of the imposing others is common in Artaud’s journal writing and gives here an example of how this allows him to conflate subjectivity with that of Divinity in the Christian myth. We have found a similar narrative shift in Surin’s 39th canticle "Fournaise d’amour".
grace as "des violents qui prennent le royaume de force". Jeanne des Anges shall learn this perspective on grace and spirituality and exploit it, as she goes on to become herself a spiritual advisor, and dubiously so. Jeanne gives us insight into this by recounting her experience of the Spiritual Exercises, administered by Surin as director of her retreat:

Dans les derniers Exercices que le bon Père me fit, il ne me donna aucun sujet. Il voulut que je me présentasse devant Dieu en simplicité pour recevoir ou souffrir ce qu'il lui plairait... Je trouvai grande liberté d'esprit dans cette manière de procéder. This reference by Jeanne is to the "Contemplation to Attain Love" in the fourth week of the Spiritual Exercises, where the by-now habile exercitant’s visualization process should no longer need depend upon a particular Gospel scene, but rather can construct the self in a state of presence to God, and as the Inhabited structure which harbors His presence. This empowerment is based upon love, and is not to be taken out of the context of the entire Ignatian spiritual practice, with its gradual progression through historical rememoration and composition of its decors into whose Immensity the exercitant is to learn to place himself, all with implications for engagement in the world. However, we see in the case of Jeanne des Anges how the empowerment and freedom of this Inhabited moment in spiritual practice is separated out and enebriates her hysterical, self-absorbed nature. It is a moment which focusses the active participation in grace on an interior level, and which allows wilful construction of the

125 Quoted in Préface, Correspondance, 10.
126 Quoted in M.de Certeau, La Possession de Leudun, 312.
self by the individual through examination of conscience, constant vigilance over the self and prayer — what indeed can approach a self-divinisation.

Out of context, this moment of spiritual practice dangerously ressembles Illuminism and Quietism, as exemplified by Jeanne des Anges' egotism which Surin critiques, and Surin's own case taken into the occult domain. Surin's own writing does focus upon the power of love, beneath which can be found a dangerously decontextualized Ignatian contemplation and use of the will. Surin's experience can perhaps be taken as an example of the misuse of the Spiritual Exercises ever since the mystical transports of his youth, inherited from Louis de Lallemant and his Spiritual Doctrine whose theology of nature and grace is far from that of St. Ignatius and can also be seen, paradoxically, as a precursor to Quietism in France as practiced by Madame Guyon and Fénelon, insofar as Quietism's passivity as an ultimate stage of Inhabitation is a willed state.\(^{127}\) We can go so far as to call it an inappropriate mystical exercise and experience, or one in bad faith, which contributed to Surin's ensuing delirium of madness and its engenderment.\(^{128}\) Artaud himself shall speak of the power of love as well, as that which integrates the soul with corporality and

\(^{127}\) M.de Certeau, ed., and Lettre 28, Correspondance, 158, 187. Surin's notes, along with those of Rigoleuc, served to reconstruct Lallemant's teachings in a 1694 publication by Champion.

\(^{128}\) Where we read the willfulness of passivity as that which contributed to Surin's madness, M.de Certeau reads the modalities of will in La Science expérimentale as blocked and impotent before grace: "L'étrange" se situe précisément là; c'est l'arrêt de Surin en la persuasion qu'il est damné: il ne peut pas croire qu'une ouverture est offerte au vouloir qui le porte vers Dieu; aussi doit-il s'en tenir à la place qui lui est fixée dans l'ordre divin et agir en damné, ce qu'il ne peut pas non plus." "Voyage et prison: La folie de J.-J.Surin", 450. While these different readings complement each other, ours takes active grace further into the realm of the occult, mad dimension. Unfortunately, Surin's Traité sur les secrets de la grâce is today a lost manuscript. M.de Certeau, "Les oeuvres de J.-J.Surin, I", 457.
affectivity,¹²⁹ and he shall use in an occult context a comparable spiritual wilfullness
and revolt against social structure, to the point of the begetting of the other in a
relation which is a form of spiritual direction.

Both Surin's disequilibrium and final madness, and Jeanne des Anges' case of
physical deformity since childhood lead one to think that demonic possession, the
eccstatic spiritual nature and its interpersonal relations have a pathological basis.
Although one need not necessitate the other, nor can neurosis or psychosis explain by
themselves mystical genius and spiritual friendship, a complementarity is definitely
there for Surin. Nonetheless, the entire spectacle of exorcism in France served to
convert Protestants and to defend the divinity of the Catholic Church. And so, as
they served a social purpose, the possession and exorcisms and nervous disequilibrium
prolonged themselves, without an effective Catharsis, in a cycle of self-exacerbation,
indeed in a birthing of devils,¹³⁰ not to mention a cathexis of morbid sexuality as
illustrated on a social level by the attraction of crowds to the spectacle, and on a
personal level by the seclusion Surin sought with Jeanne des Anges.¹³¹ He spoke of
such occasions as visited by grace, "les grâces que nous y reçûmes";¹³² the laying of

¹²⁹ OC XVIII, 32.
¹³⁰ P.Lescazes states, in a letter report to the Superior General of the Jesuits which argues
against sending Surin to Loudun a second time: "Mais l'expérience présente montre à l'évidence que la
vexation des démons cesserait si on ne les excitait pas comme on l'a fait; il y a là de quoi fonder
l'espoir qu'avec notre départ s'évanouissent peu à peu les artifices des démons. Dieu le fasse!"
Quoted in Correspondance, 464.
the sacrament upon the breast of the possessed also mediated their own personal presence, each to the other.

Surin's emphasis upon the Inhabitation stage of Spirituality to the neglect of the stages leading up to it in the Ignatian practice reinforces interiority in the spiritual life in hope for the motions of interior grace. Such a grace ultimately recalls the Immaculate Conception, as well as a perception of the beauty of the Christ as gift to man. This stage in Spirituality corresponds to what we have structurally analyzed as the affective, effusive, unitive moment; it is one which facilitates the power of creation and is where God becomes a feminine presence. It is the stage which brings presence to language and to representation. Through it, Surin "creates" his redeemed daughters, in a gesture which is one of charity; thus he quotes the Jesuit Constitutions regarding such a gift: "que la loi intérieure de la charité que le Saint Esprit a coutume d'écrire et de graver dans les coeurs, doit aider la compagnie plus que les règlements extérieurs".¹³³

This might lead us to think that there must be here an affinity for the Virgin Mother, but what is surprising is a certain rejection of the Virgin figure in the devotion given in this period of mystical fervor and practice of exorcisms, in favor of St. Joseph -- the silent, self-obliterating, fourth member of the Holy Family. It is St. Joseph to whom Jeanne des Anges makes her prayerful requests, it is St. Joseph whom she believes to visit her to anoint and cure her ailments. In this sense the Virgin is somewhat rejected or put aside; even though the relation between Surin and

¹³³ Quoted in H.Brémond, Histoire littéraire du sentiment religieux en France, t.v, 278.
Jeanne des Anges is one of Inhabitation, it is as if the paternal is needed to balance a strong relation based upon birthing and the maternal, and what we can take finally as a conflation of gender.\textsuperscript{134} Surin's canticle "Pour le jour de Saint Joseph" gives particular insight into how St. Joseph, in the mode of a terrestrial father, was thought to facilitate Inhabitation by the Christ: "Joseph [...] le plus doux miel qu'il verse dans nos âmes [...] met JESUS-CHRIST en nous. Le baume souverain [...] rend notre âme guérie".\textsuperscript{135} Surin works the event with Jeanne des Anges and the "sacred" balm into this canticle; she also has participated in such marriage, in Surin's eyes. Furthermore, St. Joseph facilitates the spiritual union of mystical marriage: "cet Epoux / Venant avec Vous / En nos coeurs se repose". To the bridegroom are offered two symbolic flowers, the white lily symbolizing virginity, and the red rose symbolizing ardent love; this combination suggests the power of virginal birthing, but here it is shared with Surin!, and suggests the suprasexual autogenitor of self and other we shall find in Antonin Artaud as well. Best of all, this transformed human nature has the power to ward off evil:

\begin{quote}
Le lys est virginal, Son pouvoir est fatal,
Au mal qui nous menace,
La rose c'est l'Amour;
Que cette double grace
Soit avec nous un jour.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
Les monstres abattus
Craignent que ces vertus
Se retrouvent ensemble;
Que leurs biens soient unis,
Et que tout l'Enfer tremble,
Nous en voyant munis.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{134} Particularly if we take the 9th letter quoted above (p.453, note 107) as plausibly addressed to Jeanne des Anges.

\textsuperscript{135} J.-J. Surin, \textit{Cantiques spirituels}, Canticle XXXII. Emphasis is our own.
This is surprisingly not far from Artaud’s wish for the body of an *autogenitor* which transcends the human engendering nature, and thereby resolves the monstrous ills of this creation.

And then there are those who are not capable of reaching such heights. Jean-Joseph Surin was a long-time correspondent with his Aunt, la Mère Anne d’Arrérac, who sought to profit from the renown of his spiritual gifts and to receive from him the *Spiritual Exercises*. But Surin is finally discouraged with her constant worldly preoccupations and schemings, and her efforts to involve his advice in the latest intrigue; he writes her that he will only give his time and direction to those who are sincerely turned away from the concerns of the world, and he even writes a spiritual canticle attesting to this experience, entitled "Le Religieuse empressée". This rejection of a weaker spiritual daughter illustrates Surin’s high spiritual standards, all the while that they do clamor to be where he is. For Surin did not give of his spiritual energies easily, nor to just anyone. He finally birthed in a reduced alterity and altruism, only the lives which would corroborate his own -- only the elite of the ascetic life.

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With a full Baroque deployment of body and force to the point of generous disempowerment, be it theatrical, psychic, spiritual or Satanic, comes in fact a certain empowerment where radical presence begets presence and, in Artaud’s view, begets both the self and the other. Antonin Artaud interprets his suffering as useful to and

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136 Canticle XXV, *Cantiques spirituels*. 
nourishing of others, as his body is possessed and inhabited by the other, despite himself, in a relation which wavers between love and hate. This extreme form of Inhabited alterity, schizophrenia and corporal possession is both a bad mystical experience and a situation of creation, a dichotomy he expresses thus:

Je ne suis pas du tout l’être expulsé de Dieu pour ses péchés et qui doit à force de purification lui revenir mais l’irréductible de l’être de Dieu qui doit d’un côté se débarrasser de l’être et de l’autre se débarrasser de Dieu.\textsuperscript{137}

This bad mystical experience and his attempts to rid himself of it, which he expresses in images of violation, fecality and martyrdom, is in commerce with a filthy, demonic God. Expressed in terms of subjectivity, this God is "l’escamoteur [qui] a su se dissimuler en nous-mêmes, être nous et penser pour nous", and "le dieu qui me mangeait le coeur"; expressed in terms of eclipsed temporality, "J’ai fait cela, frapper le passé du présent, a dit Satan en moi".\textsuperscript{138} The construction of the self in the Presence of God out of the trace left behind in His absence is, in Artaud’s experience, a horrific situation.

Artaud perpetually reads sexual relations into Christianity’s mystical union and particularly that of Catholicism, and through sexuality demonizes such union. As blasphemous as his tone may be, evidenced for example in the censoring of the radio program "Pour en finir avec le jugement de Dieu", its premise is plausible. For religious institutions and, by extension, medical institutions can be seen as that which regulate sexuality, morality and conduct, much as did the public spectacle of

\textsuperscript{137} OC XV, 61.

\textsuperscript{138} OC XIV.ii, 68-9; XV, 20, 178, 264.
exorcism, and which give them their permissible spaces of discourse and arenas of knowledge, perception and power, to speak in the terms of Michel Foucault. Indeed, *Artaud speaks and writes without repression from within the asylum that harbors him*; he occupies a space which gives him permission to speak as he wills it. By extension, the space which harbors the sacred also accommodates the blasphemous, to include the personal space of Inhabitation. And the consciousness of Western society has taken a radical shift for Artaud, to the locus of his own sexual organs.\(^{139}\) In a far-out Ignatian type of visualization, this shift allows him to deviate Christian concepts and symbols which obsess him, such as the Incarnation, the Trinity, the Sacred Blood and the Sacred Heart, and so on, into his own context and in terms of his own carnality, and to work his own particular relation to them. In the terms of our analysis of the *Spiritual Exercises*, Artaud enters into and conflates in anamorphic fashion upon himself and his own suffering certain images and a discourse which is not allowed to us, reimpressing them upon his own environment with problematic consequences, not only for himself, but for radical implications of the Ignatian spiritual technique. M. Foucault goes so far as to equate directed spiritual exercise towards mystical union as the regulation of sexuality, where we have spoken in terms of the regulation of desire, which by the same gesture also gives a space to sexuality.\(^{140}\) The spiritual relation of Inhabitation, then, can be read in terms of

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\(^{139}\) He crudely states, "ma conscience n’est pas dans ma bouche mais dans mon con que Jésus-christ a violé pour remonter au coeur avec la force de mon cu." *OC* XVII, 74.

\(^{140}\) See *Histoire de la sexualité I. La volonté de savoir* (Paris: Gallimard, 1976), particularly 94-95.
sexuality, which is not to reduce it, but to understand its allocation of space, and Artaud's case elucidates this. In Artaud's move from hyperlucidity into madness, he feels that Catholicism has imposed upon him a sexuality and, by extension, a body he would rather throw off. Its creation is criminal in his eyes.\textsuperscript{141} From there he enters into another signifying dimension which accommodates, names, both damns and tries to redeem the corporal as well, and includes his practice of the heretical permutations of Christian concepts and symbols.

We can further recall the comparison of this space of Inhabitation with that of the Kristevian "chora maternelle", a concept established initially from a Psychoanalytic point of view and which also has a structural appeal. As a space which harbors the pre-social subject and its corporality in relation to the maternal, and in correspondence to the Lacanian "imago" yet in a more substantial sense, the "chora maternelle" is source to signifying gestures which escape the established Symbolic order, it reembibes signification with affect, and ressuscitates the remains left behind by the Symbolic order, such as, for example, the "tangible étalon" in its very materiality and emotivity, and as the transpectival stage of Oedipus at Colonus. Thus Artaud himself says: "J'ai une autre façon d'écrire sans mental, avec le coeur, en un autre langage que le français", where we can take "le mental" and "le français" as all that is learned, canonical, and culturally imposed.\textsuperscript{142} Julia Kristeva goes even further to equate this choratic space with the theatrical space wherein the subject,

\textsuperscript{141} \textit{OC} XVI, 178.

\textsuperscript{142} \textit{OC} XVII, 15. Emphasis is our own. Also, previously quoted, \textit{OC} I (1956) 234-237; XVIII, 222; XX, 174.
bracketed off from a socially imposed order and identity, is in process. The "chora maternelle" is a locus which corresponds to the Semiotic stage of signification and a realm of representation prior to the Symbolic order of language, law and social structures. It is also the site to which the gestures of the revolutionary, of rejection, of regression and madness return. It accommodates the fluidity of the Imaginary and the Real, of corporality and affectivity, of gestuality — all we have attributed to the Baroque. It is a space of desire, and we consider it to be the space of the Baroque as we have elaborated it, to include the concepts of Immensity and Inhabitation as it both harbors and is harbored by the subject, or by being, as well as transpectival stance.

What has been structurally analyzed by Jacques Lacan as passage into the "mirror stage", language, society and the Law of the Father, is considered by Kristeva as leaving or repressing the choratic space; and to leave or repress it is a kind of passage through death symbolized by the severance with the maternal which also indicates a severance or schizophrenia of the subject. To manage to maintain it while living in the Symbolic order, as do Surin and Artaud, is to be Baroque, and is perhaps a gift indeed. As prior to socially-inscribed textuality, it is a kind of origin to the text, or Ur-text, what Kristeva calls the "génotexte"; to go back to it is to bring presence to the text and to reinvest the text with corporality and affectivity, and such passage is

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required by the Baroque writer and the reader’s reception. Indeed, presence in the
text necessitates this passage and this mobility, as it provokes a kind of unchained
orality. To live and maintain it in the Symbolic order is also characterized as a
perpetual Freudian fort-da, a wavering between union and separation, for the chora is
of a feminine, maternal register. As a space of Inhabitation, the "chora maternelle" is
virtually in each one of us as our spiritual dimension, and supplements both genders
towards the feminine dimension.\textsuperscript{145}

To return to this site and to withstand it — a necessary step for the likes of
Jean-Joseph Surin and Antonin Artaud — is to incur madness. However, Kristeva
reads the resort to the creation of the self mirrored in the feminine as a way to
\textbf{withstand madness}: "Le sujet en procès a besoin de se voir dans une soeur ou une
fille pour ne pas devenir fou".\textsuperscript{146} And, vice-versa, such a narcissistic relation to the
feminine or feminisation of the self can incur madness, revolt, and so on. Thus
Kristeva reads Artaud’s birthing of his six daughters and further uses his writings to
elaborate the concept of the \textit{chora}. We can also extend this to Surin’s relation to the
possessed Ursulines, to his women correspondants and spiritual protégées, and
particularly to his spiritual daughter, Jeanne des Anges. Indeed, these women allow

\textsuperscript{145} So M.de Certeau examines Surin’s description of the sensual receptivity of his sickly
body: "le corps apparaît comme une grotte occupée par les "lacs du ventre" (Groddeck); c’est une
"bouche" immense. Sur les bords de ces lacs, les vagues "déliéuses" de l’autre viennent "baiser" les
rivages intérieurs qui constituent les "membranes intérieures". "Voyage et prison: La folie de J.-
J.Surin", 457.

\textsuperscript{146} "Le Sujet en procès", 72. Emphasis is our own. Where Victor-Laurent Tremblay reads
the Kristevian chora and Semiotic to elucidate Artaud’s madness, in "Artaud, schizophrène universel",
\textit{Littéréalité} 3.2 (1991): 37-65, we use these concepts to elucidate the (self-)engenderment as/of the
feminine.
Artaud and Surin to sustain the madness of "choratic" Immensity, down to their Inhabitation by it, to their own feminisation, hysteria and "birthing" of the other, be it by spiritual union, demonic possession, or other creative powers. Or, to read this inversely, creative madness allows them to sustain Presence carried to its ultimate reality, as God's feminine face.

This concept of feminine presence, and the feminisation of he who is inhabited by presence, is further enriched by the Cabbalist figure of the Sekina, Schechina, or Sefira, the feminine aspect of God, also translated as "Presence", and whose etymology signifies "to inhabit". The Sekina is the divine presence which has descended to dwell among men, whom she inhabits, and for whom she also provides a sacred space for their dwelling. Appropriately, the root of "Sekina" has also given the word "scene". Mediatrice of this creation, she is capable of using both good and evil forces to realize God's justice. The Jews believe that she will accompany the coming of the Messiah, and she is also associated with the Messiah as mediator. Although Kristeva does not speak of the Sekina, there are affinities with the characteristics of the "chora maternelle", and we find that each concept enriches the other. The Sekina is the "face of God", fire, and also a mirror in which light, colors and all creation reflect themselves. As such, she is the glorious, moving splendor of this creation, and problematically fragments the unity of God, much as the "daughters" of Surin and Artaud multiply, reflect and fragment their being. Our own souls, in turn, are simply emanations of her. She is assimilated in various and

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147 The malefic feminine dimension to Divinity is also associated by the Cabbala with the figure of Lilith, maintaining for the most part the Sekina as the positive side of God.
contradictory ways by Cabbalists to the Messiah, to the nourishment of the "Bread of Life", and to the Holy Spirit as well. Whether or not her face is the face of God is unsettled; whether she is the reality, symbol or merely an attribute of God remains a question. Identified with Logos and the Word, she joins to them the image, and all the image implies, as we have seen — beauty, the Christ, charity, gift, grace, the treasorial real, presence. She brings presence (the Christ) to the text (the Word). This includes the Divine Will, to which she gives its affective expression and carnal execution.\textsuperscript{148}

The imaginal relation to God as feminine is also captured in the concept of the "Féminin créateur" in the Sufism of Ibn ‘Arabi.\textsuperscript{149} This feminine or "sophianic" mode of being, the \textit{Sophia aeterna}, is the most beauteous and perfect image of the Divinity, in a flesh-and-blood, young and lovely woman who embodies a Christic wisdom, grace, angelism and power. In such power she joins the spiritual to the sensual, giving thus the Divinity presence, and as such is of a suprasexuality which is both masculine and feminine, both receptive and creative, passive and active, in the images of Adam & Eve, of Maryam & Jesus, and of Sophia & Christos. For Ibn ‘Arabi, to know the \textit{Sophia aeterna} is to experience her, and thereby to have one’s existence renewed.


The experience of the *Sophia aeterna* is the outcome of the particular Spirituality of Ibn ‘Arabi’s Sufism, and surprisingly has many emphases similar to those we have found in Baroque spirituality, such as in the mutual relation with God explained through the concepts of Immensity (Being in God) and Inhabitation (God in our Being), in the exterior projective process of Ignatian visualization, and in the importance of exercitant/spectator/reader response to the Baroque work as a fleshly measure of its real dimension and truth value.

Ibn ‘Arabi explains the spiritual relation as a *unio sympathetica*. Based upon the projection of the Divine image by the creative or active imagination of the subject, which is both an organ of perception and a foyer of reception of and for the image, and a kind of disposition of mind symbolized by the heart, the *unio sympathetica* is in fact a mutual passion and love between man and God, an active corporal, affective and imaginal projection of each to the other, a mutual harboring or "Inhabitation", exchange, manifestation, and presence. This passion is presence. As a hidden treasure, active intelligence and angel of humanity, wherein the concluding elaborated image of the *Sophia aeterna* can be seen, *the active imagination’s belief in this Divinity is exactly what gives it being!* and is the key to its secret treasure:

Car lorsqu’il est parlé du «Dieu créé», il faut demander: *qui* est en réalité le sujet actif qui crée? Il est vrai de dire, certes, que sans le Divin (*haqq*) qui est la cause de notre être, et sans nous qui sommes la cause de sa Manifestation, l’ordre des choses ne serait pas ce qu’il est, et Dieu ne serait ni Dieu ni Seigneur. Mais d’autre part, si c’est *toi*, le vassal de ce Seigneur, qui détiens le «secret de sa suzeraineté» parce qu’elle se réalise par toi, cependant du fait que ton *action* qui le pose soit sa *passion* en toi, ta passion de lui, le sujet actif en réalité n’est pas toi dans une autonomie fictive. En réalité, tu es le sujet d’un verbe au passif (tu est l’*ego* d’un *Cogito*). Et c’est cela que veulent dire nos mystiques en déclarant que ce «secret de la suzeraineté divine»
Such a spiritual relation eventually transfers all of the subject’s vision, in a fidelity of love. H. Corbin elegantly refutes any psychologizing interpretation of this Spirituality by qualifying it as an a priori relation experimented by the very structure of our own created being, and as an existential disposition to spiritual presence. Thus the subject himself is feminized: "ce secret qui est toi".  

We can likewise say that Jean-Joseph Surin and Antonin Artaud both believe themselves to and, in verity, do harbor the secret of the Divinity as presence and being.

A further aspect of presence as the feminine is Hestia, or Vesta, the Greco-Roman goddess of the home -- that is, of dwelling, presence and of being, as Heidegger’s thought allows us to combine these aspects. Hestia has affinities for our study of the feminine dimension in the Baroque, and the relation of this dimension to the particular cases of Surin and Artaud, as dwelling which she allows, in her virginity, and in her representation as fire. For Surin, fire is purification towards the image of Christ, and for Artaud, this is a fire which incarnates. Jean-Joseph Goux’s study places particular emphasis upon Hestia as an iconoclast goddess amidst an iconophile cult.  

Her round temple harbors no representation of her, but rather a perpetually burning fire at its center. She is the absent middle which brings forth the


presence of all others — pluralistic gods, society and individuals alike, and ultimately prepares the interiority of the individual for housing her, much as in the spiritual concept of Inhabitation. As a presence which is not a vision, unlike Ibn 'Arabi’s *Sophia aeterna*, her temple is forbidden to men. Like the "chora maternelle", she is a creative fire prior to structuration, the zero degree to culture, and even perhaps, by extension, to language. J.-J. Goux places her more on the side of culture than are the Semiotic "chora" or the Sekina. Like the Sekina, she mediates presence and is symbolized by fire. We can speak metaphorically and out of context to say that Surin and Artaud have somehow impiously accessed her space, have envisioned and imagined Hestia in their own presence to her being, lodging themselves there, contaminating her virginity and feminizing themselves — all through the power of their madness and its outrageous cure in their own forms of self-fecundation and birthing of the feminine. If we may combine all these concepts, then, the "choratic, sophianic, vestal Sekina" is the figure of access to God, or to madness, and to the feminine part in creation. And concern with Presence, or Being, holds beneath it the feminine face. Affectivity, union and will are all fully deployed in this relation through the feminine, which is also to be found in the successful culmination of the practice of the *Spiritual Exercises*.  

153 What is feminine and maternal in this Baroque spiritual development's relation to presence is not, however, to be taken as a return to a maternal mother-earth origin or to nature, as in the pre-Romantic thought of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the elaboration of presence in his work, to include the reading by Jacques Derrida. Rather, this maternal dimension is a becoming of the self, a kind of suprasexuality, which is also charismatic, grade-laden, beautiful, and which does not hesitate to work through technique and artifice. Although there are some Baroque characteristics in Romanticism, a return of the Baroque is not quite to be found there.
Inhabitation, then, with the feminine dimension it gives to presence, is also and subsequently to madness (or spiritual union) a situation of creation for Artaud, who has the lucidity to understand it. Artaud feels himself to be in effect the origin and perpetrator of the image, of charity,\(^{154}\) and its treasorial capacity, and perpetrator of language and of sacred history, evidenced for example in his incredible relation to the Christ: "Mon Fils, le premier moi-même qui fut moi, ne sera pas toujours celui qui descendra le premier dans les choses pour y souffrir le problème de mon moi."\(^{155}\) Like Surin who felt himself to be damned beyond all the damned, Artaud is the Gnostic God before God. Furthermore, in the following text, the call to give of the self by carrying within an eternal cross is evidenced in the other incarnated by such sacrifice of the Inhabited "middle". This does not fail to recall Surin’s vision of himself and his correspondant conflated upon each other and nailed together upon the Cross, and Artaud’s own lucidity about the gift of self and its relation to self-feminization illuminates our understanding of Surin as well. We shall quote this entire remarkable text:

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Je suis Vierge sans milieu car mon milieu c’est moi-même et je ne peux pas me voir dans un milieu puisque je le fais être par ma présence et mon coeur et mon âme sont de donner l’éternel milieu et l’éternité à ce milieu.
La réalité hépatique de la douleur et de son âme.
La croix de douleur est ce qui se transporte éternellement et qui transporte son coeur mais qui ne peut le voir en soi mais devant soi dans l’incarnation d’un être aimant, on ne perd pas son coeur en le donnant mais donner au contraire réveille toujours la douleur et le Christ.
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\(^{154}\) In the sense of χαρά — the image’s beauty and perfection, and its relation to grace via the will.

\(^{155}\) OC XV, 62, 65-66.
Je serai ta mère, m’a dit la douleur, tu vivras et tu ressusciteras éternellement de l’abîme où tu n’es pas.

Et l’âme est venue aussi et m’a appelé dans l’abîme où je n’étais pas afin de me donner de monter et d’être à travers ma douleur,

la Pitié aussi est venue et m’a dit de cesser de ne pas me voir moi-même et d’être — et c’était mon cœur,

alors la Vierge qui n’était pas encore s’est levée pour me permettre d’exister car depuis toujours la Malheureuse était faite et ne le savait plus de douleur, et Jésus-christ sous l’éclat de la Douleur éternelle du corps fut sa croix et le christ en être et il l’était et il monte dans le Visible de son corps une croix. ¹⁵⁶

The conclusion of this text in the body of Christ inhabited by a cross conflates this body with the Virgin’s, and then Artaud’s own, thus capturing in the context of great suffering both the masculine and the feminine, in a chain of representations Ignatian in quality of the presence before and the presence afterwards, to describe the genesis of the Inhabited Artaud. The feminine god figure is close to the image of the Sekina,¹⁵⁷ the Sophia aeterna, Hestia, and the Kristevian feminine which preserves the most-desired choratic womb of presence. It is from here that Artaud goes on in turn to engender his beloved others. This situation is first evidenced in his relation to the actress and close friend Paule Thévenin, "une de mes œuvres",¹⁵⁸ a situation which reaches its pinnacle in his belief that he has by force of will both fathered and mothered, from a remade body perfected as autogenitor, six daughters.

¹⁵⁶ OC XV, 199. Emphasis is our own.

¹⁵⁷ G.Javary brings out the comparison of the Sekina with the Christ as Mediator: "Le Messie est celui qui entre, celui qui est au milieu, au centre, et non aux extrémités. Recherches sur l’utilisation du thème de la Sekina dans l’apologetique chrétienne du XVème au XVIIIème siècle, 232. This is where Artaud spiritually and magically situates himself.

¹⁵⁸ Lettre à Fernand Pouey, OC XIII (1974) 128. Paule Thévenin significantly recited one of the texts of "Pour en finir avec le jugement de Dieu", and performed the tedious and rather unacknowledged labor of deciphering Artaud’s handwriting for the Gallimard publication of the Oeuvres complètes.
Artaud joins his birthing body to the Virgin Mary, particularly for the importance of her corporality and its role in what he envisages as her revolt against God, and which he himself takes as a personal liberation:

La Révolte de la Vierge sera la révolte contre la Croix, son âme et DIEU, alors je serai délivré parce que la révolte de la Vierge sera la révolte du corps contre le Principe et de la substance faite par Dieu contre Dieu. ¹⁵⁹

Furthermore, Artaud also imagined such a liberation in the process of birthing as an expulsion of the Inhabited condition that possessed him. ¹⁶⁰ As we have already examined it, the Virgin Mother is the ultimate model for the stance of Inhabitation, and Artaud is on target with understanding this final, corporal stage in Spirituality. It is also of interest that Artaud initially begins speaking of creation of the feminine in the case of women saints such as St. Philomène, who according to him was brought forth by a dark version of the Virgin. ¹⁶¹ In the context of the active forcing of grace, the wilful creation of Artaud’s daughters are initially delivered to him, or torn away from being, by the "avant-garde" or occult Virgin, what he calls the black Virgin: "La Noire ne fut noire que par la douleur répulsive et non par le Désir". ¹⁶² Such creation sustains rejection of the Symbolic order.

¹⁵⁹ OC XV, 18. Emphasis is our own. This union with the Deic feminine envisaged as revolt joins Kristeva’s thought on “le rejet” as of a Semiotic and choratic dimension which refuses social and Symbolic order, and returns to pre-Oedipian infantile stages which waver between fusion with and rejection of the maternal mother figure, the subject thus remaining in flux — “en procès” as she says. It also joins the Cabbalist perception of the Sekina as capable of using both good and evil, and of Hestia as both absence and dwelling presence.

¹⁶⁰ OC XV, 203.

¹⁶¹ OC XV, 67-72.

¹⁶² OC XV, 73.
In a second moment, Artaud rejects even this Virgin figure, as she who has tricked him into the act of creation, along with the entire Holy Family who have imposed a dolorous sexuality upon him only to proceed to violate and use it. The Gnostic implication is that Artaud thinks himself in a dizzying delusional egotism to be an anterior, eternal, perfect being which is stolen from him by jealous gods in order to bring forth all of creation. So he addresses the God of sin, inviting Him to examine what he has done:

Et pourquoi toi, péché, n’as-tu pas voulu avoir de coeur et rester dans la voie véritable. — Pourquoi es-tu allée à la Vierge substance avec ce qui appartient à mon corps éternel et que ton âme (âme!?) n’a jamais voulu mériter sauf par force.
Tais-toi et scopis.\textsuperscript{163}

His vengeance shall be the excremental violence and rejection of this forced Inhabitation, or possession, which he demands be observed with microscopical vision, and is also a critique of Communion forced upon him in the asylum: "Je mangerai le cadavre de Dieu et de Jésus-christ et de sa mère, moi, corps, et je les rejeterai aux excréments."\textsuperscript{164} This very vengeance and violent drive shall also be, in effect, the final stage of the birthing of his protective daughters, just as Surin "birthed" Jeanne des Anges out of his own possession and experimentation of the occult. The only viable presence for Artaud is his daughters, and his own, as he heretically rewrites the Gospel story through his own corporality.

\textsuperscript{163} OC XVI, 255. Emphasis is our own.

\textsuperscript{164} OC XVI, 226.
Artaud’s daughters, as the Christ, are born of his suffering and lodged in his heart, and are his feminine correlates. In the seminal text of their birthing entitled "Fragmentation"; we see how they come out of both Artaud’s own passage through and beyond death, and their own death as a kind of possession. Artaud speaks of coffins, embalming processes which he envisions in the drugs he is suffered to take and as the cultural practices of death, of specific corporal maladies, physical pains and degeneration which fragment his own generating body. Who these daughters are is an even more complex question, which sounds the depths of Artaud’s understanding, suffering and schizophrenia. Their names are taken from permutations of first and last names in his own family history, and can be read as a radical reconstruction, reincarnation of souls, and appropriation of the family romance, a perversion of this task in Freudian analysis. As such, their identities change into one other. Split into doubles, they take up birthing each other in turn, and live out each others’ deaths as well. They too have occult powers; born of Artaud’s hatred and revolt, they execute his will. One of their important roles is to protect Artaud from mystical rape and possession by waging war against the demonic god. He does not wish, however, that they have the vision of his consciousness, or suffer in its place, for suffering remains his (divine) gift and right:

165 OC XIV.i, 13-21.

166 V.-L. Tremblay remarks, not without humor, "Artaud n’a pas besoin de la Psychanalyse, c’est elle qui a besoin de lui.” "Artaud, schizophren universel", 37. The editors of the Oeuvres complètes go at great length to narrate and establish the logic of Artaud’s family romance, particularly in the fifteenth volume. To a certain extent, this family romance recalls Surin’s preoccupations with giving spiritual guidance to his own relatives — his father, Aunt and cousins.

167 OC XVI, 201.
Antonin Artaud, L’Être et ses foetus (c. jan 1945, Serge Malaussena; Copyright 1997, NY, Artists’ Rights Society (ARS)/ Paris, ADAGP)
Je ne veux pas avoir une fille à qui je passerai mes facultés, car elle ne le veut pas et en souffre et c'est idiot et je ne dois pas charger quelqu'un même de confiance de faire certains travaux graves comme ceux que faisait Jésus-Christ sur la terre parce que c'était moi qui les faisais.\textsuperscript{168}

His corporality then, like that of Surin's, is, in true Inhabited form, the gift of life. Inhabitation in Artaud, as for Surin, takes on both malefic and salutary forms, as his body and suffering remain, in a charitable dimension: "L'intelligence est ce qui ne comprend rien et fera tout par pitié."\textsuperscript{169} Such a radical charity which paradoxically both uses and rejects the Christian myth perpetuates itself in a chain of representations to further birth Artaud's daughters and to continue to circumvent the need for the Christian god, to suspend the Catharsis and to repeat the sacrifice in the real, as a radical ontology: "celle qui a voulu prendre sur elle-même de souffrir au lieu de compter sur la Douleur accumulée de Dieu pour être est ma fille vraiment."\textsuperscript{170}

Furthermore, these daughters seem to be willed emanations from Artaud's soul, particular organs and specific corporal sufferings,\textsuperscript{171} much like Surin's localized suffering, and the specific corporal lodgings of the demons who possessed the Ursulines. As such, the daughters of Artaud might help him to both demonize and to

\textsuperscript{168} OC XVI, 203.

\textsuperscript{169} OC XVI, 273.

\textsuperscript{170} OC XVI, 284.

\textsuperscript{171} OC XVI, 289. Artaud's drawing, "L'Etre et ses foetus" illustrates a central, quadruped bestowed with markings for both genders, and with written indications, including "en moi ma fille Catherine [?]". Antonin Artaud, Dessins et Portraits, 146. This aspectival drawing includes hovering female faces at the top horizon, framing the presence and representation below, and whose pendulous breasts replace the traditional iconography of winged angels, as well as other various floating embrionic, fragmented organic forms.
master the body, thereby protecting him. This takes further the concept of producing being via the generosity of the body-image, or of situating body-presence in the (Gospel) text. These daughters are his corporal suffering and its glory, supreme gift of and to the other, children of Homo Baroccus.

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172 They even recall the Ignatian "Application of the Senses" technique in its role in transforming being and stance and particular body functions in space and time, as well as practices of specifically localized body-control and body-memory techniques in Indian aesthetics, particularly Vedic Psychology. On this topic of body-memory in relation to theater and the actor’s practice, and on Artaud’s theater as well, see Daniel Meyer-Dingräfe, Consciousness and the Actor. A Reassessment of Western & Indian Approches to the Actor’s Emotional Involvement from the Perspective of Vedic Psychology (Frankfurt: European University Studies, 1996).
C. Conclusion: The Extremes of a Baroque Spirituality

That the Jesuit Order and its Spirituality has strongly influenced the Counter-Reformation in a manner that can be considered foundational to Baroque aesthetic is well established. However, the direction such Spirituality has taken on French soil, from the 17th century's "école mystique" exemplified in radical fashion by Jean-Joseph Surin's life, experience and writing, to Antonin Artaud's vision for the theater and personal visions from within the asylum, is not part of a canonical understanding of the Baroque. Each of these men has taken Baroque Spirituality into the extreme ethical direction of not only the gift of self unto death, but of the modification of self unto death through the forms of madness, damnation and possession by malefic forces from which they wish to preserve all others, in order to bring forth the presence of the other. Their own liminal presences as plastic Homo Baroccus -- in the dangerous engagement of the real in illusory play with identity and affectivity, with corporality and gender, opened asunder, engaged in death, in tenuous relation to Catholicism, are also presences preserved in history and memory by the fragile thread of writing\(^\text{173}\) -- in correspondence, spiritual direction, and the personal journal with its lyricism and poetry -- to bring forth in turn the presence of the other: spectators and spiritual daughters, feminine faces, suprasexual beings and God. Their heroic and despised efforts bring us as well, much bewildered, into this strange Spirituality forged through madness, into the charity of its surprising grace, as we are forced into a radical

\(^{173}\) Even more so given the difficulties of publication, the dispersed and lost texts of J.-J.Surin, and the problematic materiality of writing for both Surin and Artaud.
aesthetic response and its mode of burning desire, as our own sense of identity and
gender is set into motion, into the space of the Other in us.
VIII. PASSAGES THROUGH DEATH, VISION FROM WITHIN: WAR,
LITERARY NARRATIVE & BAROQUE AESTHETIC

[...] car seul le héros vit jusqu’au bout sa relation aux hommes et au monde.¹

Seuls les héros ont vraiment été au dehors ce qu’ils voulaient être au dedans, seuls, ils se sont joints et confondus à l’histoire, au moment où elle prenait leur vie, mais ceux qui ont survécu même aux plus grands risques n’ont pas consommé ce mariage cruel, personne ne peut parler de ce silence ni le recommander aux autres. L’héroïsme ne se prêche pas, il s’accomplit, et toute prédication serait ici présomption, puisque celui qui peut encore parler ne sait de quoi il parle.²

We shall here consider three authors from the Baroque and Contemporary periods whose biographies are marked by participation in war -- the religious wars between Catholics and Protestants which gripped France from the Vassy massacre of 1562 to the Edict of Nantes in 1598 for Théodore-Agrippa d’Aubigné (+1552,-1630); World Wars I and II for Blaise Cendrars (+1887,-1961); and World War II for Claude Simon (+1913). Soldiers, poets, historians, memorialists and mystics, their writings, both when and when not directly descriptive of traumatic war experience, are marked with the stigma of such engagement. It is in such bloody engagement, as

¹ Maurice Merleau-Ponty, La Phénoménologie de la perception (Paris: Gallimard, 1945) 520.

a result of the Reformation and Catholic reaction, that Baroque aesthetic took hold in France.

The question of the intersection between war experience and the production of literary narrative shall bring us to consider in a Baroque/NeoBaroque light the following topics. In the optic of the *Homo Baroccus*, we shall examine the narrating voice, in the first person in all the texts under examination here, as that of the hero-subject (whether hero or anti-hero) and the situation of his radical engagement and alterity to the point of death with and for the Other/others, and his very constitution as hero by such engagement. Here comparison shall be due with the Ignatian subject, both in contexts of the stances of Immensity and Inhabitation as we have elaborated them, up to the Merleau-pontian body-subject and his chiasmic relation to his environment and to the other, not to neglect import for the ethical stance. The hero has projected through his actions his selfless interiorization of the other, as Merleau-Ponty says, and whose weight of suffering he bears, as a new Christ figure. Over the entire scope of this work, the aesthetic subject as well as the actor-subject and the testaments of the writings of author-figures such as Jean-Joseph Surin and Antonin Artaud are also brought to mind. In the context of the literary work, the question of narrative point of view and the autobiographical, real measure of the self mise-en-scène illustrates a dolorous engagement in history. This engagement as a contribution to fiction and the possibilities of language shall also be of importance, particularly in evaluation of the stages of vision and vision as a perspectival transgression which attains the transpectival stance. Such shifting and transgressive narrative viewpoints
reject the stable narrative tactics of the Classical and 19th-century novel, to join
together the Baroque epic and the 20th-century novel. It is a narrative point of view
which both disanchors and engages the reader in a new way. This shall have great
import for reader reception, for how exactly does the reader receive the work written
from a "transpectival" point of view that is confirmed in historical experience?

As we can consider the hero as Homo Baroccus and therefore as a body-
subject, the stages of engagement of this body-subject according to the concepts of
Immensity and Inhabitation, with an evaluation of corporal presence and affective
engagement, are of great importance. Here we shall find that the poetic and literary
imagination has a particular contribution to make to such concepts which no other
discipline engaged herein has exposed, as narrative description brings Baroque
corporal imagery, horror and the macabre to illustrate the reality of what Merleau-
Ponty signals as personal death given up to history in which narration is implied, and
is the ultimate stage of Inhabitation by this very narrative.

The lyrical illustration of Inhabitation in particular and the abdicated position
of the body-subject raise the question of speech versus silence, and of the various
narrative results of speech and description which wind their way around silence, the
ineffable, the irrepresentable, the absent. This is integral to the Baroque themes of
absence versus presence, of death versus life. In the Baroque, inhabitational context,
such antinomies are present to each other, as they harbor each other in violent
contrast. The literary war narrative becomes thus a sort of funerary, monumental
space and horrific, macabre spectacle or theater of cruelty, a living "tableau" into
which we may enter, more horrible precisely because its absence and space is open to our presence as the vessels of history and its final, real measure. The very spectacle of the opened, traumatized, wounded and war-torn body becomes an emblem for the open work, and for the chiasmic relation not only between characters within the text, but between author, text, event and reader. By this real measure, as well, such harboring macabre violence, like the wounds of Christ in the *Anima Christi*, paradoxically sings the mystery of life.
A. Passages through Death, Vision from Within: Théodore-Agrippa d’Aubigné’s (+1522,-1630) *Les Tragiques* (1616)

Théodore-Agrippa d’Aubigné’s (+1552,-1630) *Les Tragiques* (1616), written from the Protestant viewpoint, is considered the great French Baroque epic, and its Baroque themes and motifs have been well analysed. This includes such factors as d’Aubigné’s concrete, carnal and sensual imagery, spectacular descriptions of cruelty sparing no horrific detail and imbibed in vibrant color, the ever-presence of death, hallucinatory and prophetic visions, linguistic repetition and accumulation, luxurious excess of forms and extended similes beyond syntactical measure, multiple images, hyperbole, oxymoron, and shocking and ostentatious oppositions. This all serves a tumultuous, high-contrast, excessively laden, sensuous portrayal which Henri Weber likens to the theatrical scene of Spanish religious drama, and we further to *Le Véritable Saint Genest* examined herein, in a lack of measure called forth by the traumatic experience, all of which is to serve the rhetorical purpose of engaging the reader within it. These Baroque themes and motifs which sensually immerse both narrator and reader in the scene are captured, in our opinion, by the Baroque

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4 The Calvinist mentality of predestination, election and self-righteousness certainly served to give d’Aubigné poetic confidence in the portrayal of such visionary tableaux.


structure we have emphasized in this study, namely, a subjectival stance which has passed through death, and which speaks from such passage in motion to produce a vision which labors from within, both the within of Immensity and the within which fissures the self of Inhabitation, and here in particular, the within of death. The relation of such a structure and its mode of vision to the historical practice and the sense of time is a further, important consideration.

The passage through death comprises not only the immediate and all-surrounding presence of death’s immensity as well as its personal imminence -- final undercurrent to the luxuriant scene and so evident in the theater of war -- but also the metamorphosis of the individual subject through death to self and abdication of self into an Inhabited, harboring space for the other, totally given up to the luxuriant Baroque scene, as its very locus and place of being. We have seen the figure of the Homo Baroccus in the Ignatian exercitant, as well as in figures such as the Merleau-pontian body-subject, Rotrou’s Saint Genest, Jean-Joseph Surin and Antonin Artaud. It is particularly in the context of war narrative or narrative marked by war experience and its trauma that the Homo Baroccus becomes a veritable "walking death", not unlike Oedipus at Colonus endowed with transspectival vision. This is the subject capable of vision from within -- not only the vision of participation and engagement in an immense and deadly spectacle, but also a vision which harbors the other, the space tormented and the very spectacle itself within him, as a figure of the war-torn, open body, the very battleground, indeed who becomes the size of the
cosmos itself as earth and sky, god, man and nature are placed on the same horizon.\textsuperscript{7} Such experience and representation are not far from including hallucination, in a vision which uses the techniques of trompe-l’oeil and anamorphosis which perturb the very self, as well as recourse to ekphrasis, all captured well by poetic voice and the epic format. This figure can be the first-person narrative or semi-autobiographical voice, as well as a character within the text, evident in d’Aubigné’s first-person narrative voice which is strongest in Book I, "Misères", Blaise Cendrars’ first-person voice in his late, post-war writings, and in Claude Simon’s first-person voice as well as in the feminine and maternal other in Histoire. As d’Aubigné himself writes in L’Hécatombe à Diane, so filled with war imagery, "Je suis le champ sanglant [...]".\textsuperscript{8}

First published anonymously without place of publication in 1616, d’Aubigné’s Les Tragiques, grown out of the engagement with war experience, is considered a part of the polemical literature around the French wars of religion, as it spans from the Conspiracy of Amboise in 1560, to the end of the reign of Henry IV in 1610, and to a certain extent can also be considered an historical narrative. Henri Weber categorizes this as a poetry of Resistance and an art of engagement, familiar to our own 20th-century war experience and the literary sensibility left in its wake,\textsuperscript{9} and which allows us to further argue for a NeoBaroque return particularly in the context

\textsuperscript{7} A vision of man as microcosm of the universe was common to the 16th century. This is also evident in Blaise Cendrars’ astronomical projections, and becomes a universe later portrayed as a feminine figure in the work of Claude Simon.

\textsuperscript{8} Oeuvres, quoted by H.Weber, xvi; and VII, 249.

\textsuperscript{9} Oeuvres, iii.
of the 20th-century experience of two World Wars, the trauma inflicted and the aesthetic impact.

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The French wars of religion began in 1562, when d’Aubigné was 10 years of age. Two years prior to this, his father had him swear vengeance at the spectacle of his martyred Protestant compagnons implicated in the Conspiracy of Amboise. His father died the following year from war wounds. D’Aubigné’s relation to the history he shall recount in Les Tragiques is a personal, affective, emotionally-charged one which opens up the historical text to infinite possibilities of reason, reception and persuasion, beyond any totalization,\textsuperscript{10} much as the Calvinist opens the Biblical text. At 17 years of age, d’Aubigné participated in the third of the religious wars, which retained him for several years and interrupted his already impressive education. At the court of Henry III as of 1573, he became a confidant to Henry of Navarre, his friend since childhood and with whom he had a frank relationship. He was inspired to write Les Tragiques after receiving what were almost mortal wounds at Casteljaloux in 1577; the majority of the writing of this work would take place in 1578 during a year of countryside repose, but was in fact pursued for 36 years and more throughout his experience of the religious wars.

\textsuperscript{10} In the sense of Paul Ricoeur, Le Temps et le récit III (Paris: Le Seuil) 313-332.
1. In the Valley of Death

The presence of death and the accumulation of cadavres in *Les Tragiques* is given a very important and active, in fact living role. The martyred speak in a most macabre fashion while in the throes of death and give testimony to the outrage they suffer. The very acts of agony and dying are written and enlivened to engage the reader/spectator, whose spectatorial eye must pass through them with the narrator. The passage is not an easy one, for the poetic voice dwells in such war-tortured bodies, not from the exterior, but from the interior of their failing breath and life. So the book, like a history, lives in face of the death it recounts and is living word.\textsuperscript{11} Here, the first-person narrator himself is the hero who walks through death a second time, and time and again, and witnesses its every horrific and personal detail to give testament to the world of such events and to be a vessel to history. Such a poetic vision involves personal sacrifice, abdication and exile, as represented in the first anonymous publication of *Les Tragiques* in 1616, where the author identifies himself by the initials L.B.D.D., which stand for "Le bouc du désert" or the desert emissary. Such an exile is further exemplified by the image of the cave, where only truth can serve to illumine it: "où la vérité sert de jour", and where the poet would wish to die. (I.130-132)

From presence within the martyred and dying body, d’Aubigné shifts to the image of the earth, to which he was much attached, and to the well-known image of

the nation of France as an afflicted mother devastated and torn asunder. (I.89-130)

The religious strife and war both outrage nature and the natural relation of mother to child; as an affront to the land and nation it reaches as far as the body of the poet himself. The broken social contract is captured in the menaced individual, as what should be the feminine, harboring home becomes in fact the sepulcher.12

In addition to panoramic and mass representations of the death and devastation (I.379-380), two well-known and very pertinent tableaux for the narrator's first-person voice and the spectator's eye's passage through death are presented as early as Book I, entitled "Misères". Both of these display the maternal figure in both its suffering and malefic forms, as emblem for the outrageous offense to nature where home is either exile or the sepulcher, and where "l'homme n'est plus un homme [...]". (I.311)

The first is a portrait of a dying family, which begins in cinematic fashion at the doorstep of their home where the father who lays dying speaks to the poet to invite his vision further into the home and horror of the scene. This precise passage serves in fact as d'Aubigné's further passage into the Immensity of all the horrors to follow. We have a clear example of how death grants access to a remarkable vision and presence, where the use of the various senses are invoked. This recalls the Ignatian "Application of the Senses" which facilitates entry into the Gospel scene.

12 This attachment to the feminine symbol of France as a mother torn asunder contrasts greatly with the Protestant hostility to the cult of the Virgin and seems in fact to take its place! In fact, nowhere in Les Tragiques is the mother of God mentioned, nor parallels made with her suffering at the Crucifixion of her son. Given such symbols, we might say that, despite himself, d'Aubigné has, by the end of Les Tragiques, feminized God!
Here d'Aubigné invokes the voice of the dying father, who invites the narrator to see more within, the sense of taste is invoked in the mother's blood for want of milk for the dying infant, the sense of touch as the narrator's hair stands on end at the horrific scene. We learn that the massacred mother, herself with child, dragged her broken body next to her other dying children still in the cradle. Here the very image of maternal selflessness is portrayed:

Voici apres entrer l'horrible anatomie
De la mère assechee: elle avoit de dehors
Sur ses reins dissipez trainé, roulé son corps,
Jambes et bras rompus, une amour maternelle
L’esmouvant pour autrui beaucoup plus que pour elle.
I.414-418

Such selflessness and natural and familial order on the brink of death is further presented by d'Aubigné as the image of the France which is now dying. (I.424)

In contrast, the tableau of the mother driven by starvation to the madness of murdering and cannibalizing her own child, is an outrage to nature and to our senses. (I.495-542) This theater of cruelty illustrates the macabre, hellish version of Inhabitation, as the mother's harboring breast is turned into a forced tomb for the life it bore, presented in direct discourse and with a full, horrifying appeal to the narrator and reader's senses:

«Rends miserable, rends le corps que je t’ay faict;
Ton sang retournera où tu as pris le laïct,
Au sein qui t’allaictoit r’entre contre nature;
Ce sein qui t’a nourri sera ta sepulture.»
I.523-526
The nation France, particularly as an agricultural land which nourished the peasant people to whom D'Aubigné felt so close, has become their graveyard. So the wounded mother of d'Aubigné's famous image of France proclaims:

 [...] «Vous avez, felons, ensanglanté,
Le sein qui vous nourrit et qui vous a porté;
Or vivez de venin, sanglante geniture,
Je n'ai plus que du sang pour vostre nourriture.»
I.127-130

As mother and nation become a no-longer inhabitable, unfit dwelling, so the theme of exile is clarified -- but only an exile which has passed through and spoken from the vantage point of the most horrible, unnatural death and sickly dwelling, and whose vision is forever changed by it.

In Book IV, "Les Feux", d'Aubigné recounts the stories of a long list of martyrs prior to the religious wars themselves. Here the narrative voice has switched to the third person, and a certain narrative distance, in comparison with the tableaux of Book I, "Misères", takes place. This is balanced by the frequent use of direct discourse, rarely seen in Cendrars' and Simon's war narratives -- the poet thus gives the martyred a voice-in-transit as they pass with great detail in narration from torture to heaven, a passage which is potent in rhetorical value, and does not fail to recall the

13 Les Tragiques was initially written while d'Aubigné rested in his countryside home at Landes-Guinemer. His affinity for the peasant class and sympathy for their great suffering during the wars of religion, as well as his contempt for courtly life, was part of the Protestant ethic which rejected the luxury of Aristocratic and Parisian life, seen as corrupting. C.-G.Dubois, introduction, Les Tragiques, 100. This city/country polemic would be continued through to the 18th century between Voltaire and Rousseau, and prefigures Romanticism, wherefrom the comparison of d'Aubigné with Victor Hugo of Les Châtiments.
very techniques of Spanish religious theater and Jean Rotrou’s *Le Véritable Saint Genest*.

Of particular interest is the martyr Montalchini’s discourse (IV.655-706), which is a veritable theological treatise on the points of opposition between Protestant and Catholic faiths, and between truth and falsity for d’Aubigné. This is a polemic presented in order to persuade, all the more potent for the macabre, transitional setting from life to death to afterlife from which it is proffered.

Another repeated theme in this chapter of such transitions is that of the body—as divine gift which God may just as easily take away, as a vessel for the soul, and an unfit home for the tortured and dying martyr who quickly flees it. This basic dualism includes a certain despisal of and disattachment from the body which recalls Stoicism, and is typical of Calvinism. As counter-Baroque as such dualism might be, d’Aubigné’s insistent descriptions of martyred corporality overcome it.

2. Vision from Within

The ghastly experience of abjection and trial which has engaged the poet’s and our own emotion in fact endows the poet with a remarkable vision, a prophetic, transpectival vision from within the Immensity of the unfathomable horror, and from within the personal, individual, engaged body which has now become a "death-walking", Inhabited witness to it. Such a vision is, firstly, tied to a passage through

14 This was probably taken by d’Aubigné from Henri Bullinger’s *La Perfection des Chrétiens, démonstrant comme nostre Seigneur Jesus Christ a esté donné du Père celeste pour estre le Sauveur du monde*, and which may have been read by Montalchini before his death. Editor’s note, *Oeuvres*, 997.
the suffering maternal figure of mother, nature and nation and, secondly, it is such a passage through the feminine which facilitates the image in d'Aubigné's presentation of successive tableaux, of multiple, successive perspectives which transgress in Baroque fashion by their excess beyond a Renaissance/Classical representation. The seeing eye -- "mes yeux sont témoins" as d'Aubigné writes -- so engaging of all the senses to follow, is very different from the perspectival, distant Cartesian eye. The narrative eye and the reader/spectator as well enter into these cinematically moving, successive spaces and scenes much like the Ignatian excercitant who sensually practices through the succession of Gospel images, and much as in the style of the successive Baroque retables, as their rhetorical, indeed conversion value takes hold.

Although d'Aubigné will not itemize the Protestant martyrdoms suffered both before and because of the religious wars until books IV and V, sufficient horror was presented in a ghastly, engraving-style detail of Book I of "Misères", with the tableaux we have already examined. Such a vision of horror where both the suffering and the martyred or monstrous feminine are portrayed allows d'Aubigné to pass into a vision from within, with the ascent from earth through to the cosmos in the palace mysticism of Book III, "La Chambre dorée". D'Aubigné's recourse to portraying the divine figures and their theatrical mise-en-scène in a sumptuous celestial setting which recalls in decoration the Baroque chateaux, as well as their intercourse with

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15 This "palace mysticism", typical of Baroque aesthetic from religious to theatrical representation and comprehensive of the concepts of Immensity and Inhabitation, is best exemplified in St. Theresa of Avila's "Interior castle" in her Life, and finds its source in Merkabah mysticism of the Jewish Cabbala. Ultimately the mystical figure is to become a throne to God Himself, which captures the concept of Inhabitation. See Gershom G. Scholem, Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism (NY: Schocken Books, 1960) 49-54; 79.
earth, may seem surprising given the strong, Calvinist injunction against the figuration of God, although it is not in contrast with the Huguenot’s belief in his ability to call down justice and divine intervention in history. Above all, such is the poet’s dilemma in face of the iconophile injunction of his art and, as d’Aubigné defends himself, in the wake of the venerated epic works of Homer, Virgil and Tasso. Nonetheless, God himself is rather abstractly represented by d’Aubigné, or only through the signs of His influence upon the visible world. This book’s satire of justice on earth may also place such iconography in the same satirical mode.

In Book V, "Les Fers", d’Aubigné uses his poetic voice often in direct discourse through the voice as well as through the eyes of the martyred, to give detailed, ekphrastic portraits based upon engravings of civil and religious war’s horrors, from individual perspective to perspective, from torture to torture, and geographically from town to town:

Moy, qui rallie ainsi les eschapés de mort
Pour prester voix et mains au Dieu de leur support,
Qui chante à l’advenir leurs frayeurs et leurs peines,
Et puis leurs libertés, me tairay-je des miennes?
V.1191-1194

His own near-death suffering has granted him such ecstatic access:

Par l’Ange consolant mes ameres blessures,
Bien qu’impur, fut mené dans les regions purens.
Sept heures me parut le celeste pourpris
Pour voir les beaux secrets et tableaux qui j’escriis,
Soit qu’un songe au matin m’ait donné ces images,
Soit qu’en la pamoison l’esprit fit ces voyages.
Ne t’enquieris, mon lecteur, comment il vid et fit,
Mais donne gloire à Dieu en faisant ton profit.

16 C.-G.Dubois, introduction, Les Tragiques, 169.
En cependant qu’en luy, exstatic, je me pasme,
Tourne à bien des chaleurs de mon enthousiasme.
V.1197-1206

"L’histoire au moment où elle prenait leur vie" as Merleau-Ponty says — such was
d’Aubigné’s dangerous ascetic preparation, from contingent, individual experience to
a cosmic narrative which such individual experience does not change, but in which it
does participate. He breaks the unending, almost ahistorical litany of suffering to
explain his own cinematic vision which moves in the palace mysticism of the elect,
from the multitudes to the firmament of stars and planets:

Les spectacles passez qui tournoyent sur la droicte.
Ce qui est au devant est cela qui s’exploite:
Là esclatent encor cent portraits eslongnés,
Où se montrent les fils du siecle embesongnés
V.1209-1213

The authorial voice continues from this overwhelming overlay of images to recount
the martyrdom from a celestial point of view. Whatever the artifice of this device —
that his own voice can be inhabited by those of the now-glorious dead, succor God,17
and thereby give him an astucious historical memory which also reads the future with
the angels, a memory and understanding to be perfected in heaven — this break
reminds the reader of the very carnal price of such an epic vision. (V.1245-1252;
1269-1270) This is perhaps less startling given the opening of this particular book
upon God’s realm and the dialogue between God and Satan, to conclude upon Satan’s
fall to cosmically and materially participate in the bloodshed in France.18 It is also a

17 "Que je ne sois organe qu’à la celeste voix", VI.59.

18 D’Aubigné’s nine-month apprenticeship in 1556 with a necromancer in Lyon, which had become renown as a place for occult studies, included the study of Cornelius Agrippa and gave him a
commentary upon the role of the epic poet as one fraught with a painful and macabre alterity, where death gives life, (V.1174; 1186) as he allows such horrors to speak through him, one of the elect who has "Parfaite connoissance et parfaite memoire". (V.1270)

Gerhard F. Strasser skilfully illustrates how d'Aubigné's tableaux of war are taken from selected fragments in twelve of forty engravings by Jacques Tortorel and Jean Perrissin in their illustrations of Huguenot massacres. Michel Jeanneret considers that half of Les Tragiques is presented as a parade of tableaux. Poetic architect and painter in the Baroque style, d'Aubigné thus decorates the celestial vault with the images of such martyred souls, supposedly executed by the angels in heaven's dome. D'Aubigné continues to speak in terms of the tableaux of war, but here, "Les yeux des bien-heureux aux peintures advisent Plus qu'un pinceau ne peut [...]". (V.319-320) As the inner and primary spectators of the tableaux whose celestial vision d'Aubigné and we ourselves are to follow, their historical memory surpasses all other forms of representation. Through them, their suffering and glory,

faith in the materiality of the forces of good and evil. The image of the witch in particular preoccupies Les Tragiques, particularly for describing Catherine de Medicis. See Jacques Bailbé, "Agrippa d'Aubigné et les sorcières", Europe. Revue littéraire mensuelle 563 (mars 1976): 42-54. Robert Griffin highlights that his magical talents were well-enough known that Charles IX once offered him a post — which he refused — as court astrologer, and that occult interests occupied the academies which he frequented of both Henry III and Henry IV. "Agrippa d'Aubigné & Sixteenth-Century Occultism", Romanische Forschungen 79 (1967): 115, 121. D'Aubigné's exposure to Merkabah mysticism of the Cabbala, magic and witchcraft may also date back to this time.

and his access to their celestial dwelling, d’Aubigné himself is endowed with a
historical memory — one linked to an unspeakable trauma which he dares allow
continue to possess him, and to speak through him. He is inhabited more by horror
than he is by God, and this is empowering as well. D’Aubigné’s narratorial voice is
possessed by horror and damnation, as well as by celestial vision, by Hell as well as
by Heaven. He further qualifies such a polarity in vision as "Des guerres ici-bas et
au ciel des tableaux" and "D'un'autrepart au ciel en spectacles nouveaux [...]", where
the earthly and the factual find their complement and echo in the celestial. (V.412,
539) This recalls the technique of the Baroque dome or ceiling vault burst asunder
into the sky, exemplified in Gian Battista Gaulli’s "Adoration of the Name of Jesus"
(1672-85, Rome, Il Gesù) and Andrea Pozzo’s "Glory of the Order of Saint Ignatius",
(1691-94) in the same church, where techniques of trompe-l'œil and anamorphosis
sweep up the terrestrial and the celestial, introject the saved and expulse the damned,
and the spectatorial eye as well, within one (Phenomenological), all-containing
horizon, while they accommodate and even give a dimension of redemption to the
horror. 20 This harboring dome is another form of palace mysticism, indeed its
summit. Blaise Cendrars shall also use this motif and technique of the Baroque dome
to accommodate his personal trauma, tragic loss and the horrors of 20th-century war
in *Le Lotissement du ciel*, and Simon shall use it to project the crucified Christ, the

20 Claude-Gilbert Dubois analyses the descent of God in "La Chambre dorée" as an
anamorphic, moving vision, in "Dieu descend. Figurations et transfigurations dans Les Tragiques,
III.139-232", in Marie-Madeleine Fragonard & Madeleine Lazard, eds., *Les Tragiques d'Agrippa
sacred mother and, finally, the self. Such are the results of a suffering, abdicated, poetic vision from within.

It is in fact after the litany of sufferings lived, witnessed and chronicled in Books IV and V, "Les Feux" and "Les Fers", that d'Aubigné can resume a strong first person voice in Book VI, "Vengeances", to address God and plead with Him to open up His saintly temple to his own presence as he goes on to list all his failings in a confession of sins (VI, 99-140), for even as a member of the elect, he is nonetheless not so certain of his justified self. As he asks God to change his mortal vision and life -- "Change-moy, refai-moy, exerce ta pitié" (VI.3, 19-22, 35) -- he in fact begs for the stance of Immensity, for the vision from within. Once here, he chronicles the horrors of the Old Testament and Roman Antiquity, as if his call to vengeance, to a Dantesque remedy appropriate and just to each crime and its criminal, and his vantage point could remedy all the ills of Western history. (VI.790-1, and following) The most tempestuous of these is the reaction of Nature to the death of the despicable Cardinal of Lorrain, which seems to break loose all Hell upon the earth. (VI.1045-1066) Thus d'Aubigné works towards the final book VII, "Jugement".

"Baise donc, Eternel, tes hauts cieux pour descendre" (VII.1); so opens in direct address to God the final book VII, "Jugement" of Les Tragiquest, blurring the lines between earth and heaven. In contrast with the opening to "Vengeances", where d'Aubigné took a celestial vantage point, here he calls down judgment upon the earth. Inhabited as he is by the divine, God and poetic expression, he can facilitate this. So his very voice, in a performative mode, dispenses divine justice:
Donne force à ma voix, efficace à mes vers;  
A celui qui t'avoué, ou bien qui te renonce,  
Porte l'heur ou malheur, l'arrest que je prononce.

VII.8-10. Emphasis is our own.

This last book, like the previous, is not so much a book of witnessing, as a book of pronouncements from the stance of Inhabitation, for which he prays:

Condui, trés sainct Esprit, en cet endroict ma bouche,  
Que par la passion plus exprès je ne touche  
Que ne permet ta rgle, et que, juge leger,  
Je n'attire sur moi jugement pour juger.  
Je n'annoncerai donc que ce que tu annonce,  
Mais je prononce autant comme ta oy prononce;  
Je ne marque de tous que l'homme condamné  
A qui mieux il vaudroit n'avoir pas esté né.

VII.803-810. Emphasis is our own.

Such pronouncements waver between the condemned and the just, to conclude in a vision of the Apocalypse (VII.710 and following), where the elements of Nature herself are given a vitalism and a voice to plead with man for the injuries of war he has embedded within the long duration of her geological history. (VII.777-794)

D'Aubigné presents well how far into the very elements of creation God's judgment and final justice could be called.

From the sands of earth to the summits of the heavens, d'Aubigné's epic voice has travelled and served as "porte-parole", as if the entire cosmos has moved through him — "Pour de mon ame voir la grand' ame du monde" (VII.1212) -- and whose massiveness he has heroically heaved above him, like the miraculously suspended, seemingly dynamic weight of Baroque architecture. This travelling of the epic voice does not fail to engage the very subjectivity of the reader as well, to persuasive ends. Ullrich Langer hints at the relationship between the rhetorical purpose of poetry
common to the 16th and 17th centuries and the book’s intersubjectival engagement or situation of communication with the reader and its public, which is exactly what made the book so dangerous to the Catholic faith in times of perceived heresy.\(^{21}\) U. Langer does not, however, pursue this premise very analytically in his following essays. It is Mitchell Greenberg’s study,\(^ {22}\) however, which in examining the imbrication of the reader in the text under the motif of *trompe-l'oeil*, itemizes examples for rhetorical ends from Book V, "Les Fers", of pronoun flux such as "je-tu" dialogical discourse with the reader and the direct address of "vous" to the reader, as well as the constantly shifting points of view, which we have characterized as a cosmos-travelling vision, which dislocates the reader-subject from himself to engage him in motion through the epic story, even to take him as far as to double him upon the voice of God which speaks through him! This very attack upon the reader’s subjectivity gives him a sample of the results of the trauma described in the text. He also examines the variation in verb tenses and the use of the present tense to give an atemporal dislocation of history and to seemingly place the reader in a realm of eternal tableaux and truths. M. Jeanneret examines how the use of these tableaux suspends the temporality of history to opt for a "vertical reading", or a simultaneous, spatial superposition of events which we shall also see with Cendrars’ and Simon’s narrative


arrangements.23 *Thus history, through poetry, joins prophecy.* And the ideal reader d'Aubigné would hope for is not only converted, but by his very conversion has stepped into the Inhabitational stance where others and the soul of the world move through him as well.

Yet the closure of *Les Tragiques* places an end upon such extraordinary, inhabitational, paradoxical knowledge -- "Sçavoir ce qu'on ne sçait et qu'on ne peut sçavoir" (VII.1213) -- the senses so luxuriously deployed are nonetheless exceeded, and the excess of language as well has now shifted to the silence of the stance of a comforting Immensity, as the hero-narrator-author has accomplished his task, and such a paradisiac promise can hold for the reader as well -- what for d'Aubigné is a return to a more normative spiritual relationship, one which harmonizes man with God: "Tout meurt, l'âme s'enfuit, et reprenant son lieu / Exstatique se pasme au giron de son Dieu." (VII.1217-1218)

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23 *Les tableaux spirituels d'Agrippa d'Aubigné*; and which shall also correspond to contemporary artistic endeavors such as those of the Delaunay.

A composed collage of autobiographical reminiscences, World War I memories, World War II experiences and commentary,*25* affabulation, and passages of erudition through all the disciplines from the sciences to the mystical to the occult,*26* all presented in a strong first person narrative voice of the soldier, poet and mystic -- this is the final mystical achievement of Blaise Cendrars' (+1887,-1961) post-war works with *Le Lotissement du ciel* (1949),*27* as it presents spectacles and miracles with a son who served as a World War II pilot lost to the firmament where a 17th-century saint known for his acts of levitation takes and protects his place; with the country of Brazil "comme sur une toile de fond frappée"(492) and the contemplation of the stars before the perpetually receding horizon of a decentered universe whose bodies remain in motion. The narrative task in face of such spectacles and miracles is captured in a memory work which, belabored by immense suffering and colored by autobiographical experience, takes its aim at the infinite and so perturbs the real. So

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*24* An earlier version of this study was given under the title "Le Monde baroque écrit au ciel nocturne dans *Le Lotissement du ciel* de Blaise Cendrars", in the session "L'Écriture en trompe-l'oeil: variations baroques dans la prose de Blaise Cendrars", directed by Monique Chefdor, at the Tenth Annual International Colloquium on 20th-Century French Studies", March 11-13, 1993, Boulder, Colorado.

*25* Blaise Cendrars served as a war correspondent for British Headquarters in France during the second World War; these writings are published as *Chez l'armée anglaise* (1940).

*26* Both the patristic writings of the Church fathers and Olivier Leroy's *La Levitation* (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1928) are extensively quoted by Cendrars.

history joins affabulation, and the real the imaginary, particularly for the engaged poet, for a stunning literary effect which reworks time and resurrects the other, the reader and the self. Such elements, and others as well, lead us by their very aesthetic to qualify Blaise Cendrars as a Baroque poet of the 20th century.

A member of the French Foreign Legion which he joined voluntarily in September of 1914, and one of 26,000 foreigners called to serve France, Cendrars lost his right arm at the "Ferme Navarin" in Champagne on September 28, 1915, an experience recounted in L'Homme foudroyé (1945) and La Main coupée (1946). Given such an experience, there is a certain aura of heroism about the persona and narrating voice of Blaise Cendrars which he himself has cultivated and amplified with literary projections of his persona and the mise-en-scène of self through various legends and the masks of other figures. In the other-worldly terrain of World War I, this war of the trenches, amidst tomb-lined roads and the treacherous clay-like mud littered with shattered shells and frozen by the cold rain, all linear organization of warfare was impossible, combat units were fragmented into leaderless groups, and each soldier felt very much alone in the horror of his water- and mud-filled trench. One soldier has expressed the total experience, particularly of Verdun, as one which

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28 Oeuvres complètes, T.V. The four regiments of legionnaires would become so decimated that it would be united into one, called "La Marocaine". Miriam Cendrars, Blaise Cendrars (Paris: Ballard, 1984) 283.

29 Such masks of alterity of the Homo Baroccus have been examined in an unpublished communication by Philippe Bonnefis, entitled "De l'autre", presented in the session "L'Ecriture en trompe-l'oeil: variations baroques dans la prose de Blaise Cendrars", directed by Monique Chefdor, at the Tenth Annual International Colloquium on 20th-Century French Studies, March 11-13, 1993, Boulder, Colorado.
"on ne comprend vraiment qu'avec sa chair". And Cendrars himself would feel the pain of his amputation for the rest of his life. At best, each soldier's trench space was covered with a canvas from within which a constant, sleepless vigilance through all the senses was necessary -- from here, as Cendrars' post-World War II writings turn back to reminisce of the experience of World War I, we shall see Cendrar's affabulating preoccupation with the sky, the cinema and projected, superimposed images of fragments of his life and of the lives of those he loved, as if upon this very trench canvas as screen, and as the very structure behind his narrative.

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In the final passages of Le Lotissement du ciel entitled "La Tour Eiffel sidérale", such varied elements are reworked and displaced to revolve around the star-filled night sky of Brazil. This vision into the depths of the night sky permits a simultaneous remembrance which reworks chronology to superimpose images from the present upon the past, as in the Ignatian presencing of the Gospel texts, not without a wondrous measure of affabulation, life and war experiences, the inclusion of erudite findings, fragments of hagiography and astronomical writings, all to contribute to a complex narrative configuration where one life and its experience complements and ethically accommodates another, as in the process of Inhabitation.

We consider such superpositions particularly from the final segment "La Tour Eiffel


31 A needling pain which Claude Leroy likens to Cendrars narrative return to the mother, as her maiden name was "Dorner", in "Orion manchot", La Nouvelle Revue Française 421 (1 fév 1988): 64-74.
sidérale", thus following Cendrars' text backwards and imitating the "brahmane à rebours", as he calls himself, as his narrative shifts from the intelligible to the vagaries of language around the mystical silence of the "oraison qui l'empore de rimes en allitérations jusqu'aux balbutiements suprêmes d'Amour en face du Verbe", (463) thus making an ascetic practice and taking spiritual ascent.

1. Spiral Formations

But if the Cendrarsian imagination seems to fix itself upon the night sky and its stars as its perspectival points and limits, these are nonetheless perpetually refigured and placed in motion, their elements dispersed, with "L'Appendice pour le lecteur inconnu", a text quoted in its entirety from Pierre Lépine which serves as a sort of scientific substrate to the entirety of Le Lotissement du ciel:

   Mais le système galactique, au destin duquel nous sommes ainsi liés, est-il lui-même au centre de l'univers? Non pas. [...] chaque fois que l'homme a cru toucher aux confins de son univers, il n'a fait que reculer les bornes de l'énigme. [...] Bien des étoiles visibles à l'œil ne se résolvent à la lunette en amas spirales de structure dense ou gazeuse. (602)

Such uncertain and constantly shifting limits find their terrestrial corroboration in the terrain of war. From the configuration of stars in a spiral formation -- "symbole de la liberté, de la chute de la vie au centre de l'épanouissement universel" (525) -- falls the image of man as if some abject decomposition from the celestial ideal. The stars themselves disturb man's mental state: "Les étoiles sont myrophores et palpitent de fièvre, chacun de leurs rayons qui ensement le cerveau de l'homme y porte un germe de destruction." (497) Precisely, Cendrars discusses the mythical Lemurs,
primitive, monkeylike creatures found in Madagascar whose faces are supposedly covered with spiral designs, and which in his wartime reverie he conflates with the soldiers battling at the front. He further affabulates that such a visage gives the power to name the spiral-formed stars and so by language to own the sky, even to master the universe and physical pain and mutilation as well. To this astucious mental penetration, he joins the effects of the venom of the serpent, which recalls the spiral formation, in order to augment towards hallucination the "cerebral fever". (524) For Cendrars, such a hallucinatory practice recalls a sculptured negro figurine depicted in the Encyclopédie de Reclus which he used to gaze upon as a child. This figurine, composed of a woman’s breasts and a male organ, dominates a deadly rattlesnake at its feet, and both fascinated and terrified the young boy. As such, it has become in an ekphrastic moment the locus of his own mastery over the ambulating life of the "bourlingueur", over his own experience of physical suffering, and repressed/resurfacing continuation of the trauma and pain:

C'est elle qui m'a appris à me tenir tranquille, à cuver, comme elle, cubique et millénaire dans la solitude, le pourquoi de ma présence, inhibition qui fait que je me sens partout étranger, en exil, et déjà alors, et à mon insu, je le comprends aujourd'hui, au sein de ma famille. [...] Et pour ne pas gueuler jour et nuit, je me raconte toujours des histoires nègres. Et je ne rêve plus la nuit. J'en suis maître. (534-6)

Such is a mastery of the forces of night, as well as of visions of bodies tortured and massacred by war, as well as a mastery over pain, physical degradation and death.

The theme of a spiralling fall downward scrutinized through the lesson of the stars allows Cendrars to examine as well the cinematic image that man has made of himself:
Mais dans une salle de projection, je me détourne souvent de l'écran pour suivre des yeux les rayons d'ombre qui frétillent au-dessus de la tête des spectateurs dans le fuseau de la lumière blanche qui va s'épanouissant de l'appareil de projection à l'écran d'argent; rayons noirs qui sont les ombres portées du volet de l'obturateur entraîné par le mouvement giratoire de la manivelle, tempo qui seul impressionne la rétine et donne du relief ... (520)

He thus qualifies this as a form of illusion brought before the eyes by a girating movement of light and shadow:

[...] prodigieuse spirale que j'ai vainement essayé de capter par une coupe longitudinale et non verticale comme l'écran universellement en usage; spirale pathétique d'êtres vivants -- vedettes mondiales et stars au sex-appeal! -- que j'imagine se poursuivant non debout comme à l'écran, mais couchés, allongés, entortillés, rampant dans ce cône d'ombre qui cherche sans cesse à se reconstituer -- et si l'on projette le film à rebours, ces ombres étirées, emmêlées, tirebouchonnées, enchevêtrées, comme des serpents dévraient rentrer en bloc compact et obscur dans la lentille, noeud de vipères, boule noire, tampon ... (520)

Quite a curious perspective! of the brahman who pursues backwards worldly images to their origin in serpentine, spiral forms and dark masses, simply by placing the screen horizontally with respect to the cinematic projector.\(^\text{32}\) So the possibilities of cinematic technique, not far from the technique of the poetic narrator himself, to include d'Aubigné and Simon, gives the impression of a mastery over creation, life, death and the limits of the body.

\(^{32}\) The imaginary of this very reverse cinematic technique is at the basis of Cendrars' story, *La fin du monde filmée par l'Ange N.-D.*. Claude Leroy reads this backward narrative construction as Cendrar's rebirth to the new writing of his left hand, a rebirth linked to his traumatic wounding, in "Orion manchot", 64-74.
2. The Stars

The cinematic cone of light and shadows which functions through a spiral motion is homologous for Cendrars to the coal sack, "projection d'un cône noir" (498), an astronomical phenomenon in the nocturnal Brazilian sky. According to the legend, this opening at the summit of the sky is the source of chaos on earth, and the very entry to Hell. All exists from this originary mouthpiece, and remains under its spell.

a. Black Holes

Camille Flammarion's *L'Astronomie populaire* and *Les étoiles et les curiosités du ciel* are the sources to Cendrars astronomical knowledge, whence his familiarity with the sky's astronomical phenomenons of the "coal sack", "Magellan's spot" and the "Magellanic clouds" or nebula — dense masses of stars usually clustered in spiral formations adjoined by dark or void spaces, as is the case here. As such, Cendrars' description of the coal sack leads just as well to the theory of black holes, which today's scientific theory clarifies in the direction Cendrars himself has indicated. A black hole originates when the decomposing matter of a star begins to move in a one-

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34 "[...] les deux nuées de Magellan, et le Sac à charbon, ou trou noir dans la Voie lactée [...] le dernier est appelé *Macula Magellanea*, la tache de Magellan*. *Les étoiles et les curiosités du ciel*, 580-582.

way whirlwind towards its own absorption and disparition. This happens when the internal gravitational force of the star overwhelms the diminishing material mass. Nothing can escape this absorbing force, which draws objects ever faster into its center, often after it causes them to orbit about it for a time.\footnote{R. Allen, "Journey into a Black Hole", 65-85; C.Flammarion, Les Etoiles et les curiosités du ciel, 87.} It thus produces a spiral formation of stars around it, and at the limit thus configures our entire universe into this motion and in a state of decomposition.\footnote{This spiral formation of nebula was discovered by Lord Rosse. For Flammarion, this suggests that our entire universe is arranged in a spiral formation. Les Etoiles et les curiosités du ciel, 125.} All that the black hole attracts loses its distinctive features as it is decomposed by the centripetal force, just like the Hollywood images Cendrars follows backwards towards their origin in the cinematic projector. So works Cendrars' geometrical imagination, back to the origins and confines of matter.

The coal sack at the summit of the confines of our firmament captures our entire universe in the space of its conic projection, just as the cinematic image is no more than the luminous projection of the originary "boule noire" of the projector lense. The coal sack and the projector lense together suggest it -- that our entire universe is no more than an illusion ready to be aspirated back into its dark and infernal source. This is not far from the Baroque sensibility of the world as illusion!

H.Shipman states:

[...] What is at the center? Einstein's theory does in fact break down here. The theory presents us with a very bizarre object, a singularity. A singularity is an absurdity. It is a point containing all the mass of the hole. The
singularity has zero volume, and the density of matter is infinite. The tidal forces are infinite. So the theory says.\textsuperscript{38}

Cendrars himself predicts the absurdity of such an existence:

C'est ça le gouffre, le gouffre du ciel, ce noir [...] Le ciel, un tableau noir. Il ne reste pas une seule formule d'algèbre à la craie givrée ni traces en suspension ni aucun scintillement. Tout est effacé... J'a vu cet éponge, de mes yeux vu. C'est une énigme. (499)

b. Precious Stones

Close to the southern sky's coal sack is to be found the constellation named the "Southern Cross", symbol of salvation.\textsuperscript{39} To this, Flammarion adds:

Aux huit étoiles principales [de la Croix du Sud], nous avons ajouté \( \theta^2 \), à cause de sa richesse comme amas stellaire [...] Cette étoile x est tout simplement merveilleuse. [...] Au lieu d'une petite étoile pâle, on en voit scintiller là cent dix, de toutes les couleurs, parmi lesquelles on en remarque surtout deux d'un rouge rubis, une bleu marine, deux vert émeraude et trois vert pâle: les blanches brillent encore d'avantage par contraste. Le ciel a rassemblé là un véritable écrin de pierres précieuses: diamants d'une limpide blancheur, diamants jaunes translucides, perles, topazes, rubis et saphirs.\textsuperscript{40}

Sir John Herschel, who discovered this constellation and particularly the star cluster \( \theta^2 \), describes it as "a gorgeous piece of fancy jewelry".\textsuperscript{41} Cendrars, however, does not particularly describe this amazing star. Rather, he describes in its place his work


\textsuperscript{39} The Portuguese and Spanish colonisers of the 17th century found in this constellation the confirmation of their faith, and therefrom named the entire continent of South America \textit{Terra sancta crucis}. R.Allen, 190.

\textsuperscript{40} C.Flammarion, \textit{Les Etoiles et les curiosités du ciel}, 576-7. Also, "Around the 6 1/2 -magnitude K is the celebrated cluster of colored stars, N.G.C.4755, occupying one forty-eighth of a square degree of space; the central and principal one being of a deep red, surrounded by about 130 others, green, blue, and of various shades." H. Shipman, \textit{Black Holes, Quasars, and the Universe}, 91.

\textsuperscript{41} In R.Allen, \textit{Star Names, their Lore & Meaning}. 
of assorting stones while apprentice with the jeweler Léouba in St. Petersburg, thus appropriating in a manner the scientific discovery to his own imaginative and astucious play:

[...] mais il m’arrivait aussi, toujours pour me distraire, de dérouler une carte du ciel sur la grande table et de recouvrir chaque constellation avec des pierres précieuses que j’allais quérir dans la réserve des coffres, marquant les étoiles de première grandeur avec les plus beaux diamants, complétant les figures avec les plus vivantes pierres de couleur, remplissant les intervalles entre les dessins avec une coulée des plus belles perles de la collection de Léouba, allumant toutes les lampes dont je pouvais disposer, la rampe, le plafonnier, les baladeuses, ma lampe de poche, le projecteur mobile que je braquais et faisais pivoter comme une lance d’incendie ou, plutôt, d’arrosage car, selon celle que je visais, l’inondant de flots de lumière crue, chaque pierre dominait à tour de rôle comme fleurit chaque plante dans le cycle des saisons. (546)

This theatrical play with lights and colors, its moving chiaroscuro effect, all recalls the "Doppler" effect, known by Cendrars,\(^42\) where the changing color of a single star indicates that it is orbiting towards its slow but ultimate loss, precisely around a black hole.\(^43\) Thus by beginning with the spiral formation of astral origin as a Baroque figure of indirect ascent where the vertical is perturbed by the horizontal to produce curved, elliptical and spiral trajectories, and where the earth is swept with the move

\(^{42}\) The Doppler effect is mentioned in the quoted "L’Appendice pour le lecteur inconnu": "La théorie explique le phénomène par un effet Doppler, dû à une vitesse très rapide d’éloignement de la source, vitesse qui atteint 5.500 kilomètres par seconde pour des nébuleuses situées à 23 millions d’années-lumière, et 23.000 km.-sec. pour la nébuleuse de l’amas des Gémeaux, située à 133 millions d’années-lumière. Il en résulte que, la vitesse de fuite, ou récession, augmentant avec la distance, il nous faut concevoir qu’au-delà des limites atteintes par nos télescopes (environ 500 millions d’années-lumière) et celles qu’atteindront les télescopes futurs, il y aura encore, à des milliards d’années-lumière, d’autres nébuleuses s’éloignant si vite de nous que leur lumière ne parviendra jamais à nous rejoindre." 603.

\(^{43}\) H.Shipman, Black Holes, Quasars, and the Universe. 91.
towards the heavens, and combining this with illumined precious stones and the coal sack, there results in the sky a coexistence in a simultaneous contrast of colors, dark and light, flame and ashes, where Cendrars has inscribed own authorial namesake, indeed projected himself upon the sky in order to eventually save the other. All of this has begun on Brazilian ground and under the Brazilian night sky. A land which was first named with the entire South American continent Terra sancta crucix, or land under the sign of the Southern Cross. It was subsequently named Brazil, after the wood it produced from which was obtained a dye highly prized during the colonization period, of the color of flame, or of "braise". Thus by the change of one name, Cendrars, who loved much such play with words and names, placed himself under the sign of the Southern Cross as well, sign of faith and light.

3. The Ellipse

The coal sack seems to be a focalizing center for Cendrars' perspective, acting as a locus of associations and allowing a superposition of images. Particularly with the Doppler effect, it seems that Cendrars' imaginary remains within a concentric system. But let us look again, for this is only at first glance. The Magellanic clouds coupled with the coal sack, like the star paired with its black hole, presents something different: "We are not close enough to the star-black hole pair to see the star

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44 The Baroque scenography, as Cendrars qualifies it, of the Brazilian train the "Nocturno-17", lit along its serpentine path through the hills, seems to him an entire panel of the sky fallen upon the earth, and emphasizes the horizontal sinuosity important to Baroque structures.

45 R. Allen, Star Names, their Lore & Meaning, 190.
executing a beautiful elliptical orbit as it dances around the black hole.46 Here appears the ellipse, geometrical and structural emblem of Baroque aesthetic, which controls the astral color and movement which so fascinates Cendrars and serves as an organizing factor to his imaginary.47 Cendrars’ initially concentric system has duplicated itself! And there is in his imaginary another association which eludes us, or which he most slyly hides from us. And so his apparent perspectivism is a sham, as from the vantage point of Brazil where he stands, where all is exaggeration, where artifice is acknowledged, and where the Baroque makes its appearance:

Tout se passe, d’autre part, comme si l’espace sidéral était une grandeur uniformément croissante, ce qui signifie que les faits observés n’impliquent pas un mouvement réel au sens ordinaire du mot, mais une fonction de l’espace-temps, comme une sorte d’étirement de l’univers qui donnerait à tout observateur placé dans l’une quelconque des galaxies l’impression que toutes les nébuleuses s’écartent de lui. ("L’Appendice pour le lecteur inconnu", 603)

For lack of the second focal point, we will not be able to close the elliptical form.

Moreso, the very Doppler effect indicates an ever increasing decomposition and loss.

This second focus could very well escape us perpetually, and the moving elliptical curve thus produce a spiralling form open to the eternal time of infinite space.48 To

46 H.Shipman, 89.

47 The ellipse is also mentioned by Flammarion, as a form typical of nebula. Nebula, like the Magellanic clouds, are situated in regions where all stars seem to have been wiped out, as if some force has gathered them all up, and they are accompanied by black spots or black holes. Let us also note that "le passage de Galilée à Kepler est celui du cercle à l’ellipse, le passage de ce qui est tracé autour de l’Un à ce qui est tracé autour du pluriel: du classicisme au baroque." Severo Sarduy, Barocco (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1975) note 6, p.7.

48 *Le jour viendra où chacun reconnaîtra par ses propres yeux la place que nous occupons dans l’univers [...] que tous les astres, y compris notre demeure, sont emportés par des vitesses considérables dans toutes les directions de l’immensité." C.Flammarion, Les Etoiles et les curiosités du ciel, 586-7.
conclude, then, with the Cendrarsian Baroque imaginary, *color is movement, and a movement which surpasses us.*49 Our own sun is also at the end of its evolution, and our own world decentered, as we face myriad other stars:

Mais l’astre de nos jours était lui-même détrôné par le progrès des sciences, et nous devons nous contenter de reconnaître en lui une étoile naine jaune, dépassant de peu la cinquième grandeur, figurante infime parmi les milliards d’étoiles qui déroulent dans le ciel la spire scintillante de la Voie Lactée. ("Appendice pour le lecteur inconnu", 602)

4. The Negation of Knowledge

Thus Cendrars breaks with a Cartesian to Enlightenment belief in man as center of the universe who can know and control all. As he confronts the 18th century’s "Culte de la Raison" (486), he reacts by taking us to the Baroque epoch Classicism and its cult-like continuation repressed.50 He turns, rather, to quoting the precepts of St. John of the Cross, affirming with him the negation of knowledge, pleasure and possessions, and being’s self-sufficiency, (487) and thereby espousing with him the lost second focal point of the ellipse where "l’être s’anéantit du pluriel

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49 Cf. Sonia Delaunay, the poet’s painter and friend, as well as Robert Delaunay, on the subject of "simultanéisme" and paintings entitled "Rythmes colorés", in, among others, Jacques Damase, *Sonia Delaunay. Rhythms & Colours* (London: Thames & Hudson, 1972). In 1913 Cendrars published with Sonia Delaunay’s drawings his poem, "La prose du Transsibérien", announced as "le premier livre simultané".

au plus rien".\textsuperscript{51} to be ultimately transformed. Although the dark moment is more strongly emphasized both by St. John of the Cross and by Cendrars, this is equivalent to the Ignatian moment of self-abdication, to serve by attaining the final spiritual stage of Inhabitation by the Other and others. In fact, even Blaise Pascal joins in thought St. John of the Cross, with his vision of the Christ and his "renonciation totale et douce" of the \textit{Mémorial}. And, Cendrars himself turns to Pascal, whose first name he himself took for a pen name, with his poem "Les Pâques à New York", where precious stones play their role in the apparition of the figure of the Christ:

\begin{quote}
Et dans un ermitage, à Bourrié-Wladislasz,
Elle est bossuée d'or dans une châsse
De troubles \textit{cabochons} sont à la place des yeux
Et des paysans baisent à genoux Vos yeux.

[...]
Pourant, Seigneur, j'ai fait un périlleux voyage
Pour contempler dans un \textit{béryl} l'intaille de votre image.
\end{quote}

(T.I, 13; emphasis is our own) \textsuperscript{52}

This stone-incrusted Savior approximates the splendid bejewelled star cluster which orbits elliptically around the coal sack, where Cendrars in fact \textit{inscribes the holy image}. As such, doesn't it use the means of Baroque aesthetic to signal a mastery over the black hole of Hell?

\textsuperscript{51} S. Sarduy, \textit{Barocco}, note 6, p. 17.

\textsuperscript{52} A \textit{cabochon} is a precious stone which is roundly polished rather then cut in facets, such as a ruby cabochon. \textit{Béryl} is a beryllium and aluminum silicate mineral of varying colors, most often prized for the green Emerald and the blue Aquamarine stones it produces.
5. St. Joseph of Cupertino (+1603,-1663)

The major task Cendrars sets out for himself in *Le Lotissement du ciel* is the search for a patron saint of aviation for his son Rémy, a World War II pilot who died in flight. The first part of *Le Lotissement* presents a work of erudition where Cendrars reviews his own reading of the litany of saints who experienced mystical levitation, as well as the occult or diabolical cases. The shock, perturbations and trauma of the material bodies of war seems to serve as a subtext to the bodies jolted by the effects of levitation as both a spiritual, or malefic, corporal experience. Cendrars finally chooses St. Joseph de Cupertino (+1603,-1663), a curious saint of the 17th century. To further confirm this choice, he notes the biography of St. Joseph de Cupertino’s life, which was written by Domenico Bernini, his contemporary at the Minor Friars and who was in fact the son of the great Baroque painter, sculptor and architect Gian Lorenzo Bernini (+1598,-1680), and who certainly had instilled in him a Baroque sensibility from his works, affection for the Jesuits, practice of the *Spiritual Exercises* and great piety. Domenico Bernini also wrote his own father’s biography. Cendrars enjoys highlighting the singularly curious, even humorous levitation experiences of this well-loved saint, humorous because St. Joseph of Cupertino’s levitations often took place on a horizontal plane, and in reverse direction! which suits marvellously our "brahmane à rebours" and the movement of Cendrars’ own winding, star-orbiting narrative towards a mystical language and the final "balbutiement suprême d’amour qui se prononce au plus haut des Cieux comme au sein des Choses". (463) Such a presence in the Immensity of all
creation has its breath broken and cannot explain its possessed, final mystical
Inhabitation by God, but can only act it out in lifted body and spirit — much as the
Verdun soldier who exclaims, "on ne comprend vraiment qu’avec sa chair". Dark
moment of St. John of the Cross, St. Theresa of Avila’s silence of Carmel, as trauma
joins mystical experience and union in a knowledge which surpasses man and takes
corporal control, yet not without the ethical dimension which resurrects the other. St.
Joseph de Cupertino’s own levitating ecstasies, in curious, horizontal, backward and
spiral motion typical of the Baroque forms swept over earth and nature in their
spectacular gesture to redeem it towards a hidden second focal point:

Ah! les saints, ces enfants terribles de l’Eglise! Il n’y a que ça de vrai pour
ne pas condamner la vie et la maudire les Saints, les Enfants, les Fleurs et les
Oiseaux, des fous, des dons gratuits qui vous viennent on ne sait d’où, des
saisonnières et des innocents. Sans tout cela la vie serait impossible. (397)

Inversely to the coal sack which like a camera projector lense projects all of life as
some illusion, St. Joseph de Cupertino’s particular kind of levitation in its backward-
moving gesture ressuscitates the illusion of life and transforms it into eternal truth.53

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53 "Tout lui était prétexte à ravissement." (400) We could say that for St. Joseph de
Cupertino the distinction between earth and sky is abolished. He is already in the heavens, in this life.
Let us further note his constant meditation of the maternity of the Virgin, and that it was this spiritual
relation which provoked the greatest number of his levitations.
6. Cendrars, the Camera Shutter

The text "Le Nouveau patron de l’aviation" is dedicated to the bakery delivery girl whom Cendrars’ son Rémy once encountered at the movie theater, as if she too had come out of the cone of light and shadows where she lurked, and where Rémy lost himself one night, like the milky nebula caught in the coal sack. We could compare this youth to St. Theresa of Avila, so beloved and described by Cendrars for her double levitation with St. John of the Cross, for she recalls Bernini’s sculpture of the ecstatic saint\textsuperscript{54} as she is described getting out of a taxi, in a horizontal gesture, her legs before her torso, with her dress "troussée jusqu’à mi-cuisse". (360) Nor is this image far from a paparazzi shoot of a Hollywood movie star. To conclude, Cendrars has written a love story on all fronts -- from the erotic to the mystical, from earth to the heavens, who is to say which is the metaphor for the other? Each angle of this story is refracted by the heart and the will of the writer:

Mon crâne, c'était mon esprit qui l'obturait. Mon cœur vissé en objectif.
Focalisation. Gros plan. Longshout. Une question de degrés, d’engrenages,
d’angle, de mise au point, de limbe chiffré.
La nuit, tout est déformé au front. L’univers venait s’inscrire dans mon
crâneau équipé d’un obturateur: moi! (520)

Cendrars "l’obturateur", the camera shutter, places himself at the originary summit of chaos. The cinematic image which forms his thought places the universe within the scope of his vision and highlights the artifice behind his narrative structure. His affabulation has astutely superposed stars, their colors, black holes, the camera obscura and illusion, the ellipse and decentering, the negation of knowledge, the face

\textsuperscript{54} In the Cornaro Chapel, Santa Maria della Vittoria, Rome.
of the Savior, a perspective in motion, the written text as imaginary act (and not as concept), flowers, birds, saints, women, the body, mysticism and eroticism. That is, he has written over his own head these many presences in simultaneous contrast condensing and remaking time from his nights at the war front to leisurely ambulating about Brazil, which fashion out of the parcelled sky a baroque dome.55 A ceiling open to the sky, which allows stepping beyond its confines, and torn wide open to recall the very bodies torn asunder and blown skywards by war’s violence. So the text is both a funerary space and living tableau, which transforms the many nights at the war front as well as the aviator’s terrain, which melds history, autobiography and hagiography, thanks to the remembrance of the present with the past, where narration takes on the double function of prayer and inhabiting space for prayer, where bodies are in the text, where the text is poetic space, a space for life and death, a mystical dome-topped palace, and a space for the future, where the narrative act is an incarnating gesture of love, where Cendrars both repents for his own downfall and abjection as a man, and offers his own dolorous corporality through the text, to resurrect the son he lost to the war-torn sky.

55 See, for example, the dome of "San Carlo alle quattro fontane", Rome; the dome can very well be elliptical or in a losenge shape, as well as the nave ceiling, as in Giovan Battista Gaulli’s vault work in Il Gesù.
C. Claude Simon's (+1913) *Histoire* (1967) as a Baroque Poetics of Death

1. The Shroud

Incessant images of death throughout Claude Simon's *Histoire* (1967) culminate in the following description of a painting by Mantegna, an ekphrastic moment which recalls the epic technique also used by d'Aubigné.\(^{57}\)

MILANO. Palazzo Bréra. Mantegna. Pietà: étendu vu en raccourci un linceul le recouvrant seulement jusqu'à la taille les plis de l'étoffe courant à plat d'abord sur la dalle où il git puis faisant l'ascension du corps c'est-à-dire montant obliquement passant sur le ventre plat puis redescendant, à plat de nouveau sur la dalle, et enfin tombant en plis verticaux de l'autre côté (397-8).\(^{58}\)

Mantegna, a foremost painter of the Italian Renaissance, was known for his extreme manipulation and novel use of perspective, a precursor to use of such technique in Baroque works. His "Dead Christ" is an example, as it foreshortens the body and places the spectator on its horizontal plane, much closer than in a frontal

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\(^{56}\) An earlier version of this study was presented under the title "Claude Simon's Excess: *Histoire* 's Baroque Poetics of Death", in the session "European Ideals in Literature" directed by M.C. Andersen, at the Fourth ISSEI Conference, "The European Legacy: Towards New Paradigms", August 22-27, 1994, Graz, Austria.

\(^{57}\) Andrea Mantegna, "Dead Christ", c.1501, Pinacoteca di Brera, Milan.

\(^{58}\) Claude Simon, *Histoire* (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1967). Subsequent quotes from the novel, with pagination indicated in the body of our text, are taken from this edition. All emphasis is our own. Although war memories do not take as prominent a place in the narrative *Histoire* as they do in *La Route de Flandres* (1960), such experience plays a subliminal role in the preoccupation with death of this first person narrative, an engagement from which the narrator cannot disentangle himself.
Andrea Mantegna, Dead Christ (c. 1501, Milan, Pinacoteca di Brera)
representation. Simon’s narrative eye/"I"’s focus upon following the shroud⁵⁹ and
the contours of the Dead Christ’s body, moves as a hand, both reverently and
irreverently feeling its way across the entirety of stone and flesh, to simultaneously
cover, discover and reveal the sacred body, and thus further emphasizes the seduction
of Mantegna’s use of perspective. The descriptive gesture on the part of Simon takes
the painting beyond its already extreme perspectival limits, to move it into Baroque
artistic space.

This representation of Mantegna’s representation, is emblematic of descriptions
throughout Histoire of numerous postcards, photos, stamps and other images and
artworks, where surface becomes touchable depth in motion as the narrator pieces
together fragments of memory. The shroud is a means for a Phenomenology of
perception, in Merleau-Ponty’s terms, where vision becomes a variant of touch, and
the seeing body becomes one crossed, "chiasmic", touching and touched flesh with
the seen it attempts to discover.⁶⁰ This chiasmic perception is integral to the

⁵⁹ The description’s present participle and unending sentence puts the shroud into movement,
its folds upon the funeral slab, ascending, covering and descending over the lower stomach and legs, to
follow their position. Simon thus neglects other details of the painting, for example, the almost
anamorphic face of the Christ which follows the spectator despite his position with respect to the
painting, the cadaver-colored flesh, the two onlooking faces positioned at the Christ’s breast, the "bitter
nailholes" in his feet and hands, as Hemingway referred to them in this very painting. The Complete
Paintings of Mantegna, Introduction, Andrew Martindale, Notes & Catalogue, Niny Caravaglia

⁶⁰ Enigma of the body "pris entre des choses", losing itself, changed in its existence and in its
perception of space and object with which it dialogues. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménotologie de la
perception, 76, 287; L’Oeil et l’esprit (Paris: Gallimard, 1964) 18, 21. Also, "Le regard [...] 
enveloppe, palpe, épouse les choses visibles." "Entrelacs—le chiasme", Le Visible et l’invisible (Paris:
Editions Gallimard, 1964) 175 and entire chapter. In Christine Buci-Glucksmann’s evaluation of
Merleau-Ponty’s theory of perception, "Voir c’est ne plus Etre". La Folie du voir. De l’esthétique
baroque (Paris: Editions Galilée, 1986) 74. See also Jean Duffy, "Claude Simon, Merleau-Ponty and
phenomenological search for Dasein,61 disclosure, sensual presence, the spectacle of incarnate being or resurrected body. Simon’s literary description aptly metaphorizes this chiasmic search as opening the grave, disentombing the body, and willfully contemplating death and the corpse, if not trying to resurrect it through the text. These are the masks of absence, historically imposed upon the post-war novel, beneath which, ultimately, presence and life are sought. Furthermore, these themes tie Histoire and Phenomenology to Baroque fondness for representation of the transition between life and death, and sensibility towards death as the constant companion to life, reminder of the carnal condition, and as a privileged passageway for a new vision. Simon’s Baroque poetics chiasmically seeks out presence in death as its theme, disguise and medium, just as the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius of Loyola work with imagination of and meditation upon the life of Christ, particularly

and loss of identity, and on the relinquishment of identity as access to Merleau-Ponty’s type of Phenomenological perception, or a primary condition of "Being-in-the-World". Using Phenomenology to elucidate Claude Simon’s oeuvre and process of description is in opposition to the "Nouveau roman" emphasis upon the combinatory aspect of language which evacuates the referent, a period through which Simon’s novels, between Histoire and Les Georgiques (1981), passed, and returns to a complex, "chiasmic" as we have already named it, problematic and subject-threatening relationship to the referent of the text and to the text of the reader as well. This is not, however, a return to traditional Realism, but rather to excessive figuration of the sensible and to a NeoBaroque, as the argument herein develops it. Merleau-Ponty himself was interested in Simon’s post-Nouveau Roman writing as a literary example of his Philosophy, in the brute immediacy of vision, the layering of appearances through association and affective depth beyond perspectival presentation, a language usage symptomatic of the intermediate, chiasmic subject, as Merleau-Ponty says, "une première-deuxième personne" which captures the narrator-reader relationship we have emphasized as well. See "Cinq notes sur Claude Simon", Méditations 4 (1960-61): 5-10.

61 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 1962). Whereas our Philosophical study herein examines Merleau-Ponty in the outgrowth of his thought from Husserl, here we can see how the concepts of two disciples of Husserl reinforce one another in the search for presence, even unto the space of death. In fact, that it is this space that allows the approximation of their thought is perhaps a further comment upon the gravity of the search for presence in a post-World War II context and its narrative endeavors.
the Passion, through Composition of Place, Application of the Senses, Colloquy, and the "Within thy wounds hide me" of the often-recited Anima Christi. They use such Baroque, Phenomenological sensibility towards death to move from a perspectival point of vision to a chiasmic becoming for the sacred Other. In fact, death is not only medium, but also metanarrative for these aesthetic, poetic, phenomenological and religious passages. Simon's reference to the Renaissance painter Mantegna reinforces this as passage into Baroque space, as Mantegna was the first to use the same technique of foreshortened perspective of the "Dead Christ" for di sotto in sù ceiling representation as in the Oculus of the "Camera degli Sposi", a technique later to be famous in the painting of the Baroque domes, of bodies moving vertically towards heaven or earth, which seductively take the spectator with them.62 So in gazing upon his "Dead Christ", we are not a far step from the uplifting resurrectional configuration of the Baroque dome.

Simon uses the verb gésir, to lie or rest without movement, or to be in the grave,63 to describe his Uncle Charles and his wife lying in bed. Mantegna's work with foreshortened perspective in both the "Camera degli Sposi" and the "Dead Christ", together with Histoire's many examples of lying and cadaverous bodies, capture the semantic field of the Greek word koimétérion, which means "a sleeping

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62 Andrea Mantegna, "Camera degli sposi" (1474, Ducal Palace of Mantua). This technique was further developed by Correggio, considered a proto-Baroque painter, and by the Baroque ceiling decorators. See, for example, Correggio's "Ascension of the Virgin" (1526-30, Dome of Parma Cathedral). Art through the Ages, 523, 527.

place", and is the origin for the words for both nuptial chamber and cemetery.

Simon’s description of the bedsheets as folds enshrouding the body, the expressions and adjectives, all suggest cold, petrified bodies contaminated by death, which recall Mantegna’s enshrouded Christ: the descriptions -- "les plis du drap [...] ensevelissant déjà ce corps"; the expressions -- "la matière froide, inanimée", "le corps inerte", the blood "une pâle sève bleuâtre glacée et même glaueque presque figée"; and the adjectives -- "raide", "roide", "laiteuse", "marbre", "bronze", "polie". "Le drap ramené froissé se soulevant à peine en faibles renflements" recalls the flatness of the shroud. (355) Another description by Simon, of the narrator and his wife, puts the bedsheets into the same vectors of movement as those already described of Mantegna’s painting:

[...] plus ou moins rapprochées courant sur les deux corps c’est-à-dire à plat d’abord sur le matelas puis montant à l’assaut du premier puis redescendant puis traversant la partie plate entre eux deux, puis faisant l’ascension du deuxième corps puis traversant une dernière zone plate et retombant verticales de l’autre côté du lit, chacun des deux corps dessinant comme une fourche c’est-à-dire une forme pleine (le tronc) qui se divise à hauteur de l’attache des cuisses, les plis transversaux s’affaissant alors légèrement (sans toutefois retomber jusqu’au niveau du matelas) dans la vallée ou plutôt la combe entre les jambes, et à l’extrémité de celles-ci le drap remontant, les pieds comme les piquets d’une tente autour desquels il se répand en plis étoilés, tout toujours parfaitement immobile. (375-6)

The narrator’s own lying body imprints itself into the bedsheets, turning to stone, while the bed and linens take on his body’s contours:

rien ne bougeant immobile comme si mon corps étendu s’enfonçait lentement laissant son contour dessiné sur le drap le matelas et à la fin il ne resterait plus que ce trou ayant vaguement la forme d’un homme (367)
The emphasis upon the shroud and its folds in place of the body sculpturally represents the petrified flesh, in the manner of Baroque drappeggiamento.64

This brings us to the title of his text, Histoire, which in French means both story and history. From the Greek, historia means a search or quest, the knowledge obtained, and also the mast of a voyaging ship. But the root histos also refers to the mast of a weaving loom, the technique used to begin a weave, and the weaver’s movement as well. The looms were vertically positioned and the weaver had to walk back and forth, retracing the same steps, to accomplish the task of making cloth. These meanings of weaving tie histoire to the end product of the cloth, whence Simon’s use of the shroud to exemplify his narrative mode as chiasmic description, where the associative, back-and-forth workings of the affective memory of the engaged and traumatized narrator break down sequential narrative and fold time upon itself, to weave a story of spatially composite and superimposed elements which transgress the limits of form, to include exceeding syntactical measure,65 in order to invest the self and thus refigure time and the concept of history.66 In this light, let us read further on the narrator who sinks like stone into his bedsheets:

64 This is typical of Simonian description, which petrifies the animate while putting into movement the inanimate.

65 Similar narrative tactics in Cendrars’ and Simon’s writing, such as linguistic repetition and accumulation of nouns, adjectives and verbs, multiple images, and prolonged associations through metaphor and metonymy recall the Baroque narrative techniques of d’Aubigné’s Les Tragi ques.

66 As do the visualizations and making present of the Gospel scenes to the exercitant in Ignatius of Loyola’s Spiritual Exercises. Also, affect can be considered, "cette sorte de fragile et remuant foyer auquel ne touchent pas les formes." Antonin Artaud, Le Théâtre et son double (Paris: Editions Gallimard 1964) 19.
s'enfonçait [...] comme la fois où elle avait oublié le fer électrique allumé sur la table de la cuisine et qu’il avait fini par passer au travers commençant quand nous l’avons trouvé à attaquer le linoléum le plancher comme s’il ne cessait de vouloir descendre attaquant rongeant lentement patiemment chaque obstacle irrésistiblement attiré lui aussi par cet aimant cet obscur noyau tout au fond de la terre gisant pesant mon poids de fer de bronze de marbre elle ne cessant de m’attirer (367-8)

This burning iron in motion is compared to the narrator’s body enmeshing itself into the very fiber of the bedsheets. The motif of cloth is further exhausted by the narrator’s lament in the context of his troubled relationship with his wife:

je voudrais je voudrais si je pouvais l'enlever l'arracher de moi retrouver la fraîcheur l'oubli Déjanire (365)

This "je voudrais", a leitmotif throughout the text, refers to the macabre story of Hercules and the poisoned shirt, which his jealous wife Dejanira, thinking it infused with a faultless love potion, unwittingly gave to him to confirm his love for her. In his desperate efforts to remove it as it numbed and burned into his limbs, he tore off pieces of his own flesh.67 Thus we find Claude Simon’s own Histoire poetically and mortally inscribed in the sensate flesh.

2. The Cadaver and the Earth

The stone funeral sculpture of a lying royal couple is described in the context of an opened grave at an archeological dig:

où les inscriptions les graffitis s’accumulent se superposent s’entrecroisent couvrant les parties lisses [...] comme une frénétique accumulation de signes dépourvus de sens, les bizarres et laborieux bégaiements d’un idiot, les incompréhensibles vestiges d’un langage incohérent tissant sa trame sur les chairs imputrescibles, glacées (377-8)

This most petrified of Simon’s examples, is at the same time scratched and worn away by a woven web of graffiti — a key to Simon’s narrative procedure, an idiot’s stutterings as he calls it, of writing over and over again on death’s body, thereby condemning it to the return to dust. Another example, of Charles and his wife in bed, illustrates this further:

tous deux dans le noir avec cette obscurité blafarde sur eux comme une uniforme couche de peinture grise qui ne les distinguait pas des draps, comme si le lit les draps leurs corps étaient faits uniformément de la même matière inanimée [...] apparemment intacts portant encore et en réalité en train de se décomposer à toute vitesse comme si sous la surface grise et polie semblable à du marbre travaillait s’acharnait un invisible et vorace grolillement de sorte que peu à peu il ne resterait plus d’eux qu’une enveloppe illusoire une mince coque de plus en plus ténue, jusqu’au moment où quelque part, devenue trop mince, elle crèverait s’effriterait s’effondrerait (359-60)

Organic decay and infinite fragmentation, motifs of the death theme and textural metaphor for Simon’s narrative, trangress form to bring us to two things: the cadaver and the earth.

The novel’s living characters, presented as cadaverous, empty shells whose interior flesh has wasted away -- "charogne déjà rongée" -- and whose illusory exterior form remains as "carapace", "crustacé", "insecte", "homards bleux", dressed in "anthracite", or "pâte à papier", come up again as creatures in the following text, very probably quoted from a geography primer, on the earth of the Parisian basin:

dans le Bassin Parisien prédominent les sols calcaires sédimenteux les sédiments sont des débris arrachés par l’érosion aux parties émergées de l’écorce terrestre depuis les solidifications primitives la plupart des roches calcaires [...] constituées par des organismes animaux: monocellulaires à carapaces éponges coraux échinodermes mollusques Sommes-nous par exemple en présence de calcaires ou de marnes finement stratifiées contenant de petits gastéropodes à coquille mince: c’était probablement un lac sans tempêtes [...] la profondeur augmente... (120-1)
The earth below couches within its calcified layers various fossilized animal organisms which recall Simon's cadavers. The "anthracite"-colored clothing in which he often dresses his characters refers to the formation of coal from this very kind of decayed and petrified organic matter, and is his way of dressing them in the vestiges of death, of enshrouding and entombing them alive.

This same text repeated towards the end of the novel is interrupted by a description of the mother's grave, within the crumbling earth of "un aspect friable". (384) Simon says more about these creatures which form the earth by describing a woman who lifts her pleated skirt to step into the ocean:

elles sous les froides et mouvantes épaisseurs d'eau depuis toujours ou plutôt plissé: vieille peau de ce vieux monde ce vieux monstre Plissé pliscénien ou quoi Plioscène Sans doute rien à voir mots qui simplement se ressemblent plésiosaure (319)

"Plissé pliscénien ou quoi Plioscène"68 puts together the pleated cloth, recalling the folded shroud, with the Pliocene era, the era of the formation of the earth's upper crust containing the most recent fossils and from which anthracite coal is made, with the plesiosaur, a marine reptile of large body, webbed feet, a long neck and small head. This type of monstrous description arose earlier in relation to the mother:

quelque chose qui existerait et aurait survécu depuis les temps immémoriaux où le monde n'était que vapeurs et boues dans lesquelles se traitaient s'entredévoraient armés de pinces en dents de scie de mandibules et de cerveaux rudimentaires et féroces... (232)

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68 Simon's morphological play with language uses an excess of signifiers to explore the earth.
Quite charming women! Simon's poetic language, following a history of long duration and deep time, has disinterred the mother to find her occult alterity in the vestige of a prehistoric monster, and source of the entombing earth!

The cadaver-composed earth^69 is presented again in the context of Ancient Greece:

Hélène dit que toute la Grèce la faisait penser à un grand vieux squelette à moitié couché dans la mer, brûlé par le soleil, avec de petits squelettes de villes ou de temples sur les genoux ou les épaules, le tombeau du roi béant au flanc du coteau derrière nous (103)

The decomposition of the Western world and the weakening of its defense against death,^70 in the image of an open and desacralized tomb, are part of Histoire's poetic schemes which menace and decompose the very treacherous ground of Western order, from its foundation in the Greek world to Humanism, Classicism and Enlightenment, and its legacy of intelligibility, of history as progressive and of narrative as (chrono)logical, of mastery over the body, death and nature, and of reassuring, distanciated perspectival representation. This menace reveals a paradigm change, from the conceptual to the phenomenal, from distance to immensity and the inhabitational, from the perspectival to the transpectival. We can further qualify this passage as that from the intelligible to the sensible, from reason to affectivity, surface to depth, and vision to synaesthesia, or from man as the centered measure before all


bodies and things, to the overwhelmed, decentered subject within and traversed by them. Traditional European Ideals are fragmented to unearth the cadaver of an old paradigm hidden within Perspectival Modernity and now bursting it asunder, to restore it and recognize it anew, as that of Baroque excess. Thus illustrates Histoire’s epigraph:

We are surfeited. We set it in order. It breaks.
We put it in order again and break down ourselves.
Rainer Maria Rilke, 8th: Duino Elegy

Indeed the skeleton of Ancient Greece is our own. Simon offers an example in his experience of the horrors of this century’s wars, where the dark side of a chiasmic Phenomenology is forced upon every fiber of his being:

se retrouver d’un instant à l’autre couché cramponné à la terre et la terre elle-même à la place du ciel et l’air lui-même qui dégringole autour de toi comme du ciment brisé des morceaux de vitres et de la boue et de l’herbe à la place de la langue, et soi-même éparpillé et mélangé à tellement de fragments de nuages, de cailloux, de feu, de noir, de bruit et de silence (152)

This trauma menaces histoire, in both senses: "ce qui fait qu’il n’est pas plus possible de raconter ce genre de choses". (152) The traumatized subject close to

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72 Thus Merleau-Ponty makes the transition from life and perception to the excess of death part of thought’s horizon, and that which empowers vision: "Installé dans la vie, adossé à ma nature pensante [...] je me sens voué à un flux de vie inépuisable dont je ne puis penser ni le commencement ni la fin, puisque c’est encore moi vivant qui les pense, et qu’ainsi ma vie se précède et se survit toujours. Cependant cette même nature pensante qui me gorgé d’être m’ouvre le monde à travers une perspective, je reçois avec elle le sentiment de ma contingence, l’angoisse d’être dépassé, de sorte que, si je ne pense pas à ma mort, je vis dans une atmosphère de mort en général, il y a comme une essence de la mort qui est toujours à l’horizon de mes pensées." La Phénoménologie de la perception, 418.

73 Simon was called to service in a cavalry regiment in 1939, and was held prisoner in Germany in 1940, to escape the fall of the same year.
death is in chiasmic relation with its element and remains so, a result of forever-wounded memory.

Memory, "that which often overcomes us" to quote Rilke from the eighth of the Duino Elegies, cannot forget war's horrors, and can no longer accept the former world vision. We do not forget here the major role played by the Holocaust in the paradigm shift away from traditional European Ideals and, as Jean-Claude Lebrun signals, Simon's critique of Humanism as a farce after Auschwitz.\textsuperscript{74} We understand Nazi ideology as an exacerbation of the ideals of Philosophical Modernity, and the horrors it produced as a key factor in deconstructing those ideals, or "reason eclipsing itself" to use Max Horkheimer's words,\textsuperscript{75} thus opening the breach into Postmodernity. We ground Simon's Baroque, poetic sensibility in his war experience, which forces a consciousness of death that rejects Modernity's inhuman Humanism, to disanchor the subject and narrative in Baroque fashion. The modes of the unending sentence and repetitive, reworked narration are a forever continuing effort, at once poetically generative and symptomatically futile, to cure perpetually wounded memory and to restore the broken subject, and which finally simply represent them. Such is the context similar to that of Baroque sensibility at the horrors of the Counter-Reformation's religious wars in Agrippa d'Aubigné's Les Tragiques; it further confirms a return of the Baroque particularly in light of this 20th century's passages

\textsuperscript{74} In "L'Atelier de l'artiste", Claude Simon, Celia Britton, ed. (New York: Longman, 1993)

\textsuperscript{75} Max Horkheimer, Eclipse of Reason (NY: The Continuum Publishing Corporation, 1992).
through war, and a return in the context of all of the Western world and its
Modernity which such war passage puts into question.

3. The Mother, the Self, Being & History

In one last example, the narrator imagines himself coming into incarnate being
and appearance within the breast of the sacred mother. His mother is happily
writing a postcard:

sur un coin de table ou de comptoir la femme penchant son mystérieux buste
de chair blanche enveloppé de dentelles ce sein qui déjà peut-être me portait
dans son ténébreux tabernacle sorte de têtard gelatineux lové sur lui-même
avec ses deux énormes yeux sa tête de ver à soie sa bouche sans dents son
front cartilagineux d’insecte, moi?... (401-2)

He associates her happiness with the saintly extasy of Baroque representation,
particularly Bernini’s sculpture of St. Theresa of Avila, which is suggested here:

pouvant croyant la voir son visage comme celui de ces saintes pâmées aux
chairs pleines aux yeux levés au cou anelé et gras renversé en arrière passant
somnambulique et sereine dans des postures d’éternelle félicité [...] devant le
luxuriant décor [...] -- comme si quelque chose en elle (son destin ses goûts
quelque mystérieuse prédestination) la vouait à ces pompes ces fastes végétaux:
exubérance qui semble être la burlesque contrepartie de ces climats de ces
civilisations où par une sorte de coquetterie la mort s’entoure de délirantes et
furieuses somptuosités ". (388)

And he imagines himself transpectively from within the holy, lace-garbed figure,
both seeing and seen, touching and touched, a silkworm, source of material for

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76 "Being" is "Sein" in German, where "breast" is "sein" in French, and also the French
expression "au sein de ...", which means at the very heart of something. What was throughout the
novel a space of death -- the impure mother -- has become, albeit problematically or momentarily, a
sacred place for life, or of a "clearing-space" for "Being" in the Phenomenological sense. See
Row, 1971) 42.
weaving and history, and an insect eventually like the fossils entombed in the earth’s crust, before birth, encoded for death, within the flesh of the Mother, of the Other, and of the World. This is the dwelling for self which the poetic voice of Histoire builds, an unfinished, Baroque architecture of home and tomb, of narrative as both a maternal and choratic, as well as funerary space of vision, which houses the self as a spectacle of death continuous with life. This is Presence not in the sheltering earth, but in the Open World, in the Heideggerian sense, as well as in the sense of an ambulating speculum mundi embedded in the flux of existence.

The narrative eye/"I", under the mark of war trauma and having travelled via exaggerated perspective, fissures the feigned equilibrium and closed forms of body,

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77 “Le baroque, c'est la régulation de l'âme par la scopie corporelle.” Jacques Lacan, Le Séminaire Livre XX: Encore (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1975) 105. We take this "régulation de l'âme" to be an enigmatic finding of self in the other, as Lacan would have it, pertinent to the "moi?" of Histoire. We have left a psychoanalytic approach aside, however it has not refrained from playing in the background here. The passage through the mother’s body does not fail to confront the Oedipal complex, and further allows qualification of Histoire’s motifs of petrification and fragmentation as a castration complex. This deadly passage, then, can also be qualified as feminine, and as a feminisation of the subject, and signals the relation between the Baroque and the feminine, where the real measure and the imaginary dimension take precedence over the symbolic, paternal order in the Lacanian sense, as mode of passage into its type of vision and subjectivestance.

78 This poetically-constructed Baroque architecture recalls Heidegger’s "Language is the House of Being" in which man must ever learn to dwell, and also the unstable dwelling equivalent to Heidegger’s sense of Rilke’s "Open" for which, like Simon’s perpetually breaking-down narrative, the ‘ground fails to come’. Heidegger, "What are Poets for?" and "Building, Dwelling, Thinking", Poetry, Language, Thought 92, 102-8, 161. In this context, Heidegger, as Simon, works against the foundational imagery of Modernity, as established by Descartes. In fact, all three of the texts analyzed here present the theme of the war-ravaged, unstable ground. This does not defy, however, the Baroque sense of dwelling insofar as it is a moving process, ultimately confirmed in the ambulatory Homo Barocus himself.

79 As Rouset quotes Quevedo to present it: "Vous ne connoissez pas la mort vous autres, c’est vous-mêmes qui êtes votre mort; elle a la face de chacun de vous, vous êtes tous les morts (muertes) de vous-mêmes. Votre crâne est la mort, et votre visage est la mort; ce que vous appelez mourir, c’est achever de vivre, et ce que vous appelez naître, c’est commencer à mourir, comme aussi ce que vous appelez vivre, c’est mourir en vivant (morir viviendo)." Visiones, in Jean Rouset, La littérature de l'âge baroque en France. Circé et le paon (Paris: Librairie José Corti, 1985) 117.
corpse, earth and prehistoric stone, and finally the mother, to move into a Baroque, chiasmic vision and presence. The parameters for Phenomenology’s task — covering and uncovering, entombing and disentombing, absence and presence, invisibility and visibility and, finally, vision as temporally-transcending ecstasy — work with the astonishment created by the disequilibrium of sudden appearance and presence fissuring through successive dissemblances. This ecstasy equivalent to the Baroque literary and artistic objective of meraviglia or wonderment, is the aim of Simon’s poetics which, in keeping with Baroque illusion, maintains representation in play, the referent as real albeit elusive, and the sensible as infinite treasure. This astonishment and meraviglia do not exclude the horrific, and even owe their effect to the uncanny: “the clearing is pervaded by a constant concealment in the double form of refusal and dissembling. At bottom, the ordinary is not ordinary; it is extraordinary, uncanny.”

The image of the Dead Christ and all the various images atemporally superimposed upon it, succeed each other in a long Baroque anamorphosis which opens up, quite like a Baroque dome’s trompe-l’oeil blurring of the confines of heaven and earth, to reveal the meraviglia or astonishment of the image of the sacred mother and the unborn child within. The "moi?" which began with the macabre abjection and transgression of opening and entering the tomb and death’s very body, ends with the


81 See, for example, the close-up of the Oculus of Mantegna’s "Camera degli sposi", with the cherub in foreshortened perspective.

82 Equivalent to the 17th-century practice, both social menace and spectacle, of opening the coffin at a pitch spectacular moment at court funerals. André Chastel, "Le Baroque et la mort", Retorica e Barocco, ed. Enrico Castelli (Rome: Fratelli Bocca editori, 1955) 34. Can we not make an analogy here with the horrific discovery of the Nazi crematoriums? See also Buci-Glucksmann’s "Voir
wonderment of the self projected upon the sacred mother as an open question.\footnote{As in Merleau-Ponty's "open unity of the corporal scheme", this locus of perception is a way into the world, and the invitation to always see beyond or further within the boundaries of form. Merleau-Ponty, \textit{La Phénoménologie de la perception}, 269-70, 365.} The book \textit{Histoire}, a Baroque tomb, closes paradoxically \textit{opened}, to reveal an anamorphic reversal where death has become a disguise for life\footnote{"Dans le corps de la mort j'ai enfermé ma vie." Agrippa d'Aubigné, \textit{Stances}, quoted in Rousset, \textit{La Littérature de l'âge baroque en France}, 101. See also Goux, \textit{Oedipe philosophe}, 191, 197, and entire chapter, where "transpective" vision is associated with the final stage of Oedipus at Colonus, who has tragically played out the limits of perspective to pass through death, to a new kind of subjectivity, which we qualify as Baroque: "C'est donc quand je ne suis plus rien que je deviens un homme".} and the \textit{self}, this traumatized self written as the ultimate, yet unstable, foundation to a story and, audaciously, as an allegory for (the practice of) History. A history because so near to death, indeed written from within it -- "For nearing death, one sees death no more and stares \textit{forward}" -- which rewrites civilisation as a dwelling "open to the \textit{winds}" (Rilke),\footnote{Let us recall again here Simon's earlier novel, \textit{Le Vent}.} and which is written not \textit{before} the past, but as \textit{presence} from \textit{within} it to the future.

\begin{quote}
et voir sans merci, et tenter ce point chimérique de la Voyure où surgit de l'Irrégardable", 22.
\end{quote}
D. Conclusion: Trauma, Transpective & History

From D’Aubigné’s visionary ascent to the heavens and litany of martyrs, to Cendrars’ list of levitating saints and review of the great mystics projected upon the heavens, to Simon’s panorama of the western terrain which culminates in the harboring breast of the sacred mother, all three authors of war experience lend to their narrative a projection of self through a comprehensive vision born of their own initially traumatic and finally spiritual passage, in a trompe-l’œil gesture which brings the external world and its real measure into the fictive one, and vice-versa, thus disanchoring narrative perspective and the place of the reader, disanchored as if in the heart of a disorienting war experience, and thus moving him into the space of the narrative frame, or the narrative into the space of the real.\(^\text{86}\) Here the real measure and the imaginary dimension take precedence over any symbolic order held over language, narrative, or life.

This autobiographical engagement and narrative point of view, joined with affabulation, lengthens the passage of history from the individual, evenemential experience to the sweeping and cosmic vision of such as Fernand Braudel’s "longue durée", with the addition of a spiritual dimension. The stance of these authors comes not simply from being there, presence, witness or even engagement, but from an active and dangerous giving of self to others through their literary work, an "écriture-action" that has in fact passed through the initiation of death, and which corporally

\(^{86}\) On narrative frame, or point of view, see Michael Evans, \textit{Claude Simon and the Transgressions of Modern Art} (NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1988), particularly the chapter "What is Frame?". 
and affectively perpetuates the painful memory in the authorial-narrative self. This generosity is in our opinion facilitated by the initiating passage of the unexpected trauma, or wounding of self which initially surpassed the subject's knowledge, where "l'homme est foudroyé" to quote Cendrars, to provoke later reenactments in the artwork or narrative,\textsuperscript{87} which become a measure of knowing, a communication, albeit an unstable and moving memory and its reenactment which defies normative, logical or linear categories of understanding and its stable narrative perspective.\textsuperscript{88} There are two interpretations of the (narrating) reaction to trauma, one which is in fact a dualism and provokes a mind/body separation and a subsequent fragmentation of memory and aporetic language, and one which is a monism and provokes the ethical engagement of both being there and reliving the experience in a piecing together of memory through use of the tentative language of excess. The first is a distanciation and an unknowing; the second, a painful coming-to-know of the event and its implications, and thus an "écriture-action". It is the latter which is pertinent to our readings of the author-narrator as taking a heroic, ethical stance towards the other for whom he writes.

\textsuperscript{87} In the Freudian sense of the return of the repressed, as presented in Beyond the Pleasure Principle.

\textsuperscript{88} See Cathy Caruth, introduction, Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative and History (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1996); and Ronald Granofsky, The Trauma Novel. Contemporary Symbolic Depictions of Collective Disaster (NY: Peter Lang, 1995), 8. Shoshana Felman & Dori Laub, M.D. eloquently state the purpose of their study of various mediums expressing the traumatic experience, "This is then a book about how art inscribes (artistically bears witness to) what we do not yet know of our lived historical relation to events of our times." Testimony. Crises of Witnesing in Literature. Psychoanalysis & History (NY: Routledge, 1992) xx.
This corporal generosity is also a chiasmic giving to others, which involves a continual disintegration of self in the encounter with death given up to historical remembrance, and a survival in the life that moves on. Such a traumatic subject is the final, living vessel to history, yet one which by his own engagement engages us affectively as well in the process of remembrance, rather than posing as the ultimate authority of a finished story which could successfully and totally be recounted. To summarize, the literary texts as war narrative considered here involve the status of an engaged author-narrator-hero whose own corporality is traumatized and transgressed; bodies which are engaged in and dwell in the text, to include that of the reader, and which the text inhabits and speaks through, thus turning the text into real space, and turning history to personal vision, time and futural prophecy. As corporal and textual limits are transgressed, relived and reworked, so too are the canonical bounds of heaven and earth, and images are overlapped, layered, superimposed and simultaneous, to be read spatially, metaphorically and in depth rather than temporally and metonymically. Infinity and the eternal become a question of depth, and the very linearity of writing becomes a moving, sinuous, levitating, resurrectional Baroque gesture beyond all syntactical measure and vast enough to capture the universe,\(^9\) as

\(^9\) What for Blaise Cendrars is the engagement, temporal relativity and very genius behind 20th-century narrative: "[... et cette gymnastique et cette jonglerie [...] je les exécute maintenant devant ma machine à écrire pour me maintenir en forme [...] intercalant dans la vision directe celle, réfléchie, qui ne peut se déchiffrer qu'à l'envers comme dans un miroir, maître de ma vie, dominant le temps, ayant réussi par le désarticuler, le disloquer et à glisser la relativité comme un substratum dans mes phrases pour en faire le ressort même de mon écriture, ce que l'on a pris pour désordre, confusion, facilité, manque de composition, laisser-aller alors que c'est peut-être la plus grande nouveauté littéraire du XXe siècle que d'avoir su appliquer les procédés d'analyse et les déductions mathématiques d'un Einstein sur l'essence, la constitution, la propagation de la lumière à la technique du roman!" *Le Lotissement du ciel*, 157.
the alterity of the engaged author-narrator-hero does not fail to find its macabre and occult side as well, both personally and cosmically. Such a vision, Baroque in the scope of its perpetual passages through death and final stance and empowered by this alone, begun with D'Aubigné and traceable through to 20th-century war narrative, corroborates our reading of the Baroque as a trace that is most deeply and geographically, as well as carnally inscribed, and which resurfaces cyclically. For what is war but a carnal and individual inscription of geographically delimited powers and their limits placed into question?

Here we can ask what import the Baroque stance of a vision from within has for the practice of History, and also how this influence can serve to conflate historiography with the literary and aesthetic practice. It is particularly the experience of war which calls for the historical narrative, and which places vision from within, as individual and contingent upon minute, limited historical events which nonetheless fit into the larger structure of a cultural, religious or cosmic institution, power or order. This allows a great measure of poetic affabulation to the narrative voice, and a rhetorical power in the text and image which brings the spectatorial eye and affect into position and presence with it, thus lending a measure of disintegration or rather suppleness to the subjectivity of the addressee, who suffers the trauma of the chiasmic relation as far as opening his own self in turn to a certain subjectival stance and conversion, followed in what we have called the Ignatian "chain of representations".

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90 To follow the concept in Marc Bloch, Apologie pour l'histoire, ou Métier d'historien (Paris: A.Colin, 1974). Such is a structural reading as practiced by the "Annales School", founded in 1929 by Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre, and in prominence at the end of the 50's and 60's under Fernand Braudel's leadership.
The use of ekphrasis takes place in all of these texts, as if to give an external confirmation to their history, yet in such a way that the artwork is layered beneath the accounts of the literary text, and to be entered into as a harboring space, or to become a real and encompassing scene. Here, history joins memory and prophecy, and language attains a resurrecctional value, all of which is incited by dolorous affect. Such history, marked by the stigma of engagement, is no longer absolute and fixed in its own block of time; rather, it has an existential value based upon presence, and can even conform to a personal, spiritual adventure or passage or an affective obsession, as we can see with the cases examined here.\textsuperscript{91} As such, time is refigured to illumine individual existence; a time which we have not made becomes personal, affective, both present and futural time. And likewise, the Baroque epoch finds in the context of 20th-century war narrative its reconfiguration and return, as the Baroque becomes personal and returning, based upon experience and capable of garnering others.

Meanwhile the social and mental structure holds itself in place and the experience of horror maintains its hold on consciousness, both long in duration across all three temporal stages, at the contours of the individual experience which it makes, remakes, and surpasses, in the gesture towards the other, at the contours of life and time.

\textsuperscript{91} To follow with Paul Ricoeur the thesis of Raymond Aron, such an engaged point of view "dissolves the object" of investigation: "Dans la mesure où l'historien est impliqué dans la comprehension et l'explication des événements passés, un événement absolu ne peut être attesté par le discours historique." Quoted in \textit{Le Temps et le récit} I (Paris: Le Seuil, 1983) \textit{140}, 141.
CONCLUSION: THE BAROQUE AS PRESENCE IN THE WORK

From the object of the unstable, elaborate, overwhelming Baroque work -- seductive, inviting - to the uncertain Baroque subject in e-motion with it -- the spiritual director, the Philosopher, the saint, the mystic, the madman or the dead, as well as the exercitant, the reader, the spectator, the beholder, and the faithful -- we have followed the various modalities of Presence in the work. From the concept of Immensity, or being in God or the work, where the subject is the ultimate living presence who enters into the encompassing Baroque work, to the concept of Inhabitation, where God or the work is in our being, in the subject spiritually and aesthetically remade as the Baroque work of an actorial body possessed by O/otherly presence, or from the Baroque as actor, figure or letter, to its carnal decor, space, screen or page, we have traced the modalities of how such presence almost unnoticeably entices and transforms us, and how it is taught and exercised, through all the disciplines -- religion, Philosophy, the arts, theater, the personal journal, literature.

From here there is an ethos of the Baroque work, but not necessarily a prescriptive one as much as there is an openly structured one. The emphasis here is upon the regime of the real. Such should be the radical effect of the configuration of the Baroque work and its reception, which thus begins anew the relation to the work,
fashioning as it does man into, in effect, a receptacle for God's Presence and for the other -- a sign, space, house, dome, temple, tabernacle, Eucharist, tomb, womb -- fashioning him into a Baroque work and space himself, into an Homo Baroccus. The reception of the Baroque work thus puts into place a malleable anthropology, to make of the subject an Homo Baroccus, who is both dwelling and inhabited, choratically inspired, chiasmically engaged, charismatically illuminated, a work of art seductive in turn, anamorphically projective of his vision, ethically engaged for the O/other.

The Baroque subject, in face of the Baroque work which is ultimately a becoming of self, overwhelms any fixity in sign or image, as the subject enters into the image each day, with affectivity as sign and rite of successful passage, in a presence beyond historicity all while being a bearer of it, and in a practice of perpetual semiosis, or the work of giving perpetually anew a carnally and affectively enriched meaning to the sense already there. The focal or pivotal point here is an affectively-colored carnal presence to the work, based upon a real and affective practice of Presence to God and to the other. Modelled upon the Incarnate Christ of the Christian Trinity, this real presence has its linguistic correlate as the referent in the Saussurian concept of the sign, and as the real in the Lacanian triadic structure and in Symbolic Economy. These Baroque works in question are not only works of persuasion of such presence, but of an exercise and an education towards an exceptional grace where not only is presence brought to the work, but where the image is ultimately inscribed in the exercised subject. This is the very process which moves towards a relation -- to God, to the Mother and as the feminine, to and for the
other -- with a perception virtually Divine and a corporality which "eucharistically" receives the O/other to harbor them. *In the Baroque, there is a technique of the image and of its reception, intimately tied to techniques of the body.* Thus presence -- the subject himself -- is mediated.

For the Baroque work and its subject/recipient, in analogy to an excessive corporal presence which explains the figural saturation of Baroque space, and the harboring immensity of the objects of knowledge which explain the stance of the Baroque Philosopher, an overwhelming wealth is brought to language which explains Baroque stylistics as well. It is particularly the structural analysis and the linguistic conception of the Baroque which gives us an easy entry into the context of the 20th century, its Postmodernity, and its linguistic turn in a preoccupation and play with the outcomes for: the Saussurian concept of the sign.

In the wake of Philosophical Modernity, its perspectival Realism and its Rationalism, an entire culture is shaken by the horrific experience of two World Wars, as the solidity of the sign is shaken as well, its elements weakened in their relationships. One obvious outcome is an *iconoclast Postmodernity of distance*, absence and disaffection, of an exacerbated dualism or even an "Ultramodernity", whose linguistic correlate is the errant signifier severed from reference, often in an amusing and facile play of artifice whose only message is its medium. This characterization of the Postmodern, inclusive of the abstract figuration of modern art and minimalist narrative style as in some expressions of the "nouveau roman", is well known.
It is not, however, the only one, and it is exactly the Baroque as we have elucidated its structure and characterized it as "Presence in the Work" which allows us to envision and to elaborate upon the other Postmodern, and to find there, in an extraordinary achievement, a contemporary return of the Baroque. Or, it is in reading the Baroque in a 20th-century return that we can reread and nuance the concept of the Postmodern in the very terms of presence. This is an iconophile Postmodernity of plenitude, and presence in a spirit of monism; it is not a presence which returns to a belief in a naive realism, but rather is a presence after the crisis in Renaissance representation and the legacy of Classicism and Philosophical Modernity, a presence which maintains artifice by supplementing it with an individual carnal measure that receives and works through it, to bring the referent, and referents, to the sign time and again, opening thus the horizons of meaning and world and garnering all in a continuing chain of representations. This is a presence which involves active labor, exercise, and even carnal sacrifice; there is nothing facile, passive, or merely contemplative about it.

Thus one Postmodernity is the flip side of the other, echoing the copresent tensions between historical Classicism and the Baroque\(^1\) — when one becomes unlivable, the other becomes a reprieve; or each remains in tension with the other, like two counter-discourses; or, better yet, the iconophile NeoBaroque Postmodernity, folded within the Modernity it pursues in Jean-François Lyotard’s sense, takes artifice further — to there where the image is grace and the word is way. There, the language

\(^1\) It is to be noted that the etiquette "Baroque" was applied to the culture after the fact.
of presence is a language of love, and the face of the Divine, revivified by semiosis, is ultimately a feminine face. The subject, whether man or woman, thereby gains an empowering suprasexuality, with the feminine in him. Such a state is an ecstatic one; yet how long-lived it can be is another question. For St. Ignatius of Loyola it seemed a constant condition and charismatic presence; for the Gassendist and Merleau-pontian Philosopher, a constant labor; for the museum and theater-goer, a passing moment; for the mad and traumatized, a psychotic projection, a visceral, soldierly sacrifice, a constant, present suffering of history and memory in a remarkable, futural vision.

To review and summarize our analyses in further detail and their outcome for lived, aesthetic versions of the Baroque, an examination of the spiritual dimension of this trans-European period in culture demarcated by the religious schism in Western Christianity known as the Reformation and Counter-Reformation has been possible by beginning with an analysis of the Spiritual Exercises (1522-1548) of St. Ignatius of Loyola (+1491,-1556). The practice of these exercises is emblematic for the involvement -- corporal, affective, radically ethical -- called forth from the addressee by Baroque representation. And the Spirituality of the Jesuit Order founded by St. Ignatius, insofar as it represents the Catholic Baroque and its role in the Counter-Reformation, can be taken as a structural model which allows us to read an entire cultural period, to include conceptions about man, in an epistemological manner beyond the religious context alone, and ultimately across centuries. This model has been particularly readable in the French context, where tensions between Protestantism and Catholicism, between the Baroque and Classicism, reemphasized
and re-marked by the influence of Cartesian dualism, allow a reading of culture in line with schismatic categories, and all serve to put the Baroque épistémè into greater relief.

For an example, then, of the *Homo Baroccus*, there is the Ignatian exercitant, who receives the *Spiritual Exercises* of St. Ignatius of Loyola, first assembled as early as 1522 and which date from 1548 in their first official publication. The spiritual director who holds the text of the exercises, as if he is already present to them, gives the Ignatian exercitant the task of constructing various Gospel scenes through the practice of Composition of Place, in what is truly an exercise in Renaissance perspectival representation and construction of space to be found again in French Classicism. Yet finally, the exercitant is given the task of *transgressing into* the space of such constructed scenes, which is facilitated *corporally* through the wilfull, systematic "Application of the five Senses" and *affectively* by wilfully adjusting oneself to the desire appropriate to the constructed scene, to result in the "as though I were present there" as St. Ignatius of Loyola says.

This ultimately transgressed space is that of Baroque representation, of a crossing through of perspective to result in a *transpective*, of presence, of being-there, of *Dasein*. It is an eclipse of distance which works in two phases; firstly, to capture the religious concept of *Immensity* (being in God or, by extension, the work) *as the work, or God, harbors the exercitant*, and as man "dwell[s] poetically", to refer to Heidegger’s (+1889,-1976) thought on the work of art. As such, it corresponds to the artistic technique of *trompe-l’oeil*, which gives the spectator the impression that he
and his own space participate in the work’s space; and linguistically, it corresponds to the second of the Three Ways of Prayer, which is a semantic contemplation of individual words to invest the self in the space of their meaning. And further, in a second phase, *it is the exercitant who shall harbor the work*, who shall in fact become a Baroque work himself in turn, to act out and begin anew, perpetually and without closure, the chain of representations towards the Baroque subjectival stance of *Inhabitation* (God, or the work, in our being) -- from garnering souls for Christ and for Catholicism, as in the objective of the Jesuit Order, to an ethical offering of self and engagement, whose extreme point would be a *birthing* of the other in a mirror image of the dolorous yet empowered affectivity of Christ’s mother Mary and, by extension, an image of the feminine. This second phase has its correlates linguistically in the third Way of Prayer, which is a rhythmic prayer infused with life and breath, and artistically in the technique of *anamorphosis*, or the paranoid hallucination of Psychosis which projects the self. In a homologous relation to the triadic orders of the Trinity, and of the balance of Symbolic Economy’s elements in the Symbolic, the Imaginary and the Real, and finally of the Saussurian sign as signifier, signified and referent, the final stage of this spatial transgression which forges the Ignatian spiritual relationship places an emphasis upon the triadic regime’s third element in the presence of the *Incarnate Son*, of the *treasorial real*, and of the *carnal referent*, what Maurice Merleau-Ponty calls the "tangible-étalon", all of which discloses a *semiotic* relation to sign and form, bringing a truth value to the work,
ultimately through the self who lives as *Homo Baroccus* in the work and through the work.

To summarize and further systematize, the Baroque work which harbors and further produces such a subject is open, vertiginous, seductive; it represents and invites further presencings, it requires reception to find its real measure, and exists finally through an active reception which is not only a spiritual exercise, but is also an ethical practice. The *Homo Baroccus* is he who practices the exercise of entering such works, who experiences the stances of Immensity and Inhabitation in doing so whether or not the context is a religious one, and who finds a corporal and affective generosity towards the other through the practice of the work, as he becomes an ambulating Baroque decor, a Baroque work, a *Humanism in motion* if you will!, and thus a seductive and directing haven for others in turn. Thus through the analysis of the *Spiritual Exercizes*, I have established the parameters of the Baroque work, of presence to it, and of the stance of the Baroque subject, to go on to take this into cross-century comparisons on the French cultural terrain.

This perception of the Baroque and its works has been interesting in light of René Descartes’ (+1596,-1650) position, whose consideration may at first be startling in the context of a study on the Baroque. But as Descartes lived through the historical Baroque, he also lived in tension with it, just as Classicism and Philosophical Modernity would begin to take hold as a result of his thought. It is this very tension which has been illuminating for our study. Descartes’ struggles with matter, in scientific works such as *L’Homme* (1633) and *La Dioptryque* (1637), with
the passions in his epistolary exchange with the Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia and the work dedicated to her, Les Passions de l'âme (1649), with the roles of mind and body in the Discours de la méthode (1637) and Les Méditations métaphysiques (1641) and the ensuing polemics, all reveal waverings very Baroque in themselves, that revolve around and ultimately resolve themselves in a dualist vision of man, where mind keeps its distance in a concluding fear of any Baroque eclipse of such, or troubling presence. This is the Cartesian who struggles with matter and passion, desperately seeking the Classical distance the Baroque imperative and its incarnate Counter-Reformation God will barely allow, vicissitudes most symptomatic in Descartes' polemic and epistolary exchanges, and rightly so. It leads to the very vision of Philosophical Modernity and of Rationalism to take hold, wherein Classicism poses a body problem.

In contrast with this Cartesian tension and torment is the scientific and philosophical thought of Descartes' contemporary, Pierre Gassendi (+1592,-1655), whose vision which was far more popular than that of Descartes' in its time, of a materialist empiricism where mind and matter are one in the epistemological, if not spiritual, enterprise, and where all thought comes, perforce, to a body.

A leap from here to 20th-century Philosophers, to the thought of Edmund Husserl (+1859,-1938) on the aesthetic, affective and volitional workings of intentional consciousness which burst asunder the fixed realms of form and meaning, as well as to his interest in the Cartesian "epoché", by which he means all that Descartes' system has bracketed out, to open upon and even constitute a "baroque and
savage world", as his student Maurice Merleau-Ponty (+1908,-1961) reads him.

With Merleau-Ponty, such an intentional consciousness becomes a thinking matter in an eclipsing "chiasm" (Merleau-Ponty’s term) of a reciprocal, intersubjective being-in (or Immensity), and being-possessed-by (or Inhabitation), of the objects of perception or desire (to include the desire for knowledge), as the sensible becomes the foundation to all truth. It is this very involvement in the object of perception which is the philosophical foundation to a "presence in the work", and thereby the jump from St. Ignatius’ Spiritual Exercises to Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception has provided the parameters for our study.

From the Baroque paintings of Simon Vouet (+1590,-1649) and Eustache Le Sueur (+1616,-1655), to what we have examined as a NeoBaroque work in René Magritte’s "Mémoires d'un saint" (1960), theatrical framing and its transgression, perspectival composition and its perturbation, absence and presence in play, are to ultimately surprise and engage the beholder — truly, humorously or ironically as in Magritte’s metacritical case — in the mystery of the workings of his own gaze, as it wavers between distance and presence.

In Jean Rotrou’s (+1609,-1650) Le Véritable Saint Genest (1645), the complex workings across the frames of a triple play-within-a-play structure of a drama of martyrdom draw and absorb the actor into his role, and finally the spectators into the inner play, in a series of reverberating conversions which do not leave the "real" spectator untouched, or contaminated to speak in the terms of Antonin Artaud’s (+1896,-1948) "Théâtre de la cruauté" where, in an exacerbation of
the workings of Baroque martyrdom drama, as we have read him, Artaud would have all trembling in sympathetic vibration ultimately upon the happening stage and in the horror of its open scene without cathartic closure.

Consummate sacrificial actors themselves who enter the theatrical, poetic and spiritual work in a spirit of conversion as practicants of the body as harboring receptacle, this generous corporality unto the point of a painful personal abjection, death or even damnation is characterized by figures such as Jean-Joseph Surin (+1600,-1655), the Jesuit priest who suffered unto his own madness and physical incapacitation the possession of the Ursuline sisters of Loudun he was brought in to exorcise (and not to exercise! although the parallel with the spiritual director/exercitant relationship is too close not to be considered here!) And again, Antonin Artaud who from within the asylum gives of himself to the "succubus of the O/other" perhaps for want of his failed theatrical vision, thereby incarnating thought and engendering the feminine -- metaphorically, delusionally, or truly -- to give the work of the Homo Baroccus a perpetual resonance without closure which ultimately implicates us. This actorial figure is not far from the spiritual director whose work it is to forge the Spirituality of the other.

Such radical body-presences, illustrations of the Homo Baroccus, have not escaped the narrative endeavor as well, particularly in the case of the war narratives of Agrippa d'Aubigné (+1552,-1630), Blaise Cendrars (+1887,-1691) and Claude Simon (+1913), where the author -- a soldier-poet -- engages a good carnal measure of his affabulated autobiographical self in his work, and thus plays out the painful
practice of his perpetual presence to, indeed a hellish, death-ridden possession by a traumatic experience in the forever-wounded memory of what has now become atemporal, offering his text as a harboring space that gives testament to and even resurrects the war-ravaged other, and so engages us as its readers to finally create such a space of memory and presence in us ourselves, not without redemptive futural consequences. Such are the miraculous workings of transpectival vision with history.

And such are cross-century examples, perhaps most radical in their 20th-century versions, of a Baroque eclipse of distance, of transpectival transgression, of excessive treasorial presence in flesh and affect to the work -- in a spiritually directive relationship or relationship of presence from the author to the reader, from the artist to the beholder, from the Philosopher to his world.

Nonetheless, Baroque presence, like the Baroque work, can be a wavering, ephemeral one, just as Heidegger speaks of Dwelling as a constant process of concealing and unconcealing. As such, the Baroque can be conceived as threaded through with the Classical lines it perturbs, it can menace to give way to its opposite in moments of an impossible living of proximity and need for the calm, unfrenzied breath of distance where the agitated part of the subject, in a dualistic gesture, is simply put aside. And yet, as with Descartes' advice to the Princess Elisabeth on the use of the Mélanges métaphysiques, we see that the Classical, dualist position can be just as unlivable as well. So the Baroque and the Classical could each be seen as the counter-discourse of the other, as monism is of dualism, and as the NeoBaroque -- a Postmodernity of plenitude where the real in a spirit of monism takes on the role of
a supplementing reception of cultural forms -- is the counter-discourse of the
Postmodernity of an exacerbated dualism which results in sevrage and errancy. How
Baroque, then, can the Baroque work be? What is its tenacity, and how long can it
be withstood? For whom, we ask, is there to be such a priviledged presence in the
work?

For the author, for the practicing (spiritual) director, and also for the reader,
spectator, beholder and exercitant who all become -- from a presence before, to a
presence within, to the conversion value of a presence possessed by the work -- that
is, who all become a spiritually-stamped equivalent of the presence the work has
beckoned, a Baroque work in turn in a continuing chain of representations, an
ambulating Homo Baroccus. *A place for the other is forged in us as we too become a
possessed actorial body, both dwelling and inhabited, choratically inspired,
chiasmically engaged, charismatically illuminated, a work of art seductive in turn,
anamorphically projective of our vision, ethically engaged for the O/other.* It is our
task as well to enter into the image each day, into the work, with feeling, with our
personal affectivity as sign and rite of successful passage, engaged ourselves in a
presence beyond historicity and in the practice of perpetual *semiosis* where, by an
exceptional grace, *the image is ultimately inscribed in the subject -- us.*² For, that
Baroque aesthetic works in hand with presence, and holds an important share in
contemporary French works is not something we wish so much to conclude, as it is
something of which we wish to persuade, to educate, to permit for our reader the

² Certainly an argument in support of cultural funding for the arts and letters.
practice as presence in turn to his or her choice of the spiritual relationships, Philosophies and works we have examined, to permit the participation in the chain of representations, in the continuation of perception, and in the never-finished elaboration of meaning. The Baroque is thus withstood in such a dynamic movement from person to person — never can it be taken standing still! so to speak, or in a contemplative mode alone. Such a Baroque stance remedies the Ultramodern and high Capitalist condition of perpetual alienation and loss, by the experience of the individual’s sensorial foundation to truth, by the wonder of his own lived body and its engagement in knowledge and history, by his own treasorial plenitude, and as a manner of being beyond these studies, not without concern for the other, and on to his next aesthetic encounter. So reception of the Baroque work offers the danger of a radical engagement, for this presence in the work, this ultimate place of the Homo Baroccus, is our own to take.

* * *


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