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The Role of Political Campaigns in State Legislative Elections

by

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A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy

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Abstract

Campaigns are an important but under-studied component of legislative elections. How candidates allocate their financial and material resources during the course of a political campaign has implications not only for election outcomes but also for representation within legislative institutions. This analysis begins an exploration of state legislative campaigns by first examining their basic features -- the organizational structure, reliance on professional consultants and party operatives for assistance, and the strategies and techniques used for contacting voters. Next, the analysis examines factors related to the candidate, financial capability, and district conditions that influence the type of campaign which is waged. Finally, the analysis considers the impact of campaign activity on the vote margins won by candidates. Information obtained from survey responses along with campaign finance data collected on candidates running in seven states in 1994 is used in the analysis (Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, and Wyoming). Results show that financial resources play prominently in affecting the type of campaign which is waged, but not always in ways we might expect. Candidates with higher levels of funding are likely to utilize more modern techniques, but they are also likely to have strong campaign organizations which make grass-roots contact possible. District conditions such as total population, population density, and media market congruence affect the choice of voter contact strategies. The results also indicate that some forms of electioneering have a greater influence than others. Overall, these findings lend support to the idea that the campaign process has implications for election outcomes as well as for representation in legislative institutions.
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Table of Contents

The Role of Political Campaigns in State Legislative Elections

I. Introduction: Campaigns and the American Electoral Process (1-36)

II. A Model for Understanding the Role of Campaigns in Legislative Elections (37-81)

III. Setting the Stage for Campaigns: The Distribution of Political Resources (82-136)

IV. Organizational Features (137-199)

V. Information Gathering (200-266)

VI. Strategies of Voter Contact (267-311)

VII. Messages Sent to Voters (312-347)

VIII. Techniques Used for Contacting Voters (348-407)

IX. Campaigns and Election Outcomes (408-445)

X. Implications and Conclusions (446-477)

Notes (478-484)

Bibliography (485-502)

Data Appendix (503-509)
**List of Tables**

<p>| Table 3.1 | Average Total Spending By Candidates Running for the State Legislature in 1994 Across 13 Chambers in Primary and General Elections | 88 |
| Table 3.2 | Average Total Spending in 1994 Primaries by Candidate Type Across 13 Chambers | 89 |
| Table 3.3 | Average Total Spending in 1994 General Elections by Candidate Type Across 13 Chambers | 90 |
| Table 3.4 | Average Spending Per Resident of Voting Age By Candidate Type Across 13 Legislative Chambers | 94 |
| Table 3.5 | Prevalence of Incumbents and Their Advantages in 1994 State Legislative Elections | 99 |
| Table 3.6 | Previous Political Experience of Challenger and Open Seat Candidates in State Legislative Campaigns | 105 |
| Table 3.7 | Comparison of District Population Characteristics Across Sample of 13 Chambers in 7 States | 110 |
| Table 3.8 | Electoral Features of Districts Across Sample of 13 Chambers in 7 States | 116 |
| Table 3.9 | Regression Analysis of Factors Influencing the Percentage of the Primary Vote Received By Major Party Candidates Running for Seats in 13 Chambers in 1994 | 122 |
| Table 3.10 | Regression Analysis of Factors Influencing the Percentage of the Two Party General Election Vote Received By Major Party Candidates Running for Seats in 13 Chambers in 1994 | 123 |
| Table 3.11 | Regression Analysis of Factors Influencing the Per Eligible Voter Spending In State Legislative Primary Election Contests in 13 Chambers in 1994 | 130 |
| Table 3.12 | Regression Analysis of Factors Influencing the Per Eligible Voter Spending in State Legislative General Election Contests in 13 Chambers in 1994 | 131 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Average Percentage of Campaign Spending Allocated to the Following Areas by Candidates Running in 1994 State Legislative Primaries</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>Average Percentage of Campaign Spending Allocated to the Following Areas by Candidates Running in 1994 State Legislative General Elections</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>Amount of Control Over Campaign Decision Making By Campaign Managers in Primary and General Election Campaigns</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>Average Campaign Organizational Strength and Professionalism Scores By State</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>Regression Analysis of Factors Influencing the Index of Campaign Organizational Strength in Primary and General Election Campaigns</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>Regression Analysis of Factors Influencing the Index of Campaign Organizational Professionalism in Primary and General Election Campaigns</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>Regression Analysis of Factors Influencing the Indices of Campaign Organizational Strength and Professionalism in Primary and General Election Campaigns</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>Percent of Total Primary and General Election Spending Allocated For Information Gathering by Candidates Running for the State Legislature in 1994</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>Median Number of Services Provided by Political Consultants in 1994 Primary and General Election Campaigns by State</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>The Most Common Activities Performed by Consulting Firms for State Legislative Campaigns in 1994 Primaries and General Elections</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>Average Level of Control Over Decision-Making Given Consultants in Primary and General Elections in 1994</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>Percentage of Candidates Reporting Assistance from Parties With the Following Activities in 1994 Primary Campaigns</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.6  Percentage of Candidates By State Who Indicated that Parties Provided Survey Data, Demographic Data and Lists of Voters in Primary Elections 235

Table 5.7  Level of Support Received From County, State, and Legislative Political Party Organizations Reported by State Legislative General Election Candidates in Low and High Competition Races in 1994 239

Table 5.8  Average Level of Helpfulness of Political Party Organizations in Providing Survey Data, Demographic Data and Lists of Voters as Reported by State Legislative Candidates Running in General Election Contests in 1994 243

Table 5.9  Linear Regression Analysis of Factors Influencing the Extent of Information Gathering in Primary and General Election Campaigns in 1994 254

Table 5.10  Linear Regression Analysis of Factors Influencing the Extent of Information Gathering in Primary and General Election Campaigns of State Legislative Candidates in 1994 259

Table 6.1  Logistic Regression Analysis of Factors Influencing the Probability of a Candidate Targeting Voters in Primary and General Election Contests 286

Table 6.2  Logistic Regression Analysis of Factors Influencing the Probability of a Candidate Targeting Voters in Primary and General Election Contests 289

Table 6.3  Characteristics In Common to Voters Targeted by Campaigns in Primary and General Election Contests 293

Table 6.4  Characteristics Common to Voters Targeted by Campaigns in Primary and General Election Contests Ranked By Order of Importance 296

Table 6.5  Effort Directed at Gaining Support of Voting Groups During the General Election by Level of Electoral Competition 299
| Table 6.6 | Incumbents, Challengers, and Open Seat Candidate Effort Directed at Gaining the Support of Independent Voters by Level of Electoral Competition | 299 |
| Table 6.7 | Regression Analysis of Factors Influencing the Effort Directed at Different Types of Voters in 1994 General Election Contests | 306 |
| Table 7.1 | What Information Candidate Believed Voters Had About Them Prior to the Primary Election Campaigns in 1994 | 322 |
| Table 7.2 | What Information Candidates Believed Voters Had About Them Prior to the General Election Campaigns in 1994 | 323 |
| Table 7.3 | What Campaigns Emphasized During the Course of Primary Election Campaigns in 1994 | 331 |
| Table 7.4 | What Campaigns Emphasized During the Course of General Election Campaigns in 1994 | 332 |
| Table 7.5 | Amount of Emphasis Placed on Messages Among Candidates Who Believed Voters Knew a Great Deal or Knew Very Little About Them Prior to the Primary Campaign in 1994 | 335 |
| Table 7.6 | Amount of Emphasis Placed on Messages Among Candidates Who Believed Voters Knew a Great Deal or Knew Very Little About Them Prior to the General Election Campaign in 1994 | 336 |
| Table 7.7 | Average Number of Messages Greatly Emphasized by Candidates Running for the State Legislature in Primary and General Election Campaigns in 1994 | 339 |
| Table 7.8 | Regression Analysis of Factors Influencing the Extent of Messages Sent During Primary and General Election Campaigns in 1994 | 342 |
| Table 8.1 | Candidates’ Beliefs About the Most Effective Techniques for Conveying Their Message to Voters | 359 |
| Table 8.2 | Percentage of Voter Contact Spending Allocated in Primary Election Campaigns for Various Forms of Voter Contact By Candidates Running for the State Legislature in 1994 | 368 |
Table 8.3 Percentage of Voter Contact Spending Allocated in General Election Campaigns for Various Forms of Voter Contact by Candidates Running for the State Legislature in 1994

Table 8.4 Percentage of Candidates Who Engage in Various Forms of Voter Contact in Primary Campaigns in 1994

Table 8.5 Percentage of Candidates Who Engage in Various Forms of Voter Contact in General Election Campaigns in 1994

Table 8.6 Regression Analysis of Factors Influencing the Percentage of Voter Contact Spending Allocated to Personal and Broad Forms of Voter Contact in Primary and General Elections in 1994

Table 8.7 Percentage of Candidate Time Allocated to Various Activities During the Height of their 1994 Primary and General Election Campaigns

Table 8.8 Percentage of Candidate Time Allocated to Various Activities by Candidates in 1994 Primary Elections

Table 8.9 Percentage of Candidate Time Allocated to Various Activities by Candidates in 1994 General Elections

Table 8.10 Regression Analysis of Factors Influencing the Percentage of Time Candidates Allocate for Specific Types of Activities During the Height of Their Campaign Effort in 1994

Table 9.1 Regression Analysis of Factors Influencing Primary and General Election Vote Percentages in State Legislative Elections in 1994

Table 9.2 Regression Analysis of Campaign Spending Influencing Vote Percentages in Primary Elections in 1994

Table 9.3 Regression Analysis of Campaign Spending Influencing Vote Percentages in General Elections in 1994

Table 9.4 Importance of Factors in Determining the Outcome of Primary and General Election Campaigns
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 9.5</th>
<th>How Much Does the Campaign Matter for Who Wins and Loses?</th>
<th>441</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table 9.6</td>
<td>How Much of an Effect Did the Republican Sweep Have on Your Election?</td>
<td>441</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## List of Figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure 2.1</th>
<th>Traditional Model of Legislative Elections</th>
<th>38</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2.2</td>
<td>Revised Model of Legislative Elections</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2.3</td>
<td>Detailed Model of Legislative Elections</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3.1</td>
<td>Ratio of Challenger Spending to Incumbent Spending in Primary and General Elections by Chamber and State in 1994</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4.1</td>
<td>Who Was Most Responsible for Running the Primary and General Election Campaigns in 1994</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4.2</td>
<td>Percentage of Primary and General Election Campaigns in 1994 Reporting that Only the Candidate Was Responsible for Running the Campaign</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4.3</td>
<td>Management of Primary Election Campaigns in 1994 by State</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4.4</td>
<td>Management of General Election Campaigns in 1994 by State</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4.5</td>
<td>Median Number of Workers in Primary and General Election Campaigns in 1994</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4.6</td>
<td>Average Percentage of Workers in Primary and General Election Campaigns in 1994 Who Received Payment for their Services</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4.7</td>
<td>Percentage of Managers Who Were Paid for their Services in 1994 Primary and General Election Contests</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4.8</td>
<td>Percentage of Primary and General Election Campaigns in 1994 With Campaign Offices</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4.9</td>
<td>Location of Campaign Offices in 1994 Primary Elections</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4.10</td>
<td>Location of Campaign Offices in 1994 General Elections</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 5.1</td>
<td>Percent of Campaigns Engaging in Different Forms of Information Gathering in 1994 Primary Election Campaigns</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 5.2</td>
<td>Percent of Campaigns Engaging in Different Forms of Information Gathering in 1994 General Election Campaigns</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 5.3</td>
<td>Percentage of Campaigns With Consultants in 1994 Primary and General Elections</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 5.4</td>
<td>Percentage of Campaigns Engaging in Different Forms of Information Gathering in 1994 Primary and General Election Campaigns by Candidate Type</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6.1</td>
<td>Percentage of Campaigns that Target Specific Types of Voters in Primary and General Elections in 1994</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 8.1</td>
<td>Percentage of Voter Contact Spending Allocated for Different Forms of Contact in Primary and General Election Contests Across 5 States in 1994</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I
Introduction: Campaigns and the
American Electoral Process

Introduction

From school board candidate to presidential contender, nearly all who seek public office in the United States must first win some form of popular election. In order to win an election, however, most candidates must first engage in political campaigning as a means of gaining voter support. This study is about the process of campaigning -- how modern political candidates go about winning votes, what factors influence the type of campaign which they wage, and what role these campaigns play within the political system.

In one respect, the ultimate goal or objective of any campaign is the same - to win more votes than the opponent or opponents. However, the manner in which campaigns are waged often varies dramatically. The organizations created, the people who assist the candidate, and the forms of voter contact used, are often very different from one campaign to the next. While these differences are probably obvious between presidential versus school board campaign, huge differences often exist among candidates seeking similar offices. This is no more apparent than in state legislative contests. As this analysis will show, the campaigns by candidates vying for seats in state legislatures often vary
dramatically both across and within states. Take for instance the characteristics of the three state legislative campaigns described below:¹

- An open seat contender in a general election contest has a full-time manager in addition to a part-time campaign committee who plan and make strategy for the campaign. The organization occupies rented office space downtown where volunteers along with paid staff make phone calls and prepare mailings for distribution. Several fund-raisers and “meet the candidate” receptions are held prior to the election. Large contingents of volunteers (100 over the course of the campaign) block-walk, going door-to-door in the evenings and on week-ends drumming up support for the candidate. The candidate himself campaigns full-time approximately two months prior to the election, talking with any group of voters who will listen. While the campaign is not considered financially “well-off”, it can afford advertising space in several local newspapers as well as signs which many supporters place on their property or along roadways. The bulk of the voter contact dollars, however, is allocated for direct mail and “literature drops”. Lists of potential supporters in the district are purchased from a political consultant and these voters form the core of the campaign’s target audience. The candidate’s personal qualifications and past community service are the major components of his campaign message.
• Another first-time candidate running in a primary election contest has little or no organizational apparatus. She has no campaign office, and only one or two friends and relatives who can be considered “volunteer” workers. She continues her full-time job and campaigns occasionally in the evenings and on weekends when she attends candidate forums. The campaign does little door-to-door canvassing and scheduled no fundraising events. She is mostly bankrolling her own campaign although she is relying on some support from a state-wide women’s organization. She has purchased one newspaper advertisement and a few commercials on a local radio station. She obtained lists of registered voters from the county registrar’s office but has not utilized professional consultants for any part of her operation. She is targeting women in her campaign and therefore emphasizes themes she believes will resonate with women voters.

• Another candidate is a four-term incumbent who faces opposition by a relatively unknown contender in the party’s primary election. She plans limited amounts of campaign activity, only campaigning herself two weeks prior to the election. Fundraising effort is limited to a reception in the state capitol nearly a year before the election. A full-time staff was put in place soon after the opponent announced his candidacy. In addition there are a number of seasoned volunteers who have supported the incumbent in previous campaigns who erect signs in surrounding
neighborhoods and hand out flyers at polling places on election day. A political consultant is retained who handles most of the advertising which is focused primarily on phone banks and direct mail. The target audience in the election are those voters who have supported the incumbent in the past. In other words, the goal is re-mobilization of the incumbent’s core supporters. The candidate’s major objective over the course of the campaign is to remind voters of her past service to the district.

As these examples clearly illustrate, political campaigns even for the same office differ rather widely on a number of different dimensions: the organization, the reliance on professional consultants, the target of their efforts, the messages emphasized, and the extent of personal forms of contact with voters. It is the contention of this analysis that these differences matter. They matter for who wins and who loses on election day and they matter because campaigns are the point at which a relationship between the candidate and voters is forged.

Political campaigns are a central component of the American political system. It is through a campaign that a candidate for public office builds a coalition of supporters who will turn out on election day. Campaigns are vehicles which candidates use to inform and mobilize voters. As such they play a key role in representative democracy. Unfortunately, political scientists have been slow to incorporate the campaign process into their analyses of elections. This is particularly true with regard to research on state legislative elections. This project offers a beginning look at campaigns in this setting.
While many studies are concerned with the influence of campaigns on individual voter perceptions and behavior, this study's focus is on the campaign itself. Attention is given to several characteristics of campaigns including their organization, information gathering, strategic planning, and techniques used for communicating with voters. This study views the campaign as a process whereby resources such as money and political experience are transformed into appeals for votes on election day.

In addition to chronicling the differences which exist in campaigns across districts and states, this analysis is also concerned with what accounts for these differences. Why is it that some candidates have very strong organizations while others have weak ones? Why is it that some campaigns use personal forms of contact while others use more media oriented varieties of contact? These differences may be due to variations in the campaign environment related to district characteristics and levels of electoral competition. Or they may have to do with the fact that some candidates have more funding than others, or that some have more political experience than others. One of the major goals of this study is to sort out what factors are responsible for the variations we observe in state legislative campaigns in 1994.

Other parts of this project explore the consequences of these differences for how well candidates perform on election day. Is it necessarily the case that those candidates who have stronger organizations and who utilized more sophisticated techniques are the ones who do better at the ballot box? More importantly, what are the consequences for representation in legislative institutions? Might some types of campaigns promote greater candidate-citizen interaction than others?
Do Modern Political Campaigns Enhance or Detract from Representative Democracy?

Opinion polls in recent years find public approval for national institutions such as Congress at an all-time low (Davidson and Oleszek, 1996, p. 426). Many contend that excesses present in modern election practices are at least partially to blame for these attitudes. For example, the increasing levels of campaign spending have been widely reported by the media in recent years (Sorauf, 1992). In addition, negative attack advertising has become the norm in many congressional contests (Hagstrom and Guskind, 1992). Many citizens now believe that campaigns are mostly about obtaining the necessary funding to hire professional consultants who essentially tell candidates what to say in order to get elected. Only candidates who have both thick skins and thick wallets have a chance at winning in the current political environment. These perceptions are perpetuated, if not instilled by those who study campaigns, in the titles of books such as The Best Congress Money Can Buy (Stern, 1988). From this perspective, modern political campaign practices detract from ideals associated with representative democracy in a variety of ways which together reduce accountability on the part of public officials to government. Public officials owe their election less to individual voters today than they do to big monied interests and to political consultants who, in effect, win the election for them.

From a somewhat different perspective, campaigns are viewed in a much more positive light. While campaigns may indeed be dominated to a greater extent by the mass media, political consultants, and big money contributors, campaigns remain the major point of contact between candidates and voters. The bottom line is that candidates must
appeal to voters for support, because votes are ultimately what gets them elected. While
the nature of campaign practices may have changed in recent years, the part of campaigns
and election which is most important -- accountability to the voters -- remains the same.
This interaction is what representation is all about.

Do modern electioneering practices detract or enhance representation in American
politics? A brief review of some of the literature on the role of campaigns in electoral
politics will highlight several aspects of these varying perspectives.

**Roles of Modern Political Campaigns**

Campaigns play a variety of different roles in the American political system.
Writing about congressional elections, Clem (1976) summarizes the functions of political
campaigns: "(1) inform and educate voters as to the issues and candidates, (2) polarize or
commit groups, voters, and candidates with respect to one another, and (3) determine who
shall exercise authority and responsibility" (p. 6). These might be considered the
traditional functions of campaigns whereby candidates convey information about their
beliefs and issue positions and voters use this information to make a calculated choice at
the ballot box. This ideal conforms quite well with the work of Downs (1957) and others
who view voters as utility maximizers who vote for the candidate closest to his or her
own set of issue positions. Campaigns are about voters making choices among
competing alternatives.

Within this traditional perspective, campaigns are also important part of
representation. It is the process by which candidates build a coalition of voters to whom
the candidate is beholden for reelection (Gore and Peabody, 1958). These voters become part of what Kingdon calls the "supporting coalition" (Kingdon, 1966) or what Fenno (1978) calls the "reelection constituency" (p. 8). Campaigns are the process by which these coalitions are forged and where candidates interact with constituents. Mileur and Sulzner (1974) say that the campaign is "the principal point of contact between the representative and his constituents" (p. 6). This process provides for a two-way flow of communication between voters and candidates.

From such a perspective campaigns are a positive force for representative democracy. Throughout the campaign candidates educate voters about their positions and qualifications and voters make decisions based on this information. Campaigns are also a period of interaction between the representatives (or soon to be representatives) and the represented. In effect, campaigns are the vehicles through which the ideals of representative democracy are transformed into concrete activities.

This perspective of campaigns and their role is most closely identified with electoral politics in the United states lasting from the mid-1800s to the early part of the 1900s when parties dominated the political scene. Prior to the advent of the mass media and modern voter contact techniques, political parties and candidates were the main sources of information for voters and grass-roots politicking was the primary means by which information was conveyed (Dinkin, 1989; Salmore and Salmore, 1985). While often considered the heyday of party politics in American democracy, this period is also a time when campaigns operated in the idealized manner which many believed they should operate today.
From a more cynical viewpoint, campaigns are anything but a force for promoting democracy. This is particularly true in the period of modern political campaigns. Those espousing this perspective note that voters are relatively uninformed about the issues, have little knowledge of the candidates and base their voting decisions primarily on party identification. Through their campaigns, candidates in effect take advantage of an ill-informed electorate. Utilizing modern techniques of persuasion such as “agenda setting” and “priming” (e.g., West, 1993), candidates do not really provide voters with choices so much as they influence the standards which voters use to make their choices. Messages sent to voters have less to do with substance than an image developed increasingly by professional political consultants or advertising agencies to appeal to specific types of voters. New technologies now available make it possible for candidates to target and mobilize only certain segments of an electoral constituency. Only those voters likely to respond favorably to messages are provided with this tailored information.

With these advances in technology and professionalism, candidates have come to rely more on money than ever before. In order to be competitive in the current political environment, candidates must amass large amounts of funding. This activity is viewed as detrimental for several reasons. One is that it favors those candidates who can raise large sums of cash over those who cannot. Only those who have large bank rolls themselves or friends who do have the ability to run for political office. The need for large amounts of cash severely limits the field of potential candidates. In addition, there is a concern that the need for large amounts of cash means that candidates must spend increasing amounts
of time fundraising instead of interacting with potential voters. In effect, the campaign for dollars has become more important than the campaign for votes.

With regard to representation, many worry that there is little voter contact between candidates and voters. The mass media has become the preferred method of contact. Gone are the days when candidates went door-to-door asking voters for support. Any hands-on contact with voters in the district is done primarily for the cameras to be broadcast through the mass media. Some have referred to this as "political marketing" (e.g., O'Shaughnessy, 1990). Many reformers worry that such changes in campaign technology and media-oriented techniques remove the candidate from the fray of politics. Political campaigns are waged like product campaigns, often by professional consultants. Candidates leave the campaign to professionals who sell their image to targeted groups of voters predisposed toward a particular message. The result is often the election of a candidate who has interacted little with potential constituents and constituents who know only about the image created by the political consultant. Commenting on these new techniques, Selnow (1994) indicates that the new technologies of campaigning have:

> imposed a medium between the candidate and the voter. There are fewer and fewer occasions for direct contact, and when these do occur, they are often staged to serve media needs for camera footage, rather than to meet voters face-to-face. Today, we have mostly rubber-gloved campaigning. Candidates don't touch voters directly; they send their messages through broadcasts, print and direct mail. These technologies separate and isolate voters from the candidates (1994: p. 6).

While campaigns may clearly have lived up to some of the ideals in earlier parts of American history, today they perform mostly latent functions. Edelman (1964)
indicates how elections serve to reinforce democracy by making citizens feel as though they are taking part in government. Nimmo (1970) reiterates this point in saying that "campaign communications are symbolic utterances that enlist faith in one candidate, arouse fear of another, create both reassurances and doubts, and provide the illusion of an open debate of issues, personalities, and parties" (p. 7).

_A Focus on the State Legislative Level_

Do modern campaigns promote or detract from our ideals of representative democracy? Unfortunately, it is difficult to answer such a question because we do not really know very much about the campaign process. While we know a good deal more than we used to about the level of resources utilized by candidates and about the predispositions and behaviors of voters, we know much less about what comes in between these two parts of the political process. This analysis considers campaigns of state legislative candidates who run under a variety of electoral conditions. Findings from such an analysis will make such an evaluation of modern campaigns possible.

It may be that many of the negative aspects of political campaigns which exist in national level politics or in congressional campaigns are not pervasive in the system. In other words, we may find that such characterizations of campaigns may indeed apply to presidential and congressional campaigns, but not to those in the state legislative setting. One could argue that state legislative campaigns more accurately reflect the manner in which campaigns should be conducted. Such campaigns are often characterized by a high degree of personal interaction with voters (e.g., Mileur and Sulzner, 1974). In fact, the
close proximity of state representatives is often part of the rationale given for shifting power to states from the federal level (Nathan, 1996). However, others argue that campaigns and elections even on this level in recent years have come to resemble their congressional counterparts (Rosenthal, 1996). Such critics point to the high levels of spending and the use of sophisticated voter contact technology utilized by state legislative candidates (Graff, 1992; Salmore and Salmore, 1996). A major question for this analysis is to determine the extent to which state legislative campaigns have taken on many of the negative characteristics so often associated with congressional or state-wide races. If there is variation in campaign styles, what factors lead to some campaign styles and not to others?

We know very little about the nature of campaigns on the sub-national level. We know even less about those factors which influence the types of campaigns which are waged. This is particularly worrisome in light of reforms instigated in recent years which have the potential to dramatically change the campaign process (Alexander, 1991). For example, many states have begun to consider reforms that would effectively limit spending in state legislative races. Given the paucity of research on the campaign process, we have little idea about the implications of such reforms. In order to assess their potential impacts, we need to know more about the campaign itself. What effect does spending have on different aspects of this process? Are these effects always negative as so many reformers have assumed? Without a thorough understanding of some of these basic relationships, reforms may not bring about their intended effects.
A focus on the campaign will also help to answer a more fundamental question concerning the role of campaigns in the political process. Do modern state legislative campaigns promote or detract from the ideals of representative democracy? The contention of this study is that they have the potential to do both. Whether campaigns promote or detract depends to large extent on factors associated with the type of candidate running in addition to the electoral and institutional context in which the campaign is waged. This analysis considers many of these factors as they influence various aspects of the campaign process in state legislative elections in seven states in 1994.

What We Know About Political Campaigns

While there are a variety of roles attributed to political campaigns, the number of academic studies of the actual process are relatively few. In general, most political science research focusing on electoral outcomes has slighted the possible influence of campaigns. As Salmore and Salmore (1985) indicate, “[t]hose who have studied politics almost always have attributed electoral outcomes to anything but the actual campaigns” (p. 1). Richard Fenno (1996) makes a similar point, saying that “[p]olitical scientists have devoted more time and energy to the study of elections than to any other subject . . . [w]hat is surprising to someone who follows the exploits of campaigning politicians is how little of our huge elections research effort has gone into the study of campaigns” (1996: p. 76).
Why have political scientists given so little attention to this seemingly important topic? One explanation offered is that the campaign process is simply difficult to study. Agranoff (1976) notes that campaigns are short-term operations, made up of personnel who change from election to election. He goes on to comment that "campaigns are usually characterized by an aura of secrecy and self-interest because it is thought advantageous to keep one's strategy and techniques within the organization" (p. 2).

However, probably the most important reason for so little research directed at campaigns is that for many years political scientists believed that their impact on election outcomes was minimal. Many of the early voting studies found that voters usually made their voting decisions prior to the beginning of the campaign (Berelson et al., 1954; Lazarsfeld, et al., 1944) and that activity leading up to the elections served mostly to reinforce existing preferences. Political party identification was viewed as the primary determinant of vote choice (Campbell, et al., 1960). Studies on the congressional level found voters to be relatively unaware of congressional candidates (Mann and Wolfinger, 1980; Stokes and Miller, 1962). Goldenberg and Traugott (1984) indicate these findings moved research toward looking at "a variety of factors largely beyond the control of either candidate for congressional office -- incumbency, the state of the economy, and public assessments of presidential performance" (p. 6). Campaign effects, for all intents and purposes, were seldom examined.

Much of the literature written on elections in both individual and aggregate level studies has assumed in large part that campaign effects are minimal. This is clearly the case with those studies which develop models to predict voting in presidential elections.
Many of these studies are capable of predicting quite accurately the outcome of presidential elections long before the campaign gets underway (Campbell, 1992; Lewis-Beck and Rice, 1992; Rosenstone, 1983).

Are we to conclude from these findings that political campaigns play only a marginal role in electoral politics? Are these endeavors merely futile attempts by candidates to change the inevitable? Are political practitioners and consultants who believe their efforts are critical for success simply fooling themselves and others who often pay for their high-priced advice? As I will argue, this minimal effects thesis (or conclusion as I will refer to it) is in fact premature and misguided for several reasons.²

First, studies which attempt to determine the influence of campaigns have looked almost exclusively at general election contests. However, this might be considered a rather stringent test given the fact that voting districts are increasingly drawn to benefit a particular party. Partisanship of the district is not a factor in primary election contests. Lacking a partisan cue, what other factors are likely to have an impact? Incumbency is clearly one factor, but what if this cue is also removed? It is when these guideposts of incumbency and party are absent that campaigns may play their most prominent role. Flanigan and Zingale (1994) note, "[a]lthough research has shown little individual change in vote choice or issue positions during campaigns, to some degree this is because studies have devoted most attention to highly visible general elections -- the types of elections in which voters are most likely to have made up their minds early and firmly" (p. 155).

Aside from studies on presidential nomination contests (e.g., Bartels, 1988), few studies have examined the influence of campaigns in primary elections.
Secondly, there is a flaw in the argument that if few voters are affected by campaigns then campaigns do not have much of an impact. The fact is that in districts where there is near parity of political party attachment, any influence on voters can be significant. Erikson and Wright (1989) indicate “[a]lthough voters are not well informed about their local House candidates, it does not follow that the candidates have little impact on election outcomes. Movements by relatively few voters in a constituency can create a major surge for or against a candidate” (p. 100). Lazarsfeld, et al. (1944) found that about 8 percent of voters during the 1940 presidential campaign actually switched their preferences during the course of the campaign. Given the context of high partisanship within the electorate at that time, even this small effect had the potential to be important, however, these early studies did not interpret this effect as meaningful.³

A third reason has to do with the types of elections researchers have focused on -- almost exclusively presidential and congressional contests. For presidential contests especially, studies have shown how aggregate election outcomes are predictable well in advance of the campaign. Does this lead to the conclusion that campaigns have no effect? Gelman and King (1993) who find election outcomes to be quite predictable several months prior to the election contend that this finding should not be interpreted to mean that campaigns are ineffectual. Much of the activity on the part of a campaign is simply canceled out by the activity of the opposing campaign(s). Campaigns are influential, it is just that these efforts are not detectable in aggregate election outcomes. In presidential contests especially where both sides are well equipped, a great deal of this canceling out takes place. But what about those contests where the opposing sides are not
so evenly matched? It is in those races where campaign effects are probably greater and also more visible.

A fourth reason for believing that the minimal effects thesis is flawed involves the changing nature of American politics. Goldenberg and Traugott (1984) call the minimal effects conclusion “an accident of history” (p. 4). They indicate that voting studies which came to this conclusion were conducted in the 1940s when partisanship within the electorate was very strong, when there were few major issues which divided the electorate, and before the rise of media-oriented politics. However, the political landscape of American politics has changed dramatically over the past several years. The most important of these changes has been the decreasing party attachments of American voters (Wattenberg, 1984). Agranoff (1976) indicates that “[o]nce-powerful party organizations that mobilized a pre-existing bloc of voters behind a party ticket have given way to a new politics dominated by personal cliques, based on ‘stars’ of politics who employ new means to mobilize a more fluid electorate” (p. 10). This has led to the emergence of more candidate-centered campaigns which make use of more technologically advanced forms of communicating with voters (Agranoff, 1976; Salmore and Salmore, 1985). It is up to the candidate and his or her own team effort and not the party machinery to get out the vote on election day.

A great deal of effort in the political science community has gone toward understanding the nature of these changes. However, most of this effort has been from the perspective of the voter. The question became, if partisanship was no longer structuring the vote choice, what was? Several different avenues of inquiry have been
examined including: evaluations of the parties' performance (Fiorina, 1981), issues (Nie, Verba, and Petrocik, 1976), and candidate images (Abramowitz, 1980; Jacobson, 1992; Mann and Wolfinger, 1980; and Nimmo, 1970). Many studies on the level of the voter examine the effects of information on voter evaluations of candidates (Ansolabehere, Behr, and Iyengar, 1993; Bartels, 1993; Popkin, 1991). Studies of congressional elections noted greater volatility in inter-election vote swings (Mann, 1977) and have found voters to be influenced by a number of different factors, many of which emanate from the political campaign (Jacobson, 1992; Westlye, 1991).

Many of the factors found to be important such as issues and ideology, are important because campaigns bring them to the voting public's attention. Therefore, studies in recent years have started to focus some attention on facets of campaign activity as they affect individual voter decisions. For example, studies examine the effects of candidate advertisements on voter preferences (Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1995; West, 1993). A study by Westlye (1991) of U.S. Senate campaigns finds campaign intensity to be a contributing factor to the levels of information held by voters. Charles Franklin (1991) focuses on the effects that different issue positioning strategies have on voter perceptions. A recent study by Thomas Holbrook (1996) aptly entitled, *Do Campaigns Matter?* shows how events during the course of the campaign season have significant effects on public support for presidential candidates.

Unlike earlier studies, this more recent research shows how voters are influenced by what goes on in the political campaign. However, nearly all of them focus on only one aspect of the overall electoral process -- perceptions on the part of the voters.
Richard Fenno notes “for most political scientists most of the time, the study of elections has meant only the study of voters and their voting behavior” (1996: p. 76). The missing part of the puzzle seems to be about how these perceptions are influenced. What is the mechanism by which issues are brought to the attention of voters? How are these reactions by voters elicited? What types of messages are sent to voters? How are these messages delivered? These aspects of the process are important to understand as we evaluate the role of campaigns in representative democracy.

The Study of Political Campaigns

To say that political campaigns have been completely ignored in the political science literature would be a mis-statement. There have in fact been many studies. However, this body of literature suffers from a number of maladies, the most prominent being a lack of theoretical development and little attempt at quantitative investigation. Few studies go beyond simple descriptions of the process. There is little attempt to hypothesize about those factors or conditions which lead to the development of particular types of campaigns. Nor is there an effort made to explain how the differences observed in campaigns play a role in the larger electoral or representational process. Empirical studies which attempt quantification usually operationalize campaigns as total spending and fail to consider those aspects of the campaign which are not measurable in dollars. As I will demonstrate, these quantitative studies suffer from conceptual as well as methodological difficulties.
A popular approach to the study of campaigns has been to examine them in very
general terms. A study by Salmore and Salmore (1985), for example, looks at the
changing nature of elections in America and traces the development of candidate-centered
politics. Studies by Agranoff (1976) and Sabato (1981), among others, focus on the
changing campaign technologies which have accompanied these candidate-centered
elections.

Other studies provide rather descriptive accounts of political campaigns and are
usually about a particular presidential contest. Some of these are insider accounts written
by people who worked for particular candidates, others are by reporters, and some are by
academic scholars (Chagall, 1981; Germond and Witcover; 1989; Greenfield, 1980;
Lamb and Smith, 1968; Levin, 1966; Maisel, 1982; and White, 1961). These are often
“blow-by-blow” accounts of the ups and downs of a particular campaign, the strategy
used, and some normative assessment about the effects of a particular candidate’s efforts.
Many of these can be considered case studies about one campaign (e.g., Maisel, 1982) or
about several (e.g., Clem, 1976). Richard Fenno’s work clearly fits into the category of
case study research on the congressional level (e.g., Fenno, 1978 and 1996).

Quantitative analyses have become more prevalent in the campaign literature in
recent years, particularly those studies which focus on candidate spending. Following the
adoption of campaign finance reform legislation on the national level in the early 1970s,
political scientists were provided with a convenient measure of campaign effort. A
number of studies have examined in great detail the financial aspects of political
campaigns for Congress (e.g., Fritz and Morris, 1992; Herrnson, 1995; Jacobson, 1980;
Magleby and Nelson, 1990; Sorauf, 1992) as well as for the state legislature (Gierzynski and Breaux, 1991; Jones and Borris, 1985; Moncrief, 1992, 1998; Thompson, Cassie, and Jewell, 1994). While many of these studies concern the amounts of spending and where the funding comes from, a large number have used total spending as the operational definition of campaign effort. Several studies have attempted to link this variable to voter participation in legislative elections (Caldeira and Patterson, 1982; Caldeira, Patterson, and Markko, 1985; Tucker, 1986). However, a preponderance of attention has been given to the role of spending on electoral outcomes (Abramowitz, 1988; Breaux and Gierzynski, 1991; Gierzynski and Breaux, 1991, 1993, and 1996; Giles and Pritchard, 1985; Glantz, Abramowitz, and Burkart, 1976; Jacobson, 1978; Owens and Olson, 1977; Tucker and Weber, 1987; Welch, 1976).

A general finding to come from this literature is that spending has an important influence on turnout in legislative races as well as on the percentage of the vote candidates receive. Many studies have followed attempting to more clearly specify the relationship between spending and votes. For example, Kenny and McBurnett (1994) find that some types of voters are affected more by spending than others. Gierzynski and Breaux (1996) show how district level factors condition the influence of spending on aggregate voting in state legislative elections. However, most of the attention in this literature has revolved around the impact of spending by different types of candidates, particularly between incumbents and challengers. A spirited debate has ensued over this issue with some scholars contending that incumbent spending has no effect on election outcomes (Jacobson, 1978 and 1980) while others arguing that it does have an impact.

It is important to point out that the focus on spending is but one aspect of political campaigns. While it may be a good predictor of candidate success or failure, a focus solely on this indicator is problematic both conceptually as well as methodologically. Unfortunately, few studies go much beyond an operationalization of campaign effort as total spending.

To begin with the methodological problem, it should be recognized that operationalizing the campaign as total dollars is probably a very imprecise measure of effort. Studies by Fritz and Morris (1992) as well as by Morris and Gamache (1994) have shown that candidates running for Congress often spend large amounts of campaign funds on things other than voter contact. Use of total spending without taking into account the non-campaign related spending has been shown to mis-measure the effects of spending in congressional (Ansolabehere and Gerber, 1994) as well as state legislative (Hogan, 1998) elections. Some studies have attempted to avert this difficulty by focusing only on media expenditures (Dawson and Zinser, 1971; Jacobson, 1975; Wanat, 1974) however, this conceptualization too is limited in that not all voter contact is conducted through the mass media.

There is also a conceptual problem with operationalizing campaigns as total dollars spent. While total spending may be a convenient way to measure effort, there are many other aspects of the process that may be as important as the amount of money spent. For example, Gary Jacobson notes the importance of strategy as well as monetary
resources saying that "[e]ffective campaigns require a strategy for gathering at least a plurality of votes and the means to carry out that strategy" (1992: p. 63). He cites the comments of one political consultant who makes the point that money is only part of the explanation because "smart dimes can beat dumb dollars." What can be termed the political practitioner's perspective argues that campaigns are about many things besides advertising. They are about organization, information acquisition and strategy. In order to more fully understand why some candidates win and why others lose we should probably focus on other characteristics of campaigns aside from just advertising spending. A number of studies written as "how-to" manuals discuss various parts of the campaign thought to be critical for winning such as organization, strategy, voter contact techniques, targeting, and opposition research (Beaudry and Schaeffer, 1986; Shea, 1996; Simpson, 1996). Jacobson notes of congressional campaigns that a candidate's "skills, resources, and strategies have a decisive effect on election outcomes" (1992: p. 7). Unfortunately, few academic scholars have systematically or quantitatively examined these campaign dimensions.

If they are not adequately conceptualized or measured as total spending, is there an alternative? One option is to view the campaign as actual voter contact. A number of studies examine the effects of canvassing efforts by parties on the propensity of voters to go to the polls on election day (Blydenburgh, 1971; Crotty, 1971; Cutright and Rossi, 1958; Katz and Eldersveld, 1961; Kramer, 1970-71). More recent studies have examined party contact on voter participation with attention given to several contextual factors.
(Caldeira, Clausen, and Patterson, 1990; Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1992; Krassa, 1988).

Many of these studies operationalize effort as reported contact by voters.

But these studies too take a very limited view of campaigns. The focus is mostly on their effects. Little information is given about the overall process of deciding which types of people to contact or about how this contact occurs. Thomas Holbrook (1996) notes in a recent book on presidential campaigns that “[a] political campaign must be understood to be a process that generates a product, the election outcome, and like any other process, one cannot expect to understand the process by analyzing only the product” (p. 132). The process has many parts to be explored such as the organization, the gathering of information, and the strategy of allocating resources, as well as the actual contact made with voters. These aspects of campaigns probably have an influence on the election outcome, but they may also have implications for representation in state legislative institutions.

A few studies have approached the topic of campaigns in a more quantitative fashion while addressing some of these concerns. Some studies have examined their inner workings. Studies by Kingdon (1966) Hershey (1974 and 1984), Kayden (1978), as well as Goldenberg and Traugott (1984) fit into this category. Some have attempted to link certain environmental or candidate characteristics to particular aspects of the campaign which is waged (Hershey, 1974; Kingdon, 1966). Others have been more concerned with describing the process and have traced the strategies and techniques used to attract voters (Goldenberg and Traugott, 1984). However, the total number of such
studies is quite small — a rather amazing state of affairs given the growing “candidate-centered” nature of politics in America over the past 30 years.

While many of these studies do examine the campaign process using quantitative methods, these studies more often than not fail to develop an overarching theoretical framework or model. For example, there is usually little effort to determine the effects of outside factors (related to the district and to the candidate). Barbara Hershey (1974) as well as Goldenberg and Traugott (1984) do focus on how uncertainty surrounding the election outcome affects various aspects of campaign effort. However, there are probably many other aspects of the environment besides uncertainty which may be as important to consider.

It seems that there are several groups of individual studies focusing on different aspects of the campaign process. Many studies focus on the descriptive and process aspects but provide only qualitative assessments of strategy and tactics. Other studies use quantitative methods but focus almost exclusively on the financial parts of the campaign. Academic scholars have focused attention primarily on the effects of candidate characteristics, district-level conditions, and campaign finances as explanations for election outcomes. Political practitioners, on the other hand, attribute election outcomes to strategy and decision making.

This review of the literature seems to indicate that there is a disconnect in the flow of research on this topic. Several different strands of literature are focusing on different aspects of the process, but no one study brings them together into a unified theoretical framework. Only marginal amounts of effort have been given to making the linkages
between the external environment and internal campaign components. Little effort has been devoted to reconciling the perspectives of academic scholars and political practitioners as to the importance of particular aspects of the campaign.

One recent study which has moved toward making these linkages is Paul Herrnson’s (1995) analysis of 1992 congressional campaigns. This research focuses very closely on the inner workings of congressional campaigns and tries to link strategic decisions to election outcomes. For example, he examines the differential effect of spending strategies on aggregate vote shares received by congressional candidates. He considers the impact of a wide range of variables including candidate characteristics, district conditions, and financial resources as well as campaign-level factors. Overall, Herrnson concludes that:

*campaigns matter a great deal in the outcome of congressional elections. National conditions are significant, but their impact is secondary to the decisions and actions of candidates, campaign organization, party committees, organized interests, and others who are involved in congressional elections. This comes as no surprise to those who toil in campaign, but it is in direct contrast to what many scholars would argue (1995: p. 2).*

The approach taken in this analysis is similar to Paul Herrnson’s study of congressional elections (1995). The goal is to develop a more integrated theory of the campaign process which takes into consideration the linkages between context and campaign characteristics. Such an approach will make it possible to consider a wide range of factors considered to be important both by academic observers of elections as well as by political practitioners. In addition, it provides more detailed information for
making evaluations about the potential impact of political campaigns within the
American political process.

State Legislative Campaigns

An argument often given for returning power to state governments is that state
policy makers are "closer to the people." This makes it possible to tailor policies to the
needs of their constituencies better than a large, often distant national government. This
argument is based in part on two assumptions concerning state government. One is that
state political institutions are relatively more open and accessible than national
institutions. The other is that members of state institutions more clearly reflect the beliefs
and concerns of voters. Some empirical support is provided for these assumptions by
Rosenthal (1996) who find that by the mid-1990s these institutions were "more
representative and democratic than at any time in the past" (p. 108).

The goal of the present analysis is to assess the campaign process utilized by
candidates running for state legislative institutions in the 1990s. Are the assumptions
about state legislative institutions accurately reflected through the campaign process? In
other words do state legislative campaigns promote democratic government in a way that
campaigns for higher level offices, particularly Congress, do not? How might this
finding vary by type of legislative institutions which exist in different states?

Over the past several decades as policy responsibilities have slowly devolved
from the national level, state legislative institutions have undergone dramatic changes
(Van Horn, 1996). A number of studies have reported increased legislative support
services, compensation for members, and structure and functions across a number of states (Bowman and Kearney, 1986; Rosenthal, 1996). These changes are often referred to as the “institutionalization” or the “professionalization” of state legislatures. As their importance has increased, these institutions have become filled with more career-oriented politicians (Ehrenhalt, 1991; Pound, 1992) who have the ability to raise and spend increasing amounts of money to win elective office (Alexander, 1991; Jewell and Olson, 1988; Jones, 1984; Moncrief, 1992, 1998; Neal, 1992; Singer, 1988).

Some argue that these changes have uniformly altered the characteristics of campaigns and elections to state legislative office. Graff (1992) notes that technologies that were once available only to candidates on the national and state levels such as direct mail, powerful computer programs, and access to electronic media have become commonplace in state legislative races. Tommy Neal (1992) suggests that the increased use of this technology has contributed to the higher costs associated with legislative campaigns. Such observations have led some to conclude that state legislative campaigns have become more “congressionalized” (Salmore and Salmore, 1996). Unfortunately, such assessments have been made with little systematic investigation.

Others, however, indicate that campaigns are not the same in all states, primarily due to differences in legislative professionalism. While all state legislatures have undergone some changes over the past several decades, some have undergone more than others. There is presently a great deal of variation in legislative professionalism (Kurtz, 1992; Mooney, 1995). Some studies have noticed that there are also differences reflected in aspects of elections to these bodies. For example, some studies find that spending by
candidates is higher in those states which have more professional legislatures (Hogan and Hamm, 1998; Moncrief, 1992, 1998). A major question is to determine the extent to which institutional differences influence the characteristics of the campaigns waged in the states. Is it the case that candidates running in states with more professional legislatures also engage in campaign activities that are most like their congressional counterparts? If this is true, do we find such campaigns also possess some of the negative aspects associated with congressional campaigns? If they do, what does this tell us about the rationale for returning power to the states as well as for the continued strengthening of these legislative institutions?

A focus on the state legislative level makes it possible to observe the potential effects of institutional arrangements that a focus solely on the congressional level could not provide. Examining candidate campaigns in a variety of setting makes the development of more generalizeable theories possible. Some studies have assumed or have even concluded that the electoral process on the state legislative level is essentially the same as the electoral process on the congressional level. Ruth Jones (1986) has indicated, for example, that the differences in elections are "primarily of degree and not kind" (p. 8). A major goal of this analysis is to determine whether or not such an assessment is accurate.

In addition to institutional differences across states, the state legislative setting provides a much wider variation across other factors which are also likely to play a role in campaigns. Take for instance level of spending. Studies indicate that spending varies across congressional districts and candidate types (e.g., Magleby and Nelson, 1990;
Sorauf, 1992), but spending varies a great deal more across states (e.g., Moncrief, 1998).

Moncrief finds average spending by candidates to vary from a few thousand dollars in states like Wyoming, to over several hundred thousand dollars in states like California. A contextual feature which is of importance to campaigns has to do with district population. Congressional districts vary somewhat on this dimension, but certainly not to the degree that state legislative districts vary.

As indicated already in the literature review, the study of state legislative campaigns is generally very limited. There are few studies which focus on campaigns themselves. Most studies focus on the campaign effects which are generally operationalized as total spending. As Tucker and Weber (1987) note, "[t]he literature on state legislative election outcomes has focused on determining whether political party strength, incumbency, or campaign expenditures have the greatest impact in general elections" (p. 537). Beyond this, there are only a few single-state studies and these examined campaigning in the 1960s (Adaman, 1972; Mileur and Sulzner, 1974; Olson, 1963). Overall these studies found that campaign communication techniques focused primarily on personal contacts with voters. There is some attempt by these studies to link candidate and district characteristics to campaign style, particularly by Mileur and Sulzner (1974), but little overarching theory development.

One recent study focusing on state legislative candidate expenditure patterns in Kansas and Texas finds limited support for the idea that state legislative campaigns have become more congressionalized. While many campaigns often make use of more modern forms of technology such as reliance on campaign consultants and use of television
advertising, such usage is far from pervasive (Hogan, 1997). However, these findings are based on data from only two states and look exclusively on the financial aspects of campaigning. Before any definitive conclusions can be made about campaigns in state legislative races, more data from a variety of states should be examined.

From this brief review of the literature, it should be apparent that very little is known about state legislative campaigns. We know from empirical studies that the types of people who win state legislative office have been changing in recent years and the costs of running have grown dramatically. However, we do not know the consequences of these changes for the campaign process. Has the result of these changes meant that state legislative campaigns have become more “congressionalized” as Salmore and Salmore (1996) have suggested? Are technologies that were once available only to congressional candidates now a common part of state legislative elections? Or have these changes in campaign technologies not yet filtered down to this level? If there is variation in the use of such techniques, what factors are responsible for these variations? How prominently do institutional differences play in these explanations?

**Intent and Focus of This Research**

One of the goals for this project is to develop a theoretical framework for the study of political campaigns and to test it in the state legislative setting. Building on previous work which examines the resources utilized by campaigns, the intent is to look at the process by which these resources are transformed into votes. Several sets of questions will be addressed in this study. First, what are the characteristics of campaigns
waged on the state legislative level? For example, how professional are these endeavors and what types of techniques do they use to contact voters? Second, what factors determine the type of campaign which is waged? How do factors related to the candidate running, level of funding, and district conditions have an influence on characteristics of the campaign? Third, what difference does it make how campaigns are waged? What are the implications of various campaign styles for representation in state legislatures?

A second goal for this project is to come to some normative assessments concerning campaigns in the American political system. Some view campaigns and elections in the state legislative setting as conforming more closely to the ideals of representative democracy than campaigns for higher level offices such as for the U.S. Congress. Campaigns to these offices are viewed as being less dominated by professional politicians, modern campaign techniques, and big-monied interests. A major goal of this study is to determine the extent to which state legislative campaigns have taken on many of the characteristics of "modern" campaigns. What do these campaigns look like, what determines their characteristics, and what effect do they have within the electoral process? By answering these questions, we can better assess the degree to which campaigns promote or detract from the ideals of representative democracy.

This research project differs from existing work in several fundamental ways. First, candidate campaigns are the unit of analysis, not the individual voter. Instead of determining individual voter reaction to particular types of campaign messages, this research focuses on the process of campaigning. How candidates go about putting
together an organization, gathering pertinent information, and strategically contacting voters is the focus.

A second way this research differs from other work is its reliance on quantitative data analyses. Many studies take a very descriptive and qualitative approach. Some researchers even suggest that many of these campaign characteristics cannot be quantified. Fenno (1996) seems to indicate this when describing two U.S. Senate campaigns by saying that “there may be important campaign and candidate characteristics that are difficult to pick up in aggregate cross-sectional analysis and are more readily available to observers on the campaign trail. One is the degree of control exercised by the candidate and the campaign team over the course of the campaign. The other is the timing of candidate and campaign decisions” (p. 106). Clearly these are factors that are difficult to quantify and include in a statistical analysis. However, there are many other characteristics of a political campaign that can be studied quantitatively and such a focus may produce important insights.

A third departure from previous research is its focus on factors within the control of a candidate and other campaign decision makers. As indicated earlier, most political science literature on elections focuses on a campaign’s resources which are most often beyond the control of candidates -- political party strength, incumbency status, and total campaign spending (Tucker and Weber, 1987). The goal for this research is to examine what comes in between these resources and the election outcome. What impact do choices made by campaign decision-makers have? How can we begin to reconcile differences between the political science perspective on campaign effects and the political
practitioner's perspective? Ezra and Nelson (1995) recently wrote that "[t]he one clear difference that emerges in an examination of the way political scientists and political practitioners look at elections is that political scientists assume, by and large, that election outcomes are determined by forces other than the election campaign, whereas political practitioners assume that the campaign itself determines the outcome" (p. 224). This analysis will begin to look at how several aspects of the campaign process might be linked to how candidates fair on election day.

The overarching goal is to understand what conditions determine the types of campaigns which are waged and what impact campaigns have on election outcomes. Daniel Shea (1996) notes that "how candidates and other players in the election process attempt to win office remains a mystery in the political science literature" (p. 6). The intent of this research is to gain a better understanding of this process. Such information will add to our existing knowledge about elections. While models of election outcomes using political resources explain a large portion of the variation in the percentage of the vote candidates receive, these models leave a large portion of the variation unexplained. Information about campaigns may provide a key to explaining more of this variation.

Overall, this information will help to bridge the gap in our research between campaign resources and election outcomes.

In addition to filling these gaps in the elections research, the findings may have a number of normative implications. For example, with the rising costs of political campaigns, many reform-minded individuals worry about the disparities in resources available to candidates for political office. Much time and attention has been focused in
particular on the disparities in levels of spending by incumbents and challengers (e.g., Alexander, 1992; Magleby and Nelson, 1990; Sorauf, 1992). But, little is known about the actual result of these inequalities. For example, are candidates who have fewer financial resources restricted in the types of techniques that they can afford? How tied to financial considerations are things such as use of consultants and information gathering? Might the disproportionate allocation of such tools of campaigning present a major obstacle to candidates?

Outline of the Study

The outline of this study is as follows. A model of political campaigns is developed which shows how various factors influence the nature of the campaign process (Chapter Two). Next, the contexts in which campaigns are waged in the seven sample states are examined along with a focus on the resources utilized (Chapter Three). Organizational aspects are then considered (Chapter Four) along with informational gathering techniques (Chapter Five). In each of these chapters the goal will be to determine the influence of the resources that were noted in Chapter Three. In other words, how do candidate characteristics, level of funding, and contextual factors influence the type of campaign which is waged? The strategy for targeting voters is examined in Chapter Six, followed by a look at the types of messages that legislative candidates typically send (Chapter Seven). The focus then moves to those options available for sending these messages and those factors which influence the choice of voter contact (Chapter Eight). The effects of campaign effort are then taken into account
along with candidate perceptions about the influence of campaigns (Chapter Nine). A concluding chapter (Chapter Ten) summarizes the major findings and considers their implications for representative democracy in the United States in the 1990s.
CHAPTER 2
A Model for Understanding the Role of Campaigns in Legislative Elections

Congressional campaigns play a vital role in the U.S. system of government.
--Goldenberg and Traugott

Campaigns, by their very nature, are difficult to study.
--Dawson and Zinser

Introduction

In this chapter a theoretical model of the campaign process is developed. The initial part of this chapter provides a description of what are considered to be three important dimensions of any political campaign. The discussion then moves on to how factors related to the candidate and financial capability along with district and state contextual features influence the type of campaign that candidates choose to create. It is then shown how the campaign fits within the larger electoral process by affecting election outcomes.

As the initial chapter explained, most studies of legislative elections have focused primarily on the resources related to the district, the candidate, or the particular election to explain election outcomes. These studies have all posited a direct relationship for each of these variables. Figure 2.1 displays the model empirically tested by most of these studies. However, such a model is problematic for two reasons. One is that it really does not capture any aspect of the political campaign. Such a model assumes that political resources such as money and political experience are automatically transformed into votes. However, this transformation process, henceforth called the campaign, may determine whether or not these resources even have an impact on election outcomes.
The second and more important problem with such a model has to do with its focus on explaining only one dependent variable -- the election outcome (usually measured as the percentage of the vote received by a candidate). In doing so it ignores more complex interactions among variables which form a political campaign. For instance, there is no consideration of campaign strategy or organization. These aspects may be crucial to election outcomes, but they are also important because they form the basis of interaction between candidates and voters. Therefore, we may want to explain what factors are responsible for the characteristics of the campaign that is waged.

Not all studies on political campaigns have ignored the complexity of the campaign process and its role in electoral politics. Studies of presidential campaigns in particular have attempted to model such dynamics. Several of these studies look at the campaign process from the perspective of candidates and other campaign operatives who make decisions regarding issue appeals and resource allocation (e.g., Aldrich, 1980; Brams and Davis, 1974; Geer, 1986) These studies focus on what Gurian (1993) calls the "intermediate processes" of the campaign (p. 116). The present analysis takes a similar perspective, but considers a wider array of factors as part of this "intermediate stage" of elections.

This analysis re-conceptualizes the campaign process normally presented by models of legislative campaigns by positioning a variable called the "campaign" in between the resources and election outcomes. Figure 2.2 displays one way that we can conceive of the role of campaigns in the electoral process. The campaign becomes the sieve through which these resources must pass as they are transformed into votes on
Figure 2.2
Revised Model of Legislative Elections

Election Outcomes

Campaign Process

Candidate Characteristics
- Candidate Status
- Political Experience
- Electoral Experience

Campaign Spending
- Total Spending

District Conditions
- Electoral Competition

Contextual Features
- National Economic Factors
- National Political Factors
election day. While rather intuitive, it is important to understand that this is very different from how most models of election outcomes are tested -- the campaign process itself is usually not part of the model.

The purpose of this chapter is to outline a general model for the study of political campaigns. The major factors that have an impact on the campaign and how the campaign has an influence within the electoral process will be delineated. However, before moving into a discussion of how these factors are integrated, we need to first define what is meant by the term "campaign". As we shall see, campaigns have several dimensions, each of which is important to consider in evaluating their role within the political system.

**What is a Political Campaign?**

The definition of a political campaign varies significantly from study to study. To some, the term "political campaign" refers to the totality of behaviors exhibited by candidates, workers, members of the media, and voters prior to an election. Clem (1976) for example, lays out a list of functions which a campaign performs, among them the education of voters, the polarization of groups of voters, and the determination of who shall exercise authority. Here the campaign is a rather amorphous entity, denoting a span of time rather than an actual behavior or action.

Other scholars view campaigns in more concrete terms. To some "campaigns" are the decision-making organizations (Hershey, 1974; Lamb and Smith, 1968). To others, they are resources and are operationalized as total spending (e.g., Jacobson, 1978).
However, for a number of studies, campaigns are behaviors exhibited by candidates and their workers. Leuthold indicates that "an election campaign can be considered as the process of acquiring and using the political resources that can secure votes" (1968: p. 1). Nimmo (1970) defines a campaign as those "activities of an individual or group . . . in a particular context . . . designed to manipulate the behavior of a wider number of people . . . to his advantage" (p. 10). Finally, Salmore and Salmore (1985) indicate that "[o]btaining useful and reliable data about the voters -- and getting appropriate and persuasive information to them -- is what a campaign is all about" (p. 10). To all of these authors a campaign is not an amorphous group of behaviors exhibited by various actors, but instead is a calculated behavior exhibited by those attempting to elect a candidate to office.

The definition used in this study is one which draws on several of those just mentioned. For the purposes of this analysis, the campaign is not simply one thing, the organization, the strategy, or the resources, but is in fact all of these things. It is for all practical purposes a process that has many component parts. Utilizing such a perspective makes it possible to see how resources such as incumbency, political experience, and campaign finances are translated into votes on election day.

Before getting into the specifics concerning the various components, it is probably prudent to first set the parameters of this project by indicating what topics are within its scope. As indicated earlier, part of the campaign process to be examined has to do with the strategy of getting elected. However, this strategy is very different from the strategy often considered in studies which have to do with candidate decisions about running for
office (Barber, 1965; Jacobson and Kornell, 1983; Schlesinger, 1966). The perspective of the present study does not consider the strategy of getting into the race. The candidates under consideration have already decided to run for the office so the strategy has to do primarily with obtaining votes.

This study is also not concerned very much with the strategy of raising resources. Herrnson (1995) as well as Salmore and Salmore (1985), for example, speak of two campaigns, one for resources and one for votes. While fundraising is an important part of a political campaign and its effectiveness may lead to increased revenues and subsequent spending, it is not the major focus of this research. Some attention will be given to the amount of time and money allocated toward fundraising, however, the major focus will be on the campaign for votes and how the money raised is then used to attract support.

Having established some boundaries, I will now move on to a more detailed description of political campaigns. More specifically, I will begin with a discussion of what are considered to be the three important dimensions of any political campaign.

**Dimensions of a Political Campaign**

In order to study the campaign process, it is necessary to break down its component parts into manageable pieces that form its core. After a careful review of the literature on campaigns, three crucial dimensions have been identified:

1. *organization*

2. *information gathering*

3. *voter contact strategy*
Organization

The organization refers to the campaign's staff, facilities, and decision making structure. These are the concrete parts of the campaign that one can actually observe. The role of the organization is to deal with the mechanics of getting the candidate elected. It is within the organization where plans are made, information is gathered, and human and monetary resources are assembled. While some organizations have rather elaborate chain-of-command structures consisting of large numbers of hired or volunteer workers, others are more small-scale operations which employ relatively few workers.

What does it matter if there is a large organization or a small one? What are the possible consequences of a campaign run by professionals as opposed to one run by amateurs? Several studies note the importance of organizations to decision making and processing of information (Hershey, 1974; Lamb and Smith, 1968). Evidence from the study of political party organizations (Gibson, et al., 1983) shows their level of strength influences their activity. Fenno (1996) indicates that the nature of interpersonal interactions among candidates and workers has implications for overall campaign effort.

From the perspective of political practitioners, the organization is extremely important. Sweeney (1995) notes that the organization is a key component that should be part of the overall plan. He notes that "[a]ll organizations must first define their inner workings to themselves in order to be successful in any contest, and political campaigns are no different from any other effort organized to win a competition" (p. 26). Many books written from the "how-to" perspective spend time speaking to the importance of
putting together an effective organization (e.g., Beaudry and Schaeffer, 1986; Golden, 1996; Simpson, 1996).

In this analysis, several organizational components are examined. Like Herrnson (1995) who focuses on fundraising and Hershey (1974) and Kayden (1978) who examine the time and effort directed at assembling a variety of resources, this analysis focuses on efforts directed at satisfying internal needs. Attention is given to fundraising components since the flow of money is an internal need which is often considered a central feature of any modern campaign effort. But more importantly, attention will be focused on the aspects of the organization which are expected to influence the campaign’s more fundamental role of acquiring votes. Two characteristics in particular will be examined in detail: the strength of the organization and its level of professionalism.

A campaign’s organizational strength refers primarily to the number of people working and the division of labor among them. In organizations with many workers, there is a greater potential for a division of labor to develop. Greater task specialization in an organization may provide an advantage if several activities are occurring at one time: raising money, garnering media attention, setting up meetings with the candidate, planning the schedule, gathering information, developing strategy, etc. In campaigns with few workers, most of the workers will probably be “generalists” in the sense that they have to do several different tasks. Task specialization may lead to greater job performance. Tasks such as obtaining media attention may be performed better if there is a designated worker whose job it is to cajole the news media into covering the candidate.
Another aspect of the organization to consider involves the professionalism of the campaign team. For example, we might want to know if the workers are experienced at practical politics, if any of them are seasoned veterans of past campaigns, or if they are amateurs who are working in their first campaign. An indicator that might give insight into several parts of this dimension is whether or not workers are compensated for their efforts. Those who receive monetary compensation are probably paid because they provide a degree of expertise.

The strength and professionalism of a campaign organization are necessary to consider as they contribute to the campaign’s ability to garner votes, but they may also perform a vital role in the representation process. Stronger organizations which have many workers may make face-to-face campaigning with voters more likely. Extensive grass-roots campaigning is probably not possible without the aid of a well-developed organization.

*Information Gathering*

Two aspects of information gathering are considered in this analysis. The first involves the types of information which campaigns gather. The second concerns those professionals who assist candidates in gathering, interpreting, and using this information for purposes of creating and targeting messages to voters.

An understanding of the electoral environment, past voting trends, and the competing candidate(s) are considered by many to be the keys to success. In a recent article about designing a campaign strategy, Joel Bradshaw notes some essential pieces of
information that a campaign must consider: the number of votes to be cast in the district, how many votes are needed to win, how many votes can the candidate expect (given past voting in the district), and how many voters are persuadable (p. 34, 1995). Such knowledge can be critical when developing a campaign theme and deciding which voters to target.

Greater levels of information help candidates allocate their resources more efficiently. John Kingdon reports one worker’s comments saying that “half the money spent on campaigns is wasted. The trouble is, we don’t know which half” (1966: p. 87). Greater information about the political environment may help reduce some of the uncertainty which surrounds elections. Information can therefore play an important role in shaping decision making strategy.

Where do candidates acquire this information? They can collect it themselves, they can get it from a party organization or interest group, or they can hire a political consultant. Studies of party organizations show that parties now provide a number of services to candidates including polling and voter information (Cotter, et al., 1984; Gierzynski, 1992; and Shea, 1996). Several studies have documented the increasing role which political consultants now play in modern electioneering in the United States (Agranoff, 1976; Luntz, 1988; Sabato, 1981). Professional consulting firms provide an array of services for political candidates on many levels of government. Spending by candidates on consulting services has risen rapidly (De Vries, 1989) and some report its growing use in state and local elections (Salmore and Salmore, 1996).
Very little is known about the role played by party professionals and political consultants. It is expected that the use of consultants will strengthen the impact of voter contact. Consultants can provide information, but they can also provide a number of other services. They can assist candidates in devising strategy. They can also help candidates and managers in deciding which voters to target in an election, the type of message to convey, and how best to deliver their message.

_Voter Contact Strategy_

Strategy occurs at different stages throughout the campaign process including the decision to run (Jacobson and Kernell, 1983). However, the strategy to be examined mostly in this analysis involves the strategy of voter contact -- or put another way, the plan to go about building an electoral coalition. Strategy refers to decisions with regard to the types of voters to be contacted, to the campaign messages sent, and to the vehicle chosen to deliver these messages.

If we assume that the goal of a campaign is to win the election, decision makers will attempt to appeal to voters in the most efficient manner possible.\(^5\) Candidates are utility maximizers, they want each unit of their political resources whether it be money, volunteers, personal time, etc. to "purchase" as many votes as possible. Decisions about voter contact strategy are based on a number of factors related to the campaign environment.

For the purposes of this analysis, voter contact strategy involves three sets of decisions:
a. Which voters will be contacted?

b. What message will be conveyed to voters?

c. How will voters be contacted?

**Which voters will be contacted?**

One of the first questions a campaign decision maker must answer is what voters will be part of the targeted audience? This allows messages to be tailored accordingly and makes it possible to allocate resources for voter contact expenses in a way that will reach the intended group of voters.

As Goldenberg and Traugott (1984) point out “political campaigns are not necessarily designed to reach every voter. Using finite resources, candidates try to reach enough voters to build a winning coalition. One of the important elements of campaign tactics is deciding who will be targeted” (p. 47). Candidates must decide which voters are needed to create a winning coalition.

To what extent are campaigns targeting voters and to whom are these appeals being made? In general election contests are candidates targeting only supporters of their own party, independent voters, or voters of the opposition party? In other words, is the campaign attempting to mobilize, persuade, convert, or some combination of the three? The nature of targeting has implications for overall levels of citizen involvement. Denise Baer, for example notes that “[a]lthough targeting is necessary because of limited resources, it can undermine the recruitment and socialization of new voters” (p. 54).
What message will be conveyed to voters?

Candidates must decide the type of message they want to send to voters in order to win their support. There are two different perspectives on how this process works. One is that candidates run for office because they are interested in a certain set of issues. The candidates secondarily seek out support among voters who have similar concerns and interests. Another point-of-view is probably best labeled the Downsian (1957) perspective and assumes a somewhat more devious ordering of decisions on the part of candidates -- they first figure out how many votes they need to win and then fashion a set of messages which appeal to the largest segment of voters.

This analysis will not attempt to untangle the ordering of these decisions and takes a rather agnostic perspective. It assumes that decisions about which voters to contact and the type of message to send are intrinsically linked and determining which comes first for any one candidate is nearly impossible. For the purposes of this analysis, the causal ordering of these decisions is less of a concern than the decisions themselves. Each decision -- the target and the message -- is therefore considered separately.

Several questions are addressed. What types of issues are stressed? Is the candidate touting potential policy proposals, his or her own personal qualities, the oppositions’ qualities (or lack of quality, as the case may be) or simply trying to get his or her name before the public to boost recognition among voters? Is the campaign stressing a large number of issues or just one or two? The content of the message is important because it ultimately influences what voters will learn about candidates. Because news media pay less attention to state legislative races than many other more high profile races,
characteristics of the candidates' messages are often the only information which voters have to base their voting decisions.

For the purposes of this analysis, I am most interested in who is targeted and to whom the message is delivered. While some aspects of the message itself are important, it is assumed that voters will respond favorably to these messages.\(^7\)

**How will voters be contacted?**

Once a target and a message have been formulated, candidates and other campaign decision makers must then decide how to deliver the message. What types of techniques will be used? There are several options available including: canvassing (door-to-door or via telephone), mailings, signs, newspapers, radio, television, etc. There are benefits as well as liabilities attached to the use of various techniques based on each form’s directness, relative cost, targeting capacity, and ability to convey a particular type of message. Campaign decision makers consider these differences along with their specific situation. They take into account the nature of their own targeted audience, the type of message they wish to convey, the present campaign context, and available resources. Each of these factors is likely to play a role in the choice of technique.

In order to best explain the differences among the various modes of voter contact, I will first categorize them into three types based on two dimensions. The first dimension involves the control over the message. How precisely can messages sent through this method of contact be delivered? I use the terms “narrow” and “broad” for modes of contact as they fall on this dimension.\(^8\) Narrow forms of contact are those that can be
delivered to specific types of voters in the district while broad forms of contact are those which cannot be delivered with as much precision and often reach some voters unintentionally both inside and outside the district.

The other dimension involves the personal nature of the contact. Does the contact involve any human interaction (personal) or does the voter simply receive mail or hear a radio advertisement (impersonal).

For the purposes of this analysis I have categorized these forms of contact into three types. Below I will elaborate on each.

i. Narrow-based, personal techniques

ii. Narrow-based, impersonal techniques

iii. Broad-based techniques

Narrow-based, personal techniques involve basically canvassing voters either by telephone or face-to-face. Face-to-face campaigning can be accomplished in places where voters congregate (e.g., shopping malls, sporting events, or fairs), by visiting voters door-to-door, or by meetings with groups of voters. Canvassing is probably the most direct and personal form of voter contact that a campaign can use. It enables the campaigner (maybe even the candidate himself or herself) to provide voters with a great deal of first-hand information about the candidate’s character, political experience, community service and issue positions. Canvassing provides an opportunity for campaigners to elicit one-on-one commitments of support from voters. In addition to these advantages, canvassing is also a very selective form of campaigning — it is often
surgical in nature. When accurate and detailed information is available, campaigns can contact only those voters they want to contact. This may be why several studies find canvassing efforts to be highly effective in influencing turnout (Gosnell, 1927; Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1992; Katz and Eldersveld, 1961; Kramer, 1970-71). A final advantage to this type of technique is that it can be relatively inexpensive. Candidates who may have little money but a great deal of time and volunteer support can use this technique quite effectively at a low cost (Herrnson, 1995 notes for example that “field work expenses make up a relatively small percentage of the typical congressional campaign’s budget,” p. 197).

There are some major disadvantages to canvassing. First, it is highly labor intensive and requires a massive coordination if pursued on a large scale. For districts containing many voters (in the hundreds of thousands, for example), it is doubtful that canvassing can have any major impact on election outcomes. Canvassing may also be prohibitive if a candidate has little time to engage in such activity or is unable to assemble a large contingent of workers.

The other type of narrow-based contact includes impersonal forms. These methods include the use of billboard and mailings. These forms of contact are narrow in the sense that they can be used selectively to reach only certain types of voters in the district. Signs can be placed only in certain neighborhoods and mail can be sent to only certain types of voters. They are impersonal in the sense that they do not require contact with voters either by the candidate or by the candidate’s agent(s). These techniques do
require, in order to be effective, information about voters living in the district -- names and addresses of potential supporters.

Broad-based techniques include television, radio, and newspaper advertising. These techniques make it possible to reach a large number of voters in the district. Two of these techniques (radio and television) are in fact "broadcasting" techniques. All three techniques are very good for candidates who want to reach a great many voters living throughout the district. However, these techniques might not be suited for every candidate and every type of campaign. Along with the advantage of reaching a rather large audience come two liabilities: the relative inability to control who receives the message and the rather impersonal nature of the contact.

Daniel Shea says that "how a campaign goes about conveying its message is often undervalued" (1996: 170). Some techniques may be more effective for particular candidates than others and the choice has the potential to affect the election outcome. Choice of techniques might also have implications for representation. For example one consequence of using more narrow forms of voter contact is that they may severely limit the ability of the "non-targeted" voters to make informed voting decisions. The nature of the contact may also influence the representational style of candidates who become elected. For example, winning candidates who engaged in little personal campaigning may lack significant exposure to constituents. If campaigning is the principal point of contact between voters and officeholders involving a two-way flow of information, and if a candidate opts to use only broad-based forms of contact, then the winning candidates may go into office with little knowledge about constituents' concerns.
A number of scholars have noted the changing nature of voter contact techniques in recent years (Agranoff, 1976; Luntz, 1988; Sabato, 1981; Salmore and Salmore, 1985; Selnow, 1994). Some have argued that the use of techniques such as direct mail and television advertising have become pervasive even in state and local elections (Salmore and Salmore, 1985). Unfortunately, such assertions have for the most part remained untested. Recent work shows that many of these more modern techniques are less relevant than many have assumed and some forms of advertising such as television are seldom used in state legislative races (Hogan, 1997). However, more data covering a wider range of states is needed before any definitive conclusions can be reached.

The Influence of Candidate, Campaign, District, and State, Level Factors on Legislative Campaigns

The campaign dimensions just described are generally not incorporated into most models of elections, yet understanding how they fit can provide valuable insights not only into what influences outcomes, but also about the interaction between candidates and voters. The goal here is to fit these dimensions into what we already know about elections. For example, we know that money has an important influence on outcomes, but here we want to know how money is used -- how does it influences the dimensions just described? Candidate status is another important feature of elections. Studies show consistently that incumbents win more often than challengers. How do such factors work through the campaign process to bring about a particular outcome?

To begin the process of understanding how all of these features fit together, we will first examine how several influence the dimensions of campaigns just described.
Variables related to the candidate, campaign financing, district features, and systemic conditions are expected to have an influence on the nature of the campaign which is waged (Please see Figure 2.2).

Candidate Characteristics

Political Experience

Candidates who have political experience generally do better on election day than those candidates who do not have such experience. Evidence to support this is found in those studies showing incumbents to have a huge rate of success in congressional (Alford and Hibbing, 1981; Erikson, 1971; Ferejohn, 1977; Mayhew, 1974) as well as state legislative contests (Holbrook and Tidmarch, 1991; Jewell and Breaux, 1988; Jewell and Breaux, 1991). In addition, evidence from the congressional (Jacobson and Kernell, 1983) as well as from the state legislative context (Van Dunk, 1997) shows clearly that “quality” challengers, or those candidates who have held other elective offices, perform better on election day than political novices.

Why do incumbents and experienced candidates generally outperform other candidates at the ballot box? Some attribute the success of incumbents to their high levels of name recognition (Jacobson, 1992), their tremendous fundraising advantages (Krasno, Green, and Cowden, 1994; Magleby and Nelson, 1990; Sorauf, 1992; ),

advantages provided by their position in government (Fiorina, 1989), or the myriad of perquisites of office (Cover, 1977; Mayhew, 1974). The high rates of success by non-incumbent quality candidates over less quality candidates (quality is defined different
ways by Abramowitz, 1988; Green and Krasno, 1988; Stewart, 1989) have been attributed mostly to their ability to understand incumbent vulnerability and run when their probability of winning is greatest (Jacobson and Kernell, 1983). Research on quality challengers has therefore focused on those conditions which lead to an incumbent challenge (Bianco, 1984; Jacobson and Kernell, 1983; Krasno and Green, 1988; Pritchard, 1992; Wilcox, 1987).

While these explanations are convincing they may not be the only explanations. There may be other reasons why incumbents and experienced candidates outperform others which are attributable to abilities or skills related to campaigning. Evidence provided by Jacobson (1980) and by Green and Krasno (1988) shows that “quality” candidates are able to raise more funds than those candidates with less experience. Biersack, Herrnson, and Wilcox (1993) find that quality challengers are able to raise more seed money from individuals and PACs. Jacobson (1980) suggest that this is due to the strategic behavior of contributors who, like the challenging candidates, sense a vulnerable incumbent.

If quality candidates have superior skills at fundraising, it would not be surprising if they also had other abilities with regard to building an organization, gathering information, and creating strategy. It is expected that candidates who have participated in politics before, either running as a candidate, managing a campaign, or holding a position in a political party will probably have a much better understanding of how to win an election. Holding everything else constant, we should find that greater experience (those candidates who are either incumbents or those who have previous political experience)
will lead to campaigns with stronger and more professional organizations which engage in more extensive information gathering efforts. In addition, the campaigns of more experienced candidates are likely to engage in targeting of voters.

Candidate Status

While it is expected that incumbent candidates will have stronger organizations and engage in more information gathering, there is another way incumbency status can have an influence on campaigns. It may affect the type of voter contact strategy regarding who is contacted, the messages which are sent, and how the contact is made.

Incumbents have usually run and won at least one prior election in the district and have established a reelection constituency. Fenno (1978) notes of U.S. House incumbents that “[e]very member has some idea of the people most likely to join his reelection constituency, his ‘lucrative territory’. During a campaign, these people will often be ‘targeted’ and subjected to special recruiting or activating efforts” (p. 9). An incumbent’s strategy is therefore one of re-mobilizing those who supported him or her in the previous elections. It is likely that candidates will target this rather narrow group of supporters, reminding them of the incumbent’s previous experience and work done for the district. Because the effort is directed at a relatively small range of voters in the district, it is likely that more narrow forms of voter contact will be employed.

The strategy for challengers and open seat candidates is likely to be very different. Unlike incumbent candidates who are trying to re-mobilize their political base, the task for challengers and open seat candidates is to build an election constituency for the first
time. These candidates are probably trying to cast as wide a net as possible, so to speak, to obtain the support of whatever voters are available. These candidates are probably likely to emphasize different types of messages than incumbents. Challengers in particular are probably likely to emphasize what many would consider to be negative messages about the incumbent. Both challenger and open seat candidates are probably less likely to target voters than incumbents because they are usually less aware of who their potential supporters are. And if they do target, they are likely to direct their efforts at a much wider range of voters than incumbents. For example, in general election contests, they are more likely than incumbent candidates to target beyond those voters who normally support their party (independent voters). Because of the different sizes of the target audience, it is likely that challengers and open seat contestants will therefore use more broad-based contacting strategies.

A distinction should be made between the types of narrow contact candidates choose to employ. In particular, it seems that incumbency status might influence the likelihood of using personal forms of contact. Incumbents are probably busy people and will be more inclined to use less personal forms of contact. Hershey (1974) notes this in saying that “[i]ncumbents are much less likely to act as delegates, much less innovative, and more inclined toward the use of mass media rather than face-to-face campaign methods” (p. 94). Unfortunately, she does not consider other forms of narrow contact which are not face-to-face, particularly mailings. Hershey’s study was published in 1974 prior to the onslaught of computer-generated direct mail which is currently accessible to a
large number of candidates. I anticipate that incumbents will be more likely to use narrow forms of contact, but that this contact will be less personal in nature.

It should also be pointed out that both candidate experience and incumbency status may also have an influence on these aspects of the campaign listed above in an indirect fashion. Studies show that incumbents (e.g., Sorauf, 1992) and quality challengers (Jacobson, 1980) are able to raise more money than open seat candidates and low quality challengers. It is therefore expected that candidates with these characteristics will be more likely to have higher levels of campaign financing and this will influence these campaign dimensions. The effects of candidate characteristics are therefore both direct and indirect. The influence of campaign financing on campaign characteristics will be discussed next.

Campaign Spending

As indicated earlier, a number of studies on the congressional as well as on the state legislative level establish the importance of spending to election outcomes and voter participation. While we now know a great deal about the effects of spending on voting, we still don’t know very much about how this money is actually used and even less about how allocation strategies influence election outcomes. Some studies in recent years have begun to examine the allocation strategy of candidates (Alexander, 1992; Fritz and Morris, 1992; Morris and Gamache, 1994). But, for the most part, our knowledge about this aspect of campaigns is severely limited.
The operational definition of campaign funding used in this analysis is the total amount of spending allocated by a candidate during the primary and general election cycles. Total spending captures the amount of funding that a candidate is willing to spend during a given election. The level of campaign spending is influenced by several factors. One of the most important is the size of the electoral constituency. Spending is likely to be greater where there is a sizable number of eligible voters to contact. In addition, spending is likely to be higher if the candidate is an incumbent, if the candidate is politically experienced, if the opponent(s) spending is high, if the election is competitive, and if the state legislature is considered to be a professionalized body. These linkages have been or will be discussed at other points in the model description. Suffice it to say that a number of these factors have an indirect influence on the three campaign dimensions through level of campaign funding (Hogan and Hamm, 1998).

There are several ways which spending probably has a direct influence on campaigns. One is that it enhances the organizational strength and professionalism of the campaign. Campaigns with large amounts of funding are able to pay for large organizations with many people who are paid wages. Those with money can also afford a headquarters as well as a paid manager and staff. Spending may also influence the level of information gathering of campaigns. Those with large amounts of funding are probably able to afford voter lists or may even be able to conduct a poll. Very well-funded campaigns may also have the opportunity to hire a professional consulting firm.

The level of spending in a particular race will probably have a significant impact on several aspects of voter contact strategy. First, it is probably the case that candidates
who spend more money are likely to use more modern techniques such as targeting voters. Campaigns with greater available funding are probably more likely to hire consultants who know how to direct the campaign’s effort toward those areas where it will do the most good. Second, more spending means that candidates may be capable of targeting a larger audience of voters. Third, higher spending will likely increase the number of messages that a candidate is able to send. Fourth and finally, the level of spending will probably have an influence on the vehicles used for voter contact. Because broad forms of contact such as newspaper, radio, and television advertising are generally more expensive, it is likely that well-financed campaigns will use these more frequently. Campaigns with fewer financial resources are likely to engage in more narrow and personal forms of contact that are generally cheaper.

*District Conditions*

**Electoral Competition**

One of the most important contextual influences on campaigns is the competitive nature of the race. Is there a high degree of competition among the candidates running for an elective position, or is one candidate a shoo-in while another candidate is merely token opposition? The characteristics of the campaign will ultimately influence the level of competition in the race, but the anticipated competition will probably have an influence on the nature of the campaign which candidates choose to implement.

There is some empirical evidence in the literature to support this contention. Hershey (1974), for example, finds that a candidate’s uncertainty regarding the election
outcome influences campaign strategy. Greater uncertainty leads to greater efforts to determine voters' feelings on issues (Hershey, 1974). Goldenberg and Traugott (1984) also find evidence that candidates whom they categorized as "sure losers" and "sure winners" "relied the least on polling information, conducting fewer than one survey per campaign on average" (p. 56). Overall, Hershey finds that "[c]ertainty about the election result gives campaigners the confidence to reduce their campaigning across the board, decreasing personal involvement as well as use of the most costly media" (p. 27).

These previous findings lead to several expectations regarding the effects of perceived closeness. It is likely that campaigns in highly contested races will be more likely to have stronger and more professional organizations. It is also likely that campaigns in more hotly contested races will engage in more extensive information gathering in order to do battle with the opposing campaign(s).

Another part of the campaign which is likely to be affected by the level of competition is strategy. Goldenberg and Traugott (1984) find in their examination of congressional candidates in 1978 that closeness of the race is associated with greater use of more broad voter contact techniques. Overall, these authors find that "[c]andidates who try to win over the independents and convert members of the other party, as well as to mobilize their own partisan supporters, target the district broadly. They turn to the media, especially to broadcasting. Those content to concentrate on mobilizing partisan supporters rely more heavily on organized campaign events" (p. 91).

Based on these findings, it is expected that candidates running in highly competitive races will be more likely to target their resources in an effort to get the most
for every dollar spent. It is also likely that competitive campaigns will target much broader audiences. In other words, high competition will increase the amount of effort directed at various types of voters. For example, in general election contests, not only will effort be directed at fellow partisan supporters, but attempts will be made to contact independent voters, if not opponent partisan identifiers for support. Level of competition may also influence the messages sent -- more messages are likely to be sent to voters where competition is higher -- candidates in these races are working hard to give voters as many reasons as possible to lend support. Finally, higher competition is likely to result in greater use of more broad forms of contact than candidates running in districts with lower levels of competition. The reason for this is that candidates in tight races will probably try to appeal to a wider range of voters in an attempt to get more votes than the opponent(s). Some candidates in tight races may indeed know who their core supporters are in the district (incumbents, for example), but they probably also know that the race is close so they target their appeal as broadly as possible.

These previous findings lead to several expectations regarding the effects of perceived closeness. It is likely that campaigns in highly contested races will be more likely to have stronger and more professional organizations, engage in more extensive information gathering, more frequently target voters, target larger audiences of voters, send a larger number of messages, and use more broad forms of voter contact.
District Population

The population of the district probably has an impact on several dimensions of the campaign. In districts with large numbers of people there is likely to be a greater need for stronger organizations. A candidate in a district with 100,000 potential voters will have much more difficulty running a campaign alone than, say, a candidate running in a district with only 5,000 voters. Candidates running in highly populated districts are also probably in greater need of information about voters as they make campaign strategy.

Total population of a district may also influence the nature of voter contact. It is likely that the higher the population of the district, the greater will be the need to target. In addition, campaigns in highly populated districts will probably rely to a greater degree on more broad forms of contact. Such contact is probably a more efficient method of reaching large numbers of voters in a cost effective fashion. Campaigns in large districts are also less likely to engage in personal voter contact activities.

As with the other factors discussed so far, total population may also have an indirect effect on the campaign as it influences the level of spending. A study of factors influencing total spending by all the candidates in a given district finds total population to be a prominent influence on spending (Hogan and Hamm, 1998). It is likely that a similar finding will result from a candidate-level analysis. That is, candidate-level spending will be higher in those districts where the population is higher.
**Population Density**

A district's population density probably has a significant influence on the nature of voter contact strategy. In legislative districts where there are only a few people per square mile, it is difficult to use personal contact (a narrow form of contact) such as canvassing. Compact districts, such as in suburban areas, allow candidates and volunteers to walk door-to-door without having to drive long distances between voters' residences or campaign functions. It is likely that candidates running in more densely populated districts will make greater use of personal campaigning than candidates running in less densely populated districts.

**Media Market Congruence**

Media market congruence refers to the degree of overlap between television viewing markets and legislative districts (See Campbell, Alford, and Henry, 1984, for an expanded discussion of this concept). I anticipate that candidates running in those districts with greater media-market congruence will be more inclined to use mass media advertising through newspapers, radio, and television. When the district population is such a small fraction of the entire market, there is much more money wasted on voters who don't vote in a candidate's district, thus candidates will opt for other ways of reaching voters.
Systemic Factors

Election Type

One of the most important factors conditioning the campaign process is whether the election is a primary or a general election. Previous studies indicate that spending in primary elections is generally lower than spending in general election campaigns (Breaux and Gierzynski, 1991). The reason for this is that the entire population of registered voters is not usually being activated in a primary election, only the candidate’s fellow partisans. It stands to reason that campaigns in general elections will have to spend more money because there are more voters to reach. Lower levels of campaign financing will result in what the model above stipulates: lower levels of campaign organization, decreased information gathering, and less use of broad forms of contact. In addition, because fewer voters are being activated in primaries, we are likely to see more narrow forms of contact used. Fewer potential voters also means a greater likelihood of personal forms of contact. Election type will not be considered as a variable in the analysis, but instead, analyses will be carried out separately for primary and general election campaigns.

State Variations

Primary and general election campaigns across seven states will be examined in this analysis. The states were chosen in order to provide a degree of regional balance as well as variation on a number of district and system level variables. However, one of the more important system-level variations is legislative professionalism.
Mooney (1995) describes the concept of professionalism as a legislature’s ability to provide its members with “adequate resources to do their jobs in a manner comparable to that of other full-time political actors, and set up organizations and procedures that facilitate lawmaking” (p. 48-49). It is likely that holding state legislative office in a professional legislature is more prized than holding such an office in a less professional or “citizen” legislature. Members of professional legislatures generally receive higher levels of compensation and they view their job less like a part-time vocation, but instead as a career. The characteristics of campaigns will probably differ dramatically between highly professional and citizen legislatures (following Kurtz’s categorization scheme, 1992). Some of these differences are probably due to differences in levels of campaign spending. Studies on this topic show that average spending is higher in states with more professionalized legislatures (Hogan and Hamm, 1998; Moncrief, 1992, 1998). In addition, it is likely that campaigns in a more professionalized setting will more greatly resemble U.S. congressional campaigns. That is, campaigns in more professional legislatures are expected to have stronger and more professional organizations. In addition, they probably engage in a greater degree of information gathering. Voter contact is likely to be different in the professional legislative setting with greater use of targeting and more broad forms of contact (particularly radio and television advertising).

While legislative professionalism is one of the major differences between the states, there may be others that are unanticipated. Care will be taken to examine states individually whenever possible or to control for them throughout the analysis.
Campaign Factors

Another set of factors which are likely to have an effect on dimensions of the campaign noted above are other parts of the campaign itself. In other words, there is likely to be a correlation between one or more of the campaign dimensions. These inter-correlations will be discussed in further detail in later chapters, however, at this point the most significant of these relationships should at least be acknowledged.

All other things being equal, it is expected that stronger and more professional campaign organizations are likely to engage in greater information acquisition than weaker and less professional ones. Strong and professional organizations by definition have more workers who possess the skills which make it possible to go about acquiring and later using information about voters in the district. The organization dimension is therefore likely to directly impact the information acquisition dimension.

Information gathering is likely to have an influence on voter contact strategy in a number of ways. For example, information gleaned from analyses of past voting patterns or polling is likely to play a large role in the types of appeals which candidates develop and use to sway voters. However, the aspect of voter contact strategy where information gathering is likely to have its greatest impact is on the likelihood of targeting. It is expected that those campaigns which engage in more information gathering will be more likely to target voters.

There are also expected to be correlations between several aspects of voter contact strategy. For example, campaigns which target voters are likely to use more narrow forms of contact (or at least a higher percentage of narrow forms of contact) than those
campaigns which do not target voters. The reason for this is very plain -- narrow forms of contact are more easily targeted than broad forms of contact.

It is important to note that while these factors are expected to be linked, it is not altogether clear about how they are linked, or more precisely stated, which factor causes the other. The causal linkages are very intertwined and untangling them may pose difficulty. However it is important to control for these aspects as we examine the many candidate, district, and state level features which impact campaigns.

The Influence of Political Campaigns

Having established the first part of the model which indicates those factors which influence the characteristics of the campaign, I will now provide a series of expectations regarding the influence of these campaign characteristics on election outcomes. As indicated previously, most studies focus exclusively on this aspect of the electoral process, usually incorporating campaign spending as a measure of campaign effort along with candidate and district characteristics to predict the percentage of the vote received. But this model posits a different arrangement, one in which the resources are utilized through the campaign to create messages which are then sent to voters. It is not the resources themselves which bring about a particular outcome, but how these resources are used.

Is there any correlation between the manner in which the campaign is waged and the percentage of the vote that a candidate receives on election day? Aspects of each of the three dimensions are expected to have an influence on the election outcome.
Two aspects of campaign organizations considered important include their level of strength and professionalism. Both of these characteristics are likely to have an independent effect on how well a candidate performs at the polls on election day. Stronger organizations have larger numbers of workers to campaign door-to-door, put up signs, make phone calls, distribute literature, and organize other volunteers. Campaigns with a more professional team are likely to possess more knowledge about the political process. Such professionals are likely to make the campaign more efficient in its use of campaign resources. Overall, it is expected that candidates who have stronger and more professional campaign organizations will garner a larger share of the vote.

As indicated earlier, a firm understanding of the electoral environment, past voting trends, and the competing candidate(s) are important to how well a candidate does on election day. This information is critical for developing a workable campaign message as well as knowing where and how to send it. Shea notes in a recent book that “much of the ‘art’ in modern campaigning comes from the creation and use of this information” (1996: p. 89). When all other things are equal, it is expected that higher levels of information gathering are likely to result in an enhanced ability of campaigns to formulate a message, choose a target population, and allocate resources accordingly. These advantages are likely to translate into advantages for a candidate at the ballot box, manifested in a higher vote share. In addition, assistance from political consultants is also likely to result in a greater payoff at the polls.

Campaigns have many choices about which type of campaign strategy to pursue. As indicated in earlier parts of this model, a number of factors related to the candidate,
campaign finances, and legislative districts influence the type of campaign strategy that is adopted. Targeting of voters is one aspect of strategy that is likely to result in a bigger payoff for the candidate at the ballot box. Those campaigns which target voters are likely to make a more efficient use of their resources than those who do not engage in such activity.

Each of these factors is expected to have a direct impact on the percentage of the vote a candidate receives. An index is constructed from these variables that will be used to test their effects. Similar to those studies which operationalize campaign effort as total spending, this analysis will consider the effects of an index of campaign activity. It is expected that campaigns which score higher on the index will garner a greater share of the vote than those campaigns which score lower on the index, all other things being equal. Details concerning the construction of the index will be provided in Chapter Nine.

While the data analysis is expect to show a positive correlation between the campaign index and percentage of the vote received, it should be noted that under certain conditions the effects of the campaign are expected to vary. More specifically, it is expected that the campaign dimensions to have their greatest effects during primary election campaigns and in campaigns where no incumbents are present. Previous research indicates partisanship and incumbency are important factors influencing voting in legislative elections. The absence of one or both of these voting cues makes it more likely that campaign effects will be greater. Lacking a partisan or incumbency cue, voters in such elections will be more susceptible to influences from campaign appeals.
Another aspect of the campaign likely to have an influence on election outcomes is the manner in which voter contact dollars are allocated. Particular attention will be given to the effects that different types of spending have on the percentage of the vote received: broad-based versus narrow-based spending. While candidates are constrained by what types they can use, it is expected that the narrow-based forms of contact are more effective than broad-based forms, all other things being equal. The reason for this is that much of the message sent by broad-based techniques is wasted. State legislative districts seldom follow media market lines closely, so many voters living in other districts who cannot even vote for a candidate receive the message. Narrow contact is more precise and can be used with less waste.

Finally, attention will be given to what candidates themselves think about the major determinants of election outcomes. Do they think that some aspects of the campaign are more influential than others? How important do candidates believe that overall campaign effort is to who wins and who loses? How might candidate responses to such questions vary by how well they did on election day? Answers to such questions may provide insight into the possible effects of campaigns for the process of representation in the state legislative setting.

Revised Model of Legislative Elections

At the end of this chapter, it seems important to reiterate an earlier point about how the perspective of the electoral process utilized in this study differs from the perspective used in most other studies. For most analyses of elections (especially
elections to the state legislature) the "campaign" is a variable operationalized as total spending by a candidate in pursuit of office. Often other variables such as candidate qualities (candidate status and political experience), district conditions (partisanship), and other contextual features (e.g., national economic or political factors) are considered alongside total spending as they have a direct influence on election outcomes. Figure 2.1 earlier in this chapter portrayed the general outlines of this perspective. This chapter proposed a model that re-conceptualizes the relationships among these variables, particularly between the resources utilized and the election outcome. Figure 2.2 showed how the campaign process would be interposed between the resources and election outcomes and would be the focus of this study.

Figure 2.3 is a more detailed portrayal of the re-conceptualized model discussed in this chapter. In this diagram, the resources, candidate characteristics, campaign finances, and district conditions are all directly linked to the campaign process, but in addition the indirect influences are also delineated. Here we see that candidate characteristics and district conditions also have an indirect influence on the campaign process as they influence the extent of campaign financing. The campaign dimensions themselves are linked with some having a direct influence on each other. Finally, the campaign variables have a direct effect on the election outcome. These are the causal connections which will be explored in the analysis which follows.
Figure 2.3
Detailed Model of Legislative Elections

Candidate Characteristics
  Candidate Status
  Political Experience
  Electoral Experience
  Party Experience

Campaign Spending

Campaign Process
  Organizational Features
  Information Features
  Voter Contact Strategy

Election Outcomes

District Conditions
  Electoral Competition
  Total Population
  Population Density
  Media Market Congruence
Data and Methods

Selection of Sample States

Most of what we know about campaigns for legislative office comes from studies about congressional campaigns. Unfortunately, such a focus precludes a clear understanding of campaign development or campaign influence in the electoral system. Many of the factors that are probably important in determining campaign features do not vary greatly across U.S. House districts. District population, for instance, varies relatively little from district to district. The state legislative setting provides a degree of variation on a number of district as well as state level features which make the development of generalizeable theories possible.

To this end, the analysis utilizes data on state legislative campaigns from seven states in 1994. All major party candidates who ran for either the state House or Senate in the primary or general election contest were used. The sample of states include: Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, and Wyoming. These states provide variation on a number of factors which are important to this analysis. For example, there is at least one state from every region of the country. However, a more important variation has to do with the states’ levels of professionalization. Because the attractiveness of the office may influence the types of people who decide to run, the amount of money they are willing to raise, and the amount of effort they are willing to expend, it is important to include some states with professional legislatures and some with less professional legislatures. While most of the states in the sample are in mid-
level in terms of Kurtz’s categorization scheme (1992), Illinois is an example of a professional legislature and Wyoming is considered a citizen legislature.

Another major concern in the choice of states is the degree of variation they provide on the district level. In the next chapter, this variation will be discussed in greater detail. Suffice it to say at this point that the districts vary a great deal on a number of district level features. For example, district population varies dramatically, ranging from a low in Wyoming House districts of a little more than 5,000 eligible voters to a high in Texas Senate districts of slightly more than 400,000 eligible voters. There is also a large degree of variation on other district variables both within and across states.

A final consideration in selecting states has to do with their campaign finance regulations. Because campaign finance data is a large component of this study, it was necessary to pick states where this information is collected and accessible.\textsuperscript{16} The states in the sample all make their campaign finance data available and do a relatively good job of collecting and maintaining the data.

\textit{Data Used in the Analysis}

The data for this analysis comes from several sources. Some was obtained through interviews with candidates and campaign managers, however, the bulk of the data for this study was obtained through a survey of candidates running in 1994 and from itemized campaign expenditure reports filed by these candidates.

Initial information about legislative campaigns was obtained through a series of semi-structured interviews with state legislative candidates in several of the states. Field
interviews with candidates during the course of their campaign were conducted with about 20 candidates in the Spring and Fall of 1994 in South Carolina and Texas. Additional telephone interviews were conducted with several candidates and political operatives in these states over the course of the campaign season. Excerpts from several of these interviews are incorporated into the chapters which follow. These initial interviews, however, served mainly as guidance during the construction of a questionnaire which was formulated during this time and mailed to candidates following the general election in November 1994.

Following the 1994 general election, all candidates who ran in races against an opponent in either the primary or general election campaign in each of the seven states were mailed a survey. The survey asked candidates a number of questions about their primary and general election campaign efforts and their perceptions about the race. Non-respondents were mailed subsequent post-card reminders as well as another entire questionnaire. Of the 1,505 candidates who were mailed questionnaires, 637 candidates completed and returned them resulting in a response rate of approximately 42%. The sample of candidates who responded to the survey request appear to be representative of the sample of candidates who ran in each of the states. A more thorough description of the survey procedure along with response rates from each of the states, a test for representativeness, and a copy of the survey instrument itself can be found in the Appendix.

The other major source of data for this analysis is the campaign finance reports filed by each candidate who ran in a race with opposition in either the primary or general
election contests. State laws in each of the seven states in the sample require that candidates report their itemized expenditures over a certain amount as well as list the date of the expenditure, to whom it was paid, and its purpose. Total expenditures by all candidates and their committees in both the primary and general election cycles were compiled for all candidates who had competition in the seven states. Itemized expenditures were collected in five states for candidates who returned completed survey responses. Each line item on these reports was coded into one of over 100 categories of expenditure types that were later aggregated into larger categories for use in this analysis. The result is over 27,800 lines of itemized expenditures or nearly $14 million worth of coded expenses. For details concerning the collection and coding of the campaign finance data please see the Appendix.

Finally, data on state legislative districts were obtained from a number of sources -- usually agencies in each state. Election data, population characteristics of the districts, population density, and media market congruence were all coded for each of the seven states in the analysis. Further details concerning the construction of these district-level measures can also be found in the Appendix.

Conclusions

This chapter provides both a model as well as a theoretical approach to the study of political campaigns and their role within the electoral process. Unlike other studies which focus almost exclusively on predicting election outcomes and usually by operationalizing the campaign as total spending, this analysis takes a markedly broader
perspective. The model incorporates a large number of factors which not only have an influence on the election outcome, but also on aspects of the campaign itself. Campaign dimensions such as its organization, information gathering, and voter contact strategy are important features that are influenced by levels of campaign financing, candidate characteristics, and district features. The campaign process itself is a dependent variable which is to be explained.

Considering campaigns in this manner is necessary if we are to better understand how a campaign influences election outcomes. For example, previous studies show that resources such as candidate spending influence election outcomes. But, how does this occur? What are these funds used to purchased? By breaking the campaign into component parts, we can better understand how the campaign brings about a particular outcome on election day. But more importantly, examining campaigns in more detail can increase our understanding of the role of campaigns in the representation process. What types of techniques are used by candidates as they attempt to reach voters? Do these techniques involve personal forms of contact or are they mostly impersonal in nature? What types of messages do candidates typically send to voters? Answers to such questions should provide important insights into whether or not modern campaign practices either enhance or detract from representative democracy.

The chapters which following empirically test aspects of the model through an analysis of campaigns in the state legislative setting. This context provides a wide degree of variation on a number of independent factors which are believed to influence campaigns. In addition, campaigns themselves are believed to vary across the states in
this sample. Such a setting provides an excellent opportunity to aid in the development of generalizeable theories about political campaigns.
CHAPTER 3
Setting the Stage for Campaigns: The Distribution of Political Resources

Campaigns possess one essential, underlying commonality: they attempt to convert political resources into preferred outcomes.

--Dawson and Zinser

Introduction

Candidate status, political experience, funding, and district characteristics are all political resources that effectively establish the parameters within which campaigns are waged. Resources providing a benefit to one candidate often present a major obstacle to another. Several studies on the congressional and state legislative levels recognize the influence of these factors on election outcomes, however, few studies examine the causal linkages among them. One of the overarching goals of this study is to trace several of these linkages to better understand the role they play. While previous research indicates that resources can dramatically influence election outcomes, few establish how they have an influence on them. This study makes such an attempt by first determining the effect of resources on various aspects of the campaign process. To this end, this chapter looks closely at the distribution of political resources by candidates running for the state legislature in the 1990s.

A number of candidates running in 1994 often mention the overwhelming importance of resources to their campaign effort. Many, particularly defeated candidates, realize the huge influence of incumbency. Comments like these are typical: “Nothing helps as much as incumbency” or, “It is virtually impossible to beat an incumbent in their
own party primary.” One candidate even advises, “Don't run against an un-indicted incumbent!” Other candidates were more quick to note another resource closely related to incumbency -- money. Following the election, several candidates indicated in dollar figures how much they had been outspent by their opponent. One candidate summed up what many candidates apparently believed to be true concerning their defeat: “Money is an obstacle that cannot be overcome.”

Other candidates attributed the outcome to resources related to district conditions. Again, defeated candidates often explained their poor showing on the partisan distribution of voters in the district. One candidate commented that, “The way the district lines are drawn has a major impact in most races.” Another said, “gerrymandering . . . sealed the fate of my district race.” Another concluded simply that “an open seat is the only chance for a Republican to win in a Democratic district.”

This chapter considers the distribution of several political resources which candidates often report as crucial to the election outcome. Several questions are addressed. First, what are the political resources utilized in state legislative elections and how do they vary by candidate, district, and state? Second, what factors are responsible for these observed variations? The effects of factors such as candidate characteristics, levels of funding, and district features will be examined. Specific attention will also be given to how other resources influence levels of spending -- a resource widely acknowledged as being the most critical in modern electioneering. A thorough understanding of such linkages will make it possible to establish in later chapters how these resources influence various dimensions of the campaign.
Understanding the distribution of political resources, the role they play in the campaign process, and their ultimate effects are critical in assessing the fairness of any democratic system of government. Many complain that access to power on the national level is restricted to only those who possess certain resources -- especially money or friends with money. State legislative institutions are often seen as places that provide greater access to individuals and groups who lack large financial resources. However, changes in many institutions over the past several decades along with rising campaign costs may have restricted this access. For these reasons, questions concerning the distribution and utilization of resources are in essence questions which concern the fairness and openness of democratic institutions.

What Are Political Resources?

David Adamany (1969) says that candidates bring to their campaigns a variety of different resources. However, the type and extent of these resources vary dramatically across candidates. The most obvious resource is of course money. But there are others. Adamany (1969) speaks of factors such as candidate experience, knowledge of the electoral district, as well as the election setting as important “resources”. Salmcre and Salmore (1985) indicate that “[t]he three critical resources for any political campaign are money, organization, and the candidate. Money buys polls, targeting data, and advertising, while organization permits direct contact with voters. To some extent, the two are interchangeable resources” (p. 10).
For the purposes of this analysis, political resources are divided into three categories: candidate characteristics, financing, and district features. Previous research shows all three play a significant direct role in influencing election outcomes. For example, a number of studies on both the congressional and state legislative levels indicate how campaign finances influence election outcomes (e.g., Gierzynski and Breaux, 1991; Jacobson, 1980).

The model developed in Chapter Two reconceptualizes the relationship between resources and election outcomes, indicating that the campaign process transforms these resources into tangible outputs -- votes. This chapter is about the resources that are available to candidates in the state legislative setting.

Campaign Finances

Former Speaker of the California Assembly, Jesse Urah, once noted that "money is the mother's milk of politics." While important throughout the history of campaigns in this country, financing has taken on added significance in the "media age" as candidates for office require large amounts of funding to communicate with voters through the mass media (Salmore and Salmore, 1985). One characteristic of money which many believe makes it more important than other resources is its mutability -- it can be converted into other resources rather easily. Candidates lacking in another resource can often make up for this deficiency with financial capability (Jacobson, 1992).

Scholars have long recognized the central role of money in American elections and have spent large amounts of time studying its various aspects. Many focus on the
sources of the sums and on the level of financing across a number of different offices (e.g., Alexander, 1992; Magleby and Nelson, 1990; Sorauf, 1992). Other studies look more closely at the effects of this money within the electoral system. Some, for example, focus on the effects of candidate fundraising ability (especially the effects of incumbent war chests) on the types of candidates who decide to enter a race (e.g., Green and Krasno, 1988; Squire, 1991). Others look at the effects of spending on voter participation (e.g., Caldeira and Patterson, 1982; Patterson, Caldeira, and Markko, 1985; Tucker, 1986). However, most of the effort within this field of study concentrates on the effects of spending on voter preferences (e.g. Abramowitz, 1988; Gierzynski and Breaux, 1991; Giles and Pritchard, 1985; Green and Krasno, 1988; Jacobson, 1978; Tucker and Weber, 1987). These models consistently make a direct linkage between total spending and voter preferences measured on either the individual or aggregate levels.

What level of financial resources are expended by candidates running in the 1990s? In other words, does it cost a great deal of money to run for the state legislature? Some indicate that costs are rising at a rate similar to those of congressional elections (Alexander, 1991; Neal, 1992; Singer, 1988). Others find that the costs have not always risen over time (once controls for inflation have been introduced) and in some states have even declined in recent years (Moncrief, 1998).

More important for this analysis than the possible rising costs associated with campaigning, is the considerable variation that exists in the level of spending allocated by candidates running in different institutional settings (Gierzynski and Breaux, 1991; Jones, 1984; Moncrief, 1992; Sorauf, 1992). In the most comprehensive study on spending by
candidates across states, Moncrief (1998) finds that spending by an average state house candidate in 1994 ranged dramatically. For example, the typical candidate running in Wyoming and Maine spent about $4,000 while a similar candidate in California spent over $300,000 (p. 43).

What is the general level of spending utilized by candidates in the seven states used in this study? Table 3.1 displays the average spending by all candidates who ran in both the primary and general election campaigns. These figures represent spending by those candidates who had major party competition in either the primary or general elections. In other words, candidates who ran unopposed or who ran against an independent or third party candidate were excluded.20

Ranking the 13 chambers by spending from lowest to highest, one can see that spending varies dramatically. In primary campaigns, average candidate spending ranges from a low of about $1,738 in Wyoming House elections to a high of about $117,444 in Texas Senate elections. Average spending is considerably higher in general elections ranging from about $3,844 in contests for the Wyoming House to about $234,404 in Texas Senate races. For every state which had elections in both chambers, spending by Senate candidates was higher than spending by House candidates. This is probably a reflection of the larger size of the Senate constituencies where there are simply more voters to contact.

To obtain some sense of how spending varies by candidate type, Tables 3.2 and 3.3 display the average spending by incumbents, challengers, and open seat contenders for the two election periods. From this perspective it is clear that even within states there
Table 3.1
Average Total Spending By Candidates Running for the State Legislature in 1994 Across 13 Chambers in Primary and General Elections*
(Chambers ranked by average spending in primary elections)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Average Spending in Primary</th>
<th>N=</th>
<th>Average Spending in General</th>
<th>N=</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wyoming House</td>
<td>$1,738</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>$3,844</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wyoming Senate</td>
<td>$3,979</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>$6,813</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware House</td>
<td>$4,139</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>$15,117</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut House</td>
<td>$5,141</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>$11,369</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Carolina House</td>
<td>$7,644</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>$15,288</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut Senate</td>
<td>$10,702</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>$37,282</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware Senate</td>
<td>$12,947</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>$19,528</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon House</td>
<td>$15,516</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>$57,433</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon Senate</td>
<td>$17,542</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>$104,949</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois House</td>
<td>$21,423</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>$95,761</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas House</td>
<td>$32,157</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>$33,322</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois Senate</td>
<td>$69,189</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>$156,136</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas Senate</td>
<td>$117,444</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>$234,404</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Contains average spending only for those candidates who faced major party competition in the primary or general election period.
Table 3.2
Average Total Spending in 1994 Primaries by Candidate Type Across 13 Chambers*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Chamber</th>
<th>Incumbents</th>
<th>Challengers</th>
<th>Open Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>$33,051</td>
<td>$13,388</td>
<td>$2,237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>House</td>
<td>$8,688</td>
<td>$3,156</td>
<td>$4,887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(9)</td>
<td>(13)</td>
<td>(24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>$12,947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>House</td>
<td>$6,484</td>
<td>$4,153</td>
<td>$3,802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>$114,396</td>
<td>$53,800</td>
<td>$62,867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(7)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>House</td>
<td>$52,190</td>
<td>$10,416</td>
<td>$16,597</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(29)</td>
<td>(53)</td>
<td>(64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>$24,003</td>
<td>$15,043</td>
<td>$17,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>House</td>
<td>$25,176</td>
<td>$7,280</td>
<td>$15,611</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(14)</td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>(50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Carolina</td>
<td>House</td>
<td>$14,468</td>
<td>$7,732</td>
<td>$5,070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(19)</td>
<td>(18)</td>
<td>(51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>$329,776</td>
<td>$148,975</td>
<td>$76,801</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>House</td>
<td>$52,059</td>
<td>$15,554</td>
<td>$32,634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(27)</td>
<td>(34)</td>
<td>(57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wyoming</td>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>$5,259</td>
<td>$3,310</td>
<td>$3,813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>House</td>
<td>$2,419</td>
<td>$2,237</td>
<td>$1,253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>(17)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Contains average spending only for those candidates who faced major party competition.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Chamber</th>
<th>Incumbents</th>
<th>Challengers</th>
<th>Open Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>$46,006</td>
<td>$18,000</td>
<td>$53,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(24)</td>
<td>(26)</td>
<td>(18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>House</td>
<td>$15,027</td>
<td>$7,157</td>
<td>$12,492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(101)</td>
<td>(101)</td>
<td>(50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>$19,402</td>
<td>$15,638</td>
<td>$22,206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>House</td>
<td>$19,266</td>
<td>$11,070</td>
<td>$14,976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(14)</td>
<td>(14)</td>
<td>(10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>$222,923</td>
<td>$170,700</td>
<td>$20,553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>House</td>
<td>$131,829</td>
<td>$68,157</td>
<td>$74,907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(69)</td>
<td>(69)</td>
<td>(28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>$148,179</td>
<td>$113,771</td>
<td>$78,916</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>House</td>
<td>$57,941</td>
<td>$30,563</td>
<td>$76,891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(31)</td>
<td>(31)</td>
<td>(42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Carolina</td>
<td>House</td>
<td>$20,391</td>
<td>$11,826</td>
<td>$13,098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(32)</td>
<td>(32)</td>
<td>(24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>$389,116</td>
<td>$89,501</td>
<td>$200,071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(14)</td>
<td>(14)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>House*</td>
<td>$46,859</td>
<td>$17,678</td>
<td>$37,538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(40)</td>
<td>(40)</td>
<td>(20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wyoming</td>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>$5,225</td>
<td>$4,590</td>
<td>$7,766</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>House</td>
<td>$4,311</td>
<td>$3,381</td>
<td>$3,837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(21)</td>
<td>(21)</td>
<td>(12)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Contains average spending only for those candidates who faced major party competition.
is very often great differences in spending. On average, incumbents spend more than 
challengers in each chamber in both election cycles and more than open seat contenders 
in all the primaries. However, average spending by open seat contenders was higher than 
incumbent spending in 4 of the 13 chambers (Connecticut Senate, Delaware Senate, 
Oregon House and Wyoming Senate).

While incumbents generally spend more than challengers, one should recognize 
that the size of the spending disparities often varies. To see the range that exists, Figure 
3.1 provides the ratio of challenger spending to incumbent spending by election period 
and chamber for each of the states. The chambers are arrayed based on general election 
spending from the lowest ratio (challengers spend a small percentage of what incumbents 
spend) to the highest (challengers spend a high percentage of what incumbents spend). 
Higher values on the chart therefore signify closer parity between incumbent and 
challenger spending.

In some states there are huge differences between the average spending by 
incumbents and that of challengers. The largest disparity is in the Illinois House primary 
where challenger spending on average is less than 20% of incumbent spending. These 
differences are almost as large in the Oregon House, Texas Senate, and both houses of the 
Connecticut legislature. In other states, such as Delaware and Wyoming, the differences 
are not as dramatic. In fact, in primary elections to the Wyoming House, challenger 
spending is almost on par with incumbent spending. Challengers running in these races 
typically spend about 90% of what incumbents spend.
Figure 3.1
Ratio of Challenger Spending to Incumbent Spending in
Primary and General Elections by Chamber and State in 1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chamber and State</th>
<th>Primary (%)</th>
<th>General (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TX Senate</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TX House</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT Senate</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT House</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IL House</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OR Senate</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE House</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC House</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IL Senate</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OR Senate</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WY House</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE Senate</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WY Senate</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Part of what is probably driving the differences observed in the parity of spending by challengers and incumbents is the overall level of spending in races in these states and chambers. In states where costs are low, such as in Wyoming and Delaware, the spending differences between candidate types are small. Where costs are higher, as in Texas and Illinois, the disparity between challengers and incumbents tends to be higher. In states with low levels of spending, candidates themselves can contribute a sizable portion of their own money to the campaign. Most candidates have it within their means to spend a few thousand dollars to bring their campaign’s funding in line with that of the incumbent. But, in states where spending is rather high, few candidates can probably afford the sums necessary to keep up.

While these levels of spending may give us some idea of how much it costs to campaign in a state for a particular office, the fact that constituency sizes differ considerably across jurisdictions makes comparisons difficult. The costs of campaigning will probably be greater where there are many more potential voters to contact. In order to control for the effects of population, the average spending per eligible voter is calculated for each chamber and state.²¹

Table 3.4 shows that even after controlling for population, there is still a large degree of variation across the states and chambers. In some states, candidates on average spend as little as 15 cents per eligible voter (in Connecticut Senate primary contests) while in others candidates spend as much as $1.56 per eligible voter (in general election contests to the Oregon House). Population differences therefore account for some of the
Table 3.4
Average Spending Per Resident of Voting Age By Candidate Type Across 13 Legislative Chambers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Chamber</th>
<th>Primary Average</th>
<th>Primary Standard Deviation</th>
<th>General Average</th>
<th>General Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>$0.15</td>
<td>$0.28</td>
<td>$0.53</td>
<td>$0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>House</td>
<td>$0.31</td>
<td>$0.35</td>
<td>$0.68</td>
<td>$0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>$0.52</td>
<td>$0.56</td>
<td>$0.79</td>
<td>$0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>House</td>
<td>$0.33</td>
<td>$0.27</td>
<td>$1.19</td>
<td>$0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>$0.47</td>
<td>$0.53</td>
<td>$1.07</td>
<td>$1.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>House</td>
<td>$0.29</td>
<td>$0.38</td>
<td>$1.31</td>
<td>$1.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>$0.24</td>
<td>$0.21</td>
<td>$1.42</td>
<td>$1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>House</td>
<td>$0.42</td>
<td>$0.43</td>
<td>$1.56</td>
<td>$1.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Carolina</td>
<td>House</td>
<td>$0.36</td>
<td>$0.38</td>
<td>$0.71</td>
<td>$0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>$0.29</td>
<td>$0.35</td>
<td>$0.57</td>
<td>$0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>House</td>
<td>$0.38</td>
<td>$0.44</td>
<td>$0.40</td>
<td>$0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wyoming</td>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>$0.37</td>
<td>$0.31</td>
<td>$0.63</td>
<td>$0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>House</td>
<td>$0.32</td>
<td>$0.21</td>
<td>$0.71</td>
<td>$0.41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
variation across states, but as Frank Sorauf (1992) once observed in a similar analysis, these remaining differences are “not easy to explain” (p. 36).

In addition to the differences across states, there are also differences across chambers within states. Per eligible voter spending is generally higher in House elections than in Senate elections. In two-thirds, or 8 of the 12 elections in which spending comparisons are possible across chambers, (South Carolina had no Senate elections in 1994) spending was higher in House elections. Why is this the case? One explanation may have to do with an economy of scale in campaigning. Some aspects of a campaign’s costs may be rather fixed, such as the costs associated with a campaign manager, for instance. Whether the manager is running a campaign where there are few potential voters or many, the salary paid may be similar. The same may hold true for other organizational aspects of the campaign such as office space. The result is that these costs of campaigning are the same whether the campaign is contacting 40,000 people or 400,000 people. Contacting anyone at all may require an initial investment that manifests itself in spending totals between districts with varying constituency sizes.

Table 3.4 also shows that even within states and chambers there is a great deal of variation. As the standard deviations listed in Table 3.4 show, in about half of the state chambers listed, the standard deviations are larger than the mean values. Variation across the districts in a state is therefore rather high. Later parts of this chapter will address those factors which may be responsible for these variations -- such as the candidates’ political experience and characteristics of the electoral district.
Candidate Characteristics

Candidate Status

One political observer has noted that "No other contextual element has a greater bearing on the outcome of the election than candidate status" (Shea, 1996: p. 34). He goes on to say that "[i]ncumbency far outweighs any other resource a candidate might possess" (p. 34). Studies consistently show incumbency to be an enormous advantage in both congressional (Alford and Hibbing, 1981; Bauer and Hibbing, 1989; Collie, 1981; Cover, 1977; Erikson, 1971; Ferejohn, 1977; Jacobson, 1987; Mayhew, 1974) and state legislative races (Holbrook and Tidmarsh, 1991; Jewell and Breaux, 1988; Jewell and Breaux, 1991). While there is a general consensus that incumbents enjoy significant electoral advantages, there is much less agreement as to why these advantages exist.

A variety of different explanations for the incumbency advantage have been provided by scholars over the years. For example, some attribute the advantage to the perquisites of office that allow incumbents frequent contact with voters (e.g., Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina, 1987). Others point to the willingness of incumbents to satisfy constituents' policy concerns with their ideological positioning (McAdams and Johannes, 1988; Ragsdale and Cook, 1987). Still, other studies focus on incumbents' efforts to bring federal dollars and projects into the district (e.g., Feldman and Jondrow, 1984; Fiorina, 1989; Parker and Parker, 1985; Stein and Bickers, 1995).

Other studies, however, note the advantages enjoyed by incumbents at election time. Of particular prominence are their advantages in fundraising (Alexander, 1992; Magleby and Nelson, 1990; Sorauf, 1992). Evidence from both the congressional and
state levels indicates that interest group PACs often utilize an access oriented strategy in their giving, resulting in incumbents receiving the lion’s share of available dollars (Box-Steffensmeier and Dow, 1992; Eismeier and Pollock, 1986; Jones and Borris, 1985; Magleby and Nelson, 1990; Sorauf, 1992; Thompson and Cassie, 1992). While there is agreement among political scientists that funding disparities can provide advantages to incumbents, there is much less agreement as to how this advantage occurs. Some contend that incumbent spending increases their vote share (Abramowitz, 1988; Green and Krasno, 1988 and 1990; Thomas, 1989) while others view the effects of incumbent fundraising more as a deterrent to quality challengers (e.g., Goldenberg, Traugott, and Baumgartner, 1986; Epstein and Zemsky, 1995).

In addition to these possible institutional and financial advantages, there is another set of advantages bestowed upon incumbents that is often recognized, though seldom empirically tested in the literature. These advantages have to do with the fact that *incumbents have campaign experience* -- they have won at least one prior election. In addition to the financial capability to run an effective campaign, these candidates have contacts in the district who can provide assistance in other campaign efforts (Fenno’s notion of a personal constituency, 1978). In addition, incumbents have had at least one term of office to develop an understanding of the district’s people and their concerns that can assist them as they develop their campaign strategy.

Similar to the congressional level, incumbency is often a factor in state legislative races. In their analysis of elections across 13 states, Jewell and Breaux (1988) report that high proportions of state legislative candidates sought reelection throughout the 1968 to
1986 time-period. Generally, around 70 to 80 percent of the incumbents across these states run for reelection. In addition, incumbent candidates hold an advantage over challengers as evidenced by their high rates of reelection (Jewell and Breaux, 1988 and 1991; Tidmarch, Lonegan, and Sciortino, 1986) and the presence of a sophomore surge (Garand, 1991; Holbrook and Tidmarch, 1991).

How often is incumbency a factor and how potent of a force is it in the states in this study? Table 3.5 displays for each state the percentage of incumbents who ran for reelection in 1994. Also shown is the percentage of incumbents who ran unopposed along with the average percentage of the vote they received (for those with opponents) in both the primary and general election campaigns.

First, incumbency is very often a factor in state legislative elections in each of these states. Incumbents ran in the vast majority of districts in 1994. The Oregon and Wyoming Senate races had the lowest percentage of incumbents running, but even for these offices, 67% of the districts had an incumbent running in the primary and general elections.

Second, it appears that incumbents often go unchallenged. This is especially true in primaries where incumbents seldom face opponents from their own party. In fact, the lowest percentage of unchallenged incumbents was for the Oregon house where only 67% went unchallenged. In general election races, a much smaller number of incumbents go unchallenged and there is much more variability across states. In races for the Connecticut Senate for instance, only 8% of the incumbent candidates went unchallenged while 75% of the Wyoming incumbents went unchallenged. However, probably the best
Table 3.5
Prevalence of Incumbents and Their Advantages in 1994 State Legislative Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Chamber</th>
<th>Percent of Districts With Incumbents Running</th>
<th>Percent of Incumbents Running Unopposed in the Primary</th>
<th>Percent of Incumbents Running Unopposed in the General</th>
<th>Percent of Incumbents Running Unopposed in the Both the Primary and General</th>
<th>Percent of Vote Received by Incumbents Who Had Opposition in Primary</th>
<th>Percent of Vote Received by Incumbents Who Had Opposition in General*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>60.49%</td>
<td>66.29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>House</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>62.60%</td>
<td>63.19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>63.46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>House</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>57.50%</td>
<td>66.02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>52.57%</td>
<td>67.32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>House</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>61.80%</td>
<td>66.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>74.63%</td>
<td>56.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>House</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>64.42%</td>
<td>62.82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Carolina</td>
<td>House</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>56.51%</td>
<td>63.08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>65.45%</td>
<td>60.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>House</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>60.86%</td>
<td>63.62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wyoming</td>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>66.00%</td>
<td>57.98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>House</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>58.71%</td>
<td>60.09%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Competition in the general election is defined as major party competition only.
perspective on overall incumbent safety is from the column showing the percentage who are challenged in neither the primary nor general election. Incumbents receive the most challenges overall in Connecticut and Oregon. In fact, only 4% of incumbent Senators in Connecticut received a free ride. However, about half the candidate running for the House in three states (South Carolina, Texas, and Wyoming) faced no major party opposition in either election in 1994.

A third aspect of incumbency has to do with the percentage of the vote they receive. Jewell and Breaux (1988) found variations across the states in terms of the average percentage of the vote won by incumbents. 22 Table 3.5 indicates variation across the states in both primary and general election contests. In primary elections, incumbents in Illinois Senate elections received the lowest levels of support (average of 53%) while incumbents in Wyoming Senate races received the highest level (average of 66%). In general election contests, the average percentage of the vote received by incumbents ranged from a high of 67% in the Illinois Senate to a low of about 57% in the Oregon Senate.

Taken together the findings from Table 3.5 indicate that incumbency is very often a major force in state legislative elections. However there is variation across the states in the number of candidates who go unchallenged and in how well they do in the final vote tally. Later chapters will attempt to link candidate status to various components of the campaign to determine if this is how incumbency matters. In other words, do incumbents run different campaigns than challengers or open seat contenders?
Political Experience

Several studies indicate that previous political experience has a significant impact on election outcomes. In congressional elections, those challengers who have held prior elective office, for example, are likely to receive a higher percentage of the vote than challengers who have little or no previous office-holding experience (Bond, Covington, and Fleisher, 1985; Jacobson, 1980, 1989; Jacobson and Kernell, 1983). A recent study of state legislative elections in 10 states also finds a similar relationship between candidate experience and vote share (Van Dunk, 1997).

Why does this greater political experience lead to an advantage at the polls on election day? There are several explanations given in the literature. One is that experienced candidates are capable of raising more money than less experienced ones (Jacobson, 1980) and this advantage simply translates into higher vote shares. Herrnson (1992) finds that more professional campaign organizations which presumably are run by more politically experienced challengers, result in more effective fundraising.

A second explanation is that experienced candidates have a better understanding of when to run and when not to run than those candidates with less political experience. Jacobson and Kornell (1983) have developed the notion of “strategic politicians” whereby those with experience are more likely to run when their chances of winning are higher. “Quality” or “experienced” candidates are more likely to become candidates when there is an open seat or when the incumbent appears vulnerable due to a scandal or to some other condition associated with the electoral environment. The “advantage” that quality candidates possess is an indirect effect associated with their keen sense of timing. Other
studies have corroborated these findings on the congressional level (Bianco, 1984; Bond, Covington, and Fleisher, 1985). Van Dunk (1997) finds in an analysis of state legislative elections that the probability of a challenger having previous office experience is influenced by how well the incumbent did in the previous election. Incumbents who won by smaller margins in the previous election are more likely to face a quality challenge.

A third advantage of experienced candidates is often referred to in the literature but seldom tested. This is of course that experienced politicians are also experienced campaigners (Jacobson, 1992). Herrnson indicates that “[e]xperienced, well-staffed challenger efforts are also presumably better at developing and implementing targeting and communications plans than volunteer efforts waged by political amateurs” (1995: p. 213).

A recent study by Van Dunk (1997) is one of the only studies to examine the role of candidate quality and its effects in the state legislative setting. She finds that the percentage of challengers who posses experience does vary by state and that this experience is translated into an electoral advantage on election day. However, Van Dunk’s study is limited in several respects. She only considers the quality of challengers (not open seat contenders), she uses a simple dichotomous measure of experience (having held a previous elective office), and she examines the effect of quality only in general elections (not primaries). A much more thorough examination of candidate quality is needed which takes these factors into consideration.

There is reason to believe that political experience may be as important, if not more important, for state legislative campaigns than for congressional campaigns because
more often than not the candidates themselves are in charge of running their own campaigns. As the next two chapters will show very clearly, unlike their congressional counterparts who hire political consultants or professional managers, state legislative candidates more typically run their own campaigns. Therefore, the experience of the candidate is probably very critical in the state legislative setting.

What is the extent of political experience held by candidates running for the state legislature? Before answering this question, it is probably important to define what is meant by experience. Studies on the congressional level vary with regard to how they define this term. To some, "experienced" or "quality" challengers are defined simply as those who have held an elective office in the past. This is often operationalized as a dichotomous variable (Abramowitz, 1988; Bianco, 1984; Jacobson and Kernell, 1983; Van Dunk, 1997). Other studies use more elaborate measures based on previous offices held and the size of the electoral constituencies represented (Bond, Covington, and Fleisher, 1985; Green and Krasno, 1988; Stewart, 1989). Because the state legislature is the point of entry for many who serve in public life, it may be that candidates have not held another lower level elective office. For this reason, it is necessary to cast a rather wide net in identifying attributes that would indicate political experience.

What constitutes meaningful or relevant political experience on the state legislative level may be different from the way we think of experience on the congressional level. In other words, holding a previous office may not be necessary in order for one to have "experience" that might aid in state legislative elections. Also, experience may come in other ways aside from holding previous office. State legislative
campaigns are more local affairs that are heavily influenced by personal contacts, so the amount of involvement one has within the community might be very important.

Several aspects of a candidate's background are examined that would provide him or her with relevant experience. First, it is assume that incumbent candidates are experienced -- they have run for and won this office at least once in the past. They probably have the best type of experience possible so there is probably no need to differentiate among these candidate types. For challengers and open seat candidates, however, four aspects of their previous work may indicate their level of experience. Specifically, we want to know if a candidate has (1) run for elective office in the past, (2) held an elective office in the past, (3) held an official position or role within a political party, or (4) had any other type of work such as involvement in a community organization or an interest group that might lead one to consider a candidate to be experienced.

What political experience is possessed by those running for the state legislature? Unlike the other resources examined in this chapter, information regarding such candidate characteristics is not available from a standard source. It therefore requires the utilization of answers reported by candidates in the survey. Table 3.6 displays the percentage of challengers and open seat candidates indicating a positive response to each of the categories listed in both primary and general elections.²³

A fairly high number of challengers and open seat candidates report previous attempts at elective office. The responses among candidate types ranged from a low of 46% among primary challengers to a high of about 63% among open seat general election candidates.²⁴ There are many fewer candidates who have actually won elective public
Table 3.6
Previous Political Experience of Challenger and Open Seat Candidates in State Legislative Campaigns*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Experience</th>
<th>Primary Challengers</th>
<th>Open Seat Candidates in Primary</th>
<th>General Challengers</th>
<th>Open Seat Candidates in General</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Run For Elective Office</td>
<td>46% (64)</td>
<td>56% (151)</td>
<td>51% (181)</td>
<td>62% (126)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Won Elective Office</td>
<td>23% (65)</td>
<td>31% (151)</td>
<td>28% (181)</td>
<td>45% (126)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any Party Experience</td>
<td>42% (65)</td>
<td>44% (151)</td>
<td>44% (181)</td>
<td>51% (126)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some Position In the Party</td>
<td>15% (65)</td>
<td>22% (150)</td>
<td>22% (180)</td>
<td>22% (126)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor Party Leader</td>
<td>18% (65)</td>
<td>14% (150)</td>
<td>14% (180)</td>
<td>16% (126)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Party Leader</td>
<td>8% (65)</td>
<td>8% (150)</td>
<td>7% (180)</td>
<td>13% (126)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any Campaign Experience</td>
<td>60% (65)</td>
<td>64% (151)</td>
<td>59% (181)</td>
<td>72% (126)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Party leader and/or run for office)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Experience</td>
<td>40% (65)</td>
<td>46% (151)</td>
<td>43% (181)</td>
<td>50% (126)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table is based on the sample of candidate who returned useable survey responses to the questions about previous experience. Shaded areas indicate a chi-square significance at the .05 level or better between the group of challengers and open seat contestants.
office, however. Among primary candidates only about 23% of challengers and 31% of open seat candidates report having held a past office. The percentages were higher among general election candidates with 28% of challengers and 45% of open seat candidates having held elective office in the past.

With regard to party experience, one can see that a little more than 40% of candidates in the primary had some experience working in the party organization. In the general election, about 44% of challengers and 51% of open seat candidates had party experience. However, far fewer candidates report holding a position in the party. About one-fifth or fewer of candidates in any category have held a position in the party organization. The sub-categories include some party position (usually a member of the town committee or a precinct captain), a minor party leader (a secretary of a local committee, or a vice-president of a city party organization, for example), and major party leader (such as county, city, or district chair). Less than 10% of candidates in most categories held a major position in the party prior to the 1994 election. Only among open seat general election candidates do we see the percentage rise above this threshold, and then only about 13% report holding such a position. Overall, state legislative candidates do not appear to have extensive formal party organization experience.

Another aspect of political experience to consider involves informal experienced obtained through work on other candidates' campaigns or involvement with other types of political organizations or causes. Many of these activities would appear to be very important, yet, they are usually not considered in the congressional literature. Candidates were asked what other political experiences they had which they believed helped prepare
them for the 1994 campaign. A number of different activities were cited by candidates. For example, one candidate indicated while never holding a formal position, "I have worked in Democratic campaigns for over 25 years." Another respondent indicated that "My dad was an elected official for many years. I worked in his organization." Another reported that "I have worked in campaigns since the age of 12." Many other candidates mentioned previous work as lobbyists for a local group or cause. Table 3.6 shows that about 40 to 50 percent of candidates cited other previous political activity which they believed aided them in their 1994 campaign effort.

To gain some sense of the overall level of experience of candidates, a row in Table 3.6 labeled "Any Campaign Experience" represents the percentage of candidates who report either holding a minor or major leadership role in a political party or ever having run for elective office (no matter if they won or lost the election). As one can see, a very high percentage among challengers and open seat contestants in both primary and general election campaigns report "Any Campaign Experience" in these three categories. Approximately 60% of primary and general election challengers report "Any Campaign Experience". Open seat candidates report somewhat more -- 64% in the primary and 72% in the general election period.

For the most part, candidates in general election contests have higher levels of electoral experience than candidates running in the primary, although the differences are not very large. However, experience in the party and other political experience does not seem to separate these groups of candidates. This would seem to show some initial indications that electoral experience is important. The primary election essentially
winnows the pool of candidates, leaving those with more experience to run in the general
election. Experience may be part of what helps some candidates win -- particularly
electoral experience.

It is interesting to find from Table 3.6 that candidate experience in the general
election varies based on whether the election is an incumbent-challenger race or an open
seat race. This is the first direct evidence that we have that state legislative candidates
exhibit strategic behavior in a manner similar to their congressional counterparts
(Jacobson and Kernell, 1983). For example, only 28% of challengers running in the
general election report having held previous elective office while nearly half (45%) of
open seat candidates report holding a previous elective office. Tests of statistical
significance in both election periods indicate that open seat candidates have more
electoral experience (running for and winning elective office) than challengers, but only
in general election campaigns. The measure of “Any Campaign Experience” is also
statistically significant, but party experience and other political activities on their own do
not appear to separate these groups of candidates.

District-Level Conditions

“The most significant element in a modern campaign is the context” (Shea, 1996: p. 27). There are a number of district conditions which should probably be considered as
they influence the type of campaign that is waged. District-level conditions are resources
in the same way that money and experience are resources. But, unlike these other
resources, there is little campaign decision-makers can do to change district features.
What a campaign can do, however, is to take these conditions into consideration when making decisions about strategy in order to maximize the effects of campaign effort.

Two sets of factors are considered as potential district-level resources. The first set consists of district population characteristics such as the total number of eligible voters, population density, and media congruence. The second set are electoral features and tap into the district’s level of competition in both primary and general elections. Components of each set of factors will be considered in later chapters as they have the potential to influence various aspects of the campaign. The purpose of this chapter will be to show the variation which exists across the states and districts on each of these four important district characteristics. Table 3.7 provides a summary of the average population characteristics of districts for each of the 13 chambers.

Population is probably one of the more fundamental district characteristics which campaign decision makers consider when designing campaign strategy. As shown earlier, levels of spending are heavily influenced by the number of people residing in a district -- where there are more people, a higher level of spending is required. Total population is also likely to affect many other aspects of the campaign -- particularly the strategy of contacting voters. For example, personal contact with a sizable percentage of potential voters may be possible in a district with only a few thousand voters, but is more difficult in a district that has several hundred thousand. For this reason it is doubtful that a sizable portion of the campaign budget will be allocated to personal forms of contact in heavily populated districts.
Table 3.7
Comparison of District Population Characteristics Across Sample of 13 Chambers in 7 States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Chamber</th>
<th>Average District Voting Age Population</th>
<th>Average Population Density</th>
<th>Average Media-Market Congruence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>70,300</td>
<td>1,822</td>
<td>2.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>House</td>
<td>16,800</td>
<td>2,349</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>24,800</td>
<td>1,936</td>
<td>2.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>House</td>
<td>12,700</td>
<td>1,663</td>
<td>1.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>146,000</td>
<td>5,197</td>
<td>8.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>House</td>
<td>73,000</td>
<td>5,192</td>
<td>4.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon*</td>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>73,800</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>House</td>
<td>36,900</td>
<td>1,050</td>
<td>6.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Carolina</td>
<td>House</td>
<td>21,400</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>3.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas*</td>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>407,800</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>House</td>
<td>84,300</td>
<td>1,154</td>
<td>9.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wyoming</td>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>10,859</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>6.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>House</td>
<td>5,430</td>
<td>568</td>
<td>3.37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Media congruence and population density scores for Oregon and Texas are based on 1988 calculations and for House elections only (neither state is used in the part of the analysis testing these variables).
Table 3.7 displays the variation in the average population of eligible voters across states and chambers in 1994. The range is quite large. For example, House districts in Wyoming have slightly more than 5,000 voters while Texas Senate districts typically have over 400,000.

Population density is another district characteristic which decision makers must consider. Density describes how close together or far apart individuals live from one another and is calculated simply as the number of people living per square mile. This is likely to have an impact on the forms of voter contact strategy used, particularly the extent of personal contact. Campaigns in districts with high population density, will probably have a greater likelihood of engaging in more personal contact such as door-to-door canvassing than campaigns in districts where potential voters are scattered farther apart. Within this sample of states, Connecticut, Delaware, and Illinois have very high levels of population density (often several thousand residents per square mile). In other states such as South Carolina and Wyoming, voters are scattered much farther apart. In Wyoming Senate districts in particular, there are typically less than 100 residents per square mile.

Media congruence captures the degree of overlap between television market outlets and state legislative district populations. Studies from the congressional setting indicate that media congruence has a significant impact on levels of competition (Campbell, et al., 1984). Studies on the state legislative level indicate that this congruence influences the use of voter contact techniques (Hogan, 1997) and may condition the effect of spending on election outcomes (Gierzynski and Breaux, 1996).
The congruence measure utilized here was developed by Campbell, Alford, and Henry (1984) and indicates the percentage of overlap of the district and the corresponding media markets. The values for the measure range from 0 (no congruence) to 100 (complete congruence). As the averages indicate in Table 3.7, there is generally little congruence between state legislative districts and media markets. The averages are small in all states, ranging from a low of 0.70% in Connecticut House districts to a high of about 9% in Illinois Senate districts. There are some districts in some states with high congruence (especially Senate districts), but for the most part congruence in districts is rather low.

It is should be noted that prior to the change in many states from single to multi-member districts there was probably very often a high degree of overlap between the media market and many state legislative districts. Multi-member districts were often the counties themselves, which, if they contained a major metropolitan area, probably overlapped quite well with a television market area. A legislative candidate running in such a district would probably have a much greater incentive to use television advertising to reach potential voters. Olson (1963) describes such a situation in Austin primary elections in 1962. During this time, Travis county was one large multi-member district that elected several members to the Texas legislature. There was a high degree of overlap between the county and the television stations in Austin, consequently, nearly every candidate running in the primary used some form of television advertising. Since this time, multi-member districts in Texas and elsewhere have been converted to single-member districts, thus reducing the overlap which can be observed in the lower average scores shown in Table 3.7.
Another factor often found to play a role in the campaign process is the extent of electoral competition. Several studies find that campaign characteristics vary based on the strength of the opposing campaign or the anticipated closeness of the election outcome (Goldenberg and Traugott, 1984; Hershey, 1974; Kingdon, 1966). Studies also show that past support in the district has an influence on election outcomes (Gierzynski and Breaux, 1991; Jacobson, 1980; Tucker and Weber, 1987). The underlying partisan distribution of voters in a district, therefore, is probably an important aspect to consider. In addition, some measure of intra-party-competition in nomination struggles would also provide insight into the development of campaigns in primary elections.

Such distributions of partisan loyalties in the electorate and inter-party factional differences are consequential because they influence candidate perceptions which in turn impact the nature of the campaign which is waged. Ideally, we would want to consider the perceptions on the part of candidates and other campaign operatives and decision makers prior to the start of the campaign — do they anticipate a highly competitive race or do they expect that one candidate is almost assured to win? Such a measure would allow us then to see how perceptions influence the type of campaign that is waged. But, because the survey instrument was administered following the campaign, such perceptual measures are not available.28

One alternative is to use the partisan distribution of voters in the district from the previous election, but such a measure is susceptible to the possibility that an incumbent in the previous election may have gone unchallenged (and his or her party received 100% of the two-party vote). Such measures are probably less problematic in predicting election
outcomes because they provide a baseline of past support for the party in the district. However, they may pose severe obstacles when trying predict the attributes of campaigns in the present election. In order to preserve as much of the present competitiveness of the election as possible while at the same time respecting the causal sequence of events (campaigns actually influence competition and not the other way around), a measure of expected competition is utilized. Previous studies often categorize elections as being competitive or marginal based on the percentage of the vote received by the winning candidate (Jewell, 1982; Tidmarsh, Lonergan, and Sciotino, 1986). This study takes a similar approach and considers a seat competitive if the winner receives 60% or less of the two-party vote (a dichotomous variable coded 1=competitive and 0=not competitive). While this measure may not appear to be very precise, it is important to understand that it is attempting to gauge perception, which probably has only two categories -- people feel that the election will be close or they think it will not be close. Without gauging these perceptions directly, this is probably the best method of tapping into this concept.

To give an overall sense of the extent of competition across the districts and states, other measures of competitiveness are provided along with the ones just described in Table 3.8. General election competition in 1992 and 1994 is calculated simply as 100 minus the winner’s percentage of the two-party vote. The values for this variable can therefore range from 0 (low competition) to 50 (high competition). As one can see, the average level of general election competition varies by state and chamber. Beside this column there is another which provides the percentage of districts in each chamber and state which are considered competitive in 1994 (the margin separating the two major
party candidates was less than 20 percentage points). Here we find the percentage of competitive districts (of those with any competition) varied from a high of 62% in the Wyoming House elections to a low in the Delaware House of 26%.

It is necessary to consider competition in primary elections as well. As with general election competition, we would like to have a perceptual measure of expected competition, but lacking such a measure we look instead to the number of candidates running in the primary. This is an objective measure which is in effect a signal to the other candidates in the race of how competitive the election will probably be. Competition is considered to be higher when there are more candidates running.

Table 3.8 provides some insights into the extent of primary competition in 1994. A primary divisiveness measure is provided which taps into vote margin along with the number of candidates in the race. Higher scores on this measure indicate a higher degree of divisiveness (scores can range from a low of 0 to a high of 50). The operational definition for primary competition used in the analysis, however, is the number of candidates in the primary. Only candidates who faced at least one opponent are included in the analysis, therefore, the minimum primary competition score for any candidate is 2. Table 3.8 shows that there is often variation across the chambers and states. The average is highest in Illinois House primaries (2.7) and lowest in Connecticut Senate primaries (2.0).

It should be noted that for almost all the variables listed in Tables 3.7 and 3.8, a great deal of variation exists across districts within each chamber and state (total population is the only exception). This inter-state variation is hidden in the aggregation
Table 3.8
Electoral Features of Districts Across Sample of 13 Chambers in 7 States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Chamber</th>
<th>Seats up</th>
<th>Average Primary Divisiveness in 1994</th>
<th>Average Number of Candidates in Primaries in 1994</th>
<th>General Election Competition in 1992</th>
<th>General Election Competition in 1994</th>
<th>Percent Competitive in 1994*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>46.20</td>
<td>40.69</td>
<td>36.83</td>
<td>36.02</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>House</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>48.05</td>
<td>39.55</td>
<td>36.02</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>43.80</td>
<td>22.38</td>
<td>34.83</td>
<td>31.17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>House</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>48.38</td>
<td>24.78</td>
<td>31.17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>51.20</td>
<td>34.62</td>
<td>31.67</td>
<td>32.01</td>
<td>32.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>House</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>49.85</td>
<td>32.01</td>
<td>31.67</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon*</td>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>39.71</td>
<td>45.18</td>
<td>38.40</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>House</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>45.91</td>
<td>31.35</td>
<td>40.06</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Carolina</td>
<td>House</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>49.73</td>
<td>20.80</td>
<td>34.18</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas*</td>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>51.57</td>
<td>26.53</td>
<td>34.05</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>House</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>52.52</td>
<td>18.35</td>
<td>32.08</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wyoming</td>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>47.00</td>
<td>40.80</td>
<td>37.40</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>House</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>48.79</td>
<td>38.48</td>
<td>39.87</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note that measures of electoral competition are calculated only for those districts where there were at least two major party candidates running. For example, in the last column labeled "Percent Competitive in 1994*, the cells represent the percentage of seats that are competitive over all in which there was at least some competition (at least two major party candidates running).
to the chamber and state levels, however, it is this variation which is expected to play a
large role in the types of campaigns which develop.

Such variations are of concern here because studies on both the congressional and
state legislative levels point to the important direct effects which these factors have on
election outcomes. In particular, past party support in the district is found to be an
important predictor of the percentage of the vote received (Gierzynski and Breaux, 1991;
Giles and Pritchard, 1985; Tucker and Weber, 1987). The effects of other district factors
are examined less often, however, a recent study by Gierzynski and Breaux (1996) does
consider the interactive effects of some of these variables with spending on candidates’
electoral margins. These authors hypothesize that these “conversion” factors such as
media congruence and population of the district condition the influence of money on
elections, thereby increasing or decreasing the effect of money. They find some support
for these hypotheses. For example, they find that population of the district reduces the
impact of spending on the vote. However, a large number of the “conversion factors”
examined do not have the hypothesized impact. It is the contention of this analysis that
such factors probably have a greater influence on the candidate’s strategy of spending
money than they do on the effects of this spending. Candidates and other campaign
decision makers probably recognize the “conditioning” effects that district factors have
and allocate their resources in such a way that maximizes their influence. It is, therefore,
the relationships between district conditions and campaign dimensions which are of
greatest interest in this analysis.
Direct Effects of Resources on Election Outcomes

As indicated in the above section, the effects of many of these resources on election outcomes have been established in previous studies. This is clearly the case in the state legislative setting for the effects of money (e.g., Gierzynski and Breaux, 1991; Giles and Pritchard, 1985), incumbency (e.g., Holbrook and Tidmarsh, 1991; Jewell and Breaux, 1988) and partisan makeup of the district (e.g., Gierzynski and Breaux, 1991; Tucker and Weber, 1987). However, the effects of some resources are less clear. For example, how important is candidate experience in the state legislative setting? Do we find as in the congressional example, that greater experience of a candidate leads to greater support by voters at the polls? Establishing the direct influence of these factors on election outcomes would be a first step in understanding the influence they wield.

In order to test the direct effect of these factors, two equations are used to predict the simultaneous influence of several resources on the percentage of the vote received by candidates in both primary and general election contests. These equations follow very closely those developed initially by Jacobson (1980) and later adapted by Gierzynski and Breaux in a series of articles (1991, 1993, and 1996) for use in the state legislative setting. These basic models are employed here which include variables for district competition and spending by the candidate and the opponent(s). Spending is calculated as per eligible voter spending to control for the disparity in district population across chambers and districts (similar to Gierzynski and Breaux, 1996). The major difference in this model is the addition of two variables which measure candidate experience (electoral...
experience and party experience). Also, controls for variation in legislative professionalism are included to capture differences among the groups of states.

The primary election model takes the following form:

\[
\text{PERPVOTE} = a + b_1 \text{CANSPEND} - b_2 \text{OPPSPEND} + b_3 \text{ELECEXP} + b_4 \text{PARTYEXP} + b_5 \text{PASTCOMP} + b_6 \text{PARTY} - b_7 \text{CANNUM} + b_8 \text{PROF} + b_9 \text{CITIZEN} + e
\]

Where:

\[
\text{PERPVOTE} = \text{Percent of the primary vote received.}
\]

\[
\text{CANSPEND} = \text{Per Eligible Voter Primary Spending.}
\]

\[
\text{OPPSPEND} = \text{Per Eligible Voter Opponent Primary Spending.}
\]

\[
\text{ELECEXP} = \text{Electoral Experience. The variable can take a value of 0, 1, or 2 (0=never run for elective office; 1=run for elective office but have not won; 2=won elective office).}
\]

\[
\text{PARTYEXP} = \text{Political Party Experience. The variable can take a value of 0, 1, or 2 (0=no involvement with the party; 1=any involvement but not no leadership role; 2=leadership role in the party).}
\]

\[
\text{PASTCOMP} = \text{Percentage of the Candidate Party's District Vote in 1992.}
\]

\[
\text{PARTY} = \text{Party of the Candidate (1=Democrat and 0=Republican).}
\]

\[
\text{CANNUM} = \text{Number of Candidates in the Primary Election.}
\]

\[
\text{PROF} = \text{A dichotomous variable indicating a professional legislature (Illinois=1, all other states =0).}
\]

\[
\text{CITIZEN} = \text{A dichotomous variable indicating a citizen legislature (Wyoming=1, all other states =0).}
\]

The general election equation is similar and includes the following variables:
\[ \text{PERGVOTE} = a + b_1\text{CANSPEND} - b_2\text{OPPSPEND} + b_3\text{ELECEXP} + b_4\text{PARTYEXP} + b_5\text{PASTCOMP} + b_6\text{PARTY} + b_7\text{PROF} + b_8\text{CITIZEN} + e \]

Where:

\[
\text{PERGVOTE} = \text{Percent of the two-party vote received.}
\]

\[
\text{CANSPEND} = \text{Per Eligible Voter Spending (Measured as the total of primary and general election spending).}^{33}
\]

\[
\text{OPPSPEND} = \text{Per Eligible Opponent Spending (Measured as the total of primary and general election spending of general election opponents).}
\]

\[
\text{ELECEXP} = \text{Electoral Experience. The variable can take a value of 0, 1, or 2 (0=never run for elective office; 1=run for elective office but have not won; 2=won elective office).}
\]

\[
\text{PARTYEXP} = \text{Political Party Experience. The variable can take a value of 0, 1, or 2 (0=no involvement with the party; 1=any involvement but no leadership role; 2=leadership role in the party).}
\]

\[
\text{PASTCOMP} = \text{Percentage of the Candidate Party's District Vote in 1992.}
\]

\[
\text{PARTY} = \text{Party of the Candidate (1=Democrat and 0=Republican).}
\]

\[
\text{PROF} = \text{A dichotomous variable indicating a professional legislature (Illinois=1, all other states =0).}
\]

\[
\text{CITIZEN} = \text{A dichotomous variable indicating a citizen legislature (Wyoming=1, all other states =0).}
\]

Because political experience is one of the factors included in the equation, only those candidates for whom this information is available will be used (those who answered the survey). The equations are run separately for incumbents, challengers, and open seat candidates for both the primary and general election periods. The two experience
variables are not included in the incumbency equations because incumbency overwhels any influence that other experience might provide.

The results of these equations are reported in Tables 3.9 (primary) and 3.10 (general election). Most of these findings conform to those established in previous studies. For example, campaign spending (measured as per eligible voter spending) by challengers and open seat candidates has a positive and statistically significant influence on vote percentages in both election cycles. Likewise, spending by their opponents has a negative influence on their vote share. Spending by incumbent candidates, however, does not increase the percentage of the vote they receive. In fact, the coefficients for candidate spending in both equations for incumbents have negative signs (but are not statistically significant). These results support findings from other studies which show that incumbent spending is not very effective at influencing election outcomes.

One should not overlook or underestimate the dramatic impact which candidate spending can have on election outcomes. Keeping in mind that spending is calculated as per eligible voter spending (ranging on average from $0.15 to about $1.56) we find that the coefficients are quite large. For example, in general elections a challenger on average can increase his or her share of the vote by one percentage point by spending about ten cents more per eligible voter. For open seat contenders in the general election, it takes over twice as much of an increase in spending to bring about a similar payoff at the polls (20 cent increase in spending per eligible voter). In primary elections, much less money is needed to move the final vote tally. An increase in spending by an additional ten cents can increase the vote share of challengers and open seat contenders by more than 2
Table 3.9
Regression Analysis of Factors Influencing the Percentage of the Primary Vote Received By Major Party Candidates Running for Seats in 13 Chambers in 1994
(Un-Standardized Regression Coefficients)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Incumbents</th>
<th>Challengers</th>
<th>Open-Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>80.900***</td>
<td>36.210***</td>
<td>61.892***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate Expenditures</td>
<td>-1.867</td>
<td>23.871***</td>
<td>22.564***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opponent Expenditures</td>
<td>-10.370</td>
<td>-5.668*</td>
<td>-12.355***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Experience</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0.754</td>
<td>1.075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Experience</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>-0.335</td>
<td>1.430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>6.220</td>
<td>-2.671</td>
<td>0.696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Candidates Running</td>
<td>-6.229</td>
<td>-3.882**</td>
<td>-6.085***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past Party Vote in the District</td>
<td>-0.0431</td>
<td>0.0651</td>
<td>-0.0577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Legislature</td>
<td>1.181</td>
<td>-1.663</td>
<td>-3.348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen Legislature</td>
<td>5.347</td>
<td>0.792</td>
<td>-1.424</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R²= 0.442 0.48 0.61
Adjusted R²= 0.292 0.39 0.59
N= 33 61 145

* p < .05  
** p < .01  
***p < .001
Table 3.10
Regression Analysis of Factors Influencing the Percentage of the Two Party General Election Vote Received By Major Party Candidates Running for Seats in 13 Chambers in 1994 (Un-Standardized Regression Coefficients)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Incumbents</th>
<th>Challengers</th>
<th>Open-Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>68.459***</td>
<td>34.658***</td>
<td>42.768***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate Expenditures</td>
<td>-0.636</td>
<td>9.811***</td>
<td>4.876**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opponent Expenditures</td>
<td>-7.663***</td>
<td>-3.111**</td>
<td>-5.644***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Experience</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0.454</td>
<td>-0.355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Experience</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>-1.259</td>
<td>-1.727</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>-6.535***</td>
<td>-5.337***</td>
<td>-3.115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past Party Vote in the District</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>0.148***</td>
<td>0.284***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Legislature</td>
<td>4.182</td>
<td>-7.649***</td>
<td>-2.516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen Legislature</td>
<td>-4.140</td>
<td>-1.837</td>
<td>-3.400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R²=                           | 0.40       | 0.48        | 0.44       |
Adjusted R²=                  | 0.37       | 0.46        | 0.40       |
N=                             | 137        | 181         | 130        |

* p < .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001
percentage points. In some districts such as Wyoming House districts, these sums are quite low given the small number of residents living there. However, in others like Texas Senate districts, an increase in per eligible voter spending by just a few cents can amount to an extraordinarily large sum of money.

Other variables in the primary equations perform similarly to how they performed in previous studies. For example, the number of candidates running significantly reduces the percentage of the vote that a candidate receives. But again, this is statistically significant only for challenger and open seat contestants. Past party support in the district is unrelated to the percentage of the vote won by any of the three candidate types. Likewise, none of the control variables for party and legislative professionalism are statistically significant in primary elections.

In the general election equations, past party vote in the district is statistically significant and in the anticipated direction -- the higher the candidate’s party percentage won in the previous election, the higher the vote margin in the present election. But again, this holds true only for challengers and open seat contenders. None of the control variables for party are statistically significant and only one of the institutional controls is significant. It appears that challengers in the general elections receive a lower percentage of the vote in professional legislatures than in citizen legislatures.

The most interesting finding from Tables 3.9 and 3.10, however, is the lack of a statistical relationship between vote share and the political experience variables. Neither the measure of electoral experience nor party experience achieved statistical significance. In fact, half of the coefficients (4 of the 8) were in the negative direction (though none
were statistically significant). This would indicate that political experience does not have a direct effect on election outcomes — a rather unexpected finding given the robustness of this variable found in the congressional setting. However, this should not be taken to mean that experience is unimportant. It may be important as it has an indirect effect on election outcomes. For example, experience may have an influence on campaign dimensions which in turn affect election outcomes. Or, still in the resource stage, experience might influence the campaign’s ability to attract other resources such as money. It is to this question that we now turn.

**Resources Lead to Other Resources**

Each of the resources discussed in this chapter are expected to have an independent effect on the nature of the campaign process. However, this does not preclude the fact that they themselves are also inter-related. As indicated earlier in this chapter, there is evidence in the literature that several of these campaign features have an influence on the level of finances acquired and spent by the campaigns. Considering the fact that spending is deemed by many to be the most important campaign resource and the one that a candidate has relatively more control over (the candidate cannot easily change the district partisanship, for example), it seems reasonable to determine those factors which influence the level of spending in campaigns. This makes it possible to understand how some resources may lead to other resources.

Several of the other campaign resources will probably have an impact on the level of spending. One of these, district population, has already been shown to have an
influence. As indicated earlier, when population of the district is taken into consideration, many of the differences between states disappear, however, there remains much variation across districts within the states to explain as evidenced in Table 3.4. Past research provides evidence that many factors related to the candidate, the district, and the state influence per eligible voter spending (Hogan and Hamm, 1998). Several of these factors will be tested here along with two other variables of interest: candidate experience and opponent spending. The analysis will be conducted separately for primary and general election contests.

Candidate experience is expected to increase the amount of money that candidates are able to raise and spend in their campaigns. Those challengers and open seat contenders who have run for office previously or who have worked extensively in a political party are likely to have greater knowledge about how to go about raising campaign funds. Jacobson (1980) finds some support for this proposition in his analysis of congressional candidates in the 1970s. In order to test this in the state legislative setting, two variables for experience (one for electoral experience and the other for party experience) are included as independent variables.35

Another factor that may have an influence on spending is the level of competition in the race. Hogan and Hamm (1998) find a strong relationship between general election competition and spending. When competition between the two major party candidates is high, the amount of spending increases.36 Therefore the variable measuring anticipated electoral competition is included in both the primary and general election equations (a
dichotomous competition measure in the general election and the number of primary
candidates in the primary election).

In addition to the two measures of competition just described, another variable
which taps into the hard fought or low key nature of the race is the intensity of the
opponent(s) campaign. This is operationalized by the amount of spending allocated by
the opponents in the particular race. Studies on the congressional level indicate that
candidates often spend in reaction to their opponents (Goldenberg, Traugott, and
Baumgartner, 1986). This is probably more true for incumbents than for challengers or
open seat candidates. Opponent(s) spending is therefore included as a separate variable
in the equation and is measured as per eligible voter spending by all the opponents
combined.

Finally, controls are put in place for legislative professionalism which previous
research indicates is positively related to spending (Hogan and Hamm, 1998; Moncrief,
1998). There are two reasons why spending is higher in campaigns for more professional
legislatures. One is that professional legislatures are more capable of affecting policy and
thereby attract greater attention and more campaign contributions from interest groups.
Secondly, seats in the professional setting are more highly prized due to their greater pay
and other amenities afforded to members. For these reasons candidates expend greater
effort to win and hold seats resulting in higher levels of spending. To control for the
effects of professionalism, two dummy variables are included in the models, one for a
professional legislature and another for a citizen legislature (middle-range legislatures are
the excluded category).
Separate models are run for each candidate type (incumbents, challengers, and open seat contestants) for each election period (primary and general) resulting in a total of six regression models. Note that campaign experience is not used as a regressor in the equations for incumbent candidates. As indicated in an earlier section, incumbency is such an overwhelming factor in elections, it is doubtful that political experience will differentiate incumbents.

The equation used to estimate the effects of these factors on per eligible voter spending takes the following form:

\[ SPV = a + b_1 COMP + b_2 OPPSPV + b_3 ELECEXP + b_4 PARTYEXP + b_5 PROF - b_6 CITIZEN + e \]

Where:

\[ SPV = \text{Candidate Spending Per Eligible Voter (either total primary spending or total general election spending).} \]

\[ COMP = \text{Level of Competition (measured in the general election as a dichotomous variable -- 1 if the election margin was 20 percentage points or less; measured in the primary as the number of primary candidates).} \]

\[ OPPSPV = \text{Total opponent(s) spending per eligible voter in the primary or general election period (in primary campaigns with more than one opponent, the spending for all opponents is totaled).} \]

\[ ELECEXP = \text{Electoral Experience. The variable can take a value of 0, 1, or 2 (0=never run for elective office; 1=run for elective office but have not won; 2=won elective office).} \]

\[ PARTYEXP = \text{Political Party experience. The variable can take a value of 0, 1, or 2 (0=no involvement with the} \]
party; 1=any involvement but no leadership role; 2=leadership role in the party).

PROF = A dichotomous variable indicating a professional legislature (Illinois=1, all other states =0).

CITIZEN = A dichotomous variable indicating a citizen legislature (Wyoming=1, all other states =0).

The OLS regression results listed in Table 3.11 for the primary and in Table 3.12 for the general election indicate that the most consistent factor associated with candidate spending is spending by the opponent candidate(s). As opponent spending per eligible voter increases, so does a candidate's level of spending per eligible voter. In all but one equation (challengers in primaries), this variable is statistically significant and in the expected direction.

These findings lend substantial credence to the notion that candidates spend reactively in their campaigns. This is certainly true for incumbents whose coefficients are strongly affected by challenger spending. For example in primary campaigns, for every additional dollar of spending by opponent candidates, incumbents spend over $1.20 more.

Surprisingly, only one of the experience variables is statistically significant in the four equations where they are included. Electoral experience is statistically significant and positively related to spending only for open seat contenders in primary elections. But, neither electoral nor party experience is statistically related to spending in the other equations (both primary and general). Apparently for most candidates, experience does not add to their ability to raise and subsequently spend more money.

Why is experience generally not that important for raising and spending money in the state legislative setting? It may be due to the lower levels of spending required in
### Table 3.11
Regression Analysis of Factors Influencing the Per Eligible Voter Spending
In State Legislative Primary Election Contests in 13 Chambers in 1994
(Un-Standardized Regression Coefficients)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Incumbents</th>
<th>Challengers</th>
<th>Open Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.019**</td>
<td>0.355*</td>
<td>0.104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>0.152</td>
<td>-0.107</td>
<td>0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Experience</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>-0.065</td>
<td>0.092**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Experience</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Candidates</td>
<td>-0.355*</td>
<td>-0.022</td>
<td>0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opponent(s) Spending</td>
<td>1.213***</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>0.150**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Legislature</td>
<td>0.273</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>-0.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen Legislature</td>
<td>-0.341</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
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</table>

R² =

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Incumbents</th>
<th>Challengers</th>
<th>Open Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adjusted R² =

<p>| | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N =

<p>| | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>145</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.12  
Regression Analysis of Factors Influencing the Per Eligible Voter Spending  
In State Legislative General Election Contests in 13 Chambers in 1994  
(Un-Standardized Regression Coefficients)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Incumbents</th>
<th>Challengers</th>
<th>Open Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.593***</td>
<td>-0.240**</td>
<td>0.256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>0.120</td>
<td>0.129</td>
<td>-0.184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Experience</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>-0.069</td>
<td>0.114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Experience</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition</td>
<td>-0.189</td>
<td>0.561***</td>
<td>0.402**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opponent Spending</td>
<td>0.718***</td>
<td>0.523***</td>
<td>0.547***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Legislature</td>
<td>0.351*</td>
<td>0.177</td>
<td>-0.102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen Legislature</td>
<td>-0.177</td>
<td>0.110</td>
<td>-0.307</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R² = 0.59 0.58 0.57  
Adjusted R² = 0.57 0.56 0.54  
N = 129 179 125
these elections. In many states only small sums need to be raised, and political experience may simply not make this any easier for candidates. Or, it may be that experience is only influential under certain conditions. As the results suggest, experience is statistically related to spending for open seat contenders in primary elections. These would probably be the conditions where we would think experience would have its greatest effect -- for open seat candidates who need to raise a large amount of money and in primary elections where interest group or PAC money is less available. The findings show that when holding everything else constant, an open seat primary candidate who has run for elective office will spend a little less than 10 cents more per eligible voter than a similar candidate with no such experience. Similarly, a candidate who has run for and won elective office will spend a little more than 18 cents more per eligible voter.

Another factor that has an influence only under certain conditions is electoral competition. Competition in the primary is statistically significant only in the incumbent candidate equation, but in the opposite direction than expected. The more candidates who run, the fewer dollars incumbents appear to spend. Explanations for this finding do not come easily. In the general election, however, competition does have the effect that we would expect to observe. Competition influences spending for challengers and open seat contenders, but not for incumbents. This indicates that incumbent spending is more sensitive to opponent’s campaign activity than to the expected level of competition in the race.

Why do we find that the influence of competition on spending varies by election type? Specifically, why does anticipated competition influence candidate spending in
general elections but not in primaries? This difference is possibly a function of two factors: variations in both the level of resources and in the sources of funding in the two types of elections. Spending in general elections tends to be higher than spending in primary elections. Often this is the case because money is available from a wider variety of sources -- interest groups (PACs) and parties for example. High competition in the general election may promote greater contributions from interest groups and parties who have a stake in the outcome. These entities are generally aware of the competitiveness of a race and often have it within their means to increase their level of contributions. A very different situation exists in a primary campaign where fewer dollars come from interest groups (and PACs) and usually none from parties. The sources of the sums are more likely to be individuals or candidates themselves -- people who are probably only willing to spend a fixed amount (particularly in states where spending is rather high). These differences may be at least part of the explanation for the finding that competition is more related to candidate spending in general elections than in primaries.

Finally, what effect does the character of the state legislative institution have on the level of spending? On average, do candidates running in professional legislatures spend more than candidates running in citizen legislatures? There is not much support for institutional effects on primary spending, only incumbents running in a professional legislature spend more than incumbents running for seats in less professional institutions. The strength of this relationship is certainly weaker than that established by previous studies (e.g., Moncrief, 1992), but the sample employed here is much smaller (there is only one professional and one citizen legislature in the analysis).
Together, the results from Tables 3.11 and 3.12 suggest that variations in candidate spending in primaries and general elections are attributable to the effects of other resources related to the candidate and district. Spending by the opponent(s) is the most consistent factor affecting spending by the candidate in his or her own campaign. Anticipated competition is important only in the general election contest while candidate experience and institutional context play a rather limited role. However, the effects of many variables is highly dependent on the status of the candidate. Overall, these results show that political resources are interrelated and that some resources such as candidate status, experience, opponent spending, and electoral competition can, under certain conditions, influence the extent to which candidates collect and use money.

**Where to Go From Here?**

This chapter has considered a variety of resources that are often used in modern political campaigns for the state legislature. A number of important features associated with these resources were uncovered.

- Resources available to candidates vary dramatically across districts and states. Some campaigns spend large amounts of money while others spend very little. Some candidates have a great deal of political experience while for many, their state legislative campaign is their first foray into the political realm. Some candidates run in districts where there is a high degree of competition while others run where they have no hope of winning or where they face only token opposition.
• Many resources used in state legislative campaigns have a direct influence on election outcomes as manifested in the percentage of the vote received by candidates. However, some of these factors are more influential than others. For example, candidate spending has a consistent impact on election outcomes of challenger and open seat candidates. Political experience, on the other hand, does not influence the percentage of the vote directly.

• The presence of some resources influences the collection of other resources. Partisan competition in general elections influences the level of funding allocated to campaigns. However, the most consistent factor associated with variations in spending is the level of spending by the opponents. The more opponents spend, the more the candidate spends. Resources are therefore inter-related.

This chapter has examined the political resources utilized in state legislative campaigns from a variety of perspectives. The chapters which follow consider how factors such as candidate status and experience, finances, and district characteristics are transformed through the campaign process. The goal is to begin tracing the causal mechanisms by which resources are translated into votes on election day. How do each of these factors influence the type of campaign which is waged? How do they influence the type of organization which is created, the extent of information gathered, and the strategy which is developed and implemented? Such a perspective will make it possible
to see the *indirect* influence which resources may have on the election outcome. This indirect path of influence is likely to be where many of the resources have their greatest effects. In fact, some of the resources which were not found to play a direct role in influencing election outcomes may actually be influential as they indirectly affect outcomes through aspects of the campaign. For example, political experience might influence other parts of the campaign process (aside from the amount of money raised and spent) that in turn influences who wins and who loses on election day.
CHAPTER 4
Organizational Features

*It may be that we pay little attention to the internal politics of campaigns because we are so concerned about their outcomes.*

-- Xandra Kayden\(^{39}\)

Introduction

For many, the phrase "political campaign" brings to mind an image of dozens of volunteers working feverishly in a large campaign office, making telephone calls and stuffing envelopes late into the night. However, such aspects of campaigns are seldom the focus of much scholarly attention and almost never a part of quantitative assessments of campaign effort. Such an omission is troubling given the large investment of time and money often devoted to such activities by those who run for office. This analysis therefore considers several organizational features which candidates and other political practitioners cite as important elements of modern campaigns. For example, what is the structure of these entities -- are there many workers or just a few? Are these workers paid or are their efforts voluntary? Is there a designated manager who oversees the entire operation? Is the manager a part-time or full time employee? How much of a campaign's finances are contributed toward maintenance of the organization?

Following the 1994 elections, both defeated and victorious candidates often attributed some credit or blame, as the case may be, to the campaign's organizational elements. Many indicated that a strong organization was essential for winning grassroots support in their community. One candidate attributed his loss to such features
saying, "I should have been better organized on the precinct level. This would have enabled me to bring out the vote." Other candidates mention the quality of work by volunteers or employees. One successful candidate reported that "my campaign manager did a fantastic job." Another winning candidate credited his staff saying that "volunteers were extremely important." Other candidates (typically losers) had a negative evaluation of their assistance. One candidate explained his demise by the fact that "experienced staffers should have run the campaign earlier." Another said that "the lack of coordination between the campaign manager and the direct mail coordinator was a weak spot. In this market a professional media director or mail consultant might have overcome the incumbent advantage."

Overall, these examples illustrate that candidates themselves often believe that organizational elements have significant consequences for election outcomes. Learning about the organization may therefore assist us in understand why some candidates win and why others lose. But such knowledge might help us understand even more about representation. For example, some worry that campaigns have become too professionalized and take away from candidate involvement with voters. From this perspective campaigns in recent years have allocated too many resources toward activities unrelated to contacting voters, candidates have spent too much time raising funds, and professional managers and handlers have come to possess inordinate amounts of control. Some contend that many of these negative characteristics detract from ideals of representative democracy and have become pervasive throughout the electoral system (Salmore and Salmore, 1985).
From another perspective, organizational components are viewed as promoting democratic ideals. Campaign organizations are tools used by candidates to mobilize grass-roots support. Strong campaign organizations enhance democracy because they serve as a link between the representatives and the represented through campaign workers who have the opportunity to interact on a personal level with constituents. The few studies that examine campaigns in the state legislative setting find that personal contacts are a central feature of these campaigns (Mileur and Sulzner, 1974). Unfortunately, many of these studies were conducted prior to what has been termed the era of “New Politics” (e.g., Agranoff, 1976).

Which of these perspectives best describes the organizational features of state legislative campaigns in the 1990s? Campaign features such as organizational structure, division of labor, compensation of workers, etc. will be examined in each of the seven states. In addition, this analysis will consider those factors which are important in determining the type of organization that develops. For example, attention will be given to the role of spending and electoral competition in affecting both an organization’s strength and professionalism. Many contend that high spending has an ill effect on the electoral process, yet it may have a positive effect if it enhances the number of campaign workers an organization is able to attract. This analysis will consider such a possibility. More importantly, this chapter looks closely at the differences in campaigns across varying institutions. How do campaigns differ in professional as opposed to citizen legislatures? Do we find, for example, that campaign professionalism is correlated with legislative professionalism?
Campaign Organizations in American Politics

A widely acknowledged trend in the United States has been the move from “party-centered politics” toward more “candidate-centered” politics. This transformation means that the mechanics of running for office are centered around each candidate and not within the party organization. This is very different from the way things were in most parts of the United States several decades ago (Salmore and Salmore, 1985) and very different from the manner in which campaigns are presently waged in many western democracies (Epstein, 1986).

Previous studies of “campaign organizations”, therefore, focused primarily on party organizations, as they have been the locus of campaign activity for most of the nation’s history. These organizations were instrumental in mobilizing interest in and support for the party’s slate of candidates. However, toward the end of the 1800s, the seeds of the parties’ demise were sown with the adoption of the Australian ballot, the initial decline of political patronage, and the rise of primary elections. In later years the proliferation of independent news organizations, the growing number of services provided by government, and the increasing size of the electorate reduced the effectiveness of parties’ traditional roles in politics (Epstein, 1986; Salmore and Salmore, 1985). However, the expanded use of media, particularly broadcast media was the biggest blow to party organizations. Mass media outlets made it possible for candidates to circumvent the traditional party apparatus by appealing to voters directly. Sorauf and Beck (1988) write that “traditional grass-roots party organization has become
technologically obsolete -- that it has been superseded by newer, more efficient, and more timely avenues and techniques of campaigning” (p. 271). As a result, party organizations lost what had been their traditional role in the electoral process.

Since the 1950s candidates in many areas of the country have come to rely less and less on legions of party workers to inform voters and bring them to the polls. Instead, candidates utilize the services of professional consultants for assistance in raising money, building organizations, and developing voter contact strategies. Political parties play mostly a minor role, however the extent of their activity varies by region of the country and by level of office.\textsuperscript{40}

Due to these changes, reference to the “campaign organization” has inevitably come to focus on the candidate’s organization. While studies have examined various aspects of organizations over the years, a review of the literature will show that there is no agreement as to a focus, much less a theoretical expectation concerning the role for these entities within the overall electoral process. After a brief review of the literature, a theoretical perspective will be proposed which will indicate how campaign organizations fit within the larger campaign process.

\textbf{Campaign Organizations as a Focus of Scholarly Research}

As indicated at several points already, the campaign process itself is seldom a topic in studies of elections. The primary reason for this is probably due to the ephemeral nature of campaigns. Even successful campaigns are disbanded once all the ballots have been cast. It is likely that many of the concepts used in the study of other types of
organizations are not applicable because campaign organizations are such short-lived operations. In addition, from a methodological standpoint is difficult to study organizations after they disappear. Few campaigns leave behind a paper trail of organizational charts or data on the number of workers or the nature of their responsibilities. Without speaking with or surveying members of the campaign during or shortly after the campaign, it is likely that such information will be lost. The result is that organizational features of campaigns are relatively understudied.41

However, a number of political practitioners, candidates, and scholars often speak of the central importance of the organization. One former political candidate, Dick Simpson writes that “organizing a campaign with the right equipment, and the right support services is a poorly understood part of winning elections” (1996, p. 43). A number of practical political books or campaign manuals advise candidates to make decisions early concerning who will be part of the campaign effort and how divisions of responsibility will be drawn (Beaudry and Schaeffer, 1986; Guber, 1997; Napolitan, 1972; Shea, 1996; Simpson, 1996).

Candidates themselves often attribute importance to the organization. One scholar-candidate, Sandy Maisel (1982) writes that “[i]f they are to be successful, candidates must work hard on structuring an organization” (p. 35). In a study of defeated congressional candidates in 1962, Huckshorn and Spencer (1971) find that candidates attribute a great deal of importance to organizational features noting that “as many as 80 percent of the losers and 75 percent of the marginal losers felt that ‘inadequate campaign organization’ was of considerable or great importance to their defeat” (p. 133).42
Far from dismissing the campaign organization as inconsequential, many scholars also point to its central nature. Salmore and Salmore (1985) indicate that there are really two campaigns -- “[t]he external campaign is the visible one directed to voters; the internal campaign is the activity going on within the apparatus set up to conduct the race” (p. 59). These authors recognize that “[a] campaign organization must be in place” (p. 60) in order to complete tasks prior to the start of the external campaign. Gary Jacobson (1992) says that “[o]rganization is necessary to design and execute campaign strategy, to raise money, to schedule the candidate’s use of his or her personal time and energy to reach voters and more active supporters efficiently, and to help get out the vote on election day” (p. 63).

Unfortunately, few attempts have been made to incorporate these organizational components into comprehensive studies of the electoral process. The few that do focus on them spend a good deal of time simply describing the organizations. V.O. Key (1964) describes presidential organizations in the following manner: “[i]n truth, the campaign is a jerry-built makeshift structure manned largely by temporary and volunteer workers who labor long hours amidst confusion and uncertainty. Assignments of responsibility and lines of authority are likely to be hazy. The army of campaign workers is loosely articulated and some of its regiments may be sulky, if not actually insubordinate” (p. 457). Barbara Hershey describes campaigns as “fluid, changeable structures that are difficult to coordinate” (1974: p. xvii). Jacobson says that congressional campaigns are “personal, temporary, and, for the most part, staffed with volunteers” (1992: p. 79). These perspectives are ones often echoed in many insider accounts of campaigns written
by either former political operatives or journalists. While some authors may sometimes speak of these organizations as well run military machines (e.g., the Kennedy campaign in 1960 by Theodore White, 1961), these descriptions are few and far between. Most observers describe them much in the way Key (1964), Hershey (1974), and Jacobson (1992) do.

Aside from these descriptive assessments, there are but a few studies which try to discern the actual effect of organizational features. Those that do often focus on their resource gathering role. For example, Kayden (1978) finds that “[m]ost of those who work in campaigns on a full-time basis perform tasks that are directed not at stimulating the voter, but at mobilizing resources -- contributions of money and time from supporters of the candidate” (p. 61-62). However, other studies look at the effect of organization on the vote-getting stage of the campaign. For example, several quantitative studies have demonstrated the effectiveness of canvassing efforts on the part of party organizations (Crotty, 1971; Cutright and Rossi, 1958; Gosnell, 1927; Katz and Eldersveld, 1961). Efforts by parties in neighborhood door-to-door activities can have a significant impact on the percentage of the vote that a party receives. While clearly showing the electoral relevance of campaign organization, these studies give us little information about how or why such organizational features developed. More importantly, many of these studies were written at a time when party organizations and not the candidate organizations were the locus of control and influence.

As this short review shows, many scholars as well as practical politicians attribute importance to organizational features. Some studies show that organizational attributes
are necessary for understanding the types of strategies for securing additional resources for the campaign. Other studies focus on the use of one component of the organization (workers) on the ability to attract votes. However, there is little consensus as to what attributes are most consequential. The next section builds on this previous work by proposing two aspects of organizations on which to focus: organizational strength and organizational professionalism. These aspects of the organization and how they vary across campaigns may help us better understand the role of organizations in the overall campaign process.

**Components of Campaign Organizations**

This analysis considers several organizational components of state legislative campaigns. Unlike other studies which focus on just one part of the organization (such as the number of workers or the amount of money allocated for organizational expenses), a broader range of factors is considered. Part of the rationale for doing so is that we do not really know very much about campaign organizations, particularly on the state legislative level. In one of the few studies of campaigns in this setting, Mileur and Sulzner (1974) examined campaign organizations of Massachusetts Senate candidates in 1968. They described them as “largely nonprofessional operations” which had few paid employees and only about half having a designated campaign manager (p. 81).44

However, changes in some state legislative institutions in recent years (particularly increasing professionalism) may very well have brought about changes in campaign methods. One study examining expenditures made by lower house state
legislative candidates in Texas and Kansas finds that some candidates spend relatively large amounts of money on their organizations (Hogan, 1998). This study finds that candidates in Texas more so than those in Kansas spend a larger share of their campaign monies on such things as salaries, rent, and office expenses. These differences are attributed to the different population sizes of the districts (Texas districts are on average over five times the population of Kansas districts). A larger campaign apparatus is needed when there are more potential voters to contact. In smaller district, probably little if any organization is necessary. The findings from this study are rather limited because the analysis incorporated data from only two states -- two states which provide only limited variation on important variables. Per voter spending is similar and the legislatures in both states are considered middle-range in terms of professionalism.

But it is these two factors which we expect to have a major impact on the types of campaign organizations which are formed. High levels of available spending mean that campaigns are capable of hiring more employees, many of whom probably possess some practical political experience. They are probably also capable of equipping a well-staffed campaign headquarters. The nature of the institution might also play a role in that candidates running for these offices are probably more serious contenders and will take the time and effort to create a strong organization. For these reasons, an examination of campaign organizations under a variety of conditions is necessary.

Below two different organizational components of campaigns are introduced -- strength and professionalism. After discussing the role these two organizational aspects play, empirical descriptions of these features are provided.
What is a Campaign Organization?

For the purposes of this analysis, the organization refers to the people who work in the campaign, the division of labor among the workers, the actual decision making structure, and the support services (including physical space occupied by workers). The organization can serve many functions and is not clearly delineated from the other two dimensions explored in this analysis -- information gathering and voter contact strategy. In fact, these other components may depend to a large extent on organizational features. For example, is there anyone to gather information or to canvass the neighborhood? While not completely separate, these features are distinct. Understanding basic elements such as who is running the organization, how many workers are involved, and if there is a campaign office would all seem to be a necessary starting point for the study of any process or coordinated effort.

What aspects of the campaign organization are important to consider? Several features will be examined including the amount of financial resources allocated for organizational expenses (including fundraising). However, for the purposes of this chapter, most of the attention will focus on two characteristics: organizational strength and organizational professionalism.

Organizational Strength

Organizational strength refers to the campaign's ability to engage in a number of activities aimed at aiding the election of a political candidate. What are considered
indicators of a strong organization? One is probably the number workers who are involved. A second indicator and one that is probably a minimal level mark of task specialization is whether or not there is a campaign manager. Is there someone aside from the candidate who is responsible for making campaign decisions and dealing with the day-to-day activities of organizational maintenance? Is this person a full-time or part-time worker? How much control over decisions is granted to this campaign manager? Campaigns which have several workers and a designated campaign manager with a degree of control over the decision making process are considered to have strong organizations.

Organizations with many workers probably have several advantages over those with no workers or only a few workers. One is simply that more workers can be used to engage in extensive canvassing efforts either by telephone or through door-to-door contact. A strong organization can give the campaign decision makers the option to engage in canvassing. This is an organizational component that can have a direct impact on voting.

A number of campaign workers also provide advantages that may result in an indirect effect on the support garnered by a candidate. The presence of more workers creates the possibility of greater task specialization. Xandra Kayden (1978) notes the importance of task specialization in campaigns and differentiates those campaigns which have mostly generalists as opposed to those which have a number of specialists. When there are only one or two workers, there is little possibility that workers can concentrate on just one or two tasks such as fundraising, media attention, or opposition research.
Workers in small campaigns have to do a large number of these tasks simultaneously so specialization is not possible. While campaigns are clearly ephemeral and workers do not have much time to develop real "expertise", if they are responsible for only one job such as fundraising or media attention, they will probably become more effective than if they have to juggle a half dozen or so tasks.

Another aspect of organizational strength is whether or not there is someone who is responsible for overseeing the day-to-day operations of the campaign. Is there a designated campaign manager? Many of the books written as "how-to" manuals stress the importance of a manager who can focus attention more on the machinery of the campaign while the candidate can focus more time being seen by and meeting with voters. Beaudry and Schaeffer (1986) even write, "[r]emember the saying that a person who serves as his own lawyer has a fool for a client? Like most experienced campaigners, we firmly believe that the candidate who manages his or her own campaign is equally foolish" (p. 41).

Organizational Professionalism

Another dimension of organizations is their level of professionalism. A number of studies make the distinction between those campaigns which are more professional and those which are more amateur (Goldenberg and Traugott, 1984; Herrnson, 1995; Huckshorn and Spencer, 1971). Xandra Kayden (1978) for instance, considers the differences between what she terms "professional" and "personalized" campaigns."
Campaigns with professional organizations probably have many advantages over less professional organizations. First, such a campaign is likely to hire a manager who is likely to have experience working in politics. Experience is probably why such a campaign manager is provided a salary. These campaign professionals know how to use political resources most effectively. They know what types of techniques work and which do not. They know how to allocate voter contact dollars more efficiently and effectively than political novices. It is likely therefore that this will strengthen the impact that voter contact dollars have on election outcomes.

What defines a professional campaign organization? There is probably not one best indicator, but several. A professional campaign organization is one that has workers who are compensated, probably a designated campaign office, and monetary resources to cover organizational expenses such as telephones, furniture, and photocopy machines.

Studies on the congressional level looking at this aspect of campaigns reveal a move toward greater professionalism over time. For example, Huckshorn and Spencer (1971) found in their survey of defeated candidates in 1962 that "campaign management for over 80% of the candidates fell within the nonprofessional or amateur classes" (p. 95). They reveal that only 4% of the congressional losers in their survey indicated their campaign had been professionally managed (p. 95). But, Huckshorn and Spencer (1971) do show that the campaigns which lost by small margins had more professionally run organizations than those that lost by large margins. A study of congressional campaigns in 1978 by Goldenberg and Traugott (1984) found that "virtually every campaign had a designated campaign manager and a treasurer. The managers were most likely to be
salaried employees, although almost as many were volunteers” (p. 19). Paul Herrnson more recently examines this question in congressional campaigns during the 1992 election cycle and finds that the vast majority of congressional campaigns are run by a paid staffer or a professional consultant.

**Organizational Features of State Legislative Campaigns**

What do modern state legislative campaigns look like? Anecdotal evidence as well as empirical evidence suggests that organizational features among state legislative campaigns vary dramatically.

Some campaigns appear to exhibit characteristics that are associated with both strong and professional organizations. An example of such a campaign was in South Carolina during the 1994 primary. The organization was housed in a rented store front where a number of workers stuffed envelopes and telephoned registered voters. The candidate indicated that nearly 50 or 100 volunteers were involved with the campaign effort. He said that while he had no designated campaign manager, there was a steering committee that collectively made decisions as well took care of the day-to-day affairs. Several office workers were paid employees who handled clerical and scheduling duties. The candidate himself had been campaigning full-time for the past several months.

Other campaigns in 1994 were much more personalistic than professional. Many candidates reported having few workers, nothing that resembled an organization, and usually a relative (a spouse, typically) as a campaign manager. Some of the organizations can be described best as “minimal”. For example, in a Texas primary in 1994 one state
legislative candidate along with her daughter (the campaign manager) jokingly made reference to their campaign’s “war room” as the 1992 Clinton campaign headquarters in Little Rock had become known. This campaign “nerve center” was located in the attic and consisted of one table covered with papers, a computer, and few chairs. “This,” the candidate said, “is the heart of our operation. We plan strategy here, we put together mailings here, we do a good deal of our phone calling from up here.” The organization of this campaign is probably very different than many would probably expect. Compared to presidential campaign organizations that some have described as “well-oiled machines” many state legislative campaigns appear to be very personalized organizations indeed.

How organizationally strong and professional are state legislative campaigns? Two types of empirical evidence will be used to measure the degree of organizational strength and professionalism in a quantitative fashion. The first comes from data gleaned from campaign finance reports filed by candidates running for the state legislature. The second comes from survey responses from a sample of candidates who completed and returned the questionnaire.

*Finances Expended on the Organization*

As indicated earlier, studies on the congressional level (Fritz and Morris, 1992; Morris and Gamache, 1994) as well as on the state legislative level (Hogan, 1998) find that large portions of campaign spending go for organizational expenses. For example, among incumbents running in Texas and Kansas, the percentage allocated for “overhead”
made up anywhere between 16 to 26 percent of total spending. It costs money to hire workers, to rent office space, and to pay the many bills of the day-to-day operation.

How much money is allocated in state legislative campaigns for organizational expenses? In order to obtain such information, campaign finance reports filed by candidates in five states have been analyzed. Each itemized expenditure made by candidates was coded and entered into one of 115 expenditure categories. These individual lines of data were then aggregated by category of expenses for each candidate in both primary and general election periods. Table 4.1 and 4.2 condense these expenditure categories into five major groups with the addition of subgroups for organization/overhead and other expenses. Because this chapter is about organizational components of campaigns, most of the discussion will focus on this aspect of spending. Later chapters will go into greater depth about spending on other items.

Expenses for fundraising, operating expenses, fees, salaries, and other "organizational" or "overhead" expenditures account for varying percentages of campaign budgets across the five states. Spending on these items in the primary ranges from a low of 3% of the total budget in Wyoming to a high of slightly more than 20% in Connecticut and Illinois. A similar pattern can be observed in Table 4.2 for the general election period where Wyoming is at the bottom again (less than 3%) and Connecticut and Illinois are at the top (about 15% each). Overall, these expenses account for a considerably smaller percentage of the total budget than those reported by Fritz and Morris (1992) and by Morris and Gamache (1994) from congressional candidates in the early 1990s. However, the percentages allocated by candidates in Connecticut and
Table 4.1
Average Percentage of Campaign Spending Allocated to the Following Areas by Candidates Running in 1994 State Legislative Primaries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expenditure Category</th>
<th>Connecticut</th>
<th>Delaware</th>
<th>Illinois</th>
<th>South Carolina</th>
<th>Wyoming</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organization/Overhead</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundraising</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating Expenses</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fees</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salaries</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victory Parties/Celebrations</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Organization/Overhead</strong></td>
<td>20.4%</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
<td>19.8%</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Information Gathering</strong></td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Voter Contact</strong></td>
<td>77.2</td>
<td>64.7</td>
<td>59.7</td>
<td>75.2</td>
<td>90.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Expenses</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributions to Parties</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributions to other Candidates</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donations to Charity</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gifts to Constituents/Volunteers</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loan Repayments</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Duties</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous non-campaign related</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Other Expenses</strong></td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Unitemized</strong></td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GRAND TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditure Category</td>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>Wyoming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organization/Overhead</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundraising</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating Expenses</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fees</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salaries</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victory Parties/Celebrations</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Organization/Overhead</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Information Gathering</strong></td>
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<td>1.8%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Voter Contact</strong></td>
<td>74.8%</td>
<td>74.2%</td>
<td>65.9%</td>
<td>69.3%</td>
<td>91.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Expenses</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributions to Parties</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributions to other Candidates</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donations to Charity</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gifts to Constituents/Volunteers</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loan Repayments</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Duties</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous non-campaign related</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Other Expenses</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Unitemized</strong></td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GRAND TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0%</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0%</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0%</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0%</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Illinois come much closer to congressional candidate expenditure patterns than average spending by candidates in other states.

Within the larger category of organizational spending, operating costs and fundraising make up the largest percentages. Operating costs included such things as rent, utilities, and various office items comprising between 1.5% of the total budget in Wyoming general elections to more than 8% in Connecticut primaries. The percentage allocated for salaries also ranges with the highest percentages going for this purpose in South Carolina general elections (6%) and in both primary and general campaigns in Illinois (5%). However, in other states these expenses make up a much lower percentage. Fees for filing or permits along with victory party expenses make up a small percentage in every state.

Fundraising consumes a sizable portion of total overhead expenses. These expenses make up a very minute amount of spending in Wyoming primaries (0.2%) but a relatively high percentage in Connecticut and Delaware (almost 10 and 11 percent respectively). This constitutes a significant portion of money that candidates spend in trying to raise more money. Close inspection of the itemized expenditure reports in two of these states with high fundraising costs (Connecticut and Delaware) reveals that much of this goes for dinners, receptions, and picnics which are often combination fund-raisers and “meet the candidate” activities. Often times such events are part of larger district or county-wide party functions. However, candidates often list such expenses as “fundraising”.
Costs for gathering information and other expenses make up a relatively small percentage of the total budget. Un-itemized expenses make up a sizable percentage in Delaware and Illinois, reflecting in part, variations in the higher minimum spending for itemization required in these states. By far the largest category of expenditures in candidate budgets is for voter contact. In most states, this percentage is rather high. During both primary and general election periods, upwards of 70 to 90 percent of all spending is allocated in this manner. In Wyoming nearly 92% of spending allocated by candidates is for contacting voters. However, candidates in Illinois generally spend much less -- only about 60% in the primary and 65% in the general election.

These expenditure patterns of candidates vary a great deal across states. These differences are no more readily apparent than in the differences between campaigns in Illinois and those in Wyoming. In both the primary and general election periods, Illinois has the smallest percentage allocated for voter contact while Wyoming has the highest percentage. In terms of the percentage allocated for organizational expenses, Illinois is one of two states with the highest percentage (Connecticut is the other) while Wyoming ranks lowest. Such differences conform to earlier expectations regarding the influence of legislative professionalism. Spending patterns in Illinois are much more similar to the spending patterns of congressional candidates -- what would be expected given that it has a professional legislature. Large expenses are allocated toward the organization and, therefore, a much smaller portion can be spent on voter communication efforts. Spending in Wyoming, on the other hand, is much less like spending in congressional campaigns. Nearly all of the spending by candidates in this state goes for voter contact.
While campaign spending patterns provide insights into how much money is allocated toward the organization, a reliance solely on the financial perspective may not tell us everything we would like to know. For example, it is often difficult to infer from expense reports the exact number of people who are paid a salary by the campaign. It is certainly not possible to determine how many volunteers provided their time and services. Neither is it possible to infer how much decision-making authority is granted to a manager by the candidate. Even the total amount allocated for organizational expenses is not a good indicator of organizational strength in that some candidates may spend large amounts of money on rent or salaries simply because a large amount of money is available. For these reasons, it is necessary to use survey information in order to more fully understand the strength and professionalism of these organizations.

Who Is In Charge?

One of the most basic characteristics of a campaign has to do with who is in charge. Is the candidate responsible for running his or her campaign or is there a designated manager who holds primary responsibility? Anecdotal evidence suggests that state legislative candidates themselves are the principal decision-makers. Several candidates in 1994 indicated their reliance on advice or help from a number of individuals such as close friends. One candidate said that he along with the campaign manager made decisions about campaign strategy. But, a large number of candidates reported that they alone went about making decisions and running the campaign. When asked about the
decision making structure within his campaign organization, one candidate responded, "You're looking at it."

To more systematically examine this question, survey respondents were asked to indicate who was most responsible for running their campaign. Figure 4.1 provides the percentages of candidates who responded in both the primary and general election contests.49

By far the single most frequently cited person in charge is the candidate. About 61% of the respondents in the primary and 56% in the general election marked this response. Following somewhat far behind is the campaign manager. Only 19% of the respondents in the primary and 25% in the general election named the manager. An even smaller percentage of respondents indicated that a committee was responsible. A similar number of respondents said that the candidate along with someone else (usually the manager) held joint responsibility. Only a fraction of respondents report other entities as overseeing the campaign. For example, a few named the legislative campaign committee while a few others said their political consultant was responsible. For the most part, state legislative campaigns are run by the candidate alone or jointly by the candidate along with a campaign manager. This appears to be true for both primary and general election contests.

There are also differences across the states in the percentage of candidates who indicate that the candidate alone was responsible for running the campaign. Figure 4.2 displays the percentage of primary and general election campaigns where the candidate was primarily in charge. The states are arrayed by order of decreasing percentage being
Figure 4.1
Who Was Most Responsible for Running the
Primary and General Election Campaigns in 1994

Who Was Most Responsible

Candidate
Manager
Committee
Candidate with others
Manager with others
Other

Percent Marking

61%
56%
25%
19%
8%
7%
9%
8%
2%
2%
2%
1%
run by the candidate alone in the primary. Among primary campaigns, the percentages range from a low of 51% in Illinois to a high of 93% in Wyoming. In the general election, the percentages are similar, however, Oregon comes in with the lowest (38%) followed by Illinois (47%). Wyoming again has the highest percentage of 89%.

These results suggest that there are differences in the campaigns across states and these differences correspond to some extent with the level of legislative professionalism. The percentage of campaigns run primarily by the candidate is much higher in Wyoming (the least professional state) than in the other states. Similarly, the percentage of campaigns run by the candidate is lower in Illinois (the most professional state) than in most other states (Oregon has a lower percentage than Illinois but only in the general election). Chi-square tests for both the primary and general election periods provide statistical support for differences among the three categories of institutions (professional, middle-range, and citizen legislatures).\textsuperscript{50}

\textit{Organizational Strength}

While knowing who is in charge is probably one basic feature of a campaign, it does not say very much about the organization's strength. What characteristics might define a strong organization? One indicator probably has to do with the division of labor. Is there only one person in charge of everything or are there several people with differing responsibilities? One minimum-level indicator of division of labor, it would seem, is whether or not anyone other than the candidate has decision-making authority. Because candidates themselves are in charge of political campaigns does not mean that the
Figure 4.2
Percentage of Primary and General Election Campaigns in 1994 Reporting that Only the Candidate Was Responsible for Running the Campaign
candidate is running the enterprise alone. One way to gauge this is to determine whether or not there is a designated manager. In addition, it would probably also be helpful to understand the extent of the manager’s work. In other words, is the manager a full-time or part-time employee?

Figures 4.3 and 4.4 indicate the percentage of campaigns in each state which had no manager, a part-time manager, or a full-time manager for the primary and general elections. The states are arranged in order of those having the lowest to the highest percentage of full-time managers (a bar representing the average percentage for all the states is also included).

Overall, approximately one-fourth of campaigns in primaries have full-time managers. The highest percentage have part-time managers (46%) and almost one-third have no manager (29%). The individual bars for each state show that the percentage of manager types varies across states. For example, the percentage of campaigns with full-time managers is quite low in states like Wyoming, Delaware, and South Carolina, but is relatively higher in states like Illinois, Oregon, and Texas. Equally instructive is the percentage of campaigns reporting no manager at all. Wyoming has the highest percentage while Delaware surprisingly has the lowest. Delaware has few full-time managers, but there are also few campaigns which have no managers. Most of the managers in this state’s primary are part-time.

Figure 4.4 shows that managers are used more frequently in general election campaigns where approximately 29% are full-time and 51% are part-time. Only 20% of general election campaigns report having no manager. Again, there is variation across the
Figure 4.3
Management of Primary Election Campaigns in 1994 By State

No Manager
Part-Time Manager
Full-Time Manager

Percent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WY</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IL</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OR</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TX</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 4.4
Management of General Election Campaigns in 1994 By State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>No Manager</th>
<th>Part-Time Manager</th>
<th>Full-Time Manager</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WY</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TX</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IL</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OR</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
states with candidates in Wyoming, Connecticut, and Delaware having fewer full-time managers while candidates in Texas, Illinois, and Oregon have many more. Connecticut and Delaware have high percentages of part-time managers while Wyoming has the highest percentage of campaigns with no manager.

About 50% of all primary and general election campaigns are run by part-time managers. The remainder are divided with about half being run by full-time managers and the other half having no designated manager. More candidates have managers in the general election than in the primary and these managers are somewhat more likely to be full-time. However, the more interesting finding is that there are often large variations in campaign management across the states. These variations vary with the legislative professionalism dimension -- candidates running in the citizen legislature (Wyoming) are less likely to have managers and these managers are less likely to be full-time than candidates running in the professional legislature (Illinois). Across the range of states in both primary and general election periods, Wyoming is at the bottom while Illinois is much closer to the top. Chi-square tests indicate that variations in the percentages of campaigns having full-time managers or no-manager across the three categories of professionalism (citizen, middle-range, and professional) are statistically significant.51

Another method of determining the extent of manager participation in the decision making process involves the level of control managers were granted in making campaign strategy.52 Average responses by candidates who had managers in the primary or general election campaigns are provided in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3  
Amount of Control Over Campaign Decision Making by Campaign Managers in Primary and General Election Campaigns  
(Standard Deviations in Parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>General</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>60.93%</td>
<td>57.71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(23.32)</td>
<td>(23.88)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>54.42%</td>
<td>51.44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(25.71)</td>
<td>(23.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>52.38%</td>
<td>44.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(19.67)</td>
<td>(26.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td>49.50%</td>
<td>59.68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(21.27)</td>
<td>(20.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>47.37%</td>
<td>48.56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(24.12)</td>
<td>(24.86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>44.21%</td>
<td>50.83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(19.81)</td>
<td>(26.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wyoming</td>
<td>42.00%</td>
<td>36.77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(17.35)</td>
<td>(16.67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVERAGE</td>
<td>52.61%</td>
<td>50.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(22.75)</td>
<td>(24.50)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
For those campaigns having managers, candidates on average grant them about 50% of the control in making strategy. The differences between primary and general elections are minor. This amount of control is what we would probably expect, given that a candidate decides to have a manager in the first place (why have one if they are given no responsibility)? While about half of the control is the average, there is often quite a range -- in other words, some managers are granted wider breadth than others. Some candidates in both election cycles indicated that they gave their managers 100% control. Some also reported giving their managers no control (0%). The standard deviations across the states testify to the variation which exists across campaigns even within states.

What is probably most interesting from this table is the degree of variation present across the states. The states are arranged from top to bottom according to the level of control granted to managers in the primary election. Wyoming is the lowest with candidates granting them 42% of control in the primary and about 37% in the general. Illinois grants the highest level of control in the primary (about 61%) and second highest in the general election (58%). Only Delaware is higher than Illinois in the general with 60%. Again, these differences in the states closely mirror the variation in legislative professionalism. Analysis of variance tests reveal that the observed differences across three groups of legislative professionalism are statistically significant.53

A final component of organizational strength involves the complexity of the organization as indicated by the number of campaign workers. How many workers are part of the campaign effort?
Figure 4.5
Median Number of Workers in Primary and General Election Campaigns in 1994

- IL
- TX
- CT
- SC
- OR
- DE
- WV

Primary: □
General: ■
Analysis of survey responses shows that there is often great variation in the number of workers utilized. Some campaigns have a large number of workers while many others have few if any. Figure 4.5 displays the median number (both paid and unpaid) who were involved in both the primary and general elections in each of the states. The last two columns in Figure 4.5 show that for the entire sample, the median number of workers is 8 for the primary and 10 for the general election, but there is considerable variation across the states. Wyoming falls at the bottom with the typical campaign having only two workers in the primary and four in the general election. Illinois is at the top with 13 workers in the primary and 15 in the general election. Analysis of variance tests again indicate that the differences across the three categories of state professionalism are in fact statistically significant. A campaign in the more professional state typically has a larger number of workers in both primary and general election contests.41

For the most part, indicators of organizational strength vary across the sample of states. Of particular importance is the variation across the states on the legislative professionalism dimension. It appears that campaigns in the state with the professional legislature (Illinois) have much stronger organizations than those campaigns in other states. It is also apparent that campaigns in the state with the citizen legislature have much weaker organizations than those in other states.
Organizational Professionalism

The second dimension of state legislative campaigns involves their level of professionalism. Are state legislative campaign organizations best described as "professional" or "personalized" (following Kayden’s 1978 categorization)?

One indicator of professionalism is whether or not workers are compensated for their services. Figure 4.6 provides the percentages of campaign workers in each state across primaries and general elections who were provided monetary payments.

The column marked “average” shows that among the sample of states, 10% of workers in the primary and 9% in the general election received payment for their work. Broken out by state there is considerable variation. None of the respondents from Wyoming indicated payment to any workers in either the primary or general election. Less than 10% of workers in primary and general election campaigns in Connecticut, Delaware, and South Carolina were paid for services rendered. Only in Oregon general elections (17%) and in Texas primaries (19%) is there anywhere close to a sizable percentage of workers being paid for their work.

As with most indicators of organizational strength, there appears to be evidence that these state differences are linked to differences in legislative professionalism. Wyoming falls at the bottom and Illinois falls near the top regarding the percentage of workers receiving payment. Analysis of variance tests of the mean number of paid workers across the three categories of professionalism show that these differences are statistically significant.55
Figure 4.6
Average Percentage of Workers in Primary and General Election Campaigns in 1994 Who Received Payment for their Services

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>General</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WY</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OR</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IL</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TX</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Another indicator of professionalism is monetary compensation for the campaign manager. Figure 4.7 displays the percentage of campaigns which paid managers for their services (over all those who hired managers).

On average for the sample of states, about one-third of those campaigns with managers provided them with some monetary compensate for their work. Slightly more were compensated in the primary (35%) than in the general election (31%). Again, the range in state averages is quite large. Among the survey respondents, none of the managers in Wyoming were paid and only about 10% or fewer of the managers in Connecticut and Delaware reported payment. However, in Illinois about 39% in the primary and 44% in the general election indicate paying managers. About half of primary candidates in Oregon and primary and general election candidates in Texas report such payment. However, the largest percentage is in Oregon general election contests with 94%. Again, these differences across states are somewhat reflective of differences across the institutions. Wyoming is at the bottom, while Illinois is near the top. Chi-square tests reveal that the differences among the three groups of states achieve standard levels of statistical significance only in the general election period.56

A final indicator of campaign professionalism has to do with the physical space of the campaign operation. Is there a designated campaign office? Figure 4.8 displays the percentage of candidates in both primary and general election periods reporting a campaign office.
Figure 4.8
Percentage of Primary and General Election Campaigns
in 1994 With Campaign Offices
A large percentage of campaigns for the state legislature have offices -- 74% in the primary and 78% in the general election. Candidates running in Wyoming were less likely to have offices while candidates in Illinois and Oregon were more likely to have them. In fact, nearly all the respondents from Oregon who ran in the general election had a designated campaign office (93%).

While these percentages seem rather high, one should recognize that many of the "offices" reported by candidates are not what many would probably consider "professional" campaign offices. We may want to differentiate between those offices located in their own separate facility and those which occupy the candidate's kitchen table. We might consider campaigns located in their own facility as being more professional than those located in a party headquarters or in the candidate's place of business. Certainly such places are more professional than an office located in a candidate's home. Figures 4.9 and 4.10 provide by election period, the percentages of offices located in their own separate facility, in other locations (e.g., party headquarters, candidate's place of business, in a friend's place of business, etc.), or in the candidate's home.

On average about 29% of primary candidates and 32% of general election candidates report having campaign offices located in their own separate facilities. About 44% in the primary and 34% in the general election report their home as the location. As with the other measures of organizational strength and professionalism, there is variation across the states. For example, none of the respondents from Wyoming in either election period report having a campaign office located in its own separate facility. Few
Figure 4.10
Location of Campaign Offices in 1994 General Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>% Home</th>
<th>% Other</th>
<th>% Separate Facility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WY</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OR</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TX</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IL</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
candidates in either election cycle in Delaware report such facilities (5% in the primary and 7% in the general). However, in other states larger percentages appear to have separately located offices. However, the state with the highest percentage is Illinois where about 49% of primary candidates and 60% of general election candidates report having offices located in their own separate facilities. As with most other measures we have seen, these differences among the states appear to be reflective of the legislative institutions. Chi-square tests indicate that these differences are statistically significant for both primary and general election periods.57

As with organizational strength, professionalism varies across campaigns as well as across states. Some campaigns have very high levels of professionalism -- there are paid workers, salaried managers, and a headquarters in its own separate facility. For many other campaigns on the state legislative level, however, campaign professionalism is rather low -- there is no one in the campaign who is paid and there is no campaign office to speak of. These variations exist both across and within states with campaigns in the more professional state (Illinois) exhibiting consistent levels of campaign professionalism while campaigns in the citizen legislature (Wyoming) exhibiting much lower levels.

Indices of Organizational Strength and Professionalism

So far each component of strength and professionalism has been examined in isolation. However, what happens when these separate organizational components are
combined to create one for strength and one for professionalism? Combining the
measures may make it easier to detect variations in these concepts across campaigns.

An index called Organizational Strength is created consisting of several of the
indicators examined already. A campaign receives a score of “1” for each item utilized:

1. Is there a designated campaign manager?
2. Is there a designated full-time campaign manager?
3. Is there a designated campaign manager who plays at least 40% of a role
   in the decision-making process?
4. Are there at least 5 unpaid workers in the campaign?

An index called Organizational Professionalism is constructed similarly but uses
different indicators. Again, for each of the following items a campaign receives a score
of “1”:

1. Is there a paid campaign manager?
2. Is there at least one paid campaign worker?
3. Is there a designated campaign office?
4. Is there a designated campaign office located in its own separate facility?

The individual indicators contained within each index are all highly correlated
with one another. More importantly, they appear to represent one underlying dimension.
A factor analysis conducted separately for each index shows that only one factor has an
eigenvalue of at least 1.0, indicating the presence of only one underlying dimension for
each index.

Table 4.4 displays the average strength and professionalism index score for
candidates running in each of the states in both primary and general election periods.
These findings should not be too surprising given the results presented earlier. There is
variation across both election periods and across states.
Table 4.4
Average Campaign Organizational Strength and Professionalism Scores by State
(Standard deviations in parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Primary Strength Index</th>
<th>Primary Professionalism Index</th>
<th>General Strength Index</th>
<th>General Professionalism Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td>2.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.26)</td>
<td>(1.37)</td>
<td>(1.30)</td>
<td>(1.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>2.07</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>2.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.28)</td>
<td>(1.24)</td>
<td>(1.29)</td>
<td>(1.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>2.35</td>
<td>1.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.28)</td>
<td>(0.96)</td>
<td>(1.10)</td>
<td>(0.93)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>2.26</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>2.67</td>
<td>2.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.32)</td>
<td>(1.22)</td>
<td>(1.36)</td>
<td>(1.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.03)</td>
<td>(1.19)</td>
<td>(0.88)</td>
<td>(0.82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>2.06</td>
<td>1.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.12)</td>
<td>(0.81)</td>
<td>(1.32)</td>
<td>(1.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wyoming</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.05)</td>
<td>(0.51)</td>
<td>(1.31)</td>
<td>(0.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVERAGE</td>
<td>2.18</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>2.37</td>
<td>1.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.32)</td>
<td>(1.26)</td>
<td>(1.26)</td>
<td>(1.27)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Campaigns appear to have higher strength and professionalism index scores in the general election period than in the primary election period (Connecticut, Delaware, and Wyoming do not conform to this general rule, but only for the professionalism index). This is not too surprising given the fact that campaigns in general election contests are not just attempting to contact the relatively small number of partisan voters who turn out in primaries, but instead are attempting to contact the much larger population of voters who participate in general elections. Stronger and more professional organizations are needed to contact this larger pool of potential voters. However, the differences between the two groups do not achieve standard levels of statistical significance (the differences between strength barely miss the cutoff of p<0.05).  

The variations across the states appear to mirror variations in legislative professionalism. Here we find that Illinois ranks at or near the top on both dimensions and Wyoming ranks at the bottom for each dimension during both election periods. There appears to be a correlation among levels of legislative professionalism and the indices of organizational strength and professionalism. Analysis of variance tests find that these differences are statistically significant for the strength and professionalism index in both election periods.  

One interesting exception to this general pattern is Oregon (a middle-range legislature in terms of professionalism) that ranks higher than Illinois in terms of campaign strength and professionalism in the general election. Why do candidates in this state score so high on these measures? One explanation may have to do with the high number of competitive seats in Oregon in 1994. Approximately 55% of both Senate and
House seats in this state were highly competitive in the general election. Measures of district-level competition show that Oregon’s average is higher than any other state (See Table 3.8 in Chapter Three).

Now that we have information concerning the general characteristics of state legislative campaign organizations, we can begin to see how they fit into the larger campaign process. The rest of this chapter is devoted to understanding how political resources available to campaigns influence the nature of the organization that is created. Attention will be given to untangling some of the relationships that have been observed so far in this analysis. For example, we see differences in the types of campaigns waged by candidates in professional versus citizen legislatures. However, part of these differences may have to do with the relative levels of spending allocated by these campaigns. We know for instance that campaign spending is generally higher in states with more professional legislatures. How much of this observed difference is due to the levels of spending and how much is due to the nature of the legislative institution? Examining candidates with varying levels of spending in both professional and citizen legislatures will make it possible to answer such questions.

Factors Influencing Dimensions of Organizational Strength and Professionalism

As indicated in Chapter Two, a number of factors are expected to influence the type of campaign organization candidates put in place. Some of these factors have been identified in the literature, though few have been empirically tested. These expectations are reviewed below along with findings from previous studies.
Paul Herrnson writes that “[t]he biggest factor in House campaigns is incumbency. Assembling a campaign organization is an easy task for incumbents. Most merely reassemble the personnel who worked on their previous campaigns. A substantial number of incumbents keep elements of their organizations intact between election cycles” (p. 63). Incumbents also usually have more money to cover the costs of salaries and office space. Fritz and Morris (1992) show that incumbents spend much larger sums on such things than challengers or open seat candidates. We would therefore expect that incumbents to have stronger and more professional campaign organizations.

Another candidate-level factor involves experience. Again, Paul Herrnson recognizes how this might impact the campaign organization. He says that “[p]revious non-elective political involvement gives such people as party committee chairs, political aides, and individuals who have previously run for office some knowledge of how to wage a campaign and ties to others who can help them” (p. 64). Candidates with experience probably have contacts with a network of volunteers who can provide assistance. Previous office-holding, then, is likely to lead to stronger and more professional campaign organizations.

Level of financial resources may be another factor which influences the strength and professionalism of organizations. Goldenberg and Traugott (1984) note that “staffing of campaigns reflects a recurring difference between the resources of incumbents and their challengers” (p. 21). Fritz and Morris (1992) find that candidates with high levels of available funding have the ability to spend a great deal on the organizational apparatus. Candidates who have the most to spend are probably the ones with the most to spare for
organizational expenses. Evidence from state legislative campaigns in Texas and Kansas shows that candidates with larger amounts of money are more likely to spend a greater percentage of their funds on the organization (Hogan, 1998).

Looking at a wide range of what he terms “organizational” activities, Herrnson (1995) finds that the level of competition has an influence on the number of activities performed by paid staff or by professional consulting firms. In more competitive races these hired employees or firms perform a larger number of activities. Hershey (1974) indicates that uncertainty is important for inspiring innovation in campaigns and may have an influence on organizational structure. Huckshorn and Spencer (1971) also find that more “marginal” candidates were able to attract more volunteers and were more likely to have salaried managers than the group of losing candidates at large.

Another factor likely to play a role is the size of the eligible electorate in a given district. It would seem that candidates running in larger districts with several hundred thousand people would probably be in greater need of stronger and more professional organizations than candidates running in very small districts with, say, only a few thousand eligible voters. In fact, candidates running in very sparsely populated districts probably require little organizational structure at all. For these reasons, population of the district would seem to be an important variable to consider.

A final factor which may have an influence on a campaign’s level of organizational strength and professionalism has to do with the nature of legislative institution. As indicated throughout the analysis so far, there are often large differences across states and these differences appear to be tied to legislative professionalism. It
appears that campaigns in the state with the most professional legislature (Illinois) score much higher in terms of campaign professionalism and strength than campaigns in the state with the citizen legislature (Wyoming). Do these relationships hold when controls for a number of other variables are introduced?

The goal of this part of the analysis is to test a multivariate model which incorporates many of these variables. By considering them simultaneously, we can be more certain about the effects of each factor. This is especially important for untangling some of the relationships among variables such as legislative professionalism, population, and total spending. For example, we may find that legislative professionalism and total population are linked to organizational features, but only because total spending happens to be higher in districts with larger populations and in states with higher levels of legislative professionalism. Use of multivariate models makes it possible to sort out many of these relationships.

The variables just described along with a control variable for political party are tested in the following models using OLS regression:

\[ STRINDEX = a + b_1 INC + b_2 OPEN + b_3 PARTY + b_4 ELECExp + b_5 PARTYExp + b_6 SPEND + b_7 COMP + b_8 POP + b_9 PROF + b_{10} CITIZEN + e \]

\[ PROINDEX = a + b_1 INC + b_2 OPEN + b_3 PARTY + b_4 ELECExp + b_5 PARTYExp + b_6 SPEND + b_7 COMP + b_8 POP + b_9 PROF + b_{10} CITIZEN + e \]

Where:

\[ STRINDEX = \text{Index of Campaign Organizational Strength. The values for this variable range from 0 to 4.} \]
PROINDEX = Index of Campaign Organizational Professionalism. The values for this variable range from 0 to 4.

And,

INC = Candidate is an incumbent (a dichotomous variable 1=incumbent, 0=not an incumbent).

OPEN = Candidate is an open seat candidate (a dichotomous variable 1=open seat candidate, 0=not an open seat candidate).

PARTY = A control variable for party (Democrat=1 and Republican = 0).

ELECEXP = Electoral Experience. The variable can take a value of 0, 1, or 2 (0=never run for elective office; 1=run for elective office but have not won; 2=won elective office).

PARTYEXP = Political Party Experience. The variable can take a value of 0, 1, or 2 (0=no involvement with the party; 1=any involvement but no leadership role; 2=leadership role in the party).

SPEND = Total campaign spending per eligible voter in the district (either primary or general election spending).

COMP = Level of Anticipated Competition (measured in the general election as a dichotomous variable -- 1 if the election margin was 20 percentage points or less; Measured in the primary as the number of primary candidates).

POP = Total number of the district’s eligible voters.

PROF = A dichotomous variable indicating a professional legislature (Illinois=1, all other states =0).

CITIZEN = A dichotomous variable indicating a citizen legislature (Wyoming=1, all other states =0).
Models for each dependent variable are first run separately for the three different candidate categories: incumbents, challengers, and open seat candidates (INC and OPEN are therefore not included in this first round of models). This makes it possible to determine the effects of the variables for electoral and party experience. Twelve equations report the independent effects of the variables in both primary and general election contests. Checks of multicollinearity reveal no substantial correlations among the independent regressors. The results are displayed in Tables 4.5 and 4.6. Only the significance and direction of the coefficients are reported at this stage. A “0” indicates that there is no statistical relationship while a “+” (denoting a positive relationship) or a “-” (denoting a negative relationship) indicates a statistically significant relationship at the .05 level or better.

How influential are these factors for influencing organizational strength and professionalism? The R² statistics reveal that these variables explain between 12% and 47% of the variance in the separate candidate models. Overall, the most consistently influential variables are level of spending, population of the district, and legislative professionalism. For the most part, political experience and electoral competition have little influence on organizational characteristics.

Political experience as measured by electoral experience or party experience is statistically significant in only two instances and only for campaign professionalism. This is a rather unexpected finding. Apparently, previous involvement in politics does not enhance the ability of challengers or open seat contenders in building their organization. The findings show that electoral experience has a positive influence on
Table 4.5
Regression Analysis of Factors Influencing the Index of Campaign Organizational Strength in Primary and General Election Campaigns (Un-standardized Regression Coefficients)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>General</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Incumbents</td>
<td>Challengers</td>
<td>Open Seats</td>
<td>Incumbents</td>
<td>Challengers</td>
<td>Open Seats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spending</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Party</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Exp.</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Experience</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adjusted $R^2$ = 0.26 0.12 0.24 0.20 0.18 0.12
$N =$ 33 57 144 123 173 123

Table 4.6
Regression Analysis of Factors Influencing the Index of Campaign Organizational Professionalism in Primary and General Election Campaigns (Un-standardized Regression Coefficients)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>General</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Incumbents</td>
<td>Challengers</td>
<td>Open Seats</td>
<td>Incumbents</td>
<td>Challengers</td>
<td>Open Seats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spending</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Party</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Exp.</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Experience</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adjusted $R^2$ = 0.37 0.20 0.44 0.43 0.33 0.47
$N =$ 32 55 144 118 166 122
organizational professionalism, but only for challengers in the general election. Party experience has a positive influence, but only for open seat contenders in primaries.

Another surprise is the small effect that electoral competition appears to have. Higher levels of anticipated competition in a race were expected to positively influence strength and professionalism. Yet, this variable has an effect only on organizational strength for open seat candidates in the general election. The variable was statistically significant in the primaries for challengers, but in the opposite direction than expected. For the most part, this variable does not appear to play a major role in affecting either organizational strength or professionalism.

Other variables performed rather well across several of the equations. The most consistent of these factors is spending per eligible voter. Higher levels of spending are associated with organizational strength in four of the six equations. Only for primary incumbents and open seat contenders in the general election does this variable fail to achieve statistical significance. Spending is also highly correlated with campaign professionalism -- not too surprising since most aspects of the index involve monetary payments (to managers and workers). The variable fails to achieve statistical significance only for incumbent candidates running in the primary.

One interesting aspect about spending is that its effects do not seem to vary much by candidate type. Within each election period, the coefficients are statistically significant for all three candidate categories: incumbents, challengers, and open seat contenders. The more candidates have to spend, the higher their general level of
organizational strength and professionalism will be. This shows very clearly the critical nature of spending for the type of organization created.

Population of the district is a statistically significant variable, but mostly for the professionalism dimension. It has a positive effect on organizational strength only for incumbent candidates in the general election. Yet, it influences organizational professionalism for all candidates except challengers in the primary. This supports earlier expectations: there are more people to contact in larger districts so there is a need for a more extensive organizational apparatus. These findings specify the impact by showing that professionalism of the organization is the aspect likely to be most affected by district population.

Finally, what role does the legislative institution play? Do institutional differences matter even after controls have been put in place for electoral competition, candidate experience, and level of spending? The findings from Tables 4.5 and 4.6 suggest that the institution has a distinct influence. However, the coefficients for the citizen legislature are more often statistically significant than the coefficients for the professional legislature. The citizen legislature coefficient is statistically significant and negative (as expected) in seven of the twelve equations whereas the professional legislature coefficient is statistically significant and positive (as expected) in only two of the twelve equations. It appears that the citizen legislature is more different from middle-range institutions than the professional legislature is different.

Finally, it should be noted that the control variable for political party (for which there were no hypotheses given) is an important variable to consider. The dichotomous
variable has a positive and statistically significant impact in two of the twelve equations. This means that certain types of Democratic candidates (incumbents and open seat candidates only) have higher levels of organizational professionalism than similar Republican candidates.

Another way to gauge the effects of these factors is to examine the magnitude of the actual coefficients. Table 4.7 combines the candidate types into one equation for organizational strength and professionalism for both the primary and general election periods. This makes it possible to determine whether or not candidate status itself is influential. Since neither electoral experience nor party experience were very important, they are removed from the equation.

These results corroborate the earlier findings. Spending is very important for both organizational components. Greater spending results in stronger and more professional campaign organizations in both primary and general election periods. By looking at the coefficients themselves, one can see they are strong in each equation. But for both indices, it seems that spending has a greater influence during the primary than in the general election period. What might explain such a consistent difference? One explanation may involve the pool of potential workers. Unlike in general elections where there is a large number of potential party workers who are willing to work for their fellow partisan candidates, in primary campaigns there is no opposing party. Primary candidates might therefore have greater difficulty attracting adequate volunteer support and may simply have to hire workers to assist them.
Table 4.7
Regression Analysis of Factors Influencing the Indices of Campaign Organizational Strength and Professionalism in Primary and General Election Campaigns
(Un-standardized Regression Coefficients)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>General</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strength</td>
<td>Professionalism</td>
<td>Strength</td>
<td>Professionalism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>1.942***</td>
<td>0.326</td>
<td>1.697***</td>
<td>0.501***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent</td>
<td>-0.473</td>
<td>-0.0673</td>
<td>-0.034</td>
<td>0.175</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Seat</td>
<td>0.153</td>
<td>-0.109</td>
<td>0.211</td>
<td>0.248*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Party</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>0.440**</td>
<td>0.214*</td>
<td>0.370***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spending</td>
<td>1.240***</td>
<td>1.447***</td>
<td>0.443***</td>
<td>0.634***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition</td>
<td>-0.083</td>
<td>0.108</td>
<td>0.120</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>0.0000007</td>
<td>0.0000042***</td>
<td>0.0000022*</td>
<td>0.0000056***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>0.371*</td>
<td>0.244</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.289*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen</td>
<td>-1.271***</td>
<td>-0.629**</td>
<td>-0.905***</td>
<td>-0.921***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adjusted R²=

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>General</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.215</td>
<td>0.353</td>
<td>0.180</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>409</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001
Findings from Table 4.7 reveal that contextual features are important. District population is statistically significant in three of the four equations. Campaigns in those districts with large populations tend to have stronger organizations in the general election and more professional organizations in both election cycles. Organizational strength and professionalism appear to vary by the type of legislative institution. Statistically significant results from all four equations reveal that campaigns in citizen legislatures have weaker and less professional organizations while campaigns in more professional legislatures are somewhat stronger in the primary and more professional in the general election cycle.

These results also point to the importance of political party. It appears that in all but the equation for organizational strength in the primary, Democratic candidates have stronger and more professional organizations than Republican candidates. Explanations for this finding are not altogether clear, however, such conditions may prove to be an advantage for Democratic candidates on election day. Such differences may have to do with traditional ways that the party’s candidates in these states go about contacting voters. Or such differences may be a reflection of the types of voters Democratic candidates typically try to contact – they may be best reached with personal contact methods. Future research will have to address questions regarding party differences.

Surprisingly, there are hardly any statistically significant differences among the three candidate types. Incumbents do not have stronger or more professional organizations in either the primary or general election periods. Open seat contenders have slightly more professional organizations in the general, however this is the only
equation in which candidate differences surface. These results are counter to our earlier
expectations about incumbency in particular. It was thought that one of the reasons why
incumbents do so well on election day is that they have superior campaign organizations.
But these findings establish that incumbents have little advantage in this realm. Beyond
the fact that incumbents are able to usually spend more than challengers, incumbency
alone does not influence the strength or professionalism of campaign organizations.

In sum, these results demonstrate that spending, total voter population, and
legislative professionalism are consistently important factors related to both the
organizational strength and professionalism of state legislative campaigns. Electoral
competition, candidate status, and political experience play only a minor role. Party
differences are important with Democratic campaigns displaying organizational
advantages over those of Republican candidates.

**Summary and Conclusions**

Political practitioners and political scientists alike attribute importance to
organization features of campaigns. For the most part, studies of these organizations
have focused almost exclusively on the presidential and congressional levels. While
conventional wisdom holds that state legislative campaigns possess few organizational
features worth knowing about, this analysis establishes that such a generalization may be
ture of some campaign organizations, but certainly not all. In considering the levels of
strength and professionalism of the organizations across the seven states in the sample, a
number of interesting findings were revealed.
• There is often a large degree of variation in organizational features both across and within states. Some campaigns have large numbers of workers, a designated campaign manager, and some degree of division of authority in decision-making. Others have fewer of these characteristics and are considered to be relatively weak. Professionalism varies across campaigns as well with some being able to afford managers and workers along with an office located in a separate facility. Many other campaigns, though, are more personalistic. Compared to their congressional counterparts, campaign organizations on the state legislative level are certainly much weaker and personalistic, though, a significant level of variation exists across states and districts.

• The strength and professionalism of campaign organizations are influenced greatly by the nature of the legislative institution present in the state. Campaign organizations are stronger and more professional in states where legislative professionalism is higher. Similarly, such organizations are weaker and less professional in states where legislative professionalism is lower. This relationship holds even after controls for a number of other factors such as level of spending, electoral competition, candidate status, and district population have been introduced. In other words, campaign organizational strength and professionalism vary with legislative professionalism.
• One district-level feature, population, plays an important role in organizational development. Organizations tend to be stronger and more professional in those districts where there are many more potential voters to contact.

• One of the most consistent factors influencing the strength and professionalism of organizations is a campaign-level factor -- the amount of spending. Campaigns with larger levels of funding have stronger and more professional organizations, all other things being equal.

• Candidate-level factors do not directly affect aspects of campaign organizations. Neither candidate status nor political experience (electoral or party organization experience) seems to influence the nature of the organization. While candidate status may indeed influence the level of available funding which in turn influences the organization, such an influence is only indirect.

What are the implications of these findings? Do state legislative campaigns possess characteristics that would seem to enhance or inhibit representative democracy? As indicated earlier, some worry that the organizational professionalism is detrimental. The findings reported here would indicate that the vast majority of these campaigns are anything but professional. On average, organizations in the sample exhibited only about one and one-half of the four characteristics of professionalism examined. Few campaigns hire salaried managers or pay their workers. For the most part campaigns are staffed by
volunteers and part-time managers. The candidate, not a paid professional, is generally
the primary decision maker in charge of various activities. Extensive professionalism of
state legislative campaigns should not be a major concern.

One way that campaigns might enhance democracy is if they have strong
organizations. A strong organization makes grass-roots campaigning possible. This
analysis shows that some campaigns have very strong organizations, but far from all do.
Campaigns included in this study on average had a little more than two characteristics
associated with strength in the primary and about three such characteristics in the general
election. Such findings make it clear that modern candidate campaigns are very different
from the grass-roots oriented party organizations which were necessary in past years for
turning out the vote on election day.

One implication of these findings for representative democracy concerns the
importance of money in politics. Reform efforts have focused on the need to remove the
influence of money from campaigns. A common assumption concerning the role of
money is that it has a dampening effect on democracy. For those same people who worry
about the professionalism of modern campaigns, the findings from this analysis will
provide little comfort. As the multivariate model indicates, spending has a positive
influence on characteristics of professionalism exhibited by campaigns. However, the
findings also reveal that money has a positive influence on organizational strength. Care
should be taken that reforms aimed at removing the negative aspects of spending do not
also remove some of the apparent beneficial effects of strong organizations which make
grass-roots oriented campaigns possible.
Another concern of reformers over the past several decades has been to strengthen the capacity of state legislative institutions. What effect has this had on the representation process as manifested through the political campaign? One way to answer this question is to examine the differences between campaigns in states with professional legislatures and those in states with citizen legislatures. This analysis found significant differences in organizations across the groupings of institutions. Those wishing to continue reforming state legislative institutions would be happy to learn that the more professional state legislature in the sample (Illinois) exhibited one of highest levels of organizational strength while the least professional (Wyoming) exhibited the lowest. However, such reformers should also know that legislative professionalism is also highly correlated with campaign organizational professionalism. Campaigns in the state with the most professional legislature are the ones which are most like congressional campaigns.
CHAPTER 5
Information Gathering

Accurate information about his constituents is essential to rational allocation of scarce resources -- time, personnel, and money.

--Dan Nimmo62

Introduction

Along with building an organization, another major component of a campaign involves gathering information about district voters, opponent(s), and potential financial contributors. Because most candidates probably size up a race before making the decision to even run, they probably have some general knowledge of the political "lay of the land". However, a more detailed search ensues once the decision has been made to enter the race. This chapter focuses on this pursuit of information by candidates and other campaign operatives.

As this chapter will show, there are a variety of information sources available to campaigns on a number of different topics. However, the most important are probably those involving district voters. Advice from academic observers as well as from political professionals indicates that knowledge of voters is a key ingredient to a successful campaign. Demographic features of the district, past voting trends, and voters’ predispositions towards parties and issue concerns are critical pieces of data. This information can guide campaigns in their choice of issue and message development. Overall, levels of information may ultimately help campaigns target messages to those
areas of the district where they will be more favorably received. The result should be a more efficient use of advertising dollars and ultimately a bigger payoff at the polls.

In addition to contributing to electoral success, information is also a critical part of the representation process. As the principal point of contact between the representative and the represented, information obtained about the district’s constituency can strongly influence a candidate’s perceptions. Fenno (1978) points to these perceptions as elements which can affect the behavior of those who eventually hold public office.

Several questions regarding aspects of information gathering are addressed in this chapter. How often do campaigns attempt to conduct analyses of past voting trends in their district? How often do they compile and analyze data on individual voters? More importantly, what factors influence the extent of information gathering in campaigns? How might acquisition and use of such data be linked to district conditions, financial resources, candidate characteristics, and even campaign organizational features? In addition, how might information acquisition vary by legislative institution? Some contend that advanced information acquisition is a hallmark of modern electioneering as evidenced by the extensive use of polling in congressional and presidential races. Might we find that candidates running in states with more professional legislatures make greater use of such techniques than candidates running in states with citizen legislatures?

While the major focus of this chapter is on patterns of information acquisition, attention will also be given to those who may assist candidates in this endeavor. What actors are involved in this process of obtaining and using data related to district voters? A number of scholars note the expanding role of political consultants in the political
process. Other literature points to the changing role of parties as service providers. To what extent do candidates for the state legislature rely on consultants and parties for such services? What implications do these findings have for candidate-centered politics in state legislative races?

**Information Gathering in Campaigns**

"Obtaining useful and reliable information about the voters -- and getting appropriate and persuasive information to them -- is what a campaign is all about" (Salmore and Salmore, 1985: p. 9). This sums up what a good many political practitioners and scholars alike say is an often overlooked aspect of modern electioneering.

There are three major categories of information which are critical in any campaign. One is information on potential financial contributors. Up-to-date and accurate lists of potential supporters are necessary for successful fundraising (Himes, 1995; Sabato, 1989; Shea, 1996). Sabato (1989) notes that "[k]nowing to whom to send a letter is as important to the success of a fundraising effort as the message and the candidate" (p. 92). Another important type of information concerns political rivals. Herrnson (1995) indicates that information about opponents is an important part of knowing how to go about developing a campaign message, particularly if the opponent is an incumbent.

While lists of contributors and "dirt" on the opponent are both important to overall effort, no information is probably more fundamental or basic than information
about voters living in the district. One veteran campaigner advises that “[t]he first step in making a strategy is to understand the political behavior of the jurisdiction in which you are running” (Bradshaw, 1995: p. 32). Some call this “profiling the electorate” (Nimmo, 1970: p. 69). Shea (1996) says that “[b]efore moving to strategy, finances, themes, and a host of other complex issues, astute care must be taken to pinpoint what makes the voters of that particular district tick” (p. 53). This information can be used in making other strategic decisions in the campaign.

Recent research on presidential and congressional elections emphasizes the importance of gathering such information. Given the context of reduced partisan attachments, campaigns can no longer rely on activating known party voters. Campaigns must fight to curry the favor of a large block of independent voters. In addition, many campaigns have come to rely on modern techniques of agenda setting and priming as they attempt not only to provide issues to voters that they will find appealing -- but also to influence the standards of evaluation voters use in sizing up candidates (Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; Jacobs and Shapiro, 1994; West, 1993). Such methods of influence require high levels of knowledge about voter predispositions and preferences.

What types of information do campaigns seek out? Dan Nimmo says that “[t]o acquire usable information, professional researchers employ three basic techniques -- interpreting informal sources, analyzing recorded data, and surveying public opinion” (1970: p. 73).

Informal contact with voters, feedback from the media, and opinions from party leaders are often initial sources for candidates. However, Kingdon (1966) finds these
sources are often the primary ones for many candidates running for lower level offices who rely almost exclusively on impressions obtained through contact with party officials, campaign workers, and voters they meet on the campaign trail. Such information is probably very important in the early stages of the campaign process, particularly when candidates are deciding whether or not to run.

Another source of information involves recorded data on demographic features of the district. Shea (1996) notes that “[i]n a nutshell, demographic research seeks to find the electorally relevant groups that define a population, understand their concerns and interests, and make appeals to the individuals in these groups based upon this information. It is a process of aggregation and inference -- pulling together information on groups and connecting the data to individuals” (1996: p. 55). This data includes information on age, occupation, education, major employers, and residential patterns of voters in a given constituency. Shea goes on to say that this information “aids in the development of message, style, and tactics. Accordingly, it also says a good bit about resource allocation. Each of these components are key ingredients in any race” (p. 69).

Another type of recorded data involves past voting history of a district. Again, Shea (1996) provides the following advice: “there are three basic types of information available from prior election data: (1) how many people will vote in the election, (2) the partisan disposition of the electorate, and (3) the volatility of the voters in the district” (p. 73). This information is critical in determining aspects of strategy, particularly with regard to targeting.
A third type of information involves knowledge about the predisposition of
voters. One source for this is through public opinion polling. More than any other
technique, advances in polling most characterize what Agranoff (1976) and others have
labeled the "New Politics". Some have even said that "the art and science of modern
political polling have become the major influence in strategic decision-making in modern
is a crucial factor in making choices about the allocation of resources, the kinds of
positions the candidate will emphasize, and the order in which various events are staged
or advertising is scheduled during the course of a campaign" (p. 121).

Many different polls can be used (benchmark polls, tracking polls, quick-response
polls, etc.). Such techniques provide the campaign with an array of information about
voters’ basic levels of candidate recognition and issue preferences. Unlike other types of
information, polling data allow up-to-date perspectives on what voters are thinking and
make it possible for candidates to adjust their plans accordingly. Many studies consider
such techniques to be crucial to aspects of the decision making process (Huckshorn and
Spencer 1971; Selnow, 1994).63

However, some information about individual voters is obtainable without
conducting a poll. One way is to collect the names and addresses of those who
participated in previous elections. Getter and Titus (1989) go so far as to say that "[t]he
actual names of registered voters are the most prized commodity in American political
campaigns" (p. 82).
How prevalent is information gathering in political campaigns? In his study of candidates running in Wisconsin in 1964, Kingdon found that “over 80 percent of the respondents said that they depend on past statistics to some degree” (1966: p. 95). Even the more modern campaign techniques such as polling appear to be used quite frequently by congressional candidates. Surveying general election candidates, Herrnson (1995) finds that “[d]uring the 1992 election cycle, every Senate campaign and 86 percent of all House campaigns used some form of polling to learn about voters” (p. 161). However, Maisel (1982) finds far fewer congressional primary candidates utilizing polls (only about 22% in 1978). A goal for this analysis is to determine the level of information gathering in state legislative contests. Are they similar to those found in the congressional setting?

Information Gathering in State Legislative Campaigns

Few studies exist on the topic of information gathering in the state legislative setting. However, one of the few existing studies by John Kingdon (1966) following the 1964 election shows that state legislative candidates “tend to depend on less professional sources of information that are easily available to them” (p. 104). Few candidates report use of more professional sources of information. Kingdon says that “[w]hen probed about the use of polls, only one state legislative candidate said that he took polls of any kind, whereas half the higher-level candidates did” (1966: p. 92).

The absence of polling is not necessarily an indicator that campaign decision-makers are unsophisticated about such techniques. It may mean that they are running in a small district where they know a large number of voters and polling is simply
unnecessary. Or it may mean that they do not have the financial resources to pay for a professional poll. In the absence of a need for polling or the means to pay for one, many campaigns use more low-tech methods. For example, former Speaker of the Wisconsin House Tom Loftus (1994) recounts that during his first campaign for the state legislature in 1976, he collected data from town voter lists. While the manner in which he made use of the data (compiled and sorted on index cards) may not seem very "professional" and certainly not "modern," this is in essence what candidates do today in constructing computer databases for mailings and block-walking purposes. The tools have changed but the purpose remains the same.

While these conditions existed in the 1960s and 1970s, the campaign environment along with technology has changed dramatically. Some studies suggest that many of the information gathering techniques frequently used in state-wide and congressional races are making their way to the state legislative level (Salmore and Salmore, 1985). One author even notes that "[a]ll American electoral contests today attempt to use some type of public opinion research technique to gauge the mood or collective mind-set of the electorate" (Hamilton, 1995: p. 170). Does such a blanket statement apply to state legislative contests in the 1990s?

Extent of Information Gathering

Unlike Kingdon (1966) who focused on a wide variety of information sources including those best described as impressionistic, this analysis is concerned primarily with the collection and use of two types of information. One is the extent to which
candidates analyze data on past voting trends in the district. Shea (1996) and others describe this as recorded data. The second involves the collection and use of information on individual voters living in the district. How often do candidates engage in these two types of activities?

Anecdotal evidence suggests that such activity is quite extensive, with a large percentage of interviewed candidates saying that such a search was initiated shortly after deciding to run. Many reported obtaining lists of registered voters along with lists of voters who participated in previous elections. Some candidates said that consultants were instrumental in helping to procure data and organize it in a usable format. Others said that a state-level election agency provided valuable data aggregated at the precinct level.

Many candidates reported receiving data in a form that could be immediately used -- for block-walking purposes or printed on pre-printed mailing labels. One candidate simply told the consultant how she wanted the data -- as block walking lists (sorted by street address and number), as calling lists (with the telephone numbers), and as mailing labels (ready to stick and mail). Other candidates reported a more sophisticated use of data. These candidates often obtained information in a rather raw format and had to create their own lists for block-walking and telephoning purposes. One candidate recounted in some detail the tedious task he and his manager endured in “cleaning” voter lists obtained from the state party organization. This was done to ensure that when used for mailing purposes, only one letter would be mailed to each household instead of several letters to multiple voters at the same residence. Other candidates mentioned how they enhanced the voter files with information obtained through other sources.
Some candidates made the point that information acquisition is an on-going process throughout the campaign. One candidate told how voter lists were used during the primary for making initial telephone calls. Those voters indicating a solid preference for the opponent were removed from the list and were not called again while voters who were uncertain were targeted for continued calls and mailings. Another candidate indicated how he annotated his database with what he learned about voters as he block walked through the neighborhoods. Near the end of the campaign the candidate was able to pinpoint with high accuracy which voters had been contacted. These stories highlight the fact that information gathering is often an ongoing process.

While these stories speak to the details surrounding information acquisition, they do not say very much about data acquisition more generally. How extensive is the pursuit of information by state legislative campaigns? What type of information is gathered and used?

One way of answering this question is to look at how much of a campaign’s resources are allocated for this purpose. For example, what percentage of a typical campaign’s budget goes for voter lists? How much is paid to professional consultants? A table provided in the previous chapter displayed the percentage going for the general category of information gathering. However, Table 5.1 shows a more detailed breakdown of these expenditures into three categories: consulting, polling, and the purchase of lists, maps, and research.65
### Table 5.1
Percent of Total Primary and General Election Spending Allocated For Information Gathering by Candidates Running for the State Legislature in 1994
(As a percentage of total candidate spending)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expenditure Category</th>
<th>Connecticut</th>
<th>Delaware</th>
<th>Illinois</th>
<th>South Carolina</th>
<th>Wyoming</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Information Gathering in Primary</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consulting</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polling</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchase of Maps, Lists, etc.</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percent of Total Primary Spending</strong></td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Information Gathering in General</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consulting</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polling</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchase of Maps, Lists, etc.</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percent of Total General Spending</strong></td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As one can readily see, total spending for information gathering consumes a relatively minor portion of a typical campaign's budget. The percentage spent in the primary ranges from a low in Connecticut of only 0.2% to about 6.9% in Illinois. In the general election the typical percentage is not much higher ranging from a low in Delaware of 1.8% to a high of 10.9% in South Carolina.

The largest portion of this spending is for consulting. Consulting fees account for a much larger percentage of a typical campaign's budget in South Carolina and Illinois than in the other states. Polling takes up a small amount of funding while the purchase of lists, maps, and research accounts for a fairly consistent percentage across states. Overall, though, none of these categories consume a very large percentage of total spending. If anything, this table shows that the amount of money allocated for this purpose is relatively low.

While the range in spending is not terribly dramatic, differences among the states do emerge. These differences are most apparent between Illinois and Wyoming -- the two states in the sample which differ most in terms of legislative professionalism. Candidates running in Illinois (the state with the most professional legislature) spend a higher percentage on information acquisition than candidates running in Wyoming (the state with the citizen legislature). These findings conform to earlier expectations regarding differences in campaigns across various institutions. We would expect that candidates running in the professional legislature to make greater use of modern campaign techniques similar to those utilized by congressional candidates. These findings lend some initial support to this proposition. In particular, the percentage
allocated by candidates across these two states for polling is instructive. Whereas candidates in Illinois spent the highest percentage on polling in the general and the second highest in the primary (candidates in Delaware spent a slightly higher percentage), none of the sample of candidates in Wyoming spent any money for this purpose in either the primary or general election.

Because it consumes such a small percentage of total spending, a focus solely on dollar amounts may not adequately account for the use or acquisition of information. Even when candidates do spend money on such activities, the dollar amount is usually very small and variations in the amount may not necessarily be a good indicator of more or less data collection. Second, we do not really know how much information should cost in dollar amounts for a given district. It is, therefore, difficult to determine if a candidate is spending a great deal or very little on this activity. Third, candidates may receive help from parties or other candidates in the form of lists or computer files that do not have a dollar value and might even be excluded from finance reports. For these reasons, it seems necessary to turn to survey responses in an effort to better understand the extent and use of information.

In the survey mailed to candidates running in 1994, two questions were asked regarding this topic. The first was: “Did your campaign conduct a precinct-by-precinct analysis of past voting patterns in your district?” In other words, did the candidates or other campaign operatives conduct a basic evaluation of the district’s voting history? Another survey question asked: “Did you maintain a database of voters in your district?” The goal of this question was to understand how involved the campaign decision-makers
were in determining the preferences of individual voters. Did they go beyond simply looking at past aggregate voting records and try to gather and maintain lists of individual voters?

The percentage of candidates answering different combinations of these questions are displayed in Figure 5.1 for the primary and Figure 5.2 for the general election period. Each bar represents the percentage of campaigns which fall into one of four categories. The first category includes those candidates answering both questions in the affirmative -- they both analyzed past voting trends and maintained a data base of voters. The second category includes those candidates who only analyzed past voting trends while the third includes those who only maintained a data base. The fourth category represents the percentage of candidates who report engaging in neither activity. The states are arranged in Figures 5.1 and 5.2 by the percentage of candidates reporting both activities from the lowest to the highest percentage.

A very large percentage of candidates in both election periods report these activities are common features of their campaign effort. As the "average" bars in both figures show, about 68% of candidates in the primary and 65% in the general election say that they engage in both activities. Only about 10% of primary candidates and 8% of general election candidates say they do neither. If candidates report only one activity, they are more likely to maintain a data base than analyze data (this is true across both election cycles).

These two forms of acquiring information are therefore common features of electioneering in modern state legislative elections. There is variation across the states
Figure 5.1
Percent of Campaigns Engaging in Different Forms of Information Gathering in 1994 Primary Election Campaigns

- Neither
- Analyze Past Trends Only
- Maintain Database Only
- Both

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Neither</th>
<th>Analyze Past Trends Only</th>
<th>Maintain Database Only</th>
<th>Both</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TX</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OR</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IL</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WY</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 5.2
Percent of Campaigns Engaging in Different Forms of Information Gathering in 1994 General Election Campaigns

- Neither
- Analyze Past Trends Only
- Maintain Database Only
- Both

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Neither</th>
<th>Analyze Past Trends Only</th>
<th>Maintain Database Only</th>
<th>Both</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TX</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OR</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IL</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WY</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
but one should recognize that in no state or election cycle do a very high percentage of candidates say they engage in neither activity. The highest percentages are in Connecticut and Texas primaries, but then only 17% of candidates fall into the "neither" category. No candidates fall into this category in South Carolina primary elections. The range of candidates reporting both activities is rather large. About 52% of primary candidates fall into the "both" category in Connecticut while about 82% do so in South Carolina. A similar trend is present in the general election where Connecticut again is at the bottom with 54% and South Carolina at the top with 85%.

While there is variation among the states, unlike campaign organizational factors, it does not appear that this variation corresponds to differences in legislative professionalism. Candidates in both Illinois and Wyoming fall near the high end of those gathering information. In fact, the bar graphs show that a larger percentage of candidates in Wyoming engage in "both" activities than candidates in Illinois. This is true in the primary (77% to 69%) as well as in the general election (74% to 70%). Variation across the states in terms of legislative professionalism, therefore, does not explain differential rates of information acquisition.

Overall, these findings suggest that large percentages of candidates for the state legislature analyze past voting trends and compile information on voters as part of their campaign effort. Similar numbers of candidates engage in these activities in both primary and general elections. There appears to be variation across the states, but this variation is not linked to institutional differences. Further analysis later in this chapter will try to
account for these differences by examining factors related to the candidate, the campaign, and the district.

**Assistance in Gathering and Using Information**

Candidates often need help obtaining information on voters. In addition they also need help in analyzing and using it to create a workable strategy. There are two places that candidates can turn for assistance: consulting firms and political parties.

**Consultants**

A number of studies point to the increasing role of political consultants in American politics (Agranoff, 1976; Chagall, 1981; Luntz, 1988; Sabato, 1981; Salmore and Salmore, 1985; Selnow, 1994). Many observers contend that consultants have taken over many of the traditional functions that had once belonged to party organizations (Sabato, 1981; Salmore and Salmore, 1985). One observer, Sidney Blumenthal (1982), describes their role in the following manner:

> Political consultants are the new power within the American political system. They are permanent; the politicians ephemeral. The consultants have supplanted the old party bosses as the link to the voters. Consultants have the personal contact, possess knowledge of the intimate history of campaigns, and have the voter-catching skills that party bosses once prided themselves on. It is not surprising then that the rise of the consultants has paralleled the decline of the parties. It represents a new stage in American political history as significant as the growth of the political parties. Now, in the 1980s, the business of political consulting has matured so that every major candidate for every major office must employ a consultant in order to have the chance to win (p. 17).
From this perspective, consultants are major actors within the modern campaign, if not within the political system at large. The growing numbers of consultants have come to provide an extensive array of services related to polling, media advertising, fundraising, direct mail, and general campaign strategy. Candidates have become increasingly dependent on those who possess the specialized skills of modern campaign warfare.

A large percentage of candidates on the congressional level report a reliance on consultants. Among congressional candidates running in 1992, Paul Herrnson finds that “[v]irtually every candidate for a competitive seat hires an outside consultant to conduct polls or receives a professionally taken poll from a party or some other group” (1995: p. 69). He goes on to say that “[v]irtually every incumbent hires a media consultant or uses some combination of media consultant and campaign aide” (p. 69). These findings are corroborated by a similar study of congressional candidates by Medvic and Lenart (1997) who find that about 60% of all congressional candidates in 1992 hired a top-rated consulting firm and of these, about 70% hired more than one. Consultants are therefore central elements of modern congressional campaigns.

Until recently, few quantitative studies existed on the effects of political consultants. In fact, Larry Sabato (1981) indicates that we have very little knowledge about what effect if any political consultants have on election outcomes. However, two studies in recent years have established empirical evidence for the effectiveness of consultants in the campaign process. Paul Herrnson (1992) finds that hiring a professional firm increases the amount of money that congressional candidates are able to
raise. Use of a consultant is a signal to potential contributors that the candidate is planning to make a serious campaign effort. Another study by Medvic and Lenart (1997) shows convincingly that consultant use by challengers has an independent effect on the percentage of the vote that they receive on election day.

Do many state legislative candidates enlist the services of professional consultants? Walter De Vries (1989) writes in the 1980s that “use of consultants has extended to state legislators, mayors, city councils, county commissions, and school boards -- all the way down the ballot” (p. 22). However, there is little empirical support for this assertion. Research on campaign spending patterns in two states (Kansas and Texas) shows that spending allocated to political consultants does not take up a huge portion of the typical campaign budget (about 15% in Texas and about 2% in Kansas general elections) and large percentages of candidates report no expenditures for consulting at all (Hogan, 1998). Unfortunately, spending patterns provide only one perspective on the prevalence of political consultants in the state legislative setting. More direct measures of their usage are needed.

Political Parties

As the role of political consultants has increased in the system, many have assumed that the role of parties has withered. In fact, a number of studies have been written concerning the decreasing relevance of parties (e.g., Wattenberg, 1984). But others find that far from withering away, parties have adapted to the new political environment. They have taken on a brokerage role in the process, acting as service
providers to candidates (e.g., Frantzich, 1989). Research into state and county level party organizations (Cotter et al., 1984; Frendreis et al., 1994) finds these organizations to be growing and engaging in a wide array of candidate-centered activities. This is certainly the case for legislative campaign organizations on the congressional level. Herrnson (1988; 1995) has written extensively on the expanding role of congressional parties as service providers to candidates. Many of these services are informational in the sense that they involve opposition research, polling, and issue/message development. Herrnson (1995) finds from general election candidates that “when asked to rate the importance of campaign assistance from local, state, and national party organizations, PACs, unions, and other groups in aspects of campaigning requiring professional expertise or in-depth research, candidates and campaign aids involved in the 1992 House elections ranked their party’s Hill committee first” (p. 97). Those involved in the process clearly believe these party organizations play a large part in acquiring information.

Evidence of a role for parties in state legislative elections is rather sketchy. Work by Cotter et al., (1984) shows that county party organizations engage in activities geared to benefit candidates directly such as maintaining lists of voters and conducting polls. A more recent survey by Frendreis et al., (1994) offers a view of the parties from state legislative candidates themselves. Findings show that candidates evaluate parties as being most helpful in their grass-roots activities such as mobilizing voters through get-out-the-vote drives. While this study does not directly address the role of parties as information providers, they do indicate that their role has evolved into one of “adaptive
brokerage" whereby parties are "bringing together candidates, consultants, and contributors" (p. 144).

The most compelling evidence for a role of parties as information providers is shown by Gierzynski (1992) and Shea (1995) who examine activities performed by state legislative campaign committees. Here we find these committees supplying not only financial contributions, but also a wide array of in-kind services. Shea (1995) shows, for instance that "most legislative campaign committees now furnish extensive high-technology campaign assistance -- such as survey research, computer base facilities, direct mail services, electronic media production, candidate seminars, and the use of experienced campaign operatives" (p. 26). While parties may offer such assistance, how often do candidates make use of these services? Do they find them helpful in their campaign effort?

**Assistance in the State Legislative Setting**

What help do candidates receive from political parties and consultants regarding the acquisition and use of information? One way to answer this question is to examine campaign finance reports to determine the percentage of funding allocated to consultants and parties for such services. Previous research has attempted to infer consultant activity from these reports, but is hampered by the fact that it is difficult to determine the types of services candidates typically receive for such payments. More importantly, dollar amounts may not accurately reflect the consultant's role in the campaign. For example, candidates may simply purchase all their advertising through a consultant who plays no
role in information gathering or in strategy development. Or candidates may make payments to parties for services that are provided at a reduced rate. To answer questions about the role of consultants and parties, more direct indicators of such activity are necessary through use of survey responses.

*Political Consultants*

Several candidates indicated through the course of semi-structured interviews that they had enlisted the help of consultants in their campaign. Many candidates noted hiring consultants to supply a specific type of service. For example, one candidate said that the consultant provided lists of voters in several different forms. Another candidate indicated how his consultant was helpful with the phone banking and polling services. One candidate even told of how an image consultant helped him fine-tune his speaking and personal interaction skills.

Other candidates said they hired consultants not so much for the services they could provide, but instead for general strategizing purposes. One candidate noted of his consultant, "we are mostly just using his brain." This same candidate also mentioned that the consultant was paid a flat hourly fee to examine past voting patterns of the district and to talk with the candidate and the campaign manager about strategy.

Those familiar with the services provided by consultants generally evaluated them in a very positive light, often telling specifying what the consultant did to make their campaign run more smoothly. One candidate, for instance, told of her experience in this way: "Let me tell you what our consultants did for us . . . we would have walked every
house in this district and he [consultant] immediately said, let me suggest a way which you can use your time better.” This same candidate said when asked what she would do if more money were available to her campaign, responded that she would hire a larger consulting firm to play an expanded role. For the most part, this was a typical response. Few candidates or managers interviewed felt that consultants were a waste of money. Most were well aware of the type of assistance they provide and many wished they could afford more of it.

These examples illustrate that many candidates believe consultants can play an important role, but how often are consultants utilized and what services do they generally render in state legislative races? Figure 5.3 displays the percentage of candidates in each state by primary and general election period who report hiring a professional consulting or advertising firm. On average about 24% of primary candidates and 29% of general election candidates in the sample report hiring a professional consultant or advertising firm.

The differences between election periods are what we might expect given that general elections usually entail mobilizing and persuading a larger group of voters. Candidates may simply need greater assistance in the general election period. However, chi-square tests show that the difference between the percentage of candidates who hire them in the primary and the percentage who hire them in the general election is not statistically significant. A state by state analysis reveals that only in Oregon do such differences achieve statistical significance. In this state, 26% of primary candidates use
Figure 5.3
Percentage of Campaigns with Consultants in 1994
Primary and General Elections
consultants, but 54% of general election candidates hire them. For candidates in most states, however, the likelihood of hiring a consultant is similar in both election cycles.

Among primary contestants in some states, very few candidates report hiring consultants. No candidate among the respondents from Delaware and only a handful from Wyoming, Connecticut and South Carolina report hiring one. But in another group of states, the numbers are somewhat higher. Approximately 26% of candidates in Oregon and 33% in Illinois report hiring a consultant. Nearly one-half of Texas candidates do (46%).

Among general election candidates, the states again appear to fall into two categories. Among the group on the low end are Connecticut, Delaware, and South Carolina, along with Wyoming which lags the farthest behind all others with only 6% reporting their use (two candidates). Candidates in Illinois, Oregon, and Texas report more extensive use with over one-half of all candidates in the latter two states reporting hiring a consultant.

Overall, consultant use varies across states and institutional differences appear to be part of the explanation. For example, compared to the others, the citizen legislature (Wyoming) has a lower percentage of candidates using consultants while the professional legislature (Illinois) has a higher percentage. Chi-square tests show that these institutional differences are statistically significant in both primary and general election periods. It is interesting to find that consultant usage in Wyoming is much more different from the middle-range states than consultant usage in Illinois is different.
Another way to understand the role of consultants is to look at the services they provided to the candidates. Survey respondents who indicated hiring a professional consultant were asked to indicate what services the consultants rendered from a list of eight provided: devising strategy, purchase of advertising, direct mail, polling, compiling information about voters, telephone banks, day-to-day campaign management, and fundraising. Candidates could mark as few as one or as many as eight. Table 5.2 displays the median number of services provided to candidates in each state for both election periods.

The median for the sample shows that a typical candidate in either the primary or general election who hires a consultant or consultants has them perform approximately three services. There is variation across states in both election cycles. For example, candidates in South Carolina and Illinois typically hire consultants to perform about four services while candidates in Wyoming hire them usually to perform one. There does not appear to be much variation between election cycles and these differences do not vary with legislative professionalism.67

What do consultants generally do for candidates? Table 5.3 displays the percentage of candidates who report receiving assistance in eight different areas (among those candidates who hire consultants).

The activities provided are ranked in order of how frequently they are mentioned in the primary. The most widely cited activity is direct mail. About 88% of primary candidates and about 79% of general election candidates report hiring consultants for this purpose. Other activities rank high as well. Over one-half of candidates who hire
Table 5.2
Median Number of Services Provided by Political Consultants in 1994 Primary and General Election Campaigns by State
(Of candidates reporting the use of consultants)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>General</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(26)</td>
<td>(26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>(26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(12)</td>
<td>(32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wyoming</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median for the Sample</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(59)</td>
<td>(123)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.3
The Most Common Activities Performed by Consulting Firms for State Legislative Campaigns in 1994 Primaries and General Elections
(Of candidates who hired consultants)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>General</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct Mail</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(51)</td>
<td>(96)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchasing Advertising</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(39)</td>
<td>(64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advising Strategy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compiling Information About Yourself</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone Banks</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(22)</td>
<td>(40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Management</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>(23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundraising</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(14)</td>
<td>(24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>N=58</td>
<td>N=122</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
consultants use them for devising strategy, purchasing advertising, and polling. About 40% of primary candidates and a similar number in the general election use them for compiling information about district voters. It seems that about one-third or fewer of the candidates enlist the help of professionals with telephone banks, campaign management, and fundraising. As the shaded areas show, aspects of information gathering are prominent among the services provided to candidates by political consultants.

Another aspect of consultant use to consider is the degree of influence which they have in campaign decision making. Recall that one of the negative aspects attributed to consultants is that they have taken over far too much of the responsibility of campaigning and have therefore removed candidates from the fray of politics. Is this a fair assessment of the role of consultants in the state legislative setting? In order to determine the level of control exercised by consultants, candidates were asked to indicate on a 0 to 100 point scale the consultant’s level of involvement in making decisions with 0 indicating no involvement and 100 meaning complete control of the process. The average responses to this question along with the standard deviations are given in Table 5.4.

These results reveal that candidates in some states are very willing to cede to consultants a rather large degree of control over their campaigns, whereas candidates in other states do not allow nearly as much. However, this appears to vary by election type. In primary campaigns, it seems that those candidates who hire consultants on average give them a good bit of latitude. Of those who hire consultants, the average percentage of the decision making they gave to them was about 50% (score of 47.27). In general elections there seems to be more variation across the states. Average scores in states
### Table 5.4

Average Level of Control over Decision-Making Given Consultants in Primary and General Elections in 1994
(Or candidates who hired consultants)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th></th>
<th>General</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>Standard Deviation</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>Standard Deviation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>54.20</td>
<td>28.09</td>
<td>45.60</td>
<td>27.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(25)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(25)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>50.00</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>54.17</td>
<td>27.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>47.94</td>
<td>27.95</td>
<td>49.87</td>
<td>30.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(26)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>31.55</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>38.07</td>
<td>28.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(11)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(30)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>30.00</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>27.83</td>
<td>23.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(23)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>35.00</td>
<td>28.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wyoming</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVERAGE</td>
<td>47.27</td>
<td>27.20</td>
<td>40.76</td>
<td>28.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(56)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(116)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
range from a low of about 28% in Connecticut to a high of about 54% in South Carolina. Overall, in general elections the amount of control is lower -- an average score of 41% for all candidates who responded. However, t-tests show that the differences between primary and general election periods are not statistically significant. There are also no statistically significant differences across the states on the dimension of legislative professionalism in either election period.

The findings reported in Tables 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4 suggest that candidates who hire consultants use them for a variety of purposes and make them a relatively important part of their decision making process. While consultants may play a large role in the campaigns of those candidates who utilize their services, it is important to understand that relatively few candidates actually hire them. Far from being a typical component of campaigns as on the presidential and congressional levels, less than one-third of the candidates in this sample of states utilized consultants.

Political Parties

What types of information gathering services do parties provide to candidates? Candidates in both primary and general election periods were asked about this. While we generally only think of parties as assisting candidates in the general election, the new service-oriented role of parties may be useful to candidates in the primary season as well.

Many candidates running in 1994 credited the party with help in obtaining lists of registered voters, voter history, and demographic data on their districts. Some mentioned seminars given by state parties to assist candidates in organizing their campaign. To
determine the prevalence of this assistance, survey respondents were asked to indicate what help they received by checking a series of boxes listing a number of activities frequently performed by political parties. Table 5.5 displays the percentage of candidates in each state who reported assistance in eight different activities during the course of the primary. Note that these percentages are reflective of total party support and do not differentiate among parties on various levels.

Of the eight activities listed, by far the most frequently marked was “providing survey data, demographic data, and lists of voters”. Over half the primary respondents (53%) indicated a reliance on some party organization either on the local, state, legislative, or national levels for this type of assistance. The only other activity cited at a rate even close to “providing data” is “making strategy” and it is cited by only about half as many candidates (27%). Similar percentages of candidates report assistance with “registering voters” (25%), “get-out-the-vote activities” (25%), and “providing volunteers” (20%). Many fewer candidates marked “hiring pollsters and those with media advice” (16%), “management advice” (11%), or “purchase of advertisements” (10%). There is often variation across the states in the percentage marking each activity, but within the category of providing data, we find fairly consistent percentages. The lowest is in Wyoming (45%) while the highest is in Oregon and South Carolina where approximately 59% of candidates report receiving assistance from parities.

Probably the most striking finding from Tables 5.5 is the high percentage of candidates who report that parties were helpful at all during the primary. We normally do not think of parties assisting candidates who are seeking the nomination. Party operatives
Table 5.5  
Percentage of Candidates Reporting Assistance from Parties  
With the Following Activities in 1994 Primary Election Campaigns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>N=</th>
<th>Register Voters</th>
<th>Provide Data*</th>
<th>GOTV</th>
<th>Volunteers</th>
<th>Pollsters/ Media</th>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Manage</th>
<th>Purchase Ads</th>
<th>Average Total Assistance+</th>
<th>Standard Deviation Total Assistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td></td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>2.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td></td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>2.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td></td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>2.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td></td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>1.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td></td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>1.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wyoming</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td></td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>1.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td></td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>1.78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Average** 249 26% 53% 25% 20% 16% 27% 11% 10% 1.87 2.19

*Candidates were asked if the parties were helpful in "Providing Survey Data, Demographic Data, and Lists of Voters". Please see the Appendix for the exact wording of the survey questions.

+Average total assistance equals the average forms of assistance candidates report being provided by any level of party organization.
often point out that they intentionally do not become involved in the primary. The fact that so many primary candidates report receiving help from parties is testimony to the parties' "adaptive brokerage" role (Frendreis et al., 1994). Parties have become a clearinghouse for candidate-specific services available not only to general election candidates but also to primary contenders. Not all of these services are free of course. One veteran state legislative campaign manager made this point very plain. The state-level parties in her state can provide a wide array of data services, but they do charge for this assistance. However, as Shea (1995) indicates, these costs are often subsidized by the parties and more than likely come at a reduced rate.

There is variation across the states in the number of services provided. The last two columns at the end of the table display the average number of services along with the standard deviations. Illinois is at the top with a score of 2.59, followed closely by Oregon and Delaware where the typical candidate in the primary receives two services from a party organization in the primary. Texas and Wyoming are at the bottom of the scale with scores of 1.52 and 1.20 respectively. 70

While Table 5.5 indicates the extent of party assistance across a range of activities, it says nothing about what level of party generally provides these services. Table 5.6, therefore, displays the percentage of candidates who report assistance with survey data, demographic data, and lists of voters from four different party organizations. As the averages show, candidates report similar levels of assistance from three organizations: local (22%), state (25%), and legislative (21%). Only about one candidate (1%) reported any help from national parties.
Table 5.6
Percentage of Candidates By State Who Indicated that Parties Provided Survey Data, Demographic Data and Lists of Voters in Primary Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Local Party</th>
<th>State Party</th>
<th>Legislative Party*</th>
<th>National Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wyoming</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AVERAGE 22% 25% 21% 1%

*Note that South Carolina and Wyoming do not have legislative party organizations.
But this average masks the high degree of cross-state variation in the percentage of candidates who receive help. As Table 5.6 shows, there is little variation across states in the extent of assistance received from local organizations. The range for local assistance is from 17% in Delaware to about 27% in Oregon. Hardly any candidates report help from national parties (only one candidate in Illinois). However, assistance from state and legislative parties varies a great deal. Few candidates report help from the state in Oregon and Illinois (6% and 16% respectively) while about half the candidates in South Carolina and Delaware do. There is a similar range in support from legislative party organizations with low percentages reported in Texas (0%), Delaware (8%), and Connecticut (16%), to higher percentages reported in Illinois (31%) and Oregon (41%).

It is interesting to see that while Illinois and Oregon ranked rather low in assistance from state parties, they ranked at the top of those receiving help from legislative parties. Also, those states without legislative party organizations (South Carolina and Wyoming), also ranked higher on the assistance reported from state party organizations. These results from Tables 5.5 and 5.6 suggest that primary candidates in each of the states report similar levels of assistance from parties, however, the type of party organization providing the assistance appears to vary. For example, while candidates in Illinois and Oregon receive little assistance from the state party, they receive much more from the legislative party.

Part of the explanation for these differences probably has to do with the extent of development of the different party organizations in the states. Systematic evaluations of party organizations indicate variation in the services provided by state and local parties.
(e.g., Cotter, et al., 1984) as well as by legislative party committees (Gierzynski, 1992; Shea, 1995). If one type of party organization does not provide a service, it is likely that another level of party will take up the slack. Gierzynski (1992) argues that legislative campaign committees in particular arose from a need (or a "void", as he calls it, p. 12) for such services that neither the national or state central party organizations were willing or able to provide.

What assistance is provided by parties during the general election? To gauge the level of assistance, candidates again were given a list of services but this time were asked to mark the level of helpfulness of three levels of party organization (local, state, and legislative) in providing each. The possible responses ranged from "1" to "5" with "1" as "not helpful", "2" as "slightly helpful", "3" as "moderately helpful", "4" as "very helpful", and "5" as "extremely helpful" (Please see the Appendix for the exact wording of the questions). Such questioning makes it possible to understand not only what services parties provide, but also how helpful candidates consider such services.

In asking about party assistance, it is important to differentiate among candidates based on their competitive situation. Candidates in less competitive races who are shoo-ins are probably less likely to seek out assistance from parties. In addition, there are also hopeless contenders who the party is probably unlikely to help. Studies on party funding disbursements often show that parties channel their monetary resources to those candidates in competitive races where funding has the potential to have the greatest impact on the party’s general goal of winning seats in the chamber (Gierzynski and Breaux, 1994; Herrnson, 1988, 1995). Candidates in competitive races will be more
likely to need assistance and the parties probably more likely to give it. For these reasons, the responses by candidates are divided between those in high competition and low competition races. Competitive races are those where 20 percentage points or less separated the winner and the loser in the final vote tally in 1994. The average responses are divided in this manner for each level of party organization for all sample states in Table 5.7.

For the most part, these results suggest that parties do not assist state legislative candidates very greatly in the general election. However, these low scores are not consistent across all states nor for all types of activities. From the overall averages it appears that legislative and local parties are more helpful than state parties. But, the average even for legislative parties shows that candidates in high competition races give a score of just 2.07 which is only a little higher than the “slightly helpful” category.

But we know that the importance of parties varies across states. Such a situation may effectively dilute the scores for each type of party. In order to control for this, a column labeled “Highest Score” provides the average of the highest score for any party organization indicated by a candidate for each service. For example, if a candidate scored for “registering voters” a “3” for the local party, a “2” for the state party, and a “4” for the legislative party, the “4” would be used in the “Highest Score” column. This represents the highest score that the candidate gives to any party organization for a particular service. Calculated in this manner we see that the average for highest scores is 2.06 for candidates in low competition seats and 2.45 for those in high competition seats. Even
Table 5.7  
Level of Support Received From County, State, and Legislative Political Parties Organizations  
Reported by State Legislative General Election Candidates in Low and High Competition Races in 1994*  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Local</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Legislative</th>
<th>Highest Score*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registering Voters</td>
<td>2.29</td>
<td>2.07</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>1.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providing Data</td>
<td>2.21</td>
<td>2.06</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>2.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Getting Out Vote</td>
<td>2.28</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>1.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providing Volunteers</td>
<td>1.88</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>1.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiring Consultants</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>1.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundraising</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>1.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devising Strategy</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>1.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managing the Campaign</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>1.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchasing Advertising</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>1.21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AVERAGE 1.72 1.65 1.49 1.56 1.73 1.75 3.16 3.32 2.43 2.53

*Shaded areas represent statistical significance of helpfulness scores between the group of candidates running in low and high competition districts.  
+Highest score represents the highest score reported by any of the three party organizations for each category of services.

Note that the number of cases varies among party types because some states (South Carolina and Wyoming) do not have legislative campaign committees. In addition, some candidates in Connecticut did not respond to the question regarding local party organizations because county organizations do not exist in that state.
calculated in this manner we find that parties overall are not much more than slightly to moderately helpful to candidates.

The most interesting aspect of Table 5.7 is the relative importance of the different activities. For example, "providing data" ranks as one of the most important for each level of party organization. These scores rank highest among services provided by state and legislative parties and rank very near the top among county party services. An activity related to information gathering, the "hiring of pollsters and media consultants", only ranks high among legislative party services for candidates in highly competitive races. For the most part, candidates in the sample of states find county and state parties only "slightly helpful" and legislative parties half-way between "slightly helpful" and "moderately helpful" in providing data about voters living in the district.

The other interesting aspect of this table is the difference or lack of difference in assistance given to candidates by level of competitiveness. The shaded cells in Table 5.7 denote a statistically significant relationship between competition and level of helpfulness for each category of service. For those shaded cells, candidates in highly competitive races scored party assistance higher than candidates in less competitive races. As the table shows, these differences appear in approximately two-thirds of the cases in the "Highest Score" column. Most of the differences appear among the legislative campaign committees. For many of the services (7 of the 9) provided by legislative campaign committees, candidates in high competition races ranked these parties more helpful than candidates in low competition races (and these differences were statistically significant).
These differences were present for providing data and for devising strategy as well as for the overall helpfulness scores for legislative parties.

 Competitiveness of the race does not seem to be as important for help from state parties. Only among three services do we see differences based on competitiveness of the race and then the overall average for all services is not statistically significant. For local party organizations, there appears to be no differentiation as evidenced in the lack of a statistical relationship for any of the services. In fact, we see that the overall helpfulness score reported by candidates in low competition races is actually higher than those reported in high competition races (though these differences are not statistically significant).

 These results show a relationship between level of competition and reported helpfulness scores primarily for legislative campaign committees. Such a finding is consistent with work by Gierzynski (1992) and Shea (1995) who find that legislative campaign committees more often than not direct their resources where they will do the most good -- in highly competitive races where the party has a chance of winning another seat in the chamber. Here further evidence is provided to establish this party behavior but from the perspective of the candidate and about services that are not necessarily measured in dollar amounts. These findings can be interpreted in one or two ways. One is that candidates in competitive races are more likely than those in less competitive races to seek out assistance from parties, especially legislative campaign committees. The other is that parties themselves (especially legislative parties) are directing their services more to those candidates who are in greater need of assistance. Determining this difference is left
for future research, but the fact that there is a difference means that some candidates are more likely to receive assistance than others.\textsuperscript{72}

One other feature to explore regarding party assistance is the level of state variation. Do we find parties providing similar levels of help to candidates in securing data across states? Table 5.8 provides the average helpfulness scores reported by candidates to the question of data acquisition by state. Again, these average scores are calculated separately for those candidates running in high versus low competition races.

The average scores vary by state and party organization. For the most part, the helpfulness scores for local and state parties are higher in Wyoming and South Carolina than in the other states while legislative party organizations are most helpful among Oregon and Illinois candidates. It is interesting to find that those states lacking legislative committee parties are the states where candidates ranked help from state and county parties highest. Similarly, candidates in Illinois and Oregon ranked the highest in helpfulness from legislative parties but ranked near the bottom in helpfulness from county and state parties. As with the assistance provided during the primary campaign, it seems that if assistance is not provided from one party level, it is apparently coming from another level.\textsuperscript{73}

Similar to Table 5.7, t-tests were conducted on the differences in helpfulness as reported by candidates in high and low competition districts. These tests show that there are statistically significant differences between these two categories of candidates in only two states -- Illinois and Oregon. The differences in Illinois are for the legislative party and the "highest score" averages. For Oregon, the differences are statistically significant
Table 5.8
Average Level of Helpfulness of Political Party Organizations in Providing Survey Data, Demographic Data and Lists of Voters As Reported by State Legislative Candidates Running in General Election Contests in 1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Local</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>State</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Legislative*</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Highest Score*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wyoming</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>2.47</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>3.14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>2.47</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td>3.05</td>
<td>3.62</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3.63</td>
<td>4.08</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>3.22</td>
<td>2.29</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>3.14</td>
<td>3.44</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>2.67</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>3.06</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>2.26</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>2.96</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>2.28</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>3.55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| AVERAGE | 2.21 | 2.06 | 2.20 | 2.06 | 2.42 | 2.76 | 3.16 | 3.32 |
| N=       | (203) | (185) | (223) | (199) | (183) | (164) | (225) | (203) |

*Note that South Carolina and Wyoming do not have legislative party organizations.
+ Highest score represents the highest score reported by any of the three party organizations for each category of services.

Note that the number of cases varies among party types because some states (South Carolina and Wyoming) do not have legislative campaign committees. In addition, some candidates in Connecticut did not respond to the question regarding local party organizations because county organizations do not exist in that state.
only among legislative party organizations. Again, this means that the party is helpful to
some candidates, but not others. Whether this is a reflection of the rational allocation of
resources by parties themselves, a self-selection mechanism on the part of candidates, or
some combination of both is not clear. But such factors clearly determine whether or not
candidates receive assistance.

This analysis of the role of parties suggests several things. One is that state
legislative campaigns are clearly candidate-centered endeavors. Few candidates report
that parties were "very" or "extremely" helpful in any part of their campaign effort. Most
report that parties were only moderately helpful. If there was ever doubt in anyone's
mind concerning the candidate-centered nature of state legislative elections, the findings
from this chapter should dispel such notions. Parties do not provide a wide array of
services to a broad spectrum of candidates. From the candidates' perspective, the most
consistently mentioned and the most important service in both primary and general
election campaigns is the party's role of providing information to candidates in the form
of surveys, demographic data, and lists of potential voters.

Variation exists in the level of helpfulness that general election candidates report
receiving from parties, particularly from legislative party organizations. Candidates in
highly competitive districts were more likely to score legislative parties as being helpful
than candidates running in less competitive districts. Multiple regression analyses (not
shown) indicate that even when controlling for candidate type (incumbent, challenger, or
open seat) along with other variables such as previous electoral and party experience, that
only competitiveness of the race is a statistically significant explanatory variable. 74 These
findings are consistent with other studies on the congressional (e.g., Herrnson, 1988) and state legislative levels (e.g., Gierzynski, 1992) which show that parties allocate campaign funding in a manner which serves to maximizes its number of seats within the legislative chamber.

It is equally instructive to find that while legislative parties provide services to those candidates where they can do the most good, state and local level parties do not distribute resources in such a manner. Competitiveness of the district does not appear to be a factor. Why is competitiveness important for one set of party organizations but not for another? One reason may have to do with the types of services which the different party organizations provide. For example, candidates rank the assistance from local and state parties higher than legislative parties for services such as registering voters, getting out the vote on election day, and providing volunteers. At least two of these services (registering voters and get out the vote drives) are not really selective services in the sense that they can be directed at any one particular candidate. Parties performing these functions are in essence assisting all the candidates running under a particular party banner. The services most prominent among those provided by legislative parties, on the other hand -- providing data, devising strategy, and fundraising -- are services which must be provided to a particular candidate. Such variations in functions appear to be important for explaining these differences in helpfulness provided by parties.

This section also establishes that the services provided by parties vary by state. Some states have stronger legislative parties such as Oregon and Illinois which provide more services (Gierzynski, 1992). Candidates in these states tend to rely on these
organizations for information acquisition, whereas candidates in states where such organizations are weak or non-existent tend to rely more often on county or state parties. Such variations influence the ability of candidates to receive campaign assistance.

Now that we have some idea concerning the extent to which state legislative candidates engage in information acquisition and the actors involved in this process, we now move on to look at those factors which may influence the search for and use of such information.

**Factors Determining the Extent of Information Gathering in State Legislative Contests**

A number of factors are expected to influence the extent to which candidates engage in information gathering. Candidate characteristics, level of financing, and district conditions along with institutional context are likely to play a role. In addition, the assistance of parties and consultants and the presence of a strong campaign organization may also have an influence.

Candidate status may be a central element in information acquisition. We might expect that incumbents in particular to have more information on voters living in the district than challengers or open seat candidates. Fenno (1978) recognizes that incumbents have ingrained perceptions about voters in their constituencies. While some of these perceptions may be colored by meeting with voters, they may also be obtained through empirical analyses of data on the district. Incumbents may know more about the district because they have surveyed voters in the past, have lists of supporters in the
district, or keep up-to-date constituency service logs. This information can be extraordinarily important to a candidate running in the district.

Open seat contestants, however, are probably more likely than most other candidate types to engage in information acquisition. These candidates have probably never run in the district before and are less familiar with district voters than incumbents. Unlike the typical challenger, they also probably have the resources to go about this search for information.

Does candidate status help to explain variations in the extent of information acquisition and usage? Figure 5.4 displays the percentage of primary and general election candidates by type who fall into four separate categories of information acquisition: those who analyze past voting trends but who do not maintain a database of voters living in the district; those who maintain a database but do not analyze past trends, those who do neither, and those who do both.

It does not appear that incumbents have wide information advantages over other candidates. Generally there is a higher percentage of open seat candidates who utilize information than the other candidates while a much lower percentage of challenger use such information. Chi-square tests show that these differences achieve statistical significance only in two areas. Challengers tend to have higher levels of analyzing past voting trends in the primary (considered a lower form of data acquisition than maintaining a database) than the other candidate types. And incumbent and open seat contenders engage in both forms of information gathering to a greater extent than challengers, but only in the primary election period.
Figure 5.4
Percent of Campaigns Engaging in Different Forms of Information Gathering in 1994 Primary and General Election Campaigns by Candidate Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Neither</th>
<th>Analyze Past Trends Only</th>
<th>Maintain Database Only</th>
<th>Both</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary Incumbent</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Challenger</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Open Seat</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Incumbent</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Challenger</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Open Seat</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

State
Why are there not many differences among candidate types? Part of the explanation may have to do with other factors such as electoral competition. For example, we may find incumbents engage in information gathering only when they are challenged by a formidable candidate. Incumbents challenged by only token opposition may feel little pressure to conduct polls or analyze previous election results and may simply rely on impressionistic information. Similar to incumbents’ behavior in raising and spending funds, their behavior may be shaped less by their candidate status as they are by the competitive nature of their situation. While it may be true that incumbents possess skills that allow them to access information, they may only do so when the environment demands that they take such action.

For similar reasons we may find that open seat contenders and challengers are likely to utilize information at rates similar to incumbents because they are the candidates who most need it. They probably have never run in the district before and have much less working knowledge of voters than incumbents. While they probably possess fewer skills than incumbents to acquire such information, they generally possess a greater need. Such factors in the end may balance out and ultimately lead to the finding that candidate status alone does not differentiate information usage.

Another factor related to candidate status which is likely to play a role in information acquisition for challengers and open seat contestants is political experience. One of the reasons why “quality” candidates derive their advantage over less “quality” candidates may be due to their superior knowledge about voters. Jacobson and Kornell’s (1983) perspective on strategic politicians indicates that the “quality” candidates are those
who are best able to accurately assess their chances. It is not too much of a stretch to
think that many of the candidates who decide to run are those who engage in information
acquisition at a higher rate than those candidates who have little or no political
experience. As in the previous chapter, two types of experience are examined --
experience in a party organization and experience running for elective office.

As already alluded to, electoral competition may also play a role in information
acquisition. Previous research by Kingdon (1966) shows that candidates who are more
certain of the election outcome make less effort to obtain unbiased estimators of how well
they are doing. Hershey (1974) finds that electoral uncertainty drives information
gathering activities. Goldenberg and Traugott (1984) find a relationship between
uncertainty over the outcome and use of polls. It is expected that competition will
therefore drive candidates of all types to engage in greater information acquisition.

The amount of available spending by a candidate probably has the potential to
affect informational activities. Kingdon (1966), for example, finds that candidates with
fewer resources are less likely to rely on “professional” types of information. It would
not be very surprising to learn that candidates with little or no financial backing conduct
few polls or hire few consultants.

Size of the district might also have an effect. We may find that information
gathering and reliance on consultants is greater in more populated districts. A greater
population means that there is more information to gather. Salmore and Salmore (1985)
suggest that state-wide candidates have a greater need for consultants than U.S. House
candidates due to the fact that their districts are smaller and more homogenous.
Empirical support is found for this in an analysis of expenditure patterns by state legislative candidates in Kansas and Texas (Hogan, 1998). In this study, candidates from the state with the larger districts (Texas districts have roughly 5 times the population of Kansas districts) spent a much higher percentage of their budget on consulting expenses than candidates in Kansas spent. Greater use of consultants may be indicative of greater information usage in such districts. Is there a relationship between information usage and district population?

What role if any does the institutional context play? If information acquisition is a mark of a modern campaign, do we find greater use of such techniques among candidates vying for seats in more professional legislatures? If such a proposition is correct, we should find that information acquisition is greater in the professional legislature in the sample, Illinois, and less in the citizen legislature, Wyoming. Some evidence to support this contention has been provided in earlier tables, however, we have yet to test this factor in conjunction with competing explanations.

Finally, what is the impact of party assistance? Are those candidates who report assistance in acquiring information more likely to use it to analyze past voting trends and to maintain a database of voters? A dichotomous variable is constructed for each election cycle based on candidate responses to questions concerning assistance from party organizations. Candidates in the primary who marked a positive response for party assistance on any level for either “provided survey data, demographic data, and lists of voters” or “devising campaign strategy” received a “1” in the primary election period. Those marking neither response received a “0”. Similarly in the general election period,
candidates who scored any of the party organizations (local, state, or legislative) a “3” (moderately helpful) or better on the five-point scale on these same two factors just listed, received a party assistance score of “1”. Those candidates marking none of these categories with a score greater than a “2” (slightly helpful) were given a score of “0”.

The effects of these variables will make it possible to determine if party assistance influenced the extent to which candidates gathered and used information.

In order to test the effects of these factors, a dependent variable is created to measure the concept of information acquisition with two questions asked on the survey instrument. Candidates receive a score of 1 for each type of information they use. If they only analyze data on past voting trends they receive a “1”, if they only maintain a database on voters they receive a “1”, if they do both they receive a “2” and if they do neither they receive a “0”. The variable can therefore take the value of 0, 1, or 2. Calculated separately for the primary and general election, these indices become the dependent variables used to estimate the following equation:

\[
INFORM = a + b_1 ELECEXP + b_2 PARTYEXP + b_3 PARTY + b_4 SPEND + b_5 COMP + b_6 POP + b_7 PROF - b_8 CITIZEN + b_9 PASST + e
\]

Where:

\[
INFORM = \text{Index for information gathering (Values equal 0, 1 or 2).}
\]

And,

\[
ELECEXP = \text{Electoral Experience. The variable can take a value of 0, 1, or 2 (0=never run for elective office; 1=run for elective office but have not won; 2=won elective office).}
\]
PARTYEXP = Political Party Experience. The variable can take a value of 0, 1, or 2 (0=no involvement with the party; 1=any involvement but no leadership role; 2=leadership role in the party).

PARTY = A control variable for party (Democrat=1 and Republican = 0).

SPEND = Total campaign spending per eligible voter in either the primary or general election.

COMP = Anticipated Electoral Competition. In the general election this is measured as a dichotomous variable (1 or 0) with 1 indicating races which are close (the margin between the candidates is less than 20 points). In the primary election this is measured as the number of candidates running.

POP = Total number of the district’s eligible voters.

PROF = A dichotomous variable indicating a professional legislature (Illinois=1, all other states =0).

CITIZEN = A dichotomous variable indicating a citizen legislature (Wyoming=1, all other states =0).

PASST = Party assistance. This is a dichotomous variable indicating reported party assistance in information gathering during the election period (1=reported party assistance; 0=little or no reported party assistance).

These two equations are first run separately for each candidate type (incumbents, challengers, and open seat contestants) to make it possible to control for candidate experience since this variable cannot be part of an analysis including incumbents. The results of the OLS regression analysis are provided in Table 5.9 which displays only the sign for those variables which are significant at the .05 level or better (an O is provided for relationships which do not achieve statistical significance).³⁵
Table 5.9
Linear Regression Analysis of Factors Influencing the Extent of Information Gathering in Primary and General Election Campaigns in 1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inc</td>
<td>Chall</td>
<td>Open</td>
<td>Inc</td>
<td>Chall</td>
<td>Open</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Experience</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Experience</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Party</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Competition</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Legislature</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen Legislature</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Assistance</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adjusted $R^2$ =

<table>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inc</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>0.051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chall</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open</td>
<td>0.050</td>
<td>0.075</td>
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$N =$

<table>
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<th>General</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Coefficients achieving statistical significance at the .05 level or better are given a "+" or a "-" denoted the direction of the relationship. Statistically insignificant coefficients are given an "O".*
The results of the regression analysis indicate very clearly that few of these factors discussed so far are good predictors of information acquisition. None of the six equations explain very much of the variance in the dependent variables for incumbents, challengers, or open seat contestants. The highest amount of variance explained is in the general election equation for open seat candidates but then the $R^2$ statistic is only 0.09.\textsuperscript{76}

Neither electoral experience, party experience, political party, electoral competition, nor population of the district is correlated with information gathering in any of the six equations. Only one of the two institutional variables is statistically significant -- citizen legislature. As expected it is negatively associated with information gathering but only for challengers in the general election. But, it is positively associated with information gathering among open seat candidates in the general election -- a finding that is unexpected and is not easily explained. Party assistance is positively associated with information gathering, but only for incumbents and challengers in general elections.

The only variable of any consequences in these six equations appears to be campaign spending. In half the equations the level of spending per eligible voter is positively associated with greater information gathering. In both primary and general election contests for open seats and in incumbent races in the general election, spending is positively correlated with greater information gathering.

In many ways the importance of money to the levels of information gathered is rather intriguing given the finding earlier that a relatively small percentage of funds go for the purpose of collecting information. How is it that greater spending results in greater data acquisition if only small amounts of money are even spent on it? The answer
to this question may lie in the effects which money has on other aspects of the campaign
process which in turn have an influence on information gathering. Two such campaign-
level features include factors related to the organization and to the use of political
consultants.

Organizational strength and professionalism are two campaign features shown in
the last chapter to be highly correlated with campaign spending and themselves may very
well have an influence on aspects of information gathering. If you will recall, the
organizational strength index measure in particular takes into consideration the number of
workers and the degree of task specialization among those involved. We might assume
that those campaigns with stronger organizations would be capable of gathering more
information than those campaigns which have weaker organizations. Stronger
organizations may have workers whose primary purpose is to analyze past voting trends
or to compile and maintain a database on voters. Weaker organizations may not have the
ability to have someone engage in such activities. Similarly, more professional
organizations are those which hire workers, many of whom are hired because they have
experience in running a campaign. Part of the skill which these paid workers provide
may be the ability to collect and utilize information.

Another campaign-level factor which may have an influence on informational
components of the campaign is the use of political consultants. Is it the case that those
campaigns which utilize consultants are also those campaigns which are likely to make
greater use of information? To measure this a dichotomous variable is used which takes
the value of "1" if the candidate reported the use of a consultant or "0" if the candidate did not.

To test the effects of these variables, a series of OLS regression equations are employed. These equations are similar to the ones used earlier (one for the primary and one for the general election), but, because the two experience variables were found to be unrelated to information gathering, the equations will not be run separately for incumbents, challengers, and open seat contestants. This makes the models more parsimonious and allows us to observe the different effects of candidate type by including dummy variables for incumbents and open seats.

Three separate equations are run for both the primary and general elections.

Model One includes those features of the models run already in this chapter with the addition of dummy variables for incumbent and open seat candidates. Model Two incorporates the measures just discussed for organizational strength and professionalism and consultant usage. Because these factors are correlated with campaign spending, spending is removed from this equation. The third equation runs all the variables used in Model Two including the variable for spending. Do the effects of strong and professional organizations along with consultant usage hold up even when spending is included in the equation? Does spending itself retain statistical significance?

The three equations take the following form:

**Model One**

\[
\text{INFORM} = a + b_1 \text{INCUM} + b_2 \text{OPEN} + b_3 \text{PARTY} + b_4 \text{SPEND} + b_5 \text{COMP} + b_6 \text{POP} + b_7 \text{PROF} + b_8 \text{CITIZEN} + b_9 \text{PASST} + e
\]
Model Two

\[ \text{INFORM} = a + b_1 \text{INCUM} + b_2 \text{OPEN} + b_3 \text{PARTY} + b_4 \text{COMP} + b_5 \text{POP} + b_6 \text{PROF} + b_7 \text{CITIZEN} + b_8 \text{PASST} + b_9 \text{STRINDEX} + b_{10} \text{PROINDEX} + b_{11} \text{CONSULT} + e \]

Model Three

\[ \text{INFORM} = a + b_1 \text{INCUM} + b_2 \text{OPEN} + b_3 \text{PARTY} + b_4 \text{SPEND} + b_5 \text{COMP} + b_6 \text{POP} + b_7 \text{PROF} + b_8 \text{CITIZEN} + b_9 \text{PASST} + b_{10} \text{STRINDEX} + b_{11} \text{PROINDEX} + b_{12} \text{CONSULT} + e \]

Where the variables additional variables take the following form:

\[ \text{INCUM} = \] The candidate is an incumbent. A dichotomous variable takes the value of 1 for incumbents and 0 for other candidates.

\[ \text{OPEN} = \] The candidate is an open seat contender. A dichotomous variable takes the value of 1 for open seat candidates and 0 for others.

\[ \text{STRINDEX} = \] Index of Campaign Organizational Strength. The values for this variable range from 0 to 4.\textsuperscript{77}

\[ \text{PROINDEX} = \] Index of Campaign Organizational Professionalism. The values for this variable range from 0 to 4.\textsuperscript{78}

\[ \text{CONSULT} = \] The candidate hired a professional consultant to assist in the campaign effort (1=hired a consultant; 0=did not hire a consultant).

The results of the equations for both the primary and general election periods are displayed in Table 5.10.\textsuperscript{79} Few of the variables are statistically significant, with the dummy variable for incumbency, political party, competition, population of the district, and legislative professionalism not being statistically significant in any of the equations. The results are therefore similar to those shown in Table 5.9.
Table 5.10
Linear Regression Analysis of Factors Influencing the Extent of Information Gathering in Primary and General Election Campaigns of State Legislative Candidates in 1994
(Un-standardized coefficients)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model #1</td>
<td>Model #2</td>
<td>Model #3</td>
<td>Model #1</td>
<td>Model #2</td>
<td>Model #3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.281***</td>
<td>1.045***</td>
<td>1.015***</td>
<td>1.218***</td>
<td>1.170***</td>
<td>1.166***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent</td>
<td>0.0232</td>
<td>0.185</td>
<td>0.0904</td>
<td>-0.0525</td>
<td>-0.05909</td>
<td>-0.07349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Seat Candidate</td>
<td>0.214*</td>
<td>0.263**</td>
<td>0.250*</td>
<td>0.105</td>
<td>0.0722</td>
<td>0.06844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Party</td>
<td>-0.0828</td>
<td>-0.118</td>
<td>-0.0970</td>
<td>-0.04471</td>
<td>-0.07795</td>
<td>-0.0721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Spending</td>
<td>0.404***</td>
<td>0.253</td>
<td>0.139***</td>
<td>0.139***</td>
<td>0.03142</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition</td>
<td>0.0077</td>
<td>0.0249</td>
<td>0.0186</td>
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<td>0.09349</td>
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<td>Population</td>
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<td>Professional Legislature</td>
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<td>0.009997</td>
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<tr>
<td>Citizen Legislature</td>
<td>-0.238</td>
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<td>0.0313</td>
<td>0.08841</td>
<td>0.219</td>
<td>0.218</td>
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<tr>
<td>Party Assistance</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td>0.07918</td>
<td>0.0859</td>
<td>0.240***</td>
<td>0.183**</td>
<td>0.185**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Strength</td>
<td>0.111**</td>
<td>0.106**</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0328</td>
<td>0.03049</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Prof.</td>
<td>0.05509</td>
<td>0.0284</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0981***</td>
<td>0.0901**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultant Usage</td>
<td>0.02642</td>
<td>-0.0355</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.147*</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.133</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adjusted R² =

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0.068</th>
<th>0.082</th>
<th>0.092</th>
<th>0.087</th>
<th>0.109</th>
<th>0.11</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>403</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
However, these models do provide insight into the effects of variables that were not examined in the previous equations. In all three of the primary equations, the dummy variable for open seat candidates is positive and statistically significant. Open seat contenders in the primary collect and utilize information to a much greater extent than incumbents or challengers. However, candidate status does not appear to explain variation in the general election period. Party assistance is important in all three of the general election equations but in none of the primary equations. Similar to the findings in the earlier equations, spending is an influential factor in both election cycles. However, as one can see, it loses its statistical significance in both election periods in Model Three when organizational strength and professionalism along with consultant use are included.

How important are organizational features and consultant usage to information gathering? Considering organization features first, a curious finding emerges. It seems that the variable for strength of the organization is statistically significant only in the primary while professionalism is significant only in the general election. Different aspects of the organization are therefore influential in different election periods. But the more important finding is that their effects retain their magnitude and statistical significance even in Model Three when the variable for spending is entered. In fact, it is the spending variable which loses statistical significance in Model Three when all the variables are run simultaneously.

Having a political consultant increases the extent of information gathering but only in the general election period and only when spending is not included in the
equation. When controls for spending are included, its level of significance falls below the 0.05 threshold.

Overall, the findings in Tables 5.9 and 5.10 tell us a good bit about information gathering in state legislative campaigns. While few variables were found to be statistically significant, these null findings themselves are very revealing. What this seems to show is that many of the candidate-level factors are only marginally important for explaining information use. Neither party experience nor electoral experience differentiates those who utilize information from those who do not. However, the open seat variable is statistically significant in the primary election. It is among these first-time candidates in the first-round of elections who are more likely to analyze past voting trends and maintain a database of voters.

District-level features are not related to information acquisition. It does not seem to matter if a district has 10,000 or 100,000 voters -- the acquisition and use of information is similar. It also does not appear to matter if the campaign is for a seat in a citizen or a professional legislature. Contrary to expectations, campaigns in professional legislatures do not exhibit more advanced forms of information acquisition than those in citizen legislatures. Also counter to expectations based on studies of congressional candidates, increased electoral competition does not appear to spur on a greater search for information. The only contextual feature achieving statistical significance is the assistance provided by political party organizations. With such a large number of null findings, the question really becomes, why don't these factors play a role?
There seem to be two possible explanations. One is simply that the indicator utilized to measure information acquisition is flawed. The questions used to tap into this concept may be problematic. However, these questions were chosen because many candidates during the course of semi-structured interviews described their collection of information with such phrases as “analyzing past voting trends in the district” and “maintaining a database of voters”. The second possible explanation (and the more likely option) is that that these types of activities are very general activities that many candidates use. Many fewer candidates probably engage in advanced aspects of information gathering such as extensive polling. Some of the factors discussed probably differentiate candidates on these more advanced forms of information gathering and usage. However, future studies will have to address these issues.

One area investigated here which does show promise has to do with the effects of other campaign-level variables. While the addition of factors such as total spending, organization features (strength and professionalism), and use of consultants does not explain a large percentage of the variance, the statistical significance of these factors leads to the conclusion that they are more important than candidate-level or district-level features for information gathering. This would indicate that deliberative efforts on the part of those in charge of the campaign in deciding whether or not to have a strong organization or to hire a professional consultant can have an effect on other campaign-level factors such as information gathering.

An interesting finding regarding the influence of spending is that spending in and of itself is not as important as what the spending is used to purchase. In those equations
where spending is run simultaneously with factors such as organizational strength, organizational professionalism, and consultant use, it becomes statistically insignificant while what the spending purchases often retains its level of significance. This would appear to support the notion that choices in how money is allocated on such internal activities can have a direct influence on other aspects of the campaign.

Finally, these results indicate a role for political parties which previous studies of parties themselves have mostly only alluded to. Findings show that candidates who report greater assistance from parties in the campaign effort are those which have higher rates of information gathering in general election campaigns. Several studies in recent years indicate how parties have become more service oriented entities and this is clearly evident from the role they provide in information acquisition. Such assistance results in candidates knowing more about voters in their constituency.

Conclusions and Implications

Below are listed several key findings provided in this chapter along with a discussion of some of their implications.

- A high percentage of state legislative candidates gather information as part of their overall campaign effort. High percentages of candidates of various types and across various states report analyzing past voting patterns in the district and maintaining a database of voters.
- Candidates for the state legislature do not depend greatly on political consultants for assistance. Relatively few candidates in any state report hiring a professional consultant. Political parties play a somewhat larger, though, still limited role. The most important role of parties (from the perspective of candidates) is in their ability to supply survey information, demographic data, and lists of voters.

- While information acquisition appears to consume relatively small amounts of a campaign's total budget, level of spending does have an influence on the extent of information gathering. The level of resources utilized by a campaign (measured as total spending per eligible voter) is a consistent and important factor associated with information acquisition in state legislative contests. However, the manner in which this money is allocated seems to matter as well. Campaigns which spend money to build strong and professional organizations as well as hire consultants are more likely to be the campaigns which engage in greater information acquisition.

- Unlike a number of organizational factors examined in the previous chapter, information characteristics of campaigns do not appear to be influenced as greatly by contextual features related to population of the district and legislative professionalism. However, a political contextual feature in the form of assistance provided by party organizations does influence the extent of information usage in general election contests.
This analysis clearly demonstrates that a very large percentage of state legislative campaigns engage in information acquisition. This finding is very different from observations made by John Kingdon several decades ago when he wrote that “[s]tate legislative candidates are relatively cut off from voter attention, direct information about voters, and channels of access to rank-and-file citizens” (1966: p. 138). State legislative candidates and their workers in the 1990s do indeed collect information on voters living in the district as well as analyze past voting trends. The proliferation of computer technology and greater availability and accessibility of information on individual voters may have brought this aspect of “New Politics” to the state legislative setting.

However, not all aspects of the “New Politics” seem to have made their way down to this level. Aspects of the “permanent campaign” that Blumenthal predicted would “permeate politics down to the most remote legislative districts” (1982: p. 26) has clearly not occurred. This is certainly the case regarding use of professional consultants. Only a small percentage of candidates in state legislative races make use of these professionals. Far from taking over the reigns of campaign decision-making, political consultants in the state legislative setting are merely trying to gain a foothold.

Other evidence in this chapter sheds light on the role of parties. There is some evidence that parties have become important actors in the system as service providers to candidates. Forms of information on voters including demographics, election results, and lists are often cited by state legislative candidates as being one of the most helpful roles which parties play. Work by Freidreis, et al. (1994) as well as by Shea (1995) suggesting that parties have taken on a more service-oriented role is supported from these findings.
The results also show that assistance from parties influences the extent of overall information gathering by candidates.

These findings make it possible to evaluate further the question posed in the initial chapter about the role of campaigns in either enhancing or inhibiting representative democracy. What implications do these findings have for evaluating the role of campaigns in the political process? Information gathering is extensive in state legislative campaigns. The good part about this is that it means that candidates who win probably are more aware of the types of voters they represent and have a good idea of the kinds of things they would like their representative to accomplish. The downside is that candidates may simply tell voters what they want to hear through the use of priming and agenda setting. Or, they may use the information to enhance their ability to target only segments of the population to receive tailored messages.

To those who worry more about the imbalance of resources and the ill effects that this has on the process, the findings here should present both solace as well as additional concerns. On one hand it appears that information costs as a percentage of the overall campaign budget are rather small. Candidates do not ordinarily spend a great deal of money on such things, so candidates with various-sized budgets can afford them. However, the results also show how money is strongly associated with information gathering. It seems that money is also related to stronger campaign organizations and use of consultants which result in greater information acquisition.
CHAPTER 6  
Strategies of Voter Contact

Political consultants have yet to develop a chemistry of campaigning. As in the old politics, strategy building more nearly resembles alchemy. The contingencies of each situation, limitations on knowledge, and great numbers of variables make the development of universal rules of campaigning very difficult to formulate.

—Robert Agranoff

Introduction

Once an organization is in place and information has been gathered, campaigns must design a strategy for contacting and mobilizing a segment of the voting population. Campaigns in their most basic form are about creating a winning coalition. Voter contact strategy is the plan for putting together this coalition and consists of three key elements: the voters to be contacted, the messages to be sent, and the method of delivering the message. This chapter considers the first of these strategic components.

Candidates and other political practitioners believe that these strategic decisions can have a significant impact on the election outcome. A poor choice has the potential to doom a campaign from the start. Campaigns with superior levels of resources, organization, and information may falter at the polls if they do not have a workable strategy for contacting voters.

In addition, strategy may have an important influence on the representation process. One aspect of strategy is determining that portion of the electorate to be targeted for contact. Fenno (1978) and others (Gore and Peabody, 1958; Kingdon, 1966) view this as a critical aspect of representative democracy. What parts of the geographic
constituency will become part of a candidate’s “reelection” and “primary” constituencies? It is these voters to whom an elected representative feels beholden and to whom he or she will return for support in the next election. Campaigns are particularly important for candidates who are first elected because this is the period during which the representative-represented relationship is forged.

Some worry about this process of building coalitions in light of technological advances which allow candidates to precisely target certain segments of the population. Selnow (1994), for instance, indicates that modern targeting techniques often result in some voters receiving a great deal of information about candidates while other voters receive very little. This disparity in available knowledge has the potential to be greater in lower level races such as those for the state legislature where media attention is minimal. Such factors would appear to pose a dilemma for representation.

This analysis will proceed by first examining the strategy used by state legislative campaigns. How much targeting takes place and what voters are often the subject or focus of this target? Are the concerns which many have over modern targeting techniques justified in the state legislative setting? What conditions make it so that as many voters as possible are exposed to a candidate’s message?

**Definition of Strategy**

A number of academic scholars as well as political practitioners recognize the central nature of campaign strategy. To have any chance of success, a campaign must have a formulated plan for contacting voters. Gary Jacobson (1992) notes that
"[e]ffective campaigns require a strategy for gathering at least a plurality of votes and the means to carry out that strategy." (p. 63). Joel Bradshaw indicates that "[m]any campaigns never come to grips with the need to determine a basic strategy or theme, and they pay the price at the ballot box" (1995: p. 30).

While there is general agreement that strategy is important, just what "strategy" constitutes is another matter. Shea (1996) says that "[a] review of the literature on modern campaigning suggests little agreement on what strategies are and what they might provide" (p. 159). For some, it involves the choice of a theme or set of issues (e.g., Hurley and Wilson, 1986; Polsby and Wildavsky, 1996; Wayne, 1996). Studies of the presidential nominating process often focus on timing and momentum (e.g., Bartels, 1988). For others, strategy involves the allocation of resources -- how money is spent and what types of voter contact techniques are employed (e.g., Goldenberg and Traugott, 1984). Others look at the strategy of raising money (e.g., Herrnson, 1992 and 1995). For some, the strategy has less to do with the campaign as it does with deciding to run in the first place (Jacobson and Kernell, 1983).

For another group of scholars, strategy involves not one set of choices but several made throughout the campaign process leading up to election day. Strategy involves weighing the costs and benefits associated with various decisions given what is known about the characteristics of the candidate, the opponent(s), and the district voters. Shea defines strategy as, "the prudent consideration of several key elements" (1996: p. 159). He goes on to say that "there are no cookbook recipes for what works and what does not" (159). Maisel (1982) notes that "[n]o magic formula exists" (p. 93). He further
comments that "[w]hat is successful in one congressional primary might be totally
inappropriate in a primary in the neighboring state or even in the same district in another
year. Many candidates have failed by copying carefully a strategy that worked
marvelously in another place at another time" (p. 93). Strategy involves using available
information to make a variety of choices at different points throughout the campaign
process.

The strategies associated with the organization and information acquisition have
been considered at some length in previous chapters. The focus of this chapter is on the
strategy used to form a coalition of voters. The perspective here is similar to that
articulated by Joel Bradshaw who says that:

[a] campaign's strategy is simply a definition of how you
will win. It answers the following questions: Who will vote
for you, and why will they do it? The principles of a sound
strategy are the same whether the candidate is running for
a seat on the school board or for the presidency of the

Candidates and campaign decision makers are viewed as rational actors working within
the constraints of a given political environment who possess varying abilities and levels
of information. The goal of this analysis is to determine the types of strategies used by
candidates running for the state legislature under a variety of circumstances. In addition,
we want to know how conditions of the district along with characteristics of the candidate
influence the type of strategy which is implemented.
Which Voters Will Be Contacted?

Traditional democratic theory holds that campaigns provide a choice to voters. Two or more candidates compete for an office by appealing for support within the electorate. Through these appeals, voters are provided with information on a variety of topics including the candidate's party affiliation, issue positions, and personal qualities. However, what is often omitted from this perspective is the effort made on the part of candidates as they attempt to appeal to voters in the district. It is often assumed that candidates make appeals which are directed at as many voters as possible. But in reality this is generally not the manner in which campaigns operate.

Goldenberg and Traugott (1984) state what many campaign professionals would consider to be an obvious point, but what is often lost on those who study elections: "campaigns are not intended to reach every voter" (p. 47). They indicate that campaigns are about identifying voters in a district who a candidate feels would be willing to provide support. Shea (1996) echoes this point in saying that "[s]ophisticated campaigns amass a clear understanding of the prior voting history of a district, and from this information strategic decisions are made -- not the least of which are the areas to concentrate on and the areas to leave alone" (p. 72).

A number of books written in what is best described as the "how-to" genre advise candidates to direct their effort and resources toward those areas of the district where they will do the most good (Golden, 1996; Simpson, 1996; Shea, 1996). There is no use wasting resources contacting voters who are not likely to vote or, even worse, contacting voters who are likely to cast their ballot for the opposition. Recounting his experiences
as a state legislative candidate, Tom Loftus sums up what many who practice politics say about this aspect of strategy:

_The crux of the campaign for [the] state legislature is to find likely voters and persuade a majority of them to vote for you. Some think elections to the state legislature are won or lost based on a candidate’s stand on the issues. In most cases they are wrong. The winning campaign is usually the one which, after finding the right pool of voters, identifies supporters and then drags them out to the polls (1994: p. 13)._ 

There are two reasons why campaigns generally do not try to appeal to all voters within a constituency. One, alluded to by Goldenberg and Traugott, has to do with the “finite resources” (1984: p. 47) generally available to campaigns. There are only so many volunteers, so much time, and so many dollars to spend. It is therefore important to target resources where they will have the intended effect. There is no use trying to persuade voters who are un-persuadable.

A second reason for not attempting to contact the entire constituency is that it has the potential to mobilize segments of the population who are likely to vote for the opponent(s). Loftus says of those voters predisposed to cast ballots for the opponent: “care is taken not to spend money on them or inadvertently remind them there is an election in the offing” (1994: p. 13). This strategy of “letting sleeping dogs lie” is a well-understood strategy among the politically savvy (Shea, 1996).

This idea of contacting only segments of the voting population who are likely to respond favorably to a campaign’s message is often referred to as targeting. Some consider this a new type of campaign technique that has dramatically changed the manner in which campaigns are waged. Shea (1996) contrasts the old-style method of
campaigning with the new using the analogy of the “shotgun” and the “rifle”. With the old style “shotgun” approach, Shea indicates that “[t]he candidate’s message would be spread out over the electorate in a broad, imprecise way. The goal was to reach as many people as possible (not necessarily voters) and to stress either partisan-based appeals or the concerns of most voters” (p. 8). However, new style techniques emphasize a more “rifle” oriented approach whereby messages are tailored and delivered to specific types of voters living in the district. A number of studies have noted the changes in voter contact strategies utilized in campaigns, often likening the move from “broad-casting” to “narrow-casting” of messages (Jewell and Olson, 1988; Salmore and Salmore, 1985; Selnow, 1994).81

In an overview of modern campaign strategies, Bradshaw (1995) and Shea (1996) indicate that this method of grouping voters based on their probability of voting for the candidate is a basic strategy utilized in most campaign endeavors. It boils down to decisions about “reinforcing, persuading or converting” voters (Shea, 1996, p. 160).82 This choice of strategy is determined in part by the percentage of voters who are considered to be likely supporters, swing voters, or supporters of the opposition. For example, in a district where most voters are likely to support your candidate, effort should be placed mostly on reinforcing existing support. In situations where there are a number of swing voters (who strongly support neither candidate), campaigns should try to persuade. Finally, candidates running in districts where a majority of voters support the opponent (challengers typically), campaigns have little choice but to try converting voters to have any chance of winning.
Recent literature on political party organization activity has examined the extent of party targeting. A study by Huckfeldt and Sprague in particular (1992) looks at reported party contacting by voters to infer strategies utilized by the parties. They find that party contact strategy is focused mainly on mobilizing supporters. It appears that voters who have a history of voting in primaries have a greater likelihood of being contacted by a party during the general election campaign. For example, the percentage of reported contacts by parties was 25% for respondents who had never voted in a primary, but was 40% among other respondents. In addition, Huckfeldt and Sprague also find that the probability of contact varies based on where the voter lives. Voters living in neighborhoods with a history of support for a particular party have a greater likelihood of being contacted by that party. Overall, Huckfeldt and Sprague (1992) establish the presence and effectiveness of party contacting strategy. Party mobilization efforts are indeed directed at voters who have supported them in the past and this targeting strategy has an impact on the percentage of votes they receive.

In a related study, Wielhouwer (1995) also examines the canvassing efforts utilized by political parties and finds similar results: “people who are registered or who are previous voters are significantly more likely to be contacted by both parties than non-voters” (p. 231). In addition, he finds that the ability of parties to target individuals with specific characteristics has increased over time. He attributes this finding to the “technological innovation in their targeting efforts” (p. 230).

These studies clearly indicate some of the important factors which enter into the calculus of party strategy. But what about the strategic considerations made by
candidates? The strategy of deciding which voters to contact and which to leave alone has been of particular interest to those who study presidential election campaigns. Due to the rules surrounding the accumulation of electoral college votes, these races provide an excellent venue for the study of strategy. Unlike other contests where the goal is to win some plurality of the overall vote in a constituency, the objective in presidential contests is to win a plurality in a series of state contests. Only by winning the most votes in a given state can a candidate win any of that state’s electoral votes. Popular votes won in states where a candidate is not the plurality winner are, in effect, wasted. Such rules lead to a situation where campaign decision-makers “triage” the states. States deemed unwinnable are generally not visited by a candidate and little money is spent there. Candidates also spend little time and money in those states where they are far ahead. Instead, most of the campaign effort is expended in toss-up states where the outcome is in doubt.83

Unfortunately, studies of strategy below the presidential level are generally not as theoretically or as methodologically developed. The primary reason for this is that it is much more difficult to determine which voters are being targeted in campaigns given that voters in most districts are not contained within such parsimonious units as states. Yet, this does not mean that it is impossible to study strategy on levels other than the presidential level, it simply means that the challenges of observing these strategies are somewhat greater. There is no reason to believe that the strategies utilized by candidates and campaign decision makers in congressional or state legislative campaigns are any different from the strategies utilized by presidential candidates. Such contests are just as
John Aldrich (1980) describes presidential primary campaigns: "[t]he dynamics of the campaign [] are not mechanistic. Rather, they are manipulable, and they are manipulable by rational, goal-seeking candidates (p. 180). But, instead of appealing to voters in particular states as a way of forming a coalition, candidates in other races direct their attention at voters who have certain characteristics or who live in particular areas of a constituency.

Goldenberg and Traugott (1984), have examined targeting behavior on the part of candidates in the congressional setting. They find that 28% of congressional candidates responding to their survey planned to target only their supporters, 32% said that independents were their primary target, and 40% planned to try converting voters who normally sided with the opposing party (p. 47). These definitions conform rather well to the reinforcement, persuasion and conversion strategies delineated by Shea (1996).

Herrnson’s (1995) analysis of targeting in congressional campaigns considers the fact that candidates often target groups based on factors other than partisanship or issue and ideological concerns. He takes a much broader look at targeting by examining how factors such as occupation, issue position, and geography affect candidate targeting. He finds that there is often wide variation across districts and candidate types with regard to coalition formation.

Decisions by candidates about whether or not to target, the types of voters who are included in the target, and the size of the electoral coalition have important implications for representative democracy. Targeting only segments of the voting population for contact presents a dilemma for representation because not every potential
voter is mobilized or extended the same level of information. This problem is exacerbated in contests for lower-level offices such as the state legislature where other sources of information such as the news media are generally absent. Information received by most voters in state legislative races is information that candidates for these offices usually want voters to receive. If campaigns are only seeking to mobilize segments of the population, then large portions of the public will not be part of this process.

This dilemma is not unlike other dilemmas which confront representative government. For example, many studies over the years report that individual level characteristics such as education and wealth strongly influence rates of participation (Verba and Nie, 1972; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980). Such differential rates of participation result in a bias where the more educated and more wealthy voters have a greater voice in government. Similarly, campaigns which target particular types of voters in the district may also create a bias whereby only those voters who are mobilized or who are provided information have the ability to affect election outcomes (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993, suggest this).

An investigation of those factors which influence the extent of targeting also has implications for evaluating modern campaign practices. Many contend that the prevalence of resources such as money is detrimental to the electoral process because they result in the use of modern techniques such as targeting. This analysis will investigate the possibility of such an influence. In addition, the analysis will also
consider the possibility that greater financial resources may actually enhance democratic
government by leading to the creation of larger electoral coalitions.

**Aspects of Strategy to be Examined**

This chapter considers several aspects of voter contact strategy. First, to what extent do candidates become involved with targeting segments of the population? Targeting is considered by many to be a recent or "modern" aspect of electioneering and its use may not be pervasive. Kingdon (1966), for example, finds that candidate appeals to "groups" within the electorate are not universal. About 44% of candidates in his sample report making no group appeals (p. 116). One of the first questions to address, therefore, is the prevalence of targeting by candidates running for the state legislature. In addition, what is responsible for the fact that some candidates target while others do not? Explanations related to candidate characteristics, campaign-level features, and district conditions will be examined.

A second area of interest has to do with the types of voters who are made part of the coalition. Similar to the perspective utilized by Kingdon (1966) and Herrnson (1995), the focus will be on the groups of voters which candidates are attempting to reach. Are these groups primarily partisan coalitions similar to those found among political party organizations (Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1992; Wielhouwer, 1995)? Or, given the decreasing partisanship in the electorate, do we find that issue-based or demographic-based grouping strategies are more often the norm? How do these grouping strategies
vary by election period? Most studies address this question of targeting in general
election contests, but what might these coalitions look like in primary elections?

A third aspect of strategy involves those factors which influence the type of
coalition which candidates are attempting to form. Why is it that candidates target some
portions of the electorate and not others? To answer this question, we focus specifically
on the segment of the partisan coalition candidates are attempting to reach in the general
election. Borrowing from Shea’s phraseology (1996), the question becomes: Are
candidates trying to reinforce, persuade, convert, or some combination of the three?
Whichever choice candidates make will probably have an influence on the size of the
coalition. Such strategies will certainly have an influence on who receives information
about the candidates.

**Strategies in State Legislative Campaigns**

*Extent of Targeting*

Do state legislative candidates target voters? Many candidates in 1994 mentioned
aspects of targeting as they described other parts of their campaign. For example, some
candidates noted that one of the first things they did after deciding to run was to send
letters to friends, relatives, and acquaintances to announce their candidacy and to ask for
future support. The names of these individuals often grew from the candidate’s own
Christmas cart list. Fenno would probably describe this as targeting one’s “personal
constituency” (1978).
Targeting is probably very different in the primary than in the general election. Candidates in primaries are trying to reach a very limited segment of the citizenry -- fellow partisans. In closed primary states where citizens can only vote for one party's candidates, it makes little sense for candidates to contact voters who generally participate in the opposing party's primaries. In some states where partisan registration is required, voters are only allowed to vote in their own party's primary. Such a context dictates that candidates target only fellow partisans. To do otherwise would be a waste of resources.

General election contestants contend with a somewhat different set of circumstances than those faced by primary candidates. While they too are trying to contact only those voters who are likely to participate, the electorate in general elections is usually much larger and more heterogeneous than the primary electorate. Therefore, precise targeting of voters in the general election is not nearly as critical as it is in primary contests. For these reasons, then, it is expected that targeting of voters is probably more likely in primaries than in general elections.

Figure 6.1 displays the percentage of candidates by state in primary and general elections who indicated that their campaign targeted voters. As the bar in the middle of the graph representing the average shows, about 77% of voters in the primary and 70% in the general election reported targeting voters. Chi-square tests reveal that this difference across election periods is statistically significant (p=.030). Because the pool of potential voters in primaries is generally much smaller than the pool of potential voters in general elections, targeting is much more frequent in primaries.
Figure 6.1
Percentage of Campaigns that Target Specific Types of Voters in Primary and General Elections in 1994
In addition to variation across election types, Figure 6.1 shows that targeting also varies across states. The percentage of candidates who target is lowest in Wyoming with only 62% in the primary and 54% in the general election. The percentage reporting such activity is highest in Delaware with 92% in the primary and 82% in the general election. Institutional variations among the state legislatures may be partly responsible for these differences. As with many other aspects of campaigning, the more “modern” techniques are used less often by candidates running for the citizen legislature (Wyoming) while they are used more frequently by those running in the state with the professional legislature (Illinois). Chi-square tests show that these differences across the three levels of professionalism are statistically significant only in the primary election (p<0.05).\textsuperscript{86}

Targeting is therefore a frequently used technique among candidates running for the state legislature where nearly three-quarters of candidates make use of it. The question now becomes, why do some use it while others do not? The type of election apparently plays a role, and some support for institutional differences has been found. But what other factors might also be having an influence?

\textit{Factors Influencing Targeting}

A number of factors are expected to influence the likelihood that a candidate for the state legislature will target voters. Candidate characteristics that may be partially responsible include status of the candidate and previous political experience. Incumbent candidates are more likely to engage in targeting due to their established “re-election
constituency” (Fenno, 1978). Challengers or open seat contenders have not had time to
develop such a political following.

Another potential candidate-level factor specific to challenger and open seat
candidates is political experience. We may find those who possess greater political
experience are more familiar with modern forms of electioneering such as targeting.

Several district-level and state-level factors may also influence the likelihood that
a campaign will target voters. Greater electoral competition is likely to lead to greater
targeting as candidates try allocating their resources in the most efficient manner
possible. Targeting messages to specific types of voters is one way to accomplish this.
District population is also a factor to consider. Targeting is probably more likely in those
districts with larger populations simply because it is more difficult to reach all the voters.
In very small districts it may be possible to contact everyone, but in very large districts
with several hundred thousand voters, contact with each is prohibitive. Finally,
legislative professionalism is expected to play a role. While the effectiveness of this
variable was earlier established in primary elections, it has not been tested alongside
many other factors. Does this hold up when controls for other important variables have
been included?

A series of campaign-level variables will also be considered. As previous
chapters have shown, higher levels of spending are often associated with greater use of
modern forms of voter contact. It is therefore likely that here too we find spending
correlated with the likelihood of targeting. In addition, two other campaign-level features
are considered -- information gathering and use of consultants. It is expected that
campaigns which engage in greater information gathering will be more likely to target voters because these are the campaigns which possess the ability to do so. Collecting and analyzing data on voters in the district makes it possible to determine where potential support lies. In addition, those campaigns utilizing the assistance of professional consultants may be more likely to target. These professionals have access to information and are familiar with this modern technique of campaigning.

In order to test the effects of these different variables on the probability that a candidate will target (a dichotomous dependent variable), it is necessary to utilize a logistic regression equation which takes the following form:

\[
TARGET = a + b_1 ELECEXP + b_2 PARTYEXP + b_3 PARTY + b_4 SPEND + b_5 COMP + b_6 POP + b_7 PROF - b_8 CITIZEN + b_9 INFOR + b_{10} CONSULT + e
\]

Where:

\[
TARGET = \text{A dichotomous variable indicating whether or not the campaign targeted voters (Calculated separately for the primary and general election periods, 1=target and 0=not target).}
\]

And the following independent variables:

\[
ELECEXP = \text{Electoral Experience. The variable can take a value of 0, 1, or 2 (0=never run for elective office; 1=run for elective office but have not won; 2=won elective office).}
\]

\[
PARTYEXP = \text{Political Party experience. The variable can take a value of 0, 1, or 2 (0=no involvement with the party; 1=any involvement but no leadership role; 2=leadership role in the party).}
\]
PARTY  =  A control variable for party (Democrat=1 and Republican = 0).

SPEND  =  Total campaign spending per eligible voter in the district.

COMP  =  Anticipated Electoral Competition. In the general election this is measured as a dichotomous variable (1 or 0) with 1 indicating races which are close (the margin between the candidates is less than 20 points). In the primary election this is measured as the number of candidates running.

POP  =  Total number of the district’s eligible voters.

PROF  =  A dichotomous variable indicating a professional legislature (Illinois=1, all other states =0).

CITIZEN  =  A dichotomous variable indicating a citizen legislature (Wyoming=1, all other states =0).

INFOR  =  Extent of information gathering. This is a trichotomous variable. Candidates who neither analyze previous election results nor collect data on voters receive a “0”. Those who only engage in one of these activities receive a “1” while those who do both receive a “2”. Values for this variable can therefore be 0, 1, or 2.

CONSULT  =  The candidate hired a professional consultant to assist in the campaign effort (1=hired a consultant; 0=did not hire a consultant).

Separate models for each dependent variable were run for incumbents, challengers, and open seat candidates for both the primary and general election periods.

The results are listed in Table 6.1. The sign (either “+” or “-” ) is given for each coefficient that is statistically significant at the .05 level or higher. An “O” appears where the coefficient fails to achieve this level of statistical significance.
Table 6.1
Logistic Regression Analysis of Factors Influencing the Probability of a Candidate Targeting Voters in Primary and General Election Contests*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>General</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Incumbents</td>
<td>Challengers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Experience</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Experience</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spending</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Comp.</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Population</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen Legislature</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Legislature</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Gathering</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultant Usage</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| N= | 36 | 65 | 151 | 131 | 181 | 126 |

*The direction of the coefficient is displayed for all statistically significant relationships at the .05 level or better.
As one can see, few of the variables are statistically significant. None of the candidate-level characteristics appear to be important -- previous political experience, previous party experience, and party identification all fail to achieve statistical significance. In addition, population of the district (a district-level variable) and use of professional consultants (a campaign-level variable) are also statistically insignificant in each equation.

Marginal support at best is found for the remaining variables. For example, competition is statistically significant only among open seat contenders in the primary and among incumbents in the general election. Legislative professionalism is not very important. It seems that incumbents in general elections are less likely than those in more professional legislatures to engage in targeting, however, this is the only dummy (out of the possible 12 in the equation) to be statistically significant. Finally, spending per eligible district voter is statistically significant only among open seat contenders in the general election.

Information gathering seems to be the only variable of consequence in these equations. Those candidates who collect information on voters and analyze past voter trends have a higher probability of targeting voters. This variable is a fairly consistent predictor, failing to achieve statistical significance only in the equations for incumbents and challengers in the primary.

A slightly different perspective on the effects of these variables can be observed in Table 6.2 which displays the results of similar logistic regression analyses. Unlike the equation results reported in Table 6.1, here all the candidate types are run simultaneously
for each election period. These equations are different only by their exclusion of the political experience variables (which were not statistically related to targeting) and the inclusion of controls for incumbent and open seat contestants. These results make it possible to observe the magnitude of the coefficients by calculating the associated probabilities for changes in each independent variable.

These results confirm earlier findings which show that few of the variables are statistically significant. Here we find that information gathering is positively related to targeting in both election periods. In the primary equation, the only other statistically significant variable is electoral competition. In the general election, spending per eligible voter is positively associated with targeting while the presence of a citizen legislature is negatively related. All the other variables in these two equations fail to achieve statistical significance.

What is most interesting about this table is the associated change in probability for each beta coefficient. For the dichotomous variables in both equations, this represents a change from 0 to 1. For the continuous variables (spending and population) and one of the categorical variables (number of candidates running in the primary) this represents a change in one standard deviation below to one standard deviation above the mean for that variable. The change shown in the information variable represents the change from no analysis of past voting trends or database maintenance to both forms of information gathering (0 to 2). Such a perspective makes it possible to observe the magnitude of each variable's effect on the probability of targeting voters.
Table 6.2
Logistic Regression Analysis of Factors Influencing the Probability of a
Candidate Targeting Voters in Primary and General Election Contests
(Un-standardized regression coefficients)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>General</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>Probability</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.1676**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent</td>
<td>0.1554</td>
<td>0.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Seat</td>
<td>0.0092</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>-0.0602</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spending</td>
<td>0.4431</td>
<td>0.082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Comp.</td>
<td>0.5713*</td>
<td>0.308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>0.00001</td>
<td>0.346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prof. Legislature</td>
<td>0.3413</td>
<td>0.083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen Legislature</td>
<td>0.0094</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Gathering</td>
<td>0.8362***</td>
<td>0.323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultant Usage</td>
<td>0.5303</td>
<td>0.126</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N= 252  419
% Correctly Predicted 80.00%  76.13%
Mean of the Dep. Var. 77%  70%
The probabilities associated with each significant variable show that every one has a substantial impact. A primary candidate running in a district where there are three other primary candidates has about a 31 percentage point higher probability of targeting voters than a candidate who faces only one opponent. In the general election we see that general election candidates who spend about $0.02 per eligible voter have a 22 percentage point lower probability of targeting than those who spend about $1.77 per eligible voter. Candidates running in a citizen legislature (Wyoming) have about a 14 percentage point lower probability of targeting than candidates running in a more professional legislature.

The biggest and most consistent factor influencing the probability of targeting, though, is the extent of information gathering. Candidates in the primary who both analyze data on past voting trends and maintain a database of voters have a 32 percentage point higher probability of targeting than those candidates who engage in neither activity. In the general election, information gathering has an even larger impact. Here candidates who use both types of information gathering have approximately a 48 percentage point higher probability of targeting voters than those candidates who use neither.

Overall, these results indicate that the likelihood of targeting is influenced less by conditions outside the campaign process such as district-level factors as they are by factors associated with the campaign itself. Decisions about gathering and analyzing information especially have a substantial impact on the probability that a candidate will target voters.
Types of Voters Targeted in State Legislative Campaigns

Most candidates have an idea of the types of voters they are trying to reach. When queried about this targeted group of voters, candidates and managers will often provide a description of what they consider to be their typical supporter. They will often speak of these voters in terms of their partisan affiliation, level of education, occupation, approximate income, and location in the district.

Ideas about one's potential coalition -- the "types of people who are likely to support me" -- can often be a factor in other aspects of the campaign. For example, one candidate indicated that she was targeting women. She therefore stressed women's related issues and made contacts with women's groups throughout the district for support. Another candidate said that he was targeting mostly older or retired voters and this had an impact on his method of voter contact. He chose to canvass neighborhoods during the early afternoon after lunch when these types of voters would be most receptive to a visit.

A conservative candidate in Texas mentioned how he hoped to attract the support of conservative Christians. This was the impetus for his forging strong ties with the Christian Coalition early in his campaign.

These stories suggest that candidates often think in terms of groups. What characteristics of voters are most often the ones candidates use in their targeting? Is party the preeminent grouping factor? Or are other factors consequential? How might these groupings vary by election? A portion of the survey includes a section where candidates were provided a list of voter characteristics and asked to mark and rank those characteristics which best defined the types of voters targeted by their campaign. These
characteristics are divided into three types — party groupings, demographic groupings, and issue groupings in addition to a catch-all “other” groupings category. Table 6.3 provides the percentages of candidates who marked voters in these categories.

The most common characteristic shared by targeted voters involves their partisanship. About three-fourths of both primary and general election candidates reported that fellow party supporters were part of the targeted audience. Following close behind were voters interested in certain types of issue concerns. About 64% in the primary and 69% in the general election indicated that these voters were part of the target audience. The next largest group included voters living in certain geographic areas. About 57% of primary voters and about 48% of general election candidates marked this response.

Other groupings were of much less concern to candidates. Opponents’ party supporters were seldom targeted, only 6% in the primary and 17% in the general. Voters of a certain social or economic status were targeted by a larger number of candidates, with about 25% in the primary and 18% in the general election indicating a response. Voters of a certain racial or ethnic group were mentioned at fairly similar rates (24% in the primary and 13% in the general). Finally, other groupings were mention by 13% of primary candidates and by about 7% of general election candidates. These groupings generally included voters interested in a specific issue.

One of the most interesting findings from Table 6.3 is the percentage of candidates marking the category called “Voters likely to Spit Their Ticket or Vote Independently”. About 27% of candidates indicated that these types of voters were part
Table 6.3
Characteristics In Common to Voters Targeted by Campaigns in
Primary and General Election Contests
(Percentage Mentioning Each)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voter Grouping</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>General</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Party Groupings</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your party's supporters</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opponents' party supporters</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ticket-splitters and Independent Voters</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Demographic Groupings</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voters of a particular social/economic status</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voters of a Particular Racial/ethnic group</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voters living in certain geographic areas</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Issue Groupings</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voters interested in particular issues</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other groupings</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N= 192 301

Shaded areas indicate there is a statistically significant difference between the percentages in primary and general elections (chi-square significance at the .05 level or better).
of their target in primaries while 71% indicated such voters were part of their general
election target. The targeting of independent voters would appear to be an indication that
many candidates are utilizing a strategy of persuasion.

These results show the prominence that party plays in the targeting strategy of
candidates for the state legislature, but this should not be taken to mean that other voter
groupings are unimportant. On the contrary, it is quite clear that geography and issue
concerns rank high in targeting strategies. For example, voters interested in certain issues
rank nearly as high as the candidate’s own party supporters in general election contests
(69% to 76% respectively). More importantly, those voters who are least committed to a
particular party (ticket-splitters and independents) are mentioned almost as often as party
supporters in general election contests (72% to 76%).

It should also recognized that some of these voting groups may be more important
for some candidates than for others. Take for instance the race or ethnicity of the voters.
We might expect that minority candidates in particular would be interested in mobilizing
minority voters. If we examine candidates separately based on their race or ethnicity we
find that minority candidates target these groups at a much higher rate than non-minority
candidates. These differences are extraordinarily large in the primary where 15% of
Anglo candidates mention the race and ethnicity category while 63% of blacks, 50% of
Asians, and 75% of Hispanic candidates do.

The shaded cells in Table 6.3 denote a statistically significant difference between
the percentage of candidates marking each particular category in the primary and general
elections. Of the eight choices provided, all but two are statistically significant (chi-
square p value equals 0.05 or better). This lends support to the idea that targeting varies by election period. As we might expect, general election candidates more so than primary candidates target opponents' party supporters and independent voters. We also find that primary candidates are more likely than general election candidates to target voters based on socio-economic status, race or ethnicity, geographic location, or some other characteristic. These findings indicate that primary candidates do not have the convenience of a party label so they must forge coalitions based on other criteria.

The analysis shows so far the number of candidates who indicate that each of these voter groupings is important, but they do not indicate how important they are relative to the others. For example, voting targets may indeed include voters who are interested in particular issues, but this may not be the most important grouping. In order to determine the relative importance of targeting, candidates were asked to rank order the targeted groups of voters.

Table 6.4 displays the percentage of candidates who chose each voter category as their first, second, or third choice. By far, the first choice among respondents in both primary and general election periods is a candidate's own party supporters. Nearly half of primary candidates (49%) and about 38% of general election candidates ranked political party as the most important characteristic which targeted voters had in common. Other grouping of voters came in behind party with voters interested in certain issues chosen by 23% as the first choice of primary voters and ticket splitters by 27% of general election contestants.
Table 6.4
Characteristics Common to Voters Targeted by Campaigns in Primary and General Election Contests
Ranked By Order of Importance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voter Grouping</th>
<th>1st</th>
<th>2nd</th>
<th>3rd</th>
<th>1st</th>
<th>2nd</th>
<th>3rd</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Party Groupings</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your party’s supporters</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opponents’ party supporters</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ticket-splitters and Independent Voters</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any Party Group</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Demographic Groupings</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voters of a particular social/economic status</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voters of a particular racial/ethnic group</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voters living in certain geographic areas</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any Demographic Group</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Issue Groupings</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voters interested in particular issues</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other groupings</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N= 112 102 97 202 201 198
If we compare the percentage ranking any of the party groupings or demographic groupings we see that party groupings are predominant among the first choices, though more so in the general election than in the primary. For example, in primaries we find that 54% of candidates ranked a party grouping first while only 19% ranked a demographic grouping first. The differences are even greater in the general election where 69% of general election candidates ranked a party grouping first while only 12% ranked a demographic grouping as number one. Issue groupings were actually ranked first more often than those ranking demographic groupings in both election cycles.

For the most part the findings in Table 6.4 corroborate those from Table 6.3. Party is the most important factor in targeting strategy, followed by independent voters in the general election and issue positions and geography in both primary and general elections.

What are candidates trying to accomplish as they target different types of voters in the district? We see that candidates most often use partisanship as a mechanism for creating a strategy of voter contact, but what is their ultimate strategic goal? Are they trying to reinforce, persuade, or convert? These strategies are as likely to be present in primaries as they are in general election contests, however, such strategies are probably more clearly visible in general election contests where voters are grouped more often according to partisan affiliation. For these reasons, further questions regarding the size of the targeted coalition are restricted to the general election setting.
Factors Influencing the Size of the Electoral Coalition

A number of factors are expected to have an influence on the size of the electoral coalition which candidates attempt to form in general elections. However, no factor is probably as important to this aspect of strategy than the level of competition in the district.

In their analysis of congressional campaigns, Goldenberg and Traugott (1984) find that uncertainty of the election outcome generally leads to broader targeting strategies. As Kingdon (1966) indicates, candidates who feel secure that they will win tend to “concentrate on bolstering the support they already enjoy: they appeal to the groups in their coalitions, they campaign in their strong areas and neglect their weak areas,” while vulnerable candidates “tend to go to their areas of weakness more than secure candidates” (p. 133). It is therefore expected that candidates in high competition races will direct greater effort at independent voters and opposing party supporters than those candidates in low competition races. Similarly, candidates in low competition races will direct more of their effort at fellow partisans than candidates in high competition races.

How much effort do candidates direct at supporters, opponents’ supporters, and independent voters in general election contests? In order to measure this, candidates were asked to indicate the amount of effort they directed at each group by assigning a score from a five-point scale ranging from a 1 (no effort) to a 5 (a great deal of effort). The results are displayed in Table 6.5. Because general election competition is expected to
Table 6.5
Effort Directed at Gaining Support of Voting Groups During the General Election by Level of Electoral Competition*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate Type</th>
<th>All Districts</th>
<th>Low Competition</th>
<th>Moderate Competition</th>
<th>High Competition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Your Party Voters</td>
<td>3.92</td>
<td>3.91</td>
<td>3.89</td>
<td>3.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(424)</td>
<td>(430)</td>
<td>(130)</td>
<td>(104)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposing Party Voters</td>
<td>4.20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(425)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Voters</td>
<td>4.20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(425)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Competition is defined as the percentage of the two party vote a candidate received in the 1994 general election. Candidates are divided into the three categories of high competition (received 40 to 60% of the vote), moderate competition (received 30 to 39% or 61 to 70%), and low competition (received 0 to 29% or 71 to 100%). Shaded areas represent a statistically significant difference by columns or rows as determined by analysis of variance tests (at the 0.05 level or better).

Table 6.6
Incumbents, Challengers, and Open Seat Candidate Effort Directed at Gaining the Support of Independent Voters by Level of Electoral Competition*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate Type</th>
<th>All Districts</th>
<th>Low Competition</th>
<th>Moderate Competition</th>
<th>High Competition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incumbents</td>
<td>4.11</td>
<td>3.85</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>4.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(128)</td>
<td>(27)</td>
<td>(41)</td>
<td>(60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challengers</td>
<td>4.21</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.15</td>
<td>4.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(176)</td>
<td>(40)</td>
<td>(62)</td>
<td>(69)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Seat Candidates</td>
<td>4.29</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.14</td>
<td>4.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(121)</td>
<td>(23)</td>
<td>(22)</td>
<td>(76)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Competition is defined as the percentage of the two party vote a candidate received in the 1994 general election. Candidates are divided into the three categories of high competition (received 40 to 60% of the vote), moderate competition (received 30 to 39% or 61 to 70%), and low competition (received 0 to 29% or 71 to 100%). Shaded areas represent a statistically significant difference by columns or rows as determined by analysis of variance tests (at the 0.05 level or better).
play such a large role, the effort scores are further subdivided among candidates who
faced low, moderate, or high levels of competition.

The first column in Table 6.5 indicates the level of candidate effort directed at
each of these three groups of voters regardless of the candidate’s competitive situation. It
appears that general election candidates direct greater effort toward independents
(average score of 4.20) than the other two types of voters. The average effort score for
fellow partisans was 3.92 while the score for the opposing party was substantially lower,
only 2.92. These findings indicate that candidates place most of their effort on persuasion
and reinforcement strategies and less on conversion. Analysis of variance tests confirm
that these differences are statistically significant for candidate in the aggregated category
as well as within each competition category (low, moderate, and high).

Table 6.5 also shows very clearly how the choice of strategy varies by the
competitive nature of the district. Consider first the candidates in low competition races.
We find that these candidates report their greatest amount of effort is directed at their own
partisan supporters (average score of 3.91), somewhat less at independent voters (3.77)
and very little at opposing partisans (2.63, the lowest average score for any category).
Candidates in these races are those who are either far behind or far ahead and pursue a
strategy of reinforcement.

A very different type of strategy is pursued by candidates in races with moderate
and high levels of electoral competition. Here we see candidates attempting to reach
beyond their own partisans to take what is best described as a persuasion strategy as they
appeal to independent voters. For example, among candidates in highly competitive races
we find an average effort score of 4.46 for independent voters, a 3.95 for fellow partisans, and a 2.94 for opposing party voters. There is evidence that some candidates in the moderate and high competition races are also pursuing conversion strategies. We find that opposing party voters receive a score of only 2.63 in low competition races, but among moderate and high competition races the average scores are higher (3.09 in the moderate category and 2.94 in the high category).

Electoral competition, therefore, plays a role in the type of strategy chosen. By examining the changes in the average effort scores in Table 6.5 from left to right one can see that effort directed at all three types of voters is generally higher among candidates in more highly competitive situations. While reported effort direct at “your party voters” changes only slightly and does not achieve statistical significance, the magnitude of the changes in effort toward the other groups is much larger. Effort directed toward voters in the opposing party moves from 2.63 in low competition races to 2.94 in highly competitive ones (although the score is 3.09 in moderately competitive races). But it is among independent voters that we see the most dramatic changes. Candidates in the least competitive races report a score of 3.77 while those in high competition races report 4.46 -- the highest average score for any cell in the table. Analysis of variance tests show that the average scores across levels of competition for effort directed at opposing party voters and independent voters are statistically significant at the 0.01 level or better.

Electoral competition appears to have its greatest effect on the strategy of persuasion. But how well does this relationship hold across candidate types? Do incumbents, challengers, and open seat contestants respond similarly to variations in
competition? Table 6.6 provides some answers to this question by indicating the average scores for effort directed at independent voters for incumbents, challengers, and open seat candidates.

As one can see, for each type of candidate the level of reported effort increases as competition increases. However, only the changes for challengers and open seat contestants are statistically significant. The average score given by challengers ranges from 3.88 in low competition races to 4.46 in high competition races. But it is the scores provided by open seat contenders that appear to be most affected by the competitive situation of the race. In low competition races, open seat contestants report an average score of 3.48 but in high competition races they report an average score of 4.58. Analysis of variance tests show that the variation across levels of competition is statistically significant for both challengers (p=0.002) and open seat contestants (p=0.000).

Another important finding from this table is that effort directed at independent voters does not appear to vary by candidate type. For each category of competition as well as for all the districts together, analysis of variance tests reveal no statistically significant differences across candidate categories. This is interesting because we would expect incumbents in particular to pursue a reinforcement strategy to a greater extent than challengers and open seat contenders given their “reelection constituency” (Fenno, 1978). Yet, this does not appear to be the case. These findings suggest is that it is not so much the status of the candidate that determines their strategy as it is the competitive situation candidates find themselves. However, further tests are needed before such a definitive conclusion can be drawn.
While competition appears to be a factor influencing effort directed at independent voters, what other variables should be considered? In addition, how might these factors also influence the extent of effort directed toward fellow partisans and opposing partisans? Specifically, three sets of variables are expected to influence the amount of effort directed at the three different groups: candidate status, electoral competition, and level of spending.

Incumbents, challengers, and open seat contestants are expected to take somewhat different strategies in contacting voters. Incumbent candidates are likely to take a reinforcement strategy as they attempt to shore up support among fellow partisans. Open seat candidates, on the other hand, are expected to take a more persuasive strategy and focus their efforts at independent voters. Challengers are also expected to take a persuasive strategy, but in addition, they are expected to make an attempt at converting voters from the opposition party.

Again, the effects of competition will be tested. It is expected that high competition will have a positive influence on effort toward opposing party supporters and independent voters. Competition may be negatively associated with effort directed at fellow partisans.

A final variable to be examined is candidate spending. It seems reasonable to expect that those candidates who have more money to spend would also be the candidates who have the ability to target the largest audience. Do we find that campaigns with greater levels of available spending are the ones which direct more effort to all types of voters -- fellow partisans, members of the opposition, and independents alike? Does
greater spending allow candidates to pursue targeting strategies which go beyond simple reinforcement?

The following linear regression equation is used to test the effects of several of these variables on the average effort score provided by the candidates in the general election.

\[
EFFORT = a + b_1INC + b_2OPEN + b_3PARTY + b_4SPEND + b_5COMP + e
\]

Where:

\[
EFFORT = \text{Scale response of the amount of effort directed at the group of voters. The scores can range from 1 to 5.}
\]

And the following independent variables:

\[
\begin{align*}
INC &= \text{A dichotomous variable indicating an incumbent candidate (1=incumbent and 0=not an incumbent).} \\
OPEN &= \text{A dichotomous variable indicating an open seat candidate (1=open seat candidate and 0=not an open seat candidate).} \\
PARTY &= \text{A control variable for party (Democrat=1 and Republican = 0).} \\
SPEND &= \text{Total general election spending per eligible voter in the district.} \\
COMP &= \text{Anticipated Electoral Competition. In the general election this is measured as a dichotomous variable (1 or 0) with 1 indicating races which are close (the margin between the candidates is less than 20 points).}
\end{align*}
\]
The results of the OLS regression equations are reported in Table 6.7. They show that not very much variance in the dependent variables is explained by these factors. The $R^2$ statistics show that the amount of variance explained ranges from a low in the opposing party equation of 0.004 to a high of only .083 in the independent voter equation. Few of the coefficients are statistically significant for any of the three equations.

The most consistent factor associated with effort directed at the different groups appears to be campaign spending. It seems that when campaigns have more money to spend, they direct greater effort not only toward their own party supporters, but also toward independent voters. In other words, they appear to employ a dual strategy -- they are trying to both reinforce as well as persuade. Spending does not appear to have an effect on effort directed toward adherents of the opposing party.

Electoral competition positively influences effort directed at independent voters, but does not affect effort at the other two groups. As the coefficients suggest, in high-competition races candidates allocate much more effort toward independent voters -- about one-half a point on the five-point scale. Electoral competition does not influence the effort directed at one’s own party supporters or effort at the opposing party’s supporters. This suggests that candidates strategically increase their effort in only some areas. When races are more competitive, candidates direct resources where they think they will do the most good -- at influencing independent voters.

Only one of the candidate status variables is statistically significant, incumbent status in the independent voter equation. As we would expect, it is negatively associated with effort directed at independent voters -- evidence that these candidates are more
Table 6.7
Regression Analysis of Factors Influencing the Effort Directed at Different Types of Voters in 1994 General Election Contests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Your Party</th>
<th>Opposing Party</th>
<th>Independent Voters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.6530***</td>
<td>3.0628***</td>
<td>3.9629***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent Candidate</td>
<td>0.1134</td>
<td>-0.1210</td>
<td>-0.1918*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Seat Candidate</td>
<td>0.0841</td>
<td>0.0223</td>
<td>-0.0723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>0.2343**</td>
<td>-0.2515*</td>
<td>0.0169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spending</td>
<td>0.1427**</td>
<td>0.0277</td>
<td>0.1107*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Competition</td>
<td>-0.0732</td>
<td>0.0035</td>
<td>0.4314***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N= 422 415 423
Adjusted R²= 0.027 0.004 0.083
concerned with shoring up support among their fellow partisans. However, the lack of any statistical significance for incumbency in the other two equations or for open seat candidates in any of the equations suggests that candidate status is generally not an important factor.

How can it be that candidate status does not have a major influence on targeting strategy? This finding may mean that the status of the candidate matters less for behavior than the strategic situation in which candidates find themselves. In similar electoral contexts candidates of all types appear to react in a comparable manner. Previous studies which attribute most of the explanation to candidate status have probably not fully considered the influence of electoral competitiveness. Incumbents do typically run in less competitive situations than challengers, for example, and therefore exhibit different targeting strategies. But if we look at incumbents who are in more competitive situations, we see that they adopt strategies similar to those adopted by challenges who face comparable electoral environments.

Finally, candidate partisanship is a statistically significant factor which influences the amount of effort directed at voters. Meant mainly as a control variable, we find that Democratic candidates are more likely to direct effort at their fellow partisans than Republican candidates. Republicans, it seems, direct more effort at candidates of the opposing party than Democratic candidates do. Explanations for these differences are probably associated with the underlying party distributions in the sample of states used in the analysis.
Overall, these results show that strategy is determined less by the status of the candidates than by the electoral environment and available resources. Such findings run counter to our earlier expectations given the activities associated with much of the observed incumbent behavior. While many incumbent candidates do engage mostly in re-mobilizing their political base, this may be due more to their generally low level of competition they face. When they face strong competition they may simply react to the situation like any other candidate would -- by increasing one’s base of support. The same is true with regard to available resources. Those incumbents who have money to spend, allocate it in a way similar to challengers and open seat contestants -- to increase their political base. It may be that these incumbents are spending money in an effort to enlarge their base of support to prepare for a future run at higher office.

The influence of spending on this aspect of strategy would appear to be rather important. Greater funding results in greater numbers of people being contacted by campaigns. Campaigns with few resources direct less effort toward all groups of voters, particularly those who are independent voters. Higher spending leads to the formation of broader electoral coalitions. Far from detracting from representative democracy, these findings would appear to point to the possibility that higher levels of spending may enhance some aspects of democratic government.

Implications and Conclusions

Three important sets of strategic decisions are made in political campaigns: who will be targeted, what message will be sent, and how the message will be delivered. The
first of these three decisions was examined in this chapter. Several key findings result
which have important implications for theories about the role of political campaigns as
well as for how we evaluate the strategic aspects of the campaign process.

- Targeting voters is a common technique employed in modern state legislative
campaigns. Large numbers of candidates in both primary and general election contests
indicate targeting specific types of voters based on the voters’ individual characteristics
and location within the district.

- Several factors are important for explaining the use of targeting by candidates,
however, extent of information gathering appears to be the most consistently important
explanatory variable. More so than experience of the candidate, the level of available
resources, extent of electoral competition, or the institutional setting, information
gathering has a greater impact on targeting. In other words, the strategic decision made
to gather information (a feature internal to the campaign) appears to have a greater impact
on this aspect of strategy than factors related to the political environment (electoral
competition) or resources (funding and experience).

- The party affiliation of voters is a major factor influencing candidates’ strategic
targeting in both primary and general election campaigns. However, independent voters
are nearly as frequently targeted by candidates than fellow partisans in general election
contests. Though less frequently cited, targeting based on voters’ issue concerns and geographic location within the district are also prominent.

- Candidates often use a variety of strategies for contacting voters. Some use reinforcement, others use persuasion, some employ conversion, and still others use combinations of the three. The most important of the three strategies is persuasion in that it generally leads to a large share of voters receiving a candidate’s message. Candidate status has some influence on the extent to which candidates pursue persuasive strategies, however the two most important factors appear to be the extent of electoral competition and total spending by the campaign.

Targeting is an important feature of modern electioneering and is considered by most candidates to be a logical and rather straightforward process. For those who consider targeting a characteristic of modern campaigning, then state legislative contests are certainly modern. However, when we ask candidates about this process, we find that it is very different from the process used in presidential or in some congressional contests. Targeting in state legislative races is very often an un-sophisticated process. For example, candidates obtain a list of registered partisans or previous primary voters from the state election bureau and mail campaign literature to them. In this respect, targeting is not such a technologically advanced activity.

These findings have important implications for literature showing the persistence of partisanship as a determinant of voting in general elections. Most studies have
considered partisanship only on the level of the individual voter without taking into consideration the influence of the political campaign. The findings from this analysis point to the possibility that campaigns may act to perpetuate the influence which partisanship continues to have on the vote. If candidates continue to target based on partisanship, it may reinforce the partisan predispositions of voters. This is probably more true in the state legislative setting where campaigns receive so little media attention.

What implications do these findings have for representative democracy? For those who worry about the bias which results from targeting where some voters are informed while others are not, such concerns may be warranted. Targeting is widely use in the state legislative setting and often results in reinforcing strategies where many “sleeping dogs” are left alone. Such strategies may indeed “undermine the recruitment and socialization of new voters” (Baer, 1995: p. 54).

However, these findings should give solace to those worried about the increasing costs of campaigns. As the results indicate, higher levels of spending are not often correlated with the use of targeting, but are correlated with the amount of effort directed at contacting voters. Candidates who spend more money are also the candidates who attempt to appeal to a wider coalition for support.
Chapter 7
Messages Sent To Voters

Choosing a thematic emphasis is the most fundamental decision candidates and their organizations make.

—Salmore and Salmore

Introduction

This chapter considers a second aspect of campaign strategy -- the messages candidates send to voters. Very little is known about the types of messages candidates use to win support. Studies of state legislative races show that the partisan distribution of voters in a district has a large impact on election outcomes so we might expect partisan appeals to be paramount, particularly in general elections. In primary contests when partisanship is generally not a factor, however, we might assume that candidates emphasize their personal qualities and service to the community. But is this all they emphasize? Are voters informed about issues and policy proposals by candidates? Or do candidates generally concern themselves with projecting a favorable image? How often do candidates send messages (presumably negative ones) about their opponents? Many worry that modern campaigns are increasingly issue-less and negative. How do such descriptions fit state legislative campaigns in the 1990s?

In addition to describing these messages, this chapter will also focus on what is responsible for variations in the messages that are sent. Why is it that candidates send some types of messages and not others? Why is it that some candidates send many messages while others send only a few? Explanations will first be sought in the
differences among candidate types. Do incumbents, challengers, and open seat contestants send different types of messages? How do additional factors such as financial resources and institutional characteristics explain differences in the number of messages sent? For instance, do we find that large levels of resources make it possible for candidates to send more campaign messages than those candidates who possess fewer resources? Is there variation in the types of messages which are sent based on the professionalism of the legislative chamber? For example, are campaign messages sent by candidates running for seats in professional legislatures more likely to have a focus on issues because these institutions are more involved in policy making? Or do such campaigns focus more on candidate personality and image as is often the case in congressional campaigns?

**Messages In Campaigns**

From one perspective, messages are the central elements of any campaign effort, and precede thoughts on the part of candidates about which voters to "target". From another point-of-view, candidates are concerned primarily about winning the election and messages are merely afterthoughts or "bait" used for luring voters. This chapter on messages follows the chapter on targeting and therefore implies the latter perspective. In other words, candidates first decide which voters they need as part of their electoral coalition before fashioning a set of messages that will win their support. Such a process in effect assumes an electorally motivated strategy (similar to Mayhew's perspective, 1974) but does not necessarily obviate a concern for issues. Candidates may indeed care
very deeply about certain issues, for example, but recognize electoral reality and choose to emphasize those messages which they feel will resonate more favorably with the group of targeted voters. For all practical purposes, the choice of message and target are intrinsically linked. The concern of this analysis is not to determine which comes first, but instead to examine both as important elements of the overall campaign process.

A number of studies consider the types of messages sent by campaigns. As just indicated, the campaign message itself is often considered the real “strategy”. Within the academic literature, most effort is focused on examining the reaction of voters to these messages. Much less attention has been given to the messages themselves or why some messages are emphasized more than others.

A variety of approaches have been utilized in examining the way in which voters process these messages and the role they ultimately play in their voting decisions (e.g., Ansolabehere et al., 1994; Bartels, 1988; Franklin, 1991; Just, Crigler, Wallach, 1990; Kelly and Mirer, 1974; Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh, 1989; Popkin, 1991; Rahn, Aldrich, and Gorgida, 1994; Rosenberg, Shawn W., Lisa Bohan, and Patrick McCafferty, 1986; Westlye, 1991). Several of these studies try to decompose the various factors which influence vote choice. For example, many focus on the types of messages which have the greatest effect on voters -- party messages, issue message, or candidate images.

Some studies focus on messages from the perspective of the candidates. These studies generally view candidates as rational actors who attempt to create a favorable image in the minds of voters. Work by Anthony Downs (1957) in particular sets the framework for other studies which model position taking by candidates (e.g., Wright and
Berkman, 1986). A number of studies of presidential campaigns in particular describe
the process by which campaign messages are formulated and become articulated by
candidates (Polsby and Wildavsky, 1996; Wayne, 1996). Often times, these strategies
involve not only the set of issue positions but also the overall image that candidates wish
to project. West (1993), for example, focuses on how television ads are utilized by
presidential candidates to sway voter opinion through techniques of agenda setting and
priming. For the most part, studies view message choice as an integral component of
candidate strategy.

Other studies focus on the messages themselves. Many worry about their lack of
substance and their increasingly negative tone. Jamieson (1984 and 1992) and West
(1993) have given particular attention to analyzing television advertisements in
presidential campaigns. Ansolabehere et al. (1994) examine the variation in use of
negative advertising in U.S. Senate races and find that negativity has the effect of
depressing voter attention and participation.

Messages are important because their contents determine what voters ultimately
know about candidates. Studies comparing the relative effects of paid advertisements and
news coverage of campaigns in the 1970s showed that paid advertisements had a greater
effect on the information held by individuals concerning presidential candidates
(Patterson and McClure, 1976). For campaigns below the presidential level where news
coverage is of little consequence, we may find these messages have an even larger effect.

In some respects, campaign messages are more important today than in the past
due to the waning partisanship among those in the electorate. Voters today are less likely
to base their decisions on long-standing partisan affiliations and more likely to look for other cues, many of which are provided by candidates themselves. Political consultants as well as scholars recognize the importance of messages in providing these cues to voters. Bradshaw (1995), for instance, stresses the notion of a campaign theme and what characterizes a "good" theme (p. 42-46). Shea (1996) indicates that "[t]he selection of the message is just as important as deciding who should receive it" (p. 163). Salmore and Salmore (1985) indicate that "[t]o be successful, a candidate must now set the agenda of the campaign. Setting the agenda means advancing a set of themes or issues that the electorate will find more convincing than the opponent's" (p. 115). Herrnson (1995) notes that "[c]ampaign messages can be an essential ingredient to victory in competitive elections because they have a big impact on the decisions of persuadable voters" (p. 168).

What types of messages are emphasized in legislative campaigns? Many different messages are provided to voters by candidates running for Congress (Goldenberg and Traugott, 1984; Herrnson, 1995; Jacobson, 1992; Salmore and Salmore, 1985; Westlye, 1991). As Jacobson (1992) points out, the types of messages sent by a campaign often vary based on the status of the candidate running. For example, incumbent campaigns are more likely to stress their previous work for the district while challengers will be more likely to stress problems associated with the incumbent. While common wisdom suggests that modern campaigns are more about promoting images than policy issues, recent studies suggest that at least from the candidate's perspective, policy concerns are a large part of their campaign message. Herrnson, for example, finds among House candidates in 1992 that most of these messages have to do with specific policy issues.
(47%), followed by an emphasis on candidate imagery (25%) (1995: p. 170).

Goldenberg and Traugott (1984) find a similar level of emphasis placed on issues in campaigns examined in the late 1970s. For example, they find that “[e]xcept for Sure Winners, many candidates stressed issues as important campaign themes. Therefore, one should not assume that most House candidates avoid discussing issues. Moreover, many candidates appeared to address issues with clarity and in considerable detail” (p. 122-124).

There are relatively few studies about the messages emphasized in state legislative contests. A study of state senate races in Massachusetts in 1968 by Mileur and Sulzner (1974) indicates that about half of the candidates in that race believed issues were important while the other half believed that they were not important. These authors do not investigate other types of messages sent, but find those candidates who mention the importance of issues focus a good bit of time on them. Another study by Kingdon (1966) finds that “party label is believed to be more important and issues less important at the state legislative level than at the higher level” (p. 30). In addition, Kingdon finds that at least among winning candidates, those at the higher level believe that “voters are more politically interested and informed than do winners at the legislative level” (1966: p. 30). Such findings might lead one to expect that campaigns on the state legislative level involve little discussion of policy issues.

However, a great deal has changed in the state setting in recent years. State legislatures have generally become stronger institutions with the capacity to have a greater impact on the lives of state residents. Due to what is often termed the
“Devolution Revolution” (Nathan, 1996), responsibilities for many policies have shifted from the national to the state level. Policy choices may therefore be a greater part of voter decision-making than in the past, encouraging candidates to take stands on policy positions and to run more issue-oriented campaigns.

Because we know so little about the messages sent by candidates for the state legislature, this chapter takes a rather broad perspective on what constitutes a campaign message. The major questions include: (1) What types of messages do candidates emphasize in their campaigns? In other words, what do candidates most want voters to know about them? (2) What factors influence the choice of message? Attention here will be given primarily to variations in candidate-level variables. Finally, (3) What influences the extent to which candidates send messages? What factors associated with the candidate, electoral conditions, and context play a role in the level of information which candidates attempt to convey?

**Choice of Messages**

Candidates for political office have a number of choices about the types of messages they can send. They can send messages which emphasize their position on issues, their personal qualities and achievements, their community service, their past political record, their partisan affiliation, or the inadequacies of their opponent. As indicated by political practitioners and scholars alike, these choices constitute a critical component of strategy.
Each of these messages are of interest in this analysis, but two types are of particular concern. The first is the extent to which issues of policy are stressed by candidates. Many have come to worry that campaigns are devoid of issue appeals. Some studies contend that campaigns for lower level office revolve more around simple name recognition. How important are issue appeals in state legislative contests relative to other types of messages? The second concern is the extent to which messages emphasis the opponents since such messages have a greater potential to be negative. There is debate about whether or not negative campaigning is increasing in American politics. To what extent are negative messages a part of state legislative contests? While we do not have a direct measure of this concept (in part because such a measure from the perspective of the candidate would be highly suspect), we do ask candidates how often they send messages about their opponents. How often are such messages emphasized relative to other messages in state legislative campaigns?

Another aspect of campaign messages involves the factors which influence the sending of messages. Several studies indicate that incumbents, challengers and open seat contestants often send very different types of messages. Of particular note are the differences in incumbent versus challenger contests. Salmore and Salmore (1985) find that “[s]uccessful incumbents run proudly on a record, taking care to preempt negative charges the opposition may raise. Successful challengers make a compelling case against the incumbent, while at the same time giving voters reasons to prefer the challenger” (p. 135). Herrnson makes a similar set of points in saying that “[c]hallengers are especially likely to benefit by emphasizing position issues. By stressing points of disagreement
between themselves and the incumbent, challengers can help their images crystallize, attract media attention, and strip away some of their opponent’s support. Incumbents may not derive the same electoral benefits from running on position issues because they are usually evaluated in personal terms” (1995: p. 172).

Based on these findings from the congressional setting, we expect that incumbents will emphasize their own past records and achievements more so than challengers or open seat candidates. In addition, we expect that challengers and open seat candidates will stress their issue positions more than incumbents. It is also likely that challengers will have more to say about their opponents than other candidates.

Messages Sent in State Legislative Campaigns

Questions concerning campaign messages are often easier to answer than questions about a campaign’s strategy. In conversations with candidates in the midst of their campaign, they are generally much more forthcoming and comfortable discussing these rather “public” aspects of their campaign than they are discussing their strategy. In addition, a great deal of information about messages can be gleaned through reading campaign literature. Information obtained through semi-structured interviews and examinations of campaign literature along with candidate responses to survey questions allows a unique perspective on campaign messages in state legislative elections.
Before examining the types of messages that candidates generally send, it seems appropriate to first understand what candidates believe that voters know or do not know about them. During semi-structured interviews candidates often remarked that voters knew very little about the candidates running or the issues surrounding the race. Primary candidates in particular mentioned that many voters they contacted were not even aware of the impending election. However, not all candidates had such feelings. Incumbents, for example, often expressed the belief that most voters were aware of who they were and the sorts of things they had done for the district. Open seat contenders and challengers, as one would expect, generally had much less confidence in voters’ knowledge. Challengers in particular often mention the simple name recognition problem they experienced when going up against a long-time incumbent.

What information do candidates believe voters have about them prior to the election? Surveyed candidates were asked specifically: “Before the primary and general elections, how much information do you think the average voter had about you in each of the following areas?” Respondents were then asked to indicated for 5 items whether they thought the voters “knew nothing”, “knew some”, or “knew a great deal” about them. The percentage of candidates responding to each of these 5 items are arrayed by candidate type for primary elections in Table 7.1 and for general elections in Table 7.2.
## Table 7.1
What Information Candidates Believed Voters Had About Them
Prior to the Primary Election Campaigns in 1994
(Percentage Indicating Voters Knew Nothing, Knew Some, or Knew A Great Deal)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue Positions</th>
<th>Incumbents</th>
<th>Challengers</th>
<th>Open Seats</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Knew Nothing</em></td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Knew Some</em></td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Knew A Great Deal</em></td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Qualities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Knew Nothing</em></td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Knew Some</em></td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Knew A Great Deal</em></td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Service</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Knew Nothing</em></td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Knew Some</em></td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Knew A Great Deal</em></td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past Political Record</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Knew Nothing</em></td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Knew Some</em></td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Knew A Great Deal</em></td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Affiliation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Knew Nothing</em></td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Knew Some</em></td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Knew A Great Deal</em></td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=</td>
<td>(36)</td>
<td>(64)</td>
<td>(147)</td>
<td>(247)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Shaded areas indicate a statistically significant difference among the candidate types (chi-square test where p<0.05).*
Table 7.2

What Information Candidates Believed Voters Had About Them
Prior to the General Election Campaigns in 1994
(Percentage Indicating Voters Knew Nothing, Knew Some, or Knew Great Deal)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue Positions</th>
<th>Incumbents</th>
<th>Challengers</th>
<th>Open Seats</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Knew Nothing</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knew Some</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knew A Great Deal</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Qualities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knew Nothing</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knew Some</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knew A Great Deal</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Service</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knew Nothing</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knew Some</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knew A Great Deal</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past Political Record</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knew Nothing</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knew Some</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knew A Great Deal</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Affiliation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knew Nothing</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knew Some</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knew A Great Deal</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N= (128) (175) (123) (426)

*Shaded areas indicate a statistically significant difference among the candidate types (chi-square test where p<0.05).
Candidates in both primary and general elections believed that voters had some prior knowledge about them, though, they believed the extent of this information varied. In both election periods, a higher percentage of candidates marked the “knew a great deal” response for party affiliation (50% in the primary and 53% in the general) than for any other category. Fewer candidates marked the “knew a great deal” response for the issue category (19% in the primary and 30% in the general election) than for any other category.

Candidate beliefs about voter knowledge appear to vary by election period. As one can see, a higher percentage of general election candidates than primary candidates report that voters know something about them. If we compare the percentages of candidates across each area who report that voters “knew a great deal” we find that for each of the five areas, the percentages are higher in the general election than in the primary. Chi-square tests indicate that these differences are statistically significant for each area except party affiliation (p=0.05 or better). These findings should not be too unexpected given that many of the general election candidates spend the primary election becoming acquainted with voters.

What is also apparent from these tables is the substantial differences among the different types of candidates. Incumbents much more so than challengers and open seat candidates believe that voters know a great deal about them. For every one of the five areas asked about in both the primary and general elections, a much larger percentage of incumbents reported that voters “knew a great deal” about them than either of the other two candidate types. Challengers were slightly more likely than open seat candidates to
report that voters “knew a great deal” in the primary but were much less likely than open seat candidates to report this in the general election. Overall, chi-square tests conducted on each category of responses (for “knew a great deal”) show that the different responses by candidates are indeed statistically significant at the 0.05 level or better in both election cycles.

These findings would seem to indicate a clear informational advantage for the incumbents. Incumbents widely acknowledge that voters are fairly aware of their party affiliation, their past political record, etc. More than a majority of the candidates for three of the five areas believe that voters “knew a great deal” and hardly any said that voters “knew nothing” about them. It is somewhat surprising that incumbents admit this advantage given previous studies which show that even safe incumbents are insecure about their chances of winning (Cohen, 1984). This apparently indicates that incumbents are aware of how the informational advantage can be a double-edged sword: high levels of information may lead to loyalty, but it may also breed contempt if there are aspects of an incumbent’s record that challengers are capable of exploiting.

What Messages Are They Sending?

Candidates running for the state legislature offer a range of messages to voters. Some candidates emphasize their past accomplishments while others work to tear down their opponent. Some want to stress their work in the party, others rarely mention their party affiliation. Some candidates mention specific policy proposals they want to initiate while others focus much more on their personal qualifications and community service. A
few examples will make clear the range of messages which candidates send during the
course of state legislative campaigns.

An example of a typical incumbent’s campaign message can be seen in the
literature of such a candidate running in a Texas House of Representatives primary in
1994. The front of one of her mailers proclaims in large print: “An outstanding
performance deserves an ENCORE!” Inside the brochure the reader is told that “[the
incumbent] has been a top performer for the right causes in the Legislature” and “She has
done a lot but there is more to be done,” followed by a litany of issue sub-heading such as
“crime and prisons”, “education”, “business”, “health care”, and “taxes” which detail her
work in each area. On the side of the brochure is a list of endorsements by state and local
notables who praise the work she is doing in the legislature.

These advertisements served mainly to draw attention to the incumbent’s past
accomplishments and did little to contrast her stand on issues with those of the
challenger. In fact, the challenger was not even acknowledged. When the incumbent was
asked about her opponent, she indicated that she did not really know much about him.
She knew his name and had seen a few of his signs, but for the most part he was “not on
the radar screen”. She knew that he was an anti-abortion activist, but had no idea what
other types of issues, if any, he was planning to bring up. She did not anticipate much
voter support for him and acknowledge that she was not really running a full-fledged
campaign. She limited her campaign to one month during which time she block-walked
in the district and sent literature mostly to remind supporters of the upcoming election.
This example is typical of most campaign messages sent by incumbent candidates. For the most part they emphasize their accomplishments and qualifications. Usually there is some mention of the incumbent’s previous record of service: the committees on which they serve, the important legislation they sponsored, and projects or programs they have brought to the district. Rarely do incumbents attempt to contrast their issue positions with those of the challenger and seldom are there negative attacks.

Such messages are very different from those typically sent by challengers. An example of a typical challenger’s message can be seen in the literature mailed by a candidate running in South Carolina against a long-time state Senator in 1988. In one of his main campaign brochures he notes in bold letters: “Your per capita income will fall $3,763.40 behind the state average by the year 2000 if things don’t change!” The subheading goes on to indicate that “UNDER OUR PRESENT SENATOR’S LEADERSHIP, the Per Capita income in [four of the largest counties in the district] is, and has been lagging behind the state average!” Inside the diatribe continues with a litany of charges against the sitting Senator including the number of times he was ABSENT (in bold red letters) from important legislative committee meetings dealing with issues of aging and education.

This message is very different from the type generally sent by incumbents. Some might call such techniques a “smear campaign”. The incumbent certainly was quoted as saying so in the local newspaper. The messages were clearly negative and contained little information about the challenger or where he stood on particular policy positions. On the back of the brochure the challenger did indicate his goals of improving education and
child care and working for a drug-free community. However, most objective observers would probably not consider this an issue-oriented advertisement.

Not all challengers are as negative as the one just described. Others are very positive and have little if anything to say about the incumbent. For example, a candidate running in a primary against a long-time incumbent did not mention anything about the sitting legislator. Her brochures and other literature pointed mostly to her own qualifications and long-term commitment and service to the community. In her brochure under her photograph, large letters read: “A loyal neighbor, parent and employee in District [number] for 23 years”.

When asked about why she was running against the incumbent, the challenger did not indicate that there was really anything wrong with the incumbent legislator’s character, service to the community, or even his views on issues. She was not so much running against the incumbent as she was running for herself. She felt she could do a good job in the legislature and that it was simply time for the district to have a new representative. Such beliefs were born out by the types of messages she sent — no attacks, mostly putting forth her own qualifications and some indication about the issues she felt were important.

A third example of a challengers’ campaign message is one that cannot be categorized so neatly as mostly “negative” or mostly “issue-oriented”. The candidate was not sending one message but several. This challenger in a Texas general election emphasized his own qualifications and personal stands on issues, but also emphasized his previous service to the community while negatively attacking the incumbent. Each of
these messages was emphasized forcefully in his campaign advertisements. In a large
newspaper-type of literature the candidate laid out in great detail a list of policy proposals
on a range of issues. For example, there was a heading for his “30 Point Budget Plan:
Real Savings, Real Reform, Real Plans” and his “20 Point Crime Plan: Will Put
Criminals in their Place”. Underneath these headings were his own proposals followed
by a blurb listing some of the details. Other aspects of the brochure showed the candidate
with influential members of his party along with other public officials who endorsed his
candidacy. This is all in one piece of campaign literature, but, there are other brochures
as well. In another, the messages are quite negative. He contrasts his position on many
issues with those of the incumbent. A photograph of the incumbent is also displayed (not
a very good one!) with the caption reading: “After 12 years in Austin, [the incumbent]
has only three tough crime bills on the books. But she had raised your taxes, cut the tax
on gambling, defended a child molester and voted herself a fine 324% raise in pay.”

This example illustrates that campaigns are often sending a variety of messages.
Some attack the opponent while others provide more “positive” messages about the
candidate’s own policy proposals. Campaign literature sent by open seat candidates
especially appear to provide many different messages. Candidates in these races often are
trying to “push as many buttons as possible” in an attempt to gain recognition by voters.
By making a variety of appeals, candidates hope at least one or two messages will
resonate with voters who see the advertisements.

These examples give insight into the messages provided to voters, but to develop
a more generalizeable understanding of these messages we must turn to the systematic
analysis of candidate survey responses. In doing so it should be understood that these responses are provided from the perspective of the candidates themselves. Therefore information obtained from them are not as "objective" as those we might infer through the coding and analysis of advertisements themselves. For example, if we wanted to know the extent of negative advertising in campaigns and we coded the level of "negativity" in a candidate's advertisements, we might very well come to a different conclusion than if we had asked the candidates themselves about their emphasis on "negativity". However, the goal in this analysis is not to obtain such an "objective" evaluation of advertisements. We instead are interested in finding out what messages candidates want to send to voters. For this reason, a reliance on what candidates themselves have to say is a superior measure of candidate intentions.

What types of messages do candidates report sending? The surveyed candidates were provided a list of six messages that are often sent to voters and asked to indicate the extent to which their campaign emphasized each in both the primary and general election periods. Candidates were asked to mark whether or not each message was "seldom emphasized", "moderately emphasized", or "greatly emphasized" in their campaign. In this way it is possible to compare the relative emphasis of messages sent by campaigns as well as compare candidates across specific message types. Tables 7.3 and 7.4 provide the percentage of incumbents, challengers and open seat contenders indicating these responses for each message in primary and general elections.
Table 7.3
What Campaigns Emphasized During the Course of Primary Election Campaigns in 1994
(Percentage Indicating Seldom Emphasized, Moderately Emphasized, and Greatly Emphasized for Each Response)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue Positions</th>
<th>Incumbents</th>
<th>Challengers</th>
<th>Open Seats</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Seldom Emphasized</strong></td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Moderately Emphasized</strong></td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Greatly Emphasized</strong></td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Personal Qualities</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Seldom Emphasized</strong></td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Moderately Emphasized</strong></td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Greatly Emphasized</strong></td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Community Service</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Seldom Emphasized</strong></td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Moderately Emphasized</strong></td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Greatly Emphasized</strong></td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Past Political Record</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Seldom Emphasized</strong></td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Moderately Emphasized</strong></td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Greatly Emphasized</strong></td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Party Affiliation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Seldom Emphasized</strong></td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Moderately Emphasized</strong></td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Greatly Emphasized</strong></td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Issues about the Opposition</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Seldom Emphasized</strong></td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Moderately Emphasized</strong></td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Greatly Emphasized</strong></td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = (36) (64) (147) (247)

*Shaded areas indicate a statistically significant difference among the candidate types (chi-square test where p<0.05).*
Table 7.4
What Campaigns Emphasized During the Course of
General Election Campaigns in 1994
(Percentage indicating Seldom Emphasized, Moderately Emphasized, and Greatly
Emphasized for Each Response)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue Positions</th>
<th>Incumbents</th>
<th>Challengers</th>
<th>Open Seats</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seldom Emphasized</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderately Emphasized</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greatly Emphasized</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Qualities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seldom Emphasized</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderately Emphasized</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greatly Emphasized</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Service</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seldom Emphasized</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderately Emphasized</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greatly Emphasized</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past Political Record</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seldom Emphasized</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderately Emphasized</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greatly Emphasized</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Affiliation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seldom Emphasized</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderately Emphasized</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greatly Emphasized</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issues about the Opposition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seldom Emphasized</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderately Emphasized</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greatly Emphasized</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=</td>
<td>(128)</td>
<td>(175)</td>
<td>(123)</td>
<td>(426)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Shaded areas indicate a statistically significant difference among the candidate types (chi-square test where p<0.05).
There is quite a bit of variation in the amount of emphasis candidates place on certain messages. Some are emphasized greatly by large percentages of candidates while others are seldom mentioned. In both election periods a higher percentage of candidates report greatly emphasizing their issue positions than any other message on the list (67% in the primary and 69% in the general). A smaller percentage of candidates report greatly emphasizing their personal qualities, service to the community, and their past political record. Party affiliation is emphasized greatly by about half the candidates in the primary (47%) but by only a little more than a quarter of those in the general election (27%). However, the smallest percentage of candidates marking “greatly emphasized” is for issues about the opposition -- only 7% in the primary and 26% in the general election marked this response.

There are differences across election periods in the percentage of candidates reporting that messages were “greatly emphasized”. Chi-square tests reveal that some of these differences are statistically significant at the 0.05 level or better. Primary candidates greatly emphasize community service more than general election candidates (56% to 49%). And primary contenders also stress party affiliation more than general election candidates do (47% to 27%). However, general election candidates greatly emphasize issues about opponents more often than primary contenders do (26% to 7%).

How does the emphasis on messages vary by candidate status? Chi-square tests show statistically significant differences in the primary across candidate types (in the percentage marking “greatly emphasized”) for personal qualities, past political
experience, and issues about the opponents. In general elections, the differences are statistically significant for all but the party affiliation messages.

Several of these differences among candidate types are worth noting. For the most part, incumbents are more likely to emphasize their personal qualities, community service, and past political record than challengers or open seat contenders. This is expected given that incumbents are more likely to have a past political record to emphasize. It also interesting to find that challenger candidates in particular emphasize issues about themselves and about their opponents to a greater degree than incumbents do. These differences in “greatly emphasizing” issues about the opposition are the most pronounced (as well as statistically significant in both primary and general elections). About 40% of challengers in the primary and 48% in the general election “greatly emphasized” issues about the opposition whereas only 12% of incumbents in the primary and 5% in the general election did so. These differences are similar to those found by Herrnson (1995) in his analysis of campaign messages in congressional campaigns.

Another factor which may also influence the extent to which some messages are emphasized more than others involves the level of information which candidates believed voters had about them prior to the election. Do candidates send certain messages as a way of educating voters with new information, or do they emphasize messages as a way of reminding voters of what they already know but maybe had forgotten? Tables 7.5 and 7.6 address this point by comparing the level of emphasis placed on five different types of messages among candidates who believed that voters knew nothing or knew a great deal about them. In every case we see that a larger percentage of those candidates who
Table 7.5
Amount of Emphasis Placed on Messages Among Candidates Who Believed Voters Knew A Great Deal or Knew Very Little About Them Prior to the Primary Campaign in 1994
(Percentage Indicating Seldom Emphasized, Moderately Emphasized, and Greatly Emphasized for Each Category)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Believed Voters Knew Nothing</th>
<th>Believed Voters Knew A Great Deal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Issue Positions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seldom Emphasized</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderately Emphasized</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greatly Emphasized</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Personal Qualities</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seldom Emphasized</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderately Emphasized</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greatly Emphasized</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Community Service</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seldom Emphasized</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderately Emphasized</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greatly Emphasized</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Past Political Record</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seldom Emphasized</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderately Emphasized</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greatly Emphasized</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Party Affiliation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seldom Emphasized</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderately Emphasized</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greatly Emphasized</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Shaded areas indicate a statistically significant difference between the percentage of voters who believed that voters knew a great deal and those who believed voters knew very little (chi-square test where p<0.05).
Table 7.6
Amount of Emphasis Placed on Messages Among Candidates Who Believed Voters Knew A Great Deal or Knew Very Little About Them Prior to the General Election Campaign in 1994
(Percentage Indicating Seldom Emphasized, Moderately Emphasized, and Greatly Emphasized for Each Category)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Believed Voters Knew Nothing</th>
<th>Believed Voters Knew A Great Deal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Issue Positions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seldom Emphasized</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderately Emphasized</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greatly Emphasized</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Personal Qualities</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seldom Emphasized</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderately Emphasized</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greatly Emphasized</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Community Service</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seldom Emphasized</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderately Emphasized</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greatly Emphasized</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Past Political Record</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seldom Emphasized</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderately Emphasized</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greatly Emphasized</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Party Affiliation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seldom Emphasized</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderately Emphasized</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greatly Emphasized</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Shaded areas indicate a statistically significant difference between the percentage of voters who believed that voters knew a great deal and those who believed voters knew very little (chi-square test where p<0.05).
believed voters knew a great deal about them greatly emphasizes a particular type of message than those who believed that voters knew little about them. Chi-square tests show that differences in message emphasis are statistically related to the two categories of beliefs about voter knowledge for all but issue positions and party affiliation in the primary election. These findings lend strong credibility to the notion that candidates place emphasis on those messages as a way of reinforcing what voters already know about them.

Finally, are there any significant differences across the states? Do we find, for instance, that candidates running in states with professional legislatures emphasize a similar or different set of messages than candidates running in citizen legislatures? Chi-square tests show that few differences emerge. It seems that variations in legislative professionalism are statistically related only to differences in the percentage of candidates marking “greatly emphasized” in one message area -- issues about the opposition (only in the general election). These percentages are highest in Illinois having the professional legislature (36%), lower among candidates in the middle-range category of professionalism (25%), and lowest in Wyoming which has the citizen legislature (8%).

How Many Messages Do Candidates Send?

Candidates greatly emphasize some messages more than others. But do candidates emphasize the same number of messages? In other words, do some candidates choose to send many messages while other choose to send only a few?
Table 7.7 displays the mean number of messages which candidates "greatly emphasize" during the course of primary and general election campaigns. On average, candidates greatly emphasize about 2.76 messages in the primary and about 2.57 in the general election contest. There are differences across states in both election periods, though these differences are not statistically significant in either election period. These results do establish variation within and across the states as evidenced by the standard deviations.

What factors might be responsible for whether or not candidates emphasize many messages or just a few? One factor may be candidate status. We might expect that incumbent candidates in particular would have a greater number of messages to send than other types of candidates -- they have a political record and usually a history of political service which most open seat contenders and challengers lack.

Another factor of importance might be level of spending. Greater levels of spending may make it easier for some candidates to send more messages than candidates who have fewer resources. How are levels of spending tied to the number of messages which candidates choose to emphasize?

Electoral competition may also be an influential factor. Higher levels of electoral competition may encourage candidates to emphasize more messages in an effort to appeal to as many voters as possible. How important is this variable?

Finally, the nature of the legislative institution may play a role. We may find that candidates running in states with a more professional legislature will be those who emphasize more messages in their campaigns. These offices offer a wide array of
Table 7.7
Average Number of Messages Greatly Emphasized by Candidates Running for the State Legislature in Primary and General Election Campaigns in 1994 (Range 0-6 Messages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>General</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Standard Deviation</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Standard Deviation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wyoming</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>2.53</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>2.67</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>3.08</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>2.76</td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>438</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
amenities to members and give them a chance to have a larger impact on public policy. Candidates running for these office may want to give voters as many reasons as possible to vote for them, many more than candidates running for seats in citizen legislatures may be willing to provide.

The extent of message sending is measured by a variable based on the responses given by candidates to the questions gauging the level of emphasis placed on the six message categories. Candidates were asked to provide a score for each message. These scores for all six messages were then totaled making it possible to measure not only the number of messages emphasized by campaigns, but also the level of emphasis placed on them. Scores for this variable can range from 6 to 18.

The following equation is used to determine the relative influence of several factors on the extent of message sending by primary and general election campaigns. In addition to the variables just discussed, it also contains a control variable for political party. The equation takes the following form:

\[
EMPH = a + b_1INC + b_2OPEN + b_3PARTY + b_4SPE\text{MD}
+ b_5COMP + b_6PROF - b_7C\text{ITIZEN} + e
\]

Where:

\[
EMPH = \text{The total scale response of the amount of effort directed at voters. The scores can range from 6 to 18 (Measured separately for the primary and general election periods).}
\]

And the following independent variables:

\[
INC = \text{A dichotomous variable indicating an incumbent candidate, (1=incumbent and 0=not an incumbent).}
\]
OPEN = A dichotomous variable indicating an open seat candidate, (1=open seat candidate and 0=not an open seat candidate).

PARTY = A control variable for party (Democrat=1 and Republican = 0).

SPEND = Total campaign spending per eligible voter in the district.

COMP = Anticipated Electoral Competition. In the general election this is measured as a dichotomous variable (1 or 0) with 1 indicating races which are close (the margin between the candidates is less than 20 points). In the primary election this is measured as the number of candidates running.

PROF = A dichotomous variable indicating a professional legislature (Illinois=1, all other states =0).

CITIZEN = A dichotomous variable indicating a citizen legislature (Wyoming=1, all other states =0).

The results of these equations are displayed in Table 7.8. For the most part, neither equation explains much of the variance in the extent of message sending. The $R^2$ statistic is highest in the equation for the primary but even there it is only 0.127 (in the general election it is 0.024). In addition, few of the variables achieve statistical significance and one significant variable is in the opposite direction.

It seems that only two of the four candidate status variables are statistically significant. Open seat candidates emphasize messages less than other candidates in the primary while incumbents emphasize messages to a greater degree than other candidates in the general election.
Table 7.8
Regression Analysis of Factors Influencing the Extent of Messages
Sent During Primary and General Election Campaigns in 1994
(Un-standardized regression coefficients)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>General</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>14.7300***</td>
<td>12.7781***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent Candidate</td>
<td>0.2108</td>
<td>0.5060*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Seat Candidate</td>
<td>-1.3423***</td>
<td>-0.0549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>0.1538</td>
<td>-0.1938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spending</td>
<td>0.5401</td>
<td>0.2993*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Comp.</td>
<td>-0.2951*</td>
<td>0.1720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen Legislature</td>
<td>-0.8830*</td>
<td>-0.0196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Legislature</td>
<td>0.4049</td>
<td>0.0893</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N= 227  410
Adjusted R²= 0.127  0.024
Spending appears to positively influence the extent to which candidates emphasize messages, but is statistically significant only in the general election period. Candidates who spend more money in the general election tend to emphasize more messages in their campaigns. This seems like a very logical finding -- the more money you have to spend, the more you are able say. This finding provides an interesting perspective on the role of money in the political process. We often view it as a negative aspect of campaigns, but if money provides more information to voters about candidates, the effects of money may actually be beneficial.

The findings also show that institutional context matters to some degree. Candidates running in primary elections in citizen legislatures tend to emphasize fewer messages than candidates running in other legislatures. This statistically significant difference for citizen legislatures and the lack of one for professional legislatures is a finding consistent with the influence of professionalism found in other chapters. Citizen legislatures are more different from middle range legislatures than professional legislatures are different.

Finally, the other two variables should also be mentioned. Electoral competition is statistically significant in the primary, but in the opposite direction than we would expect. It seems that when there are fewer candidates running in the primary, candidates are likely to emphasize more messages. Explanations for such a finding are not readily apparent. Also, the control variable for political party is statistically significant in neither equation indicating that Democratic and Republican candidates emphasize messages to a similar extent.
Implications and Conclusions

This chapter has considered the strategy of sending messages in state legislative campaigns. Several key findings have resulted from this analysis:

- Candidates vary in their beliefs about what they think voters know about them prior to the beginning of the campaign. Incumbents acknowledge that voters know a good bit about their personal qualities, community service, past political record, and party affiliation. Challengers and open seat contenders generally believe that voters have little knowledge of them in most areas, with less than half saying they believed voters “knew a great deal” even about their party affiliation.

- Candidates emphasize a variety of messages in their campaigns, but some messages are emphasized more than others. For example, among several message choices, candidates report that issue positions are emphasized most while issues about the opposition are emphasized least often.

- The emphasis placed on different messages varies substantially based on the incumbency status of the candidate. Incumbents indicate that they greatly emphasize a larger number of messages than challengers or open seat candidates. However, there are some messages which incumbents emphasize less often. Most notably in both election
cycles incumbents emphasize their own issue positions and issues about the opposition to a much lesser degree than challengers emphasize these types of messages.

- Emphasis on messages also varies with a candidate's beliefs about voters. Candidates appear to emphasize those messages which they believe voters already have some knowledge. In other words, candidates are sending messages as a way of reinforcing what votes already know.

- The extent to which messages are emphasized is generally influenced by a number of factors including the status of the candidate, the level of campaign spending, and the institutional context.

The previous chapter showed that the strategy of targeting is more influenced by factors related to the electoral environment than by candidate-level factors such as candidate status. Candidates possessing comparable amounts of funding in districts having about the same level of electoral competition use similar strategies of targeting regardless of whether they are incumbents, challengers, or open seat contenders. In this chapter we find that another aspect of strategy, message choice, is most influenced by the status of the candidate running. The decision to emphasize some messages over others or to emphasize many messages or just a few appears to be strongly influenced by whether the candidate is an incumbent, a challenger, or an open seat contender.
Why is candidate status so important to the nature of campaign messages which are sent? Part of the explanation has to do with the position at which most candidates begin their campaign effort. There is often a huge informational asymmetry between candidates, particularly between incumbents and challengers. The findings presented here show very clearly that these differences are generally acknowledged by candidates running for office. Candidates of all types understand that incumbents are better known and subsequently structure their strategies accordingly to compensate for this electoral reality. Incumbents remind voters of all that they have done for them in the past while challengers try to distinguish themselves from incumbents by emphasizing policy positions and negative aspects concerning the incumbent legislator. The information asymmetry at the beginning of the campaign, therefore, leads to different strategies based on a candidate’s particular status.

The findings show that status determines not only the types of issues emphasized during the campaign, but the number of messages sent as well. Ironically, incumbents enjoy greater recognition by voters, but they also send more messages in campaigns than challenges or open seat contenders. The reason for this is that incumbents simply have more to tell voters. These candidates have a past political record and usually a history of service to the community that they can use in messages. Challengers and open seat contenders generally do not have such things to tell voters. As Chapter Three demonstrated, state legislative candidates more often than not have little previous political experience to tell voters about. They are therefore relegated to discussing policy proposals and discuss issues about the opponent.
Other factors are responsible for the general levels of emphasis placed on messages. In particular, level of spending positively influences the extent to which candidates send messages. One might therefore conclude that money is not such a negative aspect of political campaigns. However, one must consider who is spending the money and what types of messages are sent with these dollars. As shown in Chapter Three, incumbents generally have more money to spend than other candidates. And as this chapter indicates, the types of messages incumbents send have less to do with advocating issues and educating voters about policy alternatives. Most of the messages sent by incumbents have to do with image-types of messages such as personal qualities and community service -- messages that may not help voters necessarily make more "informed" policy-oriented decisions.
Chapter 8
Techniques Used for Contacting Voters

_Political campaigning is still more art than science._
--Goldenberg and Traugott\(^\text{89}\)

_Running for office is no longer low art but high tech._
--Gary Selnow\(^\text{90}\)

**Introduction**

The last two chapters examined the strategy related to targeting voters and sending messages. This chapter considers a third aspect of strategy -- techniques for delivering these messages to the targeted audience. Several sets of questions will be addressed. The first is how do candidates generally go about contacting voters in the state legislative setting? A number of studies in recent years suggest that campaigns for the state legislature have become more professional, taking on aspects of congressional and state-wide contests with their reliance on mass-media advertising. To what extent do we find this to be the case? Second, what factors or conditions make some types of techniques more likely to be used than others? Specifically, what variables related to the district, the available resources, candidate characteristics, and aspects of the campaign process itself influence variation in the use of more narrow forms of contact such as mailings versus mass-media contact such as radio and television? What factors or conditions make it more or less likely that a campaign will utilize more personal contact techniques?
Importance of Contact Techniques

Too often, studies of campaigns and elections overlook the manner in which candidates go about building a coalition of voters, however, techniques of contact are important to consider for a number of reasons. One is that advertising has been found to play an important role in the level of information held by voters. Patterson and McClure (1976) as well as Kern (1989) find that campaign advertisements help voters understand where candidates stand on issues. Patterson and McClure (1976) indicate that “[t]o put it bluntly, spot political commercials educate rather than hoodwink the voters” (p. 23).

While this advertising does affect citizens’ levels of information, these authors find that it has little effect on their final vote choice. However, this is only in presidential election contests where many voters make up their minds long before the campaign gets underway and where other information about the candidates and the issues abound. In non-presidential elections, particularly in state legislative settings where media effects are minimal, advertising is likely to be very strong. Experimental research, for example, finds that advertisements play an important part in individual voting decisions once controls are introduced for a number of other factors (e.g., Iyengar and Kinder, 1987).

Contact techniques are also important to consider because some are more conducive for sending some types of messages than others. For example, television advertising is much better at promoting image messages than other types of contact such as yard signs, for example, which can usually do little more than promote name recognition. The mailing of pamphlets or newsletters allows the candidates to communicate more in-depth messages to voters and education them on the issues
involved in the campaign. One-on-one contact with voters by candidates and campaign workers allows for a very different type of message to be sent -- one on a personal level. The vehicle chosen may therefore influence the types of message which are possible to send and ultimately how the messages are received.

A third reason for exploring the nature of the contact has to do with the fact that some forms may be more effective than others. For candidates running in highly populated districts, for example, it may be almost necessary to use mass media advertising. Personal forms of contact may be effective in smaller districts, but in larger districts it may be physically impossible for candidates to personally meet a sizable percentage of the electorate. Candidate in those situations who choose mass media techniques over more personal forms of contact will probably garner a larger share of the vote on election day. Use of certain techniques in some districts, therefore, may lead to advantages for those candidates who use the more appropriate form of contact. Such concerns make it important not only to understand the use of certain forms of contact, but also those factors which bring about their use. For example, how big of a role do financial resources play in influencing the forms of voter contact used? Are some candidates precluded from using some techniques because of their high costs?

A final reason for examining contact has to do with representation. Campaigns play a central role in the representation process. As Richard Fenno notes:

*Campaigns help to establish, maintain, and test the connections between politicians and citizens -- connections that constitute the very core of a representational relationship. It is through a campaign that a candidate is introduced to the electorate. It is through the campaign*
that a candidate locates and builds a constituency. It is through the interpretation of a campaign that the winning candidate derives some of the impulses, interests, and instructions that shape his or her subsequent behavior as a legislator. It is through a campaign that a legislator explains his or her legislative activity to the citizenry. And it is through a campaign that a legislator's contract is renewed or rejected (1996: p. 75).

If campaigns are what make representatives “representative”, then understanding the nature of the interaction during campaigns is an important consideration. Many worry that modern campaign techniques with their reliance on mass media advertising have gone too far in removing the candidate from the fray of politics (e.g., Selnow, 1994). Understanding those factors which bring about the use of certain types of techniques over others would appear to be important for understanding the representational process.

**Contacting Voters: Old Ways and New**

In recent decades campaigns in American politics have clearly become more candidate-centered. Party organizations and grass-roots campaigning have been replaced by professional campaign consultants and the utilization of modern techniques such as electronic media, polling, computers, and direct mail. Agranoff (1976) has termed this the “new style” in election campaigns.

Along with these general changes in campaigning have come changes in the communication techniques used by candidates in contacting potential voters. No longer can candidates depend on party workers to deliver their messages. Gone are the days of the party canvass where legions of block-walkers go door-to-door drumming up support
for the party's ticket. Today candidates must do for themselves what the parties once did: build organizations, recruit workers, raise funds, and develop strategies for contacting voters. Parties may perform some functions through monetary contributions (Gierzynski, 1992; Gierzynski and Breaux, 1994; Jones and Borris, 1985; Shea, 1995) some traditional grass-roots oriented activities (Cotter, et al., 1984; Frendreis, et al., 1994) and informational services (See Chapter Five). But by and large, candidates are on their own with regard to voter appeals.

What types of techniques do they utilize in sending their message to voters? Because the decline of parties coincided with (or was brought about by) the advent of television, some might assume that television advertising has been taken up by candidates to use in their campaigns. There is certainly evidence for this on the presidential level where campaigns were the first to make use of these newer technologies. However, to what extent have candidates on other levels taken up the media-oriented strategy? Consider the comments of Salmore and Salmore (1985) who trace the changing techniques for contacting voters:

*by the 1980s, the candidate- and media-centered campaign had penetrated to every level of American politics. The local party bosses were all but gone, and media consultants, pollsters, direct mail specialists, and professional organizers had come to the fore (p. 56).*

What evidence do we have to support this contention? Studies of candidate spending often find that mass media expenditures make up a very large percentage of the dollars allocated in a typical presidential contest (Alexander and Corrado, 1995). Such modern forms of contact are also clearly prevalent on the congressional level as reflected
in campaign budgets. Several studies show that television and radio advertising comprises between one-third and one-half of a typical House campaign’s voter contact spending (Fritz and Morris, 1992; Goldenberg and Traugott, 1984; Morris and Gamache, 1994).\(^9\)

However, it is important to note that not all spending on the congressional level goes toward television. What some would consider more “traditional” forms of voter contact still make up a large percentage of campaign budgets and are used even more frequently than electronic advertising. For example, Goldenberg and Traugott (1984) find that newspaper advertising accounts for about 9% of voter contact expenditures and printing costs (for signs, handouts, and mailings) account for 33% (pp. 86-88). Herrnson (1995) finds that about 70% of candidates use some form of newspaper advertising and 94% use direct mail (pp. 188-189). Herrnson’s research also shows that “fieldwork” expenses, which include travel, billboards, yard signs, and literature distribution, account for 25% of voter contact spending (p. 73). Overall, traditional techniques are still used frequently and make up a large share of voter contact dollars in congressional campaigns.

As Agranoff (1976) notes, “[n]ew style campaigns are almost always this blend of the old and new” (p. 38).

What types of communication techniques do state legislative candidates utilize? Is such a blend of techniques also present here? Unfortunately, there are not many studies which decompose spending in these races. The few studies which do suggest that these candidates too use a variety of communication techniques. However, this mix of
techniques is often quite different from that utilized by candidates on the congressional level.

Three studies in particular give us insight into what campaigning for the state legislature was like in the 1960s: Mileur and Sulzner's (1974) study of campaigning in 1968 for the Massachusetts Senate, David Olson's (1963) analysis of legislative primaries in Austin, Texas in 1962, and David Adamany's (1972) study of campaign spending from 1966 to 1968 for the Connecticut Senate are interesting illustrations. Overall these studies found that campaign communication techniques focused primarily on personal contacts with voters. However, many candidates did use mass media advertising. Mileur and Sulzner found that nearly 80% of legislative candidates at one point in the campaign used some radio advertisements, yet only one candidate purchased television advertising. Olson (1963), on the other hand, found that each of the 14 campaigns he examined used television advertising. But, Adamany (1972) found very little use of mass media advertising noting that the small size of these districts precluded the use of television. These studies show that a variety of techniques are often used by candidates running for seats in the state legislature.

Recent studies suggest that the techniques used by candidates has changed over time. For example, a study by the California Commission on Campaign Financing found that over time (1968, 1978, and 1982) a larger percentage of spending was allocated toward direct mail costs (going from 43% in 1968 to 61% in 1982) while a smaller percentage over time went for broadcasting, newspaper advertisements, and outdoor advertising (1985: p. 36). The authors of the report indicate that increased spending on
direct mail (more pieces of mail being sent) has been primarily responsible for the rising costs (p. 36-37).

Other studies emphasize the continued importance of personal campaigning (Loftus, 1994), though some seem to suggest that state legislative campaigns are becoming more like their congressional counterparts in their use of media advertising. Salmore and Salmore (1985) as well as Graff (1992) note that technologies that were once available to candidates on the national and state levels such as direct mail, powerful computer programs, and access to electronic media have become more readily available for use in legislative elections. Alan Rosenthal, commenting on state legislative races, notes that “[t]elevision may be expensive, and the costs keep going up, but TV has become a common feature of campaigning, especially in the larger more competitive districts in the big states” (1993: 125). Unfortunately, there has been little systematic evaluation of state legislative spending in recent years to warrant such a conclusion.

One recent study which has more systematically examined the use of voter contact techniques in the state legislative setting focuses on candidate spending in Texas and Kansas (Hogan, 1997). This analysis found candidates allocating money to a variety of forms of contact, however, the single largest category of expenses was for mailings. Expenditures on mailings and printing alone accounted for over 50% of all spending in Texas and Kansas campaigns. The average percentage of spending going for contact such as mailings, signs, handbills, and paraphernalia ranged from a low of about 68% in Texas general elections to a high of nearly 84% in Kansas primary elections. Mass media advertising (newspaper, radio, and television) therefore consumed much smaller
percentages of spending. Spending on television advertising, for example, ranged from
1% in Kansas primaries to only about 7% in Texas general elections.

An interesting feature of this analysis is its focus not just on the percentage of
er voter contact spending allocated for various techniques, but also on the percentage of
candidates who allocate any money toward such techniques. Such a perspective leads to
some interesting results. For example, the study shows that in all but the Kansas primary
elections, nearly half of candidates spent some money on radio advertising. Television
advertising was used by nearly one-fifth of Texas primary candidates and by about one-
third of general election candidates in Kansas.

The findings from this study are important to consider for two reasons. One is
that they call into question the idea that mass media advertising is the pervasive technique
used on the state legislative level for contacting voters. As the percentages above
indicate, the spending patterns in these campaigns are very different from the spending
patterns in congressional and presidential campaigns. In particular, mass media
advertising consumes relatively smaller proportions of total spending than do other
techniques such as mailings and signs. The second reason to consider the findings of this
study is that they point to the importance of contextual features which influence the
nature of the voter contact.

A difficulty associated with the study of Kansas and Texas is that these two states
provide only a limited amount of variation on a number of district and state level features
which are expected to play a role in influencing voter contact strategies. Most
importantly, both Texas and Kansas have legislatures which are considered to be middle-
range in terms of professionalism (Kurtz, 1992). In order to gain an understanding of the
effect of institutional factors, we need to examine a set of states which provide variety on
this dimension.

This chapter considers the manner in which candidates allocate their voter contact
spending. What percentage of their funds do they spend on different techniques? In
addition, what factors are responsible for variations in the techniques chosen?

**Options for Contacting Voters**

Candidates running for office today have a number of options available for
contacting voters. There are no scientific formulas about what types of techniques work
better than others (Hershey, 1984; Jacobson, 1992; Kayden, 1978). Political consultants
generally agree that what works best in one district for one candidate may be very
different from what works best for another candidate in another district. In other words,
the "best" type of technique varies by the nature of the district, its voters, the type of
message the candidate wants to convey, and the level of resources available to send the
message. However, candidates and their campaign operatives often do believe that some
techniques are more effective than others.  

A number of candidates emphasize the importance of person contact with voters
as a way of swaying their support. Jewell (1982) finds through his survey of state
legislators that "many of them won their first election by door-to-door campaigning, and
they are convinced that this is the most effective way to maintain contacts and visibility"
(p. 29). Tom Loftus (1994) recounts his days of door-knocking and ways he found to be
effective. He notes that “[m]ost people are pleased when a candidate comes to their door. A candidate may not be as welcome as the UPS man, but neither is he or she an evangelist trying to convert you or a kid selling band pizza” (p. 11). Candidates who ran for the state legislature in 1994 often expressed similar views about personal campaigning. Many indicated that voters were often very receptive to visits. One candidate reported that some people he visited seemed almost shocked to see the actual candidate himself on the door-step asking for support. One candidate noted, “I think walking door-to-door is the best way to reach the public, especially if you don’t have a lot of money and in a primary too where a lot of people are not willing to commit themselves financially or otherwise.”

To obtain a sense of what candidates generally believe to be the best techniques for conveying their message to voters, surveyed candidates were asked to rate the effectiveness of eight different forms of contact often used in campaigns. The respondents were asked to indicate on a five-point scale for each whether it was “not effective”, “slightly effective”, “moderately effective”, “very effective”, or “extremely effective”. The possible score for each could therefore range from 1 (not effective) to 5 (extremely effective). The average rating for each of these techniques along with the percentage marked “very effective” or “extremely effective” is listed in Table 8.1.

The techniques are arrayed in order of importance for both primary and general election campaigns (relative rankings were the same in both election periods). Candidates believe that personal contact with voters is the most effective technique for conveying their message. The average score on the five-point scale was 4.62 for primary
Table 8.1
Candidates' Beliefs About the Most Effective Techniques for Conveying Their Message To Voters
(Scale Score 1-5)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Technique</th>
<th>Primary Average Score</th>
<th>Primary Percent*</th>
<th>General Average Score</th>
<th>General Percent*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal Contact With Voters</td>
<td>4.62</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>4.66</td>
<td>93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canvassing Door-to-Door</td>
<td>4.35</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>4.45</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mailings</td>
<td>3.74</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>3.90</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Billboards and Yard Signs</td>
<td>3.42</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>3.35</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canvassing By Telephone</td>
<td>3.13</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>3.11</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper Advertising</td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Advertising</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television Advertising</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Percent equals the percentage of respondents indicating their belief that the technique is either “very helpful” or “extremely helpful”.
candidates and 4.66 for general election candidates. Approximately 92% of candidates in
the primary and 93% in the general election reported that personal contact was either
“very effective” or “extremely effective”. Following close behind “personal contact” is a
specific type of personal contact -- canvassing door-to-door. Candidates ranked this
activity rather high as well, 4.35 in the primary and 4.45 in the general election (82% of
primary candidates and 85% of general election candidates indicated that it was at least
“very” effective). Other forms of contact fell toward the middle of the distribution such
as mailings, billboards and yard signs, and canvassing by telephone. Interestingly, the
mass media forms of contact fell at the very bottom. The scores for these techniques
ranged from a high for newspapers of 2.63 in the primary and 2.75 in the general election
to a low for television advertising of 2.14 in the primary and 2.43 in the general. Radio
fell in the middle of these three with an average score of 2.42 in the primary and 2.60 in
the general. A relatively small percentage of candidates said these forms of contact were
very effective.

Such findings corroborate the anecdotal evidence showing an emphasis placed on
personal forms of campaigning. For the most part, state legislative candidates do not
believe that mass media forms of contact are very effective. However, there is obviously
a range in responses for most techniques.

Simply because candidates feel that some forms of contact are more effective than
others does not necessarily mean that they will use that form of contact. A number of
candidates indicated that they “settled” on a form of contact due to a series of constraints.
For example, several candidates stated very explicitly that they would have liked to have
used more mass media, but is was simply cost prohibitive. Several candidates indicated
that cost concerns were also a major factor in their choice even within categories of
techniques. For instance one candidate stated that cost considerations determined the
types of mailings he was able to send (black and white photographs as opposed to color).
Other candidates indicated how the nature of the district dictated their choice of
techniques. For example, one candidate professed his belief that personal contact was
extremely effective, yet, he was using mostly mailings and phone calls to reach voters
because his district was too spread out. Given that people live so far apart in the district,
"from a time-standpoint, it is easier and more efficient to use the phone, though I think
face to face contact is better." Another candidate said that it would be "ridiculous" for
her to use television advertising given that the number of people reached by the broadcast
television stations was so much larger than the number of people located in her district.

Before examining the use of various contact techniques, we should first probably
look at options available to candidates. We need to understand the advantages and
disadvantages associated with the dimensions of each technique in order to better
understand why candidates choose some techniques over others.

The first dimension involves the control over the message. How precisely can the
message be sent? Techniques are divided into two types: "narrow" and "broad".93
Narrow forms of contact are those used to deliver messages to specific types of voters.
Broad forms are media-based forms of advertising and are much less surgical in nature
than narrow forms of contact, often reaching some voters unintentionally.
The second dimension involves the personal or impersonal nature of the communication.\(^{94}\) Does it involve some degree of human interaction? For example, does it involve pamphleteering, door-to-door canvassing, travel through the district, and meeting with voters? Or is the communication more impersonal in that the candidate mostly purchases display advertisements in newspapers or radio and television time?

In order to facilitate comparisons of techniques, they are divided into categories based on these dimensions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personal</th>
<th>Narrow-Based</th>
<th>Broad-Based</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Meeting with voters/Fieldwork</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election Day Activities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phone Banks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handbills</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impersonal</td>
<td>Mailings</td>
<td>Newspapers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signs</td>
<td>Other Advertising</td>
<td>Radio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Television</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Using this scheme we see that there are in fact three categories of techniques. The fourth cell above for what should be “broad-based and personal” techniques is empty because there are no techniques which fall into this category. Each of the three technique choices has both advantages and disadvantages. Campaigners must decide which techniques are suited to their district and budget given the type of message they wish to send. For simplicity sake the narrow forms of contact are referred to in the remainder of the analysis as “personal” (for narrow and personal forms of contact) and “narrow” (for
narrow and impersonal forms of contact). Since there is only one type of broad contact, that label will remain the same.

**Personal contact** (narrow-based, personal) involves techniques such as canvassing neighborhoods and shopping malls, election day get-out-the-vote drives, participation in parades, telephone banks, and other techniques which bring the candidate or campaigners into close proximity with voters. Usually these types of techniques involve face-to-face contact whereby the candidate or his surrogate can directly solicit support.

A major advantage to this form of contact is that it brings the candidate or campaigns into direct contact with voters. Unlike most other forms of contact, this variety at least creates the possibility that a two-way flow of communication can occur. Such techniques are probably more in line with the perceptions which most people have concerning the ideals of representative forms of government and certainly part of what political scientists call "symbolic representation" (Eulau and Karps, 1977).

There are other advantages of these techniques as well. For one, they can be relatively inexpensive. Even candidates who have little or no money can still go door-to-door or stand at polling places on election day and ask for votes. Another advantage is that they can be very surgical in nature. In canvassing neighborhoods, candidates can visit some houses and not others, they can call some individual and not others. This makes the time and money spent on these types of techniques probably more efficient.

There are two disadvantages to this group of techniques. One is that they are generally more time consuming. Candidates in state legislative races often indicate that it
takes several hours each day for many weeks prior to the campaign to personally visit each of the voters on their target list. One candidate noted that he himself had hoped to make at least one attempt to contact every voter by telephone before election day. This candidate indicated that because he was retired he had the time to do this, but he knew that many other candidates would probably not have this advantage.

The other disadvantage to this group of activities is that they require candidates to have a good bit of information about voters in the district, beginning first with which voters are in the district. Some candidates indicated difficulty in just obtaining a decent map which delineated the district’s boundaries. But, much more precise information is probably needed such as lists of registered voters, or those who have a history of voting in past primary and/or general elections. The extent of information gathering may have an effect, therefore, on the degree to which candidates engage in such direct forms of contact.

**Narrow contact** (narrow-based, impersonal) involves contact with voters through the mail, yardsigns, billboards, and other advertising. These forms of contact are considered narrow because they can be used selectively to reach only certain types of voters in the district. Yardsigns and billboards can be placed only in certain neighborhoods. Mailings in particular can be sent to some residents and not to others. These techniques are impersonal because they do not require direct contact with voters.

Again, these narrow-based techniques are potentially more efficient because of the surgical nature of how they can be sent. Messages can be sent to specific types of voters in the district to bring about a maximum level of effectiveness. This is the major
advantage of these techniques. Another advantage is that they can be relatively inexpensive. Mailings and signs can generally be produced without the aid of professional consultants or media specialists.

A disadvantage is that this form of contact is often in competition with other types of advertising making it difficult for the candidate appeals to “stand out”. Along most highways there are already a number of signs and in most voters’ mailboxes there is a sufficient amount of “junk mail”. Appeals sent by candidates via these avenues may therefore “get lost in the shuffle.”

Another disadvantage similar to the one mentioned for the narrow-based, personal techniques is that it requires a good bit of information. To be used surgically, it is necessary to know where potential supporters are in the district. For example, when sending mailings in a primary campaign (in a closed primary state), it is not enough to have the names and addresses of all the citizens in a given district. One needs to know who is registered, what party they are affiliated with, and what the likelihood is that they will participate.

**Broad contact** (broad-based, impersonal) techniques are another name for mass media advertising and include communicating through newspapers, radio, and television. An advantage of these techniques is that they can reach a large number of voters in a district very quickly. In addition, precise information about voters is not necessary. For example, one does not need to know the current names, addresses, and phone numbers of all registered voters who participated in one of the past three primary elections.
The down side to media contact is that it is usually more expensive and is often less surgical in nature. More likely than not there is a lack of congruence between the circulation or coverage area of these media and the legislative district. The result is that these forms of contact are much less efficient than direct forms of contact -- the cost per person receiving the message via broad forms of contact may be less, but the costs per potential voter might actually be as expensive.

**Voter Contact Techniques in State Legislative Campaigns**

What types of techniques are predominant in races for the state legislature? One way of making such a determination is to examine the allocation of candidates' voter contact dollars. The rationale for this approach is that money is a very important resource for candidates and how they decide to spend it is an indication of their priorities.

Spending on voter contact will be examined separately in each state for both primary and general election periods. Probably one of the more important factors influencing the degree of spending on media advertising is whether the election campaign is a primary or general election contest. Because candidates in the primary are usually only trying to contact the party faithful (those who are more likely to vote in the primary), it is likely that they will use a higher preponderance of narrow forms of contact. Broad forms of contact through the mass media would seem to be inefficient in primaries given that only a small fraction of voters will probably turn out to vote (voter turnout in primaries is usually lower than in general elections) and only a fraction of these voters will be voting in one party’s primary (assuming closed primaries as exist in the states
used in this sample). Given these circumstances, is likely that we would see more direct voter contact in primary campaigns than in general elections, all other things being equal. For similar reasons, we expect that more personal forms of contact to make up a larger share of primary than general election spending. Fenno (1996) speculates on this issue saying that: “personal campaigning may be most appropriate in locating and securing a solid primary constituency, while media campaigning may be most appropriate in locating and securing a less fragile reelection constituency” (p. 155). For these reasons, primary and general election spending are analyzed separately throughout this analysis.

In addition, the states themselves will be analyzed separately. It is expected that differences in legislative professionalism may have a significant impact on spending patterns. The prevalence of modern forms of communicating with voters should be higher in more professional legislative institutions than in citizen legislatures. Candidates running for seats in the more professional legislature (Illinois) are expected to allocate larger percentages of their voter contact dollars for broad contact and much less for personal contact than candidates running in other legislatures. Similarly, candidates running for seats in the least professional legislature (Wyoming) are expected to spend less on broad forms of contact and much more on narrow and personal contact.

Where do candidates allocate the preponderance of their voter contact dollars? Tables 8.2 and 8.3 provide the percentages of voter contact spending going for various techniques in each state’s primary and general election campaign.95 The techniques are sub-divided into the three categories of personal, narrow, and broad.
Table 8.2
Percentage of Voter Contact Spending Allocated in Primary Election Campaigns for Various Forms of Voter Contact By Candidates Running for the State Legislature in 1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expenditure Category</th>
<th>Connecticut</th>
<th>Delaware</th>
<th>Illinois</th>
<th>South Carolina</th>
<th>Wyoming</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Personal Contact</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraphernalia</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meeting Voters/Field Work</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone Banks</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election Day Activities</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Personal</strong></td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Narrow Contact</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mailings</td>
<td>43.6%</td>
<td>28.9%</td>
<td>40.4%</td>
<td>35.4%</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Printing/Literature</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signs</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
<td>19.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Advertising</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Narrow</strong></td>
<td>69.5%</td>
<td>59.0%</td>
<td>53.2%</td>
<td>67.3%</td>
<td>57.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Broad Contact</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspapers</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broadcast Television</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cable Television</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television (can't tell)</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Broad Contact</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Broad</strong></td>
<td>12.1%</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>19.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Advertising (can't tell)</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of Total Spending</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n=20</td>
<td>n=9</td>
<td>n=46</td>
<td>n=28</td>
<td>n=28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table includes information on candidates who spent at least some money in the primary election period.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expenditure Category</th>
<th>Connecticut</th>
<th>Delaware</th>
<th>Illinois</th>
<th>South Carolina</th>
<th>Wyoming</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Personal Contact</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraphernalia</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meeting Voters/Field Work</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone Banks</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election Day Activities</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Personal</strong></td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Narrow Contact</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mailings</td>
<td>57.3%</td>
<td>32.3%</td>
<td>39.0%</td>
<td>35.9%</td>
<td>26.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Printing/Literature</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>20.2%</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signs</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Advertising</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Narrow</strong></td>
<td>73.6%</td>
<td>63.2%</td>
<td>52.4%</td>
<td>57.7%</td>
<td>44.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Broad Contact</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspapers</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broadcast Television</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cable Television</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television (can't tell)</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Broad Contact</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Broad</strong></td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
<td>21.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percentage of Total Spending</strong></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n=150</td>
<td>n=19</td>
<td>n=67</td>
<td>n=34</td>
<td>n=35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table includes information on candidates who spent at least some money in the general election period.*
Focusing first on the shaded areas of these tables, we find in both primary and general election periods that a majority of voter contact dollars in each state goes for narrow contact. These percentages range from about 53% in the Illinois general election to about 74% in the Connecticut general election. The percentage allocated for broad forms of contact comes next making up between 15% of voter contact spending in Connecticut primary campaigns to about 39% in Wyoming general elections. Personal contact takes up the smallest percentage of the voter contact budget ranging from less than 5% in Delaware primary races to about 14% in the Illinois primary.

What is unsurprising about these findings is the small percentage of money which is used for personal forms of contact. Such contact is not very expensive and much of it does not even entail a true monetary cost. It should not come as a shock that little money is spent for these activities. What is surprising is the relatively small percentage of campaign dollars which go for broad forms of contact -- techniques which are viewed as being so expensive. The findings from Table 8.2 and 8.3 indicate that relatively few dollars are allocated for these forms of advertising.

What specifically do candidates spend their money on within each of these categories? A large portion of spending in the personal category goes for paraphernalia such as buttons, pins, pencils, candy, and novelty items. Meeting with voters consumes a large portion of this category and includes spending for travel within the district as well as for meals with constituent groups and refreshments for volunteers. Election day activities and telephone banks generally compose a much smaller percentage.
The largest portion of narrow contact goes for mailings. In fact this expenditure is the largest single expenditure for any one activity among all the others. Mailing expenses consume anywhere between 19% (Wyoming primary elections) and 57% (in Connecticut general elections) of total voter contact spending. The only exception to this pattern is in Wyoming primary elections where signs make up a slightly larger percentage of spending (about 20%).

Printing costs are also a big portion of narrow contact spending. The percentages allocated for pamphlets, fact sheets, and other printed messages range from a low of 8.5% in Connecticut general elections to a high of about 20% in Delaware general elections. While it is difficult to determine from most expenditures reports exactly how these printed materials are used, it is probably safe to assume that large portions are sent to voters through the mail (though some are probably distributed by hand). This means that the earlier figures for amount of money spent on mailings is probably a very low estimate of the percentage of funding actually going for this purpose.

Among the broad forms of contact, the largest percentage of spending generally goes for newspaper advertising. These costs range from 3% in Illinois general elections to about 20% in Wyoming primaries. Only in Illinois do we find another form broad contact consuming a larger percentage -- radio constitutes about 8% of general election spending by candidates in this state. Broadcasting generally does not consume large portions of spending. The percentage allocated for radio ranges from a low of about 4% in Connecticut and Delaware primaries to a high of nearly 15% in Wyoming general elections. Television consumes a very minor percentage of spending in most states. In
Connecticut, for example, spending for both broadcast and cable television consumes only slightly more than 1% of total voter contact. The highest percentage for television (broadcast and cable totaled) is in Illinois general elections. But even here we see that television spending accounts for only 13% of the total.

While these spending percentages tell us how monetary sources are distributed, they do not indicate the prevalence of their usage. In other words, we do not know how many candidates actually used a particular technique. To answer this question we need to determine the percentage of candidates (of those spending any money) who allocated dollars to particular techniques. Tables 8.4 and 8.5 provide these percentages for primary and general election periods.

Narrow forms of contact are clearly the most prevalent form of advertising used in state legislative races. Nearly every candidate in both election cycles who spent money allocated at least a portion of their spending to these techniques. Only in Delaware primary campaigns is there a deviation from this trend where only 75% allocate at least some money in this manner.

Personal forms of contact are also frequently used, though clearly less often in some states than in others. For example, the range in use varies in primary elections from 33% in Delaware to about 75% in Connecticut. In the general election there is much less variation across states ranging from Delaware with 71% to Connecticut with 85%.

The most interesting feature in Tables 8.4 and 8.5, however, is the percentage of candidates who report using any broad forms of contact. While it was shown earlier that candidates allocated a relatively small percentage of their funds for these mass media
Table 8.4  
Percentage of Candidates Who Engage in Various 
Forms of Voter Contact in Primary Campaigns in 1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expenditure Category</th>
<th>Connecticut</th>
<th>Delaware</th>
<th>Illinois</th>
<th>South Carolina</th>
<th>Wyoming</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Personal Contact</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraphernalia</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meeting Voters/Field Work</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone Banks</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election Day Activities</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any Personal</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Narrow Contact</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mailings</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Printing/Literature</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signs</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Advertising</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any Narrow</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Broad Contact</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspapers</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broadcast Television</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cable Television</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television (can't tell)</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Broad Contact</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any Broad</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown Advertising (can't tell)</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N=</strong></td>
<td>(21)</td>
<td>(12)</td>
<td>(46)</td>
<td>(27)</td>
<td>(29)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table includes information on candidates who spent at least some money in the primary election period.
Table 8.5  
Percentage of Candidates Who Engage in Various Forms of 
Voter Contact in General Campaigns in 1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expenditure Category</th>
<th>Connecticut</th>
<th>Delaware</th>
<th>Illinois</th>
<th>South Carolina</th>
<th>Wyoming</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal Contact</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraphernalia</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meeting Voters/Field Work</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone Banks</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election Day Activities</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any Personal</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narrow Contact</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mailings</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Printing/Literature</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signs</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Advertising</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any Narrow</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broad Contact</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspapers</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broadcast Television</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cable Television</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television (can't tell)</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Broad Contact</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any Broad</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown Advertising (can't tell)</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=</td>
<td>(151)</td>
<td>(24)</td>
<td>(70)</td>
<td>(34)</td>
<td>(36)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table includes information on candidates who spent at least some money in the general election period.*
techniques, these tables indicate that a sizable percentage of candidates do spend at least some money on them. In primary contests the percentage of candidates utilizing some broad forms of contact ranges from 42% in Delaware to 93% in South Carolina. In the general election we see a somewhat higher range of percentages from Delaware with 54% to Wyoming with 86%. Within this category as well we find that the prevalence of voter contact usage is much higher than the percentage of money allocated to such activities would indicate. Take broadcast television for example -- we find in Illinois that about 17% of primary candidates and 19% of general election candidates utilize some form of broadcast television advertising. As a percentage of their voter contact spending, however, these techniques consumed only slightly more than 4% of a typical candidate's budget.

Overall, measures of both monetary percentages and candidate usage point to the fact that a variety of techniques are employed by state legislative campaigns. In addition, the allocation of voter contact dollars for personal, narrow, and broad forms of contact appears to vary across states and election periods. However, do these variations conform to the patterns we expected to find?

In order to answer this question Figure 8.1 displays the percentage of candidate spending in primary and general elections which is allocated to three different sub-categories: personal, narrow, and broad. They are arrayed from lowest to highest in terms of the percentage of dollars allocated for broad forms of contact.
Figure 8.1
Percentage of Voter Contact Spending Allocated for Different Forms of Contact in Primary and General Election Contests Across 5 States in 1994

State

CT Primary  CT General  IL Primary  DE General  SC Primary  DE Primary  WY Primary  SC General  IL General  WY General

- Personal
- Narrow
- Broad
The graph indicates that a higher percentage of spending goes for broad forms in the general election than in the primary for all but one state (Delaware). In addition, personal contact is lower in general elections than in primaries in all but Delaware and Wyoming. However, t-tests indicate that these differences are not statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Thus, spending differences do not vary significantly across election periods meaning that allocation strategies in primaries are similar to those in general election periods.

Such a finding is rather unexpected. How can it be that spending strategies are similar when the target audiences are so different? Part of the explanation may be found in the manner in which the techniques are categorized. Or it may be an indication of how campaign techniques have changed in recent years. Could it be that all types of techniques are “targeted” today due to high levels of information available to many candidates? More will be said about this later on in the analysis.

What about differences across the states? In particular, do we find that spending patterns vary by level of professionalism? Differences across states do emerge, however, these differences are the exact opposite of what are expected. In both election cycles the percentage of spending allocated for broad contact is actually higher in Wyoming (the citizen legislature) than in Illinois (the professional legislature). T-tests confirm that these differences in the general election cycle are statistically significant ($p<0.05$). In addition, we also observe that the percentage allocated for personal contact is higher in Illinois than in Wyoming. T-tests show that these differences too are statistically significant at the 0.05 level in both election cycles.
Why are these results so different than anticipated? Why is it that candidates running in Illinois, the more professionalized institution, spend a higher proportion of their money on personalized forms of contact and less on broad forms than candidates running in Wyoming, the citizen legislature? Part of the explanation may have to do with characteristics of the districts in the states with the professional and citizen legislatures. In other words, the district features in these states may be of a certain variety that effectively masks the possible influence of legislative professionalism.

The average population density of districts is one factor which may have such an influence. As seen in Table 3.7 from an earlier chapter, legislative districts in Wyoming and South Carolina have low population density -- voters often live very far apart from one another. The average population density (eligible voters living per square mile) in Wyoming is approximately 98 in Senate districts and about 568 in House districts (South Carolina's House districts have a population density of 428). In Illinois, however, the average density of the population is much greater -- over 5,000 people per square mile in both Senate and House districts. These differences may have consequences for how candidates choose to spend their money, particularly in their propensity to use broad versus personal forms of contact. It seems that candidates running in districts where voters are spread far apart as they are in Wyoming and South Carolina, would be less likely to allocate money for personal contact since going door-to-door would be so time consuming. It seems more likely that such candidates would choose to allocate their dollars for broad forms of contact in order to reach voters living far apart from one another. Similarly, in districts where voters live close together, it is much easier for
candidates and their workers to go door-to-door. In addition, districts where voters live close together are generally located in large cities where advertising through mass media channels is inefficient.

The result of this is that the states which form the ends of the professionalism continuum (Illinois and Wyoming) have very distinctive characteristics which may make them unsuitable for determining the effects of professionalism on choice of voter contact technique. In the next section we will try to control for these confounding district-level factors though multiple regression. In addition, a number of other factors on the candidate and campaign levels are tested which may influence the distribution of voter contact dollars.

**Factors Influencing Spending on Techniques**

It is expected that four different sets of factors may influence a candidate’s choice of voter contact techniques. These factors are on the candidate, campaign, district, and state levels. The goal is to determine the extent to which candidates use (1) broad forms of contact versus narrow forms, and (2) personal forms of contact versus impersonal forms. Each factor will be discussed in terms of their possible effects on choice of techniques within these categories.
Candidate-Level

Candidate Type

The mix of voter contact strategies used by candidates may vary with the type of candidate. It is expected that open seat candidates will be more likely than incumbents or even challengers to use mass media advertising. Open seat candidates have usually never run in the district before and are probably less able to determine where their potential support lies. These candidates are looking for support wherever they can find it.

Incumbents, however, are more aware of their core constituency because these are the voters who gave their support in the last election. Incumbents know who these voters are and will try to mobilize them. Incumbents, it would seem, might be more likely to use direct forms of contact which can be “narrowcasted” to their supporters. On the other hand, incumbents also usually have enough resources that utilization of the mass media is not prohibitive. Incumbents may want to use the mass media which is clearly less labor intensive than many forms of direct contact with voters. Mass media advertising may also be attractive to incumbents who have aspirations for higher office. While such techniques may be wasted on voters who cannot vote for the incumbent in the current election (such as voters who receive the television signal but who do not live in the district), these voters may be able to vote for the incumbent if he or she decides to make a bid for a congressional or state-wide office. Increased name familiarity with these voters might be seen as a benefit.

Finally, challengers are likely to have few resources to mount media oriented campaigns and will probably choose to target their money toward groups that are
disaffected by the incumbent. They will opt for more direct forms of contact, but will probably choose the less expensive techniques such as canvassing and telephoning.

**Campaign-Level**

**Availability of Resources**

Another candidate-level feature is the amount of resources available to the candidate’s campaign. It is expected that candidates who have a great deal of money to spend will allocate a higher percentage of their voter contact dollars for mass media advertising, all other things being equal. As noted earlier, several scholars indicate that high spending is related to use of more “modern” techniques such as television, a form of mass media advertising.

**Information Gathering**

The extent to which candidates engage in information gathering may influence the choice of voter contact techniques. More specifically, greater information gathering is likely to result in use of more narrow forms of contact. Candidates who gather information probably know more about which voters to contact and which to leave alone. As shown in Chapter Five, many candidates maintain a database of voters living in the district, often collecting the telephone numbers and addresses of likely voters. Candidates who have such information probably collected it for the purpose of being able to “narrowcast” their message.
Targeting

Candidates who engage in targeting of the population are likely to use more narrow forms of contact than those who do not target. Those who target are trying to reach only a selected group of voters in the districts. One of the more effective ways of reaching these voters is through the use of narrow forms of contact. Herrnson (1995) finds support for this in his analysis of congressional campaigns in 1992. He finds that “[c]ampaigns that target individuals who live in particular neighborhoods, work in certain occupations, or belong to specific segments of the population (such as women, the elderly, or members of an ethnic group) make greater use of direct mail than do campaigns that focus their efforts on less easily identifiable groups, such as single-issue voters” (p. 202). Do we find similar results in the state legislative setting?

Electoral Competition

The degree of electoral competition may have a significant influence on the use of particular contact techniques. While candidates do not always know how close a race will be in the end, they usually have some idea of how their campaign is doing from several sources: how voters are reacting and from the level of campaign activity of the opponent(s). As indicated in the last chapter, candidates in competitive races where the outcome is in doubt will probably make a greater effort to appeal to as many voters as possible. Kingdon (1966) hypotheses and finds some empirical support for the contention that “the greater the politician’s uncertainty about his election chances, the greater would be his efforts to enlarge his coalition by attracting more groups and more
voters as well” (p. 85). It is expected that such behavior will be manifested in candidate spending strategies. We would expect that candidates in more highly competitive races would spend a larger amount of their effort on mass media advertising than candidates in less competitive ones. While nearly all candidates may know where some of his or her potential support lies in the district, if the election outcome swings in the balance, the candidate may be more likely to use mass media advertising to attract voters who are not as easy to identify.

District-Level

Three factors related to the district may have an important influence on allocation strategy: total population, population density, and congruence with media markets.

Total Population

The total population of the district is probably one of the more important factors which influences the choice of campaign techniques. It is expected that candidates running in districts with large populations will be more likely to rely on mass media advertising than candidates running in districts with small populations. If such candidates use narrow forms of contact, they are likely to be the impersonal variety. In districts with large populations, personal contact with a sizable percentage of the electorate is prohibitive. Jacobson finds support for this in his comparisons of voter knowledge about candidates running for the U.S. House and those running for the much larger U.S. Senate districts. He finds that “[v]oters are twice as likely to have had some kind of face-to-face
interaction with the House incumbent or his staff. Twenty percent of the voters claim to have met with the House incumbent personally, only 9 percent say the same about the Senate incumbent" (1992: p. 124).

It is expected that candidates in larger districts will be more likely to use broad-based advertising while candidates in smaller districts will rely more on narrow-based personal forms of contact.

**Population Density**

Population density refers varies rather dramatically across the districts within each state. Several candidates articulated their understanding of the constraints imposed on their campaigns by the geographic placement of voters. One candidate, for instance noted that:

> *Some people are strong advocates of a door-to-door campaign, I think this is probably a good idea if you are running in an area where you are not well known."* "It is still a good idea, but from a time-standpoint, it is easier and more efficient to use the phone, though I think face to face contact is better.

It is expected that higher population density will be associated with more extensive use of direct forms of voter contact such as signs and canvassing. It is much easier for candidates to go door-to-door when voters are not scattered far apart. When population density is low and voters are spread over a large area, more personalized forms of contact such as canvassing, meeting with voters, distribution of literature, and signage are all rather inefficient forms of contact. Mass media advertising would seem to be the predominant form of advertising in districts with low population density.
Media Market Congruence

Jewell and Olson (1988) indicate that "[t]he utility of various media to a campaign varies with the congruence between the location of the office’s constituency, on the one hand, and the viewing-circulation audiences of the media, on the other" (p. 147). Media market congruence refers to the degree of overlap between a television market and a legislative district. While the definition refers specifically to television markets, other mass media including radio stations and newspapers are likely to have similar coverage areas. When there is greater congruence of media markets and districts, candidates will be more likely to use mass media advertising because it is an efficient way to contact voters. When there is much less congruence, many advertising dollars are wasted on voters who are not in the legislative district. Candidates in districts with low congruence are therefore less likely to allocate money for mass media advertising.

Several studies of congressional elections note the importance of media markets to incumbency advantage and to general campaign strategies (Campbell, et al., 1984; Goldenberg and Traugott, 1984; Jacobson, 1992; Herrnson, 1995; Maisel, 1982; Salmore and Salmore, 1985). One study on the state level finds support for the influence of media market congruence on the distribution of spending in state legislative campaigns (Hogan, 1997).
State-Level

Legislative Professionalism

While already tested and found to be of little consequence in influencing differences in spending across states, this variable is controlled in this equation. We may find that it has an effect once a number of other factors have been taken into consideration, especially population density and level of spending. As before, we would expect that candidates running for office in states with more professionalized legislatures would spend more on broad forms of contact and less on narrow-personal forms of contact. Candidates running for office in citizen legislatures, on the other hand, would be more likely to spend a much smaller percentage on broad forms of contact, but much more on narrow and personal techniques.

Multivariate Models

Before detailing the statistical models, it seems appropriate to review in tabular form the expectations regarding the influence of each of the factors just discussed on the dependent variables: percentage of spending allocated for broad forms of contact and percentage of spending allocated for personal forms of contact. A positive or negative sign is indicated for the expected direction of the coefficient. An “O” is provided in those cells where there is no hypothesized relationship. Note in particular the control variables for party.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Percent Spent on Personal Contact</th>
<th>Percent Spent on Broad Contact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Seat</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spending Per Eligible Voter</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Gathering</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeting</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media Congruence</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Legislature (IL)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen Legislature (WY)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In order to test the influence of the other factors, multiple regression equations are utilized. The dependent variable is the percentage of voter contact spending allocated toward mass media advertising and the percentage of voter contact spending allocated toward personal forms of contact. These categories of spending correspond to the categories previously listed in Tables 8.2 and 8.3.

Each dependent variable is used in two regression equations, one for the primary and one for the general election. Only those candidates who spent money are included. The equations take the following form:

\[
PERSONAL = a - b_1INC - b_2OPEN + b_3PARTY - b_4SPEND + b_5INFOR + b_6TAR + b_7COMP - b_8POP + b_9POPDEN - b_{10}MEDCONG - b_{11}PROF + b_{12}CITIZEN + e
\]

\[
BROAD = a - b_1INC + b_2OPEN + b_3PARTY + b_4SPEND - b_5INFOR - b_6TAR + b_7COMP + b_8POP - b_9POPDEN + b_{10}MEDCONG + b_{11}PROF - b_{12}CITIZEN + e
\]
Where:

PERSONAL = Percent of total voter contact spending allocated toward narrow, personal voter contact.

BROAD = Percent of total voter contact spending allocated toward broad (mass media) voter contact.

INC = A dichotomous variable indicating an incumbent candidate (1=incumbent and 0=not an incumbent).

OPEN = A dichotomous variable indicating an open seat candidate (1=open seat candidate and 0=not an open seat candidate).

PARTY = A control variable for party (Democrat=1 and Republican =0).

SPEND = Total campaign spending per eligible voter in the district.

INFOR = Extent of information gathering. This is a trichotomous variable. Candidates who neither analyze previous election results nor collect data on voters receive a “0”. Those who only engage in one of these activities receive a “1” while those who do both receive a “2”. Values for this variable can therefore be 0, 1, or 2.

TAR = Did the campaign target voters during the campaign? A dichotomous variable (1=yes; 0=no).

COMP = Anticipated Electoral Competition. In the general election is measured as a dichotomous variable (1 or 0) with 1 indicating races which are close (the margin between the candidates is less than 20 points). In the primary election this is measured as the number of candidates running.

POP = Total number of the district’s eligible voters.

POPDEN = Total number of persons per square mile in the legislative district.
\[ \text{MEDCONG} = \text{The congruence between the legislative district and the media market.} \]

\[ \text{PROF} = \text{A dichotomous variable indicating a professional legislature (Illinois=1, all other states=0).} \]

\[ \text{CITIZEN} = \text{A dichotomous variable indicating a citizen legislature (Wyoming=1, all other states =0).} \]

The results of these equations are displayed in Table 8.6. As one can clearly see, few of the variables are statistically significant. In addition, the variables explain very little of the variance in the percentage of candidates spending allocated to the different techniques.\(^{97}\)

Which of these variables appears to be most influential for the allocation of voter contact spending in state legislative races? Candidate status does not appear to matter very much. Only open seat candidates in primaries are likely to differ from other candidates as they allocate a lower percentage of dollars toward narrow forms of contact. However, party identification of the candidate is statistically significant in three of the four equations denoting differences in the allocation strategies of Democrats and Republicans. Democrats have a tendency to allocate a larger share of spending to personal forms and less to broad forms of contact than Republican candidates. This may be a reflection of traditional methods of contacting voters by candidates of the particular parties.

Only one of the campaign-level variables is statistically significant, and in just one equation. As we would expect, information gathering is negatively associated with use of broad forms of contact in the general election. This lends support to the notion that those who lack adequate information on voters are more likely to use broad form of
Table 8.6
Regression Analysis of Factors Influencing the Percentage of Voter Contact Spending Allocated To Personal and Broad Forms of Voter Contact in Primary and General Elections in 1994
(Un-standardized coefficients)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Primary Narrow-Personal</th>
<th>Primary Broad</th>
<th>General Narrow-Personal</th>
<th>General Broad</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.0466</td>
<td>0.2650**</td>
<td>0.0694**</td>
<td>0.295***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent</td>
<td>0.0059</td>
<td>0.0222</td>
<td>0.0278</td>
<td>-0.0144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Seat Candidate</td>
<td>-0.0588*</td>
<td>0.0005</td>
<td>-0.0030</td>
<td>0.0429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>0.0574*</td>
<td>0.0579</td>
<td>0.0267*</td>
<td>-0.0554*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Spending</td>
<td>0.0415</td>
<td>0.0426</td>
<td>-0.0072</td>
<td>0.0148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Gathering</td>
<td>0.0206</td>
<td>-0.0088</td>
<td>0.0123</td>
<td>-0.0522**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeting Voters</td>
<td>0.0009</td>
<td>-0.0711</td>
<td>0.00914</td>
<td>-0.0252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition</td>
<td>0.0023</td>
<td>-0.0119</td>
<td>-0.0274</td>
<td>0.00966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Population</td>
<td>0.0000006</td>
<td>-0.0000006</td>
<td>-0.000001***</td>
<td>0.0000005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density</td>
<td>-0.000007</td>
<td>-0.00002***</td>
<td>0.000004</td>
<td>-0.000012***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media Market Congruence</td>
<td>-0.0018</td>
<td>0.0087</td>
<td>0.00437*</td>
<td>0.0104**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional (IL)</td>
<td>0.0149</td>
<td>0.0693</td>
<td>0.0878***</td>
<td>-0.0394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen (WY)</td>
<td>-0.01549</td>
<td>-0.0068</td>
<td>-0.0330</td>
<td>0.123**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adjusted $R^2$ = 0.079  0.139  0.093  0.162
N= 124  124  301  301
contact -- they scatter their message to as many people as possible (because they are less
certain about how to narrowcast the message). Campaign spending, targeting of voters,
and electoral competition are not related to voter contact strategy in any equation. The
most surprising of these non-significant variables is spending. The level of available of
funding does not appear to significantly contribute to the manner in which voter contact
dollars are allocated. Those candidates who spend a great deal of money spend it in ways
similar to those who have little money. Such findings call into question the assumption
often made that higher levels of spending are correlated with use of modern techniques
such as television advertising.

The variables which appear to have the most consistent influence on spending
patterns are those related to the district. Total population is significant in only one
equation (narrow-personal contact in the general) but does have the anticipated effect.
Candidates running in districts with large populations are choosing to spend less on
personal campaigning because they recognize the daunting task of contacting a sizable
portion of the electorate.

Population density is negatively correlated with percentage of funding allocated
for broad forms of contact in both primary and general election cycles. This finding too
is as we had expected to find. Candidates running in districts where potential voters are
located close to one another are less likely to spend money on these types of activities.

Finally, media market congruence is positively correlated with use of broad forms
of contact in one of the equations. As expected, it is positively correlated with use of
broad forms of contact but only in the general election period. Unexpectedly, however, it
is also positively associated with the percentage of personal contact used. An explanation for this last finding is not readily apparent.

Measures of institutional context (dummy variables for Illinois and Wyoming) are significant in two equations, but as found in earlier descriptive analyses, the effects are in the opposite direction than expected. In general election contests candidates in Illinois are more likely to use personal forms of contact while candidates in Wyoming are more likely to use broad forms of contact. Explanations for these findings are probably related to factors associated with districts in the two states. Again, most of the districts in Wyoming have low population density making broad forms of contact more efficient whereas districts in Illinois have much higher densities in addition to low media congruence, thus making broad forms of contact very inefficient.

Overall, these findings show that spending priorities differ across campaigns and are linked in varying degrees to several of the variables tested. Of those variables, it appears that contextual features of the district are having a greater impact on how money is allocated than candidate or campaign level factors. While the magnitudes of these variables are rather low and none explain much of the variance in percentages of spending allocated for the different techniques, they are at least more important than candidate and campaign level factors. Such findings show that candidates of varying types (incumbents, challengers, and open seat contenders) who posses varying levels of political resources allocate their voter contact dollars in reaction to variations in contextual features of the district.
While the findings are not as robust as one might hope, these results do point to the importance of district and state features for campaign strategy. Part of the difficulty in studying how district features influence techniques is that whether a technique is "broad" or "narrow" may depend on how it is used. Take the use of advertising through the mail as an example. A candidate could use this technique very narrowly if he or she has a detailed list of voters he wishes to contact. However, mailings can also be used rather broadly if the candidate chooses, perhaps by mailing literature to every person in the district regardless of their probability of voting. The same is even true of broadcast media. Herrnson (1995) says of radio broadcasting in congressional districts that it "allows candidates to target voters with great precision" (p. 188). Candidates can indeed target certain types of voters based on the listenership of particular stations.

As Chapter Six indicated, large percentages of candidates (70%) target voters. What we may be observing is that candidates use techniques which are suited to reaching their targeted audience. Candidates take into consideration the nature of the district, but also the position of the voters which are distributed within the district. Some candidates may find that their targeted voters are best reached through "broad" forms of contact than through more narrow forms even though their intent is to narrowcast their message. Such a strategy cannot be determined with the methods used in this chapter. Such questions can only be answered by understanding more about the targeted group of voters -- especially how they are distributed in the district. In addition, we would probably also want to categorize techniques more precisely based on the intended audience.
The fact that some district features are having at least some influence on technique usage (given the crude manner in which it is measured) would appear to indicate that candidates take contextual features into account as they attempt to communicate with voters in the district. Future work in this area can explore these questions in greater detail by trying to link the technique to the intended audience.

**Allocation of Candidate Time**

So far this chapter has examined the allocation of campaign spending on methods of voter contact. However, understanding the extent to which candidates interact personally with voters may be difficult to infer from a focus solely on spending strategies. For example spending on leaflets and food for campaigners is probably not an ideal indicator of personal campaigning.

Probably a better method of determining the extent of personal involvement on the part of candidates is to see how candidates spend their time during the campaign. For instance, what percentage of their time is devote to interacting with voters as opposed to other activities like recruiting workers, raising money, strategizing, or non-campaign related activities (such as their normal job). Time is often as important a commodity to candidates as money.

The survey instrument administered in 1994 asked candidates to indicate what percentage of their time during the height of the campaign was spent on the following activities: “recruiting campaign workers and volunteers”, “fundraising”, “devising campaign strategy”, “campaigning for votes”, and “non-campaign related activities”.
Candidates were asked to provide a percentage for each category of activities for both the primary and general election campaigns. Table 8.7 provides a breakdown of the average amounts of their time candidates spend on various activities in primary and general election periods.

These percentages show that the time candidates allocate for different activities is very similar in both the primary and general election periods. At the height of their campaign efforts, candidates spend the largest percentage of their time campaigning for votes. Both primary and general election candidates say that slightly more than 40% of their time is spent on such activities. Other campaign activities such as recruiting workers and devising strategy take up much less time. Only about 13% of candidates’ time in primaries and 17% in general elections is taken up by fundraising. Normal, non-campaign related activities take up about one-fourth of a typical candidate’s time.

Another interesting feature in Table 8.7 is the standard deviations for each of these percentages. These figures appear to indicate that variation exists in the percentage of time candidates allocate for different activities. What might be influencing such variations?

Part of the explanation may be the status of the candidate. It seems reasonable to assume that incumbents probably need to spend less time campaigning than challengers or open seat contenders. Incumbents probably spend a higher percentage of time than others on non-campaign related activities. We may also find variations across states based on differences in legislative professionalism. For example, candidates running in states with citizen legislatures are likely to spend less time on campaign activities of any
Table 8.7
Percentage of Candidate Time Allocated to Various Activities During the Height of their 1994 Primary and General Election Campaigns
(Standard deviations in parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>General</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Campaigning For Votes</td>
<td>25% (20)</td>
<td>41% (21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Campaign Related Activity</td>
<td>24% (22)</td>
<td>29% (23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundraising</td>
<td>13% (12)</td>
<td>17% (14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devising Campaign Strategy</td>
<td>10% (9)</td>
<td>10% (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruiting Campaign Workers and Volunteers</td>
<td>9% (10)</td>
<td>8% (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL Percentage</td>
<td>100% (227)</td>
<td>100% (394)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
sort, spending most of their time on non-campaign related endeavors. However, because campaigns in less professionalized settings require fewer dollars and smaller organizations, we may see candidates spending more of their “campaign time” on interacting with voters.

Tables 8.8 and 8.9 report for candidates by status and state the average percentage of time spent campaigning for votes, other campaign related activities (recruiting volunteers, fundraising, and devising strategy), and normal non-campaign activities in primary and general elections.

These results would appear to support the notion that the allocation of time varies across states. In some states, candidates spend a large portion of their time campaigning for votes while in others they spend a much smaller amount. For example, in South Carolina primary elections and Wyoming general election, the typical candidate spends approximately 50% of his or her time campaigning for votes while in Oregon and Illinois only about 40% in either election period is spent on this activity. Time spent on other campaign activities varies as well from a low in Wyoming of about 18% of a typical primary or general election candidate’s time to a high of 40% for a candidate in Oregon general elections. Time spent on normal activities varies also from a low of about 17% in Texas primaries to a high of about 43% in Wyoming primaries.

Analysis of variance tests (not shown) indicate that these differences across states conform to expectations regarding differences in legislative professionalism. By dividing candidates into three categories of legislative professionalism, we find that primary candidates running in the more professional legislature allocate a smaller percentage of
### Table 8.8
Percentage of Candidate Time Allocated To Various Activities by Candidates in 1994 Primary Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Incumbents</th>
<th>Challengers</th>
<th>Open Seats</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Connecticut</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign for Votes</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Camp. Activities</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normal Activities</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Delaware</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign for Votes</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Camp. Activities</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normal Activities</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Illinois</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign for Votes</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Camp. Activities</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normal Activities</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Oregon</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign for Votes</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Camp. Activities</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normal Activities</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South Carolina</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign for Votes</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Camp. Activities</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normal Activities</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Texas</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign for Votes</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Camp. Activities</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normal Activities</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wyoming</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign for Votes</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Camp. Activities</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normal Activities</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AVERAGE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign for Votes</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Camp. Activities</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normal Activities</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=
(31)  (57)  (139)  (227)

*Shaded areas indicate statistically significant differences among candidate types at the 0.05 level or better (analysis of variance tests).
Table 8.9
Percentage of Candidate Time Allocated To Various Activities by Candidates in 1994 General Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Incumbents</th>
<th>Challengers</th>
<th>Open Seats</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Connecticut</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign for Votes</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Camp. Activities</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normal Activities</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Delaware</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign for Votes</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Camp. Activities</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normal Activities</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Illinois</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign for Votes</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Camp. Activities</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normal Activities</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Oregon</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign for Votes</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Camp. Activities</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normal Activities</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South Carolina</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign for Votes</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Camp. Activities</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normal Activities</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Texas</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign for Votes</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Camp. Activities</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normal Activities</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wyoming</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign for Votes</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Camp. Activities</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normal Activities</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**AVERAGE**

|                |            |             |            |      |
| Campaign for Votes | 39%  | 39%  | 46%  | 41%  |
| Other Camp. Activities| 37%  | 34%  | 34%  | 35%  |
| Normal Activities      | 25%  | 26%  | 20%  | 24%  |

N= (118) (159) (117) (394)

*Shaded areas indicate statistically significant differences among candidate types at the 0.05 level or better (analysis of variance tests).
their time to normal activities and a larger percentage on campaign activities aside from campaigning for votes than candidates running in less professional legislatures. In general elections, candidates in the more professional legislature spend a smaller percentage of their time campaigning for votes but a larger percentage of time engaging in other campaign activities than candidates running in less professional legislatures. These differences are statistically significant at the 0.05 level or greater.

Tables 8.8 and 8.9 also reveal differences across candidate types. The shaded areas indicate statistically significant differences among the candidate categories (analysis of variance tests, p<0.05). There are differences across candidate types within only two of the states (South Carolina and Oregon), however, the low number of cases in most of the cells precludes many of these differences from achieving statistical significance.

Therefore, the more important differences to observe are probably the overall differences for the entire sample reported at the bottom of the table. In the primary we find that open seat contenders spend the highest percentage of time campaigning for voters (45%) followed by challengers (41%) and lastly by incumbents (33%). Candidates of these different types allocate similar percentages of their time to campaigning in general elections. These differences are statistically significant in both election periods.

Another way to test the influence of professionalism and incumbency status on the amount of time candidates allocate for various activities is to use several of these factors in a multiple regression equation. This makes it possible to control for factors such as party, and more importantly, the effects of electoral competition for explaining the percentage of time candidates allocate toward campaigning. It seems plausible that
candidates who face greater electoral competition will spend more time campaigning for votes than candidates who face little competition. It will be interesting to see if the incumbency status of candidates holds once controls for competition have been put in place.

Two equations are used which examine the effects of these independent variables on the percentage of time candidates spend campaigning for votes and the percentage of time they spend going about their normal activities aside from the campaign. Each equation is estimated in both the primary and general election period and takes the following form:

\[
\begin{align*}
PERCAMP &= a - b_1INC + b_2OPEN + b_3PARTY + b_4COMP - b_5PROF + b_6CITIZEN + e \\
PERNORMAL &= a + b_4INC - b_2OPEN + b_3PARTY - b_4COMP - b_5PROF + b_6CITIZEN + e
\end{align*}
\]

Where:

\[
\begin{align*}
PERCAMP &= \text{Percentage of one’s time spent campaigning for votes at the height of the political campaign.} \\
PERNORMAL &= \text{Percentage of one’s time spent on normal activities at the height of the political campaign.}
\end{align*}
\]

Note that the independent variables used in this equation are measured in the same manner as those utilized earlier in this chapter. The results of these OLS regression analyses are provided in Table 8.10.
Table 8.10
Regression Analysis of Factors Influencing the Percentage of Time Candidates Allocate for Specific Types of Activities During the Height of Their Campaign Effort in 1994
(Un-standardized coefficients)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent of Time Campaigning for Votes</td>
<td>Percent of Time Spent on Normal Activities</td>
<td>Percent of Time Campaigning for Votes</td>
<td>Percent of Time Spent on Normal Activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>40.601***</td>
<td>33.160***</td>
<td>35.174***</td>
<td>29.507***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent</td>
<td>-9.298*</td>
<td>4.481</td>
<td>-1.761</td>
<td>-1.685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Seat Candidate</td>
<td>3.135</td>
<td>0.514</td>
<td>4.692</td>
<td>-5.050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>3.708</td>
<td>-3.410</td>
<td>2.972</td>
<td>-1.263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition</td>
<td>-0.259</td>
<td>-3.246*</td>
<td>6.715***</td>
<td>-7.142***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional (IL)</td>
<td>0.874</td>
<td>-1.807</td>
<td>-1.721</td>
<td>-0.237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen (WY)</td>
<td>-2.203</td>
<td>17.298***</td>
<td>9.001*</td>
<td>8.447*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adjusted R² = 0.022 0.080 0.060 0.033
N = (225) (225) (393) (393)
Interestingly, the variations just observed across candidate types virtually disappear once these other variables have been taken into account. Only incumbent candidates running in primaries allocate a lower percentage of time to campaigning for votes even after electoral competition is taken into consideration. Competition is important in three of the four equations. In both election cycles greater competition leads to less time that candidates spend on normal activities. Greater competition does lead to a higher percentage of time spent on campaigning in general elections, but does not have an effect in the primary. Candidates running for seats in the professional legislature (Illinois) do not spend their time differently than candidates in other states. But candidates running for a seat in a citizen legislature (Wyoming) spend a larger percentage of their time campaigning for votes than candidates running for seats in other legislatures (though only in the primary election period). Candidates running in Wyoming, however, also spend a much larger percentage of their time on normal activities. As the coefficients indicate, primary candidates in Wyoming spend approximately 17 percentage points more time on normal activities than candidates in other states. Campaigning, like the job of legislator in Wyoming, is a part-time undertaking -- most candidates spend their time going about their normal routine. However, they still campaign more in the general election than most candidates in other states (nine percentage points more time allocated for campaigning). It appears that candidates running in this state spend little time on other campaign activities aside from trying to gain votes. But, this should not be too surprising given what we have seen generally of campaigns in Wyoming -- they raise
small amounts of money (Chapter Three) and they have relatively little organization complexity (Chapter Four).

Overall this section shows that a number of factors influence the extent to which candidates engage in campaign activities. Of particular importance to the amount of time spent campaigning is the degree of electoral competition and legislative professionalism.

Conclusions and Implications

Several key findings have resulted from this examination of how voter contact dollars are allocated in state legislative campaigns:

- Similar to campaigns on the congressional level, state legislative campaigns utilize a wide variety of techniques to contact voters. However, unlike their congressional counterparts, most dollars do not go for “broad” forms of contact such as mass media advertising. Instead state legislative candidates allocate a preponderance of their resources toward what is termed “narrow” contact, much of which can be described specifically as “impersonal” because it does not require face-to-face interaction with voters. Money spent for mailings consumes the single largest category of voter contact expenses for candidates in most states during both primary and general election periods.

- Legislators in different states vary in the percentage of voter contact dollars that they allocate to various forms of contact. This is particularly true regarding the percentage of funding for personal, narrow, and broad forms of contact. Variations in spending patterns
are found to be linked less to candidate-level and campaign-level factors than they are to contextual features of the districts and states. The most interesting non-finding from this analysis is the lack of a relationship between campaign spending and voter contact strategy used -- those with more money do not necessarily spend money on different types of techniques (in particular mass media advertising).

- There is quite a large degree of variation in the percentage of time which candidates spend campaigning for votes. The analysis from this chapter points to the importance of electoral competition and legislative professionalism. Incumbents, challengers, and open seat contenders allocate their time similarly, indicating again that contextual features related to the district and state have a substantial impact on the strategy even on personal campaigning.

These findings show very clearly that techniques used for contacting voters in state legislative races are very different from those used in congressional campaigns, particularly in the extent of mass media advertising. Such findings would seem to show that state legislative candidates are utilizing techniques which bring them in closer proximity to the voter. However, as the itemized spending clearly shows, most techniques fall into what is best considered "impersonal" forms of contact. Most of the contact in state legislative races occurs through the mail. One has to question from a normative perspective whether or not such contact is any better or worse than contact through the newspaper, radio, or television. It may be that candidates are able to send
very different messages through the mail than through radio or television. For example, mailed advertisements may make it more likely that candidates will convey their stands on issues and policy proposals than if they used radio or television spot advertisements. Future research into the content of advertising and the extent to which different types of media convey image versus issue and policy relevant material is needed before any firm conclusions can be reached.

While state legislative candidates may not use what many consider "modern" forms of voter contact, the manner in which mailings are sent and signs are placed certainly appears to be rather modern. The finding that a high proportion of voter contact funding goes for narrow forms of contact coupled with the findings from Chapter Six showing that large numbers of candidates engage in targeting, leads to the implication that narrowcasting of messages is prevalent on the state legislative level. While this technique is often discussed less as a technique of modern campaigning, it presents a dilemma for representative democracy. Only those voters whom candidates want to send their messages to will ultimately hear them. Even if this message is simply a friendly reminder of the upcoming election, it means that some voters will be enticed to vote while others are not.

This analysis indicates very clearly that the strategy of voter contact adopted by candidates is influenced by conditions associated with the districts and states in which they run. Findings reveal that such features influence not only the allocation of voter contact dollars to some techniques over others, but also how candidates choose to spend their time. In other words, these conditions have an influence on how candidates interact
with voters. One can only speculate as to the ultimate effect that this may have on those candidates who go on to hold public office and represent their constituents. Future research should certainly look into what effect this interaction may have.
Chapter 9
Campaigns and Election Outcomes

A substantial difference exists between the minimal significance that academic studies have attributed to campaigns and the influence attributed to them by candidates, political consultants, and members of the media. According to most previous research . . . the most important factors are thought to be those largely beyond the campaign's influence, such as the voters' party identification, rather than the strategic behavior of candidates during the campaign.

--Goldenberg and Traugott

[c]andidates and campaigns do make a difference in the election outcomes. Students of election outcomes cannot leave campaigns out of their calculations. And students of campaigns should recognize the ways in which candidates can shape their own campaigns and the limitations to their influence.

--Richard Fenno

Introduction

Previous chapters show that campaigns vary greatly across states and districts. A number of factors have been identified which explain the different campaigns that are waged in terms of their organization, information gathering, and strategic allocation of resources. This chapter focuses on the implications of these differences. Some time has already been spent addressing the effect that several of these campaign features have on one another, but how might these characteristics have an effect beyond the campaign? In particular what impact might these differences have on the percentage of the vote a candidate receives on election day?
This chapter consists of two parts. The first part attempts to incorporate several campaign dimensions into existing models of election outcomes. How do factors such as organizational strength and professionalism, information gathering, strategic targeting, and use of money influence the percentage of the vote that a candidate receives? Do such factors play a large role in the ability of candidates to garner voter support? Is the manner in which money is allocated as important as the total amount allocated? If there are benefits to certain styles or techniques of campaigning, then some candidates may have advantages over others. Such finding would appear to have implications for the debate over the distribution of money and for possible reforms aimed at leveling the financial playing field among candidates.

The second part of this chapter considers candidate perceptions concerning the relative influence of campaigns. How important do candidates believe various aspects of the campaign are for election outcomes? In other words, do candidates believe that issue positions they emphasize are as important as, say, endorsements they received? Do they believe that the strength of their campaign organization is as critical as the image and personality which they project? Overall, how important do candidates believe their campaign effort is for election outcomes? Do candidates feel that their actions really make a difference or do they believe that the outcome is due mostly to forces beyond their control? Post-election survey responses by both winners and losers will give insight into what candidates think about these issues. How candidates answer such question may have implications for representation. For example, candidates who believe their actions can make a difference will probably spend more time campaigning. Beliefs developed
and colored by the campaign process may therefore have an influence on how the elected representative interacts with constituents after taking office.

**Two Divergent Perspectives**

As indicated earlier in Chapter One, political scientists have spent much effort in examining the effects of campaigns on election outcomes, unfortunately they have focused most of their attention on understanding the effects of resources such as candidate status, partisanship of the district, and campaign spending on percentage of the vote received by candidates. Political practitioners often report that decisions made about the campaign organization, information gathering, and strategy ultimately determine how candidates do at the polls. Thurber and Nelson (1995) recently wrote that “[t]he one clear difference that emerges in an examination of the way political scientists and political practitioners look at elections is that political scientists assume, by and large, that election outcomes are determined by forces other than the election campaign, whereas political practitioners assume that the campaign itself determines the outcome” (p. 224). The goal of this chapter is to begin to bridge the gap between these two varying perspectives.

For those who run for office, manage the campaigns of others, or volunteer in the organization, the centrality of the campaign process is seldom questioned. Political practitioners spend a great deal of time and effort engaging in campaign activity because they believe that such effort has a payoff. Many of those who write on the subject or who give advice on putting together a campaign attribute great importance to organizational components, strategy, and choice of communication technique. In one “how-to” manual
about campaigns entitled, *Winning Elections: A Handbook of Modern Participatory Politics*, the author (Dick Simpson) notes very explicitly that choices made during the campaign have consequences for the outcome. A campaign is won or lost by specific decisions made by individuals (1996: p. 1).

While such a perspective may be common among political practitioners, it is very different from that taken by most academic scholars. Early behavioral research found campaigns to have only a minimal effect on voting. Studies by Lazarsfeld, et al. (1944), Berelson, et al. (1954), and others found that campaigns play only a minor role in individual voting decisions. Campbell, et al. (1960) found that voting was most heavily influenced by party identification, something that does not change dramatically over the course of an election campaign. Goldenberg and Traugott (1984) indicate that the small effects of campaigns reported by these early studies steered subsequent studies away from looking at the campaign in what the authors call “an accident of history” (p. 4).

Beginning in the 1960s party attachments began to weaken (Wattenberg, 1984) and the ability of campaigns to influence general election outcomes was enhanced. Today, a number of scholars are re-examining the effects of campaigns on individual level voting decisions. For example, West (1993) as well as Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1995) examine the effects of exposure to campaign ads on voter behavior. A study by Westlye (1991) of Senate campaigns finds campaign intensity to be a contributing factor to the levels of information held by voters. Charles Franklin (1991) also finds that candidate campaign strategies influence voter perceptions about candidates. A recent study by Thomas Holbrook (1996) aptly entitled, *Do Campaigns Matter?* shows that
events during the course of presidential campaigns have significant effects on support for
candidates over the course of the campaign.

Apart from this more recent research, the vast majority of studies concerning
legislative elections have focused not so much on the campaigns as they have on one of
the resources utilized by campaigns -- money. A number of studies on both the
congressional and state legislative levels find campaign spending to be a factor in
determining the percentage of the vote a candidate receives (e.g., Gierzynski and Breaux,
and 1980; Owens and Olson, 1977; Tucker and Weber, 1987; Welch, 1976). These
studies conclude that money does have an impact on election outcomes for challengers
and candidates running in open seats. However, they disagree as to the influence of
incumbent spending. For example, Jacobson (1978 and 1980) finds that spending by
congressional incumbents does not influence vote share, while Green and Krasno (1988),
Thomas (1989), and Kenny and McBurnett (1994) argue that incumbent spending does
matter, though its influence is less influential than challenger spending. While the effects
of spending may indeed vary by candidate type, this literature establishes a clear
relationship between spending and electoral outcomes both at the aggregate and
individual levels.

A potential problem with this method of gauging campaign effects is that total
spending may not be an adequate measure of campaign effort. Not all of a candidate’s
spending may be allocated toward influencing voters. Studies by Fritz and Morris (1992)
and Morris and Gamache (1994) find that congressional candidates, particularly
incumbents, often spend large sums of campaign dollars on activities unassociated with the campaign, or spend lavishly on organizational expenses. Use of total spending without removing the non-campaign related items has been shown to mis-measure the effects of spending on outcomes in both congressional (Ansolabehere and Gerber, 1994) and state legislative (Hogan, 1998) elections.

A few studies have attempted to get around these problems by focusing only on voter contact spending. For example, the studies just cited on the congressional (Ansolabehere and Gerber, 1994) and state legislative levels (Hogan, 1998) use total voter contact spending as independent variables to predict the percentage of the vote received by challengers. Other studies have tried to be even more specific by utilizing only spending on media advertising in congressional races (Dawson and Zinser, 1971; Jacobson, 1975; Wanat, 1974). Some studies even utilize direct measures of campaign activity, focusing on the effects of party effort on levels of voter turnout and percentage of the vote received (Blydenburgh, 1971; Crotty, 1971; Cutright and Rossi, 1958; Eldersveld, 1956; Katz and Eldersveld, 1961). Unfortunately, most of these studies were conducted in the 1950s and 1960s prior to the decline in partisanship, the rise in candidate-centered politics, and the proliferation of modern campaign technology.

But even such direct measures of candidate and party activity may not completely capture what many political practitioners often cite as being of major importance. For example, such a perspective does not always take into account the notion that how one allocates money (not just the amount allocated) can have an effect. One political practitioner, for example, notes that “money helps in a campaign, but it by no means
assures election" (p. 68). He goes on to say that “[o]ccasionally a candidate may lose simply because he is outspent by a wealthy opponent and can’t match his television dollars, but what is more likely to happen is that a candidate with limited funds doesn’t spend his money wisely” (p. 68) An often quoted comment made by political practitioners which sums up this principal is that “smart dimes beat dumb dollars”. In other words, even a small amount of money can go a long way if it is used wisely. In fact this is often considered the “art” in political campaigning -- knowing how to build a campaign, implement a strategy and contact voters in a cost-effective and efficient manner.

How do the campaign organizations, decision making, and strategy ultimately influence how a candidate does on election day? For example, what types of campaigns, using what forms of voter contact are likely to bring about a particular election outcome? Many studies try to make the connection between the campaign and election outcome by focusing on how voters perceive campaign messages, however, very few studies focus on the linkage between campaign characteristics and election outcomes on the aggregate level. One recent study by Herrnson (1995) has made such an attempt by incorporating some of these factors into existing aggregate models of elections. For example, he tries to determine the differential impact of various types of voter contact spending. He also considers the effects of strategic targeting utilized by candidates. Overall, Herrnson (1995) concludes that campaigns have a great impact on election outcomes and comments that “[t]his comes as no surprise to those who toil in campaign, but it is in direct contrast to what many scholars would argue” (1995: p. 2).
But even Herrnson’s (1995) study does not fully capture what many political practitioners’ perceive to be the more important aspects of the political campaign. He does not look, for example, at the effects of information gathering or organization on the percentage of the vote received. The goal of this chapter is to use aspects of both the political practitioners’ as well as the academic’s perspective to determine those factors which have an influence on election outcomes. By viewing parts of the campaign as a process, we can better understand what is having an effect. Unlike other studies, the intent here is not to simply measure campaign effort by use of another variable so much as it is to capture the effects of several of these variables working together.

Part of bridging this gap between the practitioner’s perspective and that of the political scientist entails understanding how candidates view campaigns. Do they think their effort makes a difference? Very few empirical studies of campaigns incorporate candidate perceptions about the campaign process. Yet, this may be one of the more important aspects of campaigns to consider. Scholars often note that to understand the behavior of elected representatives within institutions, we need to pay closer attention to how they got there. For example, Hershey (1984) states plainly that “campaigning is an integral part of the representation process” (p. 268). Fenno (1978) comments that a legislator “cannot represent the people unless he knows, or makes an effort to know, who they are, what they think, and what they want; and it is by campaigning for electoral support among them that he finds out such things” (p. 233).

What candidates think about this process of campaigning is therefore very important -- especially how they believe the campaign affects the outcome of the election.
As political practitioners they probably attribute greater importance to the campaign than political scientists who have been rather skeptical concerning a campaign's influence. But candidates may indeed vary in their beliefs about the effectiveness of campaign effort. It seems that candidates who believe that such activity is crucial for election outcomes would be more willing to campaign harder since they believe such effort has a payoff. Candidates who believe campaign effort is important to election outcomes are also probably willing to continue their constituency campaigning throughout their time in office. Such candidates may work to foster closer ties to voters through service provisions as well as work to promote those issues they believe constituents are concerned about.

Kingdon (1966) explores the perceptions of candidates toward campaigning in the 1960s. He finds that these experience shapes how they view their constituency and their role in the political process. In particular he identifies what he calls the "congratulation-rationalization" effect whereby,

[w]inners tend to congratulate both themselves (on a well-run campaign) and the voters (on their perceptive, intelligent judgments). Losers tend to rationalize their defeat by attributing it to factors beyond their control and depreciating the voters' interest in politics, their level of information, and their ability to judge election issues (1966: p. 147).

Kingdon believes that this effect may be working prior to the election as candidates sense what the outcome of the election will be. And it may also be working beyond the election once an elected official takes office. If candidates think voters hold them
accountable, they might work harder during their time in office to seek out constituents’ concerns as well as act on them.

For these reasons, candidate beliefs about campaign effects will be explored. Care will be taken to distinguish between winners and losers in order to consider Kingdon’s notion of the congratulation- rationalization phenomenon.

Influence of Campaign-Level Factors on Election Outcomes

At several points throughout this analysis it has been stated that there are no magic formulas for winning elective office. As many who work in campaigns or who study them are quick to point out, “[p]olitical campaigning is still more art than science” (Goldenberg and Traugott, 1984: 27). There is no agreed upon set of strategic moves which will bring about a greater share of the vote. Many political practitioners indicate that what works in one election, may not work in another. The effectiveness of techniques is highly determined by the contextual features of the district and the events or conditions surrounding the campaign.

One goal for this chapter is to provide a modest test of how aspects of the campaign may have an influence on the percentage of the vote that a candidate receives. In doing so we should recognize what is probably best labeled a “lack of optimism” expressed by many scholars with regard to modeling the effects of campaigns on election outcomes. Sorauf and Beck (1988), for example warn that,

*documenting the impact of a campaign is extremely difficult. For one thing, there are all manner of methodological difficulties. What we call the campaign is a*
congeries of events and activities; some of them are the
activities of the parties and the candidates, and some are
not. Consequently, it is difficult to say what part of the
total impact can be attributed to any part of the campaign
or its context. It is also difficult to determine what part of
the campaign the individual voter has been aware of and
how he or she perceived it (p. 296-297).

Such warnings have certainly been heeded by a large number of others who
maneuver around such pitfalls by simply operationalizing the entire process as total
campaign spending. Such a variable comes in handy in predicting voting in both
individual and aggregate-level studies. The reason for taking such a perspective is that a
great deal is going on in campaigns -- there are many pieces of them to consider.
Opening up this “black box”, if you will, makes things a bit messier. However, this is
necessary if we ever hope to begin to understand what parts of a campaign are critical for
influencing outcomes. This analysis, therefore, provides some initial tests of campaign
effects.

How might we go about determining the impact of campaigns on election
outcomes? The method to be used builds on previous studies which have looked mostly
at the effects of total spending on percentage of the vote received. Utilizing models of
outcomes developed by Jacobson (1978) for congressional elections and adapted by
Gierzynski and Breaux (1991, 1993, 1996) for use in the state legislative setting, we are
able to incorporate aspects of the campaign. This is accomplished in two different ways.
One is by using an index of campaign activity as an alternative to campaign spending.
How does an index which incorporates the organizational, informational, and strategic
aspects of the campaign process affect the percentage of the vote received by candidates?
The other method to determine campaign effects is to look specifically at how campaigns spend their voter contact dollars. Are some voter contact dollars more effective than others? Each of these methods is discussed in detail below.

**Index of Campaign Activity**

This analysis will utilize an alternative to total spending as a measure of campaign effort. An index is constructed which takes into consideration several of the aspects of the campaign dimensions discussed at some length in earlier chapters.

Two aspects of campaign organizations were covered in Chapter Four. Organizational strength refers to a campaign’s ability to engage in a number of activities for the purpose of electing the candidate. Indicators of an organization’s strength include the number of workers and the division of labor among them. Campaign professionalism involves several factors related to the compensation of workers and managers in addition to the presence of a designated campaign office. It is expected that campaigns which possess higher levels of organizational strength and professionalism will receive a higher proportion of the vote on election day.

Information collection and strategy are also likely to contribute to a campaign’s vote-gathering potential. Greater availability of information leads to greater precision in contacting voters. Campaigns which have high levels of information are more likely to target potential supporters and this targeting may in turn bring about a bigger payoff at the polls. The information gathering measure developed in Chapter Five along with the measure for targeting from Chapter Six are both used in constructing the campaign index.
While candidates have relied more and more on political consultants in recent years, their use in the state legislative setting is far from pervasive. As Chapter Five demonstrates, only about one-fourth of the sampled candidates in both the primary and general elections use consultants. The question for this analysis is what electoral benefit their use brings? A recent study by Medvic and Lenart (1997) of consultant usage by congressional candidates in the 1992 election cycle finds that challengers who used consultants increased their vote share on average by about five percentage points. Do we find that consultant usage contributes to higher vote margins in state legislative races?

Each of these factors is expected to contribute to a campaign’s ability to attract votes at the ballot box. However, examining the effect of each individually may lead us to underestimate their impact. Because the campaign is a process, from a theoretical standpoint it seems intuitive to analyze them together. For this reason, an index of campaigns is constructed utilizing each of the factors just described (organizational strength, organizational professionalism, information gathering, targeting, and use of political consultants). A factor analysis of these variables in both primary and general election periods separately shows that they are correlated and load on only one factor with an eigenvalue of greater than one. However, in order to facilitate interpretation, an index is constructed in which the value of each component contributes a value of “1” to the index.100 This additive index can range from 0 to 5 with a campaign receiving a “1” for each of the following characteristics:
Organizational strength = Use of organizational strength index variable from Chapter Four. If score is greater than 2 (0-4 possible).

Organizational professionalism = Use of organizational professionalism index variable from Chapter Four. If score is greater than 2 (0-4 possible).

Information gathering = Use of information gathering index from Chapter Five. If information gathering score is greater than 0 (range from 0-2).

Use of Targeting = Did the campaign target voters? (1=yes; 0=no).

Use of Consultants = Did the campaign reported use of a political consultant? (1=yes; 0=no).

One of the goals of this analysis is to determine if these aspects of campaigns in combination have an influence on the percentage of the vote that candidates receive. Can we detect an influence and how large is this influence relative to the effects of other variables?

Modeling the Influence of the Campaign Index

How do we go about testing the effects of the campaign index on the percentage of the vote candidates receive? A standard model of election outcomes developed by Jacobson (1978) is used to explain the percentage of the two-party vote won by candidates. Such models were used in Chapter Three and will be incorporated here with the addition of campaign-level variables. The effects of these variables are modeled separately for the primary and general election periods. The dependent variable for the primary election is the percentage of the primary vote received while the dependent
variable for the general election is the percentage of the two-party vote received. The equations take the following form:

\[
PERPVOTE = a + b_1CANSPEND - b_2OPPSPEND + b_3INC + b_4OPEN + b_5PARTY + b_6PASTVOTE + b_7PROF + b_8CITIZEN + b_9INDEX + e
\]

\[
PERGVOTE = a + b_1CANSPEND - b_2OPPSPEND + b_3INC + b_4OPEN + b_5PARTY + b_6PASTVOTE + b_7PROF + b_8CITIZEN + b_9INDEX + e
\]

Where:

\[
PERPVOTE = \text{Percentage of the total primary vote won by a candidate.}
\]

\[
PERGVOTE = \text{Percentage of the two-party vote won by a candidate.}
\]

\[
CANSPEND = \text{Per Eligible Voter Spending (in primary or general).}
\]

\[
OPPSPEND = \text{Per Eligible Voter Opponent Spending (in primary or general).}
\]

\[
INC = \text{An incumbent candidate (1=yes; 0=no).}
\]

\[
OPEN = \text{An open seat candidate (1=yes; 0=no).}
\]

\[
PARTY = \text{Party of the Candidate (1=Democrat and 0=Republican).}
\]

\[
CANUM = \text{Number of Candidates in the Primary Election.}
\]

\[
PASTVOTE = \text{Percentage of the Candidate Party's District Vote in 1992.}
\]

\[
PROF = \text{A dichotomous variable indicating a professional legislature (Illinois=1, all other states =0).}
\]

\[
CITIZEN = \text{A dichotomous variable indicating a citizen legislature (Wyoming=1, all other states =0).}
\]

\[
INDEX = \text{The campaign index variable which measures the extent of campaign activity.}
\]
In order to better understand the relative influence of the campaign index along with the other variables, an additional equation for each election is also estimated which simply uses the same variables but with the index excluded. Running these equations along side one another for both election periods should give insight into the relative influence of the campaign index. The results of these four equations are displayed in Table 9.1.

Model One in both the primary and general election periods displays the coefficients obtained from the standard equations which use total spending to explain the percentage of the vote received. Spending is a major determinant of vote percentages. The unstandardized coefficient shows that a candidate can increase his or her vote share in the primary by about one and one-half percentage point by spending around $0.10 more per eligible voter (a typical increase in spending that many candidates can afford; please Chapter Three). In the general election, this same increase in spending would raise the candidate’s vote share by only about .40 of a percentage point.

The columns labeled Model Two for both the primary and general elections provide the coefficients for models which use the campaign index in place of the candidate’s total expenditures. We see that these variables are statistically significant and strong explanatory factors. Similar to the effects of spending, we see that the variable has a larger impact in the primary than in the general election. In the primary we see that an increase in the index by one (out of a possible five) increases a candidate’s vote share in the primary by about three percentage points. A similar increase in the campaign index
Table 9.1
Regression Analysis of Factors Influencing Primary and General Election Vote Percentages in State Legislative Elections in 1994
(Un-Standardized coefficients, Standardized coefficients in parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th></th>
<th>General</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model #1</td>
<td>Model #2</td>
<td>Model #1</td>
<td>Model #2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>54.585***</td>
<td>48.329***</td>
<td>32.496***</td>
<td>28.856***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent Candidate</td>
<td>17.714***</td>
<td>23.142***</td>
<td>13.090***</td>
<td>14.653***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.308)</td>
<td>(0.414)</td>
<td>(0.385)</td>
<td>(0.432)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Seat Candidate</td>
<td>8.366***</td>
<td>7.865***</td>
<td>7.870***</td>
<td>8.546***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.205)</td>
<td>(0.196)</td>
<td>(0.229)</td>
<td>(0.253)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>0.758</td>
<td>0.714</td>
<td>-5.985***</td>
<td>-6.119***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(-0.192)</td>
<td>(-0.197)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate Expenditures</td>
<td>16.824***</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3.993***</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.317)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.225)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.383)</td>
<td>(-0.338)</td>
<td>(-0.220)</td>
<td>(-0.113)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Candidates</td>
<td>-5.850***</td>
<td>-6.187***</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.331)</td>
<td>(-0.360)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past Party Vote in District</td>
<td>-0.0424</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.282***</td>
<td>0.305***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.052)</td>
<td>(-0.023)</td>
<td>(0.424)</td>
<td>(0.456)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional (IL)</td>
<td>-1.520</td>
<td>-3.577</td>
<td>-2.175</td>
<td>-2.244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.031)</td>
<td>(-0.076)</td>
<td>(-0.053)</td>
<td>(-0.055)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen (WY)</td>
<td>0.253</td>
<td>1.481</td>
<td>-2.533</td>
<td>-2.370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(-0.045)</td>
<td>(-0.039)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Index</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-4.360**</td>
<td>(-0.199)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.417)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>401</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
variable in the general election brings only about half as large of an increase in vote share (approximately 1.36 percentage points).

Relative to spending, the campaign index is not nearly as important in explaining variance in the dependent variable. Looking at the standardized regression coefficients in both primary and general election periods we find that candidate expenditures remain better predictors of variance -- the campaign coefficient in the primary is only two-thirds the size of the spending coefficient in the primary and only about half the size of the spending coefficient in the general election. The $R^2$ statistics show that while the total amount of variance explained by the different models is similar, the $R^2$ is much smaller when the index is used rather than when the spending variable is used.

While this is a modest test, these findings do show that by incorporating some of the more direct measures of campaigning we can explain some of the variance in the percentage of the vote received by candidates. While total spending is still a better predictor, we do see some of the cumulative effects that campaign activity can have. The implication of this finding is that even financially deprived candidates can take actions that will increase their vote share. By undertaking such low cost techniques as recruiting volunteers, gathering information, and targeting potential parts of the electorate, candidates can increase their chances of winning.

_Differential Impact of Voter Contact Dollars_

Another way in which previous studies have incorporated aspects of the campaign into models of election outcomes is by decomposing the various parts of total spending.
Studies of spending in congressional (Ansolabehere and Gerber, 1994) as well as state legislative races (Hogan, 1998) find as one might expect that spending on voter contact dollars brings about a larger “bang-for-the-buck” than spending on organizational components of the campaign. Might we find that spending on some techniques is more effective than spending on others?

In his analysis of spending in U.S. House races in 1992 Herrnson compares the effectiveness of different types of spending on the percentage of the vote won by candidates. He finds that “not all forms of campaign spending give House challengers a high rate of return” (1995: p. 214). For instance, “[d]irect mail is one of the most effective campaign activities. Every $1,000 that challenger campaigns spend on mail is associated with a .03 percent increase in the votes they win. The typical challenger campaign spent just over $30,000 on mail in 1992, which helped it win an additional 1 percent of the vote” (1995: p. 214). Contrast this payoff with $42,000 spent on television which increased challenger vote-share by one-half a percentage point and one can see that some forms of spending are certainly more effective than others.

This analysis will be conducted in a manner similar to that of Herrnson’s by comparing the effectiveness of different types of voter contact spending. The categories of spending to be tested are those developed in Chapter Eight and include broad versus narrow contact. Broad contact includes spending on mass media advertising while narrow contact includes things such as mailings, travel expenses, and signs (both personal and impersonal forms of contact). Chapter Eight explains in detail the differences between these forms of contact. However, the most important difference for the purpose
of this chapter is the fact that narrow contact can be targeted much more precisely to specific types of voters than broad forms of contact can. Narrow forms of contact are seen as more efficient because they are often intended for a specific audience in mind -- voters who are likely to support the candidate and who are likely to vote on election day. Broad forms of contact, or mass media advertising, are much more difficult to target, meaning that many other voters who are not the intended audience may also receive the message. Some of these voters may be supporters of the opposition ("sleeping dogs") who are unintentionally mobilized. In state legislative districts where media market congruence is generally low, broad forms of contact are rather blunt instruments for influencing voter support. We therefore expect that narrow forms of contact will bring a higher payoff than broad contact.\textsuperscript{102}

**Modeling the Effects of Different Forms of Voter Contact**

Do narrow forms of contact have a greater impact on percentage of the vote received than broad forms of contact? To test this proposition, the standard models utilized in Chapter Three are again employed, however, each model for the primary and general election is estimated five times using different combinations of variables for candidate spending (all of which are calculated as per eligible voter spending). In the first equation the spending variable contains total candidate spending while in the second the spending variable includes only voter contact spending. In the third equation only narrow forms of voter contact spending are used while in the fourth, only spending on broad forms of contact are entered. A fifth equation tests the effects of spending on both
narrow and broad contact simultaneously by entering these amounts as separate variables.

The models below are estimated using different combinations of these variables for
candidate spending. The equations take the following form:

\[
PERPVOTE = a + b_1INC + b_2OPEN + b_4PARTY - b_4OPPSPEND + b_5 [ \text{_____} ] - \\
b_6CANNUM + b_7PASTVOTE + b_8PROF + b_9CITIZEN + e
\]

\[
PERGVOTE = a + b_1INC + b_2OPEN + b_3PARTY - b_4OPPSPEND + b_5 [ \text{_____} ] + \\
b_6PASTVOTE + b_7PROF + b_8CITIZEN + e
\]

The results of these equations are reported in Tables 9.2 for the primary and 9.3
for the general election contests. The unstandardized coefficients represent the
percentage point change in the primary vote won when there is an increase in that
particular type of spending by 10 cents per eligible voter.

Taking the primary election equations in Table 9.2 first, we see that the impact of
spending on percentage of the vote varies by the measure of spending used. Examining
the magnitude of the candidate's spending coefficients, we find that the largest change
occurs from total spending to voter contact spending. When spending is measured as
total spending a 10 cent increase in spending brings about only a one and one-half point
increase in the vote received. But when spending is measured as just voter contact
spending, the increase in the vote for this same amount is over two percentage points.

When voter contact spending is broken down further we find that the coefficients are
even larger -- 2.26 for narrow spending and 2.35 for broad spending. It would appear
from Model 3 and 4 that spending on broad forms of contact have the greatest influence
on the percentage of the vote received. However, when both narrow and broad contact
are run simultaneously in the equation, we find that broad forms of contact are no longer
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model #1</th>
<th>Model #2</th>
<th>Model #3</th>
<th>Model #4</th>
<th>Model #5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>54.354***</td>
<td>54.467***</td>
<td>54.160***</td>
<td>57.136***</td>
<td>54.348***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent Candidate</td>
<td>16.204***</td>
<td>17.719***</td>
<td>19.156***</td>
<td>21.972***</td>
<td>17.789***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Seat Candidate</td>
<td>8.194**</td>
<td>8.119**</td>
<td>8.819**</td>
<td>8.014**</td>
<td>8.217**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>-0.0016</td>
<td>0.236</td>
<td>-0.0310</td>
<td>0.229</td>
<td>0.201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opponents' Expenditures</td>
<td>-1.041***</td>
<td>-1.089***</td>
<td>-1.068***</td>
<td>-0.904***</td>
<td>-1.092***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate's Total Spending</td>
<td>1.492***</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate's Total Voter Contact</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2.038***</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate's Total Narrow</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2.255***</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2.126***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate's Total Broad</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2.354*</td>
<td>1.755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Candidates Running</td>
<td>-5.805***</td>
<td>-5.927***</td>
<td>-6.015***</td>
<td>-6.455***</td>
<td>-5.923***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past Party Vote in District</td>
<td>-0.0244</td>
<td>-0.064</td>
<td>-0.016</td>
<td>-0.0042</td>
<td>-0.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional (IL)</td>
<td>-1.614***</td>
<td>-0.550</td>
<td>-0.616</td>
<td>-0.706</td>
<td>-0.554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen (WY)</td>
<td>0.0620**</td>
<td>-0.935</td>
<td>-0.246</td>
<td>-1.800</td>
<td>-0.817</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R²= 0.605  0.574  0.566  0.531  0.571
N= 144  144  144  144  144
### Table 9.3
Regression Analysis of Campaign Spending Influencing Vote Percentages in General Elections in 1994
(Unstandardized regression coefficients)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model #1</th>
<th>Model #2</th>
<th>Model #3</th>
<th>Model #4</th>
<th>Model #5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>29.883***</td>
<td>29.534***</td>
<td>28.801***</td>
<td>29.200***</td>
<td>29.183***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Seat Candidate</td>
<td>7.208***</td>
<td>7.452***</td>
<td>7.885***</td>
<td>8.124***</td>
<td>7.609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>-6.269***</td>
<td>-6.333***</td>
<td>-6.615***</td>
<td>-5.878***</td>
<td>-6.530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opponents’ Expenditures</td>
<td>-0.4150***</td>
<td>-0.4000***</td>
<td>-0.3336***</td>
<td>-0.2008*</td>
<td>-0.3861***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate’s Total Spending</td>
<td>0.4883***</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate’s Total Voter Contact</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0.5819***</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate’s Total Narrow</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0.7877***</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0.7521***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate’s Total Broad</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0.4646*</td>
<td>0.2875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past Party Vote in District</td>
<td>0.337***</td>
<td>0.347***</td>
<td>0.347***</td>
<td>0.356</td>
<td>0.346***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional (IL)</td>
<td>-2.183</td>
<td>-1.912</td>
<td>-1.379</td>
<td>-2.020</td>
<td>-1.619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen (WY)</td>
<td>-2.471</td>
<td>-3.168</td>
<td>-2.299</td>
<td>-3.354</td>
<td>-2.690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.643</td>
<td>0.641</td>
<td>0.642</td>
<td>0.618</td>
<td>0.642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
statistically significant. The coefficient for narrow contact expenses retains its level of significance and magnitude.

Table 9.3 shows this same analysis conducted in the general election cycle. These results are similar. Again, the magnitude of the spending coefficient varies as expected depending on the type of spending included. Also, when both narrow and broad forms of contact are entered into the equation simultaneously, broad contact becomes statistically insignificant while narrow contact retains its level of significance and magnitude.

These findings support the general conclusion that not all spending has the same effect. The manner in which money is allocated has an influence on its effectiveness. In particular, broad forms of contact are less effective at winning voter support than narrow forms of contact in both primary and general election periods.

Such a finding begs the question, why do candidates ever use broad forms of contact? Why do they not just spend most of their money on narrow contact? One explanation is that they are not aware how inefficient broad forms of contact can be. However, probably a better explanation is that they use certain forms of contact because the conditions of the district and state determine to some degree what types of contact are possible. Chapter Eight showed how conditions in the district affect the choice of techniques. It may be that some candidates use a technique because it is the easiest way for them to reach potential voters. Use of narrow contact may not be possible -- personal contact door-to-door may be prohibitive or they may not have the requisite information to send mailings to potential supports. Candidates are therefore working within the
constraints imposed by the environment. Some candidates may spend their voter contact dollars inefficiently but this is the only way they can spend them.

Now that we have some idea about how aspects of the campaign have an influence on election outcomes, we now turn to look at how candidates evaluate the campaign effort. How important do candidates believe this activity has on the outcome of elections? How much control or influence do they believe they exercise over their own fate?

**How Important Do Candidate Believe Campaign Effort Is for Election Outcomes?**

Having examined the influence or lack of influence by various components of the campaign process, we now turn to an evaluation of what candidates perceive as important to election outcomes. Do candidates running for the state legislature attribute a great deal of significance to campaigns as influences on election outcomes? In one respect this question may sound nonsensical -- why would candidates even campaign if they did not think that it made some difference? Yet, candidates often report (especially after the election) that they had been fighting an uphill battle in a race whose outcome was nearly predetermined. Take for instance the comments by a Republican candidate running in Oregon who said, “my district is 58 percent Democratic, 21 percent Republican and 21 percent other -- I [did not] stand a chance.” Other candidates, however, report that certain aspects of the campaign were extraordinarily effective at influencing the election results. One candidate stated these beliefs rather explicitly: “There are many factors that affect
the election outcome, but in the final analysis it is the candidates themselves and the amount of work they do."

For those who contend that the campaign process is important primarily for the experience it provides to candidates, these perceptions are critical. As Fenno often indicates, how an elected representative sees his or her constituency has an influence on that representative’s behavior while in office. This idea of course fits very well with the point that has been made throughout this project which is that the campaign process may be as important as its effect on who wins and who loses. Winning candidates who feel that the outcome of the election is determined by their ability to mobilize segments of the voting population may be more attuned to constituency needs and concerns than those winning candidates who feel that forces beyond their control are responsible for their election.

John Kingdon (1966) explores this question of candidate’s beliefs in great depth and finds a major difference between the perceptions of winners and losers concerning the relative influence of different factors on election outcomes. He finds that winners are more likely to attribute their success to factors associated with their campaigns and their own effort than losers who tend to place culpability on factors associated with forces beyond their control. As mentioned earlier, Kingdon calls this the “congratulation-rationalization effect.”

What do candidates running for the state legislature in 1994 believe to be the most important factors contributing to their election or defeat? Surveyed candidates were given an opportunity at the end of the questionnaire to provide any other additional
information they wished about their campaign. Many candidates took this opportunity to say what they believe affected the election outcome. A variety of responses were given and can be categorized into two groups: those candidates who attribute the outcome to outside forces beyond their immediate control and candidates who attribute the outcome to the quality of their campaign effort. As Kingdon hypothesizes, losing candidates often noted the outside forces while winners usually called attention to their own campaigning.

In fact, most of those responding to this question used the space to provide a litany of gripes about how factors beyond their control resulted in their defeat.

A wide variety of factors were often cited by losers as influencing the results. Many noted the partisan distribution of voters in their district and the prevailing political winds. For example, a candidate from Connecticut noted that “in many local elections qualifications and quality of an incumbent or challenger fall far second to party registration. Too often it is not the nominee that is chosen -- but instead the party label.”

A large number of losing candidates complained about the advantages bestowed by incumbency -- especially the monetary advantages. A frustrated candidate in Illinois wrote, “[t]here is a sentiment by newspapers, etc. that an incumbent must fail before someone else is elected -- ignores the fact that a non-incumbent may be more qualified.”

A candidate from Texas noted that “I was outspent 10 to 1 ($50,000 to $520,000) by an official with 32 years of legislative experience.”

Large number of losing candidates explained that the malapportioned supply of campaign dollars to be an overwhelming influence. One candidate from Illinois noted that “It’s a shame that money influences so much. I vowed not to take PAC money or out
of state money, I did not take money from outside my district. I raised and spent
$14,000. My opponent got what I refused to take.” Another candidate from Illinois
stated plainly: “Money is an obstacle that cannot be overcome.”

Many of these factors best labeled as “external” to the campaign were mentioned
by defeated candidates. Some blamed the media, saying that “The mainstream newspaper
endorsements tend to also be a very strong determining factor and are seemingly made
with little or no knowledge.” Another candidate said that “there was local press bias
toward the opponent.” Many candidates mentioned factors that one might not normally
think as being significant influences on election outcomes. For example, several
candidates in Connecticut said that endorsements of the ACP (A Connecticut Party)
greatly influenced the outcome. One such candidate wrote, “My opponent’s name was on
two lines, mine on one. That was deadly.” Another candidate noted how a third party
candidate played a role in his defeat: “My major obstacle was a third [party] candidate
with very similar conservative positions – we split the vote which enabled the newcomer
to win.” Ballot position was even mentioned by one candidate from Texas who advised,
“Try to be first on the ballot.”

Several candidates noted that other elections were important to the outcome of
their election. A Democratic candidate running in Illinois indicated that, “The strong
Republican ticket for Governor was critical. They provided many campaign workers.
The Republican governor was so far ahead in the polls that he devoted his time to helping
legislative candidates.” Another candidate stated that “I believe the top of the state ticket
had more to do with the results.” Especially noteworthy was the Republican sweep that
affected many state legislative races in 1994. The following comments were typical of
many candidates: “The Clinton curse was the dominate factor for Democratic losses in
Wyoming and nationwide” (Wyoming); “There was no way I could stop the Republican
sway” (South Carolina); and, “It didn’t matter this year. As a Democratic challenger to a
Republican incumbent, it would have been a miracle if I had won” (Connecticut).

Winning candidates were less likely to use the space to indicate what they
believed influenced the outcome (obviously their superior campaign skills made the
difference!). But winners who did, often pointed to the role of campaign effort. One
candidate noted that “Volunteers are extremely important.” A candidate from Texas said
that “This election was determined by the quantity of signs placed along the roadway.”
Another stated that “[winning] takes a lot of door knocking.” A candidate summed up the
“explanation” for their victory by stating simply: “A well run campaign”.

For some candidates the election outcome has a rather straightforward
explanation. Many candidates seemed to have “learned” what they consider basic truths.
For example, one candidate stated simply that “Money is the key to winning. It is a sad
ing thing to say but true.” Another candidate wrote (apparently weary of answering so many
questions on the survey) “There is no set formula [for winning]. You can make this too
complicated. Hard work, common sense, and a purpose are the ingredients for a
successful campaign.” However, not all candidates see the outcome in such simple terms
and see election outcomes as determined by a confluence of factors. Comments made by
one defeated Democratic incumbent are illustrative:
I ran a very laid-back campaign based on my incumbency and past record, did not walk door-to-door, as before. I underestimated my opponent’s organization and zeal, and the massive anti-government, anti-democratic, anti-incumbent sentiment on which he capitalized.

Such a response makes clear the candidate’s belief that a number of factors affect the election outcome. The prevailing political winds played a role, but so did the challenger’s ability to take advantage of the situation. The challenger had “zeal” and a good organization that the incumbent admittedly underestimated. Not one thing affected the outcome but several factors working together.

Such examples help us understand the way that candidates think about election outcomes and the role played by the campaign. But it is hard to generalize from these individual stories. It is also difficult to determine the relative influence which candidates attribute to campaign factors versus conditions of the district or level of opponent funding. To answer such questions more systematically, it is necessary to utilize responses provided by candidates to the close-ended questions on the survey conducted following the election.

We are interested in determining the importance attributed by candidates to these different factors. Specifically, we want to know whether or not these factors are related to the conditions existing in the district or the campaign effort. Candidates were provided with a list of factors generally thought of as being important to the outcomes of both primary and general elections. They were then asked to rate them according to how important they thought each factor was in determining the outcome of their election on a
five-point scale. The average responses for winners, losers, and all candidates are listed in Table 9.4 ranked from highest to lowest.

The results show that candidates believe that some factors are more important than others. Name recognition ranked highest in both primary and general election periods. Candidates in both periods ranked this item highest with an average score of “4” indicating their belief that this factor was “very important” in determining the outcome. Other items ranking high (an average score higher than 3.5) were candidate image, incumbent advantages, and campaign organizations in both elections. Party affiliation tied incumbent advantage (3.98) as being the second highest in the general election period. Ranking rather low on the list in both election periods are the support of party leaders, endorsements of candidates, and the influence of other elections. For the most part, campaign-level factors are viewed rather prominently by most candidates. Candidate image and campaign organizations are very near the top.

What is most interesting about the table, though, are the different ways that winners and losers evaluate the importance of the factors. The shaded parts of the tables denote a statistically significant difference between the average scores provided by winners and losers (t-tests indicating a 0.05 difference or better). In 7 of the 10 primary questions and 8 of the 10 general election questions, the differences are statistically significant. These differences conform to earlier expectations based on Kingdon’s notion of a “congratulation-rationalization” effect.

It seems that winners attribute much greater significance to internal campaign factors than losers who tend to attribute the outcome to external factors or conditions.
Table 9.4
Importance of Factors in Determining the Outcome of Primary and General Election Campaigns
(Scale Responses 1-5)

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Win</td>
<td>Lose</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>Win</td>
<td>Lose</td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name Recognition</td>
<td>3.92</td>
<td>4.13</td>
<td>4.04</td>
<td>4.36</td>
<td>4.19</td>
<td>4.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate Image</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>3.85</td>
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<tr>
<td>Incumbent Advantages*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Organizations</td>
<td>3.63</td>
<td>3.84</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Spending</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.73</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Issue Positions</td>
<td>3.35</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>3.29</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Affiliation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support of Party Leaders</td>
<td>3.07</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endorsements of Candidates</td>
<td>3.03</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence of Other Elections</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=</td>
<td>(108)</td>
<td>(139)</td>
<td>(247)</td>
<td>(196)</td>
<td>(233)</td>
<td>(429)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note that many candidates did not answer this question (answered NA) because there was no incumbent running in the district.

**Shaded areas represent statistically significant differences between winners and losers at the 0.05 level or better in t-tests.
Three of the factors most “internal” to the campaign are probably candidate image, campaign organization, and issue positions. In the primary we see that winners evaluate candidate image more highly than losers and in the general election, winners rate all three as being more important than losing candidates do. Looking at factors more external to the campaign we see the exact opposite. Losers are much more likely to score factors such as incumbent advantages, party affiliation, support of party leaders, and the influence of other elections as more important than winners in both election cycles. Losers also attribute greater importance to level of spending. While part of the overall campaign effort, spending is clearly one aspect over which candidates probably have much less control.

Another way to gauge how candidates view the effectiveness of their campaign efforts is to examine responses to another question on the survey. Candidates were asked, “In general, do you believe that campaign effort in state legislative elections like the one you ran in makes a difference in terms of who wins and who loses, or is the election decided by things which a candidate can’t control?” Candidates were asked to respond with a score of 0 to 100 with 0 meaning that the candidate’s campaign has no effect while 100 means that it determines the outcome. Answers to such questions may provide a guide to overall levels of campaign effort.

The results from Table 9.5 show that candidates overall believe that campaign effort has a fairly large influence on election outcomes. On average, primary candidates score campaign effort as 74% while general election candidates give it 65%. Incumbents and open seat candidates on average rank campaign effort higher than challengers. Most
Table 9.5
How Much Does the Campaign Matter for Who Wins and Loses?
(Average Percent 0-100%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>General</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Winners</td>
<td>Losers</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>Winners</td>
<td>Losers</td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbents</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challengers</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Seats</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9.6
How Much of an Effect Did the Republican Sweep Have on Your Election?
(Average Percent 0-100%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Democrats</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Republicans</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Winners</td>
<td>Losers</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>Winners</td>
<td>Losers</td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbents</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challengers</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Seats</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Candidates</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
interesting, however, is the relative influence which winners and losers attribute to campaigns. Winners believe that campaigns have a much greater impact than losing candidates. This is true in both primary and general election periods.

A unique aspect of the 1994 elections which should be considered in any evaluation of candidate perceptions is the influence which they believed the groundswell of support for Republicans nationwide had on their election. Many of the comments that candidates wrote on the survey indicate the uniqueness of the election year. For example, a Democratic candidate from South Carolina wrote that “It is not a good year to be a Democrat. The election was a referendum on Bill and Hillary Clinton.” “There were so many straight Republican voters that there was no way to catch up,” commented another disgruntled Democrat from Illinois.

Candidates were asked specifically about this in the following question: “If you were a candidate in the general election, what impact if any did the strong support for Republican candidates seen nationally influence the election in which you ran?” They were asked to provide a response on a scale from 0 to 100 with 0 indicating no influence and 100 indicating that the outcome of their election was determined by this Republican sweep.

Results from Table 9.6 confirm the stories told by many candidates. Democratic candidates score the influence of this much higher than Republican candidates. In other words, Democrats for the most part believed that the sweep was more detrimental than Republicans thought it is was beneficial. But given what we just saw concerning the relative influence that winners and losers attribute to external factors, such a finding
should not come as a surprise. Democratic candidate losers in particular believed that the Republican sweep contributed to their loss. The average score provided by Democratic incumbent losers was 87%. As one might expect, Democratic losers ranked the influence higher than Democratic winners (82% to 31%). Also, Republican winners ranked it higher than Republican losers (44% to 23%).

Candidates themselves, the ultimate political practitioners, attribute a great deal of importance to campaign effort. They believe that decisions they make and actions they take have implications for how well they do at the polls. The fact that importance attributed to the campaign is greatest among winning candidates means that campaigns are self-reinforcing events. Candidates who campaign vigorously in one election believe that this is why they won. This may in fact lead them to campaign vigorously again. If intense campaigning contributes to making a candidate more “representative” of his or her constituents, then this is a very important finding. This means that those who hold office feel that their effort to target certain types of voters was fruitful so they may be more inclined to pay attention to these voters once in office. Office holders probably also believe that their issue positions helped get them elected so they may try harder to implement such policies. Campaigns, therefore, have the potential to have an influence beyond election day and the characteristics of these campaigns should be considered in any analysis of representation.
Conclusions and Implications

One of goals of this chapter is to begin bridging the gap between the perspective of political practitioners and that of most academic scholars concerning the role of campaigns on election outcomes. Findings from this analysis lend support to the idea that campaign activity is important for understanding election outcomes. Election outcomes are not pre-determined by the resources used by candidates in the election and campaign features can have some influence on how well a candidate does on election day. But campaign-level decisions are also not the major determinants of election outcomes. Contrary to what many political consultants probably tell their customers, they are very limited in the miracles they can perform. Political resources along with district and even national conditions often set the parameter within which campaigns are waged. In one respect, neither the political practitioner nor political scholar is fully correct. Findings which shed light on the campaign process make these points very clear.

- Campaign-level factors such as organizational strength and professionalism, information gathering, use of political consultants, and targeting of voters do impact the percentage of the vote which candidates receive. While campaign variables do not explain as much variance as total campaign spending, they do influence the percentage of the vote which candidates receive. Candidates who have limited financial resources can implement some of the low-cost campaign activities which can increase the probability that they will be elected. These effects tend to be greatest for open seat candidates when the overwhelming influence of incumbency is removed.
• Analysis of different types of spending shows that spending on narrow forms of voter contact brings about a higher rate of return than spending on broad forms of contact. Candidates allocating more on personal forms of contact and other narrow forms (such as mailings) spend their voter contact dollars much more efficiently. But, not all candidates are probably given this opportunity given the variations in districts and states which inhibit or enhance the ability of candidates to use certain techniques.

• Candidate perceptions tend to be colored by the campaign process. Winners and losers have different perceptions about what influences the election outcome. In particular, losers tend to discount the effects of the campaign while winners generally believe that they play a large role. This belief by winners may help to stimulate continued contact with constituents after the candidate takes office and in subsequent campaigns.

Campaigns-level factors and decisions about the allocation of voter contact dollars can ultimately influence election outcomes. However, the influence of these factors is around the margins. While such factors need to be considered in any comprehensive analysis of election outcomes, they are probably of greater importance with regard to their effects on representation. Future studies should attempt to better understand the possible effects that campaigns have on the representational style of candidates who win and ultimately hold state legislative office.
CHAPTER 10
Implications and Conclusions

Some think campaigns are to educate the voters. They are wrong. The purpose, from the candidate's perspective, is to win. However, the actual outcome of a campaign is to educate the candidate about his or her district. All the handshaking, all the pleasantries exchanged, help make a politician representative.

--Tom Loftus

Introduction

One of the themes stated early in this analysis is that political science research has focused too much attention on the outcome of elections to the exclusion of the how this outcome is brought about. What do candidates running for legislative office do to win voter support? Understanding how candidates go about building a campaign organization, developing a strategy, and sending messages to voters is an integral, yet, understudied aspect of American politics. Such features are important because they have the potential to impact election outcomes, but more importantly, they have implications for representation. Campaigns are the major link between citizens and their elected leaders. Only by examining how this link is forged and maintained can we begin to formulate a thorough understanding of the representation process.

This chapter reviews some of the major findings of the previous chapters and discusses the implications of the present condition of state legislative campaigns on representative democracy in the United States. Overall, the evidence suggests that different aspects of campaigns have the potential to be either beneficial or detrimental to
representative democracy, with the effect being determined by the nature of the campaign which is waged. The conclusions reached have implications for those interested in reforming campaign finance regulations as well as other election practices.

Recapitulation of the Study's Perspective

As stated in Chapter One, previous studies have generally examined political campaigns in one of two ways. One way has been to look very closely at one or two campaigns, usually detailing their many activities ranging from their organizational apparatus and resource allocation to their choice of voter contact messages. Such studies provide great insight into how campaigns work, yet they often make a major a tradeoff of generalizeability for detail. Such a tradeoff is problematic given that most of these studies are about presidential campaigns -- a rather unique set of cases.

The other path most often used for studying campaigns has been to focus on their effects. Such studies generally develop measures of campaigns (usually total campaign spending) which is then entered into equations used to predict the percentage of the vote received. While such a method makes it possible to look at many campaigns and therefore aids in generalizeability, such a perspective ignores other important aspects of the campaign. There is no attention given to the how the campaign is conducted -- what activities do candidates use to win voter support?

Aside from the problems already stated with each of these methods, there is an additional problem which is more worrisome. Few of these studies provide a theoretical framework for the study of campaigns or any notion of how differing parts of the
campaign process might fit together. For example, what dimensions of the campaign should even be examined? How then do resources such as financing, candidate status, and political experience influence the type of campaign which is waged? In addition, how do district conditions and institutional factors have an impact? Finally, what parts of the campaign process are expected to influence the election outcome? While some studies do attempt to ask and answer some of these questions (e.g., Goldenberg and Traugott, 1984; Herrnson, 1995; Kingdon, 1966) rarely do they provide a framework for how large number of these factors fit together.

A broader perspective on campaigns which develops theoretical expectations about how pieces of this process work can provide important insights into many different areas. First, such a perspective makes it possible to see how factors such as campaign spending ultimately have an influence on election outcomes. Without looking into the process we are not certain how this important resource brings about higher vote margins. Second, by taking a wider perspective we are in a better position to evaluate modern election practices. For example, do modern forms of campaign communication go too far in removing candidates from the fray of politics? How personally involved in campaigning do candidates become? Finally, by viewing campaigns as a process, we can better understand what candidates are experiencing -- what do candidates get in their heads? Fenno (1978), for example, suggests that to understand more about representation we should ask: "What does an elected representative see when he or she sees a constituency?" (p. xiii). In order to more fully appreciate what a candidate sees, we need to understand the nature of the campaign process since this is often the principal point of
contact between candidates and constituents, making it a key point in the representation process.

Many studies have focused on the congressional and presidential levels in their efforts at trying to understand political campaigns. This analysis has taken a somewhat different perspective for two reasons. One reason for looking at state legislative elections is that state legislatures have become more significant institutions in recent years as their role in the policy making process has expanded (Van Horn, 1996). Due to what Richard Nathan (1996) calls the “Devolution Revolution” in which responsibilities for many policies have devolved from the national to the state governments (p. 13), policies enacted by states have the potential to have profound effects on citizens’ lives. Beyond this, the states legislative setting provides a variety of electoral contexts in which to study campaigns, making it possible to refine and strengthen our existing models. State electoral environments provide an array of different contextual features which aid in the development of more generalizeable theories. The more important differences explored in this project are differences in campaign-level factors such as spending, district-level features such as population, and system-level differences such as variation in legislative professionalism.

What findings have this theoretical perspective and focus yielded? What implications do such findings have for what we know about campaigns and elections? The next sections review some of the major findings and their implications.
Major Findings

A number of important findings have been uncovered in this look at state legislative elections. These findings have implications not only for what we know about elections and representation in the state legislative setting, but also for what we know about campaigns generally. Many of the findings are descriptions of modern electioneering practices, however the more important findings are related to the influence of one variable or a group of variables as they impact the type of campaign that is waged.

Campaigns Themselves

What do state legislative campaigns look like? Some studies suggest that campaigns have become more candidate centered (Salmore and Salmore, 1985) and have come to rely on a variety of modern techniques of electioneering including the use of media-oriented forms of voter contact (Agranoff, 1976). This analysis shows very clearly that some campaigns do possess the trappings of modern electioneering. Some enlist the assistance of political consultants, conduct polls to gauge the preferences of voters, target tailored messages to specific segments of the population, and contact voters through radio and television advertising. However, it is important to note that few state legislative campaigns possess all these features. Some modern elements are more prevalent than others.

Take for instance the information gathering features of state legislative campaigns. Determining who the potential voters are and understanding their preferences are often considered the marks of modern electioneering (e.g., Salmore and Salmore.
1985). Chapter Five shows that very large percentages of candidates report analyzing past voting trends as well as maintaining a database of voters living in the district. Such findings would certainly appear to support the notion that this modern aspect of electioneering has extended to the state legislative setting. Targeting of voters is also a form of modern electioneering (Baer, 1995; Shea, 1996) that is used quite prevalently by those running for the state legislature. Upwards of 70% of primary and general election candidates targeting specific types of voters (Chapter Five). If these two aspects of campaigns were used as the criterion for having a modern or congressional-like campaign, then a vast majority of campaigns can certainly be characterized as such.

However, there are other aspects of campaigns uncovered in this project which would appear to indicate that state legislative campaigns are very unlike their congressional counterparts. While a very large percentage of state candidates do indeed gather information on voters, they do not rely on political consultants for this information. Consultant usage by candidates is quite low with only 20% of primary candidates and 29% of general election candidates reporting that a political consultant was hired. These percentages are far below the percentages reported in studies of congressional campaigns (Herrnson, 1995; Medvic and Lenart, 1997).

State legislative campaigns also differ from congressional campaigns in terms of their organizational professionalism. For example, congressional campaigns are managed primarily by full-time paid managers (Herrnson, 1995), but this set-up appears to be the exception rather than the rule in the state legislative setting. Only about one-fourth of state legislative candidates in 1994 hired a campaign manager. In fact, less than one-third
of state legislative candidates who report having managers compensated them monetarily (much lower percentages report compensation for other campaign workers). State legislative campaign organizations are therefore much less professional than their congressional counterparts.

Finally, campaigns in the state setting differ in how voters are contacted. Whereas mass media expenditures make up a sizable portion of congressional campaign budgets for the vast majority of candidates, such expenses make up a much smaller percentage of spending in state legislative races. In addition, a large majority of candidates in the state legislative setting do not even make expenditures for radio and television advertising (considered to be the most modern forms of campaign communication). Voter contact spending in state legislative races is allocated primarily to narrow forms of contact such as mailings and signs. Personal forms of contact also consume a large percentage of candidate spending.

Overall, how modern are state legislative campaigns? Have they become “congressionalized” as Salmore and Salmore (1996) suggest? It is difficult to make any blanket statement about campaigns and their modernity. Large numbers of campaigns possess only one or two of these modern characteristics. Some state legislative campaigns are very professional and modern while others are best described as personalized and amateur. If anything, this examination of campaigns might lead one to reconsider what is meant by the term “modern” due to the fact that aspects of “modernity” are not always compatible, especially in the state legislative setting. For example, television is widely acknowledged as a modern form of campaigning (Agranoff,
1976; Salmore and Salmore, 1985; Selnow, 1994), but so is electoral targeting (Salmore and Salmore, 1985; Shea, 1996). However, in the state legislative setting where districts are rather small, it is quite difficult to target voters using these types of techniques. In fact, it is much more efficient to use narrow forms of contact (such as mailings) which are generally acknowledge to be less modern.\footnote{Care must therefore be taken when using a blanket criterion for modernity. Many state legislative campaigns can probably be considered modern because they gather detailed information and target voters, but relatively few can be considered modern if we use electronic advertising as the criterion.}

The most generalizeable thing that can be said about state legislative campaigns is that there is a huge amount of variation both across as well as within states on each of the campaign dimensions. However, this variation is not random. As the next section will indicate, a number of factors have been identified which influence the type of campaign that is waged.

Factors Which Influence Campaigns

Institutional Differences

One of the most consistent factors found to influence the type of campaign that is waged involves the nature of the legislative institution. Is a candidate running for a seat within a professional legislature, that is, one considered full-time and therefore similar to the U.S. Congress? Or is the candidate running for a seat within a citizen legislature which is considered a part-time endeavor? Analysis provided in nearly every chapter shows that professionalism of the legislative chamber has an influence on some aspect of
each of the three campaign dimensions. Many of these differences hold up even after
controls for total spending and size of the district have been taken into account.

For the most part we find that campaigns in the two states which are at the ends of
the professionalism continuum differ from one another and from the campaigns in the
states with hybrid legislature in ways that we might expect. Campaigns in Illinois on
average are more professional or "congressionalized" than those in other states.
Likewise, campaigns in Wyoming are typically less modern and much more amateurish
than those in other states.

These differences arise in a number of different areas. Among the states in the
sample, campaigns in Illinois rank high on the list in terms of organizational strength and
professionalism while campaigns in Wyoming fall at the bottom. Campaigns in Illinois
are more likely to hire professional consultants than the typical campaign in other states
while those in Wyoming hire them at a rate that is lower than average. In terms of
targeting voters we find that campaigns in citizen legislatures are less likely to use such
methods, but only in the general election. Candidates running for seats in citizen
legislatures were also likely to send fewer messages in primaries than those candidates in
other states. Finally, in terms of spending patterns we find that candidates running in
Illinois have spending patterns much more similar to those of congressional candidates.
Fairly high portions of total spending go for things other than voter contact. This is very
different from the spending patterns typical of candidates running in Wyoming, where
usually 90% of spending by candidates in these races goes some form of advertising.
The above examples illustrate that campaigns in Illinois are much more like congressional campaigns than those in other states, particularly Wyoming. But it is important to point out that not all the so-called “modern techniques” are used most frequently in Illinois and least frequently in Wyoming. Some of these techniques are used as frequently in states having legislatures of varying degrees of legislative professionalism. For example, information gathering in the form of analyzing past voting trends and maintaining a database are very common among campaigns regardless of the institutional setting. In addition, it does not appear that campaigns in Wyoming utilize mass media forms of contact less than campaigns in Illinois. If anything, candidates in Wyoming spend a much larger percentage of the budgets on such items.

Why do these features not fit with the others? As indicated in Chapter Five, the questions about information which candidates were asked about may be minimal level indicators of data acquisition. Such activities are generally inexpensive and do not necessarily require a high degree of skill. For these reasons, we find that over 60% of both primary and general election candidates engage in both aspects of information gathering, making it a common feature among state legislative campaigns. The explanation for the counterintuitive finding regarding the usage of mass media forms of contact can be explained primarily by the differences in average district characteristics found in Illinois and Wyoming. Forms of voter contact appear to be very susceptible to the influence of district characteristics such as population density and media market congruence. The average district in Wyoming has much lower population density and
higher media congruence score than the average district in Illinois, making mass media advertising more likely in Wyoming, the state with the citizen legislature.

While our ability to generalize is somewhat limited because only one state each takes the position of professional and citizen legislature, it does seem that professionalism of the chamber makes a difference for many of the dimensions examined. Campaigns conducted by candidates running for a seat in a professional legislature have more characteristics that make them “modern” and therefore resemble congressional campaigns to a greater extent than campaigns run by candidates in states with more hybrid and or citizen legislatures. Similarly, candidates running for seats in citizen legislatures have much less professional and more personalized campaigns. Overall, it seems that campaigns in the citizen legislature (Wyoming) are generally more different from campaigns in the other states than campaigns in the professional legislature (Illinois). In other words, campaigns in Wyoming appear to lag behind the others on many aspects of campaign professionalism.

**District-Level Characteristics and Conditions**

Characteristics of the district are important to consider. Previous studies show how competition influences the percentage of the vote candidates receive, but this analysis shows that other district-level characteristics such as population of the district, population density, and media market congruence should also be considered as they affect the campaign itself.
First and foremost, district characteristics influence the amount of money which
candidates are required to raise and spend. District population in particular has a large
influence on spending. Candidates who run in districts with larger populations must
simply spend more money to reach all the voters than candidates who run in much
smaller districts. In addition, electoral competition influences level of spending.
Candidates who are in more competitive races (often where there is near parity of partisan
voters) spend more than those candidates running in less competitive districts.

Population of the district also has a direct impact on other aspects of the
campaign. Take for instance the organizational component. Campaigns in districts with
larger populations typically have stronger and more professional organizations than those
campaigns in districts with smaller populations (all other things being equal). Apparently
the need to contact large numbers of voters makes it necessary for candidates to hire more
workers (often professional ones) to manage the campaign.

These findings echo those other studies which show the impact of electoral
competition on the type of campaign which is waged (e.g., Hershey, 1974; Kingdon,
1966; Mileur and Sulzner, 1974). But unlike these earlier studies, this analysis has
focused more attention on specifying the impact of competition on particular parts of the
campaign process. In doing so we find that competition has almost no influence on the
organizational and informational aspects of campaigns, but has a much larger impact on
the voter contact aspect of campaigns.

The decision to target in the primary for example, appears to be strongly
influenced by the extent of electoral competition. When there are more candidates in the
race, campaign decision makers see a greater need to send messages to a specific set of voters. In the general election we find that competition is related to the effort which candidates direct at independent voters. Candidates running in highly competitive districts are more likely to direct messages toward independent voters than candidates running in less competitive situations.

While electoral competition is not related to the types of voter contact techniques candidates use, it is related to the amount of time that candidates themselves engage in personal campaigning. Candidates in more highly competitive situations generally spend less time on normal activities and more time campaigning for votes.

District characteristics other than population and competition probably play their biggest role in the choice of voter contact techniques. Whereas previous studies examined the mediating role of district features on the effectiveness of expenditures (Gierzynski and Breaux, 1996), this analysis shows that candidates consider the nature of the district when deciding how to allocate their voter contact dollars. District conditions have an influence on the choice of technique. In particular, the population density of the district and the congruence of the district with media market boundaries have an impact on the degree to which candidates utilize broad versus narrow forms of contact in communicating with voters. These characteristics also influence the degree to which candidates utilize personal forms of contact.
The Role of Money

Money is a potent force in election campaigns. Previous studies have consistently shown this, yet relatively few have adequately demonstrated how the money is actually used. For the most part, studies have assumed that money is allocated mostly for voter contact. While it is generally true that campaigns with greater levels of funding are indeed able to spend more to communicate with voters, the analysis also shows that greater levels of funding also result in other advantages. For example, greater levels of funding make it possible for campaigns to gather more information about voters as well as to hire professionals to help in running their campaign organizations. Money has an influence on many parts of the campaign, and does so in ways that we might not expect.

Level of spending was found to be positively related to various aspects of the campaign including the extent of organizational strength and professionalism and the degree to which campaigns acquire and use information on voters. One might conclude that such a finding is obvious since money can be used to purchase these things. But some characteristics of these dimensions such as information gathering and organizational strength (volunteer workers) are low-cost endeavors open to almost any candidate regardless of their financial situation. Part of the explanation for the correlations between spending and these low-cost characteristics is that serious candidates are the ones who raise money as well as collect information and recruit the assistance of volunteers. Additionally, political party operatives and volunteers may be more likely to want to assist such serious candidates who are often well funded.
Money is also related to other aspects of the campaign process, particularly voter contact strategy. Candidates who spend a great deal of money are more likely to target voters during the general election than candidates who have much less money to spend. In addition, during the general election cycle we find that level of spending is positively related to the amount of effort directed at independent voters. Those with adequate resources, it seems, are the ones likely to use a strategy of persuasion (and not simply reinforcement of existing support). Additionally, those candidates with adequate resources are the ones who place greater emphasis on a large number of messages as they appeal for voter support.

Money certainly has an effect on the forms of voter contact in that the more a candidate has to spend, the more advertisements they can afford to purchase. But the findings also show that levels of spending do not necessarily influence the type of voter contact that is chosen. For example, it does not appear that level of spending is related to the percentage of voter contact allocated for broad forms of contact or to personal forms of contact. Many studies have often assumed that some voter contact techniques such as electronic advertising methods (radio and television) were reserved mainly for those candidates who possessed large campaign treasuries. But these findings suggest that this is not the case. Candidates who have more money to spend do not necessarily spend these dollars differently than those candidates who have very few resources.
Candidate Characteristics

Previous studies from the congressional level indicate that candidate status and previous political experience have a major impact on the type of campaign which is waged as well as on how candidates do at the ballot box. But this analysis shows that these candidate-level factors in the state legislative setting do not always have the same effect. In particular, the influence of candidate status and political experience are seldom important in explaining differences in campaigns.

By examining the influence of candidate experience in a manner similar to congressional studies, the analysis finds this variable’s impact to be negligible on election outcomes. Political experience does not have a statistically significant influence on the percentage of the vote received by either challengers or open seat candidates. These variables also do little to explain the amount of money that a candidate raises, or differences in the campaigns that are waged. This finding is at odds with conclusions reached from the congressional setting which point to a large impact for experience, particularly its effect on final vote margins. However, as pointed out earlier (Chapter Three) the state legislature is often the initial point at which many candidates begin their political careers. Previous experience (through winning lower level offices, running for other offices, and work in the political party) may not provide the type of experience that can assist state legislative candidates. In addition, state legislative races do not usually require as much funding as congressional races, and therefore skill at fundraising (a skill often gleaned from previous campaigns) is not as necessary. For example, in Wyoming, the amount necessary to run competitively is so low that many candidates pay for their
own campaigns and do not even seek the assistance of parties, interest groups or other individuals.

More important for this analysis than the potential influence of political experience is the influence of candidate status. Previous studies on both the congressional and state legislative levels indicate that incumbents have a tremendous advantage in elections. When they are challenged, they generally receive a much larger percentage of the vote than their opponents. But aside from outcomes, what about the manner in which candidates go about campaigning? Are there significant differences in the campaigns of incumbents, challengers, and open seat contenders? As this analysis shows, the differences among candidate types are not nearly as dramatic as we might expect once a number of other factors have been controlled.

There are clearly differences among candidate types in terms of levels of campaign spending. In particular, incumbents generally spend more than challengers in both primary and general election contests. There are also differences in the types of messages which incumbents, challengers, and open seat candidates typically send. For example, incumbents typically send a larger number of messages than other candidates, though this is true mainly in the primary election period. The tone of messages also varies by candidate type. For example, incumbents are more likely to emphasize messages about their personal qualities, community service, and past political record. Challengers, on the other hand, are more likely to emphasize issue positions and most importantly, are more likely to stress issues about the opposition as they attempt to give voters a reason to reject the incumbent.
But on many other campaign dimensions there are fewer differences among candidate types. Those differences which do exist are usually between open seat contenders and the other two candidate types. Open seat candidates have somewhat more professional campaign organizations (in the general election) and engage in more extensive information gathering (in the primary) than incumbent or challenger candidates. Open seat candidates are also likely to use less personal forms of contact (in the primary). Interestingly, there are few differences between incumbents and challengers on these aspects of campaigns and no differences among candidate types of any sort regarding the propensity to target voters in either election cycle.

For the majority of campaign indicators, incumbents, challengers, and open seat contenders run very similar campaigns when controls for district conditions, electoral competition, and level of financing have been taken into account. Previous studies from the congressional setting which find large differences in campaigns among different candidate types generally do not control for these other factors (e.g., Goldenberg and Traugott, 1984; Herrnson, 1995). Knowing the status of a candidate may explain their behavior because candidates of a particular status often find themselves in similar situations. For example, incumbents often win by comfortable margins and challengers are usually fighting an uphill battle. But when we compare candidates of varying types in similar environments, we find that their actions are similar -- they respond in a similar fashion to particular stimuli.
The Role of Political Parties and Political Consultants

What role do political parties and political consultants play in the candidate-centered campaigns for the state legislature. Findings from this analysis show that political parties are not major players in election campaigns, however, they do perform important functions. One of these integral functions is the gathering and distribution of information to candidates. A number of candidates receive assistance in securing detailed data on voters living in their district and polling information. Candidates report such help in both primary and general elections indicating the "service-oriented" nature of this assistance. Candidates in more competitive races generally report greater party assistance than candidates in less competitive races.

Some observers worry that professional political consultants have come to play too large of a role in modern campaigns. But this analysis indicates very clearly that few candidates for the state legislature make use of these resources. Only about 24% of primary candidates and 29% of general election candidates used political consultants in 1994. Candidates making use of consultants generally use their assistance with direct mail and advertisement purchases in addition to a variety of information gathering activities (devising strategy, polling, and compiling voter databases). More to the point, few candidates give consultants free reign over campaign decision making. On average, candidates report allowing consultants about 50% of control over campaign decision-making.
The influence of these campaign dimensions can be seen in a number of different areas. For example, some campaign dimensions were found to have an influence on others dimensions. In addition, campaigns also have an influence on the percentage of the vote candidates receive. Finally, activities during the course of the campaign have an influence on the attitudes and perceptions of the candidates who ran them.

The best example of this has to do with information gathering. The analysis shows that the extent of information gathering is influenced by at least two other campaign-level factors. We find that assistance from political parties during the general election increases the likelihood that a campaign gathers information. Information gathering is also positively influenced by organizational strength in the primary and organizational professionalism in the general election. Decisions about seeking help from parties and the nature of the organization created, therefore, have consequences for what candidates and other campaign operatives find out about voters living in the district.

Information gathering itself has an influence on two other aspects of the campaign process. First, higher levels of information gathering result in a greater likelihood that a candidate will target voters. It seems that information gathering makes targeting possible. Second, we find that information gathering is negatively associated with the use of broad forms of contact in general election campaigns. This means that candidates who have less information available, spend a higher percentage of their voter contact dollars on broad forms of contact, presumably because they are less certain about which voters to target with narrow forms of contact.
Findings provided in this analysis also point to the influence which campaigns have on the percentage of the vote received by candidates. Both the utility and influence of an index of campaign activity were explored in Chapter Nine. By combining important elements of campaign effort into one index, we found that this variable performed similarly to the measure of total campaign spending in predicting the percentage of the vote received by candidates. We also found that how candidates choose to allocate their voter contact spending -- either on narrow or broad forms of contact -- has an impact on the effectiveness of this spending. For the most part, narrow forms of contact are more effective at influencing the vote than broad forms of contact. However, candidates are constrained by the forms of contact they can use due to variations in the type of coalition they are trying to form and to the characteristics of the district.

Other findings show that characteristics of the campaign also have an influence on candidate perceptions. Candidates very much believe that their effort made during the course of the campaign had an influence on the number of votes they received. However, the extent of credit given to the campaign varies based on the election outcome. Losing candidates attribute blame for the outcome more on external factors whereas winning candidates give credit primarily to their campaign. Such a finding shows that campaigns and how they are waged may play a large role in shaping what winning candidate think about campaigns.
Implications for Representative Democracy

Richard Fenno (1996) says that “when people worry about the health of our representative system, they criticize those features of our campaigns that tend to impede or to distort candidate-citizen connections” (p. 75). He goes on to cite concerns such as negative advertising and the mal-distribution of campaign funding. One of the reasons for closely examining the campaign process is to determine whether or not such concerns are warranted in the state legislative setting.

Campaigns which possess some types of characteristics have the potential to detract from representative democracy while other characteristics have the potential to enhance it. Throughout the analysis, a number of these criteria for enhancing or detracting from representative democracy have been considered. Now at the end, what can we say about these characteristics of state legislative campaigns? Do campaigns for the state legislature enhance or detract from representative democracy? In addition, what can we say about potential reform efforts that might alter some of the “harmful” effects of campaigns?

The three criteria to be addressed have to do with the fair distribution of political resources, the extent to which voters are informed, and the nature of the contact which candidates have with citizens. An evaluation of state legislative campaigns on each of these criteria is provided. In addition, the implications for these findings in light of recent reform proposals are discussed.
Equitable Distribution of Resources

Candidates bring with them a variety of resources to campaigns. Some have a great deal of political experience and a large campaign treasury while others are political neophytes with little financial backing. Findings from this analysis would seem to indicate that some of these differences are more problematic than others. Political experience, for example, has almost no influence on either the types of campaigns which are waged or on final electoral outcome. However, campaign finances have a dramatic impact on many aspects of the campaign and ultimately on the outcome. The type of campaign waged is very much related to the candidate’s level of funding. Mal-distributions of funding would certainly appear to detract from the ideals associated with representative democracy.

But how large of a threat is this for representative democracy? It is certainly true that candidates who have more money can indeed spend more to influence voters (Chapter Eight) and can send a greater number of campaign messages (Chapter Seven). But we have also seen that the manner in which campaigns choose to communicate with voters does not vary by level of spending (Chapter Eight). More importantly, we have also identified a couple of factors which may influence the likelihood that these disparities result in such a threat.

For example, it appears that the threat presented by resource disparities is greater in those states where levels of spending are typically higher. The difference in the amount of money spent by incumbents and that spent by challengers is somewhat smaller in states where the typical amount of spending is lower. The reason for this as indicated
in Chapter Three is that challengers running in low-spending states often have it within their means to bring their level of spending in line with that of the incumbent. In states where candidates typically spend much larger amounts of money, challengers must rely on many external sources for funding and cannot always make up the difference. The result is that spending disparities vary based on whether the state is a "high-spending" or "low-spending" state.

The extent to which financial disparities cause problems may also vary with legislative professionalism. As we have already seen, campaigns in citizen legislatures are typically less modern and professional (or congressional-like) than campaigns in professional legislatures. This means that even if financial disparities exist between candidates in citizen legislatures, one candidate will probably not use techniques which differ markedly from his or her opponent. A very different situation probably exists in the professional legislative setting where much larger percentages of candidates make use of modern techniques such as consultants and targeting. Since level of spending influences the usage of techniques, it is in the professional setting where the ill effects of resource disparities may manifest themselves.

While disparities in resources have always been one of the primary concerns of those wishing to reform the political system, findings presented here would appear to show that such disparities are more problematic in some contexts than in others. Reformers should take such differences into consideration before implementing changes in political regulations, particularly those involving campaign finance.
Extent To Which Voters Are Informed

How well do candidates go about providing information to voters about their candidacy? One of the "functions" of a political campaign indicated in the first chapter is to inform voters about the choices which they must make in the voting booth. But how well do candidates go about doing this in the state legislative setting?

A modern feature of campaigns which is clearly present in the state legislative setting is the use of targeting. Large percentages of candidates report picking out specific types of voters for contact. A potential problem with this technique is that it provides information only to those voters whom a candidate wants to contact. In other words, not every voter is exposed to the same type or intensity of campaign messages. Candidates choose to contact only those voters who are likely to respond favorably. This behavior is manifested not only in the candidate's strategy of targeting, but also in the choice of technique which candidates utilize in making contact -- narrow versus broad forms of contact. Most state legislative districts make it difficult for candidates to contact voters through broad forms of contact such as newspapers, radio, and television -- techniques which also happen to be more difficult for the candidate to control.

The problem presented by targeting and narrow use of contact is that they provide only certain voters with the requisite information they need to make informed decisions. Such conditions are less problematic in other electoral contexts such as congressional or state-wide races where the news media play a prominent role in informing the public. But in the state legislative setting, such a condition may indeed be a hindrance because
the media play such a small role. Voters are much more dependent on what the candidates themselves have to say in state legislative races.

Interaction With Voters

Are modern campaigns mostly “rubber-gloved” campaigns as Selnow (1994) suggests? A number of findings from this analysis make it possible to answer this question about state legislative campaigns.

One charge often leveled is that candidates are less involved with their campaigns and leave such decisions up to the professional political consultants. But as shown here, few state legislative candidates utilize such professional services and even those who hire consultants do not grant them overwhelming control of the campaign. Similarly, candidates also make use of services provided by political parties, but seldom if ever to parties play a large role in decisions about campaign strategy or techniques. For the most part, candidates for the state legislature are still very much part of the fray of politics as they build their own organizations, raise their own money, and implement their own strategies.

How much interaction do they have with voters? One way to gauge this is to look at the types of campaign organizations which are put in place. Some campaigns have rather extensive organizations which make it possible to engage in grass-roots contact through canvassing voters. Another way to determine interaction is to look at how candidates allocate their voter contact dollars. While most voter contact funds go for narrow or broad contact, some candidates do allocate large portions of these monies to
personal forms of contact. However, the extent of personal contact may be difficult to
detect through spending reports since such activity is usually not very costly. Direct
measures of time spent campaigning show that at the height of their campaign effort,
candidates spend about three-fourths of their time on campaign-related activities (things
aside from their normal job or activities). Approximately 40% of a candidate’s total time
is spent campaigning for votes. Such findings would tend to support the notion that
candidates spend a good deal of time prior to the election interacting personally with
voters.

Preponderance of the Evidence

How do we sum up these findings? Do modern state legislative campaigns detract
from or enhance representative democracy? The best answer to this question is to say
that it depends on the campaign. Campaigns for the state legislature vary dramatically
and utilize a mixture of techniques and strategies. One’s ultimate evaluation depends
really on those aspects of campaigns which are considered to be most important. Is it
important for candidates to interact with constituents? Is it most important to have
candidates run their own campaigns? Or is it most important that voters are provided
with a balanced view of candidate positions? Which ever of these components has the
highest priority for an individual will lead to a particular evaluation.
Implications for Reform

Campaign finance regulations are presently one of the most debated set of reform proposals currently under consideration on both the national and state levels. Policy makers often debate the merits of such proposals based on what impact they may have on the electoral process. Care is taken when making changes since alterations in the system have often resulted in many unintended consequences (Alexander, 1991). Several of the findings provided by this analysis give us some insight into the effects that possible changes might have.

The most basic type of reform effort is to limit the amounts of money which are involved in campaigns. Such reforms can be achieved either through outright spending limits (which are tied to public funding mechanisms) or through contribution limits and prohibitions which effectively limit the amount which candidates are able to spend. What effect might such changes have for the manner in which campaigns are waged?

One negative consequence of spending limits which is often discussed is its stifling effect on electoral competition. Laws and regulations which make it more difficult for candidates to spend money unwittingly work to the advantage of incumbents who are relatively well known compared to their challengers. Spending limits are effectively limits on challenger spending -- the types of candidates we want to help if the goal is greater competition. Findings from this analysis (Chapter Three) certainly would support such a conclusion.

But another possible negative aspect of spending limits also emerges from this analysis. That implication has to do with the fact that high spending is not necessarily a
negative aspect of campaigns. Level of spending is clearly one of the more important factors which influence the type of campaign which is waged. While it is true that spending is related to the propensity of candidates to target voters, higher spending is also related to those more positive aspects of the political campaign. For instance, campaigns which spend more typically have stronger organizations (Chapter Four), gather more information (Chapter Five), and send more messages to voters (Chapter Seven). In addition, higher spending does not necessarily lead to more media-oriented forms of voter contact and in many states high spending simply means more voter contact. Limits on spending may indeed take away some of the more positive aspects of campaigning. In fact, very stringent limits may result in “throwing the baby out with the bathwater.”

Money in campaigns should therefore not be considered a negative aspect of modern electioneering. It has positive consequences which must be considered when fashioning changes in existing regulations. Instead of regulations which limit spending, policy makers might be better served to consider changes which would lead to greater equity in the distribution of campaign dollars. Clearly, some candidates are able to raise and spend more than others and these differences are part of their electoral advantage.

This analysis has shown that many other factors aside from money may have an influence on how campaigns are waged. Reforming only the monetary aspects of the system may not automatically bring about changes in campaign practices since institutional features as well as district-level conditions also play prominent roles. Reforms aimed at bringing about wholesale changes in campaigning and election practices must consider their impact given the environment in which campaigns are
typically waged. Piece-meal reforms may not lead to substantial changes and some reforms in isolation may result in possible “cures” being worse than the “disease”.

**Future Research: Specifying the Impact Campaigning on Representation**

To say that a number of important questions remain concerning the role of campaigns in state legislative elections would be an understatement. This beginning look at campaigning in the state legislative setting has raised more questions than it has answered. In doing so, it points to a number of important areas which future studies should address.

First, it shows that campaigns vary dramatically across states and districts making state legislative campaigns a fruitful area for theory-building. Studies which focus consistently on the congressional setting make it impossible to determine the effects of institutional effects, and make it difficult to determine the effects of district-level and candidate-level features. Future studies should continue inquiry into how campaigns are waged on the state legislative level.

Secondly, this project shows that state and district level factors in particular influence the manner in which campaigns are waged, but more refined measures of district conditions are needed. For example, what role does the news media play? While congruence with television markets is rather low in the state legislative setting, we may find that some legislative districts do more evenly match the circulation boundaries of small newspapers, particularly in rural settings. Does congruence with these types of media markets lead to different forms of advertising or strategies on the part of
candidates? Another example has to do with the characteristics of the people who live in the districts. How might the nature of voters living in a district (their level of education and income, for instance) influence the type of campaign which is waged?

In addition to more refined measures of the campaign environment, we also need to develop more refined measures of campaign activity itself. For example, we have shown that candidate campaign organizations vary in terms of strength and professionalism, but how do they vary in terms of what workers in these organizations do? We have shown that many candidates gather information on voters. But, what types of information have been gathered? We find that some candidates are likely to send policy or issue messages than other messages. But what specific policy issues are being stressed? It is only after answering these more detailed questions about campaigns that a thorough picture of modern campaign practices will emerge.

Future studies should also spend more time specifying the impact of modern campaign practices. We have shown that a lot of variation exists and what generally influences this variation, but we have not done very much to indicate the impact of this variation. Because it is often difficult to link minute changes in campaign behavior to aggregate changes in vote percentages, future studies might be better served to link campaign behavior to micro-level analyses of voter behavior. By documenting the dimensions of a variety of different types of campaigns and simultaneously observing the reactions of voters, we can better understand the impact that campaigns have for election outcomes.
Most importantly, future research should make greater attempts at linking campaign behavior and activity to a legislator’s behavior after entering office. Many studies allude to this “linkage” question. Matthews (1960), for example, notes of U.S. Senators: “[i]t is difficult, really, to understand the senators, how they act and why, without considering what happens to them when they are running for office” (p. 68). Fenno’s work emphatically attempts to make this linkage in his many observations of candidates who pursue both a “home-style” and a “Washington style”. Fenno says that “campaigns connect politicians and citizens and make possible the accountability of politicians to citizens that representative government requires. In short, no campaigns, no connections; no connections, no accountability; no accountability, no representative government”(1978: p. 75). One hypothesis which emanates from this, is that we might expect that candidates who utilize more personal forms of contact and who take an active part in the campaign process are more in tune with their constituents’ concerns than those candidates who do not engage in such activities. Future work should investigate such linkages in order to more fully understand the role of campaigns in American politics.
1 These examples are composite descriptions of several state legislative campaigns in 1994. Information was obtained from interviews with candidates and campaign managers.

2 Many studies refer to the minimal effects thesis as the effects of the media (Patterson and McClure, 1976), however others such as Goldenberg and Traugott (1984) as well as Finkel (1993), use the term more broadly in referring to both candidate campaigning as well as media effects. The “minimal effects” mentioned throughout this analysis is in reference to the broad usage of the term.

3 Recent studies by Markus (1982) and Finkel (1993) on changes in voter preferences during the course of the 1980 presidential campaign actually find smaller changes than the Lazarsfeld, et al. (1944) analysis.


6 Not all campaigns are run for the purpose of winning. Research indicates that some candidates run simply to fill a space on the ballot for the party or run for the satisfaction of running itself (Kazee, 1980). Others reasons for running are to provide a platform for presenting ones views (Maisel, 1982) or as a means of publicizing one’s law practice (Huckshorn and Spencer, 1971; Leuthold, 1968).

7 There is a growing literature which focuses on campaign appeals, especially those exploring the impact of campaign advertisements on attitudes (see Ansolabehere and Inkley, 1995; Kahn, 1996; West, 1993). Much of this work is conducted in the experimental setting. From a practical standpoint, it is probably better to examine the effects of advertisements on the individual level, and not on the aggregate-level.

8 Salmore and Salmore (1985) describe different voter contact techniques in a similar fashion labeling them “narrowcasting” and “broadcasting” (p. 203).

9 As I will discuss later, the broad-based techniques are by definition, impersonal forms of contact and therefore do not require subcategories of personal and impersonal.

10 Note that Fishel (1973) makes a similar distinction between personal and impersonal forms of contact.

11 As indicated earlier, there is some debate concerning the influence of incumbent spending on the percentage of the votes received by incumbents. Some scholars argue that incumbent spending is inconsequential to election outcomes (Jacobson, 1978) while others argue that it is, though it is not nearly as effective as challenger spending (Green and Krasno, 1988; Thomas, 1989). Recent research has focused on another aspect of incumbent fundraising labeled the “scare-off” effect (Epstein and Zemsky, 1995; Squire, 1991).

12 For example, we know that the relationship between spending and votes is tempered by the status of the candidate running (e.g. Jacobson, 1978; Green and Krasno, 1988), the context in which the money is allocated (Gierzynski and Breaux, 1996), and the characteristics of the voter who receives the message (Kenny and McBurnett, 1994).

13 Some may argue that total receipts or total funding available as reported by the candidates on their campaign finance forms is a superior measure in that it more accurately reflects the amount of money a candidate has available to spend. However, the total receipts reflected on campaign finance reports really cannot measure this concept either because we do not know how much more a candidate could have raised or used of his or her own money. The reports do not list potential contributions, only actual contributions. Secondly, in this analysis I am mostly interested in the amount of money that candidates are willing to spend in a given election cycle. Many candidates, particularly incumbents, may have a great deal of funding in their campaign accounts, but only want to spend some of this in a given election for whatever reasons (maybe their opponent is not too formidable, for example). Total receipts would not be the proper measure in this case. For these reasons I use total spending as a measure of the amount of money that a candidate is willing to spend in a given election cycle.

14 Population density is measured as the average number of inhabitants per square mile.

15 Though the media market measure refers specifically to television viewing markets, other forms of mass media advertising such as newspapers and radio follow similar boundaries.

16 While nearly every state requires that candidates for office report their level of spending, there is variation among the states in how much effort is made by the state agency in checking the accuracy of the candidate filings. There is also variation in terms of the specificity required such as how candidates
actually spend their money. In later parts of the analysis I code the purpose of the expenditures as listed on the reports, therefore specificity is an important requirement.

17I originally had planned to collect and code data from candidates who returned questionnaires in all seven states, however, due to financial and time constraints I was forced to limit this part of the data collection and analysis to five states.


19As cited by Herbert Alexander (1992, p. 1).

20Unless otherwise noted in this chapter, the resources examined are for the entire universe of contested elections in the states. Only latter parts of the analysis which incorporate aspects of candidate experience is the analysis restricted to only those who are part of the sample of respondents and not the universe of candidates who ran.

21This is calculated as total candidate spending (primary or general) divided by the number of persons age 18 or over residing in the legislative district.

22Note that Jewell and Breaux (1988) include incumbents in this calculation who did not have an opponent (they received 100% of the vote). In the present analysis, only incumbents facing major party competition are included in the calculations.

23Incumbent candidates are not included in this part of the analysis because incumbency is such an overwhelming indicator of experience.

24Note that many candidates are counted twice for purposes of this table. Many of the candidates listed in the primary are listed again in the general election.

25The exact wording of the question is as follows: “What other political experiences (working in campaigns or interest group activity, for example) have you had which you believe helped prepare you for your 1994 campaign?”

26Due to the perceptual nature of the question from which the information for “other experience” was derived, only the more objective indicators of past office seeking, office holding, and party activity obtained from the survey are used.

27For the purposes of this analysis, variation in average district voting age population is assumed to be similar in all districts within states and chambers. This measure is calculated as the total number of residents of voting age (18 or over) in each state divided by the number of districts for each chamber.

28Even if questions in the post-election survey had asked candidates about their perception before the campaign began, the responses would be suspect given the “rationalization-congratulation” effect exhibited by candidates following an election as reported by Kingdon (1966). Aspects of this effect are examined among the sample of candidates used in this study in Chapter Nine.

29In practice, none of the districts receive a score of 0 because these are districts without general election competition and are therefore not part of the analysis.

30As with general election districts, none of the districts receive a score of 0 because at least two candidates were necessary to be included in the analysis. Primary divisiveness has been used in other studies (Rae and Taylor, 1970; Herrnson and Gimpel, 1995) and is defined as follows:

\[ 1 - \sum p_i^2 \]

Where \( P_i \) is the proportion of the primary vote won by the \( i^{th} \) candidate.

31Connecticut’s primary system is unique among this group of states with its “challenge primary”. Nominees are generally chosen by political conventions but candidates who receive at least 15 percent of the convention vote have the opportunity to challenge the convention’s nominee in a primary. Such rules limit the number of districts in which a primary challenge occurs and clearly reduce the number of candidates who can possibly challenge in any given primary.

32In their study, only 10 of the 24 hypothesized relationships between the interactive term (the interaction is between the conversion factor and campaign spending) and percentage of the vote received are statistically significant and in the anticipated direction.

33The measure of candidate spending in the general election is the total of spending in both the primary and general election periods. This is consistent with how spending is measured elsewhere in the literature by
those who suggest that primary spending may boost name recognition and information levels about candidates in the general election (e.g., Gierynski and Breaux, 1991; Jacobson, 1978).

34 Tests for multicollinearity reveal no major relationships among the independent variables or between any one independent variable regressed against all the others.

35 Because experience variables are used, the analysis is restricted to those candidates for whom survey data is available.

36 The Hogan and Hamm (1998) analysis looks at total district spending (by all candidates), not individual candidate spending as the present analysis does.

37 Tests for multicollinearity reveal no major relationships among the independent variables or between any one independent variable regressed against all the others.

38 It could be that experience influences spending only in those legislatures where spending is relatively high -- generally professional ones. To test this, a series of interactive terms between legislative professionalism and experience was run for each equation (results not shown). However, none of the interaction terms were found to be statistically significant.

39 From Campaign Organization (1978, p. v-vi).

40 This is not to say that parties currently play no role in this process. Several studies in recent years indicated that county parties (Cotter, et al., 1984) as well as legislative parties on the state (Gierynski, 1992; Shea, 1995) and national levels (Dwyre, 1994; Hermson, 1988, 1995) perform important roles through candidate campaigns. However, parties are rarely in control of the campaign, instead they mostly assist candidates through contributions of money or services.

41 Some organizational attributes can be inferred from campaign finance reports such as the salary paid to workers or the costs of office space.

42 This is rather impressive given Kingdon's (1966) ideas of how defeated candidates often engage in "rationalization" by attributing their defeat to forces beyond their control.

43 Lamb and Smith (1968), for example, dispute White's characterization of the Kennedy campaign and find through their own research that the campaign was fraught with "continuing internal disagreements, off-the-cuff decisions, and organizational mixups" (p. 9-10).

44 Hershey notes rather explicitly why she did not focus attention on state legislative races. In her book she cites John Kingdon's (1966) findings which show that little campaign structure existed in these races. Hershey sums up Kingdon's findings by saying, "most candidates for state legislative and lower-level offices did relatively little campaigning, and did not spend much time working out a structure of perceptions about their campaigns" (1974: p. 13).

45 In addition, campaign finance laws in Texas allow greater latitude in how campaign spending can be allocated. Often state legislators spend large amounts of funding on district office expenses outside of the normal election cycle. However, even among challenger and open seat candidate campaigns, the Texas candidates spend a larger portion of their spending on organizational expenses than candidates in Kansas spend.

46 Kayden (1978) points out that greater task specialization does not come without some costs. For example, high levels of task specialization "adds to the communications problems because people working on one task will have very little knowledge of what others in the organization are doing" (p. 10).

47 Kayden's distinction between professional and personalized campaigns is probably more akin to the distinction made earlier between strong and weak organizations.

48 Only five states worth of itemized data were collected due to time and monetary constraints. As described in the Appendix, obtaining the data for just five states proved to be a arduous task unto itself. Note as well that this information is collected for only the sample of the candidates in each of the states who returned a completed questionnaire.

49 This information was obtained from the survey question which asked respondents, "Who was most responsible for running each of your campaigns?" Options were provided in columns marked "Primary" and "General" for "myself", "a campaign manager", "a political committee" and "other" followed by a line asking for specification. Some of the categories in Figure 4.1 were created based on responses to the "other" category or when a respondent marked more than one option. For example, the "manager along with others" category was created in this manner.
Chi-square tests indicate reveal a significant p value of .001 for both primary and general election contests, indicating that the three groups are statistically distinct.

Chi-square tests conducted among the three institutional categories and each of the two indicators of management (presence of no manager and presence of a professional manager) reveal significant correlations of p<.05 or better.

Respondents were asked the following question: "If you had a campaign manager, how much control would you say that he or she had in deciding campaign strategy? (On a scale of 0 to 100 with 0 meaning the manager had no influence and 100 meaning the manager had complete control). Respondents were asked to provide an estimate for both the primary and general election periods.

The p value equals .013 for the primary and .004 for the general election.

Analysis of variance tests reveal a statistically significant difference among the three categories of legislatures (p values equals .001 for the primary and .000 for the general election).

The p value equals .004 for the primary and .000 for the general election.

The p value equals .060 for the primary (not statistically significant) and .002 for the general election.

Chi-square tests conducted among the three institutional categories and each of the two indicators of offices (no campaign office and campaign office in its own separate facility) reveal significant correlations of p<.001 or better.

The continuous variables used in the index (percent of control given to the manager and number of unpaid workers) are converted into dichotomous measures by creating rather arbitrary cutoff points. Five campaign workers would seem to indicate that a campaign has at least a small group of workers who are willing to assist in the campaign effort. About 40% control over campaign decision making seems to be a reasonable indicator that a manager had some degree of control over decision making.

Analysis of variance tests show the differences between primary and general election periods are not statistically significant for either the strength index (p=0.59) or for the professionalism index (p=0.25).

The p value in both is less than 0.001.

The activities in Herrnsön’s analysis include: campaign management, press relations, issues and opposition research, fundraising, accounting, polling, media advertising, get out the vote drives, and legal advice. He finds that in competitive races there are 6.4 activities performed by paid staff or consultants whereas in uncompetitive races there are only 4.7 activities performed on average. Note that Herrnsön’s broad category of “organizational activities” includes many activities which are considered “informational” later on in this analysis (1995: p. 68).


Huckshorn and Spencer (1971) find that candidates report polling results were helpful in the selection and emphasis of certain issue positions, the allocation of campaign funds, and the development of the campaign organization. However, 40% of candidates indicate that such information was of little or no help in deciding any part of the campaign strategy.

These less professional sources of information include feedback from campaign workers and voters met on the campaign trail. Kingdom notes that a reliance on such sources presents a “communication bias” whereby candidates receive mainly positive feedback about their performance (1966: p. 104).

As indicated in the previous chapter, due to limitations of time and money, itemized expenditures for candidates were collected and coded in only five of the states from the sample.

A relationship is considered statistically significant here as well as throughout this chapter if p<0.05.

T-tests indicate no statistically significant differences in the averages between primary and general election periods even when the tests are run separately for each state. Analysis of variance tests also show no statistically significant relationship among states categorized by professionalism in either the primary or general election period.

The lone candidate from Wyoming scored the consultant he hired 10% on the scale, but because only one of the two Wyoming candidates who reported hiring a consultant answered the question, there is no mean score for Wyoming.

T-tests reveal a lack of statistical significance even when the states are run separately.

Analysis of variance tests confirm that the differences among the states are statistically significant.
Chi-square tests show that the differences among the states in responses to state and legislative party organizations are statistically significant.

It should at least be acknowledged that one difficulty with drawing such conclusions as we have done is that they are based on candidate perceptions about service provisions. But such perceptions may be biased in a way that might cause candidates to underplay the role of parties in their campaigns. As Kingdon (1966) establishes, winning candidates often downplay the importance of external factors to the election outcome while losers are more likely to blame outside forces. In this case, the result may be that winning candidates may not give parties enough credit while losers may overly blame parties for not providing enough assistance. Future research which considers a combination of perceptual as well as more objective measures of party assistance will be needed to more fully address these questions.

Analysis of variance tests reveal that there are statistically significant variations across the states in terms of party helpfulness among state and legislative party organizations (p<0.001 or better). However, the differences are not great enough among county parties to achieve standard levels of statistical significance (p<0.05).

A multiple regression equation was estimated which regressed each candidate's highest party average score (this was calculated as the average of the highest score given to any party organization for each service) on the following independent variables: electoral experience (trichotomous variable) party experience (trichotomous variable), competitiveness (dichotomous variable), incumbent (dichotomous variable), and open seat (dichotomous variable). The results indicated that only competitiveness variable was statistically significant and positive. For details concerning the construction of the independent variables just described, please see the explanations provided in the text further along in this chapter.

Tests for multicollinearity reveal no significant correlations between any two variables greater than 0.5 (Pearson correlation coefficient) nor any high correlations when each independent regressor was run against all the others.

A similar analysis was run using logistical regression where each activity (data analysis and maintaining a database) were run separately as dichotomous dependent variables. The explanatory ability of these equations (as gauged by correctly predicted observations) as well as the level of statistical significance were very similar to those provided in the reported OLS results.

Please see Chapter Four for details concerning the construction of this variable.

Please see Chapter Four for details concerning the construction of this variable.

Tests for multicollinearity reveal no significant correlations between any two variables greater than 0.5 (Pearson correlation coefficient) nor any high correlations when each independent regressor is run against all the others.


Many write of the increasing complexity of these targeting strategies such as Christopher Arterton's (1993) description of the intricate computer mapping techniques utilized by the 1992 Clinton team in targeting voters in given media markets across the country. However, it is important to recognize that as far back as the 1960 campaign, Theodore White (1961) discussed the "targeting" utilized by the Kennedy strategists. Even further back when parties orchestrated campaign efforts, it is not likely that workers canvassed every neighborhood or that advertisements were purchased in every newspaper. Clearly, party officials were limited in terms of time, workers, and resources, and probably did not appeal to all potential voters. Even then, party officials were careful not to awaken "sleeping dogs". It may be that strategy has not changed as much as have the tools used for implementing the strategy. The techniques for identifying support as well as disdain among voters in the electorate have become more precise while the basic strategy has remained constant.

Froman (1966) identifies a similar set of strategies, though he seems to indicate that campaigns do some of each "reinforcement of party supporters, activation of latent supporters, and conversion of the supporters of the opposition party" (p. 17).

Many studies of presidential elections have adopted a rational choice approach in developing mathematical formulas in modeling candidate strategies (Bartels, 1985; Brams, 1978; Colantoni, Levesque, and Ordesh ook, 1975). In recent years models have been extended to incorporate the pre-convention
strategy of accumulating convention delegates which is similar in many way to the collection of electoral votes (Aldrich, 1980; Bartels, 1988; Gurian, 1993).

*All the states in this sample have some form of closed primaries. Connecticut, Delaware, Oregon, and Wyoming have completely closed primaries in which only registered supporters of the party may vote. Illinois, South Carolina and Texas have modified closed primaries in which any registered voter may participate in one primary, but voters must choose only one party's primary. It should be acknowledged that other states have different arrangements. In Alaska, Washington, and California, for example, there are blanket primaries in which voters may cast ballots for candidates of different parties, though not for the same office.

The survey asked candidates for a yes or no response for both primary and general elections to the following question: "Campaigns often target campaign efforts toward specific types of voters within a district. Did your primary and and general election campaigns target specific types of voters? (Please check one response for each election)?".

The p value in the general election falls short of the significance threshold (0.05) at 0.086.

Information for this table was obtained from question 3B on the survey which asked of those respondents who did target voters, "what characteristics did these targeted voters have in common?" They were then asked "Please rank order the 3 most important characteristics of these targeted voters for each election, with 1 being the most important characteristic." Unfortunately, many of the respondents simply checked 3 (or sometimes more) responses. Respondents marking any of the categories (even if they did not rank them) were used in Table 6.3. Table 6.4 uses a subset of those voters who ranked their preferences as asked in the survey.


In Campaigning for Congress (1984: p. 27).


In terms of usage, Herrson (1995) finds that about 70% of House candidates use television and about 90% use radio (p. 183 and 188). These findings lead Herrson to conclude that "[t]he amounts budgeted for electronic media show the importance that modern communication techniques play in most House campaigns" (1995: p. 73).

Studies of congressional elections show that these beliefs have changed over time. For example, Fishel's (1973) analysis of candidates running in the late 1960s shows that candidates were "convinced that traditional, direct-contact activities are important determinants of electoral outcome" (p. 123). However, Herrson's research into congressional campaigns in the 1990s finds that "[m]ost campaigners believe that television is the best medium for disseminating their messages" (1995: p. 199).

Salmone and Salmone (1985) divide techniques into similar categories which they label as "narrow-casting" and "broad-casting" (p. 203).

Other studies divide techniques similarly. For example, Eulau, Zisk, and Prewitt (1966) describe the different techniques as "personal" and "impersonal" (pp. 226-228) and Fishel (1973) distinguishes between "personal and direct" and "impersonal and indirect" forms of contact (pp. 116-124).

These percentages reflect the actual dollar amounts allocated by candidates as reported on campaign finance documents filed with each state. This information reflects the spending by candidates who are part of the sample of candidates who returned a completed survey questionnaire and only those candidates who spent at least some money during the election period.

This is true whether the t-tests are run separately for each state or for the entire sample together.

Tests for multicollinearity reveal no significant correlations between any two variables greater than 0.5 (Pearson correlation coefficient) nor any high correlations when each independent regressor was run against all the others.

In Campaigning for Congress (1984, p. 3).


The factor score initially constructed is highly correlated with the index used (0.93 in the primary and 0.95 in the general election period). The index using the combination of five dichomous variables was used instead because its construction and interpretation are easier to interpret.
The campaign spending index and total spending are not run simultaneously because they are highly correlated. Spending clearly has an influence on the type of campaign that is waged.

Narrow contact is not further subdivided into personal and impersonal because both are expected to have similar effects on spending. The much larger dichotomy in effectiveness is anticipated between broad and narrow forms of contact.

The question reads as follows: "How important do you believe the following factors were in determining the outcome of the election in which you were a candidate? Please circle a response for each item in both the primary and general elections. (1=not important, 2=slightly important, 3=moderately important, 4=very important, 5=extremely important, NA=not applicable)." Response categories were available for both the primary and general election periods.


In congressional races, campaigns can target voters through the use of radio and television advertising since the population of the districts are so large.
Bibliography


Appendix

A variety of different forms of data were utilized in this project. Candidate names and election results were obtained from the relevant government agencies located in each of the states. This data was supplemented with information gleaned from candidate interviews, campaign finance reports, and a survey conducted of state legislative candidates in seven states following the 1994 general elections.

Interview Data

Approximately 20 in-depth interviews with candidates and campaign managers were conducted during the course of the primary and general election campaigns in 1994. While some were conducted over the telephone, most of the interviews in South Carolina and Texas were in person, often over the course of several hours as the candidate campaigned. The answers provided by candidates to questions about their campaigns were used to construct an appropriate survey instrument that was mailed to all the candidates following the election. In addition, this information also provided illustrations which are used throughout the text to emphasize particular points.

District Characteristics

Information on district characteristics was obtained from a variety of sources, generally state-level agencies. The construction of some variables such as past and present general election competition and total population are rather straightforward and
do not require explanation further than that given in the text. However, more detail should be provided regarding the construction of such district-level measures as population density and media market congruence.

Population density is measured as the average number of inhabitants in 1990 per square mile in a legislative district. The creation of this measure is problematic in that there is no source for square miles per legislative district. These were estimated using detailed maps as well as population statistics of cities and counties obtained from the *County and City Data Book* (1995).

Media market congruence is operationalized as the congruence between television markets and legislative districts. Television market boundaries were obtained from the *Broadcasting/Cablecasting Yearbook* (1995). These market boundaries called DMAs (Designated Market Area) encompass those counties in which most of the viewing audience view the broadcasts of stations within the DMA boundary. Every county in the U.S. falls within a DMA and no DMAs overlap. For districts which fall into one DMA, a congruence measure was created by dividing the total population of a legislative district by the total population of the DMA. For districts which overlap two or more DMAs, an estimation procedure was used to calculate congruence based on the percentage of the legislative districts falling within each of the DMAs. For further details concerning this procedure, see Campbell, Alford, and Henry (1984).
Total Spending and Itemized Spending

One of the more difficult aspects of this project was procuring and then coding the detailed campaign finance information. State laws in all seven states require that candidates file reports which list their expenditures over a certain amount as well as list the date of the expenditure, to whom it was paid, and its purpose. Unlike data for congressional elections, there is no one repository for data from state elections. It was therefore necessary to retrieve the information from each of the individual states. Several difficulties were encountered in acquiring the data, not the least of which were issues of accessibility. In some states, obtaining total campaign spending was quite easy given that listings of total spending for each candidate are stored electronically (Texas) or are printed in booklet form (Illinois and Oregon). But in the other states, to obtain just the total spending it was necessary to photocopy many pages of campaign finance documents for each candidate (Connecticut, Delaware, South Carolina, and Wyoming).

In studying campaign finance across states there are a number of issues of comparability which arise. For example, many of the states differ regarding what types of expenditures are allowed and how they are counted. This is especially true concerning loan repayments, transfers to other candidates or party entities, and in-kind contributions. A decision rule was adopted to exclude loan repayments and transfers out whenever possible from the total amount of spending since these expenditures do not adequately tap into the amount spent on the candidate’s campaign. In addition, in-kind contributions which are assigned a dollar value (as stipulated by most campaign finance regulations) are included in the total expenditure amount since these contributions are in effect
"expenditures" made on behalf of candidates with the candidate's consent. When such contributions were present and identifiable, they were included in the expenditure totals.

Another problem of comparability concerns the time of reporting and how these should be used to construct primary and general election campaign periods. For example, in one state (Wyoming) there are designated spending periods (primary and general), but in other states spending is reported at different reporting intervals which do not necessarily coincide with other states. Pseudo primary and general election periods were created in most states which roughly mirrored the reporting periods in other states. For example, the reporting periods in Illinois began on July 1 of 1993 and extended through June 30 of 1994 (several months after the primary in March), but also several months before the general election in November. Expenditures made by candidates during this period were designated as primary expenditures. Another period began on July 1 of 1994 and ended on January 1 of 1995. These expenses were designated as general election expenses. States varied in their reporting periods but an effort was made to match them together as closely as possible in order to fully capture all the spending allocated for the purpose of that particular election.¹

In addition to calculating total spending for candidates in both primary and general election periods, itemized spending was obtained for all candidates in five states who completed and returned a completed survey instrument. Candidates in each of these

¹Other precautions were also taken to ensure that spending was counted in the proper election period. For candidates who did not face opponents in the primary but made expenditures during the primary season, these monies were counted as part of the general election spending cycle. Likewise, for candidates who faced only primary election competition, spending allocated in the general election period was counted in the primary election since such expenditures were probably for purposes of paying remaining expenses
five states are required by law to provide an itemized list of each expenditure over a
certain dollar amount (this varied as well from no minimum amount required in
Wyoming to a $100 minimum in Illinois). Each of these expenditures was coded in one
of 115 different expenditure categories which were later aggregated into sub-categories
for use in the analysis.

The line-by-line itemization of spending proved to be one of the more arduous
coding tasks of the entire project. Approximately 27,800 lines of itemized expenditures
($14 million worth) was coded into each of these categories. Itemized expenditures were
obtained for 98% of those candidates who spent any money (only 13 cases were either
not available or itemized spending lists were missing).

Survey

Shortly after the 1994 general elections, both primary and general election
candidates were surveyed. All candidates who had a major party opponent in either the
primary or general election campaign were mailed a questionnaire during November and
December (a copy of the survey instrument is provided at the end of this Appendix). The
survey packet contained a return envelope with a first-class postage stamp affixed. Two
weeks later, candidates not responding to the first wave of questionnaires were mailed a
post card reminder. Two weeks after the post card, another entire survey instrument

from the primary. In this way every attempt was made to match the spending to the appropriate election
period.
packet was mailed. This effort resulted in a response rate of 42%. The breakout of the response rates by state is given below.

### Appendix Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Total Surveyed</th>
<th>Total Responses</th>
<th>Response Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wyoming</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>1505</strong></td>
<td><strong>637</strong></td>
<td><strong>42%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tests were conducted to compare the characteristics of the sample to several known characteristics of the population of contested election campaigns. Several candidate-level and district level variables are provided below. Overall, it appears that the sample is fairly representative of the population in both primary and general election periods. The sample has slightly fewer incumbents and slightly more open seat candidates than the population of candidates in the primary and general elections. Respondents were typically those who spent fewer dollars in both election cycles. In primaries it seems that winners were slightly over-represented in the sample while in general elections losers were slightly over-represented. Probably most important, though, is the typical percentage of the vote which candidates received. Candidates in the sample and those in the population won similar percentages of the vote both in the primary and

---

2 Excluding undeliverable responses in this calculation (those returned because of wrong addresses), the response rate is 43%.
general election periods. Overall, we can say that the sample is fairly representative of the population of candidates who ran in 1994 in these seven states.

**Appendix Table 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Primary Election</th>
<th>General Election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sample</td>
<td>Population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Incumbents</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Challengers</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Open Seats</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Spending</td>
<td>$30,429</td>
<td>$38,986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Primary Vote</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Two Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winners</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Losers</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The survey responses you provide are confidential. The results will contribute to an academic study of state legislative campaigns. Neither your name nor your district will be cited in any presentation or publication which results from this analysis. The form number at the top of this page is a mechanical device used to send follow up letters to individuals who have not returned a response within two weeks.

If you would like a copy of the completed study, write your name and address on a separate sheet of paper and return it with the survey.

Note that many of these questions ask for responses regarding your primary and general election campaigns in different columns. If you were not a candidate in one of these elections, simply leave the appropriate column blank.

If you have any questions, call Robert E. Hogan at 713-527-4842. Thank you for taking the time to participate in this study.
Your decision to run for the legislature

1. When did you privately decide you were going to run in 1994?
   Month and year

2. When did you publicly announce your candidacy?
   Month and year

3. How important do you believe each of the following groups was in influencing your decision to run for the state legislature in 1994? Please circle the number associated with the appropriate choice for each group. (1=not important, 2=slightly important, 3=moderately important, 4=very important, 5=extremely important)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family and friends</th>
<th>not important</th>
<th>slightly imp.</th>
<th>moderately imp.</th>
<th>very important</th>
<th>extremely imp.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interest Groups</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County Party Officials</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Party Officials</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Party Officials</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Party Officials</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other: ________________</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. How did the actual number of votes you received in the primary and general elections compare with how well you thought you would do before each campaign began? (Please check one for both the primary and general election.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Did you receive?</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>General</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More votes than you thought you would receive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About what you thought you would receive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fewer votes than you thought you would receive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following questions concern those involved with your 1994 campaign effort

1. Who was most responsible for running each of your campaigns?  
(Please check one for each election.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>General</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Myself</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A campaign manager</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A political committee</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (please specify)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1B. IF YOU HAD A CAMPAIGN MANAGER, was he or she:  
(Please check only one for each election.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>General</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Full-time, salaried</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full-time, volunteer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part-time, salaried</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part-time, volunteer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1C. IF YOU HAD A CAMPAIGN MANAGER, when approximately did he or she begin work?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>General</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Month/Day/Year</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1D. IF YOU HAD A CAMPAIGN MANAGER, how much control would you say that he or she had in deciding campaign strategy? (On a scale of 0 to 100 with 0 meaning the manager had no influence and 100 meaning the manager had complete control).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>General</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scale of 0 to 100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. Did you receive assistance from the county, state, legislative or national level party organizations in any of the following areas during your primary election campaign? (Please check all that apply for each area of assistance)

You Received Assistance From:

- National Party Org.
- Legislative Party Org.
- State Party Org.
- County Party Org.
- No Party Org.

- Registering Voters
- Providing Survey Data, Demographic Data and Lists of Voters
- Getting Voters to the Polls on Election Day
- Providing Volunteer Workers
- Hiring Pollsters and Media Consultants
- Devising Campaign Strategy
- Managing the Campaign Day-to-Day
- Purchasing Advertisements

3. How helpful were county party organizations in providing your general election campaign with each of the following? Please circle a response for each category. (1 = not helpful, 2 = slightly helpful, 3 = moderately helpful, 4 = very helpful, 5 = extremely helpful)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Registering Voters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providing Survey Data, Demographic Data</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data and Lists of Voters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Getting Voters to the Polls on Election Day</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providing Volunteer Workers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiring Pollsters and Media Consultants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devising Campaign Strategy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managing the Campaign Day-to-Day</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchasing Advertising</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. How helpful were state party organizations in providing your general election campaign with each of the following? Please circle a response for each category. (1=not helpful, 2=slightly helpful, 3=moderately helpful, 4=very helpful, 5=extremely helpful)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Registering Voters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providing Survey Data, Demographic Data and Lists of Voters</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Getting Voters to the Polls on Election Day</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providing Volunteer Workers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiring Pollsters and Media Consultants</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundraising</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devising Campaign Strategy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managing the Campaign Day-to-Day</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchase of Advertising</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. How helpful were legislative party organizations in providing your general election campaign with each of the following? Please circle a response for each category. (1=not helpful, 2=slightly helpful, 3=moderately helpful, 4=very helpful, 5=extremely helpful)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Registering Voters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providing Survey Data, Demographic Data and Lists of Voters</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Getting Voters to the Polls on Election Day</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providing Volunteer Workers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiring Pollsters and Media Consultants</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundraising</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devising Campaign Strategy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managing the Campaign Day-to-Day</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchase of Advertising</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. Did you hire a professional firm (consulting or advertising) to assist your campaign? (Please check one response for each election.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>General</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6B. IF YOU DID HIRE A PROFESSIONAL FIRM OR FIRMS, in what types of activities were they involved? (Please check all that apply for each election.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>General</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Devising Strategy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchasing of Advertising</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Mail</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polling</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compiling Information About Voters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone Banks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day-to-Day Campaign Management</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundraising</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6C. IF YOU DID HIRE A PROFESSIONAL FIRM OR FIRMS, how involved were they in making decisions about your campaign strategy on a scale of 0 to 100 with 0 no involvement and 100 meaning complete control?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>General</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scale of 0 to 100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. Did you maintain a campaign office during each election campaign? (Please check one response for each election.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>General</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7B. IF YOU DID MAINTAIN A CAMPAIGN OFFICE, which of the following best describes the location of this office? (Please check one response for each election.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>General</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In Your Home</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In a Friend's Home</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Your Place of Business</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In a Friend's Place of Business</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Its Own Separate Facility</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the County Party Headquarters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other: (specify)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following questions concern when and how campaign resources were allocated

1. At the height of your campaign, what percentage of your own time would you estimate was spent on each of the following activities? (Please indicate a percentage for each activity in both the primary and general election campaigns.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaign Activity</th>
<th>Percent in Primary (%)</th>
<th>Percent in General (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recruiting Campaign Workers and Volunteers</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundraising</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devising Campaign Strategy</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaigning for Votes</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-campaign Related Activities (normal job, time with family)</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL= 100% 100%
2. In terms of campaign expenditures, approximately what percentage of your total advertising budget was spent on each of the following? (Please write in a percentage for each category in both the primary and general elections.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>General</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mailings</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handbills</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Billboards and Yardsigns</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper Advertising</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Advertising</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television Advertising</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL = 100% 100%

3. Which consumed more of your campaign's resources (time, energy, and finances), the primary or general election campaign? (Please check only one.)

- General Election Campaign
- Primary Election Campaign
- Both Consumed Equal Amounts

4. How many weeks prior to each election did you campaign?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>General</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of weeks prior to:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. How many paid workers and unpaid volunteers assisted you at least 5 hours a week for a month preceding each election?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>General</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paid workers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unpaid volunteers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. For legislative candidates running in your district, to what extent are the following techniques effective in conveying a candidate's message to voters? Please circle a response for each activity for both the primary and general elections. (1=not effective, 2=slightly effective, 3=moderately effective, 4=very effective, 5=extremely effective)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mailings</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>General</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper Advertising</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Advertising</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television Advertising</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Billboards and Yard Signs</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Contact with Voters</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canvassing Door-to-Door</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canvassing by Telephone</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endorsements</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. How useful are each of the following for legislative candidates running in the district in which you ran? Please circle a response for each activity. (1=not useful, 2=slightly useful, 3=moderately useful, 4=very useful, 5=extremely useful)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>General</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hiring a Full-Time Manager</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiring a Political Consultant</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Get-Out-the-Vote Activities on Election Day</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These next questions concern the strategy used by your campaign in 1994

1. Did your campaign maintain a database of voters in your district?
   
   □ No.
   
   □ Yes. From whom did you acquire this data?
   
       A Political Consulting Firm
   
       □
   
       A Political Party or Interest Group
   
       □
   
       Another Candidate or Former Candidate
   
       □
   
       Other: ____________________________
   
       □

2. Did your campaign conduct a precinct-by-precinct analysis of past voting patterns in your district?
   
   □ No.
   
   □
   
   Yes.
   
   □
   
   Yes, consultant did.
   
   □

3. Campaigns often target campaign efforts toward specific types of voters within a district. Did your primary and general election campaigns target specific types of voters? (Please check one response for each election.)

   Yes
   
   □
   
   □

   No
   
   □
   
   □
3B. IF YOUR CAMPAIGN DID TARGET VOTERS, what characteristics did these targeted voters have in common? (Please rank order the 3 most important characteristics of these targeted voters for each election, with 1 being the most important characteristic).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>General</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voters Likely to Support Your Political Party</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voters Likely to Support Your Opponent’s Political Party</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voters Likely to Split Their Ticket or Vote Independently</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voters of a particular Social/Economic Status</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voters Interested in Certain Issues</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voters of a Particular Racial/Ethnic Background</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voters Living In Certain Geographic Areas</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (please specify)</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3C. IF YOUR CAMPAIGN DID TARGET VOTERS, do you believe that your opponent(s) in both the primary and general election campaigns were targeting the same voters or different voters than your campaign? (Please check only one for each election.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaigns Targeted</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>General</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nearly the Same Voters</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some of the Same Voters</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only a Few of the Same Voters</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. How important were each of the following factors in influencing the development of your campaign's strategy? Please circle a response for each factor. (1=not important, 2=slightly important, 3=moderately important, 4=very important, 5=extremely important)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities and Strategy of Opponent(s)</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>General</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reactions of Voters</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your Campaign’s Financial Resources</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Influence of Other Elections</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. IF YOU WERE A CANDIDATE IN THE GENERAL ELECTION, how much of your campaign effort was directed toward gaining support from each of the following groups in the general election? Please circle a response for each category. (1=no effort, 2=small effort, 3=moderate effort, 4=much effort, 5=great deal of effort)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voters Who Support Your Party</th>
<th>no effort</th>
<th>small effort</th>
<th>moderate effort</th>
<th>much effort</th>
<th>great deal effort</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voters Who Support the Opposing Party</th>
<th>1 2 3 4 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Voters</th>
<th>1 2 3 4 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
6. Before both the primary and general election campaigns, how much information do you think the average voter had about you in each of the following areas? Please circle a response for each item. (1=knew nothing, 2=knew some, 3=knew a great deal)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>General</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Your Issue Positions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your Personal Qualities</td>
<td>1 2 3</td>
<td>1 2 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your Community Service</td>
<td>1 2 3</td>
<td>1 2 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your Past Political Record</td>
<td>1 2 3</td>
<td>1 2 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your Party Affiliation</td>
<td>1 2 3</td>
<td>1 2 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. Listed below are topics candidates sometimes emphasize in their campaign. To what extent were each of these topics emphasized by your campaign? Please circle a response for each topic in both the primary and general elections. (1=seldom emphasized, 2=moderately emphasized, 3=greatly emphasized)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>General</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Your Position on the Issues</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your Personal Qualities and Achievements</td>
<td>1 2 3</td>
<td>1 2 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your Community Service</td>
<td>1 2 3</td>
<td>1 2 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your Past Political Record</td>
<td>1 2 3</td>
<td>1 2 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your Party Affiliation</td>
<td>1 2 3</td>
<td>1 2 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issues About the Opposing Candidate(s)</td>
<td>1 2 3</td>
<td>1 2 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This next set of questions concerns your perceptions about running for the state legislature

1. How important do you believe the following factors were in determining the outcome of the election in which you were a candidate? Please circle a response for each item in both the primary and general elections. (1=not important, 2=slightly important, 3=moderately important, 4=very important, 5=extremely important, NA=not applicable)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Image and Personality of Candidates</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>General</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Affiliation of Candidates</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue Positions of Candidates</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent’s Advantages of Office</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence of the Other Elections</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Campaign Spending by Candidates</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endorsements of Candidates</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Organizations of Candidates</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support of Key Party Leaders</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name Recognition of Candidates</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. IF YOU WERE A CANDIDATE IN THE GENERAL ELECTION, what impact if any did the strong support for Republican candidates seen nationally influence the election in which you ran? On a scale of 0 to 100 with 0 meaning the strong support for Republicans had no impact and 100 meaning that the strong support for Republican candidates determined the outcome of the election in your district

Scale of 0 to 100
3. In general, do you believe that campaign effort in state legislative elections like the one you ran in makes a difference in terms of who wins and who loses, or is the election decided by things which a candidate can’t control? On a scale of 0 to 100 with 0 meaning the campaign has no influence on election outcomes, while 100 means that a candidate’s campaign determines the outcome.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>General</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scale of 0 to 100</td>
<td>□ □</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*These final questions deal with your past political experiences and personal characteristics*

1. Other than the 1994 state legislative campaign, have you ever run for an elective office or offices?

☐ No  ☑ Yes (Please specify)

**Office**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year in which you ran:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1B. IF YOU HAVE RUN FOR ELECTIVE OFFICE IN THE PAST, which of these elections did you win?

**Office**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years office was held:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19 to 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 to 19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Have you ever held any official position or positions within a local, state, or national political party?

☐ No  ☑ Yes (Please specify)

**Position**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years position held:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19 to 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 to 19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. What other political experiences (working in campaigns or interest group activity, for example) have you had which you believe helped prepare you for your 1994 campaign?

4. Your Political Party: (please check one)  
☐ Republican  ☐ Democrat  
☐ Other ___________________________

5. Your race or ethnicity: (please check one)  
☐ African-American  ☐ American Indian  
☐ Asian-American  ☐ Hispanic-American  
☐ White non-Hispanic  ☐ Other ___________________________

6. Year you were born: 19___

7. Your highest level of education completed:  
☐ some high school  ☐ high school graduate  
☐ some college or college graduate  ☐ some graduate school or grad. degree (please specify) ______

8. Your current occupation:

9. IF YOU ARE RETIRED, what was your occupation while you were employed?

10. Your approximate net family income from all sources in 1993:  
☐ Less than $20,000  ☐ $20,000 to $40,000  
☐ $40,001 to $60,000  ☐ $60,001 to $80,000  
☐ $80,001 to $100,000  ☐ more than $100,000

11. Approximately what percentage of the vote did you receive in each election?  
☐ % Primary  ☐ % General

12. Number of years lived in the state in which you now reside: ______

13. Are there any additional comments you would like to make about your 1994 campaign for the state legislature?

Thank you very much for taking the time to complete this survey. Please return it in the enclosed stamped envelope. The envelope is addressed to: 1994 State Legislative Campaign Study, Department of Political Science MS 24, Rice University, 6100 Main Street, Houston, TX 77005.