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RICE UNIVERSITY

DEVELOPING THE EAST AFRICAN: THE EAST AFRICA ROYAL COMMISSION, 1953-1955, AND ITS CRITICS

by

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A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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ABSTRACT

Developing the East African:

The East Africa Royal Commission, 1953-1955, and its Critics

by

Andrew James Hood

The East Africa Royal Commission, 1953-55, was a wide-ranging investigation of the necessary conditions for promoting the economic development of the colonial dependencies of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika. Commissioners conceived their task as apolitical, but evidence gathered from government officials and the public—including members of the African, Asian, and European communities within the region—demonstrated that politics and economics were not easily separable. Officials, settlers, and Africans presented contending historical narratives explaining the past, present, and future of East Africa. African witnesses took the opportunity to address the state, demanding redress for the injustices of colonialism.

In their report, the commissioners suppressed the African dissent, largely ignored settler demands, and privileged much of the official narrative. The commission presented colonial development, achieved through multiracial cooperation, as the hope for East Africa's future. The report detailed the technical, and administrative requirements for future economic growth, but ultimately their proposals hinged upon the "human factor,"
especially the problem of winning the willing cooperation of the African people for the development program. The work of the commission revealed divisions among its members over the question of the degree of government intervention and control that should be exerted in the economy; the laissez-faire tone of the report was tempered by its substantive recommendations, which sanctioned continued official guidance of development plans.

Following the report's publication, British commentators in government and among the public took up the debate. Left-wing critics denounced the document as a free-market tract that proposed exposing Africans to the full blast of an agricultural and industrial revolution, similar to that which had inflicted suffering upon British workers in the nineteenth century, without attempting to cushion the effects. Some of them also demanded faster movement towards self-government in the colonies. Conservatives rejected that idea, although they did generally support continued, paternalistic interventions by colonial officials. Despite the United Kingdom's evident inability to finance the recommended program of development, many commentators from different ideological perspectives viewed development as the culmination of Britain's imperial mission.
Acknowledgments

Producing a work of scholarship is generally a solitary task, yet it is a task that would be doomed to failure in the absence of support and encouragement from many quarters. I received invaluable assistance in researching this dissertation from some very talented librarians and archivists.

In the United Kingdom, I spent two summers at London House, which brings together students and professors from around the world in an elegant setting. Staffs at the libraries of the University of London, the School of Oriental and African Studies, the Oriental and India Office Collections, and the Royal Colonial Society were very helpful, while the Institute of Historical Research provided not only access to its stacks but a convivial atmosphere in which to meet other scholars. Peter Marshall and Andrew Porter graciously allowed me to attend their imperial history seminar at the IHR, and the participants offered equal measures of criticism and hospitality. I undertook most of my archival research at the Public Record Office, Kew Gardens, where the collegiality of tea-time more than compensated for the tedium of sifting through Colonial Office files for useful nuggets of information. The courtesy and professionalism of PRO personnel is above reproach. I experienced a true sense of empire at the Rhodes House Library, Oxford, where former colonials gather to assess anew the imperial enterprise. In North America, the Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University, and Mills Memorial Library,
McMaster University, allowed me to peruse collections in their archives, while the Africana Library, Northwestern University, loaned materials that were impossible to obtain elsewhere. Above all, librarians and reference staff at Rice University's Fondren Library assisted my work in every manner, and I extend a special thanks to the Interlibrary Borrowing and Lending department.

A number of people read and commented upon drafts of portions of this work. Participants in sessions at the Western Conference of British Studies posed many useful questions. Patricia Bixel at the Journal of Southern History was most generous with her copyediting skills. She and other graduate students in Rice's history department provided moral support throughout the work. I owe special debts to Mat Moten, Tom Little, Jeff Hooton, Lynn Lyerly, and Christopher Stokes, all of whom bolstered my spirits at critical moments. My thesis advisers, E. S. Atieno Odhiambo and Martin J. Wiener, earned my eternal gratitude for both their astute advice and immeasurable forbearance while I struggled with this project. Other faculty were equally supportive, and I owe a special debt of gratitude to Edward Cox, Albert Van Helden, and Nancy Parker, the history department coordinator. Rice University provided generous funding for my graduate studies.

Finally, this effort would not have been possible and would have been meaningless without the constant love and encouragement from my parents, William and Gwen, and from Elester, who relieved the solitude of my work and made it bearable.

AJH, May 1997
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Chapter One

Introduction

Between 1953 and 1955, the East Africa Royal Commission, chaired by Sir Hugh Dow, undertook a wide-ranging examination of the economic and social challenges facing the British East African colonies. Commission members were specifically asked to study "the measures necessary to be taken to achieve an improved standard of living,"¹ and to make recommendations toward achieving that end. Their report, published in June 1955, offered a discussion of contemporary problems and a vision of the future for East Africa. The present study will analyze the work of the royal commission—the collection of evidence, the drafting of the report—and the reaction to its findings by interested parties upon its publication.

This dissertation will attempt to place the royal commission's report within a broader cultural and political context by posing a number of questions. In particular, to what extent did the report reflect contemporary views on economic and social development, both in the colonies and in England itself? What was the proper role of the state in fostering such development? Most importantly, what roles were Africans themselves to play in the schemes envisioned by colonial policy-makers? By the late 1950s it was apparent to most people who considered the question that Africans (and definitely the educated elite) were not going to be passive observers of the process of decolonization.

All plans for the future of the East African colonies had to take into account the political reaction among different groups in the region, including the various African constituencies.

British colonial planners based schemes for economic, social, and political development on both imperial requirements and assumptions about Africans and African society. Through the 1920s, the major imperative in the view of the metropolitan government was that colonies should be self-supporting, generating revenues to pay for their own administrations without becoming a burden on the Treasury through imperial grants-in-aid. Colonial governments promoted the cultivation of commodities, upon which they could levy export taxes, for world markets. In colonies such as Uganda the authorities anticipated the emergence of a mix of plantation and peasant production, while in settlement colonies like Kenya the government subsidized the European farming sector. Officials conceptualized African "traditional" society as tribal, backward, and in need of protection. The African contribution to the economy was to provide either temporary labor—for plantations or for settler farms—or small volumes of export commodities produced by peasants over and above their subsistence food crops. The African who attempted to break away from the tie to the village, the so-called "detribalized native," represented a threat to traditional society and the colonial order.

Native producers proved far more important to the colonial economy than originally theorized. Revenues derived from peasant agriculture in Uganda were indispensable to the state from the 1920s onward. During the 1930s the shock of the
depression forced colonial authorities to recognize that African farmers in Kenya and Tanganyika were far more resilient than European settlers in the face of economic hardship. Financial constraints in those territories reduced the availability of government aid to settlers and forced authorities to pay more attention to African production. The Second World War revived settler prospects but the aftermath of that conflict changed imperial priorities.

In 1929, Parliament passed the Colonial Development Act, which was mainly intended to provide a remedy for unemployment in the United Kingdom. Colonies would purchase the capital goods they required for development projects from British sources. Little more than a decade later the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940 promised large infusions of capital provided by London to underwrite development, encompassing policies to stimulate economic growth and to provide modern social services in the colonies. That act, marking a new departure in colonial policy, had been inspired by a number of events during the second half of the 1930s. From 1935 onward, British imperialists came under pressure from foreign critics: in the late 1930s from Germans, demanding the return of their pre-1919 colonies and charging that British rule meant stagnation; during World War II and after from the American allies who were essential to Britain’s survival during war and, later, subsidized British reconstruction; and, during the Cold War from Soviet propagandists charging the imperialists with exploiting the colonies without bestowing any benefits. Domestic reviewers, particularly the humanitarian lobby and critics on the left—could be just as reproachful. The allegations of
the failure of colonial rule were certainly not without foundation, as evidenced by the wave of labor unrest that swept the empire after 1935, especially in the West Indies and throughout the African copperbelt.

Colonial resources were effectively mobilized in support of the imperial effort during the Second World War. At the end of the fighting British leaders still felt the need to exonerate their brand of colonialism in the eyes of the world community, and post-war metropolitan requirements demanded a renewed effort to develop imperial assets. Labour governments were committed to sustaining full employment and increasing services provided to the British electorate. In order to meet those promises the colonies would have to provide raw resources and, perhaps more importantly, continue to earn American dollars to offset London's trade imbalance. Furthermore, colonies would not be allowed to indiscriminately spend the large sterling balances that had accumulated in England during the war and which continued to grow afterward. The colonial empire was more important economically to Britain following the war than at any other time, creating demands for increased production and efficiency. Development became infused with moral vigor as a project vital to both the benefit of the United Kingdom and for the welfare of colonial peoples.

New requirements from the colonies, however, increased the impositions of colonial governments on their subjects. Post-war demands for greater production heightened concerns expressed from the late 1930s onwards about the ecological damage wrought by "traditional" agriculture. Armies of agricultural, veterinary, medical,
hydrological, geological, and forestry experts descended upon African villages, cajoling
and coercing changes in patterns of work and daily living. That "second colonial
occupation" quickly provoked reactions among Africans. Peasants resisted agrarian
reforms actively and passively. Workers demanded better wages and living conditions.
The multiplication of discontents led to the formation of new political organizations
throughout East Africa.

To the political challenge of "agitators," the British presented development as a
counter in what they perceived to be a competition for the hearts and minds of ordinary
Africans. The East Africa Royal Commission's terms of reference prevented it from
pronouncing on political issues, but its purpose was implicitly political: higher living
standards would remove a major source of dissatisfaction. The commission produced
recommendations for transplanting the "modern exchange economy" to the (nearly virgin)
soil of East Africa. The traditional African—tribal, superstitious, and suspicious of change-
—would have to become "economic man," selling goods and services in the marketplace,
anticipating future demand, and willing to adjust to new conditions. Development
required stability defined in terms of political and social calm; multiracialism was vital
because the region needed the capital and skills supplied by all members of the community.
And development necessitated the deferral of demands for self-government while plans for
economic progress unfolded, which implied the continuation of imperial rule for the
foreseeable future.
As instruments of colonialism, commissions of inquiry had a well-established place in East African history. Before the Second World War, Marjorie Ruth Dilley wrote: "Commissions have been sent to Kenya and to East Africa until the sending of one has become a by-word and an object of sardonic amusement to the local population."² Commissions have long been a tool of the British parliamentary system, assuming their modern form in the nineteenth century. During the first half of that century the role of commissions, according to Frank Burton and Pat Carlen, "was to provide and to publicly propagate knowledge of social conditions that would shape the technology of social engineering. Their contents became part of the discursive armoury of the political scene."³ In their view, investigative commissions were refined into a system of "intellectual collusion" between state functionaries and lay intelligentsia: "The effect of this process is to replenish official arguments with both established and novel modes of knowing and forms of reasoning."⁴

Adam Ashforth concurs with Burton and Carlen, arguing that, "Replenishment from the 'lay intelligentsia' is essential for the continuing vitality of official discourse, allowing the authorities to govern according to principles of knowledge generally deemed 'true.'" But, he maintains, commissions of inquiry not only replenish arguments within official discourse, they constitute an entirely new form of discourse:

That is, Commissions produce a rational and scientific administrative discourse out of the raw materials of political struggle and debate. Although this process

⁴ Ibid., 7-8.
constantly occurs throughout most of the institutions of the State as part of the "rationalization" of Society inherent in bureaucracy, it is in Commissions of Inquiry that we find the examples of the formation of rational-instrumental discourse par excellence.\(^5\)

In Ashforth's view, commission reports represent "reckoning schemes of legitimization" that are potent because of the manner in which they articulate "concrete plans of action designed to achieve the 'proper' means and objectives of power." Reports are rhetorical texts embodying a complex balancing of various interests, and if they cannot change society by decree, they are able to frame the questions for discussion.\(^6\)

In the case of East Africa, commissions of inquiry constituted the "native" as a proper object of state power, studied through their (supposed) objective, apolitical lens. In the preface to their 1955 report on East Africa, for example, commission members declared: "We were not concerned with current political issues, but with the deep-rooted economic and social issues which underlie them, and in the consideration of these we have not been embarrassed by reluctance on the part of any section of the public to express their views."\(^7\) Assuming a stance of being removed from politics,\(^8\) the commissioners were then free to prescribe action for the "common good" of society. To claim to act for

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\(^6\) Ibid., 6.

\(^7\) *East Africa Royal Commission 1953-1955 Report*, Cmd. 9475 (June 1955): xiv. The current political issue that was surely foremost in their minds was the ongoing Mau Mau insurgency (1952-59) and the consequent "state of emergency" declared to deal with it. In Buganda, Governor Cohen's deportation of the Kabaka in 1953 sparked a crisis that lasted until 1955.

\(^8\) Members of the East Africa Royal Commission were drawn from business (both commercial and farming), academic, and governmental circles, and included one African, from Tanganyika, who had been involved with local and central government in the territory. Once constituted, the commission was free to set its own agenda within the parameters of its terms of reference. As chapter three recounts, the influence of the imperial government was exerted through the processes of drafting the terms of reference and selecting its members, which was principally the responsibility of the Colonial Office staff.
the common good, in Ashforth's opinion, is not only to buttress the legitimacy of the state, "... it is also a way of orientating the actions of those who would act in the name of the State towards the people who inhabit the spaces of jurisdiction; a way not only of justifying State action but making normatively directed collective action on the part of those who act in the name of a State possible."9

But Ashforth seems to suggest that commissions of inquiry always approach every problem with the aim of reinforcing preexisting state policies and practices. If commissions of inquiry function at a certain level in the manner in which Ashforth suggests, it is nevertheless true that they are composed of a number of individuals grounded in a specific historical context. Doreen Atkinson takes Ashforth and others to task for assuming that the beliefs of state actors are always in some way functional to the maintenance and promotion of state power.10 She does not deny that state officials pursue power (that in itself is neither illegitimate nor surprising), but a full appreciation of their actions can only be gained through a study of "political morality," that which delineates the parameters of the permissible and impermissible in public life.11 British administrators, for example, sometimes used coercion in ruling East Africa, but it was neither practical nor morally permissible to rely upon force alone. The authors of commission reports care-

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9 Ashforth, "Reckoning Schemes of Legitimation," 15-16; Bruce Berman refers to "a process of abstraction, a term that suggests both institutional differentiation and separation, and an ideological dimension of depersonalization and articulation of abstract 'principles.'" Control and Crisis in Colonial Kenya: The Dialectic of Domination (London: James Curry, 1990), 27.
11 Ibid., 8-10.
fully chose their language in the pursuit of political goals, but their words also reveal the moral code and political pressures by which they lived and which limited their choices.

Members of the East Africa Royal Commission were drawn from business (both commercial and farming), academic, and governmental circles, and included one African, from Tanganyika, who had been involved with local and central government in the territory. As chapter three recounts, the influence of the imperial government was exerted through drafting the commission's terms of reference and selecting its members, which was principally the responsibility of the Colonial Office staff in consultation with the East African administrations and under the direction of their political masters. Once constituted, the commission was free to set its own agenda within the parameters of its terms of reference, and the personalities and prejudices of the individual members shaped its findings as much as any official agenda. The process of information gathering and deliberation occupied their time for over two years before the eight commissioners and support staff produced the final report, and their efforts were not directly supervised by the Colonial Office.

The taking of testimony from witnesses and the drafting the report revealed the extent to which the royal commission can be said to have served official purposes. Many witnesses were clearly sympathetic to the colonial governments, including the officials who testified. The administrations in Nairobi, Kampala, and Dar es Salaam supplied innumerable memoranda either generated by their staffs specifically for the inquiry or retrieved from government archives. Commissioners treated officials respectfully and
allowed them to fully develop their arguments. On the other hand, African witnesses, the meaning of whose poorly translated petitions and memoranda were not always clear, were often lectured by commission members or allotted only brief periods of time in which to present their arguments. Despite those handicaps, many ordinary Africans took full advantage of the opportunity proffered by the commission to engage what they perceived to be the imperial state in spirited dialogue. Time and again, those witnesses challenged the notion that economic progress could stand as a substitute for real constitutional change. African intellectuals, workers, and villagers made it clear that they attached equal, if not greater, importance to achieving political control over the development process as they did to development itself. That African discourse of challenge to the legitimacy of imperial authority was filtered out of the commission's report, and in that sense the commission did serve the purposes of the imperial government.

In other ways, however, the work of the commission critiqued the past and present performance of the East African administrations, particularly in the manner in which paternalistic assumptions about protecting African interests were used to justify restrictions and regulations that stifled the operation of free markets. Reflecting divisions of opinion among members of the commission, the final document's forceful advocacy of unfettered competition was generally accompanied by recommendations that affirmed the role of colonial service officers as guardians of the interests of African peoples who were not yet ready to face the full, unshielded blast of the modern, competitive world. But the report did embody a powerful challenge to idea that economic advance could best be
achieved through the agency of state planning, although the arguments were perhaps more applicable to England than to East Africa, where the race question complicated and qualified the prescription for growth.

During the period of public debate that followed publication of the report, critics on the political left were particularly vociferous in denouncing the laissez faire tone of the document. They claimed that the commission advocated exposing Africans to market competition before they were ready, and that the anticipated results would be much like the impact of the early industrial revolution on British workers. Critics on the right and the colonial governors joined in attacking aspects of the report, particularly sections that advocated rapid economic and social transformations that might lead to instability and disorder. The governors were especially determined to carefully control and monitor the modernization process lest it produce unmanageable political ramifications. From somewhat different perspectives, therefore, leftward and rightward leaning commentators rejected some of the central arguments presented by the royal commission. All maintained that they could draw selectively upon its recommendations, but most continued to assume that Africa would develop under the paternalistic guidance of the colonial authorities: a potent reformulation of Britain's imperial mission.

Perhaps the most substantive obstacle to the successful implementation of the royal commission's recommendations was the financial cost. The depth of feeling behind African demands for constitutional change and for a voice in the development process was, perhaps, difficult to gauge and one can understand how commentators might fail to
appreciate its significance. But published estimates by the governors and the secretary of state clearly suggested that the United Kingdom would be hard pressed to provide the capital necessary for development on the scale called for by the report. That did not prevent British writers, thinkers, and politicians from spinning grand schemes of colonial regeneration. The debate over the report thus reveals some of the unresolved and unacknowledged contradictions that confronted imperial planners on the very eve of decolonization in Africa.

This dissertation examines the East Africa Royal Commission, from its conception, through the gathering of evidence, the production of the report, and its reception by official and unofficial critics. Chapter two outlines the historical background to the task of development about which the commissioners were asked to make recommendations. The third chapter describes Governor Sir Philip Mitchell's proposal for a royal commission to study problems of land and population in Kenya, the extension of the scope of the study to include all of East Africa, and the delineation of the terms of reference and selection of commission personnel. An examination of the written and oral evidence presented to the royal commission comprises chapter four. Chapter five scrutinizes the commission report, while chapter six considers the reaction it provoked among informed readers both within and outside of the colonial establishment.
Chapter Two

Developing the Colonial Estate

"When Great Britain assumed the administration of the territories which are now Kenya and Uganda, and later in different circumstances Tanganyika," the members of the East Africa Royal Commission of 1953-55 wrote, "there was brought to bear on the people of the region the greatest single outside influence for good in the form of a rule of law based on principles of British justice." While one might challenge that assertion, it is useful to understand the specific historical tradition within which they understood the meaning of their own labors. They were charged with investigating the conditions necessary for economic development, a question that had previously been addressed in different ways in colonial East Africa.

From the beginning of Britain's formal presence in the region, the colonial economy had been a priority, although the exact motives for promoting it and the patterns which it might assume were always open to question. Between the period of the conquest and the First World War, the primary aim of administrators in London and East Africa alike was to establish the colonies on a self-supporting basis, at least to the extent that they would not require imperial grants-in-aid and, as a consequence, be freed from direct fiscal oversight by the Treasury. After the Great War, the administration quickly became entangled in the question of who should benefit: specifically, which group--European,

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Asian, or African. Especially in Kenya and less successfully in the other territories, Europeans sought to establish their predominance both politically and economically. Administrators who cast themselves as arbiters among the contending groups, proposed the concept of "trusteeship," which theoretically would oblige them to be especially solicitous of African interests; and the "dual policy," which presumed that development could unfold among the various communities simultaneously, each advancing at its own pace and according to its members' abilities. Under that schema, each race played a role—Europeans as organizers of capital and expertise; Indians as traders, artisans, and skilled labor; Africans as unskilled labor.  

Flaws appeared in the script when Africans quickly emerged as producers in their own right. During the depression of the 1930s, peasants proved to be far more resilient than settler or plantation producers, and the colonial state was forced to pay more attention to the African cultivators who provided the bulk of government revenues. Still, settlers, colonial officials, and British observers of Africa were slow to make room for the African as anything other than unskilled, temporary laborer or subsistence farmer. He long remained the "savage" for the settlers, the "traditional native" requiring paternalistic guidance and protection for officials, and those images were never completely expunged from the colonial mind. The so-called "detribalized native" threatened to transgress barri-

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ers of race and class and, eventually, to destroy the colonial order altogether. After the Second World War, however, the requirements of the colonial state changed. "Traditional" agriculture no longer appeared sustainable, yet development was more urgently desired than ever to meet both metropolitan and colonial needs. Older patterns of thinking continued to coexist with new statements of achieving "partnership" and "multiracialism." Economic development, an idea popularized in Britain in the wake of the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940, would stand in place of and divert attention from constitutional change. Ultimately the East Africa Royal Commission was charged with the task of prescribing a future development path for the region, and in the process they would declare the African as "economic man" to be the key to future progress. This chapter examines the evolution of the development idea and the changing role and image of the African within its bounds.

Britain's formal political control in East Africa began in 1890 when, as part of a treaty with Germany, the British established a protectorate over Zanzibar in exchange for Heligoland. The agreement was a diplomatic triumph for Lord Salisbury, prime minister and foreign secretary, in that it achieved his aim of protecting the Upper Nile from German encroachment. The acquisition of the territories which later became Uganda and Kenya was almost incidental to a bargain between Salisbury and the German chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, which was primarily driven by European strategic and diplomatic considerations.3

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Salisbury hoped to leave the establishment of effective occupation of Uganda to Sir William Mackinnon's Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAC), but the undercapitalized and inefficient company was not up to the task. One of its representatives in the region, Frederick J. D. Lugard, in December 1890 did convince the kabaka and chiefs in Buganda to accept company protection in exchange for abolishing the slave trade, granting free trade and freedom of religion, and accepting the presence of a British resident. When civil strife broke out between Catholics and Protestants in 1891, Lugard imposed order and helped negotiate a division of the territory into separate religious enclaves. At the same time, however, the IBEAC, unsuccessful in securing government funding for construction of a railway from Mombassa to Lake Victoria, wished to withdraw from Uganda. The prime minister could not convince Parliament to provide the railway subsidy, which might have propped up the company. But political withdrawal was not an option; such an action would only arouse opposition from antislavery and missionary societies in Britain. Salisbury's policy in the region was only rescued by his Liberal imperialist successor at the Foreign Office in Gladstone's fourth cabinet, Lord Rosebery. Resisting fellow ministers, such as Sir William Harcourt, who favored limita-

Denny, Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism (London: Macmillan, 1965), 294. P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins claim that, "if interest in east Africa was more economic than strategic, it was also largely speculative." British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion, 1688-1914 (London: Longman, 1993), 389. But that overstates the significance of the economic interests. Sir William Mackinnon certainly hoped to extend his Indian Ocean shipping empire to include the east African coast from the 1860s onward, but his influence with procants like Sir Henry Bartle Frere and Sir John Kirk—helpful in obtaining lucrative mail contracts—hardly seems to have been a key factor in the partition of the region. It was Mackinnon's enterprise that had to "align its commercial ambitions to the 'imperial' goals of the British presence in East Africa," not the reverse. J. Forbes Muuro, "Shipping subsidies and railway guarantees: William Mackinnon, eastern Africa and the Indian Ocean, 1860-93," Journal of African History 28 (1987): 223.

4 Wesseling, Divide and Rule, 161-62; Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, 309.
tions on imperial commitments, Rosebery maintained that a British protectorate over Uganda was necessary in order to block any French advance towards the lakes and to hold the area as a base for the future reconquest of the Sudan.⁵ He succeeded Gladstone as prime minister in March 1894, and soon thereafter the British officially declared a protectorate over Uganda.⁶ The next year, following the dissolution of the IBEAC, they organized the territory between Buganda and the Indian Ocean as the East Africa Protectorate (EAP).⁷

British actions in East Africa in the early 1890s were motivated by geopolitics—control of the Upper Nile and the security of Egypt—with little thought to the commercial potential of the region. Salisbury and Bismarck had engaged in what military officers might call a tactical exercise without troops. Soon, however, the troops began to arrive. Following the delimitation of the British protectorates, a relative handful of Foreign Office representatives undertook the task of establishing control over areas painted red on the map. Strategic aims enjoined those officials to keep open the lines of communications between Kampala, in Buganda, and the Upper Nile and between Kampala and Mombasa. Those aims were achieved through a series of small-scale but brutal military actions in the course of which the British, using an assortment of Sudanese, Swahili, Indian, and indige-

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⁶ Wesseling, *Divide and Rule*, 162-64.
⁷ Renamed Kenya in 1920.
nous soldiers, conquered the whole of what became Uganda and Kenya between 1894 and 1919.⁸

Simultaneous with the campaigns of "pacification," the British appointed administrators for the protectorates, and despite the metropole's limited aims for the region, those officials soon sought sources of revenue to support their establishments. Development in this period meant the integration of the new territories into the world capitalist system. Seeking freight with which to pay for the railway, authorities in the EAP rejected the possibility of using Africans as the agents of agricultural production. Instead, European settlers were encouraged to stake their claims and the colonial state supported them by expropriating African land, confiscating African livestock, and creating marketing and financial systems that favored settlers.⁹ Natives in that schema were defined as casual labor, and by forcibly dispossessing them of their land, imposing taxation, and extracting forced labor, British administrators attempted to compel Africans to take their assigned place in the plan for progress.¹⁰

In Uganda the story of early development was somewhat different. Protectorate administrators, aware that imperial policy was for colonies to be self-sufficient, needed

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sources of revenue. The hut tax of 1900 imposed a three rupee charge per dwelling, but amounted in total to only £74,000 in 1901-02, insufficient to offset expenditures of £229,000.\textsuperscript{11} Consequently officials aimed to foster the future rise of export trade and actively promoted the cultivation of cash crops. Originally cotton was merely one of a number of suggested crops, but it quickly became the dominant export, partly as a result of encouragement by the British Cotton Growing Association for the establishment of cotton cultivation among the peasantry.\textsuperscript{12} Initially the amount of cotton produced was satisfying but left something to be desired in terms of quality. A government ordinance of 1908 prohibited the growing of all but the American Upland variety, fixed the growing season, and compelled growers to uproot and burn old plants in order to prevent the spread of pests and disease.\textsuperscript{13} The quality of Ugandan cotton improved greatly, and cultivation continued to expand. In 1914-15, the protectorate exported 32,000 bales valued at £351,000 (70% of all exports), and the next year Uganda required no imperial grant-in-aid.\textsuperscript{14} At the end of the war, peasants produced 47,000 bales.\textsuperscript{15}

African peasants--initially in response to compulsion from Bugandan chiefs and later to economic incentives--grew nearly all of Uganda's cotton. Its Eastern Province detached and added to the EAP in 1902, Uganda lacked the highlands that many deemed

\textsuperscript{14} Wrigley, \textit{Crops and Wealth in Uganda}, 21.
\textsuperscript{15} Brett, \textit{Colonialism and Underdevelopment}, 219.
necessary to make it suitable as a "white man's country." In the absence of European settlers, officials seem to have expected a combination of plantation—coffee, rubber, and (to a lesser extent) cocoa—and peasant production to develop, although they displayed no particular preference for one over the other. The important thing was to increase exports (and, consequently, state revenue) by expanding the capitalist production of cash crops, which could be accomplished by peasants or planters. But in either case it appeared that Africans would provide labor while non-Africans would provide expertise and capital.

Plantation agriculture expanded during World War I, but prices dropped after the war. In 1920 a development commission, dominated by planters, maintained that the government should endorse planter cultivation over peasant production of cotton, but peasant production was too valuable to the government for it to be discouraged in favor of the planters, who consequently found it difficult to attract labor. In the early 1920s the planter sector never achieved production levels sufficient to offset relatively high costs, and the combination of labor shortages, poor communications, lack of credit, and opposition within the Colonial Office to the emergence of a large, foreign landowning class drove most planters out of business by about 1924. At the same time, the boll weevil infestation that afflicted American cotton growers in 1920 enhanced the position of peasant pro-

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16 Ibid. Wrigley notes: "It seemed [c. 1900] that, since Uganda was admittedly not a settlers' country (universal malaria and not uncommon blackwater, not to mention other diseases, made that seem more self-evident that it would be today), it must, if it were to be anything at all, become a planters' country."


18 Wrigley, Crops and Wealth in Uganda, 34-35.

ducers in Uganda. The protectorate's economy then developed with an explicit focus on peasant cultivation, which provided the opening for the exercise of political leverage by small producers who, if state efforts to extract surpluses became too exacting, could always withdraw into subsistence agriculture to the detriment of government income.

Most officials were satisfied with the direction of development. As Wrigley notes:

"Peasant production, favoured in the first instance because it no longer had any serious competitor, was favoured also because it accorded well with the philosophy held during the 1920s by almost all those who were professionally or intellectually concerned with African affairs, namely, that capitalism and wage labour were disruptive of the native social order, and that the maintenance of this social order was at least as important as material progress."

Following the First World War, Britain acquired a League of Nations mandate over the German colony of Tanganyika. Under German rule, Tanganyika had been conquered in a series of campaigns, culminating in the ferocious suppression of the Maji Maji rising, 1905-7. The territory had also been partially integrated into the world economy.

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21 Brett, *Colonialism and Underdevelopment*, 220.
23 *Crops and Wealth in Uganda*, 43; Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society*, 49.
A hut tax introduced in 1898 achieved the desired effect of making people use money and find ways to acquire it.\textsuperscript{25} As in Uganda and Kenya, Asian shopkeepers played a key role in economic development as the intermediaries of the colonial economy.\textsuperscript{26} A mix of peasant, planter, and settler production of export crops emerged in Tanganyika. Sisal was the main plantation crop, employing no less than a third of the territory's wage labor until the mid-1950s.\textsuperscript{27} As in Uganda, planters sought control over labor and used compulsion--often with state sanction--to obtain it.\textsuperscript{28} But regardless of planter protests to the contrary, Tanganyika's German officials, like their British counterparts in Uganda, were not willing to exclude African farmers (Chagga coffee-growers in Kilimanjaro, for example) from producing cash crops if that also meant reducing state revenues.\textsuperscript{29}

British officials in the newly acquired mandate believed they had special obligations and responsibilities in regard to the African people. Following the Great War, the principle of "trusteeship" became a central tenet of the official stance of British imperialism in Africa. The concept had originally been applied to the empire in reference to India--where


\textsuperscript{26} Iliffe, Modern History of Tanganyika, 132-3, 138; Ehrlich, "The Uganda Economy," 406.


\textsuperscript{28} Sisal plantation operators in both German East Africa and Kenya were successful in obtaining official assistance to provide a supply of labor for the very difficult work of cutting and transporting their crops. N. J. Westcott, "The East African Sisal Industry, 1929-1949: The Marketing of a Colonial Commodity during Depression and War," in Development Studies and Colonial Policy, ed. Barbara Ingham and Colin Simmons (London: Frank Cass, 1987), 211.

the notion of Britain's "civilizing mission" towards other races first evolved—at the beginning of the nineteenth century.\footnote{Bernard Porter, \textit{The Lion's Share: A Short History of British Imperialism 1850-1983}, 2d. ed. (London: Longman, 1984), 18.} Later in the century, the fight against slavery and the slave trade in East Africa introduced the idea of trusteeship to that region.\footnote{E. S. Atieno Odhiambo, \textit{Siass: Politics and Nationalism in East Africa, 1905-1939} (Nairobi: Kenya Literature Bureau, 1981), 15.} In 1899 an Order in Council, in accordance with a recommendation from the Foreign Office's Law Officers, declared the territory of the EAP to be Crown Land, held in "trust" for Her Majesty. Lugard, by that time an influential voice on colonial issues, stated in his \textit{Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa},\footnote{Lord Lugard, \textit{The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa}, 5th ed. (London: Frank Cass, 1965).} published in 1922, that a colonial power had an obligation to develop its territories both in the interests of the inhabitants and for the benefit of the world. In 1919 the League of Nations adopted trusteeship as the foremost objective of European rule over mandated territories.\footnote{Robert G. Gregory, \textit{Sidney Webb and East Africa: Labour's Experiment with the Doctrine of Native Paramountcy}, University of California Publications in History, vol. 72 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962), 6.} Article three of the League's 1922 mandate, spelling out the terms of British control over former German colonies in East Africa, declared: "The Mandatory shall be responsible for the peace, order and good government of the territory, and shall undertake to promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress of its inhabitants."\footnote{"British Mandate for East Africa," appendix II in, \textit{History of East Africa}, vol. 2, 692. With the mandate being subject to League of Nations oversight, the British at least had to consider the manner in which their actions affected the Tanganyika people or risk being exposed to international criticism: Henry R. Winkler, "The Idea of Colonial Trusteeship," in \textit{The League of Nations Movement in Great Britain, 1914-1919} (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1952); H. D. Hall, \textit{Mandates, Dependencies and Trusteeships} (London: Stevens and Sons, 1948), 99. Kenneth Ingham notes: "In effect the functions of the Permanent Mandates Commission [of the League of Nations] were to act as the conscience of the mandatory powers rather than as a stern and powerful}
kan officials used the trusteeship principle to privilege the claims of peasant producers where those conflicted with planter interests.\textsuperscript{35} In Uganda, British administrators appealed to the sanctity of promises made to the Baganda under the terms of the Uganda agreement of 1900, which reserved the exercise of direct rule over the people and the administration of justice to the kabaka through the Lukiko, or native council.\textsuperscript{36}

Trusteeship also applied to Kenya. In 1923 the colonial secretary, the duke of Devonshire, declared in a famous White Paper:

Primarily, Kenya is an African territory, and His Majesty's Government think it necessary definitely to record their considered opinion that the interests of the African natives must be paramount, and that if, and when those interests and the interests of the immigrants races should conflict, the former should prevail. Obviously the interests of the other communities, European, Indian or Arab, must severally be safeguarded. Whatever the circumstances in which members of these communities have entered Kenya, there will be no drastic action or reversal of measures already introduced, such as may have been contemplated in some quarters, the result of which might be to destroy or impair the existing interests of those who have already settled in Kenya. But in the administration of Kenya His Majesty's Government regard themselves as exercising a trust on behalf of the African population, and they are unable to delegate or share this trust, the object of which may be defined as the protection and advancement of the native races . . .

. . . As in the Uganda Protectorate, so in the Kenya Colony, the principle of trusteeship for the natives, no less than in the mandated territory of Tanganyika, is unassailable. This paramount duty of trusteeship will continue, as in the past, to be carried out under the Secretary of State for the Colonies by the agents of the Imperial Government, and by them alone.\textsuperscript{37}

\textsuperscript{35} Brett, Colonialism and Underdevelopment, 217.
\textsuperscript{37} "Indians in Kenya," a Memorandum, Cmd. 1922 (1923), 1-10: quoted in Dilley, British Policy in Kenya Colony, 167-68.
A number of historians have shown that the political purpose of this declaration of native paramountcy was to allow restrictions to be placed on Indian immigration to East Africa, placating the white settlers in Kenya (who were threatening to revolt) without arousing the ire of British humanitarians or the Indian authorities.\textsuperscript{38} Pressure applied primarily by J. H. Oldham, secretary of the International Missionary Council in London, was a motive force behind the duke's declaration of native paramountcy, and missionaries and other humanitarians would continue to monitor the situation in East Africa.\textsuperscript{39} The White Paper also marked the end of Kenyan settlers' drive for self-government.\textsuperscript{40} Thus, by the early 1920s the British government had acknowledged that the principle of trusteeship should guide East African administrations; if the concept was somewhat woolly and open to various interpretations, it did require that some attention be paid to African interests in the territories.\textsuperscript{41}

While the Devonshire declaration frustrated settler political aims in Kenya, it did not prevent the domination of the settler mode of production, which accounted for over about 60 percent of agricultural exports in 1919 and 1920, and over 80 percent in 1921.\textsuperscript{42} During and immediately after the First World War, the Colonial Office failed to carefully monitor the situation in East Africa, which provided the opportunity for the settlers to use

\textsuperscript{40} R. D. Pearce writes: "[Trusteeship's] major effect in the inter-war years was not only to endow imperialists with a good conscience but to veto settler self-government. This negative contribution was its greatest achievement." \textit{The Turning Point in Africa: British Colonial Policy 1938-48} (London: Frank Cass, 1982), 4-5.
\textsuperscript{42} Maxon, "The years of revolutionary advance," 71.
the colonial state to their advantage. During the war Africans were subject to service in the Carrier Corps—for many a fatal experience—but they could escape that duty by working on settler farms. The Crown Land Ordinance of 1915 allowed settlers to obtain long-term (999 years) leases on fairly easy terms, while Africans resident on leased land became squatters. Before 1918, many squatters made money payments to leaseholders, but in that year legislation required all such payments be made in labor, thereby assuring settlers of an available workforce. War and its aftermath, including the swine flu epidemic, devastated the EAP’s African population and peasant production. Following the war, Governor Sir Edward Northey strongly favored the settlers and placed the power of the state at their disposal to make Africans take employment on settler farms. A pass system (the kipande) that registered African males over sixteen years of age and increases in hut and poll taxes were designed to control Africans and induce them to work for wages. At the same time, the income tax, instituted in mid-1920 and affecting settlers,

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43 Lewis Greenstein estimates that approximately 165,000 Africans from the EAP were persuaded or compelled to become porters, laborers, or soldiers during WW I. About 45,000 of them died. Areas of Tanganyika suffered widespread damage, and disease ravaged the whole of East Africa after the cessation of hostilities. "Africans in a European War: The First World War in East Africa with Special Reference to the Nandi of Kenya" (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 1975), 111-12, 265. Another scholar places the number of carriers from the EAP at 178,642, in addition to 184,992 from Uganda. He also cites official statistics for Africans recruited by the British to serve as soldiers, gun porters, medical staff, carriers, and casual labor: 190,150 from the EAP; 186,235 from Uganda; 327,160 from German East Africa. Totals for dead, missing, and missing-presumed dead came to: EAP, 53,387; Uganda, 5,430; German East Africa, 68,199. Geoffrey Hodges, The Carrier Corps: Military Labor in the East African Campaign, 1914-1918 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), 110-11, 207-8.

44 Brett, Colonialism and Underdevelopment, 171-72.

45 Maxon, "The years of revolutionary advance," 71-72.

46 Brett, Colonialism and Underdevelopment, 188.
was repealed under pressure from that constituency in 1922. The African sector alone, therefore, paid for state subsidies to develop settler production.47

After 1922, London did attempt to reign in some of the excesses of the Kenya administration. Winston Churchill, secretary of state for the colonies, prohibited the use of compulsory labor except where absolutely necessary and forbade government officials from recruiting labor for private concerns.48 In light of the colony's budget deficit (approaching £600,000 for the fiscal year of 1922), the Colonial Office questioned the logic behind support for settler production. Sir Humphrey Leggett of the British East Africa Corporation and organizations like the London Chamber of Commerce recommended African production of low-cost, bulk commodities (e.g. maize) for export.49 Reversing his previous stance, Northey endorsed the use of government resources to develop African agriculture.50 His successor, Sir Robert Coryndon, affirmed the "dual policy" in terms of joint development of peasant and settler agriculture, but the state continued to privilege settlers by prohibiting African production of high value cash crops, setting differential railway rates, and through tax policy.51 His administration did provide some modest support to African farmers and entrepreneurs with the establishment in 1924 of Local Native Councils.52 That same year the East Africa Commission, chaired by W. G. A. Ormsby-

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47 Maxon, "The years of revolutionary advance," 73-74.
48 Brett, Colonialism and Underdevelopment, 189-90.
49 Ibid., 178.
50 Maxon, "The years of revolutionary advance," 84-85.
51 Ibid., 89-90; Brett, Colonialism and Underdevelopment, 180, 190-95.
52 Maxon, "The years of revolutionary advance," 95.
Gore,\textsuperscript{53} visited Kenya and its members deemed settler production beneficial to the region's economy and to Africans, in that it provided employment and gave them the opportunity to learn advanced agricultural methods.\textsuperscript{54} The commission's report had the effect of forging a Parliamentary consensus favorable to the Kenyan European community and helped to minimize the impact in England of critics of the colony's administration such as Norman Leys and McGregor Ross.\textsuperscript{55} Subsequently the settlers consolidated their ascendancy in Kenya throughout the remainder of the 1920s, although they never managed to wean themselves from state support.\textsuperscript{56}

Thus, Kenya's economic development, with the ascendancy of the settler sector, stood in contrast to that of Uganda, where the peasant sector dominated. At the beginning of the 1920s, there seemed to be no reason why Tanganyika should not develop along Kenyan lines, but by the close of the 1930s a number of factors combined to defeat

\textsuperscript{53} William George Arthur Ormsby-Gore, M.P., served as under-secretary of state for the colonies, 1922-24, and November 1924-29. Later he became secretary of state for the colonies, 1936-38. In 1938 he succeeded his father as 4th baron of Harlech. \textit{Who was Who, 1961-1970} (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1972), 492-93. In the course of the commission's work, Ormsby-Gore was converted from a critic into a staunch defender of the Kenyan settlers, and that was likely a factor in L. S. Amery's decision to appoint him under-secretary of state in 1924. Gregory, Sidney Webb and East Africa, 57; Brett, \textit{Colonialism and Underdevelopment}, 183.


attempts to foster a strong white farming community loyal to the empire. First, the cultivation of sisal was vital to the Tanganyikan economy, but it was generally grown on large plantations that required large initial outlays of capital and were situated in areas deemed unsuitable for permanent European settlement. Secondly, war damage had been far more extensive in the mandate than elsewhere in East Africa and the administration devoted scarce resources to reconstruction rather than to support for expatriate agriculture. A third factor was the official commitment to the spirit of native paramountcy. In Tanganyika, for example, the administration did not use taxation to secure African labor for settler farms and placed no great emphasis on making Africans honor the terms of labor contracts. Revenues derived from African taxation were largely reinvested in African areas, which also helped to keep the price of African labor relatively high. Finally, as in other territories, peasants proved to much more resilient than expatriate producers under the impact of the global depression. The result was that by 1938 the European community in Tanganyika numbered only 9,345, of whom 3,205 were Germans whose loyalty to Britain was suspect. Sisal production dominated expatriate agriculture just prior to World War II, and small-scale settler production of temperate foodstuffs hardly existed.

At the same time as patterns of development formed within the individual territories, the imperial government's colonial development policy was also changing. The degree of change is indicated by increases in imperial aid for colonial development. Between 1875 and 1915, the imperial government spent only £1.4 million on development aid

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57 Brett, *Colonialism and Underdevelopment*, 221-27.
58 Ibid., 221, 232.
(primarily communications improvements) throughout the empire, augmented by £12 million made available as loans, not all of which was used prior to 1914. Annual expenditures between 1918 and 1940 averaged £1.6 million, an insignificant proportion of total spending on the part of the British government which only once (in 1923) amounted to more than 0.1% of gross national product and usually was far less. In comparison, annual expenditure during the 1920s on stationery and maintenance of public buildings in the United Kingdom averaged £5 million. The Colonial Development and Welfare (CD&W) Act of 1940 committed the imperial government to spend £5 million each year for ten years on colonial development and a further £500,000 per year on research.\(^{59}\) The interwar period, therefore, represented a transition between the extremely low levels of aid granted before World War I and the ambitious programs that came after 1940.

But the transitional nature of the interwar era applied not just to levels of spending on colonial development; there were also changes in the aims that expenditure was intended to achieve. The sole aim of Colonial Office staff prior to World War I and still a primary goal between the wars was for individual colonies to become self-sufficient, free of dependence on imperial grants-in-aid that also entailed close supervision of a receiving colony's finances by the imperial Treasury. The latter department was notorious for its adherence to financial orthodoxy, balanced budgets, and a reluctance to countenance colonial spending on projects that would not be self-supporting and were liable to become an ongoing charge on the imperial purse. Both the Colonial Office and the Treasury, there-

fore, concurred that development spending should be directed towards improvements in infrastructure such as railways, harbors, roads, and other improvements that would increase the production and export of primary products and thereby boost a colony's revenues. Imperial aid was directed mainly to regions where colonies were financially vulnerable and apt to become dependent. Officials paid scant attention to the development of industries in the colonies, an attitude which changed only very slowly after 1940. Industrial development would, Colonial Office personnel believed, disrupt native societies and violate the principle of trusteeship.\textsuperscript{60}

Further restricting the scope of colonial development prior to the Second World War was the nature of the Colonial Office's organization. It consisted of a number of departments (6 in 1918, 7 in 1929, with divisions and mergers both between those dates and afterwards) based upon geographical divisions, along with a small General Division that lacked the personnel and resources to deal with the specific question of economic development. Consequently, the office tended to produce territorial specialists with extensive knowledge of particular colonies or regions and not experts on empire-wide problems.\textsuperscript{61} That situation changed slowly during the interwar period as the office used committees to study special problems and more experts in fields such as law, agriculture, and labor were

\textsuperscript{60} Constantine, \textit{The Making of British Colonial Development Policy}, 12-16, 286-87, 291-93, 295. By upbringing and training, officials of Britain's colonial establishment were not inclined to view the industrial sector with favor and were unlikely to be capable of assessing industrial projects. They were more likely to have contacts with the "gentlemanly capitalism" of the southeast of England—the region from which the bulk of them originated—than with industry. Cain and Hopkins, \textit{British Imperialism: Crisis and Reconstruction, 1914-1990}, (London: Longman, 1993), 25-26, 209-10.

\textsuperscript{61} Constantine, \textit{The Making of British Colonial Development Policy}, 12-21, 279-80.
added to the establishment. Perhaps even more importantly, Colonial Office personnel did not view themselves as central planners responsible for launching grand schemes for colonial development. They were not economic managers but, rather, supervisors of a highly decentralized empire, and they depended upon the colonies themselves to take the initiative in planning and proposing projects.

During the 1920s, imperial grants and loans to East African territories were influenced by those basic assumptions about development spending. Unable to attract private capital for development projects, territories in the region received greater financial support from the imperial government than did other areas. The Uganda Development Loan of 1920, a loan to Kenya in 1921, a £3.5 million loan to Kenya and Uganda in 1924, and the 1926 East Africa Loans Act were largely premised on the assumption that without some financial aid the colonies might burden the Treasury in the future. But despite the persistence of traditional notions about development aid, there were other influences that emerged as a result of contemporary events. Between 1921 and the beginning of World War II, for example, economic sluggishness resulted in an average British unemployment rate of about 14 per cent. Politicians of all parties sought solutions to the problem and many maintained that colonial development would alleviate unemployment because orders for railway rails, locomotives, and other items would be placed in Britain. The Treasury remained skeptical of such reasoning, but political pressure secured passage of legislation

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62 Ibid., 282-85.
63 Ibid., 17, 288-89.
64 Ibid., 119-63, 295. The 1924 Ormsby-Gore commission's recommendations were important in securing passage of the 1926 act. Report of the East Africa Commission, Cmd. 2387, 10, 18-22, 182.
such as the 1924 loan to Kenya and Uganda, the 1926 loans act for East Africa, and the Colonial Development Act of 1929, all of which were expected to reduce British joblessness.\textsuperscript{65}

Adding to the mix of motives underlying development spending from the late 1920s on was the notion that such expenditure would, in the long-term, work to develop colonies as markets for metropolitan goods and provide economic security through the close integration of the colonial and British economies and the guaranteed supply of resources for British industry. As secretary of state for the colonies from 1895 to 1903, Joseph Chamberlain had preached the virtues of imperial integration. During the First World War, two of his disciples, Lord Milner and Leopold Amery,\textsuperscript{66} managed the Colonial Office and were vocal proponents of the need to achieve imperial autarky protected by an appropriate tariff structure. The Treasury, however, effectively suppressed those grand plans in the immediate aftermath of World War I when it again reasserted traditional financial control over government expenditures.\textsuperscript{67}

Unemployment remained a persistent and seemingly permanent problem in Britain during the 1920s, and some politicians continued to look to colonial development as a solution. As secretary of state for the colonies, 1924-29, Amery continued to press for


\textsuperscript{66} L. S. Amery, parliamentary under-secretary of state for the colonies, 1919-21, and secretary of state, 1924-29, dreamed of integrating the empire politically and economically to the extent that it would be an effective geopolitical counterweight to the United States and the Soviet Union. Porter, \textit{The Lion's Share}, 264-66.

\textsuperscript{67} Constantine, \textit{The Making of British Colonial Development Policy}, 11, 52-54.
closer economic integration of the empire's far flung territories, asserting that such a policy would also benefit the United Kingdom. He instigated the investigation of the Hilton Young commission into the question of closer union of East and Central African territories with the eventual aim of forming a white, settler-dominated federation. If the commission placed the federation scheme on hold, it also contained some pithy criticisms of the difficulties of raising capital for development in the region and called for a more regular flow of money to finance projects as well as less onerous repayment terms than those currently imposed by the Treasury. The Hilton Young commission provided backing for the 1929 Colonial Development Act (CDA), which promised generous support for the development of agriculture and industry throughout the empire by creating a fund (the Colonial Development Fund or CDF) maintained by a maximum annual grant of £1 million. Treasury money could be advanced in the form of capital grants or by covering interest on loans in whole or in part for up to ten years. The act made provision for funding general development schemes rather than just ad hoc projects addressing particular needs. It also paid for scientific research to aid future development. Doubtless many supporters merely expected the CDA to have the immediate effect of reducing unemployment in Britain, but the legislation also clearly linked development to the promotion of British industry and

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69 Report of the Commission on Closer Union, Cmd. 3234, 73-79; To Amery's dismay, the commission viewed the main goal of closer union as the achievement of a unified native policy, and they did not believe the settlers should be the ones to effect that aim, thereby ruling out the creation of a "Great White Dominion" in east and central Africa. Porter, The Lion's Share, 275.
commerce in the long-term. Unconvinced of the economic merits of the act and reluctant to spend money in the colonies during a depression, the Treasury nevertheless acquiesced in the face of political support for the measure.\textsuperscript{71}

Circumstances prevented the full realization of the ambitions underlying the CDA. The onset of the world trade depression after 1929 placed new impediments in the path of any increase in expenditures, and the total funds transferred from the Treasury to the CDF amounted only to £6,650,000—an average yearly allotment during the 1930s of £645,000—well short of the original plan.\textsuperscript{72} Some young Conservatives and Labour Party members during the 1930s advocated Keynesian solutions to the economic crisis—public works, redistribution of income, and an enlarged, active role for government in stimulating depressed areas—but Britain's National Government clung to the orthodoxy of low taxation, balanced budgets, and more efficiency in the private sector as the best hope for recovery.\textsuperscript{73} Depression conditions also influenced the considerations of colonial governments in designing development plans and requesting funds from the Colonial Development Advisory Committee (CDAC), which evaluated proposals and dispensed CDA funds but did not initiate projects. A major impact of the depression on colonial economies was to reduce the value of agricultural exports,\textsuperscript{74} which in turn reduced state revenues and, consequently,

\textsuperscript{71} Constantine, \textit{The Making of British Colonial Development Policy}, 191, 301-2.
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid., 199, 201.
\textsuperscript{73} Cain and Hopkins, \textit{British Imperialism: Crisis and Reconstruction}, 82-83.
\textsuperscript{74} The value of colonial products dropped precipitously between 1929 and 1932: rubber from £4.5 million to £8.6 million; tea from £15.5 million to £8.2 million; cotton from £4.7 million to £1.9 million; sugar and sugar products from £8.9 million to £7.6 million. Morgan, \textit{The Official History of Colonial Development}, vol. 1, 2.
expenditures. Markets were moribund and governments in British territories and the Colonial Office were reluctant to launch schemes that might prove to be a continuing drain on their resources once CDA funding ran out after a period of up to ten years.\textsuperscript{75} Poorer colonies in the West Indies and East Africa were far more likely to place requests before the CDAC than were the wealthier territories in West Africa and the Far East. The Colonial Office urged the CDAC to provide the needy areas with free grants for development, and the committee did so but only with the proviso that, in the case of a free grant, CDF money would be limited to one half of a particular project's cost. Furthermore, the CDAC would not approve funds to cover "normal administrative costs," including most salaries, and while projects were not rejected for failing to plan for expenditures in the United Kingdom, it was a factor in the committee's decisions.\textsuperscript{76} Thus, for a variety of reasons, the 1929 act failed to live up to its billing, and by the end of the 1930s critics were calling for new approaches to colonial development.

Some suggestions for more effective development policies were derived from official and unofficial studies of colonies and colonial peoples during the interwar period. East Africa proved to be of particular interest to researchers. Official inquiries took the form of numerous governmental commissions covering a broad range of topics related to economic and political development.\textsuperscript{77} Despite the diversity of subjects addressed by

\textsuperscript{75} Morgan, The Official History of Colonial Development, vol. 1, 42.
\textsuperscript{76} Constantine, The Making of British Colonial Development Policy, 201-11.
\textsuperscript{77} In 1937, Margery Ruth Dilley wrote: "Commissions have been sent to Kenya and to East Africa until the sending of one has become a by-word and an object of sardonic humour to the local population." British Policy in Kenya Colony, 18.
those investigations, all of them were forced to consider the African role in effecting future change. Should African societies be coaxed or forced to adopt new practices? To what extent were Africans capable of assimilating Western culture? How could their capabilities be enhanced and for what specific purposes? Increasingly the human element of the development equation appeared to be the most important and least easily resolved part of the formula for progress.

Inaugurating the commission era in East Africa was the East Africa Commission of 1924. Both British humanitarians and advocates of closer union of the region's territories welcomed the investigation. In 1920 the former group, led by the archbishop of Canterbury, had asked for a committee to examine the principles of imperialism and the application of trusteeship in East Africa. At the same time, Amery and his supporters urged closer union in order to strengthen the empire economically and militarily. The commission's terms of reference charged it with examining ways to "accelerate the general economic development of the British East African Dependencies and the means of securing closer co-ordination of policy on such important matters as transportation, cotton-growing, and the control of human, animal, and plant diseases." But the commissioners were also instructed to consider: how social conditions for Africans might be improved; the state of economic interaction between Africans and non-Africans in terms of labor

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78 Gregory, Sidney Webb and East Africa, 56.
contracts, certificates of identification, and female and child labor; and, the taxation of Africans and services provided to them.\footnote{Ibid., 3.}

Ormsby-Gore and his fellow commissioners, Archibald G. Church and Frederick C. Linfield,\footnote{Ormsby-Gore was a Conservative and, as already noted, had extensive experience in the CO. Linfield, a Liberal, and Church, representing Labour, were minor figures within their parties and neither had experience with colonial affairs. Gregory, \textit{Sidney Webb and East Africa}, 56.} visited East Africa between August and December, 1924, producing their report in 1925. They made two recommendations for further study of the region. First, confident that official efforts such as theirs were invaluable, the commissioners suggested "that similar Commissions should be sent from time to time to maintain the personal touch between the Imperial Parliament and the Colonial Office on the one hand, and the Governments and peoples of East Africa on the other, and \ldots that only by such visits can some true appreciation of the many factors and problems of East Africa be obtained."\footnote{Report of the \textit{East Africa Commission}, Cmd. 2387, 4.}

Second, they urged the imperial and territorial governments to sponsor scientific research in fields related to development, including anthropology, which they maintained, "should be considered as a subject having the most important applications in the sphere of administration in our tropical possessions, and should not be regarded as a study of purely academic interest."\footnote{Ibid., 80}

European influences upon East Africa, the Ormsby-Gore commission concluded, had been and should continue to be largely beneficial. Economic and social advance in the region could only be achieved on the basis of cooperation on the part of all races, and the
commissioners maintained that white men had to lead in that regard, not on account of any racial superiority, but because of superior moral and intellectual attainments. Trusteeship, they asserted, "is in very truth a white man's burden, and all Europeans in Africa must share in the work." They credited missionaries for much of the advance that East Africa had made in the past 30 or 40 years, particularly for their work as economic pioneers and in "civilising the African." European settlers, the commission argued, also generally had a positive influence on Africans. The "contact theory" stated that Africans working for Europeans would learn by example the essentials of modern farming and of decent, civilized behavior, and the commissioners believed that to be true, provided the employer was progressive and the term of employment permanent. Finally, they commended the efforts of colonial officials. African "tribal society," they pointed out, was not progressive, and while they did not question its maintenance they suggested that it should be reformed under European guidance, adding that the progressive African was today likely "to acquiesce in the substitution of a younger and more enlightened chief for one less satisfactory."

Faithful to Lugard's dual policy, the commissioners endorsed the idea of simultaneous development of East Africa both the benefit of its inhabitants and for the wider world. The extension of railway facilities in the region, for example, would help to

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84 Ibid., 22-23.
85 Ibid., 23.
86 They did qualify their assessment. "In cases where the employer is progressive and has a real scientific interest in his labour it may be said that the contact theory proves successful. But in the case of casual labour, while the theory is not to be rejected altogether, it must be stated that the benefits of 'contact' are often exaggerated." Report of the East Africa Commission, Cmd. 2387, 38-39.
achieve greater integration of the territories into the world economy which would also allow increased native participation in the production of commodities, thereby fostering among Africans the civilized habits of industry and (market) morality.\footnote{Ibid., 20-21.} African development certainly entailed certain modifications of traditional society. The commissioners argued, for instance, that social progress depended on the substitution of male for female labor in the performance of the bulk of manual labor on African farms.\footnote{Ibid., 32-33.} They also advocated efforts to inculcate Christian morality among natives in order to achieve public health goals such as reducing rates of venereal disease and to suppress the practice of female circumcision, which allegedly affected long-term development plans by increasing infant mortality.\footnote{Ibid., 46-47, 144. During the second half of the 1920s, clitoridectomy in East Africa became a contentious political issue in England. See Susan Pedersen, "National Bodies, Unspeakable Acts: The Sexual Politics of Colonial Policy-making," \textit{Journal of Modern History} 63 (December 1991): 647-80.} \footnote{Report of the East Africa Commission, Cmd. 2387, 32.} 

A more positive contribution by Africans to the territories' economic future, according to the commissioners, would be made through farming. "It is clear to us," they wrote, "that the true progress of the African is bound up with the encouragement of the use of the hoe and the plough. Only by the cultivation of the soil as against its use for grazing can permanent economic advance be obtained."\footnote{Report of the East Africa Commission, Cmd. 2387, 32.} Government officials would aid that process by teaching better farming techniques and providing advice concerning matters such as seed selection and crop rotation. Education, the commissioners contended, was essential to attaining native economic and social progress. Clearly they intended that
African education should be suited to the intended outcome: "There is a great danger in Africa, as elsewhere, lest over-emphasis on literary education will produce an unemployable clerical class divorced from the interests and activities of their fellows, and dissatisfied with the rewards which can be earned after the completion of their studies. Native education in Africa requires to be linked up with hygiene, agriculture, craft, and the growing needs of the community as a whole,"92 a position that conformed with the 1924 Phelps-Stokes commission on East African education,93 which referred to the future need for technical and professional education but emphasized the "three Rs" as essential to character development, the promotion of health and hygiene, and for teaching agricultural and industrial skills.94 The Ormsby-Gore commission made an exception in the case of chiefs' and headmen's sons, who required superior preparation in order to fill their future leadership positions, and the commissioners therefore recommended a system of class-based education analogous to the contemporary English system.95

The favorable opinion of the European community and its role in development expressed by the East Africa Commission encouraged those who sympathized with settler political aspirations to put forward a number of initiatives in the latter half of the 1920s in which European economic contributions to the region were used to support their political

92 Ibid., 50.
claims. Governor Sir Edward Grigg of Kenya (1925-31) followed up on one of the commission's recommendations by convening a conference of the governors of East and Central Africa in Nairobi in January 1926. They affirmed the dual policy—the importance of developing both the African and European sectors—declaring that some form of European control was necessary for the welfare and development of the African peoples. Furthermore, progress depended upon Africans clearly understanding their role as laborers either on native reserve lands or for wages elsewhere.  

Amery’s 1927 White Paper ostensibly endorsed the principle of trusteeship delineated in the Devonshire paper of 1923, but in keeping with the recommendations of the Ormsby-Gore commission and the governors' conference it emphasized the importance of the dual policy. Amery argued that economic development based on the dual policy should be matched in terms of political progress along similar lines. Europeans, he implied, were an integral element in the political future of the region and would necessarily play the leading part until such time as Africans were prepared to fully participate in public life. Amery advocated the formation of an East African federation, but the cabinet referred the question to a subcommittee, which in turn recommended that a commission be sent to the region to investigate. As a member of the subcommittee, Amery attempted to steer the work of the proposed commission towards the task of drafting a constitution for

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97 Future Policy in regard to Eastern Africa, Cmd. 2904 (1927).

98 Gregory, Sidney Webb and East Africa, 60.
a federation, inserting appropriate terms of reference in a draft of the White Paper. Again, however, the cabinet altered his plans, insisting that the terms of reference should also direct the commission to comment on the advisability of federation.  

Ultimately Amery (along with the Kenyan settlers) was disappointed with the findings of the commission on closer union headed by Sir Edward Hilton Young. While the chairman maintained in a dissenting opinion that the possibility of responsible government for Kenya should not be ruled out altogether, the rest of the commissioners—Sir Reginald Mant, Sir George Schuster, and J. H. Oldham—declared that the imperial government should retain control over policy, especially in regard to native policy. They maintained that, "the white settlers must realize that, while they may be trusted partners of the Imperial Government, they cannot claim to be the dominating element [in the region]." The only justification for closer union, in their opinion, was to allow for better

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99 Ibid., 68.

100 Schuster had been financial secretary to the Sudan government, 1922-27, and became the economic and financial advisor to the CO and chairman of the Advisory Committee on East African Loans in 1927. Mant had 24 years experience as a civil servant in the Punjab before becoming secretary of the Department of Revenue and Agriculture there. In 1921 he was appointed to the Indian Fiscal Commission and in 1923 to the Council of India. Hilton Young became financial secretary to the Treasury in 1921. In 1922 he was the British representative at the Hague Conference on International Finance. He undertook three financial missions for the government, to India, Poland, and Iraq. He headed a royal commission on Indian currency in 1926 and between 1926 and 1928 held a seat in the Assembly of the League of Nations. He was also financial editor of the Morning Post, assistant editor of the Economist, editor-in-chief of Financial News, and a director of the Hudson's Bay Company. Gregory, Sidney Webb and East Africa. 69. Oldham had been secretary of the World Missionary Conference, 1908-10, and of its Continuation Committee, 1910-21. He was secretary of the International Missionary Council, 1921-38, editor of the International Review of Missions, 1912-27, and a member of the Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies, 1925-36. Who was Who, 1961-1970 (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1972), 853.

101 Report of the Commission on Closer Union, Cmd. 3234, 234, 236, 244.
coordination of native policy, and that was necessary because the similarities among the
region's territories and peoples outweighed their differences. 102

Aside from its constitutional recommendations the Hilton Young commission also
commented on future economic and political development in East Africa. "The central
problem of Eastern and Central Africa," they stated, "is to discover a basis on which white
and black, with Asiatics as well, can live together under conditions of rapid economic
change, and with adequate opportunities for political development." 103 Each of those ra-
cial groups had contributions to make towards a common goal. There were no scientific
grounds, the commissioners argued, on which to base definitive opinions regarding the
level of progress that Africans might attain, despite their present backward condition. For
the moment, however, their essential contribution to the region's well-being would be
through physical labor, whether in terms of small-scale production on their own land or as
employees on European estates. 104

On the other hand, the main European function was to stimulate "the vast poten-
tialities of native production." 105 "White civilization," the commissioners maintained,
contained Africa's one great hope for progress, but it was a mistake to assume that Euro-
pean settlement alone embodied that civilization or that only settlement created conflict
between natives and non-natives. The European impact upon Africa assumed three basic

3234, 32.
103 Ibid., 35.
104 Ibid., 15-17.
105 Ibid., 18.
forms. First, governments and Christian missions played a "paternal" role, ruling, guiding, and educating the natives. Second, European capital, initiative, and enterprise exploited natural resources without establishing a permanent presence in Africa. Finally, white settlers established themselves in Africa where climatic conditions were appropriate. The second form of influence was essential for the first because governments needed revenues derived from economic development in order to carry out essential administrative tasks.

Two consequences followed from that relationship:

In the first place it creates obligations for the Government to consider the interests of the immigrant traders. And in the second place it means that the introduction of the sort of government which British tradition demands into any of the African territories involves setting in motion a process of economic and social change which, once started, cannot be stopped and which sooner or later must inevitably introduce a new form of society. 106

But the third influence, settlement, was the focus of conflict between natives and non-natives because it introduced competition over land, created demands for labor, and inevitably at some point produced settler demands for self-government. The commissioners concluded that European settlement was not the only source from which arose the question of "duality of interests" in Africa, and they insisted that given the right conditions settlement could be a powerful buttress to Western civilization and the benefits it bestowed upon African peoples. 107

According to the commission, the "general level of ability" of whites was higher than that of blacks, but there was also "a definite overlapping in respect of intelligence as

106 Ibid., 19.
107 Ibid., 20.
between the two races." Complicating the picture, however, were the existence of the "poor white" and the "Asiatic question." The commissioners believed the viability of European settlement in tropical Africa on a permanent basis had to be regarded as experimental; it was not clear whether or not the second and succeeding generations of settlers would "maintain the original high standard." Asians fell between Europeans and Africans in the current hierarchy of racial abilities, and they performed valuable functions as traders and artisans. The commissioners believed that Africans might replace Indians in repetitive, mechanical work but not "in tasks which require more initiative and resource." Asians were likely to retain their position of dominance in artisanal work, but they would increasingly be "squeezed" between Africans and Europeans. In order to further the aims of economic progress and political harmony, therefore, the imperial and territorial governments were essential as mediators among the races of the region.

While the report of the Hilton Young commission was hardly amenable to the plans of the secretary of state or the Kenyan settlers, who viewed the majority report as completely opposed to their aspirations for achieving responsible government, Amery was not one to give up easily. During the spring of 1929 he sent the Colonial Office's permanent under-secretary of state, Sir Samuel Wilson, to East Africa with the task of ascertaining the terms of closer union acceptable to the European community. Wilson reported

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108 Ibid., 24.
109 Ibid., 24.
110 Ibid., 28.
that the prospect of closer union alarmed all of the communities in the region, especially
the Europeans who wanted assurances about the maintenance of the dual policy and the
future attainment of responsible government before they would endorse closer union. The
permanent under-secretary suggested a plan that would favor the settlers by establishing a
weak central authority for East Africa under the direction of a high commissioner who
would direct essential economic services but not have control over native policy. The
latter would be left to the secretary of state and to the territorial governments whose legis-
latures would lose their official majorities. In other words, given the fact of a racially une-
qual franchise, Kenyan settlers would dominate the legislature in Nairobi. Unfortunately
for Amery, Hilton Young, and other settler supporters, Wilson's report was only delivered
on 2 July 1929, following a Labour victory in the June general election and the accession
of Sidney Webb as secretary of state for the colonies.\footnote{Gregory, \textit{Sidney Webb and East Africa}, 105-6. Webb assumed the title of Lord Passfield (which he
detesteed and dropped immediately upon leaving office) in order to allow the Labour government to fulfill
the constitutional requirement of having two secretaries of state from the House of Lords.}

Webb was not enthusiastic about Wilson's report and his preface to the published
version made it clear that the government did not accept—or even agree—with its con-
clusions.\footnote{Report of Sir Samuel Wilson, Cmnd. 3378, 3.} Prior to 1929, the Labour Party had cautiously adopted a stance that declared
that the main objective of imperial government in Africa should be to encourage and assist
Africans to use their land for their own benefit. In addition Labour intended to apply
trusteeship to all backward peoples, promote educational and medical advances, and to
eliminate all forms of slavery including forced labor. As colonial secretary Webb at-
tempted to implement a "pro-native" policy in Africa. His own humanitarian instincts were reinforced by a number of interested groups and individuals, including: the Labour Party's Advisory Committee on International Questions; missionaries, Africans, and Indians in Kenya; the government of India; the League of Nations; the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society; and, prominent persons such as Sir Donald Cameron (governor of Tanganyika, 1925-31), Oldham, and Lugard.\textsuperscript{114}

Two white papers published by Webb in 1930 spelled out Labour's colonial policy objectives in East Africa.\textsuperscript{115} The first, on the issue of closer union, rebutted the recommendations in Wilson's report of the previous year. Webb did suggest the appointment of a high commissioner for the region, but he was to act as chief advisor to the secretary of state in the areas of native policy and the administration of common "transferred" services. He would have strong oversight authority in all matters regarding native policy and could suspend territorial legislation that he deemed incompatible with the policy of the imperial government.\textsuperscript{116} The secretary of state also thwarted settler hopes of achieving responsible government on their terms by stating that the constitution of the Kenya Legislative Council should remain "substantially unchanged" for the present, retaining its official majority. The only alteration proposed was that there should be two, rather than one, members nominated by the governor to represent African interests.\textsuperscript{117} The second policy paper

\textsuperscript{114} Gregory, Sidney Webb and East Africa, 83, 86-104.
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid., 108-11.
\textsuperscript{116} Statement of the Conclusions of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom as regards Closer Union in East Africa, Cmd. 3574 (June 1930), 4-5.
\textsuperscript{117} Ibid., 7-8.
unequivocally stated that "the relation of His Majesty's Government to the native population in East Africa is one of trusteeship which cannot be devolved, and from which they cannot be relieved."\textsuperscript{118} Webb declared that trusteeship was not incompatible with the "Dual Policy," but where Kenyan settlers had hoped that the simultaneous development of the interests of the European and African communities would eventually result in the achievement of responsible government for the colony (which they expected to dominate), the colonial secretary insisted that "native paramountcy" took precedence. For him the dual policy meant that European interests would be fully considered only so far as they did not impede the political, social, and economic development of the region's African communities.\textsuperscript{119}

Despite bold statements, Webb's plan for placing African interests foremost in considering East African policy was not realized. The 1930 white papers aroused bitter opposition from the Kenyan European community even while it received support from Indians and Africans. There was support in England for the Europeans' claims for political dominance, and more importantly Governor Grigg refused to implement Labour's policy of native paramountcy. For his part, Webb would not go so far as to recall the governor for insubordination.\textsuperscript{120} In 1931, a joint parliamentary committee, originally intended to consider only the question of closer union, also examined native policy.\textsuperscript{121} Composed of ten members from both the House of Commons and Lords, Conservatives on the commit-

\textsuperscript{118} Memorandum on Native Policy in East Africa, Cmd. 3573 (June 1930), 4.
\textsuperscript{119} Ibid., 4-6.
\textsuperscript{120} Gregory, Sidney Webb and East Africa, 115-27.
\textsuperscript{121} Joint Select Committee on Closer Union in East Africa, H.C. 156 (December 1931).
tee outnumbered Labour representatives twelve to eight (at the time there were only four members of the Labour Party in the House of Lords). Either sitting on the committee or appearing before it as witnesses were most of the people concerned with native policy in East Africa. Witnesses included settlers, missionaries, merchants, and officials. A number of African witnesses—three from each territory—testified, although the committee seems to have been more concerned with appearing to hear from representatives of all racial communities than with taking their testimony seriously.122 In the end, the committee's report was "decidedly conservative," deciding against any form of closer union and reaffirming the trusteeship principle with increased Indian and European participation in its application. The parliamentarians defined native paramountcy as African interests not being subordinated to those of the minority communities, but that did not imply that the African community should be considered first in every situation.123 The joint committee derailed the political commitment to develop East Africa for the Africans, but in any case the onset of the depression would have pinched off funding for any development plans.

In the decade prior to the Second World War, the administration of the East African territories underwent important transformations. While continuing to take a paternalistic view of the African population, colonial governments increasingly violated the principle of indirect rule and favored a more interventionist approach. Indirect rule was the practice of administering colonial territories through indigenous political structures.124 As

123 Ibid., 134-36.
124 Porter, The Lion's Share, 186-88. The theory was closely associated with Sir Frederick Lugard, who developed it after he went to Nigeria in 1900. Donald Cameron, as governor of Tanganyika, instituted the policy
a practical matter, the colonial service throughout the empire lacked sufficient personnel to consider the alternative: direct rule. Theoretically the system preserved the cohesion of African tribes, which might otherwise shatter when exposed to the individualistic ethos of European civilization and capitalism, with its concomitant class differentiation. In practice, "native authorities" often had to be transformed or created in order to meet the demands of imperial administration, and appointed chiefs and headmen encountered resistance from peasants on traditionalist grounds. The impact of the depression was a vital factor creating the impetus for reconsidering the theory of indirect rule.

Settler agriculture in Kenya and Tanganyika suffered tremendously as international commodity markets collapsed after 1929. Most European farmers lacked reserves of capital that might have cushioned them from the economic crisis. Peasant cultivation proved less vulnerable, and for a variety of reasons Africans responded to the depression by increasing production. During the 1920s, African farmers in Kenya had proven to be more efficient producers of cereals (maize in particular) than settlers, and they grew mainly food crops for sale on local markets, which were not as severely affected by the depression. A combination of local demand and government encouragement increased

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based upon his experience as an administrator in Northern Nigeria. Ingham, "Tanganyika: The Mandate and Cameron," 571.


126 David Anderson, "Depression, Dust Bowl, Demography, and Drought: The Colonial State and Soil Conservation in East Africa During the 1930s," African Affairs 83 (1984): 323. Anderson's article was particularly helpful in guiding the discussion that follows in the text.
Government support for African production resulted from the crisis in the settler sector, which reduced the amount of work available for migrant workers and, in turn, the amount of money those workers remitted to the African reserves. As a consequence, many Africans in the reserves failed to meet their hut and poll tax obligations, thereby reducing government income and undermining the fiscal basis of the colonial regime and its support for European agriculture. At the same time, however, peasant demand for foreign consumer goods continued to grow, helping to spur African entrepreneurial production. Official intervention aimed at augmenting that process—raising African incomes, and thereby increasing government customs revenues—took the form of supplying better seed, maintaining demonstration farms, and providing some veterinary extension services. The Kenya government did not renounce its commitment to European agriculture; it intervened to boost African production in order to provide the funds necessary for continued support to the settlers. But the new emphasis on Africans as independent commercial producers eroded the validity of a socio-economic model in which Europeans supplied capital and skills and Africans labor (wholly or partly sustained by subsistence agricul-

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129 Ibid.; Kanogo, "Kenya and the depression, 1929-1939," 119. Evidence of the manner in which the colonial state continued to subsidize the settler sector, an income tax—introduced in 1931 in order to balance the budget—applied to settlers, but they were not forced to pay until 1938. Africans bore the brunt of regressive taxation. Brett, *Colonialism and Underdevelopment*, 185.
The emergence of the African as economic man was an idea that challenged the image of traditional society that had served the needs of both administrators and settlers.

In Uganda, the depression decade witnessed a brief downturn in output during 1929-30, followed by the recovery and expansion of production, despite low prices, after 1931. From 203,000 bales in 1929, cotton output slumped to 130,000 in 1930 and then climbed steadily from 190,000 in 1931 to 424,000 in 1938. Coffee production progressed without interruption from 41,000 hundredweight in 1929 to 280,000 in 1938. The total value of Ugandan exports went to £1.9 million in 1931 from £4.3 million in 1929, and averaged about £4 million between 1932 and 1938. Peasant output increased partly as a result of better weather in 1931, especially compared to the previous season, and improved communications. But the expansion of African production, which was very inexpensive, did not expose the farmer to the risk of bankruptcy, and tax obligations still had to be met while the demand for some consumer goods—now considered essential—remained fairly steady. Moreover, crops produced in the early 1930s were often a result of cultivators' response to the relatively high prices that had prevailed three to five years previously. Wrigley suggests that the effects of price fluctuations only dampened strong, ongoing economic growth in the territory.

State intervention in the Uganda economy during the 1930s combined efforts to increase production in order to augment government income with paternalistic efforts to

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132 Ibid., 456; Wrigley, Crops and Wealth in Uganda, 61-62.
both improve living standards and to shield the African from the consequences of rapid modernization. The idea of the African as producer collided with the image of traditional society. The 1930s saw the rise of "scientific agriculture" in Uganda accompanied by a substantial increase in the staff of the agricultural department, among them many specialists. The main objectives of the department were to raise the productivity of agriculture (an effort that met with limited success) and to improve marketing. The latter task entailed the imposition of paternalistic restrictions on the activities of middlemen (often Asians) in the name of "protecting" the native, but those also worked to prevent Africans from entering the distribution system as traders. The government concentrated on encouraging production of cotton at the same time as it curtailed the unregulated development of markets. As Cyril Ehrlich argues: "The Government which had begun as an active initiator of economic development had been transformed [by 1939] into an administration that valued stability above economic progress."\textsuperscript{134}

A series of local disasters—floods, damage to roads, and a plague of rats—in the early part of 1930 afflicted the Tanganyikan economy, which was dealt a more serious blow by the collapse of world prices later in the year. Production of sisal, the territory's most valuable export, increased but earned only £1,172,315 as compared with £1,485,593 in 1929.\textsuperscript{135} The slump caused serious decreases in government income because customs

\textsuperscript{133} The total staff of the department, including the director, in 1914 numbered ten people; in 1931 there were 42. Ehrlich, "The Uganda Economy, 1903-1945," 457.

\textsuperscript{134} Wrigley, Crops and Wealth in Uganda, 63-64; Ehrlich, "The Uganda Economy, 1903-1945," 461-69.

revenue declined and it became difficult in many areas to collect hut and poll taxes. Africans in Tanganyika probably suffered little hardship, however, because they were not dependent on imported goods, their subsistence crops were little affected, and they practiced import substitution: hides, skins, and bark-cloth in place of imported clothing, for example. There was greater official concern over the state of affairs, and the government launched a "grow more crops" campaign after 1931, an appeal to which peasants responded. By 1933, the Tanganyika government was again "living within its means."

In all three of the East African territories, therefore, the depression prompted officials to take a more direct interest in African agriculture. Initially the aim of agricultural departments was to increase the productivity of native cultivators in order to prop up the finances of the colonial states. But by the second half of the 1930s the very success of those earlier efforts raised a new series of concerns influenced by three important factors. First, the "dust bowl" in the southern plains region of the United States alerted international observers to the possibility of a global environmental catastrophe and motivated agricultural officers in East Africa to justify interference in African patterns of land use on the grounds of preventing soil erosion. Secondly, increased crop production exacerbated overcrowding in many areas caused by rapid population growth and increases in the numbers of livestock. Finally, below average levels of rainfall throughout much of the region between the mid-1920s and mid-1930s resulted in droughts that only increased fears of an

136 Ibid., 595.
137 Ibid., 596-97, 601-2.
environmental crisis if soil conservation policies were not immediately implemented. In all three territories government efforts to prevent erosion by introducing methods such as intercropping, growing strips of grass between cultivated fields, plowing along contours instead of straight up and down hills, and terracing hillsides, involved interference with individuals lives. Many officials were undoubtedly motivated by objective concerns, but in Kenya the European settlers vigorously took up the issue of African land use as a political device. Before the Kenya Land Commission in 1933, for instance, which was supposed to ensure that the land needs of Africans were adequately provided for, the settlers--fearful that natives might be granted rights in the White Highlands--pressed their argument that the Africans should prove that they could take care of the land they had before any consideration was given to augmenting the extent of the reserves. They also lobbied the government to cull (compulsorially, if necessary) herds of African cattle, especially in areas of the highlands occupied by squatters, in order to prevent overgrazing and the ensuing damage to the land it caused. By the end of the 1930s, the colonial state intruded into the daily lives of peasants more than ever before.


Events and policies in East Africa and other colonies during the 1930s helped influence London's thinking about colonial development. The world depression prompted cutbacks in the provision of services in the colonies, including the number of medical, educational, veterinary, and agricultural specialists recruited, and discredited the notion that economic conditions would tend to improve with minimal intervention by the imperial government.\footnote{Constantine, The Making of British Colonial Development Policy, 228-29.} An increased academic interest and proliferation of expert studies of African problems encouraged "forward thinking" at the Colonial Office, which encompassed efforts by officials in London to explore the ways in which Whitehall, despite its lack of direct authority in the territories, might influence future development throughout the empire. Inspired largely by Leopold Amery,\footnote{Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1924-29.} one aspect of "forward thinking" involved a reorganization of the Colonial Office, making systematic use of specialists to advise the colonial secretary on development issues and thereby, it was hoped, providing persuasive power at the imperial center in order to influence the periphery.\footnote{J. M. Lee, "Forward Thinking' and War: The Colonial Office during the 1940s," The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 6, 1 (October 1977): 64, 69-70.} Despite changes in thinking within the Colonial Office, and despite passage of the 1929 Colonial Development Act, Treasury parsimony stifled any ambitious schemes for colonial development that planners in London may have had during the thirties.\footnote{Porter, The Lion's Share, 278-80; Pearce, The Turning Point in Africa, 3.} But that decade did lay the groundwork for a more active policy in the future.
From 1935 onwards, proponents of colonial reform and development were galvanized by the "colonial question" arising from German demands for the restoration of their pre-1914 possessions and by criticism of British colonial administrations from Berlin and, increasingly and continuing through the war, from the United States.\textsuperscript{144} Adolf Hitler, the German chancellor, hinted in March 1935 that he might press for the return of former German colonies. The political ploy sparked a debate in the United Kingdom because it was generally recognized that a refusal to return the mandates to German control would have to be based on moral arguments acceptable to world opinion and not simply on British self-interest. In the end, the cabinet was unwilling to consider the restoration of colonial territory in the absence of a general settlement of all Anglo-German disagreements, which Hitler appeared unlikely to consider. After 1938, the British discarded the notion of appeasement through colonial concessions.\textsuperscript{145} But the issue did contribute to a reconsideration of the manner in which Britain was meeting her obligations as a colonial trustee.\textsuperscript{146} Moreover, that concern did not stop with the commencement of hostilities with Germany in September 1939. The question of the future of colonies (especially the mandates) was certain to be raised at the end of the war and the government recognized the vital neces-


\textsuperscript{145} Cain and Hopkins, \textit{British Imperialism: Crisis and Reconstruction}, 228; Ingham, "Tanganyika: Slump and Short-Term Governors," 605-8.

\textsuperscript{146} Morgan, \textit{The Official History of Colonial Development}, vol. 1, 14-21; Constantine, \textit{The Making of British Colonial Development Policy}, 230.
sity of improving its image as a colonial power—most of all in the eyes of the Americans. 147

At the end of the 1930s, three significant events energized imperial planning in the direction of reform: disturbances in the British West Indies; the publication of Lord Hai-ley’s African Survey; and, the appointment of Malcolm MacDonald for the second time as secretary of state for the colonies. Labor disturbances in the West Indies began in 1935 and culminated in some serious riots in Trinidad and Jamaica during 1937 and 1938. 148

The Moyne commission, appointed to investigate the causes of the regional upheavals and to recommend reform measures, was sharply critical of the colonial administrations, so critical that the Colonial Office postponed publication of the commission’s report—ready by December 1939—until the end of the war. 149 But the report did add impetus to those who advocated a more vigorous development program for the colonies. 150

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Hailey's study was published in 1938, the same year that Malcolm MacDonald became colonial secretary. The Survey was a magisterial work on the challenges of colonial rule in Africa, and Hailey's biographer writes that the major effects of its publication were to provide official validation of the importance of the work of the British Africanist community and to establish Hailey as the main spokesman for reform and development in the colonies. But the work also demonstrated the extent to which British knowledge about the African colonies and their peoples was deficient. MacDonald welcomed Hailey's proposals for colonial research and incorporated them into his own development scheme. He, too, believed political advance had to be accompanied by social and economic progress fostered by state intervention. Stung by international criticism of the state of imperial territories, upon taking office MacDonald not only backed the formation of the West Indies Royal Commission but also instructed his staff to review the operations of the Colonial Development Fund. Throughout the latter half of 1938, as the threat of war loomed, MacDonald initially hesitated to place before the cabinet a request for increased expenditure on the colonies, but he finally reasoned that Britain's defense would only be

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153 Among other things, MacDonald was convinced that Britain needed a more active program of development in order to justify its refusal to turn over the High Commission territories (Swaziland, Basutoland, and Bechuanaland) to South Africa as well as to improve the "British shop-window for the U.S.A."—the West Indies. Cell, *Hailey*, 237; Constantine, *The Making of British Colonial Development Policy*, 233, 235.
strengthened if its colonial policy was above reproach. Consequently, the Colonial Office pressed ahead with its plans to revamp development policy. Following the publication of Hailey’s work in November 1938, which called for the creation of a fund for conducting scientific research in Africa, MacDonald added that suggestion to his larger scheme. Ultimately, the Colonial Office asked for £500,000 per year to fund research that might produce material benefits for the United Kingdom but was primarily intended to avail colonial populations. More importantly, the Treasury eventually agreed (after forcing MacDonald to halve his original request) to provide £5 million annually that could be used to pay for capital and recurrent expenditure on colonial social services as well as for economic development as described by the 1929 Colonial Development Act. In February 1940 the government released a statement on its new approach to development policy along with a summary of the recommendations of the West India Royal Commission. MacDonald presented the Colonial Development and Welfare Act to the House of Commons on 2 May 1940, and it became law on 17 July.

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156 Constantine, The Making of British Colonial Development Policy, 242-52. The new act also made provision for the conversion of some outstanding colonial loans into grants, in the sum of £11,264,488 17s. 11d. The largest item among the cancelled debts was £5,502,592 that had been advanced to the government of the East African Protectorate (now Kenya) under the terms of the Uganda Railways Act, 1896-1902. Treasury and CO staff agreed there was little chance of the territories ever repaying the debts affected. Morgan, The Official History of Colonial Development, vol. 1, 84.
157 Constantine, The Making of British Colonial Development Policy, 257; Flint, "Planned Decolonization," 399. See also, Pearce, "Colonial Office and Planned Decolonization," 78-80. Pearce believes the prewar developments were important, but he argues, convincingly, that Flint exaggerates their significance in equating them with the beginning of decolonization. As Pearce points out, colonial secretaries after MacDonald (e.g. Moyne and Cranborne) were not yet ready to consider independence for a large number of colonies. Nevertheless, the beginning of the Second World War did see a new willingness on London’s part to commit funds to colonial development.
Full implementation of the 1940 act did not occur during the Second World War, especially as the "phoney war" phase ended in the spring of that year. Expenditure on colonial development rose from £177,802 in 1940-41 to £2,806,456 in 1944-45, while colonial research received £6,670 in 1941-42 and £58,345 in 1944-45. Those were significant increases but the amounts fell far short of the limits set by the legislation.\textsuperscript{158} Still, the 1940 law did represent an important change in the concept of colonial development. Unlike the 1929 act, which tied development to the promotion of commerce and industry in the United Kingdom, MacDonald now declared that the aim of development was primarily "to promote the prosperity and happiness of the peoples of the Colonial Empire."\textsuperscript{159} The new act emphasized that the improvement of the welfare of colonial peoples was a principal aim of the imperial government.\textsuperscript{160}

Aside from slowing implementation of the CD&W Act, the Second World War had an enormous impact on the British economy. Soon after the conflict began, the "Treasury view" of balanced budgets and financial orthodoxy was dethroned and was replaced with Keynesian budgeting techniques. Planning and coordination of the efforts of government, industry, and organized labor was used to fully mobilize the national economy. Politically, the success of the war economy convinced voters that the managed economy could produce real benefits (full employment and better living standards, for ex-


\textsuperscript{159} \textit{Statement of Policy on Colonial Development and Welfare}, Cmd. 6175 (1940), 4-5, 8, cited in Constantine, \textit{The Making of British Colonial Development Policy}, 258;

\textsuperscript{160} Morgan, \textit{The Official History of Colonial Development}, vol. 1, 96.
ample) compared to the uncertainties and hardship created by free market capitalism during the 1930s.\footnote{Cain and Hopkins, \textit{British Imperialism: Crisis and Reconstruction}, 269-70. The Beveridge Report of 1943, which laid out the fundamental principles of the welfare state in which the state would guarantee full employment, organize health care, and provide far-reaching social security for everyone, enjoyed widespread popular support: in polls conducted after its announcement, 86% of those surveyed supported its implementation; only 6% were opposed. Bernard Porter, \textit{Britannia's Burden: The Political Evolution of Modern Britain, 1851-1990} (London: Edward Arnold, 1994), 246-47.}

Of course, the war also exacted huge costs on the British economy and affected the colonial empire as well. Two important ways in which wartime imperial policy affected the colonies were through the use of the Sterling Area to support the value of the pound sterling and the British balance of trade, and through controls imposed upon colonial trade. Wartime controls over trade included: requiring import and export licenses; rationing shipping space; and, bulk purchasing of the main colonial exports at prices set by the Ministry of Supply. Purchase prices initially provided a fair return to producers, but over time (and especially after 1945, when controls remained in place) the difference between world prices and the lower purchase prices widened for most commodities. Additionally, marketing boards established in the colonies usually paid prices to producers—especially peasant producers—that were lower than the prices set by London, with the surpluses accumulated as price stabilization funds for the post-war years, when many people anticipated a return to 1930s conditions.\footnote{D. K. Fieldhouse, "The Labour Governments and the Empire-Commonwealth, 1945-51," in \textit{The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Governments, 1945-1951}, ed. Ritchie Ovendale (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1984), 97.} Prior to the war the Sterling Area was an informal bloc composed of countries that held all or part of their reserves as sterling balances. Members included: all of the empire and Commonwealth except for Canada.
and British Honduras; a number of European nations, especially the Scandinavian countries and the Baltic states; and miscellaneous states such as Argentina, Portugal, Iraq, Egypt, and Siam.\footnote{Cain and Hopkins, \textit{British Imperialism: Crisis and Reconstruction}, 80.} In 1939 sterling became inconvertible and the Sterling Area was subject to rigorous exchange controls. Britain could not pay for both the expenses of the war—particularly arms and essential imports from the United States—and the increased imports of vital supplies from the colonies. Consequently, British debts to the colonies accumulated as sterling balances held in London. Between 1941 and 1945 colonial sterling assets in London increased from £205 million to £454 million, making the colonies together Britain's second largest creditor at the war's end—after India, which held a balance of £1,111 million.\footnote{Allister Hinds, "Imperial Policy and Colonial Sterling Balances 1943-56," \textit{Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History} 19, 1 (January 1991): 24, 26, 29; Cain and Hopkins, \textit{British Imperialism: Crisis and Reconstruction}, 270.} During the war the colonies could not draw on those balances because Britain was in no position to supply their capital or consumer needs and colonial purchases outside the Sterling Area were strictly rationed in order to protect the pound. In effect, the colonies were forced to loan money to the imperial government at low rates of interest.\footnote{Fieldhouse, "Labour Governments and the Empire-Commonwealth," 95-96.} As we shall see, those rising balances had an important influence on post-war imperial policy.

Even as the war delayed fulfillment of goals designated under the CD&W Act of 1940, the Colonial Office made plans for an even more ambitious piece of legislation. Under pressure from critics on the radical Left, Indian nationalists, and perhaps most impor-
tantly the Americans, British planners pledged to stand as trustees, responsible before the world for the economic and social progress of their African dependencies.\textsuperscript{166} The Colonial Office, the Foreign Office, and even the Treasury recognized the need to provide substantial funds for development. As Lord Hailey noted in a confidential report prepared for the colonial secretary following his trip to Africa in 1940: "It has become clear that in the Colonies the maintenance of the doctrine that they should be independent of assistance from the British Treasury would condemn some of them to the premanent position of depressed areas."\textsuperscript{167} The CD&W Act of 1945 proposed spending of up to £120 million over a ten year period, an amount raised to £140 million by the CD&W Act of 1950.\textsuperscript{168} Those sums are symbolic of the increased priority assigned to development during and after the war, although one should note that the East African governments still provided most of their own post-war development funds.\textsuperscript{169} Running counter to the objectives of the CD&W Acts, British governments after 1945 assigned first priority to metropolitan borrowing on the City's money markets and stringently limited loans to the colonies. Colonial

\textsuperscript{166} Roger Louis and Robinson, "The United States and the Liquidation of British Empire," 38-39.

\textsuperscript{167} Lord Hailey, Native Administration and Political Development in British Tropical Africa (Nendeln, Liechtenstein: Kraus Reprint, 1979), 3. The original confidential report and was not published until September 1944. "Report by Lord Hailey to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1941: Native Administration and African Political Development," PRO CO 847/21/11.

\textsuperscript{168} Constantine, The Making of British Colonial Development Policy, 267; Morgan, The Official History of Colonial Development, vol. 2, Developing British Colonial Resources, 1945-1951, 92-95. In securing passage of the 1945 act throught the House of Commons, the secretary of state noted that CD&W funds were only intended to act as the "pump primer" for development. He expected greater amounts to be forthcoming in the individual colonies from sterling balances (aside from those used to back local currency issues, a net of £50 million in the case of East Africa), and private investment. Morgan, The Official History of Colonial Development, vol. 1, 200-1.

development was an important priority, but it still came second to Britain's reconstruction needs.\footnote{Fieldhouse notes that between 1946 and 1951 total welfare spending on the empire came to roughly £40.5 million, while sterling balances held in London increased by £150 million. "Labour Governments and the Empire-Commonwealth," 98. Including funds held to cover issues of colonial currencies (the Treasury required 100% reserves in sterling), London's sterling liabilities to the colonies increased from £504 million in 1946 to £928 million in 1951. Hinds, "Imperial Policy and Colonial Sterling Balances," 30.}

Changes in British attitudes towards the empire and the outbreak of war had profound implications for imperial territories, including British East Africa. Central planning became the rule, with London directing the war effort on a grand scale while a far higher degree of economic and military coordination took place at the regional level. Colonial governments imposed measures to control inflation, set up commodity marketing boards, and dealt with complex questions of production and supply.\footnote{Lee, "Forward Thinking' and War," 73.} The Conference of Governors of British East Africa, which had held annual meetings since 1926, met twice a year to tackle those problems on a regional basis.

In Kenya the war created conditions allowing for the expansion of both settler and African agricultural production and for the growth of industry. Shipping constraints, the preoccupation of British industry with war requirements, and the cutting off of supplies from Germany and Japan combined to create a shortage of consumer goods in the colonies.\footnote{Japan supplied 72% of Kenya's cotton textile imports in 1939. Tiyambe Zeleza, "Kenya and the Second World War, 1939-1950," in A Modern History of Kenya, 152.} Import-substitution industries emerged in Kenya with the encouragement of the state, which provided tariff support for "infant industries."\footnote{Wrigley, "Kenya: The Patterns of Economic Life," 264; Zeleza, "Kenya and the Second World War," 152.} Industrial expansion has-
tended the process of urbanization in the colony, although it was still characterized by low-wage, short-term migrant labor.\textsuperscript{174} Unprepared for the rapid growth of towns, colonial authorities took action to expel the unemployed, as well as women and children, from urban areas. Labor reacted to low wages, poor conditions, and coercion with desertion and strikes.\textsuperscript{175} The interventionist state fostered both the development of industry and, unintentionally, a heightened sense of worker solidarity during the war.

Settlers enjoyed increased support from the colonial state during the war. Europeans obtained influential posts in the wartime government with executive authority as "controllers" of certain primary products.\textsuperscript{176} They lobbied for the use of conscript labor to meet the labor shortage caused by military service\textsuperscript{177} and the growth of urban industry. Farm mechanization increased, partly supplied through Lend-Lease and from captured war booty. The Kenyan state subsidized fertilizer for settler use and assisted with the provision of storage facilities. The British government helped stabilize commodity prices through bulk-buying, and unlike African peasants received full purchase price for their produce. After November 1941, following the entry of Japan and the United States into

\textsuperscript{174} Nairobi's population increased from an estimated 40,000 in 1938, to 77,000 in 1947, and 95,000 in 1952. Between 1936 and 1945, the number of African workers earning wages rose 77 percent, from 213,743 to 379,286. Bruce Berman, \textit{Control and Crisis in Colonial Kenya: The Dialectic of Domination} (London: James Currey, 1990), 302, 306.


\textsuperscript{176} Bennett, "Settlers and Politics in Kenya," 329.

\textsuperscript{177} Of the 280,000 men recruited for the East African Forces (including men from Uganda, Kenya, Tanganyika, Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia, and British Somaliland) about 75,000 were drawn from Kenya. That represented about 20 per cent of the colony's adult male African population. John Middleton, "Kenya: Administration and Changes in African Life, 1912-45," in \textit{History of East Africa}, vol. 2, 386.
the war, settlers and African producers alike benefited from high commodity prices. Increasingly settlers plowed profits from cereal production (mainly maize) into more heavily capitalized mixed farming. In the White Highlands that helped set the stage for a post-war confrontation with African squatters as settlers reclaimed for their own herds land previously used only for squatter livestock. But for the duration of the fighting most settlers hesitated to implement the 1937 Resident Native Labour Ordinance—which gave highlands district councils the authority to limit the extent of squatter cultivation and the size of their herds—for fear of disrupting production, a concern shared by the colonial and imperial governments.

Despite a much lower level of support from the government than settlers enjoyed, African production in Kenya also increased during the war. That was not always apparent to officials when African producers did not provide anticipated volumes to Maize Control, the government purchasing agency for wartime needs, but peasants often chose to sell their grain on the black market rather than accept the official prices offered by Maize Control. During the war African farmers adopted more modern and intensive agricultural techniques that increased productivity, and the war years witnessed the emergence of a much greater degree of class differentiation in the reserves between proto-capitalist

farmers and landless laborers. Pessimists in the colonial administration feared the sociological and ecological effects of the government's wartime encouragement of African production and decried the demise of African communalism in the face of "selfish individualism." The colonial state was not yet prepared to accept the African as capitalist producer, nor to accommodate his post-war demands--backed with new economic clout--for state support and access to government patronage that previously only settlers had enjoyed.  

Wartime conditions spurred capitalist production in Tanganyika as well. The first two years of the war saw the collapse of the territory's traditional export markets, but Japanese conquests in the Pacific and Southeast Asia from 1941 onwards caused prices for sisal and rubber to rise precipitously, reviving rubber as a major crop in Tanganyika. The entry of the United States into the conflict ensured a virtually unlimited demand for those commodities and for pyrethrum, used to make insecticide. Sisal returned £1.5 million to Tanganyika producers in 1940; the same quantity of output realized £5.5 million in 1945. The British Ministry of Supply offered a long-term contract for sisal at a good price, and the territorial government assisted growers by conscripting labor, at a peak of 30,500 men in 1944. Altogether 86,740 Africans served with the military during the war while the state conscripted another 84,501 for estate labor. Other government actions also sup-

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185 Westcott, "Impact of the Second World War on Tanganyika," 147.
ported settlers and plantation owners. Planting subsidies for large acreages and guaranteed prices for food crops—wheat, maize, and beans—that were packaged in new bags went almost invariably to settlers, who could meet the requirements. As in the Kenyan case, the increasingly interventionist state favored the European community, although African producers also benefited from conditions produced by the war.

But while some Africans prospered, others experienced hardship during the war and after. Tanganyika's attempt to be self-supporting during the war was not entirely successful, and food shortages led to the importation of maize in 1941, 1942, 1944, and 1945. In 1942 and 1943 the rains failed, and Central Province was particularly hard hit by drought and famine. Shortages in some areas provided incentives to others to produce food crops for those markets. Africans generally had more money as a result of the war, but consumer goods were in short supply and inflation resulted. Prices doubled during the war and tripled between 1939 and 1949, and the Economic Control Board's inflation fighting measures proved inadequate. Workers on sisal plantations protested low pay and poor working conditions by desertion, boycotts of particular estates and production zones, and strikes. Poorer peasants and estate and urban workers suffered when wages failed to keep pace with price rises. The level of government intervention in the economy to control export marketing, domestic distribution, and prices reached unprecedented

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levels during the war, and many of the controls remained in place until the early 1950s. Demands for conscripted labor and agricultural efficiency fell upon Native Authorities and peasants alike. The managerial state, acting in the name of the people's interest but failing to heed African opinion, only provoked resentment and obstruction. African groups increasingly recognized their common grievances against the state, exemplified by the 1947 general strike in which clerks joined dock workers in protests which spread elsewhere from Dar es Salaam.  

Trends in Uganda between 1939 were similar to those in the other East African territories. With 55,000 men serving in the army in 1944 and many others working for short periods for military labor organizations, there was a significant manpower shortage in the protectorate. Food production was a priority, to meet both domestic needs and military requirements in the Middle East. Maize production rose from 49,000 tons in 1938 to an average in excess of 100,000 tons annually after 1942. Even so, famine became a threat in many areas when drought affected the harvest in 1939, 1942, and 1943. Cassava and sweet potatoes were grown widely as reserve crops. Commodities important for the war effort were cotton, coffee, tobacco, hides and skins, oil-seeds, timber, tea, and sugar. But while prices rose considerably after 1942, a general shortage of consumer goods provided little incentive for peasants to dramatically increase output.  

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190 Westcott, "Impact of the Second World War on Tanganyika," 150-52, 156.
prices for cotton and coffee were considerably higher than the sums paid to producers.\textsuperscript{193} The differences accrued to funds designated for the future stabilization of prices, but in fact the government used much of the money for general expenses. Between 1939 and 1945, government revenues doubled at a time when Uganda policy-makers assigned a much higher priority to development.\textsuperscript{194} While administrative direction and interference in agricultural production was not new, officials during the war were being equipped financially and ideologically to intercede in the economy on an unprecedented scale.

Military events influenced East African colonial administration during the war years. Following the debacle at Singapore in February 1942, the region appeared to be defenseless in the event of a Japanese advance into the Indian Ocean. Sir Henry Moore, governor of Kenya, feared his colony might be cut off from England and forced to rely upon its own resources. Under the circumstances he felt compelled to make concessions to settlers, and shortly thereafter measures were passed allowing the conscription of African labor and providing guaranteed crop prices. In March he created the Civil Defence and Supply Council to coordinate production and supply. First Uganda and then Tanganyika then felt obliged to join in order to prevent their interests being overridden by those of Kenya's Europeans.\textsuperscript{195} The question of closer union once again arose as the exigencies of war forced the East African territories to work together more closely than ever before.

\textsuperscript{193} During the war years, payments to cotton growers as a percentage of export proceeds from their crop came to: 50\% in 1940-41; 45\% in 1941-42; 28\% in 1942-43; 31\% in 1943-44; and, 38\% in 1944-45. Ehrlich, "The Uganda Economy, 1903-1945," 473.
\textsuperscript{194} Ehrlich, "The Uganda Economy, 1903-1945," 471-72.
Sir Arthur Dawe at the Colonial Office suggested a federal scheme, which granted self-government to settlers in a "White Highlands District," in July 1942. Moore, however, countered with his own proposal for a future, unitary East African state. Ultimately, the idea of closer union failed to win approval from the Labour Party, and this was deemed essential for any plan to proceed during the war.\textsuperscript{196}

But if plans to proceed with political union of the East African territories made little headway, there was much more enthusiasm about continuing with centralized coordination of services and economic policies after the war. Most of the people involved believed an extension of wartime controls would cushion producers against a fall in commodity prices when, as it was generally assumed, prewar depression resumed. In any case, it seemed to be the most efficient way to operate services such as customs, income tax, posts and telegraphs, defense, locust and disease control, scientific research, and aviation, all of which the governors' conference had directed during the war.\textsuperscript{197} Eventually, the East Africa High Commission, responsible to the East African Central Legislative Assembly created at the same time, came into being on 1 January 1948 to coordinate common services.\textsuperscript{198} Centralized direction in East Africa was harmonious with views of the state's economic role in the United Kingdom following the war.

Britain emerged from the Second World War with the empire intact, but there were new challenges to be faced and it was clear that a return to the prewar status quo

\textsuperscript{196} Ibid., 73-6.
\textsuperscript{197} Ibid., 78-9.
was neither possible nor even desirable. Between 1945 and 1948, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, and Palestine achieved independence, for the most part with the resigned blessing of the imperial government.\textsuperscript{199} That did not mean that policy makers were willing to relinquish Britain's role as a world power. On the contrary, until the mid-1950s London's planners did not consider general decolonization an certain (or even likely) event and determinedly pursued the aim of restoring British strength.\textsuperscript{200} There was both a political and an economic aspect to accomplishing the goal. Politically Britain had to respond to international challenges to imperialism: from the United States, where anti-colonialism had both popular and official support; from the Soviet Union, which represented a serious military and ideological threat; and, from newly emergent states in the United Nations. In the economic sphere, governments were determined to underwrite British power by quickly effecting post-war recovery and reestablishing sterling as a major international currency. For the Labour government of 1945-51, questions of empire became enmeshed with the two pressing concerns of economic recovery from the ravages of war and the emerging menace of Soviet (and, in East Africa, South African) expansion.\textsuperscript{201}

Colonial development offered attractive solutions to a number of Britain's post-war difficulties, and as a result politicians following the Second World War viewed the empire-

\textsuperscript{199} Porter, Lion's Share, 315-18.
\textsuperscript{201} Hyam, "Africa and the Labour Government," 148.
-especially the African territories, which seemed more likely to remain within the imperial fold for some time to come—as being more valuable than it had been before the war.

There were even a few cases of development projects directed from London to meet metropolitan needs. The most spectacular of those was the comedic tragedy of the Tanganyikan Groundnut Scheme, launched in 1947 under the management of the Overseas Food Corporation and intended to provide edible oils for the British populace. Planned with enthusiasm but without much attention to local environmental facts, a commission recommended abandonment of the scheme in 1950 after it had absorbed £35,870,000, nearly equal to the total expenditure of the Tanganyikan government between 1946 and 1950. \(^{202}\)

Aside from meeting Britain's urgent requirements, development would also dampen criticism from the United States (and "world opinion") by proving that the British were determined to work for the benefit of all imperial subjects. \(^{203}\) And as the Cold War developed, anti-communism superseded anti-colonialism in terms of American priorities. \(^{204}\)

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\(^{204}\) Roger Louis, "American anti-colonialism and the dissolution of the British Empire," 409; Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism: Crisis and Reconstruction, 278.
Even if constitutional change proceeded at a slower pace than economic progress, at least Whitehall could claim that they were moving in the right direction.

Post-war economic aims of the British Labour government were threefold: to re-absorb former service members into the peacetime economy; to maintain virtual full employment; and, to avoid convulsions that would upset the foreign balance of payments and undermine the value of the pound sterling. The attempt to minimize unemployment often worked at cross purposes with the aim of defending the value of sterling and thereby its importance as an international reserve currency.²⁰⁵ British productive capacity was inadequate to meet consumer needs, and demand for foreign imports inevitably put pressure on sterling. An abrupt end to lend-lease following cessation of hostilities in 1945 led to the British seeking a temporary loan in the amount of $5 billion from the dollar countries of the United States and Canada. A major condition attached by the Americans to that loan was that sterling should be made convertible within a year. London gamely tried to comply but the ensuing drain on gold and dollar reserves forced abandonment of the attempt. In 1949, another crisis and flight from sterling forced devaluation of the pound from $4.03 to $2.80. In June 1950, the start of the Korean War ruined hopes for stabilizing the British economy by raising the price of raw material imports and using industrial capacity for war production that might otherwise have been employed to boost exports. Continued pretensions to world power resulted in Britain contributing proportionally more

than other countries to that war effort and subsequently lagging behind countries such as Germany and Japan that invested in technology rather than tanks.  

Within the context of Britain's precarious economic situation, colonial development would serve metropolitan requirements in several ways. The colonies would be better able to supply the United Kingdom with vital resources that could not be purchased elsewhere due to the dollar shortage, and exports of commodities to countries outside the Sterling Area—fueled by the post-war commodity boom that lasted until the end of the Korean War in 1953—would generate hard currency earnings needed to offset Britain's "dollar gap," her balance of payments deficit with the United States and other non-sterling countries. Wartime restrictions on the colonies use of sterling assets held in London continued in force, and as a result their balances continued to increase, steadily from £504 million in 1946 to £582 million in 1949, and then more rapidly to £1,032 million in 1952. The metropolitan economy in the post-war years could not meet colonial demand for capital goods, but Britain could not allow her dependencies to purchase indiscriminately from the Dollar Area without risking a blow to sterling's stability that would set back post-war recovery and jeopardize plans to restore convertibility. Consequently

209 Ibid., 40-41; Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism: Crisis and Reconstruction, 265-66.
development plans were more limited than what they might otherwise have been because of the restrictions on colonial capital investment. And while London could control her dependencies access to surpluses, that solution only postponed a day of reckoning that appeared to be more serious as independence became imminent in the late 1950s. In the more immediate post-war period, restrictions on the colonies' use of their sterling balances deprived them of funds that might otherwise have been used for development at the very time when post-war shortages of raw materials and the Korean War commodity boom favored the expansion of colonial production.\textsuperscript{210}

Nevertheless, British planners pressed ahead with development plans, one advantage of which, they hoped, would be to undercut colonial nationalism by raising living standards and taking some of the sting out of the charge that the mother country was only interested in exploiting her dependencies for her own benefit. Labour ministers repeatedly asserted that economic and social progress was a necessary precondition for political advance in the colonies.\textsuperscript{211} But the empire's political stability was important because in the emerging Cold War world Britain needed colonial bases to counter Soviet expansionism. To abandon that geopolitical task would be to risk the special relationship with the United States—and perhaps a revival of American anti-colonialism—that was based in large part on Britain carrying her share of the anti-communist burden, especially in key areas such as the Middle East.\textsuperscript{212} East Africa (in particular, Kenya) was important as a support base for op-

\textsuperscript{210} Fieldhouse, "Labour Governments and the Empire-Commonwealth," 98; Westcott, "Impact of the Second World War on Tanganyika," 144.

\textsuperscript{211} Gupta, Imperialism and the British Labour Movement, 310.

\textsuperscript{212} Roger Louis, "American anti-colonialism and the dissolution of the British Empire," 402, 405.
erations in three vital regions: in the Indian Ocean in the wake of decolonization in the sub-continent; in the Middle East, especially as the long-term security of the base at Suez became more uncertain; and, in central and southern Africa, possibly as a counterfoil to South African designs.  

By 1946, there were a number of planners at the Colonial Office who were exploring new policy directions for Africa. Sir Sydney Caine, head of the economic department, and Andrew Cohen, then head of the Africa Division, were two of the leading thinkers in that field. Their own experience of wartime conditions left them with no hesitation about exercising control from London, and Arthur Creech Jones, Labour's new

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216 Trade unionist; national secretary, Transport and General Workers' union, 1919-29; executive member London Labour Party, 1921-28; active with Friends of Africa Committee 1930s-45; executive member, Fabian Society; Labour MP, 1935-50, and 1954-64; member, CO education advisory committee, 1936-45; executive member, Anti-Slavery Society, 1938-54, and vice president, 1954-64; parliamentary private secretary to Ernest Bevin, 1940-45; cofounder and chairman, Fabian Colonial Bureau, 1940-45; vice-chairman, Higher Education Commission to West Africa, 1943-44; member of Labour's Imperial Advisory Committee and chairman, 1944-45; parliamentary under-secretary of state for colonies, 1946-50; secretary of state for colonies, 1946-50; member FCB Advisory Committee, 1951-58; chairman,
secretary of state for the colonies, appointed Cohen and Caine to head a departmental committee to consider the problems of economic and political progress in Africa, including the ultimate transfer of power. The committee was set up early in 1947 and that year witnessed new departures in Colonial Office thinking about the future of the colonies.

On 25 February 1947, Creech Jones issued a circular dispatch on the subject of local government in which he repudiated the Colonial Office's long adherence to the concept of indirect rule, by which British administrators ruled African peoples through their traditional leaders and institutions.\(^{217}\) Henceforth, British territories in Africa would move toward a democratic system of local government on the English model, which seemed the best way to win African support for programs under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1945.\(^{218}\) In May 1947, the Cohen-Caine committee presented their report, expanding upon principles already outlined in the local government dispatch. The report attempted to look one to two decades ahead, suggesting that democratization and Africanization of politics and administration would be necessary if African territories were to

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\(^{217}\) Indirect rule had already come in for serious criticism prior to and during the war: "The principle of indirect rule has passed through the stages of first a useful administrative device, then of a political doctrine, and finally that of a religious dogma." Lord Hailey, "Some problems dealt with in an African Survey," International Affairs (March 1939): 202. In his report on native administration and political development Hailey wrote: "I have purposely avoided discussing methods of native administration in terms of 'direct' and 'indirect' rule. There is now little advantage in the use of those terms. They have no claim to precision." Native Administration and Political Development in British Tropical Africa, 13.

make economic and social progress. Convinced that nationalism would become an ever more powerful force in Africa in the future, and fearing the emergence at the level of the central colonial legislatures of a class of nationalist politicians without connections to the mass of the people, the planners at the Colonial Office believed the best course open to them would be to build up a robust system of democratic government at the local level. Africans—and here, recognizing some of the social transformations taking place on the continent, the theorists were thinking of educated Africans rather than traditional leaders—would also be represented (through indirect election at first) in colonial legislative councils, with individuals gradually being given greater responsibility over branches of central government.

The new ideas being developed in the Colonial Office were discussed at the Cambridge Summer School for colonial service officers in August 1947, where Cohen's imposing personality and persuasive arguments won general support for the local government proposals. At the African governors' conference in November, however, the Colonial Office encountered some determined opposition, mainly from the East African governors led by Sir Philip Mitchell of Kenya (1944-52). Cohen and his colleagues had been primarily concerned with West Africa because those colonies seemed to be closest to achieving self-government. And even in the Gold Coast, where Africans were considered to be the

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222 Pearce, Turning Point in Africa, 150-52.
most politically advanced, Cohen talked about transferring power in about a generation.²²³

In reference to East and Central Africa they were even more cautious (and vague about
timing), maintaining for instance that official majorities be maintained in colonial legisla-
tive councils until such time as the Africans were ready to fully participate in a system of
representative government. The East African governors did not feel pressured by African
nationalists in the late 1940s, and Mitchell in particular saw no reason to prepare for the
imminent transfer of power to people that he regarded as primitives in need of continued
British tutelage. He charged that London theorists were out of touch with the colonies
and failed to understand the "spiritual, moral and social chaos" in which Africans were
adrift. In East Africa the governors insisted that their colonial charges still badly needed
the progressive paternalism represented by British rule. Mitchell concurred with the need
for an efficient, democratic system of local government, but he wondered whether London
would be prepared to see the task through until it was finished, rather than simply caving
in to nationalist demands as they might arise. And the time frame he had in mind before
the people of East Africa would be ready for self-government was expressed in terms of
generations, not years.²²⁴ The discussion between Mitchell and Cohen is a good example
of post-1940 division described by David Fieldhouse among imperial commentators who
were optimistic about the prospects of colonial development. Some, like Mitchell, be-
lieved development would take place because colonies were part of a new progressive

²²⁴ Pratt, "Colonial Governments and the Transfer of Power," 259-60; Cell, "On the Eve of Decolonization,"
252-54.
empire and, therefore, should remain so for the foreseeable future; others, like Cohen and
a number of Labour's colonial theorists, such as Fenner Brockway, thought that colonial-
ism was an impediment to growth precisely because political dependence sapped the will
of the people to achieve economic independence, and therefore self-government would
greatly accelerate the development process.\textsuperscript{225} The latter group was more optimistic about
the capacity of Africans to manage their own affairs, but they were determined to control
the process by implementing constitutional change in stages. Cohen would get a chance to
test his theories more directly as governor of Uganda, 1952-57.\textsuperscript{226}

In the face of Mitchell's opposition (the other East African governors soon lined up
with him), the Colonial Office backed off somewhat from its most controversial proposals.
London still could not push ahead without the cooperation of the governors. In any case,
the initial stages of the Creech Jones-Cohen plan, mainly involving West Africa, could be
carried out without much difficulty, and there was no sense in provoking men like Mitchell
unnecessarily.\textsuperscript{227} East Africa presented a much more difficult problem, involving as it did
the question of balancing the interests of the various ethnic communities. Perhaps the
most important effect of the intellectual ferment within the Colonial Office in 1947 was
that Whitehall officials believed they had to preempt the nationalist challenge. In so doing

Africa}, vol. 3, 70.
\textsuperscript{227} Cell, "One the Eve of Decolonization," 255-56; R. D. Pearce, "The Colonial Office in 1947 and the Transfer
of Power in Africa: An Addendum to John Cell," \textit{The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History} 10, 2
(January 1982): 214. Cell claims the governors' criticism prompted the C.O. to abandon its 1947 plans, while
Pearce maintains the essence of the proposals became ingrained in C.O. thinking and thus continued to affect
policy making.
they may have prepared the ground for African nationalists in the next decade.\textsuperscript{228} No further initiatives relating to local government in East Africa were launched by the Labour government prior to its demise in 1951. Between 1951 and 1957, Conservative governments under Sir Winston Churchill and Sir Anthony Eden grudgingly accepted the precedents set and promises made by Labour, but they adopted a policy of gradualism in terms of constitutional change, granting concessions only when no alternative presented itself and making no attempt to accelerate the pace of change. They proceeded with colonial economic development and were determined to deal firmly with militant nationalism.\textsuperscript{229}

While radical or even moderately rapid constitutional advance may have been placed on hold in the late 1940s, changing attitudes towards the dependent empire nevertheless had profound effects in the region. Officials at the Colonial Office were convinced of the need to rejuvenate policy in Africa in order to meet criticism from sources within the dependent empire, and from foreigners. New approaches were needed both to bolster the morale of members of the colonial service and to constructively engage African participation in programs aimed at social and economic advancement.\textsuperscript{230} The "second colonial occupation" denotes the unprecedented level of official penetration into the lives of ordinary Africans that began in the late 1930s and was given greater weight by the Colonial Welfare and Development Acts of 1940 and 1945. Part of the second colonial occupation involved the establishment of institutes for social and economic research in the

\textsuperscript{229} Goldsworthy, "Keeping Change Within Bounds," 81-82, 84-85.
\textsuperscript{230} Hyam, "Africa and the Labour Government," 150.
colonies. The Rhodes Livingstone Institute in Northern Rhodesia, formed in 1938, was the first of these. After the war, the East African Institute of Social Research at Makerere College, Uganda, and the West African Institute of Social and Economic Research, administered by the University College, Ibadan, Nigeria, were established primarily with funds provided through the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1945. The institutes were intended to be centers with permanent sociological establishments that could provide social science research of a high quality and in a timely fashion to both the scholarly community and administrators.\textsuperscript{231}

During and after World War II, unofficial organizations formed with the intention of raising colonial issues in Parliament and in the forum of public opinion. The Fabian Colonial Bureau emerged in 1940 under the energetic influence of its secretary, Rita Hinden, and with Creech Jones as chairman. The original aim of the group was to have colonial questions placed before the House of Commons.\textsuperscript{232} In March 1952, a bipartisan group formed the Africa Bureau as a political lobby and platform for educating the British people concerning imperial problems. Lord Hemingford, a Conservative peer recently retired from a career in African education, chaired the executive committee, which included among its members Creech Jones and Reverend Michael Scott (honorary director), who had been influential in founding the organization. Mary Benson became its secretary and

\textsuperscript{232} Hinden, a South African economist, originally conceived the idea for the FCB. Goldsworthy, \textit{Colonial Issues in British Politics}, 57, 123-24; Gupta, \textit{Imperialism and the British Labour Movement}, 278 n. 13.
Colin Legum, Commonwealth correspondent for the Observer, supplied it with information from professional news sources. 233

New journals—semi-official publications of the Colonial Office, tightly focused on administrative questions—reflected a fresh confidence in the value of efficient colonial management. Beginning in December 1947, the African Studies Branch of the Colonial Office, formed in 1947 by Andrew Cohen, the new assistant under-secretary and head of the Africa Division, produced the type-written quarterly, Digest of African Local Administration. Men in the field reportedly found the Digest valuable and it was soon absorbed by The Journal of African Administration, which was to provide the same type of information in a more permanent form beginning in January 1949. 234 The African Studies Branch intended the journal to be "an authoritative quarterly of a high technical level for the recording and discussion of information on African administration." 235 The editors expected the journal to be most useful for the "practical administrator in Africa," but they were also confident that it would attract a readership among "serious students of African affairs" at home and abroad, and they hoped that it would forge a link between researchers and administrators in two ways: by showing the former what type of information the man-on-the-spot needed; and by publishing the results of the latest research in an understandable format that could be applied in the field. 236 Another periodical published by the Co-

236 Ibid., 2.
lonial Office beginning in 1949 was *Corona*, "The Journal of His Majesty's Colonial Service." The monthly provided somewhat lighter fare than the *Journal of African Administration*, mixing short informative articles on various aspects of colonial administration and life in the colonies with book reviews, humorous anecdotes, and news from around the empire. In introducing the new periodical, Creech Jones linked traditional paternalism with anti-communism: "The traditional and historic role of the British administrator overseas takes on a new importance amid our present difficulties: for it is his task to see that the seeds of liberal thought and true democratic life, so vital to the future of mankind and already well sown in the Colonial territories, are carefully fostered so that they grow into plants sturdy enough to resist the chill winds that blow these days from some quarters of the world."\(^{237}\) *Corona* was supposed to help to break down the isolation that many colonial service officers experienced while working in far flung corners of the empire. It would provide for an exchange of information among colonial administrators and also help the Colonial Office keep it touch with the men in the field.\(^{238}\)

If anything, the scope for government intervention in Africa was even wider than in Britain, where central planning was in fashion, for part of the state's role in the dependent empire involved preparing people for the stresses of the modern world and (at some unspecified future time) self-government. Paternalism continued to motivate officials, and was joined with the new faith in progressive development. In the foreword to the 1946 Development Plan for Uganda, Governor Sir John Hall (1944-52) stated that—given better


\(^{238}\) Ibid.
food supplies, medical services, conditions of employment, and the incentive of consumer goods—it was "surely not unduly sanguine to look for a marked improvement in the matter of idleness, indifference, and irresponsibility which are such disturbing features of the present day African labourer and cultivator."239 The post-war drive for economic development in the East African territories focused more attention on immigrant groups—described by one official as "economic man incarnate"—and less care to respecting African social or cultural practices that seemingly impeded progress. Rising standards of living, governments assumed, would salve racial antagonisms and mute the protests of nascent African nationalists.240 As territorial governments increasingly intervened at the local level, write two prominent scholars, "they did so in the name of efficiency which would raise African production, protect African land from erosion or Africans themselves from disease, and in search of the democratic supports without which no project, however expert, could be implemented. It was here, at the local rather than at the territorial or global levels, that the decisive strains appeared in the colonial relationship as it applied to East Africa."241 Confidence grounded in expert knowledge, one result of the second colonial occupation, helped remove government qualms about interfering with traditional practices or using coercion to ensure compliance with agricultural improvement and other programs.242

244 Ibid., 14.
Greatly enhanced activity by territorial governments at the local level meant that those who had political influence at the center also had access to greater rewards. Ambitious Africans quickly realized that to remain preoccupied with village politics would be disadvantageous. Thus, the second colonial occupation indirectly forced Africans to take an interest in politics at a level at which few of them had previously been involved. At the same time, aspirations, at least among the educated elite, grew faster than the ability of the state to accommodate them. Multiracial policies added to the tension as racial communities competed for influence at the center. By the early 1950s, the British faced a number of real or potential crises throughout East Africa.

After 1945 the Uganda government turned its full attention to addressing the basic problem of poverty in the protectorate. Agricultural improvement programs were launched on a larger scale than previously. Legislation enacted by the Buganda Lukiko in 1946 authorized officials to enforce soil conservation measures even to the extent of dictating crop selection under certain circumstances. Agricultural experts hoped that mechanization of peasant agriculture would lead to an increase in the scale of cultivation as well as productivity. The state itself planned to manage large-scale farming projects on unused, tsetse-infested land with the aim of quickly bring new areas into production in a more efficient manner than through peasant cultivation. Post-war administrators, however, no longer believed that agriculture alone would be adequate to meet Uganda's future needs. They pinned their hopes on the development of mining and secondary industry to

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243 Low and Lonsdale, "Towards the New Order," 43, 45, 51.
employ the surplus people among a growing population that would no longer be supported from the land. For the most part, industrial and commercial development in the early 1950s occurred around Kampala and Jinja, in the south.\textsuperscript{244}

Exports of cotton and coffee, largely produced by tractorless peasant farmers, remained the wealth-producing components of the Uganda economy, especially after a change in the terms of trade in favor of the protectorate after 1950. Farmers, however, did not receive the full benefit from the sale of their crops. During the war the government, which controlled marketing, withheld a portion of the proceeds from producers in order to prevent inflation during a period when the supply of consumer goods could not be expected to increase. The withheld revenues were initially set aside as a post-war credit for growers, but later the government used the money to create price assistance funds for future stabilization of commodity prices. The administration then raided those funds as general revenues to provide capital for large-scale development programs. Protests against such policies inevitably emerged, such as the efforts by Bagisu leaders and civil servants to mobilize peasants and demand a greater say in marketing arrangements.\textsuperscript{245}

By 1953, in addition to roughly £30 million in export taxes, producers had involuntarily paid about £30 million to the price assistance funds and £22 million for development projects. Between 1950 and 1952, farmers received between 39 and 50 percent of the actual value of cotton produced and between 27 and 43 percent of the value of their coffee.\textsuperscript{246}

\textsuperscript{244} Wrigley, \textit{Crops and Wealth in Uganda}, 68; Gertzel, "Kingdoms, Districts, and the Unitary State," 66.  
\textsuperscript{245} Bunker, \textit{Peasants against the State}, ch. 2.  
\textsuperscript{246} Wrigley, \textit{Crops and Wealth in Uganda}, 70.
The state systematically deprived peasants of the full product of their labors at the same time as it increasingly demanded changes in the manner in which they farmed their land.

Graphic proof of the manner in which the interventionist state could provoke a reaction came before the end of the war, in January and February 1945. Strikes and riots broke out in all the main towns of Uganda. Protesters in Buganda demanded the removal from office of Serwano Kulubya, the kabaka's Omuwanika (treasurer). Another sensitive point involved the British plans to create the East African High Commission, first announced in 1945. The Ganda, in particular, had no desire to forced into an East African federal scheme that might leave them subject to Kenya Europeans.\(^{247}\) In explaining the disorders, the colonial state proceeded to construct a conspiracy theory that claimed political agitators had taken advantage of a period of social and economic crisis to advance their own agenda, ignoring evidence to the contrary that suggested that economic motives—declining real wages as a consequence of wartime restrictions on the importation of consumer goods and the resulting inflation when price controls failed—motivated the majority of strikers.\(^{248}\) As one historian notes: "For British officials, 'conspiracy theory' was preferable to admitting to themselves, or to the Colonial Office, that there was anything fundamentally wrong in Uganda or that there existed problems in the protectorate which

\(^{247}\) Gertzel, "Kingdoms, Districts, and the Unitary State," 67; D. A. Low, Buganda in Modern History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), 149.

\(^{248}\) News of the Uganda strikes some reached the other end of the "transportation corridor" from Kampala to Mombasa. There was no strike among Mombasa railway workers, but a committee under Crown Counsel Arthur Phillips did award the lowest paid workers a modest increase. Cooper, Decolonization and African Society, 137; idem, On the African Waterfront, 67.
were beyond the capacity of the colonial state to solve. Scapegoats were welcome.\textsuperscript{249}

For many Africans, the events called into question the competence of the state and its emissaries. Following the 1945 upheavals, grassroots political mobilization picked up, especially in reaction to the protectorate government's marketing and pricing policies. The Bataka Party and the Uganda African Farmers' Union (founded in 1945 and 1947 respectively) opposed both the Buganda and protectorate authorities. Their efforts in the countryside led to a second major outbreak of violence in September 1949. In the late 1940s the British authorities placed their faith in economic development and a conservative measure of constitutional reform. Governor Sir Andrew Cohen attempted to accelerate greatly the pace of political reform after his appointment in 1952, but he stepped into a situation in which their was little trust or faith in the British authorities.\textsuperscript{250} By that time African economic and political demands were escalating.

Nowhere, perhaps, were post-war colonial administrators more confident of their continued ability to direct development than in Tanganyika. Tentative reforms of the territory's Native Administrations beginning in 1945 gathered speed as district commissioners became increasingly impatient with obstructive behavior on the part of an older generation of African chiefs and headmen. Those African officials found themselves subject to closer supervision by an expanded cadre of British administrative and technical officers.\textsuperscript{251}


African administrations became somewhat more representative, but primarily to make them more efficient and responsive to the dictates of the colonial officials, who continued to direct their actions and concentrated on achieving economic advance, mainly through improvements of infrastructure. On the advice of district commissioners, Native Administrations between 1946 and 1956 used their powers of compulsion to enforce soil conservation and agricultural improvement policies. Erosion control programs were among the most common impositions on African farmers in the 1940s. Agricultural officers directed peasants to terrace hillsides to prevent soil erosion from the heavy East African rains. Other plans conceived by the growing numbers of technical staff in the colonial service included: famine relief orders, requiring the planting of food crops; the burning of cotton plants; cattle dipping to control certain diseases; and, in some places, the culling of cattle herds. Chiefs and headmen had to act as British agents in carrying out these policies, their performance being judged by the number of miles of hillside terraced per month. Peasant protest movements emerged in the forties as the central government undermined the authority of the chiefs upon whom they depended to carry out policy.

An example of the reaction provoked by the second colonial occupation was the protest against mbiru (a graduated local rate) among the Pare of the northeastern part of the territory in the mid-1940s. British administrators pressed local chiefs to collect the taxes, which were supposed to pay for the cost of meeting new demands for schools. Popular protest against the taxes was not aimed at the chiefs, however, but at the colonial regime, which was assumed to be corrupting them. The Pare mobilized demonstrations, organized petitions, and sent delegations to various places in East Africa seeking advice and support. Thus, even a relatively modest intervention by the territorial government at the local level could incite considerable resistance.256 Even more prominent was the Meru land case. In 1947 a government commission sanctioned the allotment of two African farms in order to consolidate a block of land for European ranching between Meru and Kilimanjaro. The African residents were to be relocated to another part of the Northern Province. The Tanganyika government denied a recommendation by the United Nations Trusteeship Council that the order be reconsidered and attempted to forcibly remove the peasants, all in the name of improved land use. While that effort failed as a result of passive resistance, it served to increase African fears of being dispossessed in favor of Europeans and intensified distrust of the government.257

Central government encroachments on local turf fueled African political opposition. The African Association, founded in 1929, became the Tanganyika African Association (TAA) in 1948. The TAA built its popular appeal in the late 1940s through its opposition to government administrative reforms, especially among the Chagga, in Upari, and in Sukumaland. In 1954 the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) emerged as the successor organization to the TAA, and it gained widespread backing mainly as a consequence of the continued use of coercion to obtain compliance with agricultural development programs. But other issues were also important. As in Uganda, the formation of the East Africa High Commission raised fears of Kenyan domination. Many Africans objected to the territorial government's abandonment of its traditional policy of developing Tanganyika in the name of "African paramountcy" and its espousal of "multiracialism."

The new approach represented a shift away from the pre-war emphasis on the preservation of African society and asserted that the African's welfare was linked with all racial communities working towards the country's best interests, but it was not a policy that celebrated cultural differences and clearly implied that Africans should become more like Europeans. Paramountcy was to give way before the new aim of economic efficiency, which was not always compatible with other goals--Africanization, and democratization--established by Creech Jones's 1947 circular. After the government's attempt to intro-

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259 Ibid., 176-77.
260 Ibid., 159, 183. In Kenya "loyal Africans" of the Home Guard, formed to combat Mau Mau, were counterparts to the European Capricorn African Society, and were promised a place in a multiracial future. E. S. Atieno-Odhiambo, "The Formative Years, 1945-55," in Decolonization and Independence in Kenya, 41.
duce racial parity in the legislature in the early 1950s, it seemed that multiracialism might really mean European domination on the Kenyan model.262

Kenya was the main East African arena in which multiracialism (or "partnership") would be tested following the Second World War. As conceived by Governor Mitchell, the policy entailed a degree of investment in the development of the African sector in order to raise living standards, thereby securing the adherence of Africans to "civilized standards." Change in the colony would be initiated from above and closely controlled, concentrating on economic programs. Constitutional advance would consist of a gradualist approach to widening political representation and responsibility--mainly at the local level but also in the legislature--and the encouragement of apolitical trade unionism. In Mitchell's opinion, political advances had to proceed in the wake of political reform.263

Whatever the professed aims of multiracialism, Europeans continued to dominate the colony's economy, producing most of Kenya's exports. Between 1945 and 1960, investment in infrastructure to support settler farming totalled £45 million, European immigrants came to the colony, and the number of settler farms doubled.264 During and after the war, settlers increasingly diversified production, switching from cereal monoculture to mixed farming, and mechanization increased dramatically during and after the war. More intensive and efficient farming in the White Highlands put renewed pressure on the squat-

ters. As they brought more land into production, it was more profitable for the settlers to hire African labor than to continue to allow squatters to live on Highland farms. The war had been a period of relative prosperity for squatters, but after 1947 new labor contracts demanded a greater number of work days (increasing from 240 to 270) from them each year and limited the number of livestock each family could keep to 15. The effort to convert the squatters from a peasantry to a rural proletariat fostered bitter discontent. At least 3,000 squatters refused to sign the new labor contracts presented to them. On the Uasin Gishu plateau, the people resisted destocking orders by sending livestock to the reserve, disposing of about 53,000 head of cattle in that manner in 1950.265

Squatters who were squeezed out of the Highlands relocated either to urban areas, especially to Nairobi and Mombasa, or to the reserves. Repatriation of squatters only added to overcrowding in the reserves caused by Kenya's population growth from 4.8 million people in 1945 to 6.3 million in 1955.266 Overpopulation and overuse of land only stiffened the resolve of the growing army of agricultural and technical experts to control the damage to the soil. As in the other East African colonies, government officials used African authorities to enforce conservation measures such as destocking, contour-ridging, mulching, terracing, and grass-planting. Compelled to provide weekly labor for such exercises, not all of which were fully explained or fully justified, men and women in the reserves were turning to widespread agrarian protest after 1947. Adding to the discontent

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were the small-scale African entrepreneurs, often frustrated in their attempts to share in
the colony's economic growth as something other than unskilled labor.\textsuperscript{267}

Largely in response to the expanded range of action undertaken by the wartime
and post-war colonial state, Africans turned to politics to provide relief. Increasingly they
were not satisfied with local politics and focused attention on Nairobi's secretariat, where
the real source of power lay within the state. The first truly national political organization,
the Kenya African Union, emerged in 1944. Although it was riven with ethnic and ideolog-
ical divisions and was never as strong and cohesive as the colonial authorities imagined,
the KAU made an unambiguous demand for African self-government. Its leadership ulti-
mately aimed to control the central institutions of the government.\textsuperscript{268}

In the towns and cities earnings were too low to allow most Africans to afford
housing, and in the post-war period prices rose considerably. The cost of living in Nairobi
increased by about 40 percent between 1949 and 1952. Minimum wages rose from 7
shillings, 62 cents per week in 1949 to 14 shillings, 13 cents per week in 1952. But pay
continued to be calculated on the basis of the "bachelor wage," the cost of supporting a
single male unaccompanied by his family.\textsuperscript{269} Low productivity combined with the as-
sumption that Africans were only temporary residents in the towns who were subsidized
by family subsistence production in the reserves created the low-wage economy and terri-

\textsuperscript{267} Throup, \textit{Economic and Social Origins of Mau Mau}, 5, 140-64; Bennett and Smith, "From 'White Man's
\textsuperscript{268} First founded in 1944 as the KAU, the organization changed its name to the Kenya African Study Uni-
on at the government's behest, reverting to the original name in 1946. Berman, \textit{Control and Crisis in Colonial Kenya},
\textsuperscript{269} Maloba, "Nationalism and Decolonization," 186-87.
ble urban living conditions. As Frederick Cooper demonstrates in his study of the Mombasa waterfront, colonial authorities desperately sought solutions to the problem of disciplining the new urban workers to the patterns demanded by a colonial economy attempting rapidly to modernize and expand the economy. Labor unrest among the dock-workers in the late 1940s and 1950s would only be controlled once the government recognized the African worker as a permanent resident of the urban area, differentiated and separated from the dangerous classes. The administration lost control over the African sections of Nairobi in 1947. At the same time as protest grew in the countryside, unions grew in numbers and membership, providing a more radical alternative for workers than the relatively moderate KAU. The African Workers' Federation formed as a consequence of the 1947 general strike in Mombasa. The East African Trade Union Congress, established in 1949 by Fred Kubai and Makhan Singh, represented another attempt to create a single labor organization in order to confront the government. The increasing frequency and size of strikes through the second half of the 1940s, threatened to disrupt the colonial state.

Throughout East Africa by the beginning of the 1950s, governments were attempting to deal with the confusion and antagonisms fueled in large measure by the drive for

\[271\] Cooper, On the African Waterfront, 8-11.
\[272\] Throup, Economic and Social Origins of Mau Mau, 7.
\[273\] Berman, Control and Crisis in Colonial Kenya, 326; Cooper, On the African Waterfront, 84-87. Cooper refutes the misconception that the AWF was created in order to lead the general strike.
\[274\] The EATUC played a leading role in the 1950 general strike in Nairobi. Cooper, Decolonization and African Society, 353-54.
economic development. Africans' frustration at being excluded from the full benefits of the development process found expression in a variety of forms of economic and political protest, and it was often difficult to distinguish between the two. But colonial authorities were still quite confident that they could control the pace of economic and constitutional advance, the former receiving by far the highest priority. From those assumptions sprang Mitchell's proposal for a royal commission to examine all aspects of the development question.
Chapter Three

Genesis of the East Africa Royal Commission

Sir Philip Mitchell was instrumental in focusing the attention of the post-war imperial government on problems of land and population in Kenya.¹ The questions he raised regarding the future prosperity of that colony were eventually extended to all of East Africa. The Colonial Office and the governors in the region eventually agreed to institute a royal commission to recommend the most effective manner of fostering rapid economic growth. Such a body, they hoped, would speak with expert authority and command respect on the part of all interested parties, while a concentration on economic themes would avoid the more difficult and intractable questions centered on issues of race and politics. This chapter traces the origins of the East Africa Royal Commission and the attempts by colonial officials in London and the colonies to influence the investigation through the drafting of the commission's terms of reference and the selection of its personnel.

Mitchell served for nearly forty years in various capacities in East and Central Africa. In 1912, at the age of 22 he went to Nyasaland as an assistant resident. Following the outbreak of the First World War he took a commission in the King's African Rifles, returning to Nyasaland in 1918 as aide-de-camp and private secretary to the governor of that territory. The next year he began his tenure in Tanganyika, lasting until 1935, during

which time he held the successive posts of assistant political officer, assistant secretary for native affairs, provincial commissioner, and chief secretary in the territorial government. While in Tanganyika he served under Donald Cameron, governor from 1925 to 1931, and the Colonial Office came to view Mitchell as the capable administrator responsible for implementing Donald Cameron's version of "indirect rule." Mitchell next moved to Uganda, where he was governor from 1935 to 1940. During World War II, he was the political advisor to General Wavell on conquered Italian territories in Africa, and he became, in the rank of major-general, British plenipotentiary in Ethiopia and chief political officer to the general officer commanding, East Africa. From 1942 to 1944, Mitchell was governor of Fiji, but in 1944 he returned to East Africa as governor of Kenya, a post he held until 1952.3

Lord Hailey once noted that Mitchell had a strong sense of idealism that was matched by a sense of realism.4 The tension might better be described as one between optimism and pessimism, but Hailey's general point is valid. Mitchell fiercely desired to

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3 Anthony H. M. Kirk-Greene, A Biographical Dictionary of the British Colonial Governor, vol. 1, Africa (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 1980), 208; Mitchell was appointed governor of Kenya over some opposition within the Colonial Office with the support of Margery Perham, whose influence within the office was then at its peak. See Throup, Origins of Mau Mau, 33. In the end, all those years of service may have taken their toll. Lord Chandos (Oliver Lyttelton), secretary of state for the colonies 1951-54, remarked in a 1970 interview that by the end of his second tour as governor of Kenya Mitchell had lost touch with his district commissioners and that the work had run him down. Lyttelton felt that Mitchell should have been aware of the impending Mau Mau crisis, which broke out four months after he left. Transcript of taped interview given at Oxford on 27 February 1970 by Lord Chandos, Rhodes House, CHANDOS (Oliver Lyttelton), MSS. Brit. Emp. s. 525; Throup, 35. On Mitchell's career see Richard Frost, Enigmatic Proconsul: Sir Philip Mitchell and the Twilight of Empire (London: Radcliffe Press, 1992).

4 Foreword to African Afterthoughts by Philip Mitchell (London: Hutchinson, 1954), xii.
complete what he conceived to be Britain's civilizing mission in Africa. According to him, the political problem in East Africa was

the problem of devising an appropriate instrument for the discharge of our trust. If that trust is honourably and well discharged it will succeed; I want to underline that—it will succeed; that is to say that there will be created here in East and Central Africa a Christian civilization, tolerant of course of other faiths, with "equal rights for all civilized men" as its major political principle.

If that is not attained, then the result is certain to be chaos and destruction and their inevitable successor—tyranny, and there will be no place for civilized man. The choice before the people of our race in Africa is, indeed, to civilize or to perish; self-interest is on the side of the angels.5

One scholar has noted: "Mitchell's constant desire was to excel and to leave his imprint upon what he believed to be the tabula rasa of Africa and the African mind."6

As a result of his experience in Fiji—where Polynesian, Indians, and Europeans seemed to mix amicably—Mitchell brought to East Africa a firm belief in the theory of multiracial government.7 But as an administrator whose views were shaped largely during the era of indirect rule, Mitchell was wary of the effects of rapid change on the African population, and he was suspicious of the motives of the recalcitrant section of the European settler community that rejected any idea of sharing power with Africans.

Furthermore, his espousal of multiracialism did not dispel his firm belief that the mass of the African population was not competent to participate in the planning of Africa's future.8

At the beginning of the colonial period in East Africa, he maintained, the people had been

5 Mitchell, African Afterthoughts, 220.
6 Throup, Origins of Mau Mau, 55.
8 Hailey in African Afterthoughts, xii-xiii.
mired in poverty, ignorance, and superstition, a people without history who had been offered a chance at improvement only with the establishment of colonial rule.⁹

On the other hand, Mitchell thought African improvement was definitely possible. "If we do not know how they came to know so little for so long," he wrote, "we know that whatever the cause may have been it was certainly not lack of natural ability; we have therefore good reason to be confident of the capacity of mind and hand to take advantage of the new opportunities opening for them with such extraordinary rapidity."¹⁰ Mitchell believed in African potential, but he thought it was a long way from being fully realized. In 1944, for instance, there was a lone African on the Kenyan Legislative Council. Mitchell felt more should be appointed, but in 1946 he did not believe there were six Africans in the colony with the ability to serve in that post.¹¹ Furthermore, he refused to take African political aspirations seriously where they differed from his own vision. Anti-colonialists in England and abroad, he asserted, were a threat to the British mission in Africa: "These are the architects of tyranny, the allies of the men behind the Iron Curtain, for the breeding-ground of Communism is poverty, its fertilizer famine; both were the normal lot of man in Africa little more than half a century ago, and will be again, if the work of civilization is interrupted by the synthetic nationalisms being propagated so sedulously today."¹²

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⁹ Mitchell, African Afterthoughts, 26, 51.
¹⁰ Ibid., 71.
African politicians, in Mitchell's view, were self-serving scoundrels out to dupe the African masses and deprive them of the continued benefits of British tutelage. Without the supervision (sometimes backed with compulsion) of British colonial officials, Mitchell argued that African peasants would be doomed to follow old patterns of cultivation, laying waste the land without lifting themselves out of poverty. He concluded that,

the truth is that the only way in which the multitude of East African tribes can hope to enjoy the benefits of civilized government . . . before they have the opportunity to become civilized, is under the forms of colonial government—the flexible and continuously-developing forms of colonial government—administered by a strong and enlightened colonial power and directed . . . to the achievement not of any particular system but of a state of society in which the men and women of which it is composed—or at least a large part of them—have reached a stage of spiritual, moral, social, cultural and economic development capable of supporting and operating such democratic forms of government as may then appear desirable to them.

Too rapid movement towards self-government in Africa, he believed, would be disastrous without first addressing the problem of the "low wage economy" that prevailed on the continent. "Provided we [in Kenya] are not pushed into premature adventures in democracy before there is an electorate capable of using a vote," he wrote Oliver Woods, colonial correspondent for the Times, in November 1950, "I am very hopeful that we may have important lessons to teach here in this country as to the manner in which mixed communities of this kind can devise a reasonably satisfactory arrangement for mutual

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13 Throup, Origins of Mau Mau, 44.
15 Ibid., 276.
collaboration.\footnote{Letter, Sir Philip Mitchell to Oliver Woods, 23 November 1950, McMaster University, Mills Memorial Library, The William Ready Division of Archives and Research Collections, Oliver Woods Correspondence, Box 31, F. 6, Mitchell, Sir Philip.} He added that he hoped to arrange for a close study of the matter early in the next year.

Mitchell remained in contact with Woods, sharing his thoughts on the future of East Africa. He was convinced that the main obstacle to growth was the cycle of subsistence agriculture that perpetuated African poverty. He asserted that, "solutions are not to be found by seeking more land on which incompetent peasant farmers can breed and just not starve, but on breaking out altogether from the limitations of the old standard---not only into industry in all its forms but into forms of farming that will really enable the farmer to live better.\footnote{Letter, Sir Philip Mitchell to Oliver Woods, 27 May 1951, McMaster University, Mills Memorial Library, The William Ready Division of Archives and Research Collections, Oliver Woods Correspondence, Box 31, F. 6, Mitchell, Sir Philip.} He hoped one day to see a royal commission on the problem, comparable to the Linlithgow commission on Indian agriculture, and he asked Woods whether the \textit{Times} would anonymously publish something which he might write on the general subject.

Mitchell's insistence on a continuing role for the British in East Africa, guiding the Africans along the path toward civilization, was strongly expressed in his dispatch to the secretary of state for the colonies of 16 November 1951.\footnote{\textit{Land and Population in East Africa. Exchange of Correspondence Between the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Government of Kenya on the Appointment of the Royal Commission}, Colonial No. 290 (1952). Mitchell's dispatch No. 193 was published as part of the above, 1-30.} In that document he outlined what he considered to be the most pressing problems facing Kenya and East Africa. In his view, the main issues were: the rapid growth of the African population and consequent
overcrowding in certain areas; the demand for more land by certain African groups and the misuse of land; the need to fully develop the resources of East Africa; and, the difficulties caused by the African economic revolution. The need for solutions to these problems was so urgent that Mitchell called for a royal commission to investigate.

At the root of Mitchell's concerns was the rate of growth of the African population and the fact that the pressure of people on land in several districts in Kenya was such that it was more than the land could bear; even with improved farming methods in those districts—increasing yields and incomes per acre—living standards were likely to decrease as a result of too many people trying to eke an existence from the same acreage.\(^{19}\)

Although the statistics available in regard to the rate of growth of African populations were inadequate, Mitchell claimed that it was clear that most East African tribes were rapidly increasing in numbers and that the best estimates placed the rate of increase at about 2 per cent per annum in the most favorable areas. He attributed such rapid rates of increase to the effects of British rule—which removed or ameliorated the traditional population checks such as tribal warfare, famine, pestilence, or infanticide due to superstition—and to improved living standards, despite continuing high levels of infant mortality. Increasing numbers of livestock only compounded the problem. Mitchell pointed out that despite the fact that local areas were congested with people, livestock, or both, most of East Africa was underpopulated and underdeveloped.\(^{20}\)

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\(^{19}\) Ibid., 2. The most crowded areas included the Kikuyu and Machakos Districts of the Central Province, the Maragoli-Bunyore-Kakamega area of North Nyanza, the Teita Hill, and the Kisii Highlands.

\(^{20}\) Ibid., 3.
Mitchell rejected the obvious remedy of simply providing more land to those tribes experiencing overcrowding. Enlarging land holdings without improving farming methods would only lead to the destruction of more land and merely widen the problem of congestion without providing a long-term solution. The primitive methods of peasant farming as practiced in Kenya, Mitchell argued, were inadequate to support people at anything more than a subsistence level. Furthermore, traditional agriculture maintained tribal populations at a subsistence level only through shifting agriculture, leading to the successive destruction of different areas. As land became scarce within certain native areas, traditional shifting agriculture could no longer be sustained and was, therefore, not an answer to Kenya's dilemma.\(^{21}\)

But Mitchell did admit that the extension of tribal agriculture to new lands adjacent to native reserves was the solution that was self-evident to African peasants. It was natural for Africans in congested areas to "look with covetous eyes upon neighbouring land owned by European farmers, and should regard such land, plainly not suffering from congestion, as the solution to their problem, if only it could be made available for their occupation."\(^{22}\) Mitchell gave three reasons why he did not believe that European land should simply be transferred to native use. Firstly, native (i.e. Kikuyu) claims to European land in disputed areas had already been examined and disposed of by the Carter Land Commission,\(^{23}\) which compensated valid claims with cash or land. Secondly, the amount

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\(^{21}\) Ibid., 4-5.
\(^{22}\) Ibid., 5-6.
of land held by Europeans adjoining native land units was, in fact, quite limited compared to the area already occupied by natives and, therefore, even if it were transferred it would provide only temporary relief to the problem of congestion. Finally, Mitchell asserted that,

the expropriation of land properly farmed by one man in order to hand it over for destruction by others would be not only an act of gross and indefensible injustice but of egregious folly. If it were not that one party is white and the other black, no one would even suggest such a solution, unless of course land were held in very large areas and were not properly used. But by that criterion expropriation would begin with the Masai. 24

Thus, the governor dismissed what he considered to be a simplistic solution to the problem of land congestion in the native areas and sought other answers.

To Mitchell's mind, one hurdle to overcome was the notion that every African deserved a piece of Africa as if by right. "Experience has . . . shown," he wrote, "that the sentiment enshrined in the phrase 'three acres and a cow' has, here as elsewhere, an emotional influence which transcends reason." 25 But it was insufficient to simply dismiss such sentiments and the demand for land without providing alternative solutions to the African dilemma. Real solutions had to give people hope in order to turn them away from a preoccupation with the land question, and this meant that a way had to be found to provide families with good, secure livings. 26

Only through the development of all of East Africa's resources of land, water, and minerals, and by developing a wide range of industrial enterprises, Mitchell maintained,

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25 Ibid., 7.
26 Ibid., 8.
could a long-term solution to the region's dilemma be found. African farmers were still essential for development, but only as farmers freed from the constraints imposed by outmoded forms of land tenure and from antiquated practices. The new farmer had to be prepared to work hard and needed the backing of authorities at the local and central level in order to succeed.\textsuperscript{27} Agrarian improvement was only part of the solution. The development of large-scale enterprises—plantations, mining, industry, and transportation—would absorb surplus population from the countryside and raise the overall demand for labor, thereby raising standards of living.\textsuperscript{28} Mitchell pointed out that the economic revolution he was describing was already taking place in the lives of Africans. During the past 50 years there had been steady, if slow, progress, and the pace of change had greatly accelerated as a result of the impact of World War II. African entrepreneurs were emerging and land reform (facilitating enclosure, sale, and exchange of land) was already underway in some districts, often implemented by Africans themselves, "with much rough justice and shrewd common sense."\textsuperscript{29} An important part of the economic revolution was the growth of urban African populations throughout the region in cities, large towns, and near mining operations and plantations. Increasing numbers of East Africans were becoming more or less permanent urban dwellers. There was still a tendency for these people to retain small holdings of land in the native reserves, although it seemed that only a very few could retain sufficient land to provide for their support in old age.\textsuperscript{30}

\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., 8-9.
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., 10-11.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., 11-12.
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., 13.
East Africa's economic revolution created a number of problems. Mitchell was particularly concerned that the colonial governments of the region should not lose control of the process of change.\(^{31}\) Proper coordination and control of economic development required cooperation among the East African territorial governments, and Mitchell suggested as a first step that a study of the region's labor problems as a whole should be undertaken. He identified some of the most controversial questions about the general field of employment that urgently needed to be addressed. Did East Africa benefit from its present low wage economy? If not, how could the transition to a higher wage economy be effected? How might one improve the efficiency of African workers and how was this linked to education and training? How could governments provide for the social welfare of African workers, especially in urban conditions? This last question encompassed issues of health, nutrition, housing, recreation, and security in old age.\(^{32}\)

From the beginning of colonial rule and continuing to the present date, Mitchell wrote, East Africa's economies had been premised on the assumption that low wages were a key to inexpensive production of tropical raw materials. Consequently most African wages were insufficient to support a worker plus dependents at a reasonable standard of living. In considering the problem of raising living standards, however, it was imperative to keep in mind the need to maintain a balance between the conditions of living and employment which were prevalent inside and outside of African areas. Otherwise labor might shift erratically between rural and urban districts, according to which offered the

\(^{31}\) Ibid., 14.
\(^{32}\) Ibid., 15.
most attractive prospects. Wage levels were tied up with the question of the efficiency of African labor. At the present time, Mitchell noted, African labor was rather unproductive due to any number of reasons: ill health and poor nutrition; poor habits on the part of management wedded to the "cheap" labor paradigm; the high value that Africans placed on leisure; and, the fact that African workers were unused to urban conditions and industrial employment.  

In light of these hindrances to higher productivity, the governor asserted that under the present circumstances African labor was likely to be found lacking in both quantity and quality for the purpose of carrying out the development necessary to bring about a real rise in living standards. One way to improve the quality of labor was through improved education, and Mitchell suggested that any inquiry into the questions that he raised in his dispatch should examine the general question of the education policies of the territorial governments. Other issues that needed to be addressed were those pertaining to African social welfare: security in old age, housing, health, and nutrition.  

Concluding his plea for the need to guide the African economic revolution, Mitchell wrote: "It is surely of the greatest importance that this part of Africa should not be allowed to suffer, as the United Kingdom and most of Europe has suffered, by permitting this revolution to run its course, unregulated and undirected in its effects upon large populations of rural origin, whether in their primitive agricultural setting or concentrated as wage earners in industrial centres."  

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33 Ibid., 15-16.  
34 Ibid., 17-19.  
A commission of inquiry might study the region's conditions, bringing to bear "a modern point of view" informed by British and other historical perspectives in order to guide and regulate East African progress: a renewed imperial mission.

Mitchell closed the dispatch by restating his recommendation that a royal commission be formed to investigate on a regional basis the problems he had outlined. While most of the issues had been examined by various authorities, he thought it essential that a group of capable people—including experts in the matters of agriculture, population, and land, and perhaps in the fields of economics, industry, transportation, education, and public health—should study how the individual questions were interrelated. He did not anticipate definitive solutions to all the region's economic and social woes, but he hoped that a royal commission would generate useful suggestions and command a wide audience.

After reviewing Mitchell's dispatch, Oliver Lyttelton, secretary of state for the colonies, directed the governor, in his capacity as chairman of the East Africa High Commission, to consult the governors of Tanganyika and Uganda and comment upon the dispatch's recommendations, especially in regard to the proposed subjects for investigation by and terms of reference for a royal commission. The Colonial Office had accepted the argument for a general inquiry into East African problems; now began the delicate task of defining the parameters of a royal commission's investigations. From the point of view of the officials and politicians in London, it was important that such a body not address

36 Ibid., 20-23.
37 Throup describes Lyttelton as, "an unreconstructed right-wing Conservative imperialist," who had very little colonial experience prior to being appointed secretary of state in 1951. Throup, Origins of Mau Mau, 275.
38 Oliver Lyttelton to the Chairman, East Africa High Commission, 31 December 1951, PRO CO 822/708.
certain sensitive political questions. In outlining the proposal to the prime minister,

Winston Churchill, Lyttelton pointed out that the problem of rapid population increase and
subsequent overcrowding in some African districts led to demands for the dispossession of
European farmers, particularly in the "White Highlands." This, he maintained, was
unacceptable and would not even solve the agricultural problem, but something had to be
done to address the pressing concerns of the African population. Lyttelton wrote:

I agree with the Governor [Mitchell] that a Royal Commission could do a
useful service not only by clearing the air of misconceptions, but also by making
suggestions on the policy which we should follow over the next ten or twenty
years. It is important to do both these before political feeling over the issue rise[s]
too high.

Many of the agricultural and social problems which the Commission would
be asked to examine are common to the other African territories and its findings
would be helpful to Colonial Governments in Central and West Africa.39

Initially, at least, it seems the Colonial Office expected the proposed commission would
have a wide-ranging significance for all of British Africa.

In response to the secretary's note, Churchill inquired about the composition of the
proposed commission and whether or not any native would be represented on it.40

Lyttelton replied that he was considering a chairman and five or six members without a
calculated representation by race or political grouping. "If I could find a loyal African
qualified to make a good contribution," he wrote, "it might pay dividends to include him.
But I would make quite sure not to saddle myself with an agitator or anything of that

39 Oliver Lyttelton to Prime Minister, 6 March 1952, P.M. (52) 9, PRO CO 822/708.
40 Prime Minister's personal minute, Serial No. M. 94/52, to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 7 March 1952,
PRO CO 822/708.
kind."\textsuperscript{41} The prime minister, however, emphasized the political case for African participation: "The appointment of a Royal Commission is rather a serious step and will certainly attract Parliamentary discussion. There will of course be demands from the Opposition for African representation, which it would be very difficult to refuse."\textsuperscript{42}

Lyttelton's less than enthusiastic response to the idea of African representation on the commission was probably conditioned in part by the attitudes of the East African governors. Edward Twining, governor of Tanganyika, for example, had originally opposed the idea of a royal commission but later endorsed it, "provided it was free of any doctrinaire political influences and was confined to members with technical qualifications under a chairman who would command public confidence."\textsuperscript{43} His qualifications, from the perspective of colonial officialdom, would rule out most, if not all, African candidates. Nevertheless, Lyttelton informed Mitchell that he had consulted the prime minister about the royal commission scheme and that the latter had raised the issue of African representation. The secretary wrote that he would favor this, but only if they could find the "right man." He suggested that Arthur Lewis\textsuperscript{44} had the necessary professional standing to make

\textsuperscript{41} Lyttelton to Prime Minister, 11 March 1952, P.M. (52) 11, PRO CO 822/708.
\textsuperscript{42} Prime Minister's personal minute, Serial No. M. 128/52, to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 14 March 1952, PRO CO 822/708.
\textsuperscript{43} Twining to Mitchell, 6 March 1952, PRO CO 822/708.
\textsuperscript{44} Who was not, in fact, an African, but in the subsequent discussions about "African" representation on the royal commission it is clear that African ancestry was the chief qualification sought. William Arthur Lewis, a native of St. Lucia, received a Ph.D. in economics from the London School of Economics where he was a lecturer from 1938 to 1947. In 1947 he secured a readership at the University of London, and he became the Stanley Jevons Professor of Political Economy, University of Manchester, 1948-58. Lewis became secretary for the Colonial Economic Advisory Committee, established by the Colonial Office in September 1943, and was a member of the Colonial Economic and Development Office from October 1946. The United Nations appointed him a member of its group of experts on under-developed countries in 1951, and he served as a part-time member of the Board of the Colonial Development Corporation from 1951 to 1953. \textit{Who's Who 1991} (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 1099; D. J. Morgan, \textit{The Origins of British Aid Policy, 1924-1945}, vol. 1 of \textit{The Official History of
a valuable contribution, although he cautioned that Lewis "might go off at a tangent on some racial issue." 45

The East African governors were not pleased with the idea of appointing an African to the royal commission. Mitchell wrote that "it had not occurred to us that this question would be raised for we thought that the Royal Commission would be recruited from distinguished persons in Britain and that the question of representation of various races would not arise." He noted that he was not personally acquainted with Lewis but that both Twining and Andrew Cohen, governor of Uganda, knew him well and considered him unsuitable. Mitchell reported that Cohen held Lewis in high regard but believed "he has not an objective mind and in particular is completely unbalanced on the subject of European settlement in Africa." Furthermore, Mitchell argued that the appointment of an African on racial grounds would lead to similar demands for representation from Europeans and Indians in Kenya. Nevertheless, if the decision was made in London to appoint an African, Mitchell, Cohen, and Twining were unanimous in nominating Serwano Kulubya, former treasurer (Omuwanika) of the Baganda government (1928-45) and a member of the Uganda Legislative Council. 46 The governors were impressed by Kulubya's personal integrity and ability, and Mitchell cited his fine performance before the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Closer Union in 1931. 47

47 Mitchell to W. L. Gorell Barnes, 21 March 1952, PEM. 5/52. PRO CO 822/708.
While Lyttelton told the governors of the prime minister's desire to have African representation on the proposed commission, he made a final effort to dissuade Churchill from insisting on that point. He noted that on the most recent of such bodies appointed from the Colonial Office, the West Indian and the Rhodesia-Nyasaland Royal Commissions of 1938, there had been no representation of "local races." Again, he insisted, if there were a suitably qualified African he would appoint him to serve. As it was, he wrote, "to the best of my knowledge there is no African with both the high professional qualifications and the freedom from bias which are necessary. I therefore think that we should firmly resist attempts by the Opposition to introduce an element of representation into a Royal Commission appointed solely for expert and impartial knowledge." 48

On 16 May 1952, Lyttelton circulated a memorandum to the cabinet detailing his proposal for a royal commission to study land and population problems in East Africa. 49 Draft terms of reference, developed by the Colonial Office in consultation with the East Africa High Commission, instructed members of the proposed commission to inquire into the best methods to improve land use and productivity by the introduction of better farming methods, modifications in traditional systems of land tenure, and the opening for settlement and cultivation of areas not currently utilized. They were also to examine questions related to industry such as: the development and siting of industrial enterprises; wage policy and the conditions of employment in industry, commerce, mining, and

48 Lyttelton to Churchill, 28 April 1952, "Royal Commission to visit East Africa," PM. (52) 13, PRO CO 822/708.
plantation agriculture; and, the issues involved in providing for long-term social security for permanent urban and industrial populations. Commissioners were to be free to comment upon policy in related fields, such as public health and education, but the terms of reference also charged: "In their deliberations the Commission should take account of existing obligations incurred by treaty, agreement or formal declaration of policy in relation to the security of land reserved for the different races and groups in various parts of the Territories concerned."\(^{50}\)

In his memorandum, Lyttelton expressed his faith in what a royal commission might accomplish. "It is not too late," he wrote, "for the East African Governments to guide the economic and social development of the area along the right lines. I share their belief that the findings of a well-selected Royal Commission would greatly assist them. They will also be of assistance to the governments of other African territories."\(^{51}\) The secretary again stated his conviction of the need for "an impartial body of high professional standing," which precluded the appointment of an African member. He argued that "the members should be confined to experts in fields such as agriculture, economics and sociology, with a Chairman not himself a specialist, but a man of wide experience who is not closely associated with politics. I would resist any suggestion that members should be appointed to represent local economic or racial points of view."\(^{52}\)

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\(^{50}\) "Draft Terms of Reference for Royal Commission," n.d., PRO CO 822/708.


\(^{52}\) Ibid.
At the same time as Lyttelton was laying the proposal for a royal commission before the cabinet, the idea was also broached publicly. An article in the Times, written by Mitchell but bylined (at the suggestion of the Colonial Office)\textsuperscript{53} "from our correspondent," reported: "The growing importance of land and population questions in East Africa is held in some quarters here to warrant comprehensive examination." Mitchell went on to explain that a disinterested inquiry was needed in order to "discourage an emotional approach, such as the agitation among sections of the Kenya Africans." In particular, he thought it imperative to "reply factually" to assertions made by Peter Koinange,\textsuperscript{54} a young Kikuyu, in a pamphlet entitled Land Hunger in Kenya. Koinange, in Mitchell's opinion, was simply trying to enlist support for the Kenya African Union's campaign to stop further European land settlement and misrepresented the historical facts regarding the White Highlands. Given the present state of confusion and agitation over land issues, Mitchell argued that a region-wide study of land and population problems might be useful.\textsuperscript{55}

Soon after the idea was mooted publicly, a cabinet meeting of 20 May endorsed Lyttelton's proposal with some modifications. One concern raised at the meeting was that the appointment of a commission might serve only to excite controversy and, therefore,

\textsuperscript{53}\textit{Minute of W. L. Gorell Barnes, 23 April 1952, PRO CO 822/708. Minor amendments to the article were made at the suggestion of Colonial Office readers.}

\textsuperscript{54}\textit{Son of Koinange wa Mbiyu, Peter Mbiyu Koinange (b. 1907) had impressive educational credentials: Alliance High School; Hampton Institute, Virginia, 1927-31; Ohio Wesleyan University, 1931-35; Teachers' College, Columbia, 1935-36; St. John's College, Cambridge, 1936-37; and, Institute of Education, London University, 1937-39. A founder of the Kenya African Union, 1944, he delivered the Kenya Land Petition to London with Achieng Oneko in 1951. Between 1951 and 1959 he worked with the London Co-operative Society, and during the same period was the KAU's representative in London. Throup, \textit{Origins of Mau Mau}, 273.}

\textsuperscript{55}\textit{"Case for E. African Land Inquiry. Studying Tribal Claims," the Times, 15 May 1952.}
was it really necessary to take up the matter at the present time? The response to this was that public interest was already aroused in East African affairs and the government needed the advice of a royal commission in order to answer criticism. On another important point the cabinet overrode Lyttelton's objections and agreed that the commission should include at least one African member. Finally, the colonial secretary was instructed to consider whether or not the terms of reference might be simplified.\textsuperscript{56} With these modifications to the original plan cabinet approval was secured and the way was clear to begin selecting commissioners.

Once the cabinet stipulated that one of the members of the royal commission was to be an African, the Colonial Office set out in earnest to find a suitable candidate. Sir Thomas Lloyd, permanent under-secretary of state for the colonies, related to the governors that Lyttelton believed an East African would be the best choice, "if one can be found there capable of taking and maintaining an objective view on Kenya land questions."

He noted that, unfortunately, Kulubya had been rejected for fear that he would not be able to fulfill that requirement. Lloyd directed the governors to consider other East Africans, but, if that effort proved fruitless, it might be necessary to consider someone of African descent living in the United Kingdom. The problem was that Lewis had already been eliminated from consideration and, Lloyd feared, "it may well be that anyone else of African descent in this country who is up to the appointment intellectually might suffer from a similar bias." Furthermore, there was a danger that the appointment might be

\textsuperscript{56} "Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street," 20 May 1952, 11:30 a.m., C.C. (52) 54th Conclusions, PRO CAB 128/25.
offered to "someone of this kind," only to have him decline it on account of the terms of reference (i.e. the prohibition against addressing the problem of reserved lands), thereby souring the public atmosphere for the commission at the outset should the news leak out. A third possibility was to find a West African, such as Henly Coussey,\(^{57}\) who might be willing to serve.\(^{58}\) In a letter to governor Mitchell, Oliver Woods mentioned that some (unspecified) people favored the appointment of Joel Omino, secretary of the Central Nyanza District Council in Kenya, rather than a politician. Mitchell replied that Omino would be useful, "but if there is to be an African from East Africa I hope it may be somebody holding important and responsible office."\(^{59}\)

At a meeting of the East Africa High Commission, the three governors discussed the question of including an African on the royal commission. They agreed that they should make the utmost effort to find an East African.\(^{60}\) Cohen set aside his reservations about Kulubya, noting that "if there was to be an East African on the Commission the best man to have would be Kulubya." He wrote that Mitchell had helped to convince him that Kulubya was not likely to cause trouble over land questions in Kenya, noting that the latter, "as a substantial landowner in Buganda under the mailo system, is not in an entirely

\(^{57}\) A lawyer and reformer who had chaired an all-African committee on constitutional reform for the Gold Coast, the report of which Lord Hailey described as "one of the most remarkable of the series of State papers in which the problems of government in British African territories have been discussed." Lord Hailey, *An African Survey: A Study of Problems Arising in Africa South of the Sahara*, rev. ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), 204. *Report by the Committee on Constitutional Reform*, Col. no. 248 (Gold Coast, 1949).

\(^{58}\) T. I. K. Lloyd to Cohen, 24 May 1952, [identical message to Twining and Mitchell], PRO CO 822/708.

\(^{59}\) Letter, Oliver Woods to Sir Philip Mitchell, 28 May 1952, and Sir Philip Mitchell to Oliver Woods, 3 June 1952, McMaster University, Mills Memorial Library, The William Ready Division of Archives and Research Collections, Oliver Woods Correspondence, Box 31, F. 6, Mitchell, Sir Philip.

\(^{60}\) Telegram, Mitchell to Lloyd, 7 June 1952, PRO CO 822/708.
dissimilar position from the European settlers in Kenya." Further points in Kulubya's favor were: he was a man of sufficient standing not be written off by European settlers in Kenya as a "token"; he had impressed people when he appeared before the Joint Select Committee of 1931; and, he carried weight among the Baganda. All three governors agreed that he should be the number one choice. Their second choice was Chief Kidaha Makwaia, the first African member of Twining's Executive Council and of the Central Legislative Assembly (one of the first two Africans appointed to that body in 1945), who had also testified before the 1931 committee. The governors did not think that anyone of African descent living in the United Kingdom would do, and they opposed the appointment of a West African. In fact, if both Kulubya and Kidaha were unavailable, they suggested that "an American of recognised standing, such as Max Yergon [sic]," be approached, even though objections might be raised to appointing a non-British subject to serve on a royal commission.

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61 Cohen to Lloyd, 7 June 1952, PRO CO 822/708.
63 Max Yergan (1893-1976), born in Raleigh, North Carolina, and later a lecturer at Shaw University, went to Kenya during the First World War to organize the Young Men's Christian Association among regiments recruited for the British army. He later campaigned in favor of civil rights for Africans. W. Augustus Low and Virgil A. Clift, eds., Encyclopedia of Black America (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1981), 872. Following World War I Yergan was designated to head the YMCA in East Africa, serving under the direction of the English National Council. Governor Sir Edward Northey of Kenya, however, barred Yergan from entering the territory because he did "not consider it advisable to introduce into East Africa negroes of a different calibre from those to be found in East Africa itself." Cited in Kenneth James King, Pan-Africanism and Education: a study of race, philanthropy and education in the southern states of America and East Africa (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 62-63.
64 Telegram, Mitchell to Lloyd, 7 June 1952, PRO CO 822/708.
By mid-June, the composition of the royal commission was still undecided. Lyttelton accepted the governors' recommendations about the African member and informed the prime minister that Kulubya and Kidaha were the first and second choices respectively. He also suggested several candidates to chair the commission, his favorites being Lord Clydesmuir, former governor of Bombay, 1943-48, and acting viceroy and governor-general of India in 1945-47, or Sir Oliver Franks. If neither one of them was available, Lyttelton's second choice was Sir Evan Jenkins, former governor of the Punjab, 1946-47, and chairman of the Eastern Bank. Another possibility was Sir Philip Morris, the former director of Army Education and vice-chancellor of Bristol University. As for the rest of the commission, the secretary proposed to appoint "one or two agriculturalists, one or two economists, an industrialist, a sociologist and at least one man with general experience of this kind of problem." Ultimately commissioners were found to fit most of the prescribed roles, although the Colonial Office planners usually had to settle for less than their first choice.

67 Jenkins joined the Indian Civil Service following his war service, 1914-19, and spent most of his career in the Punjab. He became chief commissioner, Delhi, in 1937, and was secretary for the Department of Supply, 1940-43. He was the viceroy's private secretary, 1943-46. *Who's Who 1952* (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1952), 1502-3.
68 Morris had been the United Kingdom delegate to the first conference of UNESCO in 1946. He was vice-chairman of the British Council, 1946-59, and served on a number of educational advisory boards at the national level. He chaired the Conference on African Education in 1952. *Who was Who, 1971-1980*, vol. 7 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), 560.
69 Lyttelton to Churchill, 19 June 1952, P.M. (52)18, PRO CO 822/708.
Official announcement of the royal commission came on 24 September 1952, at which time a chairman and members for it had yet to be found. Press reaction was cautiously optimistic. The Economist reported the official line that the inquiry had nothing to do with the current unrest in Kenya and was not even confined to the land question there, adding: "But if it is able to make some practicable recommendations to relieve the acute local congestion on the land and to reduce the problems arising from the growth of large urban African populations, some of the friction inherent in plural societies ought to be considerably diminished." 70

Coincidental with the announcement of the commission, the Times published a two part article by Mitchell on the need for the inquiry. 71 He outlined the arguments that he had made in his initial dispatch, forcefully insisting that the "extravagant assertions" by certain elements of the African population--to the effect that Europeans had forcefully taken land that rightfully belonged to Africans--only served to distract people from the real issue, the improper and wasteful use of land. 72 Mitchell argued that nothing less than a royal commission would carry sufficient weight to credibly address the issues at stake: "In principle there is no great difference between the industrial revolution in Britain and the industrial revolution in Africa, and if we are to profit by the lessons of the past and apply

72 Mitchell, "Need for a New Social Structure."
them in Africa it is time to set on foot the most authoritative possible investigation of the immense subject. A large part of the task for the commission, therefore, was to fulfill the British trust in East Africa by helping Africans to avoid the historical pitfalls that Britain itself had faced in the previous century. Furthermore, Mitchell stressed that the challenges facing the region were spiritual and human, as well as material:

The central figures in all this are the African man and woman, emerging from the dark forest of superstition, sorcery, and ignorance. If the world appears to them to hold only hard-faced strangers in search of profits and dividends it is unlikely to appeal. If it appears as a welcoming, living Christian society, offering faith, hope and charity, human friendliness and sympathy, and fair opportunities for a better life, they will certainly turn to it with a new enthusiasm.

Hence, the royal commission's task, as presented to the public, was to provide moral and spiritual guidance as well as to find answers to fundamental economic questions.

While the tasks of organizing the commission and selecting members to serve on it proceeded, other issues arose for London and the colonial governments. A royal commission would create greater or lesser political problems in two major areas outside the United Kingdom: in terms of how the conclusions of such an inquiry might affect other colonial powers in Africa and Britain's position in the world community; and, in terms of how it might influence the political situation within the colonial territories.

The first set of concerns was relatively minor. The British had a perfect right to conduct any type of official inquiry they chose, but they recognized the impact that it might have in foreign territories. Soon after the cabinet approved the royal commission,

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73 Mitchell, "An Industrial and Social Revolution."
74 Ibid.
the Colonial Office's International Relations Division discussed the merits of allowing the Foreign Office to inform the French, Portuguese and Belgian governments of their intentions prior to making a general announcement of the commission plans, "since [they conceded] the position of European settlers in the territories of all those three Governments is a matter of great concern to them." The Colonial Office decided that the information could be provided to the countries in question, but they warned the Foreign Office that the terms of reference for the commission would not include an examination of the status of European settlers in East Africa and they were most anxious to avoid giving the impression that the settler position would be affected in any way.

Another question regarding the international impact of the commission's report arose after plans for it had been finalized. W. A. C. Mathieson, colonial affairs counsellor to the British delegation to the United Nations, pointed out that the United Nations Trusteeship Council was certain to take an interest in the commission's work as it related to Tanganyika. As a former mandated territory under the League of Nations, Tanganyika was subject to a degree of United Nations oversight. Mathieson suggested that the royal commission's final report be structured in such a manner that the parts related to Tanganyika would be easily separable from the rest of the document. "What I am afraid of," he wrote, "is that if the report ultimately forms part of the material on Tanganyika presented to the Trusteeship Council, and thus becomes a document officially deposited

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75 Minute by B. O. B. Giddon to F. B. Johnston, 26 May 1952, PRO CO 822/708.
76 B. O. B. Gidden to S. A. Lockhart [F.O.], 31 May 1952, PRO CO 822/708.
77 Mathieson was seconded to the UN delegation. In 1954 he returned to the CO as head of the International Relations Department, taking over the East African Department the following year. Colonial Office List (London: HMSO, 1953), 7; idem (1954), 12; idem (1955), 11.
with the United Nations, there will be some of our enemies unscrupulous enough to exploit this situation and demand a right to discuss in the Fourth Committee or elsewhere parts of the report relating to Kenya and Uganda, which have thus become in a way the official property of the United Nations." While the Colonial Office agreed that this danger did indeed exist, they maintained that the value of the report itself had to be their primary consideration. The report was intended to deal with the East African region as a whole and this probably ruled out the possibility of dividing it up into easily separable parts for each territory. If the British were asked to lay the whole report before the Trusteeship Council, they would simply have to adopt some expedient at that time to shield Kenya and Uganda from unwanted scrutiny.  

More important that the anticipated international impact of the commission's report were the immediate effects that it was expected to have in East Africa. The Kenyan government, in particular, confronted a number of thorny problems stemming from the existing tension in the colony over the issue of Kikuyu demands for more land. The acting governor, H. S. Potter, asked the Colonial Office at the beginning of September 1952 for permission to make a statement prior to the official announcement of the royal commission in order to explain the reasons for its appointment. He was concerned that the leaders of the Kenya African Union (KAU) might succeed in their attempts to claim

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78 W. A. C. Mathieson to B. O. B. Giddon, 13 January 1952, PRO CO 822/711.  
79 B. O. B. Giddon to W. A. C. Mathieson, 29 January 1953, PRO CO 822/711.  
80 Potter (1904-76) served as chief secretary in the Ugandan administration, 1948-52, prior to taking up the same post in the Kenyan government from 1952 to 1954. He retired from the colonial service as British Resident, Zanzibar, an appointment he held from 1954 to 1960. *Who was Who, 1971-1980*, vol. 7 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), 635.
full credit for the appointment of the commission. "This will be accentuated," he wrote, "on the return of Mbiyu Koinange (expected in October) who will be hailed as a conquering hero, unless he and his colleagues can be effectively deflated before he arrives."\(^{81}\) Potter later asked the secretary of state to make it clear to the press that the royal commission: had been contemplated prior to the current unrest in Kenya; was an inquiry covering all of East Africa and was focused on the ways and means of raising African living standards; was not intended to reopen questions regarding rights to land for various groups; and, was not "the outcome of efforts of Peter Koinange and others in London and Paris."\(^{82}\)

Pressure on the Kenyan administration did not stem from the KAU alone. Michael Blundell, spokesman for the European Elected Members' Organization in Kenya, had met with Sir Evelyn Baring in England during the summer of 1952. At Baring's suggestion, Blundell contacted the governor designate about matters of possible interest prior to the latter's arrival in Kenya. Blundell duly reported that the European members of the Kenya Legislative Council were concerned that the political press in the United Kingdom might force the government to alter the terms of reference that Mitchell had spelled out for the proposed royal commission in order to allow the commission to consider the question of the White Highlands. Blundell informed Baring:

> We felt it our duty to let you know that such an alteration to the terms would inevitably create in the minds of the Europeans of the Colony deep distrust and suspicion. . . .

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\(^{81}\) H. S. Potter to Sir Thomas Lloyd, 1 September 1952, PRO CO 822/709.

\(^{82}\) Telegram, Acting Governor, Kenya [H. S. Potter] to secretary of state for the colonies, 21 September 1952, PRO CO 822/709.
It is most important that the terms of reference exclude the White Highlands, as was originally suggested and also cover the whole social and economic fields of East Africa as a whole.  

Blundell tenaciously insisted that any official inquiry not question the restriction of land ownership in the Highlands to Europeans. He and the members of his organization were extremely sensitive on that issue and had gone to some lengths to obtain Lyttelton's assurance, in a meeting of 30 October 1952, that the Kenya Order in Council that reserved the Highlands for European use did not come within the terms of reference for the royal commission. When a leading article in the Times seemed to express some doubt about whether or not the forthcoming terms of reference for the royal commission would enable that body to make recommendations regarding lands specially reserved under the terms of the Highland Order in Council and other agreements, Blundell wrote to Baring (by then the resident governor in Kenya) asking for confirmation of his understanding of the secretary of state's pledge. Baring in turn asked the Colonial Office to confirm his administration's view that, under the commission's terms of reference, "documents such as the Kenya Order-in-Council, the Masai Treaty, or the Uganda

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83 Michael Blundell to Sir Evelyn Baring, 8 August 1952, PRO CO 822/709.
84 "Verbatim Report. Meeting of Secretary of State and European Elected Members held at Government House on Thursday, 30th October [1952] at 12.00 P.M." PRO CO 822/710.
85 "The African's Land," the Times, 10 December 1952. The article's author argued the royal commission should be allowed to deal with the issue of land use in the White Highlands, maintaining that: "To lay down in advance that the lands of the settlers are sacrosanct, that neither the nature of their present cultivation nor any of the legal claims upon them that have been advanced is open to debate, might be a fatal psychological error at a time when it is above all things necessary to gain the confidence of Africans in the fairness and good will of the persons sent by the QUEEN to look into their affairs." There is not reason to believe that the opinion expressed was other than that of the author's, but the Times had so often been used to express semi-official views that the anxiety of the European Members is understandable.
86 Michael Blundell to Sir Evelyn Baring, 19 December 1952, PRO CO 822/710.
Agreement would stand and that the Commission would not be entitled to advocate their cancellation or modification. 87

Baring's query raised a delicate issue and officials in London were somewhat evasive in responding. Philip Rogers, assistant secretary at the Colonial Office and head of the East African department, minuted in regard to Baring's letter on the subject that:

This is a tricky matter. On the one hand we must be sure that undertakings are observed, while politically it would be fatal if there were to be any suggestion of the Royal Commission advising the giving up of the White Highlands. On the other hand my own view . . . is that we ought to aim at the Highlands Board allowing individual Africans to buy land within the Highlands. That can be done without any amendment of the Kenya Order-in-Council, since it is entirely a matter for the discretion of the Highlands Land Board to allow sales of land. I am not suggesting here that the Royal Commission itself should advise such procedure—indeed I think it would be impolitic for it to do so. But it obviously must be concerned with the use of land within the White Highlands and personally I hope that its recommendations may be framed so as to lead at the right time to action on these lines being agreed in Kenya. 88

Officially, however, the Colonial Office did not want any controversy over the issue of the future of the White Highlands to impede the work of the commission. Rogers informed Baring that, "The interpretation which we place on the terms of reference is the same as that which you and the members of your Government have also placed on them, namely that the Royal Commission would not be entitled to advocate the cancellation or modification of the Kenya Order-in-Council, the Masai Treaty or the Uganda Agreement, but would be free if they wished to make recommendations on land matters within the

87 Sir Evelyn Baring to P. Rogers, 30 December 1952, PRO CO 822/710.
88 Minute by P. Rogers, 8 January 1953, reference Sir Evelyn Baring's letter of 30 December 1952, PRO CO 822/710.
framework of those documents.\textsuperscript{89} He added, however, that since the warrant for the royal commission had been signed on 1 January 1953, it was up to the members of the commission to interpret their own terms of reference when they came to make their report.

By January 1953, nearly all the members of the royal commission had been appointed. In October, Sir Hugh Dow agreed to chair the commission.\textsuperscript{90} Dow was not the Colonial Office's first choice, but he did fit the bill as a former governor of an Indian province and having broad administrative experience without preconceived notions concerning African problems. Born in 1886, he had entered the Indian Civil Service in 1909 and held a number of posts in Bombay and Sind before being appointed governor of the latter province, a post which he held from 1941 to 1946. He was governor of Bihar, 1946-47, and consul-general in Jerusalem, 1948-51.\textsuperscript{91} Dow would prove to be adequate, if not inspiring, as chairman. He rarely took an active part in the commission's deliberations, preferring to intervene only when discussions grew heated. Tom Soper, who served on the commission's secretariat, observed that Dow was not at ease with the free exchange of views among commission members, perhaps being accustomed, as a former governor, to making decisions in a more straight forward fashion. He was not able (or perhaps willing) to entertain the hypothetical cases put forward by the academics on the commission.\textsuperscript{92} A member of the commission later wrote in regard to the chairman: "We used to

\textsuperscript{89} P. Rogers to Sir Evelyn Baring, 14 January 1953, PRO CO 822/710.
\textsuperscript{90} B. G. Smallman to J. R. Colville, 31 October 1952, PRO CO 822/710.
\textsuperscript{92} Tom Soper, interview with author, London, 9 September 1993.
call him the Buddha. It was difficult to discover what was in his mind. However, he took every opportunity to lecture us and others on the problems of India. A keen philatelist, he used to trot off to the post office to buy any new issues available.  

By mid-December, several members had accepted appointments to the royal commission, namely Chief Kidaha Makwaia, Arthur Gaitskell, Rowland Hudson, Daniel Jack, and Frank Sykes.  

Two others, S. H. Frankel and Sir Frederick Seaford, agreed to serve soon afterwards. The government arranged for a royal warrant, officially appointing all but Seaford, to be issued on 1 January 1953. The Colonial Office pressed forward with the initial appointments because the secretary of state was under pressure about alleged delays in getting the commission to work. Furthermore, officials believed the need for the commission's advice was urgent and those members already selected could not be reimbursed for preliminary work which they had already begun until the warrant was issued.  

The queen signed a second warrant appointing Seaford on 9 February 1953.  

Chief Kidaha Makwaia of Shinyanga, as noted earlier, was one of the leading candidates to be the African member of the commission. From a prominent family, Kidaha had spent a year at Oxford before engaging in Tanganyikan politics. He had been courted by Governor Twining as one of the elite to whom the policy of multiracialism had much to offer. He had even joined the Capricorn Society, which espoused equal rights for

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95 A. M. MacKintosh to P. B. Pitblado, 9 January 1953, PRO CO 822/710; Frankel, An Economist's Testimony, 258.
96 A. M. MacKintosh to Sir Alan Lascelles, 29 December 1952, PRO CO 822/710.
97 Royal Warrant, 9 February 1953, PRO CO 822/711.
"civilized" men in the tradition of Cecil Rhodes.\textsuperscript{98} Dow expected him to play the role of a
token appointee and was somewhat surprised by the contributions that the chief made.

Soon after the real work started, in the spring of 1953, Dow reported to Lyttelton that
Kidaha was,

turning out to be a most useful member of the Commission. This is far more than I
had ventured to hope. He is extremely likeable and intelligent, has plenty of cour-
age in expressing his views and eliciting those of others, and I am sure that the set-
tler community has been much impressed with his general calibre and broad out-
look. There has been more than one meeting in which, when things were getting a
little sticky, he has come forward with just the right statement. It is not an easy
thing to be the only African member of this Commission, and I think he is also
feeling the physical strain more than most of us: he is doing a firstclass [sic] job of
work.\textsuperscript{99}

Others also noted that Kidaha was a useful member of the commission, especially when it
came to taking testimony from African witnesses.\textsuperscript{100}

Appointed agricultural adviser to the queen in 1950, Frank Sykes was the commis-
sion's farming expert. He was also the author of a well-known book on the subject.\textsuperscript{101}

Sykes was derisive towards those who were nostalgic for "Merrie England" and its large
peasantry, preferring to place his faith in education and better techniques to improve
cultivation and husbandry. He did not believe in the application of unrestrained laissez-
faire principles to farming, arguing that some controls, including fixed prices, were neces-

\textsuperscript{98} Iliffe, Modern History of Tanganyika, 446-47, 481. Kidaha did not ingratiate himself to nationalists by
serving on the royal commission, although "our Hamlet," as Julius Nyerere called him, did resign from the
United Tanganyika Party when it refused to declare that Tanganyika was primarily an African country
and stood (unsuccessfully) as a candidate for the Tanganyika African National Union in the election of
\textsuperscript{99} Sir Hugh Dow to Oliver Lyttelton, 6 April 1953, PRO CO 822/711.
\textsuperscript{100} Soper, interview with author, London, 9 September 1993; Frankel, An Economist's Testimony, 262.
\textsuperscript{101} This Farming Business (London: Faber and Faber, 1944); Frankel, An Economist's Testimony, 261.
sary to achieve a stable food supply. Likewise, regulations to ensure quality and protect consumers were essential. On the other hand, he warned against the "dead hand of bureaucracy" that could kill incentives for farmers when the state became too closely involved in directing production. Sykes reportedly did not take an active part in formulating the "philosophy" of the commission's report, but his vocational knowledge contributed much to the sections on agricultural production.

No member of the commission had more experience in the field of African colonial administration than Rowland Skeffington Hudson, head of the African Studies Branch at the Colonial Office, 1949-61. Earlier he had gained extensive field experience while serving in various capacities in Northern Rhodesia. While his most direct contribution can be seen in chapter 24 of the commission's final report, "Agrarian Administration," he was also one of the commissioners most concerned about the practical impact of government policies on "George," the typical African. Arthur Gaitskell shared his concerns in that regard. Younger brother of Labour MP and future party leader, Hugh, Arthur Gaitskell was perhaps the most leftward leaning of the commissioners in political terms. He had long experience with African agricultural problems, having worked on the Gezira irrigation and cotton-growing scheme in the Sudan from 1945 to 1952, including the final

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two years as chairman and managing director. While Gaitskell believed in eventual self-
determination for African territories, he also held that the British had a trust to fulfill in
regard to her dependencies. In particular, the key to that problem seemed to be to find a
way to raise living standards and that entailed improving agricultural productivity. Soper felt that, after Frankel, Gaitskell was the most dominant personality on the
commission, well respected by all who knew him.

Frederick Seaford was the businessman on the commission. He had been director
of Booker Bros., McConnell and Co. Ltd., Commonwealth Merchants and Sugar
Producers, since 1949. While Frankel noted that he had "exceptional knowledge of
plantation agriculture," Soper felt he was something of a disappointment because he
seemed disinclined to make full use of his business experience to help the commission in
its work.

Two economists rounded out the commission's complement. Daniel Thompson
Jack had been a lecturer in political economy at the University of Glasgow, 1923-28, and
at the University of St. Andrews, 1928-35, before becoming the David Dalve professor of
economics at Durham University, 1935-61. He was sub-rector, King's College, from 1950
to 1955. While it is difficult to gauge Jack's specific contributions to the commission's

108 Arthur Gaitskell, What Have They to Defend? The Africa Bureau Annual Anniversary Address, 1955
111 Frankel, An Economist's Testimony, 262.
work, it is of some significance that well before the royal commission started its task he had rejected any notion of the British empire as a closed economic system organized on the basis of self-sufficiency.114 It would seem to follow that he would dismiss any suggestion of autarky as the basis for East African economic development.

One of the last men appointed to the royal commission, Sally Herbert Frankel exercised a formidable influence in its deliberations. Frankel was professor of economics at the University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 1931-46, and Professor of Colonial Economic Affairs and fellow of Nuffield College, Oxford, from 1946 to 1971. During the 1940s and 1950s he served on numerous official commissions and advisory boards for both the South African and British governments.115 One scholar described Frankel as combining "a passionate belief in individual liberty with a distrust of state power, a disbelief in the validity of racial or ethnic stereotypes, and faith both in the market and in the career open to talent."116 Soper wrote that: "Through powerful and persistent argument (and the argument had to be won afresh almost every day) Frankel guided the Commission's work and moulded its recommendations."117

Of German-Jewish background, Frankel was raised and educated in South Africa. During the First World War, his father left that country to avoid internment as an enemy

114 D. T. Jack, Economic Relations within the Empire, Britain and its People, no. 10 (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1941), 14-16.
117 Soper, review of An Economist's Testimony, 104.
alien, although he was later interned in Lourenço Marques by the Portuguese. As enemy aliens, Frankel and his brother were not allowed to attend public schools in Johannesburg during the war. He later wrote that the experience "strengthened my appreciation of the values of fair play and justice."\(^\text{118}\) Throughout his life, Frankel remained somewhat of an outsider, suspicious of the power of the nation-state and skeptical of its economic manifestations. In *Capital Investment in Africa*, a companion volume to Hailey's *African Survey*, he argued that successful capital investment in Africa (as was the case for economic progress in general) would entail freeing its people from impediments imposed both by traditional practice and by colonial governments.\(^\text{119}\) In two presidential addresses to the Economic Society of South Africa, in 1942 and 1943, he expounded his view that the people of the world were economically interdependent, that the principles of nineteenth-century liberalism were the best prescription for continued economic growth and prosperity, but that, unfortunately, the march of progress had been derailed by the emergence of neo-mercantilists Great Powers in the late nineteenth century, culminating in Hitler's Germany. He later wrote: "My thesis [in the two addresses] was that there is a world economic solidarity which makes it necessary to abandon the idolatry of the nation-state."\(^\text{120}\)

In South Africa in the 1920s and 1930s, Frankel became an early and outspoken critic of racially based economic policies. In 1929, he was an influential presence in a

\(^\text{118}\) Frankel, *An Economist's Testimony*, 15.  
\(^\text{120}\) Frankel, *An Economist's Testimony*, 165.
project that resulted in the publication of *Coming of Age*, a progressive statement on the future of South Africa in regard to a wide range of economic and social issues.\(^{121}\) His contributions to the volume drove home the message that racial segregation was neither feasible nor desirable from an economic standpoint. "The choice for South Africa," he and E. H. Brookes wrote, "is not between White prosperity and Black poverty, or Black prosperity and White poverty, but simply between poverty and prosperity in which White and Black must, willy nilly, share and share alike."\(^{122}\) He never wavered from that position.\(^{123}\)

Along with his disdain for racially based economic policies, Frankel brought other firmly held principles with him when he turned to the problems dealt with by the royal commission. He dismissed autarky as a specious goal for economic planners. Individuals, nations, and regions were all interdependent and, more importantly, had to learn to accept interdependence in order to raise living standards. In his valedictory address at the University of the Witwatersrand, before leaving there for Oxford, he told the audience that South Africa had to realize that tribalism--black and white--was incompatible with the development of an open democratic society that could promote economic progress.\(^{124}\) In another place Frankel argued that, "economic progress is the enlargement of the range of

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\(^{121}\) Macmillan, review of *An Economist's Testimony*, 482.

\(^{122}\) S. Herbert Frankel and E. H. Brookes, "Problems of Economic Inequality. The Poor White and the Native," in *Coming of Age: Studies in South African Citizenship and Politics*, by Edgar H. Brookes et al. (Cape Town: Maskew Miller, 1930), 182. Frankel described the above work as a unique contribution that "attempted to overcome racial and parochial fears by co-operative action." Frankel, *An Economist's Testimony*, 87.


\(^{124}\) Frankel, *An Economist's Testimony*, 201.
our experience, which depends on the concomitant growth in the range of experience in others, and is based on our close contacts and our contracts with them.\textsuperscript{125} The acceptance of interdependence, in Frankel's view, would lead to the rejection of simple generalizations based on static, parochial models of economic growth. He maintained, for example, that: "The idea of over or under-population in relation to absolute amounts of 'land,' natural resources or capital equipment must be replaced by the concept of inter-regional and international income-creation."\textsuperscript{126} Here was an obvious disagreement with one of Mitchell's basic assumptions for framing the problems of land and population in East Africa.

Frankel continued to feel like an outsider in the United Kingdom. He wrote that at the time of his arrival at Oxford in 1946 that institution had, in its approach to economics, abandoned any understanding of, or curiosity about, the functioning of free markets. The "science of planning" had taken over, and he feared that the planning philosophy of socialism, on the ascendant at Westminster, would soon be transferred to the colonies.\textsuperscript{127} In 1947, the Mont Pèlerin Society formed under the leadership of F. A. Hayek, and Frankel was proposed as a member at its first meeting.\textsuperscript{128} The society sought to bring together like-thinking men who, skeptical of the efficacy of central economic planning and other manifestations of socialism, shared the common goal of attempting to revive the


\textsuperscript{127} Frankel, \textit{An Economist's Testimony}, 213, 218.

\textsuperscript{128} Ibid., 236.
"great liberal tradition." Part of Frankel's efforts towards that end would be evidenced in the report of the royal commission.

While it had been the intention of the secretary of state to appoint a sociologist to the commission, the Colonial Office was never able to secure a commitment from a suitable individual. In the end, Audrey Richards, the director of the East African Institute of Social Research at Makerere College, Uganda, could not, on account of other undertakings, serve full time on the commission, but she agreed to work with its members while the commission was in East Africa. Unable to find another sociologist, the Colonial Office accepted the compromise.

With the selection of its members complete, the work of the commission could begin in earnest. Preliminary work, consisting of the gathering of official documents and reports for briefing the commissioners, had proceeded under the direction of John Ingham, the senior secretary. During 1953 and 1954 the commission made two extended visits to East Africa, between 26 February and 28 May 1953, and between 16 October 1953 and 23 February 1954. On the first tour, the emphasis was on getting to know the region and its varying conditions. The commissioners attempted to develop as many contacts as possible, both with individuals and with public associations. They invited all who would

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130 Lyttelton to Churchill, 19 June 1952, P.M. (52)18, PRO CO 822/708.
132 A. M. MacKintosh to P. B. Pitblado, 9 January 1953, PRO CO 822/710.
133 Ingham later took over the task of coordinating the drafting of the report when Dow had difficulties doing so. Soper, interview with author, London, 9 September 1993.
to submit memoranda on subjects related to the commission's terms of reference, and the secretarial staff collected data from official records.

Early in the course of their investigation, the commissioners determined that their work would be more efficient if various members specialized in specific areas delineated in the terms of reference. Arthur Gaitskell and Frank Sykes were to study the development of occupied land through the introduction of improved farming methods and the expansion of areas not fully used for agriculture. Sir Hugh Dow, Rowland Hudson, and Chief Kidaha Makwaia would examine tribal land tenure systems and modifications that would be required in those systems in order to fully develop the land. The question of the development and siting of industry was assigned to Sir Frederick Seaford and S. H. Frankel. Seaford and Daniel Jack would analyze the conditions of employment in various industries with special reference to social conditions and the growth of large urban populations. Finally, Frankel, Jack, and Kidaha were to examine the social problems arising from the growth of permanent urban and industrial populations. Specialization in this manner was not to preclude any member from being generally concerned with the entire scope of the commission's work, and Frankel emphasized the danger of dealing with subjects under specific headings without relating them to general economic problems. In taking evidence from witnesses, the commissioners agreed that: no evidence would be taken under oath; the inquiry would be conducted informally and in camera, with individuals or organizations requesting formal recording of evidence receiving a transcript; from time to time the commissioners might split up in order to interview a greater number
of people more efficiently; and, while the evidence would not be published, witnesses would be free to make public their own testimony. The original intention of the commissioners was to hold public hearings, but they later decided that witnesses might feel freer to criticize government or departmental policies and--particularly in consideration of the ongoing Mau Mau insurgency in Kenya--feel more secure from reprisals as a result of speaking their minds if testimony were presented confidentially.

During the second visit the commission spent most of its time interviewing representatives of the European, Asian, and African communities in East Africa. Members also took the opportunity to visit a number of locations omitted during their first tour. The timetables were rather hectic and did not please everyone. Officials in Tanganyika and Uganda, for instance, wanted the royal commission to spend more time in their respective territories. Their complaints had some validity, but given the limited time available, the commission made an honest attempt to cover the whole region as extensively as possible.

134 Hoover Institution Archives, S. H. Frankel papers, Box 42, Accession No. 78109-13.04/06, Notes of Interviews in the UK, "East African Royal Commission: Record of a Meeting of the Royal Commission at Kampala on 7th May, 1953"; Hoover Institution Archives, S. H. Frankel papers, Box 42, Accession No. 78109-13.04/06, East Africa, "Meeting of the Royal Commission in London on the 14th August, 1953."
136 Ibid., xii-xiii, 438-45.
137 R. de Z. Hall (Dar es Salaam) to Philip Rogers, 28 January 1953; A. B. Cohen (Kampala) to Sir Thomas Lloyd, 2 February 1953, PRO CO 822/711.
Chapter Four

The Evidence

Upon their arrival in Nairobi on 26 February 1953, the members of the East Africa Royal Commission began the time-consuming investigative phase of their work, receiving hundreds of memoranda and interviewing innumerable witnesses. In presenting written evidence and testifying before the commission, witnesses addressed issues related to economic development as delineated in the terms of reference. The basic aim of development, challenged by no one, was to raise the general level of prosperity in East Africa. But within that objective were disputed questions. How could economic growth be most quickly achieved? Who should control the process—government or private interests; Europeans or Africans? In what manner should newly created wealth be distributed? Commissioners encountered a multiplicity of views.

Essentially, commission witnesses addressed development issues as they related to the basic economic factors of land, labor, and capital. Specific questions—land tenure, agricultural methods, education, labor productivity—involved those factors in different degrees, and witnesses at every stage of the inquiry presented arguments concerning the practical impediments to the theoretical goals of economic development. Many raised the question of the "human factor," specifically, whether or not the African peasant and worker was capable of effecting the series of rapid changes that most believed would have to occur in order to transform the region's economy. Would African villagers accept the
transformation of traditional patterns of land tenure and their replacement with individual tenure? Could modern agricultural techniques be rapidly introduced on a much wider scale in the region? What educational reforms were needed in order to prepare the African to play a role in the modern economy? What were the limits to that role—for men and women? How could African workers be induced to work reliably and regularly? That question raised the issue of the "stability" of labor and the need to transform urban life in East Africa. There were seldom clear-cut answers to those questions, and at every turn the human factor seemed to assume greater significance. Witnesses before the commission were reluctant to separate political from economic concerns. European settlers sought assurances about the future security of their farms and their political dominance. African peasants asked the commissioners to provide redress for their grievances regarding land expropriations. This chapter will examine the evidence presented to the royal commission, revealing in the process its conflicted nature and the daunting task the members would face in attempting to recommend a development program that would command the allegiance of a majority of East Africa's inhabitants.

The records pertaining to the work of the East Africa Royal Commission confront the historian with a number of problems. Because there was only limited time available for the taking of testimony, for example, witnesses often were not able to develop ideas in great detail. In some instances, commissioners "privileged" certain witnesses, allowing them time to elaborate and correct errors in the memoranda and oral testimony they had previously presented. Those witnesses so privileged tended to be higher ranking govern-
ment officials. African witnesses, on the other hand, were sometimes sharply questioned by the commissioners, not necessarily to give them a chance to more fully explain their positions but to show them the error of their ways. Furthermore, Africans who presented written and oral evidence often did so by way of translation. On a few occasions Kidaha took it upon himself to correct the translators,¹ and one might question the precision of the translations of some of the written material. With very few exceptions, witnesses were male, and no African woman addressed the commission.

Despite its limitations, however, the evidence available does seem to represent a complete record of the written material—official reports, memoranda, and sundry items—and of the oral testimony presented by witnesses to the royal commission. But the most difficult problem for the historian to determine is how the commissioners received the testimony; who was a credible witness in the eyes of those men and who was not? What conversations did commissioners have with witnesses and others in East Africa that were not recorded for any number of reasons? What did the commissioners discuss among themselves? Answers for some of these questions are difficult to winnow from the available sources. Finally, much of the evidence presented to the commissioners took the form of narratives, brief versions of East African history, and it was up to the commissioners to select those narratives that most comfortably accommodated their own program of development.

¹ See for example, meeting between African Representatives from the Central Province (Ali Ponda, Dodoma; Ali Abdallah, Singida; Chief Simango, Mpwapwa; Chief Heri Salim, Kondoa; Mwarabu Ibrahim, Manyoni; Kombo Suleman, Mpwapwa) and the East Africa Royal Commission, at Dodoma, 20 November 1953, 9:00 - 10:45 a.m., PRO CO 892/14/3.
One thing was clear to all who testified before the royal commission; East Africa's economy, for the present and the foreseeable future, was based on agriculture. The success or failure of economic development, therefore, hinged mainly on the extent to which agricultural productivity could be improved. Much of the commission's time was consequently devoted to addressing aspects of that problem.

Experts suggested a number of explanations to the royal commission for the relatively low productivity of East African agriculture. These included structural problems, such as a lack of capital and poor marketing systems, as well as ecological problems: soil depletion and erosion. Exacerbating, sometimes causing, those problems was the basic backwardness of African agriculture. As one Tanganyikan African official explained, "Native farming" was far from being able to provide for the present and future needs of the population and the need to improve it called for "nothing short of a revolution in methods and systems." He added: "The present undeveloped methods of African farming have led to soil erosion and a fall in soil fertility in some cases to such a low degree that there is little hope of building up that fertility again to any high level. One of the problems that will have to be faced is, therefore, the rehabilitation of ruined lands in the occupied areas and the adoption of better methods of farming."\(^2\) One of the keys to achieving growth in the agricultural sector, therefore, hinged upon the human factor, finding a way in which to change the practices of African farmers.

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Various groups within East Africa put forward different solutions for raising agricultural productivity. Kenyan European settlers tended to assert that more capital, along with technical and marketing improvements, were the answers. To them, the focus of agricultural development should be on improving the productivity of European farms, in their view the mainstay of the colonial economy. "It would seem that the value and importance of flourishing and successful European agricultural communities within Kenya are of vital necessity to the development and progress of this part of Africa, whether that progress affects the African people or the Europeans, or Kenya as a whole, and we trust that when making any recommendation which will affect these areas their value to the future of Kenya will be recognised, and the development of these areas will be encouraged and fostered in every way," declared one settler organization.³ Africans were needed as unskilled laborers on European farms and some attention had to be paid to training independent African farmers, but settlers generally discounted the notion that African agriculture could play a leading role in economic development. Echoing the view of many Kenyan Europeans, the Mau Branch of the Kenya Elector's Union proclaimed: "The basic problem of East Africa is how to raise the general standards of the African above the inertia, incompetence, and superstition which has been his lot till recently and is still an accurate description of the vast majority today. The two ways in which to improve these standards are by example and education. The example is there in the industry and achievement of the immigrant races if he cares to emulate them but the education must be provided according to

³ Memorandum, Thika Central Executive of Associations to Chairman, East Africa Royal Commission, 10 August 1953, PRO CO 892/5/1.
the means available. Where example and education failed, compulsion might used to force Africans to adopt better techniques.

Kenyan Africans also tended to emphasize the need to improve the skills of peasant farmers through education, but most (though not all) ruled out the use of compulsion. One African witness told the commission that Africans understood the need and were anxious to implement changes in methods of stock raising, noting that the results would be impressive if African farmers received the same advice and support from veterinary and agricultural experts as did Europeans. A delegation from Kilifi District in Kenya suggested the government take action to improve African agriculture, including: expanding the existing system of experimental plots in order to demonstrate farming techniques; providing financial support for African farmers; encouraging mixed farming; and, instructing Africans in regard to the marketing of crops, as many undertook to grow new crops without knowing how to sell their produce.

A number of Kenyan Africans also maintained that there should be some experimentation with the organization of agricultural production, advocating, for example, the adoption of cooperative farming methods. One witness, while objecting to regulations

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4 "Memoranda for the Royal Commission submitted by the Elector's Union (Mau Branch)," n.d., PRO CO 892/5/1.
6 See, for example, Memorandum, Njorge Ruthi to the East Africa Royal Commission, 30 December 1953, PRO CO 892/5/4.
8 Record of meeting between representatives from Kilifi District (Ronald G. Ngala, John Said Lajar, Johnston Murrumba, and Paul H. Nguzo) and the East Africa Royal Commission, 21 October 1953, 3:00-3:45 p.m., at Mombasa, PRO CO 892/7/3.
that prohibited Africans from growing large quantities of coffee, sisal, and other cash crops, asserted that Africans should be taught new agricultural techniques not by imposition, "but by providing the opportunity for an African movement of modern co-operative [sic] farming." Mbiyu Koinange, who made his submission to the royal commission from London, suggested that communal development of lands held by Africans should continue in modified form as "clan-co-operative farming." His scheme called for the utilization of modern agricultural methods on communal lands. Clan members employed elsewhere would make some contribution other than their labor to the communal effort and, in return, their wives and homes would be maintained by the community. "Such co-operative ventures," Koinange argued, "should be tied up with a wider scheme of co-operative marketing on a provincial basis which in turn would serve as a collecting and unifying market for the East Africa territories and the outside world market." In a similar vein, Koinange suggested that the "Manyatta system" of the Masai, in which members of the same age cohort lived together, might be modified into a system of cooperative dairy farming. He was an enthusiastic supporter of agricultural development but, like many other Africans, he believed that modern production methods could be adapted to fit the traditional social setting.

Many Africans in Kenya agreed with the need to improve outputs, but they were very concerned about who would control the process of agricultural development and

10 Memorandum, Mbiyu Koinange to the Secretary, East Africa Royal Commission, 2 September 1953, PRO CO 892/5/4.
who, ultimately, would benefit. A delegation from the African Unofficial Members Organisation of the Kenya Legislative Council told the commissioners that the backwardness of African agriculture could be attributed to ignorance, a lack of capital, and legal restrictions. They suggested that the introduction of modern farming methods required capital and that the government should provide this to African cultivators at reasonable rates of interest, a request echoed by Africans in the rural districts.  Kenyan Africans in general wanted the colonial government to supply capital and training for agricultural improvements but insisted that African farmers be the focus of such programs. Suspicions that government agencies discriminated against African producers were supported by the testimony of one official, who charged: "It would seem that the K.M.C. (Kenya Meat

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Commission) is 'of the beef barons, for the beef barons, by the beef barons.' Surely the African Livestock [sic] industry is at least as important as the European one, and should be given equal consideration.\textsuperscript{12} Some suspected that the government might be less than committed to the development of African agriculture. Representatives from Kiambu, for instance, argued that there were settlers and officials who worried "that if the reserves were so well developed the Africans would not want to go out and work," which accounted for the government's lethargy in introducing measures such as terracing (to prevent soil erosion) and improved animal husbandry.\textsuperscript{13} Overall, it seems that Kenyan Africans were anxious to promote measures to increase the productivity of agriculture, but they were dubious about the government's attention and commitment to their particular needs and desires.

In Tanganyika and Uganda, Europeans were somewhat more sympathetic than in Kenya to the idea of improving the "human capital" of African farmers, although it was perhaps more a difference of degree than of substance. The tiny settler populations in those colonies precluded European agriculture from being the sole mainstay of the econ-


\textsuperscript{13} Record of meeting between delegation of Africans from Kiambu (Chief Josiah [Njonjo], Harry Thuku, J. S. Gichuru) and the East Africa Royal Commission, 5 January 1954, 9:30 - 11:00 a.m., at Nairobi, PRO CO 892/7/5. Harry Thuku: compositor, Leader of British East Africa, a settler newspaper, 1911-17; founded East African Association, 1921; detained, 1922-30; president, Kikuyu Central Association, 1932; formed Kikuyu Provincial Association, 1935; president, KAU, 1944-45; was a loyalist by 1945 and later strongly opposed Mau Mau. James Samuel Gichuru: Alliance High School and Makerere College, 1933-34; headmaster, CMS Junior Secondary School, Kikuyu, 1940-50; secretary, Kenya Union of Teachers, 1940s; president, KAU, 1944-47; vice-chairman, Kiambu Local Native Council, 1948-50; chief of Dagoretti location, Kiambu, 1950-52; restricted, 1955-60. Throup, Economic and Social Origins of Mau Mau, 267, 283. Chief Josiah Njonjo was a loyalist Kikuyu during the State of Emergency. Odihambo, "The Formative Years," 41.
omy. This did not stop I. C. W. Baylden,\textsuperscript{14} a member of Tanganyika's Legislative Council, from insisting to the commission that European settlers were not exploiters but people with a definite stake in the country who could only help the Africans. "If we have any faith in ourselves and in our way of life," he wrote, "it is inconceivable that any thinking person can really believe that the European settler will do harm to the country of his adoption."\textsuperscript{15} Nevertheless, there was a greater focus in Tanganyika and Uganda on the development of native agriculture.

Some schemes for agricultural development advocated simple, "low tech," solutions. For instance, C. A. Sangai, a Tanganyikan African, maintained: "Development should be with and through the peasant farmer. There is land for cultivation and what the African peasant needs is better implements, such as iron forks and spades rather than expensive tractors. Or else an agency in each district could own such expensive machinery and do the farmer's job in return for a fee. Also[,] where peasants own cattle, these could be 'taught' how to plough and the ploughs should be owned by some agency in the region who could loan them to the farmers."\textsuperscript{16} Other Tanganyikan African experts put forward more elaborate plans, involving more extensive mechanization of operations and training for farmers,\textsuperscript{17} but all strategies for agricultural improvement in Tanganyika emphasized the

\textsuperscript{14} Ivor Baylden: farmer who believed in multiracialism; personal following in Southern Highlands; leading European politician of 1950s. John Iliffe, \textit{A Modern History of Tanganyika} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 478.

\textsuperscript{15} Memorandum, the Hon. I. C. W. Baylden to the East Africa Royal Commission, 18 May 1953, PRO CO 892/10/2.

\textsuperscript{16} Memorandum, C. A. Sangai, Native Authority Office, Lushoto, to the East Africa Royal Commission, n.d., PRO CO 892/10/3.

\textsuperscript{17} Memorandum prepared by Abdullah S. Fundikira, Assistant Agriculture Officer, Tanganyika, n.d., CO 892/10/3.
primacy of peasant agriculture. A government summary of local development schemes declared: "The primary objective of all these schemes is to improve the lot of the African peasant, with particular emphasis on better land utilization and preservation of soil fertility." The report added that, "In all these schemes the willing co-operation of the people is a sine qua non for their success."\(^{18}\)

Overall Tanganyikan officials had a more positive vision of African potential and placed greater emphasis on the need to enhance the skills of African farmers through education and other means. Many officials, and others, recognized the problems facing African cultivators. The territory's director of agriculture pointed out that peasants had extremely limited labor and capital resources with which to work. He added that traditional practices, such as the use of shifting cultivation, did not necessarily spell disaster, as long as the population load on a given area was not excessive.\(^{19}\) L. M. Heaney, provincial commissioner for the Central Province, described the difficulty of putting across new ideas to peasants who were "intensely conservative, not to say apathetic," and thought that change would have to be accompanied by close supervision on the part of the European agricultural staff, but he still expressed hope that "[a]s the influence of education spreads there may develop a readier acceptance of these foreign ideas, particularly as in primary schools much is now being done to teach improved agricultural methods."\(^{20}\) And not everyone agreed that the African peasant was an innately conservative figure. A. H. Pike,

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19 "Meeting notes of some members of the Royal Commission with the Director of Agriculture (Mr. Biggs), at Dar es Salaam, on 30th October, 1953," PRO CO 892/13/1.
Member for Lands and Mines in the territorial legislative assembly, asserted that "he had never known Africans unready to accept development." There were those who believed that European settlers were valuable, even essential, because of the example they provided to African farmers, but this was not accepted by all officials. A district commissioner in Lushoto, for example, pointed out that "the settler in Usambara was not in actual fact a practising farmer—he was rather a retired Government official. In consequence the European settlers did not in many cases provide an example of good farming techniques and there was a certain amount of political feeling about the undeveloped land in non-native ownership."

Nevertheless, witnesses from Tanganyika tended to blame "native" agricultural methods for low productivity and for causing soil depletion and erosion, and to suggest that if the example set by European settlers would not suffice to change certain practices, the government would have to take an active role. The Asian Association held that, "in Tanganyika the ancient and antiquated method of farming land adopted by the African is the main cause of the low productivity and soil erosion. The answer to this age-old curse of any such land is to be found in the assistance that must be given by the Central Gov-

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21 "Note of a meeting between the Royal Commission and the Member for Land and Mines, Mr. A. H. Pike, O.B.E., held at Dar es Salaam on the 4th November, 1953," PRO CO 892/13/1.
22 "Note of meeting of the Royal Commission at Dar es Salaam on Friday, 8th November, 1953, with the Member for Agriculture and Natural Resources (Mr. Trotman)," PRO CO 892/14/1; Record of meeting between the Southern Highlands Province Land Utilisation Committee (Lt. Col. E. J. Newall, H. K. Burrows, E. T. Ward, Chief Joseph Ubeno, Sub-Chief Nahson Nzoa, Sub-Chief Mise Sapi, Sub-Chief Lazarus) and the East Africa Royal Commission, at Dodoma, 18 November 1953, 2:15 - 3:15 p.m., PRO CO 892/14/3.
23 "Note on a meeting between Sir Hugh Dow, Mr. Gaitskell, Mr. Sykes and Mr. Hudson and the Lushoto District Team at Lushoto on the 28th October, 1953," PRO CO 892/13/1.
ernment to the peasant to enable him to improve his methods."²⁴ More forcefully, high ranking officials claimed: "The role of the African will always be limited to the production of a sufficiency of food, together with a restricted number of cash crops within the foreseeable future. The possibility of the African being integrated in plantation agriculture is most unlikely, since he prefers the maximum of leisure and free enterprise. In time mechanization may play a major role in developing African agriculture but tractors and implements will need to be simpler, cheaper and more rugged before the African can be expected to use them himself without constant European supervision and assistance."²⁵ Tanganyikan officials may have believed in the potential of Africans to improve themselves, but that belief was conditioned on the continuance of British tutelage.

Officials in Uganda, too, were willing to push ahead with agricultural improvements involving increased mechanization, wider use of fertilizers, better soil conservation, and improved stock breeding. As in Tanganyika, Uganda's European population was too small to offer the prospect of being the driving force behind the agricultural economy. Consequently, the Ugandan department of agriculture aimed to improve African farmers' skills, especially in terms of intensive farming. Unlike in Tanganyika, however, there was a shift of emphasis in Uganda away from the encouragement of small-scale peasant agriculture, a policy that prevailed prior to the Second World War, to a greater focus on large-scale African farmers.²⁶

²⁴ Memorandum, the Asian Association, Dar es Salaam, to the East Africa Royal Commission, n.d., PRO CO 892/10/1.
²⁵ "Replies to questions put to the director of agriculture and regional assistant director of agriculture by the Royal Commission," n.d., CO 892/12/4.
Official policy identified agricultural advancement as vital to the general welfare and social and economic development of the protectorate. A submission to the royal commission by the agricultural department declared:

The general policy of the Department is devoted towards obtaining an improvement in traditional methods of African agricultural practice in the interests of good farming and production efficiency. The primary aim behind this policy is the production of an adequate supply of food for both the rural and urban populations as it is recognised that without an improvement in the general level of nutrition, the socio-economic development of the Protectorate is likely to be seriously retarded. The second main objective is the increased production of economic crops to augment both individual and Protectorate incomes in the interests of improved domestic standards of living and the provision of social services for which there is a growing demand.  

Both government and private experts recognized the enormity of the task of modernizing Ugandan agriculture. "One may stand appalled at the task of turning a relatively primitive farming system to a modern [one] in which full advantage can be taken of all improvements old and new in agriculture," a commission witness declared, "but it has to be done. If we fight shy of tackling it we have no business here."  

To some, apparently, it seemed that the task of development justified Britain's continued imperial role.

Africans, too, believed that the colonial governments should play a leading part in improving the quality of agriculture in the region, but perhaps more as an act of atonement for, rather than a justification of, colonial rule. The government of Buganda, for example, suggested that district farm institutes be established to train young men and women as

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27 Memorandum for Royal Commission. Agricultural Department Policy—Uganda," at Entebbe, 11 February 1953, PRO CO 892/15/7. Similarly, H. Cronly stated that "the development of the livestock industry in Uganda is associated with the progressive social and economic development of the African communities . . .," Memorandum, H. Cronly, Director of Veterinary Services and Animal Industry, Kampala, to the East Africa Royal Commission, Kampala, 31 January 1953, PRO CO 892/15/7.

28 Memorandum, Alex S. Folkes, "The Land and the People," PRO CO 892/15/2.
farmers. Other Africans were particularly keen to receive support in mechanizing farm operations. Instead of the wholesale adoption of European methods, however, African witnesses before the commission often suggested ways in which European techniques might be adapted to the Ugandan context. Representatives from Toro doubted that individual African farmers had sufficient capital to undertake extensive farming. Therefore they suggested: "In this state of affairs intensive Farming [sic] by African peasant growers will continue and encouragement must be given to improve their occupation by new methods of plant husbandry[,] soil conservation, productions of greater yields per acre and animal husbandry." The second best alternative, they argued, would be to promote co-operative farming, which would allow small peasant cultivators to pool their limited resources. There was official support for this view, and Andrew Kerr, commissioner of co-operative development, believed, as he told Sir Hugh Dow, "... the existence of this traditional co-operative system [in Uganda] certainly helps us in the formation of co-operative societies."

Representatives from the Uganda National Congress (UNC), the premier African political party in Uganda at that time, were even more insistent that the African peasant should be the focus of agricultural improvement schemes. Suspicious of the influence of

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29 "Memorandum of His Highness's Government of the Buganda Kingdom to the Royal Commission on Land and Population in East Africa," 12 September 1953, PRO CO 892/15/5.
30 Meeting between Mr. Omonya and Mr. Olyech and the East Africa Royal Commission, Lango District, at Kampala, 11 December 1953, 11:00 a.m. - 12:15 p.m., PRO CO 892/16/5.
31 Memorandum, Owekitininisa Katikiro's Office, Kabarole, Toro, to the East Africa Royal Commission, 23 June 1953, CO 892/15/5.
32 Ibid.
33 Record of meeting between Andrew Kerr and J. Ross and the East Africa Royal Commission, 3 December 1953, 9:00 - 10:00 a.m., at Kampala, PRO CO 892/16/1.
foreign capitalists, the UNC maintained that plantation agriculture on a wide scale would be unacceptable to the people of Uganda and would only exacerbate the problem of inequitable distribution of wealth. There were too few African capitalists, UNC writers argued, to allow for large-scale farming on individual holdings, and in any case, they stated, "the exploitation of African wage-labour by a few fellow-Africans would be as obnoxious to us as that perpetrated by foreigners." In these circumstances, they concluded: "This leaves us with the development of peasant African Agriculture [sic] as the only workable and acceptable alternative." Cooperative farming was, in their view, an equitable way to incorporate Western techniques into traditional African agriculture:

[Cooperative farming] has the advantage of enlarging the size of the farm to optimum capacity, finding the capital necessary to mechanise and improve it, without, at the same time introducing the social and political problems . . . which would result had we adopted a system of increased European and Indian farming. It has the advantage of keeping the peasant on the land, of securing him on his bit of land, and it is thus a very good weapon against communism. It means that you can mechanise, capitalise and modernise a farm, bringing to it all the benefit of scientific agricultural knowledge, without disturbing, radically the life of the grower. It has the added advantage in that the principles of co-operation are already operating in the country, so that, given tactful [sic] and sympathetic handling, its introduction would meet with less suspicion and opposition than would fall to the lot of completely new innovation.\(^\text{35}\)

Despite evidence of a deep distrust of European capitalists, settlers, and institutions, the UNC, like most Africans throughout the whole of East Africa, assumed that colonial governments would guide the process of agricultural improvement.


\(^{35}\) Ibid.
Similarly, there was virtually no dissent among officials on the question of government leadership and control of schemes to improve East African agriculture, a view shared by some members of the royal commission. But the major objections to government controlled agricultural development came from other members of the commission. The transcript of a meeting with Uganda's director of agriculture, J. Y. Watson, clearly revealed the ideological division among the commissioners. The commission's economists, S. H. Frankel and Daniel Jack, leaned towards a "hands off" approach to development. Frankel questioned Watson on the issue of whether the protectorate government should itself plan development or simply assist farmers to pursue their own interests in boosting production. Watson maintained that African farmers wanted to be led, whereas Frankel argued that peasants were increasing productivity on their own initiative. He did not understand what virtue Watson saw in "orderly" development. The commission's agricultural expert, Frank Sykes, interjected that while the aim of various agricultural improvements might, ultimately, be to achieve a free market, he thought the interim period of transition from controlled to free markets would necessitate, as had been the case in England, continued government intervention for some time to come. But the most forceful proponent of government regulation on the commission, Arthur Gaitskell, suggested that the situation in East Africa was analogous to the American Tennessee Valley project. In that case, he asserted,

If the American Government had followed a suggestion that you sit back and wait until one or two intelligent chaps in the Tennessee Valley [to] say, "come and show us how to farm better," nothing would have been achieved at all[..] they did not do that, they laid on the Tennessee Valley Authority, they adopted a normal extension service procedure of the American Agricultural Administration. That is
to say, they sent their personnel into the valley and for a year discussed the problems of the valley with the farmers there who were exceedingly primitive and backward. Gradually they persuaded one or two of these chaps to utilise various practises or even machines which they may have invented. One was a threshing machine and in this process they transformed the whole of that valley. They introduced a mixed farming economy which afterwards gave the farmer from half his holding, just as much yield in maize as [well as] an additional income from dairy products, that is double the income he had before by changing the form of agriculture. None of the farmers would have thought of doing it themselves. . . . The parallel is not out of place, the position is not that we must compel these people on one hand or leave them alone on the other, surely it would be the possible Tennes-see Valley approach.  

Watson, predictably, was quick to endorse Gaitskell's position.

Whatever productivity gains might result from the adoption of improved farming methods in East Africa, however, few believed much progress could be made in the absence of reform of land tenure systems. No question occupied more of the royal commis-sion's attention. The essence of the argument in favor of land reform was that existing African systems of land tenure, while they had worked well enough when there was an abundance of unused land, were reaching the limits of their usefulness where population pressure on the land was increasing. African systems were blamed for encouraging shifting cultivation, where a piece of land was used until it was exhausted, at which point the cultivator would move to a new plot. As the Iringa Chamber of Commerce asserted: "If the land in occupation is to be developed on economic lines, the present method whereby an African can occupy a piece of land, ruin it by bad farming methods and then move on to

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36 Record of meeting between J. Y. Watson and the East Africa Royal Commission, at Kampala, 30 November 1953, 9:00 - 11:00 a.m. and 11:15 a.m. - 12:30 p.m., at Kampala, PRO CO 892/16/1.
another piece of land and repeat the performance, must be stopped at the very earliest possible moment."\textsuperscript{38}

Fragmentation of land holdings was another deleterious practice allegedly encouraged by traditional tenure systems. The possession of small, scattered plots prevented African farmers from developing their land holdings to the utmost. "It is impossible under such circumstances," warned a Kenya government document, "to develop sound farming rotations, to cart and apply manure, to establish and manage grass, to improve the management and feeding of livestock or to tend cash crops in any satisfactory manner. If, by suitable reforms to the system of land tenure and inheritance, these fragments can be amalgamated by the Africans into economic farming units, by applying sound and intensified farming methods, these are the lands which will yield the greatest return to the economy of Kenya, given a suitable injection of staff and finance."\textsuperscript{39} Commission members evidently viewed fragmentation as a major problem. Gaitskell told a group of Africans from Kenya's Voi district that he saw little point in government supplying capital to farmers who continued to work fragmented holdings.\textsuperscript{40} In an exchange between royal commission members and a delegation of Africans from Kiambu, Dow and Sykes questioned why the Africans, who admitted that fragmentation impeded efficient farming, failed to modify a tenure system that was an obvious "block to progress." Dow lectured: "If you

\textsuperscript{38} "Memorandum from the Iringa Chamber of Commerce," n.d., PRO CO 892/5/1.

\textsuperscript{39} "A Plan to Intensify the Development of African Agriculture in Kenya," in file no. 26/1, PRO CO 892/6/2.

\textsuperscript{40} Record of meeting between representatives from Voi District (Chief Richard, Sowene Laroghwa, Frederick Maseeghe, Mathew Mnene, and the East Africa Royal Commission, 21 October 1953, 2:15 - 2:50 p.m., at Mombasa, PRO CO 892/7/3.
realise that your system of land tenure is barring your progress it is open to you to change your system of land tenure. It is quite impossible for you to hang on to your old customs and have the benefits of the new dispensation.  

41 And, indeed, it seemed that at least some African communities in Uganda were moving toward the adoption of systems of individual land tenure, particularly where population was densest.  

42 Part of a Tanganyika government report submitted to the commission stated: "With the spread of agricultural education and the increasing cultivation of cash crops many Africans are becoming more alive to the value of their land, and the more they can be persuaded to adopt better farming methods the greater will be their interest in the security of their tenure."  

A basic problem throughout East Africa, many experts agreed, was that rights in land were determined by birth, by racial or ethnic affiliation, rather than by use. Criticism of existing practices was not always consistent. A member of the Legislative Council in Kenya was adamant in defending the exclusion of non-Europeans from the White Highlands. At the same time, she declared: "I think the African has got to learn, it is going to be a very hard lesson that just because you are an African you do not necessarily own a bit of Africa."  

44 On the other hand, the Fabian Colonial Bureau contended that: "The weak-

41 Record of meeting between delegation of Africans from Kiambu (Chief Josiah, Harry Thuku, J. S. Gichuru) and the East Africa Royal Commission, 5 January 1954, 9:30 - 11:00 a.m., at Nairobi, PRO CO 892/7/5.

42 Record of meeting between Mr. Simpson and the East Africa Royal Commission, 12 December 1953, 9:30-10:30 a.m. and 10:30 - 11:30 a.m., at Kampala, PRO CO 892/16/6.


44 Record of meeting between Mrs. Shaw, MLC, Nyanza Province, and the East Africa Royal Commission, 27 January 1954, 11:15 a.m. - 12:30 p.m., PRO CO 892/9/4. Another European settler argued that Europeans and Africans could not be treated as equals in the matter of land usage because, where the former could be relied upon to improve the land they had, the latter were "incapable of either planning or executing schemes of development and advancement in African areas without constant and detailed Euro-
ness of Africans and the disparity between the races in Kenya have justified, for practical, political and moral reasons, the preservation of areas for Africans alone. But discrimination in landholdings against indigenous people in their own country is indefensible. The right of Africans to hold land in areas now exclusively European should be recognised by the Government of Kenya and the administrative practice by which land in the European Highland areas is reserved to Europeans should be abandoned."45

Still, most non-Africans held that in order to raise the productivity of the land, those who were prepared to use land well had to be able to acquire it in a relatively simple fashion, regardless of race or ethnicity. Witnesses reasoned that if land could conveniently be bought and sold, the best farmers would eventually be able to accumulate larger holdings, thereby maximizing the return to themselves and to the economy as a whole. Obviously this was a delicate area, and there was a general consensus that the colonial authorities should, initially at least, protect African peasants from unfair exploitation. Kenya's Asian Elected Members, for example, declared: "We agree . . . that the land rights of the indigenous people should be statutorily laid down and be made inviolable. But outside these statutory African areas the land should be subject to no reservations or restrictions, free transfers being allowed to and from members of all races."46 Many who testified be-

fore the commission argued that freer transfers of land would benefit Africans themselves.

"Until now," asserted the Mbale (Uganda) Chamber of Commerce,

many people, and in particular the policy makers, have held the theory that Africans should be "protected" by declaring vast areas to be segregated for native use only. We contend, however, that this policy of isolating the African within vast tracts of undeveloped land, required in theory for his anticipated descendants, is contrary to the best interests of the indigenous population. We are convinced that whilst the African interests in land must be carefully safeguarded[,] the economic development of Uganda can only be furthered by the allocation of large areas to Non-African agriculture and enterprise until such time as the African is himself capable of large scale and modern agriculture and enterprise.\textsuperscript{47}

Similarly, the Tanganyika government guardedly endorsed the idea of alienating formerly reserved land to non-Africans in order to both boost food production and promote industrial development, to the benefit of the African population.\textsuperscript{48}

Despite the benefits anticipated as a result of a conversion from the existing land tenure systems to a system based on individual freehold, there were a number of serious obstacles to any change in the status quo. For one thing, colonial authorities were concerned that in the process of bringing about individual tenure in terms of landholdings they might cause other problems—the creation of a landless peasantry and an exploitative class of money lenders. The doyen of "Native" studies, Lord Hailey, stated to the commission that he believed the process of individualization of tenure was a worldwide phenomenon that was inexorable. Drawing on the examples of India, Egypt, and "Judea," however, he warned of the dangers of class and ethnic tension that might result, especially "when the


peasants and the money-lenders were, for the most part, people of different races, classes or religions." He added that, "any recommendations should bear in mind the very real danger of a landless peasant emerging in circumstances where alternative employment away from the land does not exist."\(^49\) Another academic authority, Kenneth Kirkwood, stated that he saw the dangers inherent in a system which would allow the land to be accumulated into the hands of a few people, but he considered the political necessity for removing discrimination and for allowing the progressive African to utilise his resources and ability in the same manner as persons of other races was so great as to outweigh the disadvantages."\(^50\)

Other experts were even more cautious. One Kenyan observer agreed that more land could not be provided indefinitely to the expanding African population. "But," he continued, "until sound conditions are established for a landless class, as has obtained in all civilised countries, it seems to me that more land must be provided, on the understanding that proper conditions for a landless class are set on foot, and that steps are taken to prevent mis-management of existing lands and new lands."\(^51\) The "sound conditions" referred to seem mainly to have involved the provision of employment outside of native reserves and not directly tied to agricultural employment. In Tanganyika, a government sociologist submitted to the royal commission that:

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\(^{49}\) "Note of a meeting of the Royal Commission to East Africa with Lord Hailey on 11th November [1953], at the Colonial Office," PRO CO 892/3/1.

\(^{50}\) "Note on a meeting between Members of the Royal Commission, (with the exception of Chief Kidaha) at the Colonial Office, London, on the 3rd September, 1953, with Mr. Kenneth Kirkwood, of the Institute of Colonial Studies, Oxford," PRO CO 892/3/1.

It is unavoidable and logical that sooner or later a strong tendency towards proprietary rights will gain the upper hand over usufructuary rights [in land]. It is the moral obligation of any colonial government, when this comes to pass, to control its effects on the social structure. The speculative accumulation of land on the one hand and the creation of a rural proletariat on the other are not desirable. There is no need for Africa to pass through a semi-feudal stage before attaining the agrarian structure now prevailing in Western Europe.

... We have no right to change the basic structure of Bantu society by favouring schemes which are liable to create a premature disintegration into classes simply in order to satisfy our own hunger for agricultural produce. Change will be unavoidable in due course, but at present the moral and spiritual standard of the masses and of a presumptive upper class is too low to allow of a bigger gap caused by a drive from outside. The selection of men who might be allowed to rise above their peasant brethren must be most rigorous and the only real criterion of ability must be the fulfillment of development conditions if holdings larger than customary are granted to any individuals. Big estates in the west [i.e. Europe] were originally acquired through service to King and country. Big estates in Africa must be acquired by service to the land.52

If the move towards individual tenure was indeed "unavoidable and logical," however, it seems that Cory was suggesting not so much a policy of noninterference in "Bantu" society as he was advocating substantial state intervention to ameliorate the consequences of inexorable change.

A second obstacle to land tenure reform involved finding a solution to the problem of providing for the long term security of individual Africans, which was often tied to ownership or rights of usage in plots of land, no matter how small. In a society lacking any form of social security or adequate pensions for retired workers, a piece of land in one's village was all that one could depend on in old age. An African worker employed in an industrial enterprise or in an urban area, therefore, would tend to keep "one foot in the

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52 Memorandum, H. Cory, Mwanza, to the East Africa Royal Commission, 24 November 1953, PRO CO 892/10/2.
reserves," maintaining a claim to a small parcel of land in a tribal area, which would be cultivated by his wife and children while he worked for wages elsewhere.\footnote{53} African resistance on the issue of security went beyond the economic issues, as illustrated by the following exchange between Frankel and Dow and Africans from Tanganyika's Lake Province:

Frankel: Do you agree that it is important to get people to change their ideas about the use of land?

[Chief Shoka] Luhende: Yes.

Frankel: And you agree that it is desirable to make land a thing which can be bought and sold?

[Hamsha] Mpwachu: Yes, but this land, according to the African conception of it, is the only security, [of] all his liberty and his rights of citizenship.

Chairman: It is a lack of social security that makes him want to have some land that he can go back to?

Mpwachu: The point I want to make is, if he loses the land, he feels he loses his right to be a citizen of this country.\footnote{54}

Security for the African, the commissioners were told, entailed psychological as well as economic security, which was intimately linked to traditional systems of land use, and to change the latter challenged other aspects of authority in society. "Once divorced from the system of mutual rights and obligations within which he exists," stated a Tanganyika government document, "the [African] individual is often in a precarious plight. In most African societies the pace of progress is, as yet, the pace of the slowest. An emergent capitalist farmer often finds himself up against the stubborn opposition of the tribal elders..."

\footnote{53} Record of meeting between delegation of Africans from Kiambu (Chief Josiah, Harry Thuku, J. S. Gichuru) and the East Africa Royal Commission, 5 January 1954, 9:30 - 11:00 a.m., at Nairobi, PRO CO 892/7/5.

\footnote{54} Record of meeting between African Representatives of the Lake Province (Chief Majabere Masanja, Chief Shoka Luhende, Joachim Max, Sylvester Mdachi, Hamsha Mpwachu, Herman Sylvester, Isaac Muller Bhoki Munanka, M. B. Mdoe), and the East Africa Royal Commission, 23 November 1953, 2:00 - 4:00 p.m., at Mwanza, PRO CO 892/14/3.
who fear that his new system of land usage will lead to individual ownership and so to their own loss of authority. In fact improved land usage is often considered as a direct challenge to the authority of the traditional repositories of land law.\textsuperscript{55} The issue of security would arise again when the commission considered the conditions of life in urban areas.

Perhaps the most important consideration regarding changes in land tenure was that Africans were generally extremely suspicious of the motives behind proposed changes. They assumed that hypothetical plans for changing the terms under which land was held were merely schemes by which the colonial governments hoped to expropriate their land, and their suspicion extended to the royal commission itself. Members of the Bugishu Welfare Association, in Uganda, welcomed the commission but spelled out their concerns:

Our fears are based on the fact that your visit is a direct answer to the request that was made by Governor Mitchel\textsuperscript{[I]} when he was still the Governor of Kenya Colony. This being so your coming out was due to the request of a Governor whose interests were primarily those of the settlers who want to settle permanently in Africa. In that Governor's report, he explains very carefully that the Africans' Cry for land [emphasis in original] is a thing that should not be considered because they misuse the land that they have!

We, the Africans, are afraid that the aim of your Commission is to move all the Africans and collect them in places like towns, thereby spoiling their indigenous and customary ways of living; if this is done, it is said that land will then be available for expert settler farmers. This in a way, agrees with the policies of Communism!\textsuperscript{56}

\textsuperscript{55} "Some Aspects of Land Utilization in Tanganyika and the Factors affecting it," PRO CO 892/1/1.

\textsuperscript{56} Memorandum, Bugishu Welfare Association, Nabumali, Central Bugishu, to the Chairman, East Africa Royal Commission, 11 April 1953, PRO CO 892/15/1.
The land issue, more than any other, illustrated African suspicion of official initiatives that threatened not only their economic position but the established social order.

East African authorities were well aware of African suspicions, often attributing the reluctance to accept government plans to innate African conservatism. The first two "psychological obstacles" to any changes in methods of land use were, according to a Kenya government memorandum: "(a.) Ordinary peasant conservatism: the individual's instinct to resist new ideas. (b.) Lack of African public opinion or social conscience to support progressive measures (largely lack of education)."57 In Tanganyika, Cory was even more pessimistic, stating: "The importance of the problem of African land tenure has been recognised by everyone for a long time, but the treatment of it has remained more or less cursory. Now the question has been placed in the centre of interest and it must first of all be realised that the time when any type of land legislation could perhaps have been enacted without risk to the public peace has passed. At present the very fact that the Central Government [of Tanganyika] is concerned with this issue is sufficient to discredit its good intentions in many African circles."58 In Uganda, the governor, Andrew Cohen, cautioned that any government initiative in regard to land policy, the establishment of land authorities for example, should be handled with extreme delicacy and the African people consulted at every stage.59

57 "Kenya: Note to 2 (b) (iii). The factors which have militated against the acceptance of changes in methods of land use in Kenya, with examples selected from both mixed farming and primarily pastoral areas," PRO CO 892/1/1.
59 "Meeting of the Royal Commission less Sir Frederick Seaford, with His Excellency the Governor of Uganda, on the 13th December, 1953," PRO CO 892/16/5.
Cohen was prepared to abandon the term "Crown land," which Africans, allegedly, misunderstood. Whether or not they understood the legal implications of the term, many Ugandans were certainly wary of government intentions. The hereditary clan heads, or the Abataka of Busoga wrote: "We have for many years informed our Protective [sic] Government that the land of Busoga is ours and have got all ways of getting it safeguarded. But the Government seem not to listen to us. If so, we very strongly blame the actions of Government in making a deaf ear towards our Godly gifted property which we did not acquire through fighting but it is our own, sole property and we pray that this time Government must honour us by hearing to what we say and leave the right of land ownership in our hands and control." They added: "We very sincerely like and reverence non-natives of non-Africans [sic] but the fact lies in the smallness of our country and the result which Government has shown of privately converting our land from our ownership to be owned by non-Africans WITHOUT OUR CONSENT NOR CONSULTATION IN DECLARING IT AS CROWN LAND [emphasis in original]." Similarly, an African representative from Tanganyika's Southern Province told the commission that it seemed that the government could take land from Africans and give it away at will, prompting the following exchange:

CHAIRMAN [Dow]: Who tells you the land belongs to the Crown?
[Liwali Paul] NORBERT: We are told by Government.
CHAIRMAN: I do not think Government tells you that in this territory, do they? Perhaps you read it in the newspaper.

⁶⁰ "Memorandum submitted by the hereditary Abataka of Busoga, to His Excellency the Governor of Uganda on his tour of Busoga in April, 1953," PRO CO 892/15/1. Barazas were public meetings called by the administration for the purpose of disseminating government policy.
NORBERT: Well, people are being moved from one place to another whether they like it or not.
CHAIRMAN: That does not mean that it is Crown land, does it?
NORBERT: How can people be moved from places in which they have been settled for so many years?
CHAIRMAN: How did this idea of Crown land first get into your head, where did you get it from?
NORBERT: I got this from barazas which we had, and from Government.61

Hudson then intervened to state that the policy was that the land belonged to the people but the government had the legal power to ensure that the land was well used, even to the extent of removing people from an area where land was being spoiled. Perhaps with a more plebeian understanding of what happened on the ground, Norbert replied: "For instance, if a man said that he wanted to grow sisal, he would go to the Government and arrange everything, and then Government takes away the land and moves everyone from the area and that gentleman will be allowed to buy the land the people have nowhere to go."62 Regardless of official policy, it seems ordinary Africans assumed that colonial governments could and would expropriate their land whenever they deemed it necessary.

Many Africans, however, were not adamantly opposed to all changes in systems of land tenure and use. R. M. Bere, provincial commissioner for Uganda's Northern Province, reported to the royal commission that the land system there was both flexible and adaptable, the older conception of property as belonging to a family or clan being gradu-

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61 Record of meeting between African representatives from the Southern Province (Akida Wabu Musa, George Kasembe, Liwali Paul Norbert, Mohammed Waziri) and the East Africa Royal Commission, 5 November 1953, 9:00 - 10:00 a.m., at Dar es Salaam, PRO CO 892/13/1. Barazas were public meetings called by the administration for dissemination of government policy.
62 Ibid.
ally and voluntarily superseded by the idea of individual rights. In Tanganyika, Chief Thomas Marealle of the Kilimanjaro Citizens Union stated that he could envision a time when land would be freely exchanged, regardless of the race of seller or buyer. In fact, he added, his organization had already considered and approved applications from Europeans who wanted to acquire land in order to grow sisal, their only consideration being whether land would be used for a good purpose.

Not all those who embraced the idea of progress, however, believed they should have to abandon traditional land tenure. The Busoga African local government wrote that they opposed any change in traditional tenure, but added: "The Basoga do appreciate the need for uplifting the Busoga tribe as a whole, but there must be a consultation, negotiations and formal agreement between the Protectorate Government and the Busoga tribe." The Owektitinisa Katikiro's Office in Toro, Uganda, informed the commission: "We request that consideration should be given not to overlook traditional social structure in respect of land tenure. It is the very foundation upon which the social edifice of modern

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64 Record of meeting between the Kilimanjaro Citizens Union (Chief Thomas Marealle, Chief Petro Marealle, Chief Abdiel Shangali, J. M. S. Bawala) and the East Africa Royal Commission, at Arusha, 13 November 1953, 11:15 a.m. - 12:30 p.m., PRO CO 892/14/1. Thomas Marealle: studied at Cambridge and the LSE; elected Chaga paramount chief, 1951. Petro Itosi Marealle: Thomas's uncle; withdrew from 1951 Chagga election. Abdiel Shangali: member, Kilimanjaro Native Cooperative Union; viewed by British as a "progressive chief"; among first two Africans (along with commissioner Chief Kidaha Makwaa) appointed to Tanganyika's Legislative Council, 1945. Iliffe, Modern History of Tanganyika, 279, 327, 446-47, 475, 491-94.
progress has to be built, in fact, without it, political, economic and social developments would work in the absence of the vital essence."

For the most part, African witnesses did not oppose economic development, but they had their own ideas about how to approach the land question. While favoring measures to relieve pressure on the land, including the removal of some people from their present locations, the African Unofficial Members Organization of the Kenya Legislative Council also insisted that lands not fully used in areas of European settlement should be turned over for African use. Others were more contentious, insisting that Africa belonged to the Africans, and voiced their suspicion of British intentions regarding land. "Certainly," wrote a number of Mbeya chiefs, speaking for their people in Tanganyika, "the taking of the best land in [the] Highlands of Kenya or Moshi and Arusha, or in the Southern Highlands and Mbeya (and that in the most guarded secrecy) does not spell European helpfulness towards the black man nor will the white man ever be able to convince the black that by forcing its desires he can make the African swallow any pill he can cram down the African throat." Njoroge Ruthi, a self-described "ordinary African" from Kenya, echoed those sentiments:

The land is ours from Ndemi na Mathathi and we have every right to our land we are today fighting for our soil because we are not prepared to loose [sic]

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66 Memorandum, Owektitinisa Katikiro's Office, Kabarole, Toro, to the East Africa Royal Commission, 23 June 1953, PRO CO 892/15/5.
68 Memorandum, Mbeya African Community, to the Secretary, East Africa Royal Commission, 19 May 1953, PRO CO 892/10/1 [In a cover letter, the district commissioner for Mbeya noted that the memorandum had been drafted by two Mbeya chiefs in English, and thus was not understandable by most of its signatories, but it did nevertheless accurately reflect views held by many Africans in his district].
even a[n] inch of land to any Newscome the present conflict will [not] cease until [sic] the land is returned back to us.

Land cannot be compared with any thing else in this country the last thi[n]g is that we do not like to hear the word "White Highland" because the white people did not come here with their [sic] land.

This shouldbe [sic] known as "black Highlands" because it is for black we pray that you feel mercy upon these poor people of Kenya and that their land should be returned to them as early as possible and the present conflict will come to an end.69

Clearly any proposals that the commission might make regarding changes in land tenure would have to consider whether the promise of higher living standards resulting from those changes and the projected better use of land would be sufficient inducement to overcome the profound distrust many Africans had for the colonial regimes of East Africa.

While the East Africa Royal Commission devoted much attention to the related problems of land tenure reform and increasing agricultural production, its members also studied the question of commercial and industrial development and the difficulty of raising capital for that purpose. East Africa, it seemed, would remain primarily an agricultural region for the foreseeable future. But industrial and commercial development promised to alleviate a number of problems. First of all, by providing employment opportunities that were not directly tied to the land, the growth of industry and trade would relieve the pressure on the land created by an increasing population. Secondly, skilled jobs in those sectors would provide the type of high wage work that was not available in agriculture.

Wages for agricultural workers, incidentally, could also be expected to rise as the overall demand for labor in the colonies increased. Rebecca Fane, a Kenyan settler and commen-

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69 Memorandum, Njoroge Ruthi to the East Africa Royal Commission, 30 December 1953, PRO CO 892/5/4.
tator on East African affairs, was one of the few who questioned the wisdom of fostering industry in the region. She agreed that it would relieve overcrowding on the land but doubted that it would increase agricultural productivity, and above all else she insisted that East Africa should be able to produce all the food its inhabitants needed.\textsuperscript{70} By and large, however, witnesses before the commission agreed that a number of benefits would flow from industrial development. The main sticking point was the assumption that capital and skills necessary for this type of development would have to come from sources outside of the region. Another question revolved around the pace of industrialization.

Officials in East Africa were keen to promote the growth of primary and secondary industry in the region. Sir John Hall, governor of Uganda, asserted that the answer to the question of how the next generation of Ugandans would make a living, given that population was growing and virtually all of the cultivable land in Uganda was taken, "lies in industrialisation, in encouraging and stimulating by all possible means the establishment of heavy and secondary industries in the country."\textsuperscript{71} But most officials hesitated to embrace the unfettered market, preferring to put forward a model of development that entailed close government oversight and control. In Tanganyika, for instance, the commission was informed that: "Government policy in connection with organised marketing may be summarised as being to grant as great a degree of autonomy as possible consonant with the stage of development of an industry and the maintenance of a balanced relation to other

\textsuperscript{70} Memorandum, R. Fane, "A Note on Food Production and the Necessity of Brith-Control," to the East Africa Royal Commission, 4 March 1953, PRO CO 892/5/2.
forms of production." The government of Tanganyika also held that the growth of industry had to be controlled because there was a limited pool of labor available. As an official memorandum stated: "There is a limit to the amount of labour which can be safely drawn from the food producing areas without endangering production."

Caution over the pace of industrial and commercial development did not satisfy some members of the royal commission, S. H. Frankel in particular. When Uganda's commissioner for commerce, Mr. Maybury, explained how his department helped African traders by giving them advice, putting them in contact with larger traders, showing them how to buy at wholesale prices, and assisting them with bookkeeping, Frankel countered that Africans, many of whom had worked for Indian traders for many years, did not really need assistance, that the commerce department's paternalism might, in fact, be harming those it was intended to help. "Well," Frankel told Maybury, "I put it to you that you don't assist them [i.e. African traders]; that in fact your best assistance to a man would be to let him go bankrupt, three times and he will learn something. . . . Who gave the Scots advice as to how to trade?" Maybury replied: "The process of development there was much slower. Here we are cramming into a few decades a whole thousand years of development." Like most colonial service officers in East Africa, Maybury worried about the impact that an uncontrolled free market might have upon Africans who were not prepared to deal with it.

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74 Record of meeting between Professor Frankel and Jack and Mr. Maybury (Commissioner for Commerce), at Kampala, 9 December 1953, [7] - 12:40 p.m., PRO CO 892/16/3.
Africans themselves tended to have a different set of concerns. They were generally ready to face the challenges of industrialization but were extremely cautious on the issue of foreign financed industry. The Rungwe District Council, in southwestern Tanganyika, for instance, suggested to the commission that industries that might be developed in their district included lime, pica, pottery, coal, and brick and tile manufacturing. Nevertheless, they opposed the large-scale development of these industries and wanted no foreign investment. "In this way," they wrote, "we will avoid the threatening and dreaded breaking up of homes and villages and the human sufferings and injuries which go with large scale exploitation of such industries, and the resulting crippled local economy, a hole or holes in the ground, and acres of waste land with hundreds, if not thousands, of moral and physical casualties."75 Makerere College's Political Society similarly endorsed industrial development in Uganda in a controlled and limited manner. The society held that: "New industrial establishments should only be allowed to operate up to a certain period of time, beyond which the contract could be renewed[,] modified or cancelled in favour of some system of nationalization."76 Society members realized that such conditions might make it more difficult to raise foreign capital, but they argued that business opportunities in Uganda were attractive enough to overcome investors' concerns.77 In general, African witnesses before the royal commission endorsed the notion of industrial development very cautiously.

75 Memorandum, the Rungwe District Council, Tukuyu, to the Secretary, East Africa Royal Commission. 7 May 1953, PRO CO 892/10/1.
76 Memorandum, the Makerere College Political Society to the East Africa Royal Commission, May 1953, PRO CO 892/15/1.
77 Ibid.
Correctly or not, many Africans assumed that large-scale industrial projects would not likely operate with the interests of Africa and Africans in mind. And while foreign capital and skills might be grudgingly welcome in the region, many feared that they would be accompanied by an influx of foreigners, who were not. That concern was particularly strong in Uganda and Tanganyika, where Africans resisted any increase in the European population that might give that community the same political clout it wielded in Kenya.

We know that the opening up of factories; [the Bugishu Welfare Association wrote] at the time when we are still young, and when our governments cannot even manage unaided their own affairs; is a clever way, of the governors who are leaders of the settlers, for bringing many settlers in the country so that in a short time they may ask for independence like their brothers in South Africa. This was recently seen in Kenya when the settlers asked for independence so that the African may remain their slaves for ever.

We suggest that the Europeans who should come out to East Africa to open up factories, should come out on the understanding that they will stay for a specified time, at the end of which, the factories shall be taken over by the Africans themselves; if this is impossible then [the] question of factories should be abandoned, or they should be opened up by the Governments and not by Companies of rich people.\footnote{Memorandum, Bugishu Welfare Association, Nabumali, Central Bugishu, to the Chairman, East Africa Royal Commission, 11 April 1953, PRO CO 892/15/1.}

When representatives from the Southern Highlands Province in Tanganyika told the royal commission that they welcomed foreign capital but had no desire to have a flood of European technicians settled on their land, Frankel demanded how they proposed to acquire the technical knowledge needed to run new industries. Gande Ngio Malangalilo responded that they would obtain the knowledge from Europe by sending their children to be trained. They, upon returning to their homeland, would open the new industries. This prompted the following exchange:
FRANKEL: This sounds very good, but I want to show you what the danger is, and that is that you will be weak for many years. It will take a long time, most countries have not grown in this way, most countries have grown by bringing people in who have taught them new things. Even in England the Anglo Saxons, and Danes and the Romans, the English did not leave by themselves only. It is dangerous, it is not all one way, this argument. If you want to be strong in Africa, you have got to have railways, and mines, and you have got to have money to make yourselves strong as people in Africa, because there are many people round about Africa who would like to come in to Africa. What do you say to that?
MALANGALILO: I say 'No' to that, because Africa is the last continent now left for people to go to.
FRANKEL: There are better places than Africa.
MALANGALILO: Better places, but occupied already.
FRANKEL: No, there is Canada.
MALANGALILO: To that, I say how did you chase the Romans away from your place, they came in, they improved the country, but how did you chase them away?
FRANKEL: They went, they did not like the weather, it was too cold.
MALANGALILO: Do you think we shall say the same to you if we allow you to come in here?[^79]

Apparently even the weight of Frankel's version of English history failed to sway Malangalilo's opinion.

If many doubted that trade and industrial development would, as they believed it should, primarily benefit Africans, perhaps that was because it was not at all clear that Africans would be able to fully participate in the process. Representatives from Kenya's Kwale district told the commission that they assumed Africans were not allowed to trade in goods such as bicycles because they had never seen any Africans doing so. Furthermore, they pointed out, they were effectively barred from engaging in trade because they

[^79]: Record of meeting between Southern Highlands Province Representatives (Gande Nzio Malangalilo, Iringa; Peter M. Kandy, Mbozi; Gordon W. Mwansasu, Tukuyu), and the East Africa Royal Commission, at Dodoma, 20 November 1953, 11:00 a.m. - 12:30 p.m., PRO CO 892/14/3.
lacked the money necessary to do so. Representative from Lango district, in Uganda, suggested that industrial development be delayed until such time as African technicians were sufficiently trained to get good jobs. As one put it: "I do not dislike foreign capitalists, but what I am after is that technical education must be introduced in order that when foreign capitalists come into the country there will be Africans to help them."

Witnesses presented the royal commission with a number of possibilities for promoting African participation in the development process. Colonial governments, argued Mau Mau detainees at Manda Island, Kenya, should capitalize African owned industries to process African produce. They charged: "It is practically true that the Govt. has discouraged the Africans to run their industries, eg the plants which were installed at Karatina and Kerogooya-Embu during World War II, and immediately after the war the Africans were prepared to purchase those two projects but the Govt. of Kenya instead of selling them to the Africans decided to dismantle and sell them to European firms rather than allowing Africans to own them. . . ."

In Tanganyika, R. Malcolm, registrar of co-operative societies, believed Africans needed to gain experience in areas such as cotton ginning. Malcolm "was all in favour of co-operatives starting in a small way with the co-operators learning to manage the business themselves [rather than learning via European tutelage]."

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80 Record of meeting between African representatives from Kwale District (Chief Elijah Rupia, Chief Abdullah Bin Ali, Chief Chindora, Councillor Masumbuko Zani, Councillor Ali Mlemba) and the East Africa Royal Commission, at Mombasa, 21 October 1953, 3:45 - 4:10 p.m., PRO CO 892/73.
81 Record of meeting between Mr. Omonya and Mr. Olyech (from Lango District) and the East Africa Royal Commission, at Kampala, 11 December 1953, 11:00 a.m. - 12:15 p.m., PRO CO 892/16/5.
82 Memorandum, Manda Island Detainees [more than 150 signatories] to the Secretary, East Africa Royal Commission, 24 December 1953, PRO CO 892/5/4.
83 "Note of meeting of the Royal Commission at Dar es Salaam on Friday, 6th November, 1953, with the Registrar of Co-operative Societies (Mr. R. Malcolm)." PRO CO 892/14/1.
Perhaps the most radical position on industrial development was advanced by the Uganda National Congress. For that organization, low level participation in trade and industry was not sufficient; Africans would have to have a greater political voice in the actual planning of development if colonial authorities hoped to win the confidence and support of the people for their schemes. "In short," a Congress memorandum stated bluntly, we demand that the people of this country, the Africans, must be associated more closely with the machinery of Government before we shall consider it safe to let Government exploit our mineral wealth and borrow capital for industries. It is a pity this side of the matter is outside your field of enquiry, but we regard it as a first pre-requisite to any sound economic development. There shall be no successful venture of industrial or mining development if it is founded upon distrust. There is no other way of breaking this swelling distrust except that we suggest--by having elected Africans in the Government of this country, by having a legislature dominated by freely elected members. This is a matter of first importance.\(^8^4\)

The royal commissioners may have suspected that the UNC's principal objective was to obtain political power for its own sake, but the Congress's memorandum explicitly points out the main weakness in the commission's scope, that its members were directed to deal with economic problems but not political concerns. Unfortunately, the two types of problems were not so easily separable when it came to the question of winning popular support for proposed changes. Once again, the most intractable aspect of the development conundrum proved to be the human factor.

While the human factor complicated the land question and the problem of industrial development in East Africa, it had the greatest impact when it came to considering the quality and allocation of another limited resource: labor. The basic problem was

readily identified as that of finding a way to increase the productivity of East African labor. This in turn entailed consideration of investments in "human capital"—of issues such as better education and improved nutrition—as well as the problem of creating incentives for African workers in the form of higher wages, better housing, and long-term security that would "stabilize" labor, ending the practice of Africans "keeping one foot in the reserve."

An obvious and uncontroversial way to improve the quality of African labor seemed to be through improvements in education. But opinion was divided when it came to deciding what type of education would be most appropriate. Many people advocated an increased emphasis on technical training. J. D. Riddoch, a recruiter of labor for European settlers and manager of a motor repair workshop in Kisumu, Kenya, told the royal commission that he hired a mix of workers including Europeans, Asians, and Africans. Some of the African workers, he maintained, were good mechanics considering the limitations of their education. He added: "There are a whole lot of other Africans that are just merely helpless. They can do certain jobs, change tyres, fix springs, that kind of thing. That is just about as far as they can go. What I would like to see is a far larger number of Africans who can qualify for the much higher paid posts, and they could do it, I think, if they had a proper training and a proper apprenticeship training, with sufficient education to understand the theory of what they are doing."

85 Record of meeting between J. D. Riddoch and the East Africa Royal Commission, at Kisumu, 27 January 1954, 9:00 - 11:00 a.m., PRO CO 892/9/4.
Officials generally endorsed the idea of improved technical education to produce trained workers for industry and better farmers. Abdullah S. Fundikira, in Tanganyika, wrote:

In my view the kind of education that is needed most is practical education that aims at producing technicians and artisans of various types, practical farmers, men who can build the houses and women who can keep them clean, men who can help with the making of the roads, improving and increasing the water supplies, men and women who can give instruction to the ignorant and illiterate and who can help remove the misery of disease and sickness.

In general our present need is for men and women who can play their full part in helping to bring about the economic development of these Territories which I consider should rank highest in priority. There must therefore be greater emphasis in technical education and training.  

Fundikira warned, however, that the present educational system tended to turn out a small cadre of well-educated Africans at the expense of an enormous "wastage" of students who received only a few years instruction and were turned out with little knowledge beyond, reportedly, a distaste for manual labor.

Addressing the issue of Africans apparent lack of respect for the dignity of labor, a number of witnesses suggested that ethical instruction should be a major component of any system of African education, because that type of instruction would be needed to mold "economic man," who had internalized the values of modern capitalism, from East Africa's raw material. In a memorandum presented to the commission, an educational specialist from Uganda wrote:

In each territory there are native craftsmen with varying degrees of skill. Many of them are of poor quality by comparison with European standards and those who have acquired a fair degree of skill are skilled in a restricted field and lack adapt-

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ability and reliability. The problem is one not only of acquisition of crafts and technical efficiency which at present are lacking but also of those intangible personal qualities which are conducive to dependability and ability to meet difficult situations as they arise, both physical and human. In any system of training which may be devised care must therefore be taken to develop human qualities of virtue, adaptability and dependability as well as technical efficiency.  

Europeans with doubts about the quality of African labor as often as not focused on questions of character rather than Africans' abilities in terms of acquiring technical skills.

Governor Edward Twining believed Tanganyika's education system was "too academic" and the technical education offered not practical enough. Furthermore, "he did not think the African was taught sufficient about the civic sense of citizenship." In a similar vein, an official in the Kenyan department of agriculture told Sir Frederick Seaford that:

"Education is a controlling factor in development not so much the '3 R's' but education in character and reliability and desire to do a good job, not only to get good pay for any sort of a job. A University education is useless without reliability. Many Africans do not understand this. . . ."

Kenya's European Elected Members' Organization, in their submission to the commission, endorsed the opinion that African education had hitherto concentrated too heavily on achieving literacy at the expense of technical education for industry and farm-

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88 "Minutes of Meeting Held at Government House, Dar es Salaam, on 6th November, 1953, between His Excellency the Governor and Members of the Royal Commission," PRO CO 892/14/1.
89 "Notes by R. O. Barnes, S.S.C.E., Agricultural Department, on personal views expressed in conversation with Sir Frederick Seaford regarding water supplies & land utilization," n.d., PRO CO 892/5/2.
ing, unintentionally fostering the notion among literate Africans that "literacy 'per se' entitles them to a higher standard of living." The statement continued:

There is, however, an even more serious lack in the education of the African (in Government as opposed to Mission Schools) in that he receives no religious or ethical teaching whatever.

The greatest cause amongst others of the present Emergency [i.e. Mau Mau] is that Africans have lost most of their tribal discipline and tribal taboos, which were an essential part of their lives, and have acquired none of the ethics of any more evolved religion. It is no overstatement to say that the knowledge of right and wrong hardly exists now in a majority of the Kikuyu of today, and without such consciousness any society breaks down.90

In the opinion of the European settlers, particularly in Kenya, the purpose of African education was to train and instill obedience in the labor pool. "Literary education" seemed to accomplish neither of these aims.

For this reason, East African settlers envisioned educational paths that set limits on the desirable level of attainment, teaching Africans to accept their place at the bottom of the social and economic order. Representatives from the Tanganyika European Council, for instance, told the royal commission that education in the territory should concentrate on teaching the African to be a better African (i.e. a better farmer) rather than "trying to move the African up so that he can take his place in a western country." "It is not generally appreciated," one member of the delegation asserted, "but in a few years time, it is not going to be a question of which race is going to lead us in Tanganyika, it is going to be a question of what we are all going to eat, and if our educational policy was more realistic, we would find that greater stress was put onto agricultural training schools, rather than

teaching the average African about Shakespeare."\textsuperscript{91} L. T. Gunn, chairman of the Toro European Association suggested that the system of education used in the Belgian Congo, with only about ten percent of the students were allowed to advance beyond the first year, would be a good model for Uganda because it ensured that most Africans would remain under patriarchal and tribal authority. "Here in Uganda," he wrote, "all the kids who go to school are taught how to become future clerks. They very soon get swollen heads, become cheeky and ignore their father's [sic] and chiefs'['] orders. We are merely creating for the future a large number of half educated, dissatisfied agitators, who consider themselves to be much too superior to work with their hands on the land."\textsuperscript{92}

Similar charges were heard in Kenya, where the whites-only Association of County and District Councils of Kenya criticized the existing educational system for bringing "to the fore a semi-educated class of African without the necessary Christian ethics and self-discipline to enable him to put his learning to proper use." The association blamed teachers, "completely lacking in any qualities either of character or scholarship," for turning out Kikuyu students susceptible to political agitators and thus for the Mau Mau emergency. It recommended that the government focus its efforts on "educating and training the African to become a contented and useful member of the Community."\textsuperscript{93} In contrast to the

\textsuperscript{91} Record of meeting between representatives from the Tanganyika European Council (T. W. Tyrrell, G. T. P. Seabrook, G. R. Ramsey, N. J. Sinclair, Mrs. Stubbs) and the East Africa Royal Commission, at Dar es Salaam, 2 November 1953, 9:00 - 10:00 a.m. & 10:00 - 10:45 a.m., PRO CO 892/13/1.

\textsuperscript{92} L. T. Gunn, "Further Memorandum on Uganda to Royal Commission," 20 July 1953, PRO CO 892/15/2.

Kikuyu, who were generally viewed as the most "Westernized" of Africans, a long-time observer of the Wakamba noted:

These people, the Wakamba, are in my opinion worthier of our efforts than any of the other tribes of Kenya. They are a brave people, independent and self-reliant. They are, it is true, perhaps less conscious of the value of a literary education than other tribesmen, though I am unwilling to blame them for that. They are, certainly, perhaps for that very reason, less liable to the influence of subversive propaganda though again this may well be owing to their superior intelligence. They provided, I believe, much the best material for recruitment into the armed forces.\(^{94}\)

Literary education, in the opinion of many settlers, introduced Africans to ideas that worked against the discipline and control of the labor force.

Africans, on the other hand, were generally very optimistic regarding the expected benefits of a good educational system designed to produce professionals and intellectuals as well as farmers and technicians. Their main demands were that education should be free (at least through the primary grades), compulsory, and universal. The African employees of one East African firm maintained that primary education should be free and the government should undertake to train men of all ages through evening classes. Furthermore, they urged the government to spend "a large sum of money" on overseas education for people of all races.\(^{95}\) Abiathar Omondi Opudo, of the Nyanza Engineers' Works, focused more narrowly in advocating compulsory and free primary education for Africans with the aim of achieving mass literacy.\(^{96}\) Using a different approach, Kairu Ngure, an

\(^{94}\) J. O. K. Delap, "Memorandum on the food situation of the Wakamba tribe," 20 June 1953, PRO CO 892/5/2.

\(^{95}\) Memorandum, African Employees of Land and Shipping Co. of East Africa, Ltd., to the Secretary, East Africa Royal Commission, n.d., PRO CO 892/5/4.

\(^{96}\) Memorandum, Abiathar Omondi Opudo, Nyanza Engineers' Works, to the East Africa Royal Commission, 7 November 1953, [Translated from Swahili], PRO CO 892/5/4.
African member of Nairobi's city council who began school at ten years of age and completed thirteen years of education, the most then available, cast his appeal for better education for African children in terms of European interests. "I hold a strong feeling," he wrote, "... that it is only through proper education that we can get more output from the African workers, and also cure him from the diseases of idleness, agitation, frustration, and have also a complete control over subversive activities."97 In direct opposition to settler opinion, Ngure prescribed more, not less, education as the best way to discipline and control labor.

Occasionally African critics of the region's educational systems voiced arguments similar to those put forward by European settlers. While members of the Lango branch of the Uganda National Congress, for instance, called for more and better schools, they especially reproved the government for the meager number and poor quality of technical schools. Echoing settler complaints about excessive literary education, they wrote: "The present system of education only prepares the native to b[e]come [an] employee in the Govt. or to work in the companies."98 The Congress's national office added that there should be more emphasis on agricultural training, claiming that the program at Makerere College, for instance, taught students that farming was an undignified pursuit. Nevertheless, the UNC insisted that all African children should be educated, and they suggested that there might be political motives for keeping the quality of schools low: "The Gov-

97 Memorandum, Kairu Ngure, Councillor, Nairobi City Council, to the Secretary, East Africa Royal Commission, "Re: Memorandum on 'Urbanised Africans in Towns,'" 29 December 1953, PRO CO 892/5/4.
98 Memorandum, Uganda National Congress, Lango Branch, Lira, to the East Africa Royal Commission, 20 April 1953, PRO CO 892/15/1.
ernment could not have hit on a better scheme for maintaining sound racial relations than this one of keeping the African in perpetual ignorance."99 Thus, even where European and African opinion found some basis of agreement, African lack of confidence in the good intentions of the colonial authorities seems likely to have undermined the possibility of effective action.

A few witnesses pointed to another weakness in East African educational policies as they related to development; economic development in East Africa might fail altogether if women were left out of the overall scheme. A Kenyan settler organization urged that women be educated in order to dispel one cause of African "backwardness." Women had to learn to demand certain things—better housing, food, clothing, etc.—associated with modern living, the group argued, in order to give their husbands an incentive to work and earn in a consistent fashion, a prerequisite for the emergence of a capitalist society.100 Other African leaders endorsed the view that without educated women and mothers it would be difficult to provide boys with the proper home environment to prepare them for success in the modern world.101 Girls, in other words, needed to be trained in order to fill the role of good, progressive mothers.

100 "Memoranda for the Royal Commission submitted by the Elector's Union (Mau Branch)," n.d., PRO CO 892/5/1.
101 T. W. Newton, "Short memo on the history of the Uasin Gishu Plateau and Trans Nzoia," n.d. (acknowledged by royal commission staff, 10 April 1953), PRO CO 892/5/2; Record of meeting between representatives from the Western Province [Tanganyika] (Chief Humbi Ziota, MBE, Chief Kasanda, Shabani Mtegeti, George Magembe, Mihambo Kadushi, Dominico Petro, Juma Barakabine, Louis Paul Dantes, Andre X. Fipa) and the East Africa Royal Commission, at Mwanza, 25 November 1953, 2:00 - 4:30 p.m., PRO CO 892/14/3.
Failure to provide for female education might, according to the all-white East African Women's League, have more serious effects than merely slowing the pace of development. A memorandum from that organization's headquarters in Nairobi to the royal commission claimed the "present disaster in the Kikuyu tribe [i.e. Mau Mau] underlines the vital need for women's progress to keep step with that of the men. . . . It is the case that Kikuyu women during the [Emergency] used their influence to drag their men back to barbarism where they were on an equality with them." In a meeting with the commissioners, representatives of the league elaborated the point, arguing that Europeans had failed to realize that rights and responsibilities in African society were equally divided between men and women. Consequently, when colonial authorities set out to improve African society by focusing efforts on men only, women felt left out and resentful. Lady Sydney Farrar of the League explained:

. . . We accepted him as the warrior and let him go forward; we kept her as we thought she was the slave, behind. But she was the protected person as the female of the species and in some ways we muddled the position. We said she is unfit to come forward because she is a slave with a slave mentality and so we moved the man forward. We took full advantage of that as the warrior and clamoured for more and more and we felt that we were interfering in his customs as the man of the family if we insisted that the women and female children should move forward equally in education. As a result we left the women with a deep sense of frustration and animosity which in the Kikuyu tribe has grown to the incredible proportions that it has now.

[Rowland] HUDSON: Animosity on the part of the women against the European?
FARRAR: Against the system which the European produced, because she was no longer keeping her level status with the men.
[Mrs. Michael] WOOD: I do not think it is entirely our fault for misunderstanding the position. I think the women themselves are far more conservative than the men. They are more difficult to persuade to leave the time honoured customs and

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102 "Memorandum Submitted to the Royal Commission by the East Africa Women's League, Nairobi, Kenya," May 1953, PRO CO 892/5/1.
the shambas and they have been hard to enthuse with ideas of emancipation. They do not pick up the other languages, like Swahili and English, so that when you meet them there is no means of communication with them, which is another difficulty. They do not go out into the outside world so much as the men.

FARRAR: I think we are to blame for that, we did not insist that they should be schooled.103

Colonial authorities, therefore, could ignore the education and advancement of African women only at the risk of slowing development and jeopardizing the peace and good order of the region.

Female education had other implications for African society. Schooling for girls stressed "homecrafts"--cooking, washing, housecleaning, child rearing--but, as Tanganyika's assistant director of women's and girls' education, Helen Johnson, told the commission, if African women in the future were to be occupied with these types of tasks, they would no longer have the same amount of time to devote to the agricultural work which they traditionally performed. School girls, she reported, often arrived dead tired for classes after helping their mothers with early morning chores, and the same applied to housewives. "If the [African woman] is to be the kind of wife that many Africans hope that she will be in the future," she concluded, "she cannot do as much agricultural work as she has done in the past." Commissioner Gaitskell questioned how such arrangements might affect an economy based on peasant agriculture, which depended upon the labor of women:

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103 Record of meeting between representatives from the East African Women's League (Lady Sydney Farrar, Mrs. Michael Wood) and the East Africa Royal Commission, at Nairobi, 30 January 1954, 9:00 - 10:30 a.m., PRO CO 892/9/4.
GAITSKELL: If we are going to educate all the girls to be excellent housewives, but they cannot at the same time do the agricultural work, what is going to happen?

JOHNSON: It is an answer between two things. Do you want a better home, or should the men go out and do a jolly sight more work than they have ever done in their lives before?

[S. H.] CLEAGUE-SMITH: Or will a much more revolutionary organisation of existing African agriculture be necessary in order to get improvement[?]

GAITSKELL: It is perfectly true, but that brings us up against a great deal of very difficult technical and social problems, because the introduction of machinery and bigger [land] units to eliminate women's work altogether, involves going over to an employer and employed relationship in agriculture rather than a family peasant economy.

Thus, it seemed that the education of women would affect African society in general in everything from the allocation of labor to land tenure. Johnson objected that this did not necessarily follow, because traditionally African men had been responsible for hunting and village defense while women did the field work. Since defense was now handled by the government, she argued, men were available for farm labor. Peasant cultivation, therefore, was not obsolete. Commissioner Kidaha then interjected that the division of agricultural labor varied from tribe to tribe in East Africa, with men in some tribes performing tasks that were reserved for women elsewhere. "I agree," he said, "that something must be done to raise the position of the African women in society, but I think that one has to think very carefully about the fact that in most cases one finds that the African woman has a sense of an inferiority complex. It might be that something could be done by people like yourselves [i.e. education specialists] to make them feel that they are human beings who
deserve to be respected, but I hope not to inculcate into their minds a feeling of superiority.\textsuperscript{104} If training women in the arts of homecrafts held potentially revolutionary implications for African society, then the notion of employing women in trade was sure to encounter opposition. The district commissioner for Nairobi told the commission that "the African male had been opposed to his women working for money, and in any case he would not allow her to work alongside himself. [The district commissioner] said that it all came back to the African idea of a male living a life of ease surrounded by 3 or 4 wives to do his bidding."\textsuperscript{105} In Uganda the commissioners were informed that there were few opportunities for women to be employed in any skilled trades, although social changes were rapidly taking place and it seemed likely that women would be trained in some crafts, such as garment manufacturing and catering, where they might be employed in the future.\textsuperscript{106} African witnesses before the royal commission were generally mute on the subject of employment of women, although the clan heads-Abataka of Busoga, in a memorandum to the governor of Uganda that was later submitted to the commission, complained that women were allowed to work in factories, and this would not be the case were the Basoga men

\textsuperscript{104} Record of meeting between J. P. Attenborough (Director of Education), Miss Helen Johnson (Assistant Director of Women's and Girls' Education), H. W. E. Ginner (Assistant Director of African Education), A. Emmis (Superintendent Technical Education), Father Walsh (Secretary of Mission Education), S. H. Cleague-Smith, and the East Africa Royal Commission, at Dar es Salaam, 31 October 1953, 9:00 - 9:45 a.m. and 9:45 - 10:30 a.m., PRO CO 892/13/1.

\textsuperscript{105} "Note of a meeting of the Royal Commission at Nairobi, on the 15 January, 1954, with the District Commissioner, Nairobi, (Mr. Small), Mr. Passells, African Affairs Officer, Nairobi, and Mr. Powell, Chairman of the African Affairs Committee, Nairobi City Council," PRO CO 892/8/3.

given authority to make laws for themselves. "We want to see our women stay with us," they wrote, "and not in factories nor shops owned by non-Africans nor as prostitutes. This all is brought about just because we are not permitted to make bye-laws by ourselves and that is the reason why our women are not controlled."  

Bringing women within the compass of the modern exchange economy was deemed necessary in order to improve the availability and quality of labor, issues essential to the overall process of development. Concern about the quality of labor also led the royal commission to inquire into the area of the medical fitness of the average African worker. In particular, did diet and nutrition contribute to the generally low quality of labor then available in East Africa? Would better diets increase productivity?  

There was a division of opinion on the last question. Most witnesses addressing the issue believed there was some link between nutrition and productivity. N. R. E. Fendall, a medical officer on Kenya's colonial establishment, wrote that the "so called inherent laziness of the African" was probably attributable to a combination of climatic factors, poor nutrition, and chronic, debilitating diseases. "The interaction of the above three factors," he continued, "renders the energy output of the average African to near the border line for self-sufficiency."  

Dr. G. A. Wilson, Tanganyika's superintendent for industrial health also felt that malnutrition was a factor, along with diseases such as malaria, hook-

107 "Memorandum submitted by the hereditary Abataka of Busoga, to His Excellency the Governor of Uganda on his tour of Busoga in April, 1953," PRO CO 892/15/1.  
108 Memorandum, N. R. E. Fendall (Medical Officer of Health and Medical Officer in Charge, North Nyanza-Kakamega) to the Secretary, East Africa Royal Commission, 15 April 1953, PRO CO 892/5/2.
worm, and bilharzia, affecting the output of African workers.\textsuperscript{109} Similarly, a submission from the Uganda government stated:

Although specific evidence of deficiency of one or other of the dietary essentials is uncommon, it is generally agreed that the great majority of the rural population live in a state of sub-nutrition, as regards both total calorie intake and protein intake. . . . It has been established that children on a satisfactory diet are seldom affected seriously by infections such as malaria and enteritis, while malnourished children are prone to contract these infections in a gross form. Finally, it is suggested that the lack of energy, initiative and working capacity which are notable characteristics of African labour is directly related to inadequate nutrition.\textsuperscript{110}

On the other hand, H. C. Trowell, a specialist physician in the Uganda Medical Department, said the claim that African diets were deficient was an unproved assertion. Africans, he argued, were smaller on average that Europeans and therefore did not require as many calories per day. He thought that Ugandan Africans were adequately fed from year to year, although he admitted that there were seasonal shortages in places as well as problems with the distribution of food, which caused short term periods of hunger from time to time. And while a period of shortage might be followed by a glut of food the next season, Trowell believed the experience of hunger might well leave a legacy of resentment and poor work output. "Temporary severe calorie deficiency lasting for many hours or only partially relieved and recurring over a period of several days," he wrote, "causes faintness, lack of energy, a low output of work and slow movements and mental depression. Hun-

\textsuperscript{109} Record of meeting between K. L. Sanders (Acting Labour Commissioner), Dr. G. A. Wilson (Superintendent for Industrial Health), G. J. M. Gray (Inter-territorial Inspector), F. B. Hunter (Trade Testing Inspector), S. G. Clinton (Labour Officer Personnel), W. Broadhead Williams (Labour Officer Industrial Relations), and the East Africa Royal Commission, at Dar es Salaam, 29 October 1953, 3:00 - 3:30 p.m., PRO CO 892/13/1.

\textsuperscript{110} "Information for the Royal Commission," at Entebbe, 22 January 1953, [Probably submitted by the Uganda Medical Service], PRO CO 892/15/11.
ger is experienced and much of the thinking and talking is occupied with food. Persons may work well if it is obvious that in this manner that hunger will be satisfied; if this in not so work is resented.\textsuperscript{111} Thus, while the experts disagreed on the issue of whether or not the average African worker was chronically malnourished, they all felt that productivity would suffer even as a result of temporary food shortages.

In order to increase labour outputs, it seemed clear that one goal would be to improve the quality of the food supply while at the same time ensuring that a sufficient quantity of food was available year round. How to accomplish this goal was open to some debate. Professor Jack of the commission asked representatives of the Kenya Board of the British Medical Association whether, in their opinion, African malnutrition was attributable more to lack of income or to lack of knowledge, prompting the following exchange:

[Dr.] WRIGHT: I would say it is far more necessary to raise knowledge than income. I am taking the extreme example, the highly paid servant here who puts his savings in the Post Office and suffers from gross malnutrition. In the townships . . . obviously an adequate income is necessary to purchase the food, but it is far more, I should have thought, the knowledge as to what would require to be grown and is necessary, rather than having money in the pocket to go to the local market.

[Dr.] PATERSON: I should say that if you have not got the money with which to buy the food, you cannot either make the mistakes or do the right thing.

JACK: Obviously, but you can have the money and still make the same mistakes.

PATERSON: Yes, and I do not think the African is very much better than the average British housewife in that respect.\textsuperscript{112}

Authorities in Uganda wrote that factors affecting the rate of progress in terms of meeting the public's medical and nutritional needs included "the general economic progress of the


\textsuperscript{112} Record of meeting between the Kenya Board of the British Medical Association (Dr. Wright, Dr. Paterson, CMG, Mr. Powell, Dr. Adalji) and the East Africa Royal Commission, at Nairobi, 14 January 1954, 9:30 - 11:00 a.m., PRO CO 892/8/3.
country, the rate of production of a sufficiently large number of Africans who are capable of being trained for medical and health work and who have developed an adequate sense of vocation, scientific progress in the field of therapeutics, insecticides and other adjuncts to the application of curative and health activities, and also the emergence of a more educated, balanced and self-critical public opinion. 

113 The most effective action that the government might take to improve nutrition appeared to involve efforts in the area of education. But if improved nutrition seemed to be one key to boosting labor's productivity, the reverse also appeared to be true; productivity gains and the consequent rise in real incomes would contribute to the general health and well-being of the population. The real focus, therefore, should be on finding ways to raise real incomes.

Low incomes in East Africa were related to the problem of low productivity. One witness who submitted material to the commission claimed that "the African is the best treated and the most highly paid labourer in the world." His justification for that statement was: "The accepted yard-stick of the efficiency and cost of labour is output per man per day of good quality work. It may be lack of training, lack of tradition or simply a pleasant natural indolence but whatever the cause the hours worked by the labourer are few, particularly on the smaller farms, the output very small indeed and the quality certainly not very good." 114 A secret annex to a memorandum on African wages circulated within the Kenyan colonial secretariat summed up the dilemma: "So far as it is possible to generalise,

113 "Information for the Royal Commission," at Entebbe, 22 January 1953, [Probably submitted by the Uganda Medical Service], PRO CO 892/15/11.

114 Memorandum, Hon. Mr. Frank Hinds to the East Africa Royal Commission, n.d., PRO CO 892/10/2.
it is true to say that African standards of industry, application, skill and output of work are low, and the value placed on leisure is high. Employers are therefore disposed to keep wages low, because the output of the worker is often low."\textsuperscript{115} In other words, real incomes could not rise without a corresponding increase in the productivity of labor.

Tackling the question of how to increase East African productivity, the royal commission's inquiries concentrated on a number of aspects: incentives for African labor; the structure of relationships between employers and employees; and, the general well-being of labor, including consideration of wages, housing, security, and the stability of labor. Witnesses approached the problem of incentives in terms of positive and negative inducements for persuading African workers to produce more. On the one hand, European settlers and many officials attested to the need to overcome the high value Africans placed upon leisure by disciplining and educating labor. On the other hand, Africans and some officials tended to emphasize the carrot rather than the stick: the benefits to productivity that would accrue should African consumers be presented with a greater supply and variety of consumer goods and African workers with better pay.

In the view of a number of witnesses, Africans valued leisure so highly that it would take rather extraordinary incentives in order to convince them to work on a regular, consistent basis. A long time administrator in Kenya and, later, Ghana, Meredyth Hyde-Clarke, told the commission that, "in this matter [of African attitudes to leisure] some dis-

\textsuperscript{115} Annex to memorandum, "African Wage Policy," Office of the Member for Commerce & Industry, Secretariat, Nairobi, to Chief Native Commissioner, Member for Commerce & Industry, Nairobi, 9 February 1953, PRO CO 892/7/1.
tinction was to be found as between the West Coast and the East Coast for the reason that the West Coast African had always had to work harder to subsist and he had had a much longer contact with the European who had a different outlook on life, whereas the contact in East Africa had been with the East." He also believed that health, nutrition, and genetic characteristics likely influenced the "different outlook and capacity for work of people in different areas." When asked whether or not Africans were better off than they were thirty years previously, Hyde-Clarke "replied that this might be so in terms of cash or in terms of those commodities which the European and some Africans had come to regard as desirable, but if you measured real wealth by those assets which the African in general valued, then he doubted whether they were any better off today." On the question of getting the African worker to produce more, therefore, he asserted that Africans were not likely to respond to small incentives, prompting Sykes to remark "that as he saw the matter, the African worked in two gears and it required a considerable incentive to make him change from bottom gear into top gear. Sir Frederick Seaford suggested that in fact there were three gears, a specially low one reserved for the Public Works Dept."  

H. G. Dempster, honorary secretary to the Kenya Branch of the Economic Reform Club, endorsed Hyde-Clarke's views regarding the worth of leisure to African laborers. "In Uganda," he wrote in a journal article submitted as evidence to the royal commission, "now that slavery has been suppressed, if [an African man] does not want to work, he has

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only to retire to his hut, his wife and his cassava patch in order to live in ease as his forefa-
thers did for centuries." He did suggest, however, that the lure of earning money to pay
for consumer goods such as clothes, bicycles, and "fancy goods," along with the need to
acquire cash to pay taxes, might result in sustained efforts from African workers.\footnote{H. G. Dempster, "A Tour in Uganda," \textit{Rural Economy} 20, 10 (December 1952): 11-13, PRO CO 892/15/2.}

Members of Tanganyika's Labour Utilization Board also maintained that a reader avail-
ability of inexpensive consumer goods would provide more of an incentive for Africans to
work than would increases in wages. When Seaford pointed out that the commission had
encountered examples of Africans who did work much more regularly in exchange for
better pay, one member responded:

\begin{quote}
CROSSKILL: What would alter the situation completely would be to get in more
cheap goods for them [Africans] to buy. The present cost of bicycles, or jewellery
for their wives, of modern clothes, and so on, are so terrific that it is just not within
their scope at all. We do not want Japanese goods in this country again ever if we
can help it, but we do want, if it is at all possible to get more cheap goods into the
territory and then they would spend more money and they would be keen on buy-
ing, saving money to buy a bicycle at a reasonable price, and I think it would help
enormously.
FRANKEL: That is really an argument for higher wages because I suggest to you
that the ratio between what they used to get when goods were cheaper was in their
favour, more in their favour. Today the goods have gone up in price and it is a
hopeless proposition to try and get what you have just described, and therefore if
their wages went up, they might be willing to work harder.
\end{quote}

Other board members insisted, against the protests of commissioners, that African workers
valued leisure over higher pay:

\begin{quote}
BENNETT: . . . I think you can safely say that the average African has an im-
mense thirst for what we call social welfare and social services, but generally
speaking, he is not prepared to work harder to get it. He appreciates it very much
\end{quote}
if it is handed to him just like that, and he has to make no effort to get it. The major number one incentive is to give less work.
CHAIRMAN: In other words, he does not respond to incentives, but the greatest incentive is a smaller task?
BENNETT: Yes, he values his leisure more than money.\textsuperscript{118}

The issue at stake was whether wage increases would "naturally" incline the African to work more, as would presumably be the case with European labor, or whether he would have to be conditioned to the market gradually through the arousal of his desire for consumer goods or through other means.

Those other means included education or indoctrination of workers in market principles, and the disciplining of labor. The Nakuru European Chamber of Commerce, for example, suggested ways in which the African work force might be improved, including the fostering of the realization among Africans of the necessity and benefits of productivity gains and more effective supervision of industrial labor by Europeans.\textsuperscript{119} A Tangan-
yikan labor commission's report submitted for the royal commission's consideration found that "there is an overall shortage of both skilled and unskilled African labour, and that this deficiency is due not to an absolute shortage in numbers but essentially to the instability, migratory character and low output of those who enter paid employment, the preference of many to remain as peasant producers and the inability of the vast majority of Africans to realise their own responsibilities towards increasing the productivity of the Territory as a

\textsuperscript{118} Record of meeting between the Labour Utilisation Board (Mr. Madvig, Mr Male, Mr. Featherstone-
haugh, Mr. Bennett, Mr. Hurst, Captain Watts, Mr. Kleen, Mr. Crosskill) and the East Africa Royal
Commission, at Arusha, 11 November 1953, 3:00 - 5:00 p.m., PRO CO 892/14/1.

\textsuperscript{119} "Memorandum for the Royal Commission by the Nakuru European Chamber of Commerce and Industry," n.d., PRO CO 892/5/1.
whole. That commission concluded that higher wages alone would not provide sufficient inducement for Africans to work more regularly. The authors of the report deemed the African to be a "target worker," who aimed only to earn enough money to accomplish specific and limited goals. Positive inducements might be provided in the form of attractive consumer goods, smaller labor tasks, and a "low degree of disciplinary control by management." Overall, the Tanganyikan commission suggested that African workers be gradually enticed into the modern labor market, until such time as they would submit to a greater degree of work discipline.

Some settlers and officials were less patient, demanding that labor be subject to rigorous European supervision and control, even as Africans were educated in the ways of the market. B. Leechman, member for social services in Tanganyika's Legislative Council, believed there was a direct relationship between the output of labor and the level of supervision. The Association of County and District Councils of Kenya, which had blamed the education system for turning out political agitators and demanded its reform, asserted that the task of local government in European settled areas was to control labor and to improve living standards, with emphasis on the former. Association members insisted that lack of control over labor in the past, combined with ignorance of the true number of Africans living on European land, contributed to the problem of Mau Mau.

"These numbers [of squatters]," they wrote, "proved to be infinitely greater than could

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121 Ibid.
122 "Note of a meeting held between the Royal Commission and the Member for Social Services, Mr. B. Leechman, CMG, OBE, at Dar es Salaam on the 3rd November, 1953," PRO CO 892/13/1.
ever have been imagined and were naturally only fractionally employed. Idleness, covetousness and, above all, lack of European contact, all led to disaffection."\textsuperscript{123} Their prescription was to increase the ratio of Europeans to Africans, thereby providing the necessary "control and contact," and to allow local governments to limit the numbers of African workers within their jurisdictions.

Both the association and Leechman agreed, however, that direct European supervision would not alone suffice to ensure control over labor. The association wrote: "Nothing has contributed more to the subversive tendencies among the Africans of recent years than the excessively dull lives which they lead. If tribal dancing has gone for ever, and more is the pity if it has, then field games and other recreations must take its place. Efforts have been made in many instances to centre these activities round a religious institution. These efforts have received a severe setback of recent years but should now be renewed with greater activity."\textsuperscript{124} Similarly, Leechman felt "that the trouble in rural areas was not merely education. It contained to a very large degree the fact of providing entertainment and excitement which would replace those aspects of tribal life which modern administration had taken away. Such aspects included tribal dancing and some of the ritualistic ceremonies."\textsuperscript{125} The implication seems to be that in the rush down the road towards modernity many emotional outlets of traditional African society had been aban-


\textsuperscript{124} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{125} "Note of a meeting held between the Royal Commission and the Member for Social Services, Mr. B. Leechman, CMG, OBE, at Dar es Salaam on the 3rd November, 1953," PRO CO 892/13/1.
doned. The African, only semi-socialized to his role as modern worker, needed to be provided with a channel for atavistic impulses that otherwise might be destructive to colonial society.

While Europeans tended to place great emphasis on the supervision and control of labor, Africans viewed the question of incentives somewhat differently. Their overwhelming demand was that they should receive equal pay for equal work, and African witnesses repeatedly focused on the denial of pay equity as another example of the injustice of colonial rule. In their view, low incomes for African workers had more to do with European prejudice than with the supposed low productivity of labor. And if Africans seemed to place great store in leisure, perhaps that was because low wages made the opportunity cost of leaving employment relatively insignificant. When they were fairly compensated, however, they were willing to work consistently for long periods.

Demands for fair wages were simple and direct. African workers for the Landing and Shipping Company of East Africa, for example, asked that they be paid a living wage, with separate scales for skilled and unskilled labor. Non-Europeans, they maintained, should compete in trade tests with Europeans, and those passing the tests should receive equal pay for equal work.\textsuperscript{126} Another African delegation, representing the Kenya Federation of Registered Trade Union Members,\textsuperscript{127} received a sharp lecture from Dow when they

\textsuperscript{126} Memorandum, African Employees of Landing & Shipping Co. of East Africa, Ltd., to the Secretary, East Africa Royal Commission, n.d., PRO CO 892/5/4.

\textsuperscript{127} Militant leadership of unions such as the Transport and Allied Workers and Hotel Workers unions were rounded up in Operation Anvil, 1954, at the start of the State of Emergency. The Kenya Federation of Registered Trade Unions was set up to secure recognition of unions after the suppression of the East African Trade Union Congress in 1952. Tom Mboya, a moderate, eventually assumed leadership of the KFRTU and transformed it into the Kenya Federation of Labour. Mboya developed ties with and received
pointed out the demoralizing effects of racial inequities in pay scales. "I think," the commission chairman proclaimed,

there is a certain amount of difficulty that you may be making for yourselves if you lay too much stress on the question of getting the same pay as people of other races. I was thinking that what happened in amongst the Indian seamen employed in India and they wanted the same pay and conditions. When this was put into force many of them found they were pushed out and Europeans put in their place because the Europeans did more work and stood up to more work than they did for the same pay and so it was more economic to have Europeans. I think you have to bear that in mind here. So long as efficiency is greater in one race than another there will be a tendency to employ that better race.  

In this particular case, the workers had pointed out the unfairness of men in the same shop receiving different compensation for performing the same tasks. Dow's warning, therefore, only makes sense if one assumes that European labor was inherently superior to African.

Other witnesses described the negative effects of extremely low rates of pay. Union members in Uganda suggested that wages scales be reviewed from time to time, reminding the commissioners that: "Labour is one of the factors--and perhaps the chief of these--of production, and thus a source of the national wealth. The labourers also have children, wives, and they also need to eat and to drink like the more fortunate members of society--to whom they give their labour. The rich and the poor labourer both buy from

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support from foreign labor organizations such as the British Trades Union Congress and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. Bruce Berman, Control and Crisis in Colonial Kenya: The Dialectic of Domination (London: James Currey, 1990), 390-91.

128 Record of meeting between the Kenya Federation of Registered Trade Union Members (A. A. Minya, Executive Officer; David Njomo, President; Daniel Ngethe, Treasurer; G. W. Owuor, Assistant General Secretary; Jimy Bury; Mwangi Boga) and the East Africa Royal Commission, at Nairobi, 31 December 1953, 2:30 - 3:30 p.m., PRO CO 892/7/6. James Bury was a Canadian unionist and representative of the ICFTU in Nairobi. Berman, Control and Crisis in Colonial Kenya, 391.
the same market. If the condition of labour be no[t] improved, theft, house-breaking, murder, and similar crimes due to economic causes cannot decrease. For the labourer, in addition, has no reputation which he fears will be soiled by criminal activities."¹²⁹ John Knight, an assistant agriculture officer in Kenya, wrote that many African civil servants were "not receiving a living wage, and I have personally known cases of real hunger, ill-health [sic], and inability to work due to insufficient food and clothing."¹³⁰ In at least some cases, therefore, it seemed that higher wages would likely raise productivity.

Some members of the commission seemed to believe that one impediment to Africans achieving higher wages was excess government regulation of the labor market in terms of pay rates and the allocation of labor. Jack suggested to K. L. Sanders, acting labor commissioner for Tanganyika that the Labour Corporation Ordinance actually prevented employers competing against one another for the available labor supply, and he asked why they should not be doing so. Sanders pointed to the undesirability of creating "friction" among employers and noted that European and African farmers would not be able to recruit workers in competition with the larger commercial enterprises.¹³¹ Jack seemed less than satisfied with that response. He and Frankel were also skeptical when

¹³⁰ John Knight, "Memorandum on the present low rates of salaries of African civil servants, in relation to the current cost of living in Kenya," to the Secretary, East Africa Royal Commission, 18 April 1953, PRO CO 892/5/2.
¹³¹ Record of meeting between K. L. Sanders (Acting Labour Commissioner), Dr. G. A. Wilson (Superintendent for Industrial Health), G. J. M. Gray (Inter-territorial Inspector), F. B. Hunter (Trade Testing Inspector), S. G. Clinton (Labour officer personnel), and W. Broadhead Williams (Labour Officer Industrial Relations), and the East Africa Royal Commission, at Dar es Salaam, 29 October 1953, 3:00 - 3:30 p.m., PRO CO 892/13/1.
members of Tanganyika's Labour Utilisation Board insisted that the setting of a minimum wage did not work to keep the price of labor lower than what it might be in an unregulated environment.\footnote{Record of meeting between the Labour Utilisation Board (Mr. Madvig, Mr Male, Mr. Featherstonehaugh, Mr. Bennett, Mr. Hurst, Captain Watts, Mr. Kleen, Mr. Crosskill) and the East Africa Royal Commission, at Arusha, 11 November 1953, 3:00 - 5:00 p.m., PRO CO 892/14/1.} In both the above instances, the officials seemed reluctant to allow a free market in labor to transform a situation in which they played a significant role in determining the cost of labor and where it would be allocated.

Bureaucrats in East Africa, in fact, complained about the difficulty of directing labor to its best purposes. A note for the royal commission from the Tanganyika government stated:

As regards measures to improve the efficiency and utilisation of labour, the biggest handicap from Government's point of view is the lack of organisation in industry itself. There is no responsible body of opinion to speak for employers in Industry generally, and where individual industries are organised and have association, effective co-operation and willingness to abide by agreements concluded on the part of individual employers is often lacking. On the workers' side there is no organisation whatsoever, and it is often left to the Labour Department to present their case.\footnote{"Government Policy Regarding Utilisation of Labour and Manpower," n.d., PRO CO 892/11/4.}

The note concluded by recommending the "evolution of a proper wage structure" for the territory, and part of the solution involved the development of efficient corporate entities for employers and employees, which would both allow direct negotiations and make it easier for the government to arbitrate between the two interests. M. J. B. Molohan, the territory's labor commissioner, favored the implementation of a practice known in the United Kingdom as "joint consultation," designed to promote cordial employer-employee
relations. Regarding the establishment of such a scheme, he noted: "The African's lack of responsibility will be emphasized in addition to his lack of specialized knowledge of forms of industrial organisations and techniques. In this atmosphere of general scepticism I feel that Government has a special part to play in proving the value, both existing and potential, of joint consultation." In the view of many regional officials, Africans needed to be conditioned to the assumptions and forms of modern capitalism, and government had an important role to play in that process.

Another way to impose order on the chaotic labor market in East Africa was through the establishment of trade unions, although the prospect of greater organization among laborers was not welcomed by everyone. A planter from Toro, for example, while arguing in favor of nondiscriminatory social and economic policies in order to prevent terrorism in Uganda, remained adamantly opposed to the establishment of trade unions. "In Uganda," he noted,

the strike commences as an industrial dispute but soon changes into a revolt against the Protectorate Government. There is no necessity in Uganda for collective bargaining and the strike weapon as in England. The demand for labourers is always greater than the supply and thus the employer who does not give top wages, top food and top conditions does not get any labourers. Then again[,] with individual bargaining an employee may decline a job in quite a friendly fashion and does not try to coerce an employer by trying to stage collective violence as he could if he were in a gang.135

More moderately, P. E. D. Wilson, a senior labor officer for the coastal area of Kenya, told the commission that trade union organization in Mombasa was very weak, as it was

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elsewhere. Unions, in his opinion, tended to attract "the political agitator," although an exception to the rule was "the Tailors, Tent, Sail Makers and Government Workers Union. It is functioning very well indeed because it is the only Union which has something tangible to offer its members. The rest of them merely take money in various quantities from their members." Trade unions, it seemed, were acceptable as long as they stayed clear of politics.

Witnesses and members of the royal commission generally accepted the development of some mechanism for facilitating worker-management consultation as a part of a process of organizing the nascent industry of the region. Jack suggested to the African member of Tanganyika's territorial labour board, Petro Mntambo, that a starting point, short of actual trade unions, would be to establish a system whereby representatives of management and workers would be able to sit down together in factories and on plantations in order to negotiate matters of mutual concern. He told Mntambo:

You see, trade unions in the United Kingdom are organisations which have grown up over a period of, say, 200 years. They are not suddenly introduced like that, and for a long time they were quite irresponsible bodies. It so happens that now they have become quite respectable bodies and quite responsible bodies, but that responsibility and that respectability are things which are only acquired slowly. What I am suggesting is that, instead of thinking of introducing a trade union, in the sense in which we know it in the United Kingdom, that you begin in a much smaller way of having a negotiating committee composed of people who are themselves familiar with the problems to be dealt with. If you form a trade union, you are almost bound to have the officials of the trade union, in a country such as this,

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136 Record of meeting between Capt. C. W. Hamley (ret'd) (Supreintendent Ports & Lights), T. Magner (Assitant Welfare Officer, E.A.R. & H. in the Mombasa), P. E. D. Wilson (Senior Labour Officer, Coast), T. Hopley (Labour Officer, Port), E. C. Eggins (African Affairs Officer Mombasa), Dr. C. D. Rosenwald (Medical Officer of Health, Mombasa), and the East Africa Royal Commission, at Mombasa, 23 October 1953, 2:15 - 3:15 p.m., PRO CO 892/7/3.
being people who have no knowledge of the trade or industry with which they are dealing.\(^{137}\)

Drawing on the historical experience of the United Kingdom, Jack distinguished between the legitimate (economic) and illegitimate roles of trade unions, suggesting that East Africans could choose to follow a better path of development. A submission from the Uganda government concerning conditions of employment expressed views very similar to Jack's:

Industrial relations policy over the past few years has been shaped with the lessons to be learned from the industrial revolution of the 19th century very much in mind. Uganda has not a little in common with conditions in the United Kingdom of 150 years ago, always excepting the fact that the thousands coming into central Uganda looking for work do not have to find employment or starve. It is always easy to be wise after the event and it may be idle to speculate on the shape industrial relations in the United Kingdom would have taken if the technique of joint consultation and the protective legislation we have in Uganda had existed a century and a half ago. We do however know that much of the industrial bitterness in this world which has left such a legacy of mistrust between employer and employee is largely the result of the extremely low living and working conditions during the 19th century, together with the fact that any attempt on the part of the working population to organize themselves was for many years subject to legal penalties. The intention is to educate both sides of industry to the point where their representatives can negotiate freely with each other in an atmosphere which is not poisoned by mutual suspicion and past bitterness.\(^{138}\)

Thus, historical lessons could prevent the repetition of past mistakes. Uganda could emerge from its formative period of industrialization free from the bitterness of class that divided English society. Not the least significant, the teachers who were "to educate both

\(^{137}\) Record of meeting between Petro Mntambo (Territorial Labour Board) and the East Africa Royal Commission, at Dar es Salaam, 2 November 1953, 11:00 - 11:45 a.m., PRO CO 892/13/1. A museum assistant, Mntambo was an African politician on the rise when he wrote, "The African at the road junction," Kvetu (January 1948); secretary, Dar es Salaam Tanganyika African Association, c. 1945; member, Tambarare Citizens Union; leader of United Tanganyika Party branch in Handeni, 1956; UTP candidate in Tanga Province, 1958. Iliffe, Modern History of Tanganyika, 379, 418, 528, 561.

\(^{138}\) Memorandum, "Uganda Protectorate—Conditions of employment for Africans, social services and amenities. Industrial Relations," n.d., PRO CO 892/15/11.
sides of industry" were obviously colonial administrators, the arbiters of the development process.

Associated with the problem of labor's lack of organization in East Africa was its migratory nature in much of the region. In order to organize workers easily and efficiently, they would have to first be stabilized, with workers and their families settled in locations close to industrial or large-scale agricultural enterprises. The Uganda government noted that wages for unskilled labor in the protectorate were based on the "'Bachelor System,' that is on the payment of the amount necessary to attract a man away from his own smallholding for a few months in the year and not on what it costs a man and his family to live." The author of the report argued that wage increases for Africans would not automatically result in a reduction of the number of days worked, as would happen in the case of the target worker. Furthermore, labor was more likely to respond to incentives when it was stabilized: "Some of the largest agricultural employers are beginning to realize the danger of relying on an unstable, largely immigrant labour force and are beginning to provide some married quarters and also incentive schemes to encourage greater earning. It is in the towns of Kampala and Jinja and in the future Tororo that the wages problem will first become acute." The author did not think that a sudden hike in wages for unskilled workers would be a viable solution, and neither could the labor force be stabilized without the provision of homes for workers.

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140 Ibid.
Labor's stability was speculatively linked to productivity by one witness, L. A. Mathias, formerly labor commissioner, Uganda Protectorate. He believed a stable labor force could be established if current migrant workers were adequately paid and provided with decent houses. Mathias said there was insufficient stabilization in Uganda to judge whether or not it would lead to increased output, but he pointed out that stabilized workers in the Belgian Congo were at the stage where they had become extremely reluctant to lose their jobs.\(^{141}\) A memorandum from a private company in Kenya explained how its workers' medical, educational, and recreational needs were provided for, although the company's paternalism was matched by a desire to control its labor. "One of the problems of Kenya," the company observed, "is that African[s] have too much spare time and the Company endeavours to provide some alternatives... to stagnation and vacuity, a fertile medium for the activities of political agitators. On the Utopian Estate of tomorrow one can visualize that, as in a well run European Educational Establishment, the African labourer will be so occupied with his work and community activities that he will have no time to plot the downfall of the European."\(^{142}\)

While most observers deemed the stabilization of labor desirable, the crux of the issue was that stabilization involved the bringing together of large numbers of Africans on plantations or, more importantly, in urban, industrial areas. As well as being centers for industry and commerce, towns and cities were the physical locations where large numbers

\(^{141}\) "Note of a meeting of the Royal Commission at the Colonial Office, on 10th September, 1953," PRO CO 892/3/1.

of people with diverse ethnic and cultural backgrounds encountered one another. A report for the Tanganyika government identified the growth of the cities of Dar es Salaam and Tanga as being of the most immediate concern. In those places Africans "divided by race, culture, religion and language" were thrown together, and they had become the "foci of alien influences and centres of break-down of African culture." Freed from the traditional authority of clan and tribe, administrators, settlers, and some Africans worried that large concentrations of detribalized Africans would produce a wide range of criminal, social, and political problems. Europeans were somewhat comfortable in dealing with African peasants or with the small numbers of western-educated Africans, but urban Africans tended to evade classification and, as a result, they posed perhaps the greatest dilemma for the colonial state.

Local government officials, in particular, raised a series of objections to encouraging or allowing the expansion of the number of urban-dwelling Africans. Nairobi's city treasurer, for example, questioned the wisdom of settling the families of industrial workers in the city with the aim of stabilizing labor. "A too rapid growth of urban development produces chronic inadequacy," he wrote, "inadequate housing, inadequate water, inadequate transport, inadequate social and health services. These conditions may be partly helped by the non-arrival of the family." Furthermore, he noted, if local authorities were forced to subsidize housing for families of African workers, other services would

144 Memorandum, A. W. Kent, City Treasurer, Nairobi, to the East Africa Royal Commission, 23 February 1953, PRO CO 892/5/2.
have to be cut back. The city's deputy mayor concurred, remarking: "I think we are in danger of drifting into 'moonshine' talk if we talk about the need to urge the African to come in on a family basis without trying to discover where we [might] find these phenomenal [sic] figures of finance from." A memorandum from the Tanganyika government described its efforts to improve the standard of housing for African town dwellers, although it was frankly admitted that those efforts had so far failed to help the poorest of workers. The only means of quickly making housing available to nearly all workers appeared to be through subsidization, a housing levy on employers, the use of temporary structures, or a change in the wage structure. In Uganda, social scientists based at Makerere University College and conducting surveys of Kampala and other towns in the protectorate told the commission that they were not even certain of the number of people living in the capital. While 30,000 Africans worked in the municipality, it was unknown how many lived outside of its boundaries. Housing was in short supply, and homes tended to be very overcrowded. There were two government housing estates but these were inadequate to alleviate the shortage. Estimates were somewhat vague, but clearly in Uganda, as in the rest of the region, it would be very expensive to provide even minimum standards of housing and services for growing urban populations.

145 Record of meeting between a delegation from the city council (Mr. Travis, mayor of Nairobi; R. Alexander, deputy mayor; C. Ngure, councilor; Mahan Singh, alderman; [A. W.] Kent, Treasurer; Dr. Gregory, alderman; Sir Richard Woodley; Saunders, deputy engineer; N. Harris, MLC) and the East Africa Royal Commission, at Nairobi, 15 January 1953 [sic—1954], 9:30 - 11:00 a.m., PRO CO 892/8/3.
147 Record of meeting between Dr. A. Richards, C. Wrigley, P. Gutkind, Dr. A. Southall, and the East Africa Royal Commission, at Kampala, 2 December 1953, 2:30 - 4:30 p.m., PRO CO 892/16/1.
Aside from financial concerns, observers argued that the African presence in urban areas raised other issues, social and moral. As one Kenyan chief wrote:

With large scale urban and industrialised population[s] are linked numerous social problems. There are problems of sanitation, morality, and others. It should be the aim of all concerned to see that healthy communities are desirably encouraged to grow up side by side with industries. Good health centres and schools should be built. In addition libraries should be established and cinemas and playing grounds arranged for the recreation of the workers. Without due and adequate attention paid to the provision of these it is difficult to see how we can avoid to produce undesirable characters in the industrial areas.\footnote{Memorandum, Chief E. Bonyo to Secretary, East Africa Royal Commission, 20 January 1954, PRO CO 892/5/4.}

The Buhaya Council, in northwestern Tanganyika, informed the commission that they were "quite aware of the social and also moral problems which arise from the growth of permanent urban and industrial populations, [and] we advise that the hooligans, juveniles and the thronging 'malayas' (prostitutes) only consuming food, space, and money without work in the towns and urban areas are undesirable, and that housing conditions should be made with special regard to fit the single workers and encourage the betterment of the family life there."\footnote{Memorandum, Buhaya Council, Rwanishenye, PO Bukoba, to the Secretary, East Africa Royal Commission, 7 May 1953, PRO CO 892/10/1.} Other witnesses blamed the "bachelor" nature of African urban life for the spread of venereal disease.\footnote{Memorandum, the Makerere College Political Society to the East Africa Royal Commission, May 1953, PRO CO 892/15/1; "The Western Province Tanganyika. Memorandum for the Royal Commission," by the Provincial Commissioner, Western Province, 13 May 1953, PRO CO 892/12/3.} The district commissioner for Nairobi remarked that it was both difficult and costly to try to provide interesting activities to occupy the time of the unemployed children in the city. He thought that the presence of many Kikuyu in Nairobi presented a particular problem because they "did not enjoy the normal healthy recrea-
tions of other people: they preferred [unspecified] disgusting pastimes to watching foot-
ball."\textsuperscript{151}

N. M. Deverell, a social welfare worker, agreed. He believed the problem was that young African males came to Nairobi in order to earn money and they were not particular about how they did so. "If they have not acquired moral discipline in their tribal life," he wrote, "they will certainly not acquire it in a town which has yet developed no community spirit among its African inhabitants and where the upright man is more likely to be greeted with oafish jeers than respect from the semi-literate hordes which infect the city." In conclu-

sion, Deverell summed up European suspicions of urban Africans:

It is difficult for the European to determine what the African really thinks and perhaps therefore we may be forgiven if our impression of the African inhabi-
tants of Nairobi today are those of a conglomeration of many tribes viewing each other and other races with a certain amount of distrust, where each individual seeks primarily his own interest and where apparently passive acceptance of bleak living conditions is coloured by the fact that the young men dream dreams of self government with ministerial posts for all, the old men see visions of a return to pastoral or agricultural life surrounded by rich crops and large herds and the women secretly hanker after economic independence. Few, as yet, conceive that they might be "builders of cities."\textsuperscript{152}

To Deverell these developments clearly indicated that Africans were not properly condi-
tioned to the realities of modern industrial society and their assigned roles within that so-

\textsuperscript{151} "Note of a meeting of the Royal Commission at Nairobi, on the 15 January 1954, with the District Commissioner, Nairobi (Mr. Small), Mr Passells, African Affairs Officer, Nairobi, and Mr. Powell, Chairman of the African Affairs Committee, Nairobi City Council," PRO CO 892/8/3.

\textsuperscript{152} N. M. Deverell, "Social Conditions Arising out of the Growth of Large Urban Populations in East Af-

rica," annex to memorandum by F. A. Passells (City African Affairs Officer), "African Affairs in Nai-
robi," to the Secretary, East Africa Royal Commission, 18 February 1953, PRO CO 892/7/1.
European concern about supervision and control of the urban African population was driven, in part, by suspicions that conditions in Nairobi had contributed to the outbreak of the Mau Mau insurgency. The Mbale chamber of commerce made that point explicitly, arguing that Uganda might be vulnerable to the same threat:

Much of the serious unrest in Kenya can be directly traced to the hasty industrialisation and urbanisation of primitive peoples in and around Nairobi where many thousands of Africans have for years past lived in conditions of almost unbelievable squalor. Trouble of a similar nature might well be expected in Uganda in the event of large groups of Natives being attracted to so-called industrial centres unless adequate housing, medical services, recreational facilities, sanitation and social services are organised in advance. Even when these fundamental needs have been met there still remain the problems of feeding and social order. The mass exodus of large numbers of peasants from village life and the direct authority of their chiefs and district administrative officers to townships creates a problem of great magnitude, the answer to which has yet to be found.\footnote{Mbale Chamber of Commerce, "Memorandum on Land and Development in the Protectorate of Uganda," n.d., PRO CO 892/13/1.}

The chamber also pointed out that industrial workers were ultimately dependent on world conditions for their living standards, and trade recessions could be immensely disruptive:

"Even in highly organised societies such as those of Great Britain and the United States of America the results of slumps are disastrous[,] but in Africa where there are no comparable social services to ameliorate such distress the resultant sufferings and resultant discontent of urban populations might well be catastrophic."\footnote{Ibid.} Improved social services for urban African populations, therefore, were simply prudent measures of self-preservation. To complicate the issue, some officials worried that improvements in services might only exacerbate a bad situation. If, for example, a policy of free schooling for children in urban
areas were adopted in order to alleviate some of the problem caused by unattended
youngsters, it might only encourage new Africans families to come to the towns, increasing demand for inadequate supplies of housing.\textsuperscript{155}

As was the general case in regard to the royal commission's investigations, consideration of urban conditions focused almost exclusively on African males. But in the view of some witnesses, women represented a particular difficulty in the process of socializing Africans to life in the city. A Nairobi alderman argued that women were an obstacle to stabilizing the urban population. Those who claimed that "we will not get the African to become urbanised until we make provision for his old age," he asserted, missed the point:

\ldots the thing that they forget is that an African woman, young woman, who is about to be married—the marriage ceremony is entirely surrounding the house. It is to her what the ring is to an Englishman. If she is not provided with a hut or house of her own and with her own fireplace she is not married and the sacrifice of a goat in connection with the marriage ceremony cannot be completed until all these things are done. You might as well ask a Methodist parson to lend his daughter to the white slave traffic as to expect any respectable African father in the reserves to allow his daughter to come into Nairobi, it is not incorrect to say that he would regard that action in much the same way as the Methodist parson would.\textsuperscript{156}

Thus, the African woman, bound to tradition, held back the socialization of the urban male, and observers deemed it essential to educate urban women. A committee on urban African problems wrote: "Adult education is \ldots a far more urgent matter for the detribalized woman than for her sister in the Reserve, and some means must be found to inculcate,

\textsuperscript{155} "Note of a meeting of the Royal Commission at Nairobi, on the 13th January, 1954, with the Director of Education, together with Mr. Larby, Mr Astley, and Mr. Messenger," PRO CO 892/8/3.

\textsuperscript{156} Record of meeting between a delegation from the city council (Mr. Travis, mayor of Nairobi; R. Alexander, deputy mayor; C. Ngure, councilor; Mahan Singh, alderman; [A. W.] Kent, Treasurer; Dr. Gregory, alderman; Sir Richard Woodley; Saunders, deputy engineer; N. Harris, MLC) and the East Africa Royal Commission, at Nairobi, 15 January 1953 [sic—1954], 9:30 - 11:00 a.m., PRO CO 892/8/3.
where it is needed, those principles of moral behaviour, hygiene and domestic economy
which are the foundation of civilized family life..." In the urban environment, the
point of contact between European and African, civilized and uncivilized, the education
and socialization of the African became a more urgent priority.

Witnesses before the commission put forward a number of proposals to solve or
ameliorate the problems of urban life in East Africa. Some identified the main issue as the
"drift" of young African men to the towns, principally out of boredom with life in rural
areas. One Kenyan settler thought that drift could be reversed by "providing equal at-
tractions and opportunities within the Reserves." G. C. Usher, chairman of Nairobi's
sub-committee on African social services, told royal commissioners that he endorsed the
bylaws in Nairobi and Mombasa that made it illegal for a man to be in the towns for longer
than 72 hours without work. Jack asked him how people kept out of the towns in this
manner could be prevented from squatting on the perimeter. Usher responded: "We are
razing the shanty towns to the ground, and how it is to be prevented otherwise than by
very great police activity, I do not know. I think we have to face that."
Few people believed that Africans could be induced to stay in their villages forever, but at least one local official held that a form of a "separate but equal" arrangement might be feasible. Sylvester White, director of town planning for Dar es Salaam, worried that the Africans who flocked to urban centers were not drawn as a "result of the ordinary economic forces which operated in Europe," and that they "contributed very little to the upkeep of the towns." As a result, municipal authorities were hard pressed to provide suitable housing and public services. His solution, short of compulsory restriction of urban migration, was to suggest that satellite villages be built on the edges of major centers. Inhabitants of those villages would be allowed to sell produce and their labor in the main town, but would be strongly discouraged from taking up permanent residence.161 C. A. Sangai, an African administrative official in northeastern Tanganyika, suggested that sociologists be assigned to study the problem in particular towns and that regulations be passed that would prohibit free entry into urban centers for anything other than short visits. "The land in the country needs the hands of such loitering youth," he wrote, "and efforts should be made to attract them to work on the land instead of drifting into towns to become social misfits."162 In addition, he maintained that representative councils or committees, subordinate to municipal councils or township authorities, should be established to provide surveillance of town dwellers and to be responsible for such things as

161 "Note taken by Professor Jack of the East Africa Royal Commission on a meeting with Mr. F. Sylvester White, Director of Town Planning, at Dar-es-Salaam on 30th October, 1953," PRO CO 892/13/1.
162 Memorandum, C. A. Sangai, Native Authority Office, Lushoto, to the East Africa Royal Commission, n.d., PRO CO 892/10/3.
public health, recreation, housing, and utilities. The main imperative was that young, de-
tribalized males should be subjected to some alternative form of authority and control.

Usher’s committee suggested ways to influence African behavior in towns.

There are two other matters [they wrote] which we regard as of high impor-
tance, that is the provision of electric light and of built-in radio diffusion sets.
It is generally agreed that at the end of the day the lack of adequate lighting in a
house encourages congregation and discussion of and brooding over grievances.
A man should have at least one good light by which he can read in his own house.
He should also in our opinion be able to listen to an appropriately selected radio
programme which will include ordinary amusement, news and instructional matter.
By such means he might receive some education both in language and in citizen-
ship.163

These proposals were somewhat extreme, reflecting the acute anxiety felt by many Euro-
peans in regard to urban Africans during the state of emergency. But Usher’s group also
proposed that Africans should be assisted in purchasing homes, an idea endorsed by a
number of experts.

Advocates of urban African home ownership thought it impractical to attempt to
prevent the drift of young Africans to urban areas. They accepted that African workers
were a permanent presence in the region’s cities and towns and that, as F. A. Passells put
it: “To obtain a stable African population and to help alleviate pressure on the reserves it

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163 “Social Service and Social Security for Africans in Urban Areas,” [report from the sub-committee on
African social services, Nairobi, consisting of G. A. Tyson (alderman and chairman, African affairs
committee, Nairobi city council), C. H. Adams, Eugenie D. Hughes, Mrs. Michael Wood, and C. G.
Usher (chairman)], n.d., PRO CO 892/5/1. Attached to the committee's report as an appendix was a
memorandum, "The African Housing Problem," that had been submitted to the Nairobi chamber of com-
merce by G. A. Tyson in February 1953. Tyson argued in favor of the wider use of electric lighting in
African homes because: "Crime and discontent are nurtured in darkness." He also urged the use of radio
broadcasts as propaganda: "With most of their vernacular papers quite properly proscribed, and European
or Government owned publications regarded with suspicion, the printed word may have little value [as
propaganda]. But the wireless is a weapon which other Colonies, notably Northern Rhodesia, have used
with far greater effect than Kenya. Cheap radio diffusion could provide news and entertainment to draw
the interest of Africans away from their usual topic of conversation, discontent."
is necessary completely to urbanise large numbers of Nairobi Africans who are at present regarded as having 'one foot in the reserve.' Administrators should eventually aim, he wrote, to replace tribal loyalties with "the civic pride which is at present completely lacking." The town planning advisor for Nairobi asserted that the ownership of a house in the city would give an African worker a stake in the community, alleviating the problems caused by an overwhelmingly "bachelor" population. Kenya's renowned archaeologist, L. S. B. Leakey, told the commission that a most difficult task would be to sever the connection between urban dwellers and the reserves. Africans, he asserted, seldom regarded their urban habitation as "home" because, "home is the place where the ancestral spirits join with the living to make one solid family, and ancestral spirits will never dwell in rented, temporary, accommodation [sic]." He suggested, however, that actual ownership of city house might make it a "home" in African eyes.

Africans who testified before the commission were also anxious about the deleterious effects of urban life, although predictably they emphasized different aspects of the problem than did the Europeans. They generally agreed that a policy promoting family living in towns and cities would be beneficial, without prescribing home ownership as a panacea. Kairu Ngure, a Nairobi city councillor, for example, insisted that Africans would be reluctant to stay in towns permanently unless life there was attractive. In other words,

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164 Memorandum, F. A. Passells (City African Affairs Officer), "African Affairs in Nairobi," to the Secretary, East Africa Royal Commission, 18 February 1953, PRO CO 892/7/1.
165 Memorandum, H. Thornley Dyer to the Secretary, East Africa Royal Commission, 3 July 1953, PRO CO 892/5/2.
workers had to have adequate housing for themselves and their families, sufficient income to provide for children's education, and some security for old age. He concluded: "A hopeful future must be created for the Urban African." Ronald Ngala of Kilifi District, Kenya, told commissioners that, "if housing systems could be looked into we feel that the African could be happily living in a town with his wife and children and an atmosphere of home life would make the African like town life and also would in a way put him quite at home and happily at work." But Ngala also insisted that the first issue that should be addressed in dealing with urban problems was racism. "We feel," he wrote, "that there should be more cooperation between races living in cities or towns[]. Social equality, social privileges, should be allowed to these different races living together. . . ."  

In its submission to the royal commission, the Makerere College Political Society identified low wages as the main reason why East African urban workers were unwilling to let go of their claims to small plots of land in the rural areas where they were born. Ironically, they pointed out, the low wage economy of the region was originally based on the assumption that workers would be "subsidized" by earnings from land at home, inefficiently worked by their wives who could not afford to join them in the towns. The mi-

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167 Memorandum, Kairu Ngure (Councillor, Nairobi City Council), "Re: Memorandum on "Urbanised Africans in Towns,"" to the Secretary, East Africa Royal Commission, 29 December 1953, PRO CO 892/5/4.
169 Record of meeting between representatives from Kilifi District (Ronald G. Ngala, John Said Lajar, Johnston Murramba, and Paul H. Nguzo) and the East Africa Royal Commission, 21 October 1953, 3:00-3:45 p.m., at Mombasa, PRO CO 892/7/3.
170 Ibid.
grant labor system, therefore, meant that neither industrial nor agricultural production could achieve peak efficiency.

The disintegration of family life caused by this system of migrant labour [the society maintained] has had many bad effects on the bringing up of children; and in urban areas has been the background factor that has encouraged the spread of many venereal diseases. Conditions of employment and the general social life in urban centres should be improved sufficiently to make family life and complete urbanisation possible. In this way those not particularly interested in farming could find some security in urban life, and so be willing to abandon their land, thus help[ing] to relieve congested areas.\footnote{Memorandum, the Makerere College Political Society to the East Africa Royal Commission, May 1953, PRO CO 892/15/1.}

Directly criticizing the policy of the protectorate government for causing many of the problems in urban areas, a group of Baganda landowners blamed the immigration of foreigners, African and non-African, for creating congestion and unemployment, "with its inevitable consequence of burglary, house-breaking, theft and similar crimes."\footnote{Memorandum, Baganda Landowners' General Council to the Chairman, East Africa Royal Commission, u.f.s. His Highness the Kabaka of Buganda, at Mmengo, 15 April 1953, PRO CO 892/15/1.} In general, Africans and Europeans alike were anxious to find solutions to the pressing problems created by rapid urban growth, but African critics tended to blame failings of the colonial system—racism, low wages, inadequate immigration controls—rather than the people themselves for creating the problems in the first place.

Throughout their investigations, members of the East Africa Royal Commission encountered fundamental disagreements among various witnesses, particularly between the views expressed by Europeans and Africans. There was hardly a clear path to follow in terms of development. But the commission also received testimony regarding the ob-
stacles to development, most of which revolved around the human factor. Equally important, whereas the commissioners seem to have felt that their main task was to formulate recommendations regarding the region's economic development, politics inevitably insinuated itself into the picture, and the commission was not able to address fundamental political issues effectively.

Various European witnesses impressed upon the commission the advisability of placing a higher priority on economic than on political progress in the region. If the royal commission made any recommendations on constitutional matters, Michael Blundell, a settler and member of the Kenya Legislative Council, suggested, it might only hinder future cooperation among East Africa's "communities" and undermine the Kenyan constitutional talks arranged under an agreement worked out by James Griffiths, secretary of state, 1950-51. Commissioners told Blundell that, while they were not primarily concerned with political and constitutional issues, they might have to address the latter in order to affect the former. Blundell acknowledged the point but reiterated that nothing would be helped by the commission making specific recommendations on delicate political questions. He said that the political problem in Kenya as he saw it was how to make the European realise that he is not living in 1900, and how to make the African realise that his capabilities lagged far behind his political aspirations. . . . He believed the first step was to give the African the semblance of partnership without in fact giving him the 50-50 executive share which he is at present incapable of sustaining. Mr. Blundell said that the reason why he had to go slowly in this matter was that the Mau Mau situation had created a European state of mind which was certainly not favourable for pressing full partnership. 173

173 "Note of an informal meeting between The Hon: Michael Blundell, Leader of the European Elected Members in Kenya Legislative Council, and all Members of the Royal Commission, with the exception of Mr. Gaitskell, in London, on 30th June, 1953, at the Colonial Office," PRO CO 892/3/1.
Some members of the commission took umbrage at Blundell's remarks. Frankel objected that the Kenya settler leader seemed to imply that the royal commission would make recommendations contrary to the best interests of East Africa. Hudson, "said that he did not see how the Commission could avoid entering the political field, the Commission might conclude that the first objective in East Africa must be to restore inter-racial confidence, and immediately it reached such a conclusion it would have entered the sphere of politics. Mr. Sykes suggested that the first step might be to try and restore a little confidence in the Royal Commission."

Blundell responded that political advance for Africans would inevitably follow if they focused on improving their economic situation by improving their skills and efficiency. Commissioner Kidaha then pointed out that "much of the bitterness and feeling of frustration among the better educated Africans arose from precisely what Mr. Blundell had mentioned, namely the assumption that the African, because he is an African, is inefficient and irresponsible. He thought that this bitterness would not be removed until all races started to judge men by their qualities rather than the colour of their skins." Blundell concluded his remarks by reiterating the need to slow down the pace of African political advance, a pace being forced by pressure of political arguments put forward in the United Kingdom and taken up by African "imitators."

Other witnesses were less forceful than Blundell but no less determined that economic advance should take precedence over political concessions to Africans. An agricultural officer in Kenya, for example, maintained that the government had been too lenient in

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174 Ibid.
175 Ibid.
enforcing necessary changes in agricultural practice and that progress demanded "far more vigorous and direct methods of rule. Democratic institutions may develop after a sound economic basis has been created to support them. I believe that basis can be established, but that it will never be done by putting democratic theories first, and the economic basis on which to support them second. If we are not prepared to accept this responsibility, then we might just as well shuffle out now and leave the africans [sic] to their own devices." The latter option may have proven quite popular in African circles. A mining consultant in Tanganyika told Jack that political insecurity in the region ("Mau-Mau' on the one side and of South Africa's racial attitude on the other") had discouraged foreign investment in at least one major mining operation and likely affected others. The middle, "secure," political situation preferred by international capital was, apparently, continued British rule.

Many European witnesses paid lip service to the notion that Africans would eventually assume greater political power, but for the present the general opinion was that there were too few Africans "qualified" to exercise political responsibility. The chairman of Mombasa's municipal board said he would be willing to increase African representation on the board beyond the current two members but there was a problem of finding capable representatives. Dow questioned this, saying there were surely more than two qualified Africans in a town the size of Mombasa, to which the board chairman replied: "I should

177 Record of meeting between Professor Jack and Jack Spalding, Mining Consultant, 5 November 1953, PRO CO 892/13/1.
imagine so, Sir, but they have not yet found their way onto the Board. We have had four in the past, and only one has ever spoken, the other three might just as well not have attended." A submission from the Tanganyika government revealed a similar, less than optimistic, view of the possibility of rapid political advance. A paper presented to a conference of provincial commissioners lamented the lack of ability among native administration personnel. "Admittedly," the paper noted, "there are notable exceptions. But the general run of Native Authorities themselves, both superior and subordinate, and their salaried clerical and other staff is ill-paid, ill-qualified and often corrupt." Most administrators accepted without question that it would take years before Africans were prepared to exercise self government.

Nevertheless, the commission did hear some calls from some Europeans for immediate political reform. J. B. Carson, a former colonial service officer in Kenya, insisted that an end to the "color bar" in Kenya was of primary importance. From the United Kingdom, the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society advocated a policy of non-discrimination in regard to the alienation of land. On the whole, however, few Europeans made more than token gestures concerning the possibility of political reform at some vaguely specified future time.

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178 Record of meeting between Mr. O'Hagan, Mr. Foster (Chairman—Municipal Board), Mr. Radcliffe (Town Clerk), Mr. Goodbody (District Commissioner), Mr. Eggins (African Affairs Officer), and the East Africa Royal Commission, at Mombasa, 22 October 1953, 2:15 - 3:45 p.m., PRO CO 892/7/3.
181 Letter, C. W. W. Greenidge, Secretary, Anti-Slavery & Aborigines Protection Society to Sir Frederick Seaford, 25 July 1953, PRO CO 892/5/2.
Far more common among Europeans was the attitude that the majority of Africans were not prepared to exercise political power responsibly and, indeed, were hardly interested in doing so. "A great mass of the peasantry," claimed Ugandan community development commissioner, "are still in a state in which they still like to be told by somebody." Europeans questioned whether and to what extent African political leaders represented the views of ordinary people, who allegedly cared more about their future material well-being than about politics. L. T. Gunn, chairman of the Toro European Association, claimed the Uganda National Congress had links to Kenya African Union and, therefore, to Mau Mau. "The leaders of these institutions," he wrote, "are not as they are called the genuine natural leaders of the people. They are men of no scruples who are out for personal power, and later tyranny of the people they are supposing to bring to a fuller life." Somewhat more temperately, the provincial administration for Tanganyika's Lake Province, in a memorandum prepared for the royal commission, described the spread of nationalistic and anti-European sentiment by a new brand of ambitious African politicians: "These developments are more conspicuous in the towns and among de-tribalised communities, but they are reaching out into the rural and tribal areas also. The more clamant and vocal among these 'embryo politicians' by no means represent the voice of the people. But they are gaining in influence over the people and will continue to do so until Govern-

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182 Record of meeting between Mr. Richards (Commissioner for Community Development) and the East Africa Royal Commission, at Kampala, 9 December 1953, 3:30 - 5:00 p.m., PRO CO 892/16/3.
183 L. T. Gunn (Chairman Toro European Association), "Memorandum on Uganda to the Royal Commission," n.d., PRO CO 892/15/2. Gunn also railed against "far too many Labour M.P.s coming out here from England causing trouble over matters of which they are entirely ignorant and prejudiced before leaving England." He accused men like Fenner Brockway and Leslie Hale of attempting to impose alien
ment, aided by the responsible elements of African society, can regain the initiative."¹⁸⁴

Time and again, Europeans such as C. Handley-Bird, an unofficial member of the Uganda Legislative Council, reiterated the belief that the true African, the common peasant, remained loyal to their chiefs and paramount chiefs and really did not support the upstart politicians who appealed to a nascent nationalism.¹⁸⁵ Commissioners themselves occasionally echoed similar views. In questioning representatives of the Tanganyikan African Association [TAA], including the future president of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, Seaford pointedly focused on the fact that Nyerere said the TAA aimed to persuade Africans to take an interest in politics. He implied that perhaps it would be wiser if Africans took more interest in "their advancement generally" and issues such as the development of industry.¹⁸⁶

Not surprisingly, Africans, too, raised numerous questions concerning essentially political problems. Just as readictably, they generally emphasized different issues than

¹⁸⁵ Record of meeting between Mr. [C.] Handley-Bird and the East Africa Royal Commission, at Entebbe, 14 December 1953, 9:00 - 11:00 a.m., PRO CO 892/16/5.
¹⁸⁶ Record of meeting between representatives of the Tanganyikan African Association (Julius Ngerere [sic], Joseph Kimalando, G. H. Pacha, Jeremiah Cleophas) and the East Africa Royal Commission, at Dar es Salaam, 28 October 1953, 10:15 - 10:45 a.m., PRO CO 892/13/1. Julius Nyerere: son of government chief among the Zanaki; among first Zanaki to become Roman Catholic; president of Tanganyika African Welfare Society at Makerere College, which converted to a branch of the Tanganyika African Association, 1945; schoolteacher, 1946; Edinburgh University, 1949; member, Fabian Colonial Bureau; returned to Tanganyika, 1952; president of TAA, 1953; cofounder, Tanganyika African National Union, 1954. Joseph Kimalando: Chagga civil servant; active in Dar es Salaam branch of Tanganyika African Association, late 1930s; founded Moshi branch of TAA, 1940, and Arusha branch, 1945; cofounder, TANU, 1954, and leader until 1956. Germano Pacha: represented Tabora TAA; cofounder of TANU, 1954. Iliffe, Modern History of Tanganyika, 422, 427, 447, 491, 508-9, 511-13
European witnesses. Kenya Africans were particularly vocal in calling for equal representation in government at both the local and the legislative level. They vehemently denounced the "color bar," the unofficial policy that prevented Africans from holding high posts in civil administration and in private firms. One witness declared: "Snobbery is one thing which prevents the races here in East Africa from agreeing together. The Africans are much looked down on by the other races, and when they see that they are despised so much that they lose respect for themselves, and because of the extreme indifference with which they are treated, the Africans have no heart to do well." In other words, racial discrimination affected Africans both as individuals and in terms of limiting their potential contributions to society.

While also resentful of discriminatory practices favoring non-Africans, African witnesses from Uganda and Tanganyika strenuously objected to any notion that East Africa should become a single political unit. Sir Philip Mitchell had aroused suspicions when he advised in his dispatch on land and population that the problems of the region should be investigated on an inter-territorial basis. The notion that East Africa was a single economic entity seemed to suggest that it should also be viewed as a single political entity.

\[187\] Memorandum, African Employees of Land and Shipping Co. of East Africa, Ltd., to the Secretary, East Africa Royal Commission, n.d., PRO CO 892/5/4; Memorandum, Njoroge Ruthi to the East Africa Royal Commission, 30 December 1953, PRO CO 892/5/4.
\[188\] Memorandum, Jesse Eshikhati [Opembe] to the Secretary, East Africa Royal Commission, 21 March 1953, PRO CO 892/5/4; Memorandum, Sawe Arap Bune to the Secretary, East Africa Royal Commission, 22 December 1953, PRO CO 892/5/4.
\[189\] Memorandum, Stephen K. Gichina to the Secretary, East Africa Royal Commission, 15 December 1953, PRO CO 892/5/4 [Original in Swahili and English translation in file].
Concluding their memorandum to the commission, the Kilimanjaro Chagga Citizens' Union requested an "emphatic assurance" that there would be no political federation of Tanganyika and Kenya. 191 The government of the Buganda kingdom forcefully declared:

This Government need not at the present ventilate their opinion, but have all along been very cautious of such a policy [of inter-territoriality], and may be bold to state that Sir Phillip's submissions in the dispatch are considered as a back-door method of bringing up again the issue of East African Federation. They, at least, tend that way. We find no land hunger over large areas of Tanganyika, nor are we in Uganda, certainly not out of short sight, bothered by land problems. It is thus only fair to say that His Highness's Government, looking at the Kenya problems as they are, find it difficult, if not impossible, to discern their applicability to Uganda, the more so to Buganda. 192

Regional federation held few attractions outside of Kenya, for it only promised to transfer Kenyan political difficulties to its neighbors. Ugandans and Tanganyikans feared that they might be asked to preserve the White Highlands by satisfying the land hunger of Kenyan Africans with swaths of their territory.

Any development plans would obviously have to take into consideration the distrust that many Africans had for colonial governments, because few experts believed that economic development would have any chance of success in the absence of the willing support of ordinary people. Gaitskell discussed the problem in a meeting with some official members of the Tanganyika Legislative Council. A. H. Pike, member designate for lands and mines, remarked that, "our greatest problem at the moment is a sort of defensive suspicion on the part of all Africans." Gaitskell agreed, adding: "It is exactly what we

191 Memorandum, Kilimanjaro Chagga Citizens' Union to the Secretary, East Africa Royal Commission, 28 June 1953, PRO CO 892/10/1.
192 "Memorandum of His Highness's Government of the Buganda Kingdom to the Royal Commission on Land and Population in East Africa," 12 September 1953, PRO CO 892/15/5.
found in Kenya. A general suspicions and nostalgia for their old time ways. It is in fact, exactly that antithesis of what one really wants." Commissioners therefore encouraged witnesses to suggest strategies that might be used to influence African opinion.

Christian missionaries and other witnesses asserted that the commission should not overlook spirituality as a factor in development. A delegation from the Roman Catholic missions in Kenya maintained Africans had been ill treated by other races in the colony and consequently became suspicious of every government initiative, even those designed to help them. The squatters were considered a special problem. "They [the squatters] have no schools or no religion," the archbishop of Nairobi said, "they have been brought up as barbarians and barbarism is as clear as daylight in these sections." W. Scott Dickson of the Christian Council of Kenya, which represented most of the non-Roman Catholic churches and missions in the colony, believed the creation of "a stable Christian state" would be the wisest path to follow because only Christianity would draw all three of the races in the region together, providing the foundation for a future linking of Kenya with Uganda and Tanganyika. In a more direct manner, one settler reported that his previous attempt to shake "the African worker out of his lethargy" failed, despite the close attention he paid to his workers' physical and dietary needs, because, "there was insufficient moral

193 Record of meeting between Vicars Harris (Member for Lands and Mines), A. H. Pike (Member Designate for Lands and Mines), C. E. J. Biggs (Member of the Land Utilisation Board), and the East Africa Royal Commission, at Dar es Salaam, 27 October 1953, 9:30 - 10:45 a.m., PRO CO 892/13/1.
194 Record of meeting between a delegation from the Roman Catholic Missions of Kenya (His Grace Most Rev. Dr. J. McCarthy, Archbishop of Nairobi; Very Rev. F. S. Leahy, Kisumu; Rev. W. Dunne, Nakuru; Very Rev. F. Agnolo, Nyeri) and the East Africa Royal Commission, at Nairobi, 9 January 1954, 9:30 - 11:15 a.m., PRO CO 892/8/1.
195 Memorandum, W. Scott Dickson (Gen. Sec., the Christian Council of Kenya) to the East Africa Royal Commission, 27 August 1953, PRO CO 892/5/1.
strength of character [among the workers] to withstand the temptations which increased responsibilities brought with them." He then undertook a campaign of "Moral Rearmament," based on prayer, which reportedly appealed to his workers' sense of spirituality. Here, he argued, was the formula for successful development.\textsuperscript{196}

In a less sweeping sense than spiritual renewal, radio broadcasts seemed promising as a way to win over African hearts and minds. "There is no doubt whatever," claimed the African Information Services in Nairobi, "that broadcasting is potentially one of the strongest weapons available to Government for influencing and guiding the minds of the Africans."\textsuperscript{197} Another witness, however, saw radio as a two-edged sword, warning of the subversive broadcasts directed at East Africa by All-India Radio and that "a further source of poisonous radio propaganda was Radio Cairo who broadcast in Arabic."\textsuperscript{198} Films offered other possibilities, and a submission from the Tanganyika government noted:

"Government is conscious of the great influence, for good or ill, which may be exercised on African minds by the cinema, and is carrying out a number of experiments designed to assess the relative impact of different kinds of films on different types of audiences and to stimulate the production of local films employing local talent."\textsuperscript{199} One of the problems these experiments encountered was that films which appealed to urban audiences did not

\textsuperscript{196} Memorandum, "By an African born settler on his work on labour relationships amongst his community of one thousand," 6 October 1953, PRO CO 892/5/2 [At the head of the memorandum is the name "K. A. Adcock," but it is signed "P. E. Podseth, Manager and Director, E.A. Sisal Estates Ltd."].
\textsuperscript{198} "Note of a meeting of the Royal Commission, held in Nairobi, on the 31st December, 1953, with the Director of Information, Brigadier Gibson," PRO CO 892/7/6.
\textsuperscript{199} "Cinematograph Experiments," n.d., PRO CO 892/11/5.
necessarily appeal to rural audiences. Furthermore, the memorandum reported:

"Research has shown that there is very often strong resistance to any change among the individuals who comprise a rural audience, and it should not be assumed that, because they travel long distances to see a moving picture and are apparently delighted with the performance, they are necessarily going to change their agricultural customs."\(^{200}\)

Newer media were promising, but more conventional approaches to shaping African opinion involved education and the power of example. Obviously, most state-directed education would take place in schools, but T. G. Askwith, commissioner for community development in Kenya, wrote that formal schooling, which most Africans left at the end of their fourth year, was insufficient to familiarize the African population with the basic thrust of government policy. In many cases, he asserted, "the teachers in the schools are themselves ignorant of the essential facts regarding Colonial affairs, and have a poorly developed sense of values."\(^{201}\) As a result, Africans were susceptible to the lies spread by political agitators. He continued: "In addition to a lack of general economic and political knowledge, there is also a lack of understanding as to how the indigenous social structure may be adapted to meet the changed and changing conditions of today."\(^{202}\) As evidence of lack of adaptation, Askwith pointed to Mau Mau, which he maintained was an attempt on the part of the Kikuyu to reestablish a primitive society as an alternative to the disintegrative impact of the modern, western way of life introduced by the British. The role of the

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\(^{200}\) Ibid.

\(^{201}\) T. G. Askwith, "Purpose of the Community Development Organisation," 26 February 1953, PRO CO 892/7/1.

\(^{202}\) Ibid.
Community Development Organisation, therefore, was to provide accurate information explaining the process of social change in East Africa, particularly so that African parents would be able to help their children adapt to the new conditions produced. He concluded:

There was a well defined code of behaviour in tribal society which provided the solutions to most social problems. European influence has not only caused the break-down of this corporate spirit, but has also unconsciously fostered individualism. Leaders are not lacking today and some are outstanding, on the other hand some have an extremely dangerous influence. There is a section of African leaders who would gladly give the right lead if they knew what that lead should be. It is this section that the Community Development Organisation is trying to help.  

Individualism, apparently, was alien to the African context and not, in Askwith's view, an aspect of western culture that Africans should emulate.

Another approach to positively influencing African behavior and outlook was through personal contact with administrative officers and settlers who taught by example. In a meeting with Uganda's commissioner for community development, Gaitskell said the commissioners "... have ourselves been impressed that the areas in East Africa which seem particularly to have gone ahead have usually been associated with the continuous presence of some particularly live personality in the shape of a District Commissioner, Medical Officer or the Agricultural Officer and we were wondering whether that factor is not really the key factor in getting things done and accepted by the people." Gaitskell, with Sykes agreeing, argued that the key to the "live personality" would be emphasis on leadership skills rather than technical knowledge, and technical officers would

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203 Ibid.
204 See above, 146-47, 153.
205 Record of meeting between Mr. Richards (Commissioner for Community Development) and the East Africa Royal Commission, at Kampala, 9 December 1953, 3:30 - 5:00 p.m., PRO CO 892/16/3.
still be needed to support his work. Gaitskell's musings on the influence that could be exercised by charismatic administrators were perhaps sparked by a session the royal commission had with the landowner and former treasurer of Buganda, S. W. Kulubya,206 earlier on the same day that they interviewed the community development commissioner. Kidaha asked Kulubya what was the cause of the widespread misunderstanding and suspicion between ordinary Africans and government officials and how could it be alleviated. Kulubya attributed the cause of the problem simply to African suspicion of any measures introduced by "white people." A solution, he suggested, would be for the protectorate government to work more closely with local authorities, allowing chiefs, for example, to appoint some technical officers. More importantly, agricultural officers and others would have to "try and devote their time to live out in the Sazas [counties] and move about among the Africans instead of coming to Kampala and having a bit [of] golf and tennis. . . ." Kulubya and the commissioners seemed to agree that, if only officers spent more time in the districts than they did in Kampala (with Hudson adding: "In the old days in Buganda the District Commissioner did live out in the country. . ."), that would create an empathetic understanding between government and people, thereby laying the groundwork for the trust and understanding necessary for carrying forward larger projects of development.207

206 Above, 90-91, 115.
207 Record of meeting between Mr. S. W. Kulubya, MBE, and the East Africa Royal Commission, at Kampala, 9 December 1953, 11:15 - 12:00 p.m., PRO CO 892/16/3.
Overall, schemes put forward to the commission for influencing African opinion were rather speculative. Witnesses might suggest that radio, education, or personal contact would produce a better informed and less suspicious African peasant, but the evidence presented seems less than convincing. There were perhaps two basic reasons to account for this phenomenon. In the first place, colonial governments spent a great deal of effort addressing methods of promoting development but comparatively little effort winning the support of ordinary people. Secondly, evidence presented to the commission suggests there was a problem in identifying the target audience for that type of propaganda effort. Who was the African?

Even basic data was often lacking regarding the African population of the region. In his dispatch on land and population in East Africa, Mitchell had premised the urgency of reform on the alleged dangers of a rapidly growing population outpacing development and even the region's capacity to feed its people. Few African witnesses addressed the question of population increase, other than in regard to demands for more land for reserves, but the few who did were skeptical of forecasts of doom. The Uganda National Congress pointed out that the evidence upon which population projections were based often amounted to a district officer observing many African women with babies on their backs. Census data, the congress maintained, was very unreliable. Furthermore, the organization wrote:

What is so strange about this neo-Malthusian threat of population overstripping the means of subsistence, is the fact that in some areas where there is SUPPOSED to be the greatest pressure on land (e.g. Kigezi District) National Parks have been declared for the sake of preserving wild life in order to attract millionaire tourists. It is a most enigmatic consideration that two National Parks
have been declared in Kigezi—in that small mining district where already people have been evicted (or "re-settled" as the Government puts it sweetly) because of alleged overcrowding. We might be forgiven if we say that we see here a device of forcing Africans to work the Kilembe Mines by depriving them of means of livelihood.\textsuperscript{208}

The passage displays not only skepticism about statistical data concerning population growth but the absence of any sense of trust in government motives in general.

Among European witnesses, expert or otherwise, there was certainly no consensus on the issue of the rate of population growth. C. J. Martin, director of the East African Statistics Department, said that, largely on the basis of studies of the 1948 census and other information, "it was possible authoritatively to refute exaggerated statements regarding the rate of population increase."\textsuperscript{209} Settler witnesses were more likely to echo Mitchell's fears. In Kenya, for example, Rebecca Fane described a Malthusian nightmare in which the teeming hordes of the future would outstrip the food supply unless Africans could be persuaded to adopt birth control measures.\textsuperscript{210} Humphrey Slade and E. B. Worthington warned: "Fifty years hence there will probably be some 35 million Africans in East Africa instead of the present 17 million or so (some 12 million in Kenya in place of the present 6 million). Somehow or other during that period these people have to be turned into an asset rather than a liability."\textsuperscript{211} European settlers and officials alike tended

\textsuperscript{208} Uganda National Congress, PO Box 2015, Kampala, "Land and Population in East Africa: Memorandum submitted to the Royal Commission visiting East Africa, 1953," PRO CO 892/15/1.

\textsuperscript{209} "Note on a meeting of the Royal Commission with Mr. C. J. Martin, (Director of the East African Statistics Department) in London at the Colonial Office on 17th July, 1953," PRO CO 892/3/1.

\textsuperscript{210} Memorandum, R. Fane, "A Note on Food Production and the Necessity of Birth-Control," to the East Africa Royal Commission, 4 March 1953, PRO CO 892/5/2.

\textsuperscript{211} Humphrey Slade and E. B. Worthington, "A Note on the Native Problem," 25 February 1953, PRO CO 892/5/2.
to view the prospect of more Africans as a multiplication of existing administrative problems and as more mouths to feed, rather than as a potential source of labor, skills, ideas, and other spurs to productivity.

Despite all of the development strategies laid before the royal commission, there remained some doubt as to whether the African could indeed be turned into an asset rather than a liability. At the heart of the issue was the question of the very nature of African personality and its adaptability to modern conditions. One might have expected the royal commission to turn to the academic experts in that area--anthropologists--for answers, but such was not the case. Aside from the few anthropologists on the staffs of colonial establishments and the sociologists employed by the East African Institute of Social Research, no anthropologists were consulted by or submitted materials to the commission.212 Nevertheless, the commission did not lack for opinions from people who defined the African character from their own perspectives.

Europeans unanimously agreed that African society would be profoundly transformed by the process of economic development or modernization. Differences of opinion among Europeans emerged, however, when it came to the question of assessing the suitability and adaptability of African character in relation to the development process. Some (especially settlers but also some officials) portrayed African character as an obstacle to

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212 Beverly Garthtall points out the results of the anthropological work on East African political systems were not widely available to non-specialists prior to the publication of Lucy Mair's *Primitive Government* (London: Harmondsworth) in 1962. Garthtall writes: "The battery of concepts for analyzing leadership patterns used in contemporary political anthropology was not available even to professionals prior to 1960. Instead, the static, ahistorical, and overly structural British social anthropology of the colonial period offered limited guidance to an inquiring official." "British Administrators, Colonial Chiefs, and the Comfort of Tradition: An Example from Uganda," *African Studies Review* 26, 1 (March 1983): 14-15.
development, an unchanging brake on the process of modernization. Progress, in this case, would be brought about mainly through the efforts of settlers themselves, the mainstays of the economy. Many officials agreed that Africans had many characteristics that impeded development, but they argued these could be overcome through a long-term tutorial in modern citizenship supervised, naturally, by colonial administrators. Europeans in Kenya tended to hold rather harsher views than those in the other territories (although there were many exceptions to this generalization), a result perhaps of a combination of history and the contemporary political economy. Constitutionally, Kenya was a colony, considered in fact to be British territory. Uganda was a protectorate and Tanganyika a mandated territory under United Nations trusteeship. Even if the three territories were treated much the same administratively, in the latter two there was at least a greater degree of lip service—and quite plausibly more serious consideration—paid to African interests and rights. Of course, in Kenya European settlers constituted a greater proportion of the population than in either of the other territories. Finally, the Mau Mau insurgency in Kenya had raised anxieties among the European population, both settlers and officials, and their pronouncements before the royal commission sometimes reflected an undercurrent of barely repressed panic.

It should be noted that when Europeans referred to the "African" it is often not clear whether they were alluding to race or culture, the two regularly being commingled. If African character flaws or lacunae were deemed to be racially determined, one might assume that they represented, at some level, permanent barriers to modernization. Cul-
tural deficiencies, on the other hand, might be correctable. Much of the evidence suggested that British observers, for the most part, considered Africans to be culturally disadvantaged and capable of adapting to modern conditions. Retired Brigadier General Sir Godfrey D. Rhodes wrote:

We can agree that in "the Eyes of God" every human being is potentially equal, each is Divine, created in God's Imagine [sic], each, of whatever religion or of no religion, has the spark of the Christ in him, and has had this spark down all the ages since man was created. Each therefore, is entitled to fair play, an opportunity to grow and develop. But even in the Eyes of God, it cannot be said that all men, or all nations, or all races have reached the same stage of development. . . . It will then be asked, what is the test of more advanced development? It is demonstrated only in leadership—in achievement. . . .

With these observations behind us, we must now be realistic and state facts so far as East Africa is concerned. The only Government of East Africa that can be contemplated over the next 100 years at least, measured by any test of training[,] experience or past achievement, is a British Government, composed mainly of European Britishers. . . .

The brigadier's "enlightened" views on race had definite limits.

No one could accuse Agnes R. Shaw, member of the Kenya Legislative Council for Nyanza, of prevaricating on the race issue. She welcomed the royal commission's inquiry because, she wrote:

It will serve to underline two things. First, the magnitude of our problems in Kenya and, secondly, the immense difficulty of carrying out the changes and reforms essential for a solution, when the vast majority of the African peoples with whom we have to deal are little better than savages, capable of a complete return to the worst form of barbarism, even, as has been shewn [sic] in recent months, although outwardly some of them may have attained a veneer of civilisation.  

213 Memorandum, Brig. Gen. Sir Godfrey D. Rhodes, "The Need for Confidence," to the Secretary, East Africa Royal Commission, 21 May 1953, PRO CO 892/5/2.
Shaw's view reflected both settler racism and the panic induced by Mau Mau, a subject upon which S. H. Frankel remarked in his autobiography. He recounted how one settler told him, during the commission's tour of Kenya, of being awakened in the middle of the night by two of his "boys," laborers who had gate-crashed a dance and were thrown out, and his initial fear that they were Mau Mau out to kill him. When Frankel asked what he did, he responded: "Oh, I thrashed them, of course—ten strokes each." Another settler related to the commissioner how he beat a worker who had the effrontery to wear a tie on payday.  

Not everyone was as blunt as Shaw in commenting on alleged racial characteristics, but many other witnesses merely implied that there were limits—perhaps racially determined—to adaptability and that Africans were destined to remain, in certain respects, permanently inferior to Europeans.

Not all Europeans shared the general skepticism regarding African capabilities. A dissenting view found a few adherents, with some witnesses maintaining that Africans themselves were quite capable of assessing and adapting to changing circumstances without heroic efforts on the part of Europeans. An unidentified Tanganyikan official, for example, objected to the notion, as some would have it, that the Masai were "picturesque but useless members of Society and that their only future is as museum pieces." He argued that the Masai, capable of producing in a harsh environment several thousand cattle annually for outside consumption, were certainly not useless, and they were, with some encouragement, capable of adapting to "modern conditions without destroying their excel-

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lent qualities and characteristics." R. M. Bere, provincial commissioner for Uganda's Northern Province, attested that, "with the exception of the Karamoja, tribal organization shows little sign of restricting reform." Customary law and social practices, he argued, were not rigid and were continually adapting to new circumstances. Furthermore, while education played a role in that process of adaptation, legislation by the protectorate government more often than not had a negative influence. He concluded that "interference with custom causing its breakdown would produce graver social problems than its maintenance." Audrey Richards, director of the East African Institute of Social Research, agreed. The record of a meeting between her and the royal commission states:

"[Richards] said she thought that the disintegration of tribal society was over-stressed. Tribal Society was capable of a great deal of self-adjustment. There was a tendency to expect Africans suddenly to develop their whole structure on European lines." Richards, Bere, and other Europeans who believed Africans to be capable of adapting to new conditions still tended to assume that government would play some role in the process, although that role was generally implied to be limited in extent and duration, perhaps only being sufficient to overcome African conservatism.

Conservatism, many European observers maintained, was an innate African characteristic and an obstacle to modernization. Some believed it was a surmountable obstacle.

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216 "Notes for presentation to the Royal Commission on Land and Population in East Africa," 30 April 1953, PRO CO 892/12/3.
218 "Minutes of meeting of a committee of the East African Royal Commission with Dr. Audrey Richards on 22nd September, 1953," PRO CO 892/3/1.
In response to a question from commissioner Gaitskell as to whether or not tribal conservatism was "the obstacle in the way of progress" in Kenya, R. O. Hennings, secretary for agriculture and natural resources, replied that "many of the people were conservative but there were indications that a growing section of the population was in favour of change and he thought that provided a tactful approach was made compulsion could be applied [to effect changes in land usage] where there was a favourable element of public opinion."219 In Uganda, a report from Ankole District stated that, "tribal organisation has in general proved itself sufficiently flexible to meet, and even to anticipate, the demand for social and political change." Tribal conservatism could be overcome with "time and propaganda," and, in any case, some tribal traditions that lingered on, such as a sense of responsibility towards one's neighbors, were quite laudable.220

Other observers took a more critical view of African conservatism. P. B. Ridsdale of the Church Missionary Society thought the Banyoro had an "Irish outlook," dwelling too much on the past. "I adviseably say 'Irish,'" he wrote, "as just as the Irish will talk about Cromwell as though they had tea with him yesterday, so the Banyoro think back to the days and Empire of King Kabalega, they are always looking over their shoulder backwards. This is particularly true of the rulers."221 In Tanganyika, a committee on land use and development complained that African peasants had no capacity to envision positive change. The royal commission was informed: "The African peasant is an inherent conser-

219 "Note of a meeting of the Royal Commission at Nairobi, on the 12th January, 1954, with the Secretary for Agriculture and Natural Resources (Mr. R. O. Hennings)," PRO CO 892/8/3.
221 Rev. P. B. Ridsdale (CMS, Hoima), "Memorandum containing some thoughts and suggestions on the Land Question in the Kingdom of Banyoro, Uganda," 24 April 1953, PRO CO 892/15/2.
vative and can picture no other way of life than feeding himself and obtaining such reach cash as he wants from the soil at his disposal. For the mass, the sale of labour is a way of getting a little extra cash or a journey to see the world. Few see it as a normal way of life. 

Of course, it is difficult to believe that the peasantry, who apparently were willing to become migrant laborers partly for the adventure, were utterly incapable of adaptation to new circumstances.

Stemming from the perception of African conservatism, a common European complaint about the African was that the latter was not "economic man"; he did not react to market forces in a rational and responsible manner. Uganda's director of veterinary services and animal industry lamented the fact that African stock owners continued to regard cattle more as "social than as economic assets." When asked what could be done to develop the country, the provincial commissioner for Central Province, Tanganyika, listed a number of possible projects. He then added: "We know what we ought to do but we get no response from the people. They are so uninterested and unresponsible. The Gogo will only sell 1 beast to get his price. If the price goes up, he only sells 1 beast. You cannot get the Gogo to understand any economic responsibility. Today, I am told the Gogo is spending his money on European beer in the shops in Dodoma, rather than on buying food." An official for Tanganyika's agricultural department similarly complained

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222 "Memorandum to the Royal Commission on Land and Population by the Southern Highlands Province Land Utilization Committee," n.d., PRO CO 892/10/1.
223 Memorandum, H. Crouly, Director of Veterinary Services and Animal Industry, Kampala, to the East Africa Royal Commission, Kampala, 31 January 1953, PRO CO 892/15/7.
224 "Note of a meeting of the Royal Commission at Dodoma, on the 17th November, 1953, with the Provincial Commissioner (Mr. Heeney)," PRO CO 892/14/1.
that Africans did not look to the future, seeking only to acquire for their labors a bit of money and sufficient food. In his opinion, "the African does not leave home merely to acquire money, he goes off in search of adventure, and may perhaps incidentally acquire enough money to purchase a wife or to pay his tax."\textsuperscript{225} Kassim Lakha, scion of Asian capitalist enterprise in Uganda and representative of a Protectorate cotton company told the commission that Africans were better off as a result of growing cotton commercially, but they tended to squander their earnings: "That is the tendency of most of the natives they are not thrifty people, very few are top class. If they have money they must spend it, and to do so they eat more or buy more clothes."\textsuperscript{226} Witnesses were prepared to concede that the lack of consumer goods may have influenced African behavior to some extent, but to European observers it nevertheless seemed that Africans lacked the capacity for forethought, for deferring wants, and for accumulating capital, the qualities that the British individual "economic man" possessed. They presumed capitalism was driven by the aggregate of individual decisions; if every individual looked to his or her own best interests, then society as a whole would prosper. In contrast, Africans seemed incapable of looking to their own best interests.

If one could excuse Africans for being less than fully conditioned to the market, Europeans (especially Kenyans, settlers and officials alike) were more censorious when it

\textsuperscript{225} "Note of a meeting between the Chairman and the Members of the Royal Commission and the Regional Assistant Director of Agriculture, Arusha, on the 10th November, 1953. Present: Mr. Macgregor, Substantive Regional Assistant Director of Agriculture; Mr. Robertson, Acting Regional Assistant Director of Agriculture, PRO CO 892/14/1.

\textsuperscript{226} Meeting between Mr. Hassen Kassim Lakha (Masaka Cotton Co. Ltd.) and the East Africa Royal Commission, at Kampala, 7 December 1953, 10:45 - 11:30 a.m. & 11:30 a.m. - 12:00 p.m., PRO CO 892/16/3.
came to what seemed to them to be a lack of will and application on the part of African farmers and workers. G. Gamble, an agricultural officer in North Nyanza, listed "laziness on the part of the people," as his number one difficulty experienced in effecting changes in land use. "They [Africans] would all like to raise their standard of living," he wrote, "but are not prepared to work to that end. It must be presumed therefore that their demands to raise their standards are merely vocal and that they lack the desire to better themselves."227 He also wrote that Africans lacked "integrity" and were habitually dishonest in money matters. One Kenyan settler, after enumerating a number of ways in which incentives and changes in African social practices could be used to increase productivity, suggested that the main problem with the economy was African laziness. "The young men should get down to a job of work," he wrote, "instead of loafing about and gossiping, and making their wives be the beasts of burden, and the farm labourers as well as being the housewives. No wonder the African has never even invented a wheel. He might have if he had had to carry the stuff himself!"228 Not only did the young men lack ambition, they also inverted what Europeans regarded as proper gender roles.

Closer supervision by Europeans seemed, to some, to be the obvious remedy for African slothfulness. A self-described "farmer's wife" in Kenya for 27 years, M. S. M. Martin informed the commissioners that, "the farm workers do quite well, when one is with them to encourage and supervise their work; but when left to themselves things do

not go so well! Part of the 'supervising' is really Police work, for the thieving . . . goes on all around—milk, maize, fruit, sacks, tools, etc etc. It is all in the day's work!" She prescribed a solution to Africans' educational and moral deficiencies:

The solution is a Christian upbringing, WITH DISCIPLINE. Spare the rod and spoil the child! This is what has happened in Kenya. The worldwide Social and Political Revolution caught our Kenya Africans at too immature a stage. Had they more slowly evolved through an era of sterner discipline and plodding work, eventually learning the satisfaction of a job well done, their position today would have been very different. . . . A system of Government must be evolved which will give greater discipline and more certain direction, to a People who have much that is good in their make-up.\(^{229}\)

Less forcefully, Askwith, the community development commissioner, said that "he had been unable to find an answer to the difficult problem of instilling a sense of self-help in an African community: immediately the external stimulus or supervision was removed the community lapsed back into inertia."\(^{230}\) Another administrator, H. G. S. Harrison, thought the African would gradually progress in terms of business and professional activities, and he should be encouraged to engage in "social and economic contact with other races on equal terms." In the meantime, however, "his progress should willfully and constantly be watched and improved upon by those who are responsible for him. With steady progress he will one day become a real and permanent partner of the joint family of the KENYA COMMUNITY."\(^{231}\) Apparently, Harrison believed Africans were not "real" Kenyans!

Few people went that far, but European witnesses largely agreed that Africans needed, for

\(^{229}\) Memorandum, M. S. M. Martin to Sir Hugh Dow, Chairman, East Africa Royal Commission, 9 May 1953, PRO CO 892/5/2.

\(^{230}\) "Note of a meeting of the Royal Commission at Nairobi, on the 31st December 1953, with Mr. T. Askwith, Commissioner for Community Development," PRO CO 892/7/6.

\(^{231}\) Memorandum, H. G. S. Harrison, Deputy African Affairs Officer to the East Africa Royal Commission, 21 October 1953, PRO CO 892/5/4.
their own good, continued supervision by colonial authorities until some unspecified time in the future.

Constant supervision by European overseers and managers might suffice to get more work out of African employees, but to some expert observers the problem went deeper than Africans simply being unwilling to work hard. At a meeting with the royal commission, for example, the director of Kenya's medical services, while not ruling out a physical cause, endorsed the findings of J. C. Carothers, who held that Africans lacked the aptitude and intelligence for many common tasks they were asked to perform in modern society. One of his colleagues added, "that in his experience Africans worked very well under supervision but lacked initiative and sustained mental endurance." The chief education officer for Kenya's Coast Province thought that Africans might not be able to sustain for much longer the mental pressure being placed upon them. "If a superior culture is to be accepted by a people it must be accepted voluntarily," he wrote, "you cannot ram it down their throats, which is what we are trying to do." He went on to comment at some length on "the African mentality":

People seem to think, and I thought myself when I first came out here, than an African is an Englishman with a black skin. We have these problems at home, when the evacuation took place from the slums in the war, we were absolutely horrified, people using the carpet as a lavatory, and everything else. I do not say this problem here is basically, fundamentally different, but it is different in proportion. Whether we like it or not, the African has not got as far as we can make out from teaching him in schools. He has not got the sort of mentality which is most fitting

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233 "Note of a meeting of the Royal Commission at Nairobi, on the 18th January 1954, with Dr. Anderson, Director of Medical Services, Dr. Walker and Dr. Trim," PRO CO 892/8/3.
to provide the basis for an economic development, the raising of the standard of living. If I may put it one quick phrase, the African is not interested in reality.\textsuperscript{234}

If African backwardness was an impediment to development, A. T. Culwick, the administrator, amateur anthropologist, and author, warned that there was a sinister aspect to it as well. "Contact with the European," he wrote, "has made life very safe but unutterably dull for the African. However well educated he may be and very very few are well educated--he is at most a generation removed from the savage. The veneer of civilisation is everywhere thin, and, as we have just seen, even the teachings of the London School of Economics do not invariably prevent dangerous atavism."\textsuperscript{235} While not all Europeans held that Africans were psychologically incapable of functioning in a modern environment, the royal commissioners heard experts in fields such as medicine, education, and anthropology who implied precisely that.

African witnesses before the royal commission, as one might expect, did not believe native backwardness, racial or cultural, was the main impediment to economic development. Many Africans approached the commission as if it were a court of grievance, a chance to speak directly to the imperial state about the injustices of colonialism. Many of their complaints centered on unequal and unfair treatment on the basis of race. Skilled

\textsuperscript{234} Record of meeting between Mr. Miller, Provincial Education Officer, and the East Africa Royal Commission, at Mombasa, 24 October 1953, 9:15 - 10:15 a.m., PRO CO 892/7/3.

workers protested the fact that companies paid African, Asian, and European employees who did exactly the same work different wages.\textsuperscript{236} In many instances the African witnesses were particularly resentful of being paid less than Asians, and this was probably because African and Asian skilled workers tended to compete more directly for positions. Edward Mbwaya, a compositor at a Mombasa print shop, complained that an Indian who did the same work as he was paid Shs. 650/- per month while he received only Shs. 150/-. He wrote: "My salary is not even half the salary of this Indian. What is the reason for this?"\textsuperscript{237}

Another frequent complaint, especially among Kenyan Africans, was the manner in which the color bar prevented them from attaining good employment or taking advantage of educational opportunities.\textsuperscript{238} Furthermore, some witnesses asserted that the ill treatment, or simply disrespect, accorded Africans by Europeans was detrimental in other ways. C. M. Muogothore told the commission:

We [Africans] . . . beg to state that much have been done by the white Supremacy in Kenya so as to suppress our progress. In Kenya today, Prisons are many and bigger and as more than the African Schools and Churches. In these Prisons, only Africans are imprisoned. Moreover, dogs are honoured more than the Africans in Kenya. We have been made Europeans['] servants preceded by the name "boy" and "bibi" although a person might be an aged. Should an African fails to perform his duty, he must be beaten [sic] and has no sovereign to whom he can complain or who would be willing to hear him. Through our Lands, the immigrants are very

\textsuperscript{236} Memorandum, Railway African Union to the Chairman, East Africa Royal Commission, 14 May 1953, PRO CO 892/5/4.
\textsuperscript{237} Memorandum, Edward Mbwaya to the Secretary, East Africa Royal Commission, n.d., PRO CO 892/5/4.
\textsuperscript{238} Memorandum, Kihara Karago to the Secretary, East Africa Royal Commission, 5 April 1953, PRO CO 892/5/4.
rich and because of this, they are now possessing pretty houses, seats, large farms and etc. etc.\textsuperscript{239}

Muogothore's and others' complaints often focused on the general inequities of colonialism, and the implication was that amelioration of particular problems was not sufficient: colonialism itself was the problem.

Discrimination in employment and poor treatment was unacceptable, but perhaps even more insufferable to Africans in general, most of whom still made their living from the land, were restrictions placed on Africans who wished to acquire land. Some of the sense of bitterness comes through in the record of a meeting between Chief Koinange and the commission:

Koinange said that during the last two wars the Africans had helped the British government but the Germans and Italians had been allowed to buy land in the Highlands and the Africans had not been allowed to buy land. Koinange said that he himself had urged his young men to go to the war and now they blamed him because they were not allowed to buy land in the Highlands. Koinange said that his policy was to establish mutual respect between the races and an equal share of the assets of the Colony. He could not see why the enemies of the British should be allowed to take part of these assets.\textsuperscript{240}

\textsuperscript{239} Memorandum, C. M. Muogothore (Kenya Suppressed Africans) to the Secretary, East Africa Royal Commission, 27 December 1953, PRO CO 892/5/4.

While the commission might have been inclined to dismiss Koinange as an obvious mal-content, detained under the Kenya government's emergency powers, other Africans presented for their consideration a host of grievances dealing with land issues.

Most common among the land grievances laid before the commission, and more frequently heard in Kenya and Tanganyika than in Uganda, were objections to expropriations of what Africans considered to be their tribal lands. First on the list of complaints compiled by inmates at the Athi River detention camp was, "the theft of African lands by the European."241 Benson Ngungu asked the commission to consider his plight: "I have been living in a farm since 1914. My father had some land but it was taken by the Fort Hall Forest Department. It was owing to much suffering that I moved to the settled areas--and I have been working there till today. I would like to show those members of the Commission that I am one of the people who live in difficulty and I have no relations--my father died in the 1st World War when I was a little boy. I was not given a place to live in. I would be grateful if the Commission listens to my difficulty."242 Typical of many of the grievances presented to the commission, Bakari bin Mwanyani--delegate for the Mwambani villagers, Tanga District, Tanganyika--complained that the Tanganyika government had unethically and unlawfully granted village lands for use by European settlers. His people, he objected, were denied access to certain areas, even to the extent of being cut

242 Memorandum, Benson Ngungu to the East Africa Royal Commission, 29 December 1953, PRO CO 892/5/4.
off from water supplies. They had received no satisfaction from petitioning the governor of Tanganyika and asked the royal commission to investigate.\textsuperscript{243}

Grievances also arose as a result of larger policy decisions by the imperial or colonial governments. African representatives from Tanganyika's Southern Province complained that they had been forced to move from one area to another in order to prevent continued soil erosion in the first location. They understood the problem of erosion but thought the government should have instituted measures to prevent that problem rather than moving the people. One of the representatives pointed out that drastic action on the part of the government only undermined the people's trust in district and provincial commissioners.\textsuperscript{244} A different type of grievance was put forward by N. G. F. Isaack, who contended that Bukoba District, Tanganyika, was historically, geographically, and culturally part of Uganda and that the British government should take action to remedy its plight.\textsuperscript{245} Similarly, the Bubulo County Council objected that the Bagishu of Uganda had been separated from their relatives, the Babukusu, by the territorial boundary established between Uganda and Kenya in 1902.\textsuperscript{246} In the cases above, some African petitioners asked the commission to provide a remedy for past injustice while others seem simply to

\textsuperscript{243} Letter, Bakari bin Mwanyani, for the Mwambani community, to the Secretary, East Africa Royal Commission, 24 October 1953, PRO CO 892/10/4; Letter, Bakari bin Mwanyani, delegate for and on behalf of Mwambani villagers, to the Governor, Tanganyika Territory, 18 August 1950, PRO CO 892/10/4.

\textsuperscript{244} Record of meeting between African representatives from the Southern Province (Akida Wabu Musa, George Kasembe, Liwali Paul Norbert, Mohamedi Waziri) and the East Africa Royal Commission, at Dar es Salaam, 5 November 1953, 9:00 - 10:00 a.m., PRO CO 892/13/1.

\textsuperscript{245} Memorandum, N. G. F. Isaack, Native Authority, Rwamisheny, Bukoba, to the East Africa Royal Commission, 29 November 1953, PRO CO 892/10/3.

\textsuperscript{246} "A Memorandum Presented to Her Majesty's Royal Commission by the Bubulo County Council on Various Problems Affecting Land and People in Bugishu as a Whole on 20th. April, 1953," PRO CO 892/15/5.
have wanted to have their grievances heard. These petitions often did not deal with the issue of "development," the commonality among them being the expression of an intense distrust of European and government motives relating to land issues, a situation that boded ill for any measures of land reform intended to foster more efficient use of resources.

For a majority of African witnesses, development and economic efficiency as defined by Europeans were not necessarily of prime importance. For the UNC, for example, the most important consideration was the division of political power under new circumstances, especially, as they claimed, "British Africa to-day might be likened to a huge volcano, about to erupt." Andrew James of Bukoba, Tanganyika, asserted that the land and resources of Africa should be used primarily for the benefit of Africans. He believed the British had an obligation to help prepare the Africans of Tanganyika for self-government, but the Africans had to be granted a say and a stake in development. He wrote:

One thing [for] which the British Government had to become answerable when it was being handed over this mandated territory which is now a trusteeship territory was to enable him [i.e. the African] sufficient knowledge so that he may be able to do everything by using his own brain and hands while standing on his feet, so as not to be a dependent to others any longer. In order [for] an African to stand on his own feet he must be economically[,] that is financially, wealthy as well as intel[legibly fit. Without having the above three mentioned factors I do not think he can manage to play his self-government. These factors can be attained by an African when he has been given a free hold of his land and when he has been taught the utility of it, moreover there should not be settlers in his property without having his permission.248

248 Memorandum, Andrew James, Central Native Treasury, Rwamishenye, Bukoba, to the East Africa Royal Commission, 27 April 1953, PRO CO 892/10/3.
Elias Furuguri of the Lake Province, expressed similar thoughts: "I ask you to understand that Europeans are like teachers to teach us education and civilization, also Indians are teachers to teach us to trade but they did not come to take away our rights. Thus all Africans pray to be considered in the right way because the soil of Tanganyika is ours."

Time and again in the course of their investigations the royal commissioners' attention was directed to the complex and seemingly intractable human factor. The technical challenges to the development project were enormous, but there was a certain degree of consensus on the solutions to be prescribed. Land reform was vital, and the standard to be applied had to be one of use of land rather than rights to land. Modern methods of agriculture were essential if the productivity of the land was to increase beyond the subsistence level. East Africa needed large amounts of financial capital to build the infrastructure and to capitalize the industries that were a crucial element in the long-term plan to raise the standard of living in the region. Labor needed to be stabilized, organized, and disciplined to meet the demands of the modern exchange economy. The governments of the region would require large sums of money if they were to provide housing, education, and adequate social services for the growing population, especially in the ever more crowded urban areas. But at the root of all these questions was the human factor.

There were a number of aspects to the human factor. It must have been obvious to the commissioners that the racial communities in East Africa viewed one another across a wide chasm of mutual suspicion and fear. Europeans, especially the settlers and especially

249 Letter, Elias Furuguri, Kidira, Ngara, Lake Province, to the East Africa Royal Commission, 4 May 1953, PRO CO 892/10/3.
in Kenya, believed Africans were, at their best, the necessary labor pool for the process of
developing the economy. At their worst, Africans were a backward group, resistant to
change, clinging to outdated traditions, and possessing merely the "veneer" of civilization.
The atavistic impulses that underlay and fueled Mau Mau were always close to the sur-
face. Many settlers doubted that Africans could ever provide the "human capital" needed
to propel the economy. Colonial officials, for the most part, conceived their role as being
the mediators between the various communities and tutors in civilization to their African
charges. Within their ranks there was a range of opinion on the question of African ca-
pabilities and the possibilities for economic development, ranging from great optimism to
extreme skepticism and something near despair. Africans themselves, in general, recog-
nized the potential benefits to be derived from economic advances, and they embraced
certain aspects of the development formula—education and its advantages, for example—
wholeheartedly. But as a group they were profoundly distrustful of the government and of
Europeans (and they did not necessarily distinguish between the two). For many of them,
the royal commission existed to hear their grievances and to record the past and continu-
ing injustices of colonial rule. They were not willing to set aside political demands in fa-
vor of economic gains. Until those issues were dealt with, it would be difficult to enlist
the willing cooperation of the people in any grand scheme of development.

At the conclusion of their investigation, therefore, the royal commissioners were
faced with two basic options in regard to the human factor. They might have decided that
it was an intractable problem that lacked any clear or simple resolution. That would be to
admit defeat. The only real course open to the commission was to proceed to compile their report, recognizing the scope of the human factor and recommending ways in which it could be overcome. They had to suggest a way in which a multiracial community with its energy focused on economic advancement might emerge from the tangle of mutual antagonisms in East Africa, and they had to describe how the African should be persuaded or forced to adapt to conform to their model of development. In the end, development itself would become their solution to the problems raised by the human factor. The following chapter focuses on the work of the commission in the production of the report.
Chapter Five
The Work

Following the completion of the "inquiry phase" of their task, marked by the departure from Kenya of the last of the commissioners on 23 February 1954, the East Africa Royal Commission turned to the work of producing its report. The commissioners met many times throughout most of 1954 to discuss drafts of different sections of the document, the final version being published in June 1955. This chapter will examine the main conclusions of the report, summarizing the sections relevant to the current study and paying particular attention to some of its internal tensions and contradictions.

From the outset, the royal commission presented itself as being above politics. The outstanding political issue at the time was Mau Mau, and the commission made it clear that one reason for their decisions to exclude the press from their hearings and not to publish the oral evidence was to prevent reprisals against witnesses: for example, physical threats against Africans who supported government policies or administrative sanctions against officials who criticized those policies. They also decided that evidence would be collected from among Africans detained under the state of emergency in Kenya, and they wanted these people to feel that they could speak freely. These were well intentioned and understandable precautions, perhaps, but under the circumstances it is difficult to believe

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3 East Africa Royal Commission, Report, xiii-xiv.
that politics did not play a role in both the gathering of evidence and in the commission's deliberations. Concerning submissions from "détenu," for example, the commissioners stated:

Many of these representations dealt, as did those from other Africans, with individual grievances of which we could not take cognizance, and, where they treated of more general matters, did not differ materially from those we received from other African sources. We were not concerned with current political issues, but with the deep-rooted economic and social issues which underlie them, and in the consideration of these we have not been embarrassed by reluctance on the part of any section of the public to express their views. 4

Many African witnesses had insisted on focusing on grievances that were inherently "political," and one suspects that these were precisely the kinds of issues of which the commission "could not take cognizance." The commission's insistent attention to "economic and social issues" made it possible to ignore the views of Africans who found it impossible to separate those issues from the political question of who should be making decisions and crafting policies that would change the region. Furthermore, when the commission contemplated some of the crucial problems of development—land tenure reform and an end to the reservation of certain areas for use by members of particular racial or ethnic communities, for example—the inescapability of politics became all too evident. In a highly politicized context there was no neutral ground.

Asserting their transcendence of politics, the commissioners nevertheless were left searching for a solution to the human factor of the development conundrum. Failing to address African political demands, how would any economic development plan win the

4 Ibid., xiv.
confidence and support of the people? The answer the commissioners advanced was that development itself, by satisfying the material needs and wants of the people, would steadily gain popular support. Progress, they argued, depended on the extent to which the people of East Africa accepted the economic principle of interdependence as opposed to autarky. Interdependence meant that East Africa as a region would be integrated into the world economy, and people of the region would have to work together to achieve the common goal of economic growth. The maintenance of systems of tribal and racial preference, on the other hand, could only lead to economic ruin. Prosperity would break down racial antagonism, and embracing the modern, interdependent world would transform the people of the region. Over time, as the people became conditioned to the market, they would come to accept the values—hard work, prudence, responsibility—that underpinned modern capitalism and which, allegedly, they currently lacked. Economic progress would itself shape men's characters.

If the commissioners shared a faith in the transformative power of economic development, they did not all agree on how that process should be planned and directed. All agreed that the bulk of the African population in East Africa would have to be taught to adapt to conditions imposed by the "modern exchange economy," in which everyone produced goods and services that were bought and sold in free markets. But who or what should do the teaching? There was a fundamental disagreement between those commissioners—S. H. Frankel and Daniel Jack, for example—who believed that the market itself should be allowed to direct resources of land, labor, and capital to their best uses and oth-
ers on the commission—especially Arthur Gaitskell—who were determined to harness state authority to control the development process, one of the benefits of which would be to ease the disruption of life and society experienced by ordinary Africans during a process of rapid economic change. The commission report, in its substantive recommendations, advanced a model for development that represented a compromise between "public" and "private" leadership in the field of economics. Dirigisme would continue to play a prominent role in the region's future. But the tone of the report, particularly in the sections drafted by Frankel, often amounted to a powerful indictment of state interference in the workings of the free market. Frankel accepted that government should create the framework and set the rules under which markets would operate, but he strenuously opposed—as should any colleague and disciple of F. A. Hayek—government "planning" that diminished rather than enhanced the level of competition in the economy. The lack of harmony between the substance and the style of the commission's work led, as will be seen in the following chapter, to widely varying interpretations of its findings among critics in the United Kingdom. The East Africa Royal Commission did not resolve the debate over the question of public or private primacy in economic matters, reflecting the fact that it remained a hotly contested issue in the context of British political economy. In important ways, the report was a commentary on British economics, politics, and society and demonstrated the manner in which domestic and colonial affairs interacted.

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In drafting the report, the commissioners drew selectively from historical examples to support their development plans. Whereas African witnesses before the commission, insisting on the primacy of the political, often compared the current and future process of change as analogous to the French Revolution, the royal commission drew the analogy to Europe's (specifically Britain's) Agricultural and Industrial Revolutions. All of this was taking place within the East African context, of course, and the commission provided a synopsis of the history of colonialism in that region. Perhaps not surprisingly for a commission chaired by a former Indian provincial governor and which included the head of the Colonial Office's African Studies Branch among its members, the commission's version of East African history celebrated an imperial legacy that bestowed the rule of law, peace, order, and good government. The commission accepted much of the "official" historical account, rather less of the "settler" version, and paid scant attention to the "African" narrative, which focused on the injustices of the colonial past. Overlaid on these was a strong dose of economic determinism, in which Adam Smith's invisible hand promised to bestow future benefits if only the imperial and territorial governments could reign in their meddling impulses and confine themselves to their proper functions: setting the ground rules, enforcing laws, and adopting a rather remote stance that would allow the market to function efficiently. Particular, privileged, historical narratives were essential buttresses for the report's conclusions.

Drafting and presenting the report took somewhat longer than originally anticipated. Tom Soper, one of the commission's secretaries, noted that Sir Hugh Dow was not
particularly successful in coordinating the work, a task that fell by default to John Ingham, the senior secretary. Soper believes that, considering the chairman's somewhat lackadaisical approach to the drafting of the report, the document's internal consistency is remarkable, and is attributable to S. H. Frankel's influence and persistence.\(^7\) Dow's explanation for the delays, as reported by Alan Lennox-Boyd, secretary of state for the colonies, was that the commission members lived in various locations around the country and it was difficult to gather them all together for any length of time. He hoped, however, that the delay in producing the report would lead to a unanimous finding. At the same time, the chairman warned Lennox-Boyd that not everyone would be pleased with the results of the commission's efforts, and although the commissioners had adhered to the terms of reference, there were inevitably areas in which they recommended changes in policy. In a thinly veiled reference to racial and ethnic land reservations, Dow told the secretary of state: "If we were not able to recommend any changes in policy, or variations of pledges given, then there was no possibility of easing racial tension."\(^8\)

Dow alluded to the value of a unanimous report in his conversation with Lennox-Boyd, although during one meeting achieving that goal required an ultimatum from the chairman to a minority of the commissioners that they would either have to accept the majority view or issue a dissenting opinion.\(^9\) Frankel recalled that the point at issue was the concern of Arthur Gaitskell, backed by some other members, that the commission's

\(^7\) Tom Soper, interview with author, London, 9 September 1993.
\(^8\) Minute, Alan Lennox-Boyd to Gorell Barnes, 23 September 1954, PRO CO 822/1107.
"emphasis on individual land tenure went too far and might possibly conflict with those sections in the report which stressed the need for planned land usage and rehabilitation before it could bought and sold. However it was realized by all of us that to have a minority report would so weaken our recommendations as a whole in the eyes of the public that we all decided amicably to avoid this possibility."\textsuperscript{10} Similarly, Soper observed that none of the commissioners wished to water down the overall force of the report's arguments by issuing a separate opinion.\textsuperscript{11} Nevertheless, a unanimous report did not entirely mask the fact that the commission report represented a balancing of the views of its members, especially those of Gaitskell and Frankel. The latter wrote in his autobiography that he welcomed the opportunity to work with Gaitskell, well known for his efforts in relation to the Gezira cotton scheme in the Sudan, and added: "His integrity and charm were beyond description. We became firm friends although there were profound differences between us in many of our economic views."\textsuperscript{12} Those differences were not entirely reconciled and are evident in the pages of report.

Seven parts composed the report of the East Africa Royal Commission. The first part covered the commission's interpretation of its terms of reference. Part two described the basic historical, demographic, and economic problems of the region. In part three the commissioners laid out their recommendations for creating the necessary conditions for economic and social development. Part four dealt with the problem of urban develop-

\textsuperscript{10} Letter, S. H. Frankel to author, 13 September 1993.
\textsuperscript{11} Soper, interview with author, London, 9 September 1993.
\textsuperscript{12} Frankel, \textit{An Economist's Testimony}, 261.
ment. The fifth part tackled the thorny question of land development, including reform of land tenure and use. In part six the commission addressed the issue of race relations, and part seven summed up the major conclusions of the report.

Before anything else, the commissioners discussed the manner in which they had interpreted their terms of reference. They stated that they had found it necessary to expand the field of inquiry beyond that "strictly covered by the wording of our terms of reference." Specifically, they argued, it was imperative to consider the historical background to the region's problems in order to understand the intended and unintended consequences of legislative and administrative policies in the past. This type of inquiry was essential if the commission was to fulfill its objective of examining fully the possibilities for "advancing the material and social welfare of the people, and of the factors by which this has been limited or conditioned." The commission, therefore, would select and privilege a version of East African history that would underpin its conclusions regarding development.

As noted in an earlier chapter, Sir Philip Mitchell's dispatch of 15 November 1951 set the parameters for the commission's inquiry, and the commissioners accepted these basic guidelines. A more perplexing matter was a crucial injunction in the terms of reference: "In their deliberations the Commission should take account of existing obligations incurred by treaty, agreement or formal declaration of policy in relation to the security of

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13 East Africa Royal Commission, Report, 2.
14 Ibid., 2.
15 Ibid., 2-3; Land and Population in East Africa, Exchange of Correspondence Between the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Government of Kenya on the Appointment of the Royal Commission, Colonial No. 290 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1952), 1-30; see chapter 3, above.
land reserved for the different races and groups in various parts of the Territories concerned."\textsuperscript{16} What did it actually mean to "take account of existing obligations"? The commission rejected the notion, previously advanced by Michael Blundell as a spokesman for Kenyan Europeans and by Sir Evelyn Baring, governor of Kenya,\textsuperscript{17} that land reservations should be sacrosanct and the commission debarred from making any recommendations regarding them. Instead, noting that "each of these reservations has a reverse side, and while they may be regarded, wrongly as we believe, as the sheet anchor of their security by some of those whom they were intended to benefit, they may also be felt as a complete bar to the progress of their neighbours."\textsuperscript{18} Recognizing that there was a difference of degree between formal treaties and agreements as opposed to declarations of government policy and that the British government had to exercise caution before changing policies, the commission nevertheless asserted, as had been the case in the past, that in the public interest formal declarations of policy could, and emphatically should, be changed or modified to meet new and unforeseen circumstances. With the caveat that the "practical administrator" would prudently mobilize public opinion in favor of any such changes before they occurred, the commissioners held themselves free to advocate the abolition or alteration in the terms of land reservation policies wherever these hampered the primary objective of improving standards of living in East Africa.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{16} East Africa Royal Commission, Report, xi.
\textsuperscript{17} Above, 128-30.
\textsuperscript{18} East Africa Royal Commission, Report, 4.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., 4.
In addressing the problem of land reservations, the commission ventured un-
avoidably onto the terrain of "current political issues" that they had disavowed. Nothing
was more politically charged in East Africa than the land question, which was at the root
of Mau Mau. The commissioners held, that they merely pointed out instances in which
former policies impeded progress and what seemed to them the "probable or inevitable"
results of failing to change those policies. Commenting on the report following its publi-
cation in a confidential address to a select audience at the Royal Institute of International
Affairs, Dow seemed at once to both deny and confirm the political aspect of the commis-
sion's work:

It is necessary to keep in mind that our terms of reference were limited to an ex-
amination of the measures necessary to be taken to achieve an improved standard
of living. This is an economic problem, and although we realised, as no doubt eve-
ryone here present does, that there is hardly any aspect of life which may not be-
come a matter of political controversy or may not be affected by political action,
we were not concerned in this Report with political considerations. We have done
our best to state the issues, and to point out what would seem to be the economic
results if present policies are persisted in. There are trends which make for stag-
nation or retrogression, as well as those which make for progress.... I do not
myself suppose that the serious economic issues that we have raised, and which
seem to us urgent, will in any degree stem the urge to demand political changes,
but we may reasonably hope that if the Report is carefully studied, it may instill a
greater sense of responsibility in some of those who press those changes forward.²⁰

Dow indirectly acknowledged that it was not possible to neatly separate the economic and
political issues addressed by the East Africa Royal Commission. That dilemma also pro-
duced the commission's awkward disclaimer: "But we are not required to advise on consti-
tutional questions, and we can only proceed on the assumption that East Africa will con-

²⁰ Address by Sir Hugh Dow to the Royal Institute of International Affairs, [26] October 1955, Oriental
and India Office collections, Dow Collection, MSS Eur E 372/13.
tinue to have stable governments in which such orderly constitutional developments will take place as will keep them progressively fitted for the changing tasks which they will have to undertake.\textsuperscript{21} Thus, it seems the commission's report was based in part on the questionable premise that the region's political future would be free of major disturbances, perhaps involving either a continuation of colonial rule or an orderly and seamless transition to self government.

Part two of the report, "Basic Problems," detailed the commission's view of the major obstacles to development in East Africa in five chapters. Chapter two, "Background," encapsulated the commission's interpretation of the region's history. Prior to the advent of European rule, the commissioners described the history of the East African peoples as a series of "invasions" as successive "waves" and "intrusions" of conquering peoples moved into the area. "Centuries of intermarriage and conquest," the report concluded, had produced tremendous racial diversity amongst the East African peoples, although some groups shared general characteristics and social customs. Those great migrations were still proceeding when Europeans first arrived on the scene, and the "introduction of British administration had the effect of stabilizing at a fixed point in history a situation which, until then, had been fluid."\textsuperscript{22}

Africans, according to the report, were loyal to family, clan, and tribe, but no distinct nationalism had developed along ethnic lines. "Any wider allegiances," the commissioners wrote, "have developed under the stimuli of economic forces and political leader-

\textsuperscript{21} East Africa Royal Commission, Report, 4.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 11-12.
ship rather than as a result of any correspondence of blood or cultural affinity." A demonstration of this was the "parochial attitude" with which most Africans regarded the land question, with tribal boundaries drawn to exclude outsiders and tribal authorities resistant to innovative ideas concerning land usage out of fear that such ideas might lead to an erosion of "those community interests in the land which had, in the past, been essential for the survival of the group."

Up to the beginning of European rule, the commission described African life as precarious, the year to year aim of all groups being subsistence. A community approach to hazards, both physical and human, ensured the survival of the group. That approach evolved to provide security, but it also entailed the suppression or stifling of individual initiative. No one, the report maintained, could be allowed to "lift himself above his neighbours and to make himself more economically secure," because the rest of the community would view this as a threat to the collective security of the group. At the time of the drafting of the report, however, the commissioners asserted that the traditional societies of East Africa were disintegrating and that land use and land tenure customs were changing in varying degrees throughout the region.

What then had been the impact of other races in the region? According to the royal commission, the first contacts between East African and the outside world, unfolding over a long period of time, involved the development of commercial contacts with Asia, Europe, and other parts of Africa. There was also strife among the outsiders, with Arab

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23 Ibid., 13.
24 Ibid., 13-14.
overlords eventually establishing hegemony over the coastal belt in the early nineteenth century. Inland activities of Arab traders established caravan routes for the trade in slaves and ivory.\textsuperscript{25} Into this milieu British explorers, traders, and missionaries thrust themselves in the latter half of the nineteenth century.

Initially, British objectives were the suppression of the slave trade, the conversion of heathen Africans to Christianity, and the development of trade and commerce. The commission declared:

\begin{quote}
It was inevitable that the activities of the missionaries and early traders should lead to the assumption by them of obligations to the indigenous people, obligations which it became increasingly difficult for philanthropic and commercial organizations to sustain and which the British Governments of the day were reluctant to accept. Eventually, however, when Great Britain assumed the administration of the territories which are now Kenya and Uganda, and later and in different circumstances Tanganyika, there was brought to bear on the people of the region the greatest single outside influence for good in the form of a rule of law based on principles of British justice.\textsuperscript{26}
\end{quote}

The commission presented the British conquest of East Africa, therefore, as simply the last of a series of conquests in the region's history, but one that was unique for its humanitarian origins and for the administrative and political benefits it bestowed.

Similarly, the report summarized the histories of the individual territories as a tale of the imposition of order and progress. Thus, John Speke, who traveled to Buganda in 1862, was said to have encountered a highly organized African state with an advanced culture, but one based on "cruel and arbitrary despotism." The commissioners portrayed later adventurers such as Frederick Lugard, Sir Gerald Portal, and Sir Harry Johnston as

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., 14-15.
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., 15.
\end{flushright}
men who, finding themselves in the midst of chaotic and wanton violence among competing African groups, took prompt action to impose law and order, thereby saving lives and only incidentally extending British imperial control. They also stressed that, from the early 1920s onward, British governors and their administrations in the Protectorate of Uganda had consistently maintained a "paramountcy" of African rights in land and that African peasant agriculture had proven itself to be quite productive.27

Kenya's colonial past was also constructed in a manner that depicted British motives and policies in rather benign terms. The White Highlands policy, for instance, allegedly was a response to fears of Indian settlement. Early administrations granted land to settlers in the belief that the areas in question (the best land in the territory, incidentally) was devoid of African inhabitants or claims. "It is to be noted," the report asserted, "that during this early period of European settlement, the interests of Europeans and Africans were not regarded as in any way conflicting, and that government from the beginning recognized it as a primary duty to secure adequate land for African use."28 The Devonshire White Paper of 1923, the commission noted, proved the good faith of the imperial authorities in safeguarding African rights.29

27 Ibid., 15-17.
28 Ibid., 19.
29 The report does not point out, however, that the declaration of the paramountcy of the interests of African natives in the White Paper was designed as much to exclude Indians from Kenya Colony and the White Highlands as it was to protect African interests. Marjorie Ruth Dilley, British Policy in Kenya Colony, 2d. ed. (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1966), 174-75, 179-80; Robert G. Gregory, Sidney Webb and East Africa: Labour's Experiment with the Doctrine of Native Paramountcy, University of California Publications in History, vol. 72 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962), 45.
Tanganyika, too, the report maintained, enjoyed the benefits of the rule of law and humane policies under Britain's sway. Whereas the commission made little mention of rebellions and punitive expeditions in Uganda and Kenya, it emphasized the extent to which the Germans had used brute force to subjugate the peoples of Tanganyika between 1889 and 1906. By contrast, the commission proclaimed that "subject to varying degrees of interpretation, a consistent policy of considering African interests to come first has been pursued since the beginning of the British Mandate."\(^{30}\)

In general, the report's account of East African history was more or less in line with the "official" narrative presented in various aspects during the evidence gathering phase of the commission's work. Peace, order, and good government were bestowed upon the region by British officials and extended under subsequent colonial administrations. African protests at the manner in which much of the best land, especially in Kenya, had been expropriated and reserved for the use of European settlers were considered but quickly dismissed: "It has been argued in the light of later knowledge that in some instances the traditional customary land rights of the Africans [in the area of the White Highlands] were not respected or fully understood, but little is to be gained from such an \textit{ex post facto} approach, and there can be no doubt that most of the land alienated appeared at that time to be empty, and the African was then thought to have sufficient for his requirements."\(^{31}\) On the other hand, the commission did not accept the settler narrative and that element's claim to primacy in the region's economy. The importance of Kenya's for-


\(^{31}\) Ibid., 19.
mer deliberate policy of encouraging European settlement was recognized, but the report also noted that African farmers in Uganda seemed to be doing very well in the absence of foreign settlers.

Later reflections on their work by some of the commissioners endorsed the basic historical arguments of the commission, but the various members placed their emphasis in different places. R. S. Hudson, for example, suggested that the productivity of European settlers with their sophisticated farming techniques made their African neighbors envious, as did the commercial ingenuity of Indian traders: "If there was any money to be made out of the country the Indian would find a way of doing it, and he lived on the smell of an oil rag while he was doing it!" Hudson added: "Discontent was certainly there [i.e. in East Africa] and it was inevitable when the people looked down from the heights and saw these wide open spaces with prosperous European farms and businesses—people living well and playing their polo and so on and so forth." Hudson endorsed aspects of the settler narrative in a manner which the report itself did not.

There was also a subtle suggestion in the commission's historical account that colonial governments had, from the best of intentions, been overly protective of African interests. Dow put the critique bluntly in his Royal Institute of International Affairs address:

Government policy in East Africa has, with rare exceptions, aimed at the protection of African interests, and has too often taken the form of attempts to insulate him from economic competition from the other races. There are many people who fear that the removal of this economic protection from the African may have very serious results. Those of you who are politicians will no doubt understand better

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32 Transcript of interview of Mr. R. S. Hudson, CMG, by A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, Senior Fellow in African Studies, St. Antony's College, Oxford, 4 October 1968, Rhodes House Library, MSS. Afr. s. 2111 HUDSON.
than I do why those who advocate the continuance of paternalism in economic matters generally want it rapidly removed in political matters. The Report does not advocate the immediate and indiscriminate removal of all measure of economic protection, but it suggests policies which will enable the African to stand up to conditions in the modern world, rather than to seek safety by running away from them.\(^{33}\)

Frankel, while acknowledging the competence and dedication of the colonial officials on the ground, concurred with Dow's judgment, portraying well meaning but restrictive regulations as major impediments to economic innovation. He later claimed that the ongoing Mau Mau rebellion at the time of the royal commission's East African visits,

precluded us from examining the very people who were struggling to escape the old order. They wanted to break away from the straitjacket of communal land tenure and the maze of government regulations hampering their freedom of individual enterprise to develop cash crops. True, many of these regulations were well-intentioned, even essential. They were, however, constantly being inexplicably revised. To the man who wanted to get on with the job they seemed the product of a mad bureaucracy. Such economic factors underlay much of the discontent which erupted into Mau Mau. I personally sensed a good deal of it.\(^{34}\)

Actual testimony from commission witnesses, especially among Africans, only sporadically and in a qualified sense supported the free market solutions to East African problems that Frankel advanced. His response to that fact was simply that the witnesses who would have backed his views were prevented from testifying.

Contemporary Africans, the commission recognized, were a diverse group of people, but a group that shared a common dilemma; they were approaching the limits of growth under the conditions established by colonialism and their own traditional way of

\(^{33}\) Address by Sir Hugh Dow to the Royal Institute of International Affairs, [26] October 1955, Oriental and India Office collections, Dow Collection, MSS Eur E 372/13.

\(^{34}\) Frankel, *An Economist's Testimony*, 267.
life. The colonial order had attempted to shield traditional society and culture from the hazards and uncertainties of market society while at the same time slowly integrating Africans into market systems and alleviating causes of past suffering such as starvation, warfare, disease, and superstition. Nevertheless, the report declared: "To change from the primitive requirement of a subsistence society, organized with the primary object of survival to the requirements of the modern world within the framework of a cash economy, is indeed a formidable undertaking; and there can be little wonder that the indigenous peoples of East Africa have experienced difficulty in spanning, in a matter of a few decades, the gap which it has taken the inhabitants of European countries centuries to bridge."\(^{35}\)

Most, but not all, Africans continued to make their livings from the land. Those who did not, the commission believed, faced an impending crisis. Contact with Europe for many of the indigenous peoples of East Africa had meant contact with Christian missionaries. Christian missions had mixed but generally positive results in the region, introducing alien concepts that furthered the cause of Westernizing the Africans. Christian morality had, the commission maintained, filled the void created as traditional society slowly disintegrated. On the other hand, the missionaries' sometimes overzealous assault on the "many acts in customary ceremonies and practices which were barbarous and contrary to Christian doctrines and principles," earned the enmity of many people and the tribal authorities. Perhaps the greatest impact of the missionary groups lay in their educational efforts, producing a small echelon of professional Africans (although failing to provide

\(^{35}\text{East Africa Royal Commission, Report, 23.}\)
much in the field of technical education). Education and other experiences, particularly participation in two world wars, expanded the horizons of Westernized Africans, but their aspirations were frustrated and they became embittered by the fact that they were caught precariously between the two worlds of the African village and the European city, fully accepted in neither.\footnote{Ibid., 26-27.}

According to the royal commission, living between two worlds was no longer a viable option for anyone in East Africa if the poverty endemic to the three territories were to be overcome. Africans would have to be prepared to abandon those aspects of traditional village life that the misused and depleted soil could no longer bear. In order to sustain a growing population and to raise living standards, the region could no longer continue to support the "dual economy" with a "subsistence sector" (African) on one hand and a "money sector" (European and Asian) on the other. East Africa would be forced to embrace the market economy. In order for that to happen, the governments and societies of the region would have to change certain policies and practices. In the first place, governments could no longer afford to buffer the Africans from the effects of market forces in a paternal manner. Growth would only result if "progressive" Africans were allowed to advance while less productive members of society lost their special claims on land and resources. Secondly, East Africa would only make economic strides if all races and ethnic groups were given the opportunity to participate in the market economy. Land reservations on the basis of race had to be eliminated and land opened to acquisition and use by
the most efficient producers. Africans would have to be accepted among the ranks of businessmen and professionals as equals on the basis of merit. At the same time, Africans would have to accept that Europeans and Asians were a permanent and necessary part of the community, their skills vital for the region's economic future.\footnote{Ibid., 28-29.}

Africans were still far from being fully adapted to the modern world, according to the commission's account, with pastoralists, for example, continuing to live for the most part as nomadic herdsmen. Unfortunately, time was not available for the slow transition of African society from "primitive" to "modern." The commission argued that policies such as land reservations for different African groups, while designed to preserve indigenous cultures, had introduced a rigidity into land policy that obstructed or prevented the adoption of modern farming methods and encouraged poor use of land. The best farmers did not necessarily have access to the land they needed while poor cultivators were guaranteed acreage, which they then proceeded to ruin. Furthermore, special reservations and alienation of land to Europeans only engendered suspicion of government motives among Africans, and that sense of grievance conditioned their responses to all other government actions. The time was fast approaching when there simply would be no more land for a growing population that would not abandon outdated and harmful agricultural practices.

Among the "basic problems" of East Africa detailed in part two of the report, the commission did not, contrary to Philip Mitchell's contention,\footnote{Above, 94.} include population growth as an inherently bad occurrence. Indeed, the report argued that people were a valuable
resource in a dynamic economy and, as such, a growing population should be viewed as potential source of benefits rather than as a threat.\textsuperscript{39} Once one abandoned the aim of autarky, both for East Africa as a region and for the individual territories, more people represented not just more mouths to feed but a multiplication of the human skills that the modern exchange economy demanded if it were to grow. The commissioners acknowledged that overcrowding was a serious problem in some areas, particularly in those tribal reserves where Africans continued to practice traditional, subsistence agriculture, but that condition was primarily a result of poor land usage. The alternatives in those areas were either to reduce the concentration of population (i.e. add more land to the reserves or move people to new locations) or to change methods of land use to make it more efficient.\textsuperscript{40} If land were freed for alternative uses, such as industrial development, those would create wealth and employment, further alleviating population pressure on a given acreage.

In fact, the East Africa Royal Commission did not believe that there was any real choice open to the region's governments and people. East Africa was extremely poor, both in absolute terms and relative to the rest of the continent, and that circumstance was itself a limiting factor on future economic growth. The small money sector of the region's dual economy included Europeans, Asians, and some Africans who produced crops and goods and provided services for the modern exchange economy. The much larger (in terms of people involved) subsistence sector was comprised of Africans who grew food

\textsuperscript{39} \textit{East Africa Royal Commission, Report}, 35-36.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., 37.
and made certain items for their own consumption. Since the beginning of the century, the report maintained, economic growth in East Africa was attributable to the money sector, despite its relatively small number of participants. The major obstacle to future growth was the lack of markets large enough to allow cultivators to achieve economies of scale in production. An expansion of markets would both facilitate and demand better use of economic resources: more efficient division of labor, deployment of capital, and an ability to buy and sell land in order to optimize its use. Under those conditions, traditional land tenure and official policies that perpetuated the subsistence sector and limited growth were anachronistic and would have to end. People presently in the subsistence sector would have to be drawn into the money sector as quickly as possible.\textsuperscript{41}

Time and again the commissioners pointed to land reservations on the basis of tribe or race as the quintessential example of official policies that continued the economic stagnation of the subsistence sector. Such policies were most clearly articulated in Kenya among the East African territories, and the report devoted a chapter to the Kenya Land Commission of 1934, chaired by Sir Morris Carter,\textsuperscript{42} which in the commission's view illustrated the aims and limitations of all such policies. The royal commissioners acknowledged the constraints imposed upon the members of the land commission by the context of the period and their terms of reference, which directed them to consider the present and future needs of Africans but favored the "tribal" approach. Nevertheless, the report criticized the Carter commission for considering the Kenyan land question not "from the point

\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., 41-47.
\textsuperscript{42} Report of the Kenya Land Commission, Cmd. 4556 (1934).
of view of the overall needs of the population but from the standpoint of the claims and needs of the separate tribes.43 And while the cases of individual Africans were considered in great detail, ultimately the Carter commission subordinated the land claims of individual, progressive African farmers to those of the tribal entities, recommending the expropriation of plots held by some individuals and the provision of compensation through cash payments and allotments of land to tribal authorities. Furthermore, the land commission reinforced the racial exclusiveness of the White Highlands, but this failed to provide the desired sense of security to European settlers on account of the suspicion and animosity such a policy fostered among Africans. In contrast to the Carter commission, the East Africa Royal Commission reasserted its position that Kenya (and the whole of East Africa) could only progress as an integrated economic unit, and a modern economy could not develop on the basis of tribal or racial exclusiveness.44

The royal commissioners were well aware of the difficulties stemming from their proposals. Commercialization of economic activities, they wrote, would provide opportunities and incentives for the "indigenous population" to achieve a better standard of living, but it also threatened the tribal order and the concept of economic and social security upon which it was based. Public policy had to address that issue because, while it was desirable that Africans should raise their real incomes, it would be best to avoid the deleterious effects of social disintegration that would accompany the demise of the "tribal order of security." Nevertheless, the report noted, "It should not be overlooked, in this con-

43 East Africa Royal Commission, Report, 53-54.
44 Ibid., 53-61.
nexion, that if the process of change with which we are concerned creates new problems of adaptation for the peoples who are affected by the process, it also increases the resources with which to deal with these problems. Economic development would solve the very problems it created.

Within East Africa, the commission recognized that the concept of security occupied an important place in the minds not only of Africans but of administrative officials also. Chapter five, "The Dilemma of Security," drafted by Frankel with Jack's assistance, addressed the issue. They argued that traditional subsistence agriculture left Africans dependent on the environment, limiting their wants to what the environment would permit. Under those circumstances people lived from day to day with little thought to the future. Policies that encouraged "tribal exclusiveness"—setting aside specific areas for the use of specific groups—did nothing more than attempt to preserve the status quo, but even in that effort such policies would ultimately fail. Frankel and Jack asserted that the security provided by land reservation was illusory and that "no single tribe can now afford to pursue that self-sufficient isolation which constituted its traditional heritage." Embracing the concept of a free market in land (as would be the case with other resources) would ultimately, they claimed, provide real security by raising living standards.

Frankel and Jack interpreted the fact that transactions in land were taking place in some areas as evidence that some Africans felt the pressure to abandon outdated subsis-

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45 Ibid., 47.
46 Frankel, An Economist's Testimony, 269.
47 East Africa Royal Commission, Report, 50.
48 Ibid., 48-50.
tence agriculture and traditional systems of tenure and to adapt themselves to modern economic conditions. Furthermore, they argued that the development of the modern exchange economy would cure political as well as economic woes. Frustration and discontent, they maintained, resulted when Africans observed the higher standards of living achieved in the "modern sectors" of the economy dominated by Europeans and Asians. They declared: "It is this visible opportunity for a new way of life which static tribalism frustrates. And this frustration lies at the root of African discontent. In whatever direction he turns, the African, whether he wishes to become a peasant farmer, a businessman, a permanent wage-earner in the towns or a modern tenant on the land, is hampered by the requirements of his tribal society with its obligations and restraints." Economic progress, therefore, was not only the cure for the stagnation created by the subsistence sector of the East African economy, but also for the resulting political grievances.

Part three of the report, "Conditions for Economic and Social Development," laid out the commission's recommendations regarding the steps that needed to be taken in order to raise the regional standard of living. In that part of the report, the commission also delineated the areas in which governments should play a role in terms of economic development. There were two main spheres in which the commissioners sanctioned government action. First, governments would have to take the initiative in developing the East African infrastructure and in setting the rules for the workings of markets for capital, labor, and land. The implication of the report was that governments anywhere, not just in

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49 Ibid., 51.
East Africa, should appropriately act in those areas. The second sphere in which the colonial governments should intervene was specific to the East African context. The African was not yet adapted to the conditions of the modern exchange economy and the commission described how government officials would and should play an important educative role, in effect as "tutors in modernity."

Public ownership of economic resources, in East Africa as in the United Kingdom, according to the commission's development blueprint, would be largely confined to infrastructure such as railroads, ports, roads, and water supplies. The capital outlays required to establish those "network" industries were high, and that initial cost was a barrier to entry that hindered the emergence of free competition in those enterprises. Government control of such "natural monopolies," therefore, sparked little controversy.\(^{50}\) Following their victory in the British general election of October, 1951, the Conservatives returned the iron and steel industries to private ownership, but they were content to retain public control of the network industries nationalized by Labour.\(^{51}\) Thus, it is no surprise that the East Africa Royal Commission prescribed public ownership of similar undertakings in East Africa.

Examples of industries in which the commissioners believed state ownership was appropriate were those related to transportation. Efficient transportation was essential in order to raise agricultural productivity, to stimulate the exploitation of mineral resources,

\(^{50}\) James Foreman-Peck and Robert Millward, Public and Private Ownership of British Industry, 1820-1990 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), ch. 1. Network industries require a substantial distribution system that channels the product or service provided from the source to the destination.

and to foster the growth of the exchange economy in indigenous areas by making markets for cash crops accessible. The commissioners found that the development of roads and railways for these purposes fell short of East African requirements. "The investment of capital in railways, roads and communications," they wrote, "is but a part of the general social and economic cost of breaking down the vicious circle of subsistence economy and poverty."52 Not all development funds could be used for projects in which the dividends were paid in the long term and often indirectly, but the commission held that better communications were indispensable for the region's economic future and should be made a priority. Furthermore, improved rail and road networks needed to be constructed with the requirements of the whole region, not just those of the individual territories, in mind.

The East African Railways and Harbours Administration (EARH) managed railway construction and operations. Commissioners accepted public ownership in that area, but they criticized the EARH for being undercapitalized, unable to plow profits back into the organization because funds were diverted for other purposes, and subject to political pressure from the territorial governments. They recommended the "establishment of an autonomous Railways and Harbours Corporation . . . to divorce railway finance, management and operation from political considerations and from uneconomic territorial rivalries which undermine the viability of the system as a whole."53 Better roads would, like railways, facilitate economic development (including urban development), reduce the cost of food, prevent the recurrence of famine, expand the region's volume of agricultural pro-

52 *East Africa Royal Commission, Report*, 122.
53 Ibid., 129.
duction, and extend the life of vehicles by reducing wear and tear. To accomplish those goals the commission recommended the formation of an autonomous public corporation, under the East Africa High Commission, which would achieve aims similar to those of the proposed railway corporation. The main objective was that state revenues be employed in building and maintaining the infrastructure vital for development, but the proposed corporations for that purpose would be free to pursue long-term goals free from political meddling.

Water development was another area in which the royal commission believed the government should provide the lead. The provision of fresh water was essential if other resources in the region were to be opened for exploitation, and the total benefits to society derived from water development were not always going to be realized in the immediate future. Commissioners recognized the fact that water development schemes in support of private enterprise constituted a state subsidy to those enterprises, but they were willing to sanction that as long as legislatures were fully aware of the circumstances and there were no "hidden subsidies." Furthermore, the commission emphasized that colonial governments could not afford to develop water supplies in areas only to have people flock to those areas and ruin the land through practices associated with subsistence agriculture. Nevertheless, there was a government role in the collection of hydrological and geological data, coordination of water development projects, and the protection of the overall public interest in relation to both public and private schemes for exploiting water resources.

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54 Ibid., 135.
55 Ibid., 136-37.
Another area in which the royal commission suggested the territorial governments might make an important contribution was in the collection and dissemination of statistical data. The commissioners reported that the difficulty of obtaining reliable factual information had hindered their own investigations. Proper judgments regarding the economy, both by government and by private industry, were dependent upon the availability of accurate statistics. Such information for the region greatly improved following the creation of the East African Statistical Department in 1949. The commission lauded the efforts of that department and recommended the augmentation of its financial and human resources.\footnote{Ibid., 186-90.}

Government planning for and even ownership of infrastructure in the form of network industries and support for general economic development through the provision of statistical information, in the commission's opinion, fell within the proper parameters of the public sector of the economy. Clearly falling within the private sector, however, was the development of manufacturing industries. The commissioners noted that the most frequently cited reasons for encouraging the development of new industries were to generate new incomes and to provide employment for some of the people displaced from over-crowded areas in East Africa. They rejected the second of these reasons as a basis for formulating public policy, arguing that industrial development should not be viewed as a system of "relief works," most of which were uneconomic and, in any case, failed to provide employment to a large proportion of unemployed workers. New industries were
certainly desirable, but only if they made a contribution to the "geographical incomes" of the territories.\footnote{Ibid., 105.}

How, then, might colonial governments stimulate the development of productive industries? The commission made several points regarding that question. First of all, recognizing that capital was a scarce resource within East Africa, industrial development would have to depend on the capital and skills of people from outside of the region. Secondly, colonial governments were not equipped to establish and manage new enterprises. Government manpower was limited and administrators lacked the business knowledge required. Furthermore, as it seemed unlikely that the territorial governments would be able to raise outside capital to finance public sector manufacturing industries, the only alternative would be to finance them through the proceeds of forced savings. That, the commissioners argued, would be unfair as well as difficult to accomplish because the general population had very little to save. A policy of forced savings would not only unduly burden the people of the region, it would also divert scarce resources from their normally productive employment. Governments, the report concluded, should encourage development by concentrating on providing the basic services needed by all types of enterprises and not provided by private entrepreneurs. Public policy in the past had not always conformed to that model. As an example, the report stated: "It is not without significance that at the very time when the Government of Uganda was diverting capital into a number of diverse industrial projects, it was failing to make adequate provision for roads and
communications which would have encouraged the expansion of cotton and coffee production." As a final warning, the commissioners urged colonial administrations to refrain from providing even part of the capital for new industries established by outside interests. Such a practice, they maintained, would only make future entrepreneurs expect government assistance even when it was not needed and create an expectation that the state would grant all kinds of other concessions. East Africa needed new industries, but only if they were sustainable on their own merits as judged by private capital markets.\[^{59}\]

An industry that potentially offered great benefits to East Africa and its people was mining. Mineral resources might, the commission suggested, prove to be the key to raising incomes very quickly among some workers as well as being a source of taxable revenue for governments. If that were to be the case, governments would have to control their natural impulses, making sure that tax policies and rates were not so severe as to discourage mineral exploitation altogether. Furthermore, the commissioners noted: "It must also be appreciated that East Africa is at present a marginal area in which the attraction to the investment of capital from abroad has a very low priority. It is another example of East Africa needing the enterprise and capital of the outside world more than the outside world needs East Africa."\[^{60}\] In a sense, the underdeveloped condition and pervasive poverty of the region made government interventions in certain areas of the economy more problematic and destructive than would be the case elsewhere. There were some actions,

\[^{58}\] Ibid., 110.
\[^{59}\] Ibid., 108-111.
\[^{60}\] Ibid., 115.
however, that the colonial administrations might undertake in order to create more favorable conditions for attracting outside capital. Most importantly, they could provide geological and mining services, including geological surveys of the region, and they could remove any fiscal or legal obstacles that increased the costs or risks associated with the exploitation of mineral resources.⁶¹

Regarding the development of the marketing and distribution system in East Africa, the royal commission was quite critical of colonial governments' past policies. In this crucial area, the commissioners noted, the inefficiency of the dual economy was quite apparent: "The modern system of distribution which depends upon the enterprise and efficiency of the specialist trader stands out in striking contrast to the traditional system of restricted trade, and one of the means of advance lies in the expansion of the one and the contraction of the other."⁶² The growth of the "modern system," they added, was almost entirely due to the efforts of non-Africans—Indian, Arab, and Goan traders, and large European firms—who were efficient, flexible, and attuned to trends in world markets. The markets those people had created, the commission argued, were bound to grow, the more so if freed from government interference, which stemmed in part from a desire to protect Africans and in part from a mistaken belief in the "greater efficiency of central control of marketing operations."⁶³

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⁶¹ Ibid., 114-15.
⁶² Ibid., 64.
⁶³ Ibid., 65.
Indeed, alongside the contrasting (vibrant) modern and (moribund) traditional marketing systems there had emerged in East Africa a third system of distribution in which state-fostered and partly state-operated institutions played major roles in buying African-produced stock and cash crops. The commissioners were dismissive of these institutions, stating bluntly: "We have come to the conclusion that a continuance of this state-marketing system is having a deleterious effect on the proper exercise of the commercial system of distribution and that it is now a retarding factor in the economic development of East Africa. We also consider that it is a hindrance to efficient African participation in the commerce and economy of the territories as a whole."64 The report concluded that the major reason for the emergence of government controlled marketing systems was the desire of colonial administrations, unduly influenced by the fears of Africans who struggled under the limitations of subsistence agriculture, to avoid food shortages caused by crop failures. From some districts, the commissioners found, food could not be exported without first obtaining permission from the district commissioner. But an assumption underlying such policies was that the "ordinary mechanism of the market" was inadequate and government intervention necessary to achieve self-sufficiency, a goal which ultimately doomed the region—and especially African peasants—to a cycle of subsistence production and increasing government regulation. State interference in food markets predated World War II, but wartime brought a tremendous expansion of government control that many administrators now wished to apply in entirely different circumstances. The royal com-

64 Ibid.
mission recommended the rejection of autarky in favor of policies designed to improve communications—thus easing distribution according to market demands—and to removing "all unnecessary obstacles to trade."  

In general, the commission maintained that government control of production and distribution distorted and eventually destroyed the pricing mechanism of the free market that alone ensured the most efficient use of scarce resources. Thereafter, the allocation of resources increasingly became a matter of arbitrary government decision. "In a society which is prepared to sacrifice economic efficiency, and which is both able and willing to accept the economic costs which are involved in this sacrifice," concluded the commissioners, "such a system of allocating resources may be pursued with equanimity. We take the view, however, that the economic situation of East Africa is not one which warrants or which can afford such costly and dangerous expedients." 66 The lesson seemed to be that the very poverty of the region ruled out the state interventions that characterized the planned economies of the communist bloc or even the United Kingdom itself. In that regard, the commission's position may well have been substantially influenced by Frankel, who had consistently opposed the theory of socialist planning. Addressing the problem of colonial development in 1952, he expressed his doubts about whether or not colonial governments were "assisted by current political and economic philosophies, which would make it appear that economic growth is not a decentralised process resting on the enterprise of the many, but one solely dependent upon the exercise of wisdom, foresight and

65 Ibid., 66.
66 Ibid., 69.
power by the few." In Frankel's view, which was strongly represented in the pages of the royal commission's report, the centralized planning of socialist economies shared many of the characteristics of colonialism, and that idea indirectly challenged the image of Britain's Labour Party (more precisely, elements of it) as the party of anti-colonialism because it failed to champion the cause of economic freedom.

Despite the report's emphatic insistence that governments should restrict their efforts to promoting the expansion of markets rather than direct involvement in the distributive system, the commissioners made some concessions to East Africa's peculiar situation. Acknowledging, for example, that African farmers often stopped producing when commodity prices fell precipitously, they recommended that in those circumstances governments should intervene in markets as competitive buyers in an effort to stabilize prices. They also advised that officials should continue to assist producers and cooperative associations in processing, grading, and collecting African produce, but they warned that peasant growers would have to learn that colonial administrations would not discriminate against other producers in their favor. Governments were not to attempt to influence the

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67 S. Herbert Frankel, Some Conceptual Aspects of International Economic Development of Underdeveloped Territories, Essays in International Finance, No. 14, May 1952 (Princeton: International Finance Section, Department of Economics and Social Institutions, Princeton University, 1952). Frankel believed that his 1950 inaugural lecture at Oxford, "The Concept of Colonisation," was well received, but not by all: "It must be remembered that these years following the war were years of popular enthusiasm for political action to inaugurate a new world of social reform. As far as colonial and ex-colonial territories were concerned, the socialists had a simple solution which was to transfer socialism and state enterprise to them—and the bigger the expenditure that could be envisaged the better." An Economist's Testimony, 218.

68 East Africa Royal Commission, Report, 70.
market mechanism, and Africans were to be conditioned to its rules by limiting available assistance only to guidance and advice in making the necessary adjustments.

The royal commission was particularly critical of what they considered the excesses of regulatory control over the East Africa economy. Many of these regulations bore heavily on Africans. The commissioners noted, for example, that even modest license fees might exclude Africans from certain trades or occupations, even where the fees for Africans were lower than for other people. Policies designed to prevent naive Africans from taking on excessive debt loads also made it difficult for African entrepreneurs to borrow sufficient capital to buy goods wholesale, thereby placing them at a disadvantage in relation to their competitors of other races. Regulations aimed at ensuring that only high quality produce could be sold often discouraged African producers, whereas if they were allowed to sell goods of lower quality they might by so doing eventually acquire the experience and capital needed to produce better goods. In countless ways government micromanagement of markets, often justified as protecting peasant producers, either excluded Africans from participation in the exchange economy or burdened them disproportionately compared to competitors of other races.

Ultimately, the commissioners argued, the existing official marketing system was a drain on East Africa's resources. Some producers of all races simply evaded the complex and bothersome regulations by trading on the black market. Colonial administrators, themselves a scarce human resource, were delegated many duties related to the regulation

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69 Ibid., 70-73.
of markets for which they were ill prepared. Freeing the region's markets and relaxing the oppressive regulatory regime, therefore, would spur economic growth while allowing officials to concentrate on more useful work.\(^{70}\)

Growth in the East African economy, however, would occur only at a very slow rate in the absence of significant investments of capital. The commission's opinion was that the region's capital requirements could only be met by gaining access to foreign financial markets. As incomes increased in the territories, the commissioners noted, people were likely to spend the increases on consumable goods, which would leave little for voluntary savings. And they saw more dangers than benefits in a policy of compulsory savings, whereby the government withheld a portion of the proceeds from commodity sales, for example, which were subsequently invested in capital improvements. Such schemes were defended on the basis that Africans showed little propensity to save and would squander resources if paid the full price of their goods. Royal commissioners believed the individual growers should make their own decisions concerning the disposal of income, thereby rejecting forced saving schemes. As a result, the region had all the more reason to attract outside capital. Again the commission's conclusions emphasized the dependency of East Africa on the larger world economy and the futility of pursuing autarky as a goal.\(^{71}\)

Capital was not only needed by large firms drawing on international markets but also by small entrepreneurs. The commission was concerned that Africans, in particular, should be able to obtain credit and participate fully in the market economy. At the same

\(^{70}\) Ibid., 76.

\(^{71}\) Ibid., 77-96.
time, it seemed clear that they had much to learn about the nature of credit and the conditions under which loans were normally obtained. Many Africans, the report stated, naively viewed banks as institutions that gave out money as opposed to government, which took money away. Those people would have to learn that banks only loaned money with the expectation that it would be repaid at a profit to the institution. The commissioners also argued that Africans would have to learn that borrowers expected loans to be secured with some kind of negotiable asset. Since many peasants lacked negotiable assets, they would have to use their land as such. That entailed converting land to a negotiable security. In other words, land could not be reserved for use by members of a particular tribal or ethnic group. The fewer restrictions on its transferability, the greater its value as a security. The commission suggested, therefore, that Africans should be allowed freely to participate in the environment of the exchange economy, and the incentive for them to do so was the prospect of future prosperity. In return they had to accept the risks of the market and not rely on traditional forms of social security.\textsuperscript{72}

Even so, the royal commissioners recognized that there would be situations in which commercial agencies would simply not grant loans to Africans except under onerous terms. In some limited circumstances, therefore, the commission suggested that governments might accept some of the risks associated with a loan. In such instances, the report declared, "the safeguards against the mis-application of the loan must be strong. Apart from the form or extent of the security which can be obtained, all the other condi-

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid., 96-98.
tions of the loan should be determined on a commercial basis. It would be no service to the African to encourage the belief that he can have easy access to a philanthropic government agency for financial support. Thus, in cases where the ultimate social benefits from advancing economic development were great enough, colonial administrations might accept some of the risks of financing projects, but African peasants nevertheless had to be conditioned to the ultimate discipline of the marketplace. Over time, the commissioners hoped that Africans would develop the "maturity of mind" presupposed by the concept of long-term borrowing, and in the process of being tutored in the workings of commercial credit they would also be weaned from over reliance on government paternalism.

But while the royal commission rejected government paternalism in the form of policies that aimed permanently to shield Africans from the effects of economic forces, they accepted the idea that East African administrations would play an important role in convincing their African charges to accept the new economic order envisioned for the region. Sometimes that entailed continuing policies that were less than optimal in terms of economic development. For example, African fears that immigrants, especially European immigrants, would deprive them of jobs were attributable, the commissioners alleged, to people who viewed the East African economy as static. They were more optimistic, maintaining that immigration represented infusions of skills and capital into the region. They recognized that the issue was politically charged and had to be handled with some care. They suggested that the full integration of Africans into economic affairs would

\[73 \text{ Ibid., 101.}\]
\[74 \text{ Ibid., 103-4.}\]
eventually defuse tensions over immigration, but until that happened they accepted that quotas regulating the inflow of foreigners should continue to be imposed. Immigration, the report emphasized, should properly be controlled by disinterested government officials rather than by boards, "which may reflect, either in their membership or in the considerations which they take to be relevant, the views of sectional interests."75 Administrative control over immigration at the expense of optimum economic efficiency was acceptable in this instance because the alternative of a much more open immigration policy might exacerbate racial tensions, with potentially disastrous consequences for development.

Compromises sometimes had to be struck, the royal commissioners agreed, between the aim of economic efficiency and other socially desirable results. Achieving those other results usually entailed some form of government intervention or economic planning, and East African labor issues presented a number of cases that the commissioners believed warranted intervention. At the heart of the labor problem was the fact that both wages level and labor productivity were low. The migrant nature of labor and the lack of labor organization only complicated the attainment of that basic goal. The key to raising the supply price of African labor, the commissioners believed, lay in increasing in the real incomes of African peasants, a process which would take considerable time. There was a pressing need, however, to stabilize the labor supply, which would not only increase the efficiency of labor but also alleviate social ills such as overcrowding, prostitution, and juvenile delinquency. But stabilization of the labor force, a socially desirable goal, was not

75 Ibid., 140-45.
likely to be achieved easily. The provision of "urban security," in the form of pensions for long service, for example, would contribute to but would not likely by itself convince Africans to abandon their traditional interests in the tribal areas and end labor migrancy. Only when industry could provide workers with sufficient income to support their families would Africans be inclined to become permanent employees in industrial occupations. In an effort to hasten the benefits to be derived from a stabilized labor supply, the royal commission endorsed government intervention in the market through the mechanism of minimum wage regulation.\textsuperscript{76}

The commission acknowledged that setting a minimum wage entailed a number of economic tradeoffs. In the final analysis, wages clearly had to be related to productivity, and any official body formed to set minimum wage levels had to recognize that relationship. Minimum wage regulations would also reduce profits in industry, and reduced profits would mean a lower level of reinvestment in the region's economy. On the other hand, the commissioners agreed with the finding of Kenya's Carpenter committee\textsuperscript{77} regarding the need for a "family wage" in industry, a wage that would allow a worker to support himself and his family and to live permanently in an urban area. Settled labor, they argued, was more efficient and less vulnerable to the social vices that beset "bachelor" labor. There was a likelihood that minimum pay scales calculated on the basis of the family wage would result in fewer jobs throughout the economy, but balancing that was the probability that

\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., 147-54.
Africans would be "more amenable to improved methods of labour management" when competing for fewer but better paid jobs.\textsuperscript{78}

All things considered, the royal commission recommended the setting of statutory minimum wages for various industries in East Africa. The commissioners further suggested that trade boards modeled on those in the United Kingdom be established in order to recommend the pay levels, which would be set by the appropriate minister. In addition to trade minimums, they also advocated the setting of national minimum wages in the three territories, something which was not done in the United Kingdom and which they justified on the grounds that unskilled labor in East Africa was of a more homogeneous character than in Britain. Even while sanctioning a departure from free market principles, the commission emphasized that trade boards and ministers would only be successful if their efforts were directed toward interpreting rather than superseding economic forces.\textsuperscript{79}

Another advantage of trade boards or wages councils, the report stated, was that they would act as "organs of collective bargaining" in a region where labor was largely unorganized. Employers' interests, the commissioners believed, were easily discerned, but they were anxious that workers' interests also be represented. Ideally trade unions would accomplish that task, but those organizations were relatively small and weak in East Africa. Africans themselves had shown little interest in unions for a number of reasons: most workers, even in industry, were still primarily peasant agriculturalists; industry was only at an early stage of development; migrant workers were slow to organize and did not

\textsuperscript{78} East Africa Royal Commission, Report, 156-58.

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid., 159-60.
provide a stable basis for trade unionism; and, perhaps most importantly, "the organizing experience and ability which are required if trade unions are to be effective are not readily to be found in a people so recently introduced into the climate of the modern world."80

Under those circumstances, the commissioners recommended that workers' representatives to wages councils should include a large proportion of Africans, even if initially those representatives were not themselves workers. Those negotiators would be appointed by the government but they would act independently. Their recommendations, however, would be subject to ministerial approval.

Essentially the royal commission proposed a program through which African workers would be tutored in the workings of the industrial economy. As they became used to the system, workers would be directly represented on the wages councils, and at the same time a system of industrial relations in which trade unions would play a major role would gradually evolve. Towards that end, the commissioners were impressed with efforts in Uganda and Tanganyika to develop works councils and joint staff committees that brought together workers and management to consider conditions of employment in particular industries. The report noted: "It would be premature to pass final judgment on these experiments but they should be encouraged and their results should be carefully watched. They have the advantage that they compel their members to focus their attention on matters about which they are likely to have some personal knowledge, and they may provide a training in negotiating which may prove to be of considerable value at a later

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80 Ibid., 161.
stage of industrial development.\textsuperscript{81} In the field of industrial relations, therefore, the colonial administrations were to be facilitators, establishing the conditions for employer-worker negotiations but gradually withdrawing from direct involvement in the process as soon as workers were able to effectively represent their own interests. In no event did the royal commission envision a permanent government role in that field.

Special problems arose in regard to rural labor. The commissioners endorsed the Carpenter committee's recommendation that a Rural Wages Advisory Board be set up, with wages committees along the lines of the industrial wages councils to advise the board on matters related to employment in local areas. They emphasized once again the importance of "an arrangement which will associate responsible African opinion with the statutory machinery by which minimum wages and conditions are recommended and determined."\textsuperscript{82} Even so, they argued that much more vigorous action by the central government would be required to sort out the complicated and contentious issue of squatter labor in the White Highlands.

Originally, the commission noted, the practice of squatting was beneficial for both laborers and the Europeans owners of farms in the Highlands. The owners, with very little capital, needed cheap labor. The workers, in turn, were allowed to grow crops and graze livestock on European land that otherwise would have been idle. Problems emerged later. As some owners accumulated sufficient capital to bring more and more of their land under cultivation, they desired to remove the resident laborers or, at least, to reduce the amount

\textsuperscript{81} Ibid., 162.
\textsuperscript{82} Ibid., 163.
of land they used. In the 1930s, as grain prices plummeted, Europeans switched to stock raising, which required the use of land occupied by squatters' herds, and they increasingly worried that their own stock might be infected by diseases carried by Africans' animals. As a result of those developments, increasingly restrictive legislation was introduced to limit the amount of land cultivable by resident laborers and to regulate the number of head of stock they could maintain. Even as squatters' cash incomes increased as they were forced to work more, their income from the land decreased and, overall, their real incomes declined. The problem, the commissioners observed, was that legislation protected the owners' interests in their land but failed to prevent the reduction of resident laborers' incomes. They wrote: "This was a serious omission and it has been the cause of much discontent which was avoidable."\(^{83}\)

Since the plight of the resident laborers partly resulted from government action, the royal commission recommended direct administrative action to address the problem. The commissioners advised that the Kenya government should purchase land in the Highlands (compulsorily, if necessary) that would be leased to African farm laborers. Those workers would be able to acquire a village dwelling along with a plot on which to grow food, with leases that provided relatively long-term security of tenure. They would also be allowed to sell their labor to whomever they chose without being obligated to work for a particular landowner in order to maintain rights of residency. An additional benefit of the proposed arrangement would be to reduce the amount of migrancy, and thereby help

\(^{83}\) Ibid., 167.
to stabilize rural labor, by ensuring that the former squatters could earn sufficient real income from a combination of agricultural production on their own plots and contract labor within close proximity of their homes. In the case of the Highlands squatters, therefore, the commissioners recommended rather drastic government action as a corrective to past interventions that had tended to favor European landowners.\(^{84}\)

Differing from the limited and qualified role that they prescribed for the state in most areas, the royal commissioners unequivocally supported a major government role in the provision of education. They endorsed Leo Amery's pronouncement that, "the supreme task of Government in Africa today is the spreading of education."\(^{85}\) They also noted with approval that Africans keenly desired greater educational opportunities for themselves and their children. Rejecting the argument that East African education systems were producing too many candidates for white collar jobs who would then prove unwilling to perform manual labor, they observed that such arguments had been made at the time of the introduction of compulsory primary education in England in 1870, "but there is nothing in England's current experience to support the contention that the black-coated workers has any longer an advantage over the manual worker in maintaining and improving his standard of living."\(^{86}\)

Nothing would benefit East Africa more, the report suggested, than an expansion of educational opportunity. Perhaps the most serious educational problem to be addressed

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\(^{84}\) Ibid., 163-70.


\(^{86}\) *East Africa Royal Commission, Report*, 176.
was that of "wastage." The commission reported that about half of the pupils currently in primary schools were expected to drop out, and 80 percent of the remainder would be eliminated through examinations. Thus, only one in ten would make it to secondary school and only a few of those would complete their studies. Those figures, the commissioners concluded, represented a tremendous waste of effort and resources, especially when those students who had only primary education or less (starting at six or seven years of age) tended to slip back into illiteracy. While the territorial governments could not currently pay for or find the staff for a program of universal, free education, the report recommended that education to the intermediate level in a three-tiered system be provided for all at fees that would not exclude any students. Beyond that, secondary education would be provided for those prepared to pay for it and promising students who could not afford the cost would be supported by a "wide and liberal system of bursaries." The commission regretted that education would have to be rationed, but in light of the limited financial resources of the governments in the region it was a necessary evil, mitigated to some extent by the availability of bursaries.\textsuperscript{97}

Whereas witnesses who presented evidence to the commission had sometimes been quite critical of the mission schools, and in particular of the "literary" education they provided, in their findings the commissioners stressed what they considered to be the successes rather than the failures of the missions.

Training in conduct and morals [they wrote] is so important that nothing should be done to discourage the mission schools. Throughout East Africa there is a progressive dissolution of tribal society and it will have been gathered from the

\textsuperscript{97} Ibid., 174-78.
general tenor of this Report that we regard this as an inevitable and beneficial process in the African's progress from a subsistence economy to integration into the modern world. But it has involved also a breakdown of tribal discipline, and if in this process the Christian missions have been one of the principal solvents, they may also claim credit for the substitution of something better in its place. As the restraints of African tribal society disappear, they must be replaced by others, and in the mission schools these are provided not only by religious instruction, but the visible example of practical Christian living. 88

The commission had no objection to the various churches' evangelizing efforts, noting: many of the students came from Christian homes; Muslim parents did not seem to protest when their children had to attend mission schools; and, non-Christian parents were happy to have their children educated even if in the process they abandoned a "moribund paganism." In their pronouncements on mission schools, the commissioners revealed both a disdain for "tribal" society and concern about the dissolution of its moral restraints.

"Practical" Christianity, it seems, represented the self-imposed moral boundaries necessary for the proper functioning of the modern exchange economy, and colonial administrations would need the voluntary assistance of the people, cultivated through the educational system, in policing those boundaries.

More and better technical education was definitely required to serve the future needs of the regions, the commissioners maintained, but they were hardly alarmed by the current situation in that regard. As much as anything, they emphasized, the greater need was not for more African artisans but for artisans who would take pride in and have a sense of responsibility regarding their work. Similarly, good moral lessons taught in schools by dedicated teachers would only take root if reinforced at home. The commis-

88 Ibid., 177.
sioners suggested that uneducated mothers acted as a sheet anchor on the process of development, and that was a powerful argument in favor of paying more attention to the education of girls. They also noted that Dr. J. C. Carothers, in his 1954 study, had attributed the disparity in education between Kikuyu men and women as one of the underlying causes of the Mau Mau. Female education, therefore, was vital for a number of reasons. Simultaneously, resistance to female education among African men would itself be overcome through educative efforts. Alleging that men believed that education would make women less willing to undertake the drudgery associated with peasant agriculture, the commissioners suggested that modern conditions dictated that male labor, no longer needed for defense or for hunting, would be better employed in the fields in any case. Ultimately, they believed that expanded educational opportunity could transform and improve the lives of ordinary Africans more than any other government effort.

In Chapter 18 of the report, "Social and Economic Co-operation," the commissioners tackled the issue of race and the challenge it presented to the project of development. They asserted that economic progress in East Africa would be achieved only if the region's people accepted both the interdependence of the territories with the rest of the world and the interdependence of the various peoples of the region. East African history, they argued, was a record of competition and cooperation between immigrant and indigenous groups. Unfortunately, examples of competition were often the more apparent, and that led to a polarization of racial and ethnic groups that undermined cooperative efforts.

90 East Africa Royal Commission, Report, 180-83.
"The theme that those who possess an advantage have attained it merely because they belong to a more favoured racial community," the report lamented, "runs like a pathological obsession throughout the daily life and work of the community." That obsession led the different groups to assume that East Africa's problems were fundamentally political and that they would prosper if only they could achieve or impose political solutions that privileged their own interests over those of other groups.

Fortunately, the commissioners argued, cooperation across racial and ethnic lines had also been a theme in East African history during the colonial period. They claimed that destructive competition had been a characteristic of the precolonial period, analogous to the ancient country of Hellas as described by Thucydides in The Peloponnesian War. They quoted a passage from that work to demonstrate how constant warfare would discourage populations from improving the land in any one area for fear of attracting the unwanted attention of some new invader who might force them to move on. Since 1900, East Africa had made considerable strides through the efforts of immigrants and indigenous peoples, all pursuing the same goal of prosperity. Even so, they added, "when all is said East Africa is still a region which resembles a series of small islands of modern production in a sea of relatively stagnant subsistence economy and unexplored or undeveloped natural resources." Tribal and racial boundaries still characterized much of the region and prevented the free movement of people, capital, skills, and ideas that alone fueled

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91 Ibid., 191.
92 Ibid., 192.
93 Ibid., 192-3.
growth. Overcoming those barriers would entail fostering among all people the common goal of economic opportunity that would increase everyone's wealth and well-being. Africans would have to accept that immigrants possessed certain skills vital for East Africa's future, and non-Africans would have to be willing to allow Africans to assist in (and profit from) developing regional resources.94

While colonial governments had long mediated between the races in the region, the royal commission suggested that the people had become too accustomed to that idea, appealing to administrations for special privileges on the basis of particular, group interests. The commissioners asserted that the tendency of exclusive groups to depend on political prerogatives instead of efficiency to secure economic gains should be replaced by institutions that rewarded merit and were open to all. Future "institutional evolution" would have to rest on an appreciation of two fundamental principles. The first was that laws privileging groups or permitting a continuance of past customs and vested interests should be abolished where the effects of those laws compromised the well-being of society as a whole. The second was that equality of opportunity was a legitimate expectation, equality of outcome was not. Equity would be achieved by removing privileges accorded the rich and powerful, and ordinary people of all races would benefit by the destruction of obstacles to growth of the national income. "The penalty of an unwillingness to move forward with the times," the report admonished, "is not merely stagnation but economic and political weakness and disruption in the face of a world which may not always be friendly."95

94 Ibid., 190-4.
95 Ibid., 197.
Despite their ringing endorsement of the virtues of equal opportunity, free enterprise, and economic progress, the commissioners advised that there would have to be some "safeguards" put in place to "protect the weak from the strong in the difficult and dangerous transition to which the impact of modern economic and social forces exposes an ever growing number of the inhabitants because of the disintegration of old institutions and the time lag in the development of new ones."\(^{96}\) They were careful to note that the problem was "sociological," not "racial," and that the experience of Africans in the region was similar to that of people in other societies undergoing rapid economic and social change. Declaring that economic efficiency could not be the only goal of development and that adverse social effects could not be countered solely with increased incomes, the commissioners recommended that there should be no transfers of the ownership of land (although that would not prevent the leasing of land) between persons of different races and that other (unspecified) measures should be taken to cushion the impact of transition from a primitive to a modern exchange economy. The report's "safeguards," vaguely described and limited to a mere two paragraphs, seem out of step with the bulk of the commission's recommendations that emphasize efficiency and growth as the principal criteria for judging institutions and practices. But in suggesting safeguards be put in place the commission acknowledged the political obstacles, both in East Africa and in the United Kingdom, that their program of development would inevitably encounter.

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\(^{96}\) Ibid.
Part four of the report, comprised of only a single chapter, dealt with the important question of urban development. In the eyes of the royal commission, East African towns were crucibles of modernization and engines of progress. There processes of economic and social change were greatly accelerated, dissolving African traditional cultures and transforming society. In the past the problem had been that town authorities had regarded Africans as liabilities to be excluded, and in consequence detribalized Africans, having thrown off the fetters of tribal life and embraced modernity, had been unable to reconstitute themselves as a community on a different basis than existed in the villages. Not allowed to become fully integrated members of town life, their economic and professional ambitions thwarted, urban Africans had little choice but to seek security by maintaining ties with tribal areas, thereby perpetuating the parochialism of village life in a new setting. Unfortunately, many of virtues of rural life were not replicated in towns, particularly the checks on the behavior of young men, who now found themselves free of the control of village elders and, because they could not afford to bring their families to dwell with them in the urban areas, were therefore unrestrained by familial responsibility. Consequently, the commissioners wrote, rates of drunkenness, prostitution, and venereal disease soared in towns, and poverty and social instability bred crime. Such conditions were not only socially destructive, they also impeded economic development.97 Without stating it directly, the commissioners also implied that an urban mass of undisciplined and disaffected young Africans posed a potentially serious political threat.

97 Ibid., 201-9.
Solutions to East Africa's urban development problems, the report concluded, would be found not so much in more or less government action but in the setting of different priorities. The commissioners conceded the necessity of official planning for urban growth, but the aims of that planning required clarification. Underlying all of the commission's concerns was the problem of how to discipline and control the young, single African male. In part, that issue could be addressed through the provision of salaries sufficient for a man to support his family in the urban environment. Members of a stable population that had severed ties to the native reserves were likely to develop a greater sense of loyalty to their particular town, and they would begin to police themselves more effectively. Government could assist in the process but could only do so much by way of improving services and amenities in towns, the commissioners contended, and ultimately it would have to be the people themselves who developed a "community outlook" that transcended superficial differences. "This will only come about," they wrote, "when people have been drawn together into social groups by a common level of education or wealth, irrespective of divisions of tribe or race, and when urban society is composed of innumerable small spontaneous associations." 98 In effect, the commission suggested that urban areas could be the locations where East African social divisions on the basis of race and tribe were dissolved and replaced by new associations and distinctions based on economic interests and status.

98 Ibid., 212-14.
Before urban areas in the region could be transformed into multiracial social and commercial centers, the royal commission suggested that systems of urban land tenure should change. In general, East African urban land, despite local variations in the different territories, could be held by anyone, but only those people with private title, leases, or licenses had secure tenure, and those who did were nearly all non-Africans. Land surrounding towns, however, was nearly always held by Africans in customary occupation protected by legislative or administrative measures, and non-Africans could not acquire such land for industrial or commercial projects.

There were three main consequences stemming from those circumstances. First, urban expansion involved the unwieldy process of extinguishing African customary rights as town boundaries expanded and occurred at the expense of Africans who generally settled on the fringes of urban centers. Lacking the resources needed to purchase or lease land within towns, Africans tended to live inside the towns without security of tenure or just outside of towns, often in squalid conditions. Extending township boundaries to facilitate economic development pushed Africans outside the boundaries farther away and often entailed the eviction of Africans inside the boundaries who found themselves occupying land slated for redevelopment. The second consequence was that non-Africans were prevented from stimulating development in urban hinterlands because they could not acquire land in areas reserved for Africans. The effect was an abrupt demarcation of "modern" and "traditional" economic zones marked by township boundaries. Finally, Africans themselves were prevented from fully developing land outside of existing bounda-
ries on account of the unsatisfactory nature of the tenure, which often did not grant individual title and consequently discouraged entrepreneurs who would have no reasonable surety of a return on investments of money and time.99

Any solution to the urban land question, the commissioners argued, would have to take into account the fact that municipal authorities had regularly taken active measures to discourage Africans from settling permanently in urban areas. Local officials would have to change their policies so that Africans would have the same opportunity as anyone else to flourish in the region's commercial centers. The commission applauded ongoing efforts to increase African representation through systems of advisory councils and similar mechanisms. On the other hand, commission members doubted whether increased representation alone would be sufficient. "Further measures," they wrote, "are needed to establish a satisfactory system of administration for people without experience of town life, whose cultural and economic level is below that of the other races, and who do not recognize among themselves any community of feeling other than that of race."100 Africans, it seemed, would still need guidance in the difficult process of adapting to modernity.

The report's main recommendations regarding urban areas involved restructuring their administration. Official policy, the commissioners urged, should embrace both towns and their hinterlands in native areas. Because native authorities were neither able nor willing to deal with the complexities of urban administration, land on the edges of townships would have to be administered by the municipalities. At the territorial level, the

99 Ibid., 215-16.
100 Ibid., 236.
commission asserted that urban policy had been a rather neglected field, lacking clear lines of authority and directed by ministers who often had other responsibilities. The report recommended the territories dedicate more personnel and resources to urban problems and that a senior official reporting directly to the responsible minister be appointed to oversee urban affairs.\textsuperscript{101}

Finally, the commissioners put forward a plan by which urban areas would be divided into three or more zones, each with varying standards for building and sanitation, so that urban living would be an attainable option for most people. In a particular town, the central zone would retain present standards, and consequently only Europeans and Asians were likely to live there in the near future. In the second zone, construction standards would be relaxed, allowing cheaper buildings to be erected. The third and subsequent zones would have no regulations for structures except for those involving public safety, such as limitations on thatched roofs and other fire hazards. The commissioners emphasized that their scheme was not a system of segregation; people of any race could choose where to live and where to do business. But they also conceded the political necessity of addressing the deep-seated African suspicion of European-dominated institutions. To allay those fears and for the sake of efficiency they proposed that predominantly African areas, both inside and outside township boundaries, be administered by African authorities. As towns expanded the newly annexed territory would be transferred from the administration of one African body to another, removing the suspicion currently aroused when rural,

\textsuperscript{101} Ibid., 238.
African lands passed to the control of non-African, municipal boards. In effect, the commission proposed to replace the existing systems of explicit or de facto racial segregation in East Africa's towns with a system of varying standards, which would segregate towns on a class basis, although they expected and welcomed the emergence of sub-communities within each of the zones. For a time, the vast majority of Africans would likely be relegated to the outer zones, but they would have the option to move inwards as they accumulated wealth and skills. Racial distrust and antagonism would be replaced by healthy competition and social alignments directed towards the achievement of economic goals. The zones proposed by the royal commission represented a mapping of the urban African's progress toward the goal of modernity.

Social and economic change seemed to occur quickly and dramatically in urban centers, but without fundamental transformations in East African rural society the royal commission did not believe that it would be possible to raise living standards in the region as a whole. Agriculture would have to be the foundation for any future expansion of the economy, and the fifth part of the report outlined a scheme for developing the land. The commissioners pointed out that there was far less land suitable for agricultural development in East Africa than was seemingly apparent. Tsetse fly affected about 40 percent of the region's territory, rendering people and animals vulnerable to trypanosomiasis. At least two-thirds of the surface area lacked good water supplies. Aside from some parts of southern Tanganyika and western and northern Uganda, there were not large tracts of

102 Ibid., 240.
productive land that were not already occupied. The commission concluded, therefore, that East Africa's problems could not be solved by moving people from congested areas to less populated regions. The land problem could only be addressed by improving the use of acreage currently under cultivation. 103

Customary land use involving subsistence agriculture was failing in two important aspects according to the commissioners: there was insufficient land available to allow for its expansion to accommodate a growing population; and, it had failed to yield incomes high enough to encourage young people to stay on the land rather than being drawn to alternative forms of employment. Attempting to raise incomes quickly by expanding the production of cash crops using the old methods of cultivation would only lead to depletion of the soil. Instead, the royal commission suggested that the aim should be to strike a balance between the displacement of people from rural areas and raising agricultural incomes. Agricultural productivity could only rise slowly, because it was important to avoid creating a landless proletariat lacking urban employment. The commissioners wrote that the territorial governments should not attempt to impose the most efficient model of land use to the exclusion of all other considerations, and they held that a program of "agricultural rehabilitation" would proceed unevenly, with some areas, groups, and individuals adopting reforms much more quickly than others. 104 Nevertheless, all levels of government had important roles to play in guiding the process of change and controlling its negative consequences.

103 Ibid., 256-62.
104 Ibid., 290-92.
Rural African peoples, the commission found, could generally be described as belonging to one of two groups, pastoralists or cultivators, and each of those had special needs to address as they made the transition from traditional to modern. Pastoralists were nomads, keeping herds that represented wealth and social status, and they generally attached greater importance to the quantity rather than the quality of their livestock. In the commissioners' view, the main problem with traditional practice among pastoralists was that land tended to be held communally by tribal or clan groups while there were no restrictions on the individual ownership of animals. As a result, there was no incentive for individuals to conserve the land. A solution would involve some method of relating the number of stock to the carrying capacity of the land, and the commission argued that suitable remedies might be either communally or individually based and varied according to local circumstances. Communal solutions might take the form of limiting the stock held by individuals, establishing rules for rotation of land, or dividing land held by a group into individual ranches. Pastoral communities, the commissioners argued, would likely find those types of adjustments congenial, and they might prove to be the intermediate steps in a transition to individual ownership of land. In new areas, opened to settlement as tsetse clearance and water development proceeded, the report asserted that it would be possible to break with communal tenure altogether and to lay out family ranches. Individual tenure was the ultimate goal, but the commission set a higher priority on proper land usage, which could be achieved in the short term through any of the options they described.\(^{105}\)

\(^{105}\) Ibid., 282, 292.
Land conservation was the most pressing issue, but sustained economic development also entailed raising pastoralists' incomes. That could only occur if the nomadic peoples began to participate in the market economy, raising quality stock for sale rather than maintaining low-grade animals for prestige. "Difficult as it is to establish a stable economy in the pastoral areas," the commissioners wrote, "the way to it must surely lie in putting the nomad in touch with the rising exchange economy of the rest of the territory by encouraging export of stock, emigration of persons, and import of goods."106 Central and local government officials would have to undertake the tasks of educating the Africans about the market and of developing marketing systems capable of meeting the new demands they fostered among pastoralists. Veterinary departments, in particular, would be in the forefront of teaching producers how to improve the quality of their herds and in using persuasion or, where that failed, coercion to eliminate poor stock.107

Cultivating communities, groups that remained in one location for extended periods and grew crops as well as keeping some stock, differed from pastoralists in that the royal commission believed there were more "progressive" individuals among the former. Still, they faced some similar obstacles in terms of development. Where land was limited and held in common there was little incentive to conserve it. Individual farmers had only small, often fragmented, plots, and they prudently practiced "safety first" agriculture, ensuring an adequate food supply for their families before planting cash crops. The only way for them to raise their incomes was to forgo the fallow period for a portion of their hold-

106 Ibid., 296.
107 Ibid., 301, 309.
ing and plant additional cash crops, thereby overusing and eventually ruining the land. In addition, common grazing areas were often not well maintained within cultivating communities. The challenge was to find a way for individuals in those communities to overcome their present deficiencies and to produce a surplus that would allow incomes to rise. Maintaining the status quo was not sufficient because a growing population meant that a continuation of subsistence agriculture would eventually erode everyone's income in any particular community. Furthermore, a rise in agricultural incomes would slow the exodus from the land to the towns and exert an upward pressure on urban incomes.\textsuperscript{108}

Declining to prescribe a single pattern of land development for the region as a whole, the royal commissioners maintained that a heterogeneous approach, varied according to local circumstances, would produce the desired surpluses as long as governments focused on improving land use. They wrote:

What is needed is a policy deliberately determined to encourage economic usage of land, and to remove the obstacles which prevent this, but not necessarily wedded to any one solution as a panacea; a policy which stimulates different experiments, not only in the technical alternatives in patterns of usage, but also in differing human association, by individuals, by co-operatives, by schemes under government plan, by partnerships with development organizations, or by clans still wishing to preserve their community ties, but ready to forego the faults in them; a policy seeking progress in a new mobility of ideas and people.\textsuperscript{109}

But despite their espousal of a multiplicity of approaches to the problem of poor land use, they unequivocally promoted the aim of land tenure secured to individuals through owner-

\textsuperscript{108} Ibid., 206-7, 313.
\textsuperscript{109} Ibid., 333.
ship or long-term leases, and they concluded that the territorial governments of the region would have to act to achieve that aim.

In the past, the commissioners noted, colonial authorities had erred in blindly applying the expedient policy of indirect rule, often leading them to favor the least progressive members of native society who happened to be the dominant local authority in any particular area. Even following World War II, when the British attempted to develop more representative local government, they did not try to change land tenure law, which consequently remained locally administered and generally conservative. That policy, the commissioners argued, was misguided.

The important place of customary land tenure in African society and the real difficulty in accepting changes, [they wrote,] combined with the fact that traditional authorities may have important personal motives for resisting them, means that land tenure law cannot simply be left to evolve under the impact of modern influences. A lead must be given by governments to meet the requirements of the progressive elements of society by applying a more satisfactory land tenure law wherever a fair measure of support exists. So also the breaking down of exclusive tribal and clan boundaries cannot be left entirely to a process of evolution under economic pressure.\textsuperscript{110}

They proposed that central governments should define the aim without attempting to impose uniformity in the detail of land tenure law; local land boards would set specific provisions, subject to the general regulations promulgated and overseen by territorial authorities.\textsuperscript{111}

If governments had an interest in accelerating the pace of change in terms of land tenure, however, the commissioners also held that official policy had a responsibility to

\textsuperscript{110} Ibid., 346-7.

\textsuperscript{111} Ibid., 348-9.
protect the interests of those least able to understand that process of change. Peasant farmers, they argued, were capable of adapting to new circumstances, but until they had learned the principles and rules of free markets the state should protect them from their own ignorance. Their main concern was that peasants would pledge their land as security for loans that were not primarily intended to raise capital for land improvement. To this end, they recommended laws be passed prohibiting Africans from indiscriminately mortgaging real estate. Progressive African farmers would be able to raise capital by offering land as security for loans from special land banks, established for that purpose and charged with ensuring that loans were used strictly for the purpose of making capital improvements. Through such a mechanism, the royal commission believed that the reduction of the peasantry to debt peonage and the emergence of a class of absentee landlords might be avoided. Additional measures would strictly control transfers of land between persons of difference races in an effort to allay African fears of a massive European land grab.\footnote{Ibid., 354-5, 358.}

A final, vital role for governments in effecting the transition from a primitive to a modern economy in terms of land usage involved confronting the human factor in the development equation through a program of education and guidance at the village level. In order to raise the standard of living in East Africa, the commission declared, "something in the nature of an agrarian revolution is essential, a revolution in outlook and in practice, and one in which all the people of East Africa are personally involved."\footnote{Ibid., 367.} Involving all the people entailed the elimination of barriers of class, gender, and race that currently di-
vided them, and that objective could not be achieved through the use of compulsion. Colonial administrations lacked sufficient resources to impose most measures by force and, in any case, the results of such impositions were often short-lived. Persuasion, the report argued, was the best approach. African peasants had to be convinced of the efficacy of modern methods by demonstration, not through theoretical discussion. To that end, the commissioners suggested a number of mechanisms that might be useful. They advocated the continued use of provincial and district teams, composed of technical officers (agricultural, veterinary, forestry, health, etc.), representatives of different races from among the public, local government officials, and chaired by the district commissioner. These teams were primarily concerned with the development of African areas, but the commissioners encouraged participation by Europeans and Asians, including farmers and missionaries, who were familiar with the local area and might be able to offer advice. Working in conjunction with the district teams were local governments, either native authorities or district councils, which as they evolved could be expected to form natural resources and social services committees. The commission pressed for a clear delineation of responsibility between central and local governments for improving land use, and urged local authorities to co-opt technical officers to sit on their natural resources committees until such time as they had built up their own technical staffs.  

In general the commissioners stressed the need to bring all available human resources, official and unofficial, to bear on the task of improving land usage, but it was es-

\[114\] Ibid., 368-72.
sential that the efforts of the various experts be coordinated. They assigned that responsibility to general administrative officers, the traditional "men-on-the-spot" of the colonial service. That assignment may indicate that the commission recognized the importance of garnering support for the report among colonial service officers, the most influential of whom were administrative rather than technical officers. But, more significantly, R. S. Hudson drafted chapter 24, "Agrarian Administration," and he himself had risen through the ranks of the colonial service in Northern Rhodesia before moving to the Colonial Office and becoming head of the African Studies Branch in 1949. The report did not deny the value of the work performed by specialists, but insisted that the most important relationship between ordinary Africans and colonial administration was that which developed between the individual district officer and the people within his jurisdiction. That officer required a general knowledge of all aspects of rural economic development. Supported by the experts of his district team, the district officer embodied the administration in the eyes of African peasants, and he had to earn their respect and trust. "A field service of this kind," the commission declared, "dealing with all aspects of agrarian development under the district team, will play a very important part and the qualities most needed for the work are those of character and leadership." Such a statement would have been well received by members of the colonial service at any time in its history.

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Less familiar would have been the commission's insistence that Africans and women be actively recruited and trained by the service in an effort to break down racial and gender obstacles that impeded programs of economic development. It was as field officers that the commissioners believed Africans, given proper training, could have the greatest and most immediate impact in helping to bring about agrarian change, which would be more successful if African peasants did not view it as a European imposition. Similarly, the report proposed that women should be employed to instruct other women in better farming methods and other skills. "Women . . .," the commissioners observed, "play a major part in cultivation and all the efforts to teach men the benefits of better farming may be frustrated if the women are not converted too."¹¹⁷ The best candidates to become female instructors, they argued, were local women of standing because they already had the respect of their neighbors and were therefore more likely to be able to successfully convey their message. Women's clubs and female welfare assistants were other vehicles for progressive ideas on organizing the home and family along modern lines.¹¹⁸

Of all the potential obstacles to economic development, overcoming racial antipathy and suspicion seemed to be the most serious. Part six of the report, "Race Relations," addressed that issue in a single chapter. In the royal commission's view, racial tension resulted from the pressure on fertile land due to its scarcity, and that tension, cast primarily in terms of African versus European, undermined in every instance the confidence between the government and the people of the region. British imperial rule, the commissioners felt,

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 377.
¹¹⁸ Ibid., 377-8.
did not itself produce interracial mistrust. Furthermore, they maintained that non-African settlement was not the cause of conflict over land and that in the absence of settlers there would be conflict among African tribes over the same issue. Indeed, external contact actually offered escape from the dilemma by stimulating foreign demand for East African products, raising the standard of living above what was possible in a subsistence economy, and providing alternative occupations that relieved the direct pressure on cultivable acreage. Despite that, the commissioners wrote, "where fertile land is scarce and is still sought as the only form of security for living such settlement appears not as the harbinger of greater wealth and better jobs but as an intruder."\textsuperscript{119} They noted that those sentiments were exacerbated when there was such a disparity of size between European estates and African farms or where the estates were left undeveloped.

Racial suspicion, the commission warned, posed a serious threat to the attainment of economic growth. African hostility to all things European might discourage foreign capitalists from investing in the region. European settlers, dismissive of African grievances, risked aggravating the sense of racial polarization. "Very considerable changes in the attitudes of all concerned will be needed or these differences will paralyse future progress,"\textsuperscript{120} cautioned the report. As an example of the kind of economic damage that might be inflicted, the commissioners recounted the story of a dried vegetable factory at Karatina, in the Fort Hall District of Kenya, which had been quite successful during the war and which the Kenya Government later proposed to hand over to a local African farmers co-

\textsuperscript{119} Ibid., 380.
\textsuperscript{120} Ibid.
operative, provided that the European management was retained for reasons of efficiency. The farmers rejected the offer, ending the growth of a promising industry, because they did not believe it proper to have European managers for a project on an African reserve.121 Thus, the commissioners concluded, racial divisions, originating in differing ideas about land use, imperiled economic development. By implication, changing African notions of land use and an effective development program that included Africans in its implementation would help to bridge the interracial divide.

Setting out to influence African public opinion was easier to identify as a goal than to outline as a plan. Drawing on anecdotal evidence of cooperation between individual European farmers and local African communities, the commissioners suggested that such personal contacts might lay a foundation for greater shifts in public spirit. Without describing how to go about it, they asserted that efforts should be directed toward "convincing African public opinion to support [new methods of land usage] as correct developments for the community, and on dissipating beliefs which may be opposed to them on the ground that they are somehow connected with racial competition for land."122 Affirming their opinion that the region could not bear the limits on productivity imposed by restricting land use in different areas to particular groups—African or European—they proclaimed: "Future policy needs to be associated with an ideal which can command general allegiance and can inspire a new confidence in joint endeavour."123 Such statements reem-

121 Ibid., 382.
122 Ibid., 384.
123 Ibid., 385.
phasized the commission's position that economic growth could render political dissent irrelevant, for what other ideal could command "general allegiance" in the racially charged political atmosphere of East Africa?

The royal commissioners were not oblivious to political considerations, arguing for instance that European settlers should involve themselves with the task of bring Africans into the modern exchange economy:

This is as much to the European interest as to that of the African, for European farms cheek by jowl with African lands under customary African usage, with its inevitable dependence upon more land for subsistence, are insecure. The resulting frictions carry a risk that African will revert to an isolation which can benefit neither them nor those of other races. The situation both makes demands upon and offers the opportunity to the non-African of being the bridge to African economic development for his own safety and his own material interest.\(^\text{124}\)

They allowed that "other satisfactions" were sometimes more important than material progress, and that steps should be taken to meet the African's demand to be treated as an equal, without "glossing over real differences in capacity."\(^\text{125}\) To that end they suggested a number of measures be undertaken. As a counter to the impression of European enterprise as an "alien exploiter," the commissioners advocated the promotion of African business ventures, and where Africans lacked all of the skills and capital required for a particular endeavor, they pressed for European-African partnerships and joint directorships. European estates, they suggested, should take on African tenants who, under proper supervision, would learn valuable skills. They encouraged settler farmers to adopt individual African "pupil farmers." Where there were sufficient numbers of progressive African

\(^{124}\) Ibid., 386.
\(^{125}\) Ibid.
farmers, they proposed the formation of a farmers' union, which would employ its own European advisors. Throughout East African business, the report argued, Africans should be trained and appointed at every level to responsible positions. The consistent theme was that economic growth was a goal attainable only if members of all races were involved in its pursuit and placed it above other considerations. In designing public and private schemes to further than effort, the commissioners wrote, "it is vital to take cognizance of the emerging African individual and to help him to develop his sense of leadership and initiative. Nothing can be more important in this regard than personal acquaintance and friendship." Notably, perhaps aware of the limits of their own influence, the commissioners stopped short of advocating political equality at all levels for members of different racial backgrounds; economic development took precedence over political goals as the solution to all of East Africa's problems.

Ultimately, the royal commission's repeated assertion that sustained economic growth would smooth over racial, class, and gender differences in the region appears to have been wishful thinking. The human factor emerged as the most intractable issue in the development program advanced by the commissioners. Their solution was that everyone in East Africa would benefit if only they acknowledged their interdependence. No group or race in the region could hope to prosper in isolation from others; nor would it be realistic for an individual territory to turn its back on global trade and pursue policies aimed at achieving autarky. If Africans would accept that they needed the skills and capital of non-

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126 Ibid., 387.
African farmers and businessmen, if European settlers would recognize that Africans in roles other than manual laborers were essential for economic progress, if African women would embrace the concept of modernity, then the commission held that the bitterness produced by colonial rule might be soothed. Ironically, the commission suggested those alterations of fundamental beliefs might take place without altering the basic political conditions from which they had arisen.

Although the report was unanimous, its pages nevertheless reveal a number of ongoing debates among commission members. Of significance in that regard are the voices that are missing from the final version. Chief Kidaha and Audrey Richards, full-time and part-time commissioners respectively during the evidence phase of the commission's work, who had frequently played the roles of interpreters and defenders of African traditions and practices, were not involved with drafting the report. Sections drafted by other members of the commission are not officially attributed, but information provided by Tom Soper, the tenor of commissioners' comments to witnesses while taking testimony, and a certain amount of conjecture leads to some plausible conclusions. The two economists, S. H. Frankel and Daniel Jack, stood for free markets, an end to special reservations for particular groups, and curtailment of government meddling in business affairs. They were almost certainly responsible for the bulk of part three, "Conditions for Economic and Social Development," which reflected their philosophy. Rowland Hudson, the representative of the Colonial Office, defended the work and accomplishments of colonial service officers in the chapter he drafted on "Agrarian Administration." It seems likely that Chairman Hugh
Dow shared many of Hudson's views. It is difficult to discern what impact, if any, Frederick Seaford, the commission's businessman, had on the report, and Soper maintained that he had been disinclined to offer much help. Frank Sykes, the farm expert, surely contributed a great deal to part five, "Conditions for Development of the Land," especially to the sections dealing with technical aspects of farming. Finally, Arthur Gaitskell, the man who consistently expressed concern about what would happen to "George"—the little guy in all the grand schemes of development—seems to have most strongly influenced part five, particularly sections dealing with land use and tenure.\(^{127}\)

Most striking is the contrast between part three and part five of the report, which respectively expound "private" and "public" models of development. The former asserted the principle of laissez-faire, advocating strict limitations on the government role in economic development for fear of squelching the dynamic and creative initiatives of private entrepreneurs. When faced with the massive problem of restructuring rural society and changing the region's systems of land tenure, however, the fifth part of the report sanctioned an activist policy of government intervention. Those divergent approaches to some extent parallel contemporaneous debates in British politics and society over the extent of central direction that was acceptable and desirable for economic growth.

But if there were points at which members of the royal commission disagreed with one another, the internal debate was hardly bitter (which, as will be discussed in the following chapter, was not the case among certain commentators following the report's pub-

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lication). Indeed, the commissioners shared certain premises that underpinned all of their findings. They believed in the inevitability of economic progress given the proper social and cultural conditions. Those conditions were first achieved in the United Kingdom, and the British model, therefore, became the blueprint for the achievement of "takeoff" in other economies. The commissioners repeatedly compared East Africa's state of development to various periods in British history. Thus, industrial development in the region, including relations between labor and management, would best follow a course similar to that of nineteenth- and twentieth-century England. Because industry was as yet relatively undeveloped in East Africa, there was no need for governments to intervene to set it on the right course. Regarding land tenure and usage, however, the commissioners viewed existing conditions as antithetical to economic progress. In that case, they supported official action to root out the debilitating aspects of African traditional culture, wrenching the region into the modern world and putting it on course to achieve future prosperity.

For the royal commissioners, that project of reconstruction was the imperial mission. They were not always in agreement concerning the British present, but they harbored few doubts concerning Britain's glorious past. Self-consciously they declared that what they were advocating for East Africa was an agricultural and industrial revolution. As their final comment in the report, in full knowledge of the enormity of the proposed project, they declared that the policies they recommended were "as important for East Af-
rica as was the compilation of the Domesday Book for England in the eleventh century.\textsuperscript{128} Shortly after publication of the report, Dow told a distinguished audience:

We have not glossed over the fact that our proposals call for something like a revolution in men's thinking and methods, both on the part of the African and the European. But that revolution has already started. The remorseless working of natural economic laws is rapidly changing the outlook of the human material with which we have to deal. If we are to continue to encourage the African to think in terms of self-government or independence—not that he now requires much encouragement—we must help him to supply these concepts not only in the political but in the economic field. There will be disillusion [sic] and even disaster ahead unless he is helped to progress simultaneously in each; and at present we seem to be continuing in the latter field the paternalism which we are rapidly, some may think too rapidly, abandoning in the former. In both fields, we ought to remember that the end of Government is not to exercise restraint, but to guide and help progress.\textsuperscript{129}

\textsuperscript{128} \textit{East Africa Royal Commission, Report}, 395.

\textsuperscript{129} Address by Sir Hugh Dow to the Royal Institute of International Affairs, [26] October 1955, Oriental and India Office collections, Dow Collection, MSS Eur E 372/13.
Chapter Six

The Reception

Long anticipated, the report of the East Africa Royal Commission was finally released on 9 June 1955. Immediately thereafter ensued a debate among informed British circles regarding its merits. Ostensibly the issue at stake in that debate was the economic development of East Africa, but the arguments advanced revealed sharp ideological divisions among contemporary political thinkers. The fact that the tenor of the report, if not all of its substantive recommendations, was provocatively strident in its advocacy of free market principles did nothing to allay the suspicions of critics who questioned those principles. Protagonists disputing the proper course for the future of East Africa did so by advancing competing visions of Britain's past and present. In a sense, Africa and Africans were secondary considerations in that debate, although critics on the left and right of the political spectrum asserted that they spoke with African interests foremost in their minds. Africans were certainly not participants in discussions of the report, and the fact that the Colonial Office deemed it pointless (if not impossible) to translate the document into African vernaculars indicates that the vast, uneducated majority of them were expected to be objects of, rather than subjects in, debate.

British commentators on the report focused on two major issues, both derived from opposing interpretations of British history. The first was the question of political versus economic development and which should take precedence. The other concerned
the nature and the extent of government involvement in the development process. Left-wing critics favored rapid moves towards self-government and were extremely suspicious of the motives of private businessmen in the colonies. They advocated a healthy measure of government dirigisme for the East African economy. Conservative critics were not altogether opposed to governmental direction, arguing in favor of continuing paternalism and oversight in the political sphere. They believed, however, that substantial economic progress was essential in laying the groundwork for self-government in the (relatively distant) future, and they were convinced that too many regulatory restrictions would simply slow that process. Writers and thinkers from across the British political spectrum ultimately saved their greatest reservations for consideration of the human factor. All development plans hinged on the capacity of the African people to carry them through, with or without British guidance, and many commentators were pessimistic in that regard.

Another aspect of the debate over the commission's work was that some critics took the opportunity to consider the future of the British empire. More precisely, they wrote about how it might be satisfactorily and honorably ended. To some of them, the report presented itself as a guidebook for completing the last great imperial mission. To others, who rejected some of the principal assumptions of the report, it nevertheless provided a point of departure for considering the British legacy to the peoples of its African possessions.

Responses to the report of the East Africa Royal Commission can be categorized as falling into four phases, three "official" and one "unofficial." In the first official phase,
the Colonial Office considered factors affecting the timing of the report's publication and attempted to anticipate and respond to initial public reactions. Officials weighed technical and logistical aspects of publication against political considerations that included settler reaction, the impact on Mau Mau, and the case for and against translating the report into African vernaculars. The unofficial phase consisted of the reactions to the commission's recommendations among journalists, academics, and other informed circles. Colonial Office bureaucrats made some efforts to guide unofficial opinion but acted more as observers to the debate during that phase. The second official phase (which overlapped the earlier phases) consisted of the preparation of the secretary of state's and territorial governors' responses to the report, which the Colonial Office staff coordinated with an eye to a future Parliamentary debate. Discussions of the specific recommendations of the royal commission as they applied to East Africa and to colonial Africa in general constituted the third official phase, which began soon after publication of the report and continued for some years thereafter.

Originally Sir Hugh Dow had aimed to submit the commission's finished report to the Colonial Office during the fall of 1954 with the hope of seeing it printed by the end of that year. Delays resulted from difficulties in gathering all of the commission members together from various parts of England, although Dow believed that one benefit of extending the period of drafting was to allow more time to smooth over disagreements and produce a unanimous report. The chairman warned Alan Lennox-Boyd, secretary of state for the colonies, that a number of the commission's findings would be unacceptable to one or
another interest group in East Africa. But, while the commissioners were aware of government declarations and pledges made in the past, they saw no possibility of alleviating racial tension without recommending some policy changes. The commission chose not to address certain contentious political issues, and Lennox-Boyd reported that Dow said they handled those matters by stating: "This is what should by done: there may be political reasons why you cannot do it, but, if that is so, then these will be the consequences of your failure to act." At that point, of course, Colonial Office personnel had not seen the report and were simply anticipating possible points of controversy.

Colonial governors, too, awaited with some trepidation the publication of the royal commission's recommendations. Sir Evelyn Baring informed the secretary of state that the Kenya government planned to make a bold offer of surrender terms to Mau Mau insurgents sometime after the middle of April 1955, and he worried that prior publication of the commission's report might lead to the erroneous conclusion that the two events were related in some fashion. "Both loyalist Africans and Mau Mau, and even some Europeans," Baring wrote, "might interpret the issue of the proposed new surrender terms (which like the Wedgwood terms would promise that those surrendering would not be prosecuted for any offence including murder committed prior to the surrender) as being a result of the observations of the Royal Commission on the shortage of land for the Kikuyu or their other disabilities. They might well feel that the issue by Government of a more lenient surrender offer was a belated attempt to put past 'wrongs' right." He maintained that the

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wisest course would be to defer publication of the report until sometime after the internal unrest in Kenya had subsided, perhaps by mid-1955. He continued: "It would certainly be a pity if just at a time when our operations and surrender proposals here were really producing an effect on Mau Mau a highly contentious and politically difficult report were published. The Report would stir up African or European feelings, particularly the former. It might also indicate to Mau Mau that it would be a good thing to hold on for a bit and prolong the present struggle!"

With political damage control foremost in their thoughts, the governors of Uganda and Tanganyika expressed their views on the prospect of a delay in publication. Sir Andrew Cohen noted that the Uganda government had postponed action in the field of land tenure reform pending publication of the commission's findings. In case of further delay, he hoped that the East African governments would be provided with confidential copies, thereby allowing them to proceed with policy discussions about land tenure without fear of conflicting with the report's approach. Sir Edward Twining doubted that delaying publication until the middle of 1955 would affect the Tanganyika government, but he was not sure that the timetable should be determined solely "by conditions affecting Kenya and Parliament." He was concerned about how the commission report might affect the findings of a recent United Nations Visiting Mission, whose report was to be debated in the Trusteeship Council. In a later letter to the Colonial Office, he commented that, "if the

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3 Ibid.
Report is published while the Trusteeship Council is considering the Visiting Mission's Report on Tanganyika or shortly after, and, if the Royal Commission's recommendations should be in any way at variance with our observations on the Visiting Mission's Report, it may cause us considerable embarrassment. But since Twining was largely ignorant of the contents of both reports he could hardly anticipate the impact of one upon the other. In any case, he suggested that, "no one territory should publish any comment on or decisions of policy arising from any of the recommendations of the Royal Commission without first consulting with the other territories. Any other course might cause very serious embarrassment to the other two territories, particularly if the announcement concerned policy on land tenure, a question which is politically dynamic in all the territories."7

Despite Baring's concerns, Lennox-Boyd did not agree that release of the report should be put off to a later date. He pointed out to the governor that he had for some time been pressuring Dow to complete the work as soon as possible. The commission's chief secretary, John Ingham, was scheduled to be posted to Nyasaland and would have to be withdrawn from the work by mid-January 1955, and the secretary of state had informed the House of Commons on more than one occasion that the report would be published early in 1955. Consequently, Lennox-Boyd replied to Baring,

any substantial delay in publication is likely to arouse considerable suspicion here. And will it not also make your [Kenyan] Europeans feel certain that there is something very horrible in the report itself (assuming, as we have no right to do yet, that the report will contain things that will upset them)?

Yet another consideration which occurs to me is that if the report does contain material that is likely to upset the Europeans, there is probably never likely

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to be a time which will be considered suitable for its publication and that being so, we might as well get it over quickly as possible.\(^8\)

He did not think it advisable to interfere with the timetable as it then stood. As it turned out, Dow was not able to present a complete copy of the report to the Colonial Office until 18 May 1955, but there is no evidence to suggest that the delay was deliberate or inspired by political considerations.

Attempting to negotiate Kenya's hazardous racial politics, Baring also complained that the governors were not to be provided with advance copies of the report to discuss with their governments. He told the secretary of state:

> I fully appreciate the difficulties in the way of doing this. But if I cannot prepare the ground at all in the mixed government of Kenya, I am afraid that we will be placed in a very dangerous position. As you know, European opinion has become unreasonably inflamed by the offer of improved surrender terms. There has also been very widespread criticism among most Europeans in public life, including those in [Michael] Blundell's party, of [C. J. M.] Alport's\(^9\) recent statement about the White Highlands being a "political anachronism." All sorts and kinds of implications have been suggested. At the same time I have little doubt that whatever the Asians do, the Africans will make great capital out of anything in the report which might suggest the advisability of weakening what Europeans regard as the safeguards against the transfer of land in the White Highlands to non-Europeans.\(^10\)

The receipt of advance copies of the report would allow the governor to conduct preliminary discussions with member of the Council of Ministers and perhaps reach some agreement prior to the public outcry expected to follow publication. At the very least, Baring argued, Lennox-Boyd should give him some indication of what were likely to be the most

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\(^8\) Letter, A. Lennox-Boyd to Sir Evelyn Baring, 20 December 1954, PRO CO 822/1107.


controversial of the commission's recommendations and allow him to conduct informal
discussions with ministers. The colonial secretary replied that, with respect to Parliamen-
tary privilege, the best he could do prior to publication and presentation of the report to
Parliament was to provide Baring with a single proof copy strictly for his own use. All of
the governors would also get a limited number of advance copies of the report, which
could be made available to ministers only 48 hours prior to publication. He also author-
ized Baring to allow advance copies to be viewed by "the editors of the more reputable
press whose discretion can be counted on."

Lennox-Boyd sympathized with Baring but made only small concessions to meet the governor's demands.

Several months later than expected, chairman Dow presented printed copies of the
report to the secretary of state on 18 May 1955. Both he and Lennox-Boyd believed the
authority of the document was enhanced because it was unanimously endorsed by all
members of the commission.

Soon thereafter the secretary submitted it to the queen for her signature with the recommendation that it be printed and submitted to Parliament. On
9 June, the Colonial Office released the report along with a fourteen page summary pro-
vided by the secretariat of the commission for the convenience of the press. Officials in
London were careful to note that the commission's conclusions were not an expression of
official policy on the part of the British or the East African governments and that the pro-
posals would have to be carefully studied before any policy decisions were made.

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12 Letter, Hugh Dow to A. T. Lennox-Boyd, 18 May 1955, PRO CO 822/1107; letter, A. Lennox-Boyd to
Sir Hugh Dow, [?] May 1955, PRO CO 822/1107.
secretary of state first planned to ask the East African governors for their considered views of the document.¹³

As soon as the report entered the public domain a number of issues arose concerning its dissemination. Since the 482 page document was rather unwieldy and hardly comprehensible to the casual reader, there were calls for the publication of a summary that would be accessible to more people. Rebecca Fane, a long-time Kenyan settler, wrote the secretary of state requesting the separate publication of the report's sections on its conclusions and the "Guide to the Main Conclusions and Recommendations." She did not think many people would read the whole volume and feared that, "if they do not read it, or at least a balanced summary of it, they are likely to offer uninformed opposition to the Report as a whole, or to those recommendations whose nature they only know by hearsay, which are likely to be the more contentious ones."¹⁴ Lennox-Boyd responded that, because the royal commission had insisted that the report be taken as a whole, there would be some difficulty in producing an official print of only part of it, and he wondered if the press summary released along with the document would do.¹⁵ Fane did not think it would, asserting that if her original proposal was unacceptable, she and her neighbors would like to see the publication of the summary then appearing in the Kenya Weekly News,¹⁶ or that

¹⁴ Letter, Rebecca Fane to A. Lennox-Boyd, 28 June 1955, PRO CO 822/1108.
¹⁵ Letter, A. Lennox-Boyd to Mrs. Rebecca Fane, 7 July 1955, PRO CO 822/1108.
along with and as background to the conclusions. Lennox-Boyd agreed that the report should receive wide and accurate publicity, and he told Fane that he had consulted the governor of Kenya about her suggestions. Sometime later the colonial secretariat informed Fane that the condensed version of the report published in the newspaper would be reissued in booklet form. She hoped that decisions would help dispel the commonly held opinion among Kenyan settlers that the main recommendation of the commission was "to abolish the 'sanctity' of the White Highlands," and she was enthusiastic about the prospect of the East Africa Literature Bureau preparing a Swahili translation of the summary. Soon after she disappointedly reported to the secretary of state that the Kenya government had decided not to publish a translation, because she believed such a document would reach many Africans who did not understand English and correct misunderstandings. She noted, for example, that some Africans thought that undeveloped European lands would be turned over to African farmers while others feared that the commission had recommended detribalization for the lot of them.

Fane was not the only person concerned about disseminating an accurate version of the report to Africans. In the House of Commons, J. F. W. Maitland asked whether or not it would be translated into African languages. Apparently the Colonial Office had not considered the issue prior to publication, and the secretary of state inquired of the East

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17 Letter, Rebecca Fane to Mr. Lennox-Boyd, 12 July 1955, PRO CO 822/1108.
18 Letter, A. Lennox-Boyd to Mrs. Rebecca Fane, 22 July 1955, PRO CO 822/1108.
19 Letter, Rebecca Fane to Mr. Lennox-Boyd, 8 September 1955, PRO CO 822/1108.
20 Letter, Rebecca Fane to Mr. Lennox-Boyd, 16 September 1955, PRO CO 822/1108; Letter, Rebecca Fane to Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 7 October 1955, PRO CO 822/1108.
African governors regarding "... any arrangements that have been made for bringing the contents of the Report to the notice of members of all races, but especially of Africans."\textsuperscript{22} The government of Tanganyika responded that their dissemination efforts had been confined to the sale of 75 copies of the report and the publication in Mambo Leo, a government monthly newspaper, of an article in Swahili that briefly described the findings. The government planned to summarize the whole report in very simple English.\textsuperscript{23} The acting governor of Uganda reported that it would be all but impossible to make a translation into any African vernacular because the content of much of the document could not be accurately rendered in languages with limited technical vocabularies. He continued:

There has been no request so far from Africans or African Local Governments for translation of the Report and it is thought generally that Africans who have not had the benefit of sufficient education to be able to understand English would in any case find the Report to a great extent incomprehensible. Small sections of the Report, however, especially those which apply to particular areas, might from time to time be translated into particular vernaculars if this appears desirable, and this possibility will be borne in mind when the Report is being considered.\textsuperscript{24}

Officials in Kenya concurred that the report was "not susceptible of translation into Swahili," although they thought a translation of the summary being prepared by the Tanganyikan government might be useful. Furthermore, "since Uganda did not propose to issue any summary and since Tanganyika had already adopted a line of its own, Kenya would be

\textsuperscript{22} Telegram, Secretary of State for the Colonies to Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, 27 June 1955, PRO CO 822/1108;
\textsuperscript{23} Letter, Commander J. F. W. Maitland, R.N. (ret'd), MP, to Alan Lennox-Boyd, 30 June 1955, PRO CO 822/1108.
\textsuperscript{24} Telegram, Governor's Deputy [Tanganyika] to Secretary of State for Colonies, 15 July 1955, PRO CO 822/1108.
\textsuperscript{24} Telegram, Acting Governor of Uganda to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 22 July 1955, PRO CO 822/1108.
justified in making such arrangements as were most suited to its own local circumstances."

After receiving the responses from the East African governments, Lennox-Boyd informed the member of Parliament who had raised the issue of translations of the technical obstacles to preparing them, adding: "Even if full translation were practicable, it would involve labour, time and expense out of all proportion to the number of Africans likely to study the full report in a vernacular but not equipped to do so in English." For all the emphasis placed by the royal commission and others on winning the willing cooperation of the people in the task of economic development, the mass of the African people were deemed unwilling or unable to understand the commissioners' recommendations.

While the governors and the Colonial Office could point to many practical reasons for not translating the report, it was also true that not doing so allowed them to control the dissemination of information and, perhaps, to downplay those aspects of the commission's work with which they disagreed.

Whereas the East African administrations wished to retain some autonomy by selectively publishing or propagating portions of the report for local African consumption, the Colonial Office was anxious that contradictions or embarrassments not emerge. W. L. Gorell Barnes, assistant under-secretary of state for East Africa, wrote the governors that:

Uniformity of approach on this question is not necessarily essential; but, if one or more of the three Governments publish a summary in Swahili translation, I

\[25\] Letter, J. Neil for Mr. Turnbull (the Secretariat, Kenya) to W. A. C. Mathieson (Colonial Office), 2 September 1955, PRO CO 822/1108.

have no doubt that, if it is not also published in the other territory or territories, we shall be called upon to show that there are good reasons which do not apply in the territories whose governments are issuing the publication.

If, therefore, as we rather hope, the Tanganyika Government decide to go ahead with their proposed summary in Swahili translation, I have no doubt that the other two Governments will consider seriously whether they should not adopt it for circulation in their territories too.27

He also advised that any summary be accompanied by a cautionary note stating that the full report was the authoritative document and that neither the report nor the summary constituted official policy.

In the end, the Tanganyika government decided not to publish a summary in Swahili. An attempt had been made to produce one but, reported Twining, "The result was so terrifying that we could not possibly allow it to be published either in English or Swahili. There is a great deal of difficulty in translating even passages of the report into Swahili because there is much which is technical and the language is often turgid modern jargon used in such reports."28 He added that there was no demand for a summary. Nevertheless, his government would reprint a pamphlet consisting of an English summary that had appeared in the Kenya Weekly News and promised that apposite parts of the report would be translated into Swahili and published when the territory's Legislative Council came to debate some of the commission's conclusions. Cohen concurred that the Tanganyika summary was unsuitable for publication and would hardly have furthered "dispassionate discussion" of the report. He thought the simplified form of the summary

28 Letter, E. Twining to W. L. Gorell-Barnes [sic], 29 September 1955, PRO CO 822/1108.
would only have insulted educated people in Uganda, "who are in the main the only people among the Africans who are likely to be able to contribute anything to the discussion of the Report." \(^{29}\)

Gorell Barnes then expressed concern lest the decision not produce a Swahili translation be portrayed by critics in the House of Commons "as directed towards maintaining the minimum publicity for the report until it has been comfortably absorbed by the Government machine and comments on it prepared and sold to Legislative Councils without any disturbing influences from outside opinion." \(^{30}\) He asked Baring to provide reasons to enable the secretary of state to defend the decision not to publish summaries in some territories while others did so and to provide a reasoned explanation as to why the report could not be translated into Africa vernaculars. By that time the governors probably wanted to be rid of the problem. Twining wrote Baring in reference to Gorell Barnes's letter dealing with "the tiresome question of the publicity for the Royal Commission's Report." He maintained that the Tanganyika government was doing all it could to encourage people to read the report and to give publicity to various aspects of it. "But such an indigestible document as the Report," he continued, "does not lend itself to the publicity which people in London seem to think should be given." \(^{31}\) Colonial officials hoped to use the work of the royal commission as an aid in formulating policy, but they also desired to limit its usefulness as a political device for opponents in the colonies and in the United

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\(^{29}\) Letter, A. B. Cohen to W. L. Gorell Barnes, 26 September 1955, PRO CO 822/1108.

\(^{30}\) Letter, W. L. Gorell Barnes to Sir Evelyn Baring, 6 October 1955, PRO CO 822/1108.

\(^{31}\) Letter, E. F. Twining to Sir Evelyn Baring, 15 October 1955, PRO CO 822/1109.
Kingdom. They would study the report in their own good time, and they were confident that they would be able to set the priorities and control the pace of development.

If Twining became impatient with irksome questions from the Colonial Office, he must have been dismayed by the public debate and criticism, informed or otherwise, generated by the release of the report. Initial newspaper responses to the report of the East Africa Royal Commission were somewhat positive, and commentators were hopeful that the report would set the parameters for fruitful debate.32 There were a number of cautionary notes. An editorial in the right-wing Daily Telegraph, while strongly endorsing the work, commented:

The implementation of this report would cause some real hardship and more imagined: after all, we in this country did not emerge painlessly from the Middle Ages. It asks both Europeans and Africans to exchange the partly illusory security of the present for the hope of greater security in the future. The choice is clear: either its recommendations must be remorselessly and fully implemented, or they must not be implemented at all. Nothing could be more disastrous than a half-hearted applications followed by a hasty retreat.33

George Vine, with an article provocatively headlined, "Give up your land, whites are told," predicted a hostile reaction among European farmers still struggling with Mau Mau.34 On the other hand, Arthur Clegg in the Communist Party's Daily Worker accused the commission of attempting to make East Africa safe for big business while opposing "racialism" only because it limited the generation of profits. The report's recommenda-

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32 Daily Herald, 10 June 1955; Daily Mail, 10 June 1955; Daily Telegraph, 10 June 1955.
33 Daily Telegraph, 11 June 1955.
tions, he contended, were "designed more to benefit the big capitalist monopolies than Africans."  

Much of the early coverage of the report attempted to reduce it to its bare essentials for public consumption. Unfortunately, the document was scarcely suited to such treatment. The Observer, which led by its Africa (later Commonwealth) correspondent Colin Legum took a strong anti-colonial and anti-racist line, hardly did justice to the complexity of the commission's work when it declared: "Briefly, the Commission recommends that East Africa's largely pre-feudal society should be transformed into the kind of community that Britain had become by the eighteenth or nineteenth century." The paper endorsed "the Commission's bold and self-confident assertion that Western ideas and values are of universal application. Such an approach is, we believe, sound doctrine. But the political implications of boldly applying it might be much more convulsive than they were when the Enclosure Acts and Industrial Revolution that dispossessed the English cottager made him a proletarian." Racial suspicion and antipathy would compound the dislocations created by any process of rapid economic change. All doubts aside, however, the writer thought the greatest tragedy would be if the momentum of the report were lost, and

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35 Daily Worker, 10 June 1955.
36 Born in South Africa in 1919, Legum took a part-time position with the Observer in 1949. By 1953 he was working for the paper full-time as Fleet Street's first Africa correspondent. In 1951 he co-authored Attitude to Africa with Michael Scott, Arthur Lewis, and Martin Wright. In 1952 he helped found the Africa Bureau and, subsequently, the Africa Publications Trust and the Africa Education Trust. He was an "ad hoc" member of the bureau because, as a journalist, he chose not to be too publicly associated with the organization. Colin Legum's Press Cuttings Volumes, 1936-1987, and Writings from the 1940s to the 1980s: A guide and finding list to the microform edition (Birch Villas, Hebden Bridge, West Yorkshire: Altair Publishing, 1990), I-II.
37 Observer, 12 June 1955.
38 Ibid.
suggested that the next step should be to launch a further inquiry into the political feasibility of the commission's proposals.  

Another commentator from the left, Fenner Brockway, covered the report in the *Tribune*, a weekly Labour paper. He predicted that the commission's recommendation to open the White Highlands to African farmers would certainly arouse the anger of Kenyan settlers. On the other hand, he wrote, that measure would be viewed by Africans as "the dawn of a new day," adding that had such an approach had been adopted in 1932 by the Carter land commission, Mau Mau would never have occurred. Brockway went on to suggest that the Conservative government might well attempt to shelve the proposal to end the exclusivity of the Highlands and, therefore, the Labour Party would have to insist on its implementation. He raised strong objections to two other aspects of the report. First, he held "that it is impertinence of a Commission composed of eight Europeans, only one African and not one Asian to lay down the pattern of the future life of territories in which there are 17 1/2 million Africans, less than 200,000 Asians and only about 50,000 Europeans. The social and economic order in East Africa cannot be determined until the people have the right to determine it themselves." Secondly, he argued that community-

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39 Ibid. Frankel later wrote: "The idea of yet another commission to report on our findings was typical of the political morass into which colonial issues had sunk." S. Herbert Frankel, *An Economist's Testimony: The Autobiography of S. Herbert Frankel* (Oxford: Oxford Centre for Postgraduate Hebrew Studies, 1992), 272.


41 *Tribune*, 17 June 1955.

42 Ibid.
ownership of land was deeply embedded in African tradition and that to uproot it would only provoke resistance and resentment. "And why should individual ownership," he continued, "be regarded as the last word in Western wisdom? In Britain we are moving towards the same principle of public ownership which the Africans have so long practised." Brockway knew no reason why, in the name of progress, Africans should be subjected to the iniquities of "private landlordism" from which the United Kingdom itself was only just escaping.

Soon after publication of the report, the political left had developed a critique that reacted more against the document's forceful advocacy of the theory of free market capitalism rather than the specific recommendations, which often (sometimes dramatically) qualified that theory in application. Rita Hinden, a prominent member of the Fabian Colonial Bureau, for example, in an unpublished commentary identified the two main theses of the report as: racial discrimination impedes economic progress and should therefore be eliminated; and, state intervention in the economy hampers the working of free market forces and should be expunged or minimized. She continued:

Going out from these theses the report makes many recommendations[,] some of which we, as socialists, will welcome (those intended to break down racial discrimination); others of which (those intended to cut down state intervention) will scarcely be acceptable to us. The net effect of this second category of recommendations would be to expose Africans to the full blasts of an economic revolution with no more protection than was given to British workers and farmers during the nineteenth century industrial revolution in this country. There would undoubtedly be economic progress, but at what social cost?"
Drawing lessons from British history, critics on the left tended to emphasize not the benefits of growth that might be achieved in the long term, but the short-term consequences for ordinary people of rapid social and economic change. In other words, they might have countered the classical liberalism of the report with Lord Keynes's observation that African peasants would all be dead in the long term.

From a more centrist perspective, a Manchester Guardian editorial described the "Gladstonian spirit" that animated the report as a dose of "stiff medicine; the prescription may be right, but it will take courage to swallow it." The writer did identify some serious obstacles to the adoption of the royal commission's proposals. In the first place, how could African peasants be convinced to abandon the security represented by even a small plot of land held under traditional tenure. "In this country," the article stated, "through a century of great industrial expansion, the workers lived always in the shadow of the workhouse; in East Africa there is not even the workhouse." Secondly, what would replace tribal society once it disintegrated? How would Africans be able to define themselves? Thirdly, the author wondered whether or not there was a sufficient basis of mutual trust in the region to allow for regular transfers of land between different races. Somewhat ironically, the Guardian—hardly a conservative paper—questioned whether the commission had given due consideration to the Burkean forces of conservatism in African and settler societies. The editorial writer deemed the document a masterful prescription for economic progress but cautioned: "It is common enough now to speak of the danger of political

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45 Manchester Guardian, 10 June 1955.
46 Ibid.
progress outrunning economic. There may be occasions when economics must wait a little for politics to clear the way ahead."  

No newspaper devoted more attention to the release of the report than the Times, in which an editorial proclaimed that the commission's work had "about it an intellectual incisiveness and doctrinal clarity characteristic of some of the great commissions of the past." The report, the article continued, made "three revolutionary demands": Africans were to abandon their way of life by throwing open tribal reserves to the operation of market forces; colonial governments were to forego former paternalistic policies designed to shield Africans from the vagaries of economic trends; and, white settlers were to "concede their own privileged position at a time when they are being attacked by African terrorists." But the leader writer also warned that such revolutionary changes had to be viewed with caution. To thrust rapid, uncontrolled change upon the people of the region might only provoke a strong reaction among all of the affected communities. The editorial argued that the human factor was the key variable in the development equation, and therefore the success of any development plan was dependent upon the strength of the colonial service, which the commission pointed out was not being adequately recruited.

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47 Ibid.
48 It was in The Times, of course, that Sir Philip Mitchell had published articles broaching the idea of a royal commission to study problems of land and population in East Africa. Above, 105, 118. Oliver Woods, the colonial correspondent, maintained ties to many officials in the Colonial Office and the territories and with prominent persons in the colonies. See: McMaster University, Mills Memorial Library, The William Ready Division of Archives and Research Collections, Oliver Woods Correspondence, Boxes 20-22, 25, 29, 31, 35.
49 Times, 10 June 1955.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
The *Times*, therefore, hardly endorsed a laissez-faire approach to the economic development of East Africa.

While the *Times* continued to laud the significance of the efforts of the royal commissioners, declaring for example that the report "may come to rank in that small class of Imperial state papers, like the Durham report, which are of permanent importance in history," later coverage sounded some additional cautionary notes. An editorial emphasized that the people who would be most affected by the implementation of the report's recommendations, the African peasantry, were least capable of assessing the document. White settlers and westernized Africans could balance the costs and benefits to themselves of adopting the commission's development prescription, but ordinary farmers, "who are still contained within the framework of the immemorial social order of African and, knowing only tribal customs, have no standards by which to judge whether assimilation to the white man's fashion of life would be to their material and spiritual advantage." But there was no doubt that economic and social change was inevitable, so while the African might only be weaned from the security of tribalism gradually, the process surely had to go forward:

There is one world. We cannot expect the primeval culture of Africa to go on developing along its own lines, assisted but not fundamentally modified by the white man's advice. Instead, Africa must take its place in, and make its contribution to, a generalized world civilization, which becomes more diffused every year.  

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52 *Times*, 21 June 1955.
54 Ibid.
A dilemma that the author could not fully resolve concerned the time available for the development process. For while he urged the government to go slowly and not push the African too quickly, he also warned that "the power of the imperial administration to control the pace of change may be overtaken by the progress of political emancipation."\(^{55}\)

Elspeth Huxley, well-known author and biographer of Lord Delamere,\(^{56}\) proclaimed: "It is a report that Adam Smith might have signed and Gladstone warmly commended."\(^{57}\) She wrote that the maxim, "set the people free," was "advocated with a vengeance." Like some other commentators, Huxley gave more attention to the free market principles expounded in the report while paying less heed to the numerous exceptions to those principles that the commissioners allowed; her contention that, "the Commission's policy is Radical in the nineteenth-century sense,"\(^{58}\) is rather overstated. Overall Huxley heartily approved the work, especially because: "Nowhere in this document will support be found for the anti-white, anti-settlement doctrine which would reserve all Africa for black Africans."\(^{59}\) She charged the commissioners with some lack of realism, however, when they advanced the idea that the security of individual ownership might soon replace the illusory security of tribalism. The latter force, she warned, was growing

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\(^{55}\) Ibid.


\(^{57}\) *Sunday Times*, 12 June 1955.


\(^{59}\) *Sunday Times*, 12 June 1955.
in strength and not declining as the report suggested, and the commission had made only
one reference to African nationalism. "Yet," Huxley wrote, "this is a force more potent
even than hunger, infinitely more so than common sense. Economic man will always be
eclipsed by his political brother."60

Other writers were less cautious, maintaining that the obvious obstacles to progres
s in the region were not insurmountable. Picking up on Huxley's theme with a lead ar
icle headlined, "Adam Smith in East Africa," the Economist, while pointing out that the
Royal Commission had not actually advocated immediate conversion of the economy to an
unregulated, free market model, understood why some might question "the proposed
transplantation of a free market economy in this tribal soil."61 That newspaper questioned
some of the commission's findings. If Africans were only allowed to lease and not to sell
land to non-Africans, for example, the result would be to lower the value of land as secu-
rrity for improvement loans. Would the introduction of individual land tenure impart such
a tremendous boost to economic growth that it would dissipate fears arising from a sense
of insecurity? The author argued that the Baganda, a relatively wealthy group within the
region, were obsessively opposed to land alienation and industrial development that would
entail an influx of Europeans. He wondered whether growth rates could keep pace with
increasing congestion in urban areas, or would economic progress be overwhelmed by
"frustration, race hatred and crime?"62 Most importantly, an essential premise for the suc-

60 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
cess of the report's recommendations was that the East African economy could be invigorated by infusions of foreign capital, but if an agricultural economy could reasonably be expected to accumulate capital annually at a rate of no more than 5 per cent, would that be sufficient? Nevertheless, the Economist asserted that the real tragedy would be to allow such questions to discredit the report. Those who suggested that the African might not be adaptable to change were reminded that East Africa was already being transformed; Africans were "increasingly thinking the thoughts of the trader and less the thoughts of the tribesman." There were, in fact, as many dangers inherent in moving slowly in terms of economic development—both social and political—as there were in forging ahead quickly.

The author maintained that,

it may be predicted that in proportion as the East African governments find it possible to implement the basic proposition of the report they will drain the static poverty that slows their pace everywhere; in proportion as they put the brakes on, in deference to the fears and suspicions which arise out of a decaying tribalism, black and white, they will reanimate them with fresh and malevolent power.63

The writer hailed the commission's work as a timely corrective to a colonial policy that had long subordinated economic efficiency to the task of maintaining political stability.

The latter aim was too often driven by expediency, and in his view it was time to redress the balance.

The general classical liberal tenor of the report—anti-statist and anti-protectionist—was in line with the traditional stance of the Economist,64 and support from that quarter

63 Ibid., 1019.
64 Ruth Dudley Edwards, "The pursuit of reason," Economist, 4 September 1993, 25. Not all of the Economist's readers, however, agreed with its assessment of the commission report. Noting the many instances in which Adam Smith had endorsed massive state intervention in the British economy of his day, one of the newspaper's readers wrote the editor: "There seems to me nothing in the Royal Commis-
was to be expected. For similar reasons the Council of the Liberal Party declared: "This Council welcomes the bold and comprehensive Report of the East Africa Royal Commission 1953/5, and strongly supports the traditional Liberal policies of economic and social equality and freedom which it advocates." That body held that certain of the commission's recommendations—especially those relating to the conditions of land tenure, fixing of minimum wages, and financing of urban development—required additional consideration, but urged "the speedy adoption of its main principles." Of course, the Liberal Party had little parliamentary strength, and more forceful criticism of the findings of the Royal Commission came from other sources.

Arthur Creech Jones, Labour MP, formerly secretary of state for the colonies from 1946-50, and a dedicated student of African affairs, agreed with the royal commission's treatment of certain issues: the problem of squatters in the White Highlands; the need for higher wage standards and labor stabilization; better credit facilities for Africans; the extension of cooperatives; urban poverty; and, the need to develop new industries to absorb migrants to the towns. He conceded that existing conditions in East Africa were far from satisfactory, and living standards were likely to remain shockingly low in the absence of drastic changes in policy that were sure to disrupt tribal traditions. Upon first consid-

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66 Ibid.
eration of the report he noted: "The sensible recommendation is made by the Commission that the holding of agricultural land should be free from restrictions imposed by tribal or racial reservations." In a later article, however, Creech Jones advocated removing discrimination against Africans in holding land in the White Highlands but argued that "it is a far different thing to remove certain of the frontiers between tribes such as the Masai and the Kikuyu." He also challenged some more fundamental aspects of the report, suggesting that the commissioners counterbalanced inflexible ideas based on the defense of cultural tradition or racial preference with their own dogmatism. While agreeing that colonial policy should seek to foster the development of commercial markets and expanded, relatively free trade, he believed this required the careful guidance of the state in order to avoid "very grave dangers of insecurity and the creation of social evils." He added that the commissioners' reforming zeal led them at times to the point of recklessness: "Is the present [colonial] policy of adapting the existing pattern of life so bankrupt as the Commission assumes? Or is the objective of a modern, free, market economy, with land freely bought and sold, so imperative as to justify fomenting resentment and bitterness in the East African territories at such a critical time as the present?" Creech Jones believed the commission's work had been influenced by ideological bias. "Throughout the Report," he wrote, "runs a dislike of state protection and regulation, of state enterprises and marketing, of state controls and

69 Ibid.
organisation of almost every kind." That bias led the commissioners to make some faulty assumptions. He argued: "For without formulating any such concept in terms, the Royal Commission seems to have assumed that something like the 'Economic Man' of Adam Smith is to be found in the territories of East Africa. The fact is that Economic Man proved to be largely non-existent, even in the individualist society of nineteenth-century Europe. To postulate him now in the tribal society of East Africa--tormented with doubt and disintegrating though it is beginning to be--is surely an absurdity."\(^7^3\)

Clearly Creech Jones's objections to the report extended beyond its specific recommendations regarding East African development. He presented a socialist critique of British history, maintaining,

the assumption that social and economic progress results from the free play of the markets and from a policy of free enterprise without public responsibility is, in the conditions of the modern world, unsound and false to experience. To expose Africans to the harsh consequences of an economic revolution, to deny them the protection and safeguards which are necessary when they meet the impact of a difficult and rougher economy and to forget the experience in Britain of the Enclosure movement and industrial revolution, is to betray the confidence of Africans in Britain and to create confusion and needless suffering in the respective territories.\(^7^4\)

He saw no reason to accept the British historical experience of economic development as normative, and he asserted that only "deliberate state planning" would allow Africans to escape the destructive effects of industrialization.\(^7^5\) Responding to Creech Jones's charges of ideological bias, Sir Hugh Dow in private notes confirmed that there was a basic diver-

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\(^7^3\) Creech Jones, "The Future of East Africa," 831.
\(^7^5\) Ibid., 4.
gence of opinion between the Labour MP and royal commission members: "It is I think 'Socialism versus private enterprise' in the African context."76

James Johnson77 echoed Creech Jones's concerns. In a radio discussion with Huxley, Johnson accused the commissioners of a naiveté "almost typical of Oxford dons." The report, he said, is "not of this world, as I see it, and speaking as a Socialist . . . it looks to me as though it will plunge Africans, and . . . others in the Colony, into an industrial revolution, without . . . them having a workhouse as we had here in the 19th century to look after those poor devils who . . . felt the blasting impact of this industrial change."78

Johnson argued that the African needed protection in order to have time to adapt to "money matters" and other aspects of the exchange economy. As he put it: "[H]is mind wants modernising in this whole matter of land ownership, individual ownership, mortgages and the like. . . ."79

Huxley, on the other hand, applauded the work of the royal commission, especially in regard to the land question. She thought the recommendation to break down tribal and racial barriers represented "a very bold, imaginative and exciting step and . . . a step to-

79 Ibid., 2.
wards getting away from this endless racialism." Johnson's view was that a free market in land would simply result in African land being transferred to Indians and Europeans. Huxley, however, wondered how the African (who she did not believe to be quite as economically unsophisticated as Johnson implied) could possibly become "modernised without learning the practical way." Furthermore, she challenged Johnson as to why Labour's position seemed to be to push for the rapid transfer of political power to the African population while at the same time making the case that they were not capable of making autonomous decisions in the economic sphere. "I mean," she asked, "why should we be governed by people who are inexperienced, unadvanced, backward and ignorant if they are not sufficiently advanced to safeguard—look after their own property—are they sufficiently advanced to govern the rest of us?" Johnson responded that politically there was competent African leadership, which did not exist in the commercial realm.

In fact, Johnson was more adamant in his demands for shielding Africans from rapid change than was Creech Jones. The latter questioned the existence of economic man anywhere and implied that Africans and Europeans were differentiated as much by material conditions as anything else. Johnson placed more emphasis on African cultural disability under modern conditions, arguing that "the African is not yet an economic man [suggesting there was such a creature] and that if you plant him too quickly into this Western land tenure and its Western system, of buying and selling land, I think you are

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80 Ibid., 1.
81 Ibid., 4.
82 Ibid., 3.
building on shifting sands; I think you've got to create a basis on which to build and I think the tempo must be slow."63 Europeans, he stated, ought to make the greatest concessions (i.e. giving up the racial exclusiveness of the White Highlands without gaining access to land in tribal reserves) because, "candidly I think the European is far advanced in every way, compared to the African."64

Perhaps the most interesting commentary on the royal commission report came from Margery Perham, an astute observer and longtime student of British Africa.65 She was well acquainted with many former and serving members of the colonial service and officials in the Colonial Office. A number of secretaries of state for the colonies from Malcolm MacDonald to Alan Lennox-Boyd had received her advice on administrative and constitutional matters, and she had shared a close friendship with Creech Jones, based largely on a shared vision of colonial policy.66 While her direct influence on the British government had been greatest in the 1940s and was declining by the following decade,67

63 Ibid., 2.
64 Ibid., 3.
65 Perham, 1895-1982, devoted her life to the study of Africa, particularly colonial administration. Some of the highlights of her career pertinent to the present study were: lectured to colonial service cadets while at Oxford (where she was first appointed tutor in modern history in 1924) 1928-63; appointed research lecturer (1935-39) and reader (1939-48) in colonial administration; director of Nuffield College Colonial Studies Project, 1941-47; director of the Institute of Colonial Studies, Oxford, 1945-48; attended and spoke at the Colonial Office (Cambridge) Summer Schools on African Administration, 1947-63; fellow in imperial government, Nuffield College, 1948-63; member of the Standing Committee of the Colonial Social Science Research Council, 1949-61; member of numerous committees and commissions on education in the colonies; member of unofficial groups, including the Fabian Colonial Bureau, Oxam, the Africa Bureau, the Capricorn Society, and the Universities Mission to Central Africa. See, "Chronology of Margery Perham's Life," Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 19, 3 (October 1991): 229-30; Patricia Pugh, "Margery Perham and her Archive," Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 19, 3 (October 1991): 226.
Perham approached the commission's work from a uniquely well-informed perspective. She cautioned anyone against selectively lifting portions of the report out of context and subjecting them to condemnation or praise, and she thought the initial press coverage had done exactly that. In particular, she described the characterization of the report as espousing a nineteenth-century laissez-faire doctrine as "unfair dramatization." In her view, one of the strengths of the commission's key recommendation, the adoption of a system of individual land tenure, was the fact that the transition was to be accompanied by a number of measures to safeguard African interests.

Perham welcomed the report if only for the manner in which it subjected issues to economic analysis that many people (including herself) had judged solely from a political or administrative standpoint. She did, nevertheless, have some specific criticisms of the document. The commission, she argued, demanded too abrupt a reversal of past policy in the region, and she did not feel that was either necessary or possible. In any case, the change from a tribal to an exchange economy did not have to entail a shift between polar opposites as the report suggested. She indicated that certain groups—the Chagga and the Baganda—were already making the transition by degrees. "The Report," she wrote, "recognises, in part, but perhaps not consistently enough, that tribalism should be sublimated rather than superseded." Perham was even more critical of the failure to squarely face political issues, although she recognized the constraints imposed on commission

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92 Ibid.
members by their terms of reference. But whatever the cause, the result was that the report represented something like "a jig-saw picture of East Africa with only half the pieces."

In her opinion politics and economics were inseparable, and attempting to plan future development on the basis of putting one before the other was pointless. The commission, she wrote, might have given more details on how to effect their recommendations given the unstable nature of the East African political and constitutional background. She wondered whether the commissioners believed the economic revolution they called for should take place before or after the achievement of self-government, which Britain was pledged to advance and which she believed would be demanded by Africans before all else. Despite its flaws, Perham was not ready to dismiss the report as "at once wholly convincing and wholly impracticable." She called upon moderate Conservatives and Labour supporters—the heirs of liberalism—to reject the extremists on the right and left and work to implement what was essentially a liberal prescription for East Africa, and she urged the publication of a briefer version of the report that would be accessible to general readers and translated into African languages.

Aside from her comments on particular proposals in the report, Perham made some unique contributions to the public discussion of the document. First, she had a sense of a specifically East African history, and she situated the commission's work within the context of that history. For instance, she cautioned against planning the development of

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93 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid., 242-43.
the region based on the "shaky analogy of Britain's industrial revolution." The challenge was for East Africa to follow its own path of economic and political development, informed where possible by the British experience but not shaped in slavish imitation. Perhaps also situated the aims of the report in a world context, suggesting that the East African territories might just find a formula for development that would prove superior to the alternatives: rapid movement towards self-government in West Africa; a European settler-dominated federation in Central Africa; or, the apartheid system in South Africa. The Soviet Union, she noted, had chosen "collectivization and compulsion" as its approach to rapidly improving rural economies, while the royal commission rejected those in favor of "individualism and consent." Perhaps proclaimed: "These three territories are the one large area in Africa—indeed, in the Colonial Empire—where the future is still wide open: where, in other words, we have the greatest opportunity to apply the values in which we believe, and to bring out 'colonialism' to a conclusion which would finally justify it, if not in heated contemporary opinion, at least in the cool judgement of history." In her opinion, the royal commission report represented an invaluable contribution toward the achievement of the last great imperial mission.

Another commentator, the Conservative MP, C. J. M. Alport, remarked that he agreed with virtually everything Perham had to say about the report, but he thought she ought not simply to point out the obstacles to implementation but to recommend ways in

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97 Ibid., 241.
98 Ibid., 243; Perham, "Economics v Race," 207.
which they might be overcome. Although the report's recommendations might take a generation—under the most favorable circumstances—to put into effect, Alport felt the alternative was to do nothing, which could only lead to grave political unrest when rising African demands for material wealth went unfulfilled. He thought the most serious obstacle to overcome was a psychological one. "The African masses," he claimed, "who are certain to be most intimately affected by [the report], have got to be helped to adjust their outlook to that of citizens in a western exchange economy." 100 With careful guidance, Alport thought the economic revolution envisioned by the commissioners was achievable, but it was not possible to undertake a simultaneous political revolution: "The energy devoted to politics must now be applied to economic development. Nothing can more quickly destroy the prospects of a fuller life for people of all races than continued political turmoil." 101 Alport viewed the work of the commission—apolitical as it was supposed to be—as a good argument for postponing progress towards self-government in East Africa.

A contributor to the Round Table, 102 like Alport, strongly endorsed the findings of the Royal Commission but also raised questions concerning the human element in the development equation. He questioned the commission's emphasis on material conditions.

"The Report," the author asserted,

deals with Economic Man, and says what is good for him. What of Social Man, that unstable, passionate, a-logical creature? Or Spiritual Man, a presence even more unpredictable and elusive? . . . Only when Economic, Social and Spiritual Man co-exist in a reasonable degree of harmony is there any hope of stability.

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101 Ibid., 316.
102 Articles in the Round Table were generally unattributed.
Thus, the question was whether the "complete economic Westernization" advocated by the commissioners, entailing tribalism's demise, would satisfy the people's social and spiritual needs.\textsuperscript{104} This concern about the moral vacuum that might result from the introduction of the modern exchange economy in East Africa was consonant with Creech Jones's concerns over the same issue, even though the Round Table contributor hardly approached the subject from a socialist perspective.

From the political left, one of the strongest denunciations of the royal commission report came from Thomas Balogh, an economics professor and fellow of Balliol College, Oxford.\textsuperscript{105} Balogh challenged the validity of the economic premises upon which the commission based its conclusions, dismissing them as being unacceptable in the postwar world to all but a "fringe of extremist liberal dogmatists."\textsuperscript{106} He thought it would be extremely risky to allow market forces to determine prices paid to African peasants, to whom "the importance . . . of certainty of price can hardly be exaggerated."\textsuperscript{107} Turning the tables on the commissioners, who had suggested that government interference was paternalistic and arrogant, Balogh contended that government intervention in the economy was democratic if it met popular demands. The report's recommendations, he contended, while couched in terms of creating greater opportunity for all, would in reality work to the

\textsuperscript{104} Ibid., 328.

\textsuperscript{105} Hungarian in origin and educated at the Universities of Budapest, Berlin, and Harvard, Balogh (later created baron as a life peer in 1968) worked as an economist in the City, 1931-39, before taking an appointment at Oxford in 1940. He had extensive experience as a financial advisor to a number of foreign and colonial governments. He was a member of the Economic and Financial Committee of the Labour Party, 1943-64. \textit{Who's Who, 1981 - 1982} (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), 122-23.


\textsuperscript{107} Ibid., 7.
benefit of a small cadre of non-African domestic and foreign capitalists. In their analysis of land tenure, Balogh argued (rather unfairly), that the commissioners had ignored the history of colonial Asia, especially of India and the Philippines, and were in danger once again of replicating the "despair and stagnation" that had characterized those experiments in individual tenure as well as the British experience of the second enclosure movement. He concluded by asserting that colonial economics demanded a strictly empirical approach, and he took the commission to task for failing to disclose the political basis of their recommendations while cloaking their work in the pretense of "non-political 'objectivity.'"

Balogh's condemnation of the report was sweeping and complete. While his views likely struck many contemporaries as extreme, he—like Perham—was among the few commentators who addressed the whole of the report—as the commission had insisted—as well as specific issues. The report's length and—to use Governor Twining's phrase—"turgid modern jargon" ensured that many readers looked at the document selectively. Alport told of attending a meeting of four hundred people, all concerned with East African issues, a few weeks after publication of the report. When asked how many had read it, only two people rose. Naturally, people with expertise in certain fields focused their comments on related issues. An article in Nature soon after the report's release remarked that, "in its considered unprejudiced approach, even more than in its comprehensive grasp and con-

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108 Ibid., 8.
109 Ibid., 9.
110 Alport, "East Africa's 'Revolution'," 315.
structive uninhibited suggestions, the report is characterized essentially by the scientific spirit.\textsuperscript{111} The author clearly believed that the report's recommendations would be of interest to "the many scientific workers and technologists who will be called upon to play their part in implementing them"\textsuperscript{112} (many of whom likely were readers of Nature). But all specialists were not enamored of the report. Anthropologist Lucy Mair, for example, disparaged the commission's outdated view of "tribal systems" as confining cages from which Africans were or ought to be escaping in order to enter another physical space labeled the "modern system."\textsuperscript{113} There were two attempts, however, to take a more comprehensive and detailed look at the commission's work: a conference held at Worcester College, Oxford, at the beginning of October, 1955, and a study of the report organized by the Africa Bureau.

Organized under the auspices of Nuffield College, the conference convened at Worcester College on 1-2 October 1955 brought together the members of the commission (except for Chief Kidaha) and representatives from the Colonial Office, universities, the press, and business interests to discuss the report. The sessions were closed and participants were asked not to refer directly in the press or elsewhere to its proceedings in order to encourage everyone present to speak freely.\textsuperscript{114} Most of the conferees accepted the

\textsuperscript{111} "Development in East Africa," Nature (16 July 1955), 87.
\textsuperscript{112} Ibid., 88.
\textsuperscript{114} "Private Conference on the Report of the Royal Commission on East Africa, October 1st - 2nd 1955," Oxford University, Rhodes House Library, Perham papers, MSS PERHAM, Box 431/1. The confidential record of the conference sent to participants, cited here, did not attribute comments to specific individuals. Fortunately, Margery Perham annotated her copy to indicate the sources of opinions expressed.
royal commission's economic analysis, but a number of sticking points arose in terms of its application on the ground. Much of that discussion focused on the human factor. Jack contended that the economic potential of Africa was enormous and the obstacles to development were not technical but human.\textsuperscript{115} Frankel added that the African was "between two worlds"—traditional and modern—and the psychological challenge would be to help him adapt to the modern one. He and Gaitskell both maintained that East Africa's problems were very similar to underdeveloped areas elsewhere in the world.\textsuperscript{116} Frankel later revealed that his vision for East Africa's future was a modern society devoid of European-style nationalism.\textsuperscript{117}

Others were not so sure that general models of development were applicable in all circumstances. Cambridge University economist P. T. Bauer questioned the validity of comparing contemporary African farmers with British farmers of the past, making the point that economic development would take place only within a particular social and cultural context. Professor Kofi Abrefa Busia, sociologist and future prime minister of Ghana, noted that "many people seemed to regard African custom as crystalised, but it was in fact a growing thing, and that it should be possible to carry out economic development in the context of traditional usage and law."\textsuperscript{118} Creech Jones concurred, asserting that the commissioners "had asked us to endorse a plunge into an individualistic system

\textsuperscript{115} Ibid., 1.
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., 1, 4.
\textsuperscript{117} Ibid., 9.
\textsuperscript{118} Ibid., 1, 6.
which had brought chaos into other societies.\textsuperscript{119} For a number of the report's critics economic progress did not automatically entail the dissolution of tribal society.

Another issue raised at the conference concerned the political steps necessary for the implementation of the report's recommendations. The consensus opinion seemed to be that the prescribed economic program could not be launched under the existing constitutional arrangements and that political stability was a necessary precondition for development. Harry Oppenheimer, director of DeBeers Consolidated Mines, pointed out that it would be difficult to attract foreign capital—an essential ingredient of the commission's development proposals—in the absence of stability.\textsuperscript{120} How that stability might be achieved was open to debate. On the one hand, some critics—including Arthur Hope Jones, Kenya's minister for commerce and industry—contended that the most suitable political arrangement would take the form of a multi-racial government responsible to their constituents both as individuals and as groups. The franchise, argued P. Mason, headmaster as Aldenham School and a member of the Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies, should do away with votes based on color. Instead, he suggested that half the members of the colonial legislatures should be elected on the basis of "one man one vote," while the other half would be elected by people who qualified on the basis of education.\textsuperscript{121}

On the other hand, Kenneth Kirkwood, Rhodes Professor of Race Relations, Oxford, asked whether or not it might be more advisable "to reintroduce firm Crown Colony gov-

\textsuperscript{119} Ibid., 7.
\textsuperscript{120} Ibid., 11-12.
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid., 8-9.
ernment," in order to avoid the unsettling effects of political instability on a program of economic development.  

But the success of the commissioners' plans, as they themselves had pointed out, hinged upon the question of winning the active support of the people, not simply on the absence of political unrest. Whereas the royal commission had advised that it was essential to secure African support, participants in the Worcester College conference widened the scope of the problem to consider whether or not the British people were enthusiastic about colonial development. Perham first raised the issue at the conference of whether the East African governments that the commission had taken to task for past errors would be capable of providing the strong guidance necessary for carrying out reforms.  

At a later session, Frankel argued that the governments would have create a new atmosphere to show "that the Imperial Government meant business." He felt Africans would gain confidence in development programs once they began to receive tangible benefits: access to urban homes, for example.  

Part of the problem of lack of confidence in British rule, other speakers said, stemmed from uncertainty about the future of the empire. Kenneth Robinson, then a fellow at Nuffield College and a reader in commonwealth government, maintained that development schemes lacked conviction when "there seemed to be no guarantee of a continued effective concern by the United Kingdom in the area."  

Alport picked up on that

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122 Ibid., 12.  
123 Ibid., 2.  
124 Ibid., 11.  
125 Ibid., 13.
theme, asserting that the imperial duty was to prevent the clash of extremists in the colonies and allow moderates to get on with the job of improving the economy. He thought that acceptance of the royal commission's recommendations might provide the impetus for at least ten years of political stability, implicitly defined as a pause in constitutional experimentation.\textsuperscript{126} Creech Jones agreed that political stability would be beneficial for the region, but he thought the movement toward self-government had too much momentum to be halted or even slowed significantly.\textsuperscript{127} Busia, the lone African at the conference, seemed disturbed by the idea of delaying political devolution in the name of economic progress. In his opinion, the British had made a promise to hand over political responsibility, and it was their duty to help Africans to become fit to be equal partners in the Commonwealth. He argued that the creation of democratic local institutions would not only support the development program but also train ordinary people in responsible government.\textsuperscript{128}

More troubling, perhaps, than the challenge of securing African confidence in British rule was the question of British commitment to fulfilling the imperial mission in East Africa or elsewhere. G. Bennett\textsuperscript{129} referred to the "inward looking attitude of the younger people in the United Kingdom today," and wondered whether they had as much

\textsuperscript{126} ibid.
\textsuperscript{127} ibid.
\textsuperscript{128} ibid., 14.
as 30 years of support for colonial development from the people of the United Kingdom. Kirkwood worried that changed British attitudes towards colonial peoples might prove to be an obstacle to any vigorous program of development directed from London. The senior Colonial Office representative at the conference, Deputy Under-Secretary of State Sir Hilton Poynton, directed the assembly's attention to the fact that implementation of the report would cost a great deal of money, the bulk of which would have to be provided by the United Kingdom. That flow of capital could not be achieved unless the United Kingdom succeeded in establishing a substantial balance of payments surplus. Furthermore, what was needed was a fundamental re-orientation of the national outlook of the people in this country towards colonial development in general on the part of all citizens, and our people would have to make some kind of sacrifice. Any surplus from raised productivity in the U.K. would not in itself be sufficient. The public sector was not so difficult to organise as something could always be arranged with the Treasury, but the private sector was a problem, partly because of the unwillingness of the investor to invest in East Africa and partly because of the unwillingness of East Africa to be invested in.

It is difficult to imagine that private investors would shy away from investing in an area from which they might hope to earn substantial profit. No one at the conference suggested that East Africa would prove to be a bonanza for British capitalists. It is no wonder, therefore, that the willingness of British taxpayers to substitute increases in colonial standards of living for increases in their own seemed doubtful.

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131 Ibid., 12.
132 Ibid., 15.
Given the nature of the conference, it is not surprising that those in attendance did not have a precise calculation of the financial costs of implementing the royal commission's recommendations. But even the vague estimates put forward were often contradictory. Colonial Office representatives were rather pessimistic about the prospects of finding funds to carry through the commission's full development program. Gorell Barnes, for example, said, "the Commission's recommendations did involve expenditure on a far higher scale than the U.K. had hitherto found it possible to make." On the other hand, Cambridge University economist P. T. Bauer, who endorsed the report in part because "it envisaged the kind of society he liked," doubted that the cost would be as high as many commentators assumed. Another economist, U. K. Hicks of Oxford University, pressed the commissioners to give their estimate of the amount of public financing that their schemes would require. In reply Dow would only say, "while the costs of implementing their recommendations were important, it was also important to count the cost of not doing what they had recommended." Frankel added that the commissioners had not provided a statistical estimate because it was not their function to do so. He remained more hopeful than some about the prospects of obtaining private investment, and there was still the possibility of large mineral deposits might be discovered in East Africa. Nevertheless, there was no clear answer to the question of the scope and scale of public resources

133 Ibid., 6.
134 Ibid., 7.
135 Ibid., 6-7.
that would be needed for development in the region, and implementation could hardly start without addressing that issue.

Colonial Office officials reported that the general tone of the Nuffield College conference had been one of welcoming the basic approach of the royal commissioners to the development problem and a feeling that policy should be made to conform with the report's recommendations. Gorell Barnes thought that Creech Jones had struck a "slightly discordant" note at the conference, although he did not believe the former colonial secretary would "come out as a whole-hearted and convinced critic of the report." He also noted that the general consensus among conferees was that it might take up to 20 years to fully implement the royal commission program. Poynton agreed with Gorell Barnes's assessment of the conference, but he reemphasized his concerns about the costs of implementation that he had raised. In the absence of propaganda by the press and by members of Parliament in their own constituencies, creating a climate of opinion in which the British public would be willing to accept sacrifices for the sake of East African development, he warned the secretary of state, there would be a danger

that there will be an enthusiastic blessing of the Royal Commission's Report, and its carrying out will be impeded by shortage of funds— for which the Colonial Office will be blamed.

I might have added, had I thought of it in time, that if the reaction of Lancashire towards the importation of Hong Kong textiles is any measure of the willingness of the British public to put itself out for Colonial development, the prospects are not at all bright. 137

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136 Minute, W. L. Gorell Barnes to the Secretary of State (through Sir H. Poynton), 4 October 1955, PRO CO 822/1112.
137 Minute, Sir H. Poynton to the Secretary of State, 4 October 1955, PRO CO 822/1112.
The question of whether or not the people of the United Kingdom would be willing to undertake a final imperial mission in East Africa had in a sense become part of the of the human factor, the issue on which hinged so many official doubts regarding the development dilemma.

Aside from the Worcester College conference, members of the royal commission made presentations to a number of groups interested in studying their recommendations. Sir Hugh Dow addressed a closed meeting at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, for example, while Arthur Gaitskell met informally at Lord Faringdon's home with a select group from the Fabian Colonial Bureau chaired by Creech Jones. Those talks concentrated on explaining the commission's findings and the underlying reasoning. Both Dow and Gaitskell stressed once again that the report had an economic basis and was not concerned with politics. That assertion—as other responses to the work indicate—was acceptable to those who agreed with the recommendations, while those who challenged the laissez faire tenor of the report (especially on the political left) charged that the commission had simply masked its ideological position with false claims of economic objectivity.

Perhaps the most detailed study of the commission report was launched under the auspices of the Africa Bureau. At a meeting of that organization's executive committee on 5 July 1955, chaired by Lord Hemingford and attended by Creech Jones, P. Fothergill,

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140 On the origins of the Africa Bureau see above, 85.
Reverend Michael Scott, and Mary Benson, the secretary, it was agreed that "as there would inevitably be some disagreement on [the report's] recommendations on Party lines, the Bureau should aim at creating the right atmosphere for consideration of the report. In face of the economic detribalisation recommended, it was essential to retain the confidence of the Africans." The executive committee agreed to produce a statement on the report for members of Parliament prior to any debate in the House of Commons. Consequently, the bureau formed a working party to prepare such a statement. Members of the working party included, Lord Hemingford, Dingle Foot, Kenneth Kirkwood, Richard Izard, Roland Oliver, Colin Legum, and Ethel Wix as secretary.

At a meeting in early October 1955 the working party sketched out its basic views of the royal commission's work. They agreed that the report was basically good and deserved endorsement, and that their published views should aim to ensure that it was not shelved. While the report did an excellent job of assessing East African problems, its principle deficiency was that it failed to make suggestions for action. The working party also considered the manner in which the United Kingdom government should respond to the commission's recommendations. They asserted that the British would have to take an active part in the government of the region for "one or two generations," and therefore should not "abdicate further power." All the same, they did not believe economic prog-

ress would be possible in the absence of political advance, and therefore the British government should press forward with the creation of multiracial political machinery at all levels of East African society even while maintaining oversight and ultimate authority. In that manner African confidence and support for a program of economic development would be secured.

After outlining the broad lines of its position, the working party solicited opinions from a variety of informed sources on the value of the report. Those consulted included academics, politicians, East African settlers, industrialists, and chambers of commerce. Sir Philip Mitchell and Michael Blundell passed along their comments to the bureau, and both reported encouragingly that, contrary to many people's expectations, the report had been calmly received in East Africa. Blundell was surprised that it had not become a major political issue and that "even the most controversial parts appear to be receiving sensible[,] reasoned consideration. The working party was also particularly pleased with contributions received from members of the staff of Makerere College, whose opinions were originally delivered in a series of public lectures organized by the Department of Extra-Mural Studies at the college.

Drawing upon the submissions from outside sources as well as the opinions of the working party, Colin Legum wrote the Africa Bureau's critique of the commission report.

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144 Ibid.
145 "Extract from letter dated 7 October 1955 from Mr. Michael Blundell to Miss Benson;" letter, Sir Philip Mitchell to Miss Mary Benson, 24 September 1955, Oxford University, Rhodes House Library, Africa Bureau, MSS Afr. s 1681/287
As did the bureau itself, the working party leaned towards the political left, which was reflected to some extent in the critique itself. While Legum emphasized the desirability of achieving bipartisan consensus in colonial matters, he doubted whether that would be possible on the issue of the commission's economic proposals. In an early draft he wrote:

Whilst the Commission does not recommend unadulterated free trade, it does make clear that in its view the task of the government is ultimate control and direction of the economy and not the interference in the day-to-day business of commerce, marketing and distribution either by entering the field itself or by regulation designed to restrict or protect sectional or racial interests. Such an attitude is not too far removed from the current Conservative attitude to government interference in trading and industry and runs directly counter to the doctrines and practice of the Labour Party.\footnote{147}

Later versions of the critique toned down the working party's (or perhaps Legum's) apparent suspicion—voiced by other left-wing critics—that the royal commission was advancing a Conservative program for East Africa, concentrating instead on achieving bipartisan support for the parts of the report agreeable to moderates in both parties.

In the spring of 1956 the Africa Bureau published a short summary of the royal commission report, which the bureau hoped would make the commission's work accessible to ordinary people in both the United Kingdom and East Africa and inspire readers to consult the full document.\footnote{148} Along with the summary the bureau produced its own critique—a condensation of the papers generated and collected by the working party—under the title, \textbf{Reflections on the Report of the Royal Commission on East Africa}. The bureau raised a


\footnote{148} Africa Bureau, \textit{The Future of East Africa: A Summary of the Report of the Royal Commission with an Index to the Report} (Southwick, Sussex: The Grange Press, [1956]). Ethel Wix was responsible for preparing the summary. The present author was unable to ascertain whether or not the summary was actually translated into African vernaculars.
number of concerns regarding the commission's recommendations, many of which had been addressed earlier by other critics.

Like a number of earlier commentators, the bureau challenged the commission's assumptions about the efficacy of free markets, noting that the freedom from restriction and from unnecessary government interference advocated in the report did not apply to everyone: "Adam Smith is not for the peasants. For them, there is the prospect of extensive compulsory measures — however hard the effort must be to make these unnecessary. Our caveat is not that peasants should, if necessary, be compelled to put their land to its best use, but that 'economic liberalism' should admit the need for extensive planning and, where the community interest demands it, of state interference."¹⁴⁹ Bureau critics were far from convinced that ordinary African villagers should be subjected to bewildering social change in the name of economic efficiency. The shift from communal to private ownership of land recommended by the royal commission, for instance, would shatter the African way of life. But was such an upheaval necessary or even the most desirable remedy to the problem of poor land usage? The bureau argued that private owners of land would in all likelihood be most resentful of government interference, even in the form of attempts to improve farming techniques. Whereas the commission had maintained that private ownership was essential because without it farmers would lack both the incentive and the collateral for raising capital for improvements of their property, the bureau suggested that a modified traditional tenure system might be better. Retaining tribal ownership would

avoid wrenching social changes, while individual cultivators could still be induced to modify their farming practices. As for the question of raising capital, it would surely be possible to arrange a credit system, through cooperatives or public bodies, to ensure farmers' loans. If the individual farmer were turned off his land for any reason, the creditor would then be compensated by the tribal authority.\textsuperscript{150} The bureau apparently foresaw no difficulties in a system that would demand collective responsibility for individual decisions.

Another objection to the work of the commission raised in the bureau's critique was the extent to which East Africa would have to depend on outside sources of capital for economic development. T. A. Kennedy, lecturer in economics at Makerere College, insisted that the commissioners overstated the region's poverty and became so obsessed with that proposition that they overlooked its real wealth. He asserted that foreign capital was welcome, but economies ultimately expanded only through domestic capital accumulation. Kennedy provided little evidence to support his assumption that such reservoirs of capital existed in the territories, noting only that, "I have a feeling that there are resources of wealth which may be small individually and yet if which properly mobilised and directed could make a significant contribution to expansion." He added, "I have no means of knowing in what quantities they exist . . . ," a determination that might be made by a financial and fiscal survey.\textsuperscript{151} The implication was that the royal commission demanded drastic adaptations in their way of life on the part of African peasants merely to make the region attractive for exploitation by foreign capitalists.

\textsuperscript{150} Ibid., 27-8.
\textsuperscript{151} Ibid., 19.
On the question of the pace of change in East Africa, the bureau noted that the commission was not always consistent, sometimes advocating very rapid transformation of the economy while at others warning of the dangers of pressing ahead too quickly without preparing the ground. Clearly, however, the report held that the current pace of development was too slow. The bureau agreed, but then asked how the process of transforming the economy might be accelerated. In the bureau's opinion, that could only be accomplished through direct government intervention, using compulsion where necessary. But if change were to be imposed from the top rather than allowed to occur gradually at the grassroots level, ordinary Africans would have to share a high degree of trust in their territorial governments. None of the East governments were truly representative of the people whose lives would be affected by the changes envisioned. A great weakness of the commission was the manner in which its terms of reference precluded it from addressing the question of political reform. Nevertheless, the bureau maintained, the political question remained at the heart of the region's problems: "Until there are Governments in East Africa—with authority and power firmly derived from sanction—the prospects of peaceful and thorough-going reforms are likely to remain a mirage: another of the deceptive frustrations experienced by high-minded reformers in Uganda, Kenya and Tanganyika. That is not to say that certain changes cannot be achieved; but these are not likely to be of the order demanded by the Royal Commission."\(^{152}\) Proceeding with the commission's development program in the absence of substantive political reform might prove disastrous. On

\(^{152}\) Ibid., 4.
the other hand, African leaders who could be expected to resist change imposed by colonial governments might—if the experience garnered in West Africa and elsewhere taught any lessons—turn around and support the same reform measures when they themselves were faced with the task of governing as part of a responsible government. The bureau's critique declared: "The danger in the East African situation is that attempts at hurried reform may result, not in reformation, but in counter-reformation. Mau Mau is an outstanding example of counter-reformation. It is not, as is sometimes suggested, a revolutionary movement. It is thoroughly reactionary."\textsuperscript{153}

Race relations was one area in which the bureau thought the report was of historic significance and provided a field in which the British might make a great contribution to world even as they prepared to bring their empire to an end. The royal commission was groundbreaking in taking a non-racial approach to social and economic problems. "For this reason alone," the bureau asserted, "[the report] deserves a place in history equal, at least, to the recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court on the rights of Negroes. What the Commissioners have recommended is 'integration with all deliberate speed,' not only in the field of education, but throughout all spheres of economic and social life in British East Africa."\textsuperscript{154} Yet the challenges facing the British in East Africa, the bureau argued, were greater than those confronting Americans. The latter had merely to overcome racial segregation, whereas people in East Africa were divided by race and culture. Con-

\textsuperscript{153} Ibid., 6.
\textsuperscript{154} Ibid., 9.
sequently, the British approach to achieving an integrated society would have to be more gradual, avoiding undue haste that might alienate conservative elements in the region.  

Ultimately, the Africa Bureau suggested that the last great imperial mission would be to find a middle way in creating a multiracial society, somewhere in between the extremes of the South African segregationist and American assimilationist models. Future success hinged upon a genuine acceptance of the goals of racial harmony and cooperation: "On this point, recent experience in British Central Africa has much to teach: the mere adoption of a word like partnership is not enough. There is a real danger for human relations when a key term of this kind is left embarrassingly vague and undefined. Different and conflicting interpretations—especially those which assert that Europeans as such are to be the senior partners with Africans as the juniors—can effectively destroy any value in a concept which is held by some propagandists to be the direct antithesis of apartheid."  

But if the South African solution of (theoretically) complete and permanent separation of the races was rejected, so to—less vehemently—was the American remedy of assimilation on the basis of one language and culture. The British way would entail a concerted effort, through education, "to promote mutual understanding and to foster a common sense of belonging together and of feeling a common loyalty to East Africa." The bureau, how-

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155 Ibid., 10.
156 Ibid., 12.
157 Ibid., 13. It is unclear how far this would be consistent with the notion, expressed elsewhere in the bureau's critique, to push forward boldly with urban development, in part because cosmopolitan urban areas represented the future and were the transmitters of Western heritage. The bureau argued: "Surely what is needed in the towns is an active campaign to draw this spearhead of unattached Africans [i.e. the urban proletariat] into our own Western society...". Ibid., 18. To be fair, the Africa Bureau presented its critique as a summary of the opinions of a number of different commentators and an invitation to further debate, not as a cohesive, formal statement of its own program.
ever, did not provide a programmatic plan detailing how that common loyalty might be achieved.

At the same time that the Africa Bureau was preparing its critique in order to make it available to parliamentarians prior to any formal political debate, the Colonial Office was also considering the report. Immediately after publication, officials in London anticipated strong reactions among the various interested parties in the region, although an internal note observed that, "so many apprehensions have been nurtured by sectional interests of all races East Africa during the long period of preparation of the report that its moderate and realistic appraisal of the problems to be faced and its recognition of the political considerations which must affect the future of its recommendations may come as a relief to anxiety rather than a stimulus to passionate reaction." The immediate task at hand, however, was to formulate an official response to the commission's work through consultation with the East African governors.

W. A. C. Mathieson, head of the East African department, suggested the procedure that the office would follow in dealing with the report. The governors of the three territories would have a chance to convey their initial reactions at a meeting with the secretary of state in mid-June. After that the colonial secretary would send a dispatch to each governor and to the administrator of the East Africa High Commission soliciting their views on the report and outlining modifications of existing policy that should be introduced as a result of its recommendations. The governors and the administrators would

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send drafts of their comments to the Colonial Office where another meeting would be arranged and, if possible, a draft of the secretary's responses to their comments circulated. Eventually all the dispatches would be published.159 Everything would be done to present a unified front regarding the commission's recommendations, but the officials in London could not simply impose their views on the governors, a point which was often overlooked by other critics of the royal commission.

W. L. Gorell Barnes raised the question of the spirit with which the office and the governors should approach the report. He thought that most of its recommendations should be endorsed, noting: "It is essentially a report of liberal economists. East Africa has had far too little liberal economics for a long [sic] time. It is questionable whether it can now swallow anything like such a big dose all at once. But should not the prescription perhaps now be that she should be required to take a course of pills up to the limit of tolerance?"160 As events unfolded it became increasingly apparent that officials in London were far more willing to push the "limit of tolerance" that were the governors and their administrations who would have to deal with the potential and immediate social and political problems generated by a program of rapid economic development.

When Lennox-Boyd met with the governors on 15 June 1955, the latter aired their views, some of which would hardly have encouraged the report's proponents. Sir Evelyn Baring noted that the reaction in Kenya to the commission's recommendations had been

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159 Minute, W. A. C. Mathieson to W. L. Gorell Barnes, 9 June 1955, PRO CO 822/1112.
160 Minute, W. L. Gorell Barnes to J. B. Johnston [private secretary to Alan Lennox-Boyd, secretary of state for the colonies], 14 June 1955, PRO CO 822/1112.
less vigorous than anticipated, probably owing to the length and complexity of the document. European settlers, he said, had been prepared for the loss of their exclusive rights in the White Highlands, and consequently there was a sense of relief that the commission did not specify a date for opening that area to non-Europeans. Baring thought the technical recommendations regarding land were acceptable, although he hoped there would be more consolidation of individual African holdings prior to granting freehold tenure. By the time consolidation had progressed, he hoped, tribal exclusiveness might also have a chance to "melt," allowing implementation of the commission's proposals concerning inter-tribal transfers. In that regard the governor added the caveat that the Kikuyu, on security grounds, should not be allowed to acquire land all over Kenya without controls.161

Baring's most emphatic objections to the report were grounded in paternalistic assumptions about Kenyan Africans. He recounted a conversation he had with B. A. Ohanga, minister for community development and Kenya's first African minister,162 who seemed favorably disposed towards the report. The governor did not believe Ohanga fully understood the implications of making land freely transferable between races and pointed out to him that Indians stood to gain the most from such a change in policy because they had the capital to invest in real estate. And while Baring thought that most of the African members of the Legislative Council would probably agree in principle to the commission's recommendations concerning land if safeguards for African interests were included, he still

161 "Draft Note of a Meeting to Discuss the Report of the East African Royal Commission," meeting held in secretary of state's room at 10:30 a.m., Wednesday, 15 June 1955, PRO CO 822/1112.
felt strongly "that the Africans would need protection for some time to come." Furthermore, he did not believe that the time had come for free competition in marketing because African cooperatives were not yet sufficiently advanced to hold their own against non-African producers. Government controls, he believed, might be reformed but should not be abolished.\textsuperscript{163}

Sir Edward Twining was unimpressed with the report. "Tanganyika," he said, "had never been enthusiastic about the appointment of a Royal Commission and . . . he doubted now whether the results of its work gave much cause for enthusiasm."\textsuperscript{164} He stated bluntly that many of the royal commission's observations about land tenure and transfer were not applicable to Tanganyika, which lacked most of the restrictions on land usage that the commission found elsewhere in the region. Some of the recommendations that did apply to the territory were already in the process of gradual implementation and it would be foolhardy to introduce revolutionary agrarian reform under the circumstances. Where the commissioners had criticized price stabilization funds, Twining pointed out that they did not mention the cases where local African authorities had imposed compulsory savings on producers for development purposes. He believed those instances should be exceptions to a general policy of opening marketing to free market forces.\textsuperscript{165}

From Uganda's perspective, Sir Andrew Cohen told the secretary of state that a number of the commission's recommendations were useful: the chapter on urban develop-

\textsuperscript{163} "Draft Note of a Meeting to Discuss the Report of the East African Royal Commission," meeting held in secretary of state's room at 10:30 a.m., Wednesday, 15 June 1955, PRO CO 822/1112.
\textsuperscript{164} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{165} Ibid.
opment, the agricultural recommendations, and the technical aspects of the land tenure reform proposals. His major criticism was that, "the Commission had recommended that a full blooded policy of laissez-faire should be put into effect, but the fact was that if anything were to be achieved in the sphere of economic development, the Government must participate." He dismissed the report's comments on compulsory savings imposed by the Uganda Price Stabilisation Fund as "out-of-date and misguided."

Cohen, in fact, may have held back even as he harshly criticized the report during the London meeting. In correspondence with Margery Perham, who wrote him that "the sum total of [the report's] ideas seem to me very impressive," the governor wrote: "Your letter implies that you were impressed by these ideas, but doubtful whether the revolution which they would involve can be carried through. My doubt is whether the ideas are right." He praised the agricultural sections of the report for pointing out the constructive steps governments might take to improve outputs, but he questioned the value of the recommendations on economic policy. "Positive action by Government," he informed Perham, "is absolutely necessary in my view if the African is to play its part in economic activity and also to secure economic development both in the agricultural and in

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166 Ibid.
167 Letter, Margery Perham to Sir Andrew Cohen, 27 July 1955, Oxford University, Rhodes House Library, Perham papers, MSS PERHAM, Box 51/4/5.
the industrial and mining fields.

Like Baring, Cohen invoked the specter of Indian domination of the economy. "If literally carried into effect," he argued, "I cannot help feeling that [the recommendations] would lead not to development but to stagnation in the things that really matter, with almost all sectors of the economic activity dominated by hardworking and enterprising Indians working under a happy regime of laissez-faire." Cohen and Baring seem to have viewed some aspects of economic growth as a zero sum game, with Indians profiting only at African expense (Europeans were strangely absent from the picture). Hearkening back to the Devonshire White Paper of 1923, they maintained that colonial government should interpose itself as the trustee of African interests against the alien Indian threat, thereby legitimating the continued imperial presence and their own roles as mediators among various racial and ethnic groups.

Before adjourning the June meeting, the governors agreed that their own governments should examine the report and submit their conclusions to the secretary of state within six months time. Meanwhile parts of the report would be analyzed by the colonial secretary's various advisory committees and the Colonial Office would study financial and other implications in conjunction with Treasury officials. As to the question of a debate in the House of Commons, Cohen did not think it likely that Labour would be ready to address the issue for some time to come, but those attending the meeting agreed that it would be useful to hear what politicians in the United Kingdom thought about the report.

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169 Letter Sir Andrew Cohen to Margery Perham, 2 August 1955, Oxford University, Rhodes House Library, Perham papers, MSS PERHAM, Box 514/5.
170 Ibid.
171 Above, 24-25.
Finally, they decided that current development projects in the territories should not be delayed while the commission's recommendations were being considered.\textsuperscript{172}

Anticipating a parliamentary debate, Colonial Office administrators were anxious to receive the governors' considered opinions as quickly as possible. On 5 July, Lord Ogmore proposed in the House of Lords that the report should be debated during the autumn. Lord Lloyd, parliamentary under-secretary of state for the colonies, responded that he agreed that there ought to be a debate, but he asked that it be deferred for a few months while the Colonial Office and the territorial governments studied the document in depth.\textsuperscript{173} Throughout the fall of 1955 officials continued to assume that a debate would take place before Christmas.\textsuperscript{174} Their chief concern was that the secretary of state should be able to comment on the report, praising it in a noncommittal fashion, and not making any statement that might prove embarrassing should one or all of the governors take a contradictory position on a particular point.\textsuperscript{175} In the end they need not have been so anxious. Parliament not only took no further action on the matter that year but did not get around to debating the report until May 1957.

Consideration of the report by the territorial governments went ahead in any event.

There was to be a meeting of chief secretaries from the three governments in December,

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\textsuperscript{172} "Draft Note of a Meeting to Discuss the Report of the East African Royal Commission," meeting held in secretary of state's room at 10:30 a.m., Wednesday, 15 June 1955, PRO CO 822/1112.
\textsuperscript{174} Minute, W. L. Gorell Barnes to the Secretary of State (through Sir H. Poynton). 4 October 1955, PRO CO 822/1112.
\textsuperscript{175} Letter, Sir T. I. K. Lloyd to Sir Evelyn Baring [copies to Twining and Cohen]. 28 October 1955, PRO CO 822/1112.
\end{flushleft}
followed by a meeting of the administrator of the East Africa High Commission, Sir Bruce Hutt, and the governors in Entebbe at the end of January 1956. Gorell Barnes expressed concern that, since the secretary of state was not scheduled to chair the Entebbe meeting, the Colonial Office would not have a chance to interject its views into the proceedings and the governors' positions might "crystallize" without considering the perspective from London. He suggested, therefore, that either the secretary of state or himself should go to Entebbe for the meeting.\(^{176}\) Sir Hilton Poynton thought it would be best if Gorell Barnes should attend rather than Lennox-Boyd, which would allow the secretary of state to take an objective view of the governors' recommendations. He added that it would helpful if a representative from the Colonial Office were present at the December meeting of the chief secretaries, and he recommended that W. A. C. Mathieson, who was already in East Africa, should extend his stay in order to attend.\(^{177}\) Sir Thomas Lloyd, the permanent under-secretary, and Lennox-Boyd concurred.\(^{178}\)

Proceeding on schedule, following the Entebbe meeting the governors' and administrator's draft dispatches commenting on the report were forwarded to the Colonial Office in early to mid-February where they were scrutinized by various departments. After much correspondence concerning minor details, which took a considerable amount of time, the Colonial Office published and presented to Parliament two command papers in July 1956.

\(^{176}\) Minute, W. L. Gorell Barnes to Sir H. Poynton, Sir T. Lloyd, and Secretary of State, 13 October 1955, PRO CO 822/1112.

\(^{177}\) Minute, Sir H. Poynton (re. Gorell Barnes's minute of 13 October), 13 October 1955, PRO CO 822/1112.

One contained the East African dispatches, and the other consisted of the secretary of state's commentary on those dispatches.\textsuperscript{179}

The governors' public pronouncements were not scathingly critical of the report, as had been some of their comments in the meeting with the secretary of state in June 1955. For public consumption Twining paid lip service to the commissioners' ideas. "In our careful study of this great Report," he wrote in his dispatch of 7 February 1956, "my advisers and I have felt increasing admiration for the Commission's diagnosis of the economic and social problems of East Africa. I am able to say that this feeling is shared by all shades of responsible opinion outside Government and that there are many in Tanganyika who acknowledge with gratitude that the Commission has provide us with a comprehensive and reasonable guide to which for many year to come we shall find ourselves constantly referring."\textsuperscript{180} All three of the governors stated that they agreed with many of the commission's recommendations and that their administrations were in the process of implementing a number of policy changes that had either been inspired by the report or adopted independently. Cohen, for example, expressed satisfaction that Uganda's program for developing natural resources was mainly in harmony with the royal commission's proposals and that "the Commission should also have generally endorsed the ideas which we put to them on the subject of land tenure."\textsuperscript{181}

\textsuperscript{180} Despatches from the Governors, 157.
\textsuperscript{181} Ibid., 107.
Nevertheless, the governors' approach to the report was hardly what the commissioners had hoped for. The latter had emphasized that the body of their recommendations should be viewed as an integrated whole: "We think it is important that certain of the main issues which have emerged from our study of the matters which have been referred to us should not be obscured by the attention which, for other purposes, it has been necessary to devote to the minutiae of particular problems and situations." The governors, however, assumed that they should be able to pick and choose among the report's many recommendations, and they tended to praise the "minutiae" and technical details that endorsed current or proposed policies within their own territories while rejecting some of the fundamental principles animating the report.

More than simply repudiating certain specific proposals advanced by the royal commission, the governors overall were more cautious in their approach to development problems. Whereas the commissioners, despite a number of cautionary notes, stressed the need to push forward quickly with programs of economic modernization, the governors' approach was to "go slowly." That was particularly true where the point at issue was the security of land. Baring cautioned against instituting sudden reforms that lacked popular support yet affected the heart of traditional society. His administration, he maintained,

are agreed that the development of an outlook which involves a concept of individual rather than of group responsibility and which is accompanied by wider loyalties is inevitable and that participation in the modern world of economics will sensibly hasten the change. In Africa patience is an essential quality of Government. And although we accept these changes must be made, whether or not the transformation will make the African a happier man is a matter for conjecture; for

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the circumstances of modern life involve not only the privileges but also a degree of responsibility which is likely to seem burdensome, particularly at first.  

Cohen and Twining also advised against moving too quickly in the area of land tenure reform, allowing time for the more progressive Africans to lead the way and waiting patiently for the bulk of the population to follow.  

But the most fundamental difference between the royal commission and the colonial governments concerned the human factor in the development equation. Sustaining the report, despite many distracting qualifications, was the assumption that relatively free and unfettered markets would allow the sum of individual decisions to drive the territorial economies in a manner which would result in the most efficient employment of resources of land, labor, and capital. In the end, the commissioners grounded their recommendations on a basic trust in universal human nature and a confidence that East Africans of all sorts would proceed in a manner consistent with economic self-interest. Governments generally could help the people best by standing aside and allowing free reign to individual productive efforts. The governors did not accept that view. They held that ordinary East Africans were, for the most part, not fully prepared to make autonomous decisions in the modern marketplace. They conceived their place in the world as part of a group and not as individuals. Cohen argued that "tribal loyalties" were still the most important political factor in Uganda, and to ignore that fact would be recklessly irresponsible. In a number of instances, Baring wrote, "we feel that the Commission have under-estimated the prob-

\[183\] Ibid., 3-4.
\[184\] Ibid., 145, 161.
\[185\] Ibid., 134.
able psychological impact of the economic changes suggested and that the time is not yet ripe for the removal of those safeguards which have been developed over the last half century.\textsuperscript{186} From the governors' standpoint, colonial governments for some unspecified time to come would have to guide and compel Africans to do what was needed for their own sakes. A report that represented an implicit critique of the planning impulse that was well advanced in the United Kingdom could hardly be expected to win support from men whose outlooks had been shaped by the paternalism of the colonial service.

Despite some profound differences, commissioners and governors did seem to share one common assumption. Less than a decade before the East African territories gained their independence, neither the report nor the dispatches from the governors seriously questioned whether or not the British, at some level, would be able to manage the development agenda. The commissioners seemed to think that their prescribed program could be applied regardless of constitutional and political changes that might take place.\textsuperscript{187} In a sense, their plan was above politics. The governors seem to have assumed that the colonial regimes would remain in place for the foreseeable future. At least they conveyed no great sense of urgency about pushing the pace of reform forward. What escaped both governors and commissioners was the possibility that it did not matter so much what Africans could be convinced or compelled to do in the name of economic progress but what they were willing to do under the existing political order. What the African thought, ex-

\textsuperscript{186} Ibid., 2.
\textsuperscript{187} Ibid., 4.
pressed to some extent in the record of evidence collected by the commission, found little expression in the pages of the report or the governors dispatches.

By the time the governors' comments were published, commission members and others were probably something less than optimistic about the chances of the report's recommendations being adopted. Tom Soper recalled that the commissioners realized that Cohen, although he was cordial enough in his treatment of commission members, had opposed the inquiry from the beginning, and Twining had always been more or less indifferent to their work.¹⁸⁸ Frankel later claimed he was not surprised by the governors "fears of possible over-hasty action," but he was still disappointed. He wrote: "They accepted the fundamental principles and recommendations of our report. Nevertheless, when it came to the crunch, they hedged their bets on many key issues. They pleaded for caution and more time before commercialisation of land tenure was adopted. But time was already running out and soon these problems were not longer to be decided by the Governors. A few years later the East African territories were on the road to independence."¹⁸⁹

Opposition from the governors, phrased in a more civil manner in their dispatches than in their direct conversation with Lennox-Boyd, left the secretary of state with little more to do than endorse their position. There was, after all, very little that London could do—short of recalling a governor—to force colonial administrations to implement policies against their will. In any case, there is no indication that the commission plan had any ardent champion within the Colonial Office. On the other hand, the secretary of state could

¹⁸⁹ An Economist's Testimony, 272-3.
not simply repudiate the findings of a royal commission appointed by his own party. In his commentary on the dispatches, therefore, Lennox-Boyd asserted that the entire exercise had been a smashing success. The territorial governments responses, he argued, demonstrated "the thoroughness with which the East African Governments have applied their full resources to the study of the Royal Commission's proposals and the impetus which the Report has given to a searching re-assessment of current policies for promoting the prosperity and well-being of the inhabitants of the territories. They also demonstrate a wide measure of acceptance both of the Royal Commission's diagnosis of the problems to be solved and of the solutions proposed."\textsuperscript{190} Later he added: "The impact on policy of the studies of the Commission is amply illustrated by the fact that in most of their content the despatches are devoted to explaining how their recommendations are to be applied and only in rare instances contesting the wisdom or practicality of the policies advocated."\textsuperscript{191} Of course, he did not underscore the fact that those rare instances of dissent often involved rejection of basic assumptions implicit in the commission's work.

Perhaps the most important aspect of the dispatches that Lennox-Boyd highlighted concerned the potential financial cost of attempting to implement the royal commission's proposals. "The despatches," he wrote,

\begin{quote}
bring out forcibly the hard fact that much which admittedly should be done requires the application of finance on a scale far beyond the present resources and prudent expectations of the Governments and the High Commission. . . . Although it is not possible to present a consolidated statement of need on an East African basis over a given period on the evidence now available, in round terms over the present planning period 1955-60 a sum in the region of £250 million could be
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{190} Commentary on the despatches from the Governors, 2.
\textsuperscript{191} Ibid., 5.
fruitfully applied to developments or in support of developments recommended by the Royal Commission and accepted by the Governments as desirable. This would involve the provision of external funds at an annual rate considerably in excess of that at which external loan funds and C.D. & W. [Colonial Development and Welfare] contributions have recently been available to meet East African requirements.\textsuperscript{192}

British overseas aid—including grants, loans, technical assistance, and contributions to international organizations—rose from about £52 million in 1952 to £65 million in 1957.\textsuperscript{193} The sum of £50 million per year for East Africa would therefore represent an enormous proportion of total overseas aid. Curiously, when consulted by the Colonial Office concerning the financial estimates in the governors dispatches, the Treasury seemed to hold the opinion that costs might not be quite as high as anticipated. "Would it be possible," queried a Treasury official, "somewhere to insert a sentence [in the secretary of state's commentary] saying that experience has shown that Colonial governments tend to overestimate their capacity to spend and that this casts some doubt on the amount of finance that would in practice be required?"\textsuperscript{194} That observation may not have been incorporated in Lennox-Boyd's comments on account of the need to meet a publication timetable,\textsuperscript{195} but in suggesting that the costs of pressing forward with even part of the commission's program would be extraordinarily high the secretary of state also sent a cautionary note to those who might criticize the failure to attempt to implement the full program.

\textsuperscript{192} Ibid., 6.
\textsuperscript{194} Letter, A. N. Galsworthy [Head of Finance, Colonial Office] to A. D. Peck [Treasury Office], 9 July 1956; letter, A. D. Peck to A. N. Galsworthy, 10 July 1956, PRO CO 822/1112.
\textsuperscript{195} The governors' suggestions for modifying the secretary of state's commentary were not acted upon because to do so would have delayed publication. Telegram to Governors of Kenya, Tanganyika, and Uganda, 19 July 1956, PRO CO 822/1112.
During the period when the report was under consideration by official and unofficial critics, the royal commission found itself assailed from different directions. In the pages of a long, technical document, most readers could find something of value, but few commentators endorsed the basic, liberal assumptions espoused by the commissioners. The governors and Labour rejected the idea that East Africa should suddenly undertake an economic revolution to establish the conditions under which free market forces might produce the maximum benefit. The governors' main concern was that the pace of development should be regulated and disturbances to the social order minimized. In correspondence with the Africa Bureau, Sir Eldred Hitchcock, a member of Tanganyika's Legislative Council, remarked that the administration there had "got into the habit of 'controlling' as matter of course, almost for controls sake." Conservative commentators revealed a strong paternalistic streak and were skeptical of the proposition that ordinary African peasants would be capable of functioning effectively in the modern exchange economy. But the governors were also the men-on-the-spot who would have to deal with the consequences of social dislocation that the commissioners were willing to risk in the name of material progress, and it is perhaps not surprising that they were cautious, adopting something of a "not on my watch" position.

Labour critics, too, rejected the report's liberalism, but they did so because they denied that the emergence of so-called free markets driven by laissez faire principals was

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either inevitable or desirable. Where the commissioners attacked government regulation and interference as vestiges of an outmoded imperial past, left-wing writers maintained that state planning was the way of the future. In their view, the royal commission's prescription would only lead to hardship and suffering for ordinary people comparable to the British experience during the agricultural and industrial revolutions. Some Labour commentators displayed paternalistic attitudes, but their critique was also motivated by ideological assumptions about the relative power of capital and labor. There was no justification, they contended, for remodeling East Africa to fit the needs of foreign capitalists. And before any momentous decisions regarding the economic and social future of the region was made, those on the left staunchly maintained that the African people would have to be consulted. Thus, the primary aim of colonial policy should be to press forward with political and constitutional changes that would allow the Africans to participate in planning for the future.

British critics of all stripes did share one common assumption, whether it was stated or implied. East Africa was important because it represented one of the last areas in which British imperialism might be successfully concluded and, in a sense, vindicated. All hoped that the imperial legacy would be one of prosperity and good government. The intermediate steps that should taken to achieve that goal were not clearly delineated, but the debate over the royal commission report seemed a good first effort. But for all the nobles dreams about completing one last great imperial mission, the debate over the report for the most part lacked any real sense of urgency. As Hugh Macmillan observed, the commission's work was produced at a time when both commissioners and critics still believed they
could "take the long-term view of development." By mid-1956, the future of East Africa may well have been beyond their control in any fashion.

Chapter Seven

Conclusion

On 31 May 1957, two years after the publication of the East Africa Royal Commission's report, the House of Commons debated the resolution put forward by Labour's James Johnson:

That this House takes notes of the findings of the Royal Commission on Land and Population in East Africa: recognises the need for land reform, improved agricultural techniques, efficient marketing schemes and industrial development, and the necessity for raising African standards of living by means of better education, housing and health services; and, taking into account the increasing African population and the consequent congestion in certain areas, calls upon Her Majesty's Government to encourage the necessary capital investment and, in co-operation with the leaders of all sections of the local communities, to proceed with further constitutional advances.

In the course of the debate that followed, members from both parties discussed not only the merits of the commission's work but the past and future aims and possibilities of British imperial policy in Africa. Those involved in the debate in the House were not always divided along party lines.

Parliamentarians uniformly agreed that the report represented a vital contribution to the body of knowledge upon which East African policy should be based. From Labour's side, Arthur Creech Jones (Wakefield), described it as, "one of the most important documents concerned with African affairs which has ever been presented to the

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1 Above, 361, n. 77.
2 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th ser., vol. 571, no. 121, col. 771.
3 Above, 79, n. 216.
House." Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies John Profumo was even more effusive in his praise of "one of the great State papers of our time," the effect of which had been "to clear the cobwebs spun by the spiders of habit and preconceived ideas, and to stimulate those working on the ground by a revelation of the possible, and by a warning of the results of failure to recognise the existence of precipices at the end of well-worn paths." All participants in the debate found ample grounds on which to praise the royal commissioners.

From an ideological perspective, Labour members of Parliament challenged the laissez-faire ethos that they claimed animated the report. It was hardly a "Socialist document," Johnson lamented, adding: "This laissez-faire outlook and devil-take-the-hindmost attitude is in my view . . . most unfair, in African conditions." Frederick W. Mulley protested: "I do not think that we can bring twentieth century Africans along on methods which are questionable as having been appropriate even to nineteenth century Britain. I do not think we can possibly approach the particular political and social problems of Africa along the lines of the economic doctrines of Adam Smith and Ricardo." W. Thomas Williams suggested that the commission had failed to consider

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4 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th ser., vol. 571, no. 121, col. 841.
6 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th ser., vol. 571, no. 121, cols. 857-58.
7 Ibid., col. 772.
9 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th ser., vol. 571, no. 121, col. 784.
alternatives to traditional patterns of capitalist development. He contended that the imperial government should more vigorously encourage cooperative systems of trading, marketing, and agriculture; unlike their response to other European initiatives, Africans were enthusiastic about the formation of cooperative organizations. "By developing cooperatives . . .," Williams asserted, "we can help [Africans] to lift themselves up by their own boot straps and, at the same time, we can restore that feeling of confidence without which constitutional development is impossible."\(^{11}\) In other words, the British should concentrate on promoting a type of communal self-sufficiency. Creech Jones endorsed that sentiment, reiterating his earlier criticisms of the commission\(^ {12}\) and charging: "The Report is infused with an individualistic philosophy which ill fits the present time."\(^ {13}\) He conceded, however, that the commissioners did propose a variety of controls and regulations that qualified their laissez-faire doctrine. Conservative members of the House hardly put up a zealous defense of free market principles. Profumo denied that the royal commission merely proposed, "letting loose the hounds of laissez faire economics on primitive man in East Africa."\(^ {14}\) He argued that the commissioners' primary intent had been to point out that if the African desired (quite properly) to benefit from the opportunities which arose from being treated as an individual in the political realm, then he would also have to accept the risks attendant upon "producing and consuming as an


\(^{11}\) Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th ser., vol. 571, no. 121, cols. 820-22.

\(^{12}\) Above, 358-60, 371-72.

\(^{13}\) Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th ser., vol. 571, no. 121, cols. 842-43.

\(^{14}\) Ibid., col. 838.
individual, and he must be helped and encouraged to do so."\textsuperscript{15} That interpretation of the report may have been derived more from Dow's comments following publication than from the text of the document itself.\textsuperscript{16}

Some inter-party sniping surfaced over the issue of which groups deserved credit for the economic advances that had occurred in East Africa. G. Beresford Craddock\textsuperscript{17} accused Labour of failing to acknowledge "the great work which has been done in the whole of East Africa and elsewhere in Africa by the European and British administrations. Indeed, if it had not been for the great work we started some fifty or sixty years ago we should not have the level of prosperity there is today. It is quite remarkable development which has taken place, and it is very largely due to the work of the British administration and settlers."\textsuperscript{18} In terms of constitutional changes in the region, Craddock warned against moving too fast in Uganda, lest "internecine strife" result with the Baganda on one side and the rest of the African tribes on the other. Nevertheless, he deemed Uganda, like Tanganyika, to be "essentially a native country."\textsuperscript{19} Kenya was different. With historical license, Craddock vowed:

I shall always be prepared to fight against a system which would mean the suppression of the European in Kenya, because I believe that the European there

has as much right to be in Kenya as the black African. Most of the tribes of Kenya are migratory and have come from the upper Nile and, speaking generally, at about the same time as the European. Let us be fair. The European has made tremendous contributions to Kenya, so I would not be prepared to subscribe to any system which would mean the domination of the European by any of the other races, at least for many a long year.\textsuperscript{20}

Any constitutional change in Kenya, he maintained, might spell disaster for the European community.

From the other side of the House came some weak objections to Craddock's comments. Johnson protested that he had not suggested in his opening remarks that the Kenya Europeans should be abandoned. More assertively, Kenneth Robinson\textsuperscript{21} asked Craddock whether or not the refusal of constitutional change, rather than change itself, would be far more likely to bring about the result he feared.\textsuperscript{22} Dr. Horace King\textsuperscript{23} proclaimed that, "Uganda will certainly one day be a self-governing African State within the Commonwealth." Given that premise, the British task was to convince those pressing for rapid political advance that deliberate progress towards self-government as a unitary state was a superior alternative to risking fragmentation of the country by forcing the pace. "The task of all the African political parties," King stated, "is to produce social and national programmes, in addition to mere demands for increased or complete representation."\textsuperscript{24} He did not deny that many achievements in Uganda during the past

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., col. 800.
\textsuperscript{22} \textit{Parliamentary Debates} (Commons), 5th ser., vol. 571, no. 121, col. 800.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., col. 803.
fifty years were attributable to European skill, but he added that none of them could have been accomplished without African cooperation.²⁵ Labour's response to Craddock's assertion of European rights amounted to pleas for a multiracial approach to constitutional change, the timing and form of which would be largely determined by British administrations.

Beginning with the assumption that Britain should retain control over the process of economic and political advance in the colonies, there was considerable agreement among members of both parties concerning the priorities and pace of development. Johnson declared that economic problems were irresolvable "without having first come to grips with the political difficulties and found some kind of solution to the political headaches of the moment."²⁶ He acknowledged that the commission had not been asked to address political questions, and even though the logic of the report favored the formation of an East African federation, Johnson believed such a proposal would be "dynamite" in light of the troubles with the Central African Federation. He did not offer his own views on the direction of constitutional planning. More typical of sentiment expressed during the debate was R. Chichester-Clark's²⁷ opinion that self-government would be meaningless until some of the recommendations put forward by the royal commission had time to work and—in Uganda's case—to remove some of the inter-tribal suspicions.²⁸ From Labour's side, Reginald W. Sorensen²⁹ agreed that the report carried

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²⁵ Ibid., cols. 803-4.
²⁶ Ibid., col. 772.
²⁸ Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th ser., vol. 571, no. 121, col. 823.
with it, "a recognition that whatever we may think of freedom and liberty, the freedom that is merely freedom to stagnate or decay is not a freedom worth having. Therefore, I fully recognise that this is a warning to us not to segregate the claim of freedom, liberty, self-government and so forth, and ignore the other fact that there must be a stable economic foundation for that freedom, which otherwise will collapse."

Parliamentarians were well aware that economic progress could not be accomplished overnight, especially when dealing with the question of land reform. Johnson noted that the process of land consolidation in Kenya had already made remarkable headway, but he doubted that the ambitious targets set in the plan devised by R. J. M. Swynnerton could be achieved. Sorensen and Profumo agreed concerning both the urgent need for land tenure reform and the pitfalls of proceeding too hastily.

Those engaged in the debate seemed convinced that British plans for economic and political development could be accomplished if African "politicians" moderated their extreme demands. Craddock decried the anti-European pronouncements of African leaders in Kenya, while King hoped the Ugandan nationalists would limit their demands in order to give economic development a chance. Wing Commander Eric Bullus

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30 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th ser., vol. 571, no. 121, cols. 829-30.
32 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th ser., vol. 571, no. 121, cols. 835, 851.
33 Ibid., cols. 800, 803.
underscored the point: "My personal experience bears out the Commission's conclusion that if Africans should pursue independence so fanatically as to alienate or debar external capital and immigration they will condemn themselves to internal poverty and external bitterness. Under those circumstances, I think that there could be a field in which Communism might thrive." Profumo averred that the future of East Africa and the creation of "flexible, responsive Governments" depended upon the "sustaining power of a flexible economy where all productive elements can readily be mobilised across the barriers of customs and race to yield the material for a fuller life for all." He cautioned the Kenya Africans who demanded political and social equality not to sabotage government efforts to create economic opportunity. But the warnings to African nationalists seem to have contained more pleading than threat.

The hint of supplication towards African politicians may have arisen from the recognition on the part of the parliamentarians that any development scheme would be destined to fail in the absence of willing African cooperation. "As I see it," Johnson stated, "the job is, so to speak, to sell this Report to the peoples of East Africa. Tribalism is still very much alive in East Africa. The Africans are suspicious, have been for a long time and will be for some time to come, of new ideas. But it is vital that they should participate in these new measures." But how was the report to be "sold"? Johnson

35 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th ser., vol. 571, no. 121, col. 812. Bullus had recently returned from two-week tour of Uganda by four members of Parliament, including himself, King, Williams, and Chichester-Clark.
36 Ibid., col. 859.
37 Ibid., col. 773.
promoted the idea of multiracialism. "Kenya is a microcosm of the Commonwealth," he said, "and of the whole of Africa. All our peoples, whatever their colour, must work together and pull together in the future, whether for economic advancement or for political and harmonious advance." It seems that multiracialism may have been more important for the future of the Commonwealth than for Africa's. Bullus spoke of overcoming "any suspicion which lies between us and the Africans," but he was rather imprecise in specifying how that might be accomplished other than through the dedicated work of colonial service officers. Similarly, Williams said the greatest colonial challenge facing the British was, "the breakdown of confidence between Africans and Europeans throughout East Africa." He, too, was quicker to diagnose the problem than to prescribe a remedy.

Some cited the financial burden of implementing the royal commission's recommendations as a powerful reason for Africans to cooperate in development programs. Johnson quoted estimates of the capital needs of East Africa based on the report ranging from £200 million to £250 million. Political or social instability stemming from inter-racial animosity or any other source, he cautioned, might very well have the effect of scaring away potential investors. Mulley asked the government to provide money for the region's most urgent needs: £5 million annually for agricultural development and £3 million per year for education. "I think that Africans," he added, "for their

38 Ibid., col. 782.
39 Ibid., col. 812.
40 Ibid., col. 819.
41 Ibid., col. 773.
part must recognise that, if they are to get all the capital which they need to advance, they must seek a stable political situation. They must also be prepared to co-operate in creating conditions which will give security for private as well as public investment, because I think that East Africa generally needs both.\textsuperscript{42}

From the government bench, Profumo presented a sobering assessment of the region's financial situation. During 1955-60, he reported, the East African governors estimated that £170 million in external loans were required to pay for the essential projects proposed by the commission. During those five years the gross cost of all government works would amount to £250 million. Of those costs, grants under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act would cover only a fraction. Reassessments by East African governments led them to conclude that realistic capital expenditure, 1955-60, would be approximately £180 million, which would require all three governments and the East Africa High Commission to raise internal and external loans amounting to £118 million. Profumo said the British government would do everything it could to help the regional governments secure loans from the International Bank and other foreign sources, adding that "it would be illusory to suppose that it will be possible to raise more than a small proportion of this money in this way."\textsuperscript{43} The crux of the problem was that the bulk of development funds for East Africa had to be raised in Britain. The junior minister continued: "This is, of course, part of the wider problem of the provision of capital for Commonwealth and Colonial development—a problem which, as the House is well aware,

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., cols. 792, 794.

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., cols. 856-57.
depends on the ability of this country to earn an adequate surplus on its balance of payments." Profumo assured the Commons that East Africa had a prominent place in the government's deliberations, but he made only the conditional pledge that the United Kingdom would support projects stemming from the report's recommendations, "as our economic circumstances and obligations will permit." In truth, the British could only deliver rather meager offerings as an incentive for African politicians to moderate their political demands.

Financial reality did not forestall the spinning of imperial fantasies. One speaker after another moved from consideration of the report to discussion of Britain's ongoing imperial mission in East Africa and elsewhere. Some proposals resembled older blueprints for colonial development, dusted off and updated. Johnson, quoting Kipling who said, "transportation is civilisation," suggested a program of railway and road building in western Uganda "to the fabulous Mountains of the Moon" and, more importantly, to connect East Africa with the Central African Federation, thereby opening up southern Tanganyika. In terms reminiscent of late Victorian imperial rivalries, he declared: "If we do not do that other people will come in. For long the Germans have looked at Tanganyika, which they controlled at one time. Canadian and American money is about, and one can see that other nations will come into that part of the world if we ourselves do

44 Ibid., col. 857.
not do more than we are doing now." Sorensen invoked a version of the "White Man's Burden" to buttress his argument that the British should continue to guide the African people towards a more enlightened, modern existence, proclaiming:

I do not agree at all with those anti-Imperialists who used to say in the past, even if they are not saying it today, that we have no right to be in those countries, that we must leave them alone, so to speak, to stew in their own juice. I do not agree with them because we have responsibility for those fellow human beings. We have a responsibility to help them to understand what it is they are lacking. We have no right to say that because they may be content with their lot, therefore they should remain content.

We cannot escape our responsibility. We have impacted those peoples with our own civilisation, and have brought before their very eyes our standards and our way of life, which have inevitably caused some measure of emulation, cumulative in its effect, so that if some revert back to some of their more ancient customs in anger, in violence, on the other hand there are those who desire now to share in the new ideas which they have as yet only imperfectly assimilated. 47

That was a call for British self-sacrifice with a vengeance and hardly suggests that the empire should be wound up in a hurry. Sorensen was particularly keen to demonstrate the superiority of British methods in effecting progressive changes in peasant societies, in contrast to the manner in which the Soviets had achieved similar transformations, "ruthlessly, brutally and inhumanly." 48

Other members of the House seemed more prepared to accept the end of empire, but they were no less determined that its denouement should reflect credit on Britain. King fervently wished that the British people might become more "Commonwealth-conscious," with local education authorities in England "adopting" districts in Africa and

46 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th ser., vol. 571, no. 121, cols. 778-79.
47 Ibid., col. 834.
48 Ibid., col. 835.
British universities lending faculty to teach at Makerere College in Uganda while accepting more East Africans to study in the United Kingdom.\textsuperscript{49} Mulley claimed the odds were at best even that the British might bestow a democratic system upon Kenya that would allow European farmers to remain once self-government had been attained. He continued:

"That is why I say to the Government that while they must ration money out between all the Colonies, Kenya is a special case, because if we succeed in Kenya as a colonial Power we shall have achieved an immense success."\textsuperscript{50} Mulley suggested that the British government disburse scarce reserves of capital on what was, by his own admission, a very risky venture, more in the hope of saving Britain's reputation than for monetary gain. In his summation during the debate, Bullus extended the plea to include all of East Africa:

"The problems which face us in Africa are enormous, but they present a challenge for us in this country to prove that our old British way of patience, forbearance and tolerance in leading backward peoples to full self-government is the right one. The three territories of East Africa are among our great responsibilities. I think that we have it in our power to make them one of our greatest successes."\textsuperscript{51} Like Sorensen, Bullus was anxious to vindicate British rule, past and present, in the eyes of the world.

Despite the basic assumption shared by participants in the parliamentary debate that East Africa was a backward region that still desperately needed British tutelage, they attributed that backwardness to the region being at an earlier stage in historical

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., col. 809.
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., col. 791.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., cols. 815-16.
development rather than to racial factors. The exception, perhaps, was C. W. Armstrong, a former Kenyan settler, who thought the British people did not understand the manner in which inflammatory language used by African politicians might incite violence. "If, however, a people as highly sophisticated as the Germans," he continued, "allowed themselves to be dominated by the Nazi terror in the way they did, we should be able to understand how an African can be influenced by the merest threat of terrorism." Many more House members, however, compared Africans to workers in some earlier period of British history, and suggested that British experience might be used to soften the impact of the transformations wrought by development in Africa. Both Creech Jones and Johnson, for instance, maintained that proper government planning and control would help to prevent replication in East Africa of the hardships suffered by workers and farmers in the initial phase of industrialization in Europe. Drawing on a more contemporary example, Johnson advocated extending to eight years the period of basic education in the region, lest the authorities be confronted with swarms of "little Teddy boys" on the streets of Nairobi and other towns, "idle and shiftless and a menace to society."

Sorensen, too, likened the people of East Africa to nineteenth-century Englishmen, but he used a political, rather than an economic, analogy. He explained that the people of Africa were,

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53 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th ser., vol. 571, no. 121, col. 840.
54 Ibid., cols. 772, 849.
55 Ibid., col. 776.
engaged sometimes perhaps in crude and rough propaganda such as sometimes characterised the political awakening of the working-class or indeed the middle-class people of this county. We have only to remember the Reform Bill of 1832 and the burning down of Nottingham Castle to admit that even the industrial middle-class were at times very ready to engage in crude political propaganda.

I would say that that is also true of the women who, in the pre-1914 days, were striving for political recognition. . . . We have only to look beyond the Press Gallery to recall some of the wild scenes that took place in pre-1914 days when women chained themselves to the grille, refused to behave themselves, and created grave disturbances in the Mother of Parliaments.56

Sorensen argued that the British had to look beyond the sometimes coarse utterances made by the leaders of the East African peoples, and indeed welcome the awakening of the human spirit in the region because it would be futile to try to suppress it. In the tone of an indulgent parent, he added: "If sometimes they may engage in actions that may well thwart their own best development, we can still appreciate that as a sign of life and promise struggling for expression."57

Chronologically, the East Africa Royal Commission stood at a crossroads of British policy in relation to Africa. The period between November 1951, when Sir Philip Mitchell asked the secretary of state for the colonies to appoint a royal commission to investigate problems of land and population in East Africa, and May 1957, when the House of Commons debated the commission's findings, nearly coincides with the tenure of the successive Conservative governments under Sir Winston Churchill and Sir Anthony Eden. As David Goldsworthy notes, those were the last British governments in which "old-style imperialists" still played important, sometimes predominant, roles. The cabinets

56 Ibid., cols. 830-31.
57 Ibid., col. 831.
during that period did not renege on the promises made by Labour between 1945 and
1951, but neither did they attempt to accelerate the pace of change. They held the line on
colonial policy, grudgingly giving ground when the colonial secretaries deemed that
concessions were inevitable. 58

During the 1950s, international economic and political developments changed the
relationship of Britain to other powers and with the empire. That decade witnessed the
emergence of Western Europe and Japan as reconstructed, dynamic economies. British
trade with those countries became increasingly important at the same time as trade with
the Commonwealth and rest of the Sterling Area decreased in significance. British capital
flows to Europe and the United States increased while those to less developed parts of the
world such as India, China, South America, and the tropics--traditional areas of
investment from London--declined. The post-war commodity boom that had earned
dollars for British colonies producing raw materials came to an end along with the Korean
War in 1953. In other words, Britain's colonies were less valuable to her at the very time
when growth in the world economy was coming to depend increasingly on trade among
the developed nations. Treasury and Bank of England planners hoped to capitalize on that
trend, and from 1952 onwards advocated a phased reduction of colonial sterling balances
to facilitate a restoration of sterling's convertibility. 59

After the autumn of 1956, the Suez crisis had important implications for British imperial policy. The episode did not lead Britain to relinquish control over its colonial empire, even east of Suez, but it did drive home the point that Britain could no longer exercise world power independently. Its economy was not strong enough to underwrite such a role in the face of American (and Commonwealth) disapproval, which had led to a crisis of confidence in sterling and a hemorrhaging of British dollar and gold reserves. After 1956, British leaders would continue to seek to enhance their influence abroad, but only within the bounds of the NATO alliance and in step with the United States. In the wake of the crisis, Macmillan's government concluded that London could no longer be the provider of finance for colonial development and, in future, colonies would have to depend on a larger degree on their own resources.60

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As a guide to future development in East Africa and elsewhere, the legacy of the royal commission was more modest than intended. Hugh Macmillan argues that colonial governments eased some of the most restrictive production and marketing regulations, although that might have occurred in any case. Specific parts of the document were studied by relevant experts and advisory committees within the Colonial Office and the colonial governments. One section of the report that attracted considerable interest was the chapter on land tenure. It helped, of course, that R. S. Hudson, head of the Colonial Office's African Studies Branch, had been a member of the commission. In March 1955, prior to publication of the report, Hudson suggested to W. L. Gorell Barnes—assistant under-secretary of state for Central and East Africa, and Aden—that its conclusions regarding land tenure might have broad applicability throughout East and Central Africa. Barnes broached the idea that summer with the colonial secretariats in the region and proposed a conference for officers closely concerned with the professional and administrative aspects of land tenure, which would be hosted by the Tanganyika government at Arusha in January 1956. The royal commission report's chapter 23, "Tenure and Disposition of Land," was the first item on the reading list issued for the

62 See, for example: Recommendations on the Education Section of the East African Royal Commission's Report—chapter 16, PRO CO 822/1088; Recommendations on Water Development of the East Africa Royal Commission—chapter 13, PRO CO 822/1175; Review of economic development in East Africa, PRO CO 822/1198.
64 Memorandum by R. S. Hudson, 4 March 1955; minute, Hudson to W. L. Gorell Barnes, 17 March 1955, PRO CO 955/51.
Arusha conference, and virtually every briefing paper at that meeting cited the report.\textsuperscript{66}

The conferees concluded that it was imperative to move towards systems of individual
tenure throughout their territories in order to increase agricultural productivity. At the
same time they remained hesitant concerning the consequences of rapid transformations,
titling the third section of their report: "The need to guide and control the process of
change."\textsuperscript{67}

Some of the contradictions that characterized British imperial thinking by the late
1950s lay exposed during the parliamentary debate on the findings of the East Africa
Royal Commission. Informed of the financial limitations that clearly restricted any
colonial development plans to the bare essentials, parliamentarians held imperial
aspirations that demonstrate the extent to which they continued to think of Britain as a
world power, proffering a "third way" to the developing world as an alternative to
American laissez faire or Soviet authoritarianism. The most appealing aspect of the
commission report to members of both British political parties was its assertion of the
primacy of economic over political development. But that argument had political conse-
quences. The extreme solutions of either settler or African dominance in East Africa
would scare away the capital needed to achieve economic growth and were, therefore,
unacceptable options. That left the middle position to multiracialism, or "partnership,"

\textsuperscript{66} Letter, W. L. Gorell Barnes to C. H. Thornley, Sir Evelyn Barin, R. de S. Stapledon, Sir Arthur Benson,
and Sir Geoffrey Colby, 1 June 1955; letter, Gorell Barnes to Sir Edward Twining, 18 August 1955;
letter, Twining to Gorell Barnes, 25 August 1955, PRO CO 955/51.
\textsuperscript{67} "East and Central Africa Conference on African Land Tenure. Reading List," n.d., PRO CO 955/51;
955/53.
\textsuperscript{68} Report of the Conference on African Land Tenure held at Arusha 1956, 4-6, PRO CO 955/54.
controlled, color-blind economic and political progress with the imperial power as the moderating influence. But would there be time to implement such a scenario? The colonial governors were hardly optimistic. In May 1956, Governor Twining concluded a dispatch to the secretary of state:

I hope I have made clear my view that the need is to sustain multi-racialism, in the short run for the economic development of the territory, and in the long term for the retention of the territory within the Commonwealth. But we shall not succeed in sustaining multi-racialism unless we can do something real in the form of improving living conditions and improving social services. At the moment it does not look as if the economy of the territory can do this within the short time available. 68

Political and economic imperatives were interactive, and time was running short for both.

If the royal commission excluded the African narrative from its text, the public debate over the report in the press and even more so in Parliament tended to discredit the free market ideology that infused its pages. Inspired principally by S. H. Frankel, the report was a critique of government regulation and political restraints on economic growth, but encountered far more critics than champions of its message in the public realm. The commission accepted government-imposed controls as the exception to the rule of open markets; the emphasis in the Parliamentary debate was on controlling the effects of open markets. Nevertheless, the report stands as an excellent example of the resistance to "Butskellism," the bipartisan support for the planned economy in 1950s Britain. As Kenneth Morgan's writes: "The [F. A.] Hayek view of economic freedom, consumer choice, and the primacy of the market mechanism was buoyant in the mid-

68 Dispatch from Governor of Tanganyika to Secretary of State, 2 May 1956, PRO CO 822/1071.
1950s, long before it was appropriated by the monetarist Tory Policy Group in the 1970s. 69

Where the commission placed confidence in the ability of individual members of the East African community, regardless of race, to take the risks they deemed acceptable in the modern exchange economy, critics of the report sustained the tradition of colonial paternalism. The colonial governors and their sympathizers set the goal of stability above all others. They were, perhaps vainly, determined to promote gradualist policies that would allow them to control the economic revolution they were promoting. Left-wing commentators hoped to draw on British historical experience in order to apply those lessons to shield the African people from the deleterious consequences of rapid economic dislocation. There was a widely shared belief in a model of historical advancement that entailed the successive passage of predetermined stages. Development was a process that accelerated the progress of people and societies through those stages, and past experience of one group could point out the pitfalls to be avoided by another or even to skip a stage. Critics disagreed over what stage most Africans had reached. Labour parliamentarians focused on the industrial revolution or some later point in the nineteenth century, while Kenya's European Elected Members' Organization placed them "still far behind the people of medieval Europe in their capacity to plan ahead or in their energy to carry out such

plans."\(^{70}\) The point on which nearly everyone concurred was that Africa lagged far behind Europe and would continue to do so for a long time to come.

By the late 1950s, the end of the state of emergency over Mau Mau, superficially a victory for white supremacy in Kenya, actually marked the final disappointment of the dreams of settler nationalists.\(^{71}\) "As it turned out," historian John Darwin writes, "settler nationalism in Kenya was unable to overcome the entrenched authority of the colonial administration before its fate was sealed by the outbreak of Mau Mau and reliance upon British troops and imperial cash to suppress the insurrection. When the crisis of European rule arrived, the settlers' response was crippled by weakness and division."\(^{72}\) At the same time, in official eyes Mau Mau represented the defeat of the atavistic impulses of violent African nationalism. The British would not be coerced into conceding African majority rule in Kenya.\(^{73}\) But as the royal commission report repeatedly stated and British parliamentarians seem to have grasped, the future of colonialism in East Africa hinged upon winning the willing cooperation of the African people, something which the security forces could not extract. In the final reckoning the human factor was fundamental.

Two government responses to Mau Mau in Kenya's Central Province—the heartland of Kikuyu country—were political repression and land reform. The latter took the form of the Swynnerton Plan, devised by an assistant director in the agricultural  

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\(^{70}\) "Evidence Submitted to the East African Royal Commission," 146/EM/53, 30 July 1953, PRO CO 892/5/1.


\(^{72}\) Darwin, Britain and Declonisation, 195.

\(^{73}\) Ibid., 187-88.
department, which started in 1954 and involved the consolidation of land holdings combined with improved methods of cultivation and market-oriented production.\textsuperscript{74} Darwin argues that land consolidation led to the emergence of a class of "rural notables" who, although politically moderate, demanded a greater voice in the central legislature in order to protect their property interests. Government economic reforms intended to undermine support for Mau Mau, in other words, created African political awareness of a different sort.\textsuperscript{75} But while "progressive" farmers did support the plan, it did not create the call for increased political involvement, which had been repeatedly expressed by witnesses before the royal commission. As historian B. A. Ogot writes: "African politicians [could not] be 'pocketed,' because the land and other economic reforms that had been introduced, while benefiting indigenous capitalist interests, fell far short of popular demands."\textsuperscript{76}

The East Africa Royal Commission proposed a new imperial program under which development along multiracial lines was intended to break down the factional politics of late colonialism and to weld the individual colonies and the region together in pursuit of


\textsuperscript{75} Darwin, Britain and Declination, 263.

\textsuperscript{76} Ogot, "The Decisive Years," 50.
higher standards of living. The commission found economic man alive and well in East Africa because it had to find him. In many ways the report represented a critique of past imperial policies, but the commissioners still failed to acknowledge the African narrative of the past. The Colonial Office saw no need even to submit the commission's findings to Africans in their own languages. In presenting evidence to the commission, Africans from many walks of life contested official and settler views at every turn, just as the president of the Kalenjin Union, George Katanu, challenged the idea of the altruism of British colonial policy:

The Govt. should not step back to 50 years ago as a weapon of depriving the Africans their demands and rights, viz: the "Dark Africa." Diseases, tribunal [sic] wars, ignorance and hatred between themselves (the Natives). We had neither good roads, nor Railways. These, the Govt. has introduced into this country, not only for the benefit of the African, but also for themselves, for there isn't any African who posses[ses] a train engine or a Motor-car.  

Like Katanu, Africans generally supported and even cheerfully embraced the aims of economic development, but they wanted to control the process because they were deeply suspicious of British motives, especially regarding their land. Economic man was indeed to be found in the region, but he was inseparable from political man—they were one and the same. The royal commission asked Africans to put aside their grievances in a spirit of cooperation, but that asked too much and in the asking did not hear what simple peasants had articulated when given the opportunity to address the state. The African story included the inconveniences, the impositions, and above all the daily humiliations inflicted

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77 Memorandum, George Katanu, President, Kalenjin Untion to the East Africa Royal Commission, [Dec.] 1953, PRO CO 892/5/4.
by colonialism. European rule in East Africa had been in place for only two generations; injustices were seared in living memory. There was little basis of trust; there would be no willing cooperation in the absence of constitutional change.

Clearly by 1957, the members of Parliament who debated the East Africa Royal Commission report viewed African politicians, to whom they appealed to defer their political demands in exchange for economic prosperity, as the greatest potential challengers to the fulfillment of British designs for the future of East Africa. Reversing the usual pattern of colonial relations, the Africans became the "racists," heedless of the consequences of their unreasoning insistence on Africa for the Africans. The British politicians still believed they had something of inestimable value to offer the East African peoples. Despite an awareness of the scarcity of development funds, they did not comprehend that their promises might appear in African eyes as little more than post-dated checks drawn on a failing bank.

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