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The Allocation of Distributive Program Benefits and
the Maintenance of Interest Groups

by

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A Thesis Submitted
In Partial Fulfillment Of The
Requirements For The Degree

Doctor of Philosophy

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The Allocation of Distributive Program Benefits and
the Maintenance Of Interest Groups

LaVonna J. Blair

Abstract

This thesis explores the relationship between federal program recipients and interest
groups. It is argued here that interest groups attempt to claim credit for federal program
benefits. Claiming credit efforts are the activities interest group leaders engage in that are
designed to call attention to the group and generate program recipient support of the
group. More directly, credit claiming for program benefits is offered as another means
for an interest group to solve its collective action problem. Here, instead of interest group
leaders having to produce and provide selective benefits, they are expected to take
advantage of their involvement with particular federal programs to resolve their
maintenance problems. It is further argued that effective credit claiming must have
affective, evaluative, and behavioral impacts on program recipients.

The credit claiming model is explored at both the macro-level and micro-levels. Interest
group leaders were surveyed to determine whether they engaged in credit claiming for
particular programs. Recipients of these same programs were also surveyed in order to
determine their relationship with the groups that speak on behalf of their program(s).

Key determinants of the relationship between interest groups and program recipients are
found to be: the nature of the federal program benefit (particularistic versus collective):
the presence of other interest groups; and the credit claiming activities of the interest group.
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CHAPTER 1
LITERATURE REVIEW

I. INTRODUCTION

Why would interest groups organize and get involved in the political arena if these groups are not concerned with representing the policy preferences of their members? This question is particularly important in light of recent research which defines an interest group as an organization that engages in activities to seek specific policy or political benefits from the government (Petracca, 1992). The validity of this definition, however, rests in providing evidence that these same policy benefits actually matter to interest group members.

In this dissertation, federal program benefits, which are tangible policy outputs, are seen as the things that interest groups are seeking from the government. More directly, the focus of this dissertation is on the importance that interest group leaders place on the procurement of federal program benefits for their membership. In particular, can federal program benefits be used to effectively address an interest group’s maintenance concerns?

Several questions must be examined in order to test the importance of federal program benefits to interest group maintenance. First, is there evidence that interest group leaders attempt to claim credit for federal program benefits? In line with Mayhew’s work (1974), credit claiming is defined as all those actions that the interest
group leadership takes that are designed to call attention to the group's role in the receipt and distribution of program funds.

Second, is there evidence that different types of federal programs matter more to interest groups? Specifically, are credit claiming activities focused more on particularistic programs than they are on collective programs? Finally, is there evidence that the credit claiming efforts made by interest group leaders actually leads program recipients to become interest group members and/or supporters?

In this chapter, I review the interest group literature. This body of research includes two dominant approaches: 1) pluralism, a macro-level group theory of politics; and 2) solutions to the collective action problem, a micro-level theory of interest group maintenance. In the former, the focus is on the role interest groups play in the development, design, passage, and implementation of public policy outputs. In the latter, the focus is on the internal operations of interest groups -- how groups form, how membership is sustained, and how group stability is obtained. At the conclusion of this chapter is a discussion of the value added of my proposed research, and an outline of the remaining chapters in the dissertation.

II. PLURALISM

Early interest group scholarship was dominated by the pluralists (Bentley, 1908; Latham, 1952). Ziegler (1988) states that pluralism is best understood as the belief that advanced industrial democracies generate a system of multiple competing elites including interest groups that determine public policy through bargaining and compromise. In an
earlier discussion of pluralism, Connolly states that "pluralism has been justified as a system which develops individual capacities, protects individual rights and freedoms, identifies important social problems, and promotes a politics of incremental change while maintaining a long-term stability based on consent" (1969: p. 4). In brief, pluralists viewed interest groups as the channel through which individuals were able to express their public policy preferences, in an orderly fashion.

Truman (1951) provides the definitive work in pluralist thought. He argues that individuals are naturally inclined to join groups in order to fulfill their preferences for specific policy outcomes. Truman states that interest groups facilitate individual influence on policy decisions through the aggregation and mobilization of individuals with shared policy preferences.

An implicit assumption in Truman's thesis is that interest groups are the most effective means for promoting such policy preferences. Truman views policy outputs as critical to the mobilization (and/or counter-mobilization) of collective resources for interest group formation. More directly, Truman assumes that there is a relationship between interest group membership and the policy preferences of the group. Truman, however, is silent as to the importance policy success has on group maintenance. While he does allude to the fact that better organized groups are more successful in the policy making arena, his theory speaks to the stability of the system, not the group.

Lowi (1979) also argues that interest groups form to press their policy preferences onto the governmental agenda. In contrast to Truman's more benign view of interest
group involvement in this process however, Lowi sees the group's role as much more disruptive. Lowi builds on Truman's argument by elaborating the mechanism by which the policy success of an interest group may be used to solve the collective action problem. While Lowi fails to discuss how interest groups initially form, he does explore how these groups are able to use policy outputs (federal programs) to maintain their organization, an issue unresolved in Truman's work.

Lowi points to interest group receivership which gives the group exclusive control over decisions related to a particular federal program as the link between policy success and group maintenance. Lowi speaks of the crisis of public authority associated with what he calls the Second Republic, whereby vague legislation is passed. This legislation tends to outline broad policy goals rather than establish narrow and concrete policy objectives, which allows other policy actors to significantly affect policy issues. These factors work together to create opportunities for credit claiming interest groups to have an impact on the distribution of federal benefits.

Lowi states that Congress has simply delegated (or abdicated) its decision making authority to other policy actors. The author sees the legislative enactments associated with the Great Society as the flash point of what he calls interest group liberalism. Interest group liberalism is used to define an open policy making process, in which Congress has allowed its law making authority to be coopted by a myriad of competing interest group claims. Explicit in Lowi's interest group liberalism thesis is his belief in the availability of federal domestic assistance programs to address a given group's policy
concerns. Lowi provides the first detailed attempt to establish the linkage between the availability of federal program benefits and group formation and maintenance. For Lowi, the growth in federal domestic assistance programs originating with the Great Society, and the increase in the number of organized interest groups during the same period are causally linked.

Lowi does not have the positive view of interest group involvement in the policy process normally associated with the pluralist school. This no doubt accounts for his approach being called a "middle road formulation" of pluralist theory (Garson, 1978). However, the preeminent policy making role that he gives to the group is perfectly consistent with pluralist thought. Lowi's contribution to this body of research lies in his connecting why interest groups engage in collective action. to the group's policy success in the form of receivership of federal programs that benefit the group. Lowi's claims are therefore perfectly consistent with a credit claiming model of group maintenance. What Lowi does not address however, is how an interest group's receivership of particular program benefits impact program recipients.

Given the importance the pluralist view placed on interest groups as the vehicle for aggregating individual policy preferences, group maintenance was clearly linked to the groups' policy success. The assumption here is that a group's positive impact on a given policy issue would in turn be rewarded with renewed (or new) membership support. If the interest group delivered the type of policy benefits its members desired, these individuals would have the incentives to continue to support the group.
It must be mentioned however, that the majority of the empirical work by the pluralists has not tested the validity of this claim. Instead, most empirical research has been case studies that asked whether or not the group process was unbiased, with low barriers to entry for potential groups; whether or not leaders effectively articulated member interests; or whether or not there was general consensus on the rules for participating in the policy process.

These studies were not designed as a critical test between pluralism and other competing explanations. Instead, much of the empirical work was structured to simply confirm pluralist assumptions regarding the dynamics of the group process. More importantly, the majority of the empirical studies did not ask whether or not interest group members actually responded to the receipt of policy benefits, with renewed group support.

The quick ascendance of pluralism in the field is no doubt related to its normative implications and how well it fits with the popular view of the democratic policy making process. Moreover, much of the earlier empirical work would validate this view of the process (Latham, 1952; Dahl, 1961; Polsby, 1963). Even so, pluralism was not without its critics. Early critiques of pluralist theory were more often ideological debates, not direct empirical tests of the theory's validity (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962; Edelman, 1964; Cochran, 1973). Its inherent conservatism and status quo bias were the target of many of the critiques offered by elite theorists.
How has the pluralist theory of interest group politics stood up to empirical testing? Shortly after the theoretical critiques of pluralism were offered, the weight of the empirical evidence began to undermine pluralist assumptions. At the most basic level, these tests of pluralism attacked the strength of interest groups and their ability to structure or stabilize political outcomes (Bauer, Pool, and Dexter, 1963; Verba, 1965; Luttbeg and Ziegler, 1966; Lander, 1971; Vogler, 1974). In the face of so many successful empirical challenges, pluralism was seen by many as a theory whose validity had been severely challenged.

Social unrest and the tremendous increases in citizen involvement in the policy process however, initiated a resurgence in pluralist ideas (Carden, 1974; Jenkins and Perrow, 1977; Broder, 1980; Walker, 1991). In addition, the continued increase in the number of interest groups has made policy making more competitive. As a result, much of the current empirical research supports the importance of interest groups in policy making (McFarland, 1992; Berry, 1989; Schlozman and Tierney, 1986).

Even with its current resurgence however, one of the most basic tenets of pluralism remains unresolved. Specifically, what difference does the interest group's involvement in the policy making process make to interest group members and for maintenance? Pluralists were quick to assume that the organization and development of new interest groups in response to shared policy concerns would take place, eventually. However, these same scholars failed to provide a systematic link between the desired policy outcome and group maintenance.
III. OLSON AND THE COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEM

The straightforward relationship pluralists argued existed between shared policy preferences and interest group formation was strongly challenged by Olson (1965). In his seminal work, Olson disputed the conventional wisdom and argued that the individual's propensity to associate and the relative ease of such association would not lead to interest group formation. The author argues there was little reason to expect that individuals with shared policy preferences would establish formal interest groups in such a fashion. Olson states that,

....rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests...even if all of the individuals in a large group are rational, and would gain if, as a group, they acted to achieve their common interest or objective, they will still not voluntarily act to achieve that common or group interest (p. 2).

While many critiques and empirical tests of pluralism have been offered, its strongest theoretical challenge comes from Olson. He challenged the very foundation of pluralism when he attacked the assumptions regarding the propensity, and the ease with which individuals associate and organize themselves. Olson argues that for all but small groups, there has to be some impetus for group formation, other than merely a concern with public policy outputs.

Olson argued that as a result of the problems inherent in providing collective goods - their nonexcludability and jointness of supply -- individual incentives to contribute to an interest group's efforts to lobby for these benefits are either weak or absent altogether. The inability to restrict benefits to group members leads to the
collective action problem, that is the tendency individuals have to free ride on the contributions of others. Olson further claims that for an interest group to overcome this problem, the group must use either coercion or selective benefits, produced by and available only to group members. In further developing his critique of the pluralist explanation of group formation Olson states.

"pluralists...generally take for granted that such groups will act to defend or advance their group interests, and take for granted that the individuals in these groups must also be concerned about their individual economic interests. But, if the individuals in any large group are interested in their own welfare, they will not voluntarily make any sacrifices to help their group attain its political (public or collective) objectives (p. 127).

Olson states that contrary to the pluralist argument, it is not rational for an individual to contribute to the costs of the formation of larger groups that champion his policy concerns. Olson asks, why would an individual support the group's efforts when he will receive the collective benefits of group activities, irrespective of his own contribution? For Olson, all large economic groups with significant lobbying organizations are organized for some other purpose. Olson calls lobbies the "by-products" of organizations that have the capacity to mobilize a latent group with selective incentives. These selective incentives are distinct from the positive effects of lobbying efforts. in this case, the receipt of federal program funds. Moreover, Olson assumes that selective benefits and not the potential benefits from lobbying are central to interest group maintenance.
The typology of incentives proposed by Clark and Wilson (1961) -- material, solidary, and purposive (expressive) -- has become the standard definition used in research on interest group formation and maintenance. Clark and Wilson's material incentives are tangible rewards, such as money, and these represent the private, economic benefits so critical to Olson's argument. Solidary incentives are intangible, in that there is no way to attach monetary value to them, and are benefits such as access to social events, or the sense of status gained from group membership. Moreover, solidary benefits tend to be independent of the group's goals. Finally, purposive (expressive) incentives are also intangible, but these benefits can not be separated from the ends of the group. Feelings of political efficacy, or working for a good cause, would fall under this category.

Olson's most enduring contribution to interest group scholarship is his discussion of the need for additional incentives (or coercion) for group formation and maintenance. He shows that an individual involved in interest group activities has to be driven by more than the desire to just belong to the group, and the provision of collective benefits. According to Olson, there are always costs and benefits associated with collective action in support of a preferred policy position. Individuals will choose collective action only when they perceive that the selective benefits of collective efforts are greater than the costs of group participation.

A negative consequence of Olson's critique of pluralism was to redirect scholarly attention away from the importance of policy as the motivating force for group formation
and maintenance. Instead, the research focus shifted to empirical tests of the utility of selective benefits in solving the collective action dilemma. Olson's arguments lead one to conclude that any relationship that might exist between the repertoire of federal programs and interest group maintenance is at best, coincidental.

There are however, only a few tests of this aspect of Olson's argument. The principal reason for this lack of empirical evidence has to do with the fact that most of the examinations of Olson's argument have been restricted to how public interest groups solve their collective action problems. These are the types of interest groups that are the least likely to have policy concerns or collective action problems that could be addressed through particularized federal programs.

One of the few empirical tests of Olson's argument regarding the interest group-federal program relationship is offered by Hansen (1985). Hansen shows that an increase in federal agricultural subsidy payments led to a significant increase in Farm Bureau membership (p. 86). Similarly, the author shows that while the National Association of Home Builders may not have been responsible for FHA or VA housing subsidies, the group was able to claim credit for the benefits, and builders appear to have joined the group out of gratitude.

Browne (1988, 1990) provides additional evidence that the linkage between group membership and the receipt of program benefits is much stronger than Olson predicts. Browne introduces the concept of "policy niches" with which to examine the long-term dynamics of the interest group-federal program relationship. Policy niches define a
condition where a number of interest groups concerned with agriculture policy assume ownership over a narrow set of policy issues. More importantly, these policy concerns were most often addressed through equally narrow federal programs. Browne's research shows that agricultural interest groups consistently lobby for programs that allocate benefits to a single public, its membership (Browne, 1990: 489). Are the interest groups involved with agriculture policy merely an aberration, or do groups in other policy areas lobby only for those programs that benefit their members as well?

A critical test of whether or not policy benefits or selective benefits are more important to members and therefore are a more effective way of solving the collective action problem has yet to be performed. Empirical tests of Olson's argument regarding the importance of selective incentives have been executed, and the results are mixed. In support of Olson's argument are studies that show the importance of selective material incentives for group membership (Goldthorpe, et al. 1968; van de Vall, 1970; Mitchell, 1979; Olson, 1979).

Another set of empirical findings challenge Olson, as they point out the importance of collective benefits for group membership (Ziegler, 1961, 1988; Marsh, 1976; Moe, 1980; Goodwin and Mitchell, 1982; Hansen, 1985; Browne, 1988, 1990). Simply stated, the empirical evidence shows that there are more interest group members that are interested in collective benefits than Olson's model can explain.

So how does one answer the question, is there a collective action problem? The easy answer to the question is yes there is a collective action problem, but it is not as
severe as Olson would have us to believe. Interest groups have devised solutions to their collective action problems, and these solutions are as diverse as the groups themselves. Solutions to the dilemma have involved discussions of rationality and the problems associated with 'perfect' information (Moe, 1980, 1981; Axelrod, 1984; Hardin, 1982) and the importance of values, such as altruism, civic responsibility, personal efficacy (Nagel, 1987; Margolis, 1984; Hirschman, 1982). A more definitive answer to whether or not there is a collective action problem would have to specify the conditions under which certain types of groups would pursue certain types of solutions.

IV. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS TO THE COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEM

Explanations for how interest groups solve their collective action problem continue to be offered by a variety of scholars. These alternative solutions have included an expansion of Olson's selective material incentives to include solidary and purposive benefits (Cigler, 1986; Forsythe and Welch, 1983; Oliver, 1980); the importance of leaders or entrepreneurs (Salisbury, 1969; Frolich, Oppenheimer, and Young, 1971); psychological commitment (Rothenberg, 1992; Knoke, 1990) and the importance of other political actors (Walker, 1983; Stein and Bickers, 1994). Research has also shown that how a group solves its collective action problem affects how the group solves its ongoing maintenance problems (Walker, 1991).

An integral part of the argument that follows will be a focus on developing a more integrated approach to asking how groups solve the collective action problem. One of the benefits of the alternative solutions that follow is that they offer a chance to ask, under
what conditions public policy benefits will actually matter to group members. This is a question that has been lacking in previous discussions of solutions to the collective action problem, and this research is designed to address this gap in the literature.

Scholars continue to present solutions to the collective action problem because of their dissatisfaction with the limitations of previous explanations. The alternative solutions that follow struggle with these limitations from one of two directions -- asking what internal, organizational factors can be manipulated or controlled by the group; or asking what factors external to the group, are available to help an interest group solve its collective action problem.

These studies provide valuable insights into the potential benefits of such an integrated model -- one that addresses both macro-level questions dealing with interest group involvement with particular policy issues and micro-level questions as to what impact the group’s policy involvement has on its maintenance concerns. First, in light of my concern with the importance of leadership and policy concerns for group maintenance efforts, an integration of the group's internal and external operating environments are crucial.

Second, the research on commitment provides information on how group loyalty is established. Loyalty has to be at least some component of the membership retention decision. In particular, a group member can believe in the broader policy goals of the group or he can believe that the only way he can continue to receive policy benefits is by supporting the group. Both require an individuals loyalty -- either internally focused
toward continuing to support the group for broad, collective reasons; or externally
focused, in that support the group is seen as the only means by which a member retains
access to a narrow, selective policy benefit.

A. The Importance of Leadership

Initially outlined by Salisbury (1969), exchange theory argues that interest group
formation is often due to the willingness of a single individual, an entrepreneur, to pay
the costs of formation in exchange for a leadership position in the group. Using the Clark
and Wilson (1961) typology of selective incentives, Salisbury focuses on the exchange of
selective benefits to explain how individuals are induced to maintain their group
membership. In brief, the author argues that it is the exchange of benefits between the
leaders and the led that is responsible for continued group viability, not the realization of
group policy goals.

Over time, Salisbury's initial assumptions -- the pivotal role played by the group
leader as entrepreneur, the importance of the leader-member benefit exchange, and the
irrelevance of policy goals -- have been the subject of empirical investigations. In one of
the early extensions of exchange theory, Moe (1980; 1981) argued that the entrepreneur
can also be motivated by the desire to achieve policy goals. Moe shows that even among
economic interest groups, such intangible benefits as political efficacy and working for a
good cause, often enter into the decision calculus associated with group membership.
Moe shows that there are interest group members willing to link their decision to remain
with the group to the provision of broad collective goods.
The empirical evidence about the leader-member exchange relationship is mixed. In his survey of a diverse population of interest groups, Knoke (1981, 1990) finds that group leaders make a concerted effort to provide the benefits that their members value most. Conversely, Sabatier (1992) finds that the benefits that group leaders feel are the most important, may not necessarily be the benefits that mobilized group members, or that were required for group maintenance. Further research is needed to determine the importance that group members attach to the benefits offered by group leaders.

Research efforts using some configuration of these selective incentives are pervasive in interest group research. The terms incentive theory and exchange theory are sometimes used interchangeably in the interest group literature (Sabatier, 1992) but differences do exist between the two (Cigler, 1991). In the broader context, incentive theory focuses on the importance of selective incentives for both group formation and maintenance. In its narrower context, exchange theory focuses on the importance of policy entrepreneurs (or group leaders) in the production and distribution of these same selective incentives. The credit claiming model argues that interest group leaders are willing to take advantage of federal program benefits in such a way that they are able to exchange their policy influence efforts for recipient support of the group. Recipient support of the group is expected to have a positive effect on group maintenance.

Most of the research on interest group formation and solving the collective action problem involves extensions of the basic arguments regarding the importance of selective benefits. To a lesser degree, however, the importance of the role played by policy
entrepreneurs is discussed. Given the current dominance of incentive theory in the literature it is surprising that less empirical work has actually been conducted on the role of interest group leaders, or entrepreneurs. Since many scholars have argued that the receipt of selective benefits is so critical to group membership, why haven't there been more studies that deal with how group leaders groom their benefit package in response to member concerns? What empirical work there is points to the importance of group leaders to ongoing maintenance (Salisbury, 1969; Wilson, 1973; Berry, 1977; Cook, 1984; Cigler, 1986, 1991).

**B. Patrons of Political Action**

There is little doubt that Lowi (1979) believed that other political actors, in particular, legislators, allowed interest groups a voice in the policy making process. In fact, Lowi posits that interest groups claims on the government are responsible for the increase in the number of federal programs. For Lowi, interest groups are the proactive force in the public policy debate, generating demands on the system and forcing other policy actors to respond to those demands.

Lowi, however, provides only a partial picture of this relationship. In particular, Lowi does not provide his reader with any explanation for how these interest groups were initially formed. In addressing this limitation, Walker (1983; 1991) shows that various foundations or patrons (most notably the federal government) have often been willing to underwrite the costs of interest group formation. The author argues that group leaders have addressed the public goods dilemma, not by inducing large numbers of new
members to join and support their groups through the manipulation of selective incentives, but by locating new sources of funding outside of their immediate membership. Equally important is the fact that groups that form as a direct result of the involvement of a patron continue to rely on such patronage for continued group maintenance.

Walker points to the creation of the massive Great Society programs, their associated administrative agencies and the growth of private foundations as the critical factors, leading to the increase in the number of interest groups. As the author notes, many interest groups developed in response to legislative initiatives, rather than being able to define the legislative agenda. These groups were formed after the passage of new legislation that established the outlines of public policy and funding. This challenges Lowi's arguments and raises questions about the ability of these groups to form prior to these enactments. In his conclusion, Walker states that the key to the origins and maintenance of interest groups in the United States lies in the willingness of the patrons of political action to extend the representative system (1983: p. 404).

Walker's conclusions regarding the pivotal role played by interest group patrons however, are challenged by Cigler and Nownes (1995). Based on their interviews with interest group development personnel, the authors argue that scholars have overestimated the role played by patrons in the formation and maintenance of public interest groups. Even so, the fact remains that there is empirical evidence that the federal government, along with other policy patrons, provides another means by which interest groups may
maintain their membership and develop access to the policy making process (Browne, 1988, 1991, 1992).

An issue that remains unresolved in Walker's work (1983, 1991), is the pattern of underwriting group formation and maintenance. Cigler and Nownes provide at best, a partial answer to this question. Almost 45% of the revenues obtained by the groups in their study comes from patrons (a finding downplayed by the authors, but similar to Walker's findings). They find patrons play a determinant role in the formation and maintenance of all the nonmembership, research and education organizations in their sample (25% of the cases). The remaining groups are supported primarily by their membership or through a more uneven mix of member contributions and patron support. Will similar results obtain when I examine interest group involvement with different types of federal programs, or is the generalizability of these findings limited?

C. Policy Subsystems

Policy subsystem is a term that captures the multiple categorizations of the relationship between policy actors (Bernstein, 1955; McConnell, 1966; Hecllo 1978). For example, the subgovernment or iron triangle literature argues that a reciprocal relationship exists between Congress, executive agencies, and the relevant interest groups. Here, it is posited that the give and take that exists within these dyads is responsible for policy outputs. Legislators, with their interests in reelection and constituency service (Mayhew, 1974) seek to provide tangible benefits to their congressional districts. In response to broad based constituency concerns, Congress
develops programs to address these needs, and empowers federal agencies to administer these programs. As such, agencies owe their existence and resources to legislative activities (Arnold, 1979). This relationship is by no means unidirectional, as the agencies provide benefits to the legislators in the form of efficient administration of a given program and/or electoral benefits from satisfied program beneficiaries.

As the third actor, interest groups bear the costs of monitoring the voting behavior or funding decisions of legislators and they then provide this information to their members (Stein and Bickers, 1995, 1994; Banks and Weingast, 1992; McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984). These groups provide the critical link between legislators and their constituents. Interest groups provide legislators with campaign funds and program information that might not be available from the agency. In turn, legislators provide interest groups with access to the policy process, and the programmatic benefits that lobbyists can take back to the recipient groups they represent.

Other scholars argue that the cooperative iron triangle model of policy making is much too simplistic (Heeley, 1978; Laumann and Knoke, 1987; Berry, 1989; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). The core argument presented by these scholars is that the boundaries of the policy making arena are more flexible than those captured in the subgovernment literature. These authors state that a larger number of interested parties have the freedom to come and go in the policy debate. The fact remains however, that these newer conceptualizations of the policy making arena still include a significant role for interest groups.
The subgovernment scholars and their critics focus attention on the fact that the preferences of other actors are the determinants of interest group policy influence. It is not the preeminence of the interest group, but the willingness of other institutional actors to allow the group to participate, that dictates the group's potential policy influence. What is common to each of these discussions of the policy process is the presence of actors interested in the outcome of a given policy debate. The importance of the policy subsystem approach does not lie in which actors are included in the definition, but in asking what benefits actors receive from the process.

Stein and Bickers (1995, 1994) provide evidence that the policy outputs of the subsystem meet the individual and collective goals of its participants. They outline the impact that institutional arrangements will have on the strategies that are available to legislators, executive agencies, and interest groups involved in the subsystem. When offering explanations for interest group maintenance, the policy subsystem looks to additional actors who stand to benefit from helping the group solve its collective action problem. In their research, Stein and Bickers (1995) offer federal programs, as subsystem outputs, as a way for the interest group to solve its collective action problem.

D. The Importance of Commitment

Sabatier (1992) and his co-authors (Sabatier and McLaughlin, 1988, 1990; Sabatier and McCubbin, 1990) explore the question of members' commitment to their interest group. The authors explore commitment theory, which they define as the belief congruence of potential group members, group members, and group leaders.
Commitment theory has most often been applied to the study of party activists and rank and file members, where researchers have attempted to explain the differences in the policy preferences of the two sets of actors (McClosky et al., 1960; Miller and Jennings, 1987).

Sabatier uses commitment theory to directly challenge the more prevalent interest group theories (Truman, 1951; Olson, 1965; and Salisbury, 1969). Sabatier derives a list of expectations from each of the various approaches, and then asks which model performs the best. The author provides evidence that commitment theory does a very good job of explaining membership in public interest groups, but does not do very well when applied to economic groups. Overall, the model that performs the best is exchange theory, which is able to explain membership in both public interest and economic interest groups.

The most extensive and direct examination of the membership retention decision to date is also captured under the rubric of the commitment solution (Rothenberg, 1992, 1988). Here the author offers an experiential search model to explain an individual's decision to join and remain a group member. Rothenberg argues that an individual, with imperfect information, will join a group to find out the real or unobserved benefits of group membership. These "specific", benefits of group membership are contrasted with the "general", benefits that can be observed without joining the group.

While an individual may join the group for vague purposive and collective goals, such as working for a good cause, the retention decision may require the provision of specific solidary and selective benefits. Once the individual has learned more about the
group, he decides whether or not the group really addresses his concerns, or actually provides the type of specific benefits he needs to remain with the group. In this study of Common Cause, Rothenberg presents evidence to support his argument that members learn more about the organization, and incorporate this information into their decision to remain with the organization. Rothenberg finds that effective group maintenance requires that the group leadership be responsive to changes in both its internal and external operating environment.

The presence of member cohort effects and the diminishing impact of information over time lead the author to conclude that group maintenance efforts are best directed toward newer members. Is this concern with new members also evident in other interest groups, in particular groups that may be direct or indirect beneficiaries of federal policy outputs?

Knoke (1981) studies thirty-two noneconomic, voluntary organizations and he finds that the communication of ideas is the most critical component in determining whether or not an individual will remain committed to the interest group. A second factor strongly related to the individual's commitment to the organization is his level of participation in decision making. While not noted by Knoke, an obvious extension of his argument is that those individuals who are committed to the group are also the members most likely to remain with the group. It would appear that the leadership of voluntary organizations concerned with group maintenance should try to ensure that their group has a well-developed communications network, or a decentralized decision making structure.
Are these explanations for commitment to the group still relevant if group leaders can control the information about federal program benefits? Also, if group leaders can provide particularistic, divisible program benefits, will individual group members be concerned with how much impact he or she has on the decisions made by the group? Or, is a concern with individual impact on group decision making more likely to be an issue when the group is involved with programs that provide more collective, nondivisible goods?

V. SUMMARY

What does previous interest group research tell us about the question of maintenance? First, there does not appear to be a single definitive way for an interest group to solve its maintenance problem. The preponderance of empirical evidence highlights the importance of selective benefits to sustain membership support. Few would dispute the weight of the empirical evidence regarding the significance of selective benefits to group members. The problem is that most research has focused on selective benefits as the explanation for group membership, excluding other factors from empirical study. As a result, finding that much of the research confirms the importance of selective benefits really comes as no surprise.

The persistence of interest groups that are able to sustain themselves with nothing more than pleas to the greater good however, can not be explained by selective incentives. Commitment, how deeply an individual member supports the goals and mission of the group, can also solve the group's maintenance problem. Committed group
members are willing to donate money, time, and other goods and services, toward the realization of group goals.

Currently, what constitutes a selective benefit has become so inclusive that the term has lost a significant amount of precision. If every action taken by an interest group can be described as a means of producing and providing such benefits (Rothenberg, 1992; Walker, 1991), the usefulness of the concept has been lost. A return to a more restrictive definition of selective benefits is required to make the case that these benefits are the motivating force behind continued group membership. More importantly, clearer boundaries on selective incentives are necessary if we are to accurately compare their importance to policy (i.e., program benefits) preferences or commitment for membership.

Second, how the group solves its initial resource problem plays a determinant role in how the group is able to solve its subsequent maintenance problems. Interest groups that have used material selective benefits have to continue to provide such benefits. Interest groups that rely on commitment to policy goals have to continue to champion those goals. The same claim can be made about groups that rely on patron support (Walker, 1991). At the same time however, groups that are unable to respond to changes in the incentive preferences of their members can expect to suffer the consequences (Cigler, 1986, 1991).

Third, there is evidence that the larger political environment is not merely an arena for group position taking, or vain policy influence attempts. More precisely, there is data that shows how contributions to group maintenance efforts are often made at the
behest of other policy actors. Access to elected officials and agency representatives (Stein and Bickers, 1995); or the presence of a patron to underwrite maintenance costs have been noted (Walker, 1991; Cigler and Nownes, 1993). As stated previously however, the nature or importance of group access and the pattern of underwriting remain unclear, particularly in light of selective benefits.

The most glaring empirical omission in previous interest group studies has been the lack of attention given to the importance of policy benefits to group members. More directly, research has not asked whether different types of policy benefits are in any way related to group maintenance. As such, there has been not been an attempt to establish a link between the group's policy success and its ability to attract and retain members.

Another significant oversight in the literature lies in the limited study of group leadership. The available research however, makes it clear that group leaders are critical for successful organizational maintenance efforts (Wilson, 1980; Cigler, 1986, 1991). The lack of attention given group leaders is puzzling, particularly in light of the importance given selective benefits. Selective benefits are not produced and provided spontaneously. Interest group leaders have to be able to supply its members with the benefits that are the most important to their decision to remain with the group (Knoke, 1990).

Current research supplies limited information on how group leaders are able to groom their benefit packages to satisfy members and solve their maintenance problem. A focus on the role of leadership is required to determine whether or not program benefits
are used for group maintenance. If leaders are opportunistic and play a critical role in the provision of selective benefits, leaders should be willing to play a similar role regarding programmatic benefits. How can an interest group leader take advantage of the relationship that exists between the group and program recipients to solve its collective action problem?

The relationship between federal programs and interest group maintenance will be explored in my thesis. My purpose is to examine whether or not interest groups actively claim credit for program benefits. Claiming credit are the actions interest group leaders take that are designed to call attention to the group's role in the distribution of federal program funds. In particular, I want to know if these credit claiming activities facilitate group maintenance, as program recipients become group members or supporters. The model developed in the thesis will be used to test several hypotheses about what factors allow a group to successfully link federal programs to their maintenance efforts.

VI. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS

In the chapter that follows I provide a more detailed discussion of the conditions that are necessary for interest group leaders to engage in claiming credit for program benefits. Here, I also present the first set of empirical results from the macro-level analysis. This involves a reexamination of the Walker (1991) data base, looking for evidence of credit claiming activity by interest group leaders in a less than ideal sample.

In chapter 3, I present the second set of empirical results from the macro-level model. Data for this analysis comes from my own mail survey of interest group leaders
designed to address the limitations of the Walker data. In particular, greater attention is given to a group's involvement with particular programs, more credit claiming activities, and how group leaders communicate with their members.

In chapter 4 I present the micro-level model of interest group maintenance. The micro-level model is designed to answer questions related to credit claiming efficacy. In particular, does an interest group's credit claiming activity lead program recipients to support the interest groups involved with their programs. Successful credit claiming activities are expected to have three distinct effects on program recipients -- affective, evaluative, and behavioral. First, program recipients need to be able to gauge whether they like the groups involved with their program. Second, program recipients need to be able to evaluate whether they believe the group(s) has a positive impact on the program. Finally, do program recipients make a decision to join the group involved with their program. Data for this chapter comes from a telephone survey of federal program recipients. The survey was designed to gauge program recipients knowledge of federal benefits and the interest groups involved with their programs.

In chapter 5 I summarize my research findings and discuss their potential impact on future research.
CHAPTER 2
THE MACRO-LEVEL MODEL: DETERMINING
THE INCIDENCE OF CREDIT CLAIMING ACTIVITIES (PART I)

I. INTRODUCTION

In examining the theoretical and empirical literature on the maintenance of interest groups, several inconsistencies arise. First, there are more interest groups than Olson (1965) would have ever predicted (Petracca, 1992; Cigler and Loomis, 1991). Olson argued that the collective action problem, the tendency individuals have to free ride on the contributions of others, would make interest group formation and maintenance difficult. Second, despite a preoccupation with selective benefits, empirical research has shown that interest groups have been able to solve the collective action problem in a variety of ways (Walker, 1983, 1991; Sabatier, 1992). Finally, interest groups are actively engaged in the pursuit of policy benefits for their members (Moe, 1980; Hansen, 1985; Brown, 1990). Olson argued that the solution to the collective action problem was the provision of selective benefits -- produced by and available only to group members. As a result, public policy benefits were viewed as a secondary concern for interest groups.

This chapter outlines the conditions under which an interest group's pursuit of its policy agenda would allow the group to solve its collective action problem. An interest group's policy agenda is the set of issues over which the group is willing to use its organizational resources to seek governmental intervention on the group's behalf. The argument presented here is that the policy agenda (i.e., the policy benefits the group seeks
from government) can facilitate group maintenance when interest group leaders engage in credit claiming (Mayhew, 1974). Credit claiming includes all those activities that the group leadership uses to establish a relationship between the interest group and the recipients of the policy benefits that the group has lobbied for. This analysis is designed to answer three questions related to interest group credit claiming activity: 1) do interest group leaders engage in credit claiming for policy benefits; 2) if so, what factors are the best predictors of credit claiming by interest group leaders; and 3) is credit claiming for policy benefits more important (or as important) as selective benefits for solving group maintenance problems?

II. MACRO-LEVEL INTEREST GROUP MAINTENANCE

I. DEFINING INTEREST GROUP MAINTENANCE

Interest groups that have a desire to influence public policy must also be concerned with their continued viability. As Cigler and Loomis (1991) argue, all organizations must find ways to maintain themselves. Maintenance is defined as the acquisition of resources sufficient to sustain the group's membership and the pursuit of its policy agenda. This definition of maintenance captures the central concerns of an interest group: to retain or expand its membership; to develop a stable financial base; and to respond to membership interests and preferences (Cigler and Loomis, 1991).

This definition also captures two related, but distinct dimensions of interest group maintenance. First, maintenance can be viewed as a condition -- i.e., the group has a stable membership, with stable policy preferences and a stable resource base (Walker.
1991; Cigler, 1992). Second, maintenance can be viewed as a strategy choice -- i.e., how interest group leaders respond to changes in their internal or external operating environments (Schlozman and Tierney, 1986; Walker, 1991; Rothenberg, 1992).

Walker (1991) provides one of the few attempts to address both dimensions of interest group maintenance. In explaining the maintenance condition of interest groups, Walker focused on the importance of purposive benefits over all other types of selective benefits. Groups that were engaged in policy conflict, with a high proportion of organizational representatives rather than independent individuals, that received a significant proportion of their resources from outside patrons preferred purposive benefits to all other types of benefits. These findings led Walker to conclude that collective goods can be a major factor in creating a stable group membership. A question that the author does not ask is whether groups that are highly dependent on purposive benefits represent members before government in order to gain particularistic or collective policy benefits. The underlying assumption is that interest groups are concerned about collective benefits without actually testing for the type of policy benefits the groups seek.

When Walker (1991) examined the maintenance strategies that interest groups pursue, he noted the differences between interest groups that pursue inside strategies -- lobbying, litigation, and electioneering; and those that pursue outside strategies -- efforts designed to generate publicity and mold public opinion. The author finds that the interest groups most likely to adopt inside strategies are those in the for-profit sector, that maintain large staffs, and perceive high levels of conflict in their environment. The
groups least likely to pursue inside strategies are citizen groups, with few organizational resources, that experience little or no conflict with other groups. Similar findings are reported by Schlozman and Tierney (1986) in their study of interest groups.

What is missing from previous research efforts is an explanation for how the maintenance strategy an interest group pursues in one arena can be linked back to the maintenance (i.e., stability) of the group. Credit claiming for the procurement of government benefits provides one opportunity to establish this linkage. Credit claiming by an interest group can cement a relationship between a program recipient and the interest group(s) that speak for the program. Program recipients have incentives to monitor the policy success of the interest group(s) involved with their program(s). In particular, the group's efforts may be critical to the continuation of program benefits. Program recipients that are satisfied with the group's policy efforts should be willing to join the group or use personal resources to support the group.

2. THE ROLE OF INTEREST GROUP LEADERS

It has been argued that interest group leaders are able to use public policy benefits to stimulate group membership (Moe, 1980; Oliver, 1980; Cook, 1984). Previous studies that have linked policy benefits and interest group membership have focused largely on collective goods, goods that once produced are available to all, group members as well as the general public. A question that remains unexamined is whether interest group leaders can also use more targeted federal program benefits for group maintenance. In particular, are interest group leaders as concerned with the provision of particularistic policy
benefits, which are much more restrictive in term of recipient eligibility, to impact group maintenance? Interest group leaders have been presented in the literature as opportunistic (Moe, 1980, 1981; Hardin, 1982; Frohlich, Oppenheimer and Young, 1971). Moe (1980) defines the opportunistic behavior of group leaders as exploiting

.....profitable opportunities by providing, or promising to provide, services that are designed to attract support from individuals who might find them of value (p. 36).

There can be little doubt that policy benefits are valued by those who receive them. Under certain conditions, interest group leaders are expected to use the availability of policy benefits as an opportunity to retain or recruit benefit recipients as group members. Interest group leaders that engage in credit claiming for policy benefits must first be able to identify a population of recipients that can be convinced that the group plays a decisive role in the distribution of policy benefits. Second, interest group leaders must then be able to convince the same benefit recipients that supporting the group will in some way help preserve the continuation of their policy benefits.

Interest group leaders are given supremacy in the task of evaluating the credit claiming opportunities associated with different policy benefits for several reasons. First, interest group leaders are expected to have more policy relevant information than rank and file members (Rothenberg, 1992). In addition, interest group leaders have been given the authority to use their informational advantage to act in the best interests of the group (Rothenberg, 1991). Finally, group leaders control group resources and internal communication networks (Knoke, 1981; Mundo, 1992). Each of these factors are
expected to effect the decision interest group leaders make to develop and pursue credit claiming as a maintenance strategy.

II. CREDIT CLAIMING AND INTEREST GROUP MAINTENANCE

1. DEFINING CREDIT CLAIMING

Credit claiming is the vehicle used by interest group leaders to link policy agenda success to group maintenance. Mayhew defined credit claiming as acting so as to generate a belief in a relevant political actor (in this case the program recipient) that one legislator (interest group) is personally responsible for causing government or some unit thereof, to do something that the actor (recipient) considers desirable. Credit claiming has most often been used to examine how individual representatives use policy benefits to garner constituent support and thereby address reelection concerns (Arnold, 1990; Fiorina, 1989; Cain. et al., 1987). It is reasonable to argue that other political actors would also be willing to take advantage of federal programs to address other concerns.

Credit claiming activities can be used by interest group leaders to inform and persuade benefit recipients of the group's policy influence. The number of these promotional activities that a group is actively involved in defines the importance of policy benefits to members and as a result, the importance of these benefits to group maintenance. An interest group's interactions with legislators and federal agencies become credit claiming activities when the group leaders publicize, broadcast, or in some way communicate these policy oriented activities to program recipients. These program
recipients may already be interest group members, or interest group leaders may engage in credit claiming activities in an effort to persuade recipients to become group members.

_Hypothesis 1: Credit claiming by interest groups is positively related to interest group maintenance._

2. **Factors That Influence Credit Claiming Activity**

Credit claiming is a micro-level explanation of what interest group leaders do to establish and maintain program recipient support for the group. The larger issue in this analysis is whether there is evidence of credit claiming at the macro-level. More specifically, is it possible to make predictions about which interest groups will engage in credit claiming for particular types of policy benefits? If so, what factors constrain or facilitate credit claiming for group maintenance?

A. **Interest Group Policy Agendas**

An interest group's policy agenda is the set of issues over which the group is willing to use its organizational resources to seek governmental intervention on the group's behalf. More succinctly, an interest group's policy agenda represents the sum total of the group's policy interests. Salisbury (1991) defines interest as "the conjunction between some private value held by a political actor and some authoritative action proposed by the government. Neither private value nor governmental action (actual or potential) can by itself generate the interest . . . unless the conjunction occurs there is no interest" (pp. 1-2). The credit claiming model presented here uses federal program
benefits to link what interest groups say they want from government (i.e., action) to interest group maintenance (i.e., value).

In determining its policy agenda, the group has to first decide which policy benefits it values most, and secondarily, whether or not those benefits can actually be used as part of a credit claiming for maintenance strategy. What type of policy agendas are the most advantageous for credit claiming by interest group leaders? Arnold's (1990) discussion of the traceability of legislative actions provides a framework for answering this question. Arnold argues that legislators are concerned with how their constituents will view their policy decisions. Ideally, a legislator wants voters in the next election to give him credit for his policy actions. Credit for a policy action is achieved when constituents can trace policy actions and effects back to their representatives.

Arnold states that traceability can only take place if: 1) a legislator's constituency perceives a policy effect; 2) is able to link that effect to an identifiable governmental action; and 3) can see the individual legislator's contribution. Lacking even one of these conditions of traceability, retrospective voting for the legislator becomes impossible. The traceability of a given a given policy act is therefore critical to any attempt to link interest group maintenance to credit claiming activities. Interest group leaders are expected to keep their group members (and potential members) well informed about policy issues salient to the group. Moreover, interest group leaders are expected to publicize their involvement in the policy issues most salient to their members.
The policy issues that are the most salient to the interest group will determine the character of its policy agenda. Interest group leaders may pursue a predominantly particularistic policy agenda. A particularistic policy agenda would consist of program benefits with attributes similar to private goods, goods that are exclusionary (once a recipient receives the benefit he has exclusive use of it), and rivalrous (what one recipient consumes cannot be consumed by anyone else). These benefits are in effect captured by program recipients, making them highly visible to the recipient.

Interest group leaders may also pursue policy agendas that are predominantly collective, such as clean air and water or national defense. Here, once the policy benefits are provided, they are available to all (meaning that these benefits are nonexclusionary and nonrivalrous). Collective benefits, which are widely distributed to the general public, are diffuse and may be virtually invisible to program recipients. An interest group can also have a policy agenda that is an equal mixture of both collective and particularistic policy benefits. Finally, it is also possible that some interest groups are not concerned with public policy benefits at all.

Particularistic policy agendas should increase credit claiming by interest group leaders because these agendas are composed of mostly distributive programs. Distributive programs are positively associated with credit claiming by legislators (Stein and Bickers, 1995; Cain, et al., 1987; Arnold, 1990) and similar results should obtain when the issue is credit claiming by interest group leaders.
Interest groups with collective policy agendas also have to demonstrate policy success in order to maintain membership support (Rothenberg, 1992; Davis and Wurth, 1993). Simply stated, these interest groups are sustained by the policy commitment of its membership (Sabatier, 1992). Given the fact that collective benefits are highly diffuse, however, the ability to trace any one interest group's contribution to the policy issue should be difficult. In particular, interest group leaders would have to work harder to show program recipients that the group's policy efforts matter. Under these conditions, interest group leaders may decide that credit claiming is costly and ineffective, reducing the group's use of these activities for maintenance.

*Hypothesis 2: Particularistic policy agendas will have a positive effect on credit claiming activity: collective agendas will have a negative effect on credit claiming activity.*

*Hypothesis 2a: Particularistic policy agendas will have a positive effect on interest group maintenance (new member recruitment); collective agendas will have a negative impact on interest group maintenance (new member recruitment).*

**B. Group Resources And Organizational Structure**

If policy benefits matter to interest groups, there should be evidence that groups are involved in credit claiming activities for these benefits. More specifically, there should be evidence that an interest group is willing to commit its time and resources to engage in and to finance credit claiming activities. Moreover, for those interest groups where policy benefits appear to matter most, the structure of their organizations should be designed to facilitate credit claiming activities.
1. Interest Group Resources

The literature on interest groups contains detailed discussions of the organizational resources and structural attributes that affect group strength and group policy influence (Schlozman and Tierney, 1986; Walker, 1991; Berry, 1989; Knoke, 1990; Hinckley and Hill, 1995). Resources are those items that can be used by the interest group to both pursue its policy goals and maintain the organization. Interest group scholars make a distinction between tangible resources -- i.e., the number of members, budget, and staff size; and intangible resources -- i.e., prestige, technical expertise, reputation, etc.

Interest group resources drive both policy influence and group maintenance efforts. More directly, below some level of organizational resources the interest group is unable to perform either of these functions consistently or effectively. Empirical evidence has shown that both budget levels and the number of staff are critical to group maintenance and policy influence strategies (Walker, 1991). Walker finds that interest groups with larger staffs were more likely to pursue inside strategies. Given that access to decision makers should make credit taking claims more credible, larger staffs should have a positive effect on credit claiming.

_Hypothesis 3: Larger staffs will have a positive effect on credit claiming activities._

_Hypothesis 3a: Larger staffs will have a positive effect on interest group maintenance._
2. Organizational Structure

Group resources are not the only variables that may affect a group's ability to claim credit for policy benefits. Hinckley and Hill (1995) argue that the persistent focus on group resources has meant that other critical areas of research have been neglected. In particular, the authors state that many of the strategic choices available for group policy influence efforts are a function of organizational characteristics, not group resources.

From their review of the literature, Hinckley and Hill (1995) identify thirteen variables that have been used to describe the organizational structure of interest groups. The argument here, however, is that only four of these structural components facilitate the dissemination of information about policy benefits (and/or the interest group) and are therefore important for credit claiming. These four structural factors are: represented interest, organizational subunits, group age, and funding sources. A fifth structural variable, an interest group's selective incentive package will be discussed separately.

The first attribute is the type of interest that is being represented by the group. In the first category are associational groups which are formed and developed to represent the interests of its members. In the second category are institutional groups, which are collectivities of other formal institutions. These institutional members were initially formed to perform some other social or political function, but may articulate their own members' interests as well. Salisbury (1984) and Rothenberg (1992) provide persuasive evidence that institutional groups are advantaged in the policy making process. These authors focus on the need for institutional groups to sustain themselves as the primary
reason for their ongoing public policy involvement. The concern with the long term survival of the institution appears to make consistent policy involvement more of a necessity than a choice for institutional groups (King and Walker, 1992).

The associational/institutional distinction may really be a surrogate for other underlying issues. In particular, institutional groups are expected to benefit from a preexistent organizational structure and role hierarchy, larger staffs and budgets, and greater organizational stability. As such, any relationship between credit claiming and the represented interests may be spurious. This means that this measure may simply control for the policy making advantages other scholars argue are inherent to institutional groups.

In the event that this variable does have an independent effect on credit claiming, the model would predict that associational groups would exhibit higher levels of credit claiming for policy benefits. The associational groups exist to address the needs of its members. For those groups whose members desire policy benefits, the group becomes the only vehicle for voicing their concerns, leading (potential) beneficiaries to recognize their need to support the group. Institutional groups, whose individual member organizations and policy concerns precede the formation of the group, should have to rely on other means to cement member support.

A second structural feature is the presence of subunits, which asks whether or not the group has offices, chapters, or other organized units below the level of the central office. At one end of the continuum are unitary groups, which are centralized with all
decision making taking place in one office. Federated groups are at this other end of the
continuum, meaning a more decentralized, inclusive approach to group decision making.

All other things being equal, federated groups should be advantaged in their
efforts to claim credit for policy benefits. This is due to the potential for increased
responsiveness to members concerns, the leaders' ability to use the subunits to
disseminate information and the expanded leadership cadre. Subunits increase the
incidence of credit claiming activities because they provide additional information centers
or sources. This in turn allows more individuals with a vested interest in the program to
be involved in credit claiming activities.

Older interest groups have had more time to establish relationships with other
policy actors. In particular, there has been more time to develop specialized policy
information and thereby access to policy communication networks. Consequently, this
higher level of policy involvement means that the older groups should be more successful
in their credit claiming activities than newer groups. Older interest groups' claims should
appear more credible to program recipients. Older interest groups are able to present
recipients with evidence of long term policy involvement.

The more diverse the funding sources of the interest group, the less effective its
credit claiming efforts will be. Walker (1991) has demonstrated that the resources for
group formation and maintenance come from many sources. His work also raises the
question of divided loyalties, or in some cases, potential deference to larger contributors.
In the first instance, divided loyalties and the attendant multiple audiences should reduce
the targeted nature of credit claiming. Similarly, large contributors or patrons make credit claiming less likely as the group has found an alternative solution to its collective action problem. For an interest group leader, either of these has the potential to undermine the credibility of group credit claiming efforts, which are directed toward actual (and potential) program recipients.

Hypothesis 4: Represented interest -- individual, organized subunits, older interest groups, and narrow funding sources are positively associated with credit claiming activity.

Hypothesis 4a: Represented interest -- individual, organized subunits, older interest groups, and narrow funding sources are positively associated with interest group maintenance.

C. Selective Benefits: An Alternative Explanation for Credit Claiming and Interest Group Maintenance

The fifth structural component is the selective incentive package offered by the interest group. While listed by Hinckley and Hill as a component of the group's organizational structure, the interest group's selective benefit package is an alternative explanation for group maintenance in this analysis. In particular, this research asks if group maintenance is possible with the receipt of policy benefits alone. Or, as the literature argues, is group maintenance solely a function of selective benefits? An additional possibility is that interest groups rely on a mix of strategies (i.e., both credit claiming for policy benefits and the provision of selective benefits) to facilitate maintenance.
The selective benefits that an interest group offers are expected to effect both credit claiming and maintenance. The provision of purposive and solidary benefits are expected to be positively associated with both credit claiming and group maintenance. Purposive benefits may have a policy component, while solidary benefits are related to group interaction. Both of these factors should increase credit claiming activity by the group and contribute to group maintenance.

Material benefits are expected to be negatively associated with credit claiming. Material benefits are costly to produce and the chances that a group will invest resources in both credit claiming and providing material benefits should be low. Specifically, if the group produces a variety of material benefits for its members, the group has not been able to use federal benefits to solve the collective action problem. Another possibility is that some interest groups may not have access to the federal benefits that are the most salient for their members. Under either of these conditions, it would be unreasonable for interest group leaders to incur the additional costs of lobbying for federal benefits if they do not help resolve the maintenance problem.

When the question turns to group maintenance, material benefits should have a positive effect on maintenance. The real issue however, is which has the greater impact—the interest group's selective benefit package, its policy agenda; or its credit claiming activities.

*Hypothesis 5:* Purposive and solidary benefits will be positively associated with credit claiming activity; material benefits will be negatively associated with credit claiming activity.
Hypothesis 5a: Purposive, solidary, and material benefits will be positively associated with interest group maintenance.

D. Summary: Factors That Influence Credit Claiming and Interest Group Maintenance

The internal environment of interest groups - their policy agenda, resources and organizational structure -- will affect whether or not interest group leaders will engage in credit claiming activities. If policy benefits matter to interest group members and potential members, group leaders should be willing to use group resources in pursuit of those benefits. Moreover, the availability of policy benefits makes it possible that the group may actually be able to preserve more of its own resources. If the group is able to replace selective benefits with policy benefits, the funds required to produce the former can be retained or directed toward other group concerns. The opportunistic group leader is expected to be aware of these potential savings and respond accordingly.

The organizational structure of the group will limit the maintenance strategies that are available to group leaders. Those structural components of the organization that facilitate the dissemination of information are expected to enhance the use of credit claiming as a maintenance strategy. Again, it is the responsibility of the leadership to recognize the constraints and opportunities that the group's structure places on credit claiming activities.

Table 2.1 provides a summary of all the hypothesized relationships that will be examined in this analysis.
Table 2.1 Macro-level Hypotheses Tested Walker (1991) Database

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<th>INDEPENDENT VARIABLES</th>
<th>DEPENDENT VARIABLE</th>
<th>DEPENDENT VARIABLE</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit Claiming</td>
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<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Agenda</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Particularistic</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective</td>
<td>-</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selective Benefit Package</td>
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<tr>
<td>Material</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidary</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purposive</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Group Structure</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Represented Interest -Individual</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Represented Interest -Organization</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organized Subunits</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narrow Funding Sources</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Interest Group</td>
<td>+</td>
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<tr>
<td>Resources — Staff</td>
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</table>

IV. DATA AND RESULTS

1. DATA

This first test at the macro-level involves a secondary analysis of the Walker (1991) data in order to test the hypotheses introduced above. This data base is a two wave panel study (1980 and 1985), using a mail survey of interest group leaders. Interest groups that were surveyed had to be membership organizations, active at the national level in Washington, D.C. The principal areas of concern in these surveys were: organizational structure; group activities; selective benefits; the groups' policy concerns; and relationships with other policy actors. As a result, it is possible to use this data to see whether expectations regarding credit claiming (broadly defined) obtain. Given the construction of scales for both dependent and independent variables, only cases without
missing data on critical questions are included in the analysis. Only 271 of the 448 cases listed in the Walker database are included.

2. OPERATIONAL MEASURES

A. DEPENDENT VARIABLES

Credit claiming is based on the policy influence activities an interest group engages in and their communication of those activities to their members. Policy influence efforts were determined by whether interest group leaders considered any one of three activities very important to the group: working for the passage of legislation; working to improve the administration of government programs; and serving as consultants or advisors to operating agencies of government. A group was classified as a credit claiming group only if in addition to being engaged in one of these activities, the group also published a newsletter or magazine, broadcasting their activities to members and potential members. Based on this coding scheme 138 groups engaged in credit claiming and 133 groups did not.

The credit claiming model assumes that its membership is a group's most importance maintenance concern. An interest group that is in the process of recruiting new members does so as a means of addressing the continued viability of the group. In the second model, which looks at how policy agendas and credit claiming affect group maintenance, new member recruitment is the dependent variable. This is a dichotomous measure, 1 if interest group leaders believe that new member recruitment was a very important activity, and 0 for all other responses. Based on this dichotomy, 132 interest
groups were engaged in new member recruitment activities and 139 interest groups were not.

B. Independent Variables

1. Policy Agendas

The policy agenda is expected to reflect the policy issues or benefits that interest group leaders (and leaders) value most. The Walker data base included questions regarding group interest in ten policy categories: agriculture, civil rights, education, housing and urban policy, transportation, health and human services, energy and natural resources, management of the economy, and changes in government. Each policy area was coded 1 if the group was very interested in the area and 0 otherwise.

Each of the ten policy areas has been studied extensively (Browne, 1995, 1988; Heinz et al., 1993; Laumann and Knoke, 1987) in the literature. Some of these policy areas have been dominated by particularistic benefit programs, while others confer benefits that are more collective in nature. On the basis of previous research efforts, the following coding scheme was used to determine the nature of each interest group's policy agenda. If a group received a 1 on either agriculture, education, housing, transportation, or health, it was classified as particularistic. If the group received a 1 on civil rights, energy and natural resources, management of the economy, and changes in government it was classified as collective. Of the 271 groups in the analysis, 21 groups were classified as unspecified, as they scored 0 on all the policy areas; 55 groups had particularistic
agendas; 59 groups had collective agendas; and 136 groups had mixed agendas - an equal number of particularistic and collective policy areas.

2. **Group Resources**

A significant number of interest groups in the Walker data base did not respond to the budget question on the survey. Walker, however, was able to show that staff size was highly correlated with organizational budget. Therefore, the measure of group resources is the number of full-time equivalent staff persons that were employed by the group. The natural log of the number of full time staff was taken, as the impact of each additional staff person was expected to diminish. This variable had a low value of 0, a high value of 8.1, and a mean of 2.68.

3. **Group Organizational Structure**

As stated previously, how an interest group is designed or structured should have a significant impact on whether the group engages in credit claiming activities. These structural factors are included in the model to test Hinckley and Hill's (1995) argument that an organization's structure has a determinant effect on group maintenance. Represented interests is measured by using a series of dummy variables that distinguishes among institutional groups (n=104); associational groups (n=95); and mixed membership groups (n=72).

Organized subunits is another dummy variable scored as 1 if the group has organized bodies below the national level (n=138) and a score of 0 if it does not have organized bodies below the national level (n=133). Interest group age is calculated by
subtracting the year that the organization was founded (e.g., 1900) from 1995. In this example the age of the interest group would be 95.

Based on responses to the survey, interest groups could have received funding from as many as twelve sources. A dummy variable was created for each of the funding sources, 1 if the group did receive money from a particular source and 0 otherwise. Funding diversity is a summary score of all the sources of an interest group’s funding. Of a possible 12 funding sources, no interest group scored higher than an 8 on this measure, and there were 16 groups that did not receive funds from any of the sources listed in the survey. The majority of interest groups scored 3 or less (56%), while the remaining groups scored 4 or more.

4. Selective Benefit Package

Respondents were queried about the principal benefits provided to members of their organization, and dummy variable was created for each benefit. The benefit categories are summary scores of these responses. Material benefits include: in-service training, conferences, meetings, low-cost insurance, organized trips or tours, and discounts on consumer goods. Here, an interest group could receive a score from zero to six. Four interest groups did not provide any material benefits to their members, and the mean number of material benefits provided was 2.6. The majority of the interest group leaders responded that members received 2 (38%) or 3 (36.9%) of these benefits. Another 17% of the interest groups provided four or more material benefits.
Second, purposive benefits include: advocacy for important policies, representation of members' opinions before government agencies, and opportunity for participation in public affairs. Here, an interest group could receive a score from zero to three. Twenty-two interest groups did not provide any purposive benefits to its members. Over 50% of the interest groups surveyed provided all of the purposive benefits to their members, while over 20% of the remaining groups provided two of the benefits to their members.

Finally, solidary benefits were captured with one question: friendship with other members. Over 66% of the interest groups (n=179) provided this benefit to their members and the remaining groups did not.

3. Results

A. Model 1: Credit Claiming

Table 2.2 records the results from the logit model, which predicts whether or not an interest group has engaged in credit claiming. The excluded category in the model is the mixed agenda, mixed membership interest group. The first thing to note is the results for the impact of the interest group's policy agenda. As predicted, interest groups with the unspecified policy agenda were less likely to engage in credit claiming, with a 29% reduction in the likelihood of credit claiming. Interest groups with particularistic policy agendas were also less likely to engage in credit claiming than mixed agenda groups, and these results are not consistent with expectations. The likelihood of interest groups
engaging in credit claiming activity decreased by 19% when the group had a particularistic policy agenda.

The results for collective agenda groups were not statistically significant, nor were the results in the expected direction.

Table 2.2 Logit Estimates for Credit Claiming Activity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
<th>Change in Probability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>-2.663**</td>
<td>0.905</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Policy Agendas</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>-1.324*</td>
<td>0.603</td>
<td>-0.292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Particularistic</td>
<td>-0.786*</td>
<td>0.374</td>
<td>-0.189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective</td>
<td>0.334</td>
<td>0.347</td>
<td>0.083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Benefit Package</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material Benefits</td>
<td>0.377*</td>
<td>0.171</td>
<td>0.512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purposive Benefits</td>
<td>0.597***</td>
<td>0.181</td>
<td>0.387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidary Benefits</td>
<td>0.288</td>
<td>0.333</td>
<td>0.072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interest Group Structure</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Represented Interest -</td>
<td>-0.765*</td>
<td>0.372</td>
<td>-0.187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Represented Interest -</td>
<td>-0.944**</td>
<td>0.379</td>
<td>-0.229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organized Subunits</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>0.316</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of Interest Group</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>-0.022</td>
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<tr>
<td>Diversity of Funding Sources</td>
<td>0.137</td>
<td>0.088</td>
<td>0.266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interest Group Resources</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Full-Time Staff</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.105</td>
<td>0.067</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05  **p<0.01  ***p<0.001

% Correctly Predicted: Logit 75.2%  Null 49.1%
Number of Observations: 271

NOTE: For the continuous independent variables, the change in probabilities is calculated for the dependent variable when the independent variable is set to one standard deviation above and below the mean for these measures. For each of the dichotomous independent variables, the change in probability calculated for the dependent variable when the independent variable is set at 0 and 1 for these measures.

When looking at the effect of the group’s selective benefit package, mixed results obtain. As expected purposive benefits are positively associated with credit claiming.

The results for purposive benefits are statistically significant and in the expected
direction. There is an almost 39% increase in the probability that a group will engage in credit claiming as one moves from providing none of these benefits to providing all three. The most striking finding however, relates to the impact of material benefits. There is a 51% change in the probability that groups that provide material benefits will also engage in credit claiming for policy benefits. These findings run counter to expectations, as material benefits were expected to have a negative impact on credit claiming activity. The results for solidary benefits are not statistically significant, but they are in the expected direction.

The next set of results deal with interest group resources and organizational structure. The results for interest group staff are not statistically significant, but they are in the expected direction. In regards to the represented interests: first the model does not discriminate between the two types of group members and their impact on credit claiming. In particular, groups that represent organizations and those that represent individuals are less likely to engage in credit claiming activities than mixed membership groups. However, the negative relationship between credit claiming and interest groups that represent organizations is in the expected direction with an almost 19% decrease in the likelihood that these groups will engage in credit claiming. The strong negative relationship (23% change in probability) noted between the interest groups that represent individuals and credit claiming is not in the expected direction.

None of the other structural regressors obtain statistical significance. However, the effect of organized subunits is in the expected direction: while the direction on the age
of the organization, and funding diversity are not. The fit of the model is quite good, as it is able to predict just over 75% of the cases, an improvement of 26% over the null model of 49%.

B. Model 2: New Member Recruitment

Table 2.3 reports the results from the logit model, which predicts whether an interest group has engaged in new member recruitment activities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
<th>Change in Probability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>0.95</td>
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<tr>
<td>Credit Claiming Activity</td>
<td>-0.856**</td>
<td>0.316</td>
<td>-0.191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Policy Agendas</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>0.563</td>
<td>-0.054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Particularistic</td>
<td>0.035</td>
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<td>0.008</td>
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<tr>
<td>Collective</td>
<td>0.863*</td>
<td>0.376</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Selective Benefit Package</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material Benefits</td>
<td>0.383*</td>
<td>0.176</td>
<td>0.507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purposive Benefits</td>
<td>-0.228</td>
<td>0.173</td>
<td>-0.142</td>
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<tr>
<td>Solidary Benefits</td>
<td>0.566</td>
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<td>0.131</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Interest Group Structure</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Represented Interest-Organizations</td>
<td>-0.795*</td>
<td>0.375</td>
<td>-0.172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Represented Interest-Individuals</td>
<td>0.974**</td>
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<td>0.209</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organized Subunits</td>
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<td>Age of Interest Group</td>
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<td>-0.057</td>
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<tr>
<td>Diversity of Funding Sources</td>
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<td><strong>Interest Group Resources</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Full - Time Staff</td>
<td>-0.119</td>
<td>0.114</td>
<td>-0.051</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05     **p<0.01

% Correctly Predicted: Logit 78.4% Null 48.7%
Number of Observations: 271

NOTE: For the continuous independent variables, the change in probabilities is calculated for the dependent variable when the independent variable is set to one standard deviation above and below the mean for these measures. For each of the dichotomous independent variables, the change in probability calculated for the dependent when the independent variable is set at 0 and 1 for these measures.

Once again, the directionality of the relationship on some of the principal variables of interest are inconsistent with expectations. Credit claiming by interest
groups, which was expected to be positively related to recruitment, is instead negatively related to new member recruitment. There is a 19% reduction in the likelihood that credit claiming groups will attempt to recruit new members. Substantively, this means that the interest groups that engage in credit claiming are not trying to increase their membership through recruitment efforts.

Interest groups with collective policy agendas are engaged in more recruitment activity than any other type of group. This is not surprising, as others have argued that groups that pursue collective benefits are more volatile than other types of groups. The direction of the relationship of particularistic agendas and unspecified agendas are in the right direction, but neither are statistically significant.

Of the other regressors that obtain significance, the impact of material benefits is in the right direction. Material benefits are positively related to member recruitment, with an almost 51% change in the probability of recruitment. Groups that are looking for new members appear to buy them, or more formally, offer them material benefits. These findings are supportive of Olson's idea that the provision of selective benefits is critical for group membership.

The results for interest group staff are not statistically significant, and they are not in the expected direction. Represented interests has a strong effect on member recruitment. Interest groups whose members are individuals exhibit a 21% increase in the probability that these groups will engage in new member recruitment. Interest groups that represent institutions are less likely to engage in new member recruitment, with a
17% reduction in the probability this type of group will pursue recruitment as a maintenance strategy. None of the other structural regressors obtain statistical significance. Once again the model performs very well, in that it is able to predict over 78% of the cases, a 30% improvement over the null model of 48%.

V. DISCUSSION

An uncritical examination of the empirical results in this chapter might lead one to accept Olson's (1965) arguments regarding interest group maintenance. In particular, we would say that interest group maintenance is all about selective benefits and we can reject the idea that credit claiming for policy benefits and organizational structure affect interest group maintenance. In fact, this is where most analyses of the interest group - policy benefit relationship stop. In his interest group liberalism, Lowi (1979) argued that the federal government has allowed interest groups to become policy makers, with the government's only role to respond to competing claims. Walker (1983, 1991) has also argued that federal programs matter to interest groups. Unfortunately, neither author has provided any information as to whether or not some program benefits actually matter more to interest groups. This chapter was designed to address this question.

There is evidence that whether an interest group engages in credit claiming is a function of the type of policy benefits that make-up the group's agenda. As expected, interest groups that were not interested in the ten policy areas listed in the Walker survey, were less likely to engage in credit claiming. The more puzzling finding, however, is the marked negative effect that particularistic policy agendas had on the likelihood of credit
claiming. Interest groups that pursued this type of benefit were expected to engage in more credit claiming given their prominence in the legislative literature.

In general, the best predictors of credit claiming activity were material and purposive benefits. The provision of each of these selective benefits increased the likelihood that an interest group would engage in credit claiming. While the results for purposive benefits were expected, the results for material benefits were not. In particular, it was argued that an interest group that engaged in credit claiming would not also produce and provide material benefits. Instead, the evidence shows that interest groups will claim credit for policy benefits and provide material benefits as well.

There was also some support for the importance of organizational structure. In particular, whose preferences an interest group represents has an impact on credit claiming. Organizations that represented both individuals and organizations were more likely to engage in credit claiming. It appears that having a more heterogeneous membership means that an interest group has to be more involved in credit claiming. Again, these findings are mixed as groups that represented organizations were expected to be less involved in credit claiming than mixed membership groups. These results are borne out. However, groups that represent individuals were expected to be more likely to engage in credit claiming than mixed membership groups, and these expectations were not supported.

Based on the findings reported in this chapter, one has to reject the proposition that credit claiming is a stronger predictor of interest group maintenance than selective
benefits. Olson's selective benefits model consistently outperformed the credit claiming model, even when controlling for the content of policy agendas. When the recruitment of new members is pursued as a maintenance strategy, the provision of selective benefits produced by the group, rather than policy benefits produced by the government, is the more preferred method.

There are at least two reasons why credit claiming interest groups do not engage in new member recruitment. First, there may be a limited number of potential members for credit claiming interest groups to contact. More directly, federal programs may have such restrictive eligibility requirements that the number of recipients is very small. As a result, it may not be possible to find program recipients who are not already group members.

A second explanation for these results is that new member recruitment is only employed by interest groups in trouble. This line of reasoning is rooted in Jacobson's examination of campaign spending. (1980). Here the author is able to show that more money is spent by legislators that are in trouble, than incumbents that are in 'safe' seats. A similar argument could be made that interest groups having trouble keeping their members satisfied will have to seek new members. Successful credit claiming groups would not have to employ such a strategy as they have been able to keep their members satisfied with their programmatic involvement.

Policy agendas also have an impact on new member recruitment. Interest groups with collective policy agendas are more likely to engage in new member recruitment, and
these results are inconsistent with expectations. While not expected, these results can be easily explained by pointing to the volatility of collective groups. Given that these groups are concerned with issues that require a commitment to broader, more collective policy issues, groups leaders have a more extensive pool of potential members to draw from.

When examining the impact of selective benefits are, only material benefits have a significant impact on new member recruitment. Interest groups that are attempting to recruit new members provide more material benefits than other interest groups. Material benefits, more than any other factor, are critical for new member recruitment.

Organizational structure again matters, as the results for whose interests a group represents are also significant. Moreover, this time the results are consistent with expectations. First, interest groups that represent organizations are less likely to engage in new member recruitment than mixed membership groups. Second, interest groups that represent individuals are more likely to engage in new member recruitment than either organizational or mixed membership groups.

As noted previously, these findings are more supportive of Olson's selective benefits model. However, there are some potential problems with using the Walker data to provide a definitive test of the propositions outlined above. The limitations associated with using the Walker database to test the macro-level credit claiming model are addressed in Chapter 3.
CHAPTER 3
THE MACRO-LEVEL MODEL: DETERMINING
THE INCIDENCE OF CREDIT CLAIMING ACTIVITIES (PART II)

1. INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapter, which used data from Walker's interest group study (1991), Olson's selective benefits model consistently out performed the policy agenda, credit claiming, and organizational structure models. When looking at credit claiming activity by interest groups, the selective benefits package provided by the group was a better predictor than either policy agenda or organizational structure. Moreover, when the question turned to interest group maintenance, in this case new member recruitment, in addition to out performing policy agendas and organizational structure, the selective benefit package was also a better predictor than credit claiming activity.

There are limitations however to using Walker's data to examine whether credit claiming activity will be used for interest group maintenance. In particular, the macro-level credit claiming model of interest group maintenance rests on three basic assumptions. First, the model assumes that interest groups do in fact seek governmental policy benefits. More importantly, the model posits that interest groups do not view all of these policy benefits in the same way. Second, the model assumes that absent credit claiming activities, there is no way to link the recipients of policy benefits to the interest group. Effective credit claiming (i.e., that which leads program recipients to support the interest group) requires clear communication of the group's policy influence efforts to benefit recipients. Third, the credit claiming model assumes that the group's membership is the interest group's most important resource. Finally, the model assumes that interest groups will face constraints in their ability to claim credit for policy benefits. Internal factors, such as group resources and structure, affect credit claiming activities and so do
external factors, such as the availability of program benefits, competition from other interest groups, and conflict over policy issues.

Using the Walker database to test the macro-level credit claiming model of group maintenance does not adequately address each of these critical issues. A discussion of how the Walker database fails to satisfactorily deal with these important points is followed by ways to resolve the problems. Resolution of the limitations of the Walker database will involve the analysis of data gathered from a new interest group survey. This second macro-level analysis is argued to be a more rigorous test of the macro-level credit claiming model.

II. THE LIMITATIONS OF THE WALKER DATABASE

1. The Importance of Program Attributes

The first limitation of the Walker database for testing the macro-level credit claiming model is that it required the use of broad functional policy categories to determine an interest group's policy agenda. Without more information on exactly what policy issues or benefits an interest group is involved with, this measure of an interest group's policy agenda lacks precision. A policy agenda measure that is based on the attributes of the federal programs that an interest group lobbies for is a more precise measure and is a means of addressing this first limitation. In particular, the attributes of federal programs structure the particularistic or collective nature of an interest group's policy agenda. Program attributes determine who benefits and the specificity or targeted nature of those benefits. For reasons discussed in greater detail below, homogeneity, discretion, recurrence, role of intermediary agents, and the type of recipient are all program attributes that measure the particularistic or collective nature of an interest group's policy agenda.
Interest groups with particularistic policy agendas should engage in more credit claiming activities because these agendas are composed of mostly distributive programs, which are associated with credit claiming by legislators (Mayhew 1974; Arnold, 1990). Similar results are expected when the issue is credit claiming by interest group leaders.

Interest groups with collective policy agendas should engage in less credit claiming. The ability to trace any one interest group's contribution to the policy issue may be difficult. In particular, interest group leaders would have to work harder to show program recipients that the group's policy efforts matter. Under these conditions, interest group leaders should decide that a credit claiming strategy would not only be costly, but also ineffective. As a result, the interest group is less dependent on credit claiming activities for maintenance.

As stated previously the particularistic or collective nature of the interest group's policy agenda is linked to program homogeneity, discretion, recurrence, role of intermediary agents, and type of recipient. The reasons why each of these factors is important are discussed below.

A. Homogeneity

Program homogeneity refers to the degree to which program eligibility requirements dictate that program recipients will have the same characteristics. Recipient homogeneity captures the extent to which federal programs are narrowly targeted to a given population. The more homogenous the population of program recipients, the greater the chances an interest group can capitalize on the shared policy preferences of these recipients. Homogeneity establishes clear, concrete boundaries of program eligibility.

Consequently, homogeneity should lower the costs of credit claiming activities. A narrow, easily identified population of program recipients makes communication less
costly, and facilitates membership mobilization and recruitment efforts (Marwell and Oliver, 1993). The interest group leadership can in effect target its credit claiming strategies, i.e., communication of program information and member recruitment efforts, to program recipients. Homogeneity allows interest group to recruit recipients to broadcast the group's message to other recipients. Successful targeting efforts will identify recipients willing to contribute personal resources for the group's continued policy involvement or group maintenance efforts.

A less homogenous population of program recipients should have a more diverse set of policy preferences. This diversity in policy preferences would in turn weaken the cohesiveness of the group's lobbying efforts (Ziegler, 1988). The lack of cohesion means that the ability to target credit claiming activities is reduced. The reduction in the benefits of targeting should be evident in the increased communication and recruitment costs leaders must pay, as they try to identify group members and program recipients with the most strongly held policy preferences.

**B. Discretion**

Discretion is defined as the assignment of authority over the allocation of programmatic benefits. This authority can reside with an executive agency or Congress. Discretionary programs are competitively awarded grants administered by agencies. Nondiscretionary programs assign responsibility for the distribution of grant awards to Congress. Congress defines the population of eligible recipients and allocates moneys through legislatively enacted formula programs. These programs use a structured mathematical formula and statistical data to allocate funds to all eligible recipients, to determine a potential grant recipient's eligibility to receive funds, or both.

Discretionary programs allow interest group leaders to take advantage of the competitive award process, which provides multiple opportunities to claim credit for
influence over the distribution of awards. Congressional testimony, soliciting grant applications, assisting in their preparation, and shepherding proposals through an agency review allows an interest group to demonstrate its critical role in the recipient's procurement of a grant award. Nondiscretionary programs, which equates program eligibility with receipt of the award, afford interest groups fewer such opportunities to claim credit for the receipt of an award.

C. Recurrence

Program recurrence may manifest itself in one two distinct ways. First, recurrence may be the degree to which the federal program addresses a policy problem that is habitual for the same population of recipients. For example, price supports for farmers are a recurring need for which the federal government provides recurring assistance. Second, recurrence could also be the continuation of a given program year after year, whose benefits do not go to the same population of recipients. Small business loans, college loans, and research grants are just three examples of recurrent programs where distributional decisions are made annually, and where program recipients are not expected to be the same over time.

The significance of program recurrence rests in the fact that it enhances ownership of a program for both the interest group and the eligible recipient. The regularity of the benefit provides the interest group with repeated opportunities for credit claiming with program recipients. This is particularly true for continuous program recipients (e.g., farmers). Ownership becomes more difficult when the program is ongoing, but the recipients of the program are different from year to year. In this case, claiming credit will require interest group leaders to identify those eligible to receive the benefit and to convince them that they have a significant stake in the continuation of the program. Such identification efforts may be expensive. As a result, a recipient's intermittent demand or
need for the benefit should decrease interest group leaders' attempts to claim credit for these program benefits.

D. Intermediary Agents

A federal program has an intermediary agent when the recipient and beneficiary of the program are not the same. For example, the food stamp program provides moneys to states which in turn pass these moneys to the eventual beneficiaries -- the poor. In most instances, an intermediary should have a negative impact on the incidence of credit claiming because it hinders the recipient's ability to trace a given benefit (Arnold, 1990). An intermediary agent becomes another stage in what may already be a cumbersome or convoluted policy making process. As a result, a recipient's ability to assign credit for his or her receipt of a policy benefit becomes more difficult.

It is the political influence of the eventual program beneficiary, however, that ultimately determines the effect an intermediary agent has on interest group credit claiming. Programs that address the needs of the poor or other disadvantaged groups that lack political clout rely on intermediary agents to support the program. In this case intermediaries may themselves be the relevant interest group, and are therefore critical to the continuation of the program. Cigler and Loomis (1991) call these service provider groups middlemen who are concerned with the program because they see that the program contributes to the continued well-being of service provider groups.

When program recipients have political influence, credit claiming activities becomes more complicated. The presence of an intermediary means that there will not be a clear and direct link between the interest group and the receipt of policy benefits. Having to compete with the intermediary agent for the recipient's support increases the costs of credit claiming the leadership.
E. Recipient Types

The differences between the various recipients of program benefits are also important. If interest group efficacy is linked to the ability to respond to the concerns of the program recipient, these recipient differences need to be incorporated into the explanation. Federal program recipients fall into one of three broad categories -- other governments, individuals, and institutions (public or private entities). Other governments include regional, state, local governments and Indian tribes. Individual recipients include (but are not limited to) the elderly and the disabled, while institutions include universities, public and private foundations, and various for profit and non-profit organizations.

Federal programs that benefit individuals can most easily be used to solve the maintenance and member retention problems of interest groups. These individuals may not have any other vehicle to press for their policy preferences, making the continued survival and viability of the group a major concern for these recipients (Hansen, 1985; Browne, 1992; Walker, 1991). Conversely, programs which benefit states, cities, universities, or other well-bounded interests should be used less often as part of a credit claiming strategy. Here, while these entities have well defined, shared preferences Rothenberg (1992) argues that these same organizations can provide selective benefits or use coercion to induce the contributions necessary for group maintenance. Consequently, interest groups with these types of members, should be unwilling to incur the additional costs of claiming credit for policy benefits.

F. Summary

Program attributes are critical to understanding interest group credit claiming efforts. Differences in these structural elements determine how well an interest group will be able to use federal programs to cement a relationship between the group and a
program recipient. It is the program as policy benefit that determines the nature of an interest group's policy agenda and structures the opportunities for credit claiming activities.

Federal programs that are homogeneous, discretionary, recurring, and benefit individuals should be the most popular type of program for interest group credit claiming efforts. Given that is much easier to trace the benefits of this type of program, recipient awareness (and support of) of interest group involvement with federal programs should be most evident when more of this type of program are more prevalent on the group's policy agenda. The presence of an intermediary agent is expected to have a positive effect on credit claiming when the recipient does not have political power. When the program recipient does have political power, an intermediary agent is expected to have a negative effect on credit claiming.

As the proportion of programs in an interest group's policy agenda moves further away from the 'ideal' traits noted above, the frequency of interest group credit claiming activities should decline. For example, reduced recipient homogeneity and/or reduced discretion can undermine credit claiming efforts. Claiming credit can be affected by either reducing the opportunities for the group to take advantage of individuals' shared policy preferences, or by reducing the group's involvement in distributional decisions. Moreover, nonrecurring programs do not allow interest groups to establish a history with program recipients, which should weaken all attempts to link group membership to the receipt of program benefits. In particular, nonrecurrent programs do not allow an interest group to take advantage of what a recipient can learn about the group's policy success over time (Rothenberg, 1992).

*Hypothesis 1:* Interest groups with particularistic policy agendas will engage in more credit claiming activities than interest groups with collective policy agendas.
2. CREDIT CLAIMING ACTIVITY AND POLICY AGENDA INTERACTIONS

The second limitation of the Walker database is a function of what constitutes credit claiming activity. In the analysis of the Walker data, credit claiming activity was a simple dichotomy -- an interest group either engaged in credit claiming or it did not. There are, however, differences in the types of credit claiming activities an interest group can pursue. These differences could not be measured using the Walker database. Credit claiming by an interest group can be targeted to one of two audiences: those inside of government or those outside of government. In the former are legislators, their staff, and executive agency officials. In the later category are actual program recipients and the general public.

Effective credit claiming requires that the interest group informs the relevant parties that it is involved with these activities. More specifically, an activity is only credit claiming if in addition to seeking to influence parties inside or outside of government, the group also has the means to communicate their efforts.

There is every reason to expect that there will be tangible differences in credit claiming activities based on which audience the interest group targets. Previous research has shown that interest groups generally seek to influence policy by pursuing either an insider or outsider strategy, and seldom both (Walker, 1991; Kingdon, 1995). In particular, interest groups appear to target their policy influence efforts to the audience they feel are more supportive of their involvement.

Because of the limitations in both the policy agenda and the credit claiming measures, results for the interactions of these variables were insignificant in the Walker analysis (Chapter 2). Having corrected for these limitations should clarify the true impact the interaction between credit claiming activities and policy agendas on interest group maintenance. Activities directed toward parties in government by interest groups with
particularistic policy agendas should have a positive effect on interest group maintenance efforts. In this instance, the traits of the programs that make up the group's policy agenda work together with the fact that group leaders have access to the parties responsible for the distribution of benefits. Activities directed toward parties in government by interest groups with collective policy agendas should have a negative effect on interest group maintenance. Here, collective interest groups, generally considered to be far removed from decision makers, are attempting to make claims about having influence with the same government insiders.

These expectations are reversed when looking at the relationship between activities directed toward other publics and the type of policy agenda. Outsider credit claiming activities by interest groups with collective agendas should have a positive effect on interest group maintenance. In this case, highly diffuse benefits and appeals to broader audiences outside of government, work together. Conversely, outsider credit claiming activity by interest groups with particularistic policy agendas may signal that the groups' efforts to have direct access to (or influence over) policy makers have failed. As a result, such efforts should have a negative effect on interest group maintenance.

Hypothesis 2: Credit claiming activities directed toward government by interest groups with particularistic policy agendas will have a positive effect on interest group maintenance; credit claiming activities directed toward government by interest groups with collective policy agendas will have a negative effect on interest group maintenance.

Hypothesis 2a: Credit claiming activities directed toward parties outside government by interest groups with particularistic policy agendas will have a negative effect on interest group maintenance; credit claiming activities directed toward interest groups with collective policy agendas will have a positive effect on interest group maintenance.
3. **Interest Group Resources**

The third limitation of the Walker database is related to the impact of interest group resources. While Walker was able to show that the number of staff was an adequate measure of interest group resources, the credit claiming model requires more information on the interest group membership -- both its size and its stability. In addition, respondents to the new survey were willing to respond to the question regarding the size of their budget. This measure of interest group resources is also included in the model.

A. **The Size of the Interest Group Membership**

The credit claiming model of group maintenance asks whether interest group leaders acquire resources by persuading program recipients to support the interest group(s). As such, the size of the interest group membership becomes a critical resource. Not only are members able to provide financial resources through dues. They may also bring other resources to the group as well. Members can confer legitimacy on the group's lobbying efforts and/or influence public opinion in the group's favor. Members may also be able to provide highly valued technical information and expertise. Finally, some group members may provide the group with additional political contacts or allies which may also contribute to successful credit claiming.

B. **Stability of Interest Group Membership**

Not only is the size of the interest group membership important, so is the stability of the membership. Interest groups that are experiencing a decline in their membership or that report stable memberships should be more aggressive in their credit claiming activities than groups with growing memberships. In particular, interest groups that are losing members or who have not seen a significant increase in their membership should be willing to incur the costs of informing program recipients of the groups' program involvement. Conversely, interest groups that are already reporting increases in the size
of their membership may be less willing to pay the cost of publicizing their program influence efforts to recipients.

Similarly, when the question turns to maintenance (i.e., new member recruitment), interest groups experiencing either a decline in membership or a stable membership should be more active in new member recruitment. For the same reasons that these groups would engage in credit claiming, they should also be more willing to engage in new member recruitment. Again, interest groups with a growing membership should not be as active in new member recruitment because they already have a new population of individuals or organizations wanting to join the group.

C. The Size of the Interest Group's Budget

The interest group's budget is another important resource. Interest groups that have memberships that are very interested in particular policy issues will have to use some portion of their financial resources to champion those issues. Absent some base level of financial resources, interest group involvement in credit claiming is expected to be minimal. Once a particular budget threshold has been met, however, the impact of larger budgets is expected to decline (Walker, 1991).

Hypothesis 3: Interest group resources -- number of members, membership instability, and the size of the budget will be positively associated with credit claiming activity.

Hypothesis 3a: Interest group resources -- number of members, membership instability, and the size of the budget will be positively associated with interest group maintenance.

4. EXTERNAL CONSTRAINTS

The final limitation of the Walker database is related to the impact of external constraints. It has been argued that to fully understand the issue of group maintenance one must examine both the internal and external operating environment of the group
(Davis and Wurth, 1993). This means that the credit claiming model should include external constraints imposed by other political actors. The level of policy domain conflict and the degree of competition from other interest groups, which are outside on an interest group's control, may have an effect its credit claiming efforts.

An interest group concerned with policy benefits has to respond to the limits and opportunities the environment places on their ability to influence policy outputs and credit claiming efforts. Some policy issues or debates are more amenable of interest group involvement than others. Similarly, conflict and competition may signal a change in a group's policy making status. Interest groups that rely on policy benefits for their survival must therefore respond aggressively to each opportunity for influence or potential changes in their policy making status.

A. Level of Policy Domain Conflict

Not only must group leaders deal with internal demands, they must remain responsive to their external environment. First and foremost, an interest group must deal with the character of the policy domain it operates in. Browne (1995) defines a domain as "a policy area of government with its own substantive focus . . . defined by a common set of issues, policies and institutions that are treated as a single entity by government . . . maintained by rules". Others have noted the significance of substantive policy differences on politics (Heinz, Laumann, Nelson, and Salisbury, 1993). Here the authors note that policy domains have distinctive features that might lead to differences in how policy is formulated and to related differences in the roles and effects of policy representatives (1993: p. 17).

One of the key external constraints on interest group involvement in a policy domain is the degree of conflict that exists over issues. Many studies have asked whether the level of conflict matters (Price, 1978; Evans. 1986; Laumann and Knoke. 1987;
Browne, 1988; Baumgartner and Jones, 1993). Unfortunately, the conclusions drawn
from these studies are often contradictory. Interest group surveys that asks how conflict
is related to interest group maintenance efforts conclude that conflict is positively
associated with maintenance (Knoke, 1990; Walker, 1991). Other research that asks how
conflict affects interest group influence within a given policy domain finds that conflict is
negatively associated with influence (Evans, 1986; Thurber, 1991; Scitovszman and
Tierney, 1986).

How does conflict affect credit claiming activities? Given that credit claiming
activity links maintenance efforts to what is possible in the policy domain, expectations
are complex. First, the lack of conflict could be used by group leaders to show recipients
the group's preeminence in that policy domain. At the same time however, there is some
possibility that recipients may become complacent and take policy benefits for granted
(Lowery and Gray, 1995), leading them to free ride on the contributions of others and
perhaps risking the group's survival. Second, domain conflict may signal a breakdown in
previous policy arrangements. As a result, interest group leaders could use the threat of
the loss of the benefit to mobilize its members (Hansen, 1985; Tversky et al., 1983).

Interest groups that have particularistic agendas should prefer lower levels of
conflicts as they pursue credit claiming activities. These groups prefer inside
maintenance strategies due to their access to other policy makers. Interest groups
involved in more collective policy domains rely on outside maintenance strategies,
meaning that these groups should prefer higher levels of domain conflict. These
expectations run counter to the conclusions reached by Walker (1991) regarding the
impact of conflict on interest group maintenance. This is due to the fact that Walker feels
that the type of group -- profit, citizen, etc. -- is the critical cleavage for discussing
conflict and he fails to discuss the constraints that might be imposed by different types of policy agendas.

**B. Competition From Other Groups**

For an interest group engaged in a credit claiming strategy, the presence of other interest groups interested in the same policy benefits should also have an effect on their efforts. Without competition for its members, an interest group may be perceived as the only voice speaking for a particular policy issue. This is especially true for interest groups with very narrow policy agendas, or those involved in highly specialized issues (Lowery and Gray, 1995; Browne, 1988; Laumann and Knoke, 1987). Competition from other interest groups in these specialized policy niches will undermine a group's ownership claims. As a result, competition for group members in particularistic policy domains could have a negative effect on credit claiming.

Conversely, competition from other interest groups may lead group leaders involved with particularized benefits to pursue a more aggressive credit claiming strategy. Here, competition for a narrowly defined population of program recipients makes increased claiming activity critical for group survival.

Interest groups with collective policy agendas are used to competition for group members. Interest groups concerned with collective policy issues such as clean air and water must continually compete with other groups that champion the same interests. Competition for interest group members is therefore expected to have a positive effect on credit claiming by collective agenda groups.

*Hypothesis 4: Policy conflict will have a negative effect on the incidence of credit claiming for interest groups with particularistic policy agendas; policy conflict will have a positive effect on the incidence of credit claiming for groups with collective policy agendas.*
Hypothesis 5: Competition from other interest groups will have a negative effect on the incidence of credit claiming by groups with particularistic policy agendas; competition will have a positive effect on the incidence of credit claiming by groups with collective policy agendas.

5. SUMMARY

It has been argued here that the counterintuitive findings reported in the previous chapter are a result of limitations associated with the Walker database. A more definitive test of the credit claiming model must address these limitations. Moreover, the new database must also be able to address other issues raised in the group maintenance literature. In particular, the new survey must also be able test the remaining group organizational structure and selective benefits hypotheses outlined in Chapter 2.

Hypothesis 6: Interest group organizational structure -- represented interest (individual), organized subunits, older interest groups, and narrow sources of funding are positively associated with the incidence of credit claiming activity.

Hypothesis 6a: Interest group organizational structure -- represented interest (individual), organized subunits, older interest groups, and narrow sources of funding are positively associated with group maintenance.

Hypothesis 7: Purposive and solidarity benefits will be positively associated with the incidence of credit claiming activity; material benefits will be negatively associated with the incidence of credit claiming activity.

Hypothesis 7a: Purposive, solidarity, and material benefits will be positively associated with interest group maintenance.

Table 3.1 is a summary listing of all the hypothesized relationships that will be tested.
Table 3.1 Macro-level Hypotheses Tested - 1995 Interest Group Survey Database

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DEPENDENT VARIABLE Insider CC</th>
<th>DEPENDENT VARIABLE Outsider CC</th>
<th>DEPENDENT VARIABLE Total CC</th>
<th>DEPENDENT VARIABLE Recruitment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>INTERNAL CONSTRAINTS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit Claiming Activity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parties Inside Government</td>
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<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parties Outside Government</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Incidence</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Policy Agenda</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Particularistic</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Credit Claiming*Agenda Interactions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inside*Particularistic</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inside*Collective</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside*Particularistic</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside*Collective</td>
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</tr>
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<td><strong>Interest Group Resources</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of Membership</td>
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<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instability of Membership</td>
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<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of Budget</td>
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<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organizational Structure</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Represented Interest - (Individuals)</td>
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<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Represented Interest - (Organizations)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organized Subunits</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Group Age</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narrow Funding Sources</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Selective Benefit Package</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Material</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidary</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purposive</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EXTERNAL CONSTRAINTS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Conflict</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>+,-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Particularistic</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Group Competition</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>+,-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Particularistic</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
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</table>

### III. DATA AND RESULTS

#### I. **A. THE 1995 INTEREST GROUP SURVEY DATABASE**

The goal of this research is to examine the link between federal program recipients and the interest groups involved with their programs. As the initial step in this
process, the **Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance (CFDA)** was used to identify specific programs within each of five policy domains: agriculture, health, transportation, energy, and the environment. With the exception of the environment, each of these policy domains were included in the re-analysis of the Walker data listed in chapter 2.

The CFDA provides detailed information on each federal program, including eligible applicants and recipients, program objectives, restrictions, delivery mechanisms, etc. The programs selected for study were within a single federal department, in order to control for variance across different departments with a given policy domain.

In all, a total of 64 programs were selected. In agriculture, the 17 research and development programs were selected for analysis. In the health policy domain, the 14 maternal and child health programs were selected. In transportation, 9 urban mass transportation programs are examined. In energy, the 12 research and development programs were selected. Finally, from environment, the 12 water pollution programs were selected for analysis. Appendix A is a complete list of all of the programs covered by this analysis.

To link federal programs to interest groups, the **Congressional Information System (CIS)** is used to identify all interest groups that testified on behalf of the programs listed above. The CIS provides data on all of the interest groups and other parties that testify before Congress on specific matters. While it has been argued that the CIS does not provide an exhaustive list of the interest groups concerned with a given policy issue (Heinz, et al., 1993), it does provide a list of groups who consider visibility necessary. More directly, interest groups that engage in credit claiming as a maintenance strategy have to show program recipients evidence of their policy involvement. Consequently, participation in legislative hearings should be a high priority activity for credit claiming groups.
The CIS search identified 282 interest groups that testified on behalf of the programs listed above. A formal mail survey of these interest groups was then conducted. The survey instrument was mailed to the Executive Director of each interest group. If the executive director was unable to fill out the survey, he or she was asked to forward the survey to the group's governmental affairs director.

Of the original 282 interest groups, 30 surveys were returned as undeliverable. Of the remaining 252 mail survey, 97 were returned, for a response rate of 38%. Six of these interest groups were dropped from the analysis because the respondent identified the group as a 'non-membership' organization. As a result, much of the information needed for the analysis was missing or not applicable. For the remaining 91 interest groups, information was obtained on their policy agendas, credit claiming activities, communication with members, organizational resources, organizational structure, and selective benefit package. Appendix B is a complete list of the interest groups that responded to the mail survey, while Appendix C is the interest group survey.

2. OPERATIONAL MEASURES

A. Dependent Variables

1. Credit Claiming Activity

The dependent variable in the first stage of the analysis is the incidence of credit claiming by an interest group. Credit claiming activities are designed to inform and persuade program beneficiaries of an interest group's policy influence. Three different measures of credit claiming activity are examined in this analysis. The first measure of credit claiming is the incidence of activities that are directed toward parties inside of government. The second measure of credit claiming is the incidence of activities that are directed toward actual program recipients and/or the general public. The third and final measure of credit claiming is the incidence of all types of activities.
Dummy variables are created for each of nine policy influence activities mentioned in the interest group survey. These nine activities are:

1) publicizing the availability of federal grant programs to members
2) soliciting grant applications from group members
3) testifying before congressional (sub)committees on behalf of federal programs
4) lobbying individual agencies about rulemaking and/or program implementation
5) providing information on federal grant programs to the general public
6) lobbying individual members of Congress (or their staff) on behalf of federal programs
7) monitoring individual agencies regarding the grant award process
8) engaging in grassroots lobbying
9) serving on agency governing boards or working as consultants to agencies

Five of the activities listed can be classified as efforts to influence or monitor those inside government: testimony before congressional committees, lobbying individual members of Congress, lobbying agencies about rulemaking and implementation, monitoring agencies about the grant award process, and serving on agency governing boards or working as consultants to the agency. The remaining four activities: publicizing the availability of the program to group members, soliciting grant applications from group members, providing the general public with program information, and engaging in grassroots lobbying -- are efforts to influence other publics.

Table 3.2 lists the number (and agenda type -- discussed in the section on independent variables) of interest groups engaged in each of these activities. Table 3.2 makes it clear that the interest group leaders surveyed considered activities directed toward the government to be more important than activities directed toward other publics. More directly, the interest group leaders in the survey spent significant amounts of their time interacting with Congress and federal agencies. Almost 70% of the interest groups lobbied federal agencies and over 64% of the interest groups lobbied individual congressmen (and their staff). In addition, 60% of the interest groups provided testimony
before Congress. Finally, over 40% of the interest groups served on agency boards and over 27% of the interest groups were involved in monitoring agency rulemaking.

In contrast, only two of the activities directed toward the public exhibit similar numbers. Just under 50% of the interest groups were active in grassroots lobbying and 30% of the interest groups publicized the availability of a particular program to their members. Providing program information to the general public and direct solicitation of grant applications from members - were not as important to interest group leaders.

Table 3.2 Importance of Policy Influence Activities by Type of Interest Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Activity and Number of Groups</th>
<th>Particularistic Interest Groups (n=28)</th>
<th>Collective Interest Groups (n=44)</th>
<th>Mixed Agenda Interest Groups (n=19)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Activities Directed Toward Government</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congressional Testimony</td>
<td>16 (57.1%)</td>
<td>25 (56.8%)</td>
<td>13 (68.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54 (60%)</td>
<td>(50%)</td>
<td>(61.4%)</td>
<td>(89.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lobby Congressmen</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58 (64.4%)</td>
<td>(50%)</td>
<td>(61.4%)</td>
<td>(89.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lobby Agencies</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62 (68.9%)</td>
<td>(64.3%)</td>
<td>(68.2%)</td>
<td>(73.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitor Agencies</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 (27.8%)</td>
<td>(32.1%)</td>
<td>(20.4%)</td>
<td>(36.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serve on Agency Boards</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37 (41.1%)</td>
<td>(2.5%)</td>
<td>(47.7%)</td>
<td>(47.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Activities Directed Toward Public(s)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information - Members</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 (30%)</td>
<td>(21.4%)</td>
<td>(27.3%)</td>
<td>(47.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grant Applications-Members</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 (11.1%)</td>
<td>(11.4%)</td>
<td>(26.3%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information - Public</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 (20%)</td>
<td>(14.3%)</td>
<td>(20.4%)</td>
<td>(26.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grassroots Lobbying</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43 (47.8%)</td>
<td>(42.8%)</td>
<td>(50%)</td>
<td>(26.3%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This overall preference for government directed activities is also evident when examining the type of activity by the type of interest group. For particularistic policy agenda groups, the pattern of declining importance of various activities is as follows: agency lobbying (most important); congressional testimony; lobby congressmen (or
staff; grassroots lobbying; agency monitoring; serving on agency boards; publicizing the program to members; providing program information to the public; and soliciting grant applications from members (least important).

Collective policy agenda groups exhibit the same pattern as that noted for the total interest group sample population: agency lobbying (most important); lobby congressmen (or staff); congressional testimony; grassroots lobbying; serving on agency boards; publicizing the program to members; agency monitoring; providing program information to the public; and soliciting grant applications from members (least important).

Finally, mixed policy agenda groups exhibit the following pattern: lobby congressmen/staff (most important); agency lobbying; congressional testimony; serving on agency boards; publicizing the program to members; agency monitoring; grassroots lobbying; providing program information to the public; and soliciting grant applications from members. Of all the interest groups, mixed agenda groups were more aggressive in their use of all the various types of policy influence activities. It appears that having a more diverse portfolio of programs makes multiple influence strategies necessary for mixed agenda groups.

Factor analysis of each of the policy influence efforts listed above revealed two distinct dimensions. On the first dimension were lobbying federal agencies and lobbying individual congressmen (and/or their staff). Consequently, only these two actions will be used to measure activities directed toward the government. On the second dimension were publicizing the availability of the program to group members, solicitation of grant applications from members, and informing the general public about the program. These three actions will be used to measure activities directed toward other publics1. Finally,

---

1 Factor loadings for dimension one were: lobbying agencies 0.573 and lobbying congress 0.970. Factor loadings for dimension two were: publicize the availability of the program 0.811, solicit grant applications from group members 0.529, and provide the general public with program information 0.798.
the total incidence of policy influence efforts will be a summary measure of all the activities that an interest group pursues.

Credit claiming requires that the interest group informs the relevant parties that it is involved with each of these policy influence activities. Therefore, credit claiming is measured as the interaction between each of the policy influence activities specified above and the communication of these activities to interest group members. More specifically, an activity was called credit claiming only if in addition to being engaged in one of the policy influence activities, the group was also engaged in at least one of the following communication activities:

1) writing letters to members
2) publication of a magazine
3) regularly scheduled meetings
4) regularly scheduled seminars
5) telephone contact with members
6) regularly scheduled social events
7) use of electronic media

The interest group leaders surveyed viewed telephone contact with their members, letter writing, the use of electronic media, and meetings as the most important types of group communication. Telephone contact with their members was viewed as very important by over 90% of the interest group leaders. Writing letters was very important to over 82% of the respondents and the use of the electronic media was very important to over 70% of the interest group leaders. Meetings were seen as very important by 53% of the interest groups and the publication of an organizational magazine was seen as very important by 32% of the respondents. Seminars and social events were viewed as the least important means of communication by the interest group leaders, as 29% and 11% of the respondents respectively stated that these were very important means of communicating with their members.
The same results obtain when you examine communication activities by the type of interest group. In fact, the only difference between the three types of groups is the importance each assigns to magazine publications and seminars. Seminars are seen as more important than the publication of a magazine by interest groups with particularistic agendas. Collective agenda groups and mixed agenda groups prefer magazines to seminars.

Based on the interaction between policy influence efforts and communication, the three measures of credit claiming activity are: the total incidence of credit claiming activities (0-20); government directed activities (range 0-12); and activities toward other publics (0-10). Figure 1 provides information on the total incidence of credit claiming activities, in the aggregate, and by interest group policy type. Figure 2 provides information on government directed activities and Figure 3 provides information on credit claiming activities directed toward other publics, in the aggregate, and by interest group policy agenda type.

---

2 Importance of various types of communication for particularistic groups: writing letters (85.7%); magazine (32.1%); meetings (60.7%); seminars (35.7%); telephone calls to members (92.9%); social events (10.7%); and electronic media (67.9%). Importance of various types of communication for collective groups: writing letters (81.8%); magazine (38.6%); meetings (50%); seminars (22.7%); telephone calls to members (86.4%); social events (9.1%); and electronic media (68.2%). Importance of various types of communication for mixed agenda groups: writing letters (78.9%); magazine (47.4%); meetings (47.7%); seminars (31.6%); telephone calls to members (94.7%); social events (15.8%); and electronic media (78.9%).
Figure 1. Total Incidence of Credit Claiming Activities by Type of Interest Group Policy Agenda

Of the 91 interest groups studied, 18 did not engage in any type of credit claiming activity, representing 20% of the interest groups surveyed. Of these 18 interest groups, 7 were groups with particularistic agendas, 10 were groups with collective agendas, and 1 was a mixed agenda group. Twenty two interest groups (24.4%) were involved in between 1 to 5 credit claiming activities, with 13 (14.4%) of these groups involved in 4 activities. Another 29 interest groups (32.2%) were engaged in between 5 to 8 of activities. Twelve interest groups (13.3%) were involved in between 10 to 12 of these activities, with the remaining 9 interest groups (10%) engaged in between 15 to 20 credit claiming activities.

There are differences in the total incidence of credit claiming by the type of interest group policy agenda. The majority of interest groups with particularistic agendas engage in between 1 to 4 activities (36%), with 4 activities as the modal category. For collective agenda groups the majority of the groups engage in between 5 to 8 activities (over 37%), with 6 activities as the modal category. Finally, 6 activities was the modal category for mixed agenda groups, but the majority of these groups engage in 10 or more
activities (roughly 37%). As noted earlier, have a more diverse portfolio of programs may make mixed agenda groups more aggressive in their credit claiming activities.

**Figure 2. Credit Claiming Activities Directed Toward Government by Type of Interest Group Policy Agenda**

Turning to credit claiming activities directed toward government, 23 of the interest groups (25.5%) surveyed did not engage in any of these activities. Of these 23 groups, 9 had particularistic agendas, 13 had collective agendas, and 1 was a mixed agenda interest group. Seventeen interest groups (18.9%) were engaged in 4 of these activities, the modal category, while 37 groups (41.1%) were engaged in between 5 and 12 government directed activities. The 13 remaining interest groups (14.4%) were engaged in 1 to 3 government directed activities.

For credit claiming activities directed toward government, the majority of both particularistic and collective agenda groups engage in 5 or more of these activities (35.7% and 35.6% respectively). Similarly, 4 government directed activities is the modal directed category for both groups. Mixed agenda groups were evenly split between engaging in between 1 to 4 activities, and 5 to 12 activities (both 47.4%).
Finally, for credit claiming directed toward other publics 60 groups (two-thirds of the groups surveyed) did not engage in any of these activities. Twenty-two groups had particularistic agendas, 29 groups had collective agendas, and 9 groups had mixed policy agendas. Five interest groups (5.5%) were engaged in 3 activities and five groups were involved in 6 public directed activities. Four interest groups (4.4%) each were involved in 2, 4, and 8 activities.

Almost 79% of the interest groups with particularistic agendas were not involved in any public directed activities and of the remaining groups, none were engaged in more than 1 public directed activity. For interest groups with collective agendas, 67% of the groups were not involved in any public directed activities, and 4 groups were engaged in 2 activities (the modal category). Finally, 47% of the mixed agenda groups were not involved in any credit claiming activity, with 3 groups engaged in 3 of these activities.

2. Interest Group Maintenance

The dependent variable used to measure interest group maintenance is new member recruitment. following the analysis in Chapter 2 using the Walker data. Given
the importance that the credit claiming model places on interest group membership, leadership activities designed to increase the number of members are critical to maintenance. A dummy variable was created for the question dealing with efforts to increase membership-scored 1 if group leaders considered recruitment very important and 0 otherwise. Based on this coding scheme, 43 interest groups felt that new member recruitment was critical to the organization and 48 interest groups did not.

B. Independent Variables 1: Internal Influences

1. Policy Agendas

The principal independent variable is the interest group’s policy agenda - particularistic, collective, or mixed. An interest group’s policy agenda was determined by the attributes of the federal program(s) that the interest group lobbied for. Dummy variables were created for homogeneity, discretion, recurrence, intermediary agent, and the program recipient - individual or organization. Each program could take on a value between 0, i.e., no program attributes associated with particularized benefits; and 5, i.e., all of the program attributes associated with particularized benefits.

A group’s policy agenda score was determined by summing across federal program attributes for each program the group lobbied for and then dividing by the number of programs identified for each group. Interest groups that received an agenda score of below 3 were coded as collective agenda groups; groups that received a score of 3 were coded as mixed agenda groups; and groups that scored above 3 were coded as particularistic agenda groups. Based on this coding scheme, 43 groups have collective agendas, 19 groups have mixed policy agendas, and 28 groups have particularistic agendas.
2. Interest Group Resources

There are 3 measures of interest group resources. The first two, the size of the membership and the size of the group’s budget are measured as the natural logs of these variables. The third measure, the stability of the interest group’s membership, is a dummy variable, scored 1 if group membership was declining (n=10) or stable (n=38), and 0 if the membership was increasing. Forty eight interest groups had memberships that were either declining or stable, and the remaining 43 interest groups had memberships that were increasing.

When examining the raw values, there was a tremendous range in both the size of interest group memberships and their budgets. The smallest interest group in the sample had a membership of only 8 (institutional representatives), while the largest group had almost 7 million (individual) members. This leads to a mean membership size of just under 119,000, and a median group size of 1,016. For interest group budgets, the smallest was just under $31,000 and the largest was $200 million. The mean size of the interest group budget was $14.46 million, and the median budget was $2.4 million. As with the staff measure in the previous chapter, the impact of the size of interest group membership and the group's budget are expected to taper off at higher levels, so log values are used in the analysis.

3. Organizational Structure

Represented interest is measured using a series of dummy variables for each type of interest group member. Based on this coding scheme there were 35 institutional interest groups, 32 individuals interest groups, and 24 mixed membership interest groups in the sample. The mixed membership group is the excluded category in the models.
Organized subunits is also a dummy variable, scored 1 if group has organized bodies below the central office and 0 if it does not. Forty-one interest groups did have organized subunits and the remaining 50 groups did not.

The age of the interest group was calculated by subtracting the year the organization was founded from 1995. Interest group organizational ages ranged from 1 - 148 years; with a mean age of 52 and a median age of 45.

The diversity of the group's funding source was determined by creating dummy variables for the twelve funding sources mentioned in the survey and summing across all types. All of the groups have at least one of the funding source listed in the survey, with 52% of the sample having 5 or fewer of these sources. None of the interest groups scored higher than a 10 on this measure.

4. Selective Benefits Package

Respondents were asked about the principal benefits provided to members of the organization, and a dummy variable was created for each type of benefit. The selective benefit categories are summary scores of these responses. Material benefits include: in-service training, conferences and meetings, low-cost insurance, publications, organized trips or tours, and discounts on consumer goods. Here, an interest group could receive a score from zero to six.

Most interest groups in the sample (76%) responded that only one of the material benefits was important to their members; 4 groups did not consider any of the material benefits important; and 13 groups considered 2 of the material benefits important. Four interest groups felt that 3 of the material benefits were important, and none of the interest groups scored higher than 3 on this measure.

Purposive benefits include: advocacy for important policies, representation of members' opinions before government agencies, and opportunity for participation in
public affairs. Sixty four interest group leaders (72%) responded that all 3 of the purposive benefits were important to their members. Only 2 interest groups did not feel that any of the purposive benefits were important; 7 groups felt that only one purposive benefit was important; and 16 group leaders felt that 2 of the purposive benefits were important.

Finally, solidary benefits were measured with one question, friendship with other group members. Sixty six (73%) interest group leaders felt that the solidary benefits were important to their members.

**D. Independent Variables 2: External Influences**

Interest group leaders were asked if there were other groups with similar goals or purposes with whom their group competed for new members or other resources. Group competition is a dummy variable, 1 if group does experience competition for members and 0 otherwise. There were 31 interest groups experiencing competition for group members.

Interest group leaders were also asked if there were groups with whom their group found itself in disagreement or opposition over policy. Group conflict is also a dummy variable, 1 if the interest group does experience policy conflict with other groups and 0 otherwise. Thirty interest groups were involved in policy conflicts with other interest groups. Competition and conflict are expected to have an indirect effect on credit claiming and maintenance through their interaction with interest group policy agendas.

Table 3.3 reports the descriptive statistics for each of the independent variables included in this analysis.
Table 3.3 Descriptive Statistics: 1995 Interest Group Survey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Name</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>STD</th>
<th>Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit Claiming Activities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parties Inside Government</td>
<td>4.267</td>
<td>3.499</td>
<td>0; 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parties Outside Government</td>
<td>1.667</td>
<td>2.816</td>
<td>0; 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Incidence</td>
<td>5.933</td>
<td>4.829</td>
<td>0; 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Member Recruitment</td>
<td>0.472</td>
<td>0.502</td>
<td>0; 1</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Internal Influences</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Agendas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Particularistic</td>
<td>0.308</td>
<td>0.464</td>
<td>0; 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective</td>
<td>0.483</td>
<td>0.502</td>
<td>0; 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>0.209</td>
<td>0.409</td>
<td>0; 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Group Resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Size of Membership</td>
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<td>728,825</td>
<td>8; 6,900,000</td>
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<td>Stability of Membership</td>
<td>0.472</td>
<td>0.502</td>
<td>0; 1</td>
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<td>Size of Budget</td>
<td>14,457,943</td>
<td>33,289,041</td>
<td>30780; 200,000,000</td>
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<td>Organizational Structure</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Represented Interest - (Individuals)</td>
<td>0.351</td>
<td>0.480</td>
<td>0; 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Represented Interest - (Organizations)</td>
<td>0.385</td>
<td>0.489</td>
<td>0; 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Represented Interest - (Mixed)</td>
<td>0.264</td>
<td>0.443</td>
<td>0; 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organized Subunits</td>
<td>0.450</td>
<td>0.500</td>
<td>0; 1</td>
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<td>Interest Group Age</td>
<td>51.835</td>
<td>34.234</td>
<td>1; 145</td>
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<td>Interest Group Funding</td>
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<td>2.401</td>
<td>1; 10</td>
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<td>Selective Benefit Package</td>
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<td>Material</td>
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<td>0; 3</td>
</tr>
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<td>Solidary</td>
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<tr>
<td>Purposive</td>
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<td>0.737</td>
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<td>Interest Group Conflict</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Group Competition</td>
<td>0.344</td>
<td>0.478</td>
<td>0; 1</td>
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</table>

3A. RESULTS - CREDIT CLAIMING ACTIVITY

A. The Incidence of Credit Claiming Activity Directed Toward Government

Table 3.4a reports the regression estimates for credit claiming activities directed toward government. The excluded categories in this analysis are the mixed policy
agenda, mixed membership (autonomous individuals and organization representatives)

interest groups.

**Table 3.4a OLS Estimates for the Incidence of Credit Claiming**

**Activity Directed Toward Government**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1 Coefficient</th>
<th>t-value</th>
<th>Model 2 Coefficient</th>
<th>t-value</th>
<th>Model 3 Coefficient</th>
<th>t-value</th>
<th>Model 4 Coefficient</th>
<th>t-value</th>
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<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
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<td>0.658</td>
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<td>(2.211)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(2.169)</td>
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<td>(2.732)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Particularistic</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-0.708</td>
<td>-1.016</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.697)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.704)</td>
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<td>Collective</td>
<td>-2.099</td>
<td>-1.938*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.757</td>
<td>3.196***</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.841</td>
<td>3.368***</td>
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<td>(0.547)</td>
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<td>Material Benefits</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-0.708</td>
<td>-1.016</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-0.582</td>
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<td>Purposive Benefits</td>
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<td>Interest Group Competition</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-0.476</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interest Group Conflict</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>1.132</td>
<td>1.335</td>
<td>2.860</td>
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<td>(1.728)</td>
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<td><strong>Constraints*Agenda Interactions</strong></td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-0.599</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conflict*Particularistic</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-1.172</td>
<td>-0.599</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conflict*Collective</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-3.978</td>
<td>-1.894*</td>
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<td>0.550</td>
<td>-0.776</td>
<td>-0.655</td>
<td>0.180</td>
<td>0.153</td>
<td>0.173</td>
<td>0.144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Represented Interest-Organizations</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.185)</td>
<td>(1.185)</td>
<td>(1.179)</td>
<td>(1.205)</td>
<td>(1.205)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Represented Interest-Individuals</td>
<td>-0.675</td>
<td>-0.666</td>
<td>-0.745</td>
<td>-0.750</td>
<td>-0.829</td>
<td>-0.809</td>
<td>0.032</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.013)</td>
<td>(0.994)</td>
<td>(1.024)</td>
<td>(1.024)</td>
<td>(1.000)</td>
<td>(1.000)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organized Subunits</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
<td>-0.011</td>
<td>-0.080</td>
<td>-0.093</td>
<td>0.239</td>
<td>0.267</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
<td>-0.018</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.888)</td>
<td>(0.857)</td>
<td>(0.894)</td>
<td>(0.894)</td>
<td>(0.831)</td>
<td>(0.831)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity of Funding Sources</td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td>0.557</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>0.255</td>
<td>0.079</td>
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<td>0.127</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.186)</td>
<td>(0.172)</td>
<td>(0.188)</td>
<td>(0.188)</td>
<td>(0.180)</td>
<td>(0.180)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of Interest Group</td>
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<td>1.464</td>
<td>0.012</td>
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<td>0.746</td>
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<td>(0.013)</td>
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<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interest Group Resources</strong></td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.479</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>1.080</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>1.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Group Budget</td>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.009)</td>
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<td>(0.009)</td>
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<td>Interest Group</td>
<td>0.002</td>
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<td>-0.178</td>
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<td>-0.013</td>
<td>-0.071</td>
<td>-0.192</td>
<td>-0.969</td>
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<tr>
<td>Membership</td>
<td>(0.183)</td>
<td>(0.194)</td>
<td>(0.184)</td>
<td>(0.184)</td>
<td>(0.198)</td>
<td>(0.198)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stability of Membership</td>
<td>2.045</td>
<td>2.425**</td>
<td>1.924</td>
<td>2.431**</td>
<td>1.972</td>
<td>2.367**</td>
<td>1.606</td>
<td>1.995**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.843)</td>
<td>(0.791)</td>
<td>(0.833)</td>
<td>(0.821)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R-Square</td>
<td>0.69%</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, ****p<0.001

Number of Observations: 76

NOTE: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Model 1

Columns 1 and 2 are the results for the policy agenda model, which asks how well interest group policy agendas explain the use of government directed credit claiming activities -- lobbying Congress and agencies and communicating those activities. The model explains 6.6% of the sample variance and the results for particularistic and collective policy agendas are statistically significant. Interest groups with particularistic and collective agendas engage in fewer government directed credit claiming activities than mixed policy agenda groups. Particularistic and collective agendas are each associated with on average, a 2.09 unit decrease in these activities. These results are unexpected, as interest groups with particularistic agendas were expected to engage in more government directed credit claiming activities than all other types of groups. Instead, mixed agenda interest groups spend more time on these activities.

The only other regressor to obtain statistical significance is the impact of membership instability and these results are consistent with expectations. Interest groups with a stable membership or those experiencing a decline in membership, engaged in on average, 2 more government directed credit claiming activities. As expected, these interest groups appear to be more willing to incur the costs of lobbying government actors and publicizing their efforts. Neither of the other interest group resources -- membership size or budget -- were statistically significant, but the results were in the expected direction.

None of the interest group structural variables are statistically significant. Moreover, only the results for the age of the interest groups are in the predicted direction.

Model 2

The results for the selective benefits model are listed in columns 3 and 4. Here the question is how well the interest group's selective benefit package explains
government directed credit claiming activities. This model does a better job than the policy agenda model in explaining the incidence of government directed credit claiming activities, accounting for 13.8% of the sample variance.

As predicted, purposive benefits have a positive and statistically significant affect on government directed credit claiming activities. The provision of purposive benefits is associated with a 1.76 unit increase in government directed credit claiming activity by interest groups. Purposive benefits -- advocacy for important policies, representation of members' opinions before government agencies, and the opportunity for participation in public affairs -- requires a group to engage in government directed credit claiming activities and the findings support this argument. Results for material and solidarity benefits are not statistically significant, but the results are in the expected direction.

Once again, the results for the impact of membership instability are statistically significant and consistent with expectations. Interest groups with stable memberships or those experiencing a decline in membership, engaged in just under 2 more government directed credit claiming activities. When membership stability is an issue, interest groups become more aggressive in contacting government and publicizing their efforts. As in the policy agenda model, neither of the other interest group resources were statistically significant, and only the results for interest group budgets were in the expected direction.

None of the interest group structural variables are statistically significant. The results for represented interest (organizations), and the age of the interest groups are in the expected direction. The results for all other structural regressors -- represented interest (individuals), organized subunits, and funding sources are not in the predicted direction.
Model 3

In columns 5 and 6 are the results for the external constraints model. Here, the impact that other interest groups have on government directed credit claiming activity is examined. Factors outside of the interest group’s control, competition for interest group members and policy conflict with other groups are investigated. The external constraints model explains only 3.5% of the sample variance, a poorer performance than either of the previous models. More importantly, neither competition nor conflict have a significant impact on government directed credit claiming activity.

Only the results for membership instability are statistically significant. Once again, interest groups having either a stable membership or those experiencing a decline in membership engage in almost 2 more government directed credit claiming activities. The results for the size of the group membership and the size of the budget are not significant, and only the results for the latter are in the expected direction.

None of the interest group structural variables are statistically significant. The results for organized subunits and the age of the interest groups are in the expected direction. The results for the other structural regressors -- represented interest (organizations and individuals), and funding sources are not in the predicted direction.

Model 4

Columns 7 and 8 are the results for the fully specified model of government directed credit claiming activity. Here, each of the 3 classes of major independent variables introduced previously are included in the model. The model explains 18.9% of the variance, a significant improvement over the three previous models.

There is evidence that external factors matter as policy conflict has both a direct and an indirect effect on government directed credit claiming activity. Policy conflict with other interest groups is associated with an increase of almost 3 government directed
credit claiming activities. Here, the challenge offered by other interest groups for influence makes it necessary for all interest groups to be more aggressive in their credit claiming activities.

However, the group’s policy agenda also matters and must be taken into account. In particular, for interest groups with collective agendas, conflict with other interest groups leads these groups to engage in fewer government directed credit claiming activities. These findings run counter to expectations, as policy conflict was expected to make interest groups with collective agendas engage in more government directed activities. The results for the impact of policy conflict on interest groups with particularistic agendas are not statistically significant, but they are in the expected direction. Neither collective or particularistic policy agendas have a direct effect on government directed credit claiming.

Selective benefits continue to have an effect on government directed credit claiming activity. Here, the provision of purposive benefits, with their policy component, is associated with an increase in 2 government directed activities. As noted earlier, the provision of purposive benefits requires that an interest group contact government actors. The results for material and solidary benefits are not statistically significant, but they again are in the expected direction.

The results for the instability of the interest group’s membership are statistically significant and in the predicted direction. Having a stable or declining membership leads interest group leaders to engage in 1.5 more government directed credit claiming activities than groups experiencing growth. The results for the size of the group’s membership and its budget are not statistically significant; and only the results for the latter are in the expected direction.
Finally, none of the structural variables are statistically significant; and only the results for organized subunits and the age of the interest group are in the predicted direction.

**Summary: Credit Claiming Activity Directed Toward Government**

Several points are worth noting given the analysis of credit claiming activities directed toward government. First, when examining the 3 sets variables of major theoretical importance independently, the selective benefit model explains more of the variance than either policy agendas or external constraints. More directly, the provision of purposive benefits is the best predictor of government directed credit claiming activity. As noted previously, these benefits require that interest group leaders stay in contact with government actors and the empirical results support this statement.

Second, external factors, in particular, policy conflict with other interest groups has an impact on credit claiming activity directed toward government. Having other interest groups seeking to influence policy outcomes in their favor makes interest groups more aggressive in their attempts to contact government actors. Here, notions of countervailing power are borne out, as the mobilization of one set of interest groups leads to the counter-mobilization of other interest groups.

Finally, interest group policy agendas also have an impact on government directed credit claiming activity. In the policy agenda model, interest groups with particularistic and collective agendas engaged in fewer government directed credit claiming activities than mixed agenda groups. Only the results for collective agenda groups are in the expected direction however. As interest groups with particularistic agendas were expected to engage in more government directed credit claiming activities than other groups. In the fully specified model, the interaction between collective agendas and policy conflict was also significant, but not in the anticipated direction.
B. The Incidence of Credit Claiming Activity Directed Toward Other Publics

Table 3.4b reports the regression estimates for credit claiming activity directed toward other publics. The excluded categories in this analysis are again the mixed agenda, mixed membership (autonomous individuals and organization representatives) interest groups.

Table 3.4b OLS Estimates for the Incidence of Credit Claiming Activity Directed Toward Other Publics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>t-value</td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>t-value</td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
</tr>
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<td>Constant</td>
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<td>0.305</td>
<td>1.299</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.565)</td>
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<td>(2.006)</td>
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<td>(1.604)</td>
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<td>Policy Agenda</td>
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<tr>
<td>Particularistic</td>
<td>-2.704</td>
<td>-3.188***</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.848)</td>
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<td>Collective</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.766)</td>
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<td>Selective Benefit Package</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Material Benefits</td>
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<td>0.126</td>
<td>0.227</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.558)</td>
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<td>Purposive Benefits</td>
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<td>0.079</td>
<td>0.179</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.440)</td>
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<td>Solidary Benefits</td>
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<td>0.404</td>
<td>0.550</td>
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<td>(0.735)</td>
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<td>External Constraints</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.617</td>
<td>-0.972</td>
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<td>Competition</td>
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<td>(0.635)</td>
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<td>Interest Group Conflict</td>
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<td>-0.520</td>
<td>-0.655</td>
<td>-1.011</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.623)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.648)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Interest Group Structure</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Represented Interest-Organizations</td>
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<td>1.555</td>
<td>0.536</td>
<td>0.565</td>
<td>0.752</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.838)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.949)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.872)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Represented Interest-Individuals</td>
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<td>-1.072</td>
<td>-1.348</td>
<td>-1.013</td>
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<td>(0.717)</td>
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<td>(0.795)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.757)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organized Subunits</td>
<td>-0.479</td>
<td>-0.763</td>
<td>-0.220</td>
<td>-0.321</td>
<td>-0.154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.628)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.686)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.661)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity of Funding Sources</td>
<td>0.624</td>
<td>4.745****</td>
<td>0.495</td>
<td>3.593***</td>
<td>0.526</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.132)</td>
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<td>(1.138)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.139)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of Interest Group</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-0.372</td>
<td>-0.010</td>
<td>-1.017</td>
<td>-0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Group Resources</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Group Budget</td>
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<td>-1.160</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-0.440</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.006)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interest Group Membership</td>
<td>-0.165</td>
<td>-1.274</td>
<td>-0.134</td>
<td>-0.864</td>
<td>-0.082</td>
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<td>(0.130)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.155)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.136)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stability of Membership</td>
<td>0.439</td>
<td>0.735</td>
<td>0.395</td>
<td>0.940</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.397)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.633)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.616)</td>
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</table>

Adjusted R-Square: 29.8% 18.4% 20.8% 27.8%

*p<0.10  **p<0.01  ***p<0.005  ****p<0.0001

Number of Observations: 76

NOTE: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Model 1

Columns 1 and 2 are again the results for the policy agenda model. This model asks how well interest group policy agendas explain credit claiming activities directed toward other publics and this model explains 29.8% of the sample variance. The first thing to notice is the strong, negative effect that particularistic agendas have on credit claiming directed toward other publics - i.e. interest group members and the general public. Interest groups with particularistic policy agendas engage in 2.7 fewer of these activities than interest groups with mixed policy agendas. These results are inconsistent with expectations as groups with particularistic agendas were expected to engage in more of these activities than other groups.

While the results are not as strong for interest groups with collective policy agendas, these groups also engage in fewer credit claiming activities directed toward other publics than mixed agenda groups. In particular, collective agenda groups engage in on average, 1.4 fewer credit claiming activities directed toward their members or the general public.

The only other variable to obtain statistical significance is interest group funding sources. More diverse funding sources are associated with more credit claiming activities directed toward other publics. Having more parties or audiences contributing money to an interest group makes the group engage in, on average, 0.62 more credit claiming activities. These results are unexpected as multiple audiences were expected to reduce the group's use of credit claiming activities.

The results for the remaining group structure variables -- represented interest (organizations and individuals), organized subunits, and the age of the group -- are not statistically significant. Moreover, the directionality on each of these regressors, run counter to expectations. As a result, when credit claiming activity directed toward other
publics is examined, there is only limited support is found for Hinckley and Hill’s (1995) argument about the importance of organizational structure.

None of the results for interest group resources are statistically significant. Moreover, with the exception of the results for membership instability, none of the coefficients are in the expected direction.

**Model 2**

The results for the selective benefits model are listed in columns 3 and 4. Here the question is how well the interest group’s selective benefit package explains credit claiming activity directed towards other publics. This model does a poorer job than the policy agenda model in explaining the incidence of credit claiming activities, accounting for 18.4% of the sample variance. None of the selective benefits have a statistically significant affect on credit claiming activities, but the results for purposive and solidarity benefits are in the expected direction, while the results for material benefits are not.

Group structure matters, as again interest group funding sources are statistically significant. Interest groups that receive money from more types of sources, engage in 0.50 more credit claiming activities. While statistically significant, these findings are not consistent with expectations, as having more diverse funding sources was expected to have a negative effect on credit claiming activity directed toward other publics.

Once again, none of the other organizational structure variables are statistically significant, nor are the results in the expected direction.

None of the results for interest group resources are statistically significant. Again, with the exception of the results for membership instability, none of the coefficients are in the expected direction.
Model 3

In columns 5 and 6 are the results from the external constraints model. Competition for interest group members and policy conflict with other groups are added. The addition of these external factors explains just under 21% of the sample variance. Neither competition for group members nor policy conflict have a statistically significant impact on credit claiming activity directed toward other publics.

Once again, only the results for interest group funding sources are statistically significant. Interest groups that have more funding sources engage in more credit claiming activities directed toward other publics than other groups. On average, interest groups with more funding sources engaged in 0.53 more of these activities than groups with fewer funding sources. None of the other organizational structure variables are statistically significant, and again, the results are not in the expected direction.

Interest group resources do not have a statistically significant impact on credit claiming activities directed toward other publics. The results for the size of the budget and the size of the membership are not in the expected direction, but the results for the stability of the membership are in the expected direction.

Model 4

Columns 7 and 8 are the results for the fully specified model of credit claiming directed toward other publics\(^3\). The first thing to notice is that this model explains 27.8% of the sample variance, a poorer performance than Model 1, the policy agenda model. Not surprisingly therefore, the results for the fully specified model mirror the findings noted for the policy agenda model.

---

\(^3\) The results for the interactions between competition and policy agendas and conflict and policy agendas were not statistically significant. Consequently, the interactions were dropped from the analysis.
Particularistic and collective policy agendas have an impact on credit claiming directed toward other publics. Particularistic agendas have a marked, negative effect as these interest groups engage in almost 3 fewer of credit claiming activities than interest groups with mixed policy agendas. The results for collective agenda groups are not as strong as those for groups with particularistic agendas, but these groups are still less active than mixed agenda groups, as they engage in on average, 1.5 fewer credit claiming activities.

The only other variable to obtain statistical significance is interest group funding sources. More diverse funding sources are associated with more credit claiming activities directed toward other publics. Having more parties or audiences contributing money to an interest group makes the group engage in, on average, 0.64 more of these credit claiming activities.

The results for the remaining group structure variables -- represented interest (organizations and individuals), organized subunits, and the age of the group -- are not statistically significant. Moreover, the directionality on each of these regressors, run counter to expectations. None of the results for interest group resources are statistically significant and with the exception of the results for membership instability, none of the coefficients are in the expected direction.

**Summary: Credit Claiming Activity Directed Toward Other Publics**

When examining credit claiming activities are directed toward interest group members and the general public, only the interest group's policy agenda and the diversity of its funding sources are important. Both particularistic and collective agenda groups engage in fewer of these activities than mixed agenda groups. Having both a diverse program portfolio and a diverse membership (represented interests individuals and
organizations) concerned with its policy efforts requires more aggressive credit claiming activity by mixed agenda groups.

Similar statements may be made as to the impact of having a more diverse source of funding. Having to respond to the concerns of each different class of contributor to the group's resource base may lead these groups to engage in multiple strategies, that allow them to address different audiences.

None of the other major classes of independent variables were significant. Neither the interest group's selective benefit package nor external constraints impact credit claiming activity directed toward other publics. These results are interesting, given that both sets of variables were important when examining credit claiming directed toward government. Moreover, the stability of the group membership, which was so important for government directed activity, did not have an impact on efforts directed toward group members or the general public.

There is ample support for the argument that the factors that contribute to a group's use of credit claiming activities directed toward other publics are significantly different from the factors that contribute to government directed activities.

C. The Incidence of All Types of Credit Claiming

Table 3.4c reports the regression estimates for the incidence of all types of credit claiming activities by interest groups. The excluded categories in this analysis are the mixed agenda, mixed membership interest groups.
Table 3.4c OLS Estimates for the Incidence of All Types of Credit Claiming Activity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>t-value</td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>t-value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>5.208</td>
<td>1.872*</td>
<td>-1.037</td>
<td>-0.307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.782)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(3.377)</td>
<td>(2.862)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Particularistic Policy</td>
<td>-4.804</td>
<td>-3.185****</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agenda</td>
<td>(1.508)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.893)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective Policy Agenda</td>
<td>-3.499</td>
<td>-2.568***</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.362)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.741)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selective Benefit Package</td>
<td>Material Benefits</td>
<td>-0.582</td>
<td>-0.620</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.929)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.971)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Purposive Benefits</td>
<td>-1.836</td>
<td>2.478**</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.741)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.237)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Solidary Benefits</td>
<td>0.866</td>
<td>0.700</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.237)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.218)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Constraints</td>
<td>Interest Group</td>
<td>-1.093</td>
<td>-0.965</td>
<td>-1.093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.133)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.119)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Competition</td>
<td>0.806</td>
<td>0.720</td>
<td>-0.107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.133)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.119)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interest Group Conflict</td>
<td>-1.093</td>
<td>-0.965</td>
<td>-1.093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.133)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.119)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Group Structure</td>
<td>Represented Interest- Organizations</td>
<td>1.956</td>
<td>1.312</td>
<td>-0.240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.491)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.598)</td>
<td>(1.556)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Represented Interest- Individuals</td>
<td>-1.421</td>
<td>-1.115</td>
<td>-1.818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.275)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.339)</td>
<td>(1.351)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Organized Subunits</td>
<td>-0.489</td>
<td>-0.349</td>
<td>-0.300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.117)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.154)</td>
<td>(1.180)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Diversity of Funding Sources</td>
<td>0.728</td>
<td>3.112****</td>
<td>0.539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.234)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.232)</td>
<td>(0.248)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Age of Interest Group</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>0.954</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Group Resources</td>
<td>Interest Group Budget</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-0.272</td>
<td>0.066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interest Group</td>
<td>-0.164</td>
<td>-0.710</td>
<td>-0.312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.231)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.262)</td>
<td>(0.243)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Membership</td>
<td>2.481</td>
<td>2.341**</td>
<td>2.519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.061)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.066)</td>
<td>(1.066)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adjusted R-Square: 22.5%  17.8%  11.8%  27.8%
*p <0.10  **p<0.05  ***p<0.01  ****p<0.005  *****p<0.001

Number of Observations: 76

NOTE: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

Model 1

In columns 1 and 2 are the results from the policy agenda model. Here the question is how well the interest group's policy agenda explains the incidence of all types of credit claiming activity. The model explains 22.5% of the variance in the sample and the results for both interest group policy agendas are statistically significant. Interest groups with particularistic agendas engage in almost 5 fewer credit claiming activities than interest groups with mixed agendas. Similarly, interest groups with collective
agendas engage in 3.5 fewer credit claiming activities than interest groups with mixed
agendas.

The diversity of the interest group’s funding sources has a positive impact on the
overall incidence of credit claiming activity. Interest groups with a more diverse
population of contributors engage in, on average, 0.73 more credit claiming activities.
None of the other interest group structure variables are statistically significant and only
the results for the age of the interest group are in the expected direction.

Interest group resources matter as groups with stable memberships or
experiencing a decline engage in almost 2.5 more credit claiming activities than other
groups. Neither of the other interest group resources are statistically significant and the
results for both the size of the membership and the size of the budget are not in the
expected direction.

Model 2

In columns 3 and 4 are the results from the selective benefits model. This model
asks how well selective benefits explain the incidence of all types of credit claiming
activity, and the model explains 17.8% of the variance in the sample. As predicted,
purposive benefits, which have a policy component, are positively related to credit
claiming. Each additional purposive benefit an interest group provides is associated with
an increase in overall credit claiming activity. In particular, providing purposive benefits
leads interest groups to engage in 2 additional credit claiming activities. Neither of the
other selective benefits are statistically significant, but the results for both material and
solidary benefits are in the expected direction.

The diversity of the interest group’s funding sources has a positive impact on the
overall incidence of credit claiming activity. Interest groups with a more diverse
population of contributors engage in, on average, 0.54 more credit claiming activities.
None of the other interest group structure variables are statistically significant. Only the results for represented interest (organizations) and the age of the interest group are in the expected direction.

Interest group resources matter as groups with stable memberships or experiencing a decline engage in over 2.5 more credit claiming activities than other groups. Neither of the other interest group resources are statistically significant and the results for the size of the membership are not in the expected direction; while the results for the size of the budget are in the expected direction.

**Model 3**

In columns 5 and 6 are the results for the external constraints model. The impact that other interest groups have on the overall incidence of credit claiming is examined as competition for group members and policy conflict are added. The variance explained by the model is only 11.8%, a decline relative to the two previous models. The results for the impact of competition for interest group members and policy conflict are not statistically significant.

Once again, the diversity of the interest group’s funding sources has a positive impact on the overall incidence of credit claiming activity. Interest groups with a more diverse population of contributors engage in, on average, 0.60 more credit claiming activities. None of the other interest group structure variables are statistically significant. Only the results for organized subunits and the age of the interest group are in the expected direction.

Interest group resources again have an impact as groups with stable memberships or experiencing a decline engage in almost 2.7 more credit claiming activities than other groups. Neither of the other interest group resources are statistically significant and the
results for the size of the membership are not in the expected direction; while the results for the size of the budget are in the expected direction.

Model 4

In columns 7 and 8 are the results for the fully specified model for all types of credit claiming activities\(^4\) which explains 27.8\% of the sample variance. This represents a 5-point improvement over the closest competitor, the policy agenda model. Policy agenda differences are important, as both particularistic and collective agenda groups engage in fewer credit claiming activities than mixed agenda groups. These results are mixed, as particularistic agenda groups were expected to engage in more credit claiming activities than any other type of group.

The selective benefits provided by the interest group also affects the incidence of all types of credit claiming activity. Purposive benefits, which address interest group members desire for policy influence, are associated with an increase of almost 2 credit claiming activities. Once again, results for material and solidarity benefits are not statistically significant, but the findings are in the predicted direction.

Competition for interest group members and policy conflict do not have a direct effect on the incidence of all types of credit claiming activities. When making a decision as to the number, rather than the type of credit claiming activity to pursue, the behavior of other interest groups does not have an impact.

The diversity of the interest group's funding sources continues to have a positive impact on the incidence of all types of credit claiming activity. Interest groups with a more diverse population of contributors engage in, on average, 0.80 more credit claiming

\(^4\) Once again, the results for the interactions between competition and policy agendas, and conflict and policy agendas were not statistically significant, and they were dropped from the analysis.
activities. None of the other interest group structure variables are statistically significant. Moreover, only the results for the age of the interest group are in the expected direction.

Interest group resources again have an impact as groups with stable memberships or experiencing a decline engage in almost 2.3 more credit claiming activities than other groups. Neither of the other interest group resources are statistically significant and the results for the size of the membership are not in the expected direction; while the results for the size of the budget are in the expected direction.

**Summary: The Incidence of All Types of Credit Claiming Activity**

Several points are worth noting given the analysis of the incidence of all types of credit claiming activity. First, when examining the 3 sets variables of major theoretical importance independently, the interest group’s policy agenda is the best predictor of credit claiming activity. Both particularistic and collective agenda groups engage in fewer of these activities than mixed agenda groups. As noted previously, having both a diverse program portfolio and a diverse membership (represented interests individuals and organizations) concerned with its policy efforts appears to require more aggressive credit claiming activity by mixed agenda groups.

Second, the provision of purposive benefits is also important. As noted previously, these benefits require that interest group leaders stay involved in the policy process and the empirical results support this statement.

Third, similar statements may be made as to the impact of having a more diverse source of funding. Having to respond to the concerns of each different class of contributor to the group’s resource base leads interest groups to engage in more credit claiming activity, which allows them to address different audiences.

Fourth, interest group resources matter. Interest groups with more diverse funding sources are more involved in credit claiming activities than interest groups with
fewer funding sources. Finally, external constraints do not have an impact on the total number of credit claiming activities that interest group pursue.

D. Summary: Credit Claiming Activity

In examining the incidence of credit claiming activities by interest groups several issues are worth noting. First, credit claiming activities are different. The results for credit claiming activities directed toward government are different from the results for credit claiming activities directed toward other publics. Future examinations of credit claiming activity by interest group leaders must be sensitive to these findings.

Second, policy agenda differences do have an impact on credit claiming activity. When examining all three measures of credit claiming activity, particularistic and collective agenda groups were less involved in these activities than mixed agenda groups.

Third, selective benefits also contribute to credit claiming activity. In 2 of 3 models of credit claiming, purposive benefits had a positive impact on groups engaging in these activities. For those interest groups that value purposive benefits, activities designed to influence policy are critical.

Fourth, external constraints appear to affect the choice of preferred credit claiming activity, but not the number. Only when the focus of credit claiming activity was government, was the impact of other interest groups significant.

Fifth, there are instances when group organizational structure matters. In particular, for interest groups engaged in credit claiming activity, who funds their organization makes a difference. Multiple audiences or constituencies were expected to reduce credit claiming. Instead, in 2 of 3 cases it appears that having multiple publics committing resources to the group means that interest group leaders are willing to work harder to make sure their supporters are well-informed. Here, the additional costs of
keeping multiple publics informed may be outweighed by the benefits of not being too
dependent upon any one set of supporters for continued maintenance.

Finally, interest group resources matter. In 2 of 3 cases interest groups with stable
or declining memberships were more aggressive in their credit claiming efforts than other
interest groups.

Now that the pursuit of credit claiming activity has been established, the question
shifts to whether credit claiming is as good a predictor of group maintenance than
selective benefits.

3B. RESULTS - NEW MEMBER RECRUITMENT

Table 3.5 reports the results from the logit model, which predicts whether an
interest group has engaged in new member recruitment activities\(^5\)

\(^5\) The results for the interactions between conflict and policy agendas were not statistically significant and
they were dropped from the analysis.
### Table 3.5 Logit Estimates for New Member Recruitment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
<th>Change in Probability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>-1.928***</td>
<td>4.695</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Credit Claiming Activity</strong></td>
<td>0.112</td>
<td>0.380</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Policy Agendas</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Particularistic</td>
<td>1.396</td>
<td>3.111</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective</td>
<td>1.380</td>
<td>3.016</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em><em>Credit Claiming</em> Agenda Interactions</em>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit Claiming* Particularistic</td>
<td>-0.466</td>
<td>0.437</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit Claiming* Collective</td>
<td>-0.293</td>
<td>0.411</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Selective Benefit Package</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material Benefits</td>
<td>-0.078</td>
<td>0.853</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purposive Benefits</td>
<td>0.659</td>
<td>0.647</td>
<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidary Benefits</td>
<td>-0.778</td>
<td>1.212</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>External Constraints</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Group Competition</td>
<td>8.570**</td>
<td>3.681</td>
<td>0.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Group Conflict</td>
<td>-2.865***</td>
<td>1.214</td>
<td>-0.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em><em>Constraints</em> Agenda Interactions</em>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition*Particularistic</td>
<td>-10.187**</td>
<td>4.553</td>
<td>-0.051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition*Collective</td>
<td>-10.130**</td>
<td>4.134</td>
<td>-0.109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interest Group Structure</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Represented Interest-Organizations</td>
<td>5.866****</td>
<td>1.946</td>
<td>0.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Represented Interest-Individuals</td>
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<td>0.001</td>
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<td>Organized Subunits</td>
<td>1.059</td>
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<td>0.003</td>
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<td>Diversity of Funding Sources</td>
<td>1.035****</td>
<td>0.329</td>
<td>0.029</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age of Interest Group</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interest Group Resources</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Group Budget</td>
<td>-0.021*</td>
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<td>-0.007</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interest Group Membership</td>
<td>1.009****</td>
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<td>0.055</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stability of Membership</td>
<td>1.085</td>
<td>0.962</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 ****p<0.005

% Correctly Predicted: Logit 94.7% Null 51.9%

Number of Observations: 76

NOTE: For the continuous independent variable, the change in probabilities is calculated for the dependent variable when the independent variable is set to one standard deviation above and below the mean for these measures. For each of the dichotomous independent variables, the change in probability is calculated for the dependent variable is set at 0 and 1 for these measures.

The first thing to note about the results for new member recruitment is that neither credit claiming activity, nor selective benefits have a significant impact on new member recruitment. Credit claiming activity was offered to challenge the dominance of the selective benefits explanation for interest group maintenance. Instead, neither of these factors have a marked effect on recruitment. Even so, the model performs extremely
well, correctly predicting almost 95% of the cases, a significant improvement over the null model, which predicts only 52% of the cases.

Instead of pointing out the importance of credit claiming activity or the group's selective benefit package, the results using the new interest group survey underscore the importance of four other factors: external constraints (direct and indirect effects), policy agendas (indirect effects only), interest group structure, and interest group resources.

Competition for interest group members has both a direct and an indirect effect on new member recruitment. Competition for group members increases the likelihood that interest groups will engage in new member recruitment by 4.5%. Not surprisingly, having competitors for potential group members leads interest group leaders to be more aggressive in their recruitment efforts. Competition also has an indirect effect on new member recruitment, through the interest group's policy agenda. Competition makes interest groups with particularistic and collective agendas engage in new member recruitment less often than groups with mixed policy agendas.

Interest groups with particularistic agendas are 5.1% less likely to engage in new member recruitment in a competitive environment. For interest groups with particularistic agendas competition may signal a loss of ownership of a policy issue. As a result, attempts to persuade parties to join to group would prove unfruitful, reducing leadership's willingness to pay the costs of the recruitment effort. It is also possible that the population of potential group members is so small or narrow for groups with particularistic agendas that expanding their membership, (even in the absence of competition) would be difficult.

Interest groups with collective agenda are 11% less likely to engage in new member recruitment than interest groups with mixed policy agendas. Having competitors
for group members in concert with diffuse policy benefits, appears to limit new member recruitment for these groups even more than for particularistic groups.

Policy conflict with other groups reduces the likelihood that an interest group will engage in new member recruitment by almost 2%. Interest groups that have different policy views do not lead groups to mobilize and attempt to recruit new members.

Interest group structure also has an impact on new member recruitment. Interest groups that represent organizations are 2.3% more likely to engage in new member recruitment than groups that represent both organizations and individuals. These results are not consistent with expectations as organizations that represented organizations were expected to be less involved in new member recruitment than groups that represent either individuals or both organizations and individuals.

Interest groups that receive funds from more sources are also more likely to engage in new member recruitment. Interest groups with more diverse funding sources are almost 3% more likely to be involved in recruiting new members than other groups. Again, these result run counter to expectations as having more sources of funding was expected to have a negative impact on recruitment. In particular, interest group supporters of one type, were expected to dampen recruitment efforts directed at another type of supporter. Instead, it appears that having multiple types of supporters means that the group may have a broader base of potential members to pull from. None of the other structural variables are significant, but only the results for the age of the interest group run counter to expectations.

Finally, the size of the interest group membership is important. Larger interest groups engage in more new member recruitment activities than other groups. Larger groups are 5.5% more likely to be involved in recruitment efforts than smaller groups. Neither of the other interest group resource variable are significant. However, the results
for the impact of membership instability are in the expected direction, while the results for the size of the interest group budget are not.

**Summary: New Member Recruitment**

The results for new member recruitment using the new interest group survey data are significantly different from the results noted for the analysis in Chapter 2 using the Walker data. Most notably, selective benefits which outperformed credit claiming activity or policy agendas in the previous chapter, have no impact on new member recruitment. Instead, external constraints (i.e. the impact of other groups), the group's policy agenda, organizational structure and group resources are key.

**IV. DISCUSSION**

The analysis reported in this chapter makes it clear that there are limits to using secondary data to test particular hypotheses. In particular, limits on measures of interest group policy agendas and credit claiming activity associated with the Walker data, were corrected for in this analysis. Consequently, the results reported here are significantly different from those reported in the previous chapter in several ways, each of which is discussed below.

First, there does appear to be evidence that federal program benefits are important in predicting interest group credit claiming activity. The interest group’s policy agenda had a significant impact on all types of credit claiming activities - government directed, directed toward other publics, and the total incidence of credit claiming activity.
Moreover, policy agendas outperformed all of the other principle regressors in the credit claiming models.

Second, policy agendas have an impact on interest group maintenance - measured as new member recruitment. Interest groups with either particularistic or collective policy agendas, experiencing competition for members, were less likely to engage in new member recruitment than mixed agenda groups. In the previous chapter, only collective policy agendas were related to new member recruitment, with these groups engaging in more new member recruitment. These results were expected for interest groups with particularistic agendas, as competition for group members was seen as a challenge to a group's ownership of a program. The results for collective agenda groups were not expected, as competition was expected to spur group leaders to be more aggressive in their recruitment efforts.

Third, only the provision of purposive benefits has an impact on credit claiming activities, and in the expected direction. Material and solidaary benefits do not have an impact on any of the measures of credit claiming activity. More importantly, none of the selective benefits provided by the interest group has an impact on new member recruitment. Given the dominance of selective benefits in the analysis of the Walker data these results should not be minimized. As noted at the end of the previous chapter, an uncritical examination of the results from the Walker data would have led one to accept Olson's arguments about interest group maintenance. Instead, the results recorded here
make it clear that selective benefits are not the only way for a group to solve its maintenance problem.

Fourth, external constraints have impact the group's use of credit claiming activities directed toward government and on new member recruitment. The results make it clear that interest group leaders that decide to engage in credit claiming have to monitor the activities of other interest groups. More directly, the presence of other interest groups with different policy preferences or those competing for the same potential members, has an impact of the success of credit claiming as a maintenance strategy.

Finally, organizational structure matters as multiple funding sources has a marked, positive effect on credit claiming activity and new member recruitment. While these findings are not consistent with expectations they are not completely surprising. In particular, while Walker argued that more diverse funding sources would have a negative impact on maintenance, having multiple audiences could be positive for credit claiming groups. In particular, interest group leaders can target their message to particular classes of members and potential (read program recipients), without necessarily having to make tough choices about trade offs.

The question remains as to whether credit claiming is a viable maintenance strategy. What the macro-level model of credit claiming cannot tap is the program recipient's feelings about the or a recipient's evaluations of the group's efforts on his behalf. Both of these factors are expected to be related to the group membership decision
and thereby impact interest group maintenance. This is the topic that is addressed in
Chapter 4, the micro-level of group maintenance.
CHAPTER 4
THE MICRO-LEVEL MODEL: DETERMINING THE EFFICACY OF CREDIT CLAIMING ACTIVITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Previous chapters examined the relationship between the incidence of credit claiming activities by interest group leaders, and aggregate measures of group maintenance. Interest group leaders were shown to engage in two types of credit claiming activities -- activities directed toward government (federal agencies and legislators) and activities directed toward other publics (program recipients and the general public).

However, the efficacy of those efforts, i.e., how an interest group's credit claiming activities affected individual program recipients, was not considered. What factors will determine the efficacy of interest group credit claiming efforts? The efficacy of an interest group's credit claiming activities is ultimately determined by the strength of the interest group - program recipient relationship. Do program recipients in fact, become an integral part of an interest group's resource base?

Given the extent of interest group involvement in policy making, it is reasonable to assume that program recipients can be significantly helped or harmed by these policy making efforts. As a result, program recipients should be conscious of (and interested in) the interest groups involved with their program. It is argued here that under certain conditions interest group leaders may be able to use a recipient's interest in the group's policy agenda to claim credit for federal program benefits. As a result, interest groups are then able to solve maintenance problems as they strengthen or stabilize their resource base.
II. MICRO-LEVEL INTEREST GROUP MAINTENANCE DEFINED

Previous examinations of the importance of membership support to interest group maintenance have focused on the significance of selective benefits (Cigler, 1991; Walker, 1991; Moe, 1980). In brief, group maintenance has most often been viewed as dependent upon a member's response to the selective benefit package offered by the group. While the definition of selective benefits has become more extensive (Sabatier, 1991), other means of achieving individual member support for the interest group have seldom been examined.

One of the key factors that the selective benefit model fails to explain is the process by which a potential interest group member actually becomes a group member. In his study of Common Cause, Rothenberg (1992) has provided evidence that the factors that lead to the initial decision to join an interest group are different from those that contribute to the decision to renew group membership. When making a decision to initially join an interest group, prospective members are expected to engage in a relatively inexpensive search of interest groups, becoming dues paying members of those they feel provide the most attractive benefit package. When the decision to renew their membership is made however, Rothenberg shows that many interest group members are looking for more tangible evidence of policy making success by the group.

There are, however, questions regarding the group maintenance process that Rothenberg's experiential search model also leave unanswered. For example, how do interested parties feel about the groups that speak for their policy concerns? Second, how are these same interest groups evaluated by these interested parties -- do they believe that the groups have made a difference? Finally, how do these feelings and evaluations contribute to the decision an individual makes to join the group (and/or renew their membership)? Each of these are questions that can be answered using the micro-level
credit claiming model of interest group maintenance which looks at the process by which interested parties (in this case, federal program recipients) are most likely to become interest group members.

The argument presented here is that credit claiming activities that have a significant impact on interest group maintenance should have three distinct, yet related effects on a federal program recipient -- affective, evaluative, and behavioral. Affect asks whether recipients have positive or negative feelings about the interest groups involved with their program. The evaluation question asks how recipients evaluate the programmatic impact of the interest groups involved with their program. Finally, behavior asks, what do program recipients do based on their feelings and evaluations of the interest group. More specifically, have program recipients become members of the interest group most involved with their program? It is assumed here that positive affect and positive evaluations of the interest group's efforts are necessary, but not sufficient conditions for a program recipient to join a group involved with his or her program.

III. THREE INDICATORS OF CREDIT CLAIMING EFFICACY

1. RECIPIENT AFFECT

Affect asks whether recipients have positive or negative feelings about the interest group(s) involved with their program. How recipients feel about the interest groups involved with their program may have a determinant effect on their support of these groups. For example, it is reasonable to assume that program recipients that are hostile to the interest groups involved with their program are unlikely to support these groups. Similarly, it is also reasonable to assume that program recipients that have strong positive feelings for the groups involved with their program will be more likely to support these groups. To test the validity of these arguments, several factors that might impact how program recipients feel about the interest group(s) involved with their program are
examined. These include: the frequency of the interest group's credit claiming activity, the type of policy benefit, recipient policy interest, recipient participation in other political activities, and attention to the budget debate.

A. Frequency of Credit Claiming Activity

For those interest groups with members that place a high value on program benefits, interest group leaders should take advantage of as many opportunities for credit claiming as they possibly can (Loomis and Cigler, 1991; Brown, 1995, 1991; Walker, 1991; 1983). Engaging in various credit claiming activities can be used by interest group leaders to repeatedly remind recipients of the group's commitment to their program. In a content analysis of interest group publications and communications, Shaiko (1992) shows that these documents consistently bring attention to the group's policy involvement. A program recipient that has been inundated with evidence of the group's policy role may find such claims highly credible. As a result, the more vigorous the interest group's credit claiming efforts overall, the greater the chances recipients will have positive feelings about the groups involved with their program.

B. Type of Policy Benefit

There are certain program attributes that should make it easier for the recipient to see a link between their own self-interest and what an interest group is requesting from government (Tedin, 1994; Green and Gerken, 1989). Citrin and Green (1990) state that self-interest is enhanced when the personal consequences of one's choices are: visible, tangible, large, and certain (p. 18). Particularistic federal programs have many of these attributes. As a result, the benefits associated with these programs should be easier for the recipient to trace than collective benefits. If the programmatic benefit is easier to trace by self-interested recipients, so should the interest groups involved with the benefit. Program recipients are therefore expected to have more positive feelings about interest
groups that pursue particularistic policy benefits than groups that pursue collective benefits.

C. Recipient Policy Interest

Positive feelings towards the interest group's policy involvement must also link the group to what recipients value or want from government (Salisbury, 1991). In order for program recipients to feel positive about the interest groups involved with their program, the group must in some way capture or reflect the policy interests of the recipients. Policy interest is an indicator of the value or salience of a particular issue to the program recipient. Below some threshold level of policy interest, individual recipients may be unconcerned about which interest groups are actively involved with their program. Recipients that favor more governmental spending in their policy domain are expected to be more positive in their feelings about parties that are expressing similar interests. Here, program recipients are assumed to have a vested interest in the continuation of the benefit. Consequently, higher levels of policy interest should have a positive effect on recipient affect towards the interest groups committed to the continuation of their program.

D. Political Participation

Participation in other political activities should also have an impact on recipient affect. Recipients that participate in other political activities are more likely to have contact with (or information on) the parties involved with the issues the recipient is committed to (Brady et al., 1995; Schlozman et al., 1994; Verba et al., 1993). All other things being equal, program recipients that have participated in at least one other political activity are more likely to be positive in their feelings about the interest group than recipients that have not participated in such activities.
E. Attention to the Budget Debate

Program recipients may also have more positive feelings towards the interest groups involved with their program because they have taken the time to gather more information on the current debate surrounding their program. Recipients that have paid attention to the most recent budget debate should know more about the interest groups involved with their program than other recipients. Moreover, given that interest groups were selected based on their support of a particular program, recipients should have positive feelings towards these groups.

F. Summary

Efficacious credit claiming activity by an interest group must impact recipient affect -- how the recipient feels about the group(s) involved with their program. Quite simply, there is little reason to expect that recipients that did not like the interest groups involved with their program would support these groups. To examine expectations regarding the importance of recipient affect to interest group maintenance, the following hypotheses are tested:

\( H1: \) The frequency of interest group credit claiming activities is positively related to recipient affect.

\( H2: \) Recipient affect towards the interest group will be higher for recipients of particularistic policy benefits than for recipients of collective benefits.

\( H3: \) Recipient policy interest is positively related to recipient affect.

\( H4: \) Political participation is positively related to recipient affect.

\( H5: \) Attention to the budget debate is positively related to recipient affect.
2. **Recipient Evaluation**

Evaluation asks whether recipients believe that an interest group has made a difference regarding their program. Evaluations of an interest group force the recipient to assess the significance of the group's role or impact on their program. Interest groups whose efforts are evaluated positively should have higher levels of recipient support than groups that are viewed more negatively by program recipients. Evaluation is expected to be directly affected by the recipient feelings about the group, the frequency of interest group credit claiming activity, the type of policy benefit, the type of recipient, participation in other political activities, recipient policy interest, and attention to the budget debate.

**A. Recipient Affect**

Whether recipients have positive or negative feelings about the groups involved with their program should impact their evaluations of these groups. The more recipients like an interest group, the more likely they are to have more positive evaluations of the group. Conversely, negative feelings about a group are expected to lead program recipients to equally negative evaluations of the group.

**B. Frequency of Credit Claiming Activity**

Not only does credit claiming activity affect the recipient's affective feelings towards a group, it also impacts his evaluations of the group. The more aggressive an interest group's credit claiming efforts, the greater the chances recipients will positively evaluate the group's policy impact. The increased information provided by credit claiming groups makes it easier for recipients to determine whether they have been beneficiaries of the group's efforts.
C. Type of Policy Benefit

Similarly, not only will the type of policy benefit have an effect on how recipients feel about the groups involved with their program, it also affects their evaluations of the group's policy impact. Program recipients that can easily link the benefits they have received to the particularistic policy agenda of an interest group should have higher evaluations of the group than recipients who policy benefits are linked to groups that pursue collective benefits.

D. Type of Program Recipient

Who benefits from a given program is expected to have a direct impact on recipient evaluations of the groups involved with their program. Cook (1995) in a survey of university presidents showed that these officials were well aware of the interest groups involved with education policy. More importantly, these groups were seen as critical to the continued receipt of policy benefits. It has also been noted that groups that represent institutions or organizations have a significant advantage in the policy making process (Salisbury, 1984). As such, organizational recipients should have more positive evaluations of the impact of the group than other types of recipients (i.e., individuals or mixed recipient populations).

E. Political Participation

Not only should participation in other political activities increase recipients' feelings towards interest groups, it should also effect their attendant evaluations of these groups. Political participation puts recipients in a position to gather more information about the parties that are involved in a particular policy debate. The interest groups recipients are being asked about have been selected due to their involvement with particular programs. As a result, politically active recipients are more likely to have had
contact with these groups (or their members) than recipients that have not been politically active.

F. Recipient Policy Interest

Program recipients that are supportive of more spending in their particular policy area should know whether they have received benefits from the group's policy making efforts. Program recipients that place a high value on the continuation of funding in their policy area should be supportive of interest groups that express similar concerns. Recipients that do not see a need for increased spending or who in fact favor reduced spending in their policy area should be more critical of the interest groups involved with their program.

G. Attention to the Budget Debate

Attention to the budget debate is also expected to affect the recipient's evaluation of the interest groups involved with their program. Recipients that have noticed which groups are involved in this process, on their behalf, are more likely to positively evaluate these groups.

H. Summary: Recipient Evaluation

Efficacious credit claiming activity by an interest group must impact recipients' positive evaluations of the group(s) involved with their program. If program recipients have more positive evaluations of these group(s), they should be more willing to support the group. In addition, the more positive the recipient's evaluation of the group, the greater the chances this support will include group membership. To examine the importance of recipient evaluations of a group to interest group maintenance efforts, the following hypotheses are tested:

\[ H6: \text{Recipient affect is positively related to recipients' evaluations of the interest group.} \]
H7: The frequency of interest group credit claiming activity is positively related to recipient evaluations of the interest group.

H8: Recipient evaluations of the interest groups will be lower for recipients of collective policy benefits than for recipients of particularistic policy benefits.

H9: Interest group evaluations by recipients that are organizations will be higher than group evaluations for either mixed population or individual recipients.

H10: Political participation will have a positive effect on recipient evaluations of the group.

H11: Policy interest will have a positive effect on recipient evaluations of the group.

3. Recipient Behavior

Recipient behavior is the final indicator of credit claiming efficacy. It has been argued from the beginning that the efficacy of credit claiming as a vehicle for group maintenance was determined by the strength of the relationship between the group and the program recipient. If recipients have positive feelings about an interest group and are convinced that the group's efforts make a difference, the chances are greater that these recipients will establish or renew their interest group membership.

Two stage estimation is used to generate an instrumental variable, capturing positive feelings toward the group and the evaluation of the interest groups involved with particular programs. The instrumental variable, the frequency of the group's credit claiming activity, the type of recipient, and whether a mandate is necessary for the receipt of a benefit are all expected to have an effect on recipient behavior. In keeping with previous research efforts, the receipt of selective benefits is offered as an alternative explanation for recipient behavior. This argument states that it is not the program benefit provided by the government that is responsible for group membership. Rather, it is the
selective benefits, produced by and available only to group members, that lead program recipients to become group members.

A. Instrumental Variable: Recipient Affect and Evaluations of Interest Group Impact

Recipient affect and evaluation will have a significant effect on whether recipient become interest group members. As each of these factors become more positive, they should increase the chances that the recipient will join the interest group that he believes has had the most impact on the program. In particular, with both positive feelings toward the interest group and more positive evaluations of the group's policy making impact, the more likely a recipient will become an interest group member.

B. Frequency of Credit Claiming Activity

It has been noted that credit claiming by an interest group should impact how recipients feel about the interest groups involved with their program and their attendant evaluations of the group. However, the impact of credit claiming activities does not stop until the recipient makes a decision as to what to do based on these activities. Interest group credit claiming activity should impact a program recipient's decision to join the group. It may be difficult for a recipient that is repeatedly notified of an interest group's involvement with his or her program to reject an opportunity to join the group. Consequently, credit claiming activities are expected to have a positive impact on interest group membership.

C. Type of Program Recipient

Previous research has found that interest group members have noticed the impact that interest groups can have on the distribution or receipt of benefits (Hansen, 1985; Browne, 1991; Cook, 1995). Moreover, evidence has also been presented that the type of interest group member also matters (Walker, 1991; Cook, 1995; Salisbury, 1984).
Organizational recipients, more than individual recipients or mixed recipient populations, should be more likely to be interest group members. As noted by both Cook (1995) and Salisbury (1984), organizations may be so greatly impacted by policy decisions that they eagerly seek to join interest groups that will champion their concerns.

D. Government or Legislative Mandate

Program recipients that receive benefits as a direct result of legislation or government involvement should be more willing to be interest group members. Here, once the legislation is passed and who benefits is determined, these recipients are guaranteed to receive the benefit. Given the certainty of the benefit, program recipients should be willing to support the interest group(s) that fight for or defend their programs before policy makers and the public.

E. Selective Benefits: An Alternative Explanation for Recipient Behavior

In keeping with previous research efforts, selective benefits are offered as an alternative explanation for recipient support of the interest groups involved with their program. Interest groups that supply their members with costly selective benefits should be unwilling to direct attention to policy efforts which may be of little interest to their members. When an interest group provides a diverse set of selective benefits, it is expected that recipients support the group out of their desire to continue to receive the selective benefits. Here, the desire for selective benefits supersedes the recipients concern with policy benefits.

F. Summary Recipient Behavior

Only after the interest group has made the recipient aware of its policy making efforts, and convinced the recipient that its efforts make a difference, can the group seek recipient support of the group. To examine the importance of recipient support of the group to maintenance, the following hypotheses are tested:
H12: The instrumental variable -- affect and behavior -- is positively related to interest group membership.

H13: The frequency of credit claiming activity is positively related to interest group membership.

H14: Interest group membership will be higher for recipients that are organizations than for either individuals or mixed recipient populations.

H15: The receipt of benefits established by exclusionary legislative mandate is positively related to interest group maintenance.

H16: Material, purposive, and solidary benefits are positively related to interest group membership.

IV. DATA AND RESULTS

1. The 1996 Program Recipient Survey Database

The argument that has been presented here is not that all interest groups will have the same success as they claim credit for policy benefits. This chapter has outlined the process by which interest groups might tailor their credit claiming activities to the program recipients most likely to be effected by their policy making efforts. An interest group is expected to engage in credit claiming activity in order to make these recipients feel more positive about the group. The interest group must target its credit claiming efforts in order for the recipient to more positively evaluate the group's program impact. Then and only then, can it be argued that the recipient joins or supports the group, because of these credit claiming activities. To test the propositions outlined above, a data set is needed that first focuses on what the recipients of federal programs know about the interest groups that lobby on behalf of their programs. Second, information must be provided as to what recipients do based on (or how they respond to) what they know about the interest groups involved with their program.

In addition to the Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance (CFDA), which provided information on the attributes of program recipients. the Federal Assistance
Award Data System (FAADS) was used to identify particular recipients of the 64 programs introduced with the macro-level model (see Appendix A). The sample of aid recipients surveyed was selected from the population of program aid recipients for the last quarter of 1994 and the first quarter of 1995. These are the most recent data available for identifying aid recipients. Over 3000 recipients were identified for the sample of 64 programs. From this population of 3,000 recipients, one in three recipient names were selected. The list of 1,000 recipients generated using this procedure was given to Telesurveys, Inc., located in Houston, Texas. A total of 250 program recipients were eventually contacted.

The telephone survey lasted between 11-14 minutes, depending upon whether a respondent recalled receiving the federal program benefit. Of the 250 recipients contacted, 218 (87.2%) of them stated that they did recall receiving a federal program benefit. For this analysis, only those 218 respondents that recalled having received the benefit are examined. There is evidence that program recipients are aware of the interest groups involved with their programs. Over 59% of the respondents (n=129) were able to place all three of the interest groups that were keyed to their particular program. Conversely, thirty-eight recipients were unable to identify any of the interest groups associated with their program. The 51 remaining recipients were able to identify at least one of the interest groups involved with their program.

In addition to the three interest groups listed with each program, respondents were asked to name the group they considered to be the most influential group involved with their program. Of the 104 interest groups named by respondents as the most influential, 40 were interest groups included in the survey and another 10 of the groups were state or regional affiliates of these same groups. This translates into 48% of the interest groups
listed by recipients as most influential being correctly identified by the Congressional
Information System procedure outlined in the previous chapter.

2. OPERATIONAL MEASURES

A. The Dependent Variables

Appendix D is the program recipient survey. As evident in Table 4.1, there are
three dependent variables in the micro-level analysis: recipient affect, evaluation, and
behavior. The first dependent variable is affect. Affect is measured using the response to
the following question:

Now I would like to get your feeling toward some of the interest groups that have been involved with
the program that this organization has received benefits from. I'll read the name of a group and I
would like you to rate that group using a scale from 0 to 100. The higher the number the more
favorable you feel toward that group, the lower the number the less favorable you feel toward the
group. You would rate the group as 50 if you feel neutral toward that group. How would you rate
[3 interest groups that are taken from the sample record]

The thermometer score for the first group mentioned in the survey was used to
measure affect. The group first mentioned was used for two reasons: 1) the first group
generally scored higher than the other 2 interest groups; and 2) more recipients were able
to place the first group. Program recipients did not recognize or refused to place the first
group mentioned in 59 cases. The mean value for recipient affect is 67.4.

The second dependent variable is recipient evaluation of the interest groups
involved with their program. Program recipients were asked how they evaluated the
interest group's impact in three areas: maintaining congressional support for the program,
maintaining continued funding, and assisting beneficiaries of the program. For each of
these three areas, a group could score 1 - recipient feels group has had a negative impact;
2 - recipient feels group has not impacted the program; and 3, recipient feels that the
group has had a positive impact on the program. Recipient evaluation is a summary score
of these three measures, with a range of 2 to 9.
When it comes to these more substantive evaluations of the interest groups, recipients gave the groups high marks. When asked questions regarding the group's programmatic effectiveness, the majority of respondents feel that the groups had a positive impact on the program, as evidenced by the mean of 7.7. Over half of the respondents gave the interest groups the highest possible score of 9 (n=115), and another 95 respondents gave the groups scores between 6 and 8. Only 12 respondents had scores below 6. Finally, when respondents were asked if they had directly benefited from any action taken by the group, 102 felt that they had. Another 75 respondents stated that they had not been direct beneficiaries of the group's efforts.

The third dependent variable, behavior, is whether program recipients have joined the interest group. Program recipients were asked:

*Is this organization a member of an organized interest groups that represents its policy interests?*

Interest group membership is a dichotomous variable, scored 1 if the program recipient is an interest group member and 0 otherwise. Here, the mean value is 0.47. One hundred and five recipients stated that they were members of interest groups that supported their policy concerns and 119 recipients were not members of organized interest groups. The remaining 26 respondents either did not know if they belonged to an interest group or were unwilling to respond to the question.

**B. The Independent Variables**

The frequency of an interest group's credit claiming activity is determined by asking recipients how many of nine possible credit claiming activities they know that an interest group has engaged in. Dummy variables are created for each of these activities and the frequency of credit claiming is the sum of these activities. These activities are:

---

6 Factor analysis again reveals 2 distinct dimensions. However, in marked contrast to the results noted in chapter 3, eight of these activities loaded onto one factor (alpha loading values highest 0.791- congressional testimony - down to 0.529 - publicizing the availability of federal grant programs), while
1) publicizing the availability of federal grant programs
2) soliciting grant applications
3) testifying before congressional (sub)committees on behalf of the program
4) lobbying individual agencies about rulemaking and/or program implementation
5) providing information on federal grants to the public
6) lobbying individual members of Congress (or their staff) on behalf of the program
7) monitoring individual agencies regarding the grant award process
8) engaging in grassroots lobbying and
9) serving on agency governing boards or working as consultants to agencies.

The majority of program recipients were aware of the credit claiming activities interest groups engaged in. Only 34 recipients (16.6%) stated that they were unaware of any credit claiming activities performed by an interest group. The majority of recipients were aware of interest groups involved in between 1 and 5 (61%) of these activities. Six respondents stated that they knew of interest groups that were engaged in all nine of the credit claiming activities, while the 40 remaining recipients were aware of interest groups that pursued 6 to 8 of these activities.

The type of policy benefit was determined by the attributes of the federal program(s), listed in the CFDA. Dummy variables were created for homogeneity, discretion, recurrence, and the presence of an intermediary agent. Each program could take on a value between 0, i.e., no program attributes associated with particularized benefits; and 4, i.e., all of the program attributes associated with particularized benefits. The policy benefit score was determined by summing across federal program attributes. Programs that received a score of below 3 were coded as collective; programs that scored 3 and above were coded as particularistic. Based on this coding scheme, 106 recipients

only 1 factor (solicitation of grant applications from group members) loaded onto the second factor (alpha=0.662). It appears that program recipients do not discriminate as to the type of credit claiming activity, i.e., government directed or directed towards other publics. Therefore, the only measure of credit claiming activity used in this analysis is the total incidence of credit claiming activity.
received collective benefits (mean=0.42), and 144 recipients received particularistic benefits (mean=0.58).

The CFDA and FAADS data were used to determine the type of each program recipient. For the type of program recipient, three dummy variables are created - one for individual recipients (mean=0.31), one for mixed population recipients (mean=0.27), and one for organizations or institutional recipients (mean=0.42). There were 77 individuals identified as program recipients, 68 mixed population recipients (both individuals and organizations), and 105 organizations or institutions that received benefits. Organizational recipients are the excluded category in each of the models estimated.

Policy interest is determined by the recipient's response to a question dealing with spending priorities, tailored to the five policy areas selected for analysis. Spending priorities were scored 1 if the respondent felt that there should be less spending in their policy area; 2 if the respondent felt that funding should stay about the same, and 3 if the respondent felt that spending should increase in their policy area.

Recipients were overwhelming in support of increased federal spending in their policy area, with a mean value of 2.6. Over 67% of the respondents felt that there should be more spending in their policy area, while another 29% felt that spending should at least continue at its current levels. Only 8 recipients felt that spending in their policy area should be reduced.

Political participation is a dichotomous variable, created from the recipients responses to a series of questions dealing with their political activities. These questions addressed involvement in five political activities: meetings and rallies; petitions; contacts with other organizations; contributing money; and contact with government officials. Recipients were given a 1 if they had engaged in any one of these activities and a 0 if they had not.
Forty one percent (n=109) of the respondents had been involved in at least one other form of political activity, most often contacting government officials. Program recipients seldom engaged in other forms of political activities such as attending rallies, signing petitions, or giving money to particular individuals or parties. Moreover, the majority of recipients did not engage in any political activities at all (55.9%). The mean for political participation is 0.44.

Attention to the budget debate is determined by the program recipients response to a question dealing with how attentive they had been to the budget debate. Attention was scored 1 if the respondent had not paid any attention to the debate; 2 if the respondent had spent some time monitoring the budget debate; and 3 if the respondent had spent a great deal of timing monitoring the budget debate.

Recipients were also very attentive to the budget debate, with a mean of 2.6. Sixty six percent (n=161) of the respondents stating that they had been highly attentive to discussions regarding the budget. Less than 5% (n=11) of the respondents stated that they had spent little attention to the budget debate, with the remaining 29% (n=71) of respondents spending some attention to the debate.

Respondents were asked to identify from a list benefits, those benefits that were important reasons for their support of the interest groups. If a respondent said that the benefit was an important reason for their support of the group, they received a 1. If the benefit was not an important reason for recipient support of the group, it received a 0. Group benefits were then divided into purposive, material. and solidarity. The benefit categories are summary scores of these responses: material benefits: in-service training, conferences and meetings, low-cost insurance, publications, organized trips or tours, and discounts on consumer goods; purposive benefits: advocacy for important policies, representation of members' opinions before government agencies, and opportunity for
participation in public affairs; and solidarity benefits: friendship with other group members.

Program recipients were responsive to the selective benefit package provided by interest groups. Sixty six respondents stated that the material benefits provided by an interest group were not the reason they had supported the group. Just under 43% of the respondents felt that only one of the material benefits was important for their continued support of the interest group, while another 22% of the respondents felt that 2 of these benefits were important.

A significant number of survey respondents stated that their support of a particular interest group was due to the purposive benefits that the group provided. Over 75% of the recipients supported interest groups that had provided at least one of the purposive benefits. Only 47 respondents said that the interest group had not provided any purposive benefits. Another 142 respondents said that the groups they supported had provided 2 or 3 of these benefits.

Respondents were divided on the importance they placed on friendship with other members or solidarity benefits. Fifty three percent of the respondents felt that their relationship with other members was an important reason for their support of the group and the remaining respondents did not feel that these benefits contributed to their membership decision.

Table 4.1 lists the descriptive statistics for each of the variables included in this analysis.
Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics: Program Recipient Survey

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Name</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>STD</th>
<th>Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Recipient Affect</td>
<td>67.383</td>
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<td>Recipient Evaluation</td>
<td>7.694</td>
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<td><strong>Independent Variables</strong></td>
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<td>Selective Benefit Package</td>
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<td>Purposive</td>
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3. RESULTS: THREE MODELS OF CREDIT CLAIMING EFFICACY

A. Model 1: Recipient Affect

Table 4.2 reports the findings for recipients' affect for the interest groups involved with their program. Organizational recipients, and particularistic policy benefits are the excluded categories in this analysis. The model explains 13.2% of the sample variance.
Table 4.2 OLS Estimates for Recipient Affect for Interest Groups

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<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
<th>t-value</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>11.562</td>
<td>2.805*</td>
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<td>Frequency of Credit Claiming</td>
<td>0.468</td>
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<td>Type of Policy Benefit</td>
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<td>3.946***</td>
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<td>Recipient Information</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2.006</td>
<td>3.077</td>
<td>0.652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Participation</td>
<td>-0.730</td>
<td>3.580</td>
<td>-0.204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attention to Budget Debate</td>
<td>8.472</td>
<td>2.962</td>
<td>2.860**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.01    **p<0.005    ***p<0.0001
R-Square: 13.2%
Number of Observations: 139

It was predicted that the frequency of an interest group's credit claiming activity would have a positive effect on recipient affect for the group. While the results for the frequency of credit claiming activity are in the expected direction, they are not statistically significant.

Recipients of collective policy benefits were also expected to have less positive affect towards the interest group involved with their program than recipients of particularistic benefits. The results however, show that recipients that receive collective benefits have more positive feelings towards the interest groups involved with their program. Recipients of collective benefits have affect scores for their interest groups that are on average, 13 points higher than affect scores for recipients of particularistic benefits.
The only other independent variable to obtain statistical significance was attention to the budget debate. As expected, recipients that had paid attention to the budget debate had higher affect scores for the interest groups involved with their program than other recipients. Paying attention to the budget debate increased positive feelings about the group by 8.5 points.

Program recipients that favored higher levels of spending in their policy area were expected to have more positive feelings about the interest groups involved with their program than other recipients. While the directionality of the results are consistent with expectations, the results are not statistically significant.

Recipients that had engaged in other forms of political activity were also expected to have more positive feelings about the interest groups involved with their program than other recipients. Here, the results are not statistically significant, nor are the findings in the predicted direction.

In the recipient affect model the only regressor that performs according to expectations is attention to the budget debate. As predicted, greater recipient attention to the debate surrounding the budget increases the attendant feelings about the interest groups involved in the process. Recipients of collective policy benefits, which were expected to have lower affect scores, actually have more positive feelings about the interest groups involved with their program.

Credit claiming activities and key factors from the political behavior literature, i.e., policy interest and political activity, are unrelated to recipient affect for the interest group. It may be that these factors have less of an impact on how recipients feel about the interest groups involved with their program and more of an impact on how they evaluate these groups. Recipient evaluations of the interest groups involved with their program is the next measure of credit claiming efficacy examined.
B. Model 2: Recipient Evaluations

Table 4.3 reports the findings for recipient evaluations - how recipients evaluated the interest groups involved with their program. Once again, organizational recipients and particularistic policy benefits are the excluded categories in this analysis. The model as listed explains less than 6% of the variance.

Table 4.3 OLS Estimates for Recipient Evaluations of Interest Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
<th>t-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>8.376</td>
<td>1.074</td>
<td>7.794***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recipient Affect</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>-0.948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of Credit Claiming</td>
<td>0.081</td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td>1.387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Policy Benefit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective</td>
<td>0.211</td>
<td>0.304</td>
<td>0.695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recipient Information</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recipient - Mixed</td>
<td>-1.064</td>
<td>0.450</td>
<td>-2.361*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recipient - Individual</td>
<td>-0.856</td>
<td>0.337</td>
<td>-2.538**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Participation</td>
<td>0.060</td>
<td>0.292</td>
<td>0.204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Interest</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.255</td>
<td>0.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attention to Budget Debate</td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td>0.246</td>
<td>0.274</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05    **p<0.01    ***p<0.0001
R-Square: 5.3%
Number of Observations: 131

The only results that obtain statistical significance are those for the type of program recipient. As expected, program recipients that are individuals and programs with mixed recipient populations (individuals and organizations) have lower evaluations of the interest groups involved with their program than organizational recipients. Recipients that benefit from mixed population programs evaluate their interest group 1.1
points lower than organizational recipients. Similarly, individual recipients evaluate the interest groups involved with their programs 0.9 points lower than organizational recipients.

Recipient feelings about the interest group do not have a statistically significant impact on how recipients evaluate the interest groups involved in their programs. Moreover, the directionality of the results are not in the predicted direction. Credit claiming activity by the interest group does not have a significant impact on recipient evaluations of the interest groups, but the results are in the expected direction. The results for the type of policy benefit are also insignificant, and the results are not in the expected direction.

Political participation and policy interest do not have a significant impact on recipient evaluations. Higher levels of political participation and greater salience of policy issues do not increase recipients' positive evaluations of the interest groups that speak for these issues. While not statistically significant, the direction of the results are consistent with expectations.

In the recipient evaluation model the only regressor that performs according to expectations is the type of recipient. As expected, program recipients that are individuals and programs with mixed recipient population have lower evaluations of the interest groups involved with their programs than organizational recipients. None of the other main variables of interest have an impact on recipient evaluations of the interest group.

C. Model 3: Recipient Behavior -- Interest Group Membership

Table 4.4 reports the results for interest group membership for program recipients. The model as listed accounts for almost 28% of the variance in the model.
Table 4.4 Two Stage Least Square Estimates for Interest Group Membership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
<th>t-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.320</td>
<td>0.142</td>
<td>2.240**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recipient Affect and Evaluation of Interest Groups</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrumental Variable</td>
<td>0.103</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>3.224***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of Credit Claiming</td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>2.283**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selective Benefit Package</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material</td>
<td>-0.155</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>-3.180***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose</td>
<td>0.090</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>1.710*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidary</td>
<td>0.098</td>
<td>0.101</td>
<td>0.973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recipient Information</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recipient - Individual</td>
<td>-0.249</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>-2.626***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recipient - Mixed</td>
<td>-0.225</td>
<td>0.116</td>
<td>-1.934*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Mandate</td>
<td>0.141</td>
<td>0.096</td>
<td>1.470</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.005

Adjusted R-Square: 27.8%
Number of Observations: 108

The results for interest group membership are for the most part consistent with expectations. The instrumental variable, which is used to capture both recipient affect and recipient evaluations of the interest group, increased the likelihood that recipients will be group members by over 10%. As expected, positive affect and positive evaluations of interest groups increase the willingness of program recipients to join these same groups.

The frequency of credit claiming activity also has a positive impact on interest group membership. Program recipients that know about the interest group’s credit claiming activity are 4.6% more likely to be members of the group.
The impact of recipient type is also consistent with expectations. Program recipients that are individuals and mixed recipient populations are less likely to be interest group members than organizational recipients. Individuals that receive benefits from a particular program are 25% less likely to be members of the interest groups that support their program than organizational recipients. Similarly, recipients of program benefits that go to both individuals and organizations are almost 23% less likely to be interest group members.

The results for the selective benefit package are mixed. The results for purposive benefits are consistent with expectations. Program recipients that value purposive benefits are 9% more likely to be interest group members than recipients that do not value these benefits. The strong negative effect of material benefits was not expected, given their importance in the interest group literature. Program recipients that value material benefits are almost 16% less likely to be interest group members than recipients that do not value material benefits. While not statistically significant, the results for solidarity benefits are in the expected direction.

The results for government mandate are not statistically significant, but they are in the expected direction.

The interest group membership model leaves little doubt that program recipients are willing to support the group’s that speak on behalf of their program. Interest group membership is effected by how program recipients feel about the interest group and how recipients evaluate the group’s impact on their program. Moreover, who benefits from a
particular program also impacts membership, as organizational recipients are more likely to be group members than other recipients. More importantly, the interest group’s credit claiming activities also have a positive impact on a recipient’s decision to join the interest group. These claims of policy relevance do appear to lead to recipient support of the group. Finally, when looking at the selective benefit package, only purposive benefits, which have a policy component, have a positive impact on interest group membership.

V. DISCUSSION

In this chapter the focus has been on the efficacy of interest group credit claiming activities. More directly, the issue has been an examination of the relationship between interest groups and the recipients of the federal programs these groups are involved with. It was argued that this relationship had three distinct, yet related dimensions - affective, evaluative, and behavioral - and for the most part, the empirical evidence supports this argument.

Recipient affect -- whether recipients had positive or negative feelings about the interest groups involved with their program -- was impacted by the type of policy benefit and the recipient’s attention to the budget debate. In contrast to expectations, program recipients that had received collective benefits had higher affective scores for the groups than recipients of particularistic benefits. Recipients that had paid a great deal of attention to the budget debate had higher affective scores than recipients that paid less attention to the budget debate. As expected, those recipients that more closely monitored
the debate surrounding their program(s) had more positive feelings toward the interest groups that spoke on their behalf.

Recipient evaluation -- how recipients evaluate the interest groups involved with their program -- was only effected by the type of program recipient. Individuals and mixed population recipients were more critical of the interest groups involved with their program than organizational recipients. Here, there is ample evidence in support of previous claims that more research needs to be done on interest groups that speak for organizations in the policy making process (Salisbury, 1984).

Recipient behavior -- measured as interest group membership -- is by far, the model most supportive of the arguments regarding the benefits of credit claiming for interest group maintenance. This is the only one of the three dimensions of the recipient-interest group relationship to be directly effected by credit claiming activities. Program recipients that were aware of credit claiming activities by interest groups were more likely to be members of these groups.

Also as expected, interest group membership was effected by how recipients felt about the group(s) involved with their program and how the recipient evaluated the groups' programmatic impact. Higher scores on both these dimensions makes program recipients more likely to join the interest groups involved with their program. Who receives the benefit also matters as organizational recipients are more likely to be interest group members than other recipients.
Perhaps the most striking results of all are those for the selective benefit package. As expected, purposive benefits, which capture whether program recipients value policy representation, has a positive impact on interest group membership. Conversely, material benefits, often presented in the interest group literature as the key determinant of group membership, instead has a marked, negative effect on interest group membership.

The analysis presented in this chapter makes it clear that interest groups receive more support from program recipients when they focus attention on their policy role. Program recipients do pay attention to the interest groups involved with their program. Moreover, recipients appear willing to join the interest groups that speak on their behalf.

These findings challenge Olson’s arguments about free riders. According to Olson, program recipients would not invest in interest group membership because once the program benefit was provided they would receive the benefit irrespective of their support of the group. Instead, the preponderance of evidence shows that program recipients are willing to join interest groups that they like, and whom recipients feel have had a positive impact on their program.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION

I. INTRODUCTION

The focus of this dissertation has been on the relationship between interest groups and federal program recipients. Given the vast number of both interest groups and federal domestic assistance programs, it seemed reasonable to argue that interest groups that supported particular programs would seek to develop a relationship with the recipients of these same programs. The credit claiming model of interest group maintenance was introduced as a means to explain this relationship. Credit claiming activity was defined as the actions taken by interest group leaders designed to call attention to the group's role in the support and distribution of federal program funds. As an alternative to the production and provision of selective benefits, a credit claiming interest group was expected to use its policy involvement to establish recipient support and ideally, group membership and maintenance.

Several factors were examined in order to explain an interest group's credit claiming activity and its subsequent impact on group maintenance. The nature of the programmatic benefit -- particularistic, collective, or mixed -- was expected to be a critical element in the decision to engage in credit claiming activity. The nature of the benefit was also critical to cementing the interest group-recipient relationship. External constraints caused by other interest groups, i.e., policy conflict and competition for group members, were also expected to have an impact on the incidence of credit claiming and interest group maintenance. Hinckley and Hill's (1995) claims regarding the importance of organizational structure to interest group maintenance and maintenance strategies were also examined. Finally, given its preeminence in the literature, the importance of the interest group's selective benefit package was also considered.
In the discussion that follows, the empirical support for the credit claiming model of interest group maintenance is outlined. The results from the macro-level analyses are presented first, followed by the results from the micro-level analysis. These results are in turn followed by possible problems with the study. Finally, new areas of research are identified.

II. EMPIRICAL RESULTS FOR THE CREDIT CLAIMING MODEL

A. Testing the Macro-level Model: Walker Interest Group Survey

Two primary questions were addressed at the macro-level: 1) do interest group leaders actually engage in credit claiming activities; and 2) do these activities impact interest group maintenance? The initial attempt to address these questions relied on Walker’s (1991) interest group survey. Here, both the benefits and the limitations of using secondary data to test the credit claiming model of interest group maintenance were evident.

On the benefits side, using less than ideal measures of interest group policy agendas, there was evidence that the nature of the benefit matters. Differences in the type of policy agenda an interest group pursued had an impact on whether the group engaged in credit claiming activity and on the group’s involvement in new member recruitment. Interest groups with particularistic or unspecified (i.e., groups with policy issues not addressed in Walker’s survey) policy agendas were less likely to engage in credit claiming activity. When the question turned to new member recruitment, only collective benefits mattered, and these groups were more likely to be involved in new member recruitment.

The results for the impact of the group’s policy agenda were not, however, in the expected direction. It was argued that particularistic policy agendas would be positively related to credit claiming and maintenance. Instead, interest groups with collective policy
agendas were more active in each of these areas. As noted in Chapter 2, there are at least two possible explanations for these findings. First, these results can be explained as the consequence of a limited pool of potential members for particularistic benefits. Here, once the upper limit of program recipients had been reached, there would not be a need to inform parties of the group's policy efforts, nor would there be other recipients to recruit as members.

The second explanation is that only groups in trouble would be more aggressive in both their credit claiming and their new member recruitment efforts. Interest groups that are not having a problem keeping their members satisfied with their policy efforts, will simply not have to seek new members. The results recorded using the Walker data are more supportive of this second explanation.

Once it was established that interest groups did in fact engage in credit claiming activity, it was shown that this activity also had an impact on group maintenance. Interest groups involved in credit claiming activity were less likely to be involved in new member recruitment than other groups. These findings also run counter to expectations, as credit claiming was expected to have a positive impact on interest group maintenance. Once again, it may be that new member recruitment is a sign of an interest group in trouble. If so, it is not surprising that interest groups that have been successful in their credit claiming activities, would not need to pursue new members.

There was also limited support for Hinckley and Hill's argument that organizational structure matters. More specifically, whose interests are represented has an impact on the group's credit claiming. When looking at credit claiming activity, interest groups that represent mixed memberships - both individuals and organizations - were more likely to participate than groups that represented either individuals or organizations alone. While the results for interest groups that represented organizations
were expected, the findings for groups that represent individuals were not. Given the heterogeneity of mixed membership groups, and the need for continued support from both types of members, these results are not too disturbing. They do, however, underscore potential problems for mixed membership groups if their credit claiming efforts are unbalanced.

Whose interests are represented also had an impact on interest group maintenance. For new member recruitment, interest groups that represented individuals were more active than either organizational or mixed membership groups and these results were consistent with expectations. It was argued that individuals might not have multiple avenues for policy input. As a result, it was expected that interest groups that represented individuals would be more aggressive in their maintenance efforts or their willingness to seek new members.

The importance of each of these factors in the Walker analysis, however, is minimal when compared to the group's selective benefit package, or more precisely, material and purposive benefits. The results for solidarity benefits, which were expected to have a positive impact on credit claiming and new member recruitment, were insignificant.

Material benefits were key determinants of interest group credit claiming and new member recruitment. It was argued that credit claiming interest groups would be unwilling to pay the costs of seeking policy influence while at the same time, producing and providing expensive material benefits to their members. Instead, interest groups that provided material benefits were more likely to be involved in both credit claiming activity and new member recruitment. This findings can also be explained as the consequence of an interest group at risk, which may have to engage in multiple maintenance strategies to protect itself from further declines.
Purposive benefits also had a significant impact on whether a group was involved in credit claiming activity. These results were expected as interest groups with members that value policy representation must provide their members with examples of their policy influence efforts. Purposive benefits did not effect whether an interest group was involved in new member recruitment.

It was the results for material and purposive benefits that led to the conclusion that Olson (1965) was right, and that interest group maintenance is best explained by selective benefits. There is little doubt that Olson's model consistently outperformed the credit claiming model when using the Walker survey data. However, it was noted that there were several limitations with the Walker data that made such a conclusion premature.

First, when using the Walker data it was necessary to use broad functional policy categories to determine an interest group's policy agenda. As such, it was difficult to determine the exact nature of the policy benefits the interest group was actually concerned with. Consequently, the policy agenda measure lacked precision.

Second, credit claiming activity was a simple dichotomy - an interest group either engaged in credit claiming or it did not. As such, this measure could not capture the fact that an interest group could engage in different types of credit claiming activities. Moreover, since the measure relied simply on whether the group produced its own publication, it did not capture the many ways an interest group can communicate what it is doing to its membership.

Due to imperfections in the policy agenda and credit claiming measures, it was also difficult to gauge the true significance of their interaction. This is the third limitation of using the Walker data to test the macro-level model.
Fourth, the measure of interest group resources was limited. In particular, interest group resources using the Walker data focused on the size of the group's staff. A more rigorous test of the credit claiming model, which links the group to recipients, requires more information on the interest group membership.

Finally, the credit claiming model requires an examination of the impact of external constraints. In particular, the role other interest groups play in the policy making process may have an impact on whether a group will engage in credit claiming and its ongoing maintenance efforts. These factors were not addressed in the analysis using the Walker data.

Each of these limitations was addressed in the 1995 interest group survey conducted by the author. The results of the analysis using the new survey are recorded below.

B. Testing the Macro-level Model: The 1995 Interest Group Survey

In the analysis using the new interest group survey, the same two primary questions are addressed: 1) do interest groups engage in credit claiming activities; and 2) do these activities impact interest group maintenance? As a result of responding to the limitations of the Walker data, however, significantly different results are recorded.

The first noteworthy finding is that credit claiming activities are in fact different. The factors that explain whether a group will engage in activities directed toward the government are significantly different from those that explain the group's use of activities directed toward other publics.

Government directed activities are effected by the group's policy agenda, the provision of purposive benefits, policy conflict with other groups, and the instability of the group's membership. Activities directed toward other publics are effected only by the group's policy agenda and the diversity of its funding sources. When examining the
incidence of all credit claiming activities, the group's policy agenda, purposive benefits, diversity of funding sources, and instability of the membership are critical components.

Second, policy agenda differences have a direct impact on credit claiming activities and an indirect impact on interest group maintenance. When examining all three measures of credit claiming activity, particularistic and collective agenda groups were less involved in these activities than mixed agenda groups. When looking at new member recruitment, particularistic and collective policy agendas interact with competition to reduce the likelihood that these groups will pursue new members.

Third, the constraints imposed on an interest group by other groups also has an impact on credit claiming activity and new member recruitment. Policy conflict with other groups increases credit claiming activities directed towards government actors, but does not impact the use of activities directed towards other publics. For new member recruitment, policy conflict and competition for group members reduces the likelihood that an interest group will engage in new member recruitment.

Fourth, organizational structure matters, as who funds the organization has an effect on whether a group will engage in credit claiming activity and new member recruitment. Multiple funding sources increase a group's credit claiming activities and increase the likelihood that the group will engage in new member recruitment. Whose interests are represented also effects new member recruitment as organizational groups are more likely to engage in new member recruitment.

Finally, the results for the importance of the group's selective benefit package are markedly different. Purposive benefits had an impact on an interest group's pursuit of credit claiming activities directed toward government and the incidence of all credit claiming activities. Purposive benefits did not impact the group's use of credit claiming activities directed toward other publics. Neither material nor solidarity benefits had an
impact on any of the credit claiming activities. More importantly, none of the selective
benefits produced by the interest group had an impact on new member recruitment.

The new interest group survey provides stronger evidence that federal program
benefits matter to interest groups. The nature of the program benefit is an important
determinant of all types of interest group credit claiming activity. In addition, the nature
of program benefits have an impact on new member recruitment through their interaction
with competition for group members.

What neither of the macro-level analyses address is the efficacy of interest group
credit claiming activities. What are the benefits of the interest group’s credit claiming
activity? More specifically, what is the relationship between the interest group and the
recipients of the program(s) the group champions? This is the issue examined in the
micro-level model of credit claiming.


It was argued that the efficacy credit claiming rested on the strength of the
relationship between the interest groups and the recipients of the program(s) the groups
support. It was further argued that credit claiming activity that was efficacious would
have three distinct, yet related effects on the program recipient - affective, evaluative, and
behavioral. Recipients would have affective feelings toward interest groups, meaning
they either liked or disliked the groups involved with their programs. In addition,
recipients would have to evaluate the impact or importance of the interest groups
involved with their programs. Finally, once program recipients had responded to these
issues, they were expected to act. Here, it was assumed that recipients would support the
interest groups that they liked and those they felt had made a positive difference on their
program(s).
The micro-level analysis of the interest group - program recipient relationship resulted in several interesting findings. First of all, an interest group’s credit claiming activities only had a direct effect on recipient behavior, i.e., interest group membership. There are other reasons why recipients like or dislike particular interest groups and other methods for determining whether they feel a group has had a positive impact on their program. When the question turns to how recipients respond to what they know about particular interest groups, however, credit claiming activities increase the likelihood that a program recipient will be an interest group member.

It is also worth noting that in contrast to results at the macro-level, program recipients do not appear to distinguish between government directed activities or activities directed toward other publics. Instead, program recipients are either well aware of all of an interest group’s credit claiming activities or oblivious to them. This lack of attention to which audience an interest group targets in evident in the factor analysis of recipient awareness of credit claiming activities which reveals that each of the nine activities load onto a single dimension.

It makes sense that interest group leaders would be able to distinguish between various types of credit claiming activities and program recipients are not. Interest group leaders have to make decisions as to how they will allocate resources to various credit claiming activities. The program recipient needs only to know that an interest group is involved with their program in order for them to reward or punish the group for their effort.

Other factors had an impact on how recipients viewed the interest group(s) involved with their program. Whether recipients had positive or negative feelings about the interest groups involved with their program was also impacted by the type of policy benefit and the recipient’s attention to the budget debate. Program recipients that had
received collective benefits and that paid attention to the debate surrounding their program(s) had the highest affective scores for interest groups. In fact, affect was the only measure of the interest group-recipient relationship responsive to the type of programmatic benefits.

How recipients evaluated the interest groups involved with their program was only effected by the type of program recipient, as individuals and mixed population recipients were more critical of the interest groups involved with their program than organizational recipients. The results for affect, which was expected to have a positive impact on recipient evaluations, were insignificant.

However, there is evidence that higher scores on both affect and evaluation make program recipients more likely to join the interest groups involved with their program(s). Recipients do pay attention to the interest groups involved with their program and the empirical evidence supports the argument that recipients are willing to join interest groups that they like, and whom they feel have had a positive impact on their program.

The type of program recipient also has an impact on interest group evaluations and group membership that is noteworthy. Organizational recipients have higher evaluations of the interest groups involved with their program(s). Not surprisingly, organizational recipients are also more likely to be interest group members.

Salisbury (1984) has argued that public policy outputs have a major impact on organizations or institutions. Legislative mandates may require that organizations perform certain tasks, or conversely, prohibit them from others. As a result, organizational recipients are expected to be more vigilant observers of the policy process. This in turn translates into a heightened awareness of the interest groups involved. The results listed here show that organizational recipients will join the interest groups that they feel are able to help them through the policy making process.
Finally, the impact of selective benefits on interest group membership must be noted. Material benefits have a marked, negative effect on interest group membership for program recipients. Here, there is little evidence that recipients join an interest group in order to receive such benefits as low-cost insurance, consumer discounts, or trips. Instead, for program recipients, only purposive benefits are positively related to whether they join the groups that support their programs. Recipients that value representation before government, advocacy for important policies, or the opportunity for participation in public affairs, are more likely to be interest group members.

D. Summary of Empirical Results

This analysis has made it clear that a continued preoccupation with selective benefits as the principle means of interest group maintenance has limitations. In particular, for interest groups that are active participants in the policy making process, there are benefits associated with being aligned with particular programs. More directly, program recipients are willing to join the interest groups that champion their programs. The credit claiming model of interest group maintenance allows one to plot the progressive development of the interest group-program recipient relationship. Interest group maintenance is viewed here as an ongoing process whereby groups press for certain policy outputs; communicate their efforts to the recipients of these outputs; and reap rewards for their efforts as recipients become interest group members.

Traditionally, the literature has viewed the decision to join or renew group membership as the key to successful maintenance. The credit claiming model makes it clear that other factors may also be critical for successful maintenance. The results also point out possible directions for future research, which will be discussed following a presentation of possible problems and limitations of this analysis.
III. RESEARCH LIMITATIONS

Before discussing areas of future research, it is necessary to discuss some of the problems with the analysis presented in this dissertation. First of all, some could argue that the selection of interest groups was flawed. In particular, by using the Congressional Information System to identify interest groups involved with particular programs, I may have biased the sample in favor of credit claiming interest groups. Given the tremendous variance in terms of the frequency of credit claiming activities by interest groups, I do not believe that this argument can be supported. Moreover, in light of the possibility that I may have missed the most advantaged credit claiming groups, and instead captured interest groups at risk, possible sample bias is even less of a concern.

This points to the second limitation of the analysis, its cross-sectional nature. In this analysis I have a snapshot of the interest groups involved with a particular program, at one point in time. As a result, I do not know about an interest group’s long term involvement with the program. In particular, the intensity of the group’s credit claiming efforts and how long recipients have supported the group as a result of these efforts, is not measured. Currently, the data to perform such an extension of the arguments outlined in this analysis are unavailable.

IV. FUTURE RESEARCH

One of the most intriguing questions that still remains unanswered is what leads an interest group to choose a credit claiming strategy rather than provide selective benefits. Or is the choice merely one of convenient, with one strategy dominant at one point in time and the other strategy more prevalent at other times? This analysis failed to identify the necessary and sufficient conditions to explain an interest group’s preference for credit claiming activity as a maintenance strategy. Further research is needed to more
fully develop the significance of multiple interest group maintenance strategies and their attendant determinants.

An equally intriguing question is whether interest group leaders are competitive and seek to claim credit for the same benefit programs. If so, what impact does this have on the efficacy of each interest group's credit claiming activity? It seems reasonable to assume that under these circumstances program recipients would be less likely to join either of these groups as the credibility of the claims for policy influence are distorted.

Another question is what happens to the interest group-recipient relationship if a program is reorganized. For example, a move toward more block grants would challenge interest group ownership of any particular program. In this instance, would coalitions of similarly effected interest groups form and seek to persuade recipients to continue to support individual coalition partners in order to prevent further losses? Or, would interest groups leaders remain autonomous and be forced to provide selective benefits to offset the loss of policy benefits?

A final question is what accounts for the impact that the type of recipient has on interest group evaluations and membership. Why would organizational recipients be more receptive to the policy efforts of interest groups? In particular, what characteristics of organizations as recipients make them more ardent supporters of the interest groups involved with their program(s)?
References


Appendix A: Programs Selected for Analysis
Taken From
Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance

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<th>CFDA Program Name</th>
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<td>93.995</td>
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Appendix B: 1995 Interest Group Survey Respondents

Name of Organization

Agricultural Research Institute
AIDS Resource Foundation for Children
Alliance to End Lead Poisoning
Ambulatory Pediatric Association
American Academy of Family Physicians
American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
American College of Surgeons
American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy
American Farmland Trust
American Federation of Teachers
American Fisheries Association
American Gas Association
American Hospitals Association
American Institute of Biological Sciences
American Medical Association
American Society of Mechanical Engineers
American Veterinary Medical Association
Associated General Contractors
Association of American Universities
Association of American Medical Colleges
Association of Medical School Pediatric Department Chairmen
Association of Metropolitan Sewerage Agencies
Center for Rural Affairs
Chamber of Commerce of the U.S.
Child Welfare League of America
Clean Sites Inc.
Commission for Racial Justice
Committee for Economic Development
Community Transportation Association of America
Conservation Treaty Support Fund
Consortium of Social Science Associations
Corn Refiners Association
Cotton Council International
Council for Agriculture, Science, and Technology
Council of Concerned Birth Parents
Council of Graduate Schools
Council of Great City Schools
Name of Organization

Council on Governmental Relations
Family of the Americas Foundation
Family Research Council
Federation of American Societies for Experimental Biology
Hazardous Waste Treatment Council
High/Scope Educational Research Foundation
Institute of Food Technologists
Institute of Gas Technology
Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under the Law
Lead Industries Association
Learning Disabilities Association of America
Mennonite Central Committee
Millers National Federation
National Abortion Rights Action League
National Academy of Science
National Alliance of Business
National Association for the Education of Young Children
National Association of Conservation Districts
National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners
National Association of State Boards of Education
National Association of State Foresters
National Association of State Mental Health Program Directors
National Association of State Mental Retardation Directors
National Association of Water Companies
National Association of Women Judges
National Cattlemen’s Association
National Community Mental Healthcare Council
National Cotton Council
National Council for International Health
National Council of La Raza
National Family Planning and Reproductive Health Association
National Farmers Union
National Mental Health Association
National Multi Housing Council
National Oilseed Processors Association
National Organization for Rare Disorders
National Perinatal Association
National Potato Promotion Board
National PTA
National Rural Health Association
Name of Organization

National School Boards Association
National Utility Contractors Association
National Water Resources Association
National Wildlife Federation
Pickle Packers International
Society for Occupational and Environmental Health
Society for Range Management
Society of Environmental Toxicology and Chemistry
Soil and Water Conservation Society
Stained Glass Association
The ARC
U.S. Council for Energy Awareness
U.S. Feed Grains Council
WAIF, Inc.
Water and Wastewater Equipment Manufacturers Association
Water Environment Federation
Wilderness Society
Wildlife Legislative Fund of America
Appendix C: 1995 Interest Group Survey

1. What is the official name of this group?
2. In what year was this group founded?
3. Does this group have local offices, chapters, headquarters, or other such organized bodies below the level of the central staff and headquarters?
   Yes/ No
4a. How many people work in your Washington office?
4b. Of these employees, how many are full-time paid professionals?
5. Some groups are composed of representatives of other formal organizations, while other groups are made up only of individuals. Still other groups have a membership that includes a mixture of individuals and organizational representatives. To which membership category does your group belong?
   Membership is composed of organizational representatives
   Membership is a mixture of organizations and individuals
   Membership is made up of individuals
6. What is the total membership of this group? If applicable, please record both the number of individuals and the number of organizations.
7. How large was the membership of this group 5 years ago?
   Membership was larger than current size
   Membership was approximately the same size
   Membership was smaller than current size
   Group did not exist 5 years ago
8. Please indicate whether each of the following statements is an accurate description of your group, using a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 is not a very accurate statement about the group and 5 is a very accurate statement about the group.
   a. Members join or participate in this group mainly because they are providers of certain services or products
      1 not very accurate
      2
      3
      4
      5 very accurate
   b. Members join or participate in this group mainly because they are consumers of certain services or products
      1 not very accurate
      2
      3
      4
      5 very accurate
   c. Members join or participate in this group mainly because they administer certain governmental programs
      1 not very accurate
      2
      3
      4
      5 very accurate
1 not very accurate
2
3
4
5 very accurate
d. Members join or participate in this group mainly because they benefit from certain governmental programs or services
1 not very accurate
2
3
4
5 very accurate
e. This group includes members who are providers and others who are consumers of certain services, products or governmental programs
1 not very accurate
2
3
4
5 very accurate
f. Membership of this group is not related to specific services, products or governmental programs
1 not very accurate
2
3
4
5 very accurate
9. What types of formal organizations (i.e., business firms, universities, foundations, etc.) or individuals (i.e., civil servants, people who benefit from federal programs, elected officials, etc.) are the two or three largest sources of membership for your group?
10.a During the last 5 years, for the largest source of membership you have identified, has their membership as a proportion of all group members
   increased greatly
   increased somewhat
   remained about the same
   decreased somewhat
   decreased greatly
   do not know
10.b During the last 5 years, for the second largest source of membership you have identified, has their membership as a proportion of all group members
   increased greatly
   increased somewhat
   remained about the same
decreased somewhat
decreased greatly
do not know

10.c During the last 5 years, for the third largest membership source you have identified, has their membership as a proportion of all group members
increased greatly
increased somewhat
remained about the same
decreased somewhat
decreased greatly
do not know

11. Most groups provide their members with some type of benefit. [Please indicate the relative importance of each of these benefits to your members]
a. Informative publications (i.e., newsletters, magazines, etc.)
important
not important
not provided

b. In-service training for members
important
not important
not provided

Cc. Conferences and meetings
important
not important
not provided

d. Low-cost insurance
important
not important
not provided

e. Advocacy for important policies
important
not important
not provided

f. Contacts with professional colleagues
important
not important
not provided

g. Organized tours or trips
important
not important
not provided

h. Representation of members' opinion before government
i. Opportunity for participation in public affairs
   important
   not important
   not provided

j. Friendship with other members
   important
   not important
   not provided

k. Coordination of the activities of voluntary organizations in the policy field
   important
   not important
   not provided

l. Collective bargaining
   important
   not important
   not provided

m. Research
   important
   not important
   not provided

n. Discounts on consumer goods
   important
   not important
   not provided

c. Legal assistance
   important
   not important
   not provided

d. Licensing, accreditation, or codes development
   important
   not important
   not provided

q. Other (please specify)

12. Once established, most groups receive financial support for their administrative and program costs from many different sources. Please indicate whether the following financial sources are used by this group.

a. Membership dues
   yes
   no
b. Publication sales
   yes
   no
   don't know

c. Conference fees
   yes
   no
   don't know

d. Commissions from insurance sales
   yes
   no
   don't know

e. Fees from individuals for staff services
   yes
   no
   don't know

f. Grants or contracts from government agencies
   yes
   no
   don't know

g. Fees for services to private firms
   yes
   no
   don't know

h. Royalties and honoraria
   yes
   no
   don't know

i. Individual gifts (from group members)
   yes
   no
   don't know

j. Individual gifts (from supporters that are not members of group)
   yes
   no
   don't know

k. Foundation grants
   yes
   no
   don't know

l. Interest from cash balances or endowments
yes
no
don't know
m. Loans
  yes
  no
  don't know
n. Funds from other associations
  yes
  no
  don't know
o. Sale of merchandise
  yes
  no
  don't know
p. Gifts/grants from corporations or business firms
  yes
  no
  don't know
q. Rent
  yes
  no
  don't know
r. Funds from churches
  yes
  no
  don't know
s. Funds from trade unions
  yes
  no
  don't know
t. Fund raising events
  yes
  no
  don't know
u. Other (please specify)

13 a. Which two or three of these sources provided the highest percentage of this group's total financial support during the last fiscal year? Please list sources of financial support in decreasing order.

13 b. Which of these sources has provided the highest percentage of this group's total financial support over the last 5 years?
14. What was the total revenue for this group from all sources during the last fiscal year?
15. What is the relative importance of each of the following activities in the work of this group?

a. Organize conferences for specialists/nonspecialists field
   - very important
   - important
   - not important
   - group not involved in this activity

b. Publish group newsletter, magazines
   - very important
   - important
   - not important
   - group not involved in this activity

c. Provide members with policy information
   - very important
   - important
   - not important
   - group not involved in this activity

d. Conduct in-service training for specialists
   - very important
   - important
   - not important
   - group not involved in this activity

e. Collect and distribute information about field to general public
   - very important
   - important
   - not important
   - group not involved in this activity

f. Work for the passage of needed legislation
   - very important
   - important
   - not important
   - group not involved in this activity

g. Work to improve administration of specific government programs
   - very important
   - important
   - not important
   - group not involved in this activity

h. Work to insure election of sympathetic legislators
   - very important
   - important
   - not important
group not involved in this activity

i. Engage in litigation
   very important
   important
   not important
   group not involved in this activity

j. Research into problems of the field
   very important
   important
   not important
   group not involved in this activity

k. Conduct demonstration projects in the field
   very important
   important
   not important
   group not involved in this activity

l. Develop publicity for the association, or important events in the field
   very important
   important
   not important
   group not involved in this activity

m. Organizing or carrying out public protests
   very important
   important
   not important
   group not involved in this activity

n. Campaigns for private donations
   very important
   important
   not important
   group not involved in this activity

o. Consultant to operating agencies of government
   very important
   important
   not important
   group not involved in this activity

p. Making efforts to increase membership
   very important
   important
   not important
   group not involved in this activity

q. Applying for government or foundation grants
very important
important
not important
group not involved in this activity

i. Answering questions/service requests of members
   very important
   important
   not important
   group not involved in this activity

s. Providing speakers
   very important
   important
   not important
   group not involved in this activity

t. Doing staff work/general organizational activities with other groups in the field
   very important
   important
   not important
   group not involved in this activity

u. Administering service programs on contract with government agencies
   very important
   important
   not important
   group not involved in this activity

v. Press releases and/or press conferences
   very important
   important
   not important
   group not involved in this activity

w. Television and/or radio
   very important
   important
   not important
   group not involved in this activity

x. Other (please specify)

16. The next set of questions deal with how you communicate with your members. How often do you engage in each of the following activities to communicate with and provide information to your members?
a. Newsletters
   frequently
   occasionally
   seldom
b. Magazines
   frequently
   occasionally
   seldom
   not used at all

c. Group meetings
   frequently
   occasionally
   seldom
   not used at all

d. Seminars
   frequently
   occasionally
   seldom
   not used at all

e. Social gatherings
   frequently
   occasionally
   seldom
   not used at all

f. Electronic media - e-mail, fax, etc.
   frequently
   occasionally
   seldom
   not used at all

g. Telephone
   frequently
   occasionally
   seldom
   not used at all

h. Other (please identify)

17. How important is the group's involvement in public policy making to your members?
   very important
   important
   not very important
   no member interest in policy making

18. How much influence would you say that your members have over the policy
decisions of the group?
   a great deal of influence
   some influence
minimal influence
no influence

19. Please indicate the importance of each policy category to your group:

a. Agriculture
   not important
   somewhat important
   very important

b. Business and Commerce
   not important
   somewhat important
   very important

c. Community Development
   not important
   somewhat important
   very important

d. Consumer Protection
   not important
   somewhat important
   very important

e. Cultural Affairs
   not important
   somewhat important
   very important

f. Disaster Prevention and Relief
   not important
   somewhat important
   very important

g. Education
   not important
   somewhat important
   very important

h. Employment, Labor, and Training
   not important
   somewhat important
   very important

i. Energy
   not important
   somewhat important
   very important

j. Environmental Quality
   not important
   somewhat important
very important

k. Health
   not important
   somewhat important
   very important

l. Housing
   not important
   somewhat important
   very important

m. Income Security and Social Services
   not important
   somewhat important
   very important

n. Information and Statistics
   not important
   somewhat important
   very important

o. Law, Justice, and Legal Services
   not important
   somewhat important
   very important

q. Natural Resources
   not important
   somewhat important
   very important

r. Regional Development
   not important
   somewhat important
   very important

s. Science and Technology
   not important
   somewhat important
   very important

t. Transportation
   not important
   somewhat important
   very important

u. Other (please specify)

20 a. The Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance provides detailed information on over one thousand federal domestic assistance programs that provide benefits to individuals, other levels of government, and other entities. Within the policy categories you have
identified, are you aware of federal programs listed in the CFDA that are of particular importance or significance for your members?
Yes/ No/ Don't know
If no, please go to question 21
If yes, please go to question 20 b
20 b. Would you please name those federal programs?
20 c. How would you rank the importance of the(se) program(s) to your membership (Please rank these programs in order of the most to least important to group members)?
21. If you can not remember particular program names, can you name the federal agencies or departments that have jurisdiction over the programs your group is most interested in?
22. Does this group engage in any of the following activities (Please check all that apply):
Publicizing the availability of federal grant programs to group members
Soliciting applications for federal grants from your members
Testifying before congressional (sub) committee(s) on behalf of federal grant programs
Lobbying individual agencies about rulemaking and/or program implementation
Providing information on federal grant programs to the general public
Lobbying individual members of Congress (or their staff) on behalf of federal programs
Monitoring individual agencies regarding the grant awards process
Engaging in grassroots lobbying
Serving on agency governing boards or working as consultants to agencies
23. Are there other organized groups with whom your organization regularly consults, communicates, or cooperates? If so, please name these groups.
24. Are there organized groups with similar purposes or goals with whom your group competes for new members, funds, contracts, or other resources? If so, please name these groups.
25. Are there organized groups with whom this group finds itself in disagreement or opposition? If so, please name these groups?
26. Are there agencies of the federal government with which this group communicates, consults, or interacts?
Yes/ No
If yes, please answer question 26a.
If no, please go to question 27.
26a. Please name these agencies

27. Is this group regularly consulted by government agencies when agencies are considering new legislation or changes in policy?
Yes/ No
28. Are there committees or subcommittees of Congress with which this group communicates, consults, or interacts?
Yes/ No
If yes, please answer question 28a.
If no, go to question 29.

28a. Please name these (sub)committees

29. Is this group regularly consulted by congressional (sub)committees when Congress is considering new legislation or changes in policy?

Yes/ No
Appendix D: 1996 Federal Program Recipient Telephone Survey

Hello, my name is [first and last] calling from Telesurveys of Texas, an opinion research firm in Houston. May I speak to [name of contact]? [if not available, ask] When would be a good time to reach him/her?

I am calling to ask you to participate in a study of federal aid programs. The study is designed by LaVonna Blair, a graduate student in Political Science at Rice University, and is being conducted under the supervision of Professor Robert Stein, also of Rice University. In responding to the survey, all of your answers will be kept confidential. The interview will take about 10 minutes. Do you have time now? or When would be a good time to call back?

1. I would like to begin by asking you how attentive you feel your organization has been to the current budget debate. Would you say that this organization has been very attentive, somewhat attentive, not attentive at all, or something else?

2. This question also deals with the federal budget. Some feel that the federal government should provide fewer services or benefits in order to reduce spending. Suppose these parties are at one end of the scale at point number 1. Others feel that it is important for the government to provide more services or benefits even if it means an increase in spending. Suppose these parties are at the other end at point 7. And of course, some have opinions somewhere in between at points 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6. Where would you place your organization on such a scale?

2a. If [organization name] had a say in making up the federal budget this year would you like to see federal spending on [if program=66 ‘the environment’; if program=93 ‘health care; if program=20 ‘public transportation’; if program =81 ‘energy’; if program =10 ‘agriculture’] increased/ same/ decreased/ don’t know/ refused

3. Many organizations receive payments or benefits of some type from the federal government. These payments or benefits may include loans, price supports, and other subsidies, etc., just to name a few. Has this organization ever received payments or benefits from the federal government?
   Yes [go to Q4]
   No/ Refused/ Don’t Know [go to Q7]

4. Would you please name the federal program that your organization has most recently received benefits from?
5. Is this the first year your organization (or city/state) has received benefits from [federal program name from Q4/if Q4=refused/don’t know, use the phrase “your federal program”]?  
   yes/ no/ refused/ don’t know

6. I am going to make a couple of statements that might describe [federal program name from Q4/if Q4=refused/don’t know, use the phrase “your federal program”]. For each statement, please indicate whether it is an accurate or inaccurate description of your program in your experience with this program. If you don’t know or are uncertain about the accuracy of a statement just say so and I will move on to the next statement. Based on your knowledge of [federal program name from Q4/if Q4=refused/don’t know, use the phrase “your federal program”], would you agree or disagree with the following statements.

6a. To receive funds from this program, I only had to demonstrate that I was qualified or that I was in need.
   agree/ disagree/ refused/ don’t know

6b. To receive benefits from this program, I had to submit a grant proposal and compete with other qualified recipients.
   agree/ disagree/ refused/ don’t know

7. Now I am going to read you a list of some things that an organization can do to make a statement about their policy concerns or interests. In the last year, did your organization

7a. Sponsor a political meeting or rally?
   yes/ no/ refused/ don’t know

7b. Draw up a petition?
   yes/ no/ refused/ don’t know

7c. Contact any other organization(s) and try to show them why they should support one political party over another?
   yes/ no/ refused/ don’t know

7d. Contribute money - to an individual candidate, a party group, a political action committee, or any other organization that supported your policy concerns?
   yes/ no/ refused/ don’t know

7e. Initiate any contacts with government officials?
   Yes [go to Q7e1]
No/ refused/ don’t know [go to Q8]

7e1. What title did the government official have that you contacted?

8. Another way for an organization to express its policy concerns is through organized interest groups. Some people feel that organized interest groups provide organizations an opportunity to have a voice in policy making.

8a. Is this organization a member of an organized interest group that represents its policy interests?
   Yes [go to Q8b]
   No/ Refused/ Don’t Know [go to Q9]

8b. What is the name of the group?

8c. How long has this organization been a member of this group?
   Years: / Months:

   [if years is less than 1, skip to Q9]

8d. Did your organization renew its group membership this year?
   yes/ no/ refused/ don’t know

   [if Q3 is not yes. skip to Q 15]

9. Now I would like to get your feeling toward some of the interest groups that have been involved with the program that this organization has received benefits from. I’ll read the name of a group and I would like you to rate that group using a scale from 0 to 100. The higher the number the more favorable you feel toward that group, the lower the number the less favorable you feel toward the group. You would rate the group as 50 if you feel neutral toward that group. How would you rate [3 groups that are taken from the sample record]

10. I would like to know the name of the interest group that you feel is the most involved with the program that this organization has received benefits from. This can be a group I have already listed, or some other group. Would you please name the interest group that you feel is the most actively involved with this program?

11a. How would you rate the effectiveness of [interest group named in Q10/ if refused or don’t know in Q10, insert the phrase “interest groups in general”] in maintaining support in Congress for this program? Would you say
The group's involvement has had a positive impact on the program.
The group's involvement has had a negative impact on the program, or
The group's involvement has not affected the program?
Refused/ Don't Know

11b. How would you rate the effectiveness of [interest group named in Q10/ if refused or don't know in Q10, insert the phase “interest groups in general”] in ensuring continued funding for this program? Would you say
The group's involvement has had a positive impact on the program.
The group's involvement has had a negative impact on the program, or
The group's involvement has not affected the program?
Refused/ Don't Know

11c. How would you rate the effectiveness of [interest group named in Q10/ if refused or don't know in Q10, insert the phase “interest groups in general”] in assisting the organizations that benefit from this program? Would you say
The group's involvement has had a positive impact on the program.
The group's involvement has had a negative impact on the program, or
The group's involvement has not affected the program?
Refused/ Don't Know

12. Has this organization directly benefited from any action taken by [interest group named in Q10/ if refused or don't know in Q10, insert the phase “interest groups in general”] in support of your program?
Yes/ No/ Refused/ Don't Know

13. Do you have any personal knowledge of whether [interest group named in Q10/ if refused or don't know in Q10, insert the phase “interest groups in general”] has attempted to

13a. . . . Publicize the availability of this program
Yes/ No/ Refused/ Don't Know

13b. . . . Solicit applications for federal grants from your members
Yes/ No/ Refused/ Don't Know

13c. . . . Testify before congressional (sub) committee(s) on behalf of federal grant programs
Yes/ No/ Refused/ Don't Know

13d. . . . Lobby individual agencies about rulemaking and/or program implementation
Yes/ No/ Refused/ Don't Know
13e. . . . Provide information on federal grant programs to the general public
   Yes/ No/ Refused/ Don’t Know

13f. . . . Lobby individual members of Congress (or their staff) on behalf of federal programs
   Yes/ No/ Refused/ Don’t Know

13g. . . . Monitor agencies regarding the distribution of grant awards
   Yes/ No/ Refused/ Don’t Know

13h. . . . Engage in grassroots lobbying
   Yes/ No/ Refused/ Don’t Know

13i. . . . Serve on agency governing boards or working as consultants to agencies
   Yes/ No/ Refused/ Don’t Know

14. Interest groups provide their supporters with several types of benefits. How important are the following benefits to this organization’s support of [interest group named in Q10/ if refused or don’t know in Q10, insert the phase “interest groups in general”]? 

14a. informative publications (i.e., newsletters, magazines, etc.)
   _____ important
   _____ not important
   _____ not provided

14b. low cost insurance
   _____ important
   _____ not important
   _____ not provided

14c. advocacy for important policies
   _____ important
   _____ not important
   _____ not provided

14d. organized tours or trips
   _____ important
   _____ not important
   _____ not provided
14e. representation of members opinions before government

______ important
______ not important
______ not provided

14f. opportunity for participation in public affairs

______ important
______ not important
______ not provided

14g. friendship with other members

______ important
______ not important
______ not provided

14h. discounts on consumer goods

______ important
______ not important
______ not provided

14i. legal assistance

______ important
______ not important
______ not provided
______ not important

15. Now I have a few background questions and we will be finished. Are there other organizations that provide the same services or products as your organization?

Yes/ No/ Refused/ Don’t Know

16. Does this organization have 501(c) status?

Yes/ No/ Refused/ Don’t Know

[if Q3 is not yes, skip to Q18]

17. Was state or local government legislation or involvement required to make your organization eligible for program funds?

Yes/ No/ Refused/ Don’t Know

18. Which of the following groups listed includes the total 1995 budget for this organization? [if uncertain, probe:] What would be your best guess?

Under $50,000
$50-$100,000
$100-$250,000
$250-$500,000
$500-$1 million
$1 million-$2 million
$2 million-$4 million, or
more than $4 million
Refused/ Don’t Know