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RICE UNIVERSITY

ELECTORAL COMPETITION AND THE STRUCTURE OF STATE LEGISLATURES: ORGANIZATIONAL COMPLEXITY AND PARTY BUILDING

by

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A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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ABSTRACT

Electoral Competition and the Structure of State Legislatures: Organizational Complexity and Party Building

by

Robert Bruce Anderson

A new examination of the linkages between electoral competition and the development of partisan organizations with their relationship to roll-call voting is generated. The study found a close association between variable electoral contestation, competition and success of minority parties in formerly one-party state house legislative chambers and the development of both minority and majority party organizations in these chambers. The model linked the features of increasing electoral competition to the development of greater chamber competition, greater proportional representation on substantive committees for the minority party, and the development of caucus organizations. These features of party organization, in turn, were linked to increasing intra-party cohesion and decreasing partisan conflict in roll call voting in the chambers.

The study is a comparative cross-state cross-time study of chambers which have formerly been one-party dominant.
Acknowledgments

Die Politik ist die Lehre von Möglichen...

Prince Bismarck, in conversation with Meyer von Waldeck, 11 Aug. 1867

If politics is the art of the possible, then certainly political science is the science of the art of the possible. This study could not have been carried out without the aid and assistance of so many people and organizations that I am sure to miss someone along the way; to these folks, my apologies up front.

Keith Hamm has been my committee chair, co-author, father-confessor and mentor in the truest definition of the word for the past 6 years. To say that I would not have finished this piece without him is inaccurate; I could not have started it without him. His example of persistence, integrity and hard work has informed and guided my entire graduate school experience. The fact that the art of the possible can be carried to extremes is best exemplified in Keith’s case; this year he has been Department Chair through three hirings, a move of the department to the Baker Center, been chief investigator or co-chief on 2 NSF grants, taught his regular course load, overseen two dissertations as chair and been a reader on another. He has also presented his usual complement of conference papers and has several under review for publication. Somewhere in there, he has managed to cosset me through this process, written hundreds of comments on this
work, patiently helped me struggle through the revisions, and managed to bring us to the defense. The greatest test of my resolve in finishing this degree has been meeting the exacting standards Keith sets on a daily basis via the best teacher of all – example. If he asked as much from his students as he does of himself, few of us would ever finish.

The other members of the committee have also filled critical roles in the production of this work. John Alford offered unfailing and unstinting aid and assistance to the distressed many times over the past 6 years – not only in the area of methods and models, but in the area of perspective. John helped – and sometimes forced – me to keep proper perspective on the work in progress, whether it was a paper for a class, a conference piece, or this dissertation. John’s example of precise, careful work was balanced with the example of knowing when to call it a day, think it through, and start again. It is to John that I owe this data base: it could never have been finished without his help. Like Keith, John’s personal example – as important as his instruction in the arena of computer work, methodology and most importantly, data “massage”, provided the impetus to settle for nothing less than exactly what I needed and wanted.

Chandler Davidson is a Sociologist. One of my latest meetings with him was at The Citadel Symposium on Southern Politics, where he had been invited to participate in a roundtable discussion. The Citadel meeting is one of those “invitation only” gatherings of scholars where one presents, discusses, in other words eats, drinks and lives political science. Chandler was there for the first time (on the strength of his award-winning work with Bernard Grofman) on the tenth anniversary with people who had participated in the symposium for 20 years (I was a
relative newcomer with only 3 Symposiums behind me). By the end of the conference, Chandler had charmed the “hard core” and converted the rest. His help on this project and earlier projects has been indispensable.

Earl Black came to our department from South Carolina just as I finished classes, and I had the honor to serve as his TA in the first course he taught at Rice. While it took a while to get past the dazzle of working with “one of the Black brothers”. I found him to be one of the most self-deprecating, personable folks I’ve met in the field. His comments on the first four chapters were the first to arrive after I moved to Carlisle, and helped to guide the revisions as well as the remainder of the work.

There are a number of people who, while not on the committee, were nonetheless critical to various portions of the work. Bob Stein’s work on constructing survey and interview instruments was crucial in putting together the caucus and committee survey which comprised the bulk of the data for Chapter 4. Rick Wilson was persistent in pushing me forward at points when I saw no end to whole business – he also helped tangibly in funding the work in that he saw to it that I was included in the faculty of the Foundations course long after that plum should have gone to another, perhaps more deserving person than myself. Rick deserves special mention as well, in that his guidance through the “sociology” of Political Science as a profession helped me to avoid most of the really big mistakes, aided me in overcoming the lesser ones, and helped me manage success with grace. Dan Ward is essentially known for his work in the Congress, but recently he has taken an interest in state politics and the “dirty data” associated
with state political parties – he was always available for help with any number of things along the way.

Though now moved on to other venues, Joseph Cooper and Garry Young, each in their own way, helped to spur the current work forward. Dr. Cooper dropped by one day, ostensibly to talk about an organization theory class we all needed to make up after a huge Houston rainstorm, and we ended up in a two-hour conversation about leadership that was perhaps more valuable than the entire remainder of the course. Garry was my graduate school “mentor”, “socializing” me to the profession as he passed along the things he had learned the year before. Our many long nights spent running SAS jobs and “waiting for printout” gave me the opportunity to pick his considerable brain on all sorts of subjects ranging from speed metal bands to the esoterica of the Congressional Annals. Garry, thanks.

Our Department Secretaries, Carolyn Zerda and Patti Hale, have made this process infinitely less difficult by pulling chapters off the e-mail net, printing and collating the myriad business documents which passed between the candidate and the “home office” during my stay in Carlisle, and crossing the “t’s” and dotting the “i’s” I simply could not cross nor dot from 1200 miles away. Carolyn has helped to keep me sane during the entire graduate school process: above all, she is a consummate professional, with the professional’s critical eye for proper behavior. When the going got rough. Patti shook her head and crammed in extra hours (where none were in the job description) in order to be sure I actually got through the final process … that’s pro behavior and above and beyond the call of duty.
I owe a debt, also, to those on the comparative side of the aisle, as well. With Comparative politics as my alternate subfield, I spent more than one-third of my class time with Professors John Ambler, Bob Dix, and Fred R. von der Mehden. Dr. Ambler was very indulgent of my sometimes peculiar models of sequence in his Politics of Western Europe class, which helped me to think through some of the modeling found in this dissertation; Bob Dix was quick with a smile and encouragement when things were going slow and Dr. von der Mehden provided an excellent example of perseverance – he is now “emeritus”, but this is something of a misnomer as he hasn’t seemed to slack up one iota in his research, and although he is out of the classroom, he continues to teach.

Parts of the data simply could not have been gathered without the help of numerous people and organizations. The ICPSR data set of state legislative elections was made available through Rice University’s participation in their research consortium, and proved to be the seed for the basic data set. I thank them for their rapid response to my questions on both arcane and substantive matters. The initial elections set could not have been generated from these data without the aid and unfailing assistance, ideas, syntax help and patience of John Alford and Keith Hamm. Both Keith Hamm and Robbie Hogan (my fellow conspirator and office-mate through my graduate career) were unfailing in their assistance in getting the pieces for the elections data pulled together, as well as in many sleepless nights of coding, punching and “massaging” the raw data once it was located and obtained. Keith Hamm and Ron Hedlund (who was Professor at Rhode Island at the beginning of the project and is now vice provost for research and graduate
education at Northeastern) were indispensable in his advice on how the committee data might come together, aided in much of the collection process, and have managed to keep me employed on several of their NSF grants throughout the process of the dissertation process. Dr. Hedlund has been a wonderful example in the field, whether while we were scribbling over data at the Library of Congress or the State Archives in Atlanta or simply providing an example of how a discussant should perform his duties at a national conference. In a very real way, he “grandfathered” this research.

None of the data collected for this study could have been brought together were it not for the hundreds of state elections officials at the opposite end of the request line. These folks by-and-large perform the thankless task of being battered by impatient, crabby researchers, who need data “yesterday” and usually put with this abuse with a fine sense of the absurd. I thank them one and all for their help. Pat Finney and her colleagues at the Center for Research Libraries in Chicago were absolutely wonderful in finding and shipping historical data available nowhere else. They were also more than forgiving when I broke their rules, upended return deadlines and generally made their lives miserable. I thank them for both their help and their forbearance. I also include in this thanks the folks at the Interlibrary Loan section of the Fondren Library at Rice University, who made all of these transfers possible.

The nameless people who scurry around the tunnels at the Jefferson building at the Library of Congress deserve special thanks. When researching the committees portion of this study, Dr. Hedlund and I overloaded and broke their system of materials provision to such a
point that they finally felt forced to make special provisions just for us. Seeing as they had every reason for throwing us out the door, and didn’t, I thank them for their help and patience. The Library itself is a fine institution, much maligned as a waste of taxpayers money, which does three times the job for a tenth of the money (proportionally) of many university libraries. The people who work there are some of the finest public employees I have had the pleasure to meet. They are underfunded, underpaid and now undergoing further cuts. I believe that it is one of the worst tragedies of our time that the “national library” is so close to the knife – its one of the few Federally funded programs that fit the best guidelines for any policy: it is cheap (by contrast), it is efficient, it is accessible to all, and it does what it claims to do.

All of the chapters herein have, during their development, undergone extensive peer review at one or another conferences and symposia along the way. I wish to thank the Southern Political Science Association, The Citadel Symposium on Southern Politics and Southwestern Association of Political Science for providing remarkable venues for research. The individual discussants included (but are not limited to) Professors Charles Hadley, Charles Bullock III, Ronald Keith Gaddie, Ron Hedlund, Harold Stanley, Wayne Francis, David Breaux, and Malcolm Jewell. I may have missed a few along the way, and if so I am remiss: the discussant’s job is one of the most difficult in service and potentially one of the most important to the presenter. I was fortunate to almost always receive comments which were useful, enlightening, and helpful.
The chapters on Caucuses and Committee (Chapters 3 and 4) proportionality both received their review at The Citadel Symposium for Southern Politics – a now venerable institution in the filed. This symposium, arranged biennially by Bob Steed, Tod Baker, and Larry Moreland, is a unique event in that one is closeted for 3 days with other political scientists to discuss Southern politics – the only observers are the occasional cadets. The Citadel’s Symposium facilitates interaction between scholars and the opportunity to meet and discuss research with fellow academics which other conferences strain to achieve and (sadly, I think) seldom succeed in providing.

The Caucus chapter (Chapter 4), in particular, could not have been written without the cooperation and assistance of the legislative leadership of both parties of the chambers in this study. These people gave freely of their time, their personal insights and their expertise in painting a picture of their working lives and aspirations. The elected official of the ’90s often faces a thankless, sometimes boring and always demanding task. The transfer of so much of the responsibility from the federal to the state level has resulted in ever more frustration and a lag in support and remuneration. Nevertheless, I have rarely encountered people who so clearly enjoy their work. I thank them, their aides, and the innumerable secretaries who judged my work worthy of their attention and often spurred busy legislators to finish the mail interview.

I should also like to thank my fellow graduate students, who had to put up with a seemingly unending spate of research notes, queries, and other ravings from me throughout the process. First I wish to thank Robbie Hogan, my long-time (and long-suffering) office mate for
the past 6 years. A fellow “dirty data” worker, Robbie always helped out when he could, found things I had lost, gave me the right citation when I forgot and generally nursemaided this dissertation through its major pitfalls. One’s office-mate is always the one who gets the rotten side of you when things go off, and Robbie always put up with this in pretty good spirits. His pointers and tips at handling the HCC teaching load were immeasurably useful in keeping me employed.

LaVonna Blair, Jody Neathery and Steve MacAleavy were fine friends from the start, and our discussions on political science and every other topic made the graduate school experience bearable. No-one can “make it” in grad school alone - those that try end up in rubber rooms. Without these fine folks I certainly would not have made it through to this point.

Finally, I thank my wife, Antje. In addition to her love and unfailing support, Antje also proofed the conference papers, the reviewed articles, the published work, and all of the dissertation. I challenge those who would stay me from using the over-worked “collaborator” to describe her contribution.
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Dedicated to my Father, a Scholar

ου γαρ περὶ τοῦ επιτυχοντος ο λογος, αλλα περὶ του ουτινα τροπον χρη ζην.¹

¹ For our discussion is on no trifling matter, but on the right way to conduct our lives ... Plato,Republic, VIII, 352d.
CHAPTER 1:

Electoral Competition and Party Complexity

This is to be a study exploring the linkages between electoral factors and the organization of political parties in the legislative arena. The central question is: what do changes in the electoral competition and electoral success of political parties engender in terms of change in the organizational structure of that party?

The study is over time, from 1968-1995; its setting is in states in which one party controls the legislative chamber at the intercept point, and in which the gains made by the minority party are variant across the period of the study. The study will attempt to show that the electoral fortunes of parties are critical to understanding the structure of both parties as they act in the arena of the legislative chamber, and that the structure of the party, and the duties of the party caucus in particular in the chamber is, in turn, related to the strength of the party in that arena. This study explores the effects changing
competition in the electoral arena has on both parties when there is an emergent minority party in a formerly one-party dominated chamber.

Political parties are active in several arenas, and their areas are linked by the centralizing collective of the party itself. In the case of legislatures and elections, the areas in which the party is active are inextricably connected by the complementary nature of the activities. The party’s electoral activity may be expected to have a direct effect on the efforts of the party in the legislative environment in two principal ways - directly, as a result of the loss or gain of seats; and indirectly, as a result of the changes in party expectations arising from competition differentials in the electoral arena. As a party becomes more or less successful or competitive in the electoral arena, its expectations of affecting the business of the legislature change; with this change, we may expect to see changes in the way the party organizes itself in the chamber, and, in the wider sense perhaps (although I do not test it here), reciprocal changes in the way the chamber as a whole is organized.

Theoretical Orientation

The theoretical orientation of this study is a variant of organizational theory, one of several strands drawn out of out of the economic theory of the firm coupled with management science. Organization theory is coupled with a general rational choice perspective on actor’s motives. There is a strong tradition of using such “middle range”

As Collie (1994) has noted, the two theoretical propositions (organizational theory and rational choice theory) are inherently complementary rather than contradictory (Collie, 1994:567). The central problem in joining them has been two-fold. First, there is the mechanical problem of crossing levels of analysis: organizational theory addresses problems at the institutional level while rational choice has commonly been applied at the level of the individual. This emphasis on single-level observation and explanation has led to a second problem, a point at which neither orientation has been completely successful, in unalloyed form, in empirical explanation: as Collie writes, "[t]o exploit the analytic possibilities of one at the expense of the other is to invite misrepresentation of both" (Collie, 1994:581).

Rational organizational theory assumes that norms of organizations are developed to contain certain "costs" in collective action and that institutional arrangements change as these norms are perceived by the individuals in the organization as effective or not effective in pursuing given tasks or ends of the organization (Elster, 1990:124-134). In other words, the rules of the game are enforced by institutions developed for that purpose, and as the collective context changes (in this case, as one party overwhelms the other or as another party begins to become competitive with a heretofore dominant party) the rules may change, and thereby the institution which enforces the rules will adapt to its new rôle.
by changes in its structure. This is "organizational" theory in the sense that it is a strand which most strictly adheres to the notion of the institution (and its structural components) as important; and that most possible models incorporate an institution-level analysis. It is "rational" in the sense that while it rejects strict methodological individualism through emphasis on the organization, it allows that organizational (or institutional) behaviors are expected to be best explained by the tasks and desires of the collected individuals (Olson, 1965; 1982; Schlesinger, 1984; Elster, 1990;). In the case of this study, these collectivities (political parties) are at once components of the macro-institutions (the legislatures) and sub-unit extra-structural entities with disparate, often conflictual, aims and goals within the macro-institution (see especially Schlesinger, 1984). It is assumed in this study that neither the macro institution nor its component sub-collectivities are static; rather, it assumes a dynamic relationship between the organizations under study with a causal linkage between changes in the associated sub-unit collectivities and changes in the macro-organization. This linkage is hypothesized to be associated with the electoral fortunes of the (sub-unit, extra-structural) political parties.

Collie points out that:

from an organizational theory perspective, it is expected that such structural features as the degree to which rules are codified and authority decentralized can be explained in terms of key features of the environment external to the legislature (Collie, 1994:567)
Rational choice theory generally supports no such conclusion, but rather focuses on the expectations derived directly from individuals and their personal preferences in the legislature itself. Yet in this context, the parties are at once part of the external environment (when they act in the electoral realm) and internal to the legislature, though separate from the legislature’s internal structure. The methodological individualism inherent in rational choice orientations allows for collective action mechanisms, yet cannot accept these organizations as transcendent of the aggregation of the individual preferences which direct its formation. Personal (individual) preferences, I will maintain, are conditioned by the organization to which the individual belongs (i.e. the political party), which is more than the sum aggregation of the preferences of its members. It is in the operational preferences of individual partisans that we may see evidence of the effects of party.

The contributions of rational choice theory to the middle-range theory which guides this study is the admission that individual preferences matter. I also concede that parties are aggregations of individual preferences in that they would not form except from individuals who have general agreement on a number of issues. However, the party as collective action mechanism (and organization) transcends these individual preferences - homogeneity of interests is not required. The effects of Party are most evident when personal preferences among partisans diverge. To use the language of rational choice, parties are most evident when they “cause individuals to do what they otherwise would
not do” - they discipline and reward individuals as a function of their adherence to the cooperative imperatives of the group. When an individual’s personal (or constituent) preferences override the member’s adherence to the operational preferences of the party, they may expect punishment, and where these preferences are subsumed to the common purpose, they expect reward.

As one subset of the rational choice tradition, competitive political party behavior is divisible into three types of behaviors - often (unfortunately, I would argue) identified as party types, rather than party behaviors in the legislative environment. These are the so-called “vote-seeking party”, “office-seeking party” and “policy-seeking party”. Strom (1990) challenges this thinking, arguing convincingly that these types of party behavior are “special cases of competitive party behavior under specific organizational and institutional conditions”. I would extend this argument to include most party behaviors often misidentified as “party types” or even as separate “parties”. These are behaviors in particular arenas at points in time in which we may observe the effect of party.

It is, I would argue, this misidentification of party behaviors as party types and even political parties themselves which has led authors of the rational choice perspective to challenge the existence of the political party writ large. Keith Krehbiel’s question “where’s the party?” is singularly problematic to those following this line of party definition. Krehbiel quotes from Rohde’s study as follows, in order to set up his first assumption:
We can speak of the [US] House as partisan and mean that parties (and particularly the majority party\textsuperscript{1}) are important influences on the institution’s mode of operation and on the decisions of the representatives who serve in it (Rohde, 1991:2)

The assumption Krehbiel draws from this is that parties attempt to place partisans in strategically advantageous positions from which they will then “influence” policy-making. First, under the behavioral rubric of defining party, this is still somewhat of a reach: Rohde has clearly meant several things by the “institution’s mode of operation”, some of them structural and others behavioral. Second, Krehbiel seems to miss the point that Rohde makes by joining these two domains in the first place: that decisions of partisans are linked to changing organizational attributes and vice versa.

Krehbiel also seems to confuse the personal preferences of individuals with their operational preferences. Admittedly, these are not always easy to separate. Rohde’s story about Jamie Whitten illustrates this neatly: Whitten’s operational preferences are observed to change (radically, as Rohde points out) through the twin mechanisms of a changing constituency in his district and of clear “messages” from the party caucus (in this case the threat of the loss of his chairmanship). His personal preferences are perhaps not irrelevant (as his prior voting behavior demonstrates - when less constrained by these forces, Whitten rarely toed the party line), but may be immaterial to the voting behavior which results from the action of the mechanisms.

\textsuperscript{1} Again, Rohde is primarily examining the Democrats in the House during a period of Democratic majority rule.
Krehbiel begins his piece with an examination of the difference between homogeneous parties and heterogeneous parties. He notes that in the homogeneous party, the spectrum of personal preference is tighter than that of the heterogeneous party. This seems *de facto* in that his definition is circular: the heterogeneous party is one in which preferences of members are wider across the array than in the homogeneous parties. Leaving this aside, however, the note that this is so is hardly new (see arguments here above and below concerning this artifact), and that this division within parties may result in divergent individual aims (behaviors which may be measured as vote scores, among other things) is documented by Rohde himself. The important point is not where personal and partisan preferences coincide, but rather where they diverge.

As is demonstrated by Rohde’s investigation, Congressional legislators are most divergent from the party when the party organization is moribund. When it is active, a system of rewards and sanctions (such as those which forced Whitten “into line”) enforce party cohesion at an operational level. An alternative explanation is that the homogeneity of personal preferences (perhaps as a result of the homogeneity of district preferences) are solely responsible for cohesion among partisans. If we argue the strict rational choice line this must be so - but this is testable, if not in the Congress, then elsewhere.

The problem with using the single entity of the Congress - particularly using a single chamber of the Congress - is that the changes which accrue over time are small. The Congressional parties have, indeed, “waxed and waned” in their effectiveness in
enforcing their operational preferences on individual party members. In part, this may be
due to the two factors already mentioned: the homogeneity of preferences in the
constituencies which the partisan represents and the homogeneity of personal preferences
between members. It may also depend on the strength of party organization in
transmitting and forcing its will upon the member. Even over time, the waxing and
waning of party cohesion as measured by vote scores in the Congress is marginal. The
conditions which we expect to effect the behavior of legislators (i.e., personal
preferences, constituency preferences, party organization) vary little, and are also
confounded by a multiplicity of factors associated with the passage of long periods of
time (which we must have in order to observe wide enough variation to measure). What
is needed is an array of conditions which vary both cross-sectionally (across units at a
single time point) and which vary fairly widely across a relatively short time period (so as
not to be contaminated by "history"). The matrix that I propose - state Houses and
Assemblies over a period of twenty-odd years is carefully selected to allow for wide
variance among them and within them across the time period, and should be ideal for
such a study.

If we assume that parties act as a mechanism for channeling operational
preferences (voting) in some fashion, then testing the effects of party organization across
an array where party organization strength (and even existence) varies widely seems
appropriate. Krehbiel suggests that his measures may be looking for party “in the attic”; I suggest that he is not only in the attic, but probably in the wrong House\(^2\).

In the Congressional array, the party organization faces the task of overcoming macro-institutional norms such as the proportional (party) membership of the committees, seniority norms, formal rules, and so on. In this institution, where these norms and rules are stable and (with a few exceptions) immutable, the task of measuring the “independent” effect of party on the placement of members seems problematic.

Several alternative explanations are possible, and difficult to disconfirm in the Congressional setting. The first is that it may be that the organization of the Congress is such as to cater to individual preference, and that party has no independent impact. Also difficult to ignore is the Cox and McCubbins argument that the majority party in the Congress has been in place and in power for so long that the institution itself has been molded to suit the needs of its partisans preferences and that research into Congressional conflict will be forever confounded by the bounded nature of such conflict in a setting where the majority party holds all the cards.

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\(^2\) There are, of course, other problems, though I will not dwell on them in the body of the text. The centerpiece of Krehbiel’s argument is in its empirical treatment of the placement of partisans on committees - an aspect of party behavior and structure tightly bound by the rules and norms of legislative organization. The notion that party leadership wishes to “stack” committees to its advantage is a bit absurd given that we now have a measure of party which is to be measured by the position of members on individual time-bound votes which are then aggregated. “Leadership” (never clearly defined by Krehbiel) if taken as the mean of the party preference on a given vote or set of votes or aggregation of votes, must then face the absurd task of fitting committee membership (which is stable across the array of votes) to a moving mean - an unstable and variant artifact depending on the position of the so-defined “party” at a given point in time.
If this were true, it would be possible to argue that the second portion of Krehbiel's study - which is taken up with the examination of the question of who is appointed to conference committees - fails to address is that almost all legislation which is reconciled in conference committees is “captured” by the majority party from the outset and that who sits on these committees is probably irrelevant to the majority party in any case. The purpose of the conference could be seen as one of ironing out problems of cross-chamber disagreement, in which each conferee is guided (if not bound) to the instruction of the chamber (which the majority party controls) in terms of what is negotiable and what is not. In the end, conferees are emissaries, not individuals exercising their prerogatives to preference. Conference committees are not an open forum for partisan debate because the stranglehold of the majority party on organizational structure and rules preclude it.

In sum, if we want to find the “independent effect of party”, we should be looking in a place where party organizational strength varies both in the minority party and the majority party, and where the effect of these organizations is measurable.

The literature on party unity and institutional development in the Congress is of limited usefulness in guiding research into these changes. It is, de facto, of little use at all in guiding the research of these topics in state legislatures. Fortunately, there is a wealth of research in this venue which has approached the problems of organization and party
unity from every possible angle, though Congressional scholars are wont to explore or exploit it for clues for their own research.

While Polsby’s seminal piece on institutionalization (Polsby, 1968) is informative of several dimensions of change in the Congress, it is not until Squire’s work in the state legislative setting that the full potential of the institutionalization explanation is apparent (Squire, 1992, 1993). In terms of the larger picture of how parties relate to their environment, several recent major studies have confronted these issues in various ways. The literature also goes back to earlier models of varying complexity. The most salient to this undertaking in the earlier models is that offered by Samuel Patterson (1972).

The Patterson heuristic (see Illustration 1:1) represents an example of a model which is entirely internal - it employs a closed-system view. It is also an attempt to
Illustration 1:1

Patterson (1972)
Attitudinal Patterns
Heuristically Linked to
Behavioral Artifacts in
Legislatures
address party cohesion in a two-party competitive environment. Patterson’s study confronts the issue of partisan cohesion from an attitudinal and behavioral perspective, and while all of his concepts are rooted in the internal (legislative) environment and do not extend to the external environment, the critical point in terms of this study is that Patterson clearly displays a *sequence* - “party consciousness” precedes “party cohesion”.

The second contribution of this work (for the purposes of this study) is that Patterson argues that behaviors which display cohesion may be learned, and are not simply a condition which statistically exists or does not exist in terms of the personal preferences of the members of the political party at the inception. While I will not pursue Patterson’s claims about attitudinal change in the same way, the connection he makes between what he calls “party consciousness” and “party cohesion” are part of that bundle of attributes which lead to party unity, and are therefore a target of this study.

Of the more recent Congressional studies, David Rohde’s examination of the post-reform House needs special mention and attention. Rohde’s model (like Patterson’s, a model of a two-party competitive environment) deals directly with the problems of mapping partisan resurgence and the interactions of structure and behavior, and attempts to open the “black box” a bit farther. Rohde focuses his attention on leadership
strategies, rewards and punishments by the party and their effects on members, and particularly, homogeneity of interests among partisans.

Rohde’s model is at least in part based on a historical reading of House events. In the House, for Rohde, there has been a decline period in party voting leading up to a period of increasing party unity (as measured by vote scores). During the early and mid-1970s, this decline in unity among Democrats is caused by heterogeneity among the chamber’s partisans (largely though not solely sectional). In response, the majority faction in the Democratic party revolts against some minority faction members who stand to inherit committee leadership positions. Before the revolt, the majority party caucus is largely moribund. Party cohesion is low (in comparison with the later period). After the revolt, the caucus is revitalized and the leadership allows the growth of discussion in an arena in which they can, at least in part, channel debate.

The sequence for Rohde is clear: when the party is most divided, the caucus revives and attempts to channel personal preferences (which are divergent) into operational preferences which are united behind the party. In addition to the intensifying importance of the caucus, the personal preferences of the members are becoming more homogeneous as well, and the combined effect is to effect greater party unity. Rohde is advantaged in studying the US House, as opposed to state legislatures, in two ways. The first is that the House has been a stable two-party system for most of its history; at only one point (the 1830s) may the House be said to be seriously “dominated” by one party at the expense of another. The second is that developments in the House have been tracked
and recorded since its founding, for all practical purposes. His model, however, may be instructive in terms of its design, if not direct applicability to the state legislative environment (see Illustration 1:2).
In Illustration 1:2, we can see that electoral outcomes, the external environment (to the legislature), is hypothesized to have a direct effect on party homogeneity, leadership strategies, and party unity, in part dependent (one presumes) upon chamber strength of the party. It does not, however, have a direct effect on the structure and role of the caucus. This may be because the caucus has been in place continuously for a long time, and that tracing the origins of the caucus becomes obscure.

Similarly, Jewell and Patterson (1977) have suggested the same set of associations (though measured cross-sectionally) at the state level. They connect a homogeneous party base with strong party organizations both within the legislature (the caucus) and outside (the electoral state party organization)\(^3\). While this study is primarily concerned with party organization in the legislature (and does not address state party organization per se), the model itself may inform this work.

**Earlier Studies of Party Organization in Legislatures**

The earlier studies presupposed several conditions which are worthy of note.

Patterson and Jewell assume, *ceteris paribus*, that there is some kind of competition between the parties - that power sharing between the two entities is at a minimum or non-existent, and that conflict between parties exists. This study makes no such assumptions -

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\(^3\) See p. 201
rather the reverse. It attempts to look at situations in which parties have insignificant opposition at the start, which becomes stronger in emerging over time, "transforming" the legislature and the legislative party organizations. I will suggest that in the case of this study, the standards of the earlier studies should be understood as conditional - there are many situations in one-party dominant states where they do not apply, or apply only under a set of conditions. There are many examples in states with a minimal opposition in which the minority party is invited by the majority to play a role in policy-making, even to the point of aligning itself with one or another of the extant party factions in the majority party for the purpose of determining leadership. There are also cases in which party leadership positions may carry remunerative allowances - it is not surprising to find that in the Georgia House, which had about 6 Republican members in the late 1960s, the Republicans had a fully developed party leadership - at least on paper.

This study also addresses both parties in transformation - I suggest that the process of change in the seat strength of a minority (upward) will affect both parties.

In the majority party, internal divisions may tend to be sublimated in order to meet the new challenge (when the minority party organizes), and the majority party may organize a caucus or use an existing caucus\(^4\) more than in the past. Jewell and Whicker's recent work (1994) in this area is quite enlightening, in that they have examined the

\(^4\) There are circumstances when the majority party may, contrary to organizational logic, establish a caucus even when there is no opposition in the chamber. This is especially likely when there is remuneration for the positions of party leadership.
problem from several angles. There is little to differentiate the “majority party” from “the legislature” in a one-party legislature; to all intents and purposes, they are the same organizational entity, except in the electoral arena. Why, for example, would the Alabama House Democrats, in 1948, need both a Speaker of the House and a majority leader? In this case, the party leader and the chamber leader are the same - there is no countervailing, competitive force to prompt initiating a party leadership separate from chamber leadership. When an opposition arises in the form of an opposition party, this is no longer so, and the functions which the legislative structure performed for the single party are no longer available to this party.

One-party chambers, by definition, are “party-less” in that their party is all-pervasive and all-inclusive. All-inclusiveness has faction as its by-product (unless there is total homogeneity - not possible outside an experimental realm. The domain at initiation begins to differentiate or subset as a result of pressures internal (since it is all-inclusive) to the single party, which is manifest as external in that the electoral process produces new members and removes others. Legislatures are not self-selecting.

In chambers in which a minority party has begun to emerge, the emergent party faces a different set of problems and challenges. It has a common purpose, if a negative one: they have identified themselves as separate from the majority. This does not mean that they are homogeneous in their personal policy preferences anymore than there is in the majority party. When Billy Wayne Clayton, Speaker of the Texas House, was
confronted by an emergent Republican minority, his reaction was to co-opt some of its members (Bill Davis for example) as members of the Speaker’s “team”. Clayton’s majority - a true “Speaker’s majority” (his term) - had little to do with Party, and a lot to do with conservative ideology. A number of other Speakers have also found cross-partisan coalitions as both a way to power and a system of rule. This has been true until recently in Ohio (D. Anderson, 1994) and is evidenced by the recent Speaker’s election in Massachusetts (1996) after the retirement of a long-time “strong” speaker who had effectively “shut out” the Republican minority for many years. As long as the emergent minority party is getting access to the process of policy-making *ceteris paribus*, they have no motive for forming strategy-producing caucuses.

In some “transforming” legislatures in the South, a sizable minority has been in place for a long time, and there is a considerable literature mapping their effects over the region, much of it centered on the effect of the “mountain” Republicans (Steed, Baker and Moreland, 1996; McGlennon, 1996; Black and Black, 1987). Yet this group, a traditional minority, has seen the number of their colleagues (and co-partisans) grow in these chambers in some states to the point of “pulling even” or of majority status (South Carolina, North Carolina, Florida). A new literature has emerged over the past 15 years on the effect of these changes in what I will refer to as the “transforming” legislatures -- those legislatures which have seen significant growth in their minority party, converting it
from a chamber which has been a one-party dominated institution to one in which two-party competition either has emerged or may emerge.

**The Model**

This is a sequential model in which the dependent variables are those institutional and behavioral aspects of the chamber which are hypothesized to have changed as a result of major shifts in the electoral arena over a 27-year period (1968-1995). I view the process of institutional change as an unfolding process, in which each change has resonance in several arenas. This is a causal model in the ordinary sense -- changes in the electoral arena are hypothesized to have an independent effect on organizational development in the parties (both majority and minority). I will examine these changes in three critical spheres: the partisan composition of the chamber’s standing committees, the growth in importance and complexity of the party caucuses, and in the area of increasing partisan division and increasing party unity in chamber voting. All of these are hypothesized to be effected by changes in the amount of competition in the electoral arena, and in the strength of the minority party in the chamber.

These changes are operationalized in two ways: the first is to impose a threshold on chamber strength of 33%. This standard is used as one tested in the literature (q.v.) and hypothesized to provoke changes in both parties as the minority party reaches the
threshold of parliamentary power. The second, and by far the more important, is to use a
measure of electoral competition and of chamber strength as continuous independent
variables used to explain changes in the institutional structure of the party and a source of
behavioral change in terms of votes. The first two phenomena examined -- the changes
in partisan appointment of members to standing committees and the growing complexity
of the party caucuses -- are expected to develop simultaneously; one a structural aspect
(caucus change) the other behavioral (committee appointments). They are also expected
to have an independent, additive, effect (additive to that of electoral competition or
chamber strength alone) on chamber voting behavior.

*The Electoral Realm*

The initial analysis deals with outlining the specific features of state legislative
elections over the past quarter-century, examining component aspects of competition,
assessing the usefulness of various types of ranking schemes, and making general
descriptive statements by reporting the descriptive statistics of these features across 46
chambers. This is followed by a close examination of the transforming chambers at the
heart of this study, setting them off from the more competitive chambers, and analyzing
changes which have taken place in the electoral arena over the time frame in these
chambers.

This chapter forms the "baseline" of electoral attributes which are hypothesized to
affect the chamber party organizations which are analyzed in the remaining chapters.
Committee Proportionality

The theoretical orientation of this chapter is predicated on the notion that, as features of political party competition in the electoral environment change, institutional aspects of the body over which parties have control also change. My intent here is to demonstrate that, as minority party competition increases in the electoral realm, there is an organizational response on the part of the majority party to “circle the wagons” and to decrease minority involvement in some types of committees (specifically institutional control committees and major money committees) while incorporating their numbers on other (specifically substantive) committees. This results in a general expectation that membership on substantive committees proportional to the minority party’s strength in the chamber will be affected in that the minority party will become closer to proportional representation on substantive committees, and less close on control committees - those committee which control the business of the legislature itself - as they become more competitive in the electoral arena.

Caucus Role and Complexity

This chapter will be primarily concerned with the degree to which the party leaders in these chambers have been successful in organizing party caucuses in response to changes in the electoral realm. It will trace the development of the party caucuses
through a descriptive examination of the chambers as they were measured across three
time periods, followed by a cross-sectional analysis based on a grouping of chambers by
their position on a chamber competition scale and the effect of competition as an
independent causal factor in their development. I will then comment on the development
of these caucuses (where present) across these competition indicators, and set the stage
for a discussion of the possible connection between these developments and the vote
scores reported in chapter 4.

Chamber Voting

Two concepts need to be introduced here, in some detail: personal preferences and
operational preferences. Personal preferences refer to those policy preferences that
individual members may hold. These may derive from constituency demands, personal
agendas, and so forth. Operational preferences, on the other hand, are those preferences
which emerge as decisions in policymaking - particularly votes. I hope to demonstrate
that these are in part imposed by the collective - the party - through a system of rewards
and sanctions.

When personal preferences among members are heterogeneous (or divergent), we
can expect one type of sequence, and Rohde’s story about Jamie Whitten illustrates this
neatly. Whitten’s operational preferences are observed to change through the twin
mechanisms of a changing constituency in his district and by clear “messages” (in this
case the threat of the loss of his chairmanship) from the party caucus. His personal
preferences are perhaps not irrelevant (as his prior voting behavior demonstrates - when
less constrained by these forces, Whitten rarely toed the party line), but may be
immaterial to the voting behavior which results from the action of the mechanisms.

For the heterogeneous party, the model follows the sequence found in Illustration
1:3; when the party is homogeneous, the sequence is quite different (see Illustration 1:4)
Sequence A: In Heterogeneous Party Composition

Illustration 1:3

Electoral Outcomes → Party Chamber Strength

Party Structural Differentiation → Party Cohesion

Party Cohesion → Legislative Structural Differentiation
Sequence B: With Homogeneous Party Composition

Electoral Outcomes → Party Chamber Strength → Party Cohesion

Party Structural Differentiation → Legislative Structural Differentiation
The reasoning behind this is relatively simple. When party members agree on all or most things, we can view the parties as interest aggregators with little need for complex unifying forces. They are unified in their preferences. This is not to say that no structure will arise — it will — but as a result of other forces. The party caucus may have functions that go beyond simple enforcement of unity and the ordering of operational preferences; its functions may include strategy of the party in terms of Bill order, committee assignment of members and Bills, and so on. These would be necessary to the smooth functioning of the party organization even if personal preferences were aligned at all times.

When party member's personal preferences are divergent, the duties and functions of the caucus become quite complex. The caucus becomes the transmission point for a series of rewards and sanctions which — when it works well — results in cohesion of operational preferences (voting) on party issues.

The hypothesis examined in this study is the notion that as parties become more competitive in the chamber, they also become at once more diverse (the minority party) and more homogeneous (the majority party). This is due to the conditions under which the minority party develops. When the minority party is small, it is homogeneous -- partisans stand alone in the face of an overwhelming majority because they represent interests which sharply diverge from those represented in the dominant party. At this
point, the majority party is quite heterogeneous; it tends to factionalize along lines of interest. As the minority party grows in strength, it does so at the expense of unity. Similarly, as the majority party becomes leaner, it becomes more homogeneous, and factionalization begins to decline. This, I will assert, would take place regardless of party organization, simply as a result of the “natural” evolution of partisan support. Party organization channels this effect, and makes it more pronounced. This accentuation is measurable, and while I cannot measure the “natural” sorting process, I can and will measure the effects of changing party organization.

The structural development of the parties, I will argue, is conditioned by the contours of their opposite number: if the majority party has no opposition, its impetus towards structural differentiation is minimal; if the majority party has displayed a willingness to share power with the emerging minority party, it may not need to organize either. Should the minority organize early, perhaps because it has been cut out of power sharing, the majority may be expected to respond by organizing as well.

Because most legislative chambers operate on a system of rules which advantage a minority of one-third or more, I have chosen a 33% margin to represent the point at which a minority - whether they are involved in power-sharing or not - becomes a powerful factor in policymaking in the chamber. I will test this threshold occasionally, usually imposing it separately from testing the continuous variables of competition and chamber strength. Chamber rules often include such features as the suspension of the
rules (a critical maneuver in most chambers), approval of constitutional amendments, and so on. The recent history of the US Senate shows that 33% can be a powerful number when the object is to stall or obstruct legislation.

I will argue that when the minority party reaches this point both parties, if they have not begun to organize hitherto, will begin to organize in earnest — even when homogeneity of personal preferences exists among party members.

For the purposes of the remainder of this discussion, I will occasionally refer to purely homogeneous or purely heterogeneous party situations, but for purposes of explicating the arguments, I will assume that the heterogeneous/homogeneous blend described above more accurately describes the situation. This assumption will be reflected in my operationalization of the model(s).

In both cases, there is a shift from an old to a new form of organization resulting from changes in outcomes in the electoral arena. Where Rohde has (perhaps rightly) argued for "homogeneity" among party members, I argue, rather, for differentiation between parties in the form of competition and increasing success of the minority party. It may, in the cases in this study, be possible to examine instances of both causal forces at work - homogeneity in the party personal preferences and heterogeneity in personal preferences conditioned into united operational responses by structure. These may then
be contrasted along other dimensions\(^5\) (e.g., the complexity of party structure and function arising from each).

Illustration 1:5 reveals the nature of the domains in the model to be partly operationalized in this study. Electoral events and outcomes are the result of behaviors, party chamber strength both as a measure and a time-bound concept is a structural artifact of electoral outcomes. Party cohesion, as will become apparent in greater detail later, is hypothesized to be a behavioral artifact of chamber strength and electoral outcomes; both organizational aspects are structural domains, dependent on the way the party members or legislators organize their environment.

\(^5\) Illustration 1:2 reflects the general situation Rohde describes.
For this situation, behavior in the external environs predates internal structure, which conditions internal behaviors (operational preferences) which, in turn, have a direct effect on macro-organization.

The structural indicators (see Illustration 1:6) are theoretically derived from two general areas of interest which are loosely associated with Moncrief and Hamm's (1982) general dimensions of structure (after Knight, 1967). These authors organize structure into three general groupings:

1) *Decentralization of Authority*. This set of attributes addresses such formal topics as the powers of agenda setting, the handling of Bills, how committees are assigned and what their purpose is, how the caucus is arranged, how its leadership is arranged, and what its functions are.

2) *Activity Structuring*. This includes norms of task specialization, division and distribution of labor, and formalization or routinization of the business of the party or legislature.

3) *Size and Nature of the Support Structure*. This is the commitment of resources by the body of the legislature to support of chamber business, and in some cases the commitment of resources by the party to caucus business (including legislative campaign committees and the like).
Illustration 1:6

Heterogeneous
Party Composition:
Nature of Domains
With Indicators

Electoral Events
(Behavioral)

Chamber Strength
(Structural)

Percentage of the
Majority and Minority
Parties in the Chamber

Indirect

Party Structural
Differentiation
(Structural)

Party Cohesion
(Behavioral)

Legislative
Structural
Differentiation
(Structural)

Duties and Nature of
the Party Caucuses

Formal duties of the Speaker,
machanics of how committee
appointments are made, amending
rules, presence and use of rules/
calendar committee(s), formal
leadership positions and how
appointed

Chamber Voting
This study is almost solely concerned with the first two: decentralization of authority and activity structuring. I will examine these features in two ways: a) by showing the configuration of these features as they particularly relate to the political party and b) by demonstrating how the configuration of these features is affected by changes in chamber strength and the level and nature of competition in the external system.

Here (in Illustration 1:6), I have defined the indicators in each domain. Electoral outcomes are differentiated into party contestation of elections, competition in the elections in which they run candidates, and the success or failure the party has in winning office. Chamber strength is the simple percentage count of the number of party members in the chamber at a point or points in time. Party structural differentiation is indicated by the duties and the nature of the caucus, appointments to committees and who is responsible for these, and the number and nature of party leadership positions. The legislative structural dimension is captured by examining the duties of the Speaker, the mechanics of committee appointment (including the presence or absence of party proportional representation) and the formal leadership positions in the chamber and how they are appointed or elected and by whom they are nominated. Party cohesion is measured here by a cluster of indicators, including the roll call votes used by Rohde and others, the competition and vote for the legislative leadership (the Speaker in the House
or Assembly, for example) and the votes or features by which committee leadership is attained, as well as who attains it.

It is important to be attentive to the idea that the party structure is measured both in terms of simple complexity — quantitative notions such as how many officers the party has — and functional aspects of party responsibility. A party caucus which directs strategy and holds policy forums is fundamentally a stronger and more complex entity. A caucus in which the party decides on candidates for legislative leadership which is binding on caucus members is fundamentally sounder and more able to "direct" operational preferences than one which simply takes a sense of the party on preferred candidates, leaving each member to vote as she chooses.

My central hypotheses emerge as follows: 1) there is a linkage between environmental (external) events and legislative organization and 2) this is possible through an agent which has both external and internal roles (the party) and 3) the transmission of the causal effect of the external events to the organization is possible through an interaction of behavioral and structural features of that transmitting entity.

Illustration 1:7 is the complete sequence as seen in Illustration 1:6, with the geographical areas indicated by the shading.
Illustration 1:8 is the actual model to be tested. Although there is a slight difference in the attitude of the array, it is possible to see that this model was drawn from the earlier plot in Illustration 1:7. Here, electoral events are hypothesized to have a direct effect, independent of chamber strength, on the development of the party caucuses, and to have an indirect effect, independent of chamber strength, on party differentiation (in this case the variation of committee proportionality across different types of committees). These events also have a direct effect on chamber strength, of course.

Chamber strength is hypothesized to have a direct effect on the development of party caucuses, and an indirect effect on partisan differentiation. In its turn, the development of the party caucuses is hypothesized to have a direct effect on partisan differentiation, and a direct effect on chamber voting and measures of party unity or factionalization.

Partisan differentiation, which is brought on by the effects of the increasing complexity of the party caucuses (and their more important role in the execution of increasingly complex tasks) is hypothesized to directly effect chamber voting and measures of party unity.
General Hypothesized Association Between Dynamic Domains

Illustration 1:8

Development of Party Caucuses -- Complexity of Tasks, Importance of Role

Electoral Events: Partisan Contestation, Competition and Success

Difference in Partisan Chamber Strength

Chamber Voting

Partisan Differentiation in Chamber (Variable Committee Proportionality Across Committee Types)
Illustration 1:9

General Hypothesized Association Between Dynamic Domains -- Chapter Outline

Chapter 4

- Development of Party Conscres - Complexity of Tasks - Importance of Role
  - Direct: Chapter 5
  - Indirect: Chapter 5

Electoral Events
- Partisan Conscience: Competition and Success (Chapter 2)
  - Direct: Chapter 4
  - Indirect: Chapter 3

Difference in Partisan Chamber Strength (Chapter 2)
  - Direct: Chapter 4

Chapter 5

- Chamber Voting
  - Direct: Chapter 5

Chapter 3

- Partisan Differentiation in Chamber (Variable Committee Proportionality Across Committee Types)
  - Direct: Chapter 5
  - Indirect: Chapter 3
The last Illustration, 1:9, plots the remaining chapters of the study, laying out the sequence of the chapters and delineating the relationships to be examined in each.

**Data and Setting**

The setting of the study is that of American state legislative lower house chambers in the time period 1967-1995, and includes examination and investigation of such features as committee proportionality, caucus role and complexity, and chamber voting. Raw election data (as reordered) for the years 1968-1987 is largely from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research - they are not responsible for my errors of interpretation, any alteration of their data base, or the manipulations of the data which created the component variables. Some corrections to the ICPSR base State Legislative Elections Data Collection for those years have been made by the author in accordance with data released by the states - the ICPSR is not responsible, of course, for my corrections of their otherwise excellent material. Election data for 1988-1995 was collected, coded and punched by the author. The original raw data has been aggregated to state level through the following process:

For chapter 3, committee proportions were produced from data gathered at the chamber-election year level. These data were generally from two sources. Some years were obtained from Keith Hamm and Ronald Hedlund, who are working on a project much wider in scope, but with similar aims. The remainder of the data was gathered and
coded by the author from the Journals of the various chambers, or from legislative handbooks or other similar publications of the individual legislatures.

The data in chapter 4 was from two major sources, the studies conducted under the auspices of the National Council of State Legislatures (NCSL 1981-82, 1988-89) and from an independent survey of state legislative leaders conducted by the author in the summer of 1995. This survey was augmented by interviews with leaders from most of the chambers involved, with an eye to both new data (particularly concerning electoral activity on the part of the party caucuses) and to clarifying responses to the written portions of the survey.

The chamber voting data for chapter 5 was coded according to procedures outlined in that chapter by Andrew Weber and the author during the first part of the summer of 1996, and was drawn directly from voting results recorded in the Journals for each of the chambers.

Generally, the data used in this study is further clarified as to how it was found, coded, and manipulated in the chapter in which its use appears. Any other questions concerning data sources should be addressed to the author. Needless to say, any errors occurring in these data are my responsibility, as are any interpretations arising from their use.

While the original electoral data was imported as an ASCII set on tape from ICPSR, the initial manipulations were performed in SAS, a statistical package which was
designed to operate in the CMS main-frame language. The raw data sets thus created were appended by merging data punched in Microsoft Excel, reloaded as Dbase3, and brought to the mainframe by File Transfer Protocols. This data set was then aggregated in the fashion described above. The resulting data has been appended, over time, to include the ensuing election years in SYSTAT, a statistical package designed to operate on IBM PCs and IBM-compatible machines. While some analysis was performed in SYSTAT, almost all of the material analysis for this study was performed in SPSS.

Almost all of the tables appearing in this study were produced using Microsoft Word 6.0, and all of the word-processing was performed in that program. Due to the length of the study, changes in the various program designations or model numbers are difficult to trace, and I believe the mentioned companies and corporations will excuse my omitting them.

The original committee data was entered in MS Excel, downloaded to Dbase3, and uploaded to SYSTAT, where many of the manipulations were performed. The final analysis of these data was performed in SPSS 6.0 and 6.13.

The analysis of the caucus material was performed in SPSS 6.0 and 6.13; as was the analysis of the vote scores.

All illustrations were created in either MS Excel or VISEO, a graphic design module designed for the PC. All scatter-plot charts were created in SPSS 6.13; most
graphs were created in that program as well, with the exception of the charts in chapter 3, which were created in MS Excel.

In selecting the chambers to be used, a number of criteria were laid out, and the states examined for attributes within them. There were three main concerns: First, since I have hypothesized that the degree of minority strength in the chamber has direct effect on the complexity of the political party's organization, I had to discover which states had chambers in which the minority party was at a low enough point so that change could be observed over time. Secondly, it seems obvious that these chambers would not all develop minority parties at the same rate, or if they did, there is no empirical reason to believe that all states develop these parties at the same point in time. Second, I needed the initiation point and the endpoint. Since this study is bounded by time, it was necessary to get a rough estimate for what point in the process of emergence the states were at the intercept (1967; the year preceding the first electoral data). This point also falls in line with the theory sketched out above that if minority parties develop in a systematic manner, the increase in the complexity of their organization should also be systematic — but that since the intercept point for each unit would be at least slightly different, the widest possible variation of the degree of development was desirable. I was able to group states under these bounds in terms of similarity of the point in the process at which I intercept them with the study. It follows, then, that third, it was necessary to
approximate the degree of change in chamber strength across the time frame of the study itself: this would give me a thumbnail notion of the endpoint of the time series.

These criteria were for the formation of “baseline” evaluations, and they allowed me to make informed choices about what I would be cutting out under several subsets of the data.

The intercept is treated here as the level of party chamber strength across the period 1959-1967. This allows not only a rough view of the states at the particular point of the intercept, but also a notion of how the minority party is performing over the several four-year cycles.

In order to allow for slight fluctuation above the 33% threshold, I assigned two cut-offs: one at the 33% point, and the other at 35%. A further cut-point was assigned at 20%, in order to isolate those states in which the minority party is not a factor at all during the period leading up to and including the intercept point.

I assigned an 8-point scale to these features which ran from a low of 0 (no minority party is at the cut-point at any point in the range) to 8 (the minority party, across the scale, is always under 20% in chamber strength). Values were assigned to the lowest range for the minority party in a given chamber/year: 1 if the party fell at or below the 35% cutoff, 2 if it was at or below the 33% cutoff, and 3 if it was at or below the 20% cutoff during that year.
The matrix which emerged gave me rough values to rate the chambers in question.

It is now possible to entertain questions concerning how the states in the subset perform over the period after the intercept. I compared the first year (1968) with the last year (1990-95) in terms of this variable and produced a crude change score: the difference between the minority party strength in the first year compared with the last. This index was then collapsed to three levels of change: strong, moderate and stable. This allowed the states to be broken out across a third dimension: strength of change during the period of the study. Any selection of states for the study could now be decided in terms of the greatest possible variation across the intercept, regions, and strength of change past the intercept.

In this pool of states (19), 8 are Southern (TX, GA, FL, NC, SC, AL, MS, VA), 4 are Border (TN, MO, OK, MD) and 2 are Western (NV, NM). Among the Southern states, while all are in the stable one-party category, there is significant variation in terms of the other dimensions. Four are strong change states, four are stable, and one (VA) displays moderate change. Among the others, 5 are stable and 5 display moderate change between 1968 and 1995. The “missing cells” across region are: there are no non-Southern states which are stable one-party; they are all “emergent” two-party; further, no non-Southern state changes strongly across 1968-1995.

What seems to be the case in the sample is that there are chambers which are at all levels of the (minority) party-building process: states which have minority parties which
have not yet "emerged" by 1968, but do in some form in the later period (the Southern states, minus Tennessee), and states which have nascent minority parties which emerge during the pre-1968 period (the "emergent" border). Of the former type, some of the states display strong change in their minority parties over the period 1968-1995 while others are still in the initiation phase or have leveled off where the majority party is challenged. Of the emergent states, some seem to be at the midpoint in minority party development (KY and OK), while others have leveled off - or at least have shown little change in chamber strength when 1968 and 1995 are compared (MO, NV, and NM).

This study will include states which are nascent two-party before the period of examination (FL, NC), states which become two-party competitive during the period under examination, but begin the period as basically one-party states (SC, VA); and states which remain essentially one-party states throughout the period (AL, MS).

The chambers which will be examined will be composed of the following, and may include subsets of these chambers where noted: the lower House chambers of Virginia, Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Florida, Kentucky, Maryland, Oklahoma, Nevada, New Mexico, Missouri, and Mississippi. In Chapters 1 and 3 (the elections chapter and the chapter concerned with caucus development), these chambers are thrown into relief by comparison with the features of
the other lower house chambers, with the exception of Rhode Island, Vermont, Louisiana, Nebraska and Minnesota⁶.

While the data selection technique was as “fool proof” under my criteria as possible, the chamber voting data still held some surprises, and several chambers designated as belonging to one or another “type” at the outset were revised by the time the final analysis was finished.

In summary, what I have presented here is the idea I am going forward with, a general picture of how it fits into the current and past literature, a general picture of how the model might work, and a series of decisions about the data. The next chapter will be concerned with the general outline of the elections data.

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⁶ Louisiana’s primary system does not lend itself to the types of electoral models used in this study; the elections data for Vermont is incomplete at the source. Minnesota was non-partisan in its chamber elections until 1976, and Nebraska is both unicameral and non-partisan — neither chamber, then, is practical for a study of partisan organization. The data for Rhode Island was not available.
CHAPTER 2

The Electoral Environment of Transforming House Chambers

Introduction

In recent research into changes in transforming state legislatures, two strands of changes under study stand out: changes in the electoral contestation, competitiveness and success of contemporary Republican candidates, and organizational changes in the legislatures themselves. In nearly all transforming electoral environments, Republicans have made important progress towards moving legislatures closer to true two-party status through their increasing presence, competitiveness and success in elections. During the 1994 elections, Republicans seized control of several chambers which have been, in recent memory, wholly the preserve of their Democratic counterparts. This chapter examines the dynamics of the electoral environment in state House elections over the past two and one-half decades, in an attempt to uncover some of the underlying conditions which have characterized these changes.

This Chapter will have as its major task answering questions concerning the degree to which Republican inroads in the electoral arena have changed the face of the transforming, formerly one-party chambers. This chapter will address the changes which
have taken place in the electoral environment, which is that "external" arena in which increasing partisan competition is hypothesized to produce internal stress in the chambers themselves.

This chapter is divided into three distinct sections: 1) a review of the current and historical literature on state legislative electoral competition, 2) a section of descriptive statistics outlining the changes over time in lower House elections across the nation in the past quarter-century, and 3) an examination of the electoral features of the chambers which are the specific focus of this study. At the outset of each analysis section, I will present the expectations of that section, and at the conclusion of each section I will present a resolution of these hypotheses.

Electoral Competition and the State Houses: Literature Review

The development of competitive two-party systems in formerly one-party chambers is one of the most significant changes to occur in state legislative politics in the last fifty years. Regardless of whether the electorate in these states is in a condition of dealignment, realignment or some combination (Stanley, 1988), from an office-holding perspective "at all levels, officeholders have become substantially more Republican", particularly in the South (Bullock, 1988: 569). The rate of electoral success, however, has not been constant across all offices. Rather, "there is a striking difference between
GOP performance at the federal and state offices" (1988: 570). The accepted wisdom is that "an affinity for the GOP began at the top and has percolated downward" (1988: 570).

However, in recent years the Republican party has made significant inroads in being elected to state senates and houses. By the 1992-93 period, for example, Republicans held at least 20 percent of the seats in seven houses and seven senates. In three senates and five houses, the minority party had accumulated at least 33 percent of the chamber seats, a tipping point thought to be extremely important in terms of partisan organization within the legislatures (Harmel and Hamm, 1993; Hedlund and Hamm, 1993). In the 1994 election, three chambers (the Florida Senate, the North Carolina House and the South Carolina House) went over to Republican control, and Republicans are within a few seats of a majority in the Virginia House and Senate and they now (1997) control both houses in Florida. The substantial minority party gains are not confined to the states in which Republicans have always had a viable minority presence. For example, there were no Republicans in either the Alabama House or Senate in the mid-1970s. Currently, they constitute over one-third (39%) of all legislators in both chambers. At the state legislative level, the once "Solid South" is a thing of the past.

This increased party competition has not gone unnoticed by academic researchers. Rather, a once dormant area of study has been the object of a great outpouring of research in recent years (e.g. Jewell and Breaux, 1988, 1990, 1991; Bullock, 1988; Bullock and
Gaddie, 1991a, 1991b; Elliott, Gaddie and Gryski, 1989; Winsky, 1990a, 1990b; Aistrup, 1990; Cassie and Goidel, 1991; Thompson and Cassie, 1990; Corey, 1991; Anderson and Hamm, 1992; Hamm and Anderson, 1993; Cassie, 1994), due in no small way to the creation and availability of excellent data bases. In this chapter, the focus is on political party competition for state legislative seats among the House chambers where the minority party has historically been inconsequential. These chambers, for the purposes of this study, include: Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.

Regionally, eight of these are southern states (Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia); five are "border states" — in that they border the formerly "solid south" (Kentucky, Missouri, Maryland, Oklahoma and Tennessee); and two are Western (Nevada and New Mexico). There is a clear regional bias in the array, but it is also clear that the existence of minute minority parties is not solely confined to the former "Solid South".

Party Contestation and Competition

A key issue in the study of state elections and state legislatures in these states is the extent to which there is two-party competition. While two-party competition is a seemingly simple concept, a perusal of the research literature uncovers the absence of any
agreement as to its operational definition. The dimension of electoral party competition refers to the level of competition, or the percent of votes received by each party, as opposed to chamber competition, which refers to the distance between the parties in the chamber. In general, studies which focus on the level of competition as the dependent variable for southern elections try to account for the share of the two-party vote received by one party at the legislative district level. Models incorporate national and state political and economic factors, along with characteristics of the district and the candidates (Winsky, 1990a, 1990b; Cassie and Goidel, 1991). Another method of viewing competition which incorporates the district-level approach is concerned with indices of party competition (Holbrook and van Dunk, 1994). Holbrook and van Dunk’s study was issued in reaction to the widespread use of indices of competition which are not directly based on electoral data (David, 1972; Ranney, 1976), and therefore is only tangentially concerned with many of the issues presented here.

While many researchers have criticized these types of aggregations (Patterson and Caldeira, 1984; Barrilleaux, 1986; and perhaps most succinctly, Stonecash, 1987), few have attempted to generate a district-level approach which takes into consideration the multifaceted problems associated with such an index. These are generally decomposed as: the limited time frame (i.e., the use of cross-sectional data to describe or explain dynamic events or short over-time analysis which picks up time-bound "noise"), limited samples of the units (i.e., the use of a few cases - states - to describe regional or sectional
features) and limited samples of the districts. This last method has been most frequently confounded by the presence of multi-member free-for-all districts, which defy simple analysis of competition due to the multiplicity of candidates and confusion over vote choice.

In the study below, I have sought to address these problems straightforwardly by
A) increasing the time frame to a larger number of elections (1968-1995) B) using the complete set of units where data is available and C) resolving the measurement problems in MMFFA districts so that all districts within the array may be utilized\(^7\).

\(^7\) A major difficulty in comparing results across different states is the variation in type of electoral system utilized. No problems were posed if single-member districts or multi-member districts with individual races for specific positions were used by the state. The problem is created by the free-for-all multi-member districts (MMFFAs hereafter). While some researchers (Holbrooke and van Dunk, 1993) have noted the similarities between voting behavior in single-member districts (or multi-member post districts) and MMFFA districts, it is important to note that it is not precisely comparable (see Holbrooke and van Dunk, 1993) nor is it theoretically satisfactory in the measurement of district-level competition to observe that they are, and obviate these districts from the sample. Any district-level measure which leaves out some districts (particularly of a type which is unique to the array) and opts instead to use a sample of districts defeats its purpose of being inclusive. As a solution to this problem in earlier work (Anderson and Hamm, 1992, Hamm and Anderson, 1993), we opted to follow Niemi, Jackman and Winsky's (1991) approach and create pseudo-single-member districts. The Niemi, Jackman and Winsky logic is simple — pair the Democrat with the highest vote with the Republican with the lowest vote and continue the rank/order in a descending-ascending pairing. Not only does this protocol match the election outcomes properly (and probably reflects voter preference) but it also provides the best measure of competitiveness. A problem is that in some elections the number of candidates offered by a political party does not reflect the number of seats in the election. We solved this problem by creating a syntax which asks the statistical package to count the number of possible winners (in the original dataset) and then to measure the number of candidates the party has put forward in the election. The computation which is arrived at then places a line of false data in the observations with vote set to \(0\), and will then match it with any opposing candidate. The other obvious problem here is that there may be instances in which a party may have more than the number of winners running under its label. In these cases, we asked SAS to remove the candidate with the least number of votes, forming the rectangular symmetry in the data required by the package for the pairings.
Where minority parties have historically been small, with the chamber dominated by one party, insurgency by that minority party is a process which must first unfold in the arena of elections. This process consists of at least three basic components: contesting elections (entering candidates), becoming competitive in elections (running competitively against opponents, as opposed to simply filling a place on the ballot), and winning elections. It is logical that one cannot become either competitive or win, without entering a candidate; it is also logical that simply entering a candidate guarantees nothing in terms of that candidate either becoming competitive, nor winning a race. Simply flooding the electoral arena with candidates of the minority party does not guarantee success, but it may be one strategy by which an insurgent minority may learn in which districts they are most likely to succeed, particularly if they have run few candidates in the past. A number of events may spur this type of approach to electioneering. The first is behavioral, and may simply be a sense on the part of the party that the electorate may be more receptive to their message and therefore their candidates. The second is structural, and may come as a result of reapportionment of the voting population into districts in which the party may be more successful than hitherto. Identifying districts in which to launch state legislative campaigns may also take place on the initiative of the potential candidate or candidates, rather than because of an over-arching party strategy. Recruitment of candidates, raising and allotting resources by the party may not seem to have any particular direction in cases where the minority party is beginning to make inroads in
terms of contestation. This may be a result of a learning process in which the party attempts to identify districts in which they can become competitive in future elections.

In part, money makes up a large component of what parties have to offer in terms of resources and a number of recent studies have focused on this area (Gierzynski and Breaux, 1994, e.g.). Gierzynski and Breaux find that what state parties spend depends for a good bit on the type of election at the level of the individual race (1994:178-186) and that political parties (as opposed to “non-party” organizations such as industrial PACs) are more likely to heavily fund competitive races rather than “safe” seats — the party’s motives may not be directly derived from this study, but it is perhaps safe to assume that individual interests are more concerned than the parties might be with the possible benefits (chiefly access) deriving from people who are already in the legislature. It also seems safe to assume that political parties are more interested than individual interests with expanding already existing majorities than PACs might be - at in the dimension of Party. What is not clear is the support that emerging minority parties might provide “challengers”-- this will depend on how much, or how little, the party has learned about the distribution of support for their candidates.

The state political party apparatus is not the only, or in some cases, the chief provider of money. Increasingly, state legislative parties are forming legislative campaign committees (Gierzynski and Breaux, 1994), Speaker’s committees (D.
Anderson, 1994) and are directly becoming involved in the distribution and expenditure of hard and soft monies.

Important as it may be, money is not the sole resource which is expended in the electoral process. State legislative political caucuses have, as time goes forward, become much more involved in the process of elections, broadening their role, augmenting the expenditure of cash with a wide range of services involving candidate recruitment, candidate and voter education, polling, and issue education. Much of this activity, due in large part to its labor-intensity, originates in special committees of the party legislative caucus, or in informal sub-groups of that institution.

Elections and the Growth of the Minority Party

As Cassie (1994) has pointed out, minority parties\(^8\) may adopt a number of different strategies for dealing with their limited resources in the electoral arena.

Focusing on recruiting of candidates, Cassie points out that the Republican party in southern state legislative elections has employed, broadly, two type of strategies: targeting of districts in which the party believes Republican candidates have the best chance of capturing seats, and flooding all possible races in which they can enter candidates in order to increase their odds of winning at least some of them. Cassie finds

\(^8\) I believe his comments are generalizable, at least at the theoretical level, though his particular interest resides in Southern states alone.
both strategies in operation in the south, and finds that while targeting has been successful in some states (North Carolina and Texas), the “scattershot” strategy seemed to work well in Florida. The question unasked in Cassie’s study is one related to that asked above: do these strategies vary with the rate of success at capturing seats? Does it make sense to run in every election if one has only a very few in which there is a possibility of winning, or, conversely, does it make sense to run in only a few marginal races when either the resources of the party are great or when the party has about an equal chance in winning in any district? The central question I will try to address concerning these features is whether the strategy employed seems dependent on the ratio of seats in chamber the party has achieved.

This type of involvement by the legislative party, where present, may also change the nature and the stakes of elections to the chamber — encouraging collective action and cooperation between partisans in ways sharply divergent from the old model of single-candidate “personal” campaigns.

The scenario I would like to suggest is one in which parties view their positioning of resources in terms of weighing possible collective costs (risks) and benefits. One possible assumption might be that parties which find themselves at almost inconsequential levels - in terms of legislative organization - may be as likely as not to provide whatever meager resources they have to challengers as to incumbents. One
possible pattern is one in which the emergent party has a few safe seats and a larger group in which they have little to lose by simply entering candidates -- if nothing else, these campaigns will provide future knowledge about the possibility of actually becoming competitive there. Under such a scenario, the “safe” seats require little resource maintenance, while the challengers have about equal attraction for the resources of the party.

How effective a party may be in pursuing such goals, or even recognizing them, may be in large part dependent on their strength in the chamber. Further, dependent on chamber strength, the goals themselves may be very different. Some author have suggested a threshold (Harmel, 1984; Hamm, 1986). Thirty-three percent is the number most often mentioned, this being the basis for what is essentially a parliamentary blocking minority (to borrow a phrase from comparative political science; see Strom, 1985). This idea calls forth the notion that as the party reaches the 33% margin, or as competition in the electoral arena grows overtime, there is more to protect — and resource allocation patterns may be expected to change. In a scenario where the party has a little over 33% in the chamber, the “safe” seats will be maintained, but it seems possible that a number of “marginal” seats have also entered the picture. If the party’s seats are evenly split between these seats and the seats candidates wish to challenge in the interest of widening their margin, it seems reasonable that the party night seek to hold on to what they have — to dedicate their resources to holding onto the “safe” seats and the
competitive seats, rather than risking the loss of their 33% blocking minority by
supporting risky challenges. Further, as the minority party rises above the 33% margin -
particularly if they can count a margin of 33% “safe” seats, the pattern could change
again. In a scenario where the minority party has a margin approaching 33% of “safe”
seats, but has an overall split with their majority counterparts which is competitive in the
chamber (above the 40% margin), then the party may be more likely to “risk” the loss of
those competitive seats above 33% in chamber since the possible payoff may be a
majority.

As state legislatures are widely different in terms of their parliamentary rules
concerning the “parliamentary blocking minority”, a continuous measure may be more
useful, though in the chapters which follow I will use, and test, both measures.

**Operational Definitions: Electoral Material**

In these measures I have followed the earlier work of Anderson and Hamm (1992)
and Hamm and Anderson (1993) which is conceptualized from theoretical work initiated
by Jewell (1982). I examine several dimensions of legislative elections:

1) The first is the level of *contestation*. While some authors (e.g., Aistrup, 1990) have
defined a contested race as one in which the candidate of that party received at least 10
percent of the general election vote, the more typical approach is to determine whether
one or both parties entered a candidate. In this paper, I measure single-party contestation as the percent of legislative district general elections in which the political party fielded a candidate. Separate calculations were made for the Democrats and Republicans. Then, a measure of two-party contestation is calculated as the percent of constituency-level general elections in which both major parties were represented.

2) *Competition* is the second dimension which taps the percent of district-level races in which the party’s nominee made a very credible showing. I operationalized single-party (Democratic or Republican) competitiveness as the percent of the total races in which the party’s candidate received 40 percent or more of the two-party general election vote.

3) The third dimension is the level of *electoral success*. It is defined as simply the percent of the general-election races in which the party’s candidate had the greatest number of votes. Victories by independents were not included, nor do independents play any role in the analysis or the data or measures associated with the analysis.

4) *Chamber competition* is the distance between the two-party in terms of their strength in the chamber itself. It is operationalized here in two ways. The first is the degree to which the chamber is controlled by the Democratic party. This allows a continuous, 0-100 variable which measures how much or how little the chamber leans to this party. The
second is a simple "distance" variable. This measure is not based on party, but rather a measure of majority control of the chamber.

5) *Two-party Contestation* is the subset to these dimensions and one of several "combination" concepts. The first of these is that electoral environments which contain a large number of districts in which both parties are fielding candidates -- regardless of eventual success of said candidates -- is fundamentally different from those environments in which the districts are sharply differentiated between parties. Where the opposition fails to field a candidate, this increases the importance of the dominant party in terms of nominations, endorsements, and so on. In districts where there is no two-party contestation, the point of decision is in the dominant party's primary -- not in the general election. Further, where both parties are fielding candidates, this means that however dominant one party may be, it must expend at least the minimum resources necessary to maintain that dominance in more districts than in the environment which is sharply differentiated. In other words, if a candidate faces no opposition, it stands to reason that she will expend less resources than one in which she does, and that this is also a concern of the party itself.

6) *Two-party Competition* is the notion that the two parties meet in partisan clashes which are meaningful in terms of one party challenging the other for the seat, or one party challenging the other for control of the chamber. Electoral environments in which there
is no dominant party are dissimilar from those where there is one. There are at least two types of electoral environments which fit this description. In both, chamber competition is high — the distance between the parties in the chamber is small. While this is obvious, it needs to be stated as there are at least two ways that this may be maintained. The first is a classic competitive chamber in which both parties are competitive in many of the districts — few districts go unchallenged, and in most, both parties can capture at least 40% of the vote. The second, and one which will be treated at length in this study, is the divided electoral environment, in which two-party competition is extremely low as a result of the parties reaching an electoral modus vivendi where neither party challenges the other party’s “safe seats”, or in which these challenges are perfunctory. In this environment both two-party contestation and two-party competition will be low.

Three types of chambers are examined here and throughout the study as a whole:

1) Two-party competitive chambers. These are chambers in which the parties have historically been competitive in the chamber.

2) Transforming chambers. These are chambers in which the parties are in the process of becoming competitive. Included in this definition are those chambers which have been referred to as
3) *One-party dominant chambers.* These are chambers in which one party controls most of the seats in the chamber.

This study will in almost all cases be addressing the changing structural features and behavior of the *transforming chambers* as they move from being *one-party dominant chambers* to becoming *two-party competitive chambers.*

**Hypotheses and Expectations**

While the purpose of this chapter is to establish a baseline in the electoral realm in order to make predictive or explanatory statements about changes in the chambers, there are some very basic hypotheses which are important to any use of these electoral variables for this purpose:

1) The first is that the *chambers*, generally, are becoming more competitive and less dominated by the Democratic party. This is less a hypotheses than a generally accepted notion which needs to be established before the rest of the hypotheses may be tested.

2) The second is that there are two populations underlying the full matrix of chambers: *transforming chambers, one-party dominant chambers* and *competitive chambers.* In the full array of chambers, the character of the *transforming*
chambers tends to be moderated by the presence of the competitive chambers, masking the underlying divergent attributes of contestation and competition in the transforming chambers.

3) In the transforming chambers, there will be a higher degree of Republican competition and contestation as the chamber becomes more competitive, both than heretofore in those chambers, and than in the chambers which have historically been two-party competitive.

4) In the transforming chambers, the degree of chamber competition will act as a spur to contestation and competition, and that fewer races will be won with no contest from the other party, and that two-party competition will tend to rise, rather than fall.

5) That the transforming chambers will tend to reveal increasing electoral competition for the Republican party with attendant decreases for the Democratic party.

6) That the transforming chambers can be viewed as chambers with similar characteristics, but that they lie at different points in an unfolding process of becoming more competitive.
Analysis

Change in Lower State House Election Features, 1968-1995

Section one of the analysis will deal with the establishment of:

- the character of the full array of chambers as becoming less dominated by the Democratic party and generally less competitive and

- the presence of two populations of chambers in the array, each with sharply different attributes of contestation and competition.

In order to set the stage for the analysis of the transforming legislatures, I have collected and groomed data from all states but four for the period 1968-1995\(^9\). This will allow for the widest possible variation across there chambers across the time frame, and will set the bounds for the transforming legislatures. For the initial set of models, I will examine all of the states in the array, and compare the transforming legislatures with their competitive counterparts.

\(^9\) The four chambers which are not included in this analysis are: Minnesota (non-partisan elections prior to 1976); Louisiana (the primary system in this state does not allow for the type of analysis conducted here); Vermont (missing, unavailable data); Nebraska was not included because of its non-partisan status and unicameral arrangement.
A number of ranking schemes have been current at one point or another in the search for categorization techniques in political science (Grumm, 1968; David, 1972). These ranking processes have included those which fold in indexes of campaigns for governor and Congress, often include presidential vote, and also include such items as state-wide office votes and votes for the state legislature. While many of these indexes are useful for the purposes for which they were designed, none of them is truly appropriate for the discussion of a single-ballot item. For this reason, I have elected to jettison the practice of discussing comparative state party competition as it is used in the forms described above, and instead elected to produce a series of measures which are obtained from the lower houses of the legislature alone. It seems for the immediate purpose of uncovering the broad dimensions of the electoral arena in this part of the study, the only measure which makes much sense is one in which the actual success of the parties competing for this office is measured over the time frame.

There are, of course, innumerable ways of doing this as well, and the most popular is simply to take a mean of some measure of party success. Table 2:1 ranks the state's chambers by over-time average success (percentage wins per election) of the Democratic party across time, and includes the means and rankings for each chamber across time for distance between the parties in the chamber, two-party contestation and two-party competition. The chambers in this table are split into transforming chambers
### Table 2.1a: 46 Lower House Chambers, by State, Ranked by Mean of Percent of Chamber Held By Democrats, 1968-1995

**Transforming Chambers**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Rank, Percent Chamber Democratic</th>
<th>Percent Chamber Democratic</th>
<th>Distance Between Parties in the Chamber (Rank)</th>
<th>Two-party Contestation (Rank)</th>
<th>Two-party Competition (Rank)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AR</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.94</td>
<td>.88 (1)</td>
<td>.08 (46)</td>
<td>.03 (46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MS</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>.80 (2)</td>
<td>.22 (44)</td>
<td>.10 (43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AL</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>.76 (3)</td>
<td>.26 (43)</td>
<td>.10 (44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>.68 (4)</td>
<td>.63 (27)</td>
<td>.26 (28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GA</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.60 (6)</td>
<td>.19 (45)</td>
<td>.09 (45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>.38 (7)</td>
<td>.36 (39)</td>
<td>.16 (41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NC</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>.56 (10)</td>
<td>.63 (29)</td>
<td>.37 (17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TX</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.42 (14)</td>
<td>.29 (42)</td>
<td>.13 (42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KY</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.43 (12)</td>
<td>.33 (40)</td>
<td>.17 (38)</td>
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<td>.30 (22)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>17</td>
<td>.63</td>
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<td>.37 (38)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NV</td>
<td>19</td>
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<td>.28 (23)</td>
<td>.77 (17)</td>
<td>.37 (18)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MO</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>.20 (30)</td>
<td>.46 (34)</td>
<td>.19 (36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TN</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>.15 (39)</td>
<td>.33 (41)</td>
<td>.17 (40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Mean</td>
<td>.756</td>
<td>.515</td>
<td>.428</td>
<td>.204</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RI</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.61 (5)</td>
<td>.70 (24)</td>
<td>.27 (25)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HI</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>.57 (8)</td>
<td>.63 (28)</td>
<td>.22 (33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MA</td>
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<td>.57 (9)</td>
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<td>.17 (37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WV</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>.45 (11)</td>
<td>.69 (25)</td>
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<td>NY</td>
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<td>.61</td>
<td>.23 (26)</td>
<td>.90 (5)</td>
<td>.22 (34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>.84 (10)</td>
<td>.50 (3)</td>
</tr>
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<td>.22 (28)</td>
<td>.92 (3)</td>
<td>.44 (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>.58</td>
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<td>.93 (2)</td>
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<td>OR</td>
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<td>.58 (31)</td>
<td>.30 (23)</td>
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<td>.35</td>
<td>.31 (20)</td>
<td>.82 (11)</td>
<td>.43 (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
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<td>.34 (17)</td>
<td>.80 (14)</td>
<td>.56 (2)</td>
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<td>.33 (19)</td>
<td>.73 (22)</td>
<td>.47 (6)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.43 (13)</td>
<td>.64 (26)</td>
<td>.35 (20)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Grand Mean</td>
<td>- &amp; -</td>
<td>.515</td>
<td>.253</td>
<td>.769</td>
<td>.372</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
and competitive chambers\textsuperscript{10}. While speaking of a chamber as "more Democratic" in this context is a bit crude, it does seem that some chambers have clearly elected more Republicans over time than others. In this regard, Arkansas has elected, on average, 94\% of its House members in the years 1968-1995 from the Democratic party, while Idaho has elected a spare 29\%. In viewing this table, it is clear that the Republicans have, over this time frame, been a good deal less successful over all in electing members to these chambers. In all but 13 of them, the Democrats have elected the majority of the members in each of the chambers over the time period. The general regional characteristic of the thirteen chambers in which Republicans have been successful, is that they are largely in the mid-west and west, although they also include New Hampshire (New England) and Delaware (a border state).

Of the 33 chambers in which Democrats have out-pollled Republicans, Democrats have held an average of at least 60\% of the seats; for the chambers in which Republicans have been more successful, they only dominated 7 by the same margin (ID, WY, SD, UT, NH, ND, and AZ). Democrats have, on average, dominated state-houses nationwide during this time period.

\textsuperscript{10} Arkansas is included in this table as a transforming chamber, though this chamber is not part of that group of chambers which make up the transforming chambers array in later chapters. The reason for this is that Arkansas' method of selection for committee appointment ruled it out for consideration in that section of the analysis.
In order to uncover the underlying features of the contributions of various phenomena to two-party chamber competition, a continuous measure of two-party chamber competition was generated, using a simple “distance” measure. This meter is simply the distance between the two parties in the chamber, over time, measured as an absolute number between 0-100. Table 2:1 provides figures and rankings for average distance between the parties in the chamber.

The same average measures have also been applied to the more general of the competition factors: average percentage of two-party contestation across the time frame. The top 10 chambers in this array are all dominated, on average, by Democrats, with the exception of North Dakota (as are the 10 lowest on this variable). Two-party contestation has a wide scope across the chambers, ranging from 99% of races, on average, in New Jersey to only 8% in Arkansas.

Having laid out the average measures for these features, it can be said with some assurance that, on average, Democrats have dominated more chambers than have Republicans and that the distance between the parties in the chambers dominated by the Democrats is greater than those dominated by the Republicans.
The table is split in order to highlight the differences between the two types of chambers, even at this aggregated mean level. The grand means for each population are instructive: The distance between the parties in the chamber is obvious from the ranking in terms of Democratic percentage, but the difference in two-party contestation is interesting. On average, the two-party competitive chambers average a rate of two-party contestation (76.9%) which is 34.1% greater than that of the transforming chambers (at 42.8%). In terms of two-party competition, the average in the transforming chambers (20.4%) is 16.8% less than that of the competitive chambers (at 37.2%).

Electoral Features Across Time

To measure time as a variable in this context, at least two options are open: to simply use the election data points as measures (i.e., assigning each election in a chamber an ascending number) or, simply to assign a “counter” point to each year. I have opted for the latter path, in the belief that it is time itself — and the attendant processes associated with time’s passage — which result in changes in the electorate, and not the occurrence of an election. If elections are, as they are purported to be, measures of the political associations of the electorate at a given point, and if what is wanted is to capture changes as they occur, it seems necessary to take this measure at as many points as possible in order to uncover the features of the changes. But although elections occur within time, time is not assigned according to elections -- thus, it makes no sense to assign point “2” in one chamber to 1970, and in another to 1974. This would be the case
if one were assigning counter points to Iowa and Mississippi for example. To add to the confusion which can result from this measure, the point “2” in these states would be 1973 in Virginia. In order to avoid this, I have simply assigned each year a counter number, and inserted them parallel with the elections, regardless of the interval between elections. This means that any election occurring in 1968 is counter “1”, any election occurring in 1969 is counter “2”, and so on.

Pearson correlation statistics were run for degree Democratic, percentage both parties ran candidates, percentage both parties were competitive, distance between the parties in chamber strength, and degree Democratic with the “count” variable for each, across all 46 chambers. Then the same correlates were run for each of the hypothesized sub-populations. The results may be seen in Table 2:2.
### Table 2.2

**Correlation Coefficients for All Chambers**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Degree Democratic</th>
<th>Distance Between Parties in the Chamber</th>
<th>Time (Count)</th>
<th>Two-party Contestation</th>
<th>Two-party Competition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Degree Democratic</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance Between Parties in the Chamber</td>
<td>.603***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time (Count)</td>
<td>-.0710*</td>
<td>-.1095**</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two-party Contestation</td>
<td>-.480***</td>
<td>-.508***</td>
<td>-.031*</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two-party Competition</td>
<td>-.521***</td>
<td>-.398***</td>
<td>-.198***</td>
<td>.743***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p=.05, **p=.01, ***p=.001

### Correlation Coefficients for Competitive Chambers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Degree Democratic</th>
<th>Distance Between Parties in the Chamber</th>
<th>Time (Count)</th>
<th>Two-party Contestation</th>
<th>Two-party Competition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Degree Democratic</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance Between Parties in the Chamber</td>
<td>.221***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time (Count)</td>
<td>-.015</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two-party Contestation</td>
<td>-.046</td>
<td>-.289***</td>
<td>-.222***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two-party Competition</td>
<td>-.308***</td>
<td>-.153***</td>
<td>-.332***</td>
<td>.513***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p=.05, **p=.01, ***p=.001

### Correlation Coefficients for Transforming Chambers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Degree Democratic</th>
<th>Distance Between Parties in the Chamber</th>
<th>Time (Count)</th>
<th>Two-party Contestation</th>
<th>Two-party Competition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Degree Democratic</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance Between Parties in the Chamber</td>
<td>.988***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time (Count)</td>
<td>-.291***</td>
<td>-.332***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two-party Contestation</td>
<td>-.405***</td>
<td>-.399***</td>
<td>.089</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two-party Competition</td>
<td>-.423***</td>
<td>-.417***</td>
<td>.071</td>
<td>.915***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p=.05, **p=.01, ***p=.001
These results suggest that, over time (1968-1996), across all chambers included in the array, the chambers are becoming significantly less Democratic though distance between the parties in the chamber is clearly strongly correlated with the Democratic party. Thus, the distance between the parties is generally narrowing (resulting in more competitive chambers overall). While slightly fewer races are ones in which both parties are contesting (entering candidates), significantly fewer races across these chambers are two-party competitive.

The results for the competitive chambers reveal several important differences for these chambers as compared with both the full array and their transforming counterparts. While distance between parties in the chamber and degree Democratic are still strongly correlated, "distance" is no longer significantly correlated with the time variable, indicating that change in distance between parties in the chamber across time has been slight. The correlations of two-party contestation and two-party competition with time are down, and statistically significant in this report, the difference being the stronger negative correlation between time and two-party contestation and time in the competitive chambers than in the full array.

When we contrast these findings for the competitive chambers with those of the transforming chambers, we find that the correlation between distance between the parties
in the chamber and time is again strongly significant and negative -- the distance is narrowing with time, where as in the competitive chambers it is stable\textsuperscript{11}. Further, in the transforming chambers, both two-party contestation and two-party competition are positively correlated with time (though not significantly), as opposed to strongly negative among the competitive chambers. The difference between the two populations is now fairly clear.

Table 2:3 breaks down the aggregate correlations found above into the component chambers for comparison. The chambers are ranked according to changes in Democratic percentage over time, first by the significance of the change, and then by the correlation coefficients (by chamber). Of those chambers where the change in Democratic percentage of the chamber has been significant, it has been in decline in 12 of the 19 chambers. Not surprisingly, of the 12 chambers which have shown significant decline in percentage Democratic, 6 are Southern (TX, VA, AR, SC, AL, and GA) and one is a border state (OK). Texas, Virginia, Arkansas, South Carolina and Alabama have all revealed a decline in the Democratic percentage of the chamber at the .001 level.

Again, the table is split to allow a comparison of the two chamber types, and the difference between them is readily apparent. While there are anomalies among the

\textsuperscript{11} The coefficient for the competitive chambers is positive, but not significant. For further evidence of the difference between the two chamber types and the association between electoral behavior and distance between the parties in the chamber, see appendix 2:1.
transforming chambers (i.e., the Democrats have made statistically significant gains in Tennessee), 8 of the transforming chambers reflect significant Republican gains over the time period.

Despite the common wisdom, which purports that all southern and border state chambers have become more competitive over time, we can see that there are some which have remained relatively stable. Kentucky and Missouri, for example, show a slight narrowing of the distance over time, but in both cases the coefficients are small, and in neither case are they significant. Other chambers traditionally dominated by the
Table 2.3a: Correlation Coefficients for 46 Lower House Chambers Over Time, 1968-1996. Ranked by Change in Democratic Percentage Over Time.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Change in Democratic Percentage</th>
<th>Change in Both Parties Contesting</th>
<th>Change in Both Parties Competitive</th>
<th>Change in Distance in Chamber Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TX (1)</td>
<td>-.848***</td>
<td>.362</td>
<td>.182</td>
<td>-.848***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VA (2)</td>
<td>-.865***</td>
<td>-.045</td>
<td>-.158</td>
<td>-.873***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR (3)</td>
<td>-.910***</td>
<td>.276</td>
<td>.358</td>
<td>-.910***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC (4)</td>
<td>-.927***</td>
<td>-.226</td>
<td>-.248</td>
<td>-.927***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AL (7)</td>
<td>-.952***</td>
<td>.881</td>
<td>.903**</td>
<td>-.952***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OK (8)</td>
<td>-.804**</td>
<td>.424</td>
<td>.524</td>
<td>-.804**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MS (10)</td>
<td>-.915**</td>
<td>.741</td>
<td>.701</td>
<td>-.915**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TN (11)</td>
<td>.751**</td>
<td>-.308</td>
<td>-.345</td>
<td>.617*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GA (12)</td>
<td>-.657**</td>
<td>.826***</td>
<td>.794***</td>
<td>-.657**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NC (21)</td>
<td>-.546</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>.110</td>
<td>-.545</td>
</tr>
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<td>FL (22)</td>
<td>-.471</td>
<td>.255</td>
<td>-.025</td>
<td>-.471</td>
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<td>UT (23)</td>
<td>-.418</td>
<td>-.745**</td>
<td>-.588**</td>
<td>.365</td>
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<td>MD (33)</td>
<td>-.378</td>
<td>-.512</td>
<td>-.606</td>
<td>-.375</td>
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<td>NM (39)</td>
<td>.046</td>
<td>.959***</td>
<td>-.881***</td>
<td>.044</td>
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<td>KY (41)</td>
<td>-.037</td>
<td>-.200</td>
<td>-.491</td>
<td>-.069</td>
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<td>NV (45)</td>
<td>.009</td>
<td>.293</td>
<td>.568*</td>
<td>-.178</td>
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<td>All</td>
<td>-.291***</td>
<td>.089</td>
<td>.071</td>
<td>-.332***</td>
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</table>
Table 2:3b: Correlation Coefficients for 46 Lower House Chambers Over Time, 1968-1996. Ranked by Change in Democratic Percentage Over Time.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Correlation Coefficient</th>
<th>Change in Democratic Percentage Over Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HI (5)</td>
<td>.819***</td>
<td>-.083</td>
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<tr>
<td>NY (6)</td>
<td>.750***</td>
<td>-.776***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID (9)</td>
<td>-.671**</td>
<td>-.608*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WI (13)</td>
<td>-.618*</td>
<td>-.862***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IN (14)</td>
<td>.560*</td>
<td>-.953***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IL (15)</td>
<td>.559*</td>
<td>.886***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NH (16)</td>
<td>-.552*</td>
<td>.070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MT (17)</td>
<td>-.547*</td>
<td>-.545*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ME (18)</td>
<td>.481*</td>
<td>-.178</td>
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<td>RI (19)</td>
<td>.526*</td>
<td>-.895***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MI (20)</td>
<td>-.422</td>
<td>.081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AK (24)</td>
<td>-.407</td>
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</tr>
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<td>NJ (25)</td>
<td>-.345</td>
<td>-.849***</td>
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<td>KS (26)</td>
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<td>-.050</td>
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<td>ND (27)</td>
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<td>-.235</td>
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<td>WV (29)</td>
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<td>-.646**</td>
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<tr>
<td>CA (30)</td>
<td>-.249</td>
<td>-.215</td>
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<tr>
<td>OR (31)</td>
<td>-.221</td>
<td>-.234</td>
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<tr>
<td>WY (32)</td>
<td>-.241</td>
<td>-.625*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MA (34)</td>
<td>.164</td>
<td>-.063</td>
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<tr>
<td>SD (35)</td>
<td>-.130</td>
<td>-.250</td>
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<tr>
<td>IA (36)</td>
<td>.130</td>
<td>-.890***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WA (37)</td>
<td>.060</td>
<td>.116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA (38)</td>
<td>.057</td>
<td>-.749**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MO (40)</td>
<td>-.044</td>
<td>.210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT (42)</td>
<td>-.026</td>
<td>-.934***</td>
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<tr>
<td>DE (43)</td>
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<td>-.838***</td>
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<tr>
<td>AZ (44)</td>
<td>.010</td>
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<td>OH (46)</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>.100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>-.015</td>
<td>-.222***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Two-tailed test of significance: * p=.05, **p=.01, ***p=.001

Democrats, such as Nevada and New Mexico, show a slight increase in the distance between the parties in the chamber over time. In Tennessee, where a Republican minority has traditionally occupied pride of place in the chamber, the Republicans have lost ground over time; Democratic change is in the positive direction (increasing partisan distance).
Illinois, Georgia and Alabama all show positive growth in terms of contestation, but the vast majority of the chambers in which change in this regard has been significant find this variable in sharp decline. Among these chambers, most are from the competitive chambers (i.e., NY, NJ, WI, CT, and IN). Most transforming chambers (with the exception of South Carolina and Tennessee) reveal slight increases in two-party contestation over time, but it is only significant in Georgia, Alabama and Mississippi — chambers among the least "Republican" at the start of the time period. This would be the effect of a sub-group population in which the Democrats are retreating at the same rate at which the Republicans are gaining on this variable — the actual change in two-party contestation would not change if Democrats are leaving Republicans to run alone in some districts (in which, presumably, Democrats have no chance of winning) while the Republicans are challenging them in more districts as time goes on.

Two-party competition is measured as the percentage of races in each chamber/year (averaged over the time frame) in which both parties’ candidates in a given race received 40% or more of the two-party vote. Two-party competition is rising

---

12 Two-party vote is used as opposed to “total vote” in this analysis for a number of reasons, chief of which is the assumption on the part of the author that given the extremely small number of successful independent candidates for state legislative office, the parties most often face off against opposition from their counterpart major party, rather than from an independent. Given this, I also assume that the best measure of competition will be the percentage one party’s candidate receives versus their major party counterpart, rather than versus a combination of this counterpart and an independent or collection of independents. It is also important to note that in certain chambers in the array, it is possible for the major party candidate to receive both the nomination of her major party, and of an independent party (i.e., in New York, of both the Republican party and the Conservative party). In these cases, I have coded candidates according to their major party affiliation. In some cases, it is also possible for candidates to receive both major party nominations (New York, New Hampshire, e.g.). In these cases, I have coded the candidates according
significantly in only 6 chambers: Georgia, Illinois, Alabama, Mississippi, Oklahoma and Nevada. Two-party competition is declining somewhat (at the .1 level) in 24 of the 46 chambers. Of these, some of the chambers showing a decline are those most commonly identified as stable two-party chambers: WI, (at .005), NJ (at .006), CT (at .001), and PA (at .000) being only the most obvious.

Given the significant decrease in Democratic percentage and the significant overall decrease in chamber distance, this may seem, at first glance, problematic. It seems probable that, at least among the majority of chambers, more victories must be won without opposition, and fewer victories are being won non-competitively, with token opposition. To answer this, a simple Pearson’s correlation was run between these two variables (contested, but not competitive victories and non-contested victories) and time (the counter variable). The results are those found in Table 2:4 a-c.

Here (see table 2:4a), in the aggregate (among 46 chambers), we find that significantly fewer victories are being won with token opposition, and there are slightly more uncontested victories over time. The weakness of the “uncontested victories”
Table 2:4a-c

Table 2:4a: Pearson’s Correlation Coefficients and Significance Tests* for Time Types of Victories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Contested, Non Competitive Victories</th>
<th>Uncontested Victories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>-.2920 (P=.000)</td>
<td>.0670 (P=.087)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contested, Non-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitive Victories</td>
<td>-2920 (P=.000)</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.4682 (P=.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncontested</td>
<td>.0670 (P=.087)</td>
<td>.4682 (P=.000)</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victories</td>
<td>* x^2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2:4b: Pearson’s Correlation Coefficients and Significance Tests* for Time and Types of Victories: the Transforming Chambers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Contested, Non Competitive Victories</th>
<th>Uncontested Victories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>-.498 (.000)</td>
<td>-.094 (.186)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contested, Non-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitive Victories</td>
<td>-498 (.000)</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.556 (.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncontested</td>
<td>-.094 (.186)</td>
<td>.556 (.000)</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victories</td>
<td>* x^2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2:4c: Pearson’s Correlation Coefficients and Significance Tests* for Time and Types of Victories: the Remaining Chambers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Contested, Non Competitive Victories</th>
<th>Uncontested Victories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.002 (.964)</td>
<td>.247 (.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contested, Non-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitive Victories</td>
<td>.002 (.964)</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.310 (.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncontested</td>
<td>.247 (.000)</td>
<td>.310 (.000)</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victories</td>
<td>* x^2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
coefficient could mean two things -- logically, this could simply be a weak relationship: as distance narrows (a function of time as seen above), uncontested victories rise, but not by a great deal. But the earlier data (the correlation coefficients) points to the more probable reason: there has been decline in contested victories in one population, but this decline is conditioned by a rise in contested victories in another, the transforming legislatures.

When the two chamber types are compared, a clearer picture emerges (see Table 2:4b and Table 2:4c).

Several hypothesized relationships are probable from the data at this point: first, for the competitive chambers -- even those becoming more competitive -- the instances of both parties meeting in head-to-head contestation and competition is in decline. Second, it appears that there may be two sharply different broad populations of chambers in these data. The first one is those chambers which are generally more competitive in the chamber, but in decline on both the two-party contestation and competition variables; the other is a population of transforming chambers in which party competition is increasing (partisan distance is declining), and uncontested as well as contested but non-competitive victories are in decline (see Table 2:4b). Uncontested victories, in the transforming chambers, may be declining for Democrats, but rising for Republicans, which would
return the weak correlation coefficient seen here. The effect of time on uncontested
victories seen in Table 2:4c (the more competitive chambers) is strongly significant
(compare with the weak aggregate coefficient in Table 2:4a), and points to a two-
population argument. In the aggregate, then, the two populations tend to return
misleading coefficients which, if considered alone, point to little movement in terms of
uncontested victories where it is present and significant in only one of the populations -
that of the more competitive chambers.

This section has revealed two important, though limited, characteristics of
elections in the lower house chambers over this period:

1) The character of the full array of chambers has generally become less dominated by
the Democratic party and generally less competitive.

2) There are two divergent types of electoral features for chambers lying on two very
different planes (competitive and transforming) underlying the total sample of lower
house chambers.

Features of Republican Emergence in the Transforming Chambers
I will now proceed to the examination of the chambers which form the heart of this study: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. These states were selected for examination not only because of their traditional one-party dominant status, but for the degree of change which has taken place in them, electorally, over the past two decades.

The expectations for this section are:

- that two-party competition will tend to rise, rather than fall.

- that the transforming chambers will tend to reveal increasing electoral competition for the Republican party with attendant decreases for the Democratic party.

- that the increasing strength of Republicans in the chamber is not simply a function of increasing Republican contestation and competition, but rather an interactive process whereby the rise of one party interacts with the decline of the other.

- that, in the transforming chambers, there will be a higher degree of Republican competition and contestation as the chamber becomes more competitive. This is the notion that in the transforming chambers, the degree of chamber competition will act as a spur to contestation and competition — that as chamber strength for the Republicans increases, contestation and competition for this party will also increase as a function of chamber strength.
• that in the transforming chambers, Republican contestation and competition will also rise as a function of time.

• the transforming chambers can be viewed as chambers with similar characteristics, but that they lie at different points in an unfolding process of becoming more chamber-competitive.

The first consideration is the degree of Republican success in these chambers, as any discussion of increasing Republican contestation and competition should be predicated on an examination of whether, and to what degree, the chambers are becoming more competitive.

First, then, to what degree have the Republicans been successful in capturing reasonable minorities and even majorities in the transforming chambers? We know, from the descriptive data given above, that the intercept of party distance for each of the chambers is slightly different. To illustrate this at this point, Table 2:5a ranks the transforming chambers by the degree they were democratic at the start of the time period
Table 2.5a: Change in Transforming Chambers: Chambers Ranked by First Election Democratic Percentage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chamber (Rank Indicates Percent Democratic, First Election)</th>
<th>First Election Percent Democrat</th>
<th>First Election Percent Republican</th>
<th>Last Election Percent Democrat</th>
<th>Last Election Percent Republican</th>
<th>Coefficient of Change in Republican Victories over Time</th>
<th>T/Sig. T</th>
<th>Multiple R²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. MS*</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>.008375</td>
<td>.0048</td>
<td>.907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. AL*</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>.011899</td>
<td>.0001</td>
<td>.965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. SC</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>.014532</td>
<td>.0000</td>
<td>.918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. TX</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>.013000</td>
<td>.0001</td>
<td>.851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. MD</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>.004906</td>
<td>.0958</td>
<td>.675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. NC</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>.010333</td>
<td>.0377</td>
<td>.630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. GA</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>36</td>
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<td>.0464</td>
<td>.539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. OK*</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>.005331</td>
<td>.0004</td>
<td>.812</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. VA*</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>.010459</td>
<td>.0000</td>
<td>.900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. KY</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>.001746</td>
<td>.2629</td>
<td>.335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. FL</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>.003965</td>
<td>.0169</td>
<td>.624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. NM*</td>
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<td>37</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>1.41100E</td>
<td>.935</td>
<td>.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. MO*</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>-5.33301E</td>
<td>.975</td>
<td>.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. TN*</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>-0.005888</td>
<td>.0006</td>
<td>.801</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. NV*</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>4.09516E</td>
<td>.9306</td>
<td>.025</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Tied for this rank.
Table 2.5b: Change in Transforming Chambers: Chambers Ranked by Statistical Significance and Multiple $R^2$ of Change in Republican Victories Over Time (1968-1995)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chamber (Rank Indicates Last Election, Percent Democratic)</th>
<th>First Election Percent Democrat</th>
<th>First Election Percent Republican</th>
<th>Last Election Percent Democrat</th>
<th>Last Election Percent Republican</th>
<th>Coefficient of Change in Republican Victories over Time</th>
<th>T/Sig. T</th>
<th>Multiple $R^2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>.014532</td>
<td>.0000</td>
<td>.918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VA</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>.010459</td>
<td>.0000</td>
<td>.900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AL</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>.011899</td>
<td>.0001</td>
<td>.965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TX</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>.013000</td>
<td>.0001</td>
<td>.851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OK</td>
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<td>25</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>.005331</td>
<td>.0004</td>
<td>.812</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TN</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>-.005888</td>
<td>.0006</td>
<td>.801</td>
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<tr>
<td>MS</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>.008375</td>
<td>.0048</td>
<td>.907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FL</td>
<td>64</td>
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<td>53</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>.003965</td>
<td>.0169</td>
<td>.624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NC</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>.010333</td>
<td>.0377</td>
<td>.630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GA</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>.003817</td>
<td>.0464</td>
<td>.539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>.004906</td>
<td>.0958</td>
<td>.675</td>
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<tr>
<td>KY</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>.001746</td>
<td>.2629</td>
<td>.335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NV</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>4.09516E</td>
<td>.9306</td>
<td>.025</td>
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<td>NM</td>
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<td>.023</td>
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<tr>
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<td>63</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>-5.33301E</td>
<td>.975</td>
<td>.008</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(generally 1968). Included are the degree of Republican minority gains by the last election in the time period (generally 1994), and the coefficient of change in Republican victories over time computed in the following manner:

\[ Y^{1-k} = \alpha + C^{1-k} + \varepsilon_i \]

Where \( Y \) = Republican victories, and \( C \) = the count variable.
At the start of the time frame, these chambers range from 98% Democratic (Mississippi and Alabama) to competitive (Tennessee and Nevada). All but these last have Democratic percentages above the 60% mark at the outset of the time period. Turning to the second part of the table (Table 2:5b), which ranks the chambers by significance of the change in Republican victories over time, we can see that the rate of change for the Republicans is quite variant: four chambers (South Carolina, Virginia, Alabama, and Texas) all record change significant at the $p=.001$ level; Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Mississippi have significant change at the $p=.01$ level, while Florida, North Carolina and Georgia are only slightly significant (at the $p=.05$ level). The remaining chambers (Maryland, Kentucky, Nevada, New Mexico, and Missouri) do not report significant change in this variable at all. For the purposes of this study, four chambers may be said to have experienced powerful transformative change in chamber strength, three experienced moderate change, and eight have remained fairly stable.

It is also important to make a distinction between transformative change in chamber strength which is merely statistically significant, and change which has resulted in a substantially different ordering of the political parties in the chamber. The Republican party in South Carolina, Virginia, and Texas may be said to have made gains which have resulted in a re-ordering of their political strength in the chamber which may be anticipated to have a direct effect on the way that chamber operates; the same is more
doubtful in Alabama and Mississippi. As has been mentioned above the Republican party has actually lost ground in Tennessee.

Similarly, while the statistical change in Florida and North Carolina is negligible, the substantive change in the ordering of the chamber is quite strong: North Carolina's Republicans have moved from controlling only 19% of the chamber (equivalent to the high point reached by the Republicans in Mississippi during the same period) to controlling the chamber\textsuperscript{13}. It should also be noted that this table points out a regional aspect which is interesting, if not earth-shattering: the "border state" chambers -- those often most associated with various "realignment" notions in the South -- are those chambers which have changed least. It seems in these cases that the Republicans have made some gains, or that there are observable Republican minorities in them, and that over time they have stabilized (see Kentucky, Missouri, Florida, Tennessee). Maryland is also something of an anomaly in terms of expectations in the literature: despite the placement of the state as a border state in most such configurations, the chamber has stubbornly remained Democratic in almost the same terms as it had been in 1968.

\textit{The Elemental Features of Republican Contestation and Competition}

\textsuperscript{13} Two points of caution should be made here. First, that party switching has played a role in the change-over of majority control of the chamber in North Carolina, and second, that the fluctuation of Republican gains in this chamber have been remarkable. In addition, North Carolina’s last election in the regression data is 1992, while the last election results have been included for the sake of reference in the figures.
What are the underlying features of Republican successes (or failures) in these chambers? If competition in the electoral arena is hypothesized to have an effect on party chamber organizational development which is independent of simple chamber strength, the types of victories the Republicans are winning are certainly critical to all of the analysis which follows. Several scenarios are possible\textsuperscript{14}. Cassie (1994) notes two, broadly. The first is the shot-gun approach, in which Republicans simply flood all districts with Republican candidates and hope to reap seats in the process. The second is that Republicans have carefully targeted seats in districts where they have a reasonable chance of winning, and direct their resources accordingly. Both theories hold some promise in the short term: in a single election, one might be able to tease out indications of one or another, and from this draw the conclusion that a single strategy holds for that state party over time. Nor are these two scenarios the only possible solutions. I suggest here, and will demonstrate, that in fact there is not only variation between chambers (as Cassie pointed out) but that there is a learning process going on in which Republican parties employ the first approach at some points in time, and the second approach at other points. It also seems likely that the degree to which the party may be closing on a

\textsuperscript{14} I must point out that one scenario is not examined here -- this is "party switching", a phenomena which occurs when members of the chamber change party in order to realign. This phenomena is exhaustively treated by the various papers and at least one book arising from the grassroots party survey project, a project initiated by the organizers of The Citadel Symposium on Southern Politics. I reiterate that the data upon which this study is based does not take this into consideration — that if a member is elected as a Democrat, and then changes her political label, it will not be noted in the election data (though it is treated as a "Switch" in the voting data in chapter 5). Party switching has had little effect on the upward shift of Republicans in aggregate numbers used here, though it should be noted that switching did result in a Republican majority in South Carolina in 1994 and that several Democrats switched party after the Republican win at the polls in North Carolina in the same year.
majority in the chamber will tend to affect the results. Cassie’s data\textsuperscript{15} are for the years 1974-1988, roughly the extent of the ICPSR data, plus one year. I will both extend the time frame to include the full array used to this point, and extend the number of chambers under examination to the 15 investigated in this study.

Cassie’s study incorporates state legislative electoral data for the lower houses of Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas and excludes “deep south states ... due to the traditional absence of Republican competition for [these races]” (Cassie:1994, 145). Cassie’s table of election results examines the effectiveness of Republican contestation in terms of actually winning seats in the chamber (Cassie:1994; 146) and even in this limited time frame it is possible to see that there is some variation across the chambers over time in terms of this effectiveness. His figures for Texas, for example, show a monatomic increase in the “percent win” variable -- the percentage of contested races the Republicans win -- from 25% (1974) to 45% (1982) to 72% (1986). Were we to simply carve off the front end of this time distribution, we might conclude that what is occurring a rather stable “shot-gun” approach to contesting elections, while if

\textsuperscript{15} There is some minor disagreement between my data and that used by Cassie in his published paper on the subject (see Cassie, 1994: Table 1, p. 146). This seems to be due to my considered decision to exclude all independents and party switchers from my array, and to include in my percentage figures only those races which took place at the time of the election in a given year (i.e., no special elections). While this is not readily apparent from the type of analysis I have conducted -- it is not easily compared to Cassie’s, and a quick comparison might not yield immediate differences to the casual observer -- the reader should understand that this may have an effect on the results. The results at no time so greatly differ from Cassie’s that different conclusions could be reached across the years he uses, but the extension of the time series to include three elections at the beginning (1968, 1970 and 1972) and three elections at the end (1990, 1992 and 1994) may indeed have such an effect. This is not a reflection on Cassie’s work, but rather a greater number of data points yielding more informative results.
the full array is observed, it is possible to see this as a “learning” process in which the Republican’s winning percentage (of contested seats) consistently rises as they move forward in time.

Are two-party contestation and competition rising, declining or remaining stable as a function of the passing of time in these chambers? A simple OLS regression should return the answer. A regression taking the form:

\[ Y^{l-k} = \alpha + x^l \beta_1 + \varepsilon_i \]

where \( Y \) = two-party contestation (or two-party competition) and \( x^l \) = time (the “count” variable) were run, returning the coefficients in Table 2:6. Here, we can see that at first glance the variables two-party contestation and two-party competition are remaining stable. Yet the disaggregation of two-party contestation and competition into partisan contestation and competition return an interesting finding — the stability observed in the first part of the table is a result of significant shifts: positive (and significant) for the Republicans on both variables and negative (and significant) for the Democrats on both variables.
Table 2:6: Regression Results from Various Electoral Features and Time

Dependent Variable: Two-party Contestation
Multiple R .089
R² .008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE B</th>
<th>β</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>Sig. T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time (Count)</td>
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<td>.001935</td>
<td>.089505</td>
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<td>.2098</td>
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</table>

Dependent Variable: Two-party Competition
Multiple R .071
R² .005

<table>
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<th>β</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>Sig. T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>.001084</td>
<td>.071164</td>
<td>.999</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dependent Variable: Republican Contestation
Multiple R .193
R² .037

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
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<th>β</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>Sig. T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time (Count)</td>
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<td>.193483</td>
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<td>.0063</td>
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</table>

Dependent Variable: Republican Competition
Multiple R .266
R² .070

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE B</th>
<th>β</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>Sig. T</th>
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Dependent Variable: Democratic Contestation
Multiple R .248
R² .061

<table>
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<th>β</th>
<th>T</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>7.8110E-.04</td>
<td>-.248260</td>
<td>-3.588</td>
<td>.0004</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Dependent Variable: Democratic Competition
Multiple R .326
R² .106

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Variable</th>
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<th>β</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>Sig. T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>9.4200E-.04</td>
<td>-.326366</td>
<td>-4.834</td>
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</table>
In order to look at this phenomenon in a more effective way, I have also calculated the Pearson correlation coefficients for each party’s contestation percentage over time (to determine its rise or fall). Table 2:7 reports these coefficients (and their significance) for four variables for each party, aligned for comparison. The chambers are ranked by the degree and significance of change in Republican victories over the time frame.

In the first two columns, I recorded the coefficients for each party’s contestation over time. Here, we can see that with three exceptions, the Republicans are increasing their portion in terms of contestation while Democratic contestation falls. Of those chambers which reported the greatest statistical change with regard to Republican victories (South Carolina, Virginia, Alabama and Texas: see Table 2:5), Republican contestation increases significantly in only two: Alabama and Texas. It is stable in South Carolina and Virginia, though positive. In all four of these chambers, however, there has been a significant drop in the rate of contestation for the Democrats, which explains, perhaps, why the gains in South Carolina and Virginia are not necessarily built on an expanding base of Republican contestation, but rather on a shrinking base of Democrats. Using these cases as examples, it is possible to see why it is so critical to arrange the research in this area so as not to exclude the opposition party. For the most part,
### Table 2.7: Pearson Correlation Coefficients for Republican and Democratic Electoral Variables, 1968-1995

*Relationship Variables in Table*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chamber</th>
<th>Republican Contestation and Time (p= )</th>
<th>Democratic Contestation and Time (p= )</th>
<th>Republican Competition and Time (p= )</th>
<th>Democratic Competition and Time (p= )</th>
<th>Republican Contestation and Republican Victories (p= )</th>
<th>Democratic Contestation and Democratic Victories (p= )</th>
<th>Republican Competition and Republican Victories (p= )</th>
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<td>.926***</td>
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<td>.742**</td>
<td>.798***</td>
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</tr>
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<td>.886**</td>
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<td>.748**</td>
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<td>.887***</td>
<td>.898**</td>
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<td>.913***</td>
<td>.954***</td>
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<td>Georgia</td>
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<td>.797**</td>
<td>.940***</td>
<td>.951***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
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<td>-.670</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>.043</td>
<td>-.413</td>
<td>.582*</td>
<td>.553*</td>
<td>.817***</td>
<td>.800***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nevada</td>
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<td>.291</td>
<td>.826***</td>
<td>.793***</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
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<td>-.805***</td>
<td>-.669**</td>
<td>-.607*</td>
<td>.085</td>
<td>-.026</td>
<td>.574*</td>
<td>.551*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
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<td>.108</td>
<td>-.079</td>
<td>.020</td>
<td>.442</td>
<td>.457</td>
<td>.782***</td>
<td>.744**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Two-tailed test of significance: * p=.05, ** p=.01, *** p=.001
statistically significantly increasing Republican contestation over time is mirrored by statistically significant decline among its Democratic counterpart (i.e. in VA, AL, TX, MS, FL).

Oklahoma’s change over the time frame was moderate in terms of Republican victories, and the change in contestation (both Republican and Democratic) is also moderate. The pattern in Mississippi (where statistical change was moderate) seems to be a moderate number of newly challenged districts by the Republicans coupled with a stronger withdrawal from districts over time by the Democrats. The one oddity in the remaining chambers which should be pointed out occurs in the pattern in New Mexico: here, both parties have significantly reduced the percentage of districts in which they challenge their opposite numbers.\footnote{See Chapter 4 below. The pattern in New Mexico has arisen from a successful “turf war” waged by the Democrats, in which the parties have sorted districts in terms of relative advantage and rarely challenge in the other’s districts at all.}

Columns 3 and 4 report the measure of Republican and Democratic competition over time. Here, we can see that while Republican contestation in Tennessee has dropped slightly, but not dramatically, and the Republican competition has also dropped slightly, but not dramatically (or statistically significantly), Democratic competition has risen dramatically and statistically significantly. In Georgia, what may be driving Republican gains is not Democratic decline in contestation (it is measurable, but not statistically
significant) — nor even, by itself, the rise in Republican contestation. Rather the rise in Republican competition and the concomitant decline in Democratic competition seems responsible.

The important point about the competition figures is that they resolve the mystery about the apparent stability in competition as measured as two-party competition above (see Table 2:3). For these transforming chambers, measuring "competition" as "two-party" competition masks the divergent dimensions of competition by party in these chambers: competition, for the Republicans, is rising significantly in 8 of the chambers over time; it is falling (with the exception of Tennessee) for the Democrats across the board, significantly in 10 of the chambers. Thus, in Texas, where Table 2:3 correctly reports that two-party contestation and two-party competition is stable (.362 and .182 are the non-significant correlation coefficients, respectively), we can refer to the figures in Table 2:6 and discover that, in fact, when the two-party measures are broken out, Texas Republicans are statistically significantly augmenting their share in terms of both measures (.872*** and .902***, respectively) while the Democrats are declining (-.704** and -.806*** respectively).

The remaining columns explicate, on a state by state basis, the strong correlation of contestation and victory by the parties, and the stronger tie these victories have to the competition variable. Even these, however, are not neatly monatomic, but rather vary
fairly widely. If we can think of the correlation between contestation and victory as a
crude efficiency measure (i.e., entering a candidate requires expenditure of resources by
the party), we can see that for the Republicans, greater efficiency is achieved in Alabama
than in South Carolina. But this is relative efficiency -- in Alabama, it is clear that
however mathematically efficient their “targeting”, its economy is outweighed by their
inability to achieve victory. South Carolina’s contestation is “inefficient” in the sense
that in order to achieve victory the Republicans must field a larger number of candidates,
but it is more efficient than that of Alabama in that this initial “inefficiency” has captured
more Republican seats.

As the goal of the Republicans is to bring more partisans to the chamber than
heretofore, it is difficult to argue that any combination of targeting or shot-gunning which
enables them to do this is “inefficient”. Of the chambers which have experienced
statistically significant positive change in Republican victories over the time frame (SC,
VA, AL, TX, OK NC, GA, and MD) we can, taking figures from table 2:8, roughly group
them as “targeting” chambers or “shot-gun” chambers according to their values on
contestation. Among these chambers, contestation is least related to Republican victory
in Virginia, though Virginia has experienced the second greatest change in Republican
success over the time frame. South Carolina’s relationship of contestation and
Republican victory is also low, as it is in North Carolina and Maryland.
Table 2:8a: Selected Republican Electoral Variables and Change in Republican Victories Over Time.
Chambers Ranked by Correlation of Republican Contestation and Republican Victories Over Time.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chamber</th>
<th>Republican Contestation and Republican Victories (Pearson CC)</th>
<th>Republican Competition and Republican Victories (Pearson CC)</th>
<th>OLS Regression Coefficient of Change in Republican Victories over Time</th>
<th>Multiple R²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>.926***</td>
<td>.976***</td>
<td>.014532****</td>
<td>.918</td>
</tr>
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<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>.898**</td>
<td>.920**</td>
<td>.003817*</td>
<td>.539</td>
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<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>.892***</td>
<td>.940***</td>
<td>.001746</td>
<td>.335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oklahoma</td>
<td>.883***</td>
<td>.952***</td>
<td>.004906</td>
<td>.675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>.853***</td>
<td>.887***</td>
<td>.005331****</td>
<td>.812</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>.806***</td>
<td>.955***</td>
<td>.013000****</td>
<td>.851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>.696</td>
<td>.762*</td>
<td>.003965*</td>
<td>.624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Carolina</td>
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<td>.913***</td>
<td>.010459****</td>
<td>.900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>.582*</td>
<td>.817***</td>
<td>1.41100E</td>
<td>.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Carolina</td>
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<td>.926***</td>
<td>.008375**</td>
<td>.907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>.496</td>
<td>.798***</td>
<td>.011899****</td>
<td>.965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>.442</td>
<td>.782***</td>
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<td>.025</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nevada</td>
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<td>Tennessee</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
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</table>
Table 2:8b: Selected Republican Electoral Variables and Change in Republican Victories Over Time.

Chambers Ranked by Correlation of Republican Competition and Republican Victories Over Time.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chamber</th>
<th>Republican Contestation and Republican Victories (Pearson CC)</th>
<th>Republican Competition and Republican Victories (Pearson CC)</th>
<th>OLS Regression Coefficient of Change in Republican Victories over Time</th>
<th>Multiple R²</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
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<td>.907</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>.898**</td>
<td>.920**</td>
<td>.003817*</td>
<td>.539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>.584*</td>
<td>.913***</td>
<td>.010459****</td>
<td>.900</td>
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<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
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<td>.887***</td>
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<td>.812</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nevada</td>
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<td>.826***</td>
<td>-5.33301E</td>
<td>.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>.582*</td>
<td>.817***</td>
<td>1.41100E</td>
<td>.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
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<td>.965</td>
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<td>Missouri</td>
<td>.442</td>
<td>.782***</td>
<td>4.09516E</td>
<td>.025</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>.696</td>
<td>.762*</td>
<td>.003965*</td>
<td>.624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
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<td>.600*</td>
<td>.010333*</td>
<td>.630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>.085</td>
<td>.574*</td>
<td>-.005888***</td>
<td>.801</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p = .05, **p = .01, ***p = .001, ****p = .0001.
Table 2:8 (top) ranks the chambers by the degree to which Republican contestation and Republican Victories are correlated (column 2), and includes the figures for the OLS regression results for change in Republican victories over time. Table 2:8 (bottom) contains the same information, arranged by rank of the strength of the correlation of Republican competition and Republican victories over time (column 3).

Here, we can see that the association of contestation alone with the rise in Republican victories over time is not always a good fit. Clearly, even in those chambers where contestation is relatively high with respect to positive gains, it is still highly correlated. But it is important to note that perhaps a better measure of the efficiency of the party is correlation of competition and this variable, although of course this is not a “perfect” measure either.

I have noted that it is possible for a chamber’s correlation of contestation and time to remain relatively stable and for the party to become more successful even so, due to a retreat on the part of the Democrats. It is also possible for a party to have only moderate gains in terms of competition and also make great inroads, either through retrenchment, or through the fact that in races which used to be competitive but did not win, Republicans begin to win these closer races. Of course, there is also the logical possibility that a party may gain in both areas (contestation and competition) and still
make little headway in terms of chamber strength. The case which comes closest to this scenario is that of Georgia, where both Republican contestation and Republican competition are significantly correlated with time (see Table 2:6), Democratic competition is falling moderately, but the regression coefficient for gains in Republican victories over time is negligible (see Table 2:7). In this case, the Republicans are running more candidates, rising above the 40% mark in elections more often, but not winning many more races, or at least not yet. Cassie writes that:

The bottom line for political parties is almost certainly winning elections. This is certainly critical for a party that, like the southern Republicans parties, is struggling to advance from near non-existence to a position of being able to seriously compete for governmental power.

(Cassie, 1994:147).

Further, with respect to his measures of contestation and victory, he adds:

The optimal formula for success would be to have winning percentage increase while contesting a greater number of seats. This should produce the greatest increase in net seats. However this formula for success is not observed in any of the states...


Though it is certainly seductive as a surrogate variable, victory is not the only, and may not be the best, measure of partisan success arising from contesting a given race. While it is certainly arguable that falling short of winning, in many cases, must be considered a failure, these failures are only total in a one-shot “game”. Elections (as the
Republicans have so heartily demonstrated to their Democratic colleagues in the overtime account of the transformation of these chambers) are multiple-iteration “games”, and must be theoretically viewed as such. It is clear from the incremental movement of some insurgent parties that the parties (perhaps per force) must view them so.

In the process of becoming a competitive party in the legislative chamber, insurgent parties are, as Cassie points out, forced to experiment with a number of options in their pursuit of the goal of winning. Whether parties are “targeting” districts or using a buck-shot approach, there is no particular reason to expect the same behavior in every election. Part of the process of “targeting”, and presumably the elemental goal of the shot-gun method, is to identify winnable districts. In the process of doing so, parties cannot expect to field the perfect candidate, raise exactly the right amount of money (or spend that money in exactly the right places) or avoid scandal every time. If the outcome of a given race is to be seen as an advantage to one party or another based only on winning, the assumption must be that if (in the targeting example) the party does not win there, the district is abandoned in the next iteration of elections. It seems more reasonable that party officials winnow out elections on some other basis, or the party (and its candidates) would remain at exactly the same level at all times. Logically, this cannot be what is happening. The job of the party strategist in such cases is not to identify the sure-win districts, but rather the “winnable” districts.

17 Barring an exogenous shock, such as a reapportionment.
For this reason, it is imperative to consider that the true test of targeting is not the races which are won in any given election year, or even over many election years, but the races which are, or are becoming, competitive. This is true as long as the winning of seats is on a more or less upward slope. Regardless of the actual win percentage of contested seats, I argue that the gain in competitive seats over time is at least as important as the seats won -- these are seats which may be won in the next iteration, given a change in candidate, more money, money spent more effectively, and so on. Certainly there are seats which never going to be “winnable” (ceteris paribus) and these may be found by either dismissing them and avoiding them entirely (if they may be identified) or by running in them once and making a determination after the election in which the party first runs a candidate. There may also be marginal districts, in which the party cannot determine from the election numbers alone whether or not the district is winnable at some time and simply “unwinnable” in that election, or unwinnable ceteris paribus. There may also be districts in which the party may poll a competitive number of voters each and every time it runs a candidate, but still may never have any expectation of winning the district. Obviously, there is a lot of room for error across the board.

What does seem certain is that parties are more likely to try again in districts in which they have run competitively (if not won) in the past than in districts where their candidates cannot break single digits. There is also the case to be made that when the
districts are altered in some way — due to reapportionment or redistricting or court-ordered change from multi-member to single-member — the whole process must begin again. While it may be important to take this into consideration, it is also important to acknowledge that the party (however small in terms of the chamber) takes at least a role in most chambers in many of these processes.

Further, when the election cycle begins again, the party does not, in fact, start “from scratch”, but rather with prior knowledge (albeit sometimes sketchy) of the voting history of the geography in question. This is becoming even more true as increasingly complex but user-friendly technologies become available to the party for making such determinations.\(^\text{18}\).

Naturally, in these transforming chambers, there is a concomitant process on the part of the Democratic party in terms of retrenchment and consolidation. There is no particular reason to believe that the majority party would not employ the same types of strategies that the minority party does -- only for this party, the process is moving in

\(^{18}\) I was recently reminded of just how far the technological envelope has been pushed. I have often taught a course in state government in a local community college, part of which involves the preclearance and the redistricting process. I have several times employed a video of “The Best Little Statehouse in Texas” (@1980, CBS Reports; CBS Inc., NYC, NY) in which we are regaled with an account of the use of a huge mainframe “computing machine” employed by the legislative redistricting board with dozens of zippy “techies” feeding numbers into its maw and a large lighted map of Texas reflecting the changes in front of an awed group of legislators. When I used the film (for the last time) only a few years had passed since a couple of Rice undergraduates had played a crucial role in local redistricting by employing census numbers, a mapping program and a few hours time on a PC to overturn council districts in Houston. The fact is that with a few thousand dollars and a little training, almost anyone can come up with their own redistricting plan in a matter of a day or two. Given that redistricting itself is a life or death matter to both the party and individual candidates, it seems reasonable to assume that any party organization worth its salt could predict the probable predictive vote pattern for most new districts.
reverse: here, the party must identify the districts in which it can still be competitive, as opposed to those which may as well be given up to the insurgents.

Simple correlation figures only provide a general index of change, and they are not always the best measure over time. In order to display the change in contestations' effect on increasing competitiveness on the part of Republicans, and the dampening effect this has had on Democratic contestation and competition, I have provided graphic plots 2:1 - 2:15.
Contestation and Competition
Over Time

South Carolina

Contestation and Competition
Over Time

Virginia

YEAR

Plots 2:1 and 2:2
Contestation and Competition
Over Time

Alabama

Contestation and Competition
Over Time

Texas

YEAR

Plots 2:3 and 2:4
Contestation and Competition
Over Time

Oklahoma

YEAR

Contestation and Competition
Over Time

Tennessee

YEAR

Plots 2:5 and 2:6
Contestation and Competition
Over Time

Mississippi

Contestation and Competition
Over Time

Florida

YEAR

Plots 2:7 and 2:8
Contestation and Competition
Over Time
North Carolina

Contestation and Competition
Over Time
Georgia

YEAR
Plots 2:9 and 2:10
Contestation and Competition
Over Time
Maryland

YEAR

Contestation and Competition
Over Time
Kentucky

YEAR

Plots 2:11 and 2:12
Contestation and Competition
Over Time

Nevada

Contestation and Competition
Over Time

New Mexico

YEAR

Plots 2:13 and 2:14
These plots also reveal the interactive nature of the rise of the Republicans on these variables and the collateral retrenchment of the Democrats. The plots are arranged in terms of greatest change in Republican victories over time (as in table 2:5b).

Many different variants of the general strategy outlined above are present among these chambers, and depending on what one considers “success”, it is identifiable in a number of ways in each chamber’s election record. If the best strategy is to identify seats which the party believes could be competitive and recruit candidates (or encourage and
fund resources to such candidates) to run in them, then a pattern in which contestation
and competition are tightly following arguments is the “optimal” outcome. This pattern
can be observed in Georgia, Texas, Florida, Mississippi, Kentucky, Tennessee and South
Carolina, where these variables are close throughout the time period for the Republicans.
If a less “conservative” pattern is sought, one might turn to the plots for Virginia, New
Mexico and Alabama. The least conservative pattern, closest to the “shot-gun” approach
to running candidates, may be found in North Carolina, Oklahoma, Nevada, Missouri and
Maryland. The Democrats, in retreat, seem altogether more “orderly” (if this is the
correct term for maintaining a tight relationship between contestation and competition
through a losing period) with the exception of Nevada.

The problem is that there does not appear to be a clear relationship between any of
these “strategies” and change in winning percentage over time. Clearly all of the most
“transformed” chambers during this period (i.e. those chambers in which the Republican
party has successfully “struggl[ed] to advance from near non-existence to a position of
being able to seriously compete for governmental power”, as Cassie puts it) fall into the
most conservative group. Thus, Texas, Florida and South Carolina Republicans have
done rather well over the time frame. However, in Tennessee the Republicans have
actually lost ground, and advancement has been muted in Georgia and Mississippi. The
second group, consisting of Alabama, New Mexico and Virginia, has chambers of,
respectively, great statistical change but little substantive change (AL), stable two-party
competition (NM) and substantive and statistically significant change (VA). The last
group is truly problematic in that it contains mostly stable chambers -- chambers in which
the change in Republican seat share has been lowest.

The bottom line for these Republican parties, as Cassie points out, must
eventually be the ability to win elections, but simple contestation does not a winner make.
A much more robust measure of future ability to win is increasing competition, rather
than contestation. In the remaining chapters, I will examine the relationship between
competition and changes in the party organization of the legislature independent of
chamber strength for just this reason. A party which has rising competition -- even if it
does not have (yet) a dramatic rise in actual winning -- is a party with prospects, and a
party with prospects will behave differently than one without them.

_Electoral Activity and Republican Chamber Strength_

As the minority party moves closer to becoming a threat to the entrenched
majority, does electoral behavior change? In order to test this, I will revive the "distance"
variable from the first part of this analysis and explore the possibility that the minority
party behaves differently as it begins to look as though they could become, or have
become, competitive.
Plot 2:16 is a scatter plot of Republican contestation and the distance between the parties in the chamber, lagged once. If the gains the Republicans are making in the chambers are acting as a spur to increasing contestation and competition, we would expect the lagged variable of chamber strength to have a discernible, significant effect on these variables. In Plot 2:16\(^{19}\), we can see that as this distance decreases, Republican contestation rises. The accompanying regression results point to a strongly significant relationship between the distance between the parties in the chamber and the behavior of Republicans in terms of contesting elections in the following election year.

A similar regression was performed for Republican competition, and the results may be seen in Plot 2:17. Here, the association is much tighter, returning a strongly significant positive relationship with narrowing distance in the chamber. Reasonably, this relationship is stronger because where Republicans are competitive, they are likely to be competitive again, but the fact that this relationship is almost monatomic in its rise indicates that the number of districts in which Republicans are competitive rises with the narrowing of the distance score.

\(^{19}\) I had thought to use a quadratic regression to draw this plot, to determine the justice of describing a curve, rather than a simple linear relationship. This regression took the form: \(Y = \alpha + c_1\beta_1 + c_2\beta_2^2 + \epsilon\) where \(Y =\) Republican contestation or Republican competition and \(c =\) Time (Count). The quadratic procedure uses the simple observations of the independent variable with squared observations of the same variable. I had reasoned that the closer the Republicans came to majority status, the more likely they were to take conservative approach, and therefore contest fewer elections. The quadratic function did not return coefficients with a inflection point which justified its use -- in other words, there is no evidence of the phenomenon. Republicans in these cases appear to challenge in as many districts based on prior achievement (i.e., based on the distance between the parties in the chamber) regardless of their proximity to majority status. The more conservative strategy of the parties in the competitive chambers has not manifested here.
Republican Contestation and Distance Between Parties in the Chamber, Lagged Once

Regression Results: Republican Contestation and Distance Between Parties in the Chamber, Lagged Once.

Multiple R = .680
$R^2 = .462$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE B</th>
<th>β</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>Sig T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distance Lagged</td>
<td>-.550453</td>
<td>.044204</td>
<td>-.680286</td>
<td>-12.452</td>
<td>.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>.023483</td>
<td></td>
<td>33.329</td>
<td>.0000</td>
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</table>
Republican Competition and
Distance Between Parties in the Chamber, Lagged Once

Regression Results: Republican Competition and Distance Between Parties in the Chamber, Lagged Once.

Multiple R = .815
R² = .665

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
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<th>β</th>
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<tr>
<td>Distance</td>
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<td>.027431</td>
<td>-.815815</td>
<td>-18.926</td>
<td>.0000</td>
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<td></td>
<td>43.142</td>
<td>.0000</td>
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</table>
Are these variables rising over time as well? Plots 2:18 and 2:19 report that they do. Here, the association is not quite as strong as it is between these variables and distance, but this is to be expected given the configuration of the variables. Republican contestation is rising over the time frame, but it is only significant, statistically, at the .01 level. Republican competition is also rising across the time frame, but here the statistical significance is more robust (at .0001).

The overall conclusion that can be reached about these variables is that they rise both over time and as distance narrows. It is important to keep in mind, particularly with regard to the competition variable, that this is not only a function of Republicans contesting more races, but a function of Democratic retrenchment.

Conclusion and Discussion

I stated that I expected that in these transforming chambers, there would be a higher degree of Republican competition and contestation as the chamber becomes more competitive. Generally speaking, this is true, though this is offset in some cases by the retrenchment of the Democrats, rather than by positive gains by the Republicans. For the most part, in chambers where the Republicans have made significant inroads in terms of chamber strength, both contestation and particularly competition are up, with Republican competition more consistently correlated with time than is Republican contestation. The
Republican Contestation and Time (Year)

Plot 2:18

YEAR

Regression Results: Republican Contestation and Time (Count).  
Multiple R = .193  
R^2 = .037

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
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<th>β</th>
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<th>Sig T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time (Count)</td>
<td>.005303</td>
<td>.001921</td>
<td>.193483</td>
<td>2.761</td>
<td>.0063</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.447481</td>
<td>.030826</td>
<td></td>
<td>14.516</td>
<td>.0000</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note that the regression is performed using the count variable, where the plot is drawn by actual year.
Republican Competition and Time (Year)

Plot 2:19

Regression Results: Republican Competition and Time (Count\(^{21}\)).

Multiple R = .266
R\(^2\) = .070

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
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<th>SE B</th>
<th>β</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>Sig T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>.023659</td>
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<td>12.851</td>
<td>.0000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{21}\) Note that the regression is performed using the count variable, where the plot is drawn by actual year.
two-party measure adopted early in the analysis tended to mask the underlying features of
dividual party contestation and competition, which on the whole tend to be positive for
the Republicans (where change in chamber strength is significant) and negative for the
Democrats.

I also stated that in the transforming chambers, the degree of chamber competition
will act as a spur to contestation and competition. This is also confirmed; as chamber
distance narrows, Republican contestation and competition also grows.

Two-party competition was hypothesized to tend to rise, rather than fall. Across
the board, this is generally disconfirmed. In this array, two-party contestation and two-
party competition are both seemingly stable. They are not, however, stable as a result of
no movement by the parties, rather the reverse. They remain stable as a result of sharply
decreasing Democratic contestation and competition coupled with sharply rising
Republican contestation and competition, which tends to confirm the expectation that the
transforming chambers will tend to reveal increasing electoral competition for the
Republican party with attendant decreases for the Democratic party, and that Republican
gains will be at least in part a function of Democratic retrenchment.

The notion that in the transforming chambers, there will be a higher degree of
Republican competition and contestation as the *chamber* becomes more competitive is
certainly confirmed. The plots and regressions which tested this notion were as expected and strongly significant. The idea was that in the transforming chambers, the degree of chamber competition will act as a spur to contestation and competition, that as chamber strength for the Republicans increases, contestation and competition for this party will also increase as a function of chamber strength. This also confirmed; the Republicans seem to be undergoing a learning process of some sort: the history of the electoral variables is clearly affected by the history of the Republican's chamber strength.

In the transforming chambers, Republican contestation and competition rise as a function of time. The contestation variable is somewhat less robust than that of competition, but still significant and in the expected direction.

I have stated that the transforming chambers can be viewed as chambers with similar characteristics, but that they lie at different points in an unfolding process of becoming more chamber competitive. The chambers examined here display quite variant behaviors, but they may be generally grouped into chambers which have become moderately more competitive over the time frame, those which have been competitive and remained so, and those which were one-party dominated at the beginning of the time frame but have become two-party competitive during this period. That the process observed may be said to be “unfolding” is confirmed, but not only are the chambers at
“different points in the process”, but they are at variant speeds of developing two-party competition.

The purpose of this chapter has been to establish a baseline in the electoral realm in order to make predictive or explanatory statements about changes in the chambers, and several important findings in this regard have become apparent. First, it is clear that the selection of transforming chambers does represent a very different type of electoral behavior than that exposed in the remaining, traditionally more competitive chambers. In all states, chambers are becoming more competitive with the passage of time, and there is a direct relationship between the competitiveness of the chamber and the degree of contestation and competition in the electorate. It does seem that the more competitive a chamber becomes -- and the longer it remains competitive -- the less contestation and competition between the parties is found in elections. Contrary to this, in the “transforming” chambers, there is a higher degree of Republican competition and contestation as the chamber becomes more competitive, and a decline in the contestation and competition for the Democrats. As a consequence, two-party competition as a measure remains fairly stable. This is in contrast to the historically more competitive chambers, where the greater the degree of competition in the chamber, the more races seem to be won by both parties without competition from their counterparts.

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22 This pattern, while only a sidenote to the research at the heart of this study, has proved the most elusive but most intriguing of the hypotheses pursued in the chapter and clearly deserves much more attention than it has received here. If competitive chambers are becoming less competitive, then reaching a static or near-static point of
What is clear from the foregoing is that in the transforming chambers, increasing contestation and increasing competition on the part of Republicans has been matched by decreasing contestation and competition on the part of Democrats. This change, in these chambers, signals the emergence of newly competitive electoral arenas in which the formerly stagnant political parties in the chamber must be expected to act differently. The Republican minorities are gaining ground in terms of contestation and competition, across time and as the distance between the parties narrows. In the chapters which follow, I will examine in some detail the effect these changes have had on party leadership behavior, party organization, and party chamber voting patterns in both the insurgent minority Republican party and the formerly dominant Democrats.
CHAPTER 3:

THE EFFECT OF PARTISAN COMPETITION IN ELECTIONS ON PARTISAN
APPOINTMENT TO STANDING COMMITTEES

Introduction

To what degree does external political party activity — such as electoral
performance — affect the internal power distributions in the legislative chamber?

This chapter will explore the linkages between party electoral activity and party
institutional ordering. The arenas involved are the artifacts of party building on the part
of the minority party (specifically emerging competition in the electoral environment)
and the party ordering of assignments to the chamber’s standing committees. In this
chapter I will seek to establish, beyond reasonable doubt, that it is the changes in the
minority party’s status at the polls which triggers the majority party’s response of
assigning proportionally fewer minority party members to important committees, thereby
protecting the prerogatives of authority in managing the chamber, organizing the
chamber’s policy agenda, and perpetuating their hold over the perquisites of majority
office.
It will also be concerned with a number of features of committees as they develop over time in most chambers, and with the current status of the committee system in the subject chambers.

*Political Party Electoral Competition and the Proportionality of Party Representation on Committees*

The theoretical orientation of this study is predicated on the notion that, as features of political party competition in the electoral environment change, institutional aspects of the body over which parties have control also change. My intent here is to demonstrate that, as minority party competition increases in the electoral realm, there is a requisite response on the part of the majority party to decrease minority involvement in some types of committees (specifically institutional control committees and major money committees) while incorporating their numbers on other (specifically substantive) committees. This results in a global expectation that membership on substantive committees proportional to the minority party’s strength in the chamber will be affected in that the minority party will come closer to proportional representation on substantive committees, and less so on control committees — those committee which control the business of the legislature itself — as they become more competitive in the electoral arena.
This chapter follows on several studies which I have conducted separately into the two areas of electoral competition and committee proportionality. These investigations have clearly pointed to a linkage (Anderson and Hamm, 1992; Anderson, 1994a; Anderson, 1994b). I have also relied on several other studies which similarly connect these areas, particularly in the field of committee party composition (Hedlund and Hamm, 1993; 1994a; 1994b) for guidance in both the measures and the design.

This chapter concentrates on one-party or former one-party lower houses in order to select units which have the dual advantage of great variance between and across units over time in terms of party competition features. Lower houses are used in order to avoid possible problems of degrees of freedom in the use of Senate chambers which fragment or stagger the election of their members and generally have reduced frequency of elections than do the house chambers. The particular chambers used in this chapter have been selected with an eye to variance along several other interior points as well: 1) variance at the anterior intercept in terms of party strength in the chamber; 2) variance at the end point in terms of party strength in chamber; 3) variance between stability and change in party competition across time and 4) differing rates of emergence of the minority party across time. The subject chambers in this chapter are from 10 of the 15 states which make up the heart of the analysis throughout this study, namely AL, FL, GA, MS, NC, SC, TX, KY, OK and TN.
Literature Review

The study of political party competition has grown by leaps and bounds in recent years (e.g. Jewell and Breaux, 1990, 1991; Bullock, 1988; Bullock and Gaddie, 1991a, 1991b; Winsky, 1990; Cassie and Goidel, 1991; Thompson and Cassie, 1990; Weber, Tucker and Brace, 1991a), due in no small way to the creation and availability of excellent data bases. This profusion of research has produced an abundant array of findings: some standard generalizations have been called into question, and debate has been generated about the causes of the varying rates of competition, the variance of competition with the degree of competition between the parties in the chamber, and the effects, if any, that the degree of competition may have on the chamber organization of political parties.

A fair amount of the recent research into party competition has focused on the southern states, largely due to theoretical considerations focusing on minority party emergence in this region (e.g., Stanley, 1988; Elliot, Euel, Gaddie and Gryski, 1989; Winsky, 1990b; Jewell and Breaux, 1991; Cassie and Goidel, 1991; Anderson and Hamm, 1992; Anderson, 1995). These studies have greatly increased our understanding of the dynamics of competition in formerly one-party chambers. Even though the majority of recently one-party dominant legislative chambers can be found in the South, there are several which are not. As there is no particular theoretical reason to believe that
region *per se* should specifically effect changes within these legislatures, I have elected to select outside this area as well as within it.

Concurrent with these changes in the electoral arena, recent research has also demonstrated that there is a correlation between electoral features and changes in several institutional features of the chamber and of the political parties. These include both party organizational aspects which are influenced by political party leadership directly (the operation and complexity of party caucuses, standing committee composition and the like) and legislative organizational features which are more structural in nature (numbers of minority and majority leadership positions; the power and usage of calendar and rules committees and the like) and which are indirectly influenced by the majority party leadership.

A recent investigation into the linkage between chamber strength and committee representational proportionality (Anderson, 1994b) revealed an indirect correlation between the status of the minority party in relation to a 33% cut-point and the proportion of minority members of standing committees relative to their chamber strength. The earlier study used data from 7 Southern states and three discreet time periods (1969, 1979 and 1989). This chapter seeks to extend the argument in two important ways: first, by confirming the findings of earlier studies (Hedlund and Hamm, 1994; e.g.), and, secondly, by attempting to link the aspects of committee composition to party
competition, either directly through an independent effect of competition, or indirectly, through chamber strength.

Wayne Francis’s seminal piece on state legislative committees notes that one-party dominated chambers seem to behave differently than their two-party competitive counterparts:

The majority party caucus is passive in most Southern states as well as in several other states with a single dominant party. We can speculate that in such cases the leadership exercises control, to the extent that it can, through the committee system, but that relationship is reciprocal .... In such states the party leadership does not work through the caucus — which may be large and unwieldy if not superfluous — but through the committees and the committee chairs.

Francis, 1989:42

What does not emerge from Francis’ examination of committees is what might occur should these conditions change radically in a relatively short period of time. One-party legislatures are in transition. In the electoral arena, they are not entirely on an upward slope towards two-party chamber competition. Some, after a period of sharp minority party growth, have stabilized. Others have experienced minority party insurgency relatively recently, so that the pattern in the electoral fortunes of the minority party have not yet become clear. Several chambers, on the other hand, have undergone almost complete transformation from chambers which have historically been one-party dominant for almost a century to chambers of as high as 50 - 50 competition (e.g. the
Florida Senate, by 1994) or even with the former minority in control of the chamber (in both the North Carolina and South Carolina House chambers).

The critical role that committees play in decision-making in these chambers cannot be over-emphasized. Since the role of committees may be assumed to change with the size and strength of the minority party in one-party chambers, it seems crucial that the contours of that change in terms of committee organization and composition are explored. It is possible that in chambers where the committees matter greatly to the policymaking process, gaining ground in the chamber may make little difference in the overall process if gains are kept to a minimum in the crucial committees themselves.

In several states (most prominently in Texas - see Harmel and Hamm, 1986), a degree of power sharing by the majority party with a minimal minority is found to extend to the point of allowing some minority party members to chair committees and sub-committees. The majority party grants a greater role to the minority leaders in appointing their own members. Chambers like this may also, perhaps more importantly, allow a modus vivendi to develop which embeds a norm of proportional representation on committees. Though this feature may also be an artifact of leadership style as well as of the proportion of minority membership in the chamber, it seems reasonable to assume that it is more likely to develop in chambers in which the minority does not directly threaten the majority in real terms of policymaking.
The general theoretical orientation of a threshold of some sort -- usually placed at or around 33% as I have argued. Once the minority can meet the voting requirements to do this, the majority may react by limiting the damage that the minority can do to the majority party's agenda. Aspects of this phenomenon have been investigated in the past (most extensively by Keith Hamm and Robert Harmel's 1992 piece). Assuming a 33% threshold has meaning for the parties in the "committee of the whole" might lead us to consider the same threshold (rather than some other arbitrary cut-point) for examining certain aspects of the standing committees.

While there is nothing the majority party leadership can do outside the electoral arena to dilute the strength of the minority party in the chamber, there is every likelihood that it can and will reduce their proportion on important committees -- committees important to the overall power distribution in the chamber. Where committee rules reflect chamber rules, it also seems reasonable to assume that the majority party will try to blunt the impact of the growing minority party on crucial committees where possible. In many cases (and in every chamber investigated here) the majority party leadership controls the appointment of members to standing committees (either through the caucus and the speaker's office or through the speaker's office alone). Also, standing rules of the House which require proportional representation on committees can and may be skirted or boldly flaunted if the stakes are high enough. There may also be informal
understandings of long standing which seem to require proportional representation on certain committees. I will posit that even though such rules or norms exist, they will begin to break down in practice on the control committees when the 33% threshold is reached. The reasons why a Speaker or, in turn, a committee chair, might be inclined to limit the minority party’s membership below this threshold will be discussed in its place.

No state in this analysis operates under a formal seniority rule for committee appointment, though it may be that such seniority is considered informally in the process of appointment, and that there are caucus rules which call for seniority to be enforced in the party’s list. Though in some of these chambers there may be an informal rule or norm allowing the appointment of individuals to committees by the minority leadership, in none is this required, and in none, of course, is their number determined solely by the minority leader.

Research in this area has uncovered subtle features of competition between the parties which were hitherto untapped. Among one-party and formerly one-party chambers, this has included rates of success along several dimensions for each party in terms of the type and kind of competition present in the array over time (Anderson and Hamm, 1992, e.g.). That research has also uncovered some oddities in the effects of chamber competition on electoral competition: in more competitive chambers, the political parties seem to sort themselves into safe districts (see also Jewell and Whicker,
1994:49), decreasing the number of competitive districts. It remains an empirical question whether or not this is so among elections to chambers which are not competitive, or only becoming so after a lengthy period of one-party dominance. The analysis here will in due course examine the contribution of competitive races to the overall ability of the minority party to succeed.

Expectations and Hypotheses

Several basic theoretical expectations may be outlined at this point:

A) Appointment of minority party members to important committees will never reach parity with their proportion in the chamber. If the appointment to important committees is considered as a continuous variable, as minority party strength grows, their exclusion from these committee appointments should become more pronounced. If the minority party has reached a 33% threshold in the chamber, or is threatening to do so by becoming increasingly competitive in the electoral realm, then the majority party may be expected to advance in a strategy of diluting minority strength even further on important committees (i.e., the legislative control committees and major money committees), even if the minority has been more proportionally represented in the past.
B) Increasing competition in the electoral realm, should not be expected to affect the proportional membership of minority party membership on committees less important to the operation of the chamber or expenditure decision-making (i.e., the “substantive” committees such as Labor or Waterways). Further, even if the minority party has not held proportional strength on these committees in the past, the minority party’s increasing numbers in the chamber, its decreasing numbers (in proportion) on the control committees, and the necessity of the organization to cover the workload should push them closer to chamber/committee proportion on the substantive committees.

C) The minor legislative control committees and minor money committees should remain at about the same level of proportion as hitherto (i.e., within the norms and established practices of the institution).

These expectations yield two sets of basic predictions:

The first set is concerned with the over-arching predictions made by Hedlund and Hamm (1993), and predicts that ceteris paribus, investigation will yield the following:

1) The majority party will tend to be over-represented on legislative control committees, major money committees, and electoral/redistricting committees. They will be over-
represented to a lesser degree on the minor money and minor legislative control committees.

2) The minority party will tend to reach proportional representation on the substantive committees as their numbers in the chamber grow over time.

3) As minority competition in the electoral realm increases, the minority party proportion on the legislative control committees and major money committees will drop. *Actual* percentage of minority members on these committees will drop or remain below a 33% margin. Depending on local usage of the committees coded as “minor legislative organizational committees”, these may also follow the features of the major, or critical legislative control committees.

4) As competition in the electoral realm increases, the minority membership on substantive committees will rise to proportional representation or over-representation on the substantive committees. *Actual* representation (rather than proportion alone) may also rise above the 33% margin as the proportion of the minority party in the chambers rises above this figure.
5) As competition in the electoral realm increases, minority proportion and minority party percentage on the minor money committees will remain at about the same level, or slightly below, their former (pre-threshold) values.

**Operational Definitions**

This portion of the chapter takes into consideration two general dimensions: 1) competition differentials in the electoral arena (exterior), and 2) the ratios of proportional representation on the standing committees themselves (interior). The literature of political parties has — chiefly, though not exclusively, in the comparative rather than American politics subfield — focused on the linkage between exterior behavior and organizational arrangement for some time (Strom, 1985; Dalder, 1986; van Roosendaal 1992). Only recently have these linkages become a major scholarly concern among party scholars in the American field (Jewell and Whicker, 1994).\(^{23}\)

The internal aspects (in the sense that they are internal to the legislative chamber) of the political arena are considered in light of the division of *committee types* in state legislatures introduced by Hedlund and Hamm (1993). These types are defined as: 1) legislative control committees such as Rules and Management; 2) major money committees such as Appropriations and Ways and Means committees; 3) Elections and

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\(^{23}\) It is difficult to understand why this is so, given the robust nature of the European research and the propensity of American Politics Party and Legislative scholars to follow that literature. In part, the lag may be due to an unwarranted fixation on the Souraf (after Key) division of parties into three separate entities (Souraf, 1963).
Reapportionment committees; 4) minor money committees (State Personnel Salaries and the like); 5) substantive committees (Labor, Water Conservation, Banking; e.g.); and 6) minor legislative control committees. The committee data was averaged by all committees and by type across each session by state, drawing on the percentages of minority and majority membership in each committee by session. These figures allow cross-sectional (among states, among committee types by state, etc.) as well as over time variation to be measured (i.e., across types by state over-time).

*Proportionality* by party is measured first as absolute proportion (the difference between the party’s strength on the committee and strength in chamber) and by a finer measure appropriate to the small numbers involved. In this finer measure, the proportion of the minority party on committee over/under its proportion in the chamber is computed by dividing the absolute proportionality by the strength of the party in the chamber and multiplying by 100 to arrive at a percentage.

The first measure provides a measure of the absolute difference between the percentage of the party in the chamber and the percentage on the committee. This yields a measure which is, theoretically, continuous from -100 to 100; in actual use, however, the measure is bounded by the percentage of the party in the chamber. The actual lower bound is 0\(\cdot p\), where \(p\) is the percentage of the party in the chamber. The upper bound is 100\(\cdot p\). In a hypothetical example, legislature Z’s Republicans hold 40% of the seats in
the chamber. Even if they were completely excluded from participation on committee X, the most they could be under-represented with the raw score would be -40. This measure has utility in that it returns number relative to the strength of the party in chamber, though it does not measure their absolute proportionality. It will be used, appropriately, in the regression equations and to plot the estimated relationships.

The second measure allows for this proportionality to be standardized, and is constructed through by the following manipulation: giving it a true lower bound of under-representation of -100. It is produced by the simple equation:

\[
\frac{(100[\text{committee percentage}] - p)}{p*100}
\]

The first measure can only range between the poles of full representation at the chamber strength of the party (and, conversely, the total absence of party representation could only be represented by a missing strength on the committee of the same figure). By contrast, the second proportional measure allows for the percentage of representation to be returned by dividing the raw score by the percentage in chamber, and multiplying to return a figure which is reflective of committee under-representation. Complete proportionality is preserved at the zero point but the divergence downward from that point is relative to the strength of the party in the chamber. This avoids the problem of normalizing scores for the lower bound (under-representation, which is the object of
study) which a strict subtraction of party strength on committee from party strength in chamber induces when the number of party members in both is small in relation to the majority party. The problem is that while the lower bound (under-representation) it met at -100, reflecting a percentage figure, the upper bound may range up to the astronomical (actually, +900). But it also tends to inflate the outliers in the upper bound; which means that over-representation of any sort is liable to be inaccurately\textsuperscript{24} inflated and useless for regression, which is almost unnaturally sensitive to such numbers. It also means that where this measure is used in the tables of proportionality, the numbers will also be unusually high when over-proportion is present. I will briefly return to a discussion of these possible problems when they arise in the analysis.

As this score is particularly sensitive to the small numbers of minority party members in the earlier years in many of these chambers, it will be used to derive averages of proportionality for means comparison. I have used it in the tables of proportion advisedly, and the “raw score” in the regressions, as noted above. Since neither score is completely sufficient in and of itself, I have had to make a slightly awkward compromise by utilizing two measures of proportionality - each, I hope, best fitted to their purpose\textsuperscript{25}.

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\textsuperscript{24} Inaccurate in that it does not reflect actual over-representation. Within its bounds it is accurate, of course.

\textsuperscript{25} This may seem, at first blush, to be one those intermittent “teapot tempests” which so plague our methodology. I would argue that indeed it is not. We tend to think of proportion in the simple sense of the absolute proportion of members in chamber to members on committee, yet I think I have at least raised questions about this in practice. This measurement question is a first-rate one for a first rate-methodologist, which, I am afraid, I am not. Ideas, notions and random ramblings on the subject are most welcome.
These features will be considered in light of the competition differentials of: A) competition (the number of districts in which the minority party reaches 40% or above), B) the relative competitiveness in elections of the minority party — i.e., the relative number of victories arising from their competition in that arena — and C) the competitiveness of the chamber. Success (chamber strength) is offered as the most probable *proximate* explanation, but must be considered as the product of a sequence of electoral processes.

The effort is to establish that there is more to chamber competition than merely chamber strength — that there is a direct link between the type of competition going on in the electoral realm (as well as its outcomes) and the behavior of the political parties in arenas over which they have control (specifically majority party control over committee membership).^{26}

---

^{26} The sample of chambers is controlled for chambers (Arkansas, for example) in which a seniority rule is in effect - in all of the chambers in this study the makeup of committees is controlled either by the Speaker or by the majority caucus.
Data

The elections data used here are the same data gathered for use throughout this study, and include the usable portion of the ICPSR\textsuperscript{27} data base for state elections 1968-1986, augmented by electoral data gathered for the lower house chambers for the general elections in these states 1987 - 1995. The standing committee data consists of all standing committees appointed in these state's lower chamber in the organizational session (in most years) corresponding to the start of session following the election in the elections base. These committees were coded as to committee type, and then each committee member was identified as either Democrat or Republican (independents were omitted). Each committee was then divided into Republican and Democratic members and a percentage was computed for each party\textsuperscript{28}.

Elections data is measured as in Chapter 2 across elections, and percentage counts are taken in each year for all of the elections variables (e.g., percentage of elections contested by Republicans, 1989, for Virginia). Each state is then represented by year in

\textsuperscript{27} The ICPSR data was cleaned for errors by a cross-check with existing paper source documents where possible (in nearly all cases). It has been changed to reflect the cross-check. Further, I used the Niemi - Jackman - Winsky protocol (see these authors, 1989) to adapt the multi-member districts for use. The result was a complete data set for all years/all districts for the years encompassed by the study. The ICPSR data was further altered in that I transformed the data to read in a "by-seat/race" format rather than a "by-candidate" format in which it was originally written. The ICPSR is not responsible for the altered, cross-checked and corrected, or otherwise transformed data. They are, of course, likewise not responsible for any errors in the analysis, an area which is my responsibility alone.

\textsuperscript{28} The author would like to thank Keith Hamm and Ronald Hedlund for their aid and assistance in the gathering of these data as well as for their willingness to share their wealth of experience in this area while writing this chapter. Numerous trips to the library of Congress were underwritten by these researchers and the National Science Foundation in return for data gathered on a related project.
the data used for analysis across all these variables on an election by election basis.

Where standing committee data is lacking for a given organizational session, the elections is not considered in that year in any analysis which seeks to consider the elections data and committee data simultaneously.

The data used in this study encompass the following state legislative lower house chambers: FL, VA, MS, SC, NC, GA, TX, OK, TN, and KY. Regionally, these break down to 7 Southern and 3 “border state” chambers. The chambers in the analysis represent three divisions at the intercept: those which had reached 33% in chamber strength for the minority party after a long period of one-party domination (OK, VA, SC, NC, TX); those which were above 33% at the intercept (FL, TN) — but may drop below it during the period under study; and those which remain below a 33% threshold (GA, KY\textsuperscript{29} and MS).

Analysis

Average Committee Proportionality and Percentage by Chamber and by Type

Figures 3:1 and 3:2 report the proportion of Republican members on committees, by chamber and type, across the years 1968-1994\textsuperscript{30}. The measure used here is the

\textsuperscript{29}Kentucky has reached the threshold in the recent past (1968), but not during the period for which I have data for that chamber.

\textsuperscript{30}The committee data marked 1994 is, of course, data taken from the organizational sessions following the 1994 election; North Carolina has been omitted for 1994, as the chamber changed party control in that year.
proportionality measure which reflects the "true" -100 measure of the lower bound.

Figure 3:1 reports the simple average proportion on committees, by chamber and type, across all years; figure 3:2 reports the same proportions, averaged before and after a 33% intervention has been imposed.

The first question which has to be answered is whether or not minority party proportion on committees in these data fit the expectations of the Hedlund and Hamm schema. In Table 3:1, it can be seen that they clearly do. The strongest finding in this section concerns the type 1 committees - the legislative control committees such as Rules. On these committees, the Republican minority is massively under-represented with regard to their proportion in the chamber. This feature is most clearly demonstrated in Tennessee, Oklahoma and Texas (where Republicans are under-represented at proportional rates of -87.24, -53.96 and -50.69, respectively). Tennessee is a chamber in which the Republicans have long had relatively strong representation and Texas a chamber which has boasted a long-standing cross-party coalition. Republicans deviate least from proportion (zero, in the scale) in South Carolina, at -7.32.
### Figure 3:1

**Average Republican Relative Proportion of Over or Under-Representation on Committees, By Chamber and Type, 1968-1994**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chamber</th>
<th>Type 1 (Legislative Control Committees)</th>
<th>Type 2 (Major Money Committees)</th>
<th>Type 3 (Elections and Reapportionment Committees)</th>
<th>Type 4 (Minor Money Committees)</th>
<th>Type 5 (Substantive Committees)</th>
<th>Type 6 (Minor Legislative Organizational Committees)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VA</td>
<td>-43.88</td>
<td>-32.87</td>
<td>-19.56</td>
<td>23.32</td>
<td>-3.36</td>
<td>9.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FL</td>
<td>-44.54</td>
<td>-30.64</td>
<td>-7.78</td>
<td>-32.86</td>
<td>-12.69</td>
<td>-18.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GA</td>
<td>-20.11</td>
<td>-43.35</td>
<td>29.18</td>
<td>-34.87</td>
<td>-10.83</td>
<td>15.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MS</td>
<td>-92.94</td>
<td>-5.52</td>
<td>129.67</td>
<td>-15.69</td>
<td>34.32</td>
<td>19.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. C.*</td>
<td>-16.60</td>
<td>-1.03</td>
<td>29.90</td>
<td>-17.98</td>
<td>-0.43</td>
<td>-16.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TX</td>
<td>-50.69</td>
<td>-28.45</td>
<td>-0.69</td>
<td>54.63</td>
<td>5.56</td>
<td>-4.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KY</td>
<td>-23.04</td>
<td>-4.07</td>
<td>-2.34</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>-36.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TN</td>
<td>-87.24</td>
<td>-23.15</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>-8.74</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>-50.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OK</td>
<td>-53.96</td>
<td>-16.47</td>
<td>-2.98</td>
<td>-25.70</td>
<td>-11.26</td>
<td>-18.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL</td>
<td>-44.032</td>
<td>-22.500</td>
<td>16.900</td>
<td>-7.236</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>-13.241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHMBRS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Control of the North Carolina chamber passed to the Republicans in 1994; for the purposes of this study, that session has been excluded.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chamber</th>
<th>Type 1 (Legislative Caucuses)</th>
<th>Type 2 (Major Money Committees)</th>
<th>Type 3 (Electoral Reapportionment Committees)</th>
<th>Type 4 (Minor Money Committees)</th>
<th>Type 5 (Substantive Committees)</th>
<th>Type 6 (Minor Legislative Organizational Committees)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Below 33%</td>
<td>Above 33%</td>
<td>Below 33%</td>
<td>Above 33%</td>
<td>Below 33%</td>
<td>Above 33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>-67.13</td>
<td>-47.66</td>
<td>-12.95</td>
<td>-42.55</td>
<td>-30.55</td>
<td>-18.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia*</td>
<td>-61.11</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>-43.35</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>29.18</td>
<td>XX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi*</td>
<td>-62.94</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>-5.32</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>129.67</td>
<td>XX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Carolina</td>
<td>-18.03</td>
<td>-5.14+</td>
<td>-1.80</td>
<td>3.61+</td>
<td>29.90</td>
<td>XX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Carolina</td>
<td>-8.14</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>-36.89</td>
<td>-65.10</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>-3.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>-51.54</td>
<td>-47.73</td>
<td>-65.65</td>
<td>-26.68</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>-3.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky**</td>
<td>-21.04</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>-4.01</td>
<td>14.06</td>
<td>14.11</td>
<td>-4.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>-100.00</td>
<td>-85.97</td>
<td>-9.77</td>
<td>-24.49</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>XX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL</td>
<td>-46.50</td>
<td>-34.64</td>
<td>-20.30</td>
<td>-30.70</td>
<td>19.345</td>
<td>-6.92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Georgia and Mississippi Republicans have never held more than 33% of the chamber.
** Kentucky Republicans have held a greater than 33% margin in the chamber, but not in these data.
* Control of the North Carolina chamber passed to the Republicans in 1994, for the purposes of this study, it has been excluded. n = 1 for this section for this chamber.
Republican proportion on the major money committees is similarly situated. All chambers in the array report Republican under-representation across these committees, with South Carolina (at -39.45) and Georgia (at -43.35) being the most extreme examples. The lowest proportional difference is in North Carolina, which returned a score of -1.03. Republican representation on the elections / redistricting committees (type 3) is more variable, ranging from under-representation in Virginia at the rate of -19.56, to massive over-representation in Mississippi of over 100%\(^\text{31}\). Of all states having such committees as standing committees of the House, Republicans are over-represented in 4, and under-represented in 6; it is also worth noting that where they are under-represented, the figure is generally low, with Republicans in Texas almost fully proportional and only under-represented by nominal margins in Kentucky, Oklahoma and South Carolina.

The averages on the type 5 committees — the “substantive” standing committees — are roughly as expected. While the direction of these means drifts above and below zero — full proportionality — it never strays far from it. This is as expected, as the static prediction (or as a result of smoothing produced by averaging over time data) has been that the minority would be roughly at proportionality for these committees.

\(^{31}\) This is somewhat jarring evidence of the problems with this measure once over-proportion enters the picture in a legislature with small numbers in the legislature (see discussion of the proportion measures, above).
The two remaining committee types — minor legislative control committees (type 6) and minor money committees (type 4) are also variable in result. On minor money committees (type 4), all but Virginia and Texas report proportionally under-represented minorities. This under-representation ranges from -34.87 in Georgia to -8.74 in Tennessee. Virginia, Georgia and Mississippi all report slight over-representation on the minor legislative organizational committees (type 6), but the Republicans are under-represented in the remainder of the chambers. The high variability may be the result of the fact that the coding has not fully captured the tasks of the committees coded this way, or it may be that there are situational differences among these committee types which vary by chamber usage.

The majority party, with few exceptions, is over-represented on all committee types, though strongly on major legislative control committees and major money committees and only slightly on “substantive” committees (and sometimes under-represented on these\textsuperscript{32}). As Hedlund and Hamm point out, the conventional wisdom that the majority party “stacks” committees is valid, even among formerly one-party chambers, but with critical variation according to committee type.

\textsuperscript{32} Majority party figures are available upon request. They are not reported here as the focus of this chapter does not directly concern itself with their characteristics, and because of the inflation problems with the over-representation measure’s upper bound.
What, then, of the 33% threshold? This particular threshold may be a chimera. The hypotheses above would suggest that as the minority party reaches this point, the majority party should “man the barricades” on the legislative control committees and major money committees, and tend to make their position on these committees even stronger. Table 3:2 suggests that this is partially true, but variable by committee type.

The chambers under analysis are chambers which either reach the 33% threshold of minority party strength during the time frame (VA, NC, SC, TX, OK), or chambers which have already done so, but in which the minority party has dropped to a lower level for some sessions during the period (FL, TN). Of the type 1 committees, only Virginia really holds to this pattern. Republicans remain disproportionately under-represented in all chambers but South Carolina, where they have just topped proportionality at .081. While there is no evidence in these figures that the threshold has much effect, it is a moot point, perhaps, to consider the difference between -100% and -85.97. The Republicans are generally so over-matched in these committees that any further “stacking” may be unnecessary.

Turning to the major money committees, the threshold seems to have a much greater impact. Here, of the 7 chambers in which the 33% threshold is reached, 5 (VA, SC, TX, OK, TN) reveal a pattern of “circling the wagons”. Two states show a weak reverse pattern - in Florida, the minority drop from under-representation of -34.68 to -
19.86. In only one chamber do the Republicans actually achieve proportionality: in North Carolina, where their position improves from a deficit of -1.80 to a positive reading of 3.61. It is safe to assume, at least within the bounds of aggregate mean numbers, that for the major money committees the hypotheses has some weight.

Type 3 committees are widely variant, perhaps because of the different roles these committees (electoral and reapportionment) play in individual legislatures. Type 4 committees - the minor money committees - are also variant; Florida, South Carolina, North Carolina and Tennessee have dropped these committees from their roster of standing committees as well, leaving only three chambers in the array. Of these, two are negative (with Republican proportionality in Texas diving from an over-proportion of 70.11 to under-representation of -7.27) and one (Virginia) returns a positive report.

For the type 6 committees (the minor legislative control committees), several tend to a general pattern of “stacking” (Virginia’s committees go from over-proportion of 35.39 to a negative reading of -17.27; South Carolina and Texas also seem to move in this direction), but several move toward proportionality. Tennessee moves from no representation at all to -25.64; Florida and Oklahoma both move to almost equalizing the Republican share with their chamber strength.

---

33 Again, the coding system is a good compromise, but it is not infallible. It pays to remember that in several chambers the problems of redistricting are carried out in special committees, though they may have a standing committee with that name all the same. In some chambers, elections matters are dealt with in the judiciary committees.
In the type 5 committees - the substantive committees - all but one chamber (OK) close on or exceed proportionality, as expected. The line continues to be flat, or even rises in some circumstances.

Although the proportion of minority members may rise and fall across these committee types, it is worth paying at least some attention to the actual percentages they have gained or lost on the committees. Figure 3:3 presents mean percentages, before and after the 33% threshold has been reached, of simple membership on all 6 committee types by chamber.
### Figure 3:3

**Average Percentage Republican Membership on Committees, By Chamber and Type: Above and Below the 33% Threshold**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chamber</th>
<th>Type 1 (Legislative Control Committees)</th>
<th>Type 2 (Major Money Committees)</th>
<th>Type 3 (Elections and Reapportionment Committees)</th>
<th>Type 4 (Minor Money Committees)</th>
<th>Type 5 (Substantive Committees)</th>
<th>Type 6 (Minor Legislative Organizational Committees)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Below 33%</td>
<td>Above 33%</td>
<td>Below 33%</td>
<td>Above 33%</td>
<td>Below 33%</td>
<td>Above 33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>12.99</td>
<td>20.00</td>
<td>16.58</td>
<td>21.82</td>
<td>18.57</td>
<td>31.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>13.20</td>
<td>31.73</td>
<td>18.32</td>
<td>32.48</td>
<td>27.20</td>
<td>31.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia*</td>
<td>10.70</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>7.49</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>17.47</td>
<td>XX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi*</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>8.00</td>
<td>XX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Carolina</td>
<td>14.42</td>
<td>36.36+</td>
<td>15.88</td>
<td>39.72+</td>
<td>19.95</td>
<td>XX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Carolina</td>
<td>13.89</td>
<td>33.95</td>
<td>9.66</td>
<td>11.54</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>32.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>7.41</td>
<td>19.44</td>
<td>10.31</td>
<td>22.61</td>
<td>14.66</td>
<td>41.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky**</td>
<td>19.90</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>24.87</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>25.39</td>
<td>XX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oklahoma</td>
<td>12.18</td>
<td>29.21</td>
<td>23.15</td>
<td>32.69</td>
<td>24.22</td>
<td>XX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>5.80</td>
<td>29.17</td>
<td>30.31</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>XX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Chambers</td>
<td>10.21</td>
<td>25.12</td>
<td>15.82</td>
<td>27.31</td>
<td>19.18</td>
<td>34.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Georgia and Mississippi Republicans have never held more than 33% of the chamber.
** Kentucky Republicans have held a greater than 33% margin in the chamber, but not in these data.
+ Control of the North Carolina chamber passed to the Republicans in 1994; for the purposes of this study, it has been excluded. n = 1 for this section for this chamber.
It is clear from these figures that despite rising gains in minority party chamber strength, the ruling majority is loath to allow Republicans to rise above a 33% margin on the critical major legislative control committees and the major money committees. This is not true for the substantive committees (type 5) where the 33% margin is exceeded in 4 chambers.

There are at least three possible explanations for this decline in Republican proportionality. The first is that there may be a rule-based reason -- that 33% marks some break point of majority control on the committee. This is possible, but as many committees rely on the chairperson, on a session-by-session basis, to set the rules, it seems unlikely. A second possibility, though it does not follow from structural arguments concerning committees, is that some type of reward system is in effect, and that some seats are simply reserved for loyal party members as perquisites of long service or expertise. If this last were true, however, it would seem just as likely to occur on the substantive committees such as the Judiciary or Agriculture (type 5 committees, on which the minority often exceeds the 33% margin) as on Rules or Ways and Means. The most probable explanation is that as the minority party increases in strength in the chamber, the majority may seek to ensure some protection from defections from their own numbers in the voting process, and the speaker may attempt to provide the chairperson with a shock-proof majority by stacking the committee.
Elections and Committee Proportionality

As I have already suggested, this 33% cut-point may be an illusion. The problem is that although this point is a realistic one (indeed almost intuitive) for confronting chamber rules, very often these rules do not apply in committee, or if they do, they may be easily changed by the chairperson. What is evident from a cursory understanding of the numbers, is that as the majority party loses seats in the chamber, the likelihood that it will over-represent the minority on critical committees is extremely small. As chamber strength for the minority grows, two things clearly must be true. First, the opportunity for the majority to punish the minority arises with greater frequency — the majority can "under-represent" the minority at a greater rate. The second is that no matter how amiable the relations between the parties may be, if political parties matter at all, they will never over-represent to the point of danger to themselves.

The averages derived in the foregoing can only give a very general picture of the overall features under discussion. For a more precise approach, and to examine the linkages to the electoral realm, it was necessary to construct a theoretical sequence of how I believe these variables relate to one another. I have stated above that chamber strength of the minority party is clearly the proximate causal factor - no amount of competition in the electoral arena can be of any use in terms of chamber competition unless it provides victories for that party. Yet, it seems at least reasonable to assume that
a challenged majority might perform differently in constructing its organization of committees than one which felt safe in its status. The recent experience of South Carolina Democrats demonstrates that defection from the party may take a rather more damaging turn than simple voting defection on particular bills. There is little that the party can actively do about party switching, but there may be a propensity to protect the majority while they have it. For this reason, I will also explore the possibility that rising competition among the minority in the electoral realm may, independently or in concert with rising chamber strength, lead to greater committee stacking of critical committees by the majority.

For the purpose of the sequential diagram and the regression equations from which it is derived, I have pooled the chambers across time, and tested them cross-sectionally. The measure in use is the absolute score of proportionality, which does not translate to a strict -100 - 100 range. The reason here is simple. The first part of this analysis has demonstrated that the direction of committee proportionality is roughly the same across all chambers examined here, and there is no particular reason to assume that rising competition and/or rising chamber strength will have dissimilar effects as a result of the location of the chamber.

The simple sequence takes the following form:
<(Average) Republican competition ⇒ < (Average)Republican chamber strength ⇒ 
> (Average) Republican proportionality on critical committees

The first linkage which must be established is that between minority party 
competition and chamber strength. While this may seem a *prima facie* connection, it has 
been demonstrated that in two-party competitive chambers, two-party competition is 
actually on the wane (Hamm and Anderson, 1993\textsuperscript{34}). This first linkage was accomplished 
by running a simple OLS regression in which Republican competition was regressed 
against chamber strength:

\[ Y = X_i \beta^1 + e_i \]

Where \( Y = \) Republican chamber strength and \( X_i = \) Republican competition.

This returned the results found in Table 3:1.

\textsuperscript{34} The authors found that across time, party competition in elections for seats in chambers which were competitive 
(i.e., the minority held at least 33\% of the chamber) had strongly decreased over the period 1968-1991; we 
speculated that this decrease may be a function of the stability of voting patterns in given districts, and the inability 
or inadvisability of contesting seats in districts held by the opposite party. Another possibility is that redistricting 
may lead to a division of spoils between parties — i.e., that a tacit stacking of district strength to one party or another 
takes place, leaving fewer districts in which either party will risk a challenge.
Table 3:1

\( Y = \text{Republican Chamber strength (Percentage of chamber Republican)} \)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE B</th>
<th>Sig. T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Competition</td>
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<td>.019414</td>
<td>.000****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.822486</td>
<td>.741155</td>
<td>-2.459</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( R^2 = .86 / ADJ R^2 = .74 / SE = 5.572 \)

Table 3:2

\( Y = \text{Republican Competition (Percentage of district races in which Republican candidates were competitive at the 40% level)} \)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE B</th>
<th>Sig. T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Competitive Victories</td>
<td>2.025391</td>
<td>.096311</td>
<td>.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>19.937456</td>
<td>.874982</td>
<td>.0000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( R^2 = .49 / ADJ R^2 = .49 / SE = 9.58803 \)

Table 3:3

\( Y = \text{Absolute Republican Proportion (Committee share - Chamber Share) - all committees.} \)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE B</th>
<th>Sig. T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Chamber Strength</td>
<td>-.277006</td>
<td>.034459</td>
<td>.000****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.085391</td>
<td>.874615</td>
<td>.0175</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( R^2 = .34 / ADJ R^2 = .11 / SE = 8.706 \)
Clearly, Republican competition is significantly related to chamber strength, but in order to confirm the finer points of competition, it was necessary to explore further the make-up of Republican competition in these cases. Elections in which Republicans win races, and win them at a greater rate than in other years, may in fact co-vary with changes in committees. This “explains” chamber strength in only one regard: essentially, it says that in order to increase chamber strength, it is necessary to be competitive in the electoral environment. It is quite a different thing, however, to demonstrate that Republicans are also winning more races in which they have competitive opposition, and that this is the reason why chamber strength is increasing, and, perhaps, why the majority elects to change their proportion on certain crucial committees. For the purpose of demonstrating this, I have examined the effect of races in which Republicans had competitive challenges (i.e., in which the Democratic candidate obtained a vote share equal to or exceeding 40% of the vote). Using chamber strength as the dependent variable, I used Republican competitive victories independent of unopposed races, and races with little or token opposition, as the independent variable, returning the values found in Table 3:2.
This robust relationship suggests that competitive victories play a significant role in contributing to Republican competition\textsuperscript{35}. 

Having thus confirmed that in the case of these formerly one-party legislatures, minority party competition is the driving force behind rising chamber strength, I move to the next portion of the model. 

In this, the contribution of chamber strength is measured first across all committees pooled, then against each type of committee. I expected that chamber strength would have little effect on proportionality across committees \textit{per se}, as I had theorized that the minority would reach or close on proportionality on most committee types, \textit{ceteris paribus}. This regression yielded the results found in Table 3:3. 

I next measured the leverage of chamber strength on committee \textit{by type}. Here, the expectation was that chamber strength would have a great influence — in the negative — on certain types of committees: legislative control committees and major money committees. These regressions returned the results found in Tables 3:4 -3:9 with accompanying plots 3:2 through 3:9. 

\textsuperscript{35} I also tested the independent effect of Republican competitive victories on chamber strength (reported in figure 2 as well) the variable was significant at the .00001 level and yielded an adjusted $R^2$ of .23.
### Tables 3.4 - 3.9

**Table 3.4**  
**Type 1**  
\[ Y = \text{Absolute Republican Proportion (Committee share - Chamber Share)} - \text{type 1 committees.} \]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE B</th>
<th>Sig. T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Chamber Strength</td>
<td>-63.4912</td>
<td>.073722</td>
<td>.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>4.251362</td>
<td>1.932146</td>
<td>.0301</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ R^2 = .42 / ADJ R^2 = .42 / SE = 8.555 \]

(see plot 3:2)

**Table 3.5**  
**Type 2**  
\[ Y = \text{Absolute Proportion (Committee share - Chamber Share)} - \text{type 2 committees.} \]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE B</th>
<th>Sig. T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Chamber Strength</td>
<td>-.259853</td>
<td>.052195</td>
<td>.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.328308</td>
<td>1.372193</td>
<td>.8114</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ R^2 = .19 / ADJ R^2 = .19 / SE = 6.04790 \]

(see plot 3:3)

**Table 3.6**  
**Type 3**  
\[ Y = \text{Absolute Republican Proportion (Committee share - Chamber Share)} - \text{type 3 committees.} \]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE B</th>
<th>Sig. T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Chamber Strength</td>
<td>-.272148</td>
<td>.084843</td>
<td>.0021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>5.563458</td>
<td>2.045782</td>
<td>.0083</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ R^2 = .13 / ADJ R^2 = .12 / SE = 7.661 \]

(see plot 3:4)

**Table 3.7**

**Type 4**  
\[ Y = \text{Absolute Republican Proportion (Committee share - Chamber Share)} - \text{type 4 committees.} \]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE B</th>
<th>Sig. T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Chamber Strength</td>
<td>.091705</td>
<td>.117416</td>
<td>.4396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.388033</td>
<td>2.660647</td>
<td>.6049</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ R^2 = .01 / ADJ R^2 = -.01 / SE = 8.730 \]

(see plot 3:5)
Table 3:4 - 3:9 Continued

Table 3:8

Type 5

\[ Y = \text{Absolute Republican Proportion (Committee share - Chamber Share)} - \text{type 5 committees.} \]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE B</th>
<th>Sig. T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Chamber Strength</td>
<td>-.017236</td>
<td>.035135</td>
<td>.6248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-.338091</td>
<td>.927014</td>
<td>.7161</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ R^2 = .002 \quad \text{ADJ } R^2 = -.007 \quad SE = 4.023 \]

(see plot 3:6)

Table 3:9

Type 6

\[ Y = \text{Absolute Republican Proportion (Committee share - Chamber Share)} - \text{type 6 committees.} \]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE B</th>
<th>Sig. T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Chamber Strength</td>
<td>-.267816</td>
<td>.103891</td>
<td>.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.765048</td>
<td>2.498162</td>
<td>.4821</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ R^2 = .08 \quad \text{ADJ } R^2 = .07 \quad SE = 9.950 \]

(see plot 3:7)
It is plain, from these results, that Republican chamber strength is negatively associated with Republican strength on the legislative control committees and major money committees (types 1 and 2). Both regressions are strongly significant; also negative, and also significant, is the regression for the minor legislative control committees -- as Republican competition in the electoral realm becomes stronger, the chambers themselves become more highly competitive. The same may be said of the elections and redistricting committees (type 3). Here, while the results are not quite as robust, they still tend to support the case that these committees are affected by the change of Republican strength in the chamber.

This is plainly not true of the substantive committees (type 5). Here, the results are in the negative, but so weak as to draw the direction itself into question. They are, of course, not statistically significant. There appears to be no relation between the relative amount of competition in the chamber and the proportion of minority party membership on these committees. The results for the minor money committees (type 4) are similar — here, they are weakly positive, but again, so weak that even the direction may be safely ignored.

As the chambers become more highly competitive, the ruling majority party (the Democrats, in all cases here) "man the barricades" in the critical committees and reserve
seats there to themselves, driving the Republican proportion on these committees strongly downward.

It is important, here, to revisit the measurement problem so that the case is not over-stated. The lower bound of the plots (under-representation), for example, is constrained by the percentage of the minority in the chamber. This means that where the Republicans are not represented on type 1 committees (see plot 3:2), they lie at the bottom of the distribution. If one weren’t aware of the measurement problem, one could be deluded into thinking that the lie of the plot meant that they were becoming more under-represented as chamber strength grew. It is obvious from the construction of the measure that this is not the case; they are still not represented - this has not changed - but since their share in the chamber has grown, it has allowed them to appear (at a rate of increase coterminous with their chamber strength) more under-represented that heretofore. Comparisons between committee types, of course, are unaffected by this problem.
Plots 3:2 and 3:3
Plots 3:4 and 3:5
Type 5 Committees

Plot 3:6

Type 6 Committees

Plot 3:7

Plots 3:6 and 3:7
The next set of question concern the independent effect of competition in elections and the structure of committee proportionality. Committee proportionality seems unquestionably a function of chamber strength, but it is important to remember that the variable “absolute proportion” is, in part, a product of the chamber strength variable. It is now important to address the problem of whether or minority party competition has an independent effect on the proportionality of selected committee types.

Having established the effect of chamber strength on types 1, 2 and 3 committees (legislative control committees, major money committees and elections and redistricting committees), I have, for the next set of equations, collapsed these types into a single set of committees which I will call “partisan control” committees.

Table 3:10 provides important evidence that Republican competition may have an independent effect on committee proportionality; given that chamber share is highly collinear with this variable, it may be claimed that this result is simply picking up on the effect of chamber share. This seems unlikely, but I admit the possibility. Unfortunately, as the dependent variable is a product of the independent variable “chamber strength” a simple test of the two independent variables cannot determine the greater explanatory power of one over the other.
### Tables 3:10 - 3:12

#### Table 3:10

$Y = \text{Absolute Republican Proportion (Committee share - Chamber Share) - Partisan Control committees.}$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE B</th>
<th>Sig. T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republican Electoral</td>
<td>-.236151</td>
<td>.043134</td>
<td>.0000****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.103412</td>
<td>1.665548</td>
<td>.2078</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Multiple R = .32604 R² = .10 / ADJ R² = .10 / SE = 9.171

#### Table 3:11

$Y = \text{Absolute Republican Proportion (Committee share - Chamber Share) - Partisan Control Committees.}$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE B</th>
<th>Sig. T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Competitive</td>
<td>22.650929</td>
<td>8.899154</td>
<td>.0115*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victories</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-8.563437</td>
<td>1.023920</td>
<td>.0000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Multiple R = .158 R² = .025 / ADJ R² = .021 / SE = 9.579

(see plot 3:8)

#### Table 3:12

$Y = \text{Absolute Republican Proportion (Committee share - Chamber Share) - Partisan Control Committees.}$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE B</th>
<th>Sig. T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republican Competitive</td>
<td>-.341390</td>
<td>.129232</td>
<td>.0088***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victories</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.763553</td>
<td>1.182172</td>
<td>.0016</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Multiple R = .164 R² = .026 / ADJ R² = .023 / SE = 9.570

(See plot 3:9)

#### Table 3:13

$Y = \text{Republican Competitive Victories.}$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE B</th>
<th>Sig. T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Competitive</td>
<td>42.012630</td>
<td>3.431707</td>
<td>.0000****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victories</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.966263</td>
<td>.394846</td>
<td>.0000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Multiple R = .610 R² = .372 / ADJ R² = .370 / SE = 3.694
For a fuller examination of the effects of electoral competition, the next equation adds Democratic competition as well. Here, the variables are not simply competition per se, but rather Democratic and Republican victories over time. The two independent variables are not necessarily internally collinear (i.e., between Democratic competitive victories and Republican competitive victories). These two variables may, and often do, vary independently of one another. These variables represent the portion of races won, of all races won or lost, by Republicans and Democrats which were competitive at the 40% margin. These variables were first run in bivariate equations, and yielded significant results; the equation for Democratic Competitive Victories yielded the results found in Table 3:11.

Democratic competitive victories, then, are positively, and significantly (though not strongly so) related to the Republican share of partisan control committees. The results of the bivariate equation for Republican competitive victories yielded the results found in 3:12.

Before running the multiple regression, which would yield the interactive results of party competitive victories, it was important to establish that the two were related phenomena. In order to accomplish this, I ran a model which regressed Republican competitive victories against Democratic competitive victories. This equation yielded the results in Table 3:13.
Having established that the two are undoubtedly related -- in this case, as Democratic competitive victories rise, so do Republican competitive victories -- I proceeded to the final model, which sought to use both partisan competition variables as independent variables against Republican share of partisan control committees. The results of this multiple model are those in Table 3:14.

While it cannot establish beyond all doubt that competition in the electoral arena leads to changes in Republican share of the partisan control committees, it certainly suggests a positive effect independent of chamber share. Here, Democratic competitive victories are associated with greater Republican share on the committees -- when Democrats are winning these contests, their need to depress Republican share is less than when they are losing them (i.e., see the effect of rising Republican competitive victories). This suggests that it is not only simply the winning of office, and by whom, which effects the change (i.e., chamber share), though this has an undeniable and critical effect, but also how the offices are being won.
Table 3:14

\( Y = \text{Absolute Republican Proportion (Committee share - Chamber Share)} - \text{Partisan Control Committees} \)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE B</th>
<th>Sig. T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republican Competitive Victories</td>
<td>-.865093</td>
<td>.154306</td>
<td>.0000****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Competitive Victories</td>
<td>58.995771</td>
<td>10.615483</td>
<td>.0000****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-5.132249</td>
<td>1.144559</td>
<td>.0000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Multiple R = .36546 R\(^2\) = .133 / ADJ R\(^2\) = .126 / SE = 9.048
Discussion

This section set out to investigate the linkages between electoral competition and feature within the party control of the chamber: proportionality on committees. There does seem to be support for an independent effect of electoral competition on committee proportionality in these findings, and certainly support for its indirect effect is quite strong for those committees hypothesized to be so affected.

I had theorized, at the beginning, that the majority would seek to limit the impact of rising minority party competition on committees critical to the control of the chamber and to the power of the purse. These hypotheses seem strongly supported here. I did not anticipate the effect of competition on the elections and reapportionment committees, though this certainly seems to be the case. I had also theorized that the majority party would be less concerned with the proportion of the minority on substantive committees and committees dealing with minor money matters. This also seems to be supported, and while I speculated that minority numbers might even grow on these committee types, it seems that they did not, at least not out of proportion to the minority in the chamber.

The thirty-three percent threshold remains somewhat elusive. Though there is descriptive evidence that such a threshold has an intervening effect on the propensity of the majority to stack committees, the model tended to break down under closer scrutiny.
I ran the regressions reported above using the 33% threshold as a control variable, and for
the type 1 committees, the results were encouraging (significant at the .01 level).

With reference to some type of threshold, a few observations are possible from the
plots themselves. Returning to plot 3:2 (type 1 committees), it is clear that while
increasing under-representation does not appear to occur at 33% of chamber strength,
there does appear to be a curve from flat to decreasing proportion at about the 15% and
20% level of minority chamber strength. This is reflected in plots 3, 4 and 7 as well.
Further, it is possible to ascertain from figure 3:1 that, after the 33% level, no over-
proportion occurs at all among the type 1 committees at all; nor is it present in many
observations among the type 2 and 3 committees. This is most probably due to a
confluence of circumstances, chief among them the circumstance that as chamber
strength rises, the ability to punish may widen, but the ability to reward the minority is
massively constrained by the nature of majority rule. In amicable chambers (or chambers
with cross-party coalitions), one might expect that Republicans might be given a higher
proportion of seats on the Rules committee than events strictly call for; as their numbers
increase, however, the majority party could not, without endangering its own voting
majority, over-represent them. I have also mentioned the possibility of preventing
defections through creating “insurance” majorities, so that even when defections occur,
the majority is still in a position to work its will on the critical committees. This
insurance would also constrain the ability of the majority to represent the minority -- first,
to over-represent them, and second, to represent them proportional to their strength in the chamber. Whatever seems the best sub-explanation, the critical idea here is that the political party, as the paramount organizing force both in the chamber and in the electoral arena, is crucial to it. Absent party, none of these features could be properly explained at all.
CHAPTER 4:
PARTY CAUCUSES IN FORMERLY ONE-PARTY LEGISLATIVE CHAMBERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF INTERNAL PARTY ORGANIZATION BY EXTERNAL FORCES

“The Caucus has become much larger, and therefore has [the] potential to become more effective -- [the Caucus] has 26 freshmen, and 15 incumbents for [a] total of 41 out of 141. [The] [C]aucus is no longer dominated by the Speaker. [The] minority leader and whip no longer attend the Speaker’s leadership meetings. At one time [the] [C]aucus was just another group dominated by the [Democratic] Speaker”.


This chapter examines the linkage between outcomes and features in the electoral arena and the development of party caucuses; broadly, it investigates the way caucuses develop in reaction to changes in political party advantage in the chamber. These, as pointed out in Chapter 1, result from increasing competition between the major parties in elections.

State legislative caucuses have been mostly ignored in the past -- but the increasing interest in linkage arguments (Gierzynski, 1993; Krehbiel, 1992) has re-introduced serious interest, although not yet completed studies, in these organizations. In
competitive legislatures, party caucus research was hindered by the difficulty inherent in engaging this type of research -- it requires in-depth contextual research in a given legislative chamber, or, conversely, cross-state or cross-chamber survey research which also tends to be extremely difficult with little immediate return. In one-party legislatures, the problems were compounded by the difficulty of fitting these groups into any wider picture. As long as parties played relatively minor roles in these legislatures, many did not even manifest caucuses, bound as they were to cross-party coalitions or single-party factionalism; the raison d'être for caucuses was absent.

Caucuses have existed in the US Congress for almost as long as political parties; they have served as information clearinghouses, strategy hothouses, and arenas of discipline for recalcitrant party adherents. Congressional caucuses have also received at least moderate attention on the part of scholarly research, particularly on the part of the neo-institutionalists and organization theorists. On the subject of state legislative caucuses, the literature is thin, largely due to the initial lack of interest coupled with the immense amount of data-gathering accruing relatively little return. The studies which do exist seem to divide into two strains of research. Single-state studies of legislative process (Rueter, 1994, e.g.) have contributed a good deal of information on the situational linkages between caucuses and other institutional variables, several studies of state politics, generally focused on other matters, have included caucuses in their study, sometimes in quite some detail (Zeller, 1954; Jewell and Patterson, 1977; Uslaner and
Weber, 1977; Morehouse, 1994). Two studies stand out in stark contrast to the general
trend. Robert Harmel and Keith E. Hamm’s (1986) examination of the Texas legislature
is probably the definitive one-state case study, followed by Harmel’s massive effort (also
1984) to pin down features of the state legislative caucuses then operating.

The study of Congressional Caucuses differs quantitatively and qualitatively from
the study of state legislative caucuses. The Congressional caucuses, like the Congress,
are institutions which have adapted to circumstances which are dissimilar from the those
of the state chambers, and are perhaps unique in the ranks of all legislatures. The
Congress has adopted rules and norms over a period of two and one-half centuries of
almost unadulterated two-party competition. Most recent analysis in the states, however,
has sometimes reflected this, but more often than not the state chambers are more variant
in their party composition. They are also variant in terms of the amount and type of
electoral competition. What this has meant for this type of research is that over time, and
across chambers, the degree of importance of the party caucus has been variant.

The implications of this variation may be critical, ranging from the sources of
information on pending legislation, to the degree of party loyalty which may be expected.
It is my purpose here to examine the caucuses in the transforming chambers cross-
sectionally and over time in order to sort out the empirical dimensions of the change
which may be expected as the party competition in these chambers changes.
As Jewell and Whicker note:

The ability of the party leaders to lead, to mobilize support of party members for or against legislation, depends on the norms of partisan loyalty that prevail in the legislature. These in turn depend on the political environment within which the legislature operates. ... In those southern and border-state legislatures where the Democrats have normally held huge majorities, the environment could best be described as non-partisan, and very often neither party was organized in the legislature. It is in these states that the greatest changes in partisanship are occurring as the size of the Republican delegation grows. But it is not easy for Southern legislative leaders to create effective partisan institutions in a period of a few years.


This chapter will be primarily concerned with the degree to which the party leaders in these chambers have been successful "in a few years" to organize such institutions — in this case party caucuses. In the next chapter (on chamber voting behavior), I will attempt to discern whether or not it has had any distinguishable effect on party "cohesion". I will trace the development of the party caucuses through a descriptive examination of the chambers as they were measured across three time periods, followed by a cross-sectional analysis based on a grouping of chambers by their position on a chamber competition scale. I will then comment on the development of these caucuses (where present) across this competition scale, and set the stage for a discussion of the possible connection between these developments and the vote scores reported in chapter 4.
The major points to be discussed in this chapter are based on a supposition that the following assertions are generally true:

"The organizational structure of majority and minority blocks [in legislatures] differ substantially ... from one legislature to another and even within a single legislature over a period of years. An organ such as a rules committee or a caucus may be inconsequential in one legislature, of moderate importance in another, and the main arena for decision-making in a third.

In a two-party state, the organizational structure is partisan in nature, and the cohesiveness of the party contributes to the effectiveness of the party organs. In one-party states, the structure is factional in nature. In either type of legislature, the leaders usually have considerable discretion in determining what organs will be established and what tasks they will perform.

Jewell and Patterson (1977:192-93)

Why Study the Caucuses?

In 1984, Harmel argued that there were critical roles that caucuses may play in a legislature. The first is what he termed "the caucus as service provider". In this formulation, Harmel describes the caucuses as providers of member service (subdivided into legislative, campaign, and media subsets of service), service to party leadership (largely administrative), and aid to committees. Of the 55 caucuses responding to Harmel’s survey, 33 (60%) reported having caucus staff; ranging from 1 or 2 members (e.g., for the Virginia House Republicans) to 491 (for the Pennsylvania House Democrats). This staff was roughly spread across the arenas of service provision: 23
caucuses reported staff involved in media services; 24 in legislative analysis; 17 in analysis for legislative committees, campaign assistance, administrative help to party leaders; 19 reported staff involved in administrative help for the caucus. *In toto*, 87% of caucuses with staffs reported some aspect of service provision as a majority of their regular duties.

Harmel also pointed out that caucuses have *organizational importance*. This refers to the caucus’s duties as selecting the “functioning leaders of the chamber”, and to “dispense committee membership and chairs” (1984:4). The caucus thus establishes an “important reward mechanism” which “may be used to account for legislative performance, seniority, and ... party loyalty”.

The third area of caucus importance Harmel cites is that of *policy importance*. Here, Harmel notes:

A caucus is “policy important” to the extent that it helps to shape the policy agenda for the chamber, acts as a forum for discussion of policy issues, and/or considers taking party positions on the issues. It is not necessary for the caucus to *bind* its members, leaders or staff to support the “party position” for a caucus to have an important impact on legislation, though it might be considered the ultimate means by which a caucus would try to guarantee a role for itself in shaping policy outcomes. (Harmel, 1984:7)
Harmel quotes the Francis (1985) study of the legislative “committee game” to point out that of Francis’s decision loci, 41 of the chambers with organized majority caucuses (in 1981) reported the caucus as one of the top three decision-making arenas, with 32 such chambers reporting 2/3 of members responding with this indication of importance.

Clearly, Harmel believed not only that caucuses were important, but that research into information exchange, service provision, mechanisms of party loyalty, and policy decision-making on the part of individual members would be incomplete without them. I am in complete agreement, although this study is primarily concerned with the third of these, “policy importance”, and to a degree with the second, organizational importance of the caucuses.

The State Legislative Caucus as an Evolving Organization

Given that any organization is, in theoretical terms, a bundle of measurable attributes, one simple way of looking at the state legislative caucuses would be to use some sort of additive function. This method has merits, for one point of view: either a caucus exists, or does not exist, first, but after this, caucuses either have this or that attribute or they do not. Meetings are open or closed, meetings take place on a monthly, weekly, or daily basis. etc. The more these things move toward a complex environment, the more complex the caucus and therefore the more important the caucus. I have chosen
a different way of looking at these institutions. I see the development of the caucus as an evolving, or unfolding, process, in which certain types of organizational attributes are likely to develop in sequence with others, or develop only after others have done so. There is an interdependency to the parts of this evolution which make up the whole as well. A caucus may meet daily, for example, but if members only meet to have coffee or exchange gossip from home, the caucus which meets weekly, but discusses critical points of policy is the caucus more crucial to party business in terms of policy.

I will therefore discuss the nature of caucuses in terms of complexity.

"Complexity", in this context, not only implies that the organization of the caucus is more elaborate in its component parts (i.e., there are more elected positions such as whips, secretaries and so on) but that the caucus has a more complex task structure -- that it has not only more functioning parts to achieve its given tasks, but that are more tasks to accomplish.

External Influences on Party Caucus Complexity

Jewell and Patterson (1977) note that the strength of the state party organization, in the sense that it exists independently from the legislative organization, has little influence on the strength or complexity of the legislative caucus:

In several of the states in which the legislative caucus is important ... the state party organizations are strong, and each legislative party rests on a
base of rather homogeneous constituencies. In Connecticut, for example, both parties hold daily caucuses in which most bills are discussed more thoroughly than they are on the floor. But in some states in which [external] party organizations are weaker ... the caucus has assumed importance in recent years....

(1977:201).

This problem points to the difficulty of measuring the effect that external state party organization may have on legislative institutions, and perhaps it also is a comment on the problems of the Souraf configuration of separating the two. In any event, the external party organization will not be examined here, except in the sense that elections outcomes may be affected by them.

The principal external force which has a direct effect on the complexity of caucuses are elections outcomes and competition in these elections. As has been noted above, several researchers have concluded that the strength of the internal organizations of the "legislative parties" is dependent, in one form or another, on their strength in the chamber itself. Jewell and Whicker have written extensively on the effect this feature has on the strategic decision-making of the party leadership (see above), and the process they describe as resulting in caucus formation does not take place in a vacuum. Where the margin between the parties in the legislature is small, the reliance on the party caucus for party unity enforcement and information on party business seems to be much greater than in legislative chambers where the margin is wide36.

36 This dependence is not a one-way street, either. Gierzynski (1993) has argued that the role of the legislature in financing state legislative elections on a partisan basis is growing. As these legislative
We know that power foci in an organization are not zero sum propositions — in fact there may be several competing forces which draw the individual legislator’s attention and loyalty at any given time — but we also know that legislators (at least Congressional legislators) will tend to default to a given power structure absent their own compelling personal needs (Kingdon, 1989). Which institution in the legislature takes the role of “default” may also be dependent on the strength of the party in the chamber. Francis pointed out that:

[The majority party caucus is passive in most Southern states as well as in several other states with a single dominant party. We can speculate that in such cases the leadership exercises control, to the extent that it can, through the committee system, but that relationship is reciprocal ... In such states the party leadership does not work through the caucus — which may be large and unwieldy if not superfluous — but through the committees and the committee chairs.

Francis, 1989:42

Conversely, as the caucus becomes less “unwieldy” and more complex, assuming more of the tasks associated with the party leadership’s enforcement of party loyalty, the committee system may be forced into a secondary role. As Jewell and Patterson noted, in the case of the New Jersey legislature, “[o]ne result of [the] concentration of power [in

campaign committees increase in importance, it is important to grasp the role of party leadership, and in some cases of the caucuses (see “discussion”, below) in dispersing these campaign monies.
the caucus] is a reduction of the authority of the standing committees virtually to the
vanishing point" (1977:201).

The narrower a minority closes the gap between its numbers in the chamber and
those of the majority party, the more likely it will be to win substantive battles in the
chamber. The majority also has a strong incentive to form or maintain strong party
organizations in the chamber, as Jewell and Whicker suggest:

The partisan balance affects the majority leadership in complex ways. The
more narrow the margin between the parties, the greater incentive the
majority party members have to stick together. Leaders for either the
majority or minority party can use that argument in mobilizing the support
of their members. On the other hand, a close margin increases the
pressure on leadership, particularly the leadership of the majority party.

It seems reasonable to assume that where such pressures are present, the
leadership of both parties will find it in their interest to increase their communication
with their party loyalists, increase the points at which information can be gathered by
their loyalists, and so on — in other words, to raise the role and the stature of the caucus.
I will argue that the caucus will have attributes of increasing complexity which are
measurable empirically if they do this.

*Conceptual and Operational Definitions*
“Complexity”, as has been pointed out above, is a two-stage concept; the first is the structural components of the organization, the second their tasks. Both may vary from simple to complex, and this relationship may or may not be strictly “additive”. In this section I hope to elucidate first the institutional outlines of complexity, and secondly the complexity of the tasks the caucus may undertake.

Perhaps the most important question is what is meant, in this study, by “party caucus”? For reasons of simplicity and theoretical parsimony, a group, sub-group, or minor gathering is a “party caucus” if the elected party leadership says it is. If the elected party leadership, which may, of course, exist independently of a caucus, says that there is no party caucus in the chamber, then this will be accepted as evidence of its absence. In order to categorize the features of caucuses, it is important to be specific in terms of the nature of the feature. I have divided the characteristics of caucuses into two broad types: structural attributes and “tasks”.

The structural attributes of caucuses are considered here to be those mechanistic aspects of the organization which coordinate its operation in the pursuance of its business. Generally, these are mutually agreed-upon guides to behavior which the members of the party generally accept to order the affairs of the organization. Structural attributes may also be artifacts of these norms, such as leadership positions, which reflect the willingness of members to place themselves at the disposal of certain persons in their
party -- a person as a "guide to behavior". Structure can also mean, but is not restricted to, rules (formal or otherwise), which the group adopts to order its affairs, and to which the leaders may also be subject. Rules may be simple (no person may speak without recognition), or they may be complex, ordering complex behaviors such as determining the party's position on an issue or set of issues (binding votes and the like). Standing orders of activity, which are simply *modus vivendi* for the group, may also be considered "structure"; if the caucus agrees to meet once a week, this is structure, as it is a mechanical agreement to meet, regardless of the substance of the meeting (which may or may not be pre-determined).

*Tasks* are the business in which the group has agreed to engage. In caucuses, tasks range widely -- from simple organizational measures, such as agreeing on a specific candidate for chamber leadership, to highly complex and involved work, such as agreeing on a budget that the party, as a group, can support.

The first empirical question is a simple one: do caucuses exist in the chamber? None of the questions which follow make much sense if this question is answered in the negative. The absence of party caucuses may be indicative of a set of circumstances every bit as important to an overall understanding of their operation as all that follows from their presence. While the conditions which give rise to their absence may be
examined elsewhere, and attributed to possible independent variables, it is important to at least note the baseline.

One possible situation is the presence of one caucus, but not two. In this lies the first point in the sequence of unfolding caucus complexity, and it may be viewed as variation within chamber, rather than variation within caucus. Which party -- the minority or the majority -- is theoretically best suited to organize a caucus? There are arguments on both sides. On the one hand, the majority party has been in control of the chambers examined here the majority of the time under examination and, in most cases, has held a position of dominance until relatively recently. It might be argued that the party of dominance would be first to respond to changing conditions by organizing itself in this way. Yet the preponderance of the literature seems to indicate otherwise -- there seems to be an economy of scale and of organization, which makes the formation of a self-identified party organization less likely for the majority than the minority in the newly competitive or, more appropriately, the transforming chambers which are the subject of this study. In part, this is a function of the factionalism inherent in one-party dominant legislatures (Key, 1949, etc.): where legislative chambers divide without aid of party, they tend to fluidity in their alignments, despite the presence of long-term associations such as the Long wing of the Democratic party in Louisiana or the Byrd adherents in Virginia. The examples of such factionalism among Democrats in the Southern states are legion, and point to the basic problem confronting a dominant party: it
will tend to be less homogeneous than its small minority counterpart. When the minority is small, homogeneity can be safely assumed — at least in greater portion than that of the majority party. The minority may “self-identify” away from the power centers in the chamber. If they had nothing else in common (though I would argue that they do), they would be legislative outcasts. This is true except where cross-party coalitions are in effect, and in that case, the question arises as to what makes a participant in such a chamber a Republican unless it is her own proclivity for the party label — and all that that label may stand for. The minority party seems uniquely positioned to be the first to order itself as a party in the chamber by initiating a formal organization.

I propose a continuum from simple caucuses to very complex caucuses. In terms of development, I have assumed throughout that as tasks become more complex, structures are changed, invented, mutated or are imposed in response. Changing structure is assumed to be both an innovative and sometimes subverting process\(^\text{37}\). Simple caucuses, conceptually, are those caucuses which have empirically measurable behavioral and structural attributes of parsimony. Behaviorally, they perform few tasks, and these tasks tend to be of an organizational or informational nature. Because of the nature of the tasks, they require no sharply variegated structure, and may actually only meet in the period just following the election for organizational purposes or on as “as needed” basis.

\(^\text{37}\) By this I mean that old structures and conventions may be maintained, but new structures assume greater importance or even take over the duties of the older structural appendages. When the party adds caucus leadership in order to take on the new tasks of caucus agenda setting and administration, the chamber leaders do not disappear, but rather lose their earlier duties in the caucus and re-focus on the chamber itself.
to convey information between members, from members to the leadership, or among leaders. Conversely, complex caucuses, conceptually, are those with a large and diverse workload, and will be structurally designed or evolved to address these tasks.

Operationally, this means that across a number of available elements from the data, caucuses designated “simple” or “complex” will be expected to have a number of attributes in line with the concepts outlined above. The concepts above have been operationalized as these 6 variables, which are split below into a “structural” and “behavioral” dichotomy.

*Structural aspects:*

1) *Formal Leadership*

Most of the studies extant on the subject of state legislative caucuses are cross-sectional (Harmel, 1984; Jewell and Patterson, 1984; Jewell and Whicker, 1995) rather than developmental. Therefore I must develop a sequence of complexity as well as an ordering of complexity along the task and organizational dimensions. The first of these questions deals with an element of organization -- who runs the show? There are a plethora of different positions in the chamber party when it reaches its most complex level or arrangement *in the chamber*, a series of organizational points not addressed here.

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38 The operationalization of these 6 variables is presented here in its simplest form, based on the simplest survey. While “formal leadership” is a dichotomous variable in the first (1981) survey in the data, greater shading is possible in the later surveys given the possibility of more complex answers by the respondents. For comparability reasons, the simplest choices were used for the construction of the index.
directly. The more complex the tasks of the party, the more likely it is to have a number of positions for loyalists to fill in the chamber. If, for example, the chamber positions are restricted to a minority leader and a minority whip, then it seems more probable that in its initiation period, the caucus will be led by a person in an existing position than that a new position is immediately created. It seems likely that in newly formed less complex caucuses, for the minority party, the caucus leader will be the minority leader. As the caucus becomes more complex, and more important to party policy operations, it is likely formal positions in the caucus itself will be created to supplant this dual role (i.e., conference or caucus chairperson etc.). The variable "formal leadership" is dichotomous.

In the majority party, I will assume that a similar sequence will obtain. In this case, the Speaker or chamber leader would assume the role of caucus leader at first, and as the caucus develops, positions will be created within the caucus itself.

There is an alternate possibility, of course, which points out the problem of basing a notion of complexity on structure alone. In chambers where there is perquisite or monetary remuneration for persons holding these positions, both the minority and the majority party may form caucuses appearing to have great structural complexity. In these cases, the caucus itself may do no actual work, hold no meetings (or only perfunctory rendezvous) and conduct no party business -- yet they may list persons as holding a complex and confusing multiplicity of formal positions. Without looking a bit deeper
one might be brought to believe that here lies a complex, working caucus, while in fact what is happening is that cronies in leadership have come together to obtain decent parking privileges near the House chamber. For these reasons, the number and complexity of the caucus positions, despite possible early entry into the process of caucus formation, should only be considered where other evidence of caucus activity is clearly present

2) Formal Rules

Also on the structural, rather than behavioral, dimension is the presence or absence of formal rules. Non-complex caucuses will rarely use formal rules — though they may have them in place. The use of formal rules is usually the reaction to increasing complexity, and may stand as the one singular indication of complexity. The more complex any organization becomes — the more situations it must address — the more tasks it performs and/or the more components it has, the more likely it will be to use formal rules to order its business. Formal rules may also be an indication of the increasing decentralization of power and/or leadership in the caucus. In caucuses in which the power and leadership is concentrated in the hands of the minority leader or House Speaker, the need for a series of formal constraints on activity is small — in these situations, the leadership simply dictates the business of the caucus. This does not mean

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39 In a caucus where activity and complexity are high, one would also expect these positions to remunerated in some way — the important thing is to avoid assuming activity and complexity because they are present.
that the party members simply follow them, of course. "Formal rules", as a variable, is three-fold, with the possibilities "yes", "on some occasions" or "under some circumstances" and "no". Where it has been possible to discover the incidence of use, I have used this as an indicator (i.e., "yes"). Where the preponderance of evidence points to a case where the rules are present, but not in actual use, I have downgraded the value of the case as a result (i.e., "no" [... rules present]). Where rules are present, but it is impossible to say whether the rules are in use or not, I have coded in terms of use (i.e., "yes"), with the reasoning that generally speaking, if rules are in place they are more likely than not to be in use rather than the reverse. I have had to rely on the reported presence of rules as the indicator. In Maryland's lower House, for example, the ruling Democratic party has a wide range of rules and standing orders for the caucus, yet they only meet once -- to elect the leadership. In interviews with the Maryland party leadership, it emerged that only rarely are these rules in use -- there is rarely occasion for it.

3) Binding Votes

Similarly, a simple caucus is unlikely to try to hold its membership by the use of binding votes. Binding votes should be considered in terms of what the leadership can reasonably expect in terms of party loyalty in that "binding votes" which are promises

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40 In other words, this coding was sometimes a sight call. If I have erred, it has been in the direction of an assumption of usage.
promptly abandoned on the floor of the chamber are not binding in fact, no matter what
the caucus rules may say (unless a member may be expelled from the caucus for breach).
The effectiveness and enforceability of binding votes will be examined in the next
chapter dealing with floor voting; for this section, the variable is whether or not the
leadership says there is binding voting and of what kind or to what degree. “Binding
votes” is a 5 point scale ranging from “never” to “always”\footnote{The coding scheme was: \(v^1 = \text{always}, v^2 = \text{often}, v^3 = \text{sometimes}, v^4 = \text{almost never, but possible}, \text{and } v^5 = \text{never};\) where \(v^1 - v^5 = 4 - 0\). Also, see below.}. There are two aspects this
feature: a structural one and a behavioral one. A rule concerning binding votes may be an
option — in many cases — but it may never be used. In the analysis I have tried to make
clear the distinction.

4) Frequency of Meeting

Meeting frequency is slightly problematic in that it is linked to the notion of
primary task, as pointed out above. Generally speaking, caucuses which are less complex
will tend to meet with less regularity than those of greater complexity. The reason is
simple -- the fewer things the caucus is entrusted or empowered to do, the less time is
required to do them. “Frequency of meeting” is divided into 3 options: “organizational
session only (once)”, “as needed (i.e., no regularly scheduled meeting)”, and regularly
scheduled (i.e., “monthly” “weekly” or “daily”).
Behavioral aspects:

5) Primary Task(s)

The "Primary tasks" variable has three degrees of complexity: 1) "organizational"; 2) "informational"; and 3) "policy formulation". These are the tasks of the organization. In ascending order of organizational complexity, the tasks I expect to find in party caucuses may consist of:

A) Organization of the party and/or the chamber. Probably the simplest task a caucus performs is to order the membership either in the party or in the chamber. Many caucuses only meet once, for example, to elect the party's leader or leaders in the chamber. This may take the simple form of voting for the minority or majority leader, or other chamber positions depending on which obtain. For either party, but with greater importance, perhaps, for the majority, this may be the point at which the party agrees on its candidates for chamber positions such as Speaker. This type of activity, as pointed out, may be simple or complex: where the party meets to simply "rubber stamp" selections of leadership, it is practicing a simple activity; if it meets to also decide on member committee assignments, or if it is the caucus, rather than the Speaker or the minority leader, that makes the appointments to conference committees, for example, it is executing more complex tasks. Whichever the caucus may do - where the caucus is the forum for such activities, where they are not carried out on the floor, the caucus is performing tasks of self-structuring among the members.
B) *Communication(s).* Communication(s) between party members may be complex or simple. Simple communications may be simple information: where freshmen may obtain office supplies (more and more chambers invite freshmen members to orientation sessions — frequently this is undertaken by the members’ political party colleagues). Simple communications may not imply that the information is trivial -- members may learn of their committee assignments in caucus. These caucuses are more likely to meet more regularly than the informally structured caucus which elects the chamber leadership.

More complex information transfers are likely in more complex caucuses -- here, the member may learn of the party position on a given bill, or which amendments are being proposed in committee to a given compromise. Party members may also be asked to report to the caucus on particular issues which concern the party as a whole.

Whatever the substance of the communication, most caucuses are “informational” in the sense that they convey communications between party members, even if they do nothing else.

C) *Policy Formulation.* This may be considered the apex of the hierarchy of complexity for the caucus. The task of “policy formulation” involves a great deal more
than simply exchanging information. By "policy formulation" I mean the activities associated with considering legislation, forming sub-groups for policy study, discussing possible amendment strategies, and setting party policy concerning the issues of the day. In chambers with less-developed caucuses, policy formulation takes place primarily in the standing committees, and to a lesser extent on the floor itself. The situation may be that the Speaker simply sets the pace and direction of legislation, and the legislature acts on the Speaker's agenda, though this is becoming very rare. One of the most important signals that the one-party "factional" legislature is in a transformative process (as alluded to by both Francis [1985] and Patterson and Jewell [1977]) is the shift of policy power from the committees to a more decentralized system. In a system where the power to make policy is decentralized, Jewell seems to present the caucus/committee axis as a zero-sum game, and for the purposes of this study, these bodies will be assumed to bound two ends of a continuum, where committee power is greatest at one end, and caucus power greatest at the other, with caucus policy formation being an attribute of the more decentralized system. Speaker rule may be present in either case -- either through the Speaker's total domination of the committee system through the appointment of dependent colleagues to critical committee positions, or through the domination of the majority caucus by the Speaker. In the latter case, the caucus may appear to be a policy making body, but in fact it is merely a center through which the Speaker's wishes are communicated: the caucus, in effect, is "informational only".

42 In some chambers, the legislative prerogative lies in the Governor's office. This was true until fairly recently in Kentucky, and was the rule in Louisiana during the governorship of Huey and later Earl Long.
6) Are these meetings open or closed? The more business of a critical nature the caucus does, the more likely members are to meet, at least some of the time, out of the prying gaze of their opposite numbers in the chamber. Strategy meetings on policy would have little surprise factor if they were regularly attended by members or aides of members of the other party. All three surveys asked whether or not caucuses were “open or closed”; two of them allowed a third possibility, one allowed the possibility “usually open, with exceptions”, and one (the last) allowed both “usually open” and “usually closed”. This variable ranges from 0 (open) - 1 (closed), with .5 as “sometimes open” or “sometimes closed” or some variant thereof. This particular variable has not been given a high value, as open caucus rules may, in some cases, be required by the chamber and therefore out of the purview of the political party involved.

**Index Design**

Each of the variables delineated above are assigned values which are scored in association to their assumed position in the sequence ranging from “simple” to “complex”. The “scores” of the five major variables examined are not simply added given the presence of the feature. Many indexes use a simple form which allows the researcher to add scores. Where \( x^1 = 1, x^2 = 1,2, \) or 3; \( x^3 = 2, \) etc., the score for chamber A might be based on the presence of \( x^1 \) and \( x^3 \) with the result of a score of “3”. In this
case, such an index would not only be misleadingly simple, but inaccurate, as the major assumption is that these features are interactive and relational.

The index was created on the basis of the following protocols:

*Formal leadership* ("yes" and "no"). I have hypothesized that more complex caucuses will be led by leadership created by and for the caucus. Where formal leadership is present, add 1 to the final score.

*Formal Rules* ("yes", "on some occasions" and "no"). In the absence of caucus leadership, while rules are in use, score 1. Where formal leadership is present, and rules are in use, score 2. Where there is evidence that the rules are sometimes in use and sometimes not in use, score .5. Where the rules are not in use, score is 0.

*Binding Votes*: (5-point scale ranging from "never" to "always"). Ranged from least to most complex, scored “raw” as 0 to 4;

*Frequency of meeting* and *primary purpose* represent the junction of the structural and behavioral (in this case, “task”) environments, respectively. For this reason, I have made their relationship explicitly relational in terms of the index construction. The following table describes this relationship numerically:

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4) After all the critical thinking about this measure, in actual use it only yielded values of 2 and 0. In all cases, I was able to determine the use or non-use of rules, their presence and the relationship with formal leadership. This does not mean this will always be the case in future research, and it is important to establish the treatment of cases of deviation, even if they are empty cells in a particular instance such as this.
Table 4:1: Index Configuration for Confluence of Caucus Meeting Frequency and Caucus Primary Task

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meeting Frequency</th>
<th>Meets Once</th>
<th>Meets &quot;as needed&quot; or &quot;at call&quot;*</th>
<th>Meets &quot;Weekly&quot; or &quot;Daily&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary Task</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organizational</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Informational</strong></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Policy Formulation</strong></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* "At call" or "as needed" assumes that the caucus meets fairly regularly, if infrequently, through the session. Some caucuses may be listed in the data as "at call of leadership", but in fact meet only once, at the beginning of the session. In these cases, they are scored as meeting once.

In the second survey, the authors did not ask the question concerning frequency of meeting, but were more detailed in their analysis of the primary tasks of the caucus. In this survey, the authors allowed for three basic responses, which could be combined in the following ways, the scoring for each of which is given in parentheses:

1) Organizational purposes (1)

2) Informational (2)

3) Organizational, informational (3)

4) Policy formulation (4)

5) Organizational, policy formulation (5)

6) informational, policy formulation (6)

7) Organizational, informational, policy formulation (7)
Open or closed caucus: Open = 0, Closed = 1; “usually open, with exceptions” and usually closed, with exceptions”, in those surveys which had these options, were scored as 0.5 each (see above).

The range of the index is 0 (no caucus) to 19 (all variables at most complex rating). In only one survey were the party’s leaders questioned separately, allowing a different reading for each party. Both parties must be assumed, in the first 2 surveys, to have the same score or value; in the 1995 survey, a greater degree of precision is possible, but will be included in the section on the contemporary caucuses. For the purposes of this section, the minority and majority caucuses will be scored the same way, and it is perhaps more accurate to speak of “chamber” variation rather than “caucus” variation, though the relative values of the caucuses across chamber vary widely.

Party Chamber Competition (“Distance”)

To measure the competition in the electorate, I have used the standard measures established by Jewell and utilized in the first and second chapters of this work. In these, the total races in a given year are aggregated from district-level observations to single-percentage observations per chamber per year of the election cycle.

In addition to the measures explained above, I have established a central measure of chamber competition which measures the distance between the majority and minority
party in terms of the percentage of representatives they have in the chamber at any one
time. “Distance” is a simple measure of the majority - minority in the chamber, and is the
mean chamber competition 1968-1981 (for the examination of the first survey) and of the
same measure 1968-1988 (for the examination of the second survey). The purpose here is
to provide a simple graphic display of the relationship between competition in the
chamber and caucus complexity to the point of the survey.

Chapter Hypotheses and Expectations

Here, it is evident that the two major dimensions (task and structure) are
interdependent. The sequence, which may not be immediately obvious from the
illustration is that as the number and complexity of tasks the party undertakes increases
(“task environment”), the caucus structure (“structural environment”) to accommodate
these tasks becomes more complex.

While no-one could expect all of the caucuses to align themselves neatly in this
manner, according to chamber strength, it may be useful to return for a moment to two
theoretical “cut-points” examined elsewhere.

The examination of these thresholds in chapter 3 suggests that in the case of
committee assignments, a more reasonable approach would be to consider these elements
in a continuous manner, rather than as strict “cut-points”, allowing variation between
chambers to be accommodated. For some chambers, 33% simply does not reflect the reality of the rules (as it did not in committees where the chairperson dictated or suggested new rules each session); 20% is relatively arbitrary, as any “cut-point” which tries to approximate “few” would be. Similarly, while 40% is a good theoretical marker for elections competition (see chapter 1), it may be more arbitrary for chamber party competition. For these reasons, I will consider the party caucus development variables as continuous.

Alternately, one might consider time as the operative explanatory variable. Such an assumption would be theoretically supported by the notion that as state legislatures (generally) have been saddled with more responsibility, the need for an internal legislative organization has grown, and that as this need has developed, the party organization has also evolved. Also as time has gone forward, the diffusion of the idea of party organization building has had an independent effect best represented by time itself: in response to this, parties might build such organizations without respect to their strength in the chamber\textsuperscript{44}.

In sum, then, the hypotheses which form the center of my own argument are:

\textsuperscript{44} Note that the divisions in fig. 4:1 are not tied to particular “moments” in the chamber, related to either time or competition variables, but rather constructed to suggest sequence in either hypothesis.
1) As the strength of the minority party grows in the chamber as a result of election outcomes, its propensity for building a party organization will also grow. In chambers where there is no caucus, a caucus will be formed. In chambers where a caucus has been formed, it will be transformed, as the strength of the minority party increases, into a more complex caucus. Where there is greater competition in the electoral arena, this will have a measurable independent effect.

2) As the strength of the minority party grows in the chamber as the result of election outcomes, and minority caucuses are formed, the majority party will respond by organizing its own caucus (if one is not already in place), and by increasing the role of the caucus along both structural lines (by increasing complexity) and in behavioral terms (especially concerning tasks) by allowing the caucus more role in policy-making.

The alternative explanations are the following:

1) That time itself, either as a result of the increasing workload across state legislatures or as a result of diffusion, will have an effect independent from that of increasing minority party strength in the chamber.

and, of course:
2) That there is no relation between caucus formation and any of these variables — that it is a random occurrence associated with changes situational to the chamber itself, and not empirically predictable.

**Data**

The number of empirical studies following on the heels of Harmel's (1984) lonely effort are few, and chiefly marked by the studies conducted under the auspices of the National Council of State Legislatures. The legislatures themselves apparently believe caucuses to be important, even if researchers apparently in our own field do not. These studies have been largely descriptive endeavors, employing surveys of selected legislators and secretaries (NCSL 1981-82, 1988-89).

This Chapter uses both of these sources, and I have augmented them by conducting a survey which not only uses the questions base asked in those surveys, but asks specific question tailored to address the unfolding process described above. This survey was conducted in the summer of 1995, and consisted of 18 multi-part questions concerning both the role of committees and the role of caucuses in 15 lower house chambers. These surveys were targeted to the legislative party leadership of the chamber, in both the minority and majority parties. On average, at least 2 of these leaders responded for each of the parties, though in some cases only one leader did so. In several cases, follow-up interviews were conducted over the telephone to reach a clearer
understanding of certain responses, or to gain greater detail in answers which had
responses that were not immediately clear to the researcher.

The attempt here was three-fold: to build on Harmel's basic theoretical orientation
by asking questions which conformed to the notion of the initiation, growth and
transformation of the importance of caucuses in formerly one-party legislatures; building
on the data provided by the NCSL by conducting a careful and current leadership survey,
and finally and most importantly to explore the linkage between the rise of minority
parties in electoral (and chamber) competitiveness and the requisite change in caucus
behavior for both the minority and majority parties. This effort was, I believe, not wholly
successful, in that the earlier surveys could not be repeated to the same audiences, but
within the confines of operating in fixed time, the survey served the needs of this study.

The Transforming Legislatures, 1981 and 1988

Table 4:2 is a look back on the historical data derived from the two earlier
surveys, and table 4:3 is a cross-tabulation of the results of the 1995-96 survey, put into
the briefest form possible. Even in this form, it is possible to see that there is a great deal
of variation across the chambers and across time.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chamber</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Formal Rules</th>
<th>Formal Leadership</th>
<th>Caucus Open or Closed?</th>
<th>Binding Votes Taken?</th>
<th>Frequency of Meetings During Session</th>
<th>Primary Function(s) of Caucus</th>
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<td>Leadership Election</td>
<td>Occasionally</td>
<td>Election of Leaders</td>
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<td>Once</td>
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<td>At Call</td>
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<td>Leadership Elections</td>
<td>Once</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Open - May Close for</td>
<td>Leadership Elections</td>
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<td>At Call</td>
<td>Policy</td>
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<td>At Call</td>
<td>Policy</td>
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<td>Nevada</td>
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<td>No</td>
<td>Party Leaders</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Policy</td>
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<td>No</td>
<td>At Call</td>
<td>Informational</td>
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<td>No</td>
<td>Caucus Chair</td>
<td>Open</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td>Informational</td>
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<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>1981</td>
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<td>No</td>
<td>At Call</td>
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<td>Leadership Election</td>
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Table 4.3 Survey Results:  
Party Caucus Features, 1995-96

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chamber</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Formal Leadership</th>
<th>Caucus Open or Closed?</th>
<th>Binding Votes Taken?</th>
<th>Frequency of Meetings During Session</th>
<th>Primary Function(s) of Caucus</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
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<td>Mostly Closed</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>Policy, Organizational, Informational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>Caucus Chair</td>
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<td>No</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>Informational</td>
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<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>Party Leader</td>
<td>Open</td>
<td>Leadership Selection</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>Informational</td>
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<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
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<td>Open</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
<td>Informational</td>
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<td>Georgia</td>
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<td>Open</td>
<td>Possible on any issue.</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>Democratic</td>
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<td>No</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
<td>Policy, Informational</td>
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<td>Weekly</td>
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<td>No</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
<td>Informational, some Policy*</td>
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<td>No</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>Organizational</td>
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<td>Weekly</td>
<td>Organizational, Informational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
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<td>Caucus Chair</td>
<td>Mostly Closed</td>
<td>Budget and Tax Bills</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>Policy, Informational</td>
</tr>
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<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>Party Leader</td>
<td>Mostly Closed</td>
<td>Procedural Matters</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>Policy, Informational</td>
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<td>Nevada</td>
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<td>On Request of Member</td>
<td>Daily</td>
<td>Informational</td>
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<td>Closed</td>
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<td>Weekly</td>
<td>Policy, Informational, Organizational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oklahoma</td>
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<td>Caucus Chair</td>
<td>Mostly Closed</td>
<td>Possible on Any Issue</td>
<td>Infrequently</td>
<td>Informational, Strategy</td>
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<td>Oklahoma</td>
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<td>Caucus Chair</td>
<td>Closed</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>Policy and Informational</td>
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<td>Party Leader</td>
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<td>Weekly</td>
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<td>Policy</td>
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<td>Budget and Tax Bills</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
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<td>Mostly Closed</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>Informational</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Same-party respondents differ fairly widely.*
When the first survey was administered in 1981, three chambers (Texas, Mississippi and Alabama) had no formal party caucuses at all. In part, the norms of behavior in the Texas House reviewed in Chapter 2 outline an environment in which party caucuses might be meaningless, but the cases of Mississippi and Alabama are open to question. Certainly neither chamber had a significant minority presence in 1981, and both chambers had a history of one-party factionalism. It seems likely that this explains the lack of caucuses, but the empirical work done at the time (e.g., the NCSL survey) did not probe these questions.

By 1988, Alabama reported that both the minority and majority party had not only formed caucuses, but that they engaged in policy questions and were administered by party officials elected separate from the chamber officers. The Texas party caucuses did not formally come into being until the early 1990s; one minority leader pointed out what he considered the determining factor for the Republicans: “we had a string of years of Republican Governorship -- it’s really that simple. We had to be able to support the Governor’s office. We also began to get involved in campaigning around 1990 -- we had gained some strength in the House... this meant that we had to be able to coordinate efforts on that”. While I will consider the role of campaigning only briefly, it is worth noting here that the Texas Republican caucus is not the only one which considers campaigning a crucial portion of its mission.
Mississippi, to this date, still has neither a formal Republican nor Democratic Caucus, and of is therefore reported as “without caucuses” in both these surveys. Later (1995) exploration of the reasons behind this turned up answers which were odd, if not disingenuous, in light of the strict party regulation of committee seating reviewed in that chamber in Chapter 3. One Democratic leader simply said: “[w]e have no need of party caucuses in Mississippi, because party means very little here ... we really do agree about most things, and the party stamp doesn’t mean much”. A Republican leader was more succinct: “we don’t need one because the party members don’t want one”. Whatever the case, the minority party in Mississippi has not reached any sort of hypothesized “critical mass”. If the Texas case suggests answers, it may be important that the last two governors of Mississippi have been Republican.

A number of changes have taken place between 1981 and 1988 within the selected transitional chamber party caucuses (see Table 4:2). While most caucuses remained the same across the time periods vis-à-vis formal rules, both Maryland’s and Missouri’s parties adopted formal rules where there had been none before. Maryland and North Carolina both opted to elect specific caucus leaders, changing from their former practice of allowing the chamber leaders to lead the caucuses. Missouri’s caucuses went from an open policy to one of privacy, and in both North Carolina and Virginia the 1988 caucuses allowed that they kept the option to close, where both had had open policies in 1981.
Binding votes remained singularly unpopular (they were dropped in Florida and Kentucky between 1981 and 1988), except for leadership elections, but even here, Missouri’s caucuses, which had formerly had no binding votes, reported that they were in use for “various issues” by 1988.

By far the greatest changes during this period were in the reported “mission” or their primary tasks of the caucuses. While New Mexico, Nevada and Kentucky consistently reported “policy” tasks (i.e., the discussion of bills, leadership positions, strategy and the like) as central to their raison d’être in both years in which the survey was taken, using the caucus for these types of discussions was new in several chambers. North Carolina’s caucuses, formerly only concerned with leadership elections, report their primary tasks as policy-oriented in 1988; the same may be said of the Oklahoma caucuses. The caucuses in Virginia’s House of Delegates changed from those which simply exchange information with members to policy groups as well. Alabama, where no caucuses were reported in 1981, reports caucuses which are closed, are run by specific party officers, and are embroiled in policy questions by 1988.

The State of the Caucuses, 1995-96: Results from the 1995-96 Survey
Descriptively, the caucuses surveyed in 1995-96 report important changes since the last NCSL survey was taken in 1988. How, then, does the new survey inform the theoretical expectations outlined above?

Structure and Rules:

[Our] Caucus has changed from informal, occasional meetings to [a] very formal and structured operation”. An Alabama Republican Party Leader, 1996.

The chambers central to this study are about equally split between those who employ leaders specifically designated for the caucus and those with the party leader (either majority leader or minority leader) as caucus chair. Only one chamber (New Mexico) differs by party in this regard, indicating that this feature is conventional by chamber. Caucuses (with the exception of the New Mexico Republicans) with the party leader noted as also leading the caucus do not report involvement in policy issues, suggesting that the notion of appointment of separate caucus leaders is a good indication of the complexity of the caucus on other dimensions. In caucuses without a separate caucus chair, binding votes are rarely taken -- they only are in the New Mexico Republican Caucus (where binding votes are only taken on “procedural matters”) and in the Nevada Democratic caucus (where they are only taken on request of a member).

There is great variance among these chambers as to the “openness” of meetings. Several states differ in practice between parties in the same chamber. Where the
Alabama Democratic Caucus is reported “mostly open”, that of the opposition Republicans is “mostly closed”. The opposite is true in Kentucky and Missouri, where the majority Democrats meet, for the most part, in closed session, while the Republican meetings are “mostly open”. Caucuses are “closed” or “mostly closed” in North Carolina, New Mexico, Nevada, Oklahoma, Texas and Virginia; they are “open” or “mostly open” in Tennessee, South Carolina, Maryland, Georgia and Florida.

There are some indications along the other dimensions which suggest why open caucuses may be present in some chambers (or among some parties) while others choose to conduct their business in private. Open caucuses may arise from at least two identifiable causes: tradition or practical convention, and public pressure. One leader of the majority Democrats in the Maryland House of Delegates noted that “we have always met in the chamber itself, before God and the people. There is no real reason to keep people out”. The notion that members and leaders have no business which needs to be carried out in private may be buttressed by the nature of the business of the Maryland Democratic Caucus: it is, for the most part, a caucus which concludes its business after electing the leadership of the chamber. This Caucus takes no binding votes, and in its infrequent meetings during the session, meets only for informational purposes.45

45 Oddly, though, the MD Democratic caucus does have an extensive and elaborate set of formal rules. In the course of this study, I had occasion to speak to several of the leaders of the Maryland Democrats, and they also were at something of a loss to explain why they had been adopted, except to suggest that it perhaps prevented public fits of temper in the leadership election process. I had them faxed to my office later, and discovered them to be one of the more extensive (and weighty) sets of rules to emerge!
Alabama’s split between open and closed caucuses is a good case in point of this type of difference: on one hand, the Republicans hold a closed caucus; they also report that “policy” is the primary task of the caucus. One Republican leader in Alabama was more succinct: “we gripe... we air our [dirty] laundry, we gripe about internal [issues] with [our] leadership. [We have] serious policy discussions”. The Democrats, on the other hand, hold an open caucus, but their discussions are limited to an exchange of information. Missouri’s Caucuses are also split by party in terms of their accessibility by the public and the news media. Here, the Democratic Caucus is closed. Critical policy issues are often decided in the Caucus, and there is also the notion of internal give and take between members and the leadership: “Caucuses are much more in demand by members” wrote one Democratic leader from Missouri, “[t]hey want to be informed as to what the leadership is planning and what they are doing on behalf of members”. The Missouri Republican Caucus is mostly open, but the business they conduct is qualitatively different and the organization is also different. As one Missouri Republican leader noted, “[The Caucus] used to be heavily involved in dissemination of information on Bills in meetings... Policy and legislative research and discussion is handled on or by minority staff”. Also, while this caucus does not meet in closed session, “[we] also have a group of the Caucus which meets voluntarily to discuss legislation for any interested caucus member” (emphasis is the respondent’s). This last statement suggests that while the formal Caucus meetings may take up informational material only, there is an outlet
for members close to the policy process to meet privately to discuss policy options or seek clarification of leadership positions.

Several leaders remarked on the changes which have taken place in this regard, and tied the framework in which their caucuses met to public pressure for open meetings. One of Maryland’s Democrats reported that the state’s sunshine law “may or may not apply, but it probably should”, and several of the leaders from “open caucus” chambers commented on their state’s open meeting law in their responses, but on follow-up could not recall whether or not the caucuses were liable under that law.

Binding votes seemed to be an issue of which there had been much discussion in each of the chambers, and the respondents were either very positive or very negative on the subject of employing them. In those chambers which employ binding votes on electing the leadership, the sense is that by the time such a vote is actually taken, the deal is usually done beforehand. Part of the explanation for not taking binding votes on leadership elections may lie in the nature of the leadership. Tenure in the Speakership in several chambers is often long and may go unchallenged unless the Speaker retires or loses an election. Most prominent in this regard are Georgia’s Thomas Murphy and Virginia’s Tom Moss. Where this is so, the “run” for leadership is pro forma, though the possibility of a coup attempt is always there. In Texas, candidates for the Speakership gather support in the form of written promissory notes from members, and while there is
no “legal” contract to deliver this vote, past practice and experience point to the awful consequences of reneging if your final candidate does not prevail.

For the majority party, there may be less of a problem in tying members to this vote than among minority members, who are often pressed to join the majority or a faction thereof. Coup attempts against the Speaker (some successful) in several of these chambers are not unknown, and they are often aided by the participation of minority members in chalking up the necessary numbers. On the other hand, when the minority party has reached the point of vying for power in the chamber, or has expectations that it may soon be the majority party, there may be overwhelming pressure from their leadership to back a candidate of their own. The recent experience of the Florida leadership in what had become a 50-50 chamber bears this out. The Republican leadership (at that point not really a “minority”) had to be absolutely sure of every vote taken in caucus on issues of leadership during negotiations with their counterparts in the Democratic caucus -- the experience of the California Republicans with Speaker Willie Brown in the same year in a similar situation points this problem up rather well.

The Oklahoma Democrats and the Georgia Republicans both report that binding votes may be used on “any issue”. But the two cases are actually quite different. In Oklahoma, the Democratic leaders made clear that while such a vote was possible on any issue, the fact was that it was largely reduced to leadership selection. The Georgia
Republicans were emphatic that the binding vote is used and would be used to hold members to the party line.

Where budget and tax bills are subject to such votes, the situation seems to be one of "binding" members to compromises worked out by the leadership -- preventing, where possible, defections for personal advantage at the last minute. In the highly "complex" New Mexico Democratic caucus, this is based on an odd form of consensus: though the caucus has no formal rules, the Caucus Chair allows full discussion on any issue by "listing" members so that those on the party list who have indicated they have an interest in a given issue may speak first — but each member, regardless of their interest, is listed to speak. In this fashion, no member may make the claim that they have not been given an opportunity to speak and be heard. Voting on "procedural matters" seems to be just that, and is usually tied to a strategy in the chamber of some sort.

Some of the problems of enforcing binding votes (and perhaps the reason why they are absent in this Caucus) are explained by a Texas Republican leader: "We can't really enforce [votes]. Its personal stuff, mostly -- one member may take exception to another's' dogging their bill or something. You have to understand that the lack of a formal party organization in the House itself makes the job of trying to enforce party lines almost impossible -- there's nothing to withdraw -- all [committee positions, resources] are in the hands of the Speaker; we can't really enforce anything. I suppose they could
hurt someone in the district, but why would they? That’s mostly personal stuff, actually, not party stuff”. This problem is not exclusive to Texas; one New Mexico Republican stated it more simply “We’re still in the minority -- until that changes, we don’t make any decisions. The Speaker runs the show in N[ew] M[exico]”.

This is not to say that leaders do not try to enforce the “party line” on recalcitrant members -- and it is at least suggested that such efforts have grown as a result of increasing minority party power; one Missouri Republican leader pointed out that “as we have gained numbers, we have additional power tools (sic) to keep members in line. Prior to [the current session] we have had a few members who always cut personal deals with the majority -- [these changes] have come with a balance of power”.

Most of the caucuses cited here meet frequently, a good bit more often, in almost all cases, than they did in 1988. Most meet weekly, during the session, though there are still some which meet only to elect leaders (Alabama Democrats) or infrequently (Oklahoma Democrats). The New Mexico Democratic Caucus meets weekly, and their reason is simple: “our session is so short”. reported one Democrat, “that we just have too many things to accomplish. If we’re not all reading the same book, it falls apart”. New Mexico’s situation is not unique in this regard, Texas and Virginia are on a biennial
session schedule, as is Nevada\(^{46}\), where the Democratic caucus meets *daily* throughout the session.

At least one major factor in the increase in the frequency of meeting in these caucuses is the increasing competition in the chamber. One Virginia Democrat described frequent meetings as a "political necessity".

*Changing Tasks and Behavior*

These changes in rules and structure have been intimately tied to changes in the "mission" or tasks in which the caucuses are involved. In 1981, 5 of the 12 active caucuses listed their primary purpose as the "election of leaders", 3 as "informational" purposes; only 4 listed "policy" or "policymaking" as the task most important. Election of the leadership, as pointed out above, is generally an important, but very limited function. These caucuses usually met once, and the member's contact with the Party, rather than party members, was thereafter limited to informal settings. With the addition of Alabama in 1988, 4 of 13 active caucuses were still listed this way; but perhaps more importantly, fully 7 reported "policy" their critical task, with 1 listed as "information, but some policy" and only 1 listed "informational" purposes as its most important task (South Carolina).

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\(^{46}\) It should be noted in passing that only the Governor may call the House back into session in these states.
In the 1995-6 survey, which is a much more precise measurement of the individual caucuses, of the 28 chambers with active caucuses, only 1 caucus (the North Carolina Democrats) reported that its first task was “organizational”; 10 reported informational purposes (exclusively) while 17 leadership groups reported that their caucuses were involved in “policy”, “strategy”, or some mix of all three including either policy or strategy. Since the precise purpose of the caucus was more definitively pinned down in the later survey it is difficult to gauge the precise changes over time, but it is arguable that over time, the array of caucuses has become more complex in the overarching sense as well as the individual sense.

Is there a party component to these divisions across the variables? Not really. In the aggregate, the Republicans -- who have been in the minority for the lion’s share of the time frame -- account for 8 of the “policy” oriented caucuses and 5 of the “informational” caucuses. While it is unlikely to be a good measure, it is also at least interesting that in the aggregate the Republican caucuses do not seem to develop any more quickly than their Democratic counterparts47. While it is more likely to find same-type caucuses in the same chamber, this is not always the case: the Alabama Republicans are policy-oriented, while their Democratic counterparts are not, and the same is true in Georgia and Nevada; the split is in the other direction in Tennessee.

47 To get a good measure of this, one would have had to have interviewed caucus members on a year-by-year or session by session basis. The available data does not show them developing earlier, but it is impossible to say how and when caucuses developed in the intervening years.
How do the leaders feel about their caucus tasks as currently constituted? In caucuses which reported their primary tasks as "informational", there was, as one might suspect, a variety of answers. An "exchange of information", as one Alabama leader reported straightforwardly. "We meet in crisis situations" said one Georgia Democratic leader, "the organizational session is often heated ... not so much deciding who is to be Speaker, but what [the leadership] will do for the members". This sentiment was echoed by the Missouri Democrats: "Caucuses are much more in demand by members [than by leaders]. They [the members] want to know what the leaders are planning ... most importantly, what they are doing on behalf of members". A Kentucky Republican leader wrote simply that members needed to be informed particularly about "particular legislative initiatives", and a Republican leader in Virginia differentiated "organization" from types of "information" in saying that "organization is important, but policy is crucial to its operations".

In the policy-oriented caucuses, there is yet more variance. In an extended discussion with a Republican leader in Nevada, this leader outlined a hectic schedule of caucus business: "You'd be surprised how much work actually gets done in the caucus. We are a clearing house for information, of course, and we elect the leadership, but that's

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48 The information was about policy in the Virginia Republican Caucus -- those leaders who responded "policy" in their evaluation without elaboration were asked in follow-up, where possible, whether they meant that policy was actually made in caucus, or whether members simply received information about various policy initiatives which were coming before the House.
just the start of things ... we discuss where we stand on a lot of things, there are bills coming up and so forth, and we discuss them at length. Policy, information, they're most important". "Strategy for and of the session", as one New Mexico leader put it, characterizes the heart of the comments of various "policy-oriented" caucus party leaders. There is a sense that in many of these chambers, much of the strategy commonly associated with floor activities often takes place in the caucus, and that the caucus is the place where reports from staff on various issues are evaluated and discussed.

The following exchange between the author and a GOP leader in Nevada should provide a sense of many of the interviews, generally, and is illustrative of the type of conversation which was repeated in several chambers (and of both parties) which are finding new uses for their caucuses:

Q (RBA): *What is the Caucus doing now?*

*Nevada GOP Leader*: "... we're looking to the next election, now, and that's taking up most of our time."...

Q: (RBA): *In what way? What role does the caucus play in the election?*

*Nevada GOP Leader*: "A very important role, as you might guess. We have to recruit people to run for the seats we think are vulnerable. Last time, we lost all but 7 Republicans — people retired, or moved up or whatever. We were able to get back up to

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49 Date of interview was February, 1996; the Republican primary in Nevada was to be held on March 26, 1996.
21 because we aggressively went out and got people to run for office — good people. Of course there’s a huge organization — for Nevada — at work. We have people working South and North... Nevada’s... growing at a rate of 10% a year — which is really only 4 people in the aggregate (laughs) but seriously, we have more people to cover. We hire, or people volunteer to work in the campaign North and South — I [the caucus leader] may not know what each person is doing from one day to the next, but I usually hear. We spend a lot of time raising money, of course, and educating candidates. We do polls, too, usually toward the end of the cycle. We endorse during the primary, but of course you hope there won’t be opposition to your candidate... we try to put our money where it will do the most good. There’s no point in giving money to a campaign or a guy you know can’t win, and there’s no point in giving money to someone you know will win; we try to give money in those races that are close -- where we think our guy can win, where it will make a difference. We go out to the districts, of course; we [the caucus members] spend a lot of time in the field”.

While the involvement of party leaders with elections is not the point of this study, it is necessary to note that two Republican Leaders went into great detail on such involvement, and several mentioned that they believed it was critical to the business of their (policy oriented) caucus. Minority leaders often intimated that while they may not have control of the chamber now, that day may not be far off: A New Mexico Republican leader, when asked about the primary role of the caucus, said: “policy and strategy for the
session, current topics, [and] goals and plans to become the majority party...”. There is also a sense that the members would like to do a little education “on the issues” before a member comes to the chamber. A Texas GOP party leader responded to questions about involvement with elections: “We have instituted a program of candidate education — a program which helps attune candidates to certain outlooks early in their campaigns. This can be very helpful to candidates running for the first time -- you’d be surprised how ignorant they are, really, and how open they are as well. Members will help out and get them up to speed and mass before the campaign gets going; this helps make sure they don’t make terrible mistakes early”. In essence, then, the more complex, policy-oriented caucuses tend to do a variety of things, and there is variation among them -- clearly, these caucuses differ greatly from the more simple type.

How have these caucuses changed over time? While it is impossible to reach back in time and ask these questions, each respondent was queried as to changes which had occurred in the way the caucus operated during their tenure in the body. In these, some interesting answers begin to emerge.

A Republican leader in Alabama -- one of the three chambers which had no caucus at all in the early period -- succinctly stated that the caucus has “changed” “from nothing to major significance”, and indicated that this importance was chiefly in the
Republican caucus, which the leaders rated as “extremely important” to the policy process.

If the caucuses’ first purpose (if not “primary purpose” in the sense that it is used here) is to keep members in the information loop, then changes associated with this task have intensified its importance in the eyes of the leadership. One New Mexico Democratic leader struck a note which resonates: “Since I have been Caucus Chair, far more discussion, factual analysis, and open-ended policy formulation has been a way to appraise leadership of member[’s] views and [for them] to have reports from leadership”. This comment was repeated, in substance, by an Oklahoma Democratic leader, who noted that there was, simply, “more awareness of major issues” among caucus members in the present period, than had been the case in the past.

There is a constant thread running through many of the comments gathered in the course of this study, concerning increasing member involvement with leadership, using the caucuses as a major forum. A Missouri Democratic leader states simply that the Caucus is “less leader oriented and more individual input [has been possible]”. A Democrat in Virginia cites “more involvement of all members” as the greatest change over their term in the chamber.

*The Rise of the Minority Party*
Even where the rise of the minority party has been (by comparison with other chambers) relatively small, the impact is undeniable. Directly associating the growth of the minority party with the rising importance of the caucus, one Republican leader from Maryland’s House of Delegates pointed out that the caucus had “become much larger, and therefore has [the] potential to become more effective -- [the Maryland Republican Caucus] has 26 freshmen, and 15 incumbents for [a] total of 41 out of 141”. Further, this leader reported that the minority party had come out from under what had been complete dominance of the majority in spirit, if not in numbers, and paints perhaps, the best picture of a chamber minority party which is confident and on the upward slope: “[the] Caucus is no longer dominated by the Speaker”, he wrote, “[the] minority leader and whip no longer attend the Speaker’s leadership meetings. At one time”, they explain, “[the] Caucus was just another group dominated by the Speaker”. This type of change is clearly reflected by the majority opposition, and fully supporting, in an anecdotal way, what has been demonstrated empirically by the measures above: “the increase in the number of minority membership”, wrote a Missouri Democratic leader, “and the [resulting] narrowing of the spread has greatly influenced the [number -- frequency] and intensity of the required [majority] caucuses”.

Analysis:

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50 “No.”, sic.
In order to provide a background for the more complex examination of the 13 chambers considered in this analysis, I have arrayed 47 lower house chambers for initial consideration.

Tables 4:4 and 4:5 sort all chambers according to the “distance” between the majority and minority parties in the chamber. Here, we begin to see a relationship between the strength of the minority party and the complexity of the caucus. Tables 4:4 and 4:5 (seen above) reported index scoring across all lower chambers in 47 lower House chambers across the period of the 1981 and 1988 surveys respectively. The chambers in these tables are ranked according to the distance between the majority and minority parties from least distance to greatest distance. It would do well to remember that the index has no agenda toward measuring the effectiveness of the caucuses, nor does it measure chamber variables, such as institutionalization.

The scoring and ordering in the tables reveal that both formal rules and formal leadership are scattered throughout the array, suggesting that while they may hold importance in the unfolding process in some chambers, they are not necessary conditions for complex caucuses: while California has both formal rules (scoring 9 on the scale) Utah (11 on the scale) does not; while Colorado (scoring 11 on the aggregate index) has a formal leadership, for example, Ohio (scoring 10) does not — yet all four chambers are in the higher range of caucus complexity. The same cannot be said of the remaining
Table 4.4: Caucus Complexity Measures Sorted on Caucus Index Score, Selected Lower House Chambers* 1981

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Table 4:4: Caucus Complexity Measures Sorted on Caucus Index Score, Selected Lower House Chambers* 1981; Continued

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*LA, NE and VT are excluded from this analysis (see Chapter text).
### Table 4:5: Caucus Complexity Measures Sorted on “Distance” Variable, 47 Lower House Chambers* 1988

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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IN</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WI</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KN</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NY</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OH</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MO</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AK</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CN</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AZ</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NH</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4:5 : Caucus Complexity Measures Sorted on “Distance” Variable, 47 Lower House Chambers* 1988; Continued

| NJ | 0  | 1  | 0  | 4  | 1  | 6  | 0.26 |
| ND | 0  | 1  | 0  | 4  | 0  | 5  | 0.28 |
| FL | 1  | 0  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 2  | 0.29 |
| WY | 0  | 0  | 0  | 7  | 1  | 8  | 0.30 |
| NM | 0  | 1  | 2  | 7  | 1  | 11 | 0.31 |
| UT | 0  | 0  | 2  | 7  | 0.5| 9.5| 0.31 |
| NV | 0  | 0  | 0  | 7  | 1  | 8  | 0.32 |
| SD | 0  | 0  | 0  | 4  | 0.5| 4.5| 0.37 |
| ID | 0  | 1  | 0  | 7  | 1  | 9  | 0.40 |
| VA | 0  | 1  | 2  | 7  | 0.5| 10.5| 0.44 |
| WV | 1  | 1  | 0  | 4  | 1  | 7  | 0.44 |
| MN | 0  | 0  | 0  | 4  | 0.5| 4.5| 0.45 |
| KY | 0  | 1  | 0  | 7  | 1  | 9  | 0.45 |
| OK | 1  | 1  | 2  | 7  | 1  | 12 | 0.46 |
| TX | 0  | 1  | 0  | 2  | 0.5| 3.5| 0.47 |
| HI | 0  | 0  | 0  | 3  | 0.5| 3.5| 0.53 |
| MA | 1  | 1  | 2  | 7  | 0.5| 4.5| 0.58 |
| NC | 0  | 1  | 2  | 7  | 0.5| 10.5| 0.59 |
| RI | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0.61 |
| GA | 0  | 1  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 2  | 0.64 |
| SC | 0  | 0  | 0  | 2  | 0  | 2  | 0.69 |
| MD | 1  | 1  | 2  | 3  | 0  | 7  | 0.74 |
| AL | 0  | 0  | 0  | 4  | 1  | 5  | 0.85 |
| AR | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0.89 |
| MS | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0.91 |

*LA, NE and VT are excluded from this analysis (see Chapter text).
variables. Binding votes are clearly associated with more complex caucuses, as are closed sessions.

The index is, of course, heavily “weighted” toward the primary task variables, and it should come as no surprise that this variable also, for the most part, determines the order of the array. The first 12 chambers (in order of descent from more complex to less complex) all scored at least 8 on this variable. The lowest 15 never score higher than 3.

In examining these tables, we can see that a good deal of change has taken place between the two time periods, as well, as the following descriptive statistics reveal:

The results reported in Table 4:6 display the descriptive statistics for the index for each year in the initial surveys. Across the 47 chambers, it is clear that in the aggregate, the caucuses have become more complex. The mean, mode and median all rise by a factor of nearly 1 across the chambers. This suggests that though the best explanation for caucus complexity is chamber strength of the parties, there is also change related to the passage of time. Were the array more robust, a time series might be attempted, but any such test with the current data would be suspect.
Table 4:6 Descriptive Statistics for Caucus Complexity Index, 1981 and 1988

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>1981 Survey</th>
<th>1988 Survey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>5.765</td>
<td>6.553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Deviation</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n = 94

In order to establish this beyond much reasonable doubt, two simple bivariate OLS regressions were run, using the distance variable as a possible explanatory factor in the ordering of the caucuses, in the following manner:

\[ Y = \alpha + \beta X^t (t', t^* + \varepsilon' \]

Where \( Y = \) SUM of the index measures, \( X^t = \) the distance measure and \( t' x = \) the time periods. These regression yielded the following results found in Tables 4:7 and 4:8.
### Tables 4.7 - 4.10

**Table 4.7: Regression of Index of Complexity by Distance Between Majority and Minority Party in the Chamber, 1981 Cross-Section**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>se B</th>
<th>β</th>
<th>Sig. T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distance</td>
<td>-4.7116919</td>
<td>1.809672</td>
<td>-.388844</td>
<td>.0125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>6.111762</td>
<td>1.359236</td>
<td></td>
<td>.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple R:</td>
<td>.56326</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R² :</td>
<td>.31726</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n = 47</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4.8: Regression of Index of Complexity by Distance Between Majority and Minority Party in the Chamber, 1988 Cross-Section**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>se B</th>
<th>β</th>
<th>Sig. T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distance</td>
<td>-4.977201</td>
<td>2.414831</td>
<td>-.325299</td>
<td>.0452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>6.912830</td>
<td>1.724506</td>
<td></td>
<td>.0002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple R:</td>
<td>.47039</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R² :</td>
<td>.22126</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n = 47</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4.9: Regression of Index of Complexity by Distance Between Majority and Minority Party in the Chamber, 1981 and 1988 Periods, Combined**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>se B</th>
<th>β</th>
<th>Sig. T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distance</td>
<td>-0.065541</td>
<td>.012650</td>
<td>-.475273</td>
<td>.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>8.496730</td>
<td>.534217</td>
<td></td>
<td>.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple R:</td>
<td>.47527</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R² :</td>
<td>.22588</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n = 94</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(See Plot 4.1)

**Table 4.10: Regression of Index of Complexity by Distance Between Majority and Minority Party in the Chamber, 1981, 1988, 1995-6 Periods, Combined**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>se B</th>
<th>β</th>
<th>Sig. T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distance</td>
<td>-5.697431</td>
<td>.10185114</td>
<td>-.400469</td>
<td>.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>8.712194</td>
<td>.532130</td>
<td></td>
<td>.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple R:</td>
<td>.40047</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R² :</td>
<td>.16038</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n = 109</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(See Plot 4.2)
Both results are significant at the .05 margin, and both results are relatively strong. This suggests that there is a relationship between the competitive nature of the chamber (as measured here) and the complexity of the party organization (as measured in the index). This relationship does not change over time, although tables 4:1-4:4 suggest that the complexity of the caucuses (in the aggregate) over the two time periods is generally rising.

Having established this relationship in the individual years, it seemed appropriate to combine the two periods, with their requisite distance variables, and run the full array. This regression returned the results found in Table 4:9.

The scatterplot for this last relationship is Plot 4:1. In this plot the association between SUM (the index of caucus complexity) and DISTANCE (the difference between majority and minority party shares in the chamber) is thrown into relief. There is a good distribution across the array, and the relationship is linear.
Plots 4:1 and 4:2

Lower House Chambers, 1981 and 1988
Caucus Complexity by Partisan Distance in Chamber

Plot 4:1

Caucus Complexity by Partisan Distance in the Chamber
All Years

Plot 4:2
The cross-sectional analysis thus far seems to suggest two things: that, as hypothesized, the strength of competition in the chamber is related significantly to caucus development, and that caucuses, across the chambers considered, have generally become somewhat more complex across the time frame considered here.

*The Legislative Leadership Survey, 1995*

*Caucus Complexity and the Transforming Legislatures:*

Thus far, I have examined lower House chambers across a wide array of 47 chambers, with the widest empirical variance between them in terms of minority party strength, stability of competition factors, and variance of stability in caucus complexity. The next series of tests will focus on those core transforming legislatures examined throughout the first two chapters.

For the 1995 survey, a number of protocols were used which were not used in the earlier surveys. While this has made this survey less "compatible" with the earlier surveys than might be wished, it also elicited a great deal more information. The leadership in each party was consulted as to the complexity and nature of the caucus, or the reasons why a caucus was not considered necessary, depending on the chamber. Respondents were sent a written survey, and follow-up telephone calls were made for purposes of clarification and additional comments which the respondent wished to make
but which were not included in the written portion of the survey. On average, two leaders from each party were contacted and interviewed from each party. For reasons of assuring anonymity, no comments are here attributed to individuals, and their identities are otherwise shielded by the form of the quotation where necessary.

The examination of the 47 lower House chambers suggests a causative connection between chamber competition and the complexity of the caucuses. A more in-depth investigation of the caucuses in the 14 chambers at the heart of this study should better throw into relief the nature and contours of the type of change which has occurred.

In the earlier period (1981 and 1988) these caucuses were either not present (Mississippi and Alabama) or relatively simple institutions\(^\text{31}\). Yet between the years of 1988 and 1995, many of the caucuses have developed into complex institutions which many respondents\(^\text{32}\) believed crucial to the daily legislative life of the chamber.

---

\(^{31}\) A few caveats are in order: where judicial appointments are made in the legislature (in South Carolina, for example) the caucus — or perhaps more accurately, the ruling party — has been at the center of decision-making for that purpose. It is not my purpose to overlook or diminish this capacity. Also, the fact that several of these caucuses have had only the duty of designating the Speaker does not imply that this designation has always been a "done deal"; in many cases fairly bloody battles have been fought by party factions over this vote, and coup d'\'état by one faction displacing another has not been unknown.

\(^{32}\) I am indebted to the legislative leaders who responded to the 1995 - 1996 survey. All of these people took time away from their duties or other occupations to answer what probably at times seemed naive or perhaps obscure questions. As I have promised anonymity to these people, and will do my best to maintain it, it is worth noting that not all insisted on it. Most respondents were gracious enough to take the time for extended follow-up sessions — often over the telephone and sometimes in person. They were, to a person, generous with their time, their knowledge and their experience.
The following results are reported. then, for the index of all caucus values from
the indexes for 1981, 1988 and 1995-6; 1995-6 values include both party caucuses
entered as separate observations. Each survey year index score was paired with its mean
difference value from the elections material, being the difference between the majority
and the minority party’s chamber strength from the start year (1968) through the year of
the observation. This means that the index scores for 1981 were paired with mean party
minority-majority difference from 1968-1981; 1988 observations were paired with 1968-
1988 difference means, and 1995-6 was paired with 1968-1995 (or 1996, depending on
the election cycle). This produced the findings in Table 4:10.

Plot 4:2 is a simple scatterplot of the data, with a fit line describing the negative
relationship between rising “distance” means in the chamber strength of the parties and
the index scores (which rise with increasing complexity).

Clearly the relationship between Republican gains (which reduces the “distance”
means in these chambers) and caucus complexity is statistically significant, and robustly
so.

The tests of “distance” against caucus complexity has established that it is the
narrowing of chamber share which seems to be driving the changes in the caucuses, but a
finer measure is desirable to be able to pin down what “drives” this change, and establish
the links between changes in caucus complexity and the structural changes observed in committee proportion. If both are driven by the same set of circumstances, a few simple statistical tests should establish their relationship beyond reasonable doubt.

In order to make these tests, I have merged the data for electoral changes and committee features with that of the caucus complexity measures. These data include two types of caucus measures: the single chamber measures employed by the NCSL in the early survey and the two-party measures employed in the 1995-6 survey. For the sake of regularity, I have assumed that the single “chamber” measure employed by the NCSL applied to both the Democratic and Republican caucuses for the years reported. I should make clear that while I may have some reservations about this assumption, it is the only one possible given the data available. Average measures of each of the time periods (1968-1981, 1968-1988 and 1968-1995/6) are then drawn from the electoral-committee features data base, including all measures of the competition variables for each party (a mean over the time period), average two-party competition, and average committee composition scores. The resulting data set allowed me to test and plot, through simple ordinary least squares regression, the explanatory power of each variable for caucus complexity over that time period. Each line of observations, then, contained the full array of variables corresponding to the time frame in which the observations occurred. These data were then tested using the expedient of filtering the committee proportions by
committee type for the tests of committee, and using the unfiltered data for tests of electoral variables alone.

The first question which is critical to the hypotheses advanced here is a very simple one: can the change in caucus complexity be tied directly to increasing Republican competition in the electoral arena? This would seem intuitive, as the results from chapter 2 demonstrate that changes in chamber strength of share are due to increasing competition by the minority party, and the regressions above suggest that the driving force behind caucus complexity change is changing chamber strength -- but this “jumps” over that explanation, and asks whether a direct causal link may be established between the empirical evidence of Republican competition and that of caucus complexity. Perhaps more to the point, this will allow a test of particular party competition against particular party caucus complexity.

The following model was tested:

\[ Y = \alpha + \beta_i X_i + \varepsilon_i \]

Where \( Y \) = average Republican caucus complexity, \( X_i \) = average Republican party competition in the electoral arena (the percentage of districts in which Republican party
candidates ran at 40% of the vote or greater). This regression yielded the results found in table 4:11.

**Tables 4:11 - 4:13**

**Table 4:11: Republican Caucus Complexity by Republican Party Electoral Competition: 1981, 1988 and 1995-6**

*Analysis of Variance:*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>se B</th>
<th>β</th>
<th>Sig. T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republican Competition</td>
<td>12.751769</td>
<td>3.982405</td>
<td>.45169</td>
<td>.0027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(requisite years)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.957405</td>
<td>1.483994</td>
<td></td>
<td>.1947</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Multiple R: .45169  
R² : .20403  
n = 109  
(see Plot 4:3)

**Table 4:12: Republican Caucus Complexity by Republican Party Chamber Share: 1981, 1988 and 1995-6**

*Analysis of Variance:*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>se B</th>
<th>β</th>
<th>Sig. T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republican Chamber Share</td>
<td>.144202</td>
<td>.044406</td>
<td>.443777</td>
<td>.0023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.183368</td>
<td>1.091251</td>
<td></td>
<td>.0056</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Multiple R: .44378  
R² : .19694  
n = 109  
(See Plot 4:4)

**Table 4:13: Republican Caucus Complexity by Two-Party Competition**

*Analysis of Variance:*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>se B</th>
<th>β</th>
<th>Sig. T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Two-Party Competition</td>
<td>11.636126</td>
<td>6.244421</td>
<td>.282624</td>
<td>.0698</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>4.349123</td>
<td>1.237146</td>
<td></td>
<td>.0056</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Multiple R: .28262  
R² : .07988  
n = 109
Republican chamber share was also tested, with similar but with slightly less robust findings: as in chapter 2, it is well to remember that the two variables are highly collinear and that Republican chamber strength is clearly a result of, or a “causal” product of Republican Competition. In the committee proportion tests, Republican competition could not, with any certainty, be stated to have an independent effect on committee proportion. In this case, however, though the results are not conclusive, they are certainly more encouraging (see Table 4:12).

While both are significant, and strongly so at the .005 level, the $R^2$ and multiple $R$ for Republican competition are somewhat higher than those for Republican chamber share. In addition, a check variable, Two-party competition, was also run against the Republican Caucus\textsuperscript{53} Complexity measures with the results in 4:13.

This variable is not necessarily associated with Republican chamber strength, as seductive (or intuitive) as this may appear -- as was established in chapter 1, Republican chamber strength may often be negatively associated with chamber strength, though as pointed out in chapter 2, in the emerging transforming legislatures, it is generally thought to be. Again, while nothing \textit{final} may be statistically claimed regarding the relationship

\textsuperscript{53} As the caucus measures for Republican and Democratic Caucus were identical, due to the NCSL data format for the early years, testing the democratic caucus values would have bee largely redundant for those observations.
between Republican competition and internal changes in party ordering, these results make the probability high that such a relationship exists.

**Conclusion and Discussion**

I noted at the outset in this chapter that I had two specific hypotheses to test: 1) "As the strength of the minority party grows in the chamber as a result of election outcomes, its propensity for building a party organization will also grow. In chambers where there is no caucus, a caucus will be formed. In chambers where a caucus has been formed, it will become transformed, as the strength of the minority party increases, into a more complex caucus. Where there is greater competition in the electoral arena for the minority party, this will have a measurable independent effect". The first part of the hypothesis is clearly confirmed -- as the distance is narrowed between the minority party and the majority party in the chamber, caucuses become more complex in structure, take on more tasks, and become generally more important to the party. The second part of the hypothesis is also confirmed. The statistical evidence is relatively strong, and when it is coupled with the responses of the party leadership, the preponderance of the evidence is that such a relationship between electoral competition and internal change exists. This linkage is more strongly supported than the evidence that committee proportionality is explained by an independent effect of increasing party competition (examined in chapter 2), and points to perhaps stronger linkages between party activity on the part of the minority party which that party can control, rather than majority party reaction to its
opposition’s gains in that area. This competition also has an inextricable link to party
chamber strength, and party chamber strength also has a clear independent effect on
caucus complexity\textsuperscript{54}.

2) “As the strength of the minority party grows in the chamber as the result of election
outcomes, and minority caucuses are formed, the majority party will respond by
organizing its own caucus (if one is not already in place), and by increasing the role of
the caucus along both structural lines (by increasing complexity) and in behavioral terms
(by allowing the caucus more role in policy-making)”. This hypothesis remains only
half-tested. The problem here is lack of available data: it is impossible to go back in time
and interview the principals in the formation of caucuses. It is certainly probable that this
is so, given the comments by respondents on “changing over time”, but it cannot be
demonstrated statistically beyond doubt. What is clear is that the leaders themselves,
from both parties and in most chambers, are aware of the changes, almost invariably\textsuperscript{55}
cite the change in chamber strength as their cause, and are in anticipation of further
changes.

\textsuperscript{54} While I maintain this is probable, I cannot at this time demonstrate it to be statistically so: only three chambers had
no caucuses in the earliest period, and this does not allow a large enough sample to test the model.

\textsuperscript{55} It is only fair to note the one dissenting voice among the respondents in this case. One Alabama Republican, in
discussing the changes in that Caucus which have taken during their term, states categorically that “none of the
change was a result of other party activity”. There is a sense in this and other answers from this respondent that the
leader is trying to impress upon the researcher that the Alabama Republican Caucus came into being through the
extensive efforts of the Republican leadership, and I have no particular objective reason to doubt this conclusion.
Chief among the changes taking place in the task environment are the increasing interest in processing policy questions with member involvement at a very basic level, in being sure that informational contacts between members and leaders, as well as in strengthening the more traditional contacts between leaders and members, are made strong or remain strong. For further research in the arena of the caucuses, I would point out that the involvement of the caucuses directly with elections is one of the more intriguing of the findings here. The notion of the leader-sponsored Legislative Campaign Committees found by Gierzynski is at least challenged by the sounding taken here which seem to suggest that members are demanding a more integrated role in the recruitment and campaigning process generally, and in the expenditure of money for that purpose.
CHAPTER 5:

PARTY UNITY IN THE TRANSFORMING LEGISLATURES: THE EFFECT OF EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL PARTISAN ACTIVITY ON INTERNAL LEGISLATIVE PARTY LOYALTY

Introduction

This chapter is the final analysis of a series on party development in transitional lower house chambers. The preceding chapters have examined the development of changes in the electoral realm, changes in partisan committee assignments, and the development of chamber party organization (i.e. caucuses). The present chapter will seek to link these developments to partisan voting in the chambers themselves, and examines both inter-party conflict and intra-party cohesion.

There are four sections to this chapter:

• first, a review of the recent literature on chamber voting behavior in state legislatures;
• second, an examination of the changes in intra-party cohesion and inter-party conflict in these chambers as a function of time

• third, analysis examining the dynamics of intra-party cohesion across the chambers as a function of changes in partisan chamber strength and caucus development. That is, an empirical examination of how these in-chamber variables are linked to electoral dynamics and how two-party electoral competition acts through them (as well as directly) to affect roll call cohesion.

• fourth, an examination of the dynamics of inter-party conflict across the chambers as a function of changes in electoral dynamics, partisan chamber strength, and partisan committee proportionality.

**Party Unity in State Legislatures: A Review of the Literature**

The literature on vote scores in state legislatures is generally very slender. This may be attributed to several reasons, most turning on practical considerations. Melissa Collie suggests (Collie, 1985: 471-472) that this literature should be divided into at least two types: into studies which focus on individual decision-making and those which focus on “cleavage or alignment patterns” (Collie, 1985:472). These two types may be further subdivided into those which address the determinants of the vote, and those which focus on the effect of voting on particular outputs (Collie on Eulau\(^56\); 1985, 471). Cross-

sectional and single-case studies make up a large portion of the literature, and several
have had thought-provoking results (Souraf, 1963; Bernick, 1978; Hamm, 1982). My
study is quite different from those which immediately precede it in that it deals with the
partisan cleavage of the votes and its arena of interest is in the determinants of voting,
specifically the developments in party organization and leadership behavior. Further, it
attempts to address these issues over a protracted period of time (10 session/years) and
across similarly positioned chambers.

A good deal of work has been done in the area of Congressional voting (Collie,
Some of the more theoretical work has contributed much to our understanding of how
these phenomena should be approached. The research into Congressional roll-calls has
been greatly aided by the data compilations of the ICPSR, which resulted in several
historically oriented pieces (Clubb and Traugott, 1977; Cooper, Brady and Hurley, 1977;
Collie, 1988); but with the exception of Rohde’s work on recent House voting (1990,
1991) very little research has gone beyond this. As Cox and McCubbins write in a recent
review piece, “Most of the ... literature ... has not looked beyond the 1970s” (Cox and
McCubbins, 1994).
Confining a review of the literature to these parameters, probably the first important work which is not of a historical nature\textsuperscript{57} is Jewell’s 1955 “Party Voting in State Legislatures” which still stands as one of the better pieces written in the comparative setting of the US states. Jewell’s study concentrated on highly competitive legislative chambers, with an emphasis on the role of party in the chambers examined. I have freely borrowed from this study as a guide to approach, measurement, and the broad outlines of some of the issues concerned\textsuperscript{58}. But while Jewell’s study was concerned with competitive legislatures, this study concentrates on chambers which are in transition, or in the process of becoming competitive. Jewell wrote that “[the study] of the influence of party in legislative voting is limited to sessions in which the party balance in the legislature was reasonably close, for it was assumed that there would be less party voting, even in strong two-party states, during the years of one-sided legislative control”. The sample in the present work is quite different. It is drawn from sessions in which the parties are never truly (at least longitudinally) close (and selected for this reason), in chambers which are chosen because in the broader sense they were not from “strong two-party states”.

\textsuperscript{57} The first studies are Lowell (1902) and Rice (1928). Key’s 1949 and 1956 work also contains some analysis of voting behavior. See especially his treatment of factionalism.

\textsuperscript{58} One goes to this study for guidance for three reasons: 1) its assumptions still hold, 2) the measures, though they may seem simple in the world of increasingly complex statistical perambulations, are still the best tools for viewing the contours of the broad questions and 3) very little has been done in the area of comparative state legislative roll calls since 1955.
Much of the early literature in the state legislative setting is concerned with vote division. Broach (1972), for example, examined urban-rural conflict in the lower houses of the legislatures of Alabama, Indiana, Tennessee and Iowa. Here, party was perhaps only a peripheral concern, though the author found it necessary to use a partisan-non-partisan\textsuperscript{59} split in order to control for its effects on the question at hand\textsuperscript{60}. In a similar vein, Welch and Carlson (1973) further attempt to mitigate the strength of the partisan cue by studying a legislature in which it is “institutionally minimized” (Welch and Carlson, 1973:854) -- Nebraska’s unicameral, non-partisan legislature. Here, the authors find that “party is the most important reference group in structuring legislative behavior [and] that in the absence of party no other type of reference group serves a similar purpose”; further, that “[e]ven though strong constituency differences exist, and in Nebraska the urban-rural nature of constituency is superimposed on regional differences, constituency is not a strong factor around which voting can be consistently organized” (Welch and Carlson, 1973:865-866). Several recent studies (e.g. Thielemann, 1995) have also supported this conclusion. As Collie writes, “[r]esults have indicated that in the absence of high party cohesion and conflict cleavages are fluid, factional, and highly issue-specific” (Collie, 1985:477).

\textsuperscript{59} Broach uses the Alabama case as his base for “non-partisan” voting.

\textsuperscript{60} As it turned out, party was critical to the study. Broach found that “in the absence of institutionalized supports [i.e., party] constituency-based legislative differences will probably not generate stable and continuous voting alignments”.
The attempts to tease out partisan effect by Broach et. al., or to select a setting in which it is not institutionally present as in Welch and Carlson, led to another type of analysis which is much closer to that employed here. These are the attempts to discover the elements of partisan emergence where party had been present, but not a political factor *per se* in voting decisions. Most of these studies are set in the South, or a southern legislature is used in case study analysis. Harmel and Hamm (1986) set out to discover the hallmarks of partisan activity in the development in the Texas House, where the role of parties had been moderated by just the sort of policy coalition that Welch and Carlson and Broach failed to find. In the Texas House, a conservative coalition of Western (mostly rural) Democrats and of urban and suburban Republicans had joined in what can only be identified as a "the most important reference group in structuring legislative behavior". Even so, the authors found that as the Republican party gained seats in the House, the cross-party coalition became more brittle, and the outlines of emerging party organization became more apparent. Harmel and Hamm's study was followed several years later by another by the same authors, in which they tracked developments and changes in the Speaker system (the linchpin of the coalition) and found that the coalition had become fragile as a result of partisan shifts in the seat distribution, and that inter-party conflict had increased (Hamm and Harmel, 1993).

The results of these types of studies are somewhat mixed, but the common thread is that, in the absence of partisan identity and the voting cues which it provides, two types
of factionalism may emerge: 1) policy factionalism -- that coalition type which centers on an ideological or regional interest (Harmel and Hamm, 1993) and 2) factionalism or coalitions of convenience. The latter coalitions (see Welch and Carlson and to a lesser extent Broach) which are "fluid, factional, and highly issue-specific" (Collie, 1985:477). While the second kind seem more likely to emerge in legislatures where partisanship as a cue has been institutionally constrained, the first type are more likely to emerge where party is not institutionally constrained, but rather uni-dimensional. Organized party conflict seems to be the rule in most legislatures, but in the presence of one-party domination, factionalism which is long-term and fairly rigid seems more likely to develop. The probable development of such coalitions in one-party legislatures gives rise to questions about what happens to the voting patterns in the chamber when the circumstance which gave rise to the earlier pattern no longer obtains. The recent rise of the minority party in the case of the "transforming" legislatures to be examined in this study provides the proper setting in which to determine some of the answers arising from the questions this phenomenon raises.

Because the recent literature is so slender, it is necessary to examine the rather less complex contours of the problem before engaging in the more convoluted discussions of party roll calls. This study, I hope, will begin to address the issue of

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61 By contrast see Welch and Carlson on Minnesota's non-partisan legislature, where the authors observed that the liberal and conservative caucuses had assumed the role of party. Of course, Minnesota's system became (formally) partisan in 1976.
change in the chambers which are transforming from conditions of low levels of competition to two-party competition and to fill this gap with what is, and only attempts to be, a simple examination of party voting behavior across and between 6 state houses over a dynamic data set (10 sessions).

**Roll Call Votes as a Measure of Party Unity**

The decision to use roll call votes as a measure of party unity is predicated on four central theoretical linkages:

*First*, that variation in the amount of competition between the parties in elections is a reflection of the changes in policy choices (or perceived choices) by the electorate in making their selections for representation. In other words, who sits, and to which party she owes allegiance, has policy implications. These implications are reflected in the way both the majority and minority party organize themselves in the chamber. The way the parties organize themselves in the chamber has a purpose – it is not random. This purpose is to allow the leadership to better order and communicate their message to the rank and file and to give greater clarity and a more unified message in the policy realm to the electorate. The degree to which parties are successful in this effort at better communication and environmental ordering is variable, dependent on how successful they are in their efforts at internal party organization. The best way to measure the
"success" of the party’s organizational efforts is through a measure of their impact on the vote choice of members.

As the electorate’s policy and party choices change, these changes are reflected in the relative homo/heterogeneity of the party in the chamber. The more homogeneous the party is, the more likely it will be to institute the organizational changes. In addition to the impetus of organizational change, the simple fact of increasing homogeneity or heterogeneity is expected to have an impact on the relative intraparty vote cohesion of the party members (party cohesion rising with the degree of homogeneity, falling with the degree of heterogeneity; see especially Rohde, 1991). Given the overwhelming dominance of the Democratic party in most of these chambers, and the concomitant scarcity of Republicans, its reasonable to assume that that the Democratic party at the outset is quite fractured in terms of policy choices ("factional" politics has been the byword for chambers arranged this way) while their Republican counterparts should be assumed to be in as pure a state of homogeneity as is likely to be found in "nature". This means that, when we come to measure these changes, (particularly in cases where these features are most pronounced) chamber strength may have a relative leverage higher than its substantive effect. In Alabama or Mississippi, for example, where the number of Republicans only rises a few seats, the percentage increase over time is very high indeed (see chapter 1); where this is the case, the degree to which intraparty cohesion falls as minority party heterogeneity rises may be representative only in a statistical sense. The
sharp rise in the percentage of Republicans may cause the models to report a sharp – even statistically significant – decline in party cohesion when only a few members defect.

Second, the proportionality of committees by party as effected by the competition differentials in the electoral arena is indicative of greater party control over organizational, control and money committees, and greater party control over their chamber results. If this is the case, then indications of the opportunity for greater party cooperation (between members and members, members and leadership, and leaders and their immediate subordinates) on the mechanics of the chamber and thereby on the mechanics of policy-making should result. The best measure of the success of the majority leadership's efforts to order the chamber is through the vote choice of its partisans.

Uslaner and Weber (1977), Francis (1989), and Jewell and Whicker (1994) have all noted that as formerly tiny minority parties begin to gain in chamber strength, the loci of decision-making shift from the committee “fiefdoms” of individual policy-makers to the leadership. If this is so, it is also possible to suggest that what happens is that the actual loci do not shift, but that the committees themselves (in this case through control of the assignment process) simply come under greater party leadership control. The
proportional distribution of party seats on critical committees should, in these cases, have an effect on roll calls on the floor.

Third, the organization and development of more complex caucus organizations (in form, function and effect) are evidence of further effort by the party leaders to control their environment, and to present a clear, unified message to membership in the chamber. This the caucus does by allowing better and more frequent communication, which leads to a better understanding of member needs, and therefore greater opportunity for compromise between members before an issue actually gets to the committee or floor. Where caucus structures are developed and complex, this should have a unifying effect on party voting behavior. The degree of complexity - the degree to which a party caucus takes on the tasks of strategy, information management and membership service provision is a rough measurement of the degree to which a party may expect to reward and enforce leadership decisions, party unity and clarity in the public eye.

Fourth, the effect of these organizational developments, taken in toto, may be best measured by their effect on party unity in the actual votes of the party’s membership across a wide diversity of issues, not including consent votes (unless challenged) or other votes by acclamation (which are by definition non-partisan votes).
In essence, what this chapter examines are the linkages between elements of a system in the process of transformation from a one-party dominant system to a two-party competitive system. Embedded in all of the foregoing is the notion that political parties matter in all cases, but that they matter more when there is a substantive challenge to the majority by a political party with differing orientations on issues.

I hope to demonstrate empirically that increasing competition in the electoral realm may be sequentially linked to the increasing complexity of the party organization, and that these party organizations, in turn, have a direct causal effect on greater party unity.

Roll call votes are, in my estimation, the best possible measure of policy-making in this setting. However appealing it may be to count every vote on every issue in every state in the array, it is certainly unnecessary for the purposes of demonstrating the outputs outlined here. What is important is that the roll calls be sampled across a wide variety of issues, and not be narrowed to only one kind of vote or one kind of issue. Similar to Jewell's 1955 study, no attempt has been made here to distinguish the importance of the bills selected for study\(^62\). Single-issue sampling risks missing the forest for a single stand of trees.

\(^{62}\) Jewell notes that “[n]o attempt has been made to give added weight to bills considered of major importance” – his major concern was the role of party across all votes, as is the concern here (Jewell, 1995: 774).
Returning to theory for a moment, it is important, for the sake of the type of sample taken, to ask whether or not we expect there to be party unity on one type of vote over another -- and in this case, I would argue strongly that we do not, necessarily (see also Jewell, 1955:774). Under non-partisan conditions, it is of course disingenuous to speak of “partisan conflict” over bills by bill type. But while all bills, *ceteris paribus*, may contain the same initial “seeds of conflict”, some bill types may induce more conflict than others under conditions of increasing partisanship. My assumption is that increasing partisanship and the attendant organizational changes may increase party unity in, and inter-partisan conflict over, certain bills crucial to the *parties*. In the aggregate, all votes, whatever their substance, should be more unified along party lines under increasing partisanship conditions than under non-partisan or only loosely partisan conditions.

The best course of action is a *systematic random sample*. It is not necessary to measure every vote in every year for these chambers. Just as surveys are most accurate when one measures all of the possible members of the universe, certainly the same would apply here. At some point, however, the degree of accuracy gained by adding data points is minimal. As in Jewell’s study, unanimous votes were excluded from the sample from which votes were selected. Jewell also excluded “near unanimous” votes (i.e. where 90% of both parties voted on the same side of an issue; see Jewell, 1955:774). These were included here, and the reason is that given the extremely small numbers sometimes extant
for the minority party (and the attendant large numbers for the majority), these votes were needed for a more precise view of the cohesion of the parties.

This study, unlike much of the existing work in this area, is longitudinal: a dynamic examination. This enables the researcher to ask questions which lie far outside the aims or possibilities of cross-sectional work. As it is a study of the linkage between the environment and the internal operations of the legislature in which both realms are in transition, a dynamic setting is the only one in which this linkage may be explored with any hope of success. The type of sample taken is clearly in line with the hypotheses which follow.
Hypotheses and Expectations:

The transforming legislative chambers examined here are expected to have changed in terms of the features of partisan conflict and cohesion. The major general functions addressed here are:

A) Increasing electoral competition. In all of the transforming chambers, formerly moribund elections have become more competitive: in districts where they once ran unopposed, candidates are finding partisan contestation, and increasingly, this contestation is competitive. Having linked these changes to changes in the composition of standing committees in chapter 3 and to the development of increasingly complex caucuses in Chapter 4, I here seek to link these changes in the electoral realm to behavioral indicators of partisan voting both directly and via the internal organizational changes cited above.

B) Increasing minority party chamber strength (and attendant majority party decline). As competition has grown in the electoral realm, so has the chamber strength of the minority party. These changes have also been linked to electoral behavior on the one hand, and internal organizational changes on the other. These changes are expected to have a direct effect on the voting behavior of partisans in the chamber.
C) Increasing partisanship in committee assignments on critical committees. Where the majority party is challenged, it may react to the increasing competition and increasing chamber strength of the minority party by "stacking" critical committees in their own favor. Further, as the minority party gains strength in the chamber, their proportion on committees dealing with substantive policy issues rises. Both factors are expected to have an impact on partisan voting.

D) Development of partisan chamber organizations (the caucuses). As both parties are affected by increasing competition in the electoral realm, they react by becoming more organized in the chamber by building more complex party organizations. These organizations are expected to have a direct effect on party unity.

Intra-party Cohesion and Inter-party Conflict

The specific hypotheses are:

- \( H^1 \) \textit{As party competition in elections rises and the chamber becomes more competitive between the parties, the parties will become more internally cohesive across all votes.} This is so because the increase of party competition in the external realm and the chambers itself produces an environment in which party caucuses develop more crucial roles, become more complex in their tasks, and provide for greater resolution of intra-party conflict (see Chapter 4). Further, where there is an
atmosphere of increasing competition in elections, coupled with increasing competitiveness in the chamber, the need for partisans to pull together as a party is greater, which will result in greater party unity for the parties in the chamber.

- **H^3)** *Increasing caucus complexity will result in greater majority and minority party cohesion across conflict votes when tested as a separate variable.* As the chamber becomes more competitive, the leadership of each party will seek, through the caucuses, a greater degree of control over their partisans. This will be reflected in a greater degree of complexity in the caucuses as to its organization, its tasks, and its schedule. Increasing caucus complexity will tend to have a positive effect on partisan cohesion. The test of this hypothesis will end the section on party unity within the parties. Related to this, though found in the following section, is the following:

- **H^3)** *Where conflict occurs, however, the parties will be more unified under the changed conditions resulting from party competition in the electorate and in the chamber (i.e. caucus complexity).* Though conflict will decrease as a result of the developing role of the committee system, the increasing role and complexity of the party caucuses will generate greater cohesion *when conflict occurs.* As Jewell and Whicker pointed out (and I quote them in Chapter 4 as well on this point), party loyalty depends on the “political environment within which the legislature operates” and this, in turn, depends on the development of “effective partisan institutions” such
as caucuses, to encourage and structure partisan cohesion. To the degree that the 
parties in a given chamber have developed these institutions, the party will be more 
cohesive both under conflict and across all bills.

- **H⁴** The evolution of the relationship between conflict and cohesion should follow a pattern. The direction of conflictual voting notwithstanding, as the party 
  organizations become more complex and the chamber becomes more partisan, the 
polarization of the parties will lead to greater cohesion of partisans within the parties 
when conflict between the parties occurs.

- **H⁵** Party conflict voting will vary across bill type: some bill types are more likely to 
divide the chamber along party lines than others. This behavior will become more 
pronounced as party organizations become more complex and important. Legislative 
control bills, budgetary measures and elections and reapportionment bills are often 
critical party bills, and will have a higher rate of party conflictual voting than those 
bills concerned with substantive policy measures. The greater the organizational 
complexity of internal party institutions, the more likely partisan conflict voting will 
result over these more "partisan" measures.

- **H⁶** The development, increasing importance, and increasing partisan proportional 
equilibrium on committees will tend to decrease substantially the amount of conflict
on the floor of the chamber. As was demonstrated in Chapter 3, the development of
the committee system is one of the major outgrowths of increasing electoral and
chamber party competition. This change, as suggested by Patterson and Jewell, will
engender a change in the rate of conflict between the parties. Since greater “sorting”
of party positions will be taking place in the committees, less conflict on the floor will
result. This is indicated in this analysis by the proportion of minority members on
“substantive” committees: across the full range of votes, conflict will decrease.
Conversely, the greater the over-representation of the majority on some types of
committees, the more polarized the parties will become. This effect will be variable
across types of bills (as described above): the over-representation of the majority
party on critical chamber committees will increase conflict across legislative
measures which are critical to the running of the chamber, while conflict generally is
falling (due to the greater proportion of “substantive” bills.

Operational Definitions

Dependent Variables: Roll Calls

Roll Calls are examined in the aggregate vote, by party, on a given bill in a given
session on a particular issue or issues. Chamber-session percentages are used to establish
a baseline of party unity for each party on each session in some cases. The sample was
composed of a selection of votes from all non-acclamation votes (see Appendix 5:1 for formula). The following table lays out the mean n for each chamber on the number of total votes in that chamber for each year, the mean of the n of non-acclamation votes, the mean of the n of votes selected and coded, and the n of years from which the sample was drawn:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chamber</th>
<th>Mean Total Votes (Per Year)</th>
<th>Mean Non-Acclamation Votes (Per Year)</th>
<th>Mean Votes Selected and Coded (Per Year)</th>
<th>Number of Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>948</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>1154</td>
<td>542</td>
<td>103.7</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nevada</td>
<td>874</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>113.5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>939</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>106.9</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>795</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>106.6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>1236</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data set was sampled from a total of 59,389 votes, of which 27,667 were non-acclamation or non-unanimous votes. From the non-unanimous votes, a total of 6,157 were randomly selected from a sub-sample of each state and year, coded, and analyzed.

Several different dependent variables were drawn from the roll call data:

1) **Partisan Cohesion.** For the means tables in the first part of the analysis, each party’s raw vote totals were converted into percentages and the higher of the two scores was considered the “party position” on that bill or rule. The degree to which members adhered to their own “party position” was entered as a “party cohesion score”. For
example, on a given issue, 20% of the Democrats and 60% of the Republicans voted “nay”, while 80% of Democrats and 40% of Republicans voted “yea”. In such a case, the party position of the Democrats was considered to be “yea”; that of the Republicans, “nay”. The party unity score for Democrats in this case would be 80%; Republicans, 60%. The more important measure of party cohesion, which is used for the balance of the analysis, is the standard Rice Index of Cohesion (Rice, 1925) 63 . This is a measure of the percentage distance between the majority of the party and the minority of the party on a given vote. Thus, where the majority of the party = 80% and the minority of the party (on the opposite side of the issue) is 20%, the “distance” score is 60.

2) Non-conflict votes are votes in which the majority of the voters of both parties vote for the same side of an issue or rule. They are “non-conflict” in the sense that there is no conflict between the party majorities, and not because there is no conflict or dissension on the vote.

3) Party conflict votes are those votes in which the major parties faced off against each other on a given issue, with the majority of one party voting “yea” and the majority of the other voting “nay”. Operationally, I have used a dummy variable to divide the roll calls into two types, “conflict” and “non-conflict”. I have also generated an index of difference, which is the subtraction of one party from the other on the same side of a

63 See Rice, 1928; also Jewell, 1955, p. 774.
question. These manipulations have been regularized to return a positive number. Also used under party conflict is an “index of difference” measure which is the subtraction of the majority and minority party vote percentages on the same side of an issue. This index allows for the measurement of both conflict and relative party cohesion: both rise as the index rises.

4) Coalition votes are a subset of party conflict votes, considered in terms of outcome and the partisan mix which results in the outcome. These may be considered in several ways, all under the notion that the two parties face off against each other. If the majority wins, and has enough strength to win with or without defecting minority voters, no real, or “necessary” coalition takes place: the majority party could win the vote without the participation of the minority. If the majority party wins, but must rely on the participation of minority members votes in order to win, then the coalition is a “necessary” one.

**Independent Variables**

1) Party Chamber Competition. As defined in the balance of the study (see Chapter 2).

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64 I.e. when the majority party is at 70% “yea” and the minority is at 40% “yea”, the minority is subtracted from the majority to return 30 as the index of difference. When the positions of the majority and minority are reversed, the majority is subtracted from the minority, and so on. This is simply to eliminate negative numbers, and has no effect on the values.
2) **Two-party Electoral Competition** is a measure developed from earlier studies in electoral competition (Anderson and Hamm, 1992; Anderson, 1994, etc.) and is based on Jewell’s general operational definition of competition in the electorate. This definition calls “competitive” elections those in which the losing major party candidate receives at least 40% of the two-party vote. Here, I have aggregated the lower house elections on a year by year basis to a percentage of the elections which were competitive: those in which both candidates received at least 40% of the vote.

3) **Caucus Complexity.** The caucus complexity measure is a measure developed in Chapter 4 and is drawn from a series of surveys taken under the authority of the National Council on State Legislatures.

4) **Committee Proportionality.** Proportionality on committees by party is measured here in the way as it was in Chapter 3, as the absolute proportion of a party on a committee relative to its strength in the chamber (the difference between the party’s strength on the committee and its strength in chamber).
Data

The Vote Sample

The chambers and years examined here are: Florida, Tennessee, and Texas (1978-1988); Mississippi\(^{65}\) (1974 - 1985; 1987 and 1988); Nevada (1979-1989) and Virginia (1979-1989)(see Appendix 5:2 for years and numbers of votes from which the sample was drawn). By selecting these chambers, I have included one chamber which changes very little over the time-frame (Mississippi), two chambers which started with quite small minority parties and have become quite competitive (Texas and Virginia) and two chambers which have been fairly competitive over the time frame (Nevada and Tennessee). During this period, Florida’s house chamber has remained relatively stable. The minority party in Florida during this time has an important presence, but it never threatens to take control of the chamber as it has threatened to do in both Nevada and Tennessee during this period. The span of years is protracted enough to allow comparison over time; the differences between the chambers in relation to changes in the electoral success and increasing competitiveness of the minority party will allow for the examination of both variables in terms of their effect on chamber partisan voting.

\(^{65}\) 1986 was unavailable.
Despite the necessary variation between the chambers, the overall similarity of the position of the parties in these chambers allows them to be considered together.

A systematic random sample requires knowledge of several things. The most important of these is the desired degree of accuracy (within a given year or session, for example), conditioned by the degree of accuracy it is possible to attain within practical parameters (see Appendix 5:1).

**Analysis**

Before embarking on the analysis of the cohesion and conflict variables in the roll calls, it is important to provide a descriptive definition of the electoral variables in these cases. This is critical to any interpretation of the data, and because the time frame differs from the balance of the analysis in the preceding chapters, the values are somewhat different from the results reported in earlier chapters.

Table 5:1 presents the descriptive statistics for selected electoral and chamber variables for the 6 chambers in this chapter across the limited time frame used in this analysis (roughly 1978-1988) sorted by chamber competitiveness. Not only are these chambers at different points in the transition process, but the degree of change in the time frame varies from chamber to chamber. The last two columns of the table reveal the
Table 5:1: Mean Values of Selected Variables by Chamber

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chamber</th>
<th>Majority Electoral Competition</th>
<th>Minority Electoral Competition</th>
<th>Two-party Competition</th>
<th>Chamber Competition</th>
<th>Caucus Complexity</th>
<th>Minority Party Chamber percentage Minimum and Maximum Values</th>
<th>Mean Percentage Minority Chamber: Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>97.1</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.6 – 7.4</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>74.7</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>12.0 – 37.3</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>75.1</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>61.7</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>22.5 – 37.2</td>
<td>30.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>79.7</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>210 – 35.3</td>
<td>31.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nevada</td>
<td>82.4</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>12.5 – 45.2</td>
<td>31.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>-4.0</td>
<td>32.6 – 38.3</td>
<td>36.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
minimum, maximum and mean values of minority chamber share percentage. The minority percentage share is, of course, increases with the party chamber competition variable, and there is variance across the chambers in the level and range.

As I pointed out in chapter 2, the level and direction of the two-party competition variable is wholly dependent on the level and direction of the two underlying dimensions upon which it is based: Republican and Democratic electoral competition. "Two-party competition" rises or falls according to the strength and direction of the elemental components: generally speaking, I expect Republican competition in these chambers to rise over time and Democratic competition to fall. But in the close examination of the individual cases, the level of transition is variable by case (chamber). The ideal case of rising Republican competition coupled with falling Democratic competition, rendering the two-party competition variable positive, is unlikely except in some few cases in which the chamber is in the critical stage of the transformative process. Across the full time frame (1968-1996), these stages are fairly easy to pinpoint in a given chamber because most of the chambers in the study have gone through such a stage at some time during the time frame. This becomes more problematic in the limited time frame used here. It is more useful to think of each chamber as a snapshot of the transformative process, rather than to look within each chamber for evidence of the process.
Each chamber is at a different stage of transition, and there is no particular reason to believe that the associations between the variables to be discussed should be linear across these stages, though they are presumed to linear within the chamber at that stage. For this reason, it is not theoretically correct to consider the chambers together in some kind of pooled series, particularly not in the portion of the analysis which contends with the problem of linkages between the external variables and internal structures with the attendant roll call “outputs”.

I have constructed a reprise of the electoral variable plots used in part of chapter 2 for these chambers, using only the time period used in this portion of the study. These are the plots labeled Plots 5:1-5:6.

Elections Variables Reprise: Mississippi

Election Year

Elections Variables Reprise: Texas

Election Year

Elections Variables Reprise: Florida

Elections Variables Reprise: Virginia

Election Variables Reprise: Nevada

Election Variables Reprise: Tennessee
First, it is important to remember that despite the fact that the analysis which follows is not a time series *per se*, the pattern of competition over time has a direct effect on behavior. Any discussion of “transition” or “transformation” assumes that the unit examined starts at one level in time and ends at another quite different level of whatever variable is being examined. I am assuming (and have demonstrated in the chapters above) a *sequence* of events which is embedded in time. When, for example, a chamber in which party competition has fluctuated widely but which begins and ends at the same point is contrasted with a chamber in which the rise of two-party competition is monatomic, the two chambers may have similar mean values on the competition variable, but are expected to have very different values on the response variables. Caucus development, for example, is non-existent in Mississippi (there are no caucuses), so the notion that two-party competition in the electoral realm will result in greater party cohesion via the caucus would not be expected. There is, in fact, rising two-party competition in the Mississippi chamber, but since there has as yet been no development of caucuses nor any great strides in the proportionality of minority party members on committees, it should be plain that the expectation of association between two-party electoral competition, two-party chamber competition and any of the chamber voting variables would be premature, if the model is accurate.
Coupling the over-time plots with the findings in table 5:1, a much clearer picture of the individual chambers emerges, and the expectations for the behavior of the variables in this analysis also become clearer.

The pattern in Mississippi (Plot 5:1; see also Table 5:1) is consistent with the very first stage of the transformative process: here, the levels of party competition which contribute to two-party competition are widely divergent. Democratic competition is very high indeed, although we can see that it begins to drop slightly toward the end of the time period. Republican electoral competition is gently rising, but never rises above 20% (mean is 9.0); by the same token, Democratic electoral competition (majority competition in Table 5:1) is very high (the mean is 97.1) and quite stable at that level. It is understandable, then, that two-party competition also never rises above 20% (the mean is 6.3). Here, two-party competition is driven by the rise of Republican competition, rather than the decrease of Democratic competition, but the substantive change in this variable over time is very slight. Because the slope of change over time in the underlying variables is so gentle, expectations of “two-party competition” driving any significant or consistent change in the cohesion between partisans or in the conflict between the parties should be curtailed accordingly. For Mississippi, chamber competition is also at a very low level (a mean value of 7.9); there are no caucuses during this period, and maximum chamber sharer of the minority party never rises above 7.4% (the mean is 3.9%).
Mississippi should be viewed as a *baseline, or starting point* to the transformative process, rather than as a chamber in the full throes of transition to a two-party chamber.

In Texas and Florida (see Plots 5:2/5:3), the process of transformation is in full swing: here, the two-party competition variable is relatively stable, but the critical slopes of the majority and minority party competition variables are plainly in balance. Here, Republican electoral competition is in monatomic ascendance, while Democratic competition is in monatomic decline. This is the "classic" pattern of the insurgent minority in the electoral realm (see Chapter 2), and one in which the action of the variables hypothesized above should be as expected in most cases. Note that on the chamber competition variable Florida would seem to fall more into the category of Virginia (see Plot 5:4) and Nevada (see Plot 5:5; means of 61.7, 62.5, and 63.4, respectively), but since the hypothesis is that party competition has an independent and greater effect on the roll call variables than does chamber competition, Florida is clearly, for the purposes of this analysis, better grouped with Texas. Not only are their mean two-party competition values similar (12.1 and 17.7 – Virginia’s is 25.1; see table 5:1) but the direction of the underlying variables of individual party competition are also in the same pattern. In terms of minority chamber share, these chambers are also next in the sequence. In terms of caucus complexity, Florida’s and Texas’ mean complexity (1.7 and 3.5, respectively; see Table 5:1) are much closer in terms of the mean of this variable than are Florida and Virginia (Virginia’s caucus complexity has a mean of 8.2).
Virginia’s mean values are similar to those of Florida’s on some electoral variables (Florida’s mean value of majority electoral competition is 75.1, where Virginia’s is 79.7; the values on mean minority competition are also close: see Table 5:1), but the pattern over time of Democratic and Republican competition from which the values of two-party competition are derived is very different. Here, we see Democratic competition on a monotonic decline (almost matching Florida’s in both slope and starting and ending level) but the pattern of minority party competition is very different. Where in Texas and Florida there is a monotonic increase, the pattern in Virginia is one of rise and decline: it steadily rises to over 50% in 1982, then falls precipitously almost back to the start point by 1985, followed by a slight increase in 1987. This fluctuation, where both parties decline on competition towards the end of the time frame, results in a period of dual decline which drives the two-party competition variable down as well. Thus, the pattern of stability in two-party competition which may be seen in Texas and Florida (due to the complementary fall and rise on the individual party variables) is not seen in Virginia. As mentioned above, the mean caucus value for Virginia is significantly higher than in either of the chambers which have preceded it in this discussion, and is actually the highest of all the chambers in the array. Expectations for the behavior of the variables which are linked to two-party competition should be somewhat different in Virginia than for the ideal cases (in terms of transformation) in Texas and Florida.
The pattern of two-party competition in Nevada (Plot 5:5) is one of monatomic increase, but the underlying party competition variables behave differently here than in all of the chambers which precede it in the sequence of transformation. The pattern of Democratic decline and Republican gain on the competition variable is monatomic, as it was in Texas and Florida, until 1982, and the two-party competition variable rises accordingly. In 1986 the pattern has reversed itself: there is a rise in Democratic competition and a fall in Republican competition. Nonetheless (and this is a classic example) the two-party competition variable continues its upward movement, because the reverse is so even that the slope and direction of both parties is almost equal in terms of the change in direction. This means that two-party competition will continue to rise as a function of the decrease in one party and the increase in the other, despite the fact that the parties in question have individually changed direction. Though Nevada’s mean level of minority chamber share (31.7) is almost identical to that of Virginia (at 31.2), the manner in which this mean is reached via the competition variables is quite different. It is also worth pointing out that the range of minority chamber share in Nevada is the highest of the chambers examined here and that Nevada has had a pattern of persistent two-party competition in the chamber longer than any of the others preceding it in the sequence. However, the pattern is unique only in that Nevada lies at the far end of the developmental process, and provides the “end point” where Mississippi provided the “start point”.
Tennessee (Plot 5:6) is the only chamber of this selection (and indeed, of all the transforming chambers examined in this work) in which the minority party Republicans actually lose ground. Though the Republican party has been a persistent and constant participant in the political life of the chamber (and of the state) it has declined both on these variables and in the chamber during this period. This pattern is most like that of Virginia's, though the Republican peak level of competition is two years earlier than that found in Virginia and the slope of decline for both parties is somewhat gentler. In both cases, two-party competition declines over time due to a decline in competition in both parties. This pattern is, as noted in chapter 2, one in which the parties seem to divide up the districts into spheres of interest in which their opposite number rarely contests, and is not competitive when they do. This is a pattern which is most unlikely in cases like those of Texas and Florida where, during this time period, the minority is contesting in many more districts than heretofore because they have contested so few in the past. It is more likely that this sorting process will have gone forward in states like Tennessee and Nevada than in the others, if only because they have been competitive longer.

In sum, there is one "baseline" or "start point" chamber (Mississippi), two transitional chambers (Texas and Florida), one chamber in which the transition has begun to stabilize (Virginia) and two in which the process is well established (Nevada and Tennessee).
Table 5.2 reports the descriptive values of the dependent variables in the matrix. Some generalizations about these variables are in order at this time. The percentage of non-conflict votes is quite high across all chambers\(^6\) but there is a good bit of variation among them. Here, the columns are sorted in order of chamber competition (see column 1). The percentage of non-conflict votes (see column 2) is highest in Virginia (at 91.6% of all votes across time), while the low end of the range is in Texas and Tennessee with 66.5 and 70.8, respectively. Florida is lowest, while Mississippi, the chamber with the least chamber competition over time, also has a very high level of non-conflict voting (i.e. non-conflictual between the parties).

Similarly, party cohesion (see columns 3 and 4) across these years is also quite high: ranging from 92% cohesion, on average, among Virginia’s Democrats (where

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\(^6\) It is important to caution the reader that this variable is allowed to vary greatly in these data by the fact that near-acclamation votes were accepted in the sample. This allowed the inclusion of some votes in which the minority party made up a small percentage of the chamber. Using Jewell’s rule (90% of both parties on one side of an issue) would not have worked either, unfortunately. e.g. when the Republicans are represented in the chamber by only 3 persons, one of them might defect and this would be 1/3 of the party: one person might be 50% of the party in the chamber. For the conflict votes, then, it is important not to compare these percentages to other studies in which the selection was limited (in the common usage) by some variety of cut-off.
Republican cohesion is also highest, save that of Mississippi’s Republicans\(^{67}\) to a low of 77.6 (on average) among the Democrats in Texas. When considering party cohesion at the 80% level or greater (see columns 5 and 6), 86.4% of all votes by Virginia Democrats were at this level, while the Republicans in Tennessee only voted at this level 63.7% of the time on average.

\(^{67}\) The Mississippi chamber often contained a Republican cohort in the single digits, so it is not surprising that their degree of cohesion may be either very high or very low with little variation between the two readings.
Table 5:2:
Descriptive Values of Selected Variables: Roll Call Sample; 6 States: 1974-1988

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chamber+</th>
<th>1) Party Competition</th>
<th>2) Non-Conflict Votes*</th>
<th>3) Democratic Cohesion**</th>
<th>4) Republican Cohesion**</th>
<th>5) Democratic Cohesion at 80% or Greater</th>
<th>6) Republican Cohesion at 80% or Greater</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Chambers</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>78.8</td>
<td>85.8</td>
<td>87.0</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>70.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>84.4</td>
<td>83.7</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>63.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>74.7</td>
<td>66.5</td>
<td>77.6</td>
<td>84.5</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>66.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>75.1</td>
<td>74.5</td>
<td>86.3</td>
<td>86.1</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>70.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>79.7</td>
<td>91.6</td>
<td>92.0</td>
<td>90.1</td>
<td>86.4</td>
<td>82.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nevada</td>
<td>82.4</td>
<td>87.1</td>
<td>90.3</td>
<td>86.9</td>
<td>84.2</td>
<td>72.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>97.1</td>
<td>80.6</td>
<td>84.2</td>
<td>91.0</td>
<td>66.2</td>
<td>67.2</td>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>All Chambers</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nevada</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>60.3</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ Sorted on Partisan Distance in the Chamber.
*Percent of all votes, aggregated by year; percentage averaged over all years.
**Mean of all votes by year, averaged over all years.
***Mean of coalition type, expressed as a percentage of all conflict votes, averaged across all years.
Despite the high level of non-conflictual votes, the percentage of party conflict votes is not trivial, and such votes often require a coalition between parties in order to decide a given issue or rule (see column 7). Texas tops the list of partisan conflictual voting with an average of 33.4% across these years, followed by Tennessee with 28.8%. These chambers are also near the top of the list (order reversed) for votes in which a coalition with members of both parties was necessary in order to decide an issue (see column 8). Tennessee, with 60.3% of all conflict votes, is followed by Florida with 57.5 and then by Texas with 52.3. Of all chamber conflict voting in the formerly non-competitive chambers, Mississippi still has a mere 8.9% of all conflict votes for which a coalition was necessary, all led by the majority (column 9). Minority-led coalitions are highest in Tennessee, with 21.5% of all conflict votes decided in this fashion on average over the time frame.

From these descriptive figures, it is possible to see a pattern emerging of the degree of competition between the parties across a number of dimensions. It is also possible to see the emergence of the relationships between the competition variables and the dependent variables.

*Chamber Roll Call Variables and Time*
Most important in discerning the stages of transition as represented by the activities in these chambers is the correlation of these variables with time. Some chambers report significant rates of change, while other seem more static. This will have a great influence on the behavior of certain variables in the analysis which follows. In order to produce the over-time correlations, I inserted a count variable to stand surrogate for time — in this case, as in Chapter 2, the passage of time rather than the passage of sessions. Here, a sequential number was assigned \(1, 2, 3 \ldots k\) for each year in the time-frame of the data set. These numbers were then inserted according to year for each year for which there was data for each chamber.

Table 5:3 provides a correlation between the average values of selected variables across these chambers across time. All of the chambers in the sample have seen the competition between the parties in the chamber increase over time (see column 1), but this change is statistically significant in only four of them. The degree of statistical significance also varies: the rate of change is much higher in Mississippi, Florida and Texas than in Virginia.

Democratic cohesion (column 3) is also variant in terms of the rate of change over time. Both party's cohesion levels are dropping in Mississippi (see columns 3 and 4), probably due to the fact that the minority party is starting the time period at almost zero and ending it in single digits in terms of their chamber share. This gives special leverage
Table 5.3
Correlation of Selected Roll Call Variables and Time: Roll Call Sample; 6 States: 1974-1988

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chamber (Sorted on Party Chamber Competition)</th>
<th>1) Party Chamber Competition</th>
<th>2) Non-Conflict Votes+</th>
<th>3) Democratic Cohesion++</th>
<th>4) Republican Cohesion++</th>
<th>5) Democratic Cohesion at 80% or Greater+</th>
<th>6) Republican Cohesion at 80% or Greater+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Chambers</td>
<td>.45***</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.24*</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>.96**</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>-.47</td>
<td>-.74</td>
<td>-.35</td>
<td>-.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>.981**</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.88**</td>
<td>.83*</td>
<td>.95**</td>
<td>.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>.92**</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.84***</td>
<td>.75**</td>
<td>.79**</td>
<td>.77**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>.83*</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nevada</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>-.17</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.32</td>
<td>.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.92***</td>
<td>-.54</td>
<td>.84***</td>
<td>-.47</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>.31**</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.24*</td>
<td>.232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>.70*</td>
<td>.70*</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.89**</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.82*</td>
<td>.086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>-.30</td>
<td>-.78**</td>
<td>.78**</td>
<td>-.149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>.38</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>-.700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nevada</td>
<td>-.23</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.911*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>-.34</td>
<td>-.58*</td>
<td>-.21</td>
<td>-.38</td>
<td>-.623</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p=.05, **p=.01, ***p=.001
+Percent of all votes, aggregated by year; percentage averaged over all years.
++Mean of all votes by year, averaged over all years.
to individual defections from the minority party in the computation of their cohesion measure. The parties are both becoming much more unified in Texas and Florida over time (strongly positive correlation coefficients which are statistically significant) which suggests that the influence of the two-party competition variable as seen in the earlier plots may be at work. Moving through the sequence, Virginia’s and Nevada’s cohesion measures are relatively static, and in Tennessee (where the Republicans lost ground in terms of chamber share) Democratic cohesion is significantly higher over time while the Republicans have experienced a slight decrease in cohesion.

Overall, while the total number of party conflict votes has remained roughly stable over time (column 7), the number of votes where coalitions with members of the opposite party have been necessary to decide the outcome of a vote has increased significantly (column 8). Specific to individual chambers. Texas and Mississippi report statistically significant increases in necessary coalitions. Mississippi’s increase may be due to the greater share of the chamber the majority takes. Tennessee reports a significant decrease, perhaps due to the dual effect of the strongly significant increase in Democratic cohesion and the slight downturn on the Republican cohesion measure.

Though necessary coalitions in Florida have dropped, there is a significant increase in the percentage of the number of necessary coalitions led by the minority party (in all cases the Republicans).
In summation, it seems that while non-conflictual voting between the parties clearly predominates, and while the "cohesion" level of both parties in the sample is high, there is sufficient conflict between the parties as well as sufficient departure from unity to raise interesting questions as to what drives this conflict.

_Itra-party Cohesion and Inter-party Conflict_

The high levels of cohesion evident in the descriptive analysis above beg the question of how this cohesion manifests itself. The transforming chambers under examination here have undergone some level of internal transition from one-party dominant chambers to becoming two-party competitive chambers. Hypothesis 1 states that _as party competition in elections rises and the chamber becomes more competitive between the parties, the parties will become more cohesive across all votes._

In order to measure the rate of party cohesion more precisely, I have used the Rice index of cohesion, which allows for greater variation than does the measure which only provides the percentage of the party voting on the same side of a question. The Rice index rises as party cohesion rises (i.e. the distance between the majority partisans of the party grows larger as the percentage of the minority of the total partisans falls).
I have used a partisan chamber strength variable which is similar to the Rice Index in that it is the distance between the parties in the chamber, rather than the strength of one party or another. It is simply the minority subtracted from the majority in the chamber, with this total subtracted from 100 so as to convert the values to positive values. This variable rises as chamber competition rises.

Two-party Electoral Competition, Party Chamber Competition, and Intra-party Cohesion

While simple OLS regressions might be useful in determining the impact of the endogenous variables on intra-party cohesion, it is crucial to remember that two-party competition (a variable exogenous to the system of the chamber itself) has been hypothesized to (in part) cause the variance in the distance between the parties in the chamber. This being so (see Chapter 2), it has been hypothesized that two-party competition has both a direct and indirect effect on Roll Call cohesion. To test this, a simple OLS regression would be structurally incorrect and theoretically improper, as it would assume that all of the processes were occurring simultaneously. For this reason I have constructed the path models which follow in illustrations 5:1 - 5:6. These models preserve the hypothesized sequence of events and the direction of causality. In order to construct the models found in these illustrations, I used the standardized (beta) coefficients.
Illustration 5.1: Mississippi

- $X^1 = \text{Two-party Competition}$
- $X^2 = \text{Party Chamber Competition}$
- $X^3 = \text{Roll Call Cohesion - Majority Party}$
- $X^4 = \text{Roll Call Cohesion - Minority Party}$

- Mississippi Majority Party Overall $r = -0.015$
- Indirect Through Chamber: $-0.483$

- Mississippi Minority Party Overall $r = -0.985$
- Indirect Through Chamber: $-0.839$
Illustration 5:4: Virginia

- $X^1 = \text{Two-party Competition}$
  - $X^2 = \text{Party Chamber Competition}$  (-.336)
  - $X^3 = \text{Roll Call Cohesion - Majority Party}$
  - $\text{Indirect Through Chamber: .050}$

- $\text{Virginia Majority Party Overall } r = .396$
- $\text{Virginia Minority Party Overall } r = -.473$
- $X^3 = \text{Roll Call Cohesion - Minority Party}$
  - $\text{Indirect Through Chamber: -.086}$
Illustration 5:5: Nevada

$X^1 = \text{Two-party Competition}$

$X^2 = \text{Party Chamber Competition}$

$(-.528)$

$(-.314)$

Nevada Majority Party
Overall $r = -.379$

$X^3 = \text{Roll Call Cohesion - Majority Party}$

Indirect Through Chamber: .149

Nevada Minority Party
Overall $r = .265$

$X^3 = \text{Roll Call Cohesion - Minority Party}$

Indirect Through Chamber: .081
Illustration 5:6: Tennessee

- $X^1 = \text{Two-party Competition}$
  - $X^2 = \text{Party Chamber Competition}$ ($-0.339$)
  - $X^3 = \text{Roll Call Cohesion - Majority Party}$ ($-0.394$) ($0.657$)
  - Tennessee Majority Party Overall $r = -0.616$
  - Indirect Through Chamber: $-0.222$

- $X^1 = \text{Two-party Competition}$
  - $X^2 = \text{Party Chamber Competition}$ ($-0.339$)
  - $X^3 = \text{Roll Call Cohesion - Minority Party}$ ($0.396$) ($-0.213$)
  - Tennessee Minority Party Overall $r = 0.469$
  - Indirect Through Chamber: $0.872$
Accordingly, $x^1$ = two-party competition, $x^2$ = partisan distance in the chamber and $X^3$ = roll call cohesion. Where $p_{12}$ is the coefficient of the relationship between $x^1$ and $x^2$; $p_{13}$ is the coefficient of the relationship between $x^1$ and $x^3$ (derived from the multiple regression: $x^3 = x^1 + x^2 + \varepsilon_i$); and $p_{23}$ is the coefficient of the relationship between $X^2$ and $X^3$ (derived from the multiple regression: $x^3 = x^1 + x^2 + \varepsilon_i$). OLS regression was used to determine the coefficients of these relationships, as they are assumed to be linear relationships (see Asher, 1983:30). I have reported the overall correlation between two-party competition and roll call cohesion, as well as the $p_{21}p_{32}$ values, or the indirect effect as mediated by party distance in the chamber or “chamber competition”. The direction of the overall correlation is also noted.

For the models, the following equations were performed to determine the correlations:

$$r_{12} = p_{21}$$

$p_{21}p_{32}$ = the “indirect” effect of two-party electoral competition.

$$r_{13} = p_{31} + p_{21}p_{32}$$ = the “overall” effect of two-party electoral competition.

(After Asher, 1983; pp. 39-40)

Illustrations 5:1 - 5:6 report the direct and indirect (through chamber competition) effects of two-party competition on party cohesion. First, it is important to remember that in such path models the effect of two-party competition on party chamber competition will always be the same in a given chamber regardless of whether we are
considering the majority or the minority party. In the chambers here, this effect is positive except in Virginia and Tennessee.

Looking back to the elections plots (see plots 5:4 and 5:6) we can see why this is so. In Virginia, two-party competition is negatively related to chamber competition because even though chamber competition is rising (see Table 5:3, column 1), two-party competition is falling significantly (see column 11) as a result of falling competition levels of both the parties in the chamber over time (see plot 5:4). Though the path models do not actually test time as an independent variable. we can assume that this decline over time has been precipitous enough to drive the relationship across the observations negative. Tennessee, in which the minority party has lost seats in the chamber, has a negative relationship between these variables not only because two-party competition is falling (both across the observations and across time: see Table 5:3 column 11) but also because the actual rise in chamber competition is slight.

The overall effect of two-party competition on roll call cohesion across all votes is negative in 7 of the 12 chamber cohesion instances reported: the Virginia minority and majority parties (see comments on two-party competition above), the Florida minority party, the Mississippi minority party, the Texas majority party, the Tennessee majority party, and the majority party in Nevada. This sums to 3 minority parties and 4 majority parties.
It is, overall, positive with regard to the Nevada minority party, the Tennessee minority party, the Texas minority party, the Mississippi majority party, and the Florida majority party.

While the direction of the effect on the individual parties in these chambers must remain a question for further research\textsuperscript{68}, the important point is that in only one instance – that of the Florida majority – is the \textit{direct} effect of two-party competition \textit{weaker} than the indirect effect (through competition in the chamber). Clearly, two-party competition has direct effect on cohesion across all votes which generally supersedes that of its effect via the chamber competition variable. It is also important to point out that while there may be some consistency between the direction of these coefficients and the results associated with the time variable in Table 5:3 (columns 3 and 4), two-party competition is not monatomic (as is time) and cannot be expected to perform with the same consistency as time.

\textit{Caucus Development and Intra-party Cohesion Across Conflict Votes}

In Chapter 4, I hypothesized that the development of complex party caucus organizations may lead to greater cohesion in both the minority and majority parties. Hypothesis 2 of Chapter 5 states that \textit{increasing caucus complexity will result in greater}

\textsuperscript{68} When or rather IF they may be linked to caucus complexity.
majority and minority party cohesion across conflict votes when tested as a separate variable. Here, I have taken a measure of caucus complexity for the years 1981 and 1988, and used it as an independent variable with majority and minority voting cohesion. This measure of caucus development is somewhat limited in that it is only available for 2 years of this time-frame. This means that, in the aggregate, I am contending with an n of 10 (9 degrees of freedom for any bivariate regression or correlation). Because these limitations curtail the time frame, there are problems of a theoretical nature as well as mathematical ones: it is assumed that the change in cohesion will take place incrementally over time, rather than across time with a sharp disjuncture. A path analysis, similar to the model run for two-party competition and distance between the parties in the chamber, should be run, in order to determine the direct and indirect effects of two-party competition, party distance, and caucus complexity on roll call cohesion for each of the parties. Unfortunately, the small “n” problem here makes it impractical to run such a series of regressions and correlations. In lieu of this, I have run some somewhat suggestive, if not entirely confirmatory, tests on the data. With this caution in mind, I believe that the analysis is fairly reliable within these constraints.

Table 5:4 contains the results of two simple OLS regressions of the effects of increasing caucus complexity on party unity under conflict voting. While both parties' results are in the expected direction, only the results for the majority party are significant. At least in the case of the Democrats, increasing caucus complexity results in increasing
party unity when conflict between the parties occurs. This addresses the Hypothesis 3 statement: *where conflict occurs, however, the parties will be more unified under the changed conditions resulting from party competition in the electorate and in the chamber (i.e. caucus complexity).* This also suggests the validity of Jewel and Patterson's statement that:

The caucus ... gives the leadership a chance to explain which bills are of concern to the party, and to urge a particular course of action with regard to these bills. It gives the rank and file members a chance to express their views. If it becomes clear that the party is seriously divided, the leaders have an opportunity to revise or delay the bill and thereby to prevent the division from being transferred to the floor of the house. If the caucus demonstrates that there is substantial agreement concerning a measure, the members may be more likely to go along with it in a roll call vote ... (Jewell and Patterson, 1973:200)

In summation, for intra-party cohesion, we can say from the above:
Table 5:4

Effect of Increasing Caucus Complexity on Democratic Unity Under Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coefficients*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stand ardiz ed Coef</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unstandardized Coefficients nts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>81.944</td>
<td>1.749</td>
<td>46.839</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Caucus Complexity</td>
<td>1.123</td>
<td>.332</td>
<td>.730</td>
<td>3.379</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Dependent Variable: DUNITY_1

Effect of Increasing Caucus Complexity on Republican Unity Under Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coefficients*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stand ardiz ed Coef</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unstandardized Coefficients nts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>83.426</td>
<td>1.217</td>
<td>70.186</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Caucus Complexity</td>
<td>.260</td>
<td>.231</td>
<td>.335</td>
<td>1.124</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Dependent Variable: RUNITY_1
The *direct* effect of two-party electoral competition on roll call cohesion is stronger in all cases (save one) than the indirect effect of two-party competition through party chamber competition. The result of two-party competition on roll call cohesion is variable by chamber and in many cases by the majority or minority position of the party in question. The effect of two-party competition does seem to be related to time and the placement of the chamber in terms of its development in the transformative process. The internal variables tend to support this view: as party caucus complexity rises, party cohesion (for both the minority and the majority) *also* rises. Conflict falls as caucus complexity rises, but this relationship has to be left open to question due to the limited data in which the relationship was tested.

The second portion of this analysis is devoted to inter-partisan conflict. While it may be informative in some cases to strictly divide the roll-call votes along the dichotomous lines of conflict and non-conflict (as found in the descriptive statistics at the outset of this analysis), it is also useful to have a continuous measure of conflict. For this reason, I have used such a measure, an “index of difference” (seen briefly in the analysis of caucus complexity above) in the balance of the analysis. This measure is one which subtracts the partisans of one party from the other on the winning side of a bill. The index is also a measure of cohesion in that it measures the polarization of the parties. The measure rises as conflict between the parties rises (and as intra-party cohesion, measured
across both parties, rises), and falls as this conflict drops. I have also inserted the dichotomous "dummy" variable conflict to examine the descriptive variables under conditions in which the parties face off against one another, and, conversely, when the majorities of the parties are on the same side of a given question. Further, I have divided the roll calls by bill type along the lines of the Hedlund-Hamm committee types utilized in Chapter 3, in order to discern whether or not conflict and the index of difference varies across types of bills.

Table 5:5 reports the mean values for selected cohesion and conflict variables by chamber. Here, it is clear that there is some variation across the chambers across these variables. The degree of conflict as measured by the index of difference ranges from a low of 10.3 in Virginia to a high of 24.2 in Texas. The greatest unity within the parties when the parties are in conflict (and therefore the highest "index of difference under conflict") can be found in the chambers which have had the longest history of two-party competition in the chamber – Tennessee and Nevada. The lowest is in the chamber in which there is still an essentially one-party dominant system, the "baseline" chamber in Mississippi.
### Table 5.5: Mean Values of Selected Cohesion and Conflict Variables by Chamber

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chamber</th>
<th>Mean Majority Party Unity Under Conflict</th>
<th>Mean Minority Party Unity Under Conflict</th>
<th>Mean Index of Difference</th>
<th>Mean Index of Difference Under Conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>63.9</td>
<td>79.7</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>31.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>72.9</td>
<td>78.8</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>46.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>71.0</td>
<td>77.0</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>47.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>70.6</td>
<td>74.0</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>43.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nevada</td>
<td>86.2</td>
<td>72.9</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>49.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>78.0</td>
<td>76.5</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5:6 reports the correlation between selected conflict variables and time, by chamber. Here, as in illustrations 5:1-5:6, we can see snapshots of the transition process, with each chamber revealing a piece of the wider story. Mississippi, which lies at the baseline of chamber competition (mean of chamber competition is 7.9, no caucuses, little party proportionality on committees), reports the index of difference and the index of difference under conflict both declining as over time. This is understandable in that we are moving in this case from a period in which the minority Republicans percentage share of the chamber goes from single digits to slightly larger single digits (from 1.6% to 7.4%). The effect of decline is probably due to the fact that the leverage of one defection is great enough to bias the results. Further, as pointed out above, we cannot expect much positive movement in a chamber lacking the internal mechanisms which are supposed to drive the changes.
Table 5.6: Correlation Between Selected Conflict Variables and Time, by Chamber

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chamber: Mississippi</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Index of Difference</th>
<th>Index of Difference Under Conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.923*</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.861</td>
<td>0.736</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chamber: Texas</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Index of Difference</th>
<th>Index of Difference Under Conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.362</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.542*</td>
<td>0.724</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chamber: Florida</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Index of Difference</th>
<th>Index of Difference Under Conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.876*</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.940*</td>
<td>0.873*</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chamber: Virginia</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Index of Difference</th>
<th>Index of Difference Under Conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.467</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.489</td>
<td>0.568</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.6: Correlation Between Selected Conflict Variables and Time, by Chamber; Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chamber: Nevada</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Index of Difference</th>
<th>Index of Difference Under Conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index of Difference</td>
<td>-0.455</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index of Difference Under Conflict</td>
<td>0.462</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chamber: Tennessee</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Index of Difference</th>
<th>Index of Difference Under Conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index of Difference</td>
<td>-0.649</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index of Difference Under Conflict</td>
<td>-0.502</td>
<td>0.670</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sig. Determined by Two-tailed Test

Two-party Competition and the Index of Difference

Hypothesis 4 stated that: The evolution of the relationship between conflict and cohesion should follow a pattern. The direction of conflictual voting notwithstanding, as the party organizations become more complex and the chamber becomes more partisan, the polarization of the parties will lead to greater cohesion of partisans within the parties when conflict between the parties occurs. Initially, I will test the relationship between two-party competition in the electorate and two-party chamber competition with the index of difference derived from the roll call votes. As the data for caucuses and committees do not lend themselves to the path models required for the sequence, I have had to be satisfied that the relationship between two-party competition and caucus and committee development as confirmed in chapters 3 and 4 will be supported by testing the elections and chamber variables directly on the roll call votes. While I have already examined caucuses above, a section below will be devoted to committees.
Illustrations 5:7 - 5:12 are path models similar to those run for the minority and majority party for Roll-Call cohesion. Here, the intention is to discover what the relationship is between two-party competition and party conflict. As in the earlier plots, I have used position $x^2$ as that of party chamber competition, as party chamber competition
Illustration 5.7: Mississippi

\[ X^1 = \text{Two-party Competition} \]

\[ X^2 = \text{Party Chamber Competition} \]

Overall Effect of Two-Party Competition on Index of Difference: .138
Indirect Effect: -.083

\[ X^3 = \text{Index of Difference} \]
Illustration 5.8: Texas

Overall Effect of Two-Party Competition on Index of Difference: -.061
Indirect Effect: .054

X1 = Two-party Competition

X2 = Party Chamber Competition

X3 = Index of Difference

.543

.101

-.116
Illustration 5: Florida

- $X^1 = \text{Two-party Competition}$
- $X^2 = \text{Party Chamber Competition}$
- $X^3 = \text{Index of Difference}$

Overall Effect of Two-Party Competition on Index of Difference: .100
Indirect Effect: .209
Illustration 5:10: Virginia

Overall Effect of Two-Party Competition on Index of Difference: .411
Indirect Effect: .130

$X^1 =$ Two-party Competition

$X^2 =$ Party Chamber Competition

$X^3 =$ Index of Difference

- .336

.281

- .389
Illustration 5.11: Nevada

Overall Effect of Two-Party Competition on Index of Difference: -0.411
Direct Effect: -0.476

\[ X^2 = \text{Party Chamber Competition} \]

\[ X^2 = \text{Index of Difference} \]

\[ X^2 = \text{Two-party Competition} \]
has been demonstrated to be caused in part by rising two-party competition in
other settings (see Chapter 2, and plots above).

The models displayed report that in half the cases the indirect effect of two-party
competition (that mediated by chamber competition) is stronger than the direct effect
(compare with the findings for illustrations 5:1-5:6). The direct effect is strongest in
Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia. The stronger effect is positive in Mississippi and
Virginia (i.e. greater two-party competition leads to greater party conflict) but negative in
Texas. The indirect effect is stronger in Florida, Nevada and Tennessee, and here the
stronger effect is positive in Tennessee and Florida, but negative in Nevada. There is no
ready explanation for the two negative findings in this case.

It may also be that both partisan cohesion and party conflict vary according to the
types of bills involved. Hypothesis 5 stated that: Party conflict voting will vary across
bill type: some bill types are more likely to divide the chamber along party lines than
others. This behavior will become more pronounced as party organizations become more
complex and important.

The earlier work in chapter 3 suggests that the leadership of the majority
considers certain types of committees to be more important to their interests than others.
This being the case, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that conflict in will arise with greater frequency on some bill types than on others. Table 5:7 utilizes the Hedlund-Hamm division of bills across the chambers across time and reports the mean values of variables according to the bill type.

We can see from this table that there is a good bit of variation across bill types. Majority party unity across all types of bills seems to be consistently high; similarly, minority party cohesion is high, with the greatest unity displayed on policy bills and the lowest cohesion on minor money bills.
Table 5:7 Selected Variables of Party Cohesion and Conflict by Bill Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Legislative Control Bills</th>
<th>Major Money Bills</th>
<th>Elections and Reapportionment Bills</th>
<th>Minor Money Bills</th>
<th>Substantive Policy Bills</th>
<th>All Bills</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean Majority Party Unity</td>
<td>77.7</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>82.8</td>
<td>88.0</td>
<td>86.0</td>
<td>86.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Majority Party Unity Under Conflict</td>
<td>78.1</td>
<td>72.3</td>
<td>82.9</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td>71.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Minority Party Unity</td>
<td>86.7</td>
<td>86.0</td>
<td>87.2</td>
<td>84.0</td>
<td>90.3</td>
<td>87.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Minority Party Unity Under Conflict</td>
<td>86.7</td>
<td>80.2</td>
<td>91.1</td>
<td>80.2</td>
<td>76.8</td>
<td>77.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Index of Difference</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Index of Difference Under Conflict</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>69.5</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>45.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Turning to party unity when the parties face off against each other ("under conflict" in the table), we find that minority party unity is consistently higher than that of the majority party across all types of bills, but particularly with respect to legislative control bills.

The last two rows report the index of difference both across all bills of a given type, all bills considered together, and these same divisions under conflict only. Generally, the index returns higher values for elections and reapportionment bills and legislative control bills than among the other types of bills. It is interesting that substantive policy bills, considered together, fall below the mean of the index of difference, as do minor money bills.

The index of difference and the index of difference under conflict more effectively reveal the differences in voting among these types of bills. Here, the mean index of difference is highest on elections and reapportionment bills: a type of bill where party conflict should be expected. Next are legislative control bills, which are generally those types of bills which deal with matters pertaining to the running of the chamber. These are followed by major money bills – generally budget measures of one sort or another. Substantive policy bills and minor money measures are the least conflictual – they both fall below the mean of conflict on bills of all types, supporting the notion in the
hypothesis that in terms of substantive policy bills, conflict will decrease as the committees become more proportional\textsuperscript{69}.

When we consider the cohesion of parties under conflict, the order is slightly different. Here, elections and reapportionment bills are in the same order as above, but minor money bills (when conflictual) seem to generate more unity than do budget bills. Again, substantive policy bills fall below the mean of all bill types (when conflictual). This being the case, it is important to pursue the idea that the changes the majority leadership makes on the committees which have an effect on these bills may have an effect on holding the party together in voting on them.

I will leave the consideration of possible path models here to future research, but note that we know that the leadership selection of the partisan composition of critical committees is in part caused by their consideration of the changing partisan composition of the chamber and the level of two-party competition in the electoral realm. The OLS model below simply tests whether, in general, the party composition of major committees (legislative leadership, major money committees, elections and reapportionment committees, minor money committees and substantive policy committees) has a direct effect on voting as measured by the index of difference according to bill type.

\textsuperscript{69} We have seen, in chapter 3, that the substantive committees become more proportional between the chamber strength of the minority and the committee share of that party on substantive policy committees. The opposite is true with regard to the chamber control committees.
It is important to note that the proportion of Republicans on these committees may not in some instances reduce conflict. These are the types of cases noted by Hamm (1982) in which, because of the confuting effect of the development of the caucuses, minority voting may change significantly between the committee vote and the floor vote. Unfortunately, this effect is not measurable by the data available in this study, but the sometimes controvertible effects of committee proportionality and caucus development should be examined in future research.

In view of the findings in chapter 3, perhaps the more interesting question for this section of the study is whether the over-proportion of majority members on particular types of committees has a direct effect on the polarization of the parties on bills which are associated with these committee types. In order to examine this question, a special data set was constructed which matched committee proportions by type with bill by type. These figures were averaged by chamber and “roll call /committee year” and used in a regression. The results of this test may be found in Table 5:8.
Table 5.8: Results of OLS Regression of Index of Difference by Democratic Proportion on Committee Types Matched to Bill Type, by Bill Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bill Type</th>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Coefficients</th>
<th>Std Coefficients</th>
<th>Std Error</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>Sig</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legislative Control Bills</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>22.146</td>
<td>10.438</td>
<td>2.122</td>
<td>.072</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Democratic Proportion on Committees</td>
<td>1.620</td>
<td>.591</td>
<td>.719</td>
<td>2.740</td>
<td>.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Major Money Bills</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>19.148</td>
<td>2.72B</td>
<td>7.019</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Democratic Proportion on Committees</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>.285</td>
<td>.248</td>
<td>1.357</td>
<td>.186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Elections and Reapportionment Bills</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>18.539</td>
<td>3.485</td>
<td>5.319</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Democratic Proportion on Committees</td>
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<td>.659</td>
<td>-.947</td>
<td>-5.889</td>
<td>.004</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Minor Money Bills</strong></td>
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<td>(Constant)</td>
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<td>3.802</td>
<td>1.909</td>
<td>.105</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Democratic Proportion on Committees</td>
<td>7.128E-02</td>
<td>.398</td>
<td>.073</td>
<td>.179</td>
<td>.864</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Substantive Policy Bills</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>17.441</td>
<td>.971</td>
<td>17.965</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Democratic Proportion on Committees</td>
<td>-0.291</td>
<td>.427</td>
<td>-.128</td>
<td>-0.681</td>
<td>.501</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a. Dependent Variable: INDEX of DIFFERENCE*
When the proportion of majority members on particular committee types is matched with the specific bill types, we can see (Table 5:8) that polarization is positive and significant on legislative control bills, but negative and statistically significant on elections and reapportionment bills. We know (from Chapter 3) that as chamber and electoral competition rises, the majority leadership tends to stack the legislative control committees, but that it grants greater proportion to the minority on elections and reapportionment committees. Returning to Hypothesis 6 (re-stated above), it seems from these findings to be confirmed that where the majority stacks committees, polarization results, but where greater proportionality is in effect, less conflict arises. While the direction of the results remains positive on major and minor money bills (we know from Chapter 3 that the majority tends to “stack” these committees), the relationship is negative, as hypothesized, for substantive policy bills.

When considering these results in light of the mean values for bill types given above (see Table 5:8), it may be seen that though elections and reapportionment bills tend to generate more conflict than do other types of bills, this conflict is negatively affected by proportionally representing the minority party. Legislative control bills tend to stir a good bit of inter-party conflict, and this conflict will tend to be heightened by the majority leadership stacking these committees.
In sum, the stacking of some committees by the majority and, conversely, the proportionality of minority members on others, has a significant effect on the level and intensity of inter-party conflict. This effect, as alluded to in chapter 3, is variable both by the level of committee stacking overall and the level of committee stacking (or proportional representation) on particular committees. Further, the level of conflict with respect to the type of bill is also variable, and the effect of committee proportion on party conflict is variable by both the type of committee in which the majority has greater proportion and the type of bill from which the roll call is extracted.

**Conclusion**

I began my expectations section above with the following statements, and they have generally been resolved as expected, though not always resolved in the particular as they were hypothesized.

With respect to the specific hypotheses, this study has been somewhat varied in its success. This Chapter on the linkages of external and internal party organization and behavior to chamber voting behavior in the transforming lower house chambers has resolved the original hypotheses stated above in the following manner:

- $H^1$: _As party competition in elections rises and the chamber becomes more competitive between the parties, the parties will become more internally cohesive_
across all votes. This is generally confirmed, but with the huge caveat that it depends on the stage of transformation of the internal factors - specifically the caucuses - at which the chamber is tested as to the direction of cohesion for both parties in the chambers. The path models found that there was great variation in terms of direction, and that cohesion was sometimes negatively impacted by two-party competition.

- $H^2$ Increasing caucus complexity will result in greater majority and minority party cohesion. As the chamber becomes more competitive, the leadership of each party was expected to seek, through the caucuses, a greater degree of control over their partisans. As far as this was testable, it was confirmed.

- $H^3$ Where conflict occurs, however, the parties will be more unified under the changed conditions resulting from party competition in the electorate and in the chamber (i.e. caucus complexity). This was generally confirmed. From the data available it seems there is an association between caucus complexity and the level of cohesion under conflict, particularly for the majority party.

- $H^4$ The evolution of the relationship between conflict and cohesion should follow a pattern. The direction of conflictual voting notwithstanding, as the party organizations become more complex and the chamber becomes more partisan, the polarization of the parties will lead to greater cohesion of partisans within the parties
when conflict between the parties occurs. This hypothesis was confirmed both
generally and specifically, and the effects varying with the level of party competition.
As party conflict declines, party cohesion rises.

- **H⁵** Party conflict voting will vary across bill type: some bill types are more likely to
divide the chamber along party lines than others. This behavior will become more
pronounced as party organizations become more complex and important. This was
generally borne out, with the caveat that chamber-by-chamber analysis could not be
carried out.

- **H⁶** The development, increasing importance, and increasing partisan proportional
equilibrium on committees will tend to decrease substantially the amount of conflict
on the floor of the chamber.

Overall, this hypothesis was confirmed.

Collie noted over a decade ago that “even marginally longitudinal studies of party
behavior in American state legislatures are noticeably absent” (Collie, 1984). I would
posit that very little progress has been made, save the few exceptions made above, on this
score in the last 12 years. In an address to a Roundtable discussion on the future of study
of state politics (Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, 1995),
Jewell pointedly singled out this area as one which had been little pursued since his piece
in 1955, particularly in the comparative state legislative area. It has become increasingly clear that we need to be willing to invest the time and effort necessary to redress this problem. We must conduct more cross-state comparative research, and this must be across enough sessions to assess longitudinal developments, as individual case studies and single-year multiple-state studies can only answer very particularistic questions about the range and contours of variation in party voting in these legislatures.
CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION: THE TRANSFORMING LEGISLATURES: CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTION OF FURTHER RESEARCH

It is incumbent on the practitioners of political science, and of science generally, to attempt two things in empirical research: not simply prediction (which often seems to stand alone) but also explanation. In this study, I have attempted to address two “macro” problems. The first, not simply to predict the changes in transforming legislatures, but to explain why they are changing, or “transforming” in this fashion. The second, to address a major problem (which I believe restricts and constricts scholarship in American political parties and has provided those of us in the area of legislative study with an easy justification for limiting our scope both theoretically and empirically): to look at outputs as well as inputs.

Since the publication of Key’s popular text on American party politics in the late 1950s, most Americanist political party scholars have labored under misplaced confidence in the notion that the three realms into which the American political parties are popularly divided were both easily separable and for the most part self-contained.
These realms were the so-called “party in the electorate”, the “party as organization” and the “party in government”. The recent popularity of linkage arguments has sufficiently debunked much of this artificial separation to the point at which a study like this one could go forward, and further lend credence to the notion that these allegedly separate arenas are indeed inextricably intertwined and interdependent areas in which a singular (though multifaceted) organization operates.

In the classic Cooper and Brady sense, this has been a “diachronic” work. Cooper and Brady envisioned the over-time investigation of various aspects of the US Congress, but, as Collie noted, “the point [concerning the use of organizational theory] holds for cross-sectional analysis of legislatures as well” (1994:565). I believe what I have done here is to move beyond this by at least one step. My study is a dynamic examination of organizational aspects of the legislature while also a cross-sectional comparative piece as well. By examining 15 legislatures cross-sectionally and over a significant time period (1968-1996), all crucial dimensions are present, if not always in as much depth as one would like. It is my firm belief that cross-environmental linkage arguments are best investigated and demonstrated in this way. In the search for variance in political science, the models have become incredibly complex, often in order to synthesize or create in an experimental environment the very aspects which may be viewed empirically by simply collecting and analyzing data in situ.
The task of collecting and coding such data is not trivial – the collection for the study here required better than $2^{1/2}$ years of countless man-hours\textsuperscript{70} to collect and manage, exclusive of analysis and writing - but the return, I will argue, is well worth the effort. To paraphrase Rick Wilson, one of the more interesting aspects of true empirical work is that you don’t know whether your findings are going to support your thesis (or if they do, at what level) going in, or, in some cases, half-way or two-thirds of the way through\textsuperscript{71}. The combination of massive time investment in data collection and a risk margin in the outcome for the work itself creates a research environment which is certainly not to everyone’s taste. We in the field do, however, have a responsibility to science which goes far beyond questions of what is “comfortable” in our lab-work.

The area of state politics is not to everyone’s taste, either, and probably because the best work in this field is done by those who are resigned to the necessity of true empirical research. Because the data problems are so larger and the research questions so numerous, we often seem to move at a snail’s pace in outlining even the most fundamental contours of the environment. In part, this is because the very thing which makes the study of comparative state politics so rich – the diversity – also tends to

\textsuperscript{70} Not by this researcher alone. I owe an incalculable debt of gratitude to Keith Hamm, Ron Hedlund, Wayne Francis, Bob Harmel and other charter members of what I have come to call the “dirty data” collectors group for sharing their data, time, and wisdom in the execution of this work. Andrew Weber also deserves mention here, for collecting the majority of the roll call data: though we had our problems, in the end they were “his punches”.

\textsuperscript{71} This is not to imply that this type of research is performed “blind” - of course it is not; but there is a margin of error present in uncontrolled and uncontrollable data margins that simply does not exist in experimental work unless, of course, the model has been purposely designed that way (“controlled”).
overwhelm us in the search for generalizable “laws” and enduring assumptions upon
which to base out investigations. For this reason we tend to default to taxonomies of one
sort or another: regional taxonomies, political - cultural codices, and indices or ranking
schemes based on organizational or institutional structures and norms. These very
indices on which we rely for categorization in order to (however artificially) bound the
variance have the nasty side-effect – in dynamic study – of imposing a static schematic
on what we hope is a process or series of processes in motion over time.

In this study, I have resolved this internal contradiction by “bounding” the
environment of the process of transformation in legislatures by one of the dynamic
components of the process: party competition in the electoral realm. While this has
reconciled the difficulty of the static overlay, it has created other, sometimes more radical
problems for the analysis. Electoral competition no more remains static than the other
components (which is why it is useful), but it also does not always move monatomically
over time or the transformative process. This means that by essentially using a moving
boundary for the study, the units which are defined as within that boundary sometimes
slip out. Further, there is a tautological element present: since these units (the chambers)
are classified as “transforming” by one of the independent variables (party competition),
all activity which takes place in the thus-classified units is, by definition,
“transformative”. In order to attempt to control this problem of circular evidence, I have
tried to explicate in terms of “stability” and the level of the process of transformation.
While this may seem a simple semantic problem, it is in fact a problem central to the
notion of dynamic change: all legislatures are, to a point, constantly undergoing a process
of transformation and reinvention. I do not want to create the impression anywhere in
this work that it is assumed that once legislatures reach some point of complexity, they
structurally and behaviorally grind to a halt and become rigid. Further, there is evidence
that the behavioral indicators in the transformative process are not moving across time in
an entirely linear or unidimensional manner. Rising conflict in roll call votes across one
stage, for example, subsides and changes direction in another.

The stages of transformation are not always easily identified, though the contours
of the process are painfully teased out. As in all comparative research, the units in this
study are undergoing variable internal pressures which are not always shared by the other
units across stages and even during the same stage. In most comparative research, we
start out with the assumption that the units are "comparable" or that non-comparable units
are being compared on comparable variables. While this is a useful heuristic, the outputs
of even the most rigidly controlled models in the real world of real empirical research
will always reveal an element of uncertainty as to the impact of undefined variables on
those variables of principle interest which have been defined and examined. In
shorthand, of course, this is the "error term" of any social science equation which uses
real-world data, and is often dismissed as such. But certain kinds of error terms create
special problems in linkage arguments which may not be present, or are only of
peripheral concern in other types of models. The "undefined" set in this study runs to a rather large list, and includes such viable explanatory components of the process as interest group influence, the effect of endogenous economic shocks, changing relationships with other governmental units over which the legislature has little or no control\textsuperscript{72}, and so on; to say nothing of speaker or leadership idiosyncrasies or individual activities of legislators which may speed up or slow down the process.

This study is not, however, presented as a "complete" or "closed" model of these processes. Nor has it been a question of simply rounding up the "usual suspects" and plugging them into a massive regression equation while trying to boost the $r$ values. Party organization and leadership matter, as I argued in Chapter 1, and they matter more as elections and chamber shares become more competitive. as I believe I have demonstrated throughout this work. This is not to say that, having confirmed this, we should abandon this area of research: the surface has only been scratched, but it has, indeed, been scratched now. Further research will better place these findings in their proper perspective, as always, over time.

\textit{Findings}

\textsuperscript{72} I am thinking here of the increasing role of the states in policy implementation as the federal government is trimmed.
This study has confirmed the linkages between the arenas of party behavior and structure often considered separate and complete unto themselves. I have explored the links between the "party in the electorate" and the "party in the chamber" and found them to be inextricably inter-connected. I have used as examples the legislative chambers currently in the process of transition between one-party dominated status and two-party competition to demonstrate this linkage, as they best lend themselves to such study in terms of the degree of variation on the critical factors of chamber party development.

The hypotheses put forward in Chapter 1 are, by-and-large, confirmed by the empirical evidence as set out in the foregoing chapters. Illustration 6:1 recalls the original model sequence.
Illustration 6:1

Chapter 4

Development of Party, Caucus — Complexity of Tasks, Importance of Role

Electoral Events, Partisan Contention, Competition and Success (Chapter 2)

Difference in Partisan Chamber Strength (Chapter 2)

Chamber Voting

Direct Chapter 4 (4)

Indirect Chapter 3 (2)

Direct Chapter 5 (6)

Indirect Chapter 3 (3)

Direct Chapter 5 (5)

Direct Chapter 5 (7)

Direct Chapter 5 (8)

Chapter 5

Partisan Differentiation in Chamber (Variable Committee Proportionality Across Committee Types)
Chapter 2 examined the relationship between variance in party contestation and party competition and the resulting changes in chamber strength in the transforming chambers. This chapter formed the baseline of the work as a whole. Particularly, it was found that in these transforming chambers, there was a higher degree of Republican competition and contestation as the chamber became more competitive, and, for the most part, in chambers where the Republicans have made significant inroads in terms of chamber strength, both contestation and particularly competition are up, with Republican competition more consistently correlated with time than is Republican contestation.

I found that the two-party measure adopted early in the analysis tended to mask the underlying features of individual party contestation and competition, which on the whole tend to be positive for the Republicans and negative for the Democrats. I also found that in the transforming chambers, the degree of chamber competition seemingly acted as a spur to contestation and competition: as chamber distance narrowed, Republican contestation and competition grew.

Two-party competition was hypothesized to tend to rise, rather than fall. Across the board, this was disconfirmed. Two-party contestation and two-party competition are both seemingly stable. They are not, however, stable as a result of no movement by the parties, rather the reverse. They remain stable as a result of sharply declining Democratic
contestation and competition coupled with sharply rising Republican contestation and competition, which also confirmed the expectation that the transforming chambers would reveal increasing electoral competition for the Republican party with attendant decreases for the Democratic party. Republican gains were, at least in part, a function of Democratic retrenchment.

There was a higher degree of Republican competition and contestation as the chamber became more competitive. In the transforming chambers, the degree of chamber competition did act as a spur to contestation and competition, and as chamber strength for the Republicans increased, contestation and competition for this party also increased as a function of chamber strength. The Republicans seem to be undergoing a learning process of some sort: the history of the electoral variables is clearly affected by the history of the minority's strength in the chamber.

In the transforming chambers, Republican contestation and competition rise as a function of time and distance and the transforming chambers can be viewed as chambers with similar characteristics. They lie, however, at different points in an unfolding process of becoming more chamber competitive. The chambers examined here display quite variant behaviors, but they were grouped into chambers which have become moderately more competitive over the time frame, those which have been competitive and remained so, and those which were one-party dominated at the beginning of the time frame but
have become two-party competitive during this period. The process observed is said to be “unfolding”: not only are the chambers at “different points in the process”, but they are at variant speeds of developing two-party competition. These factors have a tremendous effect on the strength and level of the effects of two-party electoral competition at every stage of the process of transformation as it unfolded in the ensuing chapters – particularly when two-party competition was tested in its direct and indirect effects on roll calls, party cohesion and conflict in the final analysis (Chapter 5).

The direct relationship between Republican (or minority party) contestation and chamber share was found to be strong. The more gains were made in a given electoral year, the more likely the minority was to widen their contestation base in the following election year; further, generally speaking, the greater the percentage of districts the minority contested, the more likely they were to widen their competitive base in subsequent years. Competition for the minority party is found to be a much better indicator of their continued gains in the chamber than contestation – overturning an earlier finding by Cassie, which seemed to find little connection between either variable and success. Again, the underlying dimension of Democratic retrenchment seems to be as responsible for these features of change as Republican gains.

In sum, the hypothesized link (1) drawn in illustration 6:1 was found to be confirmed.
Chapter 3 set out to investigate the linkages between electoral competition and majority party control of a major chamber organization: the committee system. There was support for an *independent* effect of electoral competition on committee proportionality in these findings, and certainly support for its *indirect* effect is quite strong for those committees hypothesized to be so affected.

I theorized that the majority would seek to limit the impact of rising minority party competition on committees critical to the control of the chamber and to the power of the purse by raising their proportion on these committees. Further, I hypothesized that as minority competition rose in the electoral realm and as their chamber share grew, minority proportion on the substantive policy committees would grow. These hypotheses were strongly supported. The analysis in Chapter 3 supported the hypothesis for an *independent* effect of electoral competition on committee proportionality and even more strongly supported the hypothesized *indirect* effect, via chamber share (links 2 and 3 in Ill. 6:1).

I did not anticipate the negative effect of competition on minority party proportionality on the elections and reapportionment committees (though this certainly was the case). It may be that this may be tied to the effects observable in some chambers with respect to roll calls on these issues: certainly, conflict is higher on the types of votes
associated with elections and reapportionment across the board than with any other bill type (see Chapter 5 committee analysis). The majority leadership, under conditions of increasing party competition in the electoral realm and in the chamber itself, appoints more minority party members to these committees than heretofore (see Chapter 3 section on appointments to committee with respect to rising chamber and electoral competition by committee type) but these number rise to the proportion of the minority in the chamber—they are not over-represented. I speculate that the greater the amount of competition in the electorate and in the chamber, the greater the internal stress on the majority party to reach compromise on elections and reapportionment issues: reaching an atmosphere of compromise may best served by seating more minority members on the committees in order to defuse conflict by reaching compromise in that venue.

I had also theorized that the majority party would be less concerned with the proportion of the minority on substantive policy committees and committees dealing with minor money matters. This was also supported by the empirical evidence. The majority reacts to an insurgent minority in a manner which is both predictable and explainable.

Clearly, the effect on the majority party leadership was such that the leadership in the various chambers tended to pull in the reins on appointing minority members to committees important to the distribution of power in the chamber commensurate with the strength of the minority party in the electoral realm.
In terms of organizational theory, the need for workers on the substantive committees compels the majority leadership to raise the numbers of Republicans on the substantive committees: they are needed for the work of the chamber. By raising their proportion, it seems that confidence by the rank and file in the committee’s recommendations also rises, though this was not, of course, directly tested on an individual level (see Chapter 5).

In Chapter 4, I addressed the heart of the problem of party organization. Here, both historically (via the NCSL’s fine data base of caucus complexity measures for 1981 and 1988) and in a recent (1995-96) set of surveys and interviews, I was able to establish that both the minority and majority parties are the more likely to form and develop critical organizational structures the more competitive the parties are. First, and independently, this was confirmed in the electoral realm, and secondly, also directly, it was confirmed in terms of rising chamber strength (links 4 and 5 in Ill. 6:1). I also found that the more competitive the parties became in the electoral arena, the more likely it seemed that the partisans in the chamber, through these caucuses, would take an active role in recruiting and supporting party members in elections.

The respondents in the latest survey were firm in their view that in the time since the minority party insurgencies, the caucuses had become much more important in the
respective chambers -- both with respect to the critical issues of the party itself, and in the way the chamber was organized.

Chapter 5 brought the analysis to a close with an examination on the “payoff” arena: the effect of increasing party competition and party chamber organizational complexity on party behavior in chamber voting both as independent variables (link 6 in Ill. 6:1), and through the variables examined in chapters 3 and 4 (Links 7 and 8 in Ill. 6:1). Here, I found that the variation between the chambers (which depended on their placement in the scheme of development) had the greatest impact. I found that though party competition in the electorate had both a direct and indirect role in the level of cohesion and conflict in the chambers, the effect was mediated by the degree of development of the chamber towards two-party competition.

Generally speaking, as party competition in elections rose and the chambers became more competitive between the parties, the parties became more cohesive. The stage of transformation was critical to the extent to which this was so, however. Further, since two-party competition was not always neatly linked to rising competition in the chambers -- in some cases it was negatively linked -- the direction of the association was variant within chambers, across chambers, and sometimes across parties. Also, it is important to point out that without caucus data for most years, it is impossible to link the changes in electoral competition and party chamber competition to those factors in this
analysis. If, as was suggested in chapter 4, the relationship between party competition and caucus complexity is strong, then where party competition is weak, we can deduce that caucus complexity may also be under-developed.

Increasing caucus complexity did result in greater majority and minority party cohesion. Where there was conflict, however, I had hypothesized that the degree of caucus complexity would determine the degree of cohesion – this was also confirmed; there seems to be a link between the caucuses and the degree of cohesion under conflict. It is important to point out that cohesion under conflict was uniformly high, except in the case of Mississippi, which has no caucuses.

As party competition in the electorate generated more party competition in the chamber, this was hypothesized (and confirmed) to be followed by the development of party organizations (specifically caucuses) and chamber behaviors (proportional representation of minority members on some committee types, greater majority over-representation on others). These factors, in turn, were hypothesized to provide the increased specialization and division of labor required to facilitate the resolution of conflict; the parties will become more cohesive, with the incidence of conflict voting between the parties decreasing across substantive policy votes, but rising on issues which are concerned with control of the chamber. In terms of the electoral and party competition variables alone, the results on the chamber-by-chamber analysis of these
variables was mixed. The committee analysis and the examination of the variation of conflict by bill type generally confirmed the hypothesis when the data was pooled for that analysis. Again, the results here can really only be suggestive until such time as a chamber-by-chamber data base can be generated for use in this setting.

The pattern of conflict and cohesion, when viewed together, should reveal a situation in which party conflict declines as the internal organizations, such as committees and caucuses, become more complex and have stronger roles. This reduction of conflict was expected to be paced by an increase in party cohesion when conflict does occur. This hypothesis was confirmed both generally and specifically, with the effects varying with the level of party competition. As party conflict declines, party cohesion rises. These features appear to be complementary products of the increasing importance of the internal mechanisms of the party and the chamber, and occur at the same time. While conflict is falling across the transformative phase, party cohesion (or “polarization”) is rising when conflict does occur.

I also found that Party conflict voting varied across bill type: some bill types are more likely to divide the chamber along party lines than others. I noted that legislative control bills, budgetary measures and elections and reapportionment bills are often critical party bills, and were expected to have a higher rate of conflictual voting than
those bills concerned with substantive policy measures. This was generally borne out, with the caveat that chamber by chamber analysis could not be carried out.

Increasing development, importance, and partisan equilibrium on the committees was expected to decrease the amount of conflict in the chamber overall. This, too, was confirmed. I noted that the greater the proportional representation of the minority on some types of committees, the less conflict occurred across the bill types generated by these committees. Conversely, where the majority party continued to be over-represented on committees. Further, I expected that this effect would be variable across types of bills: the over-representation of the majority party on critical chamber committees was expected to have a positive effect on conflict across legislative measures which are critical to the running of the chamber. This was generally confirmed. The effect tended to be more intense across these bill types when the majority party has “stacked” the committees directly associated with that bill type. However, where the minority party has greater proportional representation on some types of committees (particularly those which deal with substantive policy questions), conflict declined as a result.

As Jewell and Patterson noted 23 years ago, “specialization and the division of labor in the legislative system facilitate the crystallization and the resolution of conflict. The committee structure of a legislature involves a specialization of tasks, and the tendency to accept the specialists’ judgments contributes to conflict reduction” (Jewell
and Patterson, 1973:9). Certainly this has been borne out by this analysis: as the chamber systems develop party conflict in the chambers is reduced. It is slower to be reduced across some types of bills than others: for as increasing complexity of caucuses and greater reliance on the committee system evolves, the pull to partisan control of the legislature also evolves, creating greater struggles over legislative control measures though less conflict over substantive policy measures. In the individual chambers, conflict is reduced, conditioned by stage at which the internal development of party and legislative organizations has gone forward to derail it before it reaches the floor of the legislature.

Electoral Competition and Party Complexity: Redux

The preponderance of the evidence points to a direct linkage between electoral competition and changes in the operational structure and behavior of partisans in the chambers examined here, and seems quite likely to be generalizable to the developmental stages in other similar chambers\textsuperscript{71}, historically.

There is a "smaller" story here as well. Most of these chambers are Southern or "border" state chambers, and this study has also shed a little light on what has been

\textsuperscript{71} I have not addressed Senate chambers in this study, and do not now include them as "similar chambers". Senates are quite dissimilar from lower house chambers, not least dissimilar because of their different electoral schedules which would tend to dampen the types of effects found here.
addressed in the literature as a purely “Southern” phenomenon, by accident of geographic location rather than a “culture of politics”, perhaps. The literature of Southern politics has had a long and crucial role in the literature of political development over the last 40 years, stretching back to Key’s *Southern Politics in State and Nation*, arguably the first solely “modern” work in Political Science, and continuing in this tradition through a plethora of modern works such as the Black brothers ongoing enterprises and the grassroots party project (as well as other affiliated studies which have had their birth at The Citadel’s Symposium on Southern Politics).

The ongoing debate in Southern Politics, for some time, has been a questioning of its basic *raison d’être*: is there still anything peculiarly “Southern” about the politics of the South? Studies such as this one might easily be taken as a *de facto* argument that there is not. The premises of this study have, for example, assumed that geographic location was unimportant, that units could be (and were) drawn from areas outside the South, without reference to Southern culture, and could be (and were) tested in the same fashion as those which were Southern. I must, in all honesty and with only a few caveats, attempt to short-circuit this possible interpretation. This study, despite my conscious attempt to distance it from a study of southern politics, has remained largely a “southern” piece in that most of the questions which have arisen in this argument would not have been raised in this fashion, or perhaps might not have been raised at all, were it not for the
the outputs of a confluence of circumstances which resulted in a “solid (Democratic) South” to begin with.

The chambers which make up the heart of this study are Southern chambers. They are of interest to this research because of the divergent path of the process of development of the parties in the Southern United States. Surely this is a result of historical developments which could have taken place elsewhere, but did not. Because they did not, this geographically compact area, with a history shared among its sub-units of racial, cultural and political repression, is of particular interest to party scholars and indeed, all political scientists. In this sense, this is a “Southern study”. But it need not be: as I will point out in the next section, the work performed here is not regional work: the hypotheses examined here should and must be extended to the historically more competitive legislatures.
The Direction of Future Research

Die Politik ist keine exakte Wissenschaft

Otto Von Bismarck, Prussian Chamber. 18 December, 1863

This study has been ultimately successful in empirically linking the various components of the exogenous electoral realm to changes in the organization and behavior of parties in the legislature. While many of these linkages had been suggested prior to this study, very little had been done in order to establish them in a scientific manner. Several general suggestions may be made in further establishing the linkages, and specific recommendations can be suggested for future research into the areas of the underlying dimensions.

- First, while the greatest changes may viewed in the transforming legislatures as defined in the current study, I have noted above that I have never suggested that political parties become stagnant or static or even necessarily stable after these changes have taken place. Certainly we can expect great changes in the way parties organize themselves to meet new challenges, and there is every reason to believe that these changes will be linked to electoral features. Extending this research to include the historically competitive legislatures is an obvious next step.
• This study has only included the lower House chambers. The literature on state Senates is also slender, and there is every reason to believe that this analysis could and should be extended to the sister chamber. Senates operate quite differently than do House chambers, and the expectations for these linkages could not be simply exported without further study. Little enough research has concentrated on the Senate chambers, and some basic preliminary work would be required.

• While I initially worked with “dummy” variables for both the party of the government and for divided government, neither was successful. There are, however, indications that the influence of the executive branch on party conflict in the chamber is non-trivial (see Morehouse, 1994) and this is another arena to which the study of conflict and party competition might be extended.

The recommendations above are simply to widen the scope of the inquiry, and to widen the arenas into which the research is applied: what follows here are specific recommendations for work that should be conducted in the areas already explored.

• There is every reason to believe that the relationship between the legislative chambers and the electoral realm is non-recursive. Gierzynski’s work on state legislative campaign committees is only suggestive of the possible depth of the linkages between the chamber and elections. My research on caucuses presented here suggest that the
parties legislative organizations are intensely involved and ardently interested in the electoral process. If the chamber membership is playing an active role in recruiting and financing partisans in elections, this will have consequences for the legislative party organizations as well. Research in this field may be expected to uncover hitherto un plumbed linkages which further unravel the notion of separate realms or separate “parties”.

- The work on state legislative committees has been, in the immediate past, one of single-case studies and cross-sectional analysis. The major change in the research has come from the through the work of Keith Hamrin and Ron Hedlund which explores the development of state legislative committees in over half the states over a 100 year time-frame. While this is undoubtedly the leading edge, my hope is that it is only the initiation phase of a new area of research. The recent de-federalization of many tasks has led to a great deal of organizational pressure on the committee system as legislatures struggle to become more specialized: this has been coupled with the odd phenomenon of term limitation, which tends to work against the very thing that these chambers need most in order to establish specialization: organizational membership stability. How the chambers react to these changes as manifested in their specialized sub-units will be interesting and critical to the future of the organizations.
Certainly one of the most overlooked areas of state legislative research has been the chamber’s party organizations themselves. Despite persistent efforts by the NCSL and others to categorize and index the caucuses in terms of role and complexity, most of the research involved has used these measures as independent variables: little research into the caucuses themselves has gone forward. Despite the obvious need for research into these critical organizations, Robert Harmel’s pioneering study of caucuses (which informed so much of the work performed here) remains singular in its approach and emphasis.

The single most ignored area of state legislative politics research remains the study of roll calls. As Jewell pointed out on numerous occasions, this area is critical to our understanding of the outcomes of any changes we may observe in the organization of the chamber itself. The simple work in the area performed in the course of this study has uncovered, by default, new evidence that this area cannot be ignored. Prior to this study, the extent of the cohesion of the legislative parties in transforming legislatures was unknown – but we do not know whether this high degree of cohesion extends to the competitive legislatures. Further, the extremely low degree of conflict was also unknown, but similarly, we do not know if low levels of conflict extends to all state legislatures, or only applies in these formerly one-party chambers. That conflict would vary by the type of bill was certainly suggested in earlier work, but had not been confirmed in a comparative over-time study until this study was complete.
Almost any work in this area is likely to produce important new information and work to inform almost any other study of the chambers. As time-consuming as such research is, it is certainly one in which the payoffs are commensurate with the research effort.

In short, there is much to be done. The environment of the state legislative chambers is changing internally and externally every day, caused by both internal and external pressures. New challenges are posed for the membership, and the parties, as the strongest organizing force in the legislatures (if not in American politics across the board), are sure to meet them in new and innovative ways. This study has demonstrated that, in terms of policy outcomes as measured in actual votes, elections matter, organizations matter, and most importantly, political parties matter. There is no area of the American sub-field of Political Science which is more vital, more interesting, and ultimately more rewarding for research than this one is.

*With a good Conservative opponent he could shake hands almost as readily as with a good Whig ally; but the man who was neither flesh nor fowl was odious to him. According to his theory of parliamentary government, the House of Commons should be divided by a marked line, and every member should be required to stand on one side of it or the other. "If not with me, at any rate be against me", he would have said to every representative of the people.*

*Anthony Trollope, Phineas Finn, Vol. 1, p. 15*

Finis
Appendix 2:1

To determine the linearity of the association between two-party contestation and two-party competition with distance between political parties in the chamber, I used the now-standard test of splitting the data along the suspected interrupt in the series (Lewis-Beck and Alford, 1980). My suspected split — or "interrupt" — was 33%, both through long association and observation of the data itself and through the theoretical assumptions of many colleagues in the literature, and this is where I made my "cut".

I then ran four bivariate regressions\(^{34}\) of two-party contestation and two-party competition in each of the populations in the data, the results of which are in tables A:1 and A:2. These results pointed to very different slopes in these populations for each of the concerned variables with distance as the dependent\(^{35}\) variable. Two-party contestation, in the less competitive chambers, reveals a multiple \(R^2\) of .519; for the more competitive chambers, it is .145. The unstandardized beta coefficient (slope) for the first equation was -.3333; in the second it was -.0628.

The difference is even more apparent in the equations associated with two-party competition. Here, while the less competitive chambers return a multiple \(R^2\) of .536, the multiple \(R^2\) in the second is only .071. The slope (unstandardized) for the first equation was -.560; for the second it was -.042. Further, while the first relationship is significant at the .0000 level, the second is not statistically significant at all.

To make this report clearer for the reader, I have provided linear plot estimations of the regressions in plots A:1 through A:4.

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\(^{34}\) Two bivariate regressions would have further complicated matters as two-party competition is a product of two-party contestation. One, presumably two-party competition, would have demonstrated more leverage than the other on party distance (a problem addressed in chapters 3 and 4).

\(^{35}\) Later in this analysis, distance between the parties in the chamber is used as an independent variable with various formulations — including a lag variable of two-party contestation and competition — as its dependent variable. At this point in the analysis, I simply wanted to test the initial relationship and to establish a curvilinear fit using the distance variable as the dependent should make no difference for this purpose.
Two-party Contestation and
Distance Between Parties in the Chamber

Where Distance is 33% or Less

Plot A:2

Plots A:1 and A:2
Two-party Competition and Distance Between Parties in the Chamber

Where Distance is More Than 33%

Distance Between Parties in the Chamber

Plot A:3

Two-party Competition and Distance Between the Parties in the Chamber

Where Distance is 33% or Less

Distance Between Parties in the Chamber

Plot A:4

Plots A:3 and A:4
Appendix 5:1: Roll Call Data Variables

Skip Intervals and Number Bills in the coding Scheme

The sampling within sessions, in order to meet a 90% confidence interval (standard in such research) may be found by the following formula:\footnote{Index from Manheim, Jarol P., and Richard C. Rich, Empirical Political Analysis: Research Methods in Political Science, Second Edition. 1986: White Plains, New York: Longman, Inc., p 342. Appendix A.}

With the standard 95% Confidence Interval.

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<th>+/- 10%</th>
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Given the number of states and the number of bills to be coded, I use the protocol with a variance of 10%, (+ or -); this seems a reasonable margin of error for this preliminary study. By counting three times as many Bills. I would only gain an additional 10% tightening of the variance, and to reduce to 6% (3 in each end of the normal distribution curve), the number must be increased by an impossibly large factor. I would argue that the balance between the degree of accuracy desired and the time factor is best met in the +/- 10% range in this instances.
### Appendix 5:2: Report of Roll Call Calculations Data

In order to provide an idea of the numbers involved in processing the data and the sample upon which the analysis is based, I have appended here a table of the years, chambers, and votes involved.

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*Seat changed parties early in the session, this seat omitted in calculations.
**Member changed parties midway in session, party numbers reflect the change.

Note that in no case were special sessions coded. In one sense, this may have biased the numbers in chambers in which budget votes are sometimes taken during special sessions (i.e. in Texas or Virginia), but a cut-point had to be established. Since I was not exclusively looking any type of vote, these omissions made sense.
References


Francis, Wayne. 1989. The Legislative Committee Game. Columbus: The Ohio State University Press.


