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THE STRESS OF WAR: THE CONFEDERACY
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THE LAST YEAR OF THE CIVIL WAR

by

William James McNeill

A THESIS SUBMITTED
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
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Thesis Director's signature:

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Abstract

THE STRESS OF WAR: THE CONFEDERACY
AND WILLIAM TECUMSEH SHERMAN DURING
THE LAST YEAR OF THE CIVIL WAR

William James McNeill

Federal forces under the command of General William Tecumseh Sherman launched an invasion of Georgia in May 1864. One year later in April 1865 Sherman had successfully completed three campaigns, the Atlanta, Savannah, and Carolinas campaigns, which took his command through Georgia and South Carolina and into the heart of North Carolina. The war was also terminated in April 1865; the Confederacy submitted to the Union. In Sherman's correspondence and reports he made clear that his primary objective from May 1864 was to defeat the Confederate army in his front, but it is also unmistakable that he intended to take total war to the Confederate countryside to demonstrate to the Rebels the foolishness of continuing hostilities against the superior Federal armies. The impact of Sherman's invasion on the Confederacy is the subject of this dissertation, "The Stress of War: The Confederacy and William Tecumseh Sherman during the Last Year of the Civil War."

The application of historical research and evaluation supplemented by psychological analysis of Confederate reactions to the Federal invasion of the Southeast indicates that Sherman accomplished his objective of destroying the Confederate will to resist. The military command of the
Southland agonized and improvised in trying to meet the threat Sherman posed to the Confederacy. The common soldiers fought and fumed at the turn of events. Most, whether officer or Rebel without rank, were convinced they were fighting a losing battle shortly after the fall of Atlanta to the enemy in September 1864, and the common fighting man began to lay aside his weapon and turn to more rewarding pursuits. The Confederate civilian experienced personally or vicariously the viciousness of total war. Sherman's command convinced the civilian that the Federals meant business and had the material to get the desired results. Total war in Georgia and the Carolinas was instrumental in undermining the Confederate will to continue the Civil War in 1865.
No nation was ever conquered but by itself. As long as the public spirit remains untouched, the public cause is in no danger.

Edmund Burke, quoted in the Charleston Daily Courier
December 30, 1864.
PREFACE

Longer ago than I like to admit, about 1960, I searched several libraries for books which assessed the impact of the Civil War Atlanta, Savannah, and Carolinas campaigns on the Confederacy, particularly the Rebel will to sustain war during the last year of the conflict. I found nothing satisfactory; most publications on the campaigns dealt with strategy and tactics. A few contemporary accounts yielded a partial view of Confederate reaction, but it was obvious that these sources and many others needed to be studied and the information synthesized to provide a solid interpretation of the effect of the Federal invasion of the Southeast on the Southland. I began such a study at Lamar College in Beaumont, Texas under the direction of Dr. Ralph A. Wooster. Several years following the completion of a Master of Arts degree at Lamar, Dr. Frank E. Vandiver of Rice University encouraged me to continue my investigation of this topic. This dissertation is the result of his confidence and encouragement. Dr. Vandiver has not played the taskmaster directing every research move and writing effort; the results would no doubt be better had this been the case. But he made a more valuable contribution. He gave invaluable general direction, and allowed me to learn through involvement in the project. There are unquestionably portions of this study with which he does not completely agree, but he believes the dissertation should be the student's work and not that of his director. The student-teacher relationship with this man, as
it was with Dr. Wooster, was a pleasure. To both I will be eternally grateful.

The nature of and approach to my subject is explained fully in the first chapter, but it cannot be said too often that this is not a recapitulation of military maneuvers in Georgia and the Carolinas during the last twelve months of the Civil War. Rather, it is a study of the way in which Confederates responded to the stress of total war as it was applied by General William Tecumseh Sherman and his command during the Atlanta, Savannah, and Carolinas campaigns. The numerous Rebel reactions to the enemy invasion are of interest in themselves, but the focus of this study centers on Confederate war morale. What effect did the Union movements in the Southeast have on the Rebel will to continue the fight for the Confederate cause? The traditional historical approach of investigation of printed and manuscript sources was undertaken, and a historical assessment given. In addition, I have cautiously employed some psychological analysis to understand better the reasons why the Confederates reacted as they did and the import of the invasion on them as human beings.

This dissertation is divided into four chapters: the first discusses the scope of the subject and gives the necessary background information; the second explores the reaction of the Confederate military; the third investigates the behavior of the Rebel civilian; the fourth analyzes the overall impact of the invasion on the Confederacy utilizing both historical and psychological approaches. I have tried
to eliminate as many footnotes as possible by consolidation. This means most footnotes have multiple citations. Where numerous citations are grouped under one footnote, I have cited those sources first from which quoted material in the narrative was taken and then given those sources which support the information and interpretation.

To work in the Civil War field is a delight in many respects. The availability of material leaves nothing to be desired. Publications and manuscripts can keep an individual busy for a lifetime. This is challenging, but it forces concessions. One just cannot consult all the relevant material. I have read, noted, and studied numerous sources, and hope that my investigations have revealed a true representation of Confederate reactions. Nevertheless, I have resolved to continue my search and investigation of sources pertinent to this topic. Certainly there is more to be said on this subject.

Besides Doctors Vandiver and Wooster, I am indebted to Dr. Sanford W. Higginbotham, who directed me to several important publications and helped me strengthen obscure prose. Doctors Martin Wiener, William C. Howell, and Douglass Price-Williams made helpful suggestions; the latter two are psychologists, and provided guidance for me in a discipline where direction and reassurance was necessary. A visiting research fellowship with the Office of the Chief of Military History and the good offices of Dr. Maurice Matloff, Chief Historian of OCMH, greatly expedited my research and writing. Lee College, Baytown,
Texas, where I have been a faculty member since 1965, provided me many accommodations which has made my work much easier. My family, Helen, Kelly, and Julie, made many sacrifices "to see Daddy through." Helen listened, commented, and typed—indispensable contributions. To all of these and unlisted others who extended support I am grateful.

William James McNeill
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Federal invasion of Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina by General William Tecumseh Sherman and his command during the last year of the Civil War has received the attention of Civil War scholars and buffs alike. The strategies and tactics of the invasion have been closely and astutely studied, but the impact of the Union incursion on the Rebels as the Federals moved throughout the Confederate Southeast has not received comparable attention. This dissertation concentrates on those Rebel reactions to the Yankee invaders which provide insights into the fluctuations of Confederate morale from May 1864 to the end of the war. Morale is the single most important factor in war, and this study assesses Rebel morale to try to understand more fully the reasons for the Confederate collapse in the spring of 1865.

In the early autumn of 1863 after being maneuvered out of Chattanooga by the enemy, the Confederate Army of Tennessee, commanded by General Braxton Bragg, joined battle with the Union force under General William Starke Rosecrans. The battlefield lay approximately ten miles south of Chattanooga between the elevation extending south from Missionary Ridge and Chickamauga Creek. From the latter, the battle derived its name, Chickamauga. Here the Confederacy sensed an
opportunity to enhance its future in the West. It was in Bragg's grasp to reverse Confederate fortunes, as he was heavily reinforced by General James Longstreet with 11,716 men to bring his strength to 71,551 effectives. Also, fate seemed to be on the Southern side, as the Union command committed not one, but several colossal blunders during the course of the battle. The result was a crushing defeat of the Union army, which fell back and occupied the city of Chattanooga. Union General George Henry Thomas, holding his position on Snodgrass Hill in the midst of the Federal rout, was the one redeeming light for the North. Such heroism on his part and his soldiers' demanded recognition, and Washington responded by assigning Thomas, whose fame had spread as "the Rock of Chickamauga," the command of the Army of the Cumberland. Although Chickamauga was considered a Confederate victory, it was a dubious one. Over 17,500 Rebel soldiers were lost, compared to 16,100 Union casualties, an ominous fact for the South, where the supply of manpower was rapidly being depleted; moreover, Bragg failed to take advantage of the Federal rout, comparable to the First Battle of Manassas, to ensure a more complete victory by pursuing the retreating enemy; and, finally, the Union army held Chattanooga.

The last fact led to the events of November 24 and 25, when Bragg and his Army of Tennessee absorbed a humiliating defeat. Commanding the slope and crest of Missionary Ridge and Lookout Mountain, both of which seemed impregnable, the Confederate forces confidently awaited the enemy attack, but once it began and Thomas moved his men against the Confederate center, the advantage quickly shifted. The
Confederate soldiers, dug in along the top of Missionary Ridge, warily watched the Federals move irresistibly up the slope in spite of numerous casualties, and before the first Union soldier reached the top, all but one Confederate, an officer, who had drawn his sword with a determination to make a last stand, had ignobly fled. Bragg with no other alternative, his field position cut in half, ordered a retreat. The Confederate counteroffensive, initiated at Chickamauga, had been short-lived, and victorious Union forces stood poised for an invasion of Georgia.

If the Confederate defeat at Chattanooga in November 1863 was an indication that the Southern war effort was weakening, it was not discernible in the activity which surrounded the vanquished Army of Tennessee. Its commander, General Bragg, wrote to President Jefferson Davis, personally accepting the responsibility for the recent Confederate military fiasco and asking that he be relieved as head of the Army of Tennessee. Apparently concurring with Bragg's assessment of the situation, Davis immediately wired that he was to turn the command over to General William Joseph Hardee, but Hardee, not feeling adequate to the task at hand, politely acknowledged his appreciation of the confidence placed in him and accepted the appointment only on the basis that it was not to be permanent. This development initiated much thought and exchange of ideas among Confederate military and political leaders in an effort to find someone with the prerequisite qualifications to ensure optimum success in handling such an important assignment.
In Virginia, General Robert E. Lee recommended General P. G. T. Beauregard, and added that he thought the Army of Tennessee should be reinforced immediately, for "upon the defense of the country threatened by General Grant depends the safety of the points now held by us on the Atlantic." Evidently alarmed by this observation, the President suggested that General Lee, the revered and successful commander of the Army of Northern Virginia, might become Bragg's successor, but it quickly became apparent that this arrangement would cause too many complications—besides, Lee was obviously not in favor of this transfer. As Davis did not appear agreeably disposed to the Beauregard suggestion, Lee offered General Joseph E. Johnston's name as a second possibility. However, it may well have been a letter written by General Leonidas Polk to the President which finally settled the issue: "when there is so general a desire on the part of the army and the country as there is to have General Johnston placed in that command, a part of your duty seems to your friend to be to yield to this general desire, that those whose all is staked upon the issue may have something to say as to the hand in which it shall be saved or lost." By the middle of December, President Davis decided that Johnston was the most capable officer available for the assignment of halting the Union invaders, and on December 18, 1863, Johnston, then in Mississippi, received orders to proceed to Dalton, Georgia, where nine days later he was assigned command of the Army of Tennessee.

During the winter of 1863-64, the morale of the Army of Tennessee reached its nadir, and then rebounded to give renewed hope to the Confederacy in the West. The debacle in November had bred discontent,
and desertion became rampant; defeat and an unpopular commander were too much for many Confederate soldiers to withstand. Although depression and desertion were not completely eliminated, it was obvious that the appointment of Johnston greatly improved the soldiers' morale. One trooper observed upon the announcement of Johnston's assignment that "at every bivouac on the field, at every fireside in the rear, the joyous dawn of day seemed to have risen from the night. . . . Thousands who had continued the flight from Missionary Ridge to their homes returned." As the new commander solved the food shortage, obtained additional shoes, and requisitioned for clothing, the depressed atmosphere receded. Generals Patrick Ronayne Cleburne and Joseph Wheeler were able to pace their commands through rigorous drills during the winter months, and, thereby, gained the confidence and respect of their men. Finally, the hedonistic trait of the Southerners broke out in the early spring with snowball fights on a grandiose scale and baseball becoming the order of the day, and many additional diversions from horse racing and card playing to religious revivals swept Dalton, replacing much of the sulking which had once permeated the army. In April 1864, a young officer reported to his wife that "I doubt whether a volunteer army could be more perfect in its organization than the Army of Tennessee. General Johnston seems to have infused a new spirit into the whole mass, and out of chaos brought order and beauty. Our men are better clothed than at any previous time, while their food is better than one would have anticipated two months ago."
While the gradual swelling of the ranks of the Army of Tennessee by the "wayward members," the renewed respect for their superiors, and the rediscovered enjoyments of recreational activities made conspicuous the improved morale of Johnny Reb, the loyalty and devotion enkindled by the officers of the Army of Tennessee to the Southern cause were not less important. However, a different criteria must be used to determine the esprit de corps of the officers and the enlisted men; the former were not deserters, nor did they have time to indulge in the many improvised amusement activities with the frequency and vigor of the common soldier. Consequently, the effort, and often the struggle, by Johnston and succeeding commanders and their lieutenants to seek a solution to the problem at hand--in large part, Federal numerical superiority--must be evaluated to determine the morale of the officers.

The plans proposed by the Confederate authorities, political and military, to meet the Federal threat in the West ranged from a Southern advance against Union forces to a defensive strategy, which would augment the possibility of a fatal Federal blunder deep in Georgia and far away from their fortifications and base of supplies, enabling the Confederate troops not only to defeat but to annihilate the enemy. It was during the winter months that President Davis, his recently appointed military advisor, General Bragg, and Secretary of War James Alexander Seddon heartily urged Johnston to take the offensive and expel the enemy from Tennessee. Seddon wrote to Johnston before he arrived at Dalton, Georgia, to take command of the Army of Tennessee that "as soon as the condition of your forces will allow, it is hoped that you will be able to assume
the offensive. . . ." After sending an aide to observe the condition of
the Army of Tennessee and receiving an encouraging report—a report, which
Johnston considered superficial and not at all indicative of the true
state of things at Dalton, the President advised his commander that he
was hopeful active operations against the Federals would soon commence.

In March 1864 Bragg sent to Johnston his proposed plan to oust the
denim from Tennessee. Johnston was to attempt to lure the enemy out of
Knoxville and Chattanooga, engaging them in the field, but if this failed,
the Army of Tennessee was to operate on the enemy's lines of communication,
which, according to Bragg, "would necessitate the withdrawal of the enemy
to the line of the Cumberland." Nashville might also be liberated during
this Confederate maneuver. After a terse exchange of messages between
Johnston and Bragg, the proposed offensive strategy was compromised to the
extent that unless reinforcements and supplies were forthcoming to Dalton
in abundance such a forward movement was to be dropped; and the Confederacy,
beginning the fourth year of the war, was in no condition to furnish the
prerequisite manpower and equipment.

While Johnston was corresponding with Davis, Seddon, and Bragg
concerning Confederate strategy, General John Bell Hood arrived in Dalton
from Virginia in February 1864 to take command of the II Corps of the
Army of Tennessee. Hood, during a convalescence in Richmond after the
amputation of his leg at Chickamauga, was imbued with the aggressive
ideas of the President and his Richmond cohorts; however, very little
indoctrination was needed as the projected offensive movement appeared
to please Hood. The corps commander, evidently acting under unofficial
orders from the Confederate capital to surcharge the atmosphere at Dalton with the administration's eagerness for a Rebel campaign into Tennessee and to report developments to Richmond, began immediately upon his arrival to encourage Johnston to accept the offensive. Although Hood believed that the soldiers were "anxious for battle" and "that a move from this position, in sufficient force, will relieve our entire country . . . ," he was forced to report to Bragg on April 13 that nothing he could do would induce Johnston to take the initiative and move forward. By the beginning of May, Johnston had succeeded in fending off the generous advice from politicos and military colleagues, and quietly, even surreptitiously, sought a policy which would more nearly fit the circumstances and not risk the fate of the Confederacy in the West on a single battle. After all, he faced Sherman's 100,000 men with only 45,000 of his own. There was a possibility of reinforcement, but Johnston did not place much stock in promises from Richmond. Even when Richmond delivered 14,000 men from Polk's Mississippi command, the odds remained heavily in favor of the Union forces.

Two developments in early March 1864 had foreboded ill for the Southland, and were in large part responsible for the Confederate concern in the spring of that year. General Ulysses S. Grant was commissioned Lieutenant General with the assignment of General-in-Chief of the Armies of the United States, and General William Tecumseh Sherman was promoted to General Grant's former position, command of the Military Division of the Mississippi. Each commanded large, well-equipped armies and had a reputation among Confederate military leaders as determined fighters.
Thirteen months later the two Union generals received the surrender of their adversaries, the two principal armies of the Confederacy. Both men adhered to the same fundamental military strategy—"find out where your enemy is, get at him as soon as you can and strike as hard as you can, and keep moving on. . . ." During the culminating military campaigns of the Civil War, each actively and successfully pursued such a policy.

In April 1864 General Grant wrote to Sherman outlining the military offensive he wished to implement that spring. Initiating his campaign concurrently with Union forces under Grant in Virginia, Sherman was to move against the Confederate army in Georgia with the purpose of breaking it up. As an additional objective, he was "to get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their war resources." This latter goal, more than either man ever imagined in April 1864, would occupy Sherman as much as any other task for the duration of the war. It took him and his command not only in pursuit of the enemy across northern Georgia toward Atlanta, but also diagonally across the state to Savannah and, then, north through the Carolinas. The Atlanta Campaign from the Confederate base at Dalton, Georgia, to the Gate City would witness stout Confederate resistance, but the two ensuing forward movements, the Savannah Campaign from Atlanta to Savannah and the Carolinas Campaign from the latter city through South and North Carolina, were free from serious Rebel opposition. Sherman was able to concentrate on the destruction of the South's war resources.
Union accomplishments during these campaigns included the capture of Atlanta and Savannah, Georgia, Columbia and Charleston, South Carolina, and Raleigh, North Carolina. These urban areas possessed important railroad lines, stores of war supplies ranging from food to ammunition, and a civilian working force which helped to produce and distribute much of the necessities of war. The number of Confederate soldiers who lost their lives or received disabling wounds in defense of these facilities obviously worked to the detriment of the Southern cause. Also, the devastation unleashed upon the agricultural sections of Georgia and the Carolinas created a scarcity of the much-needed food and materials for the Confederacy; nor was the destruction of Southern railroads without its effect. These tangible results further impaired an unhealthy Confederate position during the last twelve months of the Civil War.

These accomplishments were accompanied by another, one which often incidentally results from such invasions, but was here, at least, partially premeditated. Sherman sought to destroy the Confederates' faith in their cause; he intended to make total war, taking the war to the people and the resources of the South. For the Atlanta Campaign the imposition of war on the Confederate home front was secondary to the defeat or neutralization of the Army of Tennessee under General Johnston, but it was an important secondary consideration. Sherman put his responsibilities for the Atlanta Campaign plainly to Grant: "I am to knock Jos. Johnston, and to do as much damage to the resources of the enemy as possible." More directly to the point when contemplating the Savannah Campaign, Sherman wrote to General Henry W. Halleck concerning his
controversial plan. "This movement is not purely military or strategic, but will illustrate the vulnerability of the South. . . ." To General George Thomas of his command, Sherman remarked that he meant to make the people of the South "feel that war and individual ruin are synonymous terms. . . ." Nevertheless, it was General Grant whom Sherman had to convince that his proposed March to the Sea was the most propitious move. Communicating with Grant, Sherman cleared all doubts as to the nature and purpose of this phase of his strategy:

I propose to act in such a manner against the material resources of the South as utterly to negative Davis' boasted threat and promises of protection. If we can march a well-appointed army right through his territory, it is a demonstration to the world, foreign and domestic, that we have a power which Davis cannot resist. This may not be war, but rather statesmanship, nevertheless it is overwhelming to my mind that there are thousands of people abroad and in the South who will reason thus: If the North can march an army right through the South, it is proof positive that the North can prevail in this contest, leaving only open the question of its willingness to use that power. . . . Even without a battle, the result operating upon the minds of sensible men would produce fruits more than compensating for the expense, trouble, and risk.

Later, in reference to the Carolinas Campaign, Sherman stated that he attached "more importance to these deep incisions into the enemy's country . . . ," because the Southern people as well as their military must be made to "feel the hard hand of war." The effect of his campaign in Georgia was encouraging, "and before we have done with her South Carolina will not be quite so tempestuous. . . . I almost tremble at her fate, but feel that she deserves all that seems in store for her."

General Sherman's statements illustrate and point toward another dimension of warfare, the psychological effect of total war. It is
apparent that, by taking deep into Rebel territory a demonstration of the inordinate strength of the Federal war machine and a widespread imposition of the blight of war, the Union commander wished to destroy the image of an indestructible Confederacy which many Southerners had created in their minds. If the South could be frustrated mentally, so Sherman seemed to reason, the defeat of the Confederacy would become less elusive; in fact, a possibility of the immediate future. The purpose of this study is to determine the extent to which the Federal invasion of Georgia and the Carolinas from May 1864 to May 1865 achieved Sherman's announced intention of illustrating to the Confederate soldiers and civilians the futility of further resistance.

A first impression might be that this study is highly superfluous, for certainly time and time again Sherman's invasion of Georgia and the Carolinas has been the subject of various publications. Also, students of the Civil War learn all too quickly that Sherman took the war into the "backyard" of the Southland, where he demonstrated to the Rebels the idiocy of continuing hostilities. Nevertheless, books and articles expounding the effectiveness of Sherman's campaigns present little more than generalizations about the effect of the Federal invasions on the resolve of the Confederates to sustain war--generalizations proffered without sufficient documentation. The pertinent primary sources are voluminous and have not previously been systematically evaluated to determine the effect of the enemy invasion of Georgia and the Carolinas on the Confederacy. One might quite legitimately ask in view of this situation: Why, then, have Civil War students long accepted without
critical examination such suppositions regarding the results of Sherman's campaigns during the last year of the war? Any answer to this question is largely conjecture, but in the opinion of this author, such hypotheses are based on a myth—the "Sherman myth," one which began to take shape and grow approximately a decade following the conclusion of the war and one which has influenced the reconstruction of Civil War events by contemporary historians. The myth created an invincible, unscrupulous, and immoral William Tecumseh Sherman. As with most phantasms, it is a mixture of fact and fiction. Significantly, that part of the myth with which this dissertation is concerned is in the main historically based—Sherman and his command did conclusively demonstrate to the Confederates that Southern resistance was becoming with each succeeding day little more than a farce. However, this statement and the corresponding portion of the "Sherman myth" is a gross oversimplification. Human behavior is seldom that simple. This study reveals the complexity of human reaction as it developed in response to an enemy invasion. Still, in the final analysis this dissertation supports and does not confute a myth. After more than a century of circulation among Civil War scholars and amateurs alike, this myth deserves documentation and, hence, verification.

For this investigation, the Confederate military is limited to those men who served in the regular army of the Confederacy. Mention of state militias and reserves or other martial groups with different designations will be considered only in relation to their association
with and effect upon the Army of the Confederacy. Emphasis will be placed on those reactions of the Confederate military which were brought about by this particular Union invasion. This will include not only those reactions which were physically enacted, such as implemented military tactics or desertion from the ranks, but also those that only reached the planning level and never came to fruition, such as military strategy which Confederate officers were never able to initiate or mere sentiment which a common soldier or civilian voiced in a diary or letter. There definitely will be no attempt to narrate per se the military campaigns in Georgia and the Carolinas. The Confederate civilian classification includes all Southerners who were not acting a majority of the time in an official military or political capacity. State militiamen are considered part of the civilian group because their orientation was predominantly civilian and not military.

This is a study of reaction to a certain situation in a specific place at a definable time, total war in Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina from May 1864 to May 1865. Conclusions are reached through an investigation of the records of numerous individuals, Union and Confederate, who left to posterity reports of their experiences, observations, and opinions. Since these contemporary accounts often provide inimitable explications of the invasion developments and best convey the flavor of the times, they are liberally quoted. Also, it may be noticed that a preponderance of the narrative concerns the Confederate reaction to the Federal invasion of Georgia during the Atlanta and Savannah campaigns and that the Carolinas Campaign receives
only brief attention by comparison; it must be remembered that out of the twelve months consumed in the invasion of the three states nine months were spent campaigning in Georgia, or three-fourths of the time expended for the three campaigns.

Since a determination of the reaction of all Confederates to the invasion of Georgia and the Carolinas is an utter impossibility, the records of the period were searched to ascertain the predominant reactions of those who were affected. However, an attempt is made to portray the reactions of all groups and levels of military and civilian Rebels.
FOOTNOTES

1


2


3

Ibid., 796-97; Douglas Southall Freeman, R. E. Lee: A Biography, III, 206-07 and 214; Mary Boykin Chesnut, Diary from Dixie, ed. Ben Ames Williams, 335.

4


5

Union strength was impressive at the time Johnston assumed command in December 1863, but became increasingly more difficult to contend with in Georgia and the Carolinas as the war progressed. When Sherman initiated the Atlanta Campaign at Dalton with 100,000 men, he was opposed by 45,000 in the Army of Tennessee. Although the Confederate force was quickly reinforced by 14,000 from Polk's command, there were at least three Federals in the field to each two Rebels. The Savannah Campaign, more commonly known as the "March to the Sea," collocated not quite five Billy Yanks against one Johnny Reb (62,000 Union troops versus 13,000 Confederate troops). The culminating Union offensive during the last three months of the war found the Federals outnumbering the Confederates more than two and one-half to one at the outset and four to one at the conclusion of the campaign. See Mark Mays Boatner III, The Civil War Dictionary, 30, 125-27, and 509.


8 Ibid., 606-08, and 781; J. B. Hood, Advance and Retreat, ed. Richard N. Current, 91-94; Connelly, Autumn of Glory, 281-325. Connelly gives a detailed account of developments affecting the Army of Tennessee prior to the beginning of the Atlanta Campaign.

9 Bruce Catton, This Hallowed Ground: The Story of the Union Side of the Civil War, 314.


12 The following sources provide only a few individual instances, often implicitly presented and greatly subordinated to other material in the narratives, of the effect of Sherman's campaigns on the Confederate disposition to wage war, or make sweeping generalizations which are unsupported by documentation. These are reputable studies which pursued similar, but different objectives than those of this dissertation; Barrett, Sherman's March Through the Carolinas; Bryan, Confederate Georgia; Connelly, Autumn of Glory; Gilbert E. Govan and James W. Livingood, A Different Valor: The Story of General Joseph E. Johnston, C. S. A.; Tom S. Gray, Jr., "The March to the Sea," Georgia Historical Quarterly, XIV (1930), 111-38; Horn, The Army of Tennessee; Lloyd Lewis, Sherman, Fightin Prophet; B. H. Liddell Hart, Sherman: The Genius of the Civil War; Earl Schenk Miers, The General Who Marched to Hell: William Tecumseh Sherman and His March to Fame and Infamy; J. G. Randall and David Donald, The Civil War and Reconstruction; Bell

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For accounts relating strategy and tactics see Jacob Dolson Cox, Atlanta; Jacob Dolson Cox, The March to the Sea: Franklin and Nashville; Horn, The Army of Tennessee; Barrett, Sherman's March Through the Carolinas; Richard Manning McMurry, "The Atlanta Campaign: December 23, 1863 to July 18, 1864" (Emory University dissertation, 1967); Errol MacGregor Clauss, "The Atlanta Campaign, 18 July - 2 September 1864" (Emory University dissertation, 1965); Connelly, Autumn of Glory. Connelly's study, the most recent publication on this topic, gives the most thorough and astute recapitulation and assessment of Confederate military activities during the Atlanta and Savannah campaigns. Cox, McMurry, and Clauss provide accounts of the Union side during the Atlanta Campaign in Georgia. Barrett's monograph tells the story of the Carolinas Campaign very well. Horn's work has been superseded by Connelly's books on the Army of Tennessee, but is still a reliable survey of the Confederate army's activities.
CHAPTER 2

MILITARY REACTION

I. The Confederate Command in the Army of Tennessee:

The Atlanta Campaign

There can be little doubt that the Confederate officers in
Dalton during the winter of 1863-64 were genuinely interested in the
welfare of their command, but there was also an equal concern among a
few for their personal fortunes. General Hardee disposed of an important
matter, when he married his fiancee in Dalton before Sherman moved his
Union army against the Rebel lines. On May 11, as the Army of Tennessee
was retiring before the enemy, General Hood asked General Polk, who
was also an Episcopal bishop, for baptism. It is interesting to note
that Hood, the erstwhile infidel, apparently considered his predicament
more precarious in May 1864, than he had earlier at Gettysburg and
Chickamauga, where he had an arm and leg severed from his body. Less
than a week after Hood's conversion, Mrs. Joseph E. Johnston interceded
for her husband, asking Bishop Polk to baptize her skeptical mate;
Johnston consented, and two days after the baptism the commander feeling
a surge of Christian faith announced to his troops: "You will now turn
and march to meet his [Sherman's] advancing columns... I lead you
to battle. We may confidently trust that the Almighty Father will still
reward the patriots' toil." However, it was easier to profess faith than
live it; Johnston countermanded the order, and a retreat ensued.
Personal matters aside, Johnston and his staff were forced on May 8 to deal immediately with the 100,000 Federals menacingly invading the Dalton, Georgia, locale. Because of his nature, Johnston kept his own counsel, and, consequently, the Confederate strategic reaction to the Union invasion of Georgia through July 18, when he was superseded by General Hood, was largely his own. One historian has characterized the commandant of the Army of Tennessee as projecting two images: "openly, the figure of bearing, who excited military elan, and privately, the troubled man who seemed bitter and despondent." Past experiences with Richmond nurtured the bitterness and despondence, and as a result by 1864, Johnston had withdrawn into himself hoping to avoid conflict with the Confederate capital.

It has already been noted that, as Johnston considered the various strategies for the Army of Tennessee during the winter, he became increasingly apprehensive about the possibilities of an offensive movement, and, subsequently, after observing the numerical superiority of the Federals in the spring, he determined that Sherman "intended to decide the contest by a battle, and that he would make that battle as near his own as far from our base as possible." Based on the information pertaining to the strength of Sherman's command and on a supposition as to the Union commander's intent for battle at the earliest possible time, Johnston concluded:

My own operations, then and subsequently, were determined by the relative forces of the armies, and a higher estimate of the Northern soldiers than our Southern editors and politicians were accustomed to express, or even the Administration seemed to entertain. . . . It was not to be supposed that such troops [Union],
under a sagacious and resolute leader, and covered by intrenchments, were to be beaten by greatly inferior numbers. I therefore thought it our policy to stand on the defensive, to spare the blood of our soldiers by fighting under cover habitually, and to attack only when bad position or division of the enemy's forces might give us advantages counterbalancing that of superior numbers. So we held every position occupied until our communications were strongly threatened; then fell back only far enough to secure them, watching for opportunities to attack, keeping near enough to the Federal army to assure the Confederate Administration that Sherman could not send reinforcements to Grant, and hoping to reduce the odds against us by partial engagements. A material reduction of the Federal army might also be reasonably expected before the end of June, by the expiration of the terms of service of the regiments that had not reenlisted. I was confident, too, that the Administration would see the expediency of employing Forrest and his cavalry to break the enemy's railroad communications, by which he could have been defeated. 3

In essence, Johnston selected a strategy, which was immortalized by General Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus, when he led a Roman army to oppose Hannibal's invasion of Italy in 217 B.C. General Fabius cautiously kept his Roman command out of reach of the numerically superior adversary while constantly watching the opposition for a weakness which could be seized for the advantage of his country. Interestingly, not only did the Confederate and Roman leaders use the same military tactics, but each met an identical fate, when, failing to elicit support for their maneuvers among superiors, they were removed from command.

Throughout his tenure as commander of the Army of Tennessee, Johnston followed his proposed strategy, continually moving his command toward Atlanta just in front of the enemy. Two and one-half weeks before Johnston's removal from command in July, Benjamin H. Hill, a Confederate senator from Georgia, had an important conference with Johnston. When Senator Hill reported the results of the meeting to Secretary of War
Seddon, he outlined the policy the commander had indicated he had followed and would follow: (1) Johnston preferred Sherman to attack his intrenchments, in which case the enemy could be destroyed, but the Confederate leader did not believe that his opponent would attempt such an assault; (2) if Sherman would fight in the open field, the Southern forces would join battle, but the Union army continued to intrench as it advanced; (3) Johnston would not attack the Federal troops in their intrenchments, and, when confronted by a flanking movement, was forced to fall back; (4) being aided by the terrain and superior numbers, the enemy executed flanking movements effectively forcing the Army of Tennessee to fall back; and (5) "General Johnston distinctly stated that the only way to get Sherman's army out of the country was by an attack in his rear—by cutting the railroad and destroying his supplies, &c." 4

Hence, as the mongoose and cobra join in deadly combat with the former depending on its speed and agility to strike the lethal foe at a vulnerable moment, Johnston relied on the ability of the Army of Tennessee to parry with its enemy, waiting for a chance to catch it unaware, when a swift, sure movement could spell the doom to the Federal invasion. Historian Bruce Catton described the Confederate retrograde movement and the Union pursuit as "a series of movements that were almost formalized, like some highly intricate and deadly dance. Johnston could never quite make a permanent stand, Sherman could never quite force a decision..." Historian Earl Schenck Miers visualized Johnston directing the Army of Tennessee as "a boxer fights a slugger—weaving and ducking, jumping back, jabbing in the clinches, bouncing off the ropes, hoping
that quicker footwork, a greater endurance, a more scientific knowledge of the fisticuffer's art would tell in the late rounds." And, Johnston himself, viewing the campaign several years after the war, complacently rendered his personal interpretation: "Between Dalton and the Chattahoochee [River] we could have given battle only by attacking the enemy intrenched, or so near intrenchments that the only result of success to us would have been his falling back into them, while defeat would have been our ruin." Johnston labored under no illusion that he was directing the most propitious plan of opposition to the Federal invasion of Georgia.

Retreat, intrenchment, harassment, and attack were all important parts of Johnston's Fabian strategy. The numerical superiority of the enemy necessitated the Confederate retrograde movements. Only by constantly retreating out of reach of the Federal force, could the Army of Tennessee avoid an engagement which would place them at a perilous disadvantage. As a result, Johnston "examined the country very minutely; and learned its character thoroughly," realizing the importance of knowing precisely how quickly his command would have to move to keep from being trapped by the enemy. From the Dalton and Resaca area, which he had thoroughly surveyed, Johnston calculated "with accuracy, therefore, the time that would be required for the march of so great an army [the Union army] from Tunnel Hill to Resaca . . ., [and] how many hours our comparatively small force, . . . would reach the same point from Dalton." Such prognostications of the prospective movements and the respective time elements of both
the Union and Confederate armies by Johnston were common throughout the Atlanta Campaign.

The retreat of the Army of Tennessee from Dalton to Atlanta was punctuated by determined Confederate stands, which through the use of field fortifications and advantageous geographical features more nearly equalized the opposing armies. Kenesaw Mountain, more than any other battlefield, provided the favorable terrain and intrenchments from which Johnston desired to meet the Union army, and the Confederate success at this location justified the Southern commander's policy. Federal losses exceeded 2,000, while there were only 270 casualties and 172 missing from the Army of Tennessee. Numerous times favorable points were occupied and fortifications were erected throughout Johnston's tenure as commander, but other defensive positions did not yield comparable results for the South.

The third named component of Johnston's policy was the harassment of the Union army. Unfortunately for the Confederate cause, this aspect of the Southern military maneuvers rarely was effective. However, there were considerable interest and some attempts by the commander to harass the enemy—in fact, Johnston came to believe, soon after the outset of the campaign, that victory or defeat in Georgia depended upon the success of this phase of his Fabian tactics. He corresponded directly with the President on two occasions, five times with General Bragg, and four times with General S. D. Lee requesting cavalry reinforcement to destroy or, at least, to harass the enemy's line of communications. On June 12, Johnston wrote to General Bragg...
informing him that he had urged General S. D. Lee with his cavalry "to break the railroad between Dalton and the Etowah [River] ..." and requesting the presidential advisor to give orders to Lee to carry out the assignment." The following day Johnston again wrote Bragg, and this time suggested that General Nathan Bedford Forrest be ordered to "operate in the enemy's rear between his army and Dalton." To Senator Hill, Johnston noted that five thousand cavalry could in one day "destroy the railroad to such an extent as to require two weeks or a month to repair it, and this work should be done between Dalton and Marietta. ... Forrest or Morgan [General John Hunt Morgan], one or both, should be at once ordered to do this work."

Although Johnston was convinced that an interruption of the Federal line of communication would greatly impair the maneuvers of the Union army, possibly causing the adversary to risk a battle with the advantage resting on the Confederate side or precipitating a calamitous retreat, he obtained the services of neither Lee, Forrest, or Morgan to attack the enemy's logistical line. Furthermore, the Army of Tennessee had no cavalry force of adequate strength which could be dispatched for such a raid. Johnston did at times send out sorties designed to destroy the railroad connecting Sherman's army with their supply depots, but the efforts were minimized because of the scarcity of mounted infantry.

It was hoped that the retreats, intrenchments, and harassments would beget conditions which would make possible the successful development of the final element of Johnston's Fabian strategy,
counterattack, for a Confederate offensive movement could not be
prudently initiated by the Army of Tennessee without an important
prerequisite, and this was simply the division of the invading Union
army, which would allow the Confederate force to join battle with only
one of the Federal corps without the prospect of its being quickly
reinforced. Johnston seized his first opportunity to strike an
isolated segment of the Union army after his command had retreated
south from Adairsville to Kingston and Cassville. The last two
Georgia towns were approximately equidistant from the former, but
were themselves close to seven miles apart. Johnston correctly
predicted that Sherman would split his forces, using the two routes
south from Adairsville through both Kingston and Cassville to pursue
his army. The Confederate commander auspiciously placed his troops,
and issued orders for an attack against the Union column moving south
along the Adairsville-Cassville road when the distance between the
divided Union forces was greatest. Polk's corps was instructed to
engage the enemy with a frontal assault, while Hood and his command
were to move against their left flank. Hardee's corps was to delay
and screen potential Federal reinforcements in Kingston from reaching
the scene of battle. Johnston believed that a major Confederate
victory and, perhaps, the repulse of the invading enemy forces from
Georgia was within reach; but, Hood was lured out of position by a
report of enemy troops in his rear, and the partially executed
Confederate attack collapsed.
Johnston planned a similar trap for a portion of Sherman's command when it was scheduled to cross Peachtree Creek approximately seven miles northwest of Atlanta. The Confederate commander reasoned that, if the attack were successful, "the great divergence of the Federal line of retreat from the direct route available to us would enable us to secure decisive results," but, if this Confederate effort did not materialize, there was, according to Johnston, ample opportunity to outflank the enemy. The commander planned to trust the defense of Atlanta to 10,000 militiamen, promised by Governor Joseph E. Brown of Georgia, while the Army of Tennessee fell back into the Gate City, and, then, suddenly marched against one flank of the Union army. The invaders could be forced against the Chattahoochee River, "where there were no fords, or to the east, away from their communications. . . . If unsuccessful, the Confederate army had a near and secure place of refuge in Atlanta. . . ." However, Johnston was removed from command before the Federals straddled Peachtree Creek, and it was Hood who, as the newly appointed commanding general of the Army of Tennessee, directed the attack.

The efforts of Johnston's officers to maintain the morale of their men in the face of one retreat after another was, no doubt, one of their most important tasks. That Johnston's officers were largely successful was well illustrated by the high esteem and unquestionable confidence which most Johnny Rebs held for their commander, and although there were exceptions, Johnston's lieutenants appreciated their leader. Mary Boykin Chesnut, who was decidedly
hostile to Johnston and his military strategy, must have recorded in her diary with some chagrin the evaluation a Colonel Carter of Johnston's staff made of his chief: "He [Johnston] has the qualities which attract men to him. That is a gift of the Gods. . . . if he [Hood] is as smart a man as Old Joe, I'm a fool, and if there is a braver man than Joe, I have to meet him yet." And, furthermore, the colonel believed Johnston to be superior to one of his kinfolk, General Robert E. Lee!

However, where the odds are so heavily against one side as was the situation during the Atlanta Campaign, it is natural that the attempts of the underdog to overcome their shortcomings might result in the expansion of the truth or revert to the ridiculous; such was the case on occasion in the Army of Tennessee. For instance, after the Confederates had fortified themselves well at Kenesaw Mountain, a position of great strategic potential, an officer, hoping to improve the morale of his men after six weeks of retreating, announced that the railroad in the rear of the enemy was destroyed, their supplies were cut off, their army was starving, having had only half rations for several days, and their retreat was imminent. Before the commander concluded his address, the Confederate troopers heard a train approaching the Union camp, and each "looked at one another, uttered hard names, and slunk back to their quarters. . . ." General Wheeler saw fit to fell trees across the path of the Union army -- anything to slow the enemy's advance without giving battle where the Union could employ its numerical superiority. In fact, Federal manpower
in Georgia greatly circumscribed Confederate resistance to the Federal invasion through July 17, 1864, when General Johnston received the following order from Richmond:

Lieut. Gen. J. B. Hood has been commissioned to the temporary rank of general under the late law of Congress. I [General Samuel Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector General] am directed by the Secretary of War to inform you that as you have failed to arrest the advance of the enemy to the vicinity of Atlanta, far in the interior of Georgia, and express no confidence that you can defeat or repel him, you are hereby relieved from the command of the Army and Department of Tennessee, which you will immediately turn over to General Hood.

Johnston replied the following day to General Cooper that he had obeyed "your dispatch of yesterday," but he prophetically observed: "Confident language by a military commander is not usually regarded as evidence of competency."

Secretary of War Seddon, in his order dismissing Johnston, questioned whether or not the latter intended to defend Atlanta. Johnston maintained that he had arranged for the strengthening of Atlanta's defenses, had informed Hood of his intention to defend the city, and had retained his family in the metropolis, and this was evidence enough that he intended to hold Atlanta. Also supporting the commander's contention was the report Senator Hill made to Seddon following his conference with Johnston. The senator quoted the general as saying: "Well, before the position you mention [Army of Tennessee trapped in Atlanta and the subsequent Union control of Southern Georgia] of course we shall have a bloody fight..."

In his *Narrative of Military Operations*, Johnston declared that "the Confederate army had a near and secure place of refuge in Atlanta, which it could
hold forever, and so win the campaign, of which that place was the object." Historian Thomas Connelly, who studied the question at hand, concluded: "The many contradictions involved in the Peachtree strategy indicate that he [Johnston] probably had not devised a definite battle plan. At best, Johnston had a general idea of attacking Sherman, but he badly neglected those details essential for success. Perhaps Johnston did not know what he would do."

It may be that Connelly's conclusion is the best that can be drawn, not only in regard to Johnston's plans for the Gate City, but for the Atlanta Campaign. Johnston's strategy has been discussed in this chapter in a systematic manner without giving detailed attention to the general's frustration with his assignment—frustration which brought indecision and inaction at times. The political authorities in Richmond were continually vexed as to what was to be Johnston's next move. In fact, this was one of the reasons he was removed from command. But, despite his reticence and ambiguity when communicating plans to his superiors, Johnston did have a strategic reaction to the Federal invasion. While Fabian tactics generally dominated his military policy, Johnston appeared to be convinced shortly after he was assigned to the Army of Tennessee and was not able to procure sufficient reinforcements to engage the enemy without the fear of being overwhelmed that he was faced with a near impossible challenge. As a result, Johnston believed he had to make the best of a bad situation, hoping that an opportunity would arise allowing him to seize the advantage for the benefit of the Army of Tennessee and Confederacy.
Due to his and others' shortcomings General Joseph E. Johnston was never able to capitalize on such an opportunity during the Atlanta Campaign, and he was removed from command.

Where General Johnston was slight in stature, reserved and intelligent in demeanor, married, and fifty-seven years old, General Hood was a stout six feet two inches in height, effervescent but mentally obtuse in manner, single, and thirty-three years of age. The contrast between the two Confederate officers becomes even greater when their military policies are compared; during their tenure at the helm of the Army of Tennessee, each employed a strategy in direct opposition to that of the other. While Johnston utilized a Fabian policy to oppose the Federal advance from Dalton to Atlanta, his successor, immediately upon being assigned to the Army of Tennessee, initiated an offensive movement against the enemy.

According to Hood, an aggressive campaign by the Army of Tennessee was the only solution to the threat the Confederacy faced in the West. In Dalton, Hood thought rations might be collected, Mill Creek and Snake Creek fortified, and a "grand assault upon Sherman's left flank and rear" launched. "This move, in my opinion [Hood's], would have culminated in an overwhelming victory [Confederate] . . .," but Johnston had ordered a retreat—a retreat which took the Southern army in less than sixty days south of the Chattahoochee River into the vicinity of Atlanta. During this period, Hood corresponded with officials in Richmond expressing a hope that Johnston's strategy might be reversed, as the Army of Tennessee
was receiving "its mortal wound when it turned its back in the retreat in the mountains of Georgia. . . ." To General Bragg in Richmond, Hood wrote on July 14, three days before he was made commanding general of the Army of Tennessee:

I have, general, so often urged that we should force the enemy to give us battle as to almost be regarded reckless by the officers high in rank in this army, since their views have been so directly opposite. I regard it as a great misfortune to our country that we have failed to give battle to the enemy many miles north of our present position.17

There were two men who would have instantly questioned the Hood-Bragg correspondence had they known its contents. On August 24 General Hardee wrote to General William Whann Mackall, former Chief of Staff to Johnston, stating he concurred that Hood had not consistently opposed Johnston's Fabian strategy. "You [Mackall] are entirely correct in saying that Hood was, of all others, in favor of retreating. If General Johnston had followed his advice he would have crossed the Chattahoochee two or three weeks before he did. This can be proved beyond all controversy." Even if this statement is not taken literally, it is reputable evidence that Hood proposed two conflicting policies, promoting one to one group and the second to another. To the authorities in Richmond and in his memoirs, he unwaveringly and urgently advocated an aggressive strategy against the enemy, while in the company of his commanding general and fellow corps commanders he supported and even called for a policy of retreat. Such Machiavellian behavior can only lead one to conclude that Hood allowed personal ambition to override professional ethics and personal integrity.
General Hood, as well as his predecessor, expressed surprise at the developments on July 17 which brought the dismissal of Johnston. It is obvious that Hood instantly took into consideration the many responsibilities accompanying his new assignment. Early on the 18th, Hood and General Alexander P. Stewart, who had recently acceded to the rank of corps commander, filling the vacancy created by General Polk's death at Kenesaw Mountain, rode to Johnston's quarters, where Hood encouraged Johnston to "pocket that dispatch, leave me in command of my corps and fight the battle for Atlanta . . . ," but Johnston refused to do so unless the order was countermanded by President Davis. Immediately, Hood, accompanied by Stewart and Hardee, wired Davis that "we deem it dangerous to change commanders, now especially. . . . A few days will probably decide the fate of Atlanta, when the campaign may be expected to close for a time, allowing a new commander opportunity to get his army in hand. . . ." When it became clear that Davis would not rescind his order, Hood again urged Johnston "for the good of the country, to pocket the correspondence, remain in command, and fight for Atlanta as Sherman was at the very gates of the city," but Johnston demurred, seemingly oblivious to Hood's pleas.

Believing himself placed in an "embarrassing position" as he did not even know the locations of Hardee's and Stewart's corps, Hood pursued Johnston with persistence, making one last attempt to gain his aid. "With all of the earnestness of which a man is capable, I besought him, . . . to at least remain with me and give me the
benefit of his counsel whilst I determined the issue." However, the deposed commander could not be prevailed upon and bade farewell to the army, beginning an extended furlough which would not terminate until General Robert E. Lee again placed him in command of the Army of Tennessee seven months later. For Hood, the die was cast; both President Davis and Johnston had refused his entreaties. He, alone, was responsible for the threat to Atlanta and the Army of Tennessee.

Hood was not the only officer who reacted to the rearrangement in the hierarchy of the Army of Tennessee. It has already been noted that the names of Generals Stewart and Hardee accompanied the telegram urging President Davis to postpone for a few days the change in command. Both entertained serious doubts about the new commander's ability to handle the assignment. Stewart was convinced "that the removal of Johnston was the final coup de grace to the Confederate cause."

Hardee believed Hood, "though a tried and gallant officer, to be unequal in both experience and natural ability to so important a command . . . ," and consequently, asked to be transferred from the Army of Tennessee. When the President suggested it was his duty to remain at his post, the general acquiesced, and served with Hood for the rest of the Atlanta Campaign after which he was reassigned. But, to Major J. J. Reeve Hood was "cordially sustained" less than a month after elevation to commanding general. Reeve was no "Johnston man" as he had not appreciated Johnston's "sublimated strategy, which makes war the science of giving up immense & fertile territory, and marching men to death for want of sleep, instead of a game of hard knocks and sturdy blows. . ."
On Hood's first full day as commanding general of the Army of Tennessee, he ordered a major attack. Although the Confederate offensive did not meet with the success Hood had anticipated, to Major Reeve and others of his ilk this was a pleasant indication that the Army of Tennessee was now under the command of a man who would take the fight to the Yankees. And, indeed, such was the case. Within a fortnight of his appointment, Hood initiated three principal engagements with the enemy.

Despite his brief tenure of little more than twenty-four hours as commander, Hood showed no hesitation on July 19 when he inaugurated his first attack. Believing "it impossible to hold Atlanta without giving battle . . . ," he planned to "crush" a segment of the Union army as it lay astride Peachtree Creek, after which he would move the Army of Tennessee against the remaining portion of the invading host in an encounter offering more equitable terms to the Rebel army than had been the case in the past. When the Confederate attack was delayed for three hours due to confusion in the placement of troops for battle, the enemy was able to intrench and succor its force, rendering the Southern assault ineffectual in the first stage. Three days later on July 22, Hood again seized an opportunity to attack in detail a column of Sherman's command in the battle of Atlanta. While positioning two of his corps in the defenses around the Gate City, Hood moved his third corps under General Hardee through the metropolis to turn the left of the Union force under General James B. McPherson. Once more, the Confederate movement lacked the timing and power to accomplish the
"grand results"—devastation of the adversary, but it did defeat the enemy attempt to sever Confederate lines of communication leading from Atlanta. The third engagement took place on July 28 at Ezra Church in an effort by Hood to foil the Union movements, which were a second attempt to cut Atlanta away from supplies emanating from Southern Georgia. As in the two previous encounters, the Army of Tennessee discovered greater Federal strength than was expected, and Hood's plan for another flanking movement could not be implemented.

During the month of August following the battles of Peacatree Creek, Atlanta, and Ezra Church, the tide of battle shifted from major infantry engagements to cavalry raids. Sherman sent 9,400 mounted infantrymen to destroy the Confederate rail communications leading into Atlanta and to release 30,000 Federal prisoners of war at Andersonville, Georgia. Neither objective was accomplished, and the fiasco was made worse when more than half of the Union cavalry command was lost. It was this fact which, no doubt, prompted Hood to take action. Realizing that the Federal cavalry was rendered almost harmless, the Confederate commander ordered Wheeler to move with 4,000 horsemen against the enemy's line of communication between Marietta, Georgia, and Nashville, Tennessee. After devastating as much enemy-controlled property as possible, Wheeler was to leave 1,200 men in Tennessee to continue harassment in the rear of the Union army, and return with the remaining troops to the Atlanta area. The raiding activities were largely directed against the railroads connecting the Federal bases of supply and the Union soldiers in the field with
hopes that Sherman would be forced "to retreat for want of supplies, and thus allow me [Hood] an opportunity to fall upon his rear with our main body." Again, Hood was plagued by the distasteful fact that, although the Rebel cavalry had "accomplished all but the impossible," the Federal capacity to reinforce threatened areas was too great and the Confederate cavalry too scarce "to interrupt the enemy's line of supplies to an extent to compel him [Sherman] to retreat."

Although there were no major infantry conflicts for more than a month after the battle of Ezra Church on July 28, there were important adjustments made in the field positions of the opposing armies. Sherman extended his line of battle to the south of Atlanta, and Hood was forced to match this extension with his thinly manned line of Confederate troops. By August 28, Hood became apprehensive about the enemy's maneuvers, and removed surplus stores from Atlanta. During the next two days, it became evident that Sherman was moving toward Jonesborough, Georgia, approximately twenty miles south of Atlanta on an important Confederate railroad line. Hood shifted the two corps of Hardee and S. D. Lee to the projected Federal objective "to attack and drive the enemy at that place across Flint River. This I [Hood] hoped would draw the attention of the enemy in that direction, and that he would abandon his works on the left, so that I could attack him in flank."

The Confederate attack at Jonesborough failed, and the Army of Tennessee was compelled to abandon Atlanta. Hood moved his command to the south to take up a position between Andersonville, Georgia, where
30,000 Federal prisoners of war were detained, and the Union army. He believed that an enemy cavalry raid could release the Federal captives and furnish them with arms and that "such a body of men, an army of itself, could have overrun and devastated the country from West Georgia to Savannah." Had such an ominous possibility not shackled the commanding general, he would have immediately moved against Sherman's communications and destroyed the Federal supply depots at Marietta.

Following the developments during the last days of August and the subsequent Union occupation of Atlanta on September 1, Sherman decided not to pursue the Army of Tennessee, but to "occupy Atlanta, enjoy a short period of rest, and to think well over the next step required in the process of events." For Hood, who had anxiously telegraphed Richmond for reinforcements, deemed "absolutely necessary... to prevent this country from being overrun...," Sherman's decision to retire from the field was a welcomed reprieve. Equally relieved was Colonel George W. Rain, who directed the work of the Confederate women operating the arsenals at Augusta and Summerville, Georgia. The ordnance establishments needed time to provide 75,000 cartridges a day for Hood. The time element was especially important because a train of reserve ammunition had been destroyed to keep it from falling into enemy hands during the evacuation of Atlanta.

The Union and Confederate armies had been in the field actively campaigning for 120 days, when the Federal invaders occupied Atlanta and a cessation to military maneuvers by both sides ensued, but only the Yankee and Rebel soldiers in the trenches could thoroughly enjoy
the respite, as the commanding generals, substituting missives for missiles, carried on a vituperative verbal battle. On September 7, Sherman wrote to Hood that the citizens of Atlanta would soon be evacuated. The Union commander proposed a plan to send to Hood under a truce those civilians wishing to remain in the Confederacy. Obviously incensed at this turn of events, but placed uncomfortably on the defensive, Hood replied to his adversary's proposal that "I do not consider that I have any alternative in this matter." However, Hood, not being one to accept the inevitable and willing to fight at the slightest provocation, rejoined in the two concluding paragraphs of his letter: "And now, sir, permit me to say that the unprecedented measure you propose transcends, in studied and ingenious cruelty, all acts ever before brought to my attention in the dark history of war. In the name of God and humanity, I protest, believing that you will find that you are expelling from their homes and firesides the wives and children of a brave people." Sherman immediately replied to this stinging attack by an individual whom he and many other Union officers thought of inferior mental ability. The Union commander noted that Generals Johnston, Hardee, and Hood had during the course of military actions within the past year either removed women and children from their homes or destroyed civilian residences or endangered non-combatants' lives by investing parapets in close proximity to residential areas. Moreover, Sherman, angered by Hood's interjection of God and humanity into the argument, remarked: "In the name of common sense, I
ask you not to appeal to a just God in such a sacrilegious manner," for if anyone had unjustly started and sustained the present conflict, it was the South.

For Hood, this only signaled the beginning of the second round. He refuted the statement that he, his predecessor, and corps commander unnecessarily endangered civilian lives. The blame lay with Sherman. To believe that the Confederacy was responsible for the war was completely preposterous. Hood argued that the Southern states had time and again offered "to leave it to the unbiased will of these States . . . to determine for themselves whether they will cast their destiny with your Government or ours . . . ," but the Federal Union has utilized the bayonet "to fasten its hateful tyranny upon the unfortunate freemen of these States." Then, Hood tried to flank Sherman by declaring that the latter's actions in Atlanta were worse than General Benjamin Butler's in New Orleans, and, the final injustice was that the Yankee had taken the Negro as an ally "to place over us an inferior race."

Following a patriotic philippic on Confederate determination to see the war through to a successful conclusion, Hood again invoked the aid of the "Almighty" and declared his present correspondence with Sherman closed.

A member of Hood's staff, Major William Clare, who participated in the receiving of 446 Atlanta families including 705 adults, 867 children, and 79 servants with 1,651 parcels of furniture back into Confederate lines, apparently did not check with his commanding general before he wrote to a member of Sherman's staff extolling the
"uniform courtesy you have shown on all occasions to me and my people . . .
[and] hoping at some future time to be able to reciprocate your
courtesy, and in many instances your positive kindness. . . ." In
view of Hood's correspondence with Sherman, Clare's views would be
considered rank insubordination, possibly treasonous.

Hood did more than trade letters with Sherman during September
1864. The morale of his command was one of his principal concerns.
He believed that the esprit de corps of the Army of Tennessee had
greatly improved during July and August, but following the evacuation
of Atlanta, the fighting spirit "had again become impaired in consequence
of the recurrence of retreat. . . ." The Confederate commander was
also apprehensive about an encounter with his adversary in the flat
country surrounding Atlanta, for the numerical superiority of enemy alone
could force dire consequences upon his army if battle were joined
under the existing circumstances. Consequently, Hood telegraphed
Richmond requesting reinforcements, and Hardee, at the suggestion of
his superior, did the same. Although President Davis acknowledged
their need for additional troops, he was forced to answer that "no
other resource remains . . ., [and] it is now requisite the absentees
be brought back, the addition required from the surrounding country
be promptly made available, and that the means in hand be used with
energy proportionate to the country's need."

In view of these circumstances, Hood pursued a strategy to
lessen, if not eradicate, both weaknesses in the condition of the
Army of Tennessee. "Something was absolutely demanded, and I rightly
judged that an advance, at all promising success, would go far to restore its fighting spirit." The forward movement was directed against the Federal line of communication into the mountainous territory northwest of Atlanta, thereby serving a twofold purpose of improving the morale and correcting the vulnerable field position of the Rebel command. After getting his army into position, Hood reasoned that Sherman would have to force him off the Union line of communication or move south from Atlanta. If the former became the case, Hood would take advantage of the uneven terrain to give battle to the advantage of the Confederacy or to elude the Federals to await a more opportune situation, and supposing the Federals chose the latter alternative, he planned to fall upon the enemy's rear.

On September 18, Hood ordered a movement by his entire command against the Federal communications between Atlanta and Dalton, and for several weeks the Army of Tennessee threatened and destroyed Union depots and railroads between these two points. Just as Hood had predicted, Sherman marched out of Atlanta to relieve the Confederate threat to his rear, but contrary to the Rebel general's prognostications, the Union general soon tired of the futile effort to trap his smaller but quicker adversary. After dispatching a force large enough to cope with Hood, Sherman retired to Atlanta, and prepared to move 62,000 soldiers in a campaign to the south. The Federal commander was splitting his command; one portion was to protect the Tennessee and North Georgia territory from Confederate raids, the remaining portion under his leadership was to seek new conquests to the south of
Atlanta. By the middle of November, Sherman's plans were being carried out.

Hood was not intimidated by these developments—a situation which would have overcome men of lesser faith in the impossible than the indomitable Commanding General of the Army of Tennessee. He immediately decided to move into Tennessee destroying Federal communications and planning to defeat and capture the commands of Generals Thomas and John McAllister Schofield, whom Sherman had assigned to defend the Middle Tennessee and North Georgia area. If successful, he would supply and reinforce his army, and march into Kentucky, assuming a position where "I could threaten Cincinnati, and recruit the Army from Kentucky and Tennessee." Then, as Sherman "cut loose and moved south" from Atlanta, Hood devised his last bit of intricate grand strategy.

I would occupy at Richmond, Kentucky, a position of superior advantage, as Sherman, upon his arrival at the sea coast, would be forced to go on board ship, and, after a long detour by water and land, repair to the defense of Kentucky and Ohio or march direct to the support of Grant. If he returned to confront my forces or followed me directly from Georgia into Tennessee and Kentucky, I hoped then to be in condition to offer battle; and, if blessed with victory, to send reinforcements to General Lee, in Virginia, or to march through the gaps in the Cumberland Mountains, and attack Grant in rear. This latter course I would pursue in the event of defeat or of inability to offer battle to Sherman. If on the other hand he marched to join Grant, I could pass through the Cumberland gaps to Petersburg, and attack Grant in rear, at least two weeks before he, Sherman, could render him assistance. This move, I believed, would defeat Grant, and allow General Lee, in command of our combined Armies, to march upon Washington or turn upon and annihilate Sherman.

Unfortunately for the Confederacy, this bit of intricate grand strategy did not get beyond its first step. In trying to defeat
Schofield and Thomas, the former at Franklin and then their combined commands at Nashville, Hood's army was defeated and the once proud Army of Tennessee virtually destroyed.

II. The Confederate Command in Georgia and the Carolinas:

The Savannah and Carolinas Campaigns

The loss of Atlanta on September 1, 1864, brought about a change in the Confederate military chain of command. On October 3 General Beauregard received orders from Richmond transferring him from an assignment of lesser importance in the Virginia theater to the command of the newly created Military Division of the West, which included the area invaded by Sherman. This was not a demotion for Hood, as he retained command of the Army of Tennessee, but, rather, a promotion for Beauregard. It did immediately involve the latter in the military affairs which during the past year had created much Confederate consternation in Tennessee and Georgia.

Beginning with an enthusiastic note in his new position, Beauregard issued a patriotic appeal "to my countrymen, of all classes and sections, for their generous support and confidence." He assured the people that President Davis would lend his "earnest support," that the governors of the Confederate states express "devotion to our cause," and that the "noble army in the field . . . will do all that patriots can achieve," and hopefully, he prophesied: "The history of the past, written in the blood of their comrades, but foreshadows the glorious future which lies before them." Holding the promises of a
"glorious future" before the Southerners, Beauregard beseeched them
to "fill up our ranks, encourage our soldiers, inspire confidence,
dispel gloom, and hasten on the day of our final success and deliverance."
The enemy "can and must" be driven from Atlanta; "it is only for the
good people of Georgia and surrounding States to speak, and the work is
done." The prerequisite provisions and men available were sufficient
to defeat the enemy. To those soldiers absent without leave, the
Division Commander granted immunity to punishment, if they would
return in the next thirty days. In conclusion, he extended a universal
invitation to attend to the task at hand.

   My appeal is to everyone, of all classes and conditions,
to come forward freely, cheerfully, and with a good heart, to
the work that lies before us. My countrymen! respond to this
call as you have done in days that have passed, and, with the
blessing of a kind and over-ruling Providence, the enemy shall be
-driven from your soil, the security of your wives and daughters from
the insults and outrages of a brutal foe shall be established,
soon to be followed by a permanent and honorable peace. The
claims of home and country, wife and children, uniting with the
demands of honor and patriotism, summon us to the field; we
cannot, dare not, will not fail to respond.

A month later after Sherman had sounded the tocsin to the South with
the beginning of his command's "March to the Sea," Beauregard, safely
removed from the scene of action in Corinth, Mississippi, again appealed
to the people of Georgia. "Arise for the defense of your native soil!
Rally around your patriotic Governor and gallant soldiers!" Rebels
were to harass Sherman by obstructing and destroying all roads in his
"front, flank, and rear, and his army will soon starve in your midst.
Be confident. Be resolute." And, then, reassuringly he added: "I
hasten to join you in the defense of your homes and firesides."
Such addresses as the above could not suffice as a means of coping with the enemy; Confederate military opposition to the invaders was yet a necessity, if the Southland wished to expel the invaders. Upon Hood's departure for Tennessee, he ordered Wheeler to use his force of 4,500 cavalrmen to keep the Dalton and Atlanta railroad line cut, and if Sherman initiated an advance "anywhere," Wheeler was to "drive off all stock in their front and destroy all the mills within ten miles of their line of march, retarding them as much as possible."

In his turn, on November 15, when it became evident that Sherman was on the verge of launching an offensive movement, the Confederate cavalry commander issued more specific orders to his men: (1) all mills within the area of hostility were to be put out of commission by destroying the machinery or draining the water; (2) buildings for mills, corncribs, etc., were not to be "burned or destroyed;"

(3) livestock was to be driven off beyond reach of the adversary and records were to be kept to facilitate reclamation by the owner; (4) inhabitants in the path of the invading army were to be instructed one day in advance where they might safely drive their stock.

Wheeler attempted to implement orders with the loss of as little personal property as possible to those living in the path of Sherman's campaign.

On December 1, Wheeler received orders from Richmond to impede the movements of the enemy by destroying bridges and causeways across all creeks and felling trees and pulling down fences wherever the Federal advance might be obstructed. "Indeed, every expedient which ingenuity may suggest should be adapted to retard the enemy's
movements. . . . To enable you successfully to carry out these orders you are authorized to impress, for temporary use, all laborers and tools necessary . . . " but supplies which might be utilized by the enemy must be destroyed. Finally, "let it be known through the country generally that we are very largely re-enforced here [Augusta, Georgia] and at Savannah, and are prepared for any movement on us." 35

Johnny Green, a member of Wheeler's cavalry, wrote in his diary on November 15 that it was their assignment "to hang on the flank of the enemy & annoy him all we could, to attack every marauding party that we could find unsupported by a heavy force & when possible to obstruct Sherman's advance." Six days later he reported that his command had attacked the enemy's rear guard, and "hurried them out of Macon. . . ." In December, the Savannah Republican paid a tribute to Wheeler and his cavalry when it wrote:

The pertinacious manner in which the gallant Wheeler has hung upon the flanks and rear of the powerful army now invading our State, attacking them by day and by night when they least expected it, and keeping watch over all their movements, should entitle him to the lasting gratitude of every Georgian and the praise of all his countrymen. From the departure from Atlanta up to the present hour, he has kept on their track, and bayed them at every step of their progress. They believed when their expedition moved there was no such enemy to harrass them, and to him we are indebted for the delays and hinderances that are likely to prove the ruin of our barbarous and cruel foe.36

The accolades of a Georgia newspaper are contradicted by the Union commander's report of proceedings during the period following his departure from Atlanta to his arrival on the East Coast at Savannah. According to Sherman, "no opposition from the enemy worth speaking of was encountered until the heads of columns were within fifteen miles
of Savannah, where all the roads leading to the city were obstructed more or less by felled timber, with earth-works and artillery"; nevertheless, the Confederates were easily driven from these outer defenses into the city. Furthermore, the invaders enjoyed sweet potatoes, corn, rice, cattle, hogs, sheep, poultry, while there was ample fodder for their livestock, which included 10,000 horses and mules collected from the countryside during the campaign. In view of this information, the report of Sherman's subordinate, General O. O. Howard, is a definite understatement. "We have found the country full of provisions and forage, and have almost completely supplied ourselves, drawing but very little upon our rations." Wheeler's cavalry was not as effective in thwarting the Federals as reported by the Republican.

While the praises of the Georgia newspaper are not to be taken at face value, neither can the Federal reports be considered conclusive evidence of Wheeler's efforts—or lack of effort—to impede the progress of the enemy campaign. It is instructive to consider the relative strengths of the opposing forces. Sherman marched at the head of 62,000 men, while Wheeler commanded only an estimated 10,000; however, the Confederate cavalry commander reported that his "force never exceeded 3,500 men, and was so distributed in front, rear, and on both flanks that I seldom had more than 2,000 under my immediate command...." Hence, the odds were six to one in favor of the Yankee at the least, and thirty to one at the greatest. Also, to be taken into consideration was the organization and method
utilized for the Federal advance. Sherman divided his force into two wings which made separate demonstrations against widely divergent points. This procedure often separated the extremities of the Union army more than fifty-five miles. It was expecting too much for Wheeler with the number of men at his command to harass effectively, much less resist, the enemy under such circumstances.

While Sherman was only remotely concerned by the Rebel cavalry hovering on the periphery of his army, many Confederate civilians were all too aware of Wheeler's presence. A letter written to Secretary of War Seddon on the last day of 1864 painted a vivid picture, while appealing, "for protection against destructive lawlessness of members of General Wheeler's command. From Augusta to Hardecville the road is now strewn with corn, left on the ground unconsumed. Beeves have been shot down in the fields, one quarter taken off and the balance left for the buzzards. Horses are stolen out of wagons on the road, and by wholesale out of stables at night..." Prior to this correspondence, General Hardee, charged with the defense of Savannah, had issued a circular notifying Confederate citizens that Wheeler had no authority to impress private property. "All parties claiming to impress under such authority [Wheeler] are thieves and robbers, and should be treated accordingly." The commander of the Military Division of the West wrote to the War Department in Richmond on December 23, and suggested a reorganization of Wheeler's command "under good commanders" or its immediate conversion into an infantry
division, for "its conduct in front of the enemy, and its depredations on private property, render it worse than useless."

To this latter charge, Wheeler felt compelled to give an answer, and on December 28, he wrote to General Bragg asserting that his command had not arbitrarily stolen horses or burned mills. To the contrary, his men were returning to the owners recaptured stock taken from the enemy, and only when inhabitants would not remove horses and mules from the advance of the enemy, did he assume the responsibility, which included their return; mills were burned only when no other alternative but enemy control was possible. Wheeler wrote that he had "positive proof that the country swarmed with organized parties who do not and never did belong to my command ... [and] in all their stealing they claimed to belong to Wheeler's cavalry." He professed to know the names of "sixteen organized parties who steal on my credit."

There remains, however, much evidence which would place at least part of the blame for depredations during the Savannah Campaign at the feet of Wheeler's command. An aide-de-camp on General Sherman's staff, to whom it mattered little which Confederate group was responsible, reported:

In the course of our march to-day, we came upon a fine stately mansion, situated in a pleasant region, and surrounded by beautiful grounds, which were carefully and tastefully arranged. On entering the house, we found the reverse of a beautiful picture. It was a scene of shocking confusion: articles of furniture, soiled and broken... household utensils lay in ill-assorted heaps; crockery, shattered in pieces, was beyond the mender's art. This was the work, not of our soldiers, but of Wheeler's Rebel cavalry, who had been on picket duty at this place on the previous night.
Governor Brown of Georgia announced that he was mortified that the Confederate cavalry would rob and plunder "citizens indiscriminately . . . [and take] from the wives and children of soldiers who are in service, discharging their whole duty, the supplies of provisions which are their only means of support. . . ."

That Wheeler's command participated in extra-legal activities while executing orders and that there were unauthorized groups that pillaged in the name of the Confederate cavalry, there is little doubt; as to the extent each was involved, there is no definite answer, but the fact that a portion of the Confederate military did take advantage of the general confusion which enveloped the countryside during the presence of the enemy and that this generated dissension in the Confederacy is of significance to this study of Southern reaction to the Federal invasion.

The Confederate military strategy became imaginative in some respects as the Federals advanced from Atlanta to Savannah. From the Confederate capital Wheeler received orders shortly after the Savannah Campaign began to publicize "through the country" that reinforcements had arrived in Augusta and Savannah and that the Georgia cities were "prepared for any movement on us." The intended purpose was obviously to frighten Sherman away from these two locations; Augusta contained valuable munition works, and Savannah was an important seaport. Although the Confederacy met with only mediocre success, as the former site was bypassed untouched while the latter was invested, there was a conscientious attempt by military officers to
carry out the ruse, hoping that spurious information would deter the Union army if either city was their objective.

From Savannah a refugee, who fled the city two weeks before its surrender, wrote to the Charleston *Daily Courier* explaining that information concerning military developments was kept from the people, and, consequently, they were "almost totally ignorant of what was going on." Most thought that Sherman would be forced to the north or south of their city. Furthermore, he surmised: "I believe our military authorities tried to frighten Sherman off from attacking Augusta and Savannah by using the press to spread abroad statements concerning the arrival or expected arrival of reinforcements which never arrived. . . ."
The dailies in the two cities announced the presence and rationing in Augusta of 20,000 troops from the Virginia front. The Savannah refugee was not fooled by such Confederate trickery.

I believe there was little, if any, reality in these newspaper statements; and I further believe they were made at the request or suggestion of the military authorities. . . . If these arrivals of reinforcement had been true, I do not believe the papers would have announced them, unless with the consent of the authorities, and in such case I do not believe consent would have been given; and I do not believe the press of both cities would, with such singular unanimity, have fallen into making the same kind of announcements, when they were unreal, unless it were suggested or requested by the military authorities.43

If a Savannah civilian was not deceived by such duplicity, it is highly improbable that Sherman, an experienced military man, could be misled, and there is no evidence that he was.
In another attempt to consolidate their position in Savannah, the Confederates employed the use of a "considerable number" of "galvanized Yankees"--Federal prisoners of war who took an oath of allegiance to the South and entered into the Rebel army in lieu of imprisonment. This unusual experiment met with little success, possibly doing more harm than good since many of the "galvanized Yankees" mutinied, with some escaping into Union lines. What else but a situation of desperation would induce Confederate military authorities to revert to an expedient so unpredictable as using prisoners of war to fight against their country and former comrades in arms?

Of the devices turned to by the Confederates to withstand the Union onslaught none caused more consternation among the Federal officers than the use of land mines. After being developed by Colonel Rains, C. S. A., and first utilized at Yorktown in May 1862, they were discontinued until the fall of 1864, when the numerical superiority of the enemy apparently forced the Confederacy to resort to any expedient which might aid their cause. Savannah was one Confederate stronghold toward which Sherman's 62,000 marched in the first days of December 1864, and General Hardee, responsible for the welfare of the city with troops not numbering one-fifth the strength of the approaching enemy, consented to the placement of land mines with fond hopes that this would at least retard the Federal advance; however, Sherman only changed pace long enough to move reluctant Confederate prisoners to the front to search out and remove the buried shells. Later in his memoirs he reflected: "This was not war, but
murder, and it made me very angry." A second Union officer agreed with Sherman that this was "cowardly murder," while another recorded in his diary that "these cowardly villains call us 'barbarous Yankees'--and then adapt instruments of murder in cold blood where they dare not stand and fight like men."

Neither pure-blooded Southern manhood, nor "glavanized Yankees," nor the promulgation of misinformation, nor land mines, nor a combination of all could withstand the mighty Federal war machine, which under the direction of General Sherman marched the breadth of Georgia, a distance of 350 miles, and captured Savannah on December 21. Moreover, this was not the end of active campaigning for this fast-moving Union command. The Carolinas were next in line to taste the wrath of "Uncle Billy's" boys. The Confederates were yet in the field—at least those who were still able. Field artillery, ammunition, and military provisions were evacuated from Savannah to continue Southern resistance; equipment left behind was rendered useless to the enemy, and the crops north of the seaport city were destroyed. The Confederate army did not wish to aid their adversary's cause.

Ideas were also being exchanged to enhance the future of the Confederacy. General Howell Cobb, who had personally witnessed the destructive advance of the enemy across his plantation and state, was outspoken in his advice to reinstate General Johnston. On January 8, 1865, he wrote to Secretary of War Seddon advising that with Johnston in command of the Army of Tennessee and Beauregard in South Carolina "gloom and despondency" would disappear. In a letter
to President Davis several days later, Cobb reminded the chief executive that there was an "overwhelming public feeling in favor of the restoration of General Johnston. I can assure you that your refusal to do this is doing you more harm and producing more opposition to your administration than you dream of." Also during January 1865, General Wade Hampton was extolling the ability of Johnston, lending credence to Georgia Congressman Warren Akin's reports that the former commanding general's friends were "clamorous" for his return to the Army of Tennessee. But it was General James Chesnut who grasped the crux of the matter as far as the Southern war effort was concerned. As documented by his wife, the general believed that with the swamps impassable and railroads blown up "much might be done ... if we had but an army to seize the opportunity. . . ."

General Sherman had not spent Christmas in Savannah before he began to make plans to launch a vigorous offensive through the Carolinas. This last campaign in its entirety would consume only three months at the most and witness but one conflict which would merit the serious consideration of Sherman's staff. For the South, it was a time when its military leaders were desperately seeking panaceas for their country's plight or courageously preparing their nation for an honorable demise. The first quarter of 1865 was truly the sunset of a short-lived life for the Confederate States of America.

As Union troops crossed the Savannah River, invading the state of South Carolina in January 1865, only scattered remnants of larger Confederate forces were available to offer resistance.
When on February 3, Generals Beauregard, Hardee, D. H. Hill and Gustavus W. Smith in conference at Augusta, Georgia, concluded that 33,450 Confederate soldiers were or would be available in the South Carolina area for use in defense of that state, they were far too optimistic. Governor Brown disallowed the use of the Georgia militia and reserves beyond the boundaries of the Empire State. This was a loss of 1,500. Also, 10,000 survivors of Hood's Tennessee Campaign were expected in the East, but due to transportation difficulties and desertion, this number was substantially diminished. The Federal force was 60,000 strong at the outset of hostilities in 1865, with reinforcements readily available in North Carolina.

No explanation is necessary to make clear why most of the Southern resistance to the advancing enemy may be classified as little more than guerrilla warfare. Since the disparity in the strengths of the two armies forced the weaker to forgo even full-scale defensive operations, the Confederacy had to resort to whatever tactics were feasible, and this is exactly what it did. Trees were felled across the path of the enemy; bridges were burned; torpedoes were planted in rivers and on land; highly advantageous positions were defended until becoming dangerous; water was released to flood areas; and ordnance and other military supplies were hastily removed from or destroyed in threatened locations. From the environs of Columbia, South Carolina, a Confederate command indiscriminately bombarded the Federals, who had bedded down on the outskirts of the city to prepare for the occupation of the Palmetto State capital at dawn. Both sides knew that the
bombing would not achieve even a very minor military objective and
that its sole purpose was to annoy the Union troopers. This it
achieved, and there is little wonder that the invaders vented their
anger upon the despised South Carolina capital, from which the death-
dealing shells had come. Then, as if all these petty harassments were
not enough, Johnny Rebs masqueraded as Yankees in blue garments and
sallied forth to hoodwink and catch the Federals unaware. Nor was the
enemy the sole target of all the destructive power of the Southern
army, for again, as during the previous campaigns in Georgia, private
property was unnecessarily destroyed and plundered by Confederate
soldiers.

In January 1865, before Sherman had launched his Carolinas
Campaign, General Hardee wrote to President Davis surveying the
Confederate position in South Carolina and suggesting what strategy
might prudently be followed in the face of a numerically superior foe.
One sentence of Hardee's letter tells more of his situation and the
subsequent Southern military reaction to the Union invasion of the
Carolinas than all the others--"I am acting strictly on the defensive,
and unless heavily re-enforced must continue to do so." Scarcity of
manpower was inexorably forcing the Confederacy into a defensive
position except for minor forays against the enemy in which little was
risked and little accomplished. The diary notations of Sergeant John
W. Green, a member of Wheeler's cavalry, illustrate the small scale
operations characteristic of Rebel military efforts in South and
North Carolina.
We are still kept busy chasing & being chased by the enemy, now & then having some men and horses wounded. But as our business is to whip such Yankee forces as we find which we can whip & to be sure not to get whipped, our casualties are not large, for when we attack an inferior force they get away as fast as they can & when the force proves to be too strong for us we get away as fast as we can. As ours is now a detached force, however, we are pretty careful to pick out a force not too large.

In this kind of campaigning we met the enemy & had fights with them more or less severe at Wilson's store on March 1st, at Wadesboro on March 2nd and later this same day at Thompson's Creek & renewed it again at the same place March 3d & at White's store on March the 4th and at Wadesboro & Bethel Chu[ral]ch on March 5th. . . .53

The Confederate generals were not the only ones cognizant of the desperate straits in which their nascent country was forced. One Rebel sergeant recommended that his men desert to return to their homes where they might aid their suffering families. When the sergeant was reproved for his actions by a superior, he attempted to shoot the officer, and, consequently, found himself court-martialed and sentenced to be shot. The antithesis to such unpatriotic behavior was displayed by Colonel Alfred Rhett, who exuded so much confidence in the Confederate cause that his Federal captors were both amused and repulsed. He was certain that Sherman's march through Georgia could have been foiled "if things had been properly managed." Furthermore, Rhett confidently stated that he could raise 100,000 men in one month for the Confederate army and that strict discipline would make the conscripts as effective as any other soldier. He noted that he had shot twelve men in the last forty-five days and recently used a pack of dogs to catch twenty-eight deserters in three days: "discipline's the thing; all you have to do is to establish the principle." Perhaps
it was best for the unyielding martinet that he was a prisoner of war, for another captive Confederate declared that the Colonel's own men were capable of taking his life and that, if they failed, a "lieutenant in Wheeler's command has sworn to kill him for shooting one of their men, the first chance he gets."

These men were representative of the extremes to which Confederate officers went, but the action of Colonel William J. Hoke was more moderate and probably more indicative of Confederate staff reaction during the Carolinas Campaign. Hoke issued a circular directing the citizens of Charlotte, North Carolina, to remain calmly and quietly at their homes in case of enemy occupation of their city. He did not think that either the rights of persons or private property would be violated by the enemy, and in addition, he advised that Union officers be treated with "politeness and respect." If Federal outrages were committed, the North Carolinians were to "apply promptly to the commanding officer [Union] for redress, who will doubtless furnish you with a safeguard."

While Colonel Hoke's instructions to the citizens of Charlotte implied a respect for the conduct of the enemy, Generals Wheeler and Hampton possessed little confidence in the honorable behavior of the Federals, and without question, the Union side reciprocated the distrust of the two Confederate officers. On February 22, Sherman's cavalry commander, General Hugh Judson Kilpatrick, wrote to Wheeler declaring that eighteen Union soldiers were murdered after surrendering to a Confederate cavalry party. Kilpatrick demanded
an explanation, or promised he would take the lives of an equal number of Rebel prisoners of war in his possession. In addition, if these atrocities were continued, "I will not only retaliate as I have already mentioned, but there shall not be a house left standing within reach of my scouting parties . . . ." Moreover, Kilpatrick threatened to encourage his soldiers "to take a fearful revenge." On the same day that Wheeler received this "shocking" message from Kilpatrick, he replied that he was sure there was a mistake. His men had not been engaged with the enemy on the day the Yankees were murdered, but he would have the "matter promptly investigated and see that full justice is done. . . ." The guilty, rather than innocent prisoners, should be made to suffer the reprisals. As to Kilpatrick's warnings of retribution, Wheeler answered that he would make no "counter-threats," but if "you cause eighteen of my men to be shot . . . , I shall regard them as so many murders committed by you, and act accordingly. . . . Your threat 'to burn every house as far as your scouts can extend' is of too brutal a character for me, and I think for my Government, to reply to."

Although Wheeler denied knowledge of any involvement on the part of his men in the massacre related by Kilpatrick, General Chesnut told of an incident where a "very handsome" Southern girl had been raped and killed by stragglers from Sherman's army, and soon after the crime was committed, some of Wheeler's men happening upon the girl's delirious mother and hearing the story set out for revenge. When the seven Federals, thought to be guilty, were overtaken, their
throats were cut, and "These were the seven" was marked upon their breasts. Reports of similar bushwhacking executions were not uncommon. Where the commanding generals have little direct control over the conduct of their men in the field, the parties involved could not reasonably afford to do more than they did as discipline degenerated during the closing months of the war—stand firm, demanding of the enemy just treatment of their men and, finally, trusting in the integrity of the adversary.

Following the exchange of letters between Wheeler and Kilpatrick, their superiors, Sherman and Hampton, took up the pen to chastise each other verbally. Sherman initiated the correspondence by warning Hampton, who was in command of all Confederate cavalry in South Carolina, that he held 1,000 Rebels which he planned to dispose of "in like manner" for each murdered Federal captive. Among the twenty-one slaughtered Federal soldiers, mentioned by Sherman, was a group of seven—possibly the seven involved in the rape and death of the Southern girl. In return Hampton promised "that for every soldier 'murdered' by you, I shall have executed two of yours, giving in all cases preference to any officers who may be in my hands." After denying the responsibility for the death of Sherman's foragers, Hampton took the liberty to lecture Sherman on "war rights," which did not include unannounced firing upon a defenseless city, nor the burning of a surrendered city.

You have permitted, if you have not ordered, the commission of these offenses against humanity and the rules of war; you fired into the city of Columbia without a word of warning; after
its surrender by the mayor, who demanded protection to private property, you laid the whole city in ashes, leaving amidst its ruins thousands of old men and helpless women and children, who are likely to perish of starvation and exposure. Your line of march can be traced by the lurid light of burning houses, and in more than one household there is now an agony far more bitter than that of death. The Indian scalped his victim regardless of age or sex, but with all his barbarity he always respected the persons of his female captives. Your soldiers, more savage than the Indian, insult those whose natural protectors are absent.57

During the last week of February after Sherman's men had already marched more than halfway across South Carolina, forcing the evacuation of Charleston and razing the capital city of that state, General Robert E. Lee, acting in one of his first capacities as general-in-chief of the Confederate Armies, reassigned General Joseph E. Johnston to the Army of Tennessee to "concentrate all available forces [in South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida] and drive back Sherman." In the face of such a staggering task, one possibly without solution, and in view of his disappointing experiences with President Davis over past assignments, Johnston received the orders from Lee with little enthusiasm. To Mary Boykin Chesnut, Johnston seemed "very angry at being ordered to take command again," and she admitted that the commander's indignation was understandable, for "this on-and-offing is enough to bewilder the coolest head." During his period of inactivity after the Atlanta and Savannah campaigns, Johnston had noted the movements of the Union troops through South Carolina against formidable obstacles, and concluded that "there had been no such army in existence since the days of Julius Caesar." Thus, when Johnston began his new assignment, it was with reservations--
with a full consciousness on my part, however, that we could have no other object in continuing the war, than to obtain fair terms of peace; for the Southern cause must have appeared hopeless then to all intelligent and dispassionate Southern men. I therefore resumed the duties of my military grade with no hope beyond that of contributing to obtain peace on such conditions as, under the circumstances, ought to satisfy the Southern people and their Government.58

Two days before Johnston acceded to command, Beauregard wrote President Davis reporting that a Federal movement in North Carolina was almost certain and predicting that with 35,000 infantry and artillery Sherman could be "crushed." Beauregard's prognostications did not stop there, as he envisioned the victorious Confederate army marching to reinforce Lee, and after the defeat of Grant in Virginia, a "march on Washington to dictate a peace." Once in command of the Carolinas and Florida, but specifically in charge of dealing with Sherman, Johnston wrote to General Lee on February 25 that he could not cope with the enemy with the available Confederate forces. He advised that his command and that of General Bragg, who had 7,000 men in North Carolina, be united. If the two forces were brought together quickly enough, "the progress of Sherman's army might be stopped." 59

Lee acted on his lieutenant's suggestion, assigning Bragg to Johnston's command. However, Johnston was still reluctant to join battle with the enemy, unless Lee's position in Virginia demanded it (Lee's supply line from Virginia to Greensboro, North Carolina, was endangered by Sherman's movements) or unless the Federal army could be attacked in detail. Moreover, if Sherman reached his reinforcements along the coast of North Carolina, Johnston did not believe his army was capable of preventing their march into Virginia. Should this
latter possibility materialize, Johnston suggested that Lee attempt to hold the inner lines of Richmond so that a portion of his army might be detached for operations against Sherman. Four days after Johnston fought his last major battle with Sherman at Bentonville, North Carolina, on March 19, with little more than the "extremely" good behavior of his troops to bolster his spirits, he wrote Lee that Sherman had reached his reinforcements and that the enemy's "course cannot be hindered by the small force I have. I can do no more than annoy him. I respectfully suggest that it is no longer a question whether you leave present position [sic]; you have only to decide where to meet Sherman. I will be near him."

Johnston was no dreamer; he foresaw no easy four step plan, as had Beauregard, to conclude hostilities successfully for the Confederacy. Neither was Lee duped by an illusions. He knew that to execute a junction with Johnston would not be easy and that the defense of Richmond was difficult and could not be ignored. After much thought, the General-in-Chief attempted to break the Union line of battle at Fort Stedman, hoping that this would force Grant to concentrate his men about the point of attack, thereby freeing from his wings the needed reinforcements for Johnston. After this venture ended unsuccessfully, it was only a matter of a few days before Lee felt compelled to spare any further unnecessary loss of life, and, hence, surrendered his noble Army of Northern Virginia to his determined foe, General Ulysses S. Grant.
Immediately following Lee's capitulation in Virginia, Johnston reevaluated his predicament in North Carolina. The results were discouraging. Only "as robbers" could the Confederacy continue the war, for the country was "without means of procuring ammunition or repairing arms, without money or credit to provide food." To continue the struggle would in all probability mean "the destruction or disposition of . . . [the South's] bravest men and great suffering of women and children by desolation and ruin inevitable from marching of 200,000 men through the country." Finally, Johnston with General Beauregard, after reviewing the respective resources of the belligerents, "agreed in the opinion that the Southern Confederacy was overthrown." Sherman had proven invincible. Further resistance was impractical, even foolish. Only the determination of the terms of surrender remained.

III. The Rebel Without Rank in Georgia and the Carolinas

The common soldiers confronting the Federal legions in Georgia and the Carolinas left voluminous records of their reactions to the struggle between the Confederacy and the Union for the possession of the Confederate Southeast. This evidence provides important insights into the morale of the Rebels without rank, and it also reveals aspects of behavior which make possible a more complete reconstruction of responses during the Atlanta, Savannah, and Carolinas campaigns.

As the Southern soldiers campaigned across the countryside, there was considerable intercourse of an unofficial and amiable nature
between themselves and the civilian residents. Each appeared eager to receive from and give to one another. Confederate musician Albert Quincy Porter made many entries in his diary explaining how and where his command serenaded single individuals or groups. On one occasion they gave a concert for the Unionville, North Carolina, Southern Relief Society. A crowded house paid five dollars each to hear three hours of instrumental band and string music. The proceeds went to the Society, and in return the members of the Society gave the Rebel musicians a meal and clothings. Returning to camp near midnight, the serenaders stopped by the governor's house and played for him. Porter did not say whether the governor appreciated the late night entertainment, but from others he carefully noted receiving favors of praise, food, clothing, and peach brandy. Other Confederates performed for civilians and were rewarded. Sometimes just the presence of the Confederates in an area was enough to move civilians to give of themselves and to share possessions with the Confederate fighting men, who invariably relished the attention.

Just as the Confederate civilian speculated about peace so did the soldier. In the middle of July 1864 one Rebel wrote that he could foresee no peace at the time, but a month later he was basing his hopes for a conclusion of hostilities "on a revolution among the people of the North or else the election of a peace candidate for the Presidency. . . ." The war was very real to this warrior, and peace rather remote, although contemplated. With the elapse of another thirty days and the fall of Atlanta, a different Rebel without rank
reported that there was then more talk of peace than since the
beginning of the struggle. Some soldiers thought of foreign in-
tervention and peace as arriving together. The Confederacy only
needed that bit of aid a foreign nation could provide to prove quickly
to the United States the impossibility of trying to coerce the Southland
64
to re-enter the Union.

The Confederate fighting men looked beyond the military
conflict at times. Much of the reverie must have been similar to
that of common soldier Tench Tilghman, who spent pleasant moments
thinking of his loved ones at home. "As I gaze into the blazing fire
I will people it with the bright faces of my little ones. . . ."
On one occasion he inferred that his desire to be with his children
had turned his thoughts to desertion—"thoughts some times which I
cannot even trust to you old diary & confidant." Another Confederate
who believed "peace, liberty, and independence" were due the Confederacy
in view of its numerous sacrifices, concluded with astounding pre-
science: "Ah! but the blighting effects of this cruel war, who will
65
live to see them effaced? Not you or I. . . ." This soldier dreaded
the enduring scars of war carried into the postwar years.

When foreign intervention, peace, and the future looked bleak,
the Rebel without rank was likely to turn to God. After the Federal
capture of the Gate City, a Confederate soldier put complete confidence
in the "giver of all victories & the ruler of every battle." God
could influence the "minds of men in a short time," and quickly
reverse the military balance. Rebels were sometimes biblical in
their assessments of Civil War developments. God instructed Abraham that Sodom was destroyed because there were not ten good persons to be found: in the Confederacy there were more who did not deserve "liberty & peace" than those who did. The lesson was a simple one of Old Testament retribution—for the Confederacy "the future is indeed shrouded in gloom. . . ." God could obviously implement His will. It was the obligation of each Southerner to get right with God and earn His trust to receive His blessings, hopefully to be bestowed upon the Confederacy.

Frequently, the common soldier was interested in more immediate prospects. Across the lines the Federals enticed the Confederates with such things as conversation, newspapers, coffee, and music; the Rebels offered some of the same and tobacco. The interesting point is that the enemies met on many occasions not as opponents, but as collaborators, both seeking their own gratification. This association broke down the hostility and even the reserve between the sides. Meetings became outwardly friendly. Confederates would request the Federal band to play "Dixie," and the Yankees complied, often concluding with "Yankee Doodle" or another appropriate Union song. Each side honorably informed the other when officers were approaching and firing would have to commence.

In considering the impact of the invasion on the common soldier in Georgia and the Carolinas, the most important aspect was the mental reaction—the morale of the Confederate fighting man in the field. During the winter of 1863-64 following the appointment of
General Johnston to the command of the Army of Tennessee, the Rebels without rank stationed around Dalton, Georgia, gradually improved their morale from the depths of despair, to which it had plunged following the Confederate disgrace at Chattanooga to a sturdy confidence in their army and officers. The men in gray who had been absent without leave returned to stand in defense of the country once more; combat training was pursued with renewed vigor; and numerous recreational activities were enjoyed. In short, the common soldier in the Army of Tennessee had come alive again, for, after all, he found the Southern cause not as hopeless as he had thought—Johnny Reb had regained his old esprit de corps.

After the beginning of May 1864, when the Atlanta Campaign had been underway a few weeks, it was readily evident that there were fair-weather Confederate soldiers just as there are fair-weather sailors, but this is not to say that there were not also those who maintained their composure, their morale, in the face of the insuperable odds which Sherman directed against the, by comparison, diminutive Army of Tennessee; in fact, the latter group was just as much in evidence as the former, even more so. Private J. T. Terrell of Aberdeen, Mississippi, expressed his faith in the Southern cause after re-enlisting in early 1864 for the duration of the war: "I tell you we [his regiment] are not by any means subjugated or despondent. There is life in the old land yet." Later, as Terrell prepared to do his part in defending Atlanta from the ominous designs of the enemy, he wrote to his mother, advising her to "hold up your
hand and behold the Sky as it brightens. Day is fast dawning upon our infant Confederacy." He believed the Army of Tennessee to be "buoyant, enthusiastic, and hopeful in feeling . . .," stating unequivocally that "there is no better army anywhere nor is there any that is better officered," and although he reassured his mother that she "need not fear," Private Terrell cautioned her that there might be a "Shock" in store for the Confederacy. Somehow the brief mention of a "Shock" loses most of its alarm amongst Terrell's abundance of highly favorable forecasts for the South.

Another Confederate Soldier, John W. Hagan, first experienced a few doubts concerning the military developments in Georgia, but shortly thereafter began to emit a confidence comparable to that of Private Terrell. After expressing some reservations on May 16 as the Union force flanked and forced the Army of Tennessee into a retreat, Hagan wrote to his wife on the 18th that, despite the need for reinforcements and the disgust with constant retreat, "all is in good Spirits now & beleave Gen Johnston will make a stand & whip the Yankees badley. . . ." By the first of June, Hagan noted that, during the past nine days of spirited fighting, the Confederacy had defeated the invaders "in evry case . . . & I beleave they will be retreating in a few days if they are not on the back track now. our troops are all in fine Spirits & eager to fight & where they get a chance they make it tel. . . ." From the secure Rebel fortifications around Kenesaw Mountain, Hagan predicted the "bloodist Battle of the war" and a Confederate victory. On Independence Day 1864, he reported
that some Rebels "grow despondent but it is only those who are all
ways despondent all good Soldiers will fight harder the harder he is
prest. . . . Some troops have behaved very badly Since we left
Dalton. . . ." Then, with the Army of Tennessee stationed in the
vicinity of Atlanta a week before Johnston was superseded by Hood,
Hagan wrote:

we are ready, & willing to fight any time for evry retreat
we make only has a tendeincy to demoralize a potion of the Army
& I am anxious for the fight to come off. but you must not be
surprised if you hear of our being in Atlanta or even of our
giving up Atlanta. Gen Johnston well Knows he has but few men
& no whear to get more when they are Killed up so he will make
his fight a successful fight when he dose fight we have given
up a large country but when the grate fight is fought & his
plans [are] Known the country will be Satisfied & give him
credit for he is as Shur to whip them as he fights them. . . .69

Although there was a substantial amount of rationalization
involved, few men were more optimistic about the outcome of hostilities
in Georgia than was Private J. W. Cotton. After facing Sherman's
100,000 for approximately two and one-half weeks, Cotton concluded
that Johnston was "determined to fite them [Federals] some where he
has been trying to get them to fight him now for 2 weaks but they
wont do it they keep flanking him. . . ." Cotton personally believed
that once Johnston could get Sherman to fight the Confederacy would
emerge victorious, but he also noted that "I saw there is a heap of
our men thinks we are whiped because we have fell back. . . ." Six
days later at Kenesaw Mountain, Cotton surmised: "I think we will
whip them rite here is [if] they dont flank us out of our positions
ours is a splendid position. . . ."
Many others besides Terrell, Hagan, and Cotton believed that Sherman and his command would soon get what they deserved—defeat and expulsion from Georgia, if not from the Confederacy. While some may not have been as sanguine, they would not admit defeat. Following the capture of Captain L. H. Levey and sixty of his men by Federal pickets in June 1864, a Union officer asked if Levey did not think the Southern cause was lost. The reply was curt: "There are about one hundred thousand high-toned, chivalric southern gentlemen whom ye may extirpate, but can never subdue." The Captain doubtlessly over-emphasized the dedication of many, but unless this response is completely irresponsible, he was surrounded by a command of ardent Rebel soldiers, who believed in and risked their lives on the fate of the Confederacy. Private Benjamin M. Seaton, a Confederate soldier from central Texas, explicitly stated on June 9 that the Army of Tennessee had retreated as far as it should, unless it was the intention to give up all the country, "and that is not the idey—it is victory or death." Any army commander would willingly sacrifice much to get men of this stripe; a positive mental attitude is of inestimable value and will overcome many shortcomings—even a dearth of manpower.

Respect and confidence in one's commanding general is another quality highly desired in a fighting man. Private Sam Watkins credited Johnston with saving the morale of the Army of Tennessee, and believed that all soldiers under "Old Joe" would have given their lives for him without hesitation, and he "knows what he is up to. . . . When we went to sleep we felt that Old Joe, the faithful old watch dog,
had his eyes on the enemy." After Johnston issued a battle order in the Cassville, Georgia, area, another Rebel observed: "We did no entrenching last night [for] Genl Johnston is going to attack the enemy. This certainly means we have got him just where we want him. Genl Joe knows what he has been watching for & the boys are all delighted; they feel sure they can do just what Genl Joe says they can."

Found throughout Civil War battle reports, letters, and diaries are testimonials to the high morale of the entire command under the direction of General Johnston in Georgia. Corps commander General Hardee recorded that the esprit de corps of the Army of Tennessee, which was "excellent" at the beginning of the Atlanta Campaign, was "improved" by the time of Johnston's dismissal. "The troops were in buoyant spirits. . . ." General Stewart, one of Hardee's brigade commanders and later a corps commander, was more outspoken: "I do not know that its [Army of Tennessee's] morale was ever before equal, certainly never superior, to what it was when the campaign opened in Georgia in 1864, under your [Johnston's] command." Stewart gave Johnston credit for this situation, as "you were the only commander of that army whom men and officers were disposed to trust and confide in without reserve." Just before the death of General Polk in June, the Episcopal Bishop and corp commander wrote to his wife that "our army is in fine condition and in excellent spirits. . . . The troops and the country appear to have undiminished confidence in the ability and skill of General Johnston, and he seems to be managing things very
prudently." Sergeant-Major Robert W. Banks observed in a letter dated May 23, 1864, that the Army of Tennessee was "in fine spirits and eager for a decisive fight. All are hopeful and confident of success." In his memoirs, Colonel Charles H. Olmstead recalled that with Johnston's command east of the Chattahoochee River in the vicinity of Atlanta the Rebels were "in splendid condition, full of confidence in itself and its great leader, Joseph E. Johnston, and believing that the hour had arrived when his Fabian policy was to find ample justification in final victory.

In July 1864, John Archibald Campbell, who was before the Civil War a United States jurist and after 1862 the Confederate Assistant Secretary of War, received a letter written by Confederate Senator R. W. Walker of Alabama. A portion of his epistle analyzed the mental attitude of the Southern fighting man in the Army of Tennessee. Due to the Rebel retreats for two months Walker admitted that he expected to find a loss of discipline and spirit among the men.

But so far from this being true. I found on my return from Richmond no indication whatever that the popular confidence in General Johnston had been at all shaken by his retreating policy. On the contrary, so far as I have been able to discover, the opinion is almost universal that the policy he has adopted was judicious and necessary. As to the army itself, its confidence in Johnston seems unlimited. From what I can gather from many sources I doubt whether any army ever existed which felt a more entire or implicit confidence in its leader. So far as I can learn this is the feeling as well with the rank and file as with officers of all grades.

Two historians, Thomas R. Hay and Bell Irvin Wiley, have concluded that the mental attitude of the Confederate soldier in the Army of Tennessee toward affairs in Georgia before the accession of
Hood to command of that army was good; at least, the Confederate enlisted men looked upon Johnston and his strategy with respect and confidence. Hay attributed Johnston's removal to a feud between President Davis and his military advisor General Bragg on the one hand and the commander of the Army of Tennessee on the other, as "it is evident that the army was not disorganized and demoralized by Johnston's retrogressive tactics and that his relief from command was due not to a demand from the army. ..." Wiley found Johnny Reb support of Johnston unanimous. "Soldiers also appreciated reluctance to shed blood, such as that manifested by Johnston before Atlanta. The writer has yet to find an unfavorable remark from a man in the ranks about the officer's Fabian generalship, while compliments are frequently found."

The foregoing analyses of the situation in Georgia are generally speaking accurate. However, there was a definite minority in the Army of Tennessee who, for one reason or another, did not support General Johnston as Hay and Wiley indicated. Robert Patrick, a Confederate from Louisiana, is an example of a Southern soldier who gradually became more disillusioned as Sherman pushed relentlessly forward. At the outset of the Atlanta Campaign, Patrick considered "Gen. Johnston the best General in the Confederacy, not even excepting Robt. E. Lee ..."; nevertheless, he was conscious of the overwhelming strength of the invading troops, which made him apprehensive about the future of the Army of Tennessee. After little more than two weeks of fighting, he believed that the enemy was moving too far from his
base of supplies, and, consequently, the chances of defeating Sherman were improving. Predicting that the war would be at an end by June 1, 1865, and complaining about the quality and quantity of his food on June 6, Patrick dejectedly paused two days later to record in his diary a description of the military situation which ended with:

"I fear the enemy out-number us so far that it will be a difficult matter to whip them, though if we can only force Sherman to fall back, it is equal to a victory for us." On June 9 Patrick gave credit to Johnston for the high morale of the army which "was never better than it is now and the men are sanguine of success and their confidence in Johnston is undiminished."

As the end of June approached, Robert Patrick's confidence degenerated to a faltering optimism, and during the first days of July as the Army of Tennessee fell back across the Chattahoochee River, his morale quickly ebbed to its lowest level, as he acknowledged that "it begins to look a little squally for our side." After the elapse of two more days on July 5, he wrote that Sherman could outflank the Confederate army with more ease around Atlanta than he had previously north of the city. "We are too weak, and that fact is as palpable as anything can be. ... According to my way of thinking matters look very gloomy . . . , [but] our army is in good spirits however, and have an abiding faith in Johnston." The next day, feeling admittedly despondent, Patrick revealed that "it's a devilish gloomy looking time for us . . . and it is 'now or never.'" On July 10, he made the following notation:
I don't believe Johnston can hold Atlanta. I am sorry to admit that as the Frenchmen say, I am losing "the grand confidence." This is an awful crisis for our young Republic and a short time now will tell the tale, because if Sherman whips Johnston out of Atlanta, we may bid farewell to this part of the country for I have yet to hear of our retaking any captured territory.76

While Patrick refrained from openly criticizing Johnston or his strategy, it is obvious that he became continually more skeptical of the position of the Army of Tennessee in relation to that of its adversary as the campaign progressed and, as a result, less enthusiastic over Johnston's generalship. There is no substitute for successful leadership, and although many thought that Johnston was doing everything within his power, he was unsuccessful in stopping the Federal advance.

General Sherman related a story of a Confederate soldier, which would indicate that he believed, not Johnston, but the Federal general to be indestructible. The Rebel, after being told that General Wheeler had completely destroyed a tunnel near Dalton and that the enemy would soon be without rations forcing them into a retreat, answered: "Oh, hell! . . . don't you know that old Sherman carries a duplicate tunnel along?" In addition, the Union command's flanking ability awed two Confederates, who commented that "you-uns [Federals] swings around on your ends like a gate . . ., [and] Sherman'll never go to hell; he will flank the devil and make heaven in spite of the guards." Such incidences led Lloyd Lewis, a biographer of Sherman, to conclude that among the Confederate soldiers Sherman had created "an atmosphere of invincibility," but this observation is too sweeping. The morale of too many Rebels without rank belie this broad assessment.
At times, even such an enthusiastic Rebel as John W. Hagan became genuinely worried about his army's constant retreats. "The truth is we have run until I am getting out of heart & we must make a Stand Soon or the army will be demoralized. . . ." And, J. W. Cotton, who was consistently optimistic, reported that "I saw there is a heap of our men thinks we are whipped because we have fell back. . . ."

General S. D. Lee, who became a corps commander after General Hood was promoted to commanding general of the Army of Tennessee, cast aspersions on the morale of the Rebel without rank during the Atlanta Campaign. He did not believe the Confederate troops were in good spirits, because "they regarded it as reckless in the extreme . . . [to attack] even temporary breast-works." This idea had so permeated the command that it "did not generally move to the attack with that spirit which nearly always insures success," and as a result, "anything like a general attack was paralyzed by it." In a letter of August 11, 1864, Major J. J. Reeve concurred with Lee, for he believed the Confederate enlisted man to be rife with "doubt and dissatisfaction" because of the constant retreats; and, General Gustavus W. Smith of the Georgia militia reported: "The backing, digging, and constant service in trenches from Dalton to Atlanta, had very perceptibly injured the morale of the Confederate forces. . . ." Yet, while some were becoming disillusioned because General Johnston would not take a stand and fight the invaders, a few Confederates resorted to self-inflicted wounds to avoid meeting the enemy. Such were the nuances of behavior from which a commander had to forge a fighting force.
While the evidence presented above shows that there was dissatisfaction among some of the men who served under General Johnston, there is nothing comparable to the desertion from a command to illustrate discontent, and although it must be admitted that not all desertion in Georgia stemmed from causes arising from the Atlanta Campaign, it most certainly played a part, and likely an important part, in motivating those absent without leave to depart and remain absent from their posts. On May 22, a Union soldier, John F. Brobst, observed 173 Rebels voluntarily surrendering. "They say they are sick of war and want peace on any terms." According to Captain Charles W. Wills of Illinois, on June 14 four Confederate officers and twenty-eight men deserted claiming that "the game is up." Then on July 3, he noted that "hundreds of deserters have come in." Sergeant Rufus Mead wrote home on June 24 that his division took more than one hundred prisoners, "and many more would have given themselves up if they could." One of the captured Rebels was released and sent back to his Confederate camp where he recruited fifteen additional deserters, who returned with him to the Union lines. A Federal officer, who published a book of his experiences in Georgia and the Carolinas, mentioned several times in his narrative of the Atlanta Campaign that groups of Confederate soldiers willingly turned themselves over to the Union command. Rebels with homes in the path of the invaders and the foreign element in the Army of Tennessee seemed to be more inclined to desert than other fighting men. Some foreigners declared that they had been conscripted under protest to fight against the Union in the first place and, consequently, took advantage of their first opportunity to desert.
The removal of General Johnston from command of the Army of Tennessee caused a greater outcry from the ranks than all the other events and developments occurring during the Federal invasion of Georgia and the Carolinas, and the fact that this reaction was largely one of admiration and sorrow for the dismissed general is further evidence that he was held in high esteem not only by his staff, but by the common soldier. Confederate Captain Thomas J. Key observed that the removal of Johnston and the promotion of General Hood to the latter's position came as a surprise to the whole army. "Every man looked sad and disheartened at this information, and felt that evil would result from the removal of Johnston, whom they esteem and love above any previous commander." Although Key conceded the gallantry of Hood, this could not replace the "confidence of the soldiery" which was placed in Johnston. On the day following the announcement of the change of commanders, Key reported that there was a rumor about that Johnston was yet in command. The captain attributed this to the need "to prevent desertions and to cause the troops to fight with their former bravery . . . ," for it was successfully calculated to cheer the 81 "despondent hearts."

Numerous reports such as the following were recorded in diaries or sent home in letters by Confederate soldiers. "The boys [of the Army of Tennessee] have no objection to him [Hood] but they don't think there is another General in the world equal to Gen'l. Joseph E.—except R. E. Lee The removal has cast gloom over the army."

Another Rebel on the day Johnston relinquished command to Hood remarked
in reference to the change: "Quite an unexpected and startling an-
nouncement this morning. . . . Hood is a fighting man. From what
I can learn the army is dissatisfied with the change." A third
soldier wrote to his wife on July 19:

this army received Sad news yesterday the grate Genl J. E.
Johnston who has led this army to so many glorious victories &
he who was loved by all who ever Sirved under him sent to us his
farwell address. . . . all moan the loss of our grate Leader &
beleave if the war department only Knew what confidence the
army has in their grate Leader he would have been retained in
preffерerence to any one else. Gen Hood now commands us & I hope
he will be successful but the releaving of Gen Joe is dамpening
tо his troops. I now beleave the grate storm is gathering.

The announcement of Johnston's removal was received by the brigade of
General C. H. Stevens "in silence and deep sorrow. . . . We feel that
in parting with you as our commanding general our loss is irreparable.
. . . We would hail with joy your return to command us." A Mississippi
lieutenant commented on the reaction of the troops to the departing
general's successor. "Hood is the most unpopular Genl in the army &
some of the troops are swearing they will not fight under him. . . ."

That the concern and apprehension of the common soldier were
sincere manifestations of their feelings, is well illustrated by the
desertion of two to three thousand men from the Army of Tennessee, all
of which General Hood attributed to the change of commanders. Then,
when President Davis reviewed the Army of Tennessee in Georgia after
the fall of Atlanta in September 1864, Hood reported that during the
review some brigades "were seemingly dissatisfied, and inclined to
cry out, 'give us General Johnston.'" More than three months after
Johnston's removal his men still longed for his return.
With the exception of Robert E. Lee, any successor to Joseph E. Johnston would have found as did John B. Hood that he was fighting an uphill battle, not only in respect to expelling Sherman from Georgia, but in winning the respect and confidence of his command. There is no doubt that the newly appointed commanding general would need the blessings of the gods as well as an indefatigable constitution in order that he might snatch victory from the grasp of Sherman's soldiers and in this way justify his accession to the head of the Army of Tennessee. In short, Hood faced a gargantuan, if not an impossible, task.

As the morale of the Rebel without rank is reviewed during Hood's tenure at the helm of the Army of Tennessee, it is important to keep in mind that the fearless Texan, once in command, immediately abandoned the Fabian strategy of his predecessor and initiated, not one, but three major attacks in less than two weeks. More than anything else, this unsuccessful reversal of policy accounted for much of the common soldiers' lack of confidence in their new commander.

The reaction of Confederate soldier Robert Patrick, who fought under Hood around Atlanta and afterward on the Federal line of communications, might be considered as a case in point. After Hood's first and unsuccessful offensive at Peachtree Creek, Patrick was skeptical about the ability of the Army of Tennessee to hold Atlanta, "for the enemy is too heavy for us, and they have taken 'old Joe' away from the helm." He also believed there was "general dissatisfaction among the men on account of the headlong way in which they
were put in yesterday [battle of Peachtree Creek], and they think that it costs more than it come to." He concluded that at the present pace the Confederate army would either force the enemy into a retreat or "we will go up the spout ourselves." According to Patrick, other soldiers were claiming that Hood thought as little about the lives of his men as did Grant of Union soldiers in Virginia. Following Hood's third attack at Ezra Church on July 28, Patrick recorded in his diary: "Hood will have our whole army killed off if he doesn't change his policy. If we had plenty of men this would do. He is entirely too reckless." As Hood led the Army of Tennessee against the enemy's communications between Atlanta and Dalton, Patrick complained about his food and ignorance of the army's movements and he also averred that "General Hood or somebody else at the head of affairs doesn't seem to understand his business. . . . Nothing works right. . . . We now miss the master hand of Gen Johnston. Nothing worked wrong while he had comman." He acknowledged that Hood was a "good, rough fighter," but this was not enough to inspire confidence. Yet, despite his reservations about Hood and the situation generally in Georgia, Patrick was a loyal Rebel, as his diary notation on November 16 indicates: "On top of the whole of it I have just learned that old Lincoln has been re-elected to the presidency. Well I suppose that we are in for four years more. Damn the day, fight it out I say as long as there is a man to fight with. I am devilish tired of Jeff Davis and his crew but I am not in favor of stopping the war until we are independent."
Robert Patrick was not as outspoken in his criticism of Hood as one soldier, who minced no words when he called his commanding general a "butcher." Most Rebels without rank were less vehement in their criticism of General Hood, but certainly still affected by his tactics. On the recommendation of several officers shortly following the Confederate evacuation of Atlanta, General S. G. French, a division commander under Hood, wrote to President Davis concerning the "depression more or less apparent in parts of this army . . .," and suggested that the chief executive investigate and "ascertain if that spirit of confidence so necessary for success has or has not been impaired within the past month or two." Approximately six weeks earlier Sergeant-Major Robert W. Banks in a letter to his father conceded that the army still silently grieved the "loss of General Johnston," but he also averred that the soldiers in gray were "in good spirits— and confidence in General Hood unabated." However, men such as Private Benjamin M. Seaton in the Army of Tennessee must have been few and far between. Seaton recorded no complaints of his superior's aggressive tactics in his diary, and in reference to orders for an attack, he wrote: "let it cost what it will . . ." For an army of more men with Banks' confidence and Seaton's apparent reckless abandon, Hood would probably have sacrificed another limb, but since neither his efforts nor ideas were attractive to the Confederate soldiers, Hood felt impelled in his own defense to report to General Bragg following the fall of Atlanta that his men did not have sufficient courage to attack breastworks. As had Generals S. D. Lee and Gustavus W. Smith,
Hood attributed this to the reliance placed on the use of trenches by their former commander. Regardless of the cause, the fact remains that the men of the Army of Tennessee did not measure up to the expectations of the commanding general.

Desertion continued to plague the Confederate Army in Georgia. In September, President Davis pleaded in a speech for a return of all those men who were away from their commands. It was a sizable number, for Davis predicted that "if one-half of the men now absent without leave will return to duty, we can defeat the enemy." When the President reviewed the Army of Tennessee a few days after his address and was greeted by some who called for the return of General Johnston, he must have realized that the morale of that command was severely damaged by his order on July 18 which transferred the helm of that army from Johnston to Hood.

By the time Sherman moved his army in a southeasterly direction from Atlanta, initiating the Savannah Campaign in mid-November 1864, most Rebels were only outwardly carrying out the functions of soldiers, while inwardly they were saturated with war weariness. Yet, in November, 1864, there remained five more months of hostilities, and during this period, much military activity pervaded the Georgia and Carolinian countrysides.

While manning the defenses around Savannah before Sherman made a serious effort to take the city, one Rebel wrote that General Hardee had collected about six to seven thousand militiamen between fifty and sixty and between fourteen and sixteen years of age. "The odds,
however, are greatly against us but our men have not lost heart."

The diarist, a member of Wheeler's cavalry, was placed with others of his command in the trenches, where he doubtless took pride in causing "many a yankee to bite the dust." However, three days before Christmas, as Sherman's presence became more ominous, the Confederate soldier became reflective.

It is sad indeed to realize that the yankee army has so devastated our dear Southland [and] That our armies have not yet been able to hurl them back & teach them that coercion is a sin which a wicked tyrannical majority can never fasten upon a liberty loving people. Our cause is just & surely God will not let us fail. . . . We must do our duty to God & our Country & not-withstanding it all looks very dark now, he will yet lead us to victory. We must cheer up [for] it is darkest just before day. Day must be near at hand for us, for it certainly is dark.

On December 25, he wrote that "Peace on Earth, Good will to men should prevail. We certainly would preserve the peace if they would go home & let us alone." Later, after a church service on New Year's Day, he concluded that it was "very plain that all we had to do was to have faith, keep your powder dry & take good aim & that finally victory would be ours."

During the fall and early winter of 1864 desertion continued to diminish the ranks of the Army of Tennessee. A Confederate major told of "the sudden disintegration of the head of my column. . . ."

Only by swiftly riding to overtake the departing soldiers and threatening to shoot was he able to detain the men long enough to persuade them on the basis of self-preservation to assume their positions in the line of march.
In January 1865, following the loss of Savannah to the enemy and preceding the outset of the Carolinas Campaign in February, the diary notations and letters of the common soldiers became more despairing. Private J. W. Cotton wrote from South Carolina that "it looks like the Yankeys has got the upperhand of us I would like to here of some terms of peace before they runn clear over us..." Although he would only reluctantly go back into the Union, Cotton was drawn by a desire to "see you [his wife] and the children and see you all well...," and, hence, the sooner the end of hostilities the better. Another Confederate placed the fate of the South, if its future were to be anything more than subservience to the Union, solely at the discretion of France, for without foreign intervention all would be lost for the Confederacy. He foresaw the fall of Savannah, Charleston, and Richmond, "and then away everything goes." From Charleston it was reported that "the soldiers are badly out of heart." A member of the Army of Tennessee observed that the men in his command were "entirely despondent, being fully convinced that the Confederacy is gone." The past four years had held little but hardships, and the future was without promise of better things; the Rebel without rank was seriously beginning to reconsider his position.

The Carolinas Campaign witnessed the final crushing blow to the morale of the common soldier as he stood by, seemingly helpless, watching the invaders move confidently across his country. In Hamburg, South Carolina, a Confederate mailbag was captured; its contents revealed a deep-seated despondency within the Southern ranks.
From Chester, South Carolina, Mary Boykin Chesnut watched and listened sadly as General S. D. Lee's corps sang heartbreaking songs while passing through the town. Although Mrs. Chesnut reported the Rebels to have "marched with as airy a tread as if they still believed the world was all on their side . . . ," the verses the soldiers sang were probably more indicative of their spirit than the nature of their step. On March 11, 1865, a Federal soldier recorded in his diary that "the Johnnys are getting rattled; they are afraid of our repeating rifles. They say we are not fair, that we load up on Sunday and shoot all the rest of the week. . . ." An army inspector considered the Confederate command opposing the Federal invaders in the Carolinas "a complete mob. I never have witnessed so much demoralization in my life. . . ." And, although General Johnston hopefully reported after the battle of Bentonville that "the moral effect of these operations has been very beneficial [and that] the spirit of the army is greatly improved and is now excellent . . . ," he apparently was not cognizant of, or did not wish to take into consideration, those soldiers who deserted immediately after the conflict to return home or to join a band of Confederate deserters laying waste to the Southern countryside.

Nor were these the only Rebels to absent themselves without leave; this illegal practice gained momentum as the war moved toward a conclusion.

Perhaps, silence, SILENCE with capital letters, more than any other single factor signaled the demise of the fighting morale of the Rebel without rank. After the dismissal of General Johnston and the fall of Atlanta, there were fewer and fewer comments which could be
construed as being sincerely sanguine about the future of the Confederacy. The J. T. Terrells—"There is life in the old land yet."—and the J. W. Cottons—"I think we will whip them rite here. . . ."—and the Benjamin M. Seatons—"it is victory or death."—had disappeared. Besides, where were those who clamored long and loudly for the return of General Johnston? He was restored to his former position, but there is no record of this restoration being followed by exultation. Apparently, the Johnstonites thought the condition of the Confederacy too far gone for even their champion to be effective.

The end to hostilities created as many different reactions in the South as there were Confederates, but in all probability many Rebels without rank who were involved in the defense of Georgia and the Carolinas against the invasion of General Sherman and his command reacted in much the same way as did Johnny Green and his friend. A diary entry of the former on April 21 tells the story.

The rumor now came floating to us that Gen'l Robt. E. Lee had surrendered & that Gen'l Joseph E. Johns[t]on had entered into an agreement for an armistice. This news came as a great shock to us. We none of us ever dreamed of such a thing as Gen'l Lee ever being forced to surrender & we thought the army left to us would be carried to the Transmississippi department & the war continued until our independence was granted.

As we were marching to the rear Billy Fox & I were side by side and I said, "Billy what do you think? Do you believe Mars Joe will surrender?"

Billy replied, "I don't know; I believe Mars Joe will do what is right but if he has to surrender I just wish I had a barrel of whiskey. I never was drunk in my life but if that is true I would like to go out in the woods & die drunk & bury all my sorrows."

We reached our horses & fed & biviouacked & the next morning our worst fears were confirmed. Soon after this we learned that we had all been surrendered & that we were to ride to Washington
Georgia & be paroled. This was the blackest day of our lives. A great gloom settled over the command; all was lost & there seemed to be no hope for the future.92

The image of an indestructible Southland was nothing but a myth, and Confederate soldiers were forced to recognize this detestable fact.

IV. The Confederate Military outside the Invaded States.

The Federal invasion of Georgia and the Carolinas evoked indifferent interest from most Confederate soldiers serving outside this area. Rebels were simply, and logically, more concerned during the last year of the war with what was taking place immediately around them. Many diaries, letters, and regimental histories written by soldiers in Virginia or to the west of the Appalachians give only very cursory attention or none at all to developments during the Atlanta, Savannah, and Carolinas campaigns. Even residents and property holders of the invaded Southeast demonstrated a surprising detachment 93 from the Union incursions in their states. There are exceptions to this aloofness or provincial preoccupation. The Confederate command, especially General Robert E. Lee, recognized the seriousness of Sherman's movements to the Rebel military effort as a whole and correspondingly reacted making proposals to meet the Federal threat in Georgia and the Carolinas. And as expected the soldiers with family, friends, and property in the path of the campaigning Federals showed more interest in the invasion developments than did those without any personal involvement in threatened states.
Besides the deterioration of the Confederate military position during the last year of the war which caused provincially minded Southerners to turn inwardly even more, there existed a communication problem. Soldiers were unsure and often unaware of what was taking place outside their general area. Rumors were rampant, but they were recognized as such and discounted. It was impossible to react to Sherman's invasion if information was not available, except to deplore the dearth of news from Georgia and the Carolinas as soldiers frequently did. Naturally, they were interested in the military developments. Was Johnston still retreating? Was Atlanta abandoned? Did the Federals capture Savannah, burn Columbia? Just where was Sherman? Interest too in the state of their personal affairs in the invaded states also provoked queries. Are the provisions sold? Are the slaves provided for? Has the livestock been moved? Is my family cared for, were they hurt during the enemy occupation? Then, there was the human desire just to hear from a loved one who was in a position of danger imposed by the Union invasion of Georgia and the Carolinas. With the Confederate lines of communication constantly threatened by the enemy, resolutions were made between soldiers outside the invaded states and residents located therein to correspond as much as possible before letters ceased to reach their destination.

Of course, information of the Georgia and Carolinas developments did filter to the outside, and much of it was personally despairing for the recipient. In Mississippi a Confederate soldier wrote his sister that it was his "painful duty" to convey "very Sad news."
Their brother was killed in the defense of Atlanta. He was "a noble boy, a true Soldier, and a devoted Christian." Death was not the only traumatic experience resulting from the enemy invasion. The mere existence of family and friends in the Southeast caused trembling in the ranks because of the enemy threat to residents. From Virginia a Confederate surgeon wrote on June 7, 1864, that "a great many of our brave boys here have noble families in N. Ga. Who are feeling the terrible weight of a tyrants paw..." As the pressure intensified with regard to the circumstances in the invaded states, soldiers fighting elsewhere made known their desire to be at home to protect their families. Some sought furloughs to attend to matters. Others took unauthorized leave; they deserted the armies of the Confederacy to honor the call of a more basic allegiance, their family.

Soldiers who remained with their commands sent advice home to their families to help them through the invasion trauma. Property should be protected by removal, hiding, getting Negroes to claim it, or trading for land, which could not eat or run away as slaves did. Horses and mules were not to be left for the Federals—hide or kill them. Black bondsmen were to be dealt with frankly and openly if they could not be removed or sold; if they wished to go with the enemy, it was useless to detain them, and if they desired to remain at home they must be prepared to secrete themselves and provisions. To protect oneself, preparation must be made and panic avoided. Playing sick or grouping together with other women was thought advantageous. If confronted by the enemy, the truth should be spoken even "if you
die for it. Be brave and resolute, my dear wife, Come what may, struggle to keep your heart right and do right, and leave the consequences to Him who can control them"  

Of the Confederate command, it was General Robert E. Lee who, as the commander of the Army of Northern Virginia, general-in-chief of all Confederate armies in 1865, and advisor to President Davis, responded most frequently to the Union invasion of Georgia and the Carolinas. Replying to the President, Lee assessed the circumstances in Georgia during the first two weeks of July 1864. He was concerned lest the removal of Johnston would bring more harm than good. Hood, the proposed replacement, was a "bold fighter," but lacking in experience and poise. Hardee was mentioned as an alternative choice. Significantly, Lee recommended to Davis that the cavalry in Mississippi and Tennessee be united and directed against Sherman's communications, a move Johnston had long requested. During the Savannah Campaign Lee advised General Wade Hampton to prepare his cavalry to prevent a possible junction between forces of Sherman and Grant, and on another occasion he took action to prevent the possibility of Sherman being succored from the Atlantic coast. It is apparent that Lee was aware of the danger to his army if Sherman were allowed to reinforce Grant and that he recognized the weakness of Confederate forces opposing Sherman. "I fear Savannah is in great danger, and unless our operations there are bold and energetic I am apprehensive of its fall."

It was in 1865 with his new responsibilities as general-in-chief that Lee entered more consistently into the military
affairs outside Virginia. In communicating with the capital, President Davis, Vice-President Alexander Stevens, Secretary of War John C. Breckinridge, and Senator William Porcher Miles, and with the governors of the Carolinas, Lee left no clear pattern of his thoughts concerning the results in Georgia and the current Carolinas Campaign. He confessed that Sherman seemed to be able to do what he liked and Confederates in the Carolinas would be able to do little, if anything, with the enemy. But he wrote of effectively meeting the Federals if Rebel troops were united in the Carolinas, especially if Carolinians would rally to the colors, and should this not bring the desired results, of destroying provisions in reach of the invaders to impede their progress. One thing established by the general-in-chief following the capture of Savannah was that he did not have any troops in Virginia to spare for the protection of the Carolinas.

In February Lee took it upon himself to reappoint Johnston to the Army of Tennessee and the Carolinas theater to oppose Sherman. Lee believed Beauregard capable but ailing, and Johnston possessed the greatest confidence of the people and soldiers. However, within a month Lee appeared convinced that Johnston did not have the wherewithal to cope with the Federals, and, consequently, he began seriously to plan to unite the two major armies of the East and then to confront Sherman and Grant separately, hoping that this approach would yield the advantage necessary for victory. Lee believed this concentration had to be effected because neither Rebel army was individually effective against its opponent, and his supplies and manpower were being depleted by Sherman's Carolinas Campaign. Sherman had captured
depots of Rebel materiel and destroyed transportation for the movement of goods from the South, and his presence was causing many of Lee's men to desert. For these reasons Lee thought it imperative to act which he did in his attack on Fort Stedman, but his efforts failed. The concentration of Confederate forces was not carried off. The Army of Northern Virginia was surrendered, and the Army of Tennessee, helpless in the face of the ubiquitous foe, followed suit. Obviously, Grant's Army of the Potomac had as much or more to do with the Confederate capitulations in April 1865, but it must not be overlooked that Sherman's command in North Carolina was a major contributing force.

Other Confederate officers proffered their expertise to meet the Federal threat to Georgia and the Carolinas while some simply registered their anxiety about Sherman's advances. General Josiah Gorgas made few concrete proposals designed to deal with the Union invasion, but he did record in his diary and letters concern for the Confederate Southeast. Equating it roughly with the campaigning in Virginia, he believed Georgia would be a crucial test of Rebel strength. Gorgas despaired of Johnston and his Fabian tactics, welcomed the appointment of Hood to command of the Army of Tennessee, thought Hood outgenerated as well as outmanned following the capture of the Gate City, possessed little hope of stopping Sherman once the Savannah and Carolinas campaigns got under way, and worked to save ordnance equipment. However, in the third week of March 1865 with Johnston back at the helm, Gorgas was convinced that Lee should send 10,000
men to Johnston, who with the reinforcements and his force could "stop and perhaps overwhelm Sherman." He considered the defeat of Sherman necessary to save Richmond.

Sherman's campaigns in the last year of the war could not be taken lightly even outside the invaded states. Lee, Gorgas, and other commanders attest to this. While officers gave principal attention and importance to the military activity surrounding them, some of their reactions to Sherman were made a matter of the record, but others were probably lost to posterity.

Although other factors affected their morale, most especially military developments in their immediate areas, there is sufficient evidence to draw conclusions concerning the effect of the Sherman campaigns on the morale of the Rebels stationed outside of Georgia and the Carolinas. Following the martial action in the Southeast as best they could, Confederate hopes ran the gamut from the heights to the depths. Rumors artificially inflated outlooks, and credible information often left them deflated. The Rebel warriors' morale rose and fell much as did that of their counterparts inside the invaded states fighting Sherman's command. The loss of Atlanta and Savannah were serious blows to the sanguine. The progress of Sherman in the Carolinas was a devastating stroke against their crumbling mental outlook. There were attempts to explain away the loss of territory in the Empire State, but the ineffectiveness of the Army of Tennessee could not be ignored. In the Army of Northern Virginia soldiers drew invidious comparisons between the ability of their army and the
failure of the Army of Tennessee. They compared General Johnston, who did not know how to fight, with General Lee, who did. Johnston only retreated; he did not fight. When General Hood, a former officer in the Army of Northern Virginia, became commander of the Army of Tennessee, many soldiers in Virginia were convinced that the tide would be reversed, with Sherman sent scurrying back to the Ohio River. Their disillusionment died hard. There is evidence that Sherman's successes in Georgia and the Carolinas prompted desertion from the ranks outside these states. Some Rebels left their posts as early as the Atlanta Campaign, but most desertion came during the Carolinas Campaign.

Officers of the Army of Northern Virginia reported the departure especially of soldiers whose homes lay in Sherman's path. Confederate soldiers were forced to make a choice between their military obligations and their responsibilities to their families. Apparently, where their families were precariously positioned, or thought to be, due to the Federal invasion of the Southeast, soldiers slipped away from their commands to their families.

As with the Confederate command and Rebel without rank in Georgia and the Carolinas, the Southern soldiers outside this area experienced frustration with the consistent successes of General Sherman and his command as they moved inexorably through the Empire, Palmetto, and Tarheel states, acclaiming their victories as they went and taking total war to the Confederate Southeast.
FOOTNOTES

1
Lewis, Sherman, 358-61.

2
Connelly, Autumn of Glory, 286-87.

3

4

5
Catton, This Hallowed Ground, 340; Miers, The General Who
Marched to Hell, 87; Battles and Leaders, IV, 276; Official Records,

6
Johnston, Narrative of Military Operations, 315-16, 318, 326,
332, 334, 338, 345-48, and 350; Official Records, Ser. 1, XXXVIII,
Pt. 3, 617 and 946-47.

7
Johnston, Narrative of Military Operations, 307, 312, 318-19,
322, 340-44, 345-48, and 350; Official Records, Ser. 1, XXXVIII,
Pt. 3, 618, 722-24, 816, 944-45, 948-49; Boatner, Civil War Dictionary,
453.

8
Official Records, Ser. 1, LII, Pt. 2, 692 and 705-706; Ibid.,
Ser. 1, XXXVIII, Pt. 3, 616, 619-20, 944, 947, and 950; Johnston,
Narrative of Military Operations, 325 and 358-60; Sherman, Memoirs, II,
151-52; Battles and Leaders, IV, 276; David P. Conyngham, Sherman's
March Through the South with Sketches and Incidents of the Campaign,
126.

9
Johnston, Narrative of Military Operations, 320-22 and 350-51;
Official Records, Ser. 1, XXXVIII, Pt. 3, 615-16, 618 and 630; Battles
and Leaders, IV, 275-76.

10
Conyngham, Sherman's March, 115; Johnston, Narrative of Military
Operations, 365-69; Official Records, Ser. 1, LII, Pt. 2, 685-86;
Chesnut, *Diary from Dixie*, 429. The great respect Johnston's men held for him is further illustrated in section III., "The Rebel without Rank in Georgia and the Carolinas," of this dissertation.

Major James A. Connolly, U. S. A., reported General Benjamin Franklin Cheatham to have been the Confederate officer who reported the break in the Union lines of communication; Captain David P. Conyngham, U. S. A., reported General Johnston to have made the announcement. Conyngham, *Sherman's March*, 126; James A. Connolly, *Three Years in the Army of the Cumberland: The Letters and Diary of Major James A. Connolly*, ed. Paul M. Angle, 224.


Official Records, Ser. 1, XXXVIII, Pt. 5, 885 and 888.


Hay, "The Davis-Hood-Johnston Controversy of 1864," 83; Horn, *Army of Tennessee*, 340; Connelly, *Autumn of Glory*, 391-426; Official Records, Ser. 1, XXXVIII, Pt. 5, 881-82; Davis, *Rise and Fall of Confederate Government*, II, 561; Johnston, *Narrative of Military Operations*, 355. Although the facts cited in this chapter support the conclusion reached by the author concerning Johnston's reaction to the Federal invasion, one additional source might be quoted. General M. C. Butler, C. S. A., wrote: "I was with General Johnston when he arranged the terms of surrender [April 1865] with Sherman. . . . I commanded the cavalry of Johnston's Army and accompanied him with an escort to the last interview with Sherman, and on our return to camp he told me that he had had no confidence in the success of our cause for two years." If this can be taken at face value, Johnston, then, directed the Atlanta Campaign for the Confederacy while believing the Southern cause was lost. Hood, *Advance and Retreat*, 152-53.
16
See pages

17
Hood, Advance and Retreat, 87; Official Records, Ser. 1, XXXVIII, Pt. 3, 630; Ibid., Pt. 5, 880.

18
Ibid., Pt. 3, 987; Govan and Livingood, A Different Valor, 320-21; Connelly, Autumn of Glory, 417.

19
Hood, Advance and Retreat, 126-28; Official Records, Ser. 1, LII, Pt. 2, 708-09.

20
Hood, Advance and Retreat, 128. Here as in many other instances, there is a lack of rapport between Johnston and Hood. Johnston leaves the impression in his correspondence that he fulfilled his obligation to Hood and the Confederacy by relating to his successor his plans for defending Atlanta and by giving orders until the afternoon (or sunset) of July 18. This placed the Army of Tennessee in position near Peachtree Creek for the impending battle. See Official Records, Ser. 1, XXXVIII, Pt. 3, 618; Battles and Leaders, IV, 275-76; and Johnston, Narrative of Military Operations, 349-51. Hood, on the other hand, definitely felt that Johnston deserted him in a time of emergency, "without a word of explanation or apology, [Johnston] left that evening [July 18] for Macon, Georgia." Hood, Advance and Retreat, 128.

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26
Sherman, Memoirs, II, 110; Hood, Advance and Retreat, 245;
Frank E. Vandiver, Ploughshares into Swords: Josiah Gorgas and
Confederate Ordnance, 216.

27
Sherman, Memoirs, II, 75, 118-24; Hood, Advance and Retreat,
229-35.

28
Official Records, Ser. 1, XXXIX, Pt. 2, 481.

29
Ibid., Pt. 1, 801; Hood, Advance and Retreat, 245.

30
Official Records, Ser. 1, XXXIX, Pt. 1, 801; Hood, Advance
and Retreat, 253; Battles and Leaders, IV, 425.

31
Sherman, Memoirs, II, 144-70.

32
Hood, Advance and Retreat, 267-68; Douglas J. Cater to Cousin
Fannie, December 15, 1864, with a January 12, 1865, postscript
(Library of Congress, Manuscript Division); Horn, Army of Tennessee,
394-418; Connelly, Autumn of Glory, 494-514.

33
Alfred Romeo, The Military Operations of General Beauregard
in the War Between the States, 1861 to 1865, Including a Brief
Personal Sketch and a Narrative of His Services in the War with
Mexico, 1846-8, II, 284-85; Telegraph and Confederate, October 26,
1864, p. 1 and October 23, 1864, p. 2; Sherman, Memoirs, II, 189.

34
Official Records, Ser. 1, XXXIX, Pt. 3, 842; Ibid., LXIV, 859;
Dyer, "Fightin' Joe" Wheeler, 203 and 205.

35
Official Records, Ser. 1, LXIV, 916-17; Dyer, "Fightin' Joe"
Wheeler, 205-06.

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A. D. Kirwan, ed., Johnny Green of the Orphan Brigade: The
Journal of a Confederate Soldier, 173-74; the Savannah Republican
37  

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39  
*Courier*, December 14, 1864, p. 2 and January 13, 1865, p. 1;  

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41  
George Ward Nichols, *The Story of the Great March, from the Diary of a Staff Officer*, 82; see also Candler, *The Confederate Records of the State of Georgia*, II, 702; Manning Force Papers (Microfilm, Rice University Library—original papers at the University of Washington Libraries), journal entry following December 31, 1864, entry and made in Savannah; Albert Quincy Porter Diary (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, typescript), February 9, 1865; Mr. Wiley to M. S. Robins, March 20, 1865, Marmaduke Swain Robins Papers (Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina Library).

42  
See page

43  
*Courier*, December 27, 1864, p. 1.

44  

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49 Sherman, Memoirs, II, 225.


51 W. C. Johnson Diary (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, typescript), January 26, 1865 and February 5, 1865; Sherlock Diary, January 30, 1865, February 4, 6, and 26, 1865, and March 3, 11, and 22, 1865; I. C. Nelson Diary (Carlisle Barracks, Manuscript Division), February 1, 1865; Fergus Elliot Diary (Carlisle Barracks, Manuscript Division), January 20, 1865; Official Records, LIII, 1049-50 and 1052-53; Hitchcock, Marching with Sherman, 237 and 258; Clement Eaton, ed., "Diary of an Officer in Sherman's Army Marching through the Carolinas," Journal of Southern History, IX (1943), 249; Barrett, Sherman's March through the Carolinas, 48, 50, 56-57 and 68; Lewis, Sherman, 489; Dyer, "Fightin' Joe" Wheeler, 217-18; Catherine Carl Wakelyn, "Charleston: A City in Rebellion, 1861-1865" (M. A. Thesis, Rice University), 157-58.


53 Official Records, Ser. 1, LXVII, Pt. 2. 999; Kirwan, Johnny Green of the Orphan Brigade, 192.

54 Barrett, Sherman's March through the Carolinas, 107; Hitchcock, Marching with Sherman, 288-90; Sherman, Memoirs, II, 300-03.

55 Raleigh, North Carolina Weekly Standard, March 1, 1865, p. 3; see also T. R. Cheves to William Porcher Miles, December 31, 1864,
William Porcher Miles Papers (Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina Library).

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Official Records, Ser. 1, XLVII, Pt. 1, 860; Chesnut, Diary from Dixie, 496; Conyngham, Sherman's March, 310 and 342; Nichols, Story of the Great March, 181 and 309-10.

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Johnston, Narrative of Military Operations, 371-72; Chesnut, Diary from Dixie, 484; Lewis, Sherman, 490.

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Freeman, R. E. Lee, IV, 10-21.

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63

Albert Quincy Porter Diary, February 20, 1865, March 1, 2, 3, 5, 9, 1865, and April 21, 1865; Tench Tilghman Diary (Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina Library, microfilm), February 1, 1865; John Hamilton Cornish Diary (Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina Library), December 24 and 27, 1864; see also pages of this manuscript for a more complete account of Confederate soldier-civilian relationship.

64

Douglas J. Cater to Cousin Fannie, June 10, 24, 1864, July 13, 1864, and August 18, 1864, Cater Papers; J. S. Espey to Margaret Espey, September 18, 1864 and Samuel H. Hargis to Margaret Espey, February 1, 1865, Joseph Espey Papers (Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina Library); Henry C. Wayne to his mother, August 6, 1864, William P. Palmer Papers (Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina Library, two reels of microfilm),

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Tilghman Diary, January 9, 1865, February 11 and 23, 1865; Douglas J. Cater to Cousin Fannie, June 10, 1864, Cater Papers.

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J. S. Espey to Margaret Espey, August 14, 27, 1864 and September 18, 1864, Espey Papers; Douglas J. Cater to Cousin Fannie, June 24, 1864 and August 4, 1864, Cater Papers; William Calder Diary (Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina Library, microfilm), March 18, 1865; Kirwan, Johnny Green of the Orphan Brigade, 184–85.

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desertion in the fall of 1864 see also: Candler, The Confederate Records of the State of Georgia, II, 769-72 and 802-03; and Macon Telegraph and Confederate, October 23, 1864, p. 2; Josiah Dexter Cotton to his wife, August 13, 1864, Cotton Papers; Penniman Reminiscences, 83.

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Cuming Recollections, 65; Bryan, Confederate Georgia, 150-51; Nichols, Story of the Great March, 95.

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Kirwan, Johnny Green of the Orphan Brigade, 195; see also Gordon Diary, April 17, 18, 20 and 28, 1865; Hargis Reminiscences, 9 and 10.

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191-93 and 201-02; _____, Chattahoochee Valley Historical Society: War Was the Place; a Centennial Collection of Confederate Soldiers Letters, only infrequent and vague references; Richard W. Corbin, Letters of a Confederate Officer to His Family in Europe during the Last Year of the War of Secession In the Magazine of History with Notes and Queries, scarce and superficial mention; Edwin H. Fay, "This Infernal War:" The Confederate Letters of Sgt. Edwin H. Fay, almost complete omission; Johnson Hagood, Memoirs of the War of Secession from the Original Manuscripts of Johnson Hagood, Brigadier-General, C. S. A., one reference on page 332; William Miller Owen, In Camp and Battle with the Washington Artillery of New Orleans: A Narrative of Events during the Late Civil War from Bull Run to Appomattox and Spanish Fort, only one statement of significance on page 366; G. Moxley Sorrel, Recollections of a Confederate Staff Officer, ed. Bell Irvin Wiley, one reference, page 270; Festus P. Summers, ed., A Borderland Confederate, one reference, 106.

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Hug Vaughan to his sister, September 9, 1864, Simpson and Brumby Family Papers (Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina Library); Burnett, "Letters of a Confederate Surgeon," (1945), 241 (1946), 35-36, 39-41, and 59-61; John Bratton to his wife, Bettie, January 2, 1865, February 17, 1865, and March 13, 1865; Bratton Letters; Waring Diary, November 22 and 27, 1864, December 29 and 30, 1864; H. M. Wagstaff, ed., The James Graham Papers, 1861-1884, 195.

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CHAPTER 3

CIVILIAN REACTION

I. Mrs. Mary S. Mallard: A Specific Case

For Mrs. Mary S. Mallard, a native-born Georgian, 1864 was not a good year, and it was the Federal invasion of her state which put Mrs. Mallard's world in jeopardy. Born Mary Sharpe Jones in 1835 in Liberty County, Georgia, only 30 miles from Savannah, she enjoyed a privileged life that few Southerners lived. Her parents owned three plantations in Liberty County, where her father served as a Presbyterian minister while overseeing plantation operations. But her early life stretched beyond Eastern Georgia to Columbia, South Carolina, and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Three years were spent in each city while her father served as a seminary professor and an administrator for his church. For the mid-19th century Miss Jones' life was enviable: material things were not wanting, she had seen and lived in a large portion of the United States, and her education received the concerned care of her parents. At twenty-two years of age in 1857, two important milestones occurred in the life of Mary Sharpe Jones. She became the wife of the Reverend Robert Quarterman Mallard, pastor of the Walthourville Presbyterian Church in Liberty County, and through the magnanimity of her parents, she was deeded along with her two brothers ownership of Arcadia, a plantation of nearly 2,000 acres. By 1864 Mrs. Mallard had given birth to three children, and had moved to Atlanta, where her
husband was made pastor of the Central Presbyterian Church. In the Gate City of 1864 many things seemed to favor the continuation of the good life for Mary S. Mallard, but fate was not to be so kind; the impending enemy invasion of Georgia turned her world upside down.

Mrs. Mallard had the ill fortune of locating twice in the path of the invading Union army. In May 1864, she resided in Atlanta as Sherman and his command moved toward that city, and in December she was refugeeing in Liberty County with relatives when the Federals invested this area as they prepared to take Savannah. Seventeen of her letters and a journal she kept with her mother, Mrs. Mary Jones, reveal many of the experiences and feelings of a Georgian female, who for a civilian encountered war in the fullest.

During the first three weeks of the Atlanta Campaign, Mrs. Mallard expressed confidence in the Confederate Army of Tennessee and its commander, Joseph E. Johnston, and for the safety of Atlanta. In four letters during this period, she wrote of the good spirits of the Confederate soldiers and their expectation of success. It was not Johnston's policy to fall back; Atlanta was not in danger. Everyone possessed the "utmost confidence in his [Johnston's] skill." When on May 19 Mrs. Mallard reported the Army of Tennessee had been retreating for a week, she explained that the retrograde movement was to "gain good fighting ground and a position that cannot be flanked." With a Confederate victory the enemy would "suffer terribly," as Johnston was sure to "follow up any advantage he may gain." She declared that in each of the numerous small battles the invaders were "handsomely
repulsed with great slaughter." To aid the Confederate commander and his troops to face the perils of the battlefield, Mrs. Mallard relied on prayer and the intervention of God. "I trust our merciful Heavenly Father will fight the battle for us and crown our arms with success..."

Through the third week of May both God and Rebel were doing a satisfactory job in Northwest Georgia, if Mrs. Mallard's record is to be taken as evidence.

Abruptly on May 27, following her last letter on the 20th, there was a change in the tone of Mrs. Mallard's correspondence. The earlier confidence was compromised by the appearance of uncertainty. She confessed to disappointment that the invaders had moved within 30 miles of Atlanta without a major engagement being fought. Her anxiety now was "intense" and she admitted she did not "know how this campaign will end." Preparations for unfavorable military developments were made. Books, clothing, carpets, comforts, and a sewing machine were sent to her brother-in-law in Augusta, Georgia, for safekeeping. Plans were made for evacuation of Atlanta by herself, the children, and servants if a battle were fought "very near." They would go to Augusta and then return home, providing the fate of the Gate City was decided in a couple of weeks, but if a siege ensued, Liberty County would be their destination. Several times in the same letter Mrs. Mallard wrote that "we hope" the Army of Tennessee would be successful and that "we are all in good heart and look for victory." This ambivalence points to the confusion and uncertainty Mrs. Mallard must have experienced as she viewed the threatening developments without
any reasonable assurance of the outcome. In five additional letters to July 1 are found many similar statements. She wrote of the "days of darkness" and her "deep anxiety" and "unsettled feeling." Yet, she invited her mother to pay her a visit before going to Augusta, for there was no "immediate danger" to Atlanta, and "we may yet be permitted to remain here." But, this July 1 letter was her last from Atlanta. Mr. Mallard had instructed his wife as early as the second week in June that, when the Union forces reached the Chattahoochee River, she and the household would have to depart. Mrs. Mallard's next letter on July 18 was sent from Augusta where they were "numbered amongst the numerous throng of refugees."

Under the stress of the period from May 27 to July 1, Mrs. Mallard did not forget "our merciful Heavenly Father," but her attention took a different approach. "Daily union prayer meetings" were held, and she attended as many as she could. She was concerned that attendance was poor and believed that, while many individuals were occupied with other benevolent activities, this was no excuse. On a later occasion she reported the improvement in attendance and noted that "some of the meetings were very interesting. . . ." What is more interesting is that Mrs. Mallard ceased to write of God's intervention to produce Confederate victories, as she had during the first three weeks of the campaign. And this was the period of the Kennesaw Mountain victory for the Rebels, but it was also a time when the enemy was inexorably moving toward Atlanta, something which obviously demanded the nearly exclusive attention of Mrs. Mallard.
From the first of July until December 13, the date of the first journal entry, Mrs. Mallard wrote only five letters in which she referred to the enemy invasion of her state. From Augusta on July 18, she reported that within thirty hours all her furniture was removed from Atlanta except for a bed left for Mr. Mallard and that their stay in Augusta was contingent on developments in Atlanta. By the third week in August the Mallards had repaired to Liberty County, as Sherman laid siege to the Gate City, but a little less than a week later Mr. Mallard was considering a return to Atlanta, if Sherman retreated as "some are predicting. . . ." September 5 brought news of the fall of Atlanta to a despairing Mrs. Mallard. "What will go next?" She grieved to think of her husband's church, fearing it would be "desecrated if not destroyed by those horrible creatures." Three weeks later she again indicated concern for the church, believing the worst would happen. She was convinced that "no one gained anything by remaining in Atlanta." Her last letter on October 19 is pessimistic. A rumor passed on by a "reliable gentleman" reported General Hood's army surrounded with great loss. The outlook was forboding: "Everything seems very dark with us now . . . if we lose our army, our state is at Sherman's mercy." If God was any consolation for the tribulations of this period, there was no reference to Him in the letters.

From May to October 1864 Mrs. Mallard was a loyal Confederate civilian who was reacting to the invasion of her state, and a significant part of her reaction was her escape from the path of the invading army, which led her first to Augusta and finally to Liberty County. The
next record of her reaction to the enemy in Georgia is found in a
daily journal kept by herself and her mother between December 13,
1864 and January 27, 1865 as the Federals overran Liberty County,
where she had fled with her children, mother, and servants. The
Mallard-Jones diary reveals the responses of Mrs. Mallard when she
was directly confronted by the invading foe.

Not unexpectedly, fear for one's personal safety and that of
loved ones is the most prevalent reaction in the Mallard-Jones diary.
Mrs. Mallard feared for the safety of her mother, who was away from
their residence at the Montevideo plantation when the Union forces
first arrived in the area. In parting with her husband that same
night, she experienced a horror that he would be captured. "I had a
fearful foreboding that he would be captured and we staid as long as
prudence would permit in the front porch." Her intuition was correct;
the next day a loyal slave reported his capture. Personal safety
was an incessant concern as the threatening, maurading Federals invaded
their home almost daily, and when they stayed away, there was
"apprehension & terror," for there was no guarantee that the inhabitants
would be left unmolested. "Was there ever any civilized land given
up for such a length of time to lawless pillage and brutal inhumanities
[sic]? Judging from Mrs. Mallard's diary entries, the most terrifying
threat to their well-being came when it was reported by a faithful
slave that Union soldiers had arrived seeking young women. Mrs. Mallard
believed the soldiers had "the most dreadful intent," and she confessed
that "the agony, the agony of that awful hour, no language can describe, no heart can conceive [sic] it."

Protecting property necessary for livelihood and possessions of sentimental value consumed much of the time of the Montevideo household. Salt, sugar, trunks of clothing, carts, and livestock were put where it was hoped they would not be taken or destroyed by the enemy. At times, direct entreaties were made to the Yankee to respect property. Mrs. Mallard was successful in persuading one Federal not to take a spyglass which had had a personal meaning to her deceased father. Other requests were rudely rebuffed. "We asked for their officer, hoping to make some appeal to him. They said they were all officers & would do as they pleased. . . . It is impossible to imagine the horrible uproar & stamping through the house, every room of which was occupied by them, all yelling, cursing, quarrelling, & running from one room to another in wild confusion."

The threat to person and property was too great for the residents at Montevideo to cope with alone. Solace and protection had to be found elsewhere, and God was their only salvation. When the Federals sought young women whom it was believed they intended to violate sexually, "we all knelt around the bed & went to prayer & we continued in silent prayer a long time . . . trusting in God for our deliverance." Many other references were made to God in the diary. "We feel that we are in the hollow of His Almighty Hand. It is a precious, precious feeling, that the omnipotent, omnipresent Jehovah is with us and that Jesus, our Divine Redeemer & Advocate, will be
touched with our sorrows." God was not only sought in emergencies. Religious services were conscientiously held on Sunday for white and black residents of the plantation.

For the residents of Montevideo, God was needed for more than protection and solace—His mere presence as a comforting companion was important. The isolation from friendly humans caused the group to feel "completely cut off from all creature helps, from all human Sympathy--Helpless!" An unsuccessful attempt was made to get a Mr. John Stevens to move in with them. Mrs. Mallard wrote they "felt so utterly alone that it would be a comfort to have him with us."
Separation from other Confederates was made worse by the dearth of information concerning developments in their immediate area and throughout the Confederacy. After Mr. Mallard's capture, Mrs. Mallard did not hear again of him for several agonizing days. A month following the outset of the enemy invasion of Liberty County there was no improvement in the availability of information to the besieged. The diarist recorded that "we are in utter ignorance of all without. We know not the state of our cause or the condition of affairs in the 10 Confederacy."

Despite the extraordinary circumstances faced by Mrs. Mallard and her fellow sufferers, in a few instances life continued as usual during the period of Yankee harassment. While the Federals infested the yard, yelling and cursing, Mrs. Mallard gave birth to a healthy baby daughter and miraculously endured the delivery in good physical condition. Amusement during these days was almost nonexistent, but on
one occasion as a Federal was stealing some eggs, he stumbled, crushing them all much to the amused satisfaction of the victims. Mrs. Mallard referred to Psalms 27:2 in the diary: "When the wicked, even mine enemies and my foes, came upon me to eat up my flesh, they stumbled and fell." In one situation Mrs. Mallard demonstrated her former confidence in the welfare of her nation, when she retorted to twenty Union soldiers who claimed the war would soon be ended that "Savannah is not the Confederacy." The implication was clear—she believed the Southern people were not yet subjugated. Besides the inevitability of nature, a flash of humor, and courageous candor, quasi-normality returned on a few days when the enemy did not come within sight of the plantation. The children were allowed to play outside, but near the house, and there was some relaxation of anxieties and fears among the adults.

From the last entry in the diary on January 27, 1865, to the end of the war, there remain only three of Mrs. Mallard's letters, and one of these reveals nothing of her reaction to the Union invasion of Georgia and the Carolinas. The other two supply only scanty information. A February 10 letter from Montevideo dwelled on the fate of Mr. Mallard, who was still a Union prisoner of war. There was some talk of his exchange, but Mrs. Mallard put little faith in this possibility. She thanked an aunt for offering household goods, but temporarily turned them down, for "everything now turns upon the release of my poor captive." Continued communication with her husband was uncertain, and this blow was exacerbated by the suspicion that
Mr. Mallard probably did not know of the birth of his daughter, as he had not mentioned it in any of his letters. A second letter of March 8 was written as she was traveling to a safer area of the Confederacy, Southwest Georgia. This was her third move in nine months to escape the presence of the invading enemy. Mrs. Mallard's letter is largely a description of a journey which took her only twenty-five miles from Montevideo, but she did note, almost as an after thought, that it was rumored that the Yankees had suffered a defeat in North Carolina. Her last extant piece of correspondence of March 15 made not even a passing reference to the invaders.

Mrs. Mallard with her family had physically endured the invasion of her native state. It must have taken exceptional strength of character to survive the ordeal, which involved more than most civilians faced: moving long distances with young children on three different occasions to avoid the invaders, once pregnant and another time with a three-month-old infant daughter, encountering the enemy for more than a month, giving birth during Federal operations in the area, experiencing the capture of her husband, and witnessing and contemplating the loss of personal property. While her silence on the state of military developments in the spring of 1865 may not indicate submission to the enemy, it probably points to her utter exhaustion and her relief that she need no longer in the foreseeable future come face to face with the odious enemy.

While other Confederate civilians encountered many of the same experiences as Mrs. Mallard did during the Atlanta, Savannah,
and Carolinas campaigns, it is obvious that what she underwent and how she reacted was peculiar to her. Her reactions cannot be taken as a typical example of civilian behavior, but this does not make the foregoing analysis of her behavior any less valuable. The rather detailed scrutiny of her actions and sentiments provides the reader with a greater feeling of what it was like to have lived through the Georgia invasion, and by analogy, that of South and North Carolina. This twelve-month biographical capsule establishes a tone that is important but difficult and probably impossible to capture when evaluating general civilian behavior.

Mrs. Mallard was set apart from many Confederate civilians in several ways: she was a married female with children; she was highly educated and at least moderately wealthy by the standards of that day; she was a citizen of an invaded state where her residence was twice in the path of the foe; her husband was so placed that he was able to assist her with two of the moves; she had relatives with whom she could refugee; and, she was a loyal Confederate. This list could be extended, but the point should be established that an overview of Confederate civilians must be made to obtain the truest possible picture of the complete Southern civilian reaction to the Federal command under William Tecumseh Sherman during the last year of the Civil War. This will be done by considering separately the reactions in the invaded states of Georgia and the Carolinas of the Southern civilians, free and slave, and of selected newspapers which influenced and in turn were influenced by the civilian population. Finally,
consideration will be given to the reactions of Confederate civilians outside the invaded states.

II. The Free Civilians of Georgia and the Carolinas.

As Sherman moved his command in three devastating campaigns three hundred miles across Georgia and into the heartland of South and North Carolina within a period of twelve months, the free civilians of these states found their faith in the defending Confederate forces demolished by the seemingly invincible Union military machine. Without protection, the civilians reacted with fear for their personal safety and for the security of their property upon the approach of the enemy. These reactions took various forms. The occupation of an area by Union troops generally led to an abatement of fear and intercourse of a nonhostile nature with the invaders. Feelings toward the Federals varied. Obviously, here again civilian behavior cannot be stereotyped. This point is underscored, when it is found that different groups of civilian did not react consistently to the many challenges the invasion presented. If one development of the invasion was largely embraced by all civilians, it was the growing conviction as the campaigns progressed that continuation of Confederate resistance was foolhardy. That Sherman and his men had a deleterious effect on civilian morale in Georgia and the Carolinas is an understatement.

On the near approach of the enemy legions, civilians admitted to experiencing distress, excitement, apprehension, fear, and panic. They confessed to crying, going into convulsions, drinking copious
amounts of liquor, and refusing to act for their self-defense. Many also regained their composure to cope with the enemy threat in the best possible way. Several reports from Northwest Georgia point to the distress, excitement, and anxiety displayed by the civilians as it became apparent the Army of Tennessee would not be able to hold back the invaders. Some resorted to weeping, but others steeled themselves to sell their property and remove to safety. Significantly, there were buyers for the articles of questionable value—questionable because of the presence of the enemy. Similar responses must have been found in Atlanta when it became known Confederate troops would evacuate the city. One resident wrote of "our fear" of Sherman's arrival, and another recorded "such excitement there was," when the Rebel soldiers departed. Business had come to a halt by the first of August except for one grocery store. A month earlier S. P. Richards, an English-born stationer, wrote that it was evident Atlanta would fall, and as a result the Gate City "has been in a complete swarm." Alarmed citizens had already left, and others were leaving. On July 22, Atlanta was a "complete hubbub," for it was thought the enemy would arrive that night. This information proved false, and the citizens, ever aware of the Federal shelling of the city, exhibited both a coolness and anxiety and suspense to military developments which he likened to "living in the midst of pestilence." Yet, police duty was performed by civilians during these extraordinary times. In Confederate Atlanta, Richards revealed both civilian disorientation and discipline in the face of foe.
Governor Brown of Georgia reminded his constituents in June, July, and August, 1864 that the enemy invasion of their state demanded individual discipline and sacrifice. He chastised malingering militiamen and civil officers who had failed to report to Atlanta for duty. Aliens who had claimed the protection of Georgia were told forthwith to stand in defense of the state or take leave of its soil within ten days. County policemen, whose duty it was to oversee plantation slaves without overseers, were sternly reprimanded for dereliction of duty. The Governor was busy ordering, threatening, and imploring his charges to discharge their responsibilities with efficiency.

There is no discernible change in responses after the Atlanta Campaign was concluded. The Macon Telegraph reported on September 6, 1864, that "our good people have been thrown into convulsions by the news of the evacuation of Atlanta. . . ." But things became ominous after November 15, 1864, when Sherman moved 62,000 men out of Atlanta toward Macon. In fact, in the November 18 edition of the Telegraph, the enemy was reported at Griffin, Georgia, only thirty miles away, and there was considerable excitement. Three days later the newspaper noted "an increased feeling of confidence in the city. The whole available force of the community is under arms and ready, at a moments notice, for the trenches. . . . those best informed believe it [Macon] can be held against any force Sherman can bring against it. . . ." Major James A. Connolly, U.S.A., observed that the civilians in the Millidgeville, Georgia, area "everywhere look paralyzed and as if stricken dumb as we pass them." From another
Union column to the north, it appeared that Georgians assumed a
"kind of moody indifference."

The responses to the approaching enemy were much the same in
Savannah. A full ten days before the city's occupation by the Union
army warehouses were thrown open, and the people helped themselves—
an action thought precipitous by some. There were those who were
prematurely ready to give up, but perhaps many citizens did not have
full control of their senses: "there is and was no scarcity of liquor
in Savannah, unless perhaps in the hospitals and places where liquor
was needed and could be properly used." Disorder was experienced
to the very last moment of Confederate control, and Union forces used
bayonets to disperse a mob ravaging stores and houses. A letter
written from Savannah three weeks before the city's surrender to
Sherman most graphically portrays the conditions faced by the in-
habitants: "We are in great confusion here as you may suppose with
Sherman threatening all round. . . . The way in which Sherman has
advanced has paralyzed every body and everything. Some people say
where shall we go. . . . Every place is threatened. My sister's
illness keeps Father here and how to send my family off with the very
great uncertainty of my being with them is beyond my means of deciding."

In the Carolinas Campaign a similar pattern of civilian behavior
is found as the Federal troops advanced. Those accompanying the Union
command reported meeting confusion and terror in the Palmetto and
Tarheel states. Following a call for home duties in Charleston, one
Rebel citizen cajoled: "Are there no men left in Charleston, or is
all reason and patriotism dead!" From the same city a month later
Edmund Rhett declared that "our militia (why I cannot tell you)
will not pretend to fight. I am told the men cry when their names
are called out to go on picket." In the middle of January 1865,
falling between the two previously noted reports, the Courier as-
serted that the gloom had disappeared and the despondent had "taken
heart again. Having calmly contemplated the danger, we have resolved
to do our utmost toward our defense and deliverance." In Charlotte,
North Carolina, panic and alarm subsided when Sherman appeared to take
another route and frightening rumors were declared false. In a
public meeting, citizens of Columbia resolved on January 9 to exert all
possible effort toward the defense of the city, to donate slaves to
work on fortifications, to seek white labor, tools, and money to
advance defense efforts, to request of President Davis the appointment
of General Johnston to the command of forces in the state, and to
request reinforcement from Richmond to prevent the evacuation of
Charleston, which "would be disastrous to the cause of the Confederacy."
Emotional display and formulation of plans predominated in the responses
as citizens reacted to the approaching enemy.

When contact with the invading force became probable rather than
simply possible, civilians responded with actions which would best
serve their individual interests. The most frequent and prominent
reaction was a compelling fear of bodily harm or personal insult.
Report after report tells how the people fled from their homes, often
convinced that the "Yankees were savages believed cannibals" and that
the invaders "were coming to wantonly violate, destroy, or enslave
them." Male children were particularly hidden "in all sorts of out-
of-the-way places," as Southerners feared that the Union army would kill
the young males to prevent them from maturing and fighting against the
Union. An observation such as the following from the Rome, Kingston,
and Cassville, Georgia, area was not uncommon. "The most of the plantation
houses were abandoned by their owners, who were either hiding in the
woods until we [Federals] should pass, or had gone on with the rebel
30
army." Mary Elizabeth Massey, author of *Refugee Life in the
Confederacy*, concluded that even more inhabitants would have evacuated
threatened areas had more prompt and exact knowledge of the ap-
proaching enemy been available, and she recorded numerous instances of
31
this response.

Not only did the civilians flee, but they often fled with little
or no preparation. Captain David P. Conyngham, a volunteer aide-
de-camp to Sherman and a correspondent to the *New York Herald*, noted
after the occupation of Rome: "The inhabitants must have left, in
hot haste, with the garrison, for provisions and furniture were untouched
in the houses; and some of them looked as if the ladies had just gone
32
out to pay an evening visit, and meant to be back to tea." The
extent to which fear motivated those who escaped the path of the
invaders was often considerable. One man, who was supposedly of
sound character since he served as a Georgia legislator, deserted his
sick wife and baby of only a few days, leaving them with no dependable
33
assistance so that he might avoid the approaching army. Another
account illustrating a similar response was related by the Yankee correspondent Conyngham, who told of riding upon a group of twelve women, an equal number of children, and three old men, who had abandoned their homes for fear of being slaughtered by the Union army. This group huddled together for three days without shelter and with only a few berries for food. A young girl approximately fourteen years of age died from such exposure. Yet, even suffering these hardships of concealment was better than meeting the Yankees, for when the group spotted Conyngham, a single horseback rider, they became "almost crazy with fear and excitement," which took some time to subside before he could talk with them.

John Hamilton Cornish, a South Carolinian minister from Aiken, observed the "great excitement" as many citizens rushed to get beyond the reach of Sherman, with special care to remove "their daughters." A Lincolnton, North Carolina, native described developments in his town, providing a good account of the nature and extent of those who fled before the foe. "It was generally believed that Sherman was making directly for Charlotte and as we had no army sufficient to fight him the panic there and at this place was very great. We had no other idea than that we were to be overrun, and everything was in confusion. First the refugees from the South filled our town overflowing, then came Government property, officials, and guards: fleeing negroes, and frightened speculators. Bank men with their treasure, Rail Road men and their books until a heterogeneous mass of human beings were mingled in our town, then on Tuesday 18th
[February] came in a frightened courier to announce the Yankee cavalry in Gaston, 20 miles off, then another that they were advancing. This increased the confusion and waggons with provisions and valuables began to move. . . ." 

To determine the number of civilians who left their homes driven by fear to "safer" areas of the Confederacy would be impossible, but that they were legion is evident in the multitude of references made to such a response in the contemporary letters, diaries, reminiscences, official accounts, and sundry documents. Furthermore, records do not indicate a greater instance of fleeing during any one of the campaigns or in any of the invaded states. Neither did the response of rural inhabitants appear to vary appreciably from that of urban residents in this instance.

If the citizens were not able by their own efforts to escape the real or imagined Union threat or insult to themselves, there might follow a direct appeal to the Union army for protection. After Federal occupation became inevitable for Milledgeville, Madison, and Savannah, Georgia, and Columbia, Mount Pleasant, and Camden, South Carolina, and Fayetteville and Raleigh, North Carolina, representatives of the residents, usually the mayor, tendered the surrender of their cities to the enemy, seeking to minimize disorder and conflict which might be injurious to the citizens. There were probably other small hamlets in the invaded states which followed the same procedure, but whose actions escaped the records or research for this study. In Savannah, a group of citizens called upon General Hardee, Confederate officer
in charge of the city's defense, and insisted on the surrender of their city, including an appeal to the Union command for the "safety of the lives . . . of the inhabitants." The mayor and two councilmen of Atlanta wrote a letter to Sherman, requesting him to rescind his order to evacuate their city because of the hardships it would work upon the inhabitants--hardships which included threats to physical well-being.

Overtures for protection were not only made by groups, but also by individual civilians who had no more than a pretense of influence with Sherman. The Union commander was approached in Savannah by the wives of Confederate general officers Gustavus W. Smith and Alexander P. Stewart, who appealed for personal protection, using thier husbands' positions for leverage; presenting a letter from General Hardee, the Confederate officer's brother asked for his family's safety. Two women in Columbia, South Carolina, one ingeniously using a book given to her and autographed by the Federal commander and the other only relying on a past acquaintance with Sherman, received protection.

Organizational affiliation was exploited to obtain special consideration. Southern Masons and Rebel Catholics used their affiliations to seek the goodwill of the enemy. Other wary civilians, lacking well-placed friends or membership in national organizations, boldly met the invader and asked that they be extended protection. Then there were those who, in an attempt to secure life and maintain dignity, claimed not to have supported, at least not in spirit, the Confederate cause. Many
made Unionist claims with a clear conscience, but a number must have feigned this position as a means to an end.

The extent to which fear of bodily harm or personal insult caused civilian desertion to the Union side cannot be determined, although it is obvious many did desert, and personal fear likely played a substantial part in motivating the turncoats. As early as May 1864, Governor Brown protested that some citizens of the state had fled behind enemy lines with movable property. After the Federal capture of Atlanta, a Union soldier wrote that he had seen "eleven thousand refugees that have come in through the mud and rain." These eleven thousand, he observed, were "mostly old men, women and children" who had deserted to the Union side because they had "advocated Northern principles." Another Federal reported "talking with the deserters who constantly came into our lines in squads. . . ." From one column of Sherman's command 2,000 Southerners following the Union army were sent to Wilmington, North Carolina. There are other estimates of Confederates who placed their fate and allegiance in the hands of the Federal conquerors, even the state militiamen, the sometime soldier, but reliable figures are unfortunately not available, as estimates vary, and there is no satisfactory way to collate or corroborate this information. Not only are specific figures questionable, but it is impossible to determine from many reports whether the deserters were military or civilian, especially where a discrimination must be made between the Confederate soldiers and state militiamen. However, because contemporaries, both Union and Confederate,
gave considerable attention to this development, it is reasonable to suggest that the Federal invasion of Georgia and the Carolinas caused substantial civilian desertion—no doubt more than the ardent Rebel would have liked to admit.

Besides fear of bodily harm or personal insult, numerous accounts tell of civilian responses regulated by a fear for the safety of their property. The following observation is of a partisan and emotional nature, but it is a good example of the objective and psychological reasons which led Georgian and Carolinian civilians to respond to protect their property. "Dead horses, cows, sheep, hogs, chickens, corn, wheat, cotton, books, paper, broken vehicles, coffee-mills, and fragments of nearly every specie of property that adorned the beautiful farms of this county, strew the wayside, monuments of the meanness, rapacity, and hypocrisy of the people who boast that they are not robbers and do not interfere with private property." The perpetrators of these heinous deeds were the enemy invaders, but they need not have been.

Coincidentally, it was not the Union army but the Confederate forces with which the civilian had first to cope in attempts to preserve property. As Sherman and his command campaigned across Georgia and the Carolinas, residents of these states were instructed to either remove or destroy any property lying in the enemy path which might be of value to him. Because the civilians were reluctant, or determined not, to destroy their property, the Army of Tennessee was forced to assume this most unpopular job, and hence civilian responses
were initially directed at Confederate authorities. The Southern Confederacy observed during the Savannah Campaign that Georgians had done "much and sacrificed much, but they did not do enough. Had every article of subsistence and transportation been removed from or destroyed in his front, he [Sherman] would not have been to-day where he is. . . ." Much other evidence indicates civilians too often failed to carry out Confederate policy, especially where it involved the destruction of unmovable property, and when the Rebel military took action to implement these directives, it incurred the wrath of the victims.

Because the property destruction fell largely to the Army of Tennessee cavalry, commanded by General Wheeler, it was this man and his horse soldiers who received most verbal darts. From Griffin, Georgia, in the center of the state, on December 27, 1864, citizen P. A. Lawson addressed President Davis on the consequences of the devastation of property. "Wheeler's cavalry was burning up all the corn and fodder, driving off all the stock of the farmers for ten miles on each side of the railroad, all of from ten to twenty-five miles to the right and rear of Sherman's forces. Worse than all, the stock of mules and horses which General Wheeler's forces carried off, nine out of ten they have appropriated to their own use. In consequence of which there will be thousands upon thousands of acres of lands uncultivated the next year for the want of plow stock, which had been stolen from them by men claiming to act under orders from those high in authority." Lawson queried how, under the circumstances, could
one pay the expected Confederate tithe? Furthermore, payment of other

taxes and even maintenance of life were made extremely difficult by
the circumstances. This Georgian civilian had not written his letter
"in malice," but he wanted the President to know how things were in
his state, in which he believed immediate action must be taken to
salvage the support of the citizens for the Confederacy. Another
Confederate making similar complaints in a letter to the Courier
signed his epistle "Omega."

In North Carolina another letter was written three months later, the
tone of which was much the same as the Lawson correspondence,
although the time and place were different and the military situation
had changed considerably. "The celebrated 'Wheeler's Cavalry,' are
[word unclear] across the country, you may conceive our position.
Many of these latter kill cattle & hogs before the eyes of the owner,
carry off leather from tan-yards, siege mills & all their contents of
[unclear word] all without asking leave. We have all forgotten our
scare at the Yankees from these new & unexpected troubles indeed the
danger at our doors absorb our thoughts & as the sacrifices likely to
be made are not caused by the public enemy, we are not consoled for
these trials by these feelings inspired by losses in the public cause."

Two salient points emerge as the records such as the previously
noted letters were surveyed: civilians were derelict in carrying out
Confederate policy relating to personal property, and when this
responsibility was forced upon the military, civilians strongly
disagreed with the way in which it was carried out. This is evidence
that the Civil War was a total war involving all segments of society; it is also proof that many civilians either did not want to accept this fact or were simply ignorant of it. In explanation of civilian responses, it should be noted that as hard as commanders tried to control their men, the numbers involved and their dispersal over large areas made discipline difficult and many times impossible to maintain; consequently, the fine line between the destruction or removal of property which would aid the enemy and the point at which the implementation of this policy becomes unwarranted pillage was often left to the discretion of the common soldier, who at times no doubt misused his authority. Too, there were unauthorized groups throughout the invaded states who plundered Confederate property in the name of the Army of Tennessee, particularly Wheeler's command; these were Confederate outlaws who were able to operate with little restraint on the periphery of the Federal invasion. Civilian complaints were in part justified.

Despite the civilian responses to their own side's policy and actions, the greatest threat to their property came from the invading enemy. Inhabitants in Sherman's path removed many movable and coveted possessions from the reach of the Federals, or at least made an effort to do so. Reports noted that "most of the inhabitants had fled carrying everything of value with them" before the arrival of the Union army. On the plantation of Confederate General Howell Cobb, former Secretary of Treasury during the Buchanan administration, the livestock and slaves were evacuated. A Rebel soldier observed from
his camp near Atlanta that "the citizens all along the line of our march had pulled up root and branch and removed with all their personnel" and that "not much was falling into the hands of the enemy." The valuable slave property was obviously among that removed, and for those chattels who could not be withdrawn, stories were circulated which were designed to destroy their exalted image of the emancipating army. It was reported that General Cobb told the slaves remaining on his plantation that "the Yanks would cut their throats for them or yoke them into their wagons." Also, slaves were warned that the Yankees placed them at the front of the line of battle, that they were slaughtered if they did not fight, that the Yankees had thrown slaves into the Chattahoochee River, and that the burning buildings of Atlanta had been filled with slaves. If the slave could not be spirited away from the enemy, perhaps he could be so indoctrinated that he would not abandon his master to follow the Federal invaders. Whether removal of property from Sherman's path was carried out by the direction of the owner or encouraged indirectly by atrocity stories, civilians made great efforts to get their possessions beyond the reach of the enemy.

Many who could not remove their property from the path of the Union army resorted to an often futile policy of concealing it, as this account illustrates: "As rumors of the approach of our army reached the frightened inhabitants, frantic efforts were made to conceal not only their valuable personal effects . . . but also articles of food. . . . A large part of these supplies were carried to the
neighboring swamps, but the favorite method of concealment was the burial of the treasures in the pathways and gardens adjoining the dwelling-houses. Sometimes, also, the grave-yards were selected as the best place of security from the 'vandal hands of the invaders.' Unfortunately for these people . . . in the early part of the march the soldiers learned the secret."

When neither removal nor concealment of property was practical, Southerners tried such other means of preserving their property as appealing to the Union army, which was in effect asking security from the identical group from which protection was needed. William King awaited the occupation of his property by the Union army in the Marietta, Georgia, area, and requested a guard to provide security for his possessions. Of his provisions he asked that twenty bushels of corn be left to him; the Federals granted him thirty bushels. Many Georgians and Carolinians made appeals identical to those of King. Some citizens used their antebellum friendship with General Sherman in an attempt to obtain special consideration. S. L. Femore of North Carolina wrote a letter to the Union commander, appealing not only for protection of his family but the preservation of a railroad and his job. "Our old friendship prompts me to write this brief note. . . . All I ask is that I may be allowed to remain a quiet citizen within your lines as to work this Road for those who desire it or can control it. . . ." Femoret suggested orders be given so that the railroad would be safe from destruction. The previously noted surrender of towns in an effort by citizens to safeguard lives and avoid
personal insult also served as an attempt to preserve the inhabitants' property. For instance, the mayor of Savannah, upon surrendering his city, asked "for the safety of the ... property of the inhabitants." This appeal was explicit, but other capitulations implied that protection of property should be extended upon surrender. Too, claims of Unionist sentiment must have been motivated in part by a desire to protect one's possessions. Many civilians asserted that they had been Union men from the very beginning of the war. Basing his estimate of the number of those who asserted Union sympathies, one Federal correspondent wrote that the vote of Georgia would have undoubtedly gone against secession. Strong Unionist leanings were also found in the Carolinas. A textile manufacturing concern at Roswell, Georgia, resorted to flying French and English flags and claiming its neutrality despite its record of considerable business with the Confederate government; this ruse was not successful, as the property was destroyed and the operatives, largely females, were shipped north to work in Union factories. Ingenuity and desperation as well as forthright action characterized civilian efforts to preserve their property.

Desolation of property created new circumstances for the civilians of Georgia and South and North Carolina. South Carolinian Maria L. Haynsworth wrote her mother that following the ravaging of her father's office he did not know what he had lost and "he has no heart to go there [his office] at all." Confederate Congressman Warren Akin of Cassville, Georgia informed his wife he did not want to see where his house "once stood until the war is over, if I do then."
That the Federal invasion was turning things around for many Confederates is evident in Akin's lament that "when this war is over many persons who had a handsome competency when the war began, will be in poverty if not in absolute want. I do not see how I am to continue to support my family. I never felt so before about it." Dolly Lunt Burge of Georgia wanted her brother in Chicago to know of her plight following the Federal devastation of her plantation; at least, he could share her misery. Thinking of her deceased husband she wrote; "never have I felt so perfectly reconciled to the death of my husband as I do to-day while looking upon the destruction of his lifelong labour. How is would have grieved him, how troubled him to see such destruction! Yes, theirs [the dead] is the lot to be envied. At rest, rest from care, rest from Heart aches, from trouble." But, Mrs. Burge carried on—in an unexpected manner. She found herself riding a wagon with wheat to the mill to protect her mule from confiscation. "Never did I think I would have to go to mill. Such are the changes of life." And, life-styles were changing for many civilians. Other Confederates were more optimistic while facing reconstruction of property or outspokenly defiant toward the wreckers. A Georgian expected to rebuild his mill and workshop and make improvements on the former arrangement; seeing his cotton factory and gristmill destroyed, another Georgian told the invaders this would not hurt him. Loss of slave property stung civilians, but because of the dearth of provisions, the Federals were at times asked to take the chattels with them and care for them as their former owners no longer could. Southerners showed compassion
for their slaves, seeking when possible to help them through the chaotic conditions the Federal invasion had brought, but when slaves who had left owners without permission returned for help, they were frequently met with rejection. Slave owners, or former slave owners, possessed little tolerance for disloyal Negro charges.

For some civilians the Atlanta, Savannah, and Carolinas campaigns offered an opportunity to accumulate property by taking advantage of conditions brought on by the Federal invasion. These civilians were purely and simply war profiteers. Examples of profiteering are most often found where civilians were trying in desperation to escape the advancing enemy, where refugees were attempting to obtain a subsistence away from home, and where individuals were speculating in cotton and tobacco. During the Union-ordered evacuation of Atlanta scarcity of transportation provided a fine opportunity for those in position and not overly scrupulous to make a substantial economic gain. One reporter mentioned that to buy a common buggy for one thousand dollars would be cheap. Conyngham noted that men who had once been millionaires were "forced to give their last dollar to some exacting conductor or railway official. . . . In some cases they gave all they had to be let go, and in many cases paid as high as one hundred dollars to conductors and others to get off. . . . Once beyond the immediate reach of the enemy, refugees still might encounter extortionists. The Southern Confederacy reported that refugees in the Empire State suffered "extortionate charges" obtaining the necessities of life. Profiteering flourished in less pressing circumstances, as Conyngham
observed that Jews claimed a large portion of the cotton which was to be destroyed and that "they strongly pleaded their neutrality, and appeared horrified when they found that dodge no good." Furthermore, he found the Jews were very much in evidence "around the army like crows around carrion..." and that this group managed to get most good stores and trade privileges upon the Union occupation of a town.

Following the Federal capture of Atlanta, a few occupants uncovered hidden tobacco which they proceeded to sell at a handsome profit to the occupation force.

While some civilians thought of and sought their own well-being at the expense of the Confederacy, others shared scarce resources with their fellow patriots. The great majority of this sharing was between the civilian and soldier, with the latter being the recipient, but civilians also gave of their worldly goods to noncombatants more needy than themselves. Civilians donated their time, efforts, and property to aid or make more comfortable the soldiers of the Army of Tennessee. Organized groups of citizens comforted the wounded with attention and supplies. Individuals took injured soldiers into their homes, sometimes at great peril to themselves, and nursed them back to health or until the Rebels had to depart. The healthy campaigner often found coveted provisions bestowed upon him or was invited to take a meal in a nearby home. Many times these acts were veritable sacrifices for the sharers. For instance, Confederate soldier John W. Green noted in his diary being offered fodder, potatoes, and hogs for his force by a lady whose plantation had recently been plundered.
Sharing among the civilian population was not as evident, at least not in the records, but it was a response in which a substantial number of civilians participated. In Mount Pleasant, South Carolina, before the Federal forces destroyed wheat and rice stored on a plantation and mill, it was sold to those who had money and given to those without funds. Congressman Akin wrote of the people around Elberton, Georgia, as being "very kind people. . . . One has sent me a cow to milk, two hams, thirty pounds lard and some butter. . . . Another sent us some beef, butter, a bag of sweet and one of Irish potatoes, and a dimijohn [sic] of syrup, and jeans for a pair of pants. . . ." Akin's experience was probably the exception to the rule, but only as to quantity, not as a receiver of provisions. It is evident that civilian benevolence overrode selfish instincts of profiteering in the greatest number of cases.

As inferred in the section above concerning civilian sharers, not all Georgians and Carolinians responded to the enemy invasion by seeking their own well-being. Some acted in an exceptionally disciplined manner. Allie McPeek of Jonesboro, Georgia, moved among Confederate and Union wounded, demonstrating courageous and humanitarian behavior by giving aid to friend and foe during the course of the battle. It also took courage, standing virtually alone in a rural area with property to protect, to admit forthrightly to Union soldiers as did Mrs. Farrar that her husband fought in the Confederate Army "from choice." And, there were civilians who hindered the movement of the enemy by felling trees across roads, swamps, and creeks, destroying
provisions and dispatching Federal stragglers; some engaged in guerrilla
activity which included unrestrained efforts against the invaders, 85
sometimes culminating in death. One young Georgian as he watched
his state being overrun informed his mother it was time he became
involved and quickly entered the ranks of the Army of Tennessee.
Groups as well as individuals stood their ground in the face of the
enemy. Captain John A. Cobb reported that on General George Stoneman's
approach to Macon "the call of General Cobb on the able-bodied men of
Macon to defend their homes, was promptly responded to." Generals
Johnston, Hood, and Gustavus W. Smith praised the citizen-soldiers or
militia of Georgia and justly so: even pardoned convicts of the state
fought valorously in the Savannah Campaign. While it is impossible
to know precisely what portion of the civilian population of Georgia
and the Carolinas exhibited behavior of this nature, the investigation
of sources indicated that less disciplined responses precipitated
primarily by fear were considerably more prevalent during Sherman's
invasion than those attributed to McPeek, Farrar, the citizens of
Macon, and a few others.

Georgia civilian reactions thus far discussed have been those
initially manifested and, for the most part, consummated before the
occupation of an area by the Union army. How did the people of
Georgia react once their land had been militarily occupied?

The first notable reaction following that of fear of bodily
harm and insult and of destruction of property was one of relief,
relief that the Union army did not conduct itself as a barbarian
horde bent on murder, rape, and indiscriminate pillage. There is even found among some Confederate inhabitants of Georgia and the Carolinas a guarded appreciation of the enemy, but most appeared to experience ambivalent feelings toward the adversary, which were conditioned by their realization that the Federals were humans, even American humans with whom they shared much in common, and by their loyalty to the Confederate cause that posited the invaders as enemies. Naturally as with other reactions to the invasion, civilian feelings about the enemy with whom they came in contact varied immensely; responses were dependent upon the individual Southerner, the Federal soldiers encountered, and one's occupation experience.

William King of Marietta, Georgia found the Union officers "gentlemanly," "intelligent," "pleasant," and "of good character."

His depression was relieved by the encampment of a Federal cavalry on his property. A diary written in Atlanta noted that there was much excitement on September 1, when it was found that the enemy would be in the city the next morning. But, after little sleep during the night due to the fear of the approaching enemy, the diarist reported that "they [Federals] were orderly and behaved very well. I think I shall like the Yankees very well." After ten weeks of enemy occupation as the Union army evacuated the Gate City, a diary entry revealed a change of heart: "They [Federals] behaved very badly. ... we were glad when they left for no body knows what we have suffered since they came in." This diarist showed the influence of the forced evacuation of Atlanta and the burning of large portion of it by the Federals. General Manning F. Force, U.S.A., observed that the
people in the suburbs of Savannah "seemed very glad to see us" 90
despite alarm caused by the reputation of the Federal invaders. A
Savannah female confessed that "on Wednesday morning December 21st,
the Yankees entered out peaceful little City in a much more orderly
way than I anticipated..." 91 From the Carolinas emanated similar
responses. Many civilians exhibited appreciation of Union conduct
tempered by a low expectation and the realization that some were
respectable men; nevertheless, they could not erase from their mind
that despite the Federals' respectability they were the ENEMY, and
this governed Rebel responses toward the Union occupation force.

In a study such as this where an assessment of human behavior
is made, qualifications and exceptions abound. The sentiments expressed
above came largely from urban areas, and while they were found in rural
areas, it was with less frequency. This may be explained by the in-
dication that the Union army had a double standard of conduct; their
conduct was more disciplined in urban centers than in rural areas. This
is logical, for Federal command control was greater in the cities
than the countryside. Some civilians acted exceptionally aiding
escaped Union prisoners or conversely reacting as the woman who
declared the enemy had taught her "what it is to hate." 93

The distinction between civilian feelings for the invaders
upon occupation of an area and their relationship with them during
this period cannot always be neatly separated. One affects the other;
there is an interaction between them. But, the relationship with the
occupation forces was limited to the selfish ways in which the Georgia
and Carolinian civilians dealt with the enemy. The invading soldiers talked with civilians throughout the campaigns both for entertainment and information germane to their military plans. Some Confederates were reticent, but many reports show the civilians relished a good discussion as much as did the Federals. Both suffered from a dearth of attention, especially from the opposite sex, and the nature of one's allegiance did not necessarily dampen the opportunity to seek socially acceptable fulfillment. Some Confederates went beyond the bounds of approbation in satisfying their emotional needs and, incidentally, the enemies'. Southerners isolated in rural settings eagerly sought news of the outside world from the Federals, generating discussion between the opponents. All this naturally led to social involvement with the invaders whenever they lingered long enough in one place. Sharing meals, attending dances, taking pleasure rides, and enjoying entertainment of various sorts brought Federal and Rebel together. More mundane circumstances also caused the civilian to deal with the enemy; those Confederates who found themselves destitute or low enough on possession of the necessities of life used what resources they owned to obtain, often by barter, the desired items. Southerners who traded homemade delicacies for basic goods possessed by the Union soldiers were not uncommon. When Georgians and Carolinians did not have anything to buy or trade for Federal goods or services, they were not always too proud to ask that something be done or given as a favor. Supplies, shelter, protection, and transportation among other things were requested and accepted.
The social and business intercourse between enemies began to break down emotional barriers. Some Confederates began to talk favorably in terms of the return of normal conditions brought about by the Union occupation. This led to expressions of appreciation to the occupying forces, culminating in some cases of declarations of allegiance to the Union. While individuals and groups made their peace with the United States, it is interesting that research revealed no ministers of the gospel who were willing without qualification to pray for President Abraham Lincoln. This refusal often precluded the holding of church services, but the Confederate clergy, doubtless supported by their parishioners, could not bring themselves to bless a man whom they believed responsible for the Civil War and in particular for their afflictions. The final and logical link in the relationship civilians developed with the Federals is unaffected affection. Not merely affection between the opposite sexes, but affection of one human being for another. F. Y. Hedley of the Union occupation force in Savannah established a close relationship with a middle-aged couple of the seaport city. Mrs. Warren and Hedley found mutual interest in the poet Robert Burns. Mr. Warren, an "ardent" Confederate, "was most cordial . . . ," and Warren and Hedley became close friends. The Savannahian offered to share his wardrobe with the Union soldier and to arrange a loan if needed. Wher Hedley left Savannah, both he and Warren regretted the parting, and they developed a correspondence on an irregular basis. One letter sent to Hedley by Warren shortly after they had parted illustrates the depth of their relationship:
"My wife and self are truly rejoiced to learn that your vessel escaped 'the perils of the sea.' . . . We sincerely desire that you may escape all perils of land and sea, and long live to be an ornament of society, and a useful and honored member of the republic. We greatly miss the company of yourself..." Relationships such as this completed the circle from strained to eased relations, to desired and enjoyed contact, and finally to the development of strong emotional ties.

Departure of Federal troops from an area often signaled the beginning of additional tribulations for civilians as individuals and groups of civilians and straggling soldiers filled the vacuum of authority with a harrowing pillage of the remaining possessions of the inhabitants. In robbing the unsuspecting residents the perpetrators of these heinous deeds operated outside the law of both Union and Confederate authorities—for many, it was a way of life. Happy that the Union forces had moved on, Mary W. Noble of Rome, Georgia, learned quickly her troubles had not passed. A group of Confederate deserters entered Rome, men of "the most desperate character."

They arrived as the Yankees departed, and since "they were the first 'graycoats' to come in, the people were almost crazy about them, the girls of Rome all went down to the river bank and welcomed them in, and committed a thousand extravagant undignified acts, they were so much overjoyed, but our joy was of short duration. . . ." The outlaws hanged two residents to obtain information concerning the hiding places of valuables; the victims were nearly killed. There was more intimidation
and more robberies. One citizen was killed by the outlaws. With only a few citizens in town, "we are afraid to trust any one now, if a soldier comes to the house we are afraid of him unless we know him; it is so different from what we expected that we almost wish for the Yankees again since we can't have a Confederate force to protect us..." Some lawlessness was less serious, but existent as was indicated by Governor Brown's order that Milledgeville residents who appropriated state property during the passage of the enemy through the capital should promptly return it. Whether acquisition of others' property was a vocation with a vengeance or an avocation with a timidity, the Federal invasion offered ample opportunity to engage in such activities.

Confusion and problems pursued Atlanta civilians a week after the Federal occupation of the Gate City, for Sherman ordered the withdrawal of all Confederates from the city. He wanted no unnecessary Rebel interference with Union military activities. This was the only Federally imposed evacuation of a city during the Atlanta, Savannah, and Carolinas campaigns. The action provoked "threats and objuries at what they [Georgians] termed a fiendish act of cruelty..." A good insight into the civilian sentiment is available in the form of a letter written by the mayor and two councilmen of Atlanta to the Union commander. The city officials began by noting generally what the results would be if the evacuation order were carried out, and then began to mention specific examples of hardship. They maintained: "the measure would involve extraordinary hardship and
loss...[and] aggregate consequences appalling and heart-rendering. Many poor women are in advanced state of pregnancy... Some say: 'I have such a one sick at my house; who will wait on them when I am gone?'' They pointed out that refugee areas to the south were "already crowded," and questioned whether women and children could survive through the winter. These arguments did not affect Sherman's decision.

Preparation to evacuate the Georgia city brought much confusion. Confusion prevailed because Sherman gave the evacuees a choice of going into the Confederacy or north into the Union. An Atlanta lady told of trying to decide which alternative to select. To the south was her family, friends, and a more pleasant climate, but one great obstacle prevented her and her family from re-entering the Confederacy. All men were conscripted into the army, and her father would not be able long to endure military life. "But a difficulty equally as great debarred us from entering life in the Yankee land of Canaan, the difference in currency occasioned this embarrassment..." Her father's property was in land and Confederate money which allowed them "not means enough to venture North unless Pa could get something for his tobacco. So we were in a vacillating condition for several 100 days." Federal correspondent Conyngham noticed that upon announcement of the intended evacuation several families immediately went south to join friends, but others "who had concealed themselves from conscription, who had been persecuted by rebel authority... and who screened our prisoners and aided their flight... did not know
what to do. They found our friendship as destructive as the rebel's enmity. . . ."

If Atlanta were the only city upon which evacuation was forced, individual civilians faced expulsion throughout Georgia and the Carolinas. The experience of Mrs. William Ross Postell may have been representative of others suffering a similar fate. Mrs. Postell, an ardent Confederate of Savannah, was ordered banished from the city because of pro-Confederate sentiments expressed in letters written to her sons. A letter recounting this experience makes clear the dilemma between patriotism and livelihood encountered by many courageous and loyal Rebels. Physically, exile was nearly impossible and unquestionably dangerous. She remonstrated with the authorities: "With four little children! And my babe sick! In this cold weather!" She argued that her husband was in Federal prison, one son was dead and two then fighting for their country; and she was without money. These arguments were used in an attempt to obtain an extension of time or an outright repeal of the order. Before receiving word that she might remain in Savannah, she agonized over the best place to locate. She would not consider Philadelphia; it was the land of the enemy. Mrs. Postell was a Confederate, but also a mother, as this remark to a Union officer illustrates: "my preference would be to go into the Confederacy, but I entreat mercy on behalf of my children . . . that you would modify, or 102 revoke, this cruel order." Banishment from one's home imposed physical as well as emotional problems.
Scarcity of information, possibility of foreign intervention on behalf of the Confederacy, and reliance on God were factors appearing during and because of the Federal invasion, and from each the civilians hoped to obtain reassurance for themselves and their nation. Military developments isolated civilians throughout Georgia and the Carolinas, keeping them ignorant of what was happening a few miles from their residence and abroad in the Southland. Whether located in urban areas or the countryside, there were periods when inhabitants faced a complete absence of news and many times a dearth of information. The uninformed craved knowledge of military developments, frequently on which to base their personal plans and actions, and they also longed for word of family and friends away from home. Not only was it difficult to obtain information, but it was trying, even impossible, to get letters out to others. Faced with the breakdown of information, rumors ran rampant. It became a unceasing challenge for civilians to decipher correct information from rumor, fact from fiction. Such circumstances obviously exacerbated anxieties and fears forcing some civilians close to the emotional breaking point.

To relieve part of the emotional crisis, civilians turned to the longed-for intervention by foreign nations or to the consolation inherent in Christian belief. The expectations of King Cotton diplomacy were not realized before the beginning of the 1864 spring campaigns, nor ever, but the Georgians and Carolinians conjured up all the good things intervention would bring. And, before long, word was about that the Confederate States of America had help on the way, an
excellent example of what a lack of accurate information can cause--unadulterated rumor. "Indications of foreign interference on the part of France begin to show themselves. It has always been my theory that this war cannot end without intervention . . .," prophesied a North Carolina civilian. Miss Green of Milledgeville reported rumors of the French attacking New Orleans and of the English sailing up the Potomac River. Such were the fantasies which bridged the Atlantic Ocean. However, more Confederates placed their faith in divine intervention. Near Christmas 1864, one Confederate, who found the outlook especially bleak, wrote: "Our only help is in God, & if the cup may not pass from us, He will give us as individuals strength to endure. . . ." Another Rebel was not as patient with his god. "Oh! righteous God will thy vengeance sleep forever. 'How long, oh! long shall the wicked prosper'" In his urgency he either ignored or forgot God's admonition to man: "Judge not, that ye be not judged." But, since this scripture did not get at the needs of the Confederacy, it was ignored to praise God for his blessings when things went right for the South and to implore His support when developments were amiss. This was a century of practiced Christianity, and the Southerner believed himself to be one of God's children; that he trusted in Him was reiterated time and again during the Atlanta, Savannah, and Carolinas campaigns.

In analyzing civilian responses to Sherman's invasion, references have been made only incidentally to specific groups or classes; instead, the free citizens of Georgia and the Carolinas have
been considered as a whole, except to note that among the residents of these states there were staunch Rebels, Unionists, profiteers, and sharers. Other more distinct groups and classes also established a separate identity by their reactions to the enemy campaigns. Many historians have suggested that for the South the Civil War was a rich man's war and a poor man's fight. There is significant evidence supporting this hypothesis in the responses to Sherman's command during the last year of the war. A Union surgeon observed that "the aristocracy of the South . . . are filled with animosity toward us; that they are thoroughly determined to secure their independence, if by any means possible. . . ." He found "far less animosity" among the rest of the civilian population, which appeared weary of war and expectant of an early conclusion, but which "will still willingly follow their aristocracy to war. . . ." The masses of civilians were more likely to encounter the Federals. From cities and plantations the rich usually fled, avoiding contact with the enemy. Whether because they did not have the means to flee or the inclination to do so, it was the commoners who largely inhabited the occupied areas of Georgia and the Carolinas. They did not find the Union forces as great a threat to their life styles as did their richer neighbors, and as a result, there was less enduring fear of the Yankee among this class for the Yankee. They met and shared with and received from the invaders; in short, the lower class of the South was far less inhibited in its intercourse with the enemy. Lest the distinction between classes as they reacted to the invasion be overdrawn, there was cooperation and
similarity in response among classes as the enemy approached; both rich and poor experienced fear and often fled or banded together for safety.

A few general observations concerning state characteristics were made. The Federals found the residents of South Carolina more passive than citizens of Georgia and North Carolina, and more Unionist sentiment was encountered in the Palmetto State than its sister state to the north. Admittedly, these state observations have little significance, because the Union troops behaved differently on separate campaigns and in the individual states and remained in the states various lengths of time, and all this naturally influenced the civilian responses.

The females of Georgia and the Carolinas represented the largest segment of the free civilians of the invaded states, and many of their reactions have already been discussed in this context. However, there were a few reactions peculiar to the fairer sex. The Confederacy had their Joans of Arc, who rallied the men to the cause and at times engaged in the military efforts themselves. In fighting around Atlanta one wounded Rebel whose foot had to be amputated turned out to be a nineteen year old girl. She "bore her suffering heroically," and for good reason, since she was a twenty-eight-month veteran. Other females cheered on and chided the stronger sex to greater military efforts. On top of Kennesaw Mountain, a large group of women shook hands with the soldiers and then waved their handkerchiefs as the fight began. During the engagement they watched proceedings with spyglasses and a satisfaction that was conducive to merriment.
In Decatur, Georgia, women ran into the town square to cheer the Confederate cavalry on; earlier, one indignant Rebel female mounted a breastwork, waving a sword and chastised the common soldier for lack of courage.

Most women exhibited their loyalty and support of the Confederate effort by giving aid to the wounded Rebel and presenting a rebellious demeanor to the Union soldiers. When the Federal army first entered a town or pervaded the countryside, the women rarely showed their faces, and if they did, the Union troopers experienced the "most inveterate hate." They tried "petty modes of annoyance." Nevertheless, they began gradually to mix with the invaders and eventually they "brightened into sunshine and smiles." The metamorphosis did not stop here; some of the "inveterate Yankee haters" married Union soldiers. One Union soldier, observing how the Southern females captured their Northern grooms, remarked that "those fairs of the south will tell a very pitiful and heartrendering story and the boys must marry them to get them out of their misery." The soldier reported fifty weddings from Atlanta on September 15--less than two weeks of Union occupation had elapsed. If marriage was not desirable or possible, extramarital liaisons were not precluded; Sherman complained that it would be easier to guard the entire Confederate Army than to keep about four hundred female factory workers of Rossville and his soldiers separated. This evidence points to the fact that the fairer sex upon association with the enemy went through an evolutionary process similar to that of the entire civilian population of Georgia and the Carolinas, but
they differed in that they often went to greater extremes—that is, from militant action and inveterate hate to marriage, and for some love.

While the effect of the invasion on civilian morale is more difficult for the historian to gauge than those considered above, it is necessary to evaluate it in order to gain as full an insight as is possible into the Union impact. What effect did the enemy invasion have on the morale of the free inhabitants of the states? While it is apparent that developments unrelated to the Federal invasion of Georgia and the Carolinas influenced morale, certainly the Atlanta, Savannah, and Carolinas campaigns were the primary catalysts molding civilian outlook in regard to the Southern cause.

A few days prior to the outset of 1865, a Griffin, Georgia, citizen wrote to President Davis deploiring the situation in the state and warning: "Unless something is done, and that speedily, too, there will be thousands of the best citizens of this State, and heretofore as loyal as any men in the Confederacy, that will not care one cent which army is victorious in Georgia." From Macon on January 8, 1865, General Howell Cobb recommended a course of immediate action to Secretary of War Seddon, for "gloom and despondency rule the hour . . ." and "disaffection and disloyalty is manifesting itself . . . ." Eleven days later Cobb wrote his wife from Augusta that he found "the people depressed, disaffected and too many of them disloyal . . . ."

The next day he assessed the situation in a letter to the President: "I regret to say that the feeling becomes more and more disloyal every
day . . . disaffection . . . exists and is spreading every hour. It could not be worse." Following a tour of northeastern Georgia, one of Cobb's subordinates reported that "I have seen no signs of disloyalty . . . ;" nevertheless, he ambiguously advised that there were men in the area who could be used in the military, but they might well desert. From the northwestern area of the state a colonel sent nothing but discouraging news to one of Cobb's staff officers. Senator Porcher Miles of South Carolina received a despairing analysis from Charleston at the end of 1864. "Do you realize how fearfully black things are down here? Sav. [Savannah] is to be evacuated—the B. B. is interrupted—even the most sanguine despair of Charleston. its fall seems only a question of time. Our old men & boys are out to swell the number of our defenders, but in fact, they only make those who look on realize our weakness, & bring home to us the strength of despair." A North Carolinian wrote that the loss of Atlanta was a "vital wound" and the fall of Savannah brought "despondence and gloom" to all; "and many, very many, have lost all hope of in-depence." Numerous other echoed and observed similar sentiments. Certainly these Confederate observations lend support to the reports of the Yankee correspondents who noted soon after the Union occupation of Atlanta that the Rebels "began to lose hope . . ." and were ready "for peace on almost any terms. . . ." The civilians also confirmed another enemy assessment after the fall of Savannah that "the people here re-echo the sentiment which has greeted us ever since we left Atlanta, that our un-interrupted march ending with the
conquest of this chief commercial city of Georgia, has closed the war so far as they are concerned." If the Federal capture of Atlanta and Savannah destroyed civilian esprit de corp, the Carolinas Campaign only re-inforced the debacle.

This analysis of Georgian and Carolinian civilian reaction to the Union invasion of their states shows that responses to the enemy invaders were variegated: from extreme fear of the Union army to elation at their presence; from a covetous obsession with property to a willing sharing with friend or enemy; from cowardice to bravery in the face of the enemy; from loyalty to betrayal of the Southern cause. It is also apparent that a conscious resignation had permeated a substantial portion of the group; most submitted to Union predominance.

III. The Newspapers of Georgia and the Carolinas.

J. Cutler Andrews' The South Reports the Civil War is a scholarly account of Confederate newspaper coverage of the Civil War. Andrews studiously analyzed the various newspapers and reporters of the Southland, noting the nature of the news and the relationship between the journalists and Confederate authorities, military and civil. While he found that both Rebel soldier, politician, and journalist impeded the reporting of events at times during the Atlanta, Savannah, and Carolinas campaigns, he spent more time evaluating the content of their copy. The author concluded that veracity was compromised as the fortunes of the nation waned, with an effort made to print only that material which would inspire continued efforts in the South.
The retreats of the Army of Tennessee were euphemistically referred to as retrograde movements, etc., and many columns were written to explain why the Confederate force was falling back to Atlanta. Bad news such as a panic in Atlanta and excessive Confederate battlefield losses was suppressed, and good news was often exaggerated, as when Sherman was repulsed at Kenesaw Mountain and Wheeler routed the Federals in minor cavalry skirmishing. Distortion of the news was evident in the Rebel disparagement of the loss of Atlanta and in labeling the Union army's "March to the Sea" a disaster for the enemy.

The principal thrust of The South Reports the Civil War is how military events were reported in the Southern press; developments unrelated to the military operations are ignored, and situations which had only an indirect relationship with martial proceedings are given very secondary consideration. This section will analyze in greater detail than the Andrews volume the nature of Rebel news in the invaded states, by directing more attention to newspaper reports which were only marginally of military significance, by giving attention to some nonmilitary copy, and by providing a fuller evaluation of military coverage during the Atlanta, Savannah, and Carolinas campaigns. First the general organization of the printed matter in four newspapers of the invaded states is viewed, followed by an analysis of the news, advertisements, and editorial policies.

The Atlanta Southern Confederacy, which located in Macon after the surrender of the Gate City, consisted of two pages from the outset of the Atlanta Campaign to the paper's demise, February 8, 1865.
The size of the sheet remained constant, with the news reported on the first page and approximately a quarter of the second being advertisements. Governmental and military announcements were also found on page two. Advertising cost $3.00 for one square of ten lines. While in Atlanta the Southern Confederacy claimed the "largest daily circulation in the state."

The Macon Daily Telegraph, which after the evacuation of the Gate City became the Macon Telegraph and Confederate as a result of a merger, published two pages during 1864. For about one month during fighting around Atlanta in August and September the paper slightly reduced its size, but reverted to its original dimensions after this period. One-half of the publication was assigned to advertising, except for the period immediately preceding the Union occupation of Atlanta and the weeks that followed. Interestingly, at the time of the Federal threat to Macon during the Savannah Campaign, advertisements regained their former share of the columns. Costs for ads jumped in January 1864 from $1.00 to $2.00 for a square of ten lines. The end of October witnessed another $1.00 increase, and in December the rate increased another dollar making it $4.00 per square, a four hundred per cent increase over the year. Governmental and military announcements shared the remaining space. The Telegraph was issued daily except for Sundays, and the Telegraph and Confederate was published seven days a week.
From the first of December 1864 when the Federals initially threatened South Carolina to February 21, 1865, the date on which the Charleston Daily Courier was taken over by the enemy, this Palmetto State newspaper issued two pages, which were not reduced in size until eight days before the Union seizure. Page one was largely news, and page two advertisements, with government and military announcements on both pages. One square of advertisement constituting twelve lines first cost $3.00, but was increased to $5.00 at the beginning of 1865. There were daily editions except for Sunday.

The Raleigh, North Carolina, Weekly Standard published four pages consistently during the threat of invasion and the subsequent Union occupation of the Tarheel State. News and announcements emanating from the military and political authorities predominated, with advertising averaging only about a twelfth of the space. Ads ran $5.00 per square of ten lines, an increase of $2.00 over the period prior to February 1865. The quantity and distribution of printed material in these newspapers showed only inconsequential changes, not being significantly influenced in this respect by the military developments in their states.

In news coverage, the Southern Confederacy unquestionably emphasized war developments, with action in Georgia and Virginia receiving near exclusive attention. General Leonidas Polk's death and funeral were allotted extensive copy. It published long lists of wounded combatants and unclaimed letters, and the editor provided space to record the plight of the numerous and growing numbers of Confederate exiles. To leaven the mood, Bill Arp's articles were
used by the paper. The Southern Confederacy obtained its news from its own reporters, letters to the editor, and excerpts from other newspapers.

At the beginning of 1864, the Telegraph assigned most news space to military and such military-related items as peace movements and uninterrupted school. Articles concerning campaigns and material and human resources filled two to three of the fourteen columns; the Virginia theater was given as much attention as the Army of Tennessee, with the area to the west of the Appalachians being ignored by comparison. The siege of Charleston was given significant coverage. National, state, and municipal politics received consideration, particularly when they affected the war effort by policy measures on currency, conscription, habeas corpus, military supplies, and refugees. Exhortions for greater sacrifices for the Southern cause were printed. News from the North which reflected badly on the Union obtained space; with special Confederate emphasis, the draft riots and Lincoln administration blunders were accorded much attention. Little was reported on matters abroad. A serialized novel, Nellie Norton, or, Southern Slavery and the Bible, by "a Georgian," ran for two and a half weeks averaging two and one-half columns. Nellie, a Northerner, was convinced of the Biblical sanction of slavery and of the benefits of the institution to the Negro. This news was derived from letters to the editor by soldiers and civilians, excerpts from Confederate and Union papers, and "By Telegraph." In May 1864 there is little change except that military news dealt more specifically with battlefield action than during the
earlier months, and balance was maintained between developments in Georgia and Virginia until the last week of May when news of the Atlanta Campaign became primary, a trend which continued through the year until the enemy left the Empire State. Union occupation of Atlanta predictably focused additional attention on events in Georgia. Some of the Hood-Sherman correspondence over the forced evacuation of Atlanta was printed. Much more was published on the peace movement in the North, and considerable attention was directed to the Union presidential conventions and campaigns. From the beginning of the Savannah Campaign to the first of December, official orders and proclamations dominated the *Telegram and Confederate*’s columns. These were, of course, related to the military situation in the Empire State. After the beginning of December, information in regard to the Savannah Campaign was increased. The Virginia theater received less attention than earlier, and interest in Northern politics and the peace movement was curtailed.

In the *Courier* military action and related subjects are by far predominant. The reporting of military developments was balanced between all theaters through the middle of December, when more attention was increasingly paid to Sherman and his command. State and national political news received secondary consideration. There was some agricultural information and some attention to the memory of John C. Calhoun. Invidious reflections on the Union and its leaders, particularly Lincoln, were printed. There was a short, but never omitted article, "Siege of Charleston." News sources were other Confederate and Union
papers, private citizens, and official Confederate military and political personnel.

As with the other papers, war and war-related news monopolized space in the *Standard*. Reports of Sherman's advance abound, but other military topics and theaters received consideration. State and national speeches and resolutions were printed in full. There were also some poetry and human interest stories as well as articles giving advice on fertilizing and planting. More letters to the editor from civilians and soldiers were printed than found in the other newspapers, and frequent use was made of excerpts from other Confederate papers. While news coverage was influenced by the Federal invasion as each newspaper directed increasingly more attention to the enemy on their approach, other military theaters, especially Virginia, and sundry nonmilitary topics received significant attention in the sheets throughout the period of invasion.

Advertisements in the four newspapers reveal more consistency than inconsistency during the Atlanta, Savannah, and Carolina campaigns. Although prices were never printed, slaves were advertised for sale and hire, and individuals placed ads seeking to procure slaves. Runaway chattels were sought through the papers with a consistency that denied any effect from the enemy incursions. Schools announced their opening dates and curriculum, theaters their shows, employers their job openings, and mourners their deceased. Land and livestock were advertised without a discernible fluctuation in the number of ads regardless of the proximity of the enemy. Dry goods, sugar, salt,
coffee, syrup, lard, cod liver oil, oysters, liquors (whiskey, brandy, wine, and gin), water buckets, almanacs, etc. found their way into the classified sections to be sold at auction or in retail transactions. The services of carpenters, bricklayers, and workers in general were sought. One Southerner, perhaps a dreamer, made known his wish to wed a wealthy female. Establishments of new businesses were announced. Judged by the commercial advertising in the newspapers, business in the invaded states was not significantly influenced by the military developments until the enemy occupied an area. Furthermore, the content of the classified ads contradicts the thesis that there was a scarcity of consumer goods in the Confederacy during the last year of the war.

Exceptions to the above assessment should be noted. In May the Telegraph ran ads publicizing revised railroad schedules, unquestionably the result of the Federal invasion of the Empire State. From the outset of the Savannah Campaign to the second week of December, the Telegraph and Confederate placed approximately fifty per cent fewer ads for the sale of slaves and property other than real estate. After this period the classified section returned to normal except that the advertisement of real estate and slave property dropped significantly after the middle of December. It is logical that during the Union threat to the Macon area commercial intercourse would diminish and would then take some time to revive as is indicated by the advertisements between November 15 and December 15. Also, the reduction in real estate and slave sale ads after the middle of
December can be attributed to the enemy invasion; after this date, 
real property was no longer immediately threatened or it may have been 
ravaged and was in no condition to sell. Chattels, too, were safer, 
and probably scarcer, some having absconded with the invading forces. 
For a short time and to a limited extent the enemy invasion did affect 
the Macon economy as reflected in the classified section of the newspaper. 
Although these changes were not found in the other sheets analyzed, 
they were probably experienced elsewhere in the invaded states. The 
Standard did not publish ads for the purchase of slaves as did the 
other newspapers. This was no doubt the result of the general condition 
of the Confederacy in March and April 1865, which can be attributed 
as much to developments outside of Georgia and the Carolinas as to the 
Sherman invasion. Despite the exceptions noted above, the extent of 
newspaper advertising is astonishing, leading one to conclude that there 
was considerable trade during the last year of the war in the invaded 
states. The general consistency in the advertising suggests that the 
Georgians and Carolinians had adjusted to wartime conditions, accepting 
them as a way of life. There was just not enough change in the 
classified sections, not enough of the invasion reflected therein to 
indicate otherwise.

The editorial policy of Georgia and Carolinas newspapers in 
reporting the war is much as historian J. Culter Andrews described it 
in The South Reports the Civil War. In the last year of the conflict 
editors out of loyalty to the Confederacy apparently felt compelled 
to report the news in such a way as to sustain morale during the most
trying of times; journalists used various subterfuges to effect this end. Unjustified reports of propitious circumstances in Georgia and the Carolinas during the Sherman invasion were stretched to the limit of credulity. Explanations and rationalizations of Rebel inadequacies in the invaded states were numerous and at times far fetched. Ignorance was sometimes pleaded to avoid admission of the disagreeable truth. These characteristics in Georgia and the Carolinas coincide with Andrews' interpretation. He also noted some honest reporting of disheartening developments. The research for this study reveals that pessimistic copy was somewhat more prevalent and that many columns were filled with advice and admonitions to those who would likely experience in person the invasion of the enemy.

Under the by-line, "The Situation-Skies Brightening," the Atlanta Appeal printed on May 11 that "hope has already ripened into confidence, and the enemy are already regarded as whipped if he will only deign to give battle. . . ." Confidence was high among the command and common soldiers of the Army of Tennessee, and they were "eager" for battle. Five weeks later after the Federals had pushed close to Marietta, only twenty miles from Atlanta, the Southern Confederacy proffered: "Sherman progresses distressingly slow with his on to Atlanta."

The Yankees should emerge from their protected lines to obtain their goal--the Gate City, but they would only meet defeat. General Johnston and his command "continues in fine condition and the troops, as they have ever been, still eager for the wrestle."

The Telegraph reported a Confederate victory at Ezra Church on July 28,
with the enemy "repulsed and driven back over one mile." Actually, the Confederate attack was unsuccessful resulting in the loss of important manpower and withdrawal into the fortifications of Atlanta. Such misrepresentation of the facts could be unintentional, but was probably intended; it happened often during the Sherman invasion. Perhaps, in this case the reporter was a victim of the flavor of his own rhetoric. "Our forces are full of spirits, and are confident of final success." Was this journalist "full of spirits?" Regardless, this article and many others was unexcusably erroneous and optimistic.

After crowding Atlanta for six weeks, the Federal army was reported to be "whipped already, we [Telegraph] firmly believe, and the coup de grace will be administered before many days." A week later the Gate City fell to the "doomed" Federal forces--doomed only by the Rebel press. At the end of November after Sherman had made substantial headway with only inconsequential opposition into the heart of Georgia on his "March to the Sea," the Telegraph and Confederate declared the Federal campaign impossible. The Confederate cavalry was "upon his [Union] rear and flank, preventing foraging expeditions, and a force in his front, destroying and removing provisions, and obstructing roads, his supplies will become exhausted and the utter ruin of his army will follow. . . ." This is the epitome of factual distortion and faulty prognosis. The battle of Honey Hill, South Carolina, was a minor confrontation in which the Georgia militia repulsed a Federal attack inflicting approximately 700 casualties, 88 of these killed. The Savannah Republican seized the opportunity to portray the conflict
as a major battle valorously won by the Confederates and to report the "wildest fright and confusion . . . [and] galling defeat and inglorious flight" of the Union soldiers. The Courier inflated the number of Federal casualties from 700 to "at least fifteen hundred," more than a hundred per cent increase. Even in the third and fourth weeks of March with Sherman in command of a sizable slice of North Carolina, the Standard offered heartening news. General Johnston, again in command of the Army of Tennessee, was reported as having confidence in his "army and people. He will doubtless do all he can to retard the march of the invader, and 'bring him grief.'" This measured optimism was increased considerably following the "brilliant victory" for the Rebels at Bentonville, North Carolina, for now the Confederate forces were "in a safe position . . . [to] deal blow after blow on the enemy." Unfortunately for the Southern cause, General Johnston was not aware of this intelligence, as Bentonville was the last Rebel blow, and a truce and surrender followed. This, however, is how a great amount of coverage of military action in Georgia and the Carolinas went—the newspapers reported the Rebel forces to be in much better condition and with considerably better prospects than circumstances warranted. Obviously, the press fought their own battle to maintain a positive morale in the Southland, a struggle which proved as on the battlefield to be a losing proposition.

It is noted above that during the Atlanta Campaign the Army of Tennessee proved fatally short of manpower and materiel in comparison to its adversary and its command coordination was never successfully
realized. In the Savannah and Carolinas campaigns manpower and materiel were ludicrously lacking and command coordination was not even a factor as there were no tools with which to work. However, the Confederacy attempted to do something with what it had, and the press played a major role. The previously noted quantities of optimistic news which stretched credibility were published with almost equal portions of journalism which explained, rationalized, and ignored disquieting developments; when conditions were discouraging, the Rebel will to oppose the Yankee was artificially supported by the press.

Explanation, rationalizations, and ignorance emerged as early and remained as long as dissemination of inflated good news. On May 16, 1864, with the Atlanta Campaign under way only two weeks, the Telegraph stated that those disturbed by the Army of Tennessee retrograde movement did not understand General Johnston's strategy; he was the "master of the situation." Dalton, Georgia, had been evacuated because the enemy had refused to fight there, and besides, the Confederate commander preferred to fight in Sugar Valley. Copious copy was spent in obvious journalistic attempts to satisfy and pacify Southerners during the Johnston retreats toward Atlanta. The Atlanta Appeal explained that Sherman was a "bold mover, but we think in the present instance he has missed the mark in suffering himself to be led so far into the interior of a hostile country where a single reverse to his arms would prove disastrous to his whole army, and make it an easy prey to his adversary." And, the Telegraph rationalized: "events will explain and vindicate Johnston's policy. So far as he is concerned
we are going to walk by faith if we cannot by sight." As the Union soldiers under Sherman marched unimpeded to Savannah, the Telegraph and Confederate reported that the Federal devastation of Rebel property brought "no cry for reconstruction and submission, but rather a shout, like the sound of many waters, for independence and revenge. . . ."

With the Carolinas Campaign getting underway, the Courier reminded their readers that the English almost defeated the American revolutionaries, the "immense horde of Persians" threatened Greek freedom, and mighty England confronted tiny Scotland under Robert Bruce, but in each case the unexpected had happened. The lesson was embarrassingly obvious—if the Confederacy persevered, victory could be hers, and so it went through the last year of the war in Georgia and the Carolinas.

An important military-related matter which received the attention of newspaper editors was the conduct of Negro slaves as Sherman marched through the South. To admit that the chattels of the South would exercise their opportunity to obtain freedom by escaping to the Union force and then enjoy the company of the Yankee and the concomitant freedom, was tantamount to confessing that the Southerner had misjudged his slaves and the intentions of the enemy. This was not necessary. The Rebel press came to the rescue by reporting time and again how the Federals had mistreated the Negro and how as a result the human contraband wasted little time in abandoning their "saviors" to return to their homes. Southern life and expectations were sustained in this case. Disparaging developments in the North were reported in a similar attempt to publicize the superiority of Southern ways.
These self-congratulatory props emanating from the press were important to the Empire, Palmetto, and Tarheel states, where the inhabitants were experiencing a successful enemy invasion which destroyed their confidence in themselves.

Silence in regard to military developments and civilian reactions to the campaigns was at times unavoidable, but it was frequently intentional. News of military setbacks and inadequacies and of enemy advantages and progress was often withheld from publication, or at least delayed and minimized. This procedure was particularly employed during the last six months of the war, when very little pointed to Confederate survival in Georgia and the Carolinas.

If there was sufficient cause for pessimistic newspaper reports, and there was, and if there was despondency among the residents, and there was, pessimism in the press was the exception, but it commanded a strong minority position. The Telegraph printed the gloomy tidings and prospects for a week and a half after the fall of Atlanta. It was "reluctantly" reported that the Federals held the Macon and Western railroad, and then on the news of the evacuation of the Gate City, it was admitted that Maconians were "thrown into convulsions. . . ."

With some perspective on September 9, the Telegraph lamented "the magnitude of the loss we have sustained in the capture of Atlanta. . . . He [Sherman] has succeeded in reaching the center of the Confederacy and now holds its life in his hands. . . ." During the Savannah Campaign the Courier characterized Sherman as a "skillful, cautious, enterprising, and daring" military leader, and admitted that his command
which had reached the "heart of the Confederacy" threatened "several vital points." In answer to some Southerners who averred that Sherman was only retreating from Atlanta on his "March to the Sea," the Courier countered: "For whether retreating or advancing he is doing enormous damages, and if he reach [sic] the sea it will be an evil event for us."

As the Federal command prepared to enter North Carolina, the Standard expressed what it hoped would take place, but concluded that Sherman would not even be "seriously checked," much less routed. "The enemy will continue to overrun and occupy the country. The people expect the truth in this paper, and they shall have it as far as we are able to tell it." Also, on the first of March the Standard endorsed the position of the Ash-ville News, which declared: "Our voice is still for peace, niggers or no niggers. Our skirts shall be clear of all responsibility for the continuance of this war." Whether it was because of the deteriorating condition of the Confederacy in the last six weeks of the conflict or rather the policy of editor William W. Holden, the Standard printed a higher proportion of pessimistic copy than the other Georgia and Carolina newspapers. A sharp eye was needed to locate this type of news, but Confederates could find it if they carefully read their news sheets.

As many inches of news space were assigned to advice and warnings as to any other news in reaction to the Federal invasion of Georgia and the Carolinas. The Augusta Constitutionalist warned that "history furnishes no parallel by which to measure the entire length and breadth and depth of national and domestic misery which the overthrow
of this Confederacy would entail upon ourselves and posterity."

Property would be confiscated; Southern womanhood subjected to the "most intolerable tyranny"; and, "social contact with the negro would be its certain and most dreadful consequence. . . ." The Southern Confederacy advised its readers that Sherman was encouraging "traitors and tories outside of his lines" to intimidate the loyal Confederates. The Telegraph was concerned that while General Johnston needed men, there were still many who could provide reinforcement. "Every other interest should be laid aside for a few weeks, and all capable of bearing arms, irrespective of age should go to the assistance of those faithful braves who are standing as a living wall between the enemy and your homes. . . ." And, then there were the frequent admonitions that Confederates should not forget to pray to God. "It is a matter of amazement that the citizens of Macon should be so regardless of prayer, when the country is in such imminent danger, and when a great and decisive battle must soon occur!"

Some of the newspaper warning and advising was done through the printing of official government and military proclamations and politicos' speeches. South Carolina Governor Milledge L. Bonham addressed his constituents in the columns of the Courier as the Union force threatened his state. Residents in the threatened area were "earnestly urged, with all their force, to tear up and obstruct all roads leading from ferries on the Savannah river . . . to remove from the enemies line of march all live stock; transport beyond his line of march all provisions possible, and on his approach the remainder to
destroy; and all who can bear arms, to report to the officer commanding the nearest State troops for service during the present emergency."
Less momentous, but obviously intended to strengthen Rebel resolve, was the short Edmund Burke statement published in the Courier.
"No nation was ever conquered but by itself. As long as the public spirit remains untouched, the public cause is in no danger." The Wilmington Journal waxed eloquent, admonishing "men of thought—men of speech—men of writing—men of action—all men who have their country's interest at stake owe it to that country to combat this disease of depression which is laying hold on the country, and snapping the vitals of its power both at home and in the army." Regardless of the source or the nature of the advice and warnings, they were numerous in the papers of the invaded states.

The news sheets of Georgia and the Carolinas supported the Confederacy throughout the Atlanta, Savannah, and Carolinas campaigns. They did this believing they were acting in the best interests of their subscribers. The nature of their reporting revealed little concern for the principles of journalism when these standards came in conflict with the needs of the nation. As J. Cutler Andrews ably shows, the reporting of the war, and particularly for this study of the last year of the war in Georgia and the Carolinas, was variously manipulated so that support of the Southern Cause would be maximized. But other interesting observations can also be made. The Federal invasion did not significantly affect the newspapers: the size of editions, the frequency of issue, and the distribution of advertisement and news
remained exceptionally constant until the enemy troops forced exile or imposed control. News coverage focused on the invasion only as it threatened the immediate locale of the publication—other military theaters, especially Virginia, military-related topics, and nonmilitary subjects received space. With some minor exceptions the classified ads ran without discernible adjustment to the enemy invasion, and newspaper advertising was surprisingly abundant, suggesting the availability of goods to those who possessed the means of purchase instead of the absence or scarcity of items so often claimed for the last year of the conflict. In reaction to the invasion, there was more pessimistic reporting and much more advice and warning to residents than Andrews’ study indicated, evidence that the news sheets tried to serve their readers, country, and profession faithfully. That the published confidence of the newspapers was stronger and more lasting than that of its clientele is unquestionable; that the press was able to sustain Rebel morale for a time by its efforts is conjecture, but it seems probable.

IV. The ! ro Slaves of Georgia and the Carolinas.

The Negro slave story is largely told by their Rebel masters and Federal saviors. Even when a slave account was attributed to the Negro chattels, it was most often recorded by white Southerners or Northerners, who by selective questioning and editing could influence the contents of the report, making it as much white as it was black. The Confederates had a vested interest in slavery, and the Yankee
soldiers and politicians by 1864 were committed to the institution's demise; their accounts too often reflect their prejudice on the issue. With the nature of the record and the relative scarcity of preserved slave responses, it is little wonder that the historian finds it difficult to assemble enough credible evidence to relate and assess the situation. As a result, the reconstruction of slave reaction to the Federal invasion of Georgia and the Carolinas is considerably less complex and less comprehensive than evaluations of other segments of the civilian population.

As far as the white Confederates and Yankees were concerned the Negro slave had two alternatives during the Union invasion: he could affirm his loyalty to his owner or he could claim his freedom, abandoning his master and former life as a chattel. The latter reaction predominated, or at least was more often and more fervently reported.

In the records there are reports of slave support to their white masters during the enemy approach to and occupation of an area. While there was ample incentive to become unruly with the emancipating invaders nearby, some slaves remained unaffected, conducting themselves as they always had, and in some instances duly providing assistance to help their owners prepare for the enemy. Negroes kept one Georgia plantation matron informed of the movement of the Federals, and one of her slaves alerted not only civilian residents to the proximity of the enemy but also a Rebel cavalry command, which apparently acted on the information. During January 1865 at the family plantation in
South Carolina, Mary Boykin Chesnut observed that "not by one word or look do these slaves show that they know Sherman and freedom is at hand. They are more obedient and more considerate than ever, to me." When her property was threatened, Mrs. Chesnut trusted her diamonds to a slave to safeguard. The jewels were successfully preserved by the Negro for about a week, and once the danger had passed, they were returned to her mistress as if this were merely a normal part of a day's work. Following the movement of the enemy through Mrs. Chesnut's state, she found no change in the Negroes.

If the slaves did not continue to work as usual and became disoriented in habits during the period of enemy approach and occupation, it was not always due to the black desire to strike a blow at the institution of slavery or their masters. Fear of the Union soldiers was just as great among some slaves as it was among their white masters. While anticipating arrival of Federal troops, chattels cried with fear and frustration and sought the comfort of those who had always been their guardians—their white masters. As the free civilians sought escape from the invaders, so also did the black bondsmen. They crowded into the plantation houses with their owners or feigned sickness in the slave huts to avoid complying with or even confronting the Yankee soldiers. Slaves with such responses as these may not only have feared the invader would inflict physical injury on them but also that the Union army would separate them from their revered masters and their accepted way of life as a slave. Not unexpectedly, correspondent Conyngham, who was a significant Yankee
observer of the Atlanta, Savannah, and Carolinas campaigns, reported that some slaves, even when threatened with death by the invaders, refused to betray their masters. Loyalty was more important than one's own welfare or was equated with one's own welfare, among some chattels.

For many Southerners the most important manifestation of loyalty was the slaves' refusal to abandon his owner and to accept the freedom which the Federals broadcast along with their devastation throughout an invaded area during the last years of the war. This act of fidelity was sometimes difficult because the Federal soldiers often insisted that slaves leave their masters or at least refuse to continue in a chattel relationship to any white Southerner. Despite Union influences some slaves continued to consider and conduct themselves as slaves. Even after the emancipation of the Negroes was accepted as an accomplished fact in areas of the South, freedmen acknowledged their loyalty to their former owners by voluntarily following their directions, including the carrying out of tasks much as they had prior to the arrival of the Federal invaders.

While such reactions of the bonded black civilians were not the most frequently reported form of behavior, they were common enough to have been recorded by Federals as well as Confederates. There is no way to determine the number of slaves remaining loyal. One South Carolina newspaper estimated that only one out of fifteen slaves sought freedom by leaving their owners. During the Atlanta Campaign a Rebel soldier noted that a majority of the chattels stayed with their
masters. Both assessments are incorrect, the first probably an intentional distortion and the second an honest miscalculation. Inaccuracies abound in Union reports. Desiring to show the Negroes' propensity for freedom, Federals erred in exaggerating the number of slaves who fidelity was shifted from their masters to the Union troops as the advance columns reached them. One must be satisfied with the generalization that only a minority of the slaves in the path of Sherman's trek through Georgia and the Carolinas continued faithfully and subserviently to serve their owners.

While black expressions of fidelity to their masters were in the minority, some loyal behavior was truly exceptional. Confederate soldier Wallace Comer wrote his mother from Kenesaw Mountain that Burwell, his personal slave, had borrowed several guns "to kill one yankee before the war ended. . . ." This was a case of like master, like slave. The Courier reported with obvious relish the escape of three Negroes from the Yankees around Nashville and their precipitous flight home. Reputedly, they did not care for the Federal freedom, making their departure "on the first favorable opportunity. . . ."

If this Courier story is correct, the escapees were exceptional in that they went to great lengths to return home. Besides these manifestations of hostility and repulsion to the enemy, slaves intervened with the Federals on behalf of the free civilians in Georgia and the Carolinas. An elderly South Carolinian who left home to administer to a sick slave encountered a Federal force on his journey. He was ordered to be executed by a firing squad, but before the order was
carried out, the sick slave whom he had gone to visit along with other slaves requested his release, arguing that he was not their owner nor the owner of the plantation and, furthermore, that they thought highly of him. Only infrequently did slaves make direct appeals to the enemy in the behalf of white civilians.

Most records report that Negro slaves rejected the slave system and embraced freedom as the Federal invaders traveled across Georgia and the Carolinas. The bondsmen initially became restless and refused to work on the approach of the Union forces, apparently in anticipation of the promised status of freedom. Southern whites' attempts to frighten the blacks with manufactured stories of Yankee cruelty to the slaves did not deter many in their quest for liberty. Less than a week following the fall of Atlanta the Telegraph reported that Macon was "overflowing with negroes," most of whom were without passes and unaccompanied by their owners. These slaves conducted "themselves generally as if they were free people." Most chattels acted individually in preparing themselves for freedom. Some, however, acted in concert. In Laurensburg, South Carolina, Negroes conspired to force their way through to the Federal lines and freedom but were detected by the home guard, which executed twenty-five of the conspirators.

Many slaves were successful in escaping to the Federal forces, but daring action was not necessary for most, as the invaders made contact with numerous blacks in their forays through the Southland, pressing freedom upon them regardless of the slaves' or masters' disposition. During the Atlanta, Savannah, and Carolinas campaigns,
Conyingham witnessed "crowds" of Negroes joining the Union army. The slaves were ecstatic: "'Glory be to de Lord; bress de Lord, the day of jubilou is come; dis nigger is off to glory'. . . ." With that and similar exclamations the human contraband cast their fate with the invaders, not knowing what freedom meant or demanded. The freedmen believed that food, clothing, and idleness were component parts of liberty, that their new status had truly brought a new day. "They found that it meant hardship, hunger, and cold; for many of them perished along the way from fatigue and the hardship of the march."
The musing of a Federal soldier as he observed the Negro contraband near the end of the war is revealing. "It is Sad & yet encouraging to see the hope in their countenances & their perfect trust in us. What is to become of this Race of uneducated, hopeful, anxious people[?] What a change has the war bro't about!" Viewing the entire Confederacy historian Bell Irvin Wiley concluded that the presence of Federal forces often induced the majority of the slaves within range to flee to freedom. Investigation of sources indicates that chattel re-131

The sting of war was felt in full force by those Southerners who lost cherished slave property to the emancipating Union army, but Negro repudiation of bondage did not stop with the opting for freedom. The bitter memory of their past caused some to betray their masters to the enemy. The hiding places of Rebels and their property were disclosed by Negroes wishing to strike at white Southerners and to propitiate the invaders. The blacks were not as docile by nature
as some had thought. In addition to abandoning and betraying their former masters, the slaves took advantage of the confusion surrounding the invasion by participating with a vengeful enthusiasm in the appropriation of free civilian property. A Federal soldier recorded the possession of alcohol, clothing, chinaware, and "other articles" by the blacks of Columbia. They also had access to large quantities of tobacco, a "good deal" of which was shared with the occupying army. On a South Carolina plantation the overseer was locked in the house by the slaves so as not to interrupt the plundering. When the owner's wife and daughter attempted to investigate the deterioration of order on one plantation, they were surrounded by their Negroes, displaying agricultural implements, guns, and wooden sticks while they chanted verses, among which was:

"I free, I free,
I free as a frog,
I free till I fool,
Glory Alleluia."

They were free by exclamation and actions, as the support the Negroes extended to the Federals indicated. Jubilant freedmen provided information on their locale, acted as guides and scouts, played the role of the spy, worked as personal servants and procurers, encouraged the conquerors with praise, and aided their new sovereigns in every way possible.

Some slave conduct in welcoming the Federals and rejecting their condition of servitude was exceptional. Along the Savannah
River a Union soldier seeking information concerning fords was told by a Negro he could point them out better than he could instruct. When the soldier remonstrated, fearing he would be shot by Confederates, the black declared: "Oh! no, Massa, you go down dar, wid that coat,—day neber shoot" This Negro believed the Yankee soldiers were as imposing to the Rebel soldiers as they were to the black chattels. The spell the Union soldiers inadvertently cast over the slaves was strong. A few reports noted how parents callously deserted children and children their aged parents to follow the Federal force. Unusual, too, was the reaction of the Haynsworth slaves, who purposely sought to hurt their master and his daughter by circulating a fictitious story of their owner's son's death at the hands of the invaders. The lie was so convincing that the father and sister accepted it until learning from more reliable sources that he was hiding in the woods. Somewhat less vindictive behavior, but a subtle reminder to the white Southerner of the arrival of justice, was Dan's parting with his masters; after making a polite bow, he asserted: "I now bid adieu to you and slavery. . . ." Most slaves left their owners without an adieu for freedom.

As the Union troopers marched across Georgia and the Carolinas, many Negro slaves were faced for the first time in their lives with a selection of alternatives which would seriously affect their future. They had to make a decision, doubtless based on contradictory and spurious information, whether to stay as slaves or try the new status of freedmen. A multitude of considerations must have influenced their
choice: their relationship with their masters; the proximity of Federal forces to them; the nature of information concerning the changing conditions, particularly freedom; the actions of respected fellow slaves. The list could be continued almost indefinitely, and these considerations made a final determination of action difficult. Nevertheless, it may be concluded that the Union incursions through Georgia and the Carolinas with the concomitant black reactions dealt the institution of slavery such a blow that, had the institution not subsequently been destroyed by legal action, it is unlikely it could ever have returned to its preinvasion form. Where the blacks did not themselves demonstrate the vulnerability of the white Southerners, the Union soldiers did. If the position of the master class could be successfully challenged, slavery as an authoritarian institution was fatally weakened, and this was a result of the Federal invasion of Georgia and the Carolinas.

V. The Free Civilian Outside the Invaded States

One historical school maintains the Confederacy died of states' rights. The reactions of the free Confederate civilians living outside the states of Georgia and the Carolinas to the Union invasion of this large area almost died a similar death as little interest was demonstrated among this group for the Confederate Southeast. Removed from the immediate threat of Sherman's soldiers and often faced by other Federal challenges, Rebels frequently ignored or gave scanty consideration in their diaries, letters, and various written records
to the Atlanta, Savannah, and Carolinas campaigns. Attention was principally directed to their immediate locale. Nevertheless, a few extant accounts reveal frustration with the currency and nature of information regarding the invasion and attention to God, foreign intervention, and the probabilities of peace. They also disclose feelings for the Yankee invaders, proposed plans to counter the Sherman invasion, and the effect of the campaigns on the writers' morale.

Across the southern tier of Confederate states from Texas to Georgia, Rebel civilians complained of the dearth of information concerning developments in Georgia and the Carolinas during the last year of the war. From East Texas a young lady was without reliable news for a month following the Union occupation of Savannah. Sarah Lois Wadley of the Monroe, Louisiana area observed two weeks after the fall of Atlanta: "Every body that comes from the east side of the river are in fine spirits, they have not our inaction to depress them." While her assessment of the Confederates to the east of the Mississippi River is not correct, her confession of depressing inaction was shared by other Rebel civilians, and it is evident from her diary that this inaction was as much related to the scarcity of information as to any other cause. Only a month into the Atlanta Campaign a Mississippi minister, Samuel Andrew Agnew, experienced a "dearth of news," and later wrote of the anxiety of the people to hear the news, the existence of only a few unworthy reports, and an absence of information. From the neighboring state of Alabama Margaret Espey penned a letter to her brother in the Army of Tennessee during the Confederate defense of
Atlanta. While admitting that she "always delighted in quietness," she confessed that "the stillness for a few weeks after the retreat [Army of Tennessee withdrawal from Dalton to Atlanta] was distressing not a word was to be heard of the result of the movement of the army save the supposition of people. . . ."

The reliability of the information possessed by the Confederate civilian ran the gamut from the impeccable to the spurious and was often a combination of both. Seventy-year-old Tennessean Nimrod Porter revealed unusually dependable sources when he recorded on November 12 that "Atlanta is reported burned up & Shearm [Sherman] coming North & reported he is going South through Georgia." The Gate City was burned; Sherman did direct Union generals Thomas and Schofield with their commands northwestward to keep General Hood and the Army of Tennessee under control; and, the Federal movement in the Savannah Campaign was southeastward through Georgia. On all three points Porter was generally correct, and on the last one he demonstrated uncanny prescience. The June 5 diary entry of the Mississippi minister Agnew is replete with indignation. "We have been most egregiously hoaxed about Johnston. The battle of Kingston, the retreat of Sherman, the pursuit of Johnston, and the reoccupation of Dalton were all lies. Sherman has not retreated--there has been no really general engagement. Johnston's army is in the neighborhood of Atlanta." Agnew's earlier intelligence was patently false, and the receipt of correct information brought bad news and his disgust.
Confederates often trapped themselves by mingling their longings for Rebel victories over the invaders with the dearth and confusion of information. The result was frequently a depressing denouement such as that experienced by Agnew. In two entries for the week preceding his receipt of reliable news, Agnew recorded conflicting information regarding the position of the Army of Tennessee. "Johnston is compelled to fall back to prevent being flanked, [and] Johnston is driving Sherman back." His June 5 diary notation declaring the perpetration of an egregious hozx suggests that the Rebel minister had forgotten what he had written in his diary only a week earlier--Sherman was forcing Johnston into a retreat to avoid being flanked. What he remembered were the bits of good news which had the Army of Tennessee pushing the enemy back, and this was his orientation when he abruptly became aware of the contradicting facts on June 5. Also illustrating the extent to which wishful thinking could influence the misconstruction of news is a young lady residing west of the Mississippi River. On May 1, 1865, Miss Wadley still believed there was some hope for the Southland. A Confederate lieutenant had told her that General Lee had surrendered only himself and 4,000 men. The rest of his Army of Northern Virginia made their way to Johnston, who faced Sherman and won a "decisive victory," taking more than 8,000 prisoners and seventy cannon. Nearly two weeks elapsed before this Louisianian was shaken from the fantasy. The mind often obliged the Rebels' desperate need for good news.
The distinction between incorrect information, fantasies, and rumors cannot always be made. One can lead to and reinforce the other, and certainly the conditions in the Confederacy were conducive to the spread of all three. The prevalence of spurious intelligence and conjured developments has been discussed. The paucity of information and the Rebel desire to be informed led to the propagation of rumors to fill the information void, and civilians very often recognized certain pieces of news as being nothing but rumor. Six days following the Union occupation of Atlanta, Miss Espey of Alabama wrote that "we hear a great many rumors of victory to our arms & among so many I hope there is some reality." In Louisiana Miss Wadley heard rumors during the Savannah Campaign that Sherman was "terribly" defeated at Millen, Georgia. From East Texas at the end of January 1865, Miss Kate Stone recorded that rumors placed Johnston again in command of the Army of Tennessee--"a rumor that gives general satisfaction. The very air is rife with rumors but nothing reliable. The favorite is that the Confederacy will certainly be recognized by all foreign powers immediately after the fourth of March, and we may look for a speedy peace with much more to the same. But we have been exalted and depressed by these rumors too often to let them weigh with us now." While the rumored information may have been accepted skeptically, it is significant that it rarely contained bad news but instead bore tidings of longed-for developments which had eluded the Confederacy. The distinction between rumor and fantasy was indistinguishable at times.
Free civilians of the invaded states encountered frustration with the nature and scarcity of information, but not to the extent that the Confederate civilians living outside of Georgia and the Carolinas. As expected in view of the breakdown of the physical means of conveying information, indications are that there were less credible intelligence available, more incorrect accounts, and much more rumor in the areas outside the invaded states.

In giving consideration to the hoped-for intervention of God and foreign nations and the arrival of peace there is no discernible difference between those civilians living inside and those outside of the Empire, Palmetto, and Tarheel states. Teenager Myra Inman of East Tennessee found the Civil War "distressing" during the third week of July and wondered "how long before God in his kindness permits us to cease from fighting or even restores our friends to us." Earlier Miss Inman was more of a partisan advocate for the Confederacy as she sought God's aid for the Rebel soldiers. In Virginia Mrs. Judith Brokenbrough McGuire lamented that Christmas day 1864 was a sad one but rejoiced that church services "were sweet and comforting." Mrs. McGuire's diary entry reveals she sought comfort at least in part because of Sherman's successful campaigns. Rebel war clerk John Beauchamp Jones noted that his daughter prayed upon hearing of the fall of Columbia and the evacuation of Charleston. These Confederate civilians removed from the scene of the Atlanta, Savannah, and Carolinas campaigns turned to God for support and consolation for themselves and their country.
Since the supplications to the Christian god did not reverse the direction of Sherman's legions, free civilians outside the invaded states entertained the thought of foreign intervention on the Confederate side or, at least, in behalf of peace. Samuel Andrew Agnew heard talk of England, France, Spain, and Italy insisting on peace and, if it was not forthcoming, giving aid to the Confederacy. Mr. Porter of Tennessee believed there had been "some attempt to negotiate a piece" without success toward the end of March 1865, and consequently the Confederacy turned to "Europe & France" to effect a "settlement of our difficulties." A substantial portion of the references to peace and foreign intervention was interrelated, but all of it reflected the frustrated desire of Confederates to stem the tide of Union victories.

The Confederate civilians residing beyond the bounds of Georgia and the Carolinas did not come in contact with Sherman's soldiers during the campaigns in those states, and unfettered by personal experience, they gave their imaginations free play. The result was an offensive characterization of the enemy which was seldom compromised. The Yankee was unfeeling, relentless, inhuman, barbarous, hatefully boastful and proud, a vandal, and a hardhearted wretch. Confederate nurse Kate Cumming reported a conversation in March of the last year of the war in which Sherman's "barbarities" and "outrages" were discussed. The enemies were not Christians, rather they were only pretenders. They were taught by Ward Beecher, "who has made God's house a den of thieves, and polluted the holy sanctuary with his impious ravings. How can these people ever expect us to forget these
fearful wrongs? How hard it is for us to feel any thing but the most deadly hate toward our foe. . . ." Where feelings were expressed, the Confederates outside the confines of Georgia and the Carolinas manifested "the most deadly hate" for the Federals involved in the Atlanta, Savannah, and Carolinas campaigns. They had no opportunity to meet the enemy and get to know him on an individual basis; they could only base their feelings on the reputed actions of the entire Federal command in Georgia and the Carolinas—actions which misrepresented the conduct of many Union soldiers.

Some Confederate civilians proposed measures to counter the Federal invasion. The removal of General Johnston from the command of the Army of Tennessee, his subsequent reappointment, and General Hood's tenure as commander of this major Confederate army received the opinionated attention of this group. Although most disliked Johnston's retrograde movements during the Atlanta Campaign, they disagreed with his dismissal and urged his reinstatement, especially after General Hood evacuated Atlanta and brought the Army of Tennessee to grief in Tennessee. A Florida Rebel addressed President Jefferson Davis after the fall of the Gate City. If Hood were pressed farther back, Sherman could release the 40,000 prisoners at Andersonville, Georgia who could take possession of the southeastern Confederate states and recruit the "large Negro population" for the Federal army. "In a word, it would result in the ruin of Our cause. . . . But One plan promising certain success accrue to me." General Robert E. Lee was to be sent to "annihilate" Sherman. Richmond was to be held by Confederate
general officers Ewell, Early, or Longstreet. If Sherman and his command were not destroyed, it was "apparent, that the loss of our principal remaining provision states, is the loss of our cause..." Other Confederates found Sherman's incursions more of a personal challenge. West of the Mississippi River Miss Wadley became excited when she thought of all the Georgians in arms opposing Sherman's "March to the Sea." "How I wish I were a man and in Georgia, how I wish I were there anyway, to know what they are doing, to rejoice with our noble Georgians, and with all the brave soldiers who are there fighting for us..." But, the deluded young Louisianian had second thoughts as she admitted that it was, perhaps, merciful that she was not a part of the action in the Empire State.

Outside of Georgia and the Carolinas the fluctuations of citizen morale as influenced by the Sherman invasion were very similar to those of the inhabitants of the invaded states. The loss of Atlanta to the enemy was a blow, but it was rationalized whenever possible. The Federal occupation of Savannah and the relatively unchallenged Federal movement through South Carolina and into North Carolina destroyed the civilians' will to resist. After the fall of the Gate City, Agnew of Mississippi believed that "nothing short of a miraculous interposition of Providence can save the Confederacy now. If we could not hold Atlanta I do not see what hope there is of being able to hold another point." On hearing of the Union capture of Savannah he averred that the "general feeling" was that the Confederacy would soon be at the mercy of Yankee rule. By the middle of April
the Mississippi minister believed the Confederacy was "dead." Soldiers and civilians were "whipped"; but "God reigns." In Louisiana Miss Wadley hoped a traveler's estimate that the fall of Atlanta was not a "very serious loss" and that peace was in sight was correct. She and her acquaintances experienced some depression. A more determined Rebel than most, it was not until the second week of May that she finally conceded: "Oh, it is all gone, I am compelled to see it, we are subjugated."

Demonstrative Mary Boykin Chesnut saw no hope when Atlanta fell but promised to try to avoid fear. With several weeks' perspective at the end of September, she was convinced "the end had come. . . . We are going to be wiped off the face of the earth." It was "as if all were dead within me, forever." When she prematurely announced the Federal capture of Savannah, Mrs. Chesnut expressed the opinion that the country was demoralized. "The deep waters are closing over us; and we in this house are like the outsiders at the time of the Flood."

With Sherman's command pressing toward the Tarheel State she reiterated previous assessments of Confederate possibilities. "There is no help for us now, in God or men." Six weeks later nothing had changed her outlook. "They are too many for us. . . . Blueblack is our horizon."

Other Confederate civilians shared her repugnant conviction that defeat had arrived for the Southland.

Removed from the invaded states, Confederate civilians fought a battle of their own to obtain information on the developments in Georgia and the Carolinas. This spawned the dissemination of inaccurate
information and wild rumors, which were often colored by the desire for word of Rebel victories. Their isolation did not preclude interest in God, foreign nations, and peace, and neither did it inhibit their expressions of animosity for the Yankee or their opinions concerning the Rebel management of the campaigns. Their morale was gradually undermined by developments in Georgia and the Carolinas during the last year of the Civil War just as was that of their civilian counterparts in the invaded states.
FOOTNOTES

1
Robert Manson Myers, ed., The Children of Pride: A True Story of Georgia and the Civil War, 16-21 and 1575-76; Mary Sharpe Jones and Mary Jones Mallard, Yankees A'Coming: One Month's Experience During the Invasion of Liberty County, Georgia, 1864-1865, ed., Haskell Monroe, 17-24.

2

3
Ibid., 1173-91.

4
Ibid.

5
Ibid., 1190-1213.

6
Jones and Mallard, Yankees A'Coming, 33-84; Myers, The Children of Pride, 1220-48. Note: Where differences of editorial procedures were found the former work edited by Monroe was followed.

7
Jones and Mallard, Yankees A'Coming, 36, 37, 46, 61, and 62; Myers, The Children of Pride, 1221-22, 1227-28, and 1236-37.

8
Jones and Mallard, Yankees A'Coming, 36, 40, 44, 45, 48, and 54; Myers, The Children of Pride, 1221-22, 1224, 1226-27.

9
Jones and Mallard, Yankees A'Coming, 46, 51, 61, and 79; Myers, The Children of Pride, 1227-28, 1230, 1236, and 1246.

10
Jones and Mallard, Yankees A'Coming, 51, 61, and 76; Myers, The Children of Pride, 1230, 1236, and 1244.

11

Albert Quincy Porter Diary, June 23, 1864; William King Diary (Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina Library), July 2, 1864; Official Records, Ser. 1, XXXVIII, Pt. 2; Taylor, Reluctant Rebel, the Secret Diary of Robert Patrick, 169; Conyngham, Sherman's March, 78; Ben Kremer, ed., "Escape from Atlanta: The Huntington Memoir," Civil War History, II (1965), 165-65.

Angle and Miers, Tragic Years, II, 882-83.


Macon Daily Telegraph, September 6, 1864, p. 1; see also Captain John A. Cobb, "Civil War Incidents in Macon," Georgia Historical Quarterly, VII (1923), 282.

Telegraph, November 18, 1864, p. 2.

Ibid., November 21, 1864, p. 2; see also James C. Bonner, ed., The Journal of a Milledgeville Girl, 1861-1867, 60-62.

Connolly, Three Years in the Army of the Cumberland, 314.

S. F. Fleharty, Our Regiment: A History of the 102d Illinois Infantry Volunteers with Sketches of the Atlanta Campaign, the Georgia Raid, and the Campaign of the Carolinas, 112.

Courier, December 14, 1864, p. 1.

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26
Courier, December 31, 1864, p. 1.

27
Edmund Rhett to William Porcher Miles, February 3, 1865, Miles Papers.

28
Courier, January 13, 1865, p. 1; Standard, March 1, 1865, p. 3; David Schenck Diary (Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina Library), February 1865.

29
Courier, January 11, 1865, p. 1.

30
Conyngham, Sherman's March, 126-27, 271, and 78.

31
Mary Elizabeth Massey, Refugee Life in the Confederacy, 15-16, 25, 51, 54, 56, 57, 60, 212, 256-59.

32
Conyngham, Sherman's March, 68; also see Nichols, The Story of the Great March, 77. Nichols and Conyngham noted civilian responses of a specific and general nature throughout the campaigns. Their reports corroborated with other Union and Confederate observations made possible discrimination between the exceptional response and the more characteristic ones. It is for this reason they are so often cited.
33 Nichols, The Story of the Great March, 68.

34 Conyngham, Sherman's March, 97.

35 John Hamilton Cornish Diary (Southern Historical Collection - University of North Carolina Library), November 28, 1864.

36 Schenck Diary, February 1865.


41 Ibid., 235 and 284-85; see also ____, "Letters to William Tecumseh Sherman," North Carolina Historical Review, XVIII (1941), 390; Jones, When Sherman Came, 14 and 300.

42 Connolly, Three Years in the Army of the Cumberland, 279; Hitchcock, Marching with Sherman, 96; Jones, When Sherman Came, 15, 39, 42-43, 56, 173, 184, 235, 245.


44 Hitchcock, Marching with Sherman, 61, 81, and 125; Nichols, The Story of the Great March, 67.


46 Roth, Well Mary, Civil War Letters of a Wisconsin Volunteer, 96. It is important to remember in this discussion of desertion that just because an individual advocated Unionist sentiments this did not make him in the legal sense any less a Confederate citizen.
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49
Douglas J. Cater to Cousin Fanny, July 13, 1864, Douglas J. and Rufus Cater Papers; *Telegraph and Confederate*, October 23, 1864, p. 2; LeConte, 'Ware Sherman, 19.

50

51
Randall and Donald, *The Civil War and Reconstruction*, 428.

52
Southern Confederacy, December 14, 1864, p. 2; Johnson Diary, February 22, 1865.

53
*Official Records*, Ser. 4, III, 967-68.

54

55
Mr. Wiley to M. S. Robins, March 20, 1864, Robins Papers.

56

57 Conyngham, Sherman's March, 142; and Connolly, Three Years in the Army of the Cumberland, 238.


59 Taylor, Reluctant Rebel, 182.

60 Conyngham, Sherman's March, 271.


64

King Diary, July 3, 1864.

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68

Conyngham, Sherman's March, 291.

69


70

*Force Papers, April 1865; Johnston Diary, March 12 and 14, 1865; David Dicks to R. P. Dicks, February 28, 1865, Robins Papers; Waring Diary, April 1, 1865.*


Conyngham, Sherman's March, 213 and 234-36.

Southern Confederacy, September 17, 1864, p. 2.

Conyngham, Sherman's March, 260 and 262; The rhetoric of these observations makes them highly suspect, but interestingly, this information brings into question Richard Hofstadter's interpretation of anti-Semitism within the Populist movement [The Age of Reform (1955), 60-81 passim], and supports Norman Pollack's suggestion that anti-Semitism was no more prevalent among Populist than others. ["Hofstadter on Populism: A Critique of 'The Age of Reform,'" Journal of Southern History, XXVI (1961), 478-500]. Yet, the bigotry of the intelligent and well-informed Conyngham enforces Hofstadter's consensus position and refutes Pollack's conflict emphasis.
80

Telegraph, September 8, 1864, p. 2; see also Force Papers, undated entry between March 25 and April 1865; Hitchcock, Marching with Sherman, 132-33; John B. Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary, ed., Earl Schenck Miers, 504; Nichols, The Story of the Great March, 149.

81

Kirwan, Johnny Green of the Orphan Brigade, 174; see also Cornish Diary, February 8, 1865; Gordon Diary, April 11, 1865; Hargis, Reminiscences, 3 and 7; Jackson Diary, September 16, 1864; Porter Diary, February 20, March 1, 2, 3, 5, and 9, 1865; Telegraph, June 11, 1864, p. 2; Courier, December 5, 1864, p. 1, and December 9, 1864, p. 1; Andrews, War-Time Journal, 26-27, 51, 55-56, 80, 91, 132-33, and 139-43; Bonner, Journal of a Milledgeville Girl, 65; Candler, "Reminiscences of Life in Georgia," 310; Cumming, Kate: The Journal of a Confederate Nurse, 228, 231, and 240; J. David Griffin, "Benevolence and Malevolence in Confederate Savannah," Georgia Historical Quarterly, XLIX (1965), 354; Hawes, "The Memoirs of Charles H. Olmstead," 55-56; Jones, When Sherman Came, 37, 51-52, 87-88, 102-03, 111, 126, 146-47, 158, 167, 192, 198, 201, 207, 211, 227, 251-52, 264, 271-75, 290, 296, 300, 302, 307, 309-10; LeConte, When the World Ended, 26; LeConte, 'Ware Sherman, 28, 55, 117, 123, 128-35, and 138-39; Leland, "Middleton Correspondence," 101; Sam R. Watkins, "Co. Aytch," Maury Grays First Tennessee Regiment or a Side Show of the Big Show, 139, 173, 192, and 208; Akin, Letters of Warren Akin, 29-30.

82


83

Bryan, Confederate Georgia, 184.

84

Hitchcock, Marching with Sherman, 78.

85

Sherlock Diary, November 21, 1864; Courier, December 5, 1864, p. 1; D. Leib Ambrose, History of the Seventh Regiment, Illinois Volunteer Infantry, from Its First Muster into the U.S. Service, April 25, 1861 to Its Final Muster Out, July 9, 1865, 248-49; Andrews, War-Time Journal, 30-32 and 34-35; Conyngham, Sherman's March, 70 and 341; Fleharty, Our Regiment, 122-23; Hedley, Marching through Georgia, 317-18; Jones, An Artilleryman's Diary, 228; Jones, When Sherman Came, 38; Padgett, "With Sherman through Georgia and the Carolinas," (1949), 53-54; Upson, With Sherman to the Sea, 166-67.

Note: Use of the term guerrilla in contemporary sources is ambiguous.
It referred at various times to irregular activity of Confederate forces or civilian actions. Because civilians were involved at times, it is reported here.

86
Hargis Reminiscences, 1.

87
Southern Confederacy, January 27, 1865, p. 2; Telegraph, August 2, 1864, p. 1; Official Records, Ser. 1, XXXVIII, Pt. 5, 867-68; Ibid., XLIV, 413-17; Battles and Leaders, IV (1956), 335 and 667-68; Kirwan, Johnny Green of the Orphan Brigade, 179-80; Dyer, "Fightin' Joe" Wheeler, 184-85.

88
King Diary, July 3, 6, 8 and 23, 1864.

89
Angle and Miers, Tragic Years, II, 882-83 and 928.

90
Force Papers, December 21, 1864 and a preceding entry entitled, "In Savannah."

91

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93
Leland, "Middleton Correspondence," 105; see also Jones, An Artilleryman's Diary, 264; Elliott Diary, January 8, 1865; Andrews, War-Time Journal, 32-33, 67, 76-77, 131, and 149; Angle and Miers, Tragic Years, II, 929-30; Conyngham, Sherman's March, 219; Gatell, "A Yankee Views the Agony of Savannah," 430; Cumming, Kate: The Journal of a Confederate Nurse, 205; John Chipman Gray, War Letters, 1862-1865, of John Chipman Gray, Major, Judge Advocate, and John

94

Hedley, Marching through Georgia, 340-41 and 350-51; see also for the various nuances of relationships Edmonds Diary, November 16, 17, 18, and 19, 1864; Elliot Diary, January 3 and 24, 1865; Force Papers, July 13, 1864 and December 31, 1864 journal entries and a report from North Carolina preceding the March 25, 1865 letter to Mr. Kebler; Haynsworth Letter, 6; King Diary, July 10, 1864; Nelson Diary, March 13 and 15, 1865; Mary W. Noble to Lelia Montan, November 20, 1864, Noble and Attaway Papers (Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina Library); Sherlock Diary, January 8 and 13, 1865 and February 8, 1865; Waring Diary, April 1, 1865; Southern Confederacy, January 20, 1865, p. 1; Telegraph, September 8, 1864, p. 2; Official Records, Ser. 1, XLVII, Pt. 1, 198-99 and 493; Ibid., XLIV, 827-28; Ambrose, History of the Seventh Regiment, 247; T. Conn Bryan, "The Churches in Georgia during the Civil War," Georgia Historical Quarterly, XXXIII (1949), 297-98; Charles Carleton Coffin, Four Years of Fighting: A Volume of Personal Observation with the Army and Navy from the First Battle of Bull Run to the Fall of Richmond, 406; Henry Steele Commager, ed., The Blue and the Gray: The Story of the Civil War as Told by Participants, II, 967-68; Connolly, Three Years in the Army of the Cumberland, 272, 281, 297-98, 307-09, 320, 322, and 375; Conyngham, Sherman's March, 88, 143-44, 293-96, 319-20, and 328; Eaton, "Diary of an Officer in Sherman's Army," p. 248; Fleharty, Our Regiment, 155; Garrett, "Civilian Life in Atlanta," 33; Hedley, Marching through Georgia, 271 and 337; Hitchcock, Marching with Sherman, 61, 153, and 198-200; Battles and Leaders, IV, 683; Jones, An Artilleryman's Diary, 225 and 235; Jones, When Sherman Came, 86-87, 89, 91-92, 100-01, 103-04, 199, 203-06, 233, 255, 260-61, 268-69, 274, and 295-96; LeConte, 'Ware Sherman, 120-21; Lord, "In the Path of Sherman," 446; Charles Peter Mallett, "Diaries and Letters, 'I Feel Conquered but Not Subdued,'" Civil War Times, II (1961), 15; Nonnett, "'The Awfullest Time I Ever Seen': A Letter from Sherman's Army," 285-87; Nichols, Story of the Great March, 208-09; Perkerson, "A Civil War Letter," 258-59; Robertson, "The Diary of Dolly Lunt Burge," 372; Sherman, Memoirs, II, 137-38, 180-81 and 234-37; Upson, With Sherman to the Sea, 153-54 and 162; Wakelyn, "Charleston: A City in Rebellion," 160; Wills, Army Life of an Illinois Soldier, 350.
Mary W. Noble to M. Lelia Montan, November 20, 1864, Noble and Attaway Papers.

Candler, Confederate Records of the State of Georgia, II, 812.


Nichols, Story of the Great March, 26; see also Schenck Diary, September 1864.


Angle and Miers, Tragic Years, II, 886-87; see also Padgett, "With Sherman through Georgia and the Carolinas," (1948), 314-15.

Conyngham, Sherman's March, 213, 224-25, and 234; see also Telegraph and Confederate, October 12, 1864, p. 2; Official Records, Ser. 1, XXXIX, Pt. 2, 481; Garrett, "Civilian Life In Atlanta," 30-31.


Cornish Diary, November 28, 1864; Grimball Diary, January 15 and February 19, 1865; King Diary, July 24, 1864; Courier, December 27, 1864, p. 1; Andrews, War-Time Journal, 63, 70-71, 116-17, and 143-46; Beaty, "Recollections of Harriet DuRouse Kershaw Lang," 201; Berger, "Sherman's Occupation of Savannah," 114; Bonner, Journal of a Milledgeville Girl, 52, 61, and 66; Cumming, Kate: The Journal of a Confederate Nurse, 245; Jones, When Sherman Came, 24-25, 38, 46, 61, 68, 82, 105, and 229; LeConte, When the World Ended, 13, 16, 22, 24, 30, 60, 71, 74-75, 78-79, 84, and 97; LeConte, Ware Sherman, 14;

104  
Schenck Diary, March 16, 1865; Bonner, Journal of a Milledgeville Girl, 73-74; LeConte, When the World Ended, 19, 21, 95, and 97; Nichols, Story of the Great March, 22.

105  
Eliza M [?] Smith to William Porcher Miles, December 21, 1864, Miles Papers; Schenck Diary, September 1864, December 12, 1864, and February 1865; King Diary, July 22 and 24, 1864; Courier, December 5, 1864, p. 1; Bonner, Journal of a Milledgeville Girl, 64; Bryan, "The Churches in Georgia," 298; Cumming, Kate: The Journal of a Confederate Nurse, 206; Jones, When Sherman Came, II, 123-24, 153, 180, 184-85, 199, 236, 256, 271, and 306; Robertson, "Diary of Dolly Lunt Burge," 368-69, and 372-74; and Akin, Letters of Warren Akin, 50 and 78.

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108  
Fleharty, Our Regiment, 94-95; Josiah Dexter Cotton to his wife, June 20, 1864, Cotton Papers; Albert Quincy Porter Diary, June 17, 1864; Hargis, Reminiscences, 5; Conyngham, Sherman's March, 81, 122, 143-44, ar 254-58; Roth, Well Mary, 85; Upson, With Sherman to the Sea, 119; Douglas J. Cater to Cousin Fannie, June 10, 1864, Cater Papers; Edmonds Diary, November 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20, 1864; Elliott Diary, January 8, 1865; Force Papers, journal entry preceding July 13, 1864 entry; Mary W. Noble to M. Lelia Montan, November 20, 1864,

109

Official Records, Ser. 4, III, 967.

110

Sumner, "Georgia and the Confederacy, 1865," 97.

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112

Sumner, "Georgia and the Confederacy, 1865," 98-99.

113


114

Ibid., 373-74.

115

Eliza M [?] Smith to William Porcher Miles, December 21, 1864, Miles Papers.

116

Schenck Diary, September 1864 and December 7, 1864.

117

Conyngham, Sherman's March, 218.

118


119

Ibid., 99.
120

Bedford Diary, September 2, 1864; Grimball Diary, September 29 and December 22, 1864 and January 15, 1865; Johnson Diary, March 4, 1865; Schenck Diary, February 1865; Telegraph and Confederate, October 6, 1864, p. 1; Courier, January 11, 1865, p. 1; Andrews, War-Time Journal, 135-36 and 140-41; Barrett, "Sherman and Total War in the Carolinas," 370; Bonner, Journal of a Milledgeville Girl, 63, 69, 70, and 74; Chamberlayne, Ham Chamberlayne, 275; Coffin, Four Years of Fighting, 406; Connolly, Three Years in the Army of the Cumberland, 356; Fleharty, Our Regiment, 167; Gattell, "A Yankee Views the Agony of Savannah," 430; Hitchcock, Marching with Sherman, 207-08, 266, and 300-01; Jones, Rebel War Clerk's Diary, 476; Jones, When Sherman Came, 131, 193-94, 285-86 and 323-24; King, "Fanny Cohen's Journal," 415; Lawrence, A Present for Mr. Lincoln, 154-55; LeConte, When the World Ended, 3-8, 11, 13, 15, 20, 66-68, 76-77, 81, 85 89-90, 96-99, and 103; LeConte, 'Ware Sherman, 22-23; Mallett, "Diaries and Letters," 15; Nichols, Story of the Great March, 74-75, 109, 172, 210, 213, and 292; Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies, Ser. 1, XV, 487; Padgett, "With Sherman through Georgia and the Carolinas," 62; Sherman, Memoirs, II, 137-38; Spencer, The Last Ninety Days of the War, 27-28, 119-20, 210-11, and 235-36; Upson, With Sherman to the Sea, 162; Akin, Letters of Warren Akin, 48, 50, 68, 72, 74, and 84; Bell Irvin Wiley, The Plain People of the Confederacy, 67.

121

See pages 429-542 of Andrews' book. This is a solid contribution to historical literature and the pages cited above should be read to supplement the information and evaluation given in this section. Each is complimentary to the other. Also see Rev. Lea Brantley, Georgia Journalism of the Civil War Period, a briefer, less substantial treatment of the Atlanta and Savannah campaigns.

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The Southern Confederacy was surveyed between May 1, 1864, and February 8, 1865, but there were many issues missing between those dates; the Telegraph (and Confederate), throughout 1864; the Courier, December 5, 1864 to February 21, 1865; and, the Standard, March 1 to April 5, 1865.

123

Atlanta Appeal, May 11, 1864, quoted in the Telegraph, May 13, 1864, p. 1; Southern Confederacy, June 18, 1864, p. 2; Telegraph, July 30, 1864, p. 2 and August 24, 1864, p. 2; Telegraph and Confederate, November 30, 1864, p. 2; Savannah Republican, December 3, 1864, quoted in the Courier, December 5, 1864, p. 1; Courier, December 7, 1864, p. 1; Standard, Ma.Jh 22, 1865, p. 3 and March 29, 1865, p. 3; see also Southern Confederacy, April 23, 1864, p. 1, June 29, 1864, p. 2, July 6, 1864, p. 2, January 20, 1865, p. 2, January 24, 1865, p. 2,
January 26, 1865, p. 2; January 27, 1865, p. 2; February 5, 1865, p. 2; Telegraph, May 14, 1864, p. 1; June 11, 1864, p. 2; June 20, 1864, p. 2; June 23, 1864, p. 2; June 30, 1864, p. 2; July 2, 1864, p. 1; July 9, 1864, p. 2; July 14, 1864, p. 2; August 2, 1864, pp. 1 and 2; August 3, 1864, p. 2; August 8, 1864, p. 2; Telegraph and Confederate, September 21, 1864, p. 2; October 31, 1864, p. 2; November 21, 1864, p. 2; November 25, 1864, p. 2; November 29, 1864, p. 2; Courier, December 6, 1864, p. 1; December 7, 1864, p. 1; December 8, 1864, p. 1; December 9, 1864, p. 1; December 10, 1864, p. 1; December 12, 1864, p. 1; December 13, 1864, p. 1; December 15, 1864, p. 1; December 29, 1864, p. 1; January 3, 1865, p. 1; January 13, 1865, p. 1; February 17, 1865, p. 1; Standard, March 1, 1865, p. 3; March 8, 1865, p. 3; March 15, 1865, p. 1; March 22, 1865, p. 1; Savannah Republican, quoted in the Courier, December 14, 1864, p. 1; Augusta Southern Presbyterian, March 9, 1865, quoted in Barrett, Sherman's March through the Carolinas, pp. 99-100; Soldiers' Friend, June 9, 1864, quoted in Henry T. Malone, "Atlanta Journalism during the Confederacy," Georgia Historical Quarterly, XXXVII (1953), 213-14.

124

Telegraph, May 16, 1864, p. 2; Appeal quoted in the Telegraph, May 28, 1864, p. 2; Telegraph, June 7, 1864, p. 2; Telegraph and Confederate, December 2, 1864, p. 2; Courier, January 23, 1865, pp. 1 and 2; and January 13, 1865, p. 1; see also Southern Confederacy, June 9, 1864, p. 2, and December 15, 1864, p. 1; Telegraph, May 18, 1864, p. 2; May 20, 1864, p. 2; May 21, 1864, p. 2; May 23, 1864, p. 2; May 24, 1864, p. 2; June 3, 1864, p. 2; July 6, 1864, p. 2; August 29, 1864, p. 2; August 31, 1864, p. 2; Telegraph and Confederate, September 21, 1864, p. 2; October 22, 1864, p. 2; November 7, 1864, p. 2; November 12, 1864, p. 2; November 18, 1864, p. 1; December 5, 1864, p. 2; December 10, 1864, p. 1; December 20, 1864, p. 2; December 21, 1864, p. 2; December 28, 1864, p. 2; Courier, December 5, 1864, p. 1; December 7, 1864, p. 1; December 9, 1864, p. 1; December 10, 1864, p. 1; December 14, 1864, p. 1; December 15, 1864, p. 1; December 17, 1864, p. 1; December 27, 1864, p. 1; January 3, 1865, p. 1; January 11, 1865, p. 1; January 24, 1865, p. 1; January 27, 1865, p. 1; January 31, 1865, p. 1; February 17, 1865, p. 1; Hedley, Marching through Georgia, 136, 181 and 317-18.

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Telegraph, September 3, 1864, p. 2; September 6, 1864, p. 1; September 8, 1864, p. 2; September 9, 1864, p. 2; Courier, December 9, 1864, p. 1; Standard, March 1, 1865, p. 1; Asheville News quoted in the Standard, March 1, 1865, pp. 2 and 3; see also Southern Confederacy, September 17, 1864, p. 2; December 14, 1864, p. 1 and 2; January 20, 1865, p. 1; Telegraph, July 14, 1864, p. 2; Telegraph and Confederate, October 12, 1864, p. 2; November 18, 1864, p. 2; November 19, 1864, p. 1; Courier, December 6, 1864, p. 1; December 7, 1864, p. 1,


127 Chesnut, A Diary from Dixie, 468 and 524; Robertson, "Diary of Dolly Lunt Burge," 270-71 and 370-72; Conyghan, Sherman's March, 346-47; see also Beaty, "Recollections of Harriet DuBose Kershaw Lang," 198; Candler, "Reminiscences of Life in Georgia," 307; King, "Fanny Cohen's Journal," 412-13; Kirwan, Johnny Green of the Orphan Brigade, 174; Benjamin Quarles, The Negro in the Civil War, 330; Taylor, Reluctant Rebel, the Secret Diary of Robert Patrick, 169; Upson, With Sherman to the Sea, 153-54; and Wiley, The Plain People of the Confederacy, 83.
128
Agnew Diary, July 18, 1864; Courier, December 17, 1864, p. 1; Chesnut, A Diary from Dixie, 527-28; Kirvan, Johnny Green of the Orphan Brigade, 174; Leland, "Middleton Correspondence," 105; Perkerson, "A Civil War Letter," 261; and Robertson, "Diary of Dolly Lunt Burge," 271 and 370-72.

129
Wallace Comer to Mrs. C. L. Comer, June 14, 1864, Comer Family Paper; Courier, January 24, 1865, p. 1; Henry A. M. Smith, "The Ashley River: Its Seats and Settlements," South Carolina Historical and Genealogical Magazine, XX (1919), 120-21; Bryan, Confederate Georgia, 128-29 and 185; Chesnut, Diary from Dixie, 532; and Wiley, The Plain People of the Confederacy, 83 and 100.

130
Telegraph, September 6, 1864, p. 1; Conyngham, Sherman's March, 82-84, 271, and 355; Nichols, Story of the Great March, 59-60; and Wiley, The Plain People of the Confederacy, 74-76.

131
Conyngham, Sherman's March, 248-49, 253-54, and 290; Moore, "The Last Officer - April 1865," 5; Wiley, The Plain People of the Confederacy, 71; see also Edmonds, Diary, November 20, 1864; Force Papers, entry made in North Carolina prior to March 25, 1865 letter to Mr. Kebler; Haynsworth Letter, 7 and 8; King Diary, July 15, 1864; Mary W. Noble to M. Leila Montan, November 20, 1864, Noble and Attaway Papers; Sherlock, Diary, January 13 and 18, 1865 and February 17, 1865; Courier, January 13, 1865, p. 1; Angle and Miers, Tragic Years, II, 936; Barrett, Sherman's March through the Carolinas, 92-94, and 137-38; Beaty, "Recollections of Harriet DuBose Kershaw Lang," 200-01; Boom, "Testimony of Margaret Ketcham Ward," 388; Brantley, Georgia Journalism, 85; Chesnut, Diary from Dixie, 531; Connolly, Three Years in the Army of the Cumberland, 312-13, 339-40, 362, and 368; Conyngham, Sherman's March, 149, 277, and 327-28; , "An Eye Witness Account of the Occupation of Mt. Pleasant," 12; Fleharty, Our Regiment, 112, 115-16, and 119-20; Hedley, Marching through Georgia, 311-12, and 401-02; Hitchcock, Marching with Sherman, 69-71 and 202-04; Jones, An Artilleryman's Diary, 237; King, "Fanny Cohen's Journal," 411; Leland, "Middleton Correspondence, 1861-1865," 105; Moore, "The Last Officer - April 1865," 3, 7, 10-11, and 13; Nichols, Story of the Great March, 60-61, 71, 155, 195, 236-37, and 252; Perkerson, "A Civil War Letter on the Capture of Atlanta," 261-62; Robertson, "Diary of Dolly Lunt Burge," 374; Upson, With Sherman to the Sea, 136; Wiley, "Southern Reaction to Feder-1 Invasion," 500; and Wills, Army Life of an Illinois Soldier, 351 and 360.
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133
Force Papers, entry following December 31, 1864 journal entry; Chesnut, Diary from Dixie, 531; Courier, January 13, 1865, p. 1; Haynsworth Letter, 9-12; Perkerson, "A Civil War Letter on the Capture of Atlanta," 261.

134
Kate Stone, Brokenburn: The Journal of Kate Stone, 1861-1868, ed. John Q. Anderson, 285, 312-13, 327, 333, and 335; Sarah Luise Wadley Diary (Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina Library), August 11, 1864, September 7 and 19, 1864, December 20, 1864, January 14, 1865, April 16, 1865, and May 1 and 13, 1865; Agnew Diary, May 17, 20, 21, 23, 25, 27, 28, and 30, 1864, June 1, 5, 7, 19, and 21, 1864, July 7, 18, 19, 22, and 25, 1864, August 3, 8, 10, 24, and 25, 1864, September 8 and 14, 1864, October 28, 1864, November 20, 25, and 27, 1864, December 4, 8, 11, 22, and 26, 1864, January 20 and 28, 1865, March 1, 3, 17, 19, and 30, 1865, April 1, 12, 13, 14, 15, 22, 26, and 28, 1865; Margaret Espey to Joseph Espey, July 22 and 23, 1864, August 15, 1864, and September 6, 1864, Espey Papers; Myra Inman Diary (Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina Library), May 3 and 13, 1864, June 9, 1864, August 31, 1864, and October 4, 1864; Nimrod Porter Diary (Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina Library), May 25 and 30, 1864, June 1, 1864, July 25, 26, and 27, 1864, August 3, 1864, September 6, 7, and 17, 1864, November 12 and 22, 1864, March 18 and 27, 1865, and April 29, 1865; and Chesnut, Diary from Dixie, 465 and
488. Note: Mrs. Chesnut is considered a Confederate civilian outside the invaded states because of her Richmond, Virginia residence throughout all but a few months of the war and of her national rather than a restricted state interests.

135
Inman Diary, May 4, 5, 11, and 13, 1864, and July 17, 1864; Judith Brockenbrough McGuire Diary, (Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina Library), December 26, 1864; Nimrod Porter Diary, July 26, 1864, November 22, 1864, and March 27, 1865; Agnew Diary, May 20, 1864, September 8, 1864, December 31, 1864, January 28, 1865, March 19, 1865, and April 12, 14, and 17, 1865; Chesnut, Diary from Dixie, 420, 488, and 491; Cumming, Kate: The Journal of a Confederate Nurse, 260; A Richmond Lady, Richmond during the War, 327; and Stone, Brokenburn: The Journal of Kate Stone, 312-13.

136
Inman, Diary, May 5, 1864; Nimrod Porter Diary, September 17, 1864; Wadley Diary, January 14, 1865, February 3, 1865, and April 16, 1865; Chesnut, Diary from Dixie, 491; and Cumming, Kate: The Journal of a Confederate Nurse, 260.

137
Chesnut, Diary from Dixie, 410, 416, 418, 420-21, 423-24, 427-28, 430, 432, 440, 443, 469-70, 475, 484, 486, 493, and 522; Unsigned letter to President Jefferson Davis, September 8, 1864, Letters Received by the Confederate Secretary of War, 1861-1865 (National Archives, microfilm roll 118); Wadley Diary, December 20, 1864; Agnew Diary, July 25, 1864, August 3, 1864, and October 28, 1864; Inman Diary, May 5 and 11, 1864; Cumming, Kate: The Journal of a Confederate Nurse, 256-57; and Stone, Brokenburn: The Journal of Kate Stone, 312-13.

138
Agnew Diary, June 19, 1864, July 7, 18, 19 and 20, 1864, August 25, 1864, September 8 and 13, 1864, December 31, 1864, January 20, 1865, and April 12, 16, 17, 19, and 22, 1865; Wadley Diary, September 19, 1864, December 20, 1864, January 14, 1865, February 3, 1865, and May 1 and 13, 1865; Chesnut, Diary from Dixie, 411, 425, 430, 434-35, 450, 453-54, 465-66, 470, 472, 479, 488, 509, 511, and 518; Unsigned letter to President Jefferson Davis, September 8, 1864, Letters Received by the Confederate Secretary of War, 1861-1865 (National Archives, microfilm roll 118); A Richmond Lady, Richmond during the War, 327-29 and 339; Taylor, Destruction and Reconstruction, 202-03; McGuire Diary, December 26, 1864; John Cope to his brother, February 15, 1865, Cope Papers; Hagood, Memoirs of the War of Secession, 332; Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary, 501-02; and Stone, Brokenburn: The Journal of Kate Stone, 333.
CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION

I. A Historical Interpretation

What was the effect on the Confederacy of total war in Georgia and the Carolinas from May 1864 to May 1865? Did General Sherman accomplish his stated purpose of demonstrating to the Rebels "that war and individual ruin are synonomous terms?" Was the "hard hand of war" felt by the Southern soldier and civilian, and was the Union commander successful in illustrating "the vulnerability of the South"? Did the results of the Atlanta, Savannah, and Carolinas campaigns sustain the following Shermanian logic? "If the north can march an army right through the south, it is proof positive that the north can prevail in this contest, leaving only open the question of its willingness to use that power. . . . Even with a battle, the results, operating upon the minds of sensible men, would produce fruits more than compensating for the expense, trouble, and risk."

The Confederate command in the Army of Tennessee first felt the impact of Sherman's presence. Dissension among officers developed almost immediately over the consideration of strategy and tactics to meet the Union threat. It did not abate until reasonable alternatives for the Confederacy in Georgia and the Carolinas ceased to exist. General Hood's conduct was only the most notorious example of the adversary relationship among colleagues which was unquestionably
counterproductive for the Army of Tennessee. The pressure of the Union invasion, personal ambition, and pride destroyed the staff cooperation needed to meet the enemy. The querulousness demonstrated by Generals Hood, Wheeler, and Hampton in dealing with their Federal counterparts over minor military considerations is a further indication that they felt the crushing force of the invaders and the inadequacy of Confederate resources for the job at hand. The same might be said for various desperate moves undertaken by officers. Information was manipulated and inflated; "galvanized Yankees" were employed in the trenches; and the felling of trees, planting of torpedoes, and burning of materiel and facilities became the primary tactics to stop the enemy rather than being reinforcing actions. These were inept Confederate command reactions to the Federal invasion, but considering the material with which they had to work, they were about the only feasible ones.

The mental attitude of the rank and file of the Army of Tennessee was considered at least good, and even excellent by some, at the outset of the Atlanta Campaign. Most of the men in uniform at Dalton, Georgia, were confident of their position and sanguine for the Confederate cause. Although many may have discussed and argued among themselves about the proper strategy to use against the numerically superior adversary, there were few in early May 1864 who believed the Confederacy seriously endangered, much less without hope. Hence, a perceptible decline in the confidence of the Rebels without rank in Georgia and the Carolinas might safely be construed as the result of the Federal invasion of those states.
Evidence emanating from the enlisted personnel of the Army of Tennessee proves without a doubt that, while this Confederate army was under the tutelage of General Johnston, most Confederate soldiers stationed in Georgia maintained hope even when the prospects were at low ebb. There was some quality about Joseph E. Johnston which radiated a contagious self-confidence through both the good and bad. It may have been his concern for the lives of his soldiers, as Bell Irvin Wiley noted; it may have been the Fabian policy which he adopted to compensate for the dearth of manpower available in the Confederacy—many believed this strategy was the most prudent in view of the situation; or, it may have been nothing more than his self-composed demeanor which emitted confidence. Regardless of his popularity and success at maintaining the morale of his command in the face of overwhelming odds, he did not in any sense of the word produce the results expected from the Confederate capital, and he was removed.

Almost as the Gregorian calendar is dated from the birth of Christ, the decline of the esprit de corps of the Rebels without rank can be measured from one day—July 18, 1864, the day on which Hood superseded Johnston as commanding general of the Army of Tennessee. The Confederate soldiers did not like the way in which Hood moved aggressively to the offensive against the substantial numerical superiority held by the enemy and a Union commander who knew well how to use such an advantage. When Sherman emerged victorious following the three battles of Peachtree Creek, Atlanta, and Ezra Church between July 19 and 28, the common soldiers became particularly disillusioned,
for Hood's strategy was costing many lives, and it was no more successful, to many even less so, than Johnston's defensive tactics had been. Then after Atlanta was lost, Hood marched into Tennessee to two staggering defeats, which so emasculated the Army of Tennessee that few survivors recovered to fight again.

The men who composed the small remnants of Rebel commands brought together in an effort to stop Sherman's Savannah and Carolinas campaigns realized the futility of their assignment. They knew that without help from other quarters Confederate opposition would only be nominal, and when it became apparent that the Southland was just as hard-pressed in other areas and that no reinforcements of significance would be forthcoming, the Rebels without rank fought only for an honorable peace which the Confederate combatants hoped would arrive with all dispatch.

The Confederate military outside Georgia and the Carolinas, whether officers or common soldiers, eagerly sought information concerning military developments in the Southeast. Suggestions to the Rebel military and civilians in the invaded states were made to counter Sherman's soldiers, but as the Yankees accumulated victories and seized territory, the futility of Confederate fortunes was obvious, not only in the Empire, Palmetto, and Tarheel states, but for the Southland. Sherman's successes were enough to make the entire Confederate military despair, a despair which appeared in the late summer of 1864 when the Gate City was lost and which became more encompassing until the end of the war.
The free civilians of the invaded states registered frustration, confusion, and fear as they reacted to the enemy invasion. They hid possessions, were reluctant to destroy property as Confederate policy ordered, and turned, at times, to the enemy for protection of person and goods. The association with the enemy effected a new outlook toward the Federals, which in a considerable number of cases produced a diminution of fear and hostility. The confusion of the invasion brought out the true character of many civilians as they seized the opportunity to profiteer, plunder, and share. Few residents in the path of Sherman's legions were left unaffected; most found that the Union presence changed their lives in one way or another, and many believed the change was for the worse. They sought the intervention of God and foreign nations to overcome the Federal preponderance. But, neither came, and their morale slipped, as did that of the Confederate military—dropping following the loss of Atlanta, sinking further after the fall of Savannah, and disappearing as a result of the Carolinas Campaign. The civilians outside the invaded states fought to obtain news and decipher rumors relating to the Confederate Southeast. Buoyed by the belief that God and foreign powers would not abandon the Southland and by numerous other fantasies, these Confederate civilians, nevertheless, lost their confidence, much as did the inhabitants of Georgia and the Carolinas.

Found throughout the search for Confederate reaction to the Federal invasion of Georgia and the Carolinas were exceptions to the norm of both the military and civilian behavior. The two largest
groups which deviated from the usual responses were the slaves and the newspapers of the invaded states. The black bondsmen in a majority of cases exercised their option to join the Federals to obtain their freedom. The chattels had, of course, much to gain and little to lose from the invaders, as they understood the situation. Such was the disruption of the institution of slavery by the invasion that it is unlikely that the Negroes could have ever been restored to their former position of servitude even if it had not been ended by law. Chattel slavery depended too greatly upon the preeminence of the master class, and the Federal soldiers as well as the Negro proved to all the vulnerability of Southern whites. Slavery as it existed before the Civil War and the Sherman invasion was dead, and the enslaved black contributed to its destruction. The newspapers proved to be the self-appointed moral backbone of the Confederacy, disseminating information which encouraged and cajoled the Rebels to persevere for their cause. They fought the good fight as did the military and lost. The papers also demonstrated that much Confederate economic activity went on unaffected by the invasion and the war. Still, the news sheets and the economy ended as did most other things in reach of Sherman's soldiers--changed; Union occupation of an area brought Yankee control to both, or if the Federals were only moving through, they destroyed property disrupting the economy and printing establishments.

Reinforced by Grant's Army of the Potomac, the results of Sherman's campaigns during the last year of the war were numerous, but their impact on the Rebel was singular: Confederate defeat.
The invincibility of Sherman and his command with the support of the resources of Yankeedom had registered with the Southerner as a hard, excruciating fact, and the majority of the Confederates understood that further resistance could not be prudently pursued, whether for one's country or one's personal honor. The stage was set for the creation of a "Sherman myth," and in the 1870s one began to develop, of which a portion, the invincible Sherman, has some basis in fact in so far as the results of the Atlanta, Savannah, and Carolinas campaigns are cases in point.

II. A Psychological Analysis: The Confederate Military.

On the face of it, the Rebel without rank succumbed to superior enemy power. Southern spirit was worn down by constant Federal pressure. Facing a choice of submission or annihilation, the Confederate fighting man chose the former. Perhaps he reasoned as an author of a recent evaluation of the Confederacy has put it: "Peace would lose its purpose if no one was left to share its joy." The Confederate morale which had sustained prosecution of the war despite the debilitating materiel deficiencies for close to four years collapsed from frustration in 1865. Was it only because of predominance on the battlefield that a Union victory emerged from the bloody encounters? In other words, was the Confederate fighting man convinced during the last year of the war that he must choose between futilely dying for his cause or continuing in this world by submitting to Union demands? Or, was his dilemma not as starkly simple as this? Were there other influences
shaping his decision? Circumstances in 1864 and 1865 indicate that more than Union superiority in battle brought Confederate capitulation, and what psychology tells us about human behavior suggests the possible complexity of factors affecting the morale of the Confederate soldier.

Morale is the state of mind significantly influencing the mental processes that determine the behavior of an individual. "Good morale" in a soldier leads him willingly to accept his position, leadership, and task and to be ready to oppose the enemy by carrying out his particular assignment. "Poor morale" causes a deterioration of his desire to function as expected, and his effectiveness as a soldier ranges from slight to total impairment. Why did the morale of the Rebel warrior slide to the depths, bringing surrender during the last year of the war? Enemy military strength in materiel and men is a basic but, when considered alone, a superficial explanation; Confederate submission is best explained by evaluating the larger Confederate setting during the Rebel drive for independence.

Men carry out military assignments for a multitude of reasons. Intellectual and emotional attitudes variously predispose soldiers toward their jobs. Identification with groups and loyalty to them influence an individual's actions in war. Society's view of aggressive and destructive behavior affects one's outlook, and the simple human drive of seeking victory is a consideration. These factors are most often brought to bear before combat is experienced, but they remain as significant determinants of behavior during conflict. Attachment for and loyalty to a combat group are important ingredients of good
morale, and these develop largely after exposure to battle conditions. Quality of leadership is a principal factor as are the physical well-being of oneself and friends and the extent of combat exposure. How did these considerations affect the Confederate soldier?

The Confederate soldier's intellectual and emotional preparation for the war against the Yankee was good, and at times excellent, throughout most of the conflict, including the last year of the war. This is amply illustrated earlier in this study by the numerous observations of Confederate soldiers who remained consistently hostile toward the enemy down to the time silence settled upon them in the last weeks of the war, the friendly collaboration between Johnny Reb and Billy Yank notwithstanding. Intellectually the Rebel understood he was fighting an enemy that was determined to force a foreign way of life on him. This meant that cherished parts of his Southern culture would be jettisoned if the opponent had his way. Some students of the South have maintained that the Confederates were fighting for their lives, and in various respects this is essentially correct. The right to maintain slaves and to preserve the social order and economic activity slavery made possible was riveted deep into the Southern culture, and undoubtedly was threatened by the North. By the last year of the war there was absolutely no question of enemy intent in regard to slavery and the concomitant changes in the social and economic orders its abolition entailed. Besides, the important thing was that the Confederates believed their civilization was in danger—indeed, in more danger than was actually the case. With this intellectual preparation it did
not take much to strengthen further this outlook. An emotional re-
inforcement came automatically when Rebels concluded that the enemy would
replace their superior Southern culture with a decidedly inferior and
corrupt Northern way of life. And, this would be imposed by force if
necessary. Emotional reactions follow such thinking with little
encouragement. Intellectually and emotionally the Confederate fighting
man was well motivated to defend his cause.

Family circle, community, and nation are a few of the significant
groups with which soldiers identify; each can influence soldiers'
military performance. These groups take demands on the interests and
liberty of individuals, requiring personal sacrifice for the benefit
of the whole. Those contributing to the welfare of the group receive
support and affection in return. From this interaction between the
individual and group there develops a social feeling which, if sufficiently
nurtured, will negate purely personal interests. Thus, the loyalty
and obligation felt to these groups may sustain an individual at such
a distasteful task as making war under disadvantageous conditions.
World War II psychologists Roy R. Grinker and John P. Spiegel have
observed: "The formation of such feelings of obligation and loyalty
to any group with which one is identified is the highest significance
3 to good morale."

There is no question that groups with which the Rebel soldier
identified effectively invoked the moral suasion of Southern society to
generate a high degree of enthusiasm for opposition to the enemy in the
first years of the war. Moreover, Confederate military successes
seemed to justify this socially endorsed martial esprit. But, high morale comes easily with success. Perhaps too easily, for when one views the fourth year of the war which followed on the heels of major Rebel disasters, the Southern families, communities, and nation no longer called so vociferously for the sacrifices of their military defenders. The war had radically changed the focus of concern for many families and communities. With loved ones dead and crippled, with some in enemy held territory, and with others experiencing devastation of property and facing extreme need, pursuance of the Confederate political objective of independence through military victory became for many a luxury they could not afford. More pressing needs of food, clothing, and shelter caused families and communities to turn inward and cease active moral support of the Southern cause. In numerous instances deteriorated local and individual circumstances were behind the cries for personal support which worked to the detriment of the national effort. In such a milieu the Confederate soldier felt less restraint in considering and acting upon his personal feelings as they grew increasingly pessimistic. Too, the Confederate States of America, which had stood so tall and dignified in 1861 declaring to all its position among the nations of the world, found it more and more difficult to convince Rebel soldiers of its viability in the face of no recognition from abroad and of repeated military failure at home.

Soldiers identify with single individuals as well as with groups. A young soldier may idolize his father or a close acquaintance,
and those who have captured the admiration of others can consciously or unconsciously exert a tremendous amount of influence over them. Knowingly, those who have gained an exalted position may successfully exhort an admirer to greater combat efforts; or, unbeknown to an idol, an aspiring soldier may try to equal his mentor's previous martial accomplishments or to fulfill his expressed desires. The many individual identifications went much the same way as did collective associations for the Confederate soldiers; personal rather than group needs gained primacy. In summary, the credibility of those groups and individuals calling for continued sacrifice in the last year of the war was seriously stretched. After 1864 societal sanctions no longer proved as effective as they had been earlier. The more numerous pessimistic expressions of the Rebel soldiers from July 1864 to the conclusion of hostilities, the sharp decline in optimistic appraisals and predictions, and the increasing numbers of deserters support this conclusion.

Upon induction into the army the soldier makes another group attachment which is highly significant in war. Most men identify with their particular military unit. Just as with family, community, and nation, the individual extends his loyalty, makes sacrifices, and receives for himself reinforcement in the form of attention and support from his comrades in arms. Under the strain of war when other identifications weaken and their requests for renewed efforts carry less weight with the soldier, his association and, hence, concern for those who are confronted with the same immediate problems as
himself will sustain a faltering determination; he must do his job and do it well, or else he will be letting down a colleague who might pay for another's dereliction of duty with his life.

The degree to which a soldier feels this camaraderie and acts with disregard of personal considerations varies. One American World War II veteran and professor of philosophy points out that "the impulse to self-sacrifice is an intrinsic element in the association of organized men in pursuit of a dangerous and difficult goal." Many Rebels risked all at times for the benefit of those fighting beside them. However, there is no evidence of a hara-kiri mentality among Southern fighting men, and as the Confederate cause began to disintegrate in 1864, the outlook and efforts of the Confederate soldier grew ever more cautious. The strong individualism of the Confederate, which David Donald notes, must have caused many to ask rhetorically: why needlessly sacrifice my life for a losing proposition or for some enthusiastic "redneck," who has stuck his own head out and now is in trouble? This adds another dimension to the reasons for the desertions which had such a deleterious effect on military-unit identification.

Historians Wilbur Cash, John Hope Franklin, and Frank E. Vandiver have concluded that there existed an exaggerated tendency to violence in Southern society. This observation seems especially appropriate for the period of the Civil War in view of the Southern reaction to their conviction that the North was set on destroying their civilization. In addition to aggressiveness, it is important during war that participants possess the drive to utilize their
resources to the utmost to obtain victory. If the reported opinion that one Confederate could whip ten Yankees was widespread in the South and if the assessments of Rebel fighting ability and spirit at the outset of the war by Bell Irvin Wiley and David Donald are sound, then the desire to turn back the enemy was not lacking in the South. In each respect, an aggressive nature and the desire to obtain victory, the Confederate position was at least equal to that of its opponent, and while recognizing the difficulty of such a subjective measurement, it is thought that the Southerner was better prepared on the whole in these respects than his adversary. But, in the last year of the war reactions emanating from Georgia and the Carolinas indicate that the Rebel was aware that violence is a two-edged sword; the other side was not only capable of perpetrating it but was in much the superior position to do so. This situation tempered the Confederate affinity for violence and the Rebel determination for victory which by then appeared less realistic than it had earlier in the war.

The role of the leader in maintaining a positive frame of mind and obtaining the desired fighting responses from his troopers is crucial. Men judge their superiors harshly, granting no favors unless they are earned; particularly is this so when things are not going well. For the Rebels in Georgia and the Carolinas conditions rarely looked promising, and the commanding generals of the Army of Tennessee, Joseph E. Johnston and John B. Hood, underwent penetrating scrutiny from their men. They were reviewed for their technical military competence, their disposition for command, and their decisions. The evaluations
were never unanimously flattering, and with defeat became sharply critical. Johnston measured up to the demands of most of his troops: he saw that his men were better supplied; his ability to command was widely endorsed; and his decisions were thought judicial. Reports from and of the ranks in the Army of Tennessee clearly indicate a confidence in Joseph E. Johnston. To the same extent that Johnston received positive endorsements, Hood incurred negative appraisals. Although the men conceded Hood's courage, they obviously believed a prudent strategy was more desirable than demonstrations of valor. Hood did not lead, he commanded only indifferent men, a condition for which he was partly to blame and for which the crumbling state of the Confederacy was also responsible; nevertheless, he did not in any respect rise to the occasion. And, the Confederates reflected their disillusionment.

The health of an individual and the length of time spent on the front fighting the enemy also affect a soldier's willingness for continued hostilities. War is an activity demanding mental and physical agility, especially the latter, for a fighting man. Physical disorders not only create discomfort and subpar efficiency but also imperil an inflicted individual's life. These factors obviously cause men to be less than enthusiastic, even hyperapprehensive, about their combat assignments. In addition to fighting the Union, the Confederate command contended with a dearth of manpower which made necessary the use of many men who in more propitious circumstances would have been either discharged for medical reasons, shipped to the rear for recuperation, or allowed longer convalescence. Akin to the physical
disrepair is fatigue resulting from prolonged combat exposure. Physical or mental fatigue or a combination of both were experienced. Again, the manpower situation in the Confederacy exacerbated this problem, for men could not be spared from the active theaters as long as they could function. Consequently, during the last year of the war there was far too little opportunity for a soldier to revive his spirits and body with a furlough. The Rebel soldier had to learn to live with bad health and fatigue, two companions almost as dangerous as the enemy.

If the intellectual and emotional desires of the Rebel soldiers were in support of the Confederate cause, little else was. The moral support they had received from groups and individuals to carry out a difficult and displeasing military task collapsed during the last twelve months of conflict. The inherent Southern aggressiveness and competitiveness were compromised by wartime developments. And, command-level leadership in the Army of Tennessee became ineffective; then, there was always the manpower situation with the problems it generated. This is not to deny that Union military strength did not figure into the Confederate defeat. It did and in the biggest way: it was principally the extent of Federal victories on the battlefield which caused the entire Confederacy to feel the pressure of war, to experience the futility of defeat, and this undermined the fighting spirit of the Rebel warriors, who decided the cause was not worth the sacrifice.
III. A Psychological Analysis: The Confederate Civilian.

Sherman's total war policy during the Atlanta, Savannah, and Carolinas campaigns involved the civilian population in the conflict much more directly than had previously been the case in the Civil War. Obviously, civilian fear of the invader was the strongest pervading reaction: fear that one's life might be taken or bodily harm incurred and fear that one's material possessions might be destroyed or damaged. Psychologist J. T. MacCurdy notes that fear, excluding pathological cases, "is always associated with some sign or thought of danger. It is not the suffering which injury causes but an anticipation of it. . . ." What then were the circumstances which mentally prepared the civilians so that when the threat presented itself their reaction was that of fear and their responses designed to eliminate or ameliorate their predicament?

The invasion of Georgia and the Carolinas took place after the war had been under way three years. Large sections of the Confederacy had fallen into Union hands; yet no significant areas of these states were under enemy control, and, furthermore, prior to the third year of the war there had been no serious Union threat to their security. Psychologists studying the effects of bombing during World War II have found that those who did not directly experience its destruction to life and property developed a conviction that they would not personally suffer such devastation; some believed themselves immune. It is logical that the residents of the invaded states by the spring
of 1864 had come to conceive their position as one of safety from enemy military operations, for their remoteness from active military theaters had spared them a first-hand experience of invasion with its concomitant destruction of life and property; Georgians and Carolinians may well have felt themselves secure in body and material possessions.

This, of course, was a false sense of security, as Sherman demonstrated beginning in May 1864. It is significant that not until the very end of 1863 did a formidable Union force present a possible threat to the states, and it was not until May 1864 that it actually materialized. At this latter point the Georgia civilian was shaken loose from his faith in his imagined immunity to invasion, nine months later, so were the Carolinians. To switch from the pre-1864 mental rationale of security, which obviously had been exploded, to reliance on the Confederate Army of Tennessee for protection quickly proved unsatisfactory. There was no escape from dealing with the enemy invasion if it happened to pass through your neighborhood, and one did not know whether it would or not. Thus, due to rapidly developing circumstances residents of the states were rudely forced from confidence in their safety to a position of seriously threatened security, and in seeking responses to these developments one predominant reaction emerges: fear. This was not an isolated reaction, at least not for long. Fear is a highly contagious mental state, and occurrences in and after May 1864 encouraged its rapid spread throughout Georgia and the Carolinas.
Preservation of life is basic to man; and civilians rather abruptly envisioned a serious challenge to their physical well-being. They believed that the enemy was a threat as an agent of bodily injury, death, and material destruction, all of which would eliminate or compromise the means of sustaining life or of maintaining a desired style of living. The anticipation of such conditions was more than most people could rationally cope with, and what resulted at the outset of the invasion, when the inhabitants were forced to deal with a situation with which they were not familiar, was the appearance and often acceptance of rumors which misled citizens by exaggerating the atrocities and destructiveness of the enemy. When accurate information is not available to instruct the uninformed in times of emergency, they will grasp at whatever is available to construct a mental picture of the threat. This is what happened, and often the information was extremely misleading, as the following Rebel observations demonstrate: "Yankees were savages believed cannibals [and] were coming to wantonly violate, destroy, or enslave them" The Union soldiers threw slaves into the Chattahoochee River, and the burning buildings of Atlanta had been filled with slaves. Confederate nurse Kate Cumming wrote in her diary of "another 'wolf' alarm" and of "rumor after rumor," and Sherman wrote that upon his arrival in Savannah the women expected the "veriest monster." There is little wonder that fear permeated the Georgian and Carolinian countryside and that such responses to the Union threat as fleeing, hiding, removal and concealment of property, and request for Federal
military protection were common. The attacked did what they could to preserve life and property.

Canards of barbarian enemy behavior initially influenced the actions of the inhabitants, but as they experienced personally the Union invasion and corrected their exaggerated misconceptions, they adjusted their reactions and responses accordingly: their fear was gradually assuaged. The approval, at least amazement, on the part of numerous Confederates at the conduct of many Federalists once occupation got underway is proof of the sway of rumor in motivating behavior not necessitated by the circumstances. It might also be cautiously suggested that fear was not as intense in the two major urban areas of Atlanta and Savannah as elsewhere. Reports from these cities by contrast to those emanating from the countryside appear to be less afflicted with desperation and more characterized by an aggressively verbal defense of Confederate life and property; witness the opposition previously noted to Sherman's Atlanta evacuation order. This, too, is consistent with what is known about human behavior; men in trouble normally find comfort and strength in association with others.

Civilian efforts to safeguard their property by removing it from the path of the enemy or by concealment have earlier been explained only in passing as an attempt to retain the tools with which to maintain life. Certainly this objective was of primary importance, but human covetousness for one's own property goes substantially beyond this, as psychologist Ernest Beaglehole makes clear: "The sense of ownership, in fact, is a special form of positive magico-animistic feeling. . . ."
The magico-animistic feeling of an owner toward his property finds an individual identifying with an object to such an extent that, when the object is influenced by development, the owner's personality is also affected. The worker whose product is criticized is himself dejected. His creation is "so linked to his own feelings of self-respect and self-esteem that a negative judgment passed on the products is taken as a direct reflection upon the worker's personality." Thus, it may be posited that those civilians who experienced loss of their property not only lost a material object and a tool which might aid in maintaining life but also a part of themselves, their personality. William James observed that with loss of possessions individuals experience "a sense of the shrinkage of our personality, a partial conversion of ourselves to nothingness. . . ."

Beaglehole also points to the social emoluments of property. Property is a criteria in determining status and power in society, and Georgians and Carolinians, as other Southerners and most people anywhere for that matter, were conscious of their position in society. Viewed from the perspective that property was a principal determinant of social position, the enemy invasion with its destruction of property had additional significance for its victims; Sherman compromised their position, the enemy invasion with its destruction of property had additional significance for its victims; Sherman compromised their position in society. Civilian responses to the fear of the loss of property were precipitated by multiple motives, but their reaction was nearly unanimous—a concerted effort to protect their possessions.
Beaglehole sums up the relationship between man and his property:
"his property becomes something that he can rely upon as a permanent home, permanent means of subsistence and enjoyment, permanent means for exercise of power and the winning of social esteem, permanent elements in that integration of personality which alone can yield some measure of order and stability to life." Property is an integral part of human existence.

The effect which the invasion had on the state of mind of the free Confederate civilians lends itself well to historical and psychological evaluation. The results of the former approach are found above, and one might superficially conclude from the evidence that the free inhabitants were overwhelmed by the enemy and they had no other choice than to submit. This interpretation, however, is oversimplified and leaves unanswered several questions. First, it should be noted that the state of Georgia was not conquered and then held by the enemy. Sherman controlled the route between Chattanooga and Atlanta from September to November 15, 1864, after which time the Georgia city and its line of communication were abandoned; Northwestern Georgia was divested of Union control. During the Savannah Campaign the Federal army did not hold territory; it only moved through, using and destroying resources. In December 1864, only Savannah and the area immediately around that city were held by Union troops. Hence, enemy control over Georgia was throughout the entire period of invasion partial and in December definitely minimal. Only the seaport areas of the Carolinas were garrisoned until the end of the war. The enemy,
therefore, was not in a position to influence directly many inhabitants of the states. If the civilians were militarily overwhelmed, such a condition was only temporarily imposed. In view of this circumstance, one might ask why civilians accepted so passively the conclusion that the Confederacy was defeated. Why was there not more civilian opposition to Sherman as he took his command across the states; at least, why did not the Georgians and South Carolinians reassert their bellicosity after the enemy had evacuated all but the Atlantic coast, where was the touted Rebel militancy?

Sociologist Herbert Blumer, in an assessment of morale, points to "the relation of the group toward its goal and the relation of the members of the group to one another . . ." as the two fundamental components which must be considered when evaluating the esprit de corps of a group. When an objective is within reach and the group is making satisfactory progress in realizing its goal and when there is cooperation among those involved, morale will be high; the reverse of this situation leads to a deterioration of a group's state of mind. Blumer notes in addition that these two factors interact upon each other. If satisfactory attainment is obvious, unity of those involved is easier, but when achievement is thwarted, group disintegration is natural; where cooperativeness is apparent, realization of the objective is more probable, but with internal dissension the end becomes more difficult to effect. Blumer found: "Group morale exists as a disposition to act together toward a goal." Basically, loyal Confederates had two goals: a national objective to establish the
integrity of the Confederate States of America by expelling the enemies from their country and a personal objective of preserving as much life and property in the attainment of the above as possible.

That these national and personal goals were severely strained by April 1865 is only a statement of the obvious, and while Sherman's invasion was the most immediate and personally compelling illustration of this condition, there were numerous other developments inside and outside the states and of a military and a nonmilitary nature which reinforced the impact of the invasion. What happened in Georgia and the Carolinas strengthened those conditions which Blumer found detrimental to a healthy morale. Achievement of and progress toward their goals were either made impossible or seriously compromised. Many found it impossible to protect their property, and all felt their property threatened; national integrity appeared progressively more and more unlikely between May 1864 and April 1865. Concerted action toward the Confederate goals was never the case, primarily because of Unionist sentiment in areas of the states, but the invasion certainly increased desertion from the ranks of the loyal and active Confederates. With the states split between the loyal, the apathetic, and Unionists, with the possibility of realizing their objectives appearing continually less feasible due to Union military successes, and with these two conditions interacting negatively on each other, the morale of the civilians moved from a position of confidence to a critical point where they began to reconsider their relationship to the Confederacy and the Union. Civilians residing outside the invaded states had
similar experiences except that another Union force might have been the primary influence and Sherman's successful campaigns a reinforcing factor.

It was possible for Rebel civilians to reevaluate their position within the Confederacy and toward the Union, and the developments beginning with the Union invasion of the states and culminating in the successful enemy campaigns made it propitious that some readjustment take place. For most slaves little thought was necessary. They absconded in large numbers to the Federals. By nature the free Confederate, too, was somewhat flexible on this particular issue; he could shift his identification from one nation to another without violating his most basic values. This was a problem of national allegiance—in essence, of nationalism. Historian David M. Potter suggests "that nationalism rests on two psychological bases rather than one—feeling of common culture on the one hand and feeling of common interests on the other." Interests include tangible and intangible possessions which are believed important to a nationality's life style.

Between the Northern free-soil states and the Southern slave states during the antebellum period, there was far more cultural unity than divergence, but because the growth of Northern political supremacy threatened Southern interests in the 1850s, the nationalism sustaining the country broke down. The South moved in 1861 to construct the political institutions necessary to switch its support to a new nation, the Confederate States of America, which, it was thought,
would embody and protect its common culture and interests. However, the Confederacy came under immediate attack, and its survival depended on the ability of the government to protect the interests of its citizens. By December 1864 the property of many Georgians had been ravaged by the enemy and their broader intangible interests placed in jeopardy, and three months later the Carolinians had experienced the same; the outlook in other states was little better. Since it was the security of interests instead of cultural diversity which motivated the Southern shift of national loyalty from the United States to the Confederate States and since the latter country could no longer satisfactorily fulfill this function nor give any realistic indication of being able to do so in the foreseeable future, many civilians decided their interests could best be protected by rejoining the Union. Civilian reactions support Potter's conclusion that "the readiness with which the South returned to the Union will defy explanation unless it is recognized that Southern loyalties to the Union were never really obliterated but rather eclipsed by other loyalties with which for a time, they conflicted." Civilian interests proved to be a more compelling determinant of behavior than "other loyalties."

The extent to which the free Rebel civilians transferred their loyalty from the Confederacy to the Union during and after Sherman's invasion naturally varied. A portion must have again become loyal to the United States in act and thought, others by action alone; some remained determined Rebels. A reading of sources indicates that sincere Union sentiment was the exception, but desire to protect
interests dictated an outward compliance with Union policies among a majority. Psychologists Marshall H. Segall and Herbert C. Kelman conducted separate but similar experiments which are germane to the problem faced by the Confederate. Segall found that among acculturating Africans the natives who accepted attitudes uncomplimentary to their position were "probably only acquiescing with anti-African statements presented to them by a European . . . with no serious concern for the content of those beliefs. . . ." While the Confederate and African situations are not analogous in numerous respects, there is enough similarity to conclude that the Rebel and African native behavior can be expected in such situations. Under experimental conditions devoid of the coercion which the Union army used, Kelman observed that compliance was the response "adopted from a communicator whose power is based on means-control. . . ." The communicator in Georgia and the Carolinas was the Federal army; it unquestionably based its authority on means-control; and, compliance was the most prevalent response among the civilian recipients.

The evaluation of morale and the consideration of Confederate nationalism vis-a-vis the Sherman invasion should help answer the questions of why civilians passively yielded to the Union campaigns, and why there was no reassertion of belligerency following the enemy withdrawal from most areas of the states. In short, for many reasons the will to oppose the enemy was not sufficient to muster effective opposition during the invasion, and following it, the Georgians,
Carolinitains, and Confederate citizens elsewhere began to transfer their national allegiance to the Union for reasons of interests.

This study of developments during the last twelve months of the war may give the student of the Civil War some indication of why the Union prevailed. Historian Richard N. Current cogently argues that it was "objective" factors which precipitated the decline in Confederate morale, motivating the Rebels to cease military operations. Hence, Charles H. Wesley's thesis that morale undermined the effectiveness of Confederate resistance does not get at the basic cause of defeat; it was the superiority of the Union military machine made possible by the North's economic advantage that dragged down the Confederate will to resist. Current's interpretation contains a serious oversight which weakens it to the extent of making it untenable: morale is a highly volatile state, especially when measured against military developments. No one can say that it takes so much material and ten major victories or fifteen, eighteen, or any certain amount of supplies or number of military successes to have destroyed the morale of the Confederates so that they would sue for peace. That which will break the determination of one group will hardly faze the perseverance of another. (The United States experience with Viet Nam is a case in point. No one knew how much bombing, how many defeats, how many years of war, etc., the North Vietnamese would absorb before agreeing to a truce, much less submission.)

Who is to say that the advantageous economic condition of the Union was sufficient to effect such a military position or results
that the Rebel morale would break? Could not the singleness of purpose
in search of Confederate independence have been such that the Union
material advantage would have been unequal to the task of bringing
Northern victories of great enough magnitude to obliterare Confederate
faith in their cause? The Rebels could have resorted to guerrilla
tactics as some advocated when their organized field forces were
23
defeated and dispersed. While the military situation as well as the
political and economic conditions were near disaster in April 1865,
further resistance could have been pursued in large areas of the
Confederacy, and at least partial fulfillment of their goals was
still possible at the time of surrender. The Union, which was not at
all united behind the war effort, may or may not have decided that
Southern subjugation was worth the price if rebelior had continued
even on a much smaller scale than before. When the reason for the
Confederate defeat is placed in this perspective, the appropriate
question to ask is: why did the Confederates believe they had more
to gain in April 1865 in submitting to Union control than in following
the course of further resistance? The answer is inherent in the
evaluation of Southern morale and nationality previously discussed;
these factors more than Union economic and military supremacy brought
the war to a successful conclusion for the Union. In effect, the
Confederacy was defeated because of its similarity to the Union.

Other theories contribute to the explanation of the deterioration
of Confederate morale. While the Rebels did not sacrifice all to
gain their independence, they did suffer considerably during the war.
Relative to their life style during the antebellum period, the Confederate position in 1865 was extremely difficult. Southern Americans had enjoyed many things while in league with the United States which were no longer available in the Confederacy of 1865. The loss was great, and continued hostilities, which meant guerrilla action after April 1865, promised greater loss of those interests the rebelling Americans held dear. Repatriation was their logical course as it might salvage what remained. The cavalier myth, which may be more than a myth, helps explain why the Southerners did not resort to the tactics of desperation at the official conclusion of hostilities. The leadership of the South took their section out of the Union in 1861 and four years later presided over the demise of their creation, the Confederate States of America. They counseled their Rebel charges to accept with honor their defeat on the battlefield. To resort to guerrilla warfare was unthinkable for most Confederate leaders, something contrary to the gentlemanly cavalier concept after which they modeled their behavior. Historian Kenneth M. Stampp has argued that many Southerners possessed "inward doubts" about the Confederate cause and "that, in all probability, some unconsciously even hoped for its defeat." Confederate defeat brought reunion of the South with "the federal Union, the only national identity it ever had," and Appomattox provided the Southerner with "another reward: a way to rid themselves of the moral burden of slavery." The Confederates won by losing, and they were, at least, subconsciously aware of this. These hypotheses are not supported by
the sources cited in this study, but they are plausible arguments contributing, in part, to the explanation of the loss and lack of Confederate morale during the Civil War.

In this century when many historians are drawn into the camps of the conflict or consensus schools and facilely manipulate the American past to justify their particular interpretation, they might consider that the one major fratricidal conflict this nation has experienced cannot be used without reservation to support the conflict school. If as this study suggests the Confederate civilians re-entered the Union because they believed their interests would be best protected as inhabitants of the United States, there is more continuity in the mid-nineteenth century between North and South than may at first be apparent. If the Rebels left the Union because they willed it, many also returned because they so desired: short-run conflict, long-run continuity.

Of more importance in this historiographical context is the consideration that the behavior of the Rebels lends support to the revisionists' arguments concerning Civil War causation. Why would the Confederates have given in to the Union had there been the moral impasse argued by the Nationalist and New Nationalist schools or the conflict of disparate economic systems or civilizations concluded by the Beardians and Southern Vindicators? These historians believe the war was irrepresible; civilian reaction in 1864 and 1865 does not support an interpretation which includes irreconcilable positions between North and South in 1860 and 1861. While it was a conscious
decision to return to the Union in their own best interest, there was
earlier a comparable determination to leave the Union. The relevant
question then is why they believed their interests sufficiently
threatened to form a new nation in 1861. There is no one objective
reason or combination such as a moral dilemma or an incompatible
economic, political, or social system. The Southern slave states making
up the Confederacy came to believe by 1861 that their interests were in
danger. The key phrase in the last sentence is: "came to believe";
Southern interests were not menaced to the extent they had concluded.
But, convinced of the vulnerability of their interests while in league
with the United States, Southerners reached a calculated decision,
based in part on faulty logic, to dissolve the Union in 1861. The
revisionist school of Avery Craven, James G. Randall, et al. best
explains how the Southerner arrived at such a state of mind by 1861.
Marxist historian Eugene D. Genovese also develops a tightly argued
interpretation that the Southern mental outlook was incompatible with
maintenance of the Union in 1861. Genovese wrote: "When the slave-
holders rose in insurrection, they knew what they were about: in the
fullest sense, they were fighting for their lives." A slight
modification would bring this observation into agreement with the one
presented in this interpretation by inserting "they thought" and "they
believed." It would then read: When the slaveholders rose in insur-
rection, they thought they knew what they were about: in the
fullest sense, they believed they were fighting for their lives.
This psychological-historical analysis deals with several historical questions which have long been disputed, and it is important to remember: first, the disclaimer to have presented the final word in Confederate reaction to invasion and, secondly, the restricted nature of this study and consequently its limited affect on larger historical questions. Rather than the support to or modification of interpretations of Confederate defeat, Civil War causation, or the broader consensus and conflict schools, the value of this dissertation may rest in its approach. What people think is of the essence, for this determines their actions, and this is where historians should direct more attention.
FOOTNOTES

1
Frank E. Vandiver, Their Tattered Flags: The Epic of the Confederacy, 285.

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3
Grinker and Spiegel, Men Under Stress, 40.

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8
Wiley, The Life of Johnny Reb; Donald, "The Confederate as a Fighting Man."

9
Richard M. McMurry, "Confederate Morale in the Atlanta Campaign of 1864," Georgia Historical Quarterly, LIV (1970), 226-43. McMurry argues that Johnston's leadership has been incorrectly sustained and Hood's condemned. His article is a valuable warning concerning the use of sources on this topic, but it contains significant weaknesses in his use of sources and evaluation. In that it presents a different interpretation than the Johnston-Hood assessment in this study, it should be consulted.
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11
The Structure of Morale, 4.

12

13
Ibid., 28 and Joost A. M. Meerloo, Patterns of Panic, 18-19.

14
W. Trotter, Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War, 47.

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16

17
Greyerz, Psychology of Survival, 42-44 and 53.

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20
The South and the Sectional Conflict, 58 and 78. Many of these ideas are discussed in more depth in Potter's book, pages 34-83.

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23
For a brief and graphic historical analysis of guerrilla warfare, and by inference how it may well have been effective if resorted to by Confederates see: Correlli Barnett, "Guerrilla Warfare," Horizon, XI (1969), 4-11. See also Albert Castel, "Quantrill's Bushwhackers: A Case Study in Partisan Warfare," Civil War History (1967), 40-50, for guerrilla action during the Civil War.

24
Kenneth M. Stampp, The Southern Road to Appomattox, passim.

25
It is principally in my emphasis of Confederate mental outlook rather than an objective threat to interests that my interpretation diverges from Potter's. While it is a subtle difference, it seems to me that emphasis of Southern belief gets closer to the explanations of why the war and why the Rebels conceded.

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