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THE GOOD-NATURED MISANTHROPE: A STUDY
IN THE SATIRE AND SENTIMENT OF THE
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

by

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REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

[Signatures]

Houston, Texas
May, 1962
TO

DR. CARROLL CAMDEN

AND

DR. ALAN D. McKILLOP

WITH GRATITUDE
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INTRODUCTION

The rise of sentiment and the man of feeling in the second half of the eighteenth century is usually held responsible for the decline of the satiric spirit that held sway in the first half of the century under such famous names as Swift and Pope. The spirit of satire never really dies, however; when it is denied its usual literary expression in such shapes as the formal verse satire and the prose anatomy, it will ally itself with other forms of literature, even with such forms which, on the surface, are completely opposed to satire. Such an alliance actually occurred between sentiment and satire in the latter half of the age. Its seeds, however, can be found very early in the eighteenth century, so that in reality the alliance was a progression rather than a sudden innovation. One of the chief, and certainly one of the most interesting, forms of this union was the development of the character which I have called the good-natured misanthrope. This sentimental misanthrope represents a blending of the man of feeling and the traditional literary satiric persona, an unusual reconciliation of satiric railing and benevolent action, of speculative misanthropy and actual good deeds.

The first two chapters attempt to explain the dilemma
of the man of feeling which encouraged such a reconciliation and to relate traditional misanthropy and satire to the change in viewpoint that took place in the eighteenth century. In Chapter II I deal exclusively with the eighteenth century critics of misanthropy and satire, although often they wrote chronologically in the middle of or after the actual literary development of the good-natured misanthrope. Chapters III through V explore the literary use of the character and its implications in the literature of sentiment, particularly of the man of feeling.

I wish to express my deepest appreciations to the staff of the Fondren Library of Rice University for its untiring assistance. Particular thanks are extended to Mr. Richard O'Keefe of the inter-library loan department for efforts above and beyond the call of duty; to Miss Pender Turnbull of rare books for her time and many courtesies; and to Mr. Richard Perrine of library information for his interest and zeal in locating materials unknown to me.

Whatever is of value in the dissertation belongs to the inspiration, interest, and sympathy of Dr. Alan D. McKillop, whose assistance and insight were present at every stage in the work. I can extend to him only my warmest gratitude and affection.
I

THE DILEMMA OF THE MAN OF FEELING

"The age of Walpole was rough, coarse, brutal; a world for the muscular and the aggressive and the cunning. The thin veneer of elegance and classic form obscured but never hid either the crime and dissipation or the drab middle-class virtue and thrift."¹ J. H. Plumb's description of England's Augustan age seems rather uncompromising in the face of recent emphasis on the charity, philanthropy, and theories of benevolence that supposedly characterize the whole eighteenth century and its conception of man and the world. We are now more apt to think of this century, particularly the latter half, as an age of benevolence, an age of sentiment, an age of feeling, which in the literature of the period caused the vogue of the exemplary hero, the good-natured man, and the man of feeling.² In general terms we can scarcely doubt that the prevailing philosophy, and to a certain extent the theology, of the era exculpated Adam and his descendents from the Fall and pointed an accusing finger at environment, luxury, and society as the causes of man's corruption. Our conception and understanding of both the age and its literature, however, tend to become confused when we confound the theories of benevolence with
benevolence in practice, the man of feeling as an ideal with his actual existence in an unfeeling world.

The various doctrines of man's natural goodness as enunciated by such men as Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume, and Adam Smith have been well treated elsewhere. We must, however, recognize the problem, indeed, the contradiction that existed between the doctrine and the reality of man's actual depraved acts. When in 1751 Whitefield preached the ancient doctrine of total depravity and denounced men as merely beasts, he raised a storm of argument that was reflected almost immediately in such magazines as the Gentleman's. In the June, 1751 number "Publicola" states the essential case for benevolence against Whitefield:

I readily acknowledge that men being abandoned to vicious practices become so forgetful of God, and act so contrary to reason, that they are like brute beasts, which have no understanding; and we have sufficient cause at this time to complain of the great corruption of mankind. And if Mr. W-field had only arraigned the vices of men, and shown them enemies to God as acting contrary to their reason and his laws, in following their sensual pleasures, in their covetousness and all manner of unrighteousness, he would have met with no opposition but from the irrational and vicious. But when these preachers represent human nature, as being sunk into such depravity by the fall of Adam, that vice is its natural and necessary production, when they assert inbred sin, and the absolute incapacity of men, either from reason or will, to do any good, according to the notions of Austin, they cast a reproach upon our good creator and his dispensations.4

The difficulty in arguing over the abstract theological question of total depravity becomes apparent in the shift
in viewpoint of further correspondents from the total depravity of man's nature to the actual depravity of his deeds. In October "Verax" begs the correspondents to return to the point, which the tone of his plea admits is really an academic one:

\[\text{Whitefield's}\text{ first vindicator . . . shifted the question from the corruption of man's nature to the depravity of his actions . . . . . . the true and only subject of debate introduced by Theophilus, and continued by Verax and Publicola, in opposition to Mr. Whitefield's doctrine, is not what his two advocates have called it---not the depravity of bad men which has been already confessed and lamented on both sides, but this, only this---the corruption of Human Nature.}\]

As Miss Whitney pointed out several years ago, the concept of progress, even when joined with man's potential goodness, did not destroy belief in the progressive degeneration of man, especially when it was faced with the apparent reality of such degeneration. But recent critics have pointed out that the blame began to fall on society, environment, or custom, and not on man's fallen nature.

On the theoretical side, however, if man were potentially good, it should be possible at least for some men to circumvent the evils of environment, society, or whatever force caused man to fall from the ideal, and become a man of feeling and benevolence. In his brilliant essay on "The Genealogy of the Man of Feeling," R. S. Crane has traced the evolution of the theory back to the Latitudinarian divines of the late seventeenth century: "... the most
significant result of their efforts was the dissemination of the idea that man is essentially a gentle and sympathetic creature, naturally inclined to society not merely by his intellect, which tells him that kindness to others is the means to the end of his own private happiness, but still more by 'those passions and inclinations that are common to him with other Creatures' and which, like everything in his nature, have a vehement tendency to acts of love and good-will."8 Furthermore, "... they devoted much effort ... to picturing the heart of man as 'naturally' good in the sense that when left to its own native impulses it tends invariably to humane and sociable feelings—and this 'without the Discipline of Reason, or the Precepts of Religion.'"9 Crane's essay did not attempt to discuss the real purposes of this type of preaching, which we will consider below, so that he ignored the more Calvinistic sermons of popular preachers like Barrow and Tillotson. Tuveson's later argument that these divines were never out of touch with the doctrines of original sin and salvation by grace seems certainly consistent with the topics of their other sermons.10 We cannot deny the tendency of the Latitudinarians to emphasize benevolence, charity, and the goodness of man. On the other hand, there is nothing unorthodox about Barrow's view of sinful man. One of his longest sermons, actually preached as four ser-
mons, "The Doctrine of Universal Redemption asserted and Explain'd," is a typical explanation of man's total and utter depravity: "All the Sons of Adam are by disobedience in a lost condition (lost in error and Sin, lost in guilt and condemnation, lost in trouble and misery) . . . ." 11 Only Christ's sacrifice saves man from complete damnation: "As Adam, being a representative of mankind, did by his transgression involve all men in guilt, and subject them to condemnation; provoked God's wrath, and drew the effects thereof upon; brought all men under the slavery of sin, and necessity of death; so was our Lord the proxy of mankind, and by his performances in our behalf did undece for our advantage, what the former did to our prejudice . . . ." (442).

Tillotson, more clearly perhaps than Barrow, gives us some indication of the purposes for preaching the doctrines of goodness and benevolence so vehemently. Essentially these purposes are very practical: to make Christianity palatable and to offer hope to men who fear it is impossible for them to fulfill the commandments. Tillotson's method threatens damnation with one hand while pointing to the ease of salvation with the other. He argues simply that "The Righteous shall be rewarded with eternal happiness, and the Wicked shall be sentenc'd to everlasting punishment." 12 While it is true " . . . that there is a
great Degeneracy and Corruption of human Nature, from what it was originally framed when it came out of God's Hands; ... that it was occasioned by the voluntary Transgression of a plain and easy command given by God to our first Parents. And this Weakness contracted by the Fall of our first Parents naturally descends upon us their Posterity, and visibly discovers itself in our Inclination to Evil ...;"¹³ nevertheless ". . . . this Degeneracy is not total. For tho our Faculties be much weakened and disordered, yet they are not destroyed nor wholly perverted" (Ibid.). Education and God's grace can help us to carry on our inclination to good with "great ease to great Perfection" (256).

Modern interest in the metaphysical poets and in preachers like Donne and Andrewes has perhaps been responsible for generating the attitude that the modified Calvinism of the eighteenth century with its benevolence and good works is somehow unorthodox Christianity. As one critic has recently pointed out, however, the only real unorthodoxy is the novelty of the stress on happiness.¹⁴ The teachings of Christ and the early Fathers certainly emphasized the duty of charity in every man. St. Basil's "Long Rules," for example, insisted that the "germ" of charity was innate and that man was by nature a social creature.¹⁵ As for man's natural goodness, even Augustine granted its
potentiality, although he denied the actuality:

Felagius contends . . . that the point of argument lies in the possibility of man's not sinning, on which subject it is unnecessary even for ourselves to take ground against him . . . .

For we do not deny that human nature may be without sin; nor ought we by any means to refuse to it the power of perfectibility, since we admit its capacity for progress. . . .

Augustine, of course, does not believe there ever has in reality been a blameless man; but " . . . so far as I can judge, no great error is made, and certainly not a dangerous one, when a man indulges such an opinion that there may be a blameless man, carried away by a certain benevolent feeling. . . ." 17 "Publicola" re-entered the Whitefield controversy in the Gentleman's in July armed with Scripture and the Fathers against the doctrine of natural depravity. He concludes his argument by asserting that "this unscriptural and unreasonable doctrine . . . was propagated by Valentinus in the first century, and was particularly confuted by Origen and Clemens Alexandrinus." 18 "Publicola" could not have invoked an early Father of the Church more embarrassing to Whitefield's doctrine than St. Clement of Alexandria. The entire extant works read like a handbook to Latitudinarian theology. His famous Paedagogus, for example, reduces the essentials of Christianity basically to "The Philanthropy of the Instructor Christ" and the duty of Christians to imitate the Instructor in his philanthropy. 19 In The Miscellanies or Stromata Clement
devotes a chapter to expounding the thesis that "The true Gnostic is an imitator of God, especially in Beneficence." The felicity of this reference to Clement and his famous pupil Origen lies in the proximity of them both to the Apostolic Fathers, both living many years before Augustine. "Publicola's" particular reference in Clement seems to be to Book II, Chapter VIII of the Stromata where Clement argues against Valentinus' assertion that fear is the cause of things, a subtle barb at the tendency of White-field's doctrines.

The Augustinian or Calvinistic concept of man was never, of course, completely abandoned, as men like Mandeville, Dr. Johnson, and Edward Young testify. Like Barrow and Tillotson many eighteenth century divines who preached on the duties of benevolence could preach just as easily on the corruption of human nature. If they admitted natural goodness in theory, they were perhaps more realistically convinced of human depravity in practice. Bishop Sherlock at one time can recommend a real Shaftesburian and Hutchesonian benevolence to his congregation: charity is more expansive than merely doing our duty to our neighbor; it "is in its nature extensive and universal, and reaches as far, nay much beyond the Power we have of doing good . . . ;" "It is a Beneficence which arises from a Contemplation of the World, from a Knowledge of the great Creator,
and the Relation we bear to Him and to our Fellow-Creatures
..." (139). At another time he can just as fervently warn: "It can serve no good Purpose to give Men a great
Opinion of themselves and of the considerable Figure they
make in the Universe; nor can it be done with Truth and
Justice. Experience, which shews us daily our own and the
Follies of those about us, will be too hard for Reasonings
upon this Foot; and the Mind of Man, Conscious of its own
Defects, will see through the Flattery, which ascribes to
it Perfections and Excellences with which it feels itself
to be unacquainted." 23

Much more important in one sense is the reason be-
hind the shift in emphasis, since it ties in very closely
with the literary presentation of the man of feeling. As
in the case of Tillotson, it is in its simplest terms an
attempt to make men good— an attempt to make the duties of
Christianity feasible, or in the case of the deists to make
virtue attainable by the majority of men. The reason for
rejecting original sin is, perhaps, stated most clearly
for the ordinary eighteenth century reader by the untiring
"Publicola":

\[
\text{Such an opinion of human nature as Whitefield's can never do any good; but will often have bad effects, and drive men into despondency or infi- delity. \ldots \ldots it gives men horrible notions of their creator, it drives them to despair, it pre-}
\text{vents their thankfulness, because they cannot thank god for an evil nature; it furnishes unbelievers with an objection to his goodness; it occasions great contempt for morality.}\]
\]
Sterne reiterates this same belief in the practicality of a belief in natural goodness in several of his sermons. Thinking well of human nature is better than thinking ill of it because "... 'tis one step towards acting well, to think worthily of our nature; and, as in common life, the way to make a man honest, is, to suppose him so, and trust him as such..." 25  Later in the sermon Sterne argues:

And tho' the brightness of this image of man like God has been sullied greatly by the fall of man, in our first parents, and the characters of it rendered still less legible, by the many superinductions of his own depraved appetites since,—yet 'tis a laudable pride and a true greatness of mind to cherish a belief, that there is so much of that glorious image still left upon it, as shall restrain him from base and disgraceful actions...

(I 82-83)

Secker's first Charge to the diocese of Canterbury is often quoted as an admission that the clergy in preaching benevolence and the social virtues were not doing their duty to the doctrines of the Church of England considered necessary to salvation. Secker, however, does not admit that the doctrines were not believed:

The truth, I fear, is that many, if not most of us, have dwelt too little on these Doctrines in our Sermons: by no means, in general, from disbelieving or slighting them; but partly from, that formerly they had been inculcated beyond their Proportion, and even to the Disparagement of Christian Obedience; partly from fancying them so generally received and remembered, that little needs to be said, but on social Obliga-

This Charge was delivered in 1758, and the reasons Secker
offers for not preaching the doctrines of the Church cannot be accepted as mere attempts to whitewash the clergy, for Secker's 1738 charge to the diocese of Oxford had only too clearly spelled out his own original belief in the necessity and practicality of preaching the "social Obligations":

... no controversies, however needful, must be suffered to divert our attention from what is of all things the most needful, the Study of Practical Religion, and the common Duties of Life. These are the things, which Mankind are most apt to fail in, and most concerned not to fail in: and therefore spending much Time upon them, obtaining a thorough Insight into them, and having a deep Sense of them, is the very Foundation of doing good both to others and to our Souls.  

The reason, then, for the shift to natural goodness and the stress on active benevolence was eminently practical. As Dean Sykes argues "It is plain that every means had been adopted to temper the demands of Christianity to the infirmities of unregenerate human nature, and to promise the consolations of religion to the weakest of its professors. . . . . But, if their doctrine lacked fire and other-worldly urgency, it should not be forgotten that its exposition of the whole duty of man laid stress upon the two great commandments, as interpreted by the twin offices of 'loving God, admiring and being delighted with all His wise and wonderful works, continually singing praises to our gracious Creator and Redeemer; and doing all kind and good-natured offices to our fellow creatures, and this with perpetual alacrity, pleasure, and joy, without weariness and
decay of spirits." The irony resulting from the theory and the actual effects is, perhaps, most pathetically stated in Secker's Charge to Canterbury.

The didacticism of the literature that followed these theories is notorious: "... literature glows with moral sentiment; the sharpness of satire and the chill of sovereign reason yield before the claims of feeling..." In a discussion of Shaftesbury's doctrine of poetry, A. D. McKillop concludes perceptively that the poet's task is ultimately reduced to the formula that the way to be moral is to talk about morality. Hence "The moral generalization came to acquire crucial significance as a clue to the lofty sentiment of the poet or to the characterization of the individuals presented in drama or fiction. The program would culminate in the presentation of an exemplary character." According to Richardson "The Example of a beneficent spirit, gracefully exerted, will awaken in others a capacity to enjoy the true pleasure that arises from a benevolent action," and thus "Lessons of morality and disinterestedness, given by Example are far more efficacious than those endeavoured to be inculcated by Precept..."

The exemplary character that eventually resulted from such theory was the how much despised man of feeling. Chronologically the movement is from a hero who combines both reason and feeling, like Sir Charles Grandison, to
the hero who espouses feeling for its own sake, like Harley. Since the recognition of the man of feeling depended on the external display of his internal state of mind, feeling became more important than reason, making it increasingly easier to stereotype the external signs and completely forget the internal motivation of moral action. Decreased emphasis on reason also tended to leave the hero without much prudence, so that he easily became a prey to hypocrites and sharpers of every kind, a situation that we will discuss later, since it plays an important role in creating the man of feeling's dilemma. By the end of the century, however, feeling had lost nearly all contact with morality. In his excellent study of sentiment, Erämetsa concludes: "As the century wore towards its end, didacticism and 'moral' outlook ceased to be predominant factors and driving forces in daily life. . . . In consequence, although the Cult of Feeling went on, the ultimate source of feeling, moral instruction, was lost sight of, and the manifestation of emotion became an end in itself."33

Goldsmith was not alone in his campaign against sentimentalism, for the dangers resulting from this display of emotion for its own sake were recognized by nearly all the leading periodical writers of the second half of the century. The problem was actually two-fold: a morbid over-refinement of feeling and a neglect of practical benevolence. The
whole purpose of the exemplary character, just as the promotion of man's natural goodness and the moral sense, was after all to inspire the reader to active charity, to awaken in him that capacity to enjoy a "benevolent action," a union of feeling and action. Perhaps the famous scene between Parson Trulliber and Parson Adams over the meaning of charity is most symbolic of the eighteenth century insistence on active charity. It was becoming increasingly evident to the writers of the journals, however, that there was entirely too much talk about sentiment and not enough benevolent action. Their attack on the over-refined man of feeling who could not put his feelings into benevolent action was an open admission that somehow the moral purposes of the man of feeling, and ultimately, as we will see below, of his literary presentation as an exemplary hero, had failed.

The Man of Feeling himself, Henry Mackenzie, made the Mirror and the Lounger a platform for denouncing false sentiment and feeling. In Lounger 20 Mackenzie attacks drawing-room sentiment: "In morals, as in religion, there are not wanting instances of refined sentimentalists, who are contented with talking of virtues which they never practice, who pay in words what they owe in actions; or perhaps, what is fully as dangerous, who open their minds to impressions which never have any effect upon their conduct. . . ."
In the same essay, which is really an attack on modern novels, he argues: "That creation of refined and subtile feeling, reared by the authors of the works to which I allude, has an ill effect, not only on our ideas of virtue, but also on our estimate of happiness. That sickly sort of refinement creates imaginary evils and distresses, and imaginary blessings and enjoyments, which imbitter the disappointments, and depreciate the common attainments of life" (143). The result of such reading, Mackenzie asserts in No. 77, is that in "the tale of woe we savor every part of the description, whereas in real life we may go out of our way to avoid a sorrowful or woeful circumstance because it may interfere with our feelings or inclinations." If we may trust the author of "Enquirer IV" and "Examiner IX" for the May and October numbers of the 1796 Monthly Magazine, Mackenzie and other writers had accomplished their purpose so well that they managed to eliminate all "true sensibility" and even active charity as well. According to the "enquirer," fear of excessive emotion had become widespread because men of sensibility always became dupes to their own benevolence; the result of too much duping eventually led to misanthropy. The final result, he lamented, was some vague belief in universal benevolence at the expense of active charity.38

The bewildered nature of the "enquirer's" plea for true sensibility reflects his lack of understanding of
exactly what happened in the development of the man of feeling. Any author who took his exemplary hero at all seriously soon found that both he and his hero were between Scylla and Charybdis. The hero was offered to the public for emulation and approval. A. D. McKillop convincingly argues that the presentation of an exemplary hero results in

a tendency which puts heavy emphasis on the virtuous impulse as (a) illustrious (b) illustrative. As illustrious, it is exalted for its own sake, and invested with much of the prestige that formerly attended such ideals as honor and valor; as illustrative, it is tied up with a social system and colors the presentation of manners and daily life. The presentation of virtue and vice is accompanied by incessant approval or disapproval, colored as it may be by Shaftesburian enthusiasm or Addisonian sobriety. This approval in turn is thought of as a sentiment (approval of approval), so that we have sympathy with sympathy, a benign attitude toward benevolence, the virtues raised to the second power, or we may say, theoretically an infinite series of mirror images of virtue.39

This presentation of an exemplary hero for the approval of the reader immediately places the author in an ambiguous situation resulting from the conflict between theory and reality. Once an author has determined on an exemplary character he is obliged to provide him with occasions for displaying his virtue. If, however, his character is to be at all convincing, his man of feeling will have to move, in McKenzie's phrase, in the midst of an "unfeeling world." Any Shaftesburian or Hutchesonian theories of virtue being its own reward become immediately dubious. The result is
an implied castigation of the world and society; more importantly, however, unless some adjustments are made in the man of feeling himself, he will hardly be able to win the approval of the reader. If the man of feeling pursues his natural moral inclinations in a world of sharpers, he will eventually be gulled by every fraud he meets, so that his portrayal ultimately implies that only a fool will be a man of feeling, even if we do approve his virtue sub specie aeternitatis.

The literary situation that develops from this conflict between the man of feeling and an unfeeling world is extremely complex. The writer's vision of the world becomes essentially the same vision that the satirist has, and the tension between the man of feeling and the unfeeling world approximates the satiric stasis that occurs in extreme satire between the satiric persona and his world. The exemplary man of feeling, however, approaches a satiric persona only by implication, not by profession. The ethos of this situation creates a dilemma both in the exemplary hero and in the reader. Should a man of feeling weep over every miserable occurrence he encounters or should he rail at those who cause it? If he chooses the latter, he approaches the posture of a satiric persona and his good nature tends to wane. If he chooses the former he may simply be the gull for some sharper, as he usually is. The reader's
dilemma, however, is perhaps more painful; if he approves of the hero and disapproves of the world in which the hero moves, he, of course, admits the practical failure of benevolence. If, on the other hand, he approves of the world, he admits his ill-nature and hardness of heart. But in either case he cannot accept the hero whole-heartedly, for he would ultimately approve of being gulled. The whole complex problem is reduced to its barest outlines in an anonymous late eighteenth century poem, "Satire," which is in reality a satire against satire. At one point the adversarius of the poem tells the satiric persona, a typical public defender, that both satirists and writers of fiction should be outlawed:

And, as the Writer of Romantic Feat
Robs half the World to make his Hero great,
And sinks Mankind below the Level true,
To give one Mortal far above his Due;
So empty Poet, with oppressive Hand,
Makes ev'ry Virtue troop at his Command,
To shut them in his titled Patron's breast... 40

In Ernest Tuveson's words, "The problem is twofold. There is the conflict of the natural man with an unnatural world and there is the difficulty of ascertaining a desirable balance between sensibility and self-interest." 41

Many writers of the period were well aware of the paradox involved in the presentation of the man of feeling or of good-nature in the real world. The most obvious solution was to learn the ways of the world and guard against
them, which was Atterbury's solution early in the century:

Charity is grafted always on Good-Nature, and a Sweetness of Disposition: which though it be a Temper of Mind very lovely and desireable; yet is it such as, in the Circumstances of our present Imperfect State, hath its Inconveniencies; and is what makes Conversation dangerous in a World, where we are surrounded with Temptations. .... It makes us easy and yielding to Common Customs, and receiv'd Opinions; Ready to comply with a thousand things (of which we are not exactly well satisfied) upon the pure score of good Nature, and because we cannot allow ourselves to be troublesome. And being found and known to be of this easy and complying Temper; this very thing will invite Ill Spirits, and Ill men, to make their attempts upon us. 42

Later in the century Fielding felt obliged to write an "Essay on the Characters of Men" to expose hypocrisy and "arm as well as I can, the honest, undesigning, open-hearted man, who is generally the pray of this monster, against it." 43 In his "Essay on the Late Increase of Robbers" Fielding again returned to the problem of the man of feeling in an unfeeling world: "... as it hath pleased God to permit human societies to be constituted in a different manner, and knaves to form a great part (a very considerable one, I am afraid) of every community, who are ever lying in wait to destroy and ensnare the honest part of mankind, and to betray them by means of their own goodness, it becomes the good-natured and tender-hearted man to be watchful over his own temper; to restrain the impetuosity of his benevolence, carefully to select the objects of his passion, and not by
too unbounded and indiscriminate an indulgence to give the reins to a courser which will infallibly carry him into the ambuscade of the enemy." (XIII 110). Fielding concludes his warning on a Christian note by referring to Christ's admonition to his disciples to be as wise as serpents and as innocent as doves (Ibid.).

In 1774 William Richardson, perhaps the first critic to see Hamlet as a man of feeling, drew the obvious moral from his own psychoanalysis of Hamlet's character: "The instruction to be gathered from this delineation is, that persons formed like Hamlet should retire, or keep aloof, from situations of difficulty and contention: or endeavour, if they are forced to contend, to brace their minds, and acquire such vigour and determination of spirit as shall arm them against malignity."Ironically Richardson is caught in a dilemma of his own making. His earlier praise of Hamlet and the admiration he expresses for Hamlet's sensibility must be greatly tempered when referring to real life. Even Richardson was aware that his analysis of the tragic effect of the play depended on Hamlet's sensibility. Richardson found himself trapped in the ambiguity of praising Hamlet's fine feelings at the same time that he must deny their emulation.

If one accepts the depravity of the world as a given assumption, which is at last the tacit understanding of
every author who presents an exemplary hero, the essential problem is reduced to making the man of feeling exemplary but not a fool. It is, of course, impossible to examine every man of feeling that crosses the pages of eighteenth century literature; but we can, I think, ascertain with a certain degree of accuracy the main points of view from which the author and the reader usually see him.

The most obvious approach, and certainly the one most widely used by very minor writers, aims at portraying the hero's prudence as well as his feeling. The author repeats ad nauseam that his hero is a prudent benevolent man, and not a gull to every sharper in the world. Chronologically he is the first type of exemplary hero and represents the union of reason and feeling. This method of presentation appealed to Richardson and was evidently popular with his admirers. In Pamela we are told that "There are hardly any cases which require more judgment in distinguishing between objects worthy and unworthy, and what is, and is not, Charity, than those we call charitable cases. . . ."45 The man of feeling is repeatedly warned of his burden: "The person who wants a feeling Heart, wants the highest joy in this life";46 "yet is saved many griefs by the defect. . . ."47 In Clarissa we are reminded that "An innocent person, being apt to judge of others hearts by his own, is the easiest to be imposed upon. . . ."48
Lovelace himself ironically plays the devil quoting scripture: "Innocence (according to its company) had better have a greater mixture of the serpent with the dove, than it generally has." Richardson's supreme effort in presenting an exemplary hero is undeniably Sir Charles Grandison. The various names that critics have called this rational man of feeling clearly indicate the inevitable result of insisting on prudence: the hero becomes essentially a prig. Constantly reminding one's readers that "A benevolent-minded man may be led into errors and rashness, even by the warmth of his Benevolence," or that "The good man's charity is not extended indiscriminately to all that ask him," and this without the slightest flicker of a smile, tends to reduce benevolence to a very cold-blooded, or at least to a cut-and-dry formula, reminiscent of the so-called "intellectual" school of moral action. While we can agree with Sir Charles that "A generous man will be thought a weak man, if he submit to imposition," we find it difficult to have sympathy with a character who metes out his tears with so much rational reflection.

Much more satisfactory, and certainly much more interesting, are the many benevolent heroes, men of feeling without reason, who must learn prudence in the course of the novel. In these cases (and they would seem to be, contrary to general opinion, much more frequent than the Sir
Charles Grandison) the hero's benevolence markedly contrasts the evil ways of the world, which always try to take advantage of it; his adventures then attempt to teach him prudence in the exercise of his feelings. The author presents the man of feeling as a clinical case for other men of feeling to study. Strikingly enough the man who vies for the dubious title of being the first man of feeling of the non-rational type, David Simple, falls into this class. Miss Fielding's title indicates the nature of the hero: David is simple in the sense of innocent, and the purpose of the novel is to remove this naive simplicity. Sarah Fielding is certainly not above mildly satirizing her hero as he journeys through the world "in search of a true friend," which he just narrowly misses finding, despite an arduous search. After he has been rejected by Miss Johnson, for example, David returns to his room where "... Love, Rage, Despair, and Contempt alternately took possession of his mind: He walked about, and raved like a Madman; repeated all the Satires he could remember on Women. ..."54 Indeed, he acted like all men on such occasions; but in the end "... instead of resolving to be her Enemy, he could not help wishing her well..." (I 61).

The implicit underlying pessimism of these novels becomes quite explicit in David Simple. After a very short stay in London David is tempted to misanthropy: he wonders
whether he should not go to some remote corner of the earth, live the life of a hermit "and never see a human face again" (I 82). Ultimately David does not have to become a hermit, but Miss Fielding implies that the active world is no place for a man of feeling unless he has protection. With his new wife, Camilla, her brother, Valentine, and his new wife, Cynthia, David conveniently retires to the country where he can enjoy his "true" friends without imposition on his good nature (II 316 ff.). In the next chapter we will have to return to David Simple, for in her characterization of Mrs. Spatter Miss Fielding offers one solution to the man of feeling's problem in the active world in the assumption of a misanthropic mask and the stance of a satirist.

The double standard of benevolence implied in fiction which attempts to teach the man of feeling prudence at the same time that it strives to teach the unregenerate reader to become a man of feeling becomes almost embarrassingly overt in The Benevolent Quixote. Squire Thornborough, the benevolent Quixote, finds himself not only imposed upon by frauds, but constantly in situations embarrassing to his virtuous friends because of his benevolent excesses. His Quixotism is his desire to go through the world randomly helping those in need. At one point the anonymous author comments that "The spirit of Benevolent Quixotism with which he set out from Thornborough Abbey, had been damped, though
not extinguished. . . ."55 The reason for his damped benevolence is stated in no uncertain terms: "... equally credulous and generous, he discerned not the plans that were often laid to ensnare him, nor saw the ridicule to which he was so frequently exposed. Till very lately, he had known the world by books; and expected more perfection, or at least more sincerity, than he ever found. A dupe to his own benevolence, he was often obliged to pay handsomely for interfering in the schemes of others, though from the best motives, when from the malice of fortune, or his own want of experience, they turned out in a different manner from what he hoped" (I 213-14). Finally, a benevolent neighbor of experience in the world, Mrs. Fitzwilliam, advises Thornborough to check his benevolence. His advice constitutes the essential moral of this type of fiction: "But remember, my young friend, this last maxim [to restrain his benevolence] is addressed solely to yourself, and is only requisite from the peculiar turn of your character: it is not my general opinion, nor the advice I give to the bulk of mankind, whose cold unfeeling apathy requires a spur to the actions of benevolence, not a curb to restrain them. But . . . the indiscriminating warmth of your temper which blinds your judgment, should have a slight check . . ." (III 11-12).

Perhaps the harshest charge that critics can bring
against this type of fiction lies in its tendency to degenerate into a moral tract. Undoubtedly in a work like *David Simple* the mild satire and the constant parade of humorous characters relieve the tedium of the moral lecture, but we find it equally true that few authors had even this mild satire at their command. Henry Fielding, however, turned the double standard of benevolence into the highest form of art that it achieved during the period. The complexities and brilliance of Fielding's work have been well treated elsewhere, but we must examine briefly the conception and portrayal of Fielding's good-natured man, since he is unquestionably the apogee of the double standard. Fielding substitutes "good-nature" for feeling, thus shifting the spotlight away from emotion and tears; but as an openhearted benevolent man, his good-natured hero faces the same problems of his more emotional brother. His "glorious Lust of doing Good"57 lies at the root of all men of feeling and indeed underlies the whole theory of natural goodness. Recent critics have been at pains to dispel the illusion that Fielding's heroes win out in the end because, despite their moral failings, they possess good-nature; such a view misses the profound irony that runs through Fielding's concept of good-nature.58 It is this irony, which J. M. S. Tompkins has aptly called "that attitude of benignant irony, based on an equal sense of man's frailty
and his worth . . . ,"59 that distinguishes Fielding's treatment of the good-natured man, rather than the prudence that Battestin upholds.60 The whole implication of Fielding's fiction is, of course, that good-natured men must be prudent in this world; but his treatment of the character is based on an ironical angle of vision, since prudence always remains the implication and the characters are presented as without it. The irony results from the tension between the character and the implication.

Thus it is true that Fielding always praises good-nature as "the mighty whole,/Full composition of a virtuous soul" (XII 258), but it is equally true that he was well aware of the dangers of possessing good-nature. His essay warnings in effect become the "benignant irony" of his fiction, and, indeed, often become out-right satire. The opening of Book XV of Tom Jones is certainly an ironic-satiric indication to the reader not to take Tom's ultimate success too seriously: "There are a set of religious, or rather moral writers, who teach that virtue is the certain road to happiness, and vice to misery, in this world. A very wholesome and comfortable doctrine, and to which we have but one objection, namely, that it is not true" (V 141). One immediately thinks of many characters in the novel, like the "religious, honest, good-natured" lieutenant who "had seen vast numbers preferred over his head, and had
now the mortification to be commanded by boys, whose 
fathers were at nurse when he first entered the service"
(IV 31). Captain Blifil, young Blifil, Square, and 
Thwakum constantly make Allworthy a dupe to his own 
benevolence. Indeed, ", ... as to his benevolence, he 
exerted so much, that he had thereby disobliged all his 
neighbours; for it is a secret well known to great men, 
that, by conferring an obligation they do not always pro-
cure a friend, but are certain of creating many enemies"
(III 45). A. D. McKillop's acute insight into the prob-
lem is especially revealing:

Good nature pays off, yet it is not clear that 
this result is grounded in 'the nature of things,' 
to borrow a phrase from Fielding's Square, or 
that it follows the 'way of the world,' the nor-
mal course of events in human society. In the 
long run, what chance has candor in the London 
social scene of Tom Jones and Amelia? Comedy 
presents maladjustment and incongruity that does 
not carry us to the length of irreparable disaster, 
but there is something conventional about the way 
the predicament of the comic character is eased 
or cleared up. ... 61

In terms of the wicked world through which Fielding's 
good-natured characters move, there is indeed something 
conventional about the solution of the hero's problems. 
Perhaps we may call this convention luck, as does Sir George 
in Fielding's The Fathers; or, The Good-Natured Man. Sir 
George is not at all convinced that it is the nature of 
things for benevolence to win out, as he tells his good-
natured brother: "You are a great deal too good for this world, indeed you are; and really, considering how good you are, you are tolerably lucky; for were I half so good, I should expect, whenever I returned home, to catch my wife in an intrigue; my servants robbing my house; my son married to a chambermaid; and my daughter run away with a footman" (XII 160-161). Only in a work like Jonathan Wild, perhaps, can the good-natured man truly succeed, when, as Wendt indicates, "Wild's hanging, in allegorical terms, marks the destruction of evil, and the creation of the perfect society in which Heartfree's goodness is practicable." In the world as it exists good-nature or feeling alone will only lead to frustration and absurdity. After a recent intensive and brilliantly illuminating study of Fielding's concept of the good-natured man Henry Miller concludes:

"The lesson that most of Fielding's good-natured characters--Mr. Boncour, Heartfree, Joseph Andrews, Tom Jones, Booth--must learn in one way or another, is that goodness alone, unsupported by social intelligence or prudence or the higher moral imperative of religion, is not enough in the world as it is." Indeed, their kind of "trusting simplicity . . . is precisely the quality that permits hypocritical and designing villains like Wild to exist and thrive."[p. 47].

The difficulty of preserving a hero's benevolent attitude toward a malevolent world, and having him ulti-
mately win out can be achieved only with a comic vision of the malevolent world, or else by admitting defeat and sending the hero off to the country where he will be away from the wiles of a corrupt society. In either case there is a definite evasion of the actual possibilities of the existence of a man of feeling in the active malevolent world, usually symbolized by the city. Many authors, however, faced up to this problem and concluded that the prospects were rather tragic than comic. Without protection from the wiles of society the man of feeling is ultimately doomed, unlike Tom Jones and Heartfree, to languish in some prison as the result of his naïveté. Unless he begins to relish melancholy and loneliness for its own sake, the only solution for the man of feeling in this situation is misanthropy or death, and in some cases both. Courtney Melmoth (Samuel Jackson Pratt) is perhaps the best exemplar of the combination of the misanthropy and eventual death of the man of feeling. His Liberal Opinions; or, The History of Benignus is a long, rambling moral tract against the vices of society which ultimately drive the innocent Benignus to misanthropy and a lonely death in the wilderness. Essentially the book is a satire not just against society, as Miss Whitney asserts, but against the whole concept that virtue will be rewarded in this life, a "liberal opinion" which completely infuriated the Monthly reviewer. Melmoth's
appeal to revealed religion's promise of a future life for the experience of happiness and the reward of virtue in no way appeased the Monthly reviewer, who argued that revealed religion rests on natural religion; hence, "if it be not manifest from fact and experience that the general tendencies of things are favourable to virtue and happiness: natural religion is a term without meaning."66 The conclusion was obvious.

Melmoth's satire is certainly heavy-handed, but it is also very effective. Nurtured on the Bible and the Spectator papers Benignus enters the world only to find that "Perhaps no man was ever accoutred with weapons of worse defence, to struggle through the warfare of life, than the principles and propensions I have mentioned" (I 116-17). Bengnus admits defeat very early in the struggle: "I have ventured to assert that, an extreme tender and good mind, ardently pursuing its propensities, is the most improper mind in the world to produce terrestrial felicity" (I 119-20). When asked if goodness is against one's worldly interest, he has to reply, "Nine times out of ten" (I 121).

If Melmoth's satire is more pugnacious, it does, however, lack the pathos and poignancy of Mackenzie's Harley, perhaps the most notorious man of feeling in literature. But as Walter Allen very perceptively remarks: "... The Man of Feeling may primarily have as its end a
description of the impact of the world upon a young man 'obedient to every emotion of the moral sense,' but it is also, by implication, a statement of the case against the world, against society."67 Early in the novel Mackenzie indicates Harley's essential unfitness for society: there "is one ingredient, somewhat necessary in a man's composition towards happiness, which people of feeling would do well to acquire; a certain respect for the follies of mankind. . . ."68 Harley's lack of respect for these follies invariably places him in situations to be gulled, as he is usually is, although he/warned by both his aunt and the shrewd beggar, who flatly asserts that there is "no doing" with plain dealing "in this world"(p.112). Harley's farewel speech is perhaps the properest epitaph for the realistic view of the man of feeling in the world:

This world, my dear Charles, was a scene in which I never much delighted. I was not formed for the bustle of the busy, nor the dissipation of the gay. . . . -- It was a scene of dissimulation, of restraint, of disappointment. I leave it to enter on that state which I have learned to believe is replete with the genuine happiness attendant upon virtue. .... I have been blessed with a few friends, who redeem my opinion of mankind. .... The world is in general selfish, interested, and unthinking, and throws the imputation of romance or melancholy on every temper more susceptible than its own.

(pp. 90-91)

Harley, of course, dies a natural death, but the ultimate tendency of such a presentation is certainly towards Werther's solution: suicide.69
If all of these literary presentations of the man of feeling demonstrate the complexities involved in the conception of a character so frequently encountered in the literature of the eighteenth century, and yet usually dismissed by readers and critics as just another effusion of sentiment typical of the period, none has really solved the man of feeling's dilemma, except perhaps the tragic presentation, which in reality merely sentences the man of feeling to death. The tension between the man of feeling and the world, however, creates an ethos that is, as noted earlier, potentially satiric. One of the most entertaining characters in the literature of the period resulted from the actualization of this incipient satiric situation which simultaneously resolved the man of feeling's dilemma. In reality an entirely new character-type evolved from what is on the surface a meaningless mixture of satire and sentiment. Actually we can view the mixture rather as a fruitful reconciliation of satire and sentiment which offered the eighteenth century a meaningful solution to the eternal literary problem of ascertaining exactly how good-natured a satirist's invectives are. The literary possibilities of a persona who possesses the good-nature and sensibility of a man of feeling at the same time that he harbors a rationally hearty hatred and contempt for man and the world, which he willingly expresses often and loudly, were extremely attrac-
tive to many writers of the period who strove for some sort of balance between the condemned wit of the Restoration and the moral platitudes of the typical exemplary novel. The development of this character, whom for historical reasons I have called a misanthrope rather than a satirist, depended for its meaning on a rather deep understanding of the frustration and dilemma of the man of feeling. Ironically, however, it could not have been either developed or perfected without a sentimental view of both satire and misanthropy, and ultimately without a concentrated effort to think well of mankind, problems which must be considered before we can examine the character in its full literary context.
NOTES

CHAPTER I


2. It is impossible to mention every work on benevolence and sensibility of the age. The following are a few of the more important books and articles on the subject: Kirkman Gray, A History of English Philanthropy (London, 1905); M. G. Jones, The Charity School Movement (Cambridge, 1933); Betsy Rodgers, The Cloak of Charity (London, 1949); Erik Erämetsä, A Study of the Word 'Sentimental' . . . in Annales Academiae Scientiarum Fennicae, Ser. B, LXXIV, No. 1, (Helsinki, 1951); Northrup Frye, "Towards Defining an Age of Sensibility," ELH, XXIII (1956), 144-52. Other works will be cited as they appear in the discussion.


7. There has been a great deal written on this subject; for a good introduction see Whitney as cited in 6 above and Humphreys as cited in 3 above.

8. "Genealogy," p. 79. All quotations are from the essay as it appears in the r.p., although both are the same. See also Paul Hazard, "Les Origines Philosophique de l'homme de sentiment," Romantic Review, XXVIII (1937), 318-41.

9. Ibid., 77.


23. Sherlock, op. cit., "Discourse XI," III, 312. Bishop Sherlock was not alone in this ability to move from damnation to love. See for example Edmund Gibson's first pastoral, The Bishop of London's Pastoral Letter to the People of His Diocese (London, 1730), pp. 10, 50, 51, 53-54; see also The Bishop of London's Second Pastoral Letter to the People of His Diocese (London, 1730), pp. 3, 7, 9-10, 14, 19, 22, 66-67 and passim in the whole pastoral. Gibson was, of course, attacking the deists in part of the Church's long war with deism. Titles of many of the benevolent sermons can be found in Crane's "Genealogy," pp. 70-71. One of the most interesting of these sermons is an attempt to reconcile natural charity to Christian charity based on the text "A new commandment I give unto you." See Tipping Silvester, "Moral and Christian Benevolence, A Sermon Containing Some Reflections upon Mr. Balguy's Essay on Moral Goodness," (London, 1734).


29. For further discussions of the persisting Calvinistic view of man see Frederick M. Link, "Rasselas and the Quest for Happiness," *BSUS*, III (1957), 121-23; Mary Lascelles, "Johnson and Juvenal," in *New Light on Dr. Johnson*, ed., Frederick W. Hills (New Haven, 1959), 35-55. See also essays that appeared in the many periodicals of the eighteenth century and particularly *The Visitor* (originally essays in the *Public Ledger*, 1760-61), 2 vols. (London, 1764), Nos. 11, 26, 36, 43, 57; *The Observer*, rpt. in *The British Essayists*, ed. Alexander Chalmers (Boston, 1856), XXXIII, No. 61.


33. Erametsä, p. 70.


37. Mackenzie, *op. cit.*, XXXI, 187. See also XXXI, Nos. 88, 90.


41. "Importance of Shaftesbury," 293.


44. William Richardson, Essays On Shakespeare's Dramatic Characters, 6th ed. (London, 1818), p. 120.


46. Ibid., p. 135.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid., p. 144.

49. Ibid., p. 143.


52. See Humphreys, "Friend,"


58. For the fullest and certainly the finest treatment of Fielding's good-nature to date, see Essays On Fielding's Miscellanies, Henry Knight Miller (Princeton, 1961), pp. 54-88; 189-228 especially.


60. Moral Basis, p. 73.


63. Miller, p. 47.

64. Courtney Melmoth, Liberal Opinions, or The History of Benignus, 4 vols. (London, 1783). All quotations are from this edition.

65. Whitney, p. 66.


69. For further examples and a brief discussion of sensibility leading to misanthropy and suicide see Foster, pp. 175 ff.
II

EIGHTEENTH CENTURY MISANTHROPY AND THE TRADITION

Plato states his famous definition of misanthropy and its causes in the *Phaedo*:

Misanthropy arises out of the too great confidence of inexperience; -- you trust a man and think him altogether true and sound and faithful, and then in a little while he turns out to be false and knavish; and then another and another, and when this has happened several times to a man, especially when it happens among those whom he deems to be his own most trusted and familiar friends, after many disappointments he at last hates all men, and believes that no one has any good in him at all. . . . Is it not obvious that such a one was attempting to deal with other men before he had acquired the art of human relationships? This art would have taught him the true state of the case, that few are the good and few the evil, and that the great majority are in the interval between them.

The chief sin of the misanthrope is excess; before he becomes a misanthrope he is excessively benevolent and credulous; as a misanthrope he is excessive in his hatred. The natural movement of the misanthrope is, then, away from the society of men, and the great misanthropes of literature, Timon, Alceste, Fielding's Man of the Hill, do repudiate the society which caused their misanthropy and eventually retire from the world. But a retired misanthrope does not offer an author too much to work with, especially if he is to be the central character of some work of literature. Authors have instead generally made the misanthrope a rail-
er; the result has been a close association of the misanthrope with the railing tradition of satire, with a strong emphasis on the excessive hatred behind the railing.

The railer type is ultimately traceable back to Thersites in the Iliad and has no necessary relationship with the misanthrope. R. C. Elliott, in his recent work on satire, concludes that "The misanthropes move in a different world from that of Thersites, Bricriu, and the rest . . . . Their diatribes are likely to be directed at Man rather than at individual men . . . ." 2 Although there is then in actuality no need for the misanthrope to rail at all, " . . . over the centuries, as the Timon story takes on its unique form, the convention develops that the misanthrope shall be frantically voluble in expressing his hatred of man. Whether he is a true 'railer' or not, the fact is that he rails superbly." 3 Thersites, the first recorded railer, is in a very real sense the archetype of the satiric persona, for from him stems the convention of invective and scurrilous abuse that distinguishes railing. From him also stems the mistrust of the satirist that society has always felt; for Thersites himself endures the mockery of Ulysses and the Greeks, indicating that his railing is the result of the blackest misanthropy and malice, and that the mocker himself can be mocked. 4

The moral purpose that later satirists claimed de-
rives from Diogenes and the cynic tradition rather than from Thersites. But the association of satire with the misanthropic Thersites type has always made this moral claim dubious. Diogenes and the cynics tried to inject into satire the moral purpose needed to preserve it from accusations of malice and ill-nature. As Diogenes Laertius records, Diogenes was famous throughout Greece for his vituperative and scurrilous speech: "He was great at pouring scorn on his contemporaries. . . . He would continually say that for the conduct of life we need right reason or a halter." But Diogenes's ethical purpose was well recognized, as Professor Fiske has shown in his exhaustive treatment of the subject of Menippean satire.

In the long run the subjects treated by the cynic philosophers in their writings have remained the core from which every satirist has drawn for his recommendation of virtue. Satire, and particularly formal verse satire, for example, traditionally contains a two part structure. In the first part the satiric persona lashes the vices of the times; in the second part he forcefully recommends various virtues. In his stance of moral superiority the satirist more often than not spends most of his time lashing vice; but even if he does not explicitly state the virtues, they are always implied as the opposite of the castigated vices. This "opposite" can usually be traced to the cynics. In Professor Fiske's words: "Diogenes, the cynic, is the first
to formulate the method and to some extent the content of a long tradition of Cynic-Stoic oral and literary discourses. The favorite themes of such preaching are the disregard of material advantage, the recognition of virtue as the highest good, the self-sufficiency of the ideal wise man, and the complete indifference to the ordinary objects of human desire and to the ordinary conventions of society."

The historical fact that satire as a literary genre began in the works of such Cynical moral philosophers as Bion and Menippus and in the oral tradition of Diogenes has always encouraged later satirists to claim a conscious moral purpose for their satire, and as such to assume a pose of moral superiority. In theory, at least, the later Roman and then the Renaissance critics insisted that satire have a moral purpose. From his study of Roman critical theory Fiske concludes:

It is clear . . . that the type of humor illustrated by the Old Comedy and Xpelai in Greece, by the plays of Plautus and the apothegms of Cato in Rome, was in the main regarded by the critical theories of the Romans as appropriate to the spirit of Latin satire, while the unrestrained, coarse, and obscene humor and lack of moral purpose . . . met with disapproval. This disapproval was mainly based on the fact that these humorous genres indulge in laughter for laugher's sake. They do not subject laughter to the restraints of reason and ethical purpose demanded by the ancient rhetorical theory of the liberal jest.

With dry humor Mary Claire Randolph, in her exhaustive study of Renaissance satiric theory, confirms the continuation of the Roman concept: "... practically every critic and sat-
irist in the Renaissance hammers out the same monotonous theme -- that satire exists only as the fearsome Nemesis of vice. . . . Practically every critic-author takes the dreary, semi-sorrowful, righteous attitude that he personally is offended to the very marrow."

Unfortunately that freedom of speech, which Diogenes held to be the most beautiful thing in the world, casts serious doubt on the moral purpose of the satirist and on the reality of his good nature. The Roman movement from the grand style to the plain style of satire is a well known example of the attempt to remove the doubts and to confirm the good nature of the satirist. The literary circle centered about Scipio urged the ironic or Socratic humor over the grand style with its *carmen maledictum ad vitia hominum carpendum*. If the satirist feels the need to show anger at the vices of men, Panatius, the critic of the coterie, warns that he "must show that this anger is designed to effect a reform in the character of the person thus re-proved; real anger must be far from us." But the satirist has always been on the defensive, and his many protests of sincerity strongly indicate that perhaps he is protesting too much. The history of satire indeed shows that satirists often harmed their own cause by permitting the persona to admit that this moral indignation is only a mask hiding the very vices he is lashing; that there is a large difference between his private and public life. Cicero
noted that this seemed to be quite characteristic of satire in general, and modern critics have pointed out the exploitation of this convention by Renaissance satirists.\textsuperscript{13} If, however, the satirist himself becomes satirized, the whole moral purpose of satire is ultimately called into question, and the satirist is revealed as an unpleasant, malicious scoundrel. Very few readers make the fine distinction between the persona and the man creating the persona.

Kerman's recent study of the Renaissance use of the satirist-satirized convention convincingly demonstrates the problem it posed for the satirist who did not desire the irony of the convention. It is a commonplace that after the ecclesiastical interdict on verse satire the satirists turned their talents to the theatre. As Kerman points out, they carried the satirist-satirized convention with them, and to writers like Ben Jonson this could mean only the eventual undermining of their own serious "comical satyre."\textsuperscript{14} Jonson's first attempt to resolve the problem resulted in a cumbersome use of dual satirists. In \textit{Every Man Out of His Humour}, Macilente is the typical railing satirist full of malice and ill-will. Asper, on the other hand, has all of the virtues, but none of the defects of the satirist. He only assumes the ill-nature of Macilente in order to present the play and reform the characters; he is the true satirist recommended by Panaetius. Jonson dropped the dual
satirists in Cynthia's Revels and Poetaster, and, as Kernan points out, his use of the good-natured satirist alone is rather ineffectual.\textsuperscript{15}

The misanthrope has been quite easily integrated into the satirist-satirized convention with all of its ironies. What the misanthrope as a railing satirist says about the vices of men and society may be true, and usually is; but the traditional excess of his denunciations turns him into an easy target for satire as well; his excessive hatred is, in the final analysis, as irrational as the vices he is lashing. Lucian's characterization of Timon clearly establishes the tradition. Lucian's Hermes argues that Timon's misanthropy resulted from excessive benevolence, which is in reality pure folly: "'Well, you might say that he was ruined by kind-heartedness and philanthropy and compassion on all those who were in want; but in reality it was senselessness and folly and lack of discrimination in regard to his friends. He did not perceive that he was showing kindness to ravens and wolves. . . .'"\textsuperscript{16} Timon has swung, however, from one extreme to the other. To Hermes he raves "'For my part, I should be content if I could bring sorrow to the whole world, young and old alike!'" (II 367). Hermes' simple reply underscores the irony of the entire dialogue: "'Don't say that, my friend; they do not all deserve sorrow!'" (Ibid.). Elliott concludes that ". . . the whole
weight of the dialogue demonstrates that Timon's indis- 
criminate rage and hatred make for comical folly. The 
railer, like Thersites . . . is mocked."¹⁷ The misan-
thrope's traditional excessive hatred has pointed up the 
revenge, spite, and ill-will of his railings, and by sim-
ple association, the railing of every other satirist has 
been shrouded with suspicions of misanthropy.¹⁸

The exact nature of the satire aimed at the two most 
famous misanthropes in literature, Shakespeare's Timon and 
Molière's Alceste, is the subject of much contention be-
cause it is difficult to decide whether we should praise 
the nobility of their moral standards more than we should 
ridicule their excessive hatred.¹⁹ As a rule, however, the 
misanthrope was the subject of scorn and contempt, as the 
character books of the seventeenth century indicate. In 
the "characters" the misanthrope was generally a victim of 
the spleen, a humorous type, which like all forms of humor 
up until the eighteenth century, "were follies and vices 
to be lashed." Although the term humor did appear in di-
verse senses, as E. N. Hooker shows, "still the thing in 
whatever guise was likely to provoke a single attitude: 
disapproval or contempt."²⁰

The long line of blunt men, malcontents, and misan-
thropes that extend from Theophrastus through the eight-
eenth century points out the contempt held for the type.
In his mildest form the misanthrope appears as Theophrastus's "Grumbler," Earle's "Blunt Man," or Dr. Johnson's "Contentious Man." In his most surly form he is a Diogenes satirized; he "Cals each man knaue he meets, but be it knowne,/That title he doth give them, is his owne." His most popular appearance, however, was in the role of the melancholy cynic malcontent, suffering from an excess of the spleen, which resulted in melancholy, "captious anger," or a combination of both. The exact degree of contempt in which he was held by the seventeenth century is more difficult to gage than some recent scholars would tend to indicate. Professor Campbell (although he insists on the distinction between the melancholic and the malcontent, or spleen as melancholy and spleen as "captious anger") considers both as objects of scorn and laughter, satirists satirized; Professor Babb would like to mitigate the satire to "tolerant amusement." Both, however, have Shakespeare's Jaques in the background, and he undoubtedly exhibits far more good-nature than the type portrayed in the usual character sketches. In either case both the splenetic melancholic and the splenetic malcontent are good satirists and both are misanthropes.

The character books satirize the malcontent in no uncertain terms; but the reason for the contempt is not that he was a satirist, but a fraud, a malicious scoundrel
using the mask of virtuous indignation to hide his own
vices. To Bishop Hall he is "a querulous curre" who speaks
nothing but "Satyres, and libels." He is a slave to envie
and would be a conspirator if fear did not prohibit him. 24
Barnaby Rich sees the melancholy and cynicism as vain
affectation "as if he would haue it said, Loe, yonder goes
the melancholy gentleman: see there vertue and wisdome
both despised and neglected..." 25 Samuel Rowlands
satirizes him in The Melancholie Knight:

Like discontented Tymon in his Cell
My braines with melancholy humers swell,
I crosse mine armes at crosses that arise,
And scoffe blinde Fortune, with hat ore mine eyes:
I bid the world take notice I abhorre it,
Having great melancholy reason for it. 26

Tolerant amusement seems too tame for the satire in these
descriptions. Babb's more benign view of the melancholy
cynic is undoubtedly colored by the more generally preva-
lent eighteenth century sympathy for Shakespeare's Jaques.
Jaques' milder form of melancholy and cynicism seemed more
adaptable to the concept of amiable humor that arose later
and which we will consider below. In any case the splenetic
character was expected to have a satiric wit, whether
his spleen was affected or real. Congreve presents the
argument in its clearest form, and one must remember that
to Congreve the humorous character was an object of ridi-
cule:

The saying of humourous things does not distin-
guish characters, for every person in a comedy
may be allowed to speak them. From a witty man they are expected, and even a fool may stumble on 'em by chance. Tho' I make a difference betwixt Wit and Humour, yet I do not think that humourous characters exclude Wit. No, but the manner of Wit should be adapted to the Humour. As for instance, a character of splenetic and peevish Humour should have a satirical Wit. A jolly and sanguine Humour should have a facetious Wit. The former should speak positively, the latter carelessly, for the former observes and shows things as they are; the latter, rather overlooks Nature and speaks things as he would have them. . . .”

The recent critical attempts to show that Wycherley's Manly is an object of scorn and not really a "plain-dealer" are ultimately based on the seventeenth century scorn for the splenetic humorist. He is in the final analysis the satirist satirized.

Critics generally blame the rise of the sentimental view of man for the decline of verse satire and the satiric spirit in general. While there is a certain amount of truth in such an accusation, it needs a great deal of qualification. Much of what J. M. S. Tompkins calls the "crude humor" in the fiction of the eighteenth century is a result of the attempt to find new methods of presenting satire and humor. Sentimentalism is often an indirect rather than a direct cause of satire's decline, and in one sense deserves credit for many of the finest "characters" in English literature.

The eighteenth century saw the satirists of the Elizabetan and Restoration Ages exactly as they often pre-
tended to be: malicious and ill-natured. The writers of
the eighteenth century may not have seen all the complexi-
ties involved in the satirist-satirized convention, but
they clearly understood the result of such a convention
and how it appeared to undermine the avowed moral purport
of satire. Moralists did not call so much for the end of
satire as for the assurance that the satirist was good-
natured. In Clarissa Richardson argues that "True Satire
must be founded in good nature, and directed by a right
heart." "When Satire is personal, and aims to expose rather
than to ammend the subject of it; how, tho' it were to be
just, can it be useful?" Thus, "Friendly Satire may be
compared to a fine lancet, which gently breathes a vein
for health sake; the malevolent Satire to a broad sword
which lets, into the gashes it makes, the air of public
ridicule."31 Steele in the Tatler and Spectator insists
again and again that the basis of a true satirist is
good-nature: "I concluded, however unaccountable the as-
sertion might appear at first sight, that good-nature was
an essential quality in a satirist. . . ."32

The chief problem involved in creating such satire
is proving that the satirist is good-natured. It is the
same problem Jonson tried rather unsuccessfully to solve;
if one reduces the satirist's invective and railing to mere
kindly admonition, his effectiveness as a satirist is re-
duced as well. Whitehead's short poem, "On Ridicule," rather clearly and concisely states the whole case for and against satire:

We oft, 'tis true, mistake the sat'rist's aim,
Not arts themselves, but their abuse they blame.
Yet if, crusaders like, their zeal be rage,
They hurt the cause in which their arms engage.
Readers are few, who nice distinctions form,
Supinely cool, or credulously warm.\(^3\)

But even if the reader cannot make nice distinctions, it is not always clear that the satirist is really making them himself:

Yet sure, ev'n here, our motives should be known:
Rail we to check his spleen, or ease our own?
Does injur'd virtue ev'ry shaft supply,
Arm the keen tongue, and flush th' erected eye?
Or do we from ourselves ourselves disguise?
And act, perhaps, the villains we chastise?
(XVII 207)

The moralists were not then asking of satire any more than it traditionally professed to be; but they were asking more than it traditionally was. They drew a clear distinction between "true" satire and malevolent satire with which the rather ambiguous satire of the satirist-satirized convention seemed to belong.

Although historically the misanthrope-railer has been closely connected with the excess of the Timon tradition, and hence with the satirist-satirized convention, there is no inherent reason for this in the character of the misanthrope himself. Even Plato implies that he is basically a virtuous man, and certainly in the tradition as it devel-
oped from Lucian, benevolence, though excessive, forms an integral part of his pre-man-hater character. As a satirist he partakes of the cynic conventions, and there is no real reason why his railing could not stem from a desire to reform as easily as from a desire to hurt. In this sense the misanthrope would participate in the ideal moral purpose of satire. The alternative always remained a latent possibility with which the dilemma of the duped and frustrated man of feeling tending towards misanthropy could be easily identified. The emphasis shifted from the hatred of the misanthrope to his underlying benevolence.

As long as the misanthrope retained his associations with the excessive hatred behind the railing of the Timon tradition, he would remain an odious character, for he was in need of reform just as much as the people he satirized. Certainly the most obvious way to point out a misanthrope's benevolence is simply to reform him and return him to society a more cautious man. In this case the misanthrope's refined feelings are guarded while his benevolence continues in active charity. The literature of the eighteenth century is dotted with reformed misanthropes like Cumberland's Penruddock, Kotzebue's Henry, and Villiers's Chaubert.34 Marmontel even cured Molière's Alceste and gave him a virtuous young wife to assist him in restraining his virtuous indignation over the vice of society.35 Such a shift from
ridicule to reformation implies that the underlying moral worth of the misanthrope be taken much more seriously than the ridicule of his excessive hatred. In 1753 Mrs. Elizabeth Montagu's description of Alceste clearly reflects the beginning of a change in viewpoint:

... when virtue and wisdom live out of the world, they grow delicate, but it is too severe to call that moroseness; and, perhaps, they lose something of their purity, when they mix with the crowd, and abate in strength, as they improve in flexibility. There is a limit, and a short one too, beyond which human virtue cannot go; a hair's breadth beyond the line, and it is vice. ... The character [of Alceste] being so entirely kept up, and the error, though every where visible, no where monstrous. ... right in principle, wrong only in excess, you cannot hate him when he is unpleasant, nor despise him when he is absurd. When the groundwork of a character is virtuous, whatever fantastic forms or uncouth figures may be wrought upon it, it cannot appear absolutely odious or ridiculous.36

The tone of Mrs. Montagu's letter indicates a movement away from the misanthrope as an object of scorn and ridicule towards a more sympathetic appreciation of his virtues. She clearly recognizes that Alceste is satirized for his excessive hatred, but she would mitigate the severity of the satire in view of his essential nobility.

By 1771 even Harley, the man of feeling, could appreciate the moral stand of an extreme misanthrope: "I cannot say ... that his remarks are of the pleasant kind; it is curious to observe how the nature of truth may be changed by the garb it wears; softened to the admonition of friendship, or soured with the severity of reproof; yet
this severity may be useful to some tempers; it somewhat resembles a file: disagreeable in its operation, but hard metals may be the brighter for it" (p. 29). By 1779 there was very little belief in the extreme misanthropy of blackest hue, for misanthropy now seemed the result of frustration in the man of feeling, who, as Mackenzie wrote in Mirror No. 39 (1779), resented the world for not measuring up to his standard of morality (XXVIII 228). Even Dugald Stewart, in his essay on the passions, felt obliged to mention that "peculiar species of misanthropy which is grafted on a worthy and benevolent heart," the result of a man of feeling's false refinement of taste.\(^{37}\) It should be removed, as Marmontel indicates, by work and activity. While this "peculiar species of misanthropy" was certainly not recommended, its connection with benevolence and the man of feeling indicates that the excess and hatred of the Timon type have been obscured.

This shifting of attention away from the hatred attributed to the misanthrope certainly reflected the contemporary sentimental view of man. In a more important sense, however, it contained the seeds of a revived concept of satire. The excessive hatred of the Timon misanthrope offered the satirist the opportunity of creating a penetrating ironic tension between the truth of his persona's invective and the implied satire of the persona himself. The
emphasis on the essential benevolence of the misanthrope, on the other hand, opened the door to the good-natured satirist required by such critics as Steele and Richardson: By retaining the misanthrope's ability to rail along with his benevolence the good-natured satiric convention could be clearly established. Thus benevolence means to the good-natured satiric convention what hatred means to the satirist-satirized convention. As a satirist, however, the good-natured misanthrope gains in satiric power. In the first place Steele's paradox of the good-natured satirist certainly holds true, and the ironic tension between speculative misanthropy and actual good deeds replaces the ambiguous irony in the satirist-satirized convention. In a much deeper sense, however, this new satiric persona calls into question the whole theory of benevolence in human nature, since the new misanthrope is really a man of feeling forced into the position of a satirist to protect himself from imposition and to castigate a society which ironically believes that men are naturally good.

Miss Montagu wrote her critique of Alceste in 1753; but the new climate of opinion looked back several years to such diverse people as Shaftesbury, Hume, and Swift. In their writings we can see the philosophical and ethical arguments that support the paradoxical union of misanthropy and benevolence. Shaftesbury's tribute to cynic philosophy
in his essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour is undoubtedly mere lip service to the theory of moral purpose behind cynic railing, but it is phrased in a way that becomes significant in the later presentation of the misanthrope:

... the gentlemen for whom I am apologising cannot however be called hypocrites. They speak as ill of themselves as they possibly can. If they have hard thoughts of human nature, 'tis a proof still of their humanity that they give such warning to the world. If they represent men by nature treacherous and wild, 'tis out of care for mankind, lest by being too game and trusting, they should easily be caught.38

The passage is essentially a paraphrase of Epictetus's famous description of a true cynic,39 but it interestingly lays stress on the philanthropy behind such railing. This same recognition of philanthropic purpose behind apparently misanthropic invective is admitted by David Hume in 1741, although he himself thinks it is more advantageous to virtue to think well of man: "I am far from thinking, that all those, who have depreciated our species, have been enemies to virtue, and have exposed the frailties of their fellow creatures with any bad intention. On the contrary, I am sensible that a delicate sense of morals, especially when attended with a splenetic temper (originally ... with somewhat of the Misanthrope), is apt to give a man a disgust of the world, and to make him consider the common course of human affairs with too much indignation."40

Both of these statements shed much light on Swift's
more famous statements on misanthropy and form a frame of reference that makes Swift's arguments more meaningful.

In one sense Swift's statements are Shaftesbury's and Hume's theories actualized:

... when you think of the world give it one lash the more at my request. I have ever hated all nations, professions, and communities, and all my love is towards individuals. ... But principally I hate and detest that animal called man, although I heartily love John, Peter, Thomas, and so forth. ... I have got materials toward a treatise, proving the falsity of that definition animal ratione, and to show it would be only rationis capax. Upon this great foundation of misanthropy, though not in Timon's manner, the whole building of my Travels is erected. ... 41

Swift's concept of misanthropy elaborates and realizes the theoretical views of Shaftesbury and Hume, but the idea itself ultimately derives from La Bruyère's similar comment:

Nothing is of greater assistance to a man for bearing quietly the wrongs done to him by relatives and friends than his reflections on the vices of humanity. ... ... he may dislike mankind in general for having no greater respect for virtue; but he finds excuses for individuals, and even loves them from higher motives, whilst he does his best to require himself as little indulgence as possible. 42

La Bruyère's reference to higher motives indicates the peculiar Christian context in which such a concept of love for the particular can thrive.

The modern philosophical school of personalism, more or less headed by Emmanuel Mounier in France, has done much to elucidate the development of the great regard for the individual person in traditional Christianity. 43 Ultimately
the worth of the person in Christianity stems from the Christian doctrine of personal salvation. The idea of the person was, of course, not completely absent from Greek philosophy, as Socrates's famous dictum reminds us, but as Professor Knudson writes, "... the central idea of personalism, the unique significance of personality, owes its origin to Christian influence." Mounier himself rather succintly summarizes the whole concept as it is elaborated in Christianity:

The unity of the human race is for the first time fully affirmed and doubly confirmed: every person is created in the image of God, every person is called to the formation of one immense Body, mystical and physical, in the charity of Christ. ... Even the conception of the Trinity, emerging from two centuries of controversy, produces the astounding idea of a Supreme Being which is an intimate dialogue between persons, and is of its very essence the negation of solitude.  

In his extended essay on Christian Personalism, Gilson reminds us that perhaps the whole Christian importance of the person is best summed up in St. Thomas's statement that "Person signifies what is most perfect in all nature..."  

In the late seventeenth century Locke fanned the flames for personalism when he separated the concept of person from the body. By making consciousness the principle of personal identity, and not the body, he seemed to be denying the personal resurrection at the Last Day, or at least Bishop Butler and other divines thought. At any rate Locke was obliged to add a paragraph intended to clear
up this difficulty: "And thus may we be able, without any difficulty, to conceive the same person at the resurrection, though in a body not exactly in make or parts the same which he had here, -- the same consciousness going along with the soul that inhabits it." In the context of a personal resurrection the individual person becomes more important than the species. As Gilson comments, "Humanity exists in each man, and, indeed, it is because they are men that the human species exists."

Mounier's statement above points out the inherent paradox in the concept of personalism; the movement of love for the individual is not towards isolationism, but towards communication, society, and ultimately the species. The image of the Trinity forming a society is particularly relevant if we consider the famous metaphor of love which several mystics have used in describing the Trinity; the self-sufficient Father's excessive love generates the Son (the Word) and the love of the Son and the Father for each other generates the Holy Spirit. Essentially the concept of the Trinity is an extension of the paradox of the self-sufficient God versus the God of plenitude which Lovejoy has brilliantly explored in The Great Chain of Being. The paradox, as Lovejoy points out, descends to us from Plato; Christianity gave it an added mystical tone in the doctrine of the Trinity and the creation ex nihilo. It is noteworthy
that all eighteenth century doctrines of benevolence move from particular love for family and friends to embrace the whole universe. The ability to maintain both sides of the paradox helps us to account for that peculiar eighteenth century habit of making "self-love and social the same," of moving easily from the individual to the community. Mounier connects the two sides of the paradox at the same time he illuminates its relevance for the eighteenth century: "The conception of a human race with a collective history and destiny, from which no individual destiny can be separated, is one of the sovereign ideas of the Fathers of the Church. In a secularized form, this is the animating principle of eighteenth century cosmopolitanism. . . . . . "Personalism is against every form of racism or of caste, against the 'elimination of the abnormal'. . . . . "

Swift's statement thus emphasizes one side of the paradox at the expense of the other, while still remaining perfectly orthodox. As a satirist he makes the moral purpose of his satire a benevolent attempt to reform the general. But it is significant that Swift did not maintain the paradox, for his concept of two types of misanthropy creates an irony which offers a whole new life to the misanthropic raider. It offers him good nature as well as the right to rail for the benefit of the species. Shaftesbury,
for example, attempted to maintain the paradox in Theocles's lecture to Philocles. Philocles, however, is like Swift, and cannot understand: "As for plain natural love of one single person in either sex, I could compass it, I thought, well enough; but this complex, universal sort was beyond my reach. I could love the individual, but not the species." In the long run Swift's type of misanthropy has ironically more universal benevolence than the benevolent theories of the eighteenth century philosophers. Swift's misanthropy lacks anger, as he writes to Pope in 1725: "I tell you after all, that I do not hate mankind: it is vous autres who hate them, because you would have them reasonable animals, and are angry for being disappointed."57

Critical recognition of the good-natured misanthropic satirist did not achieve full discussion until the type had been already developed for several years. Before examining the actual literary characters that resulted from this union of good-nature and misanthropy, it would be well to understand the development of the critical theory, since it will give us an avenue of approach to the characters themselves. Although Percival Stockdale's Essay on Misanthropy did not appear until 1783, almost ten years after the first critical discussion, his clear explanation of the kinds of misanthropy merits a consideration of it out of chronological sequence. The essay has further importance for the light
it sheds on the current arguments over Swift's misanthropy. Stockdale intended his essay to defend Swift from the charges of misanthropy and to show the moral purpose of Swift's satire. In his critical discussion the speculative misanthrope is a man of feeling forced by the reality of a corrupt world to be a cynic, although he retains his active benevolence. Like Swift, Stockdale distinguishes two types of misanthropy:

There are two kinds of misanthropy: the one is to be avoided as our seducer to most odious and dangerous errors; as the foe to our dignity, and the bane of our happiness. The other we ought carefully to study. . . . This latter misanthropy will keep us calm and serene amid the tumults of life. It will arm us completely against the selfishness, malignity, and barbarity of mankind. . . . . . . and, however paradoxical the assertion may seem, it will tend to make us good Christians: It will warm and dilate our hearts with the tenderest and most expanded humanity; and it will adorn our conduct with universal and active benevolence.58

The first misanthrope, because of "a naturally splenetic disposition, or from a long series of misfortunes, and ill treatment, which hath chagrined, and soured his mind, rails at human nature, with a childish, or doating petulance, and clamor. ..."59 The second misanthrope, however, is as acute, and severe in his observations, as he is gentle, and placid in his conduct. He cannot but be convinced, that the majority of mankind are under the fatal domain of vice. ... he is ... conscious that a noble pre-eminence in virtue is the inestimable attainment but of a few. ... Thus, however zealous he may be, with all the means that
he can command, to discourage, and reform, our abuse of power . . . and the other moral irregularities which men, every day, commit; he opposes these evil habits with a generous ardour, but not with a cynical rancour; for . . . he suppresses . . . [too virulent an indignation] by a consciousness that he feels a frequent propensity to these vices himself . . . Thus the very little principle of self-love is transmuted, and expanded into the humanest sympathy with his fellow-creatures; into universal benevolence. . . ."60 Hence the true philosopher, who looks about and sees the vices and follies of men, "must, undoubtedly, be a speculative misanthrope."61 But this misanthropy is accompanied by "compassion rather than resentment. . . ."62 In Stockdale's description the misanthrope has become a man of feeling permitted to rail because his railing is purely intended for reform; no one can doubt his sincerity because he demonstrates his active benevolence by his good deeds to individuals.

Stockdale's elaboration of the good-natured misanthrope was not, however, a novelty in 1783. The concept had been discussed by William Richardson in his Essays on Shakespeare's Dramatic Character (1774) and by Mackenzie in the Mirror essays on Hamlet and misanthropy in 1780 and 1779 respectively. Finally, Craig completed the theory in his Lounger essay No. 91 in 1785. Richardson's discussion of the character of Jaques' attempts to exculpate what to
him is an apparent inconsistency in Shakespeare: Jaques's most striking characteristic is sensibility, which should foster the social affections; Jaques, however, is misanthropical and anti-social. Richardson explains very simply that as a man of feeling, Jaques had come into the world "prepossessed in favour of mankind" and when the "fairy vision" vanished, found himself alone "in the midst of a selfish and deceitful world." His frustrated benevolence and ambitions caused a mixture of melancholy and misanthropy (the former causes inveighing for the purpose of reform, and the latter breathes only revenge and malignancy) which is more agreeable than either one alone. The result of this tempered misanthropy is a good-natured satirist whom we willingly listen to: "... As benevolence and sensibility are manifest in the temper of Jaques, we are not offended with his severity. By the oddity of his manner, by the keenness of his remarks, and the shrewdness of his observations, while we are instructed, we are also amused. ... His sadness, of a mild and gentle nature, recommends him to our regard; his humour amuses." The chief final characteristic, according to Richardson, is his wisdom, which like Solomon's, comes from experience, for he had been a libertine in his youth. Richardson's view of Timon clearly reveals the two types of misanthropy about which Richardson is talking: Timon is not a man of feeling; his railing deserves pity at the best, for all his
supposed benevolence is really extravagance resulting from his "love of distinction." Timon's bitterness is excessive and inhuman, and definitely does not arise from his fine sensibilities. 67

Craig's essay on misanthropy in Lounzer 91 (1785), which also uses Jaques and Timon for its chief examples, is the culmination of the critical theory and clearly refers back to Swift's famous dictum. Craig asserts that misanthropy is the obvious result of the collision of a "man of delicacy" with the world. The misanthropy of the man of feeling, however, "will not . . . be that species of misanthropy which takes delight in the miseries of mankind; on the contrary, it will be a feeling of disgust arising from disappointed benevolence, mingled with pity and compassion for the follies and weaknesses of men. I doubt much if there exists in the world a complete misanthrope, in the darkest sense of that word, -- a person who takes pleasure in the wretchedness of others. . . . the misanthropy of which I speak is of a much softer kind, and borders on the highest degree of philanthropy. It seems indeed to be the child of philanthropy, and to proceed from too much sensibility, hurt by disappointment in the benevolent and amiable feelings." 68 As Swift originally argued, this type of misanthropy, "though he may think ill of the species, . . . will be kind to individuals; he may dislike man, but will assist John or James." 69 Craig refers to
Hamlet, Jaques, and Timon as examples of his argument. He argues, however, that Jaques is a better and more consistent misanthrope than Hamlet, although the misanthropy of both "proceeds from excess of tenderness, from too much sensibility to the evils of the world, and the faults of mankind," because his misanthropy results in acts of benevolence in addition to railing. Hamlet's inconsistency is that his misanthropy paralyzes his will and is not the speculative mask for his good deeds, as is Jaques's. Timon, of course, is out of the running, since his misanthropy arises merely from "a selfish sense of the ingratitude of others to himself." Jaques's misanthropy does not proceed from "any misfortune peculiar to himself, but . . . from a general feeling of the vanity of the world, and the folly of those engaged in its pursuits."\(^7\) The misanthropy of this good-natured misanthrope is clearly then not just the mere guise Stuart Tave intimates,\(^7\) nor is it simply a conflict between the head and the heart. At least according to the critics we have been examining, the conflict is more truly a reconciliation of feeling and reason, than a conflict.

The entire concept of loving the particular person is in rather close accord with the new concept of humor that arose in the eighteenth century, wherein humor shifted from a ridiculous oddity to be satirized to an amiable eccentricity to be loved. Richardson, Craig, and Mackenzie all
use Hamlet and Jaques, traditional melancholy humorists, as their examples of the good-natured misanthropic type. In point of time, however, Corbyn Morris's depiction of a "humorist" in his *Essay on Wit and Humour* (1744) anticipates them; his humorist appears to be the more splenetic of the character book melancholy malcontents, and yet he considers him both loveable and benevolent, if not completely good natured.

Stuart Tave's discussion of Morris appears to be quite misleading, for he applies Morris's definition of a humorist to any eccentric person, whereas Morris very carefully uses the term for only one type, clearly the splenetic type: for Tave the term humorist is a genus, for Morris, on the other hand, it is a species under the genus.\(^{72}\) Morris carefully defines humor in the eighteenth century sense: "... Humour extensively and fully understood, is any remarkable Oddity or Foible belonging to a Person in real Life; whether this Foible be constitutional, habitual, or only affected; whether partial in one or two circumstances; or tinging the whole Temper and Conduct of the Person."\(^{73}\) The subjects of humors are not humorists, but characters: "If a Person in real Life, discovers any odd and remarkable Features of Temper or Conduct, I call such a Person in the Book of Mankind, a Character. So that the chief Subjects of Humour are Persons in real Life, who are Characters."\(^{74}\)
A man of humor is one "who can happily exhibit and expose the Oddities and Foibles of an Humourist, or of other Characters." Hence a humorist is one type of character, a species, not a genus. Morris confirms this contention when he concludes his long description of a humorist by saying: "In writing to Englishmen, who are generally tinged, deeply or slightly, with the Dye of the Humourist, it seemd not improper to insist the longer upon this Character. . . ." An examination of the qualities of Morris's humorist clearly places him in the category of the melancholy malcontent so satirized by the seventeenth, and yet to the contemporary non-English man so representative of the English type of the eighteenth century. The humorist (a) disdains all ostentation except that of his freedom and independency; (b) scorns all imitation of others and "contemns the rest of the World for being servilely obedient to Forms and Customs;" (c) is pleased to have his opinions slighted, for it proves to him that others are addicted to Folly and weakness; (d) considers himself in the world as the only sober person among a company of drunken men. These characteristics however, contribute to the formation of a good-natured misanthrope: "It is He only, the Humourist, that has the Courage and Honesty to cry out, unmov'd by personal Resentment. . . ." The humorist is then a satirist checking the frauds of every profession which "feel[s] the Lash of his Censure." Though he lashes folly with his satire,
he is still a benevolent man: "... no Person has certainly a quicker Feeling; and there are Instances frequent, of greater Generosity and human Warmth flowing from an Humourist, than are capable of proceeding from a weak Insipid, who labours under a continual Flux of Civility." As he grows old he becomes uneasy and fatigued by the constant view of the same follies, so that he "drags on the Remainder of his Life, in a State of War with the rest of Mankind." 

Morris's humorist, with a little more emphasis on good-nature, is essentially the sentimental misanthrope portrayed by Richardson, Mackenzie, and Craig. Morris dwells more on the misanthropic elements of the type while the other critics emphasize his good-nature; but taken together, we have an amazing reconciliation of opposites that, in theory, at least, offers a solution to the problem of good-natured satire.

The good-natured misanthrope is, of course, one type of the amiable humorist, but a type that received extensive use in the literature of the eighteenth century. In his satiric role he is closely connected with the new theories of laughter that developed with the new theory of humor. As Stuart Tave demonstrates, Lord Kames's definition of laughter gradually replaced Hobbes's famous laughter of superiority. For Kames, true laughter is the laughter of mirth caused by a risible object. Hobbes's laughter is for him not true laughter because it is not pure mirth,
but rather a mixture of mirth and contempt caused by a ri-
diculous object. The risible, or to use Beattie's term
which became more popular, the ludicrous, resulted from
the incongruous. The amiable humorist causes the laughter
of mirth, because he is ludicrous, a combination of incon-
gruities. 82

This new view of laughter did not in any way change
the essential purpose of comedy and satire, which, as Draper
argues, attempted in theory to arouse the laughter of ridi-
cule for contemptible objects. 83 No one pretends, of course,
that in practice much of the comedy of the eighteenth cen-
tury aroused laughter of any kind. But, as Professor
Sherbo points out, many attempts were made to provide risi-
ble laughter, mainly in the form of amiable humor. 84 Tomp-
kins and Foster have ably shown that the same attempts were
made in the novel. 85 The result was generally crude, but
the few great successes in amiable humor seems to have made
the experimentation worth while. In the context of amiable
humor the good-natured misanthrope is rather unusual: as
an amiable humorist he is intended to arouse mirthful laug-
ther at himself; but as a satirist he is supposed to arouse
the laughter of ridicule at the objects of his satire. The
laughter of ridicule naturally falls into the background,
since the primary laughter of mirth arises from the ludic-
crous combination of misanthropy and sensibility. But the
satiric laughter always hovers close by, and in some of the finest examples of the type the good-nature of the misanthrope tinges the asperity of his satire with a rich irony that only a mixture of satire and sentiment could achieve.
NOTES

CHAPTER II


3. Ibid.


12. Quoted in Fiske, p. 115.

13. Cicero's comment is quoted in Fiske, p. 87; he also discusses the satirist-satirized convention at length, pp. 87 ff.

15. Ibid., pp. 158-63.


17. Elliott, p. 145.

18. Fielding continued this same tradition in his own version of the Lucianic dialogue between Diogenes and Alexander. See Miller, pp. 398-409. Miller’s citations of references to Diogenes are typical of eighteenth century hatred for a real cynic or misanthrope, as we shall discuss later in this chapter.

19. See for example Elliott’s chapter on Molière; Shakespeare’s Timon has received most attention from Oscar James Campbell, Shakespeare’s Satire (New York, 1943); J. C. Maxwell, “Introduction” to Timon of Athens (Cambridge edition) (Cambridge, 1957); William Empson, The Structure of Complex Words (London, 1951), pp. 177-178; and Elliott’s chapter on Shakespeare.


22. Sharpe, as cited in 21 above.


30. Tompkins, pp. 112 ff.


34. Penruddock is the hero of Cumberland's The Wheel of Fortune, which we will discuss in a later chapter. Schink translated Kotzebue's Misanthropy and Repentance as The Stranger in 1798; the hero is the misanthrope Henry. Chaubert first appeared as a character sketch in The Observer, Nos. 15-16. John Charles Villiers made him the hero of a tedious closet drama Chaubert, or the Misanthrope (London, 1789).


43. See for example such works as Emmanuel Mounier, Personalism (London, 1952); Albert C. Knudson, The Philosophy of Personalism (New York, 1927); Jacques Maritain, True Humanism (New York, 1938); Etienne Gilson, The
Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, tr. A. H. C. Downes (New York, 1936). In this country the University of California at Berkeley publishes a quarterly journal dedicated to personalist philosophy, The Personalist. Mounier's own journal is Esprit. To date the best short history of personism is Jean Plaquevent, "Individu et Personne, Esquisse Historique des Notions," Esprit, LXIV (1938), 578-608.

44. Knudson, as cited in 41 above, p. 21.

45. Mounier, Personalism, op. cit., p. xiv.


49. Locke, Ibid., 456-57.

50. Gilson, p. 198.

51. See, for example, St. Thomas Aquinas, ST, I, QXXVII, a3, "Whether any other Procession exists in God Besides That of the Word" and ST, I, QXXXVII, a2, "Whether the Father and the Son Love Each Other by the Holy Ghost," in Dominican translation, op. cit.


53. Ibid., Chapter II.

54. Pope's line on self-love and social is of course famous, as is Shaftesbury's rhapsody on nature. Scott comments on Hutcheson's movement from "calm self love to calm universal benevolence," op. cit., p. 202. Hume denied Universal Benevolence as impossible because the mind cannot comprehend such vast love; it can move only from family to a rather close circle of friends: see his A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selly-Bigge (Oxford, 1888), pp. 481; 602. Lord Kames held a quite similar view; see his Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion (Edinburgh, 1751), pp. 81 ff. Adam Smith is the prime example of the movement from

57. Letters, III, 293.
59. Ibid., p. 10.
60. Ibid., pp. 10-11.
61. Ibid., p. 17.
62. Ibid.
63. William Richardson, pp. 143-46.
64. Ibid., pp. 152-53.
65. Ibid., p. 155.
66. Ibid., p. 164.
67. Ibid., p. 313.
68. Lounger, op. cit., XXXI, No. 91, 274.
69. Ibid., 275.
70. Ibid., pp. 276; 278; 277.
72. See Tave, pp. 118 ff.
73. Corbyn Morris, An Essay Towards Fixing the True Standards of Wit, Humour, Raillery, Satire, and Ridicule (London, 1744), rpt. in The Augustan Reprint Society
Publications (Series One: Essays on Wit, No. 4), ed. James L. Clifford, p. 23.

74. Ibid., p. 12.
75. Ibid., p. 15.
76. Ibid., p. 22.
77. Ibid., pp. 15-20.
78. Ibid., p. 20.
79. Ibid., pp. 21-22.
80. Ibid., p. 21.
81. Tave, pp. 76-80.
82. Ibid., pp. 55 ff., 80.
84. See Arthur Sherbo, English Sentimental Drama (Lansing, 1957), pp. 4 ff. and Chapter IV.
85. See Tompkins, pp. 48 ff.; 113 ff., and Foster, Chapters I; IV; V; VIII. For an interesting brief summary, with many quotations, of the theories of laughter from Aristotle to the present, see Ralph Piddington, The Psychology of Laughter (London, 1933), pp. 152-221.
III

A NATION OF TIMONS

The essential features of the good-natured misanthrope can be clearly derived from the critical discussions we examined in the previous chapter. (1) As in the Timon tradition his chief role is still that of a satiric persona, and (2), like Timon, his misanthropy results from excessive benevolence. As he actually appears, however, he is very unlike Timon. The emphasis falls on his benevolence; (3) his railing proceeds not from hatred, but from his desire to reform, from a true philanthropy; and (4) he continues to perform good deeds, usually in secret, if possible. He is (5) probably elderly, or at least, as Richardson says, "experienced," for it is his experience in the ways of a corrupt world that inspires his railing; as in the case of Jaques, he might even have been a libertine in his youth. His misanthropic railing in turn becomes (6) a shield for his excessive sensibility, which has not abated, despite his experience. The result of this union of reason and feeling, of speculative misanthropy and practical philanthropy, is (7) a man of feeling midway between an open-hearted, unsuspicious Heartfree and the complete cynical detachment of a Man of the Hill. As such a median his satiric invective can be (8) directed at both gullible
benevolence, even universal benevolence, and at the dark 
misanthropy towards which a duped man of feeling would tend. 
He can thus in a sense have it both ways.

As a literary character, however, the good-natured 
misanthrope resembles the other amiable humorists of the 
eighteenth century: he seems to have neither a past nor a 
future, even though a past or future may be spoken of or 
 implied. As a satiric persona, he is detached from the 
scene, so that he almost has a life of his own outside of 
the work in which he appears. Such a lack of pedigree per-
mits him, as a satirist, always to be more or less a spec-
tator of the human scene, commenting on its vices or fol-
lies, but yet as a good-natured man always able to assist 
any actor in the scene. When he appears in novels and in 
the drama, his private life as a satirist often corresponds 
to his particular plot role, which is usually a benevolent 
friend, guide, or tutor. As a minor character he often 
plays the role of ironic commentator, or as a plot charac-
ter becomes an implied norm of sanity. As a major charac-
ter his role as satiric persona stands out; he represents 
the epitome of the good-natured satiric persona, and his 
role as an amiable humorist maintains a comic ethos in the 
work. His good nature displays itself not in talk but in 
action, thus fulfilling the law of active benevolence (as 
opposed to merely thinking well of mankind) which so char-
acterized the essays of the periodical writers of the eighteenth century. He is a man of feeling who puts his feelings into action at the same time that he prevents himself, as much as possible, from being duped by every sharper he meets.

In a certain sense the good-natured misanthrope is the logical consequence of the English malady, the spleen, which C. A. Moore and others have shown was so popular in the eighteenth century. The Englishman, as viewed by both himself and foreigners, not only tended to be an individualist, but usually a rather splenetic individualist. The more famous splentics are, perhaps, the gloomy melancholics, but the literature of the era also contains the more energetic ones, those who have the type of spleen that results in the captious anger of the satirist rather than melancholy. The most common role he plays is that of the blunt man, the "bourreau bienfaisant," a popular type throughout the period. As early as 1727 the French play-wright, Boissy, had rendered this type in the character of Jack Roastbeef in his Le François à Londres. When translated in 1755 the play was, for obvious reasons, dedicated to Foote and a comparison between Foote and Boissy clearly invited. The translator, however, was fairly certain that Foote would win the applause: "the rough Briton will, doubtless, give the Palm to you; for he loves sound Sense
When Voltaire returned from England in 1726 he contributed to the concept of the splenetic Englishmen in his discussion of English comedy, going so far as to describe the whole nation an island of misanthropes:

Les Anglais ont pris, ont déguisé, ont gâté la plupart des pièces de Molière. Ils ont voulu faire un Tartuffe. Il était impossible que ce sujet réussît à Londres: la raison en est qu'on ne se plait guère aux portraits des gens qu'on ne connaît pas. Un des grands avantages de la nation anglaise c'est qu'il y a point de tartufes chez elle. Pour qu'il y eût de faux dévots il faudrait qu'il y en eût de véritables. ... La philosophie, la liberté, et le climat, conduisent à la misanthropie: Londres, qui n'a point de tartufes, est plein de Timons.

Voltaire attempted to render this misanthropic character in the person of Freeport in his L'Ecosoise (1760), and he indeed succeeded in creating an embryonic good-natured misanthrope. Freeport's opinion of man is very low: "les hommes ne sont pas bons à grand'chose: fripons ou sots, voilà pour les trois quarts: et pour l'autre quart, il se tient chez soi" (439). Freeport claims that he is not naturally tender: he admires none, though he esteems many (440). But Freeport is as generous as he is gruff and blunt, known, as Fabrice says, by his generous actions (445-446). All that Freeport lacks to be a real misanthrope is the ability to rail, for structurally he contrasts with Frelon, a venemous satirist of the Timon variety.

The translation of the play made by Smollett and
company adheres pretty literally to Voltaire's text. But in 1767 Colman the elder adapted Voltaire's play, preserving the same characters, but making Freeport the central figure, and retitling it The English Merchant. Colman's Freeport also lacks the satiric qualities of the good-natured misanthrope and is still more in the line of the blunt man tradition. His combination of benevolence and bluntness is carefully stressed and is clearly what makes his character so attractive:

Mrs. Goodman: He is benevolence itself, Sir.

Mr. Spatter: Yes, and grossness itself too.
... He always cancels an obligation by the manner of conferring it; and does you a favour, as if he were going to knock you down. (I p. 6)

Like Voltaire's character, his railing is confined to a few minor remarks about three fourths of mankind being knaves, although he carefully tells the audience that his harshness results from the spleen. When he returns from his voyage, he remarks to Mrs. Goodman, "I have got money, but I have got the spleen too . . ." (II p. 22). Colman's character carefully repudiates all external signs of the man of feeling, although like Voltaire's character, he is indeed benevolence itself: "I have never cried in my life; and yet I can feel too; I can admire, I can esteem, but what signifies whimpering?" (II p. 23) Colman also emphasizes the typical misanthropic quality of doing good in secret: "Ah!
Mr. Freeport! you have been at your old trade. You are always endeavouring to do good actions in secret; but the world always finds you out, you see" (II p. 29). Freeport's distinction is that he does "the most essential service in less time than others take in making protestations" (III p. 40).

Colman played down Freeport's railing in favor of his bluntness, although his change of Frelon's name to the Spatter seems to indicate that he was acquainted with novel that is, perhaps, the first to introduce the good-natured misanthrope as a rather well-wrought figure. At any rate the mild misanthropy evidently pleased the English, or Lessing at least thought so in his review of both Voltaire and Colman in the Hamburgische Dramaturgie:

Fiele das Treffende dieses Charakters [Freelon; Spatter in Colman's version] aber, auch gänzlich in Deutschland weg, so hat das Stück doch noch ausser ihm Interesse genug, und der ehrliche Freeport allein konnte es in unserer Gunst erhalten. Wir lieben seine plumpe Edelmütigkeit, und die Engländer selbst haben sich dadurch geschmeichelt gefunden.

As mentioned in Chapter I Sarah Fielding shares the dubious honor of giving the world the first rather fully developed man of feeling. In the character of Mr. Spatter in David Simple (1744) she also has the honor to have given us the first truly recognizable good-natured misanthrope. Spatter and some of the other "characters" that parade through Simple, even had the advantage of a puff by Henry
Fielding himself in a preface to the novel: Spatter, Orgueil, etc. "... would have shined in the Pages of Theophrastus, Horace, or La Bruyere. Nay, there are some Touches, which I will venture to say might have done honour to the Pencil of the immortal Shakespear himself" (I xi-xii). The structure of *Simple* is conducive to the presentation of characters, for it is essentially the picaresque convention with a man of feeling substituted for the rogue as hero, a very much used technique in the man of feeling tradition. The structure is, of course, equally suitable for a spectator satirist. This role has been traditionally played by the picaro himself, whose own rather questionable personal life, however, calls the whole nature of picaresque satire into question, just as Gulliver's original role as the naïf satiric persona becomes satirized as the misanthrope of Book IV, rendering the nature of the satire of the first three books more ironic. David's own disgust with the world, which in the traditional picaresque would be the implied satire of the picaro's description of things, is rather moral lamentation than satire. In this novel Miss Fielding transfers the role to Spatter, a role that eminently fits the character implied in the name.

Spatter's position is prepared for early in the novel when David first decides to go to London to find a true friend. David is dubious about finding such a person an-
where, but he knows that London is the place to look, for
if he cannot find sincerity in London he might as well
cease looking: "Mankind in their Nature are much the same
everywhere . . ." (I 37). David's ignorance of the world,
however, clearly indicates that he will need someone to
guide him through London and enable him to meet enough
people to make his decision competently. Miss Fielding
puts Spatter in the role of guide, and elaborates his posi-
tion by also making him a satirist of the society to which
he introduces David, a method brilliantly employed by Gold-
smith later. When he first meets David he offers to take
him to various assemblies where David can see men with "the
Passions actuated," for then "the Mask is thrown off, and
Nature appears as she is" (I 141). The metaphor clearly
points out Spatter's satiric function.

David willingly accompanies Spatter to a party of
whist players and then to the toilettes of the fashionable
ladies of the town. He is perhaps more surprised by the
unusual nature of his guide than by the follies and vices
of London (I 142 ff.). At the end of the various parties
Spatter would "run through the Characters of the whole
Company, and at the finishing of every one, uttered a Sen-
tence with some Vehemence, (which was a Manner peculiar to
himself) calling them either Fools or Knaves . . ." (I 144).
David soon finds that "fools" is a "Monosyllable √Spatter"
always chose to pronounce before he went to Bed. . . " (I 170). David is unwilling to tolerate such misanthropy and railing unless there is some very excellent reason for them:

... Mr. Spatter seemed to take such a Delight in abusing People; and yet as David observed, no one was more willing to oblige any Person, who stood in need of his Assistance; he concluded that he must be good at the Bottom, and that perhaps it was only his Love of Mankind, which made him have such a Hatred and Detestation of their Vices, as caused him to be eager in reproaching them. . . .

(I 148)

Spatter as a plot character serves also as a contrast between two extremes in nature represented by Mr. Orgueil and Mr. Vernish. Orgueil's reason for doing good is essentially a satire on the intellectual school of benevolence, which Miss Fielding connects with the much despised Stoics. According to Spatter, Mr. Orgueil does good purely from pride, and thoroughly enjoys watching someone do an evil deed so that he can compare their baseness to his own rectitude: "... the Follies and Vices of Mankind were his Amusements, and gave him such ridiculous Ideas, as were a continual Fund of Entertainment to him" (I 127). Vernish, on the other hand, perpetually speaks well of people and appears to be the soul of feeling and good-nature. In reality Vernish "is so despicable a Fellow, as to lead a Life of continual Hypocrisy, and affects all that Complaisance only to deceive Mankind. . . . For with all his
love of his Species, I can't find it goes farther than
Words: I never heard of any thing remarkable he did to
prove that Love." (I 174). David is unable to cope with
so much duplicity, but he does finally penetrate the dis-
guise of Mr. Spatter, a hypocrite in reverse.

Spatter closely associates himself with the misan-
thropic satiric persona in his attempt to make David be-
lieve his railing stems from revenge. He tells David he
never forgets an injury, even an accidental one: "David
could not sleep that Night, for reflecting on this Conver-
sation. He had never yet found any Fault with Spatter,
but his railing against others; and as he loved to excuse
every body till he found something very bad in them, he
imputed it to his Love of Virtue and Hatred of Vice: But
what he had just been saying, made him a perfect Daemon,
and he had the utmost Horror for his Principles . . . ."
(I 177). Ironically enough it is the smooth talking Ver-
nish who undeceives David about Spatter's un-Christian
principles of revenge:

"You are to know, Sir, Mr. Spatter's Ill-nature
dwells no-where but in his Tongue; and the very
People who [sic.] he so industriously endeavours
to abuse, he would do any thing in his power to
serve. I have known Instances of his doing the
best-natured Actions in the World, and, at the
same time, abusing the very Person he was serv-
ing. . . . But as to his being of a revenge-
ful Temper, I can assure you he is quite the
contrary; for I have seen him do friendly things
to People, who, I am certain, had done him great
Injuries. . . . ."

(I 179-80)
Miss Fielding was evidently rather interested in the new type of misanthrope she was for the most part creating, for she repeated him again later in the novel as one of Corinna's many suitors. Although her description of this beau is brief, his type is unmistakable: He was thought of by all as "the worst-natured, most morose Creature living; and yet this Man did all the benevolent Actions that were in his power; but he had so much Tenderness in him, that he was continually hurt, and consequently out of humour. His Love of Mankind was the Cause that he appeared to hate them . . ." (II 234). With some mild acidity Sarah Fielding comments that the characters given to most people are false and that this is due not so much to "Men's Ignorance, as to their Malignity . . ." (II 234).

In 1756 Samuel Foote created the character of Crab for his two act farce, The Englishman Returned From Paris. Crab is important for he is a rather direct predecessor of Smollett's Matthew Bramble, perhaps the greatest good-natured misanthrope in the literature of the era. To his railing Crab adds the elements of sturdy English patriotism in his detestation of French affectations and the then much lamented crimes of extravagance and luxury. Very early in the play the "old Diogenes" announces his character very clearly to the audience:

Fresh Instances, every Moment, fortify my Abhorrence, my Detestation of Mankind. This Turn may
be term'd Misanthropy; and imputed to Chagrin and Disappointment. But it can only be by those Fools, who, thro' Softness, or Ignorance, regard the Faults of others like their own, thro' the wrong End of the Perspective.

(I 18)

Like Matthew Bramble he is also the legal guardian to a young girl, Lucinda, who is, however, not a blood relation, like Smollett's Lydia. Lucinda, like Lydia, has come to realize that Crab's misanthropy is only in his mind and tongue, for his actions are benevolent and his intentions are of the finest. To Lord John's comment that "... Mr. Crab's Manners are rather too rough," Lucinda replies: "Not a Jot; I am familiarized to 'm. I know his Integrity, and can never be disoblig'd by his Sincerity."

Henry Fielding's Man of the Hill is a rather interesting misanthrope midway between Timon and the good-natured type; his theory of misanthropy approaches the good-natured one for the causes of misanthropy, but denies the effects, the practical benevolence of a Spatter and a Crab:

"... however it may seem a paradox, or even a contradiction, certain it is that great philanthropy chiefly inclines us to avoid and detest mankind; not on account so much of their private and selfish vices, but for those of a relative kind; such as envy, malice, treachery, cruelty, with every other species of malevolence. These are the vices which true philanthropy abhors, and which rather see and converse with, she avoids society itself."

(IV 113)

Tom's rather wooden and specious arguments against misanthropy are not nearly as effective as the satirist-satirized
convention in which Fielding places the Man of the Hill when Tom refers to the causes of his misanthropy: "But you will pardon me . . . if I desire you to reflect who that mistress and who that friend were. What better, my good sir, could be expected in love derived from the stews, or in friendship first produced and nourished at the gambling-table?" (IV 152) The essential truth of the Man of the Hill's denunciation of the usual prattle about benevolence heightens the satire aimed at his own lack of practical benevolence, which should result from his own theory of misanthropy. Fielding intensifies the irony of the situation by making the denunciation a rather close paraphrase of Shaftesbury¹⁵: "Knaves will no more endeavour to persuade of us of the baseness of mankind than a highwayman will inform you that there are thieves on the road. This would, indeed, be a method to put you on your guard, and to defeat their own purposes. For which reason, though knaves, as I remember, are very apt to abuse particular persons, yet they never cast any reflection on human nature in general" (IV 152-53).

If we contrast this last statement with the previous statement on misanthropy, we see that Fielding seems to be implying in this argument that the solution to the paradox is practical benevolence with speculative misanthropy, for Tom's lack of prudence is ultimately satirized too, making good-natured benevolence look rather foolish. Although the
Man of the Hill may be satirized, like every satirist in this convention, what he does say about man is for the most part quite true, and this is a fact which Tom completely misses. London is indeed the sink of iniquity described by the Man of the Hill, and all of Tom's reflections on the old man's former mistress and friend return with double irony to illuminate his relationships with his own London mistress, Lady Bellaston. His bland good-nature also prevents him from seeing the real character of his new friend, Nightingale, not to mention the pervading irony created by his dubious friend, Partridge. The Man of the Hill episode can thus be seen structurally as an attempt to offer the reader some median between the Man of the Hill's type of misanthropy and Tom's type of gullible good-nature.

Certainly one of the most famous good-natured misanthropes, and also one of the most delightful, is Goldsmith's Man in Black, Mr. Drybone, of The Citizen of the World. Goldsmith's reputation as a sentimentalist has been under critical attack for some years now, as critics and scholars have attempted to probe beneath the surface of the bland assertions usually made about what, one supposes, is the most famous novel of the eighteenth century, The Vicar of Wakefield. The exact nature of the satire Goldsmith uses in the novel can, I think, be clearly related to his method in the Citizen of the World. In The Vicar, as well as in
his other writings, "Goldsmith is no more willing to accept the sweeping assertion of the goodness of humanity than he is that of their bliss in a Golden Age."\(^{19}\)

The Man in Black, has suffered a great deal of misunderstanding because he is generally regarded as a character sketch and never seen in the context of the complete work, which seems to be rarely read as a whole. Excerpts, like the description of Drybone, the Club of Authors, Beau Tibbs, all now very famous, are read, and the work as an entirety is more or less neglected. While it is true that the *Citizen of the World* lacks the structural unity of a Fielding novel, and was indeed begun as a series of unconnected papers for the *Public Ledger* (later collected under the title of the *Citizen of the World*), it enjoys about as much coherence as most of Goldsmith's work, including *The Vicar of Wakefield*. The various character sketches and scenes, though for the most part unconnected with each other, are united at least by the recurring satiric theme of the work and the continuity of a central character, Lien Chi Altangi, who is the chief observer of the scenes. The structure thus has the unity of the typical picaresque novel based on the Petronian prototype. Goldsmith has even imposed a more coherent plot than usual in such satires in the construction of the story of Lien Chi's son and his marriage with Drybone's niece.\(^{20}\)
Structurally Goldsmith has employed two types of satirists in the characters of Lien Chi and Drybone. Essentially Lien Chi is what Maynard Mack calls the persona of the naïf; his satiric power comes from his strong reactions to events contradictory to his sense of reason. In some senses he is a very learned man, but the very nature of his case as a foreigner supposes him to be naive about the customs of England. He approaches men and events from a rational viewpoint and is confounded to find them irrational. We must note that hardly ever does the satire arise from a comparison of supposed Chinese and English customs in themselves. Chinese customs are preferred, as in the case of a young Chinese girl compared with a young European girl, only when the Chinese custom is more rational than the English. Lien Chi writes very early that customs alone are not sources of amusement: "... by long travelling, I am taught to laugh at folly alone, and to find nothing truly ridiculous but villainy and vice" (III 18). Letter XXIII originally opened with Lien Chi's announcement that he was not "one of those censorious moralists who are resolved to be pleased at nothing ..." (III 85). Indeed, the Chinaman is so anxious to be pleased that he is quite often gullied, as happens in the famous episode with the English prostitute who offers to have his watch fixed.

Drybone, the Man in Black, is in one sense secondary
to Lien Chi, since the greater part of the satire comes directly from the contradiction between reason and reality as Lien Chi sees and reports it. On the other hand, Drybone is clearly a satiric Vergil to Lien Chi's Dante. His role is that of guide and instructor, although this is often not realized unless we follow him through the entire work. Moreover Drybone serves as Lien Chi's satiric guide and commentator with obvious relish and complete willingness. In his first appearance in Letter XIII (III 46 ff.), before we are introduced to his particular misanthropic temperament, Goldsmith establishes his chief role in the Letters: "As I was indulging such reflections, a gentleman dressed in black, perceiving me to be a stranger, came up, entered into conversation, and politely offered to be my instructor and guide through the temple" (III 48). Lien Chi then takes pains throughout the work to remind us that he has adopted Drybone as his guide through all of London. Letter XXVIII opens: "Lately, in company with my friend in black, whose conversation is now both my amusement and instruction . . ." (III 106); Letter LVIII also opens with an emphasis on the Man in Black's role: "As the man in black takes every opportunity of introducing me to such company as may serve to indulge my speculative temper, or gratify my curiosity . . ." (III 216). When Drybone does not come to guide Lien Chi, the latter goes to him: "I
had some intentions lately of going to visit Bedlam... 
I went to wait upon the man in black to be my conductor...
"(III 359). As Lien Chi prepares to leave London,
or at least to think about it, he writes that he "shall
have no small pain in leaving my usual companion, guide,
and instructor" (III 374-75).

Goldsmith intimates in Lien Chi's first meeting
with Drybone that Drybone is to be a satiric guide through
London. The satiric nature of Drybone's office as both
"amuser and instructor" is foreshadowed in the discussion
about Pope's right to a place in the Abbey:

"There," says the gentleman, pointing with his
finger, "that is the Poet's Corner; there you
see the monuments of Shakespeare, and Milton,
and Prior, and Drayton." -- "Drayton," I replied;
"I never heard of him before; but I have been told
of one Pope -- is he there?" -- "It is time enough,"
replied my guide: "these hundred years; he is not
long dead; people have not done hating him yet."
-- "Strange," cried I; "can any be found to hate
a man whose life was wholly spent in entertaining
and instructing his fellow-creatures?" -- "Yes,"
says my guide, "they hate him for that very rea-
son."

(III 49-50)

Drybone then assumes the role as Lien Chi's guide through
London, and obviously enjoys helping to remove Lien Chi's
naivete: at least Lien Chi observes that Drybone smiles
as he informs him of things (III 49). If we follow Drybone
through the Letters we see that some of the most famous
episodes involve him, either as direct commentator on the
scene or as presentor of the scene. Drybone begins his
role as guide by first conducting Lien Chi on a satiric tour of Westminster Abbey (III 47 ff.). Lien Chi has his first glimpse of the theatre in the company of Drybone (III 76 ff.); hears a satiric invective on English women from him (III 106 ff.); learns about the flatterers of the nobility from him (III 121 ff.); attends an almost blasphemous church service at St. Paul's with him (III 154 ff.), accompanies him to a visitation dinner (III 216 ff.), to the Hall of Justice (III 359), and finally prevails on him to join him on a world tour (III 446).

Goldsmith has prepared for, and indeed enhanced, Drybone's role in his famous description of Drybone's misanthropic temper. Goldsmith makes the misanthropy a vital structural device in the Man in Black's position as satiric commentator; and as a good-natured misanthrope the good-nature of the satire is assured. Lien Chi carefully describes Drybone as both a misanthrope and a very estimable man. His sketch is, perhaps, the most famous one of all good-natured misanthropes:

The man in black . . . is one whose friendship I could wish to acquire, because he possesses my esteem. His manners, it is true, are tinctured with some strange inconsistencies, and he may be justly termed a humourist in a nation of humourists. Though he is generous even to profusion, he affects to be thought a prodigy of parsimony and prudence; though his conversation be replete with the most sordid and selfish maxims, his heart is dilated with the most unbounded love. I have known him profess himself a man-hater, while his cheek was glowing with compassion; and, while his looks were
softened into pity, I have heard him use the language of the most unbounded ill-nature. Some affect humanity and tenderness, others boast of having such dispositions from nature; but he is the only man I ever knew who seemed ashamed of his natural benevolence. He takes as much pains to hide his feelings, as any hypocrite would to conceal his indifference; but on every unguarded moment the mask drops off, and reveals him to the most superficial observer.

(III 95)

Such a combination of incongruities makes Drybone a truly amiable humorist; but more importantly they make him a capable satirist, as we have seen. Generally then the mask of misanthropy will be very easy to penetrate, or else the author creating the mask will make it clear to the reader that his misanthrope's private life is completely spotless and will emphasize his virtue by exhibiting his many acts of charity.

The irony of Goldsmith's character is very rich in implications. Unlike the Man of the Hill, Drybone is not the satirist-satirized, so that we cannot have any contempt whatsoever for him as a malevolent satirist. The reasons that drove him to his speculative misanthropy are his own excessive benevolence and feeling frustrated by the duplicity of an unfeeling world; as such they are truly in themselves a statement of the case against the world (III 106 ff.). The Man in Black's history is a veritable case book for frustrated men of feeling. Raised by a father who "loved all the world, and . . . fancied all the world loved him!"
(III 100), Drybone entered the world believing "that universal benevolence was what first cemented society" (Ibid.). He now realized that at his entrance into "the busy and insidious world" he resembled "one of those gladiators who were exposed without armour in the ampitheatre at Rome" (Ibid.). Drybone's maltreatment by an unfeeling world led him to conclusions about man which are perhaps one of the most vicious attacks on feeling ever written. Perhaps the supreme irony of his lengthy malediction is that the very last sentence: "*In short, I now find the truest way of finding esteem, even from the indigent, is -- to give away nothing, and thus have much in our power to give!*" (III 105) is practically a direct quotation from Samuel Richardson's Clarissa. 22

Goldsmith then enriches his misanthrope even further by adding to his character the melancholy which spleen takes when it is not railing in "captious anger" at the follies of man; thus his connection with the seventeenth century "character," and his essential difference from it, are carefully insisted upon (III 339 ff.).

Goldsmith also disassociates Drybone from the Timon type of misanthrope, a type he always denounces. In Asem (I 263 ff.) Goldsmith sends Asem back to society, like Marmontel's Alceste, a more cautious but reformed man. Even in The Citizen of the World Goldsmith offers a Timon misan-
throepe in Letter LXVI (III 248 ff.) in obvious contrast to the Man in Black. But we must note that even here Goldsmith stresses the good-nature or duped benevolence that caused the misanthropy -- a conscious shift from the hatred of the Timon type. In his next letter, Letter LXVII, Lien Chi explains the formation of a misanthrope and concludes with an argument typical of the time: "... the discontented being, who retires from society, is generally some good-natured man, who has begun life without experience, and knew not how to gain it in his intercourse with mankind" (III 253). Even the good-natured misanthrope may often wish to withdraw from society, but characteristic of his use as a satirist, he never does: he always remains in society, actively criticising the follies of men.

The Critical Review for 1766 commented that "Sir William Thornhill in disguise is a very original picture, and out of it a very amiable one." Curtis Dahl has recently traced the disguise motif through The Vicar of Wakefield and ably demonstrated its ironic use throughout as a symbol of appearance and reality. One of the main points made by Dahl and other recent critics of The Vicar is that Dr. Primrose is really the object of satire, kindly to be sure, but satire nevertheless. The exact nature of such satire is difficult to assess, for Primrose's presentation is complex and at times ambivalent. Essentially Primrose
is utterly unable to distinguish between appearance and reality, constantly confusing the one for the other. In structural terms, as another critic has argued, it is a question of benevolence versus prudence as the book moves from emphasis on the former to the need for the latter.\textsuperscript{25} The main method of the satire, however, is basically the same as in the \textit{Citizen of the World}. Dr. Primrose is mainly the persona of the naif who is relating his experiences; in this case, however, the naif becomes the kindly butt of the implied satire as the reader draws the conclusions implicit in Primrose's narration of events.

I should like to suggest, however, that Sir William Thornhill performs the role of a good-natured misanthrope, similar to that of Drybone in the \textit{Citizen of the World}. The misanthropy is certainly not played up as it is in the earlier work, but there is enough of it to understand exactly how Thornhill functions as the satirist he really is. While Thornhill's youth is not exactly like that of Drybone's, it is typically that kind of youth described in Lien Chi's letter on the formation of misanthropy; it conforms rather closely with the descriptions given by later critics of the advance of good-natured misanthropy:

"I have heard Sir William Thornhill represented as one of the most generous, yet whimsical men in the kingdom; a man of consummate benevolence." -- "Something, perhaps, too much so," replied Mr. Burchell; "at least he carried benevolence to an
excess when young; for his passions were then strong, and as they all were upon the side of virtue, they led it up to a romantic extreme. . . . He was surrounded with crowds, who showed him only one side of their character; so that he began to lose a regard for private interest in universal sympathy. He loved all mankind; for fortune prevented him from knowing that there were rascals."

(I 81-82)

The result is that he begins to lose his fortune and soon after his friends, until he comes to his senses and reforms. "At present, his bounties are more rational and moderate than before; but still he preserves the character of a humourist, and finds most pleasure in eccentric virtues" (Ibid.).

Throughout the novel Burchell (Sir William Thornhill) attempts to warn and save Dr. Primrose from impending disaster. The methods he uses are the typical satirist's devices -- real or metaphorical lashing. Burchell is well aware that Primrose is on the same path to destruction that he had been on: he was losing his regard for private interest in universal sympathy. Burchell's method is essentially to appear as a villain to Primrose, making fun of and castigating the values the parson seems to accept, hoping that the parson will think about the things Burchell does and see behind the satiric mask. The irony involved in Burchell's satiric method is simply that Primrose never does see the meaning of Burchell's lash until it is too late.

After Burchell's first entrance in Chapter III and
Primrose has lent him money, the parson is surprised to find that, pauper though he is, Burchell does not defer to his benefactor's opinions: "But what surprised me most was, that though he was a money borrower, he defended his opinions with as much obstinacy as if he had been my patron" (I 81). Primrose is extremely wary of Burchell's wisdom, mainly because he cannot reconcile extreme poverty and wisdom, ironically the very things he values in himself: "I know not how, but he every day seemed to become more amiable, his wit to improve, and his simplicity to assume the superior airs of wisdom" (I 98). All pretense at friendly intercourse begins to drop when Burchell assumes the satiric persona in good earnest in the famous "Fudge" scene, where Burchell deflates all the pretentious balloons of Lady Blarney and Miss Skeggs. But Primrose does not recognize the meaning behind Burchell's satire: "... I should have mentioned the very unpolite behaviour of Mr. Burchell, who during this discourse sate with his face turned to the fire, and at the conclusion of every sentence would cry out fudge, an expression which displeased us all, and in some manner damped the rising spirit of the conversation" (I 112).

Burchell continues to grow in rudeness and belligerence until he has the audacity to argue with Mrs. Primrose herself, thus appearing to the family, for all intents and
purposes, as an enemy to their happiness (I 119 ff.). When he is finally banished the house, all reason seems to have symbolically departed with him:

Our breach of hospitality went to my conscience a little; but I quickly silenced that monitor by two or three specious reasons, which served to satisfy and reconcile me to myself. The pain which conscience gives the man who has already done wrong, is soon got over. Conscience is a coward; and those faults it has not strength enough to prevent, it seldom has justice enough to accuse.

(I 122)

With Burchell departed the family turns more and more to the infamous Squire Thornhill, whom with grave irony the parson had already determined as an ignorant flop: "Mr. Thornhill, notwithstanding his real ignorance, talked with ease, and could expatiate upon the common topics of conversation with fluency" (I 96).

Burchell's second stroke of apparent hatred, his letter to the two London "ladies," causes one of the finest scenes in the novel, a flying scene in the Renaissance fashion, which confirms all of the Primroses in their suspicions that he is a misanthrope of the first order: ". . . we are not to be surprised that bad men want shame; they only blush at being detected in doing good, but glory in their vices" (I 131). Yet Burchell's letter is one of the subtlest ironies in the novel, and a sharp satire of Dr. Primrose. Primrose, as indicated above, had never really trusted Squire Thornhill nor had he much use for
the Squire's fluent tongue; but the parson lacks all initiative to do anything about his fears: he trusts to discretion, he says, but never acts discreetly at all: "I would have proceeded, but for the interruption of a servant from the Squire, who with his compliments, sent us a side of venison, and a promise to dine with us some days after. This well-timed present pleaded more powerfully in his favour than anything I had to say could obviate. I therefore continued silent, satisfied with just having pointed out danger, and leaving it to their own discretion to avoid it. That virtue which requires to be ever guarded, is scarce worth the sentinel" (I 90).

Burchell thus moves through the novel disguised as a man-hater doing all in his power to harm people. As a character in the plot he stands in obvious contrast to his nephew the Squire, but he is more profoundly a walking satire on Dr. Primrose, as he attempts to practically lash prudence into the Primrose family. Both his real name and his assumed name, Burchell, like the Crabs, Drybones, and Brambles tagging the good-natured misanthropes, indicate a disguised philanthropist, as Parson Primrose finally realizes: "You were ever our friend; we have long discovered our errors with regard to you, and repented of our ingratitude. After the vile usage you then received at my hands, I am almost ashamed to behold your face; yet I hope you'll forgive me, as I was deceived by a base ungen-
erous wretch, who, under the mask of friendship, has undone me" (I 213).
NOTES

CHAPTER III

1. See Chapter I, pp. ff. and n.


3. See, for example, the discussions in Harry Kurz, European Characters in French Drama of the Eighteenth Century (New York, 1916), pp. 115-251.

4. The "bear with the heart of gold" appears again and again in the drama and the novel. The actual phrase seems to derive from Carlo Goldoni's Le Bourru bien fâchant (1771), tr. Barrett H. Clark as The Beneficent Bear (London, 1915).

5. Louis de Boissy, Le Francois à Londres (1727) in Chefs-d'oeuvre dramatique de Boissy (Répertoire du Théâtre français, 2nd. series) (Paris, 1824), XVIII. See also the character of Jacques Splin in Charles Patrat, L'Anglais, ou Le Fou Raisonnable (1783), in Suite du Répertoire du Théâtre Français (Paris, 1822), LXXII.


8. Voltaire, L'Ecosoise, op. cit., V. All quotations are from this edition.


13. For a brief discussion of eighteenth century hatred for stoicism, see Crane, "Genealogy," 71-73. See also La Bruyère, p. 272.


15. Cp. Shaftesbury's statement "Imposters naturally speak the best of human nature, that they may the easier abuse it," in Characteristics, II, 64.

16. For Nightingale see V, 121-26. Partridge, of course, follows Tom only with the intention of trying to make him return to Allworthy. He hopes to receive some sort of reward from Allworthy for encouraging Tom's return. See IV, 87 ff.


22. Cp. the statement in Clarissa, "Persons bless'd with a will, should be doubly careful to preserve to themselves the power of doing good," Collection of Sentiments, p. 99.


IV

TOBIAS SMOLLETT -- A RISIBLE MISANTHROPE

Although Smollett's reputation as a novelist and satirist remained exceedingly high through the early nineteenth century, his fame has always been over-shadowed by the names of Fielding and Sterne, and particularly by Fielding, who is inevitably compared with him.¹ In Knapp's words: "In the frequent critical comparisons of Smollett and Fielding as men and writers Smollett's claim to be a serious and moral satirist has been looked upon with skepticism or even denied on grounds that are largely subjective."² Whenever satiric powers are granted, they are usually denied in the next breath by some assertion of a lack of satiric profundity or vague allusions to a tendency to sentimentalism. A recent critic of comedy states the case against Smollett rather succinctly: "Smollett... threw the brunt of his [comic] attack in random fashion and did not succeed in hitting anything very profound. Into his work, too, there began to creep the sober vein of sentimental romanticism which should be a topic for rather than a method of humour."³ Smollett's own formal statements on the purposes of literature, and particularly of satire, which he attached to his novels as prefaces, pointedly contradict such a light treatment of his satiric
attack. A close examination of the nature of Smollett's satire as it appears in his novels will also, I think, show that Smollett's sentimentalism is more apparent than real, and very closely allied to his attempt to find a suitable satirist. This attempt was realized in what is universally accepted as his most successful novel, *Humphry Clinker*, in the character of Matthew Bramble, certainly the finest of the good-natured misanthropes in eighteenth century literature.

Smollett's conception of the dual role of literature to both delight and instruct is quite classical in its idealism:

> We live in an age of levity and caprice, that can relish little besides works of fancy; nor do we listen to instruction unless it be conveyed to us under the pleasing form of entertainment. But to mix profit with delight should be the aim of all writers, and the business of every book. ...  

The depth of his hatred for the vice and folly of his age is everywhere evident in his satiric novels, which are serious attempts to instruct men in virtue by ridiculing their folly. The disturbing savagery of his satire can perhaps be explained by his deep conviction of the extreme difficulty inherent in such instruction, for Smollett had no exalted notions of man's innate benevolence; if he turned to sentiment later in his career, we must seek an explanation for it elsewhere. The baseness of man is a running theme in Smollett's novels and is one of the chief lessons
learned by nearly all of his heroes. In *Count Fathom*, for example, Smollett as narrator intrudes to comment on benevolent philosophy:

Success raised upon such a foundation would, by a disciple of Plato, and some modern moralists, be ascribed to the innate virtue and generosity of the human heart, which naturally espouses the cause that needs protection. But I, whose notions of human excellence are not quite so sublime, am apt to believe it is owing to that spirit of self-conceit and contradiction, which is, at least, as universal, if not as natural, as the moral sense so warmly contended for by those ideal philosophers.  

While rather sneeringly granting the theoretical possibility of benevolism, Smollett realistically contends for the actual universality of the baseness of man's motives and deeds.

Smollett's satiric vision of man and the world is not, however, of the extreme kind, for ultimately it is tempered by the spirit of comedy. In his very illuminating and stimulating essay on Smollett, Ronald Paulson clearly shows that the many problems involved in finding unity in Smollett's long rambling novels center about Smollett's attempt to create a proper satiric persona, which he finally realized only in *Humphry Clinker*. The satiric persona, however, is intimately bound to the vision of the world expressed in the satire. Part of the failure of Smollett's early novels undoubtedly depends, as Paulson contends, on the failure to integrate the persona of formal verse satire into the novel form. Part of the failure, and I would argue
a great deal of it, results from a confusion of satiric visions, which places the persona in the extremely precarious position of questioning his credibility as both satirist and hero. Quite often, indeed, as Paulson argues, the reader must forget that the story is about Perry, or Roderick, when he observes them in the roles of satirist. This disjunction of hero and satirist is difficult to maintain by either the novelist or the reader. The result is both an unconvincing story and an unconvincing satire, for basically we are faced with the traditional discrepancy between the satirist's private and public life, with the satirist's private life here corresponding to his role as a character in the plot.

All of Smollett's novels, however, end happily, usually, in Frye's terms, with the hero and his friends moving off to the country to form a new and ideal rural society. As in the case of most comedy the happy ending is brought about rather mechanically: Roderick finds his father and inherits wealth; Perry, languishing in prison, suddenly finds himself free and rich, because his father has died intestate. The plot of the novels then moves within the comic vision, towards the triumph of reason and good sense, with happiness distributed to all. But the plot exists in severe opposition to the extreme satiric ethos created by the hero as satirist, which makes a comic-
satiric union rather unconvincing. Smollett borrowed the satirist-satirized convention from formal satire and used it so freely that his heroes are for the most part rather ugly and distasteful. His hero-satirist transfers the traditional satiric persona's envy, pride, and revenge into actual character motivation and then actualizes the traditional metaphorical lashing and whipping. The happiness the hero-satirist achieves at the end thus seems at times an undeserved reward.

Smollett's search for a proper satiric persona is then closely bound to what is in reality a search for satirical comedy, or, to use the Renaissance term, comical satire. What the comical satirist needs is a persona who can convincingly foreshadow the comic solution of the plot while still maintaining his abilities as a satirist. In extreme satire, as Kernan points out, we are presented with "a stasis in which two opposing forces, the satirist on one hand and the fools on the other, are locked in their respective attitudes without any possibility of either dialectical movement or the simple triumph of good over evil. . . ."9 In mixed satire, however, this stasis is broken, and the "characters, both satirist and fools, are swept forward into the miraculous transformations of comedy or the cruel dialectic of tragedy," thus fulfilling symbolically the corrective purpose claimed by the satirist.10

In extreme satire of the Juvenalian type the conclusion
then is essentially a return to the beginning, for nothing really has happened: the fools are still fools, the satirist is still railing, and the world is still on the brink of destruction as Dullness prepares to take over the universe. Comical satire however, uses the satirist to rail at the fools and the vices of the world, while the predominating comic vision views him as merely an aid in the movement to sanity; ultimately the "social health and the balance of nature are always restored, not by the heroic activities of a scourging satirist, but by a natural process."11

The progression from Roderick Random to Humphry Clinker can then be considered as an integration of satire and comedy, resulting from the creation of a character who embodies the railing abilities of the satiric persona and the amiability of the comic hero -- a good-natured satirist. In the new tradition of good-natured misanthropy Smollett found a psychological basis for his own satirist, the man of feeling and misanthropy, Matthew Bramble. Smollett does not seem then really to bow to the onslaught of feeling and sentiment, as he is usually represented, but rather uses feeling as a vehicle of satire.

In a letter to Alexander Carlyle (c. 1747) Smollett indicates his satiric purposes in Roderick Random: "... I have finished a Romance in two Volumes called the Adventures of Roderick Random, ... -- it is intended as a satire upon mankind. ..."12 But Smollett's conception of
satiric method was intimately tied to his fondness for the picaresque novel form: "Of all kinds of satire, there is none so entertaining and universally improving, as that which is introduced, as it were, occasionally, in the course of an interesting story, which brings every incident home to life..." In Random, from which this definition of satire comes, Smollett intended to satirize mankind by showing the cruelty of the world to Roderick as he wandered through it seeking a position: "I have attempted to represent modest merit struggling with every difficulty to which a friendless orphan is exposed, from his own want of experience, as well as from the selfishness, envy, malice and base indifference of mankind" (I xlii). Smollett was well aware, however, that the typical picaro, does not remain the ingenu he starts out to be, but becomes the satirist-satirized himself as he progresses in the ways of the world and even participates rather willingly in its vices. Unlike the railing satirist, however, the picaro does not castigate, but, as Paulson argues, mirrors the vices of the world, since he enters into them. In Random Smollett attempts to change the satiric method by making Roderick a railler at, rather than a mirror of, the world. His explanation of the difference between Roderick and Gil Blas points up this change in method: "The disgraces of Gil Blas are, for the most part, such as rather excite mirth than compassion: he himself laughs at them; and his transitions from dis-
tress to happiness, or at least ease, are so sudden, that
neither the reader has time to pity him, nor himself to be
acquainted with affliction. This conduct, in my opinion,
not only deviates from probability, but prevents that gen-
erous indignation which ought to animate the reader against
the sordid and vicious disposition of the world" (I xli).
Smollett hopes that Roderick's gentle birth and the return
of his patrimony at the end will exclude him from the shafts
of ridicule aimed at the "sordid" world.

In one sense, of course, Random is also an educa-
tional novel: Roderick must learn the ways of the world;
he must learn to distinguish between the appearances that
so often deceive him and the reality behind them. 15  In
terms of the plot, then, Roderick's progression from sim-
plicity to an understanding of the world fulfills the re-
quirements of the educational novel. Roderick reminds the
reader of this purpose in the discovery scene, when Don
Rodrigo, Roderick's father "blessed God for the adversity
I had undergone, which, he said, enlarged the understanding,
improved the heart, steeled the constitution, and qualified
a young man for all the duties and enjoyments of life, much
better than any education which affluence could bestow"
(III 188). The chief satire on mankind arises from Roder-
wick's naiveté and the railing he indulges in when he is
finally duped. Quite often indeed Roderick does seem to
deserve the pity which Smollett asks for, as in the inci-
dent with the apparently benevolent landlord (I 59 ff). The invectives which Roderick calls down on him and others who dupe him, like the lying footman and the money-dropping card-sharper, seem to be deserved; the denunciations of man seem quite appropriate to the deceits practiced on him: "I was confounded at the artifice and wickedness of Mankind; and Strap lifting his eyes and hands to heaven, prayed that God would deliver him from such scenes of iniquity; for surely the devil had set up his throne in London" (I 99).

In another sense, however, Roderick has to learn not just the ways of the world, but how to control himself and his own passions. His excesses, extreme passion, and pride make him a fitting object of satire, and at the same time a rather unpleasant hero, although this does not seem to have been Smollett's original intention. Over and over again Roderick informs the reader that he is "boiling with indignation," that he is transported with grief, anger, and disdain (II 171-72). Even chance acquaintances warn him: "your passions are too impetuous; you must learn to govern them better" (I 96). At a London play Roderick is carried away with pride and vanity to such an extent that he feels people should bow to him as if he were an important personage (II 190-91). The verbal and even physical lashings that result from this excess of passion stem from envy, pride, and revenge as well as indignation over vice, thus turning the satire on the satirist himself, in typical
Renaissance fashion.

Smollett's rather extended presentation of Roderick's naivety contributes also to the negation of the final comic ending. Roderick continually refuses to learn from his experiences, remaining a dupe to appearances nearly to the end of the novel. Even after Miss Williams's tedious narration of her misfortunes, all a result of her inability to distinguish appearance from reality, Roderick misses the application to his own situation (II 4 ff.). Smollett points this up in Roderick's pride that he has learned the ways of the world. Feeling sorry for his uncle, Tom Bowling, Roderick writes: "...√\[\text{I}\]\ looked upon my own situation as less miserable than his, because I was better acquainted with the selfishness and roguery of mankind, consequently less liable to disappointment and imposition" (II 161). Several pages later Roderick displays his unfortunately great ability to be imposed on, as both the capucin and the French soldier make a fool of him (II 170 ff.). Even after his return to London he displays a curious mixture of sagacity and stupidity: he recognizes Strap's "widow" for what she is (III 3), and then falls naively into the hands of the homosexual Earl Strutwell (III 40 ff.). When he finally loses his money in gaming and finds himself imprisoned for debt (III 121-62), it is difficult to muster the pity Smollett asks for him.

The comic vision that ultimately arises from Bowling's
intervention is thus rather inconsistent with both the satiric character and the ethos Smollett has created throughout the novel (III 162-70). By making Roderick an active, railing, satiric persona in the satirist-satirized convention, Smollett denies his hero the very sympathy he wanted and felt Gil Blas lacked. Ironically, Gil Blas actually gains more sympathy than Roderick, for although he engages in the vice around him, he is at least aware that he is acting immorally and honestly blames himself for it.16 Smollett's attempt to create sympathy from the hero's gentility is rather dubious: "To secure a favourable prepossession, I have allowed him the advantages of birth and education, which, in the series of his misfortunes, will, I hope, engage the ingenuous more warmly in his behalf. . . ." (I xlii).

In his second novel, Peregrine Pickle, Smollett sought to remedy the situation of the satiric persona by insisting on his essential good-nature; by retaining the satirist-satirized convention, however, he succeeded only in creating another ambiguous persona. Smollett's shift from the first person narrator to the third person narrator in Pickle enabled him to praise the essential good-nature inherent in Perry rather frequently. Natural generosity seems to be Perry's one redeeming virtue, of which Smollett is at pains to remind the reader in the midst of nearly
every description of his pride, vanity, and excess. Such a comment as the following occurs frequently:

It is not to be supposed that a young man of Peregrine's vanity, inexperience, and profusion, could suit his expense to his allowance, liberal as it was; for he was not one of those fortunate people who are born economists, and knew not the art of withholding his purse when he saw his companion in difficulty. Thus naturally generous and expensive, he squandered away his money, and made a most splendid appearance upon the receipt of his quarterly appointment. . . . (IV 152)

The continual repetition of such descriptions of Perry are obviously intended to convince the reader that Perry is basically good. This good-nature is, however, rather well hidden, for aside from one or two charitable actions and Smollett's frequent reminders, we actually see Perry performing as a villain or as a satirist, so that the two reflect on each other and the resulting persona is a malevolent satirist of the satirist-satirized tradition.

From the time he was a young lad confirmed in his vicious inclinations and dead to fear and shame (IV 75) until his final imprisonment, Perry exhibits his villainy: "vanity and pride were the ruling foibles of our adventurer" (VI 23). His lechery on the grand tour in the affair with Mrs. Hornbeck, his cynical attempt to rape his beloved Emilia and then cast her aside as beneath him, his drunken revels and complete dissipation in London, his attempted murder of Pipes -- all tend to create a despicable hero. 17 Smollett, indeed, aggravates his villainy by making
him a satirist, associating malice with satire: "... Peregrine's satirical disposition was never more gratified than when he had an opportunity of exposing grave characters in ridiculous attitudes ..." (IV 146). Nearly all of Perry's satire in the first half of the novel result from his malicious inclination, his desire to see grave people, who have done nothing to him, in ridiculous situations. On the Grand Tour, as Paulson notes, Perry's satiric pranks are juxtaposed with the vicious life he himself is leading. But as Paulson concludes, Perry is at the same time an extremely effective satirist, for "every time Peregrine punishes a person, however unjust his motive, his satiric analysis is true..." As a man Perry may be a villain, but as a satirist he is telling the truth.

As a foreshadowing of Humphry Clinker, however, the novel, particularly the second half, is of extreme importance, for in many ways it contains the seeds of the satiric method employed there to excellent advantage. Commodore Trunnion, as a bourreau bienfaisant, an extension of Morgan in Random, though not a satirist, possesses the latent outlines of a good-natured misanthrope. Cadwallader Crabtree, who occupies the position left vacant by the death of Trunnion, has the misanthropy, but lacks the good-nature needed for the role. Crabtree, however, is presented as the misanthrope satirist. As A. D. McKillop comments, he
"is the malcontent and misanthrope of post-1600 English comedy, and the sequence in which he sets up as necromancer and derides and gulls those who expose themselves by consulting him is thoroughly Jonsonian. ... Smollett thus tries to dramatize the humourist as satirist..." 20 Crabtree was "altogether misanthropical" (VI 6), and had set himself up as a sort of public satirist, gaining his information about people by pretending to be deaf and dumb. Crabtree acts as a spectator of the foibles of the world, but lacks the compassion necessary to make his satire corrective: ". . . for Crabtree saw and considered everything through a perspective of spleen, that always reflected the worst side of human nature" (VII 66).

Crabtree permits Perry to share his knowledge of men because he feels that Perry has a "rooted contempt for the world" (VI 8). Perry's determination never to let slip one opportunity of "mortifying villainy" (VII 3) easily induces him to join Crabtree in the role of public satirist, first as necromancers and later as money-lenders (VI 228 ff.; VII 2-5). The role was not new, for Perry had already moved from private to public satirist when he and Godfrey set up to out-wit the cardsharpers at Bath (V 236-41). Perry's excitement over Crabtree's ability as a satirist soon wanes, when he discovers that Crabtree's private life does not correspond to his public life as satirist.
Why the moral problem should bother Perry is only explicable in the light of Smollett's repeated assurance that he is essentially good-natured. At any rate, Perry rejects Crabtree on the grounds that he is an ill-natured, malicious satirist: ". . . our young gentleman began to be disgusted, at certain intervals, with the character of this old man, whom he now thought a morose cynic, not so much incensed against the follies and vices of mankind, as delighted with the distress of his fellow-creatures" (VII 66). Perry calls the whole question of detached, malicious satire into question when he reproaches Crabtree for not being able to bear the misfortunes of this world any better than himself:

"These are the comfortable fruits of your misanthropy," answered the youth; "your laudable scheme of detaching yourself from the bonds of society, and of moving in a superior sphere of your own. Had you not been so peculiarly sage, and intent upon laughing at mankind, you could never have been disconcerted by such a pithy inconvenience . . . . But now the world may retort the laugh. . . ."

(VII 75)

Paulson further points out Crabtree's essential inhumanity in his tyrannic destruction of the whole race of spiders over which he was "king" when lodged in the Bastile.21 It is evident, however, that Smollett realized the potentialities inherent in the misanthrope as satirist and put them to good use in Matthew Bramble.

Perry himself in many ways points forward to Bramble.
As we have pointed out several times, Smollett insists on Perry's essential good-nature, as it appears particularly in his acts of generosity. Even in his final degradation in London he persists in acts of charity, performed in a manner that clearly points to the activities of the good-natured misanthrope:

Numberless were the objects to which he extended his charity in private. Indeed, he exerted this virtue in secret, not only on account of avoiding the charge of ostentation, but also because he was ashamed of being detected in such an awkward un-fashionable practice, by the censorious observers of this humane generation. In this particular, he seemed to confound the ideas of virtue and vice; for he did good, as other people do evil, by stealth; and was so capricious in point of behaviour, that frequently, in public, he wagged his tongue in satirical animadversions upon that poverty which his hand had in private relieved.  

(VII 48)

All Smollett had to do was change Perry's motives for doing good in secret, add the misanthropical disposition, and he would have a good-natured misanthropical railer. Goldberg's contention that Perry's secret benevolence is a further sign of his final moral decay seems unreasonable in the light of the context of the novel. Aside from Smollett's constant reminders of Perry's private beneficence, Smollett had earlier, in Pallet's friend, the doctor, argued for that Swiftian paradoxical attitude which rails at the general but loves the particular. Apart from his pedantry, the Doctor is lashed for his complete lack of benevolence:

"Indeed, the ties of private affection were too weak to
engage the heart of this republican, whose zeal for the community had entirely swallowed up his concern for individuals" (V 95-96). Smollett dramatizes the satire in the argument between Jolter and the Doctor in front of Pallet's door. Thinking that Pallet is raving mad, both Jolter and the Doctor fear to re-enter his room to aid him; Jolter intimates that it is really the Doctor's job to assist Pallet, since the two have been friends for some time:

This insinuation introduced a dispute upon the nature of benevolence, and the moral sense, which, the republican argued, existed independent of any private consideration, and could never be affected by any contingent circumstance of time and fortune; while the other, who abhorred his principles, asserted the duties and excellence of private friendship, with infinite rancour of altercation.

(V 157-58)

Ferry, however, who was actually the cause of Pallet's raving, is moved to compassion at Pallet's plight: "Chagrined as our hero was, he could not help laughing when he heard how the patient had been treated; and his indignation changing into compassion, he called to him through the keyhole . . ." (V 159). Thus, Ferry is early presented as a satirist moved by individual distress, even when the individual is one whom he particularly despises and has played satirical pranks on.

At first glance Smollett's next novel, Ferdinand Count Fathom, would not seem to point to the good-natured misanthrope developed in Glinker. Actually, I think, Fathom
is closely tied to the whole problem of Smollett's supposed
desertion of satire in favor of sentiment, and as such quite
important in the development of the sentimental man of feel-
ing underlying Bramble's character. Fathom is a rather
elloquent statement of the need for a man of feeling to be-
come a speculative misanthrope. Unfortunately the novel
has been generally dismissed as a rather poor imitation of
Jonathan Wild. Supposedly if Fielding had not written Wild,
Fathom would be our finest example of an ironical study of
greatness.24 I suggest that we would come closer to both
Smollett's intention and his actual result if we considered
the novel as an imaginative exploration of Fielding's the-
sis in his essay, "On the Knowledge of the Characters of
Men." Smollett's argument is not really the evil and vil-
lainy of Ferdinand Fathom, but the necessity for virtuous
men to protect themselves from being gulled by such vil-
lains. The brunt of Smollett's satire falls on a society
which admires false values and thus allows villains to set
up as great men. Smollett's plot is joined to the satire
by its emphasis on the men and women of true feeling who
live within such a corrupt society: the Count Melvils,
the Renaldos, the Monimias, the Don Diegos will all be
ultimately gulled and sacrificed on the altar of deceit
unless they can learn the prudence and discernment neces-
sary to live in such an evil world.

Smollett establishes the nature of his satire in
the first chapter; he insinuates in his ironic address to
the reader, that the satire is aimed at the reader himself,
as part of a society which no longer wants its morals and
mores called into question by the satirist:

If such you be, courteous reader, I say again,
have a little patience; for your entertainment we
are about to write. Our hero shall, with all con-
venient despatch, be gradually sublimed into all
those splendid connexions of which you are enam-
oured; and God forbid, that, in the meantime, the
nature of his extraction should turn to his preju-
dice in a land of freedom like this, where indi-
viduals are every day ennobled in consequence of
their own qualifications, without the least retro-
spective regard to the rank or merit of their an-
cestors. Yes, refined reader, we are hastening
to that goal of perfection, where satire dares not
show her face; where nature is castigated, almost
even to still life; where humour turns changeling,
and slayers in an insipid grin; where wit is vol-
atilised into a mere vapour; where decency, divest-
ed of all substance, hovers about like a fantastic
shadow; where the salt of genius, escaping, leaves
nothing but pure and simple phlegm; and the inof-
fensive pen for ever drops the mild manna of soul-
sweetening praise.

(VIII 9)

Smollett's manner, for all its irony, is here pretty heavy-
handed, but it should direct us to the satiric attack of
the novel: a society which permits villains to be "sub-
limed into all those splendid connexions." A society enam-
oured of appearances only is merely inviting sharpers to
lay it under imposition, and Smollett goes out of his way
(in the middle of volume one) to point out that the English
are particularly prone to such imposition. Fathom's per-
fidious accomplice, the Tyrolese, assures him that England,
and especially London, is the place for their arts: "...
and surely England is the paradise of artists of our pro-
ession. . . . For so jealous are the natives of their
liberties, that they will not bear the restraint of neces-
sary police, and an able artist may enrich himself with
their spoils, without running any risk of attracting the
magistrate, or incurring the least penalty of the law" (VIII 202-03). London itself "is a vast masquerade, in
which a man of stratagem may wear a thousand different dis-
guises, without danger of detection. . . . One glides
into a nobleman's house in the capacity of a valet-de-
chambre, and in a few months leads the whole family by the
nose. Another exhibits himself to the public, as an empir-
ic or operator for the teeth . . . and lays the whole town
under contribution" (VIII 203-04). The Tyrolese, Ratchcali,
continues for several pages to describe the ease with which
they can gull the English. Although the two sharpers do
not succeed in the end, Smollett places serious doubt on
the reason for their failure, since rather ironically not
society but the villains reform.

Although early in the novel Smollett assures us that
Fathom grew up from the cradle with "a most insidious prin-
ciple of self-love" and the ability to counterfeit virtue
so well that "surely, he was calculated by nature to dupe
even the most cautious," (VIII 25) Smollett a few pages
later insinuates that Fathom himself is not totally to
blame, but rather society itself; for if it did not cause
his villany, it at least encouraged it:

He had formerly imagined, but was now fully per-
suaded, that the sons of men preyed upon one
another, and such was the end and condition of
their being. Among the principal figures of
life, he observed few or no characters that did
not bear a strong analogy to the savage tyrants
of the wood. One resembled a tiger in fury and
rapaciousness; a second prowled about like an
hungry wolf, seeking whom he might devour; a
third acted the part of a jackal, in beating
the bush for game to his voracious employer;
and the fourth imitated the wily fox, in prac-
tising a thousand crafty ambuscades for the
destruction of the ignorant and unwary.

(VIII 54-55)

The problem of the novel is essentially one of discovering
a method for the "ignorant and unwary" to repulse the "ty-
rants of the wood." It is extremely difficult for the
innocent to escape such villains, however, for "The most
superficial tincture of the arts and sciences in such a
juggler, is sufficient to dazzle the understanding of
half mankind; and, if managed with circumspection, will
enable him to spend his life among the literati, without
once forfeiting the character of a connoisseur" (VIII 207).25
Fathom is then, what Paulson says, the persona of the vil-
lain as satirist.26 But Smollett again makes his persona
ambiguous.

Aside from the many people, both innocent and evil,
that Fathom dupes or ruins on his progress through the
world of "splendid connexions," the chief characters of
the plot, whom Fathom drives almost to destruction, are
Melvil, Renaldo, Monimia, and Don Diego. These characters are the chief "innocents" who are forced to learn prudence; for despite their almost extreme benevolence and feeling, they are continually gulled and nearly destroyed by Fathom's duplicity. Smollett's ultimate solution for the salvation of men of feeling is the development of a strong ability to discern real from counterfeit virtue. The word discern, or some synonym for it, is perhaps the most frequently occurring word in the novel.\textsuperscript{27} Around the concept of discernment Smollett builds his ironic tension between the men of feeling and Fathom.

Fathom's successes are directly attributed to his ability to "keep the faculty of discerning in full exertion" (VIII 56): Many critics have noted, however, that Fathom does not always succeed in his duplicity, but is quite often duped himself, thus making his role at times even more ambiguous.\textsuperscript{28} We must note, however, that Fathom does not fail in his schemes because of some virtuous person, but rather he is duped by someone like himself, a sharper who is more experienced in the profession. He is gulled by the Tyrolese before he has perfected his abilities, and in Paris Sir Stentor and the count dupe him simply because their abilities at discerning are much more refined than Fathom's.\textsuperscript{29} It is not really Fathom who is ambiguous; rather the ambiguity is inherent in the ability
to discern itself. The irony of Fathom's own gullibility thus results from the different degrees of discernment and one's proficiency in these degrees.

On the other hand, the benevolent characters lack any semblance of discernment, always accepting appearances as reality. Count Melvil accepts Fathom into his family as a valuable acquisition, for "being himself a man of extraordinary benevolence, he looked upon the boy as a prodigy of natural affection . . ." (VIII 21). Thus he is duped from the first moment he meets Fathom. The count is never able to penetrate Fathom's stratagems and is even duped into mistrusting his own son, Renaldo (VIII 28). On the other hand, Renaldo's own simplicity prevents him from seeing that his good deeds are easily misconstrued: "Nothing is more liable to misconstruction than an act of uncommon generosity; one half of the world mistake the motive, from want of ideas to conceive an instance of beneficence that soars so high above the level of their own sentiments; and the rest suspect it of something sinister or selfish, from the suggestions of their own sordid and vicious inclinations" (VIII 29). Both Renaldo and Monimia suffer (almost justly) for their complete inability to penetrate Fathom's schemes to separate them: "She . . . misconstrued his sudden retreat; and now they beheld the actions of each other through the false medium of prejudice and resentment" (IX 47).
Smollett's most penetrating and ironic presentation of the predicament of the man of feeling in an unfeeling world occurs in the character of Don Diego. His inability to penetrate Renaldo's German disguise leads him to attempt to murder his wife and daughter and flee the country. Ironically conscious, however, that "We live in such a world of wickedness and fraud, that a man cannot be too vigilant in his own defence" (VIII 166), Don Diego puts his trust in Fathom's appearance and proceeds like a lamb to the slaughter. Smollett permits Don Diego to condemn himself from his own mouth:

"In this emergency I have been so fortunate as to become acquainted with you, whom I look upon as a man of honour and humanity. Indeed, I was at first sight prepossessed in your favour, for, notwithstanding the mistakes which men daily commit in judging from appearances, there is something in the physiognomy of a stranger from which one cannot help forming an opinion of his character and disposition. For once, my penetration hath not failed me; your behaviour justifies my decision; you have treated me with that sympathy and respect which none but the generous will pay to the unfortunate."

(VIII 174-75)

If the innocent are unable to discern, Smollett's only other suggestion is that they approach the world with extreme caution and suspicion, realizing their own weakness: "All therefore that can be done by virtue, unassisted with experience, is to avoid every trial with such a formidable foe, by declining and discouraging the first advances towards a particular correspondence with perfidious man,
howsoever agreeable it may seem to be. For there is no security but in conscious weakness" (VIII 228). In essence the man of feeling simply is not conscious of his own weakness, his extreme openness to duplicity. Smollett, however, does not really offer much more of a solution than this, and the happy ending seems as ironic as his whole treatment of Fathom and society.

In light of the interpretation we have just seen, I think that Smollett's overemphasis on Fathom's evil, which puzzled Paulson, balances structurally the overemphasis on the lack of discernment in the innocent characters, thus pointing up the tension between Fathom and his virtuous victims. Ultimately this exaggerated evil and benevolence enrich the irony of Fathom's conversion. As indicated above, it is doubtful whether society will change, so that in the long run good triumphs only when evil repents. In this context Smollett's profession that "such monsters ought to be exhibited to public view, that mankind may be upon their guard against imposture" (IX 87) has a ring of truth which he makes ambiguous by the irony of his conclusion "that, as virtue, though it may suffer for a while, will triumph in the end; so iniquity, though it may prosper for a season, will at last be overtaken by that punishment and disgrace which are its due" (Ibid.). At any rate, as Fielding's essay also indicates, whether virtue triumphs in the end
or not, the man of feeling must be on his guard. But Smollett, also like Fielding, recognizes the difficulties involved for the man of feeling in the very ambiguity inherent in the nature of proper discernment. After all, Fathom was "calculated by nature to dupe even the most cautious" (VIII 25).

In Launcelot Greaves Smollett literally armed his benevolent man and set him out as a scourging satirist. Greaves's benevolence, not delusion or madness, drives him to redress the wrongs of society. He sets out as a knight-errant chiefly because he believes that chivalry offered the best means for a private man to castigate the vices that the law could not reach: "It was his opinion that chivalry was an useful institution while confined to its original purposes of protecting the innocent, assisting the friendless, and bringing the guilty to condign punishment" (X 203). Even before he took to the road Sir Launcelot was noted in his own county for excessive benevolence and a rather indiscreet punisher of vice: "... his generosity seemed to overlap the bounds of discretion, and even in cases might be thought tending to a breach of the King's peace" (X 53). He did not hesitate to take the execution of the law into his own hands, forcing lecherous farmers to marry the girls they seduced, and horse-whipping husbands who maltreated their wives (X 53-58).
Sir Launcelot's knight-errantry is to a great extent the Renaissance satiric mask of madness, as Paulson indicates; but Launcelot himself is not mad, as he states quite bluntly to Ferret: "I see and distinguish objects as they are discerned and described by others. I reason without prejudice, can endure contradiction, and, as the company perceives, can even bear impertinent censure without passion or resentment" (X 16). He is, however, performing the function of a satirist, or at least he is putting into practice the metaphorical claims of the typical satirist: "I do purpose . . . to act as a coadjutator to the law, and even to remedy evils which the law cannot reach; to detect fraud and treason, abase insolence, mortify pride, discourage slander, disgrace immodesty, and stigmatise ingratitude . . ." (X 18). Sir Launcelot is perhaps more like Spenser's Sir Artegall than Don Quixote or the mad Elizabethan satirist.

The madness mask does, however, have important thematic implications in the movement of the novel. In the first place, for all of his sanity, Launcelot appears to be mad to others, and in his excess of both benevolence and indignation Smollett indicates that he is somewhat mad. As Goldberg has well pointed out there are moments when Launcelot himself receives some mild satire for his excess. It is only in the asylum that Greaves learns patience and the need to curb his impetuosity. The mad-house becomes ironi-
cally a place where Greaves can be brought to sanity, or more properly to see the folly of his excesses in benevo-
lence and justice. But Smollett carefully indicates that Launcelot's excesses are not the vicious ones of a Perry or a Roderick; they are rather the excesses of virtue, as Felton tells him in the mad-house:

"God forbid . . . that I should attempt to thwart your charitable intention; but this, my good sir, is no object — she has many resources. Neither should we number the clamorous beggar among those who really feel distress; he is generally gorged with bounty misapplied. The liberal hand of charity should be extended to modest want that pines in silence, encountering cold, nakedness, and hunger and every species of distress."

(X 236)

In the development of Smollett's satiric persona, Launcelot also points forward to Clinker. He is the first of Smollett's satirists to be free from vice of the mali-
cious sort; his vices are excessive virtues. Launcelot is thus the first of the satirists who are not plainly in the satirist-satirized convention. Instead, he is depicted as a typical man of feeling of the late eighteenth century type; he personally goes from home to home distributing alms, clothes, and even repairing the huts of his poor ten-
ants himself (X 28 ff.). The mild satire he receives is hardly of the same nature as that aimed at Roderick or Perry. Smollett also indicates that as a satirist Launce-
lot fails simply because he has physically tried to inter-
fere in the activities of men and to literally lash away
their vices, thus losing the satirist's traditional detachment from the scenes he satirizes (the same problem Smollett faced in Random and Pickle).

In Launcelot's case, of course, the physical lashes lack the repulsiveness they have in the earlier novels; they are neither malicious pranks exposing "grave" people to ridicule, like Perry's, nor the result of pride, envy, or revenge. But Smollett realizes that, even when motivated by a "holy anger," physical punishment is still disturbingly out of place in any satirist, for he is forced to hide Launcelot under the eccentric knight-errant disguise of Don Quixote in order to make his activities artistically acceptable. And behind the scenes of the satirist's actions hovers the continual suggestion that satire or no satire Sir Launcelot is tending to a "breach of the King's peace."

Smollett achieved the harmony of comedy and satire that he was striving for in the final comedy of Humphry Clinker, where Bramble's misanthropic railings blend with the comic resolution that is foreshadowed in his underlying benevolent nature. Whether Smollett created Bramble from parts of the characters in the other novels, which, as we have seen, point to him, or whether he simply borrowed from Foote (whose Englishman Return'd from Paris was reviewed in the Critical or from Goldsmith, is in the long run of small importance. The type had been established
and Bramble contributed to its popularity throughout the rest of the century. In Bramble Smollett discarded the physical interference of his earlier satirists and returned to the metaphorical lashes of the formal verse satirist. A. D. McKillop aptly comments that "... for the first time in Smollett's career, the story is successfully centered about a humorous character who with all his peculiarities is rational and pungent and can convey the satire that Smollett always wants to write." As Kahrl points out Bramble is also to a large extent an extension of the persona of the peevish traveller in Smollett's Travels. In terms of Smollett himself he is an idealization of Smollett's own personality which covered kind and benevolent deeds with an exterior of cynical detachment.

Bramble's misanthropy and cynicism are established early by Jerry, who, we will have to note later, is in one sense a very important satiric contrast to Bramble. Jerry is at first displeased with his uncle, but decides to reserve judgment: "My uncle is an odd kind of humourist, always on the fret, and so unpleasant in his manner, that, rather than be obliged to keep him company, I'd resign all claim to the inheritance of his estate. Indeed, his being tortured by the gout may have soured his temper, and, perhaps, I may like him better on farther acquaintance" (XI 9). Later Jerry begins to see that much of Matt's misanthropy arises from his sensitive feelings: "I was once apt to
believe him a complete Cynic, and that nothing but the necessity of his occasions could compel him to get within the pale of society. I am now of another opinion; I think his peevishness arises partly from bodily pain, and partly from a natural excess of mental sensibility; for, I suppose, the mind as well as the body, is, in some cases, endowed with a morbid excess of sensation" (XI 20). Jerry soon learns that such characters with a morbid excess of sensation must hide it somehow, and if they resort to misanthropy the result is satirist with excessive good-nature who causes true amiable humor:

His singularities afford a rich mine of entertainment; his understanding, so far as I can judge, is well cultivated; his observations on life are equally just, pertinent, and uncommon. He affects misanthropy, in order to conceal the sensibility of a heart which is tender even to a degree of weakness. This delicacy of feeling, or soreness of the mind, makes him timorous and fearful, but then he is afraid of nothing so much as of dishonour. . . . Respectable as he is, upon the whole, I can't help being sometimes diverted by his little distresses, which provoke him to let fly the shafts of his satire, keen and penetrating as the arrows of Teucer.

(XI 35)

Bramble's real generosity and feeling are discovered by the reader long before Jerry makes his final discovery in Matt's attempt to secretly help a poor widow (XI 25-26). Matt's first letter to Dr. Lewis, the first real letter in the novel, reveals the misanthrope, in the midst of his complaints, ordering his servants to sell his corn to the poor "at a shilling a bushel under market-price" (XI 5) and
settling his domestic affairs in a manner quite contrary to his misanthropy: "Let him give five pounds to the poor of the parish, and I'll withdraw my action. . . . Let Morgan's widow have the Alderney cow, and forty shillings to clothe her children. But don't say a syllable of the matter to any living soul -- I'll make her pay when she is able" (XI 6). Jerry explains Bramble's nature rather clearly when he writes: "Mr. Bramble is extravagantly delicate in all his sensations, both of soul and body. . . . His blood rises at every instance of insolence and cruelty . . . . On the other hand, the recital of a generous, humane, or grateful action, never fails to draw from him tears of approbation, which he is often greatly distressed to conceal" (XI 86-87).

Bramble's close relationship to the Jaques type of the Renaissance malcontent tradition is revealed in the rather conventional discovery scene where Humphry learns that Matt is his natural father. As a youth, like Shakespeare's Jaques, Matt had been a libertine. As he tells Tabby, "'In short, the rogue proves to be a crab of my own planting, in the days of hot blood and unrestrained libertinism'" (XII 188). Matt's change of name is also emblematic of his misanthropic presentation; the sins of his youth were committed under another name, Lloyd, which he changed to Bramble, symbolic of his satiric disposition, when he had reformed (XII 186-88). Significantly Bramble
is Matt's real name, and indicative of his real nature as a satirist, while Lloyd was the assumed name: "'I took my mother's name, which was Lloyd, as heir to her lands in Glamorganshire; but, when I came of age, I sold that property, in order to clear my parental estate, and resumed my real name; so that I am now Matthew Bramble of Brambleton Hall, in Monmouthshire..." (XII 187-88). Smollett also makes it clear that Bramble is not a malcontent from personal misfortunes, envy, vanity, or any of the other reasons that set up the Renaissance malcontent for ridicule. At Bath Matt meets a group of his old friends who finally disgust him simply because they are basically the wrong type of Renaissance malcontent: "Each of them apart, in succeeding conferences, expatiated upon his own particular grievances; and they were all malcontents at bottom. Over and above their personal disasters, they thought themselves unfortunate in the lottery of life" (XI 72). Matt is thus clearly offered as a contrast to his old friends.

The real benevolence and feeling that make up the basis of Bramble's nature have left Smollett open to charges of at least meeting sentimentalism half way. If to use sentiment as a vehicle of satire is to meet sentimentalism half way, then I suppose the charge is true. But Smollett himself tried to make clear that Bramble did not simply go about distributing pity at random. In the character of Mr. Serle Smollett offers a pointed contrast to Bramble and
indicates Bramble's addition of good sense to his benevolence:

Mr. Serle passed this evening with us . . . but his disposition was rather of a melancholy hue. My uncle says he is a man of uncommon parts and unquestioned probity; that his fortune, which was originally small, has been greatly hurt by a romantic spirit of generosity, which he has often displayed, even at the expense of his discretion, in favour of worthless individuals.

(XI 89)

Bramble's misanthropy, of course, helps to prevent this romantic and indiscreet generosity, so characteristic of men of feeling. A. D. McKillop gives a more correct estimation of Bramble's sentimentalism when he writes that "Bramble is not merely a sentimentalist in masquerade; like Molière's Alceste, he can be diagnosed as a neurotic, and at the same time admired for the pride and honesty that lead him to talk harsh sense about the world. The humorous malcontent, like the quixotic enthusiast, can win our admiration as he exposes the human predicament." 41

In Jerry's words: "'Indeed I never knew a hypochondriac so apt to be infected with good-humour. He is the most risible misanthrope I ever met with.'" (XI 63). Thus Matt also causes mirthful laughter arising from a ludicrous combination of satire and sentiment, amiable humor.

As a satirist Bramble to some extent shares the spotlight with Jerry, and even with Lydia, Tabby, and Winifred. As Paulson indicates, Smollett here uses "multiple
satirists converging on a single scene."\(^{42}\) Jerry is obviously offered to the reader as a light-hearted, laughing philosopher. His reason for traveling is far different from Matt's (who has many actually): "Without all doubt, the greatest advantage acquired in travelling and pursuing mankind in the original, is that of dispelling those shameful clouds that darken the faculties of the mind, preventing it from judging with candour and precision" (XII 206). These reasons are essentially laudable, but ultimately he enjoys the scenes he sees in the manner of Democritus:

"I cannot account for my being pleased with these incidents any other way than by saying they are truly ridiculous in their own nature, and serve to heighten the humour in the farce of life, which I am determined to enjoy as long as I can" (XI 63).\(^{43}\) Jerry's satire is then rather cheerful in contrast to the gloomy railings of Matt. Lydia and Winifred, of course, cause laughter through their naiveté, while Tabby through her perverse disposition, more often than not makes herself the object of ridicule.

In contrast to both Matt and Jerry we have the strange character of Lismahago, who seems to be what McKillop calls a humorist of the "incorrigible" type.\(^{44}\) In one sense he certainly "serves as the axis upon which the emphasis of the novel shifts from satire to praise," as Martz contends,\(^{45}\) but in his relationship to the Bramble family he is often a touchstone for our views of Matt and
Jerry. As a humorist he most clearly contrasts with Matt's humor, and by implication points up Matt's good-nature. The humors of both characters are ultimately derived, of course, from the traditional English view of the Welchman as proud and peppery and the Scotsman as pragmatical and dour. Smollett elaborates this humor into a peevish contentiousness that likes to maintain paradoxes:

His manner is as harsh as his countenance; but his peculiar turn of thinking, and his pack of knowledge, made up of the remnants of rarities, rendered his conversation desirable, in spite of his pedantry and ungracious address. I have often met with a crab-apple in a hedge, which I have been tempted to eat for its flavour, even while I was disgusted by its austerity. The spirit of contradiction is so strong in Lismahago, that I believe in my conscience he has rummaged, and read, and studied with indefatigable attention, in order to qualify himself to refute established maxims, and thus raise trophies for the gratification of polemical pride.

(XII 32-33)

As Matt points out in the above quoted letter, Lismahago lacks the good-nature of an amiable humorist. He seems, however, to belong rather clearly to the Jonsonian type of humorist who was offered to the public for ridicule, with at least the implied hope of correction. His particular type of humor would seem to follow in a direct line from Theophrastus's "Grumbler," through the Renaissance "surly man," to Samuel Johnson's "contentious" man. He resembles the latter indeed very closely:

... from the first exertion of reason I was bred a disputant, trained up in all the arts of
domestic sophistry, initiated in a thousand low stratagems, viable shifts, and sly concealment; versed in all the turns of altercation, and acquainted with the whole discipline of fending and proving. . . . I never spoke but to contradict, nor declaimed but in defense of a position universally acknowledged to be false, and therefore worthy, in my opinion, to be adorned with all the colours of false representation. 47

Lismahago also seems to have traits which the eighteenth century attributed to the detested stoics: "The logic of the Stoics was perfectly embarrassing; it was rather the art of endless disputation, and of maintaining contradictions, than of investigating truth." 48 In either case he does not belong in the tradition of amiable humor.

Lismahago's final mellowing at the end of the novel (XII 225) corresponds somewhat to the Jonsonian method of exhibiting a humorist on the stage for the purposes of amendment, as in Every Man Out Of His Humor. In this aspect Matt plays a kind of Asper to Lismahago's Macilente. Indeed Smollett makes rather interesting use of the stage metaphor in Clinker which further suggests correspondences with the Renaissance theatre. In the background story of Wilson and Lydia, for example, the theatre plays an important role, since Wilson has taken up as a strolling player. In connection with Jerry's role as satirist, however, the stage is even more important. Jerry uses the stage metaphor rather frequently in the course of the journey. He refers to Clinker's court session, for example, as a farce: "The farce is finished, and another piece of a graver cast
brought upon the stage" (XI 191); more importantly he thinks of his descriptions of Lismahago almost as stage directions: "In my last two you had so much of Lismahago, that I suppose you are glad he is gone off the stage for the present" (XII 39). Jerry thus conceives of the journey as a sort of drama and himself as author or commentator of the characters who cross the stage. In his last letter he refers on to the whole journey as a comedy/which the curtain has finally fallen (XII 224). As we will see later, Smollett even permits Matt to dispose of his satirical mask, as though the follies of the world had been somewhat corrected and the humorists reformed as they passed before him and his satire.

But Bramble definitely dominates the travels, and in a rather symbolic manner his satire proves to be more just in the long run. After Lydia's raptures over Bath and London, in contrast to Matt's raving, she is forced to admit that she would rather leave the crowded city and return to the bliss of the country: "I wish my weak head may not grow giddy in the midst of all this gallantry and dissipation; though as yet I can safely declare I could gladly give up all these tumultuous pleasures for country solitude, and a happy retreat with those we love . . ." (II 123). Later Lydia is completely won over to Matt's view of the world:

Nature never intended me for the busy world; I
long for repose and solitude, where I can enjoy that disinterested friendship which is not to be found among crowds, and indulge those pleasing reveries that shun the hurry and tumult of fashionable society. Unexperienced as I am in the commerce of life, I have seen enough to give me a disgust to the generality of those who carry it on; there is such malice, treachery, and dissimulation, even among professed friends and intimate companions . . . and when vice quits the stage for a moment, her place is immediately occupied by folly, which is often too serious to excite anything but compassion.

(XII 173)

Jerry's rather happy estimate of human nature and its foibles also falls prey to Matt's misanthropy: "My uncle and he Quin are perfectly agreed in their estimate of life, which Quin says, would stink in his nostrils, if he did not steep it in claret. . . . I must entertain you with an incident that seems to confirm the judgment of the two cynic philosophers. I took the liberty to differ in opinion from Mr. Bramble, when he observed, that the mixture of people in the entertainments of this place was destructive of all order and urbanity . . . and vulgarised the deportment and sentiments of those who moved in the upper spheres of life" (XI 65). In the dessert contest that follows, Jerry is, of course, proved wrong and even Matt is unhappy to be right: "He hung his head in manifest chagrin, and seemed to repine at the triumph of his judgment" (XI 67).

In this union of satire and sentiment, Matt's railings have an exceptional force. In his satiric role as
misanthropic observer of man's vice and folly, Matt most clearly falls into the cynic tradition, as Jerry often indicates. Like the cynics, and especially Diogenes, Matt's railings can be divided rather generally as attacks on man and on the luxuries of over-refined civilization. Over and over again Matt cries that "... we live in a vile world of fraud and sophistication" (XI 48), or that ". . . we are all a pack of venal and corrupted rascals; so lost to all sense of honesty, and all tenderness of character, that, in a little time, I am fully persuaded, nothing will be infamous but virtue and public spirit" (XI 99-100). Fools, like the "club of authors," and the vice and folly of such places as Bath and London do seem to justify, at least speculatively, Matt's railings: "But what have I to do with the human species? except for a very few friends, I care not if the whole was -- Hark ye, Lewis, my misanthropy increases every day. -- The longer I live, I find the folly and the fraud of mankind grow more and more intolerable" (XI 60). In the light of Matt's railings at the wickedness of man the famous sentimental scene of Captain Brown's homecoming seems to fit in rather naturally, for to Matt "he had in some measure redeemed human nature from the reproach of pride, selfishness, and ingratitude ... " (II 116). Corresponding to Matt's railings, however, he is "one of those few men of worth ... that ... serve only as exceptions; which, in the gram-
marian's phrase, confirm and prove a general canon" (X 100).

Bramble's denunciation of man is closely tied to his disgust at the extravagance, luxury, and corruption of the cities. Bath we learn is a mere sink of profligacy and extortion, luxury and extravagance (XI 73); the horrors of London are brilliantly contrasted with the peace and health of the country: it is "a reservoir of folly, knavery, and sophistication . . . " (XI 140). These attacks are typical of cynic diatribes like Diogenes's famous railing at cities: "[Diogenes] said that men first came together in cities that they might not suffer wrong from the outside; but there they turned about and did all manner of wrong to one another and committed the most atrocious deeds, as though this had been the purposes of their coming together."49 Unlike the cynics, however, Matt is not against progress, as long as it is not accompanied by luxury and extravagance, for Matt does not want the hard primitivism of early cynicism. In his tour of Scotland, for example, Matt praises the progress and commerce of various towns like Leith and Glasgow (XII 74; XII 79 ff.). Scotland represents progress without corruption in contrast to England's progress accompanied by decadence. It is perhaps unfair to attribute this softening attitude to Smollett's patriotic fervor, for the praises of Scotland are certainly consistent with Matt's character. Even when Matt is in raptures, for example, in Edinburgh,
he can point out some of the blemishes of the place (XII 75). His comments on the district surrounding Stirling Castle are certainly as caustic as his remarks about the architecture of Bath, and center characteristically on their lack of convenience, upkeep, and commercial productivity (XII 88-89). We will see below that Smollett unites the Scottish tour to the total structure of the novel when he associates it with his praise of the country.

Opposed to the city are the peace and tranquility of the country which are continually on Matt's tongue. Only in the country does Matt hope to find the sanity and friendship lacking in the great cities and it is to the country that the travelers return. All of Smollett's novels end with a migration to the country as a place of felicity and ultimate salvation from the wiles of the world. Roderick moves back to Scotland and his country estate; Perry, in prison, dreams of pastoral scenes with his beloved Emila, which he achieves at his father's death and his discharge from prison; Fathom retires to a country town to carry out his penance and reform; and Sir Launcelot and Aurelia return to his country estate after their discharge from the mad-house. But this return to the country motif is certainly not convincing in the other novels, for it is a tacked on conventional formula of the typical romantic novel, even though it is evident that Smollett thinks the country is the only place for salvation in this world. In
Clinker, however, this myth of the country is a carefully wrought out structural principle and seems realistically within the Beatus Ille tradition.\textsuperscript{50} The travels of the Bramble family are stated from the first as a family journey with a return to Wales clearly anticipated. Throughout the novel the desire to return is on the lips of nearly every member of the group.

In terms of Matt's satirical railings the country becomes a structural referent to which Matt can always turn for a pointed contrast to the dissipation of the city. Matt's famous London description gains its effectiveness in satiric asperity by the long description of country life that point by point answers the description of London life (XI 150 ff.). Even before London Matt could lament: "... such is the atmosphere of Bath I have exchanged for the pure, elastic, animating air of the Welsh mountains. O Rus, quando te aspiciam!" (XI 85) In terms of the plot, on the other hand, the country provides the final comic vision of the novel, for Matt has carefully retained the country as the haven of return; it thus becomes his stable reference point as both satiric persona and character in the plot. The two roles unite in Matt's visit to Baynard and his attempt to help him. This action is Matt's first that can be called interfering in the evil he sees about him.\textsuperscript{51} When he attempts to help Baynard, both before and after the death of Mrs. Baynard, Matt steps out of the role
as satirist. While he verbally attacks Mrs. Baynard in his letters to Dr. Lewis, he attempts only to reason with and lecture to Baynard himself. As the story moves from Baynard into the extended visit with the Dennisons, whom Matt views as living the perfect life, the satire of the novel can easily recede into the comical happy ending.

The comic vision of the country myth conclusion also structurally unites the Scottish and English antithesis of the novel. The life of the Baynards and the Dennisons are to a great extent the thesis of the novel in miniature. The extravagance and luxury of the Baynard household are Matt's denunciations of Bath and London, while the Dennisons' mode of rural life corresponds closely to the praises of Scottish industry and thrift. Mrs. Baynard's extravagance has destroyed Baynard's magnificent country estate and flung Baynard himself into financial ruin (XII 143-58). In contrast, the Dennisons have achieved economic and financial security through the proper cultivation of their small country farm, and have added to this security the happiness of a rural life. Smollett does not offer the country as an absolute means of salvation, as the Baynard episode indicates; but it is one of the few places where extravagance can be avoided more successfully. The objections of Dennison's friends to the possibility of living in the country without expenses, for example, are wrong.
"... because they were chiefly founded upon the supposition that he would be obliged to lead a life of extravagance and dissipation, which he and his consort equally detested, despised, and determined to avoid. The objects he had in view were health of body, peace of mind, and the private satisfaction of domestic quiet, unalloyed by actual want, and uninterrupted by the fears of indigence. ... He required nothing but wholesome air, pure water, plain diet, convenient lodging, and decent apparel" (XII 192).

Smollett rather pointedly suggests that the journey is also Matt's own symbolic search for happiness and that it is to some extent a method of purging his own spleen. Matt writes to Dr. Lewis: "We are now happily housed with that gentleman [Dennison], who has really attained to that pitch of rural felicity at which I have been aspiring these twenty years in vain" (XII 90). His final letter indicates that perhaps the satiric role can be dropped and he can find his rural felicity: "As I have laid in a considerable stock of health, it is to be hoped you will not have much trouble with me in the way of physic, but I intend to work you on the side of exercise. ... That this scheme of life may be prosecuted the more effectually, I intend to renounce all sedentary amusements, particularly that of writing long letters ..." (XII 231). Matt's renunciation of "sedentary amusements," particularly long letters, his "formal" method of satire, seems to assume that the mask
of misanthropy is only necessary when the world's vices need castigation. The return to rural happiness at any rate provides a hasty happy ending with rewards for all, and even a mellowing of Tabby and Lismahago. The comic vision seems artistically justified when Jerry writes: "The comedy is near a close, and the curtain is ready to drop. . . ." (XII 224).
NOTES

CHAPTER IV


7. Ibid., 390 ff.


10. Ibid., p. 34.

11. Ibid., p. 187.


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15. Goldberg argues that the adventures are cumulative rather than progressive and hence the story cannot be a novel of learning. To a certain extent this is quite true, but this kind of interpretation tends to put too much of a straight jacket on Smollett which the picaresque tendencies of his novels do not seem to bear. See M. A. Goldberg, Smollett and the Scottish School (Albuquerque, 1959), pp. 38-39.

16. See, for example, such comments as "I take heaven to witness, that while I played such a fine part, I said within myself, in faith, Mr. Gil Blas, if justice should now come and seize you by the collar, you would richly deserve the saly which she would bestow." (Rene Le Sage, The Adventures of Gil Blas of Santillane, tr. Tobias Smollett, intro. J. B. Priestley, 2 vols /Oxford, 1937/, I, 325).


18. Paulson, 394.

19. Ibid., 396.


22. Perry illustrates this secret philanthropy most strikingly when he obtains a commission for Godfrey in secret, while at the very time he is in the midst of his attempts to seduce Emilia. See II, 233.

23. Goldberg, p. 73.

24. See Knapp, pp. 318 ff; Goldberg, pp. 104 ff.

25. Notice the irony of the metaphor Smollett uses when Elinor succumbs to Fathom's seduction: she gives into him as a joyful city opening its gates to a darling prince, I, 198.


27. Goldberg attributes this lack of discernment in the "sentimental" characters to the opposition of art and
nature in the novel. See pp. 88 ff.

28. See, for example, Paulson, 399.

29. See I, 114 (The Tyrolese) and I 146 ff. (Sir Stentor); Maurice and his solicitor (VIII, 240-53) also dupe him.

30. Paulson, 399. Part of this overemphasis is also due to the morality play atmosphere of the whole novel. As Knapp argues, the characters are too white and too black (p. 319). The morality play tradition heightens the irony of the satire against mankind.


32. Ibid., 287 ff.

33. Paulson, 400.

34. Goldberg, pp. 122-23.

35. Greaves is hardly the slavish imitation of Don Quixote that Kahrn claims (p. 59). It seems more likely that Smollett is capitalizing on the new attitude towards Don Quixote described in Tave, Chapter VII. Beattie, for example, saw Greaves as an object of pity and admiration, not of contempt or ridicule. See James Beattie, Dissertations Moral and Critical (Dublin, 1783), II, 316 ff.


37. Matt physically chastizes only once when he beats the negro porters from his doorway in Bath (XI 39-40).


40. See Knapp, pp. 306-07; 322.

41. Early Masters, pp. 176-77.

42. Paulson, 402.

43. As a laughing satirist Jerry also falls into the same cynical tradition of Bramble. As Diogenes Laertius explains, the cynics produced the angry railing of Diogenes and the laughing satire of Menippus and Crates. Of Menippus Diogenes Laertius writes: "There


49. From Dio Chrysostom as quoted in Lovejoy-Boas, p. 132.

50. For an excellent discussion of the development of this entire tradition, see Maren-Sofie Røstvig, *The Happy Man*, 2 vols. (Oslo, 1958). Røstvig argues for the decline of the tradition in the eighteenth century because of the rise of sentiment (II, 319 ff.). Smollett is, of course, using the tradition here as does Fielding: see Battestin, pp. 92 ff.

51. The only time Matt really attempts to concretize his railings is in the challenge to Lord Oldmixon (II 138 ff.), which is significantly averted by the Lord's apology.

52. See Paulson, 399. Mary Claire Randolph comments that "The idea of satire as a vent for the author's repressed feelings becomes increasingly common. . . . Satire is consistently regarded as having cathartic effects on both reader and writer" *Dissertation*, p. 25, n. 52.)
V

THE MINOR "MISANTHROPIC RACE"

The popular reception of the good-natured misanthrope is attested in an interesting dialogue between Walter Shandy and Matthew Bramble that appeared in the London Magazine in 1782. The altercation between the two humorists ultimately resolves into a question of which of the two types offers the world more amusement and instruction. Shandy willingly admits that the "worthy Matthew Bramble . . . was generally wont to speak worse than he thought, and his goodness of heart belied the asperity of his tongue."¹ But nevertheless Shandy feels that the world gains more from Shandean philosophers than cynics:

The world is indebted for more amusement to them (and for ought I know as much in instruction) than all the Cynic philosophers, from Diogenes to MATTHEW BRANBLE inclusive. He, it is said, literally lived in a tub; his descendents, your gloomy fraternity, metaphorically in a subterraneous dungeon of their own digging, where they dwell in darkness and then complain for want of light.²

Shandy further thinks that such philosophers do not do much for the cheer of society: "to throw a veil over the bright side of things, and exhibit only the shade, or the most disgusting objects in it, is not very amiable. . . . At any rate, they are pests to the cheerfulness of
society, and ought to be excluded from it." But Matt has the last word in the dialogue, for he knows that his "gloomy fraternity" have both amused and instructed mankind: "I heartily bid you farewell, with a better temper than you may give me credit for." It is, of course, impossible to examine all of the members of Matt's fraternity, for their name is legion; but a careful analysis of the use of the good-natured misanthrope in the more important works of the major-minor authors of the era will illustrate his importance and illuminate the rather tenuous union of satire and sentiment in the eighteenth century. The process begins, in a sense rather unexpectedly, with the sentimental playwright, Richard Cumberland. In the year following Smollett's publication of Humphry Clinker Cumberland produced The Fashionable Lover (1772), which has as a main character a good-natured misanthrope, Mortimer. Cumberland was able to unite satire and sentiment in his play by the use of this type of humorist in a way that no other sentimental playwright was able to do. As a character of the plot Mortimer serves as both deus ex machina for the young lovers and moral instructor to the dissipated Lord Aberville. As a satirist he lashes the individuals of the play and the world in general. In his biography of Garrick Thomas Davies comments on the character of Mortimer, which he recognizes is part of a new type: "Mortimer is a good character; though
not new; he pleases, because he exhibits to us a generous mind, and is a warm lover of justice and humanity."

To the world Mortimer strives to appear the cynic and the misanthrope: "... I'm a sour fellow; so the world thinks of me; but it is against the proud, the rich I war ..." (II i 30). Augusta certainly thinks he is a misanthrope (I ii 21), and Lord Aberville calls him a cynic who has turned traitor to society (I i 12). But Mortimer's misanthropy arises from his tender heart, and is partially a defense mechanism, as he tells Macleod: "Why doesn't do sic like me? Sheath a soft heart in a rough cast, 'twill wear the longer; finer sic thyself ... as thy master does, and keep a marble outside to the world" (II i 27). His sensibility is so refined that he cannot bear to hear how Macleod spends his money in charity; he is "one of nature's children, and ... hasn't yet left off the tricks of the nursery" (II i 28).

As the satiric moralist he lashes Aberville; at the same time he does all in his power to save him from the certain destruction towards which his dissipated ways are leading him. To Lord Aberville "... he is the glass in which I see myself, and the reflection tortures me ..." (III ii 51). His castigation of the world gains in asperity when we know that his private life is completely without blemish: "What is it our men of genius are about? Jarring and jangling with each other, whilst a vast army of
vices overruns the whole country at discretion" (II i 27). In his eyes the world is so evil that "no corrosive can eat deep enough to bottom the corruption" (IV ii 76). Opposed to the corruption he lashes stands his own benevolent heart that seeks to remedy the evil around him: he is "one who does a thousand noble acts without the credit of one; his tongue wounds and his heart makes whole . . ." (IV i 68). Perhaps his role in the play is best summed up in his own words to Augusta's father: "Let us do good, sir, and not talk about it . . ." (IV ii 77).

Cumberland evidently appreciated the satiric possibilities that such a character offered to sentimental drama, for he repeated him in the person of Ruefull in The Natural Son (1785). In his role as satirist Ruefull can ridicule both the world and the affectations of the Latimer ladies, for "When a miser or a man-hater is mention'd, Ruefull's name is in every body's mouth" (III 40). Also typical of the misanthropic tradition Ruefull as a youth had been a libertine, and as a plot device this early straying from virtue enables him to be the natural father of the benevolent young Blushly, just as Bramble discovers that Humphry is his natural son. As Dumps, his servant points out: "... a man-hater he is, I don't deny it; but then he does good to people out of spite. He can be charitable enough, whilst other folks take the praise of it; find him out, and you are sure to lose his good-will.
He was a rake in his young days" (V 71).

Mortimer and Ruefull stand in pointed contrast to Penruddock of *The Wheel of Fortune* (1795), which is for all practical purposes a treatise defending the use of the misanthrope as railer as well as a defense of misanthropes in general. Penruddock, like Chaubert, Alceste, Timon, and Kotzebue's Henry, becomes a misanthrope because of his mistreatment by the world. Essentially all of them are men of feeling. Cumberland ingeniously utilizes the satiric possibilities of Penruddock by pointing up his development from black to good-natured misanthropy. The character is thus, in one sense a combination of Kotzebue's Henry and Marmontel's Alceste; he is essentially a dramatic proof of the misanthrope's inherent benevolence which Richardson, Stockdale, and Craig had argued in their critical treatises. In this light Penruddock is one of the characters Cumberland describes in his *Memoire* as usually "butts for ridicule and abuse" which he has "endeavoured to present ... in such lights, as might tend to reconcile the world to them, and them to the world." As a character study in the evolvement of the new misanthropic tradition he has, however, a definite interest; but as a misanthropic railer with a benevolent heart he is much inferior to Mortimer and Ruefull, since most of the play concentrates on his black misanthropy and interior struggle to destroy it.

Penruddock certainly does use his black misanthropic
disposition to satirize the follies of men and the false luxury of London, (III iii 41 ff.), but his misanthropy lacks the amiable humor of the typical good-natured misanthrope, for his earlier character lacks the ludicrousness of speculative misanthropy and active benevolence which the good-natured misanthrope has. Penruddock's benevolence has to struggle to come to the fore; it is not constantly in action as his black misanthropy is. He thus lacks the easy penetrability of the good-natured misanthrope, so that his satire has a hue of malice about it. But in the last act, when Penruddock has given up all thoughts of revenge against Woodville he begins to assume the humor of Mortimer and Ruefull. His own description of himself to Emily marks the change in his character from extreme misanthropy to the good-natured type: "I hope, madam, there is something here present more amusing to your sight than a crabbed old clown, who happens to have a little more kindness at his heart than he carries in his countenance" (V i 66). The nature of Penruddock's new good-natured misanthropy can even be discerned in the asperity of his satire. Before the rise of his good humor we hear him exclaim: "I am weary, sick, discomfited. This world and I must part once more. That it has virtues, I will not deny; but they lie buried in a tide of vanities, like grains of gold in sand washed down by mountain torrents: I cannot wait the sifting" (IV ii 53). After the victory of good-humor he can laughingly,
though sarcastically, tell Emily: "Certainly, madam, this world is a great polisher; it makes smooth faces and slippery friendships" (V i 67).

Surprising as it may seem, aside from Cumberland (and Foote before him) the dramatists of the late eighteenth century made little use of the good-natured misanthrope to gain the mild satiric effect he obviously rendered, while still remaining within the pale of sentiment. Instead the character remained in the novel, where after Smollett Courtney Melmoth (Samuel Jackson Pratt) was the first to exploit it. In his second novel, Shenstone-Green (1779), Melmoth returned to the theme he developed in Liberal Opinions that man, if left to himself in the present situation of the world will choose vice over virtue. Hence the man of feeling is doomed in this world to frustration and disappointment and his virtue will be rewarded only in the next world. This thesis is enunciated continually by the good-natured misanthrope, Samuel Sarcastic, whose chief role as steward to Sir Benjamin Beauchamp merges with his role as a satiric commentator on Sir Benjamin's benevolent folly.

The novel is essentially a superficial allegory based on Genesis and Paradise Lost. Indeed Melmoth significantly sub-titles his work The New Paradise Lost. Being A History of Human Nature, and Sir Benjamin thinks of Shenstone-Green as Paradise Regained and then lost again.
Sir Benjamin's folly in attempting to establish a new society that would out-wit man's natural appetites and remain in its original state of bliss is attributed to his benevolence and good-will; except in a few men like Sir Benjamin, benevolence unfortunately "is in these days a tolerable oeconomist" (I 2). Thus, like Liberal Opinions, Shenstone-Green is a warning to men of feeling; it is written for those "few, and those chiefly a set of simpletons who work up their hearts to a warmth that mounts into the brain, and brings on the convulsions of sympathy" (I 3). As a condemnation of the vices of man and society the satire is as pungent as in Liberal Opinions; but by putting the actual satire in the mouth of Samuel Sarcastic and constantly contrasting his misanthropic benevolence with Benjamin's foolish charity Shenstone-Green loses the heavyhandedness of the satire in the former novel. As a case against society, however, it is just as effective.

Throughout the novel Samuel moves between his role as a satirist crying out against Sir Benjamin's benevolent excesses and his role as steward actively trying to prevent the folly that he fears will result from Sir Benjamin's benevolence; despite his fine feelings Sir Benjamin does not understand that human nature is frail, and that men in general simply do not have his benevolent disposition. In contrast to Sir Benjamin, Samuel is noted for "the goodness of his heart, and the queerness of his humour; the first
of which induced him to a thousand worthy actions, and the second rendered him a most companionable creature. He was starch, stay'd, generous, waggish, original, and odd" (I 30). Samuel's method of reproving Beauchamp is by sarcastic remarks or smiles. Unfortunately Sir Benjamin appreciates Samuel more for his benevolence than for his satire, and learns too late that Sarcastic understands human nature better than himself.

Samuel accepts the job as steward to the Green, even though he "grinned a silent sarcasm on ... the scheme in every lineament of his face" (I 47). He intends, however, to use his job to convince Beauchamp of his folly. If he plans to put his romantic scheme into action, Samuel warns that he had better at least set up laws for his model community, for no society "can long preserve its harmony without regulations" (I 78). He attempts to make Beauchamp see that the half a hundred people he has assembled have "at least half a thousand contrary passions" (Ibid.). On his journey to seek suitable inhabitants for the Green Samuel resorts to his satirist's role when he sends satiric letters to Beauchamp that try to prove to him the exact nature of his "charitable abuses" (I 72).

As a satirist Samuel expresses the cynical view of man, which in the context of the novel is the realistic one, and certainly the one that triumphs: "For my part, sir," said the steward, 'I think one has more reason to cry
at human nature than to laugh, for I never yet found her
four and twenty hours in the same mind in my life" (II 5-6).
The gradual decay of the Green brings only such satiric
remarks as, "Let us shut our eyes for a few hours -- against
the species" (II 31). Samuel, however, does not hold that
man is by nature evil, but only that he has passions which
corrupt whatever benevolent feelings are innate: "Nature,
I believe, sir, leads to a decent behaviour; but there are,
I fear, five perverted appetites, which lean to the gross-
est pleasure, to one that is delicate or true to the orig-
inal bias of human feelings" (II 162).

The prudent benevolence that Samuel preaches becomes
dramatized in the character of Seabroke (Sir Matthew Davies
in disguise) who comes to watch the experiment of the new
paradise Sir Benjamin has established. After viewing the
gradual disintegration of the Green, Seabroke concurs with
Sarcastic and tells Beauchamp to face the reality of things:

"Good and gentle characters, require no other im-
pulse to virtue than the dictate of the heart,
which is their unerring rule of right; but the
majority, being neither gentle nor good; it is
necessary to prevent the force of bad habit or
bad nature, by the interposition of wholesome
laws."

(III 56-57)

Seabroke backs up his assertion by a recitation of his
own excursion through the countryside, during which he, dis-
guised as a beggar, visited the homes of all the poor ten-
ants. In this disguise he was able to determine, by their
treatment of him, who deserved his financial assistance, who were really rascals, and who were happier living in poverty. Seabrooke has thus done "more rational and more real service to society than poor silly Sir Benjamin Beau-champ with all his thousand pounds . . ." (III 79).

Structurally Beauchamp and Seabrooke represent the man of feeling duped by the world and the man of feeling saved by prudence. In the background of the novel, however, Samuel Sarcastic stands as satiric commentator. As a character in the plot he lays aside his satiric role in the end and leaves his stewardship to become administrator of the Green, thus continuing his plot role when his satiric role is finished. The mask of misanthropy, as Paulson has well pointed out, suggests that "one is not simply a satirist but a man who is for a time forced into the role by intolerable circumstance."13

Melmoth elaborated Sarcastic into the completely low comic misanthrope, Partington, in Family Secrets (1797), which, chronologically, is almost the last work of literature to use the good-natured misanthropic type; as such it quite interestingly illustrates the fruition of nearly all the implications inherent in the misanthrope's role as satirist.14 The novel itself is a veritable treatise on benevolence and sentimentalism, covering in one manner or another nearly every type of man of feeling available to
the period. If one can speak of structure in a work longer and more rambling than Liberal Opinions, Partington represents a balance between the morbid benevolence of Henry Fitzorton and the deep-hued misanthropy towards which his brother, John, tends (needless to say as a result of his excessive feelings). Melmoth's triangle of sentiment is certainly not subtle, so that it is easy to hear what J. M. S. Tompkins so well calls the gongs of anti-sentimentality that sound from both Partington and John. But Tompkins also notes that the pages are drenched with tears, and for all his anti-sentiment, Melmoth approves of them. It is only fair to Melmoth, however, to say that the tears are consistent with the excessive melodrama of the story, and are not merely decoration. The action moves forward by a constant series of contrasts between the benevolent Fitzortons and the malevolent Sir Guise Stuart (who later adds a vicious wife and her followers to his family group). In terms of this type of plot the villainy of Sir Guise is as excessively horrible as the benevolence of the Fitzortons is sentimental. Partington weaves in and out of these two families as a friend to the Fitzortons, an enemy to the Stuarts, and a satiric commentator on the whole scene.

As a man of feeling Henry depicts the type that neither reason nor frustration will hinder: "I follow a tender emotion: nature has commanded, and I obey; but I do not
reason upon it" (I 43). His feelings are so refined, however, that he fears giving the least hurt to anyone; in this disposition he marries a girl he does not love simply because she loves him and he does not wish to hurt her (I 96 ff.). On the other hand, as his brother, John, tells him, his sensibility also makes him feel that others are constantly trying to harm him: "... it is by nursing this sickly kind of sensibility, you have acquired that soreness of mind, which not only shrinks at the touch, but induces you to imagine that aim is taken at your honour and happiness ... when ... probably, you are not at all involved in the question" (I 343-44).

Henry's morbid sensibility stands in contrast to John's philosophic conviction that men of feeling are doomed to misery in the unfeeling world of men. But John himself is a man of feeling, for while he reasoned "as a philosopher, he felt as a man" (I 350). His rational convictions and his natural sensibility are unable to unite in good-natured misanthropy, however, and he easily tends to the black misanthropy that overtook Benignus in Liberal Opinions:

There would, indeed, have been some danger that a mind like his, working under such an influence, might have brooded over its suspicions until they grew into misanthropy. But the example of a benevolent family continually before his eyes ... kept alive the principles of human kindness in his heart; and served as a counterpoise to the unso-
cial check it had thus received in early life.

... John felt it necessary ... to
add the active to contemplative employments. ...

(I 422)

John's "unsocial check" was typically an unfortunate love affair and his resort to activity is the usual advice given to misanthropes by Richardson, Craig, and Mackenzie. Marmontel cures Alceste in the same manner, although he has the kindness to reward him with a young bride for encouragement.

Partington strikes the balance between these two extremes of sensibility by hiding his sensitive heart under the mask of misanthropy:

Mr. Partington had many peculiarities; -- there was a rough honesty in his manner, and a freedom of expression corresponding to it. ... beneath this uninviting exterior, beat a heart, every pulsation of which was a genuine good-will to mankind, without the least alloy of sentimentality, -- that shining dros which makes so much glitter in these tinsel times.

(II 1-2)

Partington shows his favor to people by addressing them rudely and his disfavor by addressing them with great civility. The extent of his favor and disfavor rather humorously depends on the extremity of his language (I 203). Melmoth's addition of this rather strange trait heightens Partington's humor and easily degenerates into the realm of low comedy. Characteristic of the good-natured misanthropic type Partington also aids in private those he rails against in public; he puts active charity above mere well-
wishing:

He never talked of doing any person a kindness, and yet was kindness itself. In truth, while other people were only talking, he would be doing the very thing they talked about; for he would slip out of the company, on fifty different pretences, none of which you could suspect, -- and have had an interview with the party he had heard commiserated, -- then return to the company with no alteration in his general manner, but that of loading with exaggerated scurrility the person to whom he was indebted for the opportunity of being bountiful. . . . But more frequently he would appear altogether inattentive to tales of distress, or, if he did give ear to them, would break out into — "Fahal! — don't tell me! riff-raff! stuff! a pack of beggars! I should not have thought of their impudence! I say distress too!" . . . yet he would be at the door, or at the bedside of the sufferers . . . before any other man of the party thought of leaving the company.

(II 4-5)

Partington's severe tongue serves him in his role as satirist which is structurally the other chief function of his life: " . . . he was no less persevering in his researches after fraud and villainy, for the gratification of exposing it to scorn and infamy. . . . yet never did a human being more infinitely love an honest, nor more abundantly hate a dishonest man -- never would human being go farther, or try harder, to save the one, and hang the other" (III 398-99). In the process of the action Partington unites his satiric pursuit after villains with his role as friend and defender of the Fitzorton family. His first attempt to help the family consists in a sham attack on Henry's wedding party, in which he attempts to save Henry
from marrying the girl he does not love, Olivia. The masquerade is halted by a real attack on the party by Sir Guise and his crew, and the resulting capture of Sir Guise permits Partington to display his best low comic satiric talents, as he insults Sir Guise and his followers in the stable where they are secured:

Partington betook himself to a truss of clean straw, as nothing could prevail on him to repair to any other bed: he had sworn not to quit sight of so honourable a personage as Sir Guise Stuart till he had the supreme felicity of seeing him fully committed.

(III 77)

To this speech Partington adds a profound bow which he resumes in his admonition to young Atwood to guard the villains well:

"Be sure, you young, good-for-nothing scoundrel," said he to the worthy Atwood, "that you do not suffer your eyes to close, should mine be caught napping; for I have not the smallest doubt but that noble, generous, magnanimous gentleman in the straw" -- three respectful bows -- "would try to escape, by which I should lose the heartfelt satisfaction I promise myself, in seeing him dungeoned, if not hanged" -- two more bows.

(III 78)

He later drinks a toast to what he supposes are their "almost dead carcasses," and with "all Christian charity" wishes that "the hangman may do justice to all three of . . . \[them\]" (III 90). Melmoth pointedly comments: "The bitter sarcasm of tone, gesture, and action, which characterised the scorn of Partington cannot be conveyed in language" (Ibid.).
The nature of Partington's satiric role is perhaps most profoundly dramatized in the superb mock heroic trial, where Melmoth symbolically adds legal power to Partington's satiric power. John Fitzorton and Partington sit in judgment over Lady Stuart, Sir Guise, and their followers: "And now, Sir John Fitzorton, and Edward Partington, Esq. two of his Majesty's justices, ordering two chairs to be placed side by side, as chairs of judgment, sat themselves down" (IV 20). Before the case can be heard, however, Justice Barhim, Sir Guise's corrupt friend, finds himself on the floor; in the description of the Justice and the brawl that ensues Melmoth significantly calls on Rabelais, Fielding, Le Sage, and Smollett to assist his pen (IV 24). When order has been restored, Partington, who had been running to and fro enthusiastically encouraging his friends to defeat Sir Guise in the fray, symbolically takes his stand beside John and alternates sarcastic bows to Lady Stuart with John's recitation of the charges (IV 35 ff.). This interesting addition of legal power strikingly points up Partington's satiric powers, for ultimately the law is frustrated in favor of satiric castigation. To the look of defiance John receives from the villains Partington retorts:

"Now that look . . . being interpreted, means this -- 'as to hanging, though we have done every thing that deserves to have our necks broken, we have
done nothing by which the laws can break them; and as to the dishonour, we consider that as rather a ludicrous circumstance; since use, you know, is second nature, and shame is nothing to those who have been all their lives in the practice of laughing it to scorn. Am I not right, my noble masters?" A second look from the parties, acknowledged that Partington was a physiognomist. "Your most humble and obedient servant," said Partington, bowing in his best manner. "I thought so."

(IV 36-37)

Partington leads his last attack on evil when he joins Henry at Guise Abbey and finally secures Lady Stuart and her companions who are using its caverns as a conspiratory place of rendezvous. In the attack on Lady Stuart Melmoth strikingly re-unites Partington's role as satirist and friend: "In a moment the furious attack was made by the multitude, led on by Henry and Partington, and the abbey was filled with the defenders of innocence!" (V 472) After the villains have been tried and sentenced Partington can return to the pursuit of his own happiness and marry Mrs. Herbert. While he never completely drops his rough exterior, Melmoth indicates that, with the sentencing of the villains, Partington's satiric role can be set aside: "Partington led the way to the church, and was amongst the first of those who approached the altar, although he remained the last, preserving throughout the ceremony a reverence of demeanour suited to the occasion, and wholly different from his usual behaviour" (V 663).

Melmoth's architectonic weaknesses are particularly
glaring in the light of the rather tight structural unity of the novels of his contemporary, Robert Bage. Like Melmoth, Bage constantly fought false sentiment and over-refined feelings while he praised the true benevolence that displayed itself in active charity. There are moments indeed when it is extremely difficult to decide just how false the sentiment that Bage castigates really is. In reviewing his Barham Downs, for example, the Monthly expressed concern at Bage's ironical presentation of benevolence and sentiment, at the same time it praised his good sense: "The leading principle of this Author's novels is good sense, animated by a spirit of freedom and benevolence, and expressed in a style peculiarly pointed and sprightly. . . . he is . . . chargeable with a levity of sentiment, which hath a strong cast of irreligion and infidelity."¹⁷ The reviewer perhaps more accurately gaged Bage's method of satire when he commented rather penetratingly on his irony of presentation: "... the Author's talent lies chiefly in striking and spirited touches, and such as convey lively images of objects under a light and ludicrous form. He is seldom serious: and his pathetic is sometimes dashed with an odd mixture of ridicule and irony."¹⁸ Actually Bage attacks the theories of benevolence and sentiment in such a manner that he preserves true feeling; his method is a continual maintenance of ironic tension between the various men of feeling in his novels, who
range from the morbid Henry type to the type tending towards dark misanthropy. He then heightens his irony with the addition of a good-natured misanthrope who as a character in the plot can be a friend of the men of feeling and who as a satirist can condemn not only affected sentiment but the morbid and misanthropic-tending types.

Bage's first novel, Mount Henneth (1781) introduces the good-natured misanthrope to his work in an extremely striking way, for he is actually unknown to any of the characters; in fact he is dead before the story begins and his life is narrated by one of the correspondents, John Cheslyn. Sir Howell Henneth, the good-natured misanthrope had been the owner of Mount Henneth and Henneth castle, which Mr. Foston purchases at the misanthrope's death as a residence for himself and eventually for the other chief characters of the story. Mount Henneth itself becomes the focal point of the novel, as one character after another leaves the world to join Mr. Foston in creating a new community on the Mount. All of these characters are men and women of feeling who can find happiness in an unfeeling world only by banding together in a sort of model society, not unlike Shenstone-Green. Sir Howell's presence pervades the novel as a symbolic satiric commentator on the follies of the world which he himself finally had to desert to find peace of mind. Like himself the characters of the novel
ironically find Henneth Castle, a "large old castle, in
good, though gloomy repair" (126), a place of happiness.

"Sir Howell Henneth, the great misanthrope, whose
life and conversation may be classed in the number of Welch
curiosities" (126), had begun life as a wealthy youth in
high society, and, like the youth of most of these misan-
thropes, his had been a rather dissipated one: "Twelve
years he spent in all the pride and pomp of equipage; gave
the ton to the beau monde, and became the fashion of the
fair" (132). Similarly Sir Howell suffered the harshest
blow in life when his best friend absconded with his fian-
cée and her money; after a bout of gaming, in which he lost
heavily, he tried to enter the service of his country only
to find public service as unfaithful as his friend: "Him-
self stood for the shire. The gentlemen of the county had
an aversion to sinecure-men, and still greater to broken
gamesters. He was thrown out by a great majority. . . .
To fill up the measure of his humiliation, on his return
to court, the minister turned his back upon him; and, hav-
ing contracted a fresh debt of ten thousand pounds, he
found himself unable to live amongst his equals" (135).
Sir Howell took the only measures open to him: "He threw
up his place with disdain, and retired to this castle, ful-
ly imbued with the surly spirit of misanthropy" (Ibid.).

In his retirement Sir Howell goes farther than most
good-natured misanthropes, for he actually writes formal
satire: "... he had lately made it his principal amusement to write bitter philippics against ... the world's pleasures ..." (135). But for all his misanthropy and satire Sir Howell was one of the most benevolent landlords of the county: "... you will be astonished at the strange mixture of genius, whim, misanthropy, and benevolence" (136). In his benevolence he permitted his tenants to deceive him with their tales of woe, so that he usually ended up paying their taxes as well as their rent (136); he then went out of his way to provide work and wages for them:

In the area that fronts the baronet's late apartment, we observed several heaps of the common pebble stone, and wondering for what use they could have been collected, -- I believe, gentlemen, says an elderly labourer, I can give you some information. His honour that's dead and gone, God Bless him! neither liked to see a poor man starve, nor be idle. So when work was scant in the country, in winter time, when the brick-kilns could not gang, he sent as many of us as wanted employment to work in carrying these same heaps of stone from one place to another; and you might see his honour peeping out of the window now and then, just to see if we kept in motion, and that was all he wanted.

(136)

In the summertime he had the men make more bricks, and, then, when winter returned, either had them moved from place to place or even buried. Thus Sir Howell "chose to do some good with his money, without injuring the country, or doing violence to his hermetrical determinations" (136-37). Sir Howell's method of doing good deeds points out the essential ingredient of humor in his nature that makes
him "risible" at the same time that it heightens his satiric contempt for the ways of the world. In the laborer's words, "He was a vast comical gentleman, to be sure, at times . . ." (136).

The symbolic implications of Sir Howell and Mount Henneth are elaborated in one of the characters who eventually retire to Henneth Castle, Samuel Sutton. Samuel's conversion from dark misanthropy and his retirement to the castle structurally reflects the ironic union of satire and sentiment in Sir Howell and points up Mount Henneth as a refuge for men of feeling. In Samuel we see the movement from good-nature to misanthropy to conversion back to good-nature: "Samuel found his arm-chair irresistible. The arm-chair engendered weariness, weariness begot the spleen, and five year's habit has confirmed him the most growling and ill-conditioned tyrant within the bills of mortality" (118). Underneath his misanthropy, of course, lies a tender and feeling heart, which the young Scots doctor easily brings to the fore to the amazement of his nephew, Tom Sutton: "Ay, gude troth, Maister Sutton is one o' the best natured men in the world, 'gin he did na tak sic muckle pains to conceal it" (178).20 Foston points out the emblematic nature of Samuel's retirement to the castle when he describes in the list of inhabitants of the Mount "Samuel Sutton, whose soul, like the soul of Saul, hath
been converted from passion to peace . . ." (225). Bage heightens his case against dark misanthropy by showing that it can be the cause of gullibility as well as benevolence; the retired and misanthropic Samuel was preparing to marry his nurse-housekeeper, when her schemes were unveiled only by the benevolent Dr. Gordon and his niece, Nancy. The old man's gullibility is thus subtly contrasted to Sir Howell's gullibility as a youth. Mount Henneth draws them both as a place for the reconciliation of their misanthropy and benevolence.

In *Barham Downs* (1784) Bage explored the possibilities of the good-natured misanthrope as one of the principal characters in the novel, instead of the unifying symbol he is in *Mount Henneth*. Although Bage continues in the epistolary form, he sets up essentially the same dramatic situation Melmoth used in *Family Secrets*, a triangle of different types of men of feeling. Wyman is his Partington but without the low comic role. As a satirist Wyman castigates affected benevolence and over-refined feeling, while as a friend of young Harry Osmond, a morbid sentimentalist, he can both assist and castigate. In the character of George Osmond, Harry's older brother, Bage offers an analysis of a malicious cynic eventually converted into a good-natured misanthrope. Bage stresses George's cynicism but leaves the actual railing to Wyman. Wyman uses the mask of misanthropy in order to remain in the world and perform
benevolent deeds without imposition. In this vein he castigates the secluded Harry Osmond for permitting his sensibilities to draw him from active and beneficial participation in the affairs of the world:

Thy letter, Harry, for awhile, deceived me into an opinion that thou wert justified in thy sentiments of the world, and right in secluding thyself from it. It was the momentary triumph of feeling over reason. I was betrayed, against nature, into a fit of sensibility, which, as thy brother says, leads to infinite absurdities. (250)

The two brothers, Harry and George, represent two extremes in human nature. Harry, as a foolish sentimentalist, leaves himself open to every form of imposition and absurdity. In giving five thousand pounds for his sister's dowry he rightly loses the respect both of his sister and his fiancée, who laugh behind his back at his "extravagant generosity" (248). Such a foolish action throws his fiancée into the arms of his cynical brother: "I have taken Lucy Strode to wife. No doubt, as you are a man of fine sensibility, which I take to be a fashionable word, invented to palliate half the follies of the age, you will think you have a right to reproach me" (249). Since, however, Bage thinks Harry worth saving, he permits his retirement from the busy world actually to serve the purpose of reforming him, teaching him that the ability to act is as necessary as the ability to feel. At Barham Downs Harry falls in love with Annabella Whitaker, who serves as the cause
of his reformation. In terms of the plot structure her abduction by Lord Winterbottom moves Harry to transform his refined feelings into action. In the frantic and hot pursuit after the melodramatic villain Harry learns that feeling and sensibility can be preserved in this world only with the greatest struggle.

Lucy Strode, the fiancée who rejects Harry to marry Sir George, serves as the pawn in the reformation of both brothers, but particularly Sir George. By rejecting Harry Lucy allows him to fall in love with Anabella; and by becoming an adulteress she helps to awaken Sir George's latent sensibilities: "I had the foolish notion of believing myself a man of wisdom, because I could find out the longitude, if any man could find it out; and square the circle, if the circle was to be squared. I have shut up my heart against all social affections. I have lived for myself alone, and what have I got by it? Hatred, disease, contempt, money, and cuckoldom" (282-83). His return to sociability makes him a good-natured misanthrope, as Annabella later describes him: "Could one ever have thought Sir George Osmond would have stood so forward in the rank of virtuous men? It is true, he has not that tenderness, that sensibility, that touching softness, which distinguishes his brother; but, under an uncouth appearance, and a seeming roughness of manners, he conceals a
manly and generous heart, as ready to reward merit, or relieve distress, as many who would be thought embued with the soul of benevolence" (355).

As a character in the plot Wyman stands in the middle road between these two extremes and uses his misanthropic mask to castigate both brothers and false sentiment in general. Bage carefully points up Wyman's plot role as friend: "A plague upon it! I am doomed, in spite of myself, to love those animals the best, who have the greatest share of this cursed sensibility, which I am at every hour wishing at the devil, with all the appurtenances thereunto belonging" (250). His pity for the seduced Miss Ross and his eventual marriage to her only indicate Harry's assertion that he has a heart "as soft and gentle as a virgin's" (257). Harry's analysis of Wyman demonstrates the ease with which one can penetrate his misanthropy: "Whether thou assumest an air of asperity, and stormest at the world and me, or endeavourest to throw an air of playfulness or ridicule over a tale of love and innocence, its [his heart] tenderness is conspicuous" (Ibid.).

As a satirist, however, he can effectively analyse excess in any direction, illustrating at the same time his own attempt to maintain an ideal intermediate position:

I object equally to insensible, and to too sensible minds. There is a medium, a boundary, fixed by the nature of things, which it is folly to pass.
Would you have mankind feel for themselves and others, till ease and happiness were banished the world? And would not this be the case if everyone could really say, what the affected lady says, "Alas! I feel too sensibly for my peace?" ... One consolation is, the affection of it is at least ten times as great as the reality. ... (274)

Wyman's hatred of excessive sensibility closely ties in with the ideal moral position supported by contemporary periodicals, as we saw in chapter one:

When people have wept the distresses of a tragedy heroine, and have got their bosoms to heave at the recital of a tender tale -- Oh! then, they are the sons and daughters of sensibility -- the first-born of benevolence. ... and yet to feel imaginary distress, and to relieve real, may, for ought I know, be very different things. The first is become almost as fashionable with reading ladies and gentlemen as dressing their hair. ... Now I strongly suspect that too much familiarity with this sensation may, in time, render all distresses imaginary, except one's own; and perhaps this is the reason why to see distress and to relieve, no longer follow one another as cause and effect. ... (295)

In James Wallace (1788) Bage turned his good-natured misanthrope into perhaps the most important character of the novel. Although the novel to a certain extent centers about Wallace himself, as Tompkins observes, "... one of the most carefully wrought figures ... is that of Paul Lamounde ...," who is the benevolent satirist of the piece. In his plot role he serves as Wallace's friend and adviser; his satiric role permits him to rail both at Wallace for his excessive benevolence and at benevolence in
general, much like Wyman. His niece's description is perhaps the briefest and most pointed: "My uncle, by the aid of contracted eye-brows, and some asperity of language, conceals a kind and benevolent heart. He seldom speaks to please, and still more seldom acts to offend" (426). To Uncle Paul, benevolence consists in action and not words. As James's instructor he attempts to remove his extravagant notions of benevolence (without much success) as indicated in his letter to the captain of the ship James has agreed to serve on: "The young man has, moreover, a sound understanding, and, I suppose, a large stock of integrity. The fellow has damn'd fine sensibilities too, and a nice notion of honour; but his greatest extravagance is a romantic benevolence; a folly of the first magnitude, when there is nothing to support it" (453). Uncle Paul's attempts to teach James restraint are, of course, frustrated by his own secret benevolence, and ironically turn on the misanthrope. On his wedding day James goes to the sponging houses of London to distribute a hundred pounds to the poor. In his letter to Sir Patrick Islay Uncle Paul comments on this extravagance: "I abused him for it with all the authority of an uncle. What think you was the whelp's answer? Marry -- that he prayed to God like other people, till I taught him this other mode of religion; and then retorted upon me with a late foolish charitable indiscretion of my own, which I thought a profound secret..."
(506).

As a satirist Uncle Paul performs the persona's role of denouncing universal benevolence: "The justice that soars above the laws . . . is romance. Universal benevolence is romance; and the affections you talk of, meaning, I suppose, the altitudes of love and friendship, the greatest romance of all" (419). In his denunciations Uncle Paul usually combines the role of satirist and instructor, for more often than not his invective arises in an altercation with James over what Paul feels is some act of foolish benevolence. Indeed Uncle Paul's whole role in the novel is revealed in just such an argument where his savage denunciations of man and benevolence are followed by his private decision to help the distressed people James has tried to assist himself. Uncle Paul's invective is certainly in the vitriolic Juvanalian tradition: "No, sir, but man is an ass; these remote and improbable evils are upon his right hand and upon his left, whilst the fool, guided by passion or prejudice, will only look straight forward" (429-30). As far as benevolence is concerned Uncle Paul reasserts Wyman's position: "I hate the cant of benevolence; books are full of it; it fills our mouth, and sometimes gets as far as the eye, but never reaches the heart" (430). But as James reminds him, his private life is a commentary on his public one as a satirist; his misanthropy is only speculative: "Will you have
the goodness to pardon me, sir, if I suspect your assumed
principles ill agree with your practice" (Ibid.).

Bage has also added an interesting structural device
in James Wallace in the character of James's friend, Paracel-
sus Holman, who is a budding young misanthropic railer, a
youthful Uncle Paul. He continually rails at James for his
excessive sensibility: "Amuse yourself, my friend, with
railing at the world and me" (380), and yet has one of the
kindest hearts in the world. Judith Lamounde describes him
as "a young man . . . of great abilities, a good heart,
something of a humourist, and possessed of more sincerity
than complaisance" (474). Bage comes perilously near to
the dangers Smollett encountered in Pickle by permitting
Holman to actualize his metaphorical lashing in whipping
his drunken father who has tried to kill him. Bage is ob-
viously aware of the difficulties of such an action, for
he has Holman take great pains and time to explain all the
circumstances involved in the whipping; he thus hopes to
justify the satirist's attempt to make his metaphors con-
crete reality (380-81).

Man As He Is (1792), the last novel in which Bage
elaborates the good-natured misanthrope, is essentially
James Wallace inverted.\(^24\) The purpose of the novel is to
demonstrate that man, in general, is not basically good
but must be led to virtue through misery: "Man -- though
the lord of the creation, for whom the sun and moon was
made, and the bright galaxy above, and the sweet pretty galaxies below -- is yet -- I am sorry to tell it my fair readers -- is yet an imperfect being" (IV 182). Bage further assures the reader that "the principal part of our business is to conduct a rich high blooded young Englishman to the temple of wisdom, no small undertaking . . ." (IV 115). The rich young lord is Sir George Paradyne and the priest of the temple of wisdom is the good-natured misanthrope, Mr. Lindsay. Lindsay's role is much like that of Uncle Paul, only his satire is aimed more at the general wickedness of the world than so specifically at affected benevolence. To Sir George's request for him to be his tutor Lindsay replies: "Disgusted with mankind -- is it for me to introduce a gentleman into a proper commerce with it" (I 21). But Sir George's reasoning clearly points up the purpose Lindsay is to have in the novel:

Excellent . . . this is precisely what I want. I love the world too well, especially the fairer part of it. A gentleman of your misanthropic turn will mitigate the violence of this passion. It is through magnifiers I look at the world and its pleasures. You turn the glass the opposite way; who knows, but that by our mutual labours, we may at length construct the catoptric instrument, at which divines and philosophers have been labouring so long, and with so little success -- the glass of truth; and see things as they are.

(I 23)

Lindsay's role as satirist is emphasized again and again as the two men travel through the continent on the Grand Tour. Sir George even refers to him as his "inhuman
satirist" (I 78). As Sir George's tutor and friend, however, Lindsay seeks to steer him through the vices and follies of the world by means of kindness and benevolence: "Mr. Lindsay spoke his usual language; a language which could seldom fail to animate the human heart to virtue, if the human heart was always disposed to hear" (IV 79). Like all of these good-natured misanthropes, Lindsay turns to railing simply because the world is not "disposed to hear" the voice of benevolence and reason. Thus Sir George says with ironical truth that Lindsay "is most natural in the character of a cynic philosopher; neither the moral fabric of man, nor the silk fabric of woman, are to his taste" (II 41). 25

Two years before Bage's Barham Downs Fanny Burney published Cecilia (1782), in which she presented a character that has puzzled scholars for some time. 26 In George Sherburn's words: "... there is a mad moralist, Albany, who appears at the oddest moments to utter diatribes against the follies of fashionable life." 27 I think that Albany can be best explained in the tradition of the good-natured misanthrope, and as such can be integrated rather well into the total structure of the novel. For a minor character Albany is rather well wrought. Described by Mrs. Harrel as a "manhater" (I 112), his character is more fully elaborated by Gosport: "'He seems to hold mankind in abhorrence, yet he is never a moment alone, and at the same time that he intrudes himself into all parties, he associates with
none: he is commonly a stern and silent observer of all that passes, or when he speaks, it is but to utter some sentences of rigid morality, or some bitterness of indignant reproof" (I 117). On the other hand, all of his activities are spent in relieving the poor, such as Mr. Belfield (II 58 ff.), and at the end of the novel Cecilia appoints him her almoner (V 395). "'I know not what he is,' said Cecilia, 'but his manners are not more singular than his sentiments are affecting ...'" (I 220).

As a satirist Albany is even more detached than Matt Bramble, although Miss Burney does attempt to integrate him into the total structure of the novel. Albany at first glance seems to be a rather awkward humor character in the midst of a carefully documented novel of manners. But it is precisely the manners of an overluxurious and over-refined society that Miss Burney is attacking in the novel. In relation to the corrupt mores and morals of vicious London high life Albany stands as a satirist touched with the mantle of the biblical prophet: "'Oh times of folly and dissipation! ... Oh mignons of idleness and luxury'" (I 112). His prophetic castigations become symbolically fulfilled in the gambling and suicide of Mr. Harrel and in the extravagance of Mrs. Harrel (II 7 ff.; and III 138-82). Albany's own past history strengthens his role, for as a youth he had indulged in the same dissipations until they led to the final destruction of his happiness in the death
of his fiancée (IV 306 ff.). As a reformed libertine he thus tightens his connections with the follies he casti-
gates, and his denunciations illuminate the moral serious-
ness involved in the vices of society. From one point of
view, for example, Mrs. Harrel's extravagance can be seen
as mere folly; but when it drives her husband to gaming
and finally to suicide, that extravagance becomes a vice
implying serious moral consequences. In his prophetic-
satiric role Albany undercuts the pretentiousness of socie-
ty's refinement and pursuit of luxury.

Although Albany spends much time uttering satiric
invectives on society, he plays a special role in relation-
ship to Cecilia, thus uniting his role as satirist and
plot character. Cecilia first meets Albany at Mr. Monc-
ton's where he sat "frowning in a corner of the room" (I
20); he almost immediately sets himself up as Cecilia's
private prophet: "... fixing his eyes upon Cecilia with
an expression of mingled grief and pity," he cries, "'Alas!
poor thing!'" (I 28) No one in the room heeds him except
Cecilia. Later, at the music hall, after his denunciations
of the folly of the times, he again turns to Cecilia and
tries to warn her of her precarious situation: "'Poor sim-
ple victim! Hast thou already so many pursuers? Yet see-
est not that thou art marked for sacrifice! Yet knowest
not that thou art destined for prey!'" (I 115) Cecilia
begins to see Albany's purpose and refers to him as her
"unknown mentor" (I 120), which is exactly what he becomes in the novel.

Significantly Cecilia meets Albany at Moncton's house, for it is Moncton whom she has always regarded as her adviser and "mentor," unaware that he is plotting to marry her for her money as soon as his aged wife dies. When Moncton is aware of Albany's influence over Cecilia, he attempts to interfere, and Miss Burney pointedly notes the contrast between the two characters, for Moncton fears that Albany will dissipate Cecilia's fortune in benevolence (V 95 ff.). Despite his attempts to preserve Cecilia's fortune for himself, Cecilia officially installs Albany as her "almoner and her monitor" (V 136) which she reaffirms after her marriage, as noted above.

In the progression of the plot Albany is also useful to promote much of Miss Burney's famous method of contretemps; he is responsible for introducing Cecilia to Belfield and his sister, an acquaintance which causes most of the misunderstanding between Cecilia and the Delvills. In Cecilia's personal distresses, Albany as her monitor, is always present. He pointedly arrives when Cecilia is mourning the death of Mrs. Morton and chooses this opportunity to recite his life history, which further establishes him in the good-natured misanthrope tradition. His severe morality and satiric invectives are an attempt to warn others from the libertinism and folly he fell into as a
youth while his benevolence is an attempt to expiate his sins (IV 306 ff.). His recitation "... almost surprised her out of her peculiar grief, by the view which it opened to her of general calamity; wild, flighty and imaginative as were his language and counsels, their morality was striking, and their benevolence was affecting" (IV 322). Albany is also the first to discover the identity of Cecilia when she lies mad, and significantly enters what he thinks is her death chamber surrounded with poor children whom he wants to pay a last tribute to their benefactress (V 331 ff.).

Miss Burney thus integrates Albany's role as satirist into the total structure of the plot by making him serve as both prophet and adviser to the young Cecilia, warning her of the dangers of the fashionable society he denounces in his satiric role. Miss Burney also integrates him into the low comedy of the novel when she uses his satiric persona metaphorically to lash the humours out of Briggs, Hobson, and even Delvill senior. In the famous attainment of majority scene Miss Burney gathers all of these humours characters together and Albany rails at each one in turn, denouncing Briggs for his parsimony (V 62), Hobson for his meanness of spirit (V 63), and Delvill for his pride and "vile arrogance" (V 74). The purging of humours rather clearly relates Albany to the Jonsonian satiric method, especially to Every Man Out of His Humour,
where we can see an evident affinity between Albany and Asper.

Two years after *Cecilia*, Bage published *Barham Downs*, which we have already examined in the context of Bage's entire dealings with the good-natured misanthrope. But in the following year (1785) Henry Mackenzie published the first number of his *Lounger* papers. In number four Mackenzie introduced one of his most famous characters, Colonel Caustic, who appears from time to time in order to satirize the follies of city life. Caustic is a milder form of Matthew Bramble who, like Bramble, now and again leaves his country retreat to enter the world of the busy city. The vice and folly he sees there forces him to vent his spleen in satiric invectives on man and society. Scott, in his "Life of Henry Mackenzie," used Caustic and another of Mackenzie's *Lounger* characters to indicate the nature of Mackenzie's satire: "The Northern Addison, who revived the art of periodical writing, and sketched, though with a light pencil, the follies and the lesser vices of the times, has shown himself a master of playful satire.

... Colonel Caustic and Umfraville are masterly conceptions of the *laudator temporis acti*. ..." 28 Mr. Lounger himself was fascinated by the nature of his "conception of the *laudator*" and gave his readers an interesting character analysis, lest they be displeased with Caustic's strictures on society.
Since Caustic does not serve as a character in the plot of a novel Mackenzie dwells more on the reasons that drive Caustic to satirize than on showing that his private life is in some way connected with many other people. In this respect Caustic is very much like Goldsmith's Drybone, serving as detached commentator and guide to Mr. Lounger. The Critical Review noted the satirical use of Caustic when it favored him over Addison's famous Sir Roger de Coverley: "... in some of the scenes, the pointed shrewdness of his remarks, with his good-natured severity, form a pleasing contrast to the mild unobtrusive benevolence of Sir Roger." In this role he stands at a distance in public assemblies and satirizes the manners of the men and women present (No. 4); ridicules the theatre for stupid plays, and the audience for bad manners (No. 6); shows Mr. Lounger the disgusting table manners of the younger generation (No. 14); ridicules the modern taste for Gothic houses and gardens (No. 31); and takes Mr. Lounger to a dinner which displays the pride and hauteur of the nouveau riche (No. 33). His own quiet and peaceful life in the country presents an idyllic contrast to the mad pursuits of vanity and folly (No. 31).

Mr. Lounger, however, is fascinated by the paradox he thinks he finds in Caustic's character and at first attributes the Colonel's satire to his retirement:
A person who, after living a number of years in retirement returns again into society, is somewhat in the situation of the foreigner. Like him, he is apt to be misled by prejudices; but like him, too, he remarks many things which escape the observation of those whose sensations are blunted by habit, and whose attention is less awake to the objects around him. (No. 6 101)

The Lounger's accurate estimation of Caustic's satiric abilities of penetration, does not, however, seem to explain why the Colonel is "a determined bachelor, with somewhat of misanthropy, and a great deal of good-nature about him" (No. 4 33). The misanthropy obviously explains the satire, but the good-nature does not seem to explain the misanthropy. After a visit to Caustic's residence in the country Mr. Lounger finds that it is not retirement alone that explains the misanthropy, but indeed the good-nature itself:

I am now assured of what before I was willing to believe, that Caustic's spleen is of that sort which is the product of the warmest philanthropy. . . . the lover of mankind, as his own sense of virtue has painted them, when he comes abroad into life, and sees what they really are, feels the disappointment in the severest manner; and he will often indulge in satire beyond the limits of discretion. . . .

(No. 32 220)

Scott's connection of Mackenzie's satiric talent with Shakespeare's Jaques places both Mackenzie and Caustic in the good-natured misanthropic tradition: "... although his peculiar vein of humour may be much more frequently traced, yet it is so softened down, and divested
of the broad ludicrous, that it harmonizes with the more grave and affecting parts of the tale, and becomes, like the satire of Jaques, only a more humourous shade of melancholy. ³⁰

Although Colonel Caustic is not chronologically the last of the good-natured misanthropes (since both Bage and Melmoth extend farther into the end of the century) the brevity of his presentation and his lack of complexity as a plot character can lead us more easily to his final appearance (at least so far as I have been able to determine) and deterioration in Sir Walter Scott. In The Black Dwarf (1816), Scott presents a misanthropic raider in the central character, Elshie. ³¹ Elshie's history as a bridegroom whose bride has run off with his best friend is more consistent with the dark-hued misanthrope who is reformed, than with the good-natured misanthropic tradition in which he is more often a rake than a jilted lover. Nevertheless, Scott does not set out to reform Elshie, but insists that he is basically benevolent already; his misanthropy is the result of his "morbid and excessive sensibility" (V 350), the basic cause, of course, for the good-natured misanthrope's misanthropy as well as that of the extreme misanthrope.

The Black Dwarf, however, was not a success in its own day and certainly is not one today. ³² The essential failure of the character can, I think, be attributed to
Scott's mixture of the Timon and Jaques personae. We do not really find out the real nature of Elshie's character until the very end of the novel, so that for the most part all we have seen of his character is his public stance as misanthropic raider, a Timon who appears in his blackest hue. All that we know of his private life indicates that it is as vile as his public denunciations, so that, like Timon, he appears to be the satirist whose own excesses are an object of ridicule: the few good deeds he does perform he attributes to his desire to promote misery. When Scott does reveal Elshie's true nature, the surprise element of his dramatic revelation in the tombs forbids the conviction that would come from gradual revelation. We have only to think of Cumberland's Penruddock, for example, whose final metamorphosis into a good-natured misanthrope results from a gradual resolution of tortured internal struggle. Penruddock can be seen dramatically moving from Timon to Jaques; the reader sees Elshie acting in the tombs only once, and that in an atmosphere not very conducive to benevolence. In contrast to seeing Penruddock's dramatic struggle the reader is merely told Elshie's history and why he became a misanthrope.

This confusion of roles is essentially an attempt to have both black and good-natured misanthropy at the same time. Either kind of misanthrope will provide the railing
desired, but black misanthropy will not provide the "risibility" arising from the amiable humor involved in the combination of sentiment and satire. Ultimately such a confusion of personae also leads to a blurring of the satirist's role. With Timon we have a satirist satirized and with Jaques we have a good-natured satirist. Scott would seem to want to have both at once, a combination that appears to be dramatically unconvincing, as Smollett discovered in *Peregrine Pickle*.

In *The Fortunes of Nigel* (1822) Scott returned to the malcontent of the Renaissance convention in the character of Sir Mungo Malagrowther. Sir Mungo partakes of all the malicious qualities of the cynical malcontent as well as of the traditional malicious satirist: he has a "... bitter, caustic, and backbiting humour, a malicious wit, and an envy of others ..." (IX 100). Sir Mungo's "satire ran riot, his envy could not conceal itself ..." (IX I 100). He spent his time in typical malcontent manner "indulging his food for satire in the public walks, and in the aisles of St. Paul's ..." (IX I 101). Sir Mungo does, however, have some degree of good-nature which he displays to Nigel: "... he was about to leave Nigel very hastily, when some unwonted touch of good-natured interest in his youth and inexperience, seemed suddenly to soften his habitual cynicism" (IX I 268). In terms of the historical novel Sir
Mungo, of course, fits chronologically within the framework of *Nigel*, since the action occurs during the reign of James I. But he is clearly a reversion to the Renaissance type, for his benevolence does not stand out in contrast to his railings, nor is he in any way an man of feeling in the manner of the good-natured misanthrope. Symbolically Sir Mungo completes a cycle and returns the misanthropic satirist to his Renaissance role of satirist satirized.
CHAPTER V


2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., 323.

5. Some other interesting ones that we will not consider are: Sir Samuel Danby in The Benevolent Man; or The History of Mr. Belville, 2 vols. (London, 1775), II, 177; Lord Belmont in Susanne Harvey Keir's The History of Miss Greville, 3 vols. (London, 1787), III 169-80; Mr. Wilkins in Henry Mackenzie's The Man of the World in The Works of Henry Mackenzie, 8 vols. (Edinburgh, 1808), I, 263 ff.; Job Thornberry in George Colman the younger's John Bull; or The Englishman's Fireside (1803) (London, 1805); Andrew McDonald wrote a series of satiric odes under the pseudonym of "Matthew Bramble": see The Miscellaneous Works (London, 1791); the "Senator" in William Hayley's Triumphs of Temper (London, 1781), Canto IV, II. 66-74. The Senator is clearly contrasted to Swift and the "misanthropic race" described in the Cave of Spleen, III, 588 ff.

6. Richard Cumberland, The Fashionable Lover, in Bell's British Theatre (London, 1797), XVIII. All quotations are from this edition.


9. Richard Cumberland, The Wheel of Fortune (1795) in Inchbald's British Theatre (London, 1808), XVIII. All quotations are from this edition.

10. See Chapter II, n. 34.


13. See Chapter IV, n. 52.


16. Ibid., p. 110.


18. Ibid., 223.


20. The Scots doctor, Gordon, is a typical Scotsman come to London for advancement. He can also speak pure English. Gordon marries Sutton's niece and retires with her to Mount Henneth.

21. Robert Bage, Barham Downs, op. cit. All quotations are from this edition.

22. Robert Bage, James Wallace, op. cit. All quotations are from this edition.

23. Tompkins, p. 204.


25. Hermsprong, or Man As He Is Not, Bage's last novel, does not offer a good-natured misanthrope. The title itself indicates Bage's new method of satire, which is rather simply to place one of Rousseau's natural men in the midst of a corrupt society. Essentially he uses the persona of the naif, for Hermsprong does not rail. He asks questions and bluntly asserts what he thinks are "natural" truths.


31. Sir Walter Scott, The Black Dwarf in the Works, ed. Andrew Lang, 28 vols. (Boston, 1894), V. All quotations and references are to this edition.

32. See Lang's historical discussion prefacing the novel, 175-80.

33. Ratcliffe gives the Dwarf's history to Isabella, 350 ff.

34. Dwarf, V, 229 ff.

35. Ibid., 364 ff.

36. See n. 33 above.

37. Scott, The Fortunes of Nigel, Lang edition, op. cit., IX. All quotations are from this edition.
CONCLUSION AND RETROSPECT

Sir Mungo Malagrowther returns us to the satirist-satirized tradition of the Renaissance and beyond it to Homer's Thersites. In one sense the good-natured satirist died with Scott's Elshie, for in Elshie we can see what Erämetsa has well called the decline of the man of feeling as a meaningful character in the world of reality. The good-natured misanthrope, however, depends on the man of feeling for the source of his satiric powers as well as for the amiable humor derived from his own character. As a satirist his invectives and railing can be clearly of the corrective type only if we know that his private life is beyond reproach. In the character of a man of feeling he assures the victims of his satire (and the reader) that he sincerely seeks reform. As a humorist he creates a comic ethos and evokes "risible" laughter from the surface paradox of his combination of misanthropy and benevolence.

The peculiar nature of the good-natured misanthrope's role as a satirist can be especially seen by contrasting him to the reformed misanthropes and the mere "bourreaux bienfaisants" who appear everywhere in the literature of the eighteenth century and extend well into the nineteenth. In the case of the reformed misanthropes the attention cen-
ters on the attempt to cure them of their hatred and bring out their benevolence. Penruddock demonstrates that the cure turns the black misanthrope into a good-natured misanthrope and his invective softens accordingly. When the misanthrope appears as good-natured, his cure is assumed to have taken place already and the attention moves to his railing and his benevolence. Thus, as Craig, Richardson, and Stockdale all point out, he immediately assumes the double role of public satirist and private philanthropist. More importantly, however, it is precisely his philanthropy which inspires his satiric utterances and his railing, thus creating the paradox desired by Steele. The "bourreau bienfaisant" is, of course, a good-natured satirist in embryo, as we saw in Voltaire's Freeport. To a certain extent such characters, if they are not merely humorists, in the sense of eccentrics, are already satirists by implication. Commodore Trunnion in Smollett's Peregrine Pickle, for example, is an obvious contrast to Crabtree and satirizes him by the contrast. Indeed it is chiefly the contrast of the commodore and not merely Perry's denunciations that places Crabtree in the satirist-satirized convention. But like the works which center on the reform of the misanthrope and not his good-natured railing, the "bourreau" does not achieve the status of a satiric persona. He remains a satirist by implication.

The deeper irony of the good-natured misanthrope
also depends on his status as a man of feeling, for the dilemma caused by the man of feeling's presence in a vicious world is ultimately solved in the good-natured misanthrope. By assuming speculative misanthropy the man of feeling can remain in the world and participate in its activities. In this sense misanthropy is a mask of protection against the imposition of sharpers. The situation, however, is not quite that simple, for the misanthropy is far more than a mask. As Swift, Stockdale, and the other eighteenth century critics have argued, the misanthropy is real enough, for it definitely arises from frustrated benevolence and a sense of the corruptness of man. The misanthropy is thus speculative and based on the man of feeling's dilemma. But this dilemma is ultimately caused by the fact that man is not the benevolent creature which according to benevolent theory he should be. The good-natured misanthrope thus recoils on himself, for he is the proof that over-refined sensibilities should not be cultivated in this world, despite the theoretical possibilities of man's virtue. At the same time he is the standard of morality opposed to the vice he castigates. The irony of his situation seems to be even more complex than the satirist-satirized convention, for he is forced into the satirist's role because his sensibility invites imposition and yet it is this very sensibility that is the standard
of morality towards which vicious mankind should strive
and by which their evil deeds are judged. The irony of the
good-natured misanthrope's position intensifies the vicious-
ness of the world he castigates. He is a socially oriented
man whose social virtues lead him only to frustration in
the world's attempts to take advantage of him.

The decline of the man of feeling almost necessitated,
then, the decline of the good-natured misanthrope and his
role as a satiric persona. As long as sensibility and feel-
ing remained at least an affectation, as Mackenzie and the
journalists complained, the good-natured misanthrope could
still continue, for he represented the man of true active
benevolence as opposed to mere drawing-room sentiment. But,
as the "Society of Gentlemen at Exeter" complained in 1796,
sensibility was now affected for criminal purposes: "...delicate sensibility, and refined ideas, are more frequently
pretended than real: they are, every day, assumed, as the
pretext for some criminal design. ..."² The gentlemen
struck at the very heart of the good-natured misanthrope
when they insisted that benevolence be returned to reason
and feelings thrown completely out.³ The Exeter Society
was to some extent calling for a return to the rational
benevolence of the so-called "intellectual" school of benev-
olence, but it was more importantly calling to account the
moral tendencies of the man of feeling as he developed in
Gothic literature.
This is not the place to discuss the development of Gothic literature, but we must definitely note the decay of the man of feeling into the morbid heroes of Gothic terror. As sensibility became an end in itself all connections with benevolent action and good deeds became obscured in the cultivation of over-refined feelings for the pleasure of feeling itself. The cultivation of feeling becomes increasingly morbid as heroes and heroines begin to relish pain, sorrow, misery, terror, and death. Such a delight in death and misery may take the more classical form of the complaint of life or plaintive melancholy that Miss Sickels so well describes in *The Gloomy Egoist*. In this form the man of feeling's loneliness turns to brooding introspection that leads to the complaint of life. On the other hand it may degenerate into the mysterious, morbid introspection of a Childe Harold or a Manfred. In either case the man of feeling as a misanthropic railer becomes almost anachronistic, for his feelings are social feelings, sympathetic responses to the misery around him. He attempts to alleviate misery, not enjoy it. He may enjoy his own feelings of virtue, but he does not introspectively dwell on them. He certainly does not relish agony and pain.

To some extent, of course, the rise of the Victorian novel and Byron's revival of verse satire also helped the decline of the good-natured misanthrope. As Professor Rogers comments, satire gradually encroached on the novels
of the first thirty years of the nineteenth century "until finally the satiric novel was reborn, and satire took its place in realistic fiction." Professor Rogers has certainly not taken account of the good-natured misanthropic raider as he appears in the novels of the late eighteenth century, for our investigation shows that the satiric novel never really died. Certainly, however, the new century saw a revived form of the satiric novel of manners in Jane Austen and latter in Dickens and Thackeray. The rise of "realistic fiction," perhaps, more strikingly ended the satirist's role. As a satirist the good-natured misanthrope required a certain amount of detachment from the society that fell under his lash. The great social movements of the nineteenth century demanded that a writer of realistic fiction show intimate involvement in the society he was depicting. Perhaps Dickens symbolizes the change in his own movement from the eighteenth century characters that brighten the Pickwickian world of the early novels to what Tave aptly calls the "wilderness" of Little Dorrit and the novels of social reform. The good-natured satirist sees the vices of the world as something to be ridiculed and corrected; the novelist of social reform concentrates his vision on those who suffer because of the vices. He may often indulge in the most scathing satire, but he will rarely create a persona to do it for him. We must also recall that in this connection the good-natured misanthrope as a humor-
ist almost necessarily creates an ethos of comedy as he calls for laughter and correction; the novelist of social reform calls for correction, but he achieves it through pity and social justice.

The union of satire and sentiment is at best extremely precarious, and at worst a cheap evasion of the serious problems of literary satire if a standard of morality is only barely implied. To writers like Goldsmith, Smollett, and Bage it offered a solution to the problems that have plagued satirists since Thersites first railed at Ulysses. The literary journey from Jaques to Sir Mungo Malagrowther covers a great deal of territory in the history of English literature, however, and I can only hope to have charted the major sign posts. I have tried also to explore the structure and meaning of the major texts in which the good-natured misanthrope appears and to relate his sentiment and his railing to the total historical and critical significance of the work. If sentiment was the cause of the decline of verse satire, perhaps the decline was worthwhile; for without the marriage of satire and sentiment such unforgettable characters as Matthew Bramble and the Man in Black would have been impossible.
NOTES

CONCLUSION

1. See Chapter I, n. 33.

2. Exeter, p. 325. See Chapter I, n. 35 for bibliographical detail.

3. Ibid., p. 336 especially.


5. There are several fine discussions of this degeneracy of sensibility. See particularly Mario Praz, The Romantic Agony (Meridian Books) (New York, 1956), Chapters II-IV; see also Tompkins, pp. 284-95 and Mary Winspear, "The English Man of Feeling" (Unpublished University of Toronto Dissertation, 1942), Chapter VIII.


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