INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps.

ProQuest Information and Learning
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 USA
800-521-0600

UMI®
THE RICE INSTITUTE

THE DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY OF AUSTRIA
AND HER RELATIONS WITH GERMANY AND ITALY
1932-1938

by

David Brian McElroy

A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Houston, Texas
August 1955

Approved: [Signature]
To Mother and Father
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PREFACE</td>
<td>1-iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. CLERICO-FASCIST ENTRANCEMENT AND THE FOUR-POWER PACT</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. DIPLOMATIC INTERMEZZO</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. THE STRESA FRONT</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. THE DANUBE OR THE RHINE</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. ITALIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM AUSTRIA</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) The Berlin Protocol</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) The Development of the Austrian National Socialist Party</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) The Habsburg Restoration Question</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) International Isolation</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) The Penetration and the Schism</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) Decision</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. THE ANSCHLUSS</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII. CONCLUSION</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
On May 2, 1925, Benito Mussolini said in a speech to the Italian Senate:

It is necessary to guarantee not only the Rhineland frontier but the Brennero frontier. On this point I wish to make the opinion of the Italian Government perfectly plain, especially in face of the propaganda which is being made in favour of the Anschluss in both Austria and Germany. It cannot be permitted.

Thirteen years later, the Giornale d'Italia carried Mussolini's Genoa speech of May 14, 1938, which read in part: "Fascist Italy could not indefinitely assume what was the odious and useless task of the old Austria of the Habsburgs and Metternich—that of opposing the movement of nations towards their unity."

This work will be an attempt to determine the factors which led Mussolini from the former to the latter position, from a virtual protectorate over the Republic of Austria to the complete elimination of Italian influence in the Danube area. Such a study lends itself to a critique of the events in Austria between 1933 and 1938 and to an examination of the wider international developments of the same period as reflected in Austrian and Italian policies.

The organization of the events of the Austrian tragedy can be delineated into three distinct acts. These acts are the coup d'etat of July 25, 1934, with the death of Federal Chancellor Dollfuss; the Austro-German Agreement of July 11, 1936; and the Einmarsch of March 11, 1938. Immediately preceding each of these three principal acts are three seemingly secondary ones: the February revolt of 1934, the collapse of the
Stresa front in May 1935, and the Berchtesgaden Protocol of February 1938, respectively. These latter events are in effect the direct result of Italian influence and policy, and carry an importance not apparent at first, being the causes of the more prominent occurrences in Austria. Implicit, then, in the course of developments leading to the Austrian Anschluss with Germany is the influence of the foreign policy of Mussolini and Fascist Italy.

The significant circumstances of Austria's position prior to the Second World War are generally well-known, and the conflicts and frequently highly emotional drama of the First Republic have been subjected to critical investigation. However, these studies have confined themselves largely to Austrian internal developments, frequently biased or written to justify some party or principle. That these domestic developments are intrinsically due to external motivation is not so apparent. These external factors are obscured by their less publicized knowledge, by their overshadowing predominance in other spheres of international power politics, and by the portentousness of still greater factors crowding upon one another in this period.

The availability of such recent sources as the Documents on German Policy, Geheimer Briefwechsel Mussolini-Dollfuß, and the Nuremberg Trial Documents; the possession of the trial records of Guido Schmidt, which never have been translated or critically used in any English publication, the opportunity to utilize the complete files of the Austrian newspapers; and the accessibility of other material in various Austrian libraries and collections have made possible an evaluation of the principal events which directly or indirectly influenced the political affairs of Austria. The
competence of this work lies in its successful relegation of these events into their proportional importance from no particular standpoint other than the interplay of domestic events on foreign events and vice-versa. It is even doubtful that the Austrian State Archives, when opened for this period, will reveal much that is not already known.

The primary weakness of this work, therefore, is the lack of official Italian sources. As a consequence, this author has relied on published documents, speeches, letters, diaries, and newspapers for the Italian sources.

As to method, the period has been treated as nearly as possible in a chronological manner. At some points this has been impracticable when, for example, foreign and domestic events of importance have occurred simultaneously and it has been necessary to treat them separately, or when, as in the case of the Habsburg question, a relatively minor episode or movement achieves significance at a particular time. Such an episode or movement has then been treated fully at that point in the study. This method lends itself to a clearer perspective of the events and eliminates unnecessary confusion in an otherwise confused and complicated period of recent history.

It is with pleasure and gratitude that I am able to express my appreciation to those who have helped me in the writing of this thesis: Aumserordentlicher Professor Dr. Heinrich Benedikt of the Universität Wien, the director of my research in Vienna; Privatdozent Dr. Stephan Verosta of the Universität Wien, my advisor; Mr. Henry Delaume who accomplished the tedious but indispensable task of editing; Mrs. Addison McElroy and Mrs. J. H. Freeman who typed the drafts and the final manuscript,
respectively; Miss Mary Louise Jackson who made many helpful suggestions for the German translations; Dr. Hardin Craig, Jr., my thesis director, who has worked so faithfully and patiently with me throughout the writing of the thesis; and my father and mother, whose support, encouragement, and faith made this thesis possible.

More than a note of thanks are due the library staffs of the Fondren Library at The Rice Institute, the University of Texas library, the library of the Universität Wien, and the National Bibliothek in Vienna.
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

With the collapse of the Dual Monarchy in 1918, the Republic of Austria was founded as a state of 6,535,000 population (1923 census), more than ninety percent Roman Catholic, living in an area of 32,369 square miles. The first Austrian Republic did not represent a political power factor, but it had the fortune so to lie on the tangency of three European power blocs that no one bloc could be a danger to Austria but each could have a positive interest in her. Of the six neighboring countries, two, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, belonged to the French anti-revisionist bloc. Italy and Hungary formed the second bloc. Both Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia as well as Italy and Hungary are separated by Austria; so each of the two groups was dependent on Austria as the land bridge to its own ally. The third power factor was Germany, which until 1933 was the most impotent but the most potentially powerful of the three.

After the First World War, and even before the conclusion of the Peace Treaties of Versailles and St. Germain, the Nationalist or Pan-German and the Social Democratic parties in Austria desired a union (Anschluss) with Germany, and their leading statesmen worked for it then and later. The Christian Socialist party was, on the whole, unenthusiastic. The first act of the Provisional National Assembly was to proclaim and to demand Anschluss with Germany.\(^1\) The province of Vorarlberg expressed its wish to join the Swiss Confederation, and the Tyrol was under strong Bavarian influence.\(^2\) If the Entente Powers, primarily France, had not
prevented Austria's Anschluss with Germany, it would have taken place by reason of their common language, culture, history, and—at that time— their common political outlook. The Entente forbade absorption, however, and each of the two countries succumbed separately to the convulsions of the post-war period.

The Entente showed forbearance with Austria in the matter of reparations. They were more concerned with relief and famine than with attempting to enforce payment. In February, 1921, the question of Austria's credit was referred to the Financial Committee of the League of Nations. The Committee acted promptly in preparing an efficient scheme, but innumerable delays occurred in putting it into effect. By the Spring of 1922 Austria had to be lent money immediately. Italy contributed seventy million lire to this loan. This precarious existence with the aid of relief loans, private charity, and the sales of her depreciating paper currency did not prevent Austria from fast approaching a complete financial collapse.

On August 24, 1922, Monsignor Ignaz Seipel, Austria's Christian Socialist Premier, met the Italian Foreign Minister, Signor Carlo Schanzler, at Verona and proposed a customs union between the two countries. Schanzler replied that the matter should be examined but could only be taken up after the League had examined the whole question and that he would be bound by the decision of the Supreme Council. The Council took the question in hand on August 21 and worked out a proposal whereby an international loan would be issued for Austria to be administered by a High Commissioner appointed by and responsible to the Council of the League. In addition, there would be formed a Committee of Control consisting of
representatives of the guaranteeing nations—France, Italy, Czecho-
slovakia, and Great Britain—which would watch the interests of the
individual countries. The League of Nations granted the Austrian
Reconstruction Loan conditioned upon the formal reaffirmation of the
independence and sovereignty of Austria. The loan was an immediate
financial success. This transaction marked the beginning of Austria's
financial recovery, and the budget was balanced by the end of 1925.
However, this happy development was not destined to last long.

On September 10, 1919, the Treaty of Peace between the Allied and
Associated Powers and Austria was signed at Saint-Germain-en-Laye. By
this treaty Austria renounced in favor of Italy all rights and title
over the area of the Alto Adige—variously referred to as the South Tyrol
and the Trentino. Thus Italy obtained the most important of her war
objectives and thereafter supported the Austrian position in the Carin-
thian and Hungarian questions.

In the early period of the Fascist regime, Hungary, Bulgaria, and,
with many oscillations, Austria were Italy's only friends in continental
Europe. Mussolini saw that the parties and tendencies which opposed the
Anschluss would also tend toward a reconstruction of the old Empire, if
only partially and on a federated basis. The old ruling class with
their anti-Prussianism and the militant Catholics with their suspicion
of the German parties would work for a federation with Hungary and
perhaps Croatia. They would also support Austria's and Hungary's irre-
dentist claims against Czechoslovakia, Roumania, and Yugoslavia. Only
these aspirations could galvanize Austria into a new state, instill a
sense of patriotism for that state into the German Austrians, and inspire
them to a determination for independence. No party and no tendency, until the formation of the Fascist-like Heimwehr and the chancellorship of Engelbert Dollfuss, was definitely pro-Italian, although some realized that close collaboration with Italy was desirable. Of all the post-war problems centering around the Danubian region, that which more closely concerned Italy was the independence of Austria.

On March 19, 1923, Mussolini met Chancellor Seipel in Milan to initiate discussions for a commercial treaty between their two countries. Speaking to the Council of Ministers on April 8 of the recent conversations with the Austrian Chancellor, he said that there had been "on both sides a common desire to improve still further the relations which exist between our countries." He informed the Ministers of Seipel's gratitude for the Italian support given to Austria at Geneva in the discussions on the reorganization of her finances. Mussolini gave assurance that the negotiations for a commercial treaty were being hurried forward and that the last difficulties would be removed within a few days. The first commercial treaty between Italy and Austria was signed in Rome on April 28, 1923.

During the debates on the Geneva Protocol in 1925, the Protocol was rejected by Italy on the grounds of its rigidity and the difficulty of enforcing it in view of the absence of certain great states from the League. Speaking before the Italian Senate on May 2, 1925, Mussolini said:

It is necessary to guarantee not only the Rhineland frontier but the Brenner frontier. On this point I wish to make the opinion of the Italian Government perfectly plain, especially in face of the propaganda
which is being made in favour of the Anschluss in both Austria and Germany. It cannot be permitted.... I think that I shall carry the whole of the Senate with me when I declare that Italy would never tolerate such a patent violation of the treaties as the union of Austria and Germany. This union...would render the Italian victory valueless, would increase the population and the territory of Germany, and would create this paradoxical situation, that the only nation to increase its territories and its population, making the most powerful block in Central Europe, would be Germany!

Then to the Austrian government, he said:

That Government maintains correct and friendly relations with Italy, but it is painful, especially remembering the generosity with which Italy has treated Austria, to watch the Press campaign and read the claims which are made on the subject of the Alto Adige. That territory is, and must remain, part of Italy, because we regard the Brenner frontier as unalterable, and the Italian Government will defend that frontier at any cost.9

Although the Geneva Protocol never came into force, the rejection of this first important attempt to define the aggressor in future conflicts was followed by the acceptance of a scheme to identify any future aggressor in the Rhineland. On October 16, 1925, the Locarno Treaty was signed. But even before its component treaties were ratified, German and Austrian press attacks on the Italian administration of the Alto Adige began to grow in violence. The Provincial Diet at Innsbruck passed a resolution calling on the Austrian government to bring the matter before the League of Nations. The question of Anschluss was discussed by responsible German politicians as well as by the press, and there was an attempt to boycott Italian goods. As a result of the agitation, when the proposal for ratification of the Locarno Treaty came before the Italian Senate on January 26, 1926, it met with a cold reception. Matters became so serious that on the following day all of the foreign consuls in
Venice published a statement that conditions were normal in northern Italy and that all of the sensational stories which had been circulated were without foundation. 10

On February 5, 1926, Herr Johann George Held, President of the Bavarian Council, made a speech in the Diet at Munich in which he attacked Italy's treatment of the German minority in the Tyrol. The next day Mussolini replied in the Chamber:

...it is my duty to declare quite frankly that Italian policy in the Alto Adige will not deflect one inch. We shall apply firmly, methodically, obstinately, in the methodical, inflexible Fascist way, all the laws now in force or which will come into force in the future. We shall make that region Italian because it is Italian. Italian historically and geographically. Really we might say that the Brenner is a frontier traced by the hand of the Almighty.11

Chancellor Gustav Stresemann of Germany came unexpectedly to the defence of Held in a speech which he made in the Reichstag on February 9. Mussolini answered Stresemann in the Senate on the tenth:

Germany, both inside and outside the League of Nations, intends to assume the spiritual leadership of all Germans in the world, including those few who live in the Alto Adige, who before the war were not citizens of the Reich. It is necessary that we should recognise and remember this. But I wish to state explicitly--

1. The population of the Alto Adige is not one of those minorities which were the subject of special agreements.

2. That Italy will not allow any discussion on this subject in any Assembly or Council, and that therefore the vote of the Tyrolean Diet is entirely useless i.e., that the question should be submitted to the League of Nations .

3. That the Fascist Government will take the very strongest action against any such plan, because it would consider it a crime against the country if for the sake of one hundred thousand Germans--living on Italian soil--the Fascist Government were in any way to compromise the security and peace of the forty-two million Italians which form undoubtedly the most homogeneous and compact national block in Europe.12

This ended the German press campaign, but Rudolf Ramek, the incumbent
Austrian Chancellor, entered the verbal duels in a long speech delivered in Vienna in which he declared that Italian possession of the Brenner frontier was a denial of Wilson's Fourteen Points. He said that the German minority in Italy received worse treatment than the much larger German minorities in other countries. He said that he had instructed the Austrian Minister in Rome to ask Mussolini for an explanation of his phrase about carrying the Italian flag over the Brennero. Mussolini then demanded an explanation from Ramk and received an immediate answer which was never published. The recriminations were thus suspended for about two years.

The anti-Italian campaign was revived in 1928 in the Austrian provinces of the Tyrol and Salzburg. National societies, supported by the German press, demanded that Seipel consider how he could bring the attention of Europe or of the League of Nations to the treatment of the German subjects of Italy. On February 17, six members of the Austrian Parliament put questions to the Chancellor as to his intention to intervene in Rome or appeal to the League under article XI of the Covenant. Seipel replied that diplomatic action would not be expedient but that he was prepared to point out to Italy that her treatment of the German-speaking minority was an obstacle to friendly relations between the countries. On February 24, Mussolini recalled the Italian Minister in Vienna to Rome. On March 3, he said in the Chamber of Deputies:

I really asked myself if it was worth while to reply, and certainly if the Head of the Austrian Government, who is in many ways a man of considerable eminence, had not taken part in the debate I should have ignored the anti-Italian and anti-Fascist speeches in the Austrian Parliament....
Knowing that he had no diplomatic standing in the matter, Monsignor Seipel has endeavoured to treat the affair from the political-sentimental standpoint, and talks of "systems of tyranny," of "tortured brothers," of "a people whose throat is being cut by the barbarous Fascist dictatorship." All this, besides being untrue, is extremely ridiculous. We are not pupils of Austria, who for a century peopled the countryside of Central Europe with hangmen, filled the prisons with martyrs, and erected their gallows without ceasing. Fascist atrocities are the invention of an evil imagination.

It may be asked at this point if there are no reasons of an international kind or any real reasons how this unexpected demonstration on the part of the Austrian Parliament, and Monsignor Seipel, can be explained? First of all, it is not unexpected; it is the culminating moment of a campaign which has lasted for years, ever since the end of the war, and which became still more bitter when we created the province of Bolzano. The truth is, that Pan-Germanism cries out because it finds itself confronted by the iron will and systematic tenacity of Fascist Italy, and equality is lost.... It is time to say, and it will be perhaps for the last time, that all demonstrations on the other side of the Brennero are useless and dangerous. It is time to declare that insulting speeches, odious insinuations, vulgar abuse, will only have one result—that of accelerating the pace of the Fascist action, and opening an abyss between neighbouring peoples.... But with equal frankness we to-day inform the Tyrolese, the Austrians, and the world that, with its living and its dead all Italy is marshalled on the Brennero.14

The polemics continued in the papers of Italy, Germany, and Austria for a long time, but on March 7, a meeting of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Austrian Parliament was held. At this meeting Monsignor Seipel reviewed the course of the controversy over the Alto Adige and said that the Austrian press had replied in detail to the statements made by Mussolini. The "incident" was now considered to be at an end.15

The Italian Minister had been recalled in February. The fact that he did not return showed the determination of Italy not to allow foreign intervention in the Alto Adige. However, on July 2, it was announced that there had been an exchange of notes between the two governments and that the Minister would return to Vienna. Seipel said that the responsible leaders in Austria had never interfered in the internal affairs of Italy
nor taken part in anti-Italian demonstrations. He assured Mussolini that if future irresponsible elements attempted to carry out further such demonstrations, every legal means would be taken to prevent them. Great indignation was aroused among the Pan-Germans, and Seipel was accused of having abandoned the German minority in order to obtain Italy's support for a new loan. Officially at least the question of the Alto Adige was settled, and from this time on it disappeared from the international scene.

On September 25, 1929, Johannes Schober succeeded Seipel as Austrian Chancellor. On December 13, speaking on the question of the foreign loan, he made an important reference to Italy. He informed the Nationalrat that the government had been able to bring about a very cordial understanding with Italy and that "the improvement of our relations with that country...is one of the fundamental elements of the foreign policy of this Government." As a result the Italian government had agreed to waive certain claims which prevented the floating of an international loan. It was announced that Schober would go to Rome shortly to see Mussolini. On February 5, 1930, Schober left Vienna for Rome, and on February 5, it was announced that a Treaty of Friendship, Conciliation, and Arbitration would be signed between the two countries. The treaty was signed on February 7.

In the report accompanying the text of the treaty when it was presented to the Chamber on April 8, Mussolini wrote:

Faithful to its straightforward policy of securing peace in an atmosphere of loyalty and clarity the Government has welcomed with sincere satisfaction the recent improvement in the relations between Italy and Austria which followed the announcement by the new Austrian Government of its desire to pursue a policy of frank and faithful friendship towards Italy.
Speaking in the Senate during the debate on the ratification of the Austrian Treaty on June 27, Signor Dino Grandi, who had become the Italian Foreign Minister in 1929, said:

Inspired by the principles contained in the Covenant of the League of Nations, Italy has from the beginning effaced from her spirit and her policy the distinctions between the victorious and the defeated countries, holding out a hand of friendship and loyalty to those countries which suffered in the Great War.... We are firmly persuaded that the only really efficacious way of safeguarding peace is that of creating and maintaining relations of good faith and friendship on a basis of complete equality.19

The world economic crisis of the 'thirties hit Austria with full force. As a remedy, the Ender-Schober cabinet devised a customs union with Germany in March, 1931, to secure for Austria the advantages inherent in a large economic entity. At this time the Anschluss nearly became a reality, at least economically. It took the joint efforts of Great Britain, France, and Italy, with the support of a decision by the International Court of The Hague, to bring the matter to a standstill. On June 3, Grandi explained the Italian view in an address to the Chamber of Deputies:

The Fascist Government believes the assurances of the German and Austrian Governments, that the Customs Union was intended to be purely economic, and to have no political aim. But as I said at Geneva, apart from the fact that it is in certain cases very difficult to separate politics and economics (the distinction is not easy, sometimes it is almost impossible), in spite of the determination of the two Governments, the Customs Union might have led to a state of affairs which is forbidden by the Treaties—a state of affairs which would have disturbed the equilibrium in Central Europe and therefore could not be allowed.20

Grandi stressed the friendship of Italy for Austria and Germany and her sympathy with both countries in their economic straits. When they were
compelled to announce the abandonment of the plan, Grandi did his best to soften the blow to their prestige by saying that this renunciation would make a most favorable impression on other nations and strengthen the desire for international co-operation in assisting Austria and Germany to overcome their economic crisis.

Three months later the largest Austrian bank, the Kreditanstalt, which controlled nearly three-fourths of Austria's big industries, disclosed its inability to meet obligations and applied for government help. The insolvency of this bank initiated an industrial crisis of the first magnitude. By February, 1932, there were 430,000 registered unemployed. Foreign exchange rates rose threateningly. It was only by another international loan, granted on the condition that Austria would maintain her independence and drop the plan of the customs union with Germany, that the currency was stabilized. When the world crisis gradually subsided, Austrian economy in the mid-thirties achieved only a slow and partial recovery. Despite an extensive program of public works, the introduction of a labor service, favorable trade agreements with Italy and Hungary, et cetera, it was at no time possible to re-absorb all the unemployed. This situation affected all strata of the population, but it made life particularly difficult for young people. This unemployed and disillusioned youth fell an easy prey to the appeal of National Socialist demagogy.

The first phase in the struggle for political power in Austria was fought out between the Social Democratic and the Christian Socialist parties. Both of these parties had originated around 1890 and had already played leading roles in the Reichsrat of the old Monarchy. A coalition of
the two parties under the moderate Socialist Dr. Karl Renner, formed at the beginning of the new Republic, split as early as 1920. From this time on the history of parliamentarianism in the first Austrian Republic is a history of the opposition of the Social Democratic and Christian Socialist parties. Austrian Social Democracy was essentially the urban and workers' party; Christian Socialism, the real "conservative" party, was the provincial and peasants' party. The Social Democrats derived a great deal of support from the Jews of Vienna who gave to that party an unmistakable intellectualism, and also anti-clericalism, so commonly found in the Socialist parties of continental Europe. By contrast, the Christian Socialists, deriving their main support from the provinces and the peasantry, were Catholic, anti-Semitic, and afterward inclined to fascism. The antagonism of the two major political parties of Austria was therefore dangerously complicated by race and religion.

During this stage the German Nationalists (Grossdeutsche) and the Landbund, or Peasant party, entered into coalition with the Christian Socialists. On the grounds of their numerical strength, these two groups were hardly essential; but between 1920 and 1933 there appeared no possible compromise between the Christian Socialists and the Social Democrats, thereby giving to the numerically-weaker Nationalist and Peasant parties the balance of the scales. Consequently these two parties always held important ministerial posts because they were indispensable for any majority cabinet. It was only in this way that Seipel was able to bring domestic stability to the State.

Under the Treaty of St. Germain the country was disarmed and its total
armed forces, including police and gendarmerie, could not amount to more than thirty thousand men. These thirty thousand men, subordinated to the state government, were inadequate for the task of restoring order out of chaos, checking internal unrest, and preventing local uprisings, while simultaneously acting as border-patrols against further invasions by the Yugoslavs, Italians, and the Hungarian White Terrorists. There was also a need for utilizing the energy of the vast army of unemployed veterans roaming the country. Such conditions favored the establishment of private armies. The home defense units (Heimwehren) were formed to satisfy this need. But with the gradual consolidation of the foreign and domestic position of Austria, the Heimwehren lost their importance and until 1927 remained in the form of old comrade clubs.

In Vienna, on July 15, 1927, a protest strike was called by the Social Democrats. During the course of this action, the Palace of Justice was set afire and ninety-four persons were killed. A sympathy strike over the whole country was called by the Social Democrats, but this strike was broken within a few hours by the timely interjection of the Heimwehren. From this time on the domestic-front war in Austria became militarized. The Heimwehren and the Catholic youth Ostmarkische Sturmscharen under Kurt von Schuschnigg supported the government. Their counterpart was the Republican Defense League (Republikanischer Schutzbund), a private army recruited from among the members of the Social Democratic party. Gradually, Austria relapsed into a factional obstructionism, and the Social Democratic Schutzbund and the reactionary Heimwehr grew into veritable private armies and divided the country into opposing groups.
On September 3, 1930, Prince Starhemberg, who up to this time had been the Heimwehr leader in Upper Austria, became the leader of the national organization. In his memoirs, Starhemberg claims that this position was taken upon the advice of Mussolini. In the spring of 1930, Hitler had recommended that Starhemberg make contact with the Fascist leader of Italy and obtain his support for the Heimwehr movement. Count Stephen Bethlen, the Hungarian Prime Minister, also had advised Starhemberg to make personal contact with the Duce. Consequently when Signor Grandi invited him for a private visit in Rome, the Austrian Prince accepted and met Mussolini in July, 1930. During this first visit Mussolini told Starhemberg that "an independent Austria is essential to the maintenance of order and peace in Europe. For that reason it is absolutely imperative for Europe that Austria should be developed and made strong, and, if you [Starhemberg] get vigorously to work, you can count on my full support." Starhemberg saw the difficulty in the fact that in Austria nationalism and patriotism were not complementary ideas. The Nationalists were working against Austria, for they wanted to be absorbed into the Greater German Reich. Therefore whoever wished to maintain Austria as an independent state necessarily had to oppose the Nationalist movement. Mussolini also told Starhemberg to create a militant Austrian movement out of the Heimwehr to "pave the way for the national renaissance of Austria." He said further: "Politically, Austria is necessary to the maintenance of Europe. The day that Austria falls and is swallowed up by Germany will mark the beginning of European chaos."

Starhemberg returned to Austria, consolidated his position, and by a
small majority was elected the supreme leader of the Austrian Heimwehr
movement. That same month he visited Julius Gombos, the Hungarian
Minister of War, who promised him forty to fifty thousand rifles if
Starhemberg could arrange for their passage from Italy to Hungary. 26
The strongest opponent in his own ranks was the leader of the Vienna
Heimwehr, Major Emil Fey. Next to Fey, the two other most powerful men
were Dr. Richard Steidle in the Tyrol and Dr. Walter Pfrimer in Styria.
Steidle later supported the cause of Chancellor Dollfuss, while Pfrimer
joined the National Socialists.

On September 25, 1930, the Schober cabinet fell, and President
Wilhelm Miklas appointed Karl Vaugoin of the Christian Socialist party
to the chancellorship. Parliament was dissolved by the president and
elections were fixed for November 9. 27

Hitler sent Gregar Strasser to Starhemberg to persuade him that
the Heimwehr should make common cause with the National Socialists in
the election. Starhemberg refused and explained the situation to the
liaison man appointed by Mussolini. This man was Eugenio Morreale who
held the elastic title of press attaché at the Italian legation in
Vienna. Two days later, Mussolini sent word that Starhemberg should not
leave the field free to the National Socialists. In addition he sent
a contribution for the election campaign. 28 This contribution was the
beginning of considerable economic support which Mussolini was to give
to the Heimwehr. Therefore the National Socialists and the Heimwehr
both entered election lists. The N.S.D.A.P.*--two months after their
great election victory in Germany--won altogether 111,643 votes and no

*Nationalesozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei
mandates; while the 227,197 of the total 3,687,082 votes cast and the 8 of the total 165 mandates which the Heimatblock (the political section of the Heimwehr) won, represented a definite defeat. On November 29, Vaugoin was replaced as chancellor by Otto Ender, and the Heimwehr played no role during his chancellorship. Only two years later did the movement have a fateful political resurrection.
CHAPTER II

CLERICO-FASCIST ENTREKICHMENT AND
THE FOUR POWER PACT

The Austrian National Socialists made their initial appearance into parliamentary government in the municipal elections of Vienna and in the provincial elections of April, 1932. In the new Vienna City Council, which was also the diet of the province of Vienna, the National Socialists won fifteen seats, only sixteen percent of the voters in Vienna supporting the Nazi candidates.¹ In Lower Austria they won eight seats and in Salzburg six—enough to destroy the Clerical majority in these two diets. These facts are not so startling because of the numerical success of the Nazis, actually only a small percentage,² but because the Vienna Diet had been looked upon as the stronghold of the Social Democratic party ever since the Socialist-Peasant coalition of 1921-1924. Now a fanatical right-wing group had forced a wedge into the workers' political organization, whose ranks had held solid for over a decade.

The Christian Social party's loss of its majority in the Bundesrat (the upper house of the Austrian parliament and the representation of the provinces) precipitated a crisis. On April 28, at the first meeting of parliament following the local elections, the Social Democrats, the Pan-Germans, and the Heimatblock moved dissolution; and the position of the Buresch government was made untenable. The expense of the National Socialists' election had been borne not only by the Social Democrats but also by the Landbund or Peasant Party, traditionally the most conservative
in Austrian politics, and the party upon which Dr. Buresch rested his support. Two-thirds of the total electorate in Austria had voted in these local elections which had inflicted a reversal on the Christian Social party. This being true, the indication is that the Christian Socialists no longer retained full confidence of a majority of the voters and that therefore the parliament did not reflect the real strength of the parties. This was reason enough for the Christian Socialists to fear a general election. Schuschnigg saw in the proposed elections circumstances which would have caused the gravest convulsions.

Such convulsions...must have meant the downfall of the State. The game which was to be played was clear. Public opinion was to be worn down as the result of successive motions in favour of a dissolution, by a series of actual elections, by the exploitation of the industrial depression and the general dissatisfaction. The National Socialists' tactics are clear enough, closely following the pattern which was to bring them into power in Germany; but the position of the Socialist deputies is more difficult to understand. Fearing that a coalition with the political enemy might place them in the light of protectors of the bourgeois party and so expose the workers to the propaganda influence of the Communists or the Nazis or both, Dr. Karl Renner refused a coalition of Christian Socialists and Social Democrats. On May 6, Chancellor Buresch handed in the government's resignation, but the election resolution was defeated. At first Buresch was requested by the Federal President, Miklas, to form a cabinet from all of the bourgeois parties, but he was personally rejected by the Pan-Germans. The Christian Socialists then proposed Dollfuss, who, on May 10, was given authorization to form a government. Dollfuss attempted to secure adherence of all four
non-Socialist parties—_Landbund_, Pan-German, _Heimathblock_, and his own 8 Christian Social; but the Pan-Germans hesitated and the _Heimathblock_ took the temporary position that Dollfuss' attitude was too far "left."

On the eighteenth the Pan-Germans decided against participation, and Dollfuss informed President Miklas that he was unable to achieve any agreement between the parliamentary parties. Miklas accordingly entrusted him with the task of forming a government of "personalities," without regard to party membership. There was some attempt on the part of the right-wing section of the _Heimwehr_ to force the elevation of Anton Rintelen, then governor of Styria, to the chancellorship. The _Neues Wiener Journal_, whose editor was a personal friend of Rintelen, published an editorial on May 12, which maintained the impossibility of Dollfuss' forming a government and saw Rintelen as the only "practical possibility."

Schuschnigg tells of a letter from the _Heimathblock_ which "in effect put forward the demand for the chancellorship of Dr. Rintelen," otherwise there could be no question of political co-operation. 9 The Styrian _Heimwehr_ threatened to sever themselves from the national organization, which, if carried out, would have taken with it their two deputies thereby destroying Dollfuss' prospective majority. Negotiations were conducted and eventually Rintelen himself prevailed on his supporters to modify their claims; and Dollfuss declared himself ready to take Rintelen into the cabinet.

It was necessary for Dollfuss to form a right coalition cabinet and to broaden his support by seeking the good offices of Starhemberg and his para-military _Heimwehr_. Dollfuss admitted frankly his need for _Heimwehr_ support and requested that Starhemberg not make "impossible terms."

10
According to the latter, he was candidly informed that Dollfuss intended to invite the participation of the Social Democrats in the government, ending the state of affairs "whereby organised Austrian Labour...is in principle in opposition and excluded from all share in the responsibility and work of government." Starhemberg agreed to join the government and placed the Heimatblock at Dollfuss' disposal. This lined up sixty-six Christian Socialists, nine Landbund deputies and eight Heimwehr members behind the government. In opposition stood seventy-two Social Democrats and ten Pan-Germans, a total of eighty-two. Starhemberg claims to have made no demands of a political nature, but the evidence points to Heimwehr pressure for the total exclusion of Social Democrats and a decided inclination toward a reactionary and semi-Fascist regime. The Socialists, under the leadership of Otto Bauer, gave no indication that a proffered coalition would have been accepted and in the dissolution proposition would have placed the responsibility fully on the cabinet rather than a self-dissolution of parliament. Bauer admitted later that he did not himself offer to enter a coalition nor take sufficiently into consideration the possibility of a Christian Social-Heimatblock coalition. When Starhemberg entered the Vaugoin Cabinet in 1930, he freely admits that he was animated solely by the intention of bringing about a coup d'état. "The fate of Austria would not be decided in Parliament. The struggle would eventually take place in the streets." His contention was that the sharp demarcation of political parties in Austria completely paralysed decisive action at a time when a positive program was mandatory for the survival, not only of the already defunct parliamentary system, but for the very existence of Austria as an independent and sovereign state. The
political parties had no deep-rooted confidence in themselves, in the parliamentary system, nor even in the possibility of Austria's survival.\textsuperscript{14}

With the support of the Heimwehr, Engelbert Dollfuss, former Minister of Agriculture and leader of the Christian Social party, became the Austrian chancellor, and on May 20 presented his cabinet list to President Miklas. Included were Christian Socialists, Landbund deputies, and the Heimatblock. In addition to the chancellorship, Dollfuss retained the Ministry of Agriculture and assumed that of Foreign Affairs. The Landbund was represented by Franz Winkler as Vice-Chancellor and Franz Bachinger as Minister of Interior. The eight mandates of the Heimatblock were represented by not less than three members in the cabinet: Hermann Ach, Minister of Public Security; Odo Neustäter-Stürmer, State Secretary for Labor; and Guido Jakoncig, Minister of Commerce. The Christian Socialists were represented by Emanuel Weidenhoffer, Minister of Finance; Kurt Schuschnigg, Minister of Justice; Karl Vaugoin, Minister of War; Anton Rintelen, Minister of Education; and Joseph Resch, Minister of Social Welfare.\textsuperscript{15} This new cabinet coalition marked a decided swing to the right in Austrian politics. However, not all of the rightist parties were satisfied with this arrangement nor was there complete solidarity within the ranks of the supporting parties. The day on which Dollfuss presented his cabinet list, the Styrian Heimatschutz passed a resolution declaring itself independent of the federal government while, at the same time, denoting a willingness to maintain the unity of the federal military front in its fight against Bolshevism or Marxism.\textsuperscript{16} By forming a coalition of Christian Socialists and Landbund representatives, the Styrian leadership feared that Dollfuss would give the government an extra-parliamentary
cover which was precisely what these National Betonte did not want. ¹⁷ Dr. Walter Pfrimer, leader of the Styrian Heimatschutz, ignored the leadership of Starhemberg by placing his movement under the supreme command of Adolf Hitler. ¹⁸ Throughout this period Styria became increasingly the focal point of National Socialist strength and was destined eventually to go over en masse to the National Socialist cause. The National Socialists did everything in their power to prevent Dollfuss from becoming chancellor. This revolt in Styria marked the beginning of the terroristic methods which the Nazis were to utilize so effectively. Small newspapers were bought up to propagandise against Dollfuss, economic pressure was applied to business firms, and bribery was employed. These methods were supported by the Nationalist elements in Germany ever prior to their own assumption of power in that State. ¹⁹

Starhemberg appears to have been the principal stumbling block to a bargain between the National Socialists and the Heimwehr. An effort was made by some German party members, headed by Major Waldemar Pabst, to persuade Starhemberg to collaborate with the Nazis, thereby eliminating friction between two ideologically similar groups and strengthening both. Following the elections, Starhemberg was invited by the organizing chief of the Nazi Party, Ernst Röhm, to visit Berlin. ²⁰ Röhm was being very realistic when he said that he considered "collaboration with the Austrian Heimatschutz of the utmost importance to Germany from a military point of view." ²¹ No progress was made, and the meeting was of small consequence other than that Starhemberg turned increasingly toward the south for support and encouragement.

The Nazis continued to press their advantage and German leaders of
the eminence of Göring, Goebbels, and Gregor Strasser visited Austria to address meetings. In those days an armed clash between the Socialist Schutzbund and the Fascist Heimwehr was no novelty, but during and after the elections Austrian towns and cities were treated to types of street demonstrations, accompanied by outrages on Social Democrats and Jews, more savage and uncontrollable than anything that had been known before. In October a particularly provocative affray occurred in a working-class quarter of Vienna, when a policeman and two Nazis were shot, and as a consequence Dollfuss requested Starhemberg to suggest a Heimatschutz man for the post of Minister of Public Security. Of this recommendation, Starhemberg considers it "the gravest mistake of my whole political career. But for that, Dollfuss might still be alive. Even Austria might still exist." Emil Fey was appointed to the Ministry of Public Security on October 7. His first decree forbade all public demonstrations of parties involved in recent clashes in Semmering and in the student fights in the University of Vienna. The Heimwehr was parading on the Ringstrasse at the time, so was consequently exempted. In essence the decree pertained to the National Socialists, the Socialists, and the Communists, leaving the field free for the Heimwehr. By this method, Fey was able to make a semi-official auxiliary police force out of his Vienna Heimwehr. Some evidence of Austrian-Italian solidarity, or at least of Heimwehr-Italian accord, was publicly proclaimed when the Italian Minister, Giacinto Auriti, participated in a Heimwehr meeting standing with Starhemberg and Dollfuss on the speakers' platform. It is said that after his introduction by Starhemberg he gave the Fascist salute to the assembly. In Parliament the Socialists introduced a motion protesting the "gross impropriety and
tactlessness" of an accredited representative participating in internal politics publicly.25

The general objectives of the Nazi leadership were apparent from the beginning, and plans for the annexation of Austria were a part of the National Socialist party program. Gottfried Feder published this program in 1927. It is a summary of the points decided upon at the party meeting in Munich in February, 1920.26 The constitution of the party demanded, in Article I, the union of all Germans on the basis of the right of self-determination (Selbstbestimmungsrechtes) of peoples. The domination of the European continent, first, by the incorporation of all German-speaking groups into the Reich, and, second, by territorial expansion under the slogan of "Lebensraum," is considered by Paul Schmidt, interpreter in the German Foreign Office, to have been a basic objective of Nazi leadership.27 The annexation of Austria was Hitler’s first acknowledged aim. On the first page of Mein Kampf, he wrote:

German-Austria must return to the great German motherland, and not because of economic considerations of any sort. No, no: even if it were harmful, it ought nevertheless to be brought about. Common blood belongs in a common Reich.28

Hitler regarded the Austrian Germans as a branch of his own party, natives of his own native land, destined eventually to return to the Greater Reich. George S. Messersmith, United States Consul-General in Berlin and later in Vienna, affirms that from the very beginnings of the National Socialist government, he had been told by high German officials that "incorporation of Austria into Germany was a political and economic necessity and that this incorporation was going to be accomplished 'by whatever means were necessary'" and "the only doubt
which ever existed...was 'how' and 'when.' Austria was in no condition to resist the uncompromising and subversive forces of German National Socialism. The National Socialists had flourished almost barometrically in accordance with the country's economic distress. A well-known journalist estimated that in 1928 the Austrian National Socialists numbered a modest 7,000; by 1930 already 100,000. They maintained the closest contact with their spiritual brethren across the frontier. They used German money, German propaganda, and German tactics. In that year Hitler began to take the Austrian movement seriously, and in 1931 he sent in his loyal henchman, the rabid Nazi Theodor Hambich, to become "Inspector for Austria" with unlimited financial resources. That same year the membership rose to 300,000. By the end of 1931 the party spent five thousand pounds on the purchase of the first Brown House in the Hirschengasse in Vienna. The National Socialists fought with the determination given by the backing of Hitler and the resources of the German Reich with its 66,000,000 people, with the courage of those who knew that many of their judges would be on their side, and with the faith that they would in the end richly recoup themselves for their temporary inconveniences and sacrifices by the eventual plundering of the loyal Austrians and by National Socialist recognition of their services.

Adolf Hitler, leader of the National Socialist party, became Chancellor of the German Reich on January 30, 1933. Franz von Papen entered his cabinet as deputy (Stellvertreter) for the Chancellor and Commissioner for Prussia; Constantin von Neurath as Minister for Foreign Affairs; Dr. Wilhelm Frich as Minister of the Interior; Lieutenant-General von Blomberg as Minister of the Reichswehr; and Göring as Minister without
Portfolio and Commissioner of Aviation. The latter was also entrusted with the work of the Prussian Ministry of the Interior. 33 On March 5, the pre-election predictions were borne out in the German elections for the Reichstag and the Prussian Diet. The National Socialists won 288 seats, and the Nationalists fifty-three, giving them a combined total of 341. The government secured some fifty-two percent of the total popular vote in the election. 34 The National Socialists alone received about forty-four percent of the total vote, owing largely to the Reichstag fire in Berlin on February 27. Simply by refusing to allow the Communist deputies to take their places, Hitler was able to command an absolute majority in the Reichstag even without the support of the Hugenberg Nationalists. Under the law of March 31, 1933, 35 the Communist seats, eighty-one in number, were abolished. At the second session of the new Reichstag on March 23, the Enabling Act (Ermächtigungsgesetz) 36 was passed which gave Hitler the de jure dictatorial control of Germany by giving his cabinet the power to make laws which he could proclaim, leaving him without responsibility to either president or parliament. 37

The day after the election of March 5 in Germany, the Austrian National Socialists met in Vienna, demanded the immediate resignation of the Dollfuss cabinet, and published a manifesto declaring that the frontier posts between the two countries should be scrapped along with the treaties separating them. 38 Dollfuss offered his resignation to President Miklas but it was refused, and the Nazi manifesto was confiscated by the police. The Weltblatt, a Catholic paper, announced that there could be no question of resuming the traditional form of parliamentary
government in Austria. "We Catholics do not seek a dictatorship but the influence to which our preponderance entitles us."\textsuperscript{39}

Hitler's seizure of power in Germany gave the Austrian National Socialist movement an enormous impetus. The Nazis intensified their propaganda; their newspapers multiplied steadily; they arranged for frequent demonstration meetings. At that time their propaganda undoubtedly held the field. Starhemberg wrote: "They succeeded in giving the impression in all towns, large and small, that they were the only party.... In reality there might be only 8 National Socialists in a parish of approximately 500."\textsuperscript{40} After the seizure of power in Germany, it was not difficult for the National Socialists to create a very strong impression that Austria would soon follow suit. This form of intimidation, a kind of terrorism, was employed in an attempt to undermine the governmental machinery and the executive.

It became the wish and the concern of innumerable State officials, members of the police and gendarmerie, as well as of many officers and men of the Austrian army, to make their terms with the masters of to-morrow in time, and not to be overtaken by the Anschluss. Among the so-called bourgeois parties to, and even in the ranks of the Heimat-schutz, this spirit helped to destroy the will to fight and confidence in the Austrian cause. The same symptoms were reported even with the Republican Schutzbund.\textsuperscript{41}

The German press began to publish evidence purporting to prove the oppression of their party comrades in Austria. Insulting anti-Austrian propaganda was broadcast from Munich, notably by Theodor Habicht, the "Inspector for Austria." According to Messersmith, this was the first of three distinct periods during which Nazi outrages rose to a peak, and he was told by high Nazi officials in Berlin that these waves of
terror were being instigated and directed by them. 42

On March 4, 1933, the deputies of the Nationalrat met in special session. It was to be their last meeting. The Social Democrats had demanded the session in order to prevent the government from taking disciplinary action against the railway workers for a two-hour demonstration strike on March 1. During the subsequent debate and voting over the various motions, the house became an uproar and Renner shouted that he resigned his place as president. His resignation was followed by that of the Christian Socialist Ramek and the Pan-German Straffner. The members simply left the chamber without any formal adjournment. A situation was created involving a technicality of parliamentary procedure which was not specifically provided for by the constitution or the rules of procedure. President Miklas refused to reconvene the Nationalrat without agreement among all parties. This was impossible of achievement, and Dollfuss began to rule by emergency decree. On March 30, the Schutzbund, para-military formation of the Social Democratic Party, was dissolved, and Dollfuss forbade its former members to possess weapons or munitions. 43 On April 7, the government decided not to permit the transmission of speeches by German National Socialists over the Austrian radio stations. 44 Dollfuss was now taking a definite position in opposition to the Austrian Nazis and even to Germany. The Communist party in Austria was outlawed on May 26, on the grounds that its aims were dangerous to the state. 45 Dollfuss announced in a speech at Salzburg on May 6 that all civil servants would be required to take an oath of allegiance to the administration and the State and that no new district elections would be held for six months, at the same time stating that the
Nationalrat was to be ultimately replaced by a Chamber of Corporations on the Fascist model, which would have complete jurisdiction over economic affairs—political and cultural matters remaining with the Bundesrat. On the following day, Starhemberg declared that everyone was regarded as an enemy who opposed the idea of making Austria an independent Fascist state. He vilified the Nazis who sought to reduce Austria's status to that of a subject of Berlin and taunted Hitler to "hold his tongue until he has armies instead of khaki and flags with which to effect Austro-German anschluss." He declared the Nazis traitors because they did not help "to throw the equipment of democracy where it belongs—on the dunghill."  

In the international scene during the month of March, while the Disarmament Conference was sitting in Geneva, the British Prime Minister, Ramsey MacDonald, and the Foreign Secretary, Sir John Simon, went to Rome for the purpose of persuading Mussolini to support the British Draft Convention at Geneva. At the same time it was hoped that the British statesmen could divert the Duce's attention away from Hitler and improve Franco-Italian relations. The British were relying for success upon an appeal to the traditional Anglo-Italian relations and Italy's almost complete dependence upon British friendship in the Mediterranean. Surprisingly enough Mussolini not only met the British statesman more than halfway, but seized the opportunity to put forward his project with the object of realizing among the four Western Powers "an effective policy of co-operation with a view to maintaining peace in accordance with the Kellogg and Anti-War Pacts." Mussolini was only following the line of foreign policy which he had
pursued for many years; for he believed that the first, and indeed the most essential, condition for the peace of Europe was a good understanding between England, France, Italy, and Germany. In an address in Turin at the Tenth Anniversary of the March on Rome, he had outlined clearly the thought which was to take form in the Four-Power Pact:

There have been efforts to free Europe from this organization [League of Nations], which is too universal in its scope. But I think that if, to-morrow, on a basis of justice and of the recognition of our in- controvertible rights, won by the blood of so many generations of young Italians, there could be created the necessary and sufficient premises for a collaboration of the four great Western Powers, Europe could find peace in the political sphere and soon the economic crisis which is torturing her would come to an end.49

The original draft was dated "Rocca delle Camminate, 4 Marzo XI" and was based on the Locarno Treaty and the so-called "No Resort to Force" Pact which had been proposed in Geneva in 1932. The original text of this pact of understanding and co-operation of the Four Powers was a confirmation of the principle of the revision of peace treaties in accordance with the League of Nations' Covenant in such cases where a threat to peace existed, this principle to be applied only within the frame work of the League. If the Disarmament Conference failed to attain complete results, then France, Great Britain, and Italy were to recognize the equality of rights by stages, meaning arms equality, for Germany, Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria. A common line of action was to be adopted by the Powers "in all political and non-political European and extra-European questions." The pact was to last for ten years with a renewal option.50

On March 23, Mr. MacDonald informed the House of Commons about his
Rome visit. He did not give any detailed account of the proposal but said that:

If the Four Powers come together, if a way can be devised for joining with their views those of the smaller nationalities concerned, and for examining the causes of fear leading now to an unwillingness to disarm, who would dare to deny but that the most effective work for peace which has been done since the War will have been accomplished? That may well have been begun by the Italian plan.51

On the same day Herr Hitler addressed the Reichstag. Referring to the plan of the Italian government, he said:

The far-reading plan of the Head of the Italian Government to re-unite the European Powers in a real policy of peace is warmly welcomed by the German Government, which attaches the greatest importance to this proposal. The German Government is ready to collaborate loyally in this plan for the peaceful co-operation of the Four Great European Powers.52

This proposal represented a new attitude in Italian policy. Italian support of Austria and open hostility to Yugoslavia had strengthened the unity of the Little Entente, and a continuation of the old policy entailed the danger of Poland joining with this central and south-eastern bloc, constituting an area of formidable hostility to Italy. On the other hand, the desire to maintain the political status quo had brought Paris and London together and in effect renewed the old Entente Cordiale. Mussolini's Four-Power Pact now had the great advantage of effectively removing the danger of a division of Europe into two hostile groups of powers. There would no longer be any reason for a combination of Italy and Germany against France and her allies. Mussolini was backing away from a close alliance with Nazi Germany and assuming the role of mediator. By projecting the Four-Power Pact he stood to gain large personal credit and undoubtedly
must have thought that Italy had more to gain through co-operation with France and Great Britain.

The British Ministers, after sympathetic talks in Geneva with Premier Edouard Daladier of France, had hurried to Rome hoping to offer Mussolini advantages which would outweigh any benefits accruing from a possible partnership with Hitler. Not to be outflanked, the Nazis sent Göring to join Papen in Rome for conversations with Mussolini. Dollfuss completed the list of rather harassed visitors to the Eternal City. Germany's wooing of Italy, however, was not at the expense of National Socialist principles. In the Prussian Diet on March 22, three days after the official communique declared for "a long period of peace for Europe and the world," the Nazi leader in the Diet had said on behalf of Hitler:

As leader of the Nazis in this House and by order of Herr Hitler, I declare that the Prussians are pan-German, that we shall continue to be so, and that we shall have attained our goal only when all Germany, including German Austria, is united with the Fatherland in one great State that can thus serve Germany's world mission.53

At the same time, Göring was mouthing platitudes to Mussolini about the revolution of the Brown Shirts in Germany owing "a great debt of gratitude to the revolution of the Black Shirts in Italy, which had showed the world how it was possible to resist the dissolving forces of anarchy and communism." He said that the new Germany looked to Fascist Italy for inspiration and that Hitler hoped to remodel Germany as fascism had remodelled Italy.54 But Mussolini observed an attitude of reserve toward the Nazis; and, while Dollfuss was still in Rome, he drank a toast at a banquet to "the prosperity and the future" of the Austrian republic.55
Shortly after Mussolini's pronouncement, the Permanent Council of
the Little Entente announced from Geneva that its members could not admit
that general international relations would be improved by "agreements
aiming to dispose of the rights of third parties...." It also expressed
"regret that a revisionist policy had been stressed in the recent
negotiations." The Little Entente quite naturally opposed the proposed
Four-Power Pact, for it excluded all countries except the four major
western European powers; thereby including the two leading powers who
had been demanding revision and none of the countries at whose expense
revision would necessarily be made--certainly if it were to satisfy
Germany and Italy. The British modifications were circulated on March
24, and France offered a counter-draft on April 10. The latter veiled
any direct reference to "revision of the Peace Treaties" under reference
to Articles 10, 16, and 19 of the Covenant. France was in the difficult
position of seeking a rapprochement with Italy while at the same time
retaining her friendship with Britain and the confidence of the Little
Entente and Poland. Furthermore, she had to avoid the odium of refusing
to co-operate in the pacification of Europe. The English were pushing
for a rapid conclusion, and on May 21, an agreement was reached by repre-
sentatives of the Four Powers. On June 7 the French government assured
the governments of Poland and the Little Entente that the pact would not
affect the existing treaties between France and the Little Entente and
that the four would have no power to decide territorial revision, but
merely to consult thereon. On July 7, Mussolini announced in the Senate
that the pact had been successfully concluded, and it was initialed in
the Premier's office in the Palazzo Venezia.
In the House of Commons debate on July 5, little mention was made
of the new agreement, but Sir John Simon made an interesting and important
reference to Austria in his concluding remarks. He said:

I have been asked a number of questions to-day on the very difficult
situation in Austria. I say without hesitation that the whole sympathies
of this country are with Austria in her effort to preserve her position.
It is most fortunate that the Four-Power Pact should be negotiated and
initialled, because it does give an opportunity, which I hope will be
used, to assist that country and Dr. Dollfuß to maintain her undoubted
rights in the face of very grave circumstances."

The Pact never came into force for both Britain and Germany failed
to ratify it, but Mussolini had made his bid for the political and
economic stabilization of Europe. He had reaffirmed his Austrian commit-
ments while treating the Nazis with reserve; he had offered France a
restoration of harmonious relations, Germany recognition as a great
power with equality of rights, and both England and France co-operation
in preserving peace. Austria's situation in the play of European political
forces was threatened by two things, both of which were opposed by Fascist
Italy. The first was the Austro-German union and the second was an ab-
sorption of Austria into the Little Entente. In an Anschluss with Germany,
Austria would cease to be an independent state and be relegated to a
status similar to that of Bavaria. In the second case, while nominally
retaining her independence, Austria would be attracted into the system
of France's satellites, which would leave her, in the Italian view, no
longer an independent factor in European politics. Austria's situation
was almost impossible and Rome realized that something had to be done.
Mussolini believed that the solution lay in altering the existing treaties
so as to render Austria a self-contained, independent, economic unit—one
of the motives underlying his proposal for a Four-Power Pact. When this failed, Mussolini began to work for the Rome Protocols, and when Dollfuss returned to Vienna on April 17, he said, "It is now certain that Austria has also a friend in the South who will always stand as helpfully by her side."^{60}

The foreign policy concept of Austria has been described by Guido Zernatto, secretary of the Fatherland Front and close adviser to both Dollfuss and Schuschnigg, as the endeavor to secure the independence of the state in order to free the powers, which occupy as a midpoint the position in the Danube area, for constructive solutions. No state can formulate a foreign policy under a complete renunciation of its freedom to the domestic mood. The term "Anschluss an Deutschland" had very different meanings to different groups. The Liberals said Anschluss and meant the union of the Liberals against the monarchy and against the conservative powers of Catholicism. The Social Democrats meant by Anschluss a Socialist-led parliamentary-democratic republic. The Catholics thought of Anschluss as a Catholic counterpoise to the protestant north. The Allduitschen meant by it an Anschluss to a national Greater Prussia. The National Socialists interpreted the word as the unification (Gleichschaltung) of Austria and her uncompromising subordination under the national socialist leadership principle. The Catholic was against the Anschluss to a liberal-national Greater Prussia, against the Anschluss to a Socialist Republic, and against unification (Gleichschaltung). The Social Democrat was against the Anschluss to a Catholic and Monarchist regime, against a Fascist-oriented Germany. The National Liberals opposed a Socialist republic and a Catholic Germany. The National Socialist opposed
any form of Anschluss which would not help National Socialism to victory. There were people who saw the Anschluss only as a restoration of monarchy or only as a Republic, as a national centralized state or as a federal state. Finally, there were Austrians who opposed Anschluss in any form. 61 These many interpretations, firmly rooted in political philosophies and frequently defended by pressure, intimidation or force, presented Chancellor Dollfuss with the most difficult task of his administration. The internal question of Austrian security was primarily concerned with consolidating and unifying these various groups for practical political purposes. Unfortunately, real unification was never achieved. Despite the broad theoretical concept, in actual fact the Fatherland Front 62 was a narrow combination of the old conservative Christian Democrats and the young and radical Heimatschutz. Starhemberg claims credit for the idea and the name. 63 The purpose of the formation of the Front was to pass from the defensive to the offensive, held by the National Socialists since the advent of Hitler in Germany. The relative strength of any particular political group was judged by the outward manifestations in the form of parades, demonstrations, mass meetings and the like, and the one that was able to shout the loudest and to amass the most people was the group that attracted the waverers. It was all a huge guessing game as to whom the individual had to fear the most and which could offer him the greatest protection. As Starhemberg wrote: "We must so organize things in Austria that the individual citizen will find it extremely inconvenient, even dangerous, to be a Nazi. We must meet National Socialist terrorism with even worse terrorism." 64 The Fatherland Front had no program because it was not a party. It embraced a principle on which the new state should
be rebuilt. This principle was: "We want a free, independent, christian, German, corporate (ständisch), articulated and authoritarily-led Austria."\(^65\)

The Fatherland Front was to embrace all groups and parties which were willing to accept the state principle. The political parties would be abolished. The Fatherland Front would be the great formation to which every Austrian who was not opposed to the State could belong.\(^66\)

Whoever placed himself within the framework of the State and would cooperate, was welcomed by us; whoever opposed the Front and the State had the choice of either remaining neutral or illegally fighting the State. The one who remained neutral was not troubled by either side, but the one who participated in illegal activities had to contend with the police rather than the Fatherland Front.\(^67\)

Throughout this period, from his first visit to the Duce in July, 1930, to the formation of the Fatherland Front in May, 1933, Starhemberg had remained in constant touch with Mussolini through Morreale.

After the 1932 elections, the Heimwehr's need for money became desperate. Starhemberg had even declared bankruptcy after exhausting his personal fortune in its support.\(^68\) So with the consent of Dollfuss, he made a second trip to Rome in June, 1932, for the express purpose of requesting financial aid, together with military and diplomatic support, from Mussolini. He found Mussolini's determination to prevent Austria's absorption by Germany firm and paraphrases him as saying:

I am a sincere friend of Austria. And I am your friend and you can count on my help. Europe needs Austria. Italy needs Austria. Prussians on the Brenner! What did we fight the last war for? Austria incorporated in a Greater Germany would mean that Germany won the war. It would mean a constant threat to Italy, that the fight for the Adriatic was in vain. Trieste will cease to be Italian. Italy will never permit that!\(^69\)

Mussolini was as fearful of pan-Germanism as he was of pan-Slavism. There
was a historical enmity against any Italian-German frontier, and a further hostility toward German influence in the Danube area. "The Fascist State," Mussolini has written in the Enciclopedia Italiana, "is a will to power and to government. In it the tradition of Rome is an idea that has force...." He envisioned a revival of the glories of Imperial Rome which presupposed Italian hegemony in the Danube Basin. This very lively interest in Central Europe confronted him with Hitler's ideas on geopolitics. For precisely this reason and over a period of approximately three years, Mussolini and the Italian State were projected into the dominant position of leadership in Europe as protectors of the Danubian states against Nazi Germany. "That is why Austria is so important," Mussolini told Starhemberg. "If Austria ceases to exist, there can be no more order in Central Europe. Great dangers will then threaten Italy." There were two other reasons for Italy's disproportionate influence in European politics: 1) the long-established Franco-German antagonism which placed Italy in the position of being able to play one country off against the other, and 2) Italy, by her support of Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria, represented the principal power in the group of states which balanced the power politics of France and the Little Entente.

During this same visit the details of an arms transfer was considered. Italy's relations with Yugoslavia were extremely precarious in the summer of 1932, and in the event of an armed conflict between the two countries, Hungary would be the natural ally of Italy. Properly equipped militarily, Hungary could be expected to check the threat of the two remaining members of the Little Entente. With an active revisionist foreign policy, Hungary was anxious to settle accounts with both Czechoslovakia and Roumania. But
Hungary was not well armed and under the provisions of the Treaty of Trianon was not permitted to import arms. Julius Gömbös, the Hungarian Minister of War at that time, in the course of a meeting with Starhemberg at a hunting lodge in the Bakonyer Forest in September, 1930, had promised the Heimwehr leader forty to fifty thousand rifles and "a corresponding number of machine-guns" if he could persuade the Duce to release them and if he could arrange for their passage from Italy to Hungary. The transfer did not take place until the end of December, 1932, and was initially exposed by the Arbeiter Zeitung of January 8, 1933. The Hirtenberg weapon affair developed into a concern of international proportions. The government acknowledged the existence of the arms in a communiqué which claimed that the weapons were old war material of Imperial Austria which had been taken to the Hirtenberg munitions factory for repairs and that the government had consented in order to provide work for some of Austria's unemployed. This was evidently not a completely satisfactory explanation, for on January 11 the ministers of the Little Entente and France requested further information from Dollfuß, and on January 19 the French government declared itself ready to associate in any protest the Little Entente intended to make. A joint démarche was made by Great Britain and France in Vienna requesting that Dollfuß supplement the information already given and in Budapest requesting an explanation from Hungary. Le Temps reported that Dollfuß was stunned by this unexpected turn but promised to give a written answer in a few days. The reply professed ignorance as to the destination of the arms and added that all the government knew was that a quantity of old arms had been sent by private Italian firms for repairs in Austria and
would presumably go back to Italy.\textsuperscript{76} Pressure was now exerted on Britain and France by the Little Entente. Eduard Beneš, their spokesman, sent a note demanding an immediate investigation by the League of Nations or action by Britain and France to obtain full particulars from the Austrian government and a promise that the weapons would be returned or destroyed.\textsuperscript{77} On February 11, Austria received a second note from the British and French Ministers. This note stated that the Western Powers held as a "flagrant violation" of Section 134 of the Treaty of St. Germain this importation of arms, and Austria was "invited" to return the weapons or destroy them. She was to give proof under oath that one of the two had been effected and to determine what part, if any, of the weapons had been transported to Hungary. Austria was given two weeks to offer satisfaction.\textsuperscript{76} As early as January 16, \textit{Le Temps} had stated editorially that the interests of a great power like Italy in Central Europe and the Balkans was not contested, but that France did not consider it a legitimate Italian interest to bring Austria under her influence and aid in establishing a Fascist government in Vienna. The \textit{Giornale d'Italia} first printed the text of the Franco-British "ultimatum" on the seventeenth and commented on its "violent" tone. It termed the note:

an incredible but true document of an extremely dangerous policy for Europe.... The tone of the note is unheard of. It has the appearance of an ultimatum. Its almost singular and preemptory demands are aggravated by the request for an oath on the part of Austrian authorities, which is unprecedented in the history of international relations.\textsuperscript{79}

On February 18 the \textit{Tribuna} criticized Great Britain for adhering to the note "which cannot be regarded as alarming except as a symptom of a mentality and diplomacy that have lost all sense of responsibility and
proportion." The note has the character of an ultimatum, the paper said, but it is humiliating "not for the little State that received it but for the great State that compiled it." 80

It may be that the Austrian government regarded the incident philosophically on the theory that the French complaint really was directed against Italy but was filed with Austria "because that is always safer." On February 19, Vice-Chancellor Winkler declared in a Carinthian speech that the "ultimatum" was not compatible with Austria's sovereign rights and could never be complied with by an independent State. 81 On the same day the Reichpost, a government organ, declared that the Austrian government would not act in accordance with the demands that the arms be returned or destroyed. On February 21, a government communiqué stated that no answer would be made. 82 Sir John Simon accepted the Italian proposal to take the weapons back as soon as they had been made serviceable, and the Giornale d'Italia took this as an indication that the Britain accepted the Italian and Austrian points of view, "which tend to bring the question back to its true terms as a private affair perfectly permitted by treaties and perfectly in keeping with current international usage." The French Foreign Minister, Joseph Paul-Boncour, announced in the French Chamber of Deputies on March 1 that the question of arms in the Hirtenberg affair was now regarded as a closed incident, 83 and the following day the Little Entente renounced in a declaration from Geneva any examination of the issue by the League of Nations. It is doubtful that the arms were returned, 84 but no state suffered a loss of prestige. This episode seems to have hardened Mussolini's determination to force Dollfuss' hand in the elimination of the Socialists in Austria.
Not only was Mussolini resolved to eliminate this internal obstacle to a rapid fascistizing of Austria and to absorb her into the Italian sphere of influence, but his determination to support the Heimwehr-dominated government of Dollfuss was strong enough to cause him to oppose France and England in this matter at a time when the situation in Central Europe was very unstable and armed conflict was not out of the question.

With the sustained and demonstrated support of Mussolini, the government was now ready to present the Fatherland Front to the Austrian people. "To create this political unity, to overcome the spirit of party, was the one idea of the Fatherland Front." Though as yet there was no name, no symbol, and no organization, a concrete formulation of this idea was to take place at a mass rally of the Heimwehr before Schönbrunn Palace in Vienna, but in order to meet the Nazis on their own ground with propaganda, mass meetings, and even armed force if necessary, the government needed money; so Starhemberg journeyed to Rome. Mussolini was aware of the intentions of the Austrian government and approved, for he was assured by Starhemberg that the Heimwehr could stand up to the Nazis with Mussolini and his financial help behind them. The idea was being waged not only against National Socialism but against any sympathies for a Greater Germany. This ideal had to be countered with an absolutely independent Austrian ideal. Said Mussolini:

For us a Pan-German solution of the Danubian question is as little acceptable as a Pan-Slav one. The Danube Basin is our European hinterland. That is why we seek a firm position there. Without it, we shall be forced to play the insignificant role of a peninsula on the periphery of Europe.... I may tell you that my friendship for Austria is dictated by the interests of Italy.
This statement probably pleased Starhemberg more than any other, for by frankly admitting that the Duce's peculiar relation with Austria was dictated solely by the fact that it was to the interest of Italy to maintain Austria's independence, Mussolini was also indicating one of the most dependable bases for Italian support. Mussolini wanted to establish economic influence in the Danube Basin and ensure Italy's place in European politics. The Fascist leader feared that once Nazi Germany had become militarily strong, she would solve the Danubian problem herself. Italy would lose her hegemony in Southeastern Europe and cease to be a great power in European affairs.

Starhemberg requested two million schillings as soon as possible and also asked that Mussolini work through diplomatic channels in order to draw the attention of the other great powers to Austria's situation. The money was placed at his disposal, to be handed over in Vienna in a few days through Morreale.\(^{87}\) On May 14, Heimwehr units from all parts of Austria assembled on the grounds of Schönbrunn Palace for a mass demonstration of the Fatherland Front and from there marched to the Ringstrasse.\(^ {88}\) Financed by Fascist Italy, the Heimwehr and Christian Democratic leaders were ready to demonstrate their own strength and enthusiasm for an independent Austria. At the same time the city was host to several visitors from Nazi Germany. On May 13, Dr. Hans Frank, Bavarian Minister of Justice; Hans Kerrl, President of the Prussian Diet; Dr. Robert Ley, President of the Prussian State Council; and Wilhelm Kube, Prussian State Minister, arrived in Vienna. The government had not been notified, so their visit was unofficial, and the Austrian Nazis staged a demonstration.\(^ {89}\) The demonstrations were so violent and uncontrolled
that Frank was requested to leave Austria as soon as possible, otherwise Austria would be forced to take measures to prevent such a repetition of demonstrations. Dr. Stephan Tauschitz, the Austrian Minister in Berlin, so informed the German government. The following day, May 15, both ministers were called home by their respective governments.90

Back in Germany, Dr. Frank said in a speech to a National Social Student League, "We will not permit our Austrian brother nation to slide into spheres of action that are opposed to those of Germany. We will continue to fight for union between Austria and Germany with all legal means as an historic necessity, as an historic bridge into the future of the new Germany."91 An ordinance forbidding the display of all uniforms, flags, symbols, and other emblems, except the Austrian flag, without permission, was issued by the Austrian government;92 and public meetings and street demonstrations by any party but the new Fatherland Front were forbidden, an order that was directed against the National Socialists. The German government retaliated on May 29 by imposing a tax of one thousand marks on all visas issued to its nationals for Austrian travel, and at a stroke destroyed the very lucrative German tourist trade in Austria, estimated at about forty million marks a year.93

As the National Socialist agitation grew more and more unchecked and extreme, Dollfuss endeavored "to guide his opponents into the path of quiet and reasonable progress in the interest of the country." Personal negotiations were undertaken by Dr. Anton Rintelen, Minister of Education and Governor of Styria, and former Chancellor Buresch with the leaders of the Austrian National Socialists. With the opposition stood Habicht and Proksch, a railroad official of Sudeten German origin. Schuschnigg
relates that the sense of the meeting was to feel out the possibility of a political coalition between the Austrian N.S.D.A.P. and the Christian Socialists. The Heimwehr was to be eliminated, elections held, but Dollfuss would remain at the head of the cabinet whatever their result. "This was a concession which they [the Nazis] were ready to make, on grounds of foreign policy." The interview was without result.94

On June 11, 1933, an attempt was made on the life of Dr. Richard Steidle, the Heimwehr leader and member of the Tyrol Government. As a consequence, the Heimwehr in Innsbruck searched the National Socialist Brown House by the order of Fey. No proof of Nazi connection was found but a number of Nazi leaders were arrested.95 The following day Fey ordered all the Brown Houses in Austria closed and sealed by the police. Members of the army and federal employees were forbidden membership or activity in the National Socialist party.96 On the nineteenth, the government announced that it considered the Nazi party responsible for the greater part of the disturbances and therefore the S. A. (Sturmbteilung) and S. S. (Schutzstaffel) divisions of the party and the Styrian Heimatgeschutz97 were dissolved; it forbade the National Socialist party to carry on any further activity in Austria or to build up any sort of party organization.98 Schuschnigg wrote later:

...that party [N.S.D.A.P.] financially and in personnel, was dependent on certain forces not at home in Austria. Political emigration had in the course of time increased so much as to be a decisive factor; these people were mostly non-citizens. For every individual who had committed offences against Austrian law and saved himself by flight had been divested of his citizenship. Besides that, in certain parts of Austria district leaders and inspectors had been appointed who likewise did not possess Austrian citizenship; so that for some time now National-Socialism in Austria no longer had the character of an internal political movement.99
In order to compel the Austrian government to accept their terms, the National Socialists resorted to almost every conceivable measure, including economic pressure, propaganda, and most important of all, terrorist acts. Messersmith later related that the outrages were an almost constant occurrence. "I found no concealment in my conversations with high Nazi officials of the fact that they were responsible for these activities in Austria."¹⁰⁰

On July 1, 1933, shortly after their second meeting in Rome, Mussolini addressed a personal letter to Chancellor Dollfuss expressing his interest in Austria and his appreciation of the Chancellor's political aptitude. He also gave assurance that Italian aid would not be decreased.¹⁰¹ Convinced of a reawakening of patriotic feeling in Austria, which Mussolini felt was "polarised around the ideas of the independence of the state and the historic mission of German Austria," the conception of the Fatherland Front appealed to him. He saw in it the fusion of the various parties fighting for the "national interest" of Austria. With the Heimwehr oriented to the new government policy being developed by Dollfuss, Mussolini insisted that the Chancellor must now react in an energetic way against the recent "criminal outrages" perpetrated by the National Socialists. Because of the exigency which compels the use of rigorous police action, "the necessity is now more than ever thrust forward to carry through a program of effective and basic internal reforms in the decisive Fascist sense." This was expedient, first, to prevent any assertion that a policy of suppression was being carried out by the government against a movement which for good or bad was clothed in a national flag; and second, to attract the youth of the country, on whom the national front must rely
unconditionally, with an impressive idea representing the promise of a future for Austria. Mussolini was not unaware of the reasons that had prevented a determined stand against the Social Democratic party, but he was convinced that "apprehensions of a parliamentary nature are now of secondary importance." Because of the increased danger of the National Socialists and in order to restore normal political life in Austria, he felt it essential that the Austrian Socialists be forced into conformity with the anticipated constitutional reform.

If, instead, the Social Democratic Party is treated with consideration, it appears to me that the much greater and more concrete danger arises that thereby the anti-Marxist weapon will be given into the hands of the Nazis and they will be enabled at a given moment to play the role of savours. That this weapon which is most feared, may be neutralized in their hands, and that thereby Nazism in Austria will disappear completely, depends upon Your Excellency. 102

Mussolini expressed the conviction that Dollfuss, by appealing to all sound national powers, by striking a blow at the Socialists in their stronghold of Vienna, then by extending this purge to all centers of the state, and by pressing hard upon any disruptive forces which stand in opposition to an authoritarian state, could attract many active National Socialists into the ranks of the Fatherland Front. Here was the Heimwehr-Fascist bargain. Italian aid would not be withheld from Dollfuss, and Italy even accepted the necessity for the Austrian government to suppress the terrorist acts of the National Socialists; but for this very reason internal reforms which presaged a corporate and authoritarian constitution must be rapidly introduced. Rather than alienate the national-minded Nazis and perhaps put into their hands the very effective weapon of anti-Marxist propaganda, Mussolini insisted upon the destruction of the Socialist party,
the strongest opponent in Austria to the subjugation of independent action in political affairs—both internal and external—to the influence and authority of Italian Fascism. This would supposedly serve the dual purpose of eliminating an obstacle to the autoritätssprinzip and of attracting into the national front those National Socialists who desired only a determined stand against Marxism by the government and the hope of a brighter future for themselves.

Dollfuss answered Mussolini's letter on July 22. The tone of the answer carries a slight indication of wounded vanity that there should be any criticism of his handling of the situation or doubt that he might know what was best for Austria or that he needed any pushing or prompting. Dollfuss believed Mussolini certainly knew that he had been occupying himself constructively with these ideas for a long time and that he had been carefully preparing the ground for the creation of an authoritarian regime. First of all, however, "much rubbish which has accumulated during the years of the Republic must be cleared away." He also complained that his activities were being seriously hindered by the attacks of the Nazis and by the unpardonable way in which they were giving aid, directly and indirectly, to the Marxists. These latter, writes Dollfuss, have been pushed back to an extent unthinkable six months earlier, a success which would have been even greater but for the aggressive activity of the National Socialists against Austrian independence.

The Government is clinging steadfastly to its goal of overcoming the Marxist mentality, Marxist forms and organizations, and replacing them by a national patriotism standing above classes and by a corporate structure pinnacled in a State [unter weitgehender ingrediens] with a strong authoritarian government. In this connection we are also determined as soon as conditions allow, to drive the Marxists from their positions of power which they still hold. Presently we are intent on reducing very
materially the financial means which they have procured through their overwhelming influence in the city of Vienna.104

Dollfuss then told Mussolini of the especial attention his government was giving, by an intensive national propaganda, to an Austrian patriotism, a patriotism fostered within the framework of the Fatherland Front. The Front, constructed on the Führerprinzip with Dollfuss the Führer, was to aim at "non-partisan union of all patriotic Austrians to serve the peaceful, cultural and economic development of a free, independent Austrian State." A ban from membership of class or confessional conflict (kulturkampf) together with its non-partisan character, excluded party politics (meaning Socialism and Communism) from membership—a membership not as a member of a party but as a patriot.105

Concerning external politics Dollfuss mentioned the visit of President Gámbos to Vienna.106 The conversations, he reports, clarified the situation, including the maintenance of Italian friendship, the recognition of the necessity for the closest economic co-operation between Austria and Hungary, and the determination to honor the existing treaties. Some problems were outside the scope of their conversations, such as the problem of Soviet Russia, the question of revision of the territorial conditions of the peace treaties, and the relation of the two countries with National Socialist Germany. Not that these spheres of interest did not directly concern both countries, but they were of such delicate concern that they did not lend themselves to joint treatment. This must not, however, impair common action in the area of economic systematization of the Danubian countries, so vital to them both. As expressed by Dollfuss: "The indispensable corollary for such a development—the support of a
political and economic great power—will, I am convinced, be provided by Italy...." As for Germany, the maintenance of friendly relations is conditioned by the stipulation "that the maintenance of the independence of Austria and its governmental organs will be guaranteed and respected without reservation by the German Reich Government." The solution to this problem must find expression in a demonstration by the Reich Government and the leadership of the N.S.D.A.P. "that it is finally determined to carry out the decision to regard and to treat the National-Socialist movement in Austria as an Austrian movement connected with the Germans at most by bonds of sympathy, and to take a final and definite stand against promoting or tolerating any propaganda directed against Austria as well as against any mixing in the internal affairs of Austria."

The reserve with which Dollfuss treats of Austro-German relations in his letter is surprising in view of the particularly provocative incidents which were antagonizing the Austrian government in mid-summer of 1933. Theodore Habicht was periodically broadcasting vituperative tirades from Munich against Dollfuss and his government, and German planes were flying over Austrian territory and dropping propaganda leaflets over Salzburg and Linz. Germany flaunted her protection of the Austrian terrorists who fled across the border into Bavaria. Austria found a counterweight to this deliberate intimidation in the intervention of the Great Powers. On August 2, it was announced from London that Great Britain, France, and Italy were to take joint action to discourage the aerial demonstrations by German planes over the Austrian frontier. These representations were to be made as a reminder to Hitler
that the spirit of the recently signed Four-Power Pact was being
violated. Had the representations been discreet, firm, and in con-
cert, they may perhaps have been effective. At least Hitler would have
been reminded of some semblance of harmonious understanding concerning
the integrity of independent states. As it happened concerted action
was delayed initially by a technicality as to whether or not the Four-
Power Pact could and should be used by any two or three of its signatories
to call the fourth to order. Discretion was violated by the Parisian
press when it announced the decision of the Powers ahead of time and
with much fanfare and even a threatening tone, neither of which should
have accompanied the announcement. François-Poncet, the French
ambassador in Berlin, was able to read his instructions in the press
of the capital three days before he received them from the Quai d'Orsay.
This practically obliged Hitler to give a negative answer in order to
save face, and he certainly had ample time to prepare an answer. The
representatives of France and Great Britain made identical representations
to the Wilhelmstrasse on August 7, but their calls were not made simulta-
neously. It is not even certain that the Italian diplomat ever showed
up. The New York Times reported that Italy made only "a friendly re-
monstrance" rather than any formal diplomatic protest.

France and Britain were harshly rebuked by the German government in
a communiqué which said that the Reich government did not consider the
Four-Power Pact applicable in this form, that Germany had not infringed
any treaty obligations, and that this intervention in Austro-German
difficulties was therefore considered "inadmissible." The tone of the
communiqué was probably due to the refusal of Italy to associate herself
directly with the protest and also to the fact that the action was not made jointly. Der Angriff said even before the German communiqué was made public: "It is quite clear that Italy views the four-power pact exactly as Germany does."114 On August 9, the Italian ambassador in Berlin received assurances that the German government would do its best to prevent any repetition of the recent incidents on the Austrian frontier. The Italian ambassador told his British and French colleagues, "it was a courteous and definite pledge that Germany would try to end the propaganda air raids over Austria and keep a strict censorship over broadcasts likely to reach neighboring countries."115 The Italian communication pointed out what it described as the advisability of refraining from further representations to the Berlin government. Despite the German guarantees to the Italian ambassador, that the Nazis had little intention of taking any of the exchanges seriously is indicated by the continuation of the Habicht broadcasts from Munich, one of which said: "This is an inter-Austrian struggle, one being fought out between an overwhelming majority of the German population on the one side and a minority on the other which unscrupulously uses all means for maintaining itself and, realizing it can no longer do so by its own power, invokes the aid of foreign countries."116 The Reichspost declared on August 8, "if the great powers intervening are disinclined to accept Germany's brusque rejection of this conciliatory effort, there is scarcely any other road open than that which leads to Geneva." Once the matter was brought before the League of Nations, "the German Government would be compelled to disclose all the details of its subversive propaganda against Austria...a procedure that would cause an enormous loss of prestige by the new regime." The
Italians claimed that they had already received the promise of the German
government to correct the whole matter even before the English and French
ambassadors made their respective calls. If this were the case then the
German government probably gave assurance to Italy in order to disrupt or
discourage any intentions of common action, certainly an effective device
whether intended or not. If, on the other hand, the Italian answer was
received after the representations to the Wilhelmstrasse had been made,
then it appears as hardly more than an eleventh hour sop to Mussolini,
who had fathered the Four-Power Pact now being put to its first test.
But in either case Italian alignment with France and England in the
face of Germany--by associating herself directly with the formal protest--
had faltered, for Mussolini was obviously not willing to support the
Pact to a point which might lead to a clash with Germany.

It may appear that Italian support of the Austrian cause, for whose
benefit the protest was to be lodged, had also faltered and that Mussolini
did not consider the cause worthy enough or the provocation extreme
enough to warrant such stringent measures. But in view of the repeated
assurances to Austria and of Italian financial aid, and of the events of
the next few months, it is more plausible to assume that Mussolini resented
and perhaps feared such overt overtures of protection to his protégé on
the part of England and France in view of the Italian policy of pursuing
economic ascendency in the Danube Basin. Austria belonged in the Fascist
camp, and until her position there was secured, Italy preferred that the
Democracies keep hands off—even at the risk of sounding the deathknell
of a favorite project. This is further borne out by Mussolini's invitation
to Dollfuss—which became known in Vienna on August 6, the same day on which
the representatives of the three Powers called on the Foreign Office in Berlin\textsuperscript{117}--to visit his summer villa at Riccione. Austria was probably alarmed by the dilatory manner in which the Great Powers handled these violations of her guaranteed independence. At any rate Chancellor Dollfuss accepted the invitation to make the unexpected and rather sensational trip to meet with his benefactor.

On the afternoon of August 18, Dollfuss flew to Riccione. In the Riccione file in the State Archives there is a rough draft in Italian in which is sketched briefly, without the usual polite phrases, instructions which the Duce had prepared for the Federal Chancellor upon his arrival at Riccione. The document provides for the immediate fascistizing of Austria. This trip must be the beginning of a new course in Austrian domestic and foreign policy, and Dollfuss must announce a political speech for September to precede a series of acts--such as taking new elements into the government (Steidle and Starhemberg are specifically mentioned), emphasizing the dictatorial character of the government, and usurping the political authority of the Vienna municipality with a government commissioner--which would arouse the Austrians from their depressed morale. The speech should announce the project of constitutional reform on a Fascist basis to be approved by the Federal President and submitted to a popular plebiscite with the slogan: "Independence in foreign affairs and renovation at home." An explanation that "any attempt to use force" (jedem Versuch der Gewaltanwendung) would be met by force and suppressed should be included. With regard to foreign policy, the speech should contain declarations of friendship for all of Austria's neighbors including Germany and a claim to the historical and
inalienable functions of an independent Austria, recognition of special relations with Hungary and Italy, and possibility of co-operation with the Little Entente in economic matters and the announcement of the possibility of a tripartite meeting to bring Italy, Austria, and Hungary into closer relations in all spheres. Mussolini himself recommended undertaking a Putsch, and he ordered Dollfuss to introduce it with this programmatical speech. In the notes which were made for the Foreign Office file of the Riccione discussions, Dollfuss--translating the harsh words of Fascism into the polished speech of the Ballhausplatz--said that Mussolini was apprehensive of German developments, and that if it should come to an invasion from Bavaria, Italy would react in a military way. It was evident, however, that Mussolini preferred to continue the method of "Freundschaftlichen Konversationen mit Berlin." The Federal Chancellor assented to the delivering of an important political speech with the Leitmotiv, "the independence of Austria and the renovation of Austria," and accepted the date of September 11 for the speech.

Two days before the speech was to be delivered, Dollfuss received another letter from Mussolini. Starhemberg had been in Italy throughout August and had seen Dollfuss on his return from Riccione. Evidently Starhemberg was not completely satisfied with what Dollfuss told him about the Riccione conversations for on September 1 he went to Rome himself. He remained there a week and had two conversations with Mussolini. When he left Italy on the eighth, he sent Mussolini a telegram in which he expressed the wish that "also in Austria His Excellency’s conception [Standpunkt] of a system may be completely effected soon. My firm desire is to fight to victory [Erkämpfen] in spite of all difficulties." The
official communique of the leader's council of the Heimwehr, to which Starhemberg reported on September 9, announced a new political era which "will realize the fascist totalitarianism and decisively affect the question of the Fatherland Front and the fate of all the parties still existing in Austria." Starhemberg had left the impression with the Duce that the majority of National Socialists in Austria were merely "malcontents" who could probably be won over by the government if some very decisive steps toward Fascism were taken. This, according to Mussolini, would remove the principal objection that no intensive and definite action was being taken toward the renovation of the state. This state of inertia, lacking the confidence of the youth, was ascribed to the fact that certain elements still remained in Dollfuss' cabinet who had neither the will nor the intention to lead the country "out of the morass of liberalism and democracy." Vice-Chancellor Winkler, shortly to be replaced by Starhemberg, was specifically mentioned. Mussolini expressed conviction that the salvation of Austria from its present dangerous situation was to be found not in coalition governments of parliamentary character, but in an organized defence supported by the Austrian youth and rallied around a new idea. It is evident from this letter that Mussolini was strongly influenced, if not directed entirely, by the ideas and suggestions of Starhemberg who himself was motivated by the desire to establish the Heimwehr as the strongest single force in Austrian political life. Starhemberg's frequent visits to Italy resulted in an interchange of ideas with Mussolini who in turn applied pressure on the Austrian chancellor to make the necessary renovations within the framework of internal policies. There is no reason to believe that Starhemberg dominated
Mussolini in his directions of Austrian internal politics without the Duce's understanding of the situation or his ignorance of the Prince's motives. Starhemberg's ambitions for himself and for Austria fitted in nicely with Mussolini's own ideas and conceptions of Italian foreign policy. A totalitarian Fascist state modeled after and completely dependent on Italy was a primary and essential part of his plan for the systemization of the Danube area. By placing himself behind Starhemberg, Mussolini was able to reconstitute the internal politics of Austria, thus—and at the same time—brining Austria outwardly into accord with the Italian project of a Rome bloc.

On September 8, the official indictment of the National Socialists and their activities appeared in the government publication, Das Braunkreuz: Hackenkreuz gegen Österreich. It represented the government's accusation of German complicity in the campaign of terrorism which was being conducted at the time. The book claims that the Austrian Nazis were controlled from Berlin, that they received their orders through the diplomatic pouch sent to the German embassy in Vienna, and that a thorough spy system had been developed in Austria for the benefit of German officials.

There can be no question that the National Socialist party in Austria, although formally (according to Austrian law) an independent entity, in actual fact and from the standpoint of the supreme leaders in Germany, is a group subordinate to the Reich party, which merely forms a part of the German National Socialist party under the leadership of Adolf Hitler. With this publication, Dollfuss and his Clerico-Fascist government completely repudiated the National Socialist ideals and organization and took the final step in placing Austria under the protection of Italy and in line with the
Italian Fascist concept. His speech of September 11 formally promulgated the Fatherland Front, pointing the direction toward an authoritarian state by the destruction of the Austrian Parliament and its replacement by the corporate ideal of Fascism.

Dollfuss' solution for the problems of the country was the creation of a Fascist State on Italian lines. "The old Parliament with the old leaders has gone, never to return. The epoch of liberalistic and capitalistic systems had ended and will never come back. The period of Socialist misguidance is over." There would no longer be a rigid party system in Austria, but a Catholic, German State based on authoritarian and corporate lines, but which would remain thoroughly Austrian. Dollfuss issued an appeal in the name of the Fatherland Front to all who recognized Austria as their German fatherland to work in the renewal and defense of their country. This speech was delivered during the German Catholic Congress in Vienna. On September 15, Richard Schüller, the Austrian representative to the Economic Discussions in Rome, had a conversation with Mussolini and reported to Dollfuss that Mussolini felt the speech had been excellent and had made an extraordinary impression on the whole world. The principles of the Fatherland Front enunciated by Dollfuss were sound and would deprive the National Socialists of the foundation of their agitation.

The Austrians are too fine to carry it out in such a way as to make enemies of the whole world as the Germans have done. Italy will be able to help Austria much better than now, because a certain inner affinity will exist which will strengthen Italy's position over against Germany. Now the Germans throw it up to me that I support a government against them which has not disposed to Austro-Marxism and Communism.
The subject of the radio speeches, the violation of the boundary, and the Austrian legion were discussed; but Mussolini said, "J'exclue l'idée d'une invasion," meaning that Italy would not tolerate an invasion and would react with military measures to it. Mussolini reported that certain preparations for such a case had already been taken but he hoped that the Germans would not thus precipitate a conflict "with the only friend they still have." The sincerity of these assurances was to be demonstrated scarcely ten months later when a Nazi putsch brought a mobilization of Italian forces to the border.

Dollfuß reformed his cabinet on September 21 and assumed four departments for himself, the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Agriculture, Defense, and Public Security in addition to the Chancellorship. Dollfuß assumed direct control of the army and police. Franz Winkler, the Landbund leader, was replaced as Vice-Chancellor by Fey. This was because the Landbund opposed these new developments toward Austro-Fascism and because Mussolini insisted that these old elements must be eliminated if the Fascist idea was to succeed. Karl Buresch retained Finance and Schuschnigg relinquished the Ministry of Justice for Education.\textsuperscript{127} "The new Austrian State will neither be the corporate State of Italy nor the totalitarian State of Germany. It will be a 'ständische' State."\textsuperscript{128} When on September 22, Dollfuß answered Mussolini's letter of September 9, he could announce that he had again come a further step in the fascistizing of Austria. He acknowledged the message by telephone from Suvich and the favorable reception of the Italian Press of the speech. He gave assurance of his determination to be energetic in carrying out his program "with especial regard for Austrian conditions."\textsuperscript{129}
At the end of October Schuschnigg undertook a surprise trip to Munich with the understanding that the German Chancellor and influential circles in the N.S.D.A.P. had arranged with an accredited representative of the Austrian government discussions for the purpose of clarifying the two points of view and preparing the ground for a future exchange between Dollfuss and Hitler. As it turned out neither Hitler nor his deputy, Rudolf Hess, had prior knowledge of the meeting; but Schuschnigg was able to personally inform the Germans of the Austrian's new position and attitude toward Germany in the light of the reorienting of government policy in both internal and foreign affairs. The fundamental condition for a successful rapprochement between the two German States lay in the recognition by Germany that she was dealing with an equal partner. Austria was in agreement with the Reich on the revision of the peace treaties, and she would certainly support Germany in her racial interests. Austria was ready to go halfway and was anxious to improve relations and remove misunderstandings, but negotiations were possible only if her honor, freedom, and independence were respected. If these premises were clear and acceptable, there was no reason why Austria could not live with the German Reich "in the light of old tradition and on the best of understandings." The meeting was of no immediate influence or success since the Nazis could never accept the premise of an independent German state outside of Greater Germany. Mussolini formulated the essential difference when he said: "We and Germany follow contrary policies. Germany wants to annex Austria; we do not want that to happen, but for Austria to remain free and independent." To the Assembly of the National Council of Corporations, he said on November 13, 1933: "Great silence has enveloped
the Four Power Pact of late. Nobody mentions it, but everybody thinks of it. This is precisely why we do not intend to resume initiatives or speed up the outcome of a situation which logically and fatally, must come to a head."
CHAPTER III
DIPLOMATIC INTERMEZZO

For the remainder of the year 1933, developments in Austria were regarded by the Powers as an object of special and careful observation. France and England were apparently willing to let Italy take precedence in the stabilization of order in Central Europe without, however, any particular conviction that the Roman policy would succeed. While affecting this seemingly unimportant position and therefore projecting a not too reluctant Italy into the dominant position as guarantor of Austrian independence against the northern Germanic nation, they were at the same time skeptical and rather fearful of any direct Italian influence on the domestic politics of Austria. Wide circles in France felt that Italy was in a favorable position to encourage the development in Austria of an Italian-oriented Fascist government. This, augmented by a rapprochement with Nazi Germany, might easily result in a North-South Fascist front completely separating France from her eastern allies of the Little Entente and Poland.¹ This was one of the conditions which the Four-Power Pact had been designed to prevent and which was actually to occur in 1938. France wished not only to insure the independence of Austria but also to prevent any development which might lead to a condition that would be practically the same as Gleichschaltung or Anschluss.² London expressed concern over the situation in Austria, and British political circles felt that there was little possibility of introducing Austro-Fascism to the Austrian polity without that country eventually succumbing to National Socialism.³ But even in the official circles, the New York Times reported
there seemed to be a satisfaction with the way Premier Mussolini was handling the Austrian situation and a willingness to let him handle it alone for a while without diplomatic help from London.\textsuperscript{4} The Times (London) expressed satisfaction editorially that Austrian independence remained one of the principal objects of Italian policy and added that "for the moment the initiative rests with Italy, since the most recent developments, while contrary to the spirit of the pact [Four-Power Pact] and to accepted usages of international intercourse, are also in violation of understandings given to Italy by the German Government."\textsuperscript{5} It was hoped that the economic measures agreed upon at Riccione, if put into effect, would so buoy up the Austrian economy as to show directly and quickly a favorable reaction by the internal political situation then existing. Mussolini had already intervened decisively in the question of the export of Austrian timber to Italy as a result of this meeting.\textsuperscript{6} Threats, warnings, and protests were purely negative methods while the strengthening of Austria's economic position could be a constructive method of preventing Nazi infiltration into Austria. The Lavoro Fascista noted that Mussolini was continuing his reorganizing of the countries of Central Europe around the independence of Austria. This independence, under the present given conditions and accompanied by an economic organization that would keep the country alive, meant the normalization of Austro-German relations. Diplomatic measures had failed. An appeal to the League of Nations would be worse. The solution was to be found only in firm political means utilized with tact and understanding for the German revolution. From the standpoint of Realpolitik it must be guided and directed by someone who had created a revolutionary movement
and had remained at the head of the government. "Only one single human being can find the solution: Benito Mussolini." Then followed a discussion of Signor Mussolini's economic plan for the Danube Basin. "This plan will make the solution of the problem possible if the politicians and diplomats of the two great Western Powers refrain from acting precipitously and under the more or less conscious influence of antipathy to the new regime in Germany." 7

It was at the beginning of January, 1934, that Chancellor Dollfuss called a conference at his home to inform his closest advisors that he was entering into immediate negotiations with the National Socialists. He justified this on the ground of economic necessity, 8 but at the same time let it be understood that no concessions would be made to Austrian independence and that Germany was to have no voice in the Austrian government. Hitler had been approached through intermediaries and asked to send a representative. His appointment of Habicht was an insolent affront to the Austrian government. Starhemberg reports that everyone except Fey vigorously opposed Dollfuss' proposal and that it was finally decided not to receive Habicht. 9 Habicht's plane was already over Austria before the news could be passed through diplomatic channels; so he had to be informed by wireless to return to Berlin. This episode did nothing to improve relations between the two German nations. The Austrian government announced on January 11, that 140 Nazi bomb outrages had occurred during the first week of January. 10 There had been a prisoner exchange on the first of the year at which time Alfred Frauenfeld, the Austrian National Socialist leader, was released from jail; 11 but when the bombings continued, his home was raided and he, along with other Nazi
leaders was re-arrested. Among them was Count Johann Alberti, commander of the Heimwehr of Lower Austria and one of Starhemberg's subcommanders. A Heimwehr spokesman claimed that the government was aware of Alberti's intimacy with the Nazis and that an arrest could have been carried out any time "within the past few months." They attributed the raid to Vice-Chancellor Fey who had only received command of the police a few days earlier. Alberti was immediately relieved of his command and imprisoned, but shortly thereafter he was released. The scandal, already bad considering that the Heimwehr was the chief source of Dollfuss' strength, was increased when Alberti took part in a conference of the Heimwehr leaders after his release. Count Waldeck-Pyrmont, attached to the German Legation in Vienna, had also been present at the Frauenfeld home. The Austrian government demanded and secured his immediate departure. There is little doubt that the Heimwehr and the Nazis were conducting negotiations during the first two weeks of the year. In view of Dollfuss' willingness to enter into similar negotiations, albeit with the highest authority, it would have been unusual if more susceptible elements in the government, who had had similar contacts with the Nazis several years earlier, had not been willing to do the same. Certainly there was no demonstrative opinion nor inspired example to act as the slightest deterrent. Pressure was extreme, not only from advantages extended by the Nazis and from the uncertainty engendered by acts of violence, but also from an economic standpoint. Vorarlberg, Tyrol, and Salzburg had all been hit particularly hard by the German tourist restrictions and there was considerable feeling over discontent with the government measures. On January 9, the Innsbruck Chamber of Commerce
adopted a pro-Nazi resolution declaring for Anschluss. "Our industrial and economic life is united with Germany. We have to bear the consequences of the political quarrel between the Austrian and German governments." 15

The situation was passing beyond the endurance of a sovereign state; so Dollfuss, frustrated in his attempt to negotiate directly with the Nazis, decided to handle the situation through diplomatic channels and instructed the Austrian minister in Berlin, Dr. Tauschitz, to lodge a verbal protest with the German Foreign Minister, Herr von Neurath. Tauschitz protested on January 17 against the evident support given to Austrian Nazi terrorists from German Nazi circles and asked that Germany abandon her present policy toward Austria, desist from interference in Austria's internal affairs, and pledge herself to respect Austrian independence. It was indicated that if satisfaction were not given, Austria would appeal to the League of Nations. The Austrian demands included the dissolution of the camps along the Austro-German frontier in which Austrian Nazis were being concentrated and trained; they also included the suppression of the traffic in explosives and arms from Germany to Austria which was facilitated, if not by overt acts, at least by the negligence of the German frontier authorities. 16 That same day the French Minister, speaking in the French Senate, said that "if there exists a point on which complete agreement prevails between France and Italy, it is the firm intention and will not to allow that the independence of Austria be shaken." 17 The following day in Geneva, Baron von Pfügl, Austrian delegate to the League of Nations, informed Sir John Simon, M. Paul-Boncour and M. Eduard Beneš, of Austria's intention to ask support
of this demand from the League of Nations. Baron Pompeo Aloisi of Italy, working in favor of Austria, conferred with the three foreign ministers and also with Joseph Beck of Hungary and found them favorable to an appeal under Article XI of the League Covenant. Nothing, of course, was to be done until an answer was received from Germany.

The German government was in no hurry to answer what it considered ridiculous and exaggerated charges. Fulvio Suvich, the Italian Under-Secretary of State, had ample time to visit Vienna in the interim. Mussolini's envoy arrived in the Austrian capital amid elaborate preparations and stringent precautions to prevent the slightest Nazi demonstrations. The occasion provided an excellent opportunity for the Austrian National Socialists to impress the Italian delegation with their numerical strength and vigor; but the police, gendarmerie, and Heimwehr occupied all railroad stations through which the train passed and picketed the tracks from the Italian border to Vienna every one hundred yards with a gendarmerie or Heimwehr post. Marking the arrival of Suvich, Dollfuss said that

...the largest of the neighboring countries of Austria would have at last to understand that it was perhaps a game not without risks if a great power constantly threatened a country in its independence, the importance of which in spite of its limited territory was in all quarters understood and recognized with regard to the Central European and also the whole of European peace. A state which with regard to a small neighbor practically takes up the point of view of 'Force before right' runs the risk of withdrawing from beneath its own feet the basis of legal rights with regard to other states.19

The timely presence of Suvich in Vienna could well be taken as a warning to Germany to be wary in her reply to the Austrian note. Dollfuss interpreted the visit to be indicative of the support he had long desired,
and he expressed this by his rather exaggerated speech. Before his return home, Suvich held a press conference in Vienna at which he declared Austria occupied a position of extreme importance in Central Europe, and it was necessary to assure her of an independent and untroubled existence. Italy, according to the Under-Secretary, had decided to promote Austro-Italian trade relations and to co-operate actively in the work of economic reconstruction of the Danube Basin on the line of the Italian memorandum of September, 1933. The official communiqué said little more, only pointing to the visit as a "renewed manifestation of the extremely friendly relations between the two countries." It also pointed up the necessity for continuing the policy recently initiated at Riccione between Chancellor Dollfuss and Premier Mussolini "aiming at the maintenance of Austria's independence and her economic reconstruction." 

Infinitely more important to the peace of Austria's internal politics than the expressions from a press conference or the wording of an official communiqué was a very confidential letter addressed to Dollfuss from his guest upon the latter's return to Rome. In his letter Suvich conveys to Dollfuss the impressions which he brought from Austria for the benefit of the Duce. One feels an urgency and slight coerciveness in the wording of the letter. That which Suvich told Mussolini, he is now writing to Dollfuss in order to impress upon him the accord of the Under-Secretary and his chief and the way in which they mutually view the Austrian situation. The impression is that Suvich is now telling the Austrian Chancellor personally what he could not tell him on the more formal occasion a few days earlier in Vienna. The effect produced on Suvich was that the
Austrian government, while at a critical point, was in a position to control the situation; but that its power rested before all else on the support of the army and the Heimwehr. The support of the Heimwehr was indispensable in order to give the impression of popular reaction against the Nazis and also to prevent any feeling of isolation of the army and police from public opinion, insuring their continued loyalty to the government. While he felt that Dollfuss was able to dominate the situation, Suvich was at the same time impressed by a rather wide-spread dissatisfaction with the government because of a certain inactivity and the unexpected delay (eingetretenen Verzögerung) in the work of renovation. The active elements and particularly the youthful partisans were ready to retain their trust in the government only if a greater decisiveness and precision were visible in the work which relied on plainly outlined principles: "the fight against Marxism, the reform of the constitution in an anti-parliamentary and corporative sense, the elimination of parties and the strengthening of the Fatherland Front; finally, that the moment for carrying out this more decisive work can no longer be postponed." Furthermore, in order not to disillusion the Austrian people—who saw Dollfuss as the man to clear the table of "all the rubbish of the former democratic Austria"—and cause them to turn to the Nazis, it was necessary that they see a vigorous will for renovation (einen strammen Erneuerungswillen). Only this can justify the defense against Nazi terrorism. A note of encouragement was then injected. "With these stipulations, I have told the Head of the government that I consider the cause of Austrian independence and the regime embodied by Your Excellency capable of being saved." Dollfuss is warned to play down the Nazi activities "for otherwise greater significance
may be attached to them than they deserve," thus creating an atmosphere of the "inevitable." Mussolini agreed with Suvich's exposition and authorized him to be determined in supporting Austria in her fight to maintain her independence. Dollfuss was advised to satisfy the wishes of the active and the youthful formations for they were the ones who were willing to pay with their lives and to show themselves publicly. One could not depend entirely on the middle-class people who stayed at home and who, in order to live quietly, were ready to accept any kind of new regime.

Chancellor Dollfuss was informed that Mussolini had agreed to arrange a meeting of the three states--Italy, Austria, and Hungary--in Rome just as soon as Suvich made an official visit to Budapest and after Dollfuss had carried out the course of action agreed upon at Riccione. The time had arrived for Austria to make the first advance toward Hungary, and Suvich suggested the first half of February for a visit by the Austrian Chancellor to Budapest. Italy had indicated her willingness and readiness to proceed with the orientation of a Danubian pact for the securing of the economic position of Austria just as soon as Dollfuss destroyed the Austrian Socialists, rendered the Nazis innocuous, and instituted the Fascist state of Austria. Austrian independence was guaranteed by Italy and thereby assured, but Mussolini, in his own publicly-proclaimed speech of September 13, 1933, disapproved of the dilatory manner in which Dollfuss was carrying out the Riccione agreements. To prod and goad the Chancellor into action, further implementation of a Danubian pact and consequently economic assistance was made contingent on Dollfuss himself. He answered on January 30, 23 extolling the good effect
of the visit of the Italian delegation in Austria and abroad. Of particular importance was the impression on those Austrians whose attitude towards recent events had been a wavering one. "The popular mood which has been so favourably influenced by you will not remain unexploited from our side, and the tempo of our positive activity already shows a perceptible acceleration." Dollfuss informed Suvich that he had exchanged communications with the Hungarian government and that the dates of February 7 and 8 had been set for his visit.

The Italian press originally described the Suvich visit to Vienna as a courtesy trip reciprocating the state visit of Dollfuss to Rome. However, by the end of January, the Lavoro was describing Dollfuss' stand as "courageous," and said editorially that the visit of the previous week was directly indicative of the determination of the rest of Europe to assure the independence of Austria.

Everybody knows that National Socialism in Austria is nothing more than the long arm of Germany. The day the Nazis gain power in Austria, Germany, who is their instigator, will become substantially the master of that country. That would be a decisive step toward annexation. 24

The annexation of Austria would signalize a resumption of the Drang nach Osten—the real cause of the World War. It was the firm resolution and determination of Italy to see that she did not lose the advantages she had won of not lying the shadow of a great empire. "A Reich of 75,000,000 persons, extending to the doors of the upper Adige and the shores of the Adriatic Sea cannot be permitted." The Suvich visit was now seen as a demonstration against Germany, and Italy stood firmly behind Dollfuss' government and his program of renovation. But the incident was more than
that. The fact of its coming after the delivery to the Wilhelmsstrasse of the Austrian protest would indicate a tacit support of her demands by Italy. Mussolini had now publicly established his position. France was to do so too. As his last act in the capacity of French Foreign Minister, M. Paul-Boncour issued a statement to the press expressing the conviction that Austria should appeal to the League of Nations without waiting for the German answer. He told Dr. Pfügl in Geneva that "the best thing was to have recourse to the League of Nations and that Austrian independence could best be defended there." Here was the French spokesman suggesting that Austria not bother about waiting for the considerably delayed German answer. The complaint was legitimate and the League was the place to lodge it. Austria could naturally not expect any results from such an act unless she were assured of the intentions of the Great Powers, but time was important and the Powers were evidently not opposed to the idea.

In Austria too a sense of the impending prevailed. At a January 28 meeting of the Heimwehr, Starhemberg offered to the Germans the irreducible terms for any settlement of the Austro-German question. Negotiations would have to be with Hitler himself who must in turn recognize in writing the independence of Austria and the Fascist tenor of its government. This would automatically make the Nazi party superfluous. Also Hitler was never to introduce into Austrian leadership non-Austrians. In return, Austria would support the German foreign policy, but Hitler would have nothing to say concerning Austrian domestic policy. Starhemberg's interest was not so much in preserving Austrian liberty as the establishment of a reactionary fascism under his own aegis. "We could come to an agreement
with them \[\text{Austrian National Socialists}\] if we were convinced they wanted to establish fascism in Austria. But apparently what they want is merely to establish a dictatorship of the Nazi party. We of the Heimwehr do not intend to share the fate of the \text{Stahlhelm} or of the Nationalists in Germany.\textsuperscript{26} On the same day the Socialist party committee passed a resolution declaring that party's readiness to support Chancellor Dollfuss against the Nazis and to co-operate with him in resolving the constitutional crisis but only within the scope of constitutional lines.\textsuperscript{27}

In Germany, Hitler spoke to the Reichstag emphatically rejecting any assertion of the Austrian government that an attack on the part of the Reich against the Austrian State would be undertaken or was even planned. The German government had taken no measures with regard to the action of the Austrian government against National Socialism until that action affected German citizens living in or visiting Austria. If Dollfuss considered it necessary to suppress this movement forcefully, that was his own affair, "but in that case it must take over the responsibility for the consequences of its own policy... The German Reich is always ready to hold out a hand for a real understanding with full respect for the free will of the Austrian Germans."\textsuperscript{28} Hitler then referred to the recent visit of Suvich which gave the German people their first opportunity to express their feelings for the Italian people--so similar in their political philosophy--and for their distinguished statesman--the great leader of Italian fascism whom the German people have always held in great honor. He expressed satisfaction that there had been a further strengthening of the traditional friendship, which was always cultivated by National Socialism.
Having expressed sufficient gratitude and appreciation for Italian statesmanship and the objective sense of justice and appreciation of Mussolini and his Fascist movement and philosophy, Hitler made his reply to the Austrian note. It was handed to Dr. Tauschitz by Neurath on February 1. The question, as viewed by the German government, was not a conflict between two German states, which would come under the formal idea of the law of nations as set forth by the Austrian government, but it was "a controversy of the Austrian Government with a historical movement of the whole German nation." The Austrian government was hampering National Socialism in its "legal development and free unfolding," and a political frontier cannot remove the feeling of national affinity or stop the penetration of ideas. It is inadmissible that an attitude of indifference should be expected of Germany toward a system which "suppresses and deprives of all rights that which fills the German people with new courage and hope." In the reply the German government expressed astonishment that the Austrian government suspected it of threatening the independence of Austria, for Germany entertains no ideas of "violent intervention or any infraction of obligations fixed by agreements." It was regrettable that the Austrian government found it necessary to raise such "serious reproaches" and surprising that without waiting for the results of the German investigations and simultaneously with its steps in Berlin involved other governments in this matter. The German government was of the opinion that the matter was of a purely domestic nature, not subject to international treatment, and if the Austrian government was determined to involve the League of Nations, it must be ready to assume the responsibility for such a step.29
That same night the reply was rejected by the Austrian cabinet as "unsatisfactory." "The German answer does not give any consideration to the Austrian complaints. It merely rejects the complaints point by point." The Wiener Zeitung of February 2 asserted that "Austria will now follow the path upon which she has been forced. Since right is on her side she cannot but be successful in taking it." Germany's reply amounted to an emphatic rejection of Austria's protests and forced that country either to back down completely—an action damaging to the prestige of the government and even dangerous in view of its tenuous position—or to carry out her threats of requesting League intervention in the face of rather dubious international support and questionable results. On February 2, Ambassador Rintelen, the Austrian Minister to Rome, wrote Dollfuss informing him of this conversation of the same date with Suvich. Even though the results from Germany had been negative and the question of the League was now an immediate problem, Suvich explained that he considered such a step a bad solution (Brutta Soluzione). Germany had already left the League, so the deliberations would have to be without one of the States directly concerned. Any decisions could then be met with the objection that only one side had been heard. There were drawbacks also in the matter of procedure. The process would take too long and there was always the difficulty of implementing any decision. Suvich agreed that the German government was back of the National Socialists in Austria, but he failed to offer a substitute for bringing the matter before the League of Nations. He did suggest as a tentative idea, however, that the Great Powers might make the matter a subject of discussion among themselves and come to an agreement concerning the attitude to take. Rintelin
pointed out that because of the nature of the protest in Berlin and the negative result, immediate action was necessary to avoid giving the impression of uncertainty and hesitation which would weaken the Austrian government's position with its opponents. Suvich gave absolute affirmation that the Austrian government could rely on the support of Italy under all circumstances, while at the same time requesting them to do nothing until the Italian government had had time to study the matter.

Despite the caution exercised by Italy, the Austrian cabinet chose to follow through on its pre-determined course and on February 6 authorized Dollfuss to bring the conflict before the League of Nations. Vienna submitted a complete file of its case against Germany to London, Paris, and Rome and asked for their support at Geneva. Germany had already expressed her contempt for the League; so there was little that the League could do except to warn her. The League could neither exert nor influence the Great Powers to apply force in view of their attitude. Italy was definitely rather cool since Dollfuss had so far failed to prove himself capable of establishing an absolute Fascist state in Austria. France was preoccupied with her own internal troubles resulting from the Stavisky case. England had her attention absorbed in the Disarmament Conference and dared not antagonize Germany with any show of strong disapproval. At home Dollfuss was threatened with the loss of Heimwehr support. In his Innsbruck speech of February 4, Starhemberg said: "If the Chancellor delays or speculates on our patience continuing, I can no longer keep together and behind him the forces I lead. By following such a course the Chancellor would destroy the hope of constructing a new Austria. Without the Heimwehr nothing can be done." The position of Dollfuss' government
and indeed the whole Clerico-Fascist authoritarian state was tenuous. The final step could no longer be delayed. So on February 8, Dollfuss went to Budapest for a two-day visit with President Gömbös and left Emil Fey in charge of the State.

An official government communique on February 8 described the discovery and exposure of "an unprecedented criminal plot of Bolshevik and Marxist elements" in a series of police raids on Socialist centers which culminated in the occupation of the Arbeiter Zeitung, the official organ of the Socialist party.35 The following day the Heimwehr demanded the immediate dissolution of all political parties. For the first time, but much too late to be effective, the Christian Social party members in the Vienna Diet joined with the Socialists against such dictatorial demands. Leopold Kunschak, Chairman of the Vienna Christian Socialist members and an old Socialist opponent, declared:

There is a community of purpose [Weggemeinschaft] which can prevail over the contrary opinions and heterogenous elements in common action against National Socialism...who will force upon another his opinion with brute force [Brachialgewalt] that which is useless as service to the Fatherland.... We will set an example today by our conduct and vote shoulder to shoulder with those [referring to the Socialist deputies] from whom otherwise a world separates us.35

Both the leader of the Social Democratic faction, Dr. Danneberg, and Mayor Seitz of Vienna cheered the words of the Christian Socialist leader. There was also a glimmer of some strengthening of foreign support, especially in France. The new French government under Gaston Doumergue set up a four-man directorate headed by the Premier, the purpose of which was "to handle foreign affairs swiftly and vigorously and strike hard against the possibility of a German union with Austria." Other members of this
directorate were André Tardieu, Edouard Herriot, and Louis Barthou. Their intention was to seek an agreement with Mussolini and the Little Entente for strong support for Dollfuss and for a general solution of the Central European situation. But before anything could be done, the words of Vice-Chancellor Fey rang out before the Vienna Heimatschutz:

"Wir werden Morgen an die Arbeit gehen und wir werden ganze Arbeit Leisten!"  

"Tomorrow" was February 12, 1934. When the police and Heimwehr auxiliaries raided the Social Democratic headquarters in Linz on that day, the Socialists resisted with firearms. This touched off the February revolt which ended in the total destruction of the Social Democratic party and the dispersion of its leadership. When the news reached Vienna, the trade union leaders held a meeting and decided that the time had come for Social Democracy to make its stand against the Heimwehr and the Fascist-oriented government. A general strike was called throughout Austria. The government retaliated by outlawing the Socialist party, declaring martial law, and ordering any civilian found in possession of firearms to be court-martialed and shot at once. By the evening of February 13 there was fighting in many parts of the country, but during the revolt the National Socialists remained inactive, taking sides with neither party. They were clearly aware that regardless of the final result, they would be the ultimate winners. It took only some forty-eight hours for the government forces to regain control of the situation, leaving only the mopping-up exercises. The attack was a deliberate provocation by the government on the Socialists to furnish an excuse for their elimination. Neither the safety of the state nor of the
government was actively menaced by the Socialists, but their destruction was necessary to retain the support of the Heimwehr and of the Italian government. This support was badly needed when both the National Socialists and the Socialists were in opposition. Mussolini was not willing to tolerate Socialism in a state to which he offered Italian aid. As he had suggested, may demanded, National Socialism, a revolutionary movement from the right, was countered by the Clerico-Fascist coalition, a conservative governing minority, by waging ruthless war against the already innocuously-rendered left represented by Social Democracy.

The difficulties of the Austrian situation were recognized by the powers, and their reaction was immediate and vigorous. A spirit of jubilation prevailed in Germany. The Völkischer Beobachter, Nazi party organ, said:

There is only one possibility of putting an immediate end to the chaos in Austria--the turning out of the Dollfuss regime and the restoring to the Austrian people of the right to determine their own fate. For pacifying that country there is no need of extremely questionable international aid through the League of Nations--help rests only with the Austrian people....

The Austrian National Socialists, whose power is unassailably anchored in the German people of Austria, know with equal certainty their hour is at hand, as they know Dollfuss' hour has struck.40

Adolf Hitler expressed the conviction to Ward Price in an interview on February 16 that it was his personal and private view that the Austrian workers would "rally to the National Socialist cause, as a natural reaction against the methods of violence that the Austrian Government has exercised on them,"41 and Habicht broadcast from Munich an offer to the Austrian government of an eight-day armistice during which time no party member--
under pain of expulsion—would attack the government in any way. The idea was to give the government time to decide whether or not it was prepared to join with the National Socialist movement in view of the recent catastrophe and of the terrible prospects for the future; otherwise "the fight will be resumed with all vigor...." Le Temps prophesied "a profound repercussion on the international situation" and suggested that Dollfuss wait until the situation was calmer before taking the Austrian question before an international rostrum. "The Austrian question today appears even more difficult than yesterday and demands the greatest vigilance from the governments at Rome, Paris, and London." Italy's reaction was the most violent and went considerably beyond a mere reiteration of old declarations about the sovereignty of Austria and the sanctity of her independence. The Giornale d'Italia published on February 14 under a Paris dateline reports of Italian troop movements near the Austro-Italian frontier but added in a footnote that the reports were unconfirmed. It was specified that the movement was made in pursuance of a plan adopted by the general staff of the Italian army a number of months earlier, and that the concentrations were at Bolzano, Padua, and Trieste. Bolzano troops could penetrate Austria through the Brenner and San Candido passes. Udine, just north of Padua, was headquarters of a light division—highly motorized and very mobile—which controlled Tarvisio Pass. Trieste was within striking distance of the Piedicolle Pass. Both the New York Times and Christian Science Monitor reported a massing of approximately 75,000 troops at strategic frontier towns. Mussolini proposed that England, France, and Italy issue a three-power warning that Germany must not meddle with Austria. Exchanges between the three governments resulted in the view
that it was less practical to attempt a formulation of a three-power guarantee of Austria's independence than to offer a simple reaffirmation of existing treaty obligations. The British were opposed to any new commitment, especially among the three powers, which might be open to the interpretation that the pact was directed against a fourth power and thus defeat its own object as had happened with the abortive Four-Power Pact. On February 17, the Three Powers issued a joint declaration stressing their agreement on the necessity for preserving the independence of Austria. Sir John Simon read the text in the House of Commons stating: "The conversations which have taken place between the three Governments on this subject [the Austrian dossier] have shown they take a common view as to the necessity of maintaining Austria's independence and integrity in accordance with the relevant treaties."45 The statement was not directed to Germany, but it was based on the Austrian complaint. Foreign Minister Barthou gave an account of the conversations on the Austrian situation to the Chamber of Deputies' Foreign Affairs Commission in which he said that France opposed a restoration of the Habsburgs in accord with Great Britain, the Little Entente, and Balkan countries but that French policy remained the same—to safeguard the peace treaties, maintain the independence of Austria and settle the Austrian problem on an international plane, not as an internal problem, as Germany was trying to do.46 In Italy matters were at a white-hot temper. The National Socialist group at Trieste was dissolved and the Italian papers unleashed an attack on Germany for the first time since Hitler became Chancellor. Deputy Ezio Garibaldi, speaking in the Chamber, believed that a satisfactory solution of the Austro-German question could be found
if there were a reunion of the nations adhering to the Four-Power Pact; but he emphasized that regardless "Austria's independence will be guarded, and Germany will be recalled to the language of reason. If the German threats against Austria continue much longer, one must despair of the possibility of a tranquil future." While the National Socialist propaganda in Austria did not entirely cease, the "incidents" became fewer for the rest of February and during March and April. February 28 came and went and there was no noticeable resumption of the terroristic acts; so it was assumed that Habicht's truce was either bluff or, what is more likely, was checked by Hitler. The success of the bloody days of February 12 through 15 can with little difficulty be assessed. The way for the introduction of the new constitution was open as there was no longer any parliamentary opposition by the Socialists. The leadership of the Vienna municipality, which up until this time was the undisputed domain of the Social Democrats, was taken over by the Christian Social deputies and their leader Richard Schmitz. But the success for Dollfuss was bought so dearly that two-fifths of the Austrian population opposed the coming events without taking part in them and many of the fighters for an "independent" Austria under the Third Reich came from the ranks which stood on the other side of the barricades in February, 1934. With the elimination of the so-called Austrian Marxists, Mussolini was ready to secure Austria to a South-Central European bloc. He had initiated the idea of the systemization of the Danubian countries in a letter to Dollfuss dated at Rome on July 1, 1933. At that time the most urgent line appeared to the Duce to be a closer accord between Austria and
Hungary. He outlined a policy of political and economic co-operation through a formal agreement by which both governments would follow a common policy. Presupposing this accord to be under the auspices and active help of Italy, both countries could then enter into negotiations with other countries, especially with the countries of the Little Entente, without fear of excessive economic pressure or the appearance of sub-ordination of policy to politically stronger states, and also with Germany "since they (Austria and Hungary), thanks to their very close association with Italy, escape any danger of open or concealed absorption." A system of treaties could by this means be created. Mussolini indicated that he himself would probably take the initiative with regard to the broader developments, which could come only after an absolute and complete agreement between the three governments existed.

In July, 1933, President Gömbös paid a visit to Vienna, at the invitation of Dollfuss. Reference is made to this in Dollfuss' letter to Mussolini of July 22, 1933. Gömbös had only recently made a trip to Berlin; and now, according to Dollfuss, his appearance in Vienna had "fully clarified the situation." Naturally both countries agreed to maintain friendship with Italy, and in addition they recognized "the unqualified necessity for the closest possible co-operation between Austria and Hungary in the economic sphere...." It was precisely with respect to economic policy that the two countries fully agreed that they must continue to develop and to broaden their commercial relations. The Riccione meeting of August, 1933, revived the idea of a tripartite meeting in the proposals presented to Dollfuss. Suggested for his September speech had been a recognition of Austria's particular relations with
Hungary and Italy and the announcement of the possibility of a meeting between Italy, Austria, and Hungary which would have the purpose of coordinating all spheres of activity and bringing the three states into closer relations. Suvich informed Dollfuss at the end of January that Mussolini had agreed to arrange a meeting of the three states and suggested that Austria make the first advance toward Hungary. Contingent on the implementation by Dollfuss of the Riccione agreements was this Danubian pact and the resultant economic assistance. This was accomplished by Fey while the Chancellor was in Budapest; and so the Rome Protocols were signed in March, 1934, and Dollfuss tied his regime and the independence of Austria even more closely to Italy.

Austria, Hungary, and Italy participated in the signing on March 17, 1934. The first Protocol stipulated that the three countries would confer together on problems of a general character and also those of particular concern to them with a view to pursuing, in a spirit of friendship, a concordant policy for the promotion of effective cooperation between themselves and between the states of Europe. Joint consultations were to be held whenever one of the three governments deemed it necessary. The second Protocol concerned the development of economic relations with Rome and obligated them to facilitate reciprocal exports, remedy the difficulties of Hungary resulting from the fall of wheat prices, develop transit trade through the Adriatic ports, and establish a permanent commission of experts to make concrete proposals for the development of their mutual trade.

The third Protocol, limited to Austria and Italy only, recognized the complementary economic systems of the two countries and agreed to an
extension of the existing economic agreements. It called for the establishment of preferential treatment of products, the granting of customs privileges, and the expedition and facilitation of the conclusion of industrial agreements. Kurt Schuschnigg, shortly to become chancellor and the leader who was to see the Protocols implemented, felt that they embodied one idea: "the desire for co-operation without any effort to form a coalition or any aim directed at outside parties. It was a fact, established and repeatedly emphasized, that other states might have the right to participate." The Protocols are primarily of an economic nature, but the first Protocol certainly implies political considerations. The Reichspost saw the fate of the new order as dependent on the effect the agreement would have on the "most closely interested non-signers, the Little Entente and Germany." It also declared that Mussolini was the first of all European statesmen to draw new consequences from old truths, but that it was not enough to affirm Austrian independence; she must receive an opportunity to live and to do business under her own power. The Wiener Zeitung claimed:

The negotiations of Rome brought more than was expected, not only for Austria, Hungary, and Italy but for all Europe. They represented the first great attempt at a positive struggle with the necessity of the times, an epochal fact that certainly will have the greatest effect on all the world.

Speaking of Italy's international relations in an address before the Quinquennial Assembly of the Fascist party in Rome, Mussolini said that Italy had consistently followed a policy of friendship for Austria aimed at safeguarding her integrity and independence. This policy he proposed to continue. "Austria may be assured she can count on Italy at all times,
No effort will be spared by Italy to assist her."57 The Rome Protocols gave a semblance at least of political stability in Europe until the summer of 1936 and saved Austria from catastrophe in the July revolt. Italy was the only great power, other than Germany, which bordered on Austria and was therefore geographically able to render to Austria immediate help in the event of serious trouble. For Italy, Austria formed politically the land-bridge with Hungary, long united with Italy. So in the Rome Protocols Austria was not only a receiver but also a giver. Furthermore the two countries complemented each other economically. Austria could supply Italy with iron and timber, and Italian ports were Austria's closest way to the sea. This reciprocity had to be made, however at the expense of Yugoslavia's mines and forests and Germany's northern ports. The Italian orientation was a natural one and was directed both by economic and political considerations. The decisive influence in Dollfuss' choice to rely chiefly upon Italy was undoubtedly the Heimwehr to which he compromised himself when he formed his first cabinet. After the February revolt, the government of Dollfuss was no longer possible without the Heimwehr; and, on April 15, an agreement was reached between Dollfuss and Starhemberg for uniting all Fascist military formations under the leadership of Dollfuss with Starhemberg as deputy.58

On July 19, 1933, the Governor of Tyrol, Dr. Otto Ender, had been called into the government with the commission to work out a new constitution.59 After the instructions of Chancellor Dollfuss, the social Encyclical of Pope Pius XI "Quadragesimo Anno" was to serve as the principal intellectual foundation for the social construction.60
The Constitution of Chancellor Dollfuss was a genuine revolutionary Constitution which reconciled a completely new system with the Austrian traditions. It was an attempt in a time of extremes to travel the middle road. It sought to do away with the difficulties of the time for the accommodation of the small states by placing men in the natural association of occupations, the neighborly community, the home...and at the same time by offering help to the qualified worker in his difficult battle for existence.61

The Ender constitution as such never actually came into operation.

One of the avowed aims of the Dollfuss' "renovation" program was the elimination of the "state of parties." Previous steps in this direction had been taken with the proscription of the Communist party in May, 1933, the prohibition of the National Socialist activities in June, and the dissolution of the Heimathloc in September of the same year.

February, 1934, saw the prohibition of the Socialist party and the invalidation of its mandates on the twelfth and sixteenth of that month. The Christian Social party was gradually shoved into the background and then pushed out altogether. In June, 1933, Dollfuss had introduced "a new and significant idea" into the constitution. The class struggle must be eliminated. Employers and workers were to be united "from the bottom up," which would involve a complete reorganization of the chambers of labor. This is in direct conformity with the Encyclical which reads:

...the State and every good citizen ought to look to and strive toward this end: that the conflict between the hostile classes be abolished and harmonious co-operation of the Industries and Professions be encouraged and promoted.62

And in another paragraph:

But complete cure will not come until this opposition between classes with divergent aims has been abolished, and well-ordered members of the social body--Industries and Professions--are constituted in which men may
have their place, not according to the position each has in the labor market but according to the respective social functions which each performs.  

Dollfuss proclaimed before the Catholic Congress on September 9 that "we have the ambition to be the first country" to put into effect the principles of "Quadragesimo Anno." Dr. Loebell, former savings commissar, in an address published in the Reichspost toward the close of January said that the great turning point in the plans came in November, 1933, and from Italy where ten years experience had demonstrated that corporate chambers and a parliament could not persist side by side. If the estates were to function correctly this meant all branches of legislation would gradually be absorbed by them. Implicit in this was the disappearance of the Nationalrat. On February 8, Dollfuss told representatives of the press in Budapest:

We are at present intensively engaged with the formulation of the new constitution, although temporarily only in an intimate circle. When we become completely clear among ourselves concerning the form which the Austrian state will have for the future years and decades, we shall have accomplished the transformation from a transitional constitution into a final constitution.

The Dollfuss cabinet persistently claimed that it was operating under the Constitution of 1920 which required a "referendum of the entire people" for a complete revision of the constitution and a majority vote of the Nationalrat for the enactment of constitutional laws or provision. In order to maintain the principle of legal continuity this procedure would have to be conformed to. According to Winkler, Dollfuss was also under pressure from the Western Democracies to submit the matter to parliament; and the concordat with the Papal State had been pending since June 5, 1933,
"because Rome laid particular stress on approval by the constitutional parliament."\(^67\) The new Austrian constitution was published on April 24 on the basis of the War Economy Authorization Law of 1917.\(^68\) The Nationalrat was summoned once again to a meeting on April 30 to pass a resolution on the constitution and to ratify the concordat as well as the 471 decrees which the government had issued since March 5, 1933.\(^69\) The mandates of the Social Democrats had been set aside after the February events and most of the Grossdeutsch and Landbund deputies stayed away from the session; so of the original 165 members of the Nationalrat only seventy-six votes were cast: sixty-six Christian Social, six Heimwehr and two Landbund for and two Grossdeutsch against the government and the new constitution.\(^70\) The bill was of a most comprehensive character. Article 1 annulled Article 44, Section 2, and Article 50 of the existing constitution, thereby doing away with the necessity of submitting a complete revision of the constitution to a national referendum and with the necessity of submitting all political treaties, and other treaties so far as they altered existing laws, to the Nationalrat for approval. The second article of the empowering bill declared the constitution issued that morning to be a "federal constitutional law, also in the sense of the federal constitution valid at present," and authorized the cabinet to proclaim it as the "constitution of 1934." Article 3 dissolved the Nationalrat and Bundesrat and transferred all their powers, including those of their committees and organs, to the cabinet in the most sweeping and all-embracing language. It also authorized the cabinet to carry out certain transitional measures envisaged in Article 182 of the new constitution.\(^71\)

Simultaneously with the introduction of the new constitution came a
reorganization within the government. Emil Fey was "demoted" from the office of Vice-Chancellor and given the Ministry of Public Security—a key position. The existing "Doppelgespinn" between Dollfuss and Starhemberg remained; but as the new Vice-Chancellor, Starhemberg now became a member of the cabinet as well as the leader of the Heimwehr. In addition he represented the Federal Chancellor in the Fatherland Front, which on the grounds of a constitutional law had been raised to the status of an official state party.72 There was a further revamping of the cabinet on July 11. In this cabinet shuffle Fey was ousted altogether and given the high-sounding title of "Special Commissar for Emergency Measures for the Defence of the State against Its Enemies." Dollfuss concentrated even more power in his hands by taking over the Ministry of Public Security. Dr. Stephen Tauschitz was named Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and his Berlin spot was left vacant because of the tense relations between the two countries.73

The coming into force of the constitution and the reorganization of the government did not, however, bring any relief to the country. The attacks of the National Socialists increased to a measure unknown up to now.74 The use of violence became so frequent and reached such serious proportions that the government doubled the number of gendarmes and recruited four thousand Heimwehr Fascists for the purpose of meeting the emergency.75 The Hitler-Mussolini meeting in Venice was scheduled for June, and there was fear that Hitler would be able to persuade Mussolini of the spontaneous outbreak by the Austrians as an expression of their indignation at the Dollfuss government. The New York Times reported that Dollfuss even delayed his departure for Budapest long enough to prepare a
memorandum for Mussolini to the effect that the campaign was being
directed, financed, and furnished with munitions from across the border. Messersmith recalls that these outrages diminished "markedly" during the Venice meeting and that this "was considered by me and by the Austrian authorities and by all observers at that time as an open admission on the part of Hitler and the German government that the outrages were systematically and completely instigated and controlled from Germany."

Actually it is not unreasonable to assume that the campaign was started to furnish Hitler with bargaining power in the forthcoming talks.

It was Papen who first suggested to Mussolini that the time was propitious to invite Hitler for a visit. The two could then discuss in a friendly manner the problems of Europe. Papen felt certain that Mussolini would be a strong influence on the man who was too "unaccustomed to the international dress circle [Parketta]." The invitation was issued and accepted, and Hitler arrived in Italy on June 14. This was the Führer's first excursion into diplomacy at the top level, and it had a completely negative effect. Papen ascribed the failure in part to Hitler's inferiority complex. He was told by an eye-witness that both men continually spoke at cross purposes to one another and that Hitler's "uninterrupted tirade" (Redestrom) had made every discussion impossible. "The meeting with Mussolini did not have the least influence in changing the National Socialist's Austrian policy at the end of which, four weeks later, stood the death of Dollfuss." François-Poncet bears out Papen's contention that the expected results were not produced, for while "the Führer was filled with admiration and respect for the Duce; he was deeply hurt by Mussolini's airy and patronizing manner." Starhemberg was told by
Suvich that Mussolini was "much amused," and that Hitler had called him "questo polichinello." The two men had their tête-à-tête on the Alberoni golf course in Venice. They spoke alone without the services of an interpreter, and it is uncertain what was said. The wildest rumors were circulated. One had it that Anschluss had been discarded but in return Italy would not object to the election of a Nazi as Chancellor of Austria. Another was that Austria's independence was conceded in return for Italian help in enabling Germany to return to the League of Nations without embarrassment. The Giornale d'Italia revealed in an authoritative article that during the course of conversations a "gentlemen's agreement" had been arrived at in which Hitler agreed to call a halt to the campaign of terror in Austria and not to question the independence of that country. The communiqué issued by the two leaders on June 15 said that they had examined "in a spirit of cordial collaboration" problems of a general nature and those problems which are of a direct interest between the two countries. In a speech at Venice, Mussolini gave assurances to the world that they had not met to remake the map of Europe or to add any new reasons for anxiety to those already existing, but to

...dispel the clouds which obscure the political horizon of Europe. Let it be said again that the conscience of Europe is faced with a terrible alternative. Either Europe can show herself capable of achieving a minimum of political understanding, of economic collaboration, and of social comprehension, or her doom is irrevocably sealed.

While Hitler may have agreed to the recognition of Austria's independence and the advisability of maintaining peaceful relations with her, this action can hardly be called a victory, for official Germany had consistently repudiated any idea of Anschluss. It is certain, however,
that Austria was considered, and that the meeting had a decisive influence on the domestic situation in Austria. Regardless of what actually took place, the Nazis in Vienna believed that Hitler had dictated terms to Mussolini, that Rintelen would shortly replace Dollfuss, and that the Italian Legation in Vienna had changed its attitude. Rintelen arrived in Vienna on July 23; therefore, he was on hand when the revolt took place.

While in Budapest, Starhemberg was warned by Gömbös of an imminent putsch in Austria and against Fey. As early as June 2, the Austrian government had sent a directive concerning a plan of action of the National Socialists to all of the Austrian directors of Public Safety. In it was the information from "absolutely trustworthy sources," that an important action of the N.S.D.A.P. was impending and should be taken seriously. That Gömbös was in receipt of information concerning activities of the Austrian N.S.D.A.P. is not surprising, for this same directive said that "the threads from outside no longer run straight from Germany to Austria, but via Budapest to Vienna and from Laibach [Ljubljana] to Marburg, Graz and Villach." Then again on June 21, the public safety director for Upper Austria wrote to all the heads of offices in all Upper Austria District Captaincies even giving them the middle of July as an approximate date for the climax of the National Socialist action and the information that high premiums had been promised for attempts on the life of the Chancellor, of the Vice-Chancellor, and of Major Lahr. So the government was not totally unaware of danger, but the Vice-Chancellor relates that Dollfuss was reluctant to take drastic action when told of it. The Chancellor was planning a "great political purge" in August which would
settle all of these problems, but he needed Mussolini's help for his "decisive political and economic coup." It was planned that Dollfuss would go on a vacation to Riccione in July. Meanwhile there was a cabinet reorganization. Fay was relieved of the Ministry of Public Security and Karwinsky appointed in his place. Berger-Waldenegg took over the Ministry of Justice from Schuschnigg. On July 15, Starhemberg left for a vacation on the Lido in order to report on the situation in Austria following the cabinet reorganization. Frau Dollfuss and her two children also arrived in Italy as the guests of Mussolini. Her husband was to join them in Rimini on July 25. Whatever tranquility may have been restored to Austria by the June talks of Hitler and Mussolini collapsed when an editorial in the Giornale d'Italia of July 20 said that relations between Italy and Germany were becoming increasingly cool because "Germany still backs terroristic activities. It is now evident that Germany is still on the ground floor in Austrian terrorism. It is enough to read her newspapers and to consider that the terroristic organization has head- quarters well-established to be on German territory."

François-Poncet writes of "strange rumors" spreading in Berlin on July 24. The rumors became so persistent by that evening that the French ambassador felt he should warn Paris by telephone. On the afternoon of the twenty-fifth, special editions of the Berlin papers announced a revolt. That day Chancellor Dollfuss was shot and killed in the Vienna Chancellery. About 1,444 National Socialists forced their way into the building, imprisoned several members of the cabinet who were meeting there, shot the Chancellor, whereupon he bled to death. At about the same time, eight National Socialists made their way into the Austrian Broadcasting
Company, killed a policeman and a director of the company, and broadcast the statement that the Dollfuss government had fallen and that Dr. Anton Rintelen, then Minister to Rome, was the new Chancellor. The alarm was given after this one message was sent, and the invaders were finally marched off by the police. In the Chancellery, the National Socialists apparently did not know what to do next; the place was soon surrounded by police and Heimwehr men. Dr. Rintelen failed to appear on the scene. The remainder of the cabinet, who had assembled in the Ministry of National Defense, received orders from President Miklas not to recognize the insurgents. The latter then forced Major Fey to act as an intermediary. Owing to the necessity of saving the lives of those imprisoned, whom the insurgents threatened with death if the building were attacked, the cabinet authorized Odo Neustädter-Stürmer to offer the insurgents safe-conduct to the German border, which they had requested, "provided the three cabinet ministers were handed over unharmed." The offer was made publicly at 6 p.m., Neustädter-Stürmer standing in the street below and Fey guarded by two insurgents with revolvers on the balcony of the Ballhaus. The German Minister, Dr. Karl Heinrich Rieth, was asked by telephone to witness the agreement. As a result of the negotiations, the prisoners were released about 7 p.m. and, when it was discovered that Dollfuss had been killed, the safe-conduct was revoked and the rebels were arrested for trial under Austrian law. Martial law was proclaimed in Vienna, and the sporadic and ill-concerted National Socialist uprisings in the provinces were quickly suppressed. A broadcast by Major Fey and Dr. Schuschnigg on the night of July 25 announced the death of Dollfuss to the country and stated that Schuschnigg had accepted the task of forming a new government.
At nine o'clock that evening in Berlin, the official news agency D.N.B.* published a dispatch: "The German conscience...had at last expressed itself; a people whose most legitimate aspirations a small clique had vainly attempted to stifle had now arisen; Austria had freed herself and was entering the road that led to a common fatherland." By the twenty-sixth all trace of this dispatch had vanished. When Hitler, who was attending the Bayreuth festival, heard the news he immediately canceled the safe-conduct granted the insurgents and recalled Rieth who had intervened in favor of them without first consulting Berlin and without realizing the compromising nature of his intervention nor the avowel it represented. The official announcement, published in the Völkischer Beobachter, stated that the agreements between the rebels and the Austrian officials with respect to the entry of the participants in the revolt into Germany were without interest for Germany and did not represent any legal obligation for the government and that it had therefore issued an order that such persons be arrested immediately upon crossing the frontier.\textsuperscript{95} The roads across the Austro-German frontier were closed; the Austrian Legion forbidden to leave camp; and Habicht, who was responsible for the news passed on by the Munich wireless, was dismissed from his post as Provincial "Inspecteur."

Gabriele Preziosi, the Italian Minister in Vienna, was on leave when the revolt occurred; so it was Eugenio Morreale, the Legation Press Attaché and contact man between Mussolini and Starhemberg, who kept both Rome and Starhemberg informed about developments. He even persuaded his Heimwehr

*Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro
friends to occupy some key-points, thus reserving the telephone wires for Austrian official use and the use of the French, British, and Italian Legations. The German Legation was cut off. The Italian divisions around Padua were ordered by Mussolini to be in instant readiness to move across the frontier. All leaves were canceled and each unit was instructed to keep itself at full strength and with all its mechanical war gear in order. Mussolini left Riccione immediately for Rome, leaving Frau Dollfuss in the care of his wife. Just before leaving he sent a telegram to Starhemberg which amounted to a definite pledge committing himself to take whatever action was necessary to prevent Germany from stepping into Austria. In thinly veiled language he pointed to Germany as the instigator of the event. "The independence of Austria...is a principle that has been defended and will be defended by Italy even more strenuously in these exceptionally difficult times...the civilized world---has already smitten with its condemnation the direct and distant instigators." Mussolini was determined to safeguard Austrian independence, and Hitler realized that he would be faced by Italian troops if he attempted to utilize the situation created by the putsch to seize Austria. "Italy is in the first line of defense for the peace of Europe," said a Popolo di Roma editorial. "It is difficult, if not impossible, to deny that Germany has had a grave responsibility in that which has occurred in Austria." At Ostia, where Starhemberg met Mussolini a short time later, the Duce told him privately that little doubt remained concerning the connection of the National Socialist government and Hitler with the murder of Dollfuss. He defended fascism against national socialism—even though both were
authoritarian systems—for fascism was rooted in the great cultural traditions of Italy and recognized the right of the individual, religion, and the family. The Nazi form of fascism was "savage barbarism." Mussolini saw that perhaps some good would come from Dollfuss' death, that perhaps the other powers would now recognize the German danger and form a coalition against Germany. "I cannot always be the only one to march to the Brenner. Others must show some interest in Austria and the Danube Basin." Mussolini saw more clearly than most leaders of the time that Hitler would rearm and then embark on a war of aggression. He also knew that Italy could not stand up to Germany alone and gave expression to this warning.

France and England also gave reassurance to Austria. Premier Doumergue sent a telegram to Schuschnigg offering condolences and stating that "France, firmly attached to the maintenance of that independence [Austrian], associates herself with Austria's mourning"; and Sir John Simon said in the House of Commons that the attitude of the British government "as to the independence and integrity of Austria, in accordance with relevant treaties," had been established by him in a declaration of February, 1934, and remained unchanged despite the current events in Austria.

The effect of the putsch was a complete catastrophe in the National Socialist camp. Dr. Artur Seyss-Inquart, leader of the "national" group of Pan-Germany, felt that the position of those working toward an evolutionary Anschluss had been seriously compromised by the Nazis in their impatience. Dr. Friedrich Rainer, in the opposite camp of Pan-Germans, said that "the decision for the July rising was right, and the
execution of it was faulty." Consequently the National Socialist organization in Austria was completely destroyed. Party leaders and party members were imprisoned or forced to flee to Germany. With the telegram to Papen, the Führer had liquidated the first stage of the battle, and a new method of political penetration was to begin.¹⁰⁴

Within Germany there was a similar effect. The Austrian events seriously disturbed the Foreign Office because they did much to discredit Germany in the eyes of the world. Paul Schmidt writes that it was common knowledge that the putsch had been engineered by the party and that, by following so closely upon the purge of June, could not help but suggest a similarity in method in both foreign and domestic policy.¹⁰⁵ Göring claims that Hitler was led by Habicht to believe that the Austrian army was preparing to undertake independent action against the Dollfuss' government in order to force it to accept Anschluss or, if this were not possible, to overthrow it.¹⁰⁶ If the National Socialist party in Austria were going to support the army, then Hitler felt that it should have the political support of the German party. As it turned out, the revolt was not spearheaded by the army but by a so-called Wehrmacht Standarte made up of former and released or discharged members of the army who had gone over to the party. From a political standpoint, Hitler probably regretted the Dollfuss incident very much, for the National Socialists were placed in a serious situation, with particular regard to Italy. It was an "absurd situation" in which the purely German Austria was "not most strongly influenced in governmental matters by the German Reich but by the Italian government." "After the action against Dollfuss, Italy assumed a very aloof attitude toward
Germany and made it clear that Italy would be the country which would do everything to prevent the Anschluss. Hitler needed and wanted an appeasement which would be quick and sweeping in its effect. For this reason he called on Papen to go on a special mission to Vienna to take over this important task. Before accepting the post, Papen demanded the complete elimination of the German National Socialist party from Austrian internal improvement and the immediate removal of Habicht, to which Hitler acceded; and on July 26 Habicht arrived by plane in Beyreuth and was removed of all his duties in the presence of Papen.

Papen says that he could follow no other course than that of historical evolution, for the "historically necessary union" could succeed only if that policy were pursued:

An evolutionary coalescence \( \text{[Zusammenwachsen]} \) only will be able to strengthen Germany's position and her mission in Central Europe as a bulwark against eastern aspirations. Much too much German blood has been spilt in this century in the domestic battle of the German race. A union...can only be reached in a peaceful, friendly way, and it will be my endeavor to withdraw the solution of the German question more and more from the intervention of the foreign powers. For it is a domestic German problem which allows no interference from a foreign power. Deciding alone is the wish and the intention of our two countries. The best way to convince the Great Powers of the right of our conception would be to prove that Germany has no aggressive intentions and only wants to serve the interests of European peace. Our official foreign policy must be built on this denominator. The treatment of the German-Austrian question will take from here on a measured-look for our future.

The attitude of the temporary Austrian government was made plain by Acting-Chancellor Starhemberg in a statement issued to the Associated Press on July 29. "Austria, convinced of her European mission to serve true German culture, will fight to her last breath for her unrestricted liberty and independence and for her future." Paradoxically the failure
of this coup d'état brought about a superficial improvement in the strained relations between the two governments. "The documentary proof," writes Schuschnigg later, "that everything undertaken in Austria by the Austrian Nazis...had been organized, financed, and abetted by the central party headquarters in Munich, and the blunders that these headquarters had committed in connection with the Dollfuss assassination...forced Hitler to order a radical change in his policy toward Austria."¹¹²

Five days after the death of Dollfuss, Dr. Kurt von Schuschnigg, Christian Socialist and former associate of Monsignor Ignaz Seipel and Chancellor Dollfuss, was made Chancellor. He took over the portfolios of Defense, Justice, and Education, while Prince von Starhemberg became Vice-Chancellor and Minister of Public Security. Actually the two divided the Dollfuss inheritance. Starhemberg became leader of the Fatherland Front with Schuschnigg as his second in command but remained Vice-Chancellor, as Schuschnigg's second in federal administration. Guido Zernatto, Secretary of the Fatherland Front, commented that through this arrangement a "double government was organized that could not exist permanently."¹¹³ Major Fey became Minister of the Interior and Special Commissar for Security. Baron Egon Berger-Waldenegg was made Minister for Foreign Affairs, Friedrich Stockinger, Minister of Commerce, Dr. Karl Buresch, Minister of Finance, and Baron Neustädter-Stürmer, Minister of Social Welfare.¹¹⁴ The Austrian Minister Tauschitz returned to the Austrian Legation in Berlin and was received on August 3.¹¹⁵

It seemed at last that Hitler was going to intervene in the policies of the Austrian National Socialist party. He had repudiated the putschists, dismissed Habicht, and granted his personal emissary to Vienna concessions
which amounted almost to a confession of guilt. The conception of the problem was to receive an entirely different formulation. So too the new government entering the Ballhausplatz was willing to meet this reorientation in German policy with the revival of an old policy—that of appeasement. Italian support had not failed; rather it had proved itself determined to defend its commitments in the face of any opposition, alone if necessary. The position of the German Reich was unique in its weakness of foreign policy. Rearrangement was still in its beginning, the Rhineland had not yet been occupied, French foreign policy was motivated by the strongest distrust of Germany, and the Italian army stood on the Brenner. On the situation between Germany and Austria, European public opinion stood stronger at that time than seldom before and never afterward on the side of Austria.
CHAPTER IV

THE STRESA FRONT

The new Chancellor of Austria, Kurt von Schuschnigg, was decidedly Pan-German, and his political work was decisively affected by this fact. He realized the historic mission of Austria as a German state in the fostering of German culture and in the preservation of the traditions and inheritance of Austria's past. He drew the line—"so far and no farther," was a phrase he used in February, 1938—and refused to go to the extreme of political union with Nazi Germany. Schuschnigg's Pan-Germanism was based on a belief in the Greater Germany, possibly modeled on the Holy Roman Empire, in which Austria was a component, but politically independent, part. He was more independent and temperamentally less predisposed toward fascism than Dollfuss had been, and, if anything, he inclined to a nostalgic affection for the Habsburgs.

Wrote Starhemberg of his political rival:

With his Pan-German tendencies he regarded the fight against the Nazis as a fratricidal war, and frequently said so to me. The ardent desire to end such a war as quickly as possible influenced him to a greater degree than was politically wise, for it resulted in mistaken attempts to arrive at compromises, instead of aiming at the final defeat of National Socialism.¹

Schuschnigg himself characterized his political conception as having as its end "die unversehrte Erhaltung Österreichs und die Abschirmung des Nazismus" which stood in indissoluble opposition to it.² National Socialism in itself was not dangerous. The danger lay in its connection with the Reich Germans like a marionette. The danger did not stem from
Frauenfeld or Habicht or Leopold or from any of that group, but from Hitler. For he alone could make the decisions. Consequently a way had to be found to bind Hitler. The detachment of Austrian National Socialism from the immediate leadership of the Reich Germans and the exclusion of German influence from Austrian domestic politics remained the end to be attained. Schuschnigg was convinced that Austria could no longer endure a civil war or even latent unrest. The international position of Austria at this time was not unfavorable, and a genuine guarantee of Austrian independence by the Western Powers appeared still to be attainable. So Schuschnigg, according to himself and to his Vice-Chancellor, held to the course chartered by Dollfuss; that is, "...the preservation and the independence of a free Austrian Fatherland; the achievement of the corporative structure; and the establishment of the constitution."  

In the matter of foreign policy, Schuschnigg saw the position of Austria conditioned by the possibilities open to the smaller states and more especially by the cultural and geopolitical conditions of the country. He envisioned, therefore, three possibilities for Austria: neutrality as laid down by international law, combination in a bloc of powers including a more or less close alliance, and finally the rejection of any unilateral bond but rather "compacts of friendliness." He determined to guide Austria into the third way, because it pre-eminently gave her "the best guarantee of the peaceful accomplishment of those tasks which are laid upon Austria as her meaning and mission." This mission was to be "the bridge and the mediator between the peoples and states which once belonged to the Empire of the old Austria...." This mediating office was to be in the cultural and the economic field of politics, not
in the field of power politics. Austria's further destiny was to uphold her "connection with the larger German cultural group."

Thus I have never envisaged our political destiny as lying in a choice between the ostensible opposites Germany and Mitteleuropa—that is, between the Danube Pact and the Anschluss—but rather in the resolution of these opposites; and that is possible if none of the middle-European states feel themselves threatened by Germany nor Germany by a confederation of these states—that is to say, if a middle-European combination can be found which should include Germany.

Implicit then in Schuschnigg's political conception was a reconciliation with National Socialism—overt recognition of the Reich National Socialists and a tacit recognition of the illegal and discredited Austrian National Socialists.

Immediately following the July Putsch there was a lessening of tension between Austria and Germany. This was due as much to the international situation as to the fact that internally the government was able to maintain control and to continue functioning without any noticeable or irreparable interruption. Even in the Italian press there was a conciliatory tone by the end of July and the beginning of August. On July 30, the Giornale d'Italia reported that the Italian press had no "fundamental hostility against nor any deliberate intention to enter into polemics with present-day Germany and her policies." It expressed hope that the German government would take cognizance of its "extensive intolerance" and of the "insufficient clearness of its attitude."

Reasonableness and conciliation were paramount in future relations. The decisive action of Italy again made clear her viewpoint about Austria, which should recall to a reasonable attitude all governments that had shared in the recent Austrian disorders. Italy was ready to give credence
to Hitler's words and the conciliatory intentions which they expressed in the hope that such confidence would not be misplaced. 6 Le Temps published an editorial stating that those powers which were most interested in the preservation of peace in Central Europe would not fail to support the Schuschnigg government. Italy had already manifested her determination to do so, and M. Louis Barthou declared for Austrian independence with all the authority attached to the words of the French Foreign Minister:

But diplomatic action will not suffice at all. In order that Austria remain independent, she must be assured of the possibility of living, working, existing, and prospering by her own means. All nations which desire to maintain the status quo of Central Europe are therefore faced with a common duty. Favor Austrian recovery; help Austria live; that is the surest means to save her from the German threat and work for the consolidation of peace. 7

On August 5, Ward Price of the Daily Mail was granted a personal interview with the Führer. On being questioned about Germany's position with regard to Austria, Hitler replied: "We shall not attack Austria, but we cannot prevent Austrians from seeking to restore their ancient connexion on either side of which are people of the same race.... The question of the Anschluss...is not a problem of the present day.... Austrian independence lies outside all discussion, and nobody questions it." 8 His remarks were probably designed to placate and reconcile international resentment appearing so portentously against Germany; but while he disavowed any idea of Anschluss, he did so only as a temporary expedient because "opposition to it from the rest of Europe would be too great."

On August 11, Starhemberg arrived unexpectedly in Rome and from thence
dove directly to Ostia, the port of Rome. Here, at a camp where Austrian boys were vacationing, he met Mussolini who gave him assurances of continued Italian support and agreed to meet Schuschnigg soon in Florence.  

Shortly after this meeting, orders were given for the withdrawal of some of the Italian troops from the northern and northeastern frontiers. The information received from Starhemberg must have convinced Mussolini that the Austrian government had the situation again in hand, that it was able to maintain internal order, and that there was little likelihood of further Nazi uprisings. A few days later, Schuschnigg had his first personal encounter with the head of the Italian government when the two met in Florence at the Villa de Marinis. Schuschnigg was very favorably impressed, and the meeting afforded the Duce with the opportunity of meeting firsthand the new Chancellor of the country which Italy was sustaining. There were no surprises expected from the meeting and none occurred. No positive achievement resulted other than a reaffirmation of "an effective community of views upon guiding principles and on the methods to be adopted as regards the independence and integrity of the Austrian state—an independence and integrity to which appertains also complete European interest and an element favourable to the maintenance of tranquility in the Danubian sector."

The two confirmed the utility of the Rome Protocols, recognized that the radius of action could be enlarged and intensified, and decided to develop the spirit of collaboration through cultural relations by exchanges of students, professors, books, artists, and tourists. Concerning the second point, Schuschnigg later wrote that this one idea constantly recurred: "the desire for cooperation without any effort to
form a coalition or any aim directed at outside parties. It was a fact, established and repeatedly emphasized, that other states might have the right to participate."\(^{13}\)

The communique of the Florence meeting contained the elements for which Austria held the Rome Protocols politically important. As Schuschnigg conceived it, the Protocols were first and most essential agreements for mutually beneficial economic assistance and co-operation, which in itself was a **sine qua non** for an independent Austria, and secondly, a political document guaranteeing the complete autonomy of the Austrian government, an absolute prerequisite for the preservation of peace in the Danube area. But there was always the opportunity for friendly relationship and close co-operation within the framework of the Protocols with other countries, especially Germany. This was considered not only possible but highly desirable by the participants. In view of Gombösz's visit to Rome and Berlin in order to play the role of mediator and Schuschnigg's internal policy, this takes on added significance.

Following the meeting Schuschnigg declared to the Stefani Agency that he had considered it a "moral duty" to visit Mussolini as soon as possible after taking over the government for a full exchange of views because of the support rendered by the Italian government on the occasion of July 25. The motive originated in his statement that the new government would carry on "in every way the political inheritance of Chancellor Dollfuss," whose foreign policy had been basically economic with its essential aim the economic reinforcement of the foundations of Austria. Support for this was to be found in Mussolini's Danubian Memorandum of September, 1933, and in the recommendations to the Stresa Conference.\(^{14}\)
The origin of the Rome Protocols was in the Duce's recognition of the necessity of economic settlement in the Danube Basin; and the essential aim of the Austro-Italian relations and the basis of the present conversations was the appeasement of Europe. The foundations upon which rests the intimate relations of the two neighboring states is so secure that there is no reason for change in them or in the measures necessary to give them effect. The Florence meeting was, therefore, only a case of "examining and of developing our economic and political relations in the sense of the Rome agreements." As far as Germany was concerned, any obstacles to the reestablishment of normal relations would come from that direction for Austria was solely in a defensive position. "The Austrian Federal Government could not in any way change any of its fundamental principles. These principles have become permanent with the passage of time, and are naturally based upon the almost thousand years' mission of the German race in the Danubian Basin, a mission of which we have always been conscious."15

At any rate, the results of the visit were sparked by the announcement from Rome on August 25 that Mussolini would not undertake a visit to Hitler in Munich in the fall of 1934.16 This constituted a very pointed expression of the Duce's displeasure over Germany's Austrian policy, emphasized by his receiving the Austrian Chancellor in Italy and his address to the General Staff the day before:

Nobody in present-day Europe deliberately seeks war. Least of all does Italy, and of this fact she has given innumerable positive proofs. None the less, war is a possibility and may break out unexpectedly from one minute to the next. In some distant countries it has already done so. In Europe also at the end of July there arose, unforeseen and dramatically, a situation recalling in a particular manner 1914. It may be added that,
if we had not as a precautionary step promptly sent divisions to our eastern and northern frontiers, there would have been a danger of those complications arising which at a given moment are not to be solved except by armed intervention. 17

Then again, in speaking to the workers of Milan in the Piazza del Duomo, he added emphasis to his position by saying that a reconciliation was possible if Germany was ready to accept the situation and not continue to estrange herself from the course of history. "...we who feel strong and are strong, may offer, once more, the possibility of an understanding for which precise conditions already exist. We have defended and will defend the independence of the Austrian republic...." 18 He continued by denying that Italy had any imperialistic designs on Austria and that any who believed that were "either not aware of the facts or... lying deliberately." The conciliatory tone of the Italian press, the emphasis on the expansive nature of the Rome Protocols, and Mussolini's expressions of determination and firmness tempered with a willingness to re-establish friendly relations within certain well-defined conditions indicated that Italy was ready to receive overtures from a contrite Germany. Within Austria too the prevailing mood was one of reconciliation—even appeasement—both with the Austrian National Socialists and the National Socialist government in Berlin.

There is no evidence that Mussolini explicitly instructed Schuschnigg, while the latter was in Florence, to appease the Austrian Nazis; but, considering the direction being taken by the Italian press and his own utterances, neither is there reason to believe that he discouraged such action. Schuschnigg had already introduced his appeasement policy before the Florence meeting with the Duce. In a speech at a gathering of the
Lower Austrian Peasants’ Association on August 4, he had said: "We want peace with everybody in this country who recognizes the independence of Austria, and even our former enemies can work harmoniously with us if they recognize that their previous policy was a mistaken one."¹⁹

Schuschnigg carried this policy with him to Geneva in September. In a statement to the press at Innsbruck on September 4, he said that his government would not submit charges against Germany in connection with the recent putsch and German agitation.²⁰ And then in Geneva at the Plenary Assembly of the League of Nations on September 12, he made no appeal except for financial support and no ringing denunciation of the tactics employed against Austria. "This is no time for retrospective discussion as to whether Austria was bound to become what she now is, but I must urge that she must be preserved as she now is, and not in her own interests alone. That, and that only, is the fundamental principle of Austria’s internal and external independence."²¹ The League was left in a position to forget Austria--and did. But Schuschnigg made a serious effort to obtain some definite agreement from the League. In fact, he took with him to Geneva an outline of his own scheme for Austria’s protection. His idea was very simple and straightforward. He hoped to have England, France, and Italy pledge themselves to maintain Austria’s independence; to take such measures, in case of emergency, as the situation might demand; and to leave the agreement open to adherence by any other interested state.²² This obviously was not a question concerning League action; and Schuschnigg did not want to propose it himself, thus placing Austria in the position of supplicant for protection. So he presented it to Baron Aloisi who favored it and who in turn placed
it before Barthou. Barthou saw some obstacles in its enactment but favored it in principle. When the plan was placed before Sir John Simon, it received a definite negation, for the British Secretary saw in the second article an explicit commitment under which Great Britain might be forced to enter into military action on the continent. The Little Entente also objected because it envisaged action outside of the League of Nations and because the smaller states were left in the position of joining merely as supplementaries to an agreement already signed by the three Great Powers. Yugoslavia especially objected to the possibility of offering to Italy the opportunity of occupying Austria with Italian troops without Mussolini having done any more than he had agreed to do. So Schuschnigg finally abandoned the plan after securing only a promise that some specific guarantee of Austrian independence would be discussed during the forthcoming visit of King Alexander of Yugoslavia to Paris and during Barthou's visit to Rome.

However, on September 24, M. Barthou returned to Geneva after a week-end in Paris with a new formula for dealing with Austrian independence. It was not substantially different from Schuschnigg's plan except that it approached the problem more gradually, and it was of slight advance over the February declaration which had only reaffirmed previous declarations. Barthou's plan called for a new and more vigorous declaration by the League of Nations' Council affirming the independence and integrity of Austria and binding the League members to respect these. The French felt that with this as a basis, they could proceed to joint guarantee by Austria's neighbors which would bring Italy and the Little Entente together and which could be backed by France and Britain. Barthou
and Aloisi carried this scheme to Anthony Eden, Minister without port-
folio for the League of Nations, who made no comment. There still remained
the obstacle of the British refusal to adhere to any guarantee which might
involve them unwillingly in military action on the continent. Actually
the French themselves were opposed to any solution of the Austrian question
which would give Italy a commanding position in dealing with the Central
European question. Italy, on the other hand, opposed dependence on League
action on the theory that any action which the League could be induced to
take would help matters very little and perhaps hinder independent action
on the part of the signatories. Barthou’s plan was therefore without the
support of Italy, while the Little Entente retained their objection to
any action except through the League.

The final result was a much watered-down re-endorsement of the triple
communiqué of February 17, itself nothing more than a reaffirmation to
maintain the independence and integrity of Austria in agreement with
previous treaties by France, Great Britain, and Italy.23 Whatever vigor
and determination adhered to this newest pronouncement concerning Austria
lay in the fact that this time the confirmation was contained in a
document and signed jointly by the representatives of the Three Powers
whereas before a communiqué had sufficed. Schuschnigg was disappointed,
but between then and the summer of 1936 the great developments around
which the independence of Austria revolved lay almost entirely outside
the boundaries of that State. Austria was hopelessly enmeshed in and
entirely dependent on the exigencies of situations not of her own choosing
or direction. Of the Three-Power declaration, Schuschnigg said that:
Austria was interested in the world's realizing that she was maintaining the struggle for her independence and liberty, in the interests of her co-nationals, her economic life, and also in the interests of all lovers of liberty. Therefore Austria was happy that along the whole line full understanding for the present situation existed and that Austria's trouble had been recognized by all the states who were interested in the peace of Europe.\footnote{24} 

During the final two months of the year there was considerable diplomatic intercourse with each country attempting to stabilize its position in what appeared to be a reshuffling of European power politics. Mussolini's nod to Germany was quickly seized upon; and Ulrich von Hassell, the German ambassador in Rome, officially informed the Italian government in the early part of November that Germany unreservedly recognized the independence of Austria and added Hitler's personal promise that henceforth he would follow a strictly hands-off policy where Austria was concerned.\footnote{25} Germany's efforts to recapture Italian sympathy and support were in full swing—this time using Yugoslavia as a threat and a retaliation. The assassination of King Alexander of Yugoslavia and Louis Barthou at Marseille on October 9 did not fail to interest the Berlin government.\footnote{26} Yugoslavia had shown a benevolent attitude toward the Nazi refugees from Austria after July 25, and Messersmith reported in September that a large section of opinion in that country believed that Austria's union with Germany was inevitable and preferable to a Habsburg restoration and that when this came, by playing along with Germany, Yugoslavia would gain territorial advantages and German support against Italy.\footnote{27} Zerutto wrote that the common opposition of Germany and Yugoslavia against a Habsburg restoration was the starting point for the initiation of a German-Yugoslav friendship
and that both regarded a return of the Habsburgs to Austria as a \textit{casus belli}.\textsuperscript{28} As early as March, 1934, Foreign Minister Bogoljub Jefich had stated in the Yugoslavian parliament that any policy of a Habsburg restoration menaced the peace and stability of his country; and Deputy Kalmakovich, a former press attaché in Berlin, seemed to express the general feeling when he proposed an active policy of approach toward Germany. "Hitler's Germany holds no danger for Yugoslavia. A union between Germany and Austria would be less dangerous for us that [\textit{sic}]
the establishment of an Italian protectorate in the Danubian Basin, which is the real aim of the Rome negotiations."\textsuperscript{29} Mussolini was conscious of this attitude and must have urged on Gömbös, who visited Rome in November, the necessity of a closer political and economic unity of Italy, Hungary, Austria, and Germany, who in turn pointed it out to Schuschnigg whom he met at Semmering on his return to Budapest.\textsuperscript{30} Schuschnigg, disappointed in the September, 1934, declaration and probably alarmed by this shift in Italian policy, himself hastened to Rome in the middle of November. The principal object of this visit was to reaffirm before the world that Italy, Austria, and Hungary stood united and that Italy would not allow the independence of the Danubian countries to be threatened. A statement issued after the meeting confirmed the Dollfuss policy of close Italian-Austrian understanding and pointed out that the tri-partite agreements were not exclusive and could be extended to other states which were willing to accept the conditions forming their fundamental premise.\textsuperscript{31}

It is possible that Italy's immediate object was to secure a settlement between Austria and Germany prior to the Saar plebiscite, slated for January, 1936, which would leave Germany free to resume her aggressive
measures against Austria. But Italy was not without her own weapons for utilization in coercive measures against Germany. Italy could still throw her support to France. A foreshadowing of this came in December when Mussolini and Count de Chambrun, the French Ambassador to Rome, agreed upon an international guarantee of Austria's independence. It was a formula proposed by Sir John Simon which enabled the French and Italians to reach a mutually satisfactory compromise. He proposed a guarantee of the integrity of Austria's frontier and her political independence by the countries contiguous to Austria under the direct sponsorship of France and Italy.\textsuperscript{32} France and Roumania were willing to accede to the convention but without incurring any direct obligation for protective action. Furthermore the precise nature of Britain's share in the obligation was reserved for final settlement until the new French Foreign Minister, Pierre Laval, could visit London after his Rome visit. The willingness to consider such a plan actually amounted to a reversal of Mussolini's whole former policy. He had recognized the validity of treaty revision and had declared that peace could be secured permanently only by the adjustment of territorial and other conditions imposed on the vanquished nations by the peace of 1919. Now he was asked to guarantee the frontier of Yugoslavia--which he was willing to do--and also the territory of every other member of the Little Entente. That he was willing to concede this and reverse his policy gives reason to believe that in return Mussolini assumed that Italy would get what she wanted in Africa. The way was now open for a Franco-Italian rapprochement which gave promise of a new era in European policies.
Shortly after the July Putsch, Anton Reinthaller, a peasant leader in Upper Austria, initiated a counter-appeasement movement in the so-called "Reinthaller action" which was a respectable cover for a come-back of the defeated and discredited National Socialists. He was said to have received the approval of Rudolf Hess and Walther Darre in Germany. Franz Langoth, a former National delegate to the Landtag, and Dr. Ernst Kaltenbrunner, a lawyer from Linz, were working with this circle. Admittedly, Arthur Seyss-Inquart contacted and met with these men.\textsuperscript{33} The main activities consisted in organizing an institution to succor the needy families of the arrested and condemned Nazis. The government at first tolerated and then approved this charitable enterprise, though it knew that the funds came chiefly from the Reich. As Zernatto explained to Seyss-Inquart, it was that such activities would considerably contribute to ease the tension from a psychological and therefore also from a political point of view.\textsuperscript{34} The Linzer Volksblatt, a clerical organ, was the first to expose these negotiations between Schuschnigg and Reinthaller. That paper published the text of a scheme for a reconciliation with the Nazis, outlined by Reinthaller and handed to Schuschnigg.\textsuperscript{35} The plan called for the total capitulation of the Heimwehr to the Nazis. It was opposed both by the Clericals and by the Heimwehr, especially so when Schuschnigg continued to negotiate with them even after he had received the demands. An October 28 communiqué, issued by the government, admitted that negotiations had been carried on between the Austrian government and the German Nationalist movement in Austria or the "moderate" Nazis, represented by Engineer Reinthaller; General Bardolff, a General Staff officer; Hueber, Göring's brother-in-law; and others. The hope had been
that a means might be found for National Socialist co-operation with the government; but the National Socialists were informed by the Chancellor that such co-operation would be possible only if individual National Socialists joined the one authorized political party, the Fatherland Front, individually and not in a body and supported the government policy respecting an independent, corporative Austria.  

Starhemberg did not approve of the policy of permitting persons of National Socialist sympathy to join the Fatherland Front nor was he enthusiastic about appeasement. He told the Heimwehr members that:

German Nationalist circles...seem to think that they have only to make a pretense of a cringing attitude and commit themselves to a temporary expression of belief in Austrian independence to be received as brothers by the Heimwehr. A far more convincing proof of a real change of heart will be required.

Later he wrote:

The fighting spirit which had reigned in Dollfuss' day steadily declined. The term "internal appeasement" became the leit-motiv of Austrian politics. Expressions like "national opposition" and "strong nationals" helped to foster the illusion that the negotiations were not being carried on with the wicked Nazis.

Messersmith, in an official dispatch written in October, 1934, expressed the concern felt with regard to these appeasement conversations:

Even before July 25, when the National Socialist party was legally prohibited, it was very difficult to get proper police and judicial action against National Socialists who committed terroristic acts or who were plotting against the Government. This inaction came, not through sympathy with the movement or through lack of definite knowledge of overt acts, but through fear—through fear of reprisals when a National Socialist regime might come.... The determined attitude of the Government after July 25, strengthened the administration of justice and of the security forces, and this changed attitude came about as a result not only of the feeling within the country that National Socialism would
not come now, but also as a result of the action of the powers in support of the independence of Austria. Should the conversations which the Government is having with the National Socialist groups reawaken this fear, or should any weakening of the attitude of the Government towards National Socialism be admitted even to indirect or subordinate participation in the Government, it would undoubtedly bring back this fear in an even more acute form and bring in that element of weakness. 39

The tensions and restrictions which had prevailed since martial law had been declared were gradually relaxed. In October, Papen's mission began to have results. His frequent conferences with the Austrian foreign office resulted in government instructions to the Austrian press that they were to be less violent on the subject of Germany. Large numbers of National Socialists who had been only slightly involved in the July Putsch were released from custody. 40 The results of the Nationalists' negotiations became apparent when the German Club, center of the more discreet forms of Nazi scheming, was reopened in November. 41 General Bardolff was president of this club and also one of the principal negotiators with Reinhaller. During the month of December, the press censor issued a secret order prohibiting any comments about German rearmament or the Saar question "except in a pro-German sense," 167 branches of the German Gymnastic Association were allowed to reopen, 2,500 National Socialists were released from the Wöhlersdorf concentration camp, and President Miklas granted a Christmas amnesty for ninety Socialists and eighty Nazis and dropped two thousand investigations into criminal cases pending against political opponents. 42

Pierre Laval, having replaced the assassinated Barthou at the Quai d'Orsay in October, 1934, was anxious to reach a détente with both Germany and Italy by following a frank policy of appeasement. On January 8, 1935,
an agreement was concluded with Mussolini, during the negotiations for which it was asserted that Laval had granted Mussolini a free hand, as far as France was concerned, in regard to Italian aggression against Abyssinia. Others who were concerned with the Franco-Italian Agreement consider that Laval was aware that Mussolini was being generous in the hope of gaining a free hand in East Africa, but that he did not imagine an open breach of peace. Rather he expected a gradual penetration. Even François-Poncet felt that Italy would probably have been allowed to develop her action in Africa had she proceeded through "the patient ways of peaceful penetration." Laval went to Rome and concluded there four agreements among which was a recommendation by France and Italy to the neighbors and succession states of Austria (Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Poland, and Roumania) to guarantee the mutual respect of frontiers and non-interference in internal affairs. Here was contained the essence of Simon's December formula but without any of the specific obligations of sponsorship which the British Foreign Minister had proposed. Clarification on the British position, it will be remembered, had been reserved until after the visit of the French Premier and Foreign Minister to London. Official Italian sources reported that the two states would "recommend" to those states most interested the conclusion of a pact of non-interference and "the reciprocal pledge not to encourage any action having its aim to attack by force the territorial integrity and the political or social regime of one of the contracting countries." The agreement was to be signed first by Italy, Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Austria and then to be open to the signature of France, Poland, and Roumania. The report concluded with
the statement that the two signatories, "convinced of the necessity of maintaining the independence and integrity of Austria, will, in case this independence and integrity were threatened, consult mutually and with Austria on the measures to be taken." This consultation would then be extended to the other signatories. By this comprehensive interpretation of the Accord, Mussolini not only reversed his revisionism and encouragement to Hungary but also committed himself without a definite and prior pledge by France, to say nothing of Great Britain. In view of his repeated assertions that Italy could not indefinitely stand alone on the Brenner, it is unlikely that Mussolini would have acceded to such an agreement without a definite commitment by either of the other two Great Powers. At the same time, he would not have sacrificed his influence in the Danube area without the conviction that Italy would receive definite assent to Italian interests elsewhere. Mussolini was surprisingly yielding in matters of territorial readjustments in Africa and the status of Italians in Tunisia, and a few faintly practical steps for the international benefit of Austria were planned.

The consultations between the British government and the representatives of the French Republic--Flandin and Laval--took place between February 1 and 3 in London. The British government suggested that new protocols be submitted to Hitler for a restitution of the balance of power in Europe, and the two governments agreed upon a basis of negotiation comprising three separate agreements--one of which was an agreement to respect the independence of Austria. In the Franco-British Declaration of February 3:
The British Ministers expressed the congratulations of His Majesty's Government on the conclusion of the Rome Agreement regarding Central Europe, and made it clear that, as a consequence of the declarations made by His Majesty's Government in conjunction with the French and Italian Governments on February 17, and September 27 last, His Majesty's Government consider themselves to be among the Powers which will, as provided in the Rome Agreement, consult together if the independence and integrity of Austria are menaced.\textsuperscript{46}

An Anglo-French communiqué expressed the hope that this encouraging progress would be continued by a general settlement freely concluded between Germany and the other powers.\textsuperscript{47} The German reply was surprisingly peaceful, and Hitler agreed to discuss the proposals and invited a British minister to go to Berlin on March 7. This date was subsequently postponed after the British government issued a White Paper on Imperial Defense and the Führer "caught a cold"; but his affliction did not prevent him from unilaterally repudiating Part V of the Treaty of Versailles by reintroducing conscription and announcing the official existence of the \textit{Luftwaffe} on March 15. This was Germany's reply to the introduction of two years military service in France on March 6. On March 18, the British government sent its protest:

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom feel bound to convey to the German Government their protest against the announcement made by the latter on March 16th of the decision to adopt conscription and to increase the peace-time basis of the German army to 36 divisions. Following upon the announcement of a German Air Force, such a declaration is a further example of unilateral action, which, apart from the issue of principle, is calculated seriously to increase uneasiness in Europe.... They (His Majesty's Government) wish to be assured that the German Government still desires the visit to take place, within the terms of reference previously agreed.\textsuperscript{48}

Schmidt relates with what surprise the Foreign Office received this document, for they did not expect that the English would ask politely if they could come to Berlin after such an indignant protest. But Sir
John Simon did go to Berlin scarcely more than a fortnight before the meeting of the Three Powers on Lake Maggiore. The results were disastrous for Anglo-French relations and any pretense at unity among England, France, and Italy. Without consulting France, the British Foreign Minister proposed that "German representatives should come to London for a preliminary discussion with a view to a naval agreement in the future." When Simon introduced the Danubian Pact into the conversation, Paul Schmidt reports Hitler as saying: "Fundamentally, Germany has no objection to such a pact...but it would have to be stated quite clearly how so-called non-interference in the affairs of the Danube countries should be most accurately defined." Simon explained this away in a statement before the House of Commons on April 9, when he said that the German government did not reject a Central European pact on principle--only saw no necessity for it. The difficulty lay in defining the word "non-interference" in relation to Austria. Hitler, however, said that he would consider it if the other Central European governments desired a pact and would come to an agreement on the wording. This statement amounted to a polite rejection by Germany to become a party to any collective obligations which might hinder her unilateral action in Central Europe.

The representatives of Britain, France, and Italy met at Stressa and went through the motions of censuring Germany for her decision of March 16. The Three Powers declared their intention "to oppose by all means in their power the unilateral abrogation of treaties," which, as Papen says, were "strong words" but failed to indicate a united front. Hitler had sufficient political intuition to realize that the divergent interests of the three
powers militated against a united policy." Even before the Hitler-Eden talks and the Stresa Conference, a mere comparison of the three notes of Great Britain, France, and Italy protesting the March 16 action of Germany shows that a united front was only apparent and that the isolation of Germany was cracking.

At Stresa the representatives examined the Austrian situation and again confirmed the Anglo-Franco-Italian declarations of February 17 and September 27, 1934, which would "continue to inspire their common policy." Referring to the Franco-Italian Protocol of January 8, 1935, and the Anglo-French declarations of February 3, 1935, the three governments agreed to recommend that representatives of all the governments enumerated in the Protocol of Rome should meet "at a very early date" with a view to concluding the Central European agreement. MacDonald summed up the results as far as Austria was concerned in his speech on the Stresa Conference to the House of Commons. "As regards...the independence of Austria, it will be remembered that the position of the country has always been one of close and friendly interest, but that we have incurred no obligations except that of consultation in the event of the integrity and independence of Austria being threatened. None further were added at Stresa." Zernatto claims that at Stresa Mussolini had spoken with MacDonald and Simon about his African plans and had received the impression that the Western Powers would offer no serious difficulties to an Italian expansion in Africa. It is doubtful that any direct statement to that effect was made, but whatever was said or not said, rightly or wrongly, Mussolini deceived himself in this assumption at the time and threw Italian support behind England and France
against Germany. Stresa was the last great demonstration of the harmony of the victorious states of Versailles—the last before their final break. After this France and England would stand on one side and Italy on the other as opponents in the various fronts of the European powers. The hope had been that at Stresa the plan for a Danube Pact or at least the essential preparatory work for it would have been agreed upon. This hope was not fulfilled. Definite action was put off until the interested states could be convened at Rome for a Danubian conference. On April 16, the Wiener Amtliche Nachrichtenstelle announced: "the official invitations to the Conference concerning Austria's independence, which will meet on May 20 in Rome, will go out immediately from Italy to the Governments of Great Britain, France and all of Austria's neighboring states." From May 4 to 6, a conference met in Venice between the Austrian Foreign Minister, Berger-Waldenegg, the Hungarian Foreign Minister, Kanya, and the Italian State Secretary, Suvich, in preparation for the Danubian Conference, which however was convened neither on May 20 nor at any other date. The foreign policy of Austria at the time of the Stresa Front was characterized in an article which Foreign Minister Berger-Waldenegg wrote for the official Wiener Zeitung:

It was clear to us that Anschluss or Gleichschaltung would have meant the death of Austria, her very old German culture and the Austrian nation.... By this time further diplomatic work, which had already originated at Geneva and which had as its goal to secure the assistance of all states, undertook to bring Italy and France to a common denominator. The rapprochement of these two Great Powers, with the blessing of England, meant for us an enlarged basis of our foreign policy. Our endeavors were not in vain.... We allowed no doubt but that the peculiar political situation [die Eigenstaatlichkeit] of Austria is for us a permanent conception [ein Ewigkeitsbegriff]....
Very few Nazi disturbances occurred in Austria between the death of Dollfuss in July, 1934, and June, 1935. There were a number of demonstrations at the time of the Saar plebiscite in January, 1935. The increased Nazi activities coincided with information of a concentration of Italian troops along the Austrian border to help prevent the danger of a Nazi revolt following the plebiscite. The worst feature of these demonstrations, from the standpoint of the Austrian government, was the reiterated demand that a similar plebiscite be held in Austria to determine the true will of the people. Such a plebiscite the government dared not hold, for it was fully aware of the fact that such a vote would lead to its immediate downfall.\textsuperscript{59} Mussolini continued to push his solution for Austria and implement Italian hegemony in the Danube area. An extension of Austrian-Italian cultural relations had been discussed during the November, 1934, visit of Schuschnigg and Berger-Waldenegg to Italy.\textsuperscript{60} This cultural accord which grew out of the Rome Protocols, was signed in Rome on February 2 and was designed to intensify the cultural and artistic exchanges between the two countries. It provided for the creation of an Institute of Italian Culture in Vienna and an Institute of Austrian Culture in Rome and looked forward to the establishment of chairs at various universities and the availability of scholarships.\textsuperscript{61} The Austrian government was relying heavily upon the Italian government, although Schuschnigg wrote, in an article published in \textit{World Affairs}, that the Rome Protocols had "no political background whatsoever." They were merely a form of economic and cultural collaboration which was intended to furnish the basis for closer co-operation with other nations.\textsuperscript{62}
While Austria's international position was ostensibly being assured at Stresa and France, Great Britain, and Italy were outlining their attitudes on pressing European policies which had been brought to a head by German rearmament, the National Socialists were reorganizing and recouping their fortunes within Austria and Papen was quietly working for his "evolutionary coalescence" of Austria and Germany. His tactics were becoming clarified when he wrote Hitler on May 17, 1935, 63 that the fundamental idea was to pit Schuschnigg and the Clerical group against Starhemberg and thus utilize their anathema to the Prince's dictatorial ways. Even Josef Leopold, the new leader of the illegal Austrian Nazis, felt that the totalitarian principle of the N.S.D.A.P. in Austria had to be replaced by a combination of the Clerical supporters of Schuschnigg who favored the Greater Germany idea and the N.S.D.A.P. "The possibility of thwarting the measures arranged between Mussolini and Starhemberg should be afforded to him [Schuschnigg], in such way that he would submit the offer to the government of a definitive German-Austrian compromise of interests." Papen suggested as a further consequence of such a step the participation of Germany in the Danube pact which would have a beneficial influence on both the European situation and on Germany's relations with England. Should Schuschnigg refuse and make known Germany's offer in Rome, then the Reich government's efforts to make peace with Austria would be revealed without prejudice to other interests. Papen considered it completely possible that:

in view of the far spread dislike of the Alpine countries of the pro-Italian course and in view of the sharp tensions within the federal government, Mr. Schuschnigg [sic] will grasp this last straw--always under the supposition that the offer could not be interpreted as a trap by the opponents, but that it bears all the mark of an actually honest compromise with Austria.
Papen had analyzed well the tension within the government which would have been a great deal more secure had Schuschnigg and Starhemberg been able to see eye to eye. The Chancellor's clerical youth organization, the Ostmarkische Sturmscharen, which he controlled absolutely, did not always co-operate with the Vice-Chancellor's Heimwehr. Another private army, the Freiheitsbund (largely clerical workers) was also occasionally in conflict with the Heimwehr. Much of this conflict was due to the fact that the government was considering adopting conscription for the army. Starhemberg opposed general conscription and wanted new army recruits to be taken only from the ranks of the Heimwehr. This was opposed both by the Clericals and the army officers. In an address in Vorarlberg, Starhemberg asserted that the Heimwehr would not allow the abolition of the private Fascist forces in Austria under the plea of introducing conscription. The Heimwehr would haul down its colors only when assured that the situation in Austria would not change. So tension between the armed organizations of the various parties increased, and this did not go unnoticed by the German Minister. Then on May 25, a government decree incorporated the Austrian army into the Fatherland Front and provided that all future recruits must come from the ranks of the Front. This was regarded as a severe setback for Starhemberg who claimed that the political situation worked against general conscription since a large number of Austrian youth were opposed to the present regime.

It is possible that Papen's letter had some effect on the outline of German foreign policy which Hitler addressed to the Reichstag on May 21. At least it reflected Papen's idea of recognizing the national independence of Austria:
Germany neither intends nor wishes to interfere in the internal affairs of Austria, to annex Austria, or to conclude an 'Anschluss'. The German people and the German Government have, however, the very comprehensible desire, arising out of a simple feeling of solidarity due to a common national descent—namely, that the right to self-determination should be guaranteed, not only for foreign nations but to the German people everywhere. I myself believe that no regime which does not rest on public consent and is not supported by the people can continue permanently.66

Germany was glad to have a firmly established and independent state with a population largely German on her frontier and "regrets the tension which has arisen from the conflict with Austria all the more because it has resulted in disturbing our former good relations towards Italy, a State with whom we otherwise have no conflict of interests."

Four days later the Corriere della Sera carried Mussolini's address to the Chamber of Deputies.67 Mussolini mentioned that the Stresa decision to convene a conference to treat the problems of the Danube Basin had been postponed indefinitely and would not be held until the preliminary work had been diligently prepared. The recent meeting of the Rome Protocol states at Venice had helped to serve this purpose. Even though Hitler had politely rejected the idea of a Danubian conference in his May 21 speech, Mussolini reiterated Italy's proposal that Germany be invited to attend and be kept informed of its preparation. He agreed with Hitler that Austria was the only problem which compromised Italian-German relations, but for Italy this problem was "of the greatest importance." He then addressed Great Britain and France—"to those who would like to fossilize us on the Brenner to prevent us from moving in any other part of the world." No doubt was left but that Austrian independence was an Austrian and European problem and not exclusively an
Italian one. The independent existence of Italy's northern neighbor was a particularly Italian problem only insofar as it was a European problem. The Duce was giving public utterance to the admonitions which he had previously given to Starhemberg in private. Italy had no intention of limiting her "historic mission" to a single political problem or to a single military sector—even such an important one as the Brenner. Then he came to the point upon which the direction of Italian foreign policy was beginning to turn and which was to be so rapidly accelerated toward the end of the year as to cause a realignment of the European power blocs and a drastic and irreversible influence on the scales of Danubian hegemony:

I have reached the point for which you, my comrades, have, I am sure, been waiting. You have to consider the group of problems of which I have given you a survey, in relation to what may happen in East Africa and in relation to the attitudes which individual States may take up when the time comes for them to show us a real friendship, not a superficial one based on words alone. But, in the first place we must rely upon ourselves....

Was this a warning to the Western Democracies? Was it a threat? Was Italy backing out of her self-assumed obligations and commitments in regard to Austria? Italy's foreign policy was definitely in flux. The Abyssinian question was threatening, yet there is no reason to believe that Mussolini had changed his attitude in regard to the importance of an independent Austria for Italy. Several things had happened which may have caused him to reconsider Italy's precarious position in the Danube area. A German-Polish accord had taken place in November, 1934. Germany had already announced her intention to rearm. Britain had refused to guarantee a Danubian Pact. At Stresa the British representatives...
had made it clear that they would not consider sanctions against Germany in event of treaty violation. Eden had only recently gone to Berlin (March 25-26) to talk with Hitler. In May, 1935, France and Czecho- slovakia had concluded pacts of mutual assistance with Russia which, according to Mussolini, upset the balance of forces. The seeming defection of Great Britain came on June 18, 1935, with the Anglo-German Naval Agreement. With the uncertainty of the European system of alliances and with each state attempting to surround itself with new assurances and guarantees and to strengthen old ones, Mussolini was retreating from a commitment by Italy to any definite position or to any one bloc. Referring to Hitler's May 21 speech, he said that the thirteen points of Germany's policy could neither be accepted nor rejected as a whole, but "it would be preferable to define them more clearly and study them more deeply." Still the relations between the two dictators were not too amiable. The Polish Ambassador in Berlin, Josef Lipski, was with Göring at the Schorfheide at the end of April when the latter complained bitterly that Mussolini was working against Germany in every possible field. Then again in May Göring saw Lipski and again complained to him that Germany had joined the Four-Power Pact of June, 1933, only to please Mussolini and that this was Germany's reward. Gömbös echoed Mussolini in a speech before the Hungarian Parliament on May 28. He noted that obstacles to agreement on the north-south line had lessened and that it was "only the Austrian question, as has been stated both by the Führer and the Duce, which today divides these two powerful nations." The kernel of the question, as Gömbös saw it, was that the Great Powers had to adopt a sensible attitude and cease to
regard the problem as an Austrian-Hungarian one for it concerned the whole of Europe and a settlement was to Europe's interest. This was in line with Gömbös' role as mediator between the two great totalitarian powers, for he saw that Europe's destiny would be influenced by more powerful factors than Hungary.

Schuschnigg answered Hitler's Reichstag speech in his own before the Austrian Parliament on May 29. The tone was one of firmness and only slightly bellicose. He disavowed any belief in a repetition of the July, 1934, coup d'état while acknowledging that subversive forces were still at work, particularly in trying to stigmatize his foreign policy as treason. So he made a clear distinction between German National Socialism and Austrian National Socialism. The German form did not interest Austria as long as it was concerned solely with Reich citizens, "but we cannot accept the principle of the unity of party and people in a case where racial and state boundaries do not coincide." Once again the Chancellor made it plain that Austria regarded herself as a German state and foreign sympathy was looked upon in Austria always as pro-Austrian, never anti-German. The Austrian form of National Socialism was a purely domestic affair and as such it had no place in the new state. Passing to Austrian-Italian relations, he emphasized the friendliness existing between the two states and thanked the Italian government for its readiness to help and for the economic and cultural exchange. "It is precisely these relations with Italy which have been made use of by the hidden so-called 'national propaganda' to stir up the Austrian people." He hoped to exonerate his government of charges of treason in foreign policy by denying "even the slightest attempt to interfere in Austrian
domestic affairs" on the part of Italy. His government realized "why attempts are made to poison Austria's friendly relations with Italy by means of historical reminiscenses...and we would be no patriots were we not to think with deepest grief of our war losses and of the final collapse of the Empire." But after all, Austria must assert her right to follow a policy of realism, and as a result of that policy the new Austria was in friendly relationship with the new Italy. For any return to normal relations with Nazi Germany, Austria required the unreserved recognition of the right to decide her own destiny without the influence of factors of movements beyond her frontier:

Austria demands, and believes she is justified in demanding, first, equality of treatment in principle; secondly, the granting of Austria's rights; and thirdly, the recognition of equality of status. On all other points Austrians are willing to compromise; on these three never.73

Such confidence and determination as Schuschnigg held up before his countrymen and the world was not entirely real, and a stronger confidence and determination came from another direction. Reviewing the outlook one year after the death of Dollfuss, Papen wrote to Hitler: "National Socialism must and will overpower the new Austrian ideology." He referred to the general hostility to Germany caused by the Austrian question. Every German effort in a south-eastern direction will run up against this opposition, especially since Italy regards the Danube Basin as her Expansionsgebiet. Papen condemned the Habicht type of open terrorism. Austria is now based upon militant Catholicism and a Heimwehr which is "enthusiastically favorable to Mussolini." "The dream of resurrecting the Holy Roman Empire around Vienna becomes more grotesque the more this
idea of the Austrian imperialist romantics is exploited by Mussolini in order to advance his conception of a new *imperium romanum* at the expense of the German nation. Papen felt that a mission of the united Germans had to be created to triumph over the idea of an Austrian mission and that the German mission had to insist that, if opposed to political Catholicism, it in no way undermined the fundamental Christianity of Germany. So the ideological struggle within Austria settled down to a cold war while on the international plane other issues were being decided which in the aggregate would decisively influence Austria's future.

In August the *Wiener Zeitung* ran an editorial which stated that "because of Ethiopia, Europe has been almost forgotten. Europe should understand that in case of an Italo-Ethiopian conflict its interests are far more important than those of a barbarous State on the Dark Continent." After thanking Baron Aloisi of Italy for his accentuation in Paris of the necessity of an international guarantee of Austrian independence and of the conclusion of Eastern and Danubian pacts regardless of other acute problems, the *Zeitung* added: "The Stresa front is still holding strong!" The editorial was largely correct in stating that Europe, or at least the Danube states, had been almost forgotten; but, unfortunately for Austria, it was overly optimistic in its assertion that the Stresa Front was still strong. Quite the contrary, for the Stresa Front, never very strong, collapsed completely when Italy invaded Ethiopia on October 2. The League of Nations assembled to debate the measures to be taken in an effort to preserve the integrity of Ethiopia. Italian influence was apparent when Pflüg addressed the Sixteenth League
Assembly. He reasserted Austria's attachment to the principles of the League but indicated that he would not adhere to a sanctionist policy. He recalled that it was Italy who, in the truest spirit of the Covenant, had helped to safeguard Austria's integrity at a fateful moment of her history. Strong ties of friendship and a debt of gratitude—not provided for by the Covenant—also imply obligations. He drew attention to the dangers inherent in a sanctions policy in the economic life of Europe, especially to the smaller states and also their creditors. "Taking these circumstances into account," concluded Pflügl, "the Austrian Government does not... see how it can associate itself with certain of the conclusions already reached by other States Members of the League." At a meeting of the Co-ordination Committee, acting on the report by the Committee of Eighteen, Dr. Richard Schuller, substitute delegate for Austria, emphasized that the proposed measures would have repercussions outside of Italy, particularly in the case of economic questions. In the first eight months of 1935, Austria had received from Italy a foreign exchange surplus of forty million shillings. She was Austria's first customer and the only market of Austria's which showed any expansion. Italy was the only country, with the single exception of Switzerland, with which Austria had a considerable active trade balance. "This much was certain, that the reconstruction of Austria, for which the Austrian people had made heavy sacrifices and were even now compelled to carry the burden of an appalling unemployment figure, would be arrested and possibly endangered, not by sanctions, but by events." So with a naive loyalty and for rather sound economic considerations Austria refused to apply economic sanctions and swung over completely to Italy.
There is considerable evidence to the effect that the application of sanctions by fifty-one nations, including Great Britain and France, and the subsequent isolation of Italy, forced Italy into the ideological front of the Rome-Berlin Axis, which previously had not been absolutely necessary. When events proved that Great Britain and France had not given Mussolini tacit assent to Italian expansion in East Africa, he had to find a new concept for his foreign policy. In his search for a strong friendship, he found only Germany, for whom sympathy existed within the regime in the circles of the young Fascists. Paul Schmidt wrote that although Italy did not consult Germany prior to her commencement of war against Ethiopia, the Nazi policy makers were pleased at the opportunity of drawing Italy away from Britain and France toward Germany, as well as undermining the collective security system of the League of Nations. Germany gave assurances that she would assist Italy economically to the utmost. François-Poncet found it astonishing that Mussolini would venture upon such a plan of conquest and felt that it was not a personal ambition of the Duce's but a national ambition of Italy's. Göring even goes so far as to claim that Germany was given to understand "not openly but quite clearly," that it would be to her advantage as regards Austria to join in these sanctions. Hitler then faced the difficult decision of either declaring himself against Italy and achieving the Anschluss by this means or binding himself to Italy and so exclude Italy's opposition to the Anschluss. It was found to be "more expedient" to prevent Italy being the main opponent to the Anschluss by not joining in any sanctions against her.

Guido Schmidt, who became the Austrian Foreign Minister in July, 1936,
declared in his Verantwortung in February, 1947, that until July 11, 1936, Austria tried to maintain her independence by radio and propaganda but that Austria could only endure such a period under two suppositions: 1) as long as Germany was weak and unarmed and 2) as long as Austria could expect foreign help. But a change occurred when Mussolini entered on his Abyssinian adventure and turned his attention from the Danube area to the south. The important question from here on was the estrangement between Rome, London, and Paris. Within the ranks of the Austrian Nazis, the defeat of the Italians or even a statement was ardently desired, for then official Germany might again open a campaign against Austria. Initial reverses or a prolonged campaign would force Italy to reduce her forces in the northern provinces. This is precisely what happened. Beginning on November 24, Italian troops were withdrawn from the South Tyrol area. This withdrawal continued until the end of the month. The surplus from the two divisions stationed at Bolzano and Trento, which had been more than doubled after July, 1934, and a greater part of the motorized division at Trento left northern Italy.

It was in August, 1934, that Mussolini had spoken to Schuschnigg of the inevitability of a conflict with Abyssinia, and before the end of the year he had discussed it with his military advisors and some diplomats. He told him that because of Hitler, Italy could not wait. He estimated that Ethiopia could be subdued within a year, and then he could be back at the Brenner in full force. Hitler, Mussolini said to Cerruti, would not be ready for war until 1938. If he could come to an agreement with France, he foresaw no difficulties from the West. With France he was generous in the hope of gaining freedom of action in Ethiopia and
at Stresa he became convinced that both France and Britain were willing
to let him do what he pleased with Ethiopia in return for Italy's services
against Germany. In a sense then and to a large extent the subjection
of Ethiopia as Mussolini contemplated it was an anti-German action.
This is further borne out in a conversation which Starhemberg records
with Mussolini in the spring of 1936. "If Italy grows weak, Germany will
grow strong," he told the Prince. "Only a strong Italy can keep Germany
in check." Mussolini knew that it was impossible to make a pact with
Germany for Hitler did not want peace. He wanted Austria and the door
opened to the Balkans and the Adriatic. It was senseless to make agree-
ments containing clauses contrary to the interest of one of the contract-
ing parties. "I have nothing against England or against France. I do
not want anything from either except to be left alone. That is why I
can co-operate with England and France better and more frankly than with
Germany...." In answer to the question of whether or not Austria could
depend upon Italy's not reaching an agreement with Berlin at the expense
of Austria, the Duce said: "I will not give up Austria. I cannot give
her up. You may count upon that definitely. My friendship for Austria
is based on the material interest which Italy has in Austria's maintenance.
Therefore, as long as I am directing Italy's policy, the survival of
Austria will be an integral part of this policy."  

Control of the domestic situation was considerably tightened on
October 17, when the cabinet was revamped and Fey eliminated. At 9 p.m.
a communiqué was issued to the effect that Schuschnigg had advised President
Miklas to relieve all ministers of their functions and tendered his own
resignation. Miklas refused Schuschnigg's resignation but accepted the
other advice and asked Schuschnigg to form a new cabinet. The new list
was produced and within two hours the ministers had taken the oath. By
this move Schuschnigg remained Chancellor and Starhemberg Vice-Chancellor;
Berger-Waldenegg retained his position as Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Major Baar von Baarenfels (a Starhemberg supporter as was Berger-Waldenegg)
was made Minister of the Interior and Security, while Dr. Ludwig Drexler,
another Starhemberg man, was made Minister of Finance. The communiqué
which announced these changes stated that the first task of the new
government would be to unify the defense organizations within the country.
The rival organizations were to become a part of the new volunteer
militia instead of remaining private guards for the benefit of the
individual leaders. Fey was probably ousted because, as leader of the
Vienna Heimwehr, he had a large personal following. In his first pro-
clamation to the new Heimwehr militia, Starhemberg said that all radical
or demagogic excesses within the organization would be met with the
"utmost ruthlessness." "I am the person who will decide what political
line the Heimwehr has to follow. It is for me to fix the pace at which
we shall advance toward our aim. I know what that aim is, how and when
it should be reached." Starhemberg was now in the position of almost
virtual dictator, and his increase in power presaged continued close
relations with Italy for he was on intimate terms with Mussolini and his
Heimwehr received both moral and financial support from Italy.

In 1933 the difficulties facing Germany in the political and diplomatic
field were enormous. France was the dominant military power on the
continent. She had woven a system of mutual-assistance alliances and pacts
in the West and in the East. The Locarno Pact of 1935, supplemented by the
Franco-Belgian alliance, guaranteed the territorial status quo in the West. Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Roumania were allied in the Little Entente and each in turn was united with France by mutual assistance pacts. Since 1922 and 1925 France and Poland had likewise been allied against external aggression. Italy had made plain her special interests in Austrian independence and Hungary was included in the Rome Protocols of 1934. The Stresa Front, which included France, Italy, and Great Britain, was formed in 1935 following Germany's rearmament, and a cardinal point of these Protocols was a reaffirmation of the inviolability of Austria's political and territorial independence. Nazi Germany launched a vigorous diplomatic campaign to break up the existing alliances and understandings, to create divisions among the powers of the Little Entente and other Eastern European powers. She countered these alliances with promises of economic gain for co-operating with Germany. To some of these countries she offered extravagant promises of territorial and economic rewards. The Nazis stirred up internal dissensions to disunite and weaken their intended victims. In Austria they supported the Austrian Nazis and probed what Goebbels called the "sore spots." In particular they played on the fear of the Habsburg restoration in Austria, a fear which was very real in both Yugoslavia and Hungary. Important political leaders in these two countries and in Poland became convinced that the Nazi regime would gain its ends and that the best course was to play along with Germany. Consequently these countries became apathetic toward the development of the union with Austria. Mussolini's Italy had become involved in the Ethiopian venture; Mussolini was obliged even to encourage the temporary appeasement of the Nazis. Besides, Hitler was working hard
to effect a rapprochment with Mussolini, and did in fact a few months later. Austria refused to support the League of Nations' sanction against Italy; so France and Great Britain lost much of their interest in Austria's machinations. These external developments, along with Schuschnigg's sincere desire to settle the outstanding differences between the two German states, paved the way for the Austrian-German declaration of July 11, 1936.
CHAPTER V
THE DANUBE OR THE RHINE

On May 21, 1935, Foreign Minister Baron Berger-Waldenegg met the Czechoslovakian Foreign Minister, Dr. Beneš, in Tabor. The purpose of this meeting was to attempt to relieve the tension existing between Vienna and Prague and to co-ordinate Austria's position in the Rome Pact and the front of the democratic powers. But the conversations between the two Foreign Ministers rested on suppositions which no longer existed. Instead of the Danube Conference the world heard the speech of Adolf Hitler of the same day.¹ Four days later Mussolini dramatically turned the direction of European history and introduced the prelude to the Second World War with his warning to those "who wish to fossilize us on the Brenner in order to hinder us from free movement in any other part of the world."² Six weeks had passed since the Stresa Conference where Mussolini together with the ministers of France and Great Britain had taken common action in condemning German rearmament. Now his speech contained an unmistakable bending toward Germany, and an equally unmistakable warning to France and Great Britain.

What led Mussolini to this dangerous change of front? The course of developments during the sanctions conflict gives some presentiment to his motives. Italy did not once walk out of the League of Nations when fifty-one states condemned the invasion of Abyssinia and broke off economic relations with her. Mussolini would not let it come to a break with the Western Powers. Apparently he held the common solidarity of Britain and France on the one side and Italy on the other side as so strong
that he could put it to a very severe test without the risk of war. Berger-Waldenegg, after becoming the Austrian Minister to Rome, informed State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Guido Schmidt, in October, 1936, that Suvich saw Austria as the common connecting link of Italy with the West. By her protection of Austria, Italy retained the blessings of the Western Powers who had been forced in the interest of their Central European policies to tolerate so much. "Perhaps the attitude of France, England, and the Geneva Areopagus in the Abyssinian question would have been more energetic if Italy, by her position as Austria's guarantor, had not had the advantage of their indecision for herself."³

As a consequence Mussolini could calculate that just for the sake of Austria the Western Powers would take much from him and that the difficulties of Britain and France over the rearmament of Germany would make it easier for him to carry out his desires in Africa. Mussolini was right in this calculation. He was continually threatened during the Abyssinian maneuvers, but nothing serious was undertaken against him. The Suez Canal remained open for Italian troop transports; and, when the campaign was decided militarily, the results were recognized at least de facto by the Western Powers with noticeable haste.

In the spring of 1935, Mussolini must have yet hardly thought of a pact with Germany. The German press at the beginning of the Abyssinian war was cautiously anti-Italian. A study of the volumes of the Völkischer Beobachter shows that the tone of the press changed first with the surprising success of Italy on the African battle scene. But for Germany the war offered an immense opportunity: to decide either for England or for Italy. It opened the way for a naval agreement with Britain and, with
that, practically sanctioned rearmament, of whose condemnation at Stresa now nothing more was said. The German Reich, however, chose Italy—and not for ideological reasons only. Italy had passed from a victor state of the First World War into the front of the revisionist states and with that had arrived at a common interest with Germany. Besides Italy had found in the German Reich a confederate which she would later shadow dangerously.

As the German Reich was the victor in the Abyssinian war, so was Austria the loser—and this even before the fighting had begun. An Italian military catastrophe would have meant the loss of Austria's support and probably an Austro-German Anschluss two years before March, 1938. Ironically the victory of Italy in East Africa saved Austria once more. But it was already clear that a lasting breach of Italy with her western allies must lead to an understanding with Germany and the abandonment of Austrian independence.

While the Abyssinian war cast a shadow over all of Europe, Papen, who had stood for a long time before closed doors, received his first diplomatic success. From a conversation between Berger-Waldenegg and himself there came on August 27, 1935, an agreement "that will be effective in making the presses of both states more useful than heretofore by the re-establishment of normal relations." This press agreement was the first political treaty between the Third Reich and Austria. On July 11, 1935, Papen had handed to Berger-Waldenegg a plan which he characterized as a "personal study" on the question of a détente. The plan referred to Hitler's speech of May 21, 1935—"Germany has neither the intention nor the desire to interfere in Austria's domestic affairs nor to annex or
to unite Austria with Germany," consequently the Austrian N.S.D.A.P. is clearly an internal concern of Austria and the responsibility of the Austrian government while the existing organizations of Austrian citizens in the Reich will be allowed only a charitable activity. "On the other hand, the Austrian government should desist from characterizing domestic events as unwarranted interference resulting from foreign influence and hindering the activities of existing organizations of Reich German citizens." Here are indicated the basic lines after which exactly one year later the historic July Agreement was taken.

Papen further offered a suspension of criticism in the press and on the radio as well as a union of theater and film systems. The final inducement would be the lifting of the limitations on tourist traffic. The immediate result was a conclusion of the press agreement, while plans of reference and informal conversations were continued until October, 1935. These were seriously undertaken again in May, 1936, which led ultimately to the Gentlemen's Agreement of July 11. By this press agreement Berger-Waldenegg operated unilaterally to the dis-advantage of Austria. He obtained for both sides similar obligations, yet he overlooked the fact that in Germany neither political party nor press could espouse the Austrian cause while in Austria financial support and propaganda for Anschluss already existed. Any enlightened consideration of the negative side of the Third Reich was from now on forbidden to the Austrian press. Unfavorable reports could be explained as breaches of the press agreement and be answered by the Germans with diplomatic means. This press agreement of August 27, 1935, took from the hands of the Austrian press an important weapon.
In the opinion of Dr. Friedrich Funder, editor of the Reichspost and councillor of state in the Austrian government, the turning point (Schicksalswende) for Austria was October 1935:

At that time Mussolini began the Abyssinian war, and in the League of Nations the question of sanctions was raised. Our Geneva representative [Pflüg] delivered a rather poetical declaration which expressed a lyrical assurance of our fidelity to Mussolini’s Italy. The English representative Hoare said that they could have taken it pretty well if we had expressed our opposition to sanctions or at least delivered a declaration which was so interpreted. Our position was entered unequivocally as opposed to sanctions. Furthermore we were the first to make such declaration.... By it we had invited the ill-humor of the English.... From this moment on our relations with England deteriorated and continued to do so until 1938.7

Remembering the repeated financial help of the League and especially the English credit to which Austria more than once owed her independence, the English press became outspokenly unfriendly towards Austria. In the German press the British newspaper notices were loudly repeated. But as understandable as the British criticism may have been, they overlooked the fact that Austria lay between Germany, Italy, and Hungary. Austria’s tragic situation in March, 1938, was anticipated at this time in Geneva.

In addition to the coolness of the British, Austria was now faced with the possibility of Italy ceasing to be an effective force against Nazi aggression. This fact was due to her lack of success in Africa and the growing tension with the League of Nations and Great Britain. The only other direction was a reinsurance with the Little Entente. The December amnesty of a majority of the Socialists was a necessary prelude to any overtures to democratic Czechoslovakia, which coincided with a scaling down of the Creditanstalt’s debts to Britain from two hundred
million to sixty million. The Clerical Weltblatt attacked Italy for placing the South Tyrol Bishop of Brixen under military guard. The provincial press attacked Italy for conscripting unwilling Austrians of the South Tyrol for service in Ethiopia, and the New Year editorials in the pro-Italian Reichspost and in the Weltblatt, both showing an obvious official inspiration, expressed an unusual approval of the League's sanctions policy. 8

Again and again attempts were made on the Austrian side to avoid the threatening one-sidedness of her dependence on Italy through contacts with the front of the democratic states. On January 16, Schuschnigg undertook a trip to Prague where he spoke before the Prague Auto Club. He recalled the various attempts made to find a solution to the economic problems of the Danube region from the Act of Restoration at Geneva in August, 1922, to the Italo-Austro-Czechoslovakian Customs Agreement in 1925 and finally to the Rome Protocols of March, 1934. The success and extensions of these regional agreements led ultimately to Italy's proposal for a Danubian Conference to include Italy, France, and Germany. Schuschnigg expressed the hope that such a "thoroughly constructive attempt" to find a solution would again be discussed. "Experience shows that these regional economic agreements may be a vital factor in the reconstruction of the Central European financial system...."9 With reference to Schuschnigg's trip, the influential Narodni Listy of Prague said:

In Vienna it is generally recognized that the Prague trip of Schuschnigg could very easily influence future Austrian foreign policy for the main object of the Prague visit is Schuschnigg's conversations with the leading Czechoslovakian statesmen. With them, detailed negotiations are to
be initiated concerning a far-reaching Austrian approach to the Little Entente. The leading Austrian politicians are today no longer so firmly convinced as earlier that the tripartite Rome Protocols represent such a permanent and adequate pledge for Austrian independence. Even the leader of the Heimwehr had now perceived that the Italian 'Watch on the Bremner' has weakened. The Austrian governmental officials have come to the conviction that an approach to the Little Entente would insure a higher security of Austrian independence.\textsuperscript{10}

The Vienna \textit{Reichspost} stated editorially:

It must be recognized that with the appointment of Eden as the British Foreign Minister, with Roosevelt's message to Congress, and with the unseating of Laval by Flandin the sharp left course has experienced an accentuation. This left course in foreign policy means combat against aggressive imperialism, proscription of wars, loyal adherence to an international settlement, demand for the principle of collective security and strengthening of the League of Nations. All of the smaller and weaker states of the world must be counted in advance as followers of this course, but Austria perhaps more than any other country because she in her geopolitical position has a directly vital interest in this development.\textsuperscript{11}

On January 28, 1936, Starhemberg arrived in London to represent Austria at the funeral of George V and to engage in the post-funeral talks at the British Foreign Office. Italy alone abstained. According to Starhemberg, the British point of view was that the balance of power could best be upheld by adhering to the principles of the League Covenant and that the cause of peace could best be served by disciplining Italy to show that no attack on a member of the League would be tolerated. By defeating one dictator and one dictatorial regime, it would so weaken the other as to make his deposition easier.\textsuperscript{12} Opposed to this was the Austrian idea that only a strong Italy could maintain the balance of power in Europe. "Italian divisions on the Bremner are more important to us than the authority of the League of Nations. In order to defeat Hitler, Italy must be strong, for Mussolini is the natural enemy of Hitler and
a powerful Germany. If Mussolini finds that he cannot rely on the Western
Powers, then he will be forced to turn to Germany."13

Reporting the results of Starhemberg's London visit to the Council of
Ministers on January 31, Berger-Waldenegg said that at Starhemberg's
first meeting with Eden on January 28, a real security of Austrian in-
de-pendence was seen as representing a step toward the realization of an
international system of collective security. But since Italy was not
presently in a position to guarantee to Austria that independence,
Austria must pursue further the way recently entered upon toward a
rapprochement with the Little Entente. On January 29, following an
audience with King Edward, another conversation between Starhemberg
and Eden took place. As a result the British government declared it
would co-operate in guaranteeing Austrian independence against outside
attack. In return Starhemberg made the "almost forced declaration" in
the name of the federal government that Austria would resist every
attempt during the next few years to unfurl the restoration or revision
questions. Starhemberg was further given to understand that the British
cabinet had no wish to cut Germany out of any Middle European security
system. Eden told him that Britain would give the German Reich every
opportunity to take an energetic part in a new organization of the
Danube area.14 From London Starhemberg went to Paris for talks with
Foreign Minister Flandin. The trip brought little success, however, be-
cause of a clumsy effort on the part of the Legitimists which irritated
the Yugoslavian and Roumanian side. For they both took a strong position
against Legitimist tendencies in Austria. The heir-apparent, Archduke
Otto, arrived in Paris on February 5; and, even though Starhemberg refused
to see him, this considerably hampered the Prince for he had agreed not
to confer with Otto during the negotiations with the British and French
governments. Starhemberg wrote to Schuschnigg in his report on the
conversations:

The principal foundation of Austrian defence, the Stresa Front, is
tottering. England's anger against Italy is far greater than is generally
believed. From the fact that sanctions are not being applied with
rigour, it must not be wrongly deduced that England wishes to apply half-
measures in order to save her face. Italy will soon be isolated in
European politics. For the rift between England and Italy means to all
intents and purposes destruction of the Stresa Front, even if it re-
 mains formally in being. But Italy will not be willing to remain isolated.
Mussolini will eventually turn to Berlin, and a rapprochement may result
between Italy and Germany.

Starhemberg's plan for preventing a Rome-Berlin rapprochement in-
cluded a united front of the Rome Protocol states which should require
of Germany an acknowledgement of the independence of Austria, non-
interference in Austria's internal affairs, and a repudiation of National
Socialism in Austria. These pledges should be guaranteed by Italy and
Hungary. Such a guarantee would prevent Austria's having to negotiate
with Germany alone; and, since Italy was still a power in European poli-
tics, Germany might be willing to pay for her friendship. Schuschnigg
felt that Austria must hasten her rapprochement with the Little Entente
and prepare the way for a Danubian Front. But this would not be easy
for there was a fairly complete agreement within the Little Entente re-
garding their attitude toward Austria; and Berlin and Belgrade had very
close relations. The Yugoslavian Minister President, Stojadinovic,
especially held the conviction that Anschluss was the best possible
solution of the Austrian problem, for Anschluss would make impossible a
restoration in Austria and so prevent any opportunity for a reunion of
the old Austro-Hungarian lands. Chancellor Schuschnigg maintained that
the strongly marked inclination of the Yugoslavian premier critically
influenced the Czechoslovakian Minister President, Dr. Hodža. Unlike
Yugoslavia and Roumania, however, Hodža, one of the strongest defenders
of a constructive Middle European program, aspired to "a confirmed pact
of friendship, a non-interference pact, and perhaps even a pact of mutual
assistance between Czechoslovakia and Austria," as he declared in an
interview for the Paris Journal on February 12. Hodža expressed the
hope of winning Czechoslovakia's Entente partners, and even Hungary, for
his combination and to have Britain, France, Italy, and the Soviet Union
guarantee his Middle European Union. On the same day the Wiener Amtliche
Nachrichtenstelle announced that official French sources indicated the
possibility of an organization of the Danube area. "These possibilities
which appeared in the conversations of Federal Chancellor Dr. v. Schuschnigg
in Prague and which have been developed in Paris in the course of con-
versations of Foreign Minister Flandin with the leaders and statesmen of
the most interested states, will in the course of the next few weeks be
actively exploited." 19

Foreign Minister Koloman de Kanya of Hungary, on his return trip from
London to Budapest, stopped over in Vienna on February 4 for conferences
with Berger-Waldenegg. 20 While there he also met with Papen. Papen, in
a letter to Hitler, relates Kanya's question to Berger-Waldenegg of
whether Mussolini was exerting pressure on Vienna for negotiations and
reconciliation with Germany. Berger-Waldenegg's reply was an emphatic
"no," but that French pressure on Vienna was continuing as before extremely
strong. Kanya told Papen that it was important to work against French
pressure on Vienna. He had already recently told Mussolini that the French military attaché in Budapest was one of the greatest agitators against Italy. Now he would exert pressure on Mussolini to stimulate in Vienna the idea of normalizing Austro-German relations. In the same letter Papen records a conversation between Berger-Waldenegg and Italian Ambassador Preziosi which took place at the end of January and was designed to help calm Austria's fears over the Italo-German rapprochement. In reply to Berger-Waldenegg's question concerning the future security of Austria's independence and a possible restoration of the Stresa Front, Preziosi replied that the sovereignty and independence of Austria formed then as before the foundation stone of Italy's Danubian policy. Italy had in fact succeeded in reaching an agreement on the international and special questions of Middle European policy. This situation, however, was to Austria's interest. The Italian government intended to effect neither with Germany nor with any other power any agreements which could give the Federal government grounds for alarm. So long as Austria remained within the framework of the Rome Protocols, she could be certain of Italy's friendship and support. As far as the restoration of the Stresa Front was concerned, this Front belonged to the past. In all probability other solutions would have to be found which would come about under the participation of the German Reich in the economic rebuilding of the Danube area. Should German National Socialism still not renounce its pan-Germanic aspirations (which Italy referred to only in the case of Austria and the South Tyrol), perhaps the restoration of the Stresa Front would be possible in this or some other form. In either case the Italian government had emphasized that she aspired to a separation of
the European questions from the existing colonial opposition among the
powers. Papen deduced that Mussolini had modified his position in the
Austrian question and that the Austrian Foreign Minister was striving
to screen this weakness against others.21

The first refusal to enter into any discussions with a view toward
reorganization of the Danube area came from Yugoslavia. Then Italy
intervened. On February 19, Foreign Minister Berger-Waldenegg made a
trip to Florence to meet with Suvich, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs.
Then on March 3, Mussolini, in an address to his cabinet, said that
any attempt to solve the Danubian problem in Paris without Italy and by
ignoring Italian interests and those of states linked to Italy would be
futile. Then he announced that on March 18, 19, and 20, an Italio-
Austro-Hungarian meeting would take place in Rome within the framework
of the Rome Protocols "which in the first two years of its existence
had a definite effectiveness in strengthening the political and economic
relations between Budapest, Vienna and Rome." He also confirmed that
an exchange of views would take place between himself and Starhemberg.22
With this announcement Mussolini declared the projected plans for a
Danubian organization--especially Modža's plan--incompatible with the
Rome Pact.

On March 4, Starhemberg arrived in Rome. Before leaving Vienna he
had dispatched a telegram to Mussolini and caused it to be published in
Vienna:

United as we are with the Fascisti of Italy through bonds of a common
ideal, we Heimwehrmen share intimately all our Italian comrades' joys
and sorrows. For this reason your victories and successes in the last
few days fill us with proud and genuine happiness and we send to His
Excellency, Il Duce, our heartiest good wishes for the future, praying that this future may belong to fascism.\textsuperscript{23}

Starhemberg's trip to Rome was made reportedly on the initiative of Mussolini, but in this connection it is well to consider Papen's letter to Hitler of the previous month which contains the former's account of his conversation with Starhemberg. Concerning the Austro-German relations and the possibility of a compromise (\textit{Ausgleich}), Starhemberg maintained that it was too difficult to center discussion on details questions, but that any compromise or agreement should be treated from a larger conception. In other words, there should be found a common meeting ground--such as the Jewish-Freemasonry assault against fascism--as an expedient to give the discussions a sense of the possibility of a united front of Italy, Austria, Germany, and Hungary. This course would eliminate any question of prestige, encourage reciprocity, and still leave open the possibility of finding during the discussions a form in which the states could guarantee mutual integrity and at the same time satisfy the Austrian desire for security. Papen doubted Mussolini's willingness to lead such discussions in view of his accord with France. Starhemberg replied that Mussolini would agree to it, but that he had expressed no change of opinion recently over the Austro-German relations. Papen then wrote that the Vice-Chancellor intended as early as February 12 to personally contact Mussolini in order to speak with him about the Prince's London impressions and at the same time to find a platform for an Italo-Austro-German agreement. The middle of March, after Berger-Waldenegg's return from the Florence meeting with Suvich, was mentioned as the approximate date for Starhemberg's trip.\textsuperscript{24} This conversation would indicate that
Starhemberg was discouraged over the reception he had received in London and Paris, that he was turning again to Italy for support having reconciled himself to an Italo-German rapprochement, but that he still retained some hope for an independent Austria within a common front of Germany, Austria, Hungary, and Italy. Papen drew a similar conclusion from his impression that "the Prince feels indeed some uneasiness over the encirclement of Germany recently staged by Paris. He believes that an opportunely-restored understanding between Rome, Vienna, and Berlin can be thrown on the scale at the decisive and critical moment of the Anglo-Italian conflict." This would further indicate that Starhemberg made the trip to Rome in March on his own initiative and perhaps even encouraged Mussolini to allow an Austro-German agreement. Even if Starhemberg went to Rome with the intention of persuading Mussolini to acquiesce in a Rome-Vienna-Berlin agreement, the result can hardly be attributed to him, for Mussolini’s final decision was certainly influenced more by Germany’s action in the international field than by Starhemberg’s visit in Rome.

On March 7, Germany reoccupied the Rhineland. A memorandum was communicated to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in London by the German government respecting the Franco-Soviet Treaty, the Treaty of Locarno, and the Demilitarized Zone in the Rhineland. In it the German government declared itself ready to conclude new agreements for the creation of a system of security in Europe on the basis of several concrete proposals. One of these was to "repeat" their offer to conclude with the states bordering Germany in the east non-aggressive pacts similar to that with Poland.25 Since Germany, however, refused to be bound by
the Locarno agreements and had already abrogated the naval and military clauses of the Versailles Treaty, the effectiveness of Germany's recognition of Austrian independence, as given in Article 80 of that document, became exceedingly questionable. According to Starhemberg, Mussolini was "visibly disturbed":

Yes this is the beginning. You will see Germany will now rearm. In a very few years she will be fully armed and will be a danger to the whole of Europe.... The Western Powers will do nothing. What can they do? Germany will grow strong, she will grow too strong. It has not been possible to forbid Germany to rearm. One-sided rearmament will not do. Germany must not be too weak or she will go Bolshevist. Germany must be strong enough to resist Bolshevism, but she must not be strong enough to be a danger to Europe.... Some European organisation must be set up against Germany. Europe must compel Germany to respect her rights.26

On March 11, Ward Price of the Daily Mail interviewed Hitler and asked him if Germany's offer of non-aggression pacts to the states east of Germany applied equally to Austria and Czechoslovakia. Hitler replied that his proposal was a "universal one." No exceptions were intended and the offer included Austria and Czechoslovakia.27

On March 13 and 14, Chancellor Schuschnigg and Foreign Minister Berger-Waldenegg made a visit to Budapest intended as an affirmation of the Italo-Austro-Hungarian alliance.28 On March 20, these two men, together with Minister President Gömbös and Foreign Minister Kanya of Hungary, went to Rome. The object of this conference was to discuss the projected commercial treaty between Austria and Czechoslovakia and the plans of Schuschnigg and Hodža for an economic pact as a precursor of a political agreement between the Rome Protocol States and the Little Entente. Starhemberg had found Mussolini agreeable to a Vienna-Prague rapprochement29 but Hungary had not abandoned her hope for revision and
refused to co-operate with the Little Entente. As a consequence the Hodža plan was discarded. The three governments agreed not to undertake any political negotiations with a third government concerning the Danubian question without a previous consultation with the other two governments; and for this purpose a permanent organ of "reciprocal consultation" composed of the three foreign ministers was created. It was also decided that any intensification of economic relations with other Danube states must be through bilateral agreements; so Austria was left free to reach an agreement with Czechoslovakia even though Hungary refused to participate. The obvious advantage of this closer harmonizing of action lay with Italy. It meant essentially that the policy of the bloc would be the policy of Italy. Supposedly it assured Austria against any secret Italo-German agreement at her expense, but it also meant that Italy could block the organization of any general security system in the Danube Basin which both England and France wanted. Political negotiations with the Western Powers or with the Little Entente became for Austria practically impossible. A commercial treaty with Czechoslovakia on April 2 and a cultural agreement with France on April 3 were the meager results of the political work of the past winter. Austria no longer retained freedom of action but still had the support of the essentially strengthened Rome Protocols. Only a few months later, however, this security was cancelled by the German-Italian policy.

On April 1, Schuschnigg announced in the Nationalrat that compulsory service for all males between eighteen and forty-two would be introduced. The recent conference in Rome had indicated that Mussolini would support the Austrian and Hungarian demands for the introduction of conscription
and rearmament. The precedent had already been established by Germany; so the other powers of the Stresa Front took no position in opposition to Austria. On April 6, the Little Entente handed identical notes of protest to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs,32 which were answered in a brief reply on the same day.33 On May 4, the federal government issued a lengthy memorandum explaining that the law provided for "compulsory service" (Dienstpflcht) not for "compulsory military service" (Wehrpflicht). The provision for "service with or without arms" allowed the government to employ conscripts in public works, military training, or in an emergency in the defense of their country. The law was also justified on grounds of health, training, economy, and defense.34 The effect of the introduction of conscription in Austria was more pronounced on the domestic scene than on the international scene, for it resulted in a decisive change in the political leadership of the state. On April 25, before the announcement of conscription, there had been a meeting of all the Heimwehr district commanders. A communiqué issued later emphasized that Starhemberg and Schuschnigg were in accord on all political issues and indicated that the Heimwehr would continue its support of the government. Starhemberg did announce, however, that the organization would be dissolved in the near future as a regular army based on conscription was being organized which would replace all private armies.35 The following day Starhemberg declared before twelve thousand Heimwehr members at Horn that the Heimwehr "will never be disarmed except over my dead body." The aim of the Heimwehr was to capture the Fatherland Front and to uproot the weeds in it. The Heimwehr would reform public life and cleanse it of the profiteers of authoritarian Austria.36 At the same time
Schuschnigg's speech at Baden contained many assertions of complete unanimity of view with Starhemberg. Schuschnigg spoke without knowledge of the Himm speech but presumably with full knowledge of Starhemberg's speech at the private conference of Heimwehr leaders in Vienna the day before. This was the first indication of a serious rift within the government ranks. On May 10, the Freiheitsbund, the defense organization of the Christian trade unions which as the democratic wing of the Christian Social party stood in sharp opposition to the Heimwehr, organized a May Day celebration. As the groups were marching around the Ringstrasse, Heimwehr members attempted to disrupt the procession. Seemingly by chance, Emil Fey made an appearance in the midst of the marchers, and then Schuschnigg suddenly placed himself in the ranks of the workers and allowed the police to arrest seventy Heimwehr men. 37 On the same day Starhemberg sent a congratulatory telegram to Mussolini upon the conquest of Abyssinia:

In the consciousness of Fascist unity, participating most fervently in the destiny of Fascist Italy, I wholeheartedly congratulate Your Excellency in the name of the struggle for the Fascist idea and in my own name on the glorious and splendid victory of the Italian Fascist arms over the barbarians, for the victory of the Fascist spirit over democratic dishonesty and hypocrisy and the victory of Fascist sacrifice and disciplined resolution over demagogic mendacity. Long live the steadfast leader of victorious Fascist Italy, long live the victory of the Fascist idea in the world. 38

In most bombastic words it will be noted that the expression "Fascist" occurs no less than eight times while the democratic powers are charged with dishonesty, hypocrisy and demagogic mendacity. The English, French, and Czechoslovakian ambassadors demanded satisfaction. Starhemberg had more than acted unstatesmanlike; he had made himself ridiculous. On the night of May 13 a council of ministers took place at which Starhemberg together with Berger-Waldenegg was dismissed from the government. Schuschnigg
assumed the office of Foreign Affairs himself; and Major Baar Baarenfels, leader of the Heimwehr in Lower Austria, became Vice-Chancellor. Starhemberg was forced to relinquish his leadership in the Fatherland Front which also went to Schuschnigg; Guido Zernatto became the Secretary-General. With the fall of Starhemberg the Fascist direction in Austrian domestic politics was dispatched, and the Clerico-Fascist Heimwehr partnership created by Dollfuss ended. Telegrams were sent to Mussolini and Gömbös giving assurance that there would be no alterations in Austria’s domestic and foreign policies which would continue to be guided by the Rome Protocols. On May 16, Mussolini sent a telegram to Schuschnigg confirming his friendly sentiments and assuring Schuschnigg that faithfulness to the Protocols of Rome remained one of the cornerstones of the policy of Fascist Italy. In a declaration of program Schuschnigg spoke of a broadening of the Fatherland Front to include all classes and groups in the population. Zernatto wrote that despite the sensationalism involved in the cabinet reshuffle, it remained a compromise as the Heimwehr retained more representatives than any other group, a National representation had been avoided, and the leadership of the Fatherland Front went to Schuschnigg. The elimination of Starhemberg was naturally the most important development, and it had two important results. The democratically-oriented groups in the Fatherland Front welcomed Schuschnigg’s leadership, and the confidence of the Catholic circles was restored to the government.

It is hardly thinkable that Starhemberg would have been dropped without the consent of Mussolini. Zernatto claims that the Duce had let it be known that he considered it important that a further step be taken
toward internal pacification. It was his wish above all else to settle
the Austrian question which alone stood in the way of an Italo-German
agreement. Such an agreement could also conclusively secure to Austria
a guarantee of her independence. Schuschnigg, wrote Zernatto, had reason
to assume that the National Socialist government of the Reich would be
willing to undertake such a guarantee when the various groups and person-
alities in Austrian domestic politics, which lived with the National
Socialists in irreconciliable hostility, were disposed of or at least
restricted in their influence. The importance of concluding an agreement
with the German Reich and coming to a peaceful solution presented to
Schuschnigg the opportunity of reducing the influence of the Heimwehr,
the most offensive and unconditionally anti-National Socialist group,
to a more unimportant position.\(^{42}\)

The Italian ambassador in Vienna, Preziosi, stood close to Heimwehr
circles. The moment that the dualism in Austria was removed, Mussolini
switched for his personal contact with Schuschnigg the person of the
president of the Italian Cultural Institute in Vienna, Francesco Salata.
Salata acted as the direct contact between Chancellor Schuschnigg and the
Italian Chief of Government until July, 1936, when he himself was named
Minister.\(^{43}\) Salata was a long-standing believer in the idea of the
removal of dualism in Austria and of the assumption of single leadership
by Schuschnigg. To his influence can perhaps be traced the fact that
Mussolini reconciled himself to an Austrian solution by which Starhemberg,
his personal friend, was eliminated.

At the end of May, the Austrian military attache in Rome dispatched
a top-secret report to Vienna which said that the position of the Italian
press in the last weeks in relation to Germany had become conspicuously more friendly. All of the symptoms of an improvement in Italo-German relations, the report read, were undoubtedly designed to make an impression on France. For Italy the uncertain position of her future relation to France was very unpleasant since it was still not known how the new French Socialist government would react to Fascist Italy in general, much less to the question of the lifting of sanctions and recognition of the Italian success in East Africa. In order to impress upon France the value of Italian friendship in Europe and the possibility of an approach to Germany in case of French unfriendliness toward Italy, all of the friendly gestures toward Germany were being made. "It is entirely certain that Italy will in no case change her policy toward Austria or conclude new friendships behind her back. The maintenance of Austrian independence is for Italy most important, even a question of life for her position in Middle Europe."44 There is no reason to dismiss the report of the Austrian military attaché as naive, for in March when Schuschnigg received the advice from Mussolini recommending internal pacification, the Duce had most likely not made a definite decision. His purpose could well have been to utilize the threat of a rapprochement with Germany to force Britain and France into a recognition of his conquest of Abyssinia. But to make this threat effective, he had first to convince the Western Democracies that the old antagonisms between Italy and Germany over Austria were settled. This can account for his urging Schuschnigg to a settlement with Germany. At the same time, Mussolini held the threat of a revitalized Stresa Front over Hitler. Thus his policy was more complicated than Zematto indicated, and the attaché's observations were
rather astute. However, Britain and France were not particularly anxious to buy Italy's support; and Italy was gradually drawn closer to Germany than Mussolini at first intended.

Three events in June pointed up rather conclusively a definite approach by Italy to Germany. On June 5, Schuschnigg met with Mussolini at Rocca delle Caminate. Here he was given to understand that only an agreement between Germany and Italy could represent any guarantee for Austria. As Ciano expressed to Schuschnigg: "It is most disagreeable to have the Germans as enemies; but, believe me, even as friends they are not quite easy." Schuschnigg left Venice satisfied, but then on June 6, occurred the change most conclusively evident of a new course in Italian foreign policy in the direction of an alliance with Germany. On that date Under-Secretary of State Suvich, one of the creators of the Rome Pact who even during the sharpest conflict over sanctions had never let the wire from Rome to Geneva break and who at the end of the Abyssinian war had already spoken of a "return of Italy to the Stresa Front," had to step down; and his successor became Mussolini's son-in-law, Count Ciano, whose wife even at that time was on a visit in Germany. Berger-Waldenegg characterized the Suvich-Ciano switch in the following manner:

The first, filled with a huge distrust of the National Socialists, could imagine the preservation of an independent Austria to a certain extent only in a battle against National Socialist Germany; while the latter, who was more sympathetic to the line of thought of the Third Reich, on the contrary assured support of the guarantee for Austria precisely in an agreement with Germany.

In France the Popular Front government had come into power. It was particularly concerned about the Austrian situation, and the French Foreign
Minister, Yvon Delbos, began conversations which included the Austrian question with Eden. They extended personal invitations to Schuschnigg to meet them at the General Assembly of the League in Geneva. On June 30, Schuschnigg officially admitted that he had refused on the grounds that he was too busy at home; and the New York Times reported that "behind this apparently discourteous attitude of the present government of Austria, which was rescued from disaster and has been subsequently supported by the League, and especially by Britain and France, is of course, the anti-League influence of Italy." On July 11, the day on which the Austro-German Agreement was signed, Italy sent a refusal to participate in the preparatory meeting of the Locarno Powers which was to take place at Brussels because of "certain Mediterranean obligations which form an obstacle to Italy's participation in the work of international co-operation in which she is so earnestly interested."

At home renewed National Socialist agitation in June and July caused the Austrian government to extend the ban on German newspapers for three months from the middle of June. Stench bombs were dropped in the State Opera House in Vienna several days later apparently in an attempt to discourage tourist attendance, and as a consequence forty-eight National Socialists were sent to concentration camps. On June 19, an alleged plot to disrupt the Salzburg music festival by means of tear gas and stench bombs was discovered, bringing with it the arrest of thirteen persons. On the same day, German frontier guards refused to let Austrian workers cross the border to their jobs in Germany. As late as July 6 cardboard bombs were thrown by National Socialists in the Prater and elsewhere where there were crowds in Vienna. On June 21, the National
Socialists and the Socialists staged a demonstration against the visiting Italian team at a soccer match when the team entered the stadium and gave the Fascist salute.55

On July 11, 1936, there was a simultaneous publication in Vienna and in Berlin of the text of the German-Austrian communiqué announcing the "Gentlemen's Agreement" between Adolf Hitler and Kurt von Schuschnigg:

Convinced of contributing to the general progress in Europe toward the maintenance of peace, and
Believing that the manifold reciprocal interests of the two German States might thereby best be served, the Governments of the German Reich and of the Federal State of Austria have decided to restore their relations to normality and friendship.56

Three declarations were made. The German Reich recognized the full sovereignty of the Federal State of Austria. The internal political structure of each country, including National Socialism in Austria, was to be regarded as a domestic affair of that country which the other would influence neither directly nor indirectly. The Austrian government acknowledged itself to be a German State and would maintain a policy, with particular regard to the German Reich, based on this principle. Specifically exempted from this co-ordination of foreign policy were the Rome Protocols of 1934, the Supplementary Protocols of 1936, and Austria's position with regard to Italy and Hungary as parties to these Protocols.

Previously, a draft of the Agreement had been prepared in Vienna by the Austrian government together with Franz von Papen and carried by the latter to Germany. Schuschnigg affirmed that there, "with minor alterations," the draft was "accepted by Hitler without further formality, by either Hitler or the Austrian Government."57 The communiqué was confirmed the same evening in a broadcast by Schuschnigg to the Austrian people and one
to the German people by Dr. Joseph Goebbels, the Reich Minister of Propaganda. The broadcasts were to have been accompanied by some favor-
able comment. Schuschnigg, speaking as Chief of the Austrian government, expressed the hope and confidence that the agreement would "prove its value not only to the great German nation and to our Austria, that is to say to the two German States, not only to the whole German people, but also to the peaceful development of Europe..."58 but he received his first disappointment when Goebbels "perfunctorily read through the agreement without a single word of comment."59 In addition to the publication of the communiqué and the confirmations by broadcast, two exchanges of telegrams were made. One was between Schuschnigg and Hitler in which Schuschnigg expressed the conviction "that the effect of this treaty will bring profit to Austria and the German Reich and thus prove a blessing to the entire German people." Hitler joined to it the hope that "by this Agreement the traditional relations resulting from a community of race and historic identity through hundreds of years might again be restored, in order to clear the way for a further common task to the advantage of the German people and for the consolidation of the peace in Europe."50 The other was between Schuschnigg and Mussolini in which Schuschnigg expressed the conviction that the Duce would be satisfied with the accord; he also expressed his firm desire to proceed on the basis of the Rome Protocols, and Mussolini greeted the accord with satisfaction as a "step on the way of European reconstruction" and in the same spirit that "the question was discussed at the meeting at Rocca Delle Caminate and later examined on the basis of the Italo-Austro-Hungarian accord." Mussolini was glad to exchange assurances of "perfect friendship"
in conformity with the Rome Protocols which continued to be the basis of the relations between Italy and Austria.61

Looking at the facade presented by the communiqué, the declarations were certainly favorable to Austria. The first two articles were all that Schuschnigg demanded of Germany and the third was generally recognized by the majority of Austrians. But the real terms of the Gentlemen’s Agreement were not published nor were they confirmed in the broadcasts. This part, which was by far the longest and most important, contained the secret provisions—the personal agreement between Hitler and Schuschnigg. This agreement provided for the regulation of the treatment of Reich-Germans in Austria and of Austrian Nationals—the exiles—in the Reich. Associations of their nationals in either country were not to be hindered in their activities as long as they complied with the laws in force and did not interfere in domestic politics. As regards cultural relations, any aggressive utilization of radio, motion picture, newspaper, and theatrical facilities against the other party was to be renounced. There was to be a gradual elimination of restrictions on cultural exchange and the sale of works of authors of either country. The respective presses of both parties were to refrain from exerting political influence and from printing criticism offensive to public opinion in the other country. The importation and distribution of five Austrian newspapers in Germany and of five German newspapers in Austria, including the Essener National-Zeitung, Göring’s own propaganda organ, but not the Völkischer Beobachter, was permitted, effective immediately.62

The Austrian government was to proceed to the examination of the return to Austria of the Austrian National Socialist exiles in the Reich and to
announce the result to a joint commission which would put an agreement into effect. Each government agreed to place the nationals of the other party on an equal footing with nationals of third states in regard to the display of the national insignia of their country. The German Reich announced its preparedness to open the way for normal economic relations between the two countries. Restrictions on tourist traffic, except for maximum quotas, were to be lifted; and relatives, commercial travelers, sick persons, and athletes (especially members of the German-Austrian Alpine Association [Deutsch-Österreichischer Alpenverein] were to receive preferential treatment. The Austrian government declared its preparedness to conduct its foreign policy in the light of the peaceful endeavors of the German government's foreign policy.63

In the months that followed, the illegal party in Austria, the National Socialists in Germany, the Austrian exiles, and the German government made an empty and ridiculous mockery of a personal agreement between two heads of state and a solemn treaty between two "sovereign" states. That is, except for one paragraph--Paragraph IX, "Austrian Declaration on Domestic Policy in Relation to This Modus Vivendi":

The Federal Chancellor declares that he is prepared:

a) to grant a far-reaching political amnesty, from which persons who have committed serious public crimes shall be excluded. Also covered by this amnesty shall be persons who have not yet been sentenced by judicial decree or penalized by administrative process. These provisions shall also be duly applied to émigrés.

b) for the purpose of promoting a real pacification, to appoint at the appropriate moment, contemplated for the near future, representatives of the so-called "National Opposition in Austria" to participate in political responsibility; they shall be men who enjoy the personal confidence of the Federal Chancellor and whose selection he reserves to himself. It is agreed, in this connection, that persons trusted by the Federal Chancellor shall be charged with the task of arranging, in accordance with a plan worked out with the Federal Chancellor, for the internal pacification of the National Opposition and for its participation in the shaping of the political will in Austria.64
What did this article mean to Austria? One observer writes that it "meant nothing more nor less than that, once safely within the beleaguered Government of independent Austria, the occupants of the Trojan horse were to emerge and open the gates to the entire hostile army." Starhemberg says that "whereas Hitler made practically no concessions in regard to Austria, but merely acknowledged independence in a manner not particularly binding, Austria to all intents and purposes renounced her right to carry on the struggle against the Nazis.... The point is that the Austrian Front is psychologically broken." In an official dispatch of October, 1934, Messersmith writes "that Chancellor Hitler himself" believed "that the way to be followed is to get representatives of the National Socialist Party into the penetration...for it is certain...once a militant, even though small, National Socialist minority gets representation in the cabinet, it will be the forerunner of absorption." To Schuschnigg it was an appeasement and a conciliation:

the principles are clearly laid down which should guide a possible development greatly desired by us, to open to everybody the way of political cooperation.... I was ready and resolved to spare no effort to reach the desired goal; to smooth the path of conciliation within and without and re-establish the situation corresponding to the natural relation between two German states who have so much in common, not only in language and culture but also in history and destiny.

"The relations between Austria and Germany are now on a lasting and firm basis.... Hitler of his own free will has offered mutual contracts of guarantee," Schuschnigg is reported to have said to Martin Fuchs in a private conversation shortly after July 11. But in his book, Austrian Requiem, Schuschnigg writes that because Austrian foreign policy could no longer be based on Italian support against Germany, it was necessary "to
legalize the existing relations with Germany by some sort of public agreement." This was to be a temporary expedient until the normal power balance in Europe could be re-established. Reich Minister Goebbels was right when he expressed himself to a journalist at a conference which took place that evening in the Propaganda Ministry: "This Agreement is the hypothesis for a January 30, 1933, in Austria." Austria could no longer enter into foreign political transactions without breaking the pact and could make no arrangements which were not agreeable to the German Reich. Only her relations with Italy and Hungary, stemming from the Rome Protocols, were granted Austria—-with two states which were already more closely allied with Germany than herself.

In Italy, the signing of the accord was received calmly. Mussolini had energetically stressed the importance of such a move to Schuschnigg during the latter's visit to Rocca della Caminite in June. Ciano informed Count Louis Charles de Chambrun, French Ambassador to Rome, on the day of the signing that Italy had followed the development of the Austro-German modus vivendi from the beginning. There was no reason then for surprise in the Italian camp. The same day Hassell, German Ambassador in Italy, had a conversation with Mussolini during which he mentioned the conclusion of the Austro-German Agreement. Mussolini, according to Hassell, expressed "lively satisfaction over the event, which would bring an end to the unhappy situation of Austria as a football of foreign interests and, above all, would finally remove the last and only mortgage on German-Italian relations." On July 14, according to a memorandum by Ministerial Director Dieckhoff of the German Foreign Ministry, the Italian Ambassador called to state that the Head of the Italian government had received the news of
the Agreement with great satisfaction and that he was determined to pursue a policy parallel to that of the German Reich. This agreement represented a compromise between Germany and Italy, upon the maintenance of which good relations between the two countries depended. It was a truce in the struggle for influence in the Danube Basin which came as a welcome relief to Italy in view of her commitments in Abyssinia and the political and economic difficulties which fell to her lot as a result of the sanctions conflict.

What Hitler actually thought about the Agreement, the later Gauleiter of Carinthia, Dr. Friedrich Rainer, described in a speech before the Führerkorps of the Carinthia Gau. On July 16, five days after the conclusion of the Agreement, Hitler received a delegation of the illegal Austrian National Socialists, among them Rainer and Odilo Globočnik, another Gauleiter of the N.S.D.A.P., and said: "My political actions do not discharge my duty to Austria.... I still need two years in order to carry out my policy. As long as the party in Austria keeps discipline... I am indeed the faithful Eckehard of Austria. I will not forget you." Such declarations passed down from the leadership of the Austrian N.S.D.A.P. to the ranks of the members. But there were further manifestations of the violation of the spirit of the pact. On July 23, there appeared in the Vöskischer Beobachter a summons to the Landesleitung Austria--this fact alone was a flagrant violation of the July Agreement--under the title "Achtet des Führers Pakt":

We National Socialists of Austria have understood the Führer.... We will strictly obey the treaty, point by point, which he has concluded; but we will demand the same from our opponent.... In order for this peace to be lasting, he must make allowance for the existence of a compact,
indestructible National Socialist movement and community of opinion [Gesinnungsgemeinschaft] in Austria. Every deception or continued dissatisfaction will bring a determined defense to each battle. We stand on our demands and peace or war will depend on the sincerity of the Austrian government.

This summons indicates as the least demand the recognition of an organized National Socialist movement in Austria, a party besides the Fatherland Front, and annuls the text of the July Agreement. This contradiction of interpretation is seen in the official communique of the Austrian government of July 12, which emphasized that National Socialism in Austria came into question neither as a political factor nor as a treaty partner; the Austrian domestic policy remained unchanged; the only organization of the formation of the political opinion (politischen Willensbildung) in Austria was the Fatherland Front whose course remained unchanged and beside which there might exist no other political organization.77 Such tactics foreshadowed the general policy of the National Socialists in the twenty months between July 11, 1936, and March 13, 1938. First cautiously, then more openly an organized unit made an appearance as opposition party to the government; behind this opposition party stood the German Reich with its diplomatic and military power.

The immediate results of the Gentlemen's Agreement were the inclusion of Major General Edmund Glaise-Horstenau, a representative of the National Opposition who had been with Hitler at the Obersalzberg the day before the signing,78 in the cabinet as Minister without Portfolio; the appointment of Guido Schmidt as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; the formal lifting of the thousand-marks ban in the late autumn of 1936; the effecting of an amnesty for National Socialists as early as July 23--only twelve days after the conclusion of the pact; and the promotion of Papen from Envoy to
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the German Reich on Special Mission. Ambassador Papen returned to Vienna on July 21 and immediately had a long consultation with the Federal Chancellor reassuring and informing him of the intentions of the German government with regard to individual points in the Gentlemen's Agreement. Less than two months later, in a report to Hitler dated September 1, 1936, Papen discloses the following plans for his revised strategy: 1) obtaining a change in personnel in the Ministry of Security in due course, 2) obtaining corporative representation of the Nazi movement in the Fatherland Front, 3) not putting avowed National Socialists in important positions yet, but using "Nationalist" personalities, and 4) using economic pressure and "patient psychological treatment, with slowly intensified pressure directed at changing the regime." Later still, in a report of the political consequences of the Agreement one year after its promulgation, Papen records that the conclusion of the July Agreement was motivated by three ideas:

1) To exclude Austria to a great extent from international discussion,
2) To wreck the growing efforts toward a restoration of the Habsburgs,
3) To pave the way for the spiritual influencing of Austria by the Reich in order to prevent the creation of an indigenous Austrian culture.

Papen added that "It may be stated with satisfaction today [July 1, 1937] that the Agreement has essentially achieved its purpose." Recognizing the well-known tendency of Hitler to vacillate in his policies and the ability of the Reich officials to maintain simultaneous and parallel but completely different points of view, it is nevertheless logical to assume that Papen's strategy was essentially that of the higher authorities in view of the fact that he was "directly subordinated" to Hitler and that his
promotion was indicative of confidence and official support.

On July 16, 1936, Rainer and Globocnig had visited the Führer at the Obersalzberg where they received his strict orders of non-interference on the part of the Austrian N.S.D.A.P. A warning was published in the official Wiener Zeitung on July 25, "not to take advantage of the Austrian Government's clemency and desire for reconciliation by resuming political activities, which will not be tolerated and will be severely punished." Both remained ineffective. On July 29, new National Socialist tumults broke out in Vienna and Linz in connection with the Olympic torch celebration. Hundreds of National Socialists, brought from all parts of Austria, mingled with the crowds gathered in the Heldenplatz to watch the passing of the torch to the runner who was to carry it on its next stage in its journey to Berlin from Athens. The Federal President, other members of the government, and the Diplomatic Corps were present and prepared to make official speeches. The National Socialists--organized at the time into the German Athletic League (Deutscher Turnerbund, which received "preferential treatment" in tourist traffic)--interrupted the celebration with a well-prepared demonstration in favor of the Anschluss. Chanting and shouting of "Sieg Heil" and "Heil Hitler" broke out and the forbidden Horst Wessel was sung. The National Socialists created such a disturbance that, in the words of Starhemberg, "the President of the Olympic Games Committee had to break off in his speech" and "the wireless transmission of the proceedings had also to be interrupted to conceal the effect of the demonstration from the Austrian public." In the judgment of the Fascist prince, "The Nazis had given the Government the best possible opportunity for denouncing the July Agreement and for establishing clear-cut relations." But, he continued, the government "made no use of it"
because it was "anxious to ignore what the scandalous events on the Heldemplatz made clear to every Austrian present," and so the "campaign to hush matters up started the following day." Schuschnigg writes in a recent affidavit:

As was admitted by the German propaganda machine after March 1936, this demonstration was staged with the agreement and participation of Reich German party offices. Its effect was to paralyze the agreements of July 11, 1936, which had been concluded a few weeks previously, and which were unfavorable to the National Socialist illegal party in Austria.

The Times (London), in its issue of August 1, 1936, declared:

Whereas the agreement on paper was entirely in favour of the Austrian Government, in practise the only effect so far inside Austria has been to bring about a resumption of Nazi activity. If it were only going to bring trouble, and no advantages, the agreement would soon lose its attraction for the Austrian Government.... But the only thing that would have any permanent value for them is the certainty that such outbreaks will not recur.

To a greater degree than the Agreement itself, the energetic steps taken by the Austrian government against all further National Socialist attempts to create disorder in Austria contributed to a more peaceful state of affairs for the rest of the year. Still, overt acts of pressure against Austria continued. Germany purchased agricultural products only from proven members of the National Socialist Party in Austria. German buyers of cattle and wood made their transactions dependent upon the membership of the Austrian dealer in the illegal party. Notwithstanding the alleged removal of the thousand-marks barrier, a further decree was enacted which prevented German visitors from taking more than five Reichsmarks with them to Austria. German motorists in Austria were obliged to display the Swastika flag on their cars if they did not want to incur persecution by the Gestapo upon return to the Reich. Reich German guest speakers in Vienna
abused Austrian hospitality in the most flagrant manner.  

Meanwhile the foreign political situation in Europe intensified even further. On July 19, 1936, civil war broke out in Spain. General Franco was supported by Italy and Germany. On the other side, England, France, and the Soviet Union placed themselves with the Republicans; so that the fronts were drawn which a few years later would stand opposed to one another in the Second World War. The Spanish civil war united Germany and Italy in a military front; there still remained, however, to close the narrow strip which the Axis missed in Austria. Hungary at that time followed completely the revisionist line and simultaneously the German policy in Poland and Yugoslavia. In the last-named country there was a remarkable inclination toward Italy which up to this time had seemed impossible. The Axis spread essentially to the East, the influence of the Western Powers in middle and south Europe was shut out, and a tight ring drawn around Austria and Czechoslovakia.  

On October 9, Schuschnigg dissolved the para-military formations and allowed only the militia of the Fatherland Front to exist. This action centered around the Heimwehr and its leaders. Previously, on September 14, the Vienna Heimwehr, under the influence of Fey and Lahr, Vice-Mayor of Vienna, decided to depose Starhemberg as its leader and to reinstate Fey. Accordingly, it proceeded to the formal election of Fey on September 30, whereupon the national council of Heimwehr leaders, under the domination of Starhemberg, excluded Fey and Lahr from the organization. Starhemberg, in his memoirs, claims that this house-cleaning was encouraged and requested by Schuschnigg, but that he was tricked by the Chancellor for the latter suddenly took the part of Fey and Lahr. Starhemberg
believed that Schuschnigg's original plans were to give him more authority and power, but the Chancellor's course of action has generally been interpreted to mean that he sought gradually to reduce the power of individual Heimwehr leaders and replace the separate Fascist military organizations by a single body. Schuschnigg sincerely believed that his action in dissolving the armed formations was in the interests of his regime, which he identified with the interests of his country. However, Zernatto, his close collaborator, is of the opinion that the dissolution was the worst mistake of his government. Zernatto's judgment is very probably influenced by his active allegiance to the Heimwehr, but according to him Schuschnigg expected that his action would make it easier for the "national forces" to co-operate with the government and that it would strengthen the confidence of the workers in his regime; both groups had their reasons for hating the Heimwehr. A judgment on the dissolution of the Heimwehr can hardly be more clear than the plea of the state prosecutor, Dr. Mayer-Maly, at the Schmidt trial:

Let these defense organizations be dissolved. This dissolution would have been a measure understandable and right in itself if it had had the purpose and also the effect that for this the workers, the democratic populace, had decided to co-operate; in return they would have been given back their democratic rights. But by no means! The government disarmed its own defense organizations which were still useful against German aggression and on the other hand had not succeeded in gaining the co-operation of the workers. The government has, therefore, entirely without motivation and completely unfounded, to a degree narrowed its own platform.

In the same vein, Starhemberg would justify disbandment if a peaceful development could have been expected in Austria, if the Socialist working classes could have been won over, if workers' battalions had been set up and the basis of the government enlarged, and if the militant section
released from political ties had been immediately gathered into a new organization more directly under the influence of the Chancellor and the Fatherland Front. It is unfortunate that at that time the power in Austria rested on the Heimwehr. As a consequence the dissolution of the defense organizations was a severe blow to the independence of Austria. The Chancellor's expectations were not fulfilled; and many members of the organization, who had answered for them and offered personal sacrifice, either withdrew their support or retired disappointed from public affairs.

Italy continued to employ her dual diplomacy with the representatives of Germany and Austria; but it was largely to pacify the Austrians for Italian policy followed more and more closely the path of the Wilhelmstrasse. On September 15, Schmidt and Berger-Waldenegg met with Ciano and Mussolini at Rocca della Caminate. The purpose was to establish the normal contact foreseen by the Rome Protocols, and Schmidt appealed strongly for the maintenance of the present economic relations between the two states. This support was now more important than ever in maintaining Austrian autonomy and independence from Germany. Ciano assured Schmidt that their relations would "always be guided by political good sense" and would "bear the stamp of the friendship which binds the two countries."  

On the twenty-third of the month, Hans Frank, Minister without Portfolio, was in Rome. Frank, according to Ciano, said that German government circles considered the Austrian question to have been settled by the July Agreement. The Duce replied that Austrian-Italian relations were "most friendly" and recalled that it was he himself who suggested to Schuschnigg
that he support an understanding with Germany because Austria was a
German country and was too weak to pursue an anti-German policy. "He
is happy to note how much relations between Austria and Germany have
improved." At the invitation of the Fascist party, some three hundred
members of the Fatherland Front went to Rome on October 6. Among them
was Zernatto who had opportunity to speak with Mussolini, Ciano, Alfieri,
Starace, and other Italian leaders. From them he gained the impression
that the aim of Italian policy was to avoid every area of friction between
Germany and Austria. It can be seen that the independence of Austria
was represented as self-evident. Schuschnigg, immediately after the
meeting of the Council of Ministers which dissolved the Heimwehr, flew
to Budapest for the funeral of Gömbös who had died on October 6. While
there, he met and talked with Göring for the first time. Schuschnigg
impressed Göring as a pronounced ideologist but also as one justifying
a certain confidence in his capabilities and his aims. According to a
German memorandum of the meeting, the Austrian Chancellor expressed his
concern regarding the Anschluss. Göring is paraphrased as saying that:

...if Germany desired an Anschluss, it would have occurred long ago. That
was a question which ultimately concerned only the nearest German divisional
commander. Schuschnigg himself would surely not assume that Italy, in
such an event, would hasten to the aid of Austria, if he stopped to think
that, after all, there were the British, too, for whom nothing could be
more opportune than that Mussolini should become involved in Austria in
this manner. At any rate, he personally was convinced that in case
of an Anschluss the Italians would not intervene with troops in favor of
Austria. Besides, it was useless to talk of an annexation [Anschluss]; it
would be preferable to choose the word partnership [Zusammenschluss],
which was surely possible in many fields. In this regard he was thinking
in particular of currency unification and a common tariff policy.

Göring spoke assuredly of a reliance on Italy in a way not unwarranted. Later
that month Ciano was in Rome and Foreign Minister Neurath expressed his
satisfaction to Ciano over Schuschnigg's complete consolidation of his position. Ciano "fully concurred." Neurath opposed the elevation of Germany's diplomatic representation in Austria to Embassy status as did Ciano; but the latter agreed that if it should come to that, Italy would act in full accord with Germany and on the same day. 94 From Berlin Ciano went to Berchtesgaden for a meeting with Hitler, which added the finishing touches to the Rome-Berlin Axis. 95 In Berlin a secret protocol had been agreed upon which included a common fight against Communism, co-operation and consultation over the possibility of an economic coalition in the Danube Basin, and the execution of the July Agreement. 96 On October 24, the government of the German Reich gave official recognition to the Italian Empire in Abyssinia. 97 In a statement following his Berlin visit, Ciano said that in the light of the Rome Protocol and the Austro-German Agreement "we were able to state to our mutual satisfaction the practical and positive results to the benefit of Austria which this policy has already brought about." 98 Berger-Waldenegg wrote from Rome that the policy of Ciano had carried his calculations of the changed situation in the right direction. "Victory in Africa was won thanks to the weak position of the western democracies; and Europe, disputing in Geneva with its judicial sophistry [Spitzfindigkeiten] and empty words, was surprised by the creation of an Italian people's army on the broadest basis. Now the way was free to settle the Austrian question concerning Berlin." 99 On November 1, Mussolini publicly used the term "axis" for the first time. In a speech at Milan he said that the Agreement of July 11 opened a new era in the history of modern Austria, that he had known of and approved the agreement since June 5, and that this
agreement strengthened that country and further guaranteed its independence.

Then he spoke of a great country which had earned the sympathy of the masses of the Italian people--Germany:

The meeting at Berlin resulted in an Agreement between the two countries on certain questions, some of which are particularly interesting in these days. But these Agreements, which had been included in special statements and duly signed--this vertical line between Rome and Berlin is not a partition, but rather an axis around which all the European States animated by the will to collaboration and peace can also collaborate. Germany, although surrounded and solicited, did not adhere to sanctions. With the Agreement of July 11 an element of dissension between Berlin and Rome disappeared, and I may remind you that even before the Berlin meeting Germany had practically recognized the Empire of Rome.100

On November 3, there was another reorganization of the government in Vienna, which may well be considered another distinct success for the July 11 policy of the German Reich. Odo Neustädter-Stürmer was appointed Minister of Security and Minister von Glaise-Horstenau received the Portfolio of the Interior. Neustädter-Stürmer was elected to the National Council in 1930 as a representative of the Heimathbloc and was made leader of the Heimathbloc Deputies' Club. As a State Secretary in the Dollfuss government, he originated the voluntary labor service and conducted the negotiations with the Nazis inside the Chancellery on the occasion of the National Socialist Putsch in Vienna on July 25, 1934.

The most essential point in this new development was whether the new Director of Security would reorganize the whole police system in the direction of an understanding with the Nationalist elements. In a dispatch to Hitler, Papen wrote that Schuschnigg told him on November 3 that Neustädter-Stürmer had assumed his post with this reorientation in mind.101 Papen felt that Glaise-Horstenau would now be able to work for the Nationalist
interests, particularly in matters pertaining to clubs and other organizations. Dr. Wilhelm Taucher was made Minister of Commerce and Communications, and Rudolf Neumayer the new Minister of Finance. Eduard Baar Baarenfels was definitely dropped and Ludwig Hüllgerth took his place as Vice-Chancellor apparently as something of a sop to the Heimwehr "traditions." The local press was at pains to represent the complete reorganization of the cabinet as an act without effect on the well-known objectives of the Schuschnigg government, but the dismissal of persons who had always reacted sharply against the Reich during the period of conflict and the appointment of Nationalist-minded men to influential governmental positions can hardly be dismissed as of no consequence.

Ciano arrived in Vienna on November 8 for the Foreign Ministers' Conference of the Rome Protocol states. He records that his reception by the population of Vienna was cold and on no occasion were any gestures of friendship and sympathy toward Italy made. He was left with the impression that Schuschnigg's policy of friendship towards Italy was not at all popular. Schuschnigg took the occasion of a banquet at Schönbrunn officially to acknowledge the conquest of Ethiopia by conveying birthday wishes to Victor Emmanuel, "His Majesty, the King of Italy and the Emperor of Ethiopia." During the meeting nothing of particular interest emerged, and the acceptance and signing of the Protocol in the form and text proposed by Italy took place without much difficulty. The communiqué noted only that complete agreement "on problems of general interest as well as on those of particular interest to the three States" was again affirmed and demonstrated.

At the session of the Fascist Grand Council, November 18 and 19, the Council heard a report from Ciano and approved the procès-verbal signed at
Berlin and the Protocol of Vienna and placed on record "with satisfaction that the bases have now been established for an effective collaboration between Fascist Italy and the German, Austrian, and Hungarian peoples...."
CHAPTER VI
ITALIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM AUSTRIA

l. The Berlin Protocol

On August 29, 1936, Karl Megerle, head of Büro Megerle which was especially concerned with National Socialist propaganda in Austria, in a dispatch to Neurath wrote that Guido Schmidt was practically the only man who held the "key to Schuschnigg's confidence." Glaise-Horstenau had therefore requested Megerle to use his influence in Berlin, and particularly with Neurath, to have Schmidt treated personally and politically in such a manner as to strengthen him in his desire to work with the Reich. "Above all," wrote Megerle, "he is striving to make personal contact with Reich personalities very soon—that is, to receive an invitation to Berlin."¹ Lieutenant General Wolfgang Muff, German Military Attaché in Vienna, seconded the suggestion that Schmidt be invited to Berlin for a conference. Muff felt that Theodore Hornbostel, head of the Political Division in the Austrian Foreign Ministry, had been clever enough to again consolidate his position in the Austrian Chancellery. By winning Schmidt to the German point of view, they would have the opportunity of playing off Schmidt against Hornbostel.² Accordingly the invitation was issued. Papen had opportunity on October 12 to discuss with Schmidt the question of his Berlin visit and Schmidt said that he would prefer to make the trip after the Vienna Conference of the Rome Protocol states.³ Then on November 2, Papen and Schmidt set the twentieth of that month as the approximate date.⁴ Schmidt was ostensibly
to attend Göring's Trophy Exhibition, but actually to conduct a general political discussion. The Austro-German Agreement of July 11 and its execution was to be mentioned in particular. The German Foreign Ministry informed the German Legation in Austria that it would be desirable if at that time the following points could be brought to final clarification:

1) Permission for the Hitler salute and the wearing of Party insignia by German nationals in Austria.
2) Revocation of the Press ban, or in case this cannot be achieved generally, the admission of additional German newspapers, especially B. Z. (Berliner Zeitung) and Münchner Neueste-Nachrichten.
3) Limitation of the book ban and admission, in particular, of the Führer's book, Mein Kampf, into Austria.
4) An arrangement with regard to the exchange of university professors.5

Forthwith the draft of a confidential protocol which was to be signed on the occasion of Secretary Schmidt's visit was forwarded to Papen who was to obtain the consent of the Austrian government to the text as soon as possible. The provision concerning the position of Reich-Germans in Austria was approved by telephone by Gauleiter E. W. Bohle, the head of the Auslandsorganisation6 in the Foreign Ministry, prior to its transmission to Austria. The Austrian counter-proposal was returned on the fifteenth with a few changes concerned primarily with the questions of collaboration in the Danube Basin and the Reich-Germans in Austria.7 This became the basis of the Berlin Protocol.

Schmidt was received by the Führer and Chancellor on Thursday, November 19, 1936,8 and two days later the protocol was signed by Baron von Neurath and State Secretary Schmidt in the name of their governments. In regard to the execution of the July 11 Agreement, the following points were agreed upon: 1) the raising of the flag of the German Reich together with
Austrian flags over inns was to be permitted when such inns were frequented by German citizens who were staying in the country on special occasions; 2) in all questions concerning the common German culture close collaboration was to be sought, and it was agreed that the mutual ban on books would be lifted within a reasonable period except for those containing malicious attacks against the State; 3) two additional newspapers of each country were to be readmitted for importation and distribution in the other country and there was to be no further ban in principle on periodicals; and 4) as to exiles in Germany, the Austrian government was to examine a list furnished by Germany of about five hundred Austrian refugees who wished to return to Austria and, similarly, any future applications with their supporting documents supplied by the German government and also to communicate the results to the latter. Austria was to put no obstacles in the way of employment of refugees permitted to return, to consider applications for short stays in Austria in the case of refugees whose repatriation was not approved, and to provide, by enacting legal provisions for the re-enfranchisement of Austrians whose citizenship had been revoked.9

Essentially this Protocol was an elaboration of the July 11 Agreement in an attempt to strengthen it, speed up its operation, and settle disputed points. One important addition, however, was included in Article 2 concerning collaboration in the Danube Basin. In this article, the two governments agreed not to participate in "new, more extensive economic coalitions in the Danube region." Bilateral economic treaties were excepted as were the Rome Protocols with their supplements.10 Austria was now bound—as with Italy in the Supplementary Protocols of 1936—to consult with
Germany prior to any participation in a settlement of the Danubian problems. This excluded any rapprochement with the Little Entente or any collaboration with Britain and France for a Central European pact without the consent of both Italy and Germany.

At the reception given Schmidt, Hitler, commenting on the European situation, said that the idea of European consolidation against Bolshevism "has contributed toward creating the understanding between Germany and Italy, and it must also help to remove any obstacles to an understanding in Central Europe. There is a European federation of expediency, the members of which are primarily Germany, Italy, Austria, and Hungary..."\(^\text{11}\)

The conversations revealed, according to Weizsäcker, that the Austrian government intended to rely heavily on Italy for support. Schmidt felt that the improvement in German-Italian relations had come about as a result of the July 11 Agreement, hence through Austria. Neurath hastened to correct this "error." The improvement ante-dated the agreement and was primarily a result of Germany's attitude during the Abyssinian crisis.\(^\text{12}\)

Before signing the Protocol, Neurath emphatically pointed out to Schmidt the necessity of arranging for the inclusion of the National Socialist forces in Austria in the government to a larger extent and with greater speed than hitherto. He also expressed the necessity of discontinuing the repressive measures against members of the movement in Austria, warning that if the German authorities saw that the Agreement was not carried out by Austria, there was danger that incidents and unrest would arise for which the Reich officials would have to disclaim all responsibility.\(^\text{13}\)

Finally Schmidt asked Neurath to repay his visit in Vienna. Neurath reserved his decision in this matter until he could see what effect the
discussions would have in Vienna. Papen, who had accompanied Schmidt and his escort on the trip, on his return to Vienna reported to Hitler that in the Austrian delegation "a deep inner satisfaction with the success of this first visit was visible." Schmidt had evidently expected to receive "sabre-rattling impressions in Berlin," and so remarked to Papen that "in Rome they play with fire more than in Berlin." Glaise-Horstenau reported to Papen that Schuschnigg was "well satisfied with the course of the visit" and that he had remarked that "Berlin's domestic demands were not after all so great as he had feared." It is not entirely certain, however, that Schuschnigg was in favor of Schmidt's trip to Berlin. Dr. Karl Ritter, Ambassador for Special Assignments in the German Foreign Ministry, had informed the German Legation in Austria, on November 5, that the German government felt it was now advisable to enter upon the contemplated second stage of economic negotiations with Austria, but only after it was clearly apparent that the negotiations with Schmidt represented a real step toward the further development of German-Austrian relations. Naturally Schuschnigg was desirous of increasing Austria's exports of timber, iron, and cattle, and an economic settlement with Germany could not but have been pleasing to him. This may easily have influenced his decision in consenting to the visit. But Papen's report that Schuschnigg was so well satisfied with the results rests on the slenderest of assumptions in view of one of the latter's speeches just a week later. Schuschnigg addressed a convocation of Fatherland Front party officials at Klagenfurt, on November 26, stating his basic attitude toward the July 11 Agreement and insisting that it had not affected the domestic policy in Austria. Baron von Stein,
Counselor of the German Legation in Austria, reported Schuschnigg as saying that the Fatherland Front had three opponents: Communism, National Socialism, and defeatism within its own ranks:

National Socialism in Austria...confronted the Government and the Fatherland Front's range of political theory or action as an enemy and opponent. This struggle was therefore an exclusively domestic matter and should not prevent every success of the German Reich from being received with pleasure and satisfaction.18

This last sentence modified somewhat the harshness of his words, but the idea of National Socialism being an opponent and the recognition of a definite struggle existing between the two opposing groups is certainly in contrast to his policy of incorporating National Socialists into his Fatherland Front. The day following the speech, Neurath wired Papen to call on the Chancellor and express his (Neurath's) "astonishment" at his remarks and in that connection to ask "whether the speech is to be considered as a return for the visit of State Secretary Schmidt to Berlin and for the friendly way in which he was received by State and Party officials."19 Stein notes in a memorandum that during a conversation at the Austrian Presidential reception of November 29 at Schönbrunn, Schuschnigg explained that his utterances "had been intended only for a small circle of officials of the Fatherland Front; the press had given the matter great prominence, which was very much against his wishes."

His regret at the publicity is understandable. Paraphrasing Schuschnigg, Stein goes on to write:

It was necessary to understand him; he was between two camps. On the one hand was the Fatherland Front, whose officials had been in the struggle for years and who now feared that they might have to relinquish positions to the National Opposition, which was gradually to be called on to participate in the Government. He had to reassure these officials.20
Papen, in a report to Hitler, said that he had expressed the "most disagreeable impression" created by the speech and that Schuschnigg's reply had been that "the address he had delivered was extemporaneous, not prepared, and was intended only for a small group of people." It was a repudiation of the elements in the Fatherland Front who protested against the July 11 Agreement and tried to prevent reconciliation, and the remark concerning "Naziism" was aimed at the "personalities in the National Opposition who did not seem able to reconcile themselves to the maintenance of an independent Austria." Papen also reported as having told Schuschnigg that the Fatherland Front appeared to be "waging a bitter struggle, in alliance with black Clericalism, against the integration of the National elements into Austria's political life," and that "it would be a sin against German destiny if the leading Austrian statesman considered the Agreement of July 11 only as a façade, behind which he would continue a particularistic Austrian policy."

It was clear from the very beginning of the reorientation of relations between Germany and Austria, immediately following the July 11 Agreement, that the extensive amnesty and the participation in political responsibility by the National Opposition in shaping the political will of Austria promised by Schuschnigg would be a lengthy procedure which would meet with many reverses. For one of the most striking results of the Agreement, as Papen said, was the enhanced authority of the Austrian government within its own country. Indicative of this strengthened position was the Chancellor's dissolution in October of the para-military organizations leaving the Federal army and the police the sole custodians of the executive authority of the State. Even more suggestive of Schuschnigg's
increased authority was the reshuffling of his cabinet. Men who could in general be considered as belonging more to the pro-German Nationalist movement, although committed to the Austrian course, replaced those of pro-Fascist, pro-Clerical, pro-Legitimist and/or pro-Austrian inclinations. The efforts of the Chancellor to develop and to strengthen the Fatherland Front, however, had but meager results for the idea was completely lacking in appeal and in the power of conviction. On the one hand, Schuschnigg was attempting to appease the National Opposition, remain in the good graces of Germany, secure his Italian connections, and consolidate his own position using the Fatherland Front as a focal point. On the other, Hitler was encouraging the illegal movement in Austria and only speciously maintaining the hands-across-the-border attitude exemplified in the July 11 Agreement. Papen, on January 12, 1937, in his balance sheet for 1936 and for the future wrote that "the aim of Reich policy can only be the vindication of its historically based rights in the Danube Basin in Central Europe. All forces which have been released by the new development must be directed toward this goal." First and foremost it had to be made absolutely certain that German-Austrian developments did not suffer any reverses whatever. "The leadership of the illegal Party must be permeated with this idea." Also they had to recognize that bringing about a new political relationship between the Reich and Austria was not their responsibility and consequently they could not take any action in that direction. Their mission was to concern themselves with winning for a pro-German policy as large sections of the people as possible to form the nucleus for the domestic Austrian Nationalist movement. "They will thus be creating the medium within
Austria which the Reich will utilize when its dynamic power is sufficiently
developed to take up the problem."²³

2. The Development of the Austrian
National Socialist Party

Following the July, 1934, Putsch, there was no acknowledged leader
for the entire National Socialist party in Austria. New local leaders
and skeleton party organizations were forming in the Gaue, but the process
was constantly retarded by the interference of the police--breaking up
of party meetings, confiscation of literature, arrests of party leaders
and party members--and there was no liaison between the formations,
and frequently there were two, three, or more rival leaderships. The
first acknowledged leader of almost all the Gaue in the autumn of 1934
was Anton Reinthaller (already appointed Landesbauernführer by Hess).
Simultaneously he began a political appeasement by negotiations with
the government for the purpose of gaining legal status for the N.S.D.A.P.²⁴
and the reconstruction of the illegal political organization, at the head
of which he had placed Hermann Neubacher. The negotiations with the govern-
ment failed, quarreling arose among the Gaue, and pressure of the illegal
branch against Reinthaller's appeasement policy forced his retirement as
Landesleiter. Neubacher, his successor, was not recognized by all the
Gaue because Captain Josef Leopold, former leader of the Austrian
N.S.D.A.P., was released from prison and claimed leadership on his seniority
in the party. A solution was finally effected in such a way that Neu-
bacher and his adherents recognized Leopold as Landesleiter who in turn
appointed Neubacher to be his deputy. The points of friction were not
yet eliminated, however, and the police got hold of an indictment by
Leopold's group against Neubacher. On the strength of this material, both leaders were arrested. Thereupon, representatives of all the Gaue went to Carinthia and offered Major Franz Klausner, Gauleiter of Carinthia, the position as Landesleiter of the Austrian N.S.D.A.P. So in July, 1935, Klausner became head of the movement but did not actually adopt the title of Landesleiter. He appointed Globocnig as co-worker for the organizational part and Friedrich Rainer for the political part of his task. Both men had previously collaborated with Klausner in Carinthia. In August, 1935, some further arrests took place including Globocnig and Rainer. Schattenfroh then claimed to have been made deputy Landesleiter because of an instruction received from the imprisoned Leopold; but Schattenfroh was removed from the scene to the Wöllersdorf concentration camp shortly thereafter. Nevertheless he complicated matters by naming party member Hinterleithner of Linz as his successor. In March, 1936, Klausner was arrested in connection with the arrest of about sixty leading National Socialists, whereas Rainer and Globocnig were released. In May, 1936, Hinterleithner appointed Rainer to be chief of the political staff, Globocnig as liaison officer with the Reich and organizer of all the auxiliary bases outside of Austria, and Hiedler as chief of organization. Auxiliary centers for propaganda, press, refugees, welfare, et cetera, were established in the countries bordering Austria.

Following the signing of the Gentlemen's Agreement, Hitler desired to see the party leaders in Austria in order to give them instructions. Meanwhile, Hinterleithner had been arrested, and Rainer became his successor and leader of the Austrian party. On July 16, 1936, Rainer and Globocnig visited the Führer at the Obersalzberg where they received a clear explanation
of the situation and of his wishes. On the following day, all illegal Gauleiters met in Anif near Salzburg where Rainer gave them a complete report of the meeting. At the same conference the Gauleiters received organizational instructions from Globocnig and Hiedler. On the proposal of Globocnig, Hitler named Wilhelm Keppler Reich Commissioner for Austria in which capacity he was to serve as chief of the mixed commission which was appointed, in accordance with the July Agreement, to supervise the correct execution of the Agreement. He was also given full authority by Hitler for the party in Austria. The principles of the construction of the organization were:

The organization is the bearer of the illegal fight and the trustee of the idea to create a secret organization, in a simple manner and without compromise, according to the principle of organizing an élite to be available to the illegal land-party council upon any emergency. Besides this, all political opportunities should be taken and all legal people and legal chances should be used without revealing any ties with the illegal organization.

Therefore, co-operation between the illegal party organization and the legal political aides was anchored at the top of the party leadership.

The most tangible asset of the July Agreement, as far as the Austrian N.S.D.A.P. was concerned, was the amnesty for National Socialists. On July 21, 1936, Papen informed the German Foreign Ministry that the amnesty was to be made public on the twenty-third. The accounts, even in the published German diplomatic documents, vary as to the exact number of persons affected by this first general amnesty. In an enclosure with a memorandum by Baron Ernst von Weizsäcker, head of the Political Department of the German Foreign Ministry, the figures of the Austrian Ministry of Justice of the number of National Socialists pardoned as a result of the
general amnesty of July, 1936, were as follows:

958 by commutation of sentence
1,881 by quashing of charges
12,618 by suspension of criminal proceedings against those less involved in the July 1934 Putsch; making a total of 15,457 persons.31

Papen reported a total of 17,045 persons. He also affirmed that "of a total of 46 persons condemned to life imprisonment, 13 have been amnestied; there remains a total of 213 persons who have not been pardoned, with prospects of the lightening of their punishment for the near future," and added, "the far-reaching nature of the amnesty is generally acknowledged here."32 Schuschnigg conscientiously carried out his part of the bargain—at least as far as the amnesty was concerned.

With the general amnesty of July, 1936, and the subsequent release of practically all National Socialists, including many of the old leaders, new difficulties arose. Zernatto writes that there were no attacks against the regime "in the time from July 1936 on" because of the bitter struggle between the various groups within the illegal Nazi party, each of which was able to get the support of some protector (Schirmherrn) in Germany.33 Papen advised caution. On July 28, he wrote Hitler:

For lack of a strict Party leadership, many National Socialists do not yet know what course to adopt in the future. Instructions from the so-called Landesleitung or other persons who would like to head the 'National groups' at present give a somewhat confused picture. Insofar as we can influence them from Germany, it would be advantageous to tell our friends that the best advice for the present is to 'keep still and wait.'34

A memorandum by Altenburg of the German Foreign Ministry was a direct result of this conflict:
...the situation within the Party in Austria has not developed in a very gratifying fashion. The difficulties (which, incidentally, could have been foreseen) originate principally in the conflict between the old National Socialist leaders freed by the amnesty, who claim the unrestricted leadership of the Party for themselves, and the younger forces in the Movement, who have been administering the Party during the last 2 years of conflict and now do not wish to be excluded from a share in the leadership.35

Even so, the younger forces were prepared to respect the authority and seniority of the older group and the resumption of Leopold's leadership was approved without too much dissent. After he was released, Leopold considered co-operation quite advisable, for during his twenty-six months of imprisonment he had lost contact with the development of the movement of the last two years. He confirmed younger party members such as Stein and Globocnik in their offices and reserved for himself the position of "Federal President" in the party--thus retaining final say on most important questions.36 In addition to the struggle over party leadership, there soon appeared differences of opinion about the interpretation of the Gentlemen's Agreement. This disagreement stemmed from the fact that Captain Leopold began to represent a different attitude from that of the three Carinthian representatives. Leopold was of the opinion that it would be possible to get permission from Schuschnigg directly to rebuild the N.S.D.A.P. in the form of a cultural association. "We were of the opinion that any legal form of association (even a rabbit-breeding association) could only be permitted if we made an ideological compromise; but this would be impossible," said Rainer in speaking of the earlier conflict.37

The effect of Schuschnigg's Klagenfurt speech--branding National Socialism in Austria as "an enemy and opponent,"--on the illegal party
members was apparently very bitter. Papen was considerably worried about the whole development of the illegal party in Austria to begin with. He wrote to Hitler that Leopold's leadership was meeting with sharpest criticism in the provinces; and it was said that because of an inferiority complex, he was removing all persons of intelligence and cleverness from his entourage and from influential posts. This was the first adverse report on Leopold by Papen, and indicated that even the German Ambassador was being drawn into the conflict among the National Socialists. This rift in the party ranks was to continue and even to become aggravated, especially with the infiltration of the National Opposition into the Fatherland Front and their "participation in the shaping of the political will of Austria," until Hitler himself intervened early in 1938.

On New Year's Day, 1937, Adolf Hitler received greetings from twenty-nine members of the Austrian SS Standarte 89, who were being detained for the third year in the Wöllersdorf concentration camp. It was members of this SS Standarte who participated in the July Putsch of 1934 against the Austrian government resulting in the death of Chancellor Dollfuss. In a dispatch to Baron von Neurath, Meissner, State Secretary and Chief of the Presidential Chancellery, informed him that it was the Führer's request that he instruct Papen to call attention to the fact that Austrians, simply because they belonged to a National Socialist organization, were still being detained. Papen was to make no mention to Schuschnigg of the greeting, but was to say that "the German people failed to understand why the release of political prisoners has been carried out to such a slight extent." This attitude of unprovoked
criticism, the policy of exaggerated demands, and the complete disregard for and violation of the Gentlemen's Agreement is an indication of the course which Hitler and the National Socialist government planned to follow the ensuing year.

On January 14, Chancellor Schuschnigg gave to Papen the following amnesty figures: "As of January 1, 1937, a total of 15,583 National Socialists had been granted amnesty.... After the Amnesty granted in accordance with the July Agreement, there had been in Austria a total of only 40 National Socialists held without trial...." 42 The first official press release gave the figures as 18,684 persons covered by the amnesty, according to Stein, who added: "It must not be overlooked, however, that according to reliable figures of the Austrian N.S.D.A.P., at least 4,000 National Socialists have been arrested since July 11, and punished by court or administrative action." 43 Neustädter-Stürmer, Minister of Security as of November, 1936, was reported to have said that forty-three men who participated in the July Putsch were still being held in the Wöllersdorf concentration camp. However, he hoped that by the end of January all National Socialists would have left camp. 44 Neurath assumed from this that by the end of the month all National Socialists, including members of SS Standarte 89, would be released; at the same time he requested Papen, in a démarche with Schuschnigg in accordance with Hitler's instructions, to give his "vigorous support" to Neustädter-Stürmer's efforts in this direction. Furthermore, he was to add that, as agreed upon in Article 9 of the Gentlemen's Agreement, the extensive political amnesty promised for introducing domestic peace in Austria had not yet been completely carried out. Simply because of their convictions
and because they belonged to National Socialist organizations, Austrians were still being persecuted, penalized, and even kept in prison for years:

We perceive in this procedure on the part of the Austrian Government, as well as in its dilatory behavior in the matter of the amnesty and the repatriation of Austrian refugees, a gross offense against the latter and spirit of the Agreement of July 11, 1936, and hope that the Austrian Government will at long last tackle energetically the solution of these two questions, which are basic to the final reconciliation with the Reich.¹⁵

The National Socialists were determined to extort the greatest possible advantages from the concessions wrested from Schuschnigg in the Gentlemen's Agreement. Constant pressure, demands and counter-demands, propaganda and demonstrations and intimidations, and especially attempts to compel pacification of the National Opposition by incorporation into the Fatherland Front and Nationalist representation in the government or even legalization and recognition of the National Socialist party. This latter would have meant the downfall of the Schuschnigg government, unless, possibly, the other parties had also been legalized and a People's Front formed.

The Minister of Security, Odo Neustädtler-Stürmer, immediately after the assumption of his ministerial duties in November, 1936, exhibited an "extraordinary interest in all questions of internal politics," and commenced discussions with Guido Zernatto concerning various plans for bringing about permanent peace with the National Socialists. The two men, however, as attested by Zernatto, could not agree on the method. Neustädtler-Stürmer favored the unification of the Nationalist forces in an association which would send representatives into the Fatherland Front; Zernatto, following Schuschnigg's announced policy, stood fast for the
selection of individuals who would represent Nationalist interests in
general, not a formal organization. Though these discussions ended
with no further progress toward incorporation of the National Opposition
into the Fatherland Front, Neustädter-Stürmer, Glaise-Horstenau, and
Papen agreed that a new organization was necessary in order to foster the
German National idea. They were of the opinion that the organization
and method of activities should be discussed with Schuschnigg and accepted
by him; however, it had to be executed in the form of an independent
organization. The statutes for the new organization were to be presented
to the Austrian government not later than the end of January. Its
proponents would include representatives of the illegal party and all
those who wished to see a definite German policy pursued. According to
Austrian law, the government had to approve or reject application for a
new organization within a relatively short period of time. Thus Schuschnigg
could not avoid making a decision. The organization was to be called the
German Social People's League (Deutschsozialer Volksbund) and "the
organization would have the aim of giving the German National movement
freedom of speech and of the press, cultivating it by propaganda, and
thus combating the 'Austrian ideology' and Monarchism more effectively
than heretofore."

While the preparatory work for the German Social People's League
was being done, petitions were being circulated for another thinly dis-
guised National Socialist group. Those approached for signatures were
exclusively well-known individuals who exercised some public function.
Several hundred personalities signed the petitions. The Ostmark People's
Association (Ostmärkischer Volksverein) held its general organization meeting
in Graz on January 14, 1937. According to the official statement, the intention to form this association had been announced to the competent authorities a year before. The Fatherland Front had raised no objections, but on February 8, 1936, the Office of Public Security had prohibited the establishment of the organization. On appeal to the Supreme Court for Constitution and Administration this decision was reversed on June 16, 1936. As the Fatherland Front was the only legal political body permitted in Austria, the point of controversy had been: was the Ostmark People's Association a political association? In the light of these developments the prospects of the Ostmark People's Association seemed excellent. Under the guise of a "non-political, cultural association," it could expect to be approved by the authorities, or win an appeal to the highest court. If approval were denied, the two ministers, Neustädter-Stürmer and Glaise-Horstenau who were also the chief proponents of this organization, would almost certainly resign. This action would unquestionably stimulate protests and dissatisfaction and so hamper the efforts at pacification. Moreover, a denial of approval would have been construed as a breach of the Gentlemen's Agreement. Zernatto claims that the National Socialists made two serious mistakes. First, Leopold wrote letters to all those who had signed as proponents of the Ostmark People's Association thanking them for their help. In these letters he designated himself as "leader of the national opposition," thus providing the proof that the whole action stood under the leadership of the illegal party. Second, just because the original proponents had exerted themselves to secure "personalities" who held an official office or mandate and had carefully set down all their titles and positions, the list itself was a "speaking
proof for the thesis of the government that the nationalist population already possesses a proportional representation within the framework of the regime." It is very likely that because of the mistakes cited by Zernatto, Schuschnigg felt it possible to reject the Ostmark People's Association. At any rate, this organization dropped out of the picture and attention was concentrated on the German Social People's League.

On February 8, 1937, a Committee of Seven handed Neustädter-Stürmer the statutes of the German Social People's League in Austria. The Committee was composed of three National Socialists, Dr. Hugo Jury, Gilbert In der Maur, and Dr. Franz Taps; two contact men of Neustädter-Stürmer's, Ministerial Counselor Wolfsegger and Vice-President Berghammer; the contact man of Glaise-Horstenau, Dr. Joseph Mannlicher (former president of the Austrian Senate); and the Catholic-National university professor, Dr. Oswald Menghin. These statutes, with an attached memorandum signed by 275 persons active in public life and business, were to be forwarded to Chancellor Schuschnigg. Included in the memorandum was this paragraph:

The undersigned are of the opinion that it would be a substantial step in the direction of domestic peace in Austria if the contemplated organization could be formed unhindered and the opportunity were thus provided to cultivate the national, cultural, and social interests of the German people in Austria while excluding all political issues which, according to existing regulations cannot come within the scope of action of such an organization.

Schuschnigg, informed of the memorandum by Glaise-Horstenau, declared himself ready to start conversations with a small committee, mentioning Dr. Jury, Dr. Mannlicher, and Professor Menghin, and promising to come to a decision by February 13, the same day on which Papen wrote to Hitler that
the attempts of the Austrian N.S.D.A.P. to legalize its activity seemed to have reached a decisive state.\textsuperscript{53} The first meeting with the Committee of Three took place on February 11. After an introductory talk, the conversation was carried on with the National Socialist representative, Jury, alone. This meeting is notable for it was the first conference of an avowed National Socialist with the Federal Chancellor. Schuschnigg put forward several proposals. (1) The statutes would not be discussed but for formal reasons be temporarily withdrawn. In return, Schuschnigg would recognize the Executive Committee \textit{de facto}. He was prepared to remain in contact with the Committee and to see that its activities were not impeded while granting approval for the formation of similar committees in the provinces. (2) Schuschnigg would see that the Fatherland Front appointed, in the administrative machinery in Vienna and in the provinces, chiefs and contact men whose task it would be, as in the \textit{Soziale Arbeitsgemeinschaft} (an association for appeasing Socialist labor), to establish liaison in national matters, to make possible the collaboration of the Nationals within the framework of the Fatherland Front, and to intervene in cases of grievance. (3) Extensive reform of emergency legislation was promised. (4) The amnesty would continue and defamation and discrimination because of membership in the N.S.D.A.P. would cease. (5) The question of civil servants would be handled and expulsions investigated sympathetically. (6) Persons in the administration particularly objectionable to the National Opposition would be gradually removed.\textsuperscript{54} Such proposals can hardly be called bargaining for all concessions are entirely on one side. The Committee was asked to withdraw the request for formation of an organization the like of which was by law illegal; and Jury made the
following statement: "I declare that, for reasons of Realpolitik, we take cognizance of the independence of Austria, and shall act in accord with it. This statement also applies to the Constitution of 1934 and to the law concerning the Fatherland Front beyond which we wish to form no additional political party."\textsuperscript{55}

The Committee met on February 12 under the Chairmanship of Leopold and decided to continue the talk with Schuschnigg on the basis of his proposals and to relinquish the idea of the immediate establishment of the organization. It was determined, however, to insist on the establishment of the organization by the beginning of May. At the conference with Schuschnigg on the evening of the twelfth were Jury, Menghin, and Leopold who was called in on the proposal of Jury while Mannlicher withdrew on the request of Schuschnigg. During the conversation, Leopold repeated and confirmed the statement made by Jury on the eleventh. The result of the conference was the speedy release of some 145 National Socialists from Wöllersdorf; Schuschnigg voiced the wish that the major offenders should emigrate to the Reich which, of course, they never did.

The Federal Chancellor again asked that the Nationalists desist from establishment of the organization, and he promised to protect from police action any offices in Vienna and the provinces that might be established by the committee. Committees of arbitration and intervention would also be established in the Fatherland Front and would be charged with making binding decisions on all matters under dispute between the National Opposition and the Fatherland Front. Cases that could not be settled in this way were to be submitted to the Minister of the Interior for a decision. More discussions were to follow later.\textsuperscript{56}
The Committee of Seven thus secured de facto recognition by the Federal Chancellor of Austria. This group was placed in a position which would enable it to act as a spearhead for a legalization of the entire National Socialist party in Austria and, in the interim, to guide and to direct the activities of the illegal party. Headquarters were established at No. 4 Teinfaltstrasse in Vienna which soon became the center of activities for an eventual revolution. Dr. Franz Tavs, characterized by Zernatto as "the right hand of Captain Leopold," was formerly the chief of the committee; but Leopold had an office in the establishment—which soon became known as the Brown House. The official Wiener Zeitung of February 19, 1937, published a leading article demanding that the debate over the German Social People's League be closed. But the warning came too late. On February 14, at the Third Federal Assembly of the Fatherland Front, Schuschnigg had announced that in the "immediate future" a department (Referat) would be created in the Front to further even more the work of pacification in the country—"also toward the former National Socialist side." He had insisted that any individual was welcome in the Front, including former Austrian National Socialists, on the conditions that he give allegiance to the "reality" of the independence of Austria, that he acknowledge the Constitution of May, 1934, and that he acknowledge the Front in its legally established functions—particularly the renunciation of any political activity outside its framework.

3. The Habsburg Restoration Question

Until 1935 the question of a restoration of the Habsburgs to the Austrian throne had remained purely an academic one. It had been raised
from time to time but was taken seriously neither by the Austrian government nor by foreign powers. In 1935 it became increasingly fashionable for towns to confer honorary citizenship and for organizations to confer honorary membership or offices upon Archduke Otto, the pretender to the throne. Between 1931 and June 1935, he had become an honorary citizen of seven hundred towns and the honorary president of two hundred organizations. In July, 1935, with a few exceptions the Habsburg properties were returned and a restoration made legally possible. The European powers, and especially the Little Entente, opposed a Habsburg restoration. This attitude is expressed in an excerpt from the Prager Presse:

None of them [Little Entente states] would tolerate responsible representatives of the Habsburg dynasty settling down in neighboring Austria. The whole of the Little Entente is prepared to accept the last consequences of its decision to oppose not only restoration but the mere return of Otto and Zita on Austrian soil.

Premier Milan Stoyadinovitch expressed Yugoslavia's opposition in a speech before the Yugoslav Senate on July 27, 1935: "We cannot admit that the question of a Habsburg restoration is an internal Austrian matter; it is an international question in which we are closely interested. We would vigorously oppose restoration." Hungary was in theory still a monarchy, but Premier Gömbös opposed a Habsburg restoration. Addressing Parliament on June 15, 1935, he said that Hungary needed a real Hungarian, who would thoroughly understand the people, as king.

Throughout 1935 and 1936 it became evident that the Legitimist cause was gaining increasing support. That Otto was willing to return was confirmed in a letter to Baron von Wiesner, Austrian Legitimist leader: "It
is high time for decisive action.... I am ready at any hour to return to the fatherland and give Austria its old unity, power and happiness.”

All of the Monarchists' machinations remained ineffective, and the July 11 Agreement was a severe setback for them. One of their most effective arguments in favor of restoration was that it would prevent an Anschluss, and now the Gentlemen's Agreement had supposedly established Austrian-German relations for the same reason. If, however, as the Austrian government claimed, the Agreement reserved to Austria her internal policy and the restoration question remained an internal affair, then there was no incongruity. Baron von Wiesner maintained just this. Restoration was a purely internal affair of Austria within the spirit of the Agreement so Germany could not oppose a Habsburg return. He urged the government to uphold this point and to promote real independence by recalling the former dynasty. The question was by no means acute, but it is true that the Austrian government was toying with the idea. However, it was forced to de-emphasize its importance. While in Rome in September, 1935, Schmidt informed Ciano that the government intended to take no action on the Habsburg question. Then in November in Berlin Schmidt asked what position the Reich would take on a possible restoration. Neurath replied that Germany was absolutely opposed to it and was in this in agreement with Austria's other neighbors. Schmidt explained that the question was by no means acute. On November 29, at the Presidential Reception in Schönbrunn, Schuschnigg reiterated to Stein that "he could not call the question of a restoration in Austria one of present concern."

The assurances given Germany and Italy were not entirely unequivocal, however. Schuschnigg said before a gathering of the Fatherland Front
militia that it was the State that was important rather than the form of the State for the form depends on the necessities of the moment. "The problem of restoration and the form of a state...is an entirely domestic problem. It cannot depend upon considerations from abroad and cannot be decided by foreign powers or organizations.... Only the whole Austrian people is entitled to make a free decision about this problem, but the problem itself is not immediate."69 In November Baron von Wiesner conferred with Hungarian Legitimists in Budapest regarding the situation created by the death of Gőmbős who had opposed a return of the Habsburgs. The new premier, Koloman Daranyi was himself more favorably disposed toward the restoration question.70 From Budapest Wiesner went to Rome for a secret visit during which he called upon Mussolini. He gave the Duce an exposition of the Austrian situation and the program of the monarchist movement hoping thereby to win Italian support for restoration and induce Mussolini to persuade the Hungarian government to follow.71 The meeting had been arranged by the Italian Minister Presiosi at the request of Schuschnigg. Mussolini replied to the question as to how he felt about Legitimism: "In Italy I am a Legitimist, in Austria I am for whatever Schuschnigg wants."72 On his return to Vienna, Wiesner asserted in an interview that "the Italo-Austrian agreement promises full Austrian independence and Mussolini, therefore, believes restoration entirely an internal Austrian affair in which Chancellor Kurt Schuschnigg primarily is concerned."73 Reports of an imminent announcement of the engagement of Archduke Otto and Princess Maria of Savoy, the Italian sovereign's youngest daughter, added fresh fuel to the restoration rumors; but the fact that restoration was not
one of the issues at the November meeting of the Rome Protocol states in Vienna belies the importance of all this talk of a restoration.

Archduke Otto sent a New Year's message to 1,456 municipalities of which he was an honorary citizen urging them that the time was past for wishes and expectations. The increasing pressure of the Nazis and the National Opposition on the Schuschnigg government in 1937 resulted in intensified monarchist propaganda. The Monarchists decided to co-operate with the Hungarian Legitimists in demanding a genuine plebiscite but not immediate restoration. The Weltblatt claimed that a veto on the restoration would not be upheld by all the Little Entente states and demanded that Germany extend the principle of non-interference in Austria to refraining from opposing the restoration. It said that restoration of the Habsburg monarchy in Austria must be considered a possibility and that "monarchist ideas as a specific Austrian tendency cannot be abandoned." There seems actually to have been a drift of Socialists and Liberals to the Legitimist camp, and even some foundation for rumors that Italy was encouraging the movement as a counter-balance to the National Socialists. But such a step would have been strongly resented in Germany and Yugoslavia, for the opposition was now more determined in Berlin and Belgrade than in Bucharest, Prague, and Budapest.

After the conclusion of the Anglo-Italian "Gentlemen's Agreement" on January 2, 1937, Göring set out for a visit to Rome. He was accompanied by Count Magistrati to whom he said that the purpose of the trip was to discuss Austria with the Duce. "In any case Germany will indulge in no surprises, and whatever decisions she makes on questions so vital to her as those of Austria, Danzig or Memel will be preceded by understandings
with Italy.\textsuperscript{76} In his first conversation with Mussolini on the seventeenth, Göring emphasized the necessity for clarification of German-Italian co-operation and international political developments in general. He also specifically affirmed that the question of Anschluss was not acute and that the question would be opened only in consultation with Rome.\textsuperscript{77}

On the twenty-third, Göring had another conversation with the Duce in the presence of Ciano and the German interpreter, Paul Schmidt. Göring said that in view of the close relationship between Germany and Italy it would be useful if the Italian government would exercise its influence on the Austrian government to cause more faithful adherence to the July 11 Agreement. By characterizing National Socialism as Public Enemy No. 1, Schuschnigg was running the risk of provoking internal reactions without the least interference on Germany's part. The Austrian government was still Clerical rather than Fascist or National Socialist and therefore susceptible to left-wing pressure. "The Austrian Government, in view of its exaggerated attitude towards National Socialism, fails to recognize the Communist peril." Göring said that he only raised this issue from a desire to avoid internal conflict in Austria. Italy's relations with Austria, replied Mussolini, are "based on the principle of respect for the independence of that country with due regard to its sensibility." Legally he could not even discuss the possibility of a change in Austria's political status because he was bound by the Rome Protocols. He, Mussolini, was aware that the Austrians regarded Italy with little sympathy, and any pressure he might wish to exert would have to be done with extreme caution. However, since this was Göring's desire, he would attempt to influence the Austrian government in the manner suggested.
Full execution of the Agreement was in Italy's interest also; especially since it had been concluded at Italy's wish. Mussolini assured Göring that in the event of a conflict in Austria, Italy would not resume the "watch on the Brenner" against Germany. Each agreed that there would be no surprises as far as Austria was concerned from either Germany or Italy.

Göring then raised the Habsburg question and said that Germany would not tolerate a restoration of the Habsburgs in Austria regardless of the form under which it might be attempted. He emphasized the fact that the Habsburgs would always be anti-Italian and would logically attempt to regain that territory which formerly belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Mussolini stated that there was no sympathy for the Habsburgs in Italy for historical reasons and that a restoration would produce a very bad impression on the Italian people. He had warned the Austrian government not to play with restoration, and even to Wiesner he had expressed himself very explicitly to that effect. He concluded by giving an assurance that all plans for a marriage between Otto and Princess Maria were completely unfounded.\textsuperscript{78} Paul Schmidt writes in an affidavit for the Nuremberg trials that Göring told Mussolini the Anschluss "would and must come and that the event could not be delayed." Says Schmidt, Mussolini's only opposition was a vehement shaking of his head.\textsuperscript{79} While Göring was Germany's most ardent annexationist, Schmidt's later account was written nine years after the event and is not supported in his own minutes of the conversation written on the return journey to Berlin. Furthermore, Göring had told Hassell on January 15 that continued close German-Italian co-operation depended on complete clarity in regard
to the Austrian problem. "This clarity could only mean that Italy should keep hands off Austria and recognize her as a German sphere of interest so that even an Anschluss could be carried out if we so desired." Then shortly before Göring's conversation with Mussolini, Hassell received a promise from Göring to stress the point that he was raising the question, which was in no way acute, purely from the standpoint of principle. After the conversation, Hassell received the impression from Göring that his statement regarding Austria had met with a cool reception, and that Göring, realizing this, had by no means said all that he had intended to say. It appears then that Göring did not tell Mussolini explicitly that he could expect an Anschluss; at the same time he left no doubt but what the German conditions were for really close co-operation between Germany and Italy. These conversations reveal a fundamental change in Mussolini's attitude. He still felt a moral obligation to Austria and probably feared the consequences of National Socialist Germany on the Brenner, but he made the fatal mistake of letting the Germans know that they had become indispensable to him.

Göring had instructed Plessen, Counselor of the German Embassy in Italy, to inform Berger-Waldenegg that he (Göring) took a very serious view of the entire situation in Austria, including the "persecution" of the National Socialist elements there and especially the continual discussion of a restoration. In the event of such a step, Germany would march in and that would mean the end of Austria. The more plainly this was put to the Austrian Minister, the better. On January 27, Plessen called on Berger-Waldenegg and mentioned that he had been instructed to inform the Minister that Germany was "gravely concerned" about the
restoration question. Then he avoided the bluntness of Göring's words by adding that "the view of the German Government in regard to the restoration was, after all, known to the Austrian minister." Berger-Waldenegg assured him that this was a domestic matter in regard to which Austria could not tolerate interference by other countries. Such determination to retain independent action on the part of Austrian officials was now of little consequence for Mussolini dared not support the restoration question, and this effectively killed all Austrian schemes for it.

Papen was still concerned about the growing approval for the idea of a restoration. He addressed a letter to Hitler urging the necessity for study and consideration as to how this danger could best be obviated by the Reich. A continuation of the frontal attack by the Reich, especially when accompanied with disparaging criticism of the Habsburg tradition, only strengthened the determination and position of the Legitimists. Papen suggested a deftly managed campaign in France, where the political party set-up consciously opposed a restoration, to compel Blum publicly to present the view of the French government on the problem. Out of regard to his leftist allies and for the Succession States, he could only reject it absolutely. This would then act as a clue for its treatment by the Succession States. A propaganda campaign should also be started pointing out the inconsistencies of a red-white-red restoration. that is, a restoration which consciously relinquishes all territorial revision. This propaganda would separate the Austrian and Hungarian Legitimists because Hungarian legitimism could not live a day if it had to promote a restoration within the present limits of Hungary.
Within Austria itself, the "myth of the majority" must be assaulted. It should be pointed out abroad that the question of restoration is being pushed by a clique of large landed proprietors, the old government officials, and the clergy and that the small peasantry of the Alpine provinces is not concerned with the question. Papen reported that Schmidt had promised that the campaign would be called off and that Schuschnigg would mention it only once more in his speech to the Fatherland Front on February 14. "I still believe," wrote Papen, "that it would be desirable to define the attitude of the Reich Government again on the occasion of the visit of the Reich Foreign Minister." Speaking before the Third Federal Assembly of the Fatherland Front, Schuschnigg said that "it gives us the greatest pleasure to declare that we, at any time and in any field whatsoever, could reckon upon complete understanding in that quarter [Italy].... While declaring as we do...the full and unrestricted sovereignty of our State, we feel ourselves, none the less, genuinely and absolutely German, sprung from ancient, Christian and German soil, united with the great cultural group of our people." Then he touched on the restoration question and mentioned three essentials of it:

First, it is in the spirit of the Front to awaken and foster reverence for the Austrian tradition; secondly, the question of the form of the State in Austria will be decided solely and exclusively by the people of Austria, within the framework of the Constitution; thirdly, there will be no experiments.

On the same occasion Schuschnigg took the opportunity to declare in unequivocal terms that he would "not cease to insist, as was natural, on the full and unlimited national sovereignty of our State."
Germany was far from satisfied with the advantages she had gained in the course of a few months. The restoration question was irritating. Austria's resistance was drawing the attention of the other powers and of world opinion to Germany's campaign against her smaller neighbor. Not only for economic and military reasons but also for reasons of prestige, the "liquidation of the Austrian problem" had become for the Reich a matter of most urgent concern. For this reason it was decided to send Neurath to Vienna. Upon his arrival on February 22, the illegal National Socialist party staged a large demonstration for the Anschluss under the leadership of Leopold. This precipitated a counter-demonstration by the Fatherland Front when Neurath was scheduled to leave. The German press played up these demonstrations as proof of the Austrian desire for Anschluss and at the same time strongly attacked the Austrian demonstrators. During the visit, Neurath and Schuschnigg discussed developments of Austrian-German relations. Schuschnigg reiterated his familiar policy that, while maintaining the complete independence of the Austrian State, he desired close ties with the German Reich, in the military field as well as in the fields of foreign and commercial policy, and in the judicial sphere. Neurath called attention to the fact that such a development was difficult to achieve as long as the persecution of National Socialism continued in Austria. Schuschnigg replied that he was gradually striving to include the National Socialists in the government and for this reason had not long ago conferred with Herr Leopold. During the course of the first call on Schuschnigg Neurath declared that any re-establishment of the Habsburg Monarchy would not be tolerated by Germany. To Schuschnigg's expected retort that the form
of government was exclusively an Austrian matter, Neurath conceded but said it could not be denied that Germany had a very great interest in the state of domestic affairs in Austria. Then he told the Chancellor that a restoration would be the best way for Austria "to commit suicide."

That afternoon Schuschnigg invited Neurath to a private conversation to discuss again the restoration question. At that time he assured Neurath that he was aware a restoration could not be carried out against the wishes of Germany and that, while he could give no express assurance that he would in every case secure the advance approval of Germany, he would certainly consult the Reich. He informed Neurath that in the event of a Habsburg Putsch, he would immediately arrest the Pretender and that he had informed Archduke Otto of this. So while Schuschnigg verbally reserved his full freedom of action, Neurath emphatically rejected any Habsburg restoration. In a political appraisal of the visit of the Reich Foreign Minister given to Hitler by Papen, the latter wrote:

This welcome given to the first visit of a German Cabinet member was an encouraging gesture on the part of German Austria; it was an announcement of unprescribable historical claims on the future. It was furthermore an unmistakable indication to Italy that the Berlin-Rome Axis could be built up exclusively upon the real interest of the participants: the Mediterranean for them and the Danube area for us.... Thus I can state in conclusion that the visit was a success in every respect, in that it demonstrated to our opponents our determination to make German-Austrian relations as intimate as possible and thus, not only force the Austrian Government to reciprocate, but also stabilize the Berlin-Rome Axis as a political power factor in Europe.

Viewed from the standpoint of domestic policy, the consistent progress of the National Opposition, and the penetration of Austria by National Socialist ideology remain the prerequisites for the further historical development of the "German question," which will be decided not in Austria herself, but only in the course of the power-political reorganization of Europe.
Two days after Neurath left Vienna and five weeks after Göring had been in Rome, Gayda published an article condemning the question of a Habsburg restoration as a "dangerous one." Austria does not need a new transformation, he wrote in the Giornale d'Italia, and such a transition would provoke new disturbances. Berger-Waldenegg received instructions to call on Ciano for an explanation of the attitude expressed by Gayda. The answer was that the Italian government did not consider the time propitious for a Habsburg restoration, but that this view held good only for the moment and did not commit Italy for all time. The Reichspost took issue with the Giornale and called into question Gayda's competence to interpret the desires and intentions of the Austrian people. "The only authoritative declaration concerning the restoration problem was made by Chancellor Schuschnigg on February 14 in his speech to the Fatherland Front. The nature of this declaration has made it unnecessary for foreign circles to continue to occupy themselves with that problem." This press duel amounted to an Italian acquiescence in the German veto of a Habsburg restoration. Schuschnigg had intended a visit to Rome immediately after the Vienna trip of Neurath, but because of the Italian press attacks he temporarily abandoned the idea. Schuschnigg knew that the restoration question was not solely an internal affair of Austria and that any attempt to make it so would jeopardize the peace of Central Europe. His final capitulation in the matter came when, in a press interview, he publicly acknowledged that he did not expect that "our work in building up this State will be brought to a climax at an early date by restoration of the Habsburgs." The program of pacification continued during February and March; and
Dr. Jury, as Leopold's deputy, held repeated conferences with Schuschnigg which seemed to be meeting with some success.\textsuperscript{92} Dissension in the government's own ranks, with Mayor Richard Schmitz of Vienna as the occasion, may have contributed to this end; and also the solidarity and maneuverability of the N.S.D.A.P., as shown on the occasion of Neurath's visit to Vienna, probably made an impression upon the Chancellor. Papen felt that Schuschnigg was conducting the negotiations partly with the ulterior motive of splitting the National Socialist ranks and leaving the radical groups out of the pacification.\textsuperscript{93} As for Schmitz, Stein reported that he was making efforts to increase his influence by exploiting Schuschnigg's involuntary abandonment of the Legitimist cause for his own ambitious plans for coming into power.\textsuperscript{94} According to Papen, the Socialists would also go along with a restoration, and the candidacy of Schmitz for the Chancellorship found widespread support in Clerical circles that wished to remove the Minister of Security, Neustädter-Stürmer, because of his conciliatory policy.\textsuperscript{95} This may well explain the removal of Neustädter-Stürmer from his ministerial post only a week later. Schuschnigg assumed the post, and Glaise-Horstenau--supported by Papen--did not resign and requested through Papen that the German press not make a martyr of Neustädter-Stürmer so as not to render his (Glaise-Horstenau's) position too difficult.\textsuperscript{96} Papen contended that the only course open for Germany was support of the Schuschnigg government--even if they did not like it. "Schuschnigg is prepared to continue pacification with the National Forces. But this policy must not be made unnecessarily difficult for him by the Reich, as heretofore. Criticism by the German press of Austrian conditions...only weakens the position of Chancellor Schuschnigg...."\textsuperscript{97}
4. International Isolation

In his oral report to Hitler on March 13, 1937, Papen had said that "the Berlin-Rome Axis can only be injured at its weakest point, Vienna, and there with the maximum help of the Austrians themselves." He reported that Mayor Schmidt had handed President Miklas a memorandum calling on him to abandon the policy of depending on Germany for support because it was disastrously dividing the country. All of the Austrians must be rallied around the banner of a People's Front government. Supposedly the agreement of Renner and Seitz had already been obtained. Austria had the complete support of Britain and France and had only to ally herself economically with the Little Entente for which Hodža had already drawn up the plans. But now there was demonstrated the strong attraction the Italian-German solidarity had in winning other states for the Axis policy. Yugoslavia was allied both with France and, through the Little Entente, with Czechoslovakia and Roumania; moreover, through the Balkan Entente with Greece and Turkey, both British-oriented states. This did not prevent, however, ever since the death of King Alexander at Marseille on October 9, 1934, a growing emphasis by Yugoslavia on her friendship with Germany. Simultaneously with Poland, Yugoslavia became the first state to loosen itself from the ring containing Germany. On March 25, Ciano made a visit to Belgrade and signed there both a political and economic agreement with Yugoslavia. Before signing the documents Stoyadinovitch explained the reasons for his new policy. He told Ciano that Yugoslavia had not received anything from France and that economically the value of the Little Entente was nil. An agreement with
Italy was now fundamental for his policy. Stoyadinovitch considered the Anschluss inevitable and thought only to delay it as long as possible. His idea was that once the Anschluss was an accomplished fact, the countries which must oppose the German Drang nach Osten would polarize around the Rome-Belgrade axis and that such a bloc would dissuade Germany from any mad attempt. The political and economic agreements signed at Belgrade could not be reconciled with the Rome Protocols. Ciano noted in his Diary that the Slav alliance enabled Italy to view with calmness the possibility of the Anschluss. This was another basic change in Fascist foreign policy and represented a detachment if not complete relinquishment of Italian interest in Central Europe. The day after this agreement was signed, Hodža made a secret visit to Vienna to promote his plan for a closer collaboration between Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Hungary, and an orientation to a Prague-Paris axis. But Schuschnigg was convinced that without collaboration with Germany domestic peace in Austria was impossible, so he was silent to these overtures.

Schuschnigg determined to make a final effort to regain the unqualified support of Italy for Austrian independence. April 22 was the date set for the last meeting between the two heads of state and their foreign ministers. On April 14, an instruction was sent to the Austrian Legation in Great Britain to inform the British Foreign Secretary "very emphatically" that Austria was dependent on Italy for the preservation of her political independence and territorial integrity and that Austria must absolutely reckon with this fact as long as the principle of collective security proclaimed by the League of Nations had no real validity in international law. A recognition of Austrian independence in principle only
prevented the Federal Government from adapting its foreign policy to that of London and Paris even in the most modest degree. The Federal Government could, however, consider closer adherence to Great Britain, France, and the Little Entente if these Powers were in a position to give effective guarantees for the independence of Austria. On April 15, an instruction was sent to the Austrian Legation in Rome instructing them to inform the Italian government that there was a growing difference of opinion between Austria and Germany concerning the interpretation of the Gentlemen's Agreement. It also stated that the possibility existed of a denunciation of the Agreement with Germany as the latter continued to violate the contractual obligations assumed voluntarily to such an extent that the Austrian government found the Agreement an "almost insupportable impediment" to Austrian domestic and foreign policy. The note then called attention to the fact that Austria could not participate in the German attitude toward Czechoslovakia and noted "with astonishment" that Italian policy toward that State and the problems of the Danube area showed extensive deviations from the principle of the Rome Protocols of 1934 and 1936. In conclusion the note read: "The Federal Government must absolutely insist that the Royal and Imperial Italian Government decide to disassociate itself unequivocally from the political objectives of German National Socialism with regard to the Danube area and to adopt a clear and well-defined attitude with regard to the individual Danube States."

At Venice, Schuschnigg's tone was more mollifying. He stated that there was no question of any change in his foreign policy and pledged himself to adhere to the July 11 Agreement in its entirety. He did not
minimize the danger to Austria of an attack on Czechoslovakia by Germany but disclaimed any agreements of a political character with Democratic Prague. With regard to Italy's policy toward Austria, the Chancellor hoped that it had neither been modified nor was about to be modified. Mussolini explained the reasons for the Rome-Berlin Axis. It was necessary for Italy to assure herself of a solid continental position in order to face the scarcely concealed threat of the British in the Mediterranean. The other reason was the solidarity of the authoritarian regimes--though there were substantial differences--which were confronted by the same enemies since the Democratic bloc was attempting to isolate the two Powers in order to be able to eliminate them. Austria had to follow the example of Italy, that is, emphasize her status as a German state but at the same time affirm that there were substantial differences due to religion, culture, and a different Weltanschauung. Austria must also maintain her good relations with Budapest and not alienate the Magyar government by approaches to Prague in her game for the maintenance of national independence. Mussolini summed up the conversation by saying "that Italy confirms its policy aimed at maintaining Austrian independence and integrity, synchronising it and bringing it into harmony with the Rome-Berlin Axis." Mussolini, like Schuschnigg, was somewhat palliati{ng; but Ciano, Dino Alfieri, and Cino Butti candidly declared to Schmidt that Italy was no longer interested in Austria as a buffer state.

This last visit of Schuschnigg to Venice brought two incidents which received more attention than the conversations between the two Fascists leaders. A German steamer of the "Kraft durch Freude" organization anchored at Venice a few days before the arrival of Schuschnigg. During
the meetings with the Austrian Chancellor, Mussolini found opportunity to visit the steamer. In a speech afforded by this occasion the captain pointed to the fact that Mussolini had trod for the first time on what was symbolically German soil.\(^\text{107}\) This incident was undoubtedly pre-arranged and had as its special purpose to indicate the double alliance of Mussolini with Austria and with Germany.

The Venice conversations directed not only the foreign policy but also the domestic policy of Austria along an unequivocal line. The demand "to bring the July Agreement into complete function" was in this connection a blunt invitation to accept National Socialists in the Austrian government. It is characteristic that Ciano personally acted as a transmitter of a demand of the Austrian Nazi leader, Captain Leopold. Leopold had sent a memorandum to Count Ciano in which the Italian government was requested to suggest to Schuschnigg that he take more National Socialists into his cabinet. The Leopold group of the Austrian National Socialists had turned to a foreign government in order to attain their internal political objective.

While Schuschnigg was still in Italy, an article by the Italian journalist Virginio Gayda appeared in the *Giornale d'Italia* which gave the impression that the inclusion of more National Socialists in the Austrian government had been the subject of the conversations in Venice. The article was distributed by the official news agency *Stefani*. Gayda, at the time of the July Putsch, had written especially aggressive articles against the National Socialists and for Austrian independence. So the publication in the *Giornale d'Italia* maintained a sensational character in opposition to the official communiqué. Neither Schuschnigg nor Schmidt
nor Salata knew about the publication which had completely reversed the European conception of the Venice meeting and brought the Chancellor into an extremely unpleasant position. The Italian government answered the Austrian inquiry with the assurance that Gayda's article represented an irresponsible private view and that it had known nothing of the publication. The Italian government declared itself ready to disavow Gayda. The démenti appeared, but the political effect of the journalistic Extratour remained extraordinarily bad.108

Neurath was in Rome while Mussolini and Schuschnigg were meeting in Venice. Mussolini committed an unusual breach of international protocol by returning to the capital before his Austrian guests departed from Venice. In Rome, Neurath received a first-hand report of the results of the conversations. Austria realized that as a German state she could not pursue any anti-German policy. There would be no Austria policy toward Prague which would undermine the Rome Protocols. Restoration was considered impracticable at any time. Mussolini told Neurath that he had advised Schuschnigg to accept representation of the Nationalist parties but stressed that there must be a difference in systems between Austria and Germany.109 Thus for Austria a Habsburg restoration would not be tolerated by Germany and the formation of a Popular Front government in Vienna with the intention of orienting Austrian policy toward Prague or Paris would cause Italy to take a stand against Austria.

On May 3, Schuschnigg and Schmidt accompanied President Miklas to Budapest. For Schuschnigg the journey was political, and he made an effort to induce Hungary to come to terms with Czechoslovakia in the face of a common threat by Nazi Germany and to join a real scheme for Danubian
co-operation. The results were negative. Ciano was in Budapest on
the nineteenth of the month. Kanya told Ciano that he had doubts over
Italy's active interest in Austrian independence and that Gayda's
article had helped to confirm him in the opinion that Italy was gradually
withdrawing from her position on the Austrian question. Ciano countered
this by saying that only an alignment with the Democratic-Bolshevik
axis of Paris-Prague-Moscow would jeopardize Italian support of Austria.
Kanya appeared satisfied at this, and said that it was not the intention
of the Hungarian government to draw up a pact with Czechoslovakia for
the present.\footnote{110}

With Italy, Hungary, and the Little Entente excluded, Schuschnigg
turned to Britain and France. The coronation ceremony of George VI of
England took place in the latter half of May, and this afforded Schmidt
an opportunity to visit London and Paris. His idea was directed toward
the possibility that his visit might bring the Austrian question to
debate, and he actually obtained the promise that the Austrian question
would be taken up in a closing declaration. This would have been the
ideal solution to the problem--to obtain a guarantee of independence not
dependent entirely on Italy but now on at least one other Great Power.
But in the meantime there arose the conflict between Italy and the
Western Powers. Schmidt found that the British standpoint in case of
German aggression against Belgium or France would be to answer it with
military action; in case of German aggression against Austria or Czecho-
slovakia to use diplomacy. Schmidt worked in the direction of a settle-
ment of the Anglo-Italian conflict and pointed to the catastrophic results
this conflict must have for Austria. He received from Eden the assurance
that they would not forget to include Austria in any discussions or
negotiations with Germany and Italy. 111 This assurance was the most
which could be obtained.

Sir Nevile Henderson, newly appointed Ambassador to Berlin, inter-
preted British opinion on the Central European question when he said
to his Austrian colleague that he did not want to interfere at all in
this dispute but that he could not comprehend Austria's striving for
independence "since Austria was just as German as Germany." He felt
that England had the greatest interest in the maintenance of peace in
Europe, but it was his opinion that the matter would be simplified if
they (Germany and Austria) were one state. 112 In a conversation with
Papen, Henderson had said that he was convinced that England understood
the historical need for a solution of this question in the Reich-German
sense. When told that Sir Walford Selby, British Minister to Vienna,
took a different stand and argued in London for Austrian independence,
Henderson replied, "But I am of an entirely different opinion and am
convinced that my view will prevail in London, only you must not rush
the solution of this problem." 113 A few days later, on June 10, Frei-
herr von Franchenstei n, the Austrian Minister to London, reported that
a lead article in the Observer called for Great Britain not to interfere
in the relations between Germany, Austria, and Czechoslovakia. 114 Then
on November 22, he could report to Vienna that in the opinion of the
Manchester Guardian "the Anschluss is only a question of time, whereby the
absorption of Austria by steps is the most secure and best way.... Great
Britain is not vitally interested in the Austrian question." 115 In

December, following the visit of Chautemps and Delbos to London, Eden
informed Ribbentrop that he had told the French Ministers that Austria was of much greater interest to Italy than to England and that the British realized that closer connections between Austria and Germany would have to come about sometime. The British hoped only that a solution by force would be avoided.\textsuperscript{116} Grandi, the Italian Minister to London, received a statement from Eden on December 1, similar to the one made to Ribbentrop: England and France had agreed that in Central Europe certain changes could be made provided the status quo was not changed by force.\textsuperscript{117}

The possibility of a declaration for Austria originating from France did not exist. According to Schmidt, when he met Delbos in Paris, the French Foreign Minister was of the conviction that the salvation (Rettung) of Austria was possible only by a union with Germany.\textsuperscript{118} Actually the French did not go this far. In May, 1937, there was no immediate danger from Germany, and the hope was that by adhering to the July 11 Agreement Germany could be put off for a few years. While in Paris in early November, Papen found that neither Chautemps nor Delbos had any objection to an extension of German influence in Austria and an evolutionary development of the July 11 Agreement as long as Austrian independence was preserved.\textsuperscript{119} Before leaving for London in November, Delbos declared to a German informant that "as far as Central Europe was concerned, France could naturally not declare her disinterestedness in territorial changes. On the other hand, she had no essential objection to a further assimilation of certain of Austria's institutions with Germany's."\textsuperscript{120} Because of her other commitments in Central Europe, France could not disassociate herself completely from Austria, nor was she in a position to support Austria
unqualifiedly without a prior assurance from England. Papen felt then that his conversations with the French Ministers were decisive for Germany's purposes.\textsuperscript{121}

5. The Penetration and the Schism

Around the first of May, one of the main organizational offices of the Austrian N.S.D.A.P. in the Helfersdorferstrasse, Vienna, was raided by the police. Guido Schmidt informed Papen that much material had been found which would indicate close connections between Munich and the Austrian N.S.D.A.P., and Glaise-Horstenau and other agents told him that among the incriminating papers were memoranda of conversations of Austrian National Socialist leaders with the Führer and other leading German personages; evidence of funds made available from the Reich for organizational purposes of the Austrian NS.D.A.P.; material for purposes of political propaganda against Austrian government officials and other persons, emanating principally from Austrian exiles in the Reich; arrangements and cover addresses of the courier service; and correspondence of the Austrian SS with German SS officers.\textsuperscript{122} Papen feared that the material would be used to show that the Gentlemen's Agreement relative to non-interference had not been adhered to by the Germans. According to later information, wrote Papen, the Dum\textsuperscript{123} papers also contained records of conversations of SS-Reichführer Himmler with Leopold and Kaltenbrunner on the affairs of the Austrian SS. However, following a conversation with Schuschnigg after Papen's return to Vienna, the latter wrote to Hitler, "For the present it does not seem as if the Government wants to publish the material found in the office of the Party."\textsuperscript{124}
On June 17, 1937, Schuschnigg finally carried out his promise of February 14, concerning formal representation for the pronounced nationalists in the Fatherland Front. According to Zernatto, the Chancellor had become convinced that the Committee of Seven had to be dissolved so he was looking for an "appropriate personality to whom he could entrust the leadership of the pacification section in the Fatherland Front." Accordingly, he appointed Seyss-Inquart to the Federal State Council (Staatsrat) and "designated him in the sense of Point IX of the aide memoire of July 11 as his representative in matters of pacifying national circles."

Seyss-Inquart's duties were to examine the question of bringing in groups which hitherto had stood outside of the Fatherland Front so that they could co-operate in the formation of the political will and make proposals for this purpose—all this in consultation with the Secretary General of the Front. Walter Pembaur, another Nationalist, was given the direction of the new People's Political Department (Volkspolitisches Referat) for the preparation of the collaboration of the Nationalists with the Front.\textsuperscript{125} Seyss-Inquart promptly became the leading representative of the "legal" National Socialists. Stein was skeptical of any attempt to unite groups as opposite in their ideologies as the Fatherland Front and the Austrian N.S.D.A.P., and considered this as another well-considered attempt by Schuschnigg to divide the National Opposition.

These developments were more than distasteful to the "illegal" National Socialists in the Teinfaltstrasse; that is, the Committee of Seven and Leopold. Seyss-Inquart writes that these radicals violently opposed his policy. Immediately after his appointment, he desired to visit the Reich and through Keppler's negotiations, with Schuschnigg's consent, met with Hess and Göring. "Not too encouraged, yet without a refusal from the
Reich, I started my activities, which immediately became the object of strong attacks by the radical section of the Fatherland Front and by the Radical Nazis...."126 One group of National Socialists was co-operating with the Schuschnigg government too readily and the other was not co-operating readily enough; so the breach between them continued to widen. In order to meet this danger, understandings were reached between the National Socialists and Pambaur, under which he was to work in close contact with the Landesleitung of the N.S.D.A.P. in Austria.127

It was in this ungenial atmosphere that the mixed German-Austrian committee of representatives of the two Foreign Ministries met, on July 6, to discuss the workings, shortcomings, and possible extension of the July Agreement. Items of foreign and domestic policy--especially amnesty and internal pacification--were not dealt with at all in the committee meetings, but were discussed only in a restricted council in which, on the German side, Ambassador Papen, in addition to the chief of the delegation Weizsäcker and Dr. Keppler, and, on the Austrian side, State Secretary Schmidt, Minister von Glaise-Horstenau, State Secretary Zernatto and State Counselor Seyss-Inquart participated. Care was taken to maintain liaison with the Landesleitung. A conference with Landesleiter Leopold was held at the German Legation in the presence of Papen.128 On July 9, the German delegation threatened to break off negotiations because of attacks in the Austrian press; peace was only painfully patched up by Papen and Seyss-Inquart. On the twelfth, it was announced that the two countries had agreed on a "peace truce." A few weeks later Papen was able to write to Neurath that "the Press Agreement of last July 11 is really 90 percent to the disadvantage of Austria. For if she can inveigh less
against National Socialism, she is deprived of her best means of agitation for the Fatherland Front." \(^{129}\) This third Austro-German Press agreement went considerably further than the first two (August 1935 and July 1936) and brought about the almost complete gagging of the Austrian press as far as their views on the policies of the Third Reich were concerned. The weightiest argument which the Austrians had to offer against National Socialism was not used, namely that it led to war. Writes Martin Fuchs, the revival of sentiment in southern and western Germany against National Socialist centralization was not mentioned. And the papers were silent on the subject of the extreme economic difficulties of the Hitler regime. The persecution of the Church in Germany, which had to be censured in the Catholic papers at least, was presented in a very apologetic way. Even the Reichswehr crisis at the beginning of 1938 was not placed before the Austrian public in its true significance. \(^{130}\) Says Schuschnigg: "The attitude of the German Press with regard to Austria remained unfriendly, and at times became spiteful; it contained repeated misstatements and attacks against the government." \(^{131}\) The National Socialists claimed this newest agreement to be a definite victory. Weizsäcker listed ten results: 1) a declaration of the Austrian government which assured the position of the Reich-German Landesgruppe Austria of the German N.S.D.A.P., 2) admittance of German youth to the rallies of the League of Reich-Germans in Austria, 3) permission for sale of Mein Kampf, 4) non-interference in the showing of German films and newsreels unless they contained anti-Austrian bias, or propaganda intended specifically for Austria, 5) issuance of an identical directive to the press, in order to improve the atmosphere between the two countries, 6) appointment of a press custodian in each country to secure strict compliance with agreements and to put an effective stop
to violations, 7) the quashing of proceedings in less serious cases against
Austrian refugees who in the meantime had not acquired another nationality,
upon a petition for clemency, without the necessity for the refugee to
surrender to an Austrian court, 8) promise of a final examination by
the Austrian Ministry of Justice of the lists of refugees awaiting return,
which were transmitted to Schmidt in November, and the promise to examine
an additional one thousand cases to be designated by Germany, 9) per-
mission to display the swastika flag on holidays, in addition to May
Day, and on special days of national mourning, 10) wearing of the party
emblem by German nationals domiciled outside of Austria and staying in
Austria as tourists or while in transit.132 Such results as these,
though minor in themselves, were gradually breaking down all resistance
against the National Socialists, enabling them to penetrate into every
organization, both political and cultural. Those loyal to the regime
and to Austrian independence were slowly becoming helpless, while the
country's enemies were given every possible opportunity to propagandize,
intimidate, demonstrate, and organize. Such results as emanated from
the July 6, 1937, meeting would have been ineffectual alone; but
multiplied many times over, they proved disastrous to Austria.

In November, 1937, Keppler described the situation of the N.S.D.A.P.
in Austria: "That a great struggle had taken place within the Party...
between the faction favoring the path of evolution and the other faction,
which was bent on continuing strictly revolutionary and illegal activities,
and that, in view of the danger of a split, the latter faction had gained
the upper hand."133 The dissatisfied faction of the Austrian N.S.D.A.P.
was led by Captain Leopold, which felt that Papen's policy of peaceful
evolution would take much too long and that drastic measures must be applied. Papen had been able to curb this group up to 1937, after which time they began to intrigue against him. Besides Leopold, the former captain of cavalry (Rittmeister), Gilbert In der Maur played the main part. In January, 1937, Papen wrote to Hitler that:

the leaders of the illegal party must recognize that bringing about a new political relationship between Austria and the Reich is not their responsibility; consequently it is not their mission to undertake any action toward that goal. They should concern themselves with winning for a pro-German policy as large sections of the people as possible to form the nucleus for the domestic Austrian movement; they will thus be creating the medium within Austria which the Reich will utilize when its dynamic power is sufficiently developed to take up the problem.

Again in March, he wrote in a similar vein:

The illegal Party must be repeatedly convinced that the ultimate decision with regard to Austria lies outside of Austria, that it therefore plays only a passive role, and that its first duty is not to disturb the European policy of the Führer. There are too many offices in the Reich concerning themselves with Austrian policy, and too many ties bind former Austrians to the Reich to their native country. Here, too, greater self-restraint is imperative.

In the May issue of the Österreichischer Beobachter, its official organ, the Austrian N.S.D.A.P. stated that it had "in the immediate jurisdiction of Vienna, temporarily broken off social relations with the Metternichgasse. This measure applied to the person of the Ambassador, whose mission, in the opinion of the Austrian N.S.D.A.P. ended on July 11, 1936." Since the leaders of the Austrian N.S.D.A.P. to a large extent shaped their policy in accordance with instructions from the Reich, Papen felt that it was completely impossible to characterize the political course pursued by the special envoy of the Führer and Chancellor as being
out of harmony with theirs and to publish this in the official organ of the party throughout the country. "It is," wrote Papen, "absolutely essential for the advancement of the Austrian policy ordered by the Führer that we avoid giving the Austrian Government even the slightest impression that two different official policies are being pursued by the Reich." In order to remove this obstacle and bring about a retraction of the unprecedented attack upon the Ambassador of the Reich, Papen sent for Leopold who, in return, sent word that he was very busy at present, but might perhaps come in at some later date. At the same time, conversations had been taking place between him and other members of the Legation. Therefore Papen terminated relations with Leopold and his agents and requested Stein, Muff, and others of the Legation to do likewise until such time as he should designate. On June 7, In der Maur called at the Legation but was not received. He informed Papen in a letter of the following day that:

After 17 years of untroubled association with the German Legation, I take note of your order with the comment that I shall not again set foot in the Legation. At the same time, I would inform you that all members of the National Socialist ideological community have been forbidden to have any professional or private contact with you or the gentlemen of the Legation.

On the same day, In der Maur wrote to a party member in the Reich that the reasons for this break between the Austrian National Socialists and the envoy of the German Reich were "to be found in Herr von Papen's intrigues, which have simply become second nature to him." In der Maur accused Papen of flirting with the idea of establishing a Leader's Council (Führerrat) which would be a superstructure over the leadership of the
National Socialist movement in Austria. In February, according to In
der Maur, Papen believed he had reached his goal through the organization
of the Committee of Seven. When this Committee saw in Leopold "the
guiding spirit of the National Opposition," Papen was bitterly disappointed.
Papen only wanted to show that Austria was better off without the
N.S.D.A.P., whose presence constituted an impediment to a diplomatic
understanding between the Reich and Austria. "Now that the mistrust
has become insuperable, Herr von Papen and his special mission can probably
render but one last service to German interests in Austria: to disappear
as quickly as possible without a fuss."\textsuperscript{140}

With the situation having thus reached a stalemate, on July 12,
1937, Hitler gave Keppler the basic authority to handle all questions
connected with Austria in relation to the party.\textsuperscript{141} In an attempt to
effect a \textit{rapprochement} between the two opposing camps, Keppler wrote to
Seyss-Inquart in August:

\textit{The more I consider the whole problem the more necessary it appears to
me to act in unqualifiedly conciliatory spirit and to endeavor not to
aggravate the differences, but rather gradually to eliminate them, as
far as possible, unless real defects of character should become evident
in this or that individual...}\textsuperscript{142}

Due to the co-operation of these men with Keppler and other officials of
the Reich, it was possible to obtain the appointment of Seyss-Inquart as
Counselor of State in June, 1937. Through all of this a new and stronger
political position was won by the Nationalists. The "legal" group became
a partner with whom one had to negotiate, even when it was not officially
incorporated into internal Austrian political system. Keppler became the
Berlin "ambassador" of the Seyss-Inquart group and with its members
developed a plan that, in contrast with that of Franz Tavs, envisaged the peaceful penetration of Austria by National Socialism. "The 'Keppler Plan'," writes Zernatto, "was the basis of the discussions at Berchtesgaden; more than that, the 'Keppler Plan' was nothing other than the first ultimatum of March 11."¹⁴³

The N.S.D.A.P. was constantly agitated by the Austrian Legion, consisting of activists who had escaped to the Reich from Austria since 1934. Seeing that they could never return to their homes and families with Schuschnigg in power, unless they wanted immediate internment in a concentration camp, they yearned for the overthrow of his government, and also found Papen's policy wanting. A memorandum taken from a file of Keppler's papers, dated October 4, 1937, makes the conclusion inescapable that Leopold was systematically opposing the efforts of Seyss-Inquart to carry out Article 9 of the Gentlemen's Agreement, although at a conference on July 10, 1937, after Seyss-Inquart had been appointed State Counselor, Leopold had said that he would let him proceed at will, "in order to judge the man by the results of his work." The memorandum read: 1) In July, 1937, Leopold traveled through Austria arousing sentiment against Seyss-Inquart by falsely stating, among other things, that Seyss-Inquart was a pupil of the Jesuits, having attended the Stella Matutina. 2) Leopold instituted disciplinary proceedings against Reinhaller, within the party and discharged him from all his official positions when he refused to sign a declaration which contained a ban on associations with Seyss-Inquart, Keppler, and other persons. 3) He forbade all party members to hold political conversations with Seyss-Inquart and Keppler. 4) Party member Globocnic, a close associate
of Seyss-Inquart, was expelled without any party proceedings or opportunity for defense. 5) Talks within the party to the effect that "a certain Party member Keppler intended to dabble in Austrian politics," adding that he would not permit another Habicht to be forced on him.\textsuperscript{144} After he was unsuccessful in attempting to work with Leopold, Keppler estab-
lished relations with Rainer, Globocnig, Reinthaller, Kaltenbrunner as leader of the Austrian SS, and Jury as deputy-leader of the Austrian party, as well as with Glaise-Horstenau and Seyss-Inquart. On September 30, 1937, Neurath conferred with Hitler and it was decided that Leopold would not be received by either. "The Führer was not pleased with Leopold, and the strictest discipline had to be demanded of him."\textsuperscript{145} To counter-
balance the party’s repudiation, Leopold attempted to get in touch with other Reich governmental offices. He submitted his request to be received by Göring, but this, Altenburg and Weizsäcker advised against.\textsuperscript{146} Then Keppler had a meeting with Minister-President Göring in the company of Leopold. Göring decided that the leadership of the illegal N.S.D.A.P. was to remain in Leopold’s hands, but that the activities of Seyss-Inquart were not to be hampered in any way. Leopold further promised to maintain strict discipline and, if it should become necessary for party organi-
izations to participate with Seyss-Inquart, the persons concerned would be granted leave of absence by the party to work under Seyss-Inquart. Any unilateral action by Leopold against these associates was inadmissible. Even in difficult cases Leopold was not to proceed without Seyss-Inquart’s consent.\textsuperscript{147}

This arrangement proved to be only a temporary expedient, but for a while the work of the Austrian N.S.D.A.P. proceeded without the hindrance
of party bickering and jealousy. Absolute authority came from the central party in Germany, and its directives and instructions were followed in Austria until the opposition and contrast of ideas between the two factions became so great that the removal of one was necessitated in order to prevent a complete undoing of the work already accomplished in Austria by the National Socialists.

6. Decision

On August 10, 1937, Neurath wrote in a memorandum on a conversation with Guido Schmidt at Brand in Vorarlberg two days earlier, "My total impression of this conversation is that the will to carry out the Agreement of July 11, 1936, is not present on the part of the Austrian Government, and that we shall hardly succeed in regulating German-Austrian relations by this method." At the end of the month, in conversation with Schuschnigg in the presence of Schmidt, Papen attempted to make clear to the Chancellor that "the policy of the maintenance of friendly relations with the Reich must be more strongly supported by him than hitherto." For Schuschnigg, the maintenance of Austrian independence was an article of faith, and he was convinced that strong and very influential groups in the Reich considered the absorption of Austria to be the immediate political task. He further stated that the Reich had never ceased to exert influence on the Austrian National Socialists and that they continued to receive funds from Germany. Papen found Schuschnigg's attitude completely negative and raised the question with Neurath of whether or not consideration should be given to bringing about a change of chancellors. He suggested in this connection that Mussolini could
perhaps be pledged to "certain fundamental principles" in the further
treatment of the Austrian question while he was in Berlin.¹⁴⁹

The process of penetration was too slow for the National Socialists.
Schuschnigg, though granting major concessions, was still the principal
obstruction to a thorough nazification of Austria. Papen conferred with
Neurath on September 20, and it was agreed that the question of Austria
would be brought up with Mussolini to secure Italian non-interference
in the economic and military rapprochement with Austria. "The facade
of Austrian independence is to be maintained, in view of Mussolini's
repeated statements on this question." Göring concurred in this opinion,
but the question of personnel change would be brought into the con-
versation since Schuschnigg's negative attitude toward the July 11
Agreement would have to be the starting point in the conversation.¹⁵⁰

Mussolini's visit to Berlin was announced on September 4 as an
imminent meeting of the Chiefs of the Two Revolutions, and Mussolini
left Rome on the twenty-fourth in the company of three Ministers, Ciano,
Alfieri, and Starace, the Secretary General of the Fascist Party, and a
retinue of about a hundred people. Mussolini was feted in Munich, saw
the Reichswehr maneuvers at Mecklenburg, toured the Krupp's works in
Essen, was presented a horse in Hanover, and spoke to a crowd of some
800,000 on the Maifeld in Berlin. But no formal agreements, published
or secret, were made,¹⁵¹ and Mussolini told Schuschnigg that "the subject
of Austria has not even been mentioned in Berlin. There is no ground
for anxiety and nothing has changed."¹⁵² However, Hitler, Göring, and
Neurath had met previous to Mussolini's arrival to decide upon in-
structions for Göring in his conversations regarding Austria. Hitler was
opposed to Göring's policy which was too severe and made it clear that Germany must cause no explosion of the Austrian problem in the immediate future. Germany had to continue to seek an evolutionary solution. "We must merely obtain assurance that, in case the Austrian question were exploded by another party, intervention on the part of Germany would be possible." Keppler concludes in his memorandum that this was "obviously achieved." Mussolini had stated that he was not pleased with Schuschnigg's policy; that he (Mussolini) was one minute described as the arch-enemy of Austria and the next minute asked for assistance. However Mussolini rejected an overthrow of the Schuschnigg government and felt that a different policy could be carried out with Schuschnigg.\footnote{153} Mackensen noted that the fact of Germany's dissatisfaction with conditions inside Austria and the behavior of the Schuschnigg government was not concealed from the Duce.\footnote{154} In the information furnished the German Diplomatic Missions, Neurath informed them that the interests and potentialities (Möglichkeiten) of Italy in the Mediterranean would not be impeded by Germany and "the special German interests in Austria will not be impaired by Italy." It was correct, however, that as Mussolini publicly stated, the Rome-Berlin Axis was not directed against other countries; so nothing was discussed or agreed upon which Austria could consider dangerous or infringing upon her independence.\footnote{155}

On November 5, 1937, there was held in the Reich Chancellery in Berlin a conference between Hitler; the Reichsminister for War, Blomberg; the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Fritsch; the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Raeder; the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, Göring; and the Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs, Neurath. At this meeting the Führer
stated:

The German nation is composed of 85 million people, which because of the number of individuals and the compactness of habitation, form a homogeneous European racial body which cannot be found in any other country.

For the improvement of our military political position it must be our first aim, in every case of entanglement by war, to conquer Czecho-
lovakia and Austria simultaneously, in order to remove any threat from the flanks in case of a possible advance Westwards.

Although the population of Czechoslovakia in the first place is not a thin one, the embodiment of Czechoslovakia and Austria would nevertheless constitute the conquest of food for 5-6 million people, on the basis that a compulsory emigration of 2 million from Czechoslovakia and of 1 million from Austria could be carried out. The annexation of the two States to Germany militarily and politically would constitute a considerable relief, owing to shorter and better frontiers, the freeing of fighting personnel for other purposes and the possibility of re-constituting new armies up to a strength of about 12 Divisions, representing a new division per 1 million population.

No opposition to the removal of Czechoslovakia is expected on the part of Italy; however, it cannot be judged today what would be her attitude in the Austrian question since it would depend largely on whether the Duce were alive at the time or not.156

These are Hitler's reasons for annexing Austria in addition to that of "common blood." This meeting reveals a crystallization of Nazi plans under which Austria was to be seized to provide living room (Lebensraum), supplement Germany's food production, and improve Germany's military position for further operations. He was now definitely committed to action, though there remained doubt as to Mussolini's reaction in the face of a fait accompli. Only the day after, according to Ciano, while Ribbentrop was in Rome to sign the adhesion of Italy to the Anti-Comintern Pact, Mussolini had repeated the formula enunciated in conversation with Göring at Karinhall: "nothing will be done without previous exchange of information."157 This remained part of the risk which Hitler was willing to take and was to be resolved only on the day of the Einmarsch. The German military leaders were given to understand what they could
expect. The only questions to be answered were "how" and "when." Hitler was to answer the first by ordering his troops across the frontier after Schuschnigg had precipitated the last by calling for a national plebiscite for the independence of Austria.
CHAPTER VII

THE ANSCHLUSS

By January, 1938, Chancellor von Schuschnigg's resistance to further National Socialist demands for concessions was becoming firmer. This is perhaps best exemplified by a most interesting interview which he gave to The Daily Telegraph and Morning Post of London on January 5, 1938, preceding a meeting of the Rome Protocol states. In this interview, Schuschnigg declared that there would never be a dictatorship in Austria and that an absolute abyss separated Austria from Naziism. He expressed sympathy for Mussolini but denied that he had ever interfered in Austrian affairs or that Austria was being drawn in Italy's wake. In another passage he stated that Austria could never go back to the party system and "as we have no longer a party system, there can be no question of ever accepting Nazi representatives in the Cabinet."

He advocated co-operation in Central Europe and continued:

We feel common ties with Germany, just as an Italian-speaking Swiss feels towards Italy, or the Flemish towards Holland and the Walloons towards France. But we must remain ourselves alone. In preserving Austria's historic mission in Central Europe we can continue to render great service to the German people as a whole. But not with an Anschluss, in which Austria would become a second Bavaria, sinking to the level of a province. Instead we are the bridge between two great cultures."

The comments of the German press upon the interview were unfavorable and sharp. The Essener Nationalzeitung attacked the foreign policy of Austria during 1937 and the alleged efforts of the Schuschnigg government "to split the Austrian nationalist camp." The official Wiener Zeitung made a lengthy reply in writing that Austria's foreign policy was unequivocal
and that her statesmen had not taken advantage of their visits to foreign capitals to carry on discussions about Germany of the sort that German representatives had carried on in those same capitals about Austria. With reference to splitting the nationalist camp, the Wiener Zeitung commented that it was a notorious fact that it had long been and continued to be divided. One group operated with hand grenades, dynamite, and revolvers; to it Dollfuss had fallen victim. The other was and remained willing to pursue political discussions with civilized methods. The tone of the German papers was a support to the illegal group, and the attacks were not permissible under the Gentlemen's Agreement nor under the July, 1937, press pact. In totalitarian Germany these press attacks could be assumed to be a direct reflection of the official attitude. Altenburg of the German Foreign Ministry, in reviewing the "present state of German-Austrian relations," wrote:

The resistance to the cooperation so often promised stems mainly from the person of the Federal Chancellor himself, who said recently in the well-known interview that a wide gulf separates him from National Socialism. He considers it his objective to gain time again and again through definite promises and half promises. ...he has thus far believed that he could split the movement in Austria and then take the amenable elements and proceed all the more ruthlessly against the intransigent elements.... The institution of the Volkspolitische Referate in the Fatherland Front is also presumably to aid in his struggle against the Party. Moreover, he has so far been able deftly to play off against one another and against the Reich the men who have placed themselves at his disposal for effecting a domestic reconciliation in Austria, such as Minister von Glaize-Horstenau, State Counselor Seyss-Inquart, and Landesleiter Leopold.

After this interpretation of Schuschnigg's policy, Altenburg stated the task confronting the Germany counter-policy:

Maintenance of unity in the movement in Austria with energetic elimination of all cross-purposes and divisive tendencies, in order to create domestic
political pressure on the Federal Chancellor, and use of all admissible
diplomatic pressure from the outside by Germany in order to achieve full
compliance with the Agreement of July 11, 1936.3

With Schuschnigg's stiffened resistance came also a more resolute
determination on the part of Germany to settle the Austrian question.

The emphasis in the aims of German policy shifted insofar as Austria
had now become "target number one" in place of Czechoslovakia. Increased
German activity in that direction became evident. In this connection,
Welczeck, the German Ambassador in France, wrote to the German Foreign
Ministry: "Whereas the Czechoslovak question would only be solved by
military intervention, with all the risks that involved, the view here
is that Germany believes that she can solve the Austrian problem by a
cold war [auf kaltem Wege]." Germany hoped to accelerate developments
by intensive propaganda inside the country, the object being to force
the Austrian government to hold a plebiscite as the result of which
Schuschnigg would be compelled to resign. This would deprive the powers
interested in the preservation of Austrian independence of any pretext
for intervention. In the case of war Germany needed Roumanian oil and
grain; the road to Bucharest, however, led through Vienna and Budapest.
"It was believed that Budapest was secure, but Vienna still had to be
'synchronized.'"4 This attitude in Paris indicated a general realiza-
tion of Germany's increased interest in Austria. The fallacy lay not
in a mistaken understanding of German policy but in the estimate of the
will behind it, for the highly secret meeting in the Reich Chancellery
on November 5, 1937, had already revealed a crystallization of National
Socialist plans under which Austria was to be seized, under any conditions,
to provide living room for Germany and to improve Germany's military
position for further operations.

From the tenth through the twelfth of January, the Foreign Ministers of the Rome Protocol states met in Budapest. Hungary had been watching the changing international situation and the new Italian policy with the greatest anxiety. Not that Budapest had become insensitive to the attractions of "revision," but the preservation of an independent Austria was too much in favor of Hungarian interests not to seek to maintain it by all possible means. In the early part of November, 1937, Villani, the Hungarian Minister to Rome, had informed Ciano that Kanya proposed to announce a meeting of the three Foreign Ministers for December or January. Ciano reserved the final decision for Mussolini but saw no objection in principle to the meeting.\(^5\) Around the middle of December, Berger-Waldernegg, Villani, and Ciano had a conversation in preparation for the Budapest meeting which was set for January. At the time Ciano noted in his Diary that the meeting itself was "of little importance" for "the Rome Protocols have been superseded."\(^6\) Salata was replaced by a new Italian minister in Vienna, a man named Ghigi. His task as defined by Ciano was "that of a doctor who has to give oxygen to a dying man without the dying man's heir noticing. In case of doubt we are more interested in the heir than in the dying man."\(^7\) Mussolini and Ciano decided that they would demand of the other two member states a greater solidarity with Italy, a closer adherence to the Axis, and an anti-Comintern and anti-League policy.\(^8\) At the conference Ciano found that Kanya was ready to recognize Franco in Spain, but Schmidt would do so only under Italian pressure. Schmidt was more willing to announce an anti-League policy than Kanya. Schmidt wanted a declaration
about the independence of Austria which, as Ciano notes, "out of consideration for Germany I felt we could not make." Hungary wanted a declaration about minorities but this was also refused because, while directed at Roumania, it would have annoyed Yugoslavia more than anyone. In the end, Austria and Hungary expressed their sympathy "with the close co-operation of the two friendly Great Powers, Italy and Germany, which is rooted in the Rome-Berlin Axis and represents a new and important pledge of peace and reconstruction." Both countries expressed their hostility toward Communism and announced their intention to give formal recognition to Franco as the legitimate government of Spain. Finally they noted the "sound reasons" which led Italy to withdraw from the League of Nations. From this meeting the two smaller states of the Rome bloc lost much without gaining anything. Neither secured declarations from Italy in favor of their primary objectives, but both compromised their own positions by submerging their individual foreign policies to that of the Axis. That Schuschnigg was aware of this is seen in the fact that he found it necessary to defend the Rome Pact in an article entitled "The Vitality of the Rome Pact" and published in the Reichspost of January 13, 1938. In it Schuschnigg denied that the Rome Pact was gradually being made out of date by the course of events. He emphasized that the Protocols would continue as before to be the basis of the attitude of his government and that the conference at Budapest only confirmed the correctness of this view. The conclusion must have been written with tongue in cheek: "At this time we reflect with particular and sincere satisfaction on the tried friendship which unites us to Italy and for a long time past with Hungary, our neighbor
and the companion of our fate." The Budapest Conference cannot be under-
rated for it was the foreign political prelude to Berchtesgaden. Perhaps
in the trifling exhibition of the results of the Budapest meeting is
found the hopelessness arising from the necessities of Austrian domestic
politics, which led to the trip to Berchtesgaden. Had not a month after
the Budapest meeting, the Berchtesgaden meeting, and still another month
later the Anschluss, taken place, the consequence of this Rome Pact con-
ference would have brought the withdrawal of Austria from the League of
Nations and the complete unification of her foreign policy with Germany,
Italy, and Japan. With the Budapest communiqué, Austria placed herself
without any restrictions on the side of these three states, and while
it is doubtful that any help would have been forthcoming, she could no
longer even invoke the assistance of the Western Powers or the League.

The Reichspost of January 25, 1938, printed excerpts from an inter-
view given by Dr. Franz Tavs, a member of the so-called Committee of
Seven and well-known as a National Socialist and close collaborator of
Captain Leopold, to a reporter of the Prague newspaper, Slovensky blas.
The interview was given in November, 1937, but did not appear in the
Prague papers until the twenty-second of January.11 Thereupon the head-
quarters of the illegal National Socialist party in the Teinfaltstrasse
in Vienna was raided by the Austrian police and a number of documents
seized. This place must have been considered safe under the cloak of
the internal pacification agreement and the authority which the Committee
of Seven had received from the Chancellor, for in it were stored all
the secret material of the National Socialist illegal party.12 Tavs was
arrested. On the night of the twenty-fifth, Schuschnigg called a conference
of Ministers, which remained in session until 3 a.m. and in which Seyss-Inquart also took part. Probably as a result of this conference Leopold's office in the Teinfaltstrasse was then also searched on the morning of the twenty-sixth and Leopold himself was arrested in his hotel. The search of his office, the hotel room, and his apartment in Krems was fruitless. Leopold was held at the Vienna Police Headquarters until 2 a.m. of the twenty-seventh and then released. He had denied any knowledge of the Tavs document and said that he did not believe it came from Dr. Tavs.13 The papers found were of an incriminating character. A memorandum, "Programme of Action 1938," written by Tavs on the present situation fell into the hands of the police: "Subject: the impossibility of progress under Schuschnigg, German invasion the only solution, thereafter formation of a government under Leopold."14 The mass of documents seized by the police provided irrefutable proof of the direct and permanent connection between the Committee of Seven and high party and state officials in Germany—particularly with Rudolf Hess whose initials were found on one of the main documents.15 The offices of the Committee of Seven in the Teinfaltstrasse were padlocked and the police investigation of Tavs was concluded on the twenty-eighth with a charge of high treason lodged against him.16

Very soon after the conclusion of the Gentlemen's Agreement in July, 1936, Adolf Hitler had informed Schuschnigg that he looked forward to a visit from the Federal Chancellor. Schuschnigg had refused this invitation because the signing of the agreement with the Third Reich had added quite sufficient grounds for speculation by Austrian public opinion and the world in general, and he felt that this question must be allowed to
settle down before any sign of greater intimacy was given.\textsuperscript{17} By November, 1937, the situation was such, as demonstrated by Neurath's visit to Vienna, that a break or further violations of the relations between Germany and Austria was inevitable. Friedrich Rainer claims that it was Globocnik who first suggested the idea of the visit. The idea was cautiously considered in Berlin, and Keppler presented it to Ribbentrop. Papen was commissioned to make preparations for the conference. Globocnik and Rainer then went to Berlin and made a number of demands on behalf of the party: release of the July putschists, formation of the Ministry of the Interior under Seyss-Inquart, readmission of swastika armbands, \textit{et cetera}. The report included a declaration that the party needed these conditions but if possible without Schuschnigg.\textsuperscript{18} On January 7, 1938, Papen got in touch with Schmidt and made the proposal for a meeting of the two Chancellors. Schmidt carried this information to Schuschnigg who declared in principle his readiness for such a meeting provided certain conditions were first guaranteed by Hitler. Schuschnigg was to be invited by Hitler; prior to the visit he was to be precisely informed concerning the matters that would be discussed, and it was to be assumed that the Gentlemen's Agreement would be maintained. Hitler, moreover, would have to agree in advance with Schuschnigg about the main points of a communiqué that each of the two nations would publish at the end of the meeting, and this communiqué would again reiterate the full maintenance of the Gentlemen's Agreement by the two nations.\textsuperscript{19} On January 26, Papen presented to Schmidt a telegram from Neurath which stated that the Führer had declared himself ready to receive Schuschnigg at the Obersalzberg around February 15. Papen was to find out if the
inclination for the visit still existed and to carry out the preparatory steps until January 30. Schmidt informed Papen that the Federal Chancellor was still willing to accept an invitation.\textsuperscript{20}

The negotiations were then interrupted as a result of the Reichswehr purge and the cabinet reorganization in Germany; this was in effect a purge of those cautious elements in the Reichswehr that had for so long obstructed Hitler's aggressive foreign policy. The cabinet reorganization followed the forced resignation of the Minister of War, Field Marshal von Blomberg, due to an inauspicious domestic incident, and General von Fritsch with thirteen other senior officers were summarily retired. The Führer himself assumed the command of the Reichswehr. Göring was raised to the rank of Field Marshal and at the same time Joachim von Ribbentrop, recently Ambassador in London, was appointed Foreign Minister. The more moderate Neurath was relegated to a minor post as President of the Council. Hitler's next step was to recall his representative in Vienna, Papen, with whose help he drew up the main lines of the impending Austrian campaign. It was clear that any internal political revolt had been quashed and that Hitler's position of power within the Reich had been essentially strengthened. February 4, 1938, was the starting point for the activation of the German foreign policy of over-stepping its own boundary. The first victim of this activation was Austria.

Events were now accelerated. Propositions by the OKW\textsuperscript{21}, dated February 14, 1938, were approved in all points by Hitler and transmitted to Admiral Canaris in Munich by telephone. These propositions were:

\*Oberkommando der Wehrmacht
1. To take no real preparatory measures in the Army or Luftwaffe. No troop movements or redeployments.

2. Spread false, but quite credible news, which may lead to the conclusion of military preparations against Austria.
   a. through V-men (Vertrauensmänner or agents) in Austria,
   b. through our customs personnel at the frontier,
   c. through traveling agents.

3. Such news could be:
   a. Furloughs are supposed to have been barred in the Sector of the VII A.K.
   b. Rolling stock is being assembled in Munich, Augsburg, and Regensburg.
   c. Major General Muff, the Military Attaché in Vienna, has been called for a conference to Berlin. (As a matter of fact, this was the case.)
   d. The police stations located at the frontier of Austria have called up reinforcements.
   e. Custom officials report about the imminent maneuvers of the Mountain Brigade in the region of Freilassing, Reichenhall, and Berchtesgaden.

4. Order a very active make-believe wireless exchange in Wehrkreis VII and between Berlin and Munich.

5. Real maneuvers, training flights and winter maneuvers of the Mountain Troops near the frontier.22

On the evening of February 4, Papen had been informed by Lammers, Secretary of the Berlin Chancellery, that his mission in Vienna was ended. Papen proceeded to Berchtesgaden and there persuaded Hitler to allow him to return to Vienna and complete arrangements for the meeting between Schuschnigg and the Reich Chancellor. To this Hitler agreed, and Papen returned to Vienna on the seventh.23 Papen immediately contacted Schuschnigg and reopened the negotiations. He affirmed to the Federal Chancellor that "the suggested discussion will deal with such misunderstandings and points of friction as have persisted after the agreement of 1936. This agreement should be reaffirmed. The visit would demonstrate the unchanged continuation of this agreement." Then he added:

It is agreed that whatever the details of the discussion, the result of the meeting will in no case be to the disadvantage of the Austrian Government
nor will it entail any aggravations of the Austro-German relations. The worst that can happen is that after the meeting we are exactly where we are today. The Führer told me so himself.\textsuperscript{24}

The meeting was arranged for February 12.

Meanwhile Seyss-Inquart was also carrying on negotiations with Schuschnigg. According to a report sent to Keppler concerning the status of these negotiations, Schuschnigg had declared himself ready to comply with the following demands:

1) Release of all persons still held in jail in consequence of the Putsch of July 1934.
2) Restitution in cases of disciplinary measures affecting retirement and the forfeiture of pensions.
3) Elimination of economic discrimination because of National Socialist convictions.
4) Development of military, economic, and political relations with the Reich through the inclusion of persons from the ranks of the National Opposition, in which connection State Counselor Dr. Seyss-Inquart is to make recommendations.
5) Thorough settlement of press problems and attainment of a real press truce.
6) Inclusion of persons from the ranks of the National Opposition in various organizations (athletic clubs, school clubs, agriculture, and trades).
7) State Counselor Dr. Seyss-Inquart is to be granted control over the various Government committees, such as the Election Committee, the Committee on the Constitution, etc.
8) Federal Chancellor Schuschnigg has declared himself prepared to go beyond these points, and to establish equality [innere Gleichberechtigung] for the National Opposition.\textsuperscript{25}

These concessions, known as the "Little Program," were very similar to the Austrian illegal party demands as presented by Globocnig and Rainer. Later, Seyss-Inquart was able to report that the final negotiations resulted in the "Little Program" being accepted by Schuschnigg in full and its execution was to begin immediately. The appointment of Seyss-Inquart to the Ministry of the Interior together with Public Security was conceded in principle. Schuschnigg, however, was able to point to
recent acts of violence which made it impossible to proceed with the appointments at that time. He insisted on postponement until March 20 by which time the situation would have sufficiently calmed down to make any action on his part acceptable to his own followers. Seyss-Inquart urgently requested Keppler to see to it that the Federal Chancellor was definitely committed to make the ministerial appointments before February 20 in order to implement the "Little Program" immediately. It was also necessary to take firm domestic measures to prevent any disturbance of the diplomatic agreements by domestic disorder which would supply Schuschnigg with a plausible pretext for not honoring his commitments.26

It was generally assumed that Leopold was behind these acts of domestic disorder. The smuggling of propaganda literature, using the Mayor of Passau's car, was one of the illegal acts discovered. Papen suggested that the Austrian government be informed that steps would be taken against the persons responsible, so that the incident, which Schmidt characterized as the "crassest so far of interference in Austrian domestic affairs," could not be exploited against the Germans in the coming conversations.27 Keppler reported that Göring had ordered Leopold to come to the Reich for a conference early in 1938. Leopold replied that he could not obtain an exit visa and was therefore "unable to comply with this request." He let it be known, moreover, that he was bound to observe only the Führer's directives.28 The state of affairs had reached an impasse when Keppler received word that Leopold, on his own initiative, had started negotiations with Schuschnigg. He reported to Göring that he had received word from the Foreign Office which had received a report
from the Embassy in Vienna confirming the facts. This was denied by Papen, but Leopold had already caused too much agitation and disturbance for both Papen and his clique and Schuschnigg and his supporters. Papen wrote to Hitler on February 4, that:

all elements interested in a deterioration of German-Austrian relations are trying to exploit the present situation. To my regret I hear that Captain Leopold has issued instructions to give expression to dissatisfaction with the Schuschnigg government through occasional acts of terrorism in the provinces. Underlying these instructions is probably the desire to force the Reich into early intervention in Austria.31

Keppler said in a dispatch that:

the political efforts...were greatly handicapped by disagreements and opposition on the part of the Austrian Landesleitung. I have taken the utmost pains and shown very great patience in trying to bring Landesleiter Leopold into line; but these efforts were of no avail, with the result that today, like Field Marshal Göring, I too am of the opinion that the removal of Landesleiter Leopold is an urgent necessity.32

Schuschnigg also demanded that Hitler acquiesce in the removal of Leopold in reciprocation for his visit. Papen agreed that the official communiqué would announce the removal by the Führer of Leopold. Schuschnigg was extremely anxious to make the removal appear as though the Führer were abandoning the movement.33

On February 12, 1938, Schuschnigg, in the company of Schmidt and Papen, journeyed to the Obersalzberg for a visit of the greatest secrecy with the Führer and Chancellor of the Third Reich. The meeting was unique and without precedent, and only a bare minimum of etiquette customary to international relations was observed. The visit at the Berghof lasted for almost twelve hours without interruption. The first interview took place at 11 a.m. The development of Hitler's ideas was
essentially this:

The rise of an obscure soldier to leadership of the Germans has brought the creation of a classless, partyless, socially unprejudiced, unified people, not split by denominational conflict. All of Germany's neighbors belong to this nation, insofar as they are German-speaking. I am about to fulfill a historic mission, guided by providence, from which no one will deter me. Thus far I have achieved everything I have set out to do, and so have become the greatest German of history. Austrian history, including that of the Habsburgs and the Catholic church, has been one great series of treason against the people. This nonsense must be put to an end. Therefore, I have decided to solve the Austrian problem once and for all. One week from now, I will step before the German Reichstag to report on the course of events. Therefore, I have no time to lose. If we arrive at no conclusion, I will have to make my own decisions tomorrow night.

Austria should by no means believe that I am bluffing, nor should it expect help from any source. I see eyes to eye with Mussolini, the closest ties of friendship bind me to Italy. France is in no position and England is not willing to help Austria. If you are reasonable, you will be able to enter your name in history alongside those of other great Germans like Göring, etc. If not, everything else will take its course of its own accord.34

After two hours the first interview came to an end. At 2 p.m. Hitler excused himself and left the room. Schuschnigg informed Schmidt of his earlier interview with Hitler and was told that one of the leading Austrian Nazis, a Dr. Mühlmann from Vienna, had also been asked to the Berghof. Hitler was presumably discussing the Austrian problem with him and Papen while they waited. Two hours later, Schuschnigg and Schmidt were admitted to a room where they found Ribbentrop and Papen. Schuschnigg was handed a written draft of about two pages. This was the German draft of the Berchtesgaden Protocol. Schuschnigg and Schmidt voiced their objections but Ribbentrop and Papen agreed to only two changes, both of them utterly irrelevant. Hans Fischbőck, a Viennese Nazi, instead of becoming a cabinet member, was to get the title of Federal Commissar, and the exchange of officers was to be effected in two installments of fifty officers.
each time. Included in the Protocol were the following measures: 1) the two governments would enter into a diplomatic exchange of views on questions of foreign policy of common concern, and Austria was to give, upon request, moral, diplomatic, and press support to the desires and actions of the German Reich, with the Reich assuming the same obligation toward Austria; 2) Schuschnigg declared that he was willing to entrust Seyss-Inquart with Security; 3) "The Federal Chancellor states that the Austrian National Socialists shall in principle have opportunity for legal activity within the framework of the Fatherland Front and all other Austrian organizations. This activity shall take place on an equal footing with all other groups, and in accordance with the constitution"; 4) a general amnesty was to be proclaimed immediately; 5) economic discrimination against National Socialists was to be eliminated; and 6) relations between the German and Austrian armed forces were to be implemented by the replacement of Alfred Janse, Chief of the Austrian General Staff, by Franz Böhme, by a systematic exchange of officers, and by regular conferences between the General Staffs. Paragraph III of the Protocol contained this sentence: "The Reich Government will take measures to prevent interference in the internal affairs of Austria on the part of Reich-German Party organs." Schuschnigg refused to give final sanction to the document until he was able to consult his cabinet and to obtain the signature of President Miklas; so it was agreed during the second interview with Hitler that Schuschnigg would send a definitely binding reply by February 15, 1938. The document was signed by Hitler, Ribbentrop, Schuschnigg, and Guido Schmidt. Toward evening the two copies were signed. An invitation for supper was declined, and Schuschnigg, Schmidt,
and Papen drove back to Vienna.

The independence of Austria had been virtually lost. Of the third provision Schuschnigg wrote: "It was a typical rubber clause, the trap in a carefully planned document which, once signed, was to be used as a club against the weaker partner. It was intended to cloak the treacherous blow with a thin remnant of so-called legality." On his return to Vienna, Schuschnigg conferred immediately with President Miklas and a few of his closest political advisors. Miklas was willing to grant the amnesty, but he objected most vigorously to the appointment of Seyss-Inquart to the post of Security. Finally Schuschnigg enumerated three possible courses: "1. The Chancellor resign and the President call on a new Chancellor to form a cabinet, which action would be under no obligation to the commitments of Berchtesgaden. 2. The Berchtesgaden agreement be carried out under a newly appointed Chancellor. 3. The agreement be carried out and the Chancellor remain at his post." After considerable hesitation, Miklas finally decided on the last course. On February 15, Schuschnigg penned a reply to Hitler:

Your Excellency: With reference to the conversation with the Chancellor at the Obersalzberg on February 12, I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that the measures promised by us (in the Protocol) will be carried out before February 18. I assume therefore that the steps promised by the Chancellor will also be carried out at the proper time.

Identical German and Austrian communications on the Berchtesgaden conversations were broadcast simultaneously at 10 p.m., February 15, 1938, by Colonel Adam in Vienna, and from the German radio stations. Then on the sixteenth the official news agency broadcast the Austrian announcement of the change in the Austrian cabinet and the general political am-
nesty. Because of the opposition in Schuschnigg's own camp, nothing but the joint German-Austrian declaration could be announced on the fifteenth, but during the night it was possible to make public the composition of the fifth Schuschnigg cabinet. Its most important feature was the appointment of Seyss-Inquart as Minister of the Interior who was also put in charge of Security. State Secretary Skubl retained his post as Director of Security and at the same time was appointed inspector general of all the law-enforcement agencies, including the police. The blemishes in the new cabinet, as far as the National Socialists were concerned, were the retention of General Zehner as State Secretary for National Defense and the appointment of the clerical engineer, Julius Raab, as Minister of Commerce. The appointment of Zernatto and Hans Rott as Ministers without Portfolio was taken as a counter-balance to Seyss-Inquart's appointment. Guido Schmidt became the Foreign Minister and the moderate Christian Socialist, Professor Ludwig von Adamovich, the new Minister of Justice. Glaise-Horstenau also received a ministerial post without portfolio. There were a number of changes in the Fatherland Front. Zernatto, retaining his office as Secretary General, was appointed deputy to Front Leader Schuschnigg, Seyss-Inquart was appointed chief of the Volkspolitisches Referat, and at the same time Dr. Pembaur was put in charge of administration. Seyss-Inquart was to be assisted by an advisory council, the chairmanship of which was given to Dr. Jury. In accordance with Article 3 of the Protocol, Ribbentrop told Hess that the necessary instructions had to be given immediately to renew the old ban on interference of Reich-German party organs in the internal affairs of Austria. Accordingly Hess issued
the following instruction:

The Führer's Deputy wishes to issue a reminder of his orders strictly forbidding Reich-Germans to meddle in the internal affairs of Austria, to carry on National Socialist propaganda across the border, or to issue directions to Austrian National Socialists. He expects strictest observance of the orders.45

On the seventeenth the Völkischer Beobachter carried the banner headlines, "The New Order in Austria."46

Hitler's immediate plans are rather obscure. Whether he expected that Austria, under the efficient manipulation of Seyss-Inquart or under a renewed outbreak of terrorism on the part of the amnestied Austrian National Socialists, would now fall effortlessly into his hands, whether he always intended outright military invasion (which is doubtful), whether he would have been stayed by sufficiently resolute warning on the part of the "Stresa Powers"--all this remains unknown. Very likely he left the tactical details to the circumstances of the moment. But that he was now determined to achieve the realities of political control in Austria, regardless of the means, there can be no possible doubt.

Two days before the Berchtesgaden meeting, Attolico, the Italian ambassador in Berlin, had called on the new German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop to inform him of the status of the Italian-British conversations. These conversations had been initiated by the British when Sir Eric Drummond had left with Ciano an aide-memoire, on October 2, 1937, as a summary of Anglo-Italian conversations. Contacts were continued and before Christmas the Fascist government had presented to the British government a complete program suggesting how the agreement could be
reached to which the "Gentlemen's Agreement" of January 2, 1937, was intended only as a prelude. But the conversations were exceedingly slow in getting under way. Attolico informed Ribbentrop on February 10 that Mussolini had issued instructions to Ambassador Grandi in London that the Italian government continued to be prepared in principle to discuss the questions existing between England and Italy. At the same time Ciano had instructed Attolico to inform the German government that Italy still maintained the same position which Mussolini had expressed to Ribbentrop in the Palazzo Venezia in November, 1937, and that "nothing would be done in Rome without the full prior concurrence of Berlin." The Fascist government fully expected the same consideration to be accorded them. They were taken completely by surprise then when the Italian Legation in Vienna was first informed of the intended visit to Berchtesgaden the evening that Schuschnigg took the train for Salzburg, February 11. No further information was forthcoming until after the Chancellor's return and President Miklas' final decision to accept the Protocol. Ciano noted in his Diary on the thirteenth that the first reports of the Hitler-Schuschnigg conversations point to a silent nazification of Austria. "The Anschluss is inevitable. The only thing to do is to delay it as long as possible," and on the fourteenth he noted that the news from Vienna confirmed that the nazification of Austria was in progress.

Mussolini saw the Berchtesgaden Protocol for the first time on February 15, and according to Ciano, said that he regarded it "as a logical and inevitable development in the relations between two German countries." But Zernatto claims that the document made the greatest impression on the
Italian Chief. The Italian position in Central Europe, which had been built up painfully and with great sacrifice over the years, was being threatened. Mussolini knew that the West reckoned with this danger for Italy. He knew that the pressure of Germany on Austria was also a pressure on him, but he also knew that he could not risk a conflict with the German Reich before he had the long aspired to contract with the Western Powers in his pocket. Consequently he chose the path of expediency. He advised Austria to delay and try to gain time. He calculated on a horizontal axis between Italy and Yugoslavia and perhaps Roumania. He offered to England the possibility of assuming a share of the responsibility by the rapid conclusion of an Anglo-Italian agreement. Mussolini had already written Austria off, and his concern was now for Italy. Ciano noted that he was irritated with the Germans over the manner in which they had acted in the Austrian question. In the first place Italy should have been warned—but not a word. And then if instead of stopping with the Berchtesgaden Protocol, they should go on to a real Anschluss "a general situation would be created entirely different to that in which the Axis was formed, and it would become necessary to re-examine the whole position." Italy had been presented with a fait accompli and there was no possible alternative but to give their approval to what Schuschnigg had done. But uncertainty prevailed in the Fascist camp.

On February 14, Attolico approached Ribbentrop and asked why he had not been informed of the visit. Ribbentrop replied that he did not even know of it himself until he had arrived in Berchtesgaden and had therefore been unable to inform the Italian Ambassador before he had learned of it through the press. Specifically Ribbentrop said that it was hoped that
contact between Hitler and Schuschnigg would lead to better relations between the two countries and that "the entire complex of the many problems existing between Germany and Austria had been discussed."52 On the sixteenth, Ciano spoke with Bosko Cristich, Yugoslav Minister to Italy. The two countries were in an identical position with regard to pan-Germanism though Yugoslavia was in the weaker position because they were not as strong militarily and did not have as solid a natural barrier for a frontier as Italy. But as long as "the Austrian cockerel has found his way—or almost—into the German pot earlier than necessary," then it was indispensable that the bonds between Rome and Belgrade should be strengthened. "A horizontal Axis will make possible the existence of the vertical Axis."53

On February 16, Ciano addressed a secret and personal letter to Count Grandi in London. The letter contained instructions for him to reach quickly a full and final agreement between Italy and Great Britain:

The new fact is the Berchtesgaden meeting and what has followed it. The Nazification of Austria may now be considered—if not complete—certainly very far advanced. That was foreseen; just as it is now easy to foresee that there will be still further bounds forward in the Nazi offensive. When? That is the question which seems difficult to answer. And it is precisely in relation to this uncertainty that the present state of the Anglo-Italian negotiations must be considered. To use a phrase of the Duce's...we find ourselves in the interval between the fourth and fifth acts of the Austrian affair. When will the fifth act begin? It is impossible to foresee. But it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that the tempo may increase.

Italy knew this interval would be the only one left for negotiations between Rome and London. During this interval there would be no pressure other than time and the normal diplomacy could prevail; but should the Anschluss become an accomplished fact and the weight of Germany be pressing
on the Italian frontier, then a rapprochement with London would be interpreted by the entire world as "a journey to Canossa under German pressure."

But there must be a conclusion—and that quickly. For should still further delays be caused by the Chinese wall of prejudices and conditions, should the Nazi march into Austria in the meantime make its final advance and present us with a fait accompli, then there would exist no alternative and we would have to direct our policy in a spirit of sharp, open, immutable hostility towards the Western Powers.54

In London, Eden attempted to reach Grandi on the sixteenth and the seventeenth but was put off both times. This added considerably to Eden's embarrassment in the Austrian debate in the Commons which had begun on the sixteenth. Eden had to confine himself to the facts already known and was forced to admit under persistent questioning that consultations had not yet taken place with the French or Italian governments with whom Britain had made various declarations on Austrian independence. Eden continued to put the expected statement on Austria off on the seventeenth and eighteenth. He merely stated that the British government did not wish to take the initiative, which belonged to Italy and France, in view of the fact that the guarantees of Austrian independence were collective ones.55 Grandi let it be known through Chamberlain's confidential agent that if the Prime Minister saw fit to have personal contact with him, he was ready to present himself at Downing Street immediately.56 Accordingly Chamberlain received Grandi the following day in the presence of Eden. Grandi had arranged for "a special air service" from Paris for the courier who was carrying Ciano's letter so that he received it literally minutes before he left for No. 10
Downing Street. It would be superfluous to follow the dramatic events leading to Eden's resignation and eventually the signing of an Anglo-Italian agreement on April, 57 but it is interesting to follow Grandi's exposition to Chamberlain as to the reasons for Italy's attitude of "ostentatious passivity" in the face of the serious events taking place in Austria. First, Grandi refused to discuss the Austrian problem at all. This was to indicate that, as concerns Italy, there was no longer an Austrian problem. Grandi denied decisively and absolutely that there was any secret agreement between Hitler and Mussolini whereby Italian assent had been given in advance to a progressive absorption of Austria in exchange for German support of Italian designs in the Mediterranean. Then he chronologically listed events, beginning with Italy's attitude to the Curtius-Schober project for an Austro-German Zollverein in 1931 and including the attempted coup d'etat in July, 1934, the Stresa Conference in April, 1935, the conflict between Italy and Abyssinia and sanctions, and finally the "pretext" of Italian intervention in Spain. He concluded by saying:

What is happening today in Austria is the direct consequence of English and French policy during the last three years. The Western powers have undoubtedly been the most effective supporters of the expansionist programme of Nazi Germany and bear the responsibility for what is happening in Austria. The explanation of the Italian attitude in the face of present events in Austria is not, therefore, to be sought in absurd plots between Rome and Berlin, but only in the policy of London and Paris.

On February 17, the Informazione Diplomatica, the organ of the Italian Foreign Ministry, published the statement that the Fascist government considered the collaboration between Austria and Germany in line not only with "the immutable conditions of reality," but also with the essential
interest of peace in Central Europe. "These interests Italy has always preserved and defended against all attempts to give life to and develop the germs of conflict in Central Europe. For this reason she has followed and supported a line of action that Schuschnigg, in full agreement with her, has courageously pursued and that should gain him the sympathy of all those who, in Europe, are truly in favor of a policy of agreement and peace." 58

On the eighteenth Ciano had a conversation with the Prince of Hesse, an influential Nazi and husband of Princess Mafalda, a daughter of King Victor Emmanuel III, in which Ciano suggested three points to him "in a personal and friendly manner" since he would see Ribbentrop on February 19. The official Italian reaction to the Berchtesgaden Protocol should be recognized as a "cordial and concrete proof of friendship." But the way in which things had occurred could not be considered by Italy as altogether agreeable, especially so considering the close bonds between the two Axis countries and the verbal agreement not to do anything concerning Austria without mutual consultations. Ciano advised that these remarks be kept in mind by the German government in the future. He also hoped that the Führer in his next speech would explicitly mention the independence of Austria. 59 To tell Hitler that it would be well to declare that Austria continued to exist as an independent State was as close to a remonstrance over Berchtesgaden that Italy came.

With the rapid developments in the foreign and domestic scene, the position of the illegal party became extremely critical. Seyss-Inquart requested as a prerequisite for the assumption of his office that Hitler remove Leopold and Tavs to the Reich. 60 Veessenmayer succeeded in inducing
Leopold to leave for Germany on February 18. That same day messages from Vienna disclosed that activities on a rather large scale were planned by the illegal party. Tavs, who had been released the day before, gave instructions to smash all windows in the German Legation. One of the most important persons in the entourage of Leopold, Herr Rüdiger, an engineer, asserted to some business executives whom he had called to a meeting that even the Führer had no right to meddle in Austrian affairs. It was planned to provoke Seyss-Inquart into further arrests and then brand him as a traitor to the National cause. On February 21, Keppler, Göring, and Hitler met with Leopold. Hitler stated "that the actions of the Landesleitung had been insane.... He had succeeded this time in clearing up the difficulties. If the diplomatic situation were different, however, such actions could get him into the most painful and mortifying predicaments. He had now put Austrian policy on a different basis, and the new situation called for new forces. It was therefore his unalterable decision to remove and replace Leopold." Leopold was ordered to keep "aloof" from Austrian politics. Because of a very unsatisfactory circular which had been issued by the party on February 17 and which expressed regret over the replacement of Glaise-Horstenau by Seyss-Inquart, Schattenfroh, In der Maur, Rüdiger, and Tavs also had to leave Austria and go to Germany. Major Hubert Klausner was informed that he would succeed Leopold. Instructions were given to Klausner: "Illegal activity had to be transformed into legal activity.... The Party had to show blind discipline toward the new leader." Hitler further stressed that good working arrangements had to be created with Seyss-Inquart. He was to be supported by the party in every way, and
the radical element had to be curbed in order not to render impossible
the situation for him, who "now and then would have to lock up Nazis
too." At a meeting of Tava, Leopold, In der Maur, Rödiger, Schatten-
fröh, Ribbentrop, and Keppler with Hitler on February 26, 1938, the
latter said that:

as the Austrian question could never be solved by a revolution...there
remained only two possibilities:
1. Force,
2. Evolutionary means,
and he wanted the evolutionary course to be taken whether or not the pos-
sibility of success could today be foreseen.... He did not now desire
a solution by violent means, if it could at all be avoided, since the
danger for us in the field of foreign policy became less each year and
our military power greater each year.67

If Keppler's memorandum can be given credence, then Hitler in this latest
move had removed the leaders of the illegal party in Austria thereby
rendering their followers impotent. This, together with the Hess in-
structions to Reich-Germans gives strong support and substance to the
theory that Hitler was still determined to avoid any overt action on
the part of Germany in securing ultimate control of Austria. This is
further substantiated by the confused orders emanating from the Reich
Chancellery on that fateful March 11, 1938, which would seem to indicate
there had been no previously prepared plan for such an emergency.

Vessemmayer, who was connected with the SS security service, wrote of
the Berchtesgaden Protocol:

...the breakthrough succeeded absolutely and is much deeper than is
assumed in many quarters in the Reich. After the powers had left Schuschnigg
in the lurch, he immediately saw his former supports partly fall away, partly
quarrel among themselves, and fight furiously over the succession to the
chancellorship. In Legitimist circles chaos prevails; all hope has been
abandoned. In Jewish circles the conviction prevails that it is now only
a matter of time until Austria is politically and economically united with
the Reich. The collapse is so complete that, if an acceleration of
devotions fits into the Führer's foreign policy, a number of de-
cisive positions can be captured within the succeeding weeks by means
of definite pressure on the part of the Reich.68

Immediately after his appointment, Seyss-Inquart called on Hitler, Göring,
and Himmler in Berlin.69 There he presented his plans to Hitler which
included development of the Volkspolitische Referat under the leadership
of Juray, "thus enabling the Austrian Nazis to busy themselves within
the Fatherland Front"; the appointment of Dr. Hans Fischböck to the
Economic Council in order to represent there the National Socialist
aims; and for the same purpose Reinthaller was to be appointed to the
agricultural economic council. Any political activities outside these
organizations were forbidden and were to be prosecuted by the police.
The political leadership of the Austrian National Socialists was to be
exclusively in the hands of those men who were responsible for their
activities toward the Austrian government.70

On February 20, Hitler addressed the Reichstag, and on February 24,
Schuschnigg addressed the Austrian Federal Diet. Hitler made several
statements regarding the collaboration of the two revolutions and ex-
pressed appreciation for Mussolini and his sincere thanks to Schuschnigg
"for his great understanding and the warm-hearted willingness with which
he accepted my invitation and worked with me so that we might discover a
way of serving the best interest of the whole German people, whose sons
we all are, wherever we may have been born."71 As a whole the speech
was well received in Italy. Ciano noted that Hitler's pronouncements
on Austria, although the word "independence" did not once appear, "seem
fairly satisfactory."72 Plessen, German Chargé d'Affaires in Italy,
however, wrote to the German Foreign Ministry that Italy did not seem
to be entirely pleased with recent developments in the Austrian question.
But whether or not Italy liked the course of events, she would reconcile
herself finally to something which she has known for a long time she
cannot change.73 In Schuschnigg's speech, he made three emphatic points:

1) Austria welcomes the peace with Germany and is resolved to keep
it under any circumstances.

2) The limits of our possibilities are clearly outlined in the
interstate agreement of July 1936. Thus Austria will go so far and no
further.

3) Austria can live and will live. It will never voluntarily give
up its national resistance. Our watchword remains "true German and red-
white-red until we're dead."74

Schuschnigg also expressed clearly that there was no change in the re-
lations of Italy with Austria or of Austria with Italy. He had previously
sent an outline of the speech, by Ghigi, to Ciano who thought it was good
and suggested to Schuschnigg that he made it clear that the independence
of Austria was based on the will and determination of the Austrian people
rather than on uncertain guarantees of foreign states.75 Ciano recorded
that Mussolini, too, was very pleased with the speech and was especially
struck by the enthusiasm of the Assembly.76 Within Austria, the effect
was clearly divided: passionate approval within the ranks of loyal
Austrians and with the mass of non-political or normally indifferent
followers; momentary indecision in the camps of the opponents; fanatical
disapproval and immediate mobilization of the illegal National Socialist
formation, led by the SA and SS. The economic barometer registered a
sharp reaction in the mass withdrawal of accounts from banks and savings
accounts and in the cancellation of orders from foreign firms. Arturo
Toscanini cabled the Salzburg music festival management that he was
cancelling all contracts. The young Pretender Otto of Habsburg sent a letter from Belgium imploring Schuschnigg to appoint him to the post of chancellor if such a step would in any way save Austria. Among the letters Schuschnigg received was a document which bore the signatures of many Socialist functionaries from the Vienna factories stating that the workers would wholeheartedly support the policy of Austrian independence as expressed in the speech of February 24.77

Papen told the Federal Chancellor that "while he had found some very cordial words for Austria's German mission, these had been all but drowned out by his dramatic defense of Austrian independence, which he apparently considered threatened—to say nothing of some unnecessary asides against the Reich."78 On February 25, Papen took leave of Schuschnigg, turned his affairs over to Counselor Stein, and departed from Vienna.79

From March 3 to 6 Keppler paid a visit to Vienna on Hitler's orders. In a conversation with Minister Guido Schmidt, he demanded that the general press ban be lifted and party literature admitted. The Völkischer Beobachter would have to be admitted immediately. Schmidt promised the latter, and said that the former was being negotiated by Dr. Megerle.80 On the fifth, Keppler visited Schuschnigg and presented a number of new demands in addition to the Berchtesgaden Protocol, among them the immediate exchange of double the number of army officers. But to Schuschnigg "somewhere all patience ends." He told Keppler "in rather plain language" that the Berchtesgaden Protocol was only three weeks old and that he had "no interest whatsoever in continuing the conversation."81 Of the situation in Austria, Keppler reported that the party
was now "in fine shape."

Klausner had loyal co-operation and Leopold was hardly mentioned anymore. At the head of the Austrian National Socialists was Klausner, with Globocnic directly under him as Organization Leader (according to his official title, "for Problems Concerning the Movement"). An equivalent rank was held by Friedrich Rainer as political leader of the movement. Under this very restricted Führerrat were the Führerstämme; farmers, under Engineer Reinthaller; labor, under Sepp Nemetz; the Mannschaft, under First Lieutenant Lukesch; youth, under Schoas; the Dienst SS under Ernst Kaltenbrunner; and Welfare, under Franz Langoth, head of the Hilfswerk of the N.S.D.A.P. The relationship between Seyss-Inquart and Klausner was as follows:

Seyss-Inquart acknowledged unconditionally the party leadership and actions taken by it; and he also acknowledged Klausner as the leader of the party. As a party member he was under the command of Klausner and received orders from him. But as a result of the agreement at Berchtesgaden and the statement of the Führer made to him during his state visit in Berlin, Seyss-Inquart was the personal trustee of the Führer and directly responsible to him for the illegal NSDAP in Austria within the confines of his political sphere.

The expression "The New Fatherland Front" was coined as a contrast with the old Front. At that time, the National Socialists were inclined to "apply the brakes" to the movement in order to wring more and more concessions from Schuschnigg. Seyss-Inquart was working with "extraordinary dexterity." His intention was to try to legalize the SA and SS. The Hitlerjugend had already to a great extent been incorporated into the Youth Organization (Jungvolk) of the Fatherland Front. "Heil Hitler" and the Hitler salute were permitted. On the basis of these observations and impressions, Keppler wrote that he believed that "the Party is again ready for action and, as a disciplined body, can be used in the political game
and that Dr. Seyss-Inquart will to a great extent be successful in obtaining the possibility of organizing legally."84

If Hitler had left the tactical details to the circumstances of the moment, then Schuschnigg by his own action precipitated the more violent course or at least hastened the inevitable. Schuschnigg writes that it was in the last days of February that he first considered the possibility of a plebiscite. Negotiations with the National Opposition became more and more futile, "as every agreement, every bargain, was recanted by them within twenty-four hours and since every concession on our part brought an avalanche of new and impossible demands." When Schuschnigg's last offer, to replace the governor of Styria with a National Socialist and to create vice-governorships in all provinces for the Opposition, served to assuage the appetite of the National Socialists for barely one day, things had gone far enough. Schuschnigg decided to ask the Austrian people to express their free will and to profess their allegiance to their country. "Not the representatives of Austria, but Adolf Hitler had to fear it. For this reason and only for this reason he prevented it."

What had happened in Austria up to that point was the terroristic activity of a minority which was backed and immunized by the German Führer. First, to falsify this minority into a majority, and subsequently to make it into a real majority by pressure--that was...the true tenor of Hitler's vociferous indignation, the premeditated aim of his politico-strategic concept.85

Francesco Salata, who had been sent by Mussolini to Vienna as a special observer on February 24,86 returned to Rome and gave to Ciano the details of the violence of the Berchtesgaden meeting and said that Schuschnigg was thinking of holding a plebiscite. Ciano wrote in his Diary, "In his (Schuschnigg's) opinion, the prognostics should be favourable
to the Patriotic Front. But if he is wrong, doesn't it mean an immediate crisis? Is it right to take the risk?" Mussolini sent Schuschnigg a report through Colonel Liebitzky, Austrian military attaché in Italy, advising Austria to preserve its present course, for an impending relaxation of Anglo-Italian relations would do much to ease the present pressure. Referring to the plebiscite, Mussolini said that it was a mistake for favorable returns would be branded as a fraud, unfavorable returns would render the position of the present government untenable, and anything else would leave the situation more or less as it is.

On March 4, 1938, a conference took place with Schuschnigg, Schmitz, Zernatto, Pernter, and Stockinger participating. It was at this conference that the decision to hold a plebiscite as soon as possible was reached. Schmitz was charged with preparing a memorandum by Tuesday, March 8, regarding the necessary preliminaries. In consultation with Zernatto, Pernter, Schmitz, Kienböck (president of the National Bank), and Landeshauptmann Reither on Tuesday night of the eighth, Schuschnigg decided to make known the following day at Innsbruck before officials of the Fatherland Front that a plebiscite was to be held on Sunday, March 13. The rules were dictated by Zernatto to his secretary. It was resolved to keep this intention secret until the evening of the next day. Zernatto said, "It is Wednesday when the Nazis hear about it. Their actions can start at the latest on Thursday; they can begin with their propaganda on Friday. We gain an advantage of two days and with this advantage we can carry out the plebiscite with a small majority." Then the secretary of Zernatto became ill; she had to go out. In reality she was a National Socialist, and once outside she took a piece of paper and
in great haste wrote on it what she knew and sent it to Rainer. By
10:30 p.m. the National Socialists knew the whole plan. The party had
to wait for Hitler's instructions. Rainer sent a directive to all Gau-leiters:

The Party's standpoint toward Schuschnigg's proclamation is: the whole
is a violation of the agreement in an internal and external political
sense. The party cannot recognize this swindle. The Führer will de-
termine what is to be done. Complete abstention from voting and the
orders for Sunday will follow.92

This was the first order.

In Italy the events were being followed closely and with increasing
apprehension. The news continued to get worse. Styria was under the
control of the Nazis, and they were making progress in the other provinces.
On the seventh, Mussolini had two interviews with Liebitsky and told him
to advise Schuschnigg against the plebiscite.93 But this advice was too
late. On the evening of Tuesday, March 8, Schuschnigg informed Seyss-Inquart of the impending plebiscite and asked him for his word of honor
not to make this announcement public before he had done so officially
the next day at Innsbruck. In the provincial capitals only the governors
and the representatives of the Fatherland Front organization were informed
in order to begin the necessary preparations.94 The next morning at a
session called by the Landesleitung, Seyss-Inquart explained that he had
known about the plebiscite for only a few hours, but that he could not
talk about it because he had given his word to keep silent on the subject.
However, he made the others understand that the unofficial information
they had received through Zernatto's secretary was based on truth. Klausner,
Jury, Rainer, Globocnig, and Seyss-Inquart were present, and it was decided
that first, the Führer had to be informed immediately; second, the opportunity for the Führer to intervene must be given to him by way of an official declaration made by Seyss-Inquart to Schuschnigg; and third, Seyss-Inquart must negotiate with the government until clear instructions and orders could be received from the Führer. Gobocnig flew to Hitler on the afternoon of March 9.95 That same afternoon Schuschnigg announced in the Innsbruck speech that a plebiscite would be held the following Sunday. The election slogan was: "With Schuschnigg for Austria. We want a free and a German Austria, an independent and a social Austria, a Christian and a united Austria. We desire bread and peace in the country and equality of all who stand for their people and their nation."96 The plebiscite ballots gave a choice of "yes" or "no." The Federal Chancellor announced that the result of the plebiscite would decide his fate. He asked all cabinet members to remain in Vienna for expected important developments. Glaise-Horstenau declared that he had a lecture to deliver in Munich and would resign if not allowed to go. For reasons of diplomacy, Schuschnigg let it go at that.97 On the afternoon of Wednesday, March 9, Klausner, at the Führer's orders, flew to Vienna by special plane to prevent the plebiscite or, if this were not possible, to have added to the plebiscite a question on the Anschluss.98 By Thursday, March 10, the publicity campaign for the plebiscite was in full swing all over the country. Posters appeared on all billboards giving the particulars and sound trucks circulated in all towns and cities. That evening Seyss-Inquart had a conference with Schuschnigg. The Minister suggested that arrangements be made for the immediate appointment of some National Socialists into the Ministry; in that way he would
be able to summon the National Socialists to vote "yes" at the polls, but Schuschnigg would have to postpone the voting for the determination of the intended plebiscite, according to Seyss-Inquart's proposals. Schuschnigg said that:

the whole emergency which made a plebiscite necessary was due to the lack of discipline and reliability of the formerly illegal National Socialist movement and that the plebiscite contained not one word contrary to our constitution, which had only recently been reaffirmed by the Berchtesgaden Agreements.100

The negotiations with the government were not successful, and they were stopped in accordance with instructions received from the Führer, through the Embassy in Vienna, not to engage in any negotiations whatsoever, but at most to intensify the protest already made against the plebiscite.101 Klausner then called a meeting at the Hotel Regina of the leading National Socialists. He was informed of Seyss-Inquart's interview with Schuschnigg and replied that the Reich government had taken a position, and that a messenger was on his way to bring Seyss-Inquart a letter from Göring.102 From Thursday to Friday all Gauleiters were in Vienna waiting for information. National Socialists were attacked; so on Thursday the Gauleiters issued orders to Lukesch of the SA and Kaltenbrunner of the SS formations on their own initiative to call out their formations for the protection of National Socialists in the streets, whereas the best men were to remain armed in their barracks in the event of a civil war.103 During the night of the tenth, Globocnig returned from the Führer with the announcement that Hitler gave the party full freedom of action and that he would back it in everything it did. Rainer then gave the final instructions for Friday, March 11, and explained
that three situations might develop within the following days:

1st Case: The plebiscite will not be held. In this case, a great demonstration must be held.

2nd Case: Schuschnigg will resign. In this case, a demonstration was ordered in taking over the government power.

3rd Case: Schuschnigg will take up the fight. In this case, all party leaders were ordered to act upon their own initiative, using all means to capture the position of power.104

On Friday morning, March 11, 1938, at five-thirty, the Chief of Police, Dr. Skubl, telephoned Schuschnigg that the German border at Salzburg had been close completely about an hour earlier. All German customs officials had been withdrawn, and railroad traffic had been stopped.105 Schuschnigg went first to St. Stephen's cathedral and then to the Chancellery at the Ballhausplatz where he rang police headquarters and asked them to take preparatory measures for a cordon around the inner city and the government buildings. The cabinet ministers had been alerted and were arriving at their offices. Only Seyss-Inquart failed to put in an appearance. Guido Schmidt informed Schuschnigg of a telephone message from the Austrian consul-general in Munich—the German divisions stationed in Munich had been mobilized. Presumably destination: Austria.106

Meanwhile Dr. Franz Hueber, Göring's brother-in-law, arrived on the same plane with Glaise-Horstenau. Seyss-Inquart met them at the airport, and Hueber gave him the letter from Göring. The two ministers then proceeded to the Chancellery. Glaise-Horstenau reported to Schuschnigg that the Reich was in great excitement about the plebiscite, and Seyss-Inquart, on orders from Göring, told him of the ultimatum to postpone the plebiscite by noon of that day. Instead, another plebiscite was to be announced and held within two weeks, in the same fashion and according to the statutes of the Saar plebiscite. Göring expected an answer by telephone. If he
had not heard from Seyss-Inquart by noon, the Reich government would abandon the position it had adopted on the basis of the Berchtesgaden Agreement and would consequently recover a free hand for any eventuality. The Federal Chancellor did not yield immediately. The cordon was thrown around the inner city, but Skubl pointed out to Schuschnigg that since the general amnesty, which restored many National Socialist policemen to their jobs, complete reliability could not be expected. Writes Schuschnigg, "Already in 1934--at the time for the attempted Nazi revolt--I was sure of one thing: Never again a war against Germany as in 1866, and never a civil war." The militia of the Fatherland Front had been mobilized, but Hilgerth, Vice-Chancellor and Chief of the Militia, told Schuschnigg later that his men were willing and ready for anything--"except action against Germany."  

At 11:30 a.m., the Landesleitung had a meeting at which Klausner, Rainer, Globocnig, Jury, Seyss-Inquart, Glaise-Horstenau, Fischbäck, and Mühlmann participated. Seyss-Inquart reported on the talks with Schuschnigg which had ended in a rejection of the proposal of the two ministers. Klausner then ordered that the government be presented with an ultimatum, expiring at 2 p.m. and signed by legal, political, "Front" men, including both ministers and also State Councilors Hans Fischbäck and Jury, for the establishment of a voting date in three weeks and a free and secret ballot in accordance with the constitution. On the basis of written evidence which Glaise-Horstenau had brought with him, a leaflet, to be printed in millions of copies, and a telegram to Hitler calling for help, were prepared. The leadership of the final political actions was placed in the hands of Rainer and Globocnig. Rainer was to send the
telegram to Hitler and the statement to the population at 3 p.m. and at
the same time he would start all necessary actions to take over power
unless he received news before that time from the session of the ministers’
council which Schuschnigg had called for 2 p.m.\textsuperscript{109}

At about mid-day Philip of Hesse rang up the Italian embassy in
Berlin to say that he was leaving for Rome with an important and urgent
message for Mussolini,\textsuperscript{110} but before he could reach his destination the
pressure had become too great for Schuschnigg, and at 2:30 he recalled
the plebiscite but refused to call a new one and ordered the strongest
police measures for maintaining order. He informed Zernatto that the
plebiscite was to be postponed. "Reason: technical difficulties which
demanded a postponement. That was for the press. For us the reason
was simply Hitler's ultimatum."\textsuperscript{111} Schuschnigg told Seyss-Inquart and
Glaise-Horstenaau to inform Göring that his demand concerning postpone-
ment had been granted. At 2:45 Göring phoned Seyss-Inquart and was in-
formed by the latter that Schuschnigg had cancelled the elections for
Sunday. In his testimony during the Nuremberg Trials, Göring said: "From
this moment on I must take 100 percent responsibility for all further
happenings, because it was not the Führer so much as myself who set the
pace and, even overruling the Führer's misgivings, brought everything to
its final development."\textsuperscript{112} Göring's reply was that the measures taken
by the Chancellor were not satisfactory in any respect. In calling off
the election, Göring could see a postponement only, not a change of the
present situation which had been brought about by the behavior of
Schuschnigg in breaking the Berchtesgaden Agreement.\textsuperscript{113} Schuschnigg placed
a call to the Palazzo Venezia in Rome but shortly thereafter cancelled it.
"Could I really count on Italy's help in this hour? Could Italy—practically speaking—help us and could we accept this help? I decided that to ask for help would be a waste of time." Then a message came from the Foreign Office: "The Italian government declares that it could give no advice under these circumstances in case such advice would be asked for."¹¹⁴ Thereupon a conversation took place between Göring and Hitler, after which Göring again phoned Seyss-Inquart and told him that Berlin did not agree with the decision made by Schuschnigg. Since he had broken the Berchtesgaden Agreement, he had thereby lost the confidence of the German government. Consequently Seyss-Inquart and the other National Socialists were requested to hand in their resignations immediately and also to ask the Chancellor to resign. If after a period of one hour no report had come through, the assumption would be that the gentlemen had resigned, and Seyss-Inquart was then to send the telegram to Hitler as agreed upon. "As a matter of course, an immediate commission by the Federal President for Seyss-Inquart to form a new cabinet would follow Schuschnigg's resignation." With this new demand Schuschnigg's resistance crumbled, and he broadcast his resignation from the balcony of the Chancellery. At 5 p.m., Göring talked with Dombrowski over the telephone at the German Embassy in Vienna. After hearing that Schuschnigg had resigned, Göring issued new demands: an entirely National Socialist cabinet must be formed; the National Socialist party must be legalized; Fischböck must receive the Department of Economy and Commerce, Kaltenbrunner the Department of Security, Bahr the armed forces, Heuber the Justice Department, and Seyss-Inquart himself must take over the Austrian army, all within the specified time of 7:30 p.m. Seyss-Inquart promised to have these
measures carried out, but very soon the announcement followed that every-
thing might be threatened by the resistance of President Miklas who refused
to appoint Seyss-Inquart to the chancellorship. Miklas was negotiating
with former Chancellor Ender for the creation of a government to include
Clericals, Socialists, and National Socialists, and proposed the post
of Vice-Chancellor to Seyss-Inquart which was rejected. Rainer and
Globocnig, accompanied by Mühimann, went to the Chancellor's office to
carry on negotiations with Zernatto. Guido Schmidt, Glaise-Horstenau,
Stein, Muff, and Keppler, who had arrived in the meantime, were also
negotiating. At 5:30 p.m., Göring was again talking with Seyss-Inquart
on the situation. It was during this conversation that the final ulti-
matum was issued by Göring. Seyss-Inquart was instructed to go immediately
together with Lieutenant General Muff to tell Miklas that:

if the conditions which are known to you [Miklas] are not accepted imme-
diately, the troops who are already stationed at and advancing to the
frontier will march in tonight along the whole line, and Austria will
cease to exist.... The invasion will be stopped and the troops will be
held at the border only if we are informed by 7:30 p.m. that Miklas has
entrusted you [Seyss-Inquart] with the Federal Chancellorship.

At 7:30 the situation was substantially unchanged; Miklas stubbornly re-
fused to appoint Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor and threatened an appeal to
the world in case of a German invasion. Rainer proposed storming and
seizing the government palace in order to force the reconstruction of the
government. The proposal was rejected by Keppler, but carried out by
Rainer after he had discussed it with Globocnig. After 8 p.m., the SA
and SS marched in and occupied the government buildings and all important
positions in the city of Vienna. At 8:30, Rainer, with the approval of
Klausner, ordered all Gauleiters of Austria to take over power in all
eight Gauß with the instructions that all government representatives who tried to resist should be told that this action was taken on order of Chancellor Seyss-Inquart.¹¹⁶

Philip of Hesse arrived in Rome and saw Ciano at 9 p.m. He had the letter from Hitler to Mussolini and together they went to the Palazzo Venezia. In this letter Hitler notified the Duce of his decision to march into Austria because Schuschnigg had broken the Berchtesgaden Protocol and called a plebiscite. The Austrian people rose up at this oppression and the result was violence and anarchy. "In view of my responsibility as Führer and Chancellor of the German Reich, and also as a son of Austria, I could no longer look on inactively at the way in which events were developing. I have now decided to restore order and tranquillity in my country, and to enable the popular will to decide its own destiny in an unmistakable, clear, and open manner according to its own judgment." Then Hitler assured Mussolini of the "constancy" of his feelings; he promised that a definite German frontier with Italy would be the Brenner. "This decision will never be touched or questioned. I did not take this decision in 1938, but immediately after the end of the Great War. I have never made a mystery of it."¹¹⁷ According to Ciano, Mussolini was pleased and told Philip to inform the Führer that Italy was following events with absolute calm.¹¹⁸ Philip then phoned Hitler from Rome at 10:25 p.m. and announced that the Duce had been very friendly about the whole thing. He had told Schuschnigg that the plebiscite was an impossibility; and when he persisted, Mussolini had said that Austria would be immaterial to him. Hitler instructed Philip to "tell Mussolini, I will never forget him for this.... Never, never, never, whatever happens....
I am no longer in fear of the terrible position which would have existed militarily in case we had gotten into a conflict. You may tell him that I do thank him ever so much, never, never shall I forget that.\textsuperscript{119}

Miklas now had no alternative. Under pressure of the internal political situation, he entrusted Seyss-Inquart with the leadership of the Federal Chancellor to maintain quiet and order.\textsuperscript{120} The official announcement was made over the Austrian radio at 11:14 p.m.\textsuperscript{121} Then the Federal President transferred his affairs to Seyss-Inquart and resigned his own office.\textsuperscript{122} Of this revolution Rainer wrote:

The seizure of power was the work of the party supported by the Führer's threat of invasion and the legal standing of Seyss-Inquart in the government. The national result in the form of taking over of the government... was due to the actual seizure of power by the party on one hand, and the political efficiency of Dr. Seyss-Inquart in his territory on the other....\textsuperscript{123}

Earlier in the evening, Göring had given Keppler by telephone the following telegram which was to be sent by Seyss-Inquart:

The provisional Austrian Government which after the dismissal of the Schuschnigg Government considers it its task to establish peace and order in Austria, sends to the German Government the urgent request to support it in its task and to help it to prevent bloodshed. For this purpose it asks the German Government to send German troops as soon as possible.\textsuperscript{124}

The telephone call was made at 8:54 p.m. The telegram contained in the Documents on German Foreign Policy marks the time sent at 9:10 p.m. and the time received at 9:40 p.m. The Directive No. 2 from Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, initialled by Jodl, was dated March 11, 8:45 p.m.

This means that Directive No. 2, which ordered the German troops across the border, had already been determined when Göring dictated the text of the telegram to Keppler asking for support from Germany. The telegram
itself was then an empty formality performed for the benefit of the outside world. Directive No. 2 was as follows:

1. The demands of the German ultimatum to the Austrian government have not been fulfilled.
2. The Austrian Armed Forces have been ordered to withdraw in front of the entry of German troops and to avoid fighting.
   The Austrian Government has ceased to function of its own accord.
3. To avoid further bloodshed in Austrian towns, the entry of the German Armed Forces into Austria will commence, according to directive No. 1, at daybreak on 12/3.

Signed Adolf Hitler
initialed by Jodl

On the morning of March 12, 1938, from 6:00 on, German troops under the high command of Infantry General Fedor von Bock crossed the Austrian border. Contained in the dispatch from the German Foreign Ministry to the various German Diplomatic Missions is this explanation for the invasion:

A provisional government formed under Seyss-Inquart's leadership after Schuschnigg's resignation has asked the Führer and Chancellor to send military and police forces to maintain law and order. In order to prevent catastrophic, chaotic conditions the German Government considered it necessary to comply with this appeal addressed to it.

On March 13, 1938, the Republic of Austria officially became "a province of the German Reich."
CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

On March 12, 1938, the Fascist Grand Council noted that Austria did not inform the Italian government of the results of the Berchtesgaden meeting and the action which followed it until after they were accomplished facts. The Italian government decided "for obvious reasons not to interfere in any way with matters of Austrian internal policy and with the development of a movement of a national character the logical outcome of which could be clearly foreseen." The Council also noted that Italy had definitely advised against the plebiscite. "The Grand Council regards what has happened in Austria as the result of a previously existing state of affairs and as the open expression of the sentiments and will of the Austrian people, unequivocally confirmed by the imposing character of the public manifestations from which it was received." ¹

Four days later, Mussolini announced that the political map of Europe had changed and that Austria as a state had ceased to exist. ²

To the German Reichstag, Hitler said:

I wish in this House to express to the great Italian statesman in the name of the German people and in my own name our warm thanks. We know what the attitude of Mussolini has meant for Germany in these days. If any strengthening of the relations between Italy and Germany were possible, they have been now so strengthened. From a community of interests, from a common outlook on the world, for us Germans there has arisen a friendship which nothing can break. The country and the frontiers of this friend are for us inviolate. I repeat my words: I shall never forget this attitude of Mussolini, and the Italian people can rest assured that behind my word there stands the German nation! ³

The most significant circumstance of the Austrian situation between 1932 and 1938 is the profound mix-up of the domestic with the foreign
politics. As in 1933 one can still speak of the movements within Austria which operated on the foreign policy of that state, so from 1934 on, the Austrian domestic politics become more and more only a function of foreign developments. That Austria could not in the least influence these developments herself but only express her object, in order not to say her sacrifice, is the special tragedy of the country. As long as the victor states of Versailles stood together, Austria could not help but maintain her independence. This condition would have been true even if an overwhelming majority of the Austrian people had demanded Anschluss with Germany as was the case prior to 1933.

That the National Socialist activities contributed to the final collapse of Schuschnigg's resistance cannot be denied. However, such activities must be viewed in the light of Germany's paternal relationship to the Austrian National Socialists. They were able to keep the internal political situation in a continual state of tension, their propaganda and terroristic acts were a constant reminder of what might eventually happen to non-conformists. Agitation for the party's legal recognition and its representation in the government resulted in endless pressure on Schuschnigg. The National Socialists' zealous determination to stop at nothing short of complete nazification of Austria emphasized every weakness, every mistake, and every concession of their opponents. Social and political organizations were rendered ineffective by their infiltration and the police and army unreliable; the Chancellor's resistance was worn down by persistent demands and his faith shaken by the open National Socialist sympathies of many of his closest associates and friends, peace and stability and recovery were made impossible, inroads
were made into every phase of Austrian life. The National Socialists
offered Hitler the opportunity for intervention in Austrian domestic
affairs at any time. They so weakened Austria internally that any
determined resistance on the part of Austria against the final ulti-
matums would have been futile and the result inevitable.

The primary success of the Austrian National Socialists, aside from
their seizure of power on March 11, 1938, was in forcing Schuschnigg
to negotiate with their leaders. This constituted a recognition of
the well-known leaders of an illegal organization whose aim was the
destruction of the state and a tacit confirmation of their strength and
the importance accorded them. Only a very desperate situation could
have caused the head of a sovereign state to yield so dangerous a con-
cession. The essence of this state of affairs lay in the external
political situation—the failure of effective support from abroad and
the strength and very real threat of National Socialist Germany. It
was only possible to maintain a free and independent Austria if Austria
could count on the active and efficient help of other powers or if she
managed to get guarantees from Germany. Unfortunately, the Austrian
domestic differences were projected onto the international plane which
exposed the weaknesses and lack of decision of the government.

The realistic supporters of the Clerico-Fascist regime looked to
the only real Fascist state capable of helping them at that time. Ever
since 1933, Dollfuss accepted Italian military and economic assistance,
but at no time did either Dollfuss or Schuschnigg abandon a Western European
orientation of his own free will. Hungary and the Nationalist Catholic
movement in Croatia were the natural allies of Italy. Between these allies
stood Austria. An Austria annexed to Germany would threaten the South Tyrol and also Mussolini's Adriatic and western Balkans policy. A democratic Austria was a nuisance and an obstacle to his imperialistic aim in Central Europe. Consequently Mussolini supported the Heimwehr and insisted on the suppression of Austrian Social Democracy. After the abortive coup d'état in July, 1934, and the Stresa Conference in April, 1935, Austria became virtually an Italian protectorate. This extended Italian hegemony in the Danube area and at the same time separated Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.

In Vienna the Italian Legation became the headquarters of a Fascist plot against the Republic, and after January, 1933, the German Legation became the Nazi headquarters for the conquest of Austria. The domestic struggle between the Clerico-Fascists and the National Socialists became the international struggle between Germany and Italy for hegemony in Central and Eastern Europe. Hitler utilized the break between the democratic Western Powers and Italy in the summer of 1935 to rearm and to activate his own foreign policy. With the Italian withdrawal from the Stresa Front, Italy appeared as the only guarantor of Austrian independence. Austria's friendly relations with the other states of the Danube and with the Western Powers during the critical months of the Abyssinian crisis were not viewed unfavorably by Italy, for Austria represented Italy's sole remaining connection with the League powers. When the success of the Abyssinian venture was secured, then this friendly policy of Austria's was suddenly called an infraction of the Rome Protocols. The League of Nations' policy of sanctions isolated Italy, and Italy isolated Austria. With the Supplementary Protocols of March 23, 1936,
the Italian orientation of Austria became exclusive. Any other combination, such as a guarantee by all the Great Powers except Germany or a solution of the problems of the Danube states by their own means, had become impossible.

After his victory in Abyssinia, Mussolini, instead of returning to the Stresa Front, gradually swung over to the Axis. Dollfuss and Schuschnigg had relied almost entirely upon Mussolini for protection against Hitler's designs, but the formation of the Axis changed the power constellation of Europe. Schuschnigg had no choice but to seek an agreement with Germany. It was an unwise proposition for the weaker of the two German states to use strong measures in matters which exposed it to instant reprisals--principally economic. Schuschnigg justified his action when he said:

Of course I knew that Hitler did not consider himself bound by any treaty. But the mere appearance, the 10-percent chance, was better for us than nothing. Every government from London to Moscow had the same experience with their treaties with Hitler--and some of these treaties were concluded after Austria's annexation had become a warning to the world.  

The Austro-German Convention of July 11, 1936, signalized Austria's dual alliance, and the Berchtesgaden Protocol of February 12, 1938, took from her the last vestige of independent action in the foreign or domestic field.

Italy's first attempt to break her isolation came with the Italo-German Agreement signed on the occasion of Ciano's visit to Berchtesgaden in October, 1936, and only announced by Mussolini in the Piazza del Duomo in Milan on November 1. It is reasonable to say on the evidence now available that neither at that time nor on the occasion of Göring's visit
to Rome or Mussolini's visit to Berlin was there ever a written or a verbal agreement concerning the disposition of Austria between Hitler and Mussolini. It is true that as Austria was pressed into the Italo-German Front, her future hung on the favorable or unfavorable decision between Germany and Italy. But Hitler was never certain until the last hours what attitude Mussolini would take toward the Anschluss. The Führer's statement in the Reichskanzlei on November 5, 1937, concerning the unreliability of Italy and his effusive thanks to Mussolini when Italy remained passive in March, 1938, bears out this contention. Only Göring had no doubts:

I never had any misgivings about Austria leading to a war, as I had with the Rhineland occupation, for in the case of the Rhineland occupation I could well imagine that there might be repercussions. But how there could be any repercussions from abroad over the union of two brother nations of purely German blood was not clear to me, especially since Italy, who always pretended that she had a vital interest in a separate Austria, had somewhat changed her ideas. It could not have mattered in the least to England and France, nor would they have had the slightest interest in this union. Therefore I did not see the danger of its leading to a war.  

Göring's visit to Rome in January, 1937, left little uncertainty about Germany's attitude to a Habsburg restoration and to this Mussolini offered no objection, but the assurance was given that there would be no surprises from Germany. This compliance was Mussolini's initial surrender to a tacit recognition of German ascendancy over Italy. The Venice meeting in April, 1937, between Schuschnigg and Mussolini, was the turning point in Italy's Central European policy. The acquiescence of Mussolini to the dismissal of Starhemberg and the condemnation of a Habsburg restoration implied an abandonment of Austria; the Venice meeting evasively admitted it.
The day after the Reichskanzlei meeting, Ribbentrop was in Rome to sign, on November 6, 1937, the adhesion of Italy to the anti-Komintern Pact. By this time Mussolini saw Austria only as the second German state in which Italy had far less interest than previously because of her new imperialist development and because she was now concentrating on the Mediterranean and the colonies. "...the best method is to let events take their natural course. One must not aggravate the situation, so as to avoid crises of an international nature." The open disavowal came at Budapest in January, 1938. Italy refused to make a declaration about the independence of Austria "out of consideration for Germany." The Rome Protocols had definitely been superseded. Italy had withdrawn from the Danube.

The Berchtesgaden Protocol of February, 1938, was the final blow to Austrian independence. Schuschnigg described it "not so much an agreement as a simple case of political blackmail." Hitler was well satisfied with his handiwork. His instructions to the Austrian National Socialists were to attempt nothing but legal activity for "the Protocol signed by Schuschnigg was so far-reaching that if completely carried out the Austrian problem would be automatically solved." Mussolini's only advice to Schuschnigg was to gain time, but this period of waiting was entirely illusory. By the time Schuschnigg announced the plebiscite for a free Austria, Mussolini had already written Austria off. The occasion only provided Hitler with the opportunity to occupy the country, and Austria became the first European state to be overrun by the German war machine.

The British and French Ambassadors in Berlin entered a protest against this "interference" in Austrian affairs. This protest was rejected by the
Reich government on the plea that the special relations between the German Reich and Austria could be considered only as a domestic affair of the German people. The French summons to the Italian government for joint action was refused by Italy. The final decision had practically depended on Mussolini. In his speech to the Italian Senate on March 16, Mussolini directed an ugly personal attack against Schuschnigg and praised the "Proof of the Axis." The Democracies, the Lodges (Freemason), and the Third International had failed in their calculation to destroy the two totalitarian states by playing one off against the other.

Mussolini celebrated the Anschluss of Austria as an Italian success and in so doing, not only denounced his personal friendship with Dollfuss, Schuschnigg, and other leading Austrians, but disavowed his own Austrian policy and the foreign policy of Italy of the past eight years. Austria ceased to exist as an independent entity, but Italy ceased to exist as an independent agent.
NOTES TO CHAPTER I

1 Stenographische Protokolle Über die Sitzungen der Provisorischen Nationalversammlung für Deutsch-Oesterreich. 2. (Konstituierende) Sitzung, den 30. Oktober 1918, I. Band, Beilagen, Nr. 8.

2 Politisches Wörterbuch (Leipzig, 1923), II, 921; Neue Freie Presse (Vienna), March 12, 1920 (a.m.).


4 Muriel Currey, Italian Foreign Policy, 1918-1932 (London, 1932), 72. Cited hereafter as Currey, Italian Foreign Policy.

5 Neue Freie Presse (Vienna), September 1, 1922.

6 League of Nations, Restoration of Austria: Agreements arranged by the League of Nations and signed at Geneva on October 4th, 1922, with the Relevant Documents and Public Statements (Geneva, 1922), 57.

7 See part II, art. 27, for the frontiers of Austria with Italy, and part III, sec. I, art. 36-45, for the political clauses with Italy, "The Treaty of St. Germain," The Treaties of Peace: 1919-1923 (New York, 1924), II, 273-283.

8 Currey, Italian Foreign Policy, 97-98.

9 Quoted in ibid., 150.

10 Ibid., 163.

11 Quoted in ibid., 167.

12 Quoted in ibid., 171-172.

13 Ibid., 172-173.

14 Quoted in ibid., 221-227.

15 Neue Freie Presse (Vienna), July 12, 1928 (p.m.)

16 Reichspost (Vienna), July 2, 1928.

17 Quoted in Currey, Italian Foreign Policy, 276.

18 Quoted in ibid., 280-281.
19 Quoted in *ibid.*, 261.

20 Quoted in *ibid.*, 308.


24 *Ibid.*, 24. This of course can only be an approximation of Mussolini's actual words; but since most of what Starhemberg wrote has been borne out, if not the exact words, at least the idea which they convey can be assumed to be fairly accurate.


27 *Neue Freie Presse* (Vienna), October 1, 1930 (a.m).


NOTES TO CHAPTER II

1 New York Times, April 26, 1932. The National Socialists gained 18% of the votes cast by three-fourths of the Austrian electorate.


3 Karl Buresch replaced Endor as Chancellor on June 21, 1931. Starhemberg boasts that his eight Heimwehr votes were in a position to bring about the downfall of the Buresch government. This would have been true only if one of the three opposition parties--Social Democratic, Pan-German, or National Socialist--had supported the government. Starhemberg, Hitler and Mussolini, 86.

4 Kurt Schuschnigg, My Austria, trans. by John Segrue (New York, 1938), 166. Cited hereafter as Schuschnigg, Austria.

5 Otto Bauer, Der Aufstand der österreichischen Arbeiter (Prague, 1934), 24-25. Cited hereafter as Bauer, Der Aufstand.


7 Ibid.

8 Schuschnigg, Austria, 168.

9 Ibid., 168-69.

10 Starhemberg, Hitler and Mussolini, 86.

11 Ibid.

12 Bauer, Der Aufstand, 24-25.

13 Starhemberg, Hitler and Mussolini, 34.

14 Ibid., 38.


16 Neue Freie Presse (Vienna), May 20, 1932 (a.m.).
17 Ibid., May 20, 1932 (p.m.). "Pronounced Nationals" is the nearest translation; a name adopted by those who, without avowing themselves as Nazis, stressed their nationalist convictions. See Buschbeck, Austria, 139.

18 New York Times, May 24, 1932. Pfrimer was back of the Heimwehr revolt of September 1931, for which he had been charged with high treason and acquitted only in December of the previous year.

19 Starhemberg, Hitler and Mussolini, 88.

20 The date is not certain. Starhemberg remembers it as "the latter part of April," ibid., 77. The New York Times, June 9, 1932, writes that Pabst contacted Starhemberg and other leaders in Innsbruck and Gratz, but no reference is made of his visit to Berlin. As Starhemberg wrote some ten years after the event, it is possible that his reference is to this contact. However, there could have been two contacts even though Starhemberg mentions only the one.

21 Starhemberg, Hitler and Mussolini, 77.

22 Ibid., 98-99.


24 Charles A. Gulick, Austria From Habsburg to Hitler, 2 vols. (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1948), II, 1008. Cited hereafter as Gulick, Austria.


26 "Grundsätzliche Programm der National Socialistischen Deutschen Arbeiter-Partei," Munich, February 24, 1920, as republished in the Völkischer Beobachter (Munich), February 24, 1938.


28 Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, ed. by John Chamberlain, et al. (New York, 1941), 1.


32 Gedye, Betrayal, 69.


34 Ibid., March 7, 1933.


36 The correct title was "Gesetz zur Behebung der Not von Volk und Reich, vom 24. März 1933," Reichs-Gesetzblatt, Jahrgang 1933, Stück I, Nr. 141.

37 Calvin B. Hoover, Germany Enters the Third Reich (New York, 1933), 96ff. The law was effective from March 24, 1933, to April 1, 1937. M. Margaret Ball, Post-War German-Austrian Relations (Stanford University, [1937]), 191. Extended January 30, 1937 for four years. New York Times, January 31, 1937.


39 Quoted in ibid., March 8, 1933.

40 Starhemberg, Hitler and Mussolini, 99.

41 Ibid., 101.

42 Affidavit of George S. Messersmith, Mexico, August 28, 1945, Nazi Conspiracy, IV, 209-10.

43 Bundesgesetzblatt für die Republik Oesterreich, Jahrgang 1933, Stück 34, Nr. 97. In retaliation Mayor Seitz of Vienna ordered the Vienna Heimwehr dissolved, but the decree was annulled by Dollfuss.

44 New York Times, April 8, 1933.

45 Bundesgesetzblatt für die Republik Oesterreich, Jahrgang 1933, Stück 53, Nr. 200.


47 Quoted in ibid., May 8, 1933.

48 For the official communiqué, see Manchester Guardian Weekly (Boston), March 24, 1933, p. 224. For Mussolini’s original text, see John W. Wheeler-Bennett and Stephen Heald (ed.), Documents on International Affairs, 1933 (Oxford, 1934), 236-76. Cited hereafter as Wheeler-Bennett, Documents, 1933.


51 Text given by Ramsey MacDonald in the House of Commons, March 23, 1933, 276 H.D. Deb., 5 s., col. 520.

52 Quoted in Wheeler-Bennett, *Disarmament*, 133.

53 Quoted in *Manchester Guardian Weekly* (Boston), March 24, 1933, p. 227.

54 Quoted in *New York Times*, April 14, 1933.

55 Ibid., April 30, 1933.


57 *New York Times*, April 2, 4, and 7, 1933. For text, see *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, April 7, 1933, p. 263.

58 *New York Times*, May 21, 22, 25, and 30, and July 8, 1933; *Corriere della Sera*, June 8, 1933, in Wheeler-Bennett, *Documents, 1933*, 267-277.

59 Quoted in Wheeler-Bennett, *Disarmament*, 147.

60 Quoted in *New York Times*, April 18, 1933.


62 Frequently referred to as the Patriotic Front.


64 Ibid., 102.


66 Ibid., 82.

67 Ibid., 94.


69 Starhemberg, *Hitler and Mussolini*, 93.

71 Starhemberg, Hitler and Mussolini, 31-33.

72 New York Times, January 10, 1933.

73 Ibid., January 13 and 20, 1933.

74 Ibid., January 29, 1933.

75 Le Temps (Paris), January 30, 1933.


77 Ibid., February 9, 1933.

78 Ibid., February 12, 1933.

79 Quoted in ibid., February 18, 1933.

80 Quoted in ibid., February 19, 1933.

81 Ibid., February 20, 1933.

82 Ibid., February 22, 1933.

83 Ibid., March 2, 1933.

84 Winkler, Gedye, and Gulick maintain that most of the arms remained in Austria. Franz Winkler, Die Diktatur in Oesterreich (Zurich, 1935), 23; Gedye, Betrayal, 66-67; Gulick, Austria, II, 1015. See also Starhemberg, Hitler and Mussolini, 107, who indicates that the arms were safe in Austria when he visited Rome in May 1933.

85 Schuschnigg, Austria, 205.

86 Starhemberg, Hitler and Mussolini, 105-06.

87 Ibid., 107.


91 Ibid., May 21, 1933.

92 Bundesgesetzblatt für die Republik Oesterreich, Jahrgang 1933, Stück 60, Nr. 186.

93 "Article I. (1) A levy of 1000.—Reichsmark will be charged for every journey which is undertaken by a subject of the Reich with residence or permanent abode within Germany.... The levy will go to the Reich treasury." Reichs-Gesetzblatt, Jahrgang 1933, Stück V, Nr. 169.
94 Schuschnigg, Austria, 223-24.

95 Kölnische Zeitung, June 12, 1933 (p.m.).

96 Ibid., June 13, 1933 (a.m. and p.m.); New York Times, June 13, 1933. Minister of War, Karl Vaugoin, issued a decree expelling all Nazis from the army.

97 The Styrian Heimatschutz had gone over to the National Socialist forces.

98 Neue Freie Presse (Vienna), June 20, 1933 (a.m.). "Der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiterpartei (Hitlerbewegung) wird jede Betätigung in Oesterreich und insbesondere auch die Bildung irgendwelcher Parteiorganisation verboten. Die bestehende Sturmbteilungen und Schutzstaffeln (S.A.- und S.S.-Formationen) sind unstatthaft, das Tragen jedweder Parteiabzeichen ist verboten. Dasselbe gilt für den Steirischen Heimatschutz (Führung Kammerhofer)." Bundesgesetzblatt für die Republik Oesterreich, Jahrgang 1933, Stück 74, Nr. 240.

99 Schuschnigg, Austria, 204-05.

100 Affidavit of George S. Messersmith, Mexico, August 28, 1945, Nazi Conspiracy, IV, 309, Doc. 1760-P5.


102 Ibid., 19.

103 Dollfuss to Mussolini, July 22, 1933, State Archives, Vienna, Liasse Italien, Fasz. 477, Briefwechsel, 23ff.

104 Ibid., 26,.

105 "To create this political unity, to overcome the spirit of party, was the one idea of the Fatherland Front." Schuschnigg, Austria, 205.


107 Ibid., 29. Italics in the original.


109 François-Poncet tells of the crime novel liberation of Hofer, a Nazi leader in the Tyrol, from the prison at Innsbruck and how twenty-four hours later he was flanking Hitler at the Nuremberg Congress ceremonies.


113 For text of the communiqué, see *New York Times*, August 8, 1933.

114 Quoted in *ibid.*, August 8, 1933.

115 Quoted in *ibid.*, August 9, 1933.

116 Quoted in *ibid.*, August 10, 1933.

117 *Briefwechsel*, 30. See also *Neue Freie Presse* (Vienna), August 6, 1933 (p.m.).


119 This is the nearest translation of "Unabhängigkeit Österreichs nach aussen und Erneuerung Österreichs nach innen."


121 *Briefwechsel*, 36.

122 *Ibid*.


124 *Das Braumbuch: Hackenkreuz gegen Österreich* (Vienna, 1933), 13.

125 *New York Times*, September 12, 1933.


128 *Ibid.*, November 6, 1933. There is no exact English equivalent for this term—a word for political parties and for the expression of opposing political views.
129 Dollfuss to Mussolini, September 22, 1933, State Archives, Vienna, Liasse Italien, Fasz. 477, Briefwechsel, 43.

130 Schuschnigg, Austria, 226.


132 Benito Mussolini, Four Speeches on the Corporate State, 11.
NOTES TO CHAPTER III

1 Excerpts from a report by "Martin" of a conversation with Louis Eisenmann, State Archives, Vienna, Liasse Oesterreich, Fasz. 1006, as translated by Paul R. Sweet and published in the appendix of Julius Braunthal, The Tragedy of Austria (London, 1948), 210. "Martin" was an Austrian agent, and Louis Eisenmann was a professor at the Sorbonne and an adviser to the French Government on Central European questions.

2 Ibid., 210-11. Eisenmann astutely observed, according to "Martin," that Dollfuss would not lose anything by an empowering act approved by Parliament which could then retroactively legalize all previous emergency decrees. This is precisely what the Chancellor did when he presented his constitution in May 1934.

3 Two reports from London under date of November 14 and November 22, 1933, State Archives, Vienna, Liasse Oesterreich, Fasz. 1006, ibid., 212-13.


5 The Times (London), August 21, 1933.

6 Dollfuss to Mussolini, September 22, 1933, State Archives, Vienna, Liasse Italien, Fasz. 477; Briefwechsel, 43.

7 Quotations from the Lavoro Fascista are in Reichspost (Vienna), August 21 and August 23, 1933; Arbeiter Zeitung (Vienna), August 24, 1933.

8 See the statistics on tourist traffic of the German public in Tyrol in the year 1929 (winter) to 1937 (summer) calculated on the basis of official statements of the provincial tourist office for Tyrol in Innsbruck, Red-White-Red-Book, 35-36.

9 Starhemberg, Hitler and Mussolini, 116-17.


11 Ibid., January 2, 1934.

12 Ibid., January 13, 1934.

13 Ibid., January 14, 1934. For the official German explanation for the presence of Waldeck-Pymont at the Frauenfeld home, see the published summary of the text of the German Government's note to Austria replying to charges of Nazi plotting in that country, New York Times, February 3, 1934.

14 In the Tyrol for example statistics show a drop in the financial turnover from 6,278,400 AS in the winter of 1932-33 to 435,600 AS in 1933-34.


18 New York Times, January 23, 1934. Article XI. declares it the right of each Member of the League "to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends," "Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany signed at Versailles June 28, 1919," Part I, "The Covenant of the League of Nations," Article XI, The Treaties of Peace, 1919-1923, I, 14.


22 Suwicz to Dollfuss, Rome, January 26, 1934, State Archives, Vienna, Liasse Italien, Fasz. 477, Briefwechsel, 44-47. Italics in the original.

23 Dollfuss to Suwicz, Vienna, January 30, 1934, State Archives, Vienna, Liasse Italien, Fasz. 477, ibid., 48-49.


25 Ibid., January 28, 1934.

26 Ibid., January 29, 1934.

27 Ibid.


29 Gerd Rühle, Das Dritte Reich, Das zweite Jahr 1934 (Berlin, 1934), 253ff. Cited hereafter as Rühle, Dritte Reich.


31 Rintelen to Dollfuss, Rome, February 2, 1934, State Archives, Vienna, Liasse Deutschland, Fasz. 466, Briefwechsel, 51-53.

34 Quoted in *ibid.*, February 6, 1934.
36 *Wiener Morgentablatt*, February 12, 1934.
38 *Wiener Montagblatt*, February 12, 1934. An approximate translation is: "We'll go to work tomorrow and finish it off."
39 For a more detailed account of the fighting, see Gulick, *Austria*, II, 1278-90; **New York Times**, February 14, 15, 16 and 17, 1934.
40 **Völkischer Beobachter**, February 14, 1934.
48 Rühle, *Dritte Reich*, 193.
54 "Protocol No. II between Austria, Hungary, and Italy Regarding the Development of Economic Relations, signed at Rome, March 17th, 1934," ibid., No. 3555, 295.

55 "Protocol No. III between Austria and Italy complementary to the Protocol between Austria, Hungary, and Italy, signed at Rome, March 17th, 1934, regarding the Development of Economic Relations, signed at Rome, March 17th, 1934," ibid., No. 3556, 295.

56 Schuschnigg, Austria, 255.


58 Ibid., April 16, 1934.

59 Reichspost, July 20, 1933. For a detailed discussion of the constitution, its ratification and legality, see Gulick, Austria, II, 1143-46, chap. XXVIII.

60 See Dollfuss' speech at Villach, March 4, 1934, in New York Times, March 5, 1934.


63 Ibid., para. 83, p. 165.

64 Reichspost (Vienna), January 23 and January 24, 1934.

65 Ibid., February 9, 1934.

66 Franz Winkler, Die Diktatur in Oesterreich (Zurich, 1935), 118.


69 New York Times, May 1, 1934.

70 Reichspost, May 1, 1934.

71 Bundesgesetzblatt für den Bundesstaat Oesterreich, Jahrgang 1934, Stück 1, Nr. 239.

72 Rühle, Dritte Reich, 201-2.
73 Ibid., 205; New York Times, July 11, 1934. Others in the new cabinet were Kurt Schuschnigg, Education; Odo Neustädter-Stürmer, Social Welfare; Buresch, Finance; Fritz Stockinger, Commerce; Egon Berger-Waldenegg, Justice; and Karl Karvinsky, Secretary of State for Security.


76 Ibid., June 14, 1934.

77 Affidavit of George S. Messersmith, Mexico, August 28, 1945. Nazi Conspiracy, IV, 310, Doc. 1760-PS.

78 Papen, Der Wahrheit, 372. Höhm had ventured to suggest a meeting during a lunch at Neurath's. Mussolini reacted cautiously and consented only if a pre-arranged program was defined. Cerruti then took some initial steps but when he went on a leave to Italy he found that Papen had already completed the arrangements. Elizabeth Wiskemann, The Rome-Berlin Axis (London, 1949), 35-36. Cited hereafter as Wiskemann, The Axis.

79 Papen, Der Wahrheit, 373.

80 François-Poncet, Memoirs, 130.

81 Starhemberg, Hitler and Mussolini, 147.

82 Giornale d'Italia, June 16, 1934.

83 The Times (London), June 16, 1934.

84 Quoted in Wheeler-Bennett, Documents, 1934, 292-93.

85 Starhemberg, Hitler and Mussolini, 141.

86 Federal Chancellery (General Headquarters for Public Safety) to all directors of Public Safety, June 2, 1934, Red-White-Red-Book, 46-47.

87 The public safety director for Upper Austria to all the heads of offices in all Upper Austrian District Captaincies, Linz, June 21, 1934, Ibid., 47-48.

88 Starhemberg, Hitler and Mussolini, 147.

89 François-Poncet, Memoirs, 149-50.


Badow to Sir John Simon, Vienna, July 26, 1934, Nazi Conspiracy, V, 687-88, Doc. 2985-PS. This document contains the gist of the official version of events given verbally to the Diplomatic Corps by Schuschnigg and Fey.


François-Poncet, Memoirs, 149.

Völkischer Beobachter (Munich), July 27, 1934.


Starhemberg, Hitler and Mussolini, 167.

Wheeler-Bennett, Documents, 1934, 293.


Report by Dr. Friedrich Rainer, June 7, 1939, ibid., III, 589, Doc. 812-PS.

Affidavit by Paul Schmidt, Oberursel, Germany, November 28, 1945, Procès, XXXII, 144, Doc. 3308-PS.

Testimony by Göring, ibid., IX, 294.

Ibid., IX, 295.


Papen, Der Wahrheit, 383. Papen's demands were: "1. The 'Anschluss' can be made only on the basis of a slow, peaceful evolution. In this question, which has cost so much common blood in the course of history and just recently, not a drop more of costly German blood will be shed.
2. All action of the German NSDAP in Austria politics, directly or indirectly, is strictly forbidden by the Führer to the Party organization. 3. The present leader of the NSDAP in Austria, Habicht, will be recalled immediately. 4. As Ambassador in Vienne, I am responsible to the Führer alone and to no other person. I have the right to report to the Führer directly, at any time, in Austrian matters." Nazi Conspiracy, Supplement A, 442-43, Doc. 3300-PS.

110 Papen, Der Wahrheit, 385.
113 Zernatto, Die Wahrheit, 151.
115 Reichspost (Vienna), August 4, 1934.
NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

1 Starhemberg, Hitler and Mussolini, 172; Schuschnigg, Requiem, 99.


3 Ibid., 430-31.

4 Schuschnigg, Austria, 245.

5 Ibid., 248-50.

6 Quoted in New York Times, July 31, 1934.

7 Le Temps (Paris), August 4, 1934.


9 Starhemberg, Hitler and Mussolini, 168.


11 See Schuschnigg, Austria, 253-54, for his own description of the impression he received. Starhemberg records that this was not reciprocated as Mussolini was offended when Schuschnigg went directly to the French Riviera from Florence. Starhemberg, Hitler and Mussolini, 172.

12 The Times (London), August 22, 1934.

13 Schuschnigg, Austria, 255-56.

14 For the text of Mussolini's Danubian Memorandum of September 29, 1933, see Wheeler-Bennett, Documents, 1933, 410-14.


17 The Times (London), August 28, 1934.

18 Benito Mussolini, Four Speeches on the Corporate State, 29.

Ibid., September 4, 1934.

Ibid., September 13, 1934.

Ibid., September 19, 1934.

Red-White-Red-Book, 58. Also The Times (London), September 28, 1934.


See François-Poncet, Memoirs, 161; Wiskemann, The Axis, 42.

Affidavit of George S. Messersmith, Mexico, August 30, 1945, Procès, XXX, 301-7, Doc. 2385-PS.

Zernatto, Die Wahrheit, 55.


Ibid., November 16, 1934.

Ibid., December 30, 1934.


Ibid.

Linzer Volksblatt, October 20, 1934.

For a text of the communiqué, see New York Times, October 28, 1934. See also Starhemberg, Hitler and Mussolini, 173-74.


Starhemberg, Hitler and Mussolini, 178.

Affidavit of George S. Messersmith, Mexico, August 28, 1945, Nazi Conspiracy, IV, 321-22, Doc. 1760-PS.


Ibid., November 7, 1934.

Ibid., December 3, 10, and 24, 1934.

François-Poncet, Memoirs, 240.


Ibid., 15-16.

Text by Mr. Ramsey MacDonald in House of Commons, May 2, 1935, 301 H.C. Deb., 5 s. col. 574. From these discussions emerged the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of June 18, 1935. It is interesting to note that Paul Schmidt, acting as interpreter for the talks, does not mention this in his record of the event.

Schmidt, Interpreter, 21. See also Papen, Der Wahrheit, 407.

Text by Sir John Simon in the House of Commons, April 9, 1935, 300 H.C. Deb. 5 s., col. 985.

Papen, Der Wahrheit, 407.


Text by Mr. Ramsey MacDonald in the House of Commons, April 17, 1935, 300 H.C. Deb. 5 s., coll. 1852-1853.


Reichspost (Vienna), April 17, 1935.

Ibid., May 5, 6, and 7, 1935.


See New York Times for January 11, 12, 18, 20, 21 and March 1-3, 1935. The two primary reasons for the success of the government were first, the support of the Heimwehr, and second, the fact that its opponents (especially the Nazis and the Socialists) were unable to get together.


62 Kurt Schuschnigg, "Austria," World Affairs, March 1935, 25ff. The extent of Austro-Italian friendship was indicated by the suppression, by the Austrian government, of the Sötiroler, a paper which had kept the South Tyrol question before Austria since its annexation by Italy in 1919. New York Times, May 31, 1935.

63 Papen to Hitler, Berlin, May 17, 1935, Procès, XXX, 48-50, Doc. 2247-PS.

64 New York Times, April 1, 1935.

65 Ibid., May 26, 1935.

66 Baynes, Speeches, II, 1239.


68 Ibid.

69 Churchill, The Gathering Storm, 133; Schmidt, Interpreter, 16.

70 Wiskemann, The Axis, 44-45. Germany joined the Four-Power Pact because the German Chief of Staff, Blomberg, wanted to do so.


72 Neue Freie Presse (Vienna), May 29, 1935 (p.m.).

73 Ibid.


75 Wiener Zeitung, August 22, 1935.


77 Ibid., Special Supplement No. 145, 17.

78 Ibid., 22.

79 Zernatto, Die Wahrheit, 186-87.

80 Affidavit of Paul Schmidt, Oberursel, Germany, November 28, 1945, Procès, XXXII, 145, Doc. 3308-PS; Affidavit of George S. Messersmith, Mexico, August 30, 1945, ibid., XXX, 309, Doc. 2385-PS.
85 Ibid., November 30, 1935.
86 Schuschnigg, *Requiem*, 104.
88 Starhemberg, *Hitler and Mussolini*, 211.
89 Ibid., 215-16.
90 *New York Times*, October 18, 1935. Others in the new cabinet were Professor Dobretsberger, Social Welfare; Fritz Stockinger, Commerce; Robert Winterstein, Justice; Ludwig Strobl, Agriculture; and Karl Buresch, Minister without Portfolio.
91 Ibid.
NOTES TO CHAPTER V

1 Baynes, Speeches, II, 1239.
2 Reichs post (Vienna), May 26, 1935.
3 Berger-Waldenegger to Schmidt, Rome, October 24, 1936, Hoch verratsprozess, 514.
4 Reichs post (Vienna), August 28, 1935.
6 Schuschnigg to Papen, October 1, 1935; Beilage B, "Referentenentwurf," ibid., 477-478.
7 "Zeuge Dr. Friedrich Funder," ibid., 208.
9 Neue Freie Presse (Vienna), January 17, 1936.
11 Reichs post (Vienna), January 25, 1936.
12 This was essentially the point of view taken by Winston Churchill. See Churchill, The Gathering Storm, 167.
13 Starhemberg, Hitler and Mussolini, 203-204. See also Papen's letter to Hitler on his conversation with Starhemberg, Vienna, April 21, 1936, Hoch verratsprozess, 402.
14 Hoch verratsprozess, 399.
16 Starhemberg, Hitler and Mussolini, 205.
17 Ibid., 205-206.
18 Schuschnigg, Requiem, 169-170.
19 Reichs post (Vienna), February 13, 1936.


23 *Ibid*.


26 Starhemberg, *Hitler and Mussolini*, 186ff.

27 Wheeler-Bennett, *Documents, 1936*, 57.


29 Starhemberg, *Hitler and Mussolini*, 190.

30 For the text of the supplementary Protocols, see *The Times* (London), March 25, 1936.

31 *Reichspost* (Vienna), April 2, 1936.

32 Wheeler-Bennett, *Documents, 1936*, 316.


34 *Reichspost* (Vienna), May 5, 1936.


39 *New York Times*, May 14, 1936. Other members in the new cabinet were Hans Hammerstein, Justice; Hans Prenner, Public Instruction; Ludwig Draxler, Finance; Fritz Stockinger, Commerce; and General Wilhelm Zehner, State Secretary for War.


42 *Ibid*., 153-154. Schuschnigg claims to have received the following message from Mussolini: "If there are unbridgeable differences between the head of the government and his lieutenant I can fully understand that the lieutenant has to yield. But in view of my personal
friendship with Starhemberg I would be very glad if the latter would be, politically speaking, treated decently, i.e. that he will not be held to account."  

Requiem, 121.

43 Zernatto, Die Wahrheit, 156.


45 Ibid., 42. See also Hassell to German Foreign Ministry, Rome, July 11, 1936, German Documents, Series D, I, 283, No. 155.

46 Schuschnigg, Requiem, 124.

47 Berger-Waldenegg to Schmidt, Rome, October 13, 1936, Hochverratsprozess, 513. The marginal comment on the letter by Hornbostel was "optimist."

48 Neue Freie Presse (Vienna), July 1, 1936 (a.m.).


50 Manchester Guardian, July 13, 1936. These objections refer to the Anglo-French, Anglo-Greek, Anglo-Turkish, and Anglo-Yugoslav mutual assistance agreements which had been concluded as a result of the political and naval situation in the Mediterranean during the Italo-Abyssinian crisis and which Mussolini wanted declared invalid.


52 Ibid., June 18, 1936.

53 Ibid., June 20, 1936.

54 Ibid., July 6, 1936.

55 Ibid., June 22, 1936.


57 Affidavit of Kurt von Schuschnigg, Nuremberg, November 19, 1945, Nazi Conspiracy, V, 704, Doc. 2994-PS.

58 Reichspost (Vienna), July 12, 1936.

59 Schuschnigg, Requiem, 8. For official communiqué which was broadcast by Goebbels, see The Times (London), July 13, 1936.

60 Völkischer Beobachter (Munich), July 13, 1936.

61 Frankfurter Zeitung, July 14, 1936.
62 The official Nazi newspaper, the Völkischer Beobachter, was not permitted in Austria until February 1938.


64 Ibid., 281

65 Gedye, Betrayal, 190.

66 Starhemberg, Hitler and Mussolini, 236-237.

67 Affidavit of Messersmith, Mexico, August 28, 1945, Nazi Conspiracy, IV, 321, Doc. 1760-PS.

68 Schuschnigg, Austria, 285-286.

69 Martin Fuchs, Showdown in Vienna (New York, 1939), 40. Fuchs was a press attaché with the Austrian Embassy in Paris.

70 Schuschnigg, Requiem, 6-7.

71 Tauschitz to Schmidt, Berlin, July 22, 1936, Hochverratsprozess, 487.


73 Minute of the conversation with the French Ambassador, Rome, July 11, 1936, Ciano’s Papers, 15.

74 Hassell to the German Foreign Ministry, Rome, July 11, 1936, German Documents, Series D, I, 283, No. 155.

75 See footnote 9, German Documents, Series D, I, 285.

76 Hochverratsprozess, 9. Messersmith claims to have been furnished a document by Berger-Waldenegg early in January 1936, which is essentially an elaboration of Hitler's address to the Austrian Gauleiters. The document also records that Schacht authorized 200,000 DM per month for support of the persecuted National Socialists in Austria. See Nazi Conspiracy, IV, 315-316, Doc. 1760-PS.

77 Reichspost (Vienna), July 13, 1936.

78 Hochverratsprozess, 663.

79 Papen to the German Foreign Ministry, Vienna, July 21, 1936, German Documents, Series D, I, 287, No. 158. On July 15, Papen had left Vienna to join Hitler at the Bayreuth Festival for conversations about the Agreement. Völkischer Beobachter (Munich), July 16, 1936.
80 Papen to Hitler, Vienna, September 1, 1936, Nazi Conspiracy, V, 706, Doc. 2994-PS.
82 Starhemberg, Hitler and Mussolini, 243, 245-246.
83 Affidavit of Schuschnigg, Nuremberg, November 19, 1945, Nazi Conspiracy, V, 706, Doc. 2994-PS.
84 Ibid., 707.
85 Gulick, Austria, II, 1732-1733.
86 See Papen, Der Wahrheit, 427.
87 Zernatto, Die Wahrheit, 168-169.
88 "Plädoyer des öffentlichen Anklägers," Hochverratsprozess, 618.
89 Starhemberg, Hitler and Mussolini, 256-257.
90 Minute of the conversation with Herr Schmidt, Rome, September 15, 1936, Ciano’s Papers, 41.
91 Minute of the conversation between the Duce and Herr Frank, Rome, (Palazzo Venezia), September 23, 1936, Ciano’s Papers, 44-45.
92 Zernatto, Die Wahrheit, 166-167.
94 Minute of the conversation with the German Foreign Minister, von Neurath, Berlin, October 21, 1936, Ciano’s Papers, 54.
95 Minute of the conversation with the Führer, Berchtesgaden, October 24, 1936, Ibid., 56-60.
96 Papen, Der Wahrheit, 429.
98 The Times (London), October 26, 1936.
99 Berger-Waldenegg to Schmidt, Rome, October 24, 1936, Hochverratsprozess, 514.
100 Wheeler-Bennett, Documents, 1936, 345-346.


102 Minute of the conversations in Budapest, Ciano's Papers, 67.

103 New York Times, November 12, 1936.

104 Manchester Guardian, November 13, 1936.

105 Wheeler-Bennett, Documents, 1936, 348-349.
NOTES TO CHAPTER VI

1 Megerle to Neurath, Berlin-Lankwitz, August 29, 1936, German Documents, Series D, I, 294-295, Doc. 163.

2 Memorandum by Altenberg, Berlin, October 1, 1936, ibid., Series D, I, 301, Doc. 166.

3 Papen to Hitler, Vienna, October 12, 1936, Hochverratsprozess, 409.

4 Papen to Hitler, Vienna, November 2, 1936, ibid., 411-412.

5 German Foreign Ministry to German Legation in Austria, Berlin, November 6, 1936, German Documents, Series D, I, 319, Doc. 173.

6 Foreign Organization of the N.S.D.A.P. concerned with German nationals living abroad.


8 Völkischer Beobachter, (Munich), November 19, 1936.


10 Ibid., 343.

11 Enclosed memorandum of the reception of Austrian State Secretary Dr. Schmidt by the Führer and Chancellor on Thursday, November 19, 1936, in a communication by Meissner, Chief of the Presidential Chancellery, to Neurath, November 20, 1936, ibid., Series D, I, 341, Doc. 181.

12 Weizsäcker to various German Diplomatic Missions and to the Consulate General at Geneva, Berlin, November 2, 1936, Ibid., Series D, I, 353, Doc. 186.


14 Papen to Hitler, Vienna, November 24, 1936, ibid., Series D, I, 348, Doc. 185.


16 Papen to Hitler, Vienna, November 24, 1936, ibid., Series D, I, 349, Doc. 185.

17 Reichspost (Vienna), November 27, 1936.
18 Stein to German Foreign Ministry, Vienna, November 27, 1936, German Documents, Series D, I, 350, Doc. 186.
19 Neurath to German Legation in Austria, Berlin, November 28, 1936, ibid., Series D, I, 351, Doc. 187.
22 Papen to Hitler, Vienna, January 12, 1937, ibid., Series D, I, 368, Doc. 196.
23 Ibid., 366-374.
24 "Zeuge Dr. Kajetan Mühlmann," Hochverratsprozess, 244.
26 Report by Rainer, June 7, 1939, Nazi Conspiracy, III, 589-591, Doc. 812-PS.
27 Supra, Chap. V, p. 171.
28 Report by Rainer, June 7, 1939, Nazi Conspiracy, III, 591-592, Doc. 812-PS.
29 Papen to German Foreign Ministry, Vienna, July 21, 1936, German Documents, Series D, I, 289, Doc. 160.
33 Zernatto, Die Wahrheit, 164-165.
36 Ibid., 299-300.

37 Text of speech by Dr. Friedrich Rainer before the Leaders Corps and the bearers of honor insignia (Hrenzeichen) and blood orders (Blutorden) of the Gau Karinthia, Klagenfurt, March 11, 1942, Nazi Conspiracy, Supplement A, 696, Doc. 4005-PS.

38 Papen to Hitler, Vienna, December 2, 1936, German Documents, Series D, I, 362, Doc. 191.

39 The Standarte was a National Socialist SA and SS unit equivalent to a regiment. The SS Standarte 89 was the military organization of the Austrian N.S.D.A.P.

40 Meissner to Neurath, January 13, 1937, German Documents, Series D, I, 374, Doc. 179.

41 Ibid., 374.

42 Papen to German Foreign Ministry, Vienna, January 16, 1937, German Documents, Series D, I, 375-376, Doc. 198.


46 Zernatto, Die Wahrheit, 172-173.


49 Neue Freie Presse, (Vienna), January 19, 1937 (a.m.).

50 Zernatto, Die Wahrheit, 147. Italics in the original. What was purported to be the text of Leopold's letter as printed in Der Wiener Tag, March 4, 1937, does not support Zernatto's contention that Leopold designated himself as "leader of the National Opposition."


52 See Enclosure of February 8, 1937, ibid., 393-394.

54 Ibid., 391.
55 Ibid., 392. See also Papen, Der Wahrheit, 435.
57 Zernatto, Die Wahrheit, 174-175.
58 Neue Freie Presse (Vienna), February 15, 1937 (a.m.).
59 New York Times, June 2, 1935. After the death of Franz Josef in 1916, his grand-nephew, Charles, ruled Austria until the 1918 revolution when he and the Empress Zita left the country. Archduke Otto is the son of Emperor Charles and was at that time temporarily resident in Belgium.
60 Bundesgesetzblatt für den Bundesstaat Österreich, Jahrgang 1935, Stück 80, Nr. 299.
63 Ibid., June 16, 1935. See also Schuschnigg, Requiem, 99.
64 Ibid., June 6, 1936.
65 Ibid., July 18, 1936.
66 Minute of the conversation with Schmidt, Rome, September 15, 1936, Ciano’s Papers, 40.
67 German Foreign Ministry to various German Diplomatic Missions and to the Consulate General at Geneva, Berlin, November 28, 1936, German Documents, Series D, I, 353, Doc. 188.
69 New York Times, October 18, 1936.
70 Ibid., November 7, 1936; see also Schuschnigg, Requiem, 102.
71 New York Times, November 6, 1936.
74 Papen to Hitler, Vienna, January 9, 1937, German Documents, Series D, I, 365, Doc. 195.

75 Quoted in New York Times, February 5 and 14, 1937.

76 Information supplied to Elizabeth Wiskemann by Count Magistrati, quoted in her book, The Axis, 72.

77 Memorandum by Hassell, Rome, January 30, 1937, German Documents, Series D, I, 384, Doc. 207.

78 Minute of the conversation between the Duce and Göring in the presence of Ciano and Schmidt, Rome (Palazzo Venezia), January 23, 1937, Ciano's Papers, 88-91. This minute was written by Paul Schmidt on the journey from Rome to Berlin. See also Memorandum by Hassell, Rome, January 30, 1937, German Documents, Series D, I, 384-385, Doc. 207.

79 Affidavit by Paul Schmidt, Oberursel, Germany, November 28, 1945, Procès, XXXII, 145-146, Doc. 3308-PS. Also Paul Schmidt, Interpreter, 64.


84 Neue Freie Presse (Vienna), February 15, 1937 (a.m.).

85 Volkischer Beobachter (Munich), February 21, 22, and 23, 1937; Affidavit of Schuschnigg, Nuremberg, November 19, 1945, Nazi Conspiracy, V, 706, Doc. 2994-PS; Zernatto, Die Wahrheit, 177; for the official communiqué, see Frankfurter Zeitung, February 24, 1937, and Reichspost (Vienna), February 23, 1937.

86 Memorandum by Neurath, Berlin, February 27, 1937, German Documents, Series D, I, 399-401, Doc. 213.


89 Ibid., February 28, 1937.

90 Reichspost (Vienna), February 26, 1937.

Papen to German Foreign Ministry, Vienna, March 20, 1937, German Documents, Series D, I, 409, Doc. 217.

Ibid., 410.

Stein to German Foreign Ministry, Vienna, April 3, 1937, Ibid., Series D, I, 413, Doc. 219.


Ibid., 407.

Reichspost (Vienna), March 26, 1937.

Minute of the conversation with Stoyadinovitch, Belgrade, March 26, 1937, Ciano's Papers, 99-100.


Stein to German Foreign Ministry, Vienna, April 3, 1937, German Documents, Series D, I, 412, Doc. 219.


Minute of the conversation between the Duce and Schuschnigg in the presence of Ciano, Venice, April 22, 1937, Ciano's Papers, 108-115.

Hochverratsprozess, 43-44.

Zernatto, Die Wahrheit, 180; Schuschnigg, Requiem, 124.

Zernatto, Die Wahrheit, 180-182; Schuschnigg, Requiem, 124-125.

Minute of the conversation between the Duce and Neurath, Rome, May 3, 1937, Ciano's Papers, 116; German Foreign Ministry to German Embassy in France and German Legations in Austria and Czechoslovakia, Berlin, May 8, 1937, German Documents, Series D, I, 419, Doc. 222.
Minute of conversations with Darányi and Kánya, Budapest, May 19-22, 1937, Ciano's Papers, 118.

Hochverratsprozess, 45-46.


Papen to Hitler, Vienna, June 1, 1937, German Documents, Series D, I, 427-428, Doc. 228.


Ribbentrop to German Foreign Ministry, London, December 2, 1937, German Documents, Series D, I, 90, Doc. 50.


Hochverratsprozess, 49.


Neurath to various German Diplomatic Missions, Berlin, December 4, 1937, ibid., Series D, I, 97, Doc. 57.


Papen to Hitler, Berlin, May 12, 1937, ibid., Series D, I, 420, Doc. 223. Papen had been summoned to Berlin because of an incident which occurred on May 1, 1937, at Pinkafeld in Steiermark, where a detachment of Austrian troops had hauled down a German flag hoisted on a house.

Dum was a party member and director of the organizational office of the N.S.D.A.P. in the Helferdorferstrasse, Vienna, which was raided in May 1937.


Stein to German Foreign Ministry, Vienna, October 14, 1937, ibid., Series D, I, 473, Doc. 263.


134. Treatise by Papen, Chateau de Lesbioles, March 5, 1945, *Nazi Conspiracy*, Supplement A, 480, Doc. 3300-PS.


140. From a letter from party member In der Maur to a National Social party member in the Reich, Vienna, June 8, 1937, *ibid.*, Series D, I, 431-433, Doc. 232.


145 Memorandum by Keppler, October 1, 1937, ibid., Series D, I, 464, Doc. 256.


147 Memorandum by Keppler, October 8, 1937, ibid., Series D, I, 469, Doc. 260.


151 Entry for September 28, 1937, Ciano’s Diary 1937-1938, 16. In his entry for September 28, 1937, Ciano set down his thoughts on the axis: “Will the solidarity between the two regimes suffice to form a real bond of union between two peoples drawn in opposite directions by race, culture, religion, and tastes? No one can accuse me of being hostile to the pro-German policy. I initiated it myself. But should we, I wonder, regard Germany as a goal, or rather as a field for manoeuvre? The incidents of the last few days and above all Mussolini’s fidelity to his political allegiance make me incline towards the first alternative. But may not events develop in such a way as to separate our two peoples once again?”

152 Schuschnigg, Requiem, 125.


154 Memorandum by Mackensen, Berlin, October 2, 1937, ibid., Series D, I, 8, Doc. 3.


156 Notes by Hossbach on the Conference in the Reich Chancellery, November 5, 1937, Nazi Conspiracy, III, 295-305, Doc. 386-PS.

157 Minute of conversation with the Duce and Ribbentrop, Rome, November 6, 1937, Ciano’s Papers, 146.
NOTES TO CHAPTER VII

1 Quoted in Wheeler-Bennett, Documents, 1938, II, 42-43.

2 Reproduced in part in the Neue Freie Presse (Vienna), January 8, 1938 (a.m.).


5 Minute of the conversation with the Hungarian Minister, Rome, November 8, 1937, Ciano's Papers, 148.

6 Entry for December 18, 1937, Ciano's Diary, 1937-1938, 45.

7 Entry for November 24, 1937, ibid., 36-37.

8 Entry for January 2, 1938, January 4, 1938, and January 8, 1938, ibid., 58 and 60-61.

9 Entry for January 10, 1938, ibid., 63. Also German Foreign Ministry to various German Diplomatic Missions, Berlin, January 26, 1938, German Documents, Series D, I, 186-189, Doc. 107. In this document Ciano is reported to have told Erdmannsdorff, the German Minister to Budapest, that he had difficulty persuading the Hungarians to recognize Franco; and Schmidt and Kanya are supposed to have told him that Ciano made no attempt to force the withdrawal of Austria and Hungary from the League of Nations.

10 Pester Lloyd (Budapest), January 13, 1938, quoted in Wheeler-Bennett, Documents, 1938, II, 44.

11 Stein to German Foreign Ministry, Vienna, January 29, 1938, German Documents, Series D, I, 494, Doc. 280.

12 Telegram from Papen to Hitler, Vienna, January 27, 1938, ibid., Series D, I, 493, Doc. 279. Most of the commentators on these developments contend, on the basis of the facts then available, that the Tavs plan was seized in January 1938, thus concluding that the Tavs plan and the "Programme of Action 1938" are identical. Cf. Gedye, Betrayal, 199; Eugene Lemnoff, The Last Five Hours of Austria (New York, 1938), 67; Arnold J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs: 1938, I, 188; Fuchs, Showdown in Vienna, 171; and Schuman, Europe on the Eve, 322. However, both Schuschnigg and Zernatto testify to a November 1937 raid on No. 4 Teinfaltstrasse; Affidavit of Schuschnigg, Nuremberg, November 19, 1945. Nazi Conspiracy, V, 707-708, Doc. 2994-P; and Zernatto, Die Wahrheit, 182-183. Gulick concurs with these latter two: "In the searches of both November and January a great number of plans
of one sort or another were found, but it is incredible that Schuschnigg confused the month in which the most significant turned up, and Zernatto's account was published in 1938 so that the events must have been fresh in his memory."—*Austria*, II, 1777-1778. On the evidence now available, the present author is able to discount the November raid and to state that the Tavs plan and the "Programme of Action 1938" is the same document and that this document was seized on January 26, 1938. This affidavit was written eight years after the incident. Zernatto evidently confused Tavs' November interview with the January Action Program. The German Documents, while mentioning several lesser 1937 raids, contain no mention of a November raid but both Papen and Stein record detailed accounts of the January raid and the documents seized. The *Red-White-Red-Book*, 66-67, containing the official sources, states that the 'Programme of Action 1938" was "seized by the Federal Police Head Quarters [sic] in Vienna in January 1938 which programme originated with the then National Socialist provincial administrator 'Gauleiter' Engineer Leopold Tavs," and the program is translated therein.

13 Stein to German Foreign Ministry, Vienna, January 29, 1938, German Documents, Series D, I, 494-495, Doc. 280.


15 Affidavit of Schuschnigg, Nuremberg, November 19, 1945, Nazi Conspiracy, V, 707-708, Doc. 2994-PS.

16 *Neue Freie Presse* (Vienna), January 26 (p.m.), January 27 (a.m.), January 28 (p.m.), January 29 (a.m.), 1938. See also *New York Times* of the same dates and *Red-White-Red-Book*, 67.

17 Fuchs, *Showdown in Vienne*, 95.

18 Text of speech by Friedrich Rainer, Kalgenfurt, March 11, 1942, Nazi Conspiracy, Supplement A, 697-698, Doc. 4005-PS. Papen writes that "since December Schuschnigg has expressed the wish to attempt a clarification of the many unsettled questions in a personal conversation with Hitler."—*Der Wahrheit*, 460.

19 Hochverratsprozess, 556-557; Affidavit of Schuschnigg, Nuremberg, November 19, 1945, Nazi Conspiracy, V, 709, Doc. 2995-PS; Schuschnigg, Requiem, 10.


21 *Oberkommando der Wehrmacht*—Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces.

22 Propositions to Hitler by OKW, February 14, 1938, Nazi Conspiracy, IV, 357, Doc. 1775-PS.
23 Papen, Der Wahrheit, 460-461.

24 Schuschnigg, Requiem, 10-11.


26 Undated Report by Veessenmayer to Keppler, ibid., Series D, I, 512-513, Doc. 293.


29 Keppler to Göring, Berlin, February 9, 1938, Nazi Conspiracy, VI, 196-197, Doc. 3472-PS.

30 Papen to German Foreign Ministry, Vienna, February 6, 1938, German Documents, Series D, I, 503, Doc. 284.


33 Undated Report by Veessenmayer to Keppler, ibid., Series D, I, 513, Doc. 293.

34 A very graphic account of the meeting is found in Schuschnigg, Requiem, 10-27. Also Lennhoff, The Last Five Hours of Austria, 72-81, and Geyde, Betrayal, 214-225.


36 It is interesting to note that the German draft, but not the final draft, contained a provision for the appointment of Glaise-Horstenau as Minister of the Armed Forces, and also the following sentence subsequently revised, "The Austrian Government recognizes that National Socialism is compatible with Austrian conditions and consequently with allegiance to the Fatherland Front, provided that National Socialists recognize and adhere to the Austrian Constitution in carrying out their ideas." See German Draft, German Documents, Series D, I, 513-514, Doc. 294.

37 Schuschnigg, Requiem, 22.

38 Ibid., 29.
39 Papen had objected to the text of the letter since it mentioned only the conversation at the Obersalzberg, but not the Protocol. Guido Schmidt had thereupon immediately authorized Papen to insert the words "in the Protocol" before "promised measures." See Memorandum by Kordt, Berlin, February 15, 1938, German Documents, Series D, I, 521, Doc. 299.


41 Reichspost (Vienna), February 16, 1938.

42 For text, see Nazi Conspiracy, V, 208-209, Doc. 2464-PS.

43 Stein to German Foreign Ministry, Vienna, February 17, 1938, German Documents, Series D, I, 526-528, Doc. 306.


45 Personal Adjutant of the Führer's Deputy (Deitgen) to Ribbentrop, Berlin, February 16, 1938, ibid., Series D, I, 525, Doc. 304.

46 Völkischer Beobachter (Munich), February 17, 1938.


48 Entries for February 13 and 14, 1938, Ciano's Diary 1937-1938, 74.

49 Entry for February 15, 1938, ibid., 75.

50 Zernatto, Die Wahrheit, 319-320.

51 Entry for February 18, 1938, Ciano's Diary 1937-1938, 77.

52 Memorandum by Ribbentrop, Berlin, February 14, 1938, German Documents, Series D, I, 517-518, Doc. 296.

53 Entry for February 17, 1938, Ciano's Diary 1937-1938, 76.

54 Ciano to Grandi, Rome, February 16, 1938, Ciano's Papers, 161-162.

55 Text by Sir John Simon in the House of Commons, February 16, 17, and 18, 1938, 331 H.C. Deb., 5 s., coll. 1862-1863, 2073-2075, 2211-2212.

56 This and the following information is taken from the report of Grandi to Ciano on his meeting with Chamberlain, London, February 19, 1938, Ciano's Papers, 164-184. No further reference will be made.

57 In this connection, see Marion L. Kenney, "The Roll of the House of Commons in British Foreign Policy During the 1937-1938 Session," Norton


59 Minute of the conversation with the Prince of Hesse, Rome, February 18, 1938, *Ciano's Papers*, 163.


61 Enclosure by Veessenmayer, February 18, 1938, in a Dispatch from Keppler to Göring, Berlin, February 19, 1938, *Nazi Conspiracy*, VI, 272-273, Doc. 3576-PS.


69 *Schuschnigg, Requiem*, 30-32.


72 Entry for February 20, 1938, *Ciano's Diary 1937-1938*, 76.


74 *Schuschnigg Requiem*, 32-33; *Reichspost* (Vienna), February 25, 1938.


76 Entry for February 25, 1938, *ibid.*, 80.
77 Schuschnigg, Requiem, 34-35.

78 Memorandum by Papen, Vienna, February 26, 1938, German Documents, Series D, I, 547-548, Doc. 327; Nazi Conspiracy, IV, 103-104, Doc. 1544-PS.


81 Schuschnigg, Requiem, 34-35.

82 Enclosure in a Report by the Chief of the Sicherheitsamt at the Reichsführer SS to Keppler, March 10, 1938, German Documents, Series D, I, 565-566, Doc. 343.

83 Report by Rainer, June 7, 1939, Nazi Conspiracy, III, 593, Doc. 812-PS.

84 Memorandum by Keppler of Trip to Vienna, March 3-6, 1938, German Documents, Series D, I, 560, Doc. 335.

85 Schuschnigg, Requiem, 36-37.

86 Ibid., 32.

87 Entry for March 1, 1938, Ciano's Diary, 1937-1938, 82.

88 Schuschnigg, Requiem, 38.

89 Memorandum by Muff, March 8, 1938, German Documents, Series D, I, 562, Doc. 338.

90 Stein to German Foreign Ministry, Vienna, March 10, 1938, ibid., Series D, I, 567, Doc. 344.

91 Text of speech by Rainer, Klagenfurt, March 11, 1942, Nazi Conspiracy, Supplement A, 703, Doc. 4005-PS.

92 Ibid., 705.


94 Schuschnigg, Requiem, 40.

95 Report by Rainer, June 7, 1939, Nazi Conspiracy, III, 594, Doc. 812-PS.
96 Reichspost (Vienna), March 10, 1938.

97 Schuschnigg, Requiem, 39.

98 Weizsäcker to German Embassy in Great Britain, Berlin, March 9, 1938, German Documents, Series D, I, 562, Doc. 339.


100 Schuschnigg, Requiem, 40.

101 German Foreign Ministry to German Embassy in Great Britain, March 10, 1938, German Documents, Series D, I, 564, Doc. 342.


103 Text of speech by Rainer, Klagenfurt, March 11, 1942, ibid., Supplement A, 705, Doc. 4005-PS.

104 Report by Rainer, June 7, 1939, ibid., III, 594, Doc. 812-PS.

105 Schuschnigg, Requiem, 41.

106 Ibid., 43.


108 Schuschnigg, Requiem, 44.

109 Report by Rainer, June 7, 1939, Nazi Conspiracy, III, 594-595, Doc. 812-PS.


111 Schuschnigg, Requiem, 45.

112 Testimony of Göring, Procès, IX, 296.

113 A complete copy from which this and the following telephone conversations between Berlin and Vienna are taken is found in Nazi Conspiracy, V, 629-646, Doc. 2949-PS.

114 Schuschnigg, Requiem, 46-47; see entry for March 11, 1938, Ciano's Diary, 1937-1938, 87.

115 Report by Rainer, June 7, 1939, Nazi Conspiracy, III, 596, Doc. 812-PS.

116 Ibid.
117 La Voce d'Italia, March 13-14, 1938, quoted in Wheeler-Bennett, Documents, 1938, 233-234.

118 Entry for March 12, 1938, Ciano's Diary, 1937-1938, 87.

119 Telephone Conversation between Hitler and Philip, March 11, 1938, 11:25 p.m., Nazi Conspiracy, V, 641-642, Doc. 2949-PS.

120 Resignation of Miklas, March 11, 1938, ibid., V, 209, Doc. 2465-PS.

121 Neue Freie Presse (Vienna), March 12, 1938 (a.m.).

122 Official announcement of Miklas' resignation, March 11, 1938, Nazi Conspiracy, V, 209, Doc. 2466-PS.

123 Report by Rainer, June 7, 1939, ibid., III, 596, Doc. 812-PS.

124 Telegram from Seyss-Inquart to Hitler, March 11, 1938, German Documents, Series D, I, 580, Doc. 358.


126 German Foreign Ministry to various German Diplomatic Missions, Berlin, March 11, 1938, German Documents, Series D, I, 579, Doc. 357.

127 Law Concerning Reunion of Austria with the German Reich, Linz, March 13, 1938, Nazi Conspiracy, IV, 998, Doc. 2307-PS.
NOTES TO CHAPTER VIII

1 Popolo d'Italia, March 17, 1938, quoted in Wheeler-Bennett, Documents, 1938, 236.

2 La Voce d'Italia, March 16, 1938, quoted in ibid., 235.

3 Baynes, Speeches, II, 1436.

4 Schuschnigg, Requiem, 197-198.

5 Testimony of Göring, Procès, IX, 453.

6 Minute of the conversation with the Duce and Ribbentrop, Rome, November 6, 1937, Ciano's Papers, 146.

7 Red-White-Red-Book, 79.

8 La Voce d'Italia, March 16, 1938, quoted in Wheeler-Bennett, Documents, 1938, 235.
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. SOURCES

A. DOCUMENTS AND OFFICIAL PAPERS


Austria's Just Claim to South Tyrol, Innsbruck, 1946.


____


____


____


Germany. Documents on the Events Preceding the Outbreak of the War. Compiled and published by the German Foreign Office. Berlin, 1939.

____


____


____


____


____


The Restoration of Austria. Agreements arranged by the League of Nations and signed at Geneva on 4 October 1922, with the relevant Documents and Public Statements, Geneva, 12 October 1922. C.716. M.428.


B. MEMOIRS AND DIARIES


C. SPEECHES AND CORRESPONDENCE


Mussolini, Benito. Four Speeches on the Corporate State. a.d.

D. NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS

Arbeiter-Zeitung (Vienna).

Christian Science Monitor (Boston).

Frankfurter Zeitung.

Il Lavaro Fascista (Rome).

Kölnische Zeitung (Cologne).

Le Temps (Paris).

Manchester Guardian.

Neue Freie Presse (Vienna).


Reichspost (Vienna).

Relazioni Internazionali (Milan).

The Times (London).

Völkischer Beobachter (Munich).

Wiener Neueste Nachrichten (Vienna).

Wiener Zeitung (Vienna).

II. REFERENCE WORKS


III. WORKS

A. BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS


Ball, Mary Margaret. *Post-War German-Austrian Relations: The Anschluss Movement, 1918-1936*. Stanford University, [1937].


Hoover, Calvin B. *Germany Enters the Third Reich*. New York, 1933.


Sprigge, Cecil J. S. The Development of Modern Italy. New Haven, 1944.


B. SURVEYS


Yust, Walter (ed.). 10 Eventful Years. 4 vols. Chicago, [1947].

C. ARTICLES


Poole, DeWitt C. "Light on Nazi Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, XXV (October, 1946), 130-154.


Wertheimer, Mildred S. "The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich," Foreign Policy Reports, X (March, 1934), 14-26.