INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6” x 9” black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

ProQuest Information and Learning
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 USA
800-521-0600

UMI
RICE UNIVERSITY

Territories of Thought: Recent Vicissitudes of French Thought and the American Academy

by

Anthony Tonnes Larson

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE

Doctor of Philosophy

APPROVED, THESIS COMMITTEE:

Philip R. Wood, Director
Associate Professor of French Studies

Jean-Joseph Goux
Lawrence H. Favrot Professor of French Studies

Edith Wyschogrod
J. Newton Rayzor Professor of Philosophy and Religious Thought

Houston, Texas
December, 2000
Abstract

Territories of Thought: Recent Vicissitudes of French Thought and the American Academy

by

Anthony Tonnes Larson

The influence of French thought on the American academy in the past thirty years is unquestionable. The philosophical concept of the territory, as it is elaborated by Gilles Deleuze offers a powerful tool for explaining this influence, particularly as it is related to the thought of his contemporaries, Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault. The Deleuzian concept of the territory deploys a creative and affirmative notion of difference which also permits a critique of the "groundings" or "territorializations" of thought in the form of socio-historic or metaphysical "images" (the images deployed by contemporary capitalism and by certain readings of psychoanalysis and literature). A close reading of the work of Derrida and Foucault reveals the conceptual limits of their work in comparison to Deleuze's creative and affirmative notion of difference. When the thought of these former thinkers is expressed within the American academy (specifically within the work of Jonathan Culler, Paul de Man, Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, and Judith Butler), one may trace a Deleuzian re-territorialization of thought that is based on the critique Deleuze makes of socio-historic and metaphysical images of thought.
Acknowledgments

The encounters that matter the most are those that increase our ability to think, setting thought off like flashes of lightning in the dark. This work would not have been possible without the many deeply resonating intellectual encounters I had with Philip Wood and Jean-Joseph Goux. I am grateful for Philip Wood’s unconditional support and encouragement throughout my years of study at Rice University. His demanding standards and intellectual rigor and honesty give this work its foundation, and where this foundation fails the fault is mine alone. Our initial intellectual encounter set off an apprenticeship that has now become a friendship which I greatly cherish. Jean-Joseph Goux’s influence runs through this work as a subterranean theme (although he himself might not recognize it), giving me the initial impetus for undertaking this study and guiding it to its conclusion. The incisiveness of Dr. Goux’s thought is matched only by his gracious kindness and gentle guidance, and his works remain models for me even if my interests lead me in directions different than his.

The interpretation of signs comes only after the encounter, and I am grateful for a number of signs and the lines of thought they set off in this work after discussion with Florian Tréguer, Carle Bonafous-Murat, and Chuck Jackson. Marshall Armintor pointed me in several helpful directions in the early stages of my reflection concerning the American reception of French thinkers. Jean-Jacques Lecercle kindly offered honest and useful criticism as I refined my approach to the American thinkers treated here. Florian Tréguer provided precious help in the final proof-reading.
I would like to acknowledge the financial support I received throughout my studies from the department of French Studies at Rice University. The current director of the department, Bernard Aresu, deserves special thanks for his unwavering encouragement and assistance. I am grateful for aid to conferences received from the research group Anglophonie, Communautés, Écritures at the Université de Rennes 2, in Rennes, France and its past director, Liliane Kerjan. I would like to thank, in addition, Nicole Moulinoux for her confidence and support of my work.

I owe a debt to my parents for their steadfast support through the many years of my studies in pursuit of what, for them, most certainly appeared to be *le temps perdu*. May this lost time at last bear its fruits of learning.

Finally, my deepest gratitude goes to Anne, *pour son soutien de tous les instants.*
Style Note

The form and presentation of this thesis follow the guidelines set out by the office of the Vice Provost for Research and Graduate Studies at Rice University. The paper format (European A4 format) of examination and personal copies may slightly distort the margins and appearance of some pages. Margins and presentation will appear normal in library copies printed on standard American formatted paper (8 ½ by 11 inches).

Reference and endnote styles follow the guidelines of the Modern Language Association handbook with the exception of the separate section of works by Gilles Deleuze in the Selected Bibliography, which is presented by date of publication. Unless otherwise noted, works by Deleuze quoted in the thesis are referred to only by their date of publication to reduce unnecessary repetition. A detailed table of contents replaces the index that is often recommended within the French university system.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION .......................... 1
   The question of the territory - 1, The concept of the territory - 2, Summary of work - 3
   Negotiations .......................... 6
   Notes ................................. 7

PART I - GILLES DELEUZE AND THE TERRITORY OF PHILOSOPHY

CHAPTER 1

DIFFERENCE AND REPETITION: A GENEALOGY .......................... 8
   A. Difference Divided .......................... 9
      Affirmative difference - 9, Platonic difference - 10, Four limitations of difference - 11,
      Image of thought - 11, Resemblance - 13, Representation - 14, Analogy - 15
   1. Hume ................................. 16
      The subject - 16, Association - 17, Habit - 18, Exterior relations - 19, Passions - 20,
      Society - 21, Society, passion, and imagination - 22, Corrective reason - 23
   2. Bergson ............................... 24
      Correct problems and intuition - 25, Durée - 29, Le virtuel - 32, Memory - 34, Four
      paradoxes of memory - 38, Ontology and durée - 39, L’élán vital, le virtuel, possibility -
      41
   B. Difference Defined .......................... 43
      The image of thought and judgement - 44, Kant and judgement - 44
   1. Nietzsche ............................ 46
      Difference as force - 46, The body and the will to power - 47, Active and reactive forces -
      50, The transmutation of values - 50, The transmutation of values, the overman, and
      affirmative syntheses - 53
   2. Spinoza ............................... 54
      The body and parallelism - 55, Three illusions of encounters - 58, Spinoza’s
      "immoralism" - 58, Spinozan ethnology - 59
   C. Difference and Repetition .......................... 60
      Intensive difference - 61, The limitations of repetition - 62
   Negotiations .......................... 63
      Philosophy and judgement - 63, Platonic judgement - 64, The simulacrum - 66, Hegelian
      judgement - 68, Kantian judgement - 69
   Notes ................................. 71

CHAPTER 2

THE TERRITORY OF PHILOSOPHY .......................... 74
   Material philosophy - 74, The territory - 75
   A. Territories .......................... 76
      1. Primitive, Despotic, Civilized .......................... 76
         Socio-historic territories - 76, The territory of the earth - 77, The primitive territory - 79,
         Alliance, filiation, and debt - 79, The despotic territory - 80, The despot and debt - 81,
CHAPTER 3

THE PHILOSOPHY MACHINE
Territorialization, the individual, philosophy - 139, Agencement - 140

A. Agencement
1. Strata
Territorial geography - 141, The double face of strata - 142, Agencement, form, and substance - 143, Foucault, the prison, and form and substance - 144, Form and substance and their immanent articulation - 146, Agencements and actualization - 147, A biological example of form and substance and their immanent articulation - 148

2. The Body Without Organs
The double face of strata and the body without organs - 149, Interiority and exteriority of strata - 150, The outside and the immanent articulation of form and substance - 151, Interiority and exteriority of strata and the articulation of form and substance - 152, The double sampling of intensities and the interiority and exteriority of strata - 154, The immanent articulation of form and substance - 156, Foucauldian power - 157, Power and knowledge in Foucault and the immanent articulation of form and substance - 159

B. Subjectivity
1. Linguistics

2. Psychoanalysis
PART II - TERRITORIES OF CONTEMPORARY FRENCH THOUGHT

CHAPTER 4

JACQUES DERRIDA

A. Derrida and Philosophy


B. Derrida and Literature


C. Derrida and the Play of Deconstruction


Negotiations 4

Georges Bataille's notion of the general economy - 263, Hegel versus Bataille - 263, Writing and Bataille's notion of sovereignty - 267

Notes

CHAPTER 5

MICHEL FOUCAULT

A. Discursive Formations

The discursive formation and the non-relation of historical objects - 274, The example of the clinic - 274, The configuration of discourse versus a historical narrative - 276, The gaze and discourse - 276, Clinical discourse and the chart - 279, The clinic and historical

B. Archeology and Power

C. Power and Subjectivity
The "invisible visibility" of power - 325, The event and "non-event" of power - 326, Power as the outside - 327, The fold of subjectivity - 328, The Greco-Roman example - 330, The "double" practice of aksesis - 332

Notes

CHAPTER 6

DETERMINATIONALIZED THOUGHT: WRITING
The importance of the concept of territory - 337, The differences between Deleuze's, Derrida's, and Foucault's reading of literature - 338

A. Proust and the Literary Machine

Negotiations 5
Immanence and the Other - 363, The example of series of signs of love - 363, The other worlds and times of signs - 364, The incommensurable nature of signs and the example of Albertine - 365, The involuntary encounter and the Other - 367

B. Writing the Philosophy Machine
Intensity and the importance of the involuntary encounter - 368, The triple violence of the encounter - 369, Transcendental empiricism and the use of the faculties - 369, The encounter and the first passive synthesis of time - 370, The first passive synthesis and the constitution of the larval subject - 372, The second passive synthesis of time - 374, The encounter and the second passive synthesis of time - 376, The third passive synthesis of
time - 376, The third passive synthesis of time and repetition - 379, The triple violence of the involuntary encounter and the three passive syntheses of time - 379

C. La case vide

Negotiations 6
Difference and repetition and the unfolding of thought - 403, The concept as the unfolding of thought - 405

Notes - 406

PART III - TERRITORIES OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN THOUGHT

CHAPTER 7

DETERTERRITORIALIZED THOUGHT RETERRITORIALIZED - 415

A. The Conflict of the Faculties
The example of the freshman composition course debate at the University of Texas - 416, The Statement of the Black Faculty Caucus - 416, George Will's reaction - 417, The ends of the university - 418, Legitimization as an example of Kantian "good sense" - 419, Kant's reading of the ends of the university - 420, Kant's reading of the ends of reason - 422, The ends of the university/reason and "tribunals of judgement" - 423, The contemporary debate in perspective, the example of Gerald Graff - 424, "Teaching the conflicts" and the ends of the university - 425, The ends of the university in perspective, the example of Michael Bérubé - 427, The ends of the university in perspective, the example of Jean-François Lyotard - 429, Lyotard and legitimation narratives - 430, Bérubé and the ends of the university - 431, The "image of the university" and the "image of thought," capitalism and schizophrenia - 433, The three territories of production and the legitimate use of the faculties - 434, The first passive synthesis of time and the connective synthesis - 436, The transcendent use of the first passive synthesis versus the immanent use of this synthesis - 436, Primitive coding and the image of thought - 437, The second passive synthesis of time and the disjunctive synthesis, 439, The transcendent use of the second passive synthesis versus the immanent use of this synthesis - 439, Despotic coding - 440, Debt and the transcendent use of the disjunctive synthesis, 441, A productive reading of debt - 442, The third passive synthesis of time or the conjunctive synthesis - 444, The transcendent use of the third passive synthesis versus the immanent use of this synthesis - 444, Civilized coding - 445, Social and economic civilized coding - 447, Oedipus and social coding - 449, Civilized coding and the image of thought - 450, The ends of literature/the university/reason and the civilized territory - 451

Negotiations 7
Peggy Kamuf's reading of the university and literature - 452, Derridean literature and the legitimate use of the faculties - 454, Derridean text and the connective and disjunctive syntheses - 456, The lack of a conjunctive synthesis in Derrida's text - 457, The image of
metaphysics in Derrida - 458. The negative in Derrida and Foucault and the subsequent territorialization of their thought in America - 459

B. Derridean Territories

C. Foucauldian Territories
Hubert Dreyfus' and Paul Rabinow's reading of Foucault - 481, The coherence of Foucault's project - 482, Dreyfus' and Rabinow's historicization of Foucault - 482, Dreyfus' and Rabinow's reading of the archeological method - 483, The importance of power in Foucault's archeological method - 486, Power as a relation of force - 488, Dreyfus' and Rabinow's reterritorialization of Foucault - 489, Deleuze's conjunctive synthesis versus Foucault's inflection of the subject - 490, Judith Butler's reading of Foucault - 491, Butler's theory of gender performativity - 493, The productive nature of gender performance - 495, Deleuze's conjunctive synthesis versus Foucault's inflection of the subject - 496, Butler's limited notion of productive power - 497

Notes

CONCLUSION
The importance of the conjunctive synthesis for the concept of the territory - 508, The concept of the territory as key to the study of French thought in America - 509, The concept of the territory as key to the study of "images of thought" - 510, The concept of the territory as key to the study of our contemporary moment - 510

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Deleuze or co-authored by Deleuze
Other Works
Introduction

Why give a thesis a main title of “Territories of Thought?” How can thought or ideas occupy a certain territory? These questions and the work which attempts to answer them have, at their origin, another, more precise question: Why has a thought that is clearly tied to a territory (France) had such a remarkable impact upon another territory’s (the United States’) thought, preeminently in literary theory – at least as its original port of entry – but also, more recently, in almost every domain from religious studies to anthropology, architecture to feminism, queer theory to cultural studies? Exposure to some dimension of French thought of the last thirty-five years has been an obligatory part of graduate programs in most disciplines in the humanities for many years now, and, notwithstanding a certain decline in their stock latterly, the major French figures continue to be a source of inspiration, either directly or indirectly, for most academic research which has any “theoretical” pretensions.\(^1\) To be sure, as is well-known, this is not an entirely new phenomenon – existentialism, phenomenology, Marxism and structuralism had their vogues too, before the tidal wave of post-structuralism established an importance for French thought without precedent. Let us re-phrase what we defined above as our initial question: What is the relationship between French thought and its reception or expression within the American academy?

We may begin to sketch an answer by focusing on the first and more problematic word of our title: territories. By focusing on a concept that would seem to have very little in common with a sociological or historical approach to the study of literature, philosophy, and culture in general, we have made a theoretical choice in relation to the
above questions and our study. It is not our intention, in other words, to engage in the kind of account of the American academy represented by Pierre Bourdieu’s *Homo academicus*. That is, in order to better answer the series of questions we have posed, we believe that an approach based on thought and, more precisely, on a certain concept of thought as a territory imposes itself. Furthermore, within this territory, we have made a strategic selection. While other French thinkers have been important in the United States – Jean-François Lyotard, Jacques Lacan, Roland Barthes, Julia Kristeva, Louis Althusser, Luce Irigaray, and Jean Baudrillard, among others – we focus here upon the widely-recognized preeminence of Derrida’s deconstruction and Foucault-inspired new historicism and cultural studies.

We have stated that our approach is a “conceptual” one concerning the territory of French thought. The notion of a certain “importation” or “transplantation” of thought is nonetheless at work when discussing the arrival and influence of Derrida and Foucault within the American academy. Thought that is produced and articulated within a certain cultural and historical context is then lifted, moved, and “transplanted” in another cultural and historical context. To return to our narrower question concerning the relationship between French thought and its reception or expression within the American university, it appears that we may formulate an answer by turning to the work of another French thinker, Gilles Deleuze. Deleuze always maintained that thought occurs when a concept is invented to solve a particular problem. We believe that we may answer our question concerning the movement of thought from one territory to another by deploying Deleuze’s concept of the territory and its movement of de- and re-territorialization. In this manner, we might again re-phrase our opening question, placing it within the conceptual
framework of this thesis: What is the territory of Derridean and Foucauldian thought and how is it re-territorialized within the American academy?

In order to answer this question (and the larger questions which underpin it) we must first understand the deployment of the concept of territory within Deleuze’s own thought. The first section of this work will then be devoted to a presentation of the ensemble of Deleuze’s thought. Although a number of recent commentaries and introductions to Deleuze’s thought have been published in both French and English, we believe that a global overview is necessary if we are to properly understand the manner in which Deleuze conceives of and deploys the concept of territory and the movements of de- and re-territorialization. The first chapter of this section then presents the “historical” influences of Deleuze’s conceptual machine. We analyze his readings of Hume, Bergson, Nietzsche, and Spinoza in order to better understand Deleuze’s reading of difference and its subsequent territorialization in thought. Once we have examined what Deleuze presents as the philosophical “foundation” for his thought, we investigate the deployment of the concept of the territory, examining, first, Deleuze’s socio-historic conceptualization of territory from the perspective of primitive, despotic, and civilized territories before turning to the movement of de- and re-territorialization as it is presented in Deleuze’s notion of “becoming.” This analysis is extended within the context of what Deleuze terms “geo-philosophy” and the question of thought’s evolution. The third chapter of this section then brings together the question of difference as it is presented in our first chapter (in the “genealogy” of Deleuze’s thought) with the concept of the territory from the second chapter and the movements of thought in terms of de- and re-territorialization. In our synthesis of these two areas of Deleuze’s thought (implicit in our
first two chapters) we present Deleuze’s critique of what he terms the “image of thought” as it is presented in philosophy, psychoanalysis, and linguistics. As we noted, we feel that it is important to deploy the Deleuzian “machinery” of his thought if we are to properly answer our question concerning French thought within the concept of the territory. Any discussion of the territory of French thought would be incomplete and meaningless without the conceptual context of Deleuze’s thought as a support.

With the Deleuzian concept of territory and its critique of the “image of thought” in place, we then turn, in section two, to the territories of Derrida’s and Foucault’s thought. Chapter four is a general introduction to Derrida’s thought, focusing on Derrida’s reading of philosophy, literature, and the famous “play” of deconstruction. In our examination of Derrida’s reading of literature and philosophy we focus particularly closely on the manner in which Derridean difference is deployed in these two disciplines. In a similar manner, our following chapter focuses on what we are calling the Foucauldian territory of thought. Again, numerous commentaries and introductions to his work abound, but the nature of our argument requires an overview of Foucault’s work if we are to properly problematize the question of a re-territorialization of his thought in the American academy. Our reading of Foucault is concerned primarily with a global and comprehensive reading of his work, treating his analysis of discursive formations within an “archeological method” and the implications this has for his reading of power and the metaphysical subject. Finally, this section concludes with a comparison between the work of Derrida, Foucault, and Deleuze. In order to demonstrate the manner in which Deleuze’s reading of the “image of thought” and the concept of the territory presents a conceptual or methodological superiority in relation to the work of his two compatriots,
we feel that such a comparison is merited. As we have noted above, the influence of French thought within the American academy may be traced in large part to questions of literature and its interpretation. We have found it useful, in the interests of space and various strategic considerations which will become apparent in due course, to reiterate this tendency, basing our comparison on the approach each of these thinkers makes to literature. We open our sixth chapter then with a presentation of Deleuze’s reading of Proust and relate this reading to his larger philosophical project and the questions of difference, the “image of thought,” and de-/re-territorialization. The chapter closes with a detailed comparison between Deleuze, Derrida, and Foucault and a critique of these latter two’s thought within a Deleuzian context of territorialization.

With our theoretical and conceptual machinery in place we return, in the final section of our study, to the questions evoked at the beginning of this introduction. By placing contemporary questions concerning literature and its use within the academy (questions opened up and posed by French thought in general) within the context of our previous study of Deleuzian readings of territory, we attempt to demonstrate how these questions turn around what Deleuze defines as an “image of thought.” This image is confirmed when we make a close reading of recent or contemporary interpretations of Derrida’s and Foucault’s work within the American academy. As examples of these “images of thought” we examine readings of Derrida made by Jonathan Culler and Paul de Man and readings of Foucault by Herbert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow as well as by Judith Butler. We attempt to demonstrate how what might be termed a “conceptual weakness” in the work of Derrida and Foucault (in comparison to Deleuze’s thought)
allows for a reterritorialization of their thought in the work of these highly influential American commentators.

*Negotiations*

To answer our opening question concerning the title of our study, our notion of a “territory” of thought is then closely linked to the conceptual and theoretical work of Gilles Deleuze. As we shall demonstrate below, the movement between two territories – between a movement of territorialization and its subsequent deterritorialization – is always “in the middle.” Indeed, Deleuze often declares that the only place that one may begin to think is in the middle, in a movement of de- or re-territorialization between two territories. Another way of putting this is to borrow the title of a collection of Deleuze’s essays and interviews and say that the subject of our study is a negotiation between two territories of thought. As part of these negotiations between concepts in Deleuze’s work, between Deleuze, Derrida, and Foucault, and between French territories of thought and their American counterparts, we will attempt to speak of questions that are sometimes not always directly concerned with the most obviously topical matters but which nonetheless merit discussion. These discussions will be labeled as “negotiations.”

As we have noted, by opting for a methodological approach that is based on the concept of the territory, our study is heavily influenced by Deleuze’s thought. We are quite aware that Deleuze’s style is often highly dense, leaving much to be desired in explanation. We believe, nonetheless, that one of the merits of Deleuze’s approach is the frequent repetition of his concepts in his work. To borrow an image from his thought, one might say that the initial deployment of a concept within his work might not be recognized at first for what it is. It is only in a subsequent encounter with this concept, in
a different context, that the importance of the territory or an *agencement*, for example, becomes clear. In this sense, Deleuze’s own thought serves as a demonstration for his concepts, since the reader often experiences a sensation of difference and repetition when reading his work. This movement of difference and repetition then achieves a resonance of sorts as one advances with the concepts. In a manner similar to Deleuze, we shall return several times to the concepts we initially discuss in our first section in the subsequent second and third sections. With each return we hope to demonstrate the critical importance of the concept and achieve a resonance or intensity of thought in keeping with the spirit of Deleuze’s work.

**Notes**

1 For example, it would not be difficult to repeat the following experience described by Peggy Kamuf: “I was once shown a list [of theory texts] for a doctoral program in English in which ‘theory’ was one of seven or eight designated options for examination. Of the titles listed, a significant percentage were works originally written in French (as I recall, by Barthes, Derrida, Foucault, Irigaray, Kristeva, Lacan, and Metz)…” (Kamuf, 13).

2 See, for example, the bibliographic entries for Alliez, Ansell-Person, Badiou, Bensmaïa, Bogue, Boundas, Brusseau, Buylens, Colombat, Cressole, Goodchild, Hardt, Massumi, May, Murphy, Schérer, Stivale, and Zourabichvili.
PART I

GILLES DELEUZE AND THE TERRITORY OF PHILOSOPHY

Chapter 1

Difference and Repetition: A Genealogy

Difference – we shall begin with a word that cannot have a beginning since difference always implies at least two other terms. If we begin with difference we begin in the middle, which is the only place, according to Deleuze, where thought may take place and have a proper “beginning.” As we shall see in the chapter and chapters below, we might consider difference to be at the heart of Deleuzian thought, for it drives a philosophical project of creation through differences in ideas, differences in emotions and forces, and differences in bodies. Far from engaging in discussions of the “end of philosophy” or the “end of metaphysics,” Deleuze noisily affirms what might seem to be an older form of philosophical work, one that remains firmly committed to a sense of “progress,” if we take this term to mean the invention of and creation of new concepts for new problems (1991, 14). While his fame might come from a so-called “politics of desire” and the historical juxtaposition of its elaboration with the movements of May 1968 in France, desire and difference are understood in far more complicated ways than the simple liberation of desire and the “right” to be different that emerged in mainstream, consumer society following that movement. Difference might seem to be a highly abstract concept in the discussion that follows, however it does share something with the
spirit of May 1968 – a firm grounding in the concrete and the collective. If difference is at the heart of the lived or at the heart of being then, according to Deleuze, it is what underpins any hope for change. In order to better grasp the manner in which this rather optimistic reading of difference comes to be deployed in Deleuze’s work, we should like to explore the “origins” or genealogy of his work. How does Deleuze read his most important predecessors and what does he take from them? How is difference deployed in their work and in Deleuze’s? If we hope to provide an answer to such questions we must, as explained in our introduction, engage Deleuze’s “difference machine” in detail. We believe that it is only through a close reading of these early texts that we may construct a foundation on which to advance our later arguments.

A. Difference Divided

What is difference? For Deleuze, we might say that difference is affirmation and, more precisely, the affirmation of the intensity of lived experience (1968a, 74 & 187). The difficulty of such an odd and vague definition underlines, for Deleuze, how alien difference has become to us. Difference has become unthinkable, and perhaps one way to understand Deleuze’s definition is to understand the limitations that have been placed around difference. Deleuze declares, “Tant que la différence est soumise aux exigences de la représentation, elle n’est pas pensée en elle-même, et ne peut pas l’être. La question : fut-elle « toujours » soumise à ces exigences, et pour quelles raisons ? doit être examinée de près” (1968a, 337). The key term here is representation, which Deleuze blames for difference’s limitation. Following Deleuze, we might trace this limitation back to and through two figures: Plato and Kant.
For Deleuze, the problem of representation first enters Plato’s philosophy when he seeks to distinguish between the model and the copy, noting that Plato bases his distinction in myth (1968a, 340, 85). Invoking the image of a God, Plato explains that each member of a society may participate more or less fully in that society in direct relation to the manner in which an individual “shares” in the image of God (1968a, 85). For instance, society is composed of politicians, who share closely in God’s image and thus occupy its highest ranks (1968a, 85). Parents, servants, auxiliaries also follow in this participation, according to their relation to the image of God (1968a, 85). Finally, there are the charlatans and counterfeiters, those who imitate the image of God but do not share in it (1968a, 85). The charlatan and counterfeiter are pretenders, differing from the image of God and imperiling the just nature of society (1968a, 87). Deleuze notes how the mythic trial and its riddle serve to separate the true from the false in society (1968a, 87-88). The true participant is able to solve the riddle and remain within society while the imposter is banished. The charlatan, through her false resemblance to God, poses a threat to the order of society (1968a, 340-341). For Deleuze, the charlatan or counterfeiter is an imposter who poses a danger to the just nature of society by introducing a radical difference that exceeds the order established by God (1968a, 341). The charlatan or counterfeiter is a false copy of God, a simulacrum, and is rejected because she represents “...l’état des différences libres océaniques, des distributions nomades, des anarchies couronnées, toute cette malignité qui conteste et la notion de modèle et celle de copie” (1968a, 341). The charlatan exceeds the categories of the model and the copy. Thus, the real division in Plato is not between the model and the copy but between the true copy, that which resembles the model, and the false copy, that which contradicts the model.
(1968a, 165-167). This initial division between model and copy comes to found what Deleuze reads as the quadruple illusion of representation. That is, within four categories (thought, the sensible, the idea, and Being), representation imposes its limits on difference, excluding the latter just as strictly as Plato's mythical charlatan was excluded from the city (1968a, 341). Let us briefly examine these categories and the manner in which Deleuze believes they limit difference. As note in our introduction, we shall return to these categories many times in the following chapters, teasing out the numerous implications they have for thought.

What occurs in thought? For Deleuze, thought's very foundation is fraught with danger, for the idea of foundation implies a cutting-off point. He discovers an image of thought that returns throughout the history of philosophy, that is, that thought is natural and seeks the Truth. This image is familiar to us, for "naturally," "everyone knows" that thought seeks what is good and true (1968a, 172). In other words, the coincidence of the "natural" exercise of the faculty of thought and the "good nature" of thought – what Deleuze defines in French as *le sens commun* (1968a, 171).

To understand this image Deleuze offers the example of recognition. Explaining Descartes' famous portion of wax, Deleuze notes how we recognize it as the same object that we see, touch, remember, imagine, conceive of, etc.; in short, all of our faculties come into play when encountering the piece of wax. But it is the faculty of thought, of recognition, that allows these sensations to be brought together, regrouped and to recognize themselves in and around the object. *Le sens commun* acts as the foundation of thought and is at the heart of this exercise. It serves as the presupposed image around which thought can then take place. Of course, we readily recognize this description of
the *concordia facultatum* as the philosophical subject as it is founded in Descartes and then explicitly announced in Kant, leading Deleuze to declare, "Tel est le sens du Cogito comme commencement : il exprime l’unité de toutes les facultés de se rapporter à une forme d’objet qui réfléchit l’identité subjective, il donne un concept philosophique au présupposé du sens commun, il est le sens commun devenu philosophique" (1968a, 174).

Deleuze notes that one might object that every object is encountered in its own circumstances, implying a different mix of faculties with each encounter. That is, the object is never encountered as the pure, ideal object but as necessarily bound up in the world (1968a, 175). This is where the unifying image of *le sens commun* works with "good sense," which we recall is what Descartes declared to be "universally shared among all subjects." In our empirical encounter with objects, the faculties always perform a balancing act so that each faculty works to bring itself to recognize the model or the same of the *sens commun*. That is, the "dose" of each faculty is adjusted so that a "same" or recognition is possible. The faculty of thought provides a model in the *sens commun* and the "good sense" of the other faculties aligns itself around this model, leading Deleuze to declare, "C’est le bon sens qui détermine l’apport des facultés dans chaque cas, quand le sens commun apporte la forme du Même" (1968a, 175). To return to our theme of representation within the category of thought, the faculty of thought, as it is presented in Plato, Descartes, and Kant, differs from all other faculties because it unifies the latter under the model of the Same (1968a, 175). Instead of separating itself from the orthodoxy of opinion ("naturally, everyone knows"), this image of thought erects a new, triple-layered orthodoxy of thought as just, sharing in a natural, common sense, in which recognition is a transcendental model (1968a, 175).
When difference is represented in the sensible, Deleuze believes that difference is subordinated to the category of resemblance (1968a, 342). He explains that this occurs because resemblance no longer needs to be exact or share in an internal similitude such as the copy and the model in Plato; rather, through the thinking subject, the sensible aspects of an object have their differences reduced so that they may be recognized and identified with the concept of the object (1968a, 342). Take for example science and the nineteenth century principal of change: for Carnot, Curie, and Le Châtelier, difference is not a sufficient reason for change because the change itself negates the difference (1968a, 288). Within a closed system, given enough space and time, the differences that produce change will disappear – we recognize this as part of thermodynamic theory. For Deleuze, this way of representing difference eliminates the fundamental character of difference, which is an intensity that always remains or is “left over” (1968a, 289, 342). To return to the example of the category of thought, good sense functions in a similar manner: the empirical differences encountered in an object force a re-orientation of one’s faculties so that the encounter may always fit within the model of the Same to be found in thought’s sens commun. This “rounding out” of the edges of difference in terms of the resemblance of sensation then finds itself transcendentally reinforced within the subject of thought. Now, Deleuze is not claiming that difference does not qualitatively negate itself in extension. He does, however, believe that this form of representation is an illusion because the nature of difference is neither in the quality that covers it nor in the space in which it emerges (1968a, 342). As we have noted, for Deleuze, difference is intensive. Just what this means and what it implies will be explained below, as our study unfolds.
The illusion of representation linked to the Idea concerns negativity and the way difference is subordinated to the negative (1968a, 342). For Deleuze, an idea is always linked to a problematic, that is, the multiplicity of conditions out of which it emerged. However, the idea or problem, when represented in consciousness through the image of thought and resemblance, comes to be defined by its negative aspect (1968a, 344). For example, within the linguistic analysis of language, Deleuze notes that the Idea of linguistics is a multiplicity, a problematic (1968a, 262). It includes all the characteristics of a structure, yet when it is defined by linguists, it is defined in negative terms (1968a, 262-263). Thus, the differential relations that exist between phonemes are framed in terms of the opposition that exists between them (1968a, 263). For Deleuze, the negative, which is at the heart of the Hegelian system of thought, is the antithesis of the affirmative power of difference. The negation that drives the Hegelian system is part of the subject of identity and the illusion of resemblance. Deleuze declares, “À la complementarité du positif et de l’affirmatif, de la position différentielle et de l’affirmation de différence, se substitue la fausse genèse de l’affirmation, produite par le négatif et comme négation de la négation” (1968a, 344).

Finally, Deleuze believes that difference is subordinated to the analogy of judgement that is present within representation (1968a, 345). Deleuze explains that the identity of a concept is not yet complete as we have sketched it thus far in relation to good sense, le sens commun, recognition, and negation. He notes that before the identity of a concept is set into place by the faculties, the concept exists as undetermined. He explains, “L’identité du concept, en effet, ne nous donne pas encore une règle de détermination concrète : elle se présente seulement comme identité du concept
indéterminé, Être ou Je suis (ce Je suis dont Kant disait qu’il était la perception ou le sentiment d’une existence indépendamment de toute détermination)” (1968a, 345). That is, philosophy needs a set of original concepts which will allow the concept to be determined, and thus give it an identity based on the distributive power of the faculties (1968a, 345). In this way, the concept has an analogical function, internally sharing in the Being of the concept, in its determined and undetermined form (1968a, 345-346). We recognize this philosophical maneuver as the creation of the categories (specifically in Kant’s philosophy) of a priori concepts and empirical concepts (1968a, 346). For Deleuze, such a maneuver situates difference within the “closed” position of the subject (that is, the theoretical position in which recognition, good and common sense, and negation are deployed), which is in contrast to a concept of Being in which difference is original and outside of any pre-established limits (1968a, 346). The concepts of categories of determination allows philosophy to firmly ground and create a series of walls (originally determinable concepts or those derived from them) around the radical intensity of difference (1968a, 346).

Deleuze also refers to these four illusions of representation as the four “roots” of mediation which fog our conception of difference: identity, resemblance, opposition, and analogy (1968a, 44-45). According to Deleuze, a true philosophy of difference would separate difference from the mediation and representation of these “roots,” allowing it to escape from the cave in which it was historically enclosed. To “make a difference” regains its true sense when used by Deleuze. Difference is not between things or limited by what it is not, it is difference-in-itself, pure difference. Admittedly this remains highly theoretical and abstract. In the chapters that follow we shall attempt to explore exactly
how Deleuze proposes to "make a difference." In order to do this, however, we might be aided by an understanding of the "machine" behind Deleuze's thought. Deleuze's early "history of philosophy" monographs provide important tools for our understanding of Deleuzian difference. For example, it is in his first work, _Empirisme et subjectivité_, and his study of Hume that we find an important tool for his construction of a positive system of difference.

1. Hume

Hume may seem to be an odd influence on Deleuze, for nothing seems further from the occupations of twentieth century continental philosophy than eighteenth century empiricism. Indeed, Deleuze notes that he was first drawn to Hume by something he sensed lacking in the "three H's" of his education (Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger) (1977, 18-19). What Deleuze sensed in empiricism was the manner in which pre-established categories escaped Hume's thought, as well as the importance he gave to a self-generating system of thought that was based on the relation (1977, 21-22).

If the categories of subjectivity are not pre-determined, the question for Deleuze's reading of Hume is, How is a subject formed and defined? As an empiricist, Hume believes that the source of all knowledge is to be found in experience and not in reason. The given, or experience, is simply the flux of the sensible, a collection of impressions and images, or an ensemble of perceptions (1953, 92). More precisely, this collection of impressions, what Deleuze and Hume call ideas, is spirit and imagination. The given is the idea in the imagination (1953, 3). Thus, there is no category in Hume's philosophy between the given and ideas in the imagination. The question of how a subject is formed
is more precisely, How does the collection of ideas become organized into a system (1953, 3)?

Hume organizes ideas through association. Association takes place through the operations of contiguity (how ideas are placed next to each other in the imagination), resemblance (how ideas are recognized as being similar or dissimilar to other ideas), and causality (how ideas lead to other ideas) (1953, 4). Association brings ideas together, but it is belief that finally allows the subject to go beyond the given and constitute itself as a true subject (1953, 4). For example, we believe that the sun will rise tomorrow because it has risen every day in the same manner for all of our lives. The idea of the sun rising, as it is associated with other ideas in contiguity, resemblance, and causality, leads us to believe. Nothing tells us that this idea is true, but we create an idea and a truth according to our association of ideas and according to the problematic we give ourselves.

Before going any further, let us step back and begin again. Being is what appears in the movement of the given. Being is continually in motion and changing. It is this perception of change which is at the heart of empiricism, for if change occurs, then a distinction may be made. Deleuze finds that empiricism is driven by difference, that is, by the difference that exists between each particle of experience. He explains, "Ainsi l'expérience est la succession, le mouvement des idées séparables en tant qu'elles sont différentes, et différentes en tant qu'elles sont séparables" (1953, 93). Nothing is supposed outside of the movement of existence. Nothing comes between this movement and the next one to allow us to interpret it, to give it meaning. In other words, nothing artificially closes off this movement and the differences within it. As we have seen, the idea and existence are identical (1953, 93-95). Furthermore, the only thing that can be
distinguished in the given is the movement from one idea to another (1953, 96). For Deleuze, what is important is how Hume concentrates on the divisibility of experience, as tiny ideas or experiences, which he calls atomism (1953, 97). This is different from the associationism mentioned above. Here, we are concerned with the smallest amount of movement, the smallest amount of change, from one idea to the next. The perception of difference between ideas implies a change or movement. Movement is then not understood in terms of time or space, that is, as existing in already constituted categories (1953, 99). On the contrary, for Deleuze, it is the movement of ideas itself which creates the categories of time and space (1953, 99). The association of the smallest possible differences between ideas gives the subject the category of time, and the association of certain perceptions as they are spread out gives the subject the category of space (1953, 99). As Philip Goodchild points out, Deleuze does not consider time here to be a linear succession of “now’s,” rather, it is the association of experience that allows the subject to construct the concept of time (1996, 17). In other words, a subject is able to constitute time as the ensemble of movement passing from a particularly intense experience to a particularly dull one, etc. Time then emerges from this movement of intensity.

Now, this perception of movement is certainly not yet a subject, even if a body and the necessary organs for perception exist. The spontaneity of a subject is missing. Deleuze next asks how a subject can organize experience in such a way as to go beyond experience (1953, 100). The answer might first be found again in time, for the subject has habits, durations, expectations, etc. (1953, 101). Deleuze finds in waiting and habit a key, “L’attente est habitude, l’habitude est attente : ces deux déterminations, la poussée du passé et l’élan vers l’avenir, sont les deux aspects d’un même dynamisme
fondamental, au centre de la philosophie de Hume” (1953, 101). Expecting something provides a synthesis of the past and present with a view towards the future, for if something happens in the past with regularity (a habit), and continues in the present, then one has every right to expect it to continue in the future. Habit is at the heart of the most basic synthesis of the subject (1953, 104).

But how do we suddenly come to have two subdivisions of time, the past and the present? This itself is the organization, the association that is part of the subject. For as Deleuze explains, it is in experience, in the association of experience, of one experience that resembles another, that the subject perceives a repetition (1953, 105). By definition, this association of repetitions is in the past (1953, 105). Furthermore, this association, as it is created by the subject, comes to constitute a perpetual present, for the repetition comes to be expected and is thus a habit (1953, 105). To place this argument in Hume’s terms, Deleuze explains, “...l’entendement est l’esprit lui-même, mais qui, sous l’influence du principe de l’expérience, réfléchit le temps sous la forme d’un passé soumis à son observation ; et l’imagination, sous l’influence du principe de l’habitude, est encore l’esprit, mais qui réfléchit le temps comme un avenir déterminé rempli par ses attentes” (1953, 106). These are the fundamental maneuvers out of which emerges the subject in Hume’s system.

Clearly, what is important in this aspect of Deleuze’s reading of Hume is how he borrows the notions by which experience is given as a pure intensity and by which the subject constructs itself out of the given, independent of any presupposition. Indeed, it is not surprising that these two notions influence Deleuze, for they imply the absence of any exterior framework in which experience might be inserted to construct a site of relations
(in which difference would be understood in terms of an already existing model – recognition, the faculties, etc.). Relations are exterior to their terms, so that Hume’s system builds itself on the plane of experience, reaching outside of itself to insert an increasing number of concepts into the system (through habit, expectation, imagination, etc.). The injection of these concepts always comes from outside the system, not as the result of a presupposition about it. This method creates a practical form of the subject, as Deleuze declares, “...si la relation ne se sépare pas des circonstances, si le sujet ne peut pas se séparer d’un contenu singulier qui lui est strictement essentiel, c’est que la subjectivité dans son essence est pratique” (1953, 117).

Now, if this “machine” of additions and associations helps to explain the formation of the individual subject, it still does little to help explain the formation of individual subjects within the structure of society. Indeed, it appears that it is on two levels that Deleuze finds Hume’s thought interesting, for this notion of a practical, creative philosophy is valid as well when Deleuze turns to Hume’s reading of society’s organization and, in particular, of the role the passions have in this structure. Indeed, Hume draws a parallel between the associations discussed above and the passions that govern human nature and human society (1953, 16). For Hume, passions give direction to the beliefs we form in associating ideas, and passions are the practical engines of life bringing subjects together in a society of justice (1953, 16-17). According to Hume this occurs because the driving human passion is not competition but sympathy (1953, 23). However, sympathy is not universally shared between subjects; sympathy is reserved for those who are closest to us, such as our clan, our family, our neighborhood, etc. (1953, 25). The problem of society is to extend sympathy beyond one’s family and clan. Our
passion of sympathy is certainly a positive, extending passion, however, it is limited to those close to us. Indeed, this is a practical problem, for anyone could become a member of one's family, forcing one to suddenly embrace today the mistrusted stranger of yesterday (1953, 26-27). The moral foundation of society consists then of an extension of sympathy to all individuals. Culture, understood as the construction of a society of justice, is a manner of overcoming the partial sympathies of all individuals (1953, 28-29). The construction of the rules of society then is a practical exercise designed to allow for the common good. According to Hume, the just society then allows one to go beyond one's own partial sympathies for the good of all (1953, 29). By constructing rules, society allows subjects to extend their sympathy to other subjects and to correct their own excesses, much like atomism allows a subject to construct rules of time and space and then extend those rules, associating them, and organizing systems of thought (1953, 30). Society allows for the extension of the passions, not their limitation. The institution, which is the result of the rules of society, is understood not as limiting law, but as a construction that enables subjects to fulfill their passions. Deleuze explains, “L'institution n'est pas une limitation comme la loi, mais au contraire un modèle d'actions, une véritable entreprise, un système inventé de moyens positifs, une invention positive de moyens indirects” (1953, 35). This reading of Hume offers Deleuze an exceptionally creative, inventive, and positive conception of society and merits further investigation.

Returning to the imagination and associationism, it is the close relationship between imagination and the passions which allows for the construction of society. According to the circumstances of the subject, imagination produces various models of
rules or institutions that correspond to its situation. The institution is formed by the association of ideas and the passions that drive that association (1953, 39). Deleuze notes, "L’imagination se révèle comme une véritable production de modèles extrêmement divers : les institutions sont déterminées par les figures que tracent les tendances, selon les circonstances, quand elles se réfléchissent dans l’imagination, dans une imagination soumise aux principes d’association" (1953, 39). However, there are problems within this structure of society. Society must solidify itself as well as continue to determine itself in the imagination of subjects. In addition, it must correct certain errors that appear (1953, 40). That is, society allows for the extension of sympathy, but given sympathy’s strength as a passion it invariably returns to its natural, partial, roots (1953, 41). Society must then establish itself in the form of political institutions that artificially maintain the extension of sympathy (1953, 41). The role of the state, according to Hume, is to establish a belief in the common interest that the state represents (1953, 42). The state enforces this belief with the powers at its disposal, in the form of powers of correction and sanction (1953, 42).

Now, let us step back and consider the situation from the perspective of imagination once more. Passion reflects upon itself in the imagination (1953, 48). It is in the association of ideas that passion is able to find itself confronted with a reflection of itself. Passion drives the imagination, and it is the imagination which allows passion to construct extensions of itself (1953, 49). Deleuze explains, "Dans la réflexion, la passion s’imagine et l’imagination se passionne : la règle est possible" (1953, 49). Imagination and passion then combine to construct various rules that form society and reason, which Deleuze defines as, "...l’imagination devenue nature, l’ensemble des effets simples de
l'association, idées générales, substances, relations" (1953, 60). Reason, as a rule extensive, is also corrective, for imagination is capable of establishing false rules (rules that are incorrectly derived from association) (1953, 71, 65-70). For example, the habit of noticing a "ring" around the moon the evening before a rainstorm might lead one to believe that a causal relationship exists. The association of these events will lead to an extension of ideas and the establishment of a rule to this effect. However, this rule is obviously incorrect. The corrective function of reason comes into play to limit what is in fact the illusive nature of imagination.

Now, we recall from above that reason is based on habit, whether it is extensive or corrective. This leads to a paradox: the habitual nature of reason that leads to irrational beliefs appears to be corrected by its habitual nature (1953, 71). To return to the example immediately above, it is reason, as part of the extensive nature of habit, which "drives" our belief concerning the moon's appearance before the occurrence of rain. But it is also reason in its corrective function which allows us to discount such a believe. One might imagine a case in which a belief is extended so fully as to cover all of experience, at which point, the imagination succeeds in creating a structure that cannot be corrected by reason (1953, 72-73). It is indeed in religion that one finds most often this form of construction. Deleuze cites as an example the extension of our passions to experience as the construction of ancient polytheistic religions, "Les dieux du polythéisme sont l'écho, l'extension, la réflexion des passions ; leur ciel est seulement notre imagination" (1953, 72-73). Deleuze notes that a similar occurrence takes place in a theistic system of belief, beginning with the repetition of beliefs by the priests, the
profession of miracles, and proofs of God’s existence by analogy or by causality (1953, 74).

Before we return to the question of difference, then, we should again note the importance of Deleuze’s reading of Hume. As we have seen, the empiricist notions of atomism, the imagination, and the extension of reason are based on a positive, immanent constitution of a subject. For Deleuze and Hume, philosophy should not be concerned with the problem of origins (departing from a fixed point in the form of a subject) but rather with the positive and affirmative constitution of a subject. Furthermore, this constitution is a practical matter: it takes place within society, whose constitution is itself a positive and extensive affair. As we shall see in the following two chapters, this aspect of Hume’s thought will be important for Deleuze’s analysis of the codes of a society and the construction of what he terms the “socius.” Finally, as we shall see in Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza, Hume’s idea that society is constructed positively, proceeding from the passions will be extremely important. Before turning to that subject, we might further extend our (and Deleuze’s) reflection on the subject.

2. Bergson

While Deleuze’s study of Bergson, Le Bergsonisme, does not chronologically follow his work on Hume, it is very close to this latter study in the matter of its theme of consciousness (a positively constructed subject) and time. As we noted above, one of the themes that constantly returns in Deleuze’s early historical studies is the rejection of a category (such as negation) or position (such as one of judgement) which pre-exists its philosophical system, thus grounding thought in a “plane” of transcendence. In this manner, we may understand the importance of Deleuze’s work on Hume and the notion
of a subject as *self-constituting* as opposed to *self-constructing* which avoids any notion of a category or a subject-position that pre-exists such a positive notion of the subject. Let us follow this line of thought as it appears in Deleuze’s study of Bergson, for it will solidify our understanding of what will come to be described as the plane of immanence and a positive ontological system that attempts to work around the notion of negation in transcendental philosophy.

Deleuze’s position is clear from the opening pages of this study where he underlines the importance of a “correct” reading of philosophical problems. That is, in the Bergsonian method of intuition he finds a position similar to his own, rejecting any sort of “grounding” of a philosophical method in various fundamental categories or assumptions. Thus, in reading Bergson, Deleuze outlines several “rules,” the first of which is to concentrate not on the truth or correct nature of solutions to problems, but rather to direct this critical gaze on the problem itself, asking oneself if the problem is correctly posed (1966, 3). For example, a false or incorrect problem presents a confusion of terms so that what should be taken as differences of nature are taken to be differences of degree and posed in this latter’s terms. Taking an example from Bergson’s work, Deleuze explains this type of false problem as one in which, “…on confond la qualité de la sensation avec l’espace musculaire qui lui correspond, ou avec la quantité de la cause physique qui la produit, la notion d’intensité implique un mélange impur entre déterminations qui diffèrent en nature, [si bien] que la question « de combien la sensation grandit-elle ? » renvoie toujours à un problème mal posé” (1966, 8). One of the problems Deleuze’s study of Bergson presents is the brevity of its explanations and the high condensation of Bergsonian terms into a short space. In order to understand this difference between correctly and incorrectly posed problems, let us briefly turn to Bergson’s own thought, for it will aid us below in understanding the importance of this
In his *Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience* Bergson discusses this problem in the terms we have given above: differences of nature and differences of degree. For Bergson, our everyday encounter with objects or matter is forcibly one which involves a mixture of different categories: matter and memory, time and space, quality and quantity, etc. As Deleuze underlines, one may distinguish between these various categories by following the intuitive method. Thus Bergson poses the following question concerning a distinction between what we might term “large” or “small” sensations and those objects that we might be able to qualify as being “large” or “small:”

...il est incontestable qu’un nombre en surpasse un autre quand il figure après lui dans la série naturelle des nombres : mais si l’on a pu disposer les nombres en ordre croissant, c’est justement parce qu’il existe entre eux des rapports de contenant à contenu, et qu’on se sent capable d’expliquer avec précision en quel sens l’un est plus grand que l’autre. La question est alors de savoir comment nous réussissons à former une série de ce genre avec des intensités, qui ne sont pas choses superposables, et à quel signe nous reconnaissions que les termes de cette série croissent, par exemple, au lieu de diminuer : ce qui revient toujours à se demander pourquoi une intensité est assimilable à une grandeur (1927, 2).

In exploring this question, Bergson notes how an intensity in the form of an emotion comes to have a size but that this “rise” or increase in the “size” of intensity is deceptive. What occurs when we experience a strong passion in isolation and with no relation to an exterior stimulus is that a certain resonance appears between this passion and other ideas or passions. In other words, the passion has such an intensity that it “descends” into our consciousness and levels out any notion we might have of a separate and ordered series of ideas or passions. The strong or intense passion resonates so that any idea of multiplicity or space is annulled, leading Bergson to declare, “Quand on dit qu’un objet occupe une grande place dans l’âme, ou même qu’il y tient toute la place, on doit simplement entendre par là que son image a modifié la nuance de mille perceptions ou
souvenirs, et qu’en ce sens elle les pénètre, sans pourtant s’y faire voir” (1927, 5). Nonetheless, representative consciousness is unable to accept such a notion of “resonance” and instead adds a number to this sensation so that if we feel a certain pleasure, even though we do not count the number of ideas or passions that are affected by this emotion, we nonetheless establish a division between “levels” of pleasure. Thus, a particular moment might be “more pleasurable” than another in terms of the “number” of passions or ideas it touches within our consciousness (Bergson, 1927, 6). This confusion between the quality and quantity of an intensity is exacerbated when we consider examples in which we no longer limit ourselves to a purely interior experience and add exterior stimuli. Thus, when making a tight fist, we believe that the sensation grows larger and larger when in fact what grows larger is the number of muscles, from the fingers and the palm outward, that take part in the action. The sensation of this tightening never actually changes; it is only the number of muscles that take part in the tightening that changes. By treating this sensation as “large” or “small,” we mistakenly misinterpret a quality for a quantity (Bergson, 1927, 18-19).

Now, let us return to Deleuze’s original idea of intuition and the separation of philosophical problems into those that are correctly posed and those incorrectly posed. As our example from Bergson underlines, what has occurred in the definition of an intensity as “large” or “small” is: 1) a mistake between two separate categories and 2) the imposition of one category’s terms on another. Thus, in terms of an intensity, when one says that a certain passion is “greater” than another, one has already established a ground on which this category might be measured (greatness, smallness, etc.) in which the passion’s difference to this category is already subsumed. In other words, something is
assumed to define this passion we feel and upon this assumption, a certain negation takes place, reducing the intensity of the passion to a simple matter of multiplicities that may be counted and arranged. This is what Deleuze means when he criticizes, following Bergson, negative definitions of categories such as being or non-being: “L'idée de non-être apparaît quand, au lieu de saisir les réalités différentes qui se substituent les unes aux autres indéfiniment, nous les confondons dans l'homogénéité d'un Être en général, qui ne peut plus que s'opposer au néant, se rapporter au néant” (1966, 9). Bergsonian intuition allows one to work through the categorical confusion and false grounding of inappropriate or poorly posed questions.

By following intuition, we are able to pose our problems not in terms of the state of the experience itself (which leads to the confusion detailed above) but rather in terms of the conditions of experience. Deleuze explains, “...cet élargissement, ou même ce dépassement, ne consiste pas à dépasser l'expérience vers des concepts...au contraire, il s'agit de l'expérience réelle dans toutes ses particularités” (1966, 19). In other words, Bergsonian intuition opens up onto experience in terms of heterogeneity and not the homogeneity of a pre-determined term or ground. This heterogeneous space is defined by Bergson as durée. Now, if we are to understand Deleuze’s use of the term virtuel and its place in his thought, we must understand his reading of Bergson’s durée, and once again, another detour through Bergson’s thought is needed.

Although he discusses the concept in a number of texts, we might return to the Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience for one of the earliest discussions of durée. We recall that when discussing the difference between the quality of a passion and its quantity, we underlined how a passion’s quality could not be measured in terms of
number or multiplicity. A passion may be judged intense when it produces a certain resonance that can never be reduced to a number. If we reduce this intensity to number, we impose a certain homogeneity or flattening out on the sensation so that we might "count" the passion in terms of the number of other passions it touches. It is in terms of this homogeneity that Bergson reads space. Thus he explains our perception of a line in relation to space:

...imaginons une ligne droite, indéfinie, et sur cette ligne un point matériel A qui se déplace. Si ce point prenait conscience de lui-même, il se sentirait changer, puisqu'il se meut : il apercevrait une succession ; mais cette succession revêtirait-elle pour lui la forme d'une ligne ? Oui sans doute, à condition qu'il pût s'élever en quelque sorte au-dessus de la ligne qu'il parcourt et en apercevoir simultanément plusieurs points juxtaposés : mais par là même il formerait l'idée d'espace, et c'est dans l'espace qu'il verrait se dérouler les changements qu'il subit, non dans la durée pure (1927, 76-77).

On the contrary, perceiving our movement along a line in terms of durée would be much like our earlier reading of the quality of a passion. Each sensation would successively blend or resonate with all other sensations so that, as Bergson explains, "...la pure durée pourrait bien n'être qu'une succession de changements qualitatifs qui se fondent, qui se pénètrent, sans contours précis, sans aucune tendance à s'extérioriser les uns par rapport aux autres, sans aucune parenté avec le nombre : ce serait l'hétérogénéité pure" (1927, 77). This is, of course, a rather difficult thing to imagine, and before returning to Deleuze, let us attempt to clarify this notion.

The distinction here is, of course, between time and space, and we are tempted, indeed forced, to say that time passes, implying some sort of spatial representation. For Bergson, time does pass, but not in the terms of passage used when we speak of space. If we say that a minute has just passed, by which we mean that the second hand on our
watch has completed sixty movements, there are two ways of understanding this. The first would be to say that on a line, sixty points have just been marked off. Standing apart from that line, we might perceive, in one glance, all of these points duly marked off. However, in doing so, we have shifted time from its own proper element to that of space where we might represent it and speak of it in the latter’s own terms. Of course, we might say that we understand time to proceed in space in terms of each stroke of the second hand, but in doing so, the space of a stroke may contain no memory or remnant of the preceding stroke so that what we perceive is only one and the same action. In a word, we remain in the present. If, on the other hand, we take each second’s passing and place it within all of the other second’s passing, blending and mixing each tick of the second hand with all ticks that came before it, we understand the minute in another way. What we understand is not a juxtaposition of two numbers (one equals sixty) but rather an inter-penetration or resonance of memories. Each second blends into the next so that we have an indeterminate multiplicity in which there is no ground on which to represent these ticks nor on which we might measure them. Pure durée thus escapes any attempt to measure or represent it (Bergson, 1927, 78-79).

Now, to return to Deleuze, the intuitive method is important because we are always presented, in our everyday existence, with a mix of quality and quantity, of durée and space. As Deleuze explains, “…l’espace introduit la forme de ses distinctions extrinsèques ou de ses «coupes», homogènes et discontinues, tandis que la durée apporte sa succession interne, hétérogène et continue” (1966, 30). Out of this mixture we are able to conceive of our example of the watch in terms of both time and space. However, this mixture is nonetheless an obstacle, as we have seen, to posing and answering
philosophical questions. With intuition we may deepen our understanding of the multiplicity of space and time. For Deleuze, Bergsonian intuition permits an understanding of a multiplicity that is not numerical or based on the category of space but is rather, "...une multiplicité interne, de succession, de fusion, d'organisation, d'hétérogénéité, de discrimination qualitative ou de différence de nature, une multiplicité virtuelle et continue, irréductible au nombre" (1966, 31). This multiplicity is, of course, the multiplicity of durée. Let us examine this reading of Bergsonian durée, for it is important in Deleuze's definition of what he terms the virtuel.

When speaking of the difference between matter and memory or the objective and the subjective, Deleuze notes that Bergson defines the objective as containing a multiplicity of differences or divisions that are possible. This is in reference to the distinction that Deleuze and Bergson make between the categories of space and time, in which space differs in degrees. Thus, space and its divisions are always divisions which occur in terms of augmentation or diminution. When considering matter in terms of space, Deleuze notes that the differences or multiplicities contained within an object are always visible – we may count the possible divisions or multiplicities contained within the object. The possible, Deleuze explains, is objective in the sense that, "...un objet peut être divisé d'une infinité de manières ; or, avant même que ces divisions soient effectuées, elles sont saisies dans l'aspect total de l'objet. Elles sont donc déjà visibles dans l'image de l'objet : même non réalisées (simplement possibles), elles sont actuellement perçues, du moins perceptibles en droit" (1966, 33).

In contrast, what is subjective or part of a qualitative difference of nature is what Bergson reads as the subjective and what Deleuze defines in terms of the virtuel. Just as
the objective contains a multiplicity of possibilities, the subjective contains in turn a multiplicity. However these differences are not possible because they cannot be made visible in terms of the space of the objective. The virtuel differs in terms of its own proper nature. Clearly, what we are examining here is the Bergsonian conception of durée, and to explain this difference of multiplicity of nature (not of number), we might recall our example of a passion. If we examine a sensation of anger in terms of time, we realize that the passion resonates in a curious way. There is not simply an intensity of pure anger but rather one of disappointment, fear, resentment, sadness, panic – even love – so that as the passion “rises” inside of us. We might then follow a continually dividing line of intensity in which the passion of anger “resonates” within each of these differing passions. There is no way in which we might grasp the range of “possible” passions to emerge from anger’s actualization (to borrow Deleuze’s term). In contrast to the objective, in which one is capable of envisioning various increases or decreases in terms of space (more angry people, less happy people, etc.), the subjective differentiates itself in terms of quality. More precisely, it is this very movement of differentiation, and not the vast reserve of “virtualities” (which are, by definition, in-numerable) that might be defined as the virtuel. Deleuze explains, “...c’est le virtuel en tant qu’il s’actualise, en train de s’actualiser, inséparable du mouvement de son actualisation. Car l’actualisation se fait par différenciation, par lignes divergentes, et crée par son mouvement propre autant de différences de nature” (1966, 36). In this way, both Bergson and Deleuze may construct a positively differentiating system in which heterogeneity and continuity are not mutually exclusive. Within the subjective, a multiplicity follows a continuous line of
actualization which nonetheless creates its own lines of differentiation (of nature) as it actualizes itself.\(^3\)

Now, we have noted that this reading of Bergsonian duration is important because it allows for a positively constituted notion of subjectivity, building on Deleuze’s reading of Hume. However, it appears that the positive differentiation of duration also allows us to understand another aspect of Deleuze’s thought. Duration permits a non-contradictory reading of continuity and heterogeneity, and it is on this basis that Deleuze examines the ontological consequences of Bergson’s thought. For we must not forget that in the context of Bergson and Deleuze’s reading, we have been examining questions of pure duration or memory. When encountering objects on a daily basis, time or duration is always mixed with space, leading us back to Deleuze’s original concern regarding philosophical questions that are correctly posed. Thus, we are reminded that within Bergsonian thought we must always return to the mixture of these categories. It is as if we were “descending” down a philosophical line of inquiry, from the mixture of matter and memory and questions poorly posed to the separate categories of time and space and the correct terms of such questions, and then back “up” the line of thought to a re-integration of these categories within ontology. Indeed, when discussing \textit{durée}, Deleuze declares, “S’il y a des qualités dans les choses non moins que dans la conscience, s’il y a un mouvement des qualités hors de moi, il faut que les choses durent à leur manière. Il faut que la durée psychologique ne soit qu’un cas bien déterminé, une ouverture sur une durée ontologique” (1966, 44). It is in view of reaching such a reading of ontology that Deleuze situates Bergson’s theory of memory.
Let us once again turn to Bergson's own presentation of memory in order to understand the uses Deleuze makes of it in his work. In *Matière et mémoire*, Bergson returns to the problems treated in his earlier *Essai*, in particular, the mixture in which we apprehend things on a daily basis and the importance of recognizing the difference between reading memory in terms of space and in terms of time. When considering our existence in the world, Bergson begins his discussion by doing away with distinctions between spirit and matter. Thus, we find ourselves surrounded not by matter or spirit but by images (*Matière et mémoire*, 11-12). These images are in fact perceived through the unique image of our body which is capable of acting on the ensemble of images (*Matière et mémoire*, 15-17). In other words, we may touch, see, or hear a number of images, and by doing so, affect the way these images are arrayed in the world around us. The ensemble of images becomes structured so that a number of images are more or less easily acted upon (*Matière et mémoire*, 17-29). Another way of understanding this disposition of images is in terms of time and space. The space in which these images are arrayed is in direct proportion to the time it takes to act on these images. Thus, as Bergson explains:

...plus la réaction doit être immédiate, plus il faut que la perception ressemble à un simple contact, et le processus complet de perception et de réaction se distingue à peine alors de l'impulsion mécanique suivie d'un mouvement nécessaire. Mais à mesure que la réaction devient plus incertaine, qu'elle laisse plus de place à l'hésitation, à mesure aussi s'accroît la distance à laquelle se fait sentir sur l'animal l'action de l'objet qui l'intéresse...[Q]uelle que soit donc la nature intime de la perception, on peut affirmer que l'amplitude de la perception mesure exactement l'indétermination de l''action consécutive... (*Matière et mémoire*, 28-29).

In other words, in our perception of images, time and space are already mixed.
Now, within this perception, things are never as simple as the mechanical action/reaction described by Bergson. Indeed, even within our perception of an image we encounter a mixture of images. There is the perception we have of the image but there is also a memory of the image which allows us to recognize it. Indeed, every perception is "grounded" by a combination of thousands of other images which are themselves memories of other images. Out of this ground of images, we are able to focus on the image and perceive it for what it is (Matière et mémoire, 30). Another way of understanding this is to say that perception is always enhanced by memory. However, in our perception of the image we contract this multiplicity of images into the image before us, so that memory comes to have two forms: as the ground of all images and as the contraction of this ground of images (Matière et mémoire, 31). Indeed, when we reflect on this double movement of perception, we realize that the "present" of perception is never more than the continual contraction of a multiplicity of memories. Thus, for Bergson, perception of the objects around us must take place not in terms of the space in which we believe these objects to be deployed but in terms of the time in which they are perceived (as actualizations of memory) (Matière et mémoire, 73-74). The mixture of space and time is, again, an example of a false problem, as Bergson explains:

L'hétérogénéité qualitative de nos perceptions successives de l'univers tient à ce que chacune de ces perceptions s'étend elle-même sur une certaine épaisseur de durée, à ce que la mémoire y condense une multiplicité énorme d'ébranlements qui nous apparaissent tous ensemble, quoique successifs. Il suffirait de diviser idéalement cette épaisseur indivisée de temps, d'y distinguer la multiplicité voulue de moments, d'éliminer toute mémoire, en un mot, pour passer de la perception à la matière, du sujet à l'objet (Matière et mémoire, 73).

Now, when considering perception in this manner, we very clearly return to the problem discussed above concerning time and the false ground of space. Indeed, a
perception may involve our "present" moment and our encounter with an image, but this image is always grounded on memory and it is just as often the case that our perception involves not the present but rather the past in the form of a memory. When this is the case, we are better able to understand why both Bergson and Deleuze insist on the importance of time in their philosophical systems. For example, if we perceive someone speaking French and we ourselves speak French, we are able to recognize or act on this perception. But this recognition almost certainly first involves an encounter with memory. We remember hearing the language before this occasion. This perception of French then triggers what Bergson calls a "memory-image" that resonates with a certain image in our memory. Much like the effect of passion discussed above (our example of anger), the memory of French resonates within our memory, setting off a chain of reactions among the totality of memories (and Bergson insists that we are dealing not with a selection of the past but with all of it, *Matière et mémoire*, 180-181) so that the memory-image passes from the image perceived (and its implicit ground of memory-images) to the region of our memory where the image of French being spoken resonates the most clearly. In that region, the image moves from its inactive and virtual state "back" towards the actuality of our image of French being spoken. In doing so (and again, in the same manner as our discussion of passion and its resonance among numerous other passions), a number of other images are actualized in the process so that our perceiving French initiates an immense back-and-forth movement between the "present" and the past. Bergson thus declares, "C'est donc le lieu de passage des mouvements reçus et renvoyées, le trait d'union entre les choses qui agissent sur moi et les choses sur lesquelles j'agis, le siège, en un mot, des phénomènes sensori-moteurs"
(Matière et mémoire, 169). We might visualize this “map” of our body and perceptions in terms of the famous Bergsonian cone and line diagrams from Matière et mémoire (147, 159, 181). Now, although this has been a far too brief summary of Bergsonian thought, let us return to Deleuze to see how such a conception of memory functions within his system.

When considering Bergsonian memory, Deleuze makes a distinction between becoming and being. That is, as we said above, Bergsonian memory allows for an ontological difference to be established. Thus, our “present” is actually never present but is rather “passing,” in terms of the distinction we made above considering time. The past is always already present when we consider this present moment. As Deleuze asks, considering this movement, “...comment un nouveau présent surviendrait-il, si l’ancien présent ne passait en même temps qu’il est présent” (1966, 54)? Thus, the present might be defined as being a movement of becoming rather than a movement of being. Thought in this manner, Deleuze then explains, “Nous confondons alors l’Être avec l’être-présent. Pourtant le présent n’est pas, mais il agit” (1966, 49). Now, to turn to memory, for Deleuze, a recollection, by definition, forces us to make an ontological leap (Deleuze, 1966, 51). When we recall something, we jump from the present and its movement of actualization to the past and its collection of the virtual; we move from becoming to being. When recalling a memory of someone speaking a foreign language, we leap into the being of the past and a region of our memory where such an image stands out. Once we have made the leap, the past becomes present as that point on the cone is actualized, condensing the images of the past into the single image of perception of someone speaking French. In this manner, the past
is extended into the present, into the images of the present, so that, as we saw in Bergson’s definition of memory, the present is only the most contracted moment of the past. Deleuze explains:

L’image en effet retient quelque chose des régions où nous avons été chercher le souvenir qu’elle actualise ou qu’elle incarne; mais ce souvenir, précisément, elle ne l’actualise pas sans l’adaptation aux exigences du présent, elle en fait quelque chose de présent. Ainsi à la différence de nature entre le présent et le passé, entre la perception pure et la mémoire pure, nous substituons de simples différences de degré entre des images-souvenirs et des perceptions-images (1966, 53).

It is important to underline the ontological consequences of this reading of Bergsonian memory. The leap into the past involves four paradoxes for Deleuze. First, although we “remain” in the present, we nonetheless make an ontological leap into the being of the past. Secondly, and implicitly considering the first paradox, this leap involves a difference of nature. Thirdly, the past never gives in to the present but rather co-exists with it, forming the being of the present. Finally, the coexistence of the past with the present does not simply imply the coexistence of the particular recollection in isolation but rather of the totality of the past (we recall our examples concerning time and the sensation of “resonance” which implies the totality of the past) (1966, 56-57). Thus, we are correct to say that a memory is a repetition of a past event, but it is a repetition that is certainly more profound than a psychological reading of such a repetition might assume (for example, the manner in which we come to treat certain images in a habitual manner because our body repeats a certain action to the point of habit). With each memory, there is then a repetition of nature (the present and the past), and a repetition of what Deleuze distinguishes as planes (the psychological plane and the ontological plane).
Now, we have noted how important this analysis of Bergsonian memory and its relation to *durée* is for Deleuze’s reading of ontology. Indeed, as we shall see in the following chapters, time and the *virtuel* play an extremely important role in Deleuze’s thought. We have underlined how Bergsonian time and duration can help Deleuze form an ontology that has the quality of being both heterogeneous and continuous, and it is in this vein that Deleuze analyzes the duality of Bergson’s thought. Much like Deleuze’s own work, Bergson’s is haunted by dualities so that we always run up against matter and memory, time and space, homogeneity and heterogeneity, etc. In following this problem, Deleuze returns to the question of *durée* and its role as a “foundation” in Bergson’s thought and his own, for if *durée* contains all the differences of degree that result in space and its contraction into our “present” moment, then do we not fall back into a quantitative pluralism (1966, 74-75)? The solution to this problem, according to Deleuze, is a reading of *durée* that not only accounts for the multiplicity of *durées* but which also is able to fold back and account for *durée* itself. Deleuze explains, “...il n’y a qu’un seul temps (monisme), bien qu’il y ait une infinité de flux actuels (pluralisme généralisé), qui participant nécessairement au même tout virtuel (pluralisme restreint)” (1966, 83). In other words, if we take Bergson’s famous example of a glass of sugared water and modify it slightly, we might say that sitting at a café we are aware of three images: our own perception of the world around us, the sugar cube as it melts in our glass of water, and the movement of cars and people around us. The three images are in fact three movements of *durée*. But this division into three is only possible because our own *durée* is one of the three and it is also the element that contains the other two. Thus our own *durée* is capable of revealing other *durées*. But this “simultaneity” is only possible
because we must fold our own durée back into ourselves and make a symbolic reading of this simultaneity. As Deleuze explains, “Pour poser l’existence de deux temps, nous sommes forcés d’introduire un étrange facteur : l’image que A se fait de B, tout en sachant que B ne peut pas se vivre ainsi. C’est un facteur tout « symbolique », c’est-à-dire qui s’oppose au vécu, qui exclut le vécu ; et c’est seulement par lui que le prétendu deuxième temps se réalise” (1966, 82). In other words, we are forced to consider the simultaneity of different durées in terms of their virtual co-existence. When making such a reflection (in terms of virtuality and not actuality) we fold our own durée back into durée itself. Let us turn this problem around and consider it from the perspective “beyond” the mixture of our perception. Deleuze explains, “…si nous remontons, nous voyons chaque fois les flux, avec leurs différences de nature, avec leurs différences de contraction et de détente, communiquer dans un seul et même Temps, qui est comme leur condition” (1966, 83). Although this is a rather complicated proof, we might be able to re-phrase this in terms of what we examined earlier and say that the heterogeneous nature of durée nonetheless actualizes itself in the continuous and uniform flow of a sole and unique Time.

There is one last danger in this “dance of dualities” concerning Bergsonian durée: Deleuze notes how this notion of an all-encompassing Time or durée risks re-introducing a naïve reading of difference as simply difference of degree. Deleuze questions:

Entre la détente et la contraction, quelles différences peut-il y avoir, sauf de degré, d’intensité ? Le présent n’est que le degré le plus contracté du passé, la matière, le degré le plus détendu du présent… Et si l’on cherche à corriger ce qu’il y a de trop « graduel » ici, on ne pourra le faire qu’en réintroduisant dans la durée toute la contrariété, toute l’opposition que Bergson avait dénoncée comme autant de conceptions abstraites et inadéquates (1966, 74).
Deleuze reads Bergson's notion of *élan vital* as the solution to this problem. Instead of a false monism in which everything returns as a difference of degree within the unique Time of above, the *élan vital* re-establishes a duality of differentiation. Such a reading recalls the distinction made above concerning the difference between what is *virtuel* and what is *possible*.

We recall that the notion of the possible introduces a false ground of negation and space into our questions. When examining an object, we are able to make a distinction of quantity based on the changes or actions we could *possibly* make. However, in order to arrive at such a calculation we must always subtract something from our image. Thus as Deleuze explains, "...comme tous les possibles ne se réalisent pas, la réalisation implique une limitation par laquelle certains possibles sont censés être repoussés ou empêchés, tandis que d'autres « passent » dans le réel" (1966, 99). It follows that the possible is always an image or representation of the real since what defines the possible and the real is simply this difference of negation: the real differs from the possible only because it has an existence or being. The *virtuel*, by contrast, is never actual but is most certainly real. That is, the *virtuel* has a being (indeed, it belongs to the ontological category of being) and thus never realizes itself but rather actualizes itself. Again, we recall our example concerning the differences of degrees and differences of nature and our sensation of passion. The actualization of a passion follows a self-differentiating line of actualization that differs in terms of nature. We may never say that a passion of anger contains a possibility for x, y, and z passions; such an analysis is impossible. The actualization of the *virtuel* proceeds along a line of self-differentiation
in which difference comes before resemblance. Deleuze explains this complicated notion:

...pour s’actualiser, le virtuel ne peut pas procéder par élimination ou limitation, mais doit créer ses propres lignes d’actualisation dans des actes positifs. La raison en est simple : tandis que le réel est à l’image et à la ressemblance du possible qu’il réalise, l’actuel au contraire, ne ressemble pas à la virtualité qu’il incarne. Ce qui est premier dans le processus d’actualisation, c’est la différence – la différence entre le virtuel dont on part et les actuels auxquels on arrive, et aussi la différence entre les lignes complémentaires suivant lesquelles l’actualisation se fait (1966, 100).

For Deleuze, the élan vital is the movement of the virtuel as it passes from its proper being to an actual becoming. Thus, returning to our problem of the false monism of durée and its ontological status within the virtuel, the double movement of virtuell’actual is re-introduced into Bergson’s thought through the movement of life itself. Life and evolution mirror this movement of differentiation, resulting in the differences of degree from which Deleuze starts his analysis. This is not to say that life resembles the virtual out of which it actualized itself. For Deleuze, again, the virtuel never shares a resemblance with the actual, and in this way, the mixture of matter and memory with which we are presented is the result of a process of absolute differentiation. We cannot posit an absolute Whole or Totality out of which the actual emerges. The actual is always already a differentiation with the virtual nature of durée. Deleuze explains:

Quand la virtualité s’actualise, se différencie, se « développe », quand elle actualise et développe ses parties, elle le fait d’après des lignes divergentes, mais dont chacune correspond à tel ou tel degré dans la totalité virtuelle. Là, il n’y a plus de tout coexistant ; il y a seulement des lignes d’actualisation, les unes successives, les autres simultanées, mais dont chacune représente une actualisation du tout dans une direction, et ne se combine pas avec les autres lignes ou les autres directions (1966, 103-104).
Thus, once again, we might reformulate our earlier reading of the *virtuel* and *durée* in the following terms: *durée* contains a multiplicity of virtually co-existing natures which are then actualized, according to their natures, in life itself. The *virtuel* is then both heterogeneous and continuous.

This long and complicated exploration of Bergsonian *durée* and Deleuzian notions of time and the *virtuel* is necessary if we are to understand how Deleuze will form the “machinery” behind his concepts. We have noted how Hume’s empiricism permits Deleuze to posit a self-constituting subject. The contraction of memory or habit allows for a synthesis out of which this subject emerges. The importance of Bergson’s thought (what Bergson can add to Deleuze’s reading of Hume) is the manner in which time, particularly in the form of the “open” time of the past (*durée* or the *virtuel*) serves as an ontological “engine.” That is, the Bergsonian reading of time rejects the *a priori* categories of the subject. The open “space” of time becomes the open space of Being and permits Deleuze to posit an ontologically open reading of Being that is tied to the intensive experience of time (as in the experience of habit or memory in both Hume and Bergson).

**B. Difference Defined**

With Deleuze’s reading of Hume and Bergson in mind we may now better understand his criticism of representation and the manner in which representation limits difference. We recall that we began our discussion of difference by citing Deleuze’s “curious” definition of difference as “intensive.” We noted above how the “quadruple illusion of representation” always works to limit difference by imposing a certain
category or standard around which to measure difference. We recall that Deleuze likened this limitation to an “image of thought” against which difference might be judged, as in the Platonic distinction between the legitimate and illegitimate copy. This image of judgement recurs a number of times in Deleuze’s thought (we shall return to it again below, in the section entitled Negotiations), and we might quickly examine how such a judgement occurs in Kant, with whom Deleuze is often particularly severe.

We know that it is with Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, that the famous division between noumena and phenomena is introduced, giving rise to the ultimately difficult position of a transcendental ego which we have knowledge of but which we never empirically know. Deleuze explains:

...[Kant] introduit du même coup une sorte de déséquilibre, de fissure ou de fêlure, une aliénation de droit, insurmontable en droit, dans le Moi pur du Je pense : le sujet ne peut plus se représenter sa propre spontanéité que comme celle d’un Autre, et par là invoque en dernière instance une mystérieuse cohérence qui exclut la sienne propre, celle du monde et celle de Dieu. Cogito pour un moi dissous : le Moi de « Je pense » comporte dans son essence une réceptivité d’intuition par rapport à laquelle, déjà, JE est un autre. Peu importe que l’identité synthétique, puis la mortalité de la raison pratique restaurent l’intégrité du moi, du monde et de Dieu, et préparent les synthèses post-kantiennes ; un court instant nous sommes entrés dans cette schizophrénie de droit qui caractérise la plus haute puissance de la pensée, et qui ouvre directement l’Être sur la différence, au mépris de toutes les médiations, de toutes les réconciliations du concept (1968a, 82).

Perhaps we might better understand difference as intensity through this division within the Kantian subject. We recall how le sens commun and good sense eliminate difference by constructing a closed, extended system. An example we cited for this flattening out of difference may be found in the nineteenth century formulation of thermodynamic theory. For example, in the theory that a difference in intensity is taken as the point of departure for a series of states that are themselves irreversible and which
move in a direction from the greatest amount of difference to that of the least amount of difference. In this type of theoretical reading, the dissipation of energy is understood in terms of a flattening out of difference. The intensity of difference is confused with the extension of difference in a closed system (1968a, 288, 342). In Bergsonian terms, we are faced with a false problem in which quantity is confused with quality. For Deleuze, on the contrary, difference is not extensive but is intensive. He explains, “Toute diversité, tout changement renvoient à une différence qui en est la raison suffisante. Tout ce qui se passe et qui apparaît est corrélatif d’ordres de différences : différence de niveau, de température, de pression, de tension, de potentiel, différence d’intensité” (1968a, 286). The plurality of difference is not then to be confused with the extension in which it is expressed, for this representation of difference is always reductive. Experience certainly links intensity with extension, but intensity is not to be subordinated to extension, according to Deleuze (1968a, 288). The problem, then, is one of properly sensing difference in its form as intensity. Above we examined how Deleuze’s study of Bergson allows him to posit such a distinction. However, once the problem is properly posed one is faced with another difficulty. As Deleuze notes, intensity is not sensible as experience, “…l’intensité n’est pas sensible, elle est l’être du sensible où le différent se rapporte au différent” (1968a, 342). In other words, in spite of the influence of Hume’s empiricism, the self-constituting subject that Deleuze has elaborated tens to tackle the question of difference in terms of thought. If we recall the initial synthesis of relations in Hume, the subject emerges out of memory or habit. Now, as Deleuze’s reading of Hume illustrated, there is most certainly a link to be found between what we might term a passively-constituted subject and the active subject which plays a role in society (we recall the link
between the constitution of a subject in terms of memory and habit and the constitution of society and its beliefs, laws, etc. also in terms of memory and habit). In other words, how may we draw a link between the passively-constituted subject of thought (and the intensity of this thought) and an active subject of society (and its corollary, the body)? A solution to this problem might be found in the readings Deleuze makes of Nietzsche and Spinoza. As was the case with Hume and Bergson, a close examination of these readings will enable us to better understand Deleuze's understanding of difference, its affirmation, and the intensity of such an affirmation.

**1. Nietzsche**

With the turn toward Nietzsche and Spinoza, Deleuze concentrates much more explicitly on the body and its role in his system of thought. We recall that the problem of synthesis implicit in the *élan vital* undermines the conflict of different durations, for the subjective of individual durations and the objective of social constructions and the natural world durations are always waging battles upon each other, imposing one duration on another. Durations constantly attempt to affect other durations. One manner in which we might read Deleuze's turn to Nietzsche is an attempt to avoid the Bergsonian synthesis of *élan vital* and to preserve the plurality of difference present within the spirit as well as within the body.

According to Deleuze, Nietzsche's genealogical method is a critique of the differential that exists between values (1962, 1). A philosophical critique then never remains outside the conflict of values; it is an evaluation, which always takes a stand in a conflict. For Nietzsche and Deleuze, the critical act is *creative*, revealing the differential that is at the origin of values and acting as the source for a new value (1962, 2-3). But
what exactly is a value in Nietzsche’s system? Deleuze explains that what gives something sense, a value, is the force acting upon it (1962, 3). A phenomenon is a sign of forces at work, appropriating, dominating, or exploiting an object, thus giving it a sense or value (1962, 4). The work of the philosopher is to trace the plurality of senses present in an object, as one force and then another takes hold of it, thus revealing the different forces at play (1962, 4-5). The philosopher then interprets and evaluates the multitude of senses (1962, 7-8). As such, the philosopher herself comes to the problem with a force of her own, which Deleuze’s understands as the Nietzschean will to power.

Forces are at work in all objects, but the object that interests Deleuze in Nietzsche is the body. Consciousness is defined by the sensation of a relation of forces, and the body is the field in which this encounter takes place (1962, 44-45). Deleuze explains, “Ce qui définit un corps est ce rapport entre des forces dominantes et des forces dominées. Tout rapport de forces constitue un corps : chimique, biologique, social, politique. Deux forces quelconques, étant inégales, constituent un corps dès qu’elles entrent en rapport...” (1962, 45). The body is the result of the encounter between forces, and as such, it is a “multiple phenomenon” (1962, 45). Now, if we are attempting to draw the distinction between the synthesis of the élan vital and the Nietzschean system, but we must be careful in how this is done, for some confusion may arise in our interpretation of the “will to power” and synthesis. For Deleuze, the will to power is not simply a desire to dominate, in the sense of brute power or violence. It is, on the contrary, an act of synthesis, where one force comes into contact with another, appropriating portions of the other, exploiting the strengths and weaknesses of each force until the mixture results in the domination of one force over the other (1962, 4, 56).
Domination here is used in a positive sense, in that the encounter between forces is productive. It *produces* a mixture of two forces in which the addition and subtraction of various elements produces the domination of one force over another, but this is a new force, which is different from the one that originally entered into the encounter. In this sense, a synthesis does take place between opposing forces, but it is a synthesis that is active, taking place in the real bodies of lived experience, and which does not rely, for example, on the exterior synthesis of duration (as in Bergson’s *élan vital*). This manner of interpreting force and the changes it produces allows Deleuze to insert a radical, “revolutionary” force into his system of thought, always allowing for the possibility of a novel change that overturns the dominant system of social constructions.

Now, to return to the body, there are two types of forces at work, the superior or dominant force — the active force — and the inferior or dominated force — the reactive force (1962, 45). The first difficulty we have with these two forces is in describing them, for consciousness is only able to express reactive forces, “La conscience exprime seulement le rapport de certaines forces réactives aux forces actives qui les dominent. La conscience est essentiellement réactive.” Deleuze declares (1962, 46-47). The activity of active forces escapes consciousness. Thus in science, for instance, the mechanism of the body is always represented as reacting to active forces, for science reflects the movement of consciousness (1962, 47). Active forces are positive, appropriating forms from other forces and creating new forms, while reactive forces are negative, only being interpreted in relation to active forces (1962, 48).

The problem in mobilizing active forces in consciousness gives rise to what Nietzsche terms a reversed image of forces: the affirmative nature of the dominant,
active forces is replaced by the negative, reactive nature of the dominated forces (1962, 63). Deleuze explains:

...vu du côté des forces réactives, l'élément différentiel généalogique apparaît à l'envers, la différence est devenue négation, l'affirmation est devenue contradiction. Une image renversée de l'origine accompagne l'origine : ce qui est « oui » du point de vue des forces actives devient « non » du point de vue des forces réactives, ce qui est affirmation de soi devient négation de l'autre (1962, 63).

Thus, the affirmative, creative aspect of difference that exists between active and reactive forces is always represented negatively by consciousness (1962, 64). The mediocre philosophies that Nietzsche attacks are always those that base themselves on the reactive aspect of force.

Now, Deleuze asks what might happen if things went a little further and instead of triumphing over reactive forces, active forces were defeated by reactive forces (1962, 64). The reversed image becomes the true image of forces at work. Indeed, such reversals do occur, and when they occur reactive forces work in their own way, decomposing the relations present in active forces, separating active forces from what they are capable of accomplishing (1962, 64). Active forces, separated from their positive aspect, become reactive themselves. The power of reactive forces is not creative, but negative, always subtracting or separating active forces from their creative power (1962, 64-65).

When reactive forces come to dominate, they are driven by what Nietzsche terms the "negative will to power." We recall that the will to power is the active and creative use of force to interpret the meaning of an object. The will to power manifests itself as a "sensation" – a capacity to be affected by the multiple forces present in an object (1962, 70-71). In this way, the will to power interprets the various forces present in an object, as
well as being affected itself by those forces (1962, 70). (Deleuze’s reading of Nietzschean “will,” both positive and negative, is very close to Spinoza’s theory of the body, which calculates the force of a body in relation to the body’s ability to be affected by forces (1962, 70).) If the will to power is the “true” philosopher’s tool for interpreting and evaluating, the negative will to power is what rules the weak philosopher. In the negative will to power, the reactive forces of an object, in a position in which they dominate active forces, form a will that is not creative but resentful and marked by what Nietzsche terms nihilism (1962, 73). For Nietzsche, the power of becoming that marks the active will to power is turned into a power of nihilism in the becoming negative of the negative will to power (1962, 73). Indeed, it is the negative will to power that marks man and his nature (1962, 73).

The problem then is one of overthrowing the reactive forces and returning the positive, active forces to a position of dominance. This is the Nietzschean transmutation of values, and it takes place through the use of the eternal return. Deleuze notes how the eternal return and the will to power are intricately linked. He explains that the eternal return is based on a critique of a state of equilibrium (1962, 53). Nietzsche declares that if the universe had a state of equilibrium or was destined for one, it would have already attained it (1962, 53). But, because instants pass and continue to pass, the universe is in a motion of becoming, forcing us to think of a corresponding notion. Deleuze explains, “Que l’instant actuel ne soit pas un instant d’être ou de présent « au sens strict », qu’il soit l’instant qui passe, nous force à penser le devenir, mais à le penser précisément comme ce qui n’a pas pu commencer et ce qui ne peut pas finir de devenir” (1962, 54).
Indeed, this notion of time is very close to the synthesis of time that we have seen in our study of Hume and Bergson. In Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche, time is compressed in its passage from the present to the past. The past already co-exists with the present as it passes, and the future arrives before the present has passed (1962, 54). Time is contracted, forming a synthesis between the three divisions of time, as Deleuze explains, “Jamais l’instant qui passe ne pourrait passer, s’il n’était déjà passé en même temps que présent, encore à venir en même temps que présent” (1962, 54). Now, the eternal return is not a return of the same, rather, it is return for that which differs. Deleuze explains, “Ce n’est pas l’être qui revient, mais le revenir lui-même constitue l’être en tant qu’il s’affirme de devenir et de ce qui passe. Ce n’est pas l’un qui revient, mais le revenir lui-même est l’un qui s’affirme du divers ou du multiple” (1962, 55). In other words, the eternal return might be read as the expression of the principle itself of difference and repetition (1962, 55). However, when reactive forces come to dominate active forces and separate them from their creativity, the creative becoming of the will to power is transformed into the becoming of nihilism (1962, 73). The difficulty of the philosophical task is in the tangled path of forces, for active forces are often led down the path of nihilism, separated from their creative activity; however, it is also possible to find the creative aspect of reactive forces (1962, 75-77).

What aids in this process of interpretation is the selective nature of the eternal return. Deleuze reads the eternal return as having a selective and ethical aspect, much like the Kantian categorical imperative. The commandment of the eternal return is, “...Ce que tu veux, veuille-le de telle manière que tu en veuilles aussi l’éternel retour” (1962, 77). In this way, the eternal return only selects the will to power or that which is
open to creativity and the affirmiative nature of the will to power (1962, 78). But this is only a first selection, eliminating the weaker forms of reactive forces. For reactive forces that negatively transform the will to power, the eternal return performs a second selection (1962, 78). The negative will to power is pushed to its limit, driving the negative, separating, and reactive forces to turn upon themselves, devouring themselves, as it were (1962, 79). Deleuze explains that it is only, "...l'éternel retour qui fait du nihilisme un nihilisme complet, parce qu'il fait de la négation une négation des forces réactives elles-mêmes. Le nihilisme, par et dans l'éternel retour, ne s'exprime plus comme la conservation et la victoire des faibles, mais comme la destruction des faibles, leur auto-destruction" (1962, 79). The negative aspect of reactive forces is turned against itself, transforming negative reaction into what Deleuze terms an "active negation" (1962, 80). This is what Nietzsche means by a transmutation or transvaluation of values. It is a reversal or exhaustion of the negative aspects of reactive forces and the negative will to power. The eternal return then has a double, corrective aspect, first separating the reactive from the active, and then pushing the reactive to the limit of its force and transforming it into the active.

According to Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche, man and civilization are, in essence, reactive (1965, 40). Reactive forces never create, but tend rather to fight all active forces. Thus, Nietzsche identifies five psychological types that describe the reactive nature of man. The first is the resentful individual-type who always blames the other for her situation, never daring to act (1965, 28). The second type is that of the individual who exercises bad faith (or has a bad conscience). In this case the individual turns the negative and reactive forces upon herself, internalizing the blame (1965, 28). The third
type of individual, one who espouses an ascetic ideal, is close to the second type because the negative will to power is not only present but comes to dominate the individual. Deleuze explains, “On dit que quelqu’un est fort et noble parce qu’il porte : il porte le poids des valeurs « supérieurs », il se sent responsable. Même la vie, surtout la vie, lui semble dure à porter” (1965, 29). The fourth type of individual is one which proclaims the death of God. That is, she advocates the replacement of religious values with human values such as morality, progress, utility, etc. (1965, 30). This progression of negative values achieves its final phase with the “last man” or “the man who wishes to perish” (1965, 31). The banishment of God and the installation of negative values reveals then a world ordered by the negative will to power and reactive forces. The world loses all meaning and the last man (or woman) throws up his (her) arms in frustration, ceding to the man (or woman) who wishes to perish, considering it better to perish than to live in world ruled by the negative will to power (1965, 32). It is at this point that the overman appears, for the reactive forces turn against themselves and the transformation of values takes place (1965, 33).

With the appearance of the overman it is important to underline how Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche is quite different from the rather unfortunate inferences that Nietzsche’s terms and system often give. Rather than focus on the overman or the transmutation of values, Deleuze turns his attention to the will to power and the eternal return, as we have noted above. What Deleuze stresses above all is the creative synthesis at the heart of the will to power and the eternal return. This synthesis is not the result of a force being stronger than another and imposing its value on other forces. Rather, it is an active synthesis, influencing and being in turn influenced by the forces encountered.
Understood this way, we may hint at terms to come in Deleuze’s thought, when we say that bodies, both as individuals and as social constructions, are territories that are always in relation with each other. These territories have a duration, which implies a differential origin, and, when actualized, the contact they have with one another is always a relation of force in which one territory deterritorializes another and in turn reterritorializes itself. This movement is always affective, that is to say, creative. In addition, this movement to seduce, as it were, other territories and create new relations might be read in terms of “desire.” Finally, the exteriority of relations, as explained in Deleuze’s reading of Hume, allows for a different interpretation of the transmutation of values. For Deleuze, “the outside” is ultimately responsible for the various changes in relations on the plane of immanence. Such an injection of “outside” can lead to radical transformations in the relation of forces in thought and the social (we shall return to the question of the outside in the following chapter and in our discussion of Foucault).

2. Spinoza

As we have hinted, the problem with Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche is Nietzsche himself, for the often contradictory passages and aggressive tone of his writing are notoriously difficult to navigate. When Nietzsche speaks of force and conflict, Deleuze reads the synthesizing, purifying power of the will to power and the eternal return. Where Nietzsche speaks of warrior-like heroic figures such as Napoléon, Deleuze will later affirm the figure from the margins, the nomad, the schizophrenic, etc. We have attempted to present Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche in the positive light that Deleuze chooses, yet there is always the underlying, contradictory nature of Nietzsche himself which risks turning Deleuze’s reading into everything Nietzsche stood against.
(Goodchild, 1996, 32; Caputo, 1993, 50). What is needed is a truly affirmative theory of the body and its capabilities, and Deleuze finds this in Spinoza.

In fact, Deleuze finds in Nietzsche a very Spinozist question, one that asks, What can a body do? The problem with the normal relation of forces, the relation that Nietzsche terms “slave relations,” is that there is no true synthesis that takes place. Two forces come into contact with each other, and one comes to dominate the other. However, this domination is a reactive domination. That is, the dominating force reacts and refuses to be influenced in its encounter with the other force. Nietzsche terms this “slave mentality.” Deleuze’s reading of the eternal return provided a solution to this problem of synthesis. We recall that within the eternal return what occurs is not an imposition of the will to power but rather an the encounter and synthesis of two forces in contact with each other. Each force is influenced to a certain degree by the other, with one coming to have relatively more influence than the other force.

Deleuze notes that the question, What can a body do?, finds an answer in Spinoza’s theory of parallelism (1981a, 28). Spinoza’s theory holds that the action of a soul is reflected in the action of the body. That is, the body and the soul are equally capable of being affected as well as affecting and this to the same extent (1981a, 28-29). In this manner, the body and the soul are “tied” together. We might say that this theory is practical, for in pushing the limits of one (our body or knowledge), we also push the limits of the other. In doing so, we are able to reveal the true capabilities of our bodies and our minds, as Deleuze explains, “Quand un corps « rencontre » un autre corps, une idée, une autre idée, il arrive tantôt que les deux rapports se composent pour former un tout plus puissant, tantôt que l’un décompose l’autre et détruire la cohésion de ses
parties" (1981a, 29-30). This complex mixing and un-mixing is only consciously perceived through its effects, as joy when the encounter forms a new composite and as sadness when the encounter results in a decomposition (1981a, 30). Indeed, consciousness erects three illusions so that only the effects of composition and decomposition are apprehended and not the actual encounters themselves (1981a, 31). The three illusions are those of final causes, "free effects," and the theological illusion (1981a, 31).

Deleuze explains that consciousness misinterprets the effect of encounters between bodies for their causes, thus inverting the relationship and attributing the effects of encounters, joy or sadness, as actions emanating from the body itself. This leads one to believe that one is the master of one's own body and is an agent of actions, thus centering the action of encounters not in the encounters themselves but in the consciousness of the body. When it is impossible to explain an action as emanating from one's own body or another body, the category of God is invoked as the ultimate source of all unattributed actions. We might note that this manner of understanding consciousness is striking in its similarity to the "practical philosophy" of Hume. This is particularly true when Deleuze explains the concept of consciousness in Spinoza's philosophy:

...les affections ne sont pas séparables d'un mouvement par lequel elles nous font passer à une perfection plus grande ou moindre (joie et tristesse), suivant que la chose rencontrée se compose avec nous, ou bien au contraire tend à nous décomposer, la conscience apparaît comme le sentiment continu d'un tel passage, du plus au moins, du moins au plus, témoin des variations et déterminations du conatus en fonction des autres corps ou des autres idées (1981a, 32-33).

Like the difference in sensation that defines consciousness in Hume, Spinoza's system is firmly grounded in lived experience, in the sensation of the encounter with objects. What
allows a consciousness to be formed and to construct itself and its illusions is an object around which one forms a totality of the world (1981a, 33). That object, whatever it might be, will be the basis for an image of the world and for the three illusions. In this way, Deleuze understands Nietzsche to be Spinozist when Nietzsche declares that the true activity of the world is largely unconscious. That is, it is the flow of forces and their encounters that make up the world. Consciousness only appears when one force wishes to dominate another, thus constructing a system of totalities in which one force is subsumed by another (1981a, 33; 1962, 44-45). Consciousness and its illusions fog our understanding of the encounters of forces and their true nature as compositions and decompositions.

Now, we have perhaps set the debate in terms that are too sharply divided, for Deleuze never considers Nietzsche and his philosophy to be an impediment to his own theory. What is striking is how he reads what one might consider to be two radically different philosophers as having subterranean links, so that Nietzsche is profoundly Spinozist and vice versa.6 Thus, the eternal return and the will to power are grounded in what Deleuze sees as Spinoza’s empiricism (1996a, 21). The will to power, in its synthetic function, aids the philosopher in her work of interpretation. As we have noted, interpretation, as part of a relation of force, implies that a certain force or reading always be imposed on an encounter. That is, there are no values to which the philosopher might appeal in order to judge a relation “good” or “bad.” The philosopher must create her own values. This is the ultimate act of transmutation of values, of affirmative action. In Spinoza, Deleuze again finds inspiration for his attack on transcendental values in what he terms Spinoza’s “immoralist” position.
According to Deleuze, Spinoza, like Nietzsche, goes beyond good and evil to explore relations that are defined as good or bad (1981a, 33). A good encounter is then one that results in a positive, composite exchange while a bad encounter results in decomposition. Thus, for humanity, a good person will be, "...celui qui s'efforce, autant qu'il est en lui, d'organiser les rencontres, de s'unir à ce qui convient avec sa nature, de composer son rapport avec des rapports combinables, et, par là, d'augmenter sa puissance" (1981a, 35). Meanwhile, a bad person will be, "...celui qui vit au hasard des rencontres, se contente d'en subir les effets, quitte à gémir et à accuser chaque fois que l'effet subi se montre contraire et lui révèle sa propre impuissance" (1981a, 35).

Spinoza's ethics should be understood more as a typology of immanent relations than as a system of transcendental values (1981a, 35). The confusion with transcendental values comes with the form of a law, which is misunderstood as an order or command rather than a warning (1981a, 33). Deleuze takes as an example Adam, who misunderstands God's order to not eat the forbidden fruit as a constraining order when, in fact, it is a warning against entering into a relationship that will decompose Adam's and humanity's power (1981a, 33). Worse yet, this misunderstanding of the law leads to the imposition of moral laws which are illusions of consciousness, leading to what Deleuze terms a "long history of error" in confusing the knowledge of relations with an obedience to a transcendental law (1981a, 37). A law always imposes the transcendental values of good and evil, and Spinoza's system (in contrast) is grounded in the knowledge of relations and in their good or bad aspects, that is, in their productive or unproductive aspects.

Deleuze underlines how Spinoza believes that the power of morality leads to the creation of "sad passions" (in Nietzschean terms, "slave morality"). In this manner, the
person affected by sad passions assumes one of three personality types: the slave, the tyrant, or the priest (1981a, 38). Spinoza’s philosophy of life, then, is one that battles against all reactionary forces (much like Nietzsche): resentment, bad faith, guilt, the categories of good and evil and all that they inflict, etc. (1981a, 39). Deleuze notes that this critique of sad passions is based on the theory of affections which understands the individual as first and foremost a degree of power (1981a, 40). That is, the individual possesses an intensity or a capacity to be affected (1981a, 40). For instance, a human’s degree of power is less affected by certain natural sensations (a certain wavelength of light and sound waves, the changes in the season, in short, much of what is defined by the term “instinct”), and more affected by other less “natural” sensations (again, a certain wavelength of light and sound waves that are products of “civilization” and correspond to an “instinct” that is a product of civilization). In this way, we might distinguish between the power of an animal and the power of a human. In contrast to Aristotle, who divides life into species and genres and thus implies a system of morality with this division, Spinoza creates an ethology, which is a study of behavioral patterns in a certain environment (1981a, 40). For an ethology of man then Spinoza distinguishes between two sorts of affections, “…les actions qui s’expliquent par la nature de l’individu affecté et dérivent de son essence ; les passions, qui s’expliquent par autre chose et dérivent du dehors” (1981a, 40). The power to be affected is then a power to act and a power to be moved (in the emotional sense of the term) (1981a, 40-41). We recall from our discussion of the theory of parallelism that the individual, when affected, is conscious of the effects of this movement through the emotions of happiness or joy and sadness. With the distinction in the quote immediately above between the passions and the actions, we
are then better able to understand the deceptive nature of these effects and their illusory nature in consciousness since the passions always come from the outside, affecting our power to act. However, once they have acted upon the body, they influence its ability to act by either augmenting it or diminishing it (a body comes into contact with something that favors it or with something which does not favor it). Thus, to return to our original question at the opening of this section concerning Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche and Spinoza, it appears that these two thinkers provide a theoretical link between the passively-constituted subject of thought and the active subject of society. Sad and joyful passions, like reactive and active forces are not only what diminish or increase the body’s power to act but are also those passions or forces which decrease or increase the power of thought.

C. Difference and Repetition

With the help of what might then first appear as a very non-traditional collection of philosophical predecessors (at least in the manner in which he links them together), Deleuze constructs a system of intensive difference that is firmly grounded in lived experience. Bodies have durations, which give them differential origins, and out of these durations they enter into contact with other bodies. This contact always implies a relation of force and out of this relation comes an augmentation or diminution of a body’s force. The relations into which bodies enter are always exterior to the terms of the relation, thus allowing for a continual and eternal evolution and mutation. Deleuze’s system is an affirmative, creative, and joyful system of thought that firmly rejects any transcendental value; values are always to be created from within the system.
To return to difference and repetition, we are now much more capable of understanding against what Deleuze is writing. When the subject turns thought into an image and makes a representation of it, she always identifies thought with the subject, thus amputating the creative, "genital" power of difference from thought. Difference is intensive and is experienced as the affective capability of a body to enter into relations with other bodies. When difference is submitted to good and common sense, the intensive nature of difference is neutralized. Difference is never negative or reactionary; it is always creative. Submitting the affirmative changes of a body to representation and the negative affirmation of the dialectic only offers a hollow image of difference. Change is affirmative and is the result of a problematic, such as, What kind of body will increase my strength? The answer to such a question or a problematic will be an affirmative encounter. Thinking of this encounter as a dialectical framework of action (in terms of a certain image which takes the form of a sublimation, for instance), reaction or change always weakens the affirmative nature of difference. Finally, difference creates its own values and never submits itself to a transcendental value. The trap of representation and judgement is the imposition of a subject and values that impose a hierarchy. As a synthesis of differential forces, difference always creates its own values and never submits itself to categories such as good or evil. Difference only knows joy and sorrow as effects of its affirmative power.

Finally, we might note that the second term of Deleuze's thesis on difference, repetition, seems to have been ignored. As we have pointed out, repetition forms a critical aspect of Deleuze's reading of Hume and Bergson, but it is in Nietzsche that we find the most important consideration of repetition. We recall that the eternal return is understood
as the being of becoming. Indeed, this understanding of repetition as the “revenir lui-même” is part of the critique Deleuze levels against representations of repetition and difference. Like difference, repetition suffers the same reductive fate at the hands of representation. The return of repetition is always represented in terms of a generality, resemblance, or equivalence (1968a, 346). That is, repetition as difference is assimilated to the image of repetition and identified with the subject, just as is the case with difference. Deleuze notes how the representative maneuver concerning repetition is similar to that concerning difference, “...la répétition est représentée hors du concept, comme une différence sans concept, mais toujours sous le présupposé d’un concept identique : ainsi, il y a répétition lorsque des choses se distinguent in numero, dans l’espace et dans le temps, leur concept étant le même” (1968a, 346-347). The consequences of such a move are that repetition is always defined negatively, limiting the conceptual difference at the heart of both difference and repetition, and that repetition is eventually defined as the return of the same (1968a, 347-348). By reducing repetition to an image to be used in a comparison (for example, this idea is like another one), one creates a concept of repetition that is in fact an explanation of difference without concept (the radical difference at the heart of each idea is nullified, allowing for “the same” to return). Thus, the same can be repeated, theoretically, an infinite number of times without ever encountering true difference. Let us return to difference and to Nietzsche (and, indirectly, Bergson) to better understand this relation. When Deleuze declares that the eternal return is not the same but the return itself, he says so in the context of the eternal return as synthesis. Time is always passing, and the present is a contraction of the past and future, so that the past always returns in the present. The future, when it occurs,
is always already a repetition. As time passes, the diverse, differential aspects of the virtual world are actualized in an act of synthesis, and this act is continually repeated with each moment of the present. Furthermore, the affirmative nature of the eternal return, as that which separates the reactive from the active, is a synthesis that is also repeated. All of these syntheses are repetitions that have at their cores the concept of difference, and this is what Deleuze means when he says that the return is the being of becoming. The act of synthesis is forever repeated, but each synthesis is different from every other synthesis, thus true repetition (repetition that is not submitted to the illusions of representation) is a repetition of difference. In the following chapters of this section (as well as in chapters six and seven) we shall return in greater detail to the deployment of difference and repetition in specific contexts. We will demonstrate at these later moments the close relationship between difference and repetition in Deleuze’s thought. In this manner we shall begin to build on Deleuze’s “genealogical” foundation of difference as we have elaborated it in this chapter.

Negotiations 1

"Pour en finir avec le jugement" is the title of a short essay in Critique et clinique which, in one short phrase, often explains Deleuze’s definition of difference and the battles he wages on its part. We have seen how, in the early writings, Deleuze deploys an affirmative and intensive notion of difference through a re-reading of Hume, Bergson, Nietzsche and Spinoza. We have also seen how difference is limited in representation and have hinted at several points how such a limitation implies a certain notion of judgment. This has been a deliberate strategy, for we have attempted to show what
Deleuze's thought is and how it is constructed on its own terms. Certainly, another more traditional approach might have been to present Deleuze's reading of difference in comparison or contrast to Hegelian difference or the Kantian critique. However, this would be to enter into the dialectical system itself, a product of the philosophy of Kant and Hegel, and thus would submit Deleuze to the pre-established categories of such systems. Deleuze would be defined as difference and put into opposition with difference as defined by first Kant and then Hegel. Such an approach would invariably synthesize the "differences" between the two questions. We feel that this would be to betray Deleuze's thought and to fatally prejudice our study of French thought and the unique contribution that Deleuze's thought offers. In short, we would judge Deleuze's thought.

Our methodology is to present Deleuze's system on its own terms, as it develops, in order to place it in relation with the work of his contemporaries. Eventually, we will use his concepts as tools to help explain the situation of French post-structuralist thought in the context of the American academy. Nonetheless, in order to better understand the formation of his thought, it is helpful to understand against what, or more precisely, against whom Deleuze is writing. What reduces difference and limits it is a philosophical system that is based on morality, and we recall that Deleuze finds that perhaps the most influential (in the sense that thought continues to grapple with its consequences) of such systems of morality was established with Plato.

At times, commentators have termed Deleuze's philosophy a "reversal of Platonism," which is the task that Nietzsche gave his philosophy (Brusseau, 1-3). Deleuze agrees with this, but not in the sense that one might take the phrase to mean a doing away with the distinction between essences and appearances, for this was already
Kant and Hegel's project (1969, 292). Deleuze declares, on the contrary, that we must first find the motivation for such a distinction. In other words, we must track down the sources of Plato's distinction. And this source, we recall from our earlier discussion, is to be found in Plato's motivation for a division between the authentic and the inauthentic (1969, 293). Deleuze notes that the Platonic dialectic is different from the Hegelian dialectic, "...la dialectique platonicienne n'est pas une dialectique de la contradiction ni de la contrariété, mais une dialectique de la rivalité (amphisbetesis), une dialectique des rivaux ou des prétendants" (1969, 293). We recall that for Deleuze, the foundation of the Platonic division is based on a moral position. That is, the first step in Plato's system is to decide that the Idea holds a superior position to its appearance in the world.

The consequences of this foundation are great, for it will lead to the original limitation of difference. We recall from above that Plato, in attempting to establish a rigorous philosophical method, actually calls upon myth as his moral foundation for the division between Idea and appearance. Deleuze notes that in the Phaedrus and the Politics myth is used to explain the division between the Idea and imitations of the idea or copies (1969, 293-295). However, it is in the Sophist that Deleuze situates a crucial moment in Platonism, for it is in this work that Socrates changes tactics and instead of distinguishing between the Idea and copies, launches into a pursuit of bad copies or simulacra (1969, 295). This is a crucial moment, for as Deleuze explains, "...il se peut que la fin du Sophiste contienne l'aventure la plus extraordinaire du platonisme : à force de chercher du côté du simulacre et de se pencher sur son abîme, Platon dans l'éclair d'un instant découvre qu'il n'est pas simplement une fausse copie, mais qu'il met en question les notions mêmes de copie...et de modèle" (1969, 295).
To understand this, Deleuze explains that the distinction between copies and simulacra is based on an interior relation. That is, the copy that is valid resembles the Idea in that it shares a spiritual relation or identity with the idea (1969, 296). The just individual shares in the identity of Justice. The simulacrum does not share in this identity and thus poses a threat to the Idea, for it subverts the Idea; for example, the idea of Justice (1969, 296). The simulacrum subverts the idea because it produces only an effect of resemblance but does not share in the essential identity of the Idea. The great danger in this subversion is that the simulacrum exceeds all limits of the Idea, creating a sort of endless "profondeur" that jars and unsettles the hierarchy of the model and the copy, as Deleuze explains, "...le simulacre implique de grandes dimensions, des profondeurs et des distances que l'observateur ne peut pas dominer. C'est parce qu'il ne les domine pas qu'il éprouve une impression de ressemblance" (1969, 298). These multiple dimensions, when observed, draw the observer into the simulacrum, opening her up to the multiplicity of the simulacrum and thus creating what Deleuze terms a devenir inside of her. It is this danger of multiple becomings that poses the greatest threat to Plato's system, for if a copy only produces the effect of resemblance while hiding its true nature of multiplicity, then how is one to judge she who appears just from she who appears just but is only a simulacrum? Thus, the Platonic triad of the user, the producer, and the imitator follows in order to clearly order the hierarchy. As Deleuze notes:

Si l'usager est en haut de la hiérarchie, c'est parce qu'il juge des fins, et dispose d'un véritable savoir qui est celui du modèle ou de l'Idée. La copie pourrait être dite une imitation dans la mesure où elle reproduit le modèle; pourtant, comme cette imitation est noétique, spirituelle et intérieure, elle est une véritable production qui se règle sur les relations et proportions constitutives de l'essence (1969, 297).
According to Deleuze, the power of the simulacrum is the power of difference itself, for it derails the moral foundation of knowledge and of good and common sense. For Deleuze, the simulacrum is not a degenerated copy, and defining it in such terms is to remain within the system of representation. By overturning the original and the copy, there is no longer any way to distinguish between the two and to place one in higher relation to another. The simulacrum is an affirmation of difference, as Deleuze explains, "Le simulacre n’est pas une copie dégradée, il recèle une puissance positive qui nie et l’original et la copie, et le modèle et la reproduction. Des deux séries divergentes au moins intériorisées dans le simulacre, aucune ne peut être assignée comme l’original, aucune comme la copie" (1969, 302-303). Resemblance remains as part of this reversal, but it is the effect of a resonance between the multiple series present within the simulacrum (1969, 303). For Deleuze, the simulacrum, as a simulation of the Same, is part of the eternal return (1969, 304). In this way, the eternal return is understood as:

...[une] puissance d’affirmer la divergence et le décentrement...C’est sous la puissance du faux prétendant qu’il fait passer et repasser ce qui est. Aussi ne fait-il pas tout revenir. Il est sélectif encore, il fait de la différence, mais pas du tout à la manière de Platon. Ce qu’il sélectionne, c’est tous les procédés qui s’opposent à la sélection. Ce qu’il exclut, ce qu’il ne fait pas revenir, c’est ce qui présuppose le Même et le Semblable, ce qui prétend corriger la divergence, recentrer les cercles ou ordonner le chaos, donner un modèle et faire une copie” (1969, 306).

Placed in opposition to Plato’s thought, Deleuze’s understanding of the eternal return and difference is indeed a reversal of the most fundamental division within Platonism. If we revisit our discussion of the eternal return and Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche, we will find in this work the clearest attack he makes on modern philosophy and its system of judgement, beginning with Hegel.
Deleuze places Hegel's system within the Nietzschean critique of "God is dead" (1965, 180). That is, for Nietzsche and Deleuze, Hegel's system, while certainly a Christian system, represents the death of God in that it replaces Christian metaphysics with one entirely constructed by man. Humanity then assumes the privileged position formerly occupied by God in Christian metaphysics. The result of this change is a system (the dialectical system) that always reduces difference to a concept of identity and defines difference negatively. Deleuze declares "...[la dialectique] ne conçoit rien de plus profond qu'une permutation abstraite, où le sujet devient prédicat et le prédicat, sujet. Mais celui qui est sujet et ce qu'est le prédicat n'ont pas changé, ils restent à la fin aussi peu déterminés qu'au début, aussi peu interprétés que possible : tout se passe dans les régions moyennes" (1965, 181). The dialectic never interprets, and thus it never follows the radical differences just below the surface of events. It does this because the subject of the dialectic is dominated by the sad passions and a slave mentality. For Deleuze and Nietzsche, the dialectic and Hegel's philosophy are marked by Hegel's own bad faith and bad conscience (1965, 181). Hegel, like the slave, measures difference in opposition to his own forces. Rather than enter into a relation that would involve an exchange of forces and a true transformation, he subsumes the change of difference within his own system, dominating it and imposing his own force. Difference is always represented by the reactive and negative force of the dialectic. Thus, the affirmative power of difference is judged as a negation within the Hegelian system. This leads Deleuze to bitterly declare, "La découverte chère à la dialectique est la conscience malheureuse, l'approfondissement de la conscience malheureuse, la solution de la conscience malheureuse, la glorification de la conscience malheureuse et de ses ressources. Ce sont
les forces réactives qui s'expriment dans l'opposition, c'est la volonté de néant qui s'exprime dans le travail du négatif" (1965, 183)

In comparison to the attack on Platonism, this evaluation of Hegel and the dialectic is curiously vicious as well as lacking a form of developed argument. Indeed, such a strategy is necessary, as several commentators have noted, for a direct confrontation with Hegel is impossible without a consequent recuperation by Hegel within the dialectic (Brusseau, 22-30 & 199-200, Hardt, ix-xvii & 26-56). Michael Hardt makes the same observation when he quotes Judith Butler as saying “References to a ‘break’ with Hegel are almost always impossible, if only because Hegel has made the very notion of ‘breaking with’ into the central tenet of his dialectic” (Hardt, xi). Hardt’s position is that Deleuze’s main target in his early works is Hegel and his influence, and Deleuze gives us reason to believe that this is the case (1996a, 18-21 & 1990, 14). Hardt asserts that Deleuze’s strategy then is to approach Hegel from the sides, attacking the dialectic with the positive ontology of Bergson and Hume while simultaneously turning the force of his argument on Kant’s critical method (Hardt, ix-xvii). Hardt’s reading of Deleuze is one of the more rigorous analyses of Deleuze’s influences, and while we agree with it, we cannot wholeheartedly endorse it. It seems, rather, that the true focus of Deleuze’s critique remains firmly centered on Hegel’s predecessor, Kant. The condemnation of judgement is a theme that is constant in Deleuze’s work, and on more than one occasion he clearly links Kant with the philosophical “personnage” of the judge (1996a, 20, 1993, 158-170, 1965, 104-106, 1996b). His admiration for Kant is clear, to the point that he consecrates a work on Kant’s method (1963). However, he notes, “Mon livre sur Kant, c’est différent, je l’aime bien, je l’ai fait comme un livre sur un ennemi
dont j’essaie de montrer comment il fonctionne, quels sont ses rouages – tribunal de la Raison, usage mesuré des facultés, soumission d’autant plus hypocrite qu’on nous confère le titre de législateur” (1990, 14-15). While Hardt and Brusseau are correct to underline the difficulty in an open attack on the dialectic, it seems that the force and focus of Deleuze’s work is in the total critique that he believes Kant never completed (thus Deleuze’s insistence on his work as a transcendentale empiricism).

The attack on Kant is rather straightforward: while setting out to make a total critique of reason, Kant fatally hinders his project from the beginning by sparing categories that cannot be critiqued. Thus, Deleuze declares, “Kant n’a fait que pousser jusqu’au bout une très vieille conception de la critique. Il a conçu la critique comme une force qui devait porter sur toutes les prétentions à la connaissance et à la vérité, mais non pas sur la connaissance et à la vérité elle-même” (1965, 102). The problem of judgement arises out of the immanence of Kant’s critique, for reason is forced to judge reason and critique its errors, and Kant does not provide reason with the proper tools for its own critique (1965, 104). The famous division of being into noumena and phenomena creates a tension between the philosopher as critic and the philosopher as legislator, as Deleuze explains:

Pour Kant, en effet, ce qui est législateur (dans un domaine) c’est toujours une de nos facultés : l’entendement, la raison. Nous sommes nous-mêmes législateurs pour autant que nous observons le bon usage de cette faculté, et que nous fixons à nos autres facultés une tâche elle-même conforme à ce bon usage. Nous sommes législateurs pour autant que nous obéissons à une de nos facultés comme à nous-mêmes (1965, 105-106)

The question that Kant ignores is Who does a given faculty obey?, that is, What are the forces at work in the creation of the faculty of reason? This is the crucial aspect of the critique that Kant failed, for in trying to bring together the subject in the form of the
philosopher/legislator in the two worlds of the sensible and suprasensible, Kant succeeds in replacing God with the human subject, thus inaugurating the Death of God (1965, 106).

Deleuze's critique of judgement is a rejection of any transcendental category that stands outside of lived experience. Values are always constructed from within the plane of immanence and have a genealogy. Above all, Deleuze rejects the image of the philosopher as the "philosopher-worker" or the tool of the State (1996a, 20). The work of the philosopher is to create concepts. Philosophy is not part of the enormous machine of the state and its education system (which constructs an image of itself as a "Republic of the Spirit," place of investigation, question and answer, the "right" to thought, etc.) (1996a, 20). Again, according to Deleuze, difference is affirmative and self-generative. In the long history of philosophy Deleuze maintains that difference has often remained condemned and buried under the weight of the tribunals of the Idea and Reason, and it is against this judgement that he writes.

Notes

1 We shall return to this "use of the faculties" in much greater detail in our final chapter.

2 Indeed, this reading of the continuous and the heterogeneous is also an attempt to resolve what both Bergson and Deleuze term mis-readings of syntheses between the Multiple and the One (see, for example, Bergson 1927, 56-58 for a discussion concerning numbers). Chemical/biological examples, particularly reproduction or the fabrication of crystals in a laboratory, are perhaps some of the best ways of understanding Deleuze's philosophy of positive difference in light of his readings of Hume and Bergson (see 1968, 314-327 for a striking series of examples and explanations). Indeed, what could better illustrate the concept of a multiplicity than a fertilized egg in which the One of the egg actually conceals a Multiple whose development is entirely immanent to its mode of being? Any changes that might occur (the virtual) are already present within the system (the genes of the two partners). However, the development of an egg always proceeds according to an actualization such that these differences are differences in nature and not
simple differences of degree (with each division of the cell a new division in the genetic code occurs, ensuring that each egg is unique and different).

In a recent series of articles, the newspaper *Le Monde* discussed reproduction through a fertilized egg in terms that are quite similar to those used by Deleuze:

Heureusement, les chromosomes ne sont pas indestructibles. Ils peuvent se casser, se recoller, bref : se réinventer. C'est ce qui se produit lors de la méiose. Les deux chromosomes d'une même paire commencent par s'accorder gène à gène, sur toute leur longueur, puis, s'écartant à partir du centre, amorcent la séparation. Mais certaines zones de contact résistent ; les gènes jumeaux s'entremêlent, s'hybrident, s'approprient un peu l'un de l'autre avant de s'éloigner définitivement. C'est là, durant cette valse-hésitation, qu'a lieu leur « recombinaison », grâce à laquelle les cellules sexuelles ne transmettent pas seulement les gènes reçus du père ou de la mère, mais un patchwork des deux. Ainsi, l'œuf fécondé héritera d'un patrimoine dont les richesses proviennent au hasard de ses quatre grands-parents et, à travers eux, des innombrables générations antérieures. Ainsi, la sexualité, en créant de nouvelles associations de gènes, autorisera toutes les audaces de l'évolution (*Le Monde*, 5 Jan. 1999, 13).

The examples of biological reproduction in Deleuze's work are not by chance and the ultimate sentence in this quote calls to mind the role of desire in sexual attraction and sexual reproduction. Deleuze's philosophy has been labeled a “philosophy of desire” because of the resemblance such a system of thought has with the paradigm of sexual relations. In Deleuze's system, heterogeneous terms enter into relation with each other independently of any exterior terms. This model gives a relation in which each term influences the other to equal degrees, but in degrees that are always unpredictable. This immanent relation will be explained in greater detail in our analysis of the concept of territories in chapter two below.

3 We shall return several times to the importance of Deleuze's reading of the eternal return in the chapters that follow.

4 In a very interesting passage, Deleuze cites illness as a reactive force that drains one's creative energy while at the same time opening up new paths of creative power, thus paradoxically making one all the more receptive to the creative will (1962, 75). This is certainly in reference not only to Nietzsche's illness and eventual madness, but also to Spinoza's battle with tuberculosis. However, this passage can also be read as referring to Deleuze's own chronic health problems – problems which eventually led to his suicide. Also see “L’Épuisé” (1992).

5 The majority of our quotes in this section will come from *Spinoza: Philosophie pratique* which was published almost twenty years after *Nietzsche et la philosophie*. We do this for the sake of clarity, for it is in the former work that Deleuze's reading of Spinoza is most clearly formulated. Historically, the influence of Spinoza is evident in Deleuze's work well before the publication of *Nietzsche et la philosophie*. In *Dialogues*, he discusses the influence of Spinoza, particularly in the ten years of silence between *Empirisme et subjectivité* and the first Nietzsche study (1996a, 22). The results of this
study are most evident in Deleuze’s complementary thesis, *Spinoza et le problème de l’expression* (1968b).

6 See Deleuze’s discussion of the history of philosophy in *Dialogues* (21-22, and the first chapter in general).

7 Certainly, the very act of (re) presenting Deleuze’s thought in this thesis is already a limitation on the fecundity of his work as well as a betrayal of his concepts. Yet this is true only to a certain degree, for our work is much more than a representation of Deleuze; it is an encounter with his thought that aims to produce new concepts or new understandings of our situation. Every act of creation emerges from a problematic which is unique, and while a certain amount of Deleuze’s energy might be neutralized in our presentation, it is our desire to share in the force and strength of his work and to create a new solution to the problematic defined by this thesis.

8 Also see the critique of judgement and the law read through the works of Sacher-Masoch and Sade in *Présentation de Sacher-Masoch*, pages 71-89.
Chapter 2

The Territory of Philosophy

With concepts from the philosophies of Hume, Bergson, Nietzsche and Spinoza, Deleuze has the tools to construct what he will come to call a philosophy of desire. We recall that, according to Deleuze, the philosopher’s task is to construct concepts. Thus he writes against a philosophy concerned with contemplation, reflection, and communication, since a philosophy or thought that is based on these models eventually closes off the productive nature of difference, erecting an “image of thought” or a “philosophy of the state.” We recall from our introduction as well as from Deleuze’s reading of Bergson that the creation of a concept always takes place within the context of a particular problem. We might then read Deleuze’s interpretation of philosophy as “practical” in two manners: there is first the sense of thought as practical, based as it is on Spinoza’s theory of parallelism and the relationship one might draw between the power or force of thought and the power or force of the body. Secondly (and implicit to the first reading), philosophy is practical because the creation of concepts means that one has knowledge or experience of not only the problem but also of the concept that emerges from the problem. In contrast to a philosophy of reflection, contemplation or idealism, Deleuze advocates a very real and material notion of philosophy. In other words, philosophy as the creation of concepts – philosophy in its creative and productive aspect – requires a materialist approach. As a response to this problem of a materialist and productive notion of philosophy, Deleuze elaborates the concept of the territory and a philosophy of territoriality. Our task in this chapter will then be to Deleuze defines and
creates such a concept. As a preliminary example, we might offer one of Deleuze’s favorite illustrations of the territory that is formed between a wasp and an orchid. This particular territory emerges as the result of a problem: How may the orchid assure its survival? In other words, in what manner may the orchid best attract an insect in order to pass its pollen on to other orchids and assure the survival of the species? The solution or concept that emerges from this problem is the territory that is formed between the orchid and the wasp. The orchid produces a flower that imitates the wasp, “deterritorializing” its vegetable nature, “becoming-insect,” as it were, in order to attract the wasp. The wasp, in turn, is duly attracted to the plant and is drawn into the flower’s throat, “becoming-flower.” As Deleuze explains, a new territory has emerged, de- and re-territorializing the vegetable and insect nature of its participants, “L’orchidée se déterritorialise en formant une image, un calque de guêpe ; mais la guêpe se reterritorialise sur cette image. La guêpe se déterritorialise pourtant, devenant elle-même une pièce dans l’appareil de reproduction de l’orchidée ; mais elle reterritorialise l’orchidée, en en transportant le pollen” (1980, 17). What has occurred is not a relationship of power where the orchid or the wasp succeeds in dominating the other. On the contrary, the relation they have with each other is one of synthesis, where traits that liberate new concepts of the wasp and the orchid (becomings) are transferred to one another. We believe that this sense of territory, as a productive solution to a particular problem, is Deleuze’s greatest contribution to philosophical thought. It appears then that when philosophy itself is placed within the concept of territory (and its ancillary concepts of de- and re-territorialization), thought becomes productive, philosophy is materialist, and the difference we studied in the previous chapter becomes intensive.
Our previous chapter endeavored to trace the genealogy of a productive or intensive notion of difference. While our above example of the wasp and the orchid provides a vivid and easily grasped illustration of Deleuze’s concept of the territory, it still remains to be seen how exactly he deploys this concept. In other words, how does Deleuze respond to the problem of philosophy with the creation of this concept? In the following section we shall examine the multiple uses or senses Deleuze gives to this concept before examining (in the second section) the manner in which thought itself may be considered a territory.

A. Territories

1. Primitive, Despotic, Civilized

In the *Anti-Oedipe*, Deleuze\(^2\) consecrates a long chapter to the discussion of what we might term “geographical” or “sociological” territories and the history of territorialization, which is an attempt to show how large, historical movements of territorialization and deterritorialization are inscribed within capitalism. Deleuze readily admits that this may be considered as a Marxist universal history, on the condition that:

\[\ldots\text{l’histoire universelle est celle des contingences, et non de la nécessité; des coupures et des limites, et non de la continuité...D’autre part, si c’est le capitalisme qui détermine les conditions et la possibilité d’une histoire universelle, ce n’est vrai que dans la mesure où il a essentiellement affaire avec sa propre limite, sa propre destruction : comme dit Marx, dans la mesure où il est capable de se critiquer lui-même... (1972, 163-164).}\]

The implications of this overtly Marxist reading of historical territories shall become apparent in the pages that follow. We shall, additionally, return to this historical reading of territories within the context of our examination of the territory of French thought.
within the American university in our final two chapters. For the moment, let us examine how the Deleuze conceives of the various historical territories.

Territorialization occurs on the individual as well as regional and global scales. There is, however, one characteristic that territorializations at all levels share with each other: the role of the earth. As the ground or basis for both human and non-human activity, it conditions and appropriates all processes of production or reproduction (1972, 164). Thus, the earth, as the primary territory, marks and distributes all processes of production, leading Deleuze to describe it as, "La machine territoriale...donc la première forme de socius, la machine d'inscription primitive, « mégamachine » qui couvre un champ social" (1972, 165). Let us return to the example of the orchid and the wasp to better understand this concept. We recall how Deleuze's reading of Bergson and Spinoza affected his understanding of the body. Thus, the body of a wasp or orchid develops in such a way as to best match its forces (the wasp develops a body, that of a flying and stinging insect, that best matches its environment just as the orchid develops particular leaves and flowers as a plant). The environment in which this occurs is the earth. The wasp and orchid then each have their own separate territories as species as well as a personal or individual territory. It is, nonetheless, the territory of the earth which envelops all of these territories and conditions and forms them. In other words, every territory is ultimately implicated with the earth. The example of the wasp and orchid seems quite clear, yet how does the earth operate a territorialization on humans? Certainly, if we follow Deleuze's understanding of biological development, the human body is conditioned and territorialized by the earth, much like the example of the wasp and the orchid. In a larger sense, societies that depended upon hunting or gathering,
whether by the sea or in landlocked territories, were closely tied to the earth, developing means of production and reproduction based on their earth-bound status.

Now, when we turn to society, we should first note that Deleuze reads society in a way that is clearly influenced by Hume and Nietzsche. We recall how the illusion of reason in Hume’s philosophy leads the mind to construct ordered associations that attain a transcendental position, such as the image of God or the laws of Common Good. These transcendentals then condition society, giving the body of society a meaning or constructing a “territory.” Deleuze describes such totalities, as in the quote above concerning “la machine territoriale,” as the “socius.” In his Abécédaire, Deleuze notes that individuals are like animals in that they are linked to a geographic territory (1996b, “A comme Animal”). That is, they have knowledge of a limited amount of space over which they and their family wander, produce, and reproduce (1996b). The earliest societies were conditioned by the earth (by its geography), which inscribed its connections and divisions on individuals, grouping them together so that they formed a socius (or, in terms used by Hume, an “ordered association”), as a tribe or a family. Thus, the link between the earth and early societies is one in which, as Deleuze explains, the earth serves to, “...décliner alliance et filiation, décliner les lignages sur les corps de la terre, avant qu’il y ait un État” (1972, 171).

Now, an individual, as part of a tribe or family, marks her own personal territory in function with her place within the tribe or family, that is, within the hierarchy of filiation and the horizontal relations of alliance. In other words, an individual territory situates itself within the larger territory of the socius based on a number of factors that exist within the socius (sex, order of birth, inheritance, etc.). Thus, when considering an
individual’s place in relation to the lines of alliance, the territory of the socius opens itself up to a movement of deterritorialization when an individual moves into alliance with another socius or with the same socius but on different levels. Indeed, it is within vertical and horizontal lines of filiation and alliance, of movements of de- and re-territorialization, that Deleuze understands the primitive socius to follow a system of debt and credit. He explains that “La filiation est administrative et hiérarchique, mais l’alliance, politique et économique, et exprime [sic] le pouvoir en tant qu’il ne se confond pas avec la hiérarchie ni ne s’en déduit, l’économie en tant qu’elle ne se confond pas avec l’administration” (1972, 172). Filiation and alliance then form two blocks of primitive capital, the fixed stock of filiation and the circulating capital of alliance (1972, 172). The territory of the earth marks individuals within families who are then inscribed within an economy of debt, and it is this economy of debt that drives the reproduction of the family or tribe.

When this economy of debt is analyzed in terms of individuals, Deleuze uncovers a system of what he terms “fluxes.” That is, each tribe produces a capital of filiation that is marked through initiation rites (ritual tattooing, scarring, etc.) as well as a floating capital of debt, which is itself marked in its own particular way (rings, necklaces, tattoos, etc.) (1972, 175). The role of the socius is then to control and mark this vast system of fluxes, ensuring the proper encoding (so that each individual territory fits within the larger territory of the socius) (1972, 175). However, we would be mistaken to assume that such a machine always functions smoothly. The supposedly closed socius of the primitive territory is in fact always pushing its own limits, exceeding its own boundaries; in a word, it is malfunctioning. Following Mauss’ analysis of the debt, Deleuze identifies
a surplus value of the flux that exceeds the limits of the socius, so that the excessive nature of the debt reveals the always expanding nature of a supposedly closed socius (1972, 176). He explains, “Loin d’être une conséquence pathologique, le déséquilibre est fonctionnel et principal. Loin d’être l’extension d’un système d’abord clos, l’ouverture est première, fondée dans l’hétérogénéité des éléments qui composent les prestations, et comprenent le déséquilibre en le déplaçant” (1972, 176).

Clearly, territorialization has not remained primitive, and Deleuze marks a change in social territories with the arrival of what he calls the despotic machine or barbaric socius (1972, 227). Like the primitive socius (in which there is a double movement of territorialization – the earth marks the primitive socius and the primitive socius marks the earth in turn), the barbaric socius arises from the primitive socius, turning upon the latter and marking it in its own way, thus coming to dominate it. Deleuze is fond of citing Nietzsche from The Genealogy of Morals to explain this sudden break, “Ils arrivent comme la destinée, sans cause, sans raison, sans égard, sans prétexte, ils sont là avec la rapidité de l’éclair, trop terribles, trop soudains, trop convaincants, trop autre pour être même un objet de haine” (1972, 226). The defining feature of this break is a shift in the system of alliance and filiation (1972, 227-228). The despot centers all filiation and alliance within herself, inaugurating a state in which debt is rendered infinite (1972, 227-228). We can understand this new territory as the state in which the head assumes a god-like position. Indeed, for Deleuze, all territories of the state include this founding break within their structure. Thus, Deleuze insists on a form of archaeology or sedimentation within each territory, as one territory territorializes another (the despotic territory displaces the primitive territory and is in turn displaced by the modern, civilized
territory), portions of the colonized territory remain, so that our modern state, for instance, might be said to contain aspects of the despotic territory. Thus, in the despotic socius, the primitive structure of alliance and filiation is not suppressed and relpaced but is, rather, reterritorialized and “hijacked” by the despot.

The deterritorialization of debt and its reterritorialization within the despotic territory takes place when the despot appropriates the surplus value of the code that circulates within the system of alliance and filiation. The despot defines himself as a transcendental being, and debt, instead of passing through the primitive system, becomes infinite, turning all alliance and filiation toward the despot (1972, 232). Deleuze explains:

Les objets, les organes, les personnes et les groupes gardent au moins une partie de leur codage intrinsèque, mais ces flux codés de l’ancien régime se trouvent surcodés par l’unité transcendantale qui s’approprie la plus-value. L’ancienne inscription demeure, mais briquettée par et dans l’inscription d’État...Les alliances territoriales ne sont pas remplacées, mais seulement alliées à la nouvelle alliance ; les filiations territoriales ne sont pas remplacées, mais seulement affiliées à la filiation directe...Le stock filiatif devient l’objet d’une accumulation dans l’autre filiation, la dette d’alliance devient une relation infinie dans l’autre alliance. C’est tout le système primitif qui se trouve mobilisé, réquisitionné par une puissance supérieure, subjugué par des forces nouvelles extérieures, mis au service d’autres buts...(1972, 232).

Thus, the primitive socius finds itself aligned with the despot as his descendant as well as affiliated with him in a relation of debt. Deleuze notes that this debt, instead of being collected in the form of an alliance of marriage (although certainly possible when one considers feudal marriages between royal families, implicating the subjects of these families) is most often collected in the form of a payment of a share of the crop harvested or of profits made. Indeed, within a Marxist analysis, the state is often defined as being formed when residences are fixed within a territory and debts are absolved (1972, 232).
Deleuze notes that the fixation of residences is only the substitution of abstract signs for the signs that were already marked upon the earth as part of the territorialization of the primitive socius (1972, 232). As for the absolution of debt, Deleuze underlines how money is introduced as a means to pay debt and as an attempt to short-circuit any deterritorialization of production (both commerce and production) which might lead to the downfall of the despot (1972, 233-234). Money is introduced by the despotic socius as a way to render debt infinite and to tie the socius to the despotic territory (1972, 234). As Deleuze explains, “...la résidence ou territorialité d’État inaugure le grand mouvement de déterritorialisation qui subordonne toutes les filiations primitives à la machine despotique (problème agraire) ; l’abolition des dettes ou leur transformation comptable ouvrent la tâche d’un service d’État interminable qui se subordonne toutes les alliances primitives (problème de la dette)” (1972, 234).

This shift in debt and its role from the primitive socius to the despotic socius affects its representation. In the primitive socius, Deleuze offered a Nietzschean reading of debt in which the body was marked as punishment for breaking the alliance on which the debt was based. Deleuze notes that this equation of debt and punishment forms a triangle, for there is pleasure to be gained in watching the spectacle of punishment, “...l’œil tire de la douleur qu’il contemple une plus-value de code, qui compense le rapport rompu entre la voix d’alliance à laquelle le criminel a failli, et la marque qui n’avait pas suffisamment pénétré son corps” (1972, 226). For Deleuze, there is a relation between the “voice” of alliance and the mark that is inscribed on the body, but this is not necessarily a subordination of the mark to the “voice” (1972, 222). While this structure is certainly present in the territory of the despot, the despot reterritorializes it,
subordinating the mark of debt to the oral voice of alliance (1972, 239). In other words, the despot reterritorializes the primitive socius with the tools of the despot: the written word of imperial legislation, bureaucracy, accountability, taxes, state monopolies, state justice, etc. (1972, 239). This new regime of representation is one in which the voice dictates its will from a transcendental “beyond” in the form of written commands (1972, 243). This reversal makes a complicated move in which the triangle of voice, graphic, and eye is reterritorialized. The primitive socius constituted a link of both filiation and alliance in which these two terms were on an equal footing. Within the despotic socius, alliance and filiation are subordinated to the transcendental despot. That is, as Deleuze explains, the voice, instead of sealing the lines of alliance and filiation (as in primitive territories) dictates orders that are written within the despotic machine, and the eye, instead of seeing and appreciating the debt, is supplanted and blinded by the despot (1972, 243). The primitive triangle has become the base of a triangle in which the visual, oral, and graphic are aligned toward the transcendental despot (1972, 243). This alignment leads to a reversal of voice and sign (as Derrida has noted) so that, “...le rabattement de la graphie sur la voix a fait sauter hors de la chaîne un objet transcendant, voix muette dont toute la chaîne semble maintenant dépendre, et par rapport à laquelle elle se linéarise. La subordination du graphisme à la voix induit une voix fictive des hauteurs qui ne s’exprime plus, inversement, que par les signes d’écriture qu’elle émet (révélation)” (1972, 243).³

Deleuze notes that one might believe that this change in regime would lead to a less violent system of representation (1972, 250). After all, with the inauguration of written laws and a state-like administration, the flesh is no longer a tablet for the laws of
the tribe, to note the most dramatic example. However, this is to understand the law in a form it will assume only later, as a structure which will impede a state or head of state from becoming a despot. In this earliest form of the despotic socius, Deleuze understands the law as an overcoding system that seeks vengeance instead of punishment (1972, 251). Under the despot, the law becomes the juridical form of infinite debt, "...la loi...est l’invention du despote lui-même : elle est la forme juridique que prend la dette infinie" (1972, 252). Instead of marking the body and rejoicing in the surplus value of the pain produced in the debt of alliance or filiation (in the sense that the pact of alliance or filiation is sealed with this inscription), the despotic socius constructs an immense machine, comparable to Kafka’s *Penal Colony*, where all of the apparatuses of the state are brought to bear on the individual, marking her in an infinite number of ways which mirrors her infinite debt to the despot. Deleuze reads a dramatic reduction of freedom in this shift, and following Nietzsche, notes that resentment in the individual is a result of the despot’s vengeance, "...l’éternel ressentiment des sujets répond à l’éternelle vengeance des despotes" (1972, 254).  

Contrary to the rise of the despotic socius and its deterritorialization of the primitive socius, the shift from the despotic socius to what Deleuze terms the civilized socius is much less abrupt. Deleuze notes that deterritorializations are always occurring within the despotic territory threatening a general deterritorialization (1972, 264-265). Before following this line of thought, a brief word needed concerning the double movement of de- and re-territorialization. We must not forget that a movement of deterritorialization is ambivalent. That is, deterritorialization always leads to a reterritorialization whose result may be positive (a Nietzschean augmentation of forces)
or negative (a diminution of forces). We recall our example of the wasp and the orchid: the encounter between these two territories is a deterritorialization that involves a decoding of each respective territory. However, this deterritorialization also involves a reterritorialization in terms of a re-coding – the wasp reterritorializes itself in terms of its relation with the orchid, becoming-orchid, as it were. The orchid deterritorializes itself on the wasp’s body only to be reterritorialized later in terms of pollination on another orchid. In other words, the movement of territorialization may never be qualified as being ultimately “good” or “bad.”

Now, to return to the despotic territory and its movements of territorialization, we might examine the example of money within the despotic territory as an ambiguous movement of territorialization. Money is used by the despotic territory as a means of increasing the despot’s control over the primitive territory, writing over the primitive inscription of debt. However, this tool of territorialization is used, in turn, by commerce and free merchants, setting off a movement of deterritorialization. Describing this movement, Deleuze explains, “On sent la mort monter du dedans...Flux décodés, qui dira le nom de ce nouveau désir ? Flux de propriétés qui se vendent, flux d’argent qui coule, flux de production et de moyens de production qui se préparent dans l’ombre, flux de travailleurs qui se déterritorialisent...” (1972, 265). The fact that Deleuze underlines the decoding of money is not by chance, for it is the decoding of various fluxes linked to capitalism that marks the shift from the despotic territory to the civilized territory. Indeed, it is the encounter between these deterritorialized fluxes of financial capital and labor capital (workers) that gives birth to the civilized territory, the territory of capitalism (1972, 265).
Deleuze is careful to note that this shift is not a necessary, predictable shift from the despotic state socius to the capitalist socius. In a reading of Marx that differs from a traditional or dogmatic reading that would insist on the historical necessity leading from the primitive to the despotic to civilized or industrial capitalism, Deleuze insists on the contingent nature of these encounters (1972, 266-268). The key to this shift, Deleuze explains, is when, "...le capital cesse d'être un capital d'alliance pour devenir filiatif. Le capital devient filiatif lorsque l'argent engendre de l'argent, ou la valeur une plus-value" (1972, 269). Deleuze notes that in classical economics, a product is defined as a quantity of abstract labor that is then exchanged on the basis of a general equivalent for any number of other quantities of other general equivalents or of other products of abstract labor, etc. (1972, 268-269). However, this type of exchange remains part of the despotic state socius, for it is inscribed within relations that are controlled by the state, such as those between the bourgeoisie and the feudal state (1972, 269). Indeed, the rise to power of the bourgeoisie marks the gradual deterritorialization of the despotic territory, but it is only with a new relation that occurs between commercial capital and finance capital that Deleuze sees the true advent of the capitalist territory (1972, 270).

Deleuze understands this shift in terms of a transformation of the code of territoriality. We have seen how the primitive territory inscribed its own code on individuals and groups through filiation and alliance and how the despotic territory coded itself and individuals with an infinite debt of alliance and filiation in the form of state law. The defining shift of territories from that of the despot to that of capitalism involves the "destruction" of territorial codes of alliance and filiation (1972, 270). Where the primitive and despotic territorial machines labored to channel the production into certain
territorial "lines" (the lines of alliance and filiation as they are presented in both of these territories), the civilized or capitalist territory undoes these lines in a sort of "explosion" of production. As an example, Deleuze points to the tendency for the rate of profit to fall within capitalist society. As economists have often noted, this tendency should at some point bring the capitalist system to its knees, but this is not the case for this tendency appears to have no interior limit. Let us pause a moment and review this point for it is important in the larger perspective of Deleuze's "Marxist" and materialist approach. The falling rate of profit expresses the result of Marx's analysis of the forces at work in capitalist production. We recall that the capitalist must be careful on two fronts: there is first the battle against labor in order to keep production costs low and profit high as well as the battle against other capitalists for the realization of surplus value in the form of profit. In order to resolve the first difficulty, capitalism has generally attempted to move toward large methods of production which would ultimately allow for lower unit costs. For example, the massive mechanization of automobile manufacturing allows for a greater rate of production, keeping labor costs low while increasing the number of units that may be produced and realized as surplus-value profit. However, it is this investment in mechanization which eventually catches up with whatever might be gained over labor costs, for the fixed capital that must be invested in such mechanization (the machinery itself) leads to higher depreciation charges and higher auxiliary materials costs (electricity, fuel, etc.) so that each unit produced hides higher capitalization. The combination of higher capitalization in the form of massive mechanization must be counter-balanced by lower fixed labor costs. This battle between mechanization and its requisite levels of capitalization and lower labor costs produces an ever-decreasing
general rate of profit, for technological advances require incessant investments in fixed capital that lower the gains made in terms of fixed labor costs. To return to our example of automobile manufacturing, progressive waves of increasingly advanced methods of mechanization or rationalization (from rudimentary assembly-line production to contemporary robotic and computer-assisted assembly) may be read as stages in this process, the goal of which is an overall increase in the general rate of profit. Now, as for competition between capitalists, each capitalist is forced to adopt the above methods of mechanization in order to master her labor costs, but the cost of such a move is a lower overall rate of profit. Thus, competition between capitalists for a larger share of the market that would offset this lower rate of profit is fierce. In order to gain this larger share of the market, capitalism reverts to a number of strategies which paradoxically reverse this tendency to a lower rate of profit while also exacerbating its effects: higher intensity of exploitation, lower wages, importation of cheaper means of production, migration of capital to areas where labor costs are lower, etc. However, all of these strategies work within limits and, like technological innovations, eventually produce a pressure in which fixed capital and/or labor costs rise. In this way, capitalism produces a limit which is internal to its own system and against which the system is forced to innovate if it is to survive. By displacing this limit (with strategies that only bring this limit back to the forefront at a later date) capitalism quite literally re-tools itself.

Now, to return to Deleuze, this extended discussion of profit is important because it underlines the shift from money as code within the despotic territory to money as flux within capitalism. Instead of simply pointing out the pressures the capitalist system creates for itself (as we have just done), Deleuze goes further and reads this apparent
contradiction in terms of the shift between territories. That is, a dissimulation is at work in this shift so that the way money is analyzed and used within the despotic territory (and in terms of salaries or labor costs) and the way it is used within the civilized territory (as investment or fixed capital) is not the same. Deleuze explains his reading:

Dans un cas, des signes monétaires impuissants de valeur d’échange, un flux de moyens de paiement relatif à des biens de consommation et à des valeurs d’usage, une relation bi-univoque entre la monnaie et un éventail imposé de produits... dans l’autre cas, des signes de puissance du capital, des flux de financement, un système de coefficients différentiels de production qui témoigne d’une force prospective ou d’une évaluation à long terme, non réalisable hic et nunc, et fonctionnant comme une axiomatique des quantités abstraites (1972, 271).

In this manner, Deleuze re-reads capitalism and history in terms of the immanent limits of the capitalist system. That is, this immanent movement of de-encoding and subsequent re-coding, which is peculiar to capitalism and the civilized territory, actually serves as a base from which Deleuze may construct a critical system. This is not to say that Deleuze occupies an epistemological “neutral space” from which he is able to observe all of history and to write it. On the contrary, such a positioning would imply a transcendental philosophy – the very thing against which he is writing. By theorizing history in terms of territories and the immanent movement of de- or re-territorialization (which is, of course, the movement we have just traced in terms of capitalism’s contradictions), Deleuze is able to situate his critique of capitalism within its very own movement. In addition, he is also able to claim a “universal” history that is also immanent. He explains: “La tendance n’a de limite qu’interne, et ne cesse de la dépasser, mais en la déplaçant, c’est-à-dire en la reconstituant, en la retrouvant comme limite interne à dépasser à nouveau par déplacement : alors la continuité du procès capitaliste s’engendre dans cette coupure de coupure toujours déplacée...” (1972, 273).
Deleuze characterizes the coding of the fluxes within capitalism as an "axiomatic" (1972, 277). That is, the social machine of capitalism replaces the codes of the primitive and despotic territories by organizing the decoded fluxes and reintegrating them within the capitalist territory (1972, 277). We recall that the primitive and despotic territories attempted to control and encode the tendencies within their territories toward deterritorialization, however they always failed, bringing on the shifts that led to the creation of fundamentally new territories. The capitalist territory is much more efficient at controlling these deterritorialized fluxes since the goal of the capitalist territory is the incessant decoding and re-coding of fluxes. Indeed, in this manner, where a deterritorialization appears to escape the axiomatic of capitalism, it is revealed as participating in the capitalist territory. Thus, we might take the example of an innovation in automobile manufacturing which raises profits but also produces an increase in unemployment and a general economic stagnation (1972, 278-279). Deleuze notes that the "failures" of capitalism which might lead to dangerous, deterritorialized fluxes, are actually part of the capitalist "machine" (1972, 280). Indeed, capitalism is determined in two ways: "...non seulement le jeu des rapports et coefficients différentiels des flux décodés, non seulement la nature des limites que le capitalisme reproduit à une échelle toujours plus large en tant que limites intérieures, mais la présence de l'anti-production dans la production" (1972, 280).

We recall from above how the open nature of the debt of alliance led to a pathogenic malfunctioning of the primitive territory and its eventual downfall at the hands of the despot who is allowed to accumulate a controlling quantity of debt (1972, 176). The same malfunctioning movement is reterritorialized within the capitalist
territory. However, within capitalism, the deterritorializing effects of anti-production have been neutralized. Thus, the state, the deterritorialized territory of the despot, continues to play a role within capitalist territory, often in the form of anti-production. Nonetheless, the capitalist territory is defined by its flexibility and ability to absorb the greatest deterritorialized threat, so that the anti-production of the state is incorporated within the capitalist machine. Therefore, an axiomatic for workers is created in the form of the working class and unions (1972, 283). Class conflict is anticipated and neutralized by capitalism's multiple axiomatics and by its ability to absorb an infinite number of these combinations of fluxes. Indeed, Deleuze is led to declare that this incessant decoding and deterritorialization defines capitalist civilization. He defines this decoding on a number of planes:

“...la privatisation qui porte sur les biens, les moyens de production, mais aussi sur les organes de « l'homme privé » lui-même ; l'abstraction des quantités monétaires, mais aussi de la quantité de travail ; l'illimitation du rapport entre le capital et la force de travail, et aussi entre les flux de financement et les flux de revenus ou moyens de paiement ; la forme scientifique et technique prise par les flux de code eux-mêmes ; la formation de configurations flottantes à partir de lignes et de points sans identité discernable. L'histoire monétaire récente, le rôle du dollar, les capitaux migrants à court terme, la flotaison des monnaies, les nouveaux moyens de financement et de crédit, les droits de tirage spéciaux, la nouvelle forme des crises et des spéculations, jalonnent le chemin des flux décodés” (1972, 291).

Thus the definition of capitalist society comes to resemble a schizophrenic flux (1972, 291).

However, any identification of the fluxes of capitalism with the fluxes of schizophrenia is mistaken (1972, 291). Capitalism is the exterior limit of any civilization, but this limit is relative, for capitalism always remains in control of this limit, constructing it and then endlessly pushing it back. Schizophrenia and the fluxes it
determinizes, on the contrary, are the absolute limit of capitalism and thus are the exterior limit of any society. For Deleuze, the schizophrenic fluxes reveal a new plane of immanence that floats free of capitalism’s plane of transcendence (1972, 292). We shall see below how schizophrenia and philosophy assume privileged positions in Deleuze’s thought.⁵

Finally, the incessant movement of determinization and reterritorialization that marks capitalism reveals a new way of territorializing the individual. The capitalist socius no longer needs to mark the body in the same way as the primitive or despotic socius. Deleuze stresses that the individual has become “privation” in the capitalist socius (1972, 298). That is, she is stripped of any marks except for the most abstract marks that identify her capital and her ability to work (1972, 298). The individual becomes only a symbol for the infinitely flexible needs of capitalism. The memory that was produced through marks of debt in primitive and despotic territories is no longer needed. Indeed, memory is to be avoided in the capitalist system for it impedes the ever changing axiomatic from functioning (1972, 298). With the lack of memory, belief falls away as well, for the dominant attitude in the capitalist machine is cynicism (1972, 267). Language no longer means anything that must be believed, rather, “...[le langage] indique ce qui va être fait, et que les malins ou les compéts savent décoder, comprendre à mi-mot” (1972, 298). Indeed, a number of tools of the despotic state remain (identity cards, papers, administration, etc.) but these tools are remnants of the despotic system, reterritorialized within the capitalist territory. Thus, they come to serve a new function as the basis for immense encodings in which the individual is truly rendered private, deprived of any identity except that which identifies her capital.
These remnants of the despotic state lead to a curious dynamic within the capitalist socius. Deleuze notes that modern society is the result of the deterritorialization of the despotic state. This state imposed a rigid order in which every element of society had its place in relation to the transcendental place of the despot. The capitalist socius disrupts this order in favor of one thing: the accumulation of the surplus value of the flux. Society, in a fit of nostalgia for the dominant order of the state, oscillates between these two poles, between the archaic fixtures of the state, present within the capitalist territory, and the endlessly expanding limits of the capitalist socius. Deleuze explains, "Elles [les sociétés] recodent à tour de bras, à coups de dictature mondiale, de dictateurs locaux et de police toute-puissante, tandis qu’elles décodent ou laissent décoder les quantités fluentes de leurs capitaux et de leurs populations. Elles sont prises entre deux directions: archaïsme et futurisme, néo-archaïsme et ex-futurisme, paranoïa et schizophrénie" (1972, 309).

2. Animal Territories

The historical analysis of territories as they appear under their various forms might lead us to believe that Deleuze ignores the individual and her specific case, preferring to sweep all into the general categories of primitive, despotic, and civilized territories. This is far from the case, for Deleuze does devote a great deal of attention to the individual’s territory and its integration into these larger formations. Indeed, for Deleuze, an individual’s territory is constructed through what he terms the “ritornello,” and in *Mille Plateaux*, he devotes a long analysis to the concept of the ritornello and its role in territorialization.
Deleuze notes that the ritornello has often been analyzed in its role as a territorial marker (1980, 383). In birds, for instance, the repetition of a theme is used to mark the territory of an individual or a flock (1980, 383). In the same way, numerous animals mark their territory through the “ritornello” of scratching, rubbing, urinating or defecating in order to mark a territory through smell (1980, 387). Deleuze, however, appears to go beyond these simple understandings of territorialization. The rhythm of a song or of a certain act of rubbing or digging is an expression of a territory. He likens this expression to art, going so far as to wonder whether the first artists were not animals, “L’oiseau Scenopoïtes dentirostris établit ses repères en faisant chaque matin tomber de l’arbre des feuilles qu’il a coupées, puis en les tournant à l’envers, pour que leur face interne plus pâle contraste avec la terre...Peut-on nommer Art ce devenir, cette émergence?” (1980, 387-388).

Before returning to the question of territory and art, we should note that for Deleuze a ritornello’s expression should be read as a territorialization in that it affects the “milieu” of exteriors, interiors, intermediaries, and annexes (1980, 386). This milieu may be in whatever milieu an animal or human finds itself or herself, such as at work, at home, in various social interactions, etc.. For Deleuze, a human is like an animal in that she marks a territory through a rhythm that might be expressed in any number of indexes that are borrowed from the milieu that one occupies (leaves, urine, feces, stones, trees, streams, etc. or the tools of work, its signs of power, domination, etc.). One’s territory has an outer limit as well as different levels or limits of interiority, defining what is one’s home. Furthermore, a territory is always interacting with other territories, testing the limits, pushing the bounds of the exterior and interior, annexing new territories while
ceding others. For instance, the territory of the spider annexes the territory of the fly by invading its interior limits, moving to capture the fly in its territory (1980, 386). This relationship between the individual, who territorializes a milieu, and the territorialized milieu itself, is a reflexive one. As we saw above with the larger, historical divisions in territories, the causality between the individual and the territory is highly complicated, as Deleuze explains, "En effet, les qualités expressives ou matières d'expression entrent, les unes avec les autres, dans des rapports mobiles qui vont « exprimer » le rapport du territoire qu'elles tracent avec le milieu intérieur des impulsions, et avec le milieu extérieur des circonstances" (1980, 390).

Let us take, as an example, the earliest stage of territorialization (primitive territorialization), which marks the family and the tribe. Inside of this larger territorialization, individual territorialization takes place, which is distinguished by the ritornello. In this act of territorialization, an individual expresses her territory through the use of indexes from her milieu. However, this territorialization in turns affects the individual, expressing the limits of the individual’s territory, coming to act on the individual in the same way the individual acts on her milieu. This leads to an interesting way of understanding the individual, for she herself becomes a territory, forming what Deleuze terms a "personnage rythmique" (1980, 390-391). The expansion and retreat of one’s territorial limits becomes a “paysage mélodique,” as a territory answers and responds to various encroachments and annexations onto it (1980, 391). The individual then can be understood as a territory in which numerous ritornellos and melodies enter into relation with each other, “Alors, ils peuvent rester relativement constants, ou au contraire augmenter et diminuer, croître et décroître, varier de vitesse de déroulement..."
(1980, 392). This musical composition gives an individual her style, and Deleuze is quick to point out that such an analysis is particularly appropriate for artists (1980, 390-393). Deleuze finally defines the ritornello as "...tout ensemble de matières d'expression qui trace un territoire, et qui se développe en motifs territoriaux, en paysages territoriaux (il y a des ritournelles motrices, gestuelles, optiques, etc.)" (1980, 397).

This way of understanding the individual as territorializing and as territory leads to an interesting analysis of the composition of the individual, and the eventual breakdown of territories or their deterritorialization. Understanding an individual as a territory implies an understanding of the individual as a heterogeneous collection. If we were to consider the individual as a bird, for instance, as Deleuze does, we would consider, "...toutes sortes de composantes hétérogènes...non seulement les marques de l'agencement qui réunissent des matériaux, des couleurs, des odeurs, des sons, des postures, etc., mais les divers éléments de tel ou tel comportement agencé qui entrent dans un motif" (1980, 398). Thus, we might then consider a bird's dance, the clicking sound it makes with its beak, its colors and their exhibition, its posture, its cries, the lay of its feathers, in short, all that makes up the ritornello of its territorialization (1980, 398). Any individual is made up of just as many diverse, heterogeneous elements, and the question that one is led to ask is, What holds these elements together to make a territory?

The answer would seem to be the ritornello, for it is the continual repetition or bringing together of these diverse elements that defines the territory of an individual. However, there is an ambiguous nature to the ritornello, for Deleuze notes that some elements of a territory always enter into relation with another territory, annexing it and
bringing it into the original territory. In the same way, a territory is always attacked and loses portions of itself to other territories. Take for instance sexuality, which certainly enters into the definition of many territories. Deleuze explains that, "La sexualité peut apparaître comme une fonction territorialisée dans l’intra-agencement ; mais elle peut également tracer une ligne de déterritorialisation qui décrit un autre agencement..." (1980, 400). The ritornello, which seems to hold the key to the consistency of a territory, reveals itself to be that which not only holds the territory together but that which also works to break it apart. An aspect of the ritornello, such as sexuality, can become what Deleuze terms a "vector" or "converter of agency" which opens the territory up to a movement of deterritorialization (1980, 399).

Indeed, it appears that Deleuze privileges the deterritorializing aspects of the ritornello over its unifying qualities. A territory, as we have seen above, often implies a certain unity of borders and "rhythms" or "leitmotifs." Deleuze certainly notes this aspect of consistency, relating it to what he calls a "tree-like" model in which certain hierarchies are established, ordering the relation between separate elements, much like a tree is ordered by roots, a trunk, and a canopy (1980, 409). But the ritornello also acts as a destabilizing factor giving the territory more an air of a "rhizome" which separates itself in a multitude of directions (1980, 409). Deleuze declares, "C’est que l’agencement territorial n’est pas séparable des lignes ou coefficients de déterritorialisation, des passages et des relais vers d’autres agencements" (1980, 410). As an illustration, we might again return to our example of a bird: it may sing a song that defines its own individual territory (the "style" of a bird), but this same song can also open the individual bird up to courtship and a deterritorialization of the individual in favor of a
reterritorialization in a couple or the socius of a flock (1980, 411). Furthermore, this same song can open up completely foreign territories in the case of birds that imitate the songs of other species (the mockingbird or various species of parrots, for example) (1980, 411). Finally, this movement of deterritorialization in the ritornello is not always one that opens the territory. Indeed, we have primarily focused on the “positive” aspect of deterritorialization in the sense that it opens the territory up to other territories. Deleuze notes that deterritorialization sometimes leads to a closure, which he defines as a “black hole” (1980, 411-412). He explains, “...la machine produit alors des effets « individuels » de groupe, tournant en rond, comme dans le cas des pinsons précocement isolés, dont le chant appauvri, simplifié, n’exprime plus que la résonance du trou noir où ils sont pris” (1980, 411). Thus, what holds an individual territory together, what gives it its consistency is what is most liable to break it down: the ritornello as a deterritorializing element. Deleuze declares “Ce qui fait tenir ensemble toutes les composantes, ce sont les transversales, et la transversale elle-même est seulement une composante qui prend sur soi le vecteur spécialisé de déterritorialisation” (1980, 415).

Indeed, this notion of a portion of the ritornello slashing through the territory of an individual brings us back to the ritornello in the context of the animal. For it is certainly curious that Deleuze would concentrate so closely on the animal when describing individual territories. The notion of the ritornello surely benefits from the examples based on animals, and Deleuze insists that the animal is not just an example but an aspect of the territory. He declares that the “transversality” of the ritornello (described in the quote above) reveals the “becoming” of deterritorialization. Deleuze declares, “...devenir n’est pas une évolution, du moins une évolution par descendance et
filiation...Le devenir est toujours d’un autre ordre que celui de la filiation. Il est de l’alliance” (1980, 291). This idea becomes clearer when we consider the examples from above. Deleuze notes that a particular aspect of a ritornello in some species of birds is the gathering of bits of grass (1980, 399). These bits make up a territory that defines the bird’s individual territory (the nest) and, when deterritorialized, form an alliance or common territory of a couple (1980, 399). When this occurs, Deleuze defines the movement of becoming as a “block” in which the two territories enter into an alliance that is neither one nor the other territory, but a new territory (1980, 291). To return to our earlier example of the wasp and the orchid, Deleuze declares, “Il y a un bloc de devenir qui prend la guêpe et l’orchidée, mais dont aucune guêpe-orchidée ne peut descendre. Il y a un bloc de devenir qui saisit le chat et le babouin, et dont un virus C opère l’alliance. Il y a un bloc de devenir entre des racines jeunes et certains micro-organismes, les matières organiques synthétisées dans les feuilles opérant l’alliance...” (1980, 291-292).

The relation between the animal and the ritornello is not just for the sake of an easy example, for the “transversality” of each ritornello reveals the various blocks of becoming that are present in each individual. Thus, for Deleuze, every territory contains various blocks of becoming, and one of the most important of these blocks is that of “becoming animal,” as Deleuze explains, “Le devenir peut et doit être qualifié comme devenir-animal sans avoir un terme qui serait l’animal devenu” (1980, 291). Let us examine this odd concept more closely. We noted above how Deleuze defined a ritornello in terms of its “transversal” deployment within a territory. That is, the ritornello is both that which gives a territory its stability and solidity (the various internal and external limits of a territory, its appendixes and intrusions, etc. – in short, all that we
noted which comes together to define a territory) and that which undoes this stability and solidity (we might return again to the particular ritornello of sexuality which both marks a particular territory and brings it into contact with another territory and a relation of deterritorialization). This movement across the territory and its territoriality as well as its "deterritoriality," is what Deleuze would define as the ritornello's "transversality." It is what brings together two heterogeneous movements without destroying their heterogeneity. The ritornello of sexuality, for example, is a territorializing movement which is nonetheless shot through and through (in a "transversal" manner) with a capacity for deterritorialization. The sexuality of a territory is then "real," in the sense that it is clearly part of a territory and plays a role in the territory's territoriality, but it is also "virtual" in the sense that it "contains" a capacity for de-territorialization, for becoming-other, as in the example cited above concerning the wasp and the orchid. If we understand the ritornello's "transversality" in this manner, we might understand the seemingly odd importance Deleuze gives to the notion of becoming-animal, as in the following quote: "Le devenir-animal de l'homme est réel, sans que soit réel l'animal qu'il devient ; et, simultanément, le devenir-autre de l'animal est réel sans que cet autre soit réel" (1980, 291). Another manner of understanding the "transversality" of the ritornello and the territory would be to recall our discussion of Spinoza above and Deleuze's interpretation of his philosophy. For Deleuze, the heterogeneous mix of territories might best be understood in terms of an ethology:

On comprend dès lors que l'« éthologie » soit un domaine molaire très privilégié pour montrer comment les composantes les plus diverses, biochimiques, comportementales, perceptive, héréditaires, acquises, improvisées, sociales, etc., peuvent cristalliser dans des agencements qui ne respectent ni la distinction des ordres ni la hiérarchie des formes (1980, 414-415).
Now despite our explanation of the transversality of the ritornello (and in light of the above quote), it does not yet appear evident as to why Deleuze would attach so much importance to "animality" in terms of the becoming-animal of a territory. Instead of the "becoming-animal" of a territory, why not speak of, to take examples from the above quote, a becoming-biochemical, a becoming-perceptive, etc.? It appears that for Deleuze, a territory contains a becoming-animal because every animal has the capacity to act as a pack or a contagion (1980, 294-295). The becoming-animal of a territory is thus "animal" because of the specifically multiple and heterogeneous nature of an animal territory. This is what distinguishes the animal from our above objections/examples of "becoming-biochemical" or "becoming-perceptive." "Animal" is a strategic term since Deleuze explains that his reading is one in which animality is capable of opening itself up to multiplicity, "Oui, tout animal est ou peut être une meute, mais d'après des degrés de vocation variable, qui rendent plus ou moins facile la découverte de multiplicité, de teneur en multiplicité, qu'il contient actuellement ou virtuellement suivant les cas" (1980, 294-295). A territory is by nature consistent yet open to the multiplicity of new deterritorializations. Like a disease, territories and their very components are placed in relation to each other, like the tiniest of "animals," viruses (as the difference between animals and viruses demonstrates, Deleuze's reading of animality must not be read in a closed and strictly biological sense but rather in terms of the accent he places on a territory's capacity for becoming-multiple) In this manner, Deleuze declares, "La propagation par épidémie, par contagion, n'a rien à voir avec la filiation par hérédité, même si les deux thèmes se mélangent et ont besoin de l'un et de l'autre...l'épidémie met en jeu des termes tout à fait hétérogènes: par exemple un homme, un animal et une
bactérie, un virus, une molécule, un micro-organisme” (1980, 295). The becoming-animal, in the manner in which it forces open a territory to a multiplicity of heterogeneous terms and relations, is directly related to what we defined above as the ritornello’s transversal nature.

We recall, however, how the contradictory nature of the ritornello might reveal an apparently parallel contradiction in the becoming-animal of a territory. Deleuze notes that the concept of a pack implies that the pack has a leader, that is, that the multiplicity of a territory is also consistent (1980, 297-298). He explains, “Notre premier principe disait : meute et contagion, contagion de meute, c’est par là que passe le devenir-animal. Mais un second principe semble dire le contraire : partout où il y a multiplicité, vous trouverez aussi un individu exceptionnel, et c’est avec lui qu’il faudra faire alliance pour devenir-animal” (1980, 297). Deleuze explains that this tendency in the becoming of a territory is part of the nature of the ritornello as well as part of the becoming-animal of that territory. That is, it is both that which gives a territory a consistency and that which runs through it, threatening to deterritorialize it at all moments (1980, 298-299). In this manner, once again, we might understand the privilege Deleuze gives to the term “animal” since the tendency of the becoming-animal to move in a pack-like, contagious motion is what opens a territory up to other becomings, such as becoming-woman, becoming-child, etc. (1980, 304). The territory is continually in motion, revealing other becomings so that a territory or multiplicity is defined, “...non pas par les éléments qui la composent en extension, ni par les caractères qui la composent en compréhension, mais par les lignes et les dimensions qu’elle comporte en « intension »” (1980, 299). The use of this term, “intension,” recalls our original discussion of the ritornello in terms of its
intensity or resonance, and we recall that when read in this manner a territory opens itself up to other territories based on its capacity to enter into a harmonious (resonant, or intense) relation with another territory.

The becoming-animal of a territory reveals the world and its various territories as open and communicating. Becoming-animal is in the middle of life and allows us to push out in all directions. This understanding of the transformative power of territory offers an optimistic counterbalance to the often glum and pessimistic reading of territories and history analyzed above. It is true that territories are by nature consistent and, in their larger, historical formations, they are quite oppressive, marking all bodies within primitive, barbaric, or civilized territories. But this closer, individual reading of territories reveals the lines of flight and deteritorializations present in every territory that makes up historical territories. Indeed, Deleuze’s reading of the contradiction of the ritornello in territories offers hope for a liberating movement in even the most closed and solidified of territories. In chapter seven we shall return in greater detail to this double reading Deleuze offers of territories, particularly in terms of thought and its relation to this reading. We shall attempt to offer a synthesis of these two readings of territory and demonstrate how this more “optimistic” reading of territories (in terms of their “becoming-animal”) may be integrated with a larger, socio-historical reading of territories.
B. The Outside

1. The Earth

We recall how Deleuze insists that the role of philosophy is to create concepts, and concepts are created for each unique situation or problem. Thus, for Deleuze, "La philosophie ne contemple pas, ne réfléchit pas, ne communique pas, bien qu'elle ait à créer des concepts pour ces actions ou passions" (1991, 12). Indeed, if this position seems strangely out of character for a philosopher, it is because we have become accustomed to the dominant idea of philosophy where a universal concept is posed and then discussed, debated, reflected upon, etc. As we have noted, for Deleuze this manner of understanding philosophy only serves the "philosophy of the State" that creates universals, banishing the creative power of difference from these categories (1991, 12).

It appears that concepts and philosophy may go beyond territories as we have defined them up to this point. Above, we noted how, in both their broad, historical formations and in their individual intersections, territories always reterritorialize themselves, no matter how liberating their flights of deterritorialization. That is, when the barbaric territory deterritorializes the primitive territory, elements of both territories enter into relation with each other, creating deterritorialized blocks that are part of neither territory. However, these blocks of becoming are very quickly reterritorialized in the barbaric territory, forming the barbaric socius. The blocks of becoming that result from
the deterritorialization of the wasp and the orchid are reterritorialized in what Deleuze terms the “capturing machine” present in these two creatures. The territory of philosophy, however, reveals a special deterritorialization, for philosophy is thinking in relation with the Earth. Deleuze declares, “Penser n’est ni un fil tendu entre un sujet et un objet, ni une révolution de l’un autour de l’autre. Penser se fait plutôt dans le rapport du territoire et de la terre” (1991, 82).

Indeed, as we noted at the beginning of this chapter, for Deleuze, the earth remains a key element in a territory and in the construction of a territory of philosophy. We recall that the earth serves as the original territory for primitive territories. It marks primitive territory through signs of filiation and alliance and is, in turn, marked and deterritorialized by primitive territory and its socius. As the original territory, the earth is both deterritorialized and deterritorializer. Indeed, its unique position places it in an ambiguous position, for as Deleuze explains, “La terre n’est pas un élément parmi les autres, elle réunit tous les éléments dans une même étendue, mais se sert de l’un ou de l’autre pour déterritorialiser le territoire... Ce sont deux composantes, le territoire et la terre, avec deux zones d’indiscernabilité, la déterritorialisation (du territoire à la terre) et la reterritorialisation (de la terre au territoire)” (1991, 82). Furthermore, this unique place allows the earth to set itself apart from all other movements of de- and re-territorialization. That is, when the earth, as primary territory, is involved in a movement of deterritorialization, Deleuze declares that the deterritorialization becomes absolute, reaching the plane of immanence. To explain this important notion, we will present an extended citation:

Physique, psychologique ou sociale, la déterritorialisation est relative tant qu’elle concerne le rapport historique de la terre avec les territoires qui s'y
dessinent ou s’y effacent, son rapport géologique avec des ères et catastrophes, son rapport astronomique avec le cosmos et le système stellaire dont elle fait partie. Mais la déterritorialisation est absolue quand la terre passe dans le pur plan d’immanence d’une pensée – Être, d’une pensée – Nature aux mouvements diagrammatiques infinis. Penser consiste à tendre un plan d’immanence qui absorbe (ou plutôt l’« adsorbe »). La déterritorialisation d’un tel plan n’exclut pas une reterritorialisation, mais pose celle-ci comme la création d’une nouvelle terre à venir. Reste que la déterritorialisation absolue ne peut être pensée que suivant certains rapports à déterminer avec les déterritorialisations relatives, non seulement cosmiques, mais géographiques, historiques, et psycho-sociales. Il y a toujours une manière dont la déterritorialisation absolue sur le plan d’immanence prend le relais d’une déterritorialisation relative dans un champ donné (1991, 85).

When thought enters into relation with the earth and its deterritorializing function, the relative territory of a concept is changed, and thought becomes deterritorializing; philosophy creates a concept that is capable of tracing the world “à venir.”

This is admittedly obscure. Let us approach this idea from a different angle. In order for thought to take flight and offer a true deterritorialization, a connection must be established between a territory that deterritorializes itself in a relative manner and the ultimate deterritorialized ground of the Earth. For Deleuze, such an encounter depends on chance, and this was the case of the so-called “Greek miracle.” As he declares, “Il a fallu que la déterritorialisation absolue du plan de pensée s’ajoute ou se connecte directement avec la déterritorialisation relative de la société grecque... Bref, il y a bien une raison de la philosophie, mais c’est une raison synthétique, et contingente – une rencontre, une conjonction” (1991, 90). The creation of concepts and the deterritorialization that accompanies it go beyond a teleological narrative of history, where the concept reveals itself through the unfolding of History (1991, 91). Deleuze’s system of thought is non-historic in that it is based on the contingent encounters between territories, so that concepts are based on a sort of geo-philosophy, as it were (1991, 91).
Deleuze explains, “La nécessité repose sur l’abstraction de l’élément historique rendu circulaire. On comprend mal alors l’imprévisible création des concepts. La philosophie est une géo-philosophie, exactement comme l’histoire est une géo-histoire du point de vue de Braudel” (1991, 91). For Deleuze, the Greek miracle is the chance encounter between sea-faring immigrants, fleeing the Persian empire and the geographic location of the first Greek cities, where a potent encounter took place (1991, 83-84). Deleuze identifies three conditions as arising from this encounter: a milieu of pure sociability that assumes an immanent quality (a non-hierarchical structure of association), an atmosphere of friendship and rivalry that again escapes any hierarchical structures, and a taste for an exchange of opinions (1991, 84). This combination of deterritorializing encounters allows the relative nature of the deterritorialization to join with an absolute deterritorialization and allow for the creation of philosophy.

The perpetual action of de- and re-territorialization is like a concept pulling itself out of history only to fall back into it again. So, the movement of territory, as we saw in our earlier analysis of historical territories, is driven by the encounter between geographically influenced territories that create lines of flight and which create, in turn, territories. These encounters are always contingent, and it is within the unique territory of Western civilization that these encounters result in a movement of relative deterritorialization. Deleuze declares that this movement is marked, in general, by “...une forme commune immanente capable de parcourir les mers : la « richesse en général », le « travail tout court », et la rencontre entre les deux comme marchandise” (1991, 93). The movement of capital, as we saw earlier, is by nature deterritorializing, since it continually moves to bring different territories into relation with each other.
a way of understanding history also allows Deleuze to declare that capitalism is the internal limit of all territories, for it is the logical limit of all movements of relative deterritorialization. The external limits of a territory (such as natural and administrative borders), which marked the primitive and despotic territories, no longer function as limits within capitalism. The civilized territory, as we saw above, contains its own internal, immanent limits that it continually poses and then pushes back, only to confront them anew (1991, 93). In this way, every territory carries within it its own absolute limits, which are the immanent limits of capitalism.

Now, this movement of capital has consequences for philosophy and the creation of concepts. For if the concept is the result of the coincidence between the relative deterritorialization of classical Greece and the absolute deterritorialization of the concept and thought, what are we to make of the recent history of philosophy? Deleuze notes that this immense, immanent movement within capitalism is connected with a deterritorializing movement within thought, resembling the encounter between territories within ancient Greece (1991, 94). But we must be careful in understanding this, for again, this encounter is the result of numerous coincidences. Deleuze notes that one might try to understand the birth of philosophy in ancient Greece and its form in Modernity as being based upon the capitalist model of an exchange of ideas within a democratic society. He explains:

Certes, il peut être tentant de voir dans la philosophie un commerce agréable de l'esprit qui trouverait dans le concept sa marchandise propre, ou plutôt sa valeur d'échange du point de vue d'une sociabilité désintéressée nourrie de conversation démocratique occidentale, capable d'engendrer un consensus d'opinion, et de fournir une éthique à la communication comme l'art lui fournirait une esthétique (1991, 95).
However, to understand philosophy and the creation of concepts in this way is to reduce it to a simple model of exchange, where the concept becomes a marketing tool for the sale of the latest wave of philosophy (1991, 95). Deleuze insists that modern philosophy, like Greek philosophy, is an encounter between a relative deterritorialization and the absolute deterritorialization of the Earth, "La philosophie porte à l'absolu la déterritorialisation relative du capital, elle le fait passer sur le plan d'immanence comme mouvement de l'infini et le supprime en tant que limite intérieure, le retourne contre soi, pour en appeler à une nouvelle terre, à un nouveau peuple" (1991, 95).

Within an absolute deterritorialization, the concept escapes all reterritorialization within a model of exchange and reveals the revolutionary power of becoming. In a flash, one is able to perceive a world to come, a utopia. This is the revolutionary power of the concept and philosophy. For Deleuze, philosophy is thought that enters into relation with the territory of the Earth. When this occurs, the relative movement of deterritorialization, in which Modernity is inscribed, touches upon the utopia of an absolute deterritorialization. The concept is a solution to a practical problem, that is, a problem that is the result of a particular encounter between territories. In this way, philosophy is political and practical, for it is not useless dreaming of impossible revolutions. It is the practical creation of lines of flight. Deleuze declares:

Mais justement, dire que la révolution est elle-même utopie d'immanence n'est pas dire que c'est un rêve, quelque chose qui ne se réalise pas ou qui ne se réalise qu'en se trahissant. Au contraire, c'est poser la révolution comme plan d'immanence, mouvement infini, survol absolu, mais en tant que ces traits se connectent avec ce qu'il y a de réel ici et maintenant dans la lutte contre le capitalisme, et relancent de nouvelles luttes chaque fois que la précédente est trahie. Le mot d’utopie désigne donc cette conjonction de la philosophie ou du concept avec le milieu présent : philosophie politique...(1991, 96).
Absolute deterritorialization is not without a reterritorialization, and philosophy reterritorializes itself in the territory of the concept (1991, 97). However, it is the glimpse of the future earth, of the utopia offered, that allows philosophy, in its historical trajectory, to pull itself out of its reterritorialization and offer a new glimpse with a newly created, newly deterritorialized concept.

Deleuze claims that the difference between ancient Greece and modern philosophy is in the plane of immanence and the creation of concepts. The Greeks constructed a plane of immanence, but they did not have the concepts to fill it (1991, 97). Modern philosophy has created innumerable concepts, but it lacks the plane of immanence on which to place these concepts (1991, 97). To better understand this difference, Deleuze refers to Schelling, who noted that the Greeks lived and thought in nature (that is, in the territory of the Earth) but left the Spirit to the “mysteries” of the world. Modern philosophers, on the other hand, live in the spirit of the concept without connecting themselves to the ground of Nature (1991, 98). When philosophy reterritorializes itself in the concept today, it doubles these two historical moments, recalling a “native” past which has become foreign to it. Deleuze explains, “L’autochtone et l’étranger ne se séparent plus comme deux personnages distincts, mais se distriibuent comme un seul et même personnage double, qui se dédouble à son tour en deux versions, présente et passée : ce qui était autochtone devient étranger, ce qui était étranger devient autochtone” (1991, 98). The task of the philosopher is then to become a stranger to herself, to recall this past moment when the philosopher was grounded on the plane of immanence. The revolutionary power of philosophy is in the absolute
deterritorialization that one achieves by opening up a line of flight out of a territory, tracing the lines of an Earth-to-come where one is a stranger to oneself.

As was the case with our earlier study of socio-historical territories, we shall return to this difficult relationship between movements of deterritorialization and thought in chapter seven, below. The idea of deterritorialized thought making one a stranger to oneself is a theme that shall return in our extended analysis of literature and literary style in chapter six.

2. Chaos and Immanence

In our discussion of territories and movements of de- and re-territorialization, we have presented sometimes contradictory descriptions of the ritornello, the territory, and territorialization in relation to the Earth. Indeed, it seems that Deleuze’s description of territory, in general, is torn between two absolute states, that of a scattered and unorganized chaos and that of an organized complexity, immanence. This relation is extremely important in understanding Deleuze’s critique of philosophy and his concept of practical philosophy as well as the relation that the territory of the concept has with other territories.

We recall that in our discussion of the territory, we presented the concept as a type of territory. A concept is never simple; it is composed of numerous other concepts and is, as Deleuze terms it, a multiplicity *par excellence* (1991, 21). A concept has a number of components and is defined by this number; thus, geographically speaking, a concept has an irregular contour which is given by its numerous attachments, cuts, and intersections with other concepts and components (1991, 21). In addition to this static,
synchronic description of the concept, Deleuze notes that every concept has a history (1991, 23). That is, a concept contains components that responded to other problems in other perspectives that were later integrated and adapted to form the latest form of concept with which we are concerned. Furthermore, a concept has a "becoming" in that its relations with other concepts help to trace new lines of development and new concepts. As Deleuze explains, "En effet, tout concept, ayant un nombre fini de composantes, bifurquera sur d'autres concepts, autrement composés, mais qui constituent d'autres régions de même plan, qui répondent à des problèmes connectables, participent d'une co-création" (1991, 23-24).

We can see that this manner of understanding the concept has many similarities with Deleuze's idea of a territory. The intersection of numerous territories and ritornellos produces the territory of a bird, for instance, which, when understood as a territory, certainly has an irregular contour, a history and a becoming, etc. Indeed, Deleuze declares that any concept, even the simplest, is defined in three ways. First, each concept refers to other concepts (1991, 24). That is, if we were to take one of the components of a concept, the feathers or markings of a bird, we would see that this component alone is a concept which itself is a multiplicity. As Deleuze explains, "Les concepts vont donc à l'infini et, étant créés, ne sont jamais créés de rien" (1991, 24-25). However, this "atomism" of the concept is counterbalanced by a stability, which is Deleuze's second point. A concept has a consistence to it that makes each component inseparable in the concept itself. It operates as a sort of glue, which passes through each component without annulling the identity of the component. Deleuze explains, "Les composantes restent distinctes, mais quelque chose passe de l'une à l'autre, quelque chose d'indécidable entre
les deux : il y a un domaine \( ab \) qui appartient aussi bien à \( a \) qu'à \( b \), où \( a \) et \( b \) « deviennent » indiscernables. Ce sont ces zones, seuils ou devenirs, cette inséparabilité, qui définissent la consistance intérieure du concept” (1991, 25). Thus the markings of a bird, while discernable within the concept of the bird, are inseparable from the concept of that bird. Finally, and most importantly, each concept is understood as the point of coincidence or condensation of its own components (1991, 25). Deleuze describes this way of understanding the concept as an “intensive trait” which hovers over or passes through the components of a concept at an infinite speed (1991, 25-26). To understand a concept in this way is to understand it as a singularity, not as a generality or a particularity. Thus, the concept of the bird is not as a species or a particular example of birds in general, but as a singular coincidence of numerous components that come together to produce the concept of the bird. The concept is an event, as Deleuze describes, “Le concept d’un oiseau n’est pas dans son genre ou son espèce, mais dans la composition de ses postures, de ses couleurs et de ses chants...Il n’a pas de coordonnées spatio-temporelles, mais seulement des ordonnées intensives...Le concept dit l’événement, non l’essence ou la chose” (1991, 25-26).

The concept is then, curiously, absolute and relative, much like our definition of a territory. It is relative to its own, proper components as well as to other concepts and the problems to which it responds, but it is absolute in the condensation or intensity it produces and by the place it occupies on the plane of immanence (1991, 26). By this, Deleuze means that the infinite overflight or “survol” that occurs in a concept exceeds its relativity in relation to other concepts (1991, 26). The intensity of a concept achieves an absolute place on a plane that seems to go beyond the plane on which a concept occurs in
relation to other concepts. In other words, the territory of a concept reveals a line of flight, of deterritorialization, that exists simultaneously within the reterritorialized territory of the concept. A bird is then a territory (which is in turn a collection of multiple other territories and ritornellos, etc.) that is both territorialized (and thus relative to other territories) and deterritorialized (that is, to be understood as an event, as an intensity that transcends its own territorialization). Deleuze underlines the positive aspect of this difficult idea when he declares, “Le concept se définit par sa consistance, endo-consistance et exo-consistance, mais il n’a pas de référence : il est autoréférentiel, il se pose lui-même et pose son objet en même temps qu’il est créé. Le constructivisme unit le relatif et l’absolu” (1991, 27).

To better understand the concept and its place as an absolute concept, we need to turn to the plane of immanence. However, before moving in that direction, we should make one last note about the concept as Deleuze defines it. If the concept is auto-referential, it differs radically in function from other “concepts.” Deleuze declares that philosophy differs from other disciplines in its “non-discursiveness” because a concept, by its nature, does not connect propositions to form a chain of signifying propositions (1991, 27). As Deleuze explains, “Les propositions se définissent par leur référence, et la référence ne concerne pas l’Événement, mais un rapport avec l’état de choses ou de corps, ainsi que les conditions de ce rapport” (1991, 27). Signifying propositions are “extensional” in that they imply a linear succession that orders events within space and time, stripping the event of its intensive nature and turning it into a cog within a discursive system (1991, 27-28). Such a way of understanding the concept ignores the inseparable nature of the variations, which are present within a concept (1991, 28). This
strips the concept of its energy, flattening it out, as it were. Like an image of thought in which the intensive nature of difference is neutralized, concepts that are deployed in such a manner tear them from their origin as a solution to a particular problem. For Deleuze, the concept escapes any mapping within space and time, producing instead a kind of resonance within itself and with other concepts. He explains “Les concepts sont des centres de vibrations, chacun en lui-même et les uns par rapport aux autres. C’est pourquoi tout résonne, au lieu de se suivre ou de se correspondre. Il n’y a aucune raison pour que les concepts se suivent” (1991, 28). Thus, when a philosopher elaborates a concept, she differs from her scientific counterpart, who takes part in a discursive elaboration. That is, the scientific enunciation, while certainly taking a position, does so on the basis of the state of things, exterior to the proposition being enounced (1991, 28). Furthermore, the truth of this position is gauged in reference to this state of things, which, again, is done in a position outside of the proposition. In contrast, the philosopher, in creating a concept, enunciates a position which is, “…strictement immanente au concept, puisque celui-ci n’a pas d’autre objet que l’inséparabilité des composantes par lesquelles il passe et repasse lui-même, et qui constitue sa consistance” (1991, 28). In other words, philosophy, when understood as creating concepts, is the concept. When one creates a concept, one creates a multiplicity that responds to a specific problem and which is only able to be understood as being true within the context of that specific problem. This, we recall, is practical philosophy.7

We can now return to the plane of immanence and its relation to the concept. We recall the seemingly contradictory nature of the concept as we elaborated it above: the concept seems to have a relative, fixed relation with other concepts while equally
possessing an absolute nature that moves at an infinite speed, which Deleuze describes as an intensity. This distinction is important and very difficult to make, as Deleuze notes when he declares, "Les concepts et le plan sont strictement corrélatifs, mais doivent d’autant moins être confondus" (1991, 38). Indeed, when concepts are placed in relation to each other in their absolute state, they achieve a kind of consistency that forms the plane of immanence (1991, 38). We recall from above, that concepts do not fit neatly together like puzzles. Their multiple nature gives them a jagged geography, and this geography is reflected in the fact that a concept does not lead neatly to another concept, for this would be to make the mistake of treating them as propositions, as we noted above. Yet, together, concepts achieve a sort of resonance as their intensities vibrate off of one another (1991, 38). This resonance is felt within the plane of immanence, which opens up an infinite, non-subjective horizon. Deleuze describes this resonance and horizon in the following way:

Les concepts sont des événements, mais le plan est l’horizon des événements, le réservoir ou la réserve des événements purement conceptuels: non pas l’horizon relatif qui fonctionne comme une limite, change avec un observateur et englobe des états de choses observables, mais l’horizon absolu, indépendant de tout observateur, et qui rend l’événement comme concept indépendant d’un état de choses visible où il s’effectuerait (1991, 39).

Concepts do not necessarily lead logically from one to another, but they do connect, and it is the plane of immanence which allows concepts to “throw out bridges” and to make connections (1991, 39). Finally, it is this movement of thought, of connection between concepts, which in turn implies a creative, and practical philosophy (1991, 39-40).

As we have remarked, this practical philosophy, is closely influenced by Spinoza, “folding” thought and nature in a creative mix. Indeed, this manner of thinking reveals
numerous folds and valleys in which the infinite movement of thought spreads out, making both creative and non-creative connections. Deleuze traces an image of this landscape when he explains, "...il y a toujours beaucoup de mouvements infinis pris les uns dans les autres, pliés les uns dans les autres, dans la mesure où le retour de l'un en relance un autre instantanément, de telle façon que le plan d'immanence ne cesse de se tisser, gigantesque navette" (1991, 41). Even the negative is caught up in this movement, so that, if we were to make a mistake (become dominated by the passions, etc.), these negative movements would be folded and refolded within the plane of immanence (1991, 41).

We seem to have wandered far from the chaos mentioned in the title of this section. However, this would be to forget that Deleuze describes the plane of immanence as a screen for chaos (1991, 44). To understand this, let us again consider the relation between the plane of immanence and concepts. Deleuze stresses that one must not confuse the two even if they seem to appear to be one and the same thing, especially in situations when the concepts of “One” or “Same” seem to imply the plane of immanence (1991, 42). Deleuze draws a distinction between the two by defining a concept as an “intensive trait” of the plane of immanence while the plane itself acts as a “diagramatic trait” (1991, 42). If a concept exhibits a certain intensity as the infinite movement of its components, its movement is given direction within the plane immanence, drawn or diagrammed as it were, toward the infinite horizon of immanence. Referring to “traits diagrammatiques” and “traits intensifs,” Deleuze explains, “Les premiers sont des directions absolues de nature fractale, tandis que les seconds sont des dimensions absolues, surfaces ou volumes toujours fragmentaires, définies intensivement. Les
premiers sont des *intuitions*, les seconds, des *intentions*" (1991, 42). The plane of immanence may resemble the concepts that fill it, but it is the plane that gives a direction to the concepts that fill it. Each needs the other in order to function. This relationship between the concept and the plane of immanence resembles, to a certain extent, the reading Deleuze makes of Foucault’s study of power and knowledge. We shall return to this reading in the following chapter as well as a comparison between Foucault and Deleuze in chapter six.

Deleuze points out that philosophy begins with the construction of concepts, but he also states that the plane of immanence is the inauguration of philosophy (1991, 43-44). This means that the actual act of philosophy is a creative act: the creation of concepts. However, the plane of immanence pre-exists the concepts that come to fill it, and Deleuze notes that the plane is itself pre-philosophical (1991, 43). This seems paradoxical, for the creation of concepts implies a plane of immanence where these concepts are installed. Indeed, Deleuze explains that the creation of concepts occurs simultaneously with the inauguration of the plane of immanence, and this difference between concept and immanence then implies a portion of the pre-philosophical or non-philosophical within each act of creation (1991, 43-44). In other words, the creation of concepts and their installation within a plane of immanence requires a movement of becoming or deterritorialization (as formulated in our above section). Deleuze explains:

Précisément parce que le plan d'immanence est pré-philosophique, et n'opère pas déjà avec des concepts, il implique une sorte d'expérimentation tâtonnante, et son tracé recourt à des moyens peu avouables, peu rationnels et raisonnables... C'est qu'on ne pense pas sans devenir autre chose, quelque chose qui ne pense pas, une bête, un végétal, une molécule, une particule, qui reviennent sur la pensée et la relancent (1991, 44).
Now, if thinking involves a movement of deterritorialization or becoming, the danger is that this movement exceeds the plane of immanence. That is, the danger of at the heart of thinking is that the delicate balance between a territory’s consistency and its movement of deterritorialization shift too far towards this latter movement. In other words, the danger at the heart of thinking is chaos. We noted earlier that Deleuze describes the plane of immanence as a screen for chaos, and as such, Deleuze understands philosophy and thinking as an attempt to give some form of consistency to the infinite flux of chaos (1991, 45). Chaos is defined as the lack of any determination which might exist between two concepts on the plane of immanence, as Deleuze explains, “Ce qui caractérise le chaos, en effet, c’est moins l’absence de déterminations que la vitesse infinie à laquelle elles s’ébauchent et s’évanouissent: ce n’est pas un mouvement de l’une à l’autre, mais au contraire l’impossibilité d’un rapport entre deux déterminations...” (1991, 44-45). Within chaos, thought moves at such a speed that any determination which might be established is broken as soon as another determination is made (1991, 45). Thought, on the plane of immanence, consists in establishing “bridges” so that concepts might be constructed. Philosophy conserves the infinite nature of chaos by retaining both its infinite speed and its infinite movement within the infinite folds of thought. Thus, for Deleuze, philosophy contains a double fold: the fold between thought and nature (mentioned above) and the fold between chaos and the plane of immanence. Just as the folds between nature and thought imply an infinitely quick and reciprocal relation between the two, the folds between the plane of immanence and chaos equally imply an infinite “injection” of chaos into the plane of immanence and thought itself. Deleuze explains this when he declares:
La philosophie...procède en supposant ou en instaurant le plan d'immanence : c'est lui dont les courbures variables conservent les mouvements infinis qui reviennent sur soi dans l'échange incessant, mais aussi ne cessent d'en libérer d'autres qui se conservent. Alors il reste aux concepts à tracer les ordonnées intensives de ces mouvements infinis, comme des mouvements eux-mêmes finis qui forment à vitesse infinie des contours variables inscrits sur le plan. En opérant une coupe de chaos, le plan d'immanence fait appel à une création de concepts (1991, 45).

Far from existing as an abstract and formal distinction, chaos, and the plane of immanence by implication, are grounded in the physical world of our “everyday” life. As Goodchild has noted, chaos is very real, existing as a sort of vast repository of seeds of ideas which are in turn selected and crystallized within the plane of immanence (1996, 68). The construction of concepts implies a part of chaos being “injected” into the plane of immanence, so that the “inside” of thought always contains an element of the “outside”. Deleuze underlines this point when he cites Blanchot:

On dirait que LE plan d'immanence est à la fois ce qui doit être pensé, et ce qui ne peut pas être pensé. Ce serait lui, le non-pensé dans la pensée. C'est le socle de tous les plans, immanent à chaque plan pensable qui n'arrive pas à le penser. Il est le plus intime dans la pensée, et pourtant le dehors absolu. Un dehors plus lointain que tout monde extérieur, parce qu'il est un dedans plus profond que tout monde intérieur : c'est l'immanence, « l'intimité comme Dehors, l'extérieur devenu l'intrusion qui étouffe et le renversement de l'un et de l'autre » (1991, 59). 8

In this way, we can better understand the utopist aspect of the plane of immanence discussed earlier. We recall that when thought enters into relation with the earth as pure deterritorialization, it achieves a movement of absolute deterritorialization. This same process might be compared with the becoming-animal or becoming-other that is implicit in each act of deterritorialization. The creative act that is pure deterritorialization gives one a glimpse of the infinite collection of possible concepts present in chaos. Chaos injects a dose of infinity into our existence, “jolting” us with an
intensity that we then translate into concepts. It is these concepts which resonate with infinite speed, reaching out in turn infinitely on the horizon of the plane of immanence. To return to our notion of practical philosophy, each of us lives in such a way as to give our life a style. This style is, in fact, the way we construct a territory and fill it with concepts. When these concepts are created in such a way as to open up to an ultimately absolute deterritorialization (when our style “resonates” with a particular intensity), we engage in the creation of concepts. This act of creation then implies an opening onto the plane of immanence, the injection of chaos into our creation and thus, into our lives, and a belief in a world-to-come (a utopia). In this way, the concepts we create are the way we live. Philosophy is the creation of concepts as well as a way to live.

Negotiations 2

In our presentation of the concept of territory and its relation to the plane of immanence and chaos, it may useful to again recall the philosophical precedents and stakes that are at play within Deleuze’s thought. It would be very easy to make the mistake of attributing the plane of immanence to a subject, be it transcendent or not, as Deleuze warns. Immanence is not a new way of understanding subjectivity. Indeed, in his last work, “L’Immanence: Une Vie...,” Deleuze is very clear about the distinction between the plane of immanence and thought on this plane and the way this plane has been misunderstood in the history of philosophy. He declares, “L’immanence absolue est en elle-même : elle n’est pas dans quelque chose, à quelque chose, elle ne dépend pas d’un objet et n’appartient pas à un sujet....c’est quand l’immanence n’est plus immanence à autrue que soi qu’on peut parler d’un plan d’immanence” (1995, 4).
To understand this concern, we must recall that Deleuze is not so much worried about the *contents* of thought but with the *construction* of thought. In this way, he is the direct descendant of Kant, and it is not surprising that he views Kant as his most dangerous enemy (as noted in the previous chapter and our discussion in *Negotiations I*). As we have seen above in Deleuze’s definition of the plane of immanence, in order to truly think, one must construct thoughts on the plane of immanence, and this is done when the plane of immanence ceases to be attributed to any type of subject. Indeed, Deleuze’s work is often an attempt to explain the history of this mistake in philosophy. If we recall that a movement of absolute deterritorialization occurs when thought reaches the plane of immanence, then the history of philosophy might be understood as an attempt to reach this plane.

Deleuze notes that as early as Plato, the plane of immanence is attributed to a subject (1991, 47). We recall from the previous chapter how Platonic thought is accused of subsuming difference to the model of the One. This critique may seem clearer when Deleuze explains, “Au lieu qu’un plan d’immanence constitue l’Un-Tout, l’immanence est « à » l’Un, si bien qu’un autre Un, cette fois transcendant, se superpose à celui dans lequel l’immanence s’étend ou auquel elle s’attribue : toujours un Un au-delà de l’Un, ce sera la formule des néo-platoniciens” (1991, 47). Deleuze understands Platonic thought as attributing the plane of immanence to the idea of the Concept. Thus, while the Concept is thought of on the plane of immanence, immanence itself, as a non-transcendental concept, is lost. The plane of immanence becomes an attribute of the concept, which itself becomes a universal and transcendental object.
Within Christian philosophy, the situation worsens, for immanence is only moderately tolerated and must always cede to the transcendental position of God (1991, 47). Christian philosophy only permits small doses of immanence at a time which must always be attributed to the transcendent God (1991, 47). Thus, the situation of such thinkers as Nicolas de Cuse, Meister Ekhart, and Giordano Bruno serves as an example of the danger and power of immanence, reminding us that it is far from a theoretical or abstract concept but a powerful force within philosophy (1991, 47).

Now, to return to Kant, we can better understand Deleuze’s opposition to any attribution of the plane of immanence to a subject if we analyze Kant’s position. Within the history of philosophy, Deleuze notes that Kant follows the opening made by Descartes in subsuming the plane of immanence to a conscious subject (1991, 47-48). As Deleuze explains, referring to the split of the world into \textit{phenomena} and \textit{noumena}

“...Kant trouve la manière moderne de sauver la transcendance: ce n’est plus la transcendance d’un Quelque chose, ou d’un Un supérieur à toute chose (contemplation), mais celle d’un Sujet \textit{auquel} le champ d’immanence ne s’attribue pas sans appartenir à un moi qui se représente nécessairement un tel sujet (réflexion)” (1991, 48).

For Deleuze, this split is the “modern solution” for saving a position of transcendence in relation to the plane of immanence (1991, 48). Where Deleuze saw the Greeks as attributing the plane of immanence to a reflecting, impersonal subject, he sees Kant as completing the attribution of the plane to a human subject in the form of the empirical ego which is necessary for the existence of the transcendental ego and the concept of \textit{noumena} (1991, 48). Thus, Deleuze declares, “Quand le sujet et l’objet, qui tombent hors du plan d’immanence, sont pris comme sujet universel ou objet quelconque
auxquels l'immanence est elle-même attribuée, c'est toute une dénaturation du
transcendental qui ne fait plus que redoubler l'empirique (ainsi chez Kant), et une
déformation de l'immanence qui se trouve alors contenue dans le transcendant” (1995, 4).

Now, Deleuze is deeply influenced by Kant's and Nietzsche's critical methods,
and while he shares Kant's preoccupation with changing the question of metaphysics
from one of analysis (What are the fundamental aspects of reality?) to one of synthesis
(How do we come to know objects in general?), the problem of transcendence remains in
Kant's work. Nietzsche, in turn, offers a critique of the values that are present in Kant's
work, undermining their universality and revealing what Nietzsche terms Kant's
"ressentiment." This is an important aspect in Deleuze's thought, for as Goodchild has
noted, the position of these two philosophers helps to situate the two poles of immanence
and chaos that ground Deleuze's thought (1996, 67). Nietzsche's influence on Deleuze is
clearly more on the side of chaos and how any form of unity (subjective unity, in the case
of Kant and Hegel) is always based on a number of relations that are not part of the form
of unity itself (in this case, the plane of immanence). Before we explore Nietzsche's
influence on Deleuze in this respect, it is useful to push Deleuze's analysis of the
"appropriation" of immanence by philosophies of the subject to their historical end,
turning to Husserl and his phenomenological innovation.

We recall that, for Deleuze, the appropriation of immanence to a transcendental
subject is revealed within the notion of immanence itself when it refers back to and is
immanent to a subject, as with Kant (1991, 48). What occurs with Husserl is that
immanence is no longer attributed to a transcendental field but shifted outside the subject,
to a position occupied by the Other. However, this position comes to occupy a
transcendental place, usurping the place held by immanence and turning it over to
transcendence. Deleuze explains:

Husserl conçoit l’immanence comme celle d’un flux du vécu à la
subjectivité, mais comme tout ce vécu, pur et même sauvage, n’appartient
pas tout entier au moi qui se la représente, c’est dans les régions de non-
appartenance que se rétablit à l’horizon quelque chose de transcendant :
une fois sous la forme d’une « transcendence immanente ou primordiale »
d’un monde peuplé d’objets intentionnels, une autre fois comme
transcendance privilégiée d’un monde intersubjectif peuplé d’autres moi,
une troisième fois comme transcendance objective d’un monde idéal
peuplée de formations culturelles et par la communauté des hommes
(1991, 48).10

Thus, for Deleuze, what marks modernity is a drive to place the transcendent within the
plane of immanence and to view the “eruption” of transcendence as a saving grace,
rescuing us from the dangers of the plane of immanence (1991, 48-49). Indeed, modern
thought reproduces the same need to stop the movement of immanence and difference
that we saw criticized in the preceding chapter (1991, 49). The plane of immanence is
constantly being infused with movement from the outside (chaos) thus leading to a
movement of de- and re-territorialization within thought and within being. The
philosophical position of transcendence is an attempt to freeze this movement, to enclose
the infinite horizons within a certain position or image of thought, as it were, and thus
impose a territorial order to thought and being.

Finally, it may seem that we have fallen into the Hegelian trap of negatively
defining immanence. What does pure immanence look like? For Deleuze, it is pure,
absolute movement that is appropriated by neither an object nor a subject, such that the
indefinite article must be used to describe it: a life (1991, 4-5). In a sense, it seems that
Deleuze is asserting that immanence is what slips in between the cracks of our lives as
subjects and objects. It is what emerges when life becomes a singular event, when all
that comes together to make us is forgotten and the event (a smile, a gesture, a grimace,
etc.) becomes everything (1995, 5-6). This is difficult to grasp, for these events do form
part of what makes one a subject, but they also go beyond subjectivity to reveal the
eternity and the absolute nature of the event. Deleuze explains:

La vie de l'individu a fait place à une vie impersonnelle, et pourtant
singulière, qui dégage un pur événement libéré des accidents de la vie
intérieure et extérieure, c'est-à-dire de la subjectivité et de l'objectivité de
celui qui arrive...La vie de telle individualité s'efface au profonds de la vie
singulière immanente à un homme qui n'a plus de nom, bien qu'il ne se
confonde avec aucun autre” (1995, 5).

A life reveals the thousands of undetermined instances that pass through a life (and
Deleuze is quick to underline that such a revelation occurs at all moments, not simply at
the moment of death), revealing the undetermined aspect of the plane of immanence
(1995, 5-6). When these events are determined within an individual life, they are
appropriated by a transcendent subject who is nonetheless a subject within the plane of
immanence (1995, 6). Thus, “Les indéfinis d'une vie perdent toute indétermination dans
la mesure où ils remplissent un plan d'immanence ou, ce qui revient strictement au
même, constituent les éléments d'un champ transcendantal (la vie individuelle au
contraire reste inséparable des déterminations empiriques)” (1995, 6).

Another way of understanding this definition of immanence and life is to recall
Bergson’s resolution of the tension between the multiple and the one, for as we have
seen, a territory is always a multiplicity of other territories. Thus, the territory of a life
may be considered as a life (a determined territory of one) that nonetheless also contains
a multiplicity of lives just below the surface (the undetermined aspect of the plane of
immanence). In other words, a life is actual, but each term within a life is surrounded by
a horizon of *virtual* terms. A life is always a movement of becoming in which the terms of a life are caught up in a movement of virtual to actual and actual to virtual (1996a, 180-185). Thus, when Deleuze declares that the plane of immanence is a life, we must read such a definition as resting on the *multiplicity* of a life. When an event slips out of its determined, individualized position (a transcendent position), it can be viewed as pure immanence. In this way, we might say that the plane of immanence is always within us, constantly injecting our lives with a certain cohesion of immanence. When thought refuses to attribute this cohesion to a transcendental position (of the types studies above) then thought becomes creative and exists on the plane of immanence.\(^{11}\)

In much the same way, the plane of immanence is constantly injected with chaos. Above, we noted that Deleuze learned his critical thinking from Kant and Nietzsche, and in response to Kant’s synthetic subject, which imposes unity on the objects it encounters, Nietzsche asserts that the unity of the subject is an illusion, the result of numerous interpretations, so that any pretension of achieving a pure, grounded subject position is false. Nietzsche takes such a position in *The Will to Power* when he declares:

That the value of the world lies in our interpretation (~that other interpretations than merely human ones are perhaps somewhere possible~); that previous interpretations have been perspective valuations by virtue of which we can survive in life, i.e., in the will to power, for the growth of power; that every elevation of man brings with it the overcoming of narrower interpretations; that every strengthening and increase of power opens up new perspectives and means believing in new horizons – this idea permeates my writings. The world in which we are concerned is false, i.e., is not a fact but a fable and approximation on the basis of a meager sum of observations; it is “in flux,” as something in a state of becoming, as falsehood always changing but never getting near the truth: for – there is no “truth” (330).

Thus, to draw a line from Kant to Nietzsche, we might say that their critical philosophies attempt to answer the same general metaphysical question: How is thought possible? For
Kant, thought is possible through the synthetic unity of the subject, while Nietzsche responds that this synthetic unity is only an illusion, the result of numerous other influences. Deleuze follows in this line of thought, but breaks from Nietzsche when he declares that relations are exterior to their terms (1996a, 68-70). That is, chaos injects unknowable and unpredictable relations into the plane of immanence (the flow of actual and virtual) so that any absolute knowledge of thought cannot be made by a synthetically unified subject or by tracing relations of force or perspective. Deleuze’s philosophy reinserts chaos into thought by showing how (when one thinks in terms of immanence) the transcendent nature of the world of representation falls away, revealing the movement of actual and virtual (immanence’s consistency) that always exists, in the end, in relation to chaos. The relations that chaos may inject into the plane of immanence are unknowable, and thus prevent any form of absolute knowledge. As we noted above, this unknowable status is not at all read negatively by Deleuze; on the contrary, he sees chaos as offering hope for the future in the form of utopias to come.

For Deleuze, immanence is the internal limit of both thought and society. It is the ultimate limit of absolute deterritorialization, where the intensity of immanence flattens out, as it were, and the plane of immanence becomes a sort of degree zero of thought and being. Deleuze never claims to place his thought within the plane of immanence, but he does hope to come close to its limit, in the same manner as relative deterritorializations bring us into closer relation with movements of absolute deterritorialization. If there is a model for thought which reaches this absolute limit of immanence, it is Spinoza’s. Deleuze thus declares:

[Spinoza] a fait le mouvement de l’infini, et donné à la pensée des vitesses infinies dans le troisième genre de connaissance, dans le dernier livre de
l'Ethique... Ce n'est pas l'immanence qui se rapporte à la substance et aux modes spinozistes, c'est le contraire, ce sont les concepts spinozistes de substance et de modes qui se rapportent au plan d'immanence comme à leur présupposé (1991, 49-50).

In contrast to the Greeks, Christian thought, Kant, or Husserl, Spinoza places his thought on the plane of immanence, refusing to subordinate it to his system or make it dependent or attributed to any sort of transcendent subject position. For Spinoza, the mind strives to understand things with the knowledge of God. In Deleuze's reading of Spinoza, the knowledge of God is not of a superior transcendent subject but of the plane of immanence. Deleuze thus explains that in Spinoza's work, we may find three types of knowledge: the first is the type of inadequate ideas in which encounters result in ideas of the encounter being either good or bad for our minds and bodies (Spinoza, 52). These ideas are inadequate because we can sometimes be mistaken about their effects (for example, eating a particular fruit might be good when it is in fact poisonous). We form a second type of knowledge when we form what Spinoza terms "adequate" ideas, that is, ideas that increase our power to live or to be affected (Spinoza, 53-55). These ideas share in the common notions of all being (Spinoza, 54). Finally, the third type of knowledge, knowledge of God, arises out of this second type of knowledge and is the type of knowledge which opens us up to the plane of immanence. Spinoza thus declares:

The third kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of certain attributes of God to an adequate knowledge of the essence of things, and the more we understand things in this way, the more we understand God. Therefore, the greatest virtue of the mind, that is, the mind's power, or nature, or its greatest striving, is to understand by the third kind of knowledge (Spinoza, 173).
Indeed, the mind achieves a sort of infinite speed when it reaches this level of knowledge, for each idea is found to be connected to another idea, and the relation between the body and the mind flattens out, revealing, again, a practical field of thought. Spinoza explains:

The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things, and vice versa, the order and connection of things is the same as the order and connection of ideas. So just as the order and connection of ideas happens in the mind according to the order and connection of affections of the body, so vice versa, the order and connection of affections of the body happens as thoughts and ideas of things are ordered and connected in the mind, q.e.d. (Spinoza, 163).

This way of understanding the plane of immanence brings us back full circle to the practical implications of Deleuze's thought. The territory of philosophy holds a special place, revealing the ultimate limit of thought and society, and Spinoza is the "prince of philosophers" because his thought reaches the plane of immanence, drawing immanence down into the "everyday" of being. Recalling our discussion in the previous chapter, the relation between the mind and body is based on a capacity to be affected. To know what the body is capable of doing is to have an adequate idea of its capacities. Thus, to have an idea of immanence, in Spinoza's system, requires the body to experience immanence. There is a correspondence between thought and the body, for when we have an idea of immanence, even if it is just the briefest of ideas and occurs only once, the body is affected in such a way as to know that it is capable of forming immanent relations. And when the relative movements of de- and re-territorialization tend toward absolute deterritorialization, we tend to have an adequate idea of the third kind of Spinozan knowledge, that of the plane of immanence. The mind desires this type of knowledge, and it creates concepts that express this type of knowledge in immanent relations, relations which are then part of our way of living.
Negotiations 3

We have often mentioned the artist in our discussion of territory, noting how the creation of a territory implies the creation of a ritornello or a certain style, which calls to mind the artist as someone who creates, much like the philosopher is a creator of concepts. Indeed, Deleuze often returns to the artist to illustrate the concept of territory as well as its relation to the plane of immanence, devoting three works to artists: Kafka, Proust, and Francis Bacon.

When speaking of writers and the act of literary creation, Deleuze is often very quick to criticize literature, which he sees as a thinly veiled excuse to speak about an author’s personal experiences (1996a, 58-59). For Deleuze, such an approach is simply another manner in which immanence is attributed to a transcendental subject (1996a, 47-48). A writer is truly an artist and a creator when she brings together the heterogeneous elements of her life with those present on the plane of immanence in order to create an intensity. This intensity is then transmitted through the work of art as the intensity of the plane of immanence (1996a, 51). This is what occurs when Deleuze declares that the plane of immanence is a life. Citing Hardy, he declares, “...les personnages chez lui ne sont pas des personnes ou des sujets, ce sont des collections de sensations intensives, chacun est une telle collection, un paquet, un bloc de sensations variables...Individuation sans sujet” (1996a, 51). The act of writing creates a line of flight, a movement of deterritorialization in which the writer herself enters into the movement of becoming. Thus, the richness of the Anglo-American literature is that it creates lines of flight that always bring the writer back into geographic relation with the Earth, with the
deterritorialized and the deterritorializer. Deleuze explains, “La littérature anglaise-américaine ne cesse de présenter ces ruptures, ces personnages qui créent leur ligne de fuite, qui créent par ligne de fuite… Ils créent une nouvelle Terre, mais il se peut précisément que le mouvement de la terre soit la déterritorialisation même” (1996a, 47-48). As we noted above, such a movement of flight, of deterritorialization, always involves an encounter with other concepts. Thus, the work of literary art is always written for others, for the becoming-animal within the author and within the reader, for the becoming-woman, for the becoming-child, etc. (1996a, 54-56). When the writer creates a line of flight that flees from the established territories and their dominant orders, she creates what Deleuze terms a “minor literature” (1996a, 54).

In his study of Kafka, Deleuze extensively develops this theme and an example from Kafka’s work may help us to better understand the literary work of art in Deleuze’s thought. As we have noted, the act of literary creation goes beyond the biographical, revealing the line of flight and the becoming-other that occurs when the literary act reaches the plane of immanence and deterritorializes itself. This criticism, however, does not preclude the biographical in the work of art, but it does limit its importance. Thus, in analyzing Kafka’s work, Deleuze notes that while there may seem to be a historical collection of social forces that are inspiration for the work, there is clearly a divergence between these forces being described in the form of a narrative and their deeper, more powerful existence as an event or affect. Deleuze then underlines the power of sound in Kafka’s Castle:

Ce qui intéresse Kafka, c’est une pure matière sonore intense, toujours en rapport avec sa propre abolition, son musical déterritorialisé, cri qui échappe à la signification, à la composition, au chant, à la parole, sonorité en rupture pour dégager d’une chaîne encore trop signifiante. Dans le son,
seule compte l’intensité, généralement monotone, toujours asignifiante : ainsi, dans le Procès, le cri sur un seul ton du commissaire qui se fait fustiger, « il ne semblait pas venir d’un homme, mais d’une machine à souffrir » (1975, 12).

For Deleuze, Kafka’s work succeeds because it is not communication but the transmission of a sensation, a vibration, as it were, of the intensity of an experience, such as in the above case, of the intensity of a scream. In the same way, the specific instances of guilt, judgement, paranoia, etc. from Kafka’s life come to float free of the biographical references, transmitting an intensity, such that Kafka’s work is not about judgement, but is the intensity or experience of the event of judgement.

This notion of the intensity of the work of art brings us back to the practical implications of the plane of immanence and Spinoza’s influence on Deleuze. If the artist also creates concepts, then she enters into relation with the plane of immanence, achieving or tending towards a movement of absolute deterritorialization. This concept, which may at first be created in the mind, is immediately folded back into being and into the body. The work of art exists as a “mark” of this encounter with immanence, transmitting the intensity or sensation of such an encounter. As Deleuze explains, “...l’artiste est montreur d’affects, inventeur d’affects, créateur d’affects, en rapport avec les percepts ou les visions qu’il nous donne. Ce n’est pas seulement dans son œuvre qu’il les crée, il nous les donne et nous fait devenir avec eux, il nous prend dans le composé” (1991, 166). The work of art is a physical reminder of the artist’s encounter, and it is perhaps not by chance that Deleuze turns to Francis Bacon’s paintings as creations that remind us of the importance of the “practical” body in his philosophy of immanence.

Bacon’s paintings often depict twisted, deformed bodies or pieces of bodies in which the flesh figures prominently, falling or hanging from the body, revealing the
muscle and bone beneath it. Thus, in Bacon’s work, Deleuze finds an encounter with force. For Deleuze, Bacon’s objective is not to horrify or disgust the viewer, it is to reveal the forces of the body or answer Spinoza’s question, What can a body do? Deleuze explains:

Tout alors est en rapport avec des forces, tout est force...les déformations de Bacon sont rarement contraintes ou forcées, ce ne sont pas des tortures, quoi qu’on dise : au contraire, ce sont les postures les plus naturelles d’un corps qui se regroupe en fonction de la force simple qui s’exerce sur lui, envie de dormir, de vomir, de se retourner, de tenir assis le plus longtemps possible...etc. (1981b, 40-41).

To return to the example of the scream, in Bacon’s work, Deleuze finds the same kind of artistic creation as in Kafka: the scream of Innocent X is not a painting which gives color to the scream (1981b, 41). Rather, the painting communicates an intensity of the scream, rendering visible the forces that bring one to scream (1981b, 41).

For Deleuze, Bacon transmits the force of the plane of immanence in a way that goes beyond or short circuits representation, sending a shock or intensity straight inside our bodies. In this manner, we recall what the body is capable of doing, of the forces that act on it and our capacities for acting on these forces and for creating our own immanent space. When we note that the sensation is sent straight into the body, Deleuze is quick to point out that this is not in the sense of the incarnation of the sensation. For what occurs is a deterritorialization, an opening up of the space of our minds and bodies, where we are led across lines of flight and become-other. Deleuze thus declares, “...ce qui constitue la sensation, c’est le devenir-animal, végétal, etc., qui monte sous les plages d’incarnat, dans le nu le plus gracieux, le plus délicat, comme la présence d’une bête écorchée, d’un fruit pelé, Vénus au miroir...” (1991, 169).
The work of art is a monument to the passage of the plane of immanence, opening like a window onto the infinite, in the manner Matisse’s windows (1991, 171). But just as the plane of immanence functions as a screen on chaos, so too can the work of art open up to the chaos that lurks behind the plane of immanence present inside of it. Deleuze explains, “...les forces les plus maléfiques peuvent entrer par la porte, entrouverte ou fermée : ce sont les forces cosmiques qui provoquent elles-mêmes les zones d’indiscernabilité dans les tons rompus d’un visage, le giflant, le griffant, le fondant en tout sens...” (1991, 173). Indeed, the intensity of the sensation, of the vibration of the work of art, is the result of the complementary relation between affects and percepts, or the constant movement of de- and re-territorialization between the artist, the plane of immanence, the work of art, and anyone who might encounter the work of art. As such, it exists as a monument to the infinite on the plane of immanence (1991, 186). The confrontation between the plane of immanence and chaos remains the same for art and philosophy, but the manner in which the artist and the philosopher react to the encounter differs. For Deleuze, the philosopher wishes to save the infinity in chaos by giving it consistence in the form of a plane of immanence and trancing the outlines of the infinite with concepts (1991, 186). For the artist, the goal is to create, from the finite, a monument which will carry the sensations of the infinite (1991, 186). Both work within territories, and both endeavor to create, to “live life as a work of art.”

Notes

1 For Deleuze, a territory may be considered as a group of ideas, practices, objects, or people which constitute a certain place in time and space. “Territory” is not then an attempt to disguise thought in dressed-up jargon but rather an attempt to engage the problems of ideas, practices, objects and people in terms of a concept. The innovation
Deleuze brings to this term is then a conceptual innovation, as we have outlined in the introduction to this chapter.

While Guattari’s influence on Deleuze cannot be denied, the focus of our work is Deleuze’s thought. We agree with Michael Hardt who notes that many of the preoccupations of Deleuze’s later work (work that was largely done in partnership with Guattari) can be traced back to the problems Deleuze initially identified in his own work (Hardt, 1993, xx). Without any prejudice to Guattari, we shall continue then to refer to works done in cooperation with Guattari as works by Deleuze.

Deleuze draws a parallel between this “transcendental object which escapes the chain” and the role of the signifier. We will analyze this reading in closer detail in the following chapter and in section two as it relates to Jacques Derrida and his analysis of the Saussurian signifier.

Indeed, the transcendental position of the despot and the laws he sets in place are exactly the forms of judgement that Deleuze criticizes in his analyses of Plato, Kant, and Hegel. To place the critique of these philosophers (analyzed above in Negotiations I) in this context, Deleuze attempts a deterritorialization of the despotic territory of judgement.

We shall return to an extended discussion of these socio-historical territories in our final chapter as they relate to the larger movement of thought within territories.

Indeed, such an impoverished and distorted view of philosophy is the dominant model and the subject of section three of our work.

Understood this way, philosophy is not a debate or discussion. It is creative, and since each concept is unique, to critique or copy a concept is to misunderstand it. For Deleuze, philosophy renders discussion in terms of communication impossible. See Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? pages 32-33 for Deleuze’s virulent position in this regard.

The reference to Blanchot also contains a reference to Foucault. The notion of the “outside” of thought and the fold of the outside is central in Deleuze’s analysis of Foucault. See our reading of this analysis in Chapter 5 below.

To better distinguish Deleuze’s system of immanence from Kant’s transcendental method, we recall how Kant is pushed to elaborate his system as a result of Hume’s mise en question of scientific knowledge of the world. As Kant declares, “[Hume] indisputably proved that it is wholly impossible for reason to think ... that because something is, something else must also be, and therefore how the concept of such a connection could be introduced a priori ”(1997, 7). In response, Kant explains that such a priori connections exist (synthetic a priori principles), and his Critique of Pure Reason is an attempt to show not only that these principles do exist, but that they are necessary for the emergence and experience of consciousness. Furthermore, these principles come together and take shape in the place of the subject, a unified, sensible, understanding, and reasoning consciousness. Thus, Kant explains:
Experience consists in the synthetic connection of appearances (perceptions) in a consciousness, insofar as this connection is necessary. Therefore pure concepts of the understanding are those under which all perceptions must first be subsumed before they can serve in judgments of experience, in which the synthetic unity of perceptions is represented as necessary and universally valid” (Prolegomena, 58).

In this way, the question of knowledge is turned on its head, for it is not in the world of experience and objects that one must search for the foundations of knowledge, but within the subject, whose very elaboration frames the question of knowledge and its limits. Thus, the question of whether the world we experience is truly the world “as it is” is moot. The only world the philosopher is concerned with is the world of experience, so that Kant declares, “Consequently, even the pure concepts of the understanding have no meaning at all if they should depart from objects of experience and be referred to things in themselves (noumena)” (Prolegomena, 66). This division of the world into noumena and phenomena does, however, lead Kant to make some acrobatic philosophical maneuvers. For in order that a phenomenon emerge from the a priori principles of subjectivity, it must be universally shared among individual consciousnesses. That is, everyone must be able to recognize a house as a house. Subjects, then, share in a transcendental ego, according to Kant. However, this ego is part of the a priori principles of knowledge, so that it is in fact part of the noumena of the world and thus un-experiencable. We are then forever split between the transcendental ego and our own empirical ego; for in order to have knowledge about the world, we are constantly thrown back to the conditions for this knowledge (the transcendental ego), of which we may never have direct knowledge.

To understand Deleuze’s position, we recall that Husserl attempts to complete the critique initiated by Descartes and Kant. For Husserl, philosophy must be grounded in experience, thus even the Kantian categories of noumena and phenomena are insufficient because they presuppose a constitution of experience. Husserl’s thought is based on the examination of experience as it exists in its purest form, within consciousness. In order to examine experience in this way, he “suspects” the world in his famous époche so that knowledge may be grounded. Thus, he declares, “C’est pourquoi la démarche phénoménologique fondamentale, c’est-à-dire l’ « époche » transcendantale, dans la mesure où elle nous mène à ce domaine originel, s’appelle réduction phénoménologique transcendantale” (Méditations cartesiennes, 47). Now, upon examination of experience within consciousness, Husserl discovers that more than one perception or experience of an object may exist. In fact, a number of experiences co-exist with an object’s experience, revealing a field that surrounds the object. This is what Husserl defines as an object’s “intentionality” as he explains:

Je vois alors, dans la réflexion pure, que « ce » cube individuel m’est donné d’une façon continue comme une unité objective, et cela dans une multiplicité variable et multiforme d’aspects (modes de présentation) liés par des rapports déterminés... Chaque « aspect » que retient l’esprit, par exemple « ce cube-ci dans la sphère de proxiimité », se révèle à son tour comme unité synthétique d’une multiplicité de modes de présentation correspondants (Méditations cartesiennes, 75-76).
An object is then recognized and constituted in a subject (through a philosophical maneuver that comes very close to copying Kant’s definition of the subject, see Solomon, 172-173 and Méditations cartésiennes, 94) which eventually leads Husserl to posit a transcendental ego. This ego contains all objects and all experiences that a subject may possibly have. However, such a view can easily lead to solipsism, and to avoid such a problem, Husserl asserts that within the transcendental ego, it is possible to have experiences that are those of the Other. He thus declares, “Quoique je sois constamment donné à moi-même d’une façon originelle, et quoique je puisse, en avançant toujours, expliciter ce qui m’appartient essentiellement, cette explicitation s’effectue en grande partie au moyen des actes de conscience qui ne sont point des perceptions des moments correspondants de mon essence propre” (Méditations cartésiennes, 167-168). This experience reveals a zone of intersubjectivity which ultimately threatens Husserl’s entire philosophy, for it seems to base the experience of objects on a transcendental subjectivity in which the Other serves as a basis for the very perception of an object originally attributed to a subject. Indeed, as Solomon notes, such a universal ego is asserted at the beginning of Husserl’s last major work, The Crisis in European Philosophy (180-181).

11 Pushing thought to this limit also completes the history of philosophy, for defining the plane of immanence as a life recalls certain aspects of Sartre’s phenomenological approach. Indeed, Deleuze notes that in Sartre’s earliest work, La Transcendance de l’ego, his critique of Husserl restores the plane of immanence to its subject and objectless position (1991, 49). See Sartre, 74-87.
Chapter 3

The Philosophy Machine

In the preceding chapter, we studied how Deleuze’s philosophy might be considered a practical philosophy in the sense that the creation of the philosophical concept of the territory requires a very “real” or materialist approach to the problem of thought. We underlined, in the introduction to chapter two, the Spinozan influences of such a “practical philosophy.” That is, based on Spinoza’s theory of parallelism, Deleuze might elaborate a concept whose force is felt not only in thought but also in the body. The creation of a concept is not only the answer to a specific philosophical problem but also to a very real or material problem, responding to Spinoza’s question, What can a body do? In the preceding chapter we outlined the manner in which thought may be said to take part in movements of de- and re-territorialization. In the pages that follow, we should like to return to this notion of a practical philosophy that de- and re-territorializes both thought and the body. As our study in chapter two of socio-historic territories (primitive, despotic, and civilized) demonstrated, the movement of de- and re-territorialization must be considered in terms that transcend the individual. That is, the parallelism between the territory of thought and the body “captures” us in a much larger, trans-individual territorial machine.

As a practical example of what we mean by this “territorial machine,” we might build on the example noted in the introduction to chapter two. We recall that the “territory” that exists between a wasp and an orchid might serve as an illustration to the very practical problem of an orchid’s survival as a species. We might shift this example
to another register and turn to the philosopher himself – Deleuze – as an example of a
certain solution to a philosophical problem. Deleuze asks the question of our first
chapter, How does one make a difference? In response he pieces together a territory of
thought from the work of Nietzsche, Spinoza, Bergson, and Hume. Deleuze the
philosopher is deterritorialized, becoming someone else in the solution he proposes to his
problem. In the same manner, Deleuze and Guattari are deterritorialized, when they bring
their respective territories of philosophy and psychoanalysis to the problem of Oedipus
and difference in their collaborative work. Deleuze goes so far as to declare that he no
longer recognizes himself, stating that his collaboration with Guattari cut numerous lines
of flight through his territory, revealing a sort of multiplicity inside of himself as well as
inside of Guattari (1980, 9).

This methodology of collaboration as well as the wide array of examples (ranging
from classical philosophical problems to biological examples to reflections on
psychoanalysis) found in Deleuze’s works could lead one to believe that his work lacks
discipline or organization as far as philosophy is concerned. For Deleuze, such an
attitude would once again reflect a “philosophy of the state,” imposing a tribunal of
judgement or an image of what thought should be (1996a, 19-20). The place given to
creation and the underlying notion of positive production reminds us that even if
Deleuze’s methodology may seem undisciplined or non-traditional, this is because it is
profoundly practical. According to Deleuze, philosophy is practical when it stutters.¹
Thus, the creation of concepts yields a concrete product, what Deleuze often calls the
abstract machine of philosophy. This abstract machine might be the philosopher himself,
as in our above example. Or, to take a more traditional example, it might be a book. As
Deleuze notes, a book has neither a subject nor an object, simply a number of differently formed layers that come both together and apart, giving the book its “form,” and revealing lines of flight and de-stratification (1980, 9-10). As a solution to a certain problem, the book might then be considered as a territory. We might, however, borrow another Deleuzian term for the book and the philosopher and treat them as examples of an *agencement* (1980, 10). Much like our previous example of socio-historical territories, the territory as *agencement* allows us to better understand Deleuze’s concept of philosophy as productive or “machinic.” In the following pages, we shall study the manner in which Deleuze’s philosophy machine extends beyond the individual, capturing her within this “machinic” aspect of de- and re-territorialization. This movement of “capture” then has consequences for the constitution of a metaphysical subject, which we shall examine in greater detail in the second section of this chapter in relation to Deleuze’s criticism of linguistics and psychoanalysis.

A. Agencement

1. Strata

The concepts of territory, de-territorialization, and reterritorialization give philosophy and the world a certain Deleuzian geography, but as often as these terms are evoked, so too are a number concepts revealing a Deleuzian geology of strata, sub-strata, and formations. These terms give way in turn to an even more exotic collection of concepts, such as the abstract machine, machinic formations, the body without organs, and various other meta-strata and inter-strata. By studying what he terms the “geology”
of *agencement* we might better understand Deleuze’s concept of territory and the place philosophy holds in this system.

Deleuze explains that a machinic *agencement* exists in a sort of “middle” position, caught between two strata (1980, 54). One side of this position consists of a “face” turned toward a stratum which he terms an *interstrate* while the other face or side of the *agencement* is turned toward the *mêtastrate* or the body without organs (1980, 54). This apparently complicated “in-between” position is described by Deleuze in the following manner: “[Les strates] consistaient à former des matières, à emprisonner des intensités ou à fixer des singularités dans des systèmes de résonance et de redondance, à constituer des molécules plus ou moins grandes sur le corps de la terre, et à faire entrer ces molécules dans des ensembles molaires” (1980, 54). This formation is to be contrasted with the body without organs which is “…traversé de matières instables non formées, de flux en tous sens, d’intensités libres ou de singularités nomades…” (1980, 53-54).

In this way, each stratum or *agencement* is made up of a “double bind” which is defined in two ways (1980, 54-55). There is, first, the double definition or double face of an *agencement*, so that it faces both the consistency of the stratum and the fluidity of the body without organs. Secondly, a stratum is a “double articulation,” reflecting in its very construction the two faces that make it up. That is, the first articulation of a stratum is in the “sample” of intensities and particles that is taken from the side of the stratum facing the body without organs. This sampling will put into place the substance of the stratum as well as its form (1980, 54-55). The second articulation consists of the “solidification” of these forms and structures, compacting them and making them “functional,” so that other strata or segments can be put into place over and under the stratum or *agencement*.
in question (1980, 55). Deleuze explains, “Ainsi...la première articulation, c'est la « sédimentation », qui empile des unités de sédiments cycliques suivant un ordre statistique...La deuxième articulation, c'est le « plissement » qui met en place une structure fonctionnelle stable...” (1980, 55).

This difficult and jargon-filled description is not very helpful, but it does recall our previous analysis of the territory. We remember how a territory is both a consistent and inconsistent object. That is, the repetitive manner in which it is defined, like a ritornello, gives it a certain solidity or structure so that the territory is clearly defined. However, it is this very rigidity which hides or shelters a deterritorializing tendency, so that the territory is always in danger of deterritorializing itself and becoming-other. A territory is never an entirely stable, clearly defined object nor is it simply an endless flux, flowing in many directions and avoiding a certain definition. A territory is in the middle, always solid, yet always opening itself up to new formations and new deterritorializations. Deleuze’s analysis of agencement is very similar to his analysis of the territory. What distinguishes an agencement from a territory, however, is the distinction Deleuze makes between the forms and substances found in an agencement. That is, a form implies a sort of coding while a substance is formed matter, which implies in turn a notion of territory. Each articulation in an agencement then contains a code and a territory, a form and a substance.

One way of understanding this “double articulation” is to turn to Deleuze’s study of Foucault’s work. As we have noted, another way of understanding stratas is as historical formations, which Deleuze terms “positivités ou empiricités” (1986, 55). Existing in this way, a stratum is composed of words and things – things that are “see-
able” (contents) and “say-able” (expressions) (1986, 55). Let us take Foucault’s analysis of the prison as an example of a historical formation. Deleuze notes that the content of a stratum has both a form and a substance (1986, 55). Thus, the content of the prison consists of the form of the prison itself while its substance is the population confined within it. The expression of the prison also has a form and a substance: criminal law is the form of this expression while the utterance or énoncé of “delinquency” is the substance (1986, 55). Thus the way the content of the prison and its expression come together, in a double articulation, is what makes or defines the prison. The stratum is “revealed” by its articulation, as Deleuze explains, “De même que le droit pénal comme forme d’expression définit un champ de dicibilité (les énoncés de délinquance), la prison comme forme de contenu définit un lieu de visibilité (le « panoptisme », c’est-à-dire un lieu où l’on peut à chaque instant tout voir sans être vu)” (1986, 55).

In this way, the word “prison” never quite refers back to the object that is the prison. The prison forms a machine or historical formation made up of the expression of criminal law as it exists through its various interpretations, creations, and modifications. This expression of the “utterance” of the prison always engages the expression of the substance of the prison, the prisoner, who is first defined as a delinquent and later, as a criminal. This complex interweaving or articulation reveals what is “say-able” about the prison, as Deleuze explains:

Le droit pénal traverse une évolution qui lui fait énoncer les crimes et les châtiments en fonction d'une défense de la société (non plus d'une vengeance ou d'une restauration du souverain) : signes qui s'adressent à l'âme ou à l'esprit, et établissent des associations d'idées entre l'infraction et la punition (code)...le droit pénal concerne l'énonçable en matière criminelle : c'est un régime de langage qui classe et traduit les infractions, qui calcule les peines ; c'est une famille d'énoncés, et aussi un seuil (1986, 39-40).
The form of the prison itself is also caught up in this articulation so that the prison and its expression, the prisoners, become visible. The prison exists to show what crime and its expression of punishment (criminal law and the discourse of delinquency) are, as well as what a criminal is. The prison is thus defined not only as a structure made out of stone but also – as is the case with the panopticon – as a visual *agencement* in which criminality is brought to light. The two regimes of "light" and language do not function in the same manner, but they intersect in such a way as to reveal the historical formation or stratum of the prison and crime and punishment. As Deleuze explains, "...les deux formes ne cessent d'entrer en contact, de s'insuiner l'une dans l'autre, d'arracher chacune un segment de l'autre : le droit pénal ne cesse de reconduire à la prison, et de fournir des prisonniers, tandis que la prison ne cesse de reproduire de la délinquance, d'en faire un « objet », et de réaliser les objectifs que le droit pénal concevait autrement..." (1986, 40).

Now, these two regimes come together to form the abstract machine of the prison, but as we have noted, the regimes do not necessarily have a common form. That is, the prison, criminality, the penal code, etc. logically appear to us to be part of the same structure or to share a common form. This is however not necessarily the case. The prison and the prisoner have an entirely different history from that of law and discourses on delinquency (1986, 40-41). To the reader, the connection between the two seems to be obvious, but that is because the abstract machine or historic formation has already done its work, bringing the regimes together and imposing the stratum of the prison on us. It is by taking apart the stratum that Deleuze reveals the machine that is part of the historic formation of the stratum. Deleuze defines this machine as the “diagram” or the abstract machine present in Foucault's work.
What Deleuze wishes to show is how the articulation of two singular discourses occurs within a plane of immanence. The double articulation of the stratum or the historical formation is the double movement of actualization and differentiation that occurs when an object or discourse “emerges” or actualizes itself. By defining this machine as a “diagram,” Deleuze insists on the “graphic” nature of the historic formation. In this example, what the diagram of the prison reveals is the outline or limits of a display of power. Deleuze explains, “Le diagramme ou la machine abstraite, c’est la carte des rapports de forces, carte de densité, d’intensité, qui procède par liaisons primaires non-localisables, et qui passe à chaque instant par tout point, « ou plutôt dans toute relation d’un point à un autre »” (1986, 44). The abstract machine of the prison shows the relations of force that come together to bring a disparate population into the workings of the machine.

Now this outline or limits of power might be taken as something “outside” the prison and its two discourses. In other words, one might be led to believe that the diagram acts as a transcendental force or power or an ideological superstructure. According to Deleuze this is not the case. We recall that we defined the diagram as that which brings together the two discourses of the prison within a plane of immanence. According to Deleuze, the diagram is the non-unifying, immanent cause that co-exists throughout the social field in question (1986, 44). The diagram is the relation of forces that comes together, bringing one intensity into relation with another so that an entire field of relations exists. A virtual web of intensities actualizes itself, thus creating a primary, positive differentiation that is then repeated a second time, resulting in the
divisions or differences present within the stratum. Deleuze explains this rather complicated movement:

Si les effets actualisent, c’est parce que les rapports de force ou de pouvoir ne sont que virtuels, potentiels, instables, évanouissants, moléculaires, et définissent seulement des possibilités, des probabilités d’interaction, tant qu’ils n’entrent pas dans un ensemble macroscopique capable de donner une forme à leur matière fluente et à leur fonction diffuse. Mais aussi bien l’actualisation est une intégration, un ensemble d’intégrations progressives, d’abord locales, puis globales ou tendant à être globales, opérant un alignement, une homogénéisation, une sommation des rapports des forces... Enfin, l’actualisation-intégration est une différenciation : non pas parce que la cause en voie d’actualisation serait une Unité souveraine, mais au contraire parce que la multiplicité diagrammatique ne peut s’actualiser, le différentiel des forces ne peut s’intégrer, qu’en s’engageant dans des voies divergentes, en se répartissant dans des dualismes, en suivant des lignes de différenciation sans lesquelles tout resterait dans la dispersion d’une cause ineffectuée (1986, 45).

This movement of actualization, of divergence, necessarily takes a form of “doubling” so that dualities appear within an agencement. Thus, within the abstract prison machine, the dualities of classes, of governors and governed, of the public and the private, etc. appear through its actualization (1986, 45). However, more importantly, it is this division which creates the seemingly unbridgeable difference between what are, in fact, two forms of actualization: the forms of expression and the forms of content (1986, 45).

The immanent movement of actualization ignores the differences between these forms, slicing down this division and, in the case of our example, actualizing the agencement of the prison. The multiplicity of the divisions in the agencement allows for any number of developments to occur through the process of actualization. This process occurs in one manner and not another because of the relations of power that exist between each element. With each actualization, the overall structure of the stratum differentiates itself, so that while the movement brings elements together, they are also
differentiated and multiplied. At no point does this movement imply a sort of hierarchical or transcendental unity, which guides its formation and structure. The prison, understood as a stratum or historical formation, is the result of this movement of actualization and differentiation. Deleuze’s method thus traces backwards, through the geology of the strata to reveal the plane of immanence present within the most concrete or “practical” of historical formations.

Deleuze insists on an interpretation of strata and territories that exceeds any anthropological centering. Thus, another way of understanding this movement of double articulation would be to turn to the world of biological reproduction. The chemical processes of cellular chemistry reveal the same movement of “sampling” and differentiation as exists in the formation of the prison. Deleuze notes that an immense number of reactions occurs within a cell so that the various differences that exist between each element come together to form a certain number of small molecules (1980, 56). These small molecules then order themselves in a particular way so that they form larger molecules (1980, 56-57). This movement mirrors the movement outlined above because the elements present in a cell can come together in any number of ways, so that we might say they have a virtual existence or potential for combination. Once they come together, this virtual existence is actualized in the form of small molecules, which in turn have a virtual potential. This double movement of actualization and differentiation brings a multiple formation together, immanently, within a single structure – in this case the biological makeup of a living being.

We might note the same movement within reproduction as it is regulated by DNA, as Deleuze does when he explains, “...le code génétique n’est pas séparable à son
tour d'une double segmentarité ou d'une double articulation qui passe maintenant entre
deux types de molécules indépendantes, d'une part la séquence des unités protéiques,
d'autre part celle des unités nucléiques, les unités d'un même type ayant des rapports
binaires" (1980, 57). Such an example illustrates why or how Deleuze can declare that
the distinction between the content and the expression of a particular stratum, even if
distinct, is relative. That is, certain elements of a stratum assume roles that are that of the
expression of the machine (the division and differentiation of cells, for example).
However, these elements become, at other moments, elements of the content of a
machine (once again, cells, for example). This distinction does not necessarily coincide
with the forms or substances of each articulation (a certain organism as a form and its
identity, history, etc. as its substance), but it does show how each articulation is a double
articulation (1980, 59). As Deleuze explains:

...les protéines de contenu ont deux formes, dont l'une (la fibre repliée)
prend un rôle d'expression fonctionnelle par rapport à l'autre. Et de
même, du côté des acides nucléiques d'expression, des articulations
doubles font jouer à certains éléments formels et substantiels un rôle de
contenu par rapport à d'autres : non seulement la moitié de la chaîne qui se
trouve reproduite par l'autre devient contenu, mais la chaîne reconstituée

2. The Body Without Organs

Besides being made up of a double articulation, we also noted that there is another
"double" aspect to an agencement, that of its two faces. One face of an agencement is
turned toward the interstrate, the hardened, solidified structure that gives us the historical
formation in its form as a "positivity" or "molar" formation. The other is turned toward
the métasstrate or body without organs which is described by Deleuze as being
"...traversé de matières instables non formées, de flux en tous sens, d'intensités libres ou
de singularités nomades, de particules folles ou transitoires” (1980, 53-54). This definition of the body without organs as a “space” of unstable forces or intensities will recall our discussion of the outside and chaos as it relates to territories and thought in the preceding chapter. A territory comes together through repetition to form a consistent, defined boundary that gives it its shape. However, this repetition or ritornello also opens the territory up to a movement of deterritorialization, so that the territory is revealed as being both solid and in motion. In the same way, an agencement or stratum comes together in a relatively stable form, tying together code and territory to give the stratum definition. But this very definition – this very “unity” – reveals the exterior of the stratum or agencement. This exterior is the other face of the agencement, the body without organs. To illustrate this, Deleuze gives the example of a stratum of a crystalline structure. The crystal is a relatively stable structure with a clearly defined interior and exterior (1980, 65). The outside face of this structure is turned toward the body without organs or the chance nature of intensities that might come to form another stratum with the crystal. Yet this way of reading the interior and exterior of an agencement is overly simple. Deleuze notes that the seed of the crystal actually comes from the exterior, from the body without organs. He explains:

...sur une strate cristalline, le milieu amorphe est extérieur au germe au moment où le cristal n’est pas encore constitué ; mais le cristal ne se constitue pas sans intérioriser et incorporer des masses du matériel amorphe. Inversement l’intériorité du germe cristallin doit passer dans l’extériorité du système où le milieu amorphe peut cristalliser... au point que c’est le germe qui vient du dehors (1980, 65).

Understood this way, the interior and the exterior of the stratum, paradoxically, are interior to the stratum.
The exteriority of the stratum is important in understanding the immanent structure of an *agencement*. We recall that a stratum possesses a unity so that it may be defined as that, a stratum. A prison or an organism most certainly have a unity, which is the result of the relation that exists between various molecular materials, substantial elements and formal traits (1980, 65). However, this unity is deceptive. For though a prison is a certain *agencement* or stratum, its unity is quickly revealed as being made up of a number of heterogeneous elements, as we noted above. The same is true for even the simplest cellular structure. If we return to the cellular example of above, we might note that the unity of a stratum is defined by the exchange of energy in chemical reactions and liaisons (1980, 60). To explain this unity, Deleuze again returns to the terminology of crystalline structures, for he sees in such structures an isomorphic movement, bringing together the diverse elements of a structure but never forcing them into a relationship of correspondence (1980, 61). What occurs is a sort of “folding” in which one element folds itself into another so that the radically different chemical compositions that make up simple molecular structures come together, like a crystal, giving the structure a unity or a form. The content and expression of these elements may be radically different, but it is the *outside*, the force of outside influences or forces, that fold these elements together, producing a structure that is a stratum while nonetheless preserving the radical difference in each of its elements.

Moving slightly higher up the scale of evolution, Deleuze evokes the development of a living creature to explain this movement of folding or isomorphism:

Les matériaux n’atteignent pas partout sur la strate le degré qui leur permettrait de constituer tel ou tel ensemble. Les éléments anatomiques peuvent être ici et là arrêtés ou inhibés, par percussion moléculaire, influence du milieu ou pression des voisins, si bien qu’ils ne composent
Each abstract machine or agencement expresses itself according to its own, immanent limits. Thus, across a stratum, a certain abstract animal expresses itself, like the tortoise, with its neck and tail developed in such a way that it differs from all other vertebrates (1980, 62). However, the stratum of the animal does not end with the animal's body itself; its agencement comprises its environment. In this way an even greater degree of differentiation is introduced into the stratum. Deleuze notes that the abstract animal must be understood in relation to its population of packs, colonies, collectivities, or multiplicities (1980, 63). Furthermore, the development within these collectives is calculated according to rates of speed, coefficients, and differential relations (1980, 63). Thus, the individual animal is understood as being part of an environment of other abstract animals, and the relationship it has with these other animals is always a differential one.

These examples from biology and evolution seem to have diverted us from our discussion of strata, but nothing could be further from the case. The unity of a stratum comes not only from the relations established within the formation, but also from the outside. Each element of the structure (a substratum) is as complex as the larger formation, but it is the element of the outside, which is the most important to Deleuze. Thus, the point of encounter, within a stratum, between the interior and the exterior is what Deleuze defines as an epistratum, a sort of membrane where the exchange takes place (1980, 66). In this way, an epistratum might be understood as a substratum which
comes into contact with the outside. Thus, at one moment, a substratum forms part of the interior of a formation but then it suddenly takes on the function of the exterior (1980, 66). Deleuze notes that this region of encounter might be termed the central ring of a stratum, but this very notion of centrality is deceptive, for a stratum really has no center (1980, 66).

Perhaps a better way to understand this strange geology is to consider another aspect of these epistrata in their form as an associated milieu. Deleuze notes that the nomad acquisitions that take place within a stratum force it to come into contact with materials that might be described as “plus étrangers et moins commodes” (1980, 67). Thus, an organism that nourished itself in one way might come to “nourish” itself with air through a new form of respiration (the transfer of water-based reptiles to the land) (1980, 67). Or an *agencement* might be led to discern things in a new way and to react to their presence. A tick acquires the sense of “acquisition” of a being that passes below it (the scent of sweat and heat), and it uses gravity to speed up its “capture” of this prey (1980, 67-68). In this manner, the stratum folds itself on the outside of the body without organs. The fold may occur at levels that are hard to discern. For example, at the molecular level, even cells acquire new ways to sense and react to other molecules. In contrast, the fold may occur so that it is easily discernible, such as the associated milieu of the spider’s web (1980, 68). We should then be careful when discussing the fold as the “central ring” of a stratum, for it can occur at any point within the formation. In order to avoid confusion, Deleuze defines the exteriority of the stratum in two different ways. An *epistratum* is a stratum within a formation where the encounter with the exterior takes place. When an *epistratum* moves towards the associated milieu of a stratum, it forms a sort of broken
ring of exteriority, marking the edges of the stratum. Deleuze defines this form of epistratum as a parastratum.

Now, this placement of the exterior within the interior of a stratum brings us back to the double articulation present in a stratum. We recall that the first movement of the double articulation involves a “sampling” of intensities from the body without organs which are then folded in a second articulation so that the various elements of the stratum come into relation with each other and give it a unity. Furthermore, each movement of articulation involves a form and a substance, a code and a territory. The two “types” of interstrata, the parastratum and the epistratum correspond to the code and territory found in a stratum (1980, 70). Thus, the parastratum, that part of the stratum that breaks up and brings other relations into the stratum, contains the code or form of the stratum. For instance, an abstract animal contains the parastrata, which hold the molecular code of the animal, helping to give it its form (mammal, reptile, legs, tail, etc.). As Deleuze explains, “Il [faut] déjà toute une population moléculaire pour être codée, et les effets du code ou d’un changement dans le code s’évaluaient au niveau d’une population plus ou moins molaire, en vertu de son aptitude à se propager dans le milieu, ou à se créer un nouveau milieu associé dans lequel la modification serait popularisable” (1980, 69). This change within a stratum is the “nomad acquisition” noted earlier, so that an abstract animal mutates as it incorporates the associated milieu. The animal mutates and adapts so that it develops to its fullest possible degree as the code is decoded in favor of a new code. 

The substance of the stratum then corresponds to the epistratum, that part of the stratum that folds the exterior within the interior of the formation, moving or shifting from the exterior to the interior and back again to the exterior. If the parastratum
corresponds to a stratum’s code, the *epistratum* corresponds to its territory. Again, we must be careful to follow the double articulation laid out by Deleuze. The form of the stratum is “infused” by the outside so that its form is constantly changing, undergoing a “decoding.” In the same manner, the substance of the stratum also undergoes changes so that with each substance a territory is formed that is then deterritorialized by contact with the outside. Again, to take the example of biological changes, the movement from a cellular reaction to a combination of molecules (which then form an enzyme, and which then give way, in turn, to the formation of organic material, flesh and bone) is just such a movement of territorialization followed by deterritorialization. The substance of the stratum crosses various thresholds of expression, drawing it into a new territory as the stratum develops. As Deleuze declares:

Il faut penser la déterritorialisation comme une puissance parfaitement positive, qui possède ses degrés et ses seuils (épistrate), et toujours relative, ayant un envers, ayant une complémentarité dans la reterritorialisation. Un organisme déterritorialisé par rapport à l’extérieur se reterritorialise nécessairement sur ses milieux intérieurs. Tel fragment présumé d’embryon se déterritorialise en changeant de seuil ou de gradient, mais reçoit une nouvelle affectation du nouvel entourage (1980, 71).

It is this reference to the interior milieus that allows Deleuze to make the overall distinction between epistrata and parastrata as well as to link them to the form and substance of the stratum. The “outside” contact that occurs along the parastrata, while difficult to localize within a geography or geometry of space, is characterized by changes in the form of the stratum (a decoding that often corresponds to the mutations associated with evolution). Because its edges or its “outside” define the form of a stratum, this particular movement or fold can be termed as being part of the “exterior” of the stratum. In the same way, if the *epistratum* is associated with the stratum’s substance, the
movement of deterritorialization within the *epistratum* necessarily takes place in the stratum’s “interior.” Thus, if we take the example of a body’s growth and development, the various chemical and biological thresholds it crosses as it develops, deterritorialize its substance, which is necessarily contained within the stratum. The distinction between the code and the territory (the stratum’s form and substance) and the exterior and interior may seem trivial and overly difficult. It is important however to understand that Deleuze is writing against the traditional distinctions that allow one to divide the world into clusters of words and things, subjects and objects, etc. We might better understand this distinction in relation to Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza. In chapter one, we noted how Deleuze advocated a philosophical method based on a Spinozan ethology. The interior or exterior of a stratum goes beyond the definition we might give an animal such as a horse or dog. It involves the animal’s milieu, its development with other species, its potential, its relation to its own species, etc. Deleuze explains:

> Jamais donc un animal, une chose, n’est séparable de ses rapports avec le monde : l’intérieur est seulement un extérieur sélectionné, l’extérieur, un intérieur projeté ; la vitesse ou la lenteur des métabolismes, des perceptions, actions et réactions s’enchaînent pour constituer tel individu dans le monde. Et... il y a la manière dont ces rapports de vitesse et de lenteur sont effectués suivant les circonstances, ou ces pouvoirs d’être affecté, remplis. (1981a, 168-169)

We may also return again to Foucault’s analysis of the prison to explain this shift in distinctions or definitions. Above, we noted how the term “prison” never refers simply to the object or structure of the prison itself, but to the expression of criminal law as it defines delinquency and criminality as well as the “substance” of prison, its prisoners. In the same way, the structure of the prison is not only the actual building or physical structure but also the visible object of crime, criminality, punishment, the prisoner, etc.
When these two articulations, the form and the substance of the prison, come into contact with each other, their expression and content connect in such a way as to produce the modern notion of the prison. The very same movements of sampling of outside force, of double articulation, which Deleuze reads as existing in living organisms, may be found in the prison. Deleuze explains:

La prison, c’est une forme, la « forme-prison », une forme de contenu sur une strate, en rapport avec d’autres formes de contenus (école, caserne, hôpital, usine). Or cette chose ou cette forme ne renvoie pas au mot « prison », mais à de tout autres mots et concepts, tels que « délinquant, délinquance », qui expriment une nouvelle manière de classer, d’énoncer, de traduire et même de faire des actes criminels. Ce n’est pas du tout un signifiant, même juridique, dont la prison serait le signifié... La forme d’expression d’ailleurs ne se réduit pas à des mots, mais à un ensemble d’énoncés qui surgissent dans le champ social considéré comme strate... La forme de contenu ne se réduit pas à une chose, mais à un état de chose complexe comme formation de puissance... (1980, 86).

The reference to power at the end of this passage is important for Foucault’s analysis of various discursive formations. Deleuze understands Foucault’s definition of power in Nietzschean terms as a “power relation” in which power is not understood in terms of violence but rather in terms of the relations that exist between various forces. Thus power is defined as the power to incite, to induce, to divert, to make easy or difficult, to enlarge, to limit, to make more or less probable, etc. (1986, 77). For Deleuze, power in this sense is the power to be affected (1986, 78). The prison is then a place where a certain power is exercised, but power in a larger, less-restricted sense is what allows the formation of the prison to come into place. Power “pre-exists” the prison in this manner, bringing the various forces into relation with each other as well as predisposing these forces to new relations of power. For Deleuze, power follows the movement of double articulation outlined above, creating a diagram, which helps to give
a stratum its form and content. Deleuze explains, "On pourra donc définir le diagramme de plusieurs façons qui s'enchaînent : c'est la présentation des rapports de forces propres à une formation ; c'est la répartition des pouvoirs d'affecter et des pouvoirs d'être affecté ; c'est le brassage des pures fonctions non-formalisées et des pures matières non-formées" (1986, 79).

Power, then, forms a diagram in which a cross-fertilization of functions and matter takes place. To return to our discussion of strata and their two faces and double articulation, the stratum or historical formation of the prison has one face turned toward the stratified formation of interstrata. This is the knowledge we have of it and which allows us to answer various questions about the stratum: What may we say about the prison? How can we see it? etc. The other face of the stratum is the face turned toward the body without organs, or non-stratified intensities or forces. This is the power of the prison. Power is the distribution of the various intensities that give way to what we may know about a historical formation. Power affects the first movement of the double articulation present in a stratum. It samples the collection of virtual intensities that make up a stratum, selecting those that will be affected and actualized. In this way, power remains unknown. As Deleuze explains, "À la fois locaux, instables, et diffus, les rapports de pouvoir n'émanent pas d'un point central ou d'un foyer unique de souveraineté, mais vont à chaque instant « d'un point à un autre » dans un champ de forces... C'est pourquoi ils ne sont pas « localisables » dans telle ou telle instance" (1986, 80).

We can understand power as the force or fold emanating from the outside. It is the force that brings a formation together, stratifying it. Just as an organism is made up
of molecular structures, so too is a historical formation. These microstructures of individuals, homes, families, schools, etc. are actualizations of various intensities. Power is the fold from the outside that brings each of these elements into a structure or form, affecting them, so that a larger structure or diagram comes into existence. In this case, the diagram is that of the prison. Each element is held in place by the diagram of power, yet this structure is by definition open to change. That is, each point in the structure of power may be affected by another point so that the formation or stratum of the prison may shift or change at any point within its structure.

Above, we noted how the double articulation of the "regimes" of visibility and language present in a historical formation are heterogeneous. The double articulation of the formation's form and content is reflected in the deeper cleavage that exists between the formation's expression of a certain knowledge and a certain power. Deleuze explains, "Dans chaque formation, une forme de réceptivité qui constitue le visible, et une forme de spontanéité qui constitue l'énonçable. Certes, ces deux formes ne coïncident pas avec les deux aspects de la force ou les deux sortes d'affects, réceptivité du pouvoir d'être affecté et spontanéité du pouvoir d'afecter. Mais elles en dérivent, elles y trouvent leurs « conditions internes » (1986, 84). Thus, the division between a formation's content and expression is found expressed in a larger, more-encompassing instance which occurs with the actualization of the diagram's relations of power. The historical formation of the prison is the structure or stratum in which the relations of power are in immanent relation with one another. If power holds a certain place over knowledge, it is because the "micro-physics" of power reveals the relations of force present in non-stratified elements (1986, 90). That is, power as the movement of force
from the outside, is always in motion, always becoming, so that the diagram of forces that make up a historical formation is revealed as a non-place. Deleuze explains, "C’est que les forces en rapport sont inséparables des variations de leurs distances ou de leurs rapports. Bref, les forces sont en perpétuel devenir...le diagramme, en tant qu’il expose un ensemble de rapports de forces, n’est pas un lieu, mais plutôt « un non-lieu » : ce n’est un lieu que pour les mutations" (1986, 91). This movement of becoming needs the crystallizing quality of the historical formation in order to become perceived or known. Thus, the prison, like a living organism, is revealed as a formation that is always changing, always becoming. The prison is shown to “fold,” revealing not only a “historical” or actual formation, but also a virtual becoming. Deleuze explains this movement as “un devenir des forces qui double l’histoire” (1986, 91).

The stratum, the historical formation, the concrete machine and its abstract counterpart – all of these terms are used to describe Deleuze’s concept of *agencement*, in which the various heterogeneous elements of a formation are brought together. As Peggy Kamuf has noted, the definition of an *agencement*, which has no true English equivalent, means an arrangement or organization of a set by a combination of elements. However, the infinitive, *agencer*, has an older definition meaning “to embellish or to adorn,” which recalls the medieval Latin, *genitus*, meaning not just born or engendered, but *well-born* (Kamuf, 11). Deleuze’s method is to reveal how an object or subject is much more than “just” a “subject or object.” As Kamuf notes, the well-born demands preservation, reproduction, and repetition (11). It is, in other words, an institution. The prison is an institution, but so is the human subject as well as the objects it studies (prisons, languages, etc.). What Deleuze seeks to do is to reveal the folds present in an object so
that its limited, institutional mask is dropped in favor of the open, machine-like, and generating, stratum of the agencement. In this way, even the most closed, and repressive of objects is shown to be open and becoming, thus affirming a positive form of practical philosophy. Now, if Deleuze’s method is to show how an agencement is a much more open and unrestricted formation than is often thought, such a critical maneuver must be accomplished by overturning an agencement’s most successful invention – the subject or agent behind the agencement.

B. Subjectivity

1. Linguistics

In the twentieth century, the field of linguistics, and particularly the work of Ferdinand de Saussure, has been of special interest to philosophers and theorists alike. The role of the sign as it functions within the field of linguistics has led to a number of theoretical innovations not only in philosophy, but also in literary analysis, history, and sociology. As we shall see in our second sub-section, the importance (or, more precisely, the disappearing importance) of a subject or agent within this system of signs is the central focus of French structuralist and post-structuralist thought. Indeed, structuralism takes its name from the underlying structure that is to be found in language. Deleuze is quick to note that the very idea that language is a system or structure forcibly leads to a certain number of assumptions about language and the way it is perceived. He declares, “La question des invariants structuraux... est essentielle pour la linguistique. C'est la condition sous laquelle la linguistique peut se réclamer d'une pure scientificité... à l'abri
de tout facteur prétendu extérieur ou pragmatique” (1980, 116). Deleuze then notes that language is understood by linguists to be made up of several constants such as phonological constants, syntactic constants, semantic constants, etc. (1980, 116). There are also certain linguistic universals, which Deleuze describes as “arbres” in that, “…[ils] relient les constantes entre elles, avec des relations binaires sur l’ensemble des arbres (cf. la méthode linéaire arborescente de Chomsky) (1980, 116). To this list of “invariants” or constants, he adds, “…la compétence, coextensive en droit à la langue et définie par les jugements de grammaticalité…l’homogénéité, qui porte sur les éléments et les relations non moins que sur les jugements intuitifs…la synchronie, qui érige un « en-soi » et un « pour-soi » de la langue, passant perpétuellement du système objectif à la conscience subjective qui l’appréhende en droit (celle du linguiste lui-même)” (1980, 116-117).

Now, for Deleuze, the appearance of “structural invariants” is very much a part of language and linguistics. However, what we must understand is that these invariants appear as a result of the agencement of language. Language works because of the way its content and expression come together in the form of an abstract machine, giving us the illusion that a true subject or agent stands behind or outside language (the objective system of language that is perceived by a subjective consciousness), but this agent or subject always comes second, as a result of language’s agencement.

Let us take an example. A teacher gives a lesson. In French, “il/elle enseigne.” For Deleuze, this activity might be better understood as “l’enseignement,” for the teacher gives what he terms a mot d’ordre or watchword (1980, 95). This seems curious at first, for a lesson, such as a grammar lesson or a mathematical proof does not seem to be a command or order. However, the very base of the lesson, the énoncé, is an order around
which the entire system is built. The watchword of a lesson tells the pupil how to situate herself within the language system (1980, 95). Thus, a grammar lesson is a command for the system of dualities that exist in a language such as singular/plural, masculine/feminine, for example. But the énoncé is already a part of the structure of language, so it has a redundant quality, serving to reinforce that which already contains it. This paradoxical and redundant status of the watchword or command helps to explain the agencement of language. Deleuze explains, “Nous appelons mots d’ordre, non pas une catégorie particulière d’énoncés explicites (par exemple à l’impératif), mais le rapport de tout mot ou tout énoncé avec des présupposés implicites, c’est-à-dire avec des actes de parole qui s’accomplissent dans l’énoncé, et ne peuvent s’accomplir qu’en lui” (1980, 100). In other words, a watchword refers back not only to commands, but also to all the linguistic acts that are linked to that particular watchword, at that particular moment. For Deleuze, language must be understood as a machine, producing a certain meaning that is tied up with the very event of the énoncé or watchword. Thus, between the watchword itself, the énoncé, and the act of which it is part, there is no identity; the relationship between the two is interior or immanent (1980, 100).

The watchword mobilizes the relations among the various acts present within a given language, giving the language its structure and meaning or grammar. In this way, Deleuze opposes the agencement of the watchword (with its redundant nature) to the traditional linguistic analysis of language. According to Deleuze, this analysis subordinates the significance or meaning of the information in the watchword and the subjectivity of the act of communication to the redundancy uncovered in language’s agencement (1980, 101). That is, language theorists would have it that language is the
communication of information that is transmitted by a subject (of the enunciation). For Deleuze, such “constants” as communication and subjectivity are only the results of the mobilization effected by the watchword. He declares:

Il arrive qu’on sépare information et communication ; il arrive aussi qu’on dégage une signification abstraite de l’information, et une subjectivation abstraite de la communication…Il n’y a pas de signification indépendante des significations dominantes, pas de subjectivation indépendante d’un ordre établi d’assujettissement. Toutes deux dépendent de la nature et de la transmission des mots d’ordre dans un champ social donné (1980, 101).

Another manner of understanding this notion of agencement would be to see it as a large apparatus of free, indirect discourse in which the individuation of each énoncé as well as the subjectivation of the énoncé emerges only as part of the larger, collective agencement. We might take as en example one a passage from Proust’s Recherche in which a character (Charlus, for example) begins speaking, but as the monologue continues, we realize that the individual énoncé is part of a larger agencement of numerous other characters (Jupien, young girls, the narrator, etc.) so that Charlus is “spoken” indirectly by this larger “murmur” of language (1980, 101) (we shall return to an extended study of Proust and Deleuze in chapter six, below).

To better understand this notion, Deleuze calls on the Stoic notion of incorporeal changes in language to explain the redundancy of the watchword. An incorporeal event is the transformation a “body” undergoes when the body is defined in a way that differs from its previous definition but which does not “change” the body as we understand it. Deleuze gives the example of the moment a person or body reaches the age of majority. It is indeed the case that a body has a certain age, a certain movement of growing older, of maturing, but when society suddenly determines that the body has reached its majority such a change does not take into account the physical nature of the body. This change is
an incorporeal transformation. As Deleuze declares, "La transformation incorporelle se reconnait à son instantanéité, à son immédiateté, à la simultanéité de l’énoncé qui l’exprime et de l’effet qu’elle produit ; ce pourquoi les mots d’ordre sont strictement datés, heure, minute et seconde, et valent aussitôt que datés" (1980, 102-103). The transformation of "Tu n’es plus un enfant..." expresses an attribute that is incorporeal to the body in question. When the watchword, "Tu n’es plus un enfant," is pronounced, a redundancy occurs, for it is not only the body of the person in question that is changed, but the entire alignment of the circumstances surrounding the body. In other words, the agencement of language shifts and changes with the watchword. This may be imperceptible when it is part of the passage to the age of majority, but it is certainly obvious when the incorporeal transformation concerns an entire socio-economic structure, such as the monetary crash of Germany on November 20, 1923 (1980, 103). In this way, Deleuze insists that the watchword and its redundancy necessarily bring the exterior relations of language into play. Thus, the watchword, "I do swear," is not the same watchword when it is expressed inside of the family, inside of the courthouse, inside of an amorous relationship, or inside of a secret society. The incorporeal transformation takes place, but it is not the same transformation within each context. For Deleuze, the watchword brings language into relation with the outside, and this is what distinguishes his understanding of linguistics from that of traditional linguists. He explains:

Il y a des variables d’expression qui mettent la langue en rapport avec le dehors, mais précisément parce qu’elles sont immanentes à la langue. Tant que la linguistique en reste à des constantes phonologiques, morphologiques ou syntaxiques, elle rapporte l’énoncé à un signifiant et l’énonciation à un sujet, elle rate ainsi l’agencement, elle renvoie les
circumstances à l'extérieur, ferme la langue sur soi et fait de la pragmatique un résidu (1980, 104).

The instantaneous nature of the watchword and its immanent relation with language gives it a power of variation that is always in relation with the variation subsumed by the body in question. For Deleuze, understanding language in this way is to understand it pragmatically or politically. The conditions exterior to the watchword help to explain the incorporeal transformation that takes place; however, neither the exterior conditions nor the watchword itself precede one another. The two emerge simultaneously. Thus, the watchword, “I do swear,” is part of the socio-economic relations of bourgeois society when it is pronounced within a church as part of a marriage ceremony. The watchword crystallizes these conditions, as it were, so that the incorporeal transformation takes place not only at the level of the individual “bodies” but at the level of the entire social “body” in question.

Finally, the *agencement* of a certain watchword and its outside is part of a larger semiotic machine that includes all possible *agencements*. The watchword is not only redundant within its own *agencement* or regime, but within the entire semiotic machine. Returning to the notion of free, indirect discourse, Deleuze underlines how the semiotic machine allows for numerous watchwords and *agencements* to slip into each other, to contain each other, to refer to each other, and to create new watchwords. He declares, “C’est donc de plusieurs façons que le mot d’ordre est redondance ; il ne l’est pas seulement en fonction d’une transmission qui lui est essentielle, il l’est aussi en lui-même et dès son émission, sous son rapport « immédiat » avec l’acte ou la transformation qu’il effectue. Même le mot d’ordre en rupture avec une sémiotique considérée est déjà redondance” (1980, 106). The “rupture” that the new use of a watchword might
constitute is, according to Deleuze, part of the options that the larger semiotic machine offers. In this way, the watchword is like free, indirect discourse, because any act of "direct discourse" (that is, any discourse that might be attributed to a subject or an agent) always contains a part of the indirect discourse of the larger semiotic machine.

Deleuze understands the agencement of language as not defining language itself, but in allowing language to function in the way it does. In doing so, he makes a careful distinction, noting that even the constants of language (phonological, semantic, syntactical, etc.) are part of the agencement. The illusion is to believe that these constants are what make up a language. It is the agencement and the incorporeal transformation that take place within an agencement of language, which allow the constants to emerge and be considered as part of language. It then follows that an agent or subject is just as much a part of the agencement as the constants which define it. In this way, the entire lot – language, its function as language, its watchwords, and the agencements that contain these watchwords – are caught up together. The mistake of modern linguistics is to abstractly separate the constants from language without taking account of the conditions and use of language (1980, 108-109).

Now, if one were to take into account these very conditions and uses of language, one would quickly notice that language takes on two formalizations, in spite of the incorporeal transformations of the agencement of language. The formalizations are those that we have already encountered in our study of Foucault's method – that of content and expression (1980, 109). As we noted above, Deleuze underlines the irreducibility of the form of expression to the representation or description of a certain content that corresponds to the expression (1980, 109). The content and the expression of language
have different forms. Deleuze notes how this distinction of forms can be traced back to the Stoics, so that an incorporeal act (the expression in language) is set apart from the body or content of language. Deleuze explains, "Quand le couteau entre dans la chair, quand l'aliment ou le poison se répand dans le corps, quand la goutte de vin est versée dans l'eau, il y a mélangé de corps ; mais les énoncés « le couteau coupe la chair », « je mange », « l'eau rougit », exprime [sic] des transformations incorporelles d'une toute autre nature..." (1980, 109). The very fact that an incorporeal transformation is visible within this mixture of bodies reveals the heterogeneous nature of the two forms. By expressing the incorporeal attribute (the knife cuts the flesh, for instance) as well as attributing it to the body, what occurs is not a representation or reference to the bodies of the knife and flesh, but an intervention of sorts, revealing the agencement of language (1980, 110). Deleuze insists on this constant movement of intervention to explain the functioning of the watchword within the structure of language. The instantaneous transformation of the watchword is always inserting itself within the fabric of continuous modification, so that each transformation (each date or plateau) is also the état des lieux of the body in question. As Deleuze explains, "Un agencement d'énonciation ne parle pas « des » choses, mais parle à même les états de choses ou les états de contenu" (1980, 110). In this way, the agencement of language might be described as neither a chain of watchwords nor a causal relation of contents of bodies, but rather a sequence of contents and expressions so that one flows into the other (1980, 111). Thus, the conditions and use of language are brought once again into the equation so that language is never separated from its outside conditions.
To speak of an intervention of content and expression is also to bring us back to the notions of territory and movements of de- and re-territorialization. That is, this movement of insertion implies a change in the body in question, and the bodies of both the content and expression are deterritorialized as they enter into relation with each other. The movement of deterritorialization then becomes a movement of reterritorialization as the new body takes shape. To return to the examples above, when the knife cuts the flesh, there is an interaction of two bodies, that of the knife and the body that are deterritorialized by the new relation, which is the relation included in the *agencement* of the expression, "The knife cuts the flesh." At the very moment that this expression is uttered, a balance exists between the bodies in relation and their state of deterritorialization to each other. The statement or watchword is precisely dated to determine what Deleuze terms the "variables" of the content and expression. This may seem to be a very obvious operation, taking into account the variables that occur at each moment and their relation with the "outside" of the *agencement* of language, but it is one that Deleuze explains is often ignored in more traditional analyses.

To illustrate, let us venture briefly into the analysis Deleuze offers of the feudal *agencement* (1980, 112-113). To analyze this machine, we would have to take into account the different mixes of bodies present in the feudal system (the earth, the social body which would include the lord, his vassals and serfs, the knight and his horse, the weapons used, the revolutionary presence of the stirrup, etc) as well as the entire *agencement* of feudal enunciation (the juridical regime, the collection of incorporeal transformations including various pledges and vows, etc.) (1980, 112-113). Finally, the movement of territorialization as it was part of the Crusades would also have to be
considered (1980, 113). For Deleuze, the force of the concept of *agencement* is its analysis of the *agencement* as the necessary mixture of bodies at a particular moment. In this way, the stirrup’s importance concerning warfare and the deterritorializing movement it provokes is best understood as being part of the intervention or mixture of bodies. He declares, “L’étrier entraîne une nouvelle symbiose homme-cheval, laquelle entraîne en même temps de nouvelles armes et de nouveaux instruments. Les outils ne sont pas séparables des symbioses ou alliages qui définissent un agencement machinique Nature-Société... une société se définit par ses alliages et non par ses outils” (1980, 114).

To speak of the stirrup in the Crusades is to speak of the intervention that takes place between the content of the feudal body and its expression. The stirrup is understood as part of the “machinic” *agencement* and should in no way be confused with a model of analysis that is based on production (Marxism) in which “extrinsic” models such as the “base” or “superstructure” are used to explain a certain socio-economic situation (1980, 114). Again, the *agencement* studied is a precisely dated one, and it is used to explain the mixture of bodies (the machinic *agencement* of bodies and the collective *agencement* of expression) that exists at a particular moment, showing how what exists within the *agencement emerges* or is *possible* because of the bodies that are in contact with each other. In this way, a social field, such as that of feudal society, is best understood not in terms of exterior constants or universals, but by the “lines of flight” that it produces (1980, 114).

Now, this window onto what Deleuze terms the “machinic field” of *agencement* has turned us momentarily away from linguistics. However, this definition of an *agencement* by its lines of flight rather than a collection of “universal constants” such as
an “infrastructure” or “superstructure” leads us back to our discussion of linguistics. Deleuze notes that by defining language by a set of constants, linguists base their study of language on what he terms a “major language” (1980, 127). That is, we are confronted with the problem of a ground or subject on which we can place ourselves in order to make statements or judgements about language. For if an *agencement* is best defined not by the constants that it seems to produce but, rather, by its lines of flight, how can such a line of flight be defined, if not from a ground or center? Indeed, the question at hand sends us back to the paradoxical nature of both the territory and the stratum. That is, both the stratum and the territory possess a “face” which is turned toward the “solid,” “molar” formation so that the structure might be said to “harden” into a defined structure. Yet the opposite face of a territory or stratum is also turned toward the body without organs or the outside, so that even in its most “hardened” formation, a stratum or territory, is opened up to the deterritorializing movement of the outside. As we have seen above, Deleuze insists that the correct way to understand this “paradox” is in the immanent structure of the *agencement* and the actualization that takes place along its various lines of flight.

Let us return to the example of a watchword. When a person utters the watchword, “I do swear,” Deleuze stresses that we must understand it as an incorporeal actualization that is part of the *agencement* of language (1980, 119). Thus, when the watchword is pronounced in front of a judge by a grown man or in front of a priest by a husband with his wife, or finally in front of a parent by a child, we must take into account the variation that occurs within the watchword. The mistake would be to take the utterance as a constant (that is, as a constant of language, not simply as the simple
repetition of the same phrase or watchword). What occurs in the watchword "I do swear" is a variation, a line of flight along the virtual occurrences of the watchword. Each time the watchword is pronounced, a different collection of bodies (the machinic agencement) as well as a different collective agencement of expression are brought together. The "constant" of the watchword reveals a line of variation or flight that defines the agencement at work. Deleuze explains, "Non seulement il y a autant d'énoncés que d'effectuations, mais l'ensemble des énoncés se trouve présent dans l'effectuation de l'un d'eux, si bien que la ligne de variation est virtuelle, c'est-à-dire réelle sans être actuelle, continue par là même et quels que soient les sauts de l'énoncé" (1980, 119). Indeed, such lines of flight are visible when one notes a particular "style" that is present in the utterance. "Style" is certainly difficult to isolate in the above example of "I do swear" (although if we again place this utterance within the practical variations in which it is uttered certain variations of "style" could certainly be demonstrated – the style of the formal religious ceremony, the reluctant style of a child telling a lie, etc.) but we might certainly be able to understand the notions of agencement and style when considering the work of writers. When this occurs, Deleuze asserts that the agencement of a certain language "style" (in its form of continual variation – what Deleuze terms language used in a "minor" fashion in opposition to a "major" fashion as noted the preceding paragraph) makes itself seen and heard within the language. Deleuze explains, "...un style n'étant pas une création psychologique individuelle, mais un agencement d'énonciation, on ne pourra pas l'empêcher de faire une langue dans une autre langue" (1980, 123).

It is important to note that this "division" of language, in which "another" or "minor" language makes itself heard within a language (a "major" language) should be
understood as ways of *treat*ing language. Again, we recall from our study of the territory and the stratum that there are two manners in which one might *treat* these formations. In the same way, to oppose a major language to a supposed minor language poses a number of problems, the least of which would be a simple reversal of hierarchy, valorizing the minor language in place of its major counterpart. Deleuze reminds us that the variables that define a minor treatment of language are the very variables on which the constants of a major language are built (1980, 130-131). What truly distinguishes the two languages is the way the minor language forms an endless variation within the major language, constantly deterritorializing it. As Deleuze notes, “Les langues mineures n’existent pas en soi : n’existant que par rapport à une langue majeure, ce sont aussi des investissements de cette langue pour qu’elle devienne elle-même mineure” (1980, 133). And this brings us back, one last time, to the watchword, for we recall that the watchword is defined by its ability to shift according to the situation in which it is employed. In the same manner in which the watchword contains any number of variations in its deployment, Deleuze underlines how language, even when deployed in its major sense (that is, based on the multiple constants that limit its difference) nonetheless contains a multiplicity of variations so that a minor use of language is always possible (this manner of treating style resonates with our discussion of the ritornello and artistic style in the previous chapter).

2. **Psychoanalysis**

Deleuze’s double reading of the watchword (which mirrors the double reading we have been making of the territory and the stratum as well) offers us the opportunity to turn to perhaps the most important critique of subjective *agencement* in his work – that of
psychoanalysis. We have repeatedly insisted on the creative reading Deleuze makes of desire. In this context, desire must be understood as the immanent relation that occurs between various bodies where each body is able to come into relation with another and affect it. When this contact is immanent, desire is the productive movement of creation that results from this contact, extending as far as possible in the relation and changing each body in it. We might once again recall our example of the wasp and the orchid as an illustration of this creative definition of desire. When this relation is not immanent, when one body comes to dominate the other body, the relation falls out of immanence and into a transcendental relation. That is, one body remains fixed and unaffected by the relation, effectively deterritorializing the other body/bodies but remaining outside the movement of deterritorialization itself. Such a relation is antiproductive, and any number of examples might serve to illustrate it.\footnote{As we have noted, the posing of any sort of fixed element outside of the plane of immanence immediately tilts us back into an understanding of agencement as that which is engendered and which must be preserved (what we have otherwise termed an “image of thought,” a “philosophy of the state,” or a “tribunal of judgement”). Indeed, any fixed order in society (conventions, such as linguistic conventions or rules, institutions, or impulses or drives, as we shall see in due course) requires that productive desire become unproductive.}

Let us approach this problem from a different angle. In the traditional Freudian model of thought, desire must be repressed in its encounter with “reality.” This repression takes the form of the Oedipus complex in which the young boy’s desire for his mother (which is an unconscious fantasy) is repressed by the real and dominating presence of the father. Within this model, the boy’s sexual desire is fixed as a drive that
transcends society. That is, the Oedipus complex is to be found throughout Western society and is used as one means for explaining the various forms of neurosis and psychosis analyzed by Freud. Furthermore, desire corresponds to a lack – in this case, the boy desires the mother because she is placed outside of his reach. For Deleuze, on the other hand, desire is reality; there is no difference between the conscious and unconscious desire of the boy. Desire constructs reality. In addition, desire never reveals a lack but is part of the productive fullness or plenitude of reality. Desire is not repressed by reality but actually produces the reality that then operates this repression. Deleuze agrees with psychoanalysts who find the Oedipus complex to be part of the social reality around us, but he contends that the production of this complex is part of the larger social production of capitalism. The fixing of such a complex or drive is part of the larger movement of capitalism which requires its social repression to be reproduced on the psychic level. Thus, not only is the subject formed in such a way as to reproduce the larger social machine of capitalism, but the analysis of such a subject (be it in the form of Freudian or even Lacanian psychoanalysis or Marxism) reproduces the very movement it seeks to explain (by creating a universal convention or rule). The problem for Deleuze then is one of accounting for a productive desire that makes itself unproductive, desiring, as it were, its own proper death. Deleuze defines such an accounting not as psychoanalysis but rather as schizoanalysis.

In order to explain unproductive desire and the formation of a subject, Deleuze begins with what is now a familiar definition, that of the subject as a machine. Instead of the phenomenological subject which generates a representation of experience through the categories of reason, Deleuze insists on a subject defined as a process: a desiring
machine, "Il n’y a plus ni homme ni nature, mais uniquement un processus qui produit l’un dans l’autre et couple les machines. Partout des machines productrices ou désirantes, les machines schizophrenes, toute la vie générique : moi et non-moi, extérieur et intérieur, ne veulent plus rien dire" (1972, 8). This way of understanding subjectivity, by abolishing binary distinctions of interior and exterior, identity and non-identity, word and idea, closely resembles the experience of the schizophrenic subject. As Goodchild has noted, this is not meant to turn the schizophrenic into a postmodern hero and ideal, but it does allow us to understand the production of the subject and of a repressive subject within the immanent field of desire (Goodchild 1996, 82). Deleuze insists that the schizophrenic offers us insight into the productive nature of reality (1972, 9). Thus, three stages of production can be distinguished in these “desiring machines” which will help us understand the emergence of the subject as it has traditionally been conceived in philosophy and psychoanalysis: the “productions de productions,” the “productions d’enregistrements,” and the “productions de consommations” (1972, 10).

The “productions de productions” is the most basic stage of desiring machines. Ignoring all distinctions (like the schizophrenic) the desiring machine invents links or couplings with anything it desires so that according to Deleuze, “...homme et nature ne sont pas comme deux termes l’un en face de l’autre, même pris dans un rapport de causation, de compréhension ou d’expression (cause-effet, sujet-objet, etc.), mais une seule et même réalité essentielle du producteur et du produit” (1972, 10). Thus, Deleuze cites the famous case of Dr. Schreber (Freud’s patient who was convinced that the sun was in his anus) as an example of a productive machine at work (1972, 7). Now, one might be led to believe that in this process of production, it is the product, the desiring
machine, that is the goal of such a process. For Deleuze, this movement of "et...et...et..." is important, but it should not be taken as the end of desiring production. As the stage "productions de productions" implies, what is produced, production itself, is part of the process of production. Deleuze warns against idealizing this process in the form of the expression of desiring production. Production exists alongside the desiring machines it produces and is, in turn, re-introduced into the process as part of the machine. To extract production as a term or drive of this process would be to immediately misunderstand the desiring machine. As Deleuze explains:

La satisfaction du bricoleur quand il branche quelque chose sur une conduite électrique, quand il détourne une conduite d’eau, serait fort mal expliquée par un jeu de « papa-maman » ou par un plaisir de transgression. La règle de produire toujours du produire, de greffer du produire sur le produit, est le caractère des machines désirantes ou de la production primaire : production de production (1972, 13).

Now, the process of production has no end in itself. The desiring machine operates an endless series of connections, always re-integrating the production that results from these connections back into the process of production. Within this process, Deleuze underlines how production then becomes an enormous, un-differentiated object. Production is at once everything and nothing. This moment of nothingness may be perceived as a sudden moment of failure – a stoppage of production. Deleuze likens this change to a sudden moment of anxiety, when the desiring machine is overwhelmed by the enormity of its connections. The process of production lacks a center of organization and freezes up, forming the body without organs. The appearance of the body without organs marks the first appearance of anti-production, which is itself, a product of the process of production. Deleuze underlines how the body without organs is not nothingness itself, it is simply the body without image (1972, 14). The body without
organs co-exists with the desiring machine, emerging from the endless process of productive coupling. Indeed, part of the process of desiring production is an endless sort of stuttering, where the desiring machine alternately “works” and “breaks down.” Deleuze explains, “Les machines désirantes ne marchent que détraquées, en se détraquant sans cesse... Le corps sans organes n’est pas le témoin d’un néant original, pas plus que le reste d’une totalité perdue... C’est le corps sans image... perpétuellement réinjecté dans la production.” (1972, 14).

The “stuttering” of the body without organs leads us to another stage of desiring production, for the body without organs turns on the desiring machine, seducing it, so that the process of desiring production is recorded on the body without organs. This is what Deleuze defines as the process of the “production d’enregistrements.” This stage differs from the previous by following a different logic. Within the production of production, we might imagine a vast, undifferentiated body. The body is undifferentiated because each part is connected to every other part, forming the desiring machine. The logic of such a machine is a connective one in which each part is part of another and another and another, etc. Within the process of recording, the logic shifts from one of “and...and...and...” to one of “and then...and then...and then...” In other words, desire is distributed in relation to the non-productive element of the body without organs. What we see emerging in this stage is the first appearance of an element that fixes itself outside of desiring production and guides desire as if it occupied a place “présupposé naturel ou divin.” (1980, 18). The antiproductive element of desiring production seduces desire and tricks it into believing that desire must become binary.
The binary logic of the recording stage does not, however, form an oedipal triad. Again, evoking the schizophrenic, Deleuze underlines how the body without organs rejects any sort of parental logic, so that like a schizophrenic, this stage is marked by the rapid passing from one “code” to another (that is, from production to anti-production). We might relate this to a schizophrenic who changes the explanation for his/her behavior or his/her genealogy from day to day and from moment to moment as in the sensation Artaud experienced when he declared, “Moi, Antonin Artaud, je suis mon fils, mon père, ma mère, et moi” (1980, 21). In the same manner, the body without organs shifts from “code” to “code,” from production to anti-production. Now, this shifting from codes of production to codes of anti-production is eventually stabilized in the final stage of production, with the production of the subject, which Deleuze defines as “the production of consumption.”

We must stress that our use of the term “stage” should not be misinterpreted in the sense of a certain linear or spatial “progression.” The various stages of production co-exist so that the paradoxical nature of the body without organs within the heart of desiring production must be understood to be part of the larger process of production itself. The production of production and the production of recording occur simultaneously. Nonetheless, as we underline directly above, a certain tension exists between the desiring machine and the body without organs. The production of consumption leads to a synthetic “resolution” of this tension, which Deleuze understands to take the form of what he terms a “return of the repressed.” He explains that, “...le sujet...se confond lui-même avec cette troisième machine productrice et la réconciliation résiduelle qu’elle opère : synthèse conjonctive de consommation sous la forme
émerveillée d’un « C’était donc ça ! »” (1972, 24). Deleuze believes that such an experience can be defined as a “return of the repressed,” for it is with this final stage of production that the necessary pieces are put into place so that productive desire turns on itself, desiring its own destruction or death. In other words, the third stage of desiring production provides the key to understanding how positive and productive desire may be mistaken for lack within the Freudian (and Lacanian) scheme. Let us examine this closely.

For Deleuze, all intensities found at this third stage of production are nonetheless positive (1972, 25). That is, the intensity that is produced between the first or connective stage of production and the second or disjunctive stage of production must always be understood in terms of an accumulation of production or of anti-production. The intensity of production increases or decreases depending on whether production or anti-production is produced, but there is no exterior term against which one might measure the production and determine whether, in an absolute sense, production is “positive” or “negative.” Nonetheless, the alternation between production and anti-production poses a problem. As Deleuze explains, again citing Artaud, it is an “Expérience déchirante, trop émouvante, par laquelle le schizo est le plus proche de la matière, d’un centre intense et vivant de la matière : « cette émotion sise hors du point particulier où l’esprit la recherche...cette émotion rend à l’esprit le son bouleversant de la matière, toute l’âme s’y coule et passe dans son feu ardent »” (1972, 26). The subject comes to take refuge in the zero intensity of the body without organs, mistaking the experience of this intensity for a model to be desired. Thus, the multiple and productive subject comes to desire her own inactivity or death.
Returning to the three stages of production, we recall that in the production of recording, the body without organs suddenly injects an element of "stoppage" or "the body without image" into production. Deleuze explains that this sudden stoppage gives a sort of wholeness or completeness to the immense collection of partial objects or bodies that are connected in desiring production. Instead of an endless chain of (partial) objects, the body without organs suggests a whole or complete object. Deleuze explains, "...les objets partiels sont pris dans une intuition de totalité précoce, de même que le moi, dans une intuition d'unité qui en précède l'accomplissement" (1972, 86). Turning away from the intensity of desiring production, the subject latches on to this suggestion of totality as that which was missing from the chain of partial objects. Desire, instead of being productive and connective, is suddenly based on a lack (1980, 86). What is missing and what gives relief to the subject is the transcendent object, which, as Deleuze notes, is inevitably defined as the Law or the Transcendental Signifier: "Ce quelque chose de commun, de transcendant et d'absent, on le nommera le phallus ou loi, pour désigner « le » signifiant qui distribue dans l'ensemble de la chaîne les effets de signification et y introduit les exclusions..." (1972, 86).

With this shift, the immense chain of partial objects is suddenly changed into the totality of the body without organs. As noted above, instead of the "and...and...and..." of desiring production, the body without organs offers a logic of "and then...and then...and then..." However, this logic shifts with the introduction of lack into desire. Instead of offering a continually shifting disjunctive synthesis, the subject focuses on the lack or full body of the body without organs and introduces a logic of "either/or" (1972, 89). The exclusive logic of the transcendent object freezes the play that occurs within the
recording stage of production so that instead of the subject shifting between father, mother, child, uncle, etc. (as in our earlier example from Artaud, “Moi, Antonin Artaud, je suis mon fils, mon père, ma mère, et moi”) the subject is forced to make a choice between one identification or the other. The totality or full body of the body without organs imposes its law on the subject. Suddenly, the chain of partial objects of the body without organs is broken, and the subject is presented with a “double bind” on productive desire. That is, either the subject chooses to accept the exclusive logic of the transcendent object and choose between “either” one identification “or” another, or the subject falls into what is henceforth defined as the chaos of nonsense. Deleuze explains, “…une alternative, une disjonction exclusive est déterminée par rapport à un principe qui en constitue pourtant les deux termes ou les deux sous-ensembles, et qui entre lui-même dans l’alternative…” (1972, 95). This double bind is the ensemble of the Oedipus complex; for once desire is defined as a lack, the transcendental signifier (the Law or the Phallus) erects its boundaries, and the chaotic intensity of the schizophrenic subject is no longer simply the experience of intensity but rather the suffering of transgression as defined by the law. The only resolution possible within this model is the internalization of the law and its signification. Deleuze declares:

Oedipe comme problème ou comme solution, c’est les deux bouts d’une ligature qui arrête toute la production désirante. On serre les écrous, plus rien ne peut passer de la production…On a écrasé, triangulé l’inconscient, on l’a mis dans un choix qui n’était pas le sien. Toutes les issues bouchées [sic] : il n’y a plus d’usage possible des disjonctions inclusives, illimitatives. (1972, 94).

With the double bind of Oedipus stifling the creative productivity of desire, the flux of partial objects that is at the base of the production of production is modified. As we have stressed, within the early subject (what might be identified as the “subject”
before the Oedipus structure), the conjunctive and disjunctive syntheses of desiring production operated an immanent and intensive movement of identification. Thus, we recall Artaud's declaration "Moi, Antonin Artaud, je suis mon fils, mon père, ma mère, et moi" as an example of the numerous identities present within the schizophrenic subject. Deleuze reminds us that this identification with one's biological family also extends over various historical periods, events, and characters, so that the desiring subject identifies herself with the immense collection of partial objects at her disposition (1972, 106-107). In such a way, the flow of "and... and... and..." and "and then... and then... and then..." comes to resemble that of a Martinican who declares, "Je suis tombé malade par le problème algérien. J'avais fait la même bêtise qu'eux (plaisir sexuel). Ils m'ont adopté comme frère de race. J'ai le sang de mongol. Les Algériens m'ont controversé dans toutes les réalisations. J'ai eu des idées racistes... Je descends de la dynastie des Gaulois. A ce titre j'ai valeur de noblesse..." (1972, 107). However, with the imposition of the double bind of the Oedipus structure, such a schizophrenic flux is no longer possible. The partial objects of the subject's family as well as the names, events, and places of History become part of the larger totality of the body without organs. These partial objects become full objects, defined by its Law or Structure. Within the double bind of the Oedipal structure, the subject has no choice but to assign a fixed identity to not only itself, but also to the father, the mother, as well as to the larger social structure on which Oedipus is built. Thus, the subject identifies itself as an "I" that is separate and complete in relation to the father and mother, who are, in turn, represented as separate and complete (1972, 119-120). Deleuze explains, "L'opération d'Oedipe consiste à établir un ensemble de relations bi-univoques entre les agents de production, de re-
production et d'anti-production sociales d'une part, et d'autre part les agents de la reproduction familiale dite naturelle... Il y a là un usage fautif de la synthèse conjonctive, qui fait dire « c'était donc ton père, c'était donc ta mère... »" (1972, 120). In this way, desire turns on itself, treating the representation of reality as the real in which it must situate itself.

Above, we noted that Deleuze does not counter the psychoanalytic claim concerning the existence of the Oedipus complex or its universality. Indeed as our evocation of the Law suggests above, in order for the schizophrenic subject to desire its own oedipalization, there is always a close relation between the psychic and social conditions in which the repression of desire takes place. Deleuze criticizes psychoanalysis for its ignorance in this respect, treating Oedipus as an irreducible truth in which oedipal investments in the social formation that surrounds a subject are treated as “imaginary” rather than real (1972, 122). Indeed, Deleuze declares, “S’il est vrai qu’Oedipe est obtenu par rabattement ou application, il présume lui-même un certain type d’investissement libidinal du champ social, de la production et de la formation de ce champ” (1972, 123). Thus, it is clear that in order for us to understand the psychic formation of Oedipus, we must also turn our attention to the social field or historical formation that gives meaning to the transcendental signifier at the heart of the complex’s double bind. Such an analysis of social formations is defined by Deleuze as schizo-analysis : “...analyser la nature spécifique des investissements libidinaux de l'économique et du politique ; et par là montrer comment le désir peut être déterminé à désirer sa propre répression dans le sujet qui désire...” (1972, 124-125).
When we evoke a social formation in this context, we might be led to believe that such an analysis would turn around the alignment of classes or a critique of ideology. For Deleuze, class and ideology certainly enter into the play of Oedipus, but in order to understand the close tie between the psychic and the social, one must go beyond such frameworks. Indeed, Deleuze declares:

La schizo-analyse est à la fois une analyse transcendantale et matérialiste. Elle critique, en ce sens qu’elle mène la critique d’Oedipe, ou mène Oedipe au point de sa propre auto-critique. Elle se propose d’explorer un inconscient transcendantal, au lieu de métaphysique ; matériel, au lieu d’idéologique ; schizophrénique, au lieu d’œdipien ; non figuratif, au lieu d’imaginaire ; réel, au lieu de symbolique ; machinique, au lieu de structural ; moléculaire, microphysique et micrologique, au lieu de molaire ou grégaire ; productif, au lieu d’expressif... (1972, 130).

In order to understand the social field in its relation to the psychic formation of the subject, Deleuze approaches the social formation in what is now a familiar fashion – as a machine. Indeed, for Deleuze, a true understanding of the psychic and social production of Oedipus must be made at the level at which the various psychic and social fluxes present are marked, divided, and coded. Thus, the true innovation of schizo-analysis is not to explain Oedipus in terms of the material relations of economic production, but rather by its mode or machine of expression. Above, we noted how Deleuze analyzed the territory of three, broad, regimes of signs: those of the primitive, the barbaric, and the civilized machines or territories. Let us return to these machines of expression to understand how they relate to the psychic production of Oedipus.

We recall that within the primitive territorial machine individual bodies are marked within a hierarchy of alliance and filiation. That is, the various members of a tribe are defined, in part, by their relation to the economy of debt of the tribe. Through rituals of initiation, as well as the floating capital of debt (rings, necklaces, tattoos, etc.),
the individual is placed in a hierarchical relation to every other member of the tribe and incorporated into its "body." Thus, to take the example of the tribal chief, through an accumulation of debt and wealth, the chief is designated as the one to whom gifts must be given (1972, 176). Instead of attempting to equalize the table of debts and surpluses, the primitive society establishes an open-ended, non-equilibrated system in which debt continues to circulate, thus placing people within the socius of primitive society. Now, debt circulates according to various marks or gifts, but it also circulates within the limits of the family. For what is exchanged within systems of filiation and alliance is women, and it is the marking of women as wives, mothers, daughters, aunts, nieces, etc. which allows the primitive socius to define itself with greater precision. At the heart of the exchange of women in primitive society is the famous incest taboo, which of course plays a central role in the definition of Oedipus in Freud's work. It is the inscription of desire within this taboo that Deleuze isolates as the first indication of desire's repression and inscription within the social.

In our study of the subject, the full body of the desiring machine passed into the suddenly total and stuttering machine of the body without organs before eventually settling into the disjunctive synthesis of Oedipus. Forced to choose between either the intense madness of the schizophrenic, desiring subject, or the ordered and marked subjectivity of Oedipus, the subject chooses the latter. At the social level of primitive society a similar movement occurs. Deleuze notes that the intensive creation of society is often portrayed in myth as the spontaneous result of a union between brother and sister and/or brother (Deleuze underlines how one finds that myths of creation are frequently based on the union of twins) (1972, 181). Thus, to speak in abstract terms, the problem is
one of passing from the mythical and intensive order of the beginning of society to the actual and extensive order of alliance and filiation. For Deleuze, the key to this passage is in the sudden designation or naming of various members of the family. That is, once an individual is marked as a complete subject, as a body without organs, the intensive nature of desiring production is no longer possible. Without names, a mother and son may certainly reproduce together and incest is simply understood in terms of desiring production. The twin sleeps with her fraternal twin and desiring production occurs. But once a system of representation is put into place, once the disjunctive of the double bind of subjectivity is introduced, the persons designated as brother and sister or mother and son “define” incest and forbid its presence. The intensive production of desire must be defined in order for the extensive system of society to come into existence and promptly forbid desiring production. Deleuze explains:

Le système en extension naît des conditions intensives qui le rendent possible, mais réagit sur elles, les annule, les refoule et ne leur laisse d’expression que mythique. A la fois les signes cessent d’être ambigus et se déterminent par rapport aux filiations étendues et aux alliances latérales; les disjonctions deviennent exclusives, limitatives (le ou bien remplace le « soit...soit » intense); les noms, les appellations ne désignent plus des états intensifs, mais des personnes discernables. La discernabilité se pose sur la sœur, la mère comme épouses interdites. C’est que les personnes, avec les noms qui les désignent maintenant, ne préexistent pas aux interdits qui les constituent comme telles. Mères et sœurs ne préexistent pas à leur interdiction comme épouses (1972, 188).

Thus, it is the representation of subjects within a family structure, which allows for the establishment of the extensive system of filiation and alliance and which is further inscribed within primitive society’s economy of debt. The incest taboo marks the pure limit of the primitive society, both on the interior and the exterior. That is, without the ban on desiring production, representation would be impossible and society would not
exist. Thus, the exterior of society is uncoded desire as it exists in myths of creation – the production of production. However, the incest taboo is also the interior limit of society, for it is that object around which the extensive system of alliance and filiation is structured. Incest and its interdiction determine the various deployments of alliance and filiation possible within a societal structure. These two instances of the ban on incest form what Deleuze terms, accordingly, the représentant du désir and the représentation refoulante (1972, 193-194). Oedipus is the result of the représentation refoulante folding back upon the représentant du désir so that, just as in the formation of the individual subject, the individual is suddenly confronted with a realization that “This is what I desired!” – desiring production comes to be defined as incest (1972, 195).

With incest marking its limit, the complex lines of alliance and filiation as well as the economy of debt work to code the various fluxes of primitive society. Thus, to return to our example of the chief, even though he is designated as the chief by the intricate hierarchies of filiation and alliance, as well as the debt he accumulates over all subjects, the primitive socius works to guard against incest as well as the accumulation of too much debt in the place of one person. Indeed, according to Deleuze, primitive society does well to guard against uncoded fluxes, for it is exactly from outside this limit that danger comes in the form of the despotic state (1972, 230-231). What marks the shift from primitive society to the despotic society is not the replacement or abolition of the codes of this former society, but rather their re-writing. As Deleuze explains, the codes of primitive society are overwritten from the outside, “Nous pouvons assigner le moment précis de la formation impériale comme celui de la nouvelle alliance exogène, non seulement à la place des anciennes alliances, mais par rapport à elles” (1972, 231).
If the interdiction of incest is what permits primitive society to exist, it is also what permits the despot to overthrow its structure and re-write primitive societal codes in his name. With despotic society, Deleuze explains, incest becomes structurally possible (1972, 238). When we say that incest becomes possible, we must recall that for Deleuze the analysis of social machines is made at the level of their representation. Thus, just as we have seen that the primitive machine made representation possible through the existence of the incest taboo, with the overcoding of the despotic machine incest becomes possible in representation. What the despot does is something that occurs in mythical primitive society. That is, in terms of representation, he begins by exiting the structure of alliance and marrying his sister, which is a forbidden endogamic alliance (1972, 236-237). Once he enters into such an alliance, the despot leaves the tribal system and is capable of entering into any other alliance he so desires because he is outside of the tribal system of representation. In a word, he can overcode the tribal marriages (1972, 237). However, this forbidden alliance does not alone give the despot control over the primitive system of representation. The hierarchy of filiation remains partially outside his reach and this leads to his marrying the representational equivalent of his mother (1972, 237). In this way, the lines of filiation that were extended throughout the tribe are now directly linked to the despot (1972, 237). In a movement of double incest, the despot, symbolically, brings all tribal codes to himself. As Deleuze explains, “Ce double inceste n’a pas pour but de produire un flux, même magique, mais de surcoder tous les flux existants, et de faire qu’aucun code intrinsèque, aucun flux sous-jacent n’échappe au surcodage de la machine despotique…” (1972, 238).
Again, we must underline that this double incest takes place at the level of representation in the despotic machine, and we recall from our earlier discussion of the despotic state that the primary tool at the despot’s disposal for accomplishing this is money. Thus, in opposition to the open movement of debt put into place by primitive society, the despot first absolves all debt, bringing the movement of exchange – of primitive alliance and filiation – to a halt (1972, 233-234). In the place of articles of value, the despot introduces money, which will serve as credit for debt. With the money that he mints and which is struck with his image, the despot succeeds in placing himself at the center of society’s debt. Furthermore, as both the initiator and receptor of debt, the despot succeeds in doing exactly what primitive society had strived against – render debt infinite. Deleuze explains:

Les rouages de la machine lignagère territoriale subsistent, mais ne sont plus que les pièces travaillées de la machine étatique…L’ancienne inscription demeure, mais briquetée par et dans l’inscription d’État…Les alliances territoriales ne sont pas remplacées, mais seulement alliées à la nouvelle alliance ; les filiations territoriales ne sont pas remplacées, mais seulement affiliées à la filiation directe…Le stock filiatif devient l’objet d’une accumulation dans l’autre filiation, la dette d’alliance devient une relation infinie dans l’autre alliance (1972, 232).

In this way, the surplus value of debt that was created by the primitive economy is appropriated by the despot and rendered in the form of money. The despot succeeds in overcoding the primitive economy and the desire of its subjects. A subject cannot escape the grip of the despot for he stands at the origin of society (the despot’s money serving as the symbolic quasi-cause of society) and at its exterior (in the decoded flux of symbolic incest). This overcoding has profound consequences for the primitive system of representation.
We recall that in our study of the primitive territory, the limits of the territory were marked in a number of ways. One manner in which a subject was identified within a territory's limit was through marks of ritual initiation. The body was scarred or tattooed with a mark whose signification did not correspond directly to the voice with which the mark was associated. Instead of *signification*, the primitive machine exercised a form of *connotation*. With the arrival of the despot, the heterogeneity which existed between voice and mark is erased. The graphic mark is aligned with the vocal sound, so that the sign becomes writing (1972, 242-243). The voice of the tribal chief is no longer independent in its ability to connote its meaning, as when it marked the primitive subject with the sign of his alliance and filiation. Instead, voice is produced by the despot and subordinated to writing. Suddenly, the signs of the tribe are read and given meaning by the despot within a system of writing. The heterogeneity of the voice and sign on the body are deterritorialized and given meaning in relation to the texts of the despot. That is, the immense bureaucratic machine of the despot, with its system of legislation, accounting, tax collection, justice, etc. overcodes the primitive system of marks and signs. Deleuze thus declares:

...le graphisme s'aligne, se rabat sur la voix et devient écriture. Et en même temps il induit la voix non plus comme celle de l'alliance, mais comme celle de la *nouvelle alliance*, voix fictive d'au-delà qui s'exprime dans le flux d'écriture comme *filiation directe*...Et voilà bien l'essentiel en second lieu : le rabattement de la graphie sur la voix a fait sauter hors de la chaîne un objet transcendant, voix muette dont toute la chaîne semble maintenant dépendre, et par rapport à laquelle elle se linéarise (1972, 243).

Thus, symbolically, the system of meaning depends on a detached voice from on high – that of the despot. The primitive system of representation – of a theater of cruelty, in which the body was marked with a sign whose meaning acted in turn on the voice and
from which the eye perceived a certain surplus-value of pleasure in the act of marking –
is replaced by the despotic triangle of the voice from high which dictates its laws onto
tablets and tables and which are, in turn, read.

This system of representation is the inauguration of writing, and Deleuze agrees
with Derrida when he analyzes the transcendental signifier, on which writing depends, as
being symbolically based on incest. For as Deleuze explains, writing, based on the
simulated marriage of the signifier with its signifieds, is profoundly incestuous. He
notes:

Dans la mesure où le graphisme est rabattu sur la voix (ce graphisme qui
s’inscrivait naguère à même les corps), la représentation de corps se
subordonne à la représentation de mot : sœur et mère sont les signifiés de
la voix. Mais, dans la mesure où ce rabattement induit une voix fictive des
hauteurs qui ne s’exprime plus que dans le flux linéaire, le despote lui-
même est le signifiant de la voix qui opère, avec ses deux signifiés, le
surcodage de toute la chaîne. Ce qui rendait l’inceste impossible – à
savoir que tantôt nous avions les appellations (mère, sœur), mais pas les
personnes ou les corps, tantôt nous avions les corps, mais les appellations
se dérobaient dès que nous enfreignions les interdits qu’elles portaient – a
cessé d’exister. L’inceste est devenu possible dans les épousailles des
corps de parenté et des apppellations parentales, dans l’union du signifiant
avec ses signifiés. (1972, 248).

Following this shift in representation, the symbolic position of Oedipus shifts as well. As
Deleuze notes, incest is now structurally possible. Instead of incest taking the place of
the représentant du désir, as in primitive society, it now becomes the représentation
refoulante of desire (1972, 249). We can understand this when we consider that the
despot has placed himself at both limits of society. Thus, every subject of despotic
society invests her desire – and this infinitely – in what was determined as the outside and
forbidden quasi-cause of primitive society: productive desire. And just as was the case
with primitive society, the despotic machine now carefully surveys this symbolic
position. Though incest is now possible, the despotic machine guards against such a case, for this would signal the presence of an uncoded flux. The despotic machine enforces the repression of desire from the outside, imposing its laws (and punishment) from a transcendent position. Yet, it is with the arrival of a decoded flux that the despotic machine begins to crumble, and desire finally makes its last move, internalizing itself within the subject, so that desire comes to desire its own repression.

If the despotic territory arrived like a bolt of lightning, rapidly transforming the primitive territory, the civilized machine or capitalist territory slowly overcomes the despotic state, laying its structures over the despotic and primitive territories, decoding their various fluxes over a long period of time (1972, 264-266). Indeed, it is this movement of decoding that marks and defines the capitalist machine so that the fluxes always move toward a conjunction as Deleuze explains:

Quand la conjonction passe au premier rang dans la machine sociale, il apparaît au contraire qu'elle cesse d'être liée à la jouissance comme à l'excès de consommation d'une classe, qu'elle fait du luxe même un moyen d'investissement, et rabat tous les flux décodés sur la production, dans un « produire pour produire » qui retrouve les connexions primitives du travail à la condition, à la seule condition de les rattacher au capital comme au nouveau corps plein déterritorialisé, le vrai consommateur d’où elles semblent émaner ...(1972, 266).

Clearly, we recognize this definition of the capitalist machine as “the production of consumption” as corresponding to that final stage of the formation of Oedipus, when the productive machine of the desiring subject is brought around on itself, desiring its own repression.

Now, we noted above (in the previous chapter) that the decoding that marks the capitalist machine occurs over a long period of time. Deleuze, nonetheless, underlines the importance of a particular movement of deterritorialization: that in which the flux of
labor meets that of money, allowing money to transform itself into capital and buy labor force (1972, 266). What does this mean? Above, we noted that money, as it exists in the despotic state, derived its value from the inscription on which it depended. And this inscription is literally that of the emperor or despot, who both mints the money and determines its value. However, controlling this value is very difficult, and despite his best efforts, the despot comes to lose control of the flux of money, so that money is transformed into a general equivalent. That is, in primitive exchange, the products exchanged are considered as certain quantities of abstract labor. Abstract labor serves as the disjunctive synthesis on which primitive and despotic exchange is based, since it may be divided into various quantities of labor and used as the basis for exchange (1972, 268). However, when money enters into the equation and takes the place of abstract labor, it serves as a general equivalent with which any random partial object may be tied together (1972, 269). Suddenly, money (whether it has any value as an object or not) allows for the possibility of a more fundamental decoding. That is, when money is able to produce a surplus value by itself, it has slipped out of the territory of the despot and into a territory of its own. As Deleuze notes, the truly defining shift from despotic to capitalist machine is marked with the change from a capital of alliance to a capital of filiation (1972, 269). In doing so, the relation between the two terms (the exchange of two different quantities) is abstracted, so that the relation itself takes on a certain independence of not only the quantity of relations, but also the quality of the terms in the relation (1972, 270). This leads to a differential relation that is expressed by the division of labor force by capital. Deleuze explains, “C’est de la fluxion des flux décodés, de leur conjonction, que découle la forme filiative du capital x + dx. Ce qu’exprime le rapport différentiel, c’est le
phénomène fondamental capitaliste de *la transformation de la plus-value de code en plus-value de flux*" (1972, 270). Indeed, that this transformation can only be expressed in terms of a mathematical equation reveals the extent of the shift from the primitive and despotic systems of representation. In this way, industrial capital is able to make a fundamental break, overwrite the previous territorial codes, and form a “new-new alliance,” thus allowing for capital to produce itself.

That capital produces itself is, of course, an illusion. And Deleuze reminds us that what truly occurs is a sort of “accountant’s trick” in which two forms of capital are always shifting within this new territorial regime. The capital of alliance, which is that which is given workers in exchange for their labor is not the same capital as that of filiation. Filiation capital is financial capital and it is capable of reproducing itself over time since it is, in fact, immaterial, existing on balance sheets and on bank ledgers, disappearing in loans and returning in the form of investments with interest. Deleuze underlines this difference between the two forms when he declares:

Dans un cas, des signes monétaires impuissants de valeur d’échange, un flux de moyens de paiement relatif à des biens de consommation et à des valeurs d’usage, une relation bi-univoque entre la monnaie et un éventail imposé de produits... dans l’autre cas, des signes de puissance du capital, des flux de financement, un système de coefficients différentiels de production qui témoigne d’une force prospective ou d’une évaluation à long terme, non réalisable *hic et nunc*, et fonctionnant comme une axiomatique des quantités abstraites (1972, 271).

These entirely separate inscriptions of capital are converted within the capitalist territory. The importance of the bank is paramount in this shift, for it is at the level of dematerialized banking capital that the conjugation or conjunction of these two flows takes place. Finance capital and alliance capital are constantly exchanged within the banking system so that one is given the impression that the entire territorial
representation is dealing with the same inscription or flow of capital (1972, 271-272). This extremely efficient system of dissimulation sets into place the necessary pieces for desire to desire its own repression. For the alienated worker, even in attempting to overturn the conditions of her alienation, always works within a framework of the convertibility of these two flows. Thus, even in resistance, the worker invests her desire within the capitalist territory (1972, 272).

The consequences of such a territory are numerous. As noted earlier, this way of understanding the flow of capitalist fluxes solves the Marxist problem of the tendency to a falling rate of profit (1972, 270-271). Understanding capitalism in this way not only explains the above problem, but also reveals the internal “limits” of capitalism. That is, since the value of financial capital is never fixed (its value being determined by the return on investment), the system never enters into a terminal crisis by increasing the amount of capital available for wages: the value of alliance capital never overcomes that of filial capital. Each time the two flows come close to equaling each other, the “internal” limit of financial capital is extended. As Deleuze explains, “La tendance n’a de limite qu’interne, et ne cesse de la dépasser, mais en la déplaçant, c’est-à-dire en la reconstituant, en la retrouvant comme limite interne à dépasser à nouveau par déplacement : alors la continuité du procès capitaliste s’engendre dans cette coupure de coupure toujours déplacée...” (1972, 273). This movement of displacement is the quintessential movement of deterritorialization that is at the heart of capitalism. It reveals not only the internal movement of deterritorialization, but also that of external deterritorialization. The capitalist territory builds on its primitive and despotic predecessors, using their formations as various “internal” limits of deterritorialization.
Thus, the "primitive" territories of various third world countries are territorialized by the expansion of capitalist globalization, serving as so many false limits to its movement (1972, 274-275). In the same way, even within the capitalist territory's center, in so-called developed countries, the capitalist territory continually eats away at various formations (for example, those based on the state and its territory), short-circuiting them and rendering them obsolete (1972, 275). In this way, the final consequence of such a territory is a constant movement of crisis/resolution. The constant overcoming of its internal limits reveals a schizophrenic character to the capitalist machine, so that it only functions efficiently by constantly short-circuiting itself and malfunctioning. Thus, through taxes, war, recessions, etc. — all that is "bad" for the economy — deterritorialization is actually spurred onward (1972, 279-280). Along with production, the capitalist territory's strength is its anti-production.

If the drive of the capitalist territory is to reproduce and push its exterior limits through the reproduction of filial capital, then the representative grounds for incest are already in place. This implies that the capitalist machine replaces the despotic body without organs as the quasi-cause of societal production. And in such an alignment, the desire to reproduce filial capital is an incestuous desire. Yet on what level does this affect the representational territory of capitalism? How does Oedipus come to install itself so firmly within desire, at this final stage? Above, we underlined how representation in writing is of key importance to the despotic state. Within the capitalist state, writing just as suddenly loses its importance. Where with the despot, the graphic of writing aligns and lays itself over the voice, the capitalist machine separates this alignment, revealing only a generalized decoding of fluxes (1972, 286). The signifier and
signified are no longer in close alignment, and just as the death of the despotic state announces the death of God or the dictator, so too does it announce the death of the transcendental signifier (1972, 285-286). As Deleuze explains:

...l’usage capitaliste du langage est en droit d’une autre nature, et se réalise ou devient concret dans le champ d’immanence propre au capitalisme lui-même, lorsqu’apparaissent les moyens techniques d’expression qui correspondent au décodage généralisé des flux, au lieu de renvoyer encore sous une forme directe ou indirecte au surcodage despotique (1972, 286).

Instead of a signifying system like Saussure’s, in which the value of a sign is determined by its relation with other signs and an eternally postponed fixing of value by a transcendental signifier, this new system of representation is based only on the axiomatic. That is, signs only have meaning when the flow of expression comes into contact with the flow of content. What matters within capitalist representation is the differential relation between filial and alliance capital. Signs are produced as a result of the intersection of these two flows, but their “signification” (in the sense that the signifier points toward a signified, as in the despotic system) no longer exists. The flows of finance and labor capitals simply intersect to produce more capital, in any manner possible. To take an example, a billboard advertising the latest sports car is to be read not as signifying the car itself, but rather as a sign-post, pointing our desire in the direction of the vehicle, whose consumption is to be desired. The billboard only means one thing: that a company is trying to increase its profit, to increase its finance capital. For Deleuze, capitalist representation is the deterritorialization of the sign itself, forever breaking away, revealing splits, conjugating with other signs, flowing in the direction of finance capital (1972, 288). As he declares, “...on atteint dans cette relation à des figures qui ne sont
plus des effets de signifiant, mais des schizes, des points-signes ou des coupures de flux qui créent le mur du signifiant, passent à travers et vont au-delà” (1972, 288).

Now, we have stressed how the capitalist system of representation comes to replace that of the despotic state. However, it is important to recall that like the despotic state before it, the capitalist socius overwrites the codes it replaces. That is, just as the despot overwrites the remnants of the primitive machine, so too does the capitalist machine overwhelm the despot’s codes. The result is the belief that capitalist representation still “means” something. Certainly, there are remnants of the earlier social machines, but these remnants do not really mean anything. The mark of primitive society, which served to preserve the memory and social structure of the family no longer functions. Language only becomes an empty code. Nonetheless, these regimes of signification remain in place. What Deleuze wishes to underline is the change that each of these regimes undergoes within the capitalist socius. Language and writing continue to function within the capitalist socius, as they did within its despotic predecessor. Individuals continue to exist within family structures, as they did within the primitive and despotic socii. However, what “counts” for the capitalist machine is no longer the writing which marks these individuals on various government forms, identification papers, records, etc. or their place within a family structure (1972, 298). What quite literally counts for the capitalist machine is an individual as part of the flux of labor and finance capital (1972, 298). Deleuze explains:

...malgré l'abondance des cartes d'identité, des fiches et des moyens de contrôle, le capitalisme n'a même pas besoin d'écrire dans des livres pour suppléer aux marques disparues des corps. Ce ne sont là que des survivances, des archaïsmes à fonction actuelle. La personne est réellement devenue « privée », pour autant qu'elle dérive des quantités abstraites et devient concrète dans le devenir-concret de ces mêmes
quantités. C’est celles-ci qui sont marquées, non plus les personnes elles-mêmes; ton capital ou ta force de travail, le reste n’a pas d’importance…(1972, 298).

In this way, the person or the sign is a simulation of what it formerly represented in the primitive and despotic system. The sign of the car on the billboard or the father or mother within the family is an image of an image—a simulation. Again, the only thing that counts within the capitalist machine when considering these signs is their place within the fluxes of capital.

This clearly has repercussions for the subject and her place within the family structure. In the primitive and despotic machines, social reproduction is never independent of human reproduction (1972, 313). The family is then part of the overall strategy of the machine in question, marking each family member as a productive or non-productive part of the overall social structure. As we noted, within the primitive socius, an individual is marked by her place within the overall structure of alliance and filiation which determines the structure and limits of the socius. Within the despotic machine, these relations are over-written by the new alliance and direct filiation of the despot. Now, within the capitalist machine, for the first time, representation no longer relates to distinct objects or persons but to the productive activity itself (1972, 313). As we have seen, what matters within the capitalist machine are the forces and means of production and when and how they enter into relation with each other. In this sense, the family becomes “privatized” for Deleuze, as it is placed outside the field of capitalist representation. Deleuze explains, “C’est-à-dire que les éléments de la production et de l’anti-production ne se reproduisent pas comme les hommes eux-mêmes, mais trouvent
en eux un simple matériau que la forme de la reproduction économique préorganise sur un mode tout à fait distinct de celle qu'il a comme reproduction humaine” (1972, 314).

This place *hors-champ* does not, however, mean that the family somehow provides a safe harbor from capitalist representation. In fact, this move allows the capitalist machine to apply its social field to the family. In this way, each member of the family becomes a “figure” or *simulation* of the larger capitalist relations of forces and means of production. The father assumes the figure of the capitalist, the mother that of the natural resources of the earth, and the child the figure of the worker (1972, 314-315). The family becomes the microcosm of the capitalist network of alliance and filiation, so that the father is simply a reproduction of the image of the true father of capitalist representation, capital itself. The same is true of the mother and the son. In this manner, the larger field of social relations is invested in the family, but, in opposition to earlier social formations, the capitalist family, by nature of its place in the capitalist machine, simply applies and develops the larger network within its own mode of representation (1972, 315). Deleuze explains, “Comme chacun a un père et une mère à titre privé, c’est un sous-ensemble distributif qui simule pour chacun l’ensemble collectif des personnes sociales, qui en boucle le domaine et en brouille les images” (1972, 315).

Understood this way, Oedipus manifests itself in two instances within the family. First, the capitalist machine forbids the worker access to the raw material of the natural resources, which capital reserves for itself, in order to reproduce finance capital. This schema reproduces the Oedipal structure of the father regulating the child’s access to the mother. As Deleuze explains:

*Les personnes individuelles sont d’abord des personnes sociales, c’est-à-dire des fonctions dérivées des quantités abstraites ; elles deviennent elles-
mêmes concrètes dans la mise en rapport ou l'axiomatique de ces quantités, dans leur conjonction. Ce sont exactement des configurations ou des images produites par les points-signes, les coupures-flux, les pures « figures » du capitalisme : le capitalisme comme capital personnifié, c'est-à-dire comme fonction dérivée du flux du capital, le travailleur comme force de travail personnifiée, fonction dérivée du flux de travail (1972, 314).

In a second instance, the structure of the family itself, as a simulation of the capitalist order of representation removes or castrates the individual from full participation within the capitalist machine. In the same way that the child, in the Oedipal structure, desires the unobtainable mother, the individual, within the structure of the family and the capitalist socius, is forced to always the desire the unobtainable. The “mother” or the “sports car” is always a simulation of its object, a simple conjunction of capitalist flows of filial and alliance capital and always out of reach. In this way, desire finally comes to desire its own repression within Oedipus. As Deleuze declares, “Bref, Oedipe arrive : il naît dans le système capitaliste de l'application des images sociales de premier ordre aux images familiales privées de second ordre” (1972, 315-316). Perhaps another way to understand this is in terms of the enunciated subject and the subject of enunciation. That is, speaking as the Father, the enunciated subject, the individual is symbolically castrated from himself, the individual, the subject of the enunciation. There is always a cleavage between the individual and his or her “identity” within the capitalist machine. Deleuze explains, “C'est « donc » ton père, c'est donc ta mère, c'est donc toi : la conjonction familiale résulte des conjonctions capitalistes, en tant qu’elles s’appliquent à des personnes privatisées” (1972, 316). In this way, the movement that began with the primitive machine is completed: Oedipus becomes the representative of desire (1972, 318).
Finally, this representational configuration poses the greatest threat to thought and theory. For the individual is always “already separated” from the material means which determine her identity. Any effort to theorize this condition which does not take into account this alignment is doomed to reproduce the very system it seeks to criticize. When psychoanalysis seeks to understand and define the place of Oedipus in society, it only reproduces the movement of castration which is at the heart of the symbolic order of society. Because capitalism forms the interior and immanent limit of society, Oedipus is always already in place. As Deleuze explains, “Car la castration dans l’ordre du signifiant despotique, comme loi du despote ou effet de l’objet des hauteurs, est en vérité la condition formelle des images òedipennes, qui se déploieront dans le champ d’immanence que le retrait du signifiant laisse à découvert” (1972, 319). We shall return to the full consequences Oedipus’ deployment within the three stages of production in chapters six and seven when we synthesize the three socio-historic territories, the constitution of Oedipus, and the territory of thought itself.

Notes

1 Take for example the early monographs on philosophers: each one begins as a traditional and rather academic study of a certain philosopher’s work; however, each then ends by revealing the un-thought and particularly Deleuzian concepts to be found in the work. This “surprise ending” is the stuttering of philosophy to which Deleuze refers.

2 Deleuze shares many of the same preoccupations as Foucault, and references to Foucault appear several times in Mille Plateaux. By turning to his study of Foucault (1986), we read Deleuze’s interpretation in the same way we read his work based on other philosophers (Spinoza, Nietzsche, Hume, etc.). That is, these “studies” serve as points from which Deleuze might launch an analysis that is more properly Deleuzian than that of the author in question.
The term “relation of power” is Foucault’s, and we will return to it below, in our discussion of Foucault in section two.

See our discussion of positive differentiation and bio-chemical examples in note 2 of chapter one.

Note the way this understanding of existence mirrors that of Spinoza, who criticizes the notions of perfection and imperfection as being dominated by universal ideas or models. Spinoza explains:

If someone has decided to make something, and has finished it, then he will call this thing perfect – and so will anyone who rightly knows, or thinks he knows, the mind and purpose of the author of the work. For example, if someone sees a work (which I suppose to be not yet completed), and knows that the purpose of the author of that work is to build a house, he will say that it is imperfect. On the other hand, he will call it perfect as soon as he sees that the work has been carried through to the end which its author had decided to give it (Ethics, 114).

For Deleuze, what matters is not whether the abstract animal reaches a certain “normal” level of perfection. What is most important is that it perfections itself to the extent of its power or capacities. In this way, like Spinoza, an abstract machine will fold itself upon the outside so that it extends or perfects itself to its very limits.

See Mille Plateaux, pages 79-80 for further examples of decoding.

Again, see Mille Plateaux pages 79-80 for more examples.

Again, the Spinozan influences of Deleuze’s reading are quite obvious. The differences between what Deleuze defines as “desire” and Foucault defines as “power” help to define the divergent approaches of the two philosophers. See our discussion of this difference in chapter six.

For instance, the relation between a worker and the relations she has with an employer might be understood as being antiprodutive. The worker brings her body into contact with the labor structure, but it is the labor structure which deterritorializes the worker and rarely the inverse.

As we shall see below, this term is used in a slightly different manner than in our previous discussions. We should note, however, that the body without organs has had an ambiguous definition up to this point. Below we shall attempt to show how this particular definition of the body without organs corresponds to Deleuze’s larger discussion of immanence and the subject.

Recall our discussion of this “primitive territory” in chapter two, above.
12 Again, see our discussion above, in chapter two.

13 Once again, we direct the reader to our discussion of this aspect of territorial representation in chapter two above.

14 We refer the reader to our discussion of this problem in chapter two.
PART II

TERRITORIES OF CONTEMPORARY FRENCH THOUGHT

Chapter 4

Jacques Derrida

If we are to discuss the notions of difference and repetition, territory, and other concepts central to Deleuze's thought we must also turn our attention to the ideas formulated by his contemporaries. In particular, the thought of Jacques Derrida seems in ways to mirror and offer a particular insight into many of the same preoccupations as those of Deleuze. Furthermore, if, as we have indicated, we are to situate Deleuze's thought in relation to French thought's larger reception within the American university, we cannot avoid confronting Derrida's thought. For in the past thirty years there may not have been any other French thinker who has so profoundly influenced the American academy as Derrida has. Thus, an encounter with Derrida is in order, and we should hope to show how his thought can help to shed light on some of Deleuze's more difficult elaborations as well as demarcate the limits of Deleuzian theory. If we wish to give a succinct overview of Derrida's thought, we should like to impose a rather arbitrary division on his work, much in the same manner as we have done in the preceding section with Deleuze. Thus, one might say that Derrida's work could be approached from three interconnecting angles: his overtly philosophical angle, his more literary preoccupations,
and what might finally be qualified to be the “playful” work that seems to fall somewhere in between the two previous categories.

A. Derrida and Philosophy

For the majority of Derrida’s commentators, his project of deconstruction is a literary one. For these readers, Derrida’s attention to the literary “differences” of a text, be it overtly “literary” or “philosophical,” reveals an enterprise that is concerned more with the workings of the “text” in its traditional sense than anything else, even if such a project relies on a number of philosophical concepts and traditions to accomplish this.¹ We must be very careful in making such a reading. It seems to us that a meticulous and patient reading of Derrida’s earliest texts (the very texts which are often cited to support such a “literary” reading) reveals the profoundly philosophical origins of Derrida’s texts. As we shall see below, the fact that Derrida’s work has philosophical origins does not lead him to claim that his work follows in the philosophical tradition. Nonetheless, it is in philosophy that he begins, and it is to those earliest works in philosophy that we now turn.

In *La voix et le phénomène*, Derrida attempts to show how Husserl’s phenomenological project reveals a certain metaphysical presupposition – that of the presence of a fully constituted and original intuition (3). Before exploring Derrida’s argument, we might briefly recall that Husserlian phenomenology was an attempt to answer the question posed for at least two centuries by speculative philosophy: that of the origin of the world or the origin of the sense of the world. We recall that Kant reformulated this question in the form of the conditions of possibility for a subject to
understand and make sense of the world and thus defined the transcendental categories necessary for subjectivity. Husserl rejects these categories and attempts to reach a "purer" ground in which the subject is formed. He does this by "bracketing" the world and reaching what he terms the subject of the *epoché*, which is separate from the transcendental and psychological subject. This subject avoids the fundamental error that Husserl finds in what he terms "traditional metaphysics:" that is, the problem of the world and its *mondanité* which can lead to "metaphysical adventures" (Derrida, *Voix et phénomène*, 4 and Husserl, 21-24). In hewing to the methodological rigor of a certain philosophical tradition, however, it seems that Husserl's thought nonetheless reveals a complicity with its predecessors. Indeed, instead of instituting a radical break which would at last allow for a certain sense of grounding, Derrida asks if Husserl's philosophy does not reveal a much more fundamental theme from the history of Western philosophy:

"...la nécessité phénoménologique, la rigueur et la subtilité de l’analyse husserlienne... ne cachent-elles pas une adhésion dogmatique ou spéculative qui... constituerait la phénoménologie en son dedans, dans son projet critique et dans la valeur institutrice de ses propres prémises... à savoir l’évidence donatrice originaire, le *présent* ou la *présence* du sens à une intuition pleine et originaire" (*Voix et phénomène*, 3).

In order to show these premises at work in Husserl’s project, Derrida undertakes a critique of the *Logical Investigations*, where he first notes how Husserl concentrates on the problematic definition of the sign. That is, Husserl underlines the confusion that exists between signs that function in terms of expression and those that function in terms of indication (*Voix et phénomène*, 17). For Husserl, a sign that functions as an indication has neither meaning (*Bedeutung*) nor sense (*Sinn*) (*Voix et phénomène*, 17). However, that is not to say that an indication is not a sign without signification. In fact, Husserl determines that the difference between a sign functioning as an expression and a sign
functioning as an indication is a functional difference as opposed to a more fundamental or substantial difference (Voix et phénomène, 20). That is, the sign, when defined as an expression, acts according to a certain logic of intentionality, thus expressing a meaning (vouloir dire) (Voix et phénomène, 20). This function of expression may be found in the very same sign when it functions as an indication, however, the meaning that is present in the expression is missing (Voix et phénomène, 20). Now, the fact that the same sign may function in two different ways leads Husserl to admit that the sign as expression and the sign as indication are in fact tied together. Thus, all signs as expressions may be turned, in spite of themselves, into indexes (Voix et phénomène, 21-22). However, this places Husserl in a difficult position, for in defining expression as carrying a certain “meaning” (vouloir dire, Bedeutung) he has closely tied it to the spoken discourse, as Derrida explains, “On pourrait donc...traduire Bedeutung par vouloir dire à la fois au sens où un sujet parlant, « s’exprimant », comme dit Husserl, « sur quelque chose », veut dire, et où une expression veut dire ; et être assuré que la Bedeutung est toujours ce que quelqu’un ou un discours veulent dire : toujours un sens de discours, un contenu discursif” (Voix et phénomène, 18). For Husserl, the problem is the “contamination” of the expression by the indication. For if a sign functioning as an expression may function as an indication, a sign functioning as an indication may in turn function as an expression. The problem quickly becomes clear, for admitting the latter would reduce spoken discourse (expression) to a mere gesture (an indication). Husserl is thus forced to refine the very distinction with which he opened his discussion of the sign, that of the difference between expression and indication. In other words, the sign is defined only in its function as an expression. This move, which Derrida qualifies as one of the foundational
moves of phenomenology, defines the sign in relation to a certain *exteriority*. Derrida explains:

Par un étrange paradoxe, le vouloir-dire n’isolerait la pureté concentrée de son *ex-pressivité* qu’au moment où serait suspendu le rapport à un certain *dehors*. À un certain dehors seulement, car cette réduction n’effacera pas, révélera au contraire dans la pure expressivité, un rapport à l’objet, la visée d’une idéalité objective, faisant face à l’intention du vouloir dire, à la *Bedeutungsintention*” (*Voix et phénomène*, 22-23).

Derrida will continue to underline this problematic of the exterior in relation to Husserl’s discussion of signs. For example, in his discussion of the indication, Husserl attempts to define an indicative sign in opposition to an expressive sign. In doing so, the indicative sign is further divided into two categories: that of a sign which might make an indicative allusion and that of a sign which is deductive, evident, apodictic (*Voix et phénomène*, 28-30). In other words, an indicative sign is defined in this way because it either shows (*montration, Hinweis*) or it demonstrates (*Beweis*). However, a problem immediately occurs because showing something to be true implies a demonstration of some kind. Derrida asks, “Qu’est-ce que la montration (*Weisen*) en général avant de se distribuer en indication montrant du doigt (*Hinweis*) le non-vu et en démonstration (*Beweis*) donnant à voir dans l’évidence de la preuve” (*Voix et phénomène*, 31)?

In addition to the problems posed by the indicative sign, the expressive sign offers even more difficulties. Derrida returns to the choice of the word “expression” in Husserl’s *Investigations*. He notes that expression is a voluntary exteriorization which is clearly intentional (*Voix et phénomène*, 35). Expression cannot occur without a subject’s intention behind it. An indicative sign, on the contrary, cannot be expressive, cannot be “animated” by a subject, for two reasons. The body of the sign (the index or indicator) is immaterial, and what it indicates exists in the world. In comparison, in expression, the
intention behind the expression is interior and expresses a "meaning" which is itself ideal and interior. Derrida explains, "Dans l'expression, l'intention est absolument expresse parce qu'elle anime une voix qui peut rester tout intérieure et que l'exprimé est une Bedeutung, c'est-à-dire une idéalité n'« existant » pas dans le monde" (Voix et phénomène, 35-36). Furthermore, for Husserl, expression must necessarily include a voluntary intention if it is to be defined as meaning (vouloir dire, Bedeutung) (Voix et phénomène, 36). That is, the interpretation or Deutung of expression can never occur outside of oral discourse (Voix et phénomène, 36). Thus, the Bedeutung is reserved for those who speak and who speak by giving meaning (vouloir dire) (Voix et phénomène, 36). Signs that are indicative are then excluded from the spoken discourse of expression. As Derrida suggests, signs linked to gestures, physiognomy, the body, etc. are not included in the signs expressing a meaning (Voix et phénomène, 37). However, it seems that certain signs of language may be interpreted, that is, their meaning may be taken up and explicitly expressed by spoken discourse. Thus a qualification is necessary.

For Husserl, then, an indication and expression may not simply be distinguished by a qualification of a linguistic or non-linguistic sign. It becomes necessary to distinguish, within spoken discourse, the difference between indicative signs and expressive signs. For Derrida, Husserl's system reveals a certain contradiction that we underlined earlier concerning the sign. That is, every sign that functions within communication may be shown to function in terms of indication. Derrida declares, "Husserl peut donc considérer que des éléments d'ordre substantiellement discursif (des mots, des parties de discours en général) fonctionnent dans certains cas comme des indices. Et cette fonction indicative du discours est massivement à l'œuvre. Tout
discours, en tant qu’il est engagé dans une communication et qu’il manifeste des vécus, opère comme indication” (Voix et phénomène, 40). What serves to separate the expression from communicative indication is presence. As Derrida explains, “Tout discours, ou plutôt tout ce qui, dans le discours, ne restitue pas la présence immédiate du contenu signifié, est in-expressif. L’expressivité pure sera la pure intention active (esprit, psyché, vie, volonté) d’un bedeuten animant un discours dont le contenu (Bedeutung) sera présent” (Voix et phénomène, 43-44).

This presence is, clearly, a self-presence so that any relation to another, any communication with the other will mark the limit or the end (Derrida underlines that this limit is eventually that of death) of a self-presence (Voix et phénomène, 44). As we noted above, the phenomenological reduction to an interior monologue is made in order to escape all contamination with the exterior and the corrosive influence of indicative communication. This crucial maneuver is necessary to preserve the integrity of expression and Husserl’s definition of the sign. In fact, as Derrida notes, by hewing to a definition of expression in which presence and meaning are so closely tied, the definition of a sign is degraded so that indicative signs are the only signs that may fill Husserl’s definition (Voix et phénomène, 46). Again, all of this is done in order to preserve the self-presence of meaning.

The phenomenological reduction on which this self-presence is based is extremely important and must be well understood if we are to understand Derrida’s critique (and, for that matter, the bulk of his philosophical project). Derrida carefully explains this reduction, and we would do well to quote his explanation at length.

Dans le monologue intérieur, le mot serait donc seulement représenté. Son lieu peut être l’imaginaire (Phantasie). Nous nous contentons

Now before moving to the heart of Derrida’s argument, we should recapitulate the points made so far. We must remember that Husserl’s philosophical project is aimed at correcting the error of “traditional metaphysics:” the problem of mistaking mundane categories for the absolute grounds of thought. By bracketing the subject, Husserl aims to reveal an ideal that might be infinitely repeated. This ideal is the inner monologue of the subject of the époche. Now, in order to arrive at this subject, Husserl is forced to manipulate his definition of the sign and its appearance before this subject. That is, the definition of a sign in terms of its functionality and, specifically, in terms of a functionality of expression requires a definition of the sign based on meaning. However, meaning, in turn, requires a privileging of intention or intentionality and thus implies a subject that is present, and, more precisely, self-present. This self-presence, of course, is a theme that is insistent (or present) throughout the history of Western metaphysics. Thus, Husserl’s attempt to inscribe a radical break in Western thought soon finds itself compromised in its profound alliance with perhaps the most fundamental of metaphysical presumptions. Now, our insistence above on the rather simple distinction between the representation of the word or the object in the imagination and its appearance or événement in the world may seem redundant. However, it is necessary in order to
proceed with the crucial portion of Derrida’s critique and with his project of deconstruction in general. Let us return to Husserl.

By bracketing the subject, Husserl hopes to avoid the mundane aspects of traditional metaphysics. Thus, by focusing on the representation of the object within the “solitary life of the soul” one avoids the problems of the object’s occurrence or événement in the world. In other words, a sign’s appearance within the subject of phenomenology reveals a sign whose function is expression but which avoids communication, information, manifestation – in other words, indication (Voix et phénomène, 53). Thus, in the interior discourse of phenomenology, a subject never communicates anything to herself: a sign within this discourse is both a representation and an occurrence of the imagination (Voix et phénomène, 53). The sign then has no sense in this inner discourse because it has no destination, no finality (Voix et phénomène, 53). Now, Derrida notes that if a sign is to function in this way, within the inner discourse, this depends on a certain ideality of the sign, for the sign must fill a three-fold definition in order for it to function: “….comme Vorstellung, lieu de l’identité en général, comme Vergegenwärtigung, possibilité de la répétition reproductive en général, comme Repräsentation, en tant que chaque événement signifiant est substitut (du signifié aussi bien que de la forme idéale du signifiant)” (Voix et phénomène, 56). However, Husserl only considers the first definition of the sign, that of Vorstellung, as playing a role in the communicative function of the sign. Yet this very definition of meaning depends on the latter two definitions of the sign. As Derrida explains, the possibility of a meaning or representation (Vorstellung) that is based on ideality requires the possibility of repetition. For if an object or sign is to be recognized and express its meaning, it must not be unique:
its uniqueness would give it a new meaning with each occurrence. In order for a sign to have a meaning, it must be recognized. Thus it must be repeated. And this possibility of repetition (*Vergegenwärtigung*) is part of what makes a sign indicative. As Derrida explains:

L’idéalité absolue est le corrélat d’une possibilité de répétition indéfinie. On peut donc dire que l’être est déterminé par Husserl comme idéalité, c’est-à-dire comme répétition. Le progrès historique a toujours pour forme essentielle, selon Husserl, la constitution d’idéalités dont la répétition, et donc la tradition, sera assurée à l’infini : la répétition et la tradition, c’est-à-dire la transmission et la réactivation de l’origine (*Voix et phénomène*, 58-59).

Thus, the presence of the phenomenological subject finds itself undermined by the possibility of repetition or a relationship with the outside.

If we were to continue, we could, as Derrida does, note another paradox in this definition of the subject. If being is defined in terms of a certain ideality, then this ideality is preserved in the present. That is, for the sign to be purely present and to have meaning, it must contain the possibility of its repetition. This repetition implies a purity of the ideal. And this purity is to be found in the present. As Derrida puts it, “Le rapport à la présence du présent comme forme ultime de l’être et de l’idéalité est le mouvement par lequel je transgresse l’existence empirique, la factualité, la contingence, la mondanité, etc.” (*Voix et phénomène*, 60). Now, in order to “transgress empirical existence” we must consider the possibility of an absolute and total change in the world. For, again, the goal of phenomenology is to transcend the mundane categories of the world and find a certain ground for philosophy. Thus, within such a schema, it does not matter whether the empirical world exists or not; the phenomenological subject exists and will exist at all times. Furthermore, this mode of existence is in the present. Thus, what is revealed in
such a mediation is relationship with not only the non-existence of the empirical world, but also a relationship with our existence in the empirical world. Once again, Derrida frames this argument in terms of a relationship with death:

C’est donc le rapport à ma mort (à ma disparition en général) qui se cache dans cette détermination de l’être comme présence, idéalité, possibilité absolue de répétition. La possibilité du signe est ce rapport à la mort. La détermination et l’effacement du signe dans la métaphysique est la dissimulation de ce rapport à la mort qui produisait pourtant la signification (Voix et phénomène, 60).

We underline this and follow Derrida’s argument to show how Husserl seems to build his definition of the sign and the phenomenological subject around a false exclusion or definition. As we noted above, what Husserl attempts to avoid is any sort of contamination with the exterior world – with an Other – that would entail an indicative function of the sign. Yet in doing so, his definition of the sign, as Vorstellung, is severely compromised. Indeed, in conjuring away the indicative – the outside and the Other (death) – Husserl operates within perhaps one of the oldest metaphysical presuppositions, as Derrida explains:

On peut effacer le signe à la manière classique d’une philosophie de l’intuition et de la présence. Celle-ci efface le signe en le dérivant, annule la reproduction et la représentation en en faisant la modification survenant à une présence simple. Mais comme c’est une telle philosophie – et en vérité la philosophie et l’histoire de l’Occident – qui a ainsi constitué et établi le concept même de signe, celui-ci est, dès son origine et au cœur de son sens, marqué par cette volonté de dérivation ou d’effacement (Voix et phénomène, 57).

It is at this moment that Derrida begins the operation of deconstruction. That is, he underlines the underlying presumption at work in Husserl’s philosophy and shows how the entire system privileges a certain series of relations. In Husserl, it is the privilege of presence and a certain exclusion of the sign. The work of deconstruction is
not only one of a reversal of this system of privileges but also a re-writing of this reversal so that the hierarchy and its production are revealed. As Derrida explains elsewhere when discussing Bataille’s notion of sovereignty and writing, “[Bataille] interdit [une écriture] qui projette la trace, par laquelle, écriture de maîtrise, la volonté veut se garder dans la trace, s’y faire reconnaître, et reconstituer sa présence…Cette écriture – majeure – s’appellera écriture parce qu’elle excède le logos (du sens, de la maîtrise, de la présence, etc.)” (Écriture et différence, 389, 392). Now, to return to the question above, if Derrida is to reverse and re-inscribe the hierarchy of presence found in Husserl’s thought, this implies a radical change in the concept of the sign. That is, in Husserl’s system or presuppositions, the repetitive or indicative nature of the sign is made to depend on its presence or self-presence. However, by deconstructing Husserl’s thought, Derrida reveals how presence and ideality are in fact derivatives of the repetitive nature of the sign, “On en vient ainsi – contre l’intention expresse de Husserl – à faire dépendre la Vorstellung elle-même, et en tant que telle, de la possibilité de la répétition, et la Vorstellung la plus simple, la présentation (Gegenwärtigung), de la possibilité de la représentation (Vergegenwärtigung). On dérive la présence-du-présent de la répétition et non l’inverse” (Voix et phénomène, 58). In operating such a deconstruction, Derrida shows that the founding distinctions in Husserl’s philosophy are in fact “contaminated” and compromised from the very beginning. Phenomenology is shown to operate on a “fictional” definition of the sign – a fictional definition that reveals the “outside” of the sign “present” within its “interior” (Voix et phénomène, 63).

The deconstruction of the sign in Husserl’s thought has consequences not only for the presuppositions of Husserl’s theory of language and the sign, but for the totality of the
concepts on which such presuppositions rest. Let us examine these consequences in more detail. We recall that Husserl’s original definition of the sign in terms of its expressive function privileged a certain presence or self-presence. This presence operates within an understanding of time as the present. In fact, as we noted earlier, this privilege of the present is absolutely necessary for Husserl’s definition of the sign and for the concepts of truth and sense. Derrida explains, “Ce privilège définit l’élément même de la pensée philosophique, il est l’évidence même, la pensée consciente elle-même, il commande tout concept possible de la vérité et du sens” (Voix et phénomène, 70). However, in spite of the privilege given to the present, Husserl’s definition is clearly and carefully constructed. He is then quite aware of the problems of what might be called a more “vulgar” concept of time. Thus, in terms of a memory – of an event that is passed – Husserl is careful to distinguish between the retention of an event and its perception (Voix et phénomène, 72). However, at other levels within his text, Derrida finds that Husserl undermines this absolute difference, remarking that the perception of the present and the non-perception of the non-present are always in relation with one another. That is, the event, as it is perceived in the absolute presence, maintains a certain relation with the non-present and the non-perception of the memory or the past. It is, once again, repetition and the possibility of repetition which renders the present of phenomenology possible. For if an event is to be recognized, understood, and perceived as a repetition, its past as well as any possible future must be in relation with its present occurrence. Derrida explains:

L’idéalité de la forme (Form) de la présence elle-même implique en effet qu’elle puisse à l’infini se ré-péter, que son re-tour, comme retour du même, soit à l’infini nécessaire et inscrit dans la présence comme telle ; que le re-tour soit retour d’un présent qui se retiendra dans un mouvement
fini de rétention; qu’il n’y ait de vérité originaire, au sens phénoménologique, qu’enracinée dans la finitude de cette rétention; que le rapport à l’infini ne puisse enfin s’instaurer que dans l’ouverture à l’idéalité de la forme de présence, comme possibilité de re-tour à l’infini (Voix et phénomène, 75-76).

The truth of the present is thus always thought or formulated in relation with what we might term the “fold” of the return movement of the past and the future. In this manner, the present is always “already” constituted by the movement of the past and present – movements against which the present has always defined itself.

This opening in the presence of the present reveals another deconstruction in the ideality or subject of phenomenology, that of the deconstruction of the presence of space. We recall that in Husserl’s distinction between the indicative and the communicative, the communicative was defined by its place within the “interior life of the soul.” That is, there is no indicative function or mundane communication within the subject of phenomenology because there is no “alter ego” (Voix et phénomène, 78). Let us consider, as Husserl and Derrida do, a certain expression: “You acted poorly, and you cannot continue to act this way” (Voix et phénomène, 78-79). Husserl believes that this expression may serve as a demonstration of the communicative function of the sign. The subject learns nothing about herself, demonstrates nothing, indicates nothing – communication is entirely self-contained and refers to nothing that is exterior (Voix et phénomène, 79). Thus the sign or the expression, occurring as it does within the voice of the subject of phenomenology, is endowed with a certain purity or fullness. We might say that it is the medium of the voice that assures this fullness of presence, for if the perceived object (the sign or the expression) is to achieve a certain meaning, it must be repeatable, and this infinitely. In order for this infinite repetition to take place, the
“medium” of the voice must provide a space in which this repetition may occur without any exterior contact. In this way, the voice of phenomenology assumes a certain fullness or presence, as Derrida explains:

L’idéalité de l’objet n’étant que son être-pour une conscience non empirique, elle ne peut être exprimée que dans un élément dont la phénoménalité n’ait pas la forme de la mondanité. La voix est le nom de cet élément. La voix s’entend. Les signes (les « images acoustiques » au sens de Saussure, la voix phénoménologique) sont « entendus » du sujet qui les profère dans la proximité absolue de leur présent (Voix et phénomène, 85)

Now, if the voice is necessary for the sign to exist in its function of expression, this implies a certain understanding of the sign in terms of space. Certainly, the sign or the phoneme as it is pronounced within the voice of consciousness has no spatial form or nature. However, Husserl’s determination of expression as self-expression, in the sense that it hears itself immediately, as the phoneme is pronounced, leads Derrida to underline the spatial considerations at play. That is, since the phoneme has no relation with the exterior, we might say that, ideally, the signifier is in absolute relation with the signified. As Derrida states, “Le signifiant deviendrait parfaitement diaphane en raison même de la proximité absolue du signifié” (Voix et phénomène, 90). In contrast, when one sees oneself write or explain oneself through gestures, this proximity is lost (Voix et phénomène, 90). The privilege accorded speech then reveals the presence (in the purest sense) of the phenomenological subject.

This presence of the voice reallocates writing to what Derrida terms a “secondary layer” of expression (Voix et phénomène, 90). Yet, this hierarchy is fraught once again with danger. For if we are to consider the voice as exercising a certain presence that is temporal and, in this instance, physical, we must return to the question of time and its
manifestation within a present moment. That is, if the phoneme is to be understood in terms of auto-affection, then we must carefully distinguish what occurs within the eternal present of auto-affection. Derrida finds that this present is in fact disturbed or divided as it tries to reconstitute itself in time. That is, the present endures, but it endures in time. And time implies a certain movement that language and metaphysics have traditionally had some difficulty expressing. Thus, within the present, the awareness within auto-affection that the present is the present must take place at each moment. This implies that experience of the present does not change with each instant, giving us the present as an original (in all senses of the word) experience. However this movement reveals an exterior to the present/presence of the subject of phenomenology. Derrida explains:

Le processus par lequel le maintenant vivant, se produisant par génération spontanée, doit, pour être un maintenant, se retenir dans un autre maintenant, s'affecte lui-même, sans recours empirique, d'une nouvelle actualité originaire dans laquelle il deviendra non-maintenant comme maintenant passé, etc., un tel processus est bien une auto-affectation pure dans laquelle le même n'est le même qu'en s'affectant de l'autre, en devenant l'autre du même (Voix et phénomène, 94-95).

The movement of time reveals a fissure in the presence of the subject of phenomenology, just as we have seen above with the notion of presence in relation to repetition. The living present is the result of its exteriority and not its interiority. It depends on a relation with the outside, with its other, in order for it to establish itself as present and auto affecting. Finally, to return at last to our discussion of the problem of space, the opening of time as movement reveals an opening of space as “spacing” within the phenomenological subject. Once we have determined that the exterior “contaminates” the presence of the present moment, the interior opens itself up or displaces itself in space. As Derrida declares, “L’extériorité de l’espace, l’extériorité comme espace, ne
surprend pas le temps, elle s’ouvre comme pur « dehors » « dans » le mouvement de la temporalisation” (Voix et phénomène, 96). Time and space can never be part of an absolute subjectivity because they cannot be thought from the “ground” of a present or of a self-presence of being.

Above we noted how the work of deconstruction begins with the reversal of the hierarchy that Derrida finds in Husserl’s text and continues with the re-inscription of this reversal into the text and its presuppositions. In this way Derrida avoids a simple reversal of values in the text. It appears to us that he also avoids an immanent criticism. For such a criticism would attempt to underline the contradictions in Husserl’s text (contradictions which Derrida takes care to restitute and explicate) and resolve them according to the logic of the text. On the contrary, Derrida recognizes that the various contradictions that he finds in Husserl’s text are necessary in order for the totality of the system to function. That is, the categories and functions of presence, auto-affection, expression, truth, telos, etc. depend on these contradictions. In another text, La pharmacie de Platon, Derrida, speaking of Plato, confirms the necessity of such contradictions:

D’une part Platon avance la décision d’une logique intolérante à ce passage entre les deux sens contraires d’un même mot, d’autant plus qu’un tel passage se révélera tout autre qu’une simple confusion, alternance ou dialectique des contraires. Et pourtant, d’autre part, le pharmakon, si notre lecture se confirme, constitue le milieu original de cette décision, l’élément qui la précède, la comprend, la déborde, ne s’y laisse jamais réduire et ne se sépare pas d’un mot (ou d’un appareil signifiant) unique, opérant dans le texte grec et platonicien (La Dissemination, 122).

The work of deconstruction reveals these contradictions but never tries to re-inscribe them within the dominant logic of the text. Deconstruction attempts to reveal what we might call the “architecture” that allows such contradictions to appear and even requires that they appear. Speaking of Husserl’s text, Derrida explains that an original difference
must exist in order for the “purity” of self-presence to assume the place it does in his text. He explains:

L’auto-affection comme opération de la voix supposait qu’une différence pure vint diviser la présence à soi. C’est dans cette différence pure que s’enracine la possibilité de tout ce qu’on croit pouvoir exclure de l’auto-affection : l’espace, le dehors, le monde, le corps, etc. Dès qu’on admet que l’auto-affection est la condition de la présence à soi, aucune réduction transcendantale pure n’est possible. Mais il faut passer par elle pour ressaisir la différence au plus proche d’elle-même... (Voix et phénomène, 92).

If we recall how, in Husserl’s thought, each category necessitated the exclusion of another category or its hierarchism within the pair in question, we might also read this exclusion as revealing a certain “open space” or manque within the system. This space is always, in the end, revealed to be filled by the very term it sought to exclude (for instance, we find that the indicative function is always already part of expression, and that difference is always already part of presence in terms of both space and time, etc.). This filling of the empty or excluded space is termed “supplementarity” by Derrida, as he explains when speaking of expression and indication, “Si l’indication ne s’ajoute pas à l’expression qui ne s’ajoute pas au sens, on peut néanmoins parler à leur sujet de « supplément » originaire : leur addition vient suppléer un manque, une non-présence à soi originaire” (Voix et phénomène, 97). Indeed, it is the revelation or laying bare of this supplementarity that is deconstruction’s task. Through the deconstructive act of “double reading,” Derrida attempts to show what tends not only to contradict the founding concepts of Husserl’s phenomenology but also what, paradoxically, makes them possible. Another term for this “supplementarity” might be what Derrida terms différence, as he explains:
Ainsi entendue, la supplémentarité est bien la *différence*, l’opération du différer qui, à la fois, fissure et retarde la présence, la soumettant du même coup à la décision et au délai originaires. La différence est à penser avant la séparation entre le différer comme délai et le différer comme travail actif de la différence. Bien entendu, cela est impensable à partir de la conscience, c’est-à-dire de la présence, ou simplement de son contraire, l’absence ou la non-conscience. Impensable aussi comme la simple complication *homogène* d’un diagramme ou d’une ligne de temps, comme « succession » complexe. La différence supplémentaire vicarie la présence dans son manque originaire à elle-même (*Voix et phénomène*, 98).

As Derrida stresses, the very possibility of thinking the movement of *différence* from within subjectivity is impossible. *Différence* produces the grounds on which consciousness and subjectivity might exist (*Voix et phénomène*, 92). That is why we have be careful to distinguish the double movement of deconstruction. Not only is deconstruction a reversal and re-inscription of the differences present within a text, it is also a double reading of a text – a double reading that is neither a commentary nor an interpretation but a reading through which we might catch a glimpse of a text’s *supplément* or *différence* (*Voix et phénomène*, 98). We say, “catch a glimpse” in order to underline the impossibility of a consciousness or subjectivity grasping and “mastering” the *supplément* and *différence* present in a text. Once again, in opposition to a simple reversal of concepts that might be found in a text, deconstruction never pretends to occupy a “space” “outside” of the text from which it might be able to operate. This means that deconstruction is always an operation on the very margins of thought. The *supplément* or *différence* are what make the concepts of philosophy possible and deconstruction is always an attempt to work within those concepts. Derrida explains:

> Les mouvements de déconstruction ne sollicitent pas les structures du dehors. Ils ne sont possibles et efficaces, ils n’ajustent leurs coups qu’en habitant ces structures... Opérant nécessairement de l’intérieur, empruntant à la structure ancienne toutes les ressources stratégiques et économiques
Now, in our discussion of the interior and exterior of philosophy and its concepts, we have often used the term “text,” which has a particular meaning within Derrida’s work. For instance, when discussing the trace of presence within Husserl’s thought, Derrida declares that it is from the trace and not the presence of consciousness that the various oppositions must be thought. He declares, “Il faut penser l’être-originaire depuis la trace et non l’inverse. Cette archi-écriture est à l’œuvre à l’origine du sens” (Voix et phénomène, 95). Before turning to other preoccupations in Derrida’s texts, we should like to examine more closely his critique of writing and the sign within the context of his project for a “grammatology” – that is, a “science” that works to re-inscribe all of the concepts of science but which no longer resembles what we understand to be a science (Grammatologie, 11-14). In this manner, we might be able to better understand the Derridean “infrastructure,” of difference, trace, supplement, etc.  

Taking up where he left off in his study of Husserl, Derrida begins by underlining how the history of language reveals a hierarchy in which the spoken word is privileged over the written word or writing (Grammatologie, 15-16). This privilege is one in which the self-presence of the voice (the “s’entendre-parler”) is used in order to help produce the entire Western philosophical tradition (Grammatologie, 17). As we noted with Husserl, such fundamental notions as presence, substance/essence/existence, presence as the present instant, subjectivity, etc. are based on the foundation of self-presence (Grammatologie, 23). Furthermore, such notions or concepts are necessary for the more general concepts which we use to explain our existence: the world and its origin, history,
the interior and the exterior, the mundane and the non-mundane – all depend on this “ground” or certainty of self-presence (*Grammatologie*, 17). Now, we must be careful when qualifying Derrida’s analysis as one which underlines the privileging of the spoken word. Yes, it is true that historically, as Derrida stresses, the spoken word has been valorized in relation to the written word. However, it is the privilege of *presence* that most interests Derrida. Thus, an understanding of the spoken word or the written word acting as a fully present *signifier* is very important. Derrida says as much when, speaking of the notion of presence, he evokes the word in general, using the term *logocentrism* (*Grammatologie*, 23). That is, the *presence* of the spoken word is at the heart of any definition of the sign in which the signifier is understood to have a direct and immediate relation with its signified. Indeed, the very fact that a difference between the signifier and the signified might be made is based on the privilege given the spoken word. In fact, the modern sciences of linguistics and semiotics are based on just such a distinction between the signifier and the signified. Yet it is the privilege given to the presence of the spoken word which allows such a distinction and more fundamental distinctions (such as the difference between the sensible and the intelligible) to be made. For Derrida, if a science of *grammatology* is to be possible, we must first work through the limitations of the modern sciences of the sign.

Derrida examines Ferdinand de Saussure’s linguistic project and immediately notes that in comparison with the spoken word, the written word holds an inferior place. For Saussure, the written word has a history that is different from that of the spoken word because writing is always a representation (*Grammatologie*, p 46). That is, the written word is a signifier of the original signifier, the spoken word. In this manner, Saussure
unwittingly inscribes his thought within the metaphysical tradition that extends back to Plato and Aristotle (Grammatologie, 46). Thus, for Saussure, writing serves only as a pale and distant representation of the spoken word, serving as the exterior representation of language and the “vocal image” of the sign as it exists within speech (Grammatologie, 46-47). Now, Saussure defines writing in two ways: first as a system of representation of speech (words) and second as system of representation that is more global and systematic (as the phonetic representation of speech) (Grammatologie, 49). It is this second distinction that interests Saussure. For though his topic of study remains language as it is spoken, the problem of writing must be dealt with, and it is in this second definition that Saussure is best able to make his distinction between speech and writing. This is because writing, defined as the phonetic representation of speech, attempts to maintain a certain internal rigor that may also be found in speech. In this manner, writing expresses a certain relationship of exteriority that matches the interiority of speech. However, this “natural” relationship between the interior and exterior is fraught with danger, for, as Saussure notes, the graphic image appears to be more permanent than its spoken homologue (Grammatologie, 53). This appearance is qualified as being “deceitful” or “superficial,” for the image of the word comes to take the place of the spoken word, “usurping” the place that should be given to speech (Grammatologie, 54). Derrida underlines this “reversal” when he explains, “L’écriture est la dissimulation de la présence naturelle et première et immédiate du sens à l’âme dans le logos. Sa violence survient à l’âme comme inconscience” (Grammatologie, 55). As Derrida notes, Saussure’s treatment of writing in such negative terms reveals a moral judgement
concerning speech and writing. Writing is not only exterior to speech, it is also 
*dangerous* and linked to the passions (*Grammatologie*, 56-61).

Now, Saussure expends an enormous amount of energy trying to expel writing from speech. However, it is just at this moment (of expulsion) that Saussure's own theory of the arbitrariness of the sign comes to menace his entire hierarchy of speech and writing. Derrida notes how, "A l'intérieur du rapport « naturel » entre les signifiants phoniques et leurs signifiés *en général*, le rapport entre chaque signifiant déterminé et chaque signifié déterminé serait « arbitraire »" (*Grammatologie*, 65). However, if writing is exterior to speech and if this exteriority is shown to be true because of the natural relation or "institution" that exists between these two signifiers, then the arbitrary nature of the sign cannot exist. For this would imply that any "natural" relation between signifiers and signified were impossible. Derrida explains:

> Si « écriture » signifie inscription et d'abord institution durable d'un signe... l'écriture en général couvre tout le champ des signes linguistiques. Dans ce champ peut apparaître ensuite une certaine espèce de signifiants institués, « graphiques » au sens étroit et dérivé de ce mot, réglés par un certain rapport à d'autres signifiants institués, donc « écrits » même s'ils sont « phoniques » (*Grammatologie*, 65).

The arbitrary nature of the sign unravels all of the categories on which Saussure based his theory of speech in writing, for there is no longer any place for the written signifier to exist in an exterior relation (as an image or representation) to the spoken word. As Derrida notes:

> La thèse de l'arbitraire du signe conteste donc indirectement mais sans appel le propos déclaré de Saussure lorsqu'il chasse l'écriture dans les ténèbres extérieures du langage. Cette thèse rend bien compte d'un rapport conventionnel entre le phonème et le graphème (dans l'écriture phonétique, entre le phonème, signifiant-signifié, et le graphème, pur signifiant) mais elle interdit par là-même que celui-ci soit une « image » de celui-là. Or il était indispensable à l'exclusion de l'écriture, comme
« système externe », qu’elle vînt frapper une « image », une « représentation » ou une « figuration », un reflet extérieur de la réalité de la langue (Grammatologie, 66).

The categories (image, representation, figuration, etc.) on which a “science” of semiotics and linguistics are constructed are then revealed to be inadequate (Grammatologie, 67). For Derrida, this contradiction, while necessary for the coherence of Saussure’s argument, reveals the hierarchies and assumptions on which not only Saussure’s project, but also those of Western science and metaphysics are based. Like the deconstruction of Husserl’s notion of the self-presence of the subject, Derrida underlines how the “purity” of Saussure’s idea of speech is undermined by writing:

Il faut maintenant penser que l’écriture est à la fois plus extérieure à la parole, n’étant pas son « image » ou son « symbole », et plus intérieure à la parole qui est déjà en elle-même une écriture. Avant même d’être lié à l’incision, à la gravure, au dessin ou à la lettre, à un signifiant renvoyant en général à un signifiant par lui signifié, le concept de graphie implique, comme la possibilité commune à tous les systèmes de signification, l’instance de la trace instituée (Grammatologie, 68).

The occurrence of the word “trace” brings us back to our earlier discussion concerning Husserl. It is with this operation of deconstruction (the reversal of the hierarchy speech/writing and writing’s re-inscription within the larger system) that we are better able to understand what Derrida means by “trace” and by “writing.” It appears that among Derrida’s commentators an enormous misunderstanding exists concerning these terms. It is very important not to understand “trace” in its traditional sense — especially within this context. Indeed, it is true that Derrida is speaking of language and that a trace is commonly understood to mean the appearance of a sign or mark (thus, present) pointing to something absent. And an institution is something that is inaugurated and
continued through a certain historical or cultural tradition. Yet the “trace instituée” means much more than this.

To begin, Derrida underlines the cleavage that the trace makes between the interior and exterior of speech. Writing (or arché-écriture) is shown to be part of the interiority of speech. It is necessary in order that the difference between speech and writing manifest itself. The trace is the presence of the other – of difference itself – which is always already present within any sign before any such difference might be made. And here we must be very careful, for the use of the word “before” might imply a certain notion of temporality – of a deployment of various levels of difference along a line of time. As we underlined earlier, such an understanding of time is based on a concept of the present or presence which must include this difference or trace within it in order for it to exist. Thus the trace is an “original” difference that exists “before” any differences within time or space might be distinguished. Derrida explains:

L’« immotivation » du signe requiert une synthèse dans laquelle le tout autre s’annonce comme tel – sans aucune simplicité, aucune identité, aucune ressemblance ou continuité – dans ce qui n’est pas lui. S’annonce comme tel : c’est là toute l’histoire, depuis ce que la métaphysique a déterminé comme le « non-vivant » jusqu’à la « conscience », en passant par tous les niveaux de l’organisation animale. La trace, où se marque le rapport à l’autre, articule sa possibilité sur tout le champ de l’étant, que la métaphysique a déterminé comme étant-présent à partir du mouvement occulté de la trace. Il faut penser la trace avant l’étant (Grammatologie, 69).

Thinking the trace in this manner implies an entirely different level of difference. For the play of present versus absent that the colloquial notion of the trace implies is extended to include all of history and all being. The trace of archi-écriture is the deepest of traces, touching on the presence/absence of all of history and of all of being within each sign. The trace is first necessary if we are to only afterwards be capable of articulating or
conceptualizing this more "ordinary" or "usual" form of the trace. This "ordinary" form of the trace is the "empirical" trace, and as we have noted, it is extremely important not to confuse these two understandings in Derrida's work.

Furthermore, if we are to consider the Derridean trace in its relation to the empirical "trace," we must also reassess the institutional aspect of both the empirical trace and the Derridean trace. For if the trace is necessary for the concept of difference and trace to appear, then the very difference between the concepts of "nature" and "culture" is caught up in the larger, Derridean trace. That is, in order for us to make the distinction between the Aristotelian categories of physis and nomos, we must be already inscribed within the larger trace of Derridean différence. In this manner, the trace cannot be situated within one category or the other. It is neither natural nor cultural. However, it is what is necessary if we are to make such distinctions. As Derrida declares:

Aussi...la trace dont nous parlons n'est pas plus naturelle (elle n'est pas la marque, le signe naturel, ou l'indice au sens husserlien) que culturelle, pas plus physique que psychique, biologique que spirituelle. Elle est ce à partir de quoi un devenir-immotivé du signe est possible, et avec lui toutes les oppositions ultérieures entre la physis et son autre (Grammatologie, 69-70).

It is in this manner that we must understand the term "instituée" in Derrida’s reference to the trace. This trace is "instituted" within our understanding of empirical differences. It is true that it is from this difference that such concepts as nature and culture might arise and serve as the foundations for various institutions, but we can in no way understand the trace to be an institution itself. Again, it is the "movement" or "structure" out of which such differences might be perceived but which is always already present and divided within such differences.
If the *trace* requires an absolute relation with the outside or the Other within any concept of self-presence, it also requires the very same type of absolute relation with the exterior in the present of time. Let us consider the linguistic problem of articulation in language. Derrida notes that in order for a word to be recognized as a word, a certain difference must appear between its "sensible apparaissant" and its "apparaître vécu" (*Grammatologie*, 96). That is, there must be a temporal synthesis that takes place between the word’s initial appearance as it is articulated and its appearing (in its totality) as a “psychic imprint,” which takes note of the differences between sounds, syllables, and other words. This then gives the word its meaning in relation to other sounds, syllables, and words (*Grammatologie*, 96-97). Now, this temporal synthesis implies an opening onto the past within the present or self-presence of the sign. For if the sign is to be understood (if the temporal synthesis is to take place between appearance and appearing), then the present of the sign is always already in relation to the past. As Derrida explains, the sign, by pointing to the absent past reveals a certain passive structure: “Cette passivité est aussi le rapport à un passé, à un toujours-déjà-là qu’aucune réactivation de l’origine ne saurait pleinement maîtriser et réveiller à la présence. Cette impossibilité de ranimer absolument l’évidence d’une présence originaire nous renvoie donc à un passé absolu” (*Grammatologie*, 97). In this manner, Derrida understands the *trace* to open up unto a past that is neither a present-past nor a past presence. On the contrary, the presence of the sign reveals a relation to time that the concepts of “past,” “present,” and “future” cannot adequately describe. The present is always already deferred to the past just as the past is deferred to the future and the future to the present. This problematic is much more sophisticated than the traditional problem of time in which the present of B would be
constituted through the retention of the past of A and the anticipation of C (Grammatologie, 98). Such a problem has always been anticipated by the long tradition of reflective and transcendental philosophy. For Derrida, what is at stake is something more fundamental. The very differences between each of the above moments, the very difference between past, present, and future are already part of the larger difference instituted by the trace. For if we try to reduce these differences within the system of metaphysics and the phenomenological project (that is, place a bracket around our mundane experience of the world of space and time), we nonetheless insert ourselves within the larger, mundane understanding of time. Again, the trace marks a radical difference that exists between the present and the past as it understood in a much larger sense. Derrida explains, “L’archi-écriture comme espacement ne peut pas se donner comme telle dans l’expérience phénoménologique d’une présence. Elle marque le temps mort dans la présence du présent vivant, dans la forme générale de toute présence” (Grammatologie, 99).

Here, with the return of the notion of writing (archi-écriture), we are better able to understand how Derrida uses and undermines the traditional understanding of the sign to reveal his “infrastructure.” For if we are to understand the sign in the traditional sense, we must base this understanding on a presence of the sign within the present moment. However, in order for the sign to function within language, this presence must always point to not only another sign but also to another sign in time. Just as writing in the traditional sense undermines the privilege given to speech in Saussure’s system, this much larger understanding of “writing” undermines the very differences on which not only speech and writing are based but also all of the fundamental differences within
Western thought. Arche-writing and the arche-trace are beyond these differences. They are what allow these differences to be articulated. Above, Derrida uses the term "espacement" to explain arche-writing, and this choice of terms is deliberate. For spacing refers to both the difference in space and the difference in time. As we noted above with Husserl, it is the spacing of time which allows the spacing of space to appear, and if arche-writing is what allows for the distinctions within time to appear, it is then also at the origin of the distinction between time and space. Derrida declares:

Origine de l'expérience de l'espace et du temps, cette écriture de la différence, ce tissu de la trace permet à la différence entre l'espace et le temps de s'articuler, d'apparaître comme telle dans l'unité d'une expérience (d'un « même » vécu à partir d'un « même » corps propre). Cette articulation permet donc à une chaîne graphique (« visuelle » ou « tactile », « spatiale ») de s'adapter, éventuellement de façon linéaire, sur une chaîne parlée (« phonique », « temporelle ») (Grammatologie, 96).

The alignment of a graphic or spoken chain in time and space is also what we term the "sense" of a sign. A sign "makes sense" in time and space, and Derrida's deconstructive project, after placing the certitude of self-presence and the present in question, also undermines the certitude of sense or meaning. To understand this, let us return to Saussure's analysis of language. We recall that he wishes to separate speech from writing. It is the category of speech that (apparently) avoids the system of differences emblematic to writing and, as we have seen, it is for this reason that Saussure chooses to privilege speech over writing. However, as we have noted, in order that the differences between sounds appear in speech, it is necessary to operate a reduction of both self-presence and the present. And this reduction always implies a relation with the exterior that "contaminates" the "purity" of this self-presence and present. Derrida once again explains:
La trace (pure) est la différence. Elle ne dépend d'aucune plénitude sensible, audible ou visible, phonique ou graphique. Elle en est au contraire la condition. Bien qu'elle n'existe pas, bien qu'elle ne soit jamais un étant-présent hors de toute plénitude, sa possibilité est antérieure en droit à tout ce qu'on appelle signe (signifié/signifiant, contenu/expression, etc.), concept ou opération, motrice ou sensible (Grammatologie, 92).

Following an operation with which we are now familiar, Derrida underlines how the trace of arche-writing actively constitutes the differences on which the “later,” more “fundamental” differences on which Saussure bases his “science” of linguistics.

However, this active constitution of differences is also mirrored by a passive operation. Indeed, it is this passive operation of difference that may lead to so much confusion concerning deconstruction. Derrida notes that not only does the trace allow for the formation of the form, but also for what he terms the “l'être-imprimé de l'empreinte” (Grammatologie, 92). This distinction is based on the same one that is made within the phenomenological reduction concerning the “being-heard” of speech and the “sound-heard.” That is, Derrida underlines how within Saussure’s system, the sign of speech is characterized as an “acoustical image” (Grammatologie, 92). This image, as Saussure analyzes it, is not simply the sound as it is heard but a more rarefied phenomenological sound of the “being-heard” of sound. As Derrida explains, “L'être-entendu est structurellement phénoménal et appartient à un ordre radicalement hétérogène à celui du son réel dans le monde” (Grammatologie, 93). Saussure’s project may be distinguished from a simple “psycho-physio-phonetics” when it makes this distinction (Grammatologie, 95). For it is in order to avoid the most basic of confusions, that of mistaking the phenomenological for the empirical (in other words, confusing sensory appearing with the lived appearing), that Saussure seeks to analyze the acoustical image
over the simple sound. However, it is within this distinction that we might also determine the *passive* movement of the *trace*. For in spite of the phenomenological reduction, a difference has been marked— that between the empirical and the phenomenological. As Derrida explains, “La différence inouïe entre l’apparaissant et l’apparaître (entre le « monde » et le « vécu ») est la condition de toutes les autres différences, de toutes les autres traces, et elle est déjà une trace” (*Grammatologie*, 95). That is to say, the differences that we perceive and which allow us to make the phenomenological reduction are already inscribed within the differences of the *trace*. The *trace* is always already at the “origin” of the differences that we perceive. Thus, it is of capital importance to understand that the *trace* is already present within the differences that we perceive and on which such “fundamental” or “founding” divisions such as the empirical and the phenomenal might be made. Furthermore, we must be very careful not to confuse the phenomenological project with Derrida’s project of deconstruction. Within phenomenology, deconstruction is always already taking place. As he explains, “...la pensée de la trace ne se confondra jamais avec une phénoménologie de l’écriture. Comme une phénoménologie du signe en général, une phénoménologie de l’écriture est impossible” (*Grammatologie*, 99).

Before we leave this aspect of Derrida’s approach, it is important to underline the “marginal” or “doubled” aspect of his approach. If the “sense” of a sign is revealed to be both actively and passively undermined by the *trace*, this is true not only for the other categories of the sign within linguistics but also for the entirety of Derrida’s project. That is, like the “double reading” of deconstruction, Derrida is very careful to explain that deconstruction and its manifestations (the *trace*, arche-writing, différence, etc.) can never
be pinned down to a simple definition. They are, in this case, both active and passive.

Derrida explains:

...ce qui se laisse désigner par « différance » n’est ni simplement actif ni simplement passif, annonçant ou rappelant plutôt quelque chose comme la voix moyenne, disant une opération qui n’est pas une opération, qui ne se laisse penser ni comme passion ni comme action d’un sujet sur un objet, ni à partir d’un agent ni à partir d’un patient, ni à partir ni en vue d’aucun de ces termes (Marges, 9).

In this manner, the trace operates both actively (by manifesting itself as the presence of an absence) and passively (as the absence which helps to constitute the presence) within the self-presence of the sign and metaphysics. This is equally true for the present of time, as the “gap” between the present of this moment and the absolute past of the trace reveals the passive constitution of space within time. That is, the trace necessarily divides the present and thus reveals a certain space or “spacing” within the present. In this way, time and space (and the difference between the two concepts) emerge from the “original” difference of the trace. Indeed, this last notion of “spacing” is of particular interest, for Derrida underlines how Saussure ignores the fundamental importance of spacing in his analysis of speech and language. A certain spacing, not simply that of the space (the white) between words, but more fundamentally that which exists in time (through pauses, intervals, etc.), is necessary if speech is to make any sense. And this spacing is the “...non-perçu, le non-présent et le non-conscient...L’archi-écriture comme espacement ne peut pas se donner comme telle, dans l’expérience phénoménologique d’une présence” (Grammatologie, 99).²

It is perhaps with this example of spacing that we might make a transition. For if we have concentrated on a certain Derrida-philosopher in order to explain deconstruction within its philosophical context, this is not to limit his work to “only philosophy.”
Indeed, what we hope to show with this extended explanation is the difficulty one might have in erecting walls between such terms as "literature" and "philosophy." Derrida's work shows the fragility of such distinctions. If anything, this short venture into deconstruction and philosophy should make us sensitive to the very borders or margins of philosophy and the false closures it operates. If we evoke literature in this context, it is again to underline the difficulty in walling off "philosophy" from other disciplines as well as making "literature" a discipline unto itself. In order to make this clearer, let us again return to spacing. The spacing of the trace reveals the articulation of space and time, the becoming-space of time and the becoming time of space (*Grammatologie*, 99). It is also the spacing between the words of a text. And as Derrida declares, "Aucune intuition ne peut s'accomplir au lieu où « les « blancs » en effet assument l’importance" (*Préface au Coup de dés*) (*Grammatologie*, 99). This reference to Mallarmé and the phenomenological subject are important, for Derrida attempts elsewhere to show how literature (in particular modern literature) works to undermine the traditional divisions we use to analyze it (divisions that are, finally, based on the more fundamental divisions of metaphysics, analyzed above).

### B. Derrida and Literature

In “La double séance,” Derrida begins a reading of Mallarmé by underlining the categories shared by both philosophy and literature. For it is with the question, "What is literature?" that the very same philosophical problems analyzed above come into play. That is, with such a question, we are forced to analyze both the category of truth (the sense or meaning of a word) and the category of literature. The relationship or "play" that exists between these two categories might best be understood by outlining their
encounter around the traditional literary category of *mimesis*, as Derrida explains, “L’histoire de ce rapport serait organisée par, je ne dirai pas la *mimesis*...mais par une certaine interprétation de la *mimesis*...Et cette histoire, si elle a un sens, est tout entière réglée par la valeur de vérité et par un certain rapport inscrit dans l’hymen en question, entre littérature et vérité” (*Dissémination*, 225-226). As we have demonstrated above, Derrida will attempt to demonstrate how the *hymen* (a term Derrida deploys in a strategic manner whose meaning could be (but is not limited to) “division,” “fold,” “trace,” “arche-writing,” or “arche-text”) or division between literature and truth is always already divided by a “deeper” or “more profound” difference that “corresponds” to that difference analyzed above under the term “*trace*” or “arche-writing.”

Before turning his attention to Mallarmé, Derrida explores the philosophical foundation of the concept of *mimesis*. By closely analyzing the Platonic texts, Derrida is able to conclude that a certain ambiguity is to be found in Plato’s definition of *mimesis*. It is for this reason that he declares that it is the *history* of the concept of *mimesis* and not the concept itself that must be examined.¹⁰ From the ambiguity and contradiction that haunts Plato’s definition of *mimesis*, Derrida notes that a choice is nonetheless made (*Dissémination*, 235). This choice is one of *ontology*. That is, the definition of being made in Platonic thought comes to privilege the presence of the *on* (the being-present of being).¹¹ Derrida explains, “C’est justement l’*ontologique*: la possibilité présumée d’un discours sur ce qui *est*, d’un *logos* décidant et décidable de ou sur l’*on* (étant-présent). Ce qui est, l’étant-présent...se distingue de l’apparence, de l’image, du phénomène, etc., c’est-à-dire de ce qui, le présentant comme étant-présent, le redouble, le re-présente et dès lors le remplace et le dé-présente” (*Dissémination*, 235). The position that the
present of the thing-itself (reality) holds over any imitation becomes dominant from this moment forward (this includes any attempt to reverse this hierarchy). It is this position and its history that is at the heart of Derrida's investigation. *Mimesis* as it is understood within the Platonic tradition and then interpreted by the critical tradition may mean either the presence of the thing which then doubles itself in imitation, or it may mean the interpretation of an imitation (*Dissémination*, 237-238). In either case, the movement of *mimesis* depends on the privilege originally given the presence of the present. Derrida declares, "C'est au nom de la vérité, sa seule référence — la référence — qu'elle (la *mimesis*) est jugée, proscriée ou prescrite selon une alternance" (*Dissémination*, 238).

Now, as we have noted, Derrida is interested in showing how the concepts of truth (as it is present in the history of *mimesis*) and literature (as it is defined by the aesthetic category of *mimesis*), while appearing to be undivided and "purely" defined, are in fact divided or "marked" by a certain writing that "precedes" them. In this manner, truth (much in the same way as we have noted above, in our analysis of the trace) is always already divided by that from which it seeks to separate itself. As we shall see, literature (and the categories used to judge it) is also caught up in this division. This "marking" or "re-marking" is discernible in modern literature, especially in Mallarmé's texts.

As an example, Derrida begins with an analysis of an extract from *Mimique*. Immediately, upon entering the text, Derrida notes that we are plunged into a textual labyrinth of mirrors, for in spite of its title, *Mimique* quickly shows itself to be a text that does not imitate (*Dissémination*, 239-240). The mime imitates nothing. On the contrary, it is the mime who initiates the action, who sets the stage and who sets the pen to paper. Thus, the mime follows no instruction from any "book." In spite of this, Derrida notes
that the Mallarmean text is a reaction to a reading (*Dissémination*, 240-241). Thus, the
text falls deeper into the abyss, for it has now become a commentary on a mime who does
not imitate, who receives no instructions from outside the text yet who may be found in a
book. Now, this (missing) book might certainly be taken for the referent missing in this
line of texts and characters. However, as Derrida points out, the text on which Mallarmé
is commenting is extremely difficult to isolate (*Dissémination*, 244-246). And to add to
the difficulties, the text is a play or pantomime that recounts an event in the past. In other
words, the play is described as an anamnesis (*Dissémination*, 246). We will limit the
commentary at this point, but we add as a final note that Mallarmé’s text is of course an
addition or epigraph to the “original” text. Yet this “original” is revealed to be, itself, an
epigraph to another “Pierrot” text, that of Théophile Gautier (*Dissémination*, 250).

This curious “line” of texts that seems to flee from our sight reveals a double
nature. That is, the Mallarmean text is both open and closed. Closed because it is a text
that refers to itself and provides us with all of the marks. Yet, in inscribing itself as a text
that refers to itself, the text, *Mimique*, opens itself up; it is both a closed text and an open
one. Derrida explains, “...la difficulté tient au rapport entre le medium de l’écriture et la
détermination de chaque unité textuelle. Il faut que chaque fois renvoyant à un autre
texte, à un autre système déterminé, chaque organisme ne renvoie qu’à lui-même comme
structure déterminée : à la fois ouverte et fermée” (*Dissémination*, 249). To use the term
Derrida coins for this operation, we might say that Margueritte’s book is a *graft* (*greffé*),
for it serves as an epigraph to the text analyzed yet it is also the seed which gives
Mallarmé’s text life (*Dissémination*, 249-250).\footnote{13}
This double writing is, of course, “intuitive.” That is, we are aware, at a certain level, how difficult it is to close a work off and make it a totality unto itself. A writer never works in a vacuum and her work will tend to reflect that. However, Derrida does not end his account of the text at this level. For what he has attempted to show through his analysis of the philosophical definition of *mimesis* is how a certain history of this category has informed literature. The first step that Derrida takes in his deconstruction of this concept is to underline how *Mimique* has no proper interior. Like phenomenology, the task of the literary analyst or the critic is to isolate the text from its empirical context so that its “inner depths” might be plumbed. Once Derrida has shown that the text can never be isolated in such a way (just as Husserl’s phenomenological subject can never truly be isolated), he may move on to the “true” deconstruction of the history of *mimesis*. We recall that *mimesis* has traditionally been translated in two ways: as the “revealing” of reality itself or as the “imitation” of reality. In either way, the presence of the present is the foundation for this interpretation.

Now, in Mallarmé’s text, we might say that since it concerns a mime who follows no instructions whatsoever, who acts on his own, we are dealing with a form of *mimesis* of the first distinction. That is, as Derrida says, “…puisqu’il n’imite rien, ne reproduit rien, puisqu’il entame en son origine cela même qu’il trace, présent ou produit, il est le mouvement même de la vérité” (*Dissémination*, 254). However, this is not the case. For Mallarmé insists on the mime and the imitation in his text. What occurs in *Mimique*, according to Derrida, is an illusion that contains nothing. The mime maintains the illusion of imitation but there is never any imitation. In other words, after the “double reading” of the “line” of texts in Mallarmé, Derrida digs deeper to find a more profound
overturning of *mimesis*. Mallarmé maintains the structure of *mimesis* without the metaphysical interpretation that has supported it since Plato (*Dissémination*, 254-255). Derrida explains, "Dans ce speculum sans réalité, dans ce miroir de miroir, il y a bien une différence, une dyade, puisqu’il y a mime et fantôme. Mais c’est une différence sans référence, ou plutôt une référence sans référent, sans unité première ou dernière, fantôme qui n’est le fantôme d’aucune chair, errant, sans passé, sans mort, sans naissance ni présence" (*Dissémination*, 254-255). What occurs in this text, according to Derrida, is a movement in which the imitator reveals nothing which is imitated (in the final instance); the signifier has no signified (in the final instance); and the sign has no referent (in the final instance) (*Dissémination*, 256). It is the movement of metaphysics itself — the movement of *telos*, *eskhaton*, or *arkhè* — which is undermined and compromised by the text (*Dissémination*, 256).

This movement of "destabilization" is, according to Derrida, revealed in the manner in which Mallarmé writes his text. That is, a certain equivalence might be traced and given as, "Theatre — Idea — Mime — Drama" (*Dissémination*, 257). This slide between places and events is what Derrida describes as the "hymen:"

...signe d’abord la fusion, la consommation du mariage, l’identification des deux, la confusion entre les deux. Dans cette fusion, il n’y a plus de distance entre le désir (attente de la présence pleine qui devrait venir le remplir, l’accomplir) et l’accomplissement de la présence, entre la distance et la non-distance ; plus de différence du désir à la satisfaction. Non seulement la différence est abolie...mais la différence entre la différence et la non-différence. La non-présence, vide ouvert du désir, et la présence, plénitude de la jouissance, reviennent au même (*Dissémination*, 258).

What we might by all rights call the "event" of Mallarmé’s writing allows for the "illusion" of representation to take place. *Mimique* reveals the hymen that is the in-
between of representation and non-representation. There is always a slide within the theater of the pantomime in which the gestures of the actor refer to events which are impossible to represent, fully, in the here and now of the present. Furthermore, the pantomime recounts the story of a murder which “never happened” (Dissémination, 259). The elements of mimesis are present in Mallarmé’s text, but the actual act of mimesis (within the logic of the present and presence) never occurs. In this manner, the mirror of mimesis is always maintained (it is never simply broken or overturned), yet what it reflects is not reality, but a reflection of itself. Mimique is a mimesis of mimesis (Dissémination, 259-270). We might say that the hymen is like the trace. It is what reveals the mimesis within the text, allowing for mimesis to take place, but never falling, itself, within the logic of this concept. As Derrida explains, referring to the “in-between” of the hymen, “Le mot « entre », qu’il s’agisse de confusion ou d’intervalle entre, porte donc toute la force de l’opération...L’hymen dans le texte (crime, acte sexuel, inceste, suicide, simulacre) se laisse inscrire à la pointe de cette indécision. Cette pointe s’avance selon l’excès irréductible du syntaxique sur le sémantique. Le mot « entre » n’a aucun sens plein en lui-même (Dissémination, 272). The hymen is the movement that always comes between any attempt to close a representation or reality in the present. It is in-between the presence of reality and its non-presence.

Now, before moving on any further, let us examine exactly what Derrida means by the “irreducible excess of the syntactic over the semantic.” We are once again in dangerous waters where a mis-reading of Derrida is easily possible. Derrida is very clear when he explains that the problem is not one of an impossibility to master an infinite set of empirical meanings. The problem here is a much more profound, structural problem.
As an example, Derrida notes, within Mallarmé’s text, the importance of two “themes”: the “blank” (the page on which the poet writes and on which the mime writes his play as well as the space between words, valences, verses, etc.) and “the fold” (the fold of the fan and its movement of opening and closing) (Dissémination, 306). These “themes” exist because we, as critics, might be able to gather a certain number of empirical references to them. That is, we are able to identify and group together a number of references to what we might call a “mark” – various signs, indications, traits, etc. These marks might then in turn be identified in a collective way through their tropic use – metaphors, analogies, and metonymies (Dissémination, 307). Furthermore, this collection of marks or traits may be identified, in a larger and more general sense, as a mark – possessing that which defines a mark as such and which is then part of all other marks (Dissémination, 307). In this way we might say the mark re-marks itself. However, these marks of “blank” and “fold” are further re-marked. We recall from our discussion of the trace that the identity of a sign or mark is always deferred and differed. That is, the self-presence of a sign is always fore-closed by the present of the other. In this manner, the identity of the mark (the blank or the fold) is always deferred through another mark in the very act of self-reference. The mark of the text must always be already doubled by that which it is not in order for it to be present before us., Derrida describes this movement as an additional tropic movement in which the “blanks” between the mark and its Other appear:

Ce surcroît de marque, cette marge de sens, n’est pas une valence parmi d’autres dans la série, bien qu’elle s’y insère aussi. Elle doit s’y insérer, dès lors qu’elle n’est pas hors texte et n’a aucun privilège transcendental ; c’est pourquoi elle est toujours représentée par une métaphore et une métonymie (la page, la plume, le pli). Mais appartenant à la série des valences, elle est toujours en position de valence supplémentaire, ou plutôt marque la position structurellement nécessaire d’une inscription
supplémentaire, qu’on peut toujours soustraire ou ajouter à la série
(Dissemination, 307).

Stated otherwise, because the mark must always contain that which it is not in its own
movement of self-identity, it comes to name or mark not only itself but also that space or
spacing of inscription of marks — that space which brings each mark together and marks
each one as different, giving it an identity. Thus, this final re-marking of the mark
contains not only the identities of the marks (a totality of marks) but also what makes
marks possible. This space is the totality of the text “plus more.”

Let us follow Derrida’s explanation in order to be very clear about this. If we
identify the “blank” in Mallarmé’s text as a trait or mark, we are then able to deduce a
certain number of other traits that match this mark, leading to a larger chain of tropes in
which this mark might be identified. However, the identity of this mark itself (“blank”)
hinges on the identity of all other marks (“fan,” “fold,” etc.). This movement of identity
reveals a certain “blank” or “spacing” between each of these marks, for we must pass
through each of them in order to establish the identity of our mark. As Derrida explains,
“Le blanc dès lors (est) la totalité, fût-elle infinie, de la série polysémique, plus
l’entr’ouverture espacée, l’éventail qui en forme le texte” (Dissemination, 308). This
“blank”-too-many is not one more mark in the series of marks. It exceeds the totality.
As excess, it has no sense; its identity is constantly deferred and differed. However, as
excess, the mark falls outside of the text. Thus, the doubly re-marked mark comes to
appear to us as a self-generating object — a transcendental object and the source of all
movement within the text and the mark. As Derrida explains, a structural trap lies within
this re-marking of the mark, “…le supplément de marque produit par le travail textuel,
tombant hors du texte, comme un objet indépendant, sans autre origine que lui-même,
trace redevenue présence (ou signe), est inséparable du désir (de réappropriation ou de représentation)” (Dissémination, 315-316). However, if there is always excess in the text, the text as we know it can never appear. And so we return to the naïve question of the infinity of meaning that remains incomprehensible for a finite consciousness. As Derrida asks, “Tout devenant métaphorique, il n’y a plus de sens propre et donc plus de métaphore... Comment arrêter les marges d’une rhétorique” (Dissémination, 315)? The answer is that the mark *folds* itself. In the re-marking of the mark, we might find a space – the space of the mark – which allows for the fold. We might call this space or fold the *trace, différence*, or hymen. It is this folding which allows the movement of excess to mark the edges of the mark. Thus, the excess of the text, while never “appearing” in the text, “appears” in the form of the mark. The blank that we identified as a theme (and here, if it were not obvious, we should read “blank” in all possible senses) “appears” as a mark or theme that is identifiable because it takes on the form of a trope. Because of the structural excess of the mark, one sign or one mark too-many is added to the totality of marks. This is what Derrida means by the “irreducible excess of the syntactic over the semantic.”

One final note before returning to Mallarmé. Derrida is very careful to note that this fold may never be foreseen. That is, we must be careful to underline the difference Derrida’s thought has with Hegel’s philosophical system. As Gasché has remarked, the movement of Derridean “infrastructures” is very close to the system of reflection and self-identity as presented in Hegel’s Logic (Tain of the Mirror, 220). That is the movement of the mark through the identity of the totality of marks is similar to the Hegelian speculative concept of *Aufhebung* in which reflexivity reflects itself into itself,
including its very own possibility (*Tain of the Mirror*, 220). Hegel’s system, however, is based on the knowledge of this possibility. For Derrida, this possibility remains unknowable. That is, the fold of the mark always comes from the very limit or mark of the mark. As Derrida explains, speaking of the “blank,” “Le pli ne lui survient pas du dehors, il est à la fois son dehors et son dedans, la complication selon laquelle la marque supplémentaire du blanc (espacement asémique) s’applique à l’ensemble des blancs (pleins sémiques), plus à soi-même, pli sur soi du voile, tissu ou texte” (*Dissémination*, 315).¹⁶ Coming from the very limits or marks of the mark, the fold remains impossible to master. In this manner, Derrida ever so slightly differs from and destabilizes the Hegelian system.

Now, this long detour through the problem of the mark has very clear consequences for the study of literature. We recall that we began this digression with a pair of themes: the blank and the fold. In the European tradition of literary studies, a thematic approach has the merit of offering a study that is almost scientific in its analysis. As Derrida notes, such a systematic approach to the literary text brings to light a number of traits and elements that had, up until this point, gone unnoticed. He explains that thematic criticism is “...exemple d’une critique moderne, à l’œuvre partout où l’on vise à déterminer un sens à travers un texte, à en décider, à décider qu’il est un sens et qu’il est sens, sens posé, posable ou transposable comme tel, thème” (*Dissémination*, 300). As an example of such an approach Derrida turns to Jean-Pierre Richard’s decisive study of Mallarmé, *L’Univers imaginaire de Mallarmé* and his analysis of the two very themes at question here: the blank and the fold. In choosing such themes, we quickly see the difficulty we might have in analyzing such a text as literature. For if we are to demarcate
the limits of the Mallarmean *universe* or *imagination* (two terms which reveal the totalizing intention of the critic) through the analysis of such themes, we are doomed to failure. That is, as we have noted, the theme or *mark* of the blank and fold, while certainly existing in the text as thematic tropes, are the marks of the larger text – of what we might call the general text, arche-writing, or *trace*. The excess that these *marks* reveal (and again, we must insist that this excess is a *structural* excess and not an excess due to an infinite number of traits that remain beyond our conscious reach) the impossibility of constructing a thematic unity. And if a thematic unity is impossible, then any attempt to define the *sense* of the literary text within the logic of *mimesis* (in which the text either reveals its reality or corresponds to reality) is impossible. Derrida explains, “S’il n’y a donc pas d’unité thématique ou de sens total à se réapproprier au-delà des instances textuelles, dans un imaginaire, une intentionnalité ou un vécu, le texte n’est plus l’expression ou la représentation (heureuse ou non) de quelque vérité qui viendrait se diffracter ou se rassembler dans une littérature polysémique” (*Dissémination*, 319).

Instead of speaking of the polysemy of the text, Derrida declares that we should understand the text in terms of its *dissemination*. That is, through the mathematical excess of the *mark* and the fold, the literary text reveals itself to be much more than the totality on which *mimesis* depends. Indeed, if we are to truly understand literature and the very existence of the text, this movement of dissemination is necessary. If the *mark* were able to effect a perfect self-reflection and avoid any contact with the outside of the other, the text would annihilate itself in a movement of perfect symmetry. As Derrida notes, “...sous la contrainte de la structure différential-supplémentaire, ajoutant ou retirant toujours un pli à la série, aucun thème du pli ne peut constituer le système de son
sens ou présenter l'unité de sa multiplicité. Sans pli, ou si le pli avait quelque part une limite, autre que soi comme marque, marge ou marche...il n'y aurait pas de texte” (Dissémination, 328-329). This is not to say that the “true” text is the text we hold in our hands before us. The “text-before-the-text” is what we might call the general text. It is what allows for the doubling of the mark and the appearance of what we call literature.17 And it is precisely this text which always prevents literature from functioning as we have traditionally thought of literature and criticism.

C. Derrida and the Play of Deconstruction

We recall that we began our discussion of Derrida by remarking that a distinction such as that which exists between literature and philosophy is difficult to hold within his thought. Indeed, the above discussion has shown us that what Derrida has called the general text of arche-writing comes to mark not only the limits of what we call “literature” but also of “philosophy.” As we noted earlier in our discussion of Deleuze and Kant, one of the difficulties of an approach on the “margins” of such categories as “philosophy” and “literature” is the danger one may fall into by opposing one concept for another. That is, by opposing the general text to the limited text on which we base literature, Derrida risks entering into a logic of thesis and antithesis in which the solution is found in the dialectical synthesis. In other words, by attempting to deconstruct philosophy, Derrida must remain both inside and outside philosophy. He must, in other words, play on the margins.

Derrida discusses this difficult exercise when talking about the question of the philosophical concept. For implicit in the above oppositions is a logic of what he calls
“all or nothing” in which his philosophical concept is either accepted in its totality or rejected in its totality. Such a logic is part of the logic of philosophy and the construction of concepts, and Derrida very willingly admits that in order for him to write and argue, he must accept such a logic and play by its rules. As he admits, “Il est impossible ou illégitime de former un concept philosophique hors de cette logique de tout ou rien” (Limited Inc., 211). However, the difference between the rules of philosophical concepts and Derrida’s deconstruction is that he attempts to play by the rules while revealing something that resembles a concept but which is not a concept. As he explains, “Quand on croit devoir cesser de le faire (comme cela m’arrive quand je parle de différenciation, de marque, de supplément, d’itérabilité et de tout ce qui s’ensuit, il vaut mieux déclarer de façon aussi conceptuelle, rigoureuse, formalisante et pédagogique que possible les raisons qu’on a de le faire, de changer ainsi les règles et le contexte du discours” (Limited Inc., 211-212).

We have used the phrase “playing by the rules” to describe the logic of “all or nothing.” Indeed, one aspect of Derrida’s work that has received a great deal of attention is what has been translated as the “freeplay” or “play” of deconstruction. Deconstruction’s freeplay has been understood, as Gerald Graff notes in a discussion with Derrida, as falling within this logic of “all or nothing” in which the plenitude or presence of the voice (or speech, meaning, the subject, etc.) is placed in opposition to freeplay (Limited Inc., 207-208). That is, for Graff and other commentators, it appears that deconstruction first shows that speech and meaning are based on the thesis of the fullness or presence of speech or meaning. When this fullness is revealed to be false, language and meaning seem to be reduced to a game or play of difference or
undecidability in which meaning is forever lost (Limited Inc., 207). Derrida denies that he engages in such a "game" of false options. For him, the freeplay of a text is better understood in terms of its undecidability. He defines this understanding in at least three ways. By its opposition to the dialectic, undecidability is beyond the binary or triple system of dialectics (however, by opposing dialectics it eventually falls into the logic of resistance and thus the logic of dialectics) (Limited Inc., 209). In its calculable excess, the limits of decidability are always exceeded, so, as in our discussion of the mark, the meaning of a text is structurally exceeded by undecidability (Limited Inc., 209). Finally, the heterogeneous relationship that undecidability has in relationship to dialectics and the calculable make it forever open and forever undecidable (Limited Inc., 209). Just as we explained with the mark, the open relationship this "concept" has with the exterior and its unpredictable nature make it impossible to calculate or define the undecidable.

Now, far from undermining meaning and decidability in a dangerously reckless fashion, this structure reveals a paradox. That is, by its very openness, it opens up and makes possible any field of decision in which we are able to decide something (Limited Inc., 209-210). For Derrida, the "freeplay" of undecidability is what calls us to make a decision and to take a political-ethical position (Limited Inc., 209-210). Indeed, far from signaling the end of meaning or the impossibility of saying anything, deconstruction's freeplay underlines the singularity of every event and the importance of meaning, responsibility, and ethics. To understand how this is the case, let us examine the essay which originally gave rise to Limited Inc. and its debate.¹⁸

Above we noted how the various "concepts" that Derrida uses, such as the trace, the mark, différence, etc., are certainly similar but are never synonyms for each other.
That is, the deployment of any of these terms is always made within a *context*. And it is this question of context which Derrida attempts to explain in his essay, "Signature Événement Contexte." In questioning the notion of communication, Derrida notes that the multiple meanings of the term or act of communication are always limited or decided by their context (*Marges*, 368-369). Thus, within the context of a conference, the term "communication" means (in French) both the paper that is given at a conference and the act of transferring the knowledge contained within this paper from the author to the conference participants. Within this context, communication is oral and is rather clearly defined. However, upon reflection, we notice that the paper that is given is, of course, written. And if we consider this written aspect of the act of communication, the context becomes less easily defined. For in writing, Derrida notes that one writes with a certain notion of absence in mind (*Marges*, 372). That is, in writing, one writes in the absence of one’s interlocutor – writing thus to be read later (*Marges*, 372). And, in a more general sense, an absence is always present within representation (*Marges*, 372-373). Derrida explains, "La représentation supplée régulièrement la présence. Mais, articulant tous les moments de l’expérience en tant qu’elle est engagée dans la signification....cette opération de supplémentation n’est pas exhibée comme rupture de présence mais comme réparation et modification continue, homogène, de la présence dans la représentation" (*Marges*, 372-373).

Having underlined these absences in communication, Derrida digs deeper into their structural significance. Indeed, it is true that when one writes, the reader is always absent, but this absence is simply an absence of distance in both time and space. However, a deeper more fundamental absence is included in any act of communication,
according to Derrida. He declares, "Il faut, si vous voulez, que ma « communication écrite » reste lisible malgré la disparition absolue de tout destinataire déterminé en général pour qu'elle ait sa fonction d'écriture, c'est-à-dire sa lisibilité. Il faut qu'elle soit répétée – itéré – en l'absence absolue du destinataire ou de l'ensemble empiriquement déterminable des destinataires" (Margins, 375). That is, in order that written communication function – in order that it communicate – it must contain, structurally, the possibility that the reader and every possible reader remain absent. Clearly, this does not mean that written communication takes place in the absence of its reader, but it is possible that the reader remain absent, and this possibility is part of what makes writing work. Before moving to a more detailed argument, we might ask ourselves if such a proposition is true. Derrida gives the example of something written in a code so secret and inscrutable that only two subjects understand it, the author of the text in question and the reader or the addressee of the text. Now, if both of these subjects disappear, can we understand the text? Yes, within the limit that even if the code is not recognizable, the text may be repeated or re-iterated and recognized for what it is, a code that is impossible to understand. As Derrida explains, "La possibilité de répéter et donc d'identifier les marques est impliqué dans tout code, fait de celui-ci une grille communicable, transmissible, déchiffrable, itérable pour un tiers, puis pour tout usager possible en général" (Margins, 375). This is not to say that we can understand what the text hides in its code, but the identity of the text as an encoded text can be recognized or decided beyond the existence of the two subjects who created it. In this sense, Derrida understands the meaning or identity of a text to exceed any notion of a meaning that is fully present at the moment of its conception.
Just as we have seen above, Derrida is writing against the notion that the text or the voice can be considered to possess a fullness of being. The very act of writing implies an absence that requires, structurally, the possibility of the subject’s absence or death. As Derrida declares, “Et cette absence n’est pas une modification continue de la présence, c’est une rupture de présence, la « mort » ou la possibilité de la « mort » du destinataire inscrite dans la structure de la marque...” (Merges, 375). This very possibility, even if it is not always the case, divides the presence of the subject and the presence of any sense of meaning as a “vouloir-dire.” As we noted in our study of the mark, the identity of the subjects involved in the communication as well as the identity or meaning of the writing is always deferred and divided, in time and space, through the identity of all other marks (including the marks “time” and “space”). This movement of marking and re-marking creates a structural “space” which we might understand as the space which makes identity or presence “divided” and as the “space” or absence necessary for communication. In this manner, if we were to take the example of a shopping list or a note passed to another during a concert, the very act of communication must call into play this space in order for the message to pass. Derrida explains:

Je passe donc des notes à mon compagnon pendant un concert ou une conférence. L’émetteur et le récepteur ont bien l’air d’être présents, présents à l’autre, présents à eux-mêmes et à ce qu’ils lisent ou écrivent. Mais les notes ne sont scriptibles ou lisibles que dans la mesure où mon voisin peut se passer de mon assistance présente pour lire ce que j’ai pu écrire sans son assistance présente, et où ces deux absences possibles construisent la possibilité du message à l’instant même où j’écris et où il lit. Dès lors ces absences possibles, que la note est justement faite pour suppléer et donc qu’elle implique, viennent aussi sec laisser leur marque dans la marque. Elles remarquent d’avance la marque. Cette re-marque fait étrangement partie de la marque. Et cette remarque est indissociable de la structure d’itérabilité : ça peut être, ça doit être réitéré, ce qui veut dire comme la première fois en l’absence de la première fois, ou comme la
seconde en l’absence de la seconde, dans le supplément, la marque ou la trace de la présence-absence. (*Limited Inc.*, 99-100).

Now, this rupture in the presence of the reader or the addressee of communication is also valid for the author of the communication (*Marges*, 376). Furthermore what we have termed a “rupture in presence” has very real consequences for the sign in general. For any sign and not simply the sign of a written or oral communication, is part of this “logic of rupture.” In this manner, the context that we evoked at the beginning of this discussion is destabilized. To understand this, let us again take an example. In the most obvious case, the “real” context of communication is always less stable than we might think it to be. That is, the subjects or persons taking part in the communication, its environment, and its horizons are all easily changed and shifted. This, we know, is true because numerous examples of communication are available to us long after the “real” context has shifted (Derrida’s communication in question, for example). Now, if we consider the internal or semiotic context of communication, a stability of the context is just as unsure. That is, because a sign must be, by definition, re-iterable, the sign may find itself grafted onto other signs in other contexts. No sign is ever exclusive to any one context and it may easily find itself used in another context. The possibility or capability of “grafting” means then, as Derrida explains, “Aucun contexte ne peut se clore sur lui. Ni aucun code, le code étant ici à la fois la possibilité et l’impossibilité de l’écriture, de son itérabilité essentielle (rétention/altérité)” (*Marges*, 377). In other words, the identity or meaning of any sign remains permanently open. And, curiously, meaning is dependent upon this opening. Another way to define this opening is in terms of what Derrida defines as a sign’s “*restance.*” That is, the difference that the mark imposes on any sign always remains or “rests” within the identity of a sign. Thus the sign is forever differed
and deferred through all other signs while, nonetheless, maintaining its own identity. *Restance* is necessary if the sign is to be recognized and repeated within any context.

This aspect of writing and the sign is familiar to us from our discussion of the *mark* and what Derrida terms the “dissemination” of literature. For Derrida, the *mark* and its *restance* may be extended to all experience in general, revealing a chain of differential *marks* that undermine any idea of *pure* presence in experience. This brings us back to the context of *Limited Inc.* and Derrida’s debate with John R. Searle. For in extending his reading of the *mark* to experience (which should, in any case, following logically from any discussion of the text) Derrida notes that within the philosophy of language, John L. Austin made a number of parallel moves. In short, Austin, by distinguishing between locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary language or speech acts, attempts to show the importance of the context in which communication takes place. Thus, if one were to explain, “The book is damaged,” one would make a locutionary speech act by making the statement “The book is damaged.” The illocutionary speech act is what the speech act attempts to do, such as report, complain, suggest, etc. A performative speech act is what occurs by combining the locutionary and illocutionary speech acts. In this case, what is performed is perhaps an agreement about the state of the book, the replacement of the book, its refund, etc. As Derrida notes, the originality of this approach is that it offers a theory of the original movement or production of communication (*Margins*, 382). That is, with the category of performative speech acts, the referent is carried within the speech act itself so that the change that occurs in a performative act of communication is part of what is communicated. In this manner we might follow Derrida when he defines the originality of the performative speech act. He declares, “Le performatif est une
« communication » qui ne se limite pas essentiellement à transporter un contenu sémantique déjà constitué et surveillé par une visée de vérité (de dévoilement de ce qui est dans son être ou d’adéquation entre un énoncé judicatif et la chose même)” (Marges, 383).

However, in spite of this originality, Derrida believes that Austin’s system relies on a concept of context that does not take into account the open nature of the sign and its context. To begin, the very idea of a performative speech act rests on the presupposition of the presence of its actors. That is, in order for one to perform a marriage, to launch a boat, to swear an oath, etc., one must be present. And in this consideration of presence, there is no taking into account the divided presence as it is accounted for in the system of the mark. Derrida explains, “Cette présence consciente des locuteurs ou récepteurs participant à l’effectuation d’un performatif, leur présence consciente intentionnelle à la totalité de l’opération implique téléologiquement qu’aucun reste n’échappe à la totalisation présente” (Marges, 384). Furthermore, in his theorization of speech acts, Austin sets to one side a number of problems (the opposition between the success and possible failure of a performative speech act and what he determines as the serious and non-serious use of language) whose very exclusion calls into question the “totality” of the context of any performative speech act (Marges, 384-390). Indeed, by underlining the problematic nature of a quote within performative speech acts, Derrida sees Austin as coming very close to the problem of grafting and the larger economy of the mark (Marges, 387-388). However, like the opposition between successful performative speech acts and failed ones, Austin immediately sets this opposition to one side, falsely closing the context of the speech act.
A performative speech act is indeed an event and a unique event such as a christening or a marriage. However, the power of the performative act – its transformative nature – could never be recognized if the speech act were a closed and perfect context, as Austin would have it. In the same manner, as written communication, the speech act must be re-iterable in order for it to be understood and to have meaning. In other words, the act must contain within it the structural capacity to be grafted on to another speech act (Marges, 389). And if the speech act contains this capacity within its structure, this means that the context of the speech act can never be completely and entirely determined (Marges, 389).

This digression through speech act theory now brings us back to the point of departure for this section. One of Searle’s objections is that Derrida mistakes the non-serious for the serious and disrupts or misinterprets what he sees as a perfectly viable and serious theory of language. As we have tried to explain, the undecidable economy of the mark forecloses any possibility that speech, writing, or a context might be absolutely determined or present. By admitting the possibility of undecidability, Derrida does indeed open up the concepts of meaning and truth as well as the contexts in which these concepts have been constructed and used. But this is never to say that he concedes to what might be termed an irresponsible play of relativity. For Derrida, the structural undecidability of the mark is what allows for (and does not allow for) the various possibilities that might be found in a text or context. These possibilities are always determined by the very existence of undecidability. He explains:

...je rappelle que l’indécidabilité est toujours une oscillation déterminée entre des possibilités (par exemple de meanings mais aussi d’actes). Ces possibilités sont elles-mêmes très déterminées dans des situations strictement définies (par exemple, discursives – syntaxe ou rhétorique –
mais aussi politiques, éthiques). Elles sont *pragmatiquement* déterminées. Les analyses que j’ai consacrées à l’indécidabilité concernaient justement ces déterminations et ces définitions, nullement quelque « indeterminacy ». Je dis « indécidabilité » plutôt que « indeterminacy » parce que je m’intéresse davantage aux rapports de forces, aux différences de force, à tout ce qui permet, justement, par une décision d’écriture (au sens large que je donne à ce mot, qui comprend aussi l’action politique et l’expérience en général), de stabiliser des déterminations dans des situations données. Il n’y aurait pas d’indécision ou de *double bind*, si ce n’était entre des pôles (sémantiques, éthiques, politiques) déterminés, parfois terriblement nécessaires et toujours singuliers, irremplaçables. C’est dire que du point de vue sémantique, mais aussi éthique et politique, la « déconstruction » ne devrait donner lieu ni au relativisme ni à quelque indéterminisme (*Limited Inc.*, 273-274).

The economy of the *mark*, the play of *différence*, the fold of the hymen, etc. “are” what allow for the text, the theme, the context, the event themselves. In other words, these “infrastructures” allow us to determine these various categories.

The damage such structures do to the fullness of notions of presence, meaning, truth, etc. is far from an irresponsible damage. For Derrida, taking into account the economy of the mark or the play of *différence* is simply the most complete and responsible manner in which to discuss these concepts and contexts. We recall that the “double science” of deconstruction involves a movement between the concept and the terms it puts into play and their reversal or deconstruction. This double movement is thus always carried out *in relation* to the concepts in question. In order to deconstruct, Derrida must always take into account the stability of the concepts in question. However, taking into account the stability of a concept is not to affirm its eternal stability nor is it to attempt to erect such stability. On the contrary, as Derrida explains, “…tenir compte d’une certaine stabilité (par essence toujours provisoire et finie), c’est précisément ne pas parler d’éternité ou de solidité absolue, c’est tenir compte d’une historicité, d’une non-naturalité, de l’éthique, de la politique, de l’institutionnalité…Une stabilité n’est pas une
immutabilité, elle est par définition toujours désestabilisable” (*Limited Inc.*, 279). In taking account of the larger context of a concept, we might say, to paraphrase Derrida, that there is no outside to the context.

Furthermore, to return to the paradox evoked at the beginning of this section, just as the mark structurally renders literature possible (and impossible), the collection of deconstruction’s infrastructures renders communication and the *choice or freedom* that goes into such an act possible. That is, if meaning and contexts did not structurally include an empty space, communication in terms of transmission by voice or writing would simply not need to exist. Communication as it is defined, as passing between two subjects within a certain context, must always be open or else it would simply be an exercise in the highest and purest form of reflexivity. The openness of communication – its undecidability – is, in fact, the very opposite of irresponsibility. It is what makes any sort of responsibility possible. For if every act of communication were exhaustively determinable, there would be no need to choose or decide about anything whatsoever. Every decision could be determined beforehand. As Derrida declares, “Il n’y a pas de responsabilité morale ou politique sans cette épreuve et ce passage par l’indécidable. Même si une décision semble ne prendre qu’une seconde et n’être précédée par aucune délibération, elle est structurée par cette expérience de l’indécidable” (*Limited Inc.*, 210).

One final word should be made concerning this notion of play in Derrida’s texts. Much has been made of Derrida’s style. Indeed, in his response to Searle, the playful nature of Derrida’s puns and turns of phrase is quite remarkable. Other commentators, such as Richard Rorty, have situated a break in Derrida’s writings, borrowing in a way on the argument made by Searle, and declaring that there is a “serious” period to Derrida’s
work that can be separated from his “playful” or “non-serious” side. For Rorty, this break may be situated at the appearance, in 1974, of Glas, Derrida’s essay on Hegel and Genet, for it marks a break with the philosophical tradition and thus demonstrates Derrida’s most radical move by refusing any dialogue whatsoever with the tradition that he had engaged up to this point in his career. That is, by turning away from the concepts of the philosophical tradition, by turning away from an active engagement with and deconstruction of these concepts, Rorty implies that Derrida’s writing becomes what might be termed a “private joke” that only a privileged few might be able to appreciate.

This criticism is interesting because it again brings into play the questions we have treated in this section. That is, when reading a work such as Glas or even Limited Inc., many commentators have the impression that Derrida’s style is so playful that any “serious” discussion of philosophical concepts is missing. Derrida’s writing then avoids traditional styles or debates and thus appears to become private and not communicate anything. What is interesting about such a criticism is that it misinterprets or misunderstands the notions of communication discussed above. For if Derrida’s writing becomes “private,” it is nonetheless recognized as writing and the concepts or ideas in it are nonetheless recognized as such. And, following the arguments evoked above, if this is the case, then a certain level of communication is taking place. If communication occurs, then the concepts and contexts on which communication is built are then engaged. It is possible that Derrida’s style hinders recognition of this act. And here we might term Derrida’s style to be in the vein of the “performative” evoked within the theory of speech acts for it is true that Derrida’s style is itself an exercise in what he attempts to theorize. However, the adjective “performative” may be misinterpreted here
as relying too heavily on the theory of speech acts. What seems clear is that Derrida’s writing is much more “performative” in the sense of Nietzsche and this latter’s style than in the sense of speech act theory. Indeed, the economy of the mark and the limits of a context, in terms of the calculation of the forces which render a concept “stable,” as well as a style which attempts to convey this economy are ideas that reveal Nietzsche’s profound influence.22

_Negotiations 4_

Often, in our discussion of the _mark_, the _trace_, _différence_, and other related terms, we have evoked their “structures” in terms of an “economy.” As we shall return to a more traditional idea of the economy in terms of socio-economic history in chapter seven, we should like to take the opportunity to underline the reading Derrida gives to this term. For it is in the idea of Bataille’s “general economy” that we find, again, many of the same themes studied above.

Beginning with the idea of “mastery,” Derrida analyzes the reading that Bataille makes of Hegel’s philosophical system. In Hegel’s dialectic of the master and the slave, the master is distinguished from the slave because it is she who accepts death, she who looks it in the face (_L’écriture et la différence_, 373-374). Freedom is only possible if one is willing to place one’s life in danger, to accept the possibility of death. For Bataille, this crucial moment in Hegel’s philosophy is what defines the idea of mastery and serves as the founding move in a philosophy which eventually seeks to explain the history of self-consciousness and phenomenality (_L’écriture et la différence_, 374). It is against such a definition of mastery and the meaning or sense that results from mastery
that Bataille will pose the idea of "sovereignty" (L'écriture et la différence, 374). For in this dialectical movement, the willingness of the slave to place her life in question must not be taken so far as to embrace death itself. In other words, death must be acknowledged only in a limited manner, in the form of the negation of consciousness, which then allows for the conservation and retention of what was negated (L'écriture et la différence, 375).

In this recuperation of life in death, both Bataille and Derrida find a certain paradox. For in conserving life, another concept of life has slipped into and grafted itself onto Hegel's philosophical system. That is, if the slave-become-master is to remain the master, she must continue to live. By excluding death in an absolute manner (what Hegel defines as "abstract negativity"), the master conserves life - a life defined within the shadow of death or "abstract negativity" (L'écriture et la différence, 376). Derrida explains, "Un autre concept de vie avait été subrepticement introduit dans la place... Cette vie n'est pas la vie naturelle, l'existence biologique mise en jeu dans la maîtrise, mais une vie essentielle qui se soude à la première, la retient, la fait œuvrer à la constitution de la conscience de soi, de la vérité du sens" (L'écriture et la différence, 376).

This notion of mastery in Hegel's thought is then an artificially closed one. That is, if the founding moment of phenomenality and the dialectic is to be found in the acceptance of a limited notion of death, then a certain closure may also be detected in Hegel's system. Clearly, such an analysis echoes the analyses of the voice, thematic criticism, and communication that we have outlined above. For Derrida, Bataille's originality is to recognize this artificial closure in Hegel's system. In other words, Bataille takes Hegel seriously and assumes the consequences that follow from Hegel's
thought. What is obviously interesting for Derrida is the manner in which Bataille undoes Hegel’s system. For if Bataille takes Hegel seriously, he is certainly aware of the danger posed by directly attacking the Hegelian system (that such an attack may always be recuperated within the movement of the dialectic and subsumed within the larger movement of thesis-antithesis-synthesis). As noted, this danger is in a large part why Derrida is careful to construct a system of double movement, and it is just such a double movement that we find in Bataille as well. Derrida observes how the notion of sovereignty bases itself on Hegelian mastery, undermining it from the interior. He declares, “Étant à la fois plus et moins une maîtrise que la maîtrise, la souveraineté est tout autre…A tel point que malgré ses traits de ressemblance avec la maîtrise, elle n’est plus une figure dans l’enchaînement de la phénoménologie” (*L’écriture et la différence*, 376-377). By inscribing the excess of absolute death in terms of the sacrifice, destruction, suppression, etc. (terms in which the excess is always without limit), within the Hegelian system, Bataille traces the point around which sense, meaning, dialectics, etc. are constructed. Always present within the negative of Hegelian dialectics is a negativity that is much more profound and which can never be enclosed. It is this point which remains undeterminable and which is the point of sovereignty (*L’écriture et la différence*, 380).

Now, we noted that in Derrida’s reading, Bataille takes Hegel seriously. But within this seriousness, sovereignty again traces a double notion. That is, Hegel’s system is taken seriously, but it is in terms of the negative – the negative as labor or enslavement – that it is not taken seriously. Derrida reads an echo of Nietzschean laughter in Bataille’s sovereignty. Sovereignty is not another more profound or essential level of
negativity but a negativity that mocks itself. Like mastery, sovereignty needs life in order to bring the two notions of life (mastery and sovereignty) into relation with each other (L'écriture et la différence, 377). Because it escapes the terms of phenomenology, sovereignty is neither negativity nor life. The laughter of sovereignty is based on the simulation of seriousness within this notion, the simulation of negativity. Much like the Derridean notions of the mark, the trace, etc., sovereignty is what allows mastery to appear within the play of the Hegelian system. Derrida explains, “Loin que la souveraineté, l’absolu de la mise en jeu, soit une négativité abstraite, elle doit faire apparaître le sérieux du sens comme une abstraction inscrite dans le jeu...[L’opération souveraine] doit donc d’une certaine manière simuler le risque absolu et rire de ce simulacre” (L’écriture et la différence, 377).

The indefinable place or nature of sovereignty gives way to a new definition of writing. For if the Hegelian notion of mastery is at the origin of sense or meaning, writing, as it is traditionally understood, is then part of the expression of self-mastery or self-presence. That is, by artificially limiting or closing his system, Hegel constructs a system in which meaning is part of the larger labor of the negative. In this manner, Bataille reads meaning or sense to be servile. Derrida explains, “En tant que manifestation du sens, le discours est donc la perte même de la souveraineté. La servilité n’est donc que le désir du sens : proposition avec laquelle se serait confondue l’histoire de la philosophie ; proposition déterminant le travail comme sens du sens, et la technè comme déploiement de la vérité...” (L’écriture et la différence, 384). For Bataille, taking the negative of the dialectic seriously means pushing it beyond the limits Hegel imposes on it. In this manner, sense in its servile form gives way to the larger and more
general sense in terms of its inscription within a general economy. Speaking of Hegel, Derrida explains:

Il s’est aveuglé à la possibilité de son propre pari, au fait que la suspension consciencieuse du jeu (par exemple le passage par la vérité de la certitude de soi-même et par la maîtrise comme indépendance de la conscience de soi) était elle-même une phase de jeu ; que le jeu comprend le travail du sens ou le sens du travail, les comprend non en termes de savoir mais en termes d’inscription : le sens est en fonction du jeu, il est inscrit en un lieu dans la configuration d’un jeu qui n’a pas de sens (L’écriture et la différence, 382-383).

A writing that would no longer be dependent on sense as it is defined and limited within the Hegelian system would resemble what might be called a “discours poétique” in which the excess of the general system or economy is able to reveal itself through and beyond the servile meaning of signifying language (L’écriture et la différence, 383). In other words, Bataille is searching for words that would allow the “silence of sovereignty” to slide or graft itself onto signifying language (L’écriture et la différence, 387). In this manner, much like deconstruction, Bataille’s notion of writing would certainly inscribe itself within the tradition of classical concepts and their sense as it exists within a limited economy of difference. However, this writing would fold or bring together the concepts in such a way so that there would always be an excess, a leak, or flight in their sense, leading to what Derrida calls the “perte absolue de leur sens” (L’écriture et la différence, 393). This is not to say that sovereignty and its writing leads to a loss of sense that might be read as a reversal of Hegelian dialectics. Rather, such a writing would lead a to a “relation (that is not a relation),” or with the loss of sense (L’écriture et la différence, 398).

Clearly, Bataille’s approach as well as Derrida’s reading of his approach has important echoes in deconstruction. Nietzsche’s influence is felt here in both Derrida’s
interpretation of Bataille as well as in Bataille’s own work. Perhaps one of the most important aspects of Nietzsche’s work here is the critique of thought as knowledge or in the service of knowledge. For Nietzsche (as well as for Heidegger) one of the defining characteristics of modernity and its nihilism is the use of thought as a means to an end. And here, in Derrida’s reading of Bataille, in the very close relation the notion of sovereignty has with deconstruction and its “infrastructures” the critique of servile thought is clear. Indeed, as we shall see in chapter seven, what seems to be one of the most important and challenging aspects of deconstruction and post-structuralist thought in general is this critique of thought in the service of a limited notion of the economy (what Deleuze might term an “image of thought”). And it is not surprising that the economy, in the sense of the capitalist economy, depends on such a limited notion of thought. Indeed, as we shall see, it is perhaps in this gap between a limited and general economy that post-structuralist thought has the most to teach us.

Finally, we have repeatedly noted the underlying notion of death within such Derridean notions as the trace, the mark, différence, the fold, etc. In Bataille’s notion of excess and the “accursed share,” the importance of death cannot be understated. Indeed, in his analysis of the mark and the trace, Derrida terms the economy of difference opened up by these figures an “economy of death.” For if the mark or the trace open up a space (the space of silence that is the poetic voice) this spacing is always Other and impure to the pure presence of self in Husserl or to thematic criticism – as well as to the self-mastery/presence of the Hegelian system. This impurity or Otherness marks the death of self-presence.
Notes

1 As we have noted in our Introduction, we will return to these readings and commentaries of Derrida and his contemporaries in greater detail in chapters six and seven, below.

2 Recall our discussion of Husserl in note ten of chapter two, above.

3 See also the extended description given to Jean-Louis Houdebine in *Positions*:
   Il faut donc avancer un double geste, selon une unité à la fois systématique et comme d’elle-même écartée, une écriture dédoublée, c’est-à-dire d’elle-même multipliée, ce que j’ai appelé...une double science : d’une part, traverser une phase de renversement...et d’autre part...s’en tenir à cette phase, c’est encore opérer sur le terrain et à l’intérieur du système déconstruit. Aussi faut-il, par cette écriture double, justement, stratifiée, décalée et décalante, marquer l’écart entre l’inversion qui met bas la hauteur, en déconstruit la généalogie sublimante ou idéalisante, et l’émergence irruptive d’un nouveau « concept », concept de ce qui ne se laisse plus, ne s’est jamais laissé comprendre dans le régime antérieur (56-57).

4 As we shall see in chapters six and seven, it is around this point that we might begin to mark the differences between Derrida’s and Deleuze’s thought.

5 This, of course, leads us to recall what might be termed Derrida’s most infamous and perhaps most widely misinterpreted declaration: “Il n’y a pas de hors-texte” (*De la grammatologie*, 227).

6 Here we borrow the term “infrastructure” from Rodolphe Gasché who uses it in an attempt to weave together the disparate names and uses of various Derridean “concepts.” See Gasché’s *The Tain of the Mirror*, 177-251 and *Inventions of Difference*, 22-57.

7 Again, we shall forestall a detailed discussion of these errors until chapter seven.

8 See our extended quote of Derrida above concerning the phenomenological reduction. It is precisely to avoid such confusion that we chose to quote this explanation at length.

9 At several points we have used the terms trace, différence, archi-écriture, etc. interchangeably. We should point out that each of these terms, while certainly interchangeable to a certain point, is not a synonym for the other. Derrida acknowledges as much when discussing another term, hymen:
   Ce qui vaut pour « hymen » vaut, mutatis mutandis, pour tous les signes qui, comme pharmakon, supplément, différencement et quelques autres, ont une valeur double, contradictoire, indécidable qui tient toujours à leur syntaxe, qu’elle soit en quelque sorte « intérieure », articulant et combinant sous le même joug, uph’ en, deux significations incompatibles,
ou qu’elle soit « extérieure », dépendant du code dans lequel on fait travailler le mot (Dissémination, 272).

The multiple nature of the trace as well as the multiple relations it ties together with other terms is always dependent on a specific context. This is what Derrida means when invoking the syntax of these terms in relation to an interior and an exterior. The trace and arche-writing are used in the context of Saussure and language. The hymen, as we shall see below, is used in the context of literature and truth. The trace and each of the terms noted above (which is by no means an exhaustive list), while certainly related to each other, are singular and unique. The double nature of deconstruction requires that for each situation, the complex web of relations between various concepts (their history and their interaction) be taken into account. Thus, while these terms work to accomplish the same task, their context and strategic deployment in each context is never the same. We are once again led to warn against any attempt to reduce the trace or our highly reductive analysis of the trace to a system. While it is true that we have attempted to reveal the “infrastructure” of the trace and the “infrastructure” that exists between other related terms, the trace and its related terms always exceeds the bounds of such a structure or system..

We shall return, below, to a discussion of the event and context of deconstruction, Section C, Derrida and the Play of Deconstruction, as well as to the trap of thinking deconstruction in terms of a system, Negotiations 4.

In Plato’s dialogues and texts, Derrida notes how the soul is compared to a book. In this way, if the soul has a silent relation with itself, as Derrida explains, it is “...que le livre imite l’âme ou que l’âme imite le livre, que l’un est l’image ressemblante de l’autre...” (Dissémination, 231). In this way, the “book” or “writing” of the soul is compared with an “image” or “painting.” As Derrida notes, it would appear that the metaphor of painting and writing serves a supplemental role in the definition of the soul (Dissémination, 232). That is, the book and the image it holds come only after the internal dialogue that is the logos of thought. However, this supplementarity of writing and painting is shown to be reversible. That is, the logos is also defined as the true image of being, producing a true and “first” painting of the world before the simulation of painting and writing (Dissémination, 232). In this way, the dialogue of the soul (and the logos) comes to depend on the metaphor of painting. This open movement, in which the logos and its supplements are shown to be reversible leads to a curious double definition, for we know that Plato dismissed writing and painting as dangerous tools of the mimetic arts. However, as Derrida points out, the relationship drawn between the logos of the soul and the metaphors of writing and painting shows that:

1. Ils sont tous deux mesurés à la vérité dont ils sont capables. 2. Ils sont images l’un de l’autre et c’est pourquoi l’un peut suppléer l’autre quand celui-ci est en défaut. 3. Leur structure commune les fait participer tous deux de la mnémé et de la mimesis, de la mnémé parce que de la mimesis. Dans le mouvement du mimeisthai, le rapport du mime au mimé, du reproducteur au reproduit, est toujours un rapport à un présent passé.

L’imité est avant l’imitant (Dissémination, 234).

This double definition of mimesis and logos leads to a contradiction in Plato’s thought for he never separates the “revealing” (aletheia) of truth from the movement of anamnesis.
And this movement is itself part of mimesis, that which the philosopher is so intent on discrediting. (Dissémination, 234-235).

11 We recall that Deleuze makes in many ways a similar reading of Plato, especially regarding the ambiguous treatment he gives to the simulacrum. See our discussion of this above, in chapter one, Negotiations 1 and Deleuze’s Logique du sens, 292-325.

12 The text is included in the collection entitled, Crayonné au théâtre, but, as Derrida notes, it has a long and complicated history, appearing first as a review in la Revue indépendante and then several times later in several different versions. The text is a review and commentary on a play, Pierrot Assassin de sa Femme, by Paul Margueritte. See Dissémination, 241-244 for an extended explanation.

13 Interestingly, Derrida notes the link here between what might be termed a textual graft and vegetable or animal grafts. This, of course, recalls the biological nature of the actual and virtual in Deleuze as well as the movement of de- and re-territorialization. See Dissémination 250 for Derrida’s evocation of the vegetable and animal graft.

14 As we shall see in chapter seven, very few “deconstructionist” literary critics ever manage to make it past this “preliminary” move in deconstruction. Such a strategy reveals their misunderstanding of the phenomenological distinction discussed above in Note 8 and of the phenomenological project in general.

15 For reasons of space, we can only allude to the numerous plays on the word “hymen” that are to be found in Mallarmé’s text. See pages 259-270 of Derrida’s text for further reference.

16 “...le pli n’est pas une réflexivité. Si l’on entend par là ce mouvement de la conscience ou de la présence à soi qui joue un rôle si déterminant dans la dialectique et dans la logique spéculative de Hegel, dans le mouvement de la relève (Aufhebung) et de la négativité (l’essence est réflexion, dit la grande Logique), la réflexivité n’est qu’un effet du pli comme texte” (Dissémination, 329).

17 Although this should be clear, we might note that while we have tended to underline the mark or the general text in terms of its enabling capacities, this is not to understand Derrida’s system as an attempt to find a somehow more-profound Kantian transcendental category. The very fact that the terms we have discussed go beyond any binary distinction of “enabling” or “disabling” should help us understand this. The mark and its inscription within the general text allow for both the possibility and the impossibility of the text that we understand as literature.

18 Limited Inc. is Derrida’s polemical response to John R. Searle’s article, “Reiterating the Differences: A Reply to Derrida” which was itself written in reaction to the appearance of the English translation of Derrida’s essay, “Signature Événement Contexte.”
19 For these examples, we rely on the explanation provided by W.L. Reese in his Dictionary of Philosophy and Religion, 41.


21 Cited by Gasché (Inventions of Difference, 7).

22 An influence, incidentally, which owes a great deal to Deleuze’s (and Pierre Klossowski’s) re-introduction and interpretation of Nietzschean thought in France with the publication of Nietzsche et la philosophie in 1962. See Marges, 18 and Logique du sens, 325-350.
Chapter 5

Michel Foucault

If we judge Derrida’s work to be important in relation to that of Deleuze, it would then be unwise to ignore the work of another of Deleuze’s contemporaries, Michel Foucault, for any discussion of critical apparatuses such as *agencement* and machinic assemblages soon calls to mind Foucault’s studies. Foucault’s work is also important for our discussion below concerning French thought’s reception in America, because, like Derrida, his work has had an enormous impact in a number of disciplines and sub-disciplines, opening the way for approaches such as “new historicism,” in history and literature as well as literary and cultural readings of race, class, and gender, and “performance” in literary and critical theory. For these reasons, it seems important that we engage Foucault’s thought and attempt to trace the major preoccupations to be found there before proceeding with an analysis in relation to Deleuze. Much like our approach to Derrida, we find ourselves forced to make a rather arbitrary division of his studies based on our limitations of space. Although much has been made about a so-called “early, middle, and late” Foucault, we should like to approach his work from three angles that are ultimately interconnecting in the substance of his work and which go beyond any historical divisions: his work on historical or discursive formations, the analysis of power and its role within these formations, and the consequences such an analysis might have for any type of discourse of truth or the metaphysical subject.
A. Discursive Formations

Foucault’s analysis of discursive formations seems at first glance deceptively simple. As he declares at the beginning of *La naissance de la clinique*, the work of a historian of discursive formations (what he later calls an archeologist) is not to plumb historical discourse for their themes or logical modes – to do so would be to construct yet another discourse on top of the historical discourses already analyzed, condemning one to the endless task of commentary on top of commentary (*Naissance de la clinique*, xii). In contrast to such an approach, Foucault advocates an analysis that captures the historical object and the discourses surrounding and defining these objects in their “original” state of non-relation. He declares:

Il faudrait alors traiter les faits de discours, non pas comme des noyaux autonomes de significations multiples, mais comme des événements et des segments fonctionnels, formant système de proche en proche. Le sens d’un énoncé ne serait pas défini par le trésor d’intentions qu’il contiendrait, le révélant et le réservant à la fois, mais par la différence qui l’articule sur les autres énoncés réels et possibles, qui lui sont contemporains ou auxquels il s’oppose dans la série linéaire du temps” (*Naissance de la clinique*, xiii).

In other words, an analysis of historical objects in terms of their discursive formation would attempt to show how a number of heterogeneous discourses come both together and apart (furthermore, they may be either real or simply possible) so that an “object,” such as the medical clinic, results. In a naïve view of history, we would situate the medical clinic’s appearance within a logic of progress so that it would be only “natural” that, with scientific progress, medicine advanced from the superstitious and poorly defined state it was in anterior to the clinic’s appearance, to the appearance of the clinic,
and so on to the present moment. This view of "progress" is simply our re-mapping of history within the terms of commentary that Foucault denounces.

As an example, Foucault offers an extract from an eighteenth century medical casebook concerning a young woman's treatment for hysteria. Instructed to bathe for long periods over ten months time, the treatment yields what appears to be the peeling away of the young woman's intestines and throat and stomach membranes (Naissance de la clinique, v). One hundred years later, this rather spectacular account and view of medicine is contrasted by the clinical diagnosis of chronic meningitis, which Foucault extensively quotes: "...Les fausses membranes sont souvent transparentes surtout lorsqu'elles sont très minces; mais ordinairement elles ont une couleur blanchâtre, grisâtre, rougeâtre et plus rarement jaunâtre, brunâtre et noirâtre. Cette matière offre fréquemment des nuances différentes suivant les parties de la même membrane" (Naissance de la clinique, v-vi). Foucault wishes to draw our attention to the language used in this diagnosis. It is a language that we recognize and trust as revealing a truth about the world around us. It is the language of scientific progress, doing away, once and for all, with the superstitious language/treatment of pre-Revolutionary medicine. Yet, for Foucault, this language or discourse (which is the discourse of the medical clinic) conforms to a certain, "larger" alignment of various discourses in exactly the same way as does the earlier, eighteenth century diagnosis. This is not to say that both discourses are equally true, but a certain alignment of discourses makes each example appear and hold true for its time and period. That the second example grasps the nature of illness in a "clearer" and "truer" fashion is not the question here, for one of the corollaries of Foucault's method is a skepticism towards any sort of "ruse of history" or ideology which
would hide the "real" truth. Clearly science does hold a discourse of truth concerning illness, yet this discourse of truth is only possible—indeed the "truth" of such discoveries is only possible—within a discursive configuration.

Again, to return to the analysis of discursive formations, the historian's task, according to Foucault, is not to construct a meta-narrative encompassing the history of medicine but rather to analyze the "configuration" of various discourses around this object. Foucault declares:

...il faut sans doute interroger autre chose que les contenus thématiques ou les modalités logiques, et s'adresser à cette région où les « choses » et les « mots » ne sont pas encore séparés, là où s'apportent encore, au ras du langage, manière de voir et manière de dire...Il faut se placer, et, une fois pour toutes, se maintenir au niveau de la spatialisation et de la verbalisation fondamentales du pathologique...(Naissance de la clinique, vii-viii).

Now, if we are to understand the appearance of a number of modern, historical objects, we must un-learn the manner in which we “see” (spatialization) and speak (verbalization) about history. It appears that one of the most important aspects of Foucault’s work is often overlooked as it is categorized by commentators as part of the “early” or “late” Foucault or by the “Foucault of bio-power.”¹ That is, by categorizing or historicizing Foucault one loses sight of the force of the category of discursive formations as it is deployed in his critical project. Let us examine this project in more detail.

When considering the birth of the modern clinic, medicine situates this moment at the end of the eighteenth century with the shift towards close observation of the patient and disease in general (Naissance de la clinique, viii). For Foucault, the emphasis on medical observation or gaze is correct to a certain extent, but it is not the case that medicine simply ignored observation up to this historical point. What occurs is a re-
organization of the manner in which medicine sees and speaks about its scientific object. Thus, classical thought took the metaphor of light and vision as an ideal in which, as Foucault explains, "...la lumière, antérieure à tout regard, était l'élément de l'idéalité, l'inassignable lieu d'origine où les choses étaient adéquates à leur essence et la forme selon laquelle elles la rejoignaient à travers la géométrie des corps ; parvenu à sa perfection, l'acte de voir se résorbait dans la figure sans courbe ni durée de la lumière" (*Naissance de la clinique*, ix). However, this array of light shifts by the end of the eighteenth century so that the object of medicine’s gaze, the patient, comes to have a strange light of its own, emanating from the thickness and obscurity of the patient’s body. The gaze remains in place, but the ideality or geometry of classical light has shifted so that, as Foucault explains, "Toute la lumière est passée du côté du mince flambeau de l'œil qui tourne maintenant autour des volumes et dit, dans ce chemin, leur lieu et leur forme. Le discours rationnel s'appuie moins sur la géométrie de la lumière que sur l'épaisseur insistant, indépassable de l'objet..." (*Naissance de la clinique*, x). What has occurred with this shift is the appearance of, as Foucault notes, a rational, modern discourse. This discourse, which attempts the unlimited or infinite project of defining the individual patient in a finite and limited language, suddenly thickens and clouds the classical gaze, so that the ideality of classical thought is then grounded on the empirical objectivity of the patient. In other words, the thrust of Foucault's project is an examination of the modern condition which is the discursive shift allowing the subject of modern thought to become its own object of thought. He declares, "L'objet du discours peut aussi bien être un sujet, sans que les figures de l'objectivité soient pour autant altérées. C'est cette réorganisation formelle et en profondeur, plus que l'abandon des
théories et des vieux systèmes, qui a ouvert la possibilité d’une expérience clinique…” (Naissance de la clinique, x). Indeed this project might explain the bulk of Foucault’s work, for in his studies of the sciences humaines and various modern approaches to madness, crime, or sexuality, what is at stake is the place of the modern individual and her subjectivity within this system. The force of his analyses is that the modern subject must be viewed in two fashions: as a traditional subject underpinning an understanding or comprehension of the world as a totality and as an object who falls under the gaze of the traditional subject. Indeed, as our brief analysis of the birth of the clinic shows, it is this position as object that assures the shift from the classical to the modern. In this manner, what we think of as the privileged position that the subject holds over its alienated partner, the object, is undermined, for modernity’s movement of objectification is revealed to be a necessary part of subjectivity. The consequence of this is that a subject may be either a subject or an object – or both. This then changes the way we read power or domination for both subjectivity and “objectivity” fall into modernity’s critical gaze. Indeed, such a shift is necessary if the clinic is to emerge, and it is in the field of such a shift that medicine and its truth are both possible and realized. In this manner we return full circle to our initial reading of discursive formations as the historical alignment necessary for both the emergence and the realization of certain objects or fields of truth. In order to better understand these readings and as an illustration, let us continue with Foucault’s analysis of the medical clinic.

In our introduction to the historical object or discursive formation, we noted how Foucault insists upon the discontinuous and heterogeneous nature of the various
discourses and historical events/objects that come together to form such an object. When discussing this strategy in his *L'archéologie du savoir*, he thus declares:

> En un mot, on veut, bel et bien, se passer des « choses ». Les « dé-pré-sentifier ». Conjurer leur riche, lourde et immédiate pléniude...Substituer au trésor énigmatique des « choses » d'avant le discours, la formation régulière des objets qui ne se dessinent qu'en lui. Définir ces objets sans référence au *fond des choses*, mais en les rapportant à l'ensemble des règles qui permettent de les former comme objets et constituent ainsi leurs conditions d'apparition historique (65).

Thus his analysis in this context attempts to bring together a number of “objects:” discourses concerning medicine and disease, legal regimes surrounding the formation of doctors and the creation of hospitals and teaching hospitals, changes in logic and grammar, and changes in the political and economic regimes. Let us first examine an example of medical discourses.

Foucault traces an effort in the late eighteenth century to understand illness by arranging it in a table or chart. Arranging illnesses in terms of a table of families, genera, and species creates a particular way of seeing illness, as Foucault explains, “...le tableau nosologique implique une figure des maladies qui n’est ni l’enchaînement des effets et des causes, ni la série chronologique des événements ni son trajet visible dans le corps humain” (*Naissance de la clinique*, 2-3). In other words, the illness is flattened out in space, so that it is defined more in terms of its symptoms (the family of illness, the classic symptoms, changes in degrees of severity of the latter, etc.) and analogies between families and symptoms than in terms of a history or origin of the illness or the distance and relation between various illnesses and their origins or causes (*Naissance de la clinique*, 3-6). Such a view then leads to an understanding of illness in terms of a certain “nature and ideality” (*Naissance de la clinique*, 6). That is, the illness is natural because
it reveals its true character in nature and ideal because the illness is always corrupted to a
certain extent, once present within an organism (*Naissance de la clinique*, 6). This final
characteristic presents a problem for the doctor, because even if the illness always has a
"true nature," the latter can never be perceived in the patient, due to the variations of each
case. Thus a conflict exists between the ideal definition of the illness and its existence
within the multiply-varied body of the patient. The result of this conflict is an encounter
between the vocabulary of classificatory medicine and its space, the patient. Foucault
explains, "...ce sont les effets de multiplication provoqués par les variations
qualitatives...des qualités essentielles qui caractérisent les maladies. L'individu malade
se rencontre au point où apparaît le résultat de cette multiplication" (*Naissance de la
clinique*, 13). It is within the space of the patient's body that the illness is mapped out;
however, paradoxically, it is the body or the individual that interests the classificatory
doctor the least.

In this brief example, we might begin to see the logic behind Foucault's method.
Medical diagnosis and the specific diagnosis of the clinic with its reliance on observation
becomes possible when a certain number of discourses and practices come into contact
with each other: the logical discourse of the table and illness' classification within this
table, the conflict that this classification produces when the illness is encountered in the
patient's body, the resulting vocabulary of such a conflict, and the attention the patient's
body first begins to attract within such an alignment. To return to what we have defined
as the condition for modern thought, the individual body is not yet an object within this
configuration, but the space of the body finds itself invested and mapped with the first
traces of what will become the clinical gaze.
Let us now consider the political and social aspect of a discursive formation. This tendency toward a “mapping” of the individual body finds itself reinforced by the political and ideological changes of the French Revolution. Foucault notes that this system of classificatory medicine demanded an open “field” in which it might have access to the illness in its most natural manifestation (Naissance de la clinique, 37-38). At the very same moment that this pressure manifests itself within medicine, the French Revolution does away with a collection of institutions and regimes which prevents the organic totality of French civilization from interacting according to the revolutionary ideals. As Foucault explains, “Il y a donc un phénomène de convergence entre les exigences de l’idéologie politique et celles de la technologie médicale. D’un seul mouvement, médecins et hommes d’État réclament en un vocabulaire parfois semblable...la suppression de tout ce qui peut faire obstacle à la constitution de ce nouvel espace...” (Naissance de la clinique, 37). Thus the reforms undertaken by parliament under the revolution concerning the French hospital and its medical universities helped to clear the medical field and create a space for the future clinic. What was left in the place of these institutions of the ancien régime was not yet the clinic but a poor and retarded vision of the hospital (Naissance de la clinique, 58-62).

Although such an analysis comes closer to a “conventional” reading of history in which a narrative of historical events is placed in relation to the “appearance” or “occurrence” of certain historical objects, Foucault wants nonetheless to exclude any reading in which a certain subjective will might be detected. That is, for Foucault, one cannot say that the members of parliament and revolutionaries of this period pursued a policy whose goal was the creation of something that would come to resemble the
modern hospital or the clinic. While certainly focusing on universities and teaching hospitals and various other institutions of the ancien régime, their actions must not be read in the light of causality in which one might say that the French revolutionary government “knew what it was doing.” This latter example is certainly a naïve reading of history and one that the majority of historians tend to avoid, but let us again place this type of reading in contrast to Foucault’s project: “Le discours...n’est pas la manifestation, majestueusement déroulée, d’un sujet qui pense, qui connaît, et qui le dit : c’est au contraire un ensemble où peuvent se déterminer la dispersion du sujet et sa discontinuité avec lui-même. Il est un espace d’extériorité où se déploie un réseau d’emplacements distincts” (Archéologie du savoir, 74). As we shall see below, the notions of “dispersion” and “exteriority” play an important role for Foucault concerning the privileged place of language.

As a final example of analysis, let us now turn to a more extensive reading of the question of language as it is analyzed in the clinic. Although the very term “discursive formation” already directs our attention to the importance of language for Foucault, we have yet to discuss the explicit link between concepts of language and the appearance of a historical object. We noted above how the early clinic began to take form and its completed and modern form, might first be glimpsed with the shift from the patient as an example to the patient as a case (Naissance de la clinique, 59). This shift may be clearly marked with what Foucault notes is a close correlation between linguistic codes at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and the medical space of the clinic. In other words, we might be able to discern the introduction of a number of what could be termed linguistic considerations into the clinical gaze. For example, within the
classificatory system of medicine, a distinction was made between a sign and a symptom. The symptom was thus that form in or through which the illness would manifest itself (*Naissance de la clinique*, 89). A sign, on the other hand, was that which would announce what was to come or what had already occurred in the illness and the patient (*Naissance de la clinique*, 90). This distinction between sign and symptom or what we might term signifier and signified begins to disappear at the end of the eighteenth century. Thus the illness, in a manner, comes to follow the same logic as a language of action so that one says or expresses what the other reveals, as Foucault explains, “Signes et symptômes sont et disent la même chose : à ceci près que le signe dit cette même chose qu’est précisément le symptôme. Dans sa réalité matérielle, le signe s’identifie au symptôme lui-même ; celui-ci est le support morphologique indispensable du signe” (*Naissance de la clinique*, 92). In the same manner, one might say that a certain “logic of being” also enters into the equation. For Foucault, this logic is one of consciousness, for if the sign and the symptom are readily identifiable and this in relation to each other, then a certain logic also follows allowing one to define relations between various signs and symptoms (difference, simultaneity, succession, frequency, etc.) (*Naissance de la clinique*, 93). It then follows that a certain causality might be sketched, taking into account the complexity of the relations to be found in any one case of an illness: a comparison between the various symptoms in a single case and other cases, and the frequency of various signs and symptoms. This combination of relations then gives way to a vocabulary that covers not only the lexical field of the illness (its signs and symptoms) but also the physical field of the patient. Thus Foucault draws the parallel between the deployment of the medical gaze and Condillac’s grammar:
La description du clinicien, comme l’Analyse du philosophe, profère ce qui est donné par la relation naturelle entre l’opération de conscience et le signe. Et dans cette reprise, s’énonce l’ordre des enchaînements naturels ; la syntaxe du langage, loin de pervertir les nécessités logiques du temps, les restitue dans leur articulation la plus originale...L’ordre de la vérité ne fait qu’une chose avec celui du langage, parce que l’un et l’autre restituent en sa forme nécessaire et énonçable, c’est-à-dire discursive, le temps (Naissance de la clinique, 95).

With this shift, the medical field is finally open, shifting from the last vestiges of the ancien régime hospital and its classificatory medicine to a clinical approach in which each patient becomes a case whose structure of symptoms and signs may be examined in the light of a grammatical reasoning, allowing the doctor to at last make a calculated judgement regarding the patient’s prognosis (Naissance de la clinique, 105).

This open field appears to give way to a certain ideal: that of a correspondence between what is visible and what is say-able. This correspondence is, however, based on a certain form of circular logic. In other words, by observing the illness in its grammar-like logic, the clinical gaze gains an analytical rigor, reconstituting the genesis and composition of the illness in its logic (Naissance de la clinique, 109). However, this rigor is itself based on the grammar and syntax of the language, which is used to speak of the illness itself. As Foucault notes, we might say that, “Le regard de l’observation et les choses qu’il perçoit communiquent par un même Logos qui est ici genèse des ensembles et là logique des opérations” (Naissance de la clinique, 109). Foucault underlines how Pinel’s pedagogical recommendations might be taken as an example of this knot around which the critical gaze and its discourse are constructed. For Pinel, the exam must alternate between the critical gaze (judging the various symptoms and signs of illness), an explanation of what occurred in the past and what might have been observed around the patient and her illness, an examination of the illness’ progress in the patient, and finally, a
recommendation or prescription in order that the patient heal herself (*Naissance de la clinique*, 112). This alternation between the clinical gaze and its discourse permits the doctor to finally discover the truth or sense of the illness. What we have termed a knot or relationship between the clinical gaze and its discourse is not exactly a perfectly circular relationship. That is, for Foucault, the rules of discourse (the limits of eighteenth century grammar) at this period never completely corresponded to the clinical field of observation (*Naissance de la clinique*, 117). In other words, the innumerable variations of language (which was supposed to be the foundation, the justification, and the instrument of the clinical gaze) only managed to augment in a discursively innumerable fashion the variations that one might find within the patient and her illness (*Naissance de la clinique*, 118). The medical predictability or prognosis on which the clinical gaze based its rupture with the pre-revolutionary hospital finds itself undermined by this situation. Curiously, the limitations of the clinic's discursive regime, far from discrediting and weakening its optical regime, tends to reinforce it. Foucault then detects a clear shift towards the clinical gaze and its sensitivity, as he notes, "L'armature technique du regard médical se métamorphose en conseils de prudence, de goût, d'habileté : il faut une « grande sagacité », une « grande attention », une « grande exactitude », une « grande adresse », une « grande patience »" (*Naissance de la clinique*, 122).

Foucault takes as an example of this "high sensibility" towards the patient and her illness the importance the clinic came to attach to the autopsy and the body. Like the shift between the medical field of the hospital and the clinic, the medical gaze and the autopsy are the result of a shift in the disposition of the medical subject and its object (*Naissance de la clinique*, 138-139). Faced with the multiplicity of symptoms in an illness, the
clinical gaze comes to focus on a single point in the patient’s body in order to attempt to master the movement and transfer of symptoms and signs. As Foucault notes, this permits the doctor to limit the numerous symptoms to be found in a case of consumption to a single symptom (a pulmonary lesion, for example) (Naissance de la clinique, 140). The focalization of the medical gaze onto a single point – specifically a point within a cadaver – is extremely important, for it reverses the medical attitude toward the symptom. Instead of understanding the symptom in terms of a final or terminal sign of the illness in question, it now becomes the point of origin for the illness (Naissance de la clinique, 142). Death, instead of representing that negative and ambiguous metaphysical space which haunts medicine, becomes instead the place around which a much surer determination of the probability and the logic of the illness might be made. By opening up the corpse, the medical gaze places itself in a new position concerning the patient. Foucault reads this in the form of a triad:

C’est du haut de la mort qu’on peut voir et analyser les dépendances organiques et les séquences pathologiques. Au lieu d’être ce qu’elle avait été si longtemps, cette nuit où la vie s’efface, où la maladie même se brouille, elle est douée désormais de ce grand pouvoir d’éclairer qui domine et met à jour à la fois l’espace de l’organisme et le temps de la maladie (Naissance de la clinique, 146).

The patient’s body is thus invested with a new a much more determined gaze than that of the hospital or of classificatory medicine.

To return to the question of sensibility, clinical medicine requires a new gaze that is now sensitive to the reversal in the logic of symptoms and signs that was first established within clinical medicine. The relationship between the sign and symptoms of illness is modified so that instead of pointing directly to the illness in its configuration of symptoms and the probability indicated by such symptoms, the sign points simply to
itself, (a lesion, for instance) (Naissance de la clinique, 164). In other words, the medical gaze no longer focuses on a certain pathological state and its evolution but rather on the medical sign as it relates directly to the cause of the pathology in its actuality (Naissance de la clinique, 164-165). This manner of regarding the patient means that the doctor must not only focus his gaze but also his ears and his touch on the body. The patient is invested by a medical gaze that is all the more thorough, so that Foucault explains, “Alors que l’expérience clinique impliquait la constitution d’une trame mixte du visible et du lisible, la nouvelle séméiologie exige une sorte de triangulation sensorielle à laquelle doivent collaborer des atlas divers, et jusqu’alors exclus des techniques médicales : l’oreille et le toucher viennent s’ajouter à la vue” (Naissance de la clinique, 166). Finally, this gaze, which is much more profound than the simple and everyday gaze, penetrates the patient in a way that we might term, echoing Foucault, an “invisible visibility” (Naissance de la clinique, 169). That is, the gaze takes in, with a totalizing swoop, not only the everyday visibilities of the patient (her condition, her symptoms, the signs of her illness, etc.) but also the deployment of these signs and symptoms that form a totality revealing the invisible actuality of the pathology within the patient. Thus the patient becomes truly visible through the gaze/gauze of the invisible death the doctor projects in his examination (Naissance de la clinique, 170-171). The structure of this visibility is then reinforced with a vocabulary that attempts to become all that much more precise in its observations, describing the various skin tints, sizes of abnormalities, physical operations that one undertakes in the examination, etc. (Naissance de la clinique, 173). As Foucault underlines, “Le langage et la mort ont joué à chaque niveau de cette expérience, et selon toute son épaisseur, pour offrir enfin à une perception
scientifique ce qui pour elle était resté si longtemps l’invisible visible – interdit et imminent secret: le savoir de l’individu” (*Naissance de la clinique*, 174).

With this long detour through language we at last come up against the shift which we defined at the outset of our discussion as being central to Foucault’s analysis: the place the individual plays in modern society as both object and subject of analysis. As Foucault declares, it is only through the paradox of the individual’s or “man’s” own proper destruction (his/her death) that modern society is able to make itself and the individual the center of its analytical project (*Naissance de la clinique*, 200-201). The modern individual’s subjectivity is defined by its own objectification or limits. To paraphrase Foucault, “man” may only be defined in terms of (and simultaneously with) his “death.” This is, of course, a reference to the larger analysis Foucault makes of the *sciences humaines* in *Les mots et les choses*. Indeed, this latter study is an examination of a number of shifts that appear around the beginning of the nineteenth century, for the medical field is not isolated within the movement analyzed above. It is around the knot of three disciplines within the *sciences humaines* that Foucault focuses his analysis: economics, biology, and linguistics or grammar. However, like our reading of the medical clinic, it is the place language plays within this shift, serving as the thread which sews together the various elements of a discursive formation, that appears to interest Foucault the most. Let us briefly examine his reading of this shift in terms of the *sciences humaines* and the importance of language.

Like the human body in its relationship with the medical clinic, Foucault traces a certain “hardening” or “clouding” of knowledge in the three large, disciplinary areas mentioned above. That is, with a number of shifts in the discursive formations of the
*sciences humaines*, there is no longer a transparent correspondence between knowledge and its representation. To take an example of this shift from our above discussion, modern medical knowledge emerges out of the classical method of organizing knowledge in the form of the table. However, as the discursive formation shifts, the knowledge that is collected in the table shifts as well so that what comes to be considered as medical knowledge is actually a collection of relations, discontinuities, etc. that eventually help to trace out the individual body, the center of the clinical discursive formation. Considering this shift on a larger scale, then, Foucault declares:

...la *taxinomia* dont la grande nappe universelle s’étalait en corrélation avec la possibilité d’une *mathesis* et qui constituait le temps fort de sa perfection... va s’ordonner à une verticalité obscure : celle-ci définira la loi des ressemblances, prescrira les voisinages et les discontinuités, fondera les dispositions perceptibles et décalera tous les grands déroulements horizontaux de la *taxinomia* vers la région un peu accessoire des conséquences. Ainsi, la culture européenne s’invente une profondeur où il sera question non plus des identités, des caractères distinctifs, des tables permanentes avec tous leurs chemins et parcours possibles, mais des grandes forces cachées développées à partir de leur noyau primitif et inaccessible, mais de l’origine, de la causalité et de l’histoire (*Les mots et les choses*, 263).

The space of knowledge then shifts, becoming much more “profound” than that which was the rule during the classical period. An obvious corollary to this change is a shift in the very form or object of knowledge as well, which is, of course, the shift we attempted to trace above concerning the medical clinic.

Now, among the numerous changes within the social and human sciences, Foucault gives a special preference to that which occurs in language. According to him, it “flattens” or “levels” itself out, so that the one-to-one correspondence of classical representation (mentioned in the quote above) is no longer possible. Again, like the fractured re-working of medical epistemological space, language is fragmented by
modern philology, grammar, and linguistics so that it becomes much more “profound” and clouded. Foucault thus declares:

Détaché de la représentation, le langage n’existe plus désormais...que sur un mode dispersé : pour les philologues, les mots sont comme autant d’objets constitués et déposés par l’histoire ; pour ceux qui veulent formaliser, le langage doit dépouiller son contenu concret et ne plus laisser apparaître que les formes universellement valables du discours ; si on veut interpréter, alors les mots deviennent texte à fracturer pour qu’on puisse voir émerger en pleine lumière cet autre sens qu’ils cachent ; enfin il arrive au langage de surgir pour lui-même en un acte d’écrire qui ne désigne rien de plus que soi (Les mots et les choses, 315).

Again, as we noted above, it is the space and the form of knowledge that is both doubled and broken by this transformation. It appears that the question of language holds a singular place for Foucault because it is here that we might trace the paradoxical transformations of modernity. On the one hand, we might say that language’s very structure, as it is analyzed by modern philology and linguistics reveals its fractured and profound space. But it is in this very object, language itself, that the discipline or knowledge is expressed and transformed. Or, more precisely, it is in examining this object that the discipline is transformed. In other words, language appears to invent its own possibility so that the search for a ground or point of beginning is impossible. We are always caught within this movement of transformation and unable to point at either side of the movement (language itself as fractured or the disciplines as revealing this fracturing of knowledge) as being the cause of the structural shift in knowledge. The same paradox might be pointed out when turning to the evaluation of wealth or to biological sciences, but it is the place language holds in helping to structure these other discourses of knowledge which gives it priority for Foucault — “Cet éparpillement impose
au langage, sinon un privilège, du moins un destin qui apparaît singulier quand on le compare à celui du travail ou de la vie” *(Les mots et les choses, 315).*

The consequences of language’s “flattening out” are numerous and lead us back to Foucault’s definition of modernity. To return to the “paradox” we outlined above, linguistics (and the various other human/social sciences) reverse the classical relation the individual had with the world and infinity. That is, in relation to the order of a world dominated by God or a sovereign subject, “man’s” limits (the very limits that come to found the modern social sciences) were defined negatively, so that the limits of one’s vocabulary, one’s work, one’s body, etc. prevented the classical individual from mastering the infinite world around her. It was in the infinity of God and the sovereign subject that the classical individual defined herself. Foucault explains:

> Comme inadéquation à l’infini, la limite de l’homme rendait compte aussi bien de l’existence de ces contenus empiriques que de l’impossibilité de les connaître immédiatement... Elle fondait d’un seul mouvement, mais sans renvoi réciproque ni circularité, l’existence des corps, des besoins et des mots, et l’impossibilité de les maîtriser en une connaissance qu’il peut en prendre *(Les mots et les choses, 327).*

This, of course, does not mean that classical thought considered knowledge impossible, but knowledge was established within the order of a world ruled by a sovereign subject. Again, within the model of the *table* of language, classical knowledge was able to offer a limited but perfect representation of its world. As Foucault declares, “La possibilité de connaître les choses et leur ordre passe, dans l’expérience classique, par la souveraineté des mots... ils forment... le réseau incolore à partir de quoi les êtres se manifestent et les représentations s’ordonnent” *(Les mots et les choses, 322).*

With the shift of the discursive formation of modernity, this relationship is reversed. The individual is no longer defined *negatively* by her relationship with infinity;
it is rather the individual's finitude which serves as the ground or basis for an infinite relationship with one's own limits. As Foucault explains, "...la positivité de la vie, de la production et du travail...fonde comme leur corrélation négative le caractère borné de la connaissance ; et inversement les limites de la connaissance fondent positivement la possibilité de savoir, mais dans une expérience toujours bornée, ce que sont la vie, le travail et la langage" (Les mots et les choses, 327). The individual is now both the sovereign subject of classical thought and the object of this sovereign gaze. This double position then captures the modern individual within the double definition of the empirical and the transcendental, for the very object of analysis, "man's" empirical condition, serves as the basis for "his" subjectivity (Les mots et les choses, 331-332). It then follows that from within such a position, it is no longer a sovereign subject that establishes the order of being but the individual, "man," and because "man's" own limits found this order, what Foucault terms an "analytic" of finitude is established. He explains:

...la mort qui ronge anonymement l'existence quotidienne du vivant, est la même que celle, fondamentale, à partir de quoi se donne à moi-même ma vie empirique ; le désir, qui lie et sépare les hommes dans la neutralité du processus économique, c'est le même à partir duquel toute chose est pour moi désirable ; le temps qui porte les langages, se loge en eux et finit par les user, c'est ce temps qui étre son discours avant même que je l'aie prononcé dans une succession que nul ne peut maîtriser. Du bout à l'autre de l'expérience, la finitude se répond à elle-même ; elle est dans la figure du Même l'identité et la différence des positivités et de leur fondement (Les mots et les choses, 326).

A consequence of this "movement of the Same" is what Foucault terms the "mode of being" of modern thought. That is, modern thought constantly interrogates this distance between empiricism and transcendentalism, bringing thought to its origins at the very moment that it immediately pushes it back away. Foucault thus declares, "...le
cogito ne sera donc pas la soudaine découverte illuminante que toute pensée est pensée, mais l’interrogation toujours recommencée pour savoir comment la pensée habite hors d’ici, et pourtant au plus proche d’elle-même, comment elle peut être sous les espèces du non-pensant” (Les mots et les choses, 335). Modern thought might then be defined further by its gesture to fill this space between what it thinks and what it can never think. For Foucault, the discovery of the space of the unconscious is contemporary with the shift in the modern discursive formation (Les mots et les choses, 337-338). Furthermore, every philosophical or epistemological attempt to fill this gap between thought and its unthought is quintessentially modern (Les mots et les choses, 338-339).

One final consequence of this larger discursive shift concerns modern thought’s relationship to time and to any attempt to historicize itself. We might understand this problem in the larger epistemological field of modern thought if we relate it to our discussion of language above, in which we noted that it is language itself, as it reveals its discontinuities, connections, families, histories, etc. that appears to found both the shift in the modern discursive formation and escape its limits. That is, language, as both the object and tool of modern thought always already pre-exists the latter. In its folding-over unto itself, modern thought constructs the place for a beginning or origin of “man,” but this origin is impossible to define or isolate within the empirical evidence of thought’s disciplines. Foucault thus declares, “Ce n’est plus l’origine qui donne lieu à l’historicité ; c’est l’historicité qui dans sa trame même laisse se profiler la nécessité d’une origine qui lui serait à la fois interne et étrangère...” (Les mots et les choses, 340). “Man” discovers that “his” work, “his” language, “his” life is always already constituted around “him” such that “man’s” origin is always unreachable, thus condemning modern thought and
modern "man" to exist, paradoxically, out of the time of history (Les mots et les choses, 342-343). Modern thought realizes that it is caught in a temporal as well as spatial gap between the thought and the un-thought. What founds modern "man's" subjectivity — "his" empirical existence — also reveals "his" separation from the history of this empirical existence. As both subject and object of modern thought, the modern individual is caught in a "fold" of time. A corollary epistemological gesture to the one described above concerning the thought and the un-thought of modernity is then one in which modern thought attempts to fill this "gap" between the time of history and the time of modern "man." As Foucault explains, "Une pareille tâche implique que soit mis en question tout ce qui appartient au temps, tout ce qui s'est formé en lui, tout ce qui loge dans son élément mobile, de manière qu'apparaisse la déchirure sans chronologie et sans histoire d'où provient le temps" (Les mots et les choses, 343).

We have insisted on the importance Foucault assigns language in the emergence of the modern discursive formation but our use of the term "language" has perhaps not always been the most judicious. Let us explore the question of language and the manner in which Foucault reads language within the field of literature for such a reading might allow us to expand our reading of discursive formations and more easily identify the relationship Foucault establishes between discursive formations and power. Simultaneous to his work on the clinic, in 1963, Foucault published an extended study on the author Raymond Roussel. This strikes us as important concerning two questions: that of language and that of methodology. We recall that in his preface to La naissance de la clinique, Foucault condemned the method of commentary, particularly concerning the dangers such a method posed when considering discursive formations (Naissance de la
At first glance, his work on Roussel seems to ignore such warnings since it appears to be in the form of a commentary itself. However, upon closer examination, we believe that his discussion of language and Roussel offers a glimpse of what Foucault would later term a strategy concerning one’s experience of power and subjectivity.\(^3\) That is, it appears that Foucault’s study is an attempt to put the experience of language within its historical and discursive formation. For Foucault, Roussel is acutely aware of the doubling power of language and the place the modern subject holds within it. However, unlike the modern gesture of the sciences humaines, Roussel does not attempt to fill in or capture this fold between one’s subjectivity and language. As Foucault explains:

...Roussel apparaît tel qu’il s’est défini lui-même : l’inventeur d’un langage qui ne dit que soi, d’un langage absolument simple dans son être redoublé, d’un langage du langage, enfermant son propre soleil dans sa défaillance souveraine et centrale...L’angoisse du signifiant, c’est cela qui fait de la souffrance de Roussel la solitaire mise au jour de ce qu’il y a de plus proche dans notre langage à nous (Raymond Roussel, 210).

Foucault defends the thesis that Roussel, in contrast with the gesture of modern thought, embraces the “fold” of modern thought so that his writing reveals the doubling of language: “…chaque mot est à la fois animé et ruiné, rempli et vidé par la possibilité qu’il y en ait un second – celui-ci ou celui-là, ou ni l’un ni l’autre, mais un troisième, ou rien” (Raymond Roussel, 20).

Roussel’s project follows the intuition of the eighteenth century grammarians and their observation that the world of things or objects always exceeds the world of language so that there are letters (sent to one another) and there are letters (that make up words) (Raymond Roussel, 22-24). In other words, language possesses a certain play which may be exploited by writing a short story that begins, for instance, with a letter (written by
someone) and ends with the letters of that note traced on a paper. Roussel’s project approaches this play from a similar angle that attempts to open the space of that play so that instead of discovering and defining it (like the eighteenth century rhetoricians) he treats this space as something which tears a hole in the text (and consequently in the being of the text or in what it attempts to represent). In his early texts, Roussel attempts to turn language back onto this hole and fill it – vainly, for by filling it he endlessly opens it up again (Raymond Roussel, 24-25). Foucault explains:

...le style, c’est, sous la nécessité souveraine des mots employés, la possibilité, masquée et désignée à la fois, de dire la même chose, mais autrement. Tout le langage de Roussel...cherche à dire subrepticement deux choses avec les mêmes mots. La torsion, le léger détour des mots qui d’ordinaire leur permet de « bouger » selon un mouvement tropologique et de faire jouer leur profonde liberté, Roussel en fait un cercle impitoyable qui reconduit les mots à leur point de départ par la force d’une loi contraignante. La flexion du style devient sa négation circulaire (Raymond Roussel, 25).

Roussel accomplishes this by setting his mature works within the limits of two slightly different sentences around which the novel must be written. In between these sentences, an enormous network of doubles, echoes, differences, rifts, etc. establishes itself so that, to take the example of Chiquenaude, the initial sentence contains the phrase, “vers de la doublure dans la pièce de Forban talon rouge” and ends on the phrase, “les vers de la doublure dans la pièce du fort pantalon rouge” (Raymond Roussel, 37-38). As the text repeats or constructs the repetition and doubling of the words or phrases that Roussel initially sets out for himself, it comes to mirror on a much larger scale the stylistic limits of its individual words. That is, both the words and the text itself come to turn around the space of language, so that language’s limit is actually revealed to be an intensively creative space. Foucault declares, “Le glissement des répétitions et des différences, leur
constant déséquilibre, la perdition qu’éprouve en elles la solidité des mots sont en train de devenir subrepticement de merveilleuses machines à fabriquer des êtres : pouvoir ontologique de ce langage noyé” (Raymond Roussel, 38-39).

We have stated that Roussel’s project, according to Foucault, resembles that of modern thought yet differs in its relationship to the fold of modernity’s movement between empiricism and transcendentalism, thought and un-thought, etc. Yet our example above concerning style seems to contradict this reading: is Roussel’s style not simply yet another attempt to master and fill the gap between man’s limits and language? At first glance, this might appear to be so, however, it is in attempting to fill the chasm of language, in attempting to reveal it and fill it, that Roussel opens it up anew so that his project is not a rejection or attempt at mastering the paradoxical ontological space of modernity but rather an affirmation of it. Roussel’s texts contain chances and coincidences, but this is not evidence of a will to master these literary events. On the contrary, his text is a strictly disciplined attempt to bring the text up against the one event which truly belongs to chance and escapes all technical mastery or literary manipulation: the origin of language itself. Foucault reads Roussel’s process as an attempt to do away with such “false” origins as inspiration, fantasy, etc. He declares, “Suppression de la chance littéraire, de ses biais et de ses traverses, pour qu’apparaisse la ligne droite d’un plus providentiel hasard : celui qui coïncide avec l’émergence du langage. L’œuvre de Roussel…est une tentative pour organiser, selon le discours le moins aléatoire, le plus inévitable des hasards” (Raymond Roussel, 54-55).

However, one might (rightly) object such a literary attempt nonetheless still contains a trace of mastery. Thus, Roussel’s stylistic process evolves. In later works, the
initial and terminal phrases/sentences disappear from Roussel’s works so that the sentence that sets off the process is unknown. What appears in the text is an immense series of echoes, repetitions, whispers, etc. whose key has disappeared. As Foucault explains, “Roussel lui-même a perdu la plupart des autres clefs et, sauf par coup de chance, on ne peut retrouver ce langage premier dont les fragments phonétiques brillent, sans que nous sachions où, à la surface des féeries qui nous sont offertes” (Raymond Roussel, 59). In this manner, the doubling and repetitious nature of language is no longer part of a movement of mastery but of a movement that rejoins that of language itself. That is, there is certainly the chance that the phrase that launches the process performs a perfect and master-able movement of doubling but what this chance reveals above all is the destructive and creative aspect of language. Foucault explains, “L’aléa n’est pas le jeu d’éléments positifs, il est l’ouverture infinie, et à chaque instant renouvelée, de l’anéantissement” (Raymond Roussel, 61). Like all literary language, Roussel’s work is the violent destruction of the everyday usage of language, but what distinguishes his project from other literary projects is that his language remains caught in this violent gesture, for what becomes visible behind such a process is not the possibility of creation but the possibility of destruction. The play of language is certainly creative but this creation may only emerge from a destruction, and it is only out of this destruction – this nothing – that language might repeat itself. As Foucault explains, “Le langage de Roussel s’ouvre d’entrée de jeu au déjà dit qu’il accueille sous la forme la plus déréglée du hasard : non pas pour dire mieux ce qui s’y trouve dit mais pour en soumettre la forme au second aléa d’une destruction explosive et, de ces morceaux épars, inertes, informes, faire naître en les laissant en place la plus inouïe des significations” (Raymond Roussel,
61). A curious "invisible visibility" then appears in Roussel’s text such that by following the rules of his literary process, Roussel opens up the hole of language in which its play is possible. But by attempting to fill this hole, language is again opened. Like the fantastic machine of *Locus Solus*, Roussel’s literary technique is a machine that constructs machinic literary objects, yet it is in this space of machinic construction which fills the text that the inaudible echo of language’s empty space or destruction “appears.” In other words, the literary process “reveals” what always sets it into motion but which it cannot articulate or master. As Foucault explains:

Tous les appareils de Roussel...sont d’une façon plus ou moins claire, avec plus ou moins de densité, non seulement une répétition de syllabes cachées, non seulement la figuration d’une histoire à découvrir, mais une image du procédé lui-même. Image invisiblement visible, perceptible mais non déchiffrable, donnée en un éclair et sans lecture possible, présente dans un rayonnement qui repousse le regard (*Raymond Roussel*, 75).

Now, as Roussel’s posthumous work, *Comment j’ai écrit certains de mes livres*, reveals, it is only in a certain number of books – his mature works – that Roussel’s process is deployed. However, for Foucault, one might discern a reverse image of Roussel’s literary process in these non-procedural works that is almost as efficient in the affect they achieve as the process-created books. Foucault focuses on texts in which a “double writing” relies not on Roussel’s stylistic process and rules but is simply a function of the text, such as *la Doublure* in which the plot, written in verse, turns around the doubling of a theatrical play. In this manner, the doubling effect of the text is already given and is fully visible in opposition to the stylistic process, which is hidden from the reader, but which nonetheless reveals the doubling of language. In these pieces, the visibility of the language – its “flatness” in relation to depth provided by the process-
ruled texts – has nonetheless a strikingly similar effect when compared to those written under the sign of Roussel’s literary process. Foucault quotes as a particularly interesting example an extract from *la Vue:*

*Mon regard pénètre
Dans la boule de verre et le fond transparent
Se précise...
Il représente une plage de sable
Au moment animé, brillant. Le temps est beau. (Raymond Roussel, 144)*

In comparison to the prose and process-ruled texts, this example is extremely simple. Clearly, there is no “stylistic process,” in Foucault’s/Roussel’s sense, commanding this text. The poetic discourse runs along the surface of this description. However, it is the pure visibility of this language that operates a sort of anti-process so that the objects described are cracked open by their own visibility. It is as if the crisp and tight relation between the language and the object revealed a secret link between the words and the thing. The object itself begins to speak. Foucault explains:

*Dans la Vue et les textes qui lui sont apparentés, ce sont les choses qui s’ouvrent par le milieu et font naître de leur plénitude, comme par un surcroît de vie, toute une prolifération du langage ; et les mots d’une rive à l’autre des choses (des mêmes choses) font apparaître un monde quotidien, enfantin souvent, de pensées, de sentiments, de murmures bien connus, tout comme dans le vide qui sépare un mot de lui-même quand il est répété, le procédé jetait la masse de ses machineries jamais vues, mais offertes sans mystère au regard (Raymond Roussel, 146).*

Where Roussel’s stylistic process turned around a murmur of repetitions, echoes, underground relations, etc. which brought the hole of language to light in an “invisible visibility,” this non-procedural style openly reveals the “facticity” of the language. Yet, just as in his process-ruled texts, a strange silence might be felt underneath the text, as if what is given so clearly and fully suddenly closes up, hiding what was for a moment visible, creating yet another version of the “invisible visibility.” Foucault explains:
Dans *Comment j’ai écrit certains de mes livres*, une phrase est d’un poids singulier : « Je fus conduit à prendre une phrase quelconque dont je tirais des images en la disloquant, un peu comme s’il se fût agi d’en extraire des dessins de rébus. » C’est-à-dire que le langage est ruiné pour que ses blocs épars figurent des images-mots, des images porteuses d’un langage qu’elles parient et cachent à la fois, de manière qu’un second discours en naisse. Ce discours forme un tissu où la trame du verbal est déjà croisée avec la chaîne du visible. Ce prodigieux et secret entrecroisement d’où émergent tout langage et tout regard, c’est lui que le procédé cache sous le récit des *Impressions* et *Locus Solus*. C’est lui que révèle *Comment j’ai écrit*. Dans *la Vue*, *le Concert* et *la Source*, il est ce Visible-Parlant fixé par un artifice anonyme sur un morceau de papier avant que personne ait regardé ou parlé (*Raymond Roussel*, 147-148).

Finally, it is in terms of experience that we might at last offer a transition from Roussell and modern thought to the question of power. Foucault reacts violently against any sort of reading that would attempt to denigrate Roussell’s literary work and life, as being part and parcel of that of a madman (or, in the case of Michel Leiris’ biography, as the work of a naïf). Indeed, it is interesting that Roussell’s psychiatrist qualified him as a “pauvre petit malade,” turning Roussel into the subject/object of Foucault’s later studies. For Foucault, Roussel cannot be taken as an individual subjectivity whose madness objectifies him and submits him to the empirical positivity of modern thought. That is, we must turn our relationship with Roussel around and read him not as a literary/psychiatric “object” but in the light of our modern discursive formation. His experience is the experience of our modern discursive formation or what Foucault terms the “inquiétude du langage lui-même” (*Raymond Roussel*, 209). In order to “understand” Roussel (which is not to say to master him and his work), we must perform a reading that places him in relation with the conditions of possibility of his existence. His madness is in fact the condition of our modern reason. In the same manner that Roussel places himself and the reader in relation with this discursive formation, Foucault’s reading is not
a commentary that would reduce Roussel to a simple “case,” but rather an attempt to retrace the geometry of our discursive formation. Foucault thus declares:

Si on détache l’œuvre de Roussel de cet espace (qui est le nôtre) on ne peut plus y reconnaître que les merveilles hasardeuses de l’absurde, ou les floritures baroques d’un langage ésotérique, qui voudrait dire « autre chose ». Si on l’y replace, au contraire, Roussel apparaît tel qu’il s’est définit lui-même : l’inventeur d’un langage qui ne dit que soi, d’un langage du langage, enfermant son propre soleil dans sa défaillance souveraine et centrale (Raymond Roussel, 210).

Now, with this reference to Roussel’s “propre soleil dans sa défaillance souveraine et centrale” we might come to the final point of importance in his work. While we have not explicitly mentioned this relation, it is clear that Roussel’s work is shaped through the “prism” (if we may) of Roussel’s death. That is, the explanation of his literary method (in Comment j’ai écrit certains de mes livres) only appeared after his death – and this was upon Roussel’s express wish. Foucault insists on the “toujours” of the following quote to illustrate how the “experience” of Roussel’s work must be read through this “prism” of death: “Je me suis toujours proposé d’expliquer de quelle façon j’avais écrit certains de mes livres…” (Comment j’ai écrit certains de mes livres, 11). For Foucault, Roussel’s works became “comprehensible” only with the publication of his posthumous works. However, Roussel “directed” this comprehension from that “hole” of life itself which is his death. Like his literary process, the attempt to master his work always escapes Roussel, only gaining shape or sense when it points to that space of life which is impossible to master – death itself. Put otherwise, it is from the space of language itself that Roussel announces his life and his work, as Foucault explains, “...on retrouve dans toute l’œuvre de Roussel...une figure combinée du « secret » et du « posthume » : chaque ligne y est séparée de sa vérité – manifeste pourtant, puisque non-
cachée — par ce lien avec la mort future qui renvoie à la révélation posthume d’un secret déjà visible, déjà en pleine lumière” (Raymond Roussel, 76-77). Roussel’s life, like his work, then traces this “visible invisibility” that is the hole of language, the hole of life or death itself, and our modern discursive formation. Language as it is experienced in Roussel is then something that goes beyond the simply linguistic and touches a creative ontological space — something that Foucault would come to define as “autre chose” in his Archéologie du savoir (117). In order to understand the “reserve” that language holds we need then to examine more closely the relationship language has with the things it seems capable of creating.

B. Archeology and Power

Following Foucault’s reading of Roussel, we have divided the latter’s work into two categories: those that adhere to Roussel’s stylistic process and those that do not. In the first category, Roussel’s speech opens up a certain space or visibility in the text where the machines of Locus Solus resemble the machines of Roussel’s writing. The words of the text then come to point toward a collection of things. In the second category, it is the object or thing itself that points toward language. This relationship of words and things, of what we might also term of visibility and language might be understood under a third angle. For example, Roussel’s final work, Nouvelles impressions d’Afrique, is a very short piece of verse in which the opening stanza opens up onto the following one. This second stanza contains, in turn, the third one but also folds back onto the preceding one (the first stanza) and so on to the end of the work. In order to write such a work, Roussel was forced to effect a sort of double writing in which the verse starts from the exterior
but is then turned around and written from the interior. As Foucault explains, “Le langage est devenu circulaire, enveloppant; il parcourt en hâte de lointains périmètres, mais il est attiré sans cesse par un centre noir jamais donné, perpétuellement fuyant – perspective qui se prolonge à l’infini, au creux des mots, comme la perspective du poème entier s’ouvrait à la fois à l’horizon et au milieu du texte” (Raymond Roussel, 171-172).

As with almost all of Roussel’s work, there is a “visible invisibility” of our discursive formation at work here: this last work is a repetition of his earlier work (itself a product of the stylistic process) which attempts to fill the hole of being or language, but whose interior is nonetheless eroded by this hole. Although this text might then be recuperated into Roussel’s oeuvre, the third angle referred to above may be defined as follows: instead of opening up words to reveal things or the contrary – opening up things to reveal words – this final work is an enormous exercise in repetition and language’s proliferation.

What Roussel’s life and work reveal is that language has a privileged place in our discursive formation because it exercises an infinite determination on the world of things. Foucault notes, “Ici le langage est disposé en cercle à l’intérieur de lui-même, cachant ce qu’il donne à voir, dérobant au regard ce qu’il se proposait de lui offrir, s’écoulant à une vitesse vertigineuse vers une cavité invisible où les choses sont hors d’accès et où il disparaît à leur folle poursuite. Il mesure l’infinie distance du regard à ce qui est vu” (Raymond Roussel, 172).

Now, it is this very distance between what is seen and what is said – the space of language or being – that opens up a space of a different type in Foucault’s thought. As Deleuze notes, what is the relationship between words and things if language operates an infinite determination on things (1986, 74-75)? How is it that within our discursive
formation words and things, while nonetheless clearly belonging to different regimes, come together? This is clearly a question that haunts Foucault’s *L’archéologie du savoir*, which reviews the theoretical questions of his earlier works. Thus, when treating the discursive formation there, we find a description that mirrors the one we have reviewed in terms of the medical clinic and the *sciences humaines*. That is, a discursive formation may not be reduced to the simple combination of words and things, nor to the will of a centered and grounded subject formation, nor to an ideal form of a certain object, and the analysis of such a formation must attempt to avoid any trap of commentary or mastery of the discursive object (*Archéologie du savoir*, p. 93). We have seen, in our above readings, to what extent and how such a definition of the historical object can multiply the perspectives and enlarge the field of historical analysis. However, if we were to bring this level of analysis back down to a very close and precise reading of the historical object, we would be forced to look more closely at our definition of the discursive formation. For Foucault, accentuating once again the privilege he gives to language, the discursive formation is finally a collection of utterances or *énoncés* (*Archéologie du savoir*, 105-106). That is, in the multiplicity of approaches to the discursive formation, what is at stake is the role played by the *énoncé*.

Let us quickly review Foucault’s treatment of language in this perspective. As a way of beginning, we should be careful about the way we define the *énoncé* in relation to language. As Foucault makes clear, the *énoncé* cannot be simply assimilated to language *tout court*. He declares:

> L’*énoncé* n’existe...ni sur le même mode que le langage (bien qu’il soit composé de signes qui ne sont définissables, en leur individualité, qu’à l’intérieur d’un système linguistique naturel ou artificiel), ni sur le même mode que des objets quelconques donnés à la perception (bien qu’il soit
The énoncé might better be conceived in terms of a function, so that we understand it as what comes to regulate whether a collection of signs “makes sense,” and the manner in which these signs function (as written or oral language, etc.) (Archéologie du savoir, 115). A word or phrase that is written or spoken always occurs within an field of enunciation, in which an énoncé performs its referential function. This field involves the various individuals, objects, subjects, fields of differentiation, states of things and relations that are themselves put into relation (or non-relation) by the énoncé. Just as a discursive formation could not imply a defined and centered subject, the énoncé too does not depend on a specific subject. An énoncé implies a subject position, but not a specific author, as Foucault explains:

Si une proposition, une phrase, un ensemble de signes peuvent être dits « énoncés », ce n’est donc pas dans la mesure où il y a eu, un jour, quelqu’un pour les proférer ou pour en déposer quelque part la trace provisoire ; c’est dans la mesure où peut être assignée la position du sujet. Décrire une formulation en tant qu’énoncé ne consiste pas à analyser les rapports entre l’auteur et ce qu’il a dit (ou voulu dire, ou dit sans le vouloir), mais à déterminer quelle est la position que peut et doit occuper tout individu pour en être sujet (Archéologie du savoir, 126).

At both the level of language as a linguistic system and the level of the subject position, an énoncé always exists within an associative field, so that it may never be defined as acting alone and freely within the field of enunciation. A subject position and the various subjects which occupy this position place the énoncé into a multiplicity of relations, as does language in general. Foucault declares, “D’une façon générale, on peut dire qu’une séquence d’éléments linguistiques n’est un énoncé que si elle est immergée dans un champ énonciatif où elle apparaît alors comme élément singulier” (Archéologie du
savoir, 130). In other words, an énoncé must never be considered as containing an atom or kernel of the sense that it gives to a discursive formation. It is simply that function, through and around which the signifying units are put into relation, so that sense might occur. Finally, an énoncé has a material existence. In other words, we can pronounce or write an énoncé. Furthermore, because it has a material existence, an énoncé may then undergo a number of transformations. As Foucault explains, “Au lieu d’être une chose dite une fois pour toutes...l’énoncé, en même temps qu’il surgit dans sa matérialité, apparaît avec un statut, entre dans des réseaux, se place dans des champs d’utilisation, s’offre à des transferts et à des modifications possibles, s’intègre à des opérations et à des stratégies où son identité se maintient ou s’efface” (Archéologie du savoir, 138).

Let us now place this reading of the énoncé in relation with the historical archive of discursive formations. As should be clear, an énoncé is always caught up in a discursive formation (Archéologie du savoir, 152-153). We should stress however that an énoncé again differs from a strictly linguistic reading of language in that the utterance’s regularity or sense is ultimately defined by the discursive formation itself. This makes sense when we consider our above reading of philology and linguistics and the manner in which the rules of grammar and logic form the larger discursive formation of modern thought. It would be impossible to make an énoncé obey a grammar or logic that is outside of its discursive formation. It also follows that an analysis of a discursive formation is also an analysis of its various énoncés and vice versa (Archéologie du savoir, 152). Thus we might now define the “discursive” aspect of a discursive formation in a more precise manner. Foucault declares, “On appellera discours un ensemble d’énoncés en tant qu’ils relèvent de la même formation discursive ; il ne forme pas une
unité rhétorique ou formelle, indéfiniment répétée et dont on pourrait signaler...l'apparition ou l'utilisation dans l'histoire ; il est constitué d'un nombre limité d'énoncés pour lesquels on peut définir un ensemble de conditions d'existence” (Archéologie du savoir, 153).

This short detour through the close relationship existing between the énoncé and the historical archive or formation has, nonetheless, not brought us significantly closer to our original question: how is it that within a discursive formation words and things come together? It is perhaps in the direction of what we might grossly call “context” – in the sense in which an énoncé’s utterance is always already part of the discursive formation in question – that we might finally be able to propose an answer. For within a discursive formation there is nonetheless an element of control or power that is exercised, so that what is said and what is seen is always organized, selected, redistributed, etc. In other words, in the context of the discursive formation – in the co-appearance of words and things – there is a third element that goes unseen but which conditions the discursive formation itself: power. Foucault explains, “...je suppose que dans toute société la production du discours est à la fois contrôlée, sélectionnée, organisée et redistribuée par un certain nombre de procédures qui ont pour rôle d'en conjurer les pouvoirs et les dangers, d'en maîtriser l'événement aléatoire, d'en esquiver la lourde, la redoutable matérialité” (L'ordre du discours, 10-11). As Deleuze would say, it is in these various acts of control which are not limited to a reading of control as simply violent, but in a larger interpretation such as in inciting, inducing, diverting, rendering difficult or easy, enlarging, reducing, rendering more or less probable, etc. that the two regimes of archeological knowledge are brought together (1986, 77). It is as if under the various
relations that we trace between words and things (such as those that we found between Roussel’s literary machines and the order of language) there were another relation – of power – which shapes and guides the former.

Perhaps it is in this manner that we might again insist on the innovation of Foucault’s project. Above, in our introduction to Foucault’s reading of the medical clinic, we noted how important it is to understand the double reading he makes of the subject. That is, in his reading of our modern discursive formation, the place held by the subject as both ground of a system of thought and as the object of this system is necessary for the emergence of any such subject-as-ground in the first place. The subject-as-ground emerges in relation to the subject-as-object and vice versa, so that this paradoxical position of subject as subject/object is necessary if we are to mark the shift from classical to modern thought. As we noted above, this reading of subjectivity breaks with an attempt to read an objectification of subjectivity as negative, giving both an expanded and pessimistic reading of modern subjectivity – expanded because subjectivity might be read in a much larger sense and pessimistic because this larger sense of subjectivity includes, for a large part, a reading in which the subject is defined by its objectivity. Now, as our definition of the discursive formation should make clear, this double deployment of subjectivity is the condition for the emergence of such modern discourses as biology, linguistics, anthropology, etc. Furthermore, it is in the deployment of such discourses that the truth of these discourses and the subjectivity on which they are based is revealed. It is here, in this truth of the modern discourse, that we might be able to return to our reading of power. Much like the paradoxical relationship between the modern discursive formation’s deployment of subjectivity and its various discourses, we
might read power as conditioning what is seen and heard within a discursive formation and revealing itself through these words and things as power itself. While it is dangerous to invoke too close a relation, we might say that power is to the discursive formation itself (of words and things) what the subject is to the discursive formation's very own objects.

As is often the case when dealing with the conceptual apparatus of Foucault’s work, this remains extremely complicated. Let us quickly examine the limits Foucault places on discourse in terms of power to better understand this relationship between discursive formations and power. As a way of controlling discursive formation, we might first consider how discourse is forbidden. That is, how is it that one might determine whether something might or might not be said? To do so we might exercise a control from the outside of a specific discourse, determining what kind of object might be discussed, in what situation such an object might be discussed, and who might discuss such an object (L’ordre du discours, 11). To return to our example of the medical clinic, it is clear that a “grid” of power might be traced within the formation of a clinic. Perhaps one of the clearest examples of power’s visibility within this context is with the French Revolution and the re-ordering of the medical universities that followed in its wake, where the theoretical knowledge of the clinic was distributed in a field of power (Naissance de la clinique, 37-86). Another manner of controlling discourse from the outside might be found in what Foucault defines as a “division and rejection” (L’ordre du discours, 12). That is, taking the mad of the Middle Ages as an example, Foucault explains how the discourse of the mad was considered, on the one hand, as null and void and, on the other hand, as one which was gifted with, “...d’étranges pouvoirs, celui de
dire la vérité cachée, celui de prononcer l’avenir, celui de voir en toute naïveté ce que la sagesse des autres ne peut pas percevoir” (L’ordre du discours, 13). This discourse has the power to draw a line through what was believed and what was not believed, dividing the truth of a discourse. However, it was also a discourse which remained ultimately invisible within the larger historical formation of the Middle Ages.

In a related manner, a larger division or line of rejection runs through all discursive formations, determining whether they are true or false. Foucault characterizes this division as similar to the one that separated the Greek sophists from Platonic thought: “...un siècle plus tard [après les poètes grecs] la vérité la plus haute ne résidait plus déjà dans ce qu’était le discours ou dans ce qu’il faisait, elle résidait en ce qu’il disait : un jour est venu où la vérité s’est déplacée de l’acte ritualisé, efficace, et juste, d’énonciation, vers l’énoncé lui-même : vers son sens, sa forme, son objet, son rapport à sa référence” (L’ordre du discours, 17). This form of “control” should be familiar to us as we have underlined how a discursive formation not only forms or allows a certain archeological archive to appear – that is, it is the condition of possibility of such an archive – but it is also what makes this archive appear. It is this oddly “redundant” aspect of Foucault’s project that endows it with much the same “invisible visibility” that we have traced in his analysis of Roussel’s texts. That is, by tracing the appearance of a discursive formation, such as that of the medical clinic, Foucault appears to simply draw our attention to the obvious: a certain medical gaze and disposition appears that finds its result in the object of the medical clinic. But it is in the array of this gaze and its multiple positions and institutions that we find a deployment of power (such as in the various principles of exclusion enumerated directly above) so that what emerges out of the discursive
formation is *necessarily* true. The discursive formation is what makes a historical object possible and necessary. And what is necessary is necessarily true. This line, which is shared by the possible and necessary nature of the discursive formation, is what Foucault defines as a "will to truth:"

...[cette volonté de vérité] est à la fois renforcée et reconduite par toute une épaisseur de pratiques comme la pédagogie... comme le système des livres, de l'édition, des bibliothèques... Mais elle est reconduite aussi, plus profondément sans doute par la manière dont le savoir est mis en œuvre dans une société, dont il est valorisé, distribué, réparti et en quelque sorte attribué (*L'ordre du discours*, 19-20).

As should be obvious from our above readings of discursive formations, this aspect of power might then be characterized by its institutional deployment.

There is another aspect of power and the discursive formation that we might qualify as being exercised not from outside the formation but from within it. These means of interior control will again be familiar when placed within the context of our earlier analyses of the discursive formation, for their deployment relies very closely on the truth function of power outlined above. However, what marks these strategies of control from those noted immediately above is their ambiguous nature. That is, when analyzing the historical archive in terms of its ability to change and progress, we tend to focus on a more positive and less pessimistic reading of discursive formations and their relation to power. Indeed, we may even discount the deployment of power in such situations, as compared to the more obvious categories of control that we have just noted. For Foucault, such a reading is hazardous. Much like his reading of the subject, he insists on the exclusionary nature of such discursive practices. Thus, we might take the example of the textual commentary, which promises a certain novelty or insight on an older question of the historical archive. The commentary re-situates the text and gives us a
new understanding of the problems at hand. Yet it is in this deployment of commentary, of the new repeating the old, that we find power controlling the discourse. What occurs is a curious confirmation of what was already known. Let us consider this as Foucault does: on the one hand, a commentary ceaselessly renews the text or archive in question, ceaselessly re-actualizing and re-opening the text (L'ordre du discours, 26-27). On the other hand, this movement also reveals a limitation in the text, for if the text is ceaselessly re-activated, this implies an endless repetition of something that nonetheless remains unsaid in the text, and will continue to remain unsaid in spite of the commentary's desire to formally "close" the text (L'ordre du discours, 27-28). In other words, within the commentary, we find the same strategy of identity and repetition at work that we noted earlier as being part and parcel of the modern discursive formation. Foucault explains: "Le commentaire conjure le hasard du discours en lui faisant la part: il permet bien de dire autre chose que le texte même, mais à condition que ce soit ce texte même qui soit dit et en quelque sorte accompli...Le nouveau n'est pas dans ce qui est dit, mais dans l'événement de son retour" (L'ordre du discours, 27-28). Foucault does not deny that something new and something that might even be considered true is uncovered in the commentary, but this very gesture is already "policed" from within its own movement. A commentary supposes a re-discovery of a certain truth whose discourse is the very condition of possibility of the truth that is then necessarily produced.\(^5\)

In measured contrast to the commentary and its related function of the author, we might consider the discourses of disciplines. A discipline certainly polices a discourse from within, and again, what one seeks in such discourses is something new, but in contrast to a commentary, that which is sought is absolutely new and not based on a
principle of identity and repetition. As Foucault notes, “Pour qu’il y ait discipline, il faut donc qu’il y ait possibilité de formuler, et de formuler indéfiniment, des propositions nouvelles” (L’ordre du discours, 32). It is perhaps in this context that we might fully understand the close relationship between truth in discourse and its deployment within the historical archive. For as we have underlined in our study of the discursive formation, a discipline may be defined in a number of ways, and, in a manner, might even be considered as the discursive formation itself, such as we have analyzed it above in terms of linguistics, biology, medicine, etc. As Foucault notes, “…une discipline se définit par un domaine d’objets, un ensemble de méthodes, un corpus de propositions considérées comme vraies, un jeu de règles et de définitions, de techniques et d’instruments…” (L’ordre du discours, 32). Deployed in such a manner, a discipline appears to take in all that might be said to be true about a certain object, such as medicine. Yet, as in our example of medicine from above, there is always something excluded from disciplines, so that much like the commentary, it is around this exclusion (which is not an identity, thus distinguishing the movement from that of the commentary) that the discipline is capable of producing a “new” truth or discourse. What marks the difference between the discursive regime of the commentary-type from that of disciplines is the capability the latter has to continually adapt its methods and internal rules to allow for new readings of truth to emerge from this excluded space. Foucault explains, “Il se peut toujours qu’on dise le vrai dans l’espace d’une extériorité sauvage ; mais on n’est dans le vrai qu’en obéissant aux règles d’une « police » discursive qu’on doit réactiver en chacun de ses discours” (L’ordre du discours, 37).
One final aspect to these strategies of exclusion—although often difficult to separate from the other strategies of both interior and exterior controls on discourse—concerns access to a position of authority within a discourse. Foucault explains this aspect as follows: "...toutes les régions du discours ne sont pas également ouvertes et pénétrables; certaines sont hautement défendues (différenciées et différenciantes) tandis que d'autres paraissent presque ouvertes à tous les vents et mises sans restriction préalable à la disposition de chaque sujet parlant" (L'ordre du discours, 39). In other words, the disciplines and discursive practices, such as that of the commentary or the author, are controlled by what we might term "discursive rituals" through which we might recognize a member of the community who is allowed to hold a particular discourse. Thus, a doctor's medical opinion is generally more trusted than that of a grocer because of her education and experience within the domain of medicine. This type of discursive control corresponds to the first portion of Foucault's above definition and hardly comes as a surprise. Indeed, such a control is closely tied to the internal control over discourses that disciplines and institutions operate. However, there are other disciplines that we might qualify as being more "open," such as politics, religion, philosophy, etc. which also operate a control less easily located but just as closely regulated by "ritual." Certain discourses are thus excluded as being "heretical" to the discipline and one might qualify this type of control as one in which the discourse exercises a control over the speaking subject (L'ordre du discours, 44-45). In addition, it is often the group of speaking subjects within the discipline and not the discipline itself in its institutional deployment which exercises another type of control. Instead of the discourse itself exercising the control it is the subjects of the discourse that come to
exercise a control from within the discourse. This point is subtle and difficult to grasp, as Foucault explains:

La doctrine lie les individus à certains types d’énonciation et leur interdit par conséquent tous les autres ; mais elle se sert, en retour, de certains types d’énonciation pour lier des individus entre eux, et les différencier par là même de tous les autres. La doctrine effectue un double assujettissement : des sujets parlants aux discours, et des discours au groupe, pour le moins virtuel, des individus parlants (L’ordre du discours, 45).

What we find in this reading of the “policing” of the subject position is yet another formulation of Foucault’s double position regarding the subject and the discursive formation. We might again insist on what we see as the force of Foucault’s argument: the subject, whether in a position of mastery or “subjectivity” or in a position of domination or “objectivity,” is caught up in a larger formation, that of the discursive formation, so that there is no “outside” or free position from which to make an analysis that would “liberate” it. Just as the subject polices its own discourses, forbidding a grocer from analyzing a tumor, so does the discourse police the subject, binding her to the limits of her own discursive formation. We again reiterate the Rousselian aspect of this reading of discursive power, for though our readings of discursive formations inevitably reveal a deployment of power, it is in analyzing the discursive deployment of these formations that we come to finally see or read power’s “invisible visibility.” We evoke Roussel because our above outline of the relation between power and the discursive formation may leave us with a somewhat negative and restrictive reading of power. We should like then to again insist on a Deleuzian-inspired reading of Nietzsche to counter such a reading. Power in this context should be read as a relation of force, and not one of simple violence. Power is what brings the numerous factors and aspects of
discursive formations into relation with one another, and it is worth recalling that it is only within the relation between each of these heterogeneous aspects that a discursive formation emerges. In other words, power as a relation of forces should not be read as being exclusively exclusionary but rather (and also) as productive. The double reading we have offered of the subject is then reinforced with a double reading of power (within which a reading of the subject must naturally always take place). It is in this context that we may then understand Foucault’s following admonition:

Il faut...admettre que le pouvoir produit du savoir (et pas simplement en le favorisant parce qu’il le sert ou en l’appliquant parce qu’il est utile) ; que le pouvoir et le savoir s’impliquent directement l’un l’autre ; qu’il n’y a pas de relation de pouvoir sans constitution corrélative d’un champ de savoir, ni de savoir qui ne suppose et ne constitue en même temps des relations de pouvoir. Ces rapports de « pouvoir-savoir » ne sont donc pas à analyser à partir d’un sujet de connaissance qui serait libre ou non par rapport au système du pouvoir ; mais il faut considérer au contraire que le sujet qui connaît, les objets à connaître et les modalités de connaissance sont autant d’effets de ces implications fondamentales du pouvoir-savoir et de leurs transformations historiques. En bref, ce n’est pas l’activité du sujet de connaissance qui produirait un savoir, utile ou rétif au pouvoir, mais le pouvoir-savoir, les processus et les luttes qui le traversent et dont il est constitué, qui déterminent les formes et les domaines possibles de la connaissance (Surveiller et punir, 36).

This long declaration is from Foucault’s study of the discursive formation of the prison, during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Because of its exemplary alignment of power and knowledge, let us briefly turn to it to better understand the theoretical positions we have attempted to outline above.

When considering the modern prison, Foucault focuses particularly closely on Jeremy Bentham’s concept of the panopticon. Indeed, it is with the appearance of this historical object that we might be able to trace a number of the elements that come together between power and a historical formation. The panopticon is a roughly circular
structure in the center of which a central tower is placed and surrounded by several stories of cells. These cells are then lit from the exterior in such a manner that one might observe a cell's prisoners from the tower at any moment and without being seen. In comparison with the prisons of only fifty to sixty years before its appearance, the panopticon is a remarkably "light" structure. The heavy walls, gates, and chains of an earlier age of discipline give way to the "light" structure of light itself: visibility. It is this visibility that serves to exercise a control over the prisoner, for she is always - at least theoretically - visible to her captors. This power might then fall into the category of what we defined above as an exterior exercise of power. The prisoner-subject's actions are controlled from the exterior. At the same time, however, the prison-object is able to exert a form of interior control on the prisoner, based on the invisibility of the guard or warden in the watchtower. The prisoner disciplines herself based on the possibility that she is being watched, even if this is not the case. The prisoner in this instance controls her own actions, certainly basing them on the limits set by the exterior limits of the penal system, but it is, nonetheless, the prisoner and not these external instances which exercise these controls. While this might seem to illustrate the split and intersection of exterior and interior limits on discourse, we might push this example further. As noted above, it is in the deployment of discursive formation of the prison that the panopticon emerges, and it is within this deployment that the subject as both a subject and object of disciplinary power and knowledge emerges as well. This is what Foucault means when discussing the constitution of a subject within a power-knowledge field. A discursive formation is both the deployment of a field of power and a field of knowledge such that a number of subjects and objects might emerge from it. The panopticon is an excellent illustration of
the role that power plays in such a deployment because it is the explicit appearance of a
discursive formation of power in which a number of subject and object positions might
emerge. It is also within this field that the subject and the object then come to exercise
the limits on discourse such as those that we have above defined in terms of exterior or
interior limits. Foucault explains the multiplicity of this field of power-knowledge in
terms of subject positions that exercise an exterior control on the prisoner-object:

Il y a une machinerie qui assure la dissymétrie, le déséquilibre, la différence. Peu importe, par conséquent, qui exerce le pouvoir. Un individu quelconque, presque pris au hasard peut faire fonctionner la machine...Tout comme est indifférent le motif qui l’anime...Le Panoptique est une machine merveilleuse qui, à partir des désirs les plus différents, fabrique des effets homogènes de pouvoir... (Surveiller et punir, 236).

He also explains this multiplicity in terms of subject positions that exercise an interior
control on the prisoner-subject/object:

Un assujettissement réel naît d’une relation fictive...Celui qui est soumis à
un champ de visibilité, et qui le sait, reprend à son compte les contraintes
du pouvoir ; il les fait jouer spontanément sur lui-même ; il inscrit en soi le
rapport de pouvoir dans lequel il joue simultanément les deux rôles ; il
devient le principe de son propre assujettissement. Du fait même le
pouvoir externe, lui, peut s’alléger de ses pesanteurs physiques ; il tend à
l’incorporel ; et plus il se rapproche de cette limite, plus ces effets sont
constants, profonds, acquis une fois pour toutes, incessamment
reconduits : perpétuelle victoire qui évite tout affrontement physique et qui
est toujours jouée d’avance (Surveiller et punir, 236).

Now, we have used the cleavage between interior and exterior applications of
power within the panopticon as well as the multiplicity of subject positions to be found in
such a discursive formation to illustrate our reading of power and knowledge. When
introducing this example, we noted how the panopticon served as an example within the
larger discursive formation of the prison and penal discipline. If we are to trace the
relationship between power and knowledge within the discursive formation, we should
extend our analysis of this example to the larger discursive formation. Indeed, as we have seen in our other examples of the discursive formation, the appearance of a historical object or archive may never be reduced to a single and easily definable subject, object, or discourse. The prison and panopticon emerge out of a multiplicity of factors which come into relation and non-relation with each other. Thus, for example, the panopticon, as an object-form of the prison, might be said to emerge from a desire (among others): 1) to render discipline more efficient and less “heavy;” 2) to make observation and evaluation in a number of disciplines and fields of labor more efficient; 3) and to experiment (Surveiller et punir, 236-243). However, these “desires of surveillance” are part of a larger group of tendencies in the nineteenth century concerning the prison and discipline which might be said to seek a number of things: 1) to neutralize the danger of discipline by focusing not so much on punishment but on the desire to render those under surveillance more productive (Surveiller et punir, 244-246); 2) to extend the surveillance and discipline beyond the prisoner-object to her surrounding environment and its own subjects/objects (Surveiller et punir, 246-248); 3) and, as a corollary to the preceding desire, to extend disciplinary agency to the state itself in the form of the police and various other administrative arms (Surveiller et punir, 248-253). These three large tendencies are, without a doubt, part of the larger socio-economic movements of the nineteenth century bringing together a noticeable growth in population and the growth and expansion of European capitalism. Foucault thus explains:

Au vieux principe « prélèvement-violence » qui régissait l’économie du pouvoir, les disciplines substituent le principe « douceur-production-profit ». Elles sont à prendre comme des techniques qui permettent d’ajuster, selon ce principe, la multiplicité des hommes et la multiplication des appareils de production (et par là il faut entendre non seulement « production » proprement dite, mais la production de savoir et d’aptitudes
à l’école, la production de santé dans les hôpitaux, la production de force destructrice avec l’armée) (Surveiller et punir, 255).

Although we have traced the appearance of the panopticon and its relationship between power and knowledge to a larger web of relations, it is important to note once again (as we have in the context of the various other discursive formations already discussed) that one may in no manner reduce the panopticon’s appearance to these factors. The panopticon and the prison in general emerges from and is constituted from this multiplicity of categories and tendencies but is not the target or desired result of these categories and tendencies. This is not to say, in contrast, that the panopticon and the prison in a more general sense are completely independent of these terms. Foucault declares: “La modalité panoptique du pouvoir – au niveau élémentaire, technique, humblement physique où elle se situe – n’est pas sous la dépendance immédiate ni dans le prolongement direct des grandes structures juridico-politiques d’une société ; elle n’est pourtant pas absolument indépendante” (Surveiller et punir, 258). The panopticon is, in other words, an example of what is both possible and necessary in a discursive formation – in other words, the panopticon is what we have attempted to analyze in the theoretical portion of Foucault’s argument concerning the relationship between discursive formations’ elements.

Indeed, it is at this point between possibility and necessity that our example of the panopticon is again illustrative. Above, when discussing discipline as an example of an external exercise of power, we mentioned how a discipline differs from the more textual-related power deployment of the commentary and the author. That is, while both the commentary and a discipline continually re-work and re-open a discursive formation, the discipline is set apart from the commentary by its ability to continually adapt and evolve.
We recall that a discipline is defined by Foucault as being capable of continually formulating new discursive propositions. It is in the sense of a productive reading of power that we first cited the example of the panopticon, for the technology of the panopticon is remarkably adaptable to not only the discipline of the penitentiary and law but also to the disciplines of education, the military, medicine, labor, etc..

The socio-economic factors and tendencies we have noted above are not only examples of the heterogeneous elements and discourses of society that come together to form a discursive formation, they are also examples of the manner in which the technology of a particular discipline – the prison – is able to reformulate itself and adapt itself to other disciplines. The panopticon emerges from the multiplicity of elements and tendencies of nineteenth century France to enforce a norm on the object-prisoner. Indeed, we might then read the extension of this discourse of the norm to disciplines outside of a strictly penal environment as an example of what Foucault defines as the productive aspect of power. However, such a reading remains limited, for it is just this heterogeneous mixture of disciplines which allows a discursive formation to emerge. It appears that what Foucault terms a productive reading of power might be located in the space between a discipline’s project or goal and what it actually produces. As an example, Foucault notes that with the advent of the modern prison and a mode of punishment/control that is based on the panopticon, the inverse of what one would expect of a hyper-policed society occurs: crime continues to exist (Surveiller et punir, 308-317). Instead of reforming the criminal and society, the prison appears to be a failure if one considers the proliferation of crime in the nineteenth century. Yet is it not the hyper-sensitivity toward surveillance and the normalization of the criminal that produces this
“object?” Foucault explains: “Au constat que la prison échoue à réduire les crimes il faut peut-être substituer l’hypothèse que la prison a fort bien réussi à produire la délinquance, type spécifié, forme politiquement ou économiquement moins dangereuse – à la limite utilisable – d’illégalisme ; à produire les délinquants, milieu apparemment marginalisé mais centralement contrôlé ; à produire le délinquant comme sujet pathologisé (Surveiller et punir, 323). Between the project of a normalized prisoner and the disciplinary techniques deployed to reach such a project, one makes the surprising discovery of the delinquent. In other words, the disciplinary technique produces a new object that is not originally part of its project.7

A final word should be said about our example of the panopticon. It should be clear at this point that the panopticon is not only part of the historical archive or the larger discursive formation of the prison but also what we might define as corollary to Foucault’s reading of our present and modern discursive formation. As an exercise of power, the panopticon, as demonstrated by the double form of subjectivity it constitutes of the observer and the observed, is the perfect disciplinary tool for the knowledge of modernity. Foucault explains:

Il ne s’agit pas de dire que de la prison sont sorties les sciences humaines. Mais si elles ont pu se former et produire dans l’épistémé tous les effets de bouleversement qu’on connaît, c’est qu’elles ont été portées par une modalité spécifique et nouvelle de pouvoir : une certaine politique du corps, une certaine manière de rendre docile et utile l’accumulation des hommes. Celle-ci exigeait l’implication de relations définies de savoir dans le rapport de pouvoir ; elle appelait une technique pour entrecroiser l’assujettissement et l’objectivation ; elle comportait des procédures nouvelles d’individualisations. Le réseau carcéral constitue une des armatures de ce pouvoir-savoir qui a rendu historiquement possibles les sciences humaines. L’homme connaissable (âme, individualité, conscience, conduite, peu importe ici) est l’effet-objet de cet investissement analytique, de cette domination-observation (Surveiller et punir, 356-357).
Finally, it is in this larger connection between the arrays of modern knowledge and the deployment of power that we might return to our earlier questions concerning the relationship between words and things, the visual or observable and the say-able or the discursive, in a discursive formation. As our discussion of the panoptical prison and its various other manifestations implies, the deployment of power in the form of the panopticon always takes place along a series of points. These points occur in a variety of places but are most often associated with the various aspects or strategies of power’s deployment within a discursive formation: interior controls on the speaking subject, the object discussed, the place of such a discussion, exterior controls such as disciplines and disciplinary limits, etc. Each of these instances might be defined as a point within the discursive formation where power is deployed. Perhaps another manner of understanding the relationship between power and knowledge is along the line we might draw through the points of a discursive formation, as if an invisible diagram were being traced along a number of points and inside of which we might then find the various elements of a discursive formation. To borrow Deleuze’s term, the discursive formation of knowledge is “receptive” to the force of power so that there is no exteriority between power and knowledge. If sexuality or the clinic form a domain of knowledge, such historical objects are only formed from the diagram or relations of power which allow such objects to take shape. However, inversely, it is because such domains of knowledge exist that the techniques or disciplines of power might be deployed within them. This is not to say that power and knowledge are of the same regime. Indeed, as Foucault notes, “Entre techniques de savoir et stratégies de pouvoir, nulle extériorité, même si elles ont leur rôle spécifique et qu’elles s’articulent l’une sur l’autre, à partir de leur différence" (Volonté
*de savoir*, 130, emphasis added). The point here remains that the domain of knowledge of
the discursive formation, is inflected or affected by the deployment of power’s force. It
is this inflection or regularity of power that then bends the énoncé of the discursive
formation back onto the latter’s visual aspect. Power – the invisible line of the diagram,
not unlike the “invisible visibility” of Roussel’s literary machines, pointing to the outside
of death – might be termed a force from the outside which brings words and things into
relationship with each other.

**C. Power and Subjectivity**

Perhaps it is at this point of unity between words and things that we may
reconsider the question with which we opened the above section. If words and things do
indeed function together, our long readings of various discursive formations reveals a
certain non-relation as well – and our reading of Roussel is certainly proof enough of this.
It seems that we must temper our search for a point or place of unity between the various
poles of the discursive formation, for power’s force, which brings words and things
together, also re-orient or reformulates their conjunction. There is, again, a line of
“invisible visibility” that runs along the line which we draw between words and things, so
that what we might term the two exteriorities of the discursive formation, are constantly
doubled by another line. This doubling is of course effected by power, what Foucault, in
discussing the function of the énoncé, describes as “*autre chose*” (*Archéologie du savoir*,
117). As noted above, the regimes of knowledge and power, while not exterior to each
other, are nonetheless articulated along their difference, and it is this difference of power,
this “*autre chose*” of power which constantly reformulates the distribution of words and
things within a historical archive. The function, or effective force of power is constantly actualizing and re-actualizing the historical archive so that each point along a series in a discursive formation is at once evidence of power's deployment (the conjunction of words and things) and a point at which a mutation might emerge. In other words, power brings words and things both together and apart. Each point of power's distribution within a discursive formation is potentially a point of resistance or mutation (Volonté de savoir, 126-127). To return to our example of the delinquent, the latter may thus perhaps better be read in terms of the Rousselian writing machine: the panoptical prison, as a discursive machine constructs a text in which the words suddenly permit us to see something entirely unexpected in the object of the delinquent. Power's deployment might then be termed both an event and a non-event, for it is the place where power affects the énoncé but it also the place where power suddenly changes the "rules" of the discursive equation. Foucault notes, "Les relations pouvoir-savoir ne sont pas des formes données de répartition, ce sont des « matrice de transformations »" (Volonté de savoir, 131).

This double-reading of power again underlines what we noted earlier as power's non-exteriority with knowledge which is nonetheless based on the difference between the these two regimes. This definition deserves further explanation. We have been careful to use the word "force" in relation to our discussion of power. Indeed, we recall that in introducing the notion of power, we insisted upon a Deleuzian and Nietzschean-inspired reading which is not simply one of violence but of "inciting, inducing, diverting, rendering difficult or easy, enlarging, reducing, rendering more or less probable, etc." (1986, 77). Power's relationship with knowledge is then one of force, and it is important
to draw a distinction between the exteriority of forms to be found in power-knowledge (words and things, or speaking and seeing) and the exteriority of forces (the difference, noted above, between power and knowledge). It is in the distinction between form and force that we might understand power’s occurrence as both an event and a non-event. Power is that “autre chose” which gives an énoncé its function, but it is also that “autre chose” which operates not in terms of an exteriority but in terms of an outside. The relation which is established between the two exterior forms of knowledge occurs when a force from the outside intervenes, digging a “hole” into the space of knowledge. This event, which cannot be described, is then the non-event of power-knowledge, for it escapes discursive representation. And it is perhaps in terms of thought – of the lack of representative language and of a grounding interior or subject – that we might understand this non-relation, as Foucault explains:

Cette pensée qui se tient hors de toute subjectivité pour en faire surgir comme de l’extérieur les limites, en énoncer la fin, en faire scintiller la dispersion et n’en recueillir que l’invincible absence, et qui en même temps se tient au seuil de toute positivité, non pas tant pour en saisir le fondement ou la justification, mais pour retrouver l’espace où elle se déploie, le vide qui lui sert de lieu, la distance dans laquelle elle se constitue et où s’esquivent dès qu’on y porte le regard ses certitudes immédiates, – cette pensée, par rapport à l'intériorité de notre réflexion philosophique et par rapport à la positivité de notre savoir, constitue ce qu’on pourrait appeler d’un mot « la pensée du dehors » (La pensée du dehors, 16).

This non-event or non-space of the outside allows us to better grasp the “death of man” in the context of the modern discursive formation. It is not so much the historical archive, its various components, and forms that transform themselves over history but rather the composing forces of these discursive formations. “Man” emerges as the both the object and subject of our modern discursive formation not so much because he
discovers his finitude in the various disciplines of the *sciences humaines*, but, rather, because these “forces of finitude” inflect or impose themselves on the historical archive from the outside. It is only after the force of the outside has constituted an interiority that “man” reappropriates the positivity of the sciences and is then able to announce “man’s” proper death. Indeed, the forces of finitude are not even human but only become so after their reappropriation. Foucault explains:

…l'homme n'est pas lui-même historique : le temps lui venant d'ailleurs que de lui-même, il ne se constitue comme sujet d'Histoire que par la superposition de l'histoire des êtres, de l'histoire des choses, de l'histoire des mots. Il est soumis à leurs purs événements. Mais aussitôt ce rapport de simple passivité se renverse : car ce qui parle dans le langage, ce qui travaille et consomme dans l'économie, ce qui vit dans la vie humaine, c'est l'homme lui-même ; et à ce titre, il a droit lui aussi à un devenir tout aussi positif que celui des êtres et des choses, non moins autonome... (*Les mots et les choses*, 381).

The death of “man” must be understood in the sense of this violent eruption into the discursive formation. It is the sudden violence or eruption of this thought that then constitutes the changes that we have marked above between the classical era and the beginning of our modern period. As Foucault declares, when speaking of the emergence of the modern paradigm of the *sciences humaines*, “[Cette ouverture] est un événement radical qui se répartit sur toute la surface visible du savoir et dont on peut suivre pas à pas les signes, les secousses, les effets. Seule la pensée se ressaisissant elle-même à la racine de son histoire pourrait fonder, sans aucun doute, ce qu’a été en elle-même la vérité solitaire de cet événement” (*Les mots et les choses*, 229-230).8

Now, if we place our reading of power and the discursive formation under the sign of the event/non-event of the outside, we may re-evaluate the place of the subject. As our above reading indicates, the subject must then not be thought of as a ground or
foundation for a discursive formation but rather as a fold within the formation: the force of power or the thought of the outside inflects a fold in the knowledge of a historical archive. As a point within the discursive formation where power interacts with knowledge we might then understand the subject in two manners: 1) as a point where knowledge and power operate a will to truth, such that we reproduce the modern discursive formation; or 2) as a point where power's strategy opens up new dispositions of power and knowledge. This second reading corresponds to what we have defined as the productive aspect of power. However, when placed within the context of the discursive formation, we have treated this aspect as "productive" in the sense of the production of new forms of knowledge (words and things). When considered under the aspect of the subject, an individual who conceives of herself and recognizes herself as a subject within a discursive formation (which does not necessarily mean that the individual consider herself a subject in terms of the ground or foundation of thought – we have examined how this particular conception of the subject is tied to the modern discursive formation) must nonetheless constitute and develop a strategy in relation to the deployment of power and knowledge. That is, instead of considering the historical archive and its objects or disciplines, we turn to consider the individual herself and her constitution as a subject within the historical archive. Foucault explains how this approach differs from the study of "man" within the historical archive of the sciences humaines and the prison when announcing his study of sexual desire:

Après l'étude des jeux de vérité les uns par rapport aux autres – sur l'exemple d'un certain nombre de sciences empiriques au XVIIème et XVIIIème siècle – puis celle des jeux de vérité par rapport aux relations de pouvoir, sur l'exemple des pratiques punitives, un autre travail semblait s'imposer : étudier les jeux de vérité dans le rapport de soi à soi et la constitution de soi-même comme sujet, en prenant pour domaine de
référence et champ d’investigation ce qu’on pourrait appeler l’« histoire de l’homme de désir »... Une histoire qui ne serait pas celle de ce qu’il peut y avoir de vrai dans les connaissances ; mais une analyse des « jeux de vérité », des jeux du vrai et du faux à travers lesquels l’être se constitue historiquement comme expérience, c’est-à-dire comme pouvant et devant être pensé” (L’usage des plaisirs, 12-13).

As this quotation should make amply clear, the consideration of the subject in Foucault’s thought is in no way a “return” of the subject but the continuation of a project that extends the length of his work. In a certain manner, we have already approached the experience of the subject through the experience of Roussel and his writing machines:

Toute l’œuvre de Roussel, jusqu’aux Nouvelles impressions pivote autour d’une expérience singulière (je veux dire qu’il faut mettre au singulier) : le lien du langage avec cet espace inexistant qui, en dessous de la surface des choses, sépare l’intérieur de leur face visible et la périphérie de leur noyau invisible. C’est là, entre ce qu’il y a de caché dans le manifeste et de lumineux dans l’inaccessible que se noue la tâche de son langage (Raymond Roussel, 155).

The question at hand is then how does the thought of the outside form an interior, a subject, in which a thought or knowledge of the truth is possible?

In attempting to answer this question, Foucault turns away from a study of modern attitudes toward sexuality and pleasure and their discursive deployment of knowledge/power in the form of what is permitted and what is forbidden. For Foucault, Ancient Greece and the Greco-Roman civilization offer an example of a knowledge that breaks away from the discursive formation of that epoch and which is focused first on what Foucault terms “pratiques de soi” and only secondly on what is considered morally correct or incorrect (L’usage des plaisirs, 43). In order to understand this example, Foucault recalls that our modern understanding of sexuality and sexual pleasure is rooted in an interior relation with oneself which involve a number of techniques such as attention to one’s attitudes and acts, a de-coding of these acts in terms of a grid of
knowledge, and a subsequent battle against certain tendencies in the view of renouncing various acts or attitudes (*L’usage des plaisirs*, 85). This disposition of interior observation and discipline is, "...une condition épistémologique pour que l'individu se reconnaisses dans sa singularité de sujet désirant et pour qu'il puisse se purifier du désir ainsi mis au jour" (*L’usage des plaisirs*, 120). In opposition to this interior relation, Foucault reads the Classical Greek notion of *enkrateia* as forming an exterior relation in which a practice or domination of oneself in the face of excess is required. This domination or mastery of the self implies several factors: 1) an attitude or relation in which force or power is deployed (*L’usage des plaisirs*, 88-90); 2) this force or power is necessarily deployed in a relation on and with oneself (*L’usage des plaisirs*, 91-93), 3) in which a relationship of domination or heteronomy results (*L’usage des plaisirs*, 93-95). These broad traits are actualized in classical Greece under a system of exercises (the Socratic notion of *aksesis*), which we might read as the visibility and speech forms of a specifically Greek discursive formation.

We must, however, be careful in reading *enkrateia* as forming a discursive formation (with the complication of power and knowledge) in the modern sense. We noted above how, for Foucault, the *pratiques de soi* differ from a larger and more rigid deployment of power and knowledge in the form of a discursive formation. *Aksesis* is not to be understood as corpus of practices but rather as a guideline for individual practice or experience. In this manner, the individual virtue that is cultivated through the practices of *aksesis* allow one to accede to the larger deployment of power and knowledge in the form of the Greek city. Foucault explains:

…cette « ascétique » n’est pas organisée ni réfléchie comme un corpus de pratiques singulières qui constituerait une sorte d’art spécifique de l’âme,
with its techniques, its procedures, its recipes. Of one part, it is not distinct from the practice of virtue itself; it is the repetition anticipatric. Of another part, she serves the same exercises as those who form the citizen: the master of self and the others form at the same time (L'usage des plaisirs, 104).

This reading of akses is important for it reveals a "doubling" of the practices of the self: on the one hand, these practices anticipate virtue in its form of self-mastery and in its form of mastery of others, and on the other hand akses is an individual and singular practice which is separate from any larger code in the form of a discursive formation and its deployments of power and knowledge. The inflection of power into and unto oneself might then be read as a fold of subjectivity where the force of power forms an interiority which only afterwards becomes an exterior subject within a discursive formation. The relationship that the Greek subject forms with truth is not an epistemological one but rather an ontological one:

On le voit : que ce soit sous la forme d'une structure hiérarchique de l'être humain, sous la forme d'une pratique de prudence ou d'une reconnaissance par l'âme de son être propre, le rapport de vrai constitue un élément essentiel de la tempérance. Il est nécessaire pour l'usage mesuré des plaisirs, nécessaire pour la domination de leur violence...Il est constitutif du mode d'être du sujet tempérant ; il n'équivaut pas une obligation pour le sujet de dire vrai sur lui-même ; il n'ouvre jamais l'âme comme un domaine de connaissance possible où les traces difficilement perceptibles du désir devraient être lues et interprétées. Le rapport à la vérité est une condition structurale, instrumentale et ontologique de l'instauration de l'individu comme sujet tempérant et menant une vie de tempérance... (L'usage des plaisirs, 120).9

Reading the classical Greek discursive formation in this manner is in no way a call for a return to the Greeks and to their discursive formations. The exteriority of Greek morality requires a relationship with truth as well as a will to truth that is entirely different from a modern or Christian morality. This is nonetheless not to say that classical Greece does not deploy a discursive formation of power and knowledge.
Indeed, if we understand power as a force, then discursive formations emerge and disappear in terms of the various deployments of force. Following Deleuze, a force is always measured in terms of its capability to affect and to be affected. Power’s deployment in classical Greece is a singular instance of power’s deployment with other forces of power. Instead of a return to Greek values, the lesson we should take from this reading of subjectivity is the capacity of power to constitute an interiority of subjectivity or a fold in the subject. This fold is then the double of the discursive formation’s subjectivity in much the same manner as power is the double of a discursive formation’s knowledge.

Notes

1 We are referring here to Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow’s work, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, one of the most influential English language commentaries of Foucault’s work. We shall return to their interpretation of Foucault in our final chapter.

2 It should, nonetheless, be clear that in our previous example concerning medical discourse and socio-political changes, language is clearly implicated in the appearance of these various discourses. For example, the eighteenth century conception of knowledge within the space and form of a table is closely linked to logical and grammatical analyses of language within a similar space/form, as Foucault underlines in *Les mots et les choses*, particularly in chapters three, four, and five.

3 As Pierre Macheray has noted in his introduction to Foucault’s *Raymond Roussel*, the term *experience* is of capital importance to Foucault. Macheray reminds us that we might trace the appearance of the term in Foucault’s work, extending from his study of the *experience* of madness to the final works concerning various *experiences* of sexuality (*Raymond Roussel*, viii). There is an obvious genealogical heritage that appears here in Foucault, for when speaking of experience in the French intellectual tradition, one cannot ignore the importance of Georges Bataille’s *L’expérience intérieure*. Placing the accent on “the extreme of the possible,” Bataille’s work is not only a meditation on the singular and maybe impossible experience of death and eroticism, but also on the general condition of experience. To summarize all too briefly, for Bataille, it appears that the limits of experience necessarily involve a contestation (or a power of contestation) with the limits of one’s everyday existence as a subject. Experience in these terms involves an
excessive attitude so that both power and knowledge are put into question. Foucault’s reading of Roussel appears to place the writer within a reading of such an experience as poetic or literary, echoing Bataille’s own studies in this direction in his *La littérature et le mal*.

We should make one final remark concerning experience. We noted above that for Bataille the meditation on experience is a double one, focusing on the impossible as well as the general conditions of experience. It is in terms of the general conditions of experience, or more precisely, in terms of the general conditions of real experience that we might also make another genealogical observation in Foucault. Although we have yet to mention the relationship, it should be obvious that our reading of the discursive formation in terms of the appearance of a certain historical object or formation contains echoes of Kant’s concept of the a-priori. Deleuze’s study of Foucault makes such a rapprochement and is worth quoting at length in order to distinguish between the two readings of historical possibility:

Parler et voir, ou plutôt les énoncés et les visibilités sont des Éléments purs, des conditions a-priori sous lesquelles toutes les idées se formulent à un moment, et les comportements se manifestent. Cette recherche des conditions constitue une sorte de néo-kantisme propre à Foucault. Il y a pourtant des différences essentielles avec Kant : les conditions sont celles de l’expérience réelle, et non de toute expérience possible (les énoncés, par exemple, supposent un corpus déterminé) ; elles sont du côté de l’« objet », du côté de la formation historique, et non d’un sujet universel (l’a-priori lui-même est historique) ; les unes comme les autres sont des formes d’extériorité (1986, 67).

4 At nineteen, Roussel was overcome with a sensation of “gloire universelle” for which he was treated over a long period by Pierre Janet. According to Roussel, this sensation drove him to write his first work, *la Doublure*, and continued to fuel his creative drive for a good part of his later works. See Roussel’s short commentary on his crises and their relationship to his writing in *Comment j’ai écrit certains de mes livres*, pages 26-35.

5 Foucault makes a similar reading of the function of the author in this context, echoing certain observations already made in his study of Roussel (to which we shall return in the following chapter) (*L’ordre du discours*, 28-31). See also the related and celebrated text on the author function, “What is an Author?” in *The Foucault Reader*, pages 101-120.

6 For reasons of space, we simply cannot explain in detail Foucault’s larger analysis of discipline in *ancien régime* and post-revolutionary France. We may simply refer the reader to the first and second chapters of the third section of *Surveiller et punir*, entitled “Discipline,” in which Foucault discusses in detail the appearance of the norm in modern French society. The panopticon as a historical object as well as a much larger and more general explanation for modernity must be read and defined in relation to the norm, as Foucault defines it: “La pénalité perpétuelle qui traverse tous les points, et contrôle tous les instants des institutions disciplinaires compare, différencie, hiérarchise, homogénéise, exclut. En un mot elle *normalise*” (*Surveiller et punir*, 215).
7 Of course, one should not be so quick as to take the appearance of the delinquent as evidence of the failure of a certain alignment of discursive power/knowledge. As Foucault's quote implies, the definition and appearance of the delinquent at the cracks of the panoptical deployment of the penal system fits into a larger political and class struggle that in turn justifies and reinforces the deployment of a normalizing and panoptical discursive formation of surveillance. See *Surveiller et punir*, 324-342. Indeed, the recuperation of the delinquent by the panopticon system is further evidence of the endlessly productive power of the technology of discipline.

8 If this declaration smacks of the very modern gesture underlined within Foucault's own study in *Les mots et les choses*, we should point to the use of the terms événement and pensée. Foucault is not falling into the all-too-obvious trap of a ground or truth of the modern discursive formation. The thought in question here is not his nor that of a all-recuperating methodology but rather the thought of the outside which is never mastered. We believe that our reading of the outside of thought and the historical and discursive archive is confirmed by the following passage from the *Ordre du discours* which carries particularly Deleuzian resonances:

Si les discours doivent être traités d'abord comme des ensembles d'événements discursifs, quel statut faut-il donner à cette notion d'événement qui fut si rarement prise en considération par les philosophes ? Bien sûr l'événement n'est ni substance ni accident, ni qualité ni processus ; l'événement n'est point immatériel ; c'est toujours au niveau de la matérialité qu'il prend effet, qu'il est effet ; il a son lieu et il consiste dans la relation, la coexistence, la dispersion, le recouplement, l'accumulation, la sélection d'éléments matériels ; il n'est point l'acte ni la propriété d'un corps ; il se produit comme effet de et dans une dispersion matérielle. Disons que la philosophie de l'événement devrait s'avancer dans la direction paradoxale au premier regard d'un matérialisme de l'incorporel. D'autre part, si les événements discursifs doivent être traités selon des séries homogènes, mais discontinues les unes par rapport aux autres, quel statut faut-il donner à ce discontinu ? Il ne s'agit, bien entendu, ni de la succession des instants du temps, ni de la pluralité des divers sujets pensants ; il s'agit de césures qui brisent l'instant et dispersent le sujet en une pluralité de positions et de fonctions possibles. Une telle discontinuité frappe et invalide les plus petites unités traditionnellement reconnues ou les moins facilement contestées : l'instant et le sujet. Et, au-dessous d'eux, indépendamment d'eux, il faut concevoir entre ces séries discontinues des relations qui ne sont pas de l'ordre de la succession (ou de la simultanéité) dans une (ou plusieurs) conscience ; il faut élaborer – en dehors des philosophies du sujet et du temps – une théorie des systématicités discontinues. Enfin, s'il est vrai que ces séries discursives et discontinues ont chacune, entre certaines limites, leur régularité, sans doute n'est-il plus possible d'établir entre les éléments qui les constituent des liens de causalité mécanique ou de nécessité idéale. Il faut accepter d'introduire l'aléa comme catégorie dans la production des
événements. Là encore se fait sentir l’absence d’une théorie permettant de penser les rapports du hasard et de la pensée (59-61).

We shall return to this call for what might be termed a “philosophy of the event” in the following chapter in our discussion of Deleuze and Foucault. Although we shall discuss the question of the subject below, it is extremely important to underline how Foucault explicitly understands his own project as one that goes beyond a philosophy of the subject. Interpretations of Foucault or theories based on his work have far too often missed these crucial points outlined above to or refused to place the ensemble of his work in a trajectory that takes in his position on power and the outside of thought and have thus misunderstood the manner in which Foucault works around a philosophy of the subject.

9 We should underline how this reading rejects, again, any notion of the individual personally and voluntarily willing the forces of power inward. The practices of the self should be read as a paradox: one forgets one’s subjectivity in order to become a subject.

Here, we might underline how this reading of aksesis differs, in part from Georges Bataille’s notion of experience. Bataille believes that aksesis maintains a hint of subjectivity or will: one chooses the practices of aksesis in order to save oneself (in the manner of the Hegelian dialectic, where the slave becomes the master by calculating a partial sacrifice or questioning of his proper life in opposition to a full and complete sacrifice or forgetting of his subjectivity). In other words, aksesis remains tied to a subjective project. Speaking of this relationship between aksesis, the project, and language, Bataille explains: “Néanmoins l’expérience intérieure est projet, quoi qu’on veuille. Elle l’est, l’homme étant entier par le langage qui par essence, exception faite de sa perversion poétique, est projet. Mais le projet n’est plus dans ce cas celui, positif, du salut, mais celui, négatif, d’abolir le pouvoir des mots, donc du projet” (L’expérience intérieure, 35). Perhaps it is in this reading of the negative project of experience, in particular of the negative project of language, that we might find a link between Bataille’s and Foucault’s notions of experience. As Foucault notes in reference to the thought of the outside, one must be attracted to the outside in order to form an interiority. However in order to be attracted to the outside one must neglect what one is doing: in other words, one must renounce any project. Foucault declares, “L’attirance a pour corrélatif nécessaire la négligence... Pour pouvoir être attiré, l’homme doit être négligent, -- d’une négligence essentielle qui tient pour nul ce qu’il est en train de faire... Être attiré, ce n’est pas être invité par l’attrait de l’extérieur, c’est plutôt éprouver dans le vide et le dénuement, la présence du dehors...” (La pensée du dehors, 28, 27).
Chapter 6

Deterritorialized Thought: Writing

Through our readings of Deleuze's contemporaries, we have attempted to offer a systematic introduction to the most important aspects of their thought. We have passed through these related territories of thought for two reasons. The first (and the focus of this chapter) is to offer a reading of Deleuze and two of his most important contemporaries that differs from the more widely held interpretations: either Deleuze's thought is taken to be simply part and parcel of an *air du temps* whose focus and concern may be more easily identified and assimilated to the work of Derrida and Foucault, i.e. "another deconstruction" or "Foucauldian power read as desire;" or Deleuze's thought is taken to be rarely concerned with the same matter as that of his contemporaries and must be considered as radically different from others to emerge from France at the same moment.¹ Furthermore, our distinction between various territories of French thought is necessary if we are to justify our use of Deleuzian concepts in the larger analysis of our study.

This leads to the second reason for the above studies, which will become fully evident in the chapter to follow, however we might trace its logic here in relation to the first reason. If Deleuzian thought may be outlined, on the one hand, through the complex movements of territorialization and deterritorialization that exist between it and that of his contemporaries Derrida and Foucault, it may also be outlined through the territories of what we might more generally call "French thought" and its reception in the American academy. By showing how Deleuze's preoccupations coincide with and differ from
those of Derrida and Foucault, we might be able to use the Deleuzian concept of territory to critique, in turn, the territories that French thought (specifically Derrida and Foucault) have recently traced in the American academy. It appears that Deleuze’s immanent critique of capitalism and its correlative of positive, desiring production may help to explain how and why territories of French thought such as those of Derrida and Foucault have had such success in the American academic context in the past thirty years.\(^2\)

Let us now turn to the intersection of these territories of thought. In our discussion of Derrida and Foucault we have examined their interpretation of literature in order to better understand their larger philosophical projects. Let us nuance this, however. As underlined in our discussion of Derrida, deconstruction or the space opened up by *différance* may not be limited to “philosophy only” or “literature only.” Indeed, what we attempted to show was how literature offered a place in which we might more easily discern *différance* at work without limiting its “appearance” or privileging a particular discipline. In the same manner, Roussel’s literary works served as a place for or illustration of the larger doubling movement of power/knowledge within Foucault’s theory as well as of the inflection or folding of power within an individual subject and his work. While our previous two chapters should make this point clear, we must insist that the literary example not be taken to hold a place of privilege in these two systems of thought; literature as *creation* offers a particularly clear example (among others) of the unlimited “space” of *différance* or the “outside” of power/knowledge. Literature is not the only place where this “space” or “outside” might be detected, but as *creation* literature may open the entire system of writing (we take writing here in the sense used
by Derrida) to this “phenomenon.” In this manner, we echo the position Deleuze offers when he declares of the writer:

Il met à jour de nouvelles puissances grammaticales ou syntaxiques. Il entraîne la langue hors de ses sillons coutumiers, il la fait déliter. Mais... le problème d'écrire ne se sépare d'un problème de voir et d'entendre : en effet, quand une autre langue se crée dans la langue, c'est le langage tout entier qui tend vers une limite « asyntaxique », « agrammaticale », ou quicommunique avec son propre dehors (1993, 9).³

Deleuze offers this observation when discussing Proust, and it seems that a fruitful manner to chart the intersection of the “territories of thought” of Deleuze, Derrida, and Foucault may be found in their approach to literature. We have touched on the question of literature several times in our explanation of Deleuze, but we should like to briefly turn to the extended reading he makes of Proust to examine this question in more detail. We do this for two reasons: first, the Proust study, Proust et les signes, was published in three editions, with portions added over Deleuze’s career, so that we may insist on the coherence to be found between his early works, his “mature” period, and his later collaboration with Félix Guattari; second, this extended analysis of a writer of prose will allow us to more easily underline the points of intersection and the points of departure between the readings of literature offered by Derrida and Foucault and their larger systems of thought.⁴

A. Proust and the Literary Machine

Before we begin, let us quickly examine the “evolution” of Deleuze’s reading of Proust. In 1976, he ends his study of Proust by affirming the non-unity of the Recherche, repeating the declaration he made in 1964 when beginning his first study of the subject. At first glance these two affirmations may have very little in common, for in 1976
Deleuze pursues his reading of the *Recherche* along the lines of madness and its apparition in Proust’s oeuvre. In 1964, his approach was from the angle of learning and the learning that takes place as one interprets signs. However the distance between these texts is not as great as one might imagine. Perhaps the best manner to understand the unity of this reading of non-unity in Proust is to work our way back through the texts, beginning with the conclusion of the 1976 addition to his study.\(^5\)

A theme that Deleuze repeatedly insists on when reading Proust is the “incapacity” of Proust’s characters: they are incapable of seeing, understanding, perceiving, or understanding crucial signs throughout the *Recherche*. Thus, while the narrator may be gifted with an extraordinary memory and sensibility, he constantly misinterprets the signs that he encounters (signs of love, of high society, of age, etc.), and it is only with the conclusion of the work that these signs may at last be understood. For Deleuze, this incapacity to understand signs when they are first encountered is not to be read negatively or as a weakness, but rather positively. It is only in the misinterpretation of signs and the subsequent experience of learning the true meaning of these signs that we might properly understand the “unity” of the *Recherche*. For Deleuze the misinterpretation of signs and the apprenticeship that this requires of the narrator should be read not in terms of the “unity” or “totality” of the work but rather in terms of madness (1964, 205). Let us begin our study of Deleuze’s “literary machine” with an examination of this rather striking declaration.

Deleuze notes that the question is not one of whether Proust was mad but rather one of how madness is present in the *Recherche*, and, more importantly, how madness is distributed and used in the *Recherche* (1964, 205).\(^6\) For Deleuze, madness appears in at
least two characters, Charlus and Albertine, and although it might be possible to understand madness' deployment without referring to them, it is their explicit relationship to madness which allows us an entry into Proust’s literary machine. For Deleuze, the use of madness becomes important when these characters interact with the narrator of the Recherche, for this implies an interpretation of, and an interaction with, a number of signs. More precisely, the narrator is forced to enter into a relation with the madness of these characters in order to decipher the signs of their madness. In turn, the characters themselves attempt to interpret their own signs so that a tangled web soon captures the narrator and the characters. If we take the example of Charlus, there are first the external signs of the character: his eyes, his voice, his mannerisms. As Deleuze explains, "Charlus se présente comme un énorme signe clignotant, grosse boîte optique et vocale : celui qui écoute Charlus ou qui rencontre son regard se trouve devant un secret à découvrir, un mystère à pénétrer, à interpréter, qu’il pressent dès le début comme pouvant aller jusqu’à la folie" (1964, 207). Once the narrator is attracted by these external signs, he pursues the sign, penetrating the mystery that Charlus appears to offer and is led to believe that a totality or logos might be found behind these signs. That is, transmits a number of signs to the narrator who then organizes them into three stages of interpretation. The first stage involves a time of denial where it appears to the narrator that he does not interest Charlus. The second stage concerns a time of “distancing” where Charlus again affirms the distance between himself and the narrator but, nonetheless appears to move toward a bridging of this gap. Finally, the third stage involves a time of confusion and disarray where the encounter between Charlus and the narrator appears to occur, subsequently fails, and the relationship suddenly sours (1964,
208). This final moment in Charlus’ relationship with the narrator betrays the madness that then becomes evident in all of the subsequent encounters with Charlus. The narrator is finally able to situate the previous signs under the larger sign of madness, which breaks down the totality or Logos of an organized system he had originally believed might underlie the relationship. The violent and chance discovery of Charlus’ homosexuality is not itself to be taken for madness but as a case of the larger and “antilogos” web of relations and signs that exists under Charlus’ madness. Deleuze explains this as he situates the case of Charlus’ sexuality within the web of madness of the Recherche:

Voilà ce que nous apprend Charlus au-delà de ses discours. Chaque individu ayant les deux sexes, mais « séparés par une cloison », nous devons faire intervenir un ensemble nébuleux de huit éléments, où la partie mâle ou la partie femelle d’un homme ou d’une femme peuvent entrer en rapport avec la partie femelle ou la partie mâle d’une autre femme ou d’un autre homme...(1964, 210-211).

This network of closed elements which nonetheless communicate among themselves may certainly be read under the sign of sexuality, but we must insist that this is only one element of the larger rhizomatic machine of the madness at work in Proust’s œuvre. In other words, it is the distribution of signs and the long movement of reading or interpretation of these signs that reveal the deployment of madness in the Recherche.

By following the circles of madness that emanate from Charlus (from his exterior signs of madness to his discourses which seem to offer a Logos or reason to the violent encounter with sexuality and madness) the narrator is drawn into a logic that no longer adheres to the tree-like precision of logic but rather to the rhizomatic deployment of schizophrenia. Deleuze declares, “...le pathos est un végétal fait de parties cloisonnées, qui ne communiquent qu’indirectement dans une partie mise à part, à l’infini, si bien que nulle totalisation, nulle unification ne peuvent réunir ce monde dont les morceaux ultimes ne

The distribution of madness among the characters of the Recherche brings us back to the narrator and the totality that he seems to give the work. The narrator himself is drawn into this web, for we recall that he is first called to interpret Charlus’ folly in the same way that Charlus is drawn in turn by the narrator to offer an interpretation of his own madness. It would be an error, however, to assert that in the narrator’s remembrances we might be able to find some sort of final closure that puts this madness back into its place and offers up the Recherche in the form of a totality. We must instead reverse such a reading and understand the oeuvre in terms of the machine it deploys. The narrator, in his interpretation of Charlus and his obsession with Albertine might better be understood, according to Deleuze, as a spider at the center of an immense web. The narrator is unable to see the correct signs, does not perceive the signs sent his way, and remembers none of them correctly. In other words, his organs do not function logically. On the other hand, through the rhizomatic web of madness, the signs eventually transmit their meaning through the intensity of their recognition. That is, the narrator always fails to interpret the signs of madness correctly when approaching them with the logic of a Logos. However, when the signs become the object of an encounter – that is, when they are revealed through the violence of chance, as in the discovery of Charlus’ homosexuality – they fall into the web of madness and transmit their meaning as an intensity, much like a fly transmits its presence to a spider. Deleuze thus reads the narrator as part and parcel of the deployment of madness within the Recherche. The web
of madness and the narrator are one, and the narrator only emerges as an intensity that is
registered as the signs are deployed throughout the literary machine-web:

La Recherche n’est pas bâtie comme une cathédrale ni comme une robe,
mais comme une toile. Le Narrateur-araignée, dont la toile même est la
Recherche en train de se faire, de se tisser avec chaque fil remué par tel ou
tel signe : la toile et l’araignée, la toile et le corps sont une seule et même
machine. Le narrateur a beau être doué d’une sensibilité extrême, d’une
mémoire prodigieuse : il n’a pas d’organes pour autant qu’il est privé de
tout usage volontaire et organisé de ces facultés. En revanche, une faculté
s’exerce en lui quand elle est contrainte et forcée de la faire ; et l’organe
correspondant se pose sur lui, mais comme une ébauche intensive éveillée
par les ondes qui en provoquent l’usage involontaire. Sensibilité
involontaire, mémoire involontaire, pensée involontaire qui sont chaque
fois comme les réactions globales intenses du corps sans organes à des
signes de telle ou telle nature. C’est ce corps-toile-araignée qui s’agite
pour entrouvrir ou pour fermer chacune des petites boîtes qui viennent
heurter un fil gluant de la Recherche. Étrange plasticité du narrateur.
(1964, 218).

Perhaps it is at this point – once we have deployed the web of madness in Proust – that
we may examine more closely the notions of signs and of learning, Deleuze’s first
preoccupation when reading Proust. For as the above quote implies, it is the encounter
with these signs – and specifically the involuntary encounter one has with signs – that
reveals the web-like deployment of an anti-Reason or antilogos within the text.

The signs of the Recherche are multiple but may be divided into three categories
or “worlds” to which they belong: that of high society, that of love, and that of
impressions or sensations. The signs of high society are probably the most common in
Proust’s work. As Deleuze notes, such signs are actually “empty” for they refer to no
action, no thought, and no sense: the Duc de Guermantes’ greeting is important only in
itself and must be interpreted only in the sterile world of high society and its rules (1964,
12-13). As for a deeper signification, there is none this is why such signs are easily
stereotyped. Yet their value, as we shall see, is important for any true learning. The
signs of high society require interpretation, but not at the same level as the signs of love. As Deleuze explains, these latter signs require a different interpretation: "L'être aimé apparaît comme un signe, une « âme » : il exprime un monde possible inconnu de nous. L'aimé implique, enveloppe, emprisonne un monde, qu'il faut déchiffrer, c'est-à-dire interpréter" (1964, 14). In other words, interpreting the sign of a loved one requires entering a collection of other worlds, as if one were opening up a series of boxes and exploring their contents. By the very definition of interpretation, these worlds are not the same as those of the one who must interpret them. Thus, the signs of love necessarily lead to jealousy (for example, when loving another, one comes to realize that there are "parts" or "worlds" of that other in which one will never be able to share as others have before) (1964, 15). It is this jealous side of love that is perhaps the most powerful aspect of such signs, for it leads to a fuller and more profound interpretation or learning. Deleuze explains, "Les signes amoureux ne sont pas comme les signes mondiaux... ce sont des signes mensongers qui ne peuvent s'adresser à nous qu'en cachant ce qu'ils expriment, c'est-à-dire l'origine des mondes inconnus, des actions et des pensées inconnues qui leur donnent un sens" (1964, 16). Furthermore, the exclusion that such signs reveal is accentuated by sexuality. Heterosexual love gives way to the more profound and hidden love of homosexuality in the form of Sodom and Gomorrah: "Le monde de l'amour tout entier va des signes révélateurs du mensonge aux signes cachés de Sodome et de Gomorrhe" (1964, 18). If the signs of love are finally painful in the "lie" they reveal, the signs of impressions or sensations are joyful and affirmative. The most famous sensations of the Recherche, such as those of the madeleine, the bell-tower, or the cobblestones, seem to transmit a meaning that does not belong to the object at hand. As
Deleuze explains, in contrast to the signs of love which require an expression on our part, the signs of impressions require a "development:" "Nous « développons » cette qualité, cette impression sensible comme un petit papier japonais qui s’ouvrirait dans l’eau et libérerait la forme prisonnière" (1964, 18-19). Again, in opposition to the signs of love which draw us into a multiplicity of worlds which have a certain actuality (in the sense of the quote from Deleuze on the preceding page that the "world" or sign of the loved one is a world full of possibilities which require one’s implication in the "actual" person of the loved one) to them, the signs of impressions draw us into a world that is uncannily "outside" of time. The narrator’s encounter with the madeleine opens up a Combray that never existed; that is, the sign of impressions or sensations is, in a sense, ideal or essential (1964, 19-20).

Now, if each sign reveals another space or world, it also reveals another time. For Deleuze, we might divide the signs of the Recherche into two categories: time lost and time found (1964, 26). However, among these divisions we might trace two other subdivisions. The first subdivision of time lost is the time that is lost due to time’s passage: aging, alteration of being, etc. (1964, 26). Each of the three categories of signs might reveal such a time. For example, the signs of high society at the end of the Recherche reveal the deep changes to be found in French society at the end of the nineteenth century and in the wake of the Dreyfus affaire: in the same manner, the signs of sensation reveal the aging and death of characters as when the narrator suddenly recalls his dead grandmother while bending over his boot-lace (1964, 27-28). It is also perhaps the nature of signs of love to carry such a time within them, for the jealousy that a sign of love reveals is in fact the end or undeniable aging of the love in question (1964,
26-27). The second subdivision of time lost is quite literally the time that one loses or wastes. Signs of high society are particularly capable of revealing a time that is lost. When following such signs, one dedicates an enormous amount of time and energy to the emptiness of such signs, wasting one’s time. However, it is the act of learning – the interpretation of such signs – that reveals time lost as the time of the second, larger category, time found again. Each category of time needs the other, for one must necessarily waste one’s time if one is to find it again and understand this wasted time as the time spent learning how to interpret a sign. In addition (and importantly), time would not be found again if one did not exercise a sort of negligence in wasting it. The “intelligence” that comes with a good intention not to waste one’s time is nothing in comparison to the intelligence or the knowledge one gains when one is finally able to interpret the time wasted as time gained. Yet it is the very nature of such an intelligence that a similar goal cannot be the aim of one’s intentions when wasting time. Time wasted must be pure and total waste in order to be recuperated afterwards (1964, 32-33). This last division of time, time found again, has what Deleuze terms a “fuller” manifestation which envelops and includes all divisions of time. This “original and absolute” time concerns a sign which we have yet to discuss and whose explanation we will postpone for the moment. We should like to insist, however, before continuing, on the “complicated” aspect of signs and the time they reveal. Rarely is a sign “simply” one of high society, love, or sensation. A sign may easily involve all three “aspects” just as it may reveal a mixture of different times. In other words, the deployment of signs within the Recherche is a complicated affair, and following one sign down the path of learning necessarily involves encounters with all categories of signs and times. Deleuze explains, “...les
signes ne se développent pas, ne s’expliquent pas suivant les lignes du temps sans corresponder ou symboliser, sans se recouper, sans entrer dans des combinaisons complexes qui constituent le système de la vérité” (1964, 35).

Let us consider more closely encounters with signs and the manner in which one interprets these encounters. All of the signs we have examined to this point are tied materially to the objects which reveal them. It is true that the signs of sensation may not necessarily be considered material, however their origin, the cause of the sensation, is certainly material, as is their sense: Combray, young girls, Balbec, etc. (1964, 20). The mistake one may make when interpreting such signs is to search for the truth or meaning of the signs in the objects themselves (1964, 37). This is to read the sign in terms of what it designates and signifies – what Deleuze terms “objectivism” (1964, 37). To interpret a sign in this manner is to give in to the intelligence alluded to above: one consciously turns one’s thoughts and intelligence to the sign in order to understand it and what it represents. In other words, one makes the mistake of remaining at the level of the object, such as the madeleine or Combray, in order to interpret the sign. It is for this reason that the failure to understand signs (the long process of learning) is important in the Recherche. The narrator must suffer from numerous disappointments if he is to overcome this level of interpretation. He must overcome the good intention to read and interpret the meaning or representation of the sign and must instead waste his time and suffer disappointment (1964, 46). Having experienced disappointment, he overcomes the material aspect of the sign. However, another trap awaits him, for in compensating for his disappointment, he attempts to find a more subtle layer of truth by adding subjectively
to the sign before him. Deleuze gives the example of Madame de Guermantes and the narrator's disappointment when finally seeing her:

\[\text{Quand il voit, puis connaît Mme de Guermantes, il s'aperçoit qu'elle ne contient pas le secret du sens de son nom. Son visage et son corps ne sont pas colorés par la teinte des syllabes. Que faire, sinon compenser la déception? Devenir personnellement sensible à des signes moins profonds, mais mieux appropriés au charme de la duchesse, grâce au jeu des associations d'idées qu'elle suscite en nous (1964, 46).}\]

This is the mistake one makes in reading the sign of the madeleine as a simple association of ideas. One compensates on the subjective side of the interpretation and reduces the work of art of the \textit{Recherche} to the level of a tool which holds the association of sensations and ideas together (1964, 48-49). For Deleuze, learning must necessarily pass through these stages. One must necessarily be disappointed with the objective reading of signs in order to move to a larger association of ideas. However, this association must also be overcome. It is only with the fourth type of sign and time, that of Art and its original and absolute time, that we may move beyond the level of the objective and the subjective interpretation of signs.

If one falls mistakenly into "objectivism" when interpreting signs, it is because one confuses the material manifestation of the sign with the sign itself. The signs of Art differ from the previous three categories of signs in that they are immaterial (1964, 51). That is, there is a unity between the sign's apparition and its sense that escapes any material mediation. Deleuze takes the example of Vinteuil's short melody: it may certainly be analyzed as five notes that are bunched closely together, but their material definition as notes on a scale does not explain the sign. Any recourse to the instruments (the piano or the violin) brings us up against the same problem. The sign cannot be found in any of these material objects, as Deleuze explains, "Le piano n'est là que comme
l’image spatiale d’un clavier d’une tout autre nature ; les notes, comme « l’apparence sonore » d’une entité toute spirituelle" (1964, 51). Qualifying art as expressing a certain essence or spirituality may strike us as odd coming from Deleuze, so it is important to understand how Deleuze defines “essence” in Proust: “Qu’est-ce qu’une essence, telle qu’elle est révélée dans l’œuvre d’art ? C’est une différence, la Différence ultime et absolue. C’est elle qui constitue l’être, qui nous fait concevoir l’être” (1964, 53). As the ultimate and absolute difference, essence is the difference that goes beyond any sort of empirical difference and concerns a qualitative difference (1964, 54). It is, in other words, an ontological difference that goes beyond the subjective or objective side of signs (we will recognize this as the Deleuzian definition of difference which was the subject of our first chapter).

Let us examine more closely the signs of art and their essence, for Deleuze’s explanation is dense and not always clear. As noted, essence, as an ultimate and absolute difference, is linked to a qualitative difference that Deleuze reads in a Leibnizian sense. He explains, “...Proust est leibnizien : les essences sont de véritables monades, chacune se définissant par le point de vue auquel elle exprime le monde, chaque point de vue renvoyant lui-même à une qualité ultime au fond de la monade” (1964, 54). Deleuze then reads the signs of art and their essence in much the same manner as he does Leibniz and his theory of monism. That is, one might say that each individual or subject expresses the world according to her point of view. Thus a multitude of worlds is expressed by a multitude of individuals or subjects. However, this is not to say that each world, expressed by an individual or subject, is that individual or subject. As Deleuze explains, the world, “...n’existe pas hors du sujet qui l’exprime, mais il [le monde] est exprimé
comme l’essence, non pas du sujet lui-même, mais de l’Être qui se révèle au sujet” (1964, 56). Essence in Proust or the world of a Leibnizean monism is not the psychological state of a subject nor is it the ultimate vestige of the metaphysical subject, according to Deleuze. It is, rather, that which implicates, envelops, and “rolls” itself around the subject. Essence is, in other words, that which expresses or constitutes the subject: “Ce ne sont pas les individus qui constituent le monde, mais les mondes enveloppés, les essences qui constituent les individus…” (1964, 56). To place this within our reading of signs, we might return to Vinteuil’s short melody. Unlike the other signs of Proust’s work, the melody, as a sign of art, does not depend on the material means of its manifestation nor does it ultimately depend on Vinteuil. The sign of art reveals an essence of absolute difference and it this difference that then “reveals” (dévoile) Vinteuil.

If the sign of Art then reveals this absolute “space” of difference of essence, it also reveals a time that we have called the “original and absolute” time of le temps retrouvé. Deleuze approaches this fourth element of time by first noting how the signs of Art open us up to a sort of “birth” of time. Vinteuil’s short melody appears or reveals the absolute essence of his world before drawing that world into existence around him. As an example, Deleuze quotes Proust:

D’abord le piano solitaire se plaignit, comme un oiseau abandonné de sa compagne ; le violon l’entendit, lui répondit comme d’un arbre voisin. C’était comme au commencement du monde, comme s’il n’y avait encore eu qu’eux deux sur la Terre, ou plutôt dans ce monde fermé à tout le reste, construit par la logique d’un créateur et où ils ne seraient jamais que tous les deux : cette sonate (1964, 58-59).

Again, like the “space” of the absolute difference or essence of signs of art, the “original and absolute” time of the sign of art is difficult to grasp. Let us recall again that Deleuze associates the difference of signs of art with the Leibnizean system of monism. We recall
from above that in this perspective one might say that each individual or subject expresses the world according to her point of view. This multitude of worlds however shares a certain “root” which is their expression through the absolute difference of essence. To borrow Deleuze’s expression, each world or individual that is expressed through a work of art is “complicated:” “…la complication, qui enveloppe le multiple dans l’Un et affirme l’Un du multiple” (1964, 58) The multiple number of worlds is then nonetheless enveloped or expressed by the one of absolute difference or essence. It seems then that, according to Deleuze, the multiple and heterogeneous examples of signs of art that one may find in Proust share a “common ground” that is the absolute difference of essence. In the same manner, if each work of art shares in a “common ground” or “common space” of difference, it then follows that this space implies a common time of difference. The quotation immediately above, which Deleuze takes as an example of this “common time” or “pure and empty” time, is enigmatic. It appears, nonetheless that he wishes to say that a “complicated” time may be revealed in the same manner as a “complicated” space of essence or absolute difference. The multiple and heterogeneous examples of works of art are, in a manner, “grounded” in the “empty” time of difference. This is what Deleuze appears to confirm when he explains, “…le sujet artiste a la révélation d’un temps originel, enroulé, compliqué dans l’essence elle-même, embrassant à la fois toutes ses séries et ses dimensions. Voilà bien le sens du mot « temps retrouvé »” (1964, 59).

We recall from above that this “double” spatial and temporal aspect of the sign is important. A sign always reveals a world (of love, of high society, etc.) and a time (time lost or time found again). While we have insisted on this double aspect of signs, the
notion of an “absolute” time may remain rather unclear. Let us approach this question through the manifestation of signs of Art. Above, Deleuze evokes the artist-subject to explain the revelation of time found again, and it is clear from our discussion of the individual/individualizing aspect of signs of Art that it is through the artist herself that such signs appear. We recall that the sign of Vinteuil’s short melody manifests itself through his music, but we might also turn to Vermeer’s yellow for another manifestation or to the written word itself as expressed by Proust. With each manifestation we must insist on the immaterial manifestation of the sign of Art. If we recall our discussion of Vinteuil’s short melody above, even though the sign of art seems to be linked to a material manifestation (the piano, the notes ringing in one’s ears, etc.), we may never actually pinpoint this material manifestation of the sign in the same manner as signs of love, high society, or even sensation. Perhaps another way of understanding this manifestation is to read it in terms of the artist’s style. An artist distinguishes or “individualizes” herself through her style, which Deleuze reads as a particular manner of bringing matter into contact with essence so that, in opposition to the signs of sensation, the immaterial aspect of Art, of essence, is revealed. Again, we might recall our above example of Vinteuil: Vinteuil himself (and the “world” he expresses, to use Leibnizean terms) “emerges” as a result of the essence or absolute difference of his melody. It appears then that, for Deleuze, artistic style allows one a privileged glimpse of absolute difference. He thus declares that style is, “…la complication originelle, la lutte et l’échange des éléments primordiaux qui constituaient l’essence elle-même” (1964, 62). Style appears to be characterized then by the appearance of difference, essence, and repetition, which is simply the auto-diversification of difference as it manifests itself.
This latter aspect of style (repetition) might appear contradictory, but Deleuze counters, “Que pourrait-on faire de l’essence, qui est différence ultime, sauf la répéter, puisqu’elle n’est pas remplaçable et que rien ne peut lui être substitué?” (1964, 62). Vinteuil’s short melody appears and re-appears in Proust’s work, and with each repetition it appears that Deleuze understands the quality of Art’s essence as being affirmed in Vinteuil’s “world” (we might recall that we have treated style within the context of the territory and the ritornello in Negotiations 3 of chapter 2).

Perhaps another manner of understanding this encounter between matter and essence is in terms of a certain resonance. The style of an artist and the signs it produces may not be reduced to the objective side of the sign, nor may it be reduced to the subjective interpretation. Style is what remains apart from these two sides of signs yet brings them together in a non-totalizing manner. In other words, the sign of Art, in its manifestation as style, brings essence and matter, object and subject, together so that this union resonates, setting off our interpretation of the sign. While all signs depend upon the space and time of the three signs and times outlined above, if we are to actually interpret them correctly and learn from them, the sign of Art is particularly important concerning the delay or time spent between a sign’s encounter and our recognition of it. Above we insisted upon the failure of one’s faculties if one were to interpret signs correctly. We must “waste” our time if we are to understand the signs of high society just as we must waste our time in love if we are to understand the jealousy and betrayal such signs hide. In other words, as we have noted, understanding a sign correctly implies a certain lack of will to directly apply our intellect to a sign. Each sign, when read involuntarily, offers a glimpse of time lost, but it is only with the signs of art that we may fully understand the
complication or plenitude of le temps retrouvé. Deleuze explains that signs of Art activate our involuntary memory, creating a certain resonance between two sensations or objects such that resemblance and identity fall away in favor of a third “term,” the intensity of the sign:

...voilà le propre de la mémoire involontaire : elle intèriorise le contexte, elle rend l’ancien contexte inséparable de la sensation présente. En même temps que la ressemblance entre les deux moments se dépasse vers une identité plus profonde, la contiguïté qui appartenait au moment passé se dépasse vers une différence plus profonde. Combray resurgit dans la sensation actuelle, sa différence avec l’ancienne sensation s’est intérieurisée dans la sensation présente. La sensation présente n’est donc plus séparable de ce rapport avec l’objet différent. L’essentiel dans la mémoire involontaire n’est pas la ressemblance, ni même l’identité, qui ne sont que des conditions. L’essentiel, c’est la différence intérieurisée, devenue immanente. C’est en ce sens que la réminiscence est l’analogue de l’art, et la mémoire involontaire, l’analogue d’une métaphore : elle prend « deux objets différents », la madeleine avec sa saveur, Combray avec ses qualités de couleur et de température ; elle enveloppe l’un dans l’autre, elle fait de leur rapport quelque chose d’intérieur (1964, 75).

The Combray that appears as a result of such a sign of Art is neither the Combray of the present memory nor the Combray of a time passed or lost, but rather a Combray that could not be lived in any manner (real or psychological). It is a Combray that is real without being actual. In other words, the sign of Art and its interpretation through involuntary memory reveals a ideal real or essence in which time is simply the state of complication between matter and the immaterial. This is the “original and absolute” time of Art and le temps retrouvé.

Now, as we have noted, signs of Art are important if we are to understand the importance of time lost as it appears in the three other signs outlined above. Indeed, it would be an error to understand the signs of Art as a category apart or as the culmination of the learning that the other categories of signs induces. Each sign of Art contains traces
of the other signs in the same manner as each of the other three categories of signs contain traces of the signs of Art and their homologues. Vinteuil’s short melody as style is interpreted as a sign of Art but it is in the resonance between matter and essence that the sign individualizes itself and Vinteuil. Vinteuil and all of the material signs of high society, love, and sensation are needed if the sign of his short melody is to resonate properly. In the same manner, the narrator and the material signs of Combray and the madeleine are necessary if the involuntary memory of his tasting the madeleine is to wash over him.

Another manner of understanding this relationship between involuntary memory and the necessity of the material aspects that allow a “resonating” encounter with Art may be found by returning to our above discussion of absolute difference. We recall that the absolute difference of essence is continually affirmed by its repetition in the encounter with new and different material signs (Vinteuil’s melody, even if it remains the same, encounters new material signs with each repetition). Let us take as an example the material signs of love. We might say that a sort of original difference is to be found at the heart of our loves: we have an image or idea of the one we love. Our lovers are this image, in the sense that our love remains constant or the same through the numerous differences of each love. Deleuze explains, “[Notre amour] est une image lointaine au-delà de notre expérience, un Thème qui nous dépasse, une sorte d’archétype. Image, idée ou essence assez riche pour se diversifier dans les êtres que nous aimons, et même dans un seul être aimé ; mais telle aussi qu’elle se répète dans nos amours successives, et dans chacun de nos amours pris isolément” (1964, 84). Read in this manner, the signs of love reveal a gap between the image of our love (the archetype) and the one we love (the
various, different manifestations of this archetypal love) so that we are continually disappointed. Each lover is close to the image we hold dear but does not quite correspond to it so that we continue on, in search of that perfect correspondence, measuring the difference between our image of love and each lover. This accumulation of “differences” may be found not only externally, in the number of lovers one has, but also internally. That is, we “accumulate” a certain number of differences within ourselves as we pass along a series of lovers (1964, 85-86). What Deleuze terms this “serial” aspect of the signs of love may be further complicated if we consider the differences that accumulate within each of our lovers individually. Like Albertine, each lover contains a multitude of worlds and relationships with these worlds. Deleuze explains, “Les petites différences et les rapports contrastés que nous trouvons d’un amour à l’autre, nous les rencontrons déjà dans un même amour : d’une Albertine à l’autre, puisque Albertine a des âmes multiples et de multiples visages” (1964, 86). We might better understand this “double seriality” in terms of the extra-subjective nature of our loves. For example, the original image of love of the narrator of the Recherche might indeed be his mother, but the narrator’s relationship with her is interrupted by Swann whose presence contains the latter’s relationship with Odette, who will in turn initiate the narrator’s latter relationships with Gilberte, Madame de Guermantes, and Albertine (1964, 88). This immense web of complications then forms what Deleuze terms a “general law” of material signs (particularly signs of love and signs of high society) in which the essence of signs of Art is present in an impure or material form (1964, 83-84). The “generality” of essence is what we perceive when we come to properly interpret the sign of love, as Deleuze explains:
...dans le domaine de l’amour, l’essence ne se sépare pas d’un type de généralité : généralité de série, généralité proprement sérielle. Chaque souffrance est particulière, en tant qu’éprouvée, en tant qu’elle est produite par tel être, au sein de tel amour. Mais parce que ces souffrances se reproduisent et s’impliquent, l’intelligence en dégage quelque chose de général, qui est aussi bien de la joie (1964, 91).

Although the final sentence of the above quote appears incomprehensible (how may one say that the pain or disappoint of love lost reveals a form of joy?), it appears that Deleuze means that the disappointing and “serial” nature of love (and its signs) communicates with the essence of signs of art. That is, through the web of seriality, the essence of the sign of Art is present but may only be interpreted as the idea or image behind the general law of difference and repetition in love. This is the complication of essence at the level of the material signs, as Deleuze notes when underlining the serial nature not only of essence but of the multiple groups and series that must be taken into account in an amorous encounter: “C’est bien l’Idée qui détermine la série de nos états subjectifs, mais aussi ce sont les hasards de nos relations subjectives qui déterminent la sélection de l’Idée” (1964, 93).8

Let us keep in mind that our reading of the intertwining movement between essence and material signs of love is but one example of the numerous series we might trace throughout the Recherche. This web of series repeats the resonance of essence’s difference throughout the work at various levels of intensity so that we cannot privilege one sign or one time over the other. Each sign and each time resonates with the others so that it is in tying these signs and the times they reveal together that the work of art finally produces its effect. Yet what exactly is this effect? We have noted that the Recherche opens us up to the rhizomatic structure of madness that is the opposite of a “tree” of logic. In other words, any attempt to qualify Proust’s work as a totality mis-reads its
signs. How is it, then, that the *Recherche* brings these series into relation with each without totalizing them in the work of Art? For Deleuze, the appearance of a multiplicity of series must be understood in terms of production. Thus, the signs of love, like the signs of high society, produce a collection of what we might call "partial objects:" the disappointment that is the hallmark of these signs underlines the process of learning that accompanies these signs so that their fullness is revealed to be misleadingly "partial." This "partiality" is then part of what we have outlined as the "law of generality:" the disappointment that these signs reveals leads us to construct a series (or group) of partial objects which then reveal a general law concerning their essence. Deleuze explains:

Sans doute ce sont des signes extrêmement différents...mais nous avons vu que leur point commun était dans la faculté qui les interprétait — l'intelligence, mais une intelligence qui vient après au lieu de venir avant, forcée par la contrainte du signe. Et dans le sens qui correspond à ces signes : toujours une loi générale, que cette loi soit celle d'un groupe comme dans la mondanité, ou celle d'une série d'êtres aimés comme dans l'amour...Si nous considérons de plus près cette première espèce de machine, nous voyons qu'elle se définit avant tout par une production d'objet partiels...(1964, 180).

It is the revelation of the general law or generality of essence underlying these series and groups that then forces us to reconstruct the partial objects, producing a sense or truth of partial objects (1964, 181).

A second production might be situated at the level of the signs of sensation as well as the signs of Art. We recall how the moment of involuntary memory produces a resonance superior to that of the signs of sensation in that it is immaterial, going beyond the material aspect of the sign and that which it recalls. In this manner time lost and time found again are brought together in a third time of complication where the sign is both virtual and actual. It is important to note how the production of resonance relates to the
work of art and the *Recherche* itself. As Deleuze underlines, one might define the grandeur of the *Recherche* by the instants it presents such as the madeleine and the first episode of involuntary memory (1964, 183-184). However, this would be to underestimate the function of literature. What we define as great literature is filled with innumerable examples of such instances and while Proust’s style may define the madeleine, other great writers have produced other great instances in other styles. For Deleuze, the importance of literature and the importance of the web of signs in the *Recherche* is the production of such instances within the work of art itself. Within the realm of signs of sensation and signs of Art we are able to understand how the literary machine comes to function and produce an artistic effect. The literary machine is not something produced by an author but is something which produces an author, its proper characters and its proper readers. Deleuze explains:

> Il ne s’agit plus d’une expérience extra-littéraire que l’homme de lettres rapporte ou dont il profite, mais d’une expérimentation artistique produite par la littérature, d’un effet de littérature, au sens où l’on parle d’un effet électrique, électro-magnétique, etc....Que l’art soit une machine à produire, et notamment à produire des effets, Proust en a la plus vive conscience. Des effets sur les autres, puisque les lecteurs ou spectateurs se mettront à découvrir, en eux-mêmes et hors d’eux, des effets analogues à ceux que l’œuvre d’art a su produire (1964, 184).

The interpretation and importance we give the madeleine and its experience of involuntary memory is a production of the literary machine. This reversal of the relationship we establish between ourselves, an author, or a work of art is part of the involuntary aspect of phenomena of resonance. It breaks necessarily with the objective and subjective interpretations we might have of literature or Art and underlines the necessary violence of our encounter with Art. In this manner, the resonance of Art must always come up to us “from behind” and add to our experience of life. As Deleuze
insists, the production of resonance or the fullness of lost time actually adds to life, and it is only in this manner that the work of art might assume a place of privilege: “Dès lors l’art apparaît pour ce qu’il est, le but final de la vie, que la vie ne peut pas réaliser par elle-même ; et la mémoire involontaire, n’utilisant que des résonances données, n’est plus qu’un commencement d’art dans la vie, une première étape” (1964, 186).9

The shock or force of two times, time lost and time found again, brought together in the complication of essence is the source of a third production for Deleuze. We recall that he reads essence’s complication as a “time-out-of-time” that, in terms of our discussion of production, might be defined as death (1964, 188). That is, with the sensation of time lost in the form of alteration, for example in the signs of sensation when the narrator of the Recherche is projected into a reverie over his dead grandmother, the force or amplitude of death is such that it doubles the resonance we might sense between the present moment and time lost that is the mark of signs of sensation. Deleuze explains, “…le mouvement du temps, d’un passé au présent, se double d’un mouvement forcé d’amplitude plus grande, en sens inverse, qui balaie les deux moments, en accuse l’écart, et repousse le passé plus loin dans le temps. C’est ce second mouvement qui constitue dans le temps un « horizon »” (1964, 191). The force of this sensation dilates time, in contrast to signs of Art which contract time to a point outside of time. This is not to say that the movement of death is not also outside of time, but it is the twin of Art’s contraction. Indeed, the complicated state of time that is revealed by signs of Art would not be complicated if it were not both contracted and dilated. What is produced by the resonance of death is time itself as it passes: time comes to have a sensation and may become “time lost” (1968a, 191-192).
The work of art then produces a collection of partial objects, the effects of resonances, and the force of movement. These products are, taken together, what we might call the style of the work of art. Discussing style above we underlined its relationship to the signs of Art in that style allows one to bring together a number of terms in the same manner as signs of Art bring the material and absolute difference of essence together in the state of complicated time. When we consider the three productions of the work of art, we find that style is then what allows us to speak of a "whole" when speaking of the Recherche. Yet we must be careful, for the whole of the work is not pre-determined; it is important to remember that the interpretation of signs is involuntary and their force or intensity comes only after the fact. Thus, Deleuze explains, "Le style ici ne se propose pas de décrire ni de suggérer : comme chez Balzac, il est explicatif, il explique avec des images. Il est non-style, parce qu'il se confond avec « l'interpréter » pur et sans sujet, et multiplie les points de vue sur la phrase, à l'intérieur de la phrase" (1964, 199). To interpret the signs of Proust's œuvre is to understand the style, which weaves together the different productions. The work of art is a machine that produces signs which, when interpreted, resonate with an intensity throughout the work of art as well as with the author and the reader. This movement across a multiplicity of signs and times is what gives the work its "totality" but never totalizes it. As Deleuze declares, "...si une œuvre d'art communiquè avec un public, bien plus le suscite, si elle communiquè avec les autres œuvres du même artiste, et les suscite, si elle communiquè avec d'autres œuvres d'autres artistes, et en suscite à venir, c'est toujours dans cette dimension de transversalité, où l'unité et la totalité s'établissent pour elles-mêmes, sans unifier ni totaliser objets ou sujets" (1964, 202). Style is to remember, to come after the
fact, to view the sign as it should be viewed, to interpret it, to “create” the point of view that brings all of the associations in a work of art together. Pushed to one’s limits by the intensity of the sign, thinking (remembering) becomes creation: “…se ressouvenir, c’est créer, c’est aller jusqu’à ce point où la chaîne associative se rompt, saute hors de l’individu constitué, se trouve transféré à la naissance d’un monde individuant. Et il ne s’agit plus de dire : créer, c’est penser – mais penser, c’est créer, et d’abord créer l’acte de penser dans la pensée” (1964, 134).10

*Negotiations 5*

Before bringing this “writing machine” into the larger context of a Deleuzian “philosophy machine,” we should like to return briefly to the role of series and groups. It might seem that Deleuze’s system of immanence speaks very little of the relationship a subject might have with an other – a topic of much thought within the context of a transcendent approach to philosophy. Indeed, by approaching philosophy and writing from the middle, does the plane of immanence not ignore an other and the larger ethical question such an other’s existence poses? How does the subject construe her relationship to the other? Of course, by framing these questions in such terms, we have already forced Deleuze’s thought to engage the question on a plane of transcendence and not immanence. Instead of approaching the question from this direction, let us examine it from the angle of series and groups as they are presented in the Proustian oeuvre. We recall that the signs of love open us up onto a number of complicated series where the difference of essence and its repetition along a series of lovers gives way to a law of generality. Deleuze offers a second manner of reading these series: as a collection or
figure of boxes that are enclosed in each other or as a complication of a number of unconnected parts (1964, 140-141). In introducing these distinctions, he engages the question of incommensurability or other-ness as the point of departure or middle of a plane of immanence:

Prétendre que Proust avait l'idée même confuse de l'unité préalable de la Recherche, ou bien qu'il l'a trouvée par après, mais comme animant dès le début l'ensemble, c'est le lire d'un mauvais œil, lui appliquer les critères tout faits de totalité organique qu'il refuse précisément, se fermer à la conception si nouvelle d'unité qu'il était en train de créer. Car c'est bien de là qu'il faut partir : la disparité, l'incommensurabilité, l'émiissement des parties de la Recherche, avec les ruptures, hiatus, lacunes, intermittences qui en garantissent l'ultime diversité (1964, 140).

Let us begin with the figure of the box. The enclosure of one part or object within another cannot lead to a unifying totality because it is a relation without common measure (1964, 142). Thus things, names, people are like boxes who, when read and interpreted as signs, open up onto other things, names, or people of a completely different nature. This "boxed-in" nature of signs is what Deleuze terms the emboîtement of signs (1964, 140-141). To return to the example of Charlus, Deleuze notes how, "... « ce personnage peinturluré, pansu et clos, semblable à quelque boîte de provenance exotique et suspecte » abrite dans sa voix des nichées de jeunes filles et des âmes féminines tutélaires" (1964, 141). Opening the boxes of such signs and forcing their incommensurable nature onto each other is the task of the narrator. The narrator explicates such signs. For example, the sign of the madeleine "contains" another object of an entirely different world (Japanese paper figurines), but these objects in a bowl of water are actually containers for the world of a sensation which belongs to Combray as it was never actually lived – a world of a completely separate nature (1964, 143-144). One object opens up (or contains) another object of a different nature or different culture, but
this object then opens up another, more "profound" object of sensation which contains a world apart from this one – virtual but not un-real. The explication of boxes may, however, take place in an opposite and less "grand" movement, such as in the names of characters like Guermantes or Albertine. The syllables and the associations one makes with these names lead us to different worlds, and it is only in meeting the actual person who carries the name that we realize that these worlds are false. The person deceives us and instead of finding a great chain of ever-"larger" boxes, we find empty boxes – worlds that do not exist. As Deleuze explains, "Les noms, les êtres et les choses sont bourrés d'un contenu qui les fait éclater ; et non seulement on assiste à cette espèce de dynamitage des contenants par les contenus, mais à cet éclatement des contenus eux-mêmes qui, dépliés, expliqués, ne forment pas une figure unique, mais des vérités hétérogènes en débris qui luttent encore entre elles plus qu'elles ne s'accordent" (1964, 147-148).

What Deleuze terms the "vérités hétérogènes" of a name's contents is the second aspect of series – what we have termed above their complicated nature. In fact one aspect cannot exist without another. The signs of the Recherche are constantly feeding into each other, revealing first one side and then another side of their manifestation so that where the explication of half-closed boxes ends, their complicated nature begins. Where the first aspect of signs was a lack of common measure between the "box" and its contents, the second aspect is one of an appearance of signs which cannot communicate with one another directly. Deleuze gives the example of Albertine who might be read as a box containing a multitude of other boxes: the beach, tides, and all the impressions of a maritime series are associated with her (1964, 142). However, she might also be read as
a complicated character: there is the Albertine as one of a group of girls, the Albertine alone, the Albertine who reacts in jealous suspicion or the Albertine who acts in confidence (1964, 142). While one Albertine contains these other Albertines, the latter are utterly different from each other and do not communicate among themselves. Deleuze likens this aspect of signs to a collection of closed vases. He explains, returning to proper names, "...les noms propres ont d'abord tout leur pouvoir comme boîtes dont on extrait le contenu, et, une fois vidées par la déception, s'ordonnent encore les unes en fonction des autres en « enfermant », « emmurant » l'histoire universelle ; mais les noms communs acquièrent leur valeur en introduisant dans le discours des morceaux non communicants de mensonge et de vérité..." (1964, 142-143). Signs as half-open boxes communicate a sense of the whole through the violence of their implication in one another. As Deleuze notes, "À force de mettre des morceaux dans les morceaux, Proust trouve le moyen de nous les faire penser tous, mais sans référence à une unité dont ils dériveraient, ou qui en dériverait elle-même" (1964, 149). Signs as closed vases do not need this violence and instead easily give off a sense of the whole since the series of signs shares a common ground or law. As an example, we might return to the signs of love: we encounter a number of loves or lovers throughout our life, and although they do not necessarily communicate with other, this series is nonetheless a series of signs of love, which gives us the sense of a wholeness to the series. However, upon closer examination, we might note, as Proust does, "... « Ce que nous croyons notre amour, notre jalousie, n'est pas une même passion continue, indivisible. Ils se composent d'une infinité d'amours successives, de jalousies différentes et qui sont éphémères, mais par
leur multitude ininterrompue donnent l’impression de la continuité, l’illusion de l’unité” (1964, 152).

What does give a unity to this movement between half-open boxes and closed vases is the force of the involuntary encounter, as it draws a line through the boxes and vases of signs. The intensity of such an encounter causes us to choose a certain closed vase or follow a half-open box in its explication: “Choisir telle jeune fille dans le groupe, telle coupe ou tel plan figé dans la jeune fille, choisir tel mot dans ce qu’elle dit, telle souffrance dans ce qu’elle nous fait éprouver, et, pour éprouver cette souffrance, pour déchiffrer le mot, pour aimer cette fille, choisir tel ou tel moi qu’on fait vivre ou revivre parmi tous les possibles : telle est l’activité correspondant à la complication” (1964, 154). While the encounter forces us to choose and to open ourselves and complicate ourselves in the other of a series of half-open boxes, this choice is nonetheless also part of a closed vase, which, paradoxically, closes us off to the other at the very moment we open ourselves to explication. In spite of this “opening and closing” movement, it appears that what we might call, in all senses of the term, a complicated subject does not ignore the other in Deleuze’s system. It is in fact the other and our relationship of explication/complication that allows such a subject to emerge. In this sense, the other is perhaps at the very heart of the Deleuzian plane of immanence. As Deleuze declares, “Le « sujet » de la Recherche finalement n’est aucun moi, c’est ce nous sans contenu qui répartit Swann, le narrateur, Charlus, les répartit ou les choisit sans les totaliser” (1964, 156).
B. Writing the Philosophy Machine

The subject of Deleuzian thought – even after our long foray into the literary machine and its signs, times, series, and groups, the phrase strikes us as oddly illusive. Is there truly a subject of Deleuzian thought? Our opinion is that such a subject exists but, just as the subject or substance of this thought is oddly illusive, slipping through our fingers, repeating its difference through various territories and machines, the subject (in all senses of this term) that such thought produces is not one we might easily put our minds around and grasp. Like the Proustian antilogo, Deleuze produces an anti-subject. Let us place the Deleuzian writing machine back within its larger philosophy machine (and pretend, in doing so, that the two machines are actually separate from one another) to set off a number of resonances with our first three chapters. On the basis of this exploration of the Deleuzian anti-subject we will finally be able to better distinguish the points of intersection and the points of departure between Deleuze, Derrida, and Foucault.

As we have noted, the notion of the encounter is of capital importance for the literary machine in Proust. In order for the narrator to truly understand the signs he encounters, he must forget his subjectivity and the faculties of the subject: the organs and the faculties they serve must cease to function so that the narrator forms an enormous body without organs:

Le narrateur a beau être doué d’une sensibilité extrême, d’une mémoire prodigieuse : il n’a pas d’organes pour autant qu’il est privé de tout usage volontaire et organisé de ces facultés. En revanche, une faculté s’exerce en lui quand elle est contrainte et forcée de le faire ; et l’organe correspondant se pose sur lui, mais comme une ébauche intensive éveillée par les ondes qui en provoquent l’usage involontaire (1964, 218).
To interpret a sign is then to think in the highest manner. It is in fact a reversal of thinking or the *bon sens* of thinking. In other words, the encounter with a sign (or a philosophical concept) must be one of non-recognition which avoids any predetermination of thought and its *bonne volonté*, as we recall from our discussion of *Différence et répétition*:

En vérité, les concepts ne désignent jamais que des possibilités. Il leur manque une griffe, qui serait celle de la nécessité absolue, c’est-à-dire d’une violence originelle faite à la pensée, d’une étrangeté, d’une inimitié qui seule la sortirait de sa stupeur naturelle ou de son éternelle possibilité : tant qu’il n’y a de pensée qu’involontaire, suscitée contrainte dans la pensée, d’autant plus nécessaire absolument qu’elle naît, par effraction, du fortuit dans le monde (1968a, 181).

The violence of the encounter, as we have seen in Proust, may be located around the sign—a point which attracts the narrator like a flower attracting an insect. However, like the flower and the insect, this encounter must come about through chance; neither agent must willingly search out the encounter for risk of returning to a logic of recognition or an image of thought. In order then for the encounter to take place, each agent must be attracted to the other or have the capacity to “receive” the other as a sign. Finally, each agent must not only be capable of receiving the sign of the other but also of actually receiving it and assuming the violence of this sign. The encounter is then a triply violent moment (violence of chance, violence of the encounter itself, violence of the encounter received) which re-establishes the use of the faculties in terms of what Deleuze defines as a transcendental empiricism. To understand this, we recall from Proust how the encounter with a sign is a material encounter. It is, however, the violence of the encounter which goes beyond the empirical as we might think of it in the wake of Kant and our representation of the empirical through the *sens commun*. In other words, the proper
encounter with the empirical pushes our faculties to their very limit, to the point at which they truly become transcendent: “Il faut porter chaque faculté au point extrême de son dérèglement...chaque faculté découvre alors la passion qui lui est propre, c’est-à-dire sa différence radicale et son éternelle répétition, son élément différentiel et répétiteur, comme l’engendrement instantané de son acte et l’éternel ressassement de son objet, sa manière de naître en répétant déjà” (1968a, 186). Transcendental empiricism then reverses our approach to the encounter, treating it as a problem that precedes its solution. In this sense, we might recall Deleuze’s methodological grounding in Bergsonian intuition:

PREMIERE REGLE : Porter l’épreuve du vrai et du faux dans les problèmes eux-mêmes, dénoncer les faux problèmes, réconcilier vérité et création au niveau des problèmes...c’est le maître d’école qui « donne » des problèmes, la tâche de l’élève étant d’en découvrir la solution. Par là nous sommes maintenus dans une sorte d’esclavage. La vraie liberté est dans un pouvoir de décision, de constitution des problèmes eux-mêmes : ce pouvoir, « semi-divin », implique aussi bien l’évanouissement des faux problèmes que le surgissement créateur des vrais (1966, 3-4).

And we recall that if we are to bring the proper solution to the problem – to extend our faculties to their transcendental limit – we must solve such problems not in terms of space but rather in terms of time (1966, 22).

By reading the encounter in terms of a problem that is correctly posed, we then “descend” a level in the Deleuzian machine. We recall that when encountering a sign, the narrator of the Recherche opens up a territory such as that of high society, the territory of those loved, or the territory of sensations. Yet it is in this territory that a time is revealed as time lost and time found again:

Toute la recherche met en œuvre trois sortes de machines dans la production du Livre : machines à objets partiels (pulsions), machines à résonance (Éros), machines à mouvement forcé (Thanatos). Chacune
produit des vérités, puisqu’il appartient à la vérité d’être produite, et d’être produite comme un effet de temps : le temps perdu, par fragmentation des objets partiels ; le temps retrouvé, par résonance ; le temps perdu d’une autre façon, par amplitude du mouvement forcé, cette perte étant alors passée dans l’œuvre et devenant la condition de sa forme (1964, 192).

These three “time machines” are brought together in the non-totalizing movement of “style:” time complicated (1964, 201-203). We stated above that with the implication of time we would have to “descend” in the Deleuzian machine. This descent or (to hew more closely to temporality) regression involves what Deleuze termed in his study on Hume and later in *Différence et répétition* the first synthesis of time. We recall from Hume how the question of habit reveals the paradox of repetition: repetition changes nothing in the object of repetition but does change something in the spirit or mind that contemplates that repetition (1968a, 96; 1953, 101). This is explained by the passive power of imagination: when we encounter A and then B repeatedly, the next appearance of A sets off a contraction of all other appearances of A followed by B such that this contraction of experience is also an anticipation of the B-to-come (1968a, 97). It is this movement of contraction-anticipation which gives time its shape in the form of movement from the past to the future, as Deleuze explains, “Le présent vivant va donc du passé au futur qu’il constitue dans le temps, c’est-à-dire aussi bien du particulier au général qu’il développe dans le champ de son attente (la différence produite dans l’esprit est la généralité même, en tant qu’elle forme une règle vivante du futur)” (1968a, 97). (This, of course, recalls our discussion of the general nature of difference to be found in the signs of love in Proust as we move from one sign to another.) When the object re-appears, the double movement of contraction-anticipation surges forth, revealing a
difference – an intensity – that distinguishes the repetition from every other repetition in our imagination:

Soutirer à la répétition quelque chose de nouveau, lui soutirer la différence, tel est le rôle de l’imagination ou de l’esprit qui contemple dans ses états multiples et morcelés. Aussi bien la répétition dans son essence est-elle imaginaire, puisque seule l’imagination forme ici le « moment » de la vis repetitiva du point de vue de la constitution, faisant exister ce qu’elle contracte à titre d’éléments ou de cas de répétition (1968a, 103).

Thus, like the repetition of signs of love, each instance of repetition allows a difference to emerge, so that difference is between two differences, and repetition is what allows us to pass from one difference to the next (1968a, 104).

Let us now place this synthesis within the context of the encounter. One might say that Deleuze’s entire oeuvre is an attempt to reconcile two contradictory moves. On the one hand singularities exist in a state of pure, schizophrenic difference which, if left untouched, tend toward auto-destruction. If we attempt to capture these singularities and to give them consistence, we are able to preserve them but at the price of neutralizing their productive nature. How may we form a field or plane in which such singularities may preserve their difference but be endlessly repeated? The first step is the passive synthesis which resembles our discussion of the encounter. Two singularities meet: “La qualité sentie se confond avec la contraction d’excitations élémentaires ; mais l’objet perçu lui-même implique une contraction de cas telle qu’une qualité soit lue dans l’autre, et une structure où la forme d’objet se jumelle à la qualité au moins comme partie intentionnelle” (1968a, 99). In other words, an encounter takes place in which each singularity is capable of meeting the other (capable of contracting) and giving the singularities a plane of consistence. As Deleuze explains, “Nous sommes de l’eau, de la
terre, de la lumière et de l’air contractés, non seulement avant de les reconnaître ou de les représenter, mais avant de les sentir” (1968a, 99). This “before sensing” of our plane of consistence must be carefully explained, however. It would appear that by “sense” Deleuze is referring to the faculties as they are traditionally defined after Kant. There is, however, another level of the faculties to be found in this passive synthesis, as Deleuze explains, returning to Hume. The creative power of difference appears in the imagination or the subject that grows out of this contraction and which only comes to reflect after the contraction. The subject is then constituted by the movement of anticipation-contraction forming what we might term a double subject: a subject which does indeed reflect and a “larval” subject which corresponds to the passive movement of contraction. Deleuze explains:

Le Moi passif ne se définit pas simplement par la réceptivité, c’est-à-dire par la capacité d’éprouver des sensations, mais par la contemplation contractante qui constitue l’organisme lui-même avant d’en constituer les sensations. Aussi ce moi n’a-t-il aucun caractère de simplicité : il ne suffit même pas de relativiser, de pluraliser le moi, tout en lui gardant chaque fois une forme simple atténuée. Les moi sont des sujets larvaires ; le monde des synthèses passives constitue le système du moi, dans des conditions à déterminer, mais le système du moi dissous. Il y a moi dès que s’établit quelque part une contemplation furtive, dès que fonctionne quelque part une machine à contracter, capable un moment de soutirer une différence à la répétition. Le moi n’a pas de modifications, il est lui-même une modification, ce terme désignant précisément la différence soutirée (1968a, 107).

This “larval subject” is then what lies “underneath” or “behind” the encounter and what permits one to receive the force or intensity of this encounter. As a dissolved and passive subject, it comes to the encounter only after the fact, serving as the first step in the correct use of faculties and the dismantling of the Kantian subject.
The subject of Deleuzian thought now begins to shape. We might say that we have been able to give the contents and foundation to our problem of the subject. The content of the subject is a passive synthesis of habit which then allows us to think of the foundation of time in terms of a living present in which the past and the future are simple dimensions. Time is given its direction from the past to the future in the present of attraction-contraction. This present, nonetheless, passes, which leads to a second synthesis of time: that defined by Deleuze as the passive synthesis of memory (1968a, 108). As Deleuze explains, if we consider the present to be founded on the contraction of habit, this habit itself presupposes another, anterior, foundation of the past in the form of memory (1968a, 108). The present then poses the problem of the past. We recall the paradox of the past from our reading of Bergson: “Si le passé attendait un nouveau présent pour se constituer comme passé, jamais l’ancien présent ne passerait ni le nouveau n’arriverait. Jamais un présent ne passerait, s’il n’était passé « en même temps » que présent ; jamais un passé ne se constituerait, s’il ne s’était constitué d’abord « en même temps » qu’il a été présent” (1968a, 111). In other words, the past “shadows,” in a certain manner, the present that it was. Thus, the past is always contemporaneous with the present. As we noted in our reading of Bergson, this aspect of time makes the past the Being of time, or, put differently, the ground of time in which the present and the future are only dimensions (1968a, 111). Let us compare then the two syntheses: the passive synthesis of habit is a contraction of a number of separate instants, each of which is independent of the other. It is a contraction of the present which treats the past and the future as different dimensions of this same present of contraction. The passive synthesis of memory is a contraction of the totality of the past, since the present co-exists with the
past. The present (and the future as the present’s movement) is simply a dimension of the past – its most contracted point. We, of course, recognize this co-existence of past and present in Bergson’s cone of memory (Matière et mémoire, 169) and as the temps perdu which is revealed by the signs of sensation: “Combray ne ressurgit pas comme il fut présent, ni comme il pourrait l’être, mais dans une splendeur qui ne fut jamais vécue, comme un passé pur qui révèle enfin sa double irréductibilité au présent qu’il a été, mais aussi à l’actuel présent qu’il pourrait être, à la faveur d’un télescopage entre les deux” (1968a, 115). Time suddenly “flattens” itself out in this synthesis since all of the past, in a “pure Being,” exists simultaneously. We recall from our discussion of the philosophical concept that this is the moment of “overflight” when the infinite nature of the past suddenly “hovers” over the subject (or concept) (1991, 26). As Deleuze notes, viewed from this perspective, the present is simply a moment of passage in which the Whole of Being might find itself repeated in a more or less contracted manner: “...le signe du présent est un passage à la limite, une contraction maxima qui vient sanctionner comme telle le choix d’un niveau quelconque, lui-même en soi contracté ou détendu, parmi une infinité d’autres niveaux possibles” (1968a, 113). Difference then emerges from this synthesis in that the Whole of Being contains it, in contrast to the first synthesis in which difference is extracted from the anticipation-contraction of a number of distinct singularities. This double repetition of difference does not nullify or void one or the other but rather affirms difference, as Deleuze explains:

Le présent est toujours différence contractée ; mais dans un cas il contracte les instants indifférents, dans l’autre cas il contracte, en passant à la limite, un niveau différentiel du tout qui est lui-même de détente ou de contraction. Si bien que la différence des présents eux-mêmes est entre les deux répétitions, celle des instants élémentaires auxquels on la soutire, celle des niveaux du tout dans lesquels on la comprend (1968a, 114).
To return to our problem of the encounter, we now see that the larval subject is doubly constituted. On the one hand we have a subject that emerges out of the contraction of a number of unique singularities. However, this contraction may only occur if a grounding or Whole of Being “overflies” this larval subject in an endlessly open time of the past. In other words, the subject that serves as the foundation of Deleuzian thought is constantly doubled by an outside: “...dans les structures du dépassement, l'esprit trouve une positivité qui lui vient du dehors” (1953, 12-13). We recall from above that the problem of the Deleuzian subject is the double and contradictory movement of capturing a number of chaotic and schizophrenic singularities while preserving their active and productive nature. The double nature of the larval subject gives us the grounding on which we might then preserve the active nature of these singularities since difference as pure nouveauté is contained within the univocity of pure time. It might appear then that we have solved our problem of the encounter and the Deleuzian subject. Such a conclusion, is, however hasty. We recall that the subject which emerges from the first synthesis of time is what Deleuze qualifies as a “larval” subject. Our readings of Hume underlined how the subject reproduces itself (habit) and reflects on itself, and if we are to move from the larval subject of habit to the active subject of reflection while conserving the difference of pure time, we must make one last synthesis.

We have noted how the first synthesis of time concerns a living present and the second synthesis a pure past. It then logically follows that the third synthesis of time concern the future, as Deleuze explains, “La synthèse du temps constitue ici un avenir qui affirme à la fois le caractère inconditionné du produit par rapport à sa condition,
l'indépendance de l'œuvre par rapport à son auteur ou acteur” (1968a, 125). Just as the second synthesis allowed for a past upon which the present of the first synthesis might be grounded (and affirmed the difference between these syntheses), this third synthesis emerges out of the combination of the first two, affirming once again the ultimate difference. Let us consider how this occurs. Our problem is the move from a passive and larval subject to an active and reflecting subject. We have noted how the past in its pure form might be considered empty: instead of being made up of a number of separate events, it is the time of the past itself which is the being of these events. Time is not made up of the events it records but is that which allows these events to appear. In this sense, time is empty. Interestingly, Deleuze reads Kant’s interpretation of time as helping to reveal the empty nature of time, citing Hamlet’s “the time is out of joint,” he declares, “La Critique de la raison pure est le livre d’Hamlet, le prince du Nord. Kant est dans la situation historique qui lui permet de saisir toute la portée du renversement : le temps n’est plus le temps cosmique du mouvement céleste ordinaire, ni le temps rural du mouvement météorologique dérivé. Il est devenu le temps de la ville et rien d’autre, le pur ordre du temps” (1993: 41-42). In other words, by taking Kant’s Copernican revolution and reading this latter’s time in terms of his own time of the pure past, Deleuze opens up what we have defined as the Being of time. Time is ordered because it is emptied of its empirical contents (1968a, 120). Thus, we might consider an event, such as a murder, which, in its existence or being, is “adequate” to all of time – the event considered as pure past (1968a, 120). With the arrival of this event, time exists as both past and present, as noted above. The emptiness of time as pure past is suddenly rent open by the event itself, distributing the past and the future in relation to the living
present (the first synthesis of time) (1968a, 120). This movement from past to present, from the event as adequate to the ensemble of time, to its place as dividing time into unequal series, is a movement of what we have termed, from our reading of Bergson, actualization. The diffused, univocal, and virtual time of the pure past is actualized in the event, opening up the future. In this movement of actualization, the tension that we have traced between the first and second synthesis is erased. Time is ordered with the movement from the past to the present so that the subject might move from its larval “stage” to its “mature” stage of reflection. At the same time, however, time is also “out of joint” so that the reflecting subject is always caught up in a synthesis that exceeds it. The subject is whole but is also “more” than whole. Thus, the event of the murder, for example, always exceeds us as a subject when considered within the pure past. Oedipus and Hamlet, when considering the image of the event in its form as pure event, are overcome by the event, treating it as “too great” (1968a, 120-121). When the event occurs or is actualized, time ceases to be open but becomes ordered, moving from the past to the present. The subject becomes capable of the action of the event: Hamlet, during his voyage, reflects on what he must do and Oedipus discovers the truth of his actions. The capable subject is then a larval subject. Finally, this movement from the past of the event to its present opens up a future, a new event, whose pregnant nouveauté is made possible only on condition that the synthesis between the open time of the past and the ordered time of the present retain all of their differences. Deleuze declares:

Quant au troisième temps, qui découvre l’avenir – il signifie que l’événement, l’action ont une cohérence secrète excluant celle du moi, se retournant contre le moi qui leur est devenu égal, le projetant en mille morceaux comme si le gestateur du nouveau monde était emporté et dissipé par l’éclat de ce qu’il fait naître au multiple : ce à quoi le moi s’est égalisé, c’est l’inégal en soi (1968a, 121).
This final synthesis of time is then a third repetition, which Deleuze reads in terms of Nietzsche's eternal return. In order to understand the three forms of repetition and the difference they carry, Deleuze underlines how any attempt to understand the present in relationship to the past is based on a false problem: the historian brings the past in relation to the present in terms of analogy or similarity, artificially closing off the problem with a solution (1968a, 121). Instead of reading the present as a repetition of the past, we must read the past as repetition and the present, as well, as repetition. The past and the present are two different modes of repetition whose coherence (what we discover upon reflection) only appears as a result of the third repetition, exceeding our reflection and our subjectivity. As Deleuze declares, "Nous ne produisons quelque chose de nouveau qu'à condition de répéter une fois ce mode qui constitue le passé, une autre fois dans le présent de la métamorphose. Et ce qui est produit, l'absolument nouveau lui-même, n'est rien d'autre à son tour que répétition, la troisième répétition, cette fois par excès, celle de l'avenir comme éternel retour" (1968a, 121-122). It is, nonetheless, this third synthesis and repetition which, paradoxically, gives order and direction to time, setting up the ensemble and series of time while also preserving their difference.

We are now much better armed to return to our question of the encounter and the subject of Deleuzian thought. The triple violence of the encounter is based first in its accidental or involuntary nature which we might qualify as the first reversal of the traditional subject. In other words, we approach the problem from the correct angle, like that of the narrator of the Recherche who hides in the Guermantes' courtyard and observes, by accident, the encounter between Charius and Jupien. This encounter with a sign of love may be interpreted correctly only because it was an accidental encounter:
M. Charlus m’avait distrait de regarder si le bourdon apportait à l’orchidée le pollen qu’elle attendait depuis si longtemps, qu’elle n’avait chance de recevoir que grâce à un hasard si improbable qu’on le pouvait appeler une espèce de miracle. Mais c’était un miracle aussi auquel je venais d’assister, presque du même genre, et non moins merveilleux. Dès que j’eus considéré cette rencontre de ce point de vue, tout m’y sembla empreint de beauté (Proust, 29).

Once the encounter occurs, it sets off a sensation which does not reach the level of representation but rather creates an “overwhelming” sensation. This sensation of being overwhelmed by the experience solicits a memory which, when thought, brings the faculties to their highest function. The subject of Deleuzian thought is then this transcendental use of the faculties which reverses the traditional Kantian subject. The organs and their faculties of the Kantian subject disappear in favor of a body without organs through which the pure intensity or transcendental use of the faculties might be transmitted. This movement of triple violence and triple synthesis of time occurs, of course, simultaneously, so that we might understand the intensity of such an experience more in terms of a line, of vibration, resonance, or of connection which moves at infinite speed and infinitely increases its force – like a bolt of lightning which first arcs up to the sky from the earth before shooting back down this line in an ever-intensifying movement. Pure difference or thought constitutes a subject that always exceeds the subject of bon sens – a subject which is produced on the side and as a result of the encounter. It is the flash of lightning in the dark of night of traditional thought. The Deleuzian writing/philosophy machine is the experience of this subject not only within its proper textual limits but throughout the “text” in terms of the dimension of pure time. Thus, it seems that if we are to take this double machine seriously we must then understand our own experience or encounter with the Deleuzian text as an encounter with its subject:
Car si une œuvre d'art communique avec les autres œuvres du même artiste, et les suscite, si elle communique avec d'autres œuvres d'autres artistes, et en suscite à venir, c'est toujours dans cette dimension de transversalité, où l'unité et la totalité s'établissent pour elles-mêmes, sans unifier ni totaliser objets ou sujets (1964, 202). 13

C. La case vide

The point of an encounter in a sign, its triple violence, and the triple syntheses such an encounter sets off – all of these movements, occurring simultaneously and at an infinite speed, create a line of flight which we might term a movement of absolute difference. The point of our encounter reveals the paradox which is also the heart of the Deleuzian system: it is by definition singular but this singularity also contains that which is the most universal. In other words, our encounter opens us up to the univocity of being, that fullness of pure time that is the second synthesis and which contracts itself in a double movement of differenti/ation/differenciation in the present/future. The encounter assumes an importance in which, as Deleuze declares:

L’univocité de l’être, en tant qu’elle se rapporte immédiatement à la différence, exige que l'on montre comment la différence individuante précède dans l’être les différences génériques, spécifiques et même individuelles – comment un champ préalable d’individuation dans l’être conditionne et la spécification des formes, et la détermination des parties, et leurs variations individuelles (1968a, 56-57).

The point of the encounter is then like a gale-force wind pushing us from behind, filling the singularity of the encounter with a fullness, as if it suddenly unwound itself in an infinite spiral and unfolded its being.

If we are to compare the writing machines of Deleuze, Derrida, and Foucault, perhaps we might do so most efficiently from the point of view of the encounter. We have insisted on the fullness of this point and its productive nature. While we might insist
on the coherence of the Deleuzian project (see Negotiations 6, below) we are not blind to
certain changes in focus found in his work over the years. The simulacrum, for example,
which is quite visible in Différence et répétition and Logique du sens tends to receive
much less emphasis in the later, more mature works. We might situate a similar shift in
emphasis in an early text on structuralism, "A quoi reconnaît-on le structuralisme?"
which was written in 1967 but published in 1973 in a collection on the history of
philosophy edited by François Châtelet (see Works Cited for the complete bibliographical
entry). This text was later rejected by Deleuze as being too rigid in its structure (in short,
as being too structural) (Villani, 118-119) and its re-printing and translation was only
permitted after his death (Stivale, 258). We may nonetheless find echoes of the ideas
presented in this essay in the works published around this period (Différence et répétition
and Logique du sens). One of the more revealing shifts to occur in Deleuze’s work is the
emphasis he places on what he terms “la case vide:” the empty space which circulates
through a structure, allowing for a communication between the singular and the whole. It
appears that the shift from the case vide to the point and the line in Deleuze’s thought
might allow us some insight into the differences and similarities between Deleuze’s
thought and that of his contemporaries.

Let us quickly examine how Deleuze treats the case vide. In his essay on
structuralism, Deleuze gives six criteria for identifying structuralism. The first is the
symbolic. Borrowing the term from Lacan, Deleuze nonetheless defines it in his
distinctive manner: it has nothing to do with form, figures, or essences; the symbolic has
value, “...to the extent that it animates new works that are those of today, as if the
symbolic were the source, inseparably, of living interpretation and creation” (Stivale,
261-262). The second criterion is that of the local or positional: structural space assumes priority over empirical space, "preceding" it in terms of its position (Stivale, 262). The third criterion concerns the relation between elements of structural space. Deleuze insists that this relationship must be thought in terms of the "differential" and the "singular:"

"Every structure presents the following two aspects: a system of differential relations according to which the symbolic elements determine themselves reciprocally, and a system of singularities corresponding to these relations and tracing the space of the structure" (Stivale, 265). We will have recognized a description of the pure difference of the virtual or pure past of time in these first three criteria of structuralism. It should come as no surprise then to find that the fourth criterion concerns the passage from the virtual to the actual, a move which Deleuze terms as "differenciation" in this essay. He explains:

We must therefore distinguish between the total structure of a domain as an ensemble of virtual coexistence, and the substructures that correspond to diverse actualizations in the domain. Of the structure as virtuality, we must say that it is still undifferenciated, even though it is totally and completely differentiated. Of structures that are embodied in a particular actual form (present or past), we must say that they are differenciated, and that for them to be actualized is precisely to be differenciated (Stivale, 268).\textsuperscript{14}

The fifth criterion involves what we might read as the difference-generating effect of actualization familiar to us from the third synthesis of time. Deleuze terms this criterion one of seriality in which the elements of structural space establish relations of differentiability and singularity between themselves. This series of terms or elements then enters into relationship with another series so that the crossing of series is itself part of the movement of differenciation:
Indeed, the symbolic elements that we have previously defined, taken in their differential relations, are organized necessarily in series. But so organized, they relate to another series, constituted by other symbolic elements and by other relations... They thus organize themselves in another series capable of an autonomous development, or at least they necessarily relate the first to this other series (Stivale, 271).

Which then leads us to the sixth criterion and the *casu vide*. Deleuze notes that structural space seems to reveal a paradox in which the divergent series of a structure (the differenciation of difference – by nature non-representative and self-differenciating) contain a common element or a singular object. This object is present in all series, as in Lacan’s study of Poe’s “Purloined Letter” and the appearance of the letter in two different series: that of the king, the queen, and the minister, and that of the police, the minister and Dupin. The letter moves between each series and determines the variations of differential relations of each one (Stivale, 273-274). Referring to the empty square as an “object = x,” Deleuze explains:

If the series that the object = x traverses necessarily present relative displacements in relation to each other, this is so because the relative places of their terms in the structure depend first on the absolute place of each, at each moment, in relation to the object = x that is always circulating, always displaced in relation to itself. It is in this sense that the displacement, and more generally all the forms of exchange, does not constitute a characteristic structure to be defined as an order of places subject to the variation of relations. The whole structure is driven by the originary Third, but that also fails to coincide with its own origin. Distributing the differences through the entire structure, making the differential relations vary with its displacements, the object = x constitutes the differenciating element of difference itself (Stivale, 275).

The empty square is then what allows the structure to function but it is also what does not take part in the structure. The paradoxical nature of this object is what makes and requires it to be empty: “...this is the only place that cannot and must not be filled, were it even by a symbolic element. It must retain the perfection of its emptiness in order to
displace in relation to itself, and in order to circulate throughout the elements and the
variety of relations” (Stivale, 279). Now, even though the empty square is not filled by a
term of the structure, it is nonetheless followed by an “instance” or agency that is
produced as part of the empty square’s movements. This instance is the agent of the
subject, which is produced as an after-effect, a “subject-on-the-side” (Stivale, 279-280).
As Deleuze explains, “The subject is precisely the agency [instance] that follows the
empty place...Its agility is peerless, or should be. Thus, the subject is essentially
intersubjective” (Stivale, 280). Reading the subject of structuralism as intersubjective
certainly recalls our discussion of the Deleuzian project and its connection to style in the
work of art. It is not by chance that this qualification of the empty square comes in
discussion of a final criterion of structuralism which is one in which the subject must be
understood as being part of practice, of the ceaselessly re-generating newness of a
subject’s actualization in structural space (Stivale, 279-282).

Now, we have noted how the case vide might present an opening for our
discussion of Deleuze and his contemporaries. Deleuze’s rejection of this essay should tip
us off to an important shift in his thought, and it appears that this might be found in the
shift he makes from the case vide to the point, line of flight, or fold of later works. It
appears then that Deleuze evacuates this preliminary term’s negativity or emptiness from
his system in favor of a more affirmative reading of the encounter. We recall how
literary style was the positive outcome of an encounter which set the Proustian literary
machine into motion while nonetheless producing a subject-on-the-side or
intersubjectivity, as in the case of the empty square. The point of encounter, instead of
marking one of the empty square’s multiple positions, becomes the unfolding of an
infinite fold as Arnaud Villani explains:

Réfléchir au pliage d’une feuille de papier permet de comprendre certaines
qualités du pli. C’est une marque qu’on ne pourra plus totalement effacer,
et qui donne la possibilité d’un départ latéral. C’est un embrouillement de
directions, de sorte qu’elles se retrouvent toutes, sens dessus-dessous, dans
le pli. C’est enfin un compactage qui, poussé à l’infini, fait voir l’infini en
un seul point : monade (Villani, 108).

It is worth noting the use of the term “marque” in relation to the fold in Deleuzian
thought. Indeed, Deleuze notes how the fold is the central notion in Mallarmé’s poetry
(1988, 43), and this evocation of a marking in the fold and Mallarmé leads us at last to
Derrida.

We recall the importance of the mark from our reading of Derrida and his
interpretation of Mallarmé. Playing on the lack of interiority in Mallarmé’s text, Derrida
notes how a line between representation and non-representation might be drawn, moving
between “Theatre – Idea – Mime – Drama” (Dissémination, 257). This slide between
genres and their representation is defined as the “hymen” since it marks the space of
difference between these structures of representation, setting them apart but also setting
them into their own proper motion or logic. Again, we recall how this “in-between” of
the hymen is described by Derrida: “Le mot « entre », qu’il s’agisse de confusion ou
d’intervalle entre, porte donc toute la force de l’opération...L’hymen dans le texte
(crime, acte sexuel, inceste, suicide, simulacre) se laisse inscrire à la pointe de cette
indécision. Cette pointe s’avance selon l’excès irréductible du syntaxique sur le
sémantique. Le mot « entre » n’a aucun sens plein en lui-même” (Dissémination, 272).
The irreducible excess of the syntactic over the semantic, we recall, is revealed by the
four folds to be found in the text: the empirical mark of a text, such as a sign, the tropic
twist of this mark which refers it to a totality of marks such as metaphors or metonyms, the mark as a totality or concept for all marks, and finally, the marked out space between other marks which allows for the identity of the mark to emerge (*Dissémination*, 307-308). Let us examine in more detail this final fold.

If the mark is to emerge as a mark and then be deployed throughout the work (indeed, this "difference before difference" is necessary if the literary work is to be possible, according to Derrida) then we must look again closely at the problem of the identity of the mark. Now, we have said that the mark that separates the mark from the mark in its other manifestation is necessary for the emergence of the mark's identity. We might recall how this manner of determination of identity resembles Hegel's system of thought. In order for an identity to emerge, we must first tease a difference out of being. Opening his *Logic*, Hegel does just this by underlining the unity of pure being in which nothing can be distinguished: "*Being, pure being...* In its indeterminate immediacy it is equal only to itself...It is pure indeterminateness and emptiness...Being, the indeterminate immediate, is in fact, *nothing*, and neither more nor less than *nothing*" (82). Pure being, in its indeterminate immediacy is exactly the same thing as pure nothingness and it is the realization of this redundancy that allows for the identity of being (being equals being) to emerge as difference from itself: "...*identical* talk therefore contradicts itself. Identity, instead of being in its own self truth and absolute truth, is consequently the very opposite; instead of being the unmoved simple, it is the passage beyond itself into the dissolution of itself" (*Hegel, Logic*, 415). Hegelian absolute truth is then the hard-won product of a process that begins with the dissolution or negation of identity in its simplest form. The determinate being or identity of any object is played through a
similar process: "Something is, and is, then, also a determinate being; further, it is in itself also becoming, which, however, no longer has only being and nothing for its moments. One of these, being, is now determinate being, and further, a determinate being. The second is equally a determinate being, but determined as a negative of the something – an other" (Hegel, Logic, 116). The identity of an object is always then negatively determined, i.e., the being of a tree, for instance, is determined because it is not a house, not a car, etc. The identity of any object is always conditioned by the identity and being of something which it is not. Thus, the mark of Mallarmé’s fold may only be determined if it differs from all other objects including various other marks.

Up to this point, the logic of Derridean différence and Hegelian difference are profoundly similar. The point at which Derrida breaks with Hegel concerns the difference that such a mark must make with itself. This is a complication of the difference with itself that establishes identity in terms of negativity, which opens Hegel’s system. The “difference with difference” that produces différence means that we may never “stand outside” of the differences that condition an object’s identity. And this is exactly what Hegel’s system supposes in the end: the Absolute which brings Hegel’s system to its realization is the coming to self-consciousness of the unfolding of these differences but which remains nonetheless itself unconditioned by the differences presupposed by the system. That the subject is only the result of this movement is not the point since the negative movement of contradiction and determination assume from the very beginning of the project the result. The Hegelian Absolute subject stands outside of the play of difference, reflecting on it without being conditioned by it. The movement of negation which establishes the identity of determined being passes first through itself
and then through the totality of determinate being but never through this movement of negation itself. If it were to do so, it would wind up in a contradiction in which the identity of every being is endlessly deferred through everything else, exceeding the limitations of space and time. The fold of a text cannot not be every other fold as well as not be itself in order for these latter folds to exist and establish the former’s identity. Difference remains the one undetermined object within the Hegelian system and it is on the basis of this undetermined status that reflection might take place with the Absolute of Absolute subjectivity. It is exactly this sort of contradiction which Derrida’s system seeks to avoid. For Derrida, such reflection can only come about “after” the deployment of différence. This is what he means when he declares: “...le pli n’est pas une réflexivité. Si l’on entend par là ce mouvement de la conscience ou de la présence à soi qui joue un rôle si déterminant dans la dialectique et dans la logique spéculative de Hegel, dans le mouvement de la relève (Aufhebung) et de la négativité (l’essence est réflexion, dit la grande Logique), la réflexivité n’est qu’un effet du pli comme texte” (Dissémination, 329).

Now, as we have noted, this final fold of the mark is what allows for the existence of literature. We recall from our reading of Derrida that this fold creates a structural trap in the form of a excess space, like a transcendental object or a place for God (Dissémination, 315-316). The excess of the fold appears to be self-generating and of an order unto itself – in other words, the illusion of an absolute ground or subject is generated by the fold. Indeed, it is the fold of the mark back into its conceptual mark which creates this illusion, giving the fold its identity and then its deployment within tropical and empirical folds. The excess of the mark is folded back into the mark,
“hidden,” as it were, within the line or fold of division between the concept and its empirical appearance (*Dissémination*, 315-316). The hidden fold is what allows the excess of the text to be limited and to give the text its shape. Without it, a text could never exist. The fact that the fold allows for the text to exist marks the point at which the Derridean system breaks with its Hegelian predecessor. Indeed, we recall from our examination of Derrida that the first step of deconstruction is to bring the underlying assumptions of a work to light and to reveal how they privilege a certain series or set of relations. In the case of the fold, it is the undifferentiated illusion of the concept or theme of the fold that is examined. Once these assumptions are dug up, deconstruction reverses them and re-writes them, so that in our example the literary text is re-written within the larger text of *différence*: “Cette écriture – majeure – s’appellera écriture parce qu’elle excède le logos (du sens, de la maîtrise, de la présence, etc.)” (*Écriture et différence*, 392). Again, it is this excess of being which allows the text to appear. In a sense, Derrida unfolds the fold of literature for us, as he explains, “…sous la contrainte de la structure différential-supplémentaire, ajoutant ou retirant toujours un pli à la série, aucun thème du pli ne peut constituer le système de son sens ou présenter l’unité de sa multiplicité. Sans pli, ou si le pli avait quelque part une limite, autre que soi comme marque, marge ou marché…il n’y aurait pas de texte” (*Dissémination*, 328-329). This is what we have termed the creative aspect of Derrida’s thought. Deconstruction is not simply a movement of destruction but also a movement of construction. We recall from our discussion of *Limited, Inc.* that deconstruction is an exercise that helps to explain what makes a text understandable or decidable. It does not destroy the text but rather enables it.
All of this has been examined above in our study of Derrida. It is interesting to note how Deleuze’s early concept of the empty square resembles Derrida’s reading of the “theological trap” opened up by the mark. We recall that the empty square or “object = x” determines the relative displacements of objects in a series in relation to each other through its absolute place in relation to these objects (Stivale, 275). In other words, the empty square assumes a place outside of the series that, while always displaced, nonetheless, “…allows the structure to be defined as an order of places subject to the variation of relations” (Stivale, 275). While it may appear that Deleuze has indeed fallen into what Derrida defines as a trap, such a reading is corrected when we recall that, for Deleuze, the empty square is “…always circulating, always displaced in relation to itself” (Stivale, 275). Indeed, the identification of this empty square is necessary if the structure is to have any order whatsoever. If the series of structural space are to be deployed in their movement of differenc/tiation, a square or place must float free of that space and determine the places of such actualizations: “The whole structure is driven by this originary Third…” (Stivale, 275). However, it is the emptiness of the square which prevents Deleuze from falling into the trap described by Derrida. The square “fails to coincide with its own origin” and is “always circulating, always displaced in relation to itself” (Stivale, 275). In other words, the square folds back into itself, emptying itself of any identity so that it “constitutes the differenciating element of difference itself” (Stivale, 275). In a very striking manner, Deleuze’s empty square resembles Derrida’s mark and this latter’s folding maneuver “underneath” the structural text. Like Derrida, Deleuze insists on the productive nature of the empty square: it opens up the space of a
nomadic subject whose intersubjectivity allows for the creation of works of art. He explains:

...there is a structuralist hero: neither God nor man, neither personal nor universal, it is without an identity, made of nonpersonal individuations and preindividual singularities...For a new structure not to pursue adventures that again are analogous to those of the old structure, not to cause fatal contradictions to be reborn, depends on the resistant and creative force of this hero, on its agility in following and safeguarding the displacements, on its power to cause relations to vary and to redistribute singularities, always casting another throw of the dice" (Stivale, 281).

While certainly “Deleuzian” in its treatment of the subject, we should like to stress how closely this reading of the “subject” and literary creation resembles Derrida’s. By unfairly accenting the opening move of Derrida’s method and its accent on the contradictory elements of a system, Derrida’s readers often forget how important the notion of re-writing is to him. While he would never approach the question from this angle, we are convinced that a “structural hero” also exists for Derrida.

From our comparison above between the empty square and the point, we know that Deleuze abandoned the former concept in favor of one in which any hint of negation disappears. If the Deleuzian writing machine is just as complex as the Derridean text in its critique of a subject, its presuppositions of presence and in its affirmation of the creative, its point of difference is in its point of departure. And this point of departure may be situated, we believe, with this very precise shift from the emptiness of the square to the fullness of the point. Both philosophical projects are critical of their modern heritage in the form of the subject yet it is their approach to this problem which sets them apart. As we have seen, Derrida hews closely to the negative moves of the Hegelian system, going so far as to declare:
La différence doit signer (en un point de proximité presque absolue avec Hegel…) le point de rupture avec le système de l’Aufhebung et de la dialectique spéculative. Cette conflictualité de la différence, qu’on ne peut appeler contradiction qu’à condition de la démarquer par un long travail de celle de Hegel, ne se laissant jamais totalement relever, elle marque ses effets dans ce que j’appelle le texte en général, dans un texte qui ne se tient pas dans le réduit du livre ou de la bibliothèque et ne se laisse jamais commander par un référend au sens classique, par une chose ou par un signifié transcendantal qui en réglerait tout souci d’apaisement ou de réconciliation que je recours plus volontiers à la marque « différence » plutôt qu’au système de la différence-et-de-la-contradiction (Positions, 60-61, emphasis added).

Deconstruction is marked by the cut in the text: the difference, the hymen, the entre of the text which becomes Derrida’s entrance into the text. The Deleuzian philosophy (and writing) machine is situated in the middle as well, but there is no movement of destruction or negativity. Difference begins in the middle with an addition, an “and… and…” Where Derrida attempts to come at the problem of metaphysics from the outside, working away at its foundations until its presuppositions collapse, Deleuze approaches the problem from the inside of the history of metaphysics, transforming the structure and creating something entirely new. Instead of denying the possibility of metaphysics, or at least a certain type of metaphysics, Deleuze gladly affirms his position: “Je me sens pur métaphysicien” (Villani, 130). The classicism of Deleuzian thought is to remain loyal to a metaphysics of critique with its panoply of philosophical arms. However, by opening these arms up – in the middle – metaphysics changes. If the role of the philosopher is to create concepts, Deleuze creates concepts that necessarily change with the problems they solve. To return to our example of the encounter, the Deleuzian approach is to create a concept that solves the problem of the encounter: we encounter a sign and correctly interpret it and this interpretation takes place within a concept of deterritorialization or a line of flight. The manner in which this concept is
employed, as a creation that matches the creation of the encounter, goes completely around the Derridean problematization of concept since difference is submitted to no negativity. We must insist that Derridean thought is not negative, but it nonetheless consistently approaches the problem of metaphysics from a negative side, insisting as it does on the deconstruction which “precedes” construction.\textsuperscript{16} Perhaps it is in recognition of these profound similarities and marking differences that Derrida declared, upon Deleuze’s death:

...Deleuze reste sans doute, malgré tant de dissemblances, celui dont je me suis toujours jugé le plus proche parmi tous ceux de cette « génération ». Je n’ai jamais senti la moindre « objection » s’annoncer en moi, fût-ce virtuellement, contre aucun de ses discours, même s’il m’est arrivé de murmurer contre telle ou telle proposition de l’\textit{Anti-Oedipe}... ou peut-être contre l’idée que la philosophie consiste à « créer » des concepts (“Il me faudra errer tout seul.” 37).

In a similar manner, Foucault famously rendered homage to Deleuze’s work by underlining the resonances that it would continue to set off in thought, making the twentieth century one day, perhaps, Deleuzian (\textit{Language, Counter-Memory, Practice}, 165). We have noted how, in his more theoretical works, Foucault’s project offers striking similarities to Deleuze’s. Indeed, we might re-situate the constitution of the Deleuzian subject through the encounter, its unpredictable nature, and the resulting triple synthesis as a theory of the \textit{event}. In this manner, Foucault’s declared project suddenly becomes that of Deleuze:

...l’événement n’est ni substance ni accident, ni qualité ni processus ; l’événement n’est point immatériel ; c’est toujours au niveau de la matérialité qu’il prend effet, qu’il est effet ; il a son lieu et il consiste dans la relation, la coexistence, la dispersion, le recoupement, l’accumulation, la sélection d’éléments matériels ; il n’est point l’acte ni la propriété d’un corps ; il se produit comme effet de et dans une dispersion matérielle. Disons que la philosophie de l’événement devrait s’avancer dans la direction paradoxale au premier regard d’un matérialisme de l’incorporel.
D’autre part, si les événements discursifs doivent être traités selon des
séries homogènes, mais discontinues les unes par rapport aux autres, quel
statut faut-il donner à ce discontinu ? Il ne s’agit, bien entendu, ni de la
succession des instants du temps, ni de la pluralité des divers sujets
pensants ; il s’agit de césures qui brisent l’instant et dispersent le sujet en
une pluralité de positions et de fonctions possibles. Une telle discontinuité
frappe et invalide les plus petites unités traditionnellement reconnues ou
les moins facilement contestées : l’instant et le sujet. Et, au-dessous
deux, indépendamment d’eux, il faut concevoir entre ces séries
dis continues des relations qui ne sont pas de l’ordre de la succession (ou
de la simultanéité) dans une (ou plusieurs) conscience ; il faut élaborer
en dehors des philosophies du sujet et du temps – une théorie des
systématicités discontinues. Enfin, s’il est vrai que ces séries discursives
et discontinues ont chacune, entre certaines limites, leur régularité, sans
doute n’est-il plus possible d’établir entre les éléments qui les constituent
des liens de causalité mécanique ou de nécessité idéale. Il faut accepter
d’introduire l’aléa comme catégorie dans la production des événements.
(L’ordre du discours, 59-61).

This lengthy quote is interesting for its tone, ringing in echo perhaps to Foucault’s long
fascination with medicine, as a diagnosis of the event. It is perhaps in this tone of
examination or of archeology/genealogy that we might begin to mark the similarities and
differences between Deleuze’s project and that of Foucault. Much like our comparison of
Derrida and Foucault, we should like to insist not so much on a point of radical difference
to distinguish Deleuze from Foucault as on a certain “difference of tone.” We believe
that we might once again be able to distinguish this difference of tone around the case
vide that disappears from Deleuze’s early thought.

Our reading of Proust and Deleuze helped to elaborate what we termed both a
philosophy and a writing machine. This machinic aspect of literature immediately recalls
our examination of Raymond Roussel and Foucault’s explanation of the former’s literary
machines. We recall that Roussel’s style creates two variations in his work. The first
variation is ruled by Roussel’s literary process: the literary work is the result of an effort
to bend two similar words or phrases and reveal the play of language between these
words or phrases. Thus, we might take up our earlier example of the “Chiquenaude” which begins with the phrase: “Les vers de la doublure dans la pièce du Forban talon rouge avaient été composés par moi” and ends with “Les vers de la doublure dans la pièce du fort pantalon rouge !…” (Comment j’ai écrit, 39, 48). By forcing open the play and, more importantly, the doubling play of language between the “b” of the first phrase’s “Forban” and the “p” of the final phrase’s “pantaloon,” Roussel’s stylistic method deploys a literally doubling machine. As Foucault notes, the short story concerns a play in its normal run (thus, a representation of life that is itself not an original but repetition of a repetition) in which the principal actor falls ill and must be replaced by a double. The actor plays the role of the devil, who, protected by a magic cloak, is struck by a young beauty. Taking the place of her lover (or doubling him) the devil is caught in his trick by the lover’s fairy godmother (the lover’s “tricky” double) in her magical mirror. The fairy replaces the interior of devil’s cloak with a false double (eaten through by mites) so that when the devil (the lover’s double, played again this particular evening by a double) is drawn into a duel by the lover, he is betrayed by the false cloak, or more precisely, by the “vers de la doublure dans la pièce du fort pantalon rouge” (Raymond Roussel, 37-38, Comment j’ai écrit certains de mes livres, 39-48).

The force of Roussel’s literary machine is to both openly and secretly bend language around its own play so that the doubling of a simple letter deploys a massive doubling machine. Roussel’s style then comes to double the doubling power of language itself since the initial doubling of letters is doubled by the story’s series of doubles. In these process-oriented variations, the doubling power of language then deploys a structure of literary visibility, what we defined above as Roussel’s “invisible visibility.”
Roussel’s style – his literary machine – is deployed by language itself as it opens up its own double, which, in turn attempts to fill this space with the literary machine in a complex loop that constantly feeds back and doubles itself. We recall Foucault’s definition of this style:

...le style, c’est, sous la nécessité souveraine des mots employés, la possibilité, masquée et désignée à la fois, de dire la même chose, mais autrement. Tout le langage de Roussel...cherche à dire subrepticement deux choses avec les mêmes mots. La torsion, le léger détourn des mots qui d’ordinaire leur permet de « bouger » selon un mouvement tropologique et de faire jouer leur profonde liberté, Roussel en fait un cercle impitoyable qui reconduit les mots à leur point de départ par la force d’une loi contraignante. La flexion du style devient sa négation circulaire (Raymond Roussel, 25).17

It is clearly important to discuss the “circular negation” that Foucault discerns in Roussel’s works, however, before doing so, let us recall the second variation of Roussel’s texts. The “invisible visibility” of Roussel’s process-oriented texts weighs heavily for Foucault on Roussel’s other texts. We recall that he found the “facticity” of works such as la Vue, le Concert, and la Source to be secretly hollowed out by Roussel’s process, as if the flatness and open “given-ness” of the language hid something more profound. Foucault notes, “...ce monde de l’absolu langage est, en un certain sens, profondément silencieux. On a l’impression que tout est dit, mais qu’au fond de ce langage quelque chose se tait” (Raymond Roussel, 146). Indeed, it appears that Foucault finds a negation within the non-process oriented texts that is similar to the one revealed by those guided by Roussel’s stylistic process. The difference between these two textual variations and their respective negations might be defined by the “tenor” of the negation. The process-rulled texts deploy their fantastically visible machines only to be relentlessly mined from the interior with the same energy that they deploy in their visibility. The non-procedural
texts forsake this extravagantly visible machinery for a "flatter" and more "given" language which nonetheless points, in an equally "calm" and "given" manner, to the space that precedes and ultimately doubles this language. Foucault asks, "...cette ombre douce qui, au-dessous de leur surface et de leur masque, rend les choses visibles et fait qu'on peut en parler, n'est-ce pas dès leur naissance, la proximité de la mort, de la mort qui dédouble le monde comme on pêle un fruit" (Raymond Roussel, 156)?

We have, thus, two variations in Roussel's style and two machinic deployments: the process-oriented texts deploy a fantastic visibility which is doubled or hollowed out by the discursive play of language and the non-process guided texts deploy a flat and uncomplicated language (in the sense that its doubling and playfulness is significantly reduced in relation to the procedural texts) which nonetheless sketches an "original" space of invisible visibility. This space of the Rousselian machine is the space of literature. It is what allows the two series of visibility and discourse to interact with each other and to deploy themselves in relation to one another. Turning around this space, the Rousselian texts reveal a subject of literature which Foucault defines in the following manner:

La littérature, ce n'est pas le langage se rapprochant de soi jusqu'au point de sa brûlante manifestation, c'est le langage se mettant au plus loin de lui-même ; et si, en cette mise « hors de soi », il dévoile son être propre, cette clarté soudaine révèle un écart plutôt qu'un repli, une dispersion plutôt qu'un retour des signes sur eux-mêmes. Le « sujet » de la littérature (ce qui parle en elle et ce dont elle parle), ce ne serait pas tellement le langage en sa positivité, que le vide où il trouve son espace quand il s'énonce dans la nudité du « je parle » (La pensée du dehors, 13).

The empty space of literature, much like the Derridean fold, is what then constitutes literature. Read in this way, Foucault's analysis closely resembles the Deleuzian empty space. We might say that Roussel's style precedes itself in a symbolic virtuality in which
the singularities of "b" and "p," for instance, co-exist. Their actualization within
the literary text within a differential relation is driven by the empty space or empty square of
the subject of literature. Indeed, Deleuze admits as much when he compares the
Rousselian process to the use of portmanteau words in Joyce or Carroll as examples of
the empty square's deployment within a text: "Sense...emerges as the effect of the
structure's functioning, in the animation of its component series. And, no doubt,
portmanteau words are only one device among others to ensure this circulation. The
techniques of Raymond Roussel, as Foucault has analyzed them, are of another nature,
founded on differential phonemic relations" (Stivale, 276). And lest one object that this
discussion of Roussel is leading us far astray of Foucault's larger historical and
philosophical project, we must recall how we placed the Roussel study within the context
of discursive formations, power, and the formation of the subject. The Roussel study is
an attempt to place the subject of literature within its appearance or event. To understand
the empty space of literature as it is presented in Roussel is to place Roussel within
Foucault's larger philosophy of the event. To phrase the question in Deleuzian terms, to
properly understand the "problem" of Roussel's literary experience, we must approach it
from the correct angle of Roussel's madness, his death, and the explanation of his literary
works from the "space" of his death. In other words, the subject of literature and the
subject of Raymond Roussel are constituted in the "aléa" of the event.

Now, if Roussel's style closely resembles the Deleuzian criterion of the empty
square, what are we to make of the appearance of "circular negation" and the "space" of
death in Foucault's analysis? Above, we compared the space of literature to the
Derridean fold in the sense that it is what allows literature and Roussel's literary style
machine to constitute itself. Like the Derridean reading of the fold, we must then insist on the double character of Foucault’s literary space: it is both negative (in the sense of “circular negation” and “death”) and affirmative. Foucault explains this affirmative aspect of literary space in his analysis of Blanchot:

...le langage de Blanchot ne fait pas un usage dialectique de la négation. Nier dialectiquement, c'est faire entrer ce qu'on nie dans l'intériorité inquiète de l'esprit. Nier son propre discours comme le fait Blanchot, c'est le faire passer sans cesse hors de lui-même, le dessaisir à chaque instant non seulement de ce qu'il vient de dire mais du pouvoir de l'énoncer ; c'est le laisser là où il est, loin derrière soi, afin d'être libre pour un commencement — qui est une pure origine puisqu'il n'a que lui-même et le vide pour principe, mais qui est aussi bien recommencement puisque c'est le langage passé qui en se creusant lui-même a libéré ce vide (La pensée du dehors, 22).

For Foucault, the open space of language — its outside — goes beyond negation because it is excessive and exceeds the subject of literature. The empty space defies any attempt to master it as an absolute subject, thus injecting an extra space or fold into the logic of difference that founds such a subject. This is the sense of the opening phrase in our quotation above concerning the subject of literature: style is the sovereign necessity of the words that are deployed throughout a text, going beyond a subject in the Hegelian sense and touching upon the sovereign in the sense used by Bataille. Indeed, in discussing the experience of literature and the transgression of the limits of the Hegelian subject, Foucault insists again upon the productive reading that must be made concerning the space of literature:

Transgression is neither violence in a divided world (in an ethical world) nor a victory over limits (in a dialectical or revolutionary world); and exactly for this reason, its role is to measure the excessive distance that it opens at the heart of the limit and to trace the flashing line that causes the limit to arise. Transgression contains nothing negative, but affirms limited being — affirms the limitlessness into which it leaps as it opens this zone to existence for the first time. But correspondingly, this affirmation contains
nothing positive: no content can bind it, since, by definition, no limit can possible restrict it. Perhaps it is simply an affirmation of division; but only insofar as division is not understood to mean a cutting gesture, or the establishment of a separation or the measuring of a distance, only retaining that in it which may designate the existence of difference (Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, 35-36).19

Like Deleuze’s structuralist hero, the affirmative nature of the space of literature exceeds and transgresses the subjective limits of reflexivity.

How or where then might we mark the difference between Foucault’s and Deleuze’s literary subject? We have insisted on sitiating Foucault’s analysis of Roussel within the event of his literary experience. It appears that Deleuze and Foucault approach the experience of literature from similar angles. For Deleuze, the literary machine is set off by (and sets off) encounters whose condition is that they remain involuntary. Approaching an encounter or a sign with knowledge of its meaning beforehand reinforces our reflexive subjectivity and is an improper way to understand the problem. Foucault describes the literary experience in similar terms. Again reading Blanchot, Foucault underlines how the experience of literary space must involve a “negligent attraction:”

Être attiré, ce n’est pas être invité par l’attrait de l’extérieur, c’est plutôt éprouver dans le vide et le dénuement, la présence du dehors, et, lié à cette présence, le fait qu’on est irrémédiablement hors du dehors... L’attirance a pour corollatif nécessaire la négligence. De l’une à l’autre, les rapports sont complexes. Pour pouvoir être attiré, l’homme doit être négligent, – d’une négligence essentielle qui tient pour nul ce qu’il est en train de faire... et pour inexistantes son passé, ses proches, toute son autre vie qui est ainsi rejetée dans le dehors... (La pensée du dehors, 27-29).

It is perhaps at last in this sense of the test, the “épreuve” of “éprouver,” that we might distinguish between Deleuze and Foucault and draw on the negative aspect of the space of literature. Where for Deleuze the literary machine is an encounter which, certainly, involves a sort of attraction or attirance, this attraction is caught up in the violence of the
encounter and its movement of syntheses. One interprets signs that one is capable of
interpreting, and this capacity for interpretation – this attraction to the sign – is like a
“springing outward” of our faculties. The intensity of the encounter is the force with
which we launch into flight from a point, unfolding the divergent series to be found with
the point, on a line of flight whose end is determined only by our capacity to effect other
encounters. To unfold the Deleuzian point is to unfold the literary style machine and
place all of the signs (of high society, love, and sensation, for example) in relation to each
other, extending beyond the limits of each of these signs to the point at which they
communicate with each other in the style of the Recherche itself.

Foucault’s literary space strikingly resembles the empty square of Deleuze’s early
essay and accordingly maintains the negative inflexion we have read as the reason for
Deleuze’s later distaste for the text. To better understand this, the experience of literature
might be put into relation with our earlier analysis of power and subjectivity in Foucault.
We recall that in his study of Classical Greece, Foucault reads subjectivity as a fold or
inflexion of power: the ascetic practices of the Greeks, while treated as individual and
singular practices, were also “anticipations” of moral virtue and the political virtue of the
free citizen (L’usage des plaisirs, 104). The epistemological subjectivity of Greek
civilization is anticipated by an ontological subjectivity that “doubles” the former.
Power, in the form of akses, bends or folds a subject who lives in a “stylized” relation
to the order of being (L’usage des plaisirs, 125). Like the Deleuzian system, a subject is
constituted à côté by the deployment of number of singularities and series, yet this
subject is folded inward and not outward. Power first folds the subject inward, doubling
it like Roussel’s literary machines before exceeding it. Roussel’s subjectivity and the
subject of his literary machine is first marked by the fold of his death before they exceed the space of reflexive subjectivity. Like Derrida then, Foucault's thought presents striking resemblance to that of Deleuze, however it seems that, like Derrida again, the unevacuated negativity of the empty square might mark the point of their difference. The negation of the empty space of literature and its experience (or folding) explains perhaps the "diagnostic" characterization we made earlier of Foucault's philosophy of the event. Where Deleuze extends and expands the point of the encounter, unfolding a subject of thought in the creation of concepts, Foucault traces the folding inward of such an event to the point of its hardening within a discursive formation. This point or space of difference is perhaps at the heart of the concepts that drove their respective philosophies: to the one side, the politically engaged and present intellectual and theorizer of power and to the other the sometime-engaged but often reclusive intellectual and philosopher of desire.

_Negotiations_ 6

Difference and repetition. We return and repeat the point with which we began our study of Deleuze, extending it now to the points of difference and repetition that might be found with two of his contemporaries. In doing so, our encounter with Deleuze has necessarily taken on a Deleuzian tone. Indeed, as has often been remarked, to study Deleuze or to use Deleuzian concepts is, in the end, to fall into a sort of "Deleuze-speech." At certain points in our above chapters this has appeared inevitable. Difference returns again and again as the principal engine of the Deleuzian machine, and, as that engine, requires repetition. And with each repetition, the center of our thought shoots out
in a new direction. To read Deleuze and encounter his philosophy/writing machine is then to become-rhizome. The tree-like unity of this study and its academic unity become something else, sprouting negotiations within each chapter, wandering from territory to concept to writing machine. The unity of the Deleuzian project is this productive energy that pulses through the concepts which themselves constantly shift, change, and unfold as the problems themselves unfold. This is what we have attempted to capture in our study of Deleuze and his contemporaries. Like the signs of the *Recherche*, our encounters with the signs of Deleuzian thought have often been after-the-fact. The sign of the Proustian writing machine suddenly throws new light on the difference factory of the later works, just as these later works, in yet another re-reading, reveal more than was first seen in the early works — difference and repetition or foldings and unfoldings of Deleuze’s thought with each encounter. In the end, this is perhaps the unity or subject of Deleuzian thought. Deleuze’s thought is a constant unfolding that always produces that intensity of the subject on the side, depersonalized by the creative movement of actualization. In a note above we underlined how Deleuze brings the creative force of his philosophy machine to the Foucauldian diagnosis, re-situating the Classical Greek subject within the problem of the Platonic Idea (see note 20 of this chapter). In discussing the concept of the Idea in his *Abécédaire*, Deleuze states that the concept of the Platonic Idea is interesting because it is the creation of a concept that contains one sole thing (1996b, in “H comme Histoire de la Philosophie”). For example, the Idea of the Mother is no longer a mother who is also a daughter or is a married woman but is simply and purely Mother. Plato takes a concept and strips it of its virtual difference. Deleuze reverses Platonic thought by restoring the difference at the heart of this idea. A Mother is a mother but is also a becoming-woman,
a becoming-animal, a becoming-daughter, etc. Alain Badiou in his study of Deleuze sees a restoration of the Platonic unity in the latter’s thought, but it appears that he has forgotten the trace of the virtual carried by the third synthesis of time: “La synthèse du temps constitue ici un avenir qui affirme à la fois le caractère inconditionné du produit par rapport à sa condition, l’indépendance de l’œuvre par rapport à son auteur ou acteur” (1968a, 125). What remains in Deleuze’s thought — what forms his Idea — is the differential force of the virtual. Deleuze’s thought is the constant unfolding of this Idea. The differences and repetitions that have unfolded above form the subject of our encounter with this Idea.

In a letter to Arnaud Villani, Deleuze returns in a certain manner to his reading of Plato, explaining what defines a “good work” for him he notes, “Je crois qu’un livre, s’il mérite d’exister, peut être présenté sous trois aspects rapides. On n’écrit de livre digne que 1. si l’on pense que les livres sur le même sujet ou sur un sujet voisin tombent dans une sorte d’erreur globale...2. si l’on pense que quelque chose d’essentiel a été oublié sur le sujet...3. si l’on estime être capable de créer un nouveau concept...” (Villani, 56). While we are quite aware that our attempt to open up the fold of Deleuzian thought brings it out of its line of flight and back into the territoriality of academic space, we nonetheless hope that our encounter with Deleuze and his contemporaries Derrida and Foucault correspond to the criteria for a good work. In other words, we believe that on a global scale certain errors have been made concerning Derrida and Foucault in their reception within the American academy. For this reason, our readings of their works have accentuated the affirmative nature of Derridean difféance as well as the unity and affirmative nature of Foucault’s project. One might say that this affirmative and creative
side has been forgotten in the empty square of their thought. By placing their thought in relation to Deleuze’s we hope to approach the problem of their thought from the new angle of the plane of immanence. The first step in doing this has been then to open up the (admittedly borrowed) concept of the case vide and plot at what point Derrida and Foucault enter the problematic of this concept. By bringing these latter thinkers into relation with this concept, we now intend to show how the empty square opens a line of de/reterritorialization within the American academy. The creative line of flight of the Deleuzian fold is brought to earth by the transcendental usage of thought. The negative turn or inflexion of the empty square often dooms American reception of these thinkers to a grounding of difference. Difference as an affirmation within the Deleuzian machine is inflected with the negative, turning it into the “oldest of errors:’’ difference as the same.

Notes

1 For variations on both of these readings, see Philip Goodchild’s, *Deleuze and Guattari: An Introduction to the Politics of Desire*, pages 112-145. While Goodchild is aware that the hurried reader might find a good number of points common to Deleuze and his contemporaries Derrida and Foucault, he tends ultimately to insist on the absolute singularity of Deleuze’s thought and rejects almost any common ground of comparison between Deleuze and the former. While we are sensitive to the points raised by readers such as Goodchild, it is against readings like this which swing drastically in one direction that we write this chapter.

2 Such a reading also implicitly rebukes the faulty comparative readings of Deleuze, Derrida, and Foucault, based as they often are on what we might term a reterritorialization of French thought within the American academy.

3 In order to assuage one last time any fears that we are privileging “literary” language or for that matter language tout court in our interpretation of these thinkers, let us cite the qualification Deleuze makes immediately following this quotation:

La limite n’est pas en dehors du langage ; elle en est le dehors : elle est faite de visions et d’auditions non-langagières, mais que seule le langage rend possibles. Aussi y a-t-il une peinture et une musique propres à l’écriture, comme des effets de couleurs et de sonorités qui s’élèvent au-dessus des mots… Ces visions, ces auditions ne sont pas une affaire privée,
mais forment les figures d'une Histoire et d'une géographie sans cesse réinventées (1993, 9).

Upon first glance, this quote seems to confirm the suspicions of those who read philosophical excursions into literature as not making a distinction between poetry and prose (see for example Lynn Huffer’s critique of Blanchot’s notion of literary space and its neutrality where she assimilates Derrida’s position to her reading of Blanchot (Maternal Pasts, Feminist Futures, 154, note 14 and pages 40-50), which is simply an echo of Jürgen Habermas’ position in relation to Derrida and Roman Jakobson (see Habermas’ Le discours philosophique de la modernité, “Digression,” pages 219-248)): the “outside” may only be revealed through language (and in particular literary language). But it is the larger context which is evoked when speaking of the colors and the music of this “outside” of language that tells us we are dealing with a text that exceeds any literary interpretation of the text. The outside is non-linguistic. It exceeds the context. Indeed, where Derrida sometimes hastily evokes the larger socio-economic and extra-human context which allows for our being able to “glimpse” différence at work (Grammatologie, 12-13, for example), Deleuze explicitly brings us back to that context which is History and geography in the largest possible sense with difference at its heart. The process of writing is a process that, while eminently capable of dealing with literature per se, is ultimately extra-linguistic and is caught up in the immanent plane of History and its becomings.

4 A comparison between readings of Proust and Roussel allows a “symmetric” comparison between writers of prose. Derrida’s reading of Mallarmé poses a slight problem, although we recall that the force of Derrida’s argument was directed at the literary notion of mimesis, which concerns prose as well as poetry. For a Derridean reading of a piece of literature in the prose genre, see his interpretation of Jean Genet in Glas.

We might underline, in passing, the importance Mallarmé holds for Deleuze. See his analysis of the Mallarmean fold in Le Pli, pages 43-44. Arnaud Villani also notes the importance given to notions of depersonalization, the middle from which work always begins, and the author-spider in Mallarmé’s work (Villani, 19, note 1).

5 Indeed, as we shall see, our reading of the Deleuzian text throughout this thesis mirrors Deleuze’s own reading of Proust. It is only at the conclusion of the three texts on Proust that our apprentissage is complete and we may construct the machinic unity of the three texts as well as the unity of the Deleuzian project.

6 Though Deleuze re-wrote Proust et les signes three times, adding a section to the text with each edition, we shall refer to the text by the date of its original publication, 1964, in order to avoid any confusion concerning the larger chronology of his œuvre.

7 As we shall see below, “truth” in the Deleuzian context does not mean a truth in terms of an absolute ground. Truth is constituted by the literary and philosophical machine just as the narrator of the Recherche is constituted by its madness.
The signs of love are, in fact, doubly serial in nature. Our above discussion on the seriality of one’s loves or lovers recalls the disappointing nature of signs of love. The sign of love hides a lie since the one we love is never entirely revealed to us, thus turning love into jealousy. This hidden side to the signs of love may lead us to sketch another series of complications: that of homosexuality. Deleuze notes, “L’essence, en amour, s’incarne d’abord dans les lois du mensonge, mais en second lieu dans les secrets de l’homosexualité: le mensonge n’aurait pas la généralité qui le rend essentiel et significatif, s’il ne se rapportait à celle-ci comme à la vérité qu’il cache” (1964, 99). We recall in our reading of the 1976 addition to the Proust study, at the beginning of this section, the importance Charlus’ and Mademoiselle Vinteuil’s homosexuality hold for Deleuze. This second complication or seriality and the shock of its encounter helps to set off the resonance of essence, individualizing each character of the Recherche in an infinitely complicating series which nonetheless communicates with the whole of the work. As noted above, the encounter between Charlus and Jupien must be read as a violent and involuntary encounter with the sign of love whose secret opens the narrator up to the absolute difference of essence and its rhizomatic network of relations, series, and encounters.

This particular section of Deleuze’s study (pages 183–188) is one of the most concise and important explanations of his position concerning literary works of art. It is worth noting the rapprochement he makes between Proust’s literary machine and the Joycean production of epiphanies (1964, 187). One thinks, in particular, of the collection of epiphanies in Dubliners and the machinic production the city of Dublin itself exercises on this work’s characters, reader, and author.

As Arnaud Villani has noted (La guêpe et l’orchidée, 10–13) perhaps nothing captures the rhizomatic nature of style better than the opening chapter of Proust’s Sodome et Gomorrhe where the narrator, while waiting to see if a rare orchid in the Guermantes’ court will attract a wasp, secretly observes the first encounter between Charlus and Jupien. Proust’s observations on sexuality, its signs and their interpretation, and the web of fertilization between men and women is of capital importance. It appears to us that it is possible to find in these few pages the heart of Deleuze’s writing machine as well as, undoubtedly, the origin of his oft-repeated example of the wasp and the orchid. The passage is so revealing in relation to Deleuze’s thought that we find it important to offer several extracts:

A défaut de la contemplation du géologue, j’avais du moins celle du botaniste et regardais par les volets de l’escalier le petit arbuste de la duchesse et la plante précieuse exposés dans la cour avec cette instance qu’on met à faire sortir les jeunes gens à marier, et je me demandais si l’insecte improbable viendrait, par un hasard providentiel, visiter le pistil offert et délaissé... (Sodome et Gomorrhe, 3–4, emphasis added). Puis me rendant compte que personne ne pouvait me voir, je résolus de ne plus me déranger de peur de manquer, si le miracle devait se produire, l’arrivée presque impossible à espérer (à travers tant d’obstacles, de distance, de risques contraires, de dangers) de l’insecte envoyé de si loin en ambassadeur à la vierge qui depuis longtemps prolongeait son attente. Je
savais que cette attente n’était pas plus passive que chez la fleur mâle, dont les étamines s’étaient spontanément tournées pour que l’insecte pût plus facilement la recevoir ; de même la fleur-femme qui était ici, si l’insecte venait, arquerait coquettement ses « styles » et pour être mieux pénétrée par lui ferait imperceptiblement, comme une jouvencelle hypocrite mais ardente, la moitié du chemin. Les lois du monde végétal sont gouvernées elles-mêmes par des lois de plus en plus hautes. Si la visite d’un insecte, c’est-à-dire l’apport de la semence d’une autre fleur, est habituellement nécessaire pour féconder une fleur, c’est que l’auto-fécondation, la fécondation de la fleur par elle-même, comme les mariages répétés dans une même famille, amènerait la dégénérescence et la stérilité, tandis que le croisement opéré par les insectes donne aux générations suivantes de la même espèce une vigueur incomprise de leurs aînées… (Sodome et Gomorrhe, 4-5, emphasis added). Face à face, dans cette cour où ils ne s’étaient certainement jamais rencontrés…le baron ayant soudain largement ouvert ses yeux mi-clos, regardait avec une attention extraordinaire l’ancien giletier sur le seuil de sa boutique, cependant que celui-ci, cloué subitement sur place devant M. de Charlus, erracina comme une plante, contemplait d’un air émerveillé l’embonpoint du baron vieillissant…Jupien…prénait des poses avec la coquetterie qu’aurait pu avoir l’orchidée pour le bourdon providentiellement survenu. (Sodome et Gomorrhe, 6, emphasis added) …la multiplicité de ces comparaisons est elle-même d’autant plus naturelle qu’un même homme, si on l’examine pendant quelques minutes, semble successivement un homme, un homme-oiseau ou un homme-insecte…(Sodome et Gomorrhe, 8, emphasis added) M. Charlus m’avait distrait de regarder si le bourdon apportait à l’orchidée le pollen qu’elle attendait depuis si longtemps, qu’elle n’avait chance de recevoir que grâce à un hasard si improbable qu’on le pouvait appeler une espèce de miracle. Mais c’était un miracle aussi auquel je venais d’assister, presque du même genre, et non moins merveilleux. Dès que je j’eus considéré cette rencontre de ce point de vue, tout m’y sembla empreint de beauté. (Sodome et Gomorrhe, 29, emphasis added)

11 For a stimulating exploration of the ethical and political implications of the Deleuzian subject, see René Schérer’s article, “L’impersonnel : une politique” in Delenze : Une vie philosophique, pages 25-42.

Arnaud Villani also draws a parallel between the Sophist Antiphon’s reading of the law and nature and a Deleuzian ethics. See La gnéie et l’orchidée, page 121, note 12.

12 Although we have discussed Bergson in Chapter 1, we should again point to the third chapter of Matière et mémoire as being of particular importance within the Deleuzian system. We might consider, for example, how the following passage from that chapter illustrates the relation between the first two synthèses of Deleuzian time:

La mémoire du corps, constituée par l’ensemble des systèmes sensori-moteurs que l’habitude a organisés, est donc une mémoire quasi instantanée à laquelle la véritable mémoire du passé sert de base. Comme
elles ne constituent pas deux choses séparées, comme la première n’est, disions-nous, que la pointe mobile insérée par la seconde dans le plan mouvant de l’expérience, il est naturel que ces deux fonctions se prêtent un mutuel appui. D’un côté, en effet, la mémoire du passé présente aux mécanismes sensori-moteurs tous les souvenirs capables de les guider dans leur tâche et de diriger la réaction motrice dans le sens suggéré par les leçons de l’expérience : en cela consistent précisément les associations par contiguité et par similitude. Mais d’autre part les appareils sensori-moteurs fournissent aux souvenirs impuissants, c’est-à-dire inconscients, le moyen de prendre un corps, de se matérialiser, enfin de devenir présents. Il faut, en effet, pour qu’un souvenir reparaîsse à la conscience, qu’il descende des hauteurs de la mémoire pure jusqu’au point précis où s’accomplit l’action. En d’autres termes, c’est du présent que part l’appel auquel le souvenir répond, et c’est aux éléments sensori-moteurs de l’action présente que le souvenir emprunte la chaleur qui donne la vie (Matière et mémoire, 169-170).

13 The division of our discussion into separate moments as in the encounter with the sign and the intensity of the three syntheses can be misleading. We must be careful to place the encounter with the sign back within the plane of immanence of which it is part. The emission of signs is what we might term the “middle moment” which occurs between the differentiation of an idea or a concept and the subsequent movement of differenciation that is part of actualization. Thus, the encounter with a sign and the intensity such an encounter generates in the three syntheses are tied together and feed into each other. Intensity is “metastable” since it always conserves its potential for differentiality. In this manner, Deleuze borrows form Liebniz’s principle of sufficient reason since the intensity of the syntheses determines the differential potential of the actual sign. Deleuze explains:

Une Idée, une multiplicité comme celle de couleur, par exemple, est constituée par la coexistence virtuelle de rapports entre éléments génétiques ou différentiels d’un certain ordre. Ce sont ces rapports qui s’actualisent dans des couleurs qualitativement distinctes, en même temps que leurs points remarquables s’incarnent dans des étendues distinguées qui correspondent avec ces qualités. Les qualités sont donc différenciées, et les étendues, pour autant qu’elles représentent des lignes divergentes d’après lesquelles s’actualisent les apports différentiels qui ne coexistent qu’en Idées...les catégories de différenciation changent d’après l’ordre des différentiels constitutifs de l’Idée : la qualification et la partition sont les deux aspects d’une actualisation physique, comme la spécification et l’organisation, ceux d’une actualisation biologique. Mais toujours se retrouve l’exigence de qualités différenciées en fonction des rapports qu’elles actualisent respectivement, comme d’étendues différenciées en fonction des points remarquables qu’elles incarnent...Comment l’Idée est-elle déterminée à s’incarner dans des qualités différenciées, dans des étendues différenciées ?...La réponse est précisément donnée par les quantités intensives. C’est l’intensité, le déterminant dans le processus d’actualisation...C’est elle qui s’exprime immédiatement dans les
dynamismes spatio-temporels de base, et qui détermine un rapport différentiel, « indistinct » dans l’Idée, à s’incarner dans une qualité distincte et une étendue distinguée. Par là, d’une certaine manière...le mouvement et les catégories de la différenciation se confondent avec ceux de l’explication. Nous parlons de différenciation par rapport à l’Idée qui s’actualise. Nous parlons d’explication par rapport à l’intensité qui se « développe », et qui, précisément, détermine le mouvement d’actualisation. S’il reste littéralement vrai que l’intensité crée les qualités et les étendues dans lesquelles elle s’explique, c’est que les qualités et les étendues ne ressemblent pas, ne ressemblent nullement aux rapports idéels qui s’actualisent en elles : la différenciation implique la création des lignes d’après lesquelles elle s’opère (1968a, 315-316).

Let us also note in passing that the relationship between an Idea (or multiplicity, they are the same thing) and its differenciation is a variant on the principle of sufficient reason because we may then avoid a causal explanation for the movement of actualization. Reason is not a cause but instead accounts for why certain elements must be included in the notion of the actualized sign or individual (to a certain extent, Le Plis is a long meditation on this reason). A causal explanation of “how?” (the reason we caution against dividing the encounter and its intensity into separate “moments”) is only possible “after” the three syntheses and the establishment of space and time, as Deleuze hints in the above quote. With this in mind, the emphasis on the difference between causes and events in Logique du sens becomes much easier to understand.

14 Although our elaboration of the Deleuzian system in the first section should make this clear, it is worth stressing that the creative movement of differenciation and differenciation allows for the emergence of time and space:

Time goes from the virtual to the actual, that is, from structure to its actualizations, and not from one actual form to another. Or at least time conceived as a relation of succession of two actual forms makes do with expressing abstractly the internal times of the structure or structures that are effectuated in depth in these two forms, and the differential relations between these times. And precisely because the structure is not actualized without being differenciated in space and time, hence without differenciating the species and the parts that carry it out, we must say in this sense that structure produces these species and these parts themselves. It produces them as differenciated species and parts, such that one can no more oppose the genetic to the structural than time to structure. Genesis, like time, goes from the virtual to the actual, from the structure to its actualization; the two notions of multiple internal time an static ordinal genesis are in this sense inseparable from the play of structures (Stivale, 269).

15 See the final pages of the Logic where Hegel admits this presupposition as in the following example, “By virtue of the method just indicated, the science exhibits itself as a circle returning upon itself, the end being wound back into the beginning, the simple ground, by the mediation; this circle is moreover a circle of circles...” (Hegel, 842).
16 We might take Derrida's approach towards the concept as an example of this tendency, in which différence is no longer a concept and in which difference is neither of nature nor of degree: "Mais on peut...penser ou déconstruire autrement le concept de concept, penser une différence qui ne soit ni de nature ni de degré, et dont je dis...que ce ne sont plus tout à fait des mots ou des concepts" (Limited, Inc., 211).

17 We might note how this concept of style resembles that of Deleuze who often borrows Proust's conception of language to define the literary and philosophical machine as a machine that creates minorities: "Ce que fait la littérature dans la langue apparaît mieux : comme dit Proust, elle y trace précisément une sorte de langue étrangère, qui n'est pas une autre langue, ni un patois retrouvé, mais un devenir-autre de la langue, une minoration de cette langue majeure, un délire qui l'emporte, une ligne de sorcière qui s'échappe du système dominant" (1993, 15). Style emerges when one attacks the language, bending it like Roussel, so that the exclusions of language (its non-playful nature) are opened up and become playful. Roussel's style falls easily within the Deleuzian machine when considered in the following manner (a discussion of Gherasim Luca's poetic style):

La langue est soumise à un double procès, celui des choix à faire et celui des suites à établir : la disjonction ou sélection des semblables, la connexion ou consécution des combinaibles. Tant que la langue est considérée comme un système en équilibre, les disjonctions sont nécessairement inclusives (on ne dit pas à la fois « passion », « ration », « nation », il faut choisir) et les connexions, progressives (on ne combine pas un mot avec ses éléments, dans une sorte de surplace ou d'avant-arrière). Mais voilà que, loin de l'équilibre, les disjonctions deviennent inclusives, inclusives, et les connexions réflexives, suivant une démarche chaloupée qui concerne le procès de la langue et non plus le cours de la parole. Chaque mot se divise, mais en soi-même (pas-rats, passion-rations) et se combine, mais avec soi-même (pas-passe-passion). C'est comme si la langue tout entière se mettait à rouler, à droite à gauche, et à tanguer, en arrière en avant : les deux hégaïments (1993, 138-139).

18 From the angle of the Rousselian experience, we again find parallel's with Deleuze's reading of the literary machine and its deployment within the intensities or madness of the literary encounter. Foucault thus declares, in situating Roussel in relation to his work, "Le langage n'est-il pas, entre la folie et l'œuvre, le lieu vide et plein, invisible et inévitable, de leur mutuelle exclusion ?...L'espace du langage de Roussel, le vide d'où il parle, [c'est] l'absence par laquelle l'œuvre et la folie communiquent et s'excluent" (Raymond Roussel, 205-207).

19 In this sense, the outside of Blanchot's literary space is transgressive, always marking off the extreme limit of language in a manner which exceeds an attempt to enclose it within a reflexive subject. Foucault declares, "...[Il faut] convertir le langage réflexif. Il doit être tourné non pas vers une confirmation intérieure, -- vers une sorte de certitude
centrale d'où il ne pourrait plus être délogé – mais plutôt vers une extrémité où il lui faut toujours se contester… (La pensée du dehors, 21-22).

20 At a certain point in his study of Foucault, Deleuze objects to those who qualify Foucault's work as a study of "enclosed spaces:" the prison, the hospital, the asylum, etc. Deleuze objects that Foucault instead opens these spaces up, "opening up" the space between words and things. On this point it seems that Deleuze is indeed correct and places the accent on the creative and affirmative aspect of the space of thought or literature. However, we must again insist on the inward folding that sets Foucault apart from Deleuze. When considering the question of the "death of man" in Foucault's work, Deleuze underlines Foucault's "diagnostic" approach to explain "man's" appearance and subsequent disappearance (1986, 131-137). "Man's" replacement is only evoked as a possible change in the relations of force, as in the final works and courses concerning bio-power. We might take another example, again from Deleuze, who admires the fold of subjectivity in Foucault's study of Classical Greece: "Ils ont plié la force, ils ont découvert la force comme quelque chose qui pouvait être plié, et cela uniquement par stratégie, parce qu'ils ont inventé un rapport de forces qui passait par une rivalité des hommes libres (gouverner les autres à condition de se gouverner soi-même…)" (1986, 121). Where Foucault "diagnoses" this event, Deleuze creates, if we recall the manner in which he places this event within the "context" of its problem: government in the Greek city is distinguished by rivalry, since members of the magistrature run for office and are not appointed by an imperial bureaucracy (see, for example, the chapter on "Géophilosophie" in 1991, the appendix on Plato and the simulacrum in 1969, and pages 84-95, 1968a). The problem of Greek society is to create a concept that corresponds to the problem of selecting the proper or "true" candidate. This concept, within Platonic thought, is the concept of the Idea. The proper or "true" candidate corresponds most closely to the pure Idea and what differs from this Idea must be excluded from the City. Thus, from the "fold" in Greek subjectivity, Deleuze uncovers a problem, the problem of the Idea, which is, in fact, the problem of difference:

...tout le platonisme est dominé par l'idée d'une distinction à faire entre « la chose même » et les simulacres. Au lieu de penser la différence en elle-même, il la rapporte déjà à un fondement, la subordonne au même et introduit la médiation sous une forme mythique. Renverser le platonisme signifie ceci : dénier le primat d'un original sur la copie, d'un modèle sur l'image. Glorifier le règne des simulacres et des reflets (1968a, 91-92).

From a "fold" in thought, Deleuze unfolds a philosophy of difference, and in doing so, offers a demonstration of the intensity of the philosophical experience: the encounter with Foucault sets off a fold in Deleuze's thinking that, in its unfolding, folds back unto Greek thought itself in order to unfold again (in the form of a new fold in that thought) (we return, in this manner, to the three syntheses of thought).

A final note should be made concerning the fold inward. It is true that, as part of the "attraction" of the encounter, Deleuze speaks of an "inflexion." But this inflexion is actually an unfolding, like our movement from Foucault to the Greeks to a philosophy of difference. The inflexion of Deleuzian thought, when put to its immanent usage, is always an unfolding: "C'est là qu'on va de pli en pli, non pas de point en point, et que tout contour s'estompe au profit des puissances formelles du matériau, qui montent à la
surface et se présentent comme autant de détours et de replis supplémentaires” (1988, 23).
PART III

TERRITORIES OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN THOUGHT

Chapter 7

Deterritorialized Thought Reterritorialized

In our previous chapter we explained how our motivation for exploring Derrida’s and Foucault’s system of thought was, first, an attempt to set apart and better define the territory of Deleuze’s own thought and, second, a prelude to a reading of thought as moving in lines of deterritorialization and reterritorialization. Difference (particularly as it is mobilized within the Derridean and Foucauldian systems) is very much at the heart of the debates concerning the contemporary American university system, whether framed in terms of what was called the “political correctness debate” of the 1980s or the contemporary “culture wars.” Although it is not our goal here to weigh in on these rather long-running debates, briefly recalling the terms of this dispute might be useful as an introduction to our larger analysis of French thought and its “territorialization” within the American academy. To put it differently, this “local” context of contemporary debates is by no means an attempt to reduce or limit the meaning of these issues: on the contrary, by focusing on the “larger” issues of difference and the movements of de- and re-territorialization we may perhaps better understand the issues at question in contemporary concerns of literature and theory. The “larger” text of philosophical debate is not separate then from the “local” text of the American academy.
In the following pages we intend then to make a Deleuzian reading of the contemporary debates concerning the American academy, demonstrating in particular how certain influential interpretations of Derrida and Foucault (by far the most influential of contemporary French thinkers in the past thirty years) contribute to these debates by making transcendent, and territorializing readings of these thinkers.

A. The Conflict of the Faculties

Perhaps one of the best examples around which we might situate the contemporary debates concerning difference and its deployment may be taken from a rather recent and very public dispute. In the debate around modifications to the University of Texas freshman composition requirement, the university’s Black Faculty Caucus published a statement calling for a diversification of the literary canon and the “great works” around which incoming students were asked to complete their English composition requirements. Reading the definition of literature’s great works in the form of the canon as a limitation on the knowledge that the university intends to transmit, the authors of the statement pushed their argument to a polemical conclusion, stating, “What we are talking about here is no less than transforming the University into a center of multicultural learning: anything less continues a system of education that ultimately reproduces racism and racists” (cited in Berman, 257). In other words, by attempting to fix the meaning of a literary text, i.e. determining its value as “great” or “not great,” the designation of a canon of literary works worthy of study closes off what, in Derridean terms might be defined as the “fold of literature.” Although the general arguments
surrounding the canon as well as the specific argument of the Black Faculty Caucus of the University of Texas are certainly richer and more complex, we might quickly understand the point of the caucus' criticism by recalling our reading of the fold of literature in Mallarmé. We noted above that for Derrida one manner in which we might approach literature and make a value judgement is through a close analysis of the themes present in a work. Thus, we might carefully explicate a text by noting how its various textual marks form part of a larger thematic collection. Having done this we might be able to carefully and quite forcefully argue a work’s greatness, much like Jean-Pierre Richard does when reading Mallarmé. The difficulty with such a reading, we recall, is that it artificially and prematurely closes off what makes the work possible, in other words the fold of the text forever escapes a thematic analysis. We might recall that this artificial limitation of a text’s difference mirrors in many ways Hegel’s own limitation of difference in his dialectical system, as analyzed above in our discussion of Derrida and Deleuze. The authors of the statement extend this analysis to an ethico-political level noting how such a limitation ultimately serves to reinforce a certain metaphysical subject of such readings, reducing difference to "the same" of a very-often white and very-often male-authored text.¹ We shall return to closer reading of the implications of this statement and its conclusion with our readings of difference in Deleuze, Derrida, and Foucault below. For the moment, let us return to the reaction this statement generated.

The debate over the works to be included in the University of Texas’ freshman composition course attracted a great deal of attention, including that of the national news media. In a commentary on the debate and its larger cultural context, the syndicated columnist George Will wrote, “So it goes on many campuses. The troubles at Texas are,
as yet, mild. But the trajectory is visible: down. So is the destination: political indoctrination supplanting education” (cited in Berman, 261). As Peggy Kamuf has noted, what is interesting in this debate is not so much the different positions of its antagonists as is its framing or argumentation in terms of the “ends” of the university (138-139). On the one hand the university is understood to serve a multiple and diverse population and the proper use of reason is to establish a “center of multicultural learning” which will take into account thought that a centered and closed reason unfairly excludes. On the other hand, the university and reason provide a neutral ground where those differences of multiple and diverse populations might be transcended in a higher goal. In spite of these different goals it is nonetheless the end of their arguments that brings these two antagonists together. The proper use or role of the university (its end) is justified by that very public which it seeks to educate: “education” or “political indoctrination” are, in spite of their differences, used as the ends which justify the arguments of each side. As Kamuf notes, this logic, in spite of its circularity, constitutes what we generally understand as legitimacy or the legitimated mode of argumentation (139). Perhaps another manner of critiquing the arguments of the protagonists in the University of Texas debate would be to say that the problem is a false problem. By this we do not mean that the debate concerning the canon and multicultural literatures/discourses has no value, but rather that we might better understand this debate if we heed Deleuze’s admonition to separate true problems from false problems. By arguing in terms of the end sought and by using this end as the point around which the legitimacy of their argument hinges, both sides of the debate have posed the problem in the false terms of what we might term (echoing our previous study of the “image of thought”) the “image of the university.”
In our above reading of Deleuze’s literary and philosophical machine we focused on the productive force of the encounter and the subject it constitutes through the triple syntheses of time. Far from decrying the use of the faculties and their Kantian heritage, Deleuze declares that a return to the faculties is needed: “Le discrédit dans lequel est tombée aujourd’hui la doctrine des facultés, pièce pourtant tout à fait nécessaire dans le système de la philosophie, s’explique par la méconnaissance d’un empirisme proprement transcendantal, auquel on substituait vainement un décalque du transcendantal sur l’empirique” (1968a, 186). This “substitution of a transcendental imitation on the empirical” is the false problem of the Kantian system. We recall that Kant proposes three syntheses of his own (the synthesis of apprehension in intuition, the synthesis of reproduction in the imagination, and the synthesis of recognition in a concept), whose culmination may be found in the transcendental unity of “I think.” In his system, the use of these syntheses is never questioned since there is only one use: to assure the unity of the subject. Or, to put the question in more celebrated terms:

If cinnabar were one moment red, the next moment black, one moment light, the next moment heavy, if human beings one moment changed into one animal shape, the next moment into a different animal shape, if on the longest day the country were one moment covered with fruit, the next moment with ice and snow, then my empirical imagination would not even be able to think of the heavy cinnabar in connection with the representation of the colour red (Critique of Pure Reason, 123).

The multiply-varied differences of our imagination are brought into line or order through the recognition of a concept in a unified consciousness:

It is precisely the transcendental unity of apperception that produces, out of all the appearances capable of co-existing in a unitary experience, a connection of all representations according to rules. For this unity of consciousness would be impossible if the mind, in coming to know the manifold, could not become conscious of the identity of the function by means of which it synthetically connects the manifold into
knowledge...the mind could not possibly a priori think to itself the identity of oneself in the multiplicity of its representations if it did not fix its attention on the identity of its act, an act that subjects all synthesis of apprehension (which is empirical) to a transcendental unity and only by doing so makes possible the interconnectedness of representations according to a priori rules (Critique of Pure Reason, 126-127).

The proper use of reason, its end, is then to be found in the circular movement of recognition. What Deleuze, through Proust, calls the creative violence of thought is reduced to the bonne volonté of philosophy or the image of thought:

Dans le logos, il y a un aspect, si caché soit-il, par lequel l'Intelligence vient toujours avant, par lequel le tout est déjà présent, la loi, déjà connue avant ce à quoi on l'applique : le tour de passe-passe dialectique, où l'on ne fait que retrouver ce qu'on s’est d’abord donné et où l'on ne tire des choses que ce qu'on y a mis. Et l'on reconnaît les restes d’un Logos dans Sainte-Beuve et sa méthode harassante, lorsqu’il interroge les amis d’un auteur pour évaluer l’œuvre comme effet d’une famille, d’une époque et d’un milieu, quitte à considérer l’œuvre à son tour comme un tout qui réagit sur le milieu (1998, 128).

Like the “good will” of the antagonists in the debate at the University of Texas towards the end of the university, Kant’s law precedes his argument, legitimating it in a “tour de passe-passe.” We return then to a false problem and might echo Deleuze by asking of the debate surrounding the university, “Mais qui peut croire que le destin de l[université] s’y joue, et que nous pensions, quand nous reconnaissions ?” (1968a, 176)

Now, Kant’s reflections on reason are interesting from another angle within the debate outlined above. At several points in his works Kant reflected on the role of reason as it is deployed within the university and they are worth exploring in relation to Deleuze and our contemporary debate. In an essay in The Conflict of the Faculties, “An Old Question Raised Again: Is the Human Race Constantly Progressing?”, Kant comments at one point on “popular enlightenment” and the public instruction of the people.
Regarding the relation between the state and the people’s instructors, Kant underlines its complicated nature:

Enlightenment of the masses is the public instruction of the people in its duties and rights vis-à-vis the state to which they belong. Since only natural rights and rights arising out of the common human understanding are concerned here, then the natural heralds and expositors of these among the people are not officially appointed by the state but are free professors of law, that is philosophers who, precisely because this freedom is allowed to them, are objectionable to the state, which always desires to rule alone; and they are decried, under the name of enlighteners, as persons dangerous to the state, although their voice is not addressed confidentially to the people (as the people scarcely take any or no notice of it and of their writings) but is addressed respectfully to the state; and they implore the state to take no heart that need which is felt to be legitimate. This can happen by no others means than that of publicity in the event that an entire people cares to bring forward its grievances. Thus the prohibition of publicity impedes the progress of a people toward improvement, even in that which applies to the least of its claims, namely its mere natural right (Kant, 161).

The arguments here are tangled but deserve teasing out. Like the positions of the antagonists in the University of Texas debate, the legitimate use of reason is in question in Kant’s essay. The designation of teachers or philosophers as “free” and as “not officially appointed by the state” may be misleading since professors are indeed appointed at the university by the state. Kant is arguing that in spite of their appointment to the university and their assumed debt to this institution, the “natural heralds and expositors” of universal rights must be free. Indeed, this freedom is the condition of their appointment as philosophers. The mistake would be to undermine this freedom through an overly-intrusive state which would wish to control them. The “danger” posed then by such “heralds and expositors” is the limit they place on the state’s desire to control or rule absolutely. Indeed, it is not to the people that philosophers address their lessons but to the state, the misconception here being that in speaking to the people of their “rights and
duties vis-à-vis the state” the philosophers are addressing the people. For Kant, philosophers are actually addressing the state in its rights and duties vis-à-vis the people. To resist these lessons the state erects a number of fictions concerning philosophers (censorship preserves the people’s respect for the state, for example) in order to limit or control them.²

Now, once again, we are faced with a question of the end of reason, this time in terms of reason or enlightenment for the masses. The end of enlightenment is not the people, who “scarcely take any or no notice of it and of philosophers’ writings,” but rather the state, whose gradual instruction is to be assured by the philosopher. As Kamuf notes, Kant understands the voice of reason to be heard in an age of enlightenment and not an enlightened age, thus, reason and enlightenment are part of a passage from childhood to adulthood: enlightenment is a process that has yet to reach its end (Kamuf, 137-138). Kant understands reason’s end as the gradual instruction of the state on its rights and duties. However, again like the circular logic of the faculties examined above, the faculties of the university depend on the state for their existence. The philosopher is appointed to the university by the state, which nonetheless holds the power to censor his thought. This privileged position of the philosopher is underlined when we consider how Kant, in his short essay “Réponse à la question : qu’est-ce que les Lumières ?” distinguishes between the public and private use of reason. He explains, “Mais je comprends par usage public de sa propre raison celui qu’en fait quelqu’un, en tant que savant, devant l’ensemble du public qui lit. J’appelle usage privé celui qui lui est permis de faire de sa raison dans une charge civile qui lui a été confiée ou dans ses fonctions” (45). The private use of reason might then be limited by one’s duties to a civil post or
office, as in the case of a military officer who must not argue with an order even if he privately disagrees with it ("Réponse à la question : qu’est-ce que les Lumières?", 45-46). However, speaking as a scholar or man of learning, the officer may quite publicly make his case for disagreement. Kant never mentions the university because, conceivably, the difference between public and private reason does not apply. This seems to be confirmed if we consider the manner in which Kant defines the faculty of philosophy in comparison to its related faculties such as theology, law, or medicine: "Now the power to judge autonomously — that is, freely (according to principles of thought in general) — is called reason. So the philosophy faculty, because it must answer for the truth of the teachings it is to adopt or even allow, must be conceived as free and subject only to laws given by reason, not by government" (The Conflict of the Faculties, 43). The philosopher, as "natural herald and expositor," is subject only to the laws of reason whose end is, we recall, the state. However, it is the state which installs the philosopher in this position. The philosopher’s freedom extends from the end of his teaching, the state itself.³

Once again, the end of reason recognizes itself. As Deleuze declares, “Le signe de la reconnaissance célèbre des fiançailles monstrueuses, où la pensée « retrouve » l’État, retrouve « l’Église », retrouve toutes les valeurs du temps qu’elle a fait passer subtilement sous la forme pure d’un éternel objet quelconque, éternellement bénii” (1968a, 177). Kant, the Black Faculty Caucus of the University of Texas, and George Will, in spite of their conflicting viewpoints (Kant’s centered subject, placed within the trajectory of modern thought is certainly one of things that the Black Faculty Caucus would like to undermine with its “center of multicultural learning”) erect what Deleuze
would call "tribunals of judgement" in which the good will or end of their argument is simply the "same" "disguised" as "difference." As Deleuze argues, the false problem of the ends of reason, literature, or the university is one in which the new or different cannot serve as the basis for an argument: "...le propre du nouveau, c'est-à-dire la différence, est de solliciter dans la pensée des forces qui ne sont pas celles de la reconnaissance, ni aujourd'hui ni demain, des puissances d'un tout autre modèle, dans une terra incognita jamais reconnue ni reconnaissable" (1968a, 177).

The argument used by the two sides in our example concerning the University of Texas involves a complementary aspect which might also be found in a number of similar debates around the country this past decade. That is, each side adopts a tone or rhetoric of urgency which serves to further justify its argument and legitimization around the ends of the university. Without changes in the freshman composition syllabus, the university will inevitably produce racism and racists, according to the Black Faculty Caucus while George Will implies ominously that the end of modern society is in sight. In each case, we have the sense that the conflict between the two sides has never assumed the stakes it holds at the actual moment and that we have reached a watershed moment in the history of the university. This argument is particularly evident in Will's position, implying as it does, that contemporary innovations in literary criticism have undone a certain unity of purpose that once existed in this faculty. A useful corrective to such readings is the much-discussed work by Gerald Graff, Professing Literature: An Institutional History, which dispenses with the idea that the contemporary debate surrounding literature is new or particularly urgent. Let us examine his argument (and proposed solution) concerning the contemporary American academy, for it will allow us to further "contextualize" the
contemporary situation within what we shall define below as a "territorialization" of thought.

As Graff admits, at the outset of his study he tends to share Will's point of view: "When I first began this inquiry I vaguely assumed that the founders of academic literary studies must originally have had a shared idea of their rationale that had somehow got lost along the way" (3). However, upon closer analysis, a different sort of outline emerges of various "waves" of literary study: there is first the rise and subsequent fall of classical rhetorical study, which is replaced in time by philology and literary history, themselves subsumed by New Criticism. Contemporary students of literary studies are familiar with how the New Criticism gave way to the advent of "theory" and our contemporary moment of literary studies, "splintered" into a number of sub-categories. This unearthing of the history of the "conflict of the faculties" in the American academy leads Graff to make a celebrated conclusion/proposal: our approach to literature and literary studies should not attempt to erase or dissimulate the conflicts that are at its origin but rather bring them to the fore. Graff's widely-discussed proposal has been dubbed, "teaching the conflicts," and was first formulated in the following manner:

At issue is the teaching of literature, then, and in the formation of a literature curriculum, are how much of the "cultural text" students must presuppose in order to make sense of works of literature, and how this cultural text can become the context of teaching. That there is no agreement over how the cultural text should be understood, or whether it should come into play at all in the teaching of literature, seems to me an argument for rather than against a more explicitly historicized and cultural kind of literary study that would make such disagreements part of what is studied. The important thing, in any case, is to shift the question from "Whose overview gets to be the big umbrella?" in which form it becomes unanswerable, to "How do we institutionalize the conflict of interpretations and overviews itself?" To emphasize conflict over consensus is not to turn conflict into a value, nor certainly is it to reject
consensus where we can get it...It is simply to take our point of departure from a state of affairs that already exists (258).

Now, despite the date of Graff's proposal (1987) it tends to offer insight on the debate or conflict between competing views of literary studies advanced by our example concerning the University of Texas. However, this approach to the conflict of literature, is ultimately based on the same image of thought or the university as our previous examples. For example, just what exactly is the point or place that allows Graff to stand outside of the "conflict of interpretations and overviews?" It appears that what Graff attempts to rectify with his enlightening analysis of literary studies and its conflicts is, ultimately, re-instated by his solution. Is it not the case that the "teaching of the conflicts" and the good intentions behind such a proposal simply point to an end or image of the university as a neutral ground on which the various conflicts of the faculties might be played out? The end of the university is then the image or representation of these conflicts which then serve as the legitimization of the university and its differences. The institutionalization of the conflict of the faculties is again the place or space in which the university recognizes itself. In the final analysis, we are once again faced with an image of thought that resembles that offered by Kant, the Black Faculty Caucus, and George Will.

Now, as we stated, if Graff's argument eventually falls prey to the same weaknesses as those of our earlier examples, it has nonetheless the merit of placing what we have termed the "conflict of the faculties" within a larger historical context. Indeed, as noted in our reading of Kant, part of the motivation for the latter's discussion of the university and its relation to the state is the relation the university holds to the enlightenment project. We noted above that Kant reads that project in terms of a passage
from childhood to adulthood, implying that the end of the university is yet to come. Thus, we might better understand our reading of the Black Faculty Caucus, George Will, and Gerald Graff as points within a trajectory of thought that bases itself on the enlightenment project and the project of the scientific university. As part of our criticism of this trajectory, we have placed the accent on what we have termed the image of the university and manner in which this is part of the image of thought decried by Deleuze. If we are to understand the conflict of the faculties and the debates surrounding difference, we might return to a Deleuzian reading of the use of the faculties. Before doing this, however, we might evoke another example of the “image of the university” within a historical context that slightly precedes that which we have sketched through our above contemporary examples.

In his own study of the contemporary conflict of the faculties, *The Employment of English: Theory, Jobs, and the Future of Literary Studies*, Michael Bérubé succinctly explains, in somewhat modified terms, the reasons for the debate presented in our first example:

“...English is a leading player in the current debates over the social function of the university not only because its internal heterogeneity seems to license the discipline to speak for the humanities – and sometimes for the university – as a whole, but also because that heterogeneity emblematizes the crisis of representation in which American higher education is currently caught” (187).

In order to understand this debate, Bérubé refers to those disputes that swept through the American academy in the early 1960s. As we noted in reference to Graff, the idea that the “division” of the university and its faculties is something entirely new and requiring urgent rectification ignores a long history of debate around these very divisions, and this is what Bérubé attempts to do, in part, by tracing the contemporary conflict to some of its
recent predecessors and the very modern roots of these differences. In the early 1960s, the president of the University of California at Berkeley issued his famous position paper *The Uses of the University* in which he spelled out his plan for an "opening" of the university into a *multiversity* (Bérubé, 187). This opening was based on a reading of the misconceptions surrounding the ends of the university. The author of the paper, Clark Kerr, stated:

> There are two great cliches about the university. One pictures it as a radical institution, when in fact it is the most conservative in its institutional conduct. The other pictures it as autonomous, a cloister, when the historical fact is that it has always responded...to the desires and demands of external groups...The external reality is that [the university] is governed by history (Bérubé, 187).

As Bérubé notes, this ambiguous reading of university “governance” was quickly contested in the student revolts at the University of California at Berkeley in the following year. History, for Kerr, appears to correspond to the socio-economic demands of a particular moment, and Kerr’s “multiversity” project was an attempt to open the university to the scientific and technological needs of a post-war American economy in full expansion. Bérubé points up that this reading of “history” was taken by student activists to be doubly limiting: referring on the one hand to a particular moment of history that was uniquely “American,” or, on the other hand, limiting the larger reading of history offered in relation to the “world-in-revolution” spreading at that moment from Algeria to Mississippi, and from Cuba to Beijing as a history responding to the narrow needs of the military-industrial expansion of the economy (Bérubé, 188).

Above we underlined how this example may be read within a larger, modern debate. This requires some justification because Bérubé makes his own, proper analysis of this conflict in terms of a “postmodern” university. The shift between the terms
“modern” and “postmodern” may be explained when we recall that a decade following Kerr’s declaration, Jean-François Lyotard placed the conflict of the university faculties within his diagnosis of the “postmodern condition.” For Lyotard the postmodern condition may be identified, in part, with a de-legitimization of modern narratives (of history, progress, etc.). In his study, Lyotard offers two versions of “legitimization narratives.” Each of these narratives is ultimately based on an “image” of knowledge or thought, as in our first example concerning the freshman composition course at the University of Texas. The interest of Lyotard’s argument (and Bérubé’s) is the manner in which he connects the contemporary debate concerning the university and its recent as well as less recent antecedents.

Lyotard first notes how education might be legitimized by a narrative which takes the human subject as the “hero” of freedom (54). The end of education is realizing this right and putting an end to anything (tyrants, religion, etc.) that stands in its way (Lyotard, 54). We might note how this argument resembles the Enlightenment argument offered above by Kant. Lyotard underlines this in the context of the university by noting how such a narrative depends on the idea that the state is composed of the people, which legitimize the state through the free exercise of the higher faculties of the university:

...dans la perspective du récit des libertés, [l’état] ne reçoit pas sa légitimité de lui-même, mais du peuple. Si les institutions d’enseignement supérieur sont bien vouées par la politique impériale à être les pépinières des cadres de l’État et accessoirement de la société civile, c’est donc qu’à travers les administrations et les professions où s’exercera leur activité la nation elle-même est censée conquérir ses libertés grâce à la diffusion des nouveaux savoirs dans la population (54-55).

As Lyotard notes (and we may infer from our earlier examples), instances of such a narrative of legitimation still abound in the university. It is, however, with a slightly
more complicated dénouement to this particular argument that we might better situate the debates of the contemporary university.

Lyotard notes how the founding of the University of Berlin offers a particularly illuminating example of the modern relationship between science, the nation, and the state (55). In the debate around the founding of this particular university the universal project is defined as exposing the ensemble of knowledge as well as revealing the principles and foundations of this knowledge (Lyotard, 57). Articulated in this manner, the university project coincides with German idealism and a philosophy of speculation (Lyotard, 57). Now, we recall from the above chapter the manner in which knowledge coincides with the deployment of Spirit or Life within the Hegelian speculative system. In this second narrative of legitimization, Lyotard underlines how knowledge itself, as Spirit, is its own justification and has no end in the freedom of the people:

On néglige le principe humaniste selon lequel l’humanité s’élève en dignité et en liberté au moyen du savoir. L’idéalisme allemand recourt à un métaprincipe qui fonde le développement à la fois de la connaissance, de la société et de l’État dans l’accomplissement de la « vie » d’un Sujet que Fichte appelle « Vie divine » et Hegel « Vie de l’esprit ». Dans cette perspective, le savoir trouve d’abord sa légitimité en lui-même, et c’est lui qui peut dire ce qu’est l’État et ce qu’est la société (Lyotard, 58-59).

However, as we have seen in our reading of Derrida and Deleuze, one must not forget that this system is ultimately based on the same “tour de passe-passe” which permits Kant to pose the ends of the university as its legitimating reason: the Life of the speculative spirit is ultimately the Absolute, the ground on which the entire system must be based if one is to arrive at the Absolute Absolute of Spirit. This form of legitimization narrative also shares a certain complicity with the first narrative analyzed (the humanist narrative) in that the deployment of a system of speculative dialectics nonetheless must
take place on an Absolute ground, which, despite Hegel’s protestations to the contrary, is a human ground. Lyotard points this out when he underlines how the speculative narrative of legitimization folds back on the humanist narrative, tying together a “progressive and practical” human subject with the modern splintering of knowledge:

Le savoir n’y trouve pas sa validité en lui-même, dans un sujet qui se développe en actualisant ses possibilités de connaissance, mais dans un sujet pratique qui est l’humanité...Dans cette perspective, le savoir positif n’a pas d’autre rôle que d’informer le sujet pratique de la réalité dans laquelle l’exécution de la prescription doit s’inscrire...Ainsi s’introduit une relation du savoir à la société et à son État qui est en principe celle de moyen à fin (Lyotard, 60).

This disintegration of the speculative system’s legitimization of knowledge is what Lyotard terms the de-legitimization of great or master narratives of knowledge, marking the shift from the modern to the postmodern.⁵

We might at last place Bérubé’s analysis of the contemporary conflict in relation to Lyotard by underlining how closely Lyotard’s reading of the university resembles that made by Kerr at the University of California and the reaction it generated. By making the university the means to the end of a transmission of knowledge the humanist project is transformed: instead of teaching ideals and training an elite which might be capable of leading the people toward these ideals, the university trains its students in various skills or professions (Lyotard, 78-79). The university must then answer to certain criteria of “performativity:” first by forming students in the skills necessary for the optimum performance of the socio-economic system and second, in a related manner, by producing those professions which allow the social system to remain coherent and functional (Lyotard, 79). In a manner related to the student protestors of the 1960s at Berkeley, Lyotard teases out the evolution of the contemporary university and places the question
of its “opening” within the larger context of the modern conflict of the faculties (Kant), its argument around the ends or image of thought, and the demands of the emerging global economy.

Bérubé’s analysis is helpful, again, for pointing out how the contemporary conflicts of the faculty draw on the rather sharp social and economic divisions that became manifest near the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s in American society. Unfortunately, in his insistence on fore-grounding his argument on the socio-economic forces at play in contemporary debates (which has nonetheless a great deal of merit), he falls into the same image of the university that we have outlined throughout our above series of readings and examples. Indeed, in his reading of Clark Kerr’s multiversity proposal, Bérubé unwittingly falls into what might be termed a postmodern framing of the problem, recalling Lyotard’s reading of the modern/humanist mixture produced in the modern German university: “…Kerr (rightly) saw professionalism as the very device that increasingly integrates the university into the machinery of government and industry. The question, then, is not whether the university will serve the general public; the question is which structural and economic segments of the public will be served – and interpellated – by which academic disciplines” (192). This unevacuated notion of integration reveals the same image of the university or thought noted in Gerald Graff’s proposal to “teach the conflicts.” That is, by first pointing to the (contested) end of the university as a place of integration and then posing the problem in terms of which public (or which end) the university will serve, Bérubé unwittingly attempts to create a space or place for debate outside of the conflict of the faculties. Bérubé’s proposal for the university as a place that is, “radically porous, accommodating an outside that is its
inside,” (201) reinstates, unfortunately, the representation or image of the university that recognizes itself in its conflicts.

Now, if we have worked our way through these numerous examples and conflicts it has been with the goal of articulating these “local” debates around difference (and its implications concerning literature), the university, and the use of its faculties within the “larger” context of philosophical and critical readings of difference. Through our readings of the conflicts of the faculties we have returned, with each example, to a problem or question of the proper use of the faculties. If Michael Bérubé fails to escape a certain image of thought, his study has nonetheless the merit of placing the contemporary debates of the American academy within a larger socio-economic context. The employment or ends of English (or literature) are indeed not only a problem of the “image of thought” but also a problem of the “image of capitalism.” To return to our initial point of departure in this chapter, Bérubé shows how the “text” of conflicts around literature may never be exhausted or limited by a debate focusing solely on the philosophical or aesthetic issues of the debate. Indeed, it is the relationship opened up by Bérubé and Lyotard that may point towards a solution or at least a manner of approaching the problem of the “conflict of the faculties.” When examining Kant above, we noted how the three syntheses centered around recognition are never discussed in terms of their proper use since their deployment has only the one use of recognition. The recontextualization of the debate concerning literature within a “larger” text of socio-economic changes allows us to pose the question of the use of the faculties. As Isabelle Stengers underlines in a related context, the proper use of the faculties closely follows the lines opened up by capitalism (100). That is, if the question of the ends of the university
is posed in both a philosophical sense as well as a socio-economic sense, this is because thought, "...ne se laisse pas arrêter aux espèces, aux milieux, et aux chemins de tel ou tel diagramme...elle doit partager avec le capitalisme (capitalisme et schizophrénie) une grande indifférence par rapport aux instances et aux hiérarchies critiques" (Stengers, 100). In other words, to return to the criticism Deleuze makes of the image of thought, the contemporary debate around literature and its stakes becomes much more understandable if we ask the question: What is the proper use of the faculties? To answer in terms of a certain end is to fall into the false image of thought and its transcendent hardening of lines – in other words, capitalism. To answer in terms of an encounter is to open oneself to the triple violence of the immanent use of the faculties – in other words, the madness of the Proustian literary machine.

In this manner we trace a bridge between the above questions and our previous chapter and the subject of Deleuzian thought. Our study of literature and the experience of literature focused on the subject of literature as well as the philosophical or metaphysical subject that is constituted in this experience. In a sense, we might enlarge these reflections and say that the subject of Deleuzian thought (including literature) is an extended meditation on the proper use of the faculties. How must one approach thought so as to preserve the creative force of difference? We recall from our analysis of territory in Deleuzian thought that three broad territories might be observed through which a universal history may be written within the immanent bounds of capitalism (see chapters two and three and our reading of primitive, despotic, and civilized territories). Anytime there is production and reproduction, such as in capitalist production and its territories, there is desiring production. The difference between desiring production (as in the
production or constitution of the subject of literature) and capitalist production is in the proper use of this production and its syntheses. Marking the productive limits of capitalism, Deleuze explains:

Coder le désir – et la peur, l’angoisse des flux décodés –, c’est l’affaire du socius. Le capitalisme est la seule machine sociale...qui s’est construite comme telle sur des flux décodés, substituant aux codes intrinsèques une axiomatique des quantités abstraites en forme de monnaie. Le capitalisme libère donc les flux de désir, mais dans des conditions sociales qui définissent sa limite et la possibilité de sa propre dissolution, si bien qu’il ne cesse de contrarier de toutes ses forces exaspérées le mouvement qui le pousse vers cette limite (1972, 163).

The difference between desiring production and capitalist production is also the difference between a proper and improper use of the faculties. To place this in the context of the above discussion, the question is then the ends or uses of the faculties within a framework of use as production and not as representation: “...que le sens ne soit rien d’autre que l’usage, ne devient un principe ferme que si nous disposons de critères immanents capables de déterminer les usages légitimes, par opposition aux usages illégitimes, qui renvoient au contraire l’usage à un sens supposé et restaurent une sorte de transcendance” (1972, 130). It is in this sense – in the difference between the madness of the literary experience (the madness of the Proustian writing machine) and capitalism – that we might re-examine the territories of capitalist representation, underlining how they take part in an illegitimate use of the faculties. In other words, a synthesis of our earlier chapters, combining the Deleuzian notions of territories, the three syntheses, and the critique of capitalism/Oedipus will allow us to understand how the contemporary debates within the American academy concerning literature and difference may be read in terms of movements of territorialization.
We recall from above that the first synthesis of time (and the basis of a reversal of a Kantian use of the faculties) is a contraction that extracts difference from repetition. When event A is followed by event B, the following repetition of event A will extract an event B-to-come that forms the base of habit as well as imagination. We recall that this synthesis also serves as the basis for our reading of the violent nature of an encounter. When two elements meet, the passive synthesis of time does not exclude one or another from this encounter, rather, as noted in the previous chapter, this encounter takes place precisely because each element is capable of encountering the other: “La qualité sentie se confond avec la contraction d’excitations élémentaires ; mais l’objet perçu lui-même implique une contraction de cas telle qu’une qualité soit lue dans l’autre, et une structure où la forme d’objet se jumelle à la qualité au moins comme partie intentionnelle” (1968a, 99). Now, we might read this synthesis in another manner, as a production of production. We recall from our discussion of the body without organs that desiring production is based on a binary connection: an element is attached to another element by an “and,” so that, “...il y a toujours une machine productrice d’un flux, et une autre qui lui est connectée, opérant une coupure, un prélèvement de flux (le sein – la bouche)” (1972, 11). Again, in this productive encounter, neither element is excluded from the flux of desire.

We recall that the main preoccupation of the primitive territorial machine is production and reproduction. More precisely, as Deleuze reminds us, “La machine territoriale primitive code les flux, investit les organes, marque les corps” (1972, 169). This coding takes place through the organization of primitive society in lines of filiation and alliance. We remember from our study of this machine that the circulation and exchange of goods and individuals are secondary and are only possible once a territorial
coding has taken place. Indeed, it is precisely because primitive society first organizes and codes the lines of desire that the circulation and exchange of goods and individuals may later take place. In opposition to the immanent use of the passive synthesis, the capitalist or transcendent use of this synthesis is a limiting one. That is, the flux of desire is channeled into specific connections, limiting the binary nature of the connection. Instead of the "et" of the immanent use of this synthesis, the transcendent and capitalist use substitutes an "est." The possibility of an encounter between two individuals, for instance, is regulated by the coding of tribe and hierarchy. In opposition, the nomad follows the flux of desire, connecting with each point and extending a line of "and...and...and..." as Deleuze explains, "Le grand chasseur nomade suit les flux, les tarit sur place et se déplace avec eux. Il reproduit de manière accélérée toute sa filiation, la contracte en un point qui le maintient dans un rapport direct avec l'ancêtre ou le dieu" (1972, 173).

Once the flux of desire is coded, an entire system of exchange and hierarchies appears that further solidifies these codes. We recall how Deleuze explains this:

"...dès que le socius se fixe, et se rabat sur les forces productives, se les attribue, le problème du codage ne peut plus se résoudre par la simultanéité d'un déplacement du point de vue des flux, et d'une reproduction accélérée du point de vue de la chaîne. Il faut que les flux soient l'objet de prélèvements qui constituent un minimum de stock, et que la chaîne significante soit l'objet de détachements qui constituent un minimum de médiation" (1972, 174).

Thus, the inscription that a tribe places on a nomad limits the line that he is able to follow. As the above quote illustrates, a literal movement of capitalization takes place, since a deduction or debit is effected along the flux of desire, forming a stock or capitalization of desire. The line of the connective synthesis is segmented and broken
into individual parts, so that, to return to our example of an encounter between two individuals, in order to code desire there must be a quantification and a qualification of the flux: individuals must be marked as cut-outs of the flux of desire or blocks of accumulation of desire. Deleuze explains:

Pour que des flux soient codables, il faut que leur énergie se laisse quantifier et qualifier — il faut que des prélèvements de flux se fassent en rapport avec des détachements de chaîne — il faut que quelque chose passe, mais aussi que quelque chose soit bloqué, et que quelque chose bloque ou fasse passer. Or ce n’est possible que dans le système en extension qui discernabilise les personnes, et qui fait des signes un usage déterminé, des synthèses disjontives un usage exclusif, des synthèses connectives un usage conjugal (1972, 192).8

Recalling our example of the previous chapter, the initial intensity of an encounter within the immanent use of the connective synthesis (in the sense of the intensity of the various encounters of the narrator of Proust’s Recherche) is harnessed when this synthesis is put to a transcendent use. The “madness” of the Proustian literary machine and its body without organs is coded, so that an encounter is not violent, not by chance, and not to be interpreted after the fact but is, rather, the result of desire bringing together a fixed subject and wholly complete objects. In other words, a certain image of thought, of recognition, is deployed as soon as a territory is coded and divided into its various parts. Deleuze explains:

...le désir reçoit à la fois un sujet fixe, moi spécifié sous tel ou tel sexe, et des objets complets déterminés comme personnes globales...un moi déterminable ou différenciable par rapport à des images parentales servant de coordonnées (mère, père). Il y a là une triangulation qui implique dans son essence un interdit constituant, et qui conditionne la différenciation des personnes : défense de faire l’inceste avec la mère, et de prendre la place du père (1972, 83).9

Now, because we are tracing the legitimate and illegitimate uses of the faculties and their syntheses, it follows that the connective synthesis (in its transcendent use) is
accompanied by a second synthesis, that of the disjunctive synthesis. In its immanent use as a passive synthesis of time, we recall how the connective synthesis performed a synthesis of memory. The present is always passing, from the present to the past, but this movement of the present to the past contains a “shadow” past which is the totality of the past. In this manner, the present is always already the past. Or, as we have stated in the above chapter, the past is the being or ground of the present. This contraction of the totality of the past into the present moment is what we termed above the moment of “overflight,” when the infinite nature of the past hovers over the present moment. The passage from the present to the next present involves a repetition of the entirety of the past, so that with each passage from the present to the next present, the open nature of difference is always put into play. We recall that Deleuze describes this moment in the following manner when discussing signs of the present: “...le signe du présent est un passage à la limite, une contraction maxima qui vient sanctionner comme telle le choix d’un niveau quelconque, lui-même en soi contracté ou détendu, parmi une infinité d’autres niveaux possibles” (1968a, 113). In other words, the immanent use of the disjunctive synthesis does indeed involve a choice, a disjunction, but this choice is always made only after taking into account the dispositions which permit one to preserve the totality of the other choices and to put them into play with the very next moment of passage. Difference is repeated and affirmed in this second synthesis. Within the context of desiring production, Deleuze reads this synthesis as the recording of production. Thus we might understand it in the following manner:

Le « soit...soit » schizophrénique prend le relais du « et puis » : quels que soient deux organes envisagés, la manière dont ils sont accrochés sur le corps sans organes doit être telle que toutes les synthèses disjunctives entre les deux reviennent au même sur la surface glissante...le « soit »
désigne le système de permutations possibles entre des différences qui reviennent toujours au même en se déplaçant, en glissant (1972, 18).  

The transcendent or capitalist use of this synthesis is exclusive, limiting, and ultimately negative. Now, just as the immanent use of the three passive syntheses is impossible to limit in time (in the sense that one, then the second, and finally the third occur sequentially — on the contrary, the syntheses achieve an infinite speed in which each flows into the other), so too is it difficult to limit the passage between the two transcendent uses of the syntheses examined thus far. That is, as we have noted above, the transcendent use of the connective synthesis codes the flux of desire, designating entities as whole and separate. This movement of coding is, in a certain sense, “hardened.” We recall from our study of territories that this “hardening” (or over-coding) of the flux of desire marks what Deleuze terms the despotic territorial machine. He declares, “Au lieu de détachements mobiles de chaîne signifiante, un objet détaché a sauté hors de la chaîne ; au lieu de prélèvements de flux, tous les flux convergent en un grand fleuve qui constitue la consommation du souverain...” (1972, 230). Following Nietzsche’s *Genealogy of Morals*, Deleuze reads this shift from a connective synthesis to a disjunctive synthesis as a mounting movement from within, such that the movement of debt that is established around the coding of the primitive territorial machine suddenly blocks itself (1972, 226-227). As an example, we might examine Deleuze’s re-interpretation of Nietzsche. The repression of desire’s immanent flux must turn around an inscription that cuts off this flux and codes it. For Deleuze and Nietzsche, this repression takes the form of an inscription of pain which marks the primitive body within the hierarchy of the tribe and establishes, equally, a new memory which seals the code. Deleuze explains:
Toute la stupidité et l’arbitraire des lois, toute la douleur des initiations, tout l’appareil pervers de la répression et de l’éducation, les fers rouges et les procédés atroces n’ont que ce sens, dresser l’homme, le marquer dans sa chair, le rendre capable d’alliance, le former dans la relation créancier-débiteur qui, des deux côtés, se trouve être une affaire de mémoire (une mémoire tendue vers l’avenir). Loin d’être une apparence que prend l’échange, la dette est l’effet immédiat ou le moyen direct de l’inscription territoriale et corporelle (1972, 225).

The circulation of debt within this marking (for instance, in the surplus-value of pain that one deducts from the very act of incision or branding) is remarkably efficient. It previews (in the sense that primitive society is seen and coded by this very literal marking) all aspects of society except for its proper death. For inevitably debt is accumulated in such a fashion that primitive society becomes overly dependent on a position within the various hierarchies of code which is then capable of detaching itself from the movement of coding. Deleuze explains, “Ce qui faisait l’essentiel de la machine d’inscription primitive, les blocs de dette mobiles, ouverts et finis, « les parcelles de destinée », tout cela se trouve pris dans un immense engrenage qui rend la dette infinie et ne forme plus qu’une seule et même écrasante fatalité…” (1972, 227).

This shift does not lead to the suppression of the primitive territorial codes but rather to their realignment, as we recall from our reading of the despotic territory above in chapters two and three. The exclusive or limiting nature of this synthesis within its transcendent use might be illustrated if we return to the problem of debt within the coding structure of territorial machines. As noted above, the appearance of debt within the primitive territorial machine is important but must not be taken to play the central role in the organization of primitive codes of alliance and filiation. The primitive territorial machine, in its transcendent use of the connective synthesis, designates each entity in the primitive machine as whole and separate. Thus the flux that exists between three
individuals is broken into separate individuals such as father-mother-son. Once the connective synthesis is used in this manner, the flux may be blocked or augmented according to various rules so that the father and the mother may connect, but only within a certain coded relation, for example in relation to the father’s mother. In addition to debt, we might note that the incest taboo appears as a result of this coding. However, like debt itself, the incest taboo appears only as a result of coding and not as a point of origin around which the coding might accordingly be discerned. This determined use of elements within the primitive territorial machine then easily slips into an exclusive use of signs with the advent of the despotic territory. When debt is blocked in its circulation around one position of the primitive machine, its use becomes exclusive and is no longer part of the territorial coding/determining of this machine. Debt slips out of its coding and assumes a transcendent position within the despotic machine, rendering, as noted above, the lines of code infinite.

Now, it is helpful to understand the territorial shift between the primitive machine and its despotic successor in terms of debt because such a reading may allow us to again place the accent on an interpretation of society in terms of desire (in either its immanent or transcendent use) and not in terms of a specific transcendent object or space. In our reading of the primitive territorial machine in chapter two we noted the importance of reading debt within the deployment of a code. If we approach primitive (and despotic) territories from the angle of debt and ignore its secondary relationship to the coding of desire, we are effectively making a reading of desire that falls into the despotic territorial machine. That is, the exclusive nature of the disjunctive synthesis in this context allows for a position or space within the territorial machine which holds a transcendent place.
Relating this position to contemporary analyses of the sign and language, Deleuze treats the signifier as, "...stock transcendant qui distribue le manque à tous les éléments de la chaîne, quelque chose de commun pour une commune absence, instaurateur de toutes les coupures-flux en un seul et même lieu d'une seule et même coupure : objet détaché, phallus-et-castration, barre qui soumet les sujets dépressifs au grand roi paranoïaque" (1972, 247). In other words, we might better understand the exclusive nature of the transcendent use of the disjunctive synthesis by considering the mis-reading one might make of society and desiring fluxes. By placing debt (or the incest taboo) at the center of a systematic reading of primitive or contemporary society, one deploys a despotic representation of desire. Instead of a desire whose use (either immanent or transcendent) is read in terms of production, a uniquely despotic reading of desire folds desire back into itself, so that it comes second to the transcendental position of despotic representation, responding to the debt or negativity of despotic over-coding. Deleuze's immanent critique attempts to account for such a reading of debt while nonetheless preserving such a reading within a model of desiring production (which, in this case, is a model of the transcendent use of desiring production). Finally, we might note how, in relation to our above reading of the determining use of the first synthesis, transcendental positions are no longer simply designated within the despotic machine (that is, the designation or blocks of debt or of incest, which are the result of the determining power of the connective synthesis) but are rather very much possible. Deleuze explains, "L'inceste est l'opération même de surcodage...toutes les dettes d'alliance [sont] converties dans la dette infinie de la nouvelle alliance, toutes les filiations étendues [sont] subsumées par la filiation directe" (1972, 248).
It now follows, logically, that if the first and second passive syntheses of time have a transcendent use, this use must be completed by the third passive synthesis, which we might also qualify as the conjunctive synthesis of desiring production. We recall from our earlier study of the immanent use of this synthesis that this “moment” marks the transition from a larval and passive subject to an active and reflecting subject. The tension that exists between the first and second passive syntheses is resolved by the arrival of the event, which cuts between the present of the first synthesis and the open and univocal past of the second synthesis, opening up the future of the third synthesis. We recall how this passage to the event produces an active and reflecting subject which is, paradoxically, fragmented and constituted “on the side:”

Quant au troisième temps, qui découvre l’avenir — il signifie que l’événement, l’action ont une cohérence secrète excluant celle du moi, se retournant contre le moi qui leur est devenu égal, le projetant en mille morceaux comme si le gestateur du nouveau monde était emporté et dissipé par l’éclat de ce qu’il fait naître au multiple : ce à quoi le moi s’est égalisé, c’est l’inégal en soi (1968a, 121).

In other words, the inclusive nature of the disjunctive synthesis (in connection with the extended relations of the connective synthesis) infinitely expands itself in the open time of the past, bringing each present event into adequate relation with the past before beginning anew the movement of actualization. We might relate this synthesis with the Proustian literary machine, which Deleuze describes in the following terms:

Sensibilité involontaire, mémoire involontaire, pensée involontaire qui sont chaque fois comme les réactions globales intenses du corps sans organes à des signes de telle ou telle nature. C’est ce corps-toile-araignée qui s’agit pour entrouvrir ou pour fermer chacune des petites boîtes qui viennent heurter un fil gluant de la Recherche. Étrange plasticité du narrateur. C’est ce corps-araignée du narrateur, l’espion, le policier, le jaloux, l’interprète et le revendicateur — le fou — l’universel schizophrène qui va tendre un fil vers Charlus le paranoïaque, un autre fil vers Albertine
l'érotomane, pour en faire autant de puissances intensives de son corps sans organes, autant de profils de sa folie (1998, 218-219).

The disjunctive synthesis also resonates with the definition Deleuze gives of the subject in the *Anti-Oedipe*: “...le sujet est produit comme un reste, à côté des machines désirantes...[il] se confond lui-même avec cette troisième machine productrice et la réconciliation résiduelle qu’elle opère : synthèse conjonctive de consommation sous la forme émerveillée d’un « C’était donc ça ! »” (1972, 24).

A transcendent use of the conjunctive synthesis involves a decoding of the fluxes of desire. Where the despotic territorial machine overwrote the primitive machine, making the determining relations of this latter machine infinitely dependent on the former, the final synthesis, in its form of the capitalist territorial machine, operates a certain “destruction” of these codes. In our above study of territories, we note how the shift from the despotic territory to its capitalist successor is a long and complicated change: the fluxes of desire that were originally coded within the primitive territory and which are then over-written in the despotic machine are continually regulated by the despot. However, it is the contingent conjunction of these fluxes which marks the breakdown of the despotic territory. In chapters two and three we underlined, as an example of this movement, the encounter between the fluxes of free workers and money. Deleuze explains that this encounter depends itself on a number of other deterritorialized or de-coded encounter:

L’un des éléments dépend d’une transformation des structures agraires constitutives de l’ancien corps social, l’autre, d’une tout autre série passant par le marchand et l’usurier tels qu’ils existent marginalement dans les pores de cet ancien corps. Bien plus, chacun de ces éléments met en jeu plusieurs procès de décodage et de déterritorialisation d’origine très différente : pour le travailleur libre, déterritorialisation d’origine du sol par privatisation ; décodage des instruments de production par appropriation ;
privation des moyens de consommation par dissolution de la famille et de la corporation ; décodage enfin du travailleur au profit du travail lui-même ou de la machine — et, pour le capital, déterritorialisation de la richesse par abstraction monétaire ; décodage des flux de production par capital marchand ; décodage des États par le capital financier et les dettes publiques ; décodage des moyens de production par la formation du capital industriel, etc. (1972, 266-267).

This combination of de-codings, taken in its ensemble, helps to bring the free worker into contact with capital and serves as one of the "principal" encounters of capitalism, for Marx (1972, 266). For Deleuze, then, the transcendent use of the conjunctive synthesis involves the decoding of desiring fluxes whose goal is not an eventual re-coding (as in the despotic territorial machine) but rather a conjunction of fluxes — what we above defined in our study of territories as the "axiomatic" of capitalism — so that the productive force of desire is always turned back unto itself, producing consumption. He explains:

Alors la conjonction ne désigne plus seulement des restes qui échapperaient au codage, ni des consommations-consommations comme dans les fêtes primitives, ou même le "maximum de consommation" dans le luxe du despote et de ses agents. Quand la conjonction passe au premier rang dans la machine sociale, il apparaît au contraire qu'elle cesse d'être liée à la jouissance comme à l'excès de consommation d'une classe, qu'elle fait du luxe même un moyen d'investissement, et rabat tous les flux décodés sur la production, dans un "produire pour produire" qui retrouve les connexions primitives du travail à la condition, à la seule condition de les rattacher au capital comme au nouveau corps plein déterritorialisé, le vrai consommateur d'où elles semblent émaner...(1972, 266).

Where the despotic territorial machine aligned debt (and capital) on the transcendental body of the despot in an infinite relation of alliance (thus rendering incest structurally possible, as noted above), the capitalist territory reverses the relationship with capital, decoding the fluxes of desire so that capital becomes filial. Structurally, as Deleuze explains, this involves a shift from the *quanta* and *quantitas* of the previous two territorial machines to a relationship based on a pure differential (1972, 268-270). That
is, where the primitive territorial machine designated individuals or objects in a particular and abstract manner (the determining use of the connective synthesis) and where the despotic machine rendered these particular objects/individuals infinitely exchangeable by posing an abstract and transcendent object in the form of a general equivalent (the limiting use of the disjunctive synthesis), the capitalist machine is concerned only with the conjunction of these objects in deterritorialized fluxes. Value is no longer dependent on a primitive determination or an abstract and transcendent term but on the differential relation between two elements. Deleuze explains:

Nous ne sommes plus dans le domaine du quantum, ou de la quantitas, mais dans celui du rapport différentiel en tant que conjonction, qui définit le champ social immanent propre au capitalisme et donne à l'abstraction comme telle sa valeur effectivement concrète, sa tendance à la concrétisation. L'abstraction n'a pas cessé d'être ce qu'elle est, mais elle n'apparaît plus dans la simple quantité comme un rapport variable entre termes indépendants, c'est elle qui a pris sur soi l'indépendance, la qualité des termes et la quantité des rapports. L'abstrait pose lui-même la relation plus complexe dans laquelle il va se développer « comme » quelque chose de concret. C'est le rapport différentiel Dy/Dx, où Dy dérive de la force de travail et constitue la fluctuation du capital variable, et où Dx dérive du capital lui-même et constitue la fluctuation du capital constant... (1972, 270).

As this explanation suggests, this constantly renewed movement of deterritorialization, where the limits of the capitalist territory are incessantly pushed outward, closely resembles the immanent use of the conjunctive synthesis. In our discussion of territories in chapters two and three we underlined how the conjunction of fluxes within a differential relation might help explain the contradiction that appears with the tendency for the rate of profit to fall. It is important, however, to understand how the production of a capitalist subject emerges from this use of the conjunctive synthesis and how it relates to the subject that emerges with the immanent deployment of the same
synthesis. As Deleuze stresses, the deployment of the conjunctive synthesis in terms of the deterritorialization of codes (the capitalist axiomatic) must be situated within the social machine and not be reduced to its economic aspect alone (1972, 277). We might note in passing that even though the capitalist machine decodes the fluxes of the despotic territory, this must not be taken to mean that these territories disappear from the capitalist machine. The capitalist machine deterritorializes the codes of the despotic and primitive territorial machines, but traces of these machines may still be found within this structure in a deterritorialized form, in what Deleuze terms “anti-production.” Thus the capitalist axiomatic is caught between two tendencies: the un-limited de-coding of territories (which we might qualify as schizophrenic) and the re-coding of territories (which we might recognize as despotic). Deleuze takes these tendencies into account when explaining the conjunctive deployment of the capitalist axiomatic:

Ainsi se trouve bouclés les trois segments de la reproduction capitaliste toujours élargie, qui définissent aussi bien les trois aspects de son immanence: 1°) celui qui extrait la plus-value humaine à partir du rapport différentiel entre flux décodés de travail et de production, et qui se déplace du centre à la périphérie, en gardant pourtant au centre de vastes zones résiduelles ; 2°) celui qui extrait la plus-value machinique, à partir d’une axiomatique des flux de code scientifique et technique, aux endroits de « pointe » du centre ; 3°) celui qui absorbe ou réalise ces deux formes de la plus-value de flux, en garantissant l’émission des deux, et en injectant perpétuellement de l’anti-production dans l’appareil à produire (1972, 281-282).

Now, we might recall from our examination of the capitalist territory that the decoding axiomatic of capitalism treats the individual as literally “private” (privé) in the sense that the over-coding of the despotic state is stripped from individuals and entities in favor of a very radical decoding in which an individual or entity is marked only according to its capital or its labor force (1972, 298). In other words, an individual may
only have value within the differential relation which occurs with the conjunction of these two fluxes. Within the framework of the social machine, the “re-flux” of the capitalist machine bends back onto the individual, so that the social reproduction with which the individual and the family was charged in the primitive and despotic territorial machines is transformed. The individual or the family no longer takes part in social reproduction but is only another point at which the conjunction of desiring fluxes might meet and produce capital. Deleuze explains, “Les personnes individuelles sont d’abord des personnes sociales, c’est-à-dire des fonctions dérivées des quantités abstraites ; elles deviennent elles-mêmes concrètes dans la mise en rapport ou l’axiomatique de ces quantités, dans leur conjonction...” (1972, 314). When desiring production, in its social manifestation, turns back onto the individual and invests it in the conjunctive goal of producing capital (which is, in the final analysis, the entire goal of the capitalist machine), the structural possibility of incest becomes actual. That is, the entire social field is invested with the private familial structure whose initial coding was erected to prevent just such an investment. As Deleuze explains, “Les déterminations familiales deviennent l’application de l’axiomatique sociale. La famille devient le sous-ensemble auquel s’applique l’ensemble du champ social. Comme chacun a un père et une mère à titre privé, c’est un sous-ensemble distributif qui simule pour chacun l’ensemble collectif des personnes sociales, qui en boucle le domaine et en brouille les images” (1972, 315). Like debt before it in the primitive and despotic territorial machines, Oedipus and the images of the family are produced by the decoding movement of the capitalist territorial machine and must not be taken as the origin of these movements. The result of this production is a false use of the conjunctive synthesis: instead of a fractured and “plastic”
subject which is produced *à côté* by the immanent use of this synthesis (the body without organs in the Proustian literary machine), an equally fractured subject is produced which nonetheless *recognizes* what produced it. Deleuze declares:

Tout est préformé, arrangé d'avance. Le champ social où chacun agit et pâtit comme agent collectif d’énonciation, agent de production et d’anti-production, se rabat sur Oedipe, où chacun maintenant se trouve pris dans son coin, coupé suivant la ligne qui le divise en sujet d’énoncé et sujet d’énonciation individuels. Le sujet d’énoncé, c’est la personne sociale, et le sujet d’énonciation, la personne privée. C’est « donc » ton père, c’est donc ta mère, c’est donc toi : la conjonction familiale résulte des conjonctions capitalistes, en tant qu’elles s’appliquent à des personnes privatisées. Papa-maman-moi, on est sûr de les retrouver partout, puisqu’on y a tout appliqué (1972, 316).

This is the image of thought decried by Deleuze (and Proust) in our previous chapter and in our study above of the proper use of the faculties. The capitalist machine brings to term the initial movements that we traced in the primitive and despotic territorial machines: the limiting encoding of this first machine creates an empty space which may be symbolically filled by the latter machine and which is finally brought to term by the capitalist manifestation of desiring production. Desire turns back unto itself around the transcendental law or lack of Oedipus within the conjunctive synthesis. We recall in our analysis of the immanent use of the three passive syntheses that a temporal enumeration of these syntheses betrayed their nature since each synthesis necessarily includes the other and their occurrence or deployment in the violence of the encounter is simultaneous and, by definition, of an infinite speed. The deployment of these syntheses in their transcendent use may take the form of a historical narrative (as in our above examples) but we must also underline that the transcendent use of the syntheses, like their immanent use, involves their triple deployment. The connective synthesis necessarily implies the disjunctive and conjunctive syntheses just as each of these latter syntheses
implies its two complements. The image of thought that recognizes its ends is necessarily Oedipal as well as primitive and despotic. In this manner, we might return to our opening discussion of the transcendent use of the three syntheses and recall the manner in which the image of thought always codes thought beforehand, fixing the rules of the encounter so that the "tour de passe-passe" is sure to be played out:

Pour que des flux soient codables, il faut que leur énergie se laisse quantifier et qualifier – il faut que des prélèvements de flux se fassent en rapport avec des détachements de chaîne – il faut que quelque chose passe, mais aussi que quelque chose soit bloqué, et que quelque chose bloque ou fasse passer. Or ce n’est possible que dans le système en extension qui discernabilise les personnes, et qui fait des signes un usage déterminé, des synthèses disjonctives un usage exclusif, des synthèses connectives un usage conjugal (1972, 192).

This long detour through the legitimate and illegitimate uses of the faculties allows us to at last return to our discussion of the contemporary debate around the use of the faculties and, more precisely, to the use of literature within the faculties of the university. As we argued above, the legitimization of the various positions surrounding literature and its use within the university ultimately turns around a certain image of thought that recognizes this use (whatever the use might be, depending on the position one is arguing) as the end of literature. As our reading of the Deleuzian critique of the faculties reveals, each of these debates eventually falls into a transcendent (or capitalist/Oedipal) use of the faculties. Michael Bérubé is correct to tie this contemporary debate to the larger evolutions of what Deleuze would call the capitalist territorial machine (Bérubé, 200) (particularly by forcefully recalling the link between these theoretical and political debates and the more precise question of the “employment” of theory within the fluxes of capital and the academic labor force) yet he falls into the larger trap of desiring production by remaining within a certain image of thought. For
Deleuze the proper use of the faculties and the proper use of literature is always a question of the proper and immanent use of the faculties: "Écrire n’est certainement pas imposer une forme (d’expression) à une matière vécue" (1993, 11). Literature and its study cannot impose a form or image on thought. Any such image that is imposed beforehand leads us back to the imaginary and its Oedipal and capitalist re-flux of desire (Deleuze declares, “En vérité écrire n’a pas sa fin en soi-même, précisément parce que la vie n’est pas quelque chose de personnel. Ou plutôt le but de l’écrivain, c’est de porter la vie à l’état d’une puissance non personnelle” (1996a, 61.) and literature as a “petite affaire privée.” The subject of literature is the desiring production that constitutes the “mad” subject of the Proustian literary machine, so that one does not write with a certain goal in mind (in the same manner that one does not study literature with a certain goal in mind) but rather one writes in order to “fantasize,” to render the event of writing adequate to the open space of the past (the second synthesis), to write “for” or “in the place” of another subject by making language stutter (1993, 12-16).

_Negotiations 7_

To return then to our opening of this chapter and the question of literature (and what should be its obvious ties to difference), we would declare that debates in which the end, use, or employment of literature are in question remain illegitimate in a Deleuzian analysis since they propose an illegitimate image of literature and thought. In a sense, we mirror Peggy Kamuf’s analysis of literature when she reads “literature” in terms of a Derridean supplement or mark. She asks:

What if the institution of literature, which sets it up through a decision within writing in general, which divides the latter and sets aside a reserve,
were a gesture that must itself be repeatedly performed? What if each instituting decision carried over the very mark of division as a kind of surplus that belongs on neither side of the division it marks? If so, could we then say that what is instituted is “literature” as division, as the mark of division, a mark that can always be re-marked? In that case, its institutional status would never be fully assured or self-evident because, under the name of literature, it is this divisionality, if one may coin such a word, that is put in place, a “place” of division wherein all institutions are founded (Kamuf, 8).

Kamuf’s approach recalls our earlier reading of Derrida and Mallarmé, since her argument is that literature and its study, in an attempt to establish itself as an absolute (an end, a use, or an employment of literature, for example) institutes a division whose logic is impossible. That is, when divided off from the other disciplines or faculties, literature attains a certain ab-solute that would be “distinct and closed, without relation” (Kamuf, 8-9). However, this very movement of division betrays the concept of an absolute. Turning this passive movement of institution into an active movement, Kamuf then makes a distinction between “literature” and literature:

“Literature” (writing in the general sense of a movement that inscribes an outside or other in the mark of differentiation and division) institutes literature (writing in a restricted sense, for example, “writing which has claim to consideration on the ground of beauty of form or emotional effect,” in the OED’s definition). It is this restricted sense that has been made to work for the subject, consolidating the subject, and representing subjectivity to itself. But as an instituting force, as institutionality or divisionality, “literature,” writing in the general sense, is not a subject, an agent, or even an agency without agent; it is, rather, withdrawn from the subject/object relation (11).

Echoing Derrida’s reading of the mark in Mallarmé’s text, Kamuf then asserts that the local or institutional occurrence of literature (in both the passive and active sense of “literature’s institution”) depends on a “larger” and more “general” notion of “literature” whose mark is always folded over in the former, restricted and local sense of literature.
It is tempting here to draw a parallel between Kamuf's distinction between "literature" and literature and Deleuze's reading of the immanent and transcendent uses of the faculties. One might say that the local occurrence of literature in Kamuf's reading deploys a certain image of itself whose mode of legitimization is based on self-recognition. As Kamuf asks (speaking of the institution of literature in its active sense, as a subject or agent of its own institution):

If indeed the self or subject is instituted, constructed out of a division, then to what is owed this constitutive act? If the subject is the result and the end of an institutional process...how can it also set that process in motion? And if such questions are avoided, does one not then risk taking the subject for granted even as one also works to show its constructed, restricted, and constrictive nature (10)?

This image of literature is always undone by an encounter with the materiality of literature's letter which "re-marks" the division to be found within literature's local institution, revealing the larger and more general sense of "literature." Kamuf declares, "The setting up and setting apart of literature itself requires that a certain marked relation to an outside, to a not-itself, be effaced...Yet this movement of effacement is countered by the very discipline it installs: the discipline of the letter of the text, the habit of re-marking the specific mode of inscription in a language" (11). We have deliberately situated Kamuf's analysis within a Deleuzian terminology of "image of thought" and "encounter" to draw attention to the similarities that her approach has to Deleuze's distinction between transcendent and immanent uses of the faculties. Yet, it appears that the similarity is not complete, and we cannot hold that the deconstruction of literature by the literality of "literature" falls within the distinction drawn by Deleuze between the legitimate and illegitimate use of the faculties.
The distinction between Kamuf's reading of the deconstruction of the institution of literature and an immanent use of the faculties in relation to literature may be traced back to the difference we outlined in the previous chapter concerning literature, Deleuze, and Derrida. There, we recall, we underlined how the deconstructing movement of Derrida's method depends on an initial, negative movement that reveals the contradictions to be found in a text, such as the contradictory limits of the concept or theme of the fold in Mallarmé's work. Deconstruction then reverses and re-inscribes these contradictions within a "larger" and more "general" "text." We recognize this method in Kamuf's deconstruction of the institution of literature and its re-inscription within the general text of what she defines as "literature" in the following passage:

The setting up and setting apart of literature itself requires that a certain marked relation to an outside, to a not-itself, be effaced...Yet this movement of effacement is countered by the very discipline it installs: the discipline of the letter of the text, the habit of re-marking the specific mode of inscription in a language. For this discipline, the effacement of the marks of division and difference is itself a mark that can be re-marked (11-12).

To paraphrase our argument from the preceding chapter, Kamuf's deconstruction forces her to first "cut" the institution of literature inward, revealing its contradictions before she may open it up to the general text of "literature." This inward cut of contradiction reveals Kamuf's (and Derrida's) dependence on the Hegelian movement of difference and contradiction (as we have noted in the preceding chapter). In order to draw a distinction then between Kamuf's reading of literature and "literature" and the transcendent and immanent uses of the faculties in Deleuze, we might make a quick detour through our earlier argument marking the difference between Deleuze and Derrida. Above, we
underlined Derrida’s own acknowledgement of the affinity between his thought and that of Hegel. In remarking this debt, Derrida declares:

...pour mieux marquer cet écart [between the limited and local text and the larger and general text]...il a fallu analyser...certaines marques...que j’ai appelées...des indécidables...qui ne se laissent plus comprendre dans l’opposition philosophique (binaire) et qui pourtant l’habitent, lui résistent, la désorganisent mais sans jamais constituer un troisième terme, sans jamais donner lieu à une solution dans la forme de la dialectique spéculative (le pharmakon n’est ni le remède, ni le poison, ni le bien ni le mal, ni le dedans ni le dehors, ni la parole ni l’écriture ; le supplément n’est ni un plus ni un moins, ni un dehors ni le complément d’un dedans, ni un accident, ni une essence, etc. ; l’hymen n’est ni la confusion ni la distinction, ni l’identité ni la différence, ni la consommation ni la virginité, ni le voile ni le dévoilement, ni le dedans ni le dehors, etc....Ni/ni, c’est à la fois ou bien ou bien ; la marque est aussi la limite marginale, la marche, etc.). En fait, c’est contre la réappropriation incessante de ce travail du simulacre dans une dialectique de type hégélien...que je m’efforce de faire porter l’opération critique, l’idéalisme hégélien consistant justement à relever les oppositions binaires de l’idéalisme classique, à en résoudre la contradiction dans un troisième terme qui vient aufheben, nier en relevant, en idéalisant, en sublimant dans une intériorité anamnésique (Erringerung), en internant la différence dans une présence à soi (Positions, 58-59).

This extended distinction between Derrida’s thought and the Hegelian project once again underlines the affinity the two share, at least within the first move of deconstruction. We have chosen to quote Derrida at length here because after the long attempt to show how each “undecidable” within his thought avoids a resolution in a third, dialectical term, he notes how the unresolved-contradictory formulation of “ni/ni” may also be phrased as “ou bien/ ou bien.” This latter phrase recalls our distinction within the three Deleuzian syntheses of thought of the disjunctive synthesis which shifts the relation between terms first established in the connective synthesis of “et...et....et...” to one of “ou bien...ou bien...ou bien...”17 We would argue that the same sort of machinery to be found in the first two Deleuzian syntheses is being deployed here with Derrida. In the previous
chapter, in our discussion around the logical impossibility of the Hegelian Absolute Subject, we noted that an object and its identity or being is connected (the connective synthesis of “et...et...et...”) to the entire chain of being and only emerges or distinguishes itself (the disjunction between one identity and another of “ou bien...ou bien...ou bien...”) through the combination of this “connective-disjunction.” We recall that Derridean “undecidables” are deployed to undo the logical contradictions that the Hegelian Absolute Subject causes within such a system. What distinguishes the Derridean operation from Deleuze’s reading of the syntheses is the lack of the third Deleuzian synthesis, that of the conjunctive synthesis. The Derridean play of différence is always the play of the mark that re-marks itself, echoing Kamuf’s reading above of the institutional division of literature as a mark whose effacement may always be remarked.

To put our argument in Deleuzian terms, Derrida’s system is caught in the play between the connective and disjunctive syntheses which give difference its productive engine but which nonetheless limits this difference to the disjunctive nature of the second synthesis (To be entirely fair, we must stress that our earlier “productively” qualified reading of Derrida makes his use of the disjunctive synthesis, if we may describe things in this manner, an immanent one. We believe that our earlier exposition of Derrida’s thought (chapter four) as well as the extended quotation above underline how the “ou bien/ou bien” of Derridean thought always maintains the connective and thus productive nature of the disjunctive synthesis as Deleuze defines it). The final, total affirmation of the conjunctive synthesis is missing. This is what we meant in the previous chapter when we noted how the shift in Deleuze’s early thought from the “case vide” to the point which unfolds is a much more affirmative and productive reading of difference than that offered
by Derrida (or Foucault). It is this immanent re-flux of desiring production that transforms the disjunctive and limiting nature of the Derridean operation into a fully affirmative movement within a plane of immanence. The play of différence or the play between “literature” and literature always depends on the movement of marking and re-marking, so that the border or mark between terms is always deconstructed and then re-constructed. Within the Deleuzian machine of the three syntheses, one might discern this movement of marking and re-marking between terms but this difference is affirmed in the univocity of difference itself. In this sense, a third term is added to the Derridean equation, but one which never resolves the differences between the two terms, affirming their difference. The addition of the third synthesis is necessary if Deleuze is to make the following, admittedly complicated declaration:

En effet, l’essentiel de l’univocité n’est pas que l’Être se dise en un seul et même sens. C’est qu’il se dise, en un seul et même sens, de toutes ses différences individuantes ou modalités intrinsèques. L’Être est le même pour toutes ces modalités, mais ces modalités ne sont pas les mêmes. Il est « égal » pour toutes, mais elles-mêmes ne sont pas égales. Il se dit en un seul sens de toutes, mais elles-mêmes n’ont pas le même sens. Il est de l’essence de l’être univoque de se rapporter à des différences individuantes, mais ces différences n’ont pas la même essence, et ne varient pas l’essence de l’être – comme le blanc se rapporte à des intensités diverses, mais reste essentiellement le même blanc. Il n’y a pas deux « voies », comme on l’avait cru dans le poème de Parménide, mais une seule « voix » de l’Être qui se rapporte à tous ses modes, les plus divers, les plus variés, les plus différenciés. L’Être se dit en un seul et même sens de tout ce dont il se dit, mais ce dont il se dit diffère : il se dit de la différence elle-même (1968a, 53).

A distinction between “literature” and literature never quite deterritorializes thought on the same level as Deleuze since difference is repeatedly expressed in the tension or disjunction between these two terms. Derrida (and Kamuf) depend on a de-marking and re-marking of literature which undoes the image of metaphysics (and literature) by
“cutting” and “re-cutting” this image. Perhaps it is here where Deleuze again marks his difference with Derrida since the image of literature never enters into the Deleuzian equation. The encounter with literature (in its immanent use) is always violent and unpredictable so that an immanent use of the faculties involves a transformation of literature (or thought): the transcendent image of thought/literature shifts in one swift step to a plane of immanence and there is no room for the “work” of deconstruction (and its movement of marking and re-marking) on this plane.

Now, it is perhaps along this line between the transcendent and immanent uses of the faculties that we might trace the territorializing movements of thought. We recall that we began this chapter by underlining how our extended reading of Derrida and Foucault served a double purpose: to mark the similarities and differences between their thought and that of Deleuze and as points of departure for the study of thought de- and re-territorialized within the American academy. If we have insisted at length on the traces of the negative (in our comparative reading of Deleuze, Derrida, and Foucault in relationship to the concept of the “empty square”) to be found in Derrida and Foucault as well as on the traces of transcendent uses of the faculties as opposed to their immanent use in Derrida, it has been with a goal of teasing out the consequences of such traces. Our explanation of the transcendent use of the faculties above reveals the close relationship such a use has with the Deleuzian concept of territories and Deleuze’s attempt to place these territories within a universal history of desire. The image of thought as bon sens or judgement (as in a certain end or use of the faculties) is tied to the transcendent use of the faculties and their deployment within the various territories of the primitive, despotic, and capitalist territorial machines. We have attempted to demonstrate
above that the debates surrounding the contemporary American university and the institution of literature may be inscribed within the deployment of these territorial machines. In our introduction to these contemporary debates, we underlined how the question of "opening up" the institution of literature might be traced back, in part, to our readings of literature within the optic of Derrida and Foucault and their various reflections on literature, the author, etc. Indeed, their traces in these debates are often explicitly pointed to, as when Paul Berman names "French thought" as a foreign influence which bears a major part of the responsibility for the excesses of "PC-ism" in the American academy, declaring, "Political correctness in the 1990s...is the fog that arises from American liberalism's encounter with the iceberg of French cynicism" (Berman, 24). This notion of "importation" and its affinity to the various images of thought present in the contemporary debate within the American academy concerning literature calls to mind then the movement of territorialization and raises the following question: What is the relationship between the success (or at least impact, as measured by the tenor of reaction against such approaches) of Derridean deconstruction and Foucault-inspired new historicism and the transcendent movement of deterritorialization and reterritorialization of our contemporary capitalist moment? In other words, might the success of Derrida- and Foucault-inspired approaches to literature be related to the reterritorialization of their thought within a certain (transcendent) image of literature? Our reading above as well as our analysis at the end of the previous chapter concerning the "empty square" in Deleuzian thought leads us to advance the following: the unevacuated traces of negativity to be found in the thought of Deleuze's contemporaries permits a reterritorialization of their thought within what Deleuze would define as a
transcendent use of the faculties. This is not to argue that all applications of Derridean or Foucauldian thought are faded and invalid copies of the original but rather an attempt to turn our "larger" philosophical text back on to the "local" text or debate concerning literature and its use within the university. The success and influence of Derrida and Foucault within the American academy have been well-documented and we do not wish to engage in a simple statistical study or uncritical "constat" concerning their appearance there. We should like, rather, to extend our comparison between the legitimate and illegitimate use of the faculties to the appearance of "French thought" within the American academy in an attempt to understand to what extent such an appearance participates in the transcendent movements of de- and re-territorialization. If we take the matter up where the analyses of Michael Bérubé and Jean-François Lyotard end (drawing a parallel between the image of thought in terms of the ends of the faculties and our current capitalist moment), is it not possible to make a Deleuzian reading of "French thought" in America? That is, to what extent is the reception of French thought part of the larger movement, between immanence and transcendence, of territories of thought?

**B. Derridean Territories**

Although we have already encountered one example of Derridean thought within the American academy in the form of Peggy Kamuf's analysis of the institution of literature, we should like to turn to a pair of rather well-known "importers" (to borrow Paul Berman's term) of Derrida in America, Jonathan Culler and Paul de Man, as examples of what we might call Derridean territories of thought. Our argument extends out of our above reading of Kamuf and the institution of literature. We believe that the
traces of what Deleuze would term transcendent uses of the faculties to be found in Derrida’s thought (the initial negative movement of deconstruction, and its dependence on what we have termed the connective-disjunctive synthesis of deconstruction) contributes to a reterritorialization of this latter’s thought within the American academy. We hope to demonstrate that the initial, negative movement of deconstruction becomes clearly visible in an image of thought which solidly grounds Derridean thought in a reterritorialized segment, neutralizing what we take – in spite of our Deleuzian criticism of this thought – to be its breadth and affirmative nature.

In his extended study of Derrida, On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism after Structuralism, Jonathan Culler makes an admirable attempt to provide an overview of the former’s thought. Despite the range of this work, which extends from an introduction to the American New Criticism and its ties to European formalist approaches to contemporary manifestations of “deconstructive criticism,” and the attention it pays to many of the subtleties of Derrida’s work, we believe that Culler nonetheless lapses into one of the more common and reductive errors of reading Derrida. In spite of his declared intentions to approach deconstruction in literary studies through the philosophical stakes of his arguments (“...if our goal is to describe and evaluate the practice of deconstruction in literary studies, this is a good reason for beginning elsewhere, with deconstruction as a philosophical strategy” (85)) Culler immediately undermines his argument in a telling manner, “I will not attempt to discuss the relationship of Derridean deconstruction to the work of Hegel, Nietzsche, Husserl and Heidegger” (85, footnote 1). We term this qualification “telling” because of what appears to be Culler’s limited reading of the notion of the “text” in Derrida’s work. In our above analysis of Kamuf’s study of the
institution of literature, we noted how her deployment of the terms literature and “literature” mirrored the distinction Derrida makes between what he calls the local or “colloquial” use of the text and a more general understanding of the “text.” We recall how, in the above chapters, we insisted on the “infra-structural” nature of the general text, arche-writing, *différance*, etc. as “being” that which “enables” a text such as the literary text to appear. The general text is “anterior” to the distinctions which allow us to recognize a text as such so that in order for there to be a text (in the colloquial sense) there must “first” be a general text. We underlined the distinction between these two readings of the text in our opening study of Derrida in specific relation to the phenomenological reduction, since this reduction is really what is at issue here. In other words, when distinguishing between the Derridean general text and the text in a colloquial sense, we must be very careful to underline that the “appearance” of the general text cannot be reduced to its appearance (its phenomenological appearance, implying the sensibility and intelligence of a text) in the colloquial text. The general text “is” what allows us to study a text but is never present in the text. Derrida specifically warns against this error, declaring:

*L’archi-écriture comme espace ment ne peut pas se donner comme telle, dans l’expérience phénoménologique d’une présence. Elle marque le temps mort dans la présence du présent vivant, dans la forme générale de toute présence. Le temps mort est à l’œuvre. C’est pourquoi, une fois encore, malgré toutes les ressources discursives qu’elle doit lui emprunter, la pensée de la trace ne se confondra jamais avec une phénoménologie de l’écriture. Comme une phénoménologie du signe en général, une phénoménologie de l’écriture est impossible. Aucune intuition ne peut s’accomplir au lieu où « les « blancs » en effet assument l’importance »* (Grammatologie, 99).

With this in mind, let us turn to Culler’s reading and two similar instances where his treatment of the “text” appears not to be as rigorous as that of Derrida. When
discussing the question of meaning and iterability, Culler concludes his reading by returning to the question of "play" and deconstruction: "What deconstruction proposes is not an end to distinctions, not an indeterminacy that makes meaning the invention of the reader. The play of meaning is the result of what Derrida calls the 'play of the world,' in which the general text always provides further connections, correlations, and contexts" (134). We might add to this the rather confusing manner in which Culler distinguishes between literature and philosophy in Derridean thought:

...deconstruction's production of archi-literature provides no warrant for asserting the privileged status of poems, novels, and plays over other works. Nor does the inversion of the hierarchical relation between literature and philosophy produce a monism that obliterates all distinctions. Instead of an opposition between a serious philosophical discourse and a marginal literary discourse that takes fictional detours in the hope of attaining seriousness, we have a variable and pragmatic distinction within an archi-literature or general textuality...The effect of deconstruction is to disrupt the hierarchical relation that previously determined the concept of literature by reinscribing the distinction between literary and nonliterary works within a general literarity or textuality, and thus to encourage projects, such as the literary reading of philosophical texts and the philosophical reading of literary texts, that allow these discourses to communicate with one another (184-185).

Let us begin with the first quotation and the notion of the Derridean general text providing "connections, correlations, and contexts." As our quote above from Derrida stresses, writing in the general sense may never be conflated to the sense of writing in its colloquial or phenomenological sense. Culler is clearly anxious to reassure the reader that deconstruction does not do away with distinctions between various texts, for instance, and the connections, correlations and contexts that one might establish between such texts. The problem is that arche-writing or the text in a general sense, is not concerned with these textual representations but rather with what allows one to speak of such distinctions in the first place. To repeat our above admonition, the general text "is"
anterior to the local text and its various questions of connections, correlations and contexts. By extending the general text of arche-writing to the local text of literature (or philosophy) Culler conflates arche-writing and différance to a simple and banal difference of diacritical terms. This conflation is even more visible in the second extended quotation from Culler’s text in which the author’s confusion between general and local texts leads to the catastrophic opening phrase, “…deconstruction’s production of archi-literature provides no warrant for asserting the privileged status of poems, novels, and plays over other works” (184). Based on our extended reading and analysis of Derridean thought, it is difficult to imagine in any manner whatsoever how deconstruction might “produce” an arche-literature. We recall from our reading of Derrida that deconstruction is “defined” by a double movement which reveals the contradictions to be found in a text and then re-inscribes these contradictions within the general text19 (Culler’s declaration is all the more curious, based on the fact that he makes just this distinction concerning deconstruction’s “double science” near the end of our selected quotation). Deconstruction as a critical strategy never produces arche-writing, an arche-text, or an arche-literature. Culler’s following sentence concerning “a variable and pragmatic distinction within an archi-literature or general textuality” re-affirms the conflation he makes between the general text and its phenomenological occurrence. As we have stressed, a “variable and pragmatic distinction” may only be made because of the general text and not within it, which would imply the very presence that arche-writing must always “precede.” Finally, the ultimate sentence of this quotation concerning the communication between philosophical and literary discourses within a general literarity or textuality (coming as it does on the heels of an explanation of
deconstruction's double strategy) offers a particularly spectacular example of Culler's confusion since this communication, as well as the distinction between each of these discourses, would once again imply a determining presence within the general text, that very thing against which the Derridean project is mobilized. In opposition to the Derridean double-movement of deconstruction, this type of confusion serves to re-inscribe the hierarchies and oppositions that the Derridean enterprise sought to undermine. In this sense we might say that Culler's reading of Derrida is a reterritorialization of this latter's thought. The breadth and tenor of Derrida's project is reduced to an idealization of the text which then re-installs a metaphysical ground, presence, or subject. Once having done so, to phrase things in Deleuzian terms, we return to the same "tour de passe-passe" that might be found in a certain image of thought in Kant, Hegel, or Husserl.

Culler's conflations of the general text and, in particular, his insistence on connections, correlations, and communication leads us to the second figure named above as helping to found Derridean territories of thought, Paul de Man. De Man's name is most often cited with that of Derrida when deconstruction is discussed within the American academy, and it only seems appropriate to examine to what extent his reading of deconstruction escapes reterritorialization of Derrida's thought as well as what part of this thought might be read as just such a territorialization. Although he himself defines his approach in sometimes dissimilar terms, de Man's critical approach might be defined as being based on the "rhetorical" aspect of various texts. It is the precise definition of this term which sometimes leads to confusion. In *The Resistance to Theory*, de Man appears to draw a link between his "rhetorical" approach and the innovations of
Saussurian linguistics: "Contemporary literary theory comes into its own...as the application of Saussurian linguistics to literary texts" (8). Yet such dependence on formal linguistics is undermined at other points in his work, as when discussing Nietzsche he declares that, "...the paradigmatic structure of language is rhetorical rather than representational or expressive of a referential, proper meaning..." (Alligories of Reading, 106). The connection between formal linguistics (of the Saussurian model) and a rhetorical structure of language might be found in de Man's example of a rhetorical reading of Keats' unfinished work, The Fall of Hyperion. In examining this title, de Man notes that one might read it in two manners: in a rather literal sense of "the defeat of an older by a newer power" or in the sense of the "actual process of falling, regardless of its beginning, its end or the identity of the entity to whom it befalls to be falling" (Resistance to Theory, 16). The difference in these readings is complicated by the incomplete, fragmentary, and contradictory nature of Keats' work/project so that the reader, like Keats himself, is caught up in the indecisiveness of the text. This gap between the word (or signifier) and its meaning (or signified) is what de Man defines as a figural or rhetorical gap:

The undecidability involves the figural or literal status of the proper name Hyperion as well as of the verb falling, and is thus a matter of figuration and not of grammar...Just as Keats had to break off his narrative, the reader has to break off his understanding at the very moment when he is most directly engaged and summoned by the text...Rhetoric, by its actively negative relationship to grammar and to logic, certainly undoes the claims of the trivium (and by extension, of language) to be an epistemologically stable construct (Resistance to Theory, 16-17).

Now, de Man does not help matters when he alternately defines this manner of rhetorical or figural reading as "purely formal," "literary," or "nonphenomenal." This final term is particularly misleading since the reader might think that de Man is referring to a reading
that bases itself on the Kantian distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal (see our brief discussion of this distinction in our notes to Chapter 2). If we place what we know about a rhetorical reading of a text in relation to its undoing of grammar and logic (as the above quote implies) then we might also begin to tease out what de Man means by a phenomenal (and nonphenomenal) reading of a text. A phenomenal reading relates to Kant’s use of this term as far as it concerns the use of the senses (that is, it is intuitive and image-like): “The iconic, sensory or, if one wishes, the aesthetic moment is not constitutive of figuration” (Rhetoric of Romanticism, 114). Furthermore, according to de Man, phenomenal reading, since it implies intuition, is then a reflexive reading implying the possibility of a determined totalization (Rhetoric of Romanticism, 115). A nonphenomenal reading of the text would then work to undo this totalization and reflexivity. However, unlike Kant’s noumena, nonphenomenal reading remains tied, to a certain extent, to the sensory aspect of phenomenal reading, working first through this side of reading to a level that, while non-conceptual, is concerned with “...the modalities of production and of reception of meaning and of value prior to their establishment” (Resistance to Theory, 7). Before exploring this reading strategy, we might remark that on a certain level de Man’s distinction between different types of reading resembles the different texts of the Derridean system. On the one hand there is the colloquial text which has a phenomenological presence and which might be said to invite a phenomenal reading in that it remains tied to grammar, logic and the determined totalization of intuition. On the other hand there is the Derridean general text which is “anterior” to the colloquial text, both deconstructing the phenomenological presence of the latter and making such presence possible and which might invite a non-reflexive and non-
conceptual nonphenomenal reading à la de Man. Let us examine whether such a comparison is warranted.

If a nonphenomenal reading works to establish the modalities of production and reception of meaning prior to its establishment, then the distinctions and differences that meaning might generate after its establishment are to be overcome. Within our study of Derrida we have already underlined how deconstruction both establishes and deconstructs differences between disciplines such as philosophy and literature. Much like Derrida, de Man attempts to push reading beyond the phenomenal (and the categories that such a reading depends on, such as aesthetic categories) and towards the undifferentiated “text” (if we may) of the nonphenomenal. De Man echoes such sentiments when he declares, “The unwarranted separation between the way of reading and interpreting “literary” as opposed to “philosophical” or discursive texts – a separation due in large measure to ideologies derived from the misuse of aesthetic categories – deprives the reading of philosophical texts of elementary refinements that are taken for granted in literary interpretation” (Allegories of Reading, 226). In our discussion of Derrida, we noted how deconstruction always occurs within a double strategy that involves first the reversal of hierarchies or oppositions to be found within a text and then their re-inscription within the “larger,” general text. We might trace a similar maneuver on the part of de Man. Above, in our distinction between phenomenal and nonphenomenal reading, we noted how the latter reading, while going beyond the sensory and conceptual aspects of phenomenal reading depends nonetheless on these aspects. That is, a nonphenomenal reading, in spite of what might seem to be declarations to the contrary on the part of de Man (in a polemical exchange with Raymond Geuss over his reading of philosophical
texts, de Man declares, for instance, “It is clear, for example, that most of Raymond Geuss’s objections to my paper...have to do with the manner of reading philosophical writings prior to the substance that such readings reveals” (Aesthetic Ideologies, 186)) is problematical. According to de Man, there comes a moment when the text “opens itself up” and shifts from a phenomenal reading to a nonphenomenal one. He explains:

The commentator should persist as long as possible in the canonical reading and should begin to swerve away from it only when he encounters difficulties which the methodological and substantial assertions of the system are no longer able to master. Whether or not such a point has been reached should be left open as part of an ongoing critical investigation. But it would be naïve to believe that such an investigation could be avoided, even for the best of reasons. The necessity to revise the canon arises from resistances encountered in the text itself (extensively conceived) and not from preconceptions imported from elsewhere (Aesthetic Ideologies, 186).

The difference between a phenomenal reading and its nonphenomenal “counterpart” becomes, as de Man makes clear, rather difficult to mark.

Now, if phenomenal reading is part of nonphenomenal reading, one might expect the hierarchy between these two readings to disappear. We recall that in our opening remarks concerning de Man we noted that a rhetorical or nonphenomenal reading of the text undoes the claims of grammar and logic (which are tied to the sensory nature of the phenomenal reading of a text) to an epistemologically stable construct. Such a reading, in favor of the nonphenomenal or rhetorical aspect of the text, nonetheless recurs often in de Man’s work, leading us to believe that in spite of nimble turns, such as the following (speaking of the notion of teaching “literature as such” and “theory”), de Man asserts a certain rigor or truth to his method:20

For a method that cannot be made to suit the “truth” of its object can only teach delusion. Various developments, not only in the contemporary scene but in the long and complicated history of literary and linguistic
instruction, reveal symptoms that suggest that such a difficulty is an inherent focus of the discourse about literature... If this is indeed so, then it is better to fail in teaching what should not be taught than to succeed in teaching what is not true (Resistance to Theory, 4).

Indeed, noting the difficulty of arriving at a nonphenomenal reading and its close relationship to the phenomenal text, de Man declares, "Technically correct rhetorical readings may be boring, monotonous, predictable and unpleasant, but they are irrefutable" (Resistance to Theory, 19).

This is an admittedly brief introduction to de Man's work, but it allows us to sketch several lines of comparison between Derrida's thought and de Man's. As we have noted, the distinction between a phenomenal reading and a nonphenomenal one certainly appears to follow Derrida's distinction between the text and the general text. It is however the rather hazy distinction between these two readings that leaves room for some doubt. If the nonphenomenal reading is an attempt to reveal "the modalities of production and of reception of meaning and of value prior to their establishment," then one must wonder how such modalities might be seized or examined outside of a phenomenal subjectivity. Is this not another example of a certain conflation of the Derridean notion of the general text with its phenomenological "double?" What is particularly troubling is the notion that a nonphenomenal reading might be irrefutable or based on a certain notion of truth. Once again, a non-conceptual and non-reflexive notion of the text (the Derridean general text) is "beyond" such considerations and is the condition of possibility (and impossibility) of any local notion of truth. In spite of such objections, let us attempt to enter de Man's strategy of reading (we must be honest here – our comparison of Derridean notions of textuality to de Man's two manners of reading are our own and de Man never explicitly assimilates a nonphenomenal reading to the
Derridean notion of the general text) and see how such a system deploys itself.\textsuperscript{21} In Culler’s analysis of Derrida’s thought, we underlined how a conflation of the colloquial reading of the text with the general text led to an odd accentuation on notions of communication, connections, and correlations. As we shall see below, one of the consequences of de Man’s notion of reading (and of texts) is an insistence that he too makes on connections and correlations. This preliminary sketch of the difficulties that de Man’s system has in coping with the Derridean general text should then be reinforced by an examination of a typically rhetorical reading de Man makes of a text.

One of the more noted examples of de Man’s “deconstructive” method is the reading he makes of Shelley’s final poem, \textit{The Triumph of Life}. In a certain Deleuzian sense, we might say that de Man opens his study by interrogating the image of thought one might erect when reading Shelley, “What is the meaning of \textit{The Triumph of Life}, of Shelley, and of romanticism? What shape does it have, how did its course begin and why? Perhaps the difficulty of the answers is prefigured in the asking of the questions” (\textit{Rhetoric of Romanticism}, 94). For de Man, the image that such questions erect falsely forecloses the partial and fragmentary nature of Shelley’s work and literature in general: “Attempts to define, to understand, or to circumscribe romanticism in relation to ourselves and in relation to other literary movements are all part of [a] naïve belief” (\textit{Rhetoric of Romanticism}, 122). Just what conclusion de Man offers in counterpoint to such a reading will be examined below.

According to de Man, the above-noted questions prefigure, in their difficulty, the nature of a response. We might begin to find this response in another question that appears in Shelley’s poem when an enigmatic shpe (which turns out to be Rousseau)
asks, "...whence I came, and where I am, and why—" (Rhetoric of Romanticism, 98). According to de Man, this question leads to a sort of infinite regression where the response is only another question so that the original query is forgotten (Rhetoric of Romanticism, 98). This movement of receding questions in the text gives way to a more "fundamental" receding in which the syntax and imagery of the poem "tie themselves into a knot" so that the desire for self-knowledge (in terms of our opening questions above) becomes impossible (Rhetoric of Romanticism, 98-99). In a sense, the power of the words/questions of the poem is also what makes them lose their power (Rhetoric of Romanticism, 103). Now, these first steps of de Man's reading might be placed within the framework of the phenomenal and nonphenomenal reading offered above. De Man is insisting here that a close or literary reading of the text remains caught up in a phenomenal reading in which the various categories of grammar and linguistics (as well as aesthetics) play a role in discovering a text's meaning. A nonphenomenal reading, we recall, only appears when the reader begins to encounter difficulties that go beyond the methodological and substantial assertions of a canonical or systematic reading. The endlessly regressing questions of the poem begin to push the reader in this direction and it appears that de Man is asserting that the "knot" that such questions form in any attempt to resolve these questions in some form of self-mastery is the moment that a nonphenomenal reading begins. Let us explore the consequences of such a reading in more detail.

De Man underlines how the infinite regression of questions in Shelley’s poem leads to a form of forgetting in which the answer to the original question is forgotten (one forgets what one is looking for) when another question is asked (Rhetoric of
Romanticism, 98). This movement of forgetting or infinitely receding questions then has a disturbing effect on the distinctions characters (as well as the reader) might make in the text. For example, Rousseau offers a narration of his life that de Man reads as scrambling such essential differences as those between night and day or sleeping and waking: “The polarities of waking and sleeping (or remembering and forgetting) are curiously scrambled...with those of past and present, of the imagined and the real, of knowing and not knowing...We cannot tell the difference between sameness and difference, and this inability to know takes on the form of a pseudo-knowledge which is called forgetting” (Rhetoric of Romanticism, 104-105). This point of “non-difference” between sameness and difference comes at a crucial moment in the text when, during the narration, the sun’s light is described as being “threaded” through the forest and comes into contact with the feminine form of an eye or well of water and its shape (of a rainbow). Here, instead of being threaded through the water, the light “treads” along its surface only to be ultimately “trampled” by the rhythm or music of the water (Rhetoric of Romanticism, 111-113). It is in this movement, which de Man characterizes as passing from a “threading” to a “treading,” that the reader must “swerve away” from a phenomenal reading in favor of a nonphenomenal one since the passage centers around the rhetorical use of the term “measure.” De Man explains:

The transition from “gliding” to “trampling” passes, in the action that is being narrated, through the intermediate relay of “measure.” The term actively reintroduces music which...is at first only present by analogy in this phase of the action...Measure is articulated sound, that is to say language. Language rather than music, in the traditional sense of harmony and melody...The thematicization of language in The Triumph of Life occurs at this point, when ‘measure’ separates from the phenomenal aspects of signification as a specular representation, and stresses instead the literal and material aspects of language” (Rhetoric of Romanticism, 112-113).
However, it is not simply this specific case of “ambiguity” between the poetic and the linguistic aspect of the word “measure” that counts for de Man. He sees, rather, in this key example of the “trampled” figure, the “figurality of all signification” (*Rhetoric of Romanticism*, 116). That is, the ambiguity or nonphenomenality of Shelley’s poem reveals not only specific instances of “non-difference” (as in the difficulty in distinguishing between sleeping and waking) but a much more general and radical non-difference between a figure of signification and its linguistic articulation as in the case of the word “measure”: “...it is the alignment of a signification with any principle of linguistic articulation whatsoever, sensory or not, which constitutes the figure. The iconic, sensory, or if one wishes, aesthetic moment is not constitutive of figuration. Figuration is the element in language that allows for the reiteration of meaning by substitution...” (*Rhetoric of Romanticism*, 114-115). This “radical” non-difference of figuration is then nonphenomenal, literary, or rhetorical reading.

The above quote is interesting in the sense that it allows us to refine, one final time, de Man’s definition of nonphenomenal reading (and eventually the relation it might have with the Derridean general text). We initially identified nonphenomenal reading as “underlying” linguistics since language’s paradigmatic structure is rhetorical rather than formally linguistic (*Allegories of Reading*, 106). It is, nonetheless, in an oddly Saussurian manner that de Man affirms his reading of Shelley’s poem. The impact of the term “measure” in Shelley’s work affirms the purely arbitrary relation between this term and its meaning, which implies, for de Man that the act of reading (and any meaning that might result from such an act) must be constantly started anew. A nonphenomenal reading undermines any attempt to master the text and to provide an answer to the
questions which opened de Man’s reading (What is the meaning of *The Triumph of Life*, of Shelley, and of romanticism? What shape does it have, how did its course begin and why?). De Man thus declares:

...to read is to understand, to question, to know, to forget, to erase, to deface, to repeat – that is to say, the endless prosopopoeia by which the dead are made to have a face and a voice which tells the allegory of their demise and allows us to apostrophize them in our turn. No degree of knowledge can ever stop this madness, for it is the madness of words. What would be naïve would be to believe that this strategy, which is not our strategy as subjects, since we are its product rather than its agent, can be a source of value and has to be celebrated or denounced accordingly (*Rhetoric of Romanticism*, 122).

The act of reading is constantly renewed and must always be renewed in this manner since it occurs in a purely arbitrary fashion, like the relation between the signifier and signified in Saussurian linguistics, and has no stability. The non-stability that such a nonphenomenal reading reveals, depends nonetheless on a phenomenal reading in order that the differences visible in the latter reading may be forgotten in the former (this movement is one that de Man terms elsewhere, in his essay of the same name, “the resistance to theory” (19-20)). In this manner, we might better understand de Man’s insistence on the “truth” of teaching such a method since it must always occur in a moment of “failure” (if one considers failure or success from the perspective of a phenomenal reading).

We are at last in a position to better evaluate de Man’s strategy of reading and its relation to Derridean territories of thought, particularly the notion of the general text. It certainly appears that the relation between phenomenal and nonphenomenal reading in de Man’s system bears a very close resemblance to Derrida’s distinction between the vulgar concept of the text and the general text. As we have noted, a phenomenal reading of the
text depends, ultimately, on a phenomenal totalization of the text within a certain notion of presence or experience while a nonphenomenal reading goes "beyond" such a reading to reveal the very conditions of a phenomenal reading ("the modalities of production and reception of meaning prior to its establishment"). We have equally noted how these two readings "communicate" with one another, since a nonphenomenal reading only occurs at the point which a phenomenal reading breaks down and the reader must "swerve away" from such a reading, into the text's literality. As our earlier reading of Kamuf demonstrated — and as Derrida equally notes — the two notions of the text (its colloquial or vulgar conceptualization and its general sense) communicate on an essential level:

"Archirécriture...que nous ne continuons à appeler écriture que parce qu'elle communique essentiellement avec le concept vulgaire de l'écriture" (De la grammatologie, 83). It is, however, this point of "forgetting" (what de Man also calls "disfigurement") in which difference annuls itself in de Man's strategy which concerns us. While he never assimilates nonphenomenal reading to the Derridean general text, we feel that there are sufficient indications in de Man's texts to lead one to believe that he is attempting to open the text up in a manner similar to Derrida. We recall that for Derrida the general text is both that which renders the presence of "phenomenality" of a text possible and that which renders it impossible. That is, difference is both possible and impossible in the general text "at the same time." Although our earlier treatment of Derrida should make this clear, let us recall in an extended manner this difficult "distinction."

La différence, c'est ce qui fait que le mouvement de la signification n'est possible que si chaque élément dit « présent », apparaissant sur la scène de la présence, se rapporte à autre chose que lui-même, gardant en lui la marque de l'élément passé et se laissant déjà creuser par la marque de son
rapport à l'élément futur, la trace ne se rapportant pas moins à ce qu'on appelle le futur qu'à ce qu'on appelle le passé, et constituant ce qu'on appelle le présent par ce rapport même à ce qui n'est pas lui : absolument pas lui, c'est-à-dire pas même un passé ou un futur comme présents modifiés. Il faut qu'un intervalle le sépare de ce qui n'est pas lui pour qu'il soit lui-même, mais cet intervalle qui le constitue en présent doit aussi du même coup diviser le présent en lui-même, partageant ainsi, avec le présent, tout ce qu'on peut penser à partir de lui, c'est-à-dire tout étant, dans notre langue métaphysique, singulièrement la substance ou le sujet. Cet intervalle se constituant, se divisant dynamiquement, c'est ce qu'on peut appeler espacement, devenir-espace du temps ou devenir-temps de l'espace (temporisation). Et c'est cette constitution de présent, comme synthèse « originaire » et irréductiblement non-simple, donc, stricto sensu, non-originaire, de marques, de traces de rétentions et de protentions (pour reproduire ici, analogiquement et provisoirement, un langage phénoménologique et transcendantal qui se révélera tout à l'heure inadéquat) que je propose d'appeler archi-écriture, archi-trace ou différance. Celle-ci (est) (à la fois) espacement (et) temporisation (Marges, 13-14).

The absolute non-difference of de Man's nonphenomenal reading appears to ignore this crucial aspect of the Derridean text, plunging in to a purely non-differentiated and negative movement. The accent de Man places on the negative movement of reading and its failure (forgetting, blindness, effacement, disfiguration, etc.) leads us to believe that de Man reterritorializes the Derridean territory of the general text in a purely negative movement of destruction. As noted in chapter four, this form of reading ignores the "double" reading or science of deconstruction, favoring instead what we have at other points characterized as the inward "stroke" or "cut" of deconstruction. In light of declarations such as, "Since grammar as well as figuration is an integral part of reading, it follows that reading will be a negative process in which the grammatical cognition is undone at all times, by its rhetorical displacement" (Resistance to Theory, emphasis added, 17) it is easier to understand how misconceptions concerning deconstruction and its "destruction of meaning" might become so widespread. Contrary to a
"nonphenomenal non-difference" the Derridean general text "is" indeed non-differentiated and differentiated. As Derrida notes (as does de Man when speaking of nonphenomenal reading) the double "nature" of the general text goes beyond any agent or subject and makes us its product. Contrary to de Man, we would go so far as to say that a certain value (in Nietzschean terms, however – of an encounter of force) can be taken from the general text. As a useful corrective to de Man-inspired excesses both in favor and against deconstruction, we might recall that Derrida has underlined how the general text is – in spite of its deconstruction of differences (and this is what de Man forgets) – part of an order which we would do well not to forget:

Mais que la différence marquée dans la diffé()nce entre le e et le α se dérobe au regard et à l’écoute, cela suggère peut-être heureusement qu’il faut ici se laisser renvoyer à un ordre qui n’appartient plus à la sensibilité. Mais non davantage à l’intelligibilité, à une identité qui n’est pas fortuitement affiliée à l’objectivité du theorein ou de l’entendement ; il faut ici se laisser renvoyer à un ordre, donc, qui résiste à l’opposition, fondatrice de la philosophie, entre le sensible et l’intelligible (Marges, 5).22

Like Culler, then, we see that de Man’s reading of what we have termed the Derridean territory of the general text involves a territorialization of the latter in a reading that falls into a negative non-difference. De Man’s negative understanding of reading might serve to help illustrate our earlier distinction between Derrida and Deleuze where we attempted to show that the initial negative movement of Derridean thought (the destructive aspect of deconstruction) helped to push this thought out of the purely productive Deleuzian system and its plane of immanence. To return to Deleuzian terms, where we characterized Derrida’s thought as a connective and disjunctive synthesis that was missing the conjunctive synthesis of Deleuze’s system, we might say that de Man’s nonphenomenal reading falls further out of the plane of immanence, lacking even the
disjunctive synthesis which would allow differences to be marked within a connective synthesis. De Man's nonphenomenal reading appears to be an endless connective synthesis which fails to lift itself to the level of disjunctive and conjunctive production.

C. Foucauldian Territories

If we have been able to outline the manner in which influential readings of Derrida in America by Culler and de Man have territorialized the breadth of Derridean thought, then a similar outline of territorialized thought might be possible regarding Michel Foucault. Before making such a reading, we should note again that our theory of territorialized thought is not an attempt to brand all interpretations or applications of Foucault as faded and illegitimate copies of an original. Just as Culler attempts a complex and wide-ranging reading of Derrida and just as de Man offers innovative turns on Romanticism and aesthetic theory, the readings or applications of Foucault which we shall examine below might be understood as responding to historically and culturally specific theoretical problems. In other words, territories of Foucauldian thought are created within the context of the American academy at a specific juncture of socio-economic history (which we have attempted to outline in the first section of this chapter) so that (in a very Deleuzian sense) their appearance within the academy must be understood as responding to a context that is not the same as Foucault's. Indeed, this is the Deleuzian definition of the creation of concepts and the creation of territories. We should reiterate the point that our Deleuzian reading has merit since it attempts to place these territories of thought within their specific problematical context. If we characterize these territories as reterritorializations we do so in order to develop our Deleuzian reading
of the movement between transcendent and immanent thought (and the implications such a movement has within the more “local” context of the “conflict of the faculties” within the American academy).

In our reading of Foucault in chapter five, we insisted on what we termed a coherent study of his work. That is, Foucault’s work is sometimes read as being divided into several periods that mark breaks and re-orientations in his projects. Perhaps the most influential of these readings within the American academy is that made by Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow in their *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*. Much like Culler’s introduction to Derrida and deconstruction, their work is a far-ranging and often meticulous attempt to explain the stakes of Foucault’s project, however it also imposes certain chronological divisions on this project which leads to some unfortunate consequences in their interpretation. Perhaps the best manner to understand these divisions and the implications they have for Dreyfus’ and Rabinow’s reading of his work is to recall our reading of Foucault through his early study of Raymond Roussel. We remember that after first situating the work on Roussel within the larger framework of discursive formations and strategies or experiences of power, we returned to this study as an example of Foucault’s reading of literature and what we termed (in both its colloquial and metaphysical senses) the “subject” of literature. We must not forget that it is the term “experience” that helps to situate the Roussel study to the whole of Foucault’s project, since it permits Foucault to take the position of archeologist/genealogist and place Roussel’s literary experience within the framework of a discursive formation without claiming to make some manner of universal claim to truth concerning discursive formations or the archeological method in general. It is the
experience of power and its “inflection” along the various conjunctions of the discursive formation that is the “subject” of the Foucauldian project and it should be clear from our double treatment of the Roussel study (as well as from the third part of chapter five) that the subject of Foucault’s study does not imply in any manner an attempt to master historical or discursive formations. With these warnings in mind, let us turn now what we take to be several misleading passages from Dreyfus’ and Rabinow’s work.

Let us first consider our interpretation of Dreyfus and Rabinow as readers who “historicize” Foucault into a division of periods. Our objection may appear trivial, especially when considered in light of the criticism we shall develop below, but we insisted in chapter five on a coherent and extended reading of Foucault’s work in order to avoid falling into readings in which the productive aspect of power and its relation to a subject position within the historical archive is limited to a regulative aspect, focusing on limited, empirical examples (such as the process of “normalization” within the prison or the various aspects of power and life or “bio-power” in the history of nineteenth and twentieth century sexuality). In contrast to such readings, we have attempted to offer a reading that goes beyond Foucault’s local and empirical examples and which places the larger questions of power and knowledge within a metaphysical framework of transcendence and immanence. In other words, to “historicize” Foucault is to limit the breadth and importance of his approach.

Dreyfus and Rabinow are sometimes quite explicit in their wish to not historicize Foucault in this manner, such as when they declare:

Without getting into a futile game of classification – early, middle, late – especially for a body of work which is still so young, we can see that from his earliest days Foucault has used variants of a strict analysis of discourse (archeology) and paid a more general attention to that which conditions,
limits, and institutionalizes discursive formations (genealogy). There is no pre- and post-archeology or genealogy in Foucault. However, the weighting and conception of these approaches has changed during the development of his work (104).

In spite of such declarations, it is the “however” of the final sentence, when combined with their understanding of what they term the limitations of the archeological method that undermines such a declaration. In the paragraph that immediately follows this declaration, Dreyfus and Rabinow note, “Clearly, after May 1968 Foucault’s interests began to shift away from discourse” (104). However, as our reading from chapter five demonstrates, discourse (and the relation between words and things) is very much at the heart of the question of power (the double subject of the panoptical system is always part of a discursive formation just as the inflection of the classical Greek subject in relation to sexuality must be situated within the social practices of, again, a particular discursive formation). For Dreyfus and Rabinow, the question of power becomes properly thematized only after the Archéologie du savoir, but this is to ignore what we (following Deleuze) have traced “behind” each discursive formation in the form of a diagram of power (which is “visible” in Foucault’s earliest works on madness or the clinical hospital and which we have attempted to trace in the preceding chapters around the “invisible visibility” of Roussel’s literary experience). This “territorialization” of various aspects of Foucault’s work into rough periods leads to a curious reading of his treatment of discursive formations, particularly within the Archéologie du savoir.

Interestingly, the reading that Dreyfus and Rabinow offer leads us in a direction similar to the one traced above with Culler and de Man (and its excesses) in that Foucault is made the ambassador of a post-structuralism that “delights in [its] liberation from the deadening seriousness of the past.” In order to understand how they arrive at such a
reading we first note how Dreyfus and Rabinow are drawn into the paradox which we examined in chapter five within the panoptical historical archive. That is, the rules of discursive formation (we recall that such rules govern both the interior and exterior subject positions of various discourse, i.e., who may speak from within a certain discourse, who is addressed and in what measure they are addressed by such discourses) come to have both a descriptive and prescriptive function (79-81). For Dreyfus and Rabinow, this discovery leads Foucault into a theoretical dead-end. Any attempt to describe the rules of discursive formations immediately falls into a prescriptive trap and the archeologist, according to Dreyfus and Rabinow, "...illegitimately hypostatize[s] the observed formal regularities which describe discursive formations into conditions of these formations' existence" (83). However, as we underlined in chapter five, this is just the point that Foucault wishes to make: What is the relation between words and things such that the rules used to describe (discourse) a certain object (within the clinical hospital, for instance) immediately limit or regulate the manner in which this object might be seen or described? Instead of investigating how the exterior regimes of the discursive regime (words and things, or discourse and visibility) come together in such a way as to lead to a supposed hypostatization, the authors read Foucault as descending into a never-ending cycle of analysis in which what he claims to say in theoretical neutrality is caught up in the prescriptive function of the discursive archive, leading to another attempt to step outside of this descriptive/prescriptive trap (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 83-84). In other words, Foucault falls into a dangerous relativism whose only solution is one of two alternatives: "...either a seriousness that puts such premium on objective truth that discourse itself becomes unimportant, or, paradoxically, in the name
of the importance of discourse, a position that stands outside all serious significance” (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 85). According to the authors, Foucault opts for the latter and falls into a nihilism that goes beyond “seriousness and meaning:” “The archeologist studies mute statements and thus avoids becoming involved in the serious search for truth and meaning he describes...The archeologist claims he does not speak from within a horizon of intelligibility (85)” In his double reading of discursive formations Dreyfus and Rabinow understand Foucault as caught in the very posture that he seeks to examine:

...the archeologist, like Husserl’s transcendental phenomenologist, must perform an “ego split” in order to look on as a detached spectator at the very phenomena in which, as an empirical interested ego (or in Foucault’s case speaker), one can’t help being involved. Foucault the archeologist looks on, as a detached metaphenomenologist, at the historical Foucault who can’t, if he thinks about human beings in a serious way, help thinking in terms of the meanings and truth claims governed by the latest discursive formation (87)

Such a reading then leads the authors to understand the final portion of the Archéologie du savoir (the work’s conclusion, which reads more as a polemical response to various critics than a crowning theoretical moment) as an “un-serious” attempt at seriousness: “...if, indeed, meaningful truth claims are the only kind of seriousness available to us, Foucault, when he is a consistent archaeologist, cuts himself off from all seriousness” (88). Dreyfus’ and Rabinow’s conclusion is that the double “role” of discursive formations (as being both descriptive and prescriptive) forces Foucault into a theoretical corner where an anti- or post-structuralist discourse is simply one that “delights in [its] liberation from the deadening seriousness of the past” (88-89). Furthermore, they understand discourse’s double role as forcing Foucault into not only the problematic distinction between serious and non-serious discourse but an even graver underlying problem in which this distinction falls into the same form of empirical/transcendental
doubles Foucault analyzes in *Les mots et les choses* as part of the “analytic of finitude:” "...the Archeology is an attempt to show the limits of the legitimacy of the knowledge claims of all finite discursive practices, while it claims that it has a clear total picture of these sets of practices as ‘so many science-objects’ from a perspective that is free of their influence” (98).

Now, as we have noted in our explanation, Dreyfus and Rabinow situate their problem in the archeological method and its relationship with the two external forms of visibilities (things) and “say-abilities” (words). According to their historical reading, the impasse is resolved when Foucault abandons the archeological method in favor of a genealogical method which focuses more closely on the question of power (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 104-105). It appears, however, that the authors have not grasped the full implications of power in Foucault’s system, for it is our contention that power is already at work in the relation between words and things and the double role of discourse within discursive formations. In their analysis of the double role of the discursive formation (descriptive and prescriptive) Dreyfus and Rabinow quite lucidly point to the neo-Kantian aspects of Foucault’s reading, underlining how discursive practices are described by him as not being part of all possible discursive practices but rather as the conditions of occurrence of various practices (92-93). In spite of such a distinction, it is nonetheless this statute of “conditions” which Dreyfus and Rabinow qualify as occupying a transcendental ground, in the same manner as Heidegger’s existentials or Merleau-Ponty’s body schemata as conditions of actuality (93). We feel that this is to ignore the manner in which the two exterior forms of a discursive formation (words and things)
come together as part of the larger distinction between two exterior forces (knowledge and power).

We recall that within the panoptical discursive formation we were able to trace a number of discursive practices in which the descriptive function carried powerfully prescriptive functions as well. In this sense, knowledge and power might be read as folding seamlessly together, and any attempt to seize these discourses within a descriptive and theoretical discourse (such as archeology) leads inevitably to doubts such as those expressed by Dreyfus and Rabinow. However, it is the manner in which such a discursive formation breaks down (as in the production of the delinquent) that what initially appeared to be a tight and inevitable relationship between power and knowledge (and words and things) begins to reveal its limits. It is along the cracks of such a discursive formation that we might begin to trace what we termed earlier the "diagram" of power behind a discursive formation. Power in the form of its prescriptive function within a discursive formation no longer seems as limiting and must then be read within its productive aspect. Indeed, as we noted in chapter five, it is not the historical archive and its various components and forms that transform themselves but rather the composing forces of these discursive formations. Because it is precisely this distinction which is overlooked by Dreyfus and Rabinow, it is important to repeat what we noted in chapter five concerning the "death" of man as it is analyzed in Les mots et les choses. We recall that the modern historical archive and the death it inflicts upon man through the empirical/transcendental double is not so much man's own doing but the result of a certain configuration of forces. Power inflects a "force of finitude" onto the forces of
modern knowledge which man recuperates only after the fact. The discursive formation (and its exterior forms) is part of relation of forces *exterio* to these forms:

...l'homme n'est pas lui-même historique : le temps lui venant d'ailleurs que de lui-même, il ne se constitue comme sujet d'Histoire que par la superposition de l'histoire des êtres, de l'histoire des choses, de l'histoire des mots. Il est soumis à leurs purs événements. Mais aussitôt ce rapport de simple passivité se renverse : car ce qui parle dans le langage, ce qui travaille et consomme dans l'économie, ce qui vit dans la vie humaine, c'est l'homme lui-même ; et à ce titre, il a droit lui aussi à un devenir tout aussi positif que celui des êtres et des choses, non moins autonome... (*Les mots et les choses*, 381).

If the relation between the forms of the historical archive (words and things) is part of a larger relation of forces (which "surges" into the historical archive as an event that is also a non-event\(^{25}\)) then the contradiction located by Dreyfus and Rabinow no longer applies. In contrast to Dreyfus and Rabinow, we must understand Foucault's serious language concerning the historical archive as concerning not only the forms of the archive but also its forces. And the forces of the archive (power as it inflects the archive and its forms) are indeed the conditions of occurrence of various discursive practices. As a force from the outside (which is constantly re-aligning or re-actualizing the various points of the archive) power may never be mastered in the manner of an "archaeologist [...] in possession of the rules describing a discursive formation" (92). Foucault's archeological method traces the invisible visibility of power from the earliest works on madness to the final studies on Classical Greece. It is our belief that by artificially breaking down Foucault's thought and closing questions of power off to the final works, Dreyfus and Rabinow vastly limit the range and breadth of Foucault's system.

We might qualify this limitation of Foucault's thought as a territorialization since the affirmative and creative aspect of power is radically reduced in such a reading.
Power, as Dreyfus and Rabinow have analyzed it, is grounded in the transcendental category of the *a priori* instead of the affirmative conditions of possibility formulated by Foucault. We contend that to ignore the coherence of Foucault's project is to miss the affirmative and ontological nature Foucault reads in power. As a conclusion to our point, we might return again to the importance of the early work on Raymond Roussel where the relationship between the exteriorities of a discursive formation is placed directly within the context of power and its "invisible visibility:"

Toute l'œuvre de Roussel jusqu'aux *Nouvelles impressions* tourne autour d'une expérience singulière (je veux dire qu'il faut mettre au singulier) : le lien du langage avec cet espace inexistant qui, en dessous de la surface des choses, sépare l'intérieur de leur face visible et la périphérie de leur noyau invisible. C'est là, entre ce qu'il y a de caché dans le manifeste et de lumineux dans l'inaccessible que se noue la tâche de son langage (*Raymond Roussel*, 155).

If we recall our distinction in the previous chapter between Deleuze and Foucault, it should not be surprising that Dreyfus' and Rabinow's territorialization of Foucault's thought centers around power. In our comparison of the "subject" of literature we noted how Foucauldian power, while offering many of the same characteristics of Deleuze's desire (especially in the manner in which power continually "actualizes" the relationship between knowledge's external forms), tends to differ from desire in that the subject it produces occurs in what we termed a "negative inflection" or fold. As in our example above concerning "man's death," the forces of finitude (or power) fold themselves inward, inflecting the point which will become power's deployment within the modern subject of the empirical/transcendental double. If we place this "inflection" of power within the context of our above studies concerning the legitimate use of the faculties, we might say that Foucault's thought remains caught within a transcendent use of the
faculties because (like Derrida) it lacks the final, conjunctive and affirmative synthesis of Deleuze’s system. Let us be very clear about this. In chapter six, we analyzed the relationship between the Deleuzian writing machine and Foucault’s perception of the “subject” of literature as it is found in Roussel’s writing machines. We recall that we detected a certain subject that is produced “on the side” by the series and singularities of a discursive formation, but this subject à côté is actually a doubled subject – the invisible visibility of death in the Rousselian writing machine or the épreuve of la pensée du dehors – which cannot manage the affirmative and third repetition of Deleuze’s conjunctive synthesis. That is, it appears that Foucault’s system is caught up in the tension we outlined in the previous chapter that exists between the first and second syntheses of time. The discursive formations and their exterior forms (words and things) are connections or contractions of a number of unique singularities and series which are constantly doubled by an exteriority which gives them a positivity. This is exactly the same situation we outlined above when discussing the Deleuzian and “larval” subject, and we recall how Deleuze described the pure and open time of the second synthesis as “overflying” this subject and giving it a positivity: “...dans les structures du dépassement, l’esprit trouve une positivité qui lui vient du dehors” (1953, 12-13). However, as noted, an apparatus which deploys only two syntheses constitutes only a larval subject which is constantly subjected to the inflection from the outside. We recall that Deleuze deploys a third synthesis of time to move from the larval subject to an active, reflecting, and creative subject, thereby resolving the tension of first two syntheses and grounding a thought that is properly productive. While one might object that such productive aspects may be found within Foucault’s thought, particularly along
the points within a discursive formation where the relationship between words and things opens up, breaking down the descriptive and prescriptive properties of discursive practices (as in the case of the delinquent), we must insist again that these breakdowns only serve to confirm the difference between Deleuze and Foucault. Deleuze’s third or conjunctive synthesis permits an intensive and creative subject to emerge (for example the writer who employs language in a minor fashion) that marks a stark contrast to the Foucauldian subject and its strategies of resistance.

It is at precisely this point that we might examine another example of Foucauldian thought reterritorialized as it appears in Judith Butler’s highly influential work *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*. Like the distinction made above in our analysis of Derridean territories of thought, we have chosen Butler as our second example because her reading is not an attempt to summarize and explain Foucault (like Dreyfus and Rabinow) but is rather an example of Foucauldian thought put to work in the American academy (in much the same manner as our above example of Paul de Man in relation to Derrida). As noted at the beginning of this section, we are quite aware that Butler’s deployment of Foucauldian thought is not simply a “faded copy” of the latter’s original thought but rather a specific territorialization of thought that corresponds to a specific moment of socio-economic history (whose lines, again, we have attempted to trace in the first section of this chapter). In other words, we are not saying that because Butler bases her theory of performativity, gender, and identity on Foucault’s thought that her work is somehow illegitimate. Indeed, her reading of power, what we have termed its “inflection” onto the subject, and strategies of resistance is a remarkably innovative and creative reterritorialization of Foucauldian thought. What we should like to do then in
our analysis is follow the crucial steps of her argument and trace not so much the moment of “departure” (in the sense of our above reading of Dreyfus and Rabinow and their “grounding” of Foucauldian thought) but rather the point at which the differences outlined immediately above, between Deleuze and Foucault, manifest themselves in Butler’s work, revealing what we consider to be the limits of both Foucault’s and Butler’s work in relation to a Deleuzian theory of creative desire.

In the preceding chapter and our reading of the “subject” of literature, we focused on the manner in which the metaphysical subject is formed within Foucault’s system as a result of the fold between the forces of power and knowledge. As we have noted immediately above, such a reading of the subject and its fold may be considered productive to the extent that the fold between power and knowledge fluctuates, leaving a certain gap in which one might deploy strategies of resistance. It is precisely this gap between the forces of power and knowledge that Butler isolates and exploits in order to undermine a notion of a stable, original, or natural identity/ground:

To expose the foundational categories of sex, gender, and desire as effects of a specific formation of power requires a form of critical inquiry that Foucault, reformulating Nietzsche, designates as “genealogy.” A genealogical critique refuses to search for the origins of gender, the inner truth of female desire, a genuine or authentic sexual identity that repression has kept from view; rather, genealogy investigates the political stakes in designating as an origin and cause those identity categories that are in fact the effects of institutions, practices, discourses with multiple and diffuse points of origin. The task of this inquiry is to center on – and decenter – such defining institutions: phallogocentrism and compulsory heterosexuality (ix).

In order to decenter these latter institutions, Butler focuses, at the end of her study, on the manner in which gender is “performed” within gay and lesbian cultures. Before examining this in detail let us return to our notion of Foucauldian territories of thought.
As the above quotation illustrates, Butler’s method openly relies on and refers to Foucault’s archeological/genealogical approach.\textsuperscript{26} We recognize what we termed above as the “inflection” of power in Foucault’s thought when Butler draws a parallel between the inscription of penal law on the body of the convict, as it is examined in \textit{Surveiller et punir}, and the inscription of gender as the “disciplinary production of the figures of fantasy through the play of presence and absence on the body’s surface, the construction of the gendered body through a series of exclusions and denials, signifying absences” (135). In other words, what Foucault might term discursive practices, such as various words, acts, gestures, and expressions of desire, produce what appears to be an internal core or ground of identity (boys and girls “naturally” “act” in various ways) which is nonetheless inscribed on the exterior body (135-136). This “natural” way of acting, while never immediately given or defined, appears only as a result of these discursive practices so that a gendered identity is “naturally” doubled by its exterior discursive practices. Butler explains:

> If the “cause” of desire, gesture, and act can be localized within the “self” of the actor, then the political regulations and disciplinary practices which produce that ostensibly coherent gender are effectively displaced from view. The displacement of a political and discursive origin of gender identity onto a psychological “core” precludes an analysis of the political constitution of the gendered subject and its fabricated notions about the ineffable interiority of its sex or of its true identity (136).

By “true identity” Butler means a particular gender identity might not be revealed as a particular truth but rather as a certain discursive “visibility” around which one might trace the “invisible visibility” of power’s inflection, or what she terms, above, the “political constitution of the gendered subject.” The “invisible visibility” of gender comes to light when examined through the lens of certain performances of gender such as
camp or drag. Butler explains: "As much as drag creates a unified picture of 'woman' (what its critics often oppose), it also reveals the distinctness of those aspects of gendered experience which are falsely naturalized as a unity through the regulatory fiction of heterosexual coherence. In imitating gender, drag implicitly reveals the imitative structure of gender itself – as well as its contingency" (137). By emphasizing the contingency of the imitation, Butler is careful to note that drag as performance or parody does not imply an original (in the sense of a "natural" original) on which the performance is based (137-138). However, parody in itself is not sufficiently subversive enough if one wishes to overturn the "original" gender identity in question (male or female identity within a series of heterosexual institutions). According to Butler, performativity must be considered in terms of a Foucauldian "corporeal style" in the sense that the gender performance is both intentional and performative (139). Concretely this means that every gender performance is caught up in its repeated and ceaseless actualization or repetition. The "interiority" of gender identity only gains its "solidity" through this constant movement of actualization, and if this movement is actually contingent, then one might attempt to undermine the "normalized" performance with a "stylized" performance that calls the former one into question. Butler thus declares:

If the ground of gender identity is the stylized repetition of acts through time and not a seemingly seamless identity, then the spatial metaphor of a "ground" will be displaced and revealed as a stylized configuration, indeed, a gendered corporealization of time. The abiding gendered self will then be shown to be structured by repeated acts that seek to approximate the ideal of a substantial ground of identity, but which, in their occasional discontinuity, reveal the temporal and contingent groundlessness of this "ground." The possibilities of gender transformation are to be found precisely in the arbitrary relation between such acts, in the possibility of a failure to repeat, a de-formity, or a parodic repetition that exposes the phantasmatic effects of abiding identity as a politically tenuous construction" (141).
Such a reading of gender clearly resonates with our earlier exposition of the Foucauldian subject and the inflection of power along various points of a discursive regime’s exterior forms (words and things). We recall from our reading of archeology and power in chapter five that the discursive and disciplinary formation of nineteenth century France deployed a number of discursive practices whose stated goal was to reduce or end criminal behavior and reform felons and delinquents. However it is just the opposite that appears, and while Foucault is quick to note that the delinquent must be understood as a subject *constituted* by this particular inflection of power into the discursive formation, it is nonetheless the space that opens up between the two forces (power and knowledge) which allows the delinquent to first emerge:

Au constat que le prison échoue à réduire les crimes il faut peut-être substituer l’hypothèse que la prison a fort bien réussi à produire la délinquance, type spécifié, forme politiquement ou économiquement moins dangereuse – à la limite utilisable – d’illégalisme ; à produire les délinquants, milieu apparemment marginalisé mais centralement contrôlé ; à produire le délinquant comme sujet pathologisé (*Surveiller et punir*, 323).

Much like the delinquent (who only appears to be marginalized but is actually centrally controlled by the nineteenth century discursive regime), the transvestite, drag performer, or butch/femme lesbian occupies a falsely marginal place in contemporary society since this marginality remains closely controlled by the “central” organizing regime of “defining institutions of phallocentrism and compulsory heterosexuality.” As the “unforeseen” product of such discursive formations, the transvestite’s, drag artist’s, or lesbian’s performance of gender and sexuality offer a point of strategic resistance to power’s inflection.
Above we noted that we undertook our reading of Butler not so much in order to show how she operates a certain "grounding" or transcendental territorialization of Foucault's thought (on the contrary, we find her reading to be a striking example of thought setting off new lines of flight – in this case Foucault's territory opens up a new line of thought that connects with gender and sexual identity in a manner not foreseen in his earlier works on discipline and sexuality), as in the case of Dreyfus and Rabinow, but rather to mark once again the limits between a Foucault-inspired territory of thought and Deleuze's system of desiring production. We recall from the previous chapter how we originally marked this limit around the empty square of Deleuze's early structuralism essay. Where the later and "mature" Deleuzian subject might be defined by its folding outward, the Foucauldian subject is marked by the doubling movement of power. Power first folds itself inward and "inflects" the subject with what we have qualified as a negative movement of "épreuves." We contend that this limits Foucault to a thought of strategic resistance rather than affirmative creation. Butler's reading of corporeal style as a form of strategic resistance appears to reproduce the "subject" of Foucauldian thought. We recall that it is exactly around this point in Dreyfus and Rabinow that we made our transition to Butler's work, and we might "translate" her theory of performative or strategic resistance into Deleuzian terms: a discursive formation and its discursive practices (words and things) connects and contracts a number of unique singularities and series which are then doubled by an exteriority (in "overflight"), giving the formation its positivity. It is this doubling and contingent movement of the exterior (power) which opens up "space" for a change in a discursive formation's positivity. Such a Deleuzian reading of Foucault's thought reveals, as noted above in our study of Dreyfus and
Rabinow, the lack of a third, conjunctive synthesis. As noted in our earlier readings of these syntheses, it is only with the conjunctive or third synthesis of thought that the Deleuzian machine is able to deploy its creative and affirmative aspect, what we have above defined as the "re-flux" or "multiple unity" of desiring production. Although we have returned to this difficult notion several times in Deleuze's texts, perhaps Arnaud Villani captures it well when he explains:

Ce qui sous-tend la reprise du pli au sens leibnizien du baroque est l'unité multiple : unité en tant que la série des virtualités est continue, multiplicité en tant que ce ne sont que des hétérogénéités. Mais pour que les divergences persistent dans la différence, il faut qu'elles changent à tout moment. Et cela n'est possible que si l'on imagine une redétermination de chaque pli par l'effet de rencontre de ses points saillants avec les points remarquables d'un autre pli... (66).

It is this movement of the *encounter*, what we have termed elsewhere the "unfolding" of the point, within Deleuze's thought which allows us to distinguish between a Foucauldian, strategic resistance and a creative, Deleuzian encounter.

Perhaps an illustration of what this means may be found in Butler's account of performativity. Resistance to phallogocentrism and compulsory heterosexuality occurs at the strategic point of drag, transvestite, and lesbian gender performances. Indeed, performativity exposes "the phantasmatic effects of abiding identity as a politically tenuous construction" (*Gender Trouble*, 141). We would argue that the location of strategic resistance at this particular point reveals the limits of Butler's (and Foucault's) system. In contrast to such a position, a Deleuzian approach would "unfold" resistance at every possible point, embracing what Villani above terms the "unité multiple" so that the "phantasmatic effects of abiding identity" are considered just as equally capable of creative resistance as drag, transvestite, and lesbian identity performances. For Deleuze,
*every* point within a discursive formation is capable of a creative encounter. Perhaps it is in Butler’s limitation of resistance to strategic points and the inflection of power there that we might then trace a slight transcendent grounding of her thought. In order to understand this, let us first consider how Deleuze describes the “*unité multiple*” of the conjunctive synthesis when it appears in literature, describing the minor language of the writer in terms of a “larger,” “multiple unity” of collective agencement:

Bien qu’elle renvoie toujours à des agents singuliers, la littérature est agencement collectif d’énonciation. La littérature est délire, mais le délire n’est pas affaire du père-mère : il n’y a pas de délires qui ne passe par les peuples, les races et les tribus, et ne hante l’histoire universelle. Tout délires est historico-mondial, « déplacement de races et de continents »...But ultime de la littérature, dégager dans le délires cette création d’une santé, ou cette invention d’un peuple, c’est-à-dire une possibilité de vie. Écrire pour ce peuple qui manque... (« pour » signifie moins « à la place de » que « à l’intention de ») (1993, 15).

By limiting her point of resistance to drag, transvestites, and lesbian gender performances, does Butler not, in a sense, limit the “multiple unity” of the discursive formation and pull her resistance back down into an “*affaire du père-mère*?” In other words, does not a certain image of thought in terms of a pre-determined image or point of resistance (or subversion of identity) reveal the transcendent limits of Butler’s theory? In contrast, we would hold that a Deleuzian “subversion of identity” embraces the “multiple unity” of the discursive formation, so that any point is capable of a “fabulating” (a term used interchangeably by Deleuze with the “délires” of “délier” above, see 1993, 12-13) resistance.27

We will draw our conclusions from this investigation of “American territories” of Derridean and Foucauldian thought in our next and final chapter.
Notes

1 Perhaps unjustly so, we have not insisted at great length on the ethical implications of an “opening up” of difference in the same vein as that of the authors of the Black Faculty Caucus statement. Our study, in the previous chapter, of Deleuze’s, Derrida’s, and Foucault’s treatment of the metaphysical subject, nonetheless touches on this topic, for by undoing the subject of Kantian and Hegelian thought, one undoes the violence that is at the heart of such a reading of difference. By limiting the determination of difference to a subject which already precedes the deployment of the dialectic, Hegel unconsciously reveals the “nihilism” of his system: the determination of being is, in the end, left to a subject, which then implies that the order or meaning of things is ultimately contingently posited. Philip Wood forcefully argues this point in his essay, “Democracy” and ‘Totalitarianism’ in Contemporary French Thought: Neoliberalism, the Heidegger Scandal, and Ethics in Post-Structuralism,” explaining:

Because of the incoherences necessarily entailed by the notions of subject and totality...it follows that humanity cannot derive...an ethics from some overview of a putative totality of beings or the “nature of things” as Law: we would have to be implicated in any such totality and could not posit it as an object of knowledge...[M]odern humanism generally has asserted (or at least implied, without always grasping the nettle of the secret nihilism of its own position) that there is no meaning or value out there independent of what I (or we, as a “culture”)...posit as a sovereign choice...[T]he murderous colonization of the Americas, Africa, Australasia, and huge tracts of Asia, the Vietnam War, the destruction of the biosphere, the fact that we do not have genuinely democratic institutions, and a neocolonialism as destructive as the colonialism it replaced...are not aberrations in the history of the modern West...but integral to it, and integral to the kind of subject Heidegger and Derrida decry (95-96, 102).

2 For a closer and more detailed reading of this passage, see Peggy Kamuf’s, The Division of Literature, or, The University in Deconstruction, pages 45-48. Our reading is in large part inspired by hers.

3 Peggy Kamuf, in her Derridean approach, pushes this contradiction into a “division that does not divide:” “Once again, we come across the figure of the university (at least insofar as it concerns the faculty of philosophy) instituted by a division that does not divide, a division that is or is supposed to be a purely formal mark, one that does not set anything apart from the space of public reason” (136-137). For further readings in this direction, see Derrida’s own reflections on the university and reason in Du droit à la philosophie and specifically the five essays in the third part of this collection, “Mochlos: L’œil de l’université,” pages 397-538.
This is not to say that such posturing does not exist on the part of the Black Faculty Caucus or others with similar views, whose sometimes-gleeful enthusiasm in attacking what they see as entrenched and monolithic adversaries must be tempered by the argument developed below.

Lyotard’s argument lays bare, in a manner rather similar to that of Philip Wood, the nihilism to be found at the heart of nineteenth century systems of knowledge. See our above note concerning an ethics of difference.

Bérubé declares:

The evolution of the modern multiversity had at its source two principal imperatives: to accommodate new student populations and to produce research (and researchers) of use to national security and global economic competition. Under both headings, the university was put, as Clark Kerr said, into the service of the nation: in democratizing higher education, expanding the franchise to previously excluded populations, as well as in militarizing higher education and providing research and development for the postwar economic boom (200).

In this manner, we take up again our problem from the previous chapter, where we declared: “One might say that Deleuze’s entire oeuvre is an attempt to reconcile two contradictory moves. On the one hand singularities exist in a state of pure, schizophrenic difference which, if left untouched, tend toward auto-destruction. If we attempt to capture these singularities and to give them consistence, we are able to preserve them but at the price of neutralizing their productive nature. How may we form a field or plane in which such singularities may preserve their difference but be endlessly repeated?”

Although noted above in chapters two and three, it is important to underline again how for Deleuze the primitive territorial machine functions, above all, as a marker or “encoder” of desire and territory. It is only after the flux of desire has been coded within the lines of tribal hierarchy and alliance that one may speak of debt as playing a role in the exchange of capital. Once the flux of desire has been segmented and turned back unto itself – once “man” ceases to be a biological organism and becomes a member of society – “his” various “organs” might be encoded and marked for use within the territorial machine. Once coded, an individual and “his” organs may then debit or accumulate from the flux of desire. It is the coding that determines the restrictions on alliances (the incest taboo) and the hierarchy of a primitive society and not the resulting debt (around which these structures appear be founded). Deleuze declares:

...la dette est l’unité d’alliance, et l’alliance est la représentation même. C’est l’alliance qui code les flux du désir et qui, par la dette, fait à l’homme une mémoire des paroles. C’est elle qui refoule la grande mémoire filiative intense et muette, l’influx germinal comme représentant des flux non codés qui submergeraient tout. C’est la dette qui compose les alliances avec les filiations devenues étendues, pour former et forger un système en extension (représentation) sur le refoulement des intensités nocturnes. L’alliance-dette répond à ce que Nietzsche décrivait comme le
travail préhistorique de l’humanité : se servir de la mnéotechnie la plus crue, en pleine chair, pour imposer une mémoire des paroles sur la base du refoulement de la vieille mémoire bio-cosmique. Voilà pourquoi il est si important de voir dans la dette une conséquence directe de l’inscription primitive, au lieu d’en faire (et de faire des inscriptions mêmes) un moyen indirect de l’échange universel (1972, 218).

To understand primitive society as functioning around a model of exchange (the heart of which is debt) is to neutralize the primary role of desire and the encoding that primitive society deploys in the face of desire. If one takes debt as the central player in an exchange model of primitive society, one ignores the connective intensity of desire and the manner in which this intensity is blocked or augmented by the various codes of alliance and hierarchy. In other words, one erects, in debt, a symbolic space in which all desire is evacuated, forming an emptiness or negativity, around which the structure turns. Debt becomes the negative ground on which a closed structure of primitive society is based. As Deleuze declares of this movement, “[Cet usage extrait]de la chaîne signifiante un objet complet transcendant, comme signifiant despotique dont toute la chaîne semblait alors dépendre, assignant un manque à chaque position de désir, soudant le désir à une loi, engendrant l’illusion d’un décollement” (1972, 131). In contrast, if debt is understood as being constituted by the encoding of primitive society, then one is able to read its appearance as part of the larger (albeit transcendent) movement of desire and its blockage or augmentation.

9 Of course mention of a determined and differenciated ego recalls Deleuze’s reading of Bergson and Proust. By approaching the problem of the encounter in terms of two separate, determined and identified (represented) entities, we are posing a false problem. Instead of approaching this encounter in terms of a differentiation that is then differenciated, the problem only concerns the differenciation. In his study of Bergson, Deleuze speaks of this false problem, and we might recognize, underneath the text, the false image of thought:

L’idée de désordre apparaît quand, au lieu de voir qu’il y a deux ou plusieurs ordres irréductibles (par exemple celui de la vie et celui du mécanisme, l’un étant présent quand l’autre n’est pas là), on retient seulement une idée générale d’ordre, qu’on se contente d’opposer au désordre et de penser en corrélation avec l’idée de désordre. L’idée de non-être apparaît quand, au lieu de saisir les réalités différentes qui se substituent les unes aux autres indéfiniment, nous les confondons dans l’homogénéité d’un Être en général, qui ne peut plus que s’opposer au néant, se rapporter au néant. L’idée de possible apparaît quand, au lieu de saisir chaque existant dans sa nouveauté, on rapporte l’ensemble de l’existence à un élément préformé dont tout serait censé sortir par simple « réalisation » (1966, 9).

We might recall, in passing, the condemnation Proust (and Deleuze) make of a philosophy that codes thought in this manner. Deleuze declares:

Le tort de la philosophie, c’est de présupposer en nous une bonne volonté de penser, un désir, un amour naturel du vrai. Aussi la philosophie n’arrive-t-elle qu’à des vérités abstraites, qui ne compromettent personne

10 See our discussion of the second passive synthesis of time in the previous chapter as well as our discussion of this problem in Bergson in the first chapter.

11 Although this should go without saying, the affirmation of difference in this sense corresponds very closely to the schizophrenic experience, as Deleuze stresses:
   Il apparaît toutefois que la schizophrenie nous donne une singulière leçon extra-oedipienne, et nous révèle une force inconnue de la synthèse disjonctive, un usage immanent qui ne serait plus exclusif ni limitatif, mais pleinement affirmatif, illimitatif, inclusif. Une disjonction qui reste disjonctive, et qui pourtant affirme les termes disjoints, les affirme à travers toute leur distance, sans limiter l’un par l’autre ni exclure l’autre de l’un... (1972, 90).

12 On this aspect of territorial coding, we recall that Deleuze explains the passage from an intensive flux of desire to an extensive flux within territorial representation in the following manner:
   ...l’influx germinal d’intensité conditionne toute la représentation : il est le représentant du désir... il implique à sa manière la limite du socius, la limite et le négatif de tout socius. Aussi la répression de cette limite n’est-elle possible que pour autant que le représentant subit lui-même un refoulement. Ce refoulement détermine ce qui passera et ce qui ne passera pas de l’influx dans le système en extension, ce qui restera bloqué ou stocké dans les filiations étendues, ce qui au contraire bougera et coulera suivant les rapports d’alliance, de telle manière que s’effectue le codage systématique des flux. Nous appelons alliance cette deuxième instance, la représentation refoulante elle-même... (1972, 193-194).

The incest taboo, like debt, only appears as a result of territorial coding, once the pieces of the territorial machine are determined. Deleuze explains:
   L’inceste est seulement l’effet rétro-actif de la représentation refoulante sur le représentant refoulé : elle défigure ou déplace ce représentant sur lequel elle porte, elle projette sur lui des catégories discernabilisées qu’elle a elle-même instaurées, elle lui applique des termes qui n’existaient pas avant que l’alliance, précisément, n’ait organisé le positif et le négatif dans le système en extension — elle le rabat sur ce qui est bloqué dans ce système (1972, 195).

13 It is perhaps within this perspective of the shift from the despotic to the capitalist territorial machine that the multiple analyses made by Jean-Joseph Goux concerning capitalism and its imaginaire might be read as sharing a profound unity with the Deleuzian critique. We believe that in spite of what appears to be a certain conflation of Deleuze and his philosophy of desire with what Goux terms a “logique boursière” and
the post-modern turn in philosophy ("L'interrogation très fournie sur le désir chez Bataille, Deleuze, Baudrillard, n'est-elle pas elle-même tributaire d'[une] configuration dont l'économie marginaliste inaugure discrètement l'émergence dans les années 1870 ?") (Frivolité de la valeur, 75)) the observation that he makes concerning the theoretical and metaphysical limits of contemporary thought closely correspond to the Deleuzian distinction between the immanent and transcendent use of thought. We believe that Deleuze would have absolutely no objection to the manner in which Goux underlines the complicity between contemporary (and post-modern) thought and capitalism. In his own manner, Goux marks the capitalist territorialization of contemporary thought:

Il apparaît en effet que toutes les questions contemporaines concernant la nature du signe sont surdeterminées par une situation socio-symbolique dans laquelle prédomine la logique du « jeton » comme élément opératoire, avec comme contre-partie l'occultation complète de deux autres fonctions de l'équivalent général, mesure des valeurs dans le registre de l'idéalité, et moyen de « thésaurisation » dans le registre du réel. C'est pourquoi dans la philosophie comme dans la psychanalyse, l'insistance est partout sur l'autonomie du signifiant. Notre mise à jour de cette correspondance entre la structure contemporaine de l'échange monétaire et les théories du signifiant nous conduirait donc à relativiser la portée théorique et métaphysique de telles conceptions du signe, pour en dessiner la signification historique déterminée (Les monnayeurs du langage, 173).

14 To reiterate the point made earlier in this chapter as well as in our reading of territories in chapter two, it is in this manner that Deleuze might claim a universal history: the deployment of Òedipus in the capitalist territorial machine necessarily implies the primitive and despotic deployments of the connective and disjunctive syntheses in the same manner that these latter syntheses imply the capitalist de-encoding of the axiomatic.

15 See, for instance, the chapters entitled "Employing English" and "English for Employment" in The Employment of English.

16 These examples are taken from the short essay "Littérature et la vie" in Critique et clinique which represents one of the clearest and most concise examples of Deleuze on the proper use of the faculties and its relationship to literature. See also "De la supériorité de la littérature anglaise-américaine" in Dialogues.

17 We recall our quote from above:

Le « soit...soit » schizophrénique prend le relais du « et puis » : quels que soient deux organes envisagés, la manière dont ils sont accrochés sur le corps sans organes doit être telle que toutes les synthèses disjunctives entre les deux reviennent au même sur la surface glissante...le « soit » désigne le système de permutations possibles entre des différences qui reviennent toujours au même en se déplaçant, en glissant (1972, 18).
18 We recall that Derrida explains the phenomenological reduction in the following manner:

Dans le monologue intérieur, le mot serait donc seulement représenté. Son lieu peut être l'imaginaire (Phantasie). Nous nous contentons d'imaginer le mot dont l'existence est ainsi neutralisée. Dans cette imagination du mot, dans cette représentation imaginaire du mot (Phantasievorstellung), nous n'avons plus besoin de l'événement empirique du mot. Son existence ou sa non-existence nous sont indifférentes. Car si nous avons alors besoin de l'imagination du mot, du même coup nous nous passons du mot imaginé. L'imaginaire du mot, l'imaginé, l'être-imaginé du mot, son « image » n'est pas le mot (imaginé). De même que dans la perception du mot, le mot (perçu ou apparaissant) qui est « dans le monde » appartient à un ordre radicalement différent de celui de la perception ou de l'apparaître du mot, de l'être-perçu du mot, de même le mot (imaginé) est d'un ordre radicalement hétérogène à celui de l'imaginaire du mot (Voix et phénomène, 48).

19 As Derrida explains:

Il faut donc avancer un double geste, selon une unité à la fois systématique et comme d'elle-même écartée, une écriture dédoublée, c'est-à-dire d'elle-même multipliée, ce que j'ai appelé...une double science : d'une part, traverser une phase de renversement...et d'autre part...s'en tenir à cette phase, c'est encore opérer sur le terrain et à l'intérieur du système déconstruit. Aussi faut-il, par cette écriture double, justement, stratifiée, décalée et décalante, marquer l'écart entre l'inversion qui met bas la hauteur, en déconstruit la généalogie sublimante ou idéalisante, et l'émergence irruptive d'un nouveau « concept », concept de ce qui ne s'est jamais laissé comprendre dans le régime antérieur (Positions, 56-57).

20 As we shall see below, the accent on “failing in teaching” recurs often and is important in understanding de Man’s reading of the Derridean text.

21 Deconstruction, on the other hand, is often explicitly mentioned in relation to de Man’s strategy. He explains in Allegories of Reading, “[D]econstruction is not something we have added to the text but it constituted the text in the first place. A literary text simultaneously asserts and denies the authority of its own rhetorical mode, and by reading the text as we did we were only trying to come closer to being as rigorous a reader as the author had to be in order to write the sentence in the first place” (17). We might note, in passing, the relation de Man nonetheless draws between his rhetorical reading and deconstruction in the sense that a literary or nonphenomenal reading of a text (the “deconstruction” of a text, to use de Man’s terms) reveals what constitutes the text. In this sense, it certainly appears that de Man’s reading strategy might be assimilated to the Derridean notion of the general text.
22 Philip Wood has, again, forcefully argued this point and its implications concerning a post-structuralist ethics. See his “‘Democracy’ and ‘Totalitarianism’ in Contemporary French Thought: Neoliberalism, the Heidegger Scandal, and Ethics in Post-Structuralism,” pages 96-103.

23 We contend that it is only in this manner that the complex relationship between power and knowledge (in the form of a discursive formation) might be understood in Foucault’s work. In our analysis below we shall see how misunderstanding this relationship and its deployment within Foucault’s theoretical trajectory leads to a “grounding” or territorialization of Foucault’s work, which might be prefigured by the manner in which Dreyfus and Rabinow characterize Deleuze’s reading of Foucault as “cryptic.” “Gilles Deleuze has said cryptically that Foucault should be seen not as a historian, but as a new kind of map-maker…” (128).

24 We should underline here that our choice of this particular passage from Dreyfus and Rabinow is strategic, explicitly based as it is on their problematic reading of power. It is around power as a force from the outside that we might properly place the Foucauldian machine within the perspective of its breadth and creativity as well as within its limits in relation to Deleuze’s theoretical apparatus.

25 We recall from chapter 5 how we related this “event” to the “non-event” of thought in Foucault’s work:

Cette pensée qui se tient hors de toute subjectivité pour en faire surgir comme de l’extérieur les limites, en énoncer la fin, en faire scintiller la dispersion et n’en recueillir que l’invincible absence, et qui en même temps se tient au seuil de toute positivité, non pas tant pour en saisir le fondement ou la justification, mais pour retrouver l’espace où elle se déploie, le vide qui lui sert de lieu, la distance dans laquelle elle se constitue et où s’esquissent dès qu’on y porte le regard ses certitudes immédiates, – cette pensée, par rapport à l’intériorité de notre réflexion philosophique et par rapport à la positivité de notre savoir, constitue ce qu’on pourrait appeler d’un mot « la pensée du dehors » (La pensée du dehors, 16).

26 Lynne Huffer reads Butler’s theory of performativity as being closer to Luce Irigaray’s notion of mimesis than Foucault’s archeological/genealogical method (Maternal Pasts, Feminist Futures, 26). This is perhaps part of a strategy since according to Huffer Butler’s performativity (in opposition to Irigaray’s mimesis) is ultimately unable to account for an ethical relationship with the other. “Irigaray,” Huffer states, “inscribes an ethical model of speech that would contest Butler’s performative act, despite the apparent affinities between performativity and Irigaray’s concept of mimesis” (98). It is worth noting in passing that Huffer’s argument with Butler offers another example of what we termed above an “image of thought.” Despite Huffer’s good intentions (which are not all in question here) her insistence on an ethics of performativity as a “foundation” (that is, as a “first philosophy” instead of an ontology) nonetheless imposes a certain image or
end of thought (in terms of an ethical model) which forecloses the open and creative movement of a Deleuzian philosophy of desire. Huffer declares:

My use of the term “foundation” is quite deliberate. Butler argues against an essentializing foundationalism...because of the ontological claims upheld by any foundationalist argument. I follow Levinas here in asserting the necessity of ethics, and not ontology, as a “first philosophy.” As such, ethics accounts for an always prior sociality that subordinates ontology, thereby constituting a legitimate, non-essentializing foundation for discourse and politics. We should not annihilate the other, for it is precisely the question of the other that puts “us” into question. That is, a foundationalist claim which bases itself on the necessity of being put into question (98, note 8 (166-167)).

On this point we are in complete agreement with Huffer. What appears to trouble her, however, is that the repetitive nature of performativity (analyzed below) cannot guarantee such a foundation, “What keeps Butler’s purposeful redeployment [of heterosexual identity] from being, yet again, redeployed, with perhaps drastically different purposes? Nothing, we all admit, since iterability as repetition is precisely the point. Which is precisely why performativity alone is inadequate as political theory” (98, note 9 (167)).

Again, we must agree with Huffer. The repetitive nature of performativity carries no guarantee of ethical behavior, but to impose (Huffer never actually imposes an ethics but does call for reflection in this direction) an ethics that closes off this repetition at some point (even if it were to prevent the worst possible behavior) leads us back to an image of thought in which a certain end is presumed from the very beginning. This is the tribunal of judgement decried by Deleuze. Does this leave us to sink hopelessly into a void of nihilism? Does Deleuzian thought (as well as Foucauldian and Derridean thought) lead to, at the best, moral relativism, and, at the worst, fascism, racism, and intolerance? Certainly not. We believe that our long readings into what, in Deleuzian thought, is defined as the three synthanes, in Derrida as the “order” of différences (see, in particular, Marges, page 5) and the continual repetition or actualization of knowledge/power relations in Foucault (which we must be careful not to conflate, despite their similarities) reveal a non-foundational ontology that is also an ethics. In all of these “territories” of thought, identity emerges as part of a trans-individual (in the largest possible sense, extending through both time and space) movement that implies the most extreme prudence regarding our interaction with others and with the entire “web” or “text” of being surrounding us (for if our identity is indeed implicated with “everything else” then any violence we commit toward others is inevitably a “self” violence). True, an ethics in the sense of a certain prescription or limitation cannot emerge in such a framework, but this does not preclude our drawing an ethical conclusion. Concerning Deleuze, the three synthanes and the concept of minor language/literature, Arnaud Villani remarks, “Si tous les êtres se réduisent au même dénominateur, alors la pratique du mineur s’associe à une puissance infraverbale de fraternité...La littérature mineure est bien aussi cette langue arrachée ou dérobée, capable de vibrer selon des relations obliques, représentant des auteurs qui ne représentent qu’eux-mêmes, et ne fondent leur cause sur rien” (105-106). Such a “vaguely” (“vague” because it refuses any prescription that would close thought off in a particular “image” of ethics) articulated ethics leaves many doubtful. We know of no better response to criticisms of “vague,” “postmodern,” or “post-structuralist” ethics
than that made by Philip Wood: "...our resistance [to "postmodern" or "post-structuralist" ethics] derives from the flat refusal to accept that there could be an order (I mean, of course, a trans-human order, a kosmos) that permitted genocide, lung cancer, and so on, an order that thereby shows itself to be calmly indifferent to our most cherished notions of justice, our incorrigible, imperious demand that we be happy and that happiness be served to us on our own terms" ("Democracy’ and ‘Totalitarianism’ in Contemporary French Thought: Neoliberalism, the Heidegger Scandal, and Ethics in Post-Structuralism," 97).

27 At one point Butler appears to conflate normative heterosexuality with homosexuality and to thus concede that normative heterosexuality offers various openings for its own undermining:

...heterosexuality offers normative sexual positions that are intrinsically impossible to embody, and the persistent failure to identity fully and without incoherence with these positions reveals heterosexuality itself not only as a compulsory law, but as an inevitable comedy. Indeed, I would offer this insight into heterosexuality as both a compulsory system and an intrinsic comedy, a constant parody of itself, as an alternative gay/lesbian perspective (122).

We would hold, however, that the positions outlined above demonstrate that the strategic points of homosexual and lesbian performativity remain nonetheless privileged.
Conclusion

As the Deleuzian language of our criticism of Butler (and de Man) illustrates, it is invariably around the complicated notion of the third Deleuzian synthesis (the conjunctive moment of production) that a movement of territorialization of thought might be discerned. Indeed, this crucial third synthesis might be said to be the lynchpin of the entire Deleuzian project as well as of our own project of situating thought within the concept of the territory. We recall that the disappearance of the *case vide* from Deleuze’s early structuralism essay in favor of the point and its unfolding nature marked, in a certain manner, Deleuze’s coming to terms with this synthesis and its importance within his system. Furthermore, we have, at several points, underlined the tension that this synthesis attempts to capture in an active and creative manner. To return to the Deleuzian system, we recall that, on the one hand, singularities exist in a state of pure, schizophrenic difference which, if left untouched, tend toward auto-destruction. If we attempt to capture these singularities and to give them consistence, we are able to preserve them but only at the price of neutralizing their productive nature. The question that Deleuze’s thought attempts to answer (How may we form a field or plane in which such singularities may preserve their difference but be endlessly repeated?) is, in fact, the entire question of the territory and the point around which we might make a Deleuzian critique of his contemporaries, Derrida and Foucault. The territory is the concept which responds to the philosophical question of difference (treated in our first chapter), the socio-historical question of territories (treated in our second chapter), and the question of an “image of thought” (treated in our third chapter as it concerns psychoanalysis and in
our final section as it concerns, on a larger scale, the study of literature). With this (and our preceding example of Derridean and Foucauldian territories of thought in America) in mind, let us recall the questions that opened this study.

We remember that we began by reflecting on the title of our work and the “odd” relationship one might imagine between a territory and thought. Why, we asked, has French thought had such an important influence on American literary criticism (in particular) in the past twenty-five to thirty years? This relatively “local” question (“local” because it tends to focus mainly on the cultural exchanges between the United States and France) led us to a more “conceptual” and “general” question that justifies our use of the term “territory” in this study: What is the relationship between French thought and its reception or expression within the American academy? Our study has attempted to explain, in other words, how the unquestionable impact of French thought in the United States is conceptually (in the sense given the term “concept” by Deleuze) and structurally possible. The response to this series of questions, as it concerns the examples of Derridean and Foucauldian thought studied in the immediately preceding chapter (Culler, de Man, Dreyfus and Rabinow, and Butler), may be found in a certain “image” that these commentators make of Derrida and Foucault. In each of our examples of American reterritorializations of French thought, we have been able to pinpoint a moment when their representation of Derrida or Foucault limits or reduces the breadth of these two thinkers’ thought. Again, our examples cannot be said to represent all readings of Derrida or Foucault within the American academy, and we do not wish to insinuate that thought, particularly French thought in the form of Derrida’s and Foucault’s work, cannot be legitimately “imported” into another culture. Our examples were chosen because of
their influence and impact within the larger debates within the American academy concerning literature and its use. We might nonetheless suggest that these particular examples invite a larger reflection upon the influence of French thought within the American academy and the questions it poses in terms of literature and its use.

With this evocation of the larger debate which opened our previous chapter, we are perhaps now better positioned to respond to our opening question concerning the legitimacy of titling our study an examination of “territories of thought.” As we have demonstrated, Deleuze’s concept of territory allows him to treat the question of difference within a productive or affirmative perspective. Difference for Deleuze, we recall, is always productive. This reading of difference then produces a “philosophy of desire” in which lack or negativity in the form of an image of thought is banned. In proposing such a reading of difference and of the thought it produces, one is nonetheless led to ask how images of thought (such as those described by Deleuze in the work of Hegel, Husserl, and Kant, or such as those examined above concerning an image or “end” of literature) are produced by such a productive and affirmative difference. The answer is to be found in the critique Deleuze makes of illegitimate uses of the faculties and the territories (primitive, despotic, and civilized) that such uses produce. Instead of opening up unto a plane of immanence in affirmative and desiring production, thought recognizes itself in the transcendent use of the faculties.

We believe then that Deleuze’s concept of territory permits us to make a double analysis of our contemporary situation. As our preceding chapters have demonstrated, a certain trace of negativity may be detected within the thought of Derrida and Foucault. Our analysis of Deleuze’s own rejection of just such a “trace” of negativity, with the
disappearance of *la case vide* from his early essay on structuralism, helped to mark the limits of this negativity as they appear in the thought of his contemporaries. A territory of thought may then be considered within its purely philosophical context as a reterritorialization of difference’s productive and affirmative nature. If we are to take Deleuze *à la lettre*, difference, in terms of productive desire, must account not only for the philosophical context of our debate but also for its socio-historical context. The reterritorialization of thought occurs not only within its philosophical context but simultaneously within a socio-historical context, and Deleuze accounts for this “double” reterritorialization by relating the transcendent use of the faculties to three socio-historical territories: primitive, despotic, and civilized territories.
Selected Bibliography

Deleuze or co-authored by Deleuze


**Other Works**


