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A Response to Christian Critique of Psychology as a Religion

by

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ABSTRACT

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Modern psychology and psychotherapy for some has become a functional religion. Certain Christian scholars have employed deontological ethics of mutuality and obligation to critique the implicit ethical egoist perspective of humanistic, Jungian and ego psychologies as scholars such as Don Browning believe that therapists and pastoral counselors have appropriated clinical psychologies without examining their implicit ethical egoist orientations. They believe that an ethic of generativity best exemplifies the fit between modern psychology and Christian theology. So-called “generative man” is the preferred archetype to “productive man” or “psychological man.” However, the aretaic ethics of individuation and self-actualization have paradoxical utilitarian benefits for the community. It is argued that the process of narcissism associated with individuation is necessary before one can authentically embrace a deontological ethic of mutuality.
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INTRODUCTION

Volumes have been written on the impact of secularization and pluralism upon the role of religion in the United States, particularly during the latter half of the 20th Century. Although the majority of Americans surveyed claim to be religious and believe in some form of "god," religion has become increasingly relegated to the private sphere of people's lives. The reasons why this shift has occurred are many, with most agreeing that social mobility and the failure of traditional religions to offer a compelling response to the myriad of social, economic and technological changes have all contributed to create a vacuum which has motivated pragmatic Americans to search elsewhere for guidance in answering their existential, moral and ethical concerns.¹

Where have people looked to find such guidance? Although the natural sciences are increasingly claiming to be the harbingers of "truth," others are turning to the social sciences for insight. While all of the social sciences deal with religion to varying extents, psychology exhibits the greatest sympathy with religion, as it is the most ideally suited in addressing the increasing internalization of religion.² In addition, from a socioeconomic perspective, the increasing affluence and educational levels (due to the expanding post-war economy and legions of young men obtaining college educations through the G.I. bill), contributed to increase exposure to psychology. More recently, insurance companies have expanded their health coverage to cover all or part of the costs of therapy as a result of companies' attempts to ensure that their employees are as productive as possible. Also, the increasing social acceptability and reduced stigma associated with
psychotherapy have combined to make therapy more viable among the middle-class.\(^3\)

Quite simply, therapy has almost become a commonplace fixture in American culture via
the proliferation of client-centered therapy, encounter groups, spiritual retreats, etc.

Obviously, one factor that has increased the perceived validity of psychology over
the past fifty years has been the development of client-centered therapies. Building upon
and responding to psychoanalytic theory developed by Sigmund Freud, psychologists
have advanced a plethora of psychologies and therapies to deal with existential, emotional
and interpersonal issues.\(^4\) Jungian, humanistic and ego psychologies have attained
widespread cultural acceptance from the 1950’s to the present even among pastoral
counselors. While for some people psychology and psychotherapy have become so
integral to shaping one’s morality and ethics as to displace the role of traditional religion,
others use psychotherapy as a major adjunct to religious beliefs and practices and to aid in
interpretation and care of psychological problems.

**DEFINITION OF PSYCHOLOGY AS A RELIGION**

When one discusses psychology and psychotherapy replacing all or part of one’s
traditional religion, one must be explicit concerning its meaning and context. First of all,
psychology as a religion can describe many different ideas depending upon one’s
definition of religion. If one assumes that religion includes a formal, ecclesiastical body
of organized worshippers who adhere to a common theological, moral and ethical
perspective, then psychology in almost all cases does not attain the status of a religion.
Few psychologists have attempted to organize something resembling a “church” of
psychology. On the contrary, most psychologists actively avoid any community-based form of therapy and instead stress the individual nature of the psychotherapeutic process, which, if anything, may attenuate the patient's ties to the community. The implications of the individualization of psychology and its impact on a person's morality and ethics will be the focus of the discussion of this paper.

For now, however, I will use a broad definition of psychology as a religion as proffered by G. William Barnard, who defines religion not in terms of reflecting a traditional, ecclesiastical group of like-minded adherents, but more along the lines of "spirituality," where religion helps one to understand the "depths of reality and consciousness," and one's role in the universe. The psychologies usually included in this context, in which psychology takes on the function of religion, include humanistic, transpersonal, Jungian and ego psychologies (as a group to be referred to as "modern psychologies"), which provide a framework for spiritual development in dealing with existential, emotional and interpersonal issues. The main process involved in psychology as a religion is psychotherapy, whereby the therapist may take on the role of reverend, rabbi and priest in guiding the spiritual development of the patient. Although many scholars have commented on the rapid growth of the New Age movement in the U.S. and the importance of psychology in New Age practices, I will refrain from venturing into a discussion of the make-up, customs and history of the this nebulous movement and instead focus mainly on the moral and ethical contexts underlying the
modern psychologies and how they have been critiqued by way of a discourse with Christian ethics and morality by the religion scholar Don Browning.

One noteworthy point in discussing psychology as a religion is that although most of the theories noted above claim to have clinical and scientific foundations, most psychologists who deal with religion receive less respect from their peers than those studying less controversial and more mundane topics. Given the fact that most secular psychologists are a-religious or have biases against traditional religions, this is not unexpected. However, the perspective of psychologists towards religion is important in my discussion because any potential prejudice could be used by scholars of religion to help explain why modern psychologies’ underlying implicit ethics and morality are not congruent with Catholic, Protestant or Jewish ethics.

Browning, in particular, sets out to uncover and analyze the ethics and morality that underlie the modern psychologies and bring them into dialogue with Protestant theology. His goal appears to be to expose the limitations of modern psychologies in their seemingly unending march to unseat traditional religions in the realms of ethics and morality. Browning’s path in coming to this discourse is complex, as he begins this undertaking with a construction of a prototypical ethical Christian in his early book, Generative Man. Browning psychologically sculpts this ideal type using various aspects of modern psychologies, borrowing liberally from Erik Erikson’s ego psychology, and then incorporating Christian ethics. He expounds on the context and historical development of Christian ethics in the book, The Moral Context of Pastoral Care, in
which he also describes the failure of modern pastoral counseling to employ Christian ethics to foster the development of generative man. These two books provide an opening wedge for Browning's more sophisticated critique of modern psychologies' ethics in *Religious Thought and the Modern Psychologies*, where he applies the critical correlational method to extract the implicit ethics and morality of the modern psychologies in order to enter into a discourse with Protestant theology. Within my discussion of Browning's critique, I sometimes intersperse the more vitriolic comments of Christian psychologist Paul Vitz, as Vitz's acerbic criticism seems to explicitly reveal what Browning only implies in his more scholarly style. In responding to Browning's comments, I rely mainly on Daniel Helminiak's analysis of *Religious Thought and the Modern Psychologies* in which he takes an alternative ethical perspective. In addition, I utilize Peter Homan's comments concerning mourning, individuation and the process of narcissism in developing the ethics and morality within the modern psychologies. Finally, I expand upon Helminiak's and Homan's critiques to offer my own rejoinder to Browning.
CHAPTER ONE: BROWNING’S CRITIQUE OF PSYCHOLOGY AS A RELIGION

GENERATIVE MAN

Generative Man encompasses Browning’s attempt to describe an ethical and moral example of a psychologically sophisticated Christian, a person who appears to reconcile the individualism explicit in the modern psychologies with the Protestant ethics of mutuality and love of one’s neighbor. To fully comprehend Generative Man, one must first examine the cultural context in which it was formed, as the surrounding societal context in the United States of the late 1960’s and early 1970’s both permeates the book’s critique and influences its overall purpose. Early in the book, Browning discusses his cultural concerns including rampant population growth in developing countries that threatens the well being of all people, technological innovations that increase the specialization of labor that often ruptures a person’s ties to the community, and the continuing ecological disaster caused by the declining quality of air and water. Given these surrounding circumstances, one can see why Browning defines generative man as being “dedicated to the maintenance and ecological strength of the human race.”9 Browning apparently wishes to pull people back from these dangerous trends and pursue policies of reduced population growth, curtailment of technological proliferation, and scaling back of industrial expansion that threatens the environment.10 He hopes that these policies will allow the U.S. to return to a simpler era with cultural, economic and ecological changes occurring at a more controllable, sustainable pace so that institutions,
such as religion, would have more time to respond in an appropriate and productive manner.

During the 1960's and the early 1970's, many were looking for alternative sources of guidance to react to this cycle of unending change, mainly because religious institutions appeared to be rooted in their old ideologies, or worse, because they responded in a defensive and non-proactive fashion. Browning also suggests that the increasing affluence of Americans and the proliferation of modern psychologies has so transformed people's perspectives on life in general that Americans now view both the internal and external world through the lenses of psychology, not via the old, burnished spectacles of religion. Religion no longer has a monopoly concerning the "ultimates" in life: existential, moral and ethical concerns, as the 500-year reign of the Protestant ethic and its affiliated inner-worldly asceticism have been toppled by the modern psychologies in shaping the culture of the 20th century.\textsuperscript{11} In other words, many have abandoned the idea that salvation is attainable through the productive pursuit of a vocation in which one acts as if he or she is one of the predestined. Instead, people are increasingly looking within themselves for answers regarding what a fulfilled, productive life entails and are less concerned with commonly accepted routes to salvation. This awareness of the psychological development and nature of modern Americans in the 1960's and 1970's is crucial in understanding Browning's desire to combine these intelligent, psychologically aware people with a more traditional ethical and moral orientation towards the
community that he believes can be more appropriately experienced through Christian theology than psychology.

Within this cultural environment, Browning’s generative man is a direct response to Philip Rieff’s “psychological man.” Psychological man is more internally focused psychologically than he or she is oriented towards the community and this fact alone creates cause for worry for Browning, who fears that such a concentration of effort on the psychological leaves little energy or sympathy for a concern for others, a focus that is crucial to Christian ethics. Even worse, in Browning’s view, psychological man desires to be free from the controls of culture, which are viewed as being hindrances to his or her own development.\textsuperscript{12} The weakening of external strictures of the community creates a vacuum which has been readily filled by psychology and psychotherapy.\textsuperscript{13} Under this scenario, therapy and a withdrawal from society replace the inner-worldly asceticism of the Protestant as being the dominant ideology in guiding one’s actions.\textsuperscript{14} Browning is concerned by Rieff’s contention that although the therapist re-integrates the patient back into society via the liminal process of therapy, the patient may subsequently embrace a new individual-focused ethic that alienates him or her from the community.\textsuperscript{15} Per Rieff, the therapist is balancing on a tightrope between reinstatement of the patient back into society with some newfound sense of moral order versus a more internally focused perspective given the perception, true or false, that the current moral organization of the community is thwarting individuals’ psychological development.\textsuperscript{16} Rieff posits that bonds with others are replaced by a commitment to therapy, with the process of therapy
becoming the new telos. Once a culture makes the decisive turn towards the therapeutic, Rieff believes that “a cultural revolution occurs when the releasing or remissive symbolic (therapy), grows more compelling than the controlling one (Protestant ethics).”

People no longer identify salvation with the goals of the community and, instead, seek individual well-being and self-fulfillment. The cultural psychological reorientation from “doing” (i.e., the ethical), to “being” (the existential), appears to be the main reason that Browning is trying to re-establish a new ethical prototype with his generative man.

While Browning may up to this point agree with Rieff’s description of psychological man as exemplifying the American cultural stereotype of the early 1970’s, one area where Browning differs with Rieff concerns Rieff’s opinion regarding the potential strength of the ego compared to the id. Because Rieff believes that the ego is limited in its ability to regulate the id, he hopes that the ego can acquire sufficient psychological insight via therapy to help keep the id somewhat under control. In contrast, Browning is much more optimistic regarding the potential of the ego to dominate the id. As a result, Browning spends considerable effort critiquing the ego psychologies of Hartmann, White, Fromm and Erikson because he knows that a powerful ego is necessary for one to function independently of the instinctual and libidinal impulses of the id.

What Browning also realizes is that an autonomous ego is required for the proper implementation of any form of ethics of mutuality or love of neighbor. Browning cites Hartmann, who posits that the higher mental functions of humans such as
perception, intention, comprehension, language, productivity and motor development emerge from energies independent of the libidinal energies of the id such that these newfound abilities aid the ego in restraining the id. Overall, the ego proactively adapts, not reacts, to the environment and allows the person to learn. However, Hartmann does not totally disassociate the id from the ego as “progressive adaptation” does not suffice to allow the complete development of the individual. Regression in the service of the ego is sometimes necessary to correct and adjust for developmental shortcomings not adequately addressed in the previous stages of psychological development.

Browning even mentions the role of play in the developmental process as being important in the building and maintenance of a strong ego. Similar to play in animals, human play is not necessarily without purpose, as play can be satisfying without any other explicit consequences except for developing a sense of competence and honing one’s abilities to interact with the environment. In addition, the benefits of play help one deal with the inevitable anxiety associated with separation from one’s parents, because one can develop a method of coping with the world independent from one’s significant love objects.

White goes beyond Hartmann to posit that one’s predominant motivations are not libidinal, aggressive, or dealing with the death instinct (all of which have their wellspring in the id), but instead, one’s main desire is for a sense of autonomy. Autonomy is denoted by what White calls “effectance” and efficacy, or the abilities to interact with objects and others. Autonomy in this context does not entail physical separation from
other people, but instead refers to psychological autonomy from the influence of the id.\textsuperscript{32}

One can envision how this concept appeals to Browning as it explicitly states that humans have an inner drive (but not instinct), which involves contact with others that could be interpreted as a conceptual starting point from which an ethic of mutuality could flourish. Browning, however, does not go so far as White in positing that the ego so totally dominates as to squash any libidinal or aggressive impulses of the id in its obedience to the more rational ego.\textsuperscript{33} As an alternative, Browning notes that generative man is a combination of instinct and reason.\textsuperscript{34} He claims that generative man entails a relationship between the higher and lower with the primary goal being mastery of the environment.\textsuperscript{35} Growth for such a person is both a process of integration of the low (id) into the high (ego) and a differentiation of the person from other objects (such as one’s parents).\textsuperscript{36}

Erich Fromm, according to Browning, correctly recognizes the tension and anxiety that results between a person’s higher abilities, such as cognition, and one’s “relatedness to the world.”\textsuperscript{37} That is, a discrepancy exists between what a person thinks of himself or herself and how he or she is viewed by society.\textsuperscript{38} Much of this tension is a result of a person’s recognition that he or she is both a part of nature (and knows that death will occur), and at the same time, has the abilities to transcend nature.\textsuperscript{39} Fromm believes that people sin when they adhere too closely to either pole of their being: the instinctual or the transcendent.\textsuperscript{40} One can either sin by acting without reflection according to instinct, or act as if one is a “god” which engenders the sins of pride and narcissism.\textsuperscript{41} Fromm’s bifurcated person provides a starting point for generative man’s
individuation via the union of instinct and the transcendent. Fromm's concept of individuation allows the building of character, with Browning emphasizing the importance of social character which helps produce a feeling of interdependence with society. Although Browning would concur with Fromm regarding the importance of the development of character, he would argue that most people become so easily seduced by pride that even strong character traits may not have sufficient force to counterbalance it, such that the only way to totally prevent an inflated sense of self is to incorporate explicit ethics of mutuality. Fromm would respond that additional external ethics are unnecessary, as he believes that character development concurrently evolves an ethic of social obligation that is sufficient to overcome pride and also functions as a substitute for instinct.

Fromm fears the rise of a so-called "marketing man," a person who wholly conforms to societal expectations and is totally occupied with taking from the community. While marketing man recognizes his or her instinctual nature, he or she has not yet perfected the ability to transcend such instincts. In other words, marketing man goes too far in his or her interdependence with society without a corresponding sense of autonomy. While marketing man represents an extreme example of the loss of individuality, Fromm believes that one can have individual authenticity and an obligation to the community. Browning responds by insisting on the necessity of an explicit ethic of mutuality that must counteract and overrule one's obligation to individuation or else individuation will occur incessantly and cause harm to others. While Fromm implies
that the community benefits from the maximization of the individual, Browning argues that a deontological ethic of mutuality is more beneficial to the community compared to any potential utilitarian outcomes under Fromm’s proposal.49

The overall ethics posited by Fromm for his ideal archetype, the “productive man” contain three components: Freud’s ideas of work and love, along with reason.50 Fromm presents a more explicit eschatology for productive man compared to what Browning envisions for generative man, which is understandable given that Fromm is more concerned with outcomes while Browning is focused on process and behavior. Central to Fromm’s eschatology is the concept of hope, whereby the nurturing of current abilities allows one to be oriented to future psychological growth.51 He employs a form of messianic time, a sense of the future where people obtain harmony between instinct and their transcendent potential.52 Fromm suggests that this process to develop productive man is what he terms an “undialectical progressive solution” in which the progressive traits (reason, conscience and imagination), form a union with the baser instincts.53

Many qualities of productive man have appeal to Browning, but Browning is not reticent to criticize productive man for his limitations, especially when compared to Browning’s own archetype. It is through his detailed critique of productive man that Browning presents a fuller explication of generative man, an effort that appears to be his attempt to provide a deeper theoretical underpinning for generative man as opposed to relying exclusively on Erikson’s theory.54 Much like Erikson’s progressive psychosocial
development by stages, Browning gradually molds the main features of generative man out of Fromm’s productive man, and then refines the model with Eriksonian theory.

As one may expect, Browning cites productive man’s lack of an explicit ethic of interacting with others and discounts the value of the supposed obligation towards others that is implied in productive man’s social character traits. He also faults Fromm for both ignoring the childhood psychological development of productive man (Erikson claims that the ego comes to fruition starting in adolescence), and discounting the role of the superego in child development. Browning posits, like Erikson, that prior stages of development (or lack thereof), are manifested in the current stage of psychological evolution. For this reason, Browning believes that generative man embodies the best mix of past and present potentialities with a focus on future development.

Browning is also convinced that although Fromm’s concepts of self-love and self-interest are required to form a psychologically healthy person, what usually occurs is an excessive pursuit of individual self-interest (such as in the economic realm), which may be detrimental to the community. Here Browning is expressing his doubts regarding the potential utilitarian benefits of economic self-interest in the absence of countervailing ethics that benefit society in general (more on my critique of this view later).

Fromm deals with the seeming incommensurability of self-interest and the needs of the community through his governmental concept of communitarian socialism. Under such a political system, people would be allowed to act according to their own self-interest but without "opportunism." Opportunism is defined as anything that interferes
with the solidarity of the community, but what is not clear is exactly what constitutes an example of opportunism and who or what group would regulate people's behavior to prevent it from occurring.\textsuperscript{59} Presumably, opportunism would be regulated by the other important components of his political system: a centralized political authority (called the "National Council"), and local governing bodies.\textsuperscript{60} Fromm does not address the critical issue of balance of power between the central authority and the local groups which is important in determining the true level of economic and social freedom of individuals under such a scheme.\textsuperscript{61} Again, Browning's presentation of Fromm's political system is aimed at uncovering the seeming irreconcilability of self-interest and the interests of the community, as Fromm seems to desire the best of both individual freedom and communitarianism, while Browning is adamant that one cannot have both simultaneously without self-interest eventually prevailing absent the interdiction of a strong ethic of mutuality. Browning also faults Fromm for naively believing that his communitarian socialism will work smoothly, because Fromm assumes incorrectly that most people have the same overall goals for society. For example, Fromm advocates a form of civil religion that would help bring the community together around its beliefs and ethics, an idea that Browning discounts as being unrealistic as it ignores the diversity of beliefs and ethics.\textsuperscript{62}

Browning, in his positing of generative man as the superior successor to productive man, goes so far as to claim that people have an instinctual power and tendency towards selfless caring, which is obviously counter to the manifestations of
instinctual drives in traditional Freudian psychoanalytic theory. He envisions a form of psychological dialectics that involves a constant interplay between regressive and progressive energies that forge an improved relationship between the individual and society, and he decries any environmental factors such as technological proliferation and ecological decay that thwart such an effort. The primitive soul of people and its instinctual energies provide the impetus for constructive change under Browning's scenario. Under Eriksonian theory, the way this process takes place is that the ego, as the master force of the psyche, marshals the id so that the ego can regulate one's relationship to the environment. The ego achieves a sense of wholeness from a mastery of the environment and reconciliation of one's inner impulses and feelings, processes that form the unique identity of the person.67

Despite the importance that Erikson imparts to the role of the ego in the development of generative man, another indispensable component of the self is a responsible superego. While Fromm believes that a person needs the superego to overtake one's natural instincts, Rieff replaces the function of the superego with psychological insight.68 Erikson, on the other hand, links the superego to social ethics that can be modified as culture evolves.69 Thus, the superego appears to be the source of the ethical basis that is appropriated by the ego in a person's development. Although the superego becomes a directive force in guiding one's involvement with the community, it is not so mighty as to hinder the efficacy of play in learning to deal with the environment. As noted earlier, play not only functions to aid in the mastery of the environment, but it
also serves as a safe haven or retreat when one’s abilities are challenged. Play functions as a refuge where one can heal the scars inflicted by others and it reinstills a sense of efficacy so that one can re-insert oneself back into the world with confidence. When Erikson uses the word “mastery,” it does not denote domination, as Erikson is not a Nietzschean. Instead, Erikson is referring to a complementary relationship with the others.

Combining the above processes of the ego and the superego, Erikson provides a new theory of identity that involves not only the internal wrangling between the superego, ego and the id, but also experiences that leave their mark on one’s personality. Erikson’s ideas present a total re-visioning of Freud’s psychoanalytic theory by appropriating ego psychology’s concept of a strong ego largely independent of the libidinal energies of the id, which allows the ego free rein in a person’s interaction with others. In addition, the superego is no longer considered the overbearing, repressive, parental force depicted in Freudian theory, and is instead pictured as a constructive ethical guide in one’s relationships with others. Erikson’s unique notions of the roles of the ego and superego are critical to the ongoing psychosocial development of generative man as well as incorporating the Christian ethic of caring for others and future generations. In addition, the importance of an individual’s dealings with the community is of primary importance to Erikson, because Freud disregarded the necessity of a loving, nurturing environment to allow a child to instill within himself or herself a healthy sense of narcissism. This is critical because this constructive narcissism becomes the wellspring of self-esteem and
self-love which enables one to master the environment and allows opposing forces to be synthesized such as: child/adult, internal/external and nature/culture.  

A cultural example of such a synthesis is found in the U.S., where Erikson believes that there is a dichotomy of identities between "technologists" who "know what they are doing," and lean towards the rational and the civilized, and the "new" humanists "who mean what they are saying," and emphasize nature and instinct. The technologists respond to the call of vocation of the Protestant work ethic, and while they pursue many initiatives, they also tend towards conformity. The new humanists, on the other hand, are comfortable with change and tend to look forward to the future. Erikson’s goal is a confluence of these two types into a new “universalist,” who uses appropriate technology for the good of the community. Society must create a conducive environment for the flourishing of the universalist, and one component would be an ethic of regard for the other. In particular, Erikson mentions the “ethic of the face,” a mutual recognition that elicits the subjectivity of both “I” and “Thou” under Martin Buber’s schematic. Erikson believes that the “I-Thou” relationship elicits a discourse not only between the two adults, but also contains the traces of the child development in both as well. Erikson uses the example of the infant’s smile in response to the presence of an adult and the adult’s similar reaction to the infant. This mutual recognition, or a “need to be needed,” is an instinctual desire which places the individual and society into a complementary relationship, not in a competitive battle as portrayed under Rieff’s concept of psychological man. If society does not provide for such a supportive environment, then
individuals will inevitably search internally for comfort and will withdraw from the community, leaving no one to guide future generations under Erikson’s idea of generativity.\textsuperscript{82}

Erikson and Browning both express concern that modern culture does not create a nurturing environment for generativity, while Rieff laments the decline of the cultural superego and the resultant reduction of restraints on individualism.\textsuperscript{83} Erikson, in particular, cites the reduction in the number and form of culturally integrative rituals which in the past helped both actuate and regulate individuality.\textsuperscript{84} While Erikson praises the differentiation of vocations and the new opportunities made possible by the growth of technology and the dynamism of the modern capitalist system, he bemoans the increased social mobility and isolation that often accompany such changes and tear at the social fabric of the community.\textsuperscript{85} Again, the “uprootedness” that results may leave people no other recourse but to look within themselves for support.\textsuperscript{86} Likewise, Erikson criticizes what he terms “irresponsible creativity,” a wonton exercise of individualism without any restrictions from society regarding caring for what is produced (be it urban sprawl, a polluting industrial plant, or an unwanted child).\textsuperscript{87} The outcomes of this behavior include broken families and excessive “careerism” which harms others.\textsuperscript{88} Browning speculates that the causes of such uncaring activity are a) an existential response to the fear of death; b) a normal materialization of the Protestant work ethic; and/or c) a result of the spirit of the unbounded American frontier that seems to present unlimited opportunities.\textsuperscript{89} I
would add to this list the degenerating ethic of personal responsibility. The consequences of these factors threaten one’s identity, especially in relation to the community.\textsuperscript{90}

However, all hope is not lost in Erikson’s view, at least in regard to the U.S. The tension and dichotomy between the individual and the community exhibit the inherent freedom of people trying to successfully navigate between the competing poles.\textsuperscript{91} Americans’ pragmatic nature and openness to new ideas allow the U.S. to be portrayed as a country that is a “work in progress” and embodies a perpetual optimism that the quality of life will always be improving.\textsuperscript{92} Technology can also play a pivotal role because it (namely the Internet) can provide new opportunities for a re-connection to the community and can create new communities with common ideologies that span the geographic boundaries that normally isolate individuals. Erikson and Browning fear that individuals and communities will continue to fail to respond appropriately to demographic, technological and societal changes because institutions tend to be mired in timeworn responses to change. Again, the U.S. is less uncomfortable with dynamism in general compared to Europe, which is more securely anchored to its history in coping with change.\textsuperscript{93} Despite the potential advantages that Americans may have in dealing with such flux, Erikson warns that they are so wedded to their individual perspectives on many issues that they leave important policy decisions to be decided by others, a situation which permits special interests and corporations to have undue influence in many public matters.\textsuperscript{94} Erikson’s solution for such a situation takes the form of a new “modern” man who thrives in the technological world, but at the same time, has a sense of caring for the
community and the environment. Due to the hope and trust nurtured during previous psychosocial development (especially through the mother-infant relationship), the modern man can trust himself or herself to earnestly interact with others, in comparison to Rieff's psychological man who is in perpetual conflict with the community and retreats to his or her internal psychological sanctuary to search for guidance and answers at the expense of dealing with others.

Another important environmental factor for the growth of modern man is institutional support. Browning believes that the waning of institutions and rituals has led to the reduction in the influence of universal norms and has increased the appeal of privatism. Browning is especially concerned with the ethics of young adults, many of whom became disillusioned with conventional society in the late 1960's and early 1970's. The demise of the ethical focus on the community appeared at the time to be unabatable, so Browning wished to slow the pace of societal change to hope for a re-instilling of an ethic of mutuality for that troubled generation. He describes such an ethic as an "universal generative ethic," whereby one actualizes himself or herself and others without hindering another's ability to actualize. The goal is to meld the technologist and the new humanist. Although Browning concedes that psychological man and marketing man appear to dominate the culture of the U.S., he has hope that generative man will eventually prevail once societal changes conducive to such ethics of mutuality take hold (he lists among these changes, birth control, an increasing concern of the welfare of children and ecological protection). Browning, Fromm, Rieff and
Erikson admit that they retain faith in culture to eventually properly realign itself when forced to deal with such radical social and technological transformations, but this faith would be severely tested over the next fifteen years, the period in which Browning was to write *The Moral Context of Pastoral Care* and *Religious Thought and the Modern Psychologies*.

**THE MORAL CONTEXT OF PASTORAL CARE**

After describing in detail the traits and practices that combine to encompass generative man, Browning expands on the ethics underlying such a person and how pastoral counseling could assist in one’s ethical development. However, Browning surveys the state of pastoral care in the U.S. in the 1970’s, and finds it woefully lacking in the nurturing, guidance and growth of generative man. As part of his analysis of the relationship between pastoral counseling and ethics, he offers a detailed elaboration of the historical development of Protestant ethics which will later provide the basis for his critical ethical discourse in *Religious Thought and the Modern Psychologies*. Finally, it is in *The Moral Context of Pastoral Care* that Browning further refines the idea of psychology as a religion, mainly in response to how psychology has been uncritically appropriated into the pastoral counseling setting.

While Browning makes it clear at the outset of *Pastoral Care* that he welcomes the inclusion of secular therapies into the context of pastoral counseling, the entire book provides warnings for pastoral counselors who use such therapies without examining their underlying ethical framework.  What Browning envisions is a pastoral counseling
setting that is explicitly within the ethics of the overarching church, not a separate pastoral counseling center that has limited ideological and theological ties to the church.\textsuperscript{104} He is convinced that all too often pastoral counselors act like secular therapists in that they feel uncomfortable becoming moral judges of their patients.\textsuperscript{105} An example of such a situation is Rogerian therapy with its emphasis on unconditional affirmation for the patient. Although the overall ethic of unconditional love may be congruent with the Christian idea of an unconditionally loving God, when the patient discusses moral and ethical issues that show that he or she has strayed from the path of Christian ethics, it falls upon the therapist to provide guidance. The therapist may be reticent to take the role of such an arbiter, because it may impair or undermine the trust of the patient, such that the patient may then feel uncomfortable in freely discussing his or her problems. Browning’s response is that there should not be any confusion regarding the ethical basis of pastoral counseling and that the patient should be aware up front that the counselor is advocating an explicit, Christian ethical framework (which, in Browning’s view, ought to be based on an ethic of mutuality). Browning suggests that this blurring between pastoral and secular counseling threatens the potential growth and development of generative man.\textsuperscript{106}

**CHRISTIAN ETHICS**

Browning describes what he means by “Christian ethics” by outlining its detailed historical development, beginning with its roots in ancient Judaism. In particular, he cites the importance of Pharisaic Judaism which proposed a practical, rational application of the law (such as the ethic of reciprocity), to everyday life.\textsuperscript{107} Browning appreciates the
flexibility of such an approach, which he believes could be used in re-applying ethics into modern society as well. With the advent of Christianity, Jewish ethics were supplemented by an ethic of caring which encompassed four parts: healing, guiding, sustaining and reconciling. In this context, healing is focused on attaining wholeness; guiding refers to making choices in one’s life either through an eductive process (where a person uses her or his own conscience for making decisions), or an inductive process (where one uses general rules for decisions); sustaining refers to transcending crises in life; and reconciling allows one to mend a broken relationship with God. By going beyond mere reciprocity, Christian ethics, as understood by Browning, involve a more proactive engagement with others. Browning cites the unitive function of the Christian ethic of caring in binding the disparate Christian community in the Roman Empire both before and after the Edict of Constantine, an ethic that achieved such strength that it created a more cohesive force than the Empire itself, leaving the Romans susceptible to invasion. It is obvious that Browning is hopeful that such an unitive ethic can be resurrected in modern times to reestablish a deeper sense of community in the U.S.

The Christian concept of care was radically altered during the Reformation, which seemed to initiate the rupture of ethics from theology. Reconciliation was de-emphasized with confession being denied status as a sacrament, and an eductive perspective appeared to gain prominence in the guise of Luther’s “priesthood of all believers.” The historic shift away from a community-based religion to a focus on the individual would have a significant impact on ethics and morality. Also, the renunciation
of Catholic theology and its salvation through good works and the increasing prominence of the Calvinist idea of success in one's vocation as being a hallmark of the elect both acted to reorient Christian ethics toward the individual at the expense of the community.\footnote{114} Browning wishes to return to the ancient Christian ethic of caring, but he realizes that it must be applied in a flexible, Midrash-type manner so that ethics can adequately and appropriately respond to societal changes. He posits that such an approach has not yet been successful because, although modern life has become more rationalized and, theoretically, should be sympathetic to a practical application of rational ethics, modern experiences in fact have increasingly been interpreted within an arational perspective that focuses on authenticity and feelings.\footnote{115} In addition, Browning believes that the failure of Christianity to reapply its ethics to the issues of modern culture has left a void that has been filled by psychology and its emphasis on reflection and psychological insight to both nurture one's beliefs and guide one's behavior.\footnote{116}

The consequence of such a shift has caused modern psychology to take on many of the functions previously wholly controlled by religion, including healing, interpreting life, and changing how one deals with others.\footnote{117} For example, therapy and religious ritual both contain the comparable processes of separation, liminality and reincorporation.\footnote{118} In particular, psychotherapy involves a sanctioned separation from the moral order so that the therapist can direct one's psychological development until the patient is ready to reclaim active participation in society. Browning criticizes the therapeutic process because it often reintroduces the patient back into the community without imparting to
the patient any particular telos in dealing with others. In fact, therapy often involves the patient assimilating new, more individual-focused ethics in dealing with others such that he or she may retreat into the private sphere, or into what Browning calls a modern form of quietism, where one is cut off from external contact.

Based on the above weaknesses of secular therapies from an Christian ethical perspective, one might assume that pastoral counseling might offer the best of both worlds: a psychologically-sophisticated therapy combined with an explicit ethic of mutuality. Unfortunately this is not the case because as was mentioned earlier, Browning criticizes the current state of pastoral counseling as being too focused on secular therapy at the expense of Christian ethics (or is often the case, secular therapy may have ethics that are not congruent with Christian ethics). Most of Browning’s complaints concerning pastoral counseling focus on its indistinguishability from secular therapy or social work. That is, pastoral counseling emphasizes the healing of existential, emotional and interpersonal problems of the patient and loses sight of or ignores the moral and ethical implications of the particular therapy. Browning advocates an equal footing of both morality and ethics with the other components of therapy, and he agrees with Karl Menninger’s contention that psychological problems actually involve confusion over values as much as they deal with other issues.

Part of the failure of pastoral counseling, according to Browning, is that it has abdicated its responsibility to communicate the morals and ethics of religion, and at the heart of Browning’s indictment of the state of pastoral counseling is its leaning towards
an educative ethics at the expense of inductive ethics. That is, too much leeway is given to patients in prescribing their own solutions to their moral and ethical problems without the specific input and guidance of Christian ethics and morality (e.g., the Rogerian therapy example given above). The educative process is a legacy of Freudian psychoanalysis, because Freud tried to dissuade patients from discussing moral and ethical issues. Through the failure to explicitly deal with these concerns openly, secular and pastoral counselors unconsciously rely on the implicit ethical framework of the modern psychologies. Browning hopes that therapists will eventually recognize their roles as judges (or at minimum, view their roles as mediators), so that they can then actively and consciously deal with ethics and morality in therapy. Without such a position being taken by the therapist, patients may be confused over what values (either the values being learned in therapy or Christian values), to apply to their particular issues. In such a situation, patients may flounder and create their own rules as they attempt to navigate among a myriad of psychological issues. Browning clearly urges that Christian ethics be the overriding ideology in such a situation, but he recognizes that many perceive Christian ethics as outdated with limited relevancy in modernity. Despite the possible bleak outlook for pastoral counseling, Browning is convinced that it remains the best (although not perfect), hope for the healthy development of generative man.

**RELIGIOUS THOUGHT AND THE MODERN PSYCHOLOGIES**

Browning appears to be optimistic at the end of *The Moral Context of Pastoral Care* regarding the outlook for pastoral care in its mission to re-establish Christian
morality and ethics into the lives of modern Americans. However, after fifteen years had passed and he reviewed the religious and psychological environment during the 1980's "decade of greed," Browning probably perceived that the picture had changed for the worse because the modern therapies appeared to have gained the upper hand in permanently transforming ethics to a more individual-focused orientation instead of one centered on caring for others.

In *Religious Thought and the Modern Psychologies*, Browning expands upon the definition of psychology as a religion by positing not only that the modern psychologies have implicit moral and ethical claims, but also that they are imbued with metaphysical perspectives as well. In many respects, psychology manifests itself as a "functional religion," although Browning denies that it is successfully meeting the religious needs of its adherents, because he suggests that therapies have taken on expanded roles of their own beyond that envisioned by their theorists. Browning seems to have relinquished any sliver of hope that modern psychologies will any time in the near future complete a re-evaluation of their ethical basis in order to incorporate a more Christian ethic of mutuality. As a result, his alternative method of dealing with the intrusion of psychology into the moral and ethical realms is an attempt to totally separate psychology and religion into their respective spheres of influence. Despite his contention that religion and psychology operate within different areas of expertise, Browning posits that religion and psychology do have similar goals, i.e., to "provide concepts and technologies for the ordering of the interior life." However, according to Browning, psychology and
theology differ in their functioning, because psychology interprets an individual's life and theology interprets life in general.130

Browning traces the growth of modern psychologies from their clinical and theoretical roots from which point they expanded their focus from merely explaining the causes and cures of particular psychological problems to providing an ideology for interpreting life.131 Psychology achieves this status via the incorporation of symbols and norms which shape the functioning of the individual within the community and the person's purpose in life.132 Many people have become more sympathetic to the concept of psychology as a religion, not because of any outright rejection of the relevance of religion in their everyday lives, but due to psychology offering a more appealing and understandable vision of one's role in the moral order.133 This search for insight is further fueled by both existential anxiety and anxiety that accompanies unresolved development issues.134

While most of the above observations by Browning are elaborations of contentions he made in his previous two books, his main effort in Modern Psychologies is to enter into a critical correlational discourse to examine the ethical bases of the more important modern therapies in a dialogue with Christian ethics. Under such a design originally proposed by Paul Tillich and later revised by David Tracy, one attempts to parse out the common areas of discourse between psychology and theology regarding their ideas concerning important life issues that can then be compared and contrasted.135 While Christian ethics are based on a deontological ethic of obligation (love your
neighbor as yourself), most modern psychologies espouse an ethical egoist perspective, because psychology views ethics from the individual's viewpoint and not from an ethical agapic standpoint which would more closely reflect Christian ethics.\textsuperscript{136} Specifically, psychology usually embraces an aretaic ethic concerned with developing virtues while Christian deontic ethics (as interpreted by Browning), are based on following general rules or principles of morality.\textsuperscript{137} Although Browning does not specifically address the utilitarian outcomes of either psychology or Christian ethical practices, it is implied in his critique that the deontological ethic results in the greatest benefit to the community while the aretaic ethic explicitly ignores utilitarian outcomes and may actually lead to selfishness that is damaging to the needs of others. Browning confesses that he takes an deontological viewpoint in his critique and he states that virtue can be best exhibited as an ethic of obligation.\textsuperscript{138} That is, the only virtue that should be cultivated is that of an ethic of mutuality while any other virtues will be centered only on the individual's needs and may not have any positive impact on the community. This point is crucial, because both Daniel Helminiak and I later will advocate an aretaic ethical viewpoint in responding to Browning's critique.

Browning's analysis covers Freudian, Skinnerian, Jungian, humanistic and ego psychologies, with the order of his critique being intended to start with psychoanalysis and ending with the psychologies that best exemplify his interpretation of Christian ethics embedded within a secular psychology.\textsuperscript{139} In attempting to understand the ethics within Freudian psychology, Browning relies heavily on Reinhold Niebuhr's review of Freudian
psychoanalysis. Niebuhr posits that Freud believes that people are predominantly motivated by their own self-interest, which requires that they pursue a restrained form of reciprocity so that they will not be harmed in dealing with others.\(^\text{140}\) In theorizing how people should interact with others, Freud takes a distinctly defensive, reactive approach which does not call for taking risks in aiding others. However, it does not mean that one is to exploit others, either.\(^\text{141}\) Browning does not bemoan the fact that the Freudian concept of reciprocity fails to meet the demands of an ethic of mutuality because reciprocity mirrors ancient Judaic ethics that form the foundation from which Christian ethics were created.\(^\text{142}\)

While Browning does appear to have some sympathy for the Freudian ethic of reciprocity, he is less restrained in his criticism of the more popular humanistic psychologies, and they become the principal targets of his critique of the modern psychologies. He displays considerable insight in explaining how humanistic psychologies allege to be based on objective, clinical and scientific claims, while in actuality, they espouse an implicit morality and ethic of self-actualization.\(^\text{143}\) Humanistic psychologies contain ethics of spontaneity, freedom, introspection, fulfillment and self-actualization, such that self-actualization becomes a moral imperative.\(^\text{144}\) That is, one should self-actualize and he or she should overcome any barriers in this process.\(^\text{145}\) These psychologies, however, devote little effort in evaluating the impact of one’s self-actualization on others. They state (naively, according to Browning), that one’s self-actualization does not contend with or thwart the needs of the community and that social
harmony will naturally occur as more people become self-actualized.\textsuperscript{146} Obviously, such a clearly aretaic development of individual virtues via self-actualization elicits criticism from Browning as he discounts the value of self-actualization when it is not accompanied by countervailing ethics of self-restriction and self-renunciation.\textsuperscript{147} He also believes that self-actualization is lacking in its very narrow definition of what is “good” (i.e., good as defined as anything that helps self-actualization), because “good” is not measured in accordance with Christian morality.\textsuperscript{148} Although Browning does not go so far as to classify the ethics of humanistic psychologies as being examples of hedonistic ethical egoism whereby one is only interested in maximizing one’s own pleasure, he does apply the moniker “non-hedonistic ethical egoism,” which refers to the maximization of the amount of non-moral goods for oneself.\textsuperscript{149} He maintains that humanistic psychologies ignore the impact of one’s self-actualization on the community’s balance of non-moral goods and evil, implying that others do not benefit and may actually be harmed under such an ethical scheme.\textsuperscript{150}

Christian Psychologist Paul Vitz is even more vitriolic in his criticism of the ethics of humanistic psychologies. He regards self-actualization as equating to self-indulgence and idolatry such that psychology becomes a cult of the self.\textsuperscript{151} He claims that the resultant pathological narcissism causes one to be less involved with family and community and leads to broken families and unrealistic expectations of the fulfillment from careers or other manifestations of self-actualization.\textsuperscript{152} As a consequence, Vitz believes that the emotional letdown from unmet expectations of self-actualization can
cause depression, guilt and anxiety.\textsuperscript{153} I include Vitz's comments not only as an example of mainstream Christian critique of the influence of psychology in the U.S., but also because Vitz explicitly voices concerns that Browning only hints at in his own critique. In other words, Browning attempts to avoid the more speculative comments of Vitz, but Vitz's sentiment appears to be shared by Browning. Granted, Vitz may, for rhetorical purposes, be extreme in his list of the various ills supposedly caused by the growing influence of the modern psychologies, but his overall conclusions regarding the impact of psychology are quite similar to Browning's.

Overall, Browning supports Niebuhr's contention that the humanistic psychologies are naïve regarding the understanding of a person's source of anxiety. Niebuhr contends that humanistic psychologists are being unrealistic to believe that anxiety is entirely a result of environmental restraints on self-actualization and not partially a consequence of existential anxiety from people's awareness of their own limitations (the premier limitation being knowledge that one is going to die).\textsuperscript{154} Existential anxiety can lead to sin when people overly embrace either their more primitive nature or their transcendent part of their personality (i.e., the ability to overcome their instincts), both of which can lead to psychological disharmony.\textsuperscript{155} Niebuhr also claims that the humanists are being simplistic in positing that people have an instinctual drive for self-actualization.\textsuperscript{156} He adds that this claim of an instinctual force compelling one to self-actualize seems to preclude the existence of freedom to reflect upon any action that may require self-sacrifice in the pursuit of justice.\textsuperscript{157} Niebuhr concedes, however, that
not all acts necessarily involve an agapic ethic of self-sacrifice, as some are motivated more by mutuality that do not require a higher level of personal sacrifice.\textsuperscript{158} Browning obviously praises the agapic ethic, but it appears that he more readily embraces the ethic of equal regard for others (even if others do not reciprocate), as a possible precondition of and transition to an ethic of mutuality, which he believes is more realistically attainable within the Christian context compared to the ethic of self-sacrifice.\textsuperscript{159} As further support, he claims that the ethic of self-sacrifice has for centuries been misappropriated by those in power to justify the unequal treatment of disadvantaged minorities.\textsuperscript{160} Since the humanistic psychologies place so much effort on self-actualization at the potential detriment of mutual regard for the other, Browning states that they are more incongruous with Christian ethics compared to the Freudian ethic of reciprocity.\textsuperscript{161} That is not to imply that Freud’s ethics could be possibly considered Christian, as that is not the case, because Freud’s ethics must be considered within its context of a detached and reactive response to others, not as an active engagement with the community.

Compared to the humanistic psychologies, Jungian theory employs a much more complex view of the human psyche and motivation, although Browning classifies Jungian ethics in the same general category as humanistic ethics. Jungian psychology recognizes that people contain evil tendencies that must be harnessed, assimilated or sublimated. The process of individuation is much more complicated than self-actualization, although it shares many similarities with self-actualization. For example, Anthony Stevens defines individuation as a “conscious attempt to bring the universal program of human existence
to its fullest possible expression in the life of the individual," a definition which could also be applied to self-actualization. Note the lack of mention of others or the community, an observation that compels Browning to ask: when do you have enough individuation? This query implies two concerns: a) one could continuously be engrossed in the process of individuation and totally ignore the needs of others; and b) one does not know the telos of individuation. Like humanistic ethics, Browning classifies Jungian ethics as being egoist due the fact that individuation is primarily involved with the synthesis of the conscious with the unconscious archetypes and the personal unconscious, a process that excludes any influence of the ethic of mutuality to potentially change its outcome. In other words, it is up to the therapist and the patient to plot the course of individuation with or without any thought given to what impact the person’s new individuated identity will have on others. Similar to the impact of self-actualization, Jungian theory assumes that a natural balance will occur as the community individuates. Browning notes that in one of the few instances where Jung does mention others is when he embraces the need for caritas, but only within the context of a person trying to avoid projecting his or her shadow onto others. Jung also posits that one should “love thy enemies,” but here also it is within the setting of individuation where “enemies” refers to the shadow. Thus, in this context, “love thy enemies” is intended to prevent self-loathing. Individuation is also viewed as a moral imperative, and similar to the ethics of humanistic psychology, it is considered immoral to inhibit
another’s process of individuation regardless of whether one’s own individuation may result in harm to others.

Jung does not necessarily ignore Christian symbols in his theory, as he does refer to Christ, but only in regard to using Jesus as an example of someone who has lived his true self, because Jung ignores Jesus as a symbol of sacrifice for others.\textsuperscript{170} Browning includes this particular example to highlight Jung’s seeming ignorance of the value of the ethic of sacrifice for others within his psychological theory. A Jungian may respond to this criticism by positing that Christ’s sacrifice may have been inextricably linked to his living his true self and that Jesus did not need to espouse an explicit ethic of sacrifice because he embodied the ethic of sacrifice as part of his individuated self. That is, before one can embrace an authentic, faithful activity such as the ethics of mutuality, sacrifice, or any other ethic concerned with dealing with others, one may need to attain some level of individuation so that the ethic of mutuality is not coerced and insincere in its application. To his credit, Browning does concede that individuation may be a necessary precursor before a person can give of himself or herself to others.\textsuperscript{171}

One area where Browning accurately identifies the limitations of individuation concerns how one assimilates the shadow, which is the part of the personal unconscious that is usually repressed and contains aspects of evil.\textsuperscript{172} Jung is ambiguous in his characterization of evil and it is difficult to discern whether evil is “bad” in a moral sense, or merely not a non-moral good.\textsuperscript{173} Browning believes that Jung’s conception of evil is not based on moral terms in that evil is sometimes depicted by Jung as a vital source of
energy in the unconscious that can be expressed consciously in constructive or destructive behaviors. For example, a constructive manifestation of evil may be healthy aggression that can be used for adaptive purposes. Although Browning acknowledges that Jung was trying to make people conscious of their evil tendencies so that they may hopefully reduce their negative activations, he argues that Jung underestimated the power and influence of the shadow as it impacted others. What Browning is intimating in such critique is that Jung failed to take into account the need for an explicit ethic of mutuality to help actively and forcefully to prevent the shadow from exhibiting itself in a negative manner to others.

Browning also is convinced that Jung minimizes the amount of anxiety inherent in the process of individuation, particularly in the way in which the shadow is assimilated into consciousness. In sum, Browning espouses the traditional view of evil which usually always views it in moral terms, such that evil must be dealt with directly through a conscious overriding ethics, instead of Jung’s much more murky process whereby evil is engaged within the psyche and not directly encountered by other means (such as ethics). Where the truth lies concerning evil is anyone’s guess; it may occupy a place between Browning’s and Jung’s depictions, but that is left for others to debate and is beyond the scope of this paper.

While Browning unmistakably has qualms about Jungian psychology, he believes that ego psychology, especially the particular variant espoused by Eric Erikson, offers the most congruent ethical basis compared to Christian ethics which is required for the
development of generative man. While Erikson focuses on the anxiety encountered during the stages of psychosocial development, Heinz Kohut describes the anxiety that occurs when self-objects (e.g., parents), fail to meet one's expectations.\textsuperscript{178} Both of these theorists recognize that anxiety limits a person's freedom to interact with others in a constructive fashion.\textsuperscript{179} Even though Kohut largely ignores the impact on one's identity from interaction with cultural objects and emphasizes instead experiences with significant self-objects, Erikson posits that personal identity is forged via the psychological process of individuation, the psychosocial developmental stages and experiences throughout life.\textsuperscript{180} One can understand why Browning readily embraces Erikson's theory of identity as it explicitly includes the impact of others on one's psychological development. Browning can then refer to this theoretical support to advocate an ethics of mutuality as being an essential component of healthy identity formation.

Both Erikson and Kohut espouse an ethic of equal regard and an ethic of mutuality, with Erikson positing that the supreme goal is not only to care for one's own children, but also to care for all future generations.\textsuperscript{181} His worldview envisions each person being inextricably linked with the welfare of others (he uses the analogy of people being connected like cogs in a machine).\textsuperscript{182} While Erikson's ethic of \textit{caritas} requires a greater effort compared to Browning's ethic of mutuality, Browning believes that Eriksonian theory provides the best psychotheological fit for the generative man.

The question that remains is how culture and society can be modified to reassert the dominant authority of the Christian ethic of mutuality. Rieff suggests that traditional
religions ought to concede that the battle over the psyches of Americans has been lost to psychology and that religion should transform itself into an therapeutic institution that helps people fulfill themselves within a religious context. Vitz, on the other hand, does not concede that psychology has won the war of ethics as he believes that religion needs to prescribe a "post-modern intellectually-based counter response" to psychology. Although he does not provide much elaboration on what this response entails, he does advocate that churches should regain the upper hand by openly discussing life issues (existential, emotional, and interpersonal), that people are concerned about to presumably offer a theological alternative to the psychological perspective on these matters that has dominated the discussion for the past fifty years. This approach may sound like a welcomed proactive response, but Vitz then reverts to a more reactive and defensive posture when he suggests that Christian colleges should reject their supposed liberal political and theological orientations to revert to a more conservative tradition of morality and ethics. Browning will have the last word on this topic, as his remedy is to have churches convene subgroups to openly discuss moral issues such as sex, marriage, children, aging, death, etc., and try to reapply Christian morality and ethics within the modern context.
CHAPTER TWO: RESPONSES TO BROWNING’S CRITIQUE

HELMINIAK’S RESPONSE TO BROWNING

Daniel Helminiak critiques Browning’s *Religious Thought and the Modern Psychologies* by attempting to uncover hidden biases in Browning’s ideas, and then he employs an aretaic ethical perspective to challenge the deontological ethics advocated so forcefully by Browning. One important reason why Helminiak supports an alternative ethical viewpoint concerns his radically different way of understanding the relationship between theology and psychology. He posits that theology and psychology are much more intertwined within the context of religion compared to the competitive relationship described by Browning in which religion and psychology are in a perpetual battle over American’s hearts and minds.

Helminiak borrows the theory of the process of spirituality from Bernard Lonergan who suggests, similar to Niebuhr, that people are comprised of essentially two parts: body and spirit. \(^{188}\) However, contrary to Niebuhr’s notion of spirit, in this context spirit describes the level of non-intentional, non-reflective consciousness totally absent of thought, and it acts as a precursor and initiator of active consciousness and intention. \(^ {189}\) While normal consciousness (the description one normally associates with consciousness in psychological terms), can be understood via language, spirit is a-linguistic and reflects the essence of one’s being that is then materialized via intentionality. \(^ {190}\) Spirit becomes the prime mover of spirituality which is described as the process of unfolding of one’s “being” and one’s understanding of the universe. \(^ {191}\) A Jungian might characterize it as a
form of non-intentional individuation while others may believe it is a process of intuition or insight. Helminiak equates being with authenticity and an appreciation of truth and goodness that precludes any narcissistic tendencies. The process of spirituality can be interpreted in two different ways: a) an unfolding of being stretching out to God; or b) an internal unfolding of one’s self via psychology. These two different methods of interpretation are solely within the purview of the subject who utilizes either discourse to find meaning from the spiritual experience. Helminiak does not explicitly endorse one method over the other: he is sympathetic to psychology, but at the same time he believes that grace can be the catalyst behind spirituality and suggests that the Christian tradition (not contemporary Christianity), offers a compelling explanation for spirituality, because he thinks that “the world is clamoring for a new spiritual vision, one that will not only touch the heart, but also satisfy the mind as well.” He does not elaborate concerning what “Christian tradition” specifically entails and how it differs from modern forms of Christianity, but he implies that it is similar to ancient Christianity prior to the evolution of a formal, hierarchical ecclesiastical structure. Helminiak’s explication of the interrelationship between theology and psychology provides the foundation for his notion of spirituality which he equates to religiosity, and this concept is necessary to fully understand his approach to ethics.

Like Browning, Helminiak posits that any attempt to fully integrate theology and psychology will fail because Helminiak reaches a similar conclusion to that of Rieff’s: organized religion should concede that Christianity’s outdated mode of expressing
religion along with its unyielding grip on authority over the "absolutes" in life are keeping spirituality from flourishing. Helminiak encourages Christianity to shed all pretenses of authority and tradition and embrace spirituality in whatever direction it may lead. This approach suggests a radical revision in the way which Christianity views itself as an institution compared with Browning's much less extreme idea of Christianity's reexamining theological ethics so that they become more relevant to modern culture. Obviously, it is doubtful that Helminiak's ideas have any hope of being implemented, because people who would be sympathetic to Helminiak's idea of the spiritual process probably do not affiliate themselves with traditional religion, or in the circumstance where they do belong to a particular religion, they more than likely do not rigorously adhere to their church's spiritual practices and instead use psychology as an adjunct to their more conventional religiosity.

In Helminiak's view, Browning appears to shy away from the traditional Protestant ethic of self-sacrifice in favor of a more measured, feasible ethic of equal regard for the other which Helminiak characterizes as being associated with Roman Catholicism, or more specifically, Augustine's notion of caritas. Helminiak speculates that Browning's interpretation of humanistic psychologies' ethic of self-actualization is a not so veiled attempt to brand most psychological ethics as "covert selfishness," which is similar to Vitz's portrayal of such ethics as being a cult of self-worship.

Helminiak also sharply criticizes Browning for claiming to base his ethic of mutuality on Christian theology, when in actuality Helminiak believes that mutual regard
for the other is derived through the use of practical reason as it shapes theology. While Browning does withhold his total support for an ethic of self-sacrifice, he does so not due to a paucity of theological support for such an ethic, but more due to his belief that constantly compelling people to sacrifice themselves with no hope of a reciprocal response of equal regard is not compatible with basic human nature. Helminiak is attempting to de-link Browning’s ethics from theology so that Helminiak can then critique Browning’s ethics from both philosophical and psychological perspectives. This untethering of Browning’s ethics from theology is critical to Helminiak’s argument, because Browning’s claim of the unassailability of the ethic of mutuality is due to its basis in Holy Scripture. If Browning’s ethics are merely based on practical reason and not theology, then his ethics no longer maintain the aura of unquestionable supremacy compared to other ethical systems.

In response, Browning would not deny that his ethics do have a significant foundation in reason. In fact, Browning strongly supports a practical moral theology that is moored to scripture, but then is melded with reason to be more practicable and viable in modern culture. In addition, whereas one could debate the impact or outcomes from an utilitarian view, the deontological outlook explicitly ignores the results from ethical behavior, because estimating the impact of one’s ethical behavior may change the act chosen in comparison to that behavior that would have occurred under the deontic ethic. Put simply, the deontic ethic is focused on “doing the right thing” according to accepted rules of behavior regardless of the outcome, while the utilitarian ethic specifically looks
at achieving the right results. "Doing the right thing" assumes that some institution has ordained what is the best behavior under the circumstances. If the institutional backing of the behavior is suspect, then the value of the deontic ethic is severely undermined. In this particular case, Helminiak's basic argument is sound, but the particular circumstances that he cites do not support his contention. Although Browning may be incorrect in claiming that the ethic of mutuality is based on Protestant theology, this particular ethic still has a more than adequate basis in the bible and, therefore, retains its scriptural authority.

Helminiak takes a different approach in examining Browning's adherence to a radical dichotomy between ethics of mutuality and ethics of self-actualization. Helminiak likens such comparison to the difference between altruism and selfishness, respectively. This lack of common ground between the deontic ethic and the ethical egoist is consistent with Browning's depiction of the competitive relationship between religion and psychology. Helminiak attempts to find a middle course between the deontic and the aretaic ethics through a new ethic of authenticity, which he claims is not selfish, altruistic, solipsistic, or externally focused. Authenticity implies an adherence to objective truth that includes the self and others and is centered on promoting the person one should be and is not concerned with what one should do. Helminiak posits that authenticity is the outcome of the process of spirituality and it effectively responds to the main criticism leveled at deontic ethics: that they ignore development of character and virtues necessary to act faithfully according to any ethical scheme. The failure of the
deontic ethic to recognize the necessity of a virtuous person to act genuinely and without coercion further illustrates that the legitimacy of a deontic ethical system relies almost exclusively on community acceptance of such ethics. In other words, if the authority behind such ethics begins to lose power to unite the community, deontic ethics can then be questioned and scrutinized in comparison to other ethical alternatives.

One other argument that Helminiak makes against the generative ethic of Browning is that Erikson’s stages of psychosocial development ignore a critical period of intense spiritual growth: the mid-life crisis. This crisis of confidence in one’s telos (e.g., when Jung broke from Freud and subsequently endured an intense psychological struggle that resulted in development of a new theory of psychology), has a profound impact on one’s psychological outlook.\textsuperscript{206} What Helminiak is really criticizing is Erikson’s failure to recognize that spiritual growth is a never-ending process and that adulthood is not focused solely on caring for succeeding generations, but it is also critical that one understand the meaning of life so that he or she can then pass along this wisdom to others and more adequately nurture subsequent generations.\textsuperscript{207} This criticism of Erikson is intended to point out the superiority of aretaic ethics compared to deontic ethics by showing that the failure to develop virtues will have a significant impact on succeeding generations who may develop and reflect the psychological shortcomings of their predecessors.
HOMAN'S COMMENTS ON MOURNING, INDIVIDUATION AND NARCISSISM

Peter Homans presents a very complex and compelling analysis of the relationship between religion and psychology by describing how both cultural and psychological changes have transformed and re-interpreted religion into psychology as a form of secular religion. Homans supports his argument via his analysis of the life of Carl Jung (he also sometimes refers to the life of Freud as well) to illustrate how both the cultural shift in western Europe from a traditional, religion-based society that comes into conflict with a modern, secular society and Jung's particular psychological circumstances combine to reconfigure both his identity and his ideas about religion. This process also impacts the community-based ethics of traditional religion whose meaning is transformed through the process of narcissism to become irreversibly re-oriented towards the individual.

However, the new ethics and psychology still retain vestiges and traces of religion proving that religion is ever-present in Jung's thought. Overall, Homans portrays a dependence of psychology upon religion that is lacking in Browning's depiction of psychology serving as a mere substitute for religion.

Within his discussion of Jung, Homans defines religion in a very broad manner calling it "a careful consideration of certain dynamic factors that are conceived as 'power:' spirits, demons, gods, laws, ideas and ideals." Although Jung went so far as to envision psychoanalysis as the ultimate manifestation of the Christian gospel, Homans would probably not subscribe to this view. Instead, Homans would suggest that psychology reflects a re-visioning of religion mediated through modern culture. Jung did
repudiate traditional Christianity, because he believed that its hierarchical structure and oppressive dogma devalued the importance of religious experience.\textsuperscript{215} However, both Freud's Judaism and Jung's Protestantism were consciously and, more often than not, unconsciously incorporated within their ideas about psychology.\textsuperscript{216}

How does such a re-valuing of religion take place? Homans believes that the initial step involves mourning the loss of meaning and value of the previously cherished symbols of Christianity, whereby one can either deny its passing or mourn such a loss to build "new structures of appreciation and learning," which Jung asserts become the domain of analytical psychology.\textsuperscript{217} The cultural shifts that lead to a state of mourning are many: urbanization, the increasing specialization of labor, and separation of families from the economic realm.\textsuperscript{218} In addition, the Reformation allowed individuals an increasing autonomy from the community and the ideals of society.\textsuperscript{219} These factors along with the influence of the Enlightenment gave people the opportunity to reflect upon their lives via a mode of thought independent of religious ideology.\textsuperscript{220} With the weakening ties to the community, people began to affiliate with subgroups such as cults, sects, ethnic groups, etc., which further vied for their loyalties and strained what was left of the remaining sense of community.\textsuperscript{221}

Homans forms these conclusions based upon the ideas of several prominent sociologists. For example, Max Scheler proposes that the shift from a homogeneous society to one centered on the individual increases cultural instability and leads to loneliness, rootlessness, and confusion concerning personal identity.\textsuperscript{222} Karl Mannheim
posits that the Reformation and the Enlightenment destroyed any sense of universally accepted, objective truth, leaving individuals tradition-less and searching for new values.\textsuperscript{223} In both of these cases, religion no longer offers a relevant explanation and meaning for the irrational experiences of life.\textsuperscript{224} The resulting aimless hordes of people become susceptible to the influence of charismatic leaders who offer new meanings and values based on the cultural myths of their society (e.g., Hitler).\textsuperscript{225} Overall, modernity is characterized as rejecting the traditions of the past without incorporating new ones to fill the void.\textsuperscript{226}

Simultaneous with the cultural transformation are factors that influence how individuals respond to such environmental instability. One no longer holds group-held beliefs and identities to act as a security blanket in times of personal difficulty. Instead, people conclude that they often have no other recourse but to look within themselves for answers and guidance. Homans cites the examples of Freud and Jung as embodying the individual adjustments required in such circumstances. In Freud's case, his father, who relied on his traditional Jewish culture to survive in cosmopolitan Vienna, was of little help in Sigmund's struggle to shun his Jewish background and freely participate in modern, secular society.\textsuperscript{227} Likewise, Jung's pastor father had his own ambivalent feelings about Christianity that left Carl rudderless regarding incorporating Christianity into modern life.\textsuperscript{228}

Jung's situation regarding the need for religious meaning in life provides a contrast with Browning's depiction of the relationship of the secular (i.e., psychology),
and religion. Browning's separation of religion and psychology does not recognize the constant search for religious meaning in one's life. That is, Browning implies that once someone leaves the religious fold to embrace psychology, then religion is no longer a factor in that person's life. He appears to miss the point that the very reason why people leave traditional religion is not due to psychology is providing a less dogmatic and less authoritarian alternative, but because it offers a more inspiring and relevant source of potential religious meaning for their lives.

Using the personal examples of Jung and Freud, Homans presents how the confluence of cultural changes and personal psychological conflicts combine to compel people to search for new symbols for a modern culture and to provide a cohesive sense of identity that recognizes that one is both committed to the values of autonomy, but at the same time, desires active participation in the secular and economic realms. How does one achieve these seemingly incongruous goals? Jung points to the process of individuation as a response to the loss of commonly held beliefs and traditions while also providing a fountainhead for a new identity. Individuation represents an unconscious return to long lost ideals and represents a re-centering of the individual so that one becomes totally released from the restrictions of common culture and holds the prospect of developing new symbols with which to face the future. Individuation has been compared to Victor Turner's idea of the liminal, whereby people retreat from the structures of society to re-orient themselves and prepare for re-insertion into the community. It is through individuation that both the individual and society as a whole
shift their bearings from an extroverted, other-focused, persona that is excessively rational to become more internally focused. The new personal telos becomes the union of the conscious, the personal unconscious and the collective unconscious mediated through the archetypes to form a new midpoint that is called simply “Self.”

It is through the repudiation of the precursor cultural symbols whereby one discovers the true value and meaning of such symbols (archetypes), and then re-incorporates them into modern life. Browning misinterprets the repudiation of the current symbols of Christianity as equating to a rejection of the inherent, ancient value imbued in such symbols. In fact, the need for such meaning is so critical that one must re-interpret them within a new cultural context. Browning, on the other hand, settles for the much less revolutionary process of simply adjusting current values and morality to make them relevant to modern society, which he hopes will make them more palatable to those who are sympathetic to psychology. Instead, similar to the way in which a person derives his or her true self via a re-assimilation of ancient archetypes, so does one need to reconfigure the symbols to better reflect their ancient meanings. In other words, Jung believes that the current manifestations of Christian symbols have strayed so far from their mythical roots that they must be repudiated so that their archaic meanings can be resurrected within a new cultural context.

One particularly controversial aspect of Jung’s view of individuation is that it allows one to realize the transcendent properties of the Self, or as Jung describes it, the God within us. Despite this claim, Homans correctly characterizes individuation as
involving neither a "Christianizing" of psychology, nor a psychologizing of religion.\textsuperscript{234} It is not a Christianization of religion, because it represents a wholesale re-interpretation of religion beyond that of the bible. In addition, individuation should not be considered a regression or reduction of Christianity, as analytical psychology and individuation are a return to the ancient religion of the collective unconscious that predates Christianity and all other religions.\textsuperscript{235} Likewise, individuation should not be confused with nostalgia, or a yearning for ancient symbols to help counter the forces of modernity, an idea posited by Peter Berger (and appropriated by Browning).\textsuperscript{236} Instead, what occurs in individuation is what Berger terms "de-modernization," where one returns to the past to re-value the old symbols so they can be re-appropriated for future development.\textsuperscript{237} Homans concludes that Jung is continuously struggling with the problem of religion in its role of providing meaning in the face of the centrifugal forces of modernity that threaten to separate people from religion and their true selves.\textsuperscript{238}

**INDIVIDUATION'S IMPACT ON ETHICS**

How does individuation impact ethics? Individuation directly shapes one's ethics primarily through the process of narcissism. Narcissism here is defined as "the psychological task of forming a cohesive self, a process that occurs primarily in relation to the significant 'other' person...the problem of narcissism is the problem of otherness."\textsuperscript{239} Thus, narcissism has both similarities to, and is a subprocess of, individuation in defining the Self in relation to others, especially idealized others such as parents, loved ones, etc. It is normally associated with the pre-oedipal stage of
psychosocial development when children learn to form an identity separate from that of their parents. Homans notes that narcissism is mainly a product of modernity, because prior to this time there existed little differentiation between the narcissistic and oedipal stages of development. Once psychologically separate from the other, one can either develop a healthy sense of self-love and self-esteem or stray towards narcissistic grandiosity and self-inflation.

Similar to the overall process of individuation, narcissism has both cultural and personal antecedent causes. To Kohut, narcissism occurs when one leaves behind common values to focus on one’s own sense of identity in the face of the possibility of inner emptiness that can lead to an identity crisis, an inability to sustain relationships, despair and sometimes uncontrollable rage. It is by way of the process of narcissism that meanings previously developed externally by others in authority are now created within oneself.

Homans notes that in Freud and Jung’s particular lives, narcissism played a key component of their relationship with each other. Jung idealized Freud as a mentor, teacher and father figure, while Freud idealized Jung as the doting acolyte and potential successor. This co-idealization led to enhanced levels of self-esteem for both men. However, like all narcissistic mergers with others, it came to an end with Jung declaring the independence of his ideas from Freud. Freud responded to this rebuff from his idealized other by being overly critical of Jung’s ideas and Jung thus retaliated in a fit of narcissistic rage, because he felt abandoned by his idealized other without having a
alternative source of self-esteem. For Jung, the personal and psychological break from
Freud precipitated a near decade-long agonizing search for an new sense of identity and
self-esteem which he eventually found through creative bursts of insight which led to his
development of analytical psychology. Jung forced himself to separate from Freud,
because Freud’s views on sexuality and religion were becoming too oppressive to Jung’s
ideas on religion.

The process of narcissism has a direct bearing on ethics, because self-esteem and
self-love, although initially experienced as pre-ethical feelings, eventually influence one’s
views of ethics. As mentioned earlier, narcissism can be distorted via psychological
deficiencies to become self-absorption or it can be a source of introspection and self-
understanding based on a healthy realization of self-love. Despite its focus on the Self,
narcissism does not deny the need for altruism and self-sacrifice to enhance one’s ego
image; however, pathological narcissism may result in a total ignorance of the needs of
others. Kohut suggests that narcissism represents the capacity of creativity (as shown
in the life of Jung), and wisdom, while it remains distrustful of group commitments due
to their repression of one’s own self-esteem. Homans asserts that the process of
narcissism can allow one to develop healthy relationships with others as one does not
have to idealize the other when the subject is imbued with normal levels of self-love.
From these various perspectives of narcissism one can see its dual potential for both good
and evil.
Jung believes that individuation represents a search for the unique identity of the "archaic man" who is then mediated by contemporary culture to become a synthesis of the ancient and the modern.\textsuperscript{254} Jung hopes that once people become individuated, they can then freely engage with the community and others due to having already refined their individual sense of identity.\textsuperscript{255} Homans here illustrates the key difference between naturally occurring concern for others associated with the aretaic ethical perspective of narcissism, compared with the imposition of ethics from an external authority in the case of the deontic ethics proposed by Browning.

It is important to note that when I discuss an aretaic ethic, I do not wish it to be confused with a hedonistic form of ethical egoism that is focused purely on the maximization of pleasure. Instead, Homans, Helminiak and I are referring to a non-hedonistic aretaic ethic focused on developing one’s virtues so that one can optimize the amount of non-moral goods over evil.\textsuperscript{256} In other words, pleasure may be a non-moral good, but it is not the only non-moral good.\textsuperscript{257} However, pleasure may be an outcome associated with self-actualization, but it is obviously not guaranteed. The true telos of self-actualization is what William Frankena describes as "satisfactoriness," a kind of harmony or level of understanding (not necessarily happiness).\textsuperscript{258}

An aretaic ethical perspective implies that one takes an ethical egoist viewpoint which guides one’s behavior based upon a determination of what promotes the most good for oneself as opposed to a utilitarian view that attempts to maximize the greatest benefit for all.\textsuperscript{259} Ethical egoism within the aretaic ethical context focuses on self-realization as
opposed to a hedonistic maximization of pleasure, because ethical egoism has its
foundation in the Freudian notion that one seeks his or her own self-advantage instead of
being instinctively oriented to the concern of others (the latter being Erikson’s contention
that one is motivated to care for future generations).\textsuperscript{260}

The key conclusion that Homans develops using the processes of individuation
and narcissism as reflected through the life of Carl Jung is that both culture and
individuals have permanently re-oriented themselves and their ethics away from the
community (the deontic), and towards the self (the aretaic), which results in causing
deontic ethics to become almost wholly irrelevant. In addition, through his discussion of
individuation and narcissism, Homans illustrates the similarities of these processes to
self-actualization and Helminiak’s authenticity. All of these procedures are focused on
one function: to form an aretaic ethical scheme. Whereas Erikson suggests that a healthy
sense of self-esteem begins with the parent-child relationship, self-actualization and
authenticity rely on a more internal psychological process during adulthood that may or
may not be guided with the help of a therapist. Regardless of the particular narcissistic
method, it represents the foundation for a source of realistic self-awareness that is
required for one to base any potential development of virtues. Unfortunately, deficits in
self-esteem or self-awareness can easily lead to a grandiose sense of the self, an
observation that Browning and Vitz strongly suggest is ever present in American culture.
MY RESPONSE

Having now reviewed Browning's critique of the ethics of the modern psychologies and then examining Helminiak's and Homan's alternative views of understanding these ethics, I wish to offer my own thoughts which expand on both Helminiak's discussion of aretaic ethics and Homan's elaboration on narcissism. But before I launch directly into my comments, it is necessary to achieve a better comprehension of the differing explanations of the cultural processes that help shape the environment that influences the modern psychologies and their ethics. If one of the explanations appears to be more compelling than the others, then it may lend credence to its related ethical scheme. I will not repeat here the factors that shaped the religious and psychological landscapes during modernity as there is little disagreement regarding what caused psychology to assume such a prominent role in modern American society. What is not agreed upon, however, is how psychology has undertaken its newfound mission.

Browning's explanation for the rise of psychology as a competitor for the hearts and minds of Americans reflects the most conventional explication. As American society and its precursors in western Europe during the post-Reformation period began to shift their ethical orientation from the community to the individual (both in the economic and religious realms), this reorientation allowed people to reflect on their own views regarding the ultimates in life: death, sex, children, work, etc. Browning portrays this process as involving a split between religion and psychology. Prior to the Reformation, most used religion as their only source to answer such questions, while after the Middle
Ages, many began to look to other realms for guidance. For Browning, such a choice is an all or nothing scenario: either religion is superior in creating a community and its ties to the individual through the ethic of mutuality, or a person makes the psychological turn and abandons the community and assimilates a more aretaic or ethical egoist orientation. Browning does not see the more complex relationship involving religion and psychology that may allow a common overall metaethics that supports both religion and psychology. Instead, he perceives both as competing spheres of influence that are like oppositely charged ions that constantly repel each other. By applying such an outlook, Browning refuses to allow any alternative ethical systems other than those that are explicitly grounded in Christian theology. The reason for his stubborn adherence to theology is simple: any other authority such as psychology or philosophy can be challenged based on reason, utilitarianism, or other modes of criticism. However, an ethic based on theology is unassailable because of its supreme claim to salvation. Although Browning does not explicitly mention this claim (he does not have to), this is the implicit source of invulnerability that supports theology such that it can never be challenged by psychology or philosophy. He realizes that opening up the discourse on ethics to the other perspectives would risk breaking it off from its theological foundation which is critical to his deontic ethics. However, Browning does risk diluting the bond to theology by allowing reason and practicality to enter his mix of theological ethics through his notion of a practical moral theology. When Browning makes this partial turn towards philosophy, he does weaken the unchallenged authority of the deontic ethics. Why he is
so opposed to also allowing his theological ethics to incorporate psychological insight is not known, but one can guess that his strong criticism of the ethics of the modern psychologies may bias his whole view towards psychology.

Helminiak's viewpoint on the role of religion and psychology in the development of ethics is almost the complete opposite of Browning's. Instead of viewing religion and psychology as competitors, theology and psychology are merely two different vantage points through which one can witness the religious process (which Helminiak calls spirituality). Therefore, psychology and theology are not rivals, as the person brings into the process of spirituality either a theological or psychological orientation. So under Helminiak's system, spirituality is objectively a single process with differing subjective interpretations, which allows for a potential dialogue between the two domains. Although Helminiak claims to hold no preference between the theological and the psychological, this outward lack of favoritism fails to hide his bias for the psychological description of spirituality. This bias is clearly evident in his choice of authenticity as being an alleged middle ground between the deontic ethic of theology and the aretaic ethic of psychology. Authenticity is virtually indistinguishable from self-actualization, implying that spirituality should be viewed more as a psychological process instead of being understood as a theological discourse.²⁶¹

Homans assumes a more complicated, nuanced understanding of the relationship between religion and psychology as he claims that religion has been transformed into psychology through a combination of sociological and psychological alterations. As
noted earlier, Homans believes that the symbols and meaning of religion have been repudiated through the loss of community and the rise of the reflective, internally-focused individual who mourns the loss of the old external, deontological system and re-interprets the old symbols into a new psychological system via the process of narcissism. The re-forming of the old into the new is both a cultural and psychological alteration such that once the turn is made to psychology via the aretaic ethic, there is little hope of turning back to the discarded ideas and symbols of traditional religion.

Based on the above descriptions of the evolution of culture, it is clear that each scholar's preferred cultural orientation directly influences his proposed ethics. Browning's yearning for the community-based ethics of the ancient Christian era of a tightly knit group of fellow believers compels him to advocate a deontic ethic. He rejects any aretaic ethical system that fails to give priority to the ethic of obligation because he views pride as being the dominant motivational force in one's personality, a force which must be offset and mollified by the ethic of obligation.

Helminiak's psychologizing of the process of religion invariably leads him to support an aretaic ethic that develops a person's authentic virtues. He claims that people will sincerely embrace an ethic of obligation towards others only after they are psychologically equipped to take on such a responsibility. While Browning views the historical evolution of religion and psychology as being independent projectories, Helminiak views the development of theology and psychology as being parallel processes.
Finally, Homans stakes a middle ground to illustrate how religion has evolved into psychology which involves two different, but concurrent, processes (cultural and psychological), in direct relationship with each other. Simultaneous with Homan’s idea of the transformation of religion into psychology has been the re-formation of an external, community-based ethic into an internalized, aretaic ethic.

Which of the above scenarios is the most compelling? I think that Homans offers the best insight into the complex relationship between psychology and religion. First of all, he recognizes the sociological and psychological factors that have irreversibly reoriented society towards the individual at the detriment of the obligation towards the community.\textsuperscript{262} Browning’s desire to revert to a more-communal based society would fail under Homan’s scheme because only individuals themselves, as part of their development of their own virtues, can decide if they and/or society would benefit from an improved sense of community, and therefore, freely undertake an ethic of mutuality as being a virtue, not a command. Such an effort may have some validity as the so-called communitarian movement (not to be confused with Fromm’s communitarian socialism), appears to be gaining momentum.\textsuperscript{263}

What Browning fails to realize is that merely supporting a deontological ethic will not automatically motivate people to re-orient themselves to the community absent a direct appeal to the aretaic ethic, because American society, to a large degree, has made the seemingly permanent shift towards the individual. Would Browning ever pursue such a course of re-instilling the ethic of mutuality via an aretaic ethic? Probably not, because
by abandoning the deontic ethic he would partially break the love commandment from its
bond with Holy Scripture and forfeit any claim to guaranteeing salvation.

The second reason why Homan's concept of ethics as derived through narcissism
has greater appeal compared to Browning's deontic ethic is based on Homan's view of
human nature. Homan's concept of narcissism implies the people have the freedom to
choose sin and does not assume that people are determined to sin. This twofold nature of
narcissism, as envisioned by Homans, illustrates the danger and precariousness of
freedom. One can develop healthy self-love and self-esteem, assuming that one corrects
for any psychological deficits that may have been caused, for example, by inadequate
love-objects (namely, one's parents). If this has not occurred, then unhealthy self-esteem
can lead to selfishness and/or pride. Allowing people the freedom, with very few
restrictions, to act how they please involves both the hope for new insights and new
discoveries, and the sober realization that evil may also occur. Browning does not wish
to risk such a situation, as he believes that society is currently lamenting the rampant
exhibition of individualism that is manifested as selfishness and hedonism. He appears to
view human nature as being determined to act prideful, a situation that must be actively
and forcefully controlled by an overriding ethic of mutuality. I take a more optimistic
(and utilitarian), view of human nature, as I believe that the benefits gained through such
freedom absent the control of deontic ethics allow for the possibility of the value of the
creation of non-moral goods to greatly exceed the evil that may also occur to the
community.
Third, Browning’s critique of ethical egoism of the humanistic and Jungian psychologies does not address their possible utilitarian outcomes. Browning mentions that supporters of the free-enterprise economic system usually are attracted to the ethical egoism of self-actualization. What he ignores are the indirect benefits of self-actualization and individuation. For example, graduate students who toil and struggle through many years of graduate school may temporarily suspend their direct obligations to the community. However, in the end, their hard work will allow for the dissemination of wisdom that not only directly impacts those who take the newly hired professors’ courses or read their articles, but also those others who come in contact with these students who then benefit from the trace of wisdom that has been imparted by the professors. My point is that if people are coerced, consciously or unconsciously, via external authority or guilt to view the community’s interest over their own, then the community may suffer in the end along with the individual who is denied such opportunities for development.

Fourth, although Browning concedes that individuation and self-actualization may be necessary preliminary steps before one can wholeheartedly adopt an ethic of mutuality, he does not fully pursue the impact of such an idea on the deontic ethic. Instead, he limits his support for such a sequence of steps to include only an aretaic virtue of obligation. That is, one must first develop a self-instilled desire for mutuality before one can truly embrace such an ethic of obligation to others. My basic reply to Browning would be that people cannot give what they do not have within themselves. Building upon Freud’s
contention that a lack of psychological capabilities may prevent people from fulfilling such an obligation, such people should not be forced into ethical behavior by guilt or duress, because psychological disharmony may ensue. A person must have already assimilated insight, an internal ability and a desire for caring for others before one can share these gifts with the community. If a person forfeits taking the time and effort to fully self-actualize, they effectively shortchange others who would never receive the benefits of their newfound capabilities. In my example of the professor given above, if the graduate student/aspiring professor drops out of school due to real or perceived demands of the community, all would suffer.

This example also points to another reality of our complex society that is often disparaged by those supporting a deontic ethic: the importance and necessity of specialists. Compared to the tight-knit community of the ancient Christians, today’s technologically advanced society demands that new vocations be developed to help society cope with new technical and cultural challenges. Although specialization may lead to social isolation, I believe that technology can help answer the needs of today’s multifaceted culture and develop solutions for any potential isolation that may occur. I am more optimistic than most that technology will be harnessed in such a manner, because there exist legions of intelligent technologists whose desire is to make life easier and more meaningful for others.

In expounding on my fifth reason for my preference of the aretaic ethic, I utilize a theological analogy to help distinguish the aretaic from the deontic. The analogy I use
compares the Catholic ideal of doing good works and the Protestant ideal of justification by faith with deontic and aretaic ethics, respectively. Browning assumes that the ethic of mutuality and care for others will result in a desirable outcome for the community and individual salvation, regardless of the spiritual fitness of the person. One argument for self-actualization and individuation is that once a person reaches a level of wholeness he or she then can more readily and spontaneously enact an ethic of mutuality free from coercion. This contrasts with the notion of good works, which includes a deontic ethic centered on doing, while faith implies a state of being (no one does faith, instead, one is faithful or has faith), which has similarities to aretaic ethics.

The sixth and final reason why I take issue with Browning’s deontic ethic is that it is incompatible with the predominant spirit of American culture. Homan’s processes of individuation and secularization have cut such a wide swath through American culture as to render only the faintest hope of reversion to a more overt sense of community. For example, basic American values associated with such sayings as “equality of opportunity,” “be all that you can be,” and “people should be judged by the content of their character...,” permeate American society and form the most basic tenets of its ideology. Even the founding fathers recognized immediately after signing the Constitution (which is a form of deontic ethics), that they needed to enshrine a Bill of Rights to guarantee that the federal government would not abridge individuals’ basic freedoms. Despite these examples of the individualistic nature of American society, this is not to imply that Americans totally ignore the needs of others as that is definitely not
the case. Americans wish to enjoy the individual freedom to express their caring for others in ways that they see fit, not according to some overarching ethic which obligates them to care for others.

Having described the benefits of aretaic ethics, I would be remiss if I did not attempt to address the potential weaknesses of such an ethical orientation. The main purpose of such an analysis is to discern whether the risks associated the aretaic offset the benefits from the opportunities obtained from it. One obvious potential weakness of the aretaic ethic is the potential for selfishness or pathological narcissism occurring when one either a) overly emphasizes the individual over the community; or b) exhibits psychological deficits that do not allow one to embrace healthy self-love and self-esteem. Browning and Vitz would probably assert that the current state of American culture represents both of these failings. One factor that perpetuates this situation is the mass media, particularly since companies are acutely aware of the aretaic ethic and they attempt to link their products to the development of virtues that people desire. Quite frankly, in many cases personal fulfillment is equated with material well being and unfortunately, I am not particularly hopeful that such an attitude will change anytime in the near future, as it may take others, such as succeeding generations, to properly recognize these hollow manifestations of virtue and self-actualization.

Another complaint leveled against aretaic ethics is that it ignores the potential harm done to others from the result of one's self-actualization. For example, if one is so totally obsessed with developing one's virtues and totally ignores the needs of one's
family and community, it can result in isolation and psychological harm to others. Obviously, it is hoped that such a situation is a temporary respite, and not a permanent form of separation from the community. One thing to keep in mind is that most truly self-actualized people become more involved with others and the community after they have reached a level of wholeness compared to before becoming self-actualized. This results from the simple fact that virtues are not developed and exhibited in a vacuum without having bearing on the community. In fact, the best display of one’s virtues is while dealing with others who can benefit from one’s newly developed qualities.

The last and probably the most difficult criticism to address is that aretaic ethics inexorably lead to moral relativism. Viewed from a strict aretaic perspective, the risk of this taking place is quite real, and unfortunately, no one undeniable remedy exists to prevent moral relativism from occurring. The expectation is that a person will have sufficient psychological awareness to prevent moral relativism from seeping into one’s morality and ethics, such that one will seek therapy to keep pathological narcissism from taking hold. One other suggestion supports the incorporation of utilitarian outcomes into one’s aretaic ethics to help uncover potential conflicts between the individual and the community that may result from any contemplated behavior.
CONCLUSION

In conclusion, I have attempted to illustrate the differing perspectives of how religion and psychology (and their associated ethical systems), offer people alternative sources of meaning and value in their lives. For example, Homans notes that Jung’s psychology posits that there exist three distinct groups of people. The first is comfortable with traditional religion to provide a coherent and acceptable ideology to explain the nature of life and prevents its followers from falling into neuroses. The second group is composed of modern people who are rational, conscious, scientific, extroverted and wholly unconnected to their archaic selves which makes them vulnerable to the rumblings of the unconscious. The third group is sympathetic to Jungian psychology (and I would extend this to include the humanistic psychologies as well), and rejects the authoritarianism of religious dogma, but at the same time, they are open to a re-interpretation of Christian symbols into new manifestations relevant to modern society.

It is not likely that the first and third groups will ever change their overall orientations towards the role of religion and psychology in their lives, which means that Browning, the Jungians and the humanists are competing over the minds and souls of the middle group. Browning would hope to pull them closer to religion by offering a new application (but not a totally new re-interpretation) of morality and ethics within a modern context in his quest to prevent them from making the turn towards psychology. The psychologists would argue that the middle group has no other viable choice in these changing times but to make the psychological turn once they realize that their overly-
rational and materialistic values towards life prove hollow and devoid of meaning, causing them to search for a new source of identity and direction in their lives. I hope that I have offered a meaningful discourse between Browning and his respondents that will allow this middle group possible alternative paths in order to pursue new values and meaning in their lives should they ever decide to make such a leap of faith.
NOTES

2 While cultural anthropology and sociology may help explain why people are religious, psychology is better equipped to understanding how people have internalized religion (and adopted, consciously or unconsciously, the ethics and morality associated with psychology). Granted, Freud and most non-pastoral psychologists may have qualms with religion, but this paper focuses on those psychologies that implicitly incorporate religious themes (e.g., humanistic, Jungian and ego psychologies).
3 For example, compare the uproar in 1972, associated with the revelation that Thomas Eagleton, the Democratic vice-presidential candidate, confessed to receiving electro-shock treatment (he was forced to resign his candidacy), compared to the response, or lack thereof, to the more recent, very public admission by Tipper Gore that she sought therapy for depression after her only son was in a near-fatal car accident.
4 My discussion is bracketed to include these three areas only; I will not address the more serious psychopathologies such as those that would be diagnosed by DSM-IV which may include pharmacological treatment and or a combination of drugs and cognitive and behavioral therapy in the case of diagnosed depression or anxiety (See Ronald Comer, *Abnormal Psychology*, Third Edition, New York: W.H. Freeman and Co., 1995).
5 Homans, Peter, *Jung in Context*, p. 56. The one exception may be Jungian psychology as Jung envisioned psychoanalysis as being the ultimate manifestation of the Christian gospel. In addition, the Jung Centers located in the larger cities in the U.S. function as churches devoted to Jung’s ideas. The Jung Center in Houston, for example, has a board of directors and professional staff that are akin to a board of elders and ministry staff, respectively, found in most churches and synagogues. While there is no one regularly scheduled worship service at the Jung Centers, they do have classes, workshops and conferences that help present the psychology (some would say theology), contained in Jung’s eighteen-volume collected works. While most people who go to the Jung Center still maintain their own particular religious practices (especially those of the more liberal Protestant sects), the Jung Center provides a significant adjunct to these practices.
6 Barnard, p. 297. The use of the word “spirituality” as a new and improved descriptor of religiosity is insightful, as increasing numbers of Americans do not necessarily claim to be religious, but they do claim to be spiritual. The implications are that a particular religion is not sufficient to encompass a person’s syncretic belief system and practices that may include a traditional religion, psychotherapy, etc.
7 Ibid.
8 Koenig, Harold G., “Religion and Psychotherapy with Older Adults,” pp. 157, 158.
10 Ibid., p. 23.
Ibid., pp. 13, 57.
12 Ibid., pp. 23, 57.
13 Ibid., p. 37.
15 Ibid., pp. 70, 72.
16 Ibid., p. 235. Per Rieff, therapists of differing psychological persuasions have a difficult time advocating massive changes to society given the fact that most of them are cultural conservatives.
17 Ibid., p. 254.
18 Ibid., p. 233.
19 Ibid., pp. 243, 252.
20 Browning, *Generative Man*, p. 84.
21 Ibid., p. 82. One concern, however, is that a too powerful ego will further perpetuate individualism that could lead to "pathological narcissism" that is overly self absorbed. Homans, Peter, "Understand thy Neighbor as Thyself: Freud's Criticism of the Love Command," p. 323.
22 Browning, *Generative Man*, p. 84.
23 Ibid., p.91.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid., p. 95.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid., p. 98.
28 Ibid., p. 100.
29 Ibid., p. 101.
30 Ibid., pp. 102-103.
31 Ibid., p. 103.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid. p. 104.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid., p. 109. This does not imply that all instincts are considered "low" to Browning, as he readily embraces Erikson's idea of the instinct for generativity.
37 Ibid., p. 110.
38 Ibid., p. 114.
39 Ibid., p. 115.
40 Ibid., p. 116.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid., p. 117.
Browning, Generative Man, p. 122.

Ibid., p. 123.
Ibid., p. 126.
Ibid., p. 125.
Ibid., p. 126.
Ibid., p. 127. Fromm believes that reason helps prevent self-destructive acts. Fromm, Beyond the Chains of Illusion, p. 130; Fromm, Man for Himself, p. 84.

Browning, Generative Man, p. 131.
Ibid., p. 134; Fromm, Escape From Freedom, p. 33.
Browning, Generative Man, p. 135.

Although Browning briefly summarizes the stages of psychological development presented by Erikson, Browning believes the focal point is the generative stage.

Ibid., p. 139. See my critique of generative man under in the section titled “My Response” later in the paper.

Ibid., p. 140.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., pp. 141; Fromm, The Sane Society, pp. 93, 95.

Fromm claims that the local groups would have complete autonomy from the National Council, but he does not describe how conflicts between the local groups and the National Council are resolved. Fromm, The Sane Society, pp. 96-98.

Browning, Generative Man, pp. 142-143; Fromm, Psychoanalysis and Religion, p. 111.

Browning, Generative Man, p. 146.
Ibid., pp. 23, 146.
Ibid., p. 155.
Ibid., p. 156.
Ibid., pp. 156-157.
Ibid., p. 187.

Ibid. Erikson recognizes, however, that the superego can also be an source of guilt if it becomes too powerful and controlling. Erikson, Erik, Identity and the Life Cycle, p. 130.

Browning, Generative Man, p. 188.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 185.
Ibid., pp. 160-161; Erikson, p. 39.
Browning, Generative Man, p. 150.
Ibid., pp. 150, 177.
Ibid.
Witness the vociferous debate currently going on in the U.S. Congress over potential limitations on campaign contributions by individuals, corporations and labor organizations due to the perception that such contributions unduly influence access and policy decisions.

Browning, *Generative Man*, p. 177.

It is debatable whether or not Browning believes that generative man can be developed only within an explicitly Christian environment. On the one hand, his embrace of Erikson's theory of generativity as being the core of his (Browning's) ethics would seem to imply that generative man could flourish within a psychological setting. However, Browning is leery of psychology's attempts of intruding onto theology's turf regarding morality and ethics, which may lead one to think that Browning would only consider generative man developing within a Judeo-Christian context.
Ibid. Fromm goes so far as to claim that "Love thy neighbor as thyself," is "the most important norm of living and that its violation is the basic cause of unhappiness and mental illness." Fromm, *Psychoanalysis and Religion*, p. 87.


Ibid., pp. ix, 2.

Ibid., p. 2.

Ibid., p. 7.

Ibid., pp. 4, 7.

Ibid., p. 5.

Ibid., p. 119.

Ibid., p. 144.


Ibid., p. 11.

Ibid.

I will not analyze Browning's critique of behaviorism, as my focus is on the psychoanalytic traditions and those theories that have been in response to psychoanalysis.

Ibid., p. 56. According to Ernest Wallwork, Freud's ethics have been misappropriated by some of his successors to support their own seemingly incompatible ethical claims. For example, Rieff claims that Freud's ethics were overly narcissistic, while Erikson used Freud to support his own ethic of generativity. Reciprocity represents a compromise between narcissistic self-absorption and self-sacrifice. Freud's idea of an detached ethic reflects his suspicion of strangers who he believed deserved respect, but not an equal regard to that of friends. Wallwork uses the phrase, "love thy neighbor as they neighbor
141 Browning, Religious Thought and the Modern Psychologies, p. 58.
142 Freud avoided ethics of agape and mutuality for various reasons. One is that “shall” in the love command implies that one “can” love thy neighbor, which ignores the fact that some people are psychologically incapable of fulfilling such an ethic, which may lead to guilt, anxiety and/or depression. Another reason is that forcing people to treat others with equal regard may require them to repress naturally occurring aggressive tendencies. Finally, Freud is quite wary of totalistic commands in general that do not recognize individual differences and thus tend to be repressive. Freud believed that the love of one’s self was the chief motivation of all behaviors which could lead to destructive self-absorbed behavior as well as to altruistic acts. Wallwork, Ernest, “Thou Shalt Love Thy Neighbor as Thy Self,” pp. 265, 267, 275, 295.
143 Browning, Religious Thought and the Modern Psychologies, p. 70.
144 Ibid., p. 67.
145 Ibid., p. 68.
146 Ibid., p. 69. Browning notes that economic libertarians who espouse the benefits to the larger economy when individuals pursue their own economic self-interests are especially attracted to humanistic psychologies whereby this same reasoning is applied to the psychological realm. I will expand on this critique and add my own perspective later in the paper.
147 Ibid., p. 72.
148 Ibid., p. 70.
149 Ibid., p. 72.
150 Ibid.
151 Vitz, Paul, Psychology as Religion: The Cult of Self-Worship, pp. xii, 93.
152 Ibid., p. 124.
153 Ibid., pp. 13, 125, 131.
154 Browning, Religious Thought and the Modern Psychologies, p. 84.
155 Ibid., p. 86.
156 Ibid.
157 Ibid., p. 147.
158 Ibid., p. 146. Although Niebuhr recognizes people’s limitations in attempting to strive for an agapic ethic, he believes that they should not let their limitations become an excuse for not aspiring to an ethic of self-sacrifice. Wallwork, Ernest, “Thou Shalt Love Thy Neighbor as Thy Self,” p. 312.
159 Browning, Religious Thought and the Modern Psychologies, p. 152.
160 Ibid., p. 160.
161 Ibid., p. 90.
162 Ibid., p. 182.
163 Ibid., p. 178.
164 Ibid., pp. 180-181.
165 Ibid., p. 182.
166 Ibid., p. 186.
167 Ibid., p. 183.
168 Ibid.
169 Ibid.
170 Ibid., p. 184.
171 Ibid., p. 187.
172 Ibid., p. 192.
173 Ibid.
174 Ibid., p. 195.
175 Ibid., p. 197.
176 Ibid., p. 190.
177 Ibid., p. 200.
178 Ibid., pp. 220, 234.
179 Ibid., p. 206.
180 Ibid., pp. 212, 215.
181 Ibid., p. 222.
182 Ibid., pp. 221-222.
185 Ibid.
186 Ibid., p. 149.
189 Ibid., p. 22.
190 Ibid. The spirit exhibits many similarities to the unconscious, an observation that Helminiak fails to address.
191 Ibid., p. 23.
192 Spirituality for Helminiak appears to be largely an unconscious process, while individuation for Jung has some involvement of consciousness to allow the archetypes to express themselves within the Self without undue hindrances. Browning, *Religious Thought and the Modern Psychologies*, p. 183.
193 Helminiak, pp. 7, 16. "Being" represents the unfolding and manifestation of the spirit through the process of spirituality. For those sympathetic to mysticism, the process of spirituality appears to be similar to William James' concepts of noesis and ineffability that characterize mystical experiences. See William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985.
194 Helminiak, p. 49.
195 Ibid.
196 Ibid., pp. 70, 169.
According to Victor Paul Furnish, the scriptural passage, "You shall love thy neighbor as thyself," can have many differing interpretations depending on its biblical context. Within the Old Testament (Leviticus 19:18), he claims it could be seen as a reciprocal relationship that prevents exploitation of others. Within the New Testament (Galatians 5:14), the love command involves a helping of one's neighbor. Furnish also believes that it does not equate to selfless love or self-abnegation, nor does it imply that one must have equal regard for all others. Instead, the level of caring for others is based upon their needs. Based on these varying interpretations, Browning's ethic of mutuality appears to fall in between agape and reciprocity (actually it is much closer to reciprocity than it is to agape). Furnish, Victor Paul, "Love of Neighbor in the New Testament," pp. 327, 329, 333.

Helminiak, *Religion and the Human Sciences*, p. 188. Helminiak, apparently for rhetorical purposes, exaggerates the differences between the ethic of mutuality and ethic of self-actualization, by classifying them as altruism and selfishness, respectively.

Authenticity has so much in common with self-actualization and individuation that it is difficult to distinguish among these three concepts. Combining this with the fact that authenticity is focused more on "being" rather than doing, makes a strong case that authenticity is not dissimilar to an aretaic ethic which undercuts Helminiak's claim that authenticity somehow fills the gap between deontic and aretaic ethics.


Homans, Peter, *Jung in Context*, pp. 145, 156.

Parsons, p. 8.

Ibid.

Homans, *Jung in Context*, p. 79.

Ibid., p. 187.

Ibid., p. 56.

Ibid., p. 188. Note that when Jung speaks of "traditional religion," he is referring to something different compared to what Helminiak calls "traditional Christianity." Jung here is referring to conventional Christianity as he perceived it in modern Switzerland, especially as he observed his pastor father's ambivalence towards it. Helminiak, on the other hand, is describing the ancient form of Christianity prior to the formation of the ecclesiastical church.
Ibid., p. 145.
Parsons, p. 4.
Ibid., p. 136.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 176.
Ibid., pp. 177-178.
Ibid., p. 180.
Ibid., p. 178.
Ibid., p. 152.
Ibid., p. 145.
Ibid., p. 149.
Ibid., p. 152.
Parsons, pp. 4, 5.
Ibid., p. 179.
Ibid., p. 108.
Ibid., p. 153.
Ibid., p. 170.
Ibid., p. 204.
Ibid., p. 183.
Ibid., p. 84.
Ibid., p. 70.
Ibid., p. 133.
Ibid., p. 71.
Ibid., pp. 40, 89, 197.
Ibid., p. 196.
Ibid., p. 49.
Ibid., pp. 63, 75, 87.
Ibid., p. 87.
Ibid. Note the similarity of Jung’s own personal situation with his split from Freud compared with the cultural context where people in general separate from the oppression of the community’s rules and symbols and feel impelled to find their own values and symbols.
Homans, “Understand thy Neighbor as Thyself,” p. 323.
Parsons, p. 8.
While Homans, Jung and Helminiak choose to focus on the positive outcomes from a healthy sense of narcissism, Browning believes that all narcissism inevitably leads to evil in the form of self absorption that must be prevented via an ethic of regard for the other.

Ibid., p. 142.

Ibid., p. 104.

Frankena, p. 69.

Ibid., p. 70.

Ibid., pp. 74-75.


Ibid., pp. 16, 19. This is not to imply that Freudian self-interest should be equated with self-actualization. But, what it does connote is that the focus on the individual within Freud's notion of self-interest is also present in the ethical egoism of self-realization.

Helminiak mainly focuses on Judeo-Christian cultural contexts of spirituality; he does not discuss non-western contexts in detail.

Just to be clear, I am speaking with regard to the United States. However, this process is at work in varying degrees in even the most group-focused cultures. Take Japan for example. Its decade-long economic malaise has forced it to re-evaluate and reform its economic structure all in the name of economic efficiency due to the never-ending pressure from international competition. Thus, cherished traditions such as lifetime employment motivated employees to be extremely committed to their paternalistic employers who likewise de-emphasized the individual differences of their employees and stressed the importance of group performance which enhanced group cohesion. With the recent economic restructuring, many have been laid off for the first time in their lives which has caused these former "company men" to reorient their loyalties away from others and more towards themselves. While Japanese society will not convert anytime soon into a free agent type labor marketplace like the U.S., this slow, eventual transformation will threaten other supposedly stable institutions such as the supremacy of LDP political party, which has ruled almost totally unchallenged since World War II.

Communitarianism being defined here as a recognition that the breakdown of the bonds of the community has hurt the development of individuals, so that one should seek a better balance between the individual and the community. Note that such an effort is clearly rooted in an aretaic and utilitarian ethical system, not a deontic ethic.

Homans notes that Religious Studies have developed in the last few decades, because there was a need to find new meaning, value and symbols from religion due to secularization and individuation. Parsons, William, "The Ability to Mourn," p. 5.

A personal example helps illustrate this point. I formerly worked as a marketing manager for the Hi-C brand of fruit drinks whose primary target is mothers of young children. One particular child psychologist attempted to persuade us, through the use of object-relations theory, that Hi-C drink boxes which mothers put in their kids' lunches for school could represent a self-object, which in this case represents the love of the mother.
who showed that she cared about the child by putting the product in the child’s lunch. This approach was obviously aimed at the mother’s need to feel appreciated about how she is raising her child, a critical virtue for mothers. All sophisticated marketers spend thousands of dollars trying to understand their target consumers’ material and psychological needs with the hope of finding a close match with their particular products’ so-called “brand personality.”

For example, Generation Y is supposedly yearning for a more balanced life between career and family compared to that of their parents’ generation (the Baby Boomers), who instead, focus on career at the expense of their families with the resulting increase in broken families, neglected children, etc. A proponent of the deontic ethic would use this example as a direct consequence of the aretaic ethic achieving prominence in the U.S. While a deontic system may have prevented such results from occurring, this would be purely a matter of speculation, as deontic ethics explicitly ignore any utilitarian outcomes from their enactment.

Fromm, Man for Himself, p. 5.

Fromm is hopeful that reason, which is based on the nature of man, can form the basis from which to determine “good” and “bad.” Ibid., p. 7.

Homans, Jung in Context, p. 185.

Ibid., pp. 185-186.

Ibid., p. 185.
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