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THE INFLUENCE OF DISPUTANT AFFECT STATE ON PERCEPTIONS OF MEDIATOR ALIGNMENT

by

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A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE MASTER OF ARTS

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ABSTRACT

The Influence of Disputant Affect State on Perceptions of Mediator Alignment

by

AnJanette Agnew Nease

Previous research on mediation has not examined the influence that disputant affect state may have on perceptions of mediators and proposals for resolving the conflict. This influence may be particularly important in situations where a mediator has similar interests, or is aligned, with one particular disputing party. The present study attempted to examine how affect states influence the evaluations of mediators with unfavorable and favorable alignment. Hypotheses were that, compared to neutrals, negative and positive affect states would lead to increased reliance on heuristics such as mediator alignment for determining perceptions of the mediation situation. One hundred twenty-one participants wrote essays designed to induce angry, neutral, or happy affect states, and then participated in a mediation task. Results indicated no support for the hypotheses. The lack of results may be attributed to insensitivity of the affect and alignment manipulations. Implications for future research are discussed.
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Introduction

Over the past three decades, negotiation and mediation researchers have focused on the cognitive and motivational influences of these social interaction contexts (see Neale & Bazerman, 1991, and Thompson, 1990, for reviews). Mood and its effects on the negotiation and mediation process have remained underexplored during this time (Neale & Northcraft, 1991), despite the fact that affect is a pervasive influence on our daily experience (Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1993). Indeed, it is not difficult to imagine that the experience of conflict may give rise to various types of emotions. An examination of affect states is critical to understanding social behavior as an element of the negotiation process (Moore & Isen, 1990), as these states may influence negotiators’ cognitions, motivations, and behaviors.

Many types of behaviors may trigger anger and frustration among disputing parties (Daly, 1991). Recently, some scholars have begun to explore the role affect plays in negotiation (Barry & Oliver, 1996; Carnevale & Isen, 1986), and the results of these studies may have a place in the context of mediation as well. If parties’ efforts to resolve their conflict through negotiation are stymied, they may turn to mediation as another option. In these situations, disputants are likely to feel enhanced frustration and anger. The purpose of this study was to examine the role that mood plays in negotiators’ cognitions and motivations with regard to mediators and the mediation process.

Mediation

Mediators intervene in negotiations to help disputing parties reach mutually acceptable solutions and resolve differences. Unlike arbitrators,
mediators have no power to impose settlements on parties, but they can help identify common ground between parties and suggest possible settlements. Because mediators cannot impose their suggestions for settlement on disputing parties, they must marshal support for their suggestions through their ability to persuade the parties that a settlement is advantageous. That is, they must seek to "affect the disputing parties, their attitudes, perceptions, and behaviors about the conflict and about the mediation" (Carnevale & Arad, 1995, p. 2). The success of these efforts may rest with disputants' perceptions of the mediator's interests and incentives in the dispute (Carnevale & Arad, 1995).

The circumstances surrounding a mediator's entrance into a negotiation, for example, may determine how the third party is viewed by others. Sometimes, as is often the case with trained mediators in labor and community mediation, mediators enter into negotiations through contractual processes (Duffy, Grosch, & Olczak, 1991). At other times, emergent dispute resolution processes lead to the use of mediation. Here, a mediator may be chosen because he or she has an ongoing relationship with one or both parties, or because of an interest in a given outcome (Touval & Zartman, 1985, 1989). This is quite common in international mediation (Kolb, 1989), where the use or choice of a mediator is not predetermined. The context in which a mediator intervenes, including his or her perceived interests and motives, may have consequences for whether disputants view the mediator and mediation process as fair and acceptable (Welton & Pruitt, 1987, Arad & Carnevale, 1994).

Disputing parties may view mediators who seem to have personal stakes in the dispute or in particular settlements with suspicion. As a
result, these mediators may not be influential. In fact, a traditional perspective in mediation assumes that third parties must be impartial in order to have any influence (Stulberg, 1987; Young, 1967). According to this view, in order to reach successful agreements, mediators must be perceived as having nothing to gain from affiliations with any particular position or party. Some researchers (Stulberg, 1987) have stated clearly that a mediator should be “(1) Neutral. A mediator must have no personal preference that the dispute be resolved in one way rather than another. . . (2) Impartial. A mediator must treat all parties in comparable ways, both procedurally and substantively. . . (3) Objective. A mediator must be able to transcend the rhetoric and emotion of the parties” (p. 37).

This view parallels assumptions from legal systems in which third parties are expected to make unbiased decisions (Touval, 1982). Third parties are expected to be equally fair to all participants, and these fairness judgments are derived from impartiality. In mediation, however, the issue of impartiality and fairness may be especially important because mediators lack formal authority over negotiations. Impartiality may be a mediator’s only base of influence and persuasive power, according to this view, and without it, agreements are unlikely.

Some researchers have challenged these assumptions (Touval, 1975, 1982, 1985; Touval & Zartman, 1985), asserting that mediator impartiality is not a necessary condition for successful mediation. They argue that a biased mediator may be acceptable and sometimes may be preferable to an impartial (unbiased) mediator in certain situations. One factor that determines whether bias is acceptable is the type of bias that is present.
There are two types of bias in mediation. The first, overt support, refers to bias in a mediator's suggestions or actions. A mediator biased in this manner acts in ways that openly favor one party over another (Pruitt, 1983). A second form of bias, called alignment or affiliation, refers to a mediator's alliances with a particular outcome or party, which may include personal, political, and economic ties (Pruitt, 1983; see also Carnevale & Arad, 1995). Given that there are two opposing viewpoints present, a disputant can perceive either unfavorable or favorable alignment bias on the part of the mediator.

Overt support can make mediation difficult or impossible. A mediator who makes suggestions that favor one side over another will not be acceptable to the disfavored side for very long. Mediator alignment, however, may be acceptable to disputants under certain conditions (Touval, 1982). For example, even mediators with unfavorable alignment may be acceptable in disputes where continued conflict is costly. The prospect of a "hurting stalemate", or continued unsuccessful negotiation, may be judged as more harmful than continuing negotiations with a biased mediator's influence (Zartman & Touval, 1985). In the case of international negotiations, for example, the risk of future violence between disputants may outweigh the risk of dealing with a mediator who is unfavorably aligned.

In some situations, mediators with unfavorable alignment may be preferable to impartial third parties if they are able to provide acceptable outcomes and incentives that impartial mediators cannot (Sick, 1985). For example, if an impartial mediator lacks the expertise and the respect necessary to be effective, he or she may be less acceptable than a biased mediator.
Disputants may seek a biased mediator for other reasons as well. They may feel that a particular mediator has the capacity to influence the other party, perhaps by encouraging that party to remain in the negotiation. In labor negotiations, for example, a management negotiator may accept a pro-labor mediator who has the ability to reward an uncooperative union negotiator and provide incentives for settlement (Kressel, 1972).

Similarly, in an international context, the United States may be selected as a mediator despite clear ties to one side because of the power and resources its representatives can provide (Smith, 1985). In other words, other criteria can overrule the concern for impartiality (Carnevale, Arnold, & Conlon, 1994). And in fact, in these and other examples, biased mediators have behaved evenhandedly and in the best interests of both parties (Carnevale, Lawler, & Fobian, 1985).

So it seems clear that influence can stem from both impartiality and from alignment bias. Yet, the effect of alignment on disputants' behavior and cognitions during the mediation process still is unclear, particularly with respect to unfavorable alignment. Research supports the contention that disputants' perceptions of mediator fairness and trustworthiness influence their willingness to settle disputes (Carnevale & Pegnetter, 1985; Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992; Kressel & Pruitt, 1989; Tyler, 1987). The mere appearance of alignment bias, however, also may color disputants' evaluations of mediators, regardless of mediators' actual behavior or suggestions. Several laboratory studies recently have examined the role that mediator bias may play in disputants' perceptions and behavior in the mediation process.

The effects of alignment on disputants' perceptions of mediators have been inconsistent. In many of these studies, participants have relied on
descriptions of mediator alignment to assess the trustworthiness of the mediator. One such study was conducted by Brookmire and Sistrunk (1980). They explored the effects of unfavorable alignment bias on disputants' evaluations of a mediator in a simulated labor-management negotiation. Participants bargained with a confederate over three disputed issues. Except for those in the control condition, all subjects were interrupted midway through the negotiation and informed that a mediator would interview each party separately and then offer a proposal for their consideration. Participants received background information on the mediator and the mediation process. In the impartial condition, the mediator informed the participant individually that he could see both sides' positions, and that disputants in previous studies had felt his decisions were fair. In the unfavorable alignment condition, the mediator informed the participant that he found it difficult to put himself in that individual's position, because he previously had worked as a member of the opposite side (either union or management). Further, he stated that disputants in previous studies had felt that his decisions favored the opposing side. The mediators then offered their suggestions, which were objectively evenhanded, and disputants continued to negotiate on their own until the allotted time was up.

Unfavorable mediator alignment did not affect either mediator influence or actual bargaining behavior, as measured by the disputants' movement toward the mediator's position. It is important to note that in both the biased and impartial conditions, the mediator was rated as relatively impartial. This suggests that the bias manipulation was weaker than intended. Thus, the authors admit that the results are inconclusive (Brookmire & Sistrunk, 1980, p. 324-325).
In a follow-up study, Welton and Pruitt (1987) relied on the same task used by Brookmire and Sistrunk (1980) to examine the impact of alignment on opinions of mediator effectiveness and actual mediator influence. In this study, mediators with unfavorable alignment were rated as less acceptable than the impartial mediator, and the aligned mediators were less influential on the negotiation.

More recently, Wittmer, Carnevale, and Walker (1991) explored the possible relations between mediator alignment bias (i.e., favorable and unfavorable alignment) and overt support (proposals that were either favorable, or evenhanded, or unfavorable toward the participant). Contrary to expectations, parties faced with an unfavorably-aligned mediator who made favorable proposal suggestions viewed that mediator as less acceptable and trustworthy than both favorably aligned mediators who made favorable suggestions and unfavorably aligned mediators who made evenhanded recommendations, suggesting that the impact of alignment on disputants' perceptions may vary with the type of overt support. In other words, mediators who were expected to be unfavorable but who made favorable proposals were considered untrustworthy and unacceptable to the negotiators; the authors labeled this the "Trojan Horse" effect (see also Carnevale, Arnold, & Conlon, 1994).

A study by Arad and Carnevale (1994) relied on participants' actual perceptions and attitudes regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict to examine the effects of alignment and overt support in a mediation context. College students who were either pro-Israeli or not aligned with either side in the dispute participated in the study. Participants evaluated a proposal for settlement suggested by an intermediary identified as either a neutral Swiss
prime minister, or the president of the American Jewish Congress, or the president of the Arab League. The proposals varied in their degree of overt support for each side.

Consistent with expectations, pro-Israeli participants trusted the favorably aligned president of the American Jewish Congress more than the president of the Arab League, who was perceived as being aligned against the partisan participants. The favorably aligned mediator was not trusted more than the neutral Swiss prime minister, however. Nonpartisan participants rated the Swiss prime minister as more trustworthy than either of the biased mediators. These alignment effects on trust remained when proposal fairness was controlled. Results also indicated that partisan subjects' trust in the mediator was a significant component of their evaluations of that mediator's proposal.

Conlon and Ross (1993) examined the impact of both alignment and overt support on the mediation process, using a simulated intraorganizational dispute. They found that perceived mediator alignment affected outcome expectancies, such that negotiators expecting an unfavorably aligned mediator anticipated less favorable outcomes relative to those in the favorable mediator alignment condition. Similarly, results showed that participants in the unfavorable alignment condition were more satisfied with both the outcome and the mediator compared to those who were in the favorable alignment condition, regardless of the overt support of the recommendation.

These findings, which are in contrast to previous research (e.g., Arad & Carnevale, 1994), suggest that disputants who are assigned to an unfavorable mediator anticipate less favorable outcomes compared to those expecting a favorably aligned mediator, and because of these lowered
expectancies, they are more satisfied with their outcomes. This finding was replicated by Carnevale, Conlon, and Arnold (1994), but only for evenhanded outcomes, suggesting a “fairness pays” effect, where biased mediators gain in perceived effectiveness and trustworthiness when they make fair suggestions that do not reflect alignment.

Finally, Conlon and Ross (1993) found no effect for alignment bias on negotiator behavior. That is, whether disputants were assigned to an unfavorable or a favorable mediator did not influence their concessions or offers during the negotiation. These findings are consistent with the results of Brookmire and Sistrunk (1980) and Wittmer, Carnevale, and Walker (1991), who also found that alignment did not inform negotiating behavior.

The links between affiliation and outcome expectancies and outcome satisfaction also have been demonstrated in the context of a simulated trial procedure where participants witnessed a friendly social interaction between the judge in the case and the opposing party before the trial (Lind & Lissak, 1985). Participants who expected the judge to be aligned against them but received favorable outcomes felt greater satisfaction with the outcome than those who received a favorable outcome from an impartial judge.

The results of these studies suggest that mediator alignment can have important effects on disputants’ opinions of mediators, but the findings are somewhat inconsistent. Several studies have concluded that alignment determines judgments of biased mediators (Arad & Carnevale, 1994; Conlon & Ross, 1993; Welton & Pruitt, 1987), although the issue of whether unfavorable alignment paired with evenhanded proposals leads to favorable or unfavorable perceptions is still unclear. In contrast, one experiment has suggested that disputants overlook the appearance of
alignment bias and focus on the content of mediators’ proposals to inform their perceptions of mediator effectiveness, but as discussed above, these results may be explained by factors other than disputant cognitions (Brookmire & Sistrunk, 1980). Thus, the influence of alignment on perceptions of mediators has not been clearly demonstrated.

Further, the effects of alignment on judgments of proposals have not been examined thoroughly. Although reactions to a mediator may be a component of such proposal evaluations (Conlon & Ross, 1993), the majority of the evidence indicates that disputants’ offers and responses to suggestions are not influenced by the appearance of alignment bias. A purpose of this paper was to investigate the conditions in which alignment affects disputants’ judgments of mediators. This study also examined the effect of alignment on evaluations of mediator proposals.

Conlon and Ross (1993) identified outcome expectancies as one mechanism that drives alignment effects. Specifically, disputants who expect favorable mediators have higher anticipated outcomes than disputants faced with unfavorable alignment. In an effort to replicate this finding, it was predicted that:

*Hypothesis 1*: Neutral affect disputants faced with a favorably aligned mediator will have higher outcome expectancies than neutral affect disputants faced with an unfavorably aligned mediator.

Conlon and Ross argue that these outcome expectancies determine disputants’ satisfaction with the outcomes they receive, regardless of actual outcome favorability, such that those who expect greater outcomes are less satisfied with both the mediator and the mediator’s proposal than those who expect little from that mediator. Similarly, in this study it was expected that:
**Hypothesis 2:** Neutral affect disputants in the favorable alignment condition will rate their mediator as less satisfactory than will neutral affect disputants in conditions of unfavorable alignment.

**Hypothesis 3:** Neutral affect disputants in the favorable alignment condition will rate their mediator’s proposal as less satisfactory than will neutral affect disputants in conditions of unfavorable alignment.

**Affect and Conflict Resolution**

What role does mood play in the dispute resolution process? In a study of mediator tactics, Lim and Carnevale (1990) found evidence of the presence of affect (especially negative affect) in mediation. More importantly, they identified four specific tactics that are used frequently in mediation, all of which appear to be aimed at managing disputant affect: letting the disputants blow off steam; using humor to lighten the atmosphere; expressing pleasure at disputants' progress in negotiations; and, controlling disputants’ expressions of hostility. These tactics suggest that mediators spend some time managing disputants' negative and positive affect.

Interviews with practicing mediators (Daly, 1991) indicates that third parties perceive anger as detrimental to the problem solving process. These mediators, who specialized in the negotiation of mergers and acquisitions, described common behaviors and experiences during negotiations where they observed anger. These mediators report that anger narrows disputants’ focus by limiting their search for creative alternatives or solutions to the dispute.

Given that affect is clearly a part of mediation, the study of the impact of disputant mood on the mediation process has not been subject to much empirical scrutiny, particularly with regard to disputants’
motivations and cognitions. This study sought to identify that process and determine if mood influences how parties view mediators and their suggestions for settlement. In line with much of the research on affect and social judgments, I define affect as a low intensity, relatively pervasive mood state (Forgas, 1992), as compared with short-lasting, specific emotions. Moods have more pervasive effects on memory, information processing, and judgments than do emotions (Mayer, 1986; Sedikides, 1991), and are more likely to influence disputants' perceptions and behaviors than the many emotions they might experience during the dispute resolution process. Further, this study was concerned with the influence of moods, rather than the more stable and enduring personality dimensions of positive and negative affectivity (for a discussion of the dispositional perspective of affect, see Appendix A).

Positive (i.e., happy) and negative moods (i.e., angry) have been shown to be a source of cognitive biases in a variety of social judgment contexts, including perceptions of intragroup variability (Stroessner & Mackie, 1992), stereotyping (Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Susser, 1994a; Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994b) and persuasiveness of counterattitudinal messages (Mackie & Worth, 1989; Schwarz, Bless, & Bohner, 1991; Worth & Mackie, 1987). More generally, there is evidence that affect may influence cooperation and helping behavior in negotiation (Carnevale & Isen, 1986), creativity in problem solving (Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987), cognitive organization and categorization (Isen & Daubman, 1994), perceptions of self-efficacy (Baron, 1990), and utility functions and equity norms (Lowenstein, Thompson, & Bazerman, 1989).

Social psychological research on the impact of mood on judgments and decision-making has followed one of three perspectives: the affect-
priming approach (Bower, 1991; Isen, 1987), the mood-as-information approach (Schwarz & Clore, 1983; 1988), and a perspective emphasizing information processing (Mackie & Worth, 1989, 1991; Bodenhausen et al., 1994a; Bodenhausen et al., 1994b). The affect-priming and mood-as-information perspectives are designed to explain mood congruency effects in which judgments are skewed in the direction of prevailing mood. The information processing perspective emphasizes the strategies that people may use to process evidence relevant to a social judgment (Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Schwarz, 1990), which may or may not lead to mood-congruent effects.

Some have identified a mood-congruent effect on social judgments, such that a happy person will make extremely positive judgments, whereas an angry or unhappy person should render negative judgments in line with his or her mood. Further, because individuals rarely recall all information relevant to the judgment at hand, but instead end the search process after the minimum information has accumulated, mood-congruency tends to result in a selective set of information from which judgments are made (Bodenhausen & Wyer, 1987). Two theories have attempted to account for this effect, one focusing on the indirect effect of mood on judgments through information recall, and the other on mood as information itself.

**Affect-priming.** The affect-priming model (Bower, 1981; Isen, 1984; 1987) assumes that concepts in memory are associated with affect states. Specifically, this theory proposes that affect states have a "specific node or unit in memory that . . . is also linked with propositions describing events from one’s life during which that emotion was aroused. . . . Activation of an emotion node also spreads activation throughout the memory structures to which it is connected" (Bower, 1981, p. 135). Thus,
an affect state primes, or cues, the recall of concepts in memory associated with that affect in some way. To the extent that an individual constructs or forms an evaluative judgment, that individual's affect state may bias the type of information that is retrieved and/or the interpretation of information relevant to that judgment.

One criticism of the affect-priming hypothesis is that it seems to be a rather fragile phenomenon that is difficult to replicate under conditions that require the participant to form judgments of others (Blaney, 1986; Bower & Mayer, 1985). Negative mood, for example, has shown stronger mood-congruent effects on judgments of the self compared to judgments of others (Forgas, Bower, & Krantz, 1984; Forgas, Bower, & Moilan, 1990). For this reason, in the context of mediation, where disputants are required to interpret both the behavior of the mediator and of opponents, the affect-priming hypothesis may lack predictive value. Another weakness of the affect-priming hypothesis is that it assumes automatic, substantive processing in all cases (Forgas, 1992). To the extent that individuals have the ability or the motivation to choose different processing strategies when forming a judgment or decision, the affect-priming hypothesis may not be applicable.

**Mood-as-information.** Schwarz and Clore (1988) have posited the mood-as-information model to explain mood congruency. This hypothesis places less emphasis on retrieval of concepts in memory, and more on the information that affect itself provides. Mood-congruent effects have little to do with memory; rather, the effects arise from the use of one's mood as relevant informational input to be used in the formation of evaluative judgments and decisions (Schwarz et al., 1993). Thus, when people are asked to form a judgment, rather than consulting associated concepts in
memory, they simply may ask themselves, "How do I feel about it?". These feelings are used as a basis for judgment. In this sense, affect may function directly as a simplifying heuristic, or cue (Clore & Parrott, 1991; Schwarz & Clore, 1988).

This approach assumes that people will interpret their current affect state as being a reaction to the object or situation being evaluated. That is, individuals will tend to misattribute their current mood as a reaction to the stimulus or message being judged, regardless of the true causes of that affect state. Indeed, when people are informed that their current mood is related to some other object or stimulus unrelated to the judgment at hand, they should no longer show a mood congruency effect (Schwarz & Clore, 1988). However, many studies have found mood-congruent effects even when participants clearly were aware of the correct source of their affect states (Fiedler, 1991; Forgas & Bower, 1987; Sedikides, 1991). Thus, the mood-as-information hypothesis "may need at least to be supplemented by other processing alternatives" (Forgas, 1992, p. 247).

**Affect and information processing.** Another theoretical approach to the relation between affect and social judgments focuses exclusively on the effects of mood on individuals' processing strategies. Several studies have shown that positive and negative affect may lead to low-effort or simplified styles of information processing (Bodenhausen et al., 1994a; Bodenhausen et al., 1994b; Isen, Means, Patrick, & Nowicki, 1982; Mackie & Worth, 1989, 1991; Sullivan & Conway, 1989).

In a persuasion domain, mood appears to influence people's choices of information processing strategies (Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). According to the Heuristic-Systematic Model of persuasion (1980; 1987; Eagly & Chaiken,
1993), people assess the validity or strength of persuasive messages in order to form accurate attitudes. Depending on one's ability or motivation to process information, two routes to assessing message validity are possible.

The first route involves detailed or systematic processing (Chaiken, 1980). When people carefully consider the aspects of a message and make judgments based on the message content, systematic processing is said to have occurred (Chaiken, 1980; Chaiken et al., 1989). Similar to the Elaboration Likelihood Model's (Petty & Cacioppo, 1984, 1986) concept of a central route to persuasion, this detailed processing requires considerable cognitive effort, and thus occurs under conditions of high motivation and ability.

Sometimes people do not engage in systematic processing, but instead focus on cues inherent in the context to assess the validity of a message. Heuristic information processors exert minimum cognitive effort and focus instead on available sets or types of information that enable them to use simple decision rules or heuristics to form judgments (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993), similar to the peripheral style of processing suggested by Petty and Cacioppo (1984, 1986). Heuristic processing is likely to occur when people lack the motivation or the ability to think carefully about the information given. Those using a heuristic style of processing will be influenced by such heuristics as source identity and source likability, and these cues directly affect their willingness to accept the information (Chaiken, 1980). Thus, individuals who lack the capacity or the motivation to expend much effort will pay less attention to the content of the message and may instead notice that the source of the message is considered an
expert by others, or is likable. Judgments of the message are then formed based on these aspects of the source.

A heuristic cue can refer to “any variable whose judgmental impact is hypothesized to be mediated by a simple decision rule” (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, p. 327). The model assumes that individuals learn simple rules on the basis of past experience and observation. Levels of these variables then serve to mediate the persuasiveness of incoming information. Examples of such rules are beliefs that “experts’ statements can be trusted” and “we usually agree with people we like” (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993).

Casting these findings in a mediation context, one can argue that mediator alignment is a heuristic cue. Mediators function as a message source when they offer proposals and suggestions for disputant consideration. Information about a mediator’s background and interests, particularly information about his or her personal alignment, should affect disputants’ expectations and opinions about that mediator’s likability. Indeed, several studies have shown that disputants do not trust or find mediators with unfavorable alignment to be acceptable (Welton & Pruitt, 1987; Wittmer, Carnevale, & Walker, 1994). They find mediators who align with their side to be more acceptable than even neutral mediators (Arad & Carnevale, 1994), suggesting that mediator alignment does affect disputant opinions of the mediator. These perceived aspects of the mediator may be used to evaluate the quality of the mediator’s proposal for settlement. Thus, disputants who lack the capacity or motivation to process the details of the proposal may be most likely to rely on information about the mediator’s alignment to assess their satisfaction with that mediator’s proposal (Conlon & Ross, 1993).
One variable that has been shown to influence individuals' motivation to carefully process information is mood. Happy people tend to pay less attention to argument quality (i.e., the content of the message) and more attention to background characteristics of the message giver than participants whose mood is more neutral. This effect has been demonstrated in studies of attitude change as well as studies of person perception. In a study of attitude change, Worth & Mackie (1987) induced a positive or neutral mood in participants and then asked them to read a communication on acid rain. The author of the communication was labeled as either an expert or nonexpert. Participants read one of two versions of the message, either proattitudinal or counterattitudinal, comprised of either weak or strong arguments. The researchers measured the participants' reactions to the message, their attitude with regard to acid rain, their cognitive responses to the message, and recall of the message itself. The latter two measures were designed to measure the prediction that positive affect participants would resort to a heuristic mode of processing to evaluate the message.

Consistent with expectations, the authors found that happy people "were less influenced by argument quality and more influenced by the presence or absence of a persuasion cue than were subjects in a neutral mood" (Worth & Mackie, 1987, p. 89). Happy subjects recalled fewer of the actual points made in the message, showed less differentiation between strong and weak messages, and thus appeared to be influenced by the heuristic cue of source expertise. Similar effects for positive mood have been shown in other studies involving various attitudinal topics (Mackie & Worth, 1989; Schwarz, Bless, & Bohner, 1991). Systematic processing of persuasive messages should lead to greater acceptance of strong arguments
and rejection of weak arguments, but happy individuals typically accept both types of arguments and are more attuned to cues in the environment. Studies of person perception also indicate an effect of positive mood on information processing.

A series of experiments by Bodenhausen and his colleagues (1994a) explored the effects of positive mood on the use of stereotypical information about hypothetical crime suspects. Moreover, the researchers used four different mood induction procedures to test the mechanisms that underlie the effect of mood on processing. Compared to people in a neutral affect condition, happy people judged individuals identified as student athletes to be more likely to have cheated on a school exam than nonathletes. Thus, happy people relied more on stereotypes than those in the control condition.

The authors tested two alternative explanations for the effect of mood on use of stereotypic cues. The first possible explanation, sometimes called the cognitive distraction hypothesis, suggests that mood states consume cognitive capacity, and therefore reduce individuals' ability to process incoming information extensively (Isen et al., 1982; Mackie & Worth, 1989). According to this hypothesis, happy people expend cognitive resources ruminating on happy thoughts. As a result of this diminished capacity, these happy individuals lack the ability to process extensively and thus rely on heuristic cues to a greater extent than those in a neutral mood. Thus, happy individuals lack the ability postulated as necessary for the execution of systematic processing (Chaiken et al., 1989).

Bodenhausen and his colleagues established that diminished cognitive capacity was not responsible for the effects of positive mood on processing. Specifically, the authors manipulated mood by a procedure which involved
ruminating on happy thoughts and a procedure which was shown not to impose any cognitive load -- facial feedback. The happy participants showed the same tendency to rely on stereotypical information in both experiments, demonstrating that the imposition of cognitive load does not affect the processing strategy of happy subjects.

Some research has shown that happy subjects are capable of processing systematically if they are explicitly instructed to do so (Schwarz et al., 1991). This evidence suggests that it is a lack of motivation that differentiates happy people from neutral, and not any disruption of cognitive capacity. To test this, Bodenhausen and his colleagues provided message recipients with a motivational cue, namely, accountability. Participants received either a positive or neutral mood induction procedure as before, but before they were given the hypothetical crime scenario to judge, some subjects were told that they would have to justify any decisions or ratings that they gave. Participants in the low accountability conditions were informed that their responses would be anonymous. Results confirmed that happy people were indeed able to process information systematically when given the motivation to do so. Happy participants who expected to be held accountable did not differ from neutral subjects in their ratings of perceived guilt, thus showing a more systematic, data-based approach to the information provided. This study, as well as other studies of person perception (Bodenhausen, 1993; Bodenhausen & Kramer, 1990; Gilbert & Hixon, 1991), demonstrate clearly that subjects in happy moods make greater use of stereotypical cues to the exclusion of content-based analysis of information, including an increased reliance on intuitive and heuristic cues (Isen, Means, Patrick, & Nowicki, 1982), and decreased
processing of intragroup variability information (Stroessner & Mackie, 1992).

The research on mood and persuasion clearly indicates that positive mood is related to decreased systematic processing. Research on negative affect, however, has not been as straightforward. Unlike positive affect, which is most often interpreted as happiness, negative affect can describe a variety of emotions, many of which may be particularly relevant to mediation, such as anger, frustration, sadness, and anxiety. Research on sadness indicates that sad people tend to process information more systematically (Bodenhausen et al., 1994b; Keltner, Ellsworth, & Edwards, 1993; Sinclair, 1988). Schwarz (1990) argues that this is because systematic processing strategies help people to engage in more effective problem-solving and thus find solutions to difficulties in their lives.

Anger appears to affect motivations to process quite differently. It seems unlikely that individuals who are angry will have high levels of motivation to analyze argument quality. Indeed, those who are angry may not be able to concentrate on matters other than their anger (Bodenhausen et al., 1994b). Recent research indicates that angry people are similar to happy people in that they lack motivation to process argumentation carefully, and show increased reliance on heuristic cues when forming social judgments such as the guilt or innocence of hypothetical crime suspects (Bodenhausen et al., 1994b; Keltner, Ellsworth, & Edwards, 1993). Thus, both positive and negative affect may have important effects on people's motivations to process information.

Together, the person perception and persuasion findings suggest that the affect an individual experiences has important effects on that person's motivations for processing information. These findings may have
particular application to the mediation process, where individuals are likely to feel anger and frustration. Disputants also may experience some feelings of positive mood during the process if they are anticipating possible gain, or success for their side (Lawler & Yoon, 1993). These positive and negative affect states may affect disputants' perceptions of mediators and their proposals.

Drawing on the mood and persuasion literature, it was hypothesized that disputants who feel either happy or angry will be less motivated to process the suggestions of the mediator, and will thus engage in a heuristic style of processing. More specifically, compared with neutral affect disputants, disputants who are angry or happy should rely more on mediators’ alignment as a heuristic cue, and thus evaluate mediators and their proposals more in the direction of their perceived bias. It was proposed that:

_Hypothesis 4:_ Disputants in both the happy and angry affect conditions will rate a mediator with favorable alignment more positively than will neutral affect disputants.

_Hypothesis 5:_ Disputants in both the happy and angry affect conditions will rate a mediator with unfavorable alignment as less favorable than will neutral affect disputants.

Research on persuasion and the heuristic-systematic processing model indicates that those who engage in a heuristic style of information processing do not comprehend the information contained in a persuasive message to the same extent that systematic processors do. Tests of message recall are often used to define differences between heuristic and systematic processing (Petty, Gleich, & Baker, 1991). In line with this research, this study proposed that:
**Hypothesis 6:** Disputants in both the happy and angry affect conditions will demonstrate less accurate recall of an aligned mediator’s proposal than neutral affect disputants will.

In much the same way that source characteristics are used as cues for interpreting the persuasiveness of a message, I expected that mediator alignment will be used to assess the acceptability of a mediator’s proposals, regardless of the actual content. Thus, angry and happy disputants, who should be less motivated to consider the proposal carefully, are expected to render judgments of the proposal in line with the perceived alignment of their mediator. Although only one study (Conlon & Ross, 1993) has found an effect of mediator alignment on proposal evaluations, no research has considered the possible impact of disputant affective states on their perceptions of mediator behavior and the effect on processing that affect may have. Thus, it was predicted that:

**Hypothesis 7:** Disputants in both the happy and angry conditions will evaluate a proposal suggested by a mediator with favorable alignment more favorably than will disputants in a neutral affect state.

**Hypothesis 8:** Disputants in both the happy and angry conditions will rate a proposal suggested by a mediator with unfavorable alignment less favorably than will disputants in a neutral affect state.

**Method**

**Participants and Design**

One hundred twenty-one undergraduate students (34 males, 87 females) participated in this study for extra course credit. A 3 x 3 between-subjects factorial design was employed, with affect (happy,
neutral, or angry) and mediator alignment (favorable, neutral, or unfavorable) as independent variables.

**Procedure and Materials**

Upon arrival, participants were informed that they would participate in two experimental tasks, which were described as unrelated. The first task was described as part of an exploratory study on mood and memory. The experimenter told participants that students from various campuses were participating in the study, and that its purpose was to gain a better understanding of how college students remember important personal experiences. This task served as the mood manipulation.

Participants were given twelve minutes to write an essay, called the Life Event Inventory (LEI), which manipulated general affect by asking subjects to describe an event they had experienced within the last several months (see Appendix B). All participants were assured that their responses were anonymous and would not be reprinted.

To encourage participants to maintain their current mood state, the manipulation requires experimenters to interrupt the essay-writing and tell participants that they may have time to return to their essays later. The experimenter interrupted the participants after nine minutes and told them that the experiment was running behind, and that they needed to move on to the next task. At that point, the experimenter collected the essays and told the participants that she would hand them back at the end of the experiment so that the participants could complete them. After the collection of the essays, participants were given a background questionnaire to complete to aid in the interpretation of the Life Event Inventory. The questionnaire included items assessing participants’ current mood, as well as several demographic questions.
After the completion and collection of the Life Event Inventory questionnaire, participants were told that the second task would begin. The experimenter then gave each participant an information packet to be used for the second, ostensibly unrelated task. These materials described the process and function of mediation, as well as the background of a fictitious intraorganizational conflict between two co-workers (see Appendix C for materials). All participants were asked to play the role of a software installer who was engaged in a conflict with a co-worker of equal status. The materials described the dispute as a conflict occurring between two employees of a government contractor who were working on a project together.\(^1\)

Participants read a description of the conflict, which included information about the mediator's entry into the conflict. The mediator was described as a co-worker from another department who was familiar with the project, but not involved in it. Participants believed that their opponent had asked the mediator to intervene, and that the mediator intervened so that the project could be saved. They were informed that they had previously met with the mediator to explain their position. Next, participants read a letter from the mediator describing several suggestions for resolving the dispute. The mediator was given a gender-ambiguous name to avoid any evaluations based on gender. The proposal itself was designed and pilot-tested to ensure objective evenhandedness.

After reading the proposal, the experimenter collected the materials from the participants. Participants then completed a questionnaire assessing their opinions of the mediator and proposal, their recall of the

\(^1\)Materials were adapted from the "Amanda" mediation case. Materials can be obtained from the Dispute Resolution Research Center at Northwestern University's Kellogg Graduate School of Management.
proposal, and their current mood state. After the completion of the questionnaire, participants were thoroughly debriefed and thanked for their participation.

**Independent Variables**

**Affect.** Participants' affect state was manipulated by the completion of one of three versions of the Life Event Inventory (adapted from a procedure used by Strack, Schwarz, & Gschneidinger, 1985). This procedure has been shown to be effective in laboratory experiments manipulating general state affect (Bodenhausen et al., 1994a, 1994b; Schwarz et al., 1991). Participants in the happy and angry affect conditions were asked to describe in detail an event occurring in the last several months that had made them feel either extremely happy or angry, including a description of what occurred and how that event made them feel. Participants in the neutral affect condition were asked to describe their daily routine in detail (see Appendix B for LEI materials).

**Mediator Alignment.** All participants were told that their opponent in the dispute had asked the mediator to intervene (see Appendix C for materials). More specifically, in the favorable alignment condition, participants were informed that the mediator had previously worked in their department and thus had experience at their job. Further, these participants were told that during their private meeting, the mediator had admitted to sympathizing with their position.

In the unfavorable alignment condition, participants were informed that the mediator had previously worked in the same department as their opponent, and thus had experience at their opponent's job. The participants were also informed that during their private meeting, the mediator had admitted to actually sympathizing with their opponent's position. In the
neutral alignment condition, participants were simply informed that during their private meeting, the mediator had listened closely to their concerns.

**Dependent Measures**

**Affect manipulation check.** Effectiveness of the mood manipulation was assessed by comparing the self-reported ratings of mood given by subjects after the completion of the Life Event Inventory (see Appendix D for all dependent measures). Participants indicated the extent to which they felt emotions such as happiness, anger, hostility, excitement, sadness, and positive feelings as they completed the essay. All participants responded to 12 items using a 7-point scale. These items were summed and averaged to form a pre-mediation affect scale, with possible scores ranging from 1 to 12. Coefficient Alpha for the Pre-Task Affect scale was .95. Participants completed this same measure again after the mediation task. These responses were similarly combined to form a Post-Task Affect scale. The coefficient Alpha for this scale was .92.

**Alignment manipulation check.** Following the mediation task, participants rated the extent to which they felt that the mediator was biased toward their side, using a 9-point scale (1 = very biased against my side, 9 = very biased toward my side) as well as biased toward the other side (1 = very biased against the other side, 9 = very biased toward the other side). Participants also rated the extent to which they felt the mediator favored their side (1 = very unfavorable to my side, 9 = very favorable to my side), and the extent to which they felt the mediator favored the other side. Finally, the participants rated the extent to which they felt the mediator was committed to helping one side (1 = this mediator was very committed to helping one side, 9 = this mediator was very committed to helping my side), and the extent to which they felt the mediator was concerned with
one side’s outcomes (1 = this mediator was most concerned with the other side’s outcomes, 9 = this mediator was most concerned with my side’s outcomes). These items were summed and averaged to form an index of perceived alignment, with a minimum value of 1 and a maximum value of 9. The coefficient Alpha for the Mediator Alignment scale was .86.

**Dispositional Affectivity.** Dispositional affectivity was measured using the Positive and Negative Affectivity Schedule (PANAS) (Watson, 1988a). Participants rated the extent to which they generally experienced twenty various emotions, using a 5-point scale (1 = not at all, 5 = all the time). Adjectives included in the measure include angry, guilt, revulsion, nervous, excited, proud, and afraid. There is extensive validation evidence for the PANAS (Watson, 1988a, 1988b; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988).

**Outcome Expectancies.** Following their evaluation of the proposal and the mediator, participants were asked to retrospectively indicate what their expectations for the proposal had been and whether their expectations had been met. This was obtained using an open response format. These responses were collected after the evaluation of the proposal instead of before in order to avoid creating demand characteristics for individuals’ consideration and processing of background information about the conflict and the mediator. Participants’ responses to this question were coded by two independent raters for indications of whether the proposal had failed to meet, met, or exceeded the participant’s expectations. The raters assigned a value of 1 to indications that the proposal had failed to meet expectations, a 3 to indications that the proposal had met expectations, and a 5 to indications that the proposal had explicitly exceeded expectations, r(82) = .94. To avoid any weighting of scores due to the number of issues or elements described, the number of indications mentioned were averaged.
The proportion of times that the raters agreed on participants' overall expectancies scores was 74%. The raters determined that 34 participants either did not understand the instructions, or answered in such a vague manner as to make their responses uninterpretable. Scores for these participants were dropped.

**Evaluations of the mediator.** After participants evaluated the mediator's proposal, they answered a series of questions assessing their opinions of the mediator's behavior and interpersonal characteristics. Using a 9-point scale, participants rated the mediator on perceived fairness (1 = very unfair, 9 = very fair), trustworthiness (9 = very trustworthy), acceptability (9 = very acceptable), helpfulness (9 = very helpful), reasonableness (9 = very reasonable), qualifications (9 = very qualified), and consideration for the participants (9 = very careful in consideration). Participants also indicated the extent to which they agreed with the following statements, "I would be willing to recommend this mediator to others" (1 = strongly disagree, 9 = strongly agree), "I would be willing to work with this mediator again", "This mediator was an expert", "This mediator was trustworthy", and "This mediator was helpful".

**Evaluations of the proposal.** Participants answered a series of questions regarding their opinions of the favorability of the mediator's proposal. On a 9-point scale, subjects evaluated the acceptability (1 = unacceptable to my side, 9 = acceptable to my side) of the proposal. Similarly, they rated its reasonableness and fairness, along with their overall satisfaction with the proposal. Finally, participants indicated the extent to which they felt the proposal was biased in favor of their side, biased against the other side, favorable to their side, and unfavorable to the other side. Presentation of the questions assessing opinions of the mediator
and proposal was counterbalanced in the questionnaire. Similarly, the phrasing of questions assessing opinions were varied so that some questions were worded negatively and others were phrased positively. Items were later reverse-coded when appropriate so that higher ratings reflected more positive evaluations uniformly.

Proposal recall. Following their evaluation of the mediator and the proposal, participants were asked to recall the mediator's suggestions. Using an open response format, participants were instructed to list the points of the proposal and not to worry about grammar or spelling. These responses were coded using a scheme adapted from Wood, Kallgren, and Preisler (1985). The proposal was divided into 12 elements. Two independent raters each coded 100% of the data for accuracy of proposal recall for all 12 elements, \( r(118) = .92 \). For each element, the raters classified the participants' response as reflecting no recall (an assigned value of 0), partially accurate or complete recall (a value of 1), or completely accurate recall (a value of 2). Thus, a participant's proposal recall score could range from 0 to 24.

The raters' proportion of agreement on participants' overall proposal recall score was 33%. The raters discussed and came to a mutual decision for scores where there was disagreement. One participant's recall score was dropped due to problems with the experimental materials. Recall scores for two other participants were determined to be uncodable due to lack of understanding of the question, and thus were dropped.

Results

The data for the 121 participants in this study was first examined for missing values, outliers, and accuracy of data entry. This examination identified no pattern of missing values or outliers beyond three standard
deviations from the mean. Therefore, data for all 121 participants were analyzed in this study.

**Manipulation Checks**

**Affect.** Participants' Pre-Task Affect responses were subjected to an analysis of variance (ANOVA). Results indicated a significant effect for affect condition, $F(2, 118) = 103.05, p < .0001$. Tukey’s Least Significant Difference (LSD) Test was used to examine mean differences. Results showed that the angry, neutral, and happy affect groups were significantly different from one another in the predicted directions, $p < .05$ ($M$'s = 3.26, 5.45, and 6.25, respectively).

A second ANOVA was performed on the participants’ Post-Task Affect scores to determine if the mood manipulation was effective throughout the experiment. Results indicated a significant effect for affect condition, $F(2, 118) = 3.84, p < .03$. Tukey’s LSD test indicated a significant difference between the angry affect condition ($M = 4.34$) and the neutral affect condition ($M = 5.12$), $p < .05$; however, the happy condition ($M = 4.59$) no longer differed significantly from either the angry or neutral affect conditions.

Examination of the pre and post-mediation task means shows that the manipulated affect of the angry and happy affect groups appeared to diminish during the experiment, suggesting that the strength of the manipulation may have weakened during the course of the experiment. This conclusion is supported by examination of the size of the F-ratio for pre and post-task affect scores (103.05 and 3.84, respectively). Though still significant, the size of the post-task affect F-ratio and the results of the follow-up Tukey test suggest that the affect conditions, and the angry and
happy conditions in particular, were no longer distinct groups at the point when the dependent measures were completed.

Thus, although the mood manipulation appears to have been highly effective initially, there is limited support for its overall effectiveness. Therefore, in examination of the hypotheses, regression analyses using participants’ reported Post-Task Affect will be reported along with ANOVA’s testing differences between conditions. These results will be reported to examine whether reported levels of affect lead to the predicted effects on evaluations of the mediator and the proposal.

**Alignment.** Participants’ responses on the Mediator Alignment scale were subjected to an ANOVA. Results showed no effect for alignment condition, \( F(2, 118) = 2.29, p < .11 \) (\( M \)'s 4.4, 4.8, and 4.8 for the unfavorable, neutral, and favorable conditions, respectively).

Examination of the individual items measuring bias showed a significant difference between alignment conditions on the extent to which they felt the mediator was biased toward the other party (reverse-coded), \( F(2, 118) = 3.29, p < .05 \). Tukey’s LSD test indicated that participants in the unfavorable alignment condition (\( M = 4.24 \)) felt that the mediator was significantly less biased toward them than participants in the favorable alignment condition did (\( M = 4.89 \)), \( p < .05 \). The neutral condition (\( M = 4.62 \)) did not differ from the unfavorable or favorable groups.

Similarly, results indicated a significant effect for alignment condition on participants’ ratings of the mediator’s concern for their outcomes, \( F(2, 118) = 4.00, p < .03 \). Unfavorable alignment participants (\( M = 4.39 \)) felt the mediator was significantly less concerned with their outcomes than did neutral alignment participants (\( M = 5.13 \)), \( p < .05 \);
however, favorable alignment participants did not differ from either the neutral or unfavorable conditions ($M = 4.98$).

In summary, there appears to be limited support for the effectiveness of the alignment manipulation. Therefore, participants’ reported perceptions of bias are utilized as predictors in all regression analyses, rather than their manipulated alignment condition. This was done to determine if participants’ reported perceptions of mediator alignment replicated results previously identified in other studies of mediator alignment, as well as to examine the effects predicted in this study.

**Scale Development**

Participants’ responses to the items assessing evaluations of the mediator and the proposal were subjected to a principal components factor analysis. This was done to identify independent dimensions of evaluations of the mediation task. Twenty-six items were factor analyzed and subjected to a varimax rotation. The factor analysis identified four distinct factors with eigenvalues greater than 1, which when combined accounted for approximately 88% of the score variance. Items with factor loadings above .40 were considered. Five items loaded on the first dimension, 4 items loaded on the second, 6 items loaded on the third dimension, and 3 items loaded on the fourth dimension.

The first factor describes participants’ perceptions of the favorability of the mediator’s proposal. This factor includes items assessing the extent to which the mediator’s proposal favored the participants’ point of view. As such, it is labeled **Proposal Favorability**. The second identified factor contains items reflecting participants’ view of personal characteristics of the mediator. Items loading on this factor reflect the extent to which the participants felt the mediator exhibited qualities including trustworthiness,
reasonableness, and careful consideration. This factor is labeled perceptions of Mediator Character.

The third factor depicts perceptions of the mediator's actions. This factor includes items assessing the extent to which participants felt the mediator's actions were helpful, expert, and acceptable. This factor also includes items pertaining to the extent to which the mediator's proposal exceeded or was below participants' expectations. This factor was labeled perceptions of Mediator Behavior. The fourth factor includes items assessing participants' reported level of attention to the mediation task. Items loading on this factor reflect participants' perceptions of the amount of consideration and attention they gave to the consideration of the mediator's proposal. This factor is labeled Task Attention.

Table 1 shows the selected items for each factor as well as the factor loadings. Scales were created for each factor by summing participants' responses to the individual items and averaging them. For the Proposal Favorability scale, scores could range from 1 to 9. Coefficient Alpha for this scale was .82. Scores on the Mediator Character scale could range from 1 to 9; coefficient Alpha was .85. For the Mediator Behavior scale, scores could range from 1 to 7.66. Coefficient Alpha for this scale was .85. For the Task Attention scale, scores could range from 1 to 7. Coefficient Alpha for this scale was .66. Table 2 presents the means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations for these dimensions as well the other study variables.

Tests of Hypotheses

Proposal Favorability. Responses to the Proposal Favorability scale indicate the extent to which disputants felt the mediator's proposal favored their perspective.
Table 1

**Study Dimensions and Item Factor Loadings**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Factor Loading</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Factor: Proposal Favorability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This PROPOSAL is very:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unfavorable to the OTHER SIDE</td>
<td>.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>favorable to MY SIDE</td>
<td>.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>biased against the OTHER SIDE</td>
<td>.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>biased in favor of MY SIDE</td>
<td>.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>acceptable to MY SIDE</td>
<td>.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor: Mediator Character</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This MEDIATOR is very:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>careful</td>
<td>.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>qualified</td>
<td>.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reasonable</td>
<td>.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>trustworthy</td>
<td>.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor: Mediator Behavior</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This MEDIATOR:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>is very acceptable to MY SIDE</td>
<td>.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>was an expert</td>
<td>.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>was helpful</td>
<td>.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>was trustworthy</td>
<td>.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This PROPOSAL was:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>above my expectations</td>
<td>.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>below my expectations</td>
<td>.60</td>
</tr>
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Table 1 cont.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Factor Loading</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Factor: Task Attention</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(In this experiment) I:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>carefully considered the merits of the proposal</td>
<td>.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>paid much attention to the details of the proposal</td>
<td>.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>was motivated to listen to the mediator’s proposal</td>
<td>.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n = 121
Table 2

Means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations of study variables (N = 121)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>12</th>
<th>13</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Alignment(^a)</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>2. Affect(^b)</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>.00</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Pre-Task Affect</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.77**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Post-Task Affect</td>
<td>4.68</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.20*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Mediator Alignment</td>
<td>4.66</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.52**</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Proposal Favorability</td>
<td>4.67</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.53**</td>
<td>.81**</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Mediator Character</td>
<td>6.60</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.41**</td>
<td>.49**</td>
<td>.51**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Mediator Behavior</td>
<td>4.60</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.59**</td>
<td>.57**</td>
<td>.57**</td>
<td>.56**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Task Attention</td>
<td>5.81</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Positive Affectivity</td>
<td>3.38</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>-.18*</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.27**</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Negative Affectivity</td>
<td>2.03</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>-.17</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>.19*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Outcome Expectancies</td>
<td>2.02</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.57**</td>
<td>.32**</td>
<td>.33**</td>
<td>.31**</td>
<td>.49**</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Proposal Recall</td>
<td>8.39</td>
<td>3.85</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes. \(^a\) coded 1 = unfavorable, 2 = neutral, 3 = favorable. \(^b\) coded 1 = angry, 2 = neutral, 3 = happy.

*\(p < .05\). **\(p < .01\). Coefficient Alpha reliabilities are listed along the diagonals.
As such, participants’ scores on this scale were examined with regard to Hypotheses 3, 7, and 8.

Hypothesis 3 predicted that neutral affect disputants in conditions of favorable alignment would evaluate their mediator’s proposal as less favorable than neutral affect disputants faced with an unfavorably-aligned mediator, while Hypotheses 7 and 8 predicted that happy and angry participants would differ from the neutral affect group in conditions of favorable and unfavorable alignment. Results of an ANOVA conducted on participants’ Proposal Favorability scores indicated no support for these hypotheses (see Table 3). The affect x alignment interaction was not significant, $F(4, 112) = 0.90, p > .05$.

To further examine these hypotheses, a regression analysis was performed, using participants’ reported Post-Task Affect and Mediator Alignment perceptions as predictors of Proposal Favorability perceptions. Participants’ Post-Task Affect scores also were squared and included in the regression equation, due to the expectation of a curvilinear relationship for affect. The unsquared affect term was used in the Post-Task Affect x Mediator Alignment interaction term. Results of the regression analysis showed that perceptions of Mediator Alignment were a significant predictor of Proposal Favorability, $p < .001$ (see Table 4). Perceptions of more favorable alignment were related to perceptions of greater proposal favorability. The interaction between reported affect and alignment, however, was not significant. Thus, there was no support for Hypotheses 3, 7, and 8 for ratings of Proposal Favorability.

**Mediator Character.** The Mediator Character scale reflects participants’ perceptions of their mediator’s personal characteristics; thus, it relates to Hypotheses 2, 4, and 5. Hypothesis 2 predicted that neutral
Table 3

**ANOVA Results on Proposal Favorability**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Affect (A)</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alignment (L)</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A x L</td>
<td>5.67</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within</td>
<td>176.89</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>1.58</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4

**Multiple Regression Analyses on Proposal Favorability: Mediator Alignment and Post-Task Affect (N = 121)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE B</th>
<th>β</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mediator Alignment</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>.67**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Task Affect</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squared Post-Task Affect</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediator Alignment x Post-Task Affect</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.67**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05. **p < .01.
affect disputants in favorable alignment conditions would evaluate their mediator less positively than neutral affect participants in conditions of unfavorable alignment. Hypotheses 4 and 5 predicted that happy and angry disputants would evaluate a favorably-aligned mediator more favorably, and an unfavorably-aligned mediator less favorably, than neutral affect participants in those same conditions.

To test these hypotheses, an ANOVA was performed on participants' Mediator Character scale scores. As shown in Table 5, there was no significant interaction between the affect and alignment conditions, $F(4, 112) = 1.16, p > .05$. To further examine these hypotheses, a regression analysis was performed on participants' scale scores, using reported Post-Task Affect, squared Post-Task Affect, and Mediator Alignment, and Post-Task Affect $\times$ Mediator Alignment scores as predictors. Results indicated no significant effects (see Table 6). Thus, there was no support for Hypotheses 2, 4, and 5 for perceptions of mediator characteristics.

Mediator Behavior. The Mediator Behavior scale depicts participants' evaluations of their mediator's actions, including the consequences of those actions on the suggested proposal given to the participants. As such, responses to this scale pertain to Hypotheses 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8, which predicted interactions between affect and alignment conditions on participants' evaluation of the mediator and the mediator's proposal.

Table 7 presents the results of an ANOVA conducted on participants' Mediator Behavior scale scores. Results indicated no significant interaction between affect and alignment conditions, $F(4, 112) = 1.39, p > .05$. A regression analysis was performed on the Mediator Behavior scores to further examine the hypotheses (see Table 8). Results indicated that
Table 5

ANOVA Results for Mediator Character

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Affect (A)</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alignment (L)</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A x L</td>
<td>13.12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.28</td>
<td>1.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within</td>
<td>316.11</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>2.82</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Table 6
Multiple Regression Analyses on Mediator Character: Mediator Alignment and Post-Task Affect (N = 121)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE B</th>
<th>( \beta )</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>0.49</td>
<td>.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Task Affect</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squared Post-Task Affect</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediator Alignment x</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Task Affect</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>-.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( R^2 )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.27**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(* p < .05. \ ** p < .01. \)
Table 7
ANOVA Results for Mediator Behavior

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>SS</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Affect (A)</td>
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<td>4.86</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Alignment (L)</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A x L</td>
<td>10.08</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.52</td>
<td>1.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within</td>
<td>202.94</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>1.81</td>
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</table>
Table 8
Multiple Regression Analyses on Mediator Behavior: Mediator Alignment and Post-Task Affect (N = 121)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE B</th>
<th>β</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mediator Alignment</td>
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<td>0.33</td>
<td>-.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Task Affect</td>
<td>-0.92</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>-.88**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squared Post-Task Affect</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediator Alignment x Post-Task Affect</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>.95**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.49**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05.  **p < .01.
Mediator Alignment and the interaction between Post-Task Affect and Mediator Alignment were significant predictors of Mediator Behavior perceptions, $p < .05$.

Figure 1 depicts the effect of the Post-Task Affect x Mediator Alignment interaction on Mediator Behavior scores. Examination of the interaction shows that the behavior of mediators with more favorably perceived alignment was in fact evaluated more positively by all participants, regardless of their affect state. However, the strength of this relationship differed as a function of participants’ affect state. The relationship between reported alignment perceptions and the evaluation of mediator behavior was stronger for participants reporting more positive affect. Participants who reported more positive affect evaluated the actions of a mediator with unfavorable alignment to be more negative than participants reporting neutral or negative affect states. This result is contrary to the hypotheses, which predicted that positive and negative levels of affect would relate similarly to perceptions of the mediation task. Thus, there was no support for Hypotheses 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8 for perceptions of Mediator Behavior.

Task Attention. The Task Attention Scale reflects participants’ self-reported level of attention to and consideration of the mediator’s proposal. As such, it pertains not to any specific hypothesis, but rather to the proposed process underlying all the predicted effects for affect state. To examine participants’ levels of reported attention, an ANOVA was performed on Task Attention scores (see Table 9). Results indicated no significant effect for affect condition, $F(2, 112) = 1.56$, $p > .05$.

Outcome Expectancies. Hypothesis 1 predicted that neutral affect disputants in the favorable alignment condition would have higher outcome
Figure 1

Graph of reported Post-Task Affect x Mediator Alignment interaction on Mediator Behavior Ratings
Table 9

**ANOVA Results for Task Attention**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Affect (A)</td>
<td>3.52</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.76</td>
<td>1.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alignment (L)</td>
<td>3.35</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>1.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A x L</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within</td>
<td>126.76</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
expectancies than neutral affect participants in the unfavorable alignment condition. To test this hypothesis, the ratings of the extent to which neutral affect participants felt the proposal was above and below their expectations were compared for both the favorable and unfavorable alignment conditions.

In accordance with Hypothesis 1, it was expected that neutral affect participants in the favorable alignment conditions would indicate lower agreement with the statement that the proposal exceeded their expectations than would neutral affect participants in the unfavorable alignment condition. Results failed to support this prediction, $t(13) = -0.77$, $p > .05$, and in fact the means were in the opposite direction ($M$'s = 3.46 and 4.00 for the unfavorable and favorable alignment conditions, respectively). It was also expected that neutral affect disputants in the favorable alignment condition would indicate greater agreement with the statement that the proposal was below their expectations. Results provided no support for this prediction, $t(13) = 0.36$, $p > .05$ ($M$'s = 3.46 and 3.15 for the unfavorable and favorable alignment conditions, respectively).

To further examine this prediction, participants' coded statements regarding the extent to which the proposal met their expectations were examined. An ANOVA was performed on the coded expectancy responses. Results indicated no significant interaction between affect and alignment conditions, $F(4, 78) = 0.11$, $p > .05$ (see Table 10).

**Proposal Recall.** Hypothesis 6 predicted that happy and angry participants would exhibit less accurate recall of an aligned mediator’s proposal than neutral affect participants. To test this hypothesis, an ANOVA was performed on proposal recall scores for those participants in the unfavorable and favorable alignment conditions. Results indicated no
Table 10

ANOVA Results for Outcome Expectancies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
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<th>df</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Affect (A)</td>
<td>4.38</td>
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<td>2.19</td>
<td>2.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alignment (L)</td>
<td>5.13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>2.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A x L</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within</td>
<td>73.65</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
effect for affect condition, $F(2, 73) = 0.31, p > .05$ (see Table 11). Happy and angry participants did not differ from neutral affect participants in the accuracy of their proposal recall. Thus, hypothesis 6 was not supported.

Discussion

The purpose of this study was to examine the role that positive and negative affect states have on individuals' perceptions, cognitions, and attitudes in a mediation context. This study also sought to clarify and examine the process underlying disputants' reactions to favorable and unfavorable mediator alignment. Further, this research examined how affect states such as anger and happiness influenced reactions to such alignment.

In this study, participants engaged in a role-playing exercise designed to simulate an intraorganizational conflict between co-workers. Previous studies have found that participants presented with background information about a mediator's alignment may use that information to form expectations about the outcomes they may receive from that third party (Conlon & Ross, 1993). Such expectations have been shown to lead to different levels of satisfaction with aligned mediator's suggestions. Similarly, for neutral affect subjects in this study, it was hypothesized that individuals would have low (high) outcome expectancies when faced with an unfavorably (favorably) aligned mediator, and thus would be more/less satisfied with their mediator and that mediator's objectively fair suggestions for resolution of the conflict. It also was hypothesized that mediator alignment would have a stronger influence on perceptions of the mediator and the mediator's proposal for angry and happy disputants than it would for neutral affect participants, based on studies indicating a strong
Table 11

ANOVA Results for Proposal Recall

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Affect (A)</td>
<td>10.40</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.20</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alignment (L)</td>
<td>2.52</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.52</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A x L</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within</td>
<td>1204.16</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>16.50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
tendency for angry and happy individuals to rely on heuristic cues when forming judgments about persuasive messages (Bodenhausen et al., 1994a; Bodenhausen et al., 1994b).

The results of this study did not support the hypotheses. In general, different conditions of alignment did not lead neutral affect disputants to different outcome expectancies or different levels of satisfaction with the mediator and the outcome. Further, results indicated no support for hypotheses suggesting that disputants in positive and negative affect states would differ from neutral affect participants in their perceptions of alignment and the resulting effects of such perceptions.

More specifically, previous research has suggested that perceived mediator alignment has significant effects on individuals’ outcome expectancies and ratings of outcome and third-party satisfaction (Conlon & Ross, 1993). Based on this research, Hypothesis 1 predicted that neutral affect disputants faced with a mediator with unfavorable alignment would have lower outcome expectancies than neutral affect disputants in the favorable alignment condition. Results showed that the conditions did not differ in their reported outcome expectancies. Hypothesis 2 predicted that neutral affect disputants in the favorable alignment condition would evaluate their mediator less positively than neutral affect participants in the unfavorable alignment condition. Tests conducted on participants’ perceptions of the mediator’s character and behavior indicated no differences between the two groups in their perceptions of the mediator. Similarly, the third hypothesis was that the neutral affect participants faced with a mediator with favorable alignment would evaluate that mediator’s proposal less favorably than the neutral affect participants faced with an
unfavorably-aligned mediator; however, the groups did not differ in their perceptions of the favorability of the proposal.

Previous research has suggested that individuals in angry and happy affect states rely to heuristic cues to form opinions about persuasive messages to a greater extent than those with neutral affect (Bodenhausen et al., 1994a; Bodenhausen et al., 1994b; Worth & Mackie, 1987). Similarly, the fourth and fifth hypotheses predicted that, compared to neutral affect subjects, disputants in angry and happy affect states would evaluate a mediator with favorable alignment more positively, and a mediator with unfavorable alignment less positively, regardless of the fact that the proposal was objectively evenhanded. Tests conducted on disputants' perceptions of the mediator's character and behavior indicated no differences between affect conditions in evaluations of the favorably or unfavorably aligned mediator.

Hypothesis 6 predicted that, compared to neutral affect disputants, angry and happy disputants would exhibit less accurate recall of the proposal of a mediator with either unfavorable or favorable alignment. Results indicated no support for this hypothesis. The affect conditions did not differ in their recall of the proposal elements.

The seventh and eighth hypotheses predicted that those in angry and happy affect states would view a proposal suggested by an unfavorably aligned mediator to be less favorable, and a proposal suggested by a favorably-aligned mediator to be more favorable, than neutral affect participants would. These hypotheses were not supported. Participants in the three affect conditions did not differ in their perceptions of proposal favorability for either the unfavorable or favorable alignment conditions.

Limitations and Issues for Future Research
Affect manipulation. A clear limitation of this study regards the effectiveness of the affect manipulation. Although the initial check of the mood manipulation indicated that the three affect conditions were significantly different from one another, an examination of the conditions at the time when the dependent measures were collected suggested that, in particular, the angry and happy affect groups were no longer different.

In this study, affect was manipulated by the use of the Life Event Inventory (LEI). The LEI has been used in various tasks and has been shown to be effective (Bodenhausen et al., 1994a; Bodenhausen et al., 1994b; Schwarz et al., 1991). There may be several explanations for why the procedure had limited effectiveness in this study.

One possible explanation involves the type of task that followed the LEI manipulation. The length of the mediation task in this study may have made the LEI an inappropriate choice for the manipulation of affect. The process of reading the background information on mediation as a dispute resolution process, the information about the specific simulated conflict and mediator, and the mediator's proposal took approximately 20-30 minutes for most participants in the experiment. It is possible that the effectiveness of the LEI is ephemeral and thus should not be employed in tasks of this time duration.

Examination of previous experiments which have utilized the LEI effectively suggest that the experimental tasks often have been somewhat shorter in duration than the mediation task used in this experiment. For example, in the Bodenhausen et al. (1994a) study, the task required participants to read a case summary consisting of "approximately five or six sentences" (p. 623). A similar task was used in other studies (e.g., Bodenhausen et al., 1994b). In comparison, the task in this study involved
approximately five full pages of written material. Thus, it is possible that as the mediation task went on, the manipulated affect state of the participants simply was not strong enough initially to remain effective through the duration of the task. Previous studies using the LEI have not included additional measures of affect, so it is difficult to determine the typical strength or duration of the LEI manipulation. Indeed, in this study measures were taken to avoid such a problem through the informing of participants that they would return to work on the essays following the mediation task. However, this attempt may have been unsuccessful in encouraging the maintenance of the current mood state.

Another possible explanation for the ineffectiveness of the mood manipulation may lie in the task itself. It is possible that the task of role-playing a disputant in a mediation context may be extremely involving to participants, and may in effect eliminate any transitory mood states. It may be the case that participants took their roles so seriously as to put any influence of mood out of their minds, instead focusing on the task at hand. If this were so, it would be evidence of a systematic processing style, rather than the heuristic style hypothesized to coexist with an angry or happy affect state. Such concentration has been shown to relate to more systematic styles of information processing, thus negating any effects of temporary mood state (Bodenhausen et al., 1994a).

More specifically, Bodenhausen and his colleagues found that happy individuals who were told that they would be held accountable for their social judgments and would be expected to justify them to someone demonstrated an ability to process in a systematic fashion, similar to neutral affect participants. It is possible that the same effects occurred in this study. Indeed, it is not hard to imagine that participants took their
roles seriously enough to feel "accountable" in a sense. This commitment to their role in the dispute may have caused the mood manipulation to effectively disappear, in spite of all efforts. Again, this would suggest that the LEI is perhaps too ephemeral or too mild for the purposes of this type of study.

Future research might benefit from the use of a stronger mood manipulation than the LEI, for instance, one that manipulates affect in the context of the conflict. Such a study might benefit from a connection between the affect manipulation and the mediation task itself. It has been argued that affect states such as anger and frustration are surely common to mediation settings (Daly, 1991). Such affect states are directly related to the situation, rather than separate, as was the case in this study. The effectiveness of such a mood manipulation may therefore be strengthened if participants feel such moods are directly related to their experiences in the conflict setting. For instance, it may be possible to design experimental materials so that the description of the conflict itself is affect-inducing. This might be accomplished through descriptions of conflict that are designed to be particularly vivid and describe extremely hostile situations, thus perhaps inducing an angry affect state from participants.

Further, it might be advantageous to have a confederate play the role of the opposing negotiator. Not only might this strengthen the realistic nature of the simulated conflict, but such a confederate might be able to reinforce the mood manipulation throughout the mediation task. For example, a confederate might be able to behave in antagonistic ways that might serve to reinforce an angry mood state, as well as tie such feelings and emotions to the mediation task rather than to a previous, seemingly unrelated task.
Alignment manipulation. A second limitation of this study relates to the ineffectiveness of the mediator alignment manipulation. Disputants in the unfavorable, neutral, and favorable alignment conditions did not differ significantly in their reported perceptions of mediator alignment. There are several possible explanations for this result.

One possible explanation is that disputants' affect state influenced their attention to and perception of the alignment manipulation. That is, angry and happy disputants may have been engaged in the heuristic style of information processing as hypothesized, and simply did not notice the alignment manipulation. The alignment manipulation was similar to those used in previous studies (Brookmire & Sistrunk, 1980), and in fact efforts were made through pilot testing to ensure that the manipulation was perceived by pilot participants. However, the affect state of participants in the pilot study was not manipulated in any fashion; thus, it can be assumed that such participants were in relatively neutral states. Therefore, it is possible that the experience of being in a happy or angry affect state, and perhaps being engaged in a heuristic style of information processing, led such participants to overlook the alignment manipulation.

It is possible that angry and happy participants simply did not read the material carefully enough. If this is true, then it is likely that such angry and happy disputants would not differ in their perceptions of mediators with favorable and unfavorable alignment, and indeed this is the case. However, it is also likely that neutral affect disputants would then be more accurate than angry and happy disputants in their perceptions of alignment. That is, neutral affect disputants should be expected to perceive more favorable alignment than angry and happy disputants in conditions of favorable alignment, and the converse should be true for the unfavorable
alignment condition. However, this is not the case. Neutral affect disputants did not differ from angry and happy conditions in their alignment perceptions in either the favorable or unfavorable alignment conditions. Thus, there is little reason to believe that angry and happy disputants did not perceive the alignment manipulation.

A more likely explanation relates to the timing of the alignment manipulation check. The check of the manipulation was mixed in with the other dependent measures after the participants had read the mediator’s evenhanded proposal. This was done in order to avoid introducing demand characteristics into the task by alerting disputants unnecessarily to attend to the alignment manipulation, as well as to avoid any unnecessary disturbance in participants’ mood states. However, it may be the case that disputants did initially perceive the alignment, but that their perceptions changed based on their personal evaluations of the overt support of the mediator’s proposal.

Disputants who perceived that the mediator might be aligned against them, for example, may have felt that the proposal suggested by that mediator was in fact quite favorable, and may have decided that their initial opinions of the mediator must have been accurate. Such an occurrence would be equivalent to the previously identified “fairness pays” effect (Carnevale et al., 1994). Similarly, disputants in the favorable alignment condition may have accurately perceived the favorable bias, but may have felt misled by a proposal that they saw as evenhanded, and thus decided that perhaps the mediator wasn’t favorably aligned after all. Unfortunately, there is no way to examine this explanation. If such an explanation were true, however, for angry and happy participants, it would be evidence against the information processing hypotheses proposed in this study.
Future studies should consider reinforcing the alignment manipulation during the course of the mediation task. Such reinforcement could be accomplished by the use of a confederate who might role-play the part of the mediator. This confederate would be able to strengthen the manipulation in the beginning as well as throughout the task. For example, in this study, participants simply read and were told to believe that they had met with their mediator previously to present their perspective in the conflict. In the unfavorable alignment condition, these participants were told that the mediator had admitted to sympathizing with their opposition during this meeting. Conversely, participants in the favorable alignment condition were led to believe that their mediator had admitted to sympathizing with them. Such a manipulation would most likely be stronger if it were given verbally by a confederate, versus described on paper.

A confederate also might be able to reinforce the manipulation throughout the experiment, a suggestion which has been offered by others (Brookmire & Sistrunk, 1980). Previous studies of mediator alignment have had some difficulty in manipulating mediator alignment successfully (Brookmire & Sistrunk, 1980). If a confederate were to role-play the part of the participants' opponent, as discussed above, that confederate might be able to interact with the confederate mediator in ways that might strengthen an unfavorable alignment manipulation, such as engaging in private conversations witnessed by the participant. In conditions of favorable alignment, a confederate mediator might pay extra attention to the needs of participant during initial conversations, thus conveying an impression of concern and sympathy.
Another suggestion for future studies is to measure perceptions of alignment before any presentation of mediator suggestions or proposals. This tactic may have its costs, but is clearly the only way to unequivocally check for the effectiveness of an alignment manipulation.

Conclusions

Due to the unsuccessful nature of the affect and alignment manipulations, it is difficult to draw conclusions about the nature of information processing in a mediation context, particularly for disputants in positive and negative states. It is clear that affect, whether temporary or dispositional in nature, is a part of dispute resolution processes such as negotiation and mediation. Affect is likely to be particularly important in mediation situations, where disputants have a contentious history. Affect states such as anger may or may not be related to the heuristic style of information processing hypothesized in this study, but their possible effects on negotiators’ perceptions and attitudes toward mediators and opposing negotiators should not be ignored.
References


Appendix A
Dispositional Affectivity
The focus of this paper is on affect states, or temporary fluctuations in individuals' mood, and their influence on information processing strategies. State affect is conceptualized as feelings, moods, or emotional states that are relatively short-lasting and low-intensity. A second approach to affective experience exists, however, which regards affect as a broad dispositional trait. Research on individual differences suggests that there may be two general styles, or dimensions of affective experience (Watson & Tellegen, 1985).

Dispositional affect is comprised of two independent dimensions, negative affectivity (NA) and positive affectivity (PA) (Diener & Emmons, 1985). Negative affectivity can be defined as a pervasive tendency toward negative emotionality and self-concept (Tellegen, 1982; Watson & Clark, 1984). Individuals high in negative affectivity tend to experience feelings of distress, anger, general anxiety, and self-dissatisfaction. Those with lower levels of negative affectivity report feelings of calm and contentment. Negative affectivity has been linked to such variables as job stress, poor self-esteem, physical strains, and job satisfaction, among others (Brief, Butcher, & Roberson, 1995; Staw, Bell, & Clausen, 1986; Watson & Clark, 1984; Watson, Pennebaker, & Folger, 1987).

Positive affectivity reflects a dispositional tendency to experience positive emotional states, or the extent to which an individual is energetic and enjoys life (Cropanzano, James, & Konovsky, 1993). People who report high levels of positive affectivity tend to be excited, joyful, enthusiastic, and exhilarated. Individuals low on positive affectivity often report feeling listless, lethargic, and apathetic.
Research supports the two-factor model of dispositional affectivity (Tellegen, 1985; Watson & Clark, 1984). That is, levels of negative affectivity are unrelated to the experience of positive emotions, or positive affectivity (Diener & Emmons, 1985; Watson & Clark, 1984). The relations between trait affectivity and numerous organizational variables such as job performance, affective commitment, perceived job stress, and turnover intentions (Brief et al., 1995; Chen & Spector, 1991; Cropanzano et al., 1993) highlight its potential influence on cognitions and motivations in various settings. In the context of mediation, however, it is proposed that more temporary affect states will be more relevant. Throughout the course of negotiations, temporary moods and feelings engendered by the process of discussion and offers are expected to play a primary role in negotiators' cognitions and interpretations of the mediator and the dispute. Thus, for the purposes of this paper, no predictions were made about the influence of affectivity on the negotiation situation, although both negative and positive affectivity were measured.
Appendix B
Life Event Inventory Materials
Life Event Inventory (LEI)

The following page asks you to recall and write about an important life event. This information, gathered from you and a sample of other American college students, will be used as the basis for the Life Event Inventory, or LEI. This LEI will eventually be used to assess the positivity and negativity of events people have in their lives.

We do not want your names on this, nor do we want any other information that may identify you or other people you may write about. We assure the utmost privacy and anonymity. We are interested in your honest responses and experiences, and by making your responses completely anonymous, we hope you will feel comfortable providing these.

What is most important for the purposes of developing the LEI is that the reports you write are as vivid and detailed as possible. We therefore ask that you carefully follow the instructions on the top of the next page. Once you are finished, you will also be given a short questionnaire.

You will be given approximately 12 minutes to complete your report. However, please keep writing until we stop you. Please turn the page, read the instructions, and begin now.
LEI
(negative affect condition)

Please think about an event in your life where something or someone made you REALLY angry. We would like you to write about an event that evoked a negative emotional response from you. Take the time to imagine this event and why it made you so angry. Try to relive this event in your mind. Then please describe the event and what it was that made you so angry. Please describe this event in as much detail and as vividly as you can.

The following questions may help you with this task: What were you feeling? What made you feel that way? What was important for you? What led up to that feeling? Did that event cause some chain reaction of thoughts or emotions that enhanced your feelings or responses? What were they?

You may use the space below and the back of this sheet for this task. Please begin.

LEI
(positive affect condition)

Please think about an event in your life where something or someone made you REALLY happy. We would like you to write about an event that evoked a positive emotional response from you. Take the time to imagine this event and why it made you so happy. Try to relive this event in your mind. Then please describe the event and what it was that made you so happy. Please describe this event in as much detail and as vividly as you can.

The following questions may help you with this task: What were you feeling? What made you feel that way? What was important for you? What led up to that feeling? Did that event cause some chain reaction of thoughts or emotions that enhanced your feelings or responses? What were they?

You may use the space below and the back of this sheet for this task. Please begin.
LEI
(neutral affect condition)

Please think about a typical day in your life. We would like you to write about how a normal day proceeds in your life. Take the time to imagine a typical day. Then please describe the day in as much detail as you wish.

You may choose to describe your day in chronological order, or by discussing the routines you typically go through.

You may use the space below and the back of this sheet for this task. Please begin.
Appendix C
Experimental Questionnaires
Q1

The following is a series of questions designed to aid in the interpretation of the Life Event Inventory. Please answer all of the questions, paying attention to the appropriate scales. Remember, this information will only be reported in the aggregate and is completely anonymous. If you have any questions, please ask the experimenter.

Please circle the number of your answer.

1. How difficult/easy was it for you to describe this event?

   Very Easy 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Very Difficult

2. In general, I am feeling:

   Extremely Negative 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Extremely Positive

3. While you were writing about your event, to what extent did you feel:

   a. Happy not at all 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  extremely
   b. Displeased not at all 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  extremely
   c. Bad Mood not at all 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  extremely
   d. Pleased not at all 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  extremely
   e. Angry not at all 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  extremely
   f. Negative not at all 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  extremely
   g. Good Mood not at all 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  extremely
   h. Sad not at all 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  extremely
   i. Excited not at all 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  extremely
   j. Irritated not at all 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  extremely
   k. Positive not at all 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  extremely
   l. Hostile not at all 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  extremely
4. Your sex-- 1 Male      2 Female

5. Year in school:
   1 Freshman   2 Sophomore   3 Junior   4 Senior
Q3
Please read and answer all the questions carefully.

This **MEDIATOR** is:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very Trustworthy</th>
<th></th>
<th>Very Untrustworthy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very Reasonable</th>
<th></th>
<th>Very Unreasonable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very UNfair</th>
<th></th>
<th>Very Fair</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>UNacceptable to my side</th>
<th></th>
<th>Acceptable to my side</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very Qualified</th>
<th></th>
<th>Very UNqualified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very CAREFUL in consideration</th>
<th></th>
<th>Very CARELESS in consideration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very Helpful to the dispute</th>
<th></th>
<th>NOT AT ALL helpful to the dispute</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very UNsatisfactory</th>
<th></th>
<th>Very Satisfactory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very Committed to helping MY SIDE</th>
<th></th>
<th>Very Committed to helping the OTHER SIDE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very Biased against MY SIDE</th>
<th></th>
<th>Very Biased toward MY SIDE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very Biased against the OTHER SIDE</th>
<th></th>
<th>Very Biased in the OTHER SIDE'S FAVOR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very Favorable to MY SIDE</th>
<th></th>
<th>Very UNfavorable to MY SIDE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very Favorable to the OTHER SIDE</th>
<th></th>
<th>Very UNfavorable to the OTHER SIDE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please turn to the next page.
14. I would be willing to work with this mediator again.

1
No
2
Yes

15. I would recommend this mediator to others.

1
No
2
Yes

16. This mediator was most concerned with:

the OTHER 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 MY SIDE'S SIDE'S OUTCOMES OUTCOMES

17. What do you recall about your mediator? Please list any information you recall about your mediator.

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

Please turn to the next page.
This **PROPOSAL** is:

18. **Very Fair**  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  **Very Unfair**

19. **Unacceptable to my side**  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  **Acceptable to my side**

20. **Very Reasonable**  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  **Very Unreasonable**

21. **Very Unsatisfactory**  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  **Very Satisfactory**

22. **Very biased against MY SIDE**  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  **Very biased in favor of MY SIDE**

23. **Very biased against the OTHER SIDE**  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  **Very biased in the OTHER SIDE'S favor**

24. **Very Favorable to MY SIDE**  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  **Very Unfavorable to MY SIDE**

25. **Very Favorable to the OTHER SIDE**  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  **Very Unfavorable to the OTHER SIDE**

26. I would accept this proposal

   1  
   No
   2  
   Yes

27. How did you form your opinions about the mediator's effectiveness/acceptability?

   ________________________________________________________________
   ________________________________________________________________
   ________________________________________________________________

Please turn to the next page.
28. In general, I am feeling:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Extremely Negative</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>Extremely Positive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

29. At this time, to what extent do you feel:

a. Happy not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely
b. Displeased not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely
c. Bad Mood not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely
d. Pleased not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely
e. Angry not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely
f. Negative not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely
g. Good Mood not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely
h. Sad not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely
i. Excited not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely
j. Irritated not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely
k. Positive not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely
l. Hostile not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely

Please use the scale below to answer the following questions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

30. This TASK (participating in a simulated mediated dispute as a negotiator):

a. Required a lot of effort. 
   
   b. Required a lot of creativity. 
   
   c. Improved my mood. 
   
   d. Caused my mood to decline. 
   
   e. Had no effect on my mood. 
   
Please use the scale below to answer the following questions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
31. This MEDIATOR:

a. Was an expert.
   __________

b. Was trustworthy.
   __________

c. Was helpful.
   __________

d. Was much more concerned with MY outcomes.
   __________

e. Was much more concerned with the OTHER SIDE'S OUTCOMES.
   __________

32. The OTHER PARTY in this dispute:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Was STRONGER/ had more power than me</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was WEAKER/ had less power than me</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

33. The OTHER PARTY in this dispute:

Was Trustworthy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Was UNtrustworthy

34. This proposal met my expectations.

1 2
No Yes

35. This proposal was below my expectations.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree
36. This proposal exceeded my expectations.

| Strongly Disagree | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | Strongly Agree |

37. What did you expect the mediator to propose? Did you get what you expected?

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

Please turn to the next page.
Using the following scale, please answer the following questions.

Strongly Disagree   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Strongly Agree

38. I was motivated to listen to the mediator’s proposal.   —   ______

39. I didn’t pay much attention to the details of the proposal.   ______

40. I carefully considered the merits of the proposal.   ______

This task was:

41. Extremely Difficult   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Extremely Easy

42. Extremely Complex   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Extremely Simple

43. Extremely Dissatisfying   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Extremely Satisfying

44. Extremely Interesting   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Extremely Boring

45. Extremely Uncreative   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Extremely Creative

46. Extremely Enjoyable   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Extremely Unenjoyable

47. Extremely Confusing   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Extremely Clear

Please turn to the next page.
On this page, please list the mediator’s suggestions. That is, please write out the mediator’s proposal as you remember it in the blanks provided. Don’t worry about grammar or spelling — just write down the main points as you remember them.

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

Please turn to the next page.
48. This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. Read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word. Indicate to what extent you generally feel this way, that is, how you feel on average. Use the following scale to record your answers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>very slightly or not at all</td>
<td>a little</td>
<td>moderately</td>
<td>quite a bit</td>
<td>extremely</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

_____ interested   _____ irritable
_____ distressed   _____ alert
_____ excited      _____ ashamed
_____ upset        _____ inspired
_____ strong       _____ nervous
_____ guilty       _____ determined
_____ scared       _____ attentive
_____ hostile      _____ jittery
_____ enthusiastic  _____ active
_____ proud        _____ afraid

49. What do you think this experiment was about?

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

50. Did you feel there was anything unusual about this experiment?

1  No  2  Yes

51. If yes, please describe:

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
On this page, we ask that you list the thoughts that came to your mind as you read the mediator’s proposal. Using the boxes provided, please list any thoughts related to the proposal that you recall thinking as you read it. Please write your thoughts as you remember them, listing one thought per box and not worrying about grammar or spelling.