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A housing proposal against all odds: The case of squatter settlements in Beirut

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Rice University, 1987
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Abstract

The most dramatic housing manifestation of the twelve year war in Lebanon has been the squatting phenomenon, resulting from internal displacement. This issue has been blindly overlooked by the State and the private sector. Their indifference materialized in a "silent urban revolt" to which the sprawl of the "war-displaced settlements" in the Southern Suburb of Beirut testifies. The deplorable condition of these settlements today calls for an immediate intervention, particularly in the housing sector.

This thesis declares the need for an emergency solution. It rejects ambitious housing programs and builds on the role of political and economic constraints imposed by the urban system of the country, and on the impact of the socio-economic propensities of the population involved, in determining the nature of the required intervention.

To this end, the study establishes three sets of parameters for intervention. The first is the prevailing urban system of the country marked by a reliance on a profit-oriented private sector for the provision of housing. The second recognizes the economic potential of the Southern Suburb and the magnitude of its urban transformation. The third advocates the preservation of the social and cultural norms of the population so as to avoid a more threatening "social urban revolt".

By acknowledging these parameters, the study has formulated a comprehensive housing policy, in essence, upgrading the existing settlements and relocating their vulnerable zones into a site and services program, which shifts the role of the State and private sector from "house producers" to "facilitators" and relies on the full participation of the beneficiaries in the housing production.
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Contents

I.  PREFACE vili

II.  INTRODUCTION 1
   1. Context 8
   2. Pre-War Shums in Greater Beirut

III. THE SQUATTING PHENOMENON: AN INEVITABLE REALITY 21
    1. Good Prospects for Squatting 22
    2. The Urban Tradition: A Socio-economic Framework for Intervention
       . A Traditional Antipathy towards Urban Planning
       . The Housing Crisis 41
    3. Conclusion

IV. THE SOUTHERN SUBURB: A REGIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR INTERVENTION 46
    1. Historical Development 53
    2. The "Suburb of the Deprived"
    3. Physical Analysis of the Southern Suburb. Parameters for a Housing Policy
       . Urban Development
       . Land-use Distribution
    4. Low-Income Residential Sectors and Districts. Parameters for a Housing Policy
       . Social Profile
       . Architecture and Urban Fabric
       . Methods of Construction
       . Utilities and Community Services 82
    5. Summary 109
V. PROBLEM OF SUBSISTENCE OR URBAN SILENT REVOLT:
ANALYSIS OF THE SECTOR OF RAML

1. Historical Development 117
2. Social Profile 119
3. Urban Development 121
4. Socio-spatial Organisation 133
5. Urban Fabric 135
6. Housing 153

VI. INTRODUCING A POLICY OF LEAST INTERVENTION

1. Identification of Problems in the Sector of Raml 165
2. Socio-economic Issues to Attend to 166
3. Definition of a Housing Policy 168
   . Key Notions Adopted in Policies of Upgrading and Site and Services
   . A Theory of "Devolution of Housing Production"
   . The Myths of the Conventional Approach and the Advantages of a Policy of Least Intervention

VII. CONCLUSION: "SETTING THE SCENE" FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE HOUSING POLICY IN THE SECTOR OF RAML 186

1. Recommendations for Managing and Financing the Housing Policy 188
2. Upgrading the Sector of Raml 189
   . Tenure
   . Infrastructure
   . Housing
   . Vulnerable Zones
3. Partial Relocation through a Site and Services Project 199
   . Relocation Site
. Tenure
. Housing and Infrastructure
4. Summary

VIII. OVERVIEW
"... What often gets lost in the drama of these great battle scenes is the fabric of life still clinging together... People living through a war seem to spend much more time coping and adjusting than they do being afraid. People just don't have time to be afraid for very long..."

Thomas Friedman
"War Torn"
I. PREFACE

Squatter settlements are today a world-wide phenomenon, exhibited mainly in the developing part of the world. From the Barrios in Latin America to the Gecekondu in Turkey to the Palestinian refugee camps in the Gaza strip and the Afghani refugee camps in Pakistan, they all share two basic characteristics, misery and insecurity of tenure.

That socio-economic issues contribute significantly to this phenomenon is undeniable. Yet, politics is often their prime determinant. Refugee camps best attest to this.

For the purpose of this study, let me clarify at this stage the notion of refugee and establish the difference between two categories of refugees. The first satisfies the very definition of the word refugee that is, those who fled their country in fear of danger and persecution and who sought shelter and protection in another country. The second includes those who fled their towns and villages in fear of persecution or due to the invasion of their territories by the enemy, and who sought shelter in another part of the country, still under the auspices of the same government. Those will be referred to, throughout the study, as the "War-Displaced" or the "Displaced".

There are currently more than 20 Million Refugees and Displaced in the world. Over 10 million of them live in camps and shanty towns without sufficient food and water or other basic utilities. The similarities between the case of Refugee and that of the Displaced can be easily summarised: Both face the same problem of uprootedness and both strive to re-establish a normal life.

Yet, one major difference between the two is obvious. Due to the recognized pertinence of the case of the Refugee to political factors, the refugee populations have been offered some form of aid mainly by the International Relief Organisations. Their case is acknowledged as soon as they acquire the "privileged" status of Refugee. The case of the Displaced is different. Lebanon testifies to it. With a total population of less than 4 million
people, and after twelve years of war, Lebanon accounts for over one million Displaced from all economic, social and religious backgrounds. The low income population has faced the most endemic crisis mainly due to a substantial lack of "affordable" urban housing. Squatting has been the most popular solution to their problem.

For the past twelve years, the case of the low-income Displaced has been regarded as temporary and no serious attempt to alleviate the situation has ever been undertaken. In twelve years, squatting has taken dramatic proportions. War-Displaced settlements have mushroomed in many parts of Greater Beirut, but their main concentration remains in the Southern Suburb of Beirut _ Ad Dahiya al Janoubiyah _ which houses almost a quarter of the total population of the country. Today, the miserable conditions of this area call for an emergency intervention.

This study departs from the belief that the case of War-Displaced settlements, the magnitude and impact of their problems ought to be recognized and treated before they become irretrievable. It is evident that long-term planning policies involving the squatter settlements cannot be undertaken amidst the political and economic unrest which reigns in Lebanon. This study neither claims to do so, nor does it claim to stipulate a solution to the problem. In fact, it is formulated on the basic assumption that the war is, alas, not likely to end soon.

The thesis sets the scene for the implementation of a short-term housing strategy (which will eventually be complemented by longer-term policies), by establishing different levels of parameters for a "feasible" intervention in the War-Displaced settlements and by formulating a guideline for intervention.

The introduction presents an overview of the development of squatter settlements until the war of 1975-76, which sets the stage for the War-Displaced settlements.

The first chapter points at the inherent reason for the emergence of the squatting phenomenon in the country namely, its "urban system". Through the analysis of the major
components of the System, it attempts to formulate a framework in which any intervention in the War-Displaced settlements has to fit.

The second chapter defines the region where the major concentration of Displaced settlements occurs namely, the Southern Suburb of Beirut. A study of its historic development, its urban development, its land-use and its low income residential neighbourhoods is carried in order to substantiate a second framework for intervention.

The third chapter focuses on one illegal sector. It analyzes its urban development, the evolution of its urban fabric, its architecture, the methods of construction and its social organization.

The fourth chapter points out the most immediate problems faced by this settlement and sums up the social, economic and physical parameters in order to define the selected housing strategy. It explains the concept of the strategy and confronts it with others.

The concluding chapter formulates a guideline for the strategy from a social, economic and policy standpoint, as applied to the case study.
II. INTRODUCTION

1. Context

Location and area:

Lebanon is an independent parliamentary republic, situated at the eastern end of the Mediterranean Sea. Its area is limited to a narrow stretch of land of approximately 4000 sq. miles, 156 miles long and averaging about 31 miles wide, between neighbouring Syria to the north and east and Israel to the south. Its capital Beirut, is approximately 22 sq. miles. (Fig.1).

Climate:

It is of Mediterranean type, characterized by rainy winters with snow down to 3000 feet, early springs, four months of hot summer and mild autumns. Proximity to the sea, as in the case of Beirut, provides a levelling influence, making temperature ranges less than inland.

Population:

It is estimated at 4 million in the country, with 1.3 million residing in the capital Beirut. A reapportionment of the population according to ethnic origins shows 6% Palestinians, 6% Armenians, 19% Syrians and Kurds and 85% Lebanese.\(^1\) The annual growth rate in Lebanon is estimated at 3.9%\(^2\), while in Beirut it is 7%\(^3\).

Religion:

The Lebanese population forms a mosaic of religious communities. Muslims are believed to be the majority today although the political system is still predicated on the Christian majority reflected in the last, now outdated 1932 census. It is estimated that at present, 29% of the population is Shiite Muslim, 23% is Sunni Muslim, 21% Christian Maronite, 9% Greek Orthodox, 7% Greek Catholic and 6% Druze.\(^4\) Although different religious groups in Lebanon are intermingled geographically, the Druze have been concentrated in the Chouf area south east of Beirut, the Shites in Southern Lebanon and the Bekaa valley to the east, the Sunnis in the coastal
towns and the Maronites in Mount Lebanon north of the capital. (Fig. 2).

Economy:

Lebanon's economy depends on its strategic location at the crossroads between the Arab East and the financial capitals of the West, and draws heavily on the entrepreneurial and commercial skills of its population. For a long time, Beirut has been serving as an important banking and trade center for the whole Middle East. Lebanon has a laissez-faire, free-enterprise economy, in which the service sector dominates and which tends to benefit certain segments of the population at the expense of others. A distribution of income in Lebanon done in 1961 showed that the top 4% of the population received 32% of the national income, while the lower 50% received only 18%. The economic inequalities in Lebanon have tended to reinforce the sectarian split between Christians and Muslims, and these inequalities, coupled with unequal political representation, have caused continuing intercommunal conflict in Lebanon.

It would be interesting to note, for the sake of the study, that social services in Lebanon are generally funded and run by religious denominations, and services vary widely in quality, depending on the resources and sponsoring of the community. For example, Lebanese Muslim Shiites who have traditionally made their living in agriculture and are considered the poorest community in the country, have the least developed social services.

Education:

The literacy rate in Lebanon is about 96%, the highest in the Arab world. Beirut has actually been the center for higher education in the Middle East. Also, it was in a sense, the capital of the Arab world: a market place of ideas, a place where debate and intellectual exchange have ranged far more freely than in other Arab capitals.

Employment:

A now outdated census, showed a total labor force of 538,000 Lebanese citizens,
and a 696 rate of unemployment.\textsuperscript{9}

History:

Lebanon is one of a number of countries carved out of the Ottoman Empire following World War I. In 1920, the French mandate authorities in Lebanon decided to link the primarily Maronite Christian area of Mount Lebanon with the predominantly Muslim Mediterranean coastal plain and the Bekaa valley to the east, thereby creating “Greater Lebanon”, as we know it today. After two decades of French mandate rule, Lebanon gained its independence in 1943.

Over the centuries, Lebanon’s mountains have provided refuge to a number of religious minorities fleeing persecution; these included the Maronites, the Shiite Muslims and the Druze. As a result of the religious diversity of the country (seventeen religious groups), Lebanon has been called a model of “ennumerical” society.\textsuperscript{9} But its history has not been harmonious. Conflict has not centered on religious beliefs but rather on questions of political participation and economic equity for different communities in Lebanon. Civil strife erupted both in 1958 and again in 1975-76, sparked in each instance by different combinations of internal and external stresses. Since then, Beirut has been divided into East (Christian) and West (Muslim) by an imaginary line of demarcation running almost all the way along the Beirut-Damascus highway; it was later called the “Green Line” because of the plantation which grew with time after the area was demolished and evacuated. (Fig. 3). Since then, the country has been twice invaded by Israel, once from March to June 1978, and again starting in June 1982, when Beirut underwent a siege of 17 days. It is therefore an oversimplification to say that the civil war in Lebanon was “between Christians and Muslims”. At war were two different conceptions of Lebanon, that of the National Movement and that of the National Front; in other terms, whether Lebanon should be Arab Nationalist, non-aligned or Western oriented in its outlook. These differing loyalties have tended to reinforce confessional and economic tensions.\textsuperscript{10} Lebanon’s bitter civil strife was
3. MAP OF BEIRUT SHOWING THE "GREEN LINE" DIVIDING THE CITY.
created by all these factors, coupled with the intervention of external parties, which accounted for
tensions that have broken into violence many times since the country’s creation. Various layers
are still being fought: socio-economic, sectarian-religious, inter-Arab, Arab-Israeli, regional,
Soviet-American… It has often been said that Lebanon served as a “surrogate battleground for
other Middle Eastern countries’ wars in addition to its own.”

Government:

Lebanon is considered a confessionally democratic. It has a parliamentary system
which was designed by the French during the 1919-1943 mandate. It operates on the basis of a
political system which, by informal agreement, allocates positions in the government according
to religious affiliations. Parliamentary seats are distributed according to a fixed ratio of 6:5
between Christians and Muslims respectively; the President is always a Maronite Christian, the
Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim and the President of the Chamber of Deputies a Shiite Muslim.

Beirut Urban Growth:

A century ago, Beirut was a small medieval town of a quarter of a square mile. The
central core of the city was built around its historic port. Beirut’s fortification were gradually
eliminated in the course of the nineteenth century. Still residential neighbourhoods (harat or
ahya) were relatively compact and homogeneous, regulated through kinship and religious ties.
Gross density was high, about 125 pers./acre. After the civil war of 1860, the people turned
more to Beirut for refuge. By then, Beirut offered enough economic, social and cultural choices
to ensure the continuous growth of its population. This sudden intensive growth altered the
spatial structure of the city and changes in the sectarian composition of Beirut were obvious;
these changes became associated with others in the distribution of economic opportunities among
its religious communities. The spectacular growth was later repeated, this time due to
the flow of Armenian refugees (since 1915), Palestinians in 1948 and Syrians and Kurds a few
years later. It was coupled at the economic level, by a subsequent inflow of capital from the
Arabian Gulf, which resulted in a spectacular construction boom in the 1950’s, and until the mid
1960’s. It was the first tangible evidence of the city’s intensive urbanisation. In 1964, Beirut
population had tripled, totalling an estimate of 900,000. In 1970, 72% of the Lebanese
population, 45% of the urban population, resided in Beirut. Population had leaped over
1,200,000.

From 1975 to 1982, 40% of the population of Greater Beirut (Beirut and part of
suburbs) were affected by migration. Until now, the resulting changes in the demographic
repartition are visible: while East Beirut has more or less preserved its initial size (out: 110,000;
in: 125,000), West Beirut has considerably increased in number (out: 75,000; in: 340,000), and
today, accounts for two thirds of the population of Greater Beirut.

2. Pre-War slums in Greater Beirut

One of the most dramatic manifestations of the Lebanese war has been the
emergence of a striking phenomenon of squatting around the capital Beirut, a result of the
hundreds of thousands of displaced families around the country.

Yet, squatting settlements are not a war-time revelation in Greater Beirut. The first
step that was ever made towards what might be called an "Uncontrolled Housing Movement"
dates back to the late 1940’s, with the beginning of flow of immigrants and rural migrants.
The illegal sector of Beirut has continued to develop in close parallel with immigration and
migration patterns, until 1975, when the war substituted the phenomenon of forced internal
displacement to those of rural migration and immigration.

In 1948, Beirut economy was becoming prosperous and a major demographical
boom occurred. The same year, the State of Israel was founded and the borders between the two
countries (Lebanon and Israel) were closed. Thousands of Palestinians fleeing their country,
found refuge in Lebanon (among other Arab countries); rural migrants from North and South
Lebanon and the Bekaa, as well as Syrians and Kurds, came to Beirut in search of jobs;
Armenians continued to flee their country after the genocide (most of them started settling in Lebanon as of 1930).

This massive migration led to the quadrupling of the population in Beirut, and to the formation of a first ring of "newly created districts" around the city core, within the municipal limits of the city of Beirut, namely, the Quarantina, Medawar, Karm ez Zaytun, Camp Syriac, Hawsh Rahal, Camp Mar Elias, Wata al Moussaitbeh. (Fig.5). Soon after, a second ring developed on the urban fringe: Tell ez Zaatâr, Bourj Hammoud, Bourj al Barajneh, Jisr el Bacha, Sabra and Chatila. (Fig.6).

In less than two years, fourteen settlements were formed, housing a low-income population of migrants and immigrants, mainly divided along ethnic lines: the Armenian community in Dekouaneh and Bourj Hammoud, the Palestinians in the camps of Tell ez-Zaatâr, Bourj el Barajneh, Jisr el Bacha, the Lebanese Shiites in Nabaa. The Quarantina was mixed in population and ethnic groups and included Armenians, Palestinians, Syrians, Kurds and Lebanese Shiites.

The settlements were soon baptised "the Poverty Belt". This metaphor is easy to substantiate by the following criteria:

Density:

Density was believed to be among the highest in the world in the slum of Quarantina in 1975. 12 600 persons lived in 2 540 shacks, that is one family per room, the size of the family reaching sometimes up to fourteen persons. The slum of Nabaa-Bourj Hammoud better reflects the situation in most of the slums; there, the density was 130,000 pers./km sq.

Building types:

Building types vary from shanties made out of materials of little or no value like cheap wood, galvanized iron sheets, cardboard, to concrete blocks buildings. Houses range from one to four stories, sometimes higher. The ingenuity of the people in building up to three storey
5. FIRST RING OF PRE-WAR SLUMS
huts even with the most precarious materials is worth noting. The area of the houses ranges from 60 sq. feet to 600 sq. feet, and from two to twelve rooms. Most of the houses were self-help or artisan built, all in an incremental fashion; columns on the roof, ready for future extension, provide good proof of this phenomenon.\(^{18}\) (Fig. 7,8).

Spatial and social organization:

These extremely dense settlements are characterized by tight clusters of houses, defined predominantly by families ties. Internal streets are nothing but the left over spaces between the buildings and they are narrow and unpaved. While the adults' main social space is the semi-public courtyards serving five to ten houses, the roof is used as a recreation space for the children. (Fig. 9).

Building and land tenure:

Illegality mostly occurs at the building level, when houses do not comply with building codes and regulations. Since the plots are extremely small, narrow and deep (60 sq. feet), they are sometimes exploited at a hundred percent.\(^{19}\) Besides, shacks are very often built without any building permit. As for land tenure, it is believed that land occupation was almost nonexistent. The majority of the settlers rented a lot from private landlords for a nominal sum (30 Lebanese pounds, at that time equivalent to $10.00). For example, in Bourj Hammoud, only 20% of the population were actual owners.\(^{20}\) No security of tenure was granted to the population, and they could be evicted at any time.

Utilities and communal services:

Utilities were almost non-existent in most of the slums; in fact, sanitation was the major problem: sewage disposal networks were not provided in every area, and it was the internal streets that often played the role of open drainage channels. Bathrooms were not always part of the house, and sometimes, twelve families shared two bathrooms.\(^{21}\) Communal services
7. TYPICAL DWELLING OF THE PRE-WAR SLUMS
9. TYPICAL DWELLING OF THE PRE-WAR SLUMS
were minimal as well. For example, the 35,000 dwellers of the Quarantina had one
"neighbourhood" hospital, two dispensaries, two churches, one mosque and four primary
schools. 22

Population. Income, employment, education:

The slums dwellers were from the very low to the low income groups, except for a
few, generally Armenians from the middle-to-low income group. Unemployment was low, but
underemployment was predominant. The most common forms of employment were: port
employees, neighbouring industries employees (these were especially common in the Quarantina
and Medawar slums, due to their location); craftsmanship, (especially among the Armenian
community, which made Bourj Hammoud develop into a major artisanal and small retail district);
tailors, shoe makers, street vendors... Literacy was low among the population; it ranged from
total illiteracy to primary school education.

Government's intervention - Dwellers' contribution:

Since the formation of the slums and until the beginning of the civil war in 1975,
government's intervention never really existed, except perhaps in one instance, that of the
construction of a high wall around the Quarantina, to hide the dwellers' miserable existence from
the tourists who came to discover the "Lebanese Paradise".

The dwellers, for their part, imbued with a strong sense of community even in the
worst of conditions, undertook small works such as cleaning the streets and repairing some
decaying structures. Yet, their insecure tenure and their fright of being evicted at any time,
coupled with their poverty, did not encourage them to make more substantial physical
improvements on their settlements. 23

The 1975-76 civil war that opposed the Lebanese Front (Phalanges) to the National
Movement and the Palestinian Resistance resulted in a drastic intervention in the slums areas:
eight "pre-war" slums, the Quarantina, Medawar, Tell ez Zeatar, Jisr el Bacha, Camp Syriac, Bourj Rahhal, Bourj Hammoud and Kam ez Zaytoun were partially or completely destroyed, and hundreds of thousands of people were left homeless.

This put an end to the "Misery Belt" and led to its swift re-emergence in one large spot, the Southern Suburb area of Beirut (Fig. 10). This land, only partially developed, absorbed the population of the eight demolished slums in addition to the masses of war-displaced families from east and south Lebanon. The rapid transformation of its image into a symbol of poverty, misery and socio-political ghetto led to coming the term, the Suburb of the Deprived. Today, after twelve years of war, the Suburb of the Deprived calls for an emergency intervention.
Notes to Introduction


5. Ibid., p.2.


7. Harvey Smith, op. cit.

8. Ministry of Planning Census (Beirut, November 1970)


10. "Confessional" has been used by many authors and means "Sectarian".


13. Samir Khalaf, op.cit.


15. Ibid.


19. Ibid.


21. Take, op. cit., p. 34.

22. Ibid.

III. THE SQUATTING PHENOMENON: AN INEVITABLE REALITY

1. Good Prospects for Squatting

Massive squatting as it was manifested in the Southern Suburb since 1975 was, of course, precipitated by the war. Yet, the "raison d'être" of this phenomenon lies in some "essential" factors which I will call "good prospects of squatting". These factors are determined by the dismantling of central power, the availability of space and the laissez-faire policy of the country.

The Dismantling of Central Power:

The squatting phenomenon coincided with a breakdown of order, a lack of administrative control particularly outside the municipal boundaries of Beirut; the dismantling of central power and its acquisition by the dozens of political parties, militias, or any armed individual. As a result, the displaced had no central power to turn to; were not threatened by the non-existent State control; were backed by their affiliate party which claimed responsibility for their livelihood by stopping any threat of eviction, and often by providing them with a space to occupy.

The Availability of Space:

Squatting was helped by the availability of vacant land on the urban periphery, and vacated apartments in the insecure zones of the city.

The Laissez-Faire Policy:

This traditional policy since the independence of Lebanon in 1943, was probably the most "essential circumstance" for the ungoverned provision of minimum urban necessities for the low-income population group. In this free-market society, the housing sector is concentrated in the hands of the private sector, whose sole aim is maximum profit; building luxury apartments
for the high-income class was of course more profitable than low-income housing. This, along with other factors (i.e. competition for urban land, real estate speculation, distortion of the rental market, rapid expansion of population) led to an acute housing crisis in Beirut. Yet, the problem is not an overall shortage of housing, but a paradox of a bloated market with luxury housing (thousands of which are currently vacant) and gross neglect of housing for the low-income group. Squatter settlements became the only "solution to difficult problems rather than problems by themselves".

The laissez-faire policy of the country, thus, did not only act as an enabler or a "good prospect of squatting." It almost dictated the emergence of squatter settlements and was and still is, the major determinant behind their miserable condition. This implies that the system of the country will ultimately govern any intervention in the housing sector, in particular in the illegal settlements of the Southern Suburb.

A critical analysis of this System, (with all its particularities such as the lack of planning tradition, the lack of low-income housing schemes, the reliance on the private sector for housing production...) can therefore serve as a guideline to any attempted proposal to alleviate the problem of squatting. It will even be a warning to any ideological suggestion, by making it clear that the origins of the problem are rooted in the political, economical and social traditions of the country which are unlikely to undergo immediate changes. Thus, any proposal aiming at a workable solution to the housing problem is bound to work within the given framework, corrupt as it may be.

2. The Urban Tradition: A Socio-economic Framework for Intervention

Among the many tangible evidences of the "urban system", the absence of low-income housing provision has gained primacy, since housing needs are, undoubtedly, the most imminent and immediate problem in any country at war. So, provided the war is defined as
only a catalyst for the situation, it is the lack of provision of housing for the low-income group that is the most immediate reason for the emergence of squatters.

An examination of the factors which obstructed the provision of low-income housing can be considered to be sufficient in determining the origins of our actual problem, namely squatting. Yet, it should be reminded that housing is one of the major actors involved in the production of urban space and hence, the issue of housing lies in the broader context of urban planning. In other terms, the housing crisis in Greater Beirut is traced back to an absence of urban planning tradition in the country.

In view of this, this section will first examine the factors which, simultaneously, account for an "antipathy" towards urban planning in Greater Beirut, and the "control" the development of the city by projecting the vested interests of the dominant class often at the expense of the people's needs. It will then determine the specific ways by which those same factors affect the housing situation and how they led to the present housing crisis. Last, it will look at the different actors involved in the management of housing, at their objectives and their actual intervention, as well as the potential of their policies to address the case of the squatter settlements.

A Traditional Antipathy Towards Urban Planning

Urban Planning has been defined in many ways throughout history, ranging from a narrow physical perspective to a broader social context. In its narrow sense, planning is predominantly concerned with issues surrounding the physical form of the city (the spatial arrangement of urban functions and the control and allocation of land). In its broader sense, urban planning represents "deliberate efforts to order the Environment so as to realize common goals and values". More revolutionary theories have defined urban planning as "an instrument
of domination, integration and regulation of contradictions. 

Hence, if control is the function of urban planning, then only social movements are the true source of change and innovation in the city. In Castells’ terms, “urban structures will always be the expression of some institutionalized domination, and urban crisis will be the result of a challenge coming from new actors in history and society”.

Urban planning in Beirut satisfies Castells’ definition in that it is an instrument for the application of the dominants’ interests which deliberately by-pass sound principles of urban planning in the socio-environmental sense. In other terms, there is a clear disjunction between urbanization and urbanism, or between “over-urbanization” and “under-urbanism”.

In light of this outstanding feature of Beirut’s urbanization, I will attempt to examine the factors which accounted for an antipathy towards urban planning, and show that these same factors, inherent in the social and economic System of the country, contributed to the over-urbanization of the city and to its physical and economic development often done at the expense of the people’s needs and interests.

Let us first look at the impact of external forces on urban planning in Beirut:

External Forces:

Population Movements: The most substantial ones have been the successive migrations of Palestinians since 1948 (creation of the State of Israel) and other refugees since as early as 1930, as well as the excessive internal migrations generated by the Israeli’ invasions of South Lebanon in 1978 and 1982. The convergence of migrants and immigrants to the already congested Greater Beirut, along with demographic factors resulting from internal migration and natural growth rates, had a disruptive impact on the government’s ability to implement general master plans or specific zoning schemes.

The Twelve Year War: The war acted as an obstacle in urban planning. The most relevant of its
consequences to the study are the dismantling of central power, and the substantial demographic changes which led to an overconcentration of population in certain areas while other areas were totally devastated.

The City’s Social Structure:

Other factors which accounted for an “antipathy” towards urban planning are some persisting traditions in the city’s social structure.

Beirut’s rapid urbanization has been compounded by a very peculiar feature, namely the survival of communal and traditional loyalties.

Communal Loyalties: Often referred to as “primordial”, the values of the village, where kinship ties are strong and identity is communal, continue to form the basis for the consolidation of most Beirutis. In other words, the swift and extensive urbanization Beirut has been experiencing has not been associated with a comparative decline in kinship ties and communal loyalties. (This suggests, of course, that a sizeable portion of the urban residents are in the city but not from the city). In fact, it is said that Beirut is more “a mosaic of distinct urban communities rather than a melting pot of amorphous urban masses.” Therefore, one could not expect this confessional and pluralistic society to lend itself naturally to strong central controls and planning regulations, especially that the survival of these traditions has been the source of communal solidarity and provided much of the needed social and psychic supports. The protracted civil crisis since 1975 has not only reinforced the communal character of neighbourhoods but has also generated problems of a far more critical magnitude: the massive population shifts have generated further disparities and imbalances between the various communities and have intensified religious hostilities.
The Socio-economic System:

Three important features of the Lebanese society and its traditional "System" have been playing an important role in the so-called disjunction between over urbanization and under urbanism namely, patronage, commercialism and the laissez-faire attitude.

Patronage: To a large measure, much of the socio-political history of Lebanon may be viewed as a history of various groups striving to secure patronage (wasta), client groups needing protection, security and vital benefits, and patrons trying to expand the scope of their clientele. Since patronage does not appear alone but instead, with features of endemic corruption, bribery, private interference in public decisions ..., its prevalence suggests that private and particularistic ends are being promoted at the expense of public concerns. Such manipulations are especially frequent when the case involves land or real estate, which in Lebanon provides one of the most visible sources of commercial speculation.

Of course, patronage services are not limited to the dominant groups. In fact, the only way the ordinary citizen can secure favored treatment or "protection from the law" is by means of "good connections" or political ties. Twelve years of war and the multiplicity of political groups, each implicitly affiliated with a religious sect, have developed new sources of patronage. Today, the most influential patrons are the political parties in power; they would secure favoured treatment to those directly or indirectly affiliated with them. The role of these political organizations has been tremendous in the mobilisation of social movements, and has provided the "means by which social forces develop and contradictions are expressed". ⁹

Commercialism has become so rooted in the ethos of the average citizen that he is "inclined to reduce every relationship and dimension of his life to a cash nexus".¹⁰ The impact of commercialism has also meant that the municipal authorities are no longer able to provide the necessary funds to expropriate vital areas for public use, making it impossible to prevent some of the parcels of land intended for public use from being converted to commercial use¹¹. As a
general result, the moral and aesthetic restraints that could control the growth of the city are completely eroded and sacrificed. The Laissez-Faire Attitude: The third distinctive and persisting feature in the Lebanese society which militates against the introduction of planning, is its laissez-faire and liberal tradition. In mobilizing and managing their human and economic resources, successive governments in Lebanon have continued to pursue policies that encourage free enterprise and private initiative. The nature of Lebanon's planning is in a sense, a reflection of its economic policy: it has never been intended as an instrument of "étatisme" but rather as an aid to the role of public and private sectors in stimulating growth while keeping competition alive. Lebanese planning has in fact assumed Lebanese characteristics, often hanging between the legal forms of planning and sheer anarchy in application.

Among other factors, the laissez-faire policy resulted in the lack of provision of any kind of comprehensive land-use planning that guided the growth of Beirut and its suburbs; thus, while over densification occurred in certain areas, vast stretches of land remained unexploited. This liberalism is manifested in an excessive degree of individualism at the personal level and the predominant absence of government intervention. Such liberalism has very well served the interests of private enterprises, contributed to the rapid economic development and is consistent with the political reality of a pluralistic society; however, it is certainly not compatible with the requirements of urban planning. In fact, since the early 1930's, successive teams of specialists have been engaged in preparing the necessary guidelines to direct the future growth of Beirut. Of all the attempted master plans, the only one which was approved and which was responsible for the subsequent development of Greater Beirut (the General Master Plan), was nothing but a network of roads, with no provision for zoning or considerations for factors which could affect future development. In fact, local interest groups and politicians were arrayed against the planners, for they saw in the plans, especially in the more comprehensive ones, threats to their ability to use property freely.
In summary, three categories of factors account for the failure of urban planning in Greater Beirut:

- **external factors** of incessant flows of urban migrants and immigrants demanding more urban space.

- a socio-cultural milieu characterized by survival of a large residue of traditional norms.

- the dominant's interests, including the laissez-faire ethos, excessive real estate speculations, commercialism and patronage. This category seems to have been the most influential in terms of the development of Beirut's form and structure as well as in the failure of urban planning tradition.

### The Housing Crisis

As was mentioned earlier in this section, Housing is one of the major actors involved in the production and management of urban space. Therefore, the housing crisis in Greater Beirut stands out as one of the most critical by-products of the lack of urban planning and the rapid urbanization. And while urbanization and urbanism in Lebanon are not recognized as public issues, there is considerable awareness and concern for housing as a major problem. Certainly, housing needs are more immediate and imminent, especially to the ever increasing number of those suffering the problem of shelter. In this sense, the housing problem in Beirut has all the manifestations of a genuine crisis in the true sense of the term.

The following part of the study will attempt to determine and analyze the factors which led to the development of the housing crisis in Beirut. These factors are viewed as being divided into three categories: external forces, the "urban system," and the management of housing.
External Forces:

Population movements: The flow of rural migration towards Greater Beirut began in 1860 after the mountain battles between Druzes and Christian Maronites, and has never ceased. By the mid-twentieth century, Beirut witnessed a sudden massive migration from the rural areas of east, north and south Lebanon, due to both the regression of agriculture in those areas and the rapid economic development of Greater Beirut. Also in the late 1940's and 1950's, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians migrated from their country after the creation of the State of Israel in 1948, Armenians and Kurds were fleeing their countries in fear of danger and persecution, Syrians, Turks, Egyptians... of low-income groups came to Beirut in search of jobs. Beirut's population doubled from 150,000 to 300,000.14

These incessant population movements had a tremendous impact on the development of the housing crisis in the capital: The result of these forces was the rapid urbanization of Greater Beirut in the 1960's and early 1970's, accompanied by an extensive economic boom which in turn led to increasing migration inflow. The concentration of population in the capital was unchecked by policies of decentralization or regional development, and so, by 1975, at the eve of the civil war, two thirds of the nation's economic activity was found in Greater Beirut. As a result of continuing migration, the 1960's building boom (a by-product of the economic boom), occurred in mixed and intensive land-use patterns and vertical expansion, with obvious manifestations of uncontrolled and haphazard patterns of growth. This dense pattern of urban settlement has resulted in high prices of land which in turn, led to extensive real estate speculations. Furthermore, the concentration of population and activities meant a strong competition for urban land, scarce in any event due to geography and absence of urban planning. The convergence of migrants and immigrants to the already congested area of Greater Beirut had a disruptive impact on the government's ability to provide housing programs for the lowest income groups.
The only "offered" housing solution to the low-income groups were the slums on the urban periphery.

The Political Crisis: The prolonged effects of war and insecurity since 1975 have further exacerbated the housing crisis. Not only has new construction slowed dramatically due to both the political and economic crisis, but the existing housing stock has been reduced through damage and destruction and whole urban districts have been abandoned. According to the last surveys carried out by the government in 1982, 12,000 dwellings have been partially or totally destroyed only in Beirut and its suburbs\(^{15}\); 70% of the demolition occurred in West Beirut and the Southern Suburb.

Another effect of the war is the internal displacement of more than a million people throughout the country, in fear of danger or persecution and in the case of South Lebanon due to successive Israeli invasions. 80% of the displaced population settled in and around Beirut. With a current population growth rate of 7%, Beirut had to accommodate and provide housing, schooling, medical services, transportation, urban amenities... for at least 40,000 new residents every year! The most important phases of displacement occurred in 1975-76, 1978 and 1982. The first phase accounts mostly for religion based population shifts between East and West Beirut. It also affected thousands of low income families, mostly Lebanese and Palestinian, who moved out of their settlements in the Eastern suburbs after these had been completely destroyed. The second and third important phases of displacement were the Israeli invasions of South Lebanon in 1978 and 1982, and the siege of West Beirut in that year. They resulted in massive displacements from South Lebanon to West Beirut and the Southern Suburb.

All this resulted in further demands for housing, and in particular low-income housing. The lack of response for the immediate needs of the displaced led to the emergence in 1975 of a new phenomenon, wholesale squatting both on land and in vacant buildings.
Discrepancies of the Urban System:

The absence of a comprehensive land-use plan (plan d'aménagement du territoire) classifies the whole country as suitable for urban development, and the government has no authority to refuse granting a building permit anywhere on Lebanese territory. This has led to a dense pattern of settlement, particularly in the urban areas where most of the economic and cultural activities are concentrated.

This situation is most pertinent to Greater Beirut. The dense settlement pattern resulting from a lack of planning was exacerbated by massive rural-urban and urban-urban migrations and the natural increase in population, which, naturally, no urban growth strategy had planned for. At the eve of the civil war in 1975, demand for new housing was estimated at 150,000\(^{16}\), and prospects for the future were not encouraging due to the absence of initiative to meet future demand estimated at 400,000 between then and the year 2000.\(^{17}\)

Beirut's housing crisis has been severely exacerbated by twelve years of violent war, which caused a drastic reduction in the housing stock through damage and destruction and led to extensive displacements throughout the country. The most dramatic consequence of the housing crisis as it manifested itself at the beginning of the war was the proliferation of unhealthy and overcrowded squatter settlements for the low-income displaced category. Despite the pronounced magnitude and dimension of their housing problem, no effective strategy has yet been developed to cope with it and control some of its grievous manifestations.

Lebanon's laissez-faire policy, characterized by the non-intervention of the State and a dynamic private sector, has reduced the market to a specific category, thus intensifying the housing crisis.

In fact, Housing, as well as planning issues have to be assumed by municipal authorities. Large tracts of communal land suitable for housing development are owned or placed
under their jurisdiction, whereas the government is not a major land owner contrary to most developing countries. Hence, the role of municipal authorities is crucial and their operations should be streamlined in order to improve their efficiency. Unfortunately, this has not been the case so far. Certainly, the sector which is making best use of the lack of planning is the private sector. It concentrates solely on short-term profits and an early return on capital invested through luxury construction for an affluent minority who is not in need of housing. This brings us to another point, the lack of provision of public housing schemes. Very few public housing schemes subsidized by the government were started in the suburbs of Beirut as well as in South Lebanon, but were never completed or leased to the targeted people. Most of them are occupied by militia men, others are partially destroyed.

The interests of the uncontrolled private sector, along with the scarcity of urban land due to substantial population inflow as well as to the lack of a comprehensive land-use urban plan, have led to increased land values. In fact, spiralling land prices have become the norm since the 1960's. Fueling these price increases was a purely speculative aspect where investors perceived capital gains in the land market as higher than any other investment alternative. This contributed to the "luxury phenomenon", as developers tended towards a high total value of building plus land, and hence a higher profit margin than could be obtained with lower value building on expensive land. Speculation became such that the large developer was in no hurry to sell his luxury units. The most critical consequence of all that is the severe distortions of the market with mismatches between supply and demand of housing types and income levels. One has to be reminded at this point that "commercialism", which has been viewed to be one of the traditional characteristics of the Lebanese society, has a significant role to play in the field of real estate speculation. "Every entity and human capacity is conceived as a resource for the acquisition of profit or as a commodity to be sold to the highest bidder in a competitive market place." 18

Land is certainly not spared and has been subjected to the most intensive and profitable forms of
exploitation. Since the 1980's, commercial traffic in land has become one of the most important sources of private wealth.

The housing crisis also evolves around the rent law which seems to have ignored inflation. This is probably its most important pitfall as it results in a freezing of old rents thereby accentuating the tendency towards a shrinking rent supply. Thus, instead of fighting the high costs of living, the rent law organised the housing shortage, and one can almost no longer find apartments for rent in Beirut.

This factor is enough to prevent any surprise as to the emergence of squatter settlements by and for the low-income group. Moreover, it would be only ironical to claim that the settlements should be relocated in public housing schemes, since these do not seem to be the priority of either the State or the private sector, and would be hard to reconcile with the interests of all the parties involved.

Housing Management

Historical Overview: The first legislative decree on housing ever issued was in 1962, whereby a Housing Council was formed. The latter's task was to create some private and public companies for the management of housing. All of it remained on paper. In 1965, the law was amended, placing an emphasis on the involvement of the Housing Council in actual housing projects, which would be partially subsidized by the government and targeted towards the lower income groups. Again, the objective was not fully attained: only three governmental housing schemes were implemented, and only partially, since they were never delivered to their intended beneficiaries who could not afford the high costs of rent themselves obligatorily due to the high costs of material and building construction; the housing projects ended up being, a few years later, the de-facto property of squatters and militia men. In 1973, the Housing Council was replaced by a Ministry of Housing, whose goal was to set a definite housing policy, too little is
known of the latter to even attempt to define it.

This is enough to suggest that the "overall" inability to control the housing situation at the benefit of the people was not entirely the consequence of the national political crisis and the normlessness of the prevailing situation. Ever since the housing issue started gaining awareness, any concern for it and the little attempts to formulate these concerns were frustrated by some unrevealed opposition plans.

The first real government efforts to tackle the housing problem were started in 1977. This sudden concern was a result of the substantial reduction of the already deficient housing stock provoked by the 1975-76 civil war. The housing problem previous to the war quickly took the drastic proportions of an acute crisis: homelessness, displacement, migration, squatting, were its most obvious manifestations. In the government's efforts to alleviate the problem, a Ministry of Housing and Cooperatives was created and was to be the principal agency responsible for the Housing sector in Lebanon. This newly established Ministry, faced with the task of reconstruction of damaged buildings in the whole country, was unable to face up to the problem of setting up a long-term housing strategy. However, several government and semi-autonomous entities have been created under its tutelage, for the implementation of a comprehensive program of housing rehabilitation and reconstruction. In all cases the approach has been the provision of long-term loans to families to help them repair, construct or purchase housing units. Three distinct programs have been started and all are currently in operation: The Decree Law 20, the Housing Bank and the Caisse Autonome de l'Habitat (National Housing Fund).²⁰

The Decree Law 20 is operated by the Ministry of Housing and Cooperatives through its headquarters in Beirut and seven regional offices. Beneficiaries under the Decree Law 20 have to be Lebanese citizens in "good standing", prove ownership of the dwelling and submit proof of legal construction. By the end of 1983, only one quarter of the applications had been
processed\textsuperscript{21}. This shortage was primarily due to the insufficiency of funds, the shortage of staff, the cumbersome routine for loan processing and also the lack of security. Today, the Decree Law 20 is taking steps to increase its staff and streamline its procedure in order to be able to increase the number of loans processed from the present maximum level of 6000 loans per year to about 20 000 loans per year\textsuperscript{22}.

The Housing Bank was established in 1977 and owned by the government, the Social Security Fund and the private sector. Its main funding source has been the budgetary allocations of the central government\textsuperscript{23}. The Housing Bank can operate over the whole country and extend loans to Lebanese citizens of good standing and from middle and high income groups. The loans are made for the purchase of a ready-built apartment or for the construction of a new house. The collateral required is a mortgage on the title. In 1982, after two years of activity, the Housing Bank suffered from a severe shortage of funds and had to curtail its lending. In 1983, after three years of operations, the Housing Bank had a modest impact on the housing supply, and had already encountered some of the difficulties which usually face new financing institutions, such as the inability to diversify its sources of funds, thus emphasizing its dependence on government's financing.

The National Housing Fund (Caisse Autonome de l'Habitat) was also established in 1977, it can operate outside the municipal boundaries of Beirut. The original capital of the National Housing Fund was put up by the government. However, it benefits from a second source of income generated by what is known as the Murr Decree. This decree was promulgated in 1978 and allowed for an increase in the intensity of exploitation in land in the suburbs. Beneficiaries have to be residents of the area and have to submit proof of residence for ten years. Loans are granted to Lebanese citizens of good standing from the middle-income bracket. In 1980, the National Housing Fund was re-established under a new law by which 70% of the granted loans were to be targeted to families whose annual income was below the 1980 median
income and 30% to middle-income families.

A Recent Approach to the Management of Housing: Although considerable effort has been made to establish and expand these programs, the volumes of loans are very small compared to the total need, and only a fraction of the loans are for new construction. Furthermore, except for some of the loans through the National Housing Fund, it is not the lower-income groups which benefit but rather "large property holders and top-rank officials who are far from being in need".24

Recently, considerable thought and discussion on government's policy towards housing has been taking place within the Ministry of Housing and Cooperatives and among other concerned professional groups. It is generally recognized that the government must begin to intervene actively in the market on both the supply and demand sides, so that the country can exit from a situation which many consider to be its most pressing problem. A wide range of options have been considered, such as facilitating the supply of serviced land for housing especially for the low-income groups, the development of a revolving national housing fund, the development of the cooperative housing sector... These, however, need a more consistent institutional framework and a much improved information base. To this end, the government established in December 1983 the General Institute of Housing, a semi-autonomous body under the Ministry of Housing and Cooperatives and including the National Housing Fund. On paper at least, the General Institute of Housing was to be the prime institutional vehicle for a much wider governmental role in the housing process.

Yet again, the fear is that as soon as a public body is established to deal with an issue, political pressure and private interests will interfere to manipulate the law to suit their own individualistic ends. This fear was well expressed by the former Minister of Housing: "I hope that "they" will not want to "touch" [the General Institute of Housing] for it might intervene with "their" interests."25
Government's Housing Policy

Objectives and Policy Framework: In setting a range of options for housing policy, the objectives of the government have been to increase the housing stock as rapidly as possible, to generate an active housing market where a broad array of units affordable to all income groups will be provided, and to ensure that all these activities will take place in a proper land-use pattern.

According to the government, achieving these objectives, the policy of the government is to minimize the burden on the public sector and rely as much as possible on the private sector, developers and individuals. The State would aim at providing the needed guidance, including the development of a national perspective on urbanization thus affirming its role in guiding urban growth in an orderly and coherent manner. That is the theory the government decides to follow after it realizes the importance of breaking the supply bottleneck. In application, this would mean to encourage the private sector to build units for both rental and ownership and to restore and maintain the existing housing stock. It would also mean that the role of the public sector is not perceived as a builder of housing units but rather as a facilitator, a creator of circumstances in which individuals can build themselves. The municipalities would be encouraged to undertake, with the assistance of the Higher Council for Municipalities Organization, the Ministry of Housing and Cooperatives, the Ministry of Public Works and the Council for Development and Reconstruction, specific land assembly and site development projects, especially of the sites and services type. Then, if needed, the government should explore the possibility of a parastatal institution which would undertake land assembly and development projects including housing as well as other uses. This institution could become a prime instrument for guiding urban growth and anticipating future needs. The government's second important task would be the decontrol of rents and the provision of incentive for building. Therefore, in theory, government's intervention is geared towards alleviating supply constraints by ensuring access to finance and the provision of land, services and utilities. Such
interventions, the policy affirms, would be targeted for families below the median income level, since it is assumed that those above that income level can find adequate shelter through the existing market mechanism. In keeping with this general approach, the State considers that no subsidies and no maximum cost recovery should be sought. This implies that actions to ensure affordability should be undertaken at the level of physical standards.

"1983-1985 Public Investment Program": Short-term and medium-term programs: In light of these objectives and theoretical approaches, the government has formulated some short-term and medium-term programs.

The short-term program, to be seen in the context of a policy framework which should generate medium to long-term perspectives, involves the restoration of damaged and destroyed units and the building of new low-cost rental units. It also includes studies which should provide a general physical planning framework for policy initiatives and project interventions or which are intended to lead to the preparation of specific projects to be implemented as a medium-term program.

The short-term program is thus viewed as a step to normalizing the post-war conditions to launch the medium and long-term program.

It is also an immediate one-time input to alleviate the misery and hardship of the hundreds of thousands of war-displaced and homeless people. It discusses three broad subjects:

- "The Homeless' Institute": It represents the squatters whose shelters have been destroyed and who basically have nowhere to go. For them, a three-step program has been envisaged: They should be moved promptly to sites on nearby government or communal land; tents, prefabricated units and other temporary facilities should be provided immediately; ultimate upgrading of the sites, with the provision of decent shelter should be undertaken in incremental servicing and upgrading operations. Besides, the "Homeless' Institute" recognizes the existence of two categories of squatters, namely, those wishing to return to their villages and those who want to
stay. The first category is eligible to benefit from the Decree Law 20 credit line discussed earlier. The second category will be part of a medium-term program which will have them absorbed in appropriate sites and services projects. Until then, they should be made to pay a monthly payment to the State as an "enrolment fee" in the resettlement scheme. It is important to note that this payment is meant to be made towards participation in the sites and services schemes and in no way creates a legal basis for the tenancy of the squatter in the presently occupied premises.

Persons whose residences have been damaged or destroyed: The key instrument for dealing with these people would be the Decree Law 20. It is intended that this credit line should be made available to as many needy persons as possible. Accordingly, amendments to the Decree Law 20 were considered by the government, and further studies will be undertaken to explore ways of extending the benefits of the Decree or any other law to those beneficiaries presently ineligible to obtain assistance due to illegal status of ownership or to irregularity of building.

Low-Cost Housing: As mentioned before, the government established the Ministry of Housing and Cooperatives to cope with the shortage of low-income housing. The Ministry had hardly started getting organized when the war began. Since then, all its efforts have been diverted to the repair and reconstruction of damaged housing.

In parallel with the short-term reconstruction programs, two studies have been proposed, namely a Land-Use Planning study which is to develop an overall spatial framework for the utilization of Lebanon's limited land resources; a Master Plan for Greater Beirut which would be essential to provide the framework for the proposed land assembly-sites and services projects, as well as for the proper integration of land-use and transport planning.

The Medium-term program includes three proposed studies, the Housing Finance Project, the Greater Beirut Urban Transport Project and the Land Assembly - Sites and Services Project.

The Housing Finance Project: Its objectives would be to mobilize resources into a sound
financial framework which would provide the poor with access to housing finance. For this purpose, it would be using the two existing housing banks, the Housing Bank and the Caisse Autonome de l'Habitat. Its main intentions would be to produce and market low-cost housing units affordable to the lower half of the income distribution curve and to mobilize and direct housing finance to these groups.

_The Urban Transport Project_: It would basically aim at improving the existing performance system by introducing a traffic management program improving damaged roads.

_Environmental Projects_: Their main objectives would be: to undertake studies leading to the identification of land suitable for residential development, to facilitate open market purchases of small parcels of land in critical areas, to create subsidies for the sale of serviced lots to low and moderate income households. The development of serviced land by the government would result in guiding the pattern of urban growth, limiting speculation in land, providing a more efficient pattern of land-use and ensuring adequate land for sheltering the poor. Furthermore, the sale of such serviced land at reasonable market rates could leave the government with a substantial profit on the cost of land and infrastructure which could be channeled towards ensuring the availability of low-cost housing for the poor.26

Before I conclude this chapter, let me sum up the major issues that the analysis of the housing crisis has set forth:

The housing crisis has been perceived as the most critical by-product of the lack of urban planning tradition and the rapid urbanization in Beirut. It occurred as a result of:

_External factors_ characterised by an incessant flow of migrants until 1975, supplanted by massive internal displacement in the last twelve years, as well as a considerable reduction of the housing stock due to the war.

_Discrepancies at the policy level_ mainly in the absence of a comprehensive land-use plan and
the interests of the private sector which led to an increase in land values and to the reduction of the housing market to a specific income group.

Managerial discrepancies portrayed in the State's inability to control the housing situation to the benefit of the people, in the over ambitious housing programs which they promote and in the inevitable interference of the private interests in public decisions.

As a result of all these factors, urban squatting has become the only housing solution to the low income population.

3. Conclusion

The government's recent approach to housing was an attempt to break with with the conventional policies which have not addressed the needs of the low-income population. Yet, programs for the rehousing of squatters have proven too ambitious: one, at the policy level, where strategies pertaining to the immediacy of the problem of the squatters have not been determined; at the financial level, if one considers the cost of imported prefabricated units and low-cost housing both intended to be part of a short-term program. Besides, these programs still regard the twelve year squatting situation as a temporary issue and they almost deliberately disregard the squatters' financial constraints as well as their attempt for a "normal" life, by suggesting relocation and the payment of an enrollment fee prior to resettlement! At the social level, governmental policies overlook the cultural specificities of the squatters as well as their perception of the community as a major institution.

On the whole, of all the government's objectives and policies cited above, none has been fully implemented. Neither to prior nor during the war has the government been able to plan shelter effectively for the growing urban population or cope with the demand for rising houses as a result of massive destruction and shifting populations. That is because of three major reasons, namely, the war and the instability of the political and economical situation,
the interference of the dominant groups in any attempt to alleviate the crisis, to suit their own private interests and their over ambitious programs which standards are not necessarily those of their beneficiaries. "... People in impoverished areas rarely demand the unreasonable. On the contrary, it is governments who often want more for their people than people want for themselves. ... Reaching a consensus is not only socially expedient, it can also lead to less costly solutions. People may be more willing to pay for improvements which they have helped identify as necessary rather than those given by governments, and in this way, cost recovery is facilitated". 27

The government has been largely responsible for the endemic crisis of housing, and has been "the traditional means by which the dominants' interests have divided the urban cake". 28 Public institutions created for the purpose of alleviating the situation were only able to undertake "rescue operations" on a small scale, due to financial limitations. Private enterprise whose sole concern is profit and who does not have any public, civic or national consideration, has proven incapable of solving or even relieving the problem. The state's deep-seated weakness and deficiency in civility and public consciousness has generated mistrust from the deprived and cynicism about any kind of promised charity.

Unfortunately, weakness is not only a trait of the local government. It is also inherent in the people themselves and is best portrayed by the absence of collective protest. This is not very unusual in a society like Lebanon which continues to be sustained by parochial and fragmented ties and concerns, as discussed earlier in the study. The mobilization of collective action in favor of housing or any other public amenity requires, above all, that "groups" become "publics" and predisposed to transcend their local and segmental interests for the sake of welfare. Most of such movements in Lebanon, even when sparked by legitimate needs and claims, have either been abortive or ineffectual in mobilizing the necessary collective action. Until today, the working classes of the city have been resigned to the high social costs of urban property.
The middle classes for their part, depoliticized, lacking means of collective action and living in relatively privileged urban areas, are unlikely to provide either a basis for their own movement or support for popular action.

The only manifestation of collective action occurred when the situation reached a climax, and thousands of families were displaced by the war. Self-help, since no other kind of help was provided, was the only solution to subsistence problems. Squatting, or the invasion of land and buildings by the homeless is, to be sure, a form of collective action. But it is also, in its own way, another manifestation of the political, economic and social traditions of the country. Indeed, the laissez-faire attitude has proven essential to the provision of minimum urban necessities for such a population, which has never transcended its local and private interests, whether to solve a subsistence problem or not.

The overall urban situation does not call for any type of recommendations at the broad levels of Housing or Urban Planning, for the intricacies of the "system" have not been all revealed. Yet, a thorough understanding of the situation is necessary, for it means an understanding of the constraints generated by the System of the country. Since it is assumed that the System is not likely to change soon, these constraints will provide the socio-economical and urban framework within which an attempt to intervene in the most critical aspect of housing, namely the war-displaced settlements, has to fit.

Still, a framework for intervention cannot be restricted to socio-economical parameters. Physical and urbanistic criteria ought to be considered and maintained if a realistic proposal is aimed at. These will be the concern of the following chapter.
Notes to Chapter


2. In a survey done by Claude Dubar and Salim Nass, the dominant class has been defined as consisting of traditional politicians (not necessarily active), members of the government, industrialists and land owners. See, Claude Dubar and Salim Nass, Les classes sociales au Liban (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1976).


6. "Urbanization" refers to a physical phenomenon, measured by urban densities, overconcentration in large cities, migration... In other terms, to the physical growth of the city and as a result, to its economic development. "Urbanism" is a qualitative and socio-cultural phenomenon measured by the relevance of planning and city structure to the social organization. See Samir Khalaf, "Social Structure and Urban Planning in Lebanon", in Property, Social Structure and Law in the Modern Middle East, ed. Ann Mayer (State University of New York Press, 1985).


10. Samir Khalaf, op.cit., p.231.

11. In fact, legislation in Lebanon permits such conversions.

12. For further detail on the matter, see Samir Khalaf, op. cit., p.231.


19. In Tyre and Majdalaya in South Lebanon and Tripoli in North Lebanon.

20. For further information on this matter, see, Council for Development and Reconstruction, op. cit.

21. Ibid., pp. 2-6.

22. Ibid., p. 3.

23. 66% of the term resources at the end of 1982. Ibid.


26. For further information, see, Council for Development and Reconstruction, op. cit.


IV. THE SOUTHERN SUBURB: A REGIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR INTERVENTION

After the broad socio-economic and socio-political framework has been determined, it is important to attempt to define a more tangible set of parameters. In order to intervene in the squatter sectors of the Southern Suburb, the understanding of the region as a whole is paramount, for it serves as a guideline for the intervention in its squatter settlements.

This chapter will first present a historical overview of the Southern Suburb. Then, it will focus on the physical analysis of the region that is, its urban development, its land use and the architecture and fabric of its low-income residential neighbourhoods.

1. Historical Development of the Southern Suburb

Since the nineteenth century and until 1943, the southern suburbs of Beirut were vast unoccupied stretches of agricultural land and sand dunes. The economy was non-existent, since agriculture was kept at a regional level. It was not until the early 1920's that trade in agriculture started developing with the capital Beirut, no longer self-sufficient due to a start of urbanization at the expense of its agricultural terrains. Density in the southern suburbs was very low; only a few houses surrounded by private gardens existed at the time.

In 1943, the suburbs witnessed the first flow of rural-suburban migration. The reasons were obvious; Beirut had undergone, during the French colonial period, a major step in urban development. On the other hand, the Southern Suburbs were still underdeveloped, and the land value there was very low. their proximity to the capital made them even more attractive to the migrants. Another reason for the rural-suburban and rural-urban migration was the regression of agriculture in the rural areas. Within half a decade, the small "villages" of the southern suburbs were housing over 100,000 people. In 1948, thousands of Palestinians fleeing their country, settled in the Burj el Barajneh camp in the Southern Suburb region. The 1950's and 1960's were the decades of major economic and urban development in Beirut, and resulted in more exodus from rural areas and other Middle Eastern countries; the major objective was the search for jobs.
Another result of the city's economic boom was the affluence of rich capital holders from Egypt, Iraq, and Syria, who shunned the nationalization of large enterprises and settled in Beirut and activated considerably the investment market. Besides, some important projects concerning the Southern Suburb were decreed between 1952 and 1958, among which was Beirut International Airport. Urban policies aimed at creating an intermediary zone between the Airport and the capital, Beirut. It was to include a zone of luxury villas and sports centers such as the Golf Club, the Cité Sportive and a Hippodrome, which was never built. The implementation of these projects resulted in a sudden interest among the notables of Beirut in real estate speculations in the area, which created a tremendous confusion as to the issue of land tenure. Indeed, a recent decree had allowed the inhabitants of the Southern Suburb to lease a parcel from the municipality and built on it. The Southern Suburb's urbanization had major consequences, namely, an increasing exodus of rural families attracted to the area by the new job opportunities, the formation of four illegal sectors around the Airport, Ramli, Ouzai Haye Selloum and Burj el Barajneh, (Fig. 11), and a densification of the "legal" residential sectors of the Southern Suburb. This quick densification exacerbated an already existing problem, the lack of adequate infrastructure.

In 1958, a more moderate government came into power and until 1970, there was the most elaborate attempt to free the state from its confessional shackles and to plan for urban development on the national level. Among the planning attempts, Michel Ecochard issued the "Schéma Directeur de Beyrouth et de sa Banlieue", which consisted of three major points: regrouping the residential zones to avoid their infinite extension, integrating recent suburban development in the city, taking into account the considerable growth of unhealthy "slums", and legalising all construction dating prior to 1964. Ecochard's plan was not implemented. Yet, some development actions derived from the plan were to be done in the Southern Suburb area. Some of them were in favour of the new settlements, such as the construction of elementary and
II. SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS IN THE SOUTHERN SUBURB
secondary schools, upgrading the infrastructure without officially legalizing the settlements, and
the creation of Social Development Centers. The major project which was not in favor of the
newly created settlements was the schism of some municipalities. This point deserves further
explanations, for the division has in a way prepared the grounds for more consequential divisions
among the inhabitants. The Southern Suburbs were administered by three municipalities: Burj el
Barajneh, Chiah and Shweifat. The repartition of regions among the municipalities was made on
geographic basis and no confessional bias was yet apparent. In fact, almost all religions and sects
in the country were represented in the Southern Suburbs. The fragmentation of the municipalities
involved the division of each of the two municipalities of Burj el Barajneh and Chiah into two,
along sectarian lines: Burj el Barajneh of Shiite majority and the new municipality of Mrejye of
Christian Maronite majority; Chiah municipality of Christian majority and the new municipality of
Ghobeiry of Shiite majority. If one looks at the geographic cut-out of the municipality of Chiah
into Chiah and Ghobeiry, one would notice that its complexity is due to the integration of a
district, Hay al Kussi (Church district) to Chiah. Geographically, the annexation looks forced;
it only proves that the objective was to create two municipal entities of homogeneous religion.
Physically, it was preparing the grounds for a further socio-political division which would be
manifested at the beginning of the civil war.

By the end of the 1960's, illegal construction took new dimensions, due to the rise
of the Palestinian Resistance in Beirut. The illegal densification is particularly obvious in the
Palestinian camps of Burj el Barajneh, Sabra and Chatila. The victory of the Palestinian
Liberalization Organisation stimulated the expansion of the Islamo-Progresist opposition and by
the same token, encouraged the illegal construction in the Shiite sectors of the Southern Suburb.

That was the situation on the eve of the 1975-76 civil war that resulted in the damage
and destruction of 40,000 housing units in Beirut alone.² Squatting started taking new
proportions, and one can attribute this period of time to the emergence of squatting as a
nation-wide phenomenon. Still, the new squatting dimension was mostly visible in Greater Beirut. The outrageous number of people once more displaced from the pre-war slums, led to the very prompt densification of the Southern Suburb as well as of specific neighbourhoods of the capital. In 1976, the displaced population in Beirut and the Southern Suburb was estimated at 200,000. The hundreds of thousands of evicted families from the pre-war slums, joined by masses of displaced people from South Lebanon, found refuge in West Beirut and its Southern Suburb, often guided by their political parties. As opposed to the land squatting phenomenon in the Suburb area, which could not happen in the capital because of the shortage of vacant land, Beirut witnessed cases of building squatting, mainly in the most dangerous zones since these were vacated: the Hotels district, Staico, Wadi Abou Jamil, Bab Idriss, Raouché and Ramlet el Baida (Fig. 12). In the Southern Suburb, the resettlement pattern clearly followed ethnic and sectarian lines: Palestinians settled in the camps of Sabra, Chatila and Borj el Barajneh; Lebanese Shites joined some already established squatters in the sectors of Ramil, Ouzai, Hayes Seloum...and created new settlements such as Jnah and Bir Hassan. The coastal line of Jnah and Ouzai was mostly occupied by Syrians and Kurds who squatted in the private beach cabins. The pattern of resettlement was further governed by family and regional ties. The Displaced often chose to settle next to his family and friends. This aspect had a tremendous influence on the spatial structure of the settlements, as will be demonstrated later in the case of Ramil, by the formation of clusters of houses of extended families and the growth of these clusters with each incoming member of the family.

By that time, 1976, the partitioning of Greater Beirut into east (Christian) and west (Muslim), was confirmed, and the so-called "Green Line" emerged on the city map. It would be interesting to note that the eight demolished slums previously mentioned were located in the East part of Greater Beirut and that those in the west part, such as Ramil and Ouzai, created in the 1950's, were left untouched. This might say something about the State's urban politics, their
12. BUILDING SQUATTING IN WEST BEIRUT
notions of "beautification", and the "cleaning" and "dumping" process, if one might call it so.

On the urban stage, the results were clear: the pre-war Poverty Belt which until 1975, surrounded Beirut on three sides, north, east and south, was relocated in one overdensified region, the Southern Suburb. It was renamed: the Suburb of the Deprived.

Between 1976 and 1978, urban demographic changes started to be felt. Christian families living in the Southern Suburb area, moved gradually towards East Beirut and the Eastern Suburbs. A homogeneity in the Southern Suburb ethnic, religious, social, economic and political backgrounds was forming: Palestinian refugees, Lebanese Shiites, all from the low income class and all politically opposed to the State. Another surname to the Southern Suburb was created: the Suburb of Opposition.

This homogeneity was exacerbated in 1978 with the flow of the displaced Shiite families from South Lebanon, fleeing their villages invaded by the Israeli army, and estimated at 250,000 civilians. The aspects of illegality which characterised these settlements especially since 1975, also applied to the basic utilities which were not provided otherwise.

The 1982 Israeli invasion and siege of West Beirut put an end to the swift horizontal densification of the Southern Suburb. It resulted in the displacement of 450,000 people from West Beirut and the Southern Suburb, the partial and total destruction of 72,000 housing units in Beirut, mostly in the low-income neighbourhoods, and the demolition of approximately 30% of the settlements of the Southern Suburb. On the national scale, displacement soared to two million people of all socio-economic classes, including migration to other countries. Displacement within West Beirut and the Southern Suburb led to the evacuation of certain districts.

In 1983, reconstruction was re-started in the Southern Suburb, making a statement as to the permanence of the settlements. Urban politics did not share the same concepts. The aim of the State was the destruction of the image of Opposition of the Southern Suburb, the dedensification or the disintegration of the settlements and the transformation of the demographic,
ethnic and religious distribution. Their aims were programmed into three points: one, the most ironical perhaps since it implies a form of relief aid, was a loan program for the settlers to return to their villages. Two, were decreed projects to be implemented in the Southern Suburb area. These two approaches were never realized. Instead, it was the most radical manifestation of their aims that was put in action. On October 8, 1982, the army demolished 400 houses and shops located to the east of the Airport. On October 9, a deadly battle opposed the army to the inhabitants of Raml when the army attempted to demolish their mosque. Other instances of this sort also took place. In February 1984, in an operation which aimed at West Beirut and the Southern Suburb, heavy bombardments left, besides the dead, 6000 houses, 12 shops and 61 small industries, all destroyed. A huge part of the national low-income housing stock was lost.

The recent fightings of 1986 do not give any figures, but they certainly resulted in more destruction than ever before.

Today, no agreement has yet been made on a population census, and figures, according to the political objectives of their sources, vary from 400,000 to 800,000 persons, that is more than a quarter of the Lebanese population.

2. "The Suburb of the Deprived"

Twelve years of war have helped the metamorphosis of a simple geographic indication, the southern suburbs of Beirut, into a nation-wide symbol: symbol of misery, illegality and political upheaval; day after day, the Southern Suburb of Beirut has become the "Suburb of the Refugees", the "Shiites' Suburb", the "Suburb of Misery", the "Suburb of the Deprived"...

Today, the Southern-Suburb houses more than 75% of the displaced families of the country, 800,000 people, of the lowest income groups, live on 28 km sq. of overcrowded and only partially serviced land. It would be an irony to say that the Southern-Suburb's various
symbols are not authentic reflections of its sad reality. First, of the 800,000 people, 100,000 are illegally settled. 8 Misery has not spared neither the legal nor the illegal sectors, but illegality has been, and still is, the most controversial issue that the settlements have created. Second, the overwhelming majority of the settlers is Shiite Muslim of rural origin, who fled their dangerous or invaded villages in Southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley; this community, who since 1943 has been fighting for its rights, has found its power with the rise of political Opposition to which most of the Shiites adhere. The Southern-Suburb became in a way the Shiites' headquarters as well as the major stage for contestation, both at the level of political opposition and that of its diverse manifestations (militias, political parties, opposition movements). 9

Among all these realities, it is that of illegality, under its various forms, which seems to be the major concern of the parties involved. It is not, though, illegality in its juridistic sense which seems to create the predominant controversy (i.e. occupation of private or public owned land, building without permit). The government's major preoccupation is the "socio-political illegality", the incessantly rising power of the Southern-Suburb community, or in other terms, the "ghetto of the opposition", which has been publicly described by the Lebanese right-wing in the following terms: ...."Deprivation ( referring to the Movement of the Deprived ) was made up by the political conspirators ( the leaders of opposition ) to better destroy the country ... The poor of the Southern Suburb accepted it in the name of the "cause", i.e. the cause of the Deprived.... They exploited the people in their state of ignorance, because ignorance leads to revolution and revolution leads to other revolutions"... 10

Not only does the Southern-Suburb have a negative image in the political aspect of the situation; it also gave way to a significant socio-economic discriminations. This aspect is clearly portrayed in the "Rapport" of the Ministry of Public Works in its description of the illegal sector of the Southern-Suburb:

"... Districts of a negative image and repulsive role."
Families clustering along ethnic lines, strongly held to their territories.

Mediocre architecture and construction material.

Lack of spatial organization.

Social and economic degradation.

Marginal population, mediocre resources.

Cultural problems, under-qualification."

As a conclusion, we read: "It is true that the first problem remains to transform these "individuals" into Lebanese citizens". 11

3. Physical Analysis of the Southern Suburb

It is important to bear in mind that although the image of the Southern Suburb today, implies an ever expanding stretch of overcrowded land of poor residential character, its land use is of the most heterogeneous and varies from the typical "suburban villa" zones to the tin shacks settlements. Moreover, it is the only region in Greater Beirut with a potential for large scale development. It is therefore worth looking closer into this "land of misfortune", because any intervention aiming at alleviating the problems of the squatter settlements has to recognize the potential of the surrounding land.

The following analysis will be concerned with the urban development of each of these zones, the programmed future developments of each and their land-use distribution. Then, it will focus on the low-income residential neighbourhoods of the Southern Suburb, their social profile, their architecture and urban tissue, their methods of construction and their utilities and community services. Each of these parts will help substantiate a set of parameters which are believed to be useful to consider for any program of intervention in the squatter settlements of the Southern Suburb. Together, these parameters will formulate a second framework for a housing strategy.
The Southern Suburb of Beirut covers an area of 9.4 sq. miles and is located south of the municipal limits of Beirut, north of Khailik and west of the hilly towns of Hadath, Baabda and Shweifat. It is bordered by the Mediterranean sea to the west. (Fig. 13). The land is almost flat, although the sand dunes that were formed on it sometimes attain an altitude of 50 feet. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the availability of land in this region has been one of the reasons for the successive phases of spontaneous settlements, a consequence of the continuous flow of massive migration over the past forty years.

To begin with, a general survey of the Southern Suburb land use distribution will help clarify the situation. A land use distribution of the area as it is today, shows 41.47% residential area, 11.67% sports and leisure, 6.55% facilities and 40.31% unbuilt area (agriculture and waste land).\(^{12}\) (Fig. 13):

The residential zones consist of: the legal middle to low-income districts known as the traditional villages of the Southern Suburb, covering an area of 2.6 sq. miles and of a density equal to 152 pers./acre; the luxury high-rise and garden-villes residential zones at the north-west tip of the Suburb, of 0.85 sq. mile and a density of 300 pers./acre; finally, the illegal sectors scattered almost equally every where else, totalling 0.9 sq. mile and with an average density of 250 pers./acre.\(^{13}\)

The leisure zones include the Golf Club of 0.85 sq. mile, the Cité Sportive of 0.2 sq. mile, a municipal football field of 0.03 sq. mile and a series of private beaches along the coast of which only a few still serve the same function.

The major facilities include Beirut International Airport covering an area of 1.76 sq. miles and the Sciences Branch of the Lebanese University of 0.4 sq. mile.

The Southern Suburb is administered by seven municipalities: Ghobeiry, Borj el Barajneh, Mreiyeh, Haret hreik, Chiah, Hadath and Shweifat. The first four are wholly located in the Southern Suburb. (Fig. 14).
15. LAND USE DISTRIBUTION IN THE SOUTHERN SUBURB
The physical analysis of the Southern Suburb will not rely on the subdivision of the area into its different municipalities but instead into four larger geographical sectors, each of which bears distinct characteristics of land use, potential for development and ability or "will" to absorb temporarily or permanently the squatter settlements of the Displaced. These zones will be defined as follows:

- the Coastal Zone, extending from the Mediterranean coast to the Airport Boulevard west and east, from the municipal limits of Beirut to the north, to the International Airport to the south. (Fig. 15).

- the Central Zone, located between the Airport Boulevard to the west, the Hadath Plain to the east, the northern limits of the municipality of Borj el Barajneh to the north and the Shweifat Plain to the south.

- the North-Eastern Zone, extending from the municipal limits of Beirut, north, to the northern limits of the municipality of Borj el Barajneh south, the Airport Boulevard west and the Hadath Plain east of it.

- the South-Eastern Zone, bordered by the Airport to the west, the Hadath plain to the east, the southern limits of the municipality of Borj el Barajneh to the north and the Shweifat Plain to the south.

Urban Development

The Coastal Zone:

The geographic setting of this zone along the Mediterranean coast and at proximity to the center of the capital (20 minutes by car from furthest point), and the establishment of the International Airport in 1952 south of this zone, together made it an incredibly potential land for development and by the same token a land of very high economic value.

Physically, the determinants for the genesis of this zone were the two north-south
axes, the Airport Boulevard and Ouzai Boulevard. Easy accessibility to this zone became an additional asset indeed. The Ouzai Boulevard (Fig. 16a) was directly recognized and functioned as the major link between Beirut and South Lebanon. It acted as a strong "transit" line and accumulated services and retail activities related to "passage" such as gas stations, auto-repair shops, "fast food" stores... The Airport Boulevard (Fig. 16a) on the other hand, never had time to generate services and activities at a regional level or those linked to the Airport, as was expected of it. It is interesting to note that the activities and role of these two axes were never implied by the overwhelming character of the two major sub-zones which grew as a result of the physical setting of the zone. Indeed, the littoral (Fig. 16a), owned by the government, was developed into a leisure and tourism zone, with a series of private beaches, cafés and restaurants along the coast lines of Jnah and Ouzai. The only residential neighbourhood of the littoral sub-zone was a handful of garden-houses in Ouzai which started witnessing, in the early 1950's, a phenomenon of "random" squatting due to the recent flows of rural-urban migration. The internal sub-zone (including the districts of Jnah and Bir Hassan) (Fig. 16a) grew as the "natural extension" of the capital. Its very high land value, due to its location peripheral to the capital, attracted zones of high-rise and villa-type residences, developed on grided parcels, atypical of any urban development; major public administrations, embassies, banks and private sports clubs such as the Golf Club and the Cité Sportive. The apparent socio-economic homogeneity of this zone was disturbed by the discrete appearance of precarious tin and wood structures, mostly in Bir Hassan; although these were illegally built, unofficial negotiations and renting conditions were established with the landlords and they never seemed to cause any major upset.

Besides the two sub-zones discussed above, a third remained unbuilt. This stretch of land of 0.32 sq. mile, bordered by the Airport Boulevard to the east, the Ouzai Boulevard to the west, the Golf Club and a wooded area to the north and the Airport to the south, has remained unattractive due to its proximity to the Airport and the resulting building constraints and noise pollution.
If the two north-south axes were independent of the growth of the sub-zones, they
certainly were the prime determinants of the linear development of the 1975-76 war displaced
settlements. Indeed, the illegal settlements of Bir Hassan, Husayn Quwatl, Raml and the Palestinian
camps of Borj el Barajneh, Sabra and Chatila, grew along the Airport Boulevard. (Figs.16a,b).
The rapidly densifying squatters of Jnah and Ouzai developed along Ouzai Boulevard, which
starved loosing its functional and visual connections with the sea, and added to its already busy
character a number of illegal commences. (Figs.16a,b).

The squatter settlements never ceased to expand and densify, and to considerably
transform the openness of this suburban land into a series of little towns of densities ranking
among the highest in the world.

The Central Zone

It is the zone extending from the Airport Boulevard to the Hadeth Plain west and
east, the northern municipal limits of Borj el Barajneh and the Shweifat Plain north and south.

The central zone is considered the "historic node" of the Southern Suburb; its
residential districts are still referred to as the "traditional villages". The growth determinants of
these traditional villages were two north-south arteries peripheral to the zone, east and west of it,
namely the Chatila-El Ghoberiya-Borj el Barajneh street and the Chatila-Musarafiah-Mreyje street
(Figs.17a,b). The villages of Borj el Barajneh, Mreyjeh and Raml el Wadi started developing in the
1920's in the form of dispersed suburban garden-villes. (Figs.17a,b). The successive flows of
migration since1948 led to a rapid densification of these villages and the formation of other
settlements such as the Palestinian camp of Borj el Barajneh. Settlement occurred on the basis of
ethnic and to some extent, religious segregation: Mreyjeh was of Christian majority, Raml and
Borj el Barajneh of Shiite majority and the camp of Borj el Barajneh exclusively Palestinian.

After the war, the settlements kept densifying along the same lines, although mostly
illegally (illegality was mostly manifested in the sector of Raml), except for Mreyjeh whose
17a. Central Zone in the 1970's

17b. Central Zone in the 1980's

Legend:
- Central Zone Limits
- Illegal Settlements
- Legal Low and Middle Income Residential
- Commerce
original occupants started evacuating and were replaced by an almost exclusive Shiite population fleeing South Lebanon. The two north-south axes started gaining importance after the transformation of rue de Dames, parallel to them, into a demarcation line between “east” and “west” Beirut in 1975. They took over its role of major connector between Beirut and its Southern Suburb and started gathering commercial, religious and administrative facilities, until they finally became the two commercial strips of the region, mostly visited for their cheap construction and electrical equipment.

The recent anarchical development of the 1970's and 1980's, often illegal and unable to sustain its growth by means of utilities and community services, has been superimposed onto an existing urban tissue adapted perfectly to the traditional social organization of this rural population. While the districts of Borj el Barajneh and Mreyjé, which witnessed minor manifestations of squatting, have preserved their traditional tissue, Raml is the perfect example of a superimposition of two urban tissues: a traditional one derived from a rural pattern of settlement and a “modern” one, similar to any low-income district of the capital, entirely unadapted to their life pattern. This evolution of urban fabric will be analyzed in further detail in the following chapter in a study of the sector of Raml.

The North-Eastern Zone

At the foot of the municipal limits of Beirut, bordered to the west by the Airport Boulevard and to the east by the low to upper middle income older suburbs of Chiah and Fum el Chebbak, this zone is characterized by its old residential districts and by a recent phase of rapid and extensive urbanization.

The birth and extinction of this late 1960’s middle-income residential boom were determined by two cross axes, the rue de Dames and Chiah Boulevard, and developed north and south of the latter. While rue de Dames was, as previously mentioned, the major link between
Beirut and its Suburbs before it was proclaimed the demarcation line, the Chiah Boulevard was an important base for banks, ministries, embassies, directorates of public administration and a few religious centers. (Figs. 18a, b).

The Boulevard lost its vital character since the very beginning of the war. By being perpendicular to the demarcation line, it became a favorite sniper target and therefore dangerous to everyone. Today, almost all activities on the Boulevard have completely ceased. The residential districts have been largely evacuated and have witnessed diffuse cases of building squatting.

The South-Eastern Zone

This zone sits on private land between the Airport to the west, the two vast and scantly built plains of Shweifat to the south and Hadath to the east and includes the illegal sectors of Hay es Selloum, Hay el Laylaké and Aamrusiyyé. Except for the Lebanese University, every urbanization project on this land is illegal. This zone was the last to develop in the Southern Suburb, probably because of its relative distance from the capital but yet its expensive land. Besides, the Lebanese University owned a large parcel of the zone.

Scattered illegal construction started in the early 1950's in what is called now the sector of Hay es Selloum. (Figs. 19a, b). The 1975-76 war displaced people set both priorities of vacant land and shelter ahead of the issue of distance from the capital. The spectacular growth of this zone continues today, all of it illegal. Illegality is mostly in terms of illegal construction; most of the families are actual land owners to whom real estate agents have long contributed to the roles of mediators, by buying large parcels, dividing them into lots of 0.017 sq. mile and selling them to the new comers. This zone today, is the most deteriorated part of the Suburb.
Projects Decreed Involving the Southern Suburb Area:

Four projects involving this zone were decreed by the government in 1983:

- The Airport northern extension and a new runway west of Ouzzai Boulevard.
- A 210 foot wide north-south highway.
- Three 135 foot east-west highways linking the Eastern Suburbs to the coast.
- A project aiming at recuperating the littoral zone.

Parameters for Intervention

A radical shift in the direction of the urban development of the Southern Suburb since the mid 1970's, is noticeable. Overdensification, illegality, the emergence of overcrowded self-built and self-organized little towns, the disintegration of zones of former prime economic importance, the broken links with the capital... all these factors contributed to the making of today's image of the Southern Suburb, summed up in its most common nickname, the Suburb of the Deprived.

The reasons for this fundamental shift outrange the twelve years of political instability in the country. As we have seen in the previous chapter, if mass displacement is a direct consequence of the war, the squatting phenomenon can be interpreted as a result of the politico-economical System of the country, mainly in the lack of comprehensive planning, the natural outcome of the laissez-faire attitude.

The decline of the Southern Suburb area, which is perceived as the only potential urban zone for major development, is a perfect example of urbanization in the country: born in the hands of private enterprise, developed by its speculations, killed by its priorities and interests. The study of the urban development of the Southern Suburb makes one discern the tremendous gap between its potential, the "normal" course of development it took until the mid 1970's, and its actual state of being. Although the most immediate task seems to be the improvement of the
living conditions of some hundreds of thousands people, a rehabilitation of the whole region of the Southern Suburb aiming at its "natural" functioning both with regards to itself and to the capital, is to be sought. Opting for either extreme at the expense of the other, that is, concentrating on the development of the squatter settlements or, clearing those to recuperate the prosperous image of the the Suburb, can be dangerous. The simultaneous approach, (local improvement and regional rehabilitation), was dealt with by the only governmental study ever made on the Southern Suburb. It aimed primarily at an emergency intervention in its low-income residential sectors, but it was achieved in the context of a rehabilitation study for Beirut and its suburbs 17, namely the Schéma D'Aménagement de Beyrouth et sa Banlieue. The Schéma was started in the early 1980's by the Franco-Lebanese Mission, but was never updated because of the political and economic instability of the country and hence the rapidly changing data.

That a series of emergency operations realized independently and which disregard the regional context might lead to an irrecoverable set of problems, imply that any intervention in the low-income residential sector of the Southern Suburb, (or more specifically in the war-displaced illegal settlements), need be framed in a comprehensive planning program for the metropolitan region of Beirut. This, however, does not mean that the intervention has to await the completion of the Schéma Directeur de Beyrouth et de sa Banlieue in order to define the broad lines and general principles for development; it would involve waiting for political and economical stability of the country which is not yet in view, and before which some problems ought to be weighed before they become irredeemable. Therefore, although only a program for a socio-economic rehabilitation and "redynamization" of the region will allow the Southern Suburb to recuperate its initial potential and its function of urban complement to Beirut, simultaneous actions at both the local and regional levels are not a must. Yet, by resolving the most urgent problems, one should take into consideration any fixed premise, whether inferred from the area's "natural" course of development or from prospects for the implementation of individual projects.
What is to be done or could or should or will be done at the regional level is not within the scope of this study. Still, I believe that it is necessary to outline the stakes of the Southern Suburb which surpass the interests of its actual population, for they will serve as a framework for the formulation of a housing strategy at the local level. A few points on that matter can be inferred from the study of the urban development of the area.

The Coastal Zone of the Southern Suburb should certainly be the pole of concentration if a rehabilitation of the whole area is to be sought. It has often been argued that this zone should recover its leisure and tourism character, and cultivate its asset of location along the Mediterranean seashore for the sake of the natural amenities in the city. This concern for the "well-being of all citizens", if carried to the extreme and conceived as a "cleaning" process, could entail the demolition of the forty year old settlement of Ouzai and the evacuation of thousands of families. Should, then, the existing tissue be completely swept out in exchange for a "nice environment", or should all efforts concentrate on the interests of the actual population? Should this full or partial demolition be considered a last priority task to be implemented only after other less controversial demolition works are undertaken and after they have been followed by successful relocation programs? Even though the last option is probably the most reconciling, answering by a yes or a no does not serve the aim of the study. However, it is important to realize that such questions could be crucial for any intervention and could be subject to long-term debates. The same reasoning applies to the issue of the other four major individual projects which have been decreed by the State authorities: these are, the extension of the Airport to the north, the construction of a new runway west of Ouzai Boulevard, the north-south and the three transversal highways. Looking at these projects, one might wonder about the State's is awareness of the presence of human settlements on this land, and whether it has ever doubted its ability to relocate them once they have been displaced. It is interesting to note that these projects were all conceived in the early 1980's, that is when illegal urbanization was at its peak. The implementation of each
of these projects implies the following: The Airport extension would result in the demolition of 35% to 40% \(^\text{18}\) of the built up area in the Ouzaï sector and more than a hundred constructions in the sector of Ramli. (Fig. 20). The construction of a new runway will of course be an adequate solution to the problems of nuisance but would entail the rupture or at least the deviation of Ouzaï Boulevard, the principal artery for retail and service activities, which will in turn result in the illegal relocation of these activities by their owners. As for the highways projects, they have been conceived as entirely technical issues without the slightest concern for integration in the existing urban tissue. In their arrogance and derision of the existing fabric, they remind us of the Haussmannian projects of “événement” in Paris. The north-south highway alone would necessitate the demolition of about six hundred houses in the sector of Hayes-Salhoun. \(^\text{19}\)

A requestioning of the effects of these projects is undoubtedly a must, and should aim at the integration of the road network, both the existing and the projected, with the existing urban tissue and with minimal demolition work. But again, decisions are in the hands of politics, and it would be easy to say that as long as the political and economic unrest in the country continues, these projects will remain merely ink on paper.
LEGEND:

- Airport Extension
- North-South Highway
- Zones to Be Demolished

20. Projects Deemed for the Southern Suburb Area
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Land-use Distribution

Coastal zone (Figs. 16a,b)

- Luxury high-rise and garden-villas residential zones in Jnah and Bir Hassan, of 0.85 sq. mile.
- Dense squatting in the private beach cabins along the coasts of Jnah and Ouzzai.
- The 1950’s squatter settlement of Ouzzai, on both sides of Ouzzai Boulevard, of 0.24 sq. mile.
The mid 1970's squatter settlements of Jnah, 0.12 sq. mile, north-west of the zone, and Bir Hassan (and its recent extension in Hursh Qatul), of 0.10 sq. mile and east of the zone.

The two Palestinian camps of Sabra and Chatila, north-east of the zone.

Two sports clubs: the Golf Club in Bir Hassan, of 0.4 sq. mile and the Club Sportive of 0.2 sq. mile.

A few private beaches which still serve this purpose.

A major retail and service activities strip on Ouzai Boulevard.

A vacant land of 0.32 sq. mile, privately owned, in the heart of this zone.

A vacant land owned by the Airport Administration, to serve as a future extension, currently partly occupied by squatters.

Central Zone (Figs. 17a, b)

The 1920's legal low to middle-income districts of Mrejyé and Borj el Barajneh of approximately 0.78 sq. mile.

The 1950's illegal sector of Raml of 0.2 sq. mile.

The Palestinian camp of Borj el Barajneh of approximately 0.65 sq. mile.

Two commercial axes, Chatila-Ghobeiry-Borj el Barajneh and Chatila-Musarrafiah-Mrejyé streets, and a major commercial area, the Saha Abdel Nasser in the district of Borj el Barajneh.

A vacant municipal land of 0.03 sq. mile now used as a football field.

A vacant land east of the zone on the Hadath plain, of 0.27 sq. mile.

North-Eastern Zone (Figs. 18a, b)

The 1920's low to middle income legal district of Ghobeiry of 0.75 sq. mile, partly evacuated and subject to isolated cases of building squatting.
The late 1960's middle income legal districts of Haret Hreik, partly evacuated.

- A base for banks, ministries and embassies along Chiah Boulevard, partially evacuated.

The South-Eastern Zone (Figs. 19a, b)

- The Sciences Branch of the Lebanese University, of 0.4 sq. mile.
- The 1950's illegal sector of Hay c-Selloum of 0.68 sq. mile.
- The mid 1970's illegal sectors of Hay al Laylaké of 0.4 sq. mile and Aamrusiyé of 0.4 sq. mile.
- A vacant lot south of Hay es-Selloum on the Shweifat Plain, of 1.75 sq. miles.

Parameters for Intervention

There are three cases of overlap of land-uses, interests and priorities namely, the squatters' manifestations in the private beaches along the coasts of Jnah and Ouzaï, a peripheral illegal urbanization along the coast of Ouzaï which is regressing the natural sites of the area, and last, the extension of the illegal sector of Raml south and south-west of it, partly on a land owned by the Airport. Among the three cases, the Airport / Raml case seems to deserve the most attention. The first two, discussed earlier in this chapter, debate over the diverging priorities for shelter on one hand and for a 'nice environment' on the other.

The importance of the Raml / Airport case lies in the urgency of the problem: The illegal construction south and south-west of the sector of Raml is infringing on the activity of the Airport by disregarding the regulations imposed by the radar code. The building code for this area imposes strict height restrictions. To satisfy them, the demolition of 400 residential constructions and 168 commerces of which 138 are on Nasser street, is mandatory. (Fig. 20). This case is no more a matter of juridistic illegality, nor of political opposition, nor even of occupation of a precious land. It simply represents a threat to both the Airport activity as well as to the dwellers of the sector, and it should be seriously treated before a
spreading urbanization further aggravates the situation.

Parallel to the issue of demolition, the issue of vacant land is an appropriate consideration for an eventual operation of relocation. There are four large unbuilt parcels in the Southern Suburb region. These parcels have not been exploited for different reasons and have not been squatted on for two major reasons namely, the landlords' power and the political and religious conflicts between the squatters and the land owners.

I shall examine the constraints of each of these parcels and their potential to contribute to the absorption of those whose shelters will be subject to demolition.

The Hadath Plain, in the Central Zone:

This land parcel is of approximately 0.27 sq. mile. Before 1975, a middle income residential urbanization boom took place and four totally new districts were created. The remaining land was strictly used for agricultural purposes. Spontaneous settlement was therefore a difficult task to achieve. In 1975, this area was the first to witness fierce fighting and is since considered one of the most dangerous and insecure areas due to its proximity to the demarcation line. Massive squatting never occurred, but after the area was partly evacuated, isolated building squatting took place. Because of the prevailing insecurity of the area, a relocation program on the Hadath plain would not be possible.

Vacant land in the sector of Raml, Central zone:

It is a municipal land of 0.03 sq. mile, squished between Raml and the Palestinian camp of Borj el Barajneh. (Figs. 17a, b). It has been used as a football field for the past forty years and was never the target of illegal construction. This might be an indication as to the need of the people to have breathing spots in the midst of their overcrowded settlements.

The area between Ouzai Boulevard and the Airport Boulevard, on the Coastal zone:

This parcel of 0.32 sq. mile, located in the heart of the Southern Suburb is
divided into three lots, two of which are owned by a prominent family from the region. No real development ever occurred on either lot; while the first has served for a long time as a classroom for driving schools, the second includes a huge gas station. The third lot, unused, belongs to the municipality of Borj el Barajneh, whose mayor is of the same prominent family. The prominence of the landlords hindered subjecting the land for development as well as illegal construction. Yet, the development of this land has recently been under consideration and its expropriation by the State or a private organization has been the source of debates (Fig.21) Since considerations for its use have already been set up, it would be appropriate to regard it as a potential site for the relocation of those in "critical" squatting zones, such as the southern and south-eastern extensions of the illegal sector of Raml and eventually, parts of the illegal sector of Ouzai. An examination of the characteristics, limitations and assets of this site could be interesting for the purpose of this study.

The strategic location of the site in the heart of the Southern Suburb is certainly its strongest asset, in the sense that relocation of those on the periphery of the sector of Raml and those from the sector of Ouzai will remain in the same neighbourhood, will not be cut of their ties and above all, will not be taken away from employment. The site, as mentioned earlier, is located between the Airport Boulevard to the east and the Ouzai Boulevard to the west, south of the wooded areas of Huzh Quail and the Golf Club and north of the future extension of the Airport (Fig.13). Should future projects be implemented, it is worth noting that the north-south highway would traverse the site from north to south; the conceived highway is perceived as an eventual support for retail and service activities at a regional level and a Southern entrance to Beirut (Fig.20). As we already said, due to its proximity to the Airport, the land suffers from strict regulations imposed by the radar cone, concerning building height. The Direction Generale de l'Urbanisme, in its proposal, has suggested the
re-grading of the hilly site so as to meet these regulations and maximize the built-up area. (Figs. 22a,b). A more thorough analysis of the proposal will be carried on to the following chapter.

The most attractive aspect of this land is its economic value. Because of the strict building regulations imposed on it as well as the considerable noise pollution generated by the Airport and eventually by the future highway, the value of this land ranges among the lowest in the Southern Suburb area. This implies, of course, a low initial investment, therefore fewer loans and thus fewer returns, and the possibility of considering the land as a source of profit in the sense that the revenues invested on a low and medium income residential and commercial project could be used to purchase a parcel, for similar development, in the Central zone of the Southern Suburb, where land values are significantly higher than the Western zone. Yet, a low-income housing project alone will be unable to generate a full cost recovery; in this sense, the integration of middle-income housing, commerce, a partial sale market, would pave the way for self-generated revenues. Therefore, only part of this land will be considered for the relocation of “vulnerable” squatter settlements.

The Shweifat Plain, South-eastern zone:

This land could have been an interesting land to “exploit” for an eventual relocation project. It is an important real estate reserve of 1.75 sq. miles, almost as large as the Airport. (Fig.13). It is now owned by the municipality of Shweifat and is therefore considered a Druze territory. The settlement of Hay es Selloum constitutes a buffer zone between the two “territories”. It is for political and religious reasons that the extension of the Shite illegal sector of Hay es Selloum, north of it, was always impossible. For the same reasons, the expropriation of the land for a relocation program, by a private organization
which would necessarily be of the same political inclination of its target population, would almost be inconceivable. 26

The last point I would like to set forth is of an administrative nature. The vast amount of unbuilt surfaces is almost surprising if one keeps in mind that the most common problem related to low and very low-income housing in developing countries is the non availability of land around urban areas. Therefore, real estate reserves (acquired by means of expropriation or declaration of public use or by blocking the land market value) are an important consideration to be made by the State or a powerful organization if both squatting and real estate speculation are to be avoided.

4. Low-Income Residential Districts and Sectors in the Southern Suburb 27

Social Profile

Origins of the 1920's Legal Districts' Population:

Borj el Barajneh: Low to middle income Shiite population settled since the early 1920's.

Mrejé: Low to middle income Christian majority until the beginning of the war when it was partly evacuated and gradually replaced by a Shiite population displaced from South Lebanon.

Chish and Ghobeiry: One municipality-district of multiconfessional population until the mid 1950's when it was divided into two: Ghobeiry of Muslim predominance and Chish of Christian predominance. Both districts started a slow process of evacuation since 1975 because of their proximity to the demarcation line.

Type of Social Organization of the 1920's Legal Districts:

Borj el Barajneh and Mrejé: Traditional social organization based on principles of strong
kinship and regional ties. It was never disrupted because neither neighbourhood was subject to massive anarchical settlement but only to isolated building squatting, mostly in Mreyjé.

Chiah and Ghobeiry: The traditional form of social organization in both Christian and Muslim neighbourhoods is evident in the groupings of extended families. This form of grouping is in fact most common in this part of the Southern Suburb.

**Origins of the late 1960’s Legal Districts’ Population:**

**Hanet Hreik:** Christian village until the early 1970’s when it witnessed a rapid and strong urbanization. The new tenants are mostly Shiites of the middle income class.

**Type of Social Organization in the 1960’s Districts:**

**Hanet Hreik:** Social interaction and social organization are not visible in this district. The neighbourhood fabric, made of detached apartment buildings arranged on gridted parcels, is not conducive to interaction among the dwellers.

**Origins of the 1950’s Illegal Sectors’ Population:**

**Raml:** Shiite predominance since the 1950’s, mostly from the villages of South Lebanon. Christian minority still settled in Raml el Wati, the eastern and oldest part of the settlement.
Ouzai: Mixed ethnic backgrounds of Syrians, Kurds, Christians and Shiite Lebanese, who fled the pre-war slums of Beirut, demolished in 1975-76, squatting in the beach cabins along the coastal line.

Hayes-Selloum: Shiite predominance since the beginning of its development in the early 1950’s.

Type of Social Interaction in the Illegal Sectors of the 1950’s

Raml and Hayes-Selloum: These strong communities are organized along kinship ties and of ties of village of origin. They are unofficially headed by squatter committees which are formed by the heads of the extended families.

Ouzai: Because of its linear settlement pattern and because it is cut longitudinally by the Ouzai Boulevard, there is no strong sense of social organization in the settlement. Yet, the presence of traditional community ties is felt in the internal streets and subdistricts of the sector.

Origins of the Population of the Mid 1970’s Illegal Sectors

Jnah, Bir Hassan, Aamrusiyé, Laylaké: Shiite predominance since the beginning of war.

Type of Social Organization in the Illegal Sectors of the Mid 1970’s

Jnah, Bir Hassan, Laylaké, Aamrusiyé: It only exists to a certain extent since the urban fabric of these settlements, especially in the cases of Jnah and Bir Hassan, is not conducive to social interaction.
Population Estimates, Density and Size of Family

Population estimates, as well as density figures for each settlement vary greatly from source to source. For every case, all available sources will be cited, in order to avoid false impressions that could be created as a result of inconsistent figures.

As for the size of the nucleus family, it varies from five to twelve members.

This range applies equally to almost all settlements. The young population constitutes approximately 70% of the total population.

The Legal Districts of the 1920's

Bori el Bawineh: Two figures show population estimates of 50,000 and 65,000 persons.

Density is assumed to be approximately equal to 160 pers./acre.

Mrayî: The population is approximated at 35,000 persons.

Density at 145 pers./acre.

Ghoberiy: No population estimate.

The Legal Districts of the Late 1960's

Haret Hreik: No population estimate.

The Illegal Sectors of the 1950's

Quzzai: Three different population estimates show three different figures: 12,000, 24,000 and 42,000 persons, of which a vague 15% to 25% is considered legal.

Density is assumed to be equal to 200 pers./acre.
Raml: Two sources indicate 28,200 \(^{34}\) and 36,000 \(^{35}\) persons.
Density is considered to be 320 pers./acre.\(^{36}\)

Hayek-Selloum: Two figures, showing 54,000 \(^{37}\) and 65,000 \(^{38}\) persons.
A density approximated at 400 pers./acre.\(^{39}\)

Illegal Sectors of the Mid 1970's

Jnah: Three sources, showing 2,800 \(^{40}\), 6,000 \(^{41}\), and 20,000\(^{42}\) persons.
Density is estimated at 100 pers./acre.\(^{43}\)

Bir Hassan: The three same sources showing estimates of 4,500 \(^{44}\), 5,000 \(^{45}\) and 8,000 \(^{46}\).
Density of 100 pers./acre \(^{47}\)

Laylaké: Population estimated at 4,500.
Density estimated at 260 pers./acre.

Aamroussiye: Population estimated at 4,000.
Density estimated at 145 pers./acre.\(^{48}\)

Income and Employment

Income varies from low and very low in most of the sectors, to middle in the
districts of Borj el Barajneh and Harat Hreik.\(^{49}\)

Employment rate is 84.63\% \(^{50}\), of which almost 40\% is in the illegal sector.
The Southern Suburb, which includes 20\% of the population of the metropolitan region of
Beirut, offers only 7.3\% of its jobs.\(^{51}\) Still, 51\% are employed in the Suburb, 28\% in Beirut,
5\% outside Beirut (15\% are undetermined).\(^{52}\) Legal employment is divided between 19\% in
the primary sector, 30% in the secondary sector and 69% in the tertiary sector. Most of the employed population works in the construction trades, crafts, retail, services, municipalities employees, port and airport employees, push cart vendors, in addition to a few hundreds of fishermen along the coastal line of Jnah and Ouzai.

Parameters for Intervention

The religious, social and ethnic homogeneity of the Southern Suburb population except for the Palestinian camps of Borj el Barajneh, Saba and Chamila is striking. The overwhelming rural Shiite majority preserved its traditional social organization built primarily on kinship ties and groupings according to the village of origin. The pattern of setting portrays it very clearly. Neighbourhoods, formed along these traditional lines—"Harat" or "Hay", are called after the village or district of origin or after the settled extended family. It is important to note that these traditional forms of grouping are not specific to the Shiite communities, but to rural communities in general, more specifically to those who fled their villages before the mid century "modernization" had occurred. The most compelling examples of these two types of social organization are found in the old districts of Ramli, Borj el Barajneh, Ghobeiry and Chiah. These traditional forms of groupings are essential to their people and have to be considered in any eventual relocation program. They should be preserved and encouraged, since they form the base for management organization of the settlement. The "squatters committees", as referred to by Cherki, are formed by heads of extended families or prominent persons in the village of origin. These have successfully managed to play the role of mediators between the population and those who claimed responsibility for their livelihood, in order to satisfy the most urgent needs of their people.
The second point worthy of mention, is the relatively big number of jobs which the Southern Suburb provides to its settlers. In 1983, at least 51% of the active population worked in the region, by legal or illegal means\(^{57}\). Since employment is not only a source of revenues but also an important factor which contributes to the "normality" of a life, it is important to preserve its sources.

Finally, if illegal construction has to be absorbed, more than 100,000 persons would have to be relocated; if the average size of the family is six members, more than 15,000 housing units will have to be provided.

**Architecture and Urban Fabric**

Looking at an areal photograph of the Southern Suburb, one can distinguish two basic types of architecture and urban structure in the residential neighbourhoods of the region. This distinction, contrary to one's expectations, does not derive from the juridistic status of the settlements. Although the land and building status determine in most cases, the way construction is achieved, that is, by self-help methods or by the conventional approach\(^{58}\), different architectures and different urban tissues are underlaid by the period of settlement. A brief overview of the low-income residential neighbourhoods in the Southern Suburb might be necessary at this point: There has been, over the past sixty years, six major phases of settlement in the Southern Suburb (Fig. 23), namely:

- The 1920's, when settlement started in the districts of Chieh and Ghobeiry in the North-Eastern zone and Borj el Barajneh and Mreyié in the central zone of the Southern Suburb.

- The early 1950's, which coincided with massive rural-urban migrations and the inflow of Palestinian refugees. Besides a substantial densification of the existing neighbourhoods, settlement expanded to the new sector of Raml in the Central zone, Hay es-Selloum in the south-eastern zone and to the sector of Ouzai in the Coastal zone.
2.5. OLD AND RECENT DISTRICTS AND SECTORS
The late 1960's, the climax of Beirut's urbanization. New middle income and high income residential districts were developed at the southern periphery of the capital in Haret Hreik in the north-eastern zone and Jnah and Bir Hassan in the Coastal zone.

The mid 1970's, beginning of the war, witnessed a considerable densification and the formation of new illegal sectors such as Layjaké and Aamursieh in the south eastern zone and Jnah and Bir Hassan in the Coastal zone.

The years of 1978 and 1982, years of Israeli invasions, resulted in further displacement and therefore more densification of the existing settlement as well as of some isolated cases of building squatting.

The two broad types of architecture and physical structure of the neighbourhoods, the vernacular and the modern, the traditional and the "urbanized", occur simultaneously, in the pre-war and war settlements. Neighbourhoods which densified along the years to witness pre-war and war settlement, combine both types of architecture and urban tissue.

The Pre-War Districts:

The urban tissue of these districts is very similar to any rural settlement in Lebanon and is comparable, to some extent, to the traditional Islamic city. (Figs. 41, 42). It is characterized by a dense pattern of construction, formed by terraced semi-detached houses often surrounding a semi-private courtyard. The fabric of the settlements is a physical reflection of the traditional patterns of organization of the population, and is therefore perfectly adapted to them. Indeed, the two predominant forms of social structure and social organization in the rural societies were, and are to a certain extent, those following kinship ties and groupings according to the place of origin. Both these patterns reflected in the settlements of the 1920's and 1950's at three different scales: the settlement, the subdistrict
and the house. Patterns of settlement segregation, as we have seen earlier in this chapter, followed distinct lines of religion, village of origin and family ties. Subdistricts or "hara" reflect the same pattern of grouping along village of origin or kinship ties or both, and are often named after the extended family as in the case of the eleven subdistricts in the sector of Raml, or after the village of origin, as in "Hay el Burjawi" in Ghobeiry. As for the house, it involves a long process of construction, as long as the family is expanding. Often starting as a single room, the house keeps growing with each incoming member of the extended family, and often ends up surrounding an outdoor courtyard.

The architecture and urban tissue of these settlements are very well adapted to the social traditions and daily lifestyle of their people. Each "hara" constitutes a remarkably well structured nucleus within which the community finds its proper means of organization and a familiar lifestyle. The "saha" provides a good example of this aspect. (Figs. 46 to 49). It is typical of any rural settlement and it is the organizing element of the "hara". It is the main internal retail and service activities place (diffuse retail activity occurs on ground floors of buildings) as well as the main gathering place for men.

Some architectural elements are almost indispensable to the social well-being of the people. The terrace, balcony, cul de sac or internal courtyard are the women's gathering places, and the vantage places to see without being seen. (Figs. 49, 55, 57, 58). In this community where privacy of the household is a prevailing feature, cul de sacs and planted front gardens, as well as pseudo- blank street facades, provide effective solutions.

The main commercial areas are peripheral to the settlements (Fig. 45) and often function at a regional level. This notion of public areas surrounding a strongly tied community, reminds one of the Islamic notion of "external town" and "internal town", whereby the souks, or external town, almost impose that one ignore what lies beyond them.
This notion applies as well, in the relation between the house, introverted, and the street. (Fig. 42).

The 1970's districts:

The recent residential districts of the Southern Suburb present both an architecture and physical structure both different from the traditional districts.

These districts were perceived, as noted previously, as the "natural extension" of the Capital and in this respect, portray distinct "urban" features at least, in their high-rise apartment building type, common in many districts of Beirut. They were conceived along grided land parcels, with each building set on its lot offset from its neighbouring building based on set back regulations. (Fig. 24). Naturally, this setting does not allow for much social interaction. Finally, these three districts are purely residential, with no retail facility not even at the smallest scale. These dormitory neighbourhoods, planned according to set-back and zoning regulations, not allowing for any kind of social interaction so vital to the traditional societies of the Southern Suburb, should be reconsidered.

The 1950's illegal sectors:

The same process of evolution of urban tissues applies to the illegal sectors of Raml, Ouzai, and Hay es-Selloum. (Figs. 25, 26, 27).

Raml, Ouzai and Hay es-Selloum started developing in the early 1950's and witnessed three major phases of densification in 1975, 1978 and 1982. While the pre-war phases grew in the form of horizontal densification whereby the architecture and physical structure were similar to those in the legal districts of that same period, the latter phases were mostly characterized by a vertical densification. Because land was getting scarce, real estate speculations gained popularity: a widespread phenomenon of floor additions onto existing one or two storey structures soon started. As a result, many of the architectural elements and
25. AERIAL VIEW OF THE SECTOR OF RAML.
26. AERIAL VIEW OF THE SECTOR OF OUZAI.

1:5000
27. AERIAL VIEW OF THE SECTOR OF HAY ES SELLOUM.
aspects of urban tissue, which regulated the "traditional" settlements and were conducive to a social organization familiar to the people, were lost. Although from the same background, the strong kinship ties faded as the new tenants had to occupy the available units, with all preferences suppressed. 60

The 1970's illegal sectors:

Similarly, the physical aspect of these sectors is related to that of the legal districts developed at the same time. (Figs. 28, 29). The heterogeneity and the lack of fundamental ties among the settlers make these residential neighbourhoods more open to interaction with other neighbourhoods, contrary to the ghetto-like introversion of the traditional sectors.

Parameters for Intervention

The lack of identity of the Southern Suburb has been evidenced throughout the study of its urban development, land-use heterogeneity and the disintegration and confusion of its once coherent urban tissue. Yet, one can detect a past identity, formed by the presence of the two historic north-south axes along which the old traditional villages of the Southern Suburb have developed. (Fig. 30). These villages, Borj el Barajneh, Mieryé, Ramli, have slowly deteriorated. By being subject to real estate speculation, they have partially lost their social and physical cohesion. Their recent anarchical and amalgamous development was grafted on an organized and functional urban tissue, well adapted to the daily social practices of its population.

Helping the Southern Suburb regain its original identity, that of a series of popular traditional districts around the capital, each perceived as a homogeneous whole and yet fractionally and socially integrated to one another and linked to the capital, is one way of
2B. AERIAL VIEW OF THE SECTOR OF LAYLAKÉ
30. HISTORIC AXES OF THE SOUTHERN SUBURB

LEGEND:
- \(\square\) ILLEGAL SECTORS WHICH DEVELOPED ALONG THE AXES
- \(\odot\) CENTERS OF LEGAL DISTRICTS LOCATED ALONG THE AXES
- \(\square\) COMMERCE
- \(\square\) ADMINISTRATION
- \(\square\) SCHOOL
- \(\square\) CHURCH
- \(\square\) MOSQUE

[0  3000']
"framing" a local intervention in the illegal sectors in a regional context. The traditional
settlements, entirely created by their occupants to suit their values and needs, provide them
with what is often called "a sense of fit". The "sense of fit" is, in my belief, the most
essential aspect of a settlement to be achieved by a population which is moving from one type
of setting to another, in this case from rural to urban setting. Social and physical integrity
help achieve the needed transitional phase between the initial and the new settings. This
notion of adaptation to a new environment by means of re-creating a microcosm of the
original setting, is a common aspect of rural-urban migration. One of its most recurring
manifestations is that of a rural society settling in the old city core, because its urban tissue
and architecture are easily associated with those of the original rural settlements.\textsuperscript{61}

Another approach to setting an identity to the Southern Suburb would be to
follow the recent trends of development such as those which occurred after 1975 in the
sectors of Jinah and Bir Hassan or in the district of Haret Hreik. That is, a development
regulated by zoning and set back regulations and aiming at density exploitation. This
approach has proven to be inadapted to social traditions and organization, and unequipped to
suit the daily needs of this rural population.

I will therefore insist on the value of the traditional structure of the settlements
and in an attempt to regain it, some considerations will be substantiated from the study of the
urban tissue of the Southern Suburb's residential neighbourhoods. Two sets of
considerations can be made in this attempt, those relating to an improvement operation in the
existing sectors and those related to a relocation program.\textsuperscript{62}

Parameters for an improvement program of the existing sectors:

- The first step towards this objective is the "regulation" of the physical structure of the
  traditional settlements by means of enhancing the disintegrating relics of traditional spatial
  and social organization such as the Saha and the cul-de-sac.
After the restructuring process aiming at achieving a "coherent whole" of each settlement, their integration to one another ought to be considered. The major commercial axes, the "external town" as it has been previously termed, can be the means by which integration and linkage are achieved. This move will imply the integration of the illegal sectors into the legal districts and the consequent relief of the overwhelming ghetto aspect of the illegal sectors.

Parameters for a partial relocation program:

- Considering the notion of "district" or "hay" or "bana" as an adequate work base that corresponds to the scale of the concerned human groupings of rural origin, and that adapts perfectly to their values, needs and daily lifestyles. The construction of new units will have to bear this notion in mind and will have to make an effort at integrating new quarters in the already existing fabric by means of neighbourhood units.

- Reviving the lost architectural patrimony which nurtures the well-being of the people's lifestyle, such as the balcony, the terrace, the "mastaba" semi-detached arrangement of houses...

- Encouraging the presence of activities other than residential in the settlements in order to avoid the creation of dormitory neighbourhoods which lack the organic dynamism of the traditional fabric.

- Realizing that self-help construction has formed an impressive and spontaneous fabric of a perfectly well structured micro-organization. Therefore, "exploiting" self-help "channels" can lead to a more adequate and fitting settlement structure than that provided by the responsible agents whether professional or administrative, and with considerably less capital invested.

The basic premise of these parameters for intervention could be defined by saying that: If urbanism must be a global response to a given lifestyle for a given society whose specificities are recognized as a work base, then the Southern Suburb is closer to the functional and physical organization of the spontaneous illegal settlements than that offered in
the recent legal district of Haret Hreik or recent illegal sectors of Jnah and Bir Hassan.

We should be wary of recreating new "problematic districts" by means of an urbanism which is fixed and irremovable. Examples of these are common throughout the world, and their consequences have been established as manifesting in one of these two trends: squatting on new grounds, or the considerable transformation of the offered urbanism.64

Self-help organized sectors are almost by definition closer to the wishes of their people than the delivered package construction, even if one considers the frustrations implied by practical and financial inabilities. In other terms, were the people equipped with infrastructure, material, knowledge and above all, if land were easily provided to them, then these settlements could be ideal for their specific population. This is where the task of the responsible agents lies, and not so much in the house production itself for as I've said, the latter can be achieved by the settlers themselves in a more socially adequate and less costly manner.

Although the concept of devolution of housing production65 has been discussed, recommended and applied in different forms since the early 1960's, the conventional approach which exploits the free-market attitude and relies on the private sector for a full production of houses, is still the one prevailing in the country.

Methods of Construction

This section deals with three aspects of construction: material, labour and building process, as they apply in the legal and the illegal, the traditional and the modern, residential neighbourhoods of the Southern Suburb.

The 1960's Legal Districts:

Material: The most common building material for low and middle income residential
construction is reinforced concrete and masonry filling (houndsi blocks). Prefabrication and industrialization are restricted to elements such as doors and windows frames. Prefabricated elements other than these have to be imported and are therefore seldom used except for high and very high cost residential buildings.

Labour: Residential construction in the recent legal districts of the Southern Suburb follows the conventional approach of a sophisticated working team, starting with the conceptual design workteam, to the actual construction team, involving "specialists" in every field; the architect, construction, electrical, mechanical engineers, and the contractor. Next comes the labour team, a foreman for general supervision, the concrete master with semi-skilled assistants and unskilled labourers, the master bar bender and the master carpenter, each with his crew of semi-skilled and unskilled labourers, and finally, the master mason and two or three labourers.

Building process: It is also a conventional process which involves a lot of time spent between construction phases, such as the curing period of the reinforced concrete skeleton after casting each floor.

The 1920's Legal Districts:

Traditionally, as in the district of Borj el Barajneh, construction required less labour and less time. Buildings rarely exceeded three floors, and specialists in every field were not a must. Design was seldom done on paper by a professional; it was generally conceived, as it is still done today in most of the rural areas, on site, by means of measuring sticks and drawing on the ground. The labour team had the same composition as it does today but fewer in number.

The 1970's Illegal Sectors:

Besides the use of the traditional methods of construction, two construction trends became widespread, always with the same material and techniques. The first one is
the addition of floors on top of existing structures after a revision of the foundations, if any.

Some of these buildings are dangerous today and have to be demolished. The second trend is
the four to six storey apartment buildings of which an unofficial contractor would be in
charge. The labour team no more involves the occupants who settle only when the basic
construction is over.

These new trends did not appear as a result of changing values and different
backgrounds. The population involved is of the same background as that of the 1920's and
the 1950's. They appeared as a result of the lack of available land for further residential
spreading and the need to extend vertically to satisfy the shelter needs of the displaced
population.

Traditional illegal sectors:

Material: Reinforced concrete and C.M.U. filling is the most common type of wall
construction in the illegal sectors as well. The roof is in general the most precarious part of
the house except when an additional floor is added, and can range from asbestos cement to
corrugated metal sheets to wood planks, held in place by stones and concrete blocks thus
certituting the formwork.

Labour team: It is much less sophisticated than in the legal sector and it generally involves
the family itself with the help of one or two masons, a builder and a semi-skilled labourer.

Building process: Until the late 1970's, when speculation started and profit minded
landowners and contractors began building up to eight storey buildings, the building process
was remarkably fast and simple. The basic shelter was finished in one night so that the
administration (control patrols were the only form of administration the squatters ever
encountered), was faced with an accomplished fact.

The shelter consisted of one large room and a smaller one which served as a
kitchen. Construction material was carried from nearby factories; in the 1950's, stone, the
prevailing building material, was carried from quarries in the neighbouring mountains. After
the land "occupation" was achieved by means of surrounding the chosen lot with stones or barbed wire, the occupant prepared the material: bond stones for the foundations, wood for the formwork, cement, metal sheets and whatever could be collected. In one night, four walls were built, with a few openings kept for windows and a door. The precarious roof was then added. Foundations rarely existed. They mostly consist of concrete ditches (grade beams), 1.5 to 2.0 feet wide. The two rooms would serve as a shelter for the whole family as long as they could afford to make vertical or horizontal additions.

Parameters for Intervention

The fundamental criteria that one can infer from the study of construction in the legal and illegal sectors, in both the traditional and "modern" approaches, is the presence of two distinct types of architecture practices. As it is applied in traditional sectors and districts, architecture practice is perceived as an action departing from practice, which has accumulated experience which in turn has assimilated traditional values and techniques. The practice of architecture in the recent legal districts can be defined as an action departing from knowledge, acquired by teaching as it is practiced in schools. Construction in the recent illegal sectors does not quite fit in the first category, and yet lacks the "knowledge" required for it to belong to the conventional approach to architectural practice.

It is obvious that self-help or aided self-help construction, traditionally practiced and sometimes still is, saves not only labour costs but also a tremendous amount of time. It provides the very basic shelter on the spot, thus satisfying the immediate need of the displaced homeless family. Although, as we mentioned earlier, the product is often frustrated by financial and physical constraints, it is close to the wishes of its occupants. Therefore, self-help channels, if they exist, ought to be exploited, by attempting to find out about the availability of specialized artisans in the Southern Suburb region as well as cooperatives or private centers for low cost material and equipment. Then the State or other
responsible agents will be able to shift their role from building producers to "enablers", providing land, material and basic equipment.

The second by-product of a self-help approach to construction is the elaborate phasing process. Houses in the illegal sectors of the Southern Suburb constantly have an air of construction sites. Phasing the construction so as to add and improve onto one's houses whenever it is needed is typical of rural areas. It adapts to the traditional sense of social organization by adding a room for every newcomer in the extended family; Besides, maintenance is done, like additions, by the people and when finances permit; while in the rental apartments buildings of the 1970's sectors, maintenance, drastic transformations, like the initial construction, are not part of the dwellers' task, but that of the "house producers"; maintenance is seldom kept up because of shortage of funds after the high initial investments.

Two other points can be deduced from the study: one, the homogeneity of the construction material used in districts and sectors, recent and traditional, is certainly an indicator of its cheapness, availability and familiarity to the people; two, is the presence of inhabitable unstable structures, due to the addition of floors on top of a structure with foundations intended only to support it, which might require demolition and reconstruction in most cases.

Utilities and Community Services

Legal Districts:

Although little information concerning the availability of utilities in the illegal sectors and almost none regarding the legal districts, is provided, it is generally assumed that the legal districts are better equipped than the illegal sectors, and that is only a consequence of their juridistic status. The legal settlers are assumed to be provided with basic utilities by legal subscription. Yet, the lack of involvement of the public sector, responsible for the
provision of utilities and infrastructure, has led to the recent inability of the legal districts to support their communities. Recent trends of illegal acquisition of electricity and telephone lines, and the reliance on individual abilities and financial means to build water reservoirs or dig artesian wells, are becoming widespread phenomena.66

Illegal sectors:

The lack of utilities and community services in the illegal sectors of the Southern Suburb is probably the prime reason for the negative aspect of the region and the miserable living conditions of the settlers. No provision of basic utilities has been contributed by the public sector since 1960. Settlers have managed, either by individual illegal means or by communal contribution and effort, to get to their ends. Individual illegal means such as connecting electrical and telephone wires to existing ones or digging artesian wells when water has been cut from the settlements, have been quite popular and effective.67

Communal effort and joint contribution have led to remarkable achievements, the most striking of which occurred in the sector of Hayes-Seiloum, in the form of streets grading and paving, the digging of artesian wells, the construction of a storage room for electricity and most of all, the construction of a whole sewage system which took one year to build and cost a significant sum of money.

The absence of community services is striking notably in the illegal sectors: Hayes Seiloum, with a population of 54,000 (or 65,000) persons, has no public school, no health services, and only five private clinics, five private technical schools, one dispensary and a Husayniyya. Here again, the community itself has often contributed to the building of public services such as the construction of a mosque and the establishment of a cemetery in the sector of Raml.

Parameters for Intervention

Three general considerations could be substantiated from the study.
That the lack of basic utilities is more problematic than the lack of "adequate" houses for it can lead to health problems and can have repercussions on neighbouring regions. Although it can, as we have seen, be managed by the people themselves, it requires a lot of financial sacrifices and a much longer time than if it were provided by the responsible authorities.

That it is the task of the municipal sector to provide the basic utilities. Little effort has been done about it so far, although, some concern has been demonstrated about the matter. 69

That although it is the responsible person's task to deal with these matters, the communal effort and the remarkable achievements of the people can teach us to avoid paternalistic and professionalist attitudes towards a population which we often tend to consider inferior and impotent.

5. Summary

The interest of the study of the physical and social structure of the Southern Suburb lies in the fact that it provides a guideline for an intervention in its illegal sectors aiming at relieving the living conditions of its residents. It already defines a housing strategy in two broad points; an improvement or upgrading program on the existing settlements and a relocation program for the irredeemable structures.

Contrary to the socio-economic and contextual analyses, the physical analysis provides a tangible framework for intervention, which can be divided into three sets of considerations:

- those related to the whole region of the Southern Suburb and which will provide a framework for an intervention in the illegal sectors. They will be called, regional parameters.
- those related to the low-income residential neighbourhoods which will be called, local parameters.

Regional parameters to account for:

- That the Southern Suburb is a potential land for development, the only one in the
metropolitan of Greater Beirut.

_ That some considerations at the regional level have to be done when the aim is for a local intervention. But that the local intervention, which aims at alleviating urgent problems, does not have to work simultaneously with a rehabilitation scheme for the metropolitan region of Beirut and its suburb, for this involves waiting for security and political stability in the country._

_ That the heterogeneity of the Southern Suburb land use accounts for three instances of land use overlap, which might necessitate some demolition work. The most critical case is that of the illegal extension of the sector of Ramle on a parcel condemned by radar cone regulations._

_ That four large vacant parcels in the Southern Suburb could serve the interests of a relocation program of those zones to be demolished. The most available and interesting of these is located between the Airport Boulevard and Ouzai Boulevard._

_ That employment will have to be maintained in the region since it provides the source of revenues of approximately 84% of the population._

Local parameters to account for:

_ That the difference between the legal districts and illegal sectors does not lie in their privileges according to their juridistic aspect but in their respective social and spatial organizations._

_ That the lack of basic utilities is the prime contributor to the misery of the people’s living._

_ That self-help methods have the ability to produce an architecture and an urban fabric which adapt to their needs and values, and a construction that is fast and economic._

_ That it is important to enhance the lost architectural patrimony and some relics of traditional organization in the urban fabric, for they provide the settlers with a sense of security and a needed transition from rural to urban settlement._

_ That in view of all this, the State or the responsible private organization should shift its role from passive, or housing producer, to enabler and help the settlers acquire land, utilities,_
construction material.

That the identity of the Southern Suburb can be recovered by the restructure of its traditional neighbourhoods along the two historic axes.

That the notion of "district" is an adequate work base to regulate the existing sectors as well as create new neighbourhoods, for it fits the scale of the targeted human groupings and adapts to the traditional rural lifestyle of the population.

That relocation should be done in terms of "district" neighbourhoods of a scale which should allow them to integrate in the existing fabric.

That activities other than residential should be preserved in the residential neighbourhoods, in order to avoid the creation of dormitory sectors.

While the set of regional parameters will only be considered later in this study, the local parameters will be further elaborated in the following chapter, and applied in the case of one illegal settlement, the sector of Ram}.1.
Notes to Chapter


3. Comité de Refugies de la Zone Est (Beirut, 1977?).


5. Salim Naser, "Al-Harb, Ash-Shabakat Al Madaniyyah wa Hamkat As-Sukkan fi Beirut Al-Kubra" [The War, the City Networks and Population Movements in Greater Beirut], Al-Watan, #56 (October 1983), p. 325. (In Arabic).


7. Three different sources show very different figures; BECOM: 244,000 persons in 1983; D.G.U.: 635,000 persons in June 1983; As-Safir: 750,000 to 800,000 persons in July 1983.


9. For further readings on the subject, see, W. Charafeddine, op. cit.; F. Jalloul, As-Safir, op. cit.

10. Al Aamal (Beirut, July 6, 1983), cited in F. Jalloul, As-Safir, op.cit.


13. Ibid. p. 104.

14. All these projects are conceived and studied by the Comite de Development de la Banlieue Sud, formed in 1983 and including the Presidents of the Municipal Councils of the Southern Suburb, the Ministries of Public Works and Transportation, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Health, the General Direction of Water and Power, Oger Liban (an active private organization), the Red Cross and the UNICEF.

15. Decree #1107, on the 10/26/1983.

17. This study has been realized in August 1983 by the Direction Generale de l’Urbanisme, under the sponsorship of the Ministry of Public Works and Transportation. It will be referred to in more detail later on in this study.


20. Ibid.

21. The Nasser family is among the oldest families established in this region. They own a number of parcels mostly in the central portion of the Southern Suburb.

22. The Direction Generale de l’Urbanisme, together with a private organization, have put together a master plan for the development of this site. The project, initially meant to absorb the illegal settlements in the Southern Suburb, includes low to high income residential as well as a commercial zone, an industrial zone... (Fig. 21). See, Université Libanaise, Faculté de Genie, Branche III, "Montage financier d’une operation de logements dans le cadre d’une intervention d’aménagement urbain" (Beirut, 1983).

23. A financial study by students of the Lebanese University shows the difference of land values between the Coastal and the Central zones. However, since this study was done in 1983 and since considerable inflation has occurred since then, the values have changed. The study shows that if a land parcel of 0.11 sq. mile in the Coastal zone is purchased for 50 Lebanese pounds per sq. foot, and the coefficient of exploitation is 0.75, then the buildable surface is 0.08 sq. mile. It can be sold after having been serviced for 250 Lebanese pounds per sq. foot, that is 450 million Lebanese pounds. Considering that the utilities would cost 22 million Lebanese pounds, the net gain would be 278 million Lebanese pounds. This could buy a land parcel of 0.04 sq. mile in the Central zone, for 250 Lebanese pounds per sq. foot. With a coefficient of exploitation equal to 1.5, 1500 units could be built. (Construction values are studied in the report). See, ibid.

24. The majority of the population of the Shweifat municipality is Druze, settled there since the early twentieth century.

25. Although both communities, Shiite and Druze, work in the political opposition, they constitute different political parties, often in violent confrontation with each other. Any encroachment of one of the parties on the other’s property would be intolerable.

26. It is common, and has become a general rule, that patronage today, be determined by religious and political affiliations. This trend is very obvious in some aspects of the Displaced’s relief aid. In most of the cases, the Displaced population is led by its affiliate party to the building or land considered appropriate for squatting.

27. District will only refer to the neighbourhoods which have a historic basis, as opposed to the spontaneous settlements, or sectors.


29. F. Jelloul, As-Safir, op. cit.
49. In a study done by the Supreme Shiite Council in 1983, the income distribution shows:
29% less than 1000 LL/month
55% between 1000 and 2330 LL/month
13% between 2000 and 3000 LL/month
4% above 3000 LL/month
52. Ibid.


54. See, p. 133.

55. Salim Nasr, in "Les formes de regroupement traditionnel dans la societe de Beyrouth", in L'espace social de la ville arabe, sous la direction de Dominique Chevallier (Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 1979), p.158-160, shows the clear regression of traditional groupings along extended families in Lebanon and the more frequent occurrence, of groupings according to the village of origin even today. Some of his examples are substantiated by the Southern Suburb's settlements: For example, 60% of the Sunni population of the district of Ghobeiry come from the village of Barja in the Chouf mountains and live there even today, in the same subdistrict of Ghobeiry they named Hay el Burjawi. The strong concentration of two family groups of the 1920's, the 'Khansa', Shiites, in Ghobeiry and the 'Irmi', Maronites, in Chiah, today constitute a minority.

Other cases in Ghobeiry show that nuclear families often end up being divided into two parts: one which remains concentrated and the other dispersed, but still in the same district. One of the main reasons for this trend is the financial betterment of some members of the family and the pending necessity to live with the rest of it.


58. The conventional approach refers to the typical design-construction process which involves a much more sophisticated working team.

59. "Saha" means piazza or the main center of a neighborhood.

60. A detailed study of the architecture, urban fabric and social organization of the sector of Raml will be resumed in the following chapter.

61. Jean Claude David, in "Les quartiers anciens dans la croissance de la ville moderne d'Alep", in L'espace social de la ville arabe, sous la direction de Dominique Chevallier (Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 1979), pp.136-137 demonstrates this common trend with the example of the city of Aleppo. He shows that contrary to other urban dwellers who normally resent living in the old quarters of the city, rural population finds these quarters familiar and suitable to its needs. The regular maintenance which this population provides compared to the decay of buildings inhabited by an old urban population, attest to this point.

62. The further elaboration and the application of these considerations on a case study will be made in the following chapter for the case of the sector of Raml.

63. Terrace also serving as the front entrance to the house (Fig. 57).

64. See the Peru-Preví project or the rehabilitation of the central region of Managua, Nicaragua.
65. The theory of "Devolution of Housing Production" will be discussed in the following chapter.

66. 35% of the population of the Southern Suburb has its own artesian well.

67. In Raml, Ouzai and Hayes Sellamm, water has been cut off for the past ten years.

68. D.G.U., op. cit.; F. Jello, in As-Safir, op. cit.

69. In 1983, the President of the Republic himself went on a survey visit to the Southern Suburb settlements. His visit was followed by some upgrading work such as street paving and garbage collection.
V. PROBLEM OF SUBSISTENCE OR SILENT REVOLT: ANALYSIS OF THE ILLEGAL SECTOR OF RAML

It has been already stated that the phenomenon of unhealthy squatter settlements was the only "given" solution to the problem of homelessness faced by the low-income displaced population. The lack of intervention of the responsible agents in this sad reality has been made clear throughout this study.

It has also been recognized that although both phenomena of displacement and squatting seem to be directly pertaining to the war, other less tangible factors affect these manifestations to a great extent and stand at the very origin of the problem. These factors have been defined as the "System" of the country, that is, the lack of planning, the laissez-faire policy, the lack of State intervention in a market dominated by the private sector and as a result of these the failure to provide low-income housing schemes.

To sum it up, illegal settlements developed as a consequence of the lack of amenities provided to the low-income population by the dominant class, and in ways which conflicted with the dominant class. In Castells' words: "If the State expresses ... through the necessary mediations, the overall interests of the dominant class, then urban planning [can only be] an instrument of ... regulation of contradictions. A process of social change starting from this new field of urban contradictions occurs when, on the basis of these themes, popular mobilization takes place, social needs are given political expression and alternative forms of organization of collective consumption, in contradiction with the dominant social logic, are set up." This phenomenon can be said to be the most dramatic manifestation of social movement entrusted with power and expression by political groups. Its most obvious effect is, as we have already seen, the urban transformation of the Southern Suburb from a vast empty stretch of land into a "ghetto of the Deprived", a "ghetto of political opposition".

That the case of the Southern Suburb is not only one of socio-economic dynamics and that the diverging interests of the two groups are mainly political in nature is now
acknowledged. What remains to be understood is whether the case is one of “urban social movement” or strictly a solution to a problem of subsistence. I believe that this dialectic can be substantiated by the actual urban “effect” in the Southern Suburb, that is, its urban development, its urban fabric and the “architecture” of its settlements. On the other hand, the urban “effect” will help establish the third parameter for intervention in the squatter settlements of the Southern Suburb, one which addresses the social and urban issues pertaining to the settlement as an urban entity. The sector of Raml will be taken as a case study for this purpose. (Fig. 17b).

1. Historical Development

Let me first describe the two successive types of development which occurred in the sector of Raml, the anarchical development of the 1950’s and the 1975-76 development characterized by the new phenomenon of illegality.

Until the early 1940’s, Raml was a vast stretch of sand dunes and waste lands. With the beginning of rural migration and immigration by the late 1940’s, it witnessed a sudden population growth that led to a rapid construction development. Due to a lack of State exercised control, the development occurred in the most anarchical of ways. It is best manifested by the overlap of two forms of land tenure which I will discuss later.

The second form of development started with the disruptive 1975-76 civil war. It may be interpreted as the outcome of an urban social protest, the Homeless’ movement, targeted against the “oppressor”, still undefined at this stage. The intervention of the State in this phase of the development has been proven very controversial since it showed, most of the time, a lack of concern or opposition, and other times, a direct positive concern or strict opposition. In fact, the main concern of the State is the illegal status of the settlement in both the juridical and political sense. The issue of illegality has given way to many diverging opinions on the subject. Perhaps the most realistic ones are those which view it as the natural outcome of the society and the
prevailing circumstances in the country. In the words of Samir Khayat: “When normlessness becomes so widespread, offenses like the confiscation of property or the violation of construction and zoning become legitimate and forgivable transgressions\textsuperscript{3}.

The development of Raml has been, since the very beginning, troubled by a confusion at the level of land ownership. The confusion has in fact been rooted in this stretch of land since the Ottoman period in the nineteenth century. At that time, the land was public; owned by the municipality of Burj el Barajneh. Soon after, a decree was issued, giving the inhabitants of Raml the right to “rent” a land parcel of less than 1000 sq. ft. on the basis of a 99 years leasehold; they could then build on it and inhabit it. The confusion arose by the late 1940’s, when the State decided to implant Beirut International Airport in the Southern Suburb, right at the limit of the sector. At the same time, projects for the creation of a zone of luxury villas, a Golf Club, the Cité Sportive and the Hippodrome were in view for development. This development resulted in a sudden interest in real estate speculations on this land by prominent capital holders and political figures, who started buying some already leased lots, through members of the municipality acting as their official patrons. Soon after these “illegal” transactions began, a number of proceedings started against the “new” landlords, until finally, in 1953, the court ruled the lots as private properties. The obvious favoritism for the “new” landlords, all affiliates of the President, shows the strongly political character of the whole issue.

2. Social Profile

Before going any further in the urban analysis of Raml, a word on the social profile of this sector is noteworthy.

Origins of the population:

The predominant majority of this population is Shiite of rural origin. A repartition according to their place of origin shows that 45.2% come from South Lebanon, 32.9% from the
Bakaa plain, 13.5% from the Central regions, 5.1% from Beirut and 2.6% from elsewhere. 4

Reasons for their migration:

20.8% have been displaced from the pre-war slums of East Beirut in 1975-76;
19.9% have been displaced from South Lebanon by Israeli invasions; 24.2% came in search of jobs; 45.1% have not any determined reason.

14% have settled in Raml before the 1960’s; 15% between 1961 and 1974; 23% in 1975-1976. 24% after 1977. 5 According to the same sources, 50% of the inhabitants of Raml have been displaced more than once.

Population:

Figures vary outrageously according to different sources as shown previously. 6

The Direction Generale de l’Urbanisme shows 4700 dwelling units with an average of 6 persons per unit, a total of 28200 persons. As-Safir shows 8000 units with an average of 6 persons per unit, a total of 48000 persons.

Density is estimated by the Direction Generale de l’Urbanisme at 5.46 pers./ sq. mile, which accounts for 53 200 persons in the sector, considering its surface area of 15 acres. Another source has shown that the number of units was equal to 5228 units in 1983, which amounts to 31 368 persons if the number of persons per unit is estimated at 6. Density then shows a figure of 11.92 pers./sq. mile (7)

Age Distribution:

Age distribution is as follows: 20% of the total population less than 10 years old;
30% between 11 and 25; 45% between 26 and 5; 5% more than 51 years old. 8

Employment:

35% of the active population work in the legal private sector, mainly in the neighbouring industries of Shweifat and Kfarshima as well as in the port and the airport; 10% are
employed in the public sector such as in the municipalities, the army and State administrations; 50% own a small business in the legal or illegal sector, such as butcheries, push carts, groceries, auto repair shops, shoe repair shops...; around 7% work in the building construction sector. Many of those working in the private sector and public sector are underemployed in the sense that their job is not on steady basis.9

Place of Employment:

The sector of Raml offers 31% of the total employment base; 20% work in neighbouring sectors or districts of the Southern Suburb; 28% in Beirut; 3% outside these limits; 18% did not reveal the place of their employment.

The main sources of employment provided in the sector of Raml are auto repair shops; small construction industries (3 factories of cement blocks and 3 of window frames); crafts workshops (15 woodwork and furniture shops)... and other small business of the like. 10

Income:

76.14% of the households make a yearly income below 2000 LL which is below the median level and which creates difficult living conditions considering the number of persons per family which can attain 14 persons or even more. 11

3. Urban Development

At the time when construction began, Raml was defined as an area of 15 acres, bordered on the west by the Airport Boulevard, and by three major streets on the north, south and east. It had been divided into 35 parcels (Fig. 31), with two large ones to the west and an aggregate of small lots on the east.

Construction started along the major peripheral street to the east of the sector on the smallest parcels divided and sold in shares (Fig. 32). Soon after the first residential
development occurred, an adjacent parcel was bought by the now established shareholders, to build a mosque and a cemetery. Residential construction developed around the new mosque. By the late 1940's, it had covered the whole peripheral area to the east and almost all the north-east quadrant (Fig. 33). It is interesting to note that the settlement development followed the tracé of the cadastral parcels boundaries: it was only after the first parcel was fully occupied that the adjacent one was used, which resulted in the rapid saturation of a portion of the land while the remaining parcels were left vacant. Densification was occurring in the form of clusters of semi-detached houses. (constructions en mitoyenneté).

These two features of development talk about aspects of the settlers' socio-cultural traditions, still well preserved in their predominantly rural milieu. Indeed, clusters and the tight residential fabric are typical characteristics of the rural settlements; they reflect strong family and kinship ties in a society where the extended family is the major institution, and provide a sense of security against the "enemy". 12

While the first phase of development occurred in the form of dense clusters, the second phase was characterized by a loose pattern of construction, where detached one-storey houses surrounded with gardens spread on the two large parcels of land. This horizontal development occurred in the 1960's and was due to a major inflow of rural migrants attracted by the capital's booming economy. Despite its loose structural pattern, it retained a predominant feature of the existing settlement, namely its development along existing infrastructure for easier access and provision of utilities (Fig. 34).

This horizontal spread was bound to stop. Its growth was contained by the Airport Boulevard on the west, the Airport on the south-west and Bourj el Barajneh camp to the north and east (Fig. 35). In 1975-76, a horizontal densification of the sector of Raml started as a result of the civil war and the outrageous number of displaced families, mainly from the demolished slums of East Beirut. The built area almost doubled and in 1979, the population was estimated at 11,000 13.
By that time, a second wave of war displacement had occurred, especially from South Lebanon which had been invaded by the Israeli army.

The mid 1970's horizontal densification manifested itself by new currents of real estate speculations within the settlement which resulted in the quick spreading of the phenomenon of illegality in its juridictive sense, that is mainly, the full exploitation of the land. Two major trends in real estate speculation quickly developed: One, the dweller-owner of a large lot divided it into many small ones and sold it to new-comers who did not want to occupy the available vacant lots, possibly for political and security reasons. Two, the dweller-owner built additional houses on his lot or on any vacant lot and leased them to the new-comers. Despite this affluent speculation, the settlement continued to develop on the most accessible zones, and the central portion of the settlement remained less dense.

After the second Israeli invasion in 1982 and the siege of West Beirut which resulted in a third massive displacement, Raml witnessed a third type of development, namely the vertical densification (Fig. 36). Since the central portion of the settlement continued to be unattractive to the new settlers and since the peripheral land was fully "covered", the addition of a few storeys on top of the existing structures was almost essential (Fig. 37). These new "units" were to be leased to the recently displaced. This type of densification was achieved through restructuring the existing house in order to add the load of a few storeys on top of it. Generally, the number of additional floors did not exceed three, and the closer the building was to the peripheral infrastructure the higher it was to be. These real estate speculations exacerbated the phenomenon of illegality, but it provided the only solution to the incessant demand for more rental units, since the "legal" sector only provided a market of apartments sales. Land, which was a sacred source of survival for this rural community, was now a source of speculation.

An interesting feature of the 1980's development of the sector of Raml is the construction of a large mosque at the north-west corner of Raml el Aali, at the west"entrance" of the settlement (Fig. 38). At the same time, the settlement was developing in the same direction. It
37. Example of "Vertical Densification" in the Sector of Raml.
38. MAJOR INSTITUTIONS IN THE SECTOR OF RAML.

LEGEND:
1. NEW MOSQUE
2. OLD MOSQUE
3. CEMETERY
4. LYCEE DE JEUNES FILLES
5. ECOLE DE GARCONS
6. LOCAL OF THE POLITICAL PARTY
has been argued that the construction of the mosque did not contribute to the extension of the settlement to the west, but that on the contrary, the extension justified even imposed the construction of the mosque. Because of the lack of data available on the subject, it will not be further discussed. Nevertheless, evidences of a similar pattern of development in a neighbouring Displaced settlement, Jnah, lead to different conclusions. That is to say, by being a prominent institution, the mosque was regarded as a "legal" matter that no one would "disturb", and the area around it was considered to have a "legal aura" where the fright of being evicted had no reason for being. In any case, the fact remains that the Great Mosque of Raml el Aali affirmed a strong political will, confirmed the presence of the Shiite majority in Raml, and constituted a psychological protection of the dwellers; all these led to a further densification of construction around its site.

It is important for the sake of further discussions, to note that in 1982, the year of the Israeli invasion, construction was interrupted and concentration was on the reconstruction of demolished structures. Later that year, the government attempted to demolish the illegal sector of Raml beginning with the mosque, regarded as the stronghold of political upheaval. The attempts were strongly opposed by the settlers and their affiliate party, and no demolition occurred. This was one of the most obvious manifestations of an urban social protest that led to an urban effect which in its very essence, is in strong conflict with the dominants' interests. Through the political parties' intervention and the settlers' implicit agreement on shared interests, the protest was achieved. That is the definition of a protest movement in Oliver's terms; that "... every protest movement springs from the perception of a stake (expressing a contradiction at the level of structures) by a social force. This is only possible when there is a minimum organization at the social base (that is) the response within the base and the intervention by political groups".
4. Social Organization

At this stage, it is necessary to point out a parallel between the evolution of Raml social organization and the political transformations since the early 1940’s.

It was already mentioned that the first type of development occurring in Raml was in the form of dense clusters of semi-detached houses, which reflected traditional norms of strong kinship and familial ties, as well as the importance of the extended family. These clusters by clans or families - "Arim" - or by groups of the same place of origin, led to the formation of sub-sectors, "Hay" or "Hara" 17, named after the family which inhabited it (Fig.39). Even today, the house of the head of the extended family remains the only way of identification within the "Hay". This was a reflection of a clear social organization, still prevalent in the rural areas, where the head of the family was “in charge” of his “Arim”, or in other terms, for the provision of services and amenities to his "Hay"; it was also he who collaborated with local representatives of the State to preserve their rights and who formed benevolent committees for fund raising, garbage collection, cooperative land purchase... This form of leadership is a subtle variation of the "za'im" of the village who by personal or political influence, exercises a role of mediator between the population and the local authorities, generally the mayor. 18 Only, in the migrants' and the displaced's settlements, it is reinforced by the administrators' reluctance to interfere with the informal sector.

Clusters of extended families started disappearing with the real estate movement in the 1970's: too many "outsiders" rented houses and settled, thereby infringing on the quasi-exclusivity of family tied social and spatial organizations. What helped maintain, to a certain extent, the notion of extended family and clan ties are the different political movements 19 which, since 1975, have been claiming responsibility on the settlers' livelihood, have provided them with a feeling of security at least at the psychological level and have assimilated them through their common cause. Notable members of each family have been in some way, at different times through history, affiliates to the dominant political party and have become both the
parties' and the settlers' spokesmen. These leaders are known, in Cheriki's terms, as the "squatters committee", and work in collaboration with the "support committee" which in the case of Raml is the settlers' affiliate political party. They are in charge of the community organization, of the fund raising for the provision of services and utilities and they usually supervise the implementation of communal infrastructure. Besides, they are the major actors in any kind of social movement or protest.

The transformation of these social organizations, together with the physical development of the sector, can help us better define the case of Raml and substantiate a few factors related to issues of urban planning and urban protest. One can refer to the second phase of the development of the sector (starting in 1975) as a case of auto-urbanisation, as opposed to the first phase (1940's to 1975). While the 1940's to 1975 development was "subdued" to some initial laws and regulations, followed the already established land division and went through the most legal procedures in real estate negotiations by dealing with the public authorities, the war-time development accounted for more liberty and independence. The war displaced' total disregard of regulations and the opinions of the State is due to three reasons: one is the immediacy of their problem, their homelessness; second is the political organization's full support for both their cause and actual situation; third is the inconsistency of the State's behaviour. This refers to the absence of hard-line opposition, and yet, an attempt at demolition in 1982. It also refers to a lack of intervention in the settlement in the provision of services and utilities, in contrast to a "beautification" job in 1984. The politics behind this behaviour are too complex and will not be further studied. Yet, in view of the above, the case of Raml as a Displaced settlement can be said to be one of auto urbanization, and a silent protest in answer to a silent opposition.

5. Urban Fabric

The urban tissue of the sector of Raml can be described as being divided into two
sub-sectors, Raml el Wati (lower Raml) and Raml el Aali (upper Raml), in both a topographical sense and a historical sense (Fig. 40): Raml el Wati is, as its name indicates, the lower part of the settlement and is located on the eastern half of the settlement; it is the oldest built-up part which was occupied in the 1940's and was almost saturated at the eve of the civil war; it is considered to be a 90% legal sector. Raml el Aali is the upper part on the western half of the site and started developing in the 1960's; it accounts for the 1970's and 1980's speculation movement as well as for other forms of illegality. As a result, it is the least serviced part and also the most varied in terms of architectural "styles".

As was mentioned earlier, the settlement is surrounded by the Airport Boulevard on the west and three major streets on the east, north and south. Like in most traditional Muslim cities, these main routes determine the location of the bazaars, or of the modern souks in this case. (Figs. 41, 42). They have been referred to by Jean-Claude David as the "external town" or the public space as opposed to the tightly clustered "internal town". (Fig. 43). This extensive commerce on the periphery of the settlement was developed by independent owners, in an incremental fashion since the 1960's (Fig. 44). Illegality in this retail development occurs at the level of land exploitation which often exceeds the coefficient of exploitation pre-set for the area. These small and numerous commercial outlets serve most of the Southern Suburb settlements. Also as in most traditional Muslim cities, a semi-specialized group of souks is diffused throughout the residential quarters of the settlement (Fig. 45); these are the more "basic needs" type of retail such as food sellers, tailors, shoe repair... They are located on the ground floor of most of the houses, or grouped around the "Saha" (place, square) which is actually often referred to as a small shopping square (Fig. 46, 48). The predominant function of the "saha" as a small market place is a common feature of the Lebanese village. (Fig. 50).

The urban fabric is densest in the old part of the settlement, Raml el Wati, and is in many ways, typical of the Mediterranean villages and comparable to traditional Muslim cities.
41. AERIAL VIEW OF THE SECTOR OF RAML

1:5000
42. URBAN FABRIC OF THE OLD QUARTERS OF THE ISLAMIC CITY OF BAGHDAD
40. RETAIL SHOPS AT GROUND FLOOR OF RESIDENTIAL BUILDINGS IN THE SECTOR OF RAML

41. INTERNAL STREET IN THE SECTOR OF RAML
48. Example of the "saha" as the local market place in the sector of Raml.

49. Typical settlement pattern in the sector of Raml.
50. THE "SAHA" AS THE LOCAL MARKET PLACE IN A LEBANESE VILLAGE

51. HOUSES CLUSTERED AROUND THE MOSQUE IN RAML ELWATI
(Fig. 41,42). Ramla el Wadi settlement is made of clusters of semi-detached terraced houses gathered around the old mosque and its adjoining cemetery, similarly to most rural areas. The clusters have been formed with time to accommodate new comers, members of the extended family or of the same place of origin. (Figs. 51,52,53). They reflect the traditional values and norms of a social structure determined by strong familial and kinship relations. The horizontal growth of these clusters accounts for the absence of streets as such; streets are nothing but the residual space formed by the evolution of built area of the result of set-back regulations, often reaching a minimal width of two meters (Figs. 47,49). Although they are seldom paved, most of them are used for vehicular circulation unless the width does not permit. The only internal paved "street" is the one leading to the Lycée de Jeunes Filles and the Ecole Moyenne des Garçons. It is also the most active internal zone and the only reminder of the outer world in this pseudo-ghetto settlement.

A variation of the residual space resulting from set-back regulations or the evolution of construction is the "saha". These open-air public spaces are the only breathing spots in the tight fabric; as was mentioned earlier, they often act as small market places including at least the butcher shop, the bakery and the grocery store (Fig. 43). They also become, together with the front of the mosque, a prime public place for the men to gather. In some cases, the "saha" becomes a parking space for four cars at most, and the children's favourite playground area (Figs. 54,56).

Besides the saha, internal streets seem to provide for exceptionally frequent associations outside the family. These communication networks created by street life are in fact, a common features of squatter settlements in general. 22

As much as the "saha" is the male population gathering place, the narrow passage and the cul-de-sac in front of the house (Fig. 49), the terrace (Fig. 57) or the "mastaba" 23 (Fig. 58), are the women's semi-public spaces. They all look onto some active street while being
52. SEMI-DETACHED HOUSES CLUSTERED AROUND A SEMI PRIVATE COURTYARD

53. CLUSTERS OF SEMI-DETACHED HOUSES IN A TRADITIONAL ISLAMIC CITY
56. THE SEMI PUBLIC SAHA, IN THE SECTOR OF RAML

57. THE TERRACE ... IN THE SECTOR OF RAML
hidden from it. Semi-private spaces are provided, in the most elaborate structures, by the internal courtyard (Fig. 55) surrounded by a few houses inhabited by the same extended family. In general, the veranda or balcony remains the prime element for the traditional "long-distance" communication among the neighbours.

The full life cycle is thus represented in the urban fabric of the sector.

The overwhelming physiognomy of Ramla el Wati, typical of the Lebanese village and the Mediterranean villages in general, also comparable to the traditional Muslim city, is evidenced to a lesser extent in the more recent part of the settlement, Ramla el Aali. The detached house, initially surrounded by gardens, is a more common feature of this sub-sector. The second common feature is the four to six storey high buildings, achieved by restructuring the initial low structures and adding floors on top of them, thereby disfiguring the 1960's garden-house (Fig. 59). All this is the result of the last two decades' real estate speculation.

A common feature to both sub-sectors is their air of an ever lasting construction site. The piles of sand and gravel become the children's paradise.

The transformation of the spatial structure of the settlement within these four decades is noticeable. Perhaps it also reflects a transformation at the very concept of livelihood. The 1950's and 1960's settlers strived for the re-establishment of a "normal life", the normal life they knew and were used to. They brought their social values, traditions and religious beliefs with them; their rural-urban migration did not account for a decline in familial and kinship ties. On the contrary, a re-creation of their community was vital; it provided them with a sense of security in a constantly alien environment.

The second phase of development, that of the war-displaced's settlement, witnessed some transformations at the level of spatial structure. These transformations mirror a substantial change in the values and traditions of this predominantly rural social group, especially when compared to the 1950's and 1960's settlers who are of the same social, economic, ethnic and
religious backgrounds. But the value-changes are not the prime reason for the physical transformation. The issue is one of changing needs, of the immediacy of the situation of this new population group: the Displaced. The problem is partly one of subsistence, and quality of life is not exactly the thought of the moment. Hence, instead of re-creating their own environment, they adapted to the foreign urban world and to a new reality, that of the urban poor. Is it a case of "spatial environmental determinism", which in the terms of Lynch and Doxiadis, assumes that the modification of spatial form can mold the social process?

Both phases of the spatial fabric development are the effects of social movements, in that they are in total conflict with the dominant groups' interests. While the pre-war urban social movement is manifested in an urban structure derived from rural traditions and life style foreign to the established urban environment, the movement or protest of the Displaced occurs at different levels: one, which Castells defines as being "the reproduction of an urban system"; two, is their illegal occupation of the land as well as their illegal real estate speculations. These manifestations were and still are an obvious revolt against a system which did not provide them with the most basic form of amenities.

Of course, this urban social protest is of mainly a political nature and will not be discussed in the framework of this study. Yet, one element in the fabric of the settlement, the mosque, portrays the socio-political revolt. The old mosque of Raml el Wadi (1950's), together with the cemetery, was one of the first constructions on the site. As development started, houses clustered around it. The resulting fabric is typical of any Islamic settlement. The new mosque, located in Raml el Aali and built in the early 1980's, is of another significance: standing at the very entrance of the settlement, it is no longer of purely a religious significance, but a clear symbol of political upheaval and opposition (Fig. 38).
6. Housing

The transformation of social values, traditions and needs is also reflected in the different types of construction evidenced in Ramli throughout the years.

The first type of construction is particularly distinctive of the 1950’s and mostly occurs in Ramli el Watt. It is one of the four house types of traditional regional architecture, typical of the Lebanese village, the "enclosed rectangular house" (Figs.60 a, 61a). It is characterized by an overall rectangular form and the absence of wide openings in contrast to all other house types. The distinction between functions in their relation to specific spaces is not established in the rectangular house. The plan is a linear succession of spaces, with the entrance-living room acting as a buffer zone for the spaces on both sides. The terrace, most often on one end of the house, serves as an entrance as well as, together with the roof, the most essential element for socialization and communication with the neighbours.

Three variations on the rectangular house have been made in Ramli: one is the square plan house which often includes a courtyard instead of the terrace open on three sides, thereby resembling the "ilwan house" type (Figs.60b, 61b). The second one involves the extension of the terrace along the whole length of the house, forming a colonnaded gallery which in fact gives its name to another traditional house type, the "gallery house" (Figs.60c,61c,62). The third variation is the vertical or horizontal combination of the rectangle and the square plan around a courtyard (Figs.60d,61d,63).

These variations occur with the growth of the extended family. Construction is therefore incremental and is achieved, like all other house types of the same period, by assisted self-help methods, that is the family, the neighbours and one or two local masons. This method, perfectly adapted to the population's cultural norms, is the most commonly adopted in rural areas until today. Furthermore, it is the one prevailing in shans and squatter settlements throughout the world. (Figs.64,65).
a. Rectangular House Type

b. "Lwan" or Corner Terrace House Type

c. Gallery House Type

d. Combination of Rectangular and Square Houses Around a Semi Private Courtyard

e. Formal Sector Apartment Type

60. House Types in the Sector of RAML
A. ENCLODED RECTANGULAR   B. LIWAN HOUSE   C. GALLERY HOUSE

D. COURTYARD HOUSE

G1. LEBANESE TRADITIONAL HOUSE-TYPES
62. COLONNADED GALLERY HOUSE WITH THE "MASTABA" ON THE FIRST FLOOR, SERVING AS THE MAIN ENTRANCE TO THE HOUSE

63. SEMI-PRIVATE COURTYARD
A cloth tent supported by vertical bamboo poles. The tent is anchored to the ground by a number of metal or wooden pins.

Low mud walls are constructed around the edges of the tent to protect it from outside wind and dust.

Side walls are raised higher and at the same time the tent roof is elevated to a higher position too.

The tent is replaced by a roof provided by poplar poles. Side walls are extended outside to form an enclosure.

64. Incremental approach to construction in an Afghan refugee camp in Pakistan
Sequence of development of a 28 sq yd plot

Stage 1: One room with assorted materials
Stage 2: One room with mud walls
Stage 3: Second room with brick walls
Stage 4: Two-room pucca house
Stage 5: Three-room pucca house
Stage 6: Four-room pucca house

65. INCREMENTAL APPROACH TO CONSTRUCTION IN A SQUATTER SETTLEMENT IN DELHI, INDIA.
The second type of construction, relevant of the 1970's and 1980's, derives its "style" from the housing stock provided in the legal sector of the Southern Suburb (Fig. 25), itself derived from the urban "modern" apartment type (Fig. 60e). It is achieved through the restructure of the initial one or two storey house and the addition of a few storeys to be leased (Fig. 66). The most important point about the rental apartment type is its full exploitation of enclosed space for a further maximum exploitation of occupational density. As a result, buildings rise up to six storeys, giving the place a sense of overcrowdedness. Naturally, this exploitation is done at the expense of some traditional architectural elements, vital in the social organization of the people, like the terrace or the veranda, both reduced to a small balcony. (It is in fact surprising that the balcony did not disappear). Sometimes, though, exploitation has led to the preservation of some elements of regional and Islamic architecture. An example of this is the horizontal projection of the additional floors, thereby providing shaded areas to the street underneath.

The labour for this type of construction is not anymore provided by the family members and local masons; it is the labour of the legal sector and often a contractor who are in charge of what quickly became a veritable speculation in real estate.

A lot has been speculated about the origins of the middle rise phenomenon in Islamic societies. On one hand, Roberto Berardi argues that the concept of "building", as opposed to the house, was never prevailing in their culture, and that it was "only good" for migrants since it "secreted" money from the most minute land parcels. On the other hand, the pioneering works of Laila Ali Ibrahim and André Raymond have shown that multi-storey apartment buildings were common in some parts of the Islamic world in as early as the Mamluk and Ottoman periods.

In any case, what seems obvious in this behaviour as well as from other manifestations such as street paving and aluminium window frames in the 1970's and 1980's development ... is the attempt of the illegal Displaced to seek a new way of establishing security, by imitating the urban and architectural aspects of the legal settlement.
Different phases of the growth of a squatters' house.

- Basic room and pit latrine
- Vertical addition of apartments to be leased, closure of openings and initial room for privacy purposes.
- Higher level of finishing on commercial facade.
- One additional room, terrace, and garden furniture.
- Vertical addition, conversion of initial room into retail space.
- Enclosure of balconies in rental apartments to increase interior space.
- Definition of private entrance to the initial squatters' house.
From the two points I have been looking at, the development of Raml squatter settlement and its spatial configuration, it is clear that the issue is not limited to a problem of subsistence. Protest and revolt occurred at different levels and different times and are traced back to the settlers' first move, that is the land "occupation". Since these moves or silent revolts have led to substantial transformations at the level of urban structure, and since they are on their way to provoking changes in the social structure, it will be adequate to refer to them as a "urban social movements". "An urban social movement is defined as: A system of practices resulting from the articulation of a conjuncture of the system of urban agents with other social practices, such that its development tends objectively towards the structural transformation of the urban system, or towards a substantial change in the balance of forces in the class struggle, that is to say, in the power of the State."  

Yet, one question remains unanswered, and cannot be answered at this stage since the analysis of this case has been reduced to a narrow scope for the sake of the study: who and what is the protest directed against and what is to be achieved from this struggle? It is certainly important to note that the struggle did not only occur at the level of preservation of rights, nor were the "effects" confined to the transformation of the city structure. The war is, after all, the prevailing status quo in the country, and fighting has become the official means of expression and protest.

Looking back at the reasons which led to the emergence of the Displaced's squatter settlements, it is evident that the war is the most direct reason, but that the factors inherent in the very system of the country have played an important role. These factors are rooted in the history of the country in as much as their consequences in terms of oppression are. As a result, a considerable amount of revolts, revindications and frustrations have been accumulated but never answered. Hence, on the eve of the civil war, substantial social tensions in the popular rural and urban classes were existent. The war has been the delinquent expression of this acute social crisis
which pre-existed but did not manifest itself in a consistent way. Having been for such a long
time blocked in their expression and frustrated by the dominant groups, the revindications of the
deprived population were transformed into protest and revolt, and were recuperated by the
people's affiliate political party. This, along with the war led to the image of Rami as a ghetto of
political upheaval and opposition. The struggle becomes purely political in nature, and only
underlines socio-economic issues. Instead of being a social, political and economical struggle,
fighting against the principal actors involved in the system, it has become a series of deadly
battles conducted on behalf of the political parties who are fighting for a cause of a different
dimension.
Notes to Chapter

1. In a study done by Claude Dubar and Salim Nasr, the dominant group has been perceived by the local population to consist of traditional politicians (who are not necessarily active), of members of the government, rich families, merchants, bankers, industrialists and landowners. Claude Dubar and Salim Nasr, Les classes sociales en Liban (Paris: Presse de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1976), p. 315.


6. See, pp. 85, 86


8. Ibid.


10. Ibid., pp. 32-34.

11. Ibid., p. 35.

12. Family "wars" are still common in some villages; they trace back to tribal conflicts that have lingered on through the years.


14. Ibid., p. 84.

15. The construction of a hospital in Jnah accounted for a dense clustering of houses around it.


18. "Za'im", in Arabic, refers to those who by personal or political power, exercise an influence on higher authorities. They are the most common form of patronage in the country. For further detail on this matter, see, Elle Salem, Modernism Without Revolution: Lebanon’s Experience (Indiana University Press, 1976).

19. In the 1960’s and 1970’s, many youngsters of the sector of Rami collaborated with the Palestinian Resistance which was gaining power at the time; as a result, the neighbouring Palestinian Camp of Burj el Barajneh helped the settlers of Rami to preserve their rights on the land. Today, it is the Movement of "Amal", of Shiite majority and known as the "Movement of the Depressed", which stands as the political organization in power. It acts as the major "relief organization" in the sector.


23. “Masaba” is a terrace often covered with a trellis, which serves as the entrance to the house.


VI. INTRODUCING A POLICY OF LEAST INTERVENTION

1. Identification of problems in the sector of Raml

The analyses of the development of the urban fabric of Raml, its social organization, architecture and its methods of construction have raised a number of issues which need to be attended to for the formulation of a short term housing policy, aiming at improving the condition of the settlement. These issues, most of which are inherent in other illegal sectors of the Southern Suburb, pertain to the sector of Raml as a particular urban entity and hence, attest to the most immediate problems faced by its population, namely:

- That some "vulnerable" portions of the settlement need to be demolished and relocated on adjacent vacant land.

- That the lack of physical link of the sector with neighbouring settlements encourages its ghetto-like aspect.

- That the endless addition of storeys on the initial structures not only results in the overdensification of some areas, but also often defies structural laws.

- That the lack of basic utilities leads to an overall unhealthy environment.

- That illegality and insecurity of tenure inhibit the will of the people to improve their dwellings.

- That speculation and profit have resulted in a noticeable degradation of the traditional social structure. The preservation of groupings along traditional values of extended families and regional bonds is essential, for these provide the needed psychological support to the settlers and the needed transition between rural and urban settings. Besides, they provide the only form of patronage and mediation between settlers and authorities, and thus the only means to serve the settlers.

- That some traditional forms of social organization, totally adapted to cultural norms, have been lost as a result of the vertical densification of the settlement and the shift from adaptive urban environment to profit aimed urban development and self-help incremental built dwellings to
contractor-built alien environments. An attempt to preserve these traditional urban forms and architectural elements ought to be made.

That employment, even on illegal or irregular basis, seems to provide social stability. Therefore, activities other than residential should be preserved in the sector, especially the non intrusive retail and service activities.

Finally, that if demolition seems to provoke violent reactions from the settlers, indifference and a silent opposition of the State authorities do not solve any problem either. On the contrary, they incite a multiplication of the squatting phenomenon and a grudge and mistrust of the authorities by the settlers.¹

2. Socio-economic Issues to Attend to

Besides the identified immediate problems faced by the illegal sector of Raml, some socio-economic issues which have been detected throughout this study ought to be remembered. The first and most basic of these issues is that raised by the very existence of the settlements, that is, by the continuously spreading informal sector on the urban fringe and on a land of high economic value. To encourage this trend means, of course, to multiply the problems it generates and thus is not an adequate approach. Yet, as long as instability prevails in the country and as long as no housing alternative is provided for the displaced families, short term policies aiming at alleviating the condition of the Displaced and resolving the most immediate of his problems, ought to be undertaken. Short term policies should concentrate on the provision of basic utilities and structurally sound shelters. Yet, they should be framed in a "broader" policy in order to avoid the creation of "fixed" and hasty solutions which will appear to generate other problems; besides, the potential of the Southern Suburb area for considerable economic development has already been noted; to be blind about this matter and to concentrate on recuperating exclusively the most depressed part of this region, the Displaced settlements, would only lead to further
problems. Hence, short term strategies should be perceived as the first phase of the larger policies. These would then involve less urgent issues which would be considered in the scope of medium and long term strategies. Medium term strategies would consist of the provision of health, educational, religious and social facilities, employment and security of tenure. Longer term resolutions would involve a rehabilitation of the Southern Suburb region, in the scope of the Schéma Directeur de Beyrouth et de sa Banlieue 3.

Furthermore, consideration should be given to an eventual stabilization of the political situation in the country; to this end, some auxiliary policies will be further suggested.

Other economic issues pertaining to the approach towards the improvement of the war-displaced settlements seem to evolve as a result of the apparent financial and institutional inability of the government to provide low-income housing to the displaced population 4:

First, clearance of the existing settlements must be avoided, for not only does it mean the destruction of the only "sample" of low income housing, but it also implies the loss of a substantial low income housing stock, regardless of its illegal status. This, in turn, would result in the temporary homelessness of thousands of families and their eventual illegal re-establishment elsewhere. Second, self help or mutual help methods for housing provision should be encouraged and perceived as a way to cut down on cost and time. Finally, a cost recovery of the project would have to be, partially at least, achieved through methods of auto-financement, that is by means of generating revenues from the "rentable elements" of the longer term policy (commercial activities, higher income residential...). Therefore, large governmental subsidies should not be relied upon. Low initial investments should be the aim, since it is the initial costs which tend to be mostly made of loans.

These issues, derived from a thorough analysis of the sector of Raml as an urban entity, as well as from the socio-economic system of the country and the environmental context of the war-displaced settlements of the Southern Suburb, all seem to discredit large scale
interventions which would consist of a full production of housing units. They promote a comprehensive approach which involves minimal intervention in the settlement and which could only be achieved by shifting the role of the responsible agents from house producers to “enablers”, by reinforcing self help methods and incremental approaches to the production of housing and by encouraging “voluntary associations” among the squatters.  

3. Definition of a Housing Policy

The housing strategy as applied to the sector of Rawl, will be defined as consisting of two major comprehensive policies, Upgrading the settlement and Relocating its “vulnerable” zones through a Site and Services project onto an adjacent land. These policies have been referred to as the “improvement approach” for upgrading and the “partial approach” for sites and services, as opposed to the “full approach” of the large scale public housing and the “indirect approach”, which means the general efforts directed to protect the low-income group from bearing an excessive burden as a result of the activities in the private sector. They have often been defined as the rupture with the conventional approach. The need for this rupture is best portrayed in the following statement: “Neither policy makers nor planners, architect or urbanists can build homes. Only a family can create a home - a place (according to the Random House Dictionary) in which one’s domestic attention is centered. The critical need is to build serviced communities that enable families to help themselves with homemaking. Unfortunately, the problem is usually stated in terms of housing deficits rather than community deficits. And the answer is usually framed in terms of the quota of housing units to be built in a plan period. Then the builders and the architects who follow these governmental policies justly get labeled as “people packers, creating multistoried sardine cans solidly filled with restless frustrated discontented people”, in the words of Tao Ho.”

Upgrading as defined by Nabeel Hamid, consists of an incremental comprehensive
and integrated development of areas which are either consolidated or in the process of consolidation but lacking basic services and utilities. By promoting development through minimal intervention, the case is made for development through the lowest effective level of all decision-making and managerial responsibility for housing. Lowest effective level in this context means the smallest social or political group that can economically support or claim the exclusive use of a good or service.

**Sites and Services** is understood to mean "the preparation and subdivision of land for residential buildings and the provision of various combinations of public utilities and communities facilities".  

Key objectives and key notions of the serviced plot approach is to stimulate maximum private involvement in shelter development and employment creation using a minimum of public expenditure. Public action is geared to removing constraints, physical such as basic infrastructure and building materials, as well as institutional, such as tenure. Decisions of location, level of servicing, distribution of facilities and even sometimes types and standards of construction are determined centrally. The programming of house building is to be taken locally. The basic notion adopted in the Sites and Services approach to urban low-income residential development is aided self help. Sites and Services presuppose the construction of dwellings from the plot holder's own ability and resources. Aided is meant to subsidize the resources of the plot holder. Sites and Services is therefore the decentralization of responsibility for the implementation of centrally taken decisions.

**Key Notions Adopted in Both Policies of Upgrading and Site and Services**

The concept of minimal intervention, and the shift of the responsible's role from Housing producer to "facilitator" is central to both Upgrading and Sites and Services policies. Three other concepts are strongly advocated by these two policies, namely the incremental
approach to building construction, self help and mutual help methods, and the participation of
the community in decision making through Voluntary Associations. These concepts seem to be,
as mentioned earlier, encouraged by social, political and economical issues that affect
decision-making toward the approach for intervention in the squatter settlements of the Southern
Suburb.

The incremental approach is commonly adopted in the sector of Raml, in the
traditional settlements of the Southern Suburb as well as in squatter settlements at large. It is
understood as a means to reduce the initial investment and to assure an immediate basic shelter. In
the case of Raml, it adapts perfectly to the cultural and social norms of its rural Shiite
population to whom the extension of a dwelling is the "concretization" of family growth and
financial betterment.

Self help methods are assumed to contribute to savings in time, to the reduction of
costs, to the mobilization of initiative amongst the low-income housing dwellers and to the
increase of community spirit. Three predominant forms of self help or aided self help
construction have been identified as being:

- The allotsee-built form of self help, which implies a total self reliance in the construction
decision making. Implementation may seek for extra skilled or semi-skilled help for free. A good
example of this method is the erection of a temporary shelter built with precarious material.

- The subcontract-built form of self help, which involves contracting to semi-skilled contractors
those activities which cannot be handled by the allotsee. It is the most popular form of self help.

- The building group, which is a form of mutual help and involves initial financial assistance
from among the dwellers.

"Voluntary associations" or "squatters' committees" are believed to help squatters in
the resolution of their problems and have been encouraged by a number of scholars through their
studies. They have been perceived to have the potential to mitigate the alienation of the urban
setting and bridge the gap between squatters and the public institutions on which they depend.
true constuction in the case of Raml. The belief that the use of such networks alleviates much of
the burden these communities impose on authorities has led some scholars to advocate that local
governments strengthen mutual aid networks within these communities rather than repressing
them or undermining their effectiveness. 

A Theory of Devolution of Housing Production

Most aspects of upgrading and sites and services projects represent a change to the
conservative bureaucracy to which the pre-built low-income housing approach used by housing
policy makers is still the official view on urban housing supply. This view which suggests that
the various components of urban settlements are delivered to the household in a single, fixed and
finite package is, though, no more exclusive in most of the third world countries and has been in
several occasions during the last two decades, supplanted by a theory of Devolution of Housing
Production, an approach which started emerging in the early 1960's with the works of Charles
Abrams and Otto Koenisberger. Their attitude, best characterized by the motto: "if you can't
beat them, join them" departed from the belief that the most substandard shanties provide homes
and should therefore be recognized as part of the urban housing stock, and that the provision of
official assistance could help them raise the quality of their housing. The concept of "aided
self-help" housing as an "official" method for the production of low-income housing emerged.

The World Bank policies took over this concept in the following decades. The
1970's and early 80's were characterized by these policies which tried to institutionalize the new
ideas by developing different approaches where population initiative was the resource to be
exploited. They followed the economic logic of shifting the responsibility for housing provision
to the users. They argued that individual households can build their own dwelling with a more
effective and economic use of resources than can be achieved by centrally administered
construction programs. They distinguished the various roles that the government should take,
namely the provision of land, security of tenure, affordable credit and basic infrastructure. As a
result, many variations on the Upgrading and Site and Services principles have been tried in the past few years, involving various modes of financing and repaying the public costs of the operation, various forms of land tenure by the occupant household, and various levels of provision of utilities and services…

Inherent in the two previous arguments are the writings of John Turner. Turner advocates that housing is not just a shelter, but rather a process, an activity, and should therefore be viewed according to its meaning and those who use it rather than its mere physical characteristics. He argued that since housing needs change according to the family cycle or according to stages in the migrant’s life in the city, an endless variety of options cannot be catered for all of these needs and therefore, the main components of housing should be left to the users. Government should support and organize. He saw in this approach a high degree of social cohesion and environmental maintenance in contrast to a tendency to social apathy and neglect and vandalism in government built and managed projects. In his words: "If government is to increase the supply of housing for the mass of the people, it must reverse its conventional priorities. Every effort must be made to move large construction organizations away from house building and into the middle scale range of infrastructure development and into the large scale range of manufacturing of building materials and components. Only in this way can there be a rapid increase of valid housing for lower-income people in the short run, and a valid dwelling environment for everyone in the long run."**

A basic scholarly change of attitude seems to have been achieved. The unsightly slums, creeping cancers** in the cities were rejected; rather they were interpreted as slums of hope**, communities in formation, or as the Peruvians re-titled theirs, “young towns”, or, as “not the problem but the solution** to the problem of low income housing in the rapidly urbanizing world.” In the mid 1970’s, the United Nations referred to them as “communities in transition.”
In many developing countries, however, the conventional approach prevails.

The Myth of the Conventional Approach and the Advantages of a Policy of Least Intervention

As we have noted earlier, upgrading and site and services projects represent change in the low-income housing approach and therefore more work to an already feeble and conventional bureaucracy. The construction industry prefers the conventional business of building complete houses which are usually more profitable (because they end up housing middle income families), less risky, and familiar.

But this preferential attitude too often relies on "myths" which, if examined closely, betray the apparent excellence of the conventional approach. These "myths" have been carefully analyzed by Schlomo Angel and Stan Benjamin. Seventeen myths, principles and beliefs, which they have divided into three categories (professional and technical, middle class and elite values, myths which have found their way into our institutions), have proven to constitute obstacles to the solution of the current approach to the Housing problem. 21

The following section will attempt to describe some of the identified myths, those pertaining to our case, and will point out at the advantages of a policy of minimal intervention such as Upgrading and Site and Services projects, and as it pertains to the sector of Ramla.

Paternalism:

This myth states that the elite know better and therefore should be allowed to decide and act on behalf of the rest. The people who have housing problems are less experienced, less organized and less reliable. They should not be left to cope. Their problems must be solved for them. The three following myths could be interpreted as by-products of paternalism.

The Myth of the High Rise:
The high and middle rise ideas promised to offer two major economies: saving on land by increasing densities and savings in construction by using modern methods. Both have proven to
be mythological, especially in developing countries where costs are higher mainly because of heavy import of equipment and materials. These imported technical standards assume imported cultural standards often in total conflict or at least disregarding the targeted users. In fact, middle and high rise buildings seem to jeopardize the existing sense of community and security by their very typology. By aiming at a maximum exploitation of density, they suppress all forms of urbanization which are vital to the community such as the street and the semi public gathering spaces. They have been described by Roberto Berardi as "funnels of people" to allude to the impersonality of these buildings and to the fact that they do not house families, but "people" alien to each other. 22 This is particularly true in societies where strong community ties prevail, such as in the case of the Shiite rural community of Raml. The inadaptability of this population to such building typologies has been strongly evidenced in the building squatters in the city of Beirut, where the unemployed occupants (elderly, children, women), spend the whole day at the front porch of the building or on streets and use their flats for dormitory purposes only. A number of such low income buildings around the world have proven unsuccessful, the most critical of which was the Pruitt-Igoe project in St Louis, Missouri, which was initially highly regarded but quickly deteriorated into a veritable ghetto. 23

The Myth of Large Projects:

It expects savings because of repetition, material in bulk, and industrialization ... but it is not so. High costs of administration, organization and inexperienced management in the developing countries have to be added.

Most of all, large projects require such high initial costs that public resources are quickly exhausted; besides, these projects deteriorate rapidly due to vandalism, itself due to occupants' hostile feelings toward them. Keeping them up becomes an impossible task.

Finally, standardization and repetition implies anonymity and impersonality, a particularly intrusive attitude to communities such as that of Raml, whose prevailing mode of
identification, as noted in the socio-spatial analysis of the sector, is exclusively by reference to prominent families' dwellings and to the physical characteristics of streets and houses.

The Myth of Completeness:

The myth of completeness, or the desire to produce finished products contradicts the incremental approach to housing which derives from the low-income groups' immediate need for shelter and the impossibility for them to wait for months or years of planning.

The process of complete housing provision involves conventional procedures where elaborate designs and considerable administrative work delay the actual implementation time. Moreover, the intended beneficiaries are relocated only after the construction is all over. A financial study of the low-income housing proposal done in the context of a larger multi-functional proposal in the Southern Suburb shows that the responsible organization for the construction would be able to deliver one hundred low-income units per year in the following stages: none in the first 6 months, 25 during the seventh, eighth and ninth months and 75 in the last two months. Considering the amount of units needed to relocate the population settled on the vulnerable zone of the sector of Raml, it would take four years before everyone is relocated. That is not the purpose of an emergency intervention.

The desire to produce finished products is often due to the architect's ego in not wanting his work to be disturbed, and in his idealistic utopias in disregarding the need to challenge received ideas. This attitude often results in fixed solutions which aim to suppress variations and additions or any other form of personalization (Fig.67). Yet, it sometimes fails to do so; instead, it renders the squatters' task of adding and transforming their dwellings according to their needs and priorities only more difficult. These "forced" changes, then, lead to drastic transformations of the initial dwellings due to the dissatisfaction of their users. Evidence of that has been demonstrated in a low-income building in the formal housing sector in India shown in Fig.68, and even in the least standardized of housing projects in the Peru-Previ project, where after ten years, the architects could barely recognize their buildings.
These two adjacent blocks in Las Palmas contrast the outcome of centrally administered housing projects versus user-controlled housing. In the project shown below, virtually all design, location, financing, building, and management decisions were made by a central agency while the decisions for the dwellings shown above were made by the users (and generally the owner).

67. **Urban effect of self-help methods above, in contrast to complete housing units below.**
60. TRANSFORMATION OF A HOUSING BLOCK IN INDIA, 1953 TO 1954
Finally, the "full approach", as referred to by Samuel Arieli, requires large sums of capital to be invested for standards which are not demanded by their users and which do not necessarily comply to their needs and cultural norms.

Advantages of Upgrading and Site and Services Policies over these Three Myths

The social and economic discrepancies of these three myths can be largely overcome by policies of minimal intervention such as upgrading and sites and services programs, namely by savings on costs and time and by better adapting to the community.

Cost savings: The most important input of such policies is a social stability derived from spreading the benefits of scarce resources among a much larger section of the population. Several upgrading and sites and services programs attest to this, notably the Jakarta and Surabaya projects in Indonesia and the upgrading and sites and services projects in Lusaka, Zambia which benefited 160,000 people, 160,000 targeted beneficiaries of the low income group.

Besides, upgrading and sites and services policies involve lower cost per capita as well as negligible management compared to the large projects of complete housing units, medium or high rise. It has been demonstrated that ambitious programs of upgrading can be financed by authorities with very little resources. In the case of the upgrading program which was set forth in Ankara, Turkey, finances were all provided by a municipality with limited powers and even more limited resources; yet, it enabled the majority of the needy, low income households to obtain security of tenure and basic services reasonably quickly.

Self-help or mutual help methods used in these policies imply that each family pays for what it needs, as opposed to the flat policy where the design and the finances are fixed and are delivered as a package; hence compelling the family to pay for standards they did not ask for. Besides, as mentioned earlier, it saves on labour costs and provides temporary jobs to the low-income dwellers.
Time saving: The incremental approach used in upgrading and sites and services projects implies the **immediacy of provision of the basic shelter** and utilities and suggests that improvement is noticeable in a short period of time, as opposed to conventional methods where delay is imposed by administrative procedures and awaiting for the completion of the project. Ad hoc upgrading programs with defined priorities for improvement provide the best examples of time saving in "emergency" improvement. An interesting example is that of Indonesia's Kampung Improvement Program which developed from ad hoc municipal activities into arguably the largest settlement upgrading operation in the world, directly benefiting over three million people in Jakarta alone, in a relatively short time span.29

Social adaptability: It mainly relates to the **flexibility and variety** that both policies of upgrading and site and services offer, as a natural outcome of self help and mutual help methods. Besides, social adaptability refers to the respect of community ties which provide physical and psychological support to their people, and to the **minimum disturbance** it provokes in the community as opposed to a system of relocation on ad hoc basis, usually conducted in large housing projects, which disrupt the ties among the community.

The Myth of Upholding the Law:

Squatters are illegal land occupants. Basically, they have broken the law. To **recognize** them is perceived as an affront to the very principle of law. Another way of viewing this matter is found in Angel's argument: "If those who are forced by circumstances to squat are expected to respect the law, then the law must be changed to respect the circumstances in which these squatters find themselves".30

**Controversy of Policies of Implicit Legality of Tenure**

Recognition of the squatters can be done by **implicit forms of securing tenure**, that is, by upgrading the settlement and without establishing an official statement as to its
The most obvious benefit of securing the squatters' tenure by explicit or implicit means is that it incites the dwellers to improve their settlements. Yet, security of tenure, even implicitly, can lead to two major risks. First, it might instigate further squatting from population who believe that security of tenure is the following endowment. Second, improvement of a settlement implies a rise of the land value. It has been observed that this often results in the displacement of the low income population, as in the case of Bogota where Janssen observed that the legalization of the water supply system in an illegal settlement led to a rise in prices that forced a number of residents to search for cheaper housing solutions elsewhere. 31 In the words of Burgess: "By Legalization and Improvement, the capitalist system will more effectively penetrate the squatter settlement; land and houses will be incorporated into another sub market of Housing, the market of the middle income groups, where housing shortages are a well known phenomenon as well. Since the potential prices of the self constructed houses rise, they will more readily change from potential commodity into actual, real commodity. As a result, it can be argued, the poorest among the original low income inhabitants will be gradually displaced to their own sub-market: the illegal settlement."32

This of course suggests that specific housing policies can be considered an enforcement to the law, to an inherent law, a political one. This is in fact the most salient argument in Burgess' critique of the housing theory of one of the promoters of self help methods, namely John Turner. According to Burgess, Turner overlooks the interests of politicians, administrators and financiers, and their manipulation of the squatters financially and politically. He sees that Turner de-politicizes both the housing problem and the State.33 Strong evidence of the truth inherent in Burgess' critique is found all over the world. In Chile, both Allende and Pinochet governments have built housing to reinforce their respective political and cultural goals. Allende encouraged self help so that Housing could be built communally by actively constituted social groups. Two purposes were served: Housing was created and the
lower-class groups (the base of Allende's support) were organized. Under Pinochet, the policy involved offering completed dwelling. Thus, individual family relations were emphasized at the expense of community organization. On the other hand, counter evidence of this theory is well portrayed in Lisa Peattie's ironic remark: "The capitalist class has not read or assimilated the Marxist liberal debate on squatters, for the local government now embarks on a big campaign of clearing substandard shacks... ignoring... the argument of Marxists as to how the settlements served the interests of capitalist growth." 

In Beirut, the clearance of squatters and slums is certainly viewed as a political attitude, but a more naive one, which abides by what Angel refers to as "the myth of the nice environment". The myth of the nice environment is that which requires the clearance of squatter settlements because they look messy, dirty and run down, and give a negative impact of the life conditions in the city. Clearance is certainly the most disastrous among all policies since it not only destroys significant portions of the national low income housing stock, but it also perpetuates the squating phenomenon, since no alternative is provided. The case of the slums and squatter settlements of the Eastern Suburbs of Beirut offers good evidence of this approach; its consequences were predicted: demolished by the end of 1975, they all re-emerged in the southern Suburb a year later.

The other political attitude which has been prevailing in Beirut for the past twelve years is attributed to the myth of the double-bind, or the ultimate dilemma: on one hand, the authorities cannot alienate the "dominant", on the other hand, they recognize that squatters have a problem. The silent opposition to the squatters of the Southern Suburb is the perfect example of this myth, with all the consequences it entails, namely a multiplication of the phenomenon and a grudge and mistrust of the authorities.

That politics is a prime determinant in the formulation of a housing policy is undeniable. That this idea particularly pertains to Lebanon is equally true. The demolition of the
slums of the Eastern Suburbs, the silent opposition towards the continuously spreading displaced settlements of the Southern Suburb as well as the prospects for development attest to it.

Yet, the prime issue remains that the Displaced settlements call for an immediate intervention. Besides, one has to realize that in the case of prevailing anarchy and the decentralization and weakening of central power such as in Lebanon, any form of control is assumed to be a reinforcement of the political law and it is enough to find a "responsible agent", that is, a private organization entrusted with political power. The approach to a housing policy, then, would have to be selected on the basis of low costs, minimal time and social adequacy, which both policies of upgrading and site and services have throughout this section, appeared to fulfill.
Notes to Chapter

1. "Authorities" in this context, refers to any powerful organization such as political parties, religious works as well as to the central state authority.


3. For a rehabilitation program of the Southern Suburb, see, Universite Libanaise, Faculte de Genie, Branche III, "Montage financier d'une operation de logements dans le cadre d'une intervention d'aménagement urbain" (Beirut, 1983); Republique Libanaise, Ministere des Pauvres Publics et des Transports, Direction Generale de l'Urbanisme, "Elements pour un Livre Blanc Dossier. Banlieue Sud (Beirut, August 1983).

4. See, p. 41, 42.

5. The term was coined by Yunusar Askoyu, "Voluntary Associations in Urban Squatter Settlements", Ekistics 307 (July/August 1964), pp. 338-346.


11. This concept has generated some sophisticated methods developed by architects, engineers and planners and which place a particular emphasis on standardization and industrialization, flexibility and variation. Perhaps the most elaborate of these is the SAR method: John Habraken, in Variations (Cambridge, Mass., M.I.T. Press, 1976); Supports, transl. B. Valkenburg Anka (London: The Architectural Press, 1982), developed a complete method for the analysis, evaluation and design of plan variations, given a basic support, i.e., a generic space and structure context for adequate housing. Yet, although some attempts have been made towards the application of the SAR method on low-income housing in third world countries traditional communities, it will not be further elaborated in this study for it
presupposes, in our case, much higher costs due to the import of standardised elements and skilled labour. See, John Habraken and Eric Dubosch, "The Role of Industrial Production for Increasing Housing Production in the Low-income Sector in Egypt", Ekistics 266 (January/February 1980), pp. 51-52.

12. It is interesting to note that the naming of squatter settlements in Turkey, for example, is made after the concept of self-help immediate shelter: "Gecekondu" in Turkish, which refers to the squatter settlements in Turkey means "built overnight". See, Mehmet Faik Togbuk, "Gecekondu/Built Overnight: A Documentary on a Squatter Settlement in Istanbul" (Master's thesis, M.I.T., 1970).


22. Roberto Bertali, "Intervention", in L’espace social de la ville arabe, sous la direction de D. Chevallier, op. cit.

24. Universite Libanaise, Faculte de Genie, Branche 111, "Montage financier d'une operation de logements dans le cadre d'une intervention d'aménagement urbain" (Beirut, 1983).

25. The Peru-Previ competition, held in Peru in 1969, was an experimental low-income housing project sponsored by the United Nations to help evolve a housing policy for Peru. Thirteen foreign architects were invited to participate. Twelve to twenty houses of each participant's design have been built. See, Dorit Fromm, "Peru-Previ", The Architectural Review, $1062 (August 1985), pp. 49-54.


27. See, Geoffrey Payne, ed., op. cit., Chapters 4, 3.

28. Ibid., Chapter 5.

29. Ibid., Chapter 4.


33. Ibid., pp. 1105-1133.


VII. CONCLUSION: "SETTING THE SCENE" FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE HOUSING POLICY IN THE ILLEGAL SECTOR OF RAML

The definition of a Housing Policy has been determined as we have seen, from a thorough analysis of all the parameters which are perceived to affect an intervention for the improvement of the Displaced settlements of the Southern Suburb of Beirut. The three broad frameworks for intervention which have been established pertain to the System of the country, the physical context of the settlements and the settlement as an urban entity. (The sector of Raml, taken as a case study, was analyzed for this purpose). Each of these frameworks has introduced a set of social, economic, architectural and urban parameters. They have set the scene for an eventual intervention in the Illegal sector of the Southern Suburb and have defined a housing strategy, one which promotes minimal intervention in the sector by upgrading the sector and relocating its "vulnerable" zones through a site and services project. The advantages of this policy, as compared to the conventional approach to housing and as pertaining to the sector of Raml, have been also defined.

This concluding chapter will set the scene for the implementation of the policy in the sector of Raml, by formulating an approach to each of the policy's components, and by giving recommendations on the social and economic levels. Setting the scene for the implementation of a comprehensive housing policy involves awaiting the responsible agents to acknowledge the case, to intervene and to undertake a thorough study of the policy, administrative and financial aspects of the actual intervention, on the basis of this approach. Setting the scene, hence, does not involve an examination of the policy's components from a technical standpoint since these are perceived to be the next step toward the implementation of the policy, and within the concern of the responsible agents.

The chapter will focus on the short-term strategies involved in the selected housing policy, since only the immediate problems of these settlements are within the scope of this study. Through both policies of upgrading and sites and services, concern will be given to the issue of
infrastructure, to housing issues such as rehabilitation, demolition and relocation, to land issues such as allotment of parcels, mode of tenure and issues of permanence or temporality of the settlers. Administrative and financial issues will be discussed only in terms of suggestions.

Medium term policies such as the provision of health and educational facilities, religious services, employment base, transportation, and access... are perceived as second phase intervention and are assumed to be taken care of by local relief aid agencies and religious Wakfs and councils, who have so far assumed responsibility on these matters. This should not suggest, though, that the sector is adequately equipped with community services, but only that the lack of public services does not constitute an immediate problem which ought to be solved imminently.

Finally, it is important to remember that for this project to be financially equitable, it has to be perceived as the first phase of a large multi-function project. Since some preliminary studies for the implementation of such a project have already been conceived by the DGUL UL team, the low-income housing intervention will be assumed to constitute its first phase while other less immediate interventions will be undertaken in the scope of the Schema Directeur et de sa Banlieue, as part of a longer-term project.

Other suggestions pertaining to long term strategies at both the regional level of Beirut and its Suburbs and the national level can be alluded to in terms of auxiliary policies:

- That the upgraded sector of Raml as well as the serviced site project remain as part of the national low-income housing stock after the political stability of the country and after some of their dwellers opt to return to their villages.
- That loans be provided to the displaced families for the reconstruction of their dwellings in the war torn areas. This of course suggests that these areas be accessible and livable.
- That a savings cooperative be created to allow the low income population access to large supplies of cash with which to buy material.
That grants be provided for urban renewal and the construction of rental housing.

That construction of rental housing be promoted through a relaxation of rent controls.

That agriculture be rehabilitated and job pools provided in the rural areas which witnessed outmigration.

These suggestions are only submitted as long term objectives and require, before anything else, the reestablishment of central authority.

1. Recommendations for Managing and Financing the Housing Policy

Since evidence of interest and involvement from some private and public organizations has been witnessed, it is only natural to regard these organizations as the eventual promoters, managers and partial funders of the intervention. These organisations have recently formed, as mentioned earlier in this study, a group whose attention focuses exclusively on the Southern Suburb area, namely, the Council for Development of the Southern Suburb. Among its members, some are perceived as potential "responsible" for the project. These are: the Ministry of Public Works and Transportation, the Direction Generale de l'Urbanisme, the Ministry of Water and Power, Oger Lebanon, the Council for Development and Reconstruction.

Recommendations for the Management of the Low-income Housing Project:

- The policy should not rely on heavy governmental subsidies. Yet, the State, as well as the municipalities of Ghobeiry and Bourj el Barajneh should provide partial financial assistance. Short term loans could be provided by local banks and religious Wakfs. Longer term loans by National Central Banks and eventually by International Relief Agencies.

- The provision of land by exploitation or claim of "emergency" or public use should be done by the responsible organization through its own authority.

- Services would be provided by private societies, and private promoters would set the building regulations.
A policy of control over costs of construction should be set by the State.

Cost Recovery:
The responsible organization can reduce the costs of construction without altering the quality of construction by means of an self-financed project. Various ways can help the self-financement of the project:

- In the upgraded zones, owners would pay a "betterment tax" in return for the rising value of their land after it was serviced. Dwellers would pay an "assessment tax" in return for improvement of their settlement.

- Those elements which are considered as "rentable" such as high income apartments for sale, offices, small industries, and commercial activities, should be included in the D.G.U./U.L. proposed multi function project.

2. Upgrading the Sector of Raml

Scope:

Upgrading the sector of Raml will attempt to remedy the most immediate problems faced by the sector and which consist of:

- Issues of Infrastructure: water, electricity, roads, sewage, drainage.

- Issues of Housing: vulnerable zones to be demolished and later relocated, individual structures to be rehabilitated, individual structures to be demolished and reconstructed without relocation.

- Issues of Land: mode of tenure and the allotment of land parcels whenever possible.

Methodology:

The strategy, comprehensive in nature, is meant to provoke minimal intervention, i.e. demolition and relocation only when inevitable, and maximum participation of the dwellers.

Yet, to the eye of the Displaced, to whom the only form of intervention ever witnessed were two attempts of demolition, any proposed intervention might be subject to suspicion. Thus, if not
approached properly, demolition operations could be interpreted as interventions which are meant to oppose the squatters and hence, could incite violent reactions.

To this end, two recommendations might be relevant: one, to ensure public awareness by means of organized meetings with the "squatters' committees" and to ensure effective community participation through the squatters' committees in the decision making and various project activities; two, by starting the work in places which do not necessitate demolition work and which give way to quick and noticeable visual improvement.

Tenure and Legalization

Socio-economic Concerns:

It has been already noticed that improvement, if not assisted by some form of security of tenure, is not an efficient solution. For insecurity of tenure implies that no effort is made by the settlers to maintain their settlement and maintain the level of qualitative improvement offered by the authorities, which in turn implies that the large sums of capital invested for improvement have a short term efficiency.

Scope and Methods:

The issue of legalization is certainly the most sensitive among all aspects of improvement of squatters settlements. It certainly is a political issue since it entails decision-making on the degree of temporality or permanence of these settlements. The most extreme attitude and perhaps the most efficient on the short run would be to recognize the Displaced (squatters) officially and internationally as bearing a status of "refugees in their own country". This would be a way to incite the International Relief Organizations to pour their loans and physical help in the case, once it has been officially acknowledged.

Legalization can be approached in less political and more indirect ways. We have already noted that legalization can be implied by only providing some form of improvement to
the settlement and does not have to be carried in further administrative procedures to be defined
as such. In other terms, upgrading the settlement's infrastructure suggests that the illegal housing
sector is recognized as part of the national housing stock and has the "legal right" to be
improved. The benefits of such an operation are, as mentioned previously, a quasi-normalization
of the life of the displaced population and a stimulus towards continual improvement of their
environment. Yet, the risks that such an attitude entail are not negligible and have been already
described earlier as: one, further squatting of the low-income population; and two, further
displacement of these squatters once their settlements have been upgraded.

Approach and Recommendations:

These chain reactions could be tamed by imposing some form of control on the
squatters as well as regulations pertaining to the issue of rising land value. In other terms,
"betterment taxes" could be imposed on landlords whose land has increased in profit, and
"assessment taxes" could be imposed on the households once their settlements have been
upgraded. Again, for this form of control to be equitable, priorities as to the type and level of
improvement must be set by both the squatters and the authorities, for the two groups are
investing in the operation.

As opposed to these forms of control which apply to all settlers equally (for they are
equally served by the settlement upgrading), localized improvement such as the repair or
reconstruction of individual structures would have to comply to more particular regulations,
which can only be alluded to at this stage: should one restrict selective localized improvement
exclusively to those legally settled? or should a set of conditions irrelevant of the mode of tenure
be set, such as be Lebanese, own no house or land elsewhere, village be inaccessible...? or
should legalization occur on an individual basis by means of a leasehold fee, determined by
averaging the land value and subtracting its "plus value" due to (illegal) urbanization?
Unfortunately, the available information gives us a now outdated idea of the different modes of
tenure in the sector of Raml and the extent of their occurrence. (See Table 1). The validity and applicability of each of the options cited can only be determined after a survey has shown the number of illegal and legal settlers as well as the exact condition of every house in the sector. Only then can these options be assessed on an individual or general basis.

**Infrastructure**

**Socio-economic Concerns:**

Since infrastructure is a common need, obtaining it is perceived as an important struggle which can unite the community around a common goal. Since it also involves large sums of capital invested, attention should be paid to the **priorities** of the different parties concerned, defined by Schimzo Angel as the Houseers, the Municipal Engineers, the Community Builders, the Politicians, the Funders and the Dwellers⁶, so that no investment is made on high standards which are not needed or low standards which would later necessitate unreasonable maintenance costs. The **participation** of the beneficiaries should occur in the decision making through community meetings, as well as in the implementation process. The level of participation of all parties concerned is an important determinant in the success or failure of the improvement operation, for clashing priorities are common when so many actors are involved. For instance, while municipal engineers might perceive the provision of temporary infrastructure highly problematic and might prefer high infrastructure standards, funders might consider their choice to involve high initial costs. Squatters might perceive in this choice a danger of eviction or displacement, since environmental improvement, especially roads if they are carried out at high standards, require the displacement of a large segment of population.

As a result, basic technical alternatives pertaining to the improvement of infrastructure in the sector of Raml, such as: do we consider the precarious network or simply neglect and start all over again? or, how do we upgrade an inefficient existing network? or, how
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MODE OF TENURE</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>LEGAL</th>
<th>CONSIDER THEMSELVES LEGAL</th>
<th>ILLEGAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TENANTS</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>62% (NO CERTIFICATE)</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SQUATTERS</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAND OWNERS</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BUILDING OWNERS</th>
<th>LEGAL</th>
<th>ILLEGAL</th>
<th>LEGAL</th>
<th>ILLEGAL</th>
<th>LEGAL</th>
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<td></td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 1. Land and Building Tenure in the Sector of Raml**
to run service connections in a settlement with an ad hoc street pattern? ... will remain unanswered before a thorough survey and evaluation of the existing infrastructure is established.

Scope and Methods:

Let us consider each of the aspects of infrastructure as they exist in the sector and as they could be improved.

Electricity: Since it is ensured in all parts of the sector of Raml by legal means or illegal means, no immediate improvement is required. Yet, if legality of tenure were to be considered in the scope of a longer term policy, then legal subscription should be made the rule.

Refuse Collection: It is ensured by the dwellers' contributions of a fee of 5LL/ month. Also in this case, administrative procedures might be undertaken. This service can be a simple way to instigate further involvement of the municipality in the management of its territories.

Drainage: Even though no drainage network is provided in the sector of Raml, the Mediterranean climate, characterized by no heavy rain flow, and the topography of the site (sloping from west to east), help rain water flow without considerable accumulation. As a secondary priority, a drainage system could be installed along the east-west slopes; rain water would be collected along the eastern edge of the sector.

Street Grading and Paving: This issue is primarily determined by other aspects of infrastructure such as the improvement of sewerage and water networks. In other terms, priority for improvement will be given to the road network along which water and sewerage networks would have to be upgraded.

Sewerage: A sewerage network was provided by the population of Raml el Wati's major contribution, and installed by the community in the eastern, oldest section of the settlement. The western part of the sector is provided with septic tanks and no sewerage network. The central part lacks every form of sewerage service, and despite the decision of the Committee for the Development of the Southern Suburb to install a sewerage network in this zone, nothing has been yet undertaken.
The availability of sewerage networks in the sector of Raml is very reflective of the phases of growth of the sector. While the oldest settlers had the time to provide themselves with the basic infrastructure, the 1975-76 displaced population was forced by the immediacy of its problem to settle on any available land, whether serviced or not.

The dwellers' contribution and organization, as well as their ability to construct large infrastructure networks, are quite remarkable and have proven to be effective at least in the short run. Still, some encouragement and contribution from the municipality is necessary to stimulate the dwellers in further improvement. The installment of a sewerage network in the central part of the sector is of major importance if one wants to avoid further deterioration of the zone and further health problems. Since this zone is low in density, the intervention is facilitated and does not require the displacement of a large segment of the population.

Water: Water seems to be the most urgent problem prevailing in the sector of Raml. Public water is provided in some buildings of the oldest part of the sector but often does not function. 125 artesian wells have been fully financed and built by the dwellers. According to a survey conducted by BECOM in 1983, 65% of the wells are dirty. Drinking water is bought in quantities of 20 liters by the dwellers. Again, it is the central zone and to a certain extent, the western, most recent zone, which require the most improvement in water service, either in the form of provision of loans for the construction of artesian wells or by building dams for rain water collection.

Approach and Recommendations:

Not only should one recognize the effective contribution of the dwellers to the sector in their ability to build large infrastructure projects, but also, one ought to encourage, even "exploit", it in the upgrading project of the sector of Raml, for it considerably reduces the labour costs and by the same token provides a network of secondary jobs to the low-income population.

We have already acknowledged the adaptability to cultural norms and social organizations of the urban fabric of the sector of Raml. We have already seen that one of the
major components of socio-spatial organization is the notion of district or Hay, whereby members of the same extended family or place of origin cluster their houses around semi public and public places. We have already recognized the importance of enhancing this notion and using it as a work base.

I believe that contribution to this effect can be done in many ways, notably, in the layout of infrastructure networks. To be more specific, upgrading the various infrastructure networks could be achieved by following the physical subdivision of the sector. That is, by attributing to the streets which delimit each Hay the role of internal major streets and by undertaking the major infrastructure improvements along these streets. Then, internal service to each Hay could be provided, whenever necessary. This approach has further positive implications such as the creation of working teams in each Hay, which would be responsible for the improvement of their Hay. It encourages the formation of voluntary associations on the basis of their community belonging and their participation in all levels of decisions pertaining to the improvement of their Hay.

Housing

Socio-economic Concerns:

For infrastructure to contribute to the physical overall improvement of the sector, two conditions must be fulfilled: there must be a perceivable improvement in housing conditions; people must be stimulated and be willing and able to improve their houses.

As we already mentioned, in order to avoid violent reactions from the Displaced and in order to provide the necessary stimulus for them to improve on the physical aspect of their dwelling and to participate in the process of "general" upgrading, work on the improvement of housing should start in places which do not necessitate wholesale demolition and relocation. Locating houses in need of improvement or reconstruction is therefore the first step to be made.
A basic condition must be fulfilled before such work is undertaken, in order to avoid generating negative reactions from the part of the dwellers, such as dissatisfaction and feelings of prioritisation help. The need for upgrading a house should be apparent, that is, the house should be in a state of disrepair or dilapidation, bombed, lacking the basic utilities and thus generating health problems, or unstable due to the addition of extra storeys.

Scope and Method:

**Individual structures to be rehabilitated:**

Improvement in this case relies on financially aided self help approaches. Loans for the provision of construction material should be granted to the families whose houses ought to be rehabilitated and according to their needs. Other forms of support could be provided in the form of housing advisory service, technical assistance, social information, provision of material or community education and organization.

**Individual structures to be demolished and rebuilt without relocation**

As mentioned earlier, only a thorough survey of the housing condition in the sector of Ram will determine the particular needs for such a task. Yet, a broad assumption could be made at this stage namely that most dilapidated buildings and unsound structures occur in the central and most recent part of the sector.

Demolition work has to be sustained by the provision of an alternative shelter. In order to avoid temporary relocation, this task can be approached in the following manner. Since density in the central to western zone of the sector is not crucial and since most of the lots are only partially built up, a three step approach is suggested. First, build a multi-purpose room and a bathroom with appropriate foundation on the vacant portion of the lot. Second, demolish the existing structure and have the family live temporarily in the “basic shelter”. Third, through the provision of controlled loans for construction material, have the family extend its dwelling according to its needs, size and ability. A further improvement could be undertaken in the case of the reconstruction of several neighbouring
structures through a process of land reassembly and redistriuction according to the needs and size of the families concerned, in mutual agreement of the families and the responsible agents.

**Approach and Recommendations:**

This incremental and aided self help approach is familiar to the dwellers and well adapted to their cultural norms. Yet, some forms of control should be provided in order to avoid the repetition of previous mistakes due to a lack of technical knowledge, structural assistance or financial means. Control should be exercised in three main forms: one, in the phasing of the provision of loans for construction material; two, by insisting on the re-usage of construction material in the existing structure whenever possible; three, in setting a time limit for the construction and four, in continually checking the structural adequacy of the new construction.

**Vulnerable Zones**

One zone in the sector of Raml seems to be particularly vulnerable to eradication because of its proximity to the Airport and the danger it constitutes to the Airport activity, as well as to the dwellers. According to a survey done by Supreme Shura Council, around 400 structures ought to be demolished. Three other segments seem to be in danger of partial demolition if setback regulations were to be applied and if decreed projects were to be implemented, namely:

- the zone along the Airport Boulevard whereby setback regulations forbid any construction higher than 1.5 within 30 feet.
- the zone within the next 120 feet from the Boulevard, which has to and does not comply to a coefficient of surface exploitation of 30%, a coefficient of built-up exploitation of 0.75, a maximum height of 48 feet, a distance of 18 feet between buildings and parcel limits, a distance of 60 feet from building back to parcel limit.
- the zones which prevent the eventual extension of the Airport and the north-south highway will necessitate the demolition of a substantial part of the sector. (Fig. 20). It is assumed, though, that
these projects will not be implemented as long as the political instability prevails in the country and that long term provisions for the relocation of the large number of families to be displaced would have been then established. 9

3. PARTIAL RELOCATION THROUGH A SITE AND SERVICES PROJECT

Scope:

The Site and Services project, intended for the relocation of segments of the Displaced population of Raml settled on vulnerable grounds, is meant to instigate a greater degree of participatory role for the beneficiaries and to shift the role of the responsible agents from that of housing producers to enablers in the housing process. It consists of the delivery of buildable land with the necessary public utilities at affordable standards to initiate and support self-help or mutual help activities by the households in the housing production.

The efficiency of the system works on the basis of low cost simple options for many rather than costly and concentrated solutions for a few. Thus, it will involve some options to respond to the different circumstances of the problems, and the different needs, sizes and financial capabilities of the displaced families.

Methodology:

The relocation program should be undertaken only after the upgrading process of the existing settlement has been started. While relocation is in progress, every effort to make the public opinion feel that the region is indeed being reconquered, should be done.

Two steps have to be undertaken before the relocation-demolition process starts: one, the use of the evacuated land or the motive for evacuation should be decided upon, clearly stated and understood by the population; two, the site chosen for relocation has to be serviced and a temporary shelter or permanent minimal shelter has to be provided. In other terms, no demolition work should occur before an alternative shelter is assured.
Social concerns imply, once more, that the priorities of the different parties concerned ought to be clearly established, and the priorities set by the once-more-displaced population should set a guideline for improvement. For not only are they the beneficiaries, but also the ones who will invest from a tight budget.

**Relocation Site**

The choice of the site has been determined by three factors: one, the need for the vacant land within the area of the Southern Suburb in order to create minimum disturbance to the community and minimum job relocation; two, the uniqueness of the chosen site among a total of four vacant land parcels in that it does not present any political or locational constraint and in that it is large enough to suit the needs of the program; three, that although it is on private land, considerations for its expropriation by a powerful private organization has already been made.

Only as a reminder, the chosen site lies north of the Airport, south of the wooded areas of Hurj Beirut and the Golf Club, and between Airport Boulevard to the east and Cuzai Boulevard to the west. (Figs. 69, 70). The area it covers is 0.32 sq. mile. Its topography shows that it is formed of sand dunes which attain an altitude of 150 feet at some points. Its major constraints, as mentioned in the previous chapter, derive from its location within the parameters of the radar cone. Height regulations are strict and breaking them constitutes a danger to the Airport's activity. The Direction Generale de l'Urbanisme with the collaboration of a participant team from the Lebanese University, have suggested a regrading of the site in view of maximizing the built-up areas and complying with the regulations. Figures 71a,b,72,73,74 show the site as it has been graded and the resulting height constraints, as well as zones to which have been determined specific heights, number of floors, coefficients of surface exploitation and coefficients of built-up exploitation have been set.10.

The site is so large that it does not have to comply to the coefficient of exploitation imposed on the site. The team has determined the coefficient of surface exploitation to be 40%
64. LOCATION OF THE SITE PROPOSED FOR PARTIAL RELOCATION

70. THE PROPOSED SITE FOR RELOCATION
73. PROPOSED ZONING ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF STOREYS PERMITTED

74. PROPOSED ZONING ACCORDING TO COEFFICIENTS OF EXPLOITATION
and the coefficient of built-up exploitation to range between 0.4 and 2.8 depending on the specific altitude.

Many factors could be later considered to determine an approximate location for the site and services project. The D.G.U./U.L. team proposal for site levelling shows that little work is to be done on the western part of the site. Thus, I believe that the implementation of the intended project on this portion of the site implies considerable saving on time.

Tenure

Leasehold seems to be the most advantageous mode of tenure for this project. 15 years leasehold (to be renewed if war still prevails) could be granted to the relocated families with an option of purchase after five years. The payment could be done in the form of a down payment in the first month and a lesser monthly fee until the lease period is covered.

Some conditions such as a Lebanese nationality and no real estate property elsewhere would have to be fulfilled. The advantages that this form of tenure seems to present over others are that: first, psychologically, dwellers feel that their monthly payment will ultimately lead to the ownership of the land, as opposed to the case of rental; second, also as opposed to rent tenure, no risk of inflation affects the leaseholders; third, the dweller has the right to sell his right to someone else during the lease period. To the financing agents, downpayments of a value higher than the regular monthly fee, and the option of purchase within five years represent two forms of cost recovery on the project implementation; this option is also socially adequate, since as it has been noticed, ownership or the aim at ownership incites the dwellers to improve on their houses.

Furthermore, it gives them a sense of security and belonging to a specific urban environment. In the words of Christopher Alexander: "We advocate a system of ownership where the deed to one home carries with it part ownership in the cluster to which the home belongs; and ideally, this in turn carries with it part ownership in the neighbourhood made up of several clusters. In this way, every owner is automatically a shareholder in several levels of public land. At each level,
beginning with the homes in their clusters, is a political unit with the power to control the processes of its own growth and repair. 11

Other options under this form of tenure would involve sublet and the right to leave before the lease period is covered. Subletting as an additional source of income should not be discouraged but should be regularly controlled by the responsible agents. Leaving within the assessed lease period of fifteen years could be dealt with by granting the family a loan to which the sum of unpaid months would be subtracted. These options are only suggested as ways to provide for flexibility of tenure. More defined options can only be set after a thorough study of the income level of the relocated families, their ability to pay, their preference between permanent settlement and eventual return to the place of origin.

Housing and Infrastructure

Scope and Method:

The site and services project for the partial relocation of Ruml settlers consists of two broad steps:

One, the "authority" expropriates the site, grades it and clears it from all that might obstruct the implementation of the projects (dumps, dirt, fallen trees...), ensures its access through the Airport Boulevard and Ouzai Boulevard. It is also the authorities' responsibility to demarcate the plots and to provide the basic utilities, namely water, drainage, sewage, electricity... at a standard compatible to the financial ability of the plot occupants. Finally, individual basic utilities and optional basic shelter should be provided.

Two, the responsibility for the provision of housing rests with the occupants under the supervision and with the support of the authorities.

In order to accommodate different levels of income, different needs and different sizes of families, two considerations have to be satisfied: one, the size of the lots to be leased
should not be standardized but should vary according to the size of the targeted families and their capability to pay; two, different options for the provision of the "wet core" and "minimal shelter" should be provided to accommodate different income levels within the low income sector. Different sites and services projects throughout the world have considered different sets of options, according to the criteria mentioned above and to the ability to finance the project.\textsuperscript{12} Mainly, options range from the provision of a "wet core" only to that of a multi-room and "wet core", hence complying to Patrick Geddes' remark: "The essential need for a house and family is room and the essential improvement of house and family is more room".\textsuperscript{13}

In the site and services project for the partial relocation of the settlers of Raml, three options will be suggested:

Option 1:

- Each plot would be supplied with the basic utilities in the "wet core" which would include water connection to the WC and shower, sewage and waste water drain connections.
- Participants would be offered a construction material loan to develop their shelter through self help or mutual help forms.
- A temporary shelter could be erected as a start to be used as a storage room or a night accommodation.

Option 2:

- In addition to the wet core, each family would be provided with one room, to serve as a storage or a multipurpose room.
- Plot owners would also be offered a construction material loan of a lesser amount than that provided under option 1.

Option 3:

- In addition to the wet core, one built room and a "contractor built" room (kitchen) would be provided with no construction material loan.

It is then the responsibility of the households to construct their dwellings under the
supervision of the responsible organization (Figs. 75, 76). Again, control should be exercised under three major forms to avoid the re-creation of problems of overdensification and unsound structures: first, loans for construction material should be provided in phases, after each part of the first floor construction, (most crucial for structural stability), is approved; second, a time limit should be set for the construction of all basic rooms; three, continual control should be provided to ensure that horizontal and vertical additions do not exceed the pre-set building regulations.

Approach and Recommendations:

It should be noted that the smaller the assigned lots, the greater the servicing network required to make them affordable, so the higher the infrastructure costs. (Fig. 77). In the proposal made by the D.G.U./U.L. team, lots of 675 to 900 sq. feet have been assigned per low-income family with a plot occupancy rate of 10 persons per plot, that is, an average of one family per plot.14

I believe that relocation according to extended family ties or neighbourliness as they appear to be in the original settlements could be considered in view of forming micro-neighbourhood units on the same plot. This would not only increase the size of the plot and hence reduce infrastructure costs, but it would also enhance the traditional settlement structure formed of house clusters and encourage the formation of small communities which could form a socially coherent group base for mutual help. Most of all, it would be an effort not to disrupt the community ties prevailing in the existing settlement.

Counter evidence of this approach has been found, in different parts of the developing world, to have caused major disturbance to the community involved. In the Ciudadella Chalaca squatter settlements in Lima, Peru, which were to be razed and replaced by uniform-sized lots in rectangular blocks, the residents of the area were to be assigned lots on which they could build sturdy houses according to government provided architectural plans once the utilities had been supplied. Residents realized that a modified residence pattern would mean a
75. ANTICIPATED GROWTH OF THREE HOUSES WITH THE WET CORN PROVIDED

76. ANTICIPATED GROWTH OF THREE HOUSES WITH THE WET CORN AND A BASIC SHELTER PROVIDED
7. Optimal land utilization, network length to area and population density for sites and services projects, and the way they appear to be in different projects throughout the developing world.
dispersal of the "paisans" residential groupings which had provided physical and psychological support for them during their initial years in the city. 15

Granting an urban space to a 'group', even if that is subsequently subdivided into separate ownerships and the original bonds are not maintained, yields one of the key characteristics of Islamic cities, namely, its clear distinction between semi-public and public space. The semi-public space, or the micro-neighbourhood unit that evolves is in the interior of what, in contemporary city planning would be called a super-block. Pertinent to the notion of micro-neighbourhood unit or "communal" urban space, is the notion of collective ownership, studied by Ismail Sengeklıne in his work on the contemporary Muslim society. 16 The collective ownership of resources, the "rights of ways" and the concern for safety, provide the foundation for the definition of boundaries between collective and private spaces in Islamic communities. It is important that they remain in harmony with the ethical and cultural frameworks of these societies in any attempt to re-create "their" neighbourhoods.

Another fundamental characteristic of Islamic cities that is corollary of the first, is the secondary significance of the circulation system. In Islamic cities, in contrast to the Western cities built under Roman law, the public ways developed after the residential cells were allocated. The passages between the cells served chiefly as the boundaries of contiguous cells. The internal streets were, as noted in the case of Raml, the residual space between houses, often dead ends which served the purpose of semi-public gatherings. Only a very limited number of major arteries were actually planned and provided for, and these streets, in contrast to those which formed the boundaries of residential cells, were actually the continuation of the routes that connected cities to each other, similarly to the two historic axes which connect the Southern Suburb settlements to one another. 17 (Figs. 30, 78, 79). The circulation network, as it prevails in the Islamic cities and also in the sector of Raml, and as it is perceived by these traditional societies, is one of the urban elements to be preserved in the site and services project. In other terms, only the major arteries peripheral to the new settlements, those which will ultimately constitute the base for retail and
78. STREET NETWORK IN THE SECTOR OF RAML

79. STREET PATTERN IN A TRADITIONAL ISLAMIC CITY
service activities, the "external town", as coined earlier, is the main road infrastructure to be provided. Internal streets will emerge as the houses grow. (Fig. 78, 79). Finally, street life should be preserved by minimizing large arteries cutting through the settlement.

Besides street network considerations, essential forms of urban organizations and traditional architectural elements ought to be preserved. Although their preservation cannot be fully controlled, for they are anticipated to grow with time and according to the needs of the community, they could be promoted by a few simple ways, such as verbally through advices in the community meetings or by tentatively locating important urban elements on the site. (Fig. 80). Besides, it is assumed that self help and mutual help methods for housing provision will positively contribute to this end.

The most important traditional urban notion to conserve is, as was already noted, the notion of subdistricts or socio-spatial neighbourhoods or Hamas, which encourage and reinforces the prevailing modes of social organization in the once-more-displaced tightly knit rural community and helps them look after their interests by reaching communal agreements on basic decisions. The preservation of the "neighbourhood" which has been defined by Christopher Alexander as an identifiable spatial unit to which people need to belong, was already suggested by the layout of infrastructure and by an attempt to preserve its entity and avoid its cut by a major street. Other recommendations pertaining to the "creation" of neighbourhoods have been provided by Alexander. "Available evidence suggests, first, that the neighbourhood which people identify with have extremely small population; second, that they are small in area ...". An attempt to formulate a preliminary idea on the ways to define without designing a neighbourhood in the scope of the intended relocation project is represented in Fig. 80. Alexander also makes reference to suggested numbers of population in a neighbourhood, and that these commonly vary from 500 to 1500. Levels of population densities in newly created neighbourhoods, particularly in sites and services projects have been thoroughly studied by Reinhart Goethert.
Attempt at defining neighbourhoods and the streets peripheral to them.

Suggested staggered plots to allow for maximum number of non-continuous streets and cul de sacs. Attempt at localizing the main "sahas."

Anticipated growth of a large plot. Emergence of secondary "sahas" and cul de sacs.

Diagrammatic recommendations for the site and services project.
and low densities have been advocated (Fig. 77)

Yet, it has to be remembered that the fact that the Displaced could make the transition from village to city life is largely attributable to their adaptation of kinship ties, and that only through reciprocal obligation and community celebration and in total dependance on the very population density decried by many, a closely knit society could emerge.

4. SUMMARY

To sum up, let us restate the main components of the policies of upgrading and those of site and services as they are perceived to apply to the illegal sector of Raml.

Upgrading:

_ The most important contribution of this policy has been the preservation of around 5000 low income housing units and improving on them to meet "health" and "structural soundness" standards.

_ It has resulted in minimal disturbance to the community by relocating only those families settled on vulnerable grounds.

_ It has provided implicit security of tenure through improvement in return for an "assessment tax" to be paid by the dwellers of the sector.

_ It has given primacy to the provision of those utilities that had been lacking, namely water and sewerage.

_ It has carried improvement at the individual Housing level by rehabilitating the deteriorating houses and rebuilding those which are structurally unsound.

_ It has encouraged self help and mutual help methods and has thus generated a network of secondary jobs and reinforced the social organization of the community.

_ It has attempted to enhance some forms of urban organization and recognized the importance of the "Harat" in determining the social organization of the population.
Sites and Services Program:

- It has been conceived as an emergency relocation program for those settled in vulnerable zones of Ramla.

- The selected site lies in the heart of the Southern Suburb and therefore does not entail a disruption of social and community ties.

- The program has determined the role of the responsible organization to provide for accessible and serviced land with optional minimal shelter. Different options and sizes of lots were set to suit the different needs and financial abilities of the relocated families.

- It has attributed the provision of housing as the task of the relocated families through self help and mutual help methods, with the provision of construction material loans and under the control and supervision of the organization.

- It involves an incremental approach in the construction so as to provide minimal shelter on an immediate basis and so as additions can be made when the family needs it and can afford it.

- It has determined the mode of tenure to be a 15 year leasehold with an option of purchase after 5 years.

- It assumes that the aim of ownership would stimulate the users to improve their settlement.

- It has suggested that relocation be done by groups of extended families or on the basis of neighbourhood ties. For not only would it preserve the traditional social network of the community, but it would also reduce the costs which result from the considerable infrastructure needed to service small plots.

The study has suggested that both policies be administered by private organizations with minimal governmental subsidies. Cost recovery through a self-financed project has been sought.

These policies are perceived to be incorporated in a short term program which medium and longer policies (such as the provision of community facilities, a rehabilitation of the Southern Suburb region, the distribution of loans for construction . . . ) will complete.
Notes to Conclusion

1. This definition of "medium-term policies" has been provided by the United Nations. See, United Nations, Urban Slums, Slums and Squatter Settlements in the E.S.C.A.P. region. Case Studies of Seven Cities (New York, United Nations Publications, 1980).

2. In twelve years of war, most of the medical relief aid and education, health and social services have been provided by local relief aid agencies such as Najdeh, Secours Populaire, the Red Cross...

3. Community services available in Raml: one elementary and secondary school of 500 students; one Islamic school; one Lycee de Jeunes Filles; one primary and secondary school; two mosques; two Husaynyya; one private dispensary provided and managed by a political party; one medical clinic; one private nursery provided and managed by the Islamic Benevolent Committee; one cemetery laid by the inhabitants of Raml el Wadi.

4. See, Universite Libanaise, Faculte de genie, Branche 111, "Montage financier d'une operation de logements dans le cadre d'une intervention d'amenagement urbain" (Beirut, 1983); Republique Libanaise, Ministere des Travaux Publics, Direction Generale de l'Urbanisme, "Elements pour un Livre Blanc. Dossier: Banlieue Sud" (Beirut, August 1983).

5. See, p. 112.


7. In 1984, building an artesian well costed around 10,000 LL, which in 1984 was almost equal to $1600.

8. Supreme Shiite Council, Survey (Beirut, 1983).


10. See, Universite Libanaise, op. cit.; Direction Generale de l'Urbanisme, op. cit.


17. For further information of the circulation networks in Islamic Cities, see, Janet Abu Loghod, "Contemporary Relevance of Islamic Urban Principles" (extract), *Elisir* 280 (January/February 1980), pp. 6-10.


19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

VIII. OVERVIEW

The central concern of this study has been to confront the reality of a vulnerable urban environment which owes its misery to circumstances originating from the overall policy of its country.

Confronting the reality of the war-displaced settlements of the Southern Suburb is what the authorities have deliberately dismissed. Their inaction, along with the inevitable intervention of private interests in public decisions, indigenous to the urban system of the country, have failed to benefit either party: the Deprived or the Dominant. In their obstinate efforts to discard the so-called "Ghetto of Opposition", the authorities have, on one hand, jeopardized the only potential urban land for development and the notable private interest invested in it, by their indifference to the "silent" sprawl of squatter settlements over the years. On the other hand, they have given way to a deplorable dwelling environment, a result of the financial inability of the squatters to ensure by their own means even the basic services.

Although an overall change of attitude in the socio-economic and urban systems is likely to attenuate the disparities among different population groups and to better address the needs of the Deprived, this study does not invoke such a change. For not only would this mean waiting for a few more decades, which defies the immediacy of the situation at stake, but it also implies the transformation of an entire society, which seems improbable, even unreal.

My proposition has been to try and address the needs of the Displaced while recognizing the institutional, financial and "moral" deficiency of the prevailing urban system. In my attempt to reconcile the apathy of the public sector with the immediacy of the Squatter problem in the Southern Suburb, a notion foreign to the system yet perfectly adaptable to it, was introduced: "facilitator."

To shift the role of the authorities from that, attributed yet unassumed, of "house
producers", to that of "facilitator", does not presuppose a change of attitude. Instead, it advocates minimum reliance on an indifferent authority and the full participation of those mostly concerned, namely the beneficiaries, through the involvement of a private body entrusted with political power.

It is my argument that only through a "modest" intervention (as opposed to well known ambitious programs that remain merely ink on paper) can immediate action be promoted to remedy the most urgent problems of the Displaced, to preserve their community ties essential to their adaptation to an alien urban environment, and to appease a silent revolt which has been stymied by the incompetence of a System.

This study has dealt with only a fraction of a much broader issue. After all, the Southern Suburb is a microcosmic illustration of a crisis that has affected the whole country. Continual shifts in the political power have had a significant impact on both small and large scale entities. Over the past year, the political thrust that has enabled the Southern Suburb to survive, has waned.

That politics remain the prime determinant in every attempt to act is undeniable. Nonetheless, the magnitude of the problem here presented necessitates that political realities be transcended.

Implementation of the approach outlined in this thesis remains its ultimate test.
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Sources of Illustrations

II. INTRODUCTION


Fig. 2 Schiff, Z.; and Ya'ari, E. Israel's Lebanon War. Edited and Translated by Ina Friedman. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984.


Fig. 4 Executive Board of Major Projects for the City of Beirut. Beirut, 1983.


Fig. 10 Republique Libanaise, Ministere des Travaux Publics, Direction Generale de l'Urbanisme. "Elements pour un Livre Blanc. Dossier Banlieue Sud." Beirut, August 1983.

IV. THE SOUTHERN SUBURB: A REGIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR INTERVENTION

Fig. 11 Author. Adapted from, Charafeddine, Wafa. "Formation des secteurs ilegals dans la Banlieue Sud de Beyrouth. Memoire pour le D.E.S.S.U., Institut d'Urbanisme de l'Aademie de Paris, Universite de Paris VIII, 1985.

Fig. 12 Author.


Figs. 15-19 Author.

Fig. 20 Author. Adapted from, Republique Libanaise, Ministere des Travaux Publics, Direction Generale de l'Urbanisme. "Elements pour un Livre Blanc. Dossier. Banlieue Sud." Beirut, August 1983.

Figs. 21, 22a, b Universite Libanaise, Faculte de Genie, Branche III. "Montage financier d'une operation de logements dans le cadre d'une intervention d'amnagement urbain." Beirut, 1983.

Fig. 23 Author.
V. PROBLEM OF SUBSISTENCE OR SILENT REVOLT


Fig. 37 Photograph by Wafa Charafeddine.


Fig. 41 Republicque Libanaise, Ministere des Travaux Publics, Direction Generale de l'Urbanisme. "Elements pour un Livre Blanc. Dossier: Banlieue Sud." Beirut, August 1983.

Fig. 42 Ardalan, Nader; and Bakhtiar, Laleh. The Sense of Unity. Chicago and London: Chicago Press, 1975.

FIGS. 43, 44 Photographs by Wafa Charafeddine.


FIGS. 46, 47 Photographs by Wafa Charafeddine.


Fig. 51 Photograph by Yan Morvan. War Torn. Photographs edited by Susan Vermazen. New York: Pantheon Books, 1984.

Fig. 52 Ragette, Friedrich. Architecture in Lebanon. Delmar, New York: Caravan Books, 1974.

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xxi
Figs. 56-59 Photographs by Wafa Charafeddine.


Fig. 61 Photograph by Jacques Liger-Belair. In L'habitat au Liban. Essai de classification par H. Kalayan. Publie par l'Association pour la Protection des Sites et Anciennes Demeures.

Fig. 62, 63 Photograph by Wafa Charafeddine.

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Fig. 66 Author.

VI. INTRODUCING A POLICY OF LEAST INTERVENTION


VII. CONCLUSION: SETTING THE SCENE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE POLICY

Fig. 69 Author. Adapted from, Charafeddine, Wafa. "Formation des secteurs illegaux dans la Bandeue Sud de Beyrouth. "Memoire pour le D.E.S.S.U., Institut d'Urbanisme de l'Academie de Paris, Universite de Paris VIII, 1985.

Fig. 70 Photograph by Wafa Charafeddine.

Figs. 71-74 Universite Libanaise, Faculte de Genie, Branche III. "Montage financier d'une operation de logements dans le cadre d'une intervention d'aménagement urbain." Beirut, 1983.

Figs. 75, 76 Author.


xxii
Fig. 79  Republique Libanaise, Minister des Travaux Publics, Direction Generale de l'Urbanisme. "Elements pour un Livre Blanc. Dossier: Banlieue Sud." Beirut, August 1983.

Fig. 80  Author.