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IRONY, INNOCENCE, AND MYTH:
DOUGLAS C. MACINTOSH'S UNTRADITIONAL ORTHODOXY

by

GAYLE GUDGER GRUBBS

A THESIS SUBMITTED
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
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APPROVED, THESIS COMMITTEE

[Signatures of committee members]

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ABSTRACT

Irony, Innocence, and Myth: Douglas C. Macintosh's Untraditional Orthodoxy

Gayle Gudger Grubbs

This study analyzes the relationship of Douglas Clyde Macintosh to the time in which he lived using the concepts of irony, innocence, and myth. By employing these concepts, the author identifies four significant moves that Macintosh made to break with philosophical idealism. The author explores Macintosh's relationship to an older, reigning Ritschlian liberal theology, and the development of neo-orthodoxy by his students H. Richard and Reinhold Niebuhr. This Yale strand of neo-orthodoxy is relevant to the "new historicism" as described by William Dean. The author explores the relevance of Macintosh's work to the developing new historicism including neopragmatism in philosophy, radical empiricism, the American evasion of epistemology, and the role of apologetics in inter-religious dialogue. Macintosh's Yale strand of empirical theology emerges as a significant critique of the new historicist position.

In response to the social, intellectual and religious crisis of modernity, Macintosh moved to recover objectivism in theology, attempted to rehabilitate the apologetic arguments for the existence of God and the reasonableness of religious belief, employed the Radical Method in theology to define and to defend an essence of Christianity, and
employed the Anselmian apologetic tactic of leaving Christ aside to prove his necessity for human salvation. His use of the Ritschlian Radical Method in theology produced differences in Macintosh's and Ritschl's theological content.

The author also analyzes the criticisms that H. Richard and Reinhold Niebuhr leveled against Macintosh. Eight reasons are presented for the eclipse of Macintosh's empirical theology in scholarship.
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I am also grateful to others in the Department of Religious Studies at Rice University. Dr. Niels C. Nielsen, Jr. and Mrs. Sylvia Louie have given me support, encouragement, and practical advice. Fellow classmates Dr. Daniel Coleman and James Currie provided sympathetic ears and timely encouragement. I am deeply indebted to Jennifer Geran and the Inter-Library Loan Staff of Fondren Library, Rice University and to Martha Lund Smalley, Archivist, Yale Divinity School Library.

I have been stimulated and helped by correspondence and conversations with Macintosh's former students and successors at Yale, Julian N. Hartt and Randolph Crump Miller, who welcomed my venture into the field of Macintosh scholarship. Correspondence with Jonathan R. Wilson, S.
Mark Heim, Clark Pinnock, Fischer Humphries, William West Thomas, and Victor Anderson also provided direction and encouragement, for which I am deeply grateful.

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INTRODUCTION

"The man who undertakes to work for the future without knowledge of the past and constant regard for it, will build... a castle in the air, as many striking examples in our American Church life serve clearly to show." ¹

This assessment of worldly wisdom by Philip Schaff is particularly relevant to the developing, uniquely American "new historicism." ² The "new historicists," according to William Dean, author of American Religious Empiricism (1986) and History Making History (1988), denied their theological and ontological roots in classical American philosophy of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.³ Dean complained that they also overlooked the influence of the Jewish and Christian traditions on their history.⁴ This denial presented problems for religious belief in post-modern North America.⁵ Dean argued that without a knowledge of their past, the new historicists constructed history


³ Ibid., ix-x, 2.


based "on the creativity of the interpretive imagination."\textsuperscript{6} He noted that these contemporary thinkers claimed "that historical reality is created through interpretations of the historical subject--that it is history that makes history."\textsuperscript{7} Dean's new historicists included the neopragmatic philosophers Richard Rorty, Nelson Goodman, Richard Bernstein, and Hilary Putnam; the literary historical critic Frank Lentriccia; the neopragmatic philosophers of religion Cornel West and Jeffrey Stout; and the post-modern theologians Gordon Kaufman and Mark C. Taylor.\textsuperscript{8}

To correct the new historicists' omission of God as a force influencing history, Dean studied the response of American empirical philosophy and theology to previous challenges to religious belief.\textsuperscript{9} Dean traced American religious empiricism from Jonathan Edwards (1703-58) through William James (1842-1910), John Dewey (1859-1952), and Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947), and then to the empirical theologians of the Chicago School (including Shailer Mathews (1863-1941) and Shirley Jackson Case (1872-1947), and to the empirical process theologians Henry Nelson Wieman (1884-1975), Bernard Meland (1899-1993), and Bernard

\textsuperscript{6}Ibid., 5.

\textsuperscript{7}Ibid., ix.

\textsuperscript{8}Ibid., ix.

\textsuperscript{9}Dean, \textit{American Religious Empiricism} (1986), x.
Loomer. Dean chose this lineage because process theology was important to the development of contemporary American philosophical theology. However, as Dean wrote, he "could have taken Douglas Clyde Macintosh, H. Richard Niebuhr, and Randolph Crump Miller at Yale as instances of twentieth-century American religious empiricism." Dean noted that Macintosh's work in empiricism and pragmatism deserved serious consideration in the present renewed interest in empiricism, neopragmatism, new historicism, and the development of distinctly American theology.

In this dissertation, I contend that Douglas Clyde Macintosh (1877-1948), a Canadian Baptist of Scottish descent and Professor of Philosophy and Religion at Yale University from 1909 to 1942, was, in the words of Preston Warren, author of Out of the Wilderness: Douglas Clyde Macintosh's Journeys Through The Grounds and Claims of Modern Thought (1989), a "key figure in the intense philosophical and theological controversies that marked the beginning of this century." As William R. Hutchison,

10 Ibid.
11 Ibid., x.
12 Ibid., xi.
author of *The Modernist Impulse in American Protestantism* (1976) noted, Macintosh was important because he used his distinguished position at Yale to criticize philosophical and theological liberalism.¹⁵ Macintosh was also important for his construction of an empirical theology that influenced the neo-orthodox, ethical thinking of H. Richard and Reinhold Niebuhr, Julian N. Hartt, Stanley Hauerwas, and James M. Gustafson, according to Jonathan R. Wilson.¹⁶

I suggest that Macintosh's apologetic, "mediating" theology between the conservative Princeton theology of Benjamin B. Warfield and the liberal religious humanism of John Dewey at Columbia is significant today precisely because it did not lead to the process theology of the Chicago School. In this work, I support William Dean's position that Macintosh's alternative strand of empirical theology was a significant part of the history that the new historicism has neglected.¹⁸ According to contemporary scholars Gerald McKenny, Jonathan R. Wilson, and Victor Anderson, this Yale strand of empirical theology included


the neo-orthodox thought of Robert Lowery Calhoun and H. Richard and Reinhold Niebuhr and the contemporary ethicist, James M. Gustafson. In addition, I argue that Macintosh's universal religion and apologetic tactics illustrated the problems of these outdated views in contrast to the contemporary inter-religious dialogue of Nancy Frankenberry and the ad hoc apologetics of George Lindbeck and William Werpehowski.

To recover Macintosh's thought for contemporary scholarship, I contend that one must appreciate his apologetic task and his attempts to navigate the troubled philosophical and theological waters of his day. When one understands Macintosh's apologetic task and tactics, one begins to see him as a transition figure between an older, crumbling liberalism and a developing North American neo-orthodoxy.

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IRONY, INNOCENCE, MYTH, AND DOUGLAS C. MACINTOSH

To explore the history of Macintosh's empiricism in America, I employ the concepts of irony, innocence, and myth. According to American religious historian Martin E. Marty, author of Modern American Religion. The Irony of It All 1893-1919 (1986), and New Testament scholars Robert Jewett and John Lawrence, authors of The American Monomyth (1977), these concepts were prominent in the thought-world of the early twentieth-century. I claim that they significantly influenced Macintosh's thinking. As Marty concluded, "American religion in this period includes comic, pathetic, and tragic dimensions, but the ironic understanding best addresses the varieties of intentions and outcomes." I observe however, that Macintosh eliminated irony, innocence, and myth from all of his scholarly works. I will demonstrate below how Macintosh's denial of myth conforms to Jewett's and Lawrence's definition of the myth of mythlessness in The American Monomyth (1977). According to Jewett and Lawrence, the myth of mythlessness' "implicit claim to be antimythical and purely scientific is itself a


23Marty, The Irony of it All (1986), 317.
myth--that is, a set of unconsciously held, unexamined premises."\textsuperscript{24} I claim that by eliminating irony, innocence, and myth in his embrace of scientific culture, Macintosh attempted paradoxically to buttress his myths of mythlessness,\textsuperscript{25} optimism, and innocence. I conclude that these premises ultimately contributed to his later eclipse in philosophical and theological scholarship in what Randolph Crump Miller has called a "blackout" of his memory in Yale Divinity School classrooms.\textsuperscript{26}

\textbf{Ironic}

The \textit{Random House Dictionary} (1980) defines "irony" as "an outcome of events contrary to what was, or might have been expected."\textsuperscript{27} Marty, Fairfax M. Cone Distinguished Service Professor of the History of Modern Christianity at the University of Chicago, applied the term \textit{Irony} to a crucial period in the history of American empiricism.\textsuperscript{28}

\textsuperscript{24}Jewett and Lawrence, \textit{American Monomyth} (1977), 17.

\textsuperscript{25}Ibid., 250. The myth of mythlessness is "the unexamined belief that scientific culture has transcended mythical forms of thought."

\textsuperscript{26}Paul Douglas Macintosh Keane, Chairperson, Macintosh Centennial Committee, ed. "DOUGLAS CLYDE MACINTOSH: A Centennial Tribute at Yale University Divinity School, September 11-17, 1978, quoting Randolph Crump Miller.


\textsuperscript{28}Marty, \textit{The Irony of It All} (1986).
Following Reinhold Niebuhr, Hayden White, and others, Marty focused on the irony or crisis of historicism in American religion from 1893 to 1919, which was precipitated by the German Ritschlian theology. Marty's irony was a historical or "'figurative'" and humane irony, which he defined as "'a condition of affairs or events as if in mockery of the promise and fitness of things. '" Humane irony also included the necessary ingredient of human agency to separate it from the "'irony of fate." Here an "'ironic situation occurs when the consequences of an act are diametrically opposed to the original situation," and when "the fundamental cause of the disparity lies in the actor himself, and his original purpose." Theologically, said Marty, humane irony "for (Reinhold) Niebuhr was the view that God was 'a divine judge who laughs at human pretensions without being hostile to human


30 Marty, The Irony of It All (1986), 4.

31 Ibid., 6.

32 Ibid., 3, quoting the Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. "irony."

33 Ibid., 3-4, quoting Gene Wise, American Historical Explanations (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1973), 300.
aspirations." In The Irony of American History (1962), Niebuhr stressed that irony was neither pathos nor tragedy.

A pathetic situation is usually not as fully in the consciousness of those who are involved in it as a tragic one. A tragic choice is purest when it is deliberate. But pathos is constituted of essentially meaningless cross purposes in life, of capricious confusions of fortune and painful frustrations. Pathos, as such, yields no fruit of nobility, though it is possible to transmute pathos into beauty by the patience with which pain is borne or by a vicarious effort to share the burdens of another... An ironic situation is distinguished from a pathetic one by the fact that a person involved in it bears some responsibility for it. It is distinguished from a tragic one by the fact that the responsibility is not due to a conscious choice but to an unconscious weakness.

Used theologically by Reinhold Niebuhr and Friedrich Schlegel, according to Gary J. Handwerk, irony took man beyond Marty's humane irony located in the original actor and turned man to the divine as "an objective or objectifiable phenomenon." According to Handwerk, irony "shatters the isolation to which self-consciousness apparently condemns" man by causing man to recognize "an

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38 Ibid.
already existing presence of the otherness of distinct subjects in the individual subject." I argue that because Macintosh denied irony and its potential for turning man from his subjective self-absorption to the objective reality of God, he developed critical monistic realism in epistemology to turn to the divine. In using humane irony however, one must use caution not to go to extremes. At one extreme, the nineteenth-century German philosopher K. W. F. Solger (1780-1819) used irony as contemplative religious devotion. According to Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855), the Danish philosopher and religious writer who studied irony in depth in The Concept of Irony (1968), Solger sought "to bring about the absolute identity of the finite and the infinite, ... to destroy

39 Ibid., 19.

40 From epistemological monism and critical realism, Macintosh developed his critical monistic realism as the doctrine that "the object perceived is existentially or numerically identical with the real object at the moment of perception, although the real object may have qualities that are not perceived at that moment; and also that this same object may exist when unperceived, although not necessarily with all the qualities which it possesses when perceived."

the boundary which in many ways would hold them apart.\textsuperscript{42} Kierkegaard complained that by destroying this boundary, Solger negated all finitude, "including the observing subject"\textsuperscript{43} himself.

At the other extreme, Richard Rorty, author of \textit{Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity} (1989) and one of Dean's new historicists, used irony as the opposite of common-sense and metaphysics.\textsuperscript{44} Instead of using irony to open man to the divine and his awareness of the objective reality of an Other or God as Niebuhr did, Rorty employed irony to enhance man's self-doubts and thereby to stimulate his awareness of his contingency and solidarity with other liberal "ironists."\textsuperscript{45} In developing his liberal ethno-centrist position, Rorty rejected the concept of an absolute truth "'out there'" that natural science or religion discovered.\textsuperscript{46} To move beyond "the distinctions between absolutism and relativism, between rationality and irrationality, and between morality and expediency,"\textsuperscript{47} Rorty turned to the language games of political utopians and innovative

\begin{footnotes}
\item[42] \textit{Ibid.}, 325.
\item[43] \textit{Ibid.}, 326.
\item[45] \textit{Ibid.}, 73, 198.
\item[46] \textit{Ibid.}, 3-4.
\item[47] \textit{Ibid.}, 44.
\end{footnotes}
artists.48 He replaced a transcendent God with the human community and replaced the highest good with the unanswerable question "'Why not be cruel?'"49 Rorty wanted to turn "ironists" to one another and not to a transcendent Other or God in contrast to Niebuhr and Marty.

I contend that Macintosh eliminated the concepts of irony, tragedy, paradox, and myth from all but his autobiographical works, due perhaps to his appropriation of Hegel.50 I claim that by eliminating these concepts and by turning to empirical science, Macintosh attempted to maintain his personal myths of innocence, optimism, and

48Ibid., 4-5.
49Ibid., xv.
50Macintosh reflected that in the summer of 1902, he read Spinoza's Ethics and it made a deep impression on him, making him "a post-Kantian Spinozist of some sort, approximately an Hegelian, although I had read little of Hegel . . . My religious views were deeply affected. Rationality was henceforth to be the touchstone of truth and reality. If knowledge was possible at all, the real must be the rational, and the rational must be real . . . Gradually, however, I began to have misgivings about some of the more radical conclusions drawn by some from Hegelian principles, and it was not long before it became clear that I could not accept a 'timeless Absolute as a satisfactory substitute for the living God of religious faith. Neither could I be content to explain away moral evil as being metaphysically unreal, or as being justified from the point of view of the rational Whole. Nevertheless, with certain modifications, especially at the two points just specified, speculative or neo-Hegelian idealism continued to be for two or three years my philosophical creed and, to my mind, the final interpretation of the significance and truth of religion . . . I did not part easily with my absolute idealism, and in the first year of my graduate study at Chicago I was known by some of my fellow-students as 'the Hegelian.'" D. C. Macintosh, "Toward a New Untraditional Orthodoxy," Contemporary American Theology, ed. Vergilius Ferm (New York: Round Table Press, 1932), 293, 294, 295, 298; Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony (1968), 282.
mythlessness. From this secure ground, he could write with what Geoffrey W. Stafford, one of Macintosh's reviewers, termed a singular "clarity of thought and lucidity of style" that demonstrated the unity of all men in God in an age of rampant nationalism and religious divisiveness. Preston Warren, Macintosh's biographer, observed that Macintosh's theology has the rigor of a puritanism and yet it expresses, in Jane Austen's phrase, the serenity of a mind at peace with itself as it takes account of the wide range of theological thought and of discoveries regarding religion.53

I affirm that Macintosh's private and professional life teemed with irony, innocence, and myth as he lived out his pilgrimage of faith in the world of modern thought patterned after John Bunyan's The Pilgrim's Progress (1678).54 I also

51The myth of mythlessness is "the unexamined belief that scientific culture has transcended mythical forms of thought." Jewett and Lawrence, American Monomyth (1977), 250.


54John Bunyan, The Pilgrim's Progress, with an Introduction by Alexander M. Witherspoon (New York: Washington Square Press, Inc., 1957 [1678]); Macintosh described his early informal religious training by his mother: "On Sundays nothing but Bible stories, The Pilgrim's Progress, and other 'Sunday reading' was permitted us, not any music but hymns, and yet somehow Sunday was made for us a day to be looked forward to as the happiest day of the week." "Toward a New Unorthodox Orthodoxy," 278-9. In tracing "the pilgrimage of faith in the world of modern thought," Macintosh noted that he "from time to time make(s) some slight use, although for illustrative and literary purposes only, of an analogy . . . partly legendary, partly historical, of the pilgrimage of the Hebrew people from the
contend that Macintosh's optimistic myths of mythlessness and innocence led him to embrace scientific culture, to deny the shadow or tragic side of his story, and to modify the content of theology. As I will discuss in Chapter Five, H. Richard Niebuhr and his brother Reinhold, both former students of Macintosh, were critical of Macintosh at precisely the points of irony or tragedy, innocence, and myth.

Egypt of their bondage through the wilderness to the promised land and then their being carried away captive into a foreign country, and finally their return and re-establishment in their ancestral home. These stages of national pilgrimage will serve to point the outstanding features of what I have styled the pilgrimage of faith." D. C. Macintosh, The Pilgrimage of Faith in the World of Modern Thought Stephanos Nirmalendu Ghosh Lectures, Calcutta, India, University of Calcutta, 1931 (New York: Longmans, Green, 1931), 20. Preston Warren refered to Macintosh's personal search for an interpretive principle for the "traditions of empiricism, mysticism, and practicalisms": "Macintosh likened the search for a principle of interpretation to the Israelites wandering forty years in the wilderness in quest of the promised land. They found themselves wandering and continually confronted by hazards or problems. Like John Bunyan's Pilgrim, they turned this way and that in readiness to step out but 'knew not which way to go.' They had a leader who repeatedly pointed them to the beacon of the promised land and used the clouds by day and the starry heavens at night to edge them on their way."

"Macintosh himself, indeed, seemed a combination of a Moses and a Joshua, though in a different sphere. He had, he related to his Calcutta Lectures, been going through a wilderness himself: the wilderness of modern philosophic thought. Year after year, indeed, he had been attempting to conduct his students in Systematic Theology through the wilderness." Warren, Out of the Wilderness (1989), 42.
Inn...
Myth

Building upon Reinhold Niebuhr's previous work, Jewett and Lawrence located the concepts of innocence and irony within the American monomyth based on "Judeo-Christian redemption dramas." Jewett and Lawrence defined myth as "an uncritically accepted story that provides a model to interpret current experience, disclosing the meaning of the self, the community and the universe." Beginning and ending in an Edenic setting disrupted by evil, the American monomyth was "an archetypal plot pattern emerging in American popular culture in which a community threatened by evil is redeemed through superheroism." According to Jewett and Lawrence, this monomyth was "the myth of the one man serving as rescuer for no reason but his devotion to abstract justice." Only in America could this monomyth have developed.

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because what the myths of other nations and cultures have had in small, the American forms of popular literature have raised to an overpowering institution in a dozen different directions. So overpowering, in fact, that the myth stands almost alone—hence monomyth, the single story we do deeply believe in, and repeatedly rewrite with new characters in new settings.\textsuperscript{70}

Jewett and Lawrence claimed that the American monomyth developed during the "axial decade" or "the period from 1929 to 1941 in which traditional dramatic motifs coalesced to create the American monomyth."\textsuperscript{71} They described how beginning in 1929,

\begin{quote}
the unknown redeemer on a horse becomes the 'Masked Rider of the Plains'; his sexual renunciation is complete; he assumes the uniform and powers of angelic avengers; and thus he grows from mere heroism to superheroism.\textsuperscript{72}
\end{quote}

In that year, the sound film \textit{The Virginian}, the \textit{Tarzan} comic-books and the pulp novel "The Shadow" were released.\textsuperscript{73}

Jewett and Lawrence connected "these materials with the American religious heritage" by relating them to

\begin{quote}
the displacement of the redeemer myth. Only in a culture preoccupied for centuries with the question of salvation is the appearance of redemption through superheroes comprehensible. The secularization process in this instance does not eliminate the need for redemption, as the Enlightenment had attempted to do, but rather displaces it with a semihuman process. Powers that the culture had earlier reserved for God and his angelic beings are transferred to an Everyman, conveniently shielded by an alter ego.\textsuperscript{74}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{66}\textit{Ibid.}, 249.
\textsuperscript{67}\textit{Ibid.}, 149.
\textsuperscript{68}\textit{Ibid.}, 249.
\textsuperscript{69}Isaac Asimov, "Foreword," \textit{American Monomyth}, Jewett and Lawrence, (1977), xv.
\textsuperscript{70}\textit{Ibid.}
According to Jewett and Lawrence, the monomythic superhero possessed "disguised origins, pure motivations, a redemptive task, and extraordinary powers."\(^{75}\) Originating "outside the community he is called to save," the superhero was "patient in the face of provocations, he seeks nothing for himself and withstands all temptations."\(^{76}\) His pure motivations ensured "moral infallibility in judging persons and situations."\(^{77}\) The superhero possessed unerring aim, irresistible fists, "and his body (was) capable of suffering fatal injury."\(^{78}\) He remained "utterly cool and thus divinely competent"\(^{79}\) in the face of danger. The superhero employed "nonviolent manipulation" to resolve "insoluble personality conflicts within the community, and coolly brought "happiness to a desperate Eden."\(^{80}\) In this form, the American monomyth betrayed "an aim to deny the tragic complexities of human life."\(^{81}\) As Jewett and Lawrence observed, it also included multiple paradoxes such as

\(^{71}\)Jewett and Lawrence, *American Monomyth* (1977), 249.

\(^{72}\)Ibid., 185.

\(^{73}\)Ibid.

\(^{74}\)Ibid., 192.

\(^{75}\)Ibid., 195.

\(^{76}\)Ibid.

\(^{77}\)Ibid., 195-6.

\(^{78}\)Ibid., 196.

\(^{79}\)Ibid.

\(^{80}\)Ibid.
vigilantism without lawlessness, sexual repression without resultant perversion, and moral infallibility without the use of intellect . . . The monomythic hero claims surpassing concern for the health of the community, but he never practices citizenship.82

In this dissertation, I argue that Douglas C. Macintosh played all the parts within the American monomyth. Faced with the threat of the death of religion, Macintosh, who traced his ancestry to John Cotton on his mother's side,83 took up the classical apologetic task of defending Christianity from internal and external attacks in his pro-scientific, anti-theological age.84 I contend that Macintosh took up his pilgrimage of faith and lived out his personal myth as "Christian" and "Evangelist" in John Bunyan's The Pilgrim's Progress (1678),85 described by Mary Esther Harding as a "typical hero journey."86 I am convinced that as he pursued his personal pilgrimage, Macintosh sought to be an example for others who had to seek redemption for themselves.87 Like the late 1980s American television superhero Angus "MacGyver," Macintosh used his

81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 Macintosh, "Toward a New Untraditional Orthodoxy" (1932), 278.
86 Mary Esther Harding, Journey Into Self (1956), 52.
87 Jewett and Lawrence, American Monomyth (1977), 108.
"Yankee ingenuity" to improvise an incredible *deus ex machina* out of the materials that he happened to have at hand. I demonstrate how Macintosh appropriated his opponents' science, philosophy, language, categories, and logic to construct apologetic arguments for the reasonableness of Christian belief. Macintosh's opponents were predominantly scientists and philosophical and theological liberals and conservatives, both outside of and within Christianity.

I also suggest that Macintosh employed the tactics of Socratic irony as described by Paul Duke in *Irony in the Fourth Gospel* (1985). Like Duke's description of Socrates, Macintosh posed as a "plain man" who "'affected to be the admirer of other men's wisdom.'" I contend that in his Socratic search for the truth, Macintosh questioned "his opponents with apparent innocence and admiration while ultimately intending to prove them fools." Faced with the threat of modernity, especially the threats of post-Kantian

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89 Ibid.

90 Ibid.
philosophy, historicism, and Darwinian science, Macintosh kept his head and followed Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834) in addressing his apologetic enterprise to Christianity's "cultured despisers,"\(^91\) in my opinion.

I claim that Macintosh suffered the plight of the innocent victim when his empirical religious philosophy was virtually eclipsed by his students and subsequent scholarship, as Warren observed.\(^92\) Warren noted that at the unveiling of a replacement portrait\(^93\) of Macintosh on February 13, 1980, Yale graduate Professor of Religious Studies, Hans Frei, reflected that when he arrived at Yale as a student in 1942, Julian Hartt had already succeeded Macintosh.\(^94\) In the words of Warren, Frei observed that "except in Hartt's courses, Macintosh's writings were not being seriously studied—even in courses taught by his

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\(^93\)Ibid., 16. Upon learning of the vandalizing of the first portrait of Macintosh in the protest era of the 1960s, artist Clarence Brodeur offered to replace it. He did so because "first, a considerable number of people had contributed to the cost of the original painting. Secondly, Brodeur had been so impressed with Macintosh while painting him in 1946--despite the latter's paralyzing stroke (in 1942)--that he believed such a personage should be perpetuated in art."

\(^94\)Ibid.
former students."\(^95\) Former students H. Richard and Reinhold Niebuhr, Robert Lowery Calhoun, Julius Seelye Bixler, Roland Bainton, Randolph Crump Miller, and Julian Hartt had all taken distinguished teaching posts. Warren attributed Macintosh's eclipse to his former students' "exercising their capacities for independent thought which Macintosh had elicited in them. It was his spirit that survived rather than his thought."\(^96\) As Warren concluded, "an interlude of Existentialism, Neo-orthodoxies, and Philosophical Analysis, not to neglect Rock music, had left him in recession."\(^97\)

I also argue that Macintosh played the villain in his application for citizenship in the United States, which was eventually denied by the Supreme Court\(^98\) because he refused to swear categorically that he would bear arms in defense of

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\(^95\)Ibid.; Writing in the "Centennial Tribute" to Macintosh in 1978, Julian Hartt observed "It is a melancholy commentary on the state of theological knowledge both at YDS and elsewhere in the country that so little is known of Douglas Clyde Macintosh. It is not too much to say that he put YDS on the theological map for several generations of theological thinkers. But theological styles are subject to sudden shifts of interest and sentiment; quite as much as the size and cut of men's ties. During the latter part of the 30's Macintosh could see such shifts coming. He thought these shifts were largely regressive, and he said so."

\(^96\)Ibid., 18.

\(^97\)Ibid., 27.

this country.\textsuperscript{99} Warren noted that Macintosh based his defense on his claim to a higher loyalty to the will of God and the personal freedom to interpret the moral justification of the particular war in question.\textsuperscript{100} At the time of his death in 1948, Macintosh was a man of two countries, the land of his birth and the land of his adoption.\textsuperscript{101} In 1939, he reflected that he could sing "'My Country 'tis of thee,' and mean part of it for Canada and part of it for the United States. These are my two countries, and I love them both."\textsuperscript{102}

Based on my analysis of irony, innocence, and myth, I contend that in making this stand regarding United States' citizenship, Macintosh brought his personal myth of Christian pilgrimage patterned after Bunyan's "Christian" into conflict with the American national redeemer myth of world salvation as described by Jewett and Lawrence in The


\textsuperscript{100}\textit{Ibid.}, 3.

\textsuperscript{101}\textit{Ibid.}, 11, quoting Macintosh, \textit{Social Religion} (1939), xi.

\textsuperscript{102}\textit{Ibid.}
American Monomyth (1977). As a Christian and as a Canadian, Macintosh placed his loyalty directly in God and did not require allegiance to the United States to be saved. Although he lost his personal battle for United States' citizenship, Macintosh's myth of Christian pilgrimage was eventually successful in his critique of the American monomyth. According to Warren following the detailed analysis by William H. Harbaugh in A Lawyer's Lawyer, The Life of John W. Davis (1973),

the case of a French Canadian Seventh Day Adventist, James Louis Girouard, brought a turning point on citizenship for conscientious objectors. Stating that he would serve as a non-combatant in war but would not bear arms, he was admitted to citizenship in a U.S. Massachusetts court. The Government secured a reversal on an appeal but in April 1946—seventeen years after Macintosh had filed his application—the Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court's verdict about Girouard's citizenship and by doing so overturned other decisions including that about Macintosh. Justice Douglas' opinion in this 1946 decision explained that a 1942 Constitutional Amendment gave affirmative recognition that one "could be attached to the principles of government without bearing arms." He added that freedom of religion guaranteed by the first Amendment is the product of that "long long struggle" of men who have suffered death rather than subordinate their allegiance to God to that of the State.


Writing out of my own version of the American monomyth, I challenge the common assessment that Macintosh and the liberal German theologian Albrecht Ritschl (1822-1889) differed in method but agreed in content. Macintosh himself objected to being labeled a Ritschlian style Romantic. To provide a firm foundation for religious certainty, assurance, and morality, he opposed the Ritschlian theology's use of epistemological dualism or the numerical distinction between the experienced object and the real object at the moment of perception. Macintosh rejected dualism because it led to subjectivism or "the unverified opinion of the subject," and ultimately to agnosticism or the denial of the possibility of knowledge of independent reality. He wanted to purge liberal theology of these undesirable elements and to turn it toward more objective or "orthodox" Christianity that could be verified.


107 Macintosh, Problem of Knowledge (1916), 13.

by experience. Macintosh insisted on raising questions of truth and proof, on the reasonableness of Christianity, and on the possibility of the knowledge of God. He also wanted to develop a middle ground between this older liberalism and what he saw as the emerging excesses of fundamentalism and secularism.

My historical analysis describes how Macintosh responded to the religious, social, cultural, and philosophical crises of his ironic, innocent, secularizing age by making four significant moves to recover the reasonableness of belief. I demonstrate how Macintosh attempted:

1. to recover objectivism in philosophy and theology;
2. to recover the apologetic arguments for the existence of God;
3. to employ the Radical Method in theology to defend an essence of Christianity;¹⁰⁹

4. to employ the Anselmian apologetic tactic of leaving Christ aside to prove his necessity for man's salvation.\textsuperscript{110}

I claim that because Macintosh engaged in apologetics, he could continue to hold deeply his personal evangelical Christian beliefs while he engaged contemporary science, philosophy, and theology. In response to the crises of his ironic age of unbelief, loss of innocence, and myth, Macintosh argued creatively to turn the tide of religious liberalism toward theological orthodoxy. My analysis of Macintosh's apologetic, mediating response to the crises of his day also helps to explain his eclipse in contemporary scholarship. Like a sheep in wolf's clothing, Macintosh ironically engaged in an internal argument with the liberals, appropriated their categories, logic, and language and turned their arguments back on themselves. He employed this apologetic tactic to raise questions about truth, to reveal logical fallacies, and to recover the religious certainty, assurance, and morality of evangelical Christianity. With the decline of both liberalism and fundamentalism, Macintosh faded into obscurity in the shadow of the neo-orthodoxy of his students H. Richard and Reinhold Niebuhr.

While I give little credence to Macintosh's specific apologetic claims and expose fatal fallacies at the heart of his arguments, I argue that scholars must appreciate his larger apologetic task to understand his work. By examining Macintosh against the backdrop of irony, myth, and the American monomyth, I will present some of the central issues of the older historicism and its challenge to the American Christ/redeemer myth. Although I must reject the validity of Macintosh's apologetic arguments, I conclude that scholars should not discard the man or his Yale strand of empirical theology.
CHAPTER ONE: IRONY, INNOCENCE, MYTH, AND DOUGLAS C. MACINTOSH

1.00 SUMMARY

In this chapter, I contend that Macintosh experienced irony, innocence, and myth personally although he eliminated them from his theological, philosophical, and religious writings. The irony, innocence, and myth of the end of the Gilded or Victorian Age and the crisis of modernity influenced Macintosh's early years, religious conversion, marriage, and academic career. As he journeyed through the grounds of modern thought, Macintosh likened his journey to the pilgrimage of the Hebrew people out of bondage, into the wilderness, and entry into the promised land.\(^1\) I conclude that Macintosh suffered the ultimate irony when he descended from the pinnacle of admiration and respect on the faculty at Yale University Divinity School to the depths of scholarly eclipse and a "blackout" of his memory in Yale Divinity School classrooms.\(^2\)

1.10 MACINTOSH'S EARLY YEARS, RELIGIOUS EDUCATION AND CONVERSION

Like Jewett's and Lawrence's mythic hero who originated from outside the community he was to save,\(^3\) Douglas Clyde Macintosh was born on February 8, 1877, in Breadalbane, \\

\(^1\)Macintosh, The Pilgrimage of Faith (1931), 20.

\(^2\)Keane, "DOUGLAS CLYDE MACINTOSH: A Centennial Tribute" (1978), quoting Randolph Crump Miller.

\(^3\)Jewett and Lawrence, American Monomyth (1977), 195.
Ontario, Canada, to Elizabeth Everett and Peter Macintosh, according to his biographer, Preston Warren. Macintosh claimed to be a descendent of the Reformation and Pietism. He received his early religious education from his deeply religious and conservative mother who instilled in him the "principal evangelical concepts." Macintosh's maternal grandfather, Cotton Mather Everett, "followed farming, practiced medicine and read theology. He was a Wesleyan Methodist and a skilled controversialist, but was regarded as somewhat unorthodox in his views." Macintosh recalled that his Sundays were spent in hymn singing and reading Bible stories, John Bunyan's The Pilgrim's Progress (1678), and other "Sunday reading." During the summer of 1886, at the age of ten, he attended one of the "protracted meetings held in a neighboring Presbyterian church under the leadership of Mcintyre and Sinclair, evangelists of local celebrity." Innocently, he responded to the revivalist preacher's invitation to confess his faith and to become a

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5Macintosh, "Toward a New Untraditional Orthodoxy" (1932), 277-9.
6Ibid., 279.
7Ibid., 278.
8Ibid., 278-9.
9Ibid.
converted Christian.\textsuperscript{10} Afterwards, he experienced doubts about his actions, and in later years, felt that he had been treated unfairly.\textsuperscript{11} Macintosh felt that he had been trapped, as it were, into making a profession of conversion such as I was not quite ready for; I had acted with a certain sense of awe and a feeling that it would be very wrong for me not to respond to the invitation.\textsuperscript{12}

Although this conversion failed, it did however, bring him relief from one or two previous dreams of "'hell-fire.'"\textsuperscript{13}

\textbf{Macintosh's conversion experience}

Macintosh reflected that in 1890, during his fourteenth year, he responded again to his mother's urging that he must know whether he was a Christian.\textsuperscript{14} Convinced that he was not a Christian because he did not know it and anxious that he not repeat the failure of his first profession of faith, Macintosh did not want "to take any stand as a Christian until I could be very sure of my ground."\textsuperscript{15} In this frame of mind, Macintosh attended a weekly meeting with James

\textsuperscript{10}Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{11}Ibid., 280.  
\textsuperscript{12}Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{13}Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{14}Ibid., 279.  
\textsuperscript{15}Ibid.
Cross, brother of Professor George Cross. Macintosh recalled that he was "vaguely waiting for some new feeling which would convince me that I was 'born again' and give me that true faith in Christ which was necessary for 'everlasting life.'"16 At the meeting, an older Christian said

"Perhaps there is someone here who is waiting until he feels saved before he will take Christ as his Savior; but he has no right to expect to feel saved until he is saved, and he cannot be saved until he takes Christ as his Savior."17

These were the words for which Macintosh was waiting. Without at the moment giving the mental act any outward expression, and without any extraordinary feeling except a sense of holy awe and a feeling of intense earnestness, I said in my heart, "I do now take Christ as my Savior."18

Macintosh told the young minister about his experience and walked home with his heart "full of joy."19 The next day he began reading the Bible with new diligence and carved the date of his conversion in the bark of a beech tree to remember it often.20 This second conversion experience or "right religious adjustment" was successful and Macintosh

16Ibid., 280.
17Ibid., 281-2.
18Ibid., 282.
19Ibid.
20Ibid., 283.
was baptized and joined the church.\textsuperscript{21} When school resumed in the fall, Macintosh learned that many of his high school friends had had similar experiences, which helped to reinforce his own decision.\textsuperscript{22}

As I see it, Macintosh's conversion experience contained elements of self-deception or what contemporary scholar Ava Chamberlain, following Jonathan Edwards called "legal" or "evangelical hypocrisy."\textsuperscript{23} In her article "Self-Deception as a Theological Problem in Jonathan Edwards' Treatise Concerning Religious Affections" (1994), Chamberlain observed that Edwards complained

"There are two sorts of hypocrites: one that are deceived with their outward morality and external religion; many of which are professed Arminians, in the doctrine of justification: and the other, are those that are deceived with false discoveries and elevations; which often cry down works, and men's own righteousness, and talk much of free grace; but at the same time make a righteousness of their discoveries, and of their humiliation, and exalt themselves to heaven with them." Both sorts of hypocrite surely misled others with their false claims to grace, but the deception of others was subordinate to their own self-deception.\textsuperscript{24}

Chamberlain noted that revivalists were most susceptible to self-deception

\textsuperscript{21}\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{22}\textit{Ibid.}, 283-4.


in their understanding of the means by which the justified sinner acquired assurance of salvation. Assurance was the condition that obtained when an individual sincerely believed that he or she had been justified and the belief was true; "hypocrisy" was the term used when the belief was false.\textsuperscript{25}

I suggest that like many of these self-deceived, evangelical hypocrites, Macintosh spent his educational career seeking religious assurance of his salvation, to maintain his myth of innocence that he was saved because he knew it. I also contend that this self-deception based on the Christian myth of innocence was the source of irony in Macintosh's life. Macintosh's determined maintenance of self-deception and myth of innocence contributed greatly to unconscious weakness and personal responsibility for his eclipse in subsequent scholarship and later blackout at Yale. In the following chapters, I will discuss how Macintosh's determined maintenance of self-deception and myth of innocence affected the style and content of his philosophical and theological work.

In addition, I argue that Macintosh spent most of his adult life defending his personal evangelical conversion myth within the shadow of William James's (1842-1910)\textsuperscript{26} psychological dissection of the soul-sickness of the twice

\textsuperscript{25}\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{26}Macintosh read William James's "essays on 'The Sentiment of Rationality' and 'The Will to Believe'" during his sophomore year (1900-1901) at McMaster University under the direction of Professor James TenBroeke. Macintosh, "Toward a New Untraditional Orthodoxy" (1932), 292.
born in *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (1902).\textsuperscript{27} According to James, the religion of the twice-born viewed the world as "a double-storied mystery."\textsuperscript{28} This mystery held that man lived two lives, one natural and the other spiritual. Before man could live the spiritual life, he had to renounce and despair of the natural life.\textsuperscript{29} James attributed this dualistic view to "a certain discordancy or heterogeneity in the native temperament of the subject, an incompletely unified moral and intellectual constitution,"\textsuperscript{30} a divided self and a divided will.\textsuperscript{31}

James also identified religious melancholy, self-contempt and despair in John Bunyan, the author of *The Pilgrim's Progress* (1678), who was overly concerned with "the condition of his own personal self."\textsuperscript{32} According to James, Bunyan


\textsuperscript{28} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{29} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., 144.

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., 148-59.

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., 136, 158-9. For a more sympathetic, Jungian analysis of Bunyan, see Mary Esther Harding, *Journey Into Self* (1956).
was a typical case of the psychopathic temperament, sensitive of conscience to a diseased degree, beset by doubts, fears and insistent ideas, and a victim of verbal automatisms, both motor and sensory.  

As I see it, James's negative assessment of Bunyan's mythic Christian pilgrimage to unite his divided self struck at the heart of Macintosh's personal evangelical conversion myth.

Macintosh experienced religious doubt as a youth and at the university

According to Macintosh, in the summer of 1892, two years after his conversion, he felt called to the ministry. In the fall, he returned to his high school studies with renewed interest and determination. After graduating from high school, he spent a year and a half working on a farm and learning to be a teacher. For the next two years, Macintosh taught in one-room country schools. In the summer of 1897, he "accepted the pastoral

33 James, Varieties of Religious Experience (1902, 1961), 136.

34 Ibid., 149-50.

35 Macintosh, "Toward a New Untraditional Orthodoxy (1932), 278-9; Pilgrimage of Faith (1931), 20; Warren, Out of the Wilderness (1989), 42.

36 Macintosh, "Toward a New Untraditional Orthodoxy" (1932), 284.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.
oversight of a small mission church (Marthaville, near Petrolia) in Western Ontario.\textsuperscript{40} In the fall of 1899, following a summer of evangelistic work, Macintosh enrolled at McMaster University in Toronto.\textsuperscript{41} He originally planned to specialize in natural science and philosophy to fit himself "to deal with the intellectual problems of religion,"\textsuperscript{42} but quickly gravitated to philosophy, especially metaphysics due to the influence of his undergraduate professors at McMaster.\textsuperscript{43}

Macintosh reflected that during his sophomore year at McMaster, he read William James under the direction of Professor James TenBroeke and seriously questioned his faith.\textsuperscript{44} He felt that he "could not escape agnosticism."\textsuperscript{45} At the same time he "saw no reason why" he "should not be a Christian agnostic."\textsuperscript{46} In response to his crisis of faith, Macintosh turned to religious empiricism "to gain a true subjective assurance with regard to the reality and will of

\textsuperscript{40}\textit{Ibid.}, 288.
\textsuperscript{41}\textit{Ibid.}, 289.
\textsuperscript{42}\textit{Ibid.}, 289-91.
\textsuperscript{44}Macintosh, "Toward a New Untraditional Orthodoxy" (1932), 292.
\textsuperscript{45}\textit{Ibid.}.
\textsuperscript{46}\textit{Ibid.}.
God."

He read William Newton Clarke's *What Shall We Think of Christianity* (1899) and *An Outline of Christian Theology* (1898). At this time, his mother passed away, causing him to experience a "grievous sense of loss" and an accompanying "profound inner certitude of immortality and of the goodness and sufficiency of God." Macintosh retraced his philosophical education through neo-Kantian idealism, post-Kantian Spinozism, and Hegelianism, giving up "some precious beliefs" as he surrendered to what he "could not but regard as the truth." He concluded that in surrendering his beliefs, his religious views were deeply affected. Rationality was henceforth to be the touchstone of truth and reality. If knowledge was possible at all, the real must be the rational, and the rational must be real.

Gradually, Macintosh began to question Hegelian principles, particularly the adequacy of a timeless Absolute as a replacement for the living God and the problem of moral evil. During his senior year, he found himself becoming "increasingly rebellious against what seemed to me the narrowness and dogmatism of a few of my professors."

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47 Ibid.
48 Ibid., 290.
49 Ibid., 293.
50 Ibid., 294.
51 Ibid., 295.
52 Ibid.
or three of Macintosh's professors were sympathetic and upon his graduation from McMaster in 1903, invited him to teach at McMaster for another year in the temporary absence of philosophy Professor James TenBroeke.53

Increasingly convinced that his "best work for a rational Christianity could be done . . . as a teacher of philosophy rather than in the pastorate of a church,"54 Macintosh decided to enter the University of Chicago. At Chicago, Macintosh planned to study modern theology with G. B. Foster (1858-1918), Shailer Mathews (1863-1941), W. R. Harper (1856-1906), G. B. Smith (1868-1929), John Dewey (1859-1952), J. H. Tufts (1862-1942), G. H. Mead (1863-1931), J. R. Angell (b. 1869), A. W. Moore, and E. S. Ames (1870-1958).55 When he arrived in Chicago, Macintosh was disappointed to learn that Dewey had moved to Columbia University.56 However, he soon discovered that his religious and educational needs were being met at Chicago.57

Macintosh recalled that at the Graduate Divinity School of the University of Chicago, he suddenly became acutely interested in metaphysics when he encountered "a

53Ibid., 296.
54Ibid., 297.
55Ibid.
56Ibid.
57Ibid.
metaphysically agnostic Kantianism and Ritschlianism. 58 Propounded by theology professor George B. Foster (1858-1918) and Professor Gerald Birney Smith (1868-1929), this metaphysically agnostic philosophy and theology challenged the young Macintosh's neo-Hegelian view that theology was metaphysics. 59 According to Macintosh, the Department of Philosophy at the University of Chicago

was thoroughly and indeed enthusiastically committed to the functional psychology and essentially positivistic instrumentalism, or pragmatism of John Dewey and George H. Mead, so that it was quite out of sympathy with the aims and methods of speculative metaphysics and metaphysical theology. 60

In response to the anti-Hegelian, anti-metaphysical environment at Chicago, Macintosh

soon discovered that what I was fundamentally interested in was conserving the vital values of the Christian religion, rather than a mere exposure of the mistakes of traditionalism. 61

He also discovered that Georg Wobbermin (1869-1943), Max Scheibe (b. 1870), and Ernst Troeltsch (1865-1923) had reached the similar conclusion that theology was impossible without metaphysics. 62

58 Macintosh, "Theology and Metaphysics" (1947), 197.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Macintosh, "Toward a New Untraditional Orthodoxy" (1932), 301.
62 Macintosh, "Theology and Metaphysics" (1947), 198.
Macintosh reflected that under the pressure of his Chicago professors and their Kantian and Ritschlian rejection of metaphysics, his neo-Hegelian rationalism gradually gave way to "pragmatism in philosophy and Ritschlianism in theology." He responded to his Chicago professors' instrumentalist logic by taking three courses in logic. These three courses led to psychological problems which influenced him to take three courses in functional psychology. In his coursework, Macintosh discovered the importance of religious value-judgments to theology and began to wrestle with the problems posed by locating the source of these value-judgments in subjective, relative, human values instead of in the objective, divine absolute.

Macintosh recalled that at this point, he was "to a very considerable degree won over to the school of the pragmatists." He later reflected that in spite of his professors' best efforts, he "was never completely converted, however, either to the pragmatism of the philosophical department or to the Ritschlianism of my

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63Ibid., 197.
64Macintosh, "Toward a New Untraditional Orthodoxy" (1932), 298.
65Ibid.
66Macintosh, "Theology and Metaphysics" (1947), 198.
67Macintosh, "Toward a New Untraditional Orthodoxy" (1932), 298.
theological teachers,"68 "but for a time I was decidedly under its influence."69

I contend that this incomplete conversion or continuing tension with Ritschlianism was the source of much of Macintosh's work in epistemology and value theory. Because of the extent of this opposition, scholars may not label Macintosh a Romantic Ritschlian-style liberal based solely on the similarity of their theological methods or doctrines.70 I will discuss the relationship between Macintosh and Ritschl in greater detail in Chapters Three and Four.

Macintosh responded to the anti-metaphysical environment at Chicago by attempting to construct a more modern, scientific, empirical, metaphysical theology. To express his "chief difference with my pragmatist and Ritschlian instructors,"71 Macintosh decided to write his doctoral dissertation on "the reaction against metaphysics

68Macintosh, "Theology and Metaphysics" (1947), 198; "Toward a New Untraditional Orthodoxy" (1932), 298.


70Macintosh, "Romanticism or Realism, Which?" (1936), 325-32.

71Macintosh, "Toward a New Untraditional Orthodoxy" (1932), 300.
in Ritschlianism and pragmatism." The Reactions to his dissertation and spent the rest of his career arguing for the inclusion of metaphysics in theology.74

In spite of his intellectual and spiritual problems with the anti-metaphysical Kantian philosophy and Ritschlian theology of his Chicago professors, Macintosh developed a life-long friendship with George B. Foster.75 Foster reinforced William Newton Clarke's early influence on the young Macintosh and introduced him formally to the Ritschlian theology.76 Foster also taught Macintosh to use Ritschl's method of radical criticism of Christianity to remove "those things which were shaken, that the things which were not shaken might be seen to remain."77 Macintosh

72 Macintosh, "Theology and Metaphysics" (1947), 199.

73 Ibid., 198.

74 Macintosh, "The Plain Man's Soliloquy" (1938), 303.


76 Macintosh, "Toward a New Untraditional Orthodoxy" (1932), 298.

77 Macintosh, "Preface," Christianity in its Modern Expression (1921), v.
praised Foster as a "remarkably sympathetic interpreter of points of view other than his own,"\textsuperscript{78} and a sincere lover of truth. He admired Foster's ability to work out of the depths of his Christian experience, making "him the fearless critic of unintelligent dogmatism in the name of religion."\textsuperscript{79}

Following his three years of course work at Chicago, Macintosh helped to organize a new theological department at Brandon College in Brandon, Manitoba, Canada, "acting as Professor of Biblical and Systematic Theology"\textsuperscript{80} from 1907 to 1909, while he completed his doctoral dissertation. He reflected that

the theologically more conservative McMaster left me radical, somewhat rebellious, and intent on destroying not only traditionalism but perhaps too much of the content of our Christian theological tradition, whereas the notoriously radical University of Chicago left me comparatively conservative in relation to the Christian tradition and with a theological interest that was dominantly constructive rather than destructive.\textsuperscript{81}

Macintosh attributed this to the "exhilarating freedom of thought and discussion"\textsuperscript{82} at Chicago.

\textsuperscript{78}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{79}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{80}Macintosh, "Toward a New Untraditional Orthodoxy" (1932), 300.
\textsuperscript{81}Ibid., 300-1.
\textsuperscript{82}Ibid., 301.
In 1907, Macintosh was ordained by the Hyde Park Baptist Church in Chicago where he was a member. During his two hour long examination for ordination, Macintosh "failed to satisfy the more conservative ministers and deacons" as to the orthodoxy of his beliefs. His failure precipitated an hour long discussion about whether he should be ordained. Macintosh recalled that after the favorable but mixed vote, "a kindly elderly delegate came to me and said, 'My dear young brother, why can't you take the Bible just as it reads, and get rid of all your doubts?'" Macintosh lamented that it wasn't as easy as that, but, "having thrown away a good deal of theological 'lumber,' I was much more conscious of being happily free in my Christian faith than I was oppressed by any so-called 'doubts.'"

Macintosh described how he began his teaching and writing career at Yale University as an assistant professor of Systematic Theology upon his graduation from Chicago in 1909. Yale Divinity School historian, Roland Bainton, author of *Yale and the Ministry* (1957), noted that Macintosh

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was "appointed to the Yale faculty on February 15, 1909." In 1920, he became Chairman of Yale's Graduate Department of Religion and a member of the University's philosophy department. Macintosh's biographer, Preston Warren, reported that Macintosh retired from his teaching position at Yale in 1942, after suffering a debilitating stroke.

As S. Mark Heim has observed in his dissertation "True Relations: D. C. Macintosh and the Evangelical roots of Liberal Theology" (1982), Macintosh did not travel very far from his Canadian Baptist roots during his pilgrimage of faith. Heim noted that Macintosh's journey through "the grounds and claims of modern thought" was essentially complete by the time he began teaching at Yale and did not change significantly throughout his life. Macintosh claimed that he developed his theological position during his years at McMaster and the University of Chicago.

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90 *Ibid.*, 211.


94 Heim, "True Relations" (1982), 21.

95 Macintosh, "Toward a New Untraditional Orthodoxy" (1932), 289-302; "Theology and Metaphysics" (1947), 197-9.
Although he did not detail any of the influences on him at Yale, Macintosh abandoned the Christocentric principle in theology and developed representational pragmatism and experimental theology as an empirical science. In the summer of 1911, Macintosh visited Europe and concentrated on German universities. He recalled that he was interested

Macintosh combined the good essence of intellectualism with the good essence of representationalism and pragmatism to define truth as "representation (of subject by predicate, of reality by idea) sufficient to mediate satisfactorily the purpose with which the judgment is made. But what is really true must be representation sufficient to mediate satisfactorily whatever purpose or purposes ought to be recognized in making the judgment. In other words, real truth is practical identity of idea with reality, of predicate with subject, where the practice in question is ultimately satisfactory, as well as the mental instrument which serves it." Macintosh, Problem of Knowledge (1915), 444-5.

To unite theology and religious experience, fundamental and experimental religion, Macintosh attempted to reestablish theology as a descriptive, empirical science instead of a group of dogmatic doctrines. Macintosh, Theology as an Empirical Science (1919), 1. His empirical theology is to be "a theology of verified truth about reality." It proceeds upon one special presupposition peculiar to to empirical science as does every science, that is the existence of God as "defined in preliminary fashion--because he is already practically sure, on the basis of religious experience, that God really exists." Such an empirical science of theology will be strictly objective and scientific, "and at the same time do full justice to the legitimate demands of the religious life." Macintosh, "Toward a New Untraditional Orthodoxy" (1932), 303.

Macintosh, "Toward a New Untraditional Orthodoxy" (1932), 303.
in Bergson's vitalism\textsuperscript{99} and intuitionism, Driesch's proofs of vitalism, and Eucken's spiritual vitalism.\textsuperscript{100}

I contend that Macintosh engaged most of the important religious, social, and intellectual issues of his time from the firm ground\textsuperscript{101} of his evangelical religious training. This evangelical heritage embraced intellectualism and the myth of innocence while denying doubt, irony, tragedy, and evil. I will discuss these issues in greater detail in the next two chapters.

1.20 MACINTOSH AT YALE UNIVERSITY DIVINITY SCHOOL: 1909-1942

As Bainton noted in \textit{Yale and the Ministry} (1957), Macintosh joined the faculty of Yale Divinity School when it was at low ebb.\textsuperscript{102} In response to its failing fortunes, the school had diversified its curriculum and had declared that it was "unsectarian."\textsuperscript{103} Macintosh recalled that the only theological question he was asked when he was invited to

\textsuperscript{99}Vitalism was the theory of "a subconscious but super-mechanical factor," or creative cause. Macintosh, \textit{Reasonableness of Christianity} (1925), 98. This cause was "fundamental to the life-history of the individual organism and to those factors in evolution which operate prior to natural and even germinal selection." Macintosh, \textit{Theology as an Empirical Science} (1919), 96.

\textsuperscript{100}Macintosh, "Toward a New Untraditional Orthodoxy" (1932), 303.

\textsuperscript{101}\textit{Ibid.}, 281.

\textsuperscript{102}Bainton, \textit{Yale and the Ministry} (1957), 198.

\textsuperscript{103}\textit{Ibid.}, 203.
join the faculty was "whether he favored 'open' or 'closed' communion." He reflected that his new colleagues in the Divinity School and philosophy department at Yale were more upset by his reliance on Ritschlian pragmatism to support his Christocentric method in theology than anything else about him. He abandoned this pragmatic approach to theology after two years.

The theological environment at Yale

According to Bainton, Macintosh came to Yale to replace Professor George B. Stevens who had succeeded Professor Samuel Harris in the chair of systematic theology. Stevens had come from New Testament studies and had continued to espouse mainly Biblical theology instead of systematic theology. Bainton noted that Stevens's predecessor, Samuel Harris, had never written a book when he came to the chair of theology in 1871, at the age of fifty-seven. When he did begin writing at age sixty-nine, Harris's works were ponderous and savored "more of the

104Macintosh, "Toward a New Untraditional Orthodoxy" (1932), 302; Bainton, Yale and the Ministry (1957), 203, quoting Yale Divinity News XVII 3 (March, 1921).

105Macintosh, "Toward a New Untraditional Orthodoxy" (1932), 302.

106Ibid., 303.

107Bainton, Yale and the Ministry (1957), 173.

108Ibid.

109Ibid., 169.
classroom" than did "the previous theological works of New England, produced primarily by ministers." 110 As Bainton observed, Harris impressed his students with his "frequent quotations from current literature and notably the poets: Wordsworth, Whittier, Browning and even Goethe." 111 He was not innovative in his teaching of a religion of the heart grounded in "Pietism, the Reformation, and the Enlightenment." 112 Following Noah Porter's lead, Harris applied the problem of knowledge to religious knowledge and morality. 113 According to Bainton, Harris claimed that without the "possibility of knowing, there can be no morality because morality depends on choice, and choice requires the knowledge of alternatives." 114

Bainton observed that because of the problems posed by the destruction of the credibility of Biblical revelation and miracles, Harris did not use them to address the problem of religious knowledge. 115 Instead, Harris turned again to Noah Porter and the "doctrine of rational intuition." 116

110 Ibid.
111 Ibid.
112 Ibid., 170, quoting Bacon, "The Return to Theology," in Christianity and Modern Thought (New Haven, 1924), 115.
113 Ibid., 170.
114 Ibid.
115 Ibid., 171.
116 Ibid.
According to Bainton, Harris "made explicit the claim to immediate religious experience"\(^{117}\) when he stated that "'The knowledge of God, like the knowledge of man and nature, begins in experience, and is ascertained, defended and systematized in thought.'"\(^{118}\)

Bruce Kuklick, author of *Churchmen and Philosophers from Jonathan Edwards to John Dewey* (1985), claimed that the emphasis on philosophy, freedom, and morality so dear to Harris, Stevens, and Macintosh was present in the earlier New Haven Theology of Nathaniel William Taylor (1786-1858).\(^{119}\) According to Kuklick, Taylor based his theology on the faculty psychology of Scottish thought, Joseph Butler's (1692-1752) *Analogy of Religion* (1736), and "the tradition of English Platonism."\(^{120}\) In steering between the Unitarianism of Harvard's "rationalism and Andover mystery and empiricism,"\(^{121}\) and Princeton theology,\(^{122}\) Taylor emphasized God as "a moral governor" and the free will of human moral agents.\(^{123}\)

\(^{117}\)Ibid.

\(^{118}\)Ibid., 170, quoting Harris in *Yale Divinity News* XXIX 3 (March, 1932), 1-3.


\(^{120}\)Ibid., 97.

\(^{121}\)Ibid., 98.

\(^{122}\)Ibid., 106.

\(^{123}\)Ibid., 99.
I contend that Macintosh, like Taylor, focused on philosophy, freedom, and morality as he steered his way through the wilderness of modern thought. In addition, I claim that Macintosh, like Taylor, sought a middle way between the conservative Princeton theology and the liberalism of the Chicago School, Columbia, Harvard, and Union Theological Seminary in New York City. A comparison of Taylor's and Macintosh's thought is a fruitful area for further research.

**Macintosh as an academic theologian**

As an academic theologian, Macintosh saw his task as a preparer of converted, educated ministers for world-wide evangelism\(^\text{124}\) and as a defender of religious faith and the Christian religion from attacks from internal and external critics.\(^\text{125}\) During his career, Macintosh corresponded with John Baillie (1886-1960), William Newton Clarke (1841-1912), John Dewey (1859-1952), Albert Einstein (1879-1955), George B. Foster (1858-1918), Robert McCheyne George, James Bissett Pratt (1875-1944), Henry Nelson Wieman (1884-1975), and Georg Wobbermin (1869-1943) among others.\(^\text{126}\) He engaged in

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\(^{125}\)Macintosh, "Toward a New Untraditional Orthodoxy" (1932), 312.

\(^{126}\)Macintosh's personal papers, Yale Divinity School Library Archives.
printed arguments with Benjamin B. Warfield of Princeton on
the theological right and Henry Nelson Wieman, Max C.
Otto, and John Dewey on the left. Macintosh's The
Reasonableness of Christianity (winner of the Bross Prize in
1925) and "Theology and Metaphysics" were translated into
German, due largely to his relationship with Wobbermin. During
leaves of absence granted by Yale, Macintosh was a
visiting lecturer at the Universities of California,
Chicago, Calcutta, and Harvard. As his former student,
James S. Bixler noted, Macintosh was more than an
internationally recognized scholar. He was "an original


130Julius Seelye Bixler, "DOUGLAS CLYDE MACINTOSH: A Centennial Tribute at Yale University Divinity School, September 11-17, 1978."
thinker with a standpoint of his own" who knew his subject well enough to "treat it creatively."  

**Macintosh as a writer**


Arnold's first phase, from 1906 to 1926, was the "Era of the Socio-Historical Method" and dealt with the issues of faith and authority. It addressed the problem of "epistemology (how do we derive an adequate knowledge of truth from the sources of the Christian Faith?)." According to Arnold, the primary theologians included George

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Burman Foster, Shailer Mathews, Shirley Jackson Case, Gerald Birney Smith, and Edward Scribner Ames. Based on my reading of Macintosh's *The Problem of Knowledge* (1915), *Theology as an Empirical Science* (1919), and *The Reasonableness of Christianity* (1925), I contend that they fit into this category because they addressed the issues of faith, authority, and the problem of epistemology.

Arnold's second phase, the "Era of Philosophico-Theological Method" from 1926 to 1946, dealt with the issue of theism versus humanism and the problem of "the knowledge of God and cosmic support for Values." The primary theologians of this phase included Henry Nelson Wieman, Albert Eustace Haydon, Edwin E. Aubrey, and Wilhelm Pauck. According to Arnold, Charles Hartshorne, of the philosophy department, provided metaphysical support. I claim that Macintosh's *The Pilgrimage of Faith in the World of Modern Thought* (1931), *Social Religion* (1939), *The Problem of Religious Knowledge* (1940), and *Personal Religion* (1942) conformed to this category because they dealt with theism versus humanism and the problem of "the knowledge of God and cosmic support for Values."

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Arnold's third phase, 1946 to 1966, was the "Era of Constructive Theology."\textsuperscript{138} This phase dealt with the issue of faith and culture and the problem of "secularization, and a responsible alternative beyond liberalism and neo-orthodoxy in the construction of a neo-naturalism."\textsuperscript{139} According to Arnold, Bernard Meland, Daniel Day Williams, and Bernard Loomer were the primary theologians in this phase with support from James Luther Adams, Charles Hartshorne, and Wilhelm Pauck.\textsuperscript{140} I suggest that Macintosh's debilitating stroke in 1942 prevented his contribution to this third phase of the Chicago School and helps to explain why he did not construct the metaphysical theology for which he called during his career.\textsuperscript{141}

As indicated in the Selected Bibliography at the end of this dissertation, Macintosh published his articles in most of the major religious, theological, and philosophical journals of his time including \textit{McMaster University Monthly, Western Outlook, Harvard Theological Review, Yale Divinity Quarterly, Homiletic Review, Mind, Journal of Philosophy.}

\textsuperscript{138}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{139}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{140}Ibid.


Macintosh as an educator

Roland Bainton, in his Centennial Tribute (1978) to Macintosh, noted that Macintosh was "a stimulating teacher who engendered and fructified the thinking of a generation of distinguished students."142 Macintosh himself was aware of the personal influence of university professors.143 He defined education as an art with its ideal as the perfect man.144 Macintosh called for education by ideas as food to the mind, the study of classical literature, mathematics,

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143 D. C. Macintosh, "University Studies," McMaster University Monthly XII (January, February, 1903), 154-5.

144 Ibid., quoting the inaugural address of President Woodrow Wilson of Princeton University.
English, and modern languages. As an evangelical, Macintosh advocated religious education for the right religious adjustment which led to the religious experience of moral salvation, with its consequences for social salvation. He believed that evangelization was pedagogical: "The Christian religion must be taught; it is not always enough simply to 'tell the old, old story.'" Macintosh devoted his life to religious education as evangelism for the salvation of all humankind.

**Macintosh and his students**

According to Bainton, Julian N. Hartt, Randolph Crump Miller, and Preston Warren, Macintosh took personal interest in his students, intellectually, vocationally, financially, and emotionally. Warren described how Macintosh braved winter weather that "closed most offices" to keep appointments with his students and "during the Depression he had (Professor Raymond P.) Morris and others anonymously

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145 Ibid., 156.


deposit sizeable sums of money in an account for student assistance."\(^{149}\) According to Julian N. Hartt, Macintosh's former student and successor at Yale, Macintosh and his second wife entertained small groups of his students with lavish teas "served in high style."\(^{150}\) In his Centennial Tribute to Macintosh, Hartt related that there was little of professional-academic talk on those occasions, but almost everything else under the sun was touched on—all the way from Charlie McCarthy to international politics (perhaps not as big a leap as one might think). As seminary students we had been entertained, very occasionally, by faculty people, but not in the Macintosh style.\(^{151}\)

Another of Macintosh's former students, Randolph Crump Miller recalled that Macintosh's students thought of him as "our favorite professor"\(^{152}\) and he thought of each one of them as his favorite son. Bainton reflected that near the end of his life,

when Macintosh was paralyzed and almost deprived of speech, Mrs. Macintosh told him that she had written to one of his former students telling him that he was her husband's favorite son. The stricken man rallied and speech returned to enable him to say clearly, "No, three thousand." That was the number of his favorite sons.\(^{153}\)


\(^{151}\) Ibid., and as quoted by Warren, Out of the Wilderness (1989), 23.


Hartt concluded that while none of Macintosh's students followed him into the problems of epistemology and metaphysics, they did hold him in high regard.\textsuperscript{154} According to Bainton, Macintosh challenged his students intellectually and saw many of them take distinguished posts.\textsuperscript{155} Some of their disagreements with him were quite heated in The Nature of Religious Experience (1937), the Festschrift that they wrote in his honor.\textsuperscript{156}

\textbf{Macintosh and his faculty colleagues}

Warren also described Macintosh's loyalty to his faculty colleagues. Warren recalled that when Yale University "dismissed Jerome Davis rather than promote him to a full professorship,"\textsuperscript{157} Macintosh came to his defense. According to Warren, the University did not want to promote Davis to Professor of Social Ethics because they claimed he


\textsuperscript{155} Bainton, \textit{Yale and the Ministry} (1957), 227.


"had not produced really scholarly writings." The community speculated that Davis had also attracted the wrath of "prominent Yale businessmen" when he criticized publicly their "humanly hurtful business practices." Warren observed that although Macintosh was not a friend of Davis, he defended Davis's cause of "academic freedom of expression." As indicated by his personal papers, Macintosh enjoyed continuing warm relationships with George B. Foster, William Newton Clarke, and Charles Allen Dinsmore. His personal papers in the Archives of the Yale University Divinity School Library contained correspondence with Foster and posthumous "Appreciations" of both Foster and Dinsmore, pastor of the First Congregational Church of Waterbury, Connecticut.

1.30 IRONY AND TRAGEDY IN MACINTOSH'S PERSONAL LIFE

I am convinced that irony and tragedy, innocence, and myth characterized Macintosh's personal life. According to Warren, Macintosh was traveling by train in 1919, and chanced to overhear the conversation of two young women.

158 Ibid., 38, quoting Julian Hartt.
159 Ibid.
160 Ibid.
161 D. C. Macintosh to George B. Foster, 7 May 7 1912; George B. Foster to D. C. Macintosh 1 July; 3 Oct; 5 Nov.; 4 May 1910; 20 April 1918. Archives, Yale Divinity School, Yale University, New Haven.
seated in front of him. Impressed with them, Macintosh noted their departing station and upon his return, stopped at the appropriate station to inquire about one of the young women and to call upon her formally. Emily Powell did not know Macintosh and refused to see him or to respond to his letters and credentials. Macintosh enlisted the assistance of "Deans Charles Brown and Shailer Mathews of Yale and Chicago Divinity Schools, and President Angell of Yale to write to her." Emily responded to their intercessory pleas and subsequently married Macintosh on February 13, 1921, when he was forty-four years of age.

Warren noted that less than two years later, Emily Powell Macintosh died in childbirth. Bainton marveled that one week after her death, Macintosh kept his chapel assignment at Yale and opened with scripture from Habakkuk 3:17-18:

"Although the fig tree shall not blossom, neither shall fruit be in the vines; the labour of the olive shall fail, and the fields shall yield no meat; the flock shall be cut off from the fold, and there shall be no herd in the stalls: yet I will rejoice in the Lord, I will joy in the God of my salvation."

163 Ibid., 21.
164 Ibid.
165 Ibid.
166 Ibid., 22.
Warren added that when Macintosh returned to his Systematic Theology class where he had been discussing immortality, he began his class by saying: "What I have been saying stands even more surely."168 Four years later, in 1925, Macintosh married Hope Conklin, supposedly the other young woman on the train, according to Warren.169

Macintosh also experienced irony, innocence, and myth when he applied for United States' citizenship. As I discussed in the Introduction, I think that Macintosh's personal redeemer myth based on Bunyan's The Pilgrim's Progress (1678) conflicted with the national monomyth of Captain America170 before World War II. I claim that Macintosh was acting out of his optimistic myth of innocence when he began to apply for residential status pursuant to becoming a United States citizen in 1909.171 After many disappointments, some of them comical,172 he was able

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169 ibid.


172 Macintosh recounted "It happened in the summer of 1909. I had boarded a train in Canada for my destination in the United States, of which country I was now to become, as I supposed, a life-resident. As we neared the border, the American immigration official came around, asking the usual questions: 'Are you a citizen of the United States?' I was not. 'Are you going to reside in the United States?' I was. 'Are you going to work?' 'Yes.' 'Have you got a job?' This, too had to be answered in the affirmative. 'Where were you when the contract was made?' I had to say 'I was in Canada.' 'Well! You can't go any farther. You must get off the train.' I smiled incredulously. 'Yes, I mean it!
finally to file his application for citizenship in 1929. By this time, however, the "disillusionment as to the 'iniquitous peace to end peace' engendered (within Macintosh) 'a profound distrust of war as a way of settling anything,'"

173 according to Randolph Crump Miller. As Warren recalled, when Macintosh came to Question #22 on the application which read "'If necessary, are you willing to bear arms in defense of this country?'"174 Macintosh replied "'Yes, but I should like to be free to judge of the

You must get off at the next station. You are violating the Alien Labor Law.' 'That's very strange,' I replied. 'The President of the United States was a member of the corporation that hired me.' (President Taft was at that time a member of the Yale Corporation.) The officer eyed me narrowly. 'What are you going to do?' he asked. I answered apologetically to the effect that I was going to be a professor in Yale University. 'Oh, well!' said the agent, 'if you're going to be a professor, that's all right. I thought you said you were going to work!.'" D. C. Macintosh, "Preface," Social Religion, x; Macintosh's application for United States citizenship "was held up for years because the immigration officials could find no documentary proof in their own records of the fact of his entry! The fact that he was unquestionably here, had been unquestionably here for years, meant nothing to the bureaucratic mind . . . The fact that he had entered as publicly as a man could enter, to the accompaniment of newspaper stories of his appointment to Yale, all over the country, scores of which were offered as evidence, weighed nothing in the balance . . . Finally, after a trip around the world in 1928, which he was forced to make on a British passport, thus necessitating a cancelation of his first papers for citizenship, Professor Macintosh conceived the bright idea of offering some first aid to the authorities. He sent them the date of his re-entry into the United States from Japan, and that was later found in the records."


necessity.'" 175 His application denied, Macintosh appeared before Judge Burrows in the Federal District Court in New Haven to defend his refusal to take the prescribed oath of allegiance. 176 Ironically, Macintosh had served as a chaplain to the Canadian troops in France and then as a Y.M.C.A. worker with American troops in the first World War. 177 Macintosh claimed that the "supreme sacrifice for the person of good will" was "not so much the giving of life as the taking of life." 178 Warren recalled that when Macintosh's application for citizenship was denied, Macintosh, with the active support of Jerome Davis, Associate Professor of Social Ethics at Yale Divinity School, 179 appealed his case all the way to the U. S. Supreme Court. 180 On May 25, 1931, the Court, in a 5 to 4

175 Ibid.
176 Ibid., 2-11.
178 Macintosh, "Toward a New Untraditional Orthodoxy" (1932), 307.
decision, upheld the lower court's ruling.181 After much local and national protest and controversy, the government removed the requirement of swearing to bear arms in April of 1946,182 but it was too late for Macintosh. In 1942, he had suffered a debilitating stroke and died on July 6, 1948, in New Haven, Connecticut. He was buried in the Whitneyville Cemetery in Hamden, Connecticut.183 In 1980, an attempt to grant Macintosh honorary posthumous citizenship died in House Committee, leaving Macintosh a man with two countries.184

1.40 CONCLUSION

In this chapter I have described how Macintosh's personal and professional life was filled with irony, innocence, and myth as he attempted to live out his morally optimistic myth of innocence based on Bunyan's The Pilgrim's Progress (1678).185 I conclude that Macintosh's personal journey through the grounds of modern thought reflected the

181Ibid.

182Herman Will, Associate General Secretary Division of World Peace, Board of Church and Society of the United Methodist Church, in "DOUGLAS CLYDE MACINTOSH, A Centennial Tribute" (1978).


185Macintosh, "Toward a New Untraditional Orthodoxy" (1932), 278-9; The Pilgrimage of Faith (1931), 20; Warren, Out of the Wilderness (1989), 42.
larger North American society in which he lived, worked and
died. As other scholars have noted, the ironic age in the
United States was a time of the secularization of the Judeo-
Christian redemption myth, the end of the Gilded or
Victorian Age, the Social Gospel movement, World War I and
its aftermath, the fundamentalist-modernist controversy, and
a crisis of meaninglessness. I now turn to this crisis of
modernity as background for understanding Macintosh's
apologetic task.
CHAPTER TWO: IRONY, INNOCENCE, MYTH, AND THE CRISIS OF MODERNITY

2.00 SUMMARY

To appreciate Macintosh's empirical theology as a transitional theology between an older liberalism and a developing neo-orthodoxy, one must relate his thought to the major social, intellectual, and religious currents of late nineteenth and early twentieth-century North America. During his lifetime (1877-1948), Macintosh experienced the end of the Victorian or Gilded Age, the Darwinian or second scientific revolution, the Social Gospel movement, Prohibition, labor unrest, economic boom and bust, the end of American innocence in two world wars, the historicism controversy, the fundamentalist-modernist controversy, and the development of neo-orthodoxy in religion.

As I discussed in the Introduction, the concepts of irony, innocence, and myth figured prominently in this tumultuous period. Scholars have described various segments of this period as an Ironic Age (1893-1919),¹ a crisis of cultural authority and antimodern dissent (1880-1920),² an Innocent Rebellion (1912-1917),³ and as an "axial decade"

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¹Marty, The Irony of It All (1986), 3.
(1929-1941) of the developing American monomyth. In this chapter, I describe the social, intellectual, and religious crises of meaninglessness that threatened religious belief in Macintosh's increasingly secular society.

2.10 SOCIAL CRISIS

According to American religious historians Sydney Ahlstrom and Martin Marty, the beginning of the twentieth century witnessed the disruption of the harmony of small town, idyllic rural America by rapid social and economic revolution including industrialization, urbanization, immigration, and conflict within the churches. As Ahlstrom noted, the city became "the population's center of gravity" and the factory replaced the farm "as the country's chief producer of wealth." Both newer western and older eastern cities experienced exponential growth. Record numbers of European immigrants thronged to the northern cities in pursuit of the American dream, entering American culture at the bottom of the socio-economic order. Their flight from

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4Jewett and Lawrence defined the axial decade as the period from 1929 to 1941, American Monomyth (1977), 249.


6Ahlstrom, A Religious History (1972), 735.

7Ibid.

8Ibid., 735-6.
the old country ended up in ethnic neighborhoods in the new
that strained the cities' "absorptive powers" and socio-
political support structures.9 According to Ahlstrom, the
nation experienced an identity crisis as corporations and
"counter-organizations" developed and grew stronger.10
Religious historian Kenneth Scott Latourette observed that
"wealth mounted to dizzying heights."11 Sensitive
intellectuals experienced a moral crisis as the nation moved
from an agrarian to an urban society as described by
Ahlstrom, T. J. Jackson Lears, and Henry May.12

Ahlstrom observed that western expansion complicated
the social crisis and influenced the churches in the older
cities to engage in cooperative social work, which quickly
became inadequate.13 As downtown neighborhoods and
buildings deteriorated, the upwardly mobile population moved
outward to newer areas, taking their churches with them.14
The older Protestant churches that remained became

9Ibid., 736.

10Ibid.

11Kenneth Scott Latourette, A History of
Christianity, Volume II: A.D. 1500--A.D. 1975. (New York:

12Ahlstrom, A Religious History (1972), 736; Lears,
No Place of Grace (1981), 39-41; May, The End of American
Innocence (1959).

13Ahlstrom, A Religious History (1972), 737.

14Ibid.
increasingly unable to meet the needs of their immediate neighborhoods and lost ground to the Roman Catholic, Jewish, Eastern Orthodox, and Lutheran churches of the immigrants.\textsuperscript{15} According to Ahlstrom, churches followed the money, creating a gulf between wealthier active churches and poorer, unchurched neighborhoods.\textsuperscript{16}

Henry May described the Chicago in which Macintosh received his graduate training as a city of paradox and chaos.\textsuperscript{17} As part of the Upper Midwest that shared a claim to cultural leadership with the Northeast, Chicago possessed a "special combination of shame and pride, reform and grandiose prophecy."\textsuperscript{18} Home of the Pullman Strike (1894), Jane Addams's (1860-1935) Hull-House (1889), Dwight L. Moody's (1837-99) revivals, the Moody Bible Institute (1886), and the University of Chicago Divinity School (1890), Chicago "'hustled,'"\textsuperscript{19} according to Ahlstrom.

\textsuperscript{15}{\textit{Ibid.}}
\textsuperscript{16}{\textit{Ibid.}}
\textsuperscript{17}{May, \textit{End of Innocence} (1959), 102.}
\textsuperscript{18}{\textit{Ibid.}}
\textsuperscript{19}{Ahlstrom, \textit{A Religious History} (1972), 743.}
2.20 INTELLECTUAL CRISIS

In 1913, George Santayana, as quoted by Henry May, summed up his age as "a critical one and interesting to live in. The civilization characteristic of Christendom has not yet disappeared, yet another civilization has begun to take its place." According to May, this radical, rapid change was fueled by post-Kantian philosophy, the demise of the Baconian compromise, the Darwinian scientific revolution, and the new psychology. Rapidly changing American civilization and secularization of the Christian myth threatened the traditional three pillars of nineteenth-century belief in "the reality, certainty, and eternity of moral values," progress, and culture.

May described how a spirit of rebellion, centered in New York and Chicago and supported by Harvard, Princeton, and Yale, began to emerge in 1912. This spirit of rebellion challenged the three pillars of American belief in moral certainty, progress, and culture. The Rebellion had its cheerful side of "somewhat mystical exuberance" and

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20May, The End of Innocence (1959), Frontspiece.
21Ibid., 9.
22Ibid., 20.
23Ibid., 30.
24Ibid., 279-301.
25Ibid., 9, 20, 30.
26Ibid., 279.
its tragic side. It was both innocent and dangerous. This duality enabled the Rebellion to triumph,\textsuperscript{27} but it also contributed to its demise. Blissfully, ironically, and innocently unaware of its glaring flaw of inveterate optimism,

the civilization of 1912 condemned itself. It failed to carry out its own evolutionary precept of adaptation to conditions. It shut its eyes to some glaring flaws in the general success of American society.\textsuperscript{28}

According to May, these mistakes "were the results of a permanent flaw in American nineteenth-century thought: its inveterate optimism."\textsuperscript{29} Therefore, early twentieth-century American culture confused peace, economic expansion, and a large measure of general content "with inevitable upward evolution and even with the coming of God's kingdom on earth."\textsuperscript{30}

As T. J. Jackson Lears observed in \textit{No Place of Grace} (1981), the Northern bourgeoisie of old line WASP journalists, academics, ministers, and literati were among the hardest hit in this intellectual crisis.\textsuperscript{31} Fears of over-civilization, effeminacy, and luxury plagued "the

\textsuperscript{27}Ibid., 329.
\textsuperscript{28}Ibid., 397.
\textsuperscript{29}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{30}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{31}Lears, \textit{No Place of Grace} (1981), xvi.
intellectual heirs of Cotton Mather and Thomas Jefferson." 32 Lear observed that these fears grew into a general dissatisfaction with "modern culture in all its dimensions: its ethic of self-control and autonomous achievement, its cult of science and technical rationality, its worship of material progress." 33 Life seemed over civilized and unreal. 34 Evasive banality permeated everything. 35 For the educated bourgeoisie, authentic experience of any sort seemed ever more elusive; life seemed increasingly confined to the airless parlor of material comfort and moral complacency. 36 Lear claimed that in the throes of this identity crisis, many sufferers of "neurasthenia" developed a therapeutic world view 37 and attempted "to resurrect a solid sense of self by recapturing the 'real life' of the premodern craftsman, soldier, or saint." 38 As May observed, the discontent among intellectuals became acute following World War I. 39 The Rebellion that had begun in 1912 flowered in the aftermath of World War I and prompted "many gifted Americans of the early twentieth

32 Ibid., 4.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid., 5.
36 Ibid., 5.
37 Ibid., 47-58.
38 Ibid., 6.

century" to reject "their own civilization and its dominant values with eloquence and fervor."\textsuperscript{40} May attributed this discontent to the intellectuals' immature and ignorant embrace of "European criticisms they had not digested; they judged a whole society by one-sided 'esthetic' criteria."\textsuperscript{41} Other causes included the horror of war, the decline of capitalism and the old middle class, the emergent machine civilization, the loss of faith and Puritan heritage, and the democratic spirit.\textsuperscript{42}

According to George Marsden, this pessimistic view of modern culture was supported by dispensational premillennialism which "said that the churches and the culture were declining and that Christians would see Christ's kingdom only after he personally returned to rule in Jerusalem."\textsuperscript{43} Marsden noted that premillennialists Dwight L. Moody, Reuben A. Torrey, C. I. Scofield, and William J. Erdman among others, cited biblical prophecy

\textsuperscript{40}Ibid., 56.
\textsuperscript{41}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{42}Ibid., 56-8.

against the "prevailing post-millennialism which taught that Christ's kingdom would grow out of the spiritual and moral progress of this age."\textsuperscript{44}

\textbf{Causes of the intellectual and religious crisis}

Based on my reading of Ahlstrom, Lears, Marsden, Marty, and May, I contend that the causes of this intellectual and religious crisis of meaninglessness arose within the Scottish and European Enlightenment. The Enlightenment bore fruit in post-Kantian philosophy, the Darwinian or second scientific revolution, the crisis of historicism, and American empirical philosophy. According to Karl Barth and Claude Welch, who studied Protestant thought in the nineteenth century, Immanuel Kant set the agenda for all subsequent philosophy.\textsuperscript{45} Building on the work of Barth, Welch claimed that after Kant, scholars increasingly turned away from classical philosophy as epistemology, metaphysics, and logic to follow the Socratic turn to the subject in faith and knowledge.\textsuperscript{46}

\textsuperscript{44}Ibid.


\textsuperscript{46}Welch, \textit{Protestant Thought} (1972), I, 48, 59.
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804)

In response to the skepticism of David Hume (1711-1776), Immanuel Kant wrote The Critique of Pure Reason (1781) to limit reason in order to make room for faith as practical reason. By turning rational reason upon itself, Kant reduced the traditional rational arguments for the existence of God to meaningless antinomies and discarded them. In the ashes of the ontological, cosmological, and teleological arguments, Kant then constructed his moral argument for the existence of God based on practical reason and moral will.

According to Welch following Barth, there were four possible routes for theology to take after Kant.

1. Theology could question the validity of the first critique's restriction of theoretical knowledge or cognition, either (as in the idealistic philosophy) by "more consistently" and "courageously" following out Kant's speculative principle and overcoming the phenomenal-nomenal "dualism," or by some revised program of natural theology that would take account of Kant's work (e.g. in more recent neo-Thomism).


48Ibid., 384-514.


50Welch, Protestant Thought (1972), I, 47, quoting Barth, Protestant Thought (1959), 190-1.
2. Theology could accept "reason's criticism of its limits and thereby the denial of reason's right to establish the point of departure for theology."\(^{51}\) This route would require theology to resign itself "to stand on its own feet in relation to philosophy," to recognize "the point of departure for its method in revelation just as decidedly as philosophy sees its point of departure in reason," and to conduct, "therefore, a dialogue with philosophy, and not, wrapping itself up in the mantle of philosophy, a quasi-philosophical monologue."\(^{52}\) Karl Barth followed Hegel in this approach.\(^{53}\)

3. Theology could accept "both the Kantian critique of theoretical reason and the adoption of the moral as the basis for proceeding."\(^{54}\) The Ritschlian school, especially Wilhelm Herrmann, followed this approach.\(^{55}\)

4. Theology could "enlarge the category of direct experience by turning to Gefühl" (the capacity of feeling, Schleiermacher to Troeltsch) "or Ahnung" ("presentiment," de Wette), "or by finding in a fuller 'reason'" (as the "'organ of the supersensuous,'"\(^{56}\) an

\(^{51}\)Ibid., 47-8.

\(^{52}\)Barth, Protestant Thought, 191.

\(^{53}\)Ibid.

\(^{54}\)Welch, Protestant Thought, (1972), I, 48.

\(^{55}\)Barth, Protestant Thought (1959), 190.

\(^{56}\)Welch, Protestant Thought, (1972), I, 60.
act of will) "the possibility of knowing the spiritual order"\(^{57}\) (Pascal, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, 1772-1834, and Kierkegaard\(^{58}\)). This option, "that of correcting Kant's conception of the programme,"\(^{59}\) was the most widespread approach.\(^{60}\)

Welch noted that all four of these routes "reflected a Socratic turn to the role of the subject in faith and knowledge, a turn which had its epistemological expression in Kant's analysis in the Critique of Pure Reason."\(^{61}\) This turn to the self required theology
to start from, to articulate, and to interpret a subjective view of the religious object. . . . The religious subject--his point of view, his cognitive limitations, his "interest," his willing and choosing--had to be self-consciously and systematically recognized as ineradicably present in that with which Christian theological reflection begins.\(^{62}\)

This Socratic turn to the self influenced the philosophicalologies of Friedrich Schleiermacher, David Friedrich Strauss, Albrecht Ritschl, Adolf Harnack, William James, John Dewey and others, according to Welch.

\(^{57}\)Ibid., 48.

\(^{58}\)Ibid., 59-60.

\(^{59}\)Barth, Protestant Thought \(1959\), 190.

\(^{60}\)Ibid., 190.

\(^{61}\)Welch, Protestant Thought \(1972\), I, 48; Barth, Protestant Thought \(1959\), 190-1.

\(^{62}\)Welch, Protestant Thought \(1972\), I, 59-60.
Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834)

In developing Welch's Option 4 after Kant, Schleiermacher, the father of Liberal Protestantism, turned to the religious subject and his feelings of absolute dependence as the foundation for theology. Reacting against the Age of Reason and amid the theological debris of Kant's speculative, idealistic philosophy, Schleiermacher took apologetics or the defense of Christianity onto new ground. He rejected the traditional approach of the English apologists from Locke to Paley who built on rational arguments for the existence of God and turned to human feelings of dependence. Barth claimed that Schleiermacher abandoned the task of proclaiming Christianity as true, and became a moral philosopher and a philosopher of religion when he appealed to humankind's religious emotions of absolute dependence.

According to Welch, Schleiermacher also faced the challenge of doing theology after the Enlightenment's rationalistic attack on biblical history and theological orthodoxy as "'mythical,' that is, as belonging to the genre of religious mythology, of man's stories of the gods and their dealings with men, and of the world's beginnings and

63 Welch, Protestant Thought (1972), I, 48.
64 Schleiermacher, On Religion (1958), 106.
65 Ibid.
66 Barth, Protestant Thought (1959), 325.
endings." As a "demythologizer," or seeker of the true content of the Christian religion, Schleiermacher, like Hegel, recognized that "the mythological nature of much of Christian orthodoxy was internalized in theology." Therefore, in the words of Welch, Schleiermacher turned to historical Christianity

"to create an eternal covenant between the living Christian faith and an independent and freely working science, a covenant by the terms of which science is not hindered and faith not excluded." Thus began the scientific study of the Jesus of history as distinct from the Christ of faith.

David Friedrich Strauss (1808-1874)

Barth noted that David Friedrich Strauss published the first edition of his Life of Jesus Critically Examined (1835) in which he meticulously and critically analyzed "the naïve conception of Christ, as furnished by tradition," in response to Schleiermacher's focus on the life of Jesus. Barth observed that the work created a major controversy and inspired many others to write lives of Jesus to distinguish

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67 Welch, Protestant Thought (1972), I, 61.

68 Ibid., 62.

69 Ibid., 63, quoting Sendeschreiben an Dr. Lücke, ed. Hermann Mulert (Giessen, 1908), pp. 37, 40.


71 Barth, Protestant Thought (1959), 365.
between a core of historical fact and a surrounding veil of myth.\textsuperscript{72}

In the words of Welch, Ferdinand Christian Baur (1792-1860) criticized Strauss

for weakness in genuine \textit{literary} analysis of the Gospels as documents in their historical context, and for relying rather on a basically philosophical employment of the negative myth criteria simply in relation to individual pericopes and stories.\textsuperscript{73}

Welch observed that Strauss employed a Hegelian philosophical approach, which enabled him to assign "a vast amount" of the gospels, especially the Gospel of John, to "the categories of the mythical or legendary."\textsuperscript{74} With the discrediting of much of the Jesus story as myth or "the product of a community," theologians scrambled to establish the historical accuracy of the gospel accounts of Jesus "and whether any foundation for faith was to be found in them."\textsuperscript{75}

The demythologizing controversy reverberated through the German scholarship of Albrecht Ritschl, Adolf Harnack, Albert Schweitzer, and Rudolph Bultmann. It continues to this day.

\textsuperscript{72}Ibid., 374.

\textsuperscript{73}Welch, \textit{Protestant Thought} (1972), I, 151.

\textsuperscript{74}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{75}Ibid.
Albrecht Ritschl (1822-1889)

In developing Welch's Option 3 after Kant,76 Albrecht Ritschl, the son of a Lutheran bishop, had followed in Schleiermacher's liberal footsteps in his focus on human religious experience as the basis for theology, according to Leonard Hodgson.77 As Latourette and Welch noted, Ritschl had rejected metaphysics, philosophy, Pietism, mysticism, Hegelianism, ecclesiastical dogma, and the historical orientation of the Tübingen school and F. C. Baur.78 In his Justification and Reconciliation (1874), Ritschl had reacted against the historical critical approach and had sought to replace the Christ myth with the historical Jesus Christ who could be known "solely from the faith of the Christian community."79 Within his theological system, Ritschl had identified the essence of Christianity as the religious experience of justification and reconciliation with God through Christ.80 I will discuss Ritschl in greater detail in Chapters Three and Four.

76 Ibid., 48.


80 Ibid., 27.
Adolf von Harnack (1851-1930)

In his attempt to resolve the conflict between the Jesus of history and the mythical Christ of faith, Adolf von Harnack constructed his apologetic for a vibrant Christian experience based on "the methods of historical science and the experience of life gained by witnessing the actual course of history."81 Because of his objection to contemporary apologetics, Harnack turned to the experience of the historical community.82 According to Harnack, apologetics did "indescribable mischief" in its turn to "ethical or social arcum for the preservation or improvement of things generally."83 Instead, "the Christian religion is something simple and sublime; it means one thing and one thing only: Eternal life in the midst of time, by the strength and under the eyes of God."84 As William Adams Brown observed, there was "more apology in Harnack's history than in twenty volumes of the Bridgewater treatises."85


82Ibid., 7-9.

83Ibid., 8.

84Ibid.

American Philosophy: William James (1842-1910)

According to Lear's, prominent American sufferers from and contributors to this crisis of meaninglessness included William James and John Dewey.\textsuperscript{86} Welch observed that James and Dewey followed Samuel Taylor Coleridge's (Welch's Option 4) response to Kant's dualism and expanded reason to include the possibility of knowledge of the spiritual order.\textsuperscript{87} Gerald Myers, in William James: His Life and Thought (1986), noted that, like Coleridge, James turned to the will (or right) to believe to establish the rationality of religious belief.\textsuperscript{88} However, James wanted to expand reason to include the will to believe and to reject rationalistic philosophy and to focus on the psychology of the individual.\textsuperscript{89} James rejected "logic-chopping rationalistic talk" as the foundation of religious conversion and belief.\textsuperscript{90} According to James, articulate reasons must follow and build upon man's intuition and inarticulate feelings of reality to be convincing.\textsuperscript{91}

\textsuperscript{86}Lears, No Place of Grace (1981), 50, 54.
\textsuperscript{87}Welch, Protestant Thought (1972), I, 48; (1985), II, 60.
\textsuperscript{88}Gerald Myers, William James: His Life and Thought (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 450-1.
\textsuperscript{89}James, The Varieties of Religious Experience (1961), 74.
\textsuperscript{90}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{91}Ibid., 74.
According to Myers, James turned instead to Freudian psychology, Darwinian science, and the pragmatism of Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) to construct his intriguing apology for religion. Like Locke and Hume, James "maintained that reasoning was either demonstrative (concerned with the relations of ideas) or empirical (concerned with existence and matters of fact)." Myers noted that James employed pure experience to develop his "metaphysics of radical empiricism . . . to eliminate mind-body dualism and the accompanying notion that consciousness is some sort of entity." 

In his turn away from rationalistic philosophy and toward the psychology of religion, James marked the passing of that vast literature of proofs of God's existence drawn from the order of nature, which a century ago seemed so over-whelmingly convincing, to-day does little more than gather dust in libraries, for the simple reason that our generation has ceased to believe in the kind of God it argued for.

As I will discuss in Chapter Three below, Macintosh responded to James's denial of rationalistic apologetics and psychological criticism of the twice born as sick souls.

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92 Myers, William James (1986), 299.
93 Ibid., 281.
94 Ibid., 14.
95 James, Varieties of Religious Experience (1961), 74.
96 Ibid., 143.
with his elaborate apologetic argument based on epistemology, metaphysics, over-beliefs, moral optimism, and the right religious adjustment.

John Dewey (1859-1952)

According to Steven C. Rockefeller, author of *John Dewey: Religious Faith and Democratic Humanism* (1991), Dewey responded to the crisis of modernity by turning first to neo-Hegelian idealism and the new psychology and then by turning to the identification of Christianity with democracy.97 Rockefeller claimed that Dewey was reacting against Kantian dualism and developed pragmatism or instrumentalism, progressivism, naturalistic metaphysics, and religious humanism.98 In developing his philosophy, Dewey sought to unify his personal religious faith, philosophy, and social ethics.99 Rockefeller argued that Dewey built on the thought of Coleridge and James through his professors George Sylvester Morris and G. Stanley Hall.100 As Rockefeller noted, Dewey wanted "to unify the


98Ibid., 2.

99Ibid.

100Ibid.
ideal and the actual" as "the way to unification of self and self and world leading to freedom and community."

Rockefeller claimed that Dewey responded to the challenges of Darwinian evolutionary thought by employing the scientific method to

humanize the creative power of science and thereby to gain control of the future. For fifty years he persistently worked to transform the scientific method of knowledge into an instrument of individual moral guidance and enlightened social planning.

Rockefeller observed that along the way, Dewey jettisoned most of his religious beliefs including original sin and Kantian and Hegelian thought. Dewey abandoned his religious beliefs as he "tried to develop a philosophy of democratic humanism and naturalism" that justified his faith in life as "worthwhile and full of ideal meaning." According to Rockefeller, Dewey's attempt to "develop a naturalistic theory of religious experience and values" led him from his religious roots in Vermont Transcendentalism and Congregationalism through "neo-Hegelian panentheism and social mysticism to a through-going humanism and naturalism."

101 Ibid.
102 Ibid., 3
103 Ibid., 64, 198.
104 Ibid., 217.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid., 216.
2.30 DARWINIAN NATURAL SELECTION AND THE ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN

According to Lears, Darwinian science also contributed to the intellectual and religious crisis of meaninglessness.\textsuperscript{107} In 1859, Charles Darwin published \textit{The Origin of Species} in which he detailed his theory of evolution by natural selection. As Diogenes Allen, author of \textit{Christian Belief in a Postmodern World} (1989) observed, the theory of natural selection "made Hume's criticism of the design argument effective."\textsuperscript{108} Allen described how the religiously important design argument for the existence of God was developed by William Paley (1743-1805) in \textit{Natural Theology} (1802) and \textit{View of the Evidences of Christianity} (1794) based on the comparison of a watch with plants and animals.\textsuperscript{109} As the intricacy of a watch implied a designer and not mere chance occurrence, so did the complexities and adaptations of plants and animals to their environments imply a wise and benevolent creator/designer.\textsuperscript{110} Allen noted that Darwin's reliance on natural selection however, 

\textsuperscript{107}Lears, \textit{No Place of Grace} (1981), 21-2, 289.


\textsuperscript{109}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{110}Ibid.
proposed and documented natural processes that explained how present-day life forms evolved from earlier, simpler forms. His evolutionary "theory was the first well-documented alternative to either sheer chance or design." As Anthony Leeds observed, Darwin's evolutionary theory "accounted for a wider array of facts than any other conception except Christian creationism; dealt with certain aspects of reality--fossils, for example--much more simply than any other theory, including Christian creationism; and even permitted dealing with man-directed action--e.g., stockbreeding."

According to Allen, Darwin's theory of evolution based on natural selection provided the vast body of evidence that Hume had lacked in his Dialogues to "shut off the book of nature." Allen concluded that Darwin's use of natural selection severed forever natural history from natural theology and rendered useless the vestiges of the argument from design that had survived Kant.

As James Moore observed, the synthesis of natural history and natural theology that Darwin severed forever had been established in 1605, when Sir Francis Bacon (1561-

\[111\text{Ibid.}\]
\[112\text{Ibid.}\]
\[113\text{Welch, Protestant Thought (1985), II, 192-3, quoting Anthony Leeds in Thomas F. Glick, ed. The Comparative Reception of Darwinism, (Austin, 1972), 439.}\]
\[114\text{Allen, Christian Belief (1989), 57.}\]
\[115\text{Ibid.}\]
1626), "new counsel to King James I,"\textsuperscript{116} developed his doctrine of "the two books" or the Baconian Compromise. In the words of Moore, Bacon thought that "the book of God's works is 'a key' to the book of God's word; students of nature may therefore instruct interpreters of the Bible."\textsuperscript{117}

This happy political compromise offered

illustrations of the divine omnipotence, the true sense of the Scriptures, and recovery from the noetic effects of the Fall in exchange for the freedom of students of nature from harassment by interpreters of biblical texts.\textsuperscript{118}

Based on this compromise, English-speaking naturalists and exegetes enjoyed congenial relations and "the growth in volume and expertise of physical research."\textsuperscript{119} Moore observed that scholars in both areas could study the two books "professionally, in isolation, on a common methodological basis but according to an agreeable division of labor."\textsuperscript{120}


\textsuperscript{117}\textit{Ibid.}, 323.

\textsuperscript{118}\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{119}\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{120}\textit{Ibid.}, 335.
According to Ernest Nagel, author of *The Structure of Science* (1961), the preferred scientific method of Baconian-Newtonian science was the empirical observation-inductive or abstractive method.\(^{121}\) In the abstractive method, according to Peter Bowler, author of *Evolution: The History of an Idea* (1983), scientists proceeded by the induction method of universal generalization or a "simple abstraction from known facts"\(^{122}\) to form laws of nature. Nagel claimed that theories formed by . . . the "abstractive" method allegedly formulate relations between properties common to classes of objects or phenomena "perceived by the sense" and do not postulate anything "hypothetical" or conjectural.\(^{123}\)

As Leonard J. Trinterud and Sydney Ahlstrom observed, the Baconian compromise stemmed from the European Enlightenment ideas of Newton (1642-1727) and Locke (1632-1704) and the Scottish or Didactic Enlightenment from Scottish common-sense thought.\(^{124}\) According to George Marsden, this compromise provided the grounds for a synthesis of "the three great strands in American thought--modern empirical scientific ideals, the self-evident

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principles of the American Revolution, and evangelical Christianity.\textsuperscript{125} Marsden observed that this synthesis of evangelical Christianity, Scottish common-sense (democratic, anti-elitist) optimistic, realist philosophy of Thomas Reid and Baconian empirical science "provided the new nation with a basis for establishing a national moral order."\textsuperscript{126} As Marsden noted, both evangelical Christians and liberal Enlightenment figures assumed that the universe was governed by a rational system of laws guaranteed by an all-wise and benevolent creator. The function of science was to discover such laws, something like Newton's laws of physics, which were assumed to exist in all areas. By asserting that the external world was in fact just as it appeared to be, Common Sense provided a rock upon which to build this empirical structure.\textsuperscript{127}

Based on this Enlightenment, Deist idea, the God of divine providence "managed His visible world through impersonal natural laws,"\textsuperscript{128} according to James Turner, author of \textit{Without God, Without Creed} (1985). By the 1830's, many scientists, except for biologists, had reduced God to only "a First Cause, the Author of natural laws. The laws


\textsuperscript{126}\textit{Ibid.}, 15.

\textsuperscript{127}\textit{Ibid.}

themselves explained what actually happened.\textsuperscript{129} God's morality also had to conform to natural laws.\textsuperscript{130}

According to Marsden, American theologians, because of their reliance on common-sense philosophy, did not question "the fundamental assumption of scientific inquiry--that truth was discovered by objective examination of the facts that nature presented."\textsuperscript{131} Secure in their agreeable compromise and assurance that nature would confirm scripture, American theologians allowed science to operate unencumbered by theological constraints.\textsuperscript{132} Marsden observed that they embraced objective scientific thought as the best friend of Christian faith and culture.\textsuperscript{133} He claimed that this alliance provided a modern counterpart to the Thomist synthesis of science and faith (that) was preserved and expanded in the days of American evangelical intellectual hegemony during the first half of the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{134}

Later in the nineteenth-century, for example, Henry Drummond (1851-1897), whom Macintosh had read appreciatively in 1896,\textsuperscript{135} extended the concept of natural law into the

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{129}Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{130}Ibid., 94. \\
\textsuperscript{131}Marsden,\textit{ Fundamentalism and American Culture} (1980), 20. \\
\textsuperscript{132}Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{133}Marsden,\textit{ Understanding Fundamentalism} (1991), 129. \\
\textsuperscript{134}Ibid., 132. \\
\textsuperscript{135}Macintosh, "Toward a New Untraditional Orthodoxy" (1932), 287.
\end{flushleft}
spiritual realm. According to Macintosh, Drummond's Law of Continuity stressed that "The laws of logic do not become different when we pass from the physical to the religious. All knowledge of reality is dependent upon experience and inductive and deductive thinking." Drummond developed this law that extended the principle of continuity from the natural order into the spiritual order in parallel terms to unite scientific knowledge with religious belief. In the natural world, law made Science and transformed "knowledge into eternal truth." Drummond wanted it to do the same for Religion, to corroborate it and to purify it. Without the principle of continuity, man would have a "discontinuous universe, an incoherent and irrelevant universe--as irrelevant in all its ways of doing things as an irrelevant person." In his argument, Drummond applied Butler's principles of analogy, although he ultimately wanted to go beyond analogy to identity of Natural Law and Spiritual Law.

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136 Macintosh, "Theology in a Scientific Age" (1922), 140-1.
137 Henry Drummond, Natural Law in the Spiritual World (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1887), ix.
138 Ibid.
139 Ibid., xviii.
140 Ibid., 38.
141 Ibid., 11.
Drummond's definition of law illustrated the limits that Baconian-Newtonian science set on the understanding of law in nature as purely descriptive and not prescriptive.¹⁴² Law was mode of operation, not an operator; it was a process, not power. It was free from the concepts of cause and effect.

The fundamental conception of Law is an ascertained working sequence or constant order among the Phenomena of Nature. This impression of Law as order it is important to receive in its simplicity, for the idea is often corrupted by having attached to it erroneous views of cause and effect. In its true sense Natural Law predicates nothing of causes. The Laws of Nature are simply statements of the orderly condition of things in Nature, what is found in Nature by a sufficient number of competent observers.¹⁴³

According to Moore, the agreeable Baconian compromise between faith and reason encouraged a growing body of geological research that began to cast doubt on the Genesis account of creation and the flood.¹⁴⁴ This research eventually challenged the Baconian compromise.¹⁴⁵ Moore noted that the threat was particularly acute due to advances in eighteenth-century Germany scientific biblical scholarship.¹⁴⁶ By the mid-nineteenth century, British and American scholars had begun importing the German critical,

¹⁴²Ibid., 5.
¹⁴³Ibid. Underlining for emphasis is mine.
¹⁴⁵Ibid.
¹⁴⁶Ibid., 332.
scientific approach to biblical study\textsuperscript{147} and church history, according to Bowden.\textsuperscript{148} As Moore and Frederick Gregory claimed, the Germanization of scientific and biblical study included the speculative, predictive use of hypotheses and cause and effect.\textsuperscript{149} I will discuss the historicism crisis below.

\textbf{The Hypothetico-deductive method}

According to Bowler, the development of the hypothetico-deductive method also challenged the observation-inductive method of Baconian-Newtonian science.\textsuperscript{150} Bowler described how scientists used the hypothetico-deductive method to formulate a hypothesis to propose "how a phenomenon might operate; the hypothesis is then tested against the facts by observation and experiment."\textsuperscript{151} Bowler noted that

\textsuperscript{147}\textit{Ibid.}, 333.

\textsuperscript{148}Bowden, \textit{Church History in the Age of Science} (1971), 3-30.


\textsuperscript{151}\textit{Ibid.}
if the test fails, the hypothesis is rejected and a new one sought. If the first tests are successful, testing continues, either to build up more support or until, eventually, the weakness of the hypothesis is exposed.\textsuperscript{152}

Bowler observed that scientific knowledge deduced in this manner was thought to be more valuable "because it is proposed and accepted in such a way that if it has any weaknesses, these will be recognized and corrected as soon as possible."\textsuperscript{153} According to Bowler, by formulating and testing a scientific proposition rigorously, scientists sought its testability or degree of falsifiability to avoid the pseudoscientific "vague and slippery generalizations, which can never be falsified by any empirical test."\textsuperscript{154}

Marsden observed that these views were at variance with each other.\textsuperscript{155} The hypothetico-deductive method used a speculative, predictive view of science.\textsuperscript{156} This view conflicted with the Baconian-Newtonian understanding of natural law and scientific method as objective observation and description.\textsuperscript{157} When the Darwinian revolution destroyed

\textsuperscript{152}Ibid., 214.
\textsuperscript{153}Ibid., 15.
\textsuperscript{154}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{155}Marsden, \textit{Fundamentalism and American Culture} (1980), 121.
\textsuperscript{156}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{157}Ibid.
the earlier alliance between Baconian-Newtonian science and Christianity, common-sense scientific theology could no longer "simply incorporate the conclusions of the new science into its body of beliefs" as it had for over a century. Because Darwinian natural selection severed the roots of the argument from design, as Gregory noted, the proponents of the older scientific theology could not continue "adding new scientific discoveries to their beliefs and interpreting them as more evidence for the argument from design." By replacing a benevolent creator God with impersonal natural forces, scientists challenged the reasonableness of Christian belief.

2.40 RELIGIOUS RESPONSES TO THE CRISIS OF MODERNITY

Lears also observed that the social and intellectual crises of modernity were accompanied by a religious crisis of unbelief. Religious responses to the crises of modernity included the Social Gospel movement as developed by liberal, progressive Protestants. Other religious responses to the crisis of meaninglessness included the

158 Ibid., 15, 121.
159 Ibid., 20.
161 Marsden, Fundamentalism and American Culture (1980), 20.
162 Lears, No Place of Grace (1981), 55.
crisis of historicism and the fundamentalist-modernist controversy.

**Social Gospel**

Latourette traced the origins of the Social Gospel to the religious mission of the early Puritans, Quakers, and others seeking religious freedom in America. The Social Gospel sought to "inspire Christians to strive to bring all society as well as the individual into conformity with the teachings of Jesus." Supported by British ideas of Christian socialism, utopianism, idealistic optimism, and the German Ritschlian theology with its emphasis on the Kingdom of God, the Social Gospel arose to conquer the evils posed by industrialization and the crisis of modernity. According to Ahlstrom, the primary points of the Social Gospel were "a form of millenarial thought" that was a gospel of good news, the perfectibility of man, and the mustering of religious faith and morality to break the bonds of social evil. Latourette identified Washington Gladden

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164 Ibid.
167 Ibid.
(1836-1918), Francis Greenwood Peabody (1847-1936), Josiah Strong (1847-1916), and Walter Rauschenbusch (1861-1918), aided by the writings of Thomas Chalmers, Frederick Denison Maurice, and Horace Bushnell, as the leaders of this movement.168

According to Susan Curtis, author of *A Consuming Faith* (1991), Social Gospelers "redefined salvation, the nature of God, and religious commitment."169 Acting out of the turmoil of their private lives, Social Gospelers made salvation social and made God a loving parent who was immanent, indwelling, indulgent, and the friend of man.170 Protestants became concerned with this life and not the afterlife and initiated political actions aimed at reform. Curtis noted that the Social Gospelers needed direction and purpose and their longing for acceptance drew them toward an emerging gospel of social salvation whose adherents rewarded them for helping others and whose creed glorified an approachable brother named Jesus.171

Lears has described how the Social Gospelers turned to religion and the handicrafts of antimodernism to deal with these dilemmas.172 Curtis observed that the Social


Gospelers found in their religion "the psychic relief to do what they must in modern America without completely abandoning their tradition and yet without allowing the full force of their commitment to autonomy."173 According to Curtis, the Social Gospelers turned to secular agencies when the churches did not meet their "need for direction and purpose and their longing for acceptance."174

Andrew Feffer, author of The Chicago Pragmatists and American Progressivism (1993), claimed that American progressives drew on the functional, instrumentalist pragmatism of John Dewey and George Herbert Mead.175 They focused "on hitherto nonclerical issues: the plight of the poor, unemployment, monopolistic business practices, and in some cases trade unionism."176 According to Feffer, these issues required viewing salvation as a matter of reforming a broader array of social and political institutions to encourage the movement of history toward a collective salvation, a Kingdom of God on earth, the product of God's presence in nature (as indicated by a progressive and ultimately humane evolution) and in human endeavor.177

174 Ibid.
176 Ibid., 69.
177 Ibid.
According to Curtis, American progressives hoped optimistically "that the state could become an instrument of Christian leadership." However, when the social gospelers themselves tried to occupy the bully pulpit of American politics, they sacrificed the independent authority of their religion to the social dynamic of the state. In this way the social gospel became a gospel of social salvation, and the authority of Christian religion was absorbed into the authority of secular culture.

As Latourette and Ahlstrom noted, more socially conservative Protestants in the United States began to organize opposition to the Social Gospel and its assault on the Puritan "contempt for poverty." Ahlstrom observed that although some of these social conservatives embraced theological liberalism with its "complacency and self-satisfaction," they opposed the prophetic and unpopular Social Gospel. According to Baptist historian Robert Torbet, divergent views also began to take shape within the churches as Darwinian evolution, German idealist philosophy, and historical and literary criticism invaded theology.

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179 Ibid.
180 Latourette, History of Christianity (1975), 1264.
181 Ahlstrom, A Religious History (1972), 789.
182 Ibid., 788.
183 Ibid.
David Moberg, author of *The Great Reversal* (1977), observed that as the battle lines hardened between the "soul-winners" and the "social gospelers," between evangelists and social activists, many evangelicals moved away from social welfare work and liberal political and economic perspectives. According to Moberg, the "Great Reversal" (1910-1930) was a "major shift in the position of evangelicals on social issues," that occurred as evangelicals concentrated on other legitimate causes. Led by A. C. Dixon, editor of *The Fundamentals*, Dwight L. Moody, and Billy Sunday, the "soul-winners" sought to reach men's bodies through their souls and not their souls through their bodies. This developing fundamentalist position was characterized by an emphasis on biblical concerns including "personal sin and individualistic approaches to social evils." As Moberg noted, it also embraced fervent anti-evolutionary conflicts and battles with theological liberals, the feeling that Prohibition would solve all social ills, the premillennialist doctrine that all social conditions would inevitably and irreversibly grow increasingly worse until the Second Coming of Jesus Christ, the belief that only the establishment of the millennial Kingdom of Christ could cure social problems.

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186 Ibid. Moberg attributed this term to historian Timothy L. Smith's lectures.

187 Ibid., 35.

188 Ibid., 31-3.

189 Ibid., 34.
the false doctrine that New Testament admonitions to Christian love apply to the material welfare of only brethren in Christ, the dichotomic fallacy that the Christian message must be either personal or social, and either this-worldly or otherworldly and cannot be both, (and) "the gospel of individual piety" which has led many selfishly to try to escape from the world and live lazily in separation from it while waiting Christ's coming instead of working in it until His return. 190

Crisis of historicism

Besides the social crisis and problems posed by post-Kantian philosophy and Darwinian science, religious belief in the twentieth century suffered from the crisis of historicism and demythologizing of the scriptures. This crisis affected the areas of biblical criticism and church history. Fueled by the hypothetico-deductive method of Darwinian science, the controversy of historicism raged at home and abroad, forming the background of Macintosh's dissertation and much of his later work.

Biblical criticism

According to Albert Schweitzer, author of The Quest of the Historical Jesus (1906), German scholars had followed Schleiermacher's turn to feeling and history to defend a core of historical fact in the face of Enlightenment demythologizing tendencies. 191 Biblical scholars Johann G. 190 Ibid., 37.

Eichhorn and Hermann Samuel Reimarus (1694-1768),\textsuperscript{192} applied the rigorous methods of science to the scriptures as Moore observed.\textsuperscript{193} According to Martin Kähler (1835-1912), J. S. Semler (1725-91), David Friedrich Strauss (1808-74), Ferdinand Christian Baur (1792-1860), Wilhelm Herrmann (1846-1922), Adolf Harnack (1851-1930), Johannes Weiss (1863-1914), Albert Schweitzer (1875-1965)\textsuperscript{194} and others continued the tradition. As Welch noted, their work in biblical criticism, coupled with advances in geology and Darwinian evolution, challenged the credibility and authority of the Bible.\textsuperscript{195} Their work also discredited biblical miracles, questioned the authenticity of the earthly Jesus, and led scholars to attempt to define a minimum essence of the Christian religion.\textsuperscript{196}

\textsuperscript{192}Schweitzer, \textit{Quest of the Historical Jesus}, quoting Hermann Samuel Reimarus, \textit{Wolfenbüttel Fragments} (1774-8).


\textsuperscript{195}Welch, \textit{Protestant Thought} (1985), II, 146-82.

\textsuperscript{196}Ibid.
In 1906, Schweitzer observed that in over a century of scholarship on the study of the life of Jesus, Strauss had laid down the first great alternative which the study of the life of Jesus had to meet:

either purely historical or purely supernatural. The second had been worked out by the Tübingen school and (Heinrich) Holtzmann: either Synoptic or Johannine. Now came the third: either eschatological or non-eschatological.197

According to Turner and Hutchison, this controversy over the biblical record and the historical Jesus or the Christ of faith made its way into English speaking countries and contributed to the crisis of unbelief.198 As Hutchison noted, late nineteenth-century American Evangelical Protestants began to take sides over the acceptance or the rejection of the new scientific and biblical scholarship.199 Hutchison observed that followers of the liberal "New Theology" squared off against advocates of the conservative "Princeton Theology."200

The controversy became particularly heated in the responses to an article in the Hibbert Journal by the Rev. R. Roberts entitled "Jesus or Christ? An Appeal for

197 Schweitzer, The Quest of the Historical Jesus (1968), 238.


200 Ibid.
Consistency." G. K. Chesterton, James Hope Moulton, Alfred Loisy and others contributed articles in reply to Roberts. Roberts summed up his position in the conclusion of his rejoinder article with the observation that "humanity outgrows its Jesus, and creates new Christs for its new emergencies." As Marsden noted, liberals and conservatives escalated and intensified this controversy into the fundamentalist-modernist controversy of the 1920s.

**Views of history**

According to Ahlstrom and Welch, nineteenth-century writers of history introduced new vigor into theology by introducing a dynamic view of the past. Ahlstrom noted that this new view challenged traditional views of history by treating religious history and the Scriptures the same as

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secular history and literature. These scholars introduced the historical study of theological doctrines and comparative religions that led to "historicism" as "an all-encompassing relativism" and/or fatalism or determinism.

As Bradley J. Longfield, author of The Presbyterian Controversy (1991) noted, the historian's perspective profoundly colored history. According to Bowden this perspective took precedence over the theologian's perspective. Marsden lamented that "all the historian possessed in the present was a memory of the past, not the past itself. As such, history was primarily a matter of interpretation, not the compilation of data." In the words of Longfield, Arthur McGiffert observed that while divine truth was "eternally the same, unchanged and unchangeable, in our conceptions of it--in other words in our doctrines--there has been as real a development as in

206 Ahlstrom, Religious History (1972), 772.
207 Ibid., 773.
209 Bowden, Church History in the Age of Science (1971), 109, 143.
our institutions.'

According to Longfield, this overwhelming relativism questioned the possibility of absolute truth. It also questioned the possibility of an objective, historical "basis for the faith of the Church" in scientific fact instead of in "myth and miracle," as Welch observed.

Fundamentalist-modernist controversy: modernist position

According to Hutchison, theological liberals responded to the challenges of the social, intellectual, and religious crisis of modernity by attempting to accommodate the Christian religion to contemporary culture. Marsden claimed that evangelical liberals typically deified historical process, stressed the ethical to protect it from attack, and focused on the centrality of religious feelings to establish the contemporary relevance of religious belief. In deifying historical process, liberals placed Christ as God incarnate at the center of their theology and

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212 Ibid., 14.


214 Hutchison, Modernist Impulse (1976), 2.

history. According to Marsden, Christ's kingdom "was the continuing manifestation of the power of God to change human relationships. The Bible was a record of the religious experience of an ancient people." It was not an encyclopedia of dogma but an ancient model to be followed today. Marsden also observed that liberals identified human progress, "especially in the moral sphere . . . with the progress of Christ's kingdom." In so doing, the liberals attempted to make Christianity "immune from the ravages of modern scientific and historical criticism." Therefore, "the Bible need not be proven historically or scientifically accurate to be regarded as a faithful rendering of the religious perceptions of the Hebrew people."

In their attempt to accommodate religious ideas to modern culture, Protestant theologians, preachers, and teachers embraced the new criticism and Darwinian science. According to Hutchison, they thought that God was "immanent in human cultural development and revealed through it." They also believed "that human society is moving toward realization (even though it may never attain the reality) of

216 Ibid., 33.
217 Ibid., 33-4.
218 Ibid., 34.
219 Ibid.
220 Ibid.
221 Hutchison, Modernist Impulse (1976), 2.
the Kingdom of God."222 Drawing on Schleiermacher's religious-cultural accommodation, liberals enthusiastically embraced humanistic optimism, universal religious sentiment, experience, good works, and the doctrine of the Incarnation.223 Led by Shailer Mathews of the University of Chicago Divinity School, American modernists argued that "modernistic liberalism not only is Christian but also is actually closer than its rivals to the genius of Christianity."224 Hutchison observed that the liberals claimed "that unless Christianity can present people with a liberal option, it cannot function in the modern world and probably cannot survive there."225

According to Kenneth Cauthen, author of The Impact of American Religious Liberalism (1962), the modernistic, liberal New Theology that developed in the United States in the early twentieth century overtook the Calvinistic orthodoxy of the 19th century.226 Most of the modernistic, liberal New Theologians came out of the Edwardsian school in a reaction against it.227 Their "compelling demand that

222Ibid.

223Ibid., 4.

224Ibid., 275.

225Ibid.


227Ibid., 4.
living faith come to terms with the modern world"\textsuperscript{228} blurred the line between the sacred and the secular,\textsuperscript{229} according to Hutchison. He noted that the New Theologians were "men of irenic temper and of mediating personality."\textsuperscript{230} Their dominating theme was "God's presence in the world and in human culture."\textsuperscript{231} Hutchison observed that they preferred persuasion over polemic.\textsuperscript{232}

Marsden claimed that evolutionary naturalism, higher Biblical criticism, sociology, Freudian psychology, and Idealistic philosophy and theology fueled the new ideas.\textsuperscript{233} He described how

\begin{quote}
the Idealism of the New Theology answered naturalism and higher criticism . . . by merging the supernatural with the natural, so that the supernatural was seen only through the natural. Simultaneously, however, Idealism posited a strong dualism between the material world, known through science and logic, and the spiritual world, known by intuition and sensitivity.\textsuperscript{234}
\end{quote}

According to Marsden, this dualism was appealing to the Victorians because

\textsuperscript{228}Ibid., 5.
\textsuperscript{229}Hutchison, \textit{Modernist Impulse} (1976), 79-80.
\textsuperscript{230}Ibid., 78.
\textsuperscript{231}Ibid., 79.
\textsuperscript{232}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{233}Marsden, \textit{Understanding Fundamentalism} (1991), 32.
\textsuperscript{234}Marsden, \textit{Fundamentalism and American Culture} (1980), 26.
while not challenging the sanctity of natural science, it appealed to a strain of moderate anti-intellectualism relying on religious experience, sentiment, and sublimity as opposed to the seemingly cold rigor of the intellectualism of the old theology. Second, and probably more important, it had a clear moral application.  

Hutchison observed that the modernists had not wanted to abandon their missionary obligation to convert all mankind to the truth of the gospel. According to Hutchison, the mission enterprise, more than any other activity of the churches, demanded that the question of uniqueness (of Christianity) be faced, and that it be given an answer that would convince outsiders.

At home, "the preacher or apologist could at least count on a general feeling among his audience that Christianity . . . represented a civilization superior to those of other parts of the world." In contrast, missionaries could not count on "such prepared acquiescence." They felt "uncomfortable with a Christian apologetic that fudged the question of Christianity's relation to the other religions and cultures of mankind."

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235 Ibid.

236 Hutchison, Modernist Impulse (1976), 144.

237 Ibid., 132.

238 Ibid., 133.

239 Ibid.

240 Ibid.
needed a stripped-down Christianity suitable for export.\textsuperscript{241} This reduction of the essence of Christianity to ethical concepts and devotion to the goal of multicultural churches free of Western control threatened the old theology and fueled controversy over missions. Marsden noted that the debate over mission work was a crucial factor in the emergence of fundamentalism as an organized movement, and long remained one of the most hotly debated issues in both the Baptist and Presbyterian denominations.\textsuperscript{242}

\textbf{Fundamentalist}

As Marty observed, the age of liberalism also gave rise to "virtually every enduring and vital American religious conservatism."\textsuperscript{243} According to Marsden, conservative evangelical Protestants constructed their reactionary stand against modernity from a variety of sources.\textsuperscript{244} They turned to Baconian science, common-sense realism, revivalism, pietism, biblical inerrancy, dispensational premillennialism, postmillennialism, and anti-

\textsuperscript{241}\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{242}\textit{Marsden, Fundamentalism and American Culture (1980), 167.}

\textsuperscript{243}\textit{Marty, Irony of It All (1986), 193.}

\textsuperscript{244}\textit{Marsden, Fundamentalism and American Culture (1980), 43-5.}
intellectualism. Marsden observed that fundamentalism was full of paradox. It contained "a mosaic of divergent and sometimes contradictory traditions and tendencies that could never be totally integrated." Marty noted that the fundamentalists intertwined Calvinism with Arminianism and intellectualism with pietism. The central issue however, was the truth of the Bible.

Marsden described how Protestantism required an accurate and true Bible based on historical fact instead of community-generated myth upon which to base its belief system. Fundamentalists reacted defensively with a scheme of biblical interpretation that was the "simple and straightforward interpretation of fact according to plain laws available to common sense and the common man." According to Marsden, fundamentalists objected to German theology and "esoteric, complicated, mystical, allegorical, and other fantastical interpretations." They also

245 Ibid.
246 Ibid., 43.
247 Ibid.
248 Ibid.
250 Marsden, Fundamentalism and American Culture (1980), 61.
251 Ibid.
252 Ibid., 61.
embraced new leadership that transcended denominational lines. In the vacation setting of summer Bible conferences with their context of "common sense informality and equality, a new hierarchy readily emerged." New "evangelistic leaders emerged to build authoritarian empires." 

According to James Barr, Christian fundamentalism was characterized by:

(a) a very strong emphasis on the inerrancy of the Bible, the absence from it of any sort of error;
(b) a strong hostility to modern theology and to the methods, results and implications of modern critical study of the Bible;
(c) an assurance that those who do not share their religious viewpoint are not really "true Christians" at all.

As Niels Nielsen observed in Fundamentalism, Mythos, and World Religions (1993), the emphasis on the inerrancy of Scripture protected "the fundamentalist system against criticism by a web of secondary elaboration. Inerrancy became a test of faith, guaranteeing access to the divine." In addition,

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253Ibid., 62.
254Ibid.
255Ibid.
257Ibid.
the Christian fundamentalist model is characteristically salvationist in orientation, dominated by soteriological and eschatological beliefs. Moreover, salvation conceived as personal and individual is not necessarily associated with membership in any social group or church . . . the model typically compartmentalizes religion; individuals are seen as acting primarily alone as they witness to their belief. A historical sense of Christendom or of any inclusive larger corporate body of believers is lacking . . . historical sources of tradition are concealed. It is as if beliefs and dogmas had appeared ex nihilo.259

According to Marsden, the fundamentalist-modernist controversy transcended denominational lines but raged predominantly within the Northern Baptist and Northern Presbyterian denominations.260 Marsden observed that within these denominations, the conflict pitted "advanced and aggressive modernism" against a "conservative counter-force of comparable strength."261 He claimed that because of their individualistic view of the church and greater local autonomy, the Baptists "developed much greater diversity."262 Ahlstrom noted that they produced "an unusually large number of leading liberal theologians"263 including William Newton Clarke, Walter Rauschenbusch, Harry Emerson Fosdick, Shailer Mathews, and Douglas C. Macintosh. Marsden explained that because the Northern Baptist

259 Ibid.
261 Marsden, Fundamentalism and American Culture (1980), 165.
262 Ibid., 104.
263 Ahlstrom, A Religious History (1972), 912.
Convention was not designed to act as a court, the battles were fought in the seminaries' faculties and the issues were not well known at the popular level. Ahlstrom observed that on the one hand, liberal, financially independent Baptist seminaries including Chicago, Newton, Colgate, Rochester, and Crozer, "made the denomination famous for its sponsorship of learning." On the other, anti-intellectual and revivalist interests produced "more conservative 'counter-seminaries' than any other denomination."

Longfield observed that the controversy was much more heated within the Northern Presbyterian Church. As several scholars noted, Charles Hodge (1797-1878) of Princeton had focused on Darwin's objectionable but essential concept of natural selection as a substitute for a sovereign, benevolent "omnipotent, omniscient Creator."

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264 Marsden, Fundamentalism and American Culture (1980), 167.


266 Ahlstrom, A Religious History (1972), 912.


Gregory described Hodge's claim that man must choose between believing in "an intellectual process guided by God or a material process ruled by chance,"270 between belief in God or atheism. As Torbet observed, the "concept of man as the product of natural evolution from lower animal forms" removed man from his "position as the special creation of God, endowed with full mental and spiritual capacity from his beginning."271 Due to this developmental theory, more optimistic minds could "accept the idealist's philosophy that man's ultimate salvation lies in the acquisition of knowledge."272 Torbett complained that traditional Christian teachings of the sinfulness of man, atonement, eternal punishment and blessedness, justification by faith, predestination, perseverance of the saints, sanctification and the inerrancy of scripture were threatened.273 Ahlstrom argued that the anti-intellectualism present in the revivalist movement opposed a scientific position it could not understand.274 From these objections, fundamentalism got its start, culminating in the trial of teacher John


272Ibid.

273Ibid.

274Ahlstrom, A Religious History (1972), 767.
Thomas Scopes in Dayton, Tennessee in 1925, according to Latourette.275

Ahlstrom described how Benjamin B. Warfield and J. Gresham Machen (1881-1937) had followed Hodge as champions of the Princeton Theology.276 As Nielsen observed, their fundamentalist cause ultimately was doomed to failure because of its "simplistic understanding of mythos."277 Ironically, fundamentalism contained the seeds of its own demise. According to Nielsen, when fundamentalists denied the history of religion, they failed to "'demythologize'" or to examine the myths underlying their position.278 These myths included a sacred or transcendent Truth, "strict delineation of insiders and outsiders, true believers and unbelievers . . . hope of a heaven on earth," and expectation of "opposition from a sinister (often mythologically defined) enemy, godless and heathen."279

275 Latourette, History of Christianity (1975), 1421.
276 Ahlstrom, A Religious History (1972), 463, 813-4, 912.
277 Nielsen, Fundamentalism, Mythos, and World Religions (1993), viii.
278 Ibid.
279 Ibid., 9.
2.40 CONCLUSION

I conclude that Macintosh, the superhero "Christian" and "Evangelist" lived out his myth of innocence within this crisis of modernity with its rapidly changing intellectual, social, and religious components. As Bunyan's "Christian," Macintosh, in his inveterate optimism, never flagged in his journey through the grounds and claims of modern thought. As Bunyan's "Evangelist," Macintosh followed several of the options possible after Kant and embraced both Baconian and Darwinian science to construct massive epistemological, historical, and morally optimistic arguments for the reasonableness of religious belief. I now turn to an analysis of the four strategic moves Macintosh made in response to the crisis of modernity.
CHAPTER THREE: MACINTOSH, MODERNITY, AND APOLOGETICS

3.00 SUMMARY

In this chapter, I demonstrate how Macintosh constructed elaborate apologetic defenses of the Christian religion in response to the crisis of modernity with its Socratic turn to the self, secularization of the Judeo-Christian redeemer myth, and formation of the American monomyth. As Welch observed, the nineteenth century had witnessed an ever-increasing Enlightenment attack on and destruction of the Christian myth "as the motive power and bearer of the deepest energies of civilization."\(^1\) Rational criticism destroyed theological orthodoxy, natural theology, metaphysics, and the "possibility (or even the desirability) of revelation."\(^2\) It also destroyed "the historical reliability, apologetic value, and even the moral authority of the Scriptures."\(^3\) Welch noted that in the face of this demythologizing of theology, Schleiermacher and Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772-1834) had attempted to recover theology by turning to the self and its role in determining religious truth and belief.\(^4\)

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\(^1\) Welch, *Protestant Thought* (1972), I, 61.


\(^3\) *Ibid.*

Americans, in whose country Macintosh spent his adult life, welcomed this focus on the self, according to Jewett and Lawrence.\(^5\) With their deeply ingrained Christian myth of pilgrimage and innocence, Americans embraced the focus on the self to support their conversionist, pietistic, morally optimistic, evangelical religion.\(^6\) Jewett and Lawrence described how personal choice and embarking upon the pilgrimage of faith in emulation of "Christian" in The Pilgrim's Progress (1678) were the only routes to redemption available to early American Puritans.\(^7\) Enlightenment pressure and increasing secularization of the Judeo-Christian redemption myth caused these "traditional dramatic motifs" to coalesce "to create the American monomyth"\(^8\) during the "axial decade" of 1929-1941.

As I discussed in Chapter One, Macintosh was a twentieth-century evangelical Christian who absorbed John Bunyan's version of the Christian myth of pilgrimage and innocence at his mother's knee.\(^9\) As an adult, he turned optimistically to apologetics to relieve his doubts, and to support his self-deceived myths of innocence and

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\(^6\)Ibid.

\(^7\)Ibid., 108.

\(^8\)Ibid., 249.

\(^9\)Macintosh, "Toward a New Untraditional Orthodoxy" (1932), 278-9; *Pilgrimage of Faith* (1931), 27; Warren, *Out of the Wilderness* (1989), 42.
mythlessness. He also turned to apologetics to function as an exemplary evangelist according to his "Christian" pilgrim script. During his lifetime, Macintosh faced the American crisis of modernity as brought about by social, intellectual, and religious change as I described in Chapter Two. Within Marty's "Ironic Age," the crisis of historicism threatened to undermine the entire American society in which he spent his adult life. I am convinced that he wrote out of his own religious needs and found a sympathetic audience in the larger academic and religious communities. I conclude that Macintosh attempted to protect the Judeo-Christian redeemer myth by turning to classical apologetics, contemporary science, philosophy, and theology. From them he selectively appropriated elements for his elaborate philosophical theology. Like the knight-errant Don Quixote defending the honor of his Dulcinea, Macintosh defended Christianity from the crisis of modernity by making the following four moves:

1. Macintosh turned to theological objectivism and critical common-sense realism based on experience to respond to the Socratic turn to the self made by German

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10 The myth of mythlessness is "the unexamined belief that scientific culture has transcended mythical forms of thought." Jewett and Lawrence, American Monomyth (1977), 250.

11 Marty, The Irony Of It All (1986).

12 Macintosh, Reaction Against Metaphysics (1909), 1; Clyde Holbrook, The Ethics Of Jonathan Edwards: Morality and Aesthetics (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1973), 3-7; McKenny, "Theological Objectivism as
liberal theology.\textsuperscript{13} German liberal theologians had turned to subjectivism following the Enlightenment assault on theologies of orthodoxy, the historical apologetic and moral credibility of the Scriptures\textsuperscript{14} and Kant's destruction of the classical apologetic arguments.

2. Optimistically relying on the powers of human reason, Macintosh applied his reconstructed empirical philosophy to rehabilitate the notion of apologetic arguments for God and the reasonableness of belief in God.\textsuperscript{15}

3. In response to the Enlightenment assault on the Christian myth, Macintosh employed the Ritschlian Radical Method in theology that required experiential verification of all religious convictions to defend the essence of Christianity.\textsuperscript{16}

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\textsuperscript{13}Macintosh, Problem of Knowledge (1915); Macintosh, Problem of Religious Knowledge (1940).

\textsuperscript{14}Welch, Protestant Thought (1972), I, 59.

\textsuperscript{15}Macintosh, Reasonableness of Christianity (1925).

\textsuperscript{16}Macintosh, Reaction Against Metaphysics (1909), 1-3; "The Conservative and the Radical Method" (1911), 359-63; Theology as an Empirical Science (1919), 5-46.
4. Macintosh employed the Anselmian (1033-1109) apologetic tactic of "leaving Christ aside as if nothing had ever been heard of him," to prove "by necessary reason that it is impossible for any person to be saved without Him." 17

3.10 MACINTOSH'S APOLOGETIC TASK

Confessing to an early "fundamental and permanent interest in Christian apologetics," 18 Macintosh engaged in the rational defense of Christianity throughout his life. He recalled that his first apologetic endeavor occurred in 1895, toward the end of his first year of teaching in a one room country school. 19 At that time, Macintosh responded to his brother's expressed skepticism about "Christianity and the Bible" in a long letter that contained "not one real proof."20

Throughout his teaching and writing career at Yale, Macintosh continued his apologetic task of "construction and reasonable explanation in religion rather than . . . criticism of traditional teachings." 21 His book, The

18 Macintosh, "Toward a New Untraditional Orthodoxy" (1932), 287.
19 Ibid., 284-7.
20 Ibid., 287.
21 Ibid., 285-6.
Reasonableness of Christianity (1925), detailed the apologetic purpose of his optimistic moral, epistemological, and historical arguments "to commend Christianity to the outsider." He specifically addressed Christian believers in Theology as an Empirical Science (1919) that contained his defense of "evangelically Christian religious experience." Both arguments, however, "proved more convincing to the Christian than to the outsider." Throughout his career, Macintosh never lost sight of the importance of religious experience over argument "as the surest way of achieving the essentially Christian faith."

Other scholars noted Macintosh's apologetic task.

Many scholars were aware of Macintosh's apologetic task. Shailer Mathews, one of Macintosh's professors at Chicago, recognized the importance of apologetics for Macintosh as did former students Vergilius Ferm and Randolph

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23 Macintosh, "Toward a New Untraditional Orthodoxy" (1932), 312.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.
Crump Miller.  Other scholars including Herbert R. Reinelt, Peter A. Bertocci, William West Thomas, and S. Mark Heim also noted his apologetic task. Unfortunately, they all neglected to develop their observations of his apologetic task and its importance to his work. While they observed the evangelistic strategy and diversity of Macintosh's apologetic arguments, they overlooked his engagement and internal correction of other theological and philosophical positions, especially American empiricism, pragmatism, and Ritschlian liberal theology. I will discuss Macintosh's place within a distinctly American empirical theological tradition from Edwards, James, and Dewey to H. Richard and Reinhold Niebuhr in Chapter Five.


3.20 MOVE 1: MACINTOSH'S TURN TO THEOLOGICAL OBJECTIVISM:

The problem of knowledge

I contend that Macintosh turned to philosophical and theological objectivism or "that which is sufficiently confirmed or verified to be regarded as real and true"\(^{29}\) to recover the possibility of belief. Macintosh made this move in the wake of John Locke (1632-1704, George Berkeley (1685-1753), David Hume (1711-1776), Kant, Darwin, Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872), Freud, James, and Dewey. Addressing the problems caused by the Socratic turn to the self, Macintosh first confronted the possibility of man's experiential knowledge of the existence of independent reality.\(^{30}\) I also argue that in pursuing Welch's Option 1 after Kant,\(^{31}\) Macintosh rejected Kant's phenomenal-noumenal dualism. He rejected Kant's idealism, subjectivism and epistemological dualism (the "doctrine that the experienced object and the real object are, at the moment of perception, numerically two"\(^{32}\) because they led to subjective personal opinion, solipsism, or the theory that only the self exists.\(^{33}\) According to Macintosh, dualism led to the denial

\(^{29}\)Macintosh, Reaction Against Metaphysics (1909), note 2, 1.

\(^{30}\)Macintosh, Problem of Knowledge (1915), 5; Reasonableness of Christianity (1925), 161-8.

\(^{31}\)Welch, Protestant Thought (1972), I, 47.

\(^{32}\)Macintosh, Problem of Knowledge (1915), 13.

\(^{33}\)Ibid., 19.
of knowledge of independent reality or to an uncritical
dogmatism that asserted the fact of knowledge without
showing how this knowledge was possible.34 This duality
between experienced and real objects prohibited the
possibility of man's having direct experience or knowledge
of any external object or reality.35

Arguing against what Welch has described as Kant's
dualism and destruction of natural theology and the older
metaphysics,36 Macintosh turned to critical common sense
realism and epistemological monism.37 According to
Macintosh, critical common-sense realism was the practical,
experience-based, Scottish common-sense or naïve realism of
"the non-philosophical 'plain man.'"38 This common-sense
realism held that the object one observed permanently
possessed "whether perceived or not, the qualities,
secondary as well as primary, which it has under normal or
usual conditions of observation."39

34Ibid., 51.
35Ibid., 16.
36Welch, Protestant Thought (1972), I, 59.
37"Epistemological monism is the doctrine that the
experienced object and the real object are, at the moment of
perception, numerically one." Macintosh, Problem of
Knowledge (1915), 13.
38Ibid., 212.
39Ibid.
In *The Reasonableness of Christianity* (1925), Macintosh illustrated the relationship of his common-sense approach to the approaches of science and philosophy by paraphrasing the parable of the prodigal son.\(^{40}\) According to Macintosh, Science was the older brother and Philosophy was the prodigal, both sons of Common Sense.\(^{41}\) Philosophy journeyed to a far country and "squandered his substance, the wisdom he had received from Common Sense, in riotous imagination."\(^{42}\) Cloaked only in sophistication, the prodigal returned home to settle down as sophisticated or Critical Common Sense in the sphere or would-be wisdom, and learn to live soberly and industriously with Science (Critical Common Sense in the realm of information.\(^{43}\)

The prodigal, Philosophy, "must for the future, be characterized by common sense, but . . . it must be common sense raised to a higher power--the outcome of the application of common sense to common sense."\(^{44}\) Macintosh argued that this philosophical method was a conservative, critical procedure that would appeal to wise and discerning

\(^{40}\)Macintosh, *Reasonableness of Christianity* (1925), 163-5.

\(^{41}\)Ibid., 163.

\(^{42}\)Ibid., 164.

\(^{43}\)Ibid., 164-5.

\(^{44}\)Ibid., 165.
people instead of "an uncritical 'common-sense' dogmatism"
or "a universal Cartesian doubt." Therefore, he concluded
that critical realism became a doctrine "undertaking to be
as realistic as it can be while remaining as critical as it
ought to be." In his optimistic search for absolute truth, Macintosh
also turned to epistemological monism as the doctrine that
"the experienced object and the real object are, at the
moment of perception, numerically one." From
epistemological monism and critical realism, Macintosh
developed his critical monistic realism as the doctrine that

the object perceived is existentially or numerically
identical with the real object at the moment of
perception, although the real object may have qualities
that are not perceived at that moment; and also that
this same object may exist when unperceived, although
not necessarily with all the qualities which it
possesses when perceived.

Macintosh claimed that his critical monistic realism in
epistemology permitted verified knowledge of external
reality that might exist at moments other than at the moment
of perception, "or of any other conscious experience, and
independently of such experience."

46Ibid., 191.
47Macintosh, Problem of Knowledge (1915), 13.
48Macintosh, "Is 'Realistic Epistemological Monism
Inadmissible?'" (1913), 701; Problem of Knowledge (1915),
310-1.
49Macintosh, Problem of Knowledge (1915), 13.
I summarize Macintosh's empirical, epistemological argument for the possibility of knowledge of independent reality as he developed it in *The Problem of Knowledge* (1915) and *Theology as an Empirical Science* (1919) in the following statements:

1. According to the method of science and common-sense realism, one could logically assume that independent reality existed.\(^{50}\)

2. Independent reality possessed qualities.\(^{51}\)

3. One could experience or perceive the qualities of independent reality.\(^{52}\)

4. One could experience or perceive independent reality.\(^{53}\)

5. Therefore, one could know independent reality.\(^{54}\)

3.30 MOVE 2: REHABILITATION OF ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD:

The problem of religious knowledge

Thinking that he had successfully argued for the possibility of knowledge of independent reality, Macintosh applied his empirical, epistemological argument to the problem of the possibility of religious knowledge in *The

\(^{50}\)Macintosh, *Theology an as Empirical Science* (1919), 51, 90.

\(^{51}\)Macintosh, *Problem of Knowledge* (1915), 309-12;

\(^{52}\)Ibid., 311, 326-8.

\(^{53}\)Ibid., 322-3.

\(^{54}\)Ibid., 326-7.
Problem of Religious Knowledge (1940). Macintosh built his argument for religious knowledge on his earlier arguments in The Problem of Knowledge (1915) and Theology as an Empirical Science (1919). He claimed that the religious experience of moral salvation through the right religious adjustment or moral conversion was the verifying experience for knowledge of independently existing Reality or God. Macintosh then argued that because of man's awareness of moral evil in the race he had a practical need for God. Although science and psychology had removed the origin of evil and the necessity of a personal devil, they

55Macintosh, Problem of Religious Knowledge (1940), viii-ix, 10-1.
56"The specifically religious adjustment, which, it is claimed, tends dependably toward a desirable experience of emancipation and achievement, primarily in the moral and spiritual realm, is a very specific adjustment or series of adjustments. It begins in aspiration toward an ideal of higher moral and spiritual attainment, not only as an ultimate end in itself but also as instrumental to the redemption and regeneration of society. It culminates in self-surrender, appropriating faith and a habitual willed responsiveness toward an object regarded as at once ideal and real, friendly and accessible, efficient and for one's religious need sufficient. Such a religious adjustment, it is claimed, makes dependably toward the desired result." Macintosh, "Religious Realism," Religious Realism (1931), 323.
57Ibid., 324.
58Macintosh, "Toward a New Untraditional Orthodoxy" (1932), 306.
had not removed man's need for God.\textsuperscript{60} Practically, man needed God to provide salvation from moral evil.\textsuperscript{61} Although man could correct moral evil by learning, "through experience and observation, the consequences of different modes of life,"\textsuperscript{62} he also required moral salvation through the right religious adjustment.\textsuperscript{63} Macintosh argued that God provided for man's moral salvation through grace or special providence as "the religious experience of moral salvation."\textsuperscript{64} In the religious experience of moral salvation, God regenerated man's will and ultimately renovated and developed his "character in accordance with true ideals. The provision was special in the sense that it was for those who fulfill certain special religious conditions."\textsuperscript{65} Macintosh claimed that "on the basis of religious experience at its best we know not only that God is, but that he is perfect in character and absolutely adequate in power."\textsuperscript{66}

\textsuperscript{60}Ibid., 227.

\textsuperscript{61}Ibid., 228.

\textsuperscript{62}Macintosh, \textit{Reasonableness of Christianity} (1925), 112.

\textsuperscript{63}Macintosh, \textit{Religious Realism} (1931), 323.

\textsuperscript{64}Macintosh, \textit{Reasonableness of Christianity} (1925), 113.

\textsuperscript{65}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{66}Macintosh, \textit{Theology as an Empirical Science} (1919), 229.
However, Macintosh, in his optimistic view of man's ability to make the necessary right religious adjustments, cautioned that there may indeed be almost no noticeable result unless the qualitatively right adjustment is maintained with a high degree of intensity (concentration of attention) and persistence. Otherwise the desired result may be inhibited by any one of a number of adverse factors, or by a combination of several or all of them. Among such adverse factors are an unfavorable social environment, antagonistic instincts or "drives," deeply ingrained contrary habits ideas and prejudices of an opposite tendency, repressed complexes giving rise to hindering processes, an abnormal supply of hormones from the "glands regulating personality," lack of energy through malnutrition, and pathological conditions in general, whether physical, mental or social. On the other hand, the normal tendency of the "right religious adjustment" may be rather suddenly reinforced by the release from the unconscious of the energy and emotion associated with a long repressed but growing conviction as to truth or duty or a new religious life.67

Macintosh also claimed that this religious experience was truly scientific.

In religious experience at its best, there is a revelation (discovery) of a dependable reality, divine in quality and function, which promotes the good will in man on condition of his maintenance of the right religious adjustment . . . . This discovery of a dependable and presumably universally accessible divine reality in and through religious experience involves the possibility of formulating what is discovered about the divine reality (dependable effects on certain conditions) in the form of laws of empirical theology, and constructing a theory of the religious object or divine reality which shall be, at the heart of it, truly scientific.68

67Macintosh, Religious Realism (1931), 324.

68"This is the thesis of Theology as an Empirical Science (1919)." Macintosh, "Toward a New Untraditional Orthodoxy" (1932), 306.
Drawing primarily on *Theology as an Empirical Science* (1919) and *The Reasonableness of Christianity* (1925), I summarize Macintosh's argument for the possibility of religious knowledge as follows:

1. According to the method of modern science, one could logically assume that independent Reality existed.69

2. Independent Reality possessed qualities,70 one of which was the ability to provide moral salvation.71

3. One could experience moral salvation.72

4. One could cause independent Reality to provide moral salvation by entering the right religious adjustment.73

5. Therefore, one could experience independent Reality.74

6. Therefore, one could know independent Reality or God.75

According to Macintosh, this empirical argument relied on demonstration in religious experience as "the one adequate proof of the existence of God."76 He also claimed


74 *Ibid.*, 127.

75 *Ibid.*; Macintosh, "Toward a new Untraditional Orthodoxy" (1932), 306.

76 Macintosh, *Reasonableness of Christianity* (1925), 228.
that it fulfilled William James's prophecy for empiricism and religion:

Let empiricism once become associated with religion, as hitherto, through some strange misunderstanding, it has been associated with irreligion, and I believe that a new era of religion as well as of philosophy will be ready to begin.\footnote{William James, \textit{A Pluralistic Universe} (New York: Longmans, Green, \& Co., 1909), 314.}

However, Macintosh carefully noted that he did not think that he could verify scientifically "the entire content of valid religious belief."\footnote{Macintosh, "Toward a New Untraditional Orthodoxy" (1932), 307.} Theology contained elements of "reasonable, practically defensible faith . . . speculative surmise in our theological theory," and "a nucleus of scientifically verified (or at least verifiable) religious knowledge."\footnote{Ibid.} According to Randolph Crump Miller, Macintosh had three levels of religious knowledge within this system:

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textbf{Verified knowledge} based on experience, adequately and critically tested by logic, pragmatism, and experiment.
\item \textbf{Reasonable beliefs} which consist of concepts which cannot be verified directly, but which can be shown to be almost certain. Moral optimism, value-judgments, and analogical inferences are helpful at this point.
\item \textbf{Permissible surmises} or workable opinions, which help to complete the picture. These result from critical use of the will-to-believe, over-beliefs, and ultimate guesses about the nature of the universe.\footnote{Randolph Crump Miller, "Professor Macintosh and Empirical Theology," \textit{The Personalist} 21 (January, 1940), 37-8.}
\end{enumerate}
Crump Miller observed that Macintosh thought he could engage Christianity's scientific despisers81 and lead them into an open-ended belief system with room for traditional Christian doctrine as reasonable beliefs and permissible surmises.82 He also attempted to construct theology as an empirical science and an "untraditional orthodoxy."83

**Macintosh's empirical argument broke down: problems with logic**

In my opinion, Macintosh's empirical, critical, monistic, realistic, epistemological argument84 for the possibility of knowledge of independent reality appeared to be logically sound. I argue however, that his similar argument for the possibility of religious knowledge of independent Reality or God broke down at the following six points:

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82Randolph Crump Miller, "Professor Macintosh and Empirical Theology" (1940), 26-41.

83Macintosh, Theology as an Empirical Science (1919); "Toward a New Untraditional Orthodoxy" (1932), 275-319.

84"The object perceived is existentially or numerically identical with the real object at the moment of perception, although the real object may have qualities that are not perceived at that moment; and also that this same object may exist when unperceived, although not necessarily with all the qualities which it possesses when perceived." Macintosh, "Is 'Realistic Epistemological Monism Inadmissible?'" 701; Problem of Knowledge, 310-1.
1. Macintosh committed what Patrick J. Hurley, author of *A Concise Introduction to Logic* (1994), identified as the informal logical fallacy of ambiguity, specifically equivocation,\(^85\) in which "the conclusion of an argument depends on the fact that one or more words are used, either explicitly or implicitly, in two different senses in the argument."\(^86\) Macintosh committed this fallacy when he equated independent reality with independent Reality, or God. I offer an example of this argument as follows: All banks are muddy. First City National is a bank. Therefore, First City National Bank is muddy. According to Hurley, arguers who use informal fallacies "may not have sufficient evidence to support a certain conclusion and as a result may attempt to win its acceptance by resorting to a trick. Sometimes the trick fools even the arguer."\(^87\) I am convinced that this was the case with Macintosh. I suggest that Macintosh also committed a theological error when he equated independent reality with independent Reality or God. This equation resembles pantheism as described by D. W. D. Shaw in which "everything is the mode or appearance of one single reality, and accordingly that nature and

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\(^86\)Ibid., 160.
\(^87\)Ibid., 115.
God are identical."\textsuperscript{88} In equating independent reality with independent Reality or God, Macintosh obliterated the "desirable (Christian theistic) distinction between Creator and creature," which, "if carried to extremes . . . could obliterate the distinction between theism and atheism."\textsuperscript{89}

2. However, even if one granted Macintosh his problematical first premise of the existence of independent Reality, his empirical, epistemological argument broke down in Premise 2, in my opinion. Macintosh had no grounds for attributing the quality of providing moral salvation to independent Reality. As a personal, subjective, inward religious experience, moral salvation was unlike any of the outwardly observable, objective, and measurable qualities of physical reality such as "direction, distance, extent, shape, duration, motion, energy, and the like."\textsuperscript{90}

3. How did Macintosh know that moral salvation was a quality of independent Reality? Because he could not accept this knowledge on the basis of scripture or church doctrine, he must know it based on his own experience. He could experience personal moral


\textsuperscript{89}Ibid., 424.

\textsuperscript{90}Macintosh, Pilgrimage of Faith (1931), 214.
salvation as stated in Premise Three, but he could not
know with objective certainty that it was of God.

4. I contend that Macintosh added Premise 4 to solve this
problem. To construct this Premise, Macintosh drew upon
the Puritan covenant of Grace which held that man could
bind God to His promise to provide salvation based upon
man's achievement of the required qualifications. 91 By
applying the cause and effect of the hypothetico-
deductive method of Darwinian science to the religious
idea of claiming the covenant of Grace, Macintosh linked
God with the quality and experience of moral salvation.
Man's entry of the right religious adjustment or prayer
fulfilled his covenant qualifications and bound God to
bestow salvation on him. 92 By introducing Premise 4 in
his second argument, Macintosh introduced new material
(the hypothetic-deductive method) and destroyed any
parallels with his prior argument.

91 Perry Miller, Errand Into The Wilderness (1956),
71; Trinterud traced the origins of the Puritan covenant
theology to the Rhineland and English Reformers escaping the
Marian Exile. These reformers thought that "the covenant is
a conditional promise on God's part, which has the effect of
drawing out of man a responding promise of obedience, thus
creating a mutual pact or treaty. The burden of fulfillment
rests upon man, for he must first obey in order to bring
God's reciprocal obligation into force." Trinterud, "The
Origins of Puritanism" (1951), 45.

92 Ibid.
5. In addition, I argue that Macintosh's use of cause and effect could not be verified in experience. Man could enter the right religious adjustment or prayer and as a result, have an experience which he interpreted as moral salvation. However, he could never be certain that independent Reality or God was the cause of his experience. The cause could have been some physico-chemical or neurological process within himself. I contend that when Macintosh claimed he could cause God to effect what he interpreted as an experience of moral salvation, he embraced the psychology of religion that he had previously rejected as "a substitute for theology" instead of "an aid to theological reconstruction." Macintosh argued that the substitution of the psychology of religion for theology "will be an indication that religion is dead. Instead of performing a much needed operation upon the living body of theology, it will be shut up to a dissection of the corpse."

6. Lastly, I argue that human sinfulness introduced subjectivity into man's knowledge of God. According to Abraham Kuyper, Dutch Reformed theologian, the presence of sin made man's immediate knowledge of God

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93 Macintosh, Reaction Against Metaphysics (1909), 85.
94 Ibid.
far less than universal. Kuyper thought that "objective scientific knowledge would have to have the qualities of necessity and universality." In reality however, the presence of sin caused objective scientific knowledge to be riddled with subjectivity. In his morally optimistic myth of innocence, Macintosh, like the rest of the American common-sense thinkers, thought that the presence of sin was merely an inhibitive factor and not a prohibitive one to true knowledge of God. I claim that Macintosh's use of this subjectivity-laden "sure ground" upon which he constructed his empirical theology as objective science was the unconscious weakness that brought about its ironic collapse and eclipse in scholarship.


97 Ibid.

98 Ibid.

99 Ibid.

100 Macintosh, "Toward a New Untraditional Orthodoxy" (1932), 281.
Macintosh used empirical science to construct his empirical theology

Claiming (erroneously) that he had associated empiricism with religion and restored the metaphysical basis of religious belief, Macintosh ventured to construct theology as an empirical science.\textsuperscript{101} In this experiment, Macintosh proposed a scientific theology that would "generalize on the basis of experience of the revealed divine Reality."\textsuperscript{102} This scientific theology was based on Baconian science with its "method of observation and experiment, of generalization and theoretical explanation"\textsuperscript{103} as the "\textit{novum organum}, the new and greater organ of exact knowledge."\textsuperscript{104} It also employed the hypothetico-deductive method of Darwinian science. This method included observation, correlation, hypothesis, trial and error experimentation, data collection, generalization, and verification.\textsuperscript{105} By using the hypothetico-deductive

\begin{quotation}
\textsuperscript{101}Macintosh, \textit{Theology as an Empirical Science} (191), "Theology in a Scientific Age" (1922).

\textsuperscript{102}Macintosh, "Theology in a Scientific Age" (1922), 141.

\textsuperscript{103}Macintosh \textit{Theology as an Empirical Science} (1919), 11.

\textsuperscript{104}Ibid., 2.

\textsuperscript{105}Ibid., 26-46.
\end{quotation}
method of science, Macintosh hoped to construct theological laws or "generalizations, stating what the thing under investigation does under certain conditions."106 Once he had discovered a theological law, he could predict and partially control "future experience, on the assumption that under the same conditions the thing will act as before. The further experience resulting furnishes further data for induction."107

Macintosh turned to science as the only logical way of using experience to learn the truth about reality.108 A scientific theology had "a nucleus of verified knowledge, of science, at the heart of reasonable faith."109 Scientific theology also solved the "two main problems of apologetics, the problem of the essence of the Christian religion and the problem of its truth."110 By applying the scientific method of empirical verification, Macintosh sought to preserve a vital and true essence of historic and traditional Christianity.111

106Macintosh, Problem of Knowledge (1915), 490-1; Theology as an Empirical Science (1919), 26-46.

107Macintosh, Problem of Knowledge (1915), 492.

108Macintosh, "Theology in a Scientific Age" (1922), 155.

109Ibid., 157.

110Ibid., 158.

111Ibid.
I contend that by turning to science to rescue religious belief, Macintosh was influenced by and contributed to what Jewett and Lawrence termed the myth of mythlessness.\textsuperscript{112} The myth of mythlessness was "the unexamined belief that scientific culture had transcended mythical forms of thought."\textsuperscript{113} I argue that Macintosh's paradoxical claim that his empirical theology was scientific was "itself a myth--that is, a set of unconsciously held, unexamined premises."\textsuperscript{114} Ironically, Macintosh's attempt to reinstate science as a means of salvation contained the seeds of its own demise as I will discuss in Chapter Six.

\textbf{Representational pragmatism}

I contend that Macintosh, in his exploration of Welch's Options 3 and 4\textsuperscript{115} after Kant's destruction of natural theology and the older metaphysics, turned to the moral argument. He also sought to expand the category of direct experience of the spiritual order. In addition, I demonstrate how Macintosh appropriated and corrected William Jewett and Lawrence, \textit{American Monomyth} (1977), 250.

\textsuperscript{112}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{113}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{114}Ibid., 17.

\textsuperscript{115}Welch, \textit{Protestant Thought} (1972), I, 48.
James's linkage of pragmatism and meliorism\textsuperscript{116} to support his myths of innocence and mythlessness. From James's arguments, Macintosh constructed a moral argument from representational pragmatism\textsuperscript{117} and moral optimism\textsuperscript{118} as a philosophical means of providing truth and proof.\textsuperscript{119} To construct representational pragmatism, Macintosh combined the good points of pragmatism and intellectualism.\textsuperscript{120} From intellectualism he appropriated the definition of truth as "the identity of the idea with the reality, of the predicate with the subject."\textsuperscript{121} From current pragmatism, Macintosh appropriated the method of treating rival philosophical doctrines as working hypotheses to determine their truth or

\textsuperscript{116}According to Macintosh, James defined meliorism as "the doctrine that we must fight if we would win, that there is a good fighting chance that righteousness to prevail but that the best efforts of human wills are required, if victory for the right is to be achieved." Macintosh, Reasonableness of Christianity (1925), 45.

\textsuperscript{117}To define truth, Macintosh constructed representational pragmatism by combining the good essence of intellectualism with the good essence or representationalism of pragmatism. Macintosh, Problem of Knowledge (1915), 443.

\textsuperscript{118}Supplementing James's definition of meliorism, Macintosh added religious faith in the superhuman factor, which transcended human power and was favorable to man's ultimate well-being. This cosmic factor was necessary for religious meliorism or moral optimism as "a fundamental attitude of confidence in the cosmos, together with a full sense of man's moral responsibility." Macintosh, Reasonableness of Christianity (1925), 45-6.

\textsuperscript{119}Macintosh, Problem of Knowledge (1915), 444-5.

\textsuperscript{120}Ibid., 443.

\textsuperscript{121}Macintosh, Reasonableness of Christianity (1925), 209.
falsity and of "judging them by the way they work." By combining the good essence of intellectualism with the good essence of representationalism or realism and pragmatism, Macintosh provided a definition of truth as

representation (of subject by predicate, of reality by idea) sufficient to mediate satisfactorily the purpose with which the judgment is made. But what is really true must be representation sufficient to mediate satisfactorily whatever purpose or purposes ought to be recognized in making the judgment. In other words, real truth is practical identity of idea with reality, of predicate with subject, where the practice in question is ultimately satisfactory, as well as the mental instrument which serves it.123

Based on this definition, Macintosh claimed that because of the practical identity of idea with reality, "religious judgments, even if value-judgments, are theories about reality based more or less upon their religious value."124 In making this move to link value-judgments to reality, Macintosh wanted to move to metaphysics as "a clearing-house for ultimate values, where all claims must be presented for recognition and adjustment."125 These ultimate values were true because they were practically identical with reality.126 Therefore, Macintosh claimed

122Macintosh, Problem of Knowledge (1915), 408-9.
123Ibid., 444-5.
124Macintosh, Pilgrimage of Faith (1931), 182.
125Ibid., 191.
126Ibid., 195.
that "we can logically infer the reality of immortality and the existence of the God we imperatively need."\textsuperscript{127}

**Meliorism and moral optimism**

To provide the experiential verification that the scientific mind required, Macintosh supplemented William James's humanistic definition of meliorism by adding his own emphasis on a transcendent, friendly, cosmic factor.\textsuperscript{128} Macintosh observed that, according to James's moralistic, "practical and common-sense doctrine" of meliorism,

the world contains much good and much evil, and while for the future the good is in danger, it nevertheless has a fighting chance of coming out victorious; and this chance will be distinctly improved if we devote our best efforts to that desirable end.\textsuperscript{129}

Because of the problems of humanistic, optimistic innocence in James's meliorism, Macintosh wanted to make meliorism religiously and morally optimistic. Therefore, Macintosh called for "a certain dynamic religious relation" through which

the moral will can be greatly reinforced and made more effective in its conflict with evil in individual lives and in social institutions. Indeed, if humanity finds and maintains the right religious relation, the destruction of moral evil, and of all that flows from it, will be assured.\textsuperscript{130}

\textsuperscript{127}\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{128}Macintosh, \textit{Reasonableness of Christianity} (1925), 45-6.

\textsuperscript{129}Macintosh, \textit{Theology as an Empirical Science} (1919), 260.

\textsuperscript{130}\textit{Ibid.}
According to Macintosh, when man found and maintained the right religious relation or right religious adjustment,\textsuperscript{131} God responded by delivering him from evil\textsuperscript{132} and by regenerating his moral will.\textsuperscript{133} Based on the experience of moral salvation, Macintosh logically concluded that there must be among or above the powers at work in the world a Dependable Factor, conserving all absolute spiritual values beyond what man as a physically embodied and limited creature is able to do.\textsuperscript{134} Man could also conclude that this God was one, omnipotent or "absolutely sufficient in power for man's imperative religious needs."\textsuperscript{135} Macintosh claimed that God was omniscient, omnipresent, immanent, transcendent, ruler of the world, personal, and superhuman.\textsuperscript{136} God was personal at least "in the sense of being conscious, intelligent, purposive, working consciously and rationally toward an end in which the conservation of human personality and values is included."\textsuperscript{137} God was

\textsuperscript{131}Macintosh, \textit{Pilgrimage of Faith} (1931), 258.
\textsuperscript{132}Macintosh, \textit{Reasonableness of Christianity} (1925), 129.
\textsuperscript{133}\textit{Ibid.}, 113.
\textsuperscript{134}\textit{Ibid.}, 75.
\textsuperscript{135}\textit{Ibid.}, 77.
\textsuperscript{136}\textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{137}\textit{Ibid.}, 78.
the Supreme Power on which we are ultimately dependent; the Power upon which we depend for the conservation of values; the Causal Power which constitutes the universe as it is; the eternally transcendent Ideal; the Ideal Spiritual Companion; and the "Holy," arousing the sense of awe.  

Macintosh concluded that this transcendent, friendly God is adequate for man's dependence and trust, "completely moral, perfect in holiness and self-giving love" and is the source of optimism instead of falsely optimistic ideas of human progress.

Macintosh argued inductively from "there ought to be a God" to "there may be a God," to "there must be a God," to "there is a God." He argued that moral optimism logically involves the existence of the God we need. The God we need must be great enough and good enough to conserve for us our highest values. It is reasonable to expect that so great and good a God will be able and willing to reveal himself, particularly by responding in a recognizable and dependable way to the right religious adjustment on the part of man. But, as we have seen, it has been discovered through experience that a God who responds dependably to the right religious adjustment really exists. The presumption, then, is that the Conserver of Values, the God of moral optimism, is one and the same Divine Being as the God of revelation, of religious experience, of moral salvation. 

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139Macintosh, Reasonableness of Christianity (1925), 78.

140Ibid., 45.

141Macintosh, Is There a God? (1932), 209.

142Macintosh, "The Meaning of God in Modern Religion" (1926), 469.
Macintosh claimed that his argument from moral optimism for the knowledge of God recovered the traditional arguments for the existence of God and added new weight to them.\textsuperscript{143} He thought that moral optimism restored legitimacy to the cosmological argument, which, although it did not "prove as much as was once supposed" did represent "a natural and legitimate movement of religious thought."\textsuperscript{144}

Before he could apply moral optimism to the ontological and teleological arguments, however, Macintosh had to face the threats presented to it by the fact of evil.\textsuperscript{145} To address the problem of evil, Macintosh claimed that death and human moral failure were serious evils yet were "not too heavy a price to pay for an orderly and dependable universe."\textsuperscript{146} He concluded that

the fact of evil in the world is not incompatible with belief in a God who is great enough and good enough for every religious need of man, and that in its general constitution the world may be reasonably believed to be the best possible kind of world for the present stage of man's existence.\textsuperscript{147}

\textsuperscript{143}Macintosh, \textit{Reasonableness of Christianity} (1925), 80.

\textsuperscript{144}\textit{Ibid.}, 81.

\textsuperscript{145}\textit{Ibid.}, 84-119.

\textsuperscript{146}\textit{Ibid.}, 103.

\textsuperscript{147}\textit{Ibid.}, 118-9.
Ontological argument

According to G. R. Evans, Anselm developed the ontological argument for the existence of God. Anselm addressed "the Fool of the Psalms, who said in his heart that there is no God." In the words of Evans, Anselm argued that it is possible for everyone to conceive of "that than which nothing greater can be thought." This must, therefore, exist at least in the mind. But if it exists only in the mind, he says, it is inferior to that which exists in the mind and also in reality. It must therefore be the case that that than which nothing greater can be thought exists both in the mind and in reality. (Proslogion, Chapter II)

To recover this argument for the existence of God in The Reasonableness of Christianity (1925), Macintosh reasoned that the ontological argument, which proceeded "from an analysis of the idea to an affirmation of existence--is valid only when experience can be appealed to as establishing the idea." He thought that the ontological argument in its final form had not yet been completely realized because "the idea of God must be correct and experience adequate, and most modern religion is


149Ibid.

150Macintosh, Reasonableness of Christianity (1925), 128.
defective in both respects."\textsuperscript{151} Therefore, he turned
optimistically to human experience, especially the religious
experience of moral salvation as "the only adequate proof of
the existence of the God of religion. It is always through
experience that existence is demonstrated."\textsuperscript{152} Macintosh
claimed that his version of the ontological argument had

thus avoided the characteristic weakness of most recent
apologetics, the resting, first and last, in subjective
feeling. It has been addressed to the outsider quite as
much as to those already committed to the Christian
faith.\textsuperscript{153}

\textbf{Historical argument}

Macintosh also employed what he regarded as scientific
facts to construct a historical apologetic argument in The
Reasonableness of Christianity (1925). He constructed a
historical argument to correct the subjective, personal
opinion present in Ritschlianism's emphasis on the
experience of justification and reconciliation with the
historic Jesus.\textsuperscript{154} Because of the vulnerability of the
historic Jesus to historical criticism, Macintosh was
careful not to bind Christian faith to historic faith "in
such a way that the validity of the faith stands or falls

\textsuperscript{151}Ibid., 129.
\textsuperscript{152}Ibid., 128.
\textsuperscript{153}Ibid., 132.
\textsuperscript{154}Ibid., 134-48.
with the historicity of the fact."155 To avoid this pitfall, Macintosh distinguished between scientific fact and historic fact.156 Scientific fact was "essentially repeatable, verifiable in present-day experience when the appropriate conditions are fulfilled."157 Historic fact occurred "once for all."158 Macintosh required the scientific, repeatable, experientially verifiable fact of moral salvation on condition of the right religious adjustment instead of historic fact to support religious faith. Therefore, Macintosh claimed to have recovered both objectivism and verification and to have avoided the vulnerable, historic Jesus.

Natural revelation

In addition to denying the phenomenal-noumenal dualism of Kant in Welch's Option 1,159 Macintosh embraced natural theology in his article entitled "Natural Revelation" (1942).160 Like the classical apologists, Macintosh relied on natural revelation that included both general revelation

155Ibid., 141.
156Ibid., 140.
157Ibid.
158Ibid.
159Welch, Protestant Thought (1972), I, 47.
and special revelation.\textsuperscript{161} He related general revelation to the philosophical concept of "a constant and progressive immanence of God in the world of nature and of man."\textsuperscript{162} Special revelation occurred in "the special religious experience of moral salvation, of spiritual achievement through a definite religious adjustment, an experience accessible to all who will fulfill the necessary conditions."\textsuperscript{163} Macintosh then constructed an elaborate scheme dividing general and special revelation into numerous sub-categories.\textsuperscript{164}

In his deliberate inversion of the normal order of Christian experience and thought, Macintosh built up "the idea of revelation gradually, on the basis of a rational empiricism."\textsuperscript{165} He adopted this approach to avoid the problem of accentuating Christian dogma at the expense of natural revelation. Macintosh also wanted to recognize "the legitimacy of the interest in reasonableness in religion."\textsuperscript{166} He concluded that

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{161}\textit{Ibid.}
  \item \textsuperscript{162}Macintosh, \textit{Reasonableness of Christianity} (1925), 124.
  \item \textsuperscript{163}\textit{Ibid.}
  \item \textsuperscript{164}Macintosh, "Natural Revelation" (1942), 23.
  \item \textsuperscript{165}\textit{Ibid.}, 39.
  \item \textsuperscript{166}\textit{Ibid.}
\end{itemize}
all revelation of divine reality is divinely initiated, either at the time of the revelation or previously; that all actual revelation has its consummation and final condition in human response and discovery; and that all revelatory process, whether general or special in lower or higher degree, is as natural as it is divine. 167

Macintosh's "untraditional orthodoxy"

Based on his empirical, critical, monistic, realistic epistemology, 168 Macintosh also argued for a "modern" 169 or "untraditional orthodoxy." 170 By orthodoxy, Macintosh meant "the right doctrine for the expression and conservation of a vitally Christian experience." 171 By "untraditional" Macintosh meant "unconcern about conformity to traditional forms of thought, as compared with what ought to be our concern as theologians, namely, to conform to what is

167Ibid., 44.

168Critical monistic realism in epistemology was the doctrine that "the object perceived is existentially or numerically identical with the real object at the moment of perception, although the real object may have qualities that are not perceived at that moment; and also that this same object may exist when unperceived, although not necessarily with all the qualities which it possesses when perceived." Macintosh, Problem of Knowledge (1915), 310-1.


170Macintosh, "Toward a New Untraditional Orthodoxy" (1932), 277-319.

171Ibid., 318.
universally and permanently valid and true."172 He constructed his untraditional orthodoxy using the cosmological, historical, and psychological approaches and the "methods of undogmatic speculation, of pragmatic selection, and of religious experimentation."173

Macintosh advocated a modern orthodoxy because the "old orthodoxies were true hypothetically."174 The old orthodoxies were not based on experience, they no longer appealed to the modern mind and seemed "to have grown stale."175 Macintosh defined modern orthodoxy as "a formulation of the doctrines necessary and effective for the conservation of the faith which will meet the vital religious needs of the modern man."176 Macintosh stressed that this was not a return "to traditionalism and the appeal to an external authority."177 Its task was to achieve anew in the modern world the Christocentric faith that the supreme power in the universe has been revealed to us in the character of Jesus Christ and in his attitude toward men.178

172 Ibid.
173 Ibid., 317.
174 Macintosh, "The Idea of a Modern Orthodoxy" (1911), 479.
175 Ibid.
176 Ibid., 479-80.
177 Ibid., 480.
178 Ibid., 481-2.
I contend that Macintosh constructed his untraditional or modern orthodoxy to support the myths of optimistic innocence and mythlessness or scientific superiority that operated within himself and the larger society. Macintosh's appeal to the modern mind's requirement for empirical or experiential verification supported the superiority of scientific culture over religious, mythical forms of thought. He emphasized the character and attitude of Jesus Christ as an example for mankind to follow instead of emphasizing His person and redeeming work. This emphasis on Jesus as a moral example reflected Macintosh's use of the moral influence theory of atonement as illustrated by Bunyan's "Christian." It also appealed to morally optimistic contemporary liberals.

3.40 MOVE 3: THE RADICAL METHOD AND THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY

I am convinced that Macintosh, in his optimistic call for a new, modern, or untraditional orthodoxy, applied his empirical, epistemological, historical, and morally optimistic apologetic arguments to recover religious belief in God to the Ritschlian liberal theology. He made this move because the Ritschlian liberal theology presented a serious challenge to the modern Christian believer. As I

179Jewett and Lawrence, American Monomyth (1977), 250.

180Macintosh, "Toward a New Untraditional Orthodoxy" (1932).
discussed above, the German liberal theology after Kant contained an epistemological dualism\textsuperscript{181} that separated reason and revelation. This dualism led either to subjective personal opinion and the impossibility of knowing God or to an uncritical ecclesiastical dogmatism. The German liberal theology also suffered from the attack on the Christian religious myth by David F. Strauss and his \textit{Life of Jesus Critically Examined} (1835-6).

According to Macintosh, Ritschl's defense of the certitude of Christian belief had advanced beyond Kant and Schleiermacher in two areas.\textsuperscript{182} First, Ritschl had advanced beyond Schleiermacher in his definition of the essence of Christianity.\textsuperscript{183} Second, Ritschl had advanced beyond Schleiermacher when he attempted to recover objectivity by turning away from feeling and toward history.\textsuperscript{184} As Wieman and Meland argued, Ritschl had focused on the person of the historic Jesus in a narrow appeal to experience in his search for objective certitude.\textsuperscript{185} This narrow appeal to

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{181} The "doctrine that the experienced object and the real object are, at the moment of perception, numerically two." Macintosh, \textit{Problem of Knowledge} (1915), 13.
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{182} Macintosh, "Theology and Metaphysics" (1947), 207.
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\textsuperscript{183} Ibid.
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\textsuperscript{184} Ibid.
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\textsuperscript{185} Wieman and Meland, \textit{American Philosophies of Religion} (1936), 42.
\end{flushright}
the immediate experience of the sense of dependence upon the
person of Christ replaced Schleiermacher's more general
appeal to a feeling of dependence. Ritschl had made this
move in an effort to retain "the full force of the ethical
imperative." According to Wieman and Meland,

Ritschianism went a step beyond the appeal to
experience, in the effort to reduce the subjective
element in its approach, by narrowing down the criterion
of experienced knowledge to a single, historical object:
the historical Jesus.

As Macintosh observed, the historic Jesus had proven
vulnerable to scientifically constructed biblical and
historical criticism that threatened to undermine the entire
basis of Christian belief. To counter and to correct
internally the problems of the Ritschian liberal theology,
Macintosh adopted Ritschl's Radical Method and defense of an
essence of Christianity according to the following Table
of Theological Method:

I. Conservative.
   A. Traditionalistic.
      1. Ecclesiastical.
         a. Uncritical.
         b. Critical.
      2. Biblical.

186 Ibid.
187 Ibid.
188 Ibid., 150-1.
189 Macintosh, Reasonableness of Christianity (1925), 135-6.
190 Macintosh, Reaction Against Metaphysics (1909), 1.
191 Macintosh, Theology as an Empirical Science (1919), 7. Underlining for emphasis is mine.
a. Uncritical.
b. Critical.
3. Individual.
a. Uncritical.
b. Critical

II. Radical.
B. Rationalistic.
C. Empirical.
1. Mystical.
2. Eclectic.
a. Individual.
b. Social.
   (1) Psychological. (Schleiermacher)
   (2) Historical. (Ritschl)
      (a) Restricted.
      (b) Universal.
   c. Pragmatic.
3. Scientific. (Macintosh)

Macintosh identified his empirical, critical, monistic, realistic, epistemological method in theology as "Radical" in contrast to the "Conservative Method." These two methods did not refer to doctrinal content but to the way the content was obtained. The Radical Method rejected all purely external dogmatic authority in favor of the certainty provided by "the theologian's own experience and reflection." Macintosh observed that the Conservative Method began with the entire content of

192"The object perceived is existentially or numerically identical with the real object at the moment of perception, although the real object may have qualities that are not perceived at that moment; and also that this same object may exist when unperceived, although not necessarily with all the qualities which it possesses when perceived." Macintosh, "Is Realistic Epistemological Monism Inadmissible?" 701; Problem of Knowledge, 310-1.

193Macintosh, Reaction Against Metaphysics (1909), 1.

194Ibid.

195Macintosh, "The Conservative and the Radical Method" (1911), 361.
Christian scripture and tradition.\textsuperscript{196} It then proceeded by repeated subtraction of doctrines as they were questioned by scientific investigation.\textsuperscript{197} Both methods could have contained either radical or conservative doctrinal content.\textsuperscript{198} For example, one could have employed the Conservative method to defend radical content or one could have employed the Radical Method and retained orthodox doctrinal content.\textsuperscript{199}

According to Macintosh, the Conservative Method emphasized objective, experientially verified reality and truth, and opposed the subjective, unverified opinion of the subject.\textsuperscript{200} The Radical Method emphasized the internal experience or thought of the subject.\textsuperscript{201} It did not emphasize the "external" or that "which has its evidence only in the experience and thought of another, if at all."\textsuperscript{202} Ideally, Macintosh wanted to unite objectivity

\textsuperscript{196}Macintosh, \textit{Theology as an Empirical Science} (1919), 8.

\textsuperscript{197}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{198}Macintosh, \textit{Reaction Against Metaphysics} (1909), 1.

\textsuperscript{199}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{200}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{201}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{202}Ibid.
with internality and personal experience with the corroborating experiences of other people. If he could do so, Macintosh thought he could obtain sufficient, internal, experiential proof of objective, true reality.

Macintosh argued that the Conservative or Objective and External Method depended upon external authority in the form of church, Bible, or individual teacher to "conserve as fully as possible the whole of the doctrinal content received." He considered this the safe but dogmatic method. It employed the subtraction principle which began with "the whole traditional content, and subtracts therefrom only when and what it must." Selected elements from modern thought were added, but only incidentally. According to Macintosh, this method remained conservative even if it had surrendered most of the traditional doctrinal content so long as it began with

203 Ibid.
204 Ibid.
206 Macintosh, "The Conservative and the Radical Method" (1911), 361.
207 Ibid.
208 Ibid.
an entire traditional body of doctrine accepted on external authority and retained in so far, but only in so far as it has not been seen to be untenable as either self-contradictory or contradicted by obvious value or fact.209

Macintosh thought that the Conservative Method was strong in content but was weak in certainty.210 It was weak in certainty because it relied on external authority for verification of its truth claims.211 Ideally, Macintosh wanted to combine the Conservative, Subtraction Method with the Radical Addition Method in an empirical, philosophical theology that would unify their theological content.212 However, certain residual elements of biblical and ecclesiastical doctrine caused problems for the two methods.213 Macintosh concluded that the Conservative Method could not exclude some of these elements while the Radical Method could not include them "so long as the theology, whether conservative or radical, remains merely dogmatic and non-philosophical."214

209Macintosh, "The Plain Man's Soliloquy" (1938), 250.

210Macintosh, "The Conservative and the Radical Method" (1911), 361.

211Ibid.

212Macintosh, Reaction Against Metaphysics (1909), 3.

213Ibid.

214Ibid.
As I discussed above, Macintosh rejected reliance on external authority as uncritical dogmatism because it did not provide experiential verification of its truth claims. Therefore, Macintosh rejected the Conservative Method because of its dogmatism or subjectivism and developed his own reasonable or experiential method. Noting that sometimes it was safer to adopt the motto "'live dangerously'" than "'safety first,'" Macintosh turned to the Radical Method of personal experiential verification to construct a system that contained all of the truths vital to the traditionalist.

By turning to the Radical or Empirical Method, Macintosh wanted to provide truth, morals, and internal certainty for the believer. Instead of beginning with the New Testament account of the Christian faith and experience, the Radical method started by expressing the faith and experience which have resulted from one's response "to the religio-ethical appeal of the Christian gospel." It then added new content steadily as it was verified by the theologian's own experience and reflection.

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216 Ibid., 9.
217 Macintosh, "The Conservative and the Radical Method" (1911), 361.
219 Ibid., 2; "The Conservative and the Radical Method" (1911), 361.
In *Theology as an Empirical Science* (1919), Macintosh discussed how he followed Schleiermacher and Ritschl into the Empirical Method.\(^{220}\) Macintosh rejected the Rationalistic Method because it was speculative, unscientific, logically inconsistent, and unconsciously begged the question.\(^{221}\) It also contained unsatisfactory doctrinal content regarding human individuality, free will, and the nature of moral evil.\(^{222}\) The Rationalistic method proceeded by strictly logical processes that "would compel all rational, i.e., consistent thinkers to accept positive religious conclusions as to the being, nature and activity of God."\(^{223}\) However, the Rationalistic Method was attractive because it was "free from the bondage of any external traditional authority."\(^{224}\) It also was consistent as a theological system and with all human knowledge.\(^{225}\) Unfortunately, this method suffered from the loss of religious content because it could not prove doctrines true.


\(^{221}\) Ibid., 9-11.

\(^{222}\) Ibid.

\(^{223}\) Ibid., 9.

\(^{224}\) Ibid., 10.

\(^{225}\) Ibid.
without appeal to experience. Macintosh concluded that without religious experience to provide verification, religious values and interest would decline and life would tend toward irreligion.

In his appropriation of the Empirical Method, Macintosh rejected the extreme Mystical Method as too dogmatic, idealistic, and speculative. It denied the reality of "the material world, the finite human self, and time and evil." Macintosh also rejected the Eclectic Method in spite of its appeal to experience because of its arbitrarily chosen and varied theological beliefs. He claimed that the Eclectic Method in theology was "mere impressionism in theology, and so, except that in a vague way it appeals to experience, it is at the opposite pole from the scientific attitude and procedure."

I suggest that as an empiricist, Macintosh employed the scientific "method of observation and experiment, of generalization and theoretical explanation" to support his myth of mythlessness with its preference for science.

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226 Ibid.
227 Ibid.
228 Ibid., 13.
229 Ibid.
230 Ibid., 14.
231 Ibid.
232 Ibid., 11.
over myth. He carefully stressed that his theology as an empirical science was not an exact science. However, it rested "upon 'valid evidence and sound reasoning.'" Theology as an empirical science depended upon religious experience, but was distinctly different from the psychology of religion. Macintosh objected to the psychology of religion because it described "the activities of the human mind." Theology however, was "concerned with the activities of God." Therefore, Macintosh argued, empirical theology, "like the physical sciences, would be a science descriptive not of experience but of an object known through experience."

Macintosh noted that he did not follow Schleiermacher's Eclectic, Social, Psychological method or Ritschl's Historical method as indicated in the table above. He objected to Schleiermacher's Eclectic method because it remained highly subjective in its dependence upon personal feeling as the essence of religion. It lacked any

\[233\] Ibid., 25.
\[234\] Ibid., quoting T. H. Huxley.
\[235\] Ibid., 26.
\[236\] Ibid.
\[237\] Ibid.
\[238\] Ibid., 7.
\[239\] Ibid., 16.
"adequate universal principle upon which the choice of the
Christian religious consciousness is to be justified." Macintosh also objected to Ritschl's Historical method based
on the experience of the historic Jesus as the manifestation
of the grace of God for the moral redemption of the
world. He rejected Ritschl's Historical method because
it was vulnerable to historical criticism. While Macintosh
approved of "the progress in the direction of a scientific
empirical theology" by the Ritschlian movement, he thought
that it was "still too subjective to be really
scientific." Instead of depending upon personal feeling
or the historic Jesus, Macintosh depended upon the religious
experience of conversion or moral salvation upon entry of
the right religious adjustment to God to provide truth and
proof.

According to Macintosh, both Schleiermacher and Ritschl
had moved from

the conservative method and content of evangelical
orthodoxy to a radical, rationalistic position, followed
by a new appreciation of the nature of religion and
religious knowledge, a vigorous reaction against
intellectualism in religion and theology, and a growing
conservatism as to theological content.

\[240\] Ibid.
\[241\] Macintosh, Reaction Against Metaphysics (1909),
39, Cf. F. Kattenbusch, Von Schleiermacher zu Ritschl.
\[242\] Macintosh, Theology as an Empirical Science
(1919), 18.
\[243\] Macintosh, Reaction Against Metaphysics (1909),
38.
They had moved to the Radical method to attempt to conserve the inner certainty and content of religious faith.  

Seeking objectivity, the Ritschlians had followed Schleiermacher in finding a measure of objectivity by appealing to the way in which the religious consciousness of the individual was confirmed and reinforced by the similar religious consciousness of the religious community to which the individual belonged.  

Macintosh claimed that in spite of Ritschl's Radical method, his theology was essentially a conservative movement. It was conservative because Ritschl had wanted "to retain unimpaired the essence of evangelical Christianity, while conceding all the legitimate demands of the scientific understanding." Ritschl had attempted to remove all alien content from Christian church doctrine. He had wanted to "retain all content essential to the expression and guidance of evangelical piety, and to restore to the believer, in affirming that content, the certitude which flows from religious experience."  

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244Ibid., 38-9.  
245Macintosh, "Theology and Metaphysics" (1947), 207.  
246Macintosh, Reaction Against Metaphysics (1909), 40.  
247Ibid.  
248Macintosh, Problem of Religious Knowledge (1940), 245.  
249Ibid.
The essence of Christianity

By employing the Radical, Empirical Method, Macintosh sought to retain unimpaired the essence of evangelical Christianity. As Randolph Crump Miller observed, Macintosh created an opening in his argument for the essence of Christianity by comparing it to the permissible surmises of science. Macintosh argued that because science could legitimately suppose that the subject it investigated existed, so theology could surmise that the object of its investigations existed. According to Crump Miller, Macintosh carefully limited his claim of what man could know through experiential verification about God as a divine value-producing factor. Anything that man knew of God, such as his "mind, personality, transcendence, and metaphysical attributes were a matter of reasonable beliefs or permissible surmises beyond the realm of empirical verification." Reasonable beliefs were "rationally and logically necessary," and were more certain than permissible

250 Macintosh, "Is Belief in the Historicity of Jesus Indispensable to Christian Faith?" (July, 1911), 367.

251 Miller, "Professor Macintosh and Empirical Theology" (1940), 39.

252 Macintosh, Theology as an Empirical Science (1919), 90.


254 Ibid.
surmises. Macintosh's permissible surmises had "symbolic or poetic value only," and produced a "catch-all method for defending his Protestant evangelical liberal theology." By including his permissible surmises grounded in the legitimate demands of the scientific method, Macintosh brought "back into his system his whole Canadian Baptist (orthodox) system." Cording to Crump Miller, this carefully constructed argument possessed a cumulative power that commanded respect.

Macintosh claimed that because the Radical method sought "to build up a theology independently and on some principle approved as inwardly acceptable and self-authenticating," he had to define carefully the operative principle. The radical theologian's initial essence of Christianity had to be small enough to be defensible yet large enough to include orthodox doctrinal content. It also had to bear all of the weight of the apologetic argument.

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255 Ibid., 106.
256 Ibid.
259 Macintosh, "Plain Man's Soliloquy" (1938), 250.
This essence of Christianity had to withstand the scrutiny of empirical science that had destroyed Locke's defense of Jesus as the Messiah as the essence of Christianity. Locke based his defense on miraculous Old Testament predictions and New Testament miraculous deeds. The essence also had to withstand the scrutiny of biblical criticism and historical interpretation that had undermined Ritschlianism's defense of the historic Jesus as the essence of Christianity.

According to William Adams Brown, Adolf Harnack precipitated this discussion on the essence of Christianity in his winter semester 1899-1900 lecture series in Berlin. Harnack's lectures were delivered to "some six hundred students and taken stenographically by one of their number." This lecture series was subsequently published in German as Das Wesen des Christentums (1900) and in English as What is Christianity? (1900). It created a sensation. As Wayne Glick noted, the book was "the

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260 Macintosh, Reasonableness of Christianity (1925), 9.

261 Ibid.

262 Macintosh, Theology as an Empirical Science (1919), 17-8.

263 W. A. Brown, The Essence of Christianity (1902), 280.

264 Ibid.

watershed in the career of Adolf von Harnack." In the words of Glick, Harnack's daughter, Agnes von-Zahn Harnack recorded that "There was no pastor's conference or synod, and scarcely a periodical or daily, which did not take sides." In his Introduction to the reprint of the first American edition in 1957, Rudolf Bultmann observed that by 1927, the German original, *Das Wesen des Christentums*, had already been through fourteen printings many times and had been translated into as many languages. At the beginning of our century it exerted an extraordinary influence not only on the rising generation of theologians but also on the educated classes generally.

According to Floyd Filson, over "70,000 copies were sold before the author's death."

Welch described how Harnack precipitated the controversy by using the methods of critical historical interpretation to reduce Christianity to a permanent


267 "The criticisms, as one might expect, ran the gamut from responsible analysis to personal calumniaion. One tract opposing his representation bore the title, 'Judas, do you betray the Son of Man with a kiss?' And a conference in Mecklenburg entertained a formal proposal to cite Harnack as falling under the curse of Galatians 1:7-9." Glick, 280, quoting Agnes von Zahn-Harnack, *Adolf von Harnack* (Berlin: Hans Bott, 1936), 245-6.


269 Floyd V. Filson, "Adolf von Harnack and his 'What is Christianity?'

Interpretation 6 (January, 1952), 51.
Harnack defined Jesus' Gospel message as "the kingdom of God, and its coming, God the Father and the infinite value of the human soul, and the higher righteousness and the commandment of love." Welch noted that at the heart of the controversy was Harnack's statement that "the Gospel, as Jesus proclaimed it, has to do with the Father only and not with the Son." Harnack did not locate "the reality of Christianity simply in the teaching of Jesus." Instead, Harnack claimed that Jesus saw himself as the way to the Father: "He is the way to the Father, and as he is the appointed of the Father, so he is the judge as well." Harnack argued that Jesus "wanted to kindle individual religious life and (that was) what he did kindle." Using the methods of historical criticism, Harnack wanted to rekindle this same vital, religious life that Jesus had sparked in the early church by finding "out what is essential" or of permanent validity to Christian belief.

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270 Welch, Protestant Thought (1985), II, 147.
271 Harnack, What Is Christianity? (1900), 52-76.
272 Ibid., 147.
273 Welch, Protestant Thought (1985), II, 149.
274 Ibid.
276 Ibid., 11.
277 Ibid., 13-4.
the individual, by entering into his soul and laying hold of it. True, the kingdom of God is the rule of God; but it is the rule of the holy God in the hearts of individuals; it is God himself in his power."278

According to Benjamin B. Warfield, Arthur Drews (1865-1935) precipitated the Jesus or Christ controversy when he published The Christ Myth in early 1909.279 This controversy entered the English speaking world with the Reverend R. Roberts' publication of "Jesus or Christ? An Appeal for Consistency" and various responses to it in the 1909 Hibbert Journal.280 Macintosh responded to this controversy by turning to the same scientific inquiry that had destroyed the liberal Ritschlian position to define his essence of Christianity.281 Instead of relying on the historic Jesus and the method of historical inquiry to define an essence of Christianity, Macintosh turned to the

278 Ibid., 57.


281Macintosh, "Is Belief?" (1911), 363; Welch, Protestant Thought (1985), II, 147.
religious experience of moral salvation upon entering the right religious adjustment. By beginning with an essence of Christianity that was determined by the empirical scientific method, Macintosh thought he had avoided the catastrophes of his predecessors and had achieved critical proof.

To insure the vital persistence of the essence of Christianity, Macintosh listed the following five principles for its determination:

1. The essence must be found in the actual.
2. The essence is a necessary part in, or factor toward, the true ideal.
3. The question as to what is essential has not been sufficiently tested until objectionable elements, such as irrational ideas, have been eliminated.
4. When this elimination has been made, what remains must be vital enough to endure in new and unobjectionable relations, if it is to be regarded as the real essence of the reality in question.
5. The essence of the best member of any group must contain something not found in the essence of any other member of that group.

Based on these five criteria, Macintosh concluded that Christianity is in essence the religion of discipleship to Jesus; the religion of faith in Christ as the divine Saviour of humanity; the faith that finds God in Christ, reconciling the world unto himself. Or, differently stated, Christianity is the religion of the experience of Christlike divine grace; the religion whose universally accessible miracle is the experience of redemption from unchristlikeness to a Christlike morality, through a Christlike religious dependence upon

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283 Macintosh, "What is the Christian Religion?" (1914), 23-4.

284 Ibid.
and fellowship with the Christlike Heavenly Father. Or, again, Christianity is the religion of the regeneration and sanctification of the individual and of society through the indwelling presence and creative activity of God, the Heavenly Father—the Holy Spirit, whose presence and power in the life of Jesus of Nazareth made him the divine Redeemer, the Son and Christ of God.  

This definition allowed Macintosh to claim that he had achieved inner certainty based on the experience of Christlike divine grace without resorting to dogma or miraculous revelation. He claimed that the experience of moral salvation provided the verification needed to protect Christianity from empirical, scientific inquiry.

3.50 MOVE 4: ANSELMIAN TACTIC OF LEAVING CHRIST ASIDE

I contend that Macintosh employed the Anselmian tactic of leaving Christ aside to prove his necessity for man's salvation to argue for a sound, personal, experience of moral salvation as the basis for Christian belief. Macintosh admitted that his response to the reaction against Arthur Drews was "intended simply as an essay in

285 Ibid., 46.


288 Macintosh, Reasonableness of Christianity (1925), 135-6.
apologetics."289 It was not a discussion of the historical question.290 Macintosh wanted to

fortify Christian religious faith against skeptical attacks while the historical question was being investigated. To this end it undertook to refute the dogmatic declaration that the discontinuance of belief in the historicity of Jesus must logically lead to the collapse of modern Christianity. A thoroughly Christian faith in God would still be logically possible, it was maintained, not only during the process of historical investigation, but even if the outcome of that investigation should be able to render the historicity of Jesus either doubtful or untenable.291

Faced with the Protestant liberals' reduction of the historic Jesus as an object of belief to mere fiction292 or myth, Macintosh argued to restore Christian faith to the firm footing of individual personal religious experience. He did not want his spiritual religion to depend too exclusively upon "the religious experience and inner assurance of another, even though that other be the Jesus of history."293

I argue that like the early Puritans with their emphasis on the priesthood of all believers, Macintosh followed the example of "Christian" in Bunyan's The Pilgrim's Progress (1678). Therefore, he rejected "the notion that any son or daughter of Adam could be redemptive

289Macintosh, "Is Belief?" (January, 1912), 107.
290Ibid.
291Ibid.
292Ibid., 108.
293Ibid., 109.
for others." According to Jewett's and Lawrence's understanding of Bunyan's work, each believer had to undertake personally the pilgrimage of faith to be redeemed and called a saint. Macintosh claimed that he did not need a mediator, even Jesus Christ, to have access to God. He asked whether

granted the historicity of Jesus, was not his faith fully Christian? And yet he could not make that faith rest upon the historicity of a person of ideal character who had gone before him. If then we believe in the historicity of Jesus, we must admit that Christian faith has been possible in the case of one at least who did not believe in the historicity of any ideal Jesus before his day.

Macintosh thought that even without the historical Jesus, he could enter the right religious adjustment through prayer at any time and experience God's moral salvation.

In my opinion, Macintosh used the Anselmian tactic of setting Christ aside so that the "Inner Companion" or Holy Spirit could come to turn man back to God's inner revelation. This tactic was similar to the Apostle Paul's use of the Law to frustrate man into casting himself into the arms of God's grace. By employing this tactic of

294 Jewett and Lawrence, American Monomyth (1977), 108.

295 Ibid.

296 Macintosh, "Is Belief?" (January, 1912), 110.

297 Ibid., 110.

298 Ibid., 109.
leaving Christ aside, Macintosh thought he could avoid the problems posed by historical criticism. Macintosh said that he wanted to gain the important tactical advantage in showing how extensive and vital is that content or essence of Christianity which can be defended successfully without any assumption as to particular facts of history. We escape the danger of infecting the entire content of essential Christian belief with the necessary incertitude of historical opinion. All that has been said of the reasonableness of Christianity is demonstrably valid, whether we have any Christology or not, and whatever we may or may not believe about the historic Jesus. It would still be valid if it should turn out that Jesus was essentially different from what has been commonly believed, or even that he was not truly historical at all.  

Although he de-emphasized the importance of the historic Jesus as the essence of Christianity, Macintosh protested that he did not reject the historic Jesus entirely. Macintosh stressed that "belief in the historicity of Jesus was logically indispensable and essential to Christian faith in God." He claimed that the historic Jesus' permanent contribution to humanity was to "set before man the true moral example, the true religious example, and the true revelation of God." Without the historic Jesus, man had "to abandon the idea of personal communion with the once crucified but now risen and

300Ibid., 140.
301Ibid.
302Ibid., 149.
Man also lost the sentimental value of belief in the historical Jesus, the pedagogical advantage of Jesus as the "supreme historic exemplar," and the essence of Christianity. Without the historic Jesus as the supreme historic verification of faith, man had to rely on weaker historical evidence and increased pragmatic testing for the assurance of faith. Man gave up the supreme historic example of the reality of the ideal and of the triumph of the good even in and through its temporary defeat, and so we should be without one of the most important encouragements to "faith in the realizability of the ideal."

I suggest that Macintosh followed Descartes and Leibniz in mistakenly thinking that "Anselm's Proof of the Existence of God" was the "'Ontological' Proof of God" that was discredited by Kant. Instead of providing a scientific proof as Macintosh desired, Anselm understood his proof as a "question of theology. It is a question of the proof of faith by faith which was already established in itself.

303 Macintosh, "Is Belief?" (July, 1911), 366.
304 Ibid., 366-9.
305 Ibid., 367-71.
without proof." According to Barth, Anselm's proof worked only within his larger understanding of faith seeking understanding as joy. Barth observed that Anselm used necessity to mean "the attribute of being unable not to be, or of being unable to be different." 

Controversy with Benjamin Breckenridge Warfield (1851-1921)

Macintosh's use of Anselm's apologetic tactic of setting Christ aside to prove his necessity for man's salvation inflamed Benjamin B. Warfield, Professor of Didactic and Polemic Theology in the Theological Seminary of Princeton, New Jersey from 1887 to 1921. Warfield attacked Macintosh's defense of the essence of Christianity as "christless Christianity." Their argument appeared in a series of articles in the American Journal of Theology (Macintosh) and the Harvard Theological Review (Warfield and Macintosh) from 1911-1914.

308 Ibid., 170.
309 Ibid., 15.
310 Ibid., 49.
311 Warfield, "Christless Christianity" (1912), 423-73; "The Essence of Christianity and the Cross of Christ" (1914), 538-94.
312 Ibid.
313 Macintosh, "Is Belief in the Historicity of Jesus Indispensable to Christian Faith?" (1911, 1912); "What is the Christian Religion?" (1914); Warfield, "Christless Christianity" (1912); "The Essence of Christianity and the Cross of Christ" (1914).
Ahlstrom described Warfield as a self-proclaimed Conservative who championed the Princeton Theology of Charles Hodge (1797-1878). As Ernest Trice Thompson noted, Warfield developed the doctrine of plenary (inerrant) scriptural inspiration in response to the challenges that the historical critical method posed for biblical faith. According to Warfield, the church-doctrine of inspiration looks upon the Bible as an oracular Book, as the Word of God, in such a sense that whatever it says, God says—not a book, then, in which one may, by searching, find some word of God, but a Book which may be frankly appealed to at any point with the assurance that whatever it may be found to say, that is the Word of God.

As Thompson observed, this doctrine, along with a strict interpretation of the Reformed Westminster Confession of Faith, figured prominently in the "Fundamentalist Controversy" that raged within Northern Presbyterianism as I discussed in Chapter Two above. According to Ahlstrom, the affirmation "of the Virgin Birth, the 'Satisfaction

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315 Thompson, Presbyterians in the South (1973), 324.
316 Warfield, The Inspiration and Authority of the Bible (1951), 106.
317 Dr. Thompson, Professor of Church History and Church Polity at Union Theological Seminary in Virginia was also a target of this controversy in the (Southern) Presbyterian Church in the U.S. Thompson, "The Theological Rift," Presbyterians in the South, 302-39.
318 Ahlstrom, A Religious History (1972), 814.
Theory' of the Atonement, the Resurrection 'with the same body,' and the miracles of Jesus,"319 together with the doctrine of biblical inerrancy comprised the Five Points of fundamentalism.

As a staunch defender of traditional, conservative Christian belief, Warfield attacked the liberal or "modernist" view.320 This view held that Jesus was a myth, a watered down, "colorless phantom" who never could have changed the world.321 Warfield specifically objected to Macintosh's abandonment of the historical Jesus and his atoning sacrifice for the salvation of all humankind.322 Warfield traced this movement to Schleiermacher's separation of the historic Jesus from the historic Christ and subsequent abandonment of the historic Jesus.323 In Warfield's eyes, Macintosh became a "christless Christian" when he went one step beyond Schleiermacher and abandoned both the historic Jesus and the historic Christ.324 Only the Christ-ideal remained in Macintosh's thought, not Christ.

319Ibid.
320Warfield, "Christless Christianity" (1912), 424.
321Ibid.
322Ibid., 464-73.
323Ibid., 440.
324Ibid., 441.
himself. 325 Warfield charged that Macintosh wanted to retain the name of Christianity while utterly abandoning the cross of Christ. 326 Therefore Macintosh was not entitled to be regarded as a Christian. 327 Christless Christianity was different from the denial of the existence of Jesus because "it has no interest in the historicity of Jesus. It has no interest in the living Christ. Its sole interest is in Christianity." 328 Christless Christianity was not concerned with Christianity in its historical sense. 329 Instead, it focused on Christianity as a contemporary religion and defined its "essence." 330 Warfield questioned whether it would be more accurate to ask "Is the so-called Christianity of today to which Christ is not essential still Christian?" instead of "Is Christ essential to the Christian faith?" 331 Warfield complained that Macintosh seemed unaware that he had transmuted his original question of

325 Ibid., 442.
326 Warfield, "The Essence of Christianity" (1914), 538.
327 Ibid.
328 Warfield, "Christless Christianity" (1912), 455.
329 Ibid.
330 Ibid., 455-6.
331 Ibid., 457.
what is essential to the retention of Christianity? into the fundamentally different one, in which he is himself perhaps more deeply interested, of What in Christianity is it essential that we retain—namely in order that we may build up the "ideal religion." 332

Warfield charged that, according to Macintosh, the essence of the Christian religion became "'whatever in actual phenomenal Christianity is necessary for the realization of the true ideal of human spiritual life in general and of human religion in particular.'" 333

Warfield also contended that Macintosh abandoned both the historic Jesus and the historic Christ when he denied the Anselmian penal sacrifice theory of the atonement. 334 This theory of atonement was based on Old Testament ideas of substitution and propitiation. 335 Warfield argued that according to Macintosh's theory, "'Christianity is the religion of deliverance from unchristlikeness to a Christlike morality, through a Christlike attitude towards a Christlike superhuman reality.'" 336 The essence of the Christian religion then consisted

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332 Warfield, "The Essence of Christianity" (1914), 544.
333 Ibid., 556-7.
334 Warfield, "Christless Christianity" (1912), 462-4.
335 Ibid.
336 Warfield, "The Essence of Christianity" (1914), 558.
not merely in the fact that it brings a moral redemption, and not merely in the specific character of the morality which it brings, but still further in the particular manner in which this moral redemption is produced.\textsuperscript{337}

As Warfield argued, Macintosh's new religion was the religion of moral redemption.\textsuperscript{338}

Warfield complained that Macintosh abandoned the traditional Christian emphasis on human sin "felt both as guilt and as pollution, and offering as its central good, from which all other goods proceed, salvation from sin through an historical expiation wrought by the God-man Jesus Christ."\textsuperscript{339} This rejection of redemption by the blood sacrifice of Jesus for man's sin was "nothing less than a contradiction in terms."\textsuperscript{340} Whenever this "proper doctrine of redemption has fallen away or even has only been permitted to pass out of sight,"\textsuperscript{341} all man was left with was the germ of christless Christianity. According to Warfield, "the essence of Christianity has always been to its adherents the sinner's experience of reconciliation with

\textsuperscript{337}Ibid., 559.
\textsuperscript{338}Ibid., 558.
\textsuperscript{339}Warfield, "Christless Christianity" (1912), 462.
\textsuperscript{340}Ibid., 464.
\textsuperscript{341}Ibid.
God through the propitiatory sacrifice of Jesus Christ."342 Warfield concluded that without the cross, one did not have Christianity.343 Warfield thought that the Ritschlians were guilty of this move because of their artificial retention of emphasis on the historical Jesus.344 He suspected that "the indispensable role assigned to Jesus, as it rests rather on inherited reverence for his person on the logic of the system, is, in a word, only an interim-measure."345 Warfield complained that in Ritschl's system, everything had become mediated through the community.346

And so as soon as Jesus becomes merely the first Christian, he at once, as Macintosh justly urges, ceases to be indispensable for subsequent Christians . . . Whenever Jesus is reduced in his person or work to the level of his "followers," his indispensableness is already in principle subverted and the seeds of a christless Christianity are planted.347

Warfield concluded that the fundamental difference between Christianity and other "positive" religions was "that the founders of the other religions point out the way to God while Christ presents Himself as that Way."348

342 Ibid., 462.
343 Warfield, "The Essence of Christianity" (1914), 594.
344 Warfield, "Christless Christianity" (1912), 465.
345 Ibid.
346 Ibid.
347 Ibid., 465-6.
348 Ibid., 473.
Macintosh's response to Warfield

Macintosh defended himself against Warfield's charges in his article "What is the Christian Religion" (1914), by stating that everything depended upon one's definition of Christianity. He disagreed with Warfield's definition of Christianity because he rejected the penal satisfaction theory of the atonement. Macintosh claimed that "his opponent's theory of redemption is not only not essential to Christianity, because contrary to reason, but moreover essentially unchristian, because opposed to the principles of sound morality." He also maintained that Warfield was guilty of dogmatically begging the question of the essence of Christianity.

In contrast, Macintosh offered his own definition of essence as "whatever is both present in the actual and demanded by the ideal." Macintosh developed this definition to permit continued Christian faith that was unshaken by the questioning of Jesus's historicity. In response to the historical critical method's challenge to religious belief, Macintosh thought he had to remove the non-essentials of Christianity in order to save it. Like

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350 Ibid., 18.

351 Ibid.

352 Ibid., 18-9.

353 Ibid., 22.
Anselm, Macintosh wanted to retain the "full vitality of the spiritual dynamic of the Christian religion."354 His reconstructed Christian religion would "be a union of the essence of Christian supernaturalism, of Christian evangelicalism, and of Christian orthodoxy; a combination which must make our threatened 'new religion' nothing less than a new Christianity."355 This new Christianity was to be "distinguished from both historic Unitarianism and contemporary mysticism."356 In its "rational, scientific form, (it) will retain all that is valuable in both the moral and the mystical element."357 Macintosh concluded emphatically that "it will not be a Christless Christianity."358

Because of the problem of the historic Jesus and his own emphasis on natural revelation, Macintosh disagreed with Warfield's doctrine of atonement based on Old Testament, sacrificial lines of substitution and propitiation.359 Against Warfield's penal satisfaction theory, Macintosh argued in favor of reason, experience, and natural

354Ibid., 30.
355Ibid., 31.
356Ibid., 44.
357Ibid.
358Ibid., 45.
359Ibid., 35.
revelation. Macintosh claimed that the penal satisfaction theory of atonement was the main irrational element in Warfield's Christianity. The penal satisfaction theory was irrational and immoral because the guilt of sin is non-transferable, and so is the merit of righteousness. Any God who acted as if guilt and merit were transferable would be a God seriously deficient in moral discernment.

However, "the 'good essence' of Christianity cannot include any irrational (i.e., anti-rational) or immoral element." Therefore, "if one must be irrational to be a Christian, Christianity must be essentially bad; it has no good essence which can survive when separated from its irrational elements."

I suggest that an awareness of Macintosh's Anselmian apologetic tactic casts new light on his argument with Warfield and the differences in their respective views of atonement. In spite of his moral theory of atonement,

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360 Macintosh, "Natural Revelation" (1942).
361 Dillistone, The Christian Understanding of Atonement, 185-203.
362 Macintosh, "What Is the Christian Religion?" (1914), 35.
363 Ibid.
364 Macintosh, "Is Christianity Essentially Irrational?" Crozer Quarterly VIII (January, 1931), 23.
365 Ibid., 22.
Macintosh did not want to abandon the historic Jesus entirely.\textsuperscript{366} Macintosh claimed that

while the historicity of Jesus was indispensable to the rise of the Christian religion, and so to the Christian experience and faith of today, a continued belief in that historicity is not indispensable, though very valuable to the Christian religion.\textsuperscript{367}

Christianity would not have arisen without belief in the historic Jesus\textsuperscript{368} as "the supreme historic example of the reality of the ideal and the triumph of the good even in and through its temporary defeat."\textsuperscript{369} Neither would Christianity collapse without continued belief in the historic Jesus.\textsuperscript{370} However, "belief in his unique divinity (was) an expression of essential Christian faith."\textsuperscript{371} Saving faith did not depend upon historical criticism.\textsuperscript{372}

Macintosh concluded that

the upshot of all this then is that Christianity, while enjoying the advantage of historical verification, has this qualification for being the "absolute" and universal religion, that its fate is not bound up with the actuality of any one reputed fact of history, even when that "fact" is the one which surpasses any other fact in its value to humanity.\textsuperscript{373}

\textsuperscript{366}Macintosh, "Is Belief?" (July, 1911), 372.
\textsuperscript{367}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{368}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{369}Ibid., 371.
\textsuperscript{370}Ibid., 372.
\textsuperscript{371}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{372}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{373}Ibid.
Affirming his own Christocentric faith, Macintosh then asked:

May it not perhaps once more have become expedient that the historical Jesus should go away, as it were for a time? And if he go away, then will the Inner Companion come, for then will religious faith be driven back upon the revelation of God within. And doubtless the historical Jesus will come again, and that with greater power than ever, as a result of having successfully endured the crucial tests of critical investigation.\textsuperscript{374}

To compare Macintosh's untraditional, orthodox Christian beliefs as discussed in this chapter with traditional orthodox beliefs as found in the Apostles' Creed, I offer the following summary:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>APOSTLES' CREED</th>
<th>MACINTOSH</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I believe in God the Father Almighty</td>
<td>I know\textsuperscript{375}</td>
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\textsuperscript{374}Macintosh, "Is Belief?" (1912), 109.

\textsuperscript{375}Macintosh, "Toward a New Untraditional Orthodoxy" (1932), 306.
done."  

God is the Supreme, Causal Power, "the eternally transcendent Ideal, the Ideal Spiritual Companion, and the 'Holy' arousing the sense of awe," the creator of an orderly and dependable universe suitable for man's present stage of development. I believe in Jesus Christ, who "was in Jesus Christ, who "was our best individual revelation of what God is doing and seeking to do for man," who revealed the Christlikeness of God as man's moral
dead, and buried; he descended into hell; the third day he rose again from the dead; he ascended into heaven and sits on the right hand of God the Father almighty from thence he shall judge the quick and the dead. I believe in the Holy Spirit, the holy catholic church, the communion of saints; the forgiveness of sins; the resurrection of the body and the life everlasting.

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382 Macintosh, "Is Belief?" (1911), 371.
383 Ibid.
384 Macintosh, "Toward a New Untraditional Orthodoxy" (1932), 306.
385 Macintosh, Personal Religion (1942), 114.
386 Macintosh, "The Meaning of God in Modern Religion" (1926), 457.
387 Macintosh, "Is Belief?" (1911), 371.
Based on this comparison, I conclude that Warfield was correct when he criticized Macintosh's de-emphasis of individual human sin with its feelings of guilt and pollution. However, Macintosh did represent an advance beyond Ritschl in his linking of sin and evil as I will discuss in Chapter Four. Like Bunyan's exemplary "Christian" and "Evangelist," Macintosh emphasized the positive benefits of entering the right religious adjustment instead of negative feelings of guilt and shame. To entice unbelievers to take up the pilgrimage of moral progress leading to personal redemption, he appealed to their myths of innocence and superheroic ability to save themselves. In contrast, Warfield emphasized the revelatory power of the sovereign God to save impotent sinners.\textsuperscript{390}

3.60 MACINTOSH AVOIDED ADDITIONAL CONTROVERSY

As I discussed above, Macintosh made four significant moves to recover the possibility of religious belief in his pro-scientific age. Macintosh stated that he made these moves to avoid the problems of his predecessors. He wanted to avoid the subjective weakness of most recent apologetics, the vulnerability of the historic Jesus, and the problem of truth and proof.\textsuperscript{391} In addition to avoiding these problems,

\textsuperscript{390}Macintosh objected to Calvin's predestination and "exaggerations of human impotence." Religious Realism (1931), 325.

\textsuperscript{391}Macintosh, Reasonableness of Christianity (1925), 2-7, 132, 141.
Macintosh also avoided direct participation in the fundamentalist/modernist controversy and the Social Gospel movement.\(^{392}\) His controversy with Warfield in 1911 and 1912 was his only direct engagement of issues pertaining to the developing fundamentalist/modernist controversy. By arguing to recover the possibility of religious belief, Macintosh sought to deal with larger philosophical issues underlying the two increasingly hostile positions. I contend that he attempted to avoid taking sides in this controversy because of the protean nature of his evangelical theology,\(^{393}\) his desire to hold evangelical Christianity together,\(^{394}\) and his faculty position at Yale Divinity School.

S. Mark Heim described the protean nature of evangelical theology that gave rise to both fundamentalism and modernism in his doctoral dissertation "True Relations: D. C. Macintosh and the Evangelical Roots of Liberal Theology" (1982).\(^{395}\) Heim claimed that Macintosh's evangelical background caused him to try to hold both evangelicalism and the developing liberal or modernist position together.\(^{396}\) As I see it, Macintosh's thought

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\(^{392}\)I am especially indebted to Dr. Boles and Dr. McKenny for their insights regarding Macintosh's avoidance of these two major controversies.

\(^{393}\)S. Mark Heim, "True Relations: D. C. Macintosh and the Evangelical Roots of Liberal Theology" (1982), 7.

\(^{394}\)Ibid., 4, 7.

\(^{395}\)Ibid.

\(^{396}\)Ibid.
exhibited many similarities with his fundamentalist, Southern Baptist contemporary, Edgar Young Mullins (1860-1928), President of the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary in Louisville. Like Macintosh's work, Mullins's thinking notably lacked "the frantic acrimony of Fundamentalism."\(^{397}\) Mullins turned to apologetics in *Why Is Christianity True* (1905),\(^{398}\) as did Macintosh to make Christianity more convincing to the modern mind.\(^{399}\) They both argued apologetically to defend an experientially verified and purified essence of Christianity in the face of scientific threat to Christian belief.\(^{400}\) A comparison of Macintosh's and Mullins's thought is a fruitful area for further research.

I also suggest that Macintosh was able to avoid the fundamentalist/modernist controversy because of his faculty position at Yale Divinity School. As Marsden observed, the fundamentalist/modernist controversy within the Northern Baptist Convention was most heated in the seminaries' faculties instead of in local churches or denominational

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\(^{397}\)Ahlstrom, "Theology In America," 308.


\(^{399}\)Macintosh, *The Reasonableness of Christianity*, 1-25. For an American Presbyterian treatise on Apologetics, see Francis R. Beattie, *Apologetics or the Rational Vindication of Christianity* (Richmond, Virginia: The Presbyterian Committee of Publication, 1903).

\(^{400}\)Mullins, *Why Is Christianity True?* (1905), 397.
associations. In addition, "the strength of the liberals lay primarily in the older seminaries and in the urban churches of the North," as Torbet noted. Therefore, Macintosh, as a faculty member of the well-established, unsectarian Yale Divinity School, was insulated from the heat of the controversy. His educational emphasis on educating students for world-wide evangelism also prompted him to avoid controversy and to construct a Christianity suitable for world missions as I described in Chapter Two.

Macintosh avoided the Social Gospel controversy

I also contend that Macintosh's evangelical background enabled him to avoid the controversy surrounding the Social Gospel movement. I am convinced that his dedication to his protean evangelical background caused him to attempt to remain both a "soul-winner" and a "social gospeler," both an evangelist and a social activist. Many other liberals also avoided participation in the Social Gospel as Ahlstrom noted. Ahlstrom observed that the Social Gospel was "a

401 Marsden, Fundamentalism and American Culture, 106; Furniss, The Fundamentalist Controversy, 1918-1931 (1963), 103-118.

402 Torbet, History of the Baptists, 429.

403 Ahlstrom, Religious History, 786.
transitory phase of Christian social thought. It was a submovement within religious liberalism." Ahlstrom also observed that the Social Gospel was shortlived, dying out after the Great Depression.

Although Macintosh avoided participation in the Social Gospel movement, he did not neglect social issues entirely. In the words of Warren, Macintosh "did not write or lecture on social philosophy per se, but a social philosophy is implicit in his writing and teaching." He wrote articles on "Disarmament," "War," "Prohibition," and "Crime." His book, Social Religion, was published in 1939, more than twenty years after Walter Rauschenbusch wrote on the Social Gospel. In Social Religion, Macintosh claimed that all that man can be

404 Ibid.
405 Ibid.
409 D. C. Macintosh, "After Prohibition and Repeal, What?" Religion in Life 8 3 (Summer, 1939), 23-44.
410 D. C. Macintosh, "Our Crime Problem," The Crozer Quarterly 17 (1940), 55-72.
411 Walter Rauschenbusch, Christianity and the Social Crisis (1911); Christianizing the Social Order (1913); A Theology for the Social Gospel (1917).
required to do—is to translate into the terms of our best twentieth-century empirical knowledge and worldview the principles of social action normatively present in the spirit and ideal of the Jesus of history and expressed by him, quite naturally, in terms of the concepts available in his day.412

3.70 CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I have demonstrated how the concepts of irony, innocence, and myth illuminate Macintosh's classical apologetic arguments to defend religious belief and the Christian faith. As a man of his time, Macintosh took up the apologetic task to address the crisis of modernity that included post-Kantian philosophy, Darwinian science, and secularization of the Judeo-Christian redemption myth. The developing sciences required experiential verification that in turn posed problems for philosophy and theology including epistemology, metaphysics, and morality. To address these problems stemming from the tension between reason and revelation, Macintosh turned to science and its method of empirical verification. He turned to science to support the myths of mythlessness and optimistic innocence out of which he and the larger society operated. In the wake of the secularization of the Judeo-Christian myth, Macintosh turned to empirical science,

412Macintosh, Social Religion (1939), 5.
philosophical realism, and evangelical religious experience to construct critical monistic realism in epistemology.\textsuperscript{413} This move represented an early and decisive departure from the philosophical idealism of the older liberalism.\textsuperscript{414}

Believing that he had proved the possibility of knowledge of independent reality, Macintosh applied his argument to the problem of religious knowledge. I demonstrated how Macintosh's argument broke down at many logical and theological points. Acting out of his myth of innocence or moral optimism as described by Bunyan, Macintosh used his flawed argument to attempt to recover an absolute ground for moral values and the classical apologetic arguments. He also used his argument to construct theology as an empirical science and an untraditional orthodoxy.

I described how Macintosh, like a mythic superhero, engaged the Ritschlian liberal theology to purge it and to correct it of its objectionable dualism, subjectivism, and reliance on the vulnerable historic Jesus. He then defined an essence of Christianity that he thought he could protect from both liberal and conservative challenges. Secure in

\textsuperscript{413}"The object perceived is existentially or numerically identical with the real object at the moment of perception, although the real object may have qualities that are not perceived at that moment; and also that this same object may exist when unperceived, although not necessarily with all the qualities which it possesses when perceived." Macintosh, "Is 'Realistic Epistemological Monism Inadmissible?'" 701; \textit{Problem of Knowledge}, 310-1.

\textsuperscript{414}Hutchison, \textit{The Modernist Impulse} (1976), 214.
his belief in Jesus Christ as the definitive moral example for personal redemption, Macintosh adapted the classical Anselmian tactic of leaving Christ aside to argue for the necessity of belief in Him for man's salvation. Although he made four significant moves to recover Christian belief, Macintosh avoided direct participation in the fundamentalist/modernist controversy and the Social Gospel movement that were prominent in his Progressive Age.

In the next chapter, I will discuss Macintosh's relationship to Albrecht Ritschl based on their theological content. By analyzing the differences in their theological content, I will challenge the common assumption that Ritschl and Macintosh differed in method but were virtually identical in theological doctrinal content. 415

415 Livingston, Modern Christian Thought (1971), 427.
CHAPTER FOUR: MACINTOSH AND RITSCHL: THEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES

4.00 SUMMARY

As I noted in the previous chapter, scholars linked Macintosh with the Ritschlian theology.\(^1\) In fact, Macintosh objected to this link because he rejected Ritschl's romanticism and idealism.\(^2\) Instead, Macintosh claimed to be a Realist, not a Romanticist in the Ritschlian line.\(^3\) I contend that although Ritschl and Macintosh were both reacting against the rationalist assault on the Christian myth, they differed in their responses to this problem.

In this chapter, I demonstrate how Macintosh's internal apologetic argument led inevitably to confusion and to incorrect identification of theological positions.\(^4\) My analysis of Macintosh's work as an apologetic engagement of his opponents' arguments reveals him to be a proponent of religious belief in the face of historical criticism. He also emerges as a significant transition figure in the

\(^1\) Wieman and Meland, American Philosophies of Religion (1936), 155.

\(^2\) Ibid., Macintosh, "Romanticism or Realism, Which?" (1936), 332.

\(^3\) Ibid.

\(^4\) Macintosh, The Reaction Against Metaphysics (1909), 12-3.
development of American neo-orthodoxy. Scholars should begin to listen to what Macintosh himself said about his relationship to the Ritschlian theology and the problems he sought to correct within philosophical and theological liberalism.

I contend that because Macintosh used apologetic tactics to enter Ritschl's method, language, logic, and categories to construct an internal critique, the theological content of their philosophies of religion differed significantly in the following areas:

1. the definition of the essence of Christianity;
2. the inclusion of science;
3. the inclusion of metaphysics;
4. epistemological dualism;
5. pragmatism;
6. the religious consciousness;
7. absolute values;
8. the inclusion of mysticism;
9. the inclusion of natural revelation.

With regard to specific theological doctrines, Macintosh and Ritschl also differed in the following areas:

1. the doctrine of Jesus Christ;
2. the doctrine of the Atonement;
3. the doctrine of the Kingdom of God.
These differences in theological content explain why Macintosh resisted being labeled a Romantic Ritschlian. They also explain how this mistake was made and perpetuated.

4.10 DIFFERENCES IN CONTENT

The essence of Christianity

As I discussed in Chapter Three, the most obvious difference in content between Ritschl and Macintosh was their definition of the essence of Christianity. According to Welch, the Ritschlians, particularly Harnack, had defined the essence of Christianity as the experience of the historic Jesus to protect Christianity from the attack on myth.⁵ In contrast, Macintosh defined the essence of Christianity as the experience of conversion and regeneration through fellowship with the Christlike Heavenly Father or God.⁶ I claim that because of the threat to Christian belief by the Jesus or Christ controversy, Macintosh sought to set Jesus aside and still have an evangelical experiential knowledge of and reasonable belief in God in the tradition of Schleiermacher.⁷

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⁵Welch, Protestant Thought (1972), I, 59-61.

⁶Macintosh, "What is the Christian Religion?" (1914), 46.

⁷Macintosh embraced Schleiermacher's turn to religious experience to provide inner certainty of religious belief. However, Macintosh rejected Schleiermacher's romantic reaction against metaphysics, focus on the subject, dualism leading to agnosticism, and passive dependence of the religious subject. Macintosh, Reaction Against Metaphysics (1909), 32-9, 68-9; Theology as an Empirical Science (1919), 17; Reasonableness of Christianity (1925),
Differences on the inclusion of science

As I discussed in the previous chapter, Macintosh claimed that Ritschl had rejected science in favor of the Eclectic, Social, Historical approach within the Radical Method of theology. In *Justification and Reconciliation* (1874), Ritschl had objected to the scientific presuppositions of the doctrine of God. Ritschl had objected because, when taken seriously, these scientific presuppositions gave rise to "the different species of Rationalism--Deism and Pantheism." Ritschl had complained that science, in the hands of David Strauss, the "successor of Romanticism," became a mask for substituting the Universe "at once cause and effect, inner and outer . . . in place of the conception of a personal God." Therefore, the Universe became "the highest conception of all" and the ground for Strauss's "new faith, his substitute for religion." Ritschl had claimed that such a universe "is

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74; Pilgrimage of Faith (1931), 225; "Theology and Metaphysics" (1947), 204-9.


9Ritschl, *Justification and Reconciliation* (1900), 227.

10Ibid.

11Ibid., 230.

12Ibid., 229.

13Ibid., 230.
already by those descriptions withdrawn from the very conditions of scientific knowledge. It is an object of the imagination, a generalisation of aesthetic feeling."\textsuperscript{14} Ritschl complained that in Strauss's new faith, Jesus had "only a relative significance for the development of the moral ideal."\textsuperscript{15}

In his discussion of the problem that the Ritschlian theology addressed, Alfred E. Garvie noted that the success of science begets confidence; so great a success has bred over-confidence. It seems as if there were no secret of nature that science could not discover, and no force of nature that science could not bring under control. This insight into and power over nature has given to science the conviction that its methods and principles are universally valid; that to its results every interest of man must be subordinated. The effect on Christian theology of such an attitude on the part of science cannot but be dangerous.\textsuperscript{16}

As I discussed above, Macintosh appropriated this confidence in science to support his myths of mythlessness and innocence.

\textsuperscript{14}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{15}Ibid., 413, quoting Strauss' \textit{Life of Jesus for the German People}.

\textsuperscript{16}Alfred E. Garvie, \textit{The Ritschlian Theology} (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1899), 10, quoting Huxley's \textit{Hume}, 51.
Differences on the inclusion and content of philosophy: Metaphysics

According to Macintosh, Schleiermacher and Ritschl had followed in Kant's anti-metaphysical footsteps to regain religious certainty. However, the Ritschlian reaction against metaphysics was the most deliberate, definite, and methodical. Barth observed that Ritschl was a "ferocious opponent of Pietism," and had forbidden metaphysics in theology because Pietism had employed metaphysics to argue for an "immediate relationship with God." According to Barth, Pietism, "which instead of holding solely to the effects of God which can be experienced, seeks to hold also, or indeed predominantly, to a God in himself." Ritschl had reacted against what he termed the wrong understanding of metaphysics:

not that elementary knowledge of things in general which ignores their division into nature and spirit, but such a universal theory as shall be at once elementary and the final and exhaustive science of all particular ordered existence.

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17Macintosh, Reaction Against Metaphysics (1909), 38-40.
18Ibid., 38.
19Barth, Protestant Thought (1959), 394.
20Ibid.
21Ritschl, Justification and Reconciliation (1900), 16.
Consequently, there were "no sufficient grounds for combining a theory of things in general with the conception of God."\textsuperscript{22} Macintosh observed that Ritschl, like Schleiermacher, had feared that metaphysics would corrupt the doctrinal content of the Christian religious faith and theology and undermine its certitude.\textsuperscript{23} Macintosh wryly noted that these fears were not completely groundless.\textsuperscript{24}

I contend that Macintosh operated out of his myth of innocence with its optimistic view of human reason to restore metaphysics to theology and to regain religious certainty, assurance, and morals. Sure of his Christian ground,\textsuperscript{25} Macintosh focused his apologetic efforts on Ritschlianism to expose its agnosticism and logical fallacies. I argue that, because of the moral examples present in myths\textsuperscript{26} and because Ritschl had rejected metaphysics based on the doctrine of value-judgments,\textsuperscript{27} Macintosh turned to value-judgments to attempt to recover metaphysics. Macintosh was aware that the modern mind considered myth and legend as

\textsuperscript{22}\textit{Ibid.}, 17.

\textsuperscript{23}Macintosh, "Theology and Metaphysics" (1947), 206.

\textsuperscript{24}\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{25}Macintosh, "Toward a New Untraditional Orthodoxy" (1932), 281.

\textsuperscript{26}Donald Palmer, \textit{Looking at Philosophy} 2nd ed. (Mountain View, California: Mayfield Publishing Company, 1994), 2.

\textsuperscript{27}Macintosh, \textit{Reaction Against Metaphysics} (1900), 40.
an unconscious social fiction; but unlike legend, it centers immediately in a supermundane being, rather than in an historical personage. Like legend, however, it may have the kind of truth which great poetry has; and inasmuch as this myth of "the man from heaven" is attached to the figure of the historic Jesus, it becomes . . . a most significant expression of appreciation of the supreme religious value of a personality and career.\textsuperscript{28}

To recover morality or value-judgments, Macintosh first had to recover the possibility of knowledge because morality depended upon choice and choice required "knowledge of alternatives."\textsuperscript{29} Therefore, Macintosh developed his experiential, epistemological argument from moral optimism to ground value-judgments in God as the Absolute instead of in relative human values. I will discuss value-judgments later in this chapter.

Epistemology

As I discussed in Chapter Two above, Ritschl had returned to the practical or moral reason (Welch's Option \textsuperscript{30}) that Kant had constructed to support his claims for the knowledge of God.\textsuperscript{31} According to Garvie, Ritschl had defined religious knowledge as value-judgments to confront a growing distrust of Hegelian philosophy.\textsuperscript{32} Ritschl had

\textsuperscript{28}Macintosh, \textit{Theology as an Empirical Science} (1919), 113-4.

\textsuperscript{29}Bainton, \textit{Yale and the Ministry} (1957), 170.

\textsuperscript{30}Welch, \textit{Protestant Thought} (1972), I, 48.

\textsuperscript{31}Barth, \textit{Protestant Thought} (1959), 391.

\textsuperscript{32}Garvie, \textit{The Ritschlian Theology} (1899), 1-5.
responded to this growing distrust of Hegelian philosophy by locating man's knowledge of the essence of "the nature of God and the Divine" in his determination of "its value for our salvation."33

According to Macintosh, Ritschlianism had also rejected both metaphysics and reason as support and verification for its argument for Christian belief.34 The Ritschlians had argued instead "that the spiritually valuable element in Christianity is true, not because it is reasonable, but just because it is valuable."35 Macintosh could not accept this circular argument and its relativistic grounding of value in subjective, variable human experience because it was self-refuting.36 While he did not totally deny relativity, Macintosh did deny "the relativity which denies absoluteness."37 Instead of subjective human feeling, Macintosh required objective value-judgments that represented "an objective Reality which has its own existence and character regardless of us and our opinions."38

33Ritschl, Justification and Reconciliation (1900), 398.
34Macintosh, Reasonableness of Christianity (1925), 15.
35Ibid.
36Macintosh, "The Plain Man's Soliloquy" (1938), 414.
37Ibid., 382.
38Macintosh, The Pilgrimage of Faith (1931), 181.
In his optimistic reliance on human reason, Macintosh rejected Ritschl's anti-philosophical stance because its epistemological dualism and idealism led to subjective reliance on personal opinion.\textsuperscript{39} This subjectivism ultimately eliminated the possibility of knowledge of external reality, including God as the source of moral values. Macintosh complained that Ritschl's theology

notoriously admitted only so much of philosophy as was needed to get rid of philosophy. It was a movement toward a system of faith and thought which, without ceasing to be based upon an appreciation of religious values, was to be frankly philosophical in its eventual procedure and metaphysically defensible in its final results.\textsuperscript{40}

As I see it, Macintosh constructed his elaborate empirical argument from moral optimism specifically to counter Ritschl's anti-philosophical stance and to support his myths of mythlessness and innocence. By turning to empirical science to restore the possibility of knowledge of external reality, Macintosh thought he had recovered the possibility of morality. This morality was based on informed choice and grounded in God as the source and imperative of moral values.

\textsuperscript{39}Macintosh, \textit{Problem of Religious Knowledge} (1940), 249; \textit{Theology as an Empirical Science} (1919), 18.

Pragmatism

Pragmatism presented another challenge to Macintosh in his critique of the Ritschlian theology. Macintosh noted that the alliance of pragmatism and religion was not new and was the source of the vitality and appeal of the Ritschlian theology.\textsuperscript{41} Unfortunately however, the Ritschlians had only partially applied pragmatism to religious or value-judgments.\textsuperscript{42} Macintosh claimed that Ritschl had followed the "double-truth" theory\textsuperscript{43} when he excluded theoretical or scientific and philosophical judgments from his pragmatism.\textsuperscript{44} Macintosh concluded that this partial application of pragmatism made Ritschl's value-judgments unacceptably dualistic and unscientific.\textsuperscript{45}

Macintosh was critical of Ritschl's pragmatism because it "encouraged the impression that certain judgments were valuable and valid in theology, but not in philosophy."\textsuperscript{46} As a result, "Ritschlianism became a partial and dualistic pragmatism, religious in theology and positivistic in

\textsuperscript{41}Macintosh, "Can Pragmatism Furnish a Philosophical Basis for Theology?" Harvard Theological Review III (January, 1910), 132.

\textsuperscript{42}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{43}Macintosh, Reaction Against Metaphysics (1909), 58-69.

\textsuperscript{44}Macintosh, "Can Pragmatism?" (1910), 132.

\textsuperscript{45}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{46}Ibid.
philosophy."47 Its chief mistake was "not seeking to mediate between the scientific and religious views of the world, taking the essential ideas of religion as a working hypothesis in philosophy."48 As a result of the dualism in Ritschlianism's pragmatism, Macintosh rejected it soon after he began teaching at Yale.49 He then constructed representational pragmatism50 to integrate empirical verification into his theological system51 and to support his argument from moral optimism.

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid., 133.

49 Macintosh, "Toward a New Untraditional Orthodoxy" (1932), 303.

50 Macintosh combined the good essence of intellectualism with the good essence of representationalism and pragmatism to define truth as "representation (of subject by predicate, of reality by idea) sufficient to mediate satisfactorily the purpose with which the judgment is made. But what is really true must be representation sufficient to mediate satisfactorily whatever purpose or purposes ought to be recognized in making the judgment. In other words, real truth is practical identity of idea with reality, of predicate with subject, where the practice in question is ultimately satisfactory, as well as the mental instrument which serves it." Macintosh, Problem of Knowledge (1915), 444-5.

51 Macintosh, Reasonableness of Christianity (1925), 233-44.
Differences on the religious consciousness

While he agreed with Schleiermacher on religious experience as the basis of belief in God, Macintosh wanted to avoid the subjective psychology of religion and to recover objectivity in theology. Since Macintosh enthusiastically embraced science, he turned to metaphysics to recover objectivity\(^{52}\) and to provide assurance for the believer. He wanted to go further than Schleiermacher and Ritschl, to develop his theology "as part of a metaphysical theory of reality."\(^{53}\) In making this move to metaphysics, Macintosh was moving to recover objective or independent reality in philosophy and theology as the ground of religious belief and morality.

Differences on absolute values

Macintosh's apologetic correction of Ritschlianism focused on value and value-judgments because they were central to contemporary liberal theological systems and vulnerable to non-religious humanism.\(^{54}\) He agreed that Ritschel's brief theory of religious value-judgment had provided certainty of the knowledge of God in spite of

\(^{52}\)Macintosh, *Reaction Against Metaphysics* (1909), 85.

\(^{53}\)Macintosh, "Theology and Metaphysics" (1947), 214.

Ritschl's Kantian epistemological dualism. However, Macintosh wanted the increased certainty of religious experience of independent reality in which to ground absolute, universal, and eternal values. By grounding absolute, universal, and eternal values in independent reality, Macintosh thought he made "their realization by us . . . imperative." He defined a value as a quality which any object has by virtue of its relation to a teleological or quasi-teleological process. Negative values are qualities possessed by objects by virtue of their being obstacles to the processes in question; positive values attach to objects by virtue of their being either ends or means.

Macintosh's absolute, universal, and eternal values included the existence of real persons, the "value of truth and good will, of spiritual personality in general and spiritual fellowship between persons of good will." They also included a real world of things, and an independent divine existent being.

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57Macintosh, *Problem of Knowledge* (1915), 328.


To link human values with an independently existing higher Reality or causal Factor, Macintosh claimed that his critical monistic realism in epistemology allowed him "to interpret absolutely valid value as divine."\textsuperscript{60} Therefore, man could have knowledge of this independently existing higher Reality or causal Factor.\textsuperscript{61} Man could also interpret his realization of the divinity of absolutely valid value as a divine process.\textsuperscript{62} Macintosh concluded that this freed man from "having to argue from absolute value and the process of its progressive realization to the existence of a divine reality."\textsuperscript{63} However, I am convinced that this circular reasoning begged the original question of the existence of God and ironically reduced God to the subjective opinion or dogmatic assertion that Macintosh rejected.

**Differences on the inclusion of mysticism**

I observe that Macintosh and Ritschl also disagreed on the importance of religious mysticism in addition to their disagreement on the inclusion of philosophy in their theologies. Macintosh noted that Ritschl had rejected the mystical approach within empiricism and had settled on

\textsuperscript{60}Ibid., 229.

\textsuperscript{61}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{62}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{63}Ibid.
historical fact within the Eclectic method. According to Barth, Ritschl had rejected mysticism along with metaphysics as part of his overall rejection of Pietism, because mysticism was "a religiosity which overleaps the will of God and of man." Claiming that he was following Luther's emphasis on justification by faith within the community of believers, Ritschl had rejected religious mysticism as an intrusion of false, decadent, pagan, Neo-Platonic metaphysics into religious life. Ritschl had also objected to mysticism because it excluded the historical element and retreated from moral social action.

Macintosh, on the other hand, carefully allowed room in his apologetic argument for religious mysticism, although he did not depend upon it to make his case. Like his Pietistic ancestors, Macintosh optimistically thought that mysticism could join with pragmatism to provide empirical

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65 Barth, *Protestant Thought* (1959), 394.


verification of the experience of God. Religous pragmatism and religious mysticism could complement and supplement each other's deficiencies. By submitting its subjective certitudes to the practical tests of everyday life, religious mysticism could escape undue dogmatism. According to Macintosh, the resulting synthesis of religious mysticism and religious pragmatism became truly scientific when it used the empirical method. Macintosh was aware however, that extreme mysticism could lead to inertia in moral matters and to unacceptable ecclesiastical decree. He also cautioned that one must not follow mysticism into psychological idealism with its problems of subjective personal opinion.

77 Macintosh, *Problem of Knowledge* (1915), 73-125.
Differences on the inclusion of natural revelation

I maintain that Ritschl and Macintosh also differed significantly on the possibility of natural revelation. As David W. Lotz noted in *Ritschl and Luther* (1974), Ritschl had followed Luther in turning to the Christian community as the "principle for theological construction." In the words of Lotz,

in short, Ritschl claimed to have recovered and renewed the underlying intention of Luther's theology: to break with all speculative metaphysics, natural theology, mysticism, etc., through a theological system at once Christ-centered and community-oriented, a system rooted by conscious design in Christian faith as an event *sui generis*, i.e., as the correlate of God's objective self-revelation in Jesus Christ.

According to Lotz, Ritschl had followed Luther in correlating revelation of God in Christ with faith. In Lotz's words,

this correlation of revelation with faith points to a concluding, all-important feature of Ritschl's theology as informed by Luther: the cardinal motif that owing to the very nature of religion there can be no merely "disinterested" knowledge of God, or positively stated, that "religious knowledge consists of value-judgments."  

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80 Ibid.

81 Ibid., quoting Ritschl in *Justification and Reconciliation*, III, 211.
In contrast to Ritschl's rejection of natural theology, Macintosh optimistically affirmed the natural knowledge of a personal God and argued from human experience to the existence of God.\textsuperscript{82} He constructed an elaborate system of natural revelation\textsuperscript{83} within his epistemology to support his evangelical, Baptist belief in conversion as freely chosen entry to the right religious adjustment with God.

4.20 DIFFERENCES IN THEOLOGICAL DOCTRINAL CONTENT

Although Ritschl and Macintosh employed the Radical, Empirical method in theology to ground religious belief in religious experience, they differed in the doctrinal content of their theologies. I contend that Macintosh's myths of mythlessness and innocence with their highly optimistic view of human abilities caused his theology to differ from Ritschl's theology. Because of their differences in theological content, their doctrinal content also differed. My study of their doctrines of Jesus's Person and Work, Kingdom of God, and Sin reveal how significant these differences were.

\textsuperscript{82}Macintosh, \textit{Reasonableness of Christianity} (1925), 75-83.

\textsuperscript{83}Macintosh, "Natural Revelation" (1942), 22-44.
Ritschl's doctrine of Jesus Christ

In his turn to history, Ritschl did not separate the Jesus of history from the Christ of faith or from the community which he founded. To correct the "many distortions and obscurations which the intellectual content of Christianity has suffered in the course of history," Ritschl criticized those who did not reckon themselves part of the religious community, who embraced a religion of Jesus as only the "Author of new moral legislation, or one of those who have helped to perfect humanity's ideal." In following only the religious example of Jesus, "the advocates of 'the religion of Jesus'

either ignore Jesus' sayings about forgiveness as attached to His person and His death, or regard them as merely casual expressions, or content themselves with supposing that in Jesus' view forgiveness flows directly of itself from moral obedience to the law. (vol. ii. p. 50).

In his attempt to recover the ethical emphasis of Christianity in the wake of Strauss's demythologizing, Ritschl had claimed that

84 Ritschl, Justification and Reconciliation (1900), 3.
85 Ibid., 1.
86 Ibid., 2.
87 Ibid.
Jesus is the bearer of the perfect spiritual religion, which consists in mutual fellowship with God, the Author of the world and its final goal . . . He is before all else the Founder of a religion and the Redeemer of man from the dominion of the world.  

Ritschl had argued that if man wanted to know God, man had to know Christ's influence upon himself.  

the historical figure presented by His life. Therefore the Godhead or universal lordship of Christ must be apprehended in definite features of His historical life, as an attribute of His existence in time.

**Ritschl's moral influence theory of atonement**

As part of his innovative emphasis on the centrality of the Kingdom of God as moral fellowship, Ritschl had employed a double Christology of Christ as Prophet and Priest for us.  

As Prophet, Christ was the perfect revealer of God, the spiritual Lord of the world.  

As Priest, Christ was "the representative of the community which He brings to God through the perfect fulfillment of His personal life."  

His person and work were one as were the divine and human natures in him.  

The Divine nature present in Christ did not exhaust his Godhead but manifested itself "in His

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88Ibid., 414.

89Ibid., 406.

90Ibid.

91Ibid., 417, 546.

92Ibid., 546.

93Ibid.

94Ibid., 393, quoting Martin Luther.
exertions as man. One could only know the nature of God "in its essence by determining its value for our salvation." Jesus Christ's work was the establishment of the community of forgiveness or the Kingdom of God. He was "the instrument of the complete self-revelation of God."  

To construct his double Christology, Ritschl had subsumed the kingly office of Christ that was so important to Schleiermacher into the Priestly and Prophetic offices. In his attempt to avoid a purely objective theory of Christ's substitutionary atonement, Ritschl had claimed that "Christ is first of all a Priest in His own behalf before He is a Priest for others." Man required this priestly atonement or reconciliation with God not "to move God from wrath to grace," but to bring man into God's presence.

Because the priest draws near to God when he brings the gift, therefore he represents before God those in whose behalf he is acting; it is not meant that because the priest and the sacrifice come near to God, the others may remain at a distance from God.

95 Ibid.
96 Ibid., 398.
97 Ibid., 387.
98 Ibid., 436.
99 Ibid., 417, 428, 483.
100 Ibid., 474.
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid.
Ritschl had claimed that because Christ was first of all a Priest in His own behalf before He was a priest for others, "He is the subject of personal religion . . . that true and perfect religion, compared with which no other has been able to bring men to the desired goal of nearness to God."\(^{103}\) Ritschl's Priestly Christ had suffered only in solidarity with man as he could not substitute for human guilt or punishment.\(^{104}\) Jesus Christ's passion was due to his obedience to his Father and to his work.\(^{105}\) Christ had followed his ethical vocation as an example for man to follow.\(^{106}\) As moral exemplar of nearness to God, Jesus Christ, "as the subject of the perfect spiritual religion," had led others "into the same religious attitude to God, so as to adopt as the supreme aim of their own life the realisation of God's kingdom."\(^{107}\)

In his moral influence theory of the atonement, Ritschl had defined the work of Christ as justification or the forgiveness of sins.\(^{108}\) In justification "through the mediation of Christ within His community,"\(^{109}\) God had

\(^{103}\) Ibid., 475.  
\(^{104}\) Ibid., 477.  
\(^{105}\) Ibid., 476-7.  
\(^{106}\) Ibid., 483.  
\(^{107}\) Ibid., 482-3.  
\(^{108}\) Ibid., 85.  
\(^{109}\) Ibid., 140.
accepted "sinners into that fellowship with God in which their salvation is to be realised and carried out into eternal life."\textsuperscript{110} Justification as the forgiveness of sins had removed man's consciousness of guilt and mistrust that had separated him from God.\textsuperscript{111} Justification as reconciliation had replaced man's mistrust of God with the positive assent of his will "to God and his saving purpose."\textsuperscript{112} God did not need to be reconciled to man, but man needed to be reconciled to God. In freely forgiving man's sins, God had removed his guilt\textsuperscript{113} and had freed him for his moral task of realizing the Kingdom of God on earth.

In his emphasis on the Priestly office of Christ, Ritschl had focused on the relationship between Jesus Christ and the community he founded.\textsuperscript{114} Christ's atoning activity was primarily between Jesus Christ and humankind.\textsuperscript{115} According to Ritschl, Jesus Christ had provided salvation as justification or the forgiveness of sin which had removed

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{110}Ibid., 85.
\item \textsuperscript{111}Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{112}Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{113}Ibid., 59-64.
\item \textsuperscript{114}Ibid., 475-7.
\item \textsuperscript{115}Ibid.
\end{itemize}
man's feelings of guilt and had restored his ethical freedom. According to Hägglund, when man believed in God, his distrust and alienation were transformed or reconciled into fellowship with God and his will was changed. Due to this reconciliation, man wanted to perform good deeds and to begin to realize the kingdom of God as his highest end.

Macintosh's belief in Jesus Christ

Although he appeared to have jettisoned belief in Jesus due to the historicism crisis, Macintosh embraced a unified view of the person and work of Christ and stressed Jesus's importance to Christian belief. Macintosh believed that an "essential identity, that is, an identity sufficient for practical religious purposes" existed "between the Christ of faith and the actual Jesus of history." Like Ritschl, Macintosh looked to the religious experience of the historic

116 Ibid., 59-64; Hägglund, History of Theology (1968), 375.

117 Hägglund, History of Theology (1968), 375.

118 Ibid.

119 Macintosh, "Is Belief?" (July, 1911, Jan. 1912); "What Is the Christian Religion?" (1914).

120 Macintosh, Personal Religion (1942), 215.
Jesus who set before us "the true moral example, the true religious example, and the true revelation of God."\textsuperscript{121} There was no salvation apart from Jesus.\textsuperscript{122} The name Jesus meant that he saved his people from their sins.

In addressing the two natures of Christ, Macintosh proposed that Jesus was "divine in the quality or value of his personality."\textsuperscript{123} God was in Christ. Christ was the Divine Man who "exercises the divine function of saving man from his sin."\textsuperscript{124} Jesus was the concrete embodiment of the essence of Christianity.

On the one hand, he represents God in humanity; he is the divine Man, the living Word, the Son and Revealer of God, the Incarnation of the Spirit of God. On the other hand, he is the Redeemer and Saviour of men, the bringer of life and immortality to light, the Great High Priest of humanity, the Mediator and Reconciler between God and sinful men.\textsuperscript{125}

Jesus became the Divine Man through the "immediate presence and working of God, the Holy Spirit."\textsuperscript{126} As the normative revelation of God, Jesus opened

\textsuperscript{121}Macintosh, \textit{Reasonableness of Christianity} (1925), 149.
\textsuperscript{122}Macintosh, \textit{Personal Religion} (1942), 112-3.
\textsuperscript{123}Macintosh, \textit{Reasonableness of Christianity} (1925), 150.
\textsuperscript{124}Ibid., 151.
\textsuperscript{125}Ibid., 156-7.
\textsuperscript{126}Ibid., 114.
up a new and living way to fellowship with God and salvation for us, by making it possible (psychologically) for us, by following the same religious path, to be indwelt, increasingly and to our eternal well-being, by God the Holy Spirit. But the revelation of God in Christ remains normative.\textsuperscript{127}

I claim that although he followed Ritschel's emphasis on the prophetic office of Jesus as moral exemplar, Macintosh rejected the priestly and kingly offices of Jesus. In accordance with Bunyan's "Christian" as moral example,\textsuperscript{128} Jesus's prophetic function was to be man's example for moral progress and to bring sinners feelings of self-condemnation.\textsuperscript{129} When sinners encountered God's revelation of love and grace through the pure self-giving love of Christ, they were "impelled to come to God in repentance and trust, in self-surrender and love."\textsuperscript{130} When man responded to God's love and grace, he became "reconciled to God at heart."\textsuperscript{131} By responding to God in sincere repentance, man fulfilled "the necessary moral condition of forgiveness, or what is called in less personal terms justification."\textsuperscript{132} As members of the universal priesthood of believers, man

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\textsuperscript{127}\textit{Ibid.}.
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\textsuperscript{128}Jewett and Lawrence, \textit{American Monomyth} (1977), 108.
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\textsuperscript{129}Macintosh, \textit{Reasonableness of Christianity} (1925), 157.
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\textsuperscript{130}\textit{Ibid.}, 158.
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\textsuperscript{131}\textit{Ibid.}.
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\textsuperscript{132}\textit{Ibid.}.
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patterned his personal response to God based on the moral example of Jesus Christ. Therefore, Macintosh saw Jesus' mission as more religious than it was social.133 As the revealer of God, Jesus Christ was the true norm for the revelation of God and man's future hope in progress toward the Divine Society.134

In emphasizing the religious nature of Jesus' mission, Macintosh wanted to counter what he thought was the Ritschlian subjective ethical emphasis that had substituted social ethics for religion.135 Ritschl had emphasized the kingdom of God as the task of the community of forgiveness.136 As Garvie observed, in Ritschl's theology, an individual "is not justified by God, and as a result he loves his neighbour. It is as he loves his neighbor that he is justified by God."137 Macintosh however, emphasized the dual role of the individual for right relationship with God and the realization of the Christian social ideal.138

134Macintosh, "Natural Revelation" (1942), 44.
135Macintosh, "The New Theology" (1907), 609.
136Ritschl, Justification and Reconciliation (1900), 30.
137Garvie, The Ritschlian Theology (1899), 251.
138D. C. Macintosh, Social Religion (1939), 129.
making this move, Macintosh attempted to avoid the problems of the historic Jesus. He also emphasized his optimistic Pietistic beliefs concerning the role of the individual in conversion, freedom of the will, and direct access to God. Ironically, Macintosh's move represented a more thorough-going Socratic turn to the self, in my opinion.

Like Ritschl, Macintosh emphatically rejected the idea of Christ as a substitutionary sacrifice to propitiate an offended, angry, and dangerous God.\textsuperscript{139} Macintosh noted that the meaning of the word atonement had changed from "to cause to be at one," to include "traces of the ideas of expiation and propitiation and of such magical or semi-magical notions as were associated with the 'day of atonement.'"\textsuperscript{140} He followed liberal Christianity in rejecting this penal satisfaction theory of atonement as vicarious substitution to satisfy divine justice.\textsuperscript{141} According to Macintosh, this theory of atonement was unreasonable and immoral.\textsuperscript{142}

On the other hand, Macintosh criticized liberal Christianity because it failed to provide an adequate alternative to the traditional substitutionism that it had

\textsuperscript{139}Macintosh, "What Is the Christian Religion?" (1914), 35.

\textsuperscript{140}Macintosh, \textit{Personal Religion} (1942), 122-3.

\textsuperscript{141}Macintosh, "What Is the Christian Religion?" (1914), 37.

\textsuperscript{142}Macintosh, \textit{Reasonableness of Christianity} (1925), 158.
successfully discredited.\textsuperscript{143} He thought that liberal Christianity was correct in making its theory of redemption reasonable and consistent with its ethical and moral view of God.\textsuperscript{144} However, it was religiously and morally inadequate. Macintosh thought it merely added a "new and more rigorous law, the 'new commandment' of Christian, self-giving love; it does not state the Christian gospel."\textsuperscript{145}

As I see it, Macintosh emphasized individual pilgrimage, a personal relationship with God, and salvation apart from Jesus Christ, the scriptures, creeds, confessions, or the church. This position contrasted sharply with Ritschl's emphasis on the saving relationship between Jesus Christ and the community he founded.\textsuperscript{146} Instead, Macintosh's position corresponded to Ritschl's followers of a religion of Jesus apart from the religious community of salvation, in my opinion. Ritschl had criticized those who thought Jesus' significance could "be stated completely in terms of personal imitation," because "they overlook the very fact Jesus withdraws Himself from imitation when He sets Himself over against His disciples as the Author of forgiveness."\textsuperscript{147}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{143}Macintosh, \textit{Personal Religion} (1942), 123.
\item \textsuperscript{144}Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{145}Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{146}Ritschl, \textit{Justification and Reconciliation} (1900), 2, 475-7.
\item \textsuperscript{147}Ibid., 2.
\end{itemize}
Macintosh's more moral theory from Edwards and Bushnell

Macintosh criticized the liberal moral influence theory of atonement as developed by Charles Allen Dinsmore (b. 1860) and Horace Bushnell (1802-1876) because it was inadequate in its view of sin. The moral influence theory also over-estimated the ability of the preaching of Divine love to arouse the dead conscience. Sin was merely a broken relationship between an individual and God. Grace as forgiveness came too cheaply. Liberalism's ideas of repentance and forgiveness failed to take seriously the evil consequences of mankind's sin. According to Macintosh, the moral influence theory lacked the hope of a future reconciliation. It also lacked the need for humankind's response to appropriate and to effect reconciliation.

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148 Ibid., 123-5.
149 Ibid., 124.
150 Ibid.
151 Ibid.
152 Ibid.
153 Ibid.
154 Ibid.
Because of the moral inadequacies of this theory, Macintosh developed what he termed a still more moral influence theory of atonement.\textsuperscript{155} He turned to the thought of Jonathan Edwards to supplement Bushnell's inadequate view of sin.\textsuperscript{156} Macintosh cited man's inability to repent and to forgive to satisfy a perfectly moral God and his moral consciousness.\textsuperscript{157} Therefore, man had to uproot and destroy sin and its evil consequences because the past event of Jesus's crucifixion could not satisfy God's righteousness in the present or in the future.\textsuperscript{158} God would ultimately satisfy his own righteousness but only in the future.\textsuperscript{159} In his innocent, optimistic view of human ability and moral progress, Macintosh emphasized the importance of man's freely chosen response to God.\textsuperscript{160} He emphasized man's free response to God because


\textsuperscript{156}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{157}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{158}Macintosh, \textit{Reasonableness of Christianity} (1925), 158.

\textsuperscript{159}Macintosh, \textit{Personal Religion} (1942), 127.

\textsuperscript{160}Macintosh, "Some Reflections" (1933), 107.
so long as there is an individual will which is not righteous, and so long as there is a social relation which is not righteous, God's righteousness will not be completely satisfied. And if God is not yet fully satisfied, man has no right to be.161

To construct his own more moral theory of atonement, Macintosh turned to Paul's doctrine that God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself.162 This idea overflowed and broke down the Old Testament theory of sacrifice.163 Man's real problem was not how to reconcile God to himself but how to reconcile himself to God.164 Man's reconciliation of himself to God "necessarily involves the reconciliation of man to man."165 In his optimistic view of man's ability to reconcile himself to God and to one another, Macintosh thought God would not forgive man's trespasses if he did not forgive the trespasses of others.166 Because of his optimism that the divine life was immanent in man, Macintosh claimed that

161Ibid.
162Macintosh, Theology as an Empirical Science (1919), 126.
163Ibid.
164Ibid.
165Macintosh, Reasonableness of Christianity (1925), 159.
166Ibid.
the Reality we are reconciled to in being reconciled to God is in our fellow men. If we are not ready to be reconciled to man whom we have not seen, how shall we be reconciled to God whom we have not seen? . . . Full atonement is impossible without the at-one-ment, or unification, of man with man in a universal brotherhood. Full atonement is thus not a fact of past history, but an ideal for the future, and in the end as truly a matter of social relations as it is of personal religious experience.\textsuperscript{167}

According to Macintosh, man experienced salvation or redemption in addition to reconciliation.\textsuperscript{168} Macintosh defined salvation as "deliverance from evil, actual or potential, through the divine agency."\textsuperscript{169} He defined the conviction of sin as "moral self-dissatisfaction, together with the more or less explicit sense of the need of at-one-ment with God and man."\textsuperscript{170} Man felt that he needed at-one-ment with God "however, not for the sake of external pardon and future safety, but rather for the sake of being in harmony with the divine, and for the sake of moral power and triumph over sin."\textsuperscript{171} Out of man's felt need for harmony, moral power and triumph, he made a volitional decision to take up the Christian life religiously and morally.\textsuperscript{172} Macintosh was optimistic that when man made this volitional

\textsuperscript{167}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{168}Macintosh, \textit{Theology as an Empirical Science} (1919), 132.
\textsuperscript{169}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{170}Ibid., 133.
\textsuperscript{171}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{172}Ibid., 134.
decision, he could normally experience the assurance of atonement or reconciliation with God and a sense of forgiveness of past sins.\textsuperscript{173}

\textbf{The doctrine of the kingdom of God}

As I discussed above, Ritschl had identified the spiritual society that Christ had instituted as a moral fellowship, the Kingdom of God.\textsuperscript{174} He had reinterpreted the doctrine of the sovereignty of God as the religious moral fellowship that Christ as Lord institutes\textsuperscript{175} and emphasized its present status. According to Ritschl, God had revealed himself through Christ as loving Will.\textsuperscript{176} This revelation had assured believers of spiritual dominion over the world and of perfect moral fellowship in the Kingdom of God as the highest good.\textsuperscript{177} God, as the Author of Forgiveness, was love in this system, not wrathful judge or lawgiver.\textsuperscript{178} Ritschl had explained God's wrath as a modification of his Divine love and not its opposite.\textsuperscript{179} The God of reconciling love who had established sinners in the Kingdom of God as

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{173}Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{174}Ritschl, \textit{Justification and Reconciliation} (1900), 252.
\item \textsuperscript{175}Ibid., 30.
\item \textsuperscript{176}Ibid., 466.
\item \textsuperscript{177}Ibid., 389.
\item \textsuperscript{178}Ibid., 321.
\item \textsuperscript{179}Ibid.
\end{itemize}
the highest good was also the loving ground of creation and
government of the cosmos.\textsuperscript{180} When God had reconciled us to
himself, he had reconciled us to the cosmos and to one
another. God's righteousness or justice was "His self-
consistent and undeviating action in behalf of the salvation
of the members of His community; in essence it is identical
with His grace."\textsuperscript{181} Therefore, God's righteousness was
continuous with Christ's righteousness to which he calls us.

According to Ritschl, the religious moral fellowship or
Kingdom of God as instituted by Christ, was God's final end
and the supramundane final end of the world.\textsuperscript{182} It was
man's \textit{summun bonum} and the common task of the Christian
community.\textsuperscript{183} The Kingdom of God was the "correlate of
God's love in so far as it is the association of men for
reciprocal and common action from the motive of love."\textsuperscript{184}
Its task was the "moral unification of the human race,
through action prompted by universal love to our
neighbour,"\textsuperscript{185} through the good will. However, the Kingdom
of God was different from the legally constituted Church.\textsuperscript{186}

\textsuperscript{180} \textit{Ibid.}, 320-1.
\textsuperscript{181} \textit{Ibid.}, 473-4.
\textsuperscript{182} \textit{Ibid.}, 281.
\textsuperscript{183} \textit{Ibid.}, 30.
\textsuperscript{184} \textit{Ibid.}, 290.
\textsuperscript{185} \textit{Ibid.}, 280.
\textsuperscript{186} \textit{Ibid.}, 288.
While Ritschl had recognized the future nature of the Kingdom of God in his emphasis on its present nature, members of his school emphasized the present nature of the Kingdom of God to the exclusion of its eschatological promises, as Hägglund observed.\textsuperscript{187} Johannes Weiss and Albert Schweitzer challenged this concept of the Kingdom of God as a present reality and focused on the Kingdom of God as a future, eschatological reign of God.\textsuperscript{188} Their eschatological view presented serious problems for the historical critical position of Wilhelm Herrmann and Adolf Harnack.\textsuperscript{189}

In contrast to Ritschl, Macintosh identified the Kingdom that Jesus Christ was to establish on earth as the sovereignty of God as expressed in the "parables and other sayings attributed to the prophet of Nazareth."\textsuperscript{190} According to Macintosh, God would rule on earth through justice, kindness, and faith.\textsuperscript{191} His Kingdom was an internal reign founded upon the absolute standards of absolute honesty, purity, unselfishness, and love.\textsuperscript{192} Within His Kingdom, God would judge man's character by his

\textsuperscript{187}Hägglund, \textit{History of Theology} (1968), 394.
\textsuperscript{188}\textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{189}\textit{Ibid.}, 389-94.
\textsuperscript{190}Macintosh, \textit{Social Religion} (1939), 5.
\textsuperscript{191}\textit{Ibid.}, 15.
\textsuperscript{192}\textit{Ibid.}, 26-31.
conduct toward the underprivileged. In all of mankind were vital factors in the coming of this Kingdom. In order to realize the Christian social ideal, Christians had to be "committed to the will of God . . . 2. The will of God is right, and whatever is right is the will of God. 3. The will of God is the greatest and highest well-being of humanity." In his high assessment of human reason, Macintosh thought man could know the will of God to a great extent. It was right for man to hate evil but wrong for man to hate people. Man's highest loyalty was to the will of God and the greatest ultimate well-being of all humanity. Man had to use scientific knowledge and social processes and relationships to prevent war, to abolish poverty, to safeguard liberty, and to reform government. I suggest that Macintosh's understanding of the Kingdom of God differed from Ritschl's due to Macintosh's Pietistic emphasis on the internal reign of God and his optimistic view of man's individual ability to enter the right

193 Ibid., 40-55.
194 Ibid., 3.
195 Ibid., 129.
196 Ibid.
197 Ibid., 130.
198 Ibid.
199 Ibid., 3, 130.
200 Ibid., 26-30.
religious adjustment. Ritschl had emphasized the kingdom of God as the task of the God-justified community of forgiveness.\footnote{Ritschl, \textit{Justification and Reconciliation} (1900), 30.} According to Ritschl, an individual "is not justified by God, and as a result he loves his neighbour. It is as he loves his neighbor that he is justified by God."\footnote{Garvie, \textit{The Ritschlian Theology} (1899), 251.} Macintosh however, optimistically emphasized the dual role of the individual for right relationship with God and the realization of the Christian social ideal.\footnote{Macintosh, \textit{Social Religion} (1939), 129.} He also differed from Ritschl in his stress on the hope of a future immortality to assure man in his life in the present,\footnote{Macintosh, \textit{Pilgrimage of Faith} (1931), 201; \textit{The Hope of Immortality} (1938), 163; \textit{Theology as an Empirical Science} (1919), 213-5.} in my opinion.

I contend that Macintosh's understanding of the kingdom of God was also influenced by the premillennialist-postmillennialist controversy in the United States over the imminent return of Christ.\footnote{Macintosh, \textit{Theology as an Empirical Science}, 213.} Macintosh claimed that a scientific understanding of the world we live in and of the history of the Jewish-Christian way of thinking produces the conviction that there is no adequate ground for either pre-millennialism or post-millennialism as a whole.\footnote{Ibid.}
He opted for a modern, "non-adventist view" that was present in the Gospel of John and in its present-day form looks for the progressive domination of individuals and society by the moral and religious principles of essential Christianity, i.e., by the "Spirit of Christ." To this end, Macintosh regarded the earth "as God's public school or kindergarten for the human spirit" to prepare the immortal human spirit for "the endless life beyond."
In Ritschl's system, man's consciousness of guilt expressed his separation from both God and his "own moral destiny." Man experienced guilt "as expressive of the lack of religious fellowship with God being itself the initial manifestation of punishment as the forfeiture of the privilege of Divine sonship." According to Ritschl, guilt denotes that contradiction of God on which the individual as well as the totality of mankind has entered through the non-fulfillment of the moral law, and which is recognised as present through the consciousness of guilt in which the individual feels with pain the unworthiness of his own sin as well as his share in the guilt of all.

Forgiveness was God's removal of guilt which freed man for his moral task of realizing God's kingdom on earth.

Ritschl had thought that sin was

in all instances, opposition to the good, that conception being defined in the ethical sense, so that the least deviation from the good or even the simple omission of the good already forms opposition thereto.

Ignorance was also a "very significant factor in the origin and development of sin." Man required education as to the knowledge of good and the moral law. Ignorance was

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214 Ibid., 58.
215 Ibid., 384.
216 Ibid., 58.
217 Ibid., 59.
218 Ibid., 377.
219 Ibid.
220 Ibid.
the essential condition of the conflicts which arise between the will and the order of society regarded as the standard of the good, and also the condition of the fact that the will confirms itself in its opposition to the order of society.221

According to Ritschl, the different grades of habitual sin had accumulated "in the vast complexity of sinful action."222 This accumulation of sin was the kingdom of sin that encompassed all of humanity.223 This kingdom of sin or "sinful federation with others" had actively opposed the Kingdom of God.224 Ritschl had stressed that the kingdom of sin was not the same as the doctrine of original sin that he had rejected.225

Ritschl had agreed with Schleiermacher in defining the subject of sin as

humanity as the sum of all individuals, in so far as the selfish action of each person, involving him as it does in illimitable interaction with all others, is directed in any degree whatsoever towards the opposite of the good, and leads to the association of individuals in common evil.226

221Ibid., 377-8.
222Ibid., 338.
223Ibid.
224Ibid.
226Ibid., 335.
However, Ritschl had rejected Schleiermacher's idea of evil as Divine punishment. In Ritschl's thought, man had perceived evil as hindrances to his freedom. The notion of evil was determined by the relative standard of the freedom of the individual. In point of fact the notion of evil is so much a relative one, that evils may be turned into good or into means towards moral good, which would never be the case with sin.

Macintosh also recognized "a kingdom of sin and of consequent death" but emphasized man's capabilities of free will and moral culpability. In contrast to Ritschl's definition of sin as ignorance Macintosh quipped that "Experience shows, however, that ignorance of God is curable." Macintosh was optimistic in his belief in man's ability to cure sin as ignorance, to make informed choices and to be ethically responsible. Therefore, he placed a heavy emphasis on Christian education as part of his philosophical, theological, and evangelical agenda.

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231 Ritschl, *Justification and Reconciliation* (1900), 377.
233 Macintosh, "Some Reflections" (1933), 111.
Because of his high view of individual progress, Macintosh defined sin as man's "deliberate choice of something inferior to the best possible under the circumstances."\textsuperscript{235} This choice was "always absolutely evil and forever regrettable; but by its very definition it is the creation of the finite self whose deed it is."\textsuperscript{236} In its religious sense, sin was "moral evil viewed as an offense against God. Moral evil may be against oneself" or "against the true well-being of other human beings."\textsuperscript{237} Over time, this sin as moral evil destroyed man's character instead of building up the image of God in him.\textsuperscript{238} When man acted contrary to the will of God for himself, he progressively destroyed his character.\textsuperscript{239} If man continued in sin, he suffered the consequences of moral degradation, continuing evil influence, and "alienation from God and from all the most desirable personal relationships."\textsuperscript{240} Macintosh reflected on the imagery of the "bottomless pit" for those who continued in moral degradation.\textsuperscript{241} To escape this kingdom

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{235}Macintosh, \textit{Pilgrimage of Faith} (1931), 249
\item \textsuperscript{236}\textit{Ibid.}
\item \textsuperscript{237}Macintosh, \textit{Personal Religion} (1942), 109.
\item \textsuperscript{238}\textit{Ibid.}
\item \textsuperscript{239}\textit{Ibid.}, 109-110.
\item \textsuperscript{240}\textit{Ibid.}, 110.
\item \textsuperscript{241}\textit{Ibid.}
\end{enumerate}
of sin, man needed divine deliverance. He needed to be "reconciled' to and 'at one' with God and so to 'have God.'"243

According to Macintosh, the freedom of man's moral personality however, was "worth the price that may have had to be paid for it."244 As man exercised his free will, he could choose actions and character contrary to God's good will for him.245 Therefore, man was responsible and to blame for his choices.246 Man could experience guilt because of his sinfulness.247 Sin was original in the sense that man could inherit natural tendencies that caused him to behave badly.248 While man was not to be blamed for his natural inheritances "we are responsible, to the full extent of our freedom, for what we do about it and with it, for what we make of it. We have no need to repent for what we

242Ibid.
244Macintosh, Reasonableness of Christianity (1925), 101.
245Macintosh, Personal Religion (1942), 108.
246Ibid.
247Ibid.
248Ibid.
never could have helped."249 Unless man always did the very best that was possible for him, he "sinned and acquired guilt."250

In his evangelical emphasis on the role of the individual in conversion, Macintosh stressed the hopeful fact that "all sin is unpardonable, so long as it is not repented of; but no sin is unforgivable, if it is sincerely and wholeheartedly repented of."251 If man continued to resist "the call to repentance and to the faith which makes whole-hearted repentance possible," he tended "to make impenitence and 'unbelief' irreligion, permanent."252 As long as man continued in this state there was "no 'forgiveness.' 'Unbelief,' failure to respond to the grace of God, is the crowning sin, for the reason that it makes impenitence chronic."253

Macintosh also argued that sin had a social or corporate aspect.254 Corporate sin against the true well-being of other human beings, is often done in ignorance; but, on the other hand, this ignorance may be blameworthy, by reason of indifference or moral inertia which might have been overcome.255

249Ibid.
250Ibid.
251Macintosh, Personal Religion (1942), 110-1.
252Ibid., 111.
253Ibid.
254Ibid., 109.
Man "must learn to do right, i.e., to act in accord with a proper appreciation of values and a correct understanding of consequences." 256

As I discussed in Chapter Three above, Macintosh was optimistic in his view of death and human moral failure as an acceptable "price to pay for an orderly and dependable universe." 257 I maintain that his overwhelming myth of optimistic innocence blinded him to the pain and despair of human depravity, tragedy, irony, and innocent suffering. Without an adequate awareness of the depths of human sinfulness and agony, Macintosh's innocent conception of reality was unrealistically optimistic. Ironically, his critical monistic realism was ultimately out of touch with the reality of the twentieth century, in my opinion. I will discuss Macintosh's realism in greater detail in the next chapter.

4.40 CONCLUSION

Wieman and Meland labeled Macintosh as a Ritschlian style Romantic liberal, within the philosophical group of ethical intuitionists 258 based on his superficial similarity with the Ritschlian theology. However, Macintosh personally

256 Macintosh, Theology as an Empirical Science (1919), 198.

257 Macintosh, Reasonableness of Christianity (1925), 103.

258 Wieman and Meland, American Philosophies of Religion (1936), 149-55.
objected to this assessment and rejected Ritschl's romanticism and idealism.\textsuperscript{259} Macintosh claimed to be a religious Realist, not a Romanticist in the Ritschlian line. He offered two meanings for the term religious realism: "the one a theory of religious knowledge, the other that realistic attitude in religion which insists on due recognition of all the facts of evil as well as those of good."\textsuperscript{260} Macintosh claimed that he held a "realistic theory of knowledge" that posited

a Divine Reality which exists whether it is recognized or not, which may be directly experienced and known, and which may not only have qualities which do not appear to us but may also have, as presented in our experience, apparent qualities which cannot be taken as valid revelation of what the independently existing Divine Reality is.\textsuperscript{261}

Macintosh argued that when he applied "philosophical tests of value and scientific tests of truth" to "subjective intuitions of faith," he was very careful "not to draw conclusions which are not logically justified."\textsuperscript{262} Macintosh concluded that "realism . . . rather than 'romanticism' is still the more appropriate descriptive term for the attitude and point of view."\textsuperscript{263}

\textsuperscript{259}\textit{Ibid.}, Macintosh, "Romanticism or Realism, Which?" (1936), 325-32.

\textsuperscript{260}\textit{Ibid.}, "Romanticism or Realism, Which?" (1936), 326.

\textsuperscript{261}\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{262}\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{263}\textit{Ibid.}, 332.
Because of the significant theological differences between Macintosh and Ritschl, Macintosh's criticisms of Ritschlian liberalism, his rejection of philosophical idealism, and his construction of theology as an empirical science and an untraditional orthodoxy, I conclude that Macintosh was not a Ritschlian-style liberal. Instead, I claim that he employed liberalism's language, logic, and categories to turn it to a new orthodoxy. I argue that he was a transitional figure between an older liberalism and a developing "new" or modern orthodoxy for which his students H. Richard and Reinhold Niebuhr and Robert Lowery Calhoun became famous. Macintosh's philosophical, critical monistic realism in theology contained the seeds of some of H. Richard Niebuhr's theology. Niebuhr's God as Friend, value theory, radical monotheism, and human response to God anticipating a further divine response possessed similarities with his teacher's thought. In addition, Macintosh's morally optimistic myths of innocence and mythlessness or scientific superiority stimulated H. Richard Niebuhr to develop critical realism, neo-orthodoxy, value-theory, and a tragic view of atonement. These myths also stimulated Reinhold Niebuhr to recover irony, sin, and the truth in myths as I will discuss in the next chapter.

264 "The object perceived is existentially or numerically identical with the real object at the moment of perception, although the real object may have qualities that are not perceived at that moment; and also that this same object may exist when unperceived, although not necessarily with all the qualities which it possesses when perceived." Macintosh, "Is 'Realistic Epistemological Monism Inadmissible?'" 701; Problem of Knowledge, 310-1.
CHAPTER FIVE: IRONY, INNOCENCE, MYTH, MACINTOSH, AND THE NIEBUHRS

5.00 SUMMARY

The concepts of irony, innocence, and myth illuminate the relationship between Macintosh and his former students H. Richard and Reinhold Niebuhr. In this chapter I will analyze how these concepts reveal Macintosh to be a transitional figure between a reigning older optimistic, anthropocentric liberalism and the Niebuhrs' developing American neo-orthodoxy. I demonstrate how Macintosh's optimistic myths of innocence and scientific superiority were at the heart of the Niebuhrs' criticisms of his work. Macintosh's denial of tragedy, innocence, and myth was a primary difference between his critical monistic realism\(^1\) in epistemology and H. Richard Niebuhr's return to orthodoxy.\(^3\)

\(^1\)H. Richard Niebuhr, "Religious Realism and the Twentieth Century," Religious Realism (1931), ed. by D. C. Macintosh, 414.

\(^2\)Macintosh, "Is 'Realistic Epistemological Monism Inadmissible?'" (1913), 701; "The object perceived is existentially or numerically identical with the real object at the moment of perception, although the real object may have qualities that are not perceived at that moment; and also that this same object may exist when unperceived, although not necessarily with all the qualities which it possesses when perceived." Problem of Knowledge (1915), 310-1.

My analysis also reveals some significant similarities and differences between Macintosh and H. Richard Niebuhr in the areas of realism, value-theory, objectivism, the sovereignty of God, revelation, conversion, and atonement. In addition, I will discuss how irony, innocence, and myth illuminate Reinhold Niebuhr's criticism of Macintosh's work.

5.10  H. RICHARD NIEBUHR (1894-1962) AND D. C. MACINTOSH

Macintosh's former student and colleague at Yale, H. Richard Niebuhr, Professor of Christian Ethics, provided insightful criticisms of Macintosh's work. Calling Macintosh a "Christ of culture liberal," Niebuhr addressed the problems which Macintosh set in the areas of realism, objectivism and dualism, radical monotheism and the sovereignty of God, revelation, conversion and freedom of


\[\text{\footnotesize 5}H. \text{ R. Niebuhr, } \textit{Religious Realism} \text{ (1931), 413-28.}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize 6}H. \text{ R. Niebuhr, } \textit{Christ and Culture} \text{ (1951).}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize 7}H. \text{ Richard Niebuhr, } \textit{Radical Monotheism and Western Culture} \text{ (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1960).}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize 8}H. \text{ Richard Niebuhr, } \textit{The Meaning of Revelation} \text{ (New York: the Macmillan Company, 1941); } \textit{"Value Theory and Theology"} \text{ (1937).}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize 9}\text{Ibid.}\]
the will, atonement,\textsuperscript{10} and value-theory.\textsuperscript{11} Niebuhr then constructed his own internal apologetic in these areas to correct what he perceived were weaknesses in Macintosh's position, according to Gerald P. McKinney.\textsuperscript{12} Finally, Niebuhr constructed his American neo-orthodoxy based on the sovereignty of God, radical monotheism, tragedy, and human response. While Niebuhr's criticisms showcased his positions, in some ways they misinterpreted Macintosh. I suggest that H. Richard Niebuhr misinterpreted Macintosh because Macintosh was also engaged in an apologetic critique and correction of Ritschlian liberalism and the American empirical tradition.

By "Christ of culture liberal," Niebuhr referred to those who "find in Jesus the great exponent of man's religious and ethical culture."\textsuperscript{13} He placed Macintosh into this category together with Adolf Harnack, A. E. Garvie (1861-1945), Leonhard Ragaz (1868-1945), and Shailer Mathews.\textsuperscript{14} According to Niebuhr, these liberals employed the Ritschlian interpretation of


\textsuperscript{11}H. R. Niebuhr, "Value-Theory and Theology" (1937), 93-116.

\textsuperscript{12}McKenny, "Theological Objectivism as Empirical Theology: H. Richard Niebuhr and the Liberal Tradition" (January, 1991), 19-33.

\textsuperscript{13}H. R. Niebuhr, \textit{Christ and Culture} (1951), 101.

\textsuperscript{14}Ibid.
Jesus as a Christ of culture, in both senses: as the guide of men in all their labor to realize and conserve their values, and as the Christ who is understood by means of nineteenth-century cultural ideas.\textsuperscript{15} Niebuhr claimed that a conflict between man and nature, with Jesus as the leader of man's efforts to subdue and transcend nature resided behind these Christ of culture liberals.\textsuperscript{16} In reality, this conflict was between man and God, with Jesus Christ at the center, as "victim and mediator."\textsuperscript{17} While I agree that Macintosh showed some similarities with these liberals, I do not think he fit the profile exactly. He did appropriate the reigning cultural myths of innocence and mythlessness with their emphases on science, ethics, optimism, and philosophy to construct his apologetic arguments. Like Niebuhr's Christ of culture liberals, Macintosh favored law over grace,\textsuperscript{18} and described the human dilemma as conflict between nature and man, in my opinion. As I discussed in Chapter Three, Macintosh spoke of God as Friend to the man in the right religious adjustment, and left Jesus Christ out of the salvation equation. However, I contend that Macintosh's position was contrary to Niebuhr's

\textsuperscript{15}Ibid., 98.
\textsuperscript{16}Ibid., 101.
\textsuperscript{17}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{18}Niebuhr, Christ and Culture (1951), 113.
assessment of popular theology as "The Fatherhood of God and the Brotherhood of Man." According to Macintosh, God was Friend and not Father. In addition, Macintosh followed Bunyan and emphasized man's individual, personal decision for God in contrast to the liberals' emphasis on solidarity with one's fellows.

Religious realism

In his first significant critique of his teacher's philosophical and theological position entitled "Religious Realism and the Twentieth Century" (1931), Niebuhr focused on religious realism. As I see it, Niebuhr criticized American religious realism, with Macintosh as its leading proponent, clearly in mind. Niebuhr attributed religious realism to a reaction against the nineteenth-century's anthropocentric, anthropocratic, and optimistic philosophy. This philosophy contained an unacceptable

19 Ibid., 101.
20 Macintosh, Theology as an Empirical Science (1919), 167; Pilgrimage of Faith (1931), 283.
21 Niebuhr, Christ and Culture (1951), 97.
24 H. R. Niebuhr, "Religious Realism" (1931), 414-6.
humanistic focus on the religious subject. In opposition to the "youthful and ebullient individualism" of idealism, realism was the mature "world-view of democracy . . . the attitude of a matured science which understands its limitations and the stark givenness of the facts which it seeks to understand." Realism expressed "the point of view of a time which has learned that failure is no less symptomatic of reality than triumph, decline no less significant of process than is progress."

Against the earlier anthropocentric, optimistic focus on the religious subject, religious realists were interested in "maintaining the independent reality of the religious object" and in advancing "'inevitably from a religion of humanity to a religion of God.'" Therefore, religious realism represented "a movement distinctly different from 19th century liberal theology which found its center of gravity in the ideal of the ethical value of religion." Niebuhr observed that although religious realism shared the "ethical interest" and accepted

25 Ibid., 415-6.
26 Ibid., 416.
27 Ibid., 417.
28 Ibid., 419.
29 Ibid., 424.
30 Ibid., 419.
many of the critical results of liberalism, it has shifted the center of interest from the subject to the object, from man to God, from that which is purely immanent in religious experience to that which is also transcendent.\textsuperscript{31}

To develop his criticism of American religious realism, Niebuhr turned to a philosophically more satisfactory form of religious objectivism (that) is represented in German theology by Paul Tillich and his associates who have adopted the term "faith realism" to designate their position.\textsuperscript{32}

According to Niebuhr, "from the point of view of German realism, the American movement seems to be insufficiently critical of the empirical."\textsuperscript{33} From this perspective, Niebuhr leveled six criticisms at American realism:

1. Although it underestimated the "objectivist interest and method of American theology," German realism opposed deriving "religious content from the experience of nature rather than from religious experience."\textsuperscript{34} American realism ignored "unduly the actuality of evil and chaos in the experience of the external world"

\textsuperscript{31}Ibid., 419.

\textsuperscript{32}Ibid., 421, See Tillich, Religiöse Lage der Gegenwart; Religiöse Verwirklichung; "Religionsphilosophie," in Dessoir, Lehrbuch der Philosophie, Kairos; Protestantismus als Kritik und Gestaltung.

\textsuperscript{33}Ibid., 424.

\textsuperscript{34}Ibid.
and sacrificed "important religious values which are to be found in faith but not in the natural theology based on such empiricism."\textsuperscript{35} Therefore, American religious realism lacked critical quality in "the sphere in which theological realism is primarily interested in the interpretation of religious experience proper."\textsuperscript{36}

2. Because American religious realism did "not recognize the dualism resident in religious experience" it neglected "the factor of faith by means of which the reference to the transcendent is made."\textsuperscript{37} Therefore it confused "the object in experience with that which experience intends.\textsuperscript{38} The failure to recognize this dualism caused American religious realism to appear "to be insufficiently critical and in danger of falling back into subjectivism."\textsuperscript{39}

3. Modern German philosophy of religion also complained that American religious realism was "still too much under the influence of a progressive and technological era which is interested in knowledge for the sake of power."\textsuperscript{40} Under this optimistic influence, religion

\textsuperscript{35}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{36}Ibid., 425.
\textsuperscript{37}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{38}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{39}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{40}Ibid.
was "prone to define God in terms of his utilizable relations to the neglect of his uniquely divine or holy character."\(^{41}\) This optimistic religion tended "to define religion in terms of adjustment to divine reality for the sake of gaining power rather than in terms of revelation which subject the recipient to the criticism of that which is revealed."\(^{42}\)

4. The Germans thought that American realistic theology passed "over too rapidly into an applied science in which rules of procedure are formulated and a religious technique is elaborated."\(^{43}\) This religious technique was then employed to "use God in the service of interests which remain human, however much they may be criticized and refined."\(^{44}\)

5. German realism complained that American realism was "too optimistic about the availability of God in religious experience," and tended "toward an individualism which fails to recognize the importance of historical revelation."\(^{45}\) American thought was "too optimistic and too individualistic, too much allied with

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\(^{41}\)Ibid.  
\(^{42}\)Ibid., 425-6.  
\(^{43}\)Ibid., 426.  
\(^{44}\)Ibid.  
\(^{45}\)Ibid.
anthropocentric and positivistic faith in the ability of the individual.\textsuperscript{46}

6. In addition, modern German theology was "highly critical of the apparent lack of concern in our theology about Christian doctrine in general and Protestant doctrine in particular."\textsuperscript{47} Because of "its dualism and transcendentalism, its pessimism and suspicion of all things phenomenal," German religious realism found "ancient Christian doctrine and the thought of the Reformation more akin to its own spirit."\textsuperscript{48} Out of its "transcendentalism and dualism, \ldots rejection of anthropocentrism, disillusionment with the idea of progress and with humanism," German religious thought developed "a new appreciation of the meaning of faith, of justification and of mediation" that brought "it into relationship to Platonic and Neo-Platonic philosophy and to ancient Christian dogma.\textsuperscript{49}"

In his focus on objectivism in theology, radical monotheism, faith-realism and tragedy as the prelude to fulfillment with its creative possibilities of the coming of the kingdom of God in history,\textsuperscript{50} H. Richard Niebuhr sought to construct a truly critical realism. Niebuhr's critical realism offered "an opportunity for developing a philosophy

\textsuperscript{46}\textit{Ibid.}, 426-7.

\textsuperscript{47}\textit{Ibid.}, 426.

\textsuperscript{48}\textit{Ibid.}.
adequate to the insights and interests of the modern world in its reaction against the excessively humanistic tendencies of the nineteenth century." 51 It also offered as inclusive a philosophy or theology as it was possible to construct. 52

As I claim throughout this dissertation, Macintosh's optimistic myth of innocence, based on Bunyan's *The Pilgrim's Progress* (1678) 53 that was influenced by his progressive and technical age, caused him to focus on the individual. He rejected Calvin's predestination and "exaggerations of human impotence" 54 and turned to his optimistic myth of individual innocence and progress to define the right religious adjustment. Macintosh downplayed the story of the Fall in the Judeo-Christian Edenic myth and the presence of evil and chaos in the external world. He also neglected the factor of faith and God's holy or divine

49 *Ibid.*.


51 H. R. Niebuhr, "Religious Realism" (1931), 428.

52 *Ibid.*.


character and attempted to gain power over divine reality.\textsuperscript{55} He also discarded vital Protestant doctrine as Niebuhr claimed.\textsuperscript{56} In his optimistic embrace of empirical science over religious myth, Macintosh supported the larger cultural myth of mythlessness or scientific superiority and diminished the importance of historical revelation. Macintosh denied any dualism between God and man in his attempt to recover theological objectivism in religious experience, causing him to fall back into the very subjectivism he opposed in the Ritschlian theology.

**The sovereignty of God**

In contrast to Macintosh's denial of all dualism, Niebuhr retained the relational dualism between God and humankind in his radically monotheistic thought.\textsuperscript{57} This I-Thou or religious dualism was a creative tension between Creator and creature, sovereign God and responding self.\textsuperscript{58} It was not an epistemological or metaphysical dualism.\textsuperscript{59} Niebuhr's God was radically monotheistic and sovereign,

\textsuperscript{55}Macintosh, "Toward a New Untraditional Orthodoxy" (1932); *Theology as an Empirical Science* (1919).

\textsuperscript{56}\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{57}H. R. Niebuhr, *Responsible Self*, 60-76.

\textsuperscript{58}\textit{Ibid.}, 76.

\textsuperscript{59}\textit{Ibid.}, 60-76.
acting on man in all his actions.\textsuperscript{60} Man responded to the action of this sovereign God upon him according to "his interpretation of the latter action and with his expectation of response to his response; and all of this is in a continuing community of agents."\textsuperscript{61} God acted and man responded anticipating further response.\textsuperscript{62}

Macintosh also affirmed the sovereignty of God.\textsuperscript{63} However, his optimistic, conversionistic emphasis on our free-will efforts to enter the right religious adjustment obscured the primacy of the sovereign God's actions. Macintosh's apologetic tactic of beginning with the undesirable characteristics of liberalism to expose its fallacies and to drive man to objectivism and a sovereign God caused man to focus on himself and not on a sovereign God. As a conversionist, he wanted to include a "genuine self-determination on the part of man"\textsuperscript{64} as "a limited but creative moral freedom."\textsuperscript{65} Macintosh wanted to include

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{60}Ibid., 63.
\textsuperscript{61}Ibid., 65.
\textsuperscript{62}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{64}Macintosh, Reasonableness of Christianity (1925), 62.
\textsuperscript{65}Ibid., 63.
\end{quote}
self-determination to counter an absolute Sovereign God who
did things primarily for his own glory, that led to
Universalism.66

**Value-Theory**

In "Value-Theory and Theology" (1937), his contribution
to the Festschrift honoring Macintosh, H. Richard Niebuhr
focused his most serious critique of Macintosh on the
subjectivism in his value-theory.67 Building on his
previous criticism of American realism, Niebuhr claimed that
Macintosh used subjective human value systems to define
God.68 According to Niebuhr, recent valuational theology
had eclipsed general ethical and religious theories of
value.69 In so doing, valuational theology asked

whether the values—-the old trinity of the good, the
beautiful and the true, or the acknowledged human values
of security, justice, harmony—in their totality and
interrelation are equivalent to God, or require the
postulate of a God or offer the criteria from other
experience.70

66Macintosh, "Some Reflections on the Progress and
Decline of Religion in New England" (1933), 104-5.
67H. R. Niebuhr, "Value-Theory and Theology," The
68Ibid., 96.
69Ibid., 94.
70Ibid., 95.
Niebuhr objected to these approaches because they assumed "that men have a knowledge of absolutely valid values which is not only independent of their knowledge of God but which is also in some way determinative of God."\textsuperscript{71} Those who claimed the possibility of this natural revelation had equated value and God, and human interest and transcendental values.\textsuperscript{72} Niebuhr complained that they had made "values the criteria by means of which the experience of divine reality is distinguished from other experience."\textsuperscript{73}

According to Niebuhr, the use of human value systems to define God came from extremists such as the left-wing Feuerbach, left-wing Ritschlians, and modern religious humanists.\textsuperscript{74} These extremists maintained that religious judgments are value-judgments only and that the highest value, to which religion gives the name God, can be defined in terms of human wishes, desires or ideals without reference to a superhuman reality.\textsuperscript{75}

These extremists "assume that men have a knowledge of absolutely valid values which is not only independent of their knowledge of God but which is also in some way determinative of God."\textsuperscript{76} Niebuhr objected to independent human definitions of good that did not refer to God and that

\textsuperscript{71}Ibid., 95.
\textsuperscript{72}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{73}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{74}Ibid., 93.
\textsuperscript{75}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{76}Ibid., 95.
determined "what God must do in order to be God." To counter this problem, he developed radical monotheism in which God was the source of the good.

As Niebuhr described his radically monotheistic theology in *Radical Monotheism and Western Culture* (1960), the principle of being itself or the sovereign God replaced a closed society as the center of value, as the object of man's loyalty and trust.  

Paul Ramsey, who wrote on Niebuhr's ethics, observed that instead of a humanly contrived system of higher goods that defined God in terms of ethical value, Niebuhr defined good in terms of God. The principle of being or the sovereign, radically monotheistic God that values man was the source of all human values and was the source of theological ethics. According to Niebuhr, radical monotheism dethroned all absolutes short of the principle of being itself. At the same time it reverences every relative existent. Its two great mottoes are: "I am the Lord thy God; thou

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77 *Ibid.*, 94.


shall have no other gods before me' and "Whatever is, is good."\(^81\)

This sovereign God satisfied man's religious need for that which makes life worth living, which bestows meaning on life by revealing itself as the final source of life's being and value. The religious need is satisfied only in so far as man is able to recognize himself as valued by something beyond himself. That has the value of deity for man which values him.\(^82\)

For Niebuhr, faith was a universal human necessity, its gods were inescapable "not as supernatural beings but as value-centers and objects of devotion."\(^83\)

According to Niebuhr, Macintosh reacted against the dominance of value-theory in theology because of his opposition to the unscientific dogmatism of 19th century eclectic theology.\(^84\) Niebuhr thought that Macintosh objected to this eclectic theology because "it tends to believe that what ought to be believed ought to be and that what ought to be, is."\(^85\) Instead, Macintosh wanted to replace it with a "scientific theology which will study the

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\(^{82}\)H. R. Niebuhr, "Value-Theory and Theology" (1937), 115.


\(^{84}\)H. R. Niebuhr, "Value-Theory and Theology" (1937), 95.

\(^{85}\)*Ibid.*
object of religious experience as physics studies matter and energy."\textsuperscript{86} Niebuhr argued that on the other hand, Wieman wanted "to discuss God in terms of structure and process."\textsuperscript{87} Niebuhr accused both of them with reintroducing "the eclectic element which they wish to ban."\textsuperscript{88} According to Niebuhr, Macintosh did this by offering a double definition of religion as not only dependence on divine reality, but also as devotion to "divine" values, and by adopting as the criterion for the divine reality "eternal and absolute ideals, or values," such as "rationality, beauty and goodness of personal life."\textsuperscript{89}

Niebuhr was critical of both Macintosh and Wieman who, building on their optimistic assessment of human reason, included a presupposed knowledge of these values in their theologies.\textsuperscript{90} In both cases, empiricism is modified by an eclecticism and value takes precedence over being, despite the realistic interest. Empiricism--of the realistic sort--cannot be said then to have emancipated itself from the value approach, though it is moving definitely in this direction.\textsuperscript{91}


\textsuperscript{88}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{89}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{90}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{91}Ibid., 96-7.
Niebuhr rejected this approach because it was scientifically inadequate, religiously inaccurate, and philosophically dubious.\textsuperscript{92} The empirical value approach was scientifically inaccurate because it was an interested approach. The observer had a personal interest in the outcome of his or her experiments and conflict was inevitable. Niebuhr also rejected the empirical value approach because theology surrendered its independence to the prevailing ethical systems.\textsuperscript{93} He concluded that in the end, "the law that the seeking of life leads to its loss has application in science as well as in morality."\textsuperscript{94}

The empirical value approach was religiously inaccurate because it assumed that "man has knowledge of a system of values of absolute validity which he may make the basis of his religious judgments or employ as a criterion in the analysis of religious experience."\textsuperscript{95} Niebuhr found this religiously and scientifically unsatisfactory because "both religion and science must reject valuations prescribed to them prior to their own valuations."\textsuperscript{96} He denounced

\textsuperscript{92}\textit{Ibid.}, 97.
\textsuperscript{93}\textit{Ibid.}, 100.
\textsuperscript{94}\textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{95}\textit{Ibid.}, 101.
\textsuperscript{96}\textit{Ibid.}, 102.
a theology which begins with values that are logically prior to God or that are of greater value than God, so that what is and what is not God may be determined by reference to them, makes him a means to an end and confounds worship.\textsuperscript{97}

According to Niebuhr, value-theology was also unsatisfactory religiously because it neglected the principle of individuality in religion. It is the heir of that rationalism which sought to go back of the historical, individual faiths to a general, rational religion equally available to all men.\textsuperscript{98}

Niebuhr claimed that American empiricism was more guilty of rationalism than was Ritschlianism. Niebuhr argued that to begin with universally valid and absolute values, discovered apart from religious faith, and to make these in any way decisive for faith is to seek the essence of the religions in the common criterion of all religions, and to make devotion to these values more fundamental than the worship of the individual beings with which the historic faiths are concerned.\textsuperscript{99}

Niebuhr found value-theology to be inadequate philosophically because of the dogmatism of many of its value theories. It also failed to "take the principle of value relativity seriously."\textsuperscript{100} Any value-theory had to provide objectivity,

but it does not follow that values are independent of structure and process. Such independence could be

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{97}\textit{Ibid.}
\item \textsuperscript{98}\textit{Ibid.}, 104.
\item \textsuperscript{99}\textit{Ibid.}
\item \textsuperscript{100}\textit{Ibid.}, 106.
\end{itemize}
maintained only by means of a vitiating abstractionism and the denial of the relative standpoint of the observer. 101

Niebuhr identified another and more serious way of refusing to take the principle of relativity seriously in the field of value thinking. It consists of the exaltation of values recognized as relative to human structure into the final values of reality, in the assumption of the human standpoint as the last standpoint which man needs to recognize, or, at least, as the standpoint whence the values of universe become visible as an integrated system. 102

Niebuhr complained that Macintosh employed an unacceptable empirical, relativistic definition of values as logically prior to and definitive of God. 103 He rejected Macintosh's application of values gained from non-religious experience to the "absolute criteria of theology." 104

Niebuhr charged that Macintosh spoke of the "obvious relativity of values" and defines value as "a quality which anything has by virtue of its relation to an end-directed process, that is, a process regarded as working toward an end, whether the end be consciously contemplated in the process or not." 105

Therefore, Macintosh was guilty of making the values that were absolute for persons "the criteria of the divine." 106

When man made relative values the criteria of the divine, he

101 Ibid.
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid., 110.
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid. 107; Macintosh, Religious Realism (1931), 308-9.
106 Ibid., 108; Religious Realism, p. 309 f.
either assumed "that the divine must be personal" or regarded personality as the one wholly worshipful reality and God as a means to personal ends. To proceed from the values of persons to an integrated system of values, which overarches and includes them, is to assume a harmony of values similar to that one which liberalism assumed in the case of individuals and society. The confidence that such a harmony exists as a hidden reality and that, eventually, it will be made actual or apparent belongs to the essence of religious faith.107

Following McKenny, I affirm that Niebuhr engaged Macintosh's empirical value-theory apologetically to correct it and to include it in his own theology although he objected to many features of it.108 As Niebuhr demonstrated, Macintosh placed God and not another logically prior absolute as the basis of religious valuation. Niebuhr, however, did approve of empirical theology from Schleiermacher to Macintosh for "its insistence on the fact that knowledge of God is available only in religious relation to him."109 As Niebuhr argued, human values came from the principle of being that values man, and not vice versa. For Niebuhr, the true question of religion was

"Which among the available realities has the value of deity or has the potency of deity?" And this question turns into the other query, "Which reality has those characteristics which are the foundation of the value of deity, or which fulfill the human need for God?"110

107 Ibid.
109 Ibid., 112.
110 Ibid., 114.
Macintosh reacted negatively to Niebuhr's interpretation of his value-theory in an article entitled "Theology, Valuational or Existential?" (1939).\textsuperscript{111} He noted that while he and Niebuhr differed in their opinions, and especially in their "opinions about values," they agreed in their value-appreciations.\textsuperscript{112} Macintosh, like Niebuhr, had wanted to establish God as the objective, Absolute ground for human values as I discussed in Chapter Three. Together with Henry N. Wieman, Macintosh had developed American empiricism as "a protest against the dominance of value considerations in theology."\textsuperscript{113} In rebuttal, Macintosh claimed that Niebuhr had made an unacceptable turn to "an existential theology such as would shun every proposed valuational approach, as being dangerously misleading."\textsuperscript{114} Macintosh attributed "the resurrection of that supposedly long dead, exclusively existential theology, in which, as it is claimed, even our ultimate values and valuations have no

\textsuperscript{111}Macintosh, "Theology Valuational or Existential?" Review of Religion IV 1 (November, 1939), 23-44.

\textsuperscript{112}Ibid., 44.

\textsuperscript{113}H. R. Niebuhr, "Value-Theory and Theology," 95.

\textsuperscript{114}Macintosh, "Theology Valuational or Existential?" (1939), 23.
normative meaning" to Karl Barth and Kierkegaard. 

Macintosh complained that in existential theology
neither the ideal values of spiritual beauty and moral
goodness, nor the characteristically religious value of
the numinous can be relied upon as criteria of
revelation, and rationality is particularly suspect when
the genuineness of revelation and the truth of theology
are under consideration. Credo quia absurdum is again
the watchword. 

As Macintosh recalled, Niebuhr made this move following
the same seminar that influenced Bixler to adopt the
valuational extreme in theology. 

Macintosh cautioned
that if either extreme of valuational or existential
theology prevailed, "the effect not only upon theology but
upon religion and the life of the church will be devastating
indeed." He argued in defense of his position that

115 Ibid., 27.

116 Ibid., 27-8. Macintosh quoted a passage from
Kierkegaard's Journals "to illustrate the spirit that is
coming to dominate much of what its votaries, curiously
enough, like to call 'the new theology.'" "'Original sin'
is guilt. That is the real paradox. How paradoxical that
is may best be seen thus. It is formed by compounding
qualitatively different categories. To 'inherit' is a
natural category; 'guilt' is an ethical and spiritual
category. Now who would ever think, says reason, of putting
them together, of saying that something is inherited which
by definition cannot be inherited. It must be believed.
The paradox in Christian truth is invariably due to the fact
that it is truth as it exists for God. The standard of
measure and the end is superhuman; and there is only one
relationship possible: faith (Journals, Section 1061).

117 Ibid.

118 Ibid., 23.

119 Ibid., 43-4.
religion was rooted both in an appreciation of values felt to be supreme and in the consciousness of our human dependence upon a supreme reality, or power, and that religious thought was especially concerned with the question of how supreme power or being is related to the highest values, so that theology was, at least implicitly, both valuational and existential.\textsuperscript{120}

Macintosh rejected existential theology because it left man with no criteria for revelation and led man into irrationalism, skepticism, and agnosticism.\textsuperscript{121} Instead of returning to old time religion with its unscientific thinking and irrational beliefs or the "typical rationalistic liberalism" of the older evangelicalism,\textsuperscript{122} Macintosh turned optimistically to rational empiricism.\textsuperscript{123} He embraced rational empiricism as a middle ground between an extreme irrationalism and an extreme rationalism.\textsuperscript{124} It was continuous with inductive science and common sense, but transcending them by virtue of an intuitional faith and a religious experience which makes possible a certain limited body of verified religious knowledge, together with a more extensive content of reasonably defensible religious belief.\textsuperscript{125}

\textsuperscript{120}\textit{Ibid.}, 23.
\textsuperscript{121}\textit{Ibid.}, 27-8.
\textsuperscript{122}\textit{Ibid.}, 28.
\textsuperscript{123}\textit{Ibid.}, 31.
\textsuperscript{124}\textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{125}\textit{Ibid.}
Macintosh made this move to escape the romantic optimism about evolutionary progress that was soft on sin.\textsuperscript{126} He also wanted to escape the ravages of Fundamentalism and dogmatism.\textsuperscript{127}

In his response to Niebuhr's accusation of his employment of a double definition of religion, Macintosh launched a counter-attack on Niebuhr's dualism.\textsuperscript{128} He also attacked Niebuhr's use of church dogmatics and common-sense to escape the agnosticism that resulted from a dualistic theory of knowledge.\textsuperscript{129} Once again, Macintosh turned optimistically to the plain man's common-sense empirical religious knowledge.\textsuperscript{130} Macintosh thought Niebuhr had adopted a dualistic theory of knowledge when he embraced German existentialism and the theology of Kierkegaard, Barth, Brunner, and Unamuno.\textsuperscript{131} According to Macintosh, when Niebuhr turned to this existential theology with its underlying epistemological dualism, he stepped upon the slippery slope that naturally and "logically leads him to a

\textsuperscript{126}Ibid., 28.
\textsuperscript{127}Ibid., 29.
\textsuperscript{128}Ibid., 35.
\textsuperscript{129}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{130}Ibid., 38.
\textsuperscript{131}Ibid., 35.
more or less sceptical and agnostic position with regard to the possibility of religious knowledge through religious experience."132 Because of the impossibility of religious knowledge in Niebuhr's existential theology, he had to rely on church dogmatics that Macintosh claimed were indefensible on rational grounds.133

In addition, Macintosh disagreed with Niebuhr that a valuational approach to theology would have subjected it to the prevailing system of ethics.134 Macintosh linked value theology and our experience of the worth of God's love.135 Therefore, in Macintosh's ethical theism,

the highest values are realized in God's own character; they are part of what God is. God can thus be the supreme end and the supreme means for the promotion of the highest ends in others.136

Macintosh stated emphatically that

the only sense in which the view I am defending would make spiritual values "logically prior to God" (p. 102) is that they are worthy of our absolute devotion, even if we may be in doubt as to God's existence. It may be that God is the original source of all true values, but unless we believe with the extreme monist and the mystic in the sole reality of God, it is difficult to see why we should be required to hold to "the sole value of God" (p. 103).137

132 Ibid.
133 Ibid.
134 Ibid., 38, referring to H. R. Niebuhr, "Value-Theory and Theology," 100.
135 Ibid., 39.
136 Ibid.
137 Ibid.
In his attempt to ground absolute values in God, Macintosh affirmed the sovereignty of God and the possibility of man's knowledge of divine Reality as I described above. He carefully denied a metaphysical monism or unity between God and humankind in his epistemological monism.\textsuperscript{138} As I see it, when Macintosh observed Niebuhr's admitted dualism between God and humankind and his appropriation of German phenomenology and existentialism, Macintosh mistakenly assumed that epistemological dualism and the impossibility of knowledge of God infected Niebuhr's turn to orthodoxy. I contend that because of this misunderstanding, Macintosh claimed that Niebuhr was a liberal. In reality, both Niebuhr and Macintosh wanted to preserve an absolute, objective source of value, God. They turned to religious realism and affirmed the sovereignty of one friendly God that man could know as independently existing external reality. They both engaged in apologetic internal critiques as McKenny noted.\textsuperscript{139} Both Macintosh and Niebuhr wanted to avoid the psychology of religion.\textsuperscript{140} Their most important disagreements were over anthropology, natural theology or the possibility of natural knowledge of

\textsuperscript{138}Macintosh, \textit{Problem of Knowledge} (1915), 128-9.

\textsuperscript{139}McKenny, "Theological Objectivism" (1991), 25.

God, human free will, atonement, and the centrality of Jesus Christ.

Subjectivism and objectivism in theology

Besides realism and value-theory, Niebuhr and Macintosh wanted to restore objectivism and subjectivism to theology.\textsuperscript{141} Niebuhr noted that theology, in distinction from though not necessarily in opposition to metaphysics and ontology, has been unable to abstract discourse about the objective reality, God, from discourse about the subjective activity of faith, however the latter is defined.\textsuperscript{142}

As Gustafson observed in the Introduction to Niebuhr's The Responsible Self (1963), Niebuhr wanted to treat objectivism and subjectivism as two polarities.\textsuperscript{143} The objective pole was the Lordship of Jesus Christ through whom "the power of sin is broken, though all may not yet recognize it."\textsuperscript{144} The subjective pole was that "until this has become revelatory truth for persons, nothing has happened."\textsuperscript{145} When one combined these two polarities, one saw that "Christ is the believer's in faith, as well as the Universal Lord; both poles are true."\textsuperscript{146}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{141}H. R. Niebuhr, Radical Monotheism (1960), 12.
  \item \textsuperscript{142}Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{143}James M. Gustafson, "Introduction," The Responsible Self (1961), 37.
  \item \textsuperscript{144}Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{145}Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{146}Ibid.
\end{itemize}
As I discussed in Chapter Two, some nineteenth-century Protestant theologians had dropped the objective side in favor of psychology of religion. H. Richard Niebuhr rejected this move.\footnote{H. R. Niebuhr, "Theology and Psychology" (1927), 47-8.} He stressed that it has become quite clear—in human existence no less than in academic inquiry—that the subjective can no more be meaningfully abstracted from the objective than vice versa. Theology must attend to the God of faith if it is to understand faith no less than it must attend to faith in God if it would understand God. Faith is at least as much an unavoidable counterpart of the presence of God as sense experience is an unavoidable counterpart of the presence of natural entities or powers. The analogy is inadequate; pressed too far it is misleading. Faith is not a special sense; faith and sense experience are not exclusive of each other; the objective reality present to faith is not irrelevant to the objects of sense experience. But faith and God belong together somewhat as sense experience and physical reality do.\footnote{H. R. Niebuhr, \textit{Radical Monotheism} (1960), 12-3.} Niebuhr argued that faith and reason were not mutually exclusive.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, 13} Just as sense experience required rational elements, faith needed reason because reason forms and interprets sense experience; experience validates or invalidates such experience-filled reasoning. In roughly analogous manner reason permeates the activity of faith; it organizes, compares, reflects, criticizes, and develops hypotheses in the midst of believing.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}.}
Theology's task was to develop "reasoning in faith."\textsuperscript{151} It was also supposed to provide responsible "criticism of faith, not as subjective attitude or activity only but in relation to its objects."\textsuperscript{152} To accomplish these tasks, theology required our participation, not coolly disinterested objectivity.\textsuperscript{153}

Building on his teacher's epistemological work, Niebuhr accepted the possibility of human knowledge of independently existing external reality.\textsuperscript{154} He then moved beyond these problems to discuss relativism, idealism, and subjectivism. Niebuhr claimed that "relativism does not imply subjectivism and scepticism."\textsuperscript{155} He argued that man was able to have knowledge of independent reality because a critical idealism is always accompanied, openly or playfully, by a critical realism which accepts on faith the independent reality of what is mediated through sense, though it discriminates between uninterpreted and unintelligible impressions and verifiable, constant, intelligible content.\textsuperscript{156}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{151}\textit{Ibid.}, 14.
\item \textsuperscript{152}\textit{Ibid.}, 15.
\item \textsuperscript{153}\textit{Ibid.}
\item \textsuperscript{154}\textit{Ibid.}, 107.
\item \textsuperscript{155}H. R. Niebuhr, \textit{The Meaning of Revelation} (1941), 13.
\item \textsuperscript{156}\textit{Ibid.}, 14.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
The assumption of open or disguised critical realism that always accompanied critical idealism allowed Niebuhr to move beyond a dualism/monism dialectic.\textsuperscript{157} He drew on the work of G. H. Mead in this area.\textsuperscript{158}

**Revelation**

Niebuhr also dealt with Macintosh's idea of revelation.\textsuperscript{159} To argue for the reasonableness of religious belief, Macintosh developed an elaborate scheme of natural, general, and special revelation,\textsuperscript{160} as I discussed above. Niebuhr however, argued against the possibility of natural revelation.\textsuperscript{161} He placed his argument in the context of reason versus revelation as posed by inescapable historical relativism. Revelation meant "simply historic faith."\textsuperscript{162} Niebuhr called for a confessional theology instead of an

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{158}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{159}H. R. Niebuhr, *The Meaning of Revelation* (1941), dedicated to D. C. Macintosh and Frank C. Porter.
\textsuperscript{160}Macintosh, "Natural Revelation" (1942).
\textsuperscript{161}H. R. Niebuhr, *The Meaning of Revelation* (1941), 114-139.
\textsuperscript{162}Ibid., 16.
\end{flushleft}
individualistic apologetic theology based on natural revelation. He argued against the apologetic use of revelation and for a confessional method because of the potential for man's abuse of revelation.

Whenever the revelation idea is used to justify the church's claims to superior knowledge or some other excellence, revelation is necessarily identified with something that the church can possess. Such possessed revelation must be a static thing and under the human control of the Christian community—a book, a creed, or a set of doctrines.

According to Niebuhr, man could not possess the revelation of God because it was "an event," that happened over and over again when we remember the illuminating center of our history. What we can possess is the memory of Jesus Christ, but what happens to us through that memory we cannot possess.

As I see it, Niebuhr emphasized what revelation meant for Christians and not for all men in contrast to Macintosh's natural revelation. According to Niebuhr, revelation was the self-disclosure of the sovereign God. It means the moment in our history through which we know ourselves to be known from beginning to end, in which we are apprehended by the knower; it means the self-disclosing of that eternal knower. Revelation means the moment in which we are surprised by the knowledge of someone there in the darkness and the void of human

163 Ibid., 27-31.
164 Ibid., 29-30.
165 Ibid., 129.
166 Ibid., 30-1.
life; it means the self-disclosure of light in our
darkness ... Revelation means that we find ourselves
to be valued rather than valuing and that all our values
are transvaluated by the activity of a universal
valuer. 167

Revelation in Jesus Christ revealed the corruption of
human values, standards and moral laws. 168 It transformed
the content of the law of love "into a free love of God and
man." 169 The content of revelation

is not the self-disclosure of an unknown being, but the
unveiling of the value of a known being. What is
revealed in revelation is not a being as such, but
rather its deity-value, not that it is, but that it
"loves us," "judges us," that it makes life worth
living. 170

According to Niebuhr, revelation did not give man any
new beliefs about natural or historical facts; it does
involve the radical reconstruction of all our beliefs,
since these always reflect both human provincialism and
concern for self with its idols as well as objective
knowledge. 171 It transformed truth and expedited and liberated man's
contemplative reason in its "search for continuous relations
in the world." 172

167 Ibid., 111-2.
168 Ibid., 123-4.
169 Ibid., 124.
170 H. R. Niebuhr, "Value-Theory and Theology" (1937),
116.
171 H. R. Niebuhr, The Meaning of Revelation (1941),
125.
172 Ibid., 127.
Conversion

Although he emphasized free will entry into the right religious adjustment in response to God, Macintosh stressed that conversion was an individual and repeatable event.\textsuperscript{173} Entry into the right religious adjustment through prayer was a repeatable process of continuing regeneration throughout life.\textsuperscript{174} Niebuhr also understood conversion to be the continuous action of the sovereign God who was transforming the entire creation including man and his culture.\textsuperscript{175} Niebuhr claimed that it was impossible for man to transform his human culture but it was not impossible for God through Christ to transform it.\textsuperscript{176} Christ transformed all of man's actions "so that they are acts of love to God and man, glorify the Father and the Son, and are obedient to the commandment to love one another."\textsuperscript{177} Man responded to God's self-revelation in history and received "that special occasion which provides us with an image by means of which all the occasions of personal and common life become intelligible."\textsuperscript{178} The revelatory moment made "our past

\textsuperscript{173}Macintosh, \textit{Personal Religion} (1942), 135.
\textsuperscript{174}Ibid., 156.
\textsuperscript{175}H. R. Niebuhr, \textit{Christ and Culture} (1951), 196-229.
\textsuperscript{176}Ibid., 196.
\textsuperscript{177}Ibid., 204.
\textsuperscript{178}H. R. Niebuhr, \textit{Meaning of Revelation} (1941), 80.
intelligible."179 It caused the heart not only to understand "what it remembers" but enabled and drove it "to remember what it had forgotten."180 Revelation also caused man to appropriate the past history of others, to form a common memory and a community.181 This appropriation was a moral event in which "the heart of the participating self is engaged in this work and through it the soul is reconstructed."182 Revelation aided the heart in its reasoning that was painful because it "leads to knowledge of the self."183

As I see it, Niebuhr emphasized the crisis nature of conversion184 in contrast to Macintosh's humanly optimistic and individualistic free will entry into the right religious adjustment. In contrast, Niebuhr wanted to intensify the tension present in the radical crisis of man's experience of divine revelation to include tragedy, conflict, and divine judgment.185 Realizing the difficulty of pinpointing Niebuhr's theological sources, some scholars attributed this heightened sense of angst in the 1930s and 1940s to "crisis

179 Ibid., 81.
180 Ibid., 83.
181 Ibid., 84.
182 Ibid., 85.
183 Ibid., 96.
184 Ibid., 80-96.
185 Ibid.
theology or neo-orthodoxy,"186 as McKenny claimed in his article, "Theological Objectivism as Empirical Theology: H. Richard Niebuhr and the Liberal Tradition." McKenny however, attributed Niebuhr's "starkness," "up-againstness," and "thwarting of human wishes and goals" of religious experience to Jonathan Edwards.187

In emphasizing the crisis nature of conversion and the sovereignty of God, Niebuhr began with the Christian story, and moved toward conversion as continuing transformation.188 In contrast, Macintosh began with culture (science or philosophy) or personal story and addressed man's present decision. He tried to ease the pain of decision-making by emphasizing the attractiveness of the right religious adjustment and offered his personal testimony to entice one into conversion.189 In his individualistic, progressive appeal for entrance to the right religious adjustment, Macintosh emphasized the free act of the will to choose. He de-emphasized repentance, conviction of sin, or remorse for

186 McKenny, "Theological Objectivism" (1991), 19.
189 Macintosh, *Pilgrimage of Faith* (1931); "Toward a New Untraditional Orthodoxy" (1932).
past sinful actions. However, Macintosh did attribute conversion to the work of the Holy Spirit. Man's self-measurement against the fullness of Christ was also an important part of this experience.

Niebuhr, on the other hand, emphasized repentance, faith, and the bondage of the will. He located the arbitrary free will only at the point where the agent commits himself to inquiry into the further, longer series of interactions and into the responses taking place in a larger society, or at the point where he commits himself to resolute questioning of the adequacy of his stereotyped, established interpretations.

According to Niebuhr, at the point of his self-committal, man made his decisions "in freedom because we must choose. We are not free not to choose." Man required reason, freedom, and faith to make individual decisions. In man's "existential situation of dependent freedom" he did not face the question "whether we will choose in accordance

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190 Macintosh, Theology as an Empirical Science (1919), 151.
191 Ibid.
192 H. R. Niebuhr, Responsible Self (1963), 90-106.
193 Ibid., 106.
194 H. R. Niebuhr, Christ and Culture (1951), 249.
195 Ibid.
with reason or by faith." Instead, man addressed the question of "whether we will choose with reasoning faithlessness or reasoning faith." Faith for Niebuhr was loyalty and trust.

Atonement

In rejecting Macintosh's individualistic, humanly optimistic "more moral" influence theory of atonement which I claim was based on the exemplary moral progress of Bunyan's "Christian," H. Richard Niebuhr turned to Josiah Royce. Royce employed the concept of tragedy to oppose liberal, subjective, moral influence theories of atonement from Schleiermacher and Ritschl. Building on Nietzsche's synthesis of "Dionysian" and "Apollinian" views of tragedy into the artistic Socrates as creative energy, pathos, and myth, Royce sought to recover the objective, creative possibility of "primordial power" in tragedy. To recover an objective understanding of the work of Christ in which

196Ibid., 251.
197Ibid.
198Ibid., 253.
199Macintosh, "Toward a New Untraditional Orthodoxy" (1932), 278-9; The Pilgrimage of Faith (1931), 20; Warren, Out of the Wilderness (1989), 42.
God acted outside of man according to God's purposes, Royce employed the example of a traitor who had betrayed his beloved community and could never have undone the fact of his misdeed. According to Royce, only a creative deed performed by a steadfastly loyal servant of the community could have restored the traitor to a new life in community. Jesus as the Christ was the steadfastly loyal servant of the community and his act of atonement restored the traitor to a new life in community. Therefore, the traitor's act of treason became the opportunity for "the means of an otherwise impossible triumph."

Building on Royce's understanding of tragedy in the doctrine of atonement, Niebuhr looked through the eyes of eschatological faith and included a creative possibility within tragedy. As a responsible self living the life of repentance and forgiveness in relationship with God, Niebuhr viewed tragedy as

the prelude to fulfillment, and a prelude which is necessary because of human nature; the kingdom of God comes inevitably, though whether we shall see it or not, depends on our recognition of its presence and our acceptance of the kind of life which will enable us to enter it, the life of repentance and forgiveness.


203 Ibid.

204 Ibid.

205 H. R. Niebuhr, "The Only Way Into the Kingdom of God" (1932), 447.

206 Ibid.
In contrast to Macintosh's individualistic, optimistic, "more moral" influence theory of human progress, Niebuhr centered atonement in the cross. Instead of seeing the cross as the tragic death of one who trusted God and responded as son and died at the hands of fate or as the negation of God as love, Niebuhr said man had to face the cross, ask what God was doing, and move to the resurrection. The resurrection became evidence of an unconquerable life power that was manifest in the continuing Lordship of Jesus Christ, raised by God from the temporal to the eternal plane. Jesus Christ was the one who inaugurated and maintained "the movement beyond resignation to reconciliation" in people who were empowered to become children of God, "who know that the world is being saved."

The Jesus Christ man came to know personally was a tragic figure who trusted completely and personally in his Father God, and was himself the subject of betrayal. Like him, man must turn to God as Father in his tragedy, in the "midst of our vast distrust, our betraying and being betrayed, our certainty of death and our temptations to

208 Ibid.
209 Ibid., 177.
210 Ibid.
curse our birth." 211 In his fellowship with Jesus Christ, man's
distrust of God is turned somewhat in the direction of
trust, our hostility is turned slightly in the direction
of a desire to be loyal, our view of society to which we
are bound in loyalty begins to enlarge. The
thunderclouds on the horizon of our existence are
broken; the light begins to shine through. A great
metanoia, a revolution of the personal life, begins in
us and in human interpersonal history. 212

Man then came to know the creative possibility of Power that
was good and that goodness was powerful. 213 This creative
possibility was demonstrated by a "God who is both Father
and Son, not of a Father who is identical with the Son or of
a Son identical with the Father." 214

5.20 REINHOLD NIEBUHR (1892-1971): IRONY, INNOCENCE, AND
MYTH

H. Richard Niebuhr's criticism of Macintosh paled in
comparison to his brother Reinhold's criticisms that focused
on irony, innocence, and myth. 215 Like his brother,
Reinhold Niebuhr, Professor of Applied Christianity, Union
Theological Seminary, focused on the earlier liberalism's
humanistic optimism and denial of the severity of human sin,

211 H. Richard Niebuhr, ed. Faith on Earth (New Haven:

212 Ibid., 99.

213 Ibid., 101.

214 Ibid.

215 Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Truth in Myths," The Nature
of Religious Experience (1937), 117-35.
the importance of the larger community,\textsuperscript{216} and the value of religious myth.

\textbf{Irony}

As I discussed in the Introduction, Reinhold Niebuhr wanted to move beyond pathos and tragedy to irony as "a hope and an assurance that is 'beyond tragedy.'\textsuperscript{217} In \textit{The Irony of American History} (1962), Reinhold Niebuhr stated that he wanted to move beyond a tragic view of history because

a purely tragic view of life is not finally viable. It is, at any rate, not the Christian view ... the tragic motif is, at any rate, subordinated to the ironic one because evil and destructiveness are not regarded as the inevitable consequence of the exercise of human creativity.\textsuperscript{218}

In moving to an ironic view of history, Niebuhr cautioned that

irony cannot be directly experienced. The knowledge of it depends upon an observer who is not so hostile to the victim of irony as to deny the element of virtue which must constitute a part of the ironic situation; nor yet so sympathetic as to discount the weakness, the vanity and pretension which constitute another element.\textsuperscript{219}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{216}Reinhold Niebuhr, \textit{Moral Man and Immoral Society} (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1932, 1960).
\item \textsuperscript{217}Reinhold Niebuhr, \textit{Beyond Tragedy} (London: Nisbet and co., LTD., 1938), x.
\item \textsuperscript{218}Reinhold Niebuhr, \textit{The Irony of American History} (1962), 157-8.
\item \textsuperscript{219}Ibid., 153.
\end{itemize}
According to Niebuhr, Christians preferred an ironic interpretation of history because it understood human freedom "according to which man's transcendence over nature endows him with great possibilities which are, however, not safe against abuse and corruption." The Christian preference for an ironic interpretation of history was "also derived from its faith that life has a center and source of meaning beyond the natural and social sequences which may be rationally discerned." Only by faith could man have discerned the "divine source and center . . . because it is enveloped in mystery, though being the basis of meaning." When man discerned this divine source and center, "it yields a frame of meaning in which human freedom is real and valid and not merely tragic or illusory." However, Niebuhr cautioned that

man is constantly tempted to overestimate the degree of his freedom and forget that he is also a creature. Thus he becomes involved in pretentions which result in ironic refutations of his pride.

As I see it, Macintosh's denial of an ironic interpretation of history was a denial of part of his own life and meaning. It was also a denial of the awe and mystery of the divine source of that life. In his

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220Ibid., 168.
221Ibid.
222Ibid.
223Ibid.
224Ibid.
optimistic myth of "Bunyanesque" innocence and progress, Macintosh turned to the sense of moral evil as the turning point to the right religious adjustment. He then attempted to reduce God to a predictable moral transaction. By relying on man's virtue to effect salvation, Macintosh denied man's weakness, vanity, and pretension. I conclude that Macintosh's denial of irony in his philosophical theology caused him to succumb to Niebuhr's temptation "to overestimate the degree"\textsuperscript{225} of man's freedom. He forgot that man was "also a creature."\textsuperscript{226} Therefore, Macintosh's theology as an empirical science and untraditional orthodoxy suffered from "pretensions which result(ed) in ironic refutations"\textsuperscript{227} of his work.

\textbf{Innocence}

Reinhold Niebuhr dealt with the problem of human sin in two important works. In \textit{Moral Man and Immoral Society} (1932), Niebuhr argued that the morality of individuals was superior to that of social groups which operated out of collective egoism.\textsuperscript{228} He wanted to move beyond Macintosh's optimistic myth of individual moral progress to the problem of social justice. Niebuhr stressed that "we cannot build

\textsuperscript{225}\textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{226}\textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{227}\textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{228}Reinhold Niebuhr, \textit{Moral Man} (1932), xii.
our individual ladders to heaven and leave the total human enterprise unredeemed of its excesses and corruptions." 229

He observed that the human social group lacked ego and impulse control, the "capacity for self-transcendence," and the "ability to comprehend the needs of others." 230 Because of these problems, the immorality of the national, racial, or economic group justified and necessitated "political policies which a purely individualistic ethic must always find embarrassing." 231

In the two volumes of The Nature and Destiny of Man (1941, 1943), 232 Niebuhr criticized the optimistic modern view of man that was prevalent in the nineteenth century. Niebuhr criticized this view to recover the Christian view of the paradoxical nature of man as made in the "image of God" and as sinner. 233 According to Niebuhr, the modern view of man was "informed partly by classical, partly by Christian and partly by distinctly modern motifs." 234

229 Ibid., 277.
230 Ibid., xi.
231 Ibid.
233 Ibid., 16.
234 Ibid., 18.
combination led to the following "difficulties and confusions".\footnote{235}

a) The inner contradictions in modern conceptions of human nature between idealistic and naturalistic rationalists; and between rationalists, whether idealistic or naturalistic, and vitalists and romanticists.
b) The certainties about human nature in modern culture which modern history dissipates, particularly the certainty about individuality.
c) The certainties about human nature, particularly the certainty about the goodness of man, which stands in contradiction to the known facts of history.\footnote{236}

Niebuhr objected most to modern anthropology's "optimistic treatment of the problem of evil" that led to modern man's "essentially easy conscience."\footnote{237} The modern rejection of "the idea that man is sinful at the very centre of his personality, that is in his will . . . has seemed to make the Christian gospel simply irrelevant to modern man."\footnote{238} By defining man "primarily in terms of the uniqueness of his rational faculties," modern culture "finds the root of his evil in his involvement in natural impulses and natural necessities from which it hopes to free him by the increase of his rational faculties."\footnote{239}

\footnote{235}{Ibid.}
\footnote{236}{Ibid.}
\footnote{237}{Ibid., 23.}
\footnote{238}{Ibid.}
\footnote{239}{Ibid.}
optimistic turn to nature as a source of virtue, modern man, "whether romantic or rationalistic, has an easy conscience because he believes that he has not strayed very far from, and can easily return to, the innocency of nature."\textsuperscript{240}

Modern optimism also led to "a philosophy of history expressed in the idea of progress."\textsuperscript{241} Ironically, "the idea of progress is possible only upon the ground of a Christian culture."\textsuperscript{242} By eliminating the Christian doctrine of the sinfulness of man, modern man expected "to move toward some kind of perfect society."\textsuperscript{243} Modern man relied either on "a force immanent in nature itself," or on "the gradual extension of rationality," or on "the elimination of specific sources of evil, such as priesthoods, tyrannical government and class divisions in society."\textsuperscript{244}

To correct this modern, optimistic view of man, Niebuhr turned to the Christian paradoxical view of man as made in the "image of God" and as rebellious sinner. According to the Christian view of man, man was part of God's good creation.\textsuperscript{245} Based on the Christian belief in "God's self-

\textsuperscript{240}Ibid., 104.
\textsuperscript{241}Ibid., 23.
\textsuperscript{242}Ibid., 24.
\textsuperscript{243}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{244}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{245}Ibid., 12.
disclosure, culminating in the revelation of Christ,"\textsuperscript{246} Christians believed that mankind was made in the image of God, uniting bodies and souls in human personality.\textsuperscript{247} As a creature of the Creator, man was able to "relate himself to God without pretending to be God."\textsuperscript{248} Man was also able to "accept his distance from God as a created thing, without believing that the evil of his nature is caused by this finiteness."\textsuperscript{249}

Paradoxically, man was also a sinner, possessing evil in the "very centre of his personality: in the will."\textsuperscript{250} Man rebelliously "refuses to admit his 'creatureliness,' and to acknowledge himself as merely a member of a total unity of life. He pretends to be more than he is."\textsuperscript{251} Man abused his freedom of self-determination and thereby destroyed it.\textsuperscript{252} Man violated the law of love by seeking to make himself "the centre and source of his own life."\textsuperscript{253}

\textsuperscript{246}Ibid., 15.
\textsuperscript{247}Ibid., 12.
\textsuperscript{248}Ibid., 15.
\textsuperscript{249}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{250}Ibid., 16.
\textsuperscript{251}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{252}Ibid., 16.
\textsuperscript{253}Ibid.
Only in the light of God's self-revelation "can man discover the root of sin to be within himself." Man's conscience should have been uneasy instead of optimistic in his abilities and progress.

Myth

In his contribution to the Festschrift (1937) honoring his teacher, Niebuhr addressed "The Truth in Myths." He wanted to reclaim the truth value of myth that had been displaced by "the scientific outlook of our modern culture." To construct his argument, Niebuhr distinguished between primitive myth and permanent myth. Primitive myth was derived from pre-scientific thought. Permanent myth dealt "with aspects of reality which are supra-scientific rather than pre-scientific." For example,

254Ibid., 17.
255Ibid., 93-122.
257Ibid., 117.
258Ibid., 118-9.
259Ibid., 119.
260Ibid.
the idea of creation is a typical mythical idea. It relates the source of life to observable life in terms which defy rationality. The primitive myth speaks of God making man out of clay, and breathing the breath of life into him. But the idea of creation remains mythical even when the primitive myth is discarded.261

Niebuhr agreed that the primitive, pre-scientific part of myth should "be sacrificed in a scientific age."262 However, he wanted to retain the abiding aspects of reality present only in myth.263 These aspects of reality included value,264 dimension of depth in existence,265 creation,266 evil,267 the vital thrust of life with its organic unities and disharmonies,268 sin, salvation, and God.269 Without the aspects that myth and metaphysics provided, one was left with a rationalistic, scientific, mechanistic, superficial world view that lacked meaning.270 One attempted to remedy this situation by trying to slip these aspects back in

261 Ibid., 120.
262 Ibid., 118-9.
263 Ibid., 119.
264 Ibid.
265 Ibid., 120; Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol. 3 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 113.
266 Ibid., 120-1.
267 Ibid., 123.
268 Ibid., 125.
269 Ibid., 126-32.
270 Ibid., 118-27.
covertly or unconsciously. Niebuhr argued that when one completely rationalized a myth, it lost its virtue because it ceases to point to the realm of transcendence beyond history, or, pointing to it, fails to express the organic and paradoxical relationship between the conditioned and the unconditioned.

Niebuhr also cautioned that religious myth was at risk of becoming dogma. This tendency to dogmatize "whatever mythical definition a particular historic tradition has entrusted to a certain portion of the religious community" was a basic problem of religion. One could escape this dogmatism only if one realized that though human knowledge and experience always point to a source of meaning in life which transcends knowledge and experience, there are nevertheless suggestions of the character of this transcendence in experience. Great myths have actually been born out of profound experience and are constantly subject to verification by experience.

According to Niebuhr, the cross of Christ "in Christian faith is the myth of the truth of the ideal of love." It pointed to the reality beyond man's experience and gave meaning to his life. Man was able to express this revealed reality only in mythical terms.

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271 Ibid., 122.
272 Ibid., 129.
273 Ibid., 133.
274 Ibid.
275 Ibid.
276 Ibid., 135.
These mythical terms are the most adequate symbols of reality because the reality which we experience constantly suggests a center and source of reality, which not only transcends immediate experience, but also finally transcends the rational forms and categories by which we seek to apprehend and describe it.277

Macintosh responded to Reinhold Niebuhr's article with a broadside against American theologians who bobbed like corks with the vicissitudes of German theology when they could have steered their own true course.278 Specifically, he accused Reinhold Niebuhr of adopting a Kantian dualistic and logically agnostic epistemology.279 He also accused Niebuhr of committing the logical fallacy of undistributed middle (fallacy of excluded middle).280 He wondered whether Niebuhr has really moved theologically to the Right after all. Extremes meet and it may be that he has traveled so far to the Left that he has come round the circle to a point where he is within hailing distance of the real conservatives?281

Instead of myth, poetry, and metaphor, Macintosh emphasized that theology properly consisted of "those elements which may be defended as literally true."282 This

277Ibid.

278D. C. Macintosh, "Is Theology Reducible to Mythology?" Review of Religion IV 2 (January, 1940), 140-58.

279Ibid., 155.

280Ibid. An example of the formal fallacy of undistributed middle is the argument that "All tigers are animals. All mammals are animals. Therefore, all tigers are mammals. All A are B. All C are B. Therefore, all A are C." Hurley, A Concise Introduction to Logic (1994), 113-4.

281Ibid., 152.

282Ibid., 157.
literal truth was provided by vital religious experience and not dogmatic indoctrination with the so-called orthodoxy of a bygone generation, but spiritual regeneration and a positive faith, such as will grow its own creed and doctrinal system; not a mere external reaction to the old so-called evangelical doctrines in their no longer digestible form, whether these be taken in good faith, literally, as by the fundamentalists, or in the latest style, as mere mythology. The old theological evangelicalism functioned serviceably in the evangelism of an earlier day, and while the functional test is not an adequate test of the truth of a theology, it is a proper test of its evangelical quality. That will be our modern evangelical theology which, having successfully passed all fair theoretical tests and been shown to be intellectually permissible at the very least, functions effectively as an instrument of personal evangelism in this our own day. What we need and what is, I believe, available, is an experientially verifiable evangel of a spiritual regeneration universally accessible on the fulfillment of certain specifiable and practicable religious conditions. And we need a theology which we can reasonably take as literally true, and which is functionally evangelical in that it is effectively instrumental to that spiritual evangel. 283

Niebuhr replied that Macintosh had completely misunderstood his purpose in recovering myth for faith when Macintosh accused him of returning to subjectivism. 284 He countered that Macintosh made irrelevant criticisms when he called for a return to literal truth. 285 Niebuhr stated indignantly that

283 Ibid., 158.


285 Ibid., 305.
I have no interest in reviving orthodoxy. My only interest in orthodox symbols and concepts is derived from my belief that they contain truths, and that these truths are answers to problems and questions which have been obscured in the past centuries of Renaissance and Enlightenment... I do not see very much in most liberal theology except the addition of pious phrases to the characteristic faith of the bourgeois-liberal period, faith in the essential goodness of man and in the idea of progress.\textsuperscript{286}

Macintosh replied to Reinhold Niebuhr's reply with a complaint that he too had been misunderstood.\textsuperscript{287} He claimed that Niebuhr overstated and neglected his careful qualifications of language. Macintosh stressed that he undertook to warn Mr. Niebuhr against the controversialist's besetting "fallacy of excluded middle" (in one place inadvertently miswritten "undistributed middle"), the fallacy, namely, of treating contraries (opposite extremes) as if they were contradictories, with no intermediate position left as logically possible.\textsuperscript{288}

Unfortunately, Macintosh had to complain of the opposite fallacy, that of treating contradictories as contraries. What seems to be, in Professor Niebuhr's thinking, a clear case of the fallacy of not excluding any middle term between contradictories is indicated by his unqualified

\textsuperscript{286}Ibid., 307.

\textsuperscript{287}Macintosh, "A Rejoinder to Professor Niebuhr's Reply," Review of Religion IV 4 (May, 1940), 434-7.

\textsuperscript{288}Macintosh, "A Rejoinder," 435.
assertion that in religion there is no literal truth which has any particular significance. 289

Macintosh disagreed with Niebuhr's assumption that his theological position is simply that of the typical nineteenth-century religious liberal. If one may take as the distinguishing criteria of religious liberalism a belief in the "essential goodness of man," with a practical ignoring of the desperate plight he is in by reason of his individual and social sins and sinfulness, and confidence in human progress as either inevitable or actually steady, especially without a thoroughgoing repentance and turning to God, then I have no hesitation in declaring my unwillingness to be classed as a religious liberal. For many years I have been critical of ordinary liberal theology. What I am interested in might be more appropriately designated modern evangelicalism than liberalism. 290

I argue that Macintosh's exclusion of irony (or tragedy), innocence, and myth contributed significantly to his eclipse in scholarship. By eliminating irony or tragedy, innocence, and myth from his empirical theology, Macintosh closed off his philosophical arguments for the reasonableness of religious belief to the "primordial power" or objective Absolute. Without irony, innocence, or myth to turn man to the divine, Macintosh approached God on his own humanistic terms of the right religious adjustment, metaphysics, natural revelation, or mysticism. By eliminating myth, Macintosh's theology suffered what

289 Ibid., 436.
290 Ibid., 437.
Nietzsche described as the result of a culture losing its myths.\textsuperscript{291} According to Nietzsche, when a culture lost its myths, it lost the healthy natural power of its creativity: only a horizon defined by myths completes and unifies a whole cultural movement. Myth alone saves all the powers of the imagination and of the Apollinian dream from their aimless wanderings. . . Even the state knows no more powerful unwritten laws than the mythical foundation that guarantees its connection with religion and its growth from mythical notions.\textsuperscript{292}

However, Macintosh did not eliminate irony, innocence, and myth entirely. His myths of innocence and mythlessness continued to operate unexamined to guide and direct his apologetic work. Macintosh's conscious exclusion of myth was an unconscious weakness that prompted his students to apply his ideas and methods to his work, to critique it internally, and to move beyond it to neo-orthodoxy. The crowning irony came when "the most obvious forms of success" that he achieved at Yale in the classroom and in print were "involved in failure on the ultimate level."\textsuperscript{293} I will discuss Macintosh's eclipse and subsequent blackout at Yale in the next chapter.

\textsuperscript{291}Nietzsche, \textit{The Birth of Tragedy} (1968), 135.

\textsuperscript{292}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{293}Reinhold Niebuhr, \textit{The Irony of American History} (1962), 160.
5.30 CONCLUSION

In my opinion, H. Richard and Reinhold Niebuhr's turn to irony or tragedy, innocence, and myth in their development of neo-orthodoxy was in part a reaction against Macintosh's thought. Their reactions against Macintosh's value-theory and demythologizing were insightful and correct. However, they failed to appreciate fully the fact that Macintosh was an apologist engaged in removing intellectual barriers to Christian belief and internally correcting the reigning Ritschlian-style liberalism of his day. As an apologist for evangelical Christian faith, Macintosh donned the clothing of Ritschlian-style liberalism and American empiricism, pragmatism, and metaphysics to correct them and to turn them back to evangelical orthodoxy. Macintosh argued for the possibility of knowledge of external reality, the reasonableness of Christian belief in God, the grounding of absolute values in God, and the necessity of conversion or entry into the right religious adjustment. In his own eyes, Macintosh was not a Ritschlian-style liberal.


295 Macintosh, "Romanticism or Realism, Which?" (1931), 325-32.
Instead, Macintosh lived out his myth of John Bunyan's pilgrim on the way to and leading others to the Promised Land of an untraditional orthodoxy that was meaningful for his skeptical, scientific age. He stated this repeatedly and offered frequent criticisms of liberalism. Contemporary scholars must take his statements seriously. When they do so, they will gain insights into Macintosh's place within American religious history and recover resources for engaging the new historicism.
CHAPTER SIX: IRONY, INNOCENCE, MYTH, AND THE ECLIPSE OF DOUGLAS C. MACINTOSH

6.00 SUMMARY

Irony, innocence, and myth figured prominently in the eclipse of Macintosh's empirical theology. In this chapter, I contend that Macintosh was eclipsed in scholarship because:

1. Macintosh was highly original; he produced independent, thoughtful students; and he did not construct a theology in continuity with other theologies.¹

2. Macintosh's arguments were too subtle and complex for most readers.

3. Macintosh's empirical theology based on conversion as the universal religious experience was too narrowly Baptist.²

4. Macintosh's apologetic effort was futile in the wake of Kant's destruction of the apologetic arguments for the existence of God, Darwin's destruction of the design argument, and Barth's denial of natural theology.

¹Jonathan R. Wilson, "Revising Macintosh by Hartt: Shaping Empirical Theology," Perspectives on Religious Studies 20 1 (Spring, 1993), 44-5.

5. Macintosh's myth of mythlessness suffered from changing views of science including the demise of Baconian common-sense realism and vitalism on which he based his theology.³

6. Macintosh's empirical theology suffered from the demise of evangelicalism in academia,⁴ with which he was associated.

7. Macintosh's empirical theology also suffered from the demise of liberalism,⁵ with which he was associated.

8. Macintosh's defense of his myths of innocence and mythlessness including individualistic optimism and scientific progress caused him to deny irony and tragedy, innocence, and myth in his work and to modify the content of theology as H. Richard and Reinhold Niebuhr observed.


6.10 ORIGINALITY, INDEPENDENT STUDENTS, AND LACK OF CONTINUITY

In "Revising Macintosh by Hartt: Shaping Empirical Theology" (1993), Jonathan R. Wilson attributed Macintosh's eclipse in scholarship to several factors. Wilson claimed that Macintosh was highly original, which meant that he could not "be clearly identified with any one school of theology."\(^6\) Wilson also traced Macintosh's eclipse to the famous independence of his students, and "the absence of clear continuity between his theology and any contemporary theology."\(^7\)

While I agree with Wilson on this point, I add that Macintosh was difficult to identify because of his subtlety, originality, and apologetic engagement of a variety of philosophical and theological positions as I discussed above. In my opinion, Macintosh attempted to be all things to all men\(^8\) and ironically became nothing to anyone. By following the Apostle Paul's apologetic endeavor to relate to all men so that he might save some, Macintosh became identified with his opponents and suffered their respective fates. He was neither modernist nor fundamentalist, neither Ritschlian nor Princetonian; yet he exhibited some

\(^6\)Wilson, "Revising Macintosh by Hartt" (1993), 44.
\(^7\)Ibid., 45.
\(^8\)I Corinthians 9:22.
similarities with all four positions. Macintosh's empirical theology, while highly original in its engagement of other positions, lacked clear continuity with any of them. Such a close, internal apologetic argument led inevitably to confusion and incorrect identification of theological positions as Macintosh noted in his doctoral dissertation:

The real theological position of any apologist is usually difficult to determine, for the reason that the exigencies of controversy demand that he view things largely from the general point of view of his opponents. Thus there is often a wide difference between the basis of the apologist's own religious certainty and the foundation which he seeks to lay for a favorable attitude toward his religion on the part of others. Naturally enough this frequently involves a difference too between the content held and the content defended.9

Ironically, Macintosh's apologetic tactics led scholars to identify him, in many cases, with his opponents, as Wilson observed.10

6.20 SUBTLETY AND COMPLEXITY OF ARGUMENTS

Macintosh's elaborate apologetic attempt to reinterpret theology as an empirical science and to construct a new "untraditional orthodoxy" confused both the scientifically trained and the more traditional churchman.11 Even his

10Wilson, "Revising Macintosh by Hartt" (1993), 44.  
attempt to speak as a "plain man" quickly launched into highly technical jargon appealing more to the academic philosopher than to the "common" reader.

6.30 TOO NARROWLY BAPTIST

In following Bunyan's evangelical emphasis on individual progress toward salvation, Macintosh employed conversion as the specific kind of "truly valid" universal religious experience upon which he constructed his philosophy of religion as Kuethe noted. Ironically, Macintosh's supposedly broad appeal to the conflicting

12 Macintosh began the manuscript of "The Plain Man's Soliloquy" with a series of dialogues with an imaginary, color-blind "philosophical friend" concerning the red, orange, and yellow dahlias in a garden they were passing. The possibility of seeing colors quickly moved to the possibility of knowledge of independent reality. According to Macintosh, my friend "assures me that I am now fairly launched on the sea of philosophy and tells me that the particular problem that has principally engaged my attention belongs to what philosophers call epistemology, or the philosophy of knowledge. He informs me further that my present position is known as epistemological dualism, or dualistic realism, the term dualism referring to the fact that from the point of view I now occupy the object is interpreted as double: on the one hand there is the experienced or perceived and therefore knowable object, depending on perception for its existence; and on the other hand and wholly distinct from this, there is the independently existing object or thing, which, since it is entirely shut off from our experience, is therefore, strictly speaking, unknowable. Naive realism, it appears, is sometimes spoken of as a form of epistemological monism, since it holds that the object perceived in ordinary perception is numerically one with the independently existing thing." Macintosh, "The Plain Man's Soliloquy" (1938), 1, 17-8.

positions of Warfield's theological conservatism and Dewey's liberal humanism, intellectual elites and the "plain man" was limited by his staying "more in his Baptist tradition" as Crump Miller observed. According to Kuehne, Macintosh relied on a "more parochial understanding of the 'true' Christian tradition" than the philosophies of Henry Nelson Wieman or Bernard Meland. Macintosh's adherence to his religious tradition caused subsequent scholars to discard his massive argument. Instead, scholars turned to Wieman and Meland who "tried to transcend the particularism of the western cultural viewpoint." In the words of Kuehne, "Wieman's concentration on the actual processes of increase of appreciable value" was improved upon by "Meland's deeper empiricism and more adequate attention to the processes of human symbolization of the meaning of experience."

Against this assessment of Macintosh's limitations, Randolph Crump Miller, one of Macintosh's former students, discussed Macintosh's Canadian Baptist roots. Crump Miller argued however, that Macintosh had not intended to stay

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15Kuehne, "Three Empirical Philosophies" (1963), 236.
16Ibid., 235.
17Ibid., 232.
18Ibid., 235.
with this minimal foundation, but he believed it was sound enough to be the basis for a superstructure, based on reasonable faith and permissible surmise, and this normative theology was the secret of his piety and devotion.\textsuperscript{20}

By including his permissible surmises grounded in the legitimate demands of the scientific method, Macintosh brought "back into his system his whole Canadian Baptist (orthodox) system."\textsuperscript{21} According to Crump Miller, this carefully constructed argument possessed a "cumulative power" that "commanded respect."\textsuperscript{22}

6.40 DEMISE OF APOLOGETICS

I am convinced that Macintosh's apologetic effort was futile in the wake of Kant's destruction of the apologetic arguments for the existence of God, Darwin's destruction of the design argument, and Karl Barth's rejection of purely rational knowledge of God. As I have discussed in Chapter Two above, post-Kantian philosophy and the second or Darwinian scientific revolution effectively destroyed the classical apologetic arguments for the existence of God and


\textsuperscript{21}Randolph Crump Miller, to Gayle Grubbs, 22 September 1993, Transcript in hands of Gayle Grubbs.

\textsuperscript{22}Crump Miller, American Spirit (1974), 106.
the reasonableness of religious belief. Macintosh, however, sought to restore them based on his epistemological, historical, and moral optimism arguments as I discussed in Chapter Three.

Macintosh's apologetic effort also suffered a serious setback when Karl Barth (1886-1968) rejected natural theology. In developing his third option after Kant, Barth responded to Kant's Socratic turn to the self by accepting reason's limitation of itself and consequent unsuitability as the point of departure for theology. To establish the objectivity of God, Barth rejected the possibility of doing theology from below, from humankind to God. Barth then returned to his Reformed theological tradition with its emphasis on the sovereignty of God. According to Barth's neo-orthodox theology from above, from God to humankind, man could know God only through His self-


24 Barth, Protestant Thought (1959), 190-1; Cf. Welch's Second Option, Welch, Protestant Thought (1972), I, 47.


26 Ibid.
revelation\textsuperscript{27} of grace and faith and not through human reason.\textsuperscript{28} Therefore, "a 'natural' theology--is quite impossible within the Church, and indeed, in such a way that it cannot even be discussed in principle."\textsuperscript{29} According to Diogenes Allen, Barth, by rejecting natural theology as a human, philosophical construction, rejected the god created by man's reason as an idol.\textsuperscript{30} As Allen noted, without natural theology as the basis of reasoning his way to God, man could not have apologetics as a reasoned or philosophically argued approach to knowledge of or relationship with God.\textsuperscript{31} Allen lamented that unfortunately, Barth's rejection of natural theology led many students and clergy to reject all philosophy for doing theology.\textsuperscript{32} I am convinced that Macintosh's use of natural revelation\textsuperscript{33} caused him to fall under this blanket rejection.\textsuperscript{34}

\textsuperscript{27}Barth, \textit{Church Dogmatics The Doctrine of God II.1.10.}
\textsuperscript{28}\textit{Ibid.}, II.1.85.
\textsuperscript{29}\textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{31}\textit{Ibid}, 8.
\textsuperscript{32}\textit{Ibid}, 8.
\textsuperscript{33}Macintosh, "Natural Revelation" (1942), 22-44.
\textsuperscript{34}S. Mark Heim, "True Relations," (1982), 182.
6.50 CHANGING VIEWS OF SCIENCE

As I see it, three significant changes in the understanding of science that supported Macintosh's myth of mythlessness affected the relevance of his work. First, the older Baconian Compromise or doctrine of the two books35 began to unravel due to the burgeoning development of the physical sciences.36 The developing sciences were turning more and more to the hypothetico-deductive method including hypotheses, predictions,37 and causality.38 Secondly, the Darwinian or second scientific revolution severed the earlier alliance between Baconian-Newtonian science ("the cornerstone of the Enlightenment's optimism,"39 according to Allen) and Christianity.40 Darwinian science destroyed the


40Marsden, Fundamentalism and American Culture, 15, 121.
argument from design by replacing the divine creator with impersonal natural causes.\textsuperscript{41} Thirdly, Macintosh suffered from the discrediting of the doctrine of vitalism upon which he based some of his work\textsuperscript{42} by the "synthetic theory" of evolution.

\textbf{Decline of the Baconian Compromise (1605)}

I suggest that although Macintosh carefully limited the validity of his empirical method in theology,\textsuperscript{43} he suffered the fate of the demise of Baconian common-sense realism which supported his philosophical, theological system.\textsuperscript{44} In his attempt to hold Christianity together in an age of unbelief, Macintosh attempted to support the myth of mythlessness or scientific superiority. He relied heavily but not exclusively on Baconian-Newtonian common-sense realism in science to construct his critical monistic

\begin{footnotesize}


\textsuperscript{43}Crump Miller, "Professor Macintosh & Empirical Theology" (1940), 34.

\textsuperscript{44}Macintosh, \textit{Problem of Knowledge} (1915), \textit{Theology as an Empirical Science} (1919).
\end{footnotesize}
realism\textsuperscript{45} in epistemology and theology as an empirical science.\textsuperscript{46} As I see it, Macintosh embraced the challenge that Darwinian naturalistic evolution and the hypothetico-deductive method presented to Baconian-Newtonian commonsense realism in science. He then appropriated it for his own apologetic purposes. Unfortunately, his attempt to shore up the older Baconian-Newtonian view of science as objective empirical observation by incorporating the newer concept of the predictability of science and hypotheses\textsuperscript{47} failed along with the older view.

\textbf{The Darwinian or Second Scientific Revolution}

As I discussed in Chapter Two above, Darwin's use of the hypothetico-deductive method and his theories of evolution based on natural selection in \textit{The Origin of Species} (1859), produced a second scientific revolution.\textsuperscript{48} According to Marsden, Darwinism's second scientific

\textsuperscript{45}"The object perceived is existentially or numerically identical with the real object at the moment of perception, although the real object may have qualities that are not perceived at that moment; and also that this same object may exist when unperceived, although not necessarily with all the qualities which it possesses when perceived." Macintosh, "Is 'Realistic Epistemological Monism Inadmissible'?" (1913), 701; \textit{Problem of Knowledge} (1915), 310-1.

\textsuperscript{46}Macintosh, \textit{Problem of Knowledge} (1915), 211-15; \textit{Theology as an Empirical Science} (1919).

\textsuperscript{47}Marsden, \textit{Fundamentalism and American Culture} (1980), 121.

revolution posed a dilemma for evangelicals. As Marsden noted, evangelicals were caught in a double bind. "If they kept their commitment to autonomous scientific inquiry now, the very foundations of theistic and Christian belief seemed to be threatened." In this conflict of myths between religious belief and science, some moderates held to a middle ground. Marsden observed that for most educated American evangelicals, however, the commitment both to objective science and to religion was so strong, and the conflict so severe, that they were forced into one of two extreme positions.

On the one hand, they could hold Hodge's view "that Darwinism was irreconcilable with Christianity -- a new form of infidelity -- and that it was speculative and hypothetical rather than truly scientific." On the other, they could redefine "the relationship between science and religion."


49 Marsden, Fundamentalism and American Culture (1980), 20.

50 Ibid.

51 Ibid.

52 Ibid.

53 Ibid.

54 Ibid.

55 Ibid.
Marsden also noted that those evangelicals who redefined the relationship between science and religion turned to the "philosophical tradition of Kant and German Idealism." They also turned to "the theological work of Friedrich Schleiermacher and Albrecht Ritschl." Like Schleiermacher and Ritschl before them, these evangelicals sought to remove religion from its dependence "on historical or scientific fact susceptible of objective inquiry." As Marsden observed, they confined religion to the realms of the spirit, heart, religious experience, and moral will that were "not open to scientific investigation." Marsden concluded that these evangelicals made science autonomous and placed religion safely "beyond its reach."

I am convinced that Macintosh was also caught in this double bind. As one of Marsden's educated evangelicals, he maintained the objectivity of common-sense realism but rejected Charles Hodge's (1797-1878) position as I discussed in Chapter Three. According to Marsden, Hodge had seen the challenge to intelligent design present in natural selection. Marsden discussed the futility of Hodge's

\[56\text{Ibid.}\]
\[57\text{Ibid.}\]
\[58\text{Ibid.}\]
\[59\text{Ibid.}\]
\[60\text{Ibid., 21.}\]
\[61\text{Marsden, "The Collapse" (1983), 244; Gregory, God & Nature (1986), 376.}\]
claim that Darwinism was irreconcilable with Christianity and that speculative hypothetical science was unscientific. Marsden concluded that the belief in intelligent design was not irresistible and universal. Because common-sense philosophy claimed to be objective and free of any prior assumptions, it could not respond to such an attack on one of its fundamental principles. The supposed objectivism of the system suffered from a fatal flaw. Common sense could not settle a dispute over what was a matter of common sense.

I argue that Macintosh appropriated this fatal flaw because he rejected the subjective philosophical, theological tradition of German Idealism from Kant, Schleiermacher, and Ritschl. To reconstruct the relationship between science and religion, Macintosh constructed a highly original attempt to retain the Baconian compromise and common-sense realism. He required this reconstructed relationship to support his critical monistic realism in epistemology and theology as an empirical

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62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
64 Macintosh, Problem of Knowledge (1915), 75-125.
65 From epistemological monism and critical realism, Macintosh developed his critical monistic realism as the doctrine that "the object perceived is existentially or numerically identical with the real object at the moment of perception, although the real object may have qualities that are not perceived at that moment; and also that this same object may exist when unperceived, although not necessarily with all the qualities which it possesses when perceived." Macintosh, "Is 'Realistic Epistemological Monism Inadmissible?'" (1913), 701; The Problem of Knowledge (1915), 310-1.
science. As I discussed in Chapter Three, Macintosh wanted to make religion verifiable by objective scientific inquiry. For scientific verification, he turned to empirical religious experience, moral sense, and moral action. To this end, he incorporated the hypothetico-deductive method of speculative science with its hypotheses, prediction, and cause and effect with common-sense realism's empirical observation and inductive method. He then claimed that he had made religious experience compatible with scientific fact and susceptible of objective inquiry.

Within this system, Macintosh stated that the chief practical function of science seemed "to be to predict the future." He claimed that man's entry into the right religious adjustment would cause God as a Dependable Factor to respond predictably with an assurance of his salvation. Macintosh then tried to establish theological laws or "generalizations, stating what the thing under investigation does under certain conditions." He thought that once he had discovered a law, he could predict and partially control "future experience, on the assumption that under the same

66Macintosh, Theology as an Empirical Science.
67Macintosh, Problem of Knowledge (1915), 492.
68Macintosh, "Plain Man's Soliloquy" (1938), 56.
69Macintosh, Reasonableness of Christianity (1925), 124-5.
70Macintosh, Problem of Knowledge (1919), 490-1; Theology as an Empirical Science (1919), 140-56.
conditions the thing will act as before. The further experience resulting furnishes further data for induction."71 Macintosh's first law, the "law of elemental religious experiences," said that "on condition of the right religious adjustment with reference to desired moral achievements of the will, a dependable Factor produces the specific moral results desired."72 This law was based on the hypothetic-deductive method's use of cause and effect, as was his second law of conversion:

On condition of the right religious adjustment, with a view to being turned permanently from sin to God and to the right way of living, a dependable Factor works primarily in the will and ultimately in the nature more generally the definite and manifest beginning of a new and better type of life.73

I am convinced that Macintosh's acceptance of Darwinian science, the Baconian observation-inductive scientific method of empirical observation and generalization and the hypothetico-deduction method made him vulnerable to all of the criticisms of these positions. Because of his appropriation of Baconian common-sense realism in epistemology and science, Macintosh suffered its demise at

71Macintosh, Problem of Knowledge (1915), 492.
72Macintosh, Reasonableness of Christianity (1925), 239.
73Ibid., 239-40.
the hands of the Darwinian scientific revolution. Due to his acceptance of Darwinian science, Macintosh also incurred the wrath of those evangelicals who, in the tradition of Hodge, had rejected the hypothetico-deductive method of science.

As I discussed in Chapter Three, Randolph Crump Miller claimed that Macintosh was aware of the limits of his empirical argument.74 Crump Miller observed that Macintosh used empiricism as a tool to complement his moral argument and did not pretend to provide a complete theology.75 I contend that when one realizes Macintosh's apologetic agenda as Crump Miller did, one also becomes aware of these appropriate limitations. As Crump Miller observed, all that Macintosh claimed for his empirical method was that

(1) It must be logically consistent with our accepted body of knowledge and with itself.
(2) It must be pragmatically adequate.
(3) It must be tested in immediate experience.76

As Crump Miller argued, "any concept which meets these requirements is as true as any inductive concept can ever be."77 He stressed how little Macintosh "claims as empirically verified, and how he combines the experience of

74Crump Miller, "Professor Macintosh and Empirical Theology" (1940), 31-41.
75Ibid., 34.
76Ibid., 31.
77Miller, "Professor Macintosh & Empirical Theology" (1940), 31.
value with a sense of reality." Crump Miller concluded that those "readers and students" who "have confused his empirically verified knowledge of God with the rest of his theology . . . have been inclined to reject his results." According to Crump Miller, Macintosh became vulnerable when he claimed to provide a theology as an empirical science. He should have claimed scientific spirit instead of scientific method because "his superstructure can in no sense be called 'scientific.'" As Crump Miller noted, Macintosh's presuppositions were those of common-sense. He concluded that Macintosh's approach was much more sound than Wieman's denial of "personality, intelligence, or creatorship of God." Crump Miller concluded that Wieman also denied "that there can be any valid theology outside the results of observation and rational inference." Therefore, Wieman's position was "really reduced to a

79 *Ibid*.
religious positivism of immediacy by this method, although his naturalistic metaphysics enriches his position greatly."\textsuperscript{85}

As I see it, even Macintosh's empirical verification of the knowledge of God broke down at the six points I discussed in Chapter Three. In addition, Macintosh's empirical theology committed the errors of the earlier Puritan covenant theology as described by Leonard J. Trinterud and Perry Miller.\textsuperscript{86} This older Calvinistic theology sought to prove the necessity of human works, the assurance of individual salvation, and to establish a view of God who cared for and conformed to human needs and logic.\textsuperscript{87} As I discussed above, Macintosh tried to chain the transcendent God. In the words of Perry Miller, he tried to make God "less inscrutable, less mysterious, less unpredictable."\textsuperscript{88} Like Bunyan, Macintosh wanted "to extort salvation from God."\textsuperscript{89} I conclude that his endeavor was doomed to fail.

\textsuperscript{85}\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{86}Leonard J. Trinterud, "The Origins of Puritanism" (1951), 45; Perry Miller, \textit{Errand into the Wilderness} (1956), 48-98.

\textsuperscript{87}Perry Miller, \textit{Errand into the Wilderness} (1956), 54-5.

\textsuperscript{88}Perry Miller, \textit{Errand into the Wilderness} (1956), 54-5.

\textsuperscript{89}\textit{Ibid.}, 73; Trinterud, "Origins of Puritanism" (1951), 45.
Problems with vitalism

In addition, I claim that Macintosh's philosophical theology was doomed to fail because he appropriated the problematic biological theory of vitalism. He had embraced Bergson's vitalism to recover the teleological argument and to explain human freedom and moral responsibility.90 According to Macintosh, vitalism was the theory of "a subconscious but super-mechanical factor,"91 or creative cause. Vitalism was "the plausible but perhaps not fully established theory of a non-mechanical factor in life-processes, directing life-impulse underlying the facts of evolution."92 Macintosh added that "the vitalistic interpretation of human freedom lends color to this supermechanical theory of life in general."93 According to Anthony Flew, Aristotle first inspired this theory that "the phenomenon of life cannot be fully explained in purely material terms, but that it is something non-material in living organisms that differentiates them from inanimate bodies."94 Jaques Roger described how Christian theologians 

90Macintosh, Theology as an Empirical Science (1919), 96, 255.
91Macintosh, Reasonableness of Christianity (1925), 98.
92Macintosh, Theology as an Empirical Science (1919), 96.
93Ibid.
linked the vital principle with the soul and influenced early evolutionary theorists to link it with the driving principle of evolution.⁹⁵ According to Henry May, vitalism or "the Life Force" replaced the nineteenth century's concept of natural law in the early twentieth century. May observed that vitalism "often sounded like a new name for God."⁹⁶

According to Roger, vitalism dominated European physiology until the 1840's.⁹⁷ At that time, physiologists insisted on reducing life to physio-chemical processes and attacked vitalism as a spiritualist philosophy and abandoned it.⁹⁸ Thomas Goudge observed that Darwin's emphasis on natural selection as the controlling factor in evolution destroyed what was left of the teleological or design argument because it no longer needed the concept of an external Architect.⁹⁹ As Roger noted, the demise of vitalism contributed to the decline of Christian belief


⁹⁶May, The End of Innocence (1959), 225.

⁹⁷Jaques Roger, "Mechanistic Conception of Life" (1986), 291.

⁹⁸Ibid.

because "since vitalism was considered a spiritualistic philosophy, it followed that if vitalism was wrong, so was Christianity."\textsuperscript{100}

Although discredited in the natural sciences, vitalism or élan vital played a central role in the thought of the French philosopher Henri Bergson (1859-1941), according to Flew.\textsuperscript{101} In the words of Frederick Copleston in A History of Philosophy (1974), Bergson's "concept of the élan vital bears some resemblance at any rate to that of the soul of the world as found in ancient philosophy and in some modern philosophers such as Schelling."\textsuperscript{102} Copleston also noted that Bergson spoke of the élan vital as "'supra-consciousness'" and likened "it to a rocket, the extinguished fragments of which fall back as matter."\textsuperscript{103} Bergson also used the word "God" in reference to evolutionary theory, as signifying an immanent cosmic vital impulse which is not creator in the Judaeo-Christian traditional sense but . . . as the instrument of the creation of fresh forms of life.\textsuperscript{104}

\textsuperscript{100}Roger, "Mechanistic Conception of Life," 292.
\textsuperscript{101}Flew, Dictionary of Philosophy (1979), 41.
\textsuperscript{103}Ibid., 200-1, quoting Bergson, Creative Evolution, 275.
\textsuperscript{104}Ibid., 201.
Macintosh recalled that while traveling abroad in the summer of 1911, he had encountered vitalism in the thought of Bergson and Hans Driesch (1867–1941). Macintosh appropriated vitalism as a way to recover the teleological argument and the divine agency present in deliberate, creative, free human moral action. He argued that in metaphysics a good case can be made out for the reasonableness of taking vitalism as very possibly true, or even as probable. In human free action, as we have seen, the conduct is to some extent creatively determined at the time. This corresponds, in the conscious realm, to the vitalistic principle in the biological realm, so that we may extend the application of the term "vitalism" to include this unpredetermined but determining factor in human conduct, belief in which has already been established as morally certain and theoretically reasonable.

During the course of Macintosh's lifetime, the scientific community discredited vitalism as a scientific theory. According to Goudge, the recovery of Mendelian (1865) genetics in 1900, and its reconciliation with the doctrine of natural selection by R. A. Fisher (1930) and J. B. S. Haldane (1932) into the "synthetic theory" of evolution eliminated vitalism from serious scholarship.

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105 Macintosh, "Toward a New Untraditional Orthodoxy" (1932), 303.

106 Macintosh, Reasonableness of Christianity (1925), 260.

107 Ibid.


109 Ibid.
As I see it, the discrediting of vitalism did not cause Macintosh's apologetic arguments to fail because he did not make it one of his basic premises. However, vitalism's demise and the failure of his apologetic arguments due to logical fallacy and overzealous claims contributed to his eclipse in scholarship. I suggest that although scholars must reject his arguments as fatally flawed and unconvincing, scholars should not reject the importance of his apologetic task for understanding his work. Scholars should interpret Macintosh's use of vitalism as positive evidence of his familiarity with the science of his day. It is also evidence of his persistent, eclectic effort to appropriate his opponents' arguments to defend religious content, certainty, assurance and moral values.

6.60 THE DEMISE OF EVANGELICALISM IN ACADEMIA

As S. Mark Heim observed in his study of Macintosh's evangelical theology,\(^\text{110}\) Macintosh "always considered himself a child of evangelicalism and a defender of its theological essence."\(^\text{111}\) According to Heim, Macintosh's theology remained "fundamentally faithful to and continuous with the evangelical background out of which Macintosh

\(^{110}\)S. Mark Heim, "True Relations: D. C. Macintosh and the Evangelical Roots of Liberal Theology" (1982).

\(^{111}\)Ibid., 1.
came."112 Heim then argued that "liberalism no less than its sister fundamentalism is a child of evangelicalism."113 Evangelicalism possessed a "protean character" which "contained within itself the impetus and dynamic of liberal theology."114 Based on Heim's assessment of Macintosh as an evangelical and the protean nature of evangelical theology115 for both fundamentalism and liberalism,116 I contend that Macintosh's empirical theology suffered the fate of both of these positions in academia.

George Marsden described the demise of American evangelicalism in academia in his article "The Collapse of American Evangelical Academia" (1983).117 In this article, Marsden attributed the collapse of the American evangelical scholarly community by 1950 to several factors.118 As I discussed in the previous section, the second or Darwinian scientific revolution led to the collapse of the synthesis of Baconian-Newtonian science and evangelical Christianity.119 According to Marsden, the demise of

112Ibid., 395.
113Ibid., 4.
114Ibid., 7.
115Ibid., 7.
116Ibid., 4.
117Marsden, "The Collapse of Evangelical Academia" (1983), 219-64.
118Ibid., 220.
119Ibid., 223.
Baconian common-sense realism accompanied the decline of evangelicals in the colleges.\textsuperscript{120} This dominance was "built directly on the ethnic dominance of 'Anglo-Saxon' Protestants."\textsuperscript{121} Marsden described how democratic ideals challenged this group's control of higher education by "offering a new and seemingly neutral basis for refashioning education."\textsuperscript{122} As Marsden noted, these democratic ideals, also described by Jewett and Lawrence as a developing democratic American monomyth "provided a compelling secular account of the dynamics of a civilization that in many areas was losing its religious orientation."\textsuperscript{123}

Marsden also cited professionalism, the rise of universities and the requirement of the Ph.D. for entry into academic life as contributing factors to the demise of evangelicalism in academia.\textsuperscript{124} Specialists replaced generalists\textsuperscript{125} as Macintosh himself evidenced in his succession of Stevens at Yale.\textsuperscript{126} As James Turner noted in Without God, Without Creed (1985), the rising interest in science in the late nineteenth century "in turn supported

\textsuperscript{120} Ibid., 220.
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{122} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{123} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{124} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{125} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{126} Bainton, Yale and the Ministry (1957), 173.
the multiplication of scientists and creation of institutional niches for them." Turner described how the increasing number of "new schools and new departments meant jobs--full-time jobs, many with the chance for research." Scientists published to ever increasing audiences and became entrenched within American society. They formed their own cultural elite that was distinct from the older clerical and literary body of opinion molders. To establish their independence and make good their draft on resources and prestige, these professional scientists had to pry loose the prior claims of traditional literary and religious intellectuals, of whom ministers still constituted the majority. This need bred a tendency on the part of a vociferous minority of scientists to snap at the clergy and denigrate their pretensions.

Marsden also noted how the "new combination of scientific positivism and historicism" threatened the credibility of the Bible itself. This new combination questioned the Bible's "accuracy at innumerable points." It also offered "alternative naturalistic and seemingly scientific explanations for the rise of human religious

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128 Ibid.
129 Ibid.
130 Ibid., 122-3.
131 Marsden, "The Collapse of Evangelical Academia" (1983), 221.
132 Ibid.
beliefs." Marsden concluded that "the intellectual aspect of the revolution involved the replacement of the old authorities with the new in all but the obscure crannies of American academia."  

As I see it, this new combination of scientific positivism and historicism merged into Jewett's and Lawrence's myth of mythlessness. This myth of scientific superiority threatened what Marsden described as the common-sense "account of reality (that) was considered to provide a sure base for the rational and scientific confirmation of the truths of the Bible and the Christian faith." I affirm that as American culture turned from its religious myth to the myth of scientific superiority, it was forced to give up its cherished belief in the ability of science to confirm Scripture. I agree with Marsden that the developing neo-orthodoxy in American theological institutions during the 1930s sought to provide Americans an alternative that preserved traditional Christian theology while keeping the core of sacred history in a transcendental realm likewise immune to scientific-historical criticism.

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133 Ibid.
134 Ibid.
136 Ibid.
137 Marsden, "The Collapse of Evangelical Academia," 222.
According to Marsden, these middle positions affected "few, if any, alternative nontheological educational institutions or even academic organizations."\textsuperscript{138} They endorsed "to some degree the historical and scientific canons of the day."\textsuperscript{139} Therefore, they were able to maintain "cordial relations with American academia by conceding its virtual autonomy."\textsuperscript{140} As Marsden noted, these middle positions granted "the authority of the new science and history."\textsuperscript{141} However, they limited this authority "to certain secular domains."\textsuperscript{142} As a result, evangelical Christian apologists "rested the entire weight of their apologetic on the point that Christianity went far beyond that which mere scientific reason could reach."\textsuperscript{143} These apologists pursued the new tactic of reducing Christianity to an essence that was "wholly immune from scientific or historical inquiry."\textsuperscript{144} Secular institutions, then became

\textsuperscript{138}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{139}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{140}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{141}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{142}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{143}Marsden, "The Collapse of Evangelical Academia," 222.
\textsuperscript{144}Ibid.
the proper location for such inquiries."\textsuperscript{145} By relinquishing so much intellectual turf to secular institutions, the evangelicals lost credibility and power in American academic institutions.\textsuperscript{146} I am convinced that Macintosh shared their fate in spite of his affinities with liberal theology.

6.70 DEMISE OF LIBERALISM

Based on Heim's discussion of the evangelical roots of liberal theology and Macintosh's empirical theology,\textsuperscript{147} I contend that Macintosh also suffered from the demise of liberalism in academia. Kenneth Cauthen described this demise in \textit{The Impact of American Religious Liberalism} (1962).\textsuperscript{148} According to Cauthen, American religious liberalism flowered between 1901 and 1933.\textsuperscript{149} With roots in "deism in the eighteenth century and unitarianism in the nineteenth century," liberalism began to emerge in the United States around 1850.\textsuperscript{150} Since the mid 1930s, however, this liberalism was displaced but not totally obliterated by

\textsuperscript{145}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{146}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{147}Heim, "True Relations" (1982), 395-8.


\textsuperscript{149}Ibid., 3.

\textsuperscript{150}Ibid.
"newer modes of thought," especially the neo-orthodoxy of Macintosh's students H. Richard and Reinhold Niebuhr.\textsuperscript{151} Cauthen concluded that in many ways, neo-orthodoxy was a "repudiation of liberalism."\textsuperscript{152} In others, however, it was a "continuation of liberalism" because "in both method and content" it depended upon liberal insights.\textsuperscript{153}

As I discussed in Chapter Four, Macintosh engaged liberalism so deeply to critique and correct it that he was identified as a Ritschlian-style liberal. This led to his eclipse in scholarship by neo-orthodoxy. Ironically, Macintosh's empirical theology contained the seeds of the Niebuhrs' neo-orthodoxy and therein his own eclipse as I discussed in Chapter Five.

\section{6.80 MACINTOSH'S MYTHS OF INNOCENCE AND MYTHLESSNESS}

As I claim throughout this work, Macintosh's myths of moral optimism and scientific superiority supported his confidence in the possibility of knowledge of God. Because he was optimistic about human achievement and progress, Macintosh thought that he could know divine Reality or God, as I discussed in Chapter Three. I am convinced that from this deceptively optimistic and sure ground,\textsuperscript{154} Macintosh

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{151}Ibid., 228-55.
\item \textsuperscript{152}Ibid., 254.
\item \textsuperscript{153}Ibid., 255.
\item \textsuperscript{154}Macintosh, "Toward a New Untraditional Orthodoxy" (1932), 279.
\end{itemize}
denied the severity of irony and tragedy and modified the content of theology\textsuperscript{155} as H. Richard and Reinhold Niebuhr claimed. I suspect that much of the anguish Macintosh felt from the Niebuhrs' critiques was because he knew that the Niebuhrs were right. In applying Macintosh's argument back on itself, H. Richard Niebuhr exposed a dualism in Macintosh's proposal of human values that were logically prior to God.\textsuperscript{156} By focusing on irony, human sinfulness, and the truth in myths, Reinhold Niebuhr exposed the fatal weaknesses of Macintosh's morally optimistic empirical theology.

As I see it, Macintosh's optimistic belief in human reason and scientific progress led him to engage all comers and to reduce summarily their positions to idealism, dualism, subjectivism, solipsism, and agnosticism or an uncritical dogmatism.\textsuperscript{157} From the ashes of his opponents' defeated arguments, Macintosh constructed his own position from which he attempted to correct two thousand years of Western thought. This certainly was not an endearing trait as Macintosh himself learned painfully from his former student and colleague H. Richard Niebuhr.\textsuperscript{158}

\textsuperscript{155}Macintosh, "The Idea of a Modern Orthodoxy" (1911), 477-88; "Toward a New Untraditional Orthodoxy" (1932); \textit{Theology as an Empiricl Science} (1919).

\textsuperscript{156}Macintosh, "Natural Religion," 28.

\textsuperscript{157}Macintosh, \textit{The Problem of Knowledge} (1915), 17-35.

\textsuperscript{158}H. R. Niebuhr, "Value-Theory and Theology" (1937), 93-116.
In addition to alienating people with his repetitive intellectual assaults and reconstruction of their philosophical positions, Macintosh optimistically denied irony and tragedy in his theology. Without irony and tragedy, Macintosh downplayed sin and evil, although not so severely as did the Ritschlians as I discussed in Chapter Four. As I discussed in Chapter Five, H. Richard Niebuhr objected to Macintosh's theory of atonement and value judgments on precisely these grounds. I agree with H. Richard Niebuhr's assessment of Macintosh at this point, in spite of Macintosh's efforts to recover objective values grounded in God. I also agree with Niebuhr's criticism of American realism that it downplayed "the actuality of evil and chaos in the experience of the external world" and sacrificed faith as an important source of religious values. As I discussed in Chapter Three, Macintosh's optimism and self-righteousness led him to modify the content of the Christian religion in his modern or "untraditional orthodoxy" and theology as an empirical science.

159 H. R. Niebuhr, Meaning of Revelation (1941), 80-96.

160 H. R. Niebuhr, "Religious Realism" (1931), 424.

161 Macintosh, "The Idea of a Modern Orthodoxy" (1911).

162 Macintosh, "Toward a New Untraditional Orthodoxy" (1932).
6.90 CONCLUSION

In spite of the eclipse of his work, Macintosh left behind many friends but no disciples.\textsuperscript{164} His students continued their independent viewpoints fostered in his classroom as they in turn took important teaching positions.\textsuperscript{165} Macintosh may not have founded a school or left behind any direct descendants, but the problems that he addressed and the original way in which he presented them have survived.\textsuperscript{166} In the next chapter, I demonstrate how Macintosh's responses to the challenges to religious belief in his ironic age were a significant part of the American philosophical and religious history that William Dean's new historicists neglected.

\textsuperscript{164}Randolph Crump Miller, "A Centennial Tribute" (1978).
\textsuperscript{166}\textit{Ibid.}, 39.
CHAPTER SEVEN: MACINTOSH AND THE NEW HISTORICISM

7.00 SUMMARY

Irony, innocence, and myth also illuminate Macintosh's relationship to a developing North American "new historicism." As I noted in the Introduction, this new historicism presents renewed challenges to religious belief in North America. To respond to these challenges to religious belief, William Dean followed Libertus Hoedemaker and Bruce Kuklick in tracing a line of American religious empiricism from Edwards to James, to Dewey, to the Chicago School, then to Wieman, Meland, and Loomer. Dean is a member of the Empiricism in American Religious Thought Group of the American Academy of Religion. Members of this group cluster "around The American Journal of Theology and Philosophy and the Highlands Institute for American Religious Thought."  


3Dean, History Making History (1988), xi.

4Ibid.
Dean was critical of some new historicism because it neglected its own history.\textsuperscript{5} This history included the Jewish and Christian traditions.\textsuperscript{6} As a post-modern deconstructionist, Dean wanted to remedy this situation by turning to radical empiricism and radical historicism.\textsuperscript{7} He wanted to locate the "object which interprets us and we who interpret the object"\textsuperscript{8} within American history and culture.\textsuperscript{9}

As Dean noted, Macintosh's religious empiricism was part of the history that the new historicists neglected. The problems that he addressed remain today and the responses that he made to them stimulated a subsequent generation of scholars. I suggest that Macintosh's work is relevant to the contemporary new historicism in the following five areas:

1. Macintosh embraced a transcendental truth beyond history while the new historicists limit themselves to historical experience.

2. Macintosh emphasized the individual with only nominal attention to the role of the community while the new historicists focused on the larger society and culture.

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\textsuperscript{5}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{6}Ibid., 144.

\textsuperscript{7}Ibid., 111.

\textsuperscript{8}Dean, \textit{American Religious Empiricism} (1986), 14.

\textsuperscript{9}Dean, \textit{History Making History} (1988), 25.

4. Macintosh dealt with epistemology in contrast to Cornel West's description of the American evasion of philosophy.\(^{10}\)

5. Several contemporary scholars have turned to apologetics to support inter-religious dialogue.

7.10 TRANSCENDENTAL ABSOLUTE BEYOND HISTORY

According to Dean, the "new historicism" was developed by neopragmatic philosophers Richard Rorty, Richard Bernstein, and Hilary Putnam, by literary critic Frank Lentricchia, by neopragmatic philosophers of religion Cornel West and Jeffrey Stout and by post-modern theologians Gordon Kaufman and Mark C. Taylor.\(^{11}\) Dean noted that these new historicists, like the original American historicists accept only historical references and deny all extrahistorical references, including those implicit in idealism and positivism. They affirm pragmatism, pluralism, and the constructive and value-laden power of the imagination. They deny foundationalism, the transcendentalized subject, and a correspondence-theory-of-truth realism. They deny both authoritarian and


\(^{11}\)Dean, History Making History (1988), ix.
subjectivistic nihilisms, and they affirm the responsibility of the subject. Most simply, they acknowledge that historical reality is created through interpretations of the historical subject—that it is history that makes history.\(^{12}\)

In his desire to take religion seriously in a radically empirical, radically historicist way,\(^{13}\) Dean addressed the challenges posed by the new historicists by examining the history of American religious empiricism.\(^{14}\) American empiricism was important because it developed in response to an older historicism earlier in this century.\(^{15}\) Dean did not explore the radical empiricism "line of Charles Sanders Peirce and Josiah Royce and their epistemological idealism."\(^{16}\) Neither did he examine a Yale strand of religious empiricism from Macintosh, H. Richard Niebuhr, and Randolph Crump Miller.\(^{17}\)

As I see it, Dean did not follow the Yale strand of radical empiricism because he objected to Reinhold Niebuhr's limitation of the effects of evil.\(^{18}\) Dean objected to Niebuhr's "restriction of evil by protecting an unambiguously good God from contamination in historical

\(^{12}\)Ibid.

\(^{13}\)Ibid., 111.

\(^{14}\)Ibid., x.

\(^{15}\)Ibid.

\(^{16}\)Ibid., 1.


\(^{18}\)Ibid., 68.
evil." According to Dean, the Niebuhrs, in their opposition to Macintosh's inadvertent slip back into subjective human moral optimism, turned to a transcendent God beyond history. This transcendent God beyond history was incompatible with Dean's radical historicist, radical empiricist, deconstructionist position of God solely within history.

In his discussion of pragmatism as a tactic for moving beyond the tragic contingencies of history, Dean argued that empirical liberals of Macintosh's day were not optimists because they "could not look to a redemptive process which intervened in the natural course of events." Dean claimed that they employed pragmatism "to fight the tragedy implicit in this confinement to history." Pietistic liberals on the other hand,

were sometimes historical optimists, sometimes not. The important point is that for them some transcendental absolute shining through history, and not historical experience itself, is the source of what is real.

Unfortunately, pragmatism as an "effort to avoid the tragic in fact extended the tragic." According to Dean,

19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., 70.
21 Ibid., 69.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., 71.
if history was a perilous struggle, and this seemed to be what Darwin was telling the pragmatists and the liberals, well then, God itself and the values promoted by God were caught in that perilous struggle, for they existed within history, or they did not exist at all.24

Dean did not neglect Macintosh entirely, however.25 He struggled to identify Macintosh's older American historicism as a partial or perhaps an ahistorical realism that was "unaffected by local dynamics of history."26 According to Dean, Macintosh was a partial or ahistorical realist, or an empirical liberal in contrast to the German, nonhistorical, pietistic liberals Kant and Schleiermacher.27 Nonhistorical, pietistic liberals viewed God as beyond history in "a realm of spirit, separate from the events of natural and social history,"28 while man was in history. In this view, the religious subject had access to the God of this realm that transcended human history in religious experience.29

Dean claimed that American empirical liberals like Macintosh were more historical

24Ibid., 70-1.
25Ibid., 6; Dean, "Empiricism and God" (1992), 120.
26Dean, "Empiricism and God" (1992), 120.
28Ibid.
29Ibid.
because (in principle, if not always in terminology) they had replaced this nature-spirit dualism with a nature-spirit unity in which whatever might be called spirit lies within, not beyond history.  

Dean attributed this nature-spirit unity to epistemological monism stemming from the late seventeenth and the early eighteenth century British empirical Enlightenment of John Locke and David Hume.  

Macintosh's partial ahistorical realism  

I contend that Macintosh retained what Dean termed an ahistorical view of history in which God was both immanent and transcendent in opposition to the problems posed by the crisis of historicism, pre- and post-millennialism and post-Kantian subjective philosophy. Contrary to Dean's assessment of liberal empiricists however, Macintosh did not embrace metaphysical monism and did not limit God to human history. Although he emphasized the natural realm, Macintosh embraced a spirit realm beyond history in which spiritual law was continuous with natural law as Drummond  

30Ibid.  

31"Epistemological monism is the doctrine that the experienced object and the real object are, at the moment of perception, numerically one." Macintosh, Problem of Knowledge (1915), 13.  


33Ibid., 6.
proposed. I argue that Macintosh, like Dean's liberal Pietists, viewed God as "the eternally transcendent Ideal." According to Macintosh, man could have contact with this independently existing Reality through divine revelation, his free-will response of entering the right religious adjustment, his awareness of values grounded in the Absolute, and through his hope of personal immortality. Contact with God as "Supreme Power," "Cosmic Factor," "Ideal Companion of the inner life," "Moral Personality," "Conserver of Values," "Divine Reality," "the God of moral optimism," or ""Loving, Intelligent Will" regenerated and renewed "the spiritual vigor of individuals and social groups."

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34 Drummond, *Natural Law in the Spiritual World* (1887), ix; Macintosh, "Theology in a Scientific Age" (1922), 140-1.

35 Macintosh, "The Meaning of God in Modern Religion" (1926), 463.

36 Ibid., 462.

37 Ibid., 463, 467.

38 Ibid., 459, 461, 468-9.


41 Ibid., 470.
I also maintain that Macintosh's view was similar in many ways to Dean's older pietistic historicism of "nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Germany under the leadership of Kant, Schleiermacher, Hegel, Dilthey, Troeltsch, and H. Richard Niebuhr." According to Dean, this older historicism claimed that the world was in process, "and that this process is determined largely by creatures working within history through the interaction of historical freedom and historical destiny." Dean also claimed that the older historicism rested on the additional belief that there is more to history than the combined forces of freedom and destiny, that history is influenced also by an extra-historical, universal, and eternal reality, usually called God, sometimes called the Absolute.

While Macintosh rejected the dualism of this pietistic older historicism, he affirmed the importance of man's free-will efforts within history and the presence of an extra-historical, universal, and eternal reality as God or the Absolute.

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43Ibid.
44Ibid.
45Macintosh, "The Meaning of God in Modern Religion" (1926).
As I discussed above, Macintosh was aware of the challenges posed by the older historicism to religious belief. He constructed elaborate apologetic arguments and internal critiques to correct the philosophy and theology of his day and to encourage others to believe. Although he remained within the Edwardsean tradition, Macintosh specifically objected to James's and Dewey's radical empiricism because it led to the elevation of human ability and values and the denial of sin and belief in God. Macintosh's corrected version of empirical theology, representational pragmatism, and moral optimism were also significantly different from the direction taken by Meland and Loomer of the Chicago School. In his emphasis on the role of the individual in entering a relationship with God, Macintosh kept the community of faith in his system to provide collaborating, interpretative religious experience, and social responsibility.

46 Macintosh, Theology as an Empirical Science (1919), 18.

47 Macintosh combined the good essence of intellectualism with the good essence of representationalism and pragmatism to define truth as "representation (of subject by predicate, of reality by idea) sufficient to mediate satisfactorily the purpose with which the judgment is made. But what is really true must be representation sufficient to mediate satisfactorily whatever purpose or purposes ought to be recognized in making the judgment. In other words, real truth is practical identity of idea with reality, of predicate with subject, where the practice in question is ultimately satisfactory, as well as the mental instrument which serves it." Macintosh, Problem of Knowledge (1915), 444-5.
Macintosh knew that religious belief required a divinity that was both immanent and transcendent to give meaning and hope to natural and social history. If, as the new historicists argued, man alone gave meaning to history as man alone created new history, then they left "the impression that they are mere relativists, mere subjectivists, virtual nihilists."\(^{48}\) I contend that if man alone gives meaning to history, then man is vulnerable to the logic of Peter Berger's "relativizing the relativizers" argument that pushed "the relativity business through to its very end."\(^{49}\) According to Berger,

when everything has been subsumed under the relativizing categories in question (those of history, of the sociology of knowledge, or what-have-you), the question of truth reasserts itself in almost pristine simplicity.\(^{50}\)

Man could no longer avoid the question of truth or falsity as Macintosh knew. Either man was the source of a relative, subjective truth or there was an Absolute as the ground of truth and value. As indicated in his argument from moral optimism, Macintosh wanted both.\(^{51}\)

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\(^{50}\) Ibid.

\(^{51}\) Macintosh, Reasonableness of Christianity (1925), 45.
7.20 INDIVIDUAL AND COMMUNITY

As I discussed above, Macintosh followed Bunyan's myth of "Christian" and "Evangelist" as examples of personal moral progress\(^{52}\) with less emphasis on the larger religious community.\(^{53}\) However, Macintosh's students, H. Richard and Reinhold Niebuhr reacted against his individualistic focus and emphasized the role of the community. The new historicists continued this focus on the community as a democratic society or culture. As I discussed in the Introduction, Richard Rorty used irony to foster self-doubt and to turn an "ironist" to solidarity with other liberal "ironists."\(^{54}\) I noted how Rorty's use of irony contrasted with that of Reinhold Niebuhr who used irony to turn mankind to a transcendent divine irony.

Jeffrey Stout, one of Dean's "new historicists," also focused on the role of the community in his study of the "cultural and linguistic status of" authority "at various points in modern history."\(^{55}\) Instead of a transcendent absolute, Stout's "real hope for rational discourse lies in the will to create communities and institutions in which the

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\(^{52}\) Macintosh, "Toward a New Untraditional Orthodoxy" (1932), 278-9.


\(^{54}\) Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (1989), 73, 198.

virtues of good people and good conversation can flourish."\(^56\)

Another of Dean's new historicists, neo-pragmatic philosopher of religion Cornel West of Harvard, former Professor of Religion and Director of Afro-American Studies at Princeton University,\(^57\) turned to prophetic pragmatism to support an Emersonian culture of creative democracy.\(^58\) According to West, an Emersonian culture of creative democracy was "a society and culture where politically adjudicated forms of knowledge are produced in which human participation is encouraged and for which human personalities are enhanced."\(^59\) Within West's Emersonian culture of creative democracy, the people or "citizenry in action, with its civil consciousness molded by participation in public-interest-centered and individual-rights-regarding democracy"\(^60\) replaced the elite philosophers and engaged in rational deliberation.


\(^{59}\) *Ibid*.

\(^{60}\) *Ibid*.
7.30 MORAL OPTIMISM

As I described above, Macintosh objected to James's and Dewey's focus on humanly optimistic meliorism. Macintosh then constructed his apologetic argument for moral optimism grounded in God as independent Reality.61 However, Macintosh maintained Bunyan's myth of human innocence and moral progress in his high assessment of human ability. The Niebuhrs objected to this optimistic assessment of human ability. I argue that the new historicists followed James and Dewey in appropriating the optimistic myth of human moral progress. For example, in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (1989), Richard Rorty embraced moral progress "in the direction of greater human solidarity."62 In Ethics After Babel (1988), Jeffrey Stout called for "a broadly humanistic account" of the "rational or nonrational" forces that "incline people toward religious faith or against it in the first place."63 Stout strongly opposed James Gustafson's "austere doctrine of divine sovereignty derived from the Reformed tradition against everything in the tradition that in fact glorifies humanity rather than

61Macintosh, Reasonableness of Christianity (1925), 45.


63Jeffrey Stout, Ethics After Babel (Boston: Beacon Press, 1988), 123.
In his optimistic assessment of human ability, Stout claimed that we determine our fate in the end not by choosing for or against liberal society, nor by finding the right general principle of acceptability, but by drawing the line here or there in countless particular cases, given our sense of the daily detail. If we do it well, it will be because we have the virtue of practical wisdom—just as Aristotle (and Dewey) would insist. So we had better strive to maintain and strengthen whatever it is about our society that makes this and other virtues possible. Failure to exhibit the virtues, to concern ourselves with the sort of people we are becoming, is bound to create conditions under which the virtues themselves will be harder to acquire and thus all the more difficult to exhibit.

Cornel West, a self-styled prophetic pragmatist, was another new historicist who appropriated the myth of moral progress. West emphasized "the political and moral side of American pragmatism" that began with Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-1882). He claimed that as an epistemology-avoiding philosophy, American pragmatism accented "human powers," and transformed "antiquated modes of social hierarchies in light of religious and/or ethical ideals (that) make it relevant and attractive." West argued that American pragmatism was

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64 Ibid., 172.
65 Ibid., 242.
67 Ibid., 6.
68 Ibid., 5.
69 Ibid., 4.
compatible with his Marxist views and post-modern "yearning for principled resistance and struggle that can change our desperate plight."\textsuperscript{70}

7.40 EPISTEMOLOGY

I also contend that Macintosh's turn to epistemology is relevant to West's argument in support of pragmatism as an evasion of epistemology-centered philosophy--from Emerson to Rorty--(that) results in a conception of philosophy as a form of cultural criticism in which the meaning of America is put forward by intellectuals in response to distinct social and cultural crises.\textsuperscript{71}

In his historical overview of pragmatism, West focused approvingly on Dewey as

the culmination of the tradition of American pragmatism. After him, to be a pragmatist is to be a social critic, literary critic, or a poet--in short, a participant in cultural criticism and cultural creation.\textsuperscript{72}

In the words of West, Dewey was

the greatest of the American pragmatists because he infuses an inherited Emersonian preoccupation with power, provocation, and personality--permeated by voluntaristic, amelioristic, and activistic themes--with the great discovery of nineteenth-century Europe: a mode of historical consciousness that highlights the conditioned and circumstantial character of human

\textsuperscript{70}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{71}Ibid., 5.

\textsuperscript{72}Ibid., 71.
existence in terms of changing societies, cultures, and communities.\textsuperscript{73}

West also admired Dewey's genius because he infused a cosmopolitan and historical outlook into American pragmatism, remains open to Baconian, Enlightenment, and Hegelian sensibilities yet faithful to the Emersonian evasion and theodicy.\textsuperscript{74}

As a philosopher, Dewey aimed to "evade the epistemological problematic of modern philosophy and thereby emancipate philosophy from its arid scholasticism and cultural conservatism."\textsuperscript{75} According to West, Dewey did this by calling "into question the most fundamental project of modern philosophy: the bridging of the gulf between subject and object by means of epistemological mechanisms."\textsuperscript{76} West claimed that Dewey articulated a counter-epistemology or a conception of philosophy that gives professional expression to the Emersonian evasion of epistemology-centered philosophy. In fact, the dominant theme of his metaphilosophy is that philosophy is neither a form of knowledge nor a means to acquire knowledge. Rather philosophy is a mode of cultural critical action that focuses on the ways and means by which human beings have, do, and can overcome obstacles, dispose of predicaments, and settle problematic situations.\textsuperscript{77}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{73}Ibid., 69-70.
\item \textsuperscript{74}Ibid., 85.
\item \textsuperscript{75}Ibid., 87-8.
\item \textsuperscript{76}Ibid., 88.
\item \textsuperscript{77}Ibid., 86.
\end{itemize}
Macintosh, epistemology, and the evasion of philosophy

As I see it, Macintosh addressed the epistemological problem directly to counter Dewey's anti-epistemological pragmatism as I discussed in Chapter Two.78 I claim that although Macintosh, like Dewey, remained open to Baconian, Enlightenment, and Hegelian sensibilities, he sought to correct Dewey's neglect of the problem of knowledge. In his first major work, The Problem of Knowledge (1915), Macintosh identified Dewey's epistemological view as "disguised psychological idealism."79 As I discussed in Chapter Three, Macintosh rejected idealism because of its underlying epistemological dualism80 that denied the possibility of knowledge of independent reality.81 I suggest that Macintosh's correction of Dewey's anti-epistemological stance is applicable to West's attempt to construct a prophetic pragmatism. While I think that Macintosh would have agreed with West's larger agenda of a prophetic pragmatism that called "for reinvigoration of a sane, sober, and sophisticated intellectual life in America and for regeneration of social forces empowering the disadvantaged,

78See "American Philosophy: John Dewey."

79Macintosh, Problem of Knowledge (1915), 118.

80"Epistemological dualism is the doctrine that the experienced object and the real object are, at the moment of perception, numerically two." Macintosh Problem of Knowledge (1915), 13.

81Macintosh, Problem of Knowledge (1915), 13-9, 51.
degraded, and dejected," I do not think that Macintosh would have agreed with West's evasion of epistemology-centered philosophy. Therefore, I conclude that Macintosh's emphasis on epistemology and correction of pragmatism, regardless of the success of his apologetic arguments, would have opposed West's prophetic pragmatism. As I understand Macintosh, he would have argued quietly and tenaciously against West's claim that "the American evasion of philosophy is not an evasion of serious thought and moral action." In contrast, Macintosh required an epistemology-centered religious philosophy to prevent war, abolish poverty, safeguard liberty, and reform the government.

7.50 INTER-RELIGIOUS DIALOGUE: Nancy Frankenberry

I suggest that Macintosh's Yale strand of empirical theology is relevant to contemporary discussions of inter-religious dialogue. For example, in Religion and Radical Empiricism (1987), Nancy Frankenberry, Associate Professor of Religion at Dartmouth College and a member of the Empiricism in American Religious Thought Group, claimed that

82West, American Evasion of Philosophy (1989), 239.
83Ibid., 86.
84Ibid., 239.
85Macintosh, Social Religion (1939), 3.
the future of religious empiricism, like that of poetry and of philosophy, may depend on its ability to become a conversable voice, one speaking in an idiom of its own but capable of participating in other discourses.86

As a radical empiricist, Frankenberry wanted to expand the conversation partners to include non-Western religious and philosophical traditions.87 Frankenberry identified Buddhism, particularly Abhidharma and Madhyamika Buddhism, and Zen meditational practices as the closest of these traditions.88 She turned to these varieties of Buddhism because of their deconstructionist moves that paralleled those in Western culture.89 According to Frankenberry, Buddhism was "the first philosophy to perceive reality as creative social process."90 To keep us from limiting our conversation to our bourgeois liberal European values in the West, Frankenberry turned to Whitehead's process metaphysics and to Buddhist experiential tradition. She explained that she turned to these positions because

1. In the work of American religious empiricists such as Wieman, Meland, and Loomer, we can see the beginnings of something very much like a Buddhist epistemology, serving to deconstruct our normal (Western) views of experience and religious variation.91

87 Ibid., 155-88.
88 Ibid., 155.
89 Ibid., 155-88.
90 Ibid., 156.
91 Ibid., 155.
2. American religious empiricists in the West have in common with Buddhists in the East a rejection of any theism that posits an ultimate ground of being or substance underlying and relativizing the flux of events, or any static substantial essence transcending the flux of concrete space-time. Radical empiricism's recognition of the non-substantial character of what has been called "God" in the West leads to a revisionary theism that affirms the category of creativity as the most fruitful conception of ultimate reality.\textsuperscript{92}

3. Both American religious empiricism and Buddhist religious philosophies offer striking resistance to the seductive efforts by Oakeshottians and Rortyans to reduce "the conversation of mankind" to the dimensions of "our" bourgeois liberal European values in the West. Neither tradition has much sympathy with ethno-centric apologies for the status quo.\textsuperscript{93}

Macintosh and inter-religious dialogue

Macintosh presented his own discussion of inter-religious dialogue in \textit{The Pilgrimage of Faith}, delivered as the Stephanos Nirmalendu Ghosh Lectures, at the University of Calcutta, Calcutta, India in 1931. He proposed a League of Religions and argued for a universal religion\textsuperscript{94} instead of Frankenberry's dialogue partners searching for points of contact. His universal religion was to be the evolutionary result "of the survival of the fittest in man's struggle for a better existence."\textsuperscript{95} According to Macintosh, the resulting universal religion had to "appreciate and promote

\textsuperscript{92}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{93}Ibid., 156.

\textsuperscript{94}Macintosh, \textit{Pilgrimage of Faith} (1931), 266-90.

\textsuperscript{95}Ibid., 290.
universally valid values in the lives of others."96 It had to "find place for certain assurances which are the natural and logical expression of normal, spiritual living," and to "develop a rational and universally valid religious philosophy."97 Macintosh also claimed that universal religion should include an essential Christianity based on the unquestionably unique historic Jesus, who must die that he may live. Or rather, the trappings of an ancient and outworn Christology--in so far as it is outworn--must be cast aside that the true Jesus of history may be clothed anew in robes of religious appreciation and interpretation which will better befit him in the exalted place he is to occupy in the world of modern thought and life, and particularly in the universal religion of the future.98

Macintosh concluded that this essential Christianity "must be thoroughly moral, it must not be irrational, and it must aim to retain the vitality of historic religion at its best."99

Macintosh's universal religion retained the empirical method "to seek verification of the hypotheses of faith in religious experience, and to refute the teachings of tradition in so far as they are incompatible with the facts of experience."100 Universal religion also had to reject current pragmatism although it taught us "to appreciate more

definitely the fact that the test of a true or false representation of reality is ultimately a practical test."101

In reflecting on his journey through the world of modern thought, Macintosh distinguished four essentially valid methods of arriving at religious conclusions. These methods, which were mutually supplementary, were the historical, the pragmatic, the scientific, and the metaphysical.102

According to Macintosh, a universal religion based on these four methods would contain a right understanding of reality in the following four categories:

(1) the supreme value of self-dedication to the highest well-being of humanity.
(2) beliefs about reality which may be logically inferred from the validity of moral optimism.
(3) discoveries or revelations which result from persisting in a right of scientific, that is, a dependably successful religious adjustment.
(4) the fruitful idea, rooted in the soil of mysticism and cultivated by metaphysical theology, of the immanence of God in the world but particularly in the spiritual life of man.103

Ad hoc apologetics: George Lindbeck and William Werpehowski

I contend that Macintosh's apologetic, empirical theology is also relevant to the contemporary discussion of ad hoc apologetics by George Lindbeck104 and William Werpehowski.

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101 Ibid., 269.
102 Ibid., 272.
103 Ibid., 275.
Following Lindbeck's discussion in *The Nature of Doctrine* (1984), William Werpehowski, of Villanova University, explored the possibilities of ad hoc apologetics in inter-religious dialogue in "Ad Hoc Apologetics" (1986). According to Lindbeck, who recently retired as Pitkin Professor of Historical Theology, Yale University, the problem of interpreting different languages presented a formidable challenge to inter-religious dialogue. To address these problems, Lindbeck called for ad hoc, or specific case apologetics that understood religions "only in their own terms, not by transposing them into an alien speech."

Werpehowski cautioned that in constructing ad hoc apologetics, one preceded carefully as one established a common ground to support the unique identities of both Christian and non-Christian. In his own argument for ad hoc apologetics, Werpehowski cited Lindbeck's observation that man developed his unique identity in religious

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enclaves. Werpehowski quoted Lindbeck that these religious enclaves

"socialize their members into highly particular outlooks supportive of concern for others rather than for individual rights and entitlements, and of a sense of responsibility for the wider society rather than for personal fulfillment."

According to Werpehowski, these socializing enclaves reinforced man's self identity as a member of a specific religious group. I conclude that they allowed one to listen and to communicate as a member of a specific religious group instead of having to resort to the competitive negotiating tactics of universal religion, in which the "winner" gave up the least. In an atmosphere of mutual dialogue, one did not have to sacrifice diversity for the sake of unity. In such dialogue, one discovered who one was and what was essential to religious belief as one began to see his or her religion as others saw it.

**Macintosh's apologetics and ad hoc apologetics**

I argue that although he called for a universal religion, Macintosh provided an example of ad hoc apologetics in his argument to construct theology as an


empirical science and his internal critique of Ritschlian theology. He met his listeners on their scientific or philosophical turf and in the language of their specific discipline without losing his own unique Christian identity. As I see it, Macintosh employed apologetic arguments as an evangelical tool designed to lead people to and to verify empirically basic Christian beliefs. Like Lindbeck and Werpehowski, Macintosh did not see his apologetic activity as foundational theology. Instead it was an evangelical tool designed to lead Lindbeck's specific "cultural/linguistic" groups from the periphery of Christian belief into the center of a right religious adjustment.

CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION

8.00 SUMMARY

Irony, innocence, and myth provide useful concepts for my historical analysis of Macintosh, his time, and his work. Using irony, innocence, and myth, I have demonstrated the following four points:

1. Macintosh was a man of his time.
2. Macintosh represented an early and decisive departure from the philosophical idealism of the older liberalism.\(^1\)
3. Macintosh was a stimulus for growth, especially the neo-orthodoxy of the Niebuhrs.
4. Irony, innocence, and myth also illuminate Macintosh's Yale strand of religious empiricism and its relevance to the new historicism.

8.10 MACINTOSH WAS A MAN OF HIS TIME

As a man of the Progressive Age, Macintosh illustrated many of the problems of his day. He engaged the reigning contemporary philosophies of idealism, realism, pragmatism, and humanism. In living out his myth of innocence or exemplary human moral progress as Bunyan's "Christian" and "Evangelist," Macintosh, who was very sure of his ground,\(^2\) defended his turf from cultured, learned despisers from

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\(^1\)Hutchison, Modernist Impulse (1976), 214.

\(^2\)Macintosh, "Toward a New Untraditional Orthodoxy," 279.
every discipline, both outside and within Christianity. From the certainty of his evangelical Christian religious experience, Macintosh engaged the problems of science, philosophy, and the liberal theological tradition from Schleiermacher and Ritschl. He employed Bunyan's religious myth of innocence with its optimistic assessment of individual human moral ability and contributed to its secularization by appropriating the myth of mythlessness or scientific superiority. To support the myth of mythlessness, Macintosh turned to contemporary Baconian-Newtonian science, Darwinian evolution, and Bergson's vitalism. To make religion relevant for his times, Macintosh attempted to construct theology as an empirical science and to construct a new "untraditional orthodoxy." He also confronted the uniquely American thought of William James and John Dewey, the problems posed by historical criticism, Darwinian evolution, Prohibition, the Great Depression, two world wars, the American fundamentalist/modernist controversy, and developing American and Continental neo-orthodoxy.

No significant person or intellectual position of his time escaped Macintosh's critical analysis and subsequent appropriation in defense of religious belief. To defend the certainty, assurance, and moral values of religious belief, Macintosh attempted to recover objectivism in theology and the apologetic arguments for the existence of God and the reasonableness of religious belief. He appropriated what he
identified as the Ritschlian or Radical Method in theology to defend an essence of Christianity and the Anselmian apologetic tactic of leaving Christ aside to prove His necessity for human salvation. In constructing his elaborate, subtle apologetic arguments, Macintosh turned to classical apologetics to raise questions of truth and proof and to draw his audience into Christian conversion. In attempting to navigate between the two sides of the Fundamentalist/Modernist controversy he engaged in a printed debate with Benjamin B. Warfield at Princeton. As I discussed in Chapter Six, these enterprises contained the seeds of the eclipse of his empirical theology in scholarship.

8.20 MACINTOSH MOVED BEYOND PHILOSOPHICAL IDEALISM

My historical analysis involving irony, innocence, and myth also illustrates how Macintosh moved beyond philosophical idealism to realism, empiricism, representational pragmatism, and critical monism. As I discussed in Chapter Three, he rejected the underlying dualism of idealism in both European and American philosophy. Macintosh then engaged the Ritschlian theology to purge it and to correct it of its objectionable dualism which led to subjectivism, agnosticism, or dogmatism as I discussed in Chapter Four. In his ill-fated attempt to recover theological objectivism, Macintosh moved beyond
James's psychology of religion and Dewey's religious humanism to place his faith and moral optimism in an independent Reality or God that was both immanent and transcendent. However, he remained optimistic about human moral progress like Bunyan's "Christian" in opposition to Calvin's doctrine of predestination and exaggerated human impotence.³ Ironically, this moral optimism caused Macintosh to slip back into the subjectivism he sought to escape as H. Richard Niebuhr argued in "Value-Theory and Theology."⁴

8.30 MACINTOSH STIMULATED GROWTH

As a beloved teacher at Yale, Macintosh influenced the lives of many students by his personal example, financial and emotional support, and by the way in which he posed the problems he set before his students. Like Bunyan's "Evangelist," Macintosh patiently and diligently labored to show others the way to his supposedly secure turf.⁵ Although Macintosh's theology as an empirical science and new "untraditional orthodoxy" proved impossible, he influenced the Niebuhrs in significant ways. The overwhelming moral optimism of Macintosh's individualistic,

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³Macintosh, "Religious Realism" (1931), 325.
⁵Macintosh, "Toward a New Untraditional Orthodoxy" (1932), 279.
critical monistic realism prompted the Niebuhrs to move to a realism that took seriously human sin, a God who did not always support human purposes, and evil in history as I discussed in Chapter Five. Macintosh stimulated H. Richard Niebuhr to attempt to recover objectivism, the role of the community, and tragedy in theology and value theory. Macintosh's morally optimistic treatment of sin and naturally occurring evil prompted Reinhold Niebuhr to recover irony, individual and corporate sinfulness, and myth in theology.

8.40 MACINTOSH AND THE NEW HISTORICISM

As I discussed in the previous chapter, the concepts of irony, innocence, and myth illuminate Macintosh's relationship to the developing new historicism as described by William Dean, Nancy Frankenberry, Richard Rorty, Jeffrey Stout, and Cornel West. I contend that these new historicists, much like Macintosh, turned to empirical or experiential tests for verification of truth claims, and affirmed a morally optimistic view of human progress. They attempted to place the source of their moral optimism in rational human thought and ability, formulated their arguments in the reigning language (language philosophy) of today, and downplayed the problems of evil, tragedy, and
human sinfulness. Following Macintosh's lead, some of the new historicists embraced ad hoc apologetics as an aid to inter-religious dialogue. They also employed a radically reduced essence of Christianity as human solidarity and social criticism.

In contrast to Macintosh, the new historicists denied a transcendental truth beyond history, emphasized irony, tragedy, and the role of the community, neglected their own history including the Judeo-Christian religious tradition, and sought to evade epistemology in philosophy. By turning to objectivism in theology, constructing apologetic arguments for the reasonableness of religious belief and the existence of God, and employing the Anselmian tactic to prove the necessity of Jesus Christ for human salvation, Macintosh made an early and decisive break with the philosophical idealism of the older Ritschlian liberal theology as Hutchison observed.6

In making this break with the Ritschlian liberal theology and the American humanistic philosophy of James and Dewey, Macintosh turned to realism and empiricism in theology. By making this turn and by presenting creatively the problems of his day to his Yale Divinity School students, Macintosh stimulated three of them including H. Richard and Reinhold Niebuhr and Robert Lowery Calhoun to develop neo-orthodox thought that subsequently developed

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6Hutchison, Modernist Impulse (1976), 214.
into what Dean termed a Yale strand of empirical theology. 7 This alternative strand of empirical theology leading from the Niebuhrs to James M. Gustafson emerged as a significant criticism of the process thought of the Chicago School, the neopragmatic philosophy of Richard Rorty, and the neopragmatic philosophies of religion of Jeffrey Stout and Cornel West.

I conclude that although he was eclipsed in scholarship, Macintosh was a significant transition figure in American religious thought. I also conclude that Macintosh was a significant part of the history that the new historicists neglected. By neglecting this part of American history with its religiously based myth of innocence, the new historicists appear to have constructed "castles in the air" as Philip Schaff cautioned. 8

7Dean, American Religious Empiricism (1986), xi.

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