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ELEMENTAL GYRES: THE STRUCTURE OF WILLIAM BUTLER YEAT'S A VISION

by

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ABSTRACT

Elemental Gyres: The Structure of William Butler Yeats's *A Vision*

by

Stephen Patrick Schneider

This dissertation presents a method for reading William Butler Yeats's *A Vision*. Establishing parallels between the language of *A Vision* and that of Jung's *Psychological Types* both renders *A Vision* comprehensible at the sentence level and identifies the classical theory of temperaments as a crucial unacknowledged influence on both Yeats and Jung. A reading of Book I of *A Vision* demonstrates how its cycle of lunar phases functions as a sophisticated psychological typology and reveals the underlying structure of Yeats's system.
Acknowledgements

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Chapter 1
Reading A Vision

When William Butler Yeats published the first edition of A Vision by subscription after more than seven years of work, the book he had modestly subtitled "An Explanation of Life" was met with what was probably a stunned silence, even from the subscribers who received the book in January of 1926. Yeats described this reception in a letter in March of 1926:

A Vision reminds me of the stones I used to drop as a child into a certain very deep well. The splash is very far off and very faint. Not a review except one by AE--either the publisher has sold the review copies or the editors have--and no response of any kind except from a very learned doctor in the North of England who sends me profound and curious extracts from ancient philosophers on the subject of gyres. (Letters 712)

That single review by Yeats's lifelong friend AE (George Russell) explains that this silence is the product more of the book's difficulty than of its ambition:

A sage out of the ancient world possibly might write with more understanding of A Vision than any of Mr. Yeats' contemporaries [sic]. . . . It might be compared with Henry Adams' mathematical interpretation of history in the astonishing essay on 'Phase', but it is infinitely more complicated, infinitely more difficult to understand . . . . It is not a book which will affect many in our time. It is possible it may be discussed feverishly by commentators a century hence, as Blake's prophetic books so ignored, so unintelligible a hundred years ago, are discussed by many editors in our time, and he is found to be the profoundest voice of his own age. (269-72)

Part of this difficulty in reading the book stems from its concentrated complexity:

The Vision is so concentrated, the thought which in other writers would be expanded into volumes, is here continually reduced to bare essentials, to tables of the faculties and their interactions. . . . Almost any of its crammed pages would need a volume to elucidate its meanings. (270-72)

Yet there is a definite order to this complexity:

For all its bewildering complexity the metaphysical structure he rears is coherent, and it fits into its parts with the precision of Chinese puzzle-boxes into each other. It coheres together, its parts are related logically to each other. . . . (271)
AE’s summation is as hopeful as a review by an author’s lifelong friend can be:

It is possible that A Vision may come to be regarded as the greatest of Mr. Yeats’ works [sic]. It is conceivable also that it may be regarded as his greatest erring from the way of his natural genius, and the lover of his poetry may lament that the most intense concentration of his intellect was given to this book rather than to drama or lyric. Personally, I am glad it was written. I do not doubt that though the seeds of his thought do not instantly take root and fructify in my mind that they will have their own growth, and later I may find myself comprehending much that is now unintelligible.

(272)

The review thus makes several enduring observations about A Vision: The book is extraordinarily difficult to read and understand. It is extraordinarily distilled, yet complex in an extremely precise way. It may draw on ideas that a "sage out of the ancient world" would recognize more readily than we do. And as the product of "the most intense concentration of his intellect", it was of supreme importance to Yeats, which renders poignant both AE’s belief that A Vision would go uncomprehended or even unread, and Yeats’s own self-deprecating account of the book’s reception. Despite his anticipation of this reception, AE believed that A Vision should be read, and had faith that it could be read; he left open the question of how it could be read.

Subsequent criticism of A Vision has expressed more dismay and less faith on these points. In his pioneering 1941 book-length study, Louis MacNeice calls A Vision "the most ingenious, the most elaborate, and the most arid" of Yeats’s writings, saying that "Being unable to accept the established religions or to understand the professional philosophers. . . . [Yeats] succeeded in writing a book more unreadable than most orthodox philosophy" (123-24). By 1956, Hugh Kenner was able to report how "a brief generation of critics assaulted the doors of that Gothic fortress, A Vision, or scrutinizing its interior by periscope reported that it was full of bats" (615). In 1963, Helen Vendler said that "A Vision remains
(to use Bridges' phrase about 'The Wreck of the Deutschland') a great dragon
lying folded at the entrance to all of Yeats's later work" (viii), while Northrop Frye
said that A Vision "is to the student of Yeats what De Doctrina Christiana is to the
student of Milton: an infernal nuisance that he can't pretend doesn't exist" in 1965
(9).

Complaining of the difficulty of reading A Vision has thus always been an
opportunity to exercise a brand of exasperated humor at the book's expense, but
the vein of painful truth inherent in these wry critical pronouncements indicates
the direction critical inquiry ought to take. If A Vision can neither be successfully
read nor ignored, then further assaults—the martial figure seems inevitable, given
those of "Gothic fortress", "great dragon", "infernal nuisance"—across its arid
regions in pursuit of meaning are the only alternative to the surrender of ignoring
the book. It was just this that Warwick Gould called for in the 1985 Yeats Annual:
"critical evaluation of A Vision in a variety of contexts is also too urgently needed
to be delayed" (xviii), which suggests a continuing crisis of evasion in Yeats
studies so long as A Vision remains a puzzle.

Besides the martial, the architectural is frequently invoked when critics
seek metaphors for A Vision, doubtless due to the book's evident precision of
construction; and these edifices are always of a size consonant with the length of
time Yeats spent writing the book: some seven years for the first edition of 1925,
and roughly ten more for the revised 1937 edition (hereafter abbreviated as VA
and VB when the two editions differ). In addition to Kenner's "Gothic fortress",
Richard Ellmann calls A Vision "cathedral-like" (Eminent Domain 80), while Frank
Kermode sees it as "a palace of art, a place in the mind where men may suffer,
some less and some more" (26). In 1986, Colin McDowell took up the architec-
tural metaphor in getting at the crux of the problem of reading A Vision, namely
the almost universal experience everyone has when reading the book of insight in one sentence being taken away in the next. If we think of *A Vision* in architectural terms, it seems at times like a building from an Escher etching, where stairs which we had thought were leading upward suddenly debouche at a lower level. (219)

We need to be able to read *A Vision* coherently at the sentence level before we can construct a comprehensive determinate meaning to build upon theoretically.

The difficulty of reading *A Vision* has been extensively addressed in Steven Helmling's 1988 *The Esoteric Comedies of Carlyle, Newman, and Yeats*, which groups it with Carlyle’s *Sartor Resartus* and Newman’s *Apologia Pro Vita Sua* as examples of "an oddly unforthcoming apocalypse, a devious and teasing revelation as often occulted as disclosed" (2). Helmling considers these three very different books to be linked by their ironic or even overtly humorous presentation of exacting intellectual arguments concerning ultimate beliefs, and sees their difficulty as the result of authorial design rather than faulty exposition:

If some aura of the esoteric is implicit in the conviction that to read is to be initiated into an experience, rather than argued into a position, such a view of literary experience is relevant not only to the way we should read *Sartor Resartus*, the *Apologia*, and *A Vision*, but to the way Carlyle, Newman, and Yeats wrote them. These books aim not to explain a doctrine but to involve us in the activity of wresting illumination from bafflement. They instruct us, if obliquely, in how to read them, thus implicitly criticizing or correcting whatever habits of "reading" (interpreting, understanding) we had before and suggesting that if our reading is sufficiently sympathetic, generous, and intelligent, we will gain some access to the author's sense of things far more vibrant and alive than a mere expository report could offer. (3)

For Helmling these books are assaults on Victorian rationalism and materialism, as much in their difficulty and humor as in their actual statements of or arguments for belief. And in light of Yeats's disputed status as a modernist, Helmling sees fit to use the difficulty of *A Vision* as a criterion for classing it with the other two books as "protomodernist" works:

And like the masterpieces of modernism, these books were willfully and self-consciously difficult, and advertised their difficulty as an
index (and a criticism) of the insufficiency of ordinary habits of discussion and understanding, as well as a challenge to the fit audience, though few—that citizenry of "the selecter world," that "high fellowship" Meredith associates with the "Comic Spirit"—willing to depart from conventional habits of mind for at least the length of a book. (9)

This is borne out by Yeats's own comments on his intended audience in reference to reviews of *VB*:

The *Irish Church Gazette* has given *A Vision* a long eloquent enthusiastic review, which makes up for the stupidities of men who attribute to me some thought of their own and reply to that thought. They all think I was bound to explain myself to them. It is just that explaining which makes many English books empty. A Frenchman thinks of his friend and his friend's mistress, with whom he dines at some cafe, an Englishman of the chance woman he brings down to dinner. I have always deliberately left out this explaining. Intensity is all. I want to be some queer man's companion. (*Letters* 905-06)

Yeats thus admits that he has not made *A Vision* as easy as he could have, but claims he did so to heighten its intensity, and seems to accept the bewilderment of the average reader as his due. But what was he trying to say to that "queer man"—the reader whose intensity would match that of the book, whose tenacity (keeping the book as "companion") could at last plumb its secrets?

Nothing, or at least nothing worth knowing, those critics who characterize *A Vision* as "full of bats" would answer. Even Helmling leans toward the view that *A Vision* is a void wrapped in an enigma:

The young Yeats, seeking mystic knowledge, had spent years turning the pages of queer old books—Blake, Swedenborg, Boehme—books that promise wisdom even as they withhold it, that complacently invite interpretation, but—such is the inscrutable irony of "text"—finally authorize none. The temptation to elicit, even to extort, gratifyingly orderly meanings out of such texts is one that Yeats experienced fully and rather indulged than resisted. (In a preface to a translation of *Axel*, Yeats remembers how, as he worked through the original in his poor French, the play "seemed all the more profound because I was never quite certain that I had read a page correctly.*) The ambiguity of oracular texts and the uses of ambiguity for any pose laying claim to special wisdom were not lost on Yeats. Indeed, we find him very early on, and with great deliberateness, polishing small masterpieces of enigma and illusion. *A poem like "Who Goes with Fergus?" begs every question*
patient analysis can ask, including the one the poem itself asks in its own title. Such calculated ambiguities are part and parcel of symbolism. As adumbrated in France, symbolisme meant the promotion of mysterious and elusive effects through the presentation of symbols whose referents were entirely suppressed; as introduced into England by Yeats's intimate friend, Arthur Symons, symbolism referred itself to Carlyle's remark, quoted on the second page of The Symbolist Movement in Literature, that "in a symbol, there is concealment, yet revelation."

A gnomic vagueness that can accommodate a great breadth of interpretative response: To some degree, it is in such vagueness that the continuing power of the Bible or the Kabala inheres. While a student of the occult, Yeats came to regard indistinctness as a virtue, as permitting the stylization, or reduction, of the particular to archetype. (164-65)

Yeats's characterization of A Vision as "stylistic arrangements of experience" (VB 25) suggests that he has reduced the particulars of all experience to the archetypal symbol of his Great Wheel of lunar phases, and this symbol indeed offers both concealment and revelation; but what Yeats meant as intensity, Helmling calls indistinctness.

And as for the substance—not the style—of the book, Helmling devotes his energies to treating the deliberately humorous prefatory material of both editions of A Vision and then declares, "If I were not reluctant to plunge into the stuff of Yeatsian esoterica proper, I might be tempted to suggest a comic reading of the whole of A Vision" (187). In other words, none of the book is to be taken very seriously, though demonstrating that would be too much trouble. Though Helmling has done much the best job yet of examining the rich vein of humor running through A Vision, he manages to finesse the larger matter of the book's serious meaning by exhaustively examining the comic style of the introductory material of both editions and virtually ignoring the rest of the book.

In like manner, Barbara L. Croft's 1987 "Stylistic Arrangements": A Study of William Butler Yeats's A Vision is devoted to a comparison of the two editions of A Vision, with particular attention given to the prefatory material. While Croft
diligently enumerates the differences between the editions, her approach to the
central mystery of its meaning takes the form of a disclaimer: "Yet perhaps
mastery is not our proper aim in reading A Vision. . . . [T]he proper approach to
A Vision should suggest, to borrow Yeats's own metaphor, a spiral staircase, a
constant return to the same puzzles, but each time with more understanding" (9).
This calls for the tenacious reader Yeats had in mind, yet offers no hope for the
substantial understanding of A Vision which Yeats said that reader might
achieve. Croft's book itself represents another return to the same critical
puzzles, with no significant advance in reading A Vision at the sentence level.

George Mills Harper's 1987 The Making of Yeats's A Vision might seem to
promise such an advance, but turns out to be almost entirely devoted to a
chronologically ordered transcription of selections from the automatic writing ses-
sions which led to A Vision, with little interpretation of this material and less of A
Vision. As Thomas Parkinson remarked, "Reading Harper's transcriptions of the
Automatic Script for A Vision, I find that much of the material is not interesting in
itself or in relation to the final version of A Vision or the poetry" ("Fifty Years"
112). Speaking of the general state of Yeats criticism in 1989, Parkinson
observed that "Recently, a certain tentativeness seems to be present among
critics, as if there were an interregnum" ("Fifty Years" 112).

How much this owes to the state of A Vision studies is hard to say, but it is
no doubt significant that even the two recent anthologies of postmodernist
approaches to Yeats have almost nothing new to say about the problem of A
Vision's meaning. In the 1987 William Butler Yeats, editor Harold Bloom chooses
to deal with A Vision by reprinting a chapter on it from his 1970 book Yeats,
which was not the last word on the subject, its merits notwithstanding (129-53).
In the 1991 Yeats and Postmodernism, Cheryl Herr's "The Strange Reward of All
That Discipline*: Yeats and Foucault* examines A Vision's theory of history in Foucauldian terms (146-66). Herr discovers useful parallels between Yeats's view of historical epistemés and Foucault's theories of history, but is unable to shed new light on the fundamentals of Yeats's system itself, even though Yeats's theory of history is a direct application of the system.

Thus Herr, like Helmling and Harper, is able to write about A Vision at length without addressing the meaning of its system, which is a typical weakness of criticism of the book. Previous critical approaches to A Vision have followed the three usual avenues of critical inquiry: its meaning has been sought through examination of its parts, its relationship to things outside itself has been examined, and its importance has been assessed. To begin with the last point: The importance of A Vision remains as problematic for critics today as it was for AE in his original review; despite its obvious importance for Yeats, its importance for readers of Yeats is necessarily minimized by precisely the degree to which the book is not yet understood—which is considerable. And the failure of recent developments in critical theory to throw new light on A Vision must stem largely from the lack of a recognized old-style determinate reading of the book's meaning for new theories to work from and react to.

As for the other two approaches, Cecil Salkeld's review of VB prefigured their inherent problems by giving two reasons why the book resisted critical analysis:

(a) There is no critical terminology wherewith to treat of a technical work having no border-line between metaphysics, astrology, history, spiritualism, "school" philosophy, poetry, symbolism, geometry (conic sections), and a great deal of humour (an unfortunate man whose guardian angel is jealous of his sweetheart is a case in point).
(b) Symbol and dogma are both modes that invalidate analysis. This whole section [the Great Wheel] might be termed Dogmatic Symbolism and, as such, either personally valid or invalid in toto. In no case can the original and arbitrary symbol be questioned since
we are at no time on common or verifiable ground.\textsuperscript{1}

In Salkeld's view, \textit{A Vision} defies analysis because it belongs to no identifiable genre and because the basic and unique symbolic terminology established in the "Great Wheel" section of the book relates to no "common or verifiable ground" used anywhere else. What is lacking in either case is the kind of external referent that would enable the reader to understand and readily assimilate what Yeats is saying.

Salkeld's response may have been precisely what Yeats hoped for. Monk Gibbon has recorded Yeats's mood on the very day that he finished writing the 1925 edition: "Yeats rejoined us by the fire and announced that he doubted whether the critics would be able to make anything of it. It would be completely outside their province, and he chuckled to think of their predicament" (82-83). Yet Salkeld's remarks indicate what we should ask of any analysis of \textit{A Vision}: What does it do to explain the book at the sentence level so that we can read with a useful degree of comprehension? In particular, what does it do to explain the book's unique central terminology--the \textit{primary} and \textit{antithetical tinctures}, the four \textit{Faculties} and four \textit{Principles}--where Yeats assigns a new signification to existing words? If, as \textit{AE} says, "the thought which in other writers would be expanded into volumes, is here continually reduced to essences, to tables of the faculties and their interactions," it would be by understanding what these terms mean that we could expand what \textit{A Vision} means for us and what it meant for Yeats as well. Whether criticism relies on the exploration of possible sources, the characteristics of genres, the internal workings of the text, or the latest in criti-

cal theory to explain _A Vision_, its ability to explain the book’s essential terminol-
ogy is the final measure of its usefulness to the reader of _A Vision_ at this time.

Undaunted critics have sought to refute Salkeld’s first point by assigning _A Vision_ to a specific genre in order to understand the book as an example of its kind. This approach tends to evade the central terminological problem by examining isolated aspects of _A Vision_ that conform to genres and dismissing the remainder of the book as unintelligible or unimportant. We have already seen how even Steven Helmling’s creation of a genre to include _A Vision_ is guilty of this very evasion. Barbara L. Croft also finds fault with other genre-based approaches—religion, cosmology, poetics, apocalypse, and philosophy—in her survey of them (18-30), and goes on to suggest cosmogony as the proper genre instead (170-72). However, her critique is on the grounds that the other genres are too restrictive; because cosmogony "implies the creation of a world—perhaps, in artistic terms, a new world" (171), it can include the characteristics of other genres.²

While this does address Yeats’s calling the book _A Vision_ and "An Explanation of Life" (_VA_ iii), it does little or nothing to help us read it at the sentence level. The problem is that Salkeld’s two points are effectively inseparable: assigning the book to a single genre is reductive, and more impor-
tantly it does not immediately explain its symbolism and terminology. Yet genres can indicate where to seek the "common or verifiable ground" where _A Vision_ can be understood, if we are willing to pursue the hints that Yeats gives further than

² For other discussions of _A Vision_’s genre, see Bloom, Yeats 211-12, 216-19; Ellmann, The Identity of Yeats 163-64; Fletcher 114-17; Good 67-74; Hough 63-64; and Timm 45-47.
they have yet been followed.

Yeats referred to *A Vision* in four ways: as a "philosophy" (Letters 694, 764, 916), a "mythology" (Letters 781), a "symbolism" (VB 23), and "a form of science for the study of human nature" (Letters 709); i.e., a psychology. It is by investigating the philosophic, mythological, and psychological elements of the book's symbolism that a method of understanding the book can be achieved. Yeats's own explanations of his terminology are inadequate in relating his terms to anything we already know, but critics have not been able to get much beyond Yeats's explanations. Yet Yeats does indicate where psychological and philosophical analogues and antecedents for his central terms can be found outside *A Vision*, and these can be used to explain Yeats's terms and understand the book from within. Furthermore, the tracing of these analogues and antecedents reveals hitherto unrecognized sources for and influences on *A Vision*, and raises new issues concerning the book's composition.

The foundation of *A Vision* lies in Book I, where Yeats defines his essential terms and then applies them in his "Great Wheel" of twenty-eight lunar phases. When Yeats describes the complementary *primary* and *antithetical* psychological orientations and the *Four Faculties*—Will, Mask, Creative Mind, and *Body of Fate*—which make up his psychological system, there are obvious parallels with Carl Gustav Jung's *Psychological Types*, which has two orientations (extraversion and introversion) and four mental functions (sensation, feeling, thinking, and intuition). This general similarity was remarked early and often by critics, but the exact correspondence between Yeats's *Faculties* and Jung's

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3 See Bloom, *Yeats* 212, 225; Flannery 7; Hough 101-02; Moore 293-300; Olney 7; Seiden 75-76; and Wall and Fitzgerald 49-51.
functions has never been established by them. Graham Hough, for example, says that the *Faculties* "do not fit" Jung's functions (102). James Flannery asserts that "Psychologically, the Four Faculties correspond to Jung's four functions of the psyche—thinking, feeling, sensation, and intuition" (sic) (27); yet he neglects to say which *Faculty* corresponds to each function, and fails to follow up the implications of his assertion. Virginia Moore does arrive at the correct correspondence between Jung's functions and the *Four Principles* which Yeats says "are the innate ground of the *Faculties*" in Book II of *VB* (187) when she compares the systems of Yeats and Jung (293-300), but does not extend that equivalence to the corresponding *Faculties*, apparently because she thinks that the *Principles* are mental functions but the *Principles* are not. Nor does she use the equivalence to explain *A Vision*'s sections on the afterlife, the only part of the book where the *Principles* figure strongly. Only the astrological writers Busteed and Wergin have hit upon the precise correspondence between the *Faculties* and Jung's functions; they are unaware of its full implications, and their insight has received no critical application.4

Establishing the exact correspondence between the two systems in this area would make the language of Jung's system available to substitute for the obscurities of Yeats's terminology throughout *A Vision*. And because this exact correspondence is the result not of direct influence on Yeats by Jung but of a shared source in the classical theory of temperaments, Yeats's sources can be traced back through the theories of temperaments and humours to the Pre-

4 See *Phases of the Moon* vii. Busteed and Wergin analyze *A Vision*'s system in astrological terms and do not explore its Jungian parallels, though in other respects theirs is the best structural analysis of *A Vision*. 
Socratic philosophy in which those theories originated. This new source material will also make it possible to make new distinctions between Yeats’s use of his wife's automatic writing scripts and his use of traditional philosophical and psychological sources in the composition of *A Vision*. And employing Jung's terminology makes it possible to examine *A Vision* thoroughly as a serious psychological typology for the first time as well. Finally, bringing Jung's language to bear on Yeats's terminology will make it far easier to read *A Vision* at the sentence level, especially in the Great Wheel section that is the core of the book.

It is easy to see how there could be confusion about equating Jung’s functions with the *Faculties* when we look at how Yeats defines them; there is a definite blurring of distinctions between the mind and its objects in *VA*:

By *Will* is understood feeling that has not become desire because there is no object to desire; a bias by which the soul is classified and its phase fixed but which as yet is without result in action; an energy as yet uninfluenced by thought, action, or emotion; the first matter of a certain personality--choice. . . . By *Mask* is understood the image of what we wish to become, or of that to which we give our reverence. Under certain circumstances it is called the *Image*. By *Creative Mind* is meant intellect, intellect as it was understood before the close of the seventeenth century--all the mind that is consciously constructive. By *Body of Fate* is understood the physical and mental environment, the changing human body, the stream of Phenomena as this affects a particular individual, all that is forced upon us from without, *Time* as it affects sensation. (14-15)

Here *Creative Mind* clearly corresponds to thinking, and *Will* may also be a mental function, albeit one resembling the Jungian libido in its undifferentiated psychic energy. But *Mask* and *Body of Fate* seem to be external objects of desire or perception rather than integral aspects of the mind.

Yeats greatly streamlines his definitions in *VB* to emphasize this pairing of active principles and their objects:

It will be enough until I have described the geometrical diagrams in detail to describe *Will* and *Mask* as the will and its object, or the Is and the Ought (or that which should be), *Creative Mind* and *Body of*
Fate as thought and its object, or the Knower and the Known. (73)

However, elements of the VA definition are retained in a passage found several pages later:

The Four Faculties are not the abstract categories of philosophy, being the result of the four memories of the Daimon or ultimate self of that man. His Body of Fate, the series of events forced upon him from without, is shaped out of the Daimon's memory of the events of his past incarnations; his Mask or object of desire or idea of the good, out of its memory of the moments of exaltation in his past lives; his Will or normal ego out of its memory of the all the events of his present life, whether consciously remembered or not; his Creative Mind from its memory of ideas--or universal! --displayed by actual men in past lives, or their spirits between lives. (83)

Making the Faculties the product of the Daimon's memories would move the Faculties within the mind, except that external events and objects of desire still constitute the Body of Fate and Mask. We do learn that Will relates to the "normal ego", and perhaps to Jung's personal unconscious: "all the events of his present life, whether consciously remembered or not". Another description of Will in VB suggests the subconscious and survival instincts as well:

When not affected by the other Faculties it has neither emotion, morality nor intellectual interest, but knows how things are done, how windows open and shut, how roads are crossed, everything that we call utility. It seeks its own continuance. (82-83)

Yeats thus suggests that most of the Faculties have dimensions beyond those of Jung's sensation, feeling, thinking and intuition; only thinking and Creative Mind are an obvious match, and at this point critics have usually abandoned the attempt to establish a precise correspondence between the two systems.

Virtually all critics are content to quote or paraphrase Yeats's descriptions of the Faculties.5

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5 See Archibald 183-84, 186; Brooks 187-88; Bushru 47-48; Croft 58-59; Ellmann, Yeats: The Man and the Masks 226-27; Frye 25-26, 30; Henn 186; Malins 72-73; Parkinson, "This Extraordinary Book" 198-200; Peterson 127; Rajan 83-85; Seiden 77-78; Senior 160; Stock 124-26; Unterecker 25-27; Vend-
Moore does hit the mark in her equation of the Jungian functions with Yeats's *Principles* (294), as was mentioned earlier. The definition of the *Principles* undergoes the same change between *VA* and *VB* that the definition of the *Faculties* does; in the first edition they are described individually, but in the second they are described in pairs as powers and their objects. The *VB* definition also describes the relationship between the *Principles* and *Faculties*:

The *Faculties* are man's voluntary and acquired powers and their objects; the *Principles* are the innate ground of the *Faculties* and must act upon one another in the same way. . . . They are Husk, Passionate Body, Spirit and Celestial Body. Spirit and Celestial Body are mind and its object (the Divine Ideas in their unity), while Husk and Passionate Body, which correspond to Will and Mask, are sense (impulse, images; hearing, seeing, etc., images that we associate with ourselves—the ear, the eye, etc.) and the objects of sense. (187-88)

Thus *Husk* corresponds to *Will*, *Passionate Body* to *Mask*, *Spirit* to *Creative Mind*, and *Celestial Body* to *Body of Fate*. The passage assigns "sense" or sensation to *Husk* and thus to *Will*, as well as affirming that *Spirit* and *Creative Mind* are "mind" or thinking. But defining the other *Principles* as the objects of the mind or sense extends the confusion created by the definition of the *Faculties* as pairs in *VB*.

However, Moore's correlation relies on the *VA* definition of the *Principles*:

The *Husk* is sensuous and instinctive, almost the physical body during life, and after death its record.

The *Passionate Body* is passion, but unlike the *Mask*—which if permitted to govern the mind is isolating passion—is without solitude.

The *Celestial Body* is the portion of Eternal Life that can be separated away.

The *Spirit* is almost abstract mind, for it has neither substance nor

ler 9-10; Whitaker 99-100; and Wilson 50-51.
life unless united to the *Passionate Body* or *Celestial Body*. (160)

With the exception of *Celestial Body*, this is clear enough that Moore can say that Jung names four main kinds of mental activity: thinking, feeling, sensing and intuiting, paired and described as opposites. This scheme recalls Yeats' *Four Principles*: intuition being equatable with man’s *Celestial Body*, thinking with his Spirit, feeling with his *Passionate Body*, and sense perception with his *Husk* [sic]. (294)

Though Moore drops the matter there, we can extend this equivalence to the *Faculties*:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>intuition</th>
<th><em>Celestial Body</em></th>
<th><em>Body of Fate</em></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>thinking</td>
<td><em>Spirit</em></td>
<td><em>Creative Mind</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>feeling</td>
<td><em>Passionate Body</em></td>
<td><em>Mask</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sensation</td>
<td><em>Husk</em></td>
<td><em>Will</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If this correspondence is at least possible (based on what Yeats says about the *Principles* in *VA*), then the question of why the two systems should correspond arises naturally.

Because *Psychological Types* was first published in an English translation in 1923 and *A Vision* was first published in 1925, a direct influence is the obvious possibility. But James Olney has thoroughly investigated the matter and concluded that Yeats and Jung did not know each other and knew little or nothing about each other's work (3-7). Eitel Timm's more recent remark that "in any discussion of Jung's influence on Yeats, one should remember that one of the earliest translations of Jung in Yeats's library dates from 1916" is an error (45), as the book in question—*Collected Papers on Analytical Psychology* (London: Bailliere, 1916)—is the only book by Jung in Yeats's library (Olney 6), and furthermore none are missing from the 1920s catalogue of his library (O'Shea 284), though two books by Freud are (O'Shea 283). The answer to the question of similarity lies in a common source—the theory of tem-peraments—whose influence
is betrayed by the mention of its central component—the four elements of classical cosmology—in each man's work.

Within *A Vision*, Yeats implies a direct correspondence between the four elements and his *Four Faculties*; speaking of the four quarters of his Great Wheel of lunar phases, he says that

The Phases 1 to 8 are associated with elemental earth . . . those between Phase 8 and Phase 15 with elemental water . . . those between Phase 15 and Phase 22 with elemental air . . . those between Phase 22 and Phase 1 with elemental fire. . . . The Will is strongest in the first quarter, *Mask* in second, *Creative Mind* in third, and the *Body of Fate* in fourth. (VA 24; VB 93)

So *Will* corresponds to earth, *Mask* to water, *Creative Mind* to air, and *Body of Fate* to fire.

And in an analysis of the alchemical writings of Paracelsus, Jung says that

Like the four seasons and the four quarters of heaven, the four elements are a quaternity system of orientation which always expresses a totality. In this case it is obviously the totality of the mind (animus), which here would be better translated as "consciousness" (including its contents). The orienting system of consciousness has four aspects, which correspond to four empirical functions: thinking, feeling, sensation (sense-perception), intuition [sic]. This quaternity is an archetypal arrangement. (CW 13: par. 207)\(^6\)

But Jung does not give the precise correspondence between elements and functions here, so we must approach his system inductively, with some assistance from Yeats himself.

Earth became the sensation function through the element's association with the primary matter which sensation perceives. Water became feeling

\(^6\) Quotations from Jung's *Collected Works* are cited by the abbreviation *CW* followed by the volume and paragraph numbers, unless they come from a chapter heading or other location where a paragraph number is not available, in which case a page number is given.
because the heart pumps the body's chief fluid, the blood; Yeats equates water
with the blood and passion when discussing *A Vision* in a letter (*Letters* 824). Air
becomes the thinking function through the traditional association of abstract
thought with the lofty realms of the sky, and Yeats equates air with "logical
thought" in the letter mentioned above (*Letters* 824). Fire became intuition
because intuition stands at the top of the hierarchy of mental functions, just as
fire was placed atop the classical elemental hierarchy; fire was the divine element
of the sun, stars, and planets, and so was higher than the others. Jung cites a
pair of philosophers when he implies that intuition is the highest mental function:
"Intuitive knowledge possesses an intrinsic certainty and conviction which
enabled Spinoza (and Bergson) to uphold the *scientia intuitiva* as the highest
form of knowledge" (*CW* 6: par. 770).

With this in mind, the following table of equivalences becomes possible:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quarter</th>
<th>Element</th>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Faculty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>fourth</td>
<td>fire</td>
<td>intuition</td>
<td>Body of Fate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>third</td>
<td>air</td>
<td>thinking</td>
<td>Creative Mind</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>second</td>
<td>water</td>
<td>feeling</td>
<td>Mask</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>first</td>
<td>earth</td>
<td>sensation</td>
<td>Will</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Yet though the evidence suggests these parallels, it remains to be seen whether
they are borne out by extensive direct comparison both of Yeats and Jung's
systems themselves and of those systems with their common source in the
theory of temperaments. Before considering Yeats and Jung's sources in depth,
it is necessary to establish the similarity between their systems as thoroughly as
possible, because recognizing certain of their sources is impossible without
knowledge of the specifics of each system. Such a comparison can also resolve
the problem of the divergence between the definitions of the *Faculties* and those
of the *Principles*, which clouds the relationship between them. It can also provide
an initial example of how to use Jung to read *A Vision* at the sentence level.
Chapter 2
Two and Four: Tinctures and Orientations,
Faculties and Functions

A direct comparison of the Faculties and functions should begin with a discussion of their two mental polarities or orientations. The subjectivity of Yeats's antithetical tincture and Jung's introverted orientation and the objectivity of the primary tincture and extraverted orientation have long been recognized as a major similarity between the two systems, and an exhaustive comparison of them would be redundant. However, one point of comparison is of supreme importance in understanding A Vision, and has been overlooked—the extent to which their language agrees on the role and importance of archetypal images. In both systems, the two types of orientation can be combined to produce a single inclusive range of orientation, a range which moves from an objective orientation toward the external world at one extreme to a subjective orientation toward the internal or archetypal image at the other extreme. The extraverted, primary, or objective orientation has the external world as the end point of its outward movement; the introverted, antithetical, or subjective movement has the timeless, primordial image or archetype as the goal of its movement inward.

In this scheme, consciousness exists as the tangential point between two worlds—one within the mind and related to the archetypal image, the other external and based on physical facts. Yet though the mind possesses this entire range of orientation, both its conscious orientation at a given moment and its overall habit of orientation must finally fall on one side or the other; it must be

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7 See Flannery 26; Moore 293-94; Olney 61; Seiden 75-76; and Wall and Fitzgerald 49-51.
turned toward the image or the world, with the dominant conscious orientation pushing the other orientation into the subconscious or unconscious. As Virginia Moore (339-44, 365) and James Olney (113-14, 171) have noted, this initial division of our experience into inner and outer realities is the foundation of *A Vision*’s system: "The whole system is founded upon the belief that the ultimate reality, symbolised as the Sphere, falls in human consciousness, as Nicholas of Cusa was the first to demonstrate, into a series of antinomies" (VB 187), with the opposed pairs of Faculties joining the opposed pair of orientations to make up the "series of antinomies" which constitute human reality. And Olney finds Jung entirely in agreement with Yeats on this point (113-14). The two systems arrive at their fundamental twofold divisions of humanity from the division of consciousness into inner and outer reality.

Yeats’s reliance on the terms "subjective" and "objective" is misleading in one sense; even his primary people are quite capable of having a subjective or independent viewpoint, though this subjective viewpoint is based on some objective foundation. As Jung puts it, the extravert "has a positive relation to the object. He affirms its importance to such an extent that his subjective attitude is constantly related to and oriented by the object" (CW 6: par. 557)—the "object" being the external world, which decisively influences the extravert’s views even when the extravert disagrees with his immediate surroundings.

The word "polarity" is useful in discussing the orientations, because it conveys the sense of movement of mental focus: either the withdrawal inward of subjectivity and introversion, or the movement outward of objectivity and extraversion. Both Yeats and Jung come into clearer focus if we rely on this opposition of the internal image and the external world. In *A Vision*, this movement can be represented thus:
Yeats ascribes the "outward-looking mind" to the primary (VB 207), while in Jung's extraverted type
orientation by the object predominates in such a way that decisions and actions are determined not by subjective views but by objective conditions. . . . If a man thinks, feels, acts, and actually lives in a way that is directly correlated with the objective conditions and their demands, he is extraverted. His life makes it perfectly clear that it is the object and not his subjective view that plays the determining role in his consciousness. Naturally he has subjective views too, but their determining value is less than that of the objective conditions. Consequently, he never expects to find any absolute factors in his own inner life, since the only ones he know are outside himself. Like Epimetheus, his inner life is subordinated to external necessity. . . . (CW 6: par. 563)

As we saw above, the extravert's "subjective view" would be decisively influenced by objective conditions anyway, and would never reach inward as far as the image-centered inner sanctum of the mind.

Like Yeats, Jung implies that extraverts are guilty of social conformity; Yeats's primary people "are content with things as they find them" (VA 20), and the extravert conforms to existing conditions: "The moral laws governing his actions coincide with the demands of society, that is, with the prevailing moral standpoint" (CW 6: par. 564). And in Yeats's view, this focus on external conditions restricts primary artists to realistic art; having no inner fund of symbolic images, they must confine themselves to depicting the outer world as accurately as possible. Jung does not place the same restriction on his extraverts, but in other respects his extraversion agrees with Yeats's primary in their emphasis on the external world of objective facts.

Having identified the primary with the external world, Yeats gives to the antithetical "our inner world of desire and imagination" and its expression (VB
73); its inward movement culminates in "introspective knowledge of the mind's self-begotten unity" (VB 207) as an archetypal image. A passage from the autobiographical The Trembling of the Veil (1922), which was written while Yeats was working on VA, describes how the antithetical artist goes through a rigorous struggle to move from experience of the external world to a point where the receptively emptied mind can experience the inner images:

Does not all art come when a nature, that never ceases to judge itself, exhausts personal emotion in action or desire so completely that something impersonal, something that has nothing to do with action or desire, suddenly starts into its place, something which is as unforeseen, as completely organized, even as unique, as the images that pass before the mind between sleeping and waking? (Autobiographies 410)

The "mind's self-begotten unity" takes the form of a "unique," "completely organized" image; as the goal of the "aesthetic" (VB 73) antithetical artist's quest, the images require the pursuit of a subjective, self-absorbed, and seemingly selfish life. The state of receptivity to subjective images is reached through great effort in the "complete exhaustion of personal emotion in action or desire," and a continuing tendency toward withdrawal from external concerns is implied by the artist's ceaseless self-judgment.

The "withdrawing libido from the object" of Jung's introversion (CW 6: par. 557) seems to be the same process, because the archetypal image is the goal of that withdrawal. Jung's subjective energy is manifested like Yeats's; it comes as something impersonal which enters a receptive mind once the ego is out of the way:

In so far as the subjective factor has, from the earliest times and among all peoples, remained in large measure constant, elementary perceptions and cognitions being almost universally the same, it is a reality that is just as firmly established as the external object. . . . The introverted attitude is normally oriented by the psychic structure, which is in principle hereditary and is inborn in the subject. This must not be assumed, however, to be simply identical with the subject's ego . . . it is rather the psychic structure
of the subject prior to any ego-development. . . . The psychic structure is . . . what I call the "collective unconscious". . . . The inborn mode of acting has long been known as instinct, and for the inborn mode of psychic apprehension I have proposed the term archetype. What I understand by it is identical with the "primordial image". . . . The archetype is a symbolic formula which always begins to function when there are no conscious ideas present, or when conscious ideas are inhibited for internal or external reasons. (CW 6: pars. 622-625)

The "primordial image" comes from the collective unconscious and is something impersonal which comes "when there are no conscious ideas present," just as Yeats's images come at the "complete exhaustion of personal emotion in action or desire." Both describe an introspective state of passive receptivity to the subjective images; though Yeats has the images supplant "personal emotion" rather than "conscious ideas," his use of the phrase "pass before the mind" indicates a mental process like that in Jung.

Note that Jung considers the "subjective factor" to be "a reality that is just as firmly established as the external object"; because the subjective orientation has the archetypal image as its foundation, Jung considers the subjective world of the images to be just as real as the external world of facts, a view that Yeats shares; as several critics have remarked, Yeats's Anima Mundi is his equivalent of Jung's collective unconscious. Their shared opposition of an inner reality of timeless images to an external world of facts can be seen as a late expression of the opposition of a Platonic realm of eternal Ideas to an Aristotelian world of external facts. Jung makes this clear in the introduction to Psychological Types, which begins with a quotation from Heinrich Heine that contrasts Plato and Aristotle as the two basic human types (CW 6: 2). By associating the Ideas with

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8 See Bloom 221; Flannery 56; Hough 15-16; Moore 294-5; Olney 6; Rudd 30; and Wall and Fitzgerald 44-47.
the desires and instincts of antithetical life and the collective unconscious, Yeats and Jung seem to turn Platonic idealism upside down, but their approach is faithful to Plato's Symposium, where Eros is the daimon of love and sexual desire and yet leads us upward to the realm of the ideas, as Olney has observed (212-21).

The effect of this range of orientation on A Vision's Four Faculties can be understood better if we first examine its effect on Jung's four psychological functions. Before examining them, it is important to note that although Jung professes to consider all eight functions (introverted and extraverted sensation, feeling, etc.) to be of equal value, his description of their types indicates otherwise, as four of the types seem distinctly more effective in a practical sense than the other four do. As Joseph Campbell puts it in his introduction to The Portable Jung:

Jung assigns the leading part in the differentiation of types to what he terms the "Four Functions of Consciousness"; noticing that whereas one person may favor thought as a guide to judgment, another will follow feeling; and whereas one will tend to experience both the world and his friends according to impressions made directly on his senses, another will be given, rather, to intuiting potentialities, hidden relationships, intentions, and possible sources. Sensation and Intuition are the two functions, according to this view, by which "facts" and the "fact world" are apprehended; Feeling and Thinking, those of judging and evaluating. (xxvi)

If sensation and intuition are naturally suited to perceiving the "fact world," then extraversion would be their most effective orientation, and the judging and evaluating functions of thinking and feeling would be most effective when introverted, as this would make them independent and subjective in their judging capacity. This implies that only four of Jung's eight types are truly effective, and recognizing this is the first step in reconciling the discrepancy between the number of Jungian types and the number of phases in A Vision. For the moment, it is
enough to recall that the second and third quarters of *A Vision*'s cycle of phases, where *Mask* (feeling) and *Creative Mind* (thinking) respectively dominate, are *antithetical* or introverted; and the first and fourth quarters where *Will* (sensation) and *Body of Fate* (intuition) dominate are *primary* or extraverted (*VA* 13; *VB* 81). Jung's descriptions of his corresponding types can aid us greatly in reading *A Vision*, but they need distillation to those crucial passages which describe the essence of each function, which can then be kept in mind when considering Yeats's types.

In its extraverted range of orientation, Jung's sensation function is extraordinarily conscious of the external world: "No other human type can equal the extraverted sensation type in realism. His sense for objective facts is extraordinarily developed" (*CW* 6: par. 606). Introverted sensation, on the other hand, replaces perception of external fact with perception of presuppositions or dispositions of the collective unconscious, with mythological images, with primordial possibilities of ideas. . . . The decisive thing is not the reality of the object, but the reality of the subjective factor, of the primordial images which, in their totality, constitute a psychic mirror-world. It is a mirror with the peculiar faculty of reflecting the existing contents of consciousness not in their known and customary form but, as it were, *sub specie aeternitatis*, somewhat as a million-year-old consciousness might see them. . . . Actually he [the introverted sensation type] lives in a mythological world, where men, animals, locomotives, houses, rivers, and mountains appear either as benevolent deities or malevolent demons. . . . His begins to strike him only when he discovers that his sensations are totally different from reality. (*CW* 6: pars. 648-653)

Introverted sensation begins with external objects, but moves inward and away from them in order to perceive them as the archetypal images which the objects elicited in what at first was the unconscious. Things and events are perceived not as others would likely perceive them, but as they are expressed symbolically by the primordial brain of the introverted sensation type. This transfiguration of
objective reality can be of artistic value, but apart from that introverted sensa-
tion's evasion of external reality makes it of dubious value for perception.

Extraverted intuition also excels at perceiving the external world, but
atward a different end than sensation pursues. Jung defines intuition as "the
unconscious, purposive apprehension of a highly complicated situation" (CW 8:
par. 269); thus extraverted intuition does not simply affirm that an external situ-
atation is there, as extraverted sensation would do. Instead it perceives the underly-
ing workings of the situation and what possibilities it holds:

Just as extraverted sensation strives to reach the highest pitch of
actuality...so intuition tries to apprehend the widest range of poss-
sibilities, since only through envisioning possibilities is intuition fully
satisfied. It seeks to discover what possibilities the objective situa-
tion holds in store; hence, as a subordinate function (i.e., when not
in the position of priority), it is the auxiliary that automatically comes
into play when no other function can find a way out of a hopelessly
blocked situation. (CW 6: par. 612)

Jung is also drawing upon the definition of intuition advanced by Spinoza in his
Ethica and by Bergson in Matter and Memory and Creative Evolution, where
intuition provides "supposedly concrete knowledge of the world as an inter-
connected whole" (Quinton 461). Jung says that "The primary function of intuition
...is simply to transmit images, or perceptions of relations between things,
which could not be transmitted by the other functions..." (CW 6: par. 611).

Perceiving the relations between external things is how intuition provides pos-
sibilities for action, especially in the "hopelessly blocked situations" mentioned
above; extraverted intuition's ability to quickly understand external situations and
find possibilities in them is quite effective in a practical way.

Introverted intuition also begins with an external situation, but moves
inward and away from external reality in order to apprehend the situation in terms of

subjective images of things which, though not to be met with in the
outside world, constitute the contents of the unconscious, and of the collective unconscious in particular. . . . \[T\]he introverted intuitive moves from image to image, chasing after every possibility in the teeming womb of the unconscious. . . . But since the images represent possible views of the world which may give life a new potential, this function, which to the outside world is the strangest of all, is as indispensable to the total psychic economy as is the corresponding human type to the psychic life of a people. Had this type not existed, there would have been no prophets in Israel. . . . It can even foresee . . . events which later actually do happen. Its prophetic foresight is explained by its relation to the archetypes, which represent the laws governing the course of all experienceable things. (CW 6: pars. 655-60)

It finally sees only the archetypal images activated by the external situation and seeks to perceive the relations between the images, finding its possibilities among them rather than in the external world.

The images activated by an external situation may be related to other images which symbolize possible outcomes of the situation; Jung feels that introverted intuition's ability to trace such relations accounts for the phenomenon of prophecy. Yet like introverted sensation it evades external reality and replaces it with entirely subjective perceptions which have nothing to do with the external situation. It may be useful for artists or prophets, but it tends to produce useless mystics and cranks who cannot influence society constructively (CW 6: par. 661). The apocalyptic Book of Revelation would seem to be a good example of introverted intuition and its products, because within it an external situation—the persecution of early Christians by the Roman Empire, which seemed to be headed for some decisive confrontation—is transformed into an archetypal final battle between good and evil whose archetypal imagery is so extravagant as to make it impossible for modern scholars to say precisely which particular instance of Roman persecution inspired its composition. Its enduring popularity attests to the intuitive internal logic of its imagery, regardless of the external situation of its reader.
A clear trend thus emerges from Jung's descriptions of his sensation and intuition types: the movement of orientation away from the external world toward archetypal images undercuts the purpose of perception, which is more useful when dealing with our surroundings. The reverse holds true for his judging functions of feeling and thinking, which offer greater potential when freed from external influence. Extraverted feeling lacks both originality and a capacity for independent judgment:

Even when it appears not to be qualified by a concrete object, it is none the less still under the spell of traditionally or generally accepted values of some kind. I may feel moved, for instance, to say that something is "beautiful" or "good" not from my own subjective feeling about it, but because it is fitting and politic to call it so, since a contrary judgment would upset the general feeling situation. . . . The valuations resulting from the act of feeling either correspond directly with objective values or accord with traditional and generally accepted standards. This kind of feeling is very largely responsible for the fact that so many people flock to the theatre or to concerts, or go to church, and do so moreover with their feelings correctly adjusted. . . . Without it, a harmonious social life would be impossible. (CW 6: pars. 595-96)

It creates a congenial atmosphere of common feeling, but takes away our capacity for subjective feeling, and its final effect can be called conformity.

Introverted feeling seeks not to conform, or "adjust itself to the object" as Jung would put it; it moves inward to follow feelings back to their respective archetypal images, and uses those images as the basis for creativity:

Its aim is not adjust itself to the object, but to subordinate it in an unconscious effort to realize the underlying images. It is continually seeking an image which has no existence in reality, but which it has seen in a kind of vision. It glides unheedingly over all objects that do not fit in with its aim. . . . But the very fact that thoughts can generally be expressed more intelligibly than feelings demands a more than ordinary descriptive or artistic ability before the real wealth of this feeling can be even approximately presented or communicated to the world. . . . Feeling progressively emancipates itself from the object and creates for itself a freedom of action and conscience that is purely subjective, and may even renounce all traditional values. (CW 6: pars. 638-39)
Introverted feeling's pursuit of the image gives it tremendous depth and creativity, though its process of artistic creation is difficult. The contrast between extraverted and introverted feeling provides the clearest possible parallel to Yeats, whose primary people "are content with things as they find them" (VA 20), while his "aesthetic" antithetical people (VB 73) display an originality that springs from subjective emotion. Speaking of the artist's need for tragic experience—the complete exhaustion of personal emotion in action or desire that leads to inner vision—Yeats says in Per Amica Silentia Lunae, "It is not permitted to a man, who takes up pen or chisel, to seek originality, for passion is his only business, and he cannot but mould or sing after a new fashion because no disaster is like another" (Mythologies 339). Subjective emotion leads inward to the image; the artist who can bring forth that vision will create something new.

Extraverted thinking is also guilty of conformity, as the type will endeavor to

make all his activities dependent on intellectual conclusions, which in the last resort are always oriented by objective data, whether these be external facts or generally accepted ideas. This type of man elevates objective reality, or an objectively oriented intellectual formula, into the ruling principle not only for himself, but for his whole environment. By this formula good and evil are measured, and beauty and ugliness determined. (CW 6: par. 585)

Here thinking is determined by collective standards; its ability to work with facts is useful, and we all learn to do this type of thinking in order to work with existing ideas, but again the capacity for independent judgement is lacking.

But introverted thinking moves inward from the external world to find images which are the foundation of original ideas and independent views:

Facts are of secondary importance for this kind of thinking; what seems to it of paramount importance is the development and presentation of the subjective idea, of the initial symbolic image hovering darkly before the mind's eye. Its aim is never an intellectual reconstruction of the concrete fact, but a shaping of that dark image into a luminous idea. It wants to reach reality to see how the
external fact will fit into and fill the framework of the idea, and the
creative power of this thinking shows itself when it actually creates
an idea which, though not inherent in the concrete fact, is yet the
most suitable abstract expression of it. (CW 6: par. 628)

Like introverted feeling, introverted thinking can shape a subjective image
received in an introspective reverie into something communicable to others,
whether as an idea or as a work of art.

The full range of orientation of Jung’s four functions thus produces varying
results: perception benefits from extraversion, while judgment benefits from intro-
version. Two kinds of artistic creativity are also suggested: realism, which relies
on extraversion in depicting the external world, and what may literally be called
imagination, which uses the subjective images of introversion as the basis for art-
istic creation—note that Jung considers all four introverted functions to be of art-
istic value. That the range of orientation has a specific dividing point is also sig-
nificant; either the external world or the archetypal image is finally decisive for
consciousness, making the functions or activity either extraverted or introverted.
Introversion does begin with consciousness of the external world, but sub-
sequently moves inward toward the image, always requiring an effort to reach a
receptive state; it can then move outward again toward expression of the image.
What this suggests is that the full range of orientation is always present, but we
can consciously use only half of it at any time. When our orientation is
extraverted, our consciousness is dominated by the external world, while the sub-
jective activity goes on unnoticed in the unconscious; when our orientation is
introverted, we are aware (at the extreme) of the contents of the collective uncon-
scious, but are temporarily unconscious of the external world.

Of course, these are absolute statements, with our actual state of con-
sciousness falling somewhere between the extremes at any given time; when in
a mildly introverted state, for example, we retain considerable subconscious awareness of the external world. Yeats apparently arrives at the same conclusion about the phases of complete objectivity and subjectivity in his system: "Phase 1 and Phase 15 are not human incarnations because human life is not possible without strife between the tinctures" (VB 79). "Strife between the tinctures" is his term for the normal interaction between introversion and extraversion in consciousness, and he places the two extremes of orientation outside the boundaries of human existence. What Jung says about the two extremes will bear remembering when we examine Phases 1 and 15: "Introverted thinking carried to extremes arrives at the evidence of its own subjective existence [the archetypal image], and extraverted thinking at the evidence of its complete identity with the objective fact" (CW 6: par. 630). At Phase 15 we literally become an image and inhabit the subjective world of images, while at Phase 1 our "complete plasticity" (VB 183) allows us to merge with the objective world. Furthermore, A Vision's representation of the human psyche as a pair of interconnected, overlapping gyres—one primary and one antithetical—implies that Yeats also grants a complete range of orientation to the mind as a whole and classifies people according to whether their habit of consciousness is largely primary or antithetical. "My instructors used this single cone or vortex once or twice but soon changed it for a double cone or vortex, preferring to consider subjectivity and objectivity as intersecting states struggling one against the other" (VB 71). Each phase in Yeats's Great Wheel thus represents a specific proportion of subjectivity and objectivity in the mind's typical activity.

As mentioned above, the predominance of a specific orientation and Faculty in each quarter of A Vision's cycle suggests a way of reconciling Yeats's twenty-eight lunar phases with Jung's eight types. By taking the predominant
tincture and Faculty of each quarter and their Jungian equivalents, what emerges is the four most effective Jungian types:

- **primary Will** = extraverted sensation
- **antithetical Mask** = introverted feeling
- **antithetical Creative Mind** = introverted thinking
- **primary Body of Fate** = extraverted intuition

The "phase-types" of the four quarters should not be expected to be precisely identical to the four Jungian types, but their central activity (the Will of each quarter) is largely the same because of the above equivalence. Yeats tells us that "A particular man is classified according to the place of Will, or choice, in the diagram" of the gyres, and this also applies to the Great Wheel and its quarters (VB 73); in VA he says that the Will is "a bias by which the soul is classified and its phase fixed" (15), which establishes that the Will of a phase is its central activity. The place of the Will on the wheel designates the strongest Faculty and central activity of a phase, and thus denotes a corresponding Jungian type; a Will in the third quarter makes the phase an antithetical Creative Mind or introverted thinking type, and so forth. But it is not accurate to identify a specifically oriented function with any whole quarter except when the Will is there. For reasons which will become clear as we proceed, only the function itself should be identified with a quarter—the first quarter is sensation, the second is thinking, and so on:
The function associated with each quarter should be thought of as possessing (at least potentially) the full range of orientation, both introverted and extraverted. One should think of the entire wheel as being comparable to the overall model of the mind which emerged from Jung; it is made up of four functions, with two directions of orientation for each function.

Because the Will of each quarter reflects the nature of the dominant Faculty of the quarter it is in, it provides a description of that Faculty which can be directly compared with Jung’s description of the corresponding function. The reason for the changing nature of the Will will be explained later; note that I am using Yeats’s own distinction between Will as a psychological function and the Will as something which is moving around the Wheel from phase to phase. (This distinction applies to the other Faculties as well.) Although the corroborative material from Psychological Types may seem a relatively small selection from the many pages of description of the functions and types, it covers the essential activity of each function and thus should do justice to Jung. Readers of Psychological Types should also be aware that Jung often describes his types rather as conditions of psychic imbalance where one function dominates to the detriment of the others, which makes the descriptions somewhat distorted at times. Those who undertake to read all that Jung says about his types will, therefore, find much that does not resemble the phases of A Vision; but they will find the central activity of both the phases and the types to be the same. With this in mind, a comparison of the Faculties and functions can begin.

Will seems to be not only the conscious tendency or choice of the individual, but also an a priori survival instinct. As the former, it is "a bias by which the soul is classified and its phase fixed but which is as yet without result in action . . . the first matter of a certain personality--choice" (VA 15), and is the "normal ego"
(VB 83); it is our avowed sense of what we are. As a survival instinct it is "Man's root . . . an energy as yet uninfluenced by thought, action, or emotion" (VA 14-15), and "It seeks its own continuance" (VB 83). It appears to be a sort of bottom layer of consciousness or primal psychic energy, and in some respects it resembles Freud's preconscious or subconscious and Jung's personal unconscious, because it retains all memory of our experiences and handles routine tasks unconsciously. One's Will is shaped out of the Daimon's "memory of all the events of his present life, whether consciously remembered or not" (VB 83), and it "knows how things are done, how windows open and shut, how roads are crossed, everything that we call utility" (VB 83). It is specifically sensuous: "When the Will predominates the Mask or Image is 'sensuous"' (VB 87), and this sensuousness is related to territorial instinct: "The automatic script defines 'sensuous' in an unexpected way. An object is sensuous if I relate it to myself, 'my fire, my chair, my sensation' . . ." (VB 87). Yeats takes pains to distinguish between the sensuousness of Will and the "concrete" nature of Body of Fate as well (VB 87).

In Phase 7 Yeats speaks of "forms of character so dissolved in Will, in instinct" (VB 115), and throughout the first quarter of the cycle he associates Will with instinct and the senses. He speaks of "bodily instincts" in Phase 2 (VB 107); the "senses and . . . subconscious nature" in Phase 3 (VB 108); "a life where all is fused by instinct" between Phases 4 and 5 (VB 111); "some fragmentary violence of sensation" in Phase 5 (VB 113); and says that "Impulse or instinct begins to be all in all" in Phase 6 (VB 114). The nature of Will, both as Faculty and within the first quarter where Will is strongest, is clearly centered on the instincts, the subconscious, and the senses.

Jung's extraverted sensation displays virtually the same characteristics. It
too is a sort of primal level of consciousness, one which in a sense precedes thinking, feeling and intuition, and can be crowded out of consciousness by the others:

[It is a conscious function only to the extent that the rational attitude of consciousness permits accidental perceptions to become conscious contents—in a word, registers them. The sensory function is, of course, absolute in the stricter sense; everything is seen or heard, for instance, to the physiological limit, but not everything attains to the threshold value a perception must have in order to be apperceived. (CW 6: par. 604)

Extraverted sensation tends to be subconscious; we seldom need the whole of our perceptions of our environment, so the majority of them remain below the threshold of consciousness. Jung's extraverted sensation type shows that this function is a survival instinct and possibly a territorial one as well:

As sensation is chiefly conditioned by the object, those objects that excite the strongest sensations will be decisive for the individual's psychology. The result is a strong sensuous tie to the object. Sensation is therefore a vital function equipped with the strongest vital instinct. (CW 6: par. 605)

The extraverted sensation type becomes related to objects by the very act of perceiving them, much as Yeats claimed that objects become sensuous when you relate them to yourself. And it only takes an unexpected loud noise in our vicinity (one that "excites the strongest sensations") to remind us how closely our survival instincts are linked to our sensory perceptions.

In light of Yeats's careful distinction between sensuous Will and concrete Body of Fate, the fact that Jung uses both "sensuous" and "concrete" in reference to extraverted sensation but only "concrete" in reference to extraverted intuition in Psychological Types seems a rather remarkable coincidence. He also uses the term "experience" several times in discussing extraverted sensation and its type, and again does not use it in describing extraverted intuition and its type. These may be coincidences produced by the vagaries of translation, but long
passages in Jung echo Yeats's description of the first quarter:

No other type can equal the extraverted sensation type in realism. His sense for objective facts is extraordinarily developed. His life is an accumulation of actual experiences of concrete objects. . . . Since one is inclined to regard a highly developed reality-sense as a sign of rationality, such people are esteemed as very rational. . . . On the lower levels, this type is the lover of tangible reality, with little inclination for reflection and no desire to dominate. (CW 6: pars. 606-07)

The "practical wisdom" of Phase 4 (VB 110) and the "practical sanity" of Phase 6 (VB 113) come to mind, as do those "lovers of tangible reality" who provide the examples for Phases 2 through 5: "the Satyr, the Sheperd, the Rural Sage, and the Don Juan" (Vendler 31). Yeats even marks the precise point in the cycle where "instinct grows reflective" in Phase 4 (VB 110). All this is further evidence of the common heritage that Will and extraverted sensation derive from their source, the earth element. They both emphasize the subconscious, experience of life, and the senses, and are closely related to instinct.

Much has been written about the Mask as a dramatic persona for living, but when we compare what Jung says about introverted feeling with what Yeats says about the Mask Faculty, a less obvious side of the Mask emerges. Both are closely associated with emotion, but neither one is only emotion itself. Yeats tends to refer to the Mask Faculty as "emotional," but it is also associated with those timeless images which come to us from within; it is "idealised" or linked to the eternal Ideas (VB 87), and has the greatest "image-making power" (VB 93). One of these images can become an internal role model or an external object of our aspirations: "By Mask is understood the image of what we wish to become, or of that to which we give our reverence" (VA 15). In VB it becomes our "object of desire or idea of the good" (VB 83), and also has emotional associations, being formed out of the Daimori's "memory of the moments of exaltation in his past"
lives* (VB 83). Emotion and images appear together in a 1925 definition describing how the *Mask* is the object of the instinctive *Will*: "*Mask, or Image, is a form selected instinctively [by the *Will*] for those emotional associations which come out of the dark, and this form is set before us by accident, or swims up from the dark portion of the mind* (VA 27). This "swimming up" of forms recalls Yeats's statement that art comes as a unified form or image which suddenly appears in the mind at the exhaustion of conscious *antithetical* desire; and these internal images can have external counterparts, which may be "set before us by accident": "The *Image* is a myth, a woman, a landscape, or anything whatsoever that is an external expression of the *Mask*" (VB 107). When we take the *Image* into account, the *Mask Faculty* becomes a confusing welter of internal images and external ones, images we revere or desire and those upon which we pattern ourselves.

Yet three main aspects of *Mask* as a *Faculty* can be distinguished. The first is the aforementioned role, the *Mask* itself, which might be termed the object of our will to become, our will to make something of ourselves. The second aspect is the *image*, an external object of desire which can be a woman, a man, or a thing, and which functions as an external "representation of the *Mask*" (VB 142). The third aspect of the *Mask* is artistic creation, which encompasses both *Mask* and *Image*; the common element in all this is the subjective image and its emotional associations. *Mask* supplies internal images or compels us to seek external ones: Yeats distinguishes internal and external images in his description of Phase 20, where "*Mask* and *Image* must take an historical and not a mythological or dream form, a form found but not created . . ." (VB 153). Internal images are "mythological or dream forms" out of which a *Mask* or *Image* can be "created"; once created, these *Masks* and *Images* can be used by others, but
have become "historical" and are "found" by others who can use them because they are now external. The first Roman Emperor created the role of Emperor around an internal image of leadership, but at Phase 20 Napoleon models himself on a Roman Emperor's role. Yet such external images are actually concrete representations or counterparts of internal images, so the Mask Faculty always draws on internal images either directly or indirectly. As a role, the Mask is the "emotional antithesis" (Autobiographies 234) of what we are naturally inclined to be; in antithetical people it has a subjective basis, being either created out of an internal image or freely chosen among external ones, and is called the "free Mask" (VB 84). In primary people the Mask has an objective basis, as it is a role provided by the society of their time; an "imitative Mask" or an "accepted pattern" both imply conformity (VB 84). This is called the "enforced Mask," since it is forced upon primary people by the society of their time (VB 84).

While the Mask is the object of the Will, the Image could be called the object of Mask-as-feeling. Once we have assumed the role we desire, we must play that role by desiring its proper object, and finding an Image ensures that the process of desire and emotion continues after the Mask has been assumed. As an "external expression of the Mask," the Image is an external counterpart to some internal image received through the Mask Faculty, something which evokes the same emotions the internal image would evoke. What Yeats says about the Image in The Trembling of the Veil and reiterates in his description of Phase 17 is important; the "daily re-creation of all that exterior fate snatches away" (Autobiographies 234) and the substitutions of "some new image of desire" (VB 142) imply that the Image is not singular; it can be a series of images, a series of works of art. When Yeats speaks of the singular Image, he means the central image of an artist's career or the core of his artistic vision, the central image of a
person's life. In his *Mask* of the exiled poet, Dante has Beatrice as the *Image* of perfect woman he revere; yet Beatrice is but one image among many in Dante's work, though for Yeats she is the most important one. The definition of the *Image* should be expanded to include whatever image concerns the artist, whatever image that is being transformed into a work of art or is motivating a person's life.

Through the interrelation of *Mask* and *Image*, Yeats makes self-actualization and artistic creation (and even sexual love) into manifestations of the same process. We become our true selves by assuming a role based on an internal or external image--the *Mask*--and mold ourselves into a concrete embodiment of that image for emotional reasons. We then look for other emotionally fulfilling images to desire, finding them outside ourselves in existing things--in myths or landscapes or men or women--or inside ourselves in those images which come on their own; and these images are the basis of whatever we create in life. In a sense, we are our own first artistic creation, one that is modelled, finally, on some internal image; and all other artistic creation that is original (in Yeats's opinion) follows this pattern of creation around internal images. Even the creation of our children follows upon our search for our opposing *Image* or object of desire. The *Mask Faculty* incorporates theories of psychological self-actualization, artistic creation, and aesthetic enjoyment which have as their common basis the internal images and their emotional associations received through the *Mask Faculty*. These images become ideals, the basis of art, and the basis of all creative achievements in life; Yeats confirms the central importance of the *Mask Faculty* when he says that the *Faculties* find their unity in the *Mask* (VB 188).

The central role played by images and emotions gives the *Mask Faculty*
important similarities not only to Jung's introverted feeling and concept of the persona, but also to the view of the process of artistic creation which appears in Jung's essay "On the Relation of Analytical Psychology to Poetry" (1922). Jung also sees the reception and subsequent shaping of subjective images as the basis of artistic creation:

The creative process, so far as we are able to follow it at all, consists in the unconscious activation of an archetypal image, and in elaborating and shaping this image into a finished work. By giving it shape, the artist translates it into the language of the present and so makes it possible for us to find our way back to the deepest springs of life. (CW 15: par. 130)

This "unconscious activation" means that the primordial images seem to come of their own volition:

In contrast to the personal unconscious, which is a relatively thin layer immediately below the threshold of consciousness, the collective unconscious shows no tendency to become conscious under normal conditions, nor can it be brought back to recollection by any analytical technique, since it was never repressed or forgotten. (CW 15: par. 126)

But Yeats was a lifelong student of nonanalytical methods of arranging trysts with the image-bearing Muses. The tragic vision of life he first expressed in Per Amica Silentia Lunae is the artist's way: "we who are poets and artists . . . must go from desire to weariness and so to desire again, and live but for the moment when vision comes to our weariness like terrible lightning . . ." (Mythologies 340). We have already seen this idea as he formulated it five years later:

Does not all art come when a nature, that never ceases to judge itself, exhausts personal emotion in action or desire so completely that something impersonal, something that has nothing to do with action or desire, suddenly starts into its place, something which is as unforeseen, as completely organised, even as unique, as the images that pass before the mind between sleeping and waking? (Autobiographies 410)

Ceaseless pursuit of the Image—the regular "exhaustion of personal emotion in action or desire"—is a cyclical process whereby regular inspiration is at least pos-
sible, though never guaranteed, as Helen Vendler has pointed out (28); but what Vendler does not see is how well this process addresses Jung’s description of the obstacles between the conscious mind and inspiration from the collective unconscious. The *Image* can provide a way to empty the conscious mind in preparation for the archetype, which as we saw is “a symbolic formula which always begins to function when there are no conscious ideas present, or when conscious ideas are inhibited for internal or external reasons” (*CW* 6: par. 625).

But then Yeats had long practiced traditional forms of meditation which emptied the mind into receptivity. He describes his experience with occult evocation of visions at length in *Per Amica Silentia Lunae*: the following passage lets us see his theory of *Mask* and *Image* in the making, as it helps to explain the relationship between external objects, emotion, internal images, and the collective unconscious. The first section of the passage describes the emptying of the mind and touches on one relation between external objects and internal images; bear in mind that later sections of this passage indicate that Yeats may be blithely misusing the term “subconscious” when he should be saying “unconscious” instead:

There is a letter of Goethe’s, though I cannot remember where, that explains evocation, though he was but thinking of literature. He described some friend who had complained of literary sterility as too intelligent. One must allow the images to form with all their associations before one criticises. ‘If one is critical too soon,’ he wrote, ‘they will not form at all.’ If you suspend the critical faculty, I have discovered, either as the result of training, or, if you have the

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9 Olney has discussed the philosophical relations between Yeats’s *Anima Mundi* and Jung’s collective unconscious (288-345), but is not aware of the specific parallels between the *Mask Faculty*’s agency and Jung’s version of the process of making art out of archetypes.

10 Olney calls attention to Yeats’s careless use of the Freudian term “subconscious” in a Jungian sense on another occasion (210).
gift, by passing into a slight trance, images pass rapidly before you. If you can suspend also desire, and let them form at their own will, your absorption becomes more complete and they are more clear in colour, more precise in articulation, and you and they begin to move in the midst of what seems a powerful light. But the images pass before you linked by certain associations, and indeed in the first instance you have called them up by their association with traditional forms and sounds. You have discovered how, if you can but suspend will and intellect, to bring up from the 'subconscious' anything you already possess a fragment of. Those who follow the old rule keep their bodies still and their minds awake and clear, dreading especially any confusion between the images of the mind and the objects of sense; they seek to become, as it were, polished mirrors. (Mythologies 344)

The "association with traditional forms and sounds" that calls up images must relate to the link between external Images and internal images, especially the "historical" Mask and Image Yeats says are used by less creative people. Notice that the inner images achieve a new level of luminous intensity when desire as well as analysis has been suspended, becoming more powerful and forming "at their own will"; Yeats seems to be describing distinct levels of increasing subjectivity as the mind moves toward the collective unconscious.

As the passage continues, Yeats details his attempts to go beyond the stage of mere imaginative play to the deeper stage of true vision:

I had no natural gift for this clear quiet, as I soon discovered, for my mind is abnormally restless; and I was seldom delighted by that sudden luminous definition of form which makes one understand almost in spite of oneself that one is not merely imagining. I therefore invented a new process. I had found that after evocation my sleep became at moments full of light and form, all that I had failed to find while awake; and I elaborated a symbolism of natural objects that I might give myself dreams during sleep, or rather visions, for they had none of the confusion of dreams, by laying upon my pillow or beside my bed certain flowers or leaves. Even to-day, after twenty years, the exaltations and the messages that came to me from bits of hawthorn or some other plant seem of all moments of my life the happiest and the wisest. [sic] (Mythologies 344-45)

A "sudden luminous definition of form" and "exaltations" are signs of true vision, as opposed to mere imagination or dreaming. We should recall at this point that
Mask is formed from the Daimon’s "memory of moments of exaltation in his past lives" (VB 83); emotional intensity is a sign of contact with the realm of images. We might recall the climactic appearance of "a vast image out of Spiritus Mundi" in "The Second Coming" (Variorum Poems 402) as Yeats’s best-known example of the exaltation of real vision.

Yeats then makes it clear that he thought he was contacting the collective unconscious:

After a time, perhaps because the novelty wearing off the symbol lost its power, or because my work at the Irish Theatre became too exciting, my sleep lost its responsiveness. I had fellow-scholars, and now it was I and now they who made some discovery. Before the mind's eye whether in sleep or waking, came images that one was to discover presently in some book one had never read, and after looking in vain for explanation to the current theory of forgotten personal memory, I came to believe in a great memory passing on from generation to generation. . . . Our daily thought was certainly but the line of foam at the shallow edge of a vast luminous sea; Henry More's Anima Mundi. . . . (Mythologies 345-46)

Yeats thus sees the collective unconscious as a realm which can be sought by artists or anyone else willing to make the effort to pass from external objects to vision.

Jung, however, has to be much more scientifically skeptical and less picturesque about the origin of the timeless inner images than Yeats if he is to gain credibility for his psychological system:

The collective unconscious is not to be thought of as a self-subsistent entity; it is no more than a potentiality handed down to us from primordial times in the form of mnemonic images or inherited in the anatomical structure of the brain. There are no inborn ideas, but there are inborn possibilities of ideas that set bounds to even the boldest fantasy and keep our fantasy within certain categories: a priori ideas, as it were, the existence of which cannot be ascertained except from their effects. They appear only in the shaped material of art as the regulative principles that shape it; that is to say, only by inferences drawn from the finished work can we construct the age-old original of the primordial image. (CW 15: par. 126)
Yet this view of the origin of images is not inconsistent with Yeats's deliberate clearing of the mind, which could clear the way for older portions of the brain to speak: "The archetype is a symbolic formula which always begins to function when there are no conscious ideas present, or when conscious ideas are inhibited for internal or external reasons" (CW 6: par. 625). And as Olney observes (356), elsewhere Jung is more willing to grant the collective unconscious the status of existence as an autonomous repository/world:

The collective unconscious is in no sense an obscure corner of the mind, but the mighty deposit of ancestral experience accumulated over millions of years, the echo of prehistoric happenings to which each century adds an infinitesimally small amount of variation and differentiation. Because the collective unconscious is, in the last analysis, a deposit of world-processes embedded in the structure of the brain and the sympathetic nervous system, it constitutes in its totality a sort of timeless and eternal world-image. . . . (CW 8: par. 729)

Jung simply had to be much more cautious in his Collected Works about avoiding the supernatural implications of the collective unconscious than Yeats had to be. Olney has remarked how unsatisfying Jung's ambivalence can be:

God, the collective unconscious, the [Gnostic] Pleroma, or the collectivity of the dead—we may choose whichever name pleases us, since they all come to the same thing—are instinct pure, unmediated, undifferentiated, unconscious of itself or of anything else. The jumble is nearly hopeless, but then so is the collective unconscious. (300-01)

But so long as Yeats and Jung agree that the timeless inner images are related to the instincts, as Olney demonstrates (289-297), then the main point is that Jung would only talk off the record about "God, the Pleroma and the collectivity of the dead" in relation to the collective unconscious, and on the record would confine himself to what seemed empirically verifiable about the archetypes. As Olney says, "Jung would probably have declined to go along with the notion of access to 'particulars,' and he might have been uneasy about Yeat's insistence
that 'knowledge of other minds can be detailed and circumstantial'" (291). But Jung was bound by the constraints inherent in the construction of a psychological hypothesis about long-standing notions of eternal Ideas and communication with dead ancestors; Yeats was bound only by the limits of his skill and imagination.

And what Jung says about the difference between the archetype itself and the image seen in a work of art is crucial for understanding why he and Yeats consider creativity to be the result of the archetypes. The true archetype, the "inborn possibility" of an idea, is something we never actually perceive; by the time we receive an image from within, it has already been fleshed out from the guidelines of the archetype into a unique form by the agency of the instinct that underlies the archetype: "The primordial image might suitably be described as the instinct's perception of itself, or as the self-portrait of the instinct, in exactly the same way as consciousness is an inward perception of the objective life-process" (CW 8: par. 277). By connecting the image with an active instinct that underlies it, Jung tries to account for the kind of autonomy that Yeats gives to the images. The archetype is how an instinctive pattern typically portrays itself, but each instance of self-portrayal will be individual. The image we receive is a representation, perhaps even a performance of the archetype that is already at one remove from the archetype itself. And this performance of the archetype is involuntarily shaped by our individuality, with the result that no two performances are quite alike.

This shaped quality of the image is what I think Yeats means in making his artistic vision "as unforeseen, as completely organised, even as unique, as the images which pass before the mind between sleeping and waking" (Autobiographies 410). The greater the individuality of the artist, the more unique the vision, both at inception and in the finished work; the archetype is recognized
only as a generic principle of form within the work. An artist might employ found archetypes from history, as Napoleon employed a found Mask; but for Yeats this would be mere manipulation, rather than the truest creativity. Like Yeats, Jung associates the archetype with creative activity: "The primordial image, or archetype, is a figure—be it a daemon, a human being, or a process—that constantly recurs in the course of history and appears wherever creative fantasy is freely expressed. Essentially, therefore, it is a mythological figure" (CW 15: par. 127). And for Jung, like Yeats, the appearances of images within and our encounters with the external counterparts of such images are vitally important for the emotional associations those images evoke; they bring "moments of exaltation":

The moment when this mythological situation reappears is always characterized by a peculiar emotional intensity; it is as though chords in us were struck that had never resounded before, or as though forces whose existence we had never suspected were unloosed. . . . [W]hen an archetypal situation occurs we suddenly feel an extraordinary sense of release, as though transported, or caught up by an overwhelming power. (CW 15: par. 128)

Jung's words here find an uncanny echo in Yeats's descriptions of his ideal state of Unity of Being, a condition achieved by adoption of the proper Mask and ceaseless tragic pursuit of the proper Image. The concept originated with Yeats's father John Butler Yeats, who wrote, "In the completely emotional man the least awakening of feeling is a harmony, in which every chord of every feeling vibrates" (Letters 48). Yeats quotes his father at greater length on Unity of Being:

My father, from whom I had learned the term, preferred a comparison to a musical instrument so strung that if we touch a string all the strings murmur faintly. There is not more desire, he has said, in lust than in true love, but in true love desire awakens pity, hope, affection, admiration, and given appropriate circumstance, every emotion possible to man. (Autobiographies 235-36)
That Yeats sees Unity of Being as a state of continuing receptivity to the emotional influence of archetypes is apparent from the way he describes it in VA: "A man becomes passionate and this passion makes the Daimonic thought luminous with its peculiar light—this is the object of the Daimon—and she [the Daimon] so creates a very personal form of heroism or of poetry" (28). Here we see several of Yeats's recurring points about the subjective images: "passionate" emotion, the "peculiar light" of visions, and the creative individuality of "a very personal form of... poetry." The Daimon seems in fact to be the unconscious creative power that mediates between the collective unconscious and the conscious mind by giving shape to the archetypes as unique images.

Yeats suggests as much in the passage about Anima Mundi from Per Amica Silentia Lunae quoted above:

I came to believe in a great memory passing on from generation to generation. But that was not enough, for these images showed intention and choice. They had a relation to what one knew and yet were an extension of one’s knowledge. If no mind was there, why should I suddenly come upon salt and antimony, upon the liquefaction of the gold, as they were understood by the alchemists, or upon some detail of cabalistic symbolism verified at last by a learned scholar from his never-published manuscripts, and who can have put together so ingeniously, working by some law of association and yet with clear personal application, certain mythical images... The thought was again before me that this study had created a contact or mingling with minds who had followed a like study in some other age, and that these minds still saw and thought and chose. (Mythologies 345-46)

So there is an active entity within the mind that works purposefully with archetypes to create visions. I have mentioned this activity of the Daimon in order to complete a sketch of the mechanism of reverie, Daimon, and image through which Yeats's Mask Faculty influences artistic creativity and life in general. Olney examines the role of the Daimon in both Yeats and Jung, but is not aware of this aspect of its activity in Yeats (184-233); Levine sees the Daimon as
a mediator between poet and *Anima Mundi*, but without reference to the *Mask Faculty* (171-78).

So Unity of Being depends on an intensity of feeling that both Yeats and Jung associated with subjective images. Jung also sees the archetypal images as the basis of self-actualization, as they are in the *Mask* and Unity of Being; for him they are the basis of the ideals which enable everyone to make the fullest use of their own powers:

The individual man cannot use his powers to the full unless he is aided by one of those collective representations we call ideals, which releases all the hidden forces of instinct that are inaccessible to his conscious will. The most effective ideals are always fairly obvious variants of an archetype... *(CW 15: par. 128)*

Jung goes on to mention a pair of quite collective ideals which are more related to Yeats’s Unity of Culture, the motherland and fatherland. Yet the principle applies to individual ideals as well, such as Yeat’s personal ideal of Unity of Being; and chief among these is the archetype of the Self of Jungian individuation, that quaternary figure whose embodiment in the Great Wheel made Yeats’s imagination “free to create as it chose” *(VA xi)*:

![Diagram](image)

The above diagram (after *CW 18*: par. 81) depicts the mandala of the Self which Jung calls the "sun-wheel":

The sun-wheel is an exceedingly archaic idea, perhaps the oldest religious idea there is... But this image is not a naturalistic one,
for it is always divided into four or eight partitions. This image, a sort of divided circle, is a symbol which you find throughout the whole history of mankind as well as in the dreams of modern individuals. (CW 18: par. 81)

Moore (294-95) and Olney (165) have pointed out the similarity of the Great Wheel and mandalas in general as symbols. A Vision's Great Wheel turns this mandala into a "moon-wheel," but it is nonetheless an image of the unified totality of human experience, an image which Yeats felt had made possible the fullest use of his own creative powers.

The importance of images in Jung's concept of self-actualization suggests another parallel to Yeats's Mask: the free choice of an image or ideal would correspond to the free Mask of antithetical people (a role freely chosen or created), while the adoption of a role provided by society—the Jungian persona—corresponds to the enforced Mask of primary people. In primary phases "man is moulded more and more from without" and "cannot create a role," and must adopt an "imitative Mask" representing some socially "accepted pattern" (VB 83). This faint contempt for conformity is matched in Jung's description of the persona; though there is "something individual in the peculiar choice and delineation of the persona" (CW 7: par. 247), and though it is "often fashioned with considerable pains" (CW 7: par. 244) and may even be an "ideal image" (CW 7: par. 245), Jung nonetheless describes it in pejorative terms:

It is, as its name implies, only a mask of the collective psyche, a mask that feigns individuality, making others and oneself believe that one is individual, whereas one is simply acting a role through which the collective psyche speaks. . . . Fundamentally the persona is nothing real: it is a compromise between the individual and society as to what a man should appear to be. He takes a name, earns a title, exercises a function, he is this or that. In a certain sense all this is real, yet in relation to the essential individuality of the person concerned it is only a secondary reality, a compromise formation, in making which others often have a greater share than he. The persona is a semblance, a two-dimensional reality, to give it a nickname. (CW 7: pars. 245-46)
What Jung calls "the false wrappings of the persona" (CW 7: par. 269) have none of the creative quality of Yeats's free Mask; simply saying that the Mask resembles Jung's persona, as Moore does (296), does not do justice to either concept. The free Mask is a role adopted more in opposition to society (e.g., as Yeats himself overplayed the Romantic poet in his youth) than as a concession to society. Wall and Fitzgerald relate the persona to the Mask more convincingly by emphasizing the way the persona protects the inner nature of the individual from society's view, but they make the mistake of calling the persona itself an archetype, apparently because it comes from the "collective psyche" (47-49). But the collective psyche is collective consciousness here; according to Jung, "The persona is never the true character; it is a composite of the individual's behavior and of the role attributed to him by the public" (CW 18: par. 1334), "attribution by the public" indicating that what others think and expect creates the persona--"what a man should appear to be." The persona has little to do with the images and emotions that are the heart of the Mask Faculty; its resemblance to Yeats's enforced Mask is significant, but should not be overstated.

The Mask Faculty clearly influences the Will of the Mask quarter; as the quarter begins, Yeats says of the man at Phase 8 moving from sensation to feeling, "now shock can give him back his heart" (VB 119). At Phase 10 "a vague abstract sense of some world, some image, some circumstance, harmonious to emotion, has begun, or of something harmonious to emotion that may be set upon the empty pedestal, once visible world, image, or circumstance has been destroyed" (VB 123). At Phase 12 Yeats speaks of the "emotional Will" (VB 128), while at Phase 13 the "Will is now a mirror of emotional experience" (VB 129). These constant references to emotion are not to be found in Jung's descriptions of introverted feeling, because Jung's penchant for empirical accuracy
compels him to make a fine distinction between emotion and feeling. He says that "Emotion is the thing that carries you away. . . . But when you have feeling you have control" (CW 18: par. 46). Feeling is something which we use for making value judgments: "Feeling informs you through its feeling-tones of the values of things. Feeling tells you for instance whether a thing is acceptable or agreeable or not. It tells you what a thing is worth to you" (CW 18: par. 23).

Nevertheless, feeling is directly related to emotion:

If you have a value which is overwhelmingly strong for you it will become emotion at a certain point, namely, when it reaches such an intensity as to cause a physiological innervation. . . . [T]he electrical resistance of the skin decreases under emotion. It does not decrease under the influence of feeling. (CW 18: par. 48)

Jung sees feeling and emotion as parts of the same process, with the loss of conscious control of our actions as the dividing line between the two parts. The general tendency to equate feeling with emotion can be seen in one of the statements by John Butler Yeats which inspired his son's concept of Unity of Being:

"In the completely emotional man the least awakening of feeling is a harmony, in which every chord of every feeling vibrates" (48). Jung's distinction is especially useful for dealing with the affective aspect of aesthetic experience; his definition of feeling certainly resembles Wordsworth's "emotion recollected in tranquillity."

Jung's feeling is a judgment-making function, one that accepts or rejects according to affective values. Yeats reveals in a letter that he thinks of feeling in a similar way: "I say to myself 'I feel' this is [?]or] that--I 'hate' something or 'like' something. I thus analyse my feeling, relate one feeling to another and so on until I say, 'Yes, I must always have believed that' or 'known that'" (Letters 889). Jung's feeling is also a conscious guide for action, unlike emotion, which carries us recklessly into action; he therefore considers it to be a rational function like thinking (CW 6: pars. 601, 644). The questions "How do you feel about -------?"
and "What do you think about -------?" show the judging quality of feeling and thinking, as well as the distinction between affective values and logical reasons.

We might reasonably consider Yeats's *Mask Faculty* to be a similar guide for action, one which decides what we value--our "idea of the good" (VB 83)--on the basis of emotional associations, seeking "something harmonious to emotion that may be set upon the empty pedestal, once visible world, image, or circumstance has been destroyed." (This "destruction" of the visible world is Yeatsian code for turning inward to vision, as well as the creative originality that vision can bring.)

At Phase 12 there is even "the greatest possible belief in all values created by personality" (VB 127), "personality" for Yeats being the *antithetical* creative individuality which, as we have seen, originates in subjective images and their emotional associations.

Turning at last to Jung's description of introverted feeling, we find that the emphasis on images, feeling, and artistic creation makes it quite similar to the *Mask Faculty*. Jung says that introverted feeling "is continually seeking an image which has no existence in reality, but which it has seen in a kind of vision. . . . It strives after inner intensity, for which the object serves at most as a stimulus" (CW 6: par. 638). The "object," of course, could correspond to Yeats's *Image*, the external counterpart to internal images which continuously evokes emotional associations. The importance of introverted feeling in artistic creation is made clear in this passage:

The primordial images are, of course, just as much ideas as feelings. Fundamental ideas, ideas like God, freedom, and immortality, are just as much feeling-values as they are significant ideas. . . . But the very fact that thoughts can generally be expressed more intelligibly than feelings demands a more than ordinary descriptive or artistic ability before the real wealth of this feeling can be even approximately presented or communicated to the world. . . . In order to communicate with others, it has to find an external form not only acceptable to itself, but capable also of arousing a parallel feeling in them. Thanks to the relatively great inner (as well as outer)
uniformity of human beings, it is actually possible to do this, though the form acceptable to feeling is extraordinarily difficult to find as long as it is still mainly oriented to the fathomless store of primordial images. (CW 6: par. 639)

The images of introverted feeling can arouse tremendous depth and intensity of feeling, but only if the artist can find or create "the form acceptable to feeling"—an external form which corresponds to the inner image and which will affect the audience as it has already affected the artist.

This formulation should bring to mind T. S. Eliot's famous remark in "Hamlet and His Problems":

> The only way of expressing emotion in the form of art is by finding an 'objective correlative'; in other words, a set of objects, a situation, a chain of events which shall be the formula of that particular emotion; such that when the external facts, which must terminate in sensory experience, are given, the emotion is immediately evoked. (48)

For both Yeats and Jung, the creation of objective correlatives to the inner images is the basis of imaginative art; adequate depictions of archetypal situations (such as the Oedipal scene of Hamlet) or images must automatically evoke the desired emotion—or more precisely, feeling. The role of the Yeatsian Mask and Image as objective correlatives meant to evoke emotional unity should also be clear by now.

Jung's description of the introverted feeling type adds little to his description of the function, but his example of the type is a seemingly indifferent woman who greatly resembles the Helen of Troy found in Yeats's Phase 14. As Yeats describes Helen,

> for all the languor of her movements, and her indifference to the acts of others, her mind is never at peace. She will wander much alone as though she consciously meditated her masterpiece that shall be at the full moon [a total absorption in the image], yet unseen by human eyes. . . . [A]lready perhaps, through weakness of desire, she understands nothing yet seems to understand everything; already serves nothing, while alone seeming of service. Is it not because she desires so little, gives so little that men will die and
murder in her service? (VB 133-34)

Such people have become so absorbed in subjective images that their associated feelings have been virtually withdrawn from external objects, particularly other people: "in Wordsworth the soul's deepening solitude has reduced mankind, when seen objectively, to a few slight figures outlined for a moment amid mountain and lake" (VB 134). Their feelings have been reabsorbed by the inner images, having been "withdrawn from the object" in Jungian terms. Jung's female introverted feeling types

are mostly silent, inaccessible, hard to understand. . . . As they are mostly guided by their subjective feelings, their true motives generally remain hidden. Their outward demeanour is harmonious, inconspicuous, giving an impression of pleasing repose, or of sympathetic response, with no desire to affect others, to impress, influence, or change them in any way. If this outward aspect is more pronounced, it arouses a suspicion of indifference and coldness, which may actually turn into a disregard for the comfort and well-being of others. . . . Faced with anything that might carry her away or arouse enthusiasm, this type observes a benevolent though critical neutrality. . . . Since this type appears rather cold and reserved, it might seem on a superficial view that such women have no feelings. But this would be quite wrong; the truth is their feelings are intensive rather than extensive. They develop in depth. (CW 6: pars. 640-41)

Give their common source in the water element and their emphasis on images and feeling, it is not surprising that both the antithetical Mask Faculty and the introverted feeling function both culminate in the same figure: that of a woman who, being conventionally expected to display her feelings and lavish them on others, instead turns them inward toward an image-centered reverie.

Antithetical Creative Mind and introverted thinking are the most obviously similar pairing of Faculty and function. Yeats first defines Creative Mind as "intellect, as intellect was understood before the close of the seventeenth century—all the mind that is consciously constructive" (VA 15). Later it becomes "thought" (VB 73) and is "abstract" (VB 87), and is said to be shaped out of the
Daimon's "memory of ideas—or universals—displayed by actual men in past lives, or their spirits between lives" (VB 83). Yeats thus associates ideas with the Ideas, and this is borne out by the Will of the Creative Mind quarter, which displays a development from images (the Ideas) to ideas. At Phase 16 the Will "finds the soul's most radiant expression and surrounds itself with some fairyland, some mythology of wisdom and laughter" and displays "a delight in certain glowing or shining images of concentrated force" (VB 137-38). At Phase 17, "The Will is falling asunder, but without explosion and noise. The separated fragments seek images rather than ideas . . ." (VB 141); but at Phase 18 "The Will, with its closing antithetical [decreasing subjectivity], is turning away from the life of images to that of ideas . . ." (VB 146). At Phase 21, "The Will has driven intellectual complexity into its final entanglement" (VB 155). Yeats uses "thought" and "intellect" as synonyms for Creative Mind throughout the phases, and the progression from images to ideas will be explained when we turn to Jung's introverted thinking.

Jung says of introverted thinking,

With regard to the establishment of new facts it is only indirectly of value, since new views rather than new knowledge are its main concern. . . . Facts are collected as evidence for a theory, never for their own sake. . . . Facts are of secondary importance for this kind of thinking; what seems to it of paramount importance is the development and presentation of the subjective idea, of the initial symbolic image hovering darkly before the mind's eye. Its aim is never an intellectual reconstruction of the concrete fact, but a shaping of that dark image into a luminous idea. It wants to reach reality to see how the external fact will fit into and fill the framework of the idea, and the creative power of this thinking shows itself when it actually creates an idea which, though not inherent in the concrete fact, is yet the most suitable abstract expression of it. Its task is completed when the idea it has fashioned seems to emerge so inevitably from the external facts that they actually prove its validity. (CW 6: par. 628).

Introverted thinking develops subjective images into original ideas which can be
related to external facts, but if their relationship to facts is not pursued the ideas will remain overly subjective and may even retain the mythological quality of the archetypes:

The thinking of the introverted type is positive and synthetic in developing ideas which approximate more and more to the eternal validity of the primordial images. But as their connection with objective experience becomes more and more tenuous, they take on a mythological coloring and no longer hold true for the contemporary situation. Hence his thinking is of value for his contemporaries only so long as it is manifestly and intelligibly related to the known facts of the time. Once it has become mythological, it ceases to be relevant and runs on in itself. (CW 6: par. 637)

Rather than become extraverted thinking in the effort to relate itself to "known facts," introverted thinking should rely on the fact-observing capacity of extraverted sensation for its practical grounding. This combination results in original thinking which is also grounded in facts, and in A Vision it appears as the interaction of Will and Creative Mind near the end of the third quarter.

Yeats and Jung both define subjective thought as the development out of subjectively received images. While their definition of subjective feeling involves the inner image and its emotional associations, their definition of subjective thinking involves the inner image and its ideational associations. Jung implies that subjective feelings may be traced back inward from an external object to an archetypal image, while original subjective ideas develop outward from such images and reach toward the external world of fact; when we combine these two movements we have the essential movement of the antithetical half of the Great Wheel. During the Mask quarter, the emotional Will becomes more and more subjective and turns increasingly inward to the subjective image, a process which culminates in the merging into pure images of the utterly subjective Phase 15. In the Creative Mind quarter which follows, the intellectual Will moves away from images to ideas and turns increasingly outward to ground these ideas in external
facts. This movement is possible because Yeats's antithetical Mask and Creative Mind, like introverted feeling and thinking, are centered on the inner image and its subjective associations.

Yeats's primary Body of Fate at first seems to have little in common with Jung's extraverted intuition: "By Body of Fate is understood the physical and mental environment, the changing human body, the stream of Phenomena as this affects a particular individual, all that is forced upon us from without, Time as it affects sensation" (VA 15). The combination of actual physical events and circumstances with mental perception of them continues in VB, where "The Body of Fate is the sum, not the unity of fact, fact as it affects a particular man" (VB 82), and as "the series of events forced upon him from without, is shaped out of the Daimon's memory of the events of his past incarnations" (VB 83). Yet Yeats also speaks of "a relation to the unity of society or of material things known through the Body of Fate" (VB 85), and in the fourth quarter where Body of Fate is strongest, "all things are made simple" (VB 93), which may refer to the reductive power of the fire element and yet could also imply some kind of reduction to unity.

The Body of Fate is specifically "concrete" rather than "sensuous" (VB 87), and Yeats uses "concrete," "spiritual," and "morality" as synonyms for Body of Fate in the descriptions of the phases. The emphasis on concrete externals and the intimations of a unifying process coalesce in the Will of the fourth quarter, which displays an intuitive perception of the underlying relations between things that should recall Spinoza and Bergson's "supposedly concrete knowledge of the world as an interconnected whole" (Quinton 461). At Phase 22, an "amalgamation" (VB 160) forms intuitively: "'Systematised' is the only word that comes to mind, but it implies too much deliberation, for association has ranged itself by
association as little bits of paper and little chips of wood clinging to one another upon the water in a bowl" (VB 160). As an artist, the man of Phase 23 "would construct a whole, but that whole must seem all event, all picture. That whole must not be instinctive, bodily, natural, however, though it may seem so, for in reality he cares only for what is human, individual, and moral" (VB 165). These seemingly natural "amalgamations" are held together by an underlying intuitively perceived unity, and given the spiritual nature of the fire element, it is not surprising that the external world's underlying unity comes to be perceived as God during the latter half of the fourth quarter.

At Phase 25 begins "the intuition of God" (VB 176); at Phase 26 intuition gives "knowledge of each separated life in relation to supersensual unity" (VB 179); while at Phase 27 "the total life has suddenly displayed its source" (VB 180), the "total life" being the totality of the living external world. These descriptions should recall the Spinozan definition of intuition given earlier; Wild defines Spinoza's intuition as "the immediate recognition of the particular in its relationship to the whole, as Spinoza prefers to put it, not probably without a deeper meaning, with 'God'" (24-25). Allison describes Spinoza's scientia intuitiva thus:

[S]ince every finite thing is part of that infinite system (natura naturata) that is grounded in God (natura naturans), it follows that, in the last analysis, the adequate idea of anything involves the idea of the whole, or of God. We thus return . . . to that central tenet of Spinoza's thought, that the knowledge of anything in nature depends ultimately on the knowledge of God. (119)

Spinoza's intuition gives a kind of divine knowledge that agrees with the divine nature of the fire element. The identity of Yeats's "supersensual unity" to God is clear in Phase 22 at the beginning of the fourth quarter, where Yeats says that Dostoevski's characters "are aware . . . of some ungraspable Whole to which they have given the name of God" (VB 160-61). That Yeats has Spinoza in mind
is supported by an unpublished letter to his wife from May of 1918, which mentions that he is reading Spinoza while working on the early drafts of *A Vision* (Harper 2:36); his copy of Spinoza’s *Ethica* is also listed in the 1920s catalogue of his library (O’Shea 288).

In describing Spinoza’s comparison of intuition and reason, Allison makes a distinction that is important in understanding the language of *A Vision*:

Intuition, unlike reason, is able to arrive at knowledge of the essence of individuals. Whereas the province of reason is general truths—for example, axioms—which hold universally and do not pertain to any individuals in particular, intuition achieves “adequate knowledge of the essence of things.” Consequently, it is concrete and particular, whereas reason is abstract and general. (117)

Intuition sees the world as an interconnected whole by relating the essence of individuals to the essence of the whole, God; but the association here of reason with the abstract and intuition with the concrete is important because Yeats makes the same association throughout *A Vision*. Referring to the third and fourth quarters, he says that when “Creative Mind predominates” the *Mask* or *Image* is “abstract”; but when *Body of Fate* predominates it is “concrete” (*VB* 87), and he goes on to use “abstract” as a synonym for thinking and “concrete” as a synonym for intuition throughout the book.

The distinction between abstract and concrete is general usage, of course, but few people are aware of the philosophical precedent for linking those terms with specific mental functions. Part of the Scholastic debate between Nominalists and Realists was a discussion of the mental functions used to perceive or experience universals and particulars. The Scholastics began with the distinction between abstract and concrete seen here in the definition of the past participle *concretus* in *A Lexicon of St. Thomas Aquinas*: “made specific, specialized, i.e., coalesced with special or individual characteristics, the opposite of
abstractus* (195). Later, Duns Scotus designated intuition as the function through which we know the concrete and reason as that with which we know the abstract, as Maurer explains: "Scotus based the distinction between intuitive and abstractive knowledge on their objects: An object of intuitive knowledge is something existing and present to the knower, whereas the object of abstractive knowledge need not exist or be present" (282). Later Ockham would attempt to reconcile individuals with universals by making intuitive knowledge the starting point for abstractive knowledge (Day 146-59, Leff 5-14, Maurer 282), but according to Maurer, Ockham still distinguishes between intuition and reason as modes of knowledge:

Intuitive knowledge is experimental [experiential] knowledge of individual things. The object of simple abstractive knowledge, on the other hand, is not primarily an individual but a universal. Nevertheless, an individual can be known abstractively (that is, in abstraction from existence) as well as a universal. Thus intuitive and abstractive knowledge do not differ because of their objects. In themselves they are two radically different kinds of cognition; they do not differ by their objects or causes but simply by themselves. (282)

Spinoza retained this as a distinction between intuition and reason (Allison 115-18); whether Yeats adopted it from Spinoza or the Scholastics themselves is not clear, though, because his early philosophical reading is even harder to trace than his occult reading.

Apart from the moral implications of religious intuition, Yeats's use of "morality" as a synonym for intuition throughout A Vision also has a philosophical basis in the tradition of intuitionism or "ethical intuition":

Moral philosophers, from Bishop Butler and the Moral Sense school to G. E. Moore and the Oxford moralists, have held that moral assertions record knowledge of a special kind. The rightness of actions (or, in Moore's case, the goodness of states of affairs) is discovered by a special moral faculty, seen as analogous to the power of observation (Moral Sense school, Moore) or the power of intuiting logical principles (Oxford moralists). (Quinton 461)
Hill describes the development of this largely British branch of ethical philosophy:

The foundations of a British Intuitive moral theory were laid in the seventeenth century by strong reactions against Hobbes's attempt to base moral right on the will of a sovereign, in the thought of Richard Cudworth, Henry More, and Samuel Clarke. Against the pretenses of Hobbes's sovereign these writers stoutly contended that morality rested upon immediate principles which determined a kind of moral fitness that even God could not alter. This tradition was continued in the eighteenth century in that part of [Bishop Joseph] Butler's thought which represented conscience as a kind of rational intuition into moral reality and, in some degree, in certain phases of Francis Hutchison's Moral Sense Theory. British moral Intuitionism, however, took its more characteristic form in the work of Richard Price and Thomas Reid. The former held that such concepts as right and wrong and good and bad were not merely "qualities of our minds" ascribed by us to our actions but "real characters of actions," "indefinable save by synonymous expressions," and discovered by "the power of immediate perception in the human mind" or "from intuition into the nature of things." Thomas Reid insisted perhaps even more vigorously upon the objective independence of moral principles and held that just as the eye revealed the physical world, so a moral faculty in us brought to light "both the original conceptions of right and wrong—and the original judgments that this conduct is right, that is wrong." The tradition of British moral Intuitionism found significant expression in the nineteenth century in W. E. H. Lecky's monumental History of European Morals, in which an attempt was made to show that striking changes in moral ideals were to be explained not by utilitarian considerations but by the disturbing effects of social institutions upon moral intuitions which otherwise gradually though steadily improved. Toward the close of that century the Intuitive principle was applied not to acts but to motives by James Martineau's Types of Ethical Theory; and in the same period Henry Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics undertook to found a partly Hedonistic ethics upon the mind's immediate perception of self-evident moral axioms. (292-93)

This historical view of it as a distinct line of ethical thought was first formulated by Sidgwick in his Outlines of the History of Ethics (1886), whose influence is attested to by the five editions printed by 1902. The fact that Sidgwick was a founding member and the first president of the Society for Psychical Research might be used to argue personal acquaintance with Yeats, except that his presidency was during that period in the 1890s when Yeats avoided spiritualism altogether after the traumatic initial experience recorded in Autobiographies (69-
More likely Yeats or his wife simply encountered either Sidgwick's historical survey or his further development of intuitionism in *Methods of Ethics* (1874), which influenced G. E. Moore's *Principia Ethica*, as Moore acknowledged (x); Sidgwick had a substantial influence on ethical philosophy around the turn of the century. G. E. Moore himself was not only one of the preeminent philosophers of Yeats's time; he was the brother of Yeats's good friend T. Sturge Moore, with whom Yeats extensively discussed the philosopher's ideas on other subjects (*The Unicorn* 305-12; 321-22; 327-28). Ethical intuition itself seems a forerunner of the Freudian superego; both are a nonrational sense of right and wrong which might commonly be called the conscience. Intuition is sometimes defined as instinctive knowledge, which supports ethical intuition's similarity to the superego in light of what Freud says in *The Ego and the Id*: "the superego is always close to the id and can act as its representative vis-à-vis the ego. It reaches far down into the id and for that reason is farther from consciousness than the ego is" (38-39). The concept of the superego has generally superseded that of ethical intuition, but when Yeats was writing that had not yet happened.

Yeats also had personal ties to yet another proponent of a specialized form of intuition: Henri Bergson. The first edition of *A Vision* is dedicated to Bergson's sister Moina ("Vestigia* on *VA* ix), the widow of Hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn founder MacGregor Mathers, despite the estrangement between Mathers and longtime Order member Yeats. Bergson conceived of experience (and thus, the experienceable world) as an interconnected whole--duration--whose nature could only be grasped completely through intuition. In *Matter and Memory*, Bergson says that "Pure intuition, external or internal, is that of an undivided continuity"--that interconnected whole (239). Bergson developed his
central concept of duration as the undivided continuity with which intuition deals; because conscious, linear thinking could never deal with the ongoing whole of pure duration, the true nature of things could only be known through intuition. He describes his "intuition of duration" in Creative Evolution:

Thus, intuition may bring the intellect to recognize that life does not quite go into the category of the many, not yet into that of the one; that neither mechanical causality nor finality can give a sufficient interpretation of the whole process. Then, by a sympathetic communication which it establishes between us and the rest of the living, by the expansion of consciousness which it brings about, it introduces into life's own domain, which is reciprocal interpenetration, endlessly continued creation. (195)

Bergson's intuition of duration matches up nicely with the definition of Body of Fate in VA; what could be better suited to deal with "the physical and mental environment, the changing human body, the stream of Phenomena as this affects a particular individual, all that is forced upon us from without, Time as it affects sensation" (VA 15)? Hone says Yeats read both Creative Evolution and Matter and Memory in 1927 (368), but Yeats first met Bergson in February of 1894 (Hone 106), which might have spurred Yeats to an earlier reading of them. There was also the chance of personal contact during Bergson's tenure as President of the Society for Psychical Research in 1914, as Yeats had joined the Society in 1913 and was at the peak of his interest in spiritualism at that time.

Bergson's intuition of duration, ethical intuition, and Spinoza's religious intuition all help to explain the development of intuition from intuitive technique ("amalgamation" on VB 160) to morality to direct experience of God during the Body of Fate quarter, as they all involve knowledge of experience or the world as interconnected wholes whose underlying unity is perceived by intuition. Yeats's employment of these philosophical concepts enables him to use the term "intuition" only three times during the Body of Fate quarter, all of which are in the final
paragraph of the description of Phase 25 (VB 176).

Like sensation, Jung considers intuition to be a function of perception and so regards them both as irrational functions, as opposed to thinking and feeling, which are rational functions because they are used to make judgments. He says that intuition's contents "have the character of being 'given,' in contrast to the 'derived' or 'produced' character of thinking and feeling" contents (CW 6: par. 770). Though Jung never uses the term "sensuous" to describe intuition, he echoes the difficulty of distinguishing between the sensuous Will and the concrete Body of Fate encountered in reading A Vision:

But since extraverted intuition is directed predominantly to objects, it actually comes very close to sensation. . . . If I ask an intuitive how he orients himself, he will speak of things that are almost indistinguishable from sense-impressions. Very often he will even use the word "sensation." He does have sensations, of course, but he is not guided by them as such; he uses them merely as starting-points for his perceptions. (CW 6: par. 611)

Just as introverted feeling and thinking diverged in following the emotional and ideational associations of the subjective image, so do extraverted sensation and intuition part ways in their use of their common object, the external world; sensation is only concerned with confirming that things are there, while intuition seeks to perceive the underlying relations between things.

Jung says that "The primary function of intuition . . . is simply to transmit images, or perceptions of relations between things, which could not be transmitted by the other functions or only in a very roundabout way" (CW 6: par. 611). When extraverted, these images are not the archetypal images of introversion, but rather images of external things as related wholes. Extraverted intuition displays a mental attitude rather like that seen in the last phases of the Great Wheel: "The intuitive function is represented in consciousness by an attitude of expectancy, by vision and penetration . . ." (CW 6: par. 610). It is particularly
concerned with finding ways of dealing with existing circumstances:

Just as extraverted sensation strives to reach the highest pitch of actuality . . . so intuition tries to apprehend the widest range of possibilities, since only through envisioning possibilities is intuition fully satisfied. It seeks to discover what possibilities the objective situation holds in store; hence, as a subordinate function (i.e., when not in the position of priority), it is the auxiliary that automatically comes into play when no other function can find a way out of a hopelessly blocked situation. When it is the dominant function, every situation in life seems like a locked room which intuition has to open. It is constantly seeking fresh outlets and new possibilities in external life. (CW 6: par. 612)

These new possibilities involve a kind of innovation or creativity different from that which introversion provides, as they are created out of existing situations rather than from archetypal images.

Besides dealing with existing circumstances, extraverted intuition (along with sensation) is best at dealing with chance events:

Their perception is directed simply and solely to events as they happen, no selection being made by judgment. In this respect they have a decided advantage over the two judging types. Objective situations both conform to law and are accidental. In so far as they conform to law, they are accessible to reason; in so far as they are accidental, they are not. (CW 6: par. 616)

Jung's rational functions of thinking and feeling cannot deal with seemingly accidental twists of fate, and sensation can only confirm that such events have happened; only intuition can instantaneous figure out why they have occurred and what can be done about them. Extraverted intuition is therefore the best suited to deal with one's Body of Fate, to use Yeats's term for chance events.

Sharing a common source in the fire element gives the Body of Fate Faculty and the extraverted intuition function a number of shared characteristics: the perception of the underlying relations between things, an attitude of vision and expectation, and a capacity for dealing with chance events and existing circumstances. Jung's desire to retain the stance of an empirical scientist probably
compels him to leave out those religious aspects of intuition that Yeats makes so much use of, though he does concede the possibility of prophecy to introverted intuition. Yeats's assertion that events forced upon us from without are "shaped out of the Daimon's memory of his past incarnations" (VB 83) seems absurd even by occult standards, but if we think in terms of having our perception of those events shaped by our having seen similar events in previous lives (which would make possible an instantaneous apprehension of the current events), then the concept becomes more plausible. Some recent research on intuition does in fact suggest that it functions through unconscious recognition of patterns already familiar to us which underlie situations that are new to us (Holden 59; Trotter).

And the placement of intuition in the last quarter of A Vision's historical cycle takes advantage of intuition's ability to deal with existing circumstances and find new possibilities among them, because intuition is the best function for dealing with the accumulated institutions and traditions of the late stages of a civilization. The Body of Fate's connection with external circumstances or situations makes sense if we consider how intuition depends on the circumstances which call it into play. We cannot have a hunch upon demand; we can only observe a situation and hope that intuition will provide some explanation or possibility, which means that no matter how long it takes for intuition to produce something, this result is still directly tied to the situation which originally elicited it. Sensation, of course, is also tied to our surroundings, but is readily available to consciousness.

The focus on facts and the external world which extraverted sensation and intuition share accounts for the fundamental movement of the primary half of the Great Wheel. During the Body of Fate quarter, the intuitive Will grows increasingly objective and progressively loses its sense of self, flowing outward in
perception of the external world and its immanent unity, God, and finally merging with them in utter selflessness. This unity with the external world opposes the unity with the image at the heart of the antithetical half of the Wheel, and the process culminates at Phase 1, which is "completely absorbed in its supernatural environment" (VB 183) and so is completely objective. Phase 1 is completely merged with the underlying unity of the external world, God; in the Will quarter which follows, the instinctive Will develops from its initial unity with Nature (the external world) into an increasing awareness of self and thus becomes increasingly less objective. In VA, the central portion of this process becomes a reflection of the Unity of Being of Phases 12 through 18; the Body of Fate quarter seeks "Unity with God" in Phases 26 to 28, while the instinctive Will quarter can experience "Unity with Nature" in Phases 2 through 4 (VA 29). While the antithetical half of the cycle is organized around two different ways of dealing with the subjective image at its center (Phase 15), the primary half is organized around two different ways of dealing with the external world at its center (Phase 1). This primary movement is possible because Yeats's primary Will and Body of Fate, like Jung's extraverted sensation and intuition, are centered on the external world.

Besides the explanatory power that the descriptions of Jung's orientations and functions provide when they are equated with Yeats's tinctures and Faculties, the equation itself provides another step toward reading A Vision at the sentence level. We have seen that each Faculty has not only a Jungian synonym but Yeatsian ones as well. Thus Will can both be thought of as sensation in the Jungian sense and recognized as "instinct" or "sensuous" or even "race" (VB 95) within A Vision's terminological framework. A table of related terms can be developed along that line and should be kept in mind whenever one
reads Yeats’s descriptions of his phases:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Will</th>
<th>sensation</th>
<th>instinct, sensuous, race</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mask</td>
<td>feeling</td>
<td>emotion, idealised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creative Mind</td>
<td>thinking</td>
<td>intellect, abstract, thought</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Body of Fate</td>
<td>intuition</td>
<td>morality, concrete, supersensual unity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We have already seen examples of this in the changing *Will* of the four quarters: the instinctive *Will* of the first quarter, the emotional *Will* of the second, the intellectual *Will* of the third, and the moral *Will* of the last quarter. The *Mask*, the *Creative Mind*, and the *Body of Fate* undergo corresponding changes as they move around the Great Wheel, and these shifts in their natures cause much of the confusion inherent in reading *A Vision*; learning to recognize these shifts and understanding Yeats’s rationale for them is a key step in learning to read the book.
Chapter 3

Thimblerig: The Shell-Game of the Faculties

The intrinsic nature of the Faculties closely resembles Jung's four most effective functions. The nature of the Will changes as it goes through the four quarters, and this change reflects the nature of the strongest Faculty of each quarter. The reasons for this change begin with the roles for the Faculties that were mentioned earlier—the Will and the Mask are the will and its object, and the Creative Mind and the Body of Fate are the mind and its object. Yeats tells us that the first pair is antithetical or "emotional and aesthetic," while the second pair is primary or "reasonable and moral"; he also tells us that "only two of the four, Will and Creative Mind, are active" (VB 73), which means that the Mask and the Body of Fate are passive or acted upon. Yeats is proposing a sort of structural model of the human psyche, one which might be depicted thus:

active

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{active} \\
\text{Creative Mind} \\
\hline
\text{Will} & \text{Mask} \\
\hline
\text{acted upon} \\
\text{Body of Fate} \\
\hline
\text{rational} \\
\text{emotional}
\end{array}
\]

He creates a conventional reason/emotion dichotomy, and divides the mind into active and passive halves as well; however, these designations are not absolute. This model does provide a standard frame of reference for the descriptive language in each phase, but underneath that frame of reference something else is going on—that change in the nature of each moving Faculty, which can be better understood if we first examine Jung's corresponding structural model of the psyche.

In a brief section of Psychological Types entitled "The Principal and Auxiliary Functions," Jung describes a hierarchical structure for the four functions in his exaggerated types. He designates the function which determines the type
the primary or principal conscious function, and describes it as a bias of the mind much like the role of the Will in Yeats's scheme:

[The products of all functions can be conscious, but we speak of the "consciousness" of a function only when it is under the control of the will and, at the same time, its governing principle is the decisive one for the orientation of consciousness. . . . This absolute sovereignty always belongs, empirically, to one function, because the equally independent intervention of another function would necessarily produce a different orientation. . . . (CW 6: par. 667)

This primary or superior function is supported by an auxiliary conscious function which differs in nature (in terms of Jung’s rational/irrational distinction) from the primary function:

Its secondary importance is due to the fact that it is not, like the primary function, valid in its own right as an absolutely reliable and decisive factor, but comes into play more as an auxiliary or complementary function. Naturally only those functions can appear as auxiliary whose nature is not opposed to the dominant function. For instance, feeling can never act as the second function alongside thinking, because it is by nature too strongly opposed to thinking. Thinking, if it is to be real thinking and true to its own principle, must rigorously exclude feeling. . . . (Thinking as the primary function can readily pair with intuition as the auxiliary, or indeed equally well with sensation, but, as already observed, never with feeling. . . . (The auxiliary function is possible and useful only in so far as it serves the dominant function, without making any claim to the autonomy of its own principle. (CW 6: pars. 667-68)

Functions of similar nature must contend for the domination of consciousness; in the rational pair, thinking and feeling contend for the control of judgment, while in the irrational pair sensation and intuition contend for the control of perception, as sensation's "intrusive sensory stimuli direct attention to the physical surface, to the very things round and beyond which intuition tries to peer" (CW 6: par. 611). Intuition and sensation cannot both function at the same strength concurrently when perceiving, nor can feeling and thinking do so when judging.

This contention between paired functions explains a curious sentence at the end of the description of Phase 24: "Morality and intellect persecute instinct
and emotion respectively, which seek their protection* (VB 172). In Jung's terms
the sentence would read: "Intuition and thinking drive out sensation and feeling
respectively, even though they share the same respective qualities of perception
and judgment." Yeats casts the conflict in anthropomorphic terms, but the rela-
tive strength of the paired functions or Faculties will prove to be even more
important in his system than it is in Jung's.

Jung's primary and auxiliary functions combine to create distinct and
synergistic subtypes:

The resulting combinations present the familiar picture of, for
instance, practical thinking allied with sensation, speculative think-
ing forging ahead with intuition, artistic intuition selecting and pre-
senting its images with the help of feeling-values, philosophical
intuition systematizing its vision into comprehensible thought by
means of a powerful intellect, and so on. (CW 6: par. 669)

These subtypes themselves will be of importance when we turn to Yeats's
phases. In addition to the conscious pair of functions, there are always two func-
tions on the unconscious level: "The unconscious functions likewise group them-
selves in patterns correlated with the conscious ones. Thus, the correlative of
conscious, practical thinking, may be an unconscious, intuitive-feeling attitude,
with feeling under a stronger inhibition than intuition" (CW 6: par. 670). This
"inhibition" of one function allows us to designate principal and auxiliary functions
on the unconscious level as well; Jung calls the fourth or auxiliary unconscious
function the "inferior function" (CW 6: par. 763). The above example could be
ranked in order of decreasing importance:

1. Thinking : primary/principal conscious function
2. Sensation : auxiliary conscious function
3. Intuition : principal unconscious function
4. Feeling : inferior/auxiliary unconscious function

The four functions rotate through these four positions to create different function-
types, but this process will be easier to follow if it is represented in visual form.

Jung prefers to depict the quaternity of functions visually as a cross for two reasons: first, because of the appearance of the cross throughout history as a symbol of psychic balance; and second, because the primary function can be placed at the top to emphasize its domination of consciousness. He considers the other three functions to be relatively unconscious, calling even the auxiliary conscious function "relatively unconscious" (CW 6: par. 669). A cruciform representation of his practical thinking type would look like this (after CW 18: par. 29):

```
Thinking
----------
Sensation   Intuition
----------
Feeling
Conscious level
----------
Unconscious level
```

In Jung's types, the orientation of the primary function is opposed by that of the three unconscious functions, as in this description of the extraverted types:

Normally speaking, the compensating attitude of the unconscious finds expression in the maintenance of the psychic equilibrium. A normal extraverted attitude does not, of course, mean that the individual invariably behaves in accordance with the extraverted schema. Even in the same individual many psychological processes may be observed that involve the mechanism of introversion. We call a mode of behaviour extraverted only when the mechanism of extraversion predominates. In these cases the most differentiated function is always employed in an extraverted way, whereas the inferior functions are introverted; in other words, the superior function is the most conscious one and completely under conscious control, whereas the less differentiated functions are in part unconscious and far less under the control of consciousness. The superior function is always an expression of the conscious personality, of its aims, will, and general performance, whereas the less differentiated functions fall into the category of things that simply "happen" to one. (CW 6: par. 575)

A Jungian psychological type, then, consists of a distinct habitual orientation and hierarchical ordering of the four psychological functions. A practical introverted thinking type could be represented in a cruciform diagram as shown in the one below:
And using the Meyer-Briggs typology's practice of abbreviating intuition as "N" to avoid confusing it with the logical abbreviation for "introverted", the type becomes

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{IN T} \\
\text{EX S} & \quad \text{EX N} \\
\text{EX F}
\end{align*}
\]

Jung divides the potential range of mental orientation between the primary function and the unconscious ones; if the primary function is extraverted, then the less conscious functions turn inward as a balance, and vice versa.

However, the cruciform diagram does not reflect the principal/auxiliary and conscious/unconscious pairings mentioned earlier, but that can be amended by dispensing with the cross and realigning the diagram to create two levels:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{IN T} & \quad \text{EX S} & \quad \text{principal/auxiliary conscious} & \quad 1 \quad 2 \\
\text{EX N} & \quad \text{EX F} & \quad \text{principal/auxiliary unconscious} & \quad 3 \quad 4
\end{align*}
\]

The two perceptive or irrational functions can trade places to produce the two introverted thinking types:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{IN T} & \quad \text{EX S} & \quad \text{IN T} & \quad \text{EX N} \\
\text{EX N} & \quad \text{EX F} & \quad \text{EX S} & \quad \text{EX F}
\end{align*}
\]

A change in orientation produces the two extraverted thinking types:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{EX T} & \quad \text{IN S} & \quad \text{EX T} & \quad \text{IN N} \\
\text{IN N} & \quad \text{IN F} & \quad \text{IN S} & \quad \text{IN F}
\end{align*}
\]

The same process yields the other twelve possible Jungian types from intro-
verted and extraverted feeling, sensation, and intuition.

But apart from these sixteen fixed patterns of orientation, the functions can be considered as rotating through the four positions of the diagram to produce eight possible function-types:

\[
\begin{array}{cccc}
S & F & S & T \\
T & N & F & N \\
T & N & T & S \\
S & F & N & F
\end{array}
\]

Adding the pattern of orientation to these will produce the sixteen types, but if we recall that each function potentially possesses a complete range of orientation (introverted to extraverted), then the above diagrams also represent legitimate types which are characterized by their hierarchy of functions. They also represent the subtypes mentioned earlier: sensation seconded by feeling, sensation supported by thinking, feeling supported by sensation, and so forth. In fact, in the final analysis these subtypes are the definitive types and should be thought of as such; the overall hierarchy of functions is more of a constant than the naturally fluid movement of orientation between inner and outer worlds.

What is most important in all this is that the diagram of the Jungian hierarchy of functions:

\[
\begin{array}{c|c}
\text{principal conscious} & \text{auxiliary conscious} \\
\hline
\text{principal unconscious} & \text{auxiliary unconscious}
\end{array}
\]

can be considered a structural model of the mind and standard frame of reference which are comparable (though not directly equivalent) to Yeats's structural model and standard frame of reference in the phases:

\[
\begin{array}{c|c}
\text{Creative Mind} & \text{Body of Fate} \\
\hline
\text{Will} & \text{Mask}
\end{array}
\]
In the eight function-types above, we saw how the rotation or interchange of functions within Jung's structural model produced the different types; an extraordinarily similar process creates the phases of *A Vision*, and it is to this process that we may now turn our attention.

When the *Faculties* were compared with Jung's functions, it became clear that the nature of the *Will* changed as it moved from quarter to quarter around the wheel. The *Will* takes on the characteristics of the strongest *Faculty* or function of the quarter it is in: *Will* or sensation in the first quarter, *Mask* or feeling in the second, and so on. Yeats tells us that "a particular man is classified according to the place of the *Will* or choice in the diagram" ([V. B 73](#)), and the place of the *Will* determines more than the phase or basic psychological type; as Hough observes, it also determines the place of the other three *Faculties* around the diagram of the wheel (105-06). The *Creative Mind* is always as far from Phase 1 around the wheel as the *Will* is; the *Mask* is always directly opposite the *Will* on the wheel; and the *Body of Fate* is always directly opposite the *Creative Mind*. This creates a pair of axes moving symmetrically around the wheel in opposite directions.

The *Will* and the *Mask*—here abbreviated as *W* and *M*—move around the wheel in a counterclockwise direction:
Because Yeats considers them to be the "lunar or antithetical" pair of Faculties, they move "from right to left like the moon in the zodiac" (VB 80), as the moon moves through the zodiac while it is above the horizon. (Although the moon appears to move from left to right as the sun does because of the earth's rotation, it actually moves some eleven to fifteen degrees a day in the opposite direction because of its rapid travel through the zodiac, as Yeats the astrologer was well aware.) At the same time, the Creative Mind and Body of Fate move at the same rate in the opposite direction:

![Diagram](image)

Because they are the "solar or primary" pair, they travel "from left to right like the sun's daily course" above the horizon (VB 80). The result is a pair of contrarotating axes moving symmetrically around the Great Wheel.

If we leave out the "phases of crisis (Phases 8, 22, 15, 1)" for the moment (VB 92), the symmetrical movement of the Faculties means that with the Will at a given phase in one quarter, there will be one Faculty in each of the three remaining quarters: if the Will is in the first quarter, the Mask will be in the third quarter, the Creative Mind in the fourth quarter, and the Body of Fate in the second quarter. As we have seen, the Will takes on the nature of the dominant Faculty or function of the quarter it is in—and what happens is that each of the other three
moving Faculties also takes on the nature of the strongest Faculty or function of the quarter that it is in. In the example below, the Will displays the characteristics of Will or sensation because it is in the first quarter, while the Mask takes on the nature of Creative Mind or thinking from the third quarter, the Creative Mind takes on the characteristics of Body of Fate or intuition from the fourth quarter, while the Body of Fate displays the traits of Mask or feeling because it is in the second quarter:

This duality is the key to understanding the phases of A Vision; a given Faculty in a given phase reflects not only its role in Yeats's structural model of the psyche (the will and its object, the mind and its object), but also a psychological function received from the Faculty's place on the wheel. In Jung's system the functions rotate through the four fixed positions or roles in his structural model to create the different types, but in A Vision the structural roles themselves travel around the wheel to create all the different phases. Yeats is playing a sort of thimble or shell-game with the Faculties; he shows us four nutshells or cups marked "Will," "Mask," and so forth, but beneath them he has four peas also marked "Will," etc.—and it is the nature of those interchanging peas which is decisive in determining the qualities of each phase.
Yeats's description of a *Faculty* in a given phase usually reflects three things: its structural role, its actual nature, and its life experience. Its structural role is its place in Yeats's structural scheme of the psyche, the standard frame of reference for the phases: the *Will* (the Is) always acts upon its object the *Mask* (the Ought), while the *Creative Mind* (the Knower) always acts upon its object the *Body of Fate* (the Known). Their interaction is essentially a conflict which expresses Yeats's sense of his own life as conflict (Ellmann, *Identity* 160; Seiden 78-79). The *Mask* and the *Body of Fate* can also be actual external things or conditions, but when Yeats refers to the *Will*, the *Mask*, etc., he is usually referring to that structural role. The actual nature of a *Faculty* in a given phase is the psychological function associated with the quarter the *Faculty* is currently in, and it differs from its structural role three-quarters of the time; the *Will* is only in the *Will* quarter during the first quarter of the cycle, for example. When the *Will* enters the *Mask* quarter through the crisis of Phase 8, Yeats begins to call it the "emotional *Will,*" and the other *Faculties* undergo a corresponding change. He uses the synonyms for the essential nature of the *Faculties*—e.g., instinct, emotion, intellect and morality—to denote the actual nature of the *Faculties.*

To continue our example from the second quarter, the emotional *Will* would have a "moral" *Mask,* and its "intellectual" *Creative Mind* would have an "instinctive" *Body of Fate*; or, to use another set of synonyms, the phase would have an "idealised" *Will,* a "concrete" *Mask* or *Image,* an "abstract" *Creative Mind,* and a "sensuous" *Body of Fate.* In Phase 12, for example, we find an "emotional" *Will* from the second quarter and a "philosophic intellect (Creative Mind)*" from the third quarter (VB 128), and learn that its *Body of Fate* "is from the phase where instinct . . . reached its most persuasive strength" in the first quarter.
(VB 127-28), while its Mask from the fourth quarter provides a "concrete . . . Image" (VB 129):

Such descriptions tend to be more complex than "the emotional Will," as in the case of the instinctive Body of Fate above, but learning to recognize them is an essential part of learning to read A Vision. Some confusion may be presented by Yeats's occasional use of the synonyms to describe structural roles; in Phase 17, for example, we find both "the emotional Image of Phase 3" (VB 141) and a True Creative Mind of "Creative imagination through antithetical emotion" (VB 140). But a moment's investigation shows that the former is a Mask from Phase 3 in the first quarter, while the Creative Mind's actual nature is emotional because it comes from the Mask quarter. Greater familiarity with the system can make this process of recognition almost instantaneous; the system's rigorously precise construction underlies the description of each phase.

What I call "life experience" in the description of the Faculties is derived not so much from the quarter as from the phase where a given Faculty originates, and it involves both the kind of person produced by a particular phase and the kind of life which that person experiences. Once again excepting the phases of
crisis, the Great Wheel can be divided into six groups of four phases, each group consisting of those four phases which are in effect made up of one another because of the symmetrical movement of the Faculties around the wheel. For example, Phase 17 is made up of Faculties from Phases 17, 3, 13, and 27—and so are Phases 3, 13, and 27. Thus each group of four phases is interrelated, and this is manifested in their life experience. (The phases of crisis occur when the moving axes of Faculties meet one another in a single pair of opposed phases: 8 and 22 for the human phases of crisis, and 1 and 15 for the supernatural phases of crisis, which creates interrelated pairs of phases rather than tetrads.)

We can typify each phase in our example group of four: Phase 17 produces the Daimonic lyric poet, Phase 3 the shepherd of "perfect bodily sanity" (VB 108), Phase 13 the emotionally morbid intellectual lover, and Phase 27 the ego-renouncing Saint. These four types and their lives can influence any one of these phases; for example, Phase 17 derives its lonely intensity from the shepherd's life, which becomes "a Mask of simplicity that is also intensity"; and its "Body of Fate . . . derived from a phase of renunciation, is 'loss,'" and shows the Saint's influence (VB 141). To these, Phase 17 adds an attempt to synthesize and control its "scattering" images that is peculiar to the intellectual Will of this phase: "He is called the Daimonic man because Unity of Being, and consequent expression of Daimonic thought, is now more easy than at any other phase" (VB 141). Sometimes the structural role and life experience of a Faculty greatly overshadow its actual nature; this happens with the Faculties in Yeats's own Phase 17, where his own life experience and the structural scheme he created to express the conflicts of his own life obscure the actual nature of all four Faculties. But the actual nature of a phase's Faculties can always be deduced from their quarters of origin.
Several passages in VA are an attempt to describe the interchanging actual nature and shared life experience of the circulating Faculties:

Incarnate man has Four Faculties which constitute the Tinctures... When thought of in isolation, they take upon themselves the nature now of one phase, now of another... All Four Faculties influence each other, and the object of the diagram of the Wheel is to show when and in what proportions. (VA 14-15)

Certainly the Faculties "make up" the two Tinctures; it is with the mental functions that we experience the inner and outer worlds, so they literally constitute our experience of introversion and extraversion. When "thought of in isolation" the Faculties each "take on the nature" of a given phase; each takes an actual nature and life experience from the quarter and phase it is currently in. The Faculties "influence each other" when they interchange actual natures because of their movement on the wheel; a Will in the fourth quarter retains the characteristics of the Will as a structural role, yet displays the influence of Body of Fate or intuition from its actual nature. Once we are aware of the interchange of the Faculties, the above passage is fairly straightforward; when combined with the attribution of the strongest Faculty to each quarter (VA 24), it may qualify as an honest but unsuccessful attempt to inform the reader of the interchange of the Faculties.

Another explanatory passage in VA is important both as an attempt to explain the interchange of the Faculties and as an indication of the relationship between the Great Wheel and the gyres:

Will and Mask are opposite in Tincture, Creative Mind and Body of Fate are opposite in Tincture. The one has the primary in the exact strength of the antithetical in the other, and vice versa. The primary and antithetical define the inclination of the Will, and through the Will affect the other three; this may be called the difference in quality. A Will at Phase 18 would have the exact amount of antithetical inclination that a Will at Phase 4 would have of primary. On the other hand, a Will at Phase 18 and Creative Mind at Phase 12 are exactly the same in the proportions of their Tinctures, have exactly the same quality of Tincture but move in opposite directions—one is going from Phase 1 to Phase 28 and the other from Phase 28 to
Phase 1. It is therefore necessary to consider both direction and quality. (VA 16-17)

This passage appears opaque even in light of what we have learned thus far about the interchange of the Faculties, but it is obviously trying to tell us something specific about the mechanical structure ("exact strengths, amounts and proportions" of opposing Faculties) of the system, and the questions of direction and quality it raises are crucial in understanding the system. Yeats does provide a clue to the meaning of the "difference in quality" in a passage from VA on Unity of Being:

When the Tinctures open, that is to say when observation gives way to experience, when the being attains self knowledge [sic] or its possibility, the Four Faculties reflect themselves in experience as the Four Qualities, the Will as instinct (or race), the Mask as emotion, the Creative Mind as reason, the Body of Fate as desire. (VA 60)

This identifies the "quality" as the actual nature or psychological function of a Faculty that is moving around the wheel. Thus the position of the Will "affects the other three" in terms of their actual nature; Yeats does seem to be describing the interchange of the Faculties here.

Moore questions the importance of the direction of movement of the Faculties (265), and the answer is that this movement is related to changes in the relative strength of the actual natures of the Faculties which will enable to determine a precise equivalence between A Vision's phases and Jung's eight function-types. Earlier we saw what was called a contention or conflict within pairs of Faculties or functions of similar natures, as the dominant function of each pair drives its counterpart out of consciousness. Sensation and intuition contend for the control of perception, while thinking and feeling contend as judging functions. In A Vision, "Morality and intellect persecute instinct and emotion respec-
tively" (VB 172), and vice versa; if one Faculty is growing stronger, its counterpart must be weakening at the same rate.

In the Great Wheel, this change in strength is partly the product of the way that the strongest Faculty of each quarter of the wheel grows progressively stronger within its quarter. Increasing strength is indicated by the direction of the arrows in the diagram below:

As the phases progress numerically higher, the related Faculties and functions grow progressively stronger; as the Will, for example, moves counterclockwise around the wheel it grows stronger as sensation or instinct until it reaches the end of the first quarter. It then repeats the process as feeling or emotion in the second quarter, and so forth. The process stems from the Will’s gain in experience, skill, and control as it lives through the successive phases or incarnations in a quarter and learns to use the function associated with that quarter. Yeat’s perplexing assignment of primary and antithetical orientation to the Faculties (VA 14; VB 73) makes more sense when we see in the above diagram that the "antithetical" pair of Will and Mask increase in strength in their respective quarters as the cycle moves toward the antithetical climax of Phase 15, while the "primary" pair of Creative Mind and Body of Fate increase in strength on the way to the primary climax of Phase 1.
When combined with the structure of the wheel and the rotating axes of the moving *Faculties*, this change in strength changes the relative strength of the actual natures of the moving *Faculties* in a consistent, mechanically precise pattern derived from the "direction" of movement that Yeats emphasized above. As the *Will/Mask* axis rotates counterclockwise, its actual natures are always growing stronger during the course of a quarter:

![Diagram 1]

Because it rotates clockwise, the actual natures of the *Creative Mind/Body of Fate* axis continually decrease in strength at an identical rate at the same time:

![Diagram 2]

We can combine these diagrams to illustrate a phase from the first quarter. Sensation is increasing in strength as the *Will* of the first quarter, while intuition is decreasing in strength as the *Creative Mind* in the fourth quarter, which accounts for the perceiving functions. Of the judging functions, thinking is increasing in
strength in the third quarter as the Mask, while feeling is decreasing in strength as the Body of Fate in the second quarter. The symmetrical movement of the two axes ensures that half of each contending pair of Faculties is always increasing in strength while the other half weakens:

This has a pronounced effect on the structural roles in the descriptions of the phases of each quarter; although the Will is in command from the beginning of each quarter, its competitor the Creative Mind exerts considerable influence through the first half of each quarter because its actual nature is technically stronger than that of the Will during the same period. A look at the last diagram given will confirm this; when the Will was back near Phase 1, it was at the beginning of the first quarter and so was not yet very strong, while the Creative Mind was near the end of the fourth quarter and so was close to maximum strength. Intuition was technically stronger than sensation at that point, even though sensation was in control of the quarter as the Will, so that the Creative Mind considerably influenced consciousness at that point, despite the precedence of the Will. Similarly, while the Body of Fate is stronger during the first half of a quarter, the Mask is stronger during the second half for the same reason. One could say that the Will/Mask axis overcomes the Creative
Mind/Body of Fate axis at the midpoint of each quarter, and this happens simply because the two axes rotate in opposite directions at the same rate.

This causes a change at the midpoint of each quarter: between Phases 4 and 5, 11 and 12, 18 and 19, and 25 and 26, where the lines marked "Fall," "Heart," "Head," and "Loins" are found on the Great Wheel (VA 13; VB 81). Harper's chronological account of the automatic script sessions shows Yeats struggling at first with the placement and significance of these divisions, which clearly were imposed on him by the automatic script (2:100-02); the fact that they were dictated by the automatic script is a convincing piece of evidence that George Yeats was as much a creator of the system as her husband was. When these lines are added to the last diagram given, it can represent the Faculties of Phase 5:

Sensation has just become stronger than intuition, and thinking has just become stronger than feeling; in terms of the structural roles, the Will has now subdued the Creative Mind, while the Mask has become more powerful than the Body of Fate. Yeats might say that the Will learns to consciously control the being during the course of a quarter, at first sharing this control in large measure with the Creative Mind. At the same time, the Body of Fate is more powerful than the Mask at first, which means that the aim of the being (its Will) is more likely to be
defeated by circumstances (the *Body of Fate*) during the first half of the quarter. Once past the midpoint of the quarter, the *Will* drives the *Creative Mind* into submission, while the *Mask* overshadows the *Body of Fate*; the result is that the being can achieve its aim more readily and triumph over circumstances more completely near the end of each quarter.

This change can also be expressed in terms of Jung's structural model as a preliminary to establishing the precise correspondence between Yeats's phases and Jung's types. The change between Phases 4 and 5 will continue to serve as our example; here sensation is the primary or principal conscious function, so its opponent intuition must be the inferior or fourth function. In Phase 4, feeling is stronger than thinking, so it is the auxiliary conscious or second function; thinking is the principal unconscious or third function. Between Phases 4 and 5, feeling and thinking exchange positions:

\[
\begin{array}{ll}
\text{Phase 4} & \text{Phase 5} \\
S & S \\
F & T \\
T & F \\
N & N
\end{array}
\]

This produces Jung's two sensation function-types: Phase 4 is sensation supported by feeling, and Phase 5 is sensation supported by thinking. As thinking becomes relatively stronger than feeling, it displaces feeling on the upper level and plays a greater role in consciousness than feeling does. The one drawback of the above diagrams is that in the first one intuition appears to play a less important role in Phase 4 than it actually does, but it is easy enough to simply remember that the inferior function is more active during the first half of a quarter than the diagram implies.

Yeats's structural model can be modified to agree with Jung's model if we first put the active pair of *Faculties* (the *Will* and *Creative Mind*) into the places of
the primary and inferior functions, and then allow the passive pair (the *Mask* and *Body of Fate*) to trade places as the second and third pair of functions:

\[
\begin{align*}
W & \rightarrow \ W \ BF \ W \ M \\
\rightarrow CM & \ M \ CM \ BF \ CM
\end{align*}
\]

These diagrams reflect the *Mask*'s displacement of the *Body of Fate* in the latter half of each quarter, as well as the subordination of the *Creative Mind* to the *Will* throughout each quarter; between the two of them they describe all twenty-eight phases in terms of their structural roles. I do not wish to give the impression that these diagrams are precisely equivalent to Jung's structural model, as Yeats does not divide his into conscious and unconscious roles in the same way that Jung does. But they do reflect a hierarchy of the structural roles that is similar to Jung's model—the *Creative Mind* or inferior function is most subordinate to the *Will*, while the second and third functions are interchangeable. And the overall closeness of this equivalence will be useful in recognizing Yeats and Jung's probable common sources.

These diagrams can be combined with those of their actual natures and Jungian functions to present a more complete picture of the two function-types of the first quarter. According to the Jungian diagram below, feeling should play a more prominent role in consciousness than thinking does in Phases 2 through 4, but thinking then becomes more prominent than feeling in Phases 5 through 7:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structural Roles</th>
<th>Actual Natures</th>
<th>Jungian Functions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phase 4 (2-4)</td>
<td>W BF</td>
<td>W M</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M CM</td>
<td>CM BF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 5 (5-7)</td>
<td>W M</td>
<td>W CM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BF CM</td>
<td>M BF</td>
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This is exactly what can be found encoded in the descriptions of the first quarter; when "in phase" (Yeats's term for psychological good health from following a
phase's proper orientation and true Will), thinking is quite eclipsed by feeling in Phases 2, 3, and 4. This feeling is manifested as the decision-making of Phase 2: "He would decide on this or that by no balance of the reason but by an infallible joy . . ." (VB 106); the "delight in all that passes" of Phase 3 (VB 108); and is clearest in Phase 4, where "nature still dominates his thought as passion" (VB 110)—a phrase that obviously encodes feeling's domination of thinking in these phases.

Thinking is prominent in the "out of phase" (psychologically imbalanced) condition of the first three phases, but unsuccessfully so; the being is attempting to emulate the third quarter (its opposite, and the Creative Mind quarter) by using thinking as its primary function, and fails at this task, as in Phase 3: "Out of phase and copying the opposite phase he gives himself up to a kind of clodhopper folly, that keeps his intellect moving among conventional ideas with a sort of make-believe" (VB 108). When in phase, thinking first emerges—though "nature still dominates his thought as passion"—during Phase 4, as "instinct grows reflective" (VB 110). It emerges a phase early because this is Yeats's practice throughout the cycle of phases; strengthening functions impinge on consciousness to foreshadow their coming dominance a phase before that dominance actually takes effect, which is one of the ways Yeats mitigates the impact of the mechanism of his system on the descriptions of the cycle.

"Reflection" or thinking is ascendant over feeling in Phase 5, because "Between Phase 4 and Phase 5 the tinctures ceased to be drowned in the One, and reflection begins" after what Yeats calls the "Closing of the Tinctures" between Phases 4 and 5 (VB 111). Here the closing of the tinctures marks the end of the virtually complete objectivity or selflessness ("drowning in the One") found around Phase 1, and one manifestation of the increasing subjectivity and
sense of self which follows is the rise of thinking or "reflection" into prominence. Thus, in Phase 5, "Abstraction has indeed begun . . ." (VB 112), and in Phase 6 we find Walt Whitman as an example of the phase: "all his thought and impulse a product of democratic bonhomie, of schools, of colleges, of public discussion. Abstraction had been born, but it remained the abstraction of a community, of a tradition" (VB 114), in which we should recognize something remarkably similar to Jung's extraverted thinking:

> Extraverted thinking, therefore, need not necessarily be purely concretistic thinking; it can just as well be purely ideal thinking, if for instance it can be shown that the ideas it operates with are largely borrowed from outside, i.e., have been transmitted by tradition and education. (CW 6: par. 577)

The first quarter is primary or extraverted in its overall orientation, so its thinking must tend to be extraverted; the "clodhopper folly" of Phase 3's out of phase condition is in fact a case of deleteriously extraverted thinking "that keeps his intellect moving among conventional ideas with a sort of make-believe" (VB 108). But by the latter three phases of the first quarter, thinking and subjectivity have both increased in strength enough to bring out the useful side of extraverted thinking: "Thomas Aquinas, whose historical epoch was nearly of this phase [6]. summed up in abstract categories all possible experience . . . Walt Whitman makes catalogues of all that has moved him, or amused his eye, that he may grow more poetical" (VB 114). The writers given as examples of Phases 6 (Whitman) and 7 (Dumas, Carlyle, James MacPherson) are evidence of the increased strength of thinking, as none were given for Phases 2 through 4.

At the same time, we can follow the influence of intuition as the inferior function, which appears both as the perception of the supersensual unity behind nature--"Unity with Nature" (VA 29)--and as codified morality. In Phases 2, 3, and 4 where intuition is strongest, what was a direct perception of divine unity in
the phases immediately before Phase 1 becomes a perception of natural unity and a literal "sinking into" or union with that unity itself after Phase 1. Phase 2 "gives himself up to Nature as the Fool (Phase 28) gave himself up to God" (VB 106). The "supersensual impulse" perceived in Phase 2 (VB 106) appears again in Phase 3, where "though the body is still in close contact with supersensual rhythm, it is no longer absorbed in that rhythm" as intuition fades in strength (VB 108). The "practical wisdom . . . founded upon concrete examples" of Phase 4 is the final intuitive expression of Unity with Nature: "It is as though he woke suddenly out of sleep and thereupon saw and remembered more than others" (VB 110). Sensation makes that wisdom practical, but intuition provides its "concrete examples." Yeats is again foreshadowing a change in dominant function here; that "waking out of sleep" suggest the waking out of intuitive unity with Nature achieved by Phase 5’s instinctive strength, with the "remembering" being intuitive recall of the knowledge of unity.

But that intuitive perception of Nature gives way to the superior strength of sensation and thinking in Phase 5:

He no longer touches, eats, drinks and feels Nature, but sees her as something from which he is separating himself, something that he may dominate, though only for a moment and by some fragmentary violence of sensation or of thought. Nature may seem half gone, but the laws of Nature have appeared and he can change her rhythms and her seasons by his knowledge. (VB 112-13; emphasis added)

Phase 5 dominates Nature through sensation and thinking; Nature "seems half gone" because the first quarter is half over. Abstract knowledge replaces intuitive understanding, and intuition, which as "morality" was able to keep "instinct" in check so long as it was stronger than sensation, gives way before sensation's superior strength through the end of the quarter, as in Phases 7 and 8:

At Phases 2, 3, and 4, the man moved within traditional or seasonal limits, but since Phase 5 limits have grown indefinite; public
codes, all that depend upon habit, are all but dissolved. . . . Every new modification or codification of morality has been its attempt, acting through the Creative Mind, to set order upon the instinctive and vegetative faculties, and it must now feel that it can create order no longer. (VB 115-17)

The moral nature of intuition (the Creative Mind of the first quarter) has combined with the habitual nature of simple instinct to create habitual or traditional moral codes, but as sensation drives out intuition during the latter half of the quarter, "impulse or instinct begins to be all in all" (VB 114). The complexity with which Yeats is thus able to configure basic contentions between psychological functions should be apparent from these examples, which are actually taken from the least complex quarter of A Vision's cycle.

Through the initial prominence of intuition and feeling and the subsequent dominance of sensation and thinking, Phases 2 through 7 are effectively divided into two sets of three phases, and the structure of the wheel ensures that the other three quarters also each fall into two sets of three phases. As we will see, each of the resulting eight sets corresponds to one of the eight Jungian function-types. Yeats has this to say about these divisions:

Excluding the phases of crisis (Phases 8, 22, 15, 1), each quarter consists of six phases, or of two sets of three. In every case the first phase of each set can be described as a manifestation of power, the second of a code or arrangement of powers, and the third of a belief, the belief being an appreciation of, or submission to some quality which becomes power in the next phase. The reason of this is that each set of three is itself a wheel, and has the same character as the Great Wheel. (VB 92-93)

The smaller wheels of the first quarter would look like this:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>15</th>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>22</th>
<th>Phase</th>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Phase</td>
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<td>Phase</td>
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<td>Phase</td>
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This minor cycle within each set of three gives each of the three phases which share the same Jungian function-type a distinct character of its own. Yeats
attributes this cycle to the Great Wheel, where the central "code or arrangement of powers" would be the phases of Unity of Being around Phase 15, with the rest of the cycle serving either as prologue or denouement to that antithetical peak.

Evidence of this micro-cycle can easily be found in the first quarter. The power of Phase 2 is that of instinct, in that "he would seem more entirely living than all other men, a personification or summing up of all natural life" (VB 106). Instinct is perfectly arranged in Phase 3: "Almost without intellect, it is a phase of perfect bodily sanity . . . one instinct balances another; every season brings its delight" (VB 108). As for the "belief" of the third phase in a set, "an appreciation of, or submission to some quality which becomes power in the next phase" is the foreshadowing or initial emergence of an expression of a function or orientation that will displace its opposite in the next group of phases. In Phase 4, "nature still dominates his thought as passion; yet instinct grows reflective" (VB 110) as thinking begins to emerge. Thinking then appears as literal power in Phase 5, where Nature has become "something that he may dominate, though only for a moment and by some fragmentary violence of sensation or of thought" (VB 112-13).

However, this power is more than merely the thinking function; it is the interaction of thinking and sensation (as in the quote above) creating what Yeats calls "experience": the shaping and organization of sensation's objective fact by the increasingly subjective power of thinking in these phases. To give the entire relevant passage,

Abstraction has indeed begun, but it comes to him as a portion of experience cut off from everything but itself and therefore fitted to be the object of reflection. He no longer touches, eats, drinks, thinks and feels Nature, but sees it as something from which he is separating himself, something that he may dominate, though only for a moment and by some fragmentary violence of sensation or of thought. (VB 112-13)
The "codification or arrangement of power" in Phase 6 is a literal arranging of experience into "catalogue and category"--Aquinas *summed up in abstract categories all possible experience,* while Whitman *makes catalogues of all that has moved him, or amused his eye* (VB 114). The emergent belief of Phase 7 is in "Individuality" (VB 114), individuality being the transitional state between the social conformity of primary "character" and the independence of the antithetical "personality" of the coming subjective half of the cycle:

Phase 7 when true to phase . . . is excited into forms of character so dissolved in Will, in instinct, that they are hardly distinguishable from personality. These forms of character, not being self-dependent like personality, are, however, inseparable from circumstance. . . . (VB 115)

This exemplifies the subtlety Yeats is capable of in his system: an underlying mechanical increase in the strength of sensation is expressed as an increase in the literal "will" of instinctive self-interest and self-assertion that moves Phase 7 to the brink of antithetical independence from society. Yeats calls the crisis of Phase 8 a "War between Individuality and Race" (VB 116), "race" being his term for collective (i.e., extraverted) instinct. Phase 8 is in fact a struggle to declare independence from society and move toward antithetical personality by throwing off extraversion, becoming introverted, and thus commencing the antithetical half of A Vision's cycle.

The first quarter thus provides relatively simple examples of the way Yeats weaves his text among the warp and woof of his mechanical system. Yeats attributes the forming of these triads of phases to the operation of lesser wheels within his Great Wheel, as discussed above; but the minor cycle seems to me to owe still more to the cardinal, fixed, and mutable cycle of signs in the astrological zodiac, which are meant to correspond to the course of each season of the year. The cardinal signs initiate each season; Aries, for example, begins the spring
season after the spring equinox in late March. The fixed signs then stabilize the
weather during the middle of each season; Taurus is the fixed sign of mid-spring
and extends from late April to late May. The mutable signs conclude each sea-
son, as the season's characteristic weather dissipates and the first signs of the
next season's weather begin to appear. Gemini is the mutable sign of spring and
extends into late June, as spring breaks up and begins to give way to the heat of
summer. Thus each season consists of a manifestation, a stable period, and a
period of dissolution which foreshadows the next season (Hand 197-98); and
Yeats seems to be using another cycle of nature to further refine his "circuits of
sun and moon" (VB 24).

At this point, readers may want to try reading the in-phase descriptions of
the first quarter's phases in order to follow for themselves the changes outlined
above. Both the function-types created by the structure of the wheel and the dis-
tinctions between phases within triads are easiest to follow in the relatively short
descriptions of the first quarter. And as the last three quarters follow the same
pattern of division into two sets of three, we can assign Jung's eight function-
types where they belong on the wheel:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>2-4</th>
<th>5-7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9-11</th>
<th>12-14</th>
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<tr>
<th>15</th>
<th>16-18</th>
<th>19-21</th>
<th>22</th>
<th>23-25</th>
<th>26-28</th>
<th>1</th>
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<td>T N</td>
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As well as aiding in the recognition of the mechanical structure which underlies
the phase descriptions when one is reading them, these function-types will be
decisive in identifying the theory of temperaments as Yeats and Jung's common
source. And having thus determined the hierarchy of functions within the phases,
we will be able to turn to the problem of their mental orientation or polarity.
The emergence of the Jungian types from A Vision's phases goes far to answer Hough's criticism (which was made before the publication of the automatic script transcripts) that the symmetrical movement of the Faculties around the wheel is meaningless:

What we have here is an elaborate ballet of the Faculties, one pair moving in one direction, the other in the opposite direction; and the individual members of each pair starting from opposite points. This has a symmetry of motion that I suppose gives a certain aesthetic satisfaction. But can anyone believe for a moment that this elaborate schematism has anything to do with the constitution of the human mind? The twenty-eight phases are a possible description of the types of human motivation, the four faculties a possible description of the forces at work within the psyche; and they seem to have been devised with some reference to experience. But the dance of the four faculties and the rules for their mutual relation is schematism for its own sake; it has no reference whatever to anything encountered in life or deducible from it. From the way this part of the doctrine is presented--dogmatic, unargued, unpersuasive--we might surmise that most of it came from the unknown instructors, and that Yeats simply took it as it came.

But we do not know about this; and we do not know because those who are in a position to know--i.e. those who have been allowed to inspect the original documents--conspicuously refrain from telling us. Yeat's own comments however reveal that there was certainly much working up of the original material. The point to note here is a teasing discrepancy between what looks like descriptive psychology and what looks like a priori system-building. Any formula for the dynamics of the psyche--Freud's Id, Ego and Super-ego, Jung's four faculties, the Platonic threelfold classification--must be more or less mythological; but most of them fulfil some evident analytical or moral purpose. Part of the Yeatsian scheme does so too; the subjective/objective antithesis, the one diminishing as the other increases, seems rationally satisfying and makes some sort of empirical sense. But the rest of the scheme--the sustained and rigorous opposition between Will and Mask, Creative Mind and Body of Fate, the counterclockwise movement of the first pair, the clockwise movement of the second--seems to fulfil only the demands of a geometrical pattern. And since the mysterious affinity of geometry with the motions of the human soul is no longer part of our intellectual experience, it runs the risk of looking ingenious but meaningless.

[sic] (106-07)

Being able to read A Vision at the sentence level can at least make this adherence to geometry seem more arbitrary than meaningless. If we grant Yeats
and Jung’s premise of an additional pair of mental antitheses--sensation/intuition and feeling/thinking--then we may also be able to view the interaction of the *Faculties* as "rationally satisfying" and "empirically sensible," rather than as simply mysterious; and we can increase our "aesthetic satisfaction" as well.

Their movements are meant to integrate the seesawing of relative strength within each pair of psychological functions into the central symbol of twenty-eight lunar phases, and though this symbol is indeed arbitrary in one sense, it is also beautiful and powerful. If we read with deepened comprehension and watch Yeats work to fit patterns of psychological development into an arbitrary structure, we may begin to perceive the essential rhythms that lead Harold Bloom to concede that *A Vision* "is, at the least, a beautiful book, a considerable if flawed major poem" (211). We might even think of Yeats tackling the demands of the geometry as he approached the challenges of metrical and stanzatic form; if *A Vision* is indeed a primer of "stylistic arrangements of experience comparable to the cubes in the drawing of Wyndham Lewis and the ovoids in the sculpture of Brancusi" (*VB* 25), then it would be precisely these mechanical requirements that provide structural form.

The question of what portion of the elaborated symbol is Yeats’s "working up of the original material" and what is George Yeats’s contribution through the automatic script can only be settled by a thorough comparison of both editions of *A Vision* with the draft materials and the whole of the automatic script, which is beyond the scope of this study. At this point, the next step in reading *A Vision* is to discern the pattern of changing orientation within the phases that satisfied Hough and integrate it with the changes in relative *Faculty* strength to arrive at the essential underlying skeleton of the cycle of phases before attempting a reading of Book I.
Chapter 4

The Completed System: Phase Orientation, the

*Daimon*, and the Out of Phase Condition

Although the function-types given at the end of the last chapter correspond well enough to *A Vision*’s phases to be useful frames of reference when reading the phases, the pattern of orientation of the functions in the phases differs significantly from that of Jung’s types, whose dominant function opposes the orientation of the three less conscious functions. While Jung divides his function-types into conscious and unconscious levels, *A Vision*’s function-types represent consciousness alone. Yeats believes that we are conscious of all four functions in varying degrees; his model of the mind is more complex than that of Jung, but is perhaps more fully developed and flexible.

In it, the active pair of structural roles (the *Will* and the *Creative Mind*) share the same orientation and determine the overall orientation of the phase. If the *Will* is on the *primary* half of the wheel, the phase is *primary*, and the *Creative Mind* will also be on the *primary* half of the wheel; in an *antithetical* phase, the *Will* and the *Creative Mind* will both be on the *antithetical* half of the wheel. It is helpful to recall the essential movement of each half of the Great Wheel here; the *antithetical* half of the cycle moves inward to the subjective image at Phase 15 and back outward again, while the *primary* moves outward to the world at Phase 1 and back inward again. This process actually involves the convergence of the active *Will* and *Creative Mind* at Phase 1 during the *primary* half of the cycle and Phase 15 during the cycle’s *antithetical* half, the phases which Yeats considered supernatural states outside of human existence because of the purity of their mental orientation. The diagram below shows the *Faculties* approaching these respective peaks:
The active pair of *Faculties* becomes increasingly extraverted or introverted as they move toward Phase 1 or Phase 15, and less so after they pass each other, a process which Yeats explains in terms of the gyres (VB 75-77):

The gyres clarify the process—the proportion of the opposing *tincture* dwindles in the active *Faculties*, which means that the orientation becomes completely extraverted or introverted. A general rule can be drawn from this: in primary phases sensation and intuition are always clearly extraverted, while in antithetical phases feeling and thinking are always clearly introverted.

It is tempting to assume that this rule must hold true for all the phases, because the gyres imply that the passive pair of *Faculties* (the *Mask* and the *Body of Fate*) oppose the orientation of the active pair, so that a primary *Will* and *Creative Mind* must be opposed by an antithetical *Mask* and *Body of Fate*. But the complexity of Yeats’s model makes this assumption inaccurate, and the reasons for this have to do with the roles of the *Principles* and the *Daimon*. 
The similarity of the Principles to the Faculties has led some critics to dismiss them as superfluous; Vendler says that they are "irritatingly similar to the Four Faculties [sic]" (26), while Hough sees them as "mere doublets, mistaken or alternative reformulations of the Faculties [sic]" (110). Yet this very similarity is the key to the probable role of the Principles. Each Principle corresponds to one of the Faculties (and thus to one of the elements), and is described in similar terms: the Husk is "sensuous and instinctive" like the Will (VA 160), and so forth. This similarity stems from the shared function of each Faculty/Principle pair; the Celestial Body, for example, is "the portion of Eternal Life which can be separated away" (VA 160), and thus is responsible for the religious intuition of the Body of Fate.

My belief is that the difference between the Principles and the Faculties is that each Principle consists of the combined range of orientation of the corresponding Faculty. The Husk, for example, would combine both introverted and extraverted sensation; the Passionate Body would combine introverted and extraverted feeling, and so forth. Now, each Jungian function can be thought of as possessing both ranges of orientation when we consider the function as a hypothetical whole, but Jung says quite specifically that our consciousness of a function must be either introverted or extraverted—it can never be both at once. Either the external object or the subjective image must be more important to consciousness, and yet the two ranges are contiguous, as we saw in the case of the introverted functions; they begin with some external object and move inward toward the subjective image.

This implies that although the entire range of each function is available to the mind as a whole, we can only be conscious of one-half of that potential range at once. When sensation is extraverted, we perceive external conditions but are
unaware of the subjective images associated with those surroundings; when sensation is introverted, we perceive those images but are unconscious of external conditions. Our consciousness of a function is necessarily limited to half of that function's potential range because consciousness must be turned either inward or outward.

The Faculties must bear the same relation to the Principles that consciousness of a function bears to the potential range of that function in Jung's system. In a phase, a Faculty must be either primary or antithetical, and thus possesses only half the range of its corresponding Principle. This would explain the statement Yeats makes at the opening of Book II of VB:

The Faculties are man's voluntary and acquired powers and their objects; the Principles are the innate ground of the Faculties, and must act upon one another in the same way, though my instructors, to avoid confusion, have given them a different geometry. The whole system is founded on the belief that the ultimate reality, symbolised as the Sphere, falls in human consciousness, as Nicholas of Cusa was the first to demonstrate, into a series of antinomies. (187)

Jung says that "we speak of the 'consciousness' of a function only when its use is under the control of the will" (CW 6: par. 667), so as "voluntary and acquired powers" the Faculties represent the conscious half of the potential range found in their "innate ground," the Principles. The "ultimate reality" experienced by the Principles "falls in human consciousness" into the "antinomies" of the Faculties, which experience either primary or antithetical orientation.

Yeats says that the Principles transcend human consciousness in several different passages in VB:

The wheel or cone of the Faculties may be considered to complete its movement between birth and death, that of the Principles to include the period between lives as well. (188)

I shall write little of the Principles except when writing of the life after death. They inform the Faculties and it is the Faculties alone that are apparent and conscious in human history. Vico said that we
know history because we create it, but as nature was created by God only God can know it. (207)

I only speak of the Thirteenth Cone as a sphere and yet I might say that the gyre or cone of the Principles is in reality a sphere, though to Man, bound to birth and death, it can never seem so, and that it is the antinomies that force us to find it a cone. (240)

The Principles are transcendent not because they are "higher" in the sense of a division between material and spiritual as McDowell claims (222-26), but because they are simply more inclusive and completely conscious than the human mind can usually be in life. They are beyond the physical only in that they transcend the division between primary and antithetical orientation which is part of physical life. Resolving the primary/antithetical antinomy makes them a perfect sphere instead of a cone; they include both life and the period between lives, while the Faculties are limited to life alone; and it is only the Faculties, with their halves of the range of orientation, that are "conscious in human history" and in the mind. Thus the Principles represent transcendent experience within the system of A Vision.

This view is supported by the diagram of Plotinus' "Authentic Existants" provided by Yeats (VB 194); it is the Husk as physical body which produces the separated primary and antithetical tinctures of incarnate life, and all the Principles must be separated into the two tinctures through the agency of the Husk. But a question arises concerning the limited range of orientation of the Faculties and functions during life; if sensation, for example, is extraverted in a given phase, what happens to sensation's introverted range? Where does it go? The answer must be that if our consciousness of a function is extraverted, its introverted range is part of the unconscious and is still present in that portion of the mind.

The diagrams of gyres in A Vision confirm that both tinctures or orientations are always part of the mind no matter what the orientation of a given Faculty
is, and Yeats's remark that the gyres represent "Man and Daimon" (VA 131) hints at the nature of the unconscious and its orientation in A Vision. The Daimon of VA is actually the unconscious, according to Hough:

The Daimon is here referred to as 'she', being always of the opposite sex to man. She is fact the Jungian Anima—a contra-sexual image, the interpreter and representative of the unconscious as a whole, always opposite to the Will or consciousness of man; a main agent in what Jung calls the integration of the personality, and Yeats calls Unity of Being. (sic) (112)

As the unconscious, the Daimon must contain the range of orientation not possessed by the Four Faculties:

The Daimon carries on her conflict, or friendship with a man, not only through the events of life, but in the mind itself, for she is in possession of the entire dark of the mind. . . . When man is in his most antithetical phases the Daimon is most primary . . . but in man's most primary phases the Daimon is at her most antithetical. (VA 28-29)

When consciousness is primary or extraverted, the Daimon or unconscious must be antithetical or introverted, and vice versa.

However, the Daimon of VB is a somewhat different concept; Hough says that it stands for "the new totality that is created by the union of the opposites—what Jung calls the Self, the man re-centered and transformed" (112). In this guise it appears as the "ultimate self" of incarnate man (VB 83), and seems to possess the Principles and not just the unconscious range of the Faculties as in VA:

The ultimate reality because neither one nor many, concord nor discord, is symbolised as a phaseless sphere, but as all things fall into a series of antinomies in human experience it becomes, the moment it is thought of, what I shall presently describe as the thirteenth cone. All things are present as an eternal instant to our Daimon (or Ghostly Self as it is called, when it inhabits the sphere), but that instant is of necessity unintelligible to all bound to the anti-nomies. (VB 193)

The Daimon's possession of the Principles (VB 189-95) allows it to inhabit the "thirteenth cone" or "sphere" where all the antinomies are resolved, and the
Faculties of living man are only a portion of its range, "being the result of the four memories of the Daimon or ultimate self of that man" (VB 83).

Yet despite these differences the two versions of the Daimon can be reconciled well enough if we take into account the increased emphasis on the Principles in VB. We might say that the Daimon first appears to the conscious mind as the unconscious, and then after becoming linked to the conscious mind represents the Self and the Principles. As Yeats says in "Under Ben Bulben," man "completes his partial mind" when in contact with the Daimon (Variorum Poems 638), and briefly gains the transcendant perspective of the Principles—but only through the agency of the Daimon or unconscious. One must confront the Daimon-as-unconscious in order to reach the Daimon-as-Self, but the increased emphasis on the Principles in VB obscures the role of the Daimon-as-unconscious there, though Unity of Being as the "expression of Daimonic thought" (VB 141) remains much the same.

It is the relationship of the Mask and the Body of Fate as structural roles to the Daimon-as-unconscious which accounts for the Daimon's continued influence on the unconscious in VB, though this relationship is explained only in VA:

The Will and the Creative Mind are in the light, but the Body of Fate working through accident, in dark, while Mask, or Image, is a form selected instinctively for those emotional associations which come out of the dark, and this form is itself set before us by accident, or swims up from the dark portion of the mind. But there is another mind, or another part of our own mind in this darkness, that is yet to its own perceptions in the light; and we in our turn are dark to that mind. These two minds (one always light and one always dark, when considered by one mind alone), make up man and Daimon, the Will of the man being the Mask of the Daimon, the Creative Mind of the man being the Body of Fate of the Daimon and so on. The Wheel is in this way reversed. (VA 26-27)

As structural roles, the active Will and Creative Mind are "in the light" of consciousness, while the passive Mask and Body of Fate are unconscious
because they are in "the dark portion of the mind" and are experienced as "accident," which should recall Jung's statement about the unconscious: "the less differentiated functions fall into the category of things that simply 'happen' to one" (CW 6: par. 575). In *A Vision*, unconscious drives are projected onto our surroundings as "fate," and events caused by unconscious drives are considered "fateful" accidents, while unconscious desires may be projected onto the Images of desire "accidentally set before us" by our surroundings.

The above passage suggests another structural model of the mind for *A Vision*:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>W</th>
<th>CM</th>
<th>Conscious Level</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>BF</td>
<td>Unconscious Level</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Down in the unconscious level, the *Daimon* is present as an independent mind or a potentially equal part of our own mind in *VA*. As man's *Mask* and *Body of Fate* are the *Daimon's Will* and *Creative Mind*, the *Daimon's* structural roles reverse those of man:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Man</th>
<th>Daimon</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conscious W CM</td>
<td>Unconscious M BF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unconscious M BF</td>
<td>Conscious W CM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Through the *Mask* and the *Body of Fate*, the *Daimon*-as-unconscious influences man not only through accidental events, but within the mind as well:

The *Daimon* carries on her conflict, or friendship with a man, not only through the events of life, but in the mind itself, for she is in possession of the entire dark of the mind. The things we dream, or that come suddenly into our heads, are therefore her *Creative Mind* (our *Creative Mind* is her *Body of Fate*) through which her energy, or bias, finds expression; one can therefore, if one will, think of man as *Will* and *Creative Mind* alone, perpetually face to face with another being who is also but *Will* and *Creative Mind*, though these appear to man as the object of desire, or beauty, and fate in all its forms. If man seeks to live wholly in the light, the *Daimon* will seek to quench that light in what is to man wholly darkness, and there is conflict and *Mask* and *Body of Fate* become evil; when however in *antithetical* man the *Daimonic* mind is permitted to flow through the events of his
life (the Daimonic Creative Mind) and so to animate his Creative Mind, without putting out its light, there is Unity of Being. (VA 28)

As in Jung, the attempt to wholly repress the unconscious results in the irruption of unconscious contents into consciousness. Within the mind, the unconscious makes itself known through the emotional images of dreams from man's Mask—remember that Yeats assigns Mask or emotion the greatest "image-making power" (VB 93)—or through intuitions which "come suddenly into our heads" from man's Body of Fate. Thus Yeats can claim that "In dreams begins responsibility" (Variorum Poems 269)—in one sense, the responsibility of dealing with the unconscious in order to become a fully integrated being.

The unconscious can also be "permitted to flow through the events of life," so that we encounter it in those accidents triggered by our own unconscious drives. Such tragic events represent a chance to face and incorporate the unconscious, and this may be an important reason why Yeats says that "We begin to live when we have conceived life as tragedy" (Autobiographies 234), because tragedy forces us to confront the unconscious portion of ourselves and live more completely.

And if the dream images and intuitions which enter the mind unbidden include the "completely organised . . . unique" artistic images discussed in relation to the Mask Faculty in Chapter 2 of this dissertation (Autobiographies 410), then the concept of Unity of Being clearly means a union of the conscious and unconscious minds through art or action or both. It is the struggle with events which "exhausts personal emotion in action or desire so completely" (Autobiographies 410) that the mind becomes receptive to the subjective images from which art and heroism come:

A man becomes passionate and this passion makes the Daimonic thought luminous with its peculiar light—this is the object of the Daimon—and she so creates a very personal form of heroism or of
poetry. . . . He who attains Unity of Being is some man, who, while struggling with his fate and his destiny until every energy of his being has been roused, is content that he should so struggle with no final conquest. For him fate and freedom are not to be distinguished; he is no longer bitter, he may even love tragedy like those "who love the gods and withstand them"; such men are able to bring all that happens, as well as all that they desire, into an emotional or intellectual synthesis. . . . (VA 28-29)

Here "an emotional or intellectual synthesis" points to the operation of introverted feeling and thinking in the antithetical half of the cycle. And "his fate" and "all that happens" refer to the Body of Fate, while "his destiny" and "all that they desire" refer to the Mask, so that this struggle is clearly one of bringing the unconscious into "an emotional or intellectual synthesis" with consciousness for a moment in a work of imaginative art or a heroic action. Such unions of the conscious and unconscious are fleeting rather than permanent--there is "no final conquest"--but those who possess Unity of Being accept the ongoing struggle.

So the Mask and the Body of Fate represent the unconscious and are central to the "expression of Daimonic thought" in both VA and VB. As we noted earlier, their orientation is supposed to oppose that of the Will and the Creative Mind, which would make Yeats's model resemble that of Jung: the orientation of consciousness would oppose that of the unconscious. But this leads to the false assumption mentioned earlier--that sensation and intuition must be extraverted and thinking and feeling introverted in all phases. In reading the phase descriptions, it transpires that this is simply not the case.

What happens is that sensation and intuition clearly become introverted near the antithetical peak of Phase 15, and thinking and feeling become extraverted near the primary peak of Phase 1, which is precisely the opposite of what the gyres imply. This contradiction in orientation is yet another process like the interchange of the Faculties and the changes in their relative strength; all
three are processes which Yeats uses in the phase descriptions without quite explaining them in his explanatory sections. Yet it may be possible to extract a rationale for this problem of orientation out of what Yeats does say about it, just as was possible with the interchange and relative strength of the Faculties.

Because the Mask and the Body of Fate are the passive pair of structural roles and are placed in the unconscious, within the mind we experience them indirectly most of the time through the active Will and Creative Mind, and thus our consciousness of the Mask and the Body of Fate takes on the orientation of the Will and the Creative Mind to some extent. This is another reason why Yeats calls the Mask and the Body of Fate the "objects" of the Will and the Creative Mind respectively; we are used to thinking of them as external objects of desire and analysis, but as unconscious Faculties they function as internal objects of consciousness within the mind as well. However, throughout the descriptions of the phases the Mask and the Body of Fate are given their own functions—a "sensuous" Mask, an "intellectual" Body of Fate, etc.—which means that they themselves are conscious in some way and are not known only through the agency of the Will and the Creative Mind.

If the orientation of the passive Faculties is influenced in part by the orientation of the active pair, this influence is further modified by the proportions of the primary and antithetical indicated by the gyres. The gyres indicate that consciousness (as the Will and the Creative Mind) is entirely introverted only at the antithetical peak of Phase 15 and wholly extraverted only at the primary peak of Phase 1. In all other phases, some influence or "contamination" (VB 75) of the opposing orientation is part of consciousness; antithetical phases (except for Phase 15) are aware of the world in varying degrees, and primary ones (except for Phase 1) have some degree of subjectivity or consciousness of self. On the
gyres, this is symbolized by the movement of the *Will/Creative Mind* line along the small end of the opposing gyre, which indicates the diminishing degree of influence the opposing orientation has upon consciousness (e.g., the small portion of the dark *primary* cone on VB 75-76).

However, this influence is negligible during the two unities which surround Phases 15 and 1. During Unity of Being in Phases 12 to 18, all functions are effectively introverted because the *primary* influence on consciousness is relatively small, while Unity with God or Nature in Phases 26 through 4 makes all four functions extraverted because the *antithetical* proportion is relatively small. But in the remaining phases the descriptions of the phases show a mixture of introversion and extraversion. The *primary* Phases 5 to 7 and 23 to 25 show some introverted influence, while the *antithetical* Phases 9 to 11 and 19 to 21 display a degree of extraversion. This trend makes for a symmetrical pattern of orientation in the two halves of the cycle, which can be seen in the diagram below. The central phases are either extremely introverted (12 to 18) or extraverted (26 to 4), while the outlying or transitional phases (5 to 11 and 19 to 25) mix introversion and extraversion as the cycle goes from *primary* to *antithetical* and back again:

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<tr>
<th>8</th>
<th>9-11</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>mixed extraversion</td>
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<tr>
<th>12-18</th>
<th>15</th>
<th>16-18</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>pure introversion</td>
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<tr>
<th>19-21</th>
<th>22</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>mixed introversion</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>22</th>
<th>23-25</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>mixed extraversion</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>26-28</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2-4</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>pure extraversion</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5-7</th>
<th>8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>mixed extraversion</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

What is not immediately apparent is that the relative strength of the four functions follows a corresponding pattern: intuition and feeling are at their strongest in the central phases of unity (12 to 18 and 26 to 4), while sensation and thinking are strongest in the transitional phases (5 to 11 and 19 to 25). The two halves of the
cycle are thus divided into distinct sections by the pattern of orientation and relative strength of the Faculties.

Yeats was aware of these divisions and gave specific names to some of them; we have already touched upon Unity with God, Unity with Nature, and Unity of Being. It is important to understand that these unities are created by two factors: the domination of consciousness by one orientation or tincture, and the strength of feeling and intuition. As the Principles "find their unity in the Celestial Body," which corresponds to intuition, and the "Faculties find theirs in the Mask" (VB 188), which corresponds to feeling, the strength of these functions is of central importance for such unity. And as structural roles, the Mask and the Body of Fate represent the unconscious (or Daimon) in the process of achieving inner unity; thus their corresponding functions of feeling and intuition are strongest in the phases where unity is possible.

Yeats gives useful names to the divisions of the primary half of the cycle: the primary phases of unity (26 to 4) he terms "spiritual objectivity," while "the three first and three last phases are physical objectivity," which covers Phases 23 to 25 and 5 to 7 (VB 89). Following Busted and Wergin (25-29), these terms can be adapted to cover the antithetical half as well:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>8</th>
<th>9-11</th>
<th>12-14</th>
<th>15</th>
<th>16-18</th>
<th>19-21</th>
<th>22</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Physical Subjectivity</td>
<td></td>
<td>Spiritual Subjectivity (Open Tinctures)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Physical Subjectivity</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Opening</td>
<td></td>
<td>Unity with</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Closing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>23-25</td>
<td>God</td>
<td>26-28</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2-4</td>
<td>5-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Objectivity</td>
<td></td>
<td>Spiritual Objectivity (Open Tinctures)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Physical Objectivity</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Yeats may have been leery of using "spiritual" to qualify subjectivity, but the term is meant to denote awareness of antithetical "divinity"--the religion of art and
heroism based on the timeless subjective images. Busteed and Wergin point out that the open *tinctures* are a correlative of the periods when the moon lightens or darkens most quickly during its monthly cycle, which happen around the full and new moon respectively (25-26); but apart from their logical extension of the terms to the subjective half of the cycle, virtually everything they say about these divisions is inaccurate or misinterpreted.

The above divisions also reflect the fact that

One may regard the subjective phases as forming a separate wheel, its Phase 8 between Phases 11 and 12 of larger wheel, its Phase 22 between Phases 19 and 20; the objective phases as another separate wheel, its Phase 8 between Phases 25 and 26, its Phase 22 between Phases 4 and 5. (VB 88-89)

This is far clearer if depicted in diagrams, with one modification to the "subjective wheel". The phases of crisis of the "wheels" mark the major changes in each half of the cycle, and these divisions again correlate exactly with the changes in orientation and *Faculty* strength:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subjective Wheel</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>15</th>
<th>22</th>
<th>1</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9-11</td>
<td>12-14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16-18</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective Wheel</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>15</th>
<th>22</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>23-25</td>
<td>26-28</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2-4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The one modification is that Phase 22 of the subjective wheel probably belongs between Phases 18 and 19, rather than 19 and 20, where Yeats puts it in the above passage.

This inconsistency must be related to a mistake found in *VA* and *VB*: he says in *VB* that the *primary tincture* opens or closes only in even-numbered phases, while the *antithetical tincture* does so only during odd-numbered ones (VB 88); yet in both editions the description of Phase 18 begins, "The *antithetical tincture* closes during this phase . . ." (VA 79; VB 145), while in Phase 19 "The *primary tincture* is closing . . ." (VA 82; VB 148), which is precisely the reverse of
what they should say if they are to follow VB 88: "At Phase 18 the primary tincture closes once more, and at Phase 19 the antithetical." This single instance of confusion about the closing of the tinctures and the divisions of the antithetical cycle suggests that Yeats himself could succumb to the mechanical intricacies of his own system, especially when extracting it from the automatic script. Harper has remarked the fact that though the automatic script extends Unity of Being through Phase 19, Yeats limited it to Phase 18 during the phase descriptions in A Vision, which is a move toward the symmetry of the above diagrams (2:115-16). An important point Harper notes here is that this move maroons Phase 19's examples—in VB, Byron and Oscar Wilde—outside the period of Unity of Being (2:116), which is a significant reassessment of them by Yeats’s standards.

Some generalizations can be made about the divisions of the cycle delineated above. The relative strength of the Faculties or functions emphasizes certain activities in each section of the cycle; during physical objectivity and subjectivity, the strength of thinking and sensation results in an emphasis on intellectual systems and practical concerns, while the strength of feeling and intuition during spiritual objectivity and subjectivity emphasizes emotion and internal or external unity. As sensation and thinking correspond to the active Will and Creative Mind, physical objectivity and subjectivity are concerned with activity and effectiveness in the external world; whether primary or antithetical, these phases can greatly affect or change their surroundings.

The counterparts of the passive Mask and Body of Fate—feeling and intuition—are strongest during spiritual objectivity and subjectivity, and the result is not so much passivity as a withdrawal from purposeful activity in the external world. During spiritual subjectivity, there is a withdrawal into the contemplative reverie of the antithetical artist; people of these phases may be capable of per-
sonal heroism, but are usually too preoccupied with subjective images to greatly affect their surroundings. Yeats applies the term "passivity" to spiritual objectivity in his diagrams of the Great Wheel (VA 13, VB 81), because the virtually complete lack of a sense of self in these phases renders them incapable of ambitiously affecting the external world.

We could say that physical objectivity and subjectivity are concerned with action, whether for the sake of society (primary phases) or the individual (antithetical phases), while spiritual objectivity and subjectivity involve receptivity, whether to the external world and God (primary phases) or the subjective image (antithetical phases). The open tinctures of spiritual objectivity and subjectivity make possible the direct experience of the outer or inner worlds through intuition and feeling; "observation gives place to experience" (VA 60) when consciousness becomes almost completely extraverted or introverted and the mind is entirely focused on the external world or the subjective image.

At this point, the general character of the four quarters and the further subdivisions of the cycle should be clear, but the transitional phases of crisis remain to be examined. As we have seen, there are two configurations of functions within each quarter; the phases of crisis are best understood as periods of transition between the last configuration of the previous quarter and the first configuration of the next quarter. Phase 8 can serve as our example of the process:

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phases 5-7</th>
<th>Phase 8</th>
<th>Phases 9-11</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S T</td>
<td>F S</td>
<td>N T</td>
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The actual process of transition can be depicted in terms of the Great Wheel. It is the movement of the Faculties as structural roles across the clearly defined boundaries of the quarters of the wheel which creates the change. The phases of crisis straddle those boundaries, so that the first half of each phase of crisis
belongs to the function of the previous quarter and the second half belongs to the function of the next quarter, with an abrupt division in between. The Will of Phase 8 thus begins the phase in the Will quarter and ends it in the Mask quarter, going from sensation to feeling, while the Body of Fate begins the phase in the Mask quarter and ends it in the Will quarter, going from feeling to sensation; we can think of them as moving around the wheel during the phase itself:

Because they are moving in opposite directions, the Will and the Body of Fate contact each other, merge, overlap precisely for a brief period, and then draw apart once again as they move past each other. That brief central period of precise overlap creates a point of balance within the lifetime of the individual of Phase 8; it is a point of balance because the Mask and the Creative Mind have also come to the point of precise overlap on the opposite side of the wheel, so that all four structural roles are balanced across the wheel precisely on the vertical axis of the four quarters.

Up to this point, the individual of Phase 8 had the same configuration of functions as Phase 7, and after this point will have the same configuration as Phase 9; but at the point of balance, "He is suspended, he is without bias . . ." (VB 118). A conscious effort of the will is required to tip this balance, because
the movement of the system will not push one through this point--the choice to push through must be made by the individual. And because the cycle is going from *primary* to *antithetical* at this point, the choice is exceedingly difficult; the previous configuration has been exhausted of its possibilities, and the previous *primary* mode of living must be abandoned:

Only a shock resulting from the greatest possible conflict can make the greatest possible change, that from *primary* to *antithetical* or from *antithetical* to *primary* again. Nor can anything intervene. He must be aware of nothing but the conflict, his despair is necessary, he is of all men the most tempted--"Eloi, Eloi, why hast thou forsaken me?" (VB 119)

Yet once "bias comes" and the individual "has begun groping for strength within his own being" (VB 119), the cycle begins to move again and the individual adopts the configuration of functions found in Phases 9 through 11.

Yeats is more explicit about this process of exhausting the potential of the previous configuration, reaching the point of balance, and moving into the next configuration through an act of will when he describes Phase 22:

The aim of the being, until the point of balance has been reached, will be that of Phase 21 except that synthesis will be more complete. . . but the character of the phase is precisely that here balance is reached and passed, though it is stated that the individual may have to return to this phase more than once, though not more than four times, before it is passed. (VB 157-58)

Again Yeats stresses the role of the individual in choosing to change at the point of balance; the incarnation must be repeated if that choice is not made.

Within the transitional process, the relative strength of the *Faculties* plays an important role. Sensation reaches its peak in Phase 8, and as instinct it drives the being to excess in order to create the conflict which brings about the change in the *Will*. At the same time, intuition reaches its weakest level as the *Creative Mind* (from Phase 22), so that sensation seems to literally drive out intuition in the course of Phase 8. As "morality," intuition has checked the strength of sensation
as "instinct," but has given way steadily through the first quarter; in Phase 8 the
strength of instinct overcomes morality as sensation peaks:

The struggle of idealised or habitual theologised thought with instinct, mind with body, of the waning primary with the growing antithetical, must be decided, and the vegetative and sensitive faculties must for a while take the sway.... Every new modification or codification of morality has been its attempt, acting through the Creative Mind, to set order upon the instinctive and vegetative faculties, and it must now feel that it can create order no longer. (VB 117)

Sensation then runs amok as sensuality: "Here for the most part are those obscure wastrels who seem powerless to free themselves from some sensual temptation--drink, women, drugs--and who cannot in a life of continual crisis create any lasting thing" (VB 118). In Jungian terms, the inferior function (extraverted intuition) is completely eclipsed by the dominant function (extraverted sensation), which burns itself out in the process. But Yeats recasts the mechanics of his system as a drama of human conflict, as he does throughout A Vision.

Primary conformity reaches the end of its usefulness in this phase, as "the collapse of all those public thoughts and habits that are the support of primary man" (VB 118) forces the individual toward antithetical independence of society. Yeats describes the point of balance in terms of the opposition of the structural roles on the wheel: "The union of Creative Mind and Mask in opposition to Body of Fate and Will, intensifies this struggle by dividing the nature into halves which have no interchange of qualities. The man is inseparable from his fate, he cannot see himself apart, nor can he distinguish between emotion and intellect" (VB 118). The "man and his fate" are the merged Will and Body of Fate, while "emotion and intellect" are the merged Mask and Creative Mind. A person at Phase 8 needs to develop truly antithetical feeling and thought (with their subjective imagery), but is thwarted by the location of the corresponding structural roles (the
Mask and the Creative Mind) at the utterly rational and realistic Phase 22: "He is will-less, dragged hither and thither, and his unemotionalised intellect, gathered up into the mathematical Phase 22, shows perpetually for object of desire, an emotion [a Mask] that is like a mechanical energy, a thought [a Creative Mind] that is like wheel and piston" (VB 118). Here only a knowledge of the system can tell us that "emotion" and "thought" refer to structural roles and not actual natures; reading the phases does require one to be able to make these distinctions when Yeats is using them.

Feeling has actually been the Body of Fate during the first quarter, and has been stimulating the individual into the individuality which precedes antithetical personality: "So long as the primary tincture predominated, the antithetical tincture accepted its manner of perception; character and individuality were enlarged by those vegetative and sensitive faculties excited by the Body of Fate, the nearest a primary nature can come to antithetical emotion" (VB 117). Individuality increases as feeling becomes more introverted or antithetical during the latter half of the first quarter, and this development is aided by the emergence of subjective or introverted thinking at the same time. But because introverted thinking and feeling occupy the passive structural roles of the Mask and the Body of Fate, they cannot actively propel the individual into antithetical life; for that, a change of the Will is required, because "until bias comes, till he has begun groping for strength within his own being, his thought and his emotion bring him to judgment but they cannot help" (VB 118-19).

Thinking and feeling thus bring the individual to the brink of change; one must then transform the instinctive Will into the emotional Will by reaching not for primary strength outside oneself, but for antithetical strength within oneself:

The being clings like a drowning man to every straw, and it is precisely this clinging, this seemingly vain reaching forth for strength,
amidst the collapse of all those public thoughts and habits that are
the support of primary man, that enables it to enter at last upon
Phase 9. It has to find its strength by a transformation of that very
instinct which has hitherto been its weakness and so to gather up the
strewn and broken members. (VB 118)

By finally "groping for strength within his own being," the individual "chooses him-
self and not his Fate," abandoning the primary Mask provided by society (VB
119). This is done with the aid of "courage and diversity" from the life experience
of Phase 22:

Courage is his true Mask, and diversity, that has no habitual pur-
pose, his true Creative Mind, because these are all that the phase of
the greatest possible weakness can take into itself from the phase of
the greatest possible strength. When his fingers close upon a straw,
that is courage, and his versatility is that any wave may float a straw.
(VB 119)

Antithetical emotion takes over the Will as the courage needed for antithetical
independence, while diversity marks the beginning of truly antithetical thinking,
which rejects the conformist primary habits of thought of the first quarter.

When feeling and thinking achieve this independence, they become the
active Faculties (the Will and the Creative Mind), and the being becomes
antithetical. This process nearly occurred in the individuality of Phase 7, but the
primary active Faculties do not weaken enough to allow the change until Phase
8, where the dwindling of intuition (as morality) and the peaking and exhaustion
of sensation (as sensuality) force the individual to choose between primary and
antithetical life:

At Phase 7, he had tried out of ambition to change his nature, as
though a man should make love who had no heart, but now shock
can give him back his heart. Only a shock resulting from the
greatest possible conflict can make the greatest possible change,
that from primary to antithetical [at Phase 8] or from antithetical to
primary [at Phase 22] again. (VB 119)

His choice "gives him back the heart" needed for the antithetical emotion of the
Mask quarter.
I have given a fairly close reading of Phase 8 to demonstrate that virtually every sentence in the description of a phase can be understood when read with a knowledge of the underlying system, but the process of transition at Phases 8 and 22 can be reduced to this: the dominant function reaches the peak of its strength and burns out, while the inferior function dwindles and effectively disappears, at which point the primary unconscious function takes over as the new dominant function. The process is traumatic because it involves crossing from the primary to the antithetical side of the Wheel (or from extraversion to introversion) or vice versa, which changes their fundamental identity in relation to society.

That is not the case at Phases 15 and 1; there the overall orientation does not change, and while the dominant function still peaks and begins to weaken, it is replaced by the inferior function in a relatively easy process which is symbolized by the merging of the active Will and Creative Mind on the same side of the Wheel. At Phase 15, introverted feeling easily gives place to introverted thinking through the medium of their common focus, the subjective or archetypal image, as shown in the diagram below:

At Phase 15, introverted feeling easily gives place to introverted thinking through the medium of their common focus, the subjective or archetypal image; at Phase 1, extraverted intuition gives way to extraverted sensation through their
common focus on the external world. Both of these phases are characterized by balance rather than conflict; through unity with the subjective image or unity with the external world and God, the individual experiences a brief moment of relative peace in an existence outside the cycle of human incarnation. The transition is further eased by the auxiliary conscious function, whose actual nature remains the same throughout, though it takes the structural role of the Mask before the change and the Body of Fate afterwards.

An overview of the complete cycle is now possible; the table below details the structural changes within the cycle and briefly describes the changes in *Faculty* strength, with an example from each triad:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Structural Roles</th>
<th>Phase Numbers</th>
<th>Actual Natures</th>
<th>Jungian Functions</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>W M</td>
<td>1 15</td>
<td>BF M</td>
<td>N F</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BF CM</td>
<td>15 1</td>
<td>CM W</td>
<td>T S</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>W BF</td>
<td>1 15</td>
<td>W M</td>
<td>S F</td>
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<tr>
<td>M CM</td>
<td>15 1</td>
<td>CM BF</td>
<td>T N</td>
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Complete spiritual objectivity; Unity with God/Nature; intuition peaks and is replaced by sensation through unity with the external world; feeling over thinking

| 2-4   | W BF             | 2 14          | W M            | S F              |
| (2)   | M CM             | 16 28         | CM BF          | T N              |

Spiritual objectivity; Unity with Nature; feeling (14-12) over thinking (16-18); intuition still strong

| 5-7   | W M             | 5 19          | W CM           | S T              |
| (5)   | BF CM           | 11 25         | M BF           | F N              |

Physical objectivity; *tinctures* closed; thinking (19-21) dominates feeling (11-9); intuition dwindles (25-23)

| 8     | W M             | 8 22          | W CM           | S T              |
|       | BF CM           | 8 22          | M BF           | F N              |

| 8     | W BF            | 8 8           | M W            | F S              |
|       | M CM            | 22 22         | BF CM          | N T              |
"Discovery of Strength" (of antithetical personality) (VB 81); antithetical bias begins; sensation peaks and is replaced by feeling; sensation then replaces thinking as second function

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9-11</td>
<td>W BF</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>M W</td>
<td>F S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9)</td>
<td>M CM</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>BF CM</td>
<td>N T</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Physical subjectivity; sensation (7-5) dominates intuition (23-25); thinking still strong (21-19)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12-14</td>
<td>W M</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>M BF</td>
<td>F N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(12)</td>
<td>BF CM</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>W CM</td>
<td>S T</td>
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</tbody>
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Spiritual subjectivity; tinctures open; Unity of Being; intuition (26-28) over sensation (4-2); thinking dwindles (18-16)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>W M</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>M BF</td>
<td>F N</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BF CM</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>W CM</td>
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</table>

Complete spiritual subjectivity; unity as a timeless subjective image; feeling gives place to thinking through the image; intuition continues to dominate sensation as the auxiliary conscious function

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16-18</td>
<td>W BF</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>CM BF</td>
<td>T N</td>
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<tr>
<td>(16)</td>
<td>M CM</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>W M</td>
<td>S F</td>
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Spiritual subjectivity; Unity of Being; intuition (28-26) dominates sensation (2-4); feeling still strong (14-12)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19-21</td>
<td>W M</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>CM W</td>
<td>T S</td>
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<tr>
<td>(19)</td>
<td>BF CM</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>BF M</td>
<td>N F</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Physical subjectivity; tinctures closed; sensation (5-7) dominates intuition (25-23); feeling dwindles (11-9)

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<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>W BF</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>CM W</td>
<td>T S</td>
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<td></td>
<td>BF CM</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>BF M</td>
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<td>22</td>
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<td></td>
<td>M CM</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>M W</td>
<td>F S</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
"Breaking of Strength" (of antithetical personality) (VB 81); return to primary bias; while feeling dwindles, thinking peaks and is replaced by intuition; thinking replaces sensation as second function

```
23-25   W  BF
(23)    M  CM
         23  21
         BF  CM
         N  T
         M  W
         F  S
```

Physical objectivity; thinking (21-19) dominates feeling (9-11); sensation still strong (7-5)

```
26-28   W  M
(26)    BF  CM
         26  12
         BF  M
         N  F
         CM  W
         T  S
```

Spiritual objectivity; tinctures open; Unity with God; feeling (12-14) over thinking (18-16); sensation dwindles away (4-2)

After this initial mapping, one feature of the system of phases still requires explanation—what the "out of phase" state means.

The out of phase condition occurs when an individual attempts to live a primary idie during an antithetical phase, or vice versa. Adopting the orientation of the opposing phase either forces the dominant function into an unnatural change to its weaker orientation, or allows an inferior function to dominate consciousness. In the systems of both Yeats and Jung, the opposing orientation is associated with the unconscious, so reversing the mind’s dominant orientation is tantamount to allowing the unconscious to take over the mind and results in compulsive behavior. According to Campbell,

Jung names such a turnover, such a transfer from conscious to unconscious factors, enantiodromia, a "running the other way"... Each attitude [orientation] is susceptible to enantiodromia, and when that occurs there emerge all the other unconscious contents, contaminating, reinforcing, and bewildering one another in such a pell-mell of feeling-toned complexes as to put one, literally, "beside oneself." (xxvi-xxvii)

In A Vision, this turnover takes a specific form which is related to the "False Mask" in two different senses. The "True Mask" of a given phase represents some useful facet of the life experience of the opposing phase, such as the
*simplicity that is also intensity* that Phase 17 derives from Phase 3 (VB 141). In one sense, the False Mask can involve the attempt to use the dominant function or orientation of the opposite phase rather than the useful facet of life experience that it offers. The result is a combination of dominant function and orientation from among Jung's four less useful pairings: generally there is extraverted thinking in the first quarter, extraverted feeling in the second, introverted sensation in the third, and extraverted feeling or introverted intuition in the fourth quarter.

The first quarter, for example, retains its extraverted orientation, but attempts to use the dominant function of thinking from the third quarter, and the result is the kind of extraverted thinking seen when Phase 4 is out of phase: *"When out of phase he attempts antithetical wisdom (for reflection has begun), separates himself from instinct . . . and tries to enforce upon himself and others all kinds of abstract or conventional ideas which are for him, being outside his experience, mere make-believe"* (VB 109). On the other hand, the second quarter retains its dominant function of feeling when out of phase, but adopts the extraverted or primary orientation of the opposing fourth quarter, as we see when Phase 11 is out of phase:

He will be the antithesis of all this, should he be conquered by his Body of Fate (from Phase 5, where the common instinct first unites itself to reflection), being carried off by some contagion of belief, some general interest, and compelled to substitute for intellectual rage some form of personal pride and so to become the proud prelate of tradition. (VB 125)

Pride in an external tradition and *"some contagion of belief" are forms of extraverted feeling unsuitable for this phase, which is supposed to be an antithetical enemy of conformity.*

As the above passage indicates, the life experience of the related phases also plays a part in the out of phase condition; here as elsewhere, Yeats is at
pains to flesh out the mechanism of the system into something that suggests the complexity of life. This added complexity is more apparent in the third and fourth quarters, where the dominant function of the out of phase state often disappears beneath the attendant dramatic conflicts. Still, Phases 16 to 18 clearly display traits of introverted sensation when out of phase, as Shelley does in Phase 17:

He sees the devil leaning against a tree, is attacked by imaginary assassins, and, in obedience to what he considers a supernatural voice, creates The Cenci that he may give to Beatrice Cenci her incredible father. His political enemies are monstrous, meaningless images. And unlike Byron, who is two phases later, he can never see anything that opposes him as it really is. (VB 143)

When out of phase, the fourth quarter shows traces of both extraverted feeling and introverted intuition. We see the first in Phase 23: "When out of phase, when the man seeks to choose his Mask, he is gloomy with the gloom of others, and tyrannical with the tyranny of others, because he cannot create" (VB 166). Later in the quarter, introverted intuition is a factor: "At Phase 27, the central phase of the soul, of a triad that is occupied with the relations of the soul, the man asserts when out phase his claim to faculty or to supersensitive privilege beyond that of other men; he has a secret that makes him better than other men" (VB 180). Here the personalizing of intuition ("supersensitive privilege") indicates that it is introverted when it should be extraverted.

Jung's four less useful functions do play useful roles in A Vision's cycle, but only in subordinate positions; as dominant functions, they subvert the purpose of the cycle of incarnations by diverting the individual from the central life experience of a phase. In terms of the cycle, it is no doubt significant that after the primary peak of Phase 1, the first and second quarters are dominated by extraverted functions when out of phase; it is though the out of phase individual resists the cycle's movement toward complete subjectivity at Phase 15 by trying to
remain extraverted. Similarly, the two quarters after the subjective peak of Phase 15 tend toward introversion when out of phase, as if to resist the cycle's movement toward the primary peak of Phase 1.

Extraverted feeling appears recurrently throughout the cycle as part of the out of phase state, and provides the second sense of the False Mask. Those primary phases which "seek antithetical emotion" (VB 112) are finally dominated by extraverted feeling, and in both antithetical quarters the False Mask can be a role provided by society, with the attendant socially adjusted (or extraverted) feelings. Because the Faculties find their unity in the Mask, it is logical that their disharmony should stem from the False Mask, and the structural consistency of Yeats's system gives the out of phase state a specific underlying cause in each phase.

Completing Yeats's basic model of the mind as it is described in the cycle of phases makes it clear that if its fundamental similarities to Jung's system are not the product of direct influence, they must stem from a common source in some earlier system. I have already suggested that the theory of temperaments is the system in question, and an examination of the probable lines of derivation of Yeats and Jung's systems should precede a close reading of A Vision's phases. This will accomplish three things: it will account for the similarities between Yeats and Jung, bring into focus the question of the Yeats's respective contributions to A Vision, and prepare the reader to appreciate the degree to which Yeats developed beyond his sources in writing the cycle of phases.
Chapter 5
Sources and Analogues for *A Vision*

In themselves, the similarities between Yeats and Jung's systems describe what we should look for in prospective sources: there should be a pair of fundamental polarities from which to derive the two orientations, and a quartet of models for Yeats's *Four Faculties* and Jung's four psychological functions. Furthermore, this quartet should contain two pairs of opposing energies or internal polarities of its own. All these features can be found in the theory of temperaments and its antecedents; the remarkable thing is that both Yeats and Jung must have been familiar with the entire history of the temperaments up to their own time and chose to modernize the theory in very similar ways that have specific philosophical implications.

Though unaware of the role of the temperaments in the process, Olney has traced the general origins of Yeats and Jung's systems back to what he terms the "Perennial Philosophy" of Plato and the Pre-Socratic philosophers in *The Rhizome and the Flower.* The four elements and the concept of reality as an interplay of opposites first appear in Heraciius, but it was Empedocles who developed them into an eightfold system that was the precursor of the temperaments, Jung's types, and Yeats's phases. Yeats admits that his system could have been inspired by the "vortex of Empedocles" (VB 20); Olney describes the vortex and its influence thus:

---

11 Because Olney is unaware of the precise correspondence between Yeats and Jung's psychological systems, his description of their antecedents seldom highlights the origins of the particulars of the two systems. Thus much of what follows is my own interpretation of Yeats and Jung's relation to their sources, and specific debts to Olney will be identified as such in the course of the text.
Four elements and two contrary forces to keep those elements in motion; a perpetual movement back and forth from one to many and many to one, from the complete dominance of Love in the blessed Sphere where "is all music and all rest" to the complete dominance of Strife where all is divided, elemental hostility (with the world as we know it--i.e., a world possible to human life--existing at neither extreme: Phase 15 and Phase 1 of A Vision); and all this complex of air-earth-fire-water, Love-and-Strife, Sphere-and-chaos, operating as a self-enclosed, self-perpetuating system, spinning gyrelike now one way, now the other way, within a time that never had a beginning and will never have an end--this is what Empedocles, the great system-maker, represented for Yeats, who was himself a confessed system-lover and an inspired system-builder. (163)

The four elements became Jung's four psychological functions and Yeats's *Four Faculties*; Love and Strife, the opposed pair of forces, became the pair of psychological orientations in Yeats and Jung's systems.

Olney says that

What Jung does is to make his psychology a closed system of four elemental "functions" and two psychic "forces," closely resembling, in its schematic outlines, Empedocles' closed system of four elements moved about by Love and Strife; and both of these resemble Yeats's system of four "faculties" spinning perpetually in and out on the primary and antithetical gyres. [sic] (169)

As Olney describes Empedocles' influence on Jung,

Much more of Empedocles' system informed Jung's empirical observations, both clinical and personal, and his scientific deductions, than the shaman of Küsnacht was always willing to acknowledge. The psyche, that great subject and object of Jung's science and of everything he wrote, is itself precisely an Empedoclean system, binary and quaternary, self-balanced and self-regulating (when healthy), striving ever to restore itself to the condition of the monadic Sphere, which is its essence, Jung agreed, and its entelechy. (163)

Strife became introversion for Jung because its separation of one into many suggested the isolation of introversion, while Love's merging of many into one became the communal concord of extraversion's externally oriented allegiance. (The idea of balancing the eightfold forces to restore the psyche to the condition of Parmenides' perfect Sphere will be examined later in the context of the
temperaments and alchemy as part of the historical progression toward Yeats and Jung.)

Yeats referred to the two Empedoclean forces as Love and Strife in VA (132), but calls them Concord and Discord in VB, where he matches Jung's sense of the individual's relation to others:

[T]he subjective cone is called that of the *antithetical tincture* because it is achieved and defended by continual conflict with its opposite; the objective cone is called that of the *primary tincture* because whereas subjectivity—in Empedocles "Discord" as I think—tends to separate man from man, objectivity brings us back to the mass where we begin. (71-72)

Yeats's contrast of *primary* Love and *antithetical* Strife shows how he developed them beyond psychological orientations into forces acting in human history:

After an age of necessity, truth, goodness, mechanism, science, democracy, abstraction, peace, comes an age of freedom, fiction, evil, kindred, art, aristocracy, particularity, war. (VB 52)

A *primary* dispensation looking beyond itself towards a transcendent power is dogmatic, levelling, unifying, feminine, humane, peace its means and end; an *antithetical* dispensation obeys imminent power, is expressive, hierarchical, multiple, masculine, harsh, surgical. (VB 263)

As we have seen, Yeats also strives to transform the four Empedoclean *rhizōmata* or "roots of all things" (Olney 45)—into values, behavior, and perceptions that can combine with the orientations to cover the entire range of human activity and perception and thus constitute the world as we experience it. His attempt to create an all-encompassing system of thought that could "restore to the philosopher his mythology" (VA 252) is a direct development of the philosophical myths of the Pre-Socratic philosophers, Plato, and the Neoplatonists, but the leap from Empedocles to A Vision (and Psychological Types) is made possible mainly by Galen's development of the theory of temperaments out of Empedocles' concepts. The cosmologies of the early
Western philosophers were their statement of what the world is, but *A Vision* is a statement that in the final analysis the world is what we experience it with--the mind or psyche. The theory of temperaments provided the essential link between the two positions by relating the different types of minds or psyches people have to the eightfold Empedoclean universe.

As Klibansky, Panofsky, and Saxl point out in *Saturn and Melancholy*, Empedocles linked macrocosm with microcosm by saying that man, like the rest of the universe, was made up of four elements (5-7). He even attributed specific psychological characteristics to the relative balance of the elements in the body, though not in any systematic fashion (Klibansky 6). Yet his concepts were unsuited as yet to be the basis of any empirical medical or psychological system, because they lacked an intermediary which could translate the cosmic elements--earth, water, air and fire seen as earth, sea, sky and sun--to the microcosm of the actual human body (Klibansky 6-7). Later thinkers combined the concept of the four primary elements with that of the four primary qualities--hot, cold, moist and dry--to create the concept of the four humors, which could represent the cosmic elements within the human body itself (Klibansky 3-15).

The first major expression of the theory of humors is the fifth century BC Hippocratic treatise *On the nature of man*. As Robert I. Watson describes it,

In propounding the theory, this Hippocratic writer implicitly accepted the view of Empedocles that the universe is composed of air, earth, fire, and water, which combined to produce all substances, although he [Empedocles] spoke of them not as elements but as "roots of all." They are unchangeable, water cannot become earth, nor earth water. By mingling, they form concrete objects. Corresponding respectively to these elements, he held, are the four combinations of qualities, warm-moist, cold-dry, warm-dry, and cold-moist. With this as its base, these elements and qualities took bodily form in the respective humors, blood, black bile, yellow bile, and phlegm. These humors make up the constitution of the body and cause both disease and health. . . . To Hippocrates, the theory of humors was a theory of disease. (13-14)
Thus the Hippocratic theory of humors was concerned with empirical medicine rather than psychology, and yet it was precisely this empirical emphasis which would produce the psychological component of the theory of temperaments.

The Roman physician Galen is widely credited with creating the theory of humoral temperaments in the second century AD, but this is a misperception (Diamond 604, Klibansky 57-65). As Per-Gunner Ottoson describes it, Galen's medical system derives from Aristotelian biology (which itself derives directly from Empedocles by way of Plato's *Timaeus*) rather than from the Hippocratic humors:

Within the Aristotelian-Galenic tradition the fundamental mixture in the body is never a mixture of humours, but of the primary qualities. According to Aristotle, the living creatures have principally the same structures as all things in the sublunar world. Everything consists of the four elements: earth, water, air, and fire. The four elements arise out of primary matter by the action of the active qualities (the hot or the cold) on the passive qualities (the wet or the dry). Because of this, it is also possible that one element can be transformed into another by qualitative influence. The dynamic qualities of the elements form homogenous bodies of all kinds, whose properties are determined by these qualities. Different homogenous bodies form in turn heterogenous bodies. . . . [H]ealth is regarded as the proper balance between the primary qualities, and disease a disturbance of it. (130-31)

Thus in Aristotle and Galen it is the active and passive qualities which can mediate between the cosmic elements and the body itself, and not the humors as in the Hippocratic system. For Galen, the humors are incidental to the operation of the qualities in the body, rather than essential. And while the four elements may be an intuitive representation of the relative kinetic energy of matter in its various states, the four qualities' emphasis on mutability and action suggests energies rather than matter, which is a step toward seeing them as the basis for purely psychological energies.

The Galenic model's emphasis on the active and passive qualities of the
four elements foreshadows the two orientations and four *Faculties* or functions in
the systems of Yeats and Jung even more closely than the vortex of Empedocles
does; each element consists of an active and a passive quality, just as each of
Jung’s functions consists of both the introverted and extraverted orientations
(though only one of the orientations can be experienced consciously at any given
time). Those familiar with Yeats’s thought will recognize that "active" and "pas-
sive" can be used to describe his *antithetical* and *primary* orientations; at his
peak, *antithetical* man has "all his energies active" (*VB* 84), while *primary* man is
"submissive and plastic" at his peak (*VB* 82). Yeats considers the *primary* to be
passive because it inherently conforms to prevailing social conditions, while the
*antithetical* is active because it uses subjective creativity to express itself
originally by bringing something imaginatively new into the world.

Evidence that Yeats was at least aware of the Aristotelian conception
underlying Galen comes from the very beginning of his ceaseless system-
building. His pioneering study of William Blake was undoubtedly a major step in
the formation of his own theories; yet in an unpublished diary from the year Yeats
began working on his edition of Blake (1889), we find him making this list for his
own reference:

Heat + Dryness = Fire
Heat + Moisture = Air
Cold + Moisture = Water
Cold + Dryness = Earth
(Natl. Library of Ireland ms. 13:569; qtd. in Flannery 43)

Yeats was therefore well aware of the four elements and the active and passive
qualities when he began to work on Blake, though his knowledge of the theory of
temperaments at this point is open to speculation. And while we are considering
this point early in Yeats’s career, it is worth noting that Harper and Hood have
determined that Yeats relied on the 1892 first edition of John Burnet’s *Early*
Greek Philosophy as the source for the translated passages from Empedocles, Heraclitus and Parmenides that he uses in both editions of *A Vision* (32-33). That Yeats used this edition rather than the editions of 1908 or 1920 suggests, at least, that his familiarity with the Pre-Socratics could have preceded the writing of *A Vision* by nearly thirty years.

Besides the centrality of the active and passive qualities in the Aristotelian-Galenic tradition, the ability of the qualities to cause a transformation from one element to another that Ottoson took note of is also important in recognizing the probable genesis of Yeats’s system. The idea that the elements can and do transform themselves into each other in a recurring cycle of earth-water-air-fire first appears in Heraclitus (Olney 98-100), but the action of the qualities in the later conception makes the process significantly more complex in a way that suggests Yeats’s system. Yeats clearly associates one element and its corresponding Faculty or psychological function with each quarter of his cycle of twenty-eight phases, and this corresponds well enough to Heraclitus (*VA* 24; *VB* 93). But as we saw in Chapter Four of this dissertation, the relative strength of the Faculties and their degree of inward or outward orientation also change in an intricate pattern that complicates the changes of element, Faculty, and function from one quarter to the next. If, in the Aristotelian-Galenic tradition, an increase in hotness changes air to fire, then what are we to make of the fact that in Yeats’s system, for example, an increase in primary, objective or extraverted orientation leads to the change from *Creative Mind/thinking/air* in the third quarter to *Body of Fate/intuition/fire* in the fourth quarter?

The parallel is suggestive, and is reinforced by a passage from *VA* which Yeats cut from *VB*:

> When the *Tinctures* open, that is to say when observation gives way to experience, when the being attains self knowledge or its
possibility, the *Four Faculties* reflect themselves in the experience or knowledge as the *Four Qualities*, the *Will* as *instinct* (or race), the *Mask* as *emotion*, the *Creative Mind* as *reason*, the *Body of Fate* as *desire*. [sic] (60)

As we saw in previous chapters, this passage is describing the hidden code of Yeats’s system:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Will} &= \text{instinct} = \text{sensation} = \text{earth} \\
\text{Mask} &= \text{emotion} = \text{feeling} = \text{water} \\
\text{Creative Mind} &= \text{reason} = \text{thinking} = \text{air} \\
\text{Body of Fate} &= \text{desire} = \text{intuition} = \text{fire}
\end{align*}
\]

That Yeats should add the term *Qualities* to designate further aspects of the four elements in his system is, again, extremely suggestive—even if he did abandon the entire section this passage comes from (VA 59-61) in his revisions for VB.

When he says in the very next paragraph that "*Emotion* and *instinct* when acting as one are *love*, *reason* and *desire hatred* . . . " (VA 60), we may be confused by what he is saying, but we should recognize the Love and Strife of Empedocles in this *love* and *hatred*, as Yeats has been talking of his *primary* and *antithetical* orientations. What we are seeing here may in fact be Yeats displaying knowledge of the close relation between Empedocles and Aristotle.

Because it emphasizes the less tangible elements and qualities rather than the actual humoral fluids, Galen’s conception of the nature of humankind provides a better basis for a psychological model of the mind than the humoral theory of Hippocrates does. Yet Galen himself did not develop a systematic theory of psychological temperaments, though he is responsible for the term *temperament*. He referred to the mixture of elements and qualities within the human body as the *complexio* (Ottoson 132-35), a Latin term which is the etymological antecedent of our terms for both the *complex* of elements and qualities within the body and the *complexion* of that body, which is the external indicator of the relative balance of those elements and qualities (or of the balance
of humors in the humoral version).

As a physician, Galen was interested in the symptoms of disease and illness, and he considered the complexion an important indicator of an excess of one of the four humors; an excess of each humor created a distinct complexion and body type. To provide additional symptoms, Galen drew on his belief in the interrelation of bodily constitution and character to describe mental characteristics caused by excesses of the three of the four humors. His delineation of the psychological traits of the sanguine, choleric, and melancholy humors is probably the reason why he is credited with the theory of humoral temperaments (Klibansky 57-58).

But Galen’s system was incomplete in that it assigned no traits to the phlegmatic humor. Furthermore, Galen never used the term temperament to denote the psychological traits caused by an excess of one of the humors (Diamond 604; Klibansky 64-65; Ottoson 130-34). Instead, he used temperament (the Latin temperamentum) to denote both a hypothetical ideal complexio where all the qualities are properly balanced or tempered (Ottoson 133-34) and eight additional complexios which are essentially unbalanced. These unequal complexios, which are best translated as inequable temperaments, intemperaments, or distemperaments (Gruner 63, Ottoson 134), can be either simple or complex. The four simple distemperaments involve the excess of a single quality—the hot, cold, moist, or dry—while the compound distemperaments have an excess of two qualities at once: hot and moist, hot and dry, cold and moist, or cold and dry (Dols 13; Klibansky 64; Ottoson 134).

Galen attributed specific personality traits to the four compound intemperaments (Klibansky 63), and later writers seem to have mistakenly assigned these traits to the four humors which have the same respective com-
bination of qualities (Klibansky 64-65). The result was the theory of humoral temperaments, whose first accurately dated appearance is the fourth century AD physician Vindician's Letter to Pentadius, where the four humors are associated with the hours of the day, the four seasons, the four ages of man, and the sanguine, choleric, melancholy, and phlegmatic temperaments (Diamond 605-06; Klibansky 60-61). Later writers made the humoral theory of temperaments the dominant medical theory of the Middle Ages and reinforced the misconception that Galen was its originator.

Evidence that Yeats and Jung were influenced by Galen's version of the temperaments takes two forms: direct allusion to Galen and internal evidence within the structure of Yeats and Jung's systems. What Jung does tell us about his development of his system and its relation to the history of psychological typology is enough to betray the influence of the temperaments as a source. It also clarifies the problems Yeats must have faced in developing his own system, and what the temperaments offered as a way of expanding his earlier theories into the fully articulated world view of A Vision. Yeats offers only his various frame stories as an account of A Vision's genesis, so pending an exhaustive search of the manuscripts of the book, Jung's account gives us the best idea of the logical process of extrapolation from the temperaments.

After the initial publication of Psychological Types in 1921, Jung consistently uses the temperaments to set his system in its historical context when discussing psychological typology. In lectures on psychological types in 1923 and 1928 as well as in an article in 1936, Jung does in fact give Galen credit for creating the first major psychological typology (CW 6: pars. 883-84, 933-34, 960). He even traces the underlying idea back to Hippocrates, although he mistakenly ascribes the humoral theory of temperaments to Galen (CW 6: pars. 883-84).
When we add these to an actual mention of the temperaments in *Psychological Types* (CW 6: pars. 546-47)--which does not, however, refer to Galen, relate the temperaments to Jung’s functions or admit any derivation--we can conclude that Jung must have investigated the temperaments thoroughly while developing his typology. This is even more likely given what we will see was a surge in interest in the temperaments during the dawn of modern psychology in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Jung explains that an empirical problem faced him after his initial formulation of the concepts of introversion and extraversion in a 1913 paper:

> The contrast between introversion and extraversion is simple enough, but simple formulations are unfortunately the most open to doubt. They all too easily cover up the actual complexities and so deceive us. I speak here from my own experience, for scarcely had I published the first formulation of my criteria when I discovered to my dismay that somehow or other I had been taken in by them. Something was amiss. I had tried to explain too much in too simple a way, as often happens in the first joy of discovery.

> What struck me now was the undeniable fact that while people may be classed as introverts or extraverts, this does not account for the tremendous differences between individuals in either class. So great, indeed, are these differences that I was forced to doubt whether I had observed correctly in the first place. It took nearly ten years of observation and comparison to clear up this doubt.

> The question as to where the tremendous differences among individuals of the same type came from entangled me in unforeseen difficulties which for a long time I was unable to master. To observe and recognize the differences gave me comparatively little trouble, the root of my difficulties being now, as before, the problem of criteria. How was I to find suitable terms for the characteristic differences? (CW 6: pars. 943-45)

Jung’s problem, then was to expand his initial pair of psychological orientations into a more complex system that would classify patients more precisely; the "ten years of observation and comparison" spent in solving it were the period leading to the publication of *Psychological Types*.

Jung says that the answer to his empirical problem would have to derive from a theoretical formulation:
My more limited field of work is not the clinical study of external characteristics, but the investigation and classification of the psychic data which may be inferred from them. The first result of this work is a phenomenology of the psyche, which enables us to formulate a corresponding theory about its structure. From the empirical application of this structural theory there is finally developed a psychological typology. (CW 5: par. 922)

What he needed to find were those structural components of consciousness (and the unconscious) that would create the "characteristic differences" he was trying to classify. If we consider Jung's teenage reaction to the Pre-Socratics, it is clear where he might look for theoretical formulation:

I found to my gratification that many of my intuitions had historical analogues. Above all I was attracted to the thought of Pythagoras, Heraclitus, Empedocles, and Plato, despite the long-windedness of Socratic argumentation. Their ideas were beautiful and academic, like pictures in a gallery, but somewhat remote. (Memories, Dreams, Reflections 68)

Jung's entire psychology can be viewed as an attempt to move these philosophers from the remote realm of abstract thought to a practical application in the psychiatric field. If in 1913 he saw any relation between his introverted/extraverted polarity and the Love and Strife of Empedocles, then given the level of interest in the temperaments in psychology at the time he would be compelled to consider adding four mental functions to create an eightfold system of increased precision.

The problem of making a twofold classification of humanity more sophisticated also faced Yeats when he had finished Per Amica Silentia Lunae in 1917. His opposition of sentimental conformity and inner-directed artistic passion would become the primary and antithetical orientations of A Vision:

Nor has any poet I have read of or heard of or met with been a sentimentalist. The other self, the anti-self or antithetical self, as one may choose to name it, comes but to those who are no longer deceived, whose passion is reality. The sentimentalists are practical men who believe in money, in position, in a marriage bell, and whose understanding of happiness is to be so busy whether in work or in play, that all is forgotten but the momentary aim. [sic]
(Mythologies 331)

Out of this fundamental binary opposition would come not only the psychological characteristics of humanity, but also the movements of history; and Yeats suggests that if he could further refine his theory, it might yield a precise measurement of human history, even to the point of prophecy:

I do not doubt those heaving circles, those winding arcs, whether in one man's life or in that of an age, are mathematical, and that some in the world, or beyond the world, have foreknown the event and pricked upon the calendar the life-span of a Christ, a Buddha, a Napoleon: that every movement, in feeling or in thought, prepares in the dark by its own increasing clarity and confidence its own executioner. [sic] (Mythologies 340)

Accuracy in such prophecy requires, as does accuracy in psychological judgement of personality, a complete set of factors or polarities: a field of coordinates on which the possibilities could be mapped. Here is the premise of A Vision: that the interaction of opposites—whether in the individual's psychology or the sweep of human history—could be "mathematically" measured with a sufficiently precise instrument of analysis to such a degree as to provide "An Explanation of Life" (VA iii). The challenge facing Yeats after finishing Per Amica Silentia Lunae was to devise that instrument, and given his love of Empedocles, we should not wonder that he developed an eightfold system out of his initial duality, just as Jung was doing at the same time.

Curiously enough, Jung also employs the figure of a compass—whose "heaving circles" and "winding arcs" Yeats would use to measure reality in the above quotation—when discussing his reasons for using four psychological functions to expand his two orientations into an eightfold system of psychological coordinates:

I have often been asked, almost accusingly, why I speak of four functions and not of more or of fewer. That there are exactly four was a result I arrived at on purely empirical grounds. But as the following consideration will show, these four together produce a kind
of totality. Sensation establishes what is actually present, thinking enables us to recognize its meaning, feeling tells us its value, and intuition points to possibilities as to whence it came and whither it is going in a given situation. In this way we can orient ourselves with respect to the immediate world as completely as when we locate a place geographically by latitude and longitude. The four functions are somewhat like the four points of the compass; they are just as arbitrary and just as indispensable. Nothing prevents our shifting the cardinal points as many degrees as we like in one direction or the other, or giving them different names. It is merely a question of convention and intelligibility.

But one thing I must confess: I would not for anything dispense with this compass on my psychological voyages of discovery. This not merely for the obvious, all-too-human reason that everyone is in love with his own ideas. I value the type theory for the objective reason that it provides a system of comparison and orientation which makes possible something that has long been lacking, a critical psychology. (CW 6: pars. 958-59)

Jung thus admits that his typology is simply an arbitrary grid to throw over our experience of both inner and outer reality in order to map it for psychological purposes; yet he also claims, albeit guardedly, that his system yields "a kind of totality"—that despite its simplicity it is finally profound and comprehensive. Yeats wonders if the same is true of his system in VA:

Much of this book is abstract, because it has not yet been lived, for no man can dip into life more than a moiety of any system. When I was a child, I went out with herring fishers one dark night, and the dropping of their nets into the luminous sea and the drawing of them up has remained with me as a dominant image. Have I found a good net for a herring fisher? (251)

Again we see the figure of a net thrown out to capture reality. If we view the immediate genesis of A Vision as starting with Yeats's 1914 essay "Swedenborg, Mediums, and the Desolate Places" as Seiden does (67), then both Yeats and Jung reacted to the cultural dislocation of the First World War by composing new myths to organize reality.

Reviewing his work near the end of his life, Jung says that it is one's psychological type which from the outset determines and limits a person's judgment. My book, therefore, was an effort to deal with the relationship of the individual to the world, to people and things. It discussed the various aspects of consciousness, the
various attitudes the conscious mind might take toward the world, and thus constitutes a psychology of consciousness regarded from what might be called a clinical angle. . . . The book on types yielded the insight that every judgment made by an individual is conditioned by his personality type and that every point of view is necessarily relative. (Memories, Dreams, Reflections 207)

Jung dealt with the unconscious and its mechanisms in more depth elsewhere in his psychology, but the importance of the collective unconscious for his introverted orientation and the principle of unconscious compensation for one's dominant orientation and psychological function extend the reach of his typology into the unconscious as well. At any rate, his typology aims at a comprehensive view of reality, if we define human reality as consciousness; and this is the aim of A Vision as well.

If the result for Jung is a sort of theory of psychological relativity, the resemblance to physics must be intentional, given his ensuing attempt to define libido as pure psychic energy comparable to Robert Mayer's energetic concept in physics:

> What I wished to do for psychology was to arrive at some logical and thorough view such as is provided in the physical sciences by the theory of energetics. This is what I was after in my paper "On Psychic Energy" (1928). I see man's drives, for example, as various manifestations of energetic processes, and thus as forces analogous to heat, light, etc. (Memories, Dreams, Reflections 208)

The parallel with Einstein's efforts to redefine reality places Jung (and Yeats) within the overarching modernist attempt to redefine the nature of things in the face of cultural discontinuity. If in so doing Yeats and Jung were able to derive their systems from as far back as Empedocles and Heraclitus at the beginning of Western thought, then so much the more satisfying their systems would have been to them. What they sought in Empedocles may not have been authority so much as a starting point for continuity; the degree to which they expanded upon Empedocles testifies that they found Empedocles in himself to be unequal to the
needs of their situation. But they must have felt that Empedocles had recognized fundamental principles of the mind that could be developed into systems that could address their historical situation.

The question for both of them would have been how to diversify from their two orientations to an eightfold system, and our question is how and why they used the temperaments to do that. To fully modernize Empedocles they needed to put the four elements into play somehow, but it is hard to see how Empedocles' basic polarity of Love and Strife figures in the classical temperaments—that is, how to get from Empedocles to a modern system through the temperaments themselves. It is in this gap that Yeats and Jung created rather than merely updated their systems. It is a long way from Empedocles to Psychological Types or A Vision, but there is perhaps an inherent logic in the probable route which accounts for the independent similarity of the two systems.

Again we must rely on Jung's account of his progress. He says in Psychological Types that in his initial treatment of his two psychological orientations he had distinguished two of his four functions—thinking and feeling—but identified the thinking type with introversion and the feeling type with extraversion (CW 6: pars. 7, 836). It was not until later that he was able to distinguish both orientations in each of these function-types, and it may well be that his clinical experience led him to this differentiation. But what he says suggests that by 1913 he may already have arrived at his rational or judging polarity of feeling/thinking, which puts him halfway to the four functions he needed. And even the problem of tending to associate functions with specific orientations was something that Jung eventually turned to his advantage, as the discussion of introverted feeling/thinking and extraverted sensation/intuition in Chapter Two of this dissertation demonstrated; they are part of the internal logic that made both
his and Yeats's systems develop in close parallel.

Jung described the empirical part of his search for functions in a 1931 lecture:

We must be able to designate what it is that functions outstandingly in the individual's habitual way of reacting. We are thus forced to revert to something that at first glance looks alarmingly like the old faculty psychology of the eighteenth century. In reality, however, we are only returning to ideas current in daily speech, perfectly accessible and comprehensible to everyone. When, for instance, I speak of "thinking," it is only the philosopher who does not know what it means; no layman will find it incomprehensible. He uses the word every day, and always in the same general sense, though it is true he would be at a loss if suddenly called upon to give an unequivocal definition of thinking. The same is true of "memory" or "feeling." However difficult it is to define these purely psychological concepts scientifically, they are easily intelligible in current speech.

...Thinking and feeling are such insistent realities that every language above the primitive level has absolutely unmistakable expressions for them. We can therefore be sure that these expressions coincide with quite definite psychic facts, no matter what the scientific definition of these complex facts may be. Everyone knows, for example, what consciousness means, and nobody can doubt that it coincides with a definite psychic condition, however far science may be from defining it satisfactorily.

And so it came about that I simply took the concepts expressed in current speech as designations for the corresponding psychic functions, and used them as my criteria in judging the differences between persons of the same attitude-type. (CW 6: pars. 949-50)

Jung seems to be saying that he discerned four habitual modes of reaction in his patients and confirmed them by finding them to be universally understood to be distinct modes of mental activity. That he uses the thinking/feeling pair as his example over a page and a half of discussion of how this pair can be differentiated and then gives a mere thirteen lines to the differentiation of his sensation/intuition pair suggests that perhaps this second pair was far less easy to distinguish and name in the first place (CW 6: pars. 949-51). What I am driving at is that despite his claim to being empirical about his functions, Jung may have been working from an a priori assumption that he would find four functions.

This can be deduced from the sole mention of the classical temperaments
within *Psychological Types*, which, though disingenuous in its evasion of the relation of the temperaments to Jung's functions, may suggest how Jung pursued the problem of expanding and refining his initial binary opposition of orientations from 1913 onward. Jung devotes more than half of *Psychological Types* to a historical survey of precursors of his two orientations, among which is a chapter on biographical typology devoted exclusively to Wilhelm Ostwald's *Great Men*. Ostwald divided great scientists into "classic" and "romantic" types based on how they worked, their influence on their contemporaries, and their speed of mental reaction. Classic types were withdrawn and worked and reacted slowly, so Jung considers them introverts; romantic types immediately influenced those around them and worked and reacted quickly, which Jung sees as clearly extraverted (*CW 6*: par. 548).

Jung also used Ostwald's work as an example in his 1913 paper introducing the introversion/extraversion theory (*CW 6*: par. 870), which means that though Jung did not mention what Ostwald has to say about the classical temperaments in 1913, he must have been aware of it. As Jung sees it in *Psychological Types*,

Ostwald compares his two types with the four classical temperaments, with special reference to the speed of reaction, which in his view is fundamental. Slow reactions are correlated with phlegmatic and melancholic temperaments, quick reactions with the sanguine and choleric. . . . If one glances through the biographies of Humphry Davy and Liebig on the one hand, and Robert Mayer and Faraday on the other, it is easy to see that the former are distinctly romantic, sanguine, and choleric, while the latter are just as clearly classic, phlegmatic, and melancholic. This observation of Ostwald's seems to me entirely convincing, since the doctrine of the four temperaments was in all probability based on the same empirical principles as Ostwald's classic and romantic types. (*CW 6*: pars. 546-47)

Jung thus implicitly associates the sanguine and choleric temperaments with extraversion and the phlegmatic and melancholy temperaments with introversion
when he assigns the romantic to extraversion and the classic to introversion in the very next paragraph:

As one reads Ostwald’s biographies, one can see at a glance that the romantic type corresponds to the extravert, and the classic type to the introvert. Humphry Davy and Liebig are perfect examples of the one, and Mayer and Faraday of the other. The outward reaction characterizes the extravert, just as the inward reaction is the mark of the introvert. (CW 6: par. 948)

When we recall that Jung himself was searching for empirical principles for distinguishing among types, his saying that "the doctrine of the four temperaments was in all probability based on the same empirical principles as Ostwald’s classic and romantic types" ought to make us take notice; it constitutes an admission of sorts that Jung’s orientations and the temperaments are somehow directly related.

But the relation seems to be that in Jung’s view Ostwald’s types and the temperaments are making the right distinctions for the wrong reasons. His standard objection to the temperaments is that they differentiate according to visible emotional behavior rather than underlying mental functions; as he describes their "empirical principles."

The four temperaments are obviously differentiations in terms of affectivity, that is, they are correlated with manifest affective reactions. But this is a superficial classification from the psychological point of view; it judges only by appearances. According to it, the man who is outwardly calm and inconspicuous in his behaviour has a phlegmatic temperament. He looks phlegmatic and is therefore classed as phlegmatic. In reality he may be anything but phlegmatic; he may have a profoundly sensitive, even passionate nature, his intense, introverted emotionality expressing itself through the greatest outward calm. Jordan, in his typology, takes this into account. He judges not merely from the surface impression, but from a deeper observation of human nature, Ostwald’s criteria of distinction are based on appearances, like the old division into temperaments. His romantic type is characterized by a quick outward reaction; the classic type may react just as quickly, but within. (CW 6: par. 547)

Jung brings this charge of superficial discrimination based on affectivity against
the temperaments two out of the three times that he mentions them as part of the history of typology (CW 6: pars. 884, 964), and calls their criteria "appearance and behaviour" in his other mention of them in a historical context (CW 6: par. 934). This should lead us to assume that he had considered them thoroughly; his penchant for mentioning them in his historical surveys suggests that for him they were a part of the process of arriving at a modern typology.

And we have seen in his treatment of Ostwald's types that a perceptive differentiation could be validated in his eyes if the true underlying reason for the psychological difference could be deduced. In his view, Ostwald is right to divide scientists into classics and romantics, but only Jung can tell you the real foundation for the difference: that the two types are introverts and extraverts respectively. By mentioning the temperaments so often in a historical context, and showing the degree of consideration he had given them when dealing with Ostwald, Jung all but tells us that he has undertaken to rehabilitate and modernize the temperaments in the same way. And by calling Ostwald's assignment of the temperaments to his classic and romantic types "entirely convincing" (CW 6: par. 547) in the passage already quoted above, Jung effectively links his own pair of orientations back to Empedocles: the temperaments, which derive from Empedocles, are either classic or romantic and thus are introverted or extraverted. What remained was to validate the four elements by discovering what mental functions corresponded to them.

The division of the temperaments by Ostwald's types and Jung's orientations suggests something crucial for understanding how Jung may have proceeded: the sanguine and choleric appear externally active, while the phlegmatic and melancholy appear passive by comparison. When we recall that the elements consist of active (hot/cold) and passive (moist/dry) qualities, a possible
basis for using the elements and temperaments in a psychological classification begins to appear. This gains significance in light of the surprising amount of activity employing the temperaments in the emergence of modern psychology at the turn of the century, much of which focuses on precisely this distinction between active and passive. Jung must have been well aware of this surge of activity, and a brief historical review can tell us something more about his probable attitude toward the temperaments.

Roback finds a variety of nineteenth and early twentieth century approaches employing the classical temperaments in his 1928 survey (60-109), but those which emphasize the active/passive dichotomy can be traced to a single source. Klibansky, Panofsky, and Saxl follow the medieval doctrine of the temperaments up to eighteenth century Germany (120-21), saying that "The doctrine of temperaments may be described as one of the longest-lived and in some respects one of the most conservative parts of modern culture" (120). This was particularly true in Germany, where "In the popular philosophic writings of the eighteenth century the character portraits first painted in later antiquity still preserve a stability which they have not entirely lost even to-day [sic]" (121). This persistence of the temperaments in Germany culminated in two works which probably inspired the nineteenth century revival of the temperaments: Kant’s Observations on the Sense of the Beautiful and the Sublime and Practical Anthropology.

Both of these works present Kant in his lesser-known guise of popular lecturer rather than the daunting philosopher of the Critique of Pure Reason; yet his stature as a philosopher gave these works a credibility which carried his innovative thinking about the temperaments into the emerging German psychology of the following century. The Observations deal mainly with the aesthetic
sensibilities of the various temperaments, but Practical Anthropology undertakes a psychological analysis of them that would make it more influential among psychologists.

Kant begins this analysis by distinguishing between the physiological and psychological aspects of the temperaments. The former include "physical constitution" and "physical complexion" (152), the first being the physical build and the second including the humors. However, these are of secondary concern to him:

But when we take a psychological point of view—that is, when we mean temperament of soul (emotional and appetitive capacities)—we introduce those terms derived from the composition of the blood only because of an analogy that the play of feelings and appetites has with corporeal causes of movement (the most prominent of which is the blood). (152)

The humors are "those terms derived from the composition of the blood," and though anxious for a way that "the ancient forms can be preserved" (152), Kant is interested instead in the psychological origin of temperament:

[T]erms referring to the composition of the blood do not serve to indicate the cause of what happens when a man’s sensibility is affected, whether according to the pathology of the humors or of the nerves: they serve only to classify these phenomena by the effects we observe. For in order correctly to assign a man the title of a particular class we do not need to know beforehand what chemical composition of the blood entitles us to name a certain characteristic property of temperament; we need to know, rather, what feelings and inclinations we have observed in him. (152-53)

Three of Jung’s concerns appear here: an interest in the root causes of temperamental behavior, the desire to classify empirically, and the primarily affective nature ("feelings and inclinations") of the classical temperaments.

However, Kant’s new classification of the temperaments manages to deemphasize affective factors and point the way for subsequent psychological theories. He says that the "temperaments can first be divided generally into
temperaments of feeling and of activity, each of which can, secondly, be connected with a heightening (intensio) or slackening (remissio) of the vital force* (152). The result is the four simple temperaments, here arranged to reflect their probable relation to A Vision's four quarters:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>activity</th>
<th>feeling</th>
<th>feeling</th>
<th>activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PHLEGMATIC</td>
<td>MELANCHOLY</td>
<td>SANGUINE</td>
<td>CHOLERIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>slackening</td>
<td>slackening</td>
<td>heightening</td>
<td>heightening</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Kant's "slackening" of energy corresponds to the inward movement of consciousness in Yeat's first two quarters, and "heightening" follows the outward movement of the last two quarters. Yeats's central two quarters emphasize passionate aesthetic sensibility or feeling, while his first and last quarters pursue activity in the external world rather than artistic seclusion. I would not claim, however, that Yeats was aware of Kant's classifications; rather, Kant's classifications suggest how a certain amount of inherent logic within the temperaments would tend to result in the above arrangement of them for Yeats's purposes.

Kant's analysis of the two temperaments of feeling anticipates Jung in looking beyond affective behavior for differentiating characteristics:

What characterizes the sanguine temperament is that sense impressions are quick and strong, but do not penetrate deeply (are not lasting). In the melancholy temperament, on the other hand, sense impressions are less striking, but they get themselves rooted deeply. It is in this, and not in the tendency to gaiety or sadness, that we must locate the distinction between these temperaments of feeling. (153)

Kant's interest here in the speed and depth of nervous response or activity is what made his work an influence on later psychologists, as it suggests possibilities for testing and classification that could make the temperaments useful for modern psychology.

Kant discusses something else of importance for Yeats and Jung: the possibility of composite or combined temperaments, such as a sanguine-choleric
combination (which would correspond to Jung's thinking/intuition types, or Yeats's Phases 16-18 or 23-25). This idea first appears in the humoral tradition in the early fourteenth century (Ottosson 140), and persisted into eighteenth-century German popular philosophy (Klibansky 115), where Kant would have encountered it: "Complexions which have one quality in common can be combined in one and the same individual, so that beside the four pure types there are four mixed types, namely, the sanguine-phlegmatic, the melancholic-choleric, the sanguine-choleric and the melancholic-phlegmatic" (Klibansky 115). Though these could correspond to Yeats and Jung's four basic function-types, Kant denies their possibility on purely affective grounds; for example, cheerfulness would neutralize anger in the sanguine-choleric pairing (156). Still, Kant does consider this question, and Jung's move beyond the affective aspect of the temperaments frees him to explore the possibility of complementary mental functions.

At any rate, Kant provides the crucial link for the transmission of the temperaments to the early twentieth century. Roback considers Johann Friedrich Herbart's *Textbook in Psychology*

an illustration of how much Kant's successor at Königsberg was indebted to the famous philosopher as well as to the rise of modern nerve physiology. As one of the founders of modern psychology and one who has justly exercised a tremendous influence in the whole realm of the mental sciences, Herbart deserves a hearing in the brief historical examination of the temperaments. . . . (60)

Herbart considers the sanguine/melancholy pair to be temperaments of feeling as Kant does, but pairs the choleric and phlegmatic on the basis of emotional excitability (Roback 60-61). This excitability turns out to be Kant's activity in another guise, the choleric being emotionally excitable or active and the phlegmatic being slow or inactive. Though Herbart breaks with Kant in allowing the
possibility of combined temperaments as discussed in the above paragraph, he also develops Kant's hints about sensation by assigning the nervous system a role in temperament (Roback 61-62). Jung includes Herbart's book in the bibliography for *Psychological Types* (CW 6: 573) without referring to his work on the temperaments, but its inclusion does indicate Jung's probable awareness of psychological theories stemming from Kant's work.

Later in the century Wilhelm Wundt also drew on Kant in his *Principles of Physiological Psychology*, and focused exclusively on each temperament's quality of reaction, resulting in this classification (following Roback 68):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strong</th>
<th>Weak</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quick Choleric</td>
<td>Sanguine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slow Melancholic</td>
<td>Phlegmatic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Speed and strength or depth of reaction are Wundt's criteria; note that the choleric/phlegmatic and the sanguine/melancholic pairs are most opposed to each other in quality, a distinction whose significance we will return to. Jung was thoroughly familiar with this book, and again lists it in the bibliography for *Psychological Types* without ever referring to its use of the temperaments (CW 6: 583); yet he makes enough use of it in developing his definition of his sensation and feeling functions to qualify it as a significant influence on his typology.\(^\text{12}\)

And one measure of Wundt's influence around the turn of the century is that after Yeats finished the first edition of *A Vision*, he asked his wife for a list of all the serious philosophical reading she had ever done, the sum of which was: "two or three volumes of Wundt, part of Hegel's *Logic*, all Thomas Taylor's *Plotinus*, a Latin work of Pico della Mirandola, and a great deal of mediaeval

\(^{12}\) See CW 6: 290, 309, 409, 411, 412, 414, 434, 461, and 546.
mysticism" \( \textit{VR} 20-21 \). The final item no doubt covered a great deal of occult material that employed the four elements and possibly even mentioned the classical temperaments; yet the surprising thing is that as far as the temperaments are concerned, Wundt is not out of place on this list, and something that George Yeats saw in Wundt may have shaped the automatic script--though this Wundt may have been the yearly \textit{Philosophical Studies} he edited.

This potential affinity between \textit{A Vision}, early modern psychology, and mediaeval or classical thinking is even more apparent in certain French psychologists around the turn of the century. Roback’s summary of Fouillée’s principles should bring Yeats’s two \textit{Tinctures} or orientations to mind:

Redintegration and disintegration he observes is the vital rhythm in nature. Integration takes a centripetal direction, while disintegration is centrifugal. With the former he connects the idea of concentration, with the latter the idea of expansion. The one is a female element, the other a masculine principle. \( \text{[sic]} \) (75)

We should recognize Empedocles’ Love and Strife in these principles; if we apply them to consciousness Yeats’s \textit{primary} and \textit{antithetical} orientations will emerge, and Jung’s introversion and extraversion as well.

The reason for this is perhaps clearer in what Roback says about certain classifications by Manouvrier, another French psychologist of the period: "Each of these may be viewed under the catabolic and the anabolic aspect, the former involving a disintegrative process, the latter an integrative process" (77). This language should recall that of Ibn Sina (Avicenna) on the temperaments in his \textit{Canon of Medicine}: "Inasmuch as the primary powers in the aforesaid elements are four in number (namely, heat, cold, moisture, dryness), it is evident that the temperaments in bodies undergoing generation and destruction (ana-., kata-bolism) accord with these powers" (Gruner 58). When we find Yeats saying ""Our master Avicenna has written that all life proceeds out of corruption"" in "Rosa
Alchemica" (The Secret Rose 139) and "as Avicenna did when he wrote 'all life proceeds out of corruption'" (VA 139), then we should recognize common principles at work; Yeats's "life" is Avicenna's "generation," and his "corruption" is Avicenna's "destruction." By transmitting Galen's temperaments to mediaeval Europe, Avicenna's work was a crucial link between Empedocles and modern Europe, and its principles were ripe for psychological application; Empedocles' myth was ready to be transformed into a model of how consciousness works. Fouillée and Manouvrier used it to classify how nervous and physical energies are used (Roback 75-77), but Yeats and Jung would apply it to consciousness itself.

Some early twentieth century uses of the temperaments should also have attracted Jung's attention, as they were published by German psychiatrists while he was Lecturer in Psychiatry at the University of Zurich. E. Hirt uses his professional experience to redefine the classical temperaments in terms of "variations of the speed, quantity and energy of certain psychophysiologival processes, largely the feelings" (Roback 79). Meumann also treats the temperaments as affective dispositions, but with emphases on intensity, persistence, excitability, and active or passive quality as differentiating factors (Roback 81-83). Eilenhans revises Kant's scheme, treating Kant's temperaments of activity as products of affect like the temperaments of feeling (Roback 83-84). All of these are examples of the psychiatric use being made of the temperaments during a period (1900-1909) when Jung himself was on the staff of Burghölzli Mental Clinic as a working psychiatrist.

All of the modern versions of the temperaments listed above represent only that fraction of the total activity using the temperaments which bears the clearest relation to what Jung and Yeats were doing and the highest probability of
being seen by Jung in particular. In his account of the "ten years of observation and comparison" (CW 6: par. 944) he spent developing his typology out of his initial pair of orientations, Jung claims that he surveyed the whole of contemporary psychology and found it wanting:

The question as to where the tremendous differences among individuals of the same type came from entangled me in unforeseen difficulties which for a long time I was unable to master. To observe and recognize the differences gave me comparatively little trouble, the root of my difficulties being now, as before, the problem of criteria. How was I to find suitable terms for the characteristic differences? Here I realized for the first time how young a science psychology really is. It is still little more than a chaos of arbitrary opinions and dogmas, produced for the most part in the study or consulting room by spontaneous generation from the isolated and Jove-like brains of learned professors, with complete lack of agreement. Without wishing to be irreverent, I cannot refrain from confronting the professor of psychology with, say, the psychology of women, of the Chinese, or of the Australian aborigines. Our psychology must get down to brass tacks, otherwise we simply remain stuck in the Middle Ages.

I realized that no sound criteria were to be found in the chaos of contemporary psychology, that they had first to be created, not out of thin air, but on the basis of the invaluable preparatory work done by many men whose names no history of psychology will pass over in silence. (CW 6: pars. 945-46)

Remember how Jung described his process of going from empirical collection of data to a theoretical explanation of them, and then to the empirical application of the theory. Jung says in the above passage that he found his data easily enough, but had trouble naming his distinctions according to their underlying causes. He could have turned to the temperaments as a long-standing classification, yet would have found them—for his purposes, at least—to be dogma: a set of differentiations without sufficient causal explanation, even after what followed Kant's innovations.

His comment about "remaining stuck in the Middle Ages" could not be more loaded with respect to the temperaments and contemporary treatments of them—made as it is in the context of his development of his typology—if he was
conscious at all of the temperaments, as we have seen he was. To jump from the Middle Ages to *Psychological Types* is to go from the classical temperaments to Jung’s typology, and Jung’s formulation of his four psychological functions is what made the jump possible. Thus the "preparatory work done by many men" encompasses both everyone who worked on the temperaments and all those whose work influenced Jung’s conception of his functions; besides Wundt’s previously mentioned work on emotion and sensation, there was Spinoza’s and Bergson’s work on intuition as mentioned in Chapter One of this dissertation, for example. We may wish that Jung had named these "many men" for our convenience, but we might ask whether Jung has nonetheless made the derivation of his typology clear enough by consistently mentioning the temperaments as his historical starting point, finding fault with their reliance on affective qualities, and saying that he had to develop his own criteria. And perhaps he is right not to say that he is using the temperaments, even if they were his starting point; when he develops his four functions, in a real sense he is no longer using the temperaments themselves and is not obligated to give them any more credit than they are due.

Still, the question remains of how Jung went from the four temperaments to his four functions, and how Yeats might have done the same. Part of this can be discerned in the origin of the contentions within the thinking/feeling and intuition/sensation pairs of functions. There was a tradition of opposing the sanguine and melancholy temperaments, which was paralleled by an opposition between the choleric and phlegmatic temperaments. There would be a tendency to do this on affective grounds, as each pair contains the most contrary dispositions; but each pair is also the most opposed in quality in Aristotelian terms:

SANGUINE: hot and moist
MELANCHOLY: cold and dry
CHOLERIC: hot and dry
PHLEGMATIC: cold and moist

Jung follows these pairings in his 1923 lecture on his typology:

You wonder perhaps why I dwell so insistently on this question of objectivity, but you would cease to wonder if ever you should try to classify people in practice. A man of pronounced sanguine temperament will tell you that at bottom he is deeply melancholic; a choleric, that his only fault consists in his having always been too phlegmatic. (CW 6: par. 888)

This statement comes in the course of an analysis of why the affective nature of the temperaments fails to provide objective enough criteria for a modern psychological typology; Jung goes on to delineate his two orientations and four functions as the criteria which answer his needs.

What we must notice in the above passage is that Jung speaks of the contending pairs in the language of psychological compensation and balancing that he always uses for talking about his own opposing pairs: conscious and unconscious, introverted and extraverted, thinking and feeling, or intuition and sensation. When Jung is talking about psychology as a science today, then mentions the temperaments in terms of contending pairs, and follows with the need to establish new, objective categories for classification, having started the lecture at Galen--what can we make of it, other than that Jung is telling us he went from Galen to his own four functions? What is not clear is which pair of functions would go with each pair of temperaments.

In Chapter One of this dissertation I suggested an inductive derivation of Jung's four functions from the four elements: Earth became the sensation function through the element's association with the primary matter which sensation perceives. Water became feeling because the heart pumps the body's chief fluid, the blood. Air becomes the thinking function through the traditional association of
abstract thought with the lofty realms of the sky. Fire became intuition because intuition stands at the top of the hierarchy of mental functions, just as fire was placed atop the classical elemental hierarchy; fire was the divine element of the sun, stars, and planets, and so was higher than the others. Unfortunately, this does not square with the elemental attributions of the four temperaments. The problem lies in the attribution of earth to the melancholy temperament and water to the phlegmatic, rather than the reverse as suggested by the above attribution of functions.

This gap was one place where Jung and Yeats may have departed significantly from the temperaments by reassigning elements to those two temperaments. If we were to assign Jung’s functions to the temperaments strictly on the strength of the relation between a function and how its corresponding temperament is usually perceived, a case can be made for assigning them thus:

CHOLERIC = intuition = fire
SANGUINE = thinking = air
MELANCHOLY = feeling = water
PHLEGMATIC = sensation = earth

This assignment moves away from the affective qualities of the temperaments toward other aspects of their behavior. The choleric had the rapidity of response we associate with intuition; the sanguine’s optimism stemmed from the detachment or objectivity we associate with thinking; the melancholy displayed the greatest depth of feeling or moodiness; and the phlegmatic suggested a complacent practicality and sensuality that could be linked with sensation. In the traditional view, earth (or sensation) had been linked with melancholy because black bile was thought to be cold and dry like earth; this led to the earthiest planet, Saturn, being assigned to melancholy and imparting its saturnine character to that temperament (Klibansky 127-28). Phlegm was considered cold and
moist like water, on the other hand.

But if we at least concede the possibility of the above reassignment of elements to temperaments, then Kant’s scheme of the temperaments suddenly falls into a symmetry that precisely mirrors Yeats’s four quarters in A Vision, as well as Jung’s four preferred types:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>activity</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>feeling</th>
<th>15</th>
<th>feeling</th>
<th>22</th>
<th>activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PHLEGmatic</td>
<td>MELancholy</td>
<td>SANGUINE</td>
<td>CHOLERIC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(earth)</td>
<td>(water)</td>
<td>(air)</td>
<td>(fire)</td>
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<td>slackening</td>
<td>heightening</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

First, as was suggested earlier, Kant’s two central temperaments of feeling, parallel Yeats’s two central antithetical quarters where Unity of Being is possible; we should recall that Unity of Being is above all emotional: “Every emotion begins to be related to every other as musical notes are related. It is as though we touched a musical string that set other strings vibrating” (VB 88). Second, the temperaments of activity then correspond to Yeats’s two primary quarters (the first and fourth) that are concerned with active external life rather than the life of inner feeling, if we accept Yeats’s view that the life of feeling demands a turn inward, away from external activity. Third, also as was noted earlier, Kant’s slackening and heightening of energy parallels Yeats’s inward movement of consciousness from Phases 1 to 15 and outward movement from Phases 15 to 1.

In regard to Jung, the two central temperaments correspond to feeling and thinking, which both work best when introverted. The first and last temperaments correspond to sensation and intuition, which Jung thinks work better when extraverted; this perceiving pair should play a greater role in external activity, responding to external situations.

Admittedly, this scheme rests on the reassignment of the elements, but consider the contention between temperaments that it sets up: the depressive
melancholy (feeling) balances the optimistic sanguine (thinking), and the torpid
phlegmatic (sensation) balances the impulsive choleric (intuition), as in both
Yeats and Jung’s systems, and in the tradition of the classical temperaments.
What I am demonstrating here could be grounds for reworking the temperaments
as Yeats and Jung might have done. As I argued earlier, Yeats and Jung may
not have gone to the temperaments so much for authority as for a starting point;
Jung repeatedly insists that the temperaments themselves cannot be the basis
for a modern psychological system. His struggle to conceive and name his own
quaternity of functions to replace the temperaments parallels Yeats’s effort to
create and especially to name his *Four Faculties*; new names indicate a new
start.

We can also discover a basis for the relation between functions in Yeats
and Jung’s systems if we look back to the qualitative makeup of the four ele-
ments according to Aristotle:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Orientation</th>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Element</th>
<th>Qualities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>antithetical</em></td>
<td>thinking</td>
<td>AIR</td>
<td>hot/moist primary,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>introverted</td>
<td>feeling</td>
<td>WATER</td>
<td>cold/moist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sensation</td>
<td>intution</td>
<td>FIRE</td>
<td>hot/dry</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The elements (or functions) best suited to each orientation have their *passive*
quality in common: thinking and feeling come from the moist pair of air and water,
while intuition and sensation come from the dry fire and earth pair. Thinking and
feeling are Jung’s rational or judging functions, of course, while intuition and
sensation are his irrational or perceiving pair. The contention within each pair
could then derive from their *active* qualities: hot and cold contend in the air/water
pair, as they would in the fire/earth pair as well.

We should recall the language of Avicenna’s *Canon of Medicine* again
here: "Temperament is that quality which results from the mutual interaction and
interpassion of the four contrary qualities residing within the (imponderable) elements" (Gruner 57). If Yeats and Jung analyzed the elements and temperaments in depth, the above kind of interrelationships between the qualities within the elements are what they would have found. If they are going back beyond the temperaments to the elements as I suggested, they will find some structural basis for their systems in both places. The temperaments led them in the right direction for their purposes, but they would have had to make a departure from them and start over again at the beginning—the elements—in order to discover the inherent logic that independently shaped their systems into nearly identical form.

Having covered Jung's confrontation with the temperaments, we should ask what evidence there is that Yeats knew them well enough to use them in A Vision. There are few clues, but at least one seems decisive. The first two date from the 1913-14 period when Yeats was beginning to articulate the theories that became A Vision. In the essay "Swedenborg, Mediums, and the Desolate Places," Yeats says of the more archetypal aspects of Lady Gregory's folklore,

Much that Lady Gregory has gathered seems but the broken bread of old philosophers, or else of the one sort with the dough they made into their loaves. Were I not ignorant, my Greek gone and my meagre Latin all but gone, I do not doubt that I could find much to the point in Greek, perhaps in old writers on medicine, much in Renaissance or Mediaeval Latin. (Explorations 60)

Unfortunately the context of this passage does not clarify just what it is that Yeats expects to find in these old texts that would correspond to Lady Gregory's gatherings. Is he thinking of the treatises on the nature of the soul which Aristotle, Galen, and Avicenna wrote? It could also have something to do with the temperaments—Hippocrates and Galen are "old writers on medicine" who wrote in Greek. Despite his alleged weakness in Greek and Latin, Yeats seems to have some notion of what he would find in the old texts he refers to. And the sig-
nificance of his charting a historical course from old philosophers to Greek writers on medicine to mediaeval and Renaissance writers lies in the transmission of Empedocles' ideas through Aristotelian-Galenic principles to Arabic writers, to European medical writers and alchemists, and finally to Kant's eighteenth century revival of the temperaments. Yeats could have been aware of this entire process when starting on A Vision.

Further evidence of Yeats's familiarity with early medical writers and Kant can be found in his autobiographical Reveries over Childhood and Youth, published in 1914. Here Yeats describes the painter George Wilson's landscapes as being "painted with phlegm and melancholy, the romantic movement drawing to its latest phase" (Autobiographies 56), which foreshadows the art-historical theories of A Vision in addition to commenting on the individual painter. "Phlegm and melancholy" seem strange terms to apply aesthetically unless Yeats had read Kant's Observations on the Sense of the Beautiful and the Sublime, where Kant actually evaluates the aesthetic sensibility of the four temperaments; he gives the melancholy a special capacity for appreciating the sublime, for example (64-66). If Yeats is using Kant's aesthetic temperaments here, it is admittedly a rare instance; yet Yeats would have found in Kant a precedent for what he would later do in A Vision, and may have thought that Kant's classifications needed improvement before they could be employed regularly as part of his critical apparatus. The passage quoted above certainly has the bewildering obscurity that plagues A Vision.

But the decisive reference to the temperaments appears in the Trembling of the Veil section of Yeats's autobiography. This section was published in 1922 while Yeats was working on the first edition of A Vision, and it is informed throughout by that book's system, often to the point of obscurity. But passages
like the one below are a dress rehearsal for *A Vision*:

The bright part of the moon's disk, to adopt the symbolism of a certain poem, is subjective mind, and the dark, objective mind, and we have eight and twenty Phases for our classification of mankind, and of the movement of its thought. At the first Phase--the night where there is no moonlight--all is objective, while when, upon the fifteenth night, the moon comes to the full [Phase 15], there is only subjective mind. The mid-renaissance could but approximate to the full moon "For there's no human life at the full or the dark," but we may attribute to the next three nights of the moon [Phases 16-18] the men of Shakespeare, of Titian, of Strozzi, and of Van Dyck, and watch them grow more reasonable, more orderly, less turbulent, as the nights pass; and it is well to find before the fourth--the nineteenth moon counting from the start [Phase 19]--a sudden change, as when a cloud becomes rain, or water freezes, for the great transitions are sudden. . . . (Autobiographies 360-61)

Yeats is trying out his new theories of personality and cultural history; this passage leads into the hypothesis that Oscar Wilde's personal phase made him at odds with the historical phase that he was living in. The "certain poem" he cites as authority is "The Phases of the Moon," but he is using details from the system itself; after the antithetical peak of the full moon at Phase 15, Phases 16 to 18 form a triad of the same function-type, with a change to another function-type in the triad of Phases 19 to 21, as we saw in Chapter Three of this dissertation.

In his analysis of cultural history, Yeats likes to use the term "gyre" for each of the eight triads of phases (corresponding to the eight Jungian function-types) and the four single phases of transition, which makes a total of twelve gyres within a historical cycle. The above passage treats three of these gyres--the transitional Phase 15, the 16-18 triad, and the triad of Phases 19 to 21. Counting Phase 1 as the first gyre, these would be the seventh, eighth, and ninth gyres of this historical cycle; as Yeats sees it, "The eighth gyre, which corresponds to Phases 16, 17 and 18 and completes itself say between 1550 and 1650" (VA 203; VB 293) is characterized by Shakespeare, whom Yeats explicitly associates "with the . . . beginning of the eighth gyre" (VA 204; VB 294).
If, then, Yeats associates Shakespeare with the beginning of a historical triad that corresponds to Jung’s thinking-intuition function-type and thus to the sanguine-choleric composite temperament, what are we to make of Yeats’s statement in "Four Years" that "Shakespeare himself foreshadowed a symbolic change, that is a change in the whole temperament of the world" (Autobiographies 175)? Yeats referred to his system as an "arbitrary, harsh, difficult symbolism" (VB 23), so "a symbolic change" is a shift happening within the system, as from one triad or temperament to another: the psychological reconfiguring of a civilization as expressed artistically within Shakespeare’s Hamlet. Given Yeats’s earlier aesthetic use of phlegm and melancholy, and given that he is working on A Vision at this time, what else could "a change in the whole temperament of the world" refer to? He was eager to utilize his new system, even to the point of indiscretion; he had not settled on how to write up the automatic script material yet, and so may be saying something that he would have not let slip later.

A final affirmation that Yeats was well aware of the temperaments is his late poem "The Four Ages of Man" (Variorum Poems 561). The concept of four ages of man which corresponded to the four temperaments was an ongoing part of the temperamental tradition:

Probably as early as with the Pythagoreans, the four seasons had been matched with the Four Ages of Man, the latter being counted either as boyhood, youth, manhood, and old age; or, alternatively, as youth till twenty, prime till about forty, decline till about sixty, and after that old age. A connexion could therefore be established between the without more ado between the Four Humours (and later the Four Temperaments) and the Four Ages of Man—a connexion which held good for all time and which was to be of fundamental significance in the future development of both speculation and imagery.

Through the whole of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance this cycle remained virtually unchanged, apart from some controversy over its starting point: it could begin with "phlegmatic" childhood, passing through "sanguine" youth and "choleric" prime to "melan-
cholic" old age (in certain circumstances returning to a "second childhood"); or else it could begin with "sanguine" youth, pass through a "choleric" period between twenty and forty and a "melancholic" period between forty and sixty, and end in a "phlegmatic" old age. (Klibansky 10-11)

Traditionally, then, people lived through periods linked with water, air, fire, and earth (or with air, fire, earth, and water in the alternative version).

But Yeats realigns the elements with the stages of life in accordance with the scheme of *A Vision* and the original elemental hierarchy of earth, water, air, and fire, here seen as the corresponding human attributes of "Instinct," "Passion," "Thought," and "Soul" (*Letters* 823-24) in *The Four Ages of Man*:

> He with body waged a fight;  
> Body won and walks upright.

> Then he struggled with the heart;  
> Innocence and peace depart.

> Then he struggled with the mind;  
> His proud heart he left behind.

> Now his wars with God begin;  
> At stroke of midnight God shall win.  
> (*Variorum Poems* 561)

The Jungian sensation, feeling, thinking, and intuition are are distilled to "body," "heart," "mind," and "God" to achieve an epigrammatic quality; the use of God for intuition is justified by Spinoza, as we saw in Chapter Two of this dissertation.

Yeats's explication of the poem in the letter to a friend quoted above also extends its elemental symbolism to the history of the Christian era:

- The Earth = Every early nature-dominated civilisation
- The Water = An armed sexual age, chivalry, Froissart's chronicles
- The Air = From the Renaissance to the end of the 19th Century
- The Fire = The purging away of our civilisation by our hatred (*Letters* 825)

His statement that "They are the four ages of individual man, but they are also
the four ages of civilisation" (Letters 826) indicates how far he went in applying this notion derived from the temperaments. Granted, the classical tendency was to see the elements and temperaments everywhere, but Yeats went further in making Empedocles' elemental universe real by saying that consciousness constitutes it and can shape human history. Yeats's confidence in his own system shows in the decisiveness with which he reassigns the elements to ages in the poem and assigns psychological functions to them. As I said of Jung, Yeats is not exactly using the temperaments anymore; he has remade them and made them his own.

Any consideration of A Vision in relation to its possible sources ought to bear in mind that as a totality or systematic "Explanation of Life" (VA iii) it satisfied Yeats so far as to absorb or supersede the systems he had previously relied upon. Besides the temperaments, prominent among these systems are alchemy and the Prophetic Books of William Blake, which have been cited as major influences on A Vision. But no one citing them as influences has been able to demonstrate those systems' power to explain the language of A Vision beyond their most obvious parallels. This should put their degree of possible influence in question if Jung's typology, with its common grounding in the temperaments, has so much explanatory power. The disparity must stem from the degree to which A Vision's system went beyond the earlier ones (including the temperaments) in attempting to describe our experience of reality. From the standpoint of A Vision, Yeats may have viewed alchemy and Blake as affirmations of his system rather than influences on it. Still, there are some aspects of

13 See Adams; Bloom, Yeats; Billigheimer; Moore 84-102; Raine, Yeats the Initiate 82-176; Rudd; Seiden 18-30; Whitaker.
their relationship that should be remarked upon.

That Yeats was thoroughly familiar with alchemy by 1900 is proved by his short story "Rosa Alchemica," but the introduction to VA reveals both A Vision's kinship with alchemy and Yeats's desire to go beyond alchemy:

We all, so far as I can remember, differed from ordinary students of philosophy or religion through our belief that truth cannot be discovered but may be revealed, and that if a man do not lose faith, and if he go through certain preparations, revelation will find him at the fitting moment. I remember a learned brassfounder in the North of England who visited us occasionally, and was convinced that there was certain moment in every year which, once known, brought with it "The Summum Bonum, the Stone of the Wise." But others, for it was clear that there must be a vehicle or symbol of communication, were of opinion that some messenger would make himself known, in a railway train let us say, or might be found after search in some distant land. . . . Some were looking for spiritual happiness or for some form of unknown power, but I had a practical object. I wished for a system of thought that would leave my imagination free to create as it chose and yet make all that it created, or could create, part of the one history, and that the soul's. The Greeks certainly had such a system, and Dante—though Boccaccio thought him a bitter partisan and therefore a modern abstract man—and I think no man since. Then when I had ceased from all active search, yet had not ceased from desire, the documents upon which this book is founded were put into my hands, and I had what I needed, though it may be too late. (x-xi)

For Yeats, the Philosopher's Stone is a system of thought, a system of ordering consciousness for imaginative purposes. It was based on the revelation he had long sought, one that he had prepared for in Per Amica Silentia Lunae and the essays "Swedenborg, Mediums, and the Desolate Places" and "Magic": a synthesis that pulled together all that he had been working on and yielded a foundation that he could work from for the rest of his career.

Joseph Campbell applies the alchemical ideal to the goal of Jung's typology in a way that helps understand what A Vision meant for Yeats:

"Individuation" is Jung's term for the process of achieving such command of all four functions that, while bound to the cross of this limiting earth (Saint Paul's "body of this death"), one might open one's eyes at the center, to see, think, feel and intuit transc-endence, and to act out of such knowledge. This, I would say, is
the final good, the Summum Bonum, of all his thought and work.

(oxvii)

In Yeats's case we might say "write out of such knowledge" of transcendance, bearing in mind Yeats's own ironic consciousness that even the revelation he had sought came in writings whose authorship and authority were suspect, and that transcendance itself eluded even his best efforts to write it into presence within A Vision.

It is worth noting that Jung claims not to have gained any insight into alchemy until 1928, well after he had finished Psychological Types (Memories, Dreams, Reflections 204), and that he made no major revisions to Psychological Types after finishing his alchemical studies. Their independence of each other may result from Jung viewing his typology as a classification of consciousness, while alchemy deals with the unconscious:

[Psychological Types] was an effort to deal with the relationship of the individual to the world, to people and things. It discussed the various aspects of consciousness, the various attitudes the conscious mind might take toward the world, and thus constitutes a psychology of consciousness regarded from what might be called a clinical angle. (Memories, Dreams, Reflections 207)

Only after I had familiarized myself with alchemy did I realize that the unconscious is a process, and that the psyche is transformed or developed by the relation of the ego to the contents of the unconscious. In individual cases that transformation can be read from dreams and fantasies. . . . I had at last reached the ground which underlay my own experiences of the years 1913 to 1917; for the process through which I had passed at that time corresponded to the process of alchemical transformation. (Memories, Dreams, Reflections 209)

Jung is referring to a period when he struggled with an onslaught of his own dreams and fantasies whose significance was embodied in his subsequent theories as he worked out the meaning of those dreams. Jung found metaphors for psychology in alchemy, which gave him both a framework for his therapeutic process and a historical link back to the Pre-Socratics and early Gnostics that
assured him of historical precedent for his psychology. Yeats's early familiarity with alchemy may have led him to take for granted the things which Jung found in it, but like Jung he did find further affirmation of the goal of a balanced totality of consciousness in its conception of the perfectly balanced lapis philosophorum, which corresponds to Galen's ideal of the perfectly balanced temperament. It would be a mistake to overestimate alchemy's influence on A Vision, however.

Likewise, attributing influence more than affirmation to William Blake's Prophetic Books is a mistake where A Vision is concerned. Bloom stands the situation on its head when he says that

for all Yeats's quasi-erudition, in which his critics of the occult persuasion have followed him, the substance of A Vision is quarried largely out of Blake (or one should say Yeats's Blake) with a number of structural hints from Shelley. Just as Yeats grossly exaggerated the relation of Blake and Shelley to esoteric traditions, so his followers, or rather a group thereof, have magnified Yeats's dependence on the arcana that constituted only another stimulus for his work. (212)

Bloom is right to assign lesser importance to the influence of truly esoteric traditions, if we count the temperaments as something much more popular than Theosophy and the like. But a simple rebuttal of his claim for Blake's primacy is possible: if the massive industry of Blake explication has produced nothing that makes it possible to read A Vision at the sentence level, then the degree of Blake's influence must be limited.

This is nowhere more apparent than on the following page of Bloom's book, where Bloom gives a table purporting to relate Yeats's Four Faculties to Blake's four Zoas, characters in Shelley's Prometheus Unbound, and Freudian concepts. The problem is that Bloom sets up the table as a talisman, utters an incantation--"The Freud is there only as common mythology; all the equivalences are rough, but they will be found to work" (213)--and then neglects to
demonstrate that the equivalences work at the sentence level of _A Vision_ outside of the brief descriptions of the _Faculties_, if at all (226-34). As Hough says when trying to make sense of the _Faculties_, "The Blakean, Shelleyan and Freudian parallels suggested by Bloom are ridiculous" (102); they have not been "found to work" to any great extent by anyone, or _A Vision_ would have made sense before now.

Bloom's statement that "_A Vision_ is most heavily indebted to Blake, but it is not a Blakean book" (211) is no defense of Bloom's position, but rather a measure of his determination to impose Blake on _A Vision_. Calling _A Vision_ bad Blake does not help us to read it, and is in fact a strategy to avoid reading it while denying Yeats's work independent status, a strategy which is crucial to the theory of poetic influence which Bloom first advanced in _Yeats_. Those things in Yeats which most resemble Blake should be much more similar to Blake than they are. Blake's four Zoas are indeed elemental, and their division into active Emanation and passive Spectre should recall the active and passive qualities of the four elements, but this harks back to Empedocles, as does _A Vision_--and Flannery makes the point that Yeats had found these things elsewhere before he started reading Blake's _Prophetic Books_: "What Yeats was working out for a Cabbalistic order, what had been introduced to him by Theosophy and magical study, was also the base of a great poet's symbolic structure--at least as Yeats perceived it" (_Yeats and Magic_ 43). What Yeats does in _A Vision_ is rethink the eightfold Empedoclean structure from first principles (as Jung did) in order to arrive at something sufficient for his purposes.

Yeats actually that he found Blake's system inadequate in specific respects:

I wished for a system of thought that would leave my imagination free to create as it chose and yet make all that it created, or could
create, part of the one history, and that the soul’s. The Greeks had such a system, and Dante . . . and I think no man since . . . What I have found indeed is nothing new, for I will show presently that Swedenborg and Blake and many before them knew that all things had their gyres; but Swedenborg and Blake preferred to explain them figuratively, and so I am the first to substitute for Biblical or mythological figures, historical movements and actual men and women. (VA xi-xii)

To this last Yeats might add "actual psychological functions and orientations" delineated clearly rather than allegorized figuratively. But it is clear that Yeats does not class Blake with the Greeks or Dante or himself as a system-builder, and that Blake's main shortcoming is a failure to deal with external reality adequately.

A new study of Blake in the light of what we learn from using Jung to read A Vision at the sentence level might yet disclose solid links between the two poets' systems, but that is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Until then, their relations are best summarized by Flannery: "Blake did not so much influence Yeats as serve to give him confidence that a major poet could work from an occult system. Yeats did not find a system in Blake but rather confirmed ideas he was adopting from Theosophy and Cabbalism" (Yeats and Magic 39). Yeats started at the beginning in his master system, as he realized when he read philosophy after finishing VA: "Although the more I read the better did I understand what I had been taught, I found neither the geometrical symbolism nor anything that could have inspired it except the vortex of Empedocles" (VB 20). Yeats's influences grow stronger the closer they approach Empedocles historically, and we have seen how he completely reconceived even Galen's temperaments to make them his own; this transformation means that everything following Empedocles eventually becomes more an affirmation than an inspiration to him the later it falls historically.
An important remaining issue of influence concerns the contribution of George Yeats to A Vision's system. As Cullingford points out, acting as a medium was an empowering and relatively socially acceptable voice for women at the time (115). And it is clear that important features of the system appear verbatim in the automatic script that she dictated: twenty-eight lunar phases, the two orientations, the four elements, the original names of the Four Faculties, and even details like the divisions between triads of phases, as Margaret Mills Harper notes (55-63). But the poet reworked some of them significantly, as when he renamed the Faculties, and he may have added even more. There is definite confusion in George Yeats's early attribution of psychological functions to the four elements in the automatic script; the first appearance of the elements on January 7, 1918 assigns them to the proper quarters of A Vision's cycle, but reverses the functions of two of the elements; the comments are mine:

\begin{verbatim}
Earth = instinct (sensation)  
Water = desire (intuition desires unity)  
Air = intellect (thinking)  
Fire = emotion (feeling)
\end{verbatim}

Feeling is assigned to fire instead of water at this stage (Harper I: 123-24).

An automatic writing session three weeks later shows another instance of confusion in a statement which became the basis of the poem "The Four Ages of Man" only after Yeats made a major change in what his wife had dictated in Questions 8 and 9 of that session's script:

8. In every cycle - first 1/4 fighting body - 2nd 1/4 fighting mind - 3rd 1/4 fighting heart - 4[th] 1/4 fighting soul

9. What do you take it does the fighting
9. Mind against body against mind against heart against soul because in these quarters these four are dominant (Harper I: 172)

Yeats would later reverse "mind" and "heart" in this scheme so as to put feeling
in the second quarter and thinking in the third quarter, even changing a table in VA's galley proofs to reflect this (Harper 1:173).

However, a session only three days later gives early forms of the Four Principles which correspond to the Faculties, and here the Principle of the second quarter is "passionate" or emotional (Harper 1:186), and was retained as the Passionate Body in VA and VB. This indicates that Mrs. Yeats also dictated the scheme that her husband eventually used, but there is evidence that he began to impose this structure on the later automatic writing once the scheme had become clear to him. We see this in his question about the "Four Automatisms" on September 21, 1918: "First quarter instinct? second emotion third intellect, fourth morality" (Harper 2:126), which was answered affirmatively in the script. It may well have been Yeats's knowledge of other systems such as alchemy, Blake, or the temperaments which helped him to weed out inconsistencies in the automatic script and shape the material into a coherent system. Through his practice of asking questions which George Yeats would answer, Yeats's knowledge of other systems would have influenced his wife's responses. They also had enough reading in common from their shared occult interests that an influence on either of them could well have been familiar to the other, even if the system they were creating was new to them. And George's verbatim contributions to A Vision are both fundamental and skeletal; where the descriptions of the phases are concerned, Yeats fleshed out the automatic script's bare tables of characteristics with a great deal of his own interpretation of the interaction of the four functions and two orientations. If he was aware of the temperaments, and had decided to modernize them, they would have influenced A Vision at this stage.

Something in the automatic script for 9 April 1919 strongly suggests that such a process took place. Yeats asked the "Communicators" about the origin of
A Vision’s system, and was told that it was "induced" by the strongly "lunar" or antithetical or introverted nature of both Yeatses, which led Yeats to ask whether the system had already existed in the collective unconscious:

2. Induced yet pre-existant - preexistent in anima mundi?
2. No that is what I have been waiting for - This system is not preexistent - it is developed & created by us & and by you two or you three [George Yeats was pregnant] now - from a preexisting psychology - all the bones are in the world - we only select & our selection is subordinate to you both - therefore we are dependent on you & you influence our ability to develop & create by every small detail of your joint life [sic] (Harper 2: 249)

Thus the system of A Vision was "not preexistent" as a finished system; its machinery was a joint production of the Yeatses’ Daimons or, more plausibly, of George Yeats’s subconscious. But the development of this system "from a preexisting psychology - all the bones are in the world" points directly to the temperaments as the predecessor of A Vision’s system.

Answers to Yeats’s ensuing questions may depict the system as superseding the temperaments, alchemy, Blake, and other systems deriving from Empedocles that are historical analogues of A Vision:

3. You mean by pre-existent psychology its most abstract form?
3. In human nature & human life & spiritual life

4. Yet even for its least abstract form one finds historic analogies.
4. Well

5. Are you not aware in working of its past use of those analogies.
5. No never - that is why we can force true thought into a philosophic system (Harper 2: 250)

Only an exhaustive comparison of the automatic script with the various manuscripts of A Vision and the two editions of the book could hope to determine the Yeats’s relative contributions, and that is beyond the scope of this dissertation.
But being able to read *A Vision* at the sentence level will make that process much easier.

As I said earlier in this chapter, though the temperaments lent a form that shaped Yeats and Jung's typologies--four basic types, an active/passive distinction, the possibility of compound types--Yeats and Jung made a quantum leap in expanding them into systems that were really self-sufficient world views. In so doing, they tried to validate Empedocles by refiguring his eightfold vortex/universe as an eightfold structure of consciousness that constitutes the knowable human universe. By thinking through the inherent logic of the structural possibilities within the temperaments, they arrived at systems that are virtually identical in their details, fulfilling in specific terms what Olney sees in general terms:

One hesitates before the muchness of it all: where does one not find nearly identical quaternities whenever some visionary--Blake or Yeats or Jung, Boehme or Paracelsus or Timaeus--sets about drawing out the whole scheme of the world or of reality? It seems as if, in the division of experience, the investigator could not but come up with quaternities--they appear to be in his mind as much as in the world, but in the world as much as in his mind. It is clear that the mind cannot know any other reality than the one it is fitted out to know--as Blake put it, a cup cannot contain more than its capaciousness--but that reality that is proper to it, or configured to it, the mind can know: a cup can be filled to capacity, and what it holds is no less real for being of just this volume. (364-65)

The survival of Jung's system not only in analytical psychology but in adaptations such as the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator is an indication that the original quaternity of elements found a viable modern form as a system of psychological classification. Yeats's later poems and plays stand as evidence that such a system has imaginative potential as well; what remains to be demonstrated is how this potential is also fulfilled in the cycle of phases in Book I of *A Vision* through a reading of that section of the book.
Chapter 6
Reading Phases 2 through 15: the First Half
of A Vision’s Cycle

This determinate reading of A Vision’s cycle of phases will show its underlying psychological system at work in an intelligible fashion. It will identify the various psychological functions operating under their guise of the Faculties, and it will trace significant shifts in psychological orientation as well. By analyzing the nature of the eight triads of phases both internally and in relation to each other, the major movements of the cycle will be delineated and built up into a coherent whole that should give some sense of the organic flow of the system. The out of phase state in each phase will also be addressed, as the nature of this imbalance tells us something significant about the potential balance that the phase can achieve; Yeats considers the out of phase state important enough to lead off most of the phase descriptions with it. Such a reading must necessarily be limited; it can only use salient examples to show how to make out the outlines of the system at work as one reads along. A Vision is constructed so densely that a reader could repeat the process indefinitely without getting to the bottom of all that is going on in the cycle of phases; yet this preliminary study should show that what is going on is intelligible, and thus demonstrate that reading A Vision at the sentence level is indeed possible.

Like Yeats, I would prefer to begin a survey of the system at Phase 2, because as a phase of transition Phase 1 can indeed "better be described after Phase 28" (VB 105); the cycle truly begins with the physical incarnation at Phase 2. Phases 2 through 4 are the latter phases of spiritual objectivity; as the Will, extraverted sensation appears as the "bodily instincts" of Phase 2 (VB 107), the "senses and subconscious nature" of Phase 3 (VB 108), and the "sense" which
"expands and contracts" in Phase 4 (VB 110). Because these are phases of spiritual objectivity, extraverted intuition and extraverted feeling exert a strong influence as the Creative Mind and the Body of Fate of these phases. They experience an intuitive "Unity with Nature" (VA 29), as their intuitive Creative Minds perceive a "supersensual impulse" in Phase 2 (VB 106), and a "supersensual rhythm" in Phase 3 (VB 108). The term "supersensual" indicates that extraverted intuition is at work here, perceiving the underlying unity of the world as the rhythm of Nature rather than as the transcendant God of the fourth quarter. But this direct experience of unity is ending in Phase 4, as the primary tincture closes during that phase; there we find an intuitive "wisdom of instinct": "it as though he woke suddenly out of sleep and thereupon saw and remembered more than others" (VB 110). Yeats's image for intuition here is vivid—an instantaneous perceptive remembering of the world.

Feeling should be considered extraverted in these phases, as it is directly influenced by the outside world. It appears in its judging capacity in Phase 2: "He would decide on this or that by no balance of the reason but by an infallible joy . . ." (VB 106), while Phase 3 "takes delight in all that passes. . . . every season brings its delight" (VB 108). This feeling becomes a "keen interest" in Phase 4: "his interest in everything that happens, in all that excites his instinct ('search'), is so keen that he has no desire to claim anything for his own will; nature still dominates his thought as passion" (VB 109-10). Several things in this sentence tell us that it describes the feeling function: the "excited" feeling; "search," which is used to describe the phase's Body of Fate from Phase 12 in the "Table of the Four Faculties" (VB 97); and that fact that "passion dominates thought" here, which is significant because feeling is still stronger than thinking in this phase. Yeats takes pains to describe each function in every phase, but often his reader
must take pains to recognize those functions for what they are. Notice, too, the interconnection of instinct and feeling in Phase 4—"all that excites his instinct"—because Yeats is at pains to weave the functions together in his descriptions and make them as organically interrelated as possible.

However, the thinking function is hard to recognize in these phases only because its relative strength is still very weak. Phase 2 uses "no balance of the reason" in its judgment (VB 106), while Phase 3 is "Almost without intellect" (VB 108). Thinking finally becomes a discernible influence in Phase 4, where "instinct grows reflective. He is full of practical wisdom, a wisdom of saws and proverbs, or founded upon concrete examples" (VB 110). Note the simplicity of this thinking, which suits the generally simple nature of these early phases; yet it interacts with sensation’s practicality and intuition’s "concrete examples" as well.

Again, I consider thinking to extraverted in these phases because it seems externally influenced ("saws and proverbs") and directed toward practical concerns. Extraverted thinking becomes prominent, however, when these phases lead out of phase lives and copy the opposing third quarter, though thinking is so weak in Phase 2 that it can only "copy the emotional explosion of Phase 16 in so far as difference of phase permits" (VB 106). Extraverted thinking is clearly responsible for Phase Three's "clodhopper folly, that keeps his intellect moving among conventional ideas with a sort of make-believe" (VB 108), as well as the "make-believe . . . abstract or conventional ideas" of Phase 4 (VB 109). Out of phase, this triad tries to be introverted thinkers along the lines of the third quarter, but because they lack the "antithetical capacity" (VB 109) for receiving the subjective images of introversion, they can only toy pointlessly with what Jung calls "generally accepted ideas" in his description of the extraverted thinking type (CW 6: par. 585).
When in phase, the triadic cycle of the manifestation of power, codification of that power, and submission before the next emergence of power is manifested in Phase 2 as the "Beginning of Energy" (VB 105), and it is stabilized in the "perfect bodily sanity" of Phase 3 where "one instinct balances another" (VB 108). In Phase 4, the submission is to the initial emergence of thinking, as "instinct grows reflective" (VB 110); it is thinking that will be manifested as power when the next triad begins, as thinking is stronger than feeling by Phase 5.

One final point about these phases of spiritual objectivity: though Harper is confused about its meaning (1:125) when Yeats uses the term "race" in discussing the first quarter, Yeats means a kind of collective survival instinct that impels individuals to sacrifice themselves for the good of their race. The survival of the race outweighs the survival of the individual, but this creates no conflict in these early phases, because they have virtually no sense of discrete selfhood—they cannot pursue their own interests to the detriment of others, because they are not yet capable of developing such interests. These phases have strong instinctive drives, but they cannot be truly selfish with them (when in phase) because they have no sense of self. Extraverted sensation gives them a strong sense of external reality, but they have no real sense of themselves apart from that reality and thus cannot analyze it yet. Unity with Nature is responsible for this identification of self with the world.

As we saw in Chapter Three of this dissertation, the tinctures effectively close between Phases 4 and 5, which ushers in physical objectivity in Phases 5 through 7. The conscious mind is no longer wholly extraverted, as subjectivity and self-consciousness begin to be part of consciousness in these phases. Extraverted sensation increases in strength and complexity as the Will, as "Impulse or instinct begins to be all in all" in Phase 6 (VB 114), and the "instincts
are all but at the apex of their complexity" in Phase 7 (VB 115). At the same
time, extraverted intuition has grown too weak to create unity with the world, and
functions only as a weakening "morality" which is not even mentioned until Phase
7: "At Phases 2, 3, and 4 the man moved within traditional or seasonable limits,
but since Phase 5 limits have grown indefinite; public codes, all that depend upon
habit, are all but dissolved . . ." (VB 115), "public codes" being the collective form
of intuitive morality.

Feeling is also obscured by its decrease in strength, but it noticeably
increases in subjectivity and seems more of a subjective reaction to external
things and events, as in Phase 6:

While Thomas Aquinas, whose historical epoch was nearly of this
phase, summed up in abstract categories all possible experience,
not that he might know but that he might feel, Walt Whitman makes
catalogues of all that has moved him, or amused his eye, that he
may grow more poetical. (VB 114)

Men of Phase 7 "delight in actions . . . that are inspired by emotions that move all
hearers because such that all understand" (VB 116). We might understand this
through the placement of Alexandre Dumas in Phase 7; his historical novels
would be placed amid actual events (sensation's influence), and would appeal to
the sentimentality of a mass audience. Part of the increasing awareness of self
in these phases is an increasing awareness of one's own feelings and the use of
feeling for subjective purposes like the poetry of Phase 6 and the heroism of
Phase 7, however. The movement of feeling and thinking toward introversion in
these phases is important to recognize for the sake of clarity in following the
movement of the cycle, because it foreshadows the change to antithetical
orientation at Phase 8.

Thinking is stronger than feeling in these phases, and its prominence sets
the tone of the triad. "Abstraction has indeed begun . . ." (VB 112) as "knowl-
edge of the laws of Nature" in Phase 5 (VB 113), and continues as the "abstract categories" and "catalogues" of Phase 6 (VB 114). As was the case with feeling, thinking's degree of extraversion is still considerable, as we see in Phase 6:

Abstraction had been born, but it remained the abstraction of a community, of a tradition, a synthesis starting, not as with Phases 19, 20, and 21 with logical deduction from an observed fact, but from the whole experience or from some experience of the individual or of the community: "I have such and such a feeling. I have such and such a belief. What follows from feeling, what from belief?" (VB 114)

Yet though this thinking begins with the ideas of a community or of a tradition, it is moving inward toward a more subjective evaluation: "What follows?" Again, the movement toward an antithetical orientation is a crucial aspect of thinking in these phases because it reflects an overall movement toward introversion.

As proof of this, I would offer Yeats's use of "experience" in these phases, which denotes the combination of extraverted sensation's perception of external facts with introverted thinking's subjective interpretation of them. The term is first used in this sense in connection with the closing of the tinctures between Phases 4 and 5:

Since Phase 26 the primary tincture has so predominated, man is so sunk in Fate, in life, that there is no reflection, no experience, because that which reflects, that which acquires experience, has been drowned. Man cannot think of himself as separate from that which he sees with the bodily eye or in the mind's eye. (VB 111)

Reflection and experience are impossible in Phases 26 through 4 not simply because thinking is so weak in those phases, but because thinking so lacks subjectivity in them as well. (The "mind's eye" in the above passage refers to intuition and its perception of God, not to any introverted function.) To reflect upon events requires a subjective consideration of them, and even though sensation is also growing less extraverted in Phases 5 to 7, subjective thinking about events is far more instrumental than slightly subjective perception of them in shaping
"experience." In Phase 6, we learn that "Experience is all-absorbing, subordinat-
ing observed fact . . ." (VB 114), which implies that thinking's subjective inter-
pretation controls extraverted sensation's observation of facts when shaping
experience.

As soon as it begins, experience is put to personal use in Phase 5:

Abstraction has indeed begun, but it comes to him as a portion of
experience cut off from everything but itself and therefore fitted to
be the object of reflection. He no longer touches, eats, drinks,
thinks and feels Nature, but sees her as something from which he is
separating himself, something that he may dominate, though only
for a moment and by some fragmentary violence of sensation or of
thought. Nature may seem half gone, but the laws of Nature have
appeared, and he can change her rhythms and seasons by his
knowledge. (VB 112-13)

The new strength of "sensation and thought"—now stronger than intuition and
feeling, so that "Nature is half gone"—make the being capable of acting for itself
for the first time in the cycle. The "catalogues and categories" of Phase 6 help
the individual to feel or to grow more poetic; though the personally heroic ges-
tures and poses of Phase 7 are "inseparable from circumstance," they are also
"hardly distinguishable from personality" (VB 115), and personality is the hallmark
of antithetical life. The increasing introversion of thinking and feeling thus fore-
shadow their emergence as the active Faculties of the second quarter.

Within the triad, thinking is the power manifested in the "knowledge of the
laws of Nature" in Phase 5, and it is codified or stabilized in the "catalogue and
category" of Phase 6. Individuality emerges in Phase 7, as the being begins to
fully separate itself from primary dependence on society and external circums-
stances; the "Assertion of Individuality" (VB 114) in Phase 7 precedes the conflict
of Phase 8, where the being must succeed in becoming an antithetical individual.

When out of phase, the triad is dominated by extraverted thinking and feel-
ing, from the "insincere attitudes" of Phase 5 (VB 112) to the "practical sanity"
and "healthy and intelligible emotions" of Phase 6 (VB 113) and the "thoughts and emotions . . . common to all" of Phase 7 (VB 115). Thinking and feeling are still too extraverted to take command of these phases when they are out of phase, but when in phase, as subordinate functions they are subjective enough to bring the cycle to the brink of antithetical life.

In Chapter 4 of this dissertation we examined the shift from primary to antithetical emphasis at Phase 8, where individuality's desire to stand out and separate from society is achieved when sensation (as sensuality) drives out intuition (as morality) and is itself replaced by introverted feeling as the dominant function. Physical subjectivity follows in Phases 9 through 11, where thinking and sensation still have a strong influence in the form of intellectual systems and practical concerns. Although feeling has definitely become introverted as the Will, it has not yet withdrawn inward to the realm of archetypal images; it remains both externally directed to some degree. The effect of this orientation is stated most clearly in Phase 10:

He seeks . . . to free the creative power from mass emotion, but never wholly succeeds, and so the life remains troubled, a conflict between pride and race, and passes from crisis to crisis. At Phase 9 there was little sexual discrimination, and now there is emotion created by circumstance rather than by any unique beauty of body or of character. (VB 123)

Love is not yet reserved for the "unique beauty" of those who actually personify some subjective image; it still seeks less ideal objects and so reveals that it is still somewhat externally oriented and has not yet shaken off "mass emotion" entirely. Here Yeats is setting up the drama of desire that centers on Phase 15.

Yet feeling does become more introverted during these phases, though it is still relatively weak in strength; feeling ensures the antithetical independence of Phase 9 through his dramatisation of himself as a form of passionate self-
mastery* (VB 121). Though feeling is still externally directed as rage against the world in Phase 10, with the aid of introverted thinking it also approaches the archetypal image for the first time:

Here is rage, desire to escape but not now by mere destruction of the opposing fate; for a vague abstract sense of some world, some image, some circumstance, harmonious to emotion, has begun, or of something harmonious to emotion that may be set upon the empty pedestal, once visible world, image, or circumstance has been destroyed. (VB 123)

The antithetical tincture opens during Phase 11, and the process of withdrawal into subjective reverie begins in earnest, though it is not yet complete: "The man of the phase is a half-solitary, one who defends a solitude he cannot or will not inhabit . . ." (VB 125). Not yet having withdrawn into that subjective solitude, his emotion is still externally directed as "rage against rough-and-ready customary thought" (VB 125) or extraverted thinking.

Introverted thinking is still relatively strong as the Creative Mind of these phases, though the self-dramatizing life experience of Phases 21, 20, and 19 tends to overshadow the thinking function, as in Phase 9's "dramatisation of himself as a form of passionate self-mastery" (VB 121). The "vague abstract sense of some world, some image, some circumstance, harmonious to emotion" of Phase 10 (VB 123; emphasis added) and the "Creative Mind that would destroy exterior popular sanction" of Phase 11 (VB 126) are both products of increasingly introverted thinking, though it is still extraverted enough to be concerned with ideas and their external implications more than the pure underlying images of absolute introversion.

Extraverted sensation is also strong as the Body of Fate of these "phases of action where the man mainly defines himself by his practical relations" (VB 127); their awareness of the "facts of life" (VB 122) makes their antithetical self-
conception an instrument for social change, as the examples of Parnell (Phase 10) and Savanarola (Phase 11) attest. Sensation appears as "sensuality" in Phase 9 (VB 121), and the "pantheism" of Phase 11 also harks back to the first quarter (VB 126). But as the Body of Fate, sensation also works to thwart subjectivity through the sensuality of Phase 9 and the "conflict of pride and race" in Phase 10 (VB 123).

Extraverted intuition is still too weak to have much influence as the Mask, but the "vehement self, working through mathematical calculation, a delight in straight line and right angle" of Phase 9 (VB 120) derives from the intuitive "technical mastery" of Phase 23 (VB 164), while the "code of personal conduct" of Phase 10 (VB 122) is an internalization of the intuitive code formed in Phase 24. The intuitive "system of belief" (VB 125) based on the emergent "intuition of God" (VB 176) which Phase 25 creates is internalized in Phase 11 and "makes possible for the first time the solitary conception of God" in Spinoza's work (VB 126). But even the perception of God as an external unity is being turned inward into a "solitary conception" that antithetically challenges society's view of God.

When out of phase, this triad tends to accept society's view and is dominated by extraverted feeling. Phase 10 "accepts what form (Mask and Image) those about him admire" (VB 122), while Phase 11 is "carried off by some contagion of belief, some general interest, and compelled to substitute for intellectual belief some form of personal pride and so to become the proud prelate of tradition" (VB 125). In phase, the power which is manifested in Phase 9 is that of antithetical personality, which is stabilized in the personal code of Phase 10--"personality no longer perceived as power only" (VB 123). The new power that emerges in Phase 11 is "solitude" (VB 125), the antithetical independence and reverie which will be an integral part of Unity of Being.
In Phases 12 through 14, the open tinctures of spiritual subjectivity provide direct experience of the subjective images; consciousness becomes almost wholly introverted as part of a nearly complete withdrawal into the image through solitary reverie. The strength of feeling and intuition in these phases combines with their introverted orientation to create an emotional unity around the image; in Phase 12,

The phases of action where the man mainly defines himself by his practical relations are finished, or finishing, and the phases where he defines himself mainly through an image of the mind begun or beginning: phases of hatred for some external fate are giving way to phases of self-hatred. (VB 127)

Feeling is withdrawing into the image, as the above change from externally directed hate to self-hatred suggests; the antithetical conflict with the surrounding society—though theoretically still in force—is reduced to largely ignoring society while pursuing the solitary reverie. The man who "overcomes himself . . . and so no longer needs, like Phase 10, the submission of others, or, like Phase 11, conviction of others to prove his victory. Solitude has been born at last . . ." (VB 127). As this solitude deepens, the emotional Will withdraws its feeling from all but its beloved Image; as the Image is the external counterpart of some subjective image, this too is a symbolic withdrawal. By Phase 14, Helen of Troy "understands nothing yet seems to understand everything; already serves nothing, yet alone seeming of service. Is it not because she desires so little, gives so little that men will die and murder in her service?" (VB 133). I have already commented on this passage's similarity to Jung's description of the withdrawal of feeling in the introverted feeling type in Chapter Two of this dissertation, but it is important to see the process as a progressive one.

As the Mask, introverted intuition now seeks an internal unity around the image rather than any unity in the external world; its aim could be called unity
with the image rather than the unity with the world we saw in Phases 2 to 4. While extraverted intuition causes a "sinking into the world" in Phases 26 through 4 (VB 173), introverted intuition causes external Images to sink into unity with their subjective counterparts, and even causes the body of Phase 14 to unite with and take on the form of its own corresponding image:

The aim of the being should be to disengage those objects which are images of desire from the excitement and disorder of the Body of Fate, and under certain circumstances to impress upon these the full character of the Mask which, being from Phase 28, is a folding up, or fading into themselves. It is this act of the intellect, begun at conception, which has given the body its beauty... When we compare these images with any other phase, each seems studied for its own sake; they float as in serene air, or lie hidden in some valley, and if they move it is to music that returns always to the same note, or in a dance that so returns into itself that they seem immortal. (VB 131-32)

Introverted intuition causes this eternal return of the image to itself by perceiving the relation between external objects of desire and their corresponding subjective images, which unites the ideal form of the image with external reality, at least within the mind. The external images "fade into" the subjective ones, and this activity causes the body itself to form itself in the shape of its own eternal image; Phase 15 will inhabit the "clarified or Celestial Body" (sic), and Celestial Body is of course the Principle which corresponds to intuition (VB 136). In Phases 12 and 13, the unifying power of intuition is expressed in a "marble pure" Mask (VB 128) and a "virginal purity of emotion" (VB 129) respectively, as unity is equated with purity in the intuitive Mask of these phases.

Jung sees introverted intuition as a function which intensifies our experience of archetypal images; rather than perceiving possibilities in the underlying relations between things in the external world as extraverted intuition does, introverted intuition perceives the relation between an external object and an
archetypal image, and considers the image itself to be the possibility it explores, as we see in the description of the introverted intuition type:

Although his intuition may be stimulated by external objects, it does not concern itself with external possibilities but with what the image has released within him... [It] peers behind the scenes, quickly perceiving the inner image... This image fascinates the intuitive activity; it is arrested by it, and seeks to explore every detail of it. It holds fast to the vision, observing with the liveliest interest how the picture changes, unfold, and finally fades. (CW 6: par. 656)

Within this triad of phases, Yeats credits intuition with an increasing ability to hold the images still for this kind of examination and contemplation, as we see in Phase 14:

The images of desire, disengaged and subject to the Mask, are separate and still... The images of Phase 13 and even of Phase 12 have in a lesser degree this character. When we compare these images with those of any subsequent phase, each seems studied for its own sake; they float as in serene air, or lie hidden in some valley, and if they move it is to music that returns always to the same note, or in a dance that so returns into itself that they seem immortal. (VB 131-32)

As the Mask is now in the intuitive Body of Fate quarter, it is introverted intuition which is working to hold the images steady within the subjective reverie. At Phase 15 the images will be constant and unfading; Yeats’s inner world of images is a timeless one like Jung’s realm of primordial archetypes. But Yeats thinks that the increasing subjectivity of Phases 12 to 14 enables their artists to hold the image steady in contemplation and even preserve it in a work of art, and so prevent its fading.

The images are becoming separate from each other because of the increasing subjectivity of these phases; Yeats interprets subjectivity’s sense of self as a separation from others, and an awareness of that separation. Turning our attention to the world of subjective images turns us inward and away from other people, except for those we love precisely because they resemble or per-
sonify an inner image. We ourselves turn into images in the process, images which are also separate from one another; as the unity of the images increases, as our own unity increases, all become increasingly separated and increasingly beautiful. Near Phase 1, extraverted intuition works to unite men with each other and the external world, so that all are "drowned in the One" (VB 111); near Phase 15, introverted intuition unites each person with their own unique Idea and so refines and separates them into the Many. As the strongest functions of Phases 12 through 14, introverted feeling and intuition work together to create Unity of Being; feeling increases in depth and intensity as it withdraws into the image, while intuition unites inner images with their external counterparts to make the images a (subjective) reality. Some of Yeats's most beautiful writing in *A Vision* is thus derived from the structural particulars of his system.

Though it is relatively weak in these phases, introverted thinking still plays an important role as the *Creative Mind*. It comes from Phases 16 through 18, where thought is first developing out of the image; the mechanical structure reverses the process in Phases 12 to 14, so that we learn in Phase 14 that "Thought is disappearing into image . . ." (VB 134). Thinking and feeling withdraw into the image at the same rate, but feeling grows stronger while thinking weakens in the process. Nevertheless, thinking is present as the "philosophic intellect (Creative Mind)" in Phase 12 (VB 128), while the *Creative Mind* of Phase 13 displays "a preoccupation with those metaphors and symbols and mythological images through which we define whatever seems most strange or most morbid" (VB 130). Throughout Unity of Being, thinking deals in obvious metaphors, symbols, and images rather than systematic ideas.

Sensation, the other relatively weak function, becomes introverted and image-centered during this triad, and like intuition it manifests itself in a curious
way: "Every thought comes with sound and metaphor, and the unity of the being is no longer from its relation to facts, but from its relation to its own unity, and from now [Phase 12] on we shall meet with men and women to whom facts are a dangerous narcotic or intoxicant" (VB 127). Sensation's antithetical proportion is now so large that the senses are almost completely turned toward the inner images, in which capacity they provide the musical sound and cadences which poets can use, the visual beauty which painters and sculptors employ, the sensory details of dreams, and very probably the supernatural sights, sounds, and smells Yeats and his wife experienced during the writing of A Vision: "I can discover no apparent difference between a natural and a supernatural smell, except that the natural smell comes and goes gradually while the other is suddenly there and as suddenly gone (VB 16). This could be introverted sensation at work: sensory experiences that come from images within in the case of artists, or seemingly from nowhere in the case of the supernatural.

The small primary proportion of sensation in Phase 14 means that the senses are perceiving space which has become internalized as the world of images:

The being has almost reached the end of that elaboration of itself which has for its climax an absorption in time, where space can be but symbols or images in the mind. There is little observation even in detail of expression, all is reverie, while in Wordsworth the soul's deepening solitude has reduced mankind, when seen objectively, to a few slight figures outlined for a moment amid mountain and lake. (VB 134)

Even sensation repeats the theme of withdrawal into the image and separation from others as subjectivity nears its peak. The small degree of extraversion left to sensation fulfills its structural role as the Body of Fate: "Facts are from the Body of Fate..." and "are a dangerous narcotic or intoxicant" (VB 127) because
they represent the entire external world which impedes the subjectivity of those who try to achieve Unity of Being.

When out of phase, Phases 12 and 14 display signs of extraverted feeling; Phase 12 "spends his life in oscillation between the violent assertion of some commonplace pose, and a dogmatism that means nothing apart from the circumstances which created it" (VB 128), while in Phase 14 "Wordsworth, shuddering at his solitude, has filled his art in all but a few pages with common opinion, common sentiment . . ." (VB 134). When Phase 13 tries to live objectively, it falls under the sway of its instinctive remnant of extraverted sensation:

This is said to be the only phase where entire sensuality is possible, that is to say, sensuality without the admixture of any other element. . . . If it live objectively, that is to say, surrender itself to sensation, it becomes morbid, it sees every sensation separate from every other under the light of its perpetual analysis. . . . (VB 129-30)

Here the "perfect bodily sanity" of Phase 3 (VB 108) is distorted into complete sensuality, as Yeats uses his system to imaginatively account for the debauchery of the writers he gives as examples of the phase: Baudelaire, Beardsley, and Ernest Dowson.

This appearance of instinct during Unity of Being brings up the question of the relation of instinct to Unity of Being, because it is an area where Yeats and Jung might seem to disagree at first glance. Jung considers the instincts and archetypes to be interrelated components of the collective unconscious:

Just as his instincts compel man to a specifically human mode of existence, so the archetypes force his ways of perception and apprehension into specifically human patterns. The instincts and the archetypes together form the "collective unconscious." I call it "collective" because, unlike the personal unconscious, it is not made up of individual and more or less unique contents but of those which are universal and of regular occurrence. Instinct is an essentially collective, i.e., universal and regularly occurring phenomenon which has nothing with individuality. Archetypes have this quality in common with the instincts and are likewise collective phenomena.
In my view the question of instinct cannot be dealt with psychologically without considering the archetypes, because at bottom they determine one another. (CW 8: pars. 270-71)

The primordial image might suitably be described as the instinct’s perception of itself, or as the self-portrait of the instinct, in exactly the same way as consciousness is an inward perception of the objective life-process. Just as conscious apprehension gives our actions form and direction, so unconscious apprehension through the archetype determines the form and direction of instinct. (CW 8: par. 277)

The archetypes thus give articulated form to the instincts and are the mode by which the unconscious instincts can become known to consciousness.

Why, then, does Yeats exclude the images from the instinctive first quarter and place them in the phases of Unity of Being instead? The answer lies in the distribution of mental orientation through the cycle and the ability of the archetypes to make the unconscious available to consciousness. During the first quarter, the extraverted orientation of consciousness restricts the images to the unconscious, where they can only shape unconscious drives; the instincts must be fulfilled in the collective manner approved by society, which provides traditional expressions of the archetypes in religion, art, and other cultural forms. But in the phases of Unity of Being, the mind has become so introverted in reverie that the images or archetypes have become the objects of consciousness, and this increasing subjectivity has detached these phases from their collective ties to society at the same time.

By seeking the images in subjective reverie and consciously shaping them into works of art or acts of heroism, those who possess Unity of Being make the images quite personal without changing their universal validity—and this symbolized by the way their bodies literally take on the shape of an image near Phase 15 and become uniquely beautiful. Unity of Being is a union of consciousness with the unconscious common ground of being, as conscious activity moves into
the realm of the usually unconscious images and the body itself becomes an image. It corresponds to Jung's individuation in that each involves the individual's becoming most individual and differentiated from the collective through inner unity, which in Jung's theory requires a similar confrontation with the archetypes of the collective unconscious in a process that he considered an analogue of the alchemical process and which could also be expressed artistically. Yeats's version of the process shapes the triad of Phases 12 through 14, as the power which is manifested in Phase 12 is that of solitude and its images, which Phase 13 codifies in "expression for expression's sake" (VB 130). Absolute union with the image and existence in the realm of images emerge in Phase 14 to foreshadow the antithetical peak of Phase 15.

At Phase 15, complete spiritual objectivity is experienced as the complete introversion of consciousness while feeling gives place to thinking. The Will and the Creative Mind converge at Phase 15, so that introverted feeling and thinking meet in the realm of perfect subjective images and exchange places in the structural scheme. At the same time, the Mask and the Body of Fate meet at Phase 1, which symbolizes the total extraversion of the unconscious. The being is not conscious of the external world at all; "because, as Plotinus says, things that are of one kind are unconscious, it is an ideal or supernatural incarnation" (VB 82). The Will moves easily from introverted feeling to introverted thinking because feeling and thinking have both retreated into the image at the same rate.

Feeling has been withdrawn from other people, except those who can personify some image and thus become objects of desire, and in the process it has increased in strength. This process of withdrawal and selection recalls what Jung says about introverted feeling: "It is continually seeking an image which has no existence in reality, but which it has seen in a kind of vision. It glides
unheedingly over all objects that do not fit in with its aim. It strives after inner intensity, for which the objects serve at most as a stimulus" (CW 6: par. 638). Yeats considers Unity of Being to be capable of uniting objects with images, which gives the images an "existence in reality"; at Phase 15, the images become absolutely real.

In concert with feeling, thinking has withdrawn from the world and from ideas, which can change the external world:

Thought has been pursued, not as a means but as an end—the poem, the painting, the reverie has been sufficient of itself. . . . Since Phase 12 the Creative Mind has been so interfused by the antithetical tincture that it has more and more confined its contemplation of actual things to those that that resemble images of the mind desired by the Will. The being has selected, moulded and remoulded, narrowed its circle of living, been more and more the artist, grown more and more "distinguished" in its preference. Now contemplation and desire, united into one, inhabit a world where every beloved image has bodily form, and every bodily form is loved. (VB 135-36)

Thinking and feeling are united as "contemplation and desire" and inhabit the world of images. As feeling reaches its peak, the "effort of desire" ceases and the point of balance between the two quarters follows, because thinking has not yet begun to move outward from the image it reached just as effort ceased:

This love knows nothing of desire, for desire implies effort, and though there is still separation from the loved object, love accepts the separation as necessary to its own existence. . . . As all effort has ceased, all thought has become image, because no thought could exist if it were not carried toward its own extinction, amid fear or in contemplation; and every image is separate from every other, for if image were linked to image, the soul would awaken from its immovable trance. (VB 136)

Unlike the trauma of Phase 8 which began the Mask quarter, Phase 15 begins the Creative Mind quarter in stillness and balance. Feeling has exerted an effort to reach the image, but at the point of balance that effort ceases. Feeling has extinguished thinking in the process, but the cycle will move past the point of
balance when thinking begins a new effort to move outward from the image toward the external world during the third quarter.

During Phase 15, introverted intuition reaches its peak strength while uniting images with bodily forms. Its crowning achievement is the transformation of the body into a visible image with the aid of the Celestial Body Principle: "Its own body possesses the greatest possible beauty, being indeed that body which the soul will inhabit when all its phases have been repeated according to the number allotted: that which we call the clarified or Celestial Body [sic]" (VB 136). This process which transforms the individual has also been uniting external objects of desire with inner images. Because the external object is found by chance among one's surroundings or Body of Fate, it is the "fated Image" (VB 94), while the inner image from the Mask "is predestined, Destiny being that which comes to us from within" (VB 86), and yet is also a matter of choice--the "chosen Image" (VB 94)--because we must consciously choose to confront our destiny.

At Phase 15, intuition succeeds in bringing together the chosen, predestined inner Image from the Mask and the fated, accidental, external Image from the Body of Fate, a union which is symbolized by the convergence of the phase's Mask and Body of Fate at Phase 1: "Fate is known for the boundary that gives our Destiny its form, and--as we can desire nothing outside that form--as an expression of our freedom. Chance and Choice have become interchangeable without losing their identity" (VB 136). When all external objects of desire are united with their inner images, we can choose or desire nothing but our Fate; as part of the same process, our external body has become united with its ideal inner image to become the Celestial Body. At Phase 15, intuition is turned inward to perceive and achieve (with the aid of the other functions) the underlying ideal unity of each individual.
Though weak, introverted sensation also plays a role in Phase 15. As external objects have converged with their inner images, sensation has become increasingly able to perceive the sensuous beauty of the subjective images: "Since Phase 12 all images, and cadences of the mind, have been satisfying to that mind just in so far as they have expressed this converging of will and thought, effort and attainment. The words "musical," "sensuous," are but descriptions of that converging process" (VB 135). It is introverted sensation that perceives the unearthly beauty that for Yeats was the hallmark of true vision, whether mystical or artistic. At Phase 15, introverted sensation perceives the external world's essence in the form of the inner world of the eternal Ideas: "All that the being has experienced as thought is visible to its eyes as a whole, and in this way it perceives, not as they are to others, but according to its own perception, all orders of existence" (VB 136). Note that the Ideas are perceived subjectively ("not as they are to others") because the being is at the peak of its subjectivity. We may call this a solipsistic ideal, but Yeats calls it a nonhuman incarnation instead.

The exchange of structural roles between sensation and intuition at Phase 15 is also worthy of attention. Intuition has been the Mask during the second quarter and has contributed to Unity of Being while becoming introverted enough to create unity around the inner image. But sensation has been the Body of Fate and thus has worked to thwart subjectivity so long as it retained any degree of extraverted orientation. After Phase 15, though, sensation will be the Mask of the third quarter, and the being's unity will increasingly be derived from awareness of the external world as sensation becomes increasingly extraverted and the cycle moves out toward the external world again. Intuition will decrease in strength throughout the third quarter and will be progressively less capable of maintaining
the inner unity of the being; instead it will function as the _Body of Fate_ and will disrupt that unity as intuition becomes both weaker and more extraverted.

As the apotheosis of subjectivity, Phase 15 requires a complete separation from others in one sense; as the being has itself become an image, this means a separation from the other images when the withdrawal of feeling into the image creates the phase's point of balance:

> This love knows nothing of desire, for desire implies effort, and though there is still separation from the loved object, love accepts the separation as necessary to its own existence. . . . [E]very image is separate from every other, for if image were linked to image, the soul would awake from its immovable trance. (VB 136)

Paradoxically, after all its attempts to bridge that separation, love is strongest when it accepts this final absolute separateness, but then love exists as the desire to overcome that separation and create unity; fulfilled love's unity with its object must diminish that love.

This conflict between unity and separate identity--the One and the Many in the guise of desire--is probably resolved in the "Beatific Vision" and "sexual love" (VA xii) which Yeats chose to leave out of _A Vision_, though we are perhaps given enough of a hint there: "The marriage bed is the symbol of the solved antinomy, and were more than symbol could a man there lose and keep his identity, but he falls asleep. That sleep is the same as the sleep of death" (VB 52). To keep one's separate identity and lose it in union at the same time would resolve the antinomy, but apparently this can only happen fleetingly and symbolically in sex until the being has escaped the wheel of phases by living through all of them.

The complete solitude of Phase 15 can create a sort of out of phase state:

> Where the being has lived out of phase, seeking to live through _antithetical_ phases as though they had been _primary_, there is now a terror of solitude, its forced, painful and slow acceptance, and a life haunted by terrible dreams. Even for the most perfect, there is a time of pain, a passage through a vision, where evil reveals itself in
its final meaning.  \textit{(VB 136)}

The "Vision of Evil" might have something to do with the absolute separation from others at this phase, which symbolizes the general tendency of the antithetical phases to pursue their own goals without considering the consequences their actions may have for other people. Because people are incarnated as separate individuals, unity between two or more people is momentary (in sex) or destructive of individual identity (in primary collective relations). Individual interests will always cause conflict in the end, and so the Vision of Evil might teach us to "conceive of the world as a continual conflict" \textit{(VB 144)} between people as well as between the primary and antithetical orientations. It would be a realization of the finality of Otherness.

Yeats does some of the most beautiful writing in \textit{A Vision} in describing the cycle's movement inward toward the image at Phase 15, and this reading of that movement should have shown that this beauty derives directly from Yeats's imaginative articulation of "those hard symbolic bones under the skin" of his system \textit{(VB 24)}: the functions and orientations interacting according to the machinery of the system. What we will see in the second half of the cycle is that Yeats's greater imaginative interest in the phases that move outward from the image leads him to bury the bones of his system somewhat deeper, so that the functions are less easily visible, particularly in the third quarter. They are there nonetheless; it is just that the more they stimulate Yeats's imagination, the less visible their machinery becomes.
Chapter 7
Completing the Cycle: Phases 16 through 1

The unity and stillness achieved at Phase 15 begin to break up, however, as the cycle moves on into the spiritual subjectivity of Phases 16 to 18, even though feeling and intuition remain very strong in these phases. Introverted thinking is still image-centered as the Will, but its images are bursting outward into movement again, as in Phase 16:

[They produce the comedy of Aretino and Rabelais or the mythology of Blake, and discover symbolism to express the overflowing and bursting of the mind. There is always an element of frenzy, and almost always a delight in certain glowing or shining images of concentrated force: in the smith's forge; in the heart; in the human form in its most vigorous development; in the solar disc; in some symbolical representation of the sexual organs; for the being must brag of its triumph over its own incoherence. (VB 138-39)]

At Phase 17 the images "all now flow, change, flutter, cry out, or mix into something else" (VB 141), but at Phase 18 "The Will, with its closing antithetical, is turning away from the life of images to that of ideas, it is vacillating and curious . . ." (VB 146). As its orientation moves back outward, thinking begins to turn its images into ideas that are "manifestly and intelligibly related to the known facts of the time," as Jung puts it (CW 6: par. 637). In this triad, however, thinking is for the most part still manifested in pure images.

Feeling is just as introverted, and because it is so strong as the Creative Mind, its activity is sometimes difficult to distinguish from that of the intellectual Will in these phases. We can see this in Yeats's own Phase 17:

Then the intellect (Creative Mind), which in the most antithetical phases were better described as imagination, must substitute some new image of desire; and in the degree of its power and of its attainment of unity, relate that which is lost, that which has snatched it away, to the new image of desire, that which threatens the new image to the being's unity. (VB 142)

Because the Creative Mind here comes from the Mask quarter, it provides
"images of desire"; as a structural role—the intellect—it must also deal with the Body of Fate which threatens both image and unity. The "emotional philosophy" of Phase 18 (VB 146) is a clear example of a less image-centered feeling functioning as the Creative Mind.

Intuition is overshadowed by its own structural role as the Body of Fate, because Unity of Being is broken up by the cycle's movement toward the external world represented by the Body of Fate. As introverted intuition loses strength, it falls away from the perfect inner unity of Phase 15, and it is not yet extraverted enough to seek any external unity; thus the impression we receive from these phases is one of decreasing inner unity, which is linked to defeat by circumstances (the Body of Fate). Phase 16 has "an antithetical self-absorbing dream . . . thrust upon it" by circumstances, but this dream of unity is an "illusion" because the being must now "use its intellect" to create its own unity (VB 137). This "self-absorption" was the intuitive process that absorbed the self into its own image in Phases 12 to 14; the process must now work backwards because intuition is now decreasing in strength.

Yeats's own Phase 17, of course, experiences "loss" in relation to illusions (VB 142), while Phase 18 encounters "a 'disillusionment' differing from the 'illusions' of Phase 16, which are continuous, in that it permits intermittent awakening" (VB 146). These illusions involve two things, the first being the illusion of inner unity created by the dream we saw in Phase 16, which must be countered by a conscious intellectual (thinking) drive to artificially create unity. The second is an illusion of unity in the external world when "so small is the primary nature, sense of fact is an impossibility" (VB 137). The being must fight to maintain its own unity and refrain from seeking unity in the external world as yet; the thinking Will and emotional Creative Mind must actively create unity around
the image as introverted intuition loses the strength to do so. Yet this struggle to actively create an artificial unity in the face of fragmentation is what makes these phases so artistically productive in Yeats's eyes. Phase 18 begins to "awaken intermittently" from both illusions as Unity of Being nears its end, the perception of external unity becomes possible again, and interest in worldly affairs replaces artistic withdrawal.

Introverted sensation is also described more in terms of its role as the Mask; Phase 16 has a Mask from "a phase of aimless energy [Phase 2], of physical life for its own sake" (VB 137). As sensation is still oriented to the image at this point, its small degree of extraversion creates only "the still faint perception of things in their weight and mass" at Phase 17 (VB 143). However, Phase 18 "must relate all to social life" (VB 146), as it begins to be active in the external world by reestablishing contact with society; remember the role of instinctive "race" in societal relations in the first quarter. Though not prominent in this triad, sensation's movement toward extraversion parallels that of the other functions, and we see again that such movement is as important as what the orientation of the functions currently is (introverted, in this case).

Introverted sensation does dominate the out of phase state in this triad, as in Phase 16:

    Capable of nothing but an incapable idealism (for it has no thought but in myth, or in defence of myth), it must, because it sees one side as all white, see the other side all black. . . . At one moment they are full of hate—Blake writes of "Flemish and Venetian demons" and of some picture of his own destroyed "by some vile spell of Stoddard's"—and their hate is always close to madness. . . . (VB 138)

Yeats describes the out of phase Shelley of Phase 17:

    How subject he is to nightmare! He sees the devil leaning against a tree, is attacked by imaginary assassins, and, in obedience to what he considers a supernatural voice, creates The Cenci that he may give to Beatrice Cenci her incredible father. His political enemies
are monstrous, meaningless images. And unlike Byron, who is two phases later, he can never see anything that opposes him as it really is. (VB 143)

This substitution of the images of deities and demons for real people and things is characteristic of introverted sensation at its worst; Jung says that the type "lives in a mythological world, where men, animals, locomotives, houses, rivers, and mountains appear either as benevolent deities or as malevolent demons... [H]is sensations are totally different from reality" (CW 6: par. 653). The corresponding out of phase condition stems from these phases' attempt to use sensation to deal with the external world too soon within the cycle.

This triad can be described as an exodus from the perfect subjective image which uses the imagination, lyric poetry, and "emotional philosophy" (VB 146) to stave off the increasing disintegration of Unity of Being. Phase 16 manifests both the new power of image-centered thinking and the "violent scattering energy" (VB 137) of the disintegration of Unity of Being and its images. Phase 17 stabilizes the images, its thinking, and its own unity through a Mask derived from Phase 3's "perfect physical well-being or balance" (VB 142), so that "Unity of Being, and consequent expression of Daimonic thought, is now more easy than at any other phase" (VB 141). The emergent power of Phase 18 is sensation, which begins to make effective activity in the external world possible again:

He can hardly, if action and the intellect that concerns action are taken from him, recreate his dream life; and when he says "Who am I?", he finds it difficult to examine his thoughts in relation to one another, his emotions in relation to one another, but begins to find it easy to examine them in relation to action. He can examine those actions themselves with a new clearness. Now for the first time since Phase 12, Goethe's saying is almost true: "Man knows himself by action only, by thought never". (VB 145)

The phase's "object of desire is no longer a single image of passion, for it must relate all to social life" (VB 146); Unity of Being's contemplation of the separated
images of dream life, with their interrelation of thought and emotion, now gives way to effective worldly action.

After the tinctures close, physical subjectivity returns in Phases 19 to 21 as thinking and sensation approach their maximum strength. The mind is no longer extremely introverted, and a significant degree of extraversion is evident from Phase 19 onward: "[N]ow the weakness of the antithetical has begun, for though still the stronger it cannot ignore the growing primary. It is no longer an absolute monarch, and it permits power to pass to statesman and demagogue, whom, however, it will constantly change" (VB 150). As the Will, introverted thinking now embarks upon the life of ideas and abandons the pure image in favor of shaping that image into an idea which can be applied practically: "The mastery of images, threatened or lost at Phase 18, may however, be completely recovered, but there is less symbol, more fact. Vitality from dreams has died out, and a vitality from fact has begun which has for its ultimate aim the mastery of the real world" (VB 149). This endeavor is aided by a more extraverted sensation as the Mask, which provides most of the "vitality from fact."

The being is now more interested in actual things and events than its dream life, as in Phase 20: "Napoleon sees himself as Alexander moving to the East, Mask and Image must take an historical and not a mythological or dream form, a form found but not created; he is crowned in the dress of a Roman emperor" (VB 153). Introverted thinking and extraverted sensation work together to create the converse of the "experience" of Phases 5 to 7: fictional experience. There, real events receive a subjective interpretation; here, imaginary events receive realistic detail, with results which are best seen in Phase 21:

in phase he strengthens conflict to the utmost by refusing all activity that is not antithetical: he becomes intellectually dominating, intellectually unique. He apprehends the simplicity of his opposite phase as some vast systema-tisation, in which the will imposes
itself upon the multiplicity of living images, upon all in Shakespeare, in Napoleon even, that delighted in its independent life; for he is a tyrant and must kill his adversary. If he is a novelist, his characters must go his road, and not theirs, and perpetually demonstrate his thesis; he will love construction better than the flow of life. . . . (VB 156-57)

As artists, these phases impose a subjective scheme on objective facts; as men of action, they pursue a "dramatisation" of themselves (VB 151) that can also change society, as in Napoleon's case.

Introverted feeling still has some effect as the Creative Mind of this triad; Phase 19 has "an intellect which turns easily to declamation, emotional emphasis" (VB 148), while in Phase 20 "abstraction . . . may be no more than an emotional interest in such generalisations as 'God,' 'Man,' a Napoleon may but point to the starry heavens and say that they prove the existence of God" (VB 152). But the strength of thinking drives out feeling by the triad's end; to "live according to phase," Phase 21 must "regard life without emotion" (VB 156).

Extraverted intuition is difficult to recognize as the Body of Fate, but it takes a form influenced by the life experience of its phases of origin. At Phase 19, the "enforced failure of action" (VB 149) requires the phase to seek unity through conviction instead of action, and this conviction is the antithetical version of the intuitive "belief" of Phase 25 (VB 173). Like Phase 24, Phase 20 uses tradition or history in an intuitive way, "Owing to the need of seeing the dramatic image, or images, as individuals, that is to say set among concrete or fixed surroundings" (VB 152); the resulting artistic success actually threatens the phase's antithetical independence, as in Shakespeare's case. The intuitive technical skill of Phase 23 is part of the "domination over all circumstance" (VB 155) of Phase 21, as "he is a master of surprise, for one cannot be certain where even a charge of shot will fall. Style now exists as a sign of work well done, a certain energy and precision of movement . . ." (VB 157). Intuition is the function that produces
the unexpected possibility in Phase 21; it is becoming externally effective again in this triad after abandoning its attempt to achieve complete inner unity around the image, but this very effective leads to a collective success that threatens the self-dramatizing unity of these phases.

When out of phase the triad displays elements of introverted sensation and extraverted feeling, though it is only the "superstition" of Phase 20 (VB 153) which suggests introverted sensation. These phases are meant to pursue an intellectual unity rather than the emotional unity of Unity of Being; when they attempt emotional unity they are dominated by extraverted feeling. In Phase 19, "When lived out of phase there is a hatred or contempt of others, and instead of seeking conviction for its own sake, the man takes up opinions that he may impose himself on others" (VB 149). Phase 21 "is driven into all that is freakish or grotesque, mind-created passions, simulated emotions; he adopts all that suggests the burning heart he longs for in vain" (VB 156). The weakening of feeling in these phases means that it must come from outside the self and be extraverted.

When Phase 19 is in phase,

Unity of Being is no longer possible, for the being is compelled to live in a fragment of itself and to dramatise that fragment. The primary tincture is closing, direct knowledge of self in relation to action is ceasing to be possible. The being only completely knows that portion of itself which judges fact for the sake of action. (VB 148)

Phases that achieve Unity of Being can know themselves through expression of their whole being in heroic action, but this triad can achieve only partial self-realization because its attention is turning to external fact. The "breaking up and subdivision of the being" (VB 151) is an unavoidable result of its increasing concern with the external world, which is most influenced by the increasing strength of extra-verted sensation.
Thus the power manifested in Phase 19 is a combination of extraverted sensation's "vitality from fact" (VB 149) and the "isolation of parts" of the being (VB 152); the two go together, as did image-centered thinking and the scattering of images in the previous triad. This power is stabilized in Phase 20's creative activity:

The energy is always seeking those facts which being separable can be seen more clearly, or expressed more clearly, but when there is truth to phase there is a similitude of the old unity, or rather a new unity, which is not a Unity of Being but a unity of the creative act. He no longer seeks to unify what is broken through conviction . . . but by projecting a dramatisation or many dramatisations. (VB 151)

Yeats places Shakespeare's personal phase here to illustrate the above process. By emerging in the final phase of the triad, the individuality seen at Phase 7 again precedes a change in overall orientation, as "a man of Phase 21 has a personality that seems a creation of his circumstances and his faults, a manner peculiar to himself and impossible to others. We say at once, 'How individual he is'" (VB 155).

The combination of abstract introverted thinking and factual extraverted sensation reaches its peak strength and is exhausted during Phase 22, and extraverted intuition takes over as the Will:

It has become abstract, and the more it has sought the whole of natural fact, the more abstract it has become. One thinks of some split liquid which grows thinner the wider it spreads till at last it is but a film. That which at Phase 21 was a longing for self-conscious simplicity, as an escape from logical complication and subdivision, is now (through the Mask from Phase 8) a desire for the death of the intellect. At Phase 21 it still sought to change the world, could still be a Shaw, a Wells, but now it will seek to change nothing. It needs nothing but what it may call "reality," "truth," "God's Will": confused and weary, through trying to grasp too much, the hand must loosen. (VB 158-59).

Introverted thinking finally tries to create subjective ideas that will encompass the entire natural world perceived through extraverted sensation, but exhausts itself
in the attempt. At this point, extraverted intuition, which perceives the external world as an interconnected whole, takes over—but it will do so from an objective viewpoint rather than a subjective one. It will no longer claim its view of the world as its own achievement; instead it will regard its view almost as a gift from the world, or as the world's own view of itself—"reality" or "truth" or "God's Will." In the fourth quarter, thinking will be the Body of Fate and will prevent the selflessness of Unity with God by persisting as "individual abstract speculation" (VB 175) until its strength dwindles, which reverses its process of creating a sense of self in the first quarter.

Feeling has been virtually driven out by thinking in Phase 22, but returns in bursts of both its primary and antithetical forms as the being first becomes aware of the Principles which combine both orientations, and thinking becomes exhausted as well:

An element in the nature is exhausted at the point of balance, and the opposite nature controls the mind. One thinks of the gusts of sentimentality that overtake violent men, the gusts of cruelty that overtake the sentimental. At Phase 8, a blinded and throttled phase, there is not a similar interchange. (VB 159)

By Phase 22 the being has experienced both primary and antithetical life in its current cycle, and so begins to be aware of the Principles which combine the two. Its extreme strength and experience in self-reliance enable it to alternately use feeling from both orientations—primary sentimentality, antithetical cruelty—until the point of balance is passed and thinking finally gives way to feeling. Phase 8 could not do this because it was weak to use either one confidently.

The role of the Principles here lies in their replacing the Faculties between lives: "Before the self passes from Phase 22 it is said to attain what is called the "Emotion of Sanctity", and this emotion is described as a contact with life beyond death" (VB 181). Thus Phase 22's feeling draws on the Passionate Body Princi-
ple, which combines both introverted and extraverted feeling. All of this is caught up in Yeats's confusing concepts of the Sage and Victim in the description of Phase 22 (VB 159), but if we focus on the function and orientations in question, then the replacement of thinking by feeling emerges from the muddle.

The point of balance is reached as the Creative Mind merges with the Mask at Phase 8 on the wheel and the Will merges with the Body of Fate at Phase 22: "Intellecct knows itself as its own object of desire; and the Will knows itself to be the world; there is neither change nor desire of change. For the moment the desire for a form has ceased and an absolute realism becomes possible" (VB 163). Here "intellect" is the Creative Mind and the "object of desire" is the Mask it has merged with, while the "world" is the Body of Fate that the Will has joined. Along with the strength of introverted thinking and extraverted sensation, this double merging symbolically reduces the being to a contemplative mind and the world of fact which it contemplates:

Now that Will and Body of Fate are one, Creative Mind and Mask one also, we are no longer four but two; and life, the balance reached, becomes an act of contemplation. There is no longer a desired object, as distinct from thought itself, no longer a Will, as distinct from the process of nature seen as fact; and so thought itself, seeing that it can neither begin nor end, is stationary. (VB 163)

For a moment, the subjective mind is balanced with the objective world, and "an absolute realism becomes possible" (VB 163). After this balance the objective world will outweigh the individual, and the being will be primary. Yeats manages to make the attempt to understand the world objectively into another drama of desire like the one that culminated at Phase 15; desire for union with God ensues in the fourth quarter.

Extraverted intuition's influence as the new Will first appears as the intuitive linking of disparate elements in Flaubert's work: "'Systematised' is the only
word that comes to mind, but it implies too much deliberation, for association has
ranged itself by association as little bits of paper and little chips of wood cling to
one another upon the water in a bowl" (VB 160). This intuitive "amalgamation"
(VB 160) even displays the Spinozan religious sense of intuition in Dostoevsky's
novels, where characters "are aware . . . of some ungraspable Whole to which
they have given the name of God" (VB 160-61). And Swedenborg uses it to
examine "a new branch of science: the economics, the natural history of Heaven"
(VB 161). These initial manifestations of intuition foreshadow the course of the
fourth quarter, where intuitive technique dominates Phases 23 to 25 and religious
intuition guides Phases 26 to 28.

When out of phase, the intellectual systems created in the last several
phases may be misused:

Men will murder and die for an abstract synthesis, and the more
abstract it is the further it carries them from compunction and com-
promise; and as obstacles to that synthesis increase, the violence
of their will increases. It is a phase as tragic as its opposite, and
more terrible, for the man of the phase may, before the point of
balance has been reached, become a destroyer and persecutor, a
figure of tumult and of violence; or as is more probable—for the
violence of such a man must be checked by moments of resigna-
tion or despair, premonitions of balance—his system will become an
instrument of destruction and of persecution in the hands of others.
(VB 161)

That Yeats puts both Karl Marx (biographically) and the Russian Revolution (his-
torically) in Phase 22 indicates his fear of unchecked rationalism. The phase is a
difficult transition, but its extreme strength prior to the point of balance is the
opposite of the weakness of Phase 8. This strength is that of the subjective
intellect reaching the apex of its ability to survey and organize the objective
world; its exhaustion at the point of balance and subsequent submission begin a
gradual relinquishing of the desire to change the world which continues through
the fourth quarter.
Phases 23 through 25 are phases of physical objectivity where sensation and thinking are still near maximum strength; they endeavor to change the world as the previous triad did, but they do so for the sake of society rather than to fulfill their sense of self-expression. As the Will, extraverted intuition is technically skilled or moralistic rather than overtly mystical in these phases. In Phase 23,

Technical mastery must exist, not for its own sake, though for its own sake it has been done, but for that which it reveals, for its laying bare—to hand and eye, as distinguished from thought and emotion—general humanity. . . . [H]e would construct a whole, but that whole must seem all event, all picture. That whole must not be instinctive, bodily, natural, though it may seem so, for in reality he cares only for what is human, individual, and moral. (VB 164-65)

The unified whole constructed by the artist of Phase 23 must be intuitive ("human, individual, and moral") rather than sensory ("instinctive, bodily, and natural"). Intuition works not "for its own sake" here, which would be antithetical, but for "that which it reveals," which is the world as an interconnected whole.

At Phase 24, intuition formulates a code of morality:

Instead of burning, as did Phase 23, intellectual abstraction in a technical fire, it grinds moral abstraction in a mill. This mill, created by the freed intellect, is a code of personal conduct, which, being formed from social and historical tradition, remains always concrete in the mind. . . . The code must rule, and because that code cannot be an intellectual choice, it is always a tradition bound up with family, or office, or trade, always a part of history. (VB 169-70)

This code "is always seemingly fated" (VB 170) because it comes from the intuitive nature of Body of Fate. Religious intuition awakens in Phase 25, but is still tied to collective belief and has not yet become a direct experience of God:

He must eliminate all that is personal from belief; eliminate the necessity for intellect by the contagion of some agreement, as did Phase 23 by its technique, Phase 24 by its code. . . . There may be great eloquence, a mastery of all concrete imagery that is not personal expression, because though as yet there is no sinking into the world but much distinctness, clear identity, there is an overflowing social conscience. (VB 173)

There is still a sense of self ("clear identity") in these phases, but once the tinc-
tures have opened again in Phase 26 the being will "sink into the world" and experience Unity with God in a process that mirrors the sinking into the image that precedes Phase 15. In this triad intuition is moralistic, whether in the morally ironic art of Phase 23, the moral code of Phase 24, or the social conscience of Phase 25.

As the Body of Fate, thinking is still strong and subjective enough to contribute the "distinctness and clear identity" of a somewhat subjective viewpoint to these phases, especially for creative purposes. The Body of Fate of Phase 23 "drives him to intellectual life" (VB 165); Phase 24 considers abstract reasoning to be part of the Body of Fate or surrounding world: "There is no philosophic capacity, no intellectual curiosity, but there is no dislike for either philosophy or science; they are a part of the world and that world is accepted" (VB 170). But as thinking weakens and grows more extraverted, Phase 25 tries "to kill within himself the last trace of individual abstract speculation" (VB 175), because subjective thinking presents (as the Body of Fate) the major obstacle to the selflessness of Unity with God.

Extraverted sensation is also strong as the Creative Mind of this triad and provides a strong sense of external fact and social ties; Phase 23 will delight in colour and idiosyncrasy, though these he must find rather than create. Synge must find rhythm and syntax in the Aran Islands, Rembrandt delight in all accidents of the visible world; yet neither, no matter what his delight in reality, shows it without exaggeration... (VB 166)

Yet the preceding passage shows that these phases retain enough subjectivity to create an exaggerated personal vision (comic or tragic in Phase 23) out of their perception of objective reality. Phase 24 creates a personal code from "social or historical tradition" (VB 170), but wants to extend this code to society and "see their code expressed in multiform human life" (VB 171), which is another form of
the practical effectiveness and collective relations provided by extraverted sensation's role as instinct or "race" in Yeats's scheme. At Phase 25, "all the man's thought arises out of some particular condition of actual life, or is an attempt to change that condition" (VB 173), another expression of practical concerns. Phase 25 is the last phase of social leadership in the cycle; by Phase 26, intuition and feeling will have driven out sensation and thinking to the point that spiritual concerns will take the place of practical effectiveness.

As the Mask, feeling is still subjective enough to be considered introverted, but it clearly grows more extraverted or collectively oriented during these phases. Yeats says that in the fourth quarter, "active moral man should receive into himself, and transform into primary sympathy the emotional self-realisation of the second quarter" (VB 168), but in this triad, even primary sympathy for others seems to distinguish individuals from those around them, which implies a degree of subjectivity when compared with the emotional merging into humanity which occurs in the final triad. The "audacious, joyous, ironical" Synge whose "emotional life in so far as it was deliberate had to be transferred . . . from a condition of self-regarding melancholy to its direct opposite" (VB 167) was, after all, almost always at odds with the public feeling-values of his time in his work.

Phase 24 is set apart by the depth of feeling inspired by its code:

The rage of Phase 10 [its opposite or Mask] to destroy all that trammels the being from without is now all self-surrender. There is great humility—"She died every day she lived"—and pride as great, pride in the code's acceptance, as though one were to sign "servant of servants". . . . [T]he man is flooded with the joy of self-surrender; and flooded with mercy. . . . (VB 170)

Yet because these feelings are inspired by an external code drawn from tradition, they are more extraverted than those of the previous phase. And the emotional conviction of Phase 25 derives from "the contagion of some common agreement" (VB 173), though Phase 25 becomes a leader on the strength of its convictions:
His power rests in certain simplifying convictions which have grown with his character; he needs intellect for their expression, not for proof, and taken away from these convictions is without emotion and momentum. He has but one overwhelming passion, to make all men good, and this good is something at once concrete and impersonal; and though he has hitherto given it the name of some church, or state, he is ready at any moment to give it a new name, for, unlike Phase 24, he has no pride to nourish upon the past. (VB 174)

Here we see the interaction of feeling and intuition that will dominate the next triad in the "passion" for a "concrete good" that is a moral (i.e., intuitive) emotion in Yeats's sense of the term. When the sense of individual selfhood is broken in Phase 26, the individual's depth of feeling will begin to create unity with the world through empathy.

When out of phase, Phase 23 is dominated by extraverted feeling: "when the man seeks to choose his Mask, he is gloomy with the gloom of others, and tyrannical with the tyranny of others, because he cannot create" (VB 166).

Phase 24 also has emotional problems, though to call them the result of extraversion would be inaccurate:

Out of phase, seeking emotion instead of impersonal action, there is--desire being impossible--self-pity, and therefore discontent with people and circumstance, and an overwhelming sense of loneliness, of being abandoned. . . . [T]here is great indifference to others' rights and predilections; we have the bureaucrat or the ecclesiastic of satire, a tyrant who is capable of insight or of hesitation. (VB 171)

At Phase 25, however, Yeats sees a form of introverted sensation or intuition in the work of George Russell (Æ):

His False Mask showed him what purport to be "nature spirits". . . . When he desires the Mask, instead of flying that it may follow, it gives, instead of the intuition of God, a simulated intuition of nature. That simulated intuition is arrayed in ideal conventional images of sense, instead of in some form of abstract opinion, because of the character of his horoscope. (VB 176)

This is confusing, but his "nature spirits" seem to be introverted images perceived intuitively or sensually, and we will see more indications of introverted intuition
when the next triad is out of phase.

When in phase, Phase 23 manifests the new power of extraverted intuition in its intuitive technique, and Phase 24 stabilizes that power in its personal moral code. At Phase 25, the submission to God (Æ's "intuition of God") that will produce the selflessness of the final triad begins to emerge; it is most connected with the increasing strength of feeling in the religious conviction of the phase.

After the tinctures open between Phases 25 and 26, the primary tincture dominates consciousness and all conscious functions become extraverted during the spiritual objectivity of Phases 26 to 28. Intuition and feeling combine to make Unity with God possible while they approach their maximum strength during this triad, as the old sense of self that began between Phase 4 and Phase 5 is broken during Phase 26 by the direct experience of God: "He stands in the presence of a terrible blinding light..." (VB 179). Therefore,

From Phase 26 to Phase 28 there is, when the phase is truly lived, contact with supersensual life, or a sinking-in of the body upon its supersensual source, or desire for that contact and sinking. At Phase 26 has come a subconscious exhaustion of the moral life, whether in belief or in conduct, and of the life of imitation, the life of judgment and approval. (VB 178)

In Yeats’s scheme, "morality" is religious intuition modified by two factors: the superior strength of sensation in Phases 23 to 25, which (as "race" or "instinct") insists on codifying spiritual intuitions to give them a sort of tangible reality, and the lingering degree of subjectivity in these phases, because the individual can use such codes to gain personal power over society. When intuition becomes stronger than sensation and consciousness becomes almost entirely objective, the personal power of morality is renounced and is replaced by immediate religious experience or "contact with supersensual life." And just as the body gained in distinctness and beauty when introverted intuition merged it with the image during Unity of Being, it becomes coarse and undefined during the "sinking-in of
the body on its supersensual source," as extraverted intuition merges the body with God and the world.

At Phase 26, intuition provides "knowledge of each separated life in relation to supersensual unity" (VB 179), and in Phase 27 "the total life has suddenly displayed its source" (VB 180), as intuition delves beneath external reality to reveal its underlying divine unity. In the process it drives out sensation because, as Jung puts it, "Sensation is a hindrance to clear, unbiased, naïve perception; its intrusive sensory stimuli direct attention to the physical surface, to the very things round and beyond which intuition tries to peer" (CW 6: par. 611). As extraverted sensation becomes relatively weak, "At Phases 26, 27, and 28 he permits those senses and those faculties to sink in upon their environment. He will if it be possible, not even touch or taste or see: 'Man does not perceive the truth; God perceives the truth in man'" (VB 181). As the Body of Fate, thinking also virtually disappears while becoming extraverted in these phases; if Phase 27 possesses intellect "he will use it but to serve perception and renunciation" (VB 180), while Phase 28 has "no active intelligence" (VB 182). Because it first created a sense of self between Phases 4 and 5, thinking fades away along with that sense of self in this triad.

As it nears its peak strength, extraverted feeling leads the being to unity as the Mask, but that unity is selfless and externally oriented, as is its central emotion:

Before the self passes from Phase 22 it is said to receive the "Emotion of Sanctity," and this emotion is described as a contact with life beyond death. It comes at the instant when synthesis is abandoned, when fate is accepted. At Phases 23, 24, and 25 we are said to use this emotion, but not to pass from Phase 25 till we have intellectually realised the nature of sanctity itself, and sanctity is described as the renunciation of personal salvation. The "Emotion of Sanctity" is the reverse of that realisation of incipient personality at Phase 8, which the Will related to collective action till Phase 11 had passed. (VB 181)
This emotion comes when thinking or "synthesis" is given up in Phase 22 and replaced by "fate" or intuition; it is the opposite of the introverted antithetical feeling that began to create antithetical "personality" in Phase 8. The converse of Yeatsian personality is selflessness, and the emotion is externally oriented—a "contact with life beyond death"—unlike the centripetal emotion of personality. The "Emotion of Sanctity" requires the renunciation of any interest in personal salvation; it hopes for the salvation of others before itself, and seeks the collective good.

The anguish of the "terrible unflinching judgment" of Phase 26 (VB 179) marks the new dominance of feeling over thinking, and shows how extraverted feeling helps to break down the old sense of self. The full range of this feeling can be seen in Phase 27:

True to phase, he substitutes for emulation an emotion of renunciation, and for the old toil of judgment and discovery of sin, a beating upon his breast and an ecstatically crying out that he is even the worst of men. . . . His joy is to be nothing, to do nothing, to think nothing; but to permit the total life, expressed in its humanity, to flow in upon him and to express itself through his acts and thoughts. (VB 180)

This feeling is reminiscent of the delight in the external world of Phases 2 through 4; it is so extraverst that it is virtually the emotion of others flowing into the individual once the emotion of renunciation has broken down the self. Yeats is using the mechanics of his system to build up a portrait of the complex motivations of certain types of religious people, just as he did for artists and heroes around Phase 15. The process demonstrates how he used the psychological functions to make the opposition of saint and artist/hero from Per Amica Silentia Lunae more sophisticated and more vividly imagined, and the rest of the cycle shows how he became able to characterize all the intervening human types in the terms of his system and imagine them more vividly as well.
By Phase 28 all the functions have become so extraverted that the being is incapable of thinking or acting for itself, and lives only to experience its surroundings passively:

[Having no active intelligence he owns nothing of the exterior world but his mind and body. He is but a straw blown by the wind, with no mind but the wind and no act but a nameless drifting and turning. . . . The physical world suggests to his mind pictures and events that have no relation to his needs or even to his desires; his thoughts are an aimless reverie; his acts are aimless like his thoughts; and it is in this aimlessness that he finds his joy. (VB 182)]

This passivity is partly the result of the weakness of sensation and thinking, the counterparts of the "active" Faculties (Will and Creative Mind), as it was during Unity of Being, though Unity of Being was more capable of acting effectively because it possessed the strongest possible sense of self. Here at the end of the cycle the reverie is externally oriented, but the being virtually sees through the variety and particularity of the physical world to its underlying unity, ignoring even its personal circumstances (its own "needs and desires").

In A Vision, extraverted or primary orientation begins as a state of being influenced by external conditions, but as the cycle nears Phase 1 it develops into a condition where those external conditions virtually flow through the individual to create consciousness. In the phases nearest to Phase 1, those surroundings coalesce into their own immanent unity, so that the being looks outward not just to its surroundings but to the self-aware Whole of the universe, and surrenders the last remnants of its sense of self in the service of that Whole. Again, Yeats is developing a systematic rationale for people who act out of extreme selflessness.

When out of phase, Phases 26 and 27 lead a useless symbolic life like that which Jung attributes to the morally oriented introverted intuition type:

Since he tends to rely most predominantly on his vision, his moral efforts become one-sided; he makes himself and his life symbolic—adapted, it is true, to the inner and eternal meaning of things, but unadapted to present-day reality. He thus deprives himself of any
influence upon it because he remains uncomprehended. His language is not the one currently spoken— it has become too subjective. His arguments lack the convincing power of reason. He can only profess or proclaim. His is "the voice of one crying in the wilderness." (CW 6: par. 662)

When out of phase, Phase 26 "becomes the most completely solitary of all possible men, for all normal communion with his kind, that of a common study, that of an interest in work done, that of a condition of life, a code, a belief shared, has passed . . ." (VB 177). Even when in phase, that which it seeks is without social morality, something radical and incredible. When Ezekiel lay upon his "right and left side" and ate dung, to raise "other men to a perception of the infinite", he may so have sought, and so did perhaps the Indian sage or saint who coupled with the roe. (VB 179)

Phase 27 uses the prophetic capacity of introverted intuition for self-aggrandizement: "the man asserts when out of phase his claim to faculty or to supersensitive privilege beyond that of other men; he has a secret that makes him better than other men" (VB 180). Note that the visionary faculty is used introvertedly to separate the being from others rather than to merge with them.

This triad also displays a thwarted antithetical emotion when out of phase, whether the "malice" of Phase 26 (VB 178), the misplaced "zeal" of Phase 27 (VB 180), or the "jealousy" of Phase 28 (VB 182), all of which result from the attempt to emulate the opposing Mask quarter. Whether Yeats is guilty of inconsistency when he assigns more than one function or orientation to the out of phase state of this triad and other phases, or is simply expanding the possibilities inherent in his system, is probably unimportant given the system's overwhelming general internal coherence.

When in phase, the overwhelming religious intuition of this triad's phases may separate them from society to some degree, but not by making them introverted; instead it is their absorption in an objectively real God which seems to dif-
ferentiate them from others. This awareness of God is manifested in Phase 26, which "stands in the presence of a terrible blinding light" (VB 179), and is codified in the "sainthood" of Phase 27. At Phase 28 ("The Child of God") there emerges the first trace of the utter selflessness and actual union with God which will characterize Phase 1 (VB 182).

At Phase 1, complete objectivity is manifested as the complete extraversion of consciousness and the literal absorption of the being in the living unity of the external world. As at Phase 15, the active Will and Creative Mind merge, as do the passive Mask and Body of Fate: "Thought and inclination, fact and object of desire, are indistinguishable (Mask is submerged in Body of Fate, Will in Creative Mind), that is to say, there is complete passivity, complete plasticity" (VB 183). Note that it is Yeats's antithetical pair of Faculties (Will and Mask) which are "submerged in" or overwhelmed by his primary pair (Creative Mind and Body of Fate), which symbolizes the primary tincture's domination of consciousness. This situation is the reverse of Phase 15, where "the Creative Mind is dissolved in the Will and the Body of Fate in the Mask" (VB 135), which symbolizes the complete introversion of consciousness there.

Intuition and sensation exchange structural roles through the medium of unity with the external world at Phase 1, just as feeling and thinking traded roles through the subjective image at Phase 15. Extraverted intuition reaches its peak in creating complete unity with God, and extraverted feeling reaches its peak strength in the joy of complete openness to external influence: "There may be great joy; but it is the joy of a conscious plasticity; and it is this plasticity, this liquefaction, or pounding up, whereby all that has been knowledge becomes instinct and faculty" (VB 183). The "knowledge" in question is the direct knowledge of God gained through intuition, which is transformed into instinct as sensa-
tion takes over the Will to begin the first quarter again.

But before the change can occur, the peak strength of extraverted intuition drives out extraverted sensation completely, so that no sensory perception of the external world stands in the way of intuition's perception of the underlying unity of God. Although consciousness is completely extraverted in this phase, it looks beyond the external world to a "supernatural environment" (VB 183), and inhabits that supersensual environment. At Phase 15, complete introversion banished the external world and moved the being into a supernatural realm; the dwindling of extraverted sensation accomplishes the same result here at Phase 1. In fact, Phases 15 and 1 probably inhabit the same supernatural realm, but they experience it in diametrically opposed ways: Phase 15 is completely aware of itself and entirely separate from others, while Phase 1 has no sense of self and is merged with all those around it.

At Phase 1, the mind is wax to external impressions, and not just because feeling has driven out thinking; the trend of the previous three phases, where the world actually began to act and express itself through the being, now culminates in an utter lack of self:

Mind has become indifferent to good and evil, to truth and falsehood; body has become undifferentiated, dough-like; the more perfect be the soul, the more indifferent the mind, the more dough-like the body; and mind and body take whatever shape, accept whatever image is imprinted upon them, transact whatever purpose is imposed upon them, are indeed the instruments of supernatural manifestation, the final link between the living and more powerful beings. (VB 183)

The being is entirely formed both physically and mentally by external influences, just as Phase 15 was formed by its own ideal image.

Because the being so lacks a sense of self, it must be unconscious of all that is antithetical, including the physical being of the body itself:

At Phase 15 mind was completely absorbed by being, but now body
is completely absorbed in its supernatural environment. The images of mind are no longer irrelevant even, for there is no longer anything to which they can be relevant, and acts can no longer be immoral or stupid, for there is no one there that can be judged. (VB 183)

While the most antithetical phases may seem heedless of others when in pursuit of their inner visions, they are nonetheless morally responsible for their actions because they possess such a strong sense of self. Phase 1 lacks the capacity for moral choice, just as it lacks consciousness of the "images of mind" and the beauty of body associated with those antithetical images; in fact, Phase 1 cannot go out of phase even insofar as Phase 15 can, because it is incapable of choosing to go out of phase. As Yeats associates the primary with conventional "goodness," this phase may be his ironic view of what happens to those who are simply too good in the conventional sense. It is "wholly automatic" (VB 184) in its actions because it is so completely influenced by others.

Yeats's long investigation of spiritualism probably inspired the ectoplasmic "plasticity" and mediumship of Phase 1; these "instruments of supernatural manifestation" (VB 183) must be the spirits which would make communication through mediums possible, just as the living images of Phase 15 account for the images Yeats saw when he "meditated under the direction of the Cabalists" (VB 301). Those sections of A Vision dealing with the afterlife are not the book's only attempt to account for occult phenomena; it is the cycle of incarnations which produces trance-spirits and the images of mind, with the machinery of the system again serving as an explanation for those things that Yeats was most interested in.

And as this survey of A Vision's cycle of phases reaches its conclusion, it is important to realize that Phase 1 is at once the last phase of the previous cycle and the first phase of a new cycle; the previous cycle breaks up and is remade at
the point of balance in preparation for the emergence of a new cycle at Phase 2.
As the preceding survey of the phases was too detailed to allow an overview to
emerge easily, the table below is meant to summarize the central activities, over-
all orientation, and types of men (as Yeats rarely uses women) given as exam-
pies in each of the twelve major subdivisions of the cycle:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2-4</th>
<th>5-7</th>
<th>8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sensation as animal innocence; largely extraverted; Unity with Nature</td>
<td>Sensation as experience; somewhat extraverted; demagogues; artistic realism</td>
<td>Sensual weakness; emotion and introversion begin; debauchees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-11</td>
<td>12-14</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotion as self-assertion; somewhat introverted; rebels, reformers, men of action</td>
<td>Images and emotion; largely introverted; lyric artists, heroes; Unity of Being</td>
<td>Becoming an image; completely introverted; utter separateness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-18</td>
<td>19-21</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Images and thinking; largely introverted; lyric artists; Unity of Being</td>
<td>Thinking as ideas; somewhat introverted; novelists, dramatists, men of action</td>
<td>Triumph of thinking; extraversion and intuition begin; artistic realism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-25</td>
<td>26-28</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intuition as morality; somewhat extraverted; moralists; artistic realism</td>
<td>Religious intuition; largely extraverted; holy men; Unity with God; selflessness</td>
<td>Merging with the external world as God/Nature; completely extraverted; utter selflessness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These summaries demonstrate the sort of logical progression that can be found
within A Vision's cycle once we know how to read it at the sentence level.
Chapter 8

Conclusion

An understanding of Jung's adaptation of the four elements of classical cosmology and the temperaments as psychological functions enables us to understand A Vision's cycle of phases at the sentence level. This clarification of the structure and language of Book I should also make those sections of A Vision which deal with history and the period between lives more accessible as well; in the future, critics need not dismiss large sections of the book as incomprehensible or superfluous. Yeats and Jung are mutually illuminating not only in their general concepts (as Olney has demonstrated), but also in the remarkably similar particulars of A Vision and Psychological Types. The two books are not identical, but each is perhaps the one thing to which the other can best be likened. Both trace the movement of mental orientation from the inner image to the external world, and describe models of the mind which are composed of four structural roles through which four psychological functions can rotate to create types or phases. The similarity of A Vision's eight triads to Jung's four most useful subtypes and the relation of the out of phase states to Jung's four less useful types effectively resolves the numerical disparity between A Vision's twenty-eight phases and Jung's eight types or sixteen subtypes. These similarities stem both from the vast background in philosophical and occult tradition which the two men shared and the logical possibilities inherent in the classical temperaments. Their common aim of devising a psychological typology carried them from the same source to a very similar result.

The fact that the mechanical structure of A Vision is so deliberate and its similarity to Jung so extensive may inspire renewed charges of a hoax. There are a number of points against such a charge, the first of which is the nature and
sheer bulk of the automatic script. These suggest an expenditure of energy far greater than would be required to simply adapt and disguise some existing system, and the nature of the automatic script material suggests that Yeats was indeed groping to learn the outlines of a system which, though constructed largely of elements familiar from his thinking and occult learning, was nonetheless new to him as a coherent, expanded, and self-contained system. The crucial question here would not be whether there was a hoax, but rather what portion of *A Vision* can be credited to George Yeats and what is the work of her husband, which could only be addressed by an exhaustive comparison of the automatic script, manuscript drafts, and published versions of the book. Being able to read the book at the sentence level would greatly expedite this process and make it possible to tackle the intriguing question of the Yeatses' shared ambivalence about assigning authority to George Yeats.

A second point against the hoax charge is, as Olney puts it, that "Yeats and Jung were strangers" (6)—not only to each other, but to each other's work. The system of *A Vision* is close enough to that of *Psychological Types* to make it seem possible that Yeats was cribbing from a book which Jung had, after all, published in 1921—except that it was not published in an English translation until 1923. Yeats could not have read the German original, which leaves him little over a year to perpetrate such a hoax, after spending years working on the automatic script.

The nature of the two systems themselves argues against such cross-pollination; they may be very much alike, but they are also significantly different. Yeats's assignment of fine shadings of mental orientation to his phases makes them far more precise than Jung's broadly drawn types, and he assigns Jung's four less useful functions to the out of phase state, rather than giving them
nominally equal status (as types) to the more useful ones, as Jung does. Yeats weaves the structural model into the fabric of life by relating the *Mask* and the *Body of Fate* to external conditions and objects, much as he weaves his antinomies into the fabric of history; collective life is formed by the same forces which influence the life of the individual. Jung's book sometimes seems far less organic, but that contrast might be expected when comparing the work of a poet to that of a clinical psychologist. But we could say that Yeats's integration of his system with the rest of his thought is far more complete; his views on artistic creation and the artist's role in society, the relations between the living and the dead, the enduring types of humanity, and the movements of history are all drawn up into the central symbol of the Great Wheel. *Psychological Types* is not anomalous within Jung's body of work, but it is rather independent in a way, concerned as it is with the contents of consciousness rather than the unconscious; it is almost an exercise in adapting classical typology to modern psychological methods. The book's glossary of Jungian terms did tie together much of his work up to that point, but the book is nowhere near the comprehensive synthesis and summary that *A Vision* is for Yeats.

A final point against the hoax charge concerns Yeats's own attempts to explain the structure of his system. The difficulty of explaining his system even with the aid of Jungian parallels makes it seem possible that Yeats did in fact make an honest but unsuccessful attempt to explain the workings of his own system; the cycle of phases is so self-referential and contains so many separate yet interrelated movements that a thorough exposition of it would be a lengthy and difficult task for anyone. The expository material on the gyres and *Faculties* is different enough between *VA* and *VB* to say that Yeats published two separate attempts to explain the workings of his system.
Though Yeats should not be considered guilty of an outright hoax, he does
seem to be guilty of being deliberately less obvious than he might have been in
order to achieve a specific and unusual goal, as "Owen Aherne" tells us in one of
the introductions to VA:

According to the Robartes MSS, the Dance of the Four Royal Pers-
sons is one of the names for the first figure drawn by the Judwali
elders for the instruction of youth and is identified with the "Great
Wheel" of Giraldus.
I am inclined to see in the story of its origin a later embodiment of
a story that it was the first diagram drawn upon the sand by the wife
of Kusta ben Luka, and that its connection with the lunar phases,
the movements and the nature of the Four Faculties and their gen-
eral application to the facts of human life, were fully explained
before its geometrical composition was touched upon. The Judwali
doctor of Bagdad, who is mentioned elsewhere in this book, said
that the whole philosophy was so expounded in a series of frag-
ments which only displayed their meaning, like one of those child's
pictures which are made up out of separate cubes, when all were
put together. The object of this was, it seems, to prevent the
intellect from forming its own conclusions, and so thwarting the
Djinn who could only speak to curiosity and passivity. (VA 10-11)

Yeats means to bypass the reader's conscious understanding in VA by treating
the geometrical foundation of the wheel--the gyres--after the cycle of phases.
Though he reverses that order in VB, his handling of the entire system in both
editions has the same effect: though the reader may not be able to consciously
understand the system, its consistency and unity make a deep impression on the
reader's subconscious. Yeats means to recreate his experience of encountering
the automatic script by speaking to the reader's "Djinn" or genius or Daimon as
the Yeatse's own Daimons had spoken to them.

Though, as McDowell says, "A Vision appears to be constructed in such a
way as to ward off extensive examination" (220), the purpose of this construction
is "to prevent the intellect from forming its own conclusions" and thus to avoid
"thwarting the Djinn who could only speak to curiosity and passivity." Yeats felt
that A Vision should work upon the reader's subconscious, so he intentionally
constructed it as "a series of fragments which only displayed their meaning . . . when all were put together" by the reader's subconscious and intuition. And if A Vision is a series of fragments linked by an underlying unity, then perhaps this curiously medieval book should be classed with The Waste Land, Pound's Cantos, Ulysses, and the other landmarks of modernism which Yeats assigned to Phase 22 of the modern era, where intellectual synthesis gives way to the intuitive linking of disparate fragments. We should also bear in mind Yeats's modernist esteem for language that does not try to be clearly referential. As he said of A Vision's reviewers, "They all think I was bound to explain myself to them. It is just that explaining that makes many English books empty. . . . I have always left out this explaining. Intensity is all" (Letters 905-06). A Vision may have seemed more intense than successful for a long time, but it may not surrender all its intensity even when we are able to read it at the sentence level.

The notion of the subconscious presentation of a daimonic composition is borne out by the dreamlike construction of the book's system; when you understand its structure, A Vision does in fact seem to be the "expression that unites the sleeping and waking mind" (VP 23) that Yeats claims it is. With its multiple levels of meaning, complex and mirrorlike changes in Faculty strength and orientation, and endlessly self-referential quality, the cycle of phases has the intricate perfection of something seen in a dream. McDowell's architectural simile seems especially apt in this regard, as it captures a sense of the book's confusingly intricate workings: "If we think of A Vision in architectural terms, it seems at times like a building from an Escher etching, where stairs which we had thought were leading upward suddenly debouche at a lower level" (219).

One wonders whether anyone would go to the lengths necessary to consciously create such a convoluted structure from scratch; but if one were given
some tantalizing glimpses of such a structure, and became convinced that it existed in its entirety somewhere and required only a conscious reconstruction for its elucidation, one might end up spending seven years in such an effort. And Yeats tells us that he received much of the material for the cycle of phases at the very beginning, and spent nearly twenty years refining it:

During the first months of instruction I had the Great Wheel of the lunar phases as printed at the end of this paragraph, but knew nothing of the conic sections that explain it, and though I had abundant definitions and descriptions of the Faculties at their different stations, did not know why they passed one another at certain points, nor why two moved from left to right like the sun’s daily course, two from right to left like the moon in the zodiac. Even when I wrote the first edition of the book I thought the geometrical symbolism so difficult, I understood it so little, that I put it off to a later section. . . . I tried to interest my readers in an unexplained rule of thumb that somehow explained the world. (VB 80-81)

His continuing struggle to understand what his wife had given him supports the idea of a dream creation or subconscious composition. The intricate central structure of the the system seems to have been developed in its entirety before it was gradually made conscious through the automatic writing sessions. Few of us can describe a dream adequately; Yeats’s long concern with his own dream life seems to have prepared him for transcribing the Vision. What Yeats did was work out its logical possibilities, and the bulk of the detail of the interplay of the four functions and two orientations is probably his doing, arising out of his recognition that something related to the classical temperaments was being expounded. He wrote A Vision by relating what he was learning to what he already knew.

The degree of similarity and contemporaneity of composition of Psychological Types and A Vision bring to mind the shared dream that Yeats mentions in his introduction to VB:

Much that has happened, much that has been said, suggests that the communicators are the personalities of a dream shared by my
Olney has remarked the aptness of Jung's concept of synchronicity for speculation about the Yeats/Jung coincidences, and mentions another more tangible possibility—that "the personal and cultural circumstances in which the two bodies of work were produced caused them to be alike—that the works were, in a manner of speaking, precipitated out by the times* (8). Not only did each man turn to automatic writing (in Jung's case, his journals and *Seven Sermons to the Dead*) and typology as ways of dealing with crises in their personal lives—Jung published *Psychological Types* eight years after his break with Freud, and Yeats first published *A Vision* eight years after his precipitous marriage—but both were expressing something that was in the air at the time. The "perennial philosophy" which Olney traces as their shared background had gathered force in obscurity and was now demanding expression not only in muddles like theosophy, but also in the psychological context which Jung supplied and the poetic context which Yeats supplied. We cannot answer the question of synchronicity, nor do we need to do so; the shared tradition and common aim of psychological typology are explanation enough for the similarity of *Psychological Types* and *A Vision*, if we take into account how the possibilities inherent in the temperaments could logically lead to virtually the same result.

Though the temperaments lent a form that shaped Yeats' and Jung's typologies—four basic types, an active/passive distinction, the possibility of compound types—Yeats and Jung made a quantum leap in expanding them into systems that were really self-sufficient world views. In so doing, they tried to validate Empedocles by refiguring his eightfold vortex/universe as an eightfold structure of consciousness that constitutes the knowable human universe. We have
seen one reason why they did so: each was trying to expand a binary classification of humanity into a more detailed system. Another reason for doing so, and the reason for needing a more detailed system in the first place, appears in a quotation from Jung that we have already seen:

Without wishing to be irreverent, I cannot refrain from confronting the professor of psychology with, say, the psychology of women, of the Chinese, or of the Australian aborigines. Our psychology must get down to brass tacks, otherwise we simply remain stuck in the Middle Ages. (CW 6: par. 945)

Jung is saying that his typology is a way of dealing with the Other, as A Vision is for Yeats. Jung’s various psychological functions and two attitudes or orientations create psychological Otherness; if the functions and orientations go unrecognized and unexamined, they can not relate to one another because they have different criteria, values, and modes of experiencing the world. They even tend to be strenuously opposed to one another in certain pairings. Some might say that Jung is imposing binary oppositions on people, but he might answer that those binary oppositions were already there in force and that freedom from them can only come through recognizing them in their entirety and ceasing to privilege one side or the other of them.

We tend to valorize the orientation and function that we rely on most--our type--and project our unconscious attitude and less differentiated functions as the Other. Jung’s typology can be a way to confront psychological Otherness within ourselves and overcome these projections to some degree. No one can really exist at the extreme of introversion or extraversion, but we tend to project the extreme of the orientation opposed to our own onto our opponents and demonized them. This should recall Yeats’s statement about the extremes of orientation in his system: "Phase 1 and Phase 15 are not human incarnations because human life is impossible without strife between the tinctures" (VB 79).
Consciousness is always mixed ("strife between the tintures") for Yeats and Jung, but our tendency is to try to purify it by excluding and demonizing the opposing orientation and functions.

Yeats takes ironic notice of this tendency to privilege one side when he has his primary or extraverted narrator Owen Aherne say in the introduction to VA: "Mr. Yeats's completed manuscript now lies before me. The system itself has grown clearer for his concrete expression of it, but I notice that if I made too little of the antithetical phases he has done no better by the primary" (xxiii). Yeats uses his system as a means of dealing with the Other imaginatively in his later work, most obviously in the Fool poems about a phase nearly opposite his own. Aherne's complaint applies to this later work as well--Yeats always preferred the antithetical--but the fact remains that Yeats was changed by the act of putting his preferences into their larger context by evolving the system of A Vision. He and Jung both had the idea of balance and totality as their goal, whether imaginative (A Vision) or psychological (individuation); and this idea of a balanced whole goes back to the ideal of the perfectly balanced or tempered complexio in Galen.

Something Jung says about his two orientations applies to Yeats as well:

Introversion or extraversion, as a typical attitude, means an essential bias which conditions the whole psychic process, establishes the habitual mode of reaction, and thus determines not only the style of behaviour but also the quality of subjective experience. Not only that, it determines the kind of compensation the unconscious will produce. (CW 6: par. 940; emphasis added)

Jung is saying something that Yeats would agree with: that subjectivity is constructed not only from without but from within, and that the orientations (more than the functions) are the foundation of ideology insofar as ideology depends on binary oppositions. Language and culture will work together to construct subjectivity, but the ideological content of that subjectivity must finally stem from one
orientation or the other, and may even be spontaneously generated from within
the individual's psyche in varying degrees.

Individuals' orientation affects how they respond to ideology from without—
whether they identify with it or reject it. In A Vision, if one's personal phase dif-
fers from the historical phase one is living in, then one's personal ideology will
conflict with the prevailing ideology of the times insofar as the two phases dis-
agree. This was Yeats's explanation for his own dilemma: he was a very subject-
ive or antithetical man living in increasingly objective or primary times. The mat-
ter of living out of phase in the personal sense is ideological as well; the out of
phase state involves adopting ideology from the opposite phase as part of being
untrue to oneself in a psychological sense.

And because we have an inborn ideological bias, we can actually generate
ideology ourselves, particularly in opposition to a prevailing ideology. What
Yeats said in Per Amica Silentia Lunae, A Vision's cycles of history express at
the level of civilizations: "every movement . . . prepares in the dark by its own
clarity and confidence its own executioner" (Mythologies 340). The process is
complex at the historical level because orientations and functions never realiy
drive their opponents entirely out of the picture, just as in the mind they remain
present in the unconscious; but the process of exploring orientations and func-
tions to their limits, exhausting them, and replacing them with their opponents
happens on the cultural level for Yeats. He would probably not argue against
there being other mechanisms of cultural formation at work as well, but would
maintain that the orientations--which are his gyres and thus are made up of his
Faculties or functions (VA 14)--are the basis of ideology and thus of all attempts
to make meaning out of experience and structure societies.

Yeats also implies that the orientations play a role in constructing gender.
He calls the *primary* orientation "feminine" and the *antithetical* "masculine" (VA 263), but his descriptions of the phases prove that either sex can have either orientation. This means that cultures may impose the characteristics of an orientation on a sex to create gender, and that in patriarchal societies they have traditionally done so; we see this in Yeats's descriptions of the "dispensations" or beginnings of historical cycles:

A *primary* dispensation looking beyond itself towards a transcendent power is dogmatic, levelling, unifying, feminine, humane, peace its means and end; an *antithetical* dispensation obeys imminent power, is expressive, hierarchical, multiple, masculine, harsh, surgical. (VB 263)

The "feminine" *primary* is unifying, humane, and peaceful, while the "masculine" *antithetical* is hierarchical, harsh, and surgical; both conform to traditional patriarchal expectations for women and men, and yet if either sex may be born with either orientation then the matter is more complex than traditional expectations would have it. Yeats does not pursue the matter explicitly, but his tendency to refer to the inhabitant of a phase as "the being" or as "Phase --" much of the time suggests that his view of the individual could have been gender neutral in some important respects. Much of his language in the phase descriptions is sexist in its reliance on masculine pronouns, but there is still enough neutral language to make one wonder. The examples for the phases are virtually all men, but Yeats's reliance on canonical artists and politicians dictates this; yet his placement of "beautiful women" around the *antithetical* (i.e., "masculine") peak of Phase 15 shows that even his examples are not as simple as they seem (VB 131, 137).

The notion of androgyny would derive from what *A Vision* was to Yeats: a vision of a unified whole that transcended the individual, yet could be grasped through the imagination. The idea of a balanced totality recalls one of the crucial
passages in *A Vision* about the ultimate purpose and significance of the book for
Yeats, a passage which ought to be reconsidered in light of the influence of the
temperaments:

Some will ask whether I believe in the actual existence of my cir-
cuits of sun and moon. Those that include, now all recorded time in
one circuit, now what Blake calls "the pulsaters of an artery", are
plainly symbolical, but what of those that fixed, like a butterfly upon
a pin, to our central date, the first day of our Era, divide actual his-
tory into periods of equal length? To such a question I can but an-
swer that if sometimes, overwhelmed by miracle when in the midst of
it, I have taken such periods literally, my reason has soon
recovered; and now that the system stands out clearly in my
imagination I regard them as stylistic arrangements of experience
comparable to the cubes in the drawing of Wyndham Lewis and the
ovoids in the sculpture of Brancusi. They have helped me to hold in
a single thought reality and justice. [sic] (VB 24-25)

If we recall Yeats's speculation in *Per Amica Silentia Lunae*—that with the right
compass, one might mark out the crucial events of the future upon a calendar—
then we should recognize that with the help of the temperaments he has found,
for imaginative purposes at least, that which he sought. But the final sentence is
ambiguous—why "justice"?

However, if it was indeed the temperaments which Yeats employed in
going from the binary opposition of *Per Amica Silentia Lunae* to the eighthoid
system of *A Vision*, then that final sentence takes on a hitherto unsuspected
meaning. "Justice" would have a specific meaning where the temperaments are
concerned; as Ottosson puts,

Galen states that the balanced *complexio* is a relative conception.
The best temperament is not the same for all men, animals, or
plants, but each has its proper mixture of the primary qualities.
Galen here uses the term *justice* (*dikaiosynē*) as the criterion of the
proper temperament for each thing, as opposed to the criterion of
absolute balance between the qualities. (133)

The word used in the Latin translation is *iustitiam* (Ottosson 133), which clarifies
the use of "justice" here. The just temperament is the proper balance of qualities
for a given type of person or thing, an ideal that is particular to that type. Yeats
could therefore be juxtaposing the reality of people and cultures as they are and a justice that is the ideal of what they might become if they attained their proper balance.

This view is supported by Yeats's contrast between the in phase and out of phase conditions in his description of each phase; each phase has a proper balance of functions and orientations to achieve in order to live up to its potential, and attempts to live one's life through the wrong function or orientation result in frustration, insincerity, and ultimate failure. The question of whether this is determinism is greatly complicated by Yeat's insistence that it is much harder to live in phase than out of phase--that it is easier to take what life is giving us than to exert ourselves by seeking to live in phase. He sees living in phase as the fulfillment of a particular structural potential that gives a degree of form to one's individuality; yet individuals of a given phase will always differ from one another to some degree because of their circumstances and final individuality.

A larger potential lies in the entire cycle of phases when they are taken together as a symbolic representation of the totality as it might be imagined symbolically. We need to live through the whole of the wheel in successive incarnations to experience life fully, but Yeats implies the possibility of speeding up that process and transcending the limitations of our own phases by imagining a larger whole. Although for our civilization as a whole "the day is far off when the two halves of man can define each its own unity in the other as a mirror, Sun in Moon, Moon in Sun, and so escape out of the Wheel" (VA 215), through imagination the individual may be able to do more. The totality of the Wheel may be the final "justice" to which Yeats would appeal.

The crucial point is the imagining of that totality as something that is ordinarily out of the grasp of the individual consciousness, except through the
imagination. Yeats is wholly cognizant of the provisionality of any system for thinking about reality and experience, but he felt compelled throughout his life to construct something that would suffice for his needs, realizing in the end that it would only be provisional. What he sought was something that would expand his capacity to imagine, and that system would somehow always have to transcend his current grasp; it would have to be somehow ideal, transcendent, yet capable of imaginative embodiment in his thought and work. It would also be only a working hypothesis.

We see all of this in a discarded draft of the introduction to VB:

Some will ask if I believe all that this book contains, and I will not know how to answer. Does the word belief, used as they will use it, belong to our age, can I think of the world as there and I standing here to judge it. I will never think any thoughts but these, or some modification or extension of these; when I write prose or verse they must be somewhere present though it may not be in the words; they must affect my judgment of friends and events; but then there are many symbolisms and none exactly resembles mine. What Leopardi in Ezra Pound's translation calls that "concord" wherein "The arcane spirit of the whole mankind turns hardy pilot"--how much better it would be without that word "hardy" which slackens speed and adds nothing--persuades me that he has best imagined reality who has best imagined justice. (Harper 2:414-15)

Yeats seems to be saying that if anything about his system requires belief, it is its lack of resemblance to other "symbolisms"; what matters to him is that he has found his working hypothesis, though it stands alone. Is he postmodern in asking if belief in a system is possible in our age, and is he asking if he can participate in the objectivity of his time--"the world as there and I standing here to judge it"--when he knows he is an antithetical or subjective type? And is he saying that seeing the whole--objectivity and subjectivity together as opposites that require each other for their own existence--is the source of his belief, even if his age cannot see what he does? That may be the sense of the final sentence: that Yeats felt he had been given a vision of "the arcane spirit of the whole mankind" in the
system of *A Vision* (the cycle of phases as both cultural engine and ultimate reality), and that this vision better equipped him to imagine reality as it is because it was a vision of how things would ideally be--justice. Imaginatively, one deals better with any part of experience--reality--when one has imagined the ideal whole: justice.

What the rest of us can think about this system and its presentation is another matter. Objectively speaking, the central symbol of lunar phases has only tenuous connections with reality, though we ought not to expect so much from a system of signifiers anyway. Hough's previously cited objection to the symbol--that "the dance of the four faculties and the rules for their mutual relation is schematism for its own sake" [sic] (106)--still requires an answer. We need to view the phases of the moon as something that the Yeatses were simply given to work with, as Hough acknowledges (106); we should also view them as perhaps the most powerful and appropriate natural symbol that could be used for Yeats's purposes. What Yeats wants to do is depict the interplay between the mind's most fundamental elements at a sufficient level of complexity; what other natural symbol would serve as well? Its contrast of light and dark accounts for the orientations, and the twenty-eight phases allow clear gradations between the two extremes, with a week for each of the functions. It also ties into traditional symbolism, which always validates a symbol in Yeats's eyes.

And after all, a symbol does not play by the rules of objective analysis, as Hough finally admits:

*Symbols, it will be recalled, need not be verbal or discursive. They can be visual, geometric, numerical. And they can have an intrinsic power. A talismanic image can have a meaning, though a meaning that has never been put into words; and it can affect the mind, though its meaning has never reached the level of conscious awareness. The Wheel and its internal movements is such a talisman, and a very rich one. The principles of its movement are quite simple, but*
the resultant pattern (the twenty-eight phases and their mutual relations) is intricate. And Yeats feels this as a powerful symbolic design. How many of his readers today are capable of doing so is another question. One answer I think is that everyone finds brilliant flashes, occasional tantalising glimpses from inside the Wheel to a fragment of the outer world. The description of phase 24 with its examples (Queen Victoria, Galsworthy and Lady Gregory) is a case in point. But some of the other phases remain quite opaque, or lead to mere bewilderment. And we ought probably to understand that the efficacy of the Wheel as a symbol is not really to be judged in this way at all. If it is 'empty and measured' rather than obviously related to life, that for Yeats is part of its virtue. Or, a more reassuring way of looking at it, we can see it as something like an orrery or planetarium—a working model, illustrating in a small-scale, more or less graspable form, much larger motions not visible to the naked eye, yet of fundamental importance to the life that it seems to pass by. (108-09)

Obviously, understanding the language of A Vision at the sentence level removes much of the opacity and bewilderment that bother Hough, even if the result is sometimes only that we are better able to see the gears of this intricate machine turning. Other things that emerge make the effort worthwhile: a much more coherent representation of life within the symbol than Hough suspects, and a much clearer aesthetic achievement. Something in the rigid demands of the system's structure must have appealed to Yeats's taste for the challenge of fixed metrical forms; the cycle is nothing if not a rhythmic patterning. When we can read it at the sentence level, we gain a new appreciation of Yeats's successes in this unique form; in particular, those passages dealing with the sinking into the image around Phase 15 emerge as a beautiful statement of one of Yeats's most challenging conceptions. Achieving a workable determinate reading of A Vision also lays the groundwork for effectively applying different theoretical approaches to the book in the future.

Jung can provide the last word on what A Vision meant for Yeats; the descriptions of introverted thinking and its type quoted in Chapter Two of this dissertation are, in the end, good descriptions of Yeats and of A Vision as well. As a
man of Phase 17 and thus an introverted thinking type, Yeats is finally most concerned with "the initial symbolic image hovering darkly before the mind's eye"; for him, the Great Wheel and the interlocking gyres, "though not inherent in the concrete fact" of life, are yet "the most suitable abstract expression of it" (CW 6: par. 628). A Vision leaves many readers exasperated at its "tendency to force the facts into the shape of its image" (CW 6: par. 629), and yet for Yeats it was "manifestly and intelligibly related to the known facts of the time" (CW 6: par. 637). Within the book, Yeats drew together all of his occult knowledge, his poetic power, and his views on life within the magic circle of a symbol of the Self, and found serenity and inspiration in the act. The better we understand A Vision, the better we can understand its significance for Yeats; our understanding of his poetry and plays may not benefit as much from our understanding of the role of the four elements and the temperaments in A Vision, but at least we can better read and understand A Vision on its own terms, and thus continue to give the book the active life which Yeats so wanted for it.
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