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CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND NEGOTIATION ARITHMETIC:
ADDING ISSUES, ADDING PARTIES

by

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ABSTRACT

Conflict Management and Negotiation Arithmetic:
Adding Issues, Adding Parties

by

Valerie L. Schwebach

The addition of new issues and parties to negotiations is often recommended as a means of conflict management at the international level. Such addition (or "negotiation arithmetic") contains an element of strategic interaction that is often ignored in the prescriptive work on conflict management. Though disputants in an international crisis may be seeking to avoid war, they are also trying to protect important national interests. For that reason, each disputant has an incentive to choose only those options that make her better off. Since what makes one disputant better off may make the other disputant worse off, conflict management is necessarily a matter of strategic choice.

A game-theoretic analysis of disputants' incentives to pursue the conflict management options of issue linkage and mediation demonstrates that these strategies are complementary. The conditions that preclude the pursuit of one strategy encourage the pursuit of the other. Empirical tests of the resulting hypotheses
indicate that the more likely a dispute dyad is to pursue mediation, the less likely it is to pursue issue linkage.
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Chapter 1

ADDING ISSUES AND ADDING PARTIES:
AN INTRODUCTION

At the height of the Cold War, the prospect of the Soviet Union's dissolution would no doubt have been greeted with great enthusiasm. However, the reality of that dissolution appears to be as much a cause for concern as for celebration. Uncertainty about the nature of future international conflicts, and about mankind's ability to resolve them peacefully, has clouded the optimism that followed in the immediate wake of the Cold War's end.

This uncertainty has resulted in an intense debate that has dominated much recent discussion of world politics, in scholarly journals and lay media alike. While it has many facets, ultimately what much of the debate boils down to is disagreement about the future of conflict management. Students of international relations are at odds over whether or not the conditions of a post-Cold War world are favorable to such management. Positions taken in this debate can be broadly characterized as optimistic and pessimistic.

Those who are less sanguine about the future point out that although Cold War tension between the superpowers did threaten the world with nuclear devastation, that threat was never realized. What made this avoidance of nuclear war possible, they argue, were conventions of crisis behavior and conflict management developed by the superpowers over several years (Bell, 1972; Williams, 1976;
Miller, 1993). A logical implication of this claim is that, since one of the superpowers has broken down, those conventions must break down also. Even if they do not break down, their specific tailoring to Cold War conflicts and the superpower relationship renders them obsolete. Either way, this line of thinking thus sees the immediate future of conflict management as very grim. Until some kind of replacement develops for the conflict management "regime" established by the United States and the Soviet Union, world politics will be plagued by a series of dangerous crises that could spiral out of control. Moreover, since it takes decades for such regimes to develop, we can look forward to several years of great instability in international relations.

Others point to at least three bases for optimism. First, Cold War issues have long been cited as the main impediment to the effectiveness of international organizations. With the Cold War apparently over, these organizations may finally come into their own as conflict managers. Second, integration, the ultimate form of cooperation, seems to be back on track with the continuing development of the European Community. Finally, international economic issues dominate much contemporary political discourse. Recent newspaper headlines seem to be as much if not more concerned with trade blocs as they are military alliances. These developments have led some to conclude that military conflict has been superseded by economic competition as the most important aspect of international interactions. This line of thinking implies that the future of conflict management is not so much grim as increasingly irrelevant. Economic development and political
integration will in themselves limit the escalation of international disputes, since the costs of such escalation will rise as interdependence increases; for this reason, conflict management will just not be as important as it was during the Cold War.

These two positions paint radically different pictures of the post-Cold War world. The pessimistic argument paints a picture of a chaotic international arena filled with dangerous disputes; the optimistic argument sees political integration and economic development as progress toward perpetual peace. Each of these views must be qualified in important ways, however. The optimists should keep in mind that serious international disputes will continue to occur in spite (or perhaps because) of the end of the Cold War. For example, the fall of Communism led to the rise of ethnic conflict in Eastern Europe. Moreover, as the recent dispute between North Korea and the United States demonstrates, nuclear proliferation will be a complicating factor in some future disputes. If this proliferation is coincident with the erosion of some existing conventions of conflict management, it could be dangerous for us to conclude that the history of war has ended. (It could be dangerous anyway.) On the other hand, the pessimistic argument places the burden of conflict management squarely (and solely) on the shoulders of the superpowers. However, other actors can and do undertake conflict management. Several international organizations have been formed for exactly that purpose, and nation-states other than the superpowers have frequently acted as mediators in attempts to facilitate peaceful conflict resolution. If the superpowers are
stepping aside when it comes to conflict management, one major effect may be to give these other actors more room to maneuver.

However, though it is clear that each of the positions sketched out above needs to be qualified, and it is clear what at least some of those qualifications should be, what is not clear is what kinds of expectations result or what the implications are for conflict management in a post-Cold War world. Precisely because of this uncertainty, the apparent end of the Cold War cannot be construed as grounds for shifting academic attention away from international conflict. On the contrary, the demise of the Soviet Union may make the continued study of conflict and its management even more important, since we do not know what to expect. However, this problem cannot be usefully addressed without some kind of theoretical framework, as our uncertainty about the future demonstrates. Such a framework would provide a solid basis for inferences about the post Cold War world by specifying the conditions under which strategies of conflict management can be expected to be effective. Once we have those, we can then tie them to the conditions that we think describe the Cold War world; to the extent that they match up, we have grounds for optimism. Of course, disagreements on what conditions best describe a post-Cold War world are not immaterial, but they do not obviate the usefulness of this kind of approach. Instead, they may only underscore it. If we begin with a set of assumptions that say the Cold War world will exhibit a certain set of characteristics, then a theoretical framework allows us to say "Given these conditions, we should expect this empirical result." If substituting different initial
conditions leads to different empirical expectations, these
differences can be subjected to empirical test.

This research effort addresses this lack, presenting a
theoretical framework that looks at conflict management from a
bargaining perspective. The central idea in traditional conflict
management literature is that though bargainers in an international
dispute may be interested in preventing dispute escalation, they are
also interested in protecting their stakes in the disputed issues
(George, 1984). Their pursuit of conflict management is therefore
not purely altruistic, but strategic. An important (and unexamined)
implication of this idea is that disputants considering conflict
management would compare different methods of management to
each other, choosing the one that best protects their interests,
instead of considering them separately. In other words, the
conditions required for the choice of one method are not independent
of the conditions required for another. Yet, as will be seen below,
most of the scholarly work on conflict management either ignores
the disputants' choice of particular methods of management or
ignores the theoretical possibility of relationships among them.
Thus, a major contribution of this study is its analysis of the
connections among strategies of conflict management, and the
extent to which they are complementary and/or substitutable.

Of particular interest to this research effort are those
strategies that involve introducing some new element into a dispute.
Adding another issue (for the purpose of creating package deals) or
another party (as a mediator), or doing both, are frequently
recommended as methods of conflict management. These methods
are examples of bargaining moves that Sebenius (1983) calls "negotiation arithmetic". In Sebenius' analysis of negotiations, the number of parties and issues are not taken to be fixed throughout the course of dispute bargaining. Instead, they are proposed as choice variables, the value of which depends upon the strategy choices of the disputants. There are distinct costs and benefits associated with adding or subtracting either, and this (Sebenius argues) affects the willingness of bargainers to do so. Sebenius uses a simple graphical analysis to explore how adding issues or parties can either facilitate or complicate negotiations.

The analysis undertaken in this research effort builds on Sebenius' framework in three ways. First, it focuses on the consequences of those choices for the form and effectiveness of conflict management. The addition of parties and actors are common prescriptions in the conflict management literature and are clearly examples of "negotiation arithmetic". Second, it recognizes that an actor does not evaluate any of these methods independently of the others. She compares different methods, not just to each other, but also to the merits of the status quo. (Actors never "have" to engage in conflict management--they can, and frequently do, choose to do nothing to change the structure or the course of the bargaining.) However, the relative values of these courses of action cannot be completely determined by only one of the crisis bargainers, since the consequence of any choice depends upon the response of her opponent. This brings us to the third contribution of the analysis undertaken here. Conflict management is presented as a problem of strategic interaction: an actor's expectation of her opponent's
behavior conditions her evaluation of the options available to her. Consequently, where Sebenius uses a graphical analysis to examine the addition of issues or parties, this research effort employs game theory.

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND "NEGOTIATION ARITHMETIC"

With its emphasis on "negotiation arithmetic" and strategic interaction, the analytic focus of this project differs in important ways from that of the established literature on conflict management. At this point, a survey of existing conflict management studies will serve to put this effort in perspective. Reviews of the individual topics of issue linkage, mediation, and the involvement of international organizations follow. Then, the formal framework of the analysis is introduced, and the plan of the empirical investigation is discussed. The chapter concludes with an outline of the volume's organization.

Conflict Management Literature:
Three Traditions

The study of conflict management has been approached in three ways. The term itself is a legacy of the Cuban Missile Crisis, as will be seen below. Consequently, the concept is usually used to describe a set of problems and policy prescriptions based upon that experience and the general context of the Cold War. A second tradition of conflict management studies shares the focus on major powers, but is descriptive rather than prescriptive. This branch of the literature compares major power interaction in the interwar and
Cold War periods of the twentieth century with that of the nineteenth century Concert of Europe. The third approach associates conflict management with the unique twentieth century phenomenon of international organizations and the broader topic of third party intervention. Each of these will be reviewed in turn.

The prevailing conceptualization of conflict management presents it as a matter of simultaneously reconciling two very different (and potentially competing) goals: achieving the political objectives at stake in a crisis and limiting the military force employed for that purpose. The earliest explicit statement of this definition can be found in Williams (1976:30): "Crisis management is concerned on the one hand with the procedures for controlling and regulating a crisis so that it does not get out of hand and lead to war, and on the other hand with ensuring that the crisis is resolved on a satisfactory basis in which the vital interests of the state are secured and protected."1 Snyder and Diesing define the central problem of conflict management as the identification of "an optimum blend of coercion and accommodation in one's strategy, a blend that will both avoid war and maximize one's gains or minimize one's losses" (1977:10). Similarly, Alexander George argues that the "policy dilemma" of conflict management stems from "a desire to do what may be necessary to protect one's most important interests but, at the same time, to avoid actions that may result in undesired costs and risks" (1984:224).

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1George et al. (1971) acknowledge the competition between the requirements of coercive diplomacy and crisis management, but George does not set forth the specific dilemma of conflict management until 1984.
This framing of the problem is very much a legacy of three interrelated elements of twentieth century history. The invention and use of nuclear weapons, the general context of the Cold War, and the particular experience of the Cuban missile crisis had a great impact on the mindsets of decision-makers and academics alike. Memories of the two world wars and the crises that preceded them conditioned that impact in important ways.

During the Cold War, and especially after the missile crisis, controlling escalation and avoiding war became a major focus of both policy-making and research. The possibility of an "unwanted" war was seen as particularly significant, with the crisis of 1914 serving as an important reference point. Several studies focused on human error as a cause of inadvertent escalation; after all, the reasoning went, since the use of nuclear weapons practically guaranteed suicide, no one would use them on purpose. According to this logic, conflict management was largely a matter of controlling the human element, and controlling the human element depended upon improving the quality of the decision-making process. The model for such improvements was the creation and behavior of ExCom, in the eyes of some authors (e.g., Allison, 1971). More generally, the emphasis was on minimizing the effects of crisis on decision-making.\(^2\) Technology was also recognized as a contributing factor. Rapid technological advancements and the increasing destructiveness of weaponry made both the likelihood and the consequences of an accidental war much more serious. Therefore,

\(^2\)For a recent review of this literature, see Holsti (1989).
controlling the technological element was also crucial to restraining escalation. Studies in this area include analyses of the mechanics of command control systems and the impact of arms control (Bracken, 1983; McGillivray and Winham, 1988).

Preventing escalation is what kept the Cold War "cold", but at the heart of the conflict for each superpower was the question of how to contain the other's influence. When considering this goal, the crisis preceding W.W.II weighed heavily on the minds of policy makers, who wanted to avoid a repeat of the disastrous experience with appeasement. The general perception in light of what happened at Munich was that safeguarding the national interest entailed competition in risk-taking and exploitation of fears of escalation. This required the skillful wielding of force and the clear communication of intent and resolve (Schelling, 1960; Bell, 1972). Analyses of deterrence and brinkmanship grew out of this intellectual tradition (see, e.g., George and Smoke, 1974). In a similar but more policy-oriented vein, the Kennedy administration's attempts to use force as a policy tool motivated much of the literature on coercive diplomacy.3

The Cold War policy goals of controlling escalation (avoiding war) and containing the influence of a rival (protecting national interests) were ambitious in themselves, but matters were complicated by the fact that they had to be pursued simultaneously.

3"The Kennedy administration was attempting to develop a concept of force that would enable it to be employed as a highly refined instrument of diplomacy. Force and threats of force would unfortunately continue to be necessary even in the dangerous world of nuclear weapons; therefore, the administration gave greater emphasis than ever before to ensuring controlled, discriminating use of force" (George et al., 1971:8).
Consider the problem from the standpoint of bargaining theory. Key to protecting one's interests is the communication of resolve, which is largely measured by the level of cost one is willing to bear. Conveying a wish to avoid war is equivalent to revealing one's pain threshold, which may create an incentive for the adversary to respond aggressively. (The experience of 1939 appeared to confirm this in the minds of policy makers.) The problem for Cold War policy makers was essentially a signaling one: how to make a policy choice that communicated both determination and the desire to avoid war without inviting either pre-emption or exploitation.

To many, the peaceful resolution of the Cuban missile crisis suggested that the solution to this problem had been found. The extremes of Sarajevo and Munich were avoided, and consequently so as was World War III. In the aftermath of the crisis, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara made the oft-quoted statement that "There is no longer any such thing as strategy; there is only crisis management" (cited in Bell, 1971:2). That experience thus provided the historical basis for the idea of "conflict management", and inspired the prescriptive branch of this literature.

From this standpoint, conflict management is aimed at reducing the tension in international crises between the pursuit of political ends and the restraint of military means. Conflict management must be more than the sum of these two goals, analysts argued, since the operational requirements for the successful pursuit of one objective sometimes contradict those for the other (George et al., 1971). Effective prescriptions for conflict management thus had to go beyond the recommendations of both the
literature on accidental war and the literature on deterrence. In the prescriptive conflict management literature, several broad tenets can be identified. Multiple advocacy in the decision-making process and close political control over policy implementation are recommended, as is the moderation of political demands and military responses. Sensitivity to the adversary's situation, open and clear communication, and the slowing or "freezing" of the crisis are also urged (Holsti, 1972; Millburn, 1972; Bell, 1978; Chang, 1982; George, 1991). More specific suggestions advocate stress reduction and sensitivity training for leaders and diplomatic personnel; organizational prescriptions address the (in)flexibility of standard operating procedures, the availability of multiple communication channels, and the implications of strategic doctrines for crisis stability (Millburn, 1972; Frei, 1982; Hermann, 1988; Nye and Ury, 1988).

These policy prescriptions are primarily directed at major powers and their leaders. This too is in part a legacy of the Cold War, in which the superpowers (and their nuclear weapons) dominated world affairs. Continuing this major power focus, another branch of the conflict management literature places the Cold War in historical context. The fact that the local crises of the Cold War failed to erupt into general wars inspired comparisons with the interwar period and the Concert of Europe. According to these studies, decades of major power interaction lead to the evolution of conventions of crisis behavior. Conflict management

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4For a thorough review of the prescriptive literature on conflict management, and its critiques, see Richardson (1988).
then is the result of a learning process shared by great powers and made possible through tacit communication (McClelland, 1961; Boulding, 1966; Bell, 1972; Elrod, 1976; Miller, 1993). In particular, the United States and the Soviet Union developed an understanding of the "rules of the game" over the course of the Cold War (Gaddis, 1987:238). The idea of such "rules" is not inconsistent with the directly policy-relevant approach taken in the prescriptive literature. The ideas are related in the following sense: the dominant nation-states' policy responses to the dilemma of conflict management evolved through tacit communication and experiential learning to result in shared "conventions of crisis". It is the loss of this common ground is the down-side, unanticipated by many, to the end of the Cold War.

However, there are exceptions to the view of conflict management as the exclusive domain of major powers. Recently, some attention has been paid to minor power conflict management (Stern and Sundelius, 1992). The term has also been used to describe the activity of international organizations, and third party intervention more generally, with a slight shift in meaning. In these studies, conflict management involves more than adherence to the "conventions of crisis", and, due to the nature of international organization involvement, the protection of national interests is not identified as an objective. Instead, conflict management consists of efforts undertaken to prevent dispute escalation and/or promote settlement, and in contrast to the original definition of the concept,

5The term is Bell's (1972).
there is no acknowledgment of any tension between these objectives (see, e.g., Haas et al, 1972; Butterworth, 1978:196; Dixon, 1993a, 1993b). The emphasis is not on how to resolve tension between these goals, since they are not recognized as competing, but rather on the specific activities that can be undertaken to reach them.

Thus, the term "conflict management" has been used in three different ways in existing literature. As was noted at the beginning of this section, the prevailing definition presents it as attempts to resolve the tension between the policy goals of protecting political interests and restraining military force. Other approaches conceive of conflict management as conventions of crisis or as third party intervention. This makes it possible for a wide range of topics to be included under the general rubric of "conflict management". Unfortunately, this loose theoretical articulation also makes it difficult to tell exactly when it has been pursued and exactly when it has been successful. In part, this is because the term has been used to denote both means and ends. Does the avoidance of war automatically imply conflict management? Does the occurrence of war imply mismanagement? Is any policy advanced during a crisis an example of conflict management? Is the involvement of international organizations an example of conflict management in itself, or is conflict management what they do?

To avoid some of these conceptual difficulties, this project focuses on two specific bargaining strategies that appear in many prescriptions for conflict management. Issue linkage and mediation are examples of deliberate modifications of a bargaining situation. The purpose of these strategies is to alter the structure of the
interaction so as to make a bargained settlement more likely. In effect, they are attempts to build "safety features" into a crisis situation, so conflict management strategies like this can be thought of as "dispute engineering". From this point on, this term will be used to delimit the scope of this project and distinguish these strategies from the more general topic of conflict management.

This focus has a number of conceptual advantages. Consistent with the meaning of the word "management", the addition of issues and/or actors is a purposive, active policy decision. Moreover, this decision is regarded as strategic. Existing conflict management literature is often criticized on the basis that it is biased toward operational requirements for the avoidance of war, and pays little attention to the effective protection of bargaining interests (Dessouki, 1983; Richardson, 1988). But, as George has pointed out, "there need be no crisis if one side is willing to forgo its objectives and accept damage to the interests at stake" (1984:224). The analysis presented here is based on the assumption that disputants attempt to manage crises to their own ends. The addition of an issue and the acceptance of a mediator (as well as the type of mediator chosen) all reflect the resources and interests of the disputants. This implies that the pursuit and manner of dispute engineering are a function of strategic interaction.

In turn, acknowledgment of the role of strategic interaction affects how "successful" dispute engineering is defined. It is more than the avoidance of war; just as importantly, it is more than the achievement of negotiated settlement. It implies a particular kind
of settlement, one that reflects the interests of the involved parties. The transformation of a dispute to a win-win situation, in which both parties avoid diplomatic defeat and also avoid war, is truly an example of successful dispute engineering. The main dilemma of conflict management examined by this project is whether and how such a situation can be created.

Elements of "Dispute Engineering": Adding Issues, Adding Parties

Issue linkage and mediation are widely assumed to facilitate peaceful conflict resolution. These topics are similar in that each involves what appears to be the expansion of the dispute. Issue linkage increases the number of issues (for the purpose of creating package deals), and mediation by definition introduces at least one other actor. In effect, the strategy of issue linkage restructures the bargain, while third-party intervention restructures the conflict. These are related in important and interesting ways. Sometimes, the bargain cannot be restructured unless the conflict is restructured, and other times, restructuring the conflict involves restructuring the bargain. The nature of the third party, if there is one, probably affects this relationship. These questions have been touched upon, but not fully explored, in the existing literatures on issue linkage and mediation.

To analyze this area of overlap, this project uses an extensive form game. There are two reasons for this approach. First, the use of an extensive form game is consistent with the conceptualization of dispute engineering as a matter of strategic interaction. Second, the game itself provides a simple way of organizing and displaying
the logical relationships between issue linkage and mediation. The strategies themselves are examined as a preliminary step in the analysis.

Before presenting the analytical framework of the study, I first turn to brief reviews of previous work on issue linkage, mediation, and international organizations. The literature on these topics is voluminous, and approaches to the subject matter are diverse both within the individual research areas as well as across them. However, there are some broad similarities in the state of our knowledge of each. In particular, the conditions under which disputants engage in issue linkage, submit to mediation, and/or accept the intervention of international organizations have yet to be identified in existing work, and these are probably related in important ways. This is a significant gap in our understanding. After all, issue linkage, mediation, and international organizations must actually be employed before they can be effective.

The following sections briefly review each body of literature for the purpose of demonstrating the gaps in our knowledge that this study is designed to address. Additional discussion is undertaken in the individual chapters.

**Issue Linkage.** Many prescriptions for conflict management advocate "face-saving" diplomatic moves, the creation of "golden bridges" that make the adversary's graceful retreat possible (Bell, 1978:540). One possible way to create these "bridges", and still protect one's own interests, is through the bargaining tactic of issue linkage. Briefly defined, this tactic consists of the inclusion of additional,
welfare-enhancing issues in negotiations for the purpose of increasing the likelihood of a bargained agreement. A "win-win" situation can be created through the addition of a separate issue, in which both sides come away from the bargaining table with more than they otherwise would have. Such deals have the added advantages of enabling disputants to avoid war and setting a precedent for their future cooperation.

Because of these benefits, issue linkage is widely touted as a creative, peaceful means of conflict resolution. Whether it is in fact effective in this regard is a topic of great debate in the issue linkage literature. Analysts who favor this strategy generally argue that the addition of issues increases the benefits of such a negotiated settlement to both parties (Tollison and Willett, 1979; Raiffa, 1982; Pillar, 1983; Keohane, 1984:91). Those on the other side of the debate focus on the possibility that adding more issues, even for the purpose of a mutually beneficial package deal, unnecessarily complicates negotiations and may destabilize or overwhelm them (Fisher, 1964; Rangarajan, 1985; Gallarotti, 1991). These opposing viewpoints are reconciled somewhat by the work of Sebenius (1983) and Morgan (1990), who bring to the debate theoretical formulations that demonstrate that under some conditions issue linkage will be effective, while under others it will not.

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6 There is an additional dimension to issue linkage that is not considered here, and that is "linkage-as-leverage" (Gosovic and Ruggie, 1976; Haas, 1980; Stein, 1980; Sebenius, 1983). The analytical focus of this dissertation is restricted to those cases in which issue linkage is employed as a conflict management strategy rather than as a means of extracting concessions.
While evaluations of the usefulness of issue linkage for conflict management are important, they all depend upon a crucial assumption — that this strategy will be pursued in the first place. Yet for a number of reasons proposing an issue linkage can be problematic. Introducing a linkage conveys information to the other disputant about one's preferences, and so may act as a signal of weakening resolve. A linkage proposal may be interpreted by the other actor as evidence that the original issue means so much to the proposer that she would rather arrange concessions on another matter than risk the breakdown of the negotiations (Morrow, 1992). Also, undertaking issue linkage involves direct costs in terms of time and resources. One of the most important determinants of linkage success has been shown to be the nature of the issue proposed for linkage purposes (Deutsch, 1973; Pruitt, 1981). Even if an issue appropriate for linkage exists, identifying it is not necessarily easy, and implementing the linkage deal may be at least as problematic (Morgan, 1990).

Because the purpose of previous studies was to illustrate the potential consequences of issue linkage, little or no attention was paid to the actual agent of issue linkage — whether it was one of the disputants that proposed such a deal, or whether some third party arranged it. Yet the costs and risks of this strategy of conflict management may make it difficult for the parties themselves to suggest it, especially in a crisis situation. It may be that in order for such mutually beneficial package deals to be undertaken, third parties must assume the costs of their creation. Third parties could serve two functions in this capacity. To minimize possible
reputational costs, a third party could undertake the proposal of a deal itself, and/or act as a "guarantor of the peace" to ensure that the deal is not exploited. To minimize costs of implementation, a third party could actually design the deal, using the pooled information it receives as a go-between, and make side-payments to the disputants to help offset domestic political discontent.

Addressing the question of issue linkage agency is important in a theoretical sense, but it would also provide a way to approach an apparent empirical puzzle. This tactic appears to be employed very rarely, despite its multifaceted appeal as a conflict management strategy. However, this may be a function of how it has been studied. The empirical work in this area has consisted solely of a handful of case studies, and this in itself could contribute to a false impression of empirical rarity. The same impression would also be created by ignoring third-party sponsorship of package deals, if issue linkage is one of the main modes of third-party intervention. The identification of the conditions under which issue linkage is pursued and successful would tell us where to look in the empirical record for these package deals, and make it possible to evaluate the practicality of this prescription for conflict management.

Mediation. Many conflict management prescriptions stress the importance of keeping communication lines open. Communication is important not only because it reduces the ambiguity of signals, but because it can lead to the identification of a "zone of agreement", a range of mutually acceptable negotiated settlements. Of course, once this range has been identified, some actor must take the
initiative to make a proposal. Facilitating communication, and making proposals, are tasks that have traditionally been assigned to mediators. Consequently, acceptance (or even solicitation) of third-party involvement is often recommended in the prescriptive literature on conflict management.

Dissension in the scholarly ranks regarding the effectiveness of formal mediation is so acute that some analysts have chosen to advocate a completely different form of third party involvement, that of Track Two Diplomacy (Burton, 1972; Kelman, 1972; Azar, 1990). In the literature that retains its focus on traditional means of mediation, there is a rough consensus on the factors that influence its effectiveness. Variables such as the nature of the disputants (their regime types), their relative power, levels of internal political discord, the issues under contention, the parties' previous relationship, the nature of the mediator, and the strategies employed by the mediator have all been shown to have an impact on the success of mediation (Young, 1972; Ott, 1972; Frei, 1976; Bercovitch, 1989, 1991).

There is considerably less agreement regarding the effect of mediator bias. Young (1967, 1972) argues that impartiality is crucial to the success of a mediation initiative. The findings of Bercovitch et al. (1991) suggest the opposite, but these authors contend that a mediator's partiality or impartiality plays less of a role than the actual leverage it has over one or both parties. Touval and Zartman (1985, 1989) also stress partiality and leverage, but maintain that it affects the disputants' acceptance of mediation. They argue that disputants prefer a mediator who is close to the
other side, because they believe that the mediator will "deliver" that party (Zartman and Touval, 1985:257; Touval and Zartman, 1989:122; see also Rubin, 1981). Princen (1992) takes a more extreme position, arguing that mediator bias is in fact irrelevant. In his framework, which views third-party intervention as an example of strategic interaction, acceptance of mediation requires only that each side believe it will do better with mediation than without it. Thus, "a disputant could accept a third party who is clearly against it if its expected outcome is still better than the alternative" (p.62).

Key to the question of the effects of mediator bias are the disputants' decision to involve a mediator and their actual choice of a mediator. These present an interesting strategic problem that has yet to be addressed by the mediation literature. The approach taken by much of this work first assumes that the disputants have arrived at a "mutually hurting stalemate" that leads them to accept third party involvement (Touval and Zartman, 1989:125). The focus of research then shifts to the decision and actions of that third party.7 Yet for a "mutually hurting stalemate" to be a sufficient rationale, each disputant must believe that agreeing to mediation will yield an outcome that is better than the continuation of the stalemate or any negotiated agreement they could reach themselves (Zartman and Touval, 1985; Touval and Zartman, 1989; Princen, 1992). The

7Consequently, there has been a great deal of research done on the particular strategies that mediators pursue and the motivations underlying their offers to mediate. In their review of the last decade's mediation literature, Wall and Lynn (1993) identify about one hundred possible mediation techniques, which have been organized into several different taxonomies (e.g., Carnevale, 1986, 1989; Kressel and Pruitt, 1985, 1989). Almost as much effort has been devoted to analyzing the determinants of mediator strategies.
problem here is that the outcome that represents a more favorable settlement for one party may not be more favorable for the other. Each side would be happier with the mediated agreement if it resulted in increased benefits for it; thus, mediation efforts that produce agreements that make both parties better off would seem to have the highest probability of acceptance.

The strategy of issue linkage discussed above produces mutually beneficial agreements of this kind. It follows then that the ability of a third party to make these package deals should affect that actor's attractiveness as a mediator. The disputants may recognize the potential for a linkage agreement to be reached, but because of the associated costs and risks, refrain from proposing such a deal themselves. They may accept mediators in part because they expect them to assume the costs and risks of issue linkage, and successful mediation may involve this activity more often than not. The identity of the mediator comes into play at this point. Nation-state mediators may be more likely to present linkages than international organizations, or vice versa. Or, the conditions under which each type of mediator is likely to offer package deals may differ.

Existing studies of mediation (empirical and otherwise) rarely examine the bargaining tactic of issue linkage. Among the typologies of mediator strategies there is usually some category labeled "formulative", which includes strategies that involve actively suggesting possible compromise solutions to the disputants. It is in this category that the specific tactic of issue linkage would fit, but because these classifications do not separate
issue linkage from single-issue compromise proposals, we cannot know how often issue linkage is represented in the datasets used in studies of mediation or what its effects have been. Instead, we have such broad conclusions as "the more active the mediator's strategy, the more effective he was in moving the disputants toward a settlement" (Bercovitch, 1989:296; see also Rubin, 1981; Bercovitch et al., 1991; Bercovitch and Wells, 1993). Of course, before a mediator can be effective, it must be accepted by both sides. Because linkage deals let each side "win", a mediator who is seen as likely to suggest this kind of deal will probably be acceptable to both.

International Organizations. As was noted in the Introduction, one conception of conflict management associates it with the activity of international organizations. Since the charters of these organizations identify the prevention or restraint of international conflict as their raison d'etre, this makes sense. Until fairly recently, though, conventional wisdom in political science characterized international organizations as "moribund" (Kratochwil and Ruggie, 1986:753). The UN in particular has been strongly criticized in recent years, with several authors arguing that it worsens more disputes than it solves (Pines, 1984; van den Haag and Conrad, 1987; Harrod and Schrijver, 1988; Krauthammer, 1989; Gallarotti, 1991). However, the significant role played by the organization in the Gulf War lent dramatic support to the contention that the UN has been increasingly effective (Urquhart, 1989; Lister, 1991).
The waning of the Cold War may be the basis for these changing perceptions. Several early large N studies found that Cold War issues were the main obstacle to the effectiveness of international organizations (Haas et al., 1972; Holsti, 1972; Butterworth and Scranton, 1976; Butterworth, 1978). Some of these authors went on to argue that the management capacity of international organizations is a function of particular patterns of nation-state preferences. These patterns shift to reflect changes in the nature and type of issues on the international agenda, and the effectiveness of international organizations shifts accordingly (see, e.g., Haas, 1983). The apparent end of the Cold War may signal a reconfiguration that is more conducive to successful conflict management by international organizations.

Because recent events may have ramifications for the effectiveness of international organizations, they may also have affected the incentives for their involvement. This involvement does seem to be increasing: "by one count the United Nations alone has implemented more conflict management activities in just the last five years than in all previous years combined" (Dixon, 1993b:1). Yet as is the case with the issue linkage literature, research on the conflict management activity of international organizations has focused primarily on the extent of its effectiveness and conditions that influence that effectiveness. This is because the question of what determines the involvement of these actors seems like a non-question. International organizational involvement is of course
largely determined by international organizational mandate.\textsuperscript{8}

However, if these mandates do not vary, they cannot explain variance in levels of involvement. What \textit{can} vary is disputants' tolerance for that involvement. This point is critical to the question of effectiveness. "Since pacific settlement procedures in contemporary international organizations are based on the principle of voluntarism--both parties to a conflict must accept the role and functions of the third party--it is the protagonists themselves, through their responsiveness and willingness to be influenced, who will ultimately determine the third party's effectiveness" (Holsti, 1972:474-5). As is the case with third party intervention in general, before international organizations can be \textit{effective} as conflict managers, they must be \textit{accepted} as conflict managers.

What influences disputants' willingness to accept international organizational involvement? Dixon (1993a) finds that the more democratic a state is, the more likely it is to accept conflict management by international organizations. This suggests that something about democracy affects states' incentives to accept conflict management. Another element is, of course, the disputants' expectations. Both disputants must think they have something to gain from allowing international organizations to mediate their conflict. One way these expectations can be realized is through the

\textsuperscript{8}Butterworth (1978) uses this to explain his finding that single states were more effective conflict managers than political/security organizations. He argues that states only get involved when they want to, whereas international organizations are mandated to do so. Moreover, Butterworth maintains, international organizations got the "tougher" disputes. Clearly some relationship is implied here between the incentives for attempts at conflict management, the actors that get involved, and the success of their efforts.
aforementioned strategy of issue linkage, which lets both sides come away from a negotiated settlement with more than they otherwise would have. Thus, the ability of international organizations to offer this kind of settlement ought to affect their acceptability and success as mediators.

Previous analyses of the activities of international organizations do not include the particular negotiation tactic of issue linkage as a category, however. Instead, reflecting the fact that international organizations have functions in addition to mediation, these studies compare their success at that activity with their success at others, like fact-finding and truce supervision (Holsti, 1968, 1972; Haas, 1968; Haas et al, 1972).\(^9\) On the basis of these analyses, mediation does not appear to be international organizations' strong suit; they are generally more successful at other practices. Perhaps part of their apparent ineffectiveness as mediators stems from a limited ability to offer settlements that provide benefits to all disputants. An analysis of international organizations' use of issue linkage could shed light on their effectiveness and their involvement as conflict managers.

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\(^9\)Other studies have focused on the level, rather than the type, of international organization involvement. These have generated contradictory results. For example, while both Haas (1983) and Wilkenfeld and Brecher (1984) find that higher-level UN activity was more likely to be effective, Haas considers the activities of the Secretary-General to be high-level, and such activity is low-level in the Wilkenfeld and Brecher analysis. Wilkenfeld and Brecher consider the involvement of the Security Council and/or the General Assembly examples of high-level activity.
OBJECTIVES AND ORGANIZATION OF THIS STUDY

The subject-specific focus of the literature on issue linkage, mediation, and international organizations has structured our knowledge in important ways. "Blind spots" exist in the literature on each subject, and these blind spots correspond to each other to create a wide range of unanswered questions. In particular, we know very little about possible interconnections between these topics. The conditions required for the pursuit of each could illuminate those interconnections. For example, analyses of issue linkage have largely ignored the question of agency, that is, whether disputants themselves suggest it or whether third parties undertake it. On the other hand, studies that have focused on mediators and international organizations identify categories of actions that do not correspond to the specific activity of issue linkage. Issue linkage may be pursued more frequently than is immediately apparent; in fact, it may characterize much mediator activity, and mediators that offer it may be more successful than those that do not. Expectations of issue linkage sponsorship may often underlie disputants' acceptance of third party intervention in the first place.

The purpose of this dissertation is to explore the areas where these "blind spots" intersect. Therefore it must involve both additional theoretical development and the construction of an original dataset. Each of these objectives will be discussed in turn.

The Formal Framework

In much of the literature on conflict management, the contention is often made that the subject matter is too complex to
permit the development of some organizing theoretical framework. For example, Haas (1986) states the "[t]he number of variables is too large and the peculiarities of each era too great to permit a simple causal statement of what determines successful conflict management." A similar point is frequently made in the work on mediation, in which the skill and expertise of particular individuals is often argued to be a key determinant of the success or failure of conflict management attempts (Young, 1967; Kolb, 1983). Likewise, in the literature on international organizations, great emphasis is placed on the personal qualities of the UN Secretary General (e.g., Urquhart, 1989). This argument is often carried to the apparently logical conclusion that since the idiosyncrasies of individual negotiators play such a significant role in determining dispute outcomes, theoretical treatments of conflict management are impossible.

However, assigning individual expertise a key role in conflict management immediately begs the question of what makes such expertise possible. Expertise consists largely of the ability to identify broad patterns of cause and effect, and skill in recognizing which of the generalizations derived from past experience are applicable to the current situation. Thus, what separates "good" from "bad" practitioners is that the former have implicit models of conflict management that are fairly accurate. If expertise is possible, some form of theory (however limited) must also be possible. The main difference between the informal models employed by statesmen and the scientific theories developed by scholars is simply that in the latter, the bases for deductions and
generalizations are more likely to be made explicit. Underlying assumptions are clearly laid out, and as many logical conclusions and expectations as possible are identified.

On the other hand, Haas is probably correct when he argues that explaining conflict management with a simple causal statement is not possible. However, this is not so much because the phenomena are too complicated as it is because of poor conceptual development. The term is used many different ways to mean many different things. "Conflict management" is more a loose grouping of topics and ideas than a single unified concept, and it is this that precludes the development of a general theory. What is possible, however, is a kind of middle-range theory that connects subsets of these topics and ideas, and that is the goal of this project.

The concept of "dispute engineering" identifies the specific topics of issue linkage, mediation, and the special case of international organizations as mediators as the theoretical "islands" of interest. Possible ways they are related have been sketched briefly above. However, before these relationships can be examined, the "islands" themselves must be mapped out. Therefore, the first step in this analysis is to identify the conditions associated with each topic. We need to look at the conditions under which disputants can resolve their conflict themselves (through issue linkage), and those under which they decide to involve a mediator. In turn, these suggest direct and indirect patterns of relationships. For example, if disputants can resolve a conflict on their own through issue linkage, there is no need for a mediator to become involved. On the other hand, if the conditions for successful linkage by the disputants
are not met, the stage is set for mediator intervention. The idea of dispute engineering thus interjects a strategic component to the concept of "negotiation arithmetic" as it applies to conflict management.

An extensive form game, shown in Figure 1.1, organizes the analysis. The subgames labeled (λ) and (μ) represent the topics of issue linkage and mediation respectively. The structure of the game allows these to be analyzed separately. Accordingly, Chapter 2 presents the analysis of the issue linkage subgame. Chapter 3 presents the analysis of the mediation subgame. International organizations are considered as a special case of mediator and are reserved for a separate section of this chapter. Chapter 4 ties the previous chapters together in an analysis of the entire game.

The game begins with the decision of some third party to offer its services as a mediator to two disputing parties caught in a negotiation stalemate. If it decides to refrain from mediation, one of the disputants (selected by Nature) has the choice of either reiterating her demands (and thus perpetuating the stalemate) or offering a linkage deal. If she does not offer a linkage deal, her opponent has that option. If neither side offers a linkage deal, the negotiation stalemate is perpetuated indefinitely. If one side does offer a linkage deal, the other must choose between accepting or rejecting that proposal. Analysis of this subgame thus results in identification of the necessary conditions for the pursuit and success of issue linkage by the disputants.

If the third party does choose to offer its services as a mediator, each of the disputants must decide whether or not to
Figure 1.1
Dispute Engineering Game Tree

The Mediation Subgame ($\mu$)

The Linkage Subgame ($\lambda$)

KEY

a - disputant accepts initiative/offer
r - disputant rejects initiative/offer
m - third party offers mediation
f - mediator facilitates
l - mediator offers linkage
$M_1$ - mediated outcome on initial disputed issue
$M_2$ - mediated outcome with linkage
N - perpetuation of dispute
accept that involvement. If both do, the mediation subgame begins, in which the mediator bases his choice of strategies on his own resources and his expectations of the disputants' reactions. If at least one of the disputants rejects the mediator's involvement, they end up in the linkage subgame. This subgame thus addresses the conditions for successful mediation.

The mediation subgame is only reached, however, if both disputants have chosen to accept that third party as a mediator. Each disputant's expectations of what the mediator will be able to deliver influences her willingness to accept his involvement. Backward induction at this point permits the identification of the conditions under which both disputants accept a particular third party as a mediator.

In turn, the potential mediator's beliefs about disputants' reactions affect whether or not he offers his involvement. In the special case of international organizations, this may appear inappropriate, if not silly, given that their involvement is dictated by organizational charter. However, while international organizational involvement is a function of mandate, the manner of that involvement is determined in part by the reactions of the disputants. International organizations have several functions in addition to mediation; it may be that disputants allow them to become involved as mediators only when other potential mediators, more desirable from the disputants' point of view, stay away. This may explain their apparent ineffectiveness as mediators. International organizations offer their services because they have to, in effect rushing in where nation-state mediators fear to tread.
[Butterworth's (1978) finding that the disputes they get involved in are "tougher" than those mediated by other types of third parties is consistent with this argument.]

The use of an extensive form game to structure the inquiry identifies a wide range of questions and clearly demonstrates areas of possible overlap. These three topics are directly related in that issue linkage is a negotiation strategy that is available to mediators, of which international organizations are a special case. They are also indirectly related in that the conditions for the pursuit and success of one influence the conditions for the pursuit and success of others. Disputants' ability to solve their problems through issue linkage affects their willingness to accept mediation; likewise, a mediator's ability to offer issue linkage affects its acceptability.

In addition to illustrating the possible relationships among these topics, the game-theoretic framework is also convenient because it is consistent with the conception of dispute engineering as a matter of strategic interaction and interdependent choice. Game theory in general analyzes situations in which the choices of the actors are interdependent. Also, game-theoretic treatments assume rationality, if only in the form of consistent choices and broad cost-benefit calculations. Although the rationality assumption is hotly contested in much of the international relations literature, such calculations are implicitly assumed as the whole basis for conflict management in the prescriptive literature, since disputants and intervenors are seeking to avoid the horrible costs of war. Cost-benefit calculations are also embedded in the idea of a
"mutually hurting stalemate", and in the principle of voluntarism that underlies international organizational involvement in disputes. Therefore, the use of a game-theoretic approach departs from existing work primarily with respect to the degree of formalization of the argument. It does not involve the introduction of admittedly controversial assumptions that have not been employed (albeit implicitly) in the work to date.

A final justification for this project's use of an extensive form game is that such games are an efficient means of identifying testable hypotheses. The equilibrium conditions that "solve" extensive form games specify the relationships between variables that must hold for certain outcomes to obtain. These relationships constitute hypotheses which are in principle testable. Thus, extensive form games are also a logical analytical tool for guiding the empirical investigation of this project. I now turn to a brief discussion of that part of the project.

The Empirical Investigation

The formal framework outlined above will result in a number of hypotheses about the likelihood and manner of dispute engineering. These hypotheses will be very general in the sense that the variables they identify as important have several possible real-world interpretations. Consequently, there will be more empirical hypotheses generated by the framework than will be tested here.

The empirical focus of this project will be limited to analyses of the effects of domestic political structure and enduring rivalry on dispute engineering. These empirical contexts have received a
great deal of attention in the recent international relations literature and have a special bearing on questions of conflict management. The persistent peace between democracies suggests that they handle disputes with each other differently. The persistent conflict between other dyads suggests that they, too, handle disputes with each other differently, albeit to the opposite effect. Democracies "manage" disputes with each other in the sense that they successfully avoid war, while enduring rivals "manage" disputes with each other in the sense that the underlying conflict is not resolved. This difference is particularly relevant given the emphasis on the prevention of escalation and the promotion of settlement in much of the conflict management literature. The analysis here will present possible reasons for these differences and shed some light on their true extent.

A dispute dataset containing information on issue linkage attempts and offers of mediation was constructed for the purposes of testing the empirical hypotheses specified by the model. The dataset itself also represents a contribution in its treatment of cases and its incorporation of the previously neglected strategy of issue linkage as a conflict management variable. Details of the dataset's construction and of the empirical tests are provided in Chapter Four, which also describes the results of the analysis.

Organizational of the Volume

This project consists of two parts, a formal framework and the empirical analysis of parts of that framework. The extensive form game discussed earlier is the focus of the first half of the
volume. Chapters Two and Three are devoted to the analyses of the issue linkage and mediation subgames, respectively. Chapter Four ties the results of these earlier chapters together and to the empirical contexts of domestic political structure and enduring rivalry. The tests and the dataset used to conduct those tests are described in this chapter. Chapter Five concludes the volume with a discussion of the formal and empirical results and suggestions for future research.

CONCLUSION

Three conceptual approaches can be identified in the literature on conflict management. The most widely used conceptualization emphasizes the tension between avoiding war and protecting national interests. A second school of thought places conflict management in historical context, comparing the conventions of crisis behavior developed by the superpowers with patterns of major power interaction during the Concert of Europe and the interwar years. The third approach identifies conflict management with third party intervention aimed at preventing escalation and promoting settlement.

The diversity of these approaches allows several different topics to be included in the general category of "conflict management". To specify a subset of questions within this broad area, this project introduces the concept of "dispute engineering". Dispute engineering is defined as the strategic addition of parties (specifically, mediators) and/or issues for the purpose of making a
bargained agreement more likely. This concept combines elements of the first and third traditions of thought identified above. The goal of dispute engineering is the achievement of a negotiated settlement, which in itself implies the cessation of hostilities and the prevention of escalation. However, also included in the concept is the recognition that participants have incentives to be strategic in their pursuit of that settlement. This reflects the desire to protect interests that is part of the "policy dilemma" of conflict management identified by George (1984).

In the second part of this project, hypotheses regarding the pursuit and success of dispute engineering are examined in the empirical contexts of domestic political structure and enduring rivalry. Theoretically, these are interesting because they represent opposite ends of a conflict management "continuum"--democratic dyads enjoy persistent peace, while enduring rivals engage in persistent conflict. However, they are also interesting in light of current trends in world politics. The lack of war between democracies has led to the recommendation of this form of domestic political structure as a "remedy" for international conflict. On this basis, the spread of democracy is held to be an important component of a "new world order". The relationship of this regime type to conflict management thus merits closer examination. Even if this basis for optimism is sound, however, there are other aspects of the post-Cold War world that may be less favorable. In contrast to the identification of democracy with peace, the phenomenon of enduring rivalry has been identified as a significant source of conflict (Goertz and Diehl, 1993). We do not yet know whether the end of the
Cold War will have any impact on enduring rivalries. If these dyads are likely to involve international organizations in their disputes, perhaps the Cold War's apparent end removes major impediments to the resolution of these long-standing conflicts. An analysis of how enduring rivals manage conflict will tell us how much optimism is warranted.

Understanding more about these two empirical contexts can also tell us something about what a future without superpower conflict management will be like. The second tradition of conflict management analysis emphasizes the historical evolution of conflict management methods, and posits established patterns of major power interaction as the basis for tacit "rules" for handling international conflicts. The erosion of contemporary conflict management conventions seems inevitable in light of the Soviet Union's disintegration. What will replace them? In the time it takes new conventions to evolve, perhaps international organizations will finally be able play the role for which they were designed. On the other hand, the spread of democracy may obviate the need for them, or rivalries persist despite them. The results of this project should give us some idea of what to expect.

Thus, the purpose of this research effort is two-fold. The primary purpose is to contribute a theoretical framework for organizing specific conflict management methods and identifying logical relationships among them. The secondary purpose is to provide some insight into the future of conflict management in the wake of the Cold War. The two purposes are, of course, related. By fleshing out our theoretical understanding of conflict management
strategies, we gain more insight into their practicality in a post-
Cold War world.

I turn now to the first of the strategies considered here: the
addition of issues.
Chapter 2

ADDING ISSUES

As noted in Chapter One, some aspects of conflict management involve building "golden bridges" that make it possible for disputants to retreat gracefully. One way such bridges can sometimes be built is through the addition of issues. Issue linkage enables a disputant to trade a concession on one issue for compensation on another. Trades like these can make backing down less painful and negotiated settlement more attractive. Giving a disputant something to show for her concession helps to minimize the appearance of retreat, and, if the compensation is worth more than the concession, might even create the appearance of diplomatic victory. Of course, issue linkage can be valuable for more than appearances' sake; there are tangible gains to be had from such trades. These gains may take the form of indirect side payments (involving the introduction of new, uncontested issues), or they may be realized through "integrative bargaining" over the initial dispute issue (Walton and McKersie, 1965). However, regardless of where the extra gains come from, or whether they are tangible, their effect is to increase the value of settlement to at least one of the disputants. In turn, by increasing the benefits of settlement, the package deals created though linkage make bargained agreement more likely (Tollison and Willet, 1979; Raiffa, 1982).
This result alone recommends issue linkage as a way to manage conflict (since it decreases the likelihood of war), but there may also be long-term positive effects that extend beyond a dispute's resolution. A successful linkage deal enables both parties to come away from the bargaining table with more than they otherwise would have, thus letting both sides "win", or at least save face. Such a mutually beneficial outcome might encourage a shift in how the disputants view their relationship. They could learn to see each other as partners in problem-solving rather than rivals in competition, with the conclusion of the linkage deal setting the stage for collaboration in the future (Fisher and Ury, 1981, Pruitt, 1981). Ultimately, a successful linkage could have the long-term effect of stimulating further cooperation between nation-states (McGinnis, 1986). Empirical analyses of reciprocity and bargaining support this conjecture. Diplomatic victories do appear to encourage nation-states to refrain from more coercive behavior in successive crises, at least initially (Leng, 1983). A successful linkage would provide each side with a diplomatic victory, and so could dampen the incentives for escalatory behavior in following disputes.

Thus, in theory, issue linkage appears to be an extraordinarily beneficial means of conflict management. It not only enables the disputants to avoid war, it may even establish a precedent for future cooperation.\textsuperscript{10} In reality, package deals created through linkage have

\textsuperscript{10}Because it can affect both the short-term resolution of the dispute and the long-term relationship of the disputants, issue linkage provides a much-needed connection between the ideas of "crisis management" and "conflict management". The
had impressive consequences for the resolution of some international disputes. The Cuban Missile Crisis, arguably the most serious crisis in modern history, did not escalate to war in part because Kennedy promised not to invade Cuba (and also agreed to remove missiles from Turkey) in exchange for Soviet compliance with American demands. The 1911 crisis between France and Germany over Agadir was peacefully resolved through a similar trade-off, when the Germans accepted territory in the Congo in exchange for recognizing French control of the Moroccan port city. In both of these instances, a dispute over one matter was mitigated, and the immediate possibility of war lessened, by the introduction of a different matter that made reciprocal concessions possible. The long-term effects were less consistently positive; the French-German dyad was at war within three years of its successful linkage. On the other hand, the peaceful resolution of the Cuban missile crisis inspired a series of cooperative efforts between the superpowers that culminated in the famous "détente" of the seventies.

Successes like these illustrate the potential of issue linkage for international conflict management. Unfortunately, such examples seem to be as rare as they are dramatic. The literature on linkage has documented only a handful of cases, and it has been observed that, at least when it comes to crisis bargaining, "linkage is rarely done in practice" (Morrow, 1992:153). The impression of linkage's scarcity is lent credence by experimental evidence that

management literature has been strongly criticized for its neglect of such a connection. For further comment, see Richardson (1982).
shows that subjects rarely engage in integrative bargaining, even in situations designed to facilitate it (Raiffa, 1982:101). Unless subjects are explicitly instructed to make package deals, they often fail to recognize built-in possibilities for trade-offs (Froman and Cohen, 1970). Also, time pressure, often put forward as a distinguishing feature of international crises, tends to exacerbate bargainers' avoidance of integrative bargaining, particularly if they have a competitive orientation to begin with (Carnevale and Lawler, 1986).

If bargainers generally refrain from searching for joint gains, even in experimental settings where such gains exist with certainty, the chance that these benefits could be realized in the complex and stressful context of an international dispute seems remote. Of course, evidence from experiments can provide only limited support for the contention that linkage rarely occurs in crisis bargaining between nation-states. The most that can be claimed is that the infrequency of linkage in the lab is consistent with its apparent infrequency in interstate crisis bargaining. Even so, that provides no explanation. If we accept the claim that bargainers in dispute situations ranging from the experimental to the international tend to refrain from linkage, that in itself does not tell us why that is so.

One possible explanation is that the prima facie benefits of linkage are often overwhelmed by costs and risks. While the ultimate effect of a successful linkage is to increase the net benefits of a negotiated agreement to both sides, an actor considering whether or not to suggest such a proposal faces a strategic quandary. Offering a linkage involves several costs and
the danger of exploitation. Domestic political considerations can make it hard to compose useful package deals, and the very act of proposing a deal might send the wrong message to domestic and international audiences. There is also the possibility that a linkage proposal could send the wrong message to its recipient, encouraging her to resort to coercive bargaining. The desire to avoid these difficulties might lead a disputant to refrain from making a linkage proposal in the hope that the other side will bear the costs and risks associated with suggesting a deal. Yet if each side attempts to free-ride off the other, an important opportunity for peaceful conflict resolution could be lost. In this respect, the strategic quandary faced by a disputant considering linkage is an example of the general dilemma of conflict management. The actor wants to avoid the perpetuation of the dispute, which could lead to war (or the war's continuation). At the same time, however, she must protect her own interests, i.e., safeguard against possible exploitation and avoid unnecessary costs. If a disputant cannot suggest package deals without incurring extra costs and putting herself at risk, it may not always be worthwhile for her to make an attempt. The potential of issue linkage as a "golden bridge" must be weighed against the demands its construction makes of a disputant.

This chapter examines in greater detail the strategic dilemma inherent in the decision to add issues. Its analysis centers on the linkage subgame in Figure 1-1. Building upon arguments advanced by Morgan (1990) and Morrow (1992), I identify the theoretical conditions under which linkage offers should be expected, as well as those under which these offers are accepted. Specifying these
conditions serves two purposes. First, it paves the way for the analyses of the following chapters. Adding issues can enable the disputants to resolve their disagreement without third-party involvement. If the disputants manage to create mutually beneficial trade-offs in negotiations with each other, they may not need another party's assistance to reach a bargained settlement. On the other hand, if they are unable or unwilling to try linking issues, intermediary intervention may be their only hope. Thus, issue linkage serves as a good starting point, because identifying the conditions under which the disputants are unlikely to add issues can tell us something about the conditions under which they are likely to add parties. Second, the theoretical conditions required for linkage attempts can provide the basis for empirical hypotheses. The testing of these hypotheses, undertaken in the second part of the project, is a more direct means of evaluating linkage's apparent infrequency than the experimental evidence offered so far. Issue linkage could be the most efficient means of conflict management we can devise, but that matters little if it is never (or rarely) employed.

HOW LINKAGE WORKS: THE SPATIAL MODEL

To set the stage for further discussion, I first review the theoretical basis for the assertion that issue linkage makes negotiated agreements more likely. A very brief sketch of the "logic of linkage" is presented here; a thorough demonstration is provided by Morgan (1990), from whom this discussion draws heavily.
Figure 2.1 depicts a bargaining situation involving two actors, A and B, who are at odds over some issue. The horizontal line depicts the range of outcomes associated with divisions of the good in question. Each actor is represented on this line by its ideal point, or most preferred outcome. The farther away an outcome is from an actor's ideal point, the less desirable it is. The outcome that is farthest away from its ideal, but is still better than no agreement, is represented by the actor's reservation point (denoted by A' for actor A, and B' for actor B). The area between its ideal point and its reservation point defines the subset of outcomes an actor considers acceptable. Elements in common between actors' subsets thus constitute mutually acceptable outcomes, and this area of overlap is called a zone of agreement. In Figure 2.1, the subset of outcomes acceptable to A does not overlap with the subset of outcomes acceptable to B. Because there is no zone of agreement, a bargained settlement of this dispute is impossible, since by definition such a settlement requires the mutual consent of the bargainers.

Figure 2.2 demonstrates how issue linkage restructures the bargaining situation. (For those familiar with micro-economic terms, Figure 2.2 is an Edgeworth box.) The added issue is represented by the vertical axis. In the two-dimensional issue space that results, Actor B's ideal point shifts to the upper right corner. Now, the outcomes under consideration by the actors are no longer divisions of a single good, but combinations or "bundles" of some amount of issue 1 and some amount of issue 2. An actor's preferences over these two-dimensional outcomes are represented by indifference contours, which reflect sets of bundles that the
Figure 2.1

Dispute Over Initial Issue:
No Zone of Agreement
actor finds equally desirable.\textsuperscript{11} Recall that in the single-dimensional case, the closer some outcome is to an actor's ideal point the more preferred it is. The same is true in the two-dimensional case. Indifference contours closer to an actor's ideal point represent sets of bundles that are preferable to those on more distant indifference contours. Recall also that each actor would accept the range of outcomes up to and including the one at its reservation point in the single-dimensional case. In the two-dimensional case, the actors' reservation points become reservation contours. Actor A will accept all outcomes on or below its reservation contour, and actor B will accept all outcomes on or above its reservation contour. With the addition of the second issue, A's range of acceptable outcomes now overlaps with that of B. Thus, issue linkage creates a zone of agreement, thereby making a negotiated settlement possible.

On the basis of this theoretical argument, it seems possible that a zone of agreement could be created for any given dispute where one does not already exist. In addition, issue linkage can also enhance the likelihood of settlement in cases in which there is already a zone of agreement. In those cases, several settlements

\textsuperscript{11}The curvature of an actor's indifference contours reflect the relative importance to an actor of the issues that comprise these bundles. If an actor views both issues as equally important, her indifference contours will be circular. If, however, one issue matters more to her than the other, her indifference contours will be elliptical. In the example illustrated by Figure 1, actor A cares more about issue 1 than issue 2. Conversely, actor B cares more about issue 2 than issue 1. In this example, the actors have different priorities over the two issues, but this is done for the sake of demonstration and is not a necessary requirement for successful linkage. Morgan (1990) shows that as long as the relative salience ratios of the parties are not equal (i.e., the curvatures of the disputants' indifference contours are different) they can order the issues the same way.
Figure 2.2
The Effects of Successful Issue Linkage

Zone of agreement created by linkage
are possible, but each side still prefers settlements closer to its ideal point. A negotiated agreement on this single issue, though it would prevent war, would still be zero-sum. A linkage deal improves upon the range of possible single-issue bargains by providing a new option that makes both sides better off. In effect, issue linkage transforms the zero-sum game to a win-win situation.

Because issue linkage can "work" regardless of the prior existence of a zone of agreement, it seems like a reasonable strategic response to the uncertainty that motivates bargaining in the first place. Disputants do not know the locations of each other's reservation points, and engage in bargaining as a means of searching for mutually acceptable outcomes. Linking issues can create such outcomes when they do not exist, and improve upon them when they do. On this basis, one might expect issue linkage to be undertaken frequently in crisis bargaining. The weakness of the empirical record of linkage contrasts sharply with this expectation, however. The real-world evidence of issue linkage is largely anecdotal, consisting of only a few well-known and oft-cited historical examples. Moreover, it is not the case that linkage is either undertaken or foregone. Limited though it is, the available evidence suggests a broader range of outcomes. Linkage proposals are made, but not always; and when they are offered, they are not always accepted. If we want to understand the conditions under which disputants will add issues, the conditions under which each of these outcomes obtains must be identified.

This can be accomplished through an analysis of the sequence of moves in the linkage process. Though Figure 2.2 provides an
effective demonstration of how linkage works, the static nature of this spatial representation obscures an important aspect of how linkage happens. Logically, issue linkage must involve at least two stages. One actor must propose a linkage deal, and the other must respond to it. Previous research suggests potential difficulties with each of these stages. These sources of friction prevent issue linkage from being the smooth, seamless exchange depicted in Figure 2.2. I turn now to a discussion of these difficulties and how they affect disputants' willingness to engage in linkage.

**SOURCES OF FRICTION: COSTS AND RISKS**

In the literature on linkage, suggesting a trade-off is generally viewed as unproblematic. An example is the contention that issue linkage allows bargainers to circumvent "the vexing question of who goes first" (Pillar, 1983:225). Making the first concession in negotiations is dangerous, Pillar argues, because it may be interpreted by the opponent as a sign of weakness. Issue linkage eliminates this danger since both actors concede at the same time. However, some actor must be responsible for arranging this simultaneous concession. In an argument that runs directly counter to that of Pillar, Morrow (1991) considers the possibility that the actor who undertakes this task invites attack. In Morrow's argument, it is a linkage proposal that may be seen as a sign of weakness, because it sometimes signals a lack of resolve. A bargainer has good reason to avoid communicating such an impression (whether it is true or not) and may thus decide not to propose linkage.
Morrow also argues that, in addition to the receiver's uncertainty regarding the sender's resolve, linkage is further complicated by the sender's uncertainty regarding the receiver's interest in the added issue. For linkage to be successful, the concessions contained in the package deal must be worth enough to the receiver to offset whatever losses she incurs by accepting the sender's initial demand. These losses are essentially costs that the receiver of the linkage proposal pays for agreement. Here, Morrow's argument overlaps with that of Morgan (1990), who emphasizes the impact of linkage's costs on the likelihood of its success. However, Morgan argues that beyond the direct costs entailed in a side payment or concession to the other actor, there are also indirect costs incurred by the act of linkage itself that diminish its net benefits (p. 320). These "appendant costs" reflect the political and bureaucratic realities of linkage. Examples of such costs include the resources expended in the search for an issue and the bureaucratic machinery required to implement a linkage once it is accepted. They also include the cost of placating political constituencies, domestic and/or international, whose interests are compromised by the package deal. In Morgan's framework, the relationship of appendant costs to the net direct benefits of the linkage determines the probability of linkage success. Assuming the benefits are greater than the costs, as their difference increases so does the likelihood of linkage success.

The arguments of Morgan and Morrow indicate that linkage is not the smooth, seamless exchange depicted in Figure 2.2, but that it involves costs and risks. These costs and risks diminish the welfare
benefits of linkage, reducing its likelihood of success. In addition, however, the costs and risks of linkage are not equally borne by sponsor and recipient, and this affects the likelihood of its pursuit.

To see why this is so, consider the steps involved in the linkage process. One actor must decide to offer a linkage, and the other must decide how to respond to that offer. Undertaking linkage imposes appendant costs that are borne only by the sponsor of the proposal. It takes time and resources to craft a useful package deal, and actually suggesting it can compromise an actor's reputation for standing firm in a crisis. Once a linkage has been suggested, the kinds of additional costs that accrue depend on the recipient's reaction. If the recipient accepts the deal, both sides must translate the agreement reached in negotiations into actual policy changes. Doing so can require constituency side-payments and the modification of bureaucratic standard operating procedures. Morgan and Morrow emphasize the effect of these anticipated implementation costs on the likelihood of a recipient's accepting, but they are also incurred by a successful sponsor. Though a sponsor can design a package deal in a way that minimizes her own implementation costs, this requires additional time and resources and consequently increases the costs of sponsorship. Moreover, even the most carefully crafted of proposals may be rejected by the recipient. If that happens, the sponsor of the failed deal bears a different kind of cost, one that is not offset by any gains. In effect, she pays a penalty for her proposal in the form of the information that it transmits. Proposing a linkage compromises the sponsor's original bargaining position, because the recipient knows that the
sponsor's reservation point on one of the issues must be at least as close to the recipient's ideal point as the suggestion contained in the proposal. The risk emphasized by Morrow is that this information could encourage the recipient to reject the deal. Because she knows that the sponsor would rather arrange some concession (either on the initial issue or an added issue) than perpetuate the dispute, the recipient may resort to coercive bargaining in the belief that she can extract the concession without reciprocating. She may or may not be successful, but the information contained in the proposal has given her the incentive to try.\(^{12}\)

The unequal distribution of linkage's costs means a disputant is never worse off for receiving a linkage proposal, but she can be worse off for making one. In any case, an actor always bears more costs as a sponsor than as a recipient. Recipients bear implementation costs at the most; sponsors bear search and proposal costs at the least, and either implementation or information costs beyond those. For this reason, it is always better to be the recipient of a linkage deal rather than its sponsor. However, a disputant cannot choose to be a recipient; that opportunity is provided only by her opponent's sponsorship of linkage. Without a proposal in hand, the only choice open to a disputant is whether or not to sponsor a deal of her own. This choice must depend upon what she thinks her opponent will do. If

\(^{12}\text{A linkage proposal transmits information regardless of whether or not it is accepted, but the information is only costly to the sponsor in the event of the recipient's rejection.}\)
she thinks her opponent will suggest a deal, there is no need for her to sponsor one. If she thinks her opponent will not suggest a deal, she must consider whether she would be better off sponsoring one herself, which depends upon how she expects her opponent to react to her proposal. Her opponent must make her own decision about what to do on the same basis; each disputant's evaluation of the linkage option depends on her anticipation of her opponent's actions. If neither actor has made a proposal, both must consider doing so. The pursuit of linkage thus involves a simultaneous decision problem. To examine its implications, we must move beyond the static depiction of linkage provided by the spatial model.

HOW LINKAGE HAPPENS: AN EXTENSIVE FORM GAME

The simplest possible account of the linkage process begins with the opportunity of one disputant to suggest a linkage deal to her opponent, who then must react to her choice. If a linkage proposal has been made, the second actor must decide whether to accept or reject it. If a linkage proposal has not been made, the second actor must decide whether to sponsor one of her own. If the second actor does not sponsor a deal, the dispute is perpetuated.

If an actor knows whether she is first or second, the pursuit of linkage is not very complicated. If she is the first actor, the unequal distribution of linkage costs creates an incentive for her to "shirk" (that is, to refrain from sponsorship in order to avoid its costs and risks) as long as she believes the second actor will make a linkage proposal. If she is the second actor, she knows the first has
shirked if no proposal is made, and that she will perpetuate the dispute if she does not sponsor a deal herself. Since she can unilaterally guarantee the dispute's continuation by not sponsoring, she sponsors a deal as long as she expects to be better off. However, if an actor given the opportunity to sponsor a linkage cannot determine if hers is the first such chance, her decision problem is not so simple. She would prefer to let the other actor bear the costs and risks of sponsorship, but cannot be sure that her opponent will sponsor a deal if she does not. On the other hand, proposing could incur unnecessary costs (if her opponent still has a chance to sponsor) or even jeopardize her bargaining position (if her opponent rejects the deal). Her opponent faces the same problem. If he has the opportunity to link, he does not know if it is because his is the first chance or if his opponent has shirked. Neither actor knows if she can safely avoid sponsorship, but neither actor knows if she can safely undertake sponsorship.

The extensive form game of Figure 2.3 depicts the simultaneous decision problems of two disputants, actors A and B, caught in a negotiation stalemate. The game begins with a move by Nature to determine which actor has the first opportunity to sponsor a linkage. Actors A and B have an equal likelihood (.5) of being chosen as first mover. However, after Nature's move, each actor is in an information set, so that her opportunity to link can come about as a consequence of being the first actor or as a consequence of the first actor's choice. If an actor decides to sponsor a deal, her opponent either accepts or rejects it.
Figure 2.3
The Linkage Game-
Incomplete Information

Restrictions on Preferences

Actor A
\( L_{ba} P L_{ab} P R_{ab} \)
\( N P R_{ab} \)
\( R_{ba} P R_{ab} \)

Actor B
\( L_{ab} P L_{ba} P R_{ba} \)
\( N P R_{ba} \)
\( R_{ab} P R_{ba} \)

KEY

1 - sponsor linkage
a - accept
r - reject
\( L_{ab} \) - linkage offered by A, accepted by B
\( R_{ab} \) - linkage offered by A, rejected by B
N - no linkage; dispute is perpetuated
Possible outcomes to this game fall into three categories. Outcomes characterized by successful linkage are labeled L, with $L_{ab}$ representing a linkage sponsored by A and accepted by B, and $L_{ba}$ representing a linkage sponsored by B and accepted by A. Outcomes R and N, those in which linkage is not achieved, represent linkage rejections ($R_{ab}$ being B's rejection of A's proposal, vice versa for $R_{ba}$) and the lack of a linkage attempt, respectively.

The nature and distribution of linkage's costs suggest two restrictions on the actors' preferences over these outcomes. Because of the extra costs of sponsorship, an actor prefers to accept a deal that is offered rather than sponsor a deal that is accepted, regardless of whether she is A or B. Also, since the rejection of a linkage deal leaves a sponsor worse off than she would have been had she not made an offer (her pre-proposal bargaining position has been compromised, and the costs of sponsorship are not offset by any gains from linkage), it is the worst possible outcome for either actor. These restrictions are represented as follows:

**For Actor A**

- $(L_{ba}) P (L_{ab}) P (R_{ab})$
- $(N) P (R_{ab})$
- $(R_{ba}) P (R_{ab})$

**For Actor B**

- $(L_{ab}) P (L_{ba}) P (R_{ba})$
- $(N) P (R_{ba})$
- $(R_{ab}) P (R_{ba})$

These preference restrictions reflect the incentive to shirk created by the attendant costs of linkage. Beyond this, attendant costs also affect an actor's comparison of her own (successful) deal
to the no-linkage outcome. If the combined costs of sponsorship and implementation exceed the benefits of linkage for an actor, she has nothing to gain from proposing. Consequently, she would prefer the continuation of the dispute to her own successful linkage. If these combined costs do not exhaust the benefits of linkage, then an actor can still gain from a successful proposal and so prefers that outcome to the dispute's continuation. Label the former type of actor "high cost", and the latter type "low cost". In terms of preferences, for example, a high-cost actor A prefers N to Lab, a low-cost actor A prefers Lab to N.

The preference restrictions specified above also reflect each actor's desire to avoid the rejection of her own linkage proposal. However, they do not specify whether an actor will reject the proposal of her opponent. Because linkage proposals always transmit information, an actor could be inclined to reject a linkage proposal in order to capitalize on its content. Label this type of actor "exploitative", and an actor who prefers to accept rather than reject her opponent's deal "non-exploitative". In terms of preferences, an exploitative actor A prefers outcome Rba to outcome Lba.

High-cost actors will never sponsor linkage deals, because they cannot tolerate the combination of the sponsorship and implementation costs. However, this does not imply that they will automatically reject a deal that is offered, since acceptance involves the implementation costs alone. Nor will low-cost actors necessarily accept a linkage offer, though they are able to make one themselves. Linkage proposals always transmit information, so the
incentive to reject is always there once a proposal has been made. Whether it is sufficient to induce an actor to reject an offer she receives is exogenous to the model. The two aspects of preference are therefore independent, resulting in four possible types of actor (and sixteen possible types of dyad).\textsuperscript{13}

The linkage game is one of incomplete information. Each actor knows her own type, but not that of her opponent. Each actor knows the structure of the game, but not the consequences of Nature's choice. Because the decision problems of the actors are symmetrical, the analysis can be conducted in terms of either of them without loss of generality. To simplify the model's exposition, I focus on actor A. After analyzing the decision problem of actor A, I examine the conjunction of the actors' strategy choices that constitutes the game.

Since by definition high-cost actors never sponsor, they face no decision problem regarding proposals. Therefore, the analysis of this part of the strategy choice need be conducted only from the perspective of a low-cost actor. The problem for a low-cost actor is to induce proposal by her opponent if she can, and to cover herself if she cannot. She cannot simply refrain from sponsorship, because if her opponent is high-cost, refraining guarantees the perpetuation

\textsuperscript{13}Thus, the game depicted in Figure 2.3 actually begins after a series of initial moves by Nature establishing the actors' cost sensitivity and propensity for exploitation. Each possible dyadic combination leads to Figure 2.3, with information sets constructed so that each player knows her own type, but not that of her opponent. It is still the case that neither actor knows the consequences of Nature's choice; for example, all of the initial (sponsor/do not sponsor) decision nodes of a low-cost, non-exploitative Actor A are connected. Because this requires that Figure 2.3 be represented sixteen times, it is not feasible to depict the game in its entirety. The analysis of the game does take the entire game into account and is presented in the Appendix.
of the dispute. Since she prefers her own deal to the dispute's continuation, controlling for the possibility of a high-cost opponent requires some chance that she make a proposal herself. The question then becomes what determines that chance. Two considerations go into an actor's decision about whether to sponsor a linkage or not. It depends in part upon her estimate of the chance of her opponent's proposal. If there is a high enough chance her opponent will propose, she can refrain from proposing herself; if she believes her opponent's probability of proposal is low, she can sponsor a deal herself to protect against the perpetuation of the dispute. However, prior to deciding her likelihood of sponsorship, the low-cost actor must first estimate her opponent's propensity for exploitation, since there is no point to suggesting a deal if one expects it to be rejected. If an actor is satisfied that the potential benefits of the deal outweigh its risks, then and only then does her opponent's probability of proposal figure into her strategy choice.

To examine how these two estimates structure the low-cost actor's decision, we must answer two questions: How high does A's estimate of B's exploitative propensity have to be for not proposing to be rational for A? How high does her estimate of the chance of B's proposal have to be for not proposing to be rational for A? The answers to these questions are given by the probabilities of actor B's exploitative propensity and proposal that equate actor A's expected utility for proposing with her expected utility for not proposing. These cut points establish the conditions under which each strategy choice (proposing and not proposing) is rational. An actor compares her estimate of her opponent's probabilities of
proposal and exploitation to these cut point probabilities in order to
decide what strategy to pursue. In effect, the cut points constitute
"belief thresholds" that can be used to define the set of rational
belief-strategy pairings.

The more important of the two thresholds is that which
establishes the highest probability of exploitation at which actor A
can still expect to gain from proposing. For actor A to be willing to
propose with some probability greater than zero, the proposal
lottery must have a higher expected value than the perpetuation of
the dispute. This is true if and only if

\[ s > \frac{U_a(N) - U_a(L_a)}{U_a(R_{ab}) - U_a(L_{ab})} \]  
(Condition 2.1),

where \( s \) = the likelihood that B is exploitative.

Condition 2.1 specifies a belief threshold for Actor A
regarding her opponent's propensity for exploitation. If her belief
\( (s^*) \) that the probability that her opponent is exploitative is
greater than \( s \), she will not propose at all. The satisfaction of this
condition is necessary, but not sufficient, for actor A's sponsorship.
Assuming Condition 2.1 is met, the likelihood of A's proposal
depends upon her beliefs about the likelihood of B's proposal. In
order for actor A to be indifferent between proposing and not
proposing, she must believe B is playing a mixed strategy. Let the
probability of B's proposal dictated by this mixed strategy be
denoted by \( \phi_B \). If A does not expect B to propose with probability
\( \phi_B \), she will resort to her pure strategies. If her estimate \( (\phi_B^*) \) of
B's likelihood of proposal is lower than $\phi_B$, A is better off proposing; if $\phi_B^*$ is greater than $\phi_B$, she is better off shirking. This threshold is given by:

$$\phi_B = \frac{2[U_b(\cdot) - U_b(N)]}{(*) + U_b(\cdot) - 2[U_b(N)]}$$  \hspace{1cm} (Condition 2),

where $(* )$ represents the term $[\text{MAX}\{U_b(L_{ba}), U_b(R_{ba})\}]$. The symbol $()$ represents the value of the proposal lottery, the value of which for Actor B is $[r(R_{ba}) + (1-r)L_{ba}]$, where $r$ is the probability that Actor A is exploitative.

If actor A believes B will engage her mixed strategy (i.e., she expects actor B to propose with probability $\phi_B$), she responds with a mixed strategy of her own.

The set of rational belief-strategy pairings for Actor A is shown in Figure 2.4. Actor A refrains from sponsorship if she believes there is a high enough probability that her deal would be exploited, or if she believes there is a high enough probability that her opponent will suggest a deal. She proposes only if she believes there is a good enough chance her deal will be accepted, and even then, only if she believes her opponent's likelihood of sponsorship is too low to safeguard against the dispute's perpetuation. (Low-cost actor B's set of rational belief-strategy pairings is exactly analogous to that of low-cost actor A.)

This set of belief-strategy pairings solves the low-cost actor's decision problem regarding proposal. For a high-cost actor,
Figure 2.4: Rational Belief Strategy

Combinations for Actor A

\[ s^* < s \quad s \quad s^* > s \]

- \( \phi_{B^*} < \phi_B \) Propose
- \( \phi_B \) Do not propose
- \( \phi_{B^*} > \phi_B \) Do not propose

\[
\begin{align*}
    s &= \frac{U_a(N)-U_a(\text{Lab})}{U_a(\text{Rab})-U_a(\text{Lab})} \\
    \phi_B &= \frac{2[U_b(\cdot)-U_b(N)]}{U_b(m)+U_b(s)-2N} \\
    s^* &= A's \ estimate \ of \ s \\
    \phi_{B^*} &= A's \ estimate \ of \ B's \ likelihood \ of \ proposal
\end{align*}
\]
this is irrelevant, since she is always better off refraining from proposal regardless of her beliefs about her opponent. Deciding whether or not to propose is only part of an actor's strategy choice, however; she must also specify how she would react to her opponent's proposal. This choice is simply dictated by her preferences (i.e., whether she is exploitative or not).

Up to this point, the discussion has focused on the complete strategy choice of a single actor. The game itself consists of the interaction of the complete strategy choices of both actors. Because each actor must choose a probability of proposal, and each must choose her reaction to her opponent's proposal, there are sixteen possible dyadic strategy combinations. All of these can be sequential equilibria, given certain conditions on the beliefs and types of the actors (which are presented in the Appendix). These equilibrium conditions are not as interesting in themselves as for what they imply about the distribution of possible outcomes across dyads and the probability distribution over outcomes within dyads. To draw these implications out, consider the account of the linkage process provided by the model. The simultaneity of the disputants' decision problems means that prior to Nature's move, each actor must submit a sealed bid that details her complete strategy choice. In this bid, each actor specifies the likelihood of her proposal and her response to her opponent's proposal. The outcome of the game then depends upon the interaction of the strategies specified by the sealed bids, which are opened by Nature at the game's beginning. The game's equilibrium conditions set boundaries on this interaction by defining the range of rational bids and assigning certain strategy (or
bid) combinations to particular dyads. In turn, the strategy combinations associated with each dyad establish probabilities over the possible outcomes. On this basis, we can draw conclusions about the distribution and frequency of each possible outcome, including successful linkage.

Figure 2.5 illustrates the implications for outcomes of the game's equilibrium conditions. Figure 2.5 shows the probability of each possible outcome associated with each possible dyad. Before discussing Figure 2.5 any further, it will be useful at this point to note and explain a few critical features. The actors are labeled "first mover" and "second mover". The symmetry and simultaneity of their decision problems means their identities as A and B are irrelevant; it is the conjunction of Nature's choice and their beliefs and types that matter. Also, note that the range of outcomes is limited to three: no linkage, successful linkage, or rejected linkage. Whether the first or second mover sponsors a linkage is not as important as the outcome of the linkage attempt. Finally, the rows and columns designated by "f" represent the condition in which an actor is sufficiently fearful of her opponent's exploitative tendency to refrain from sponsorship. This condition is incorporated into the table because of its priority in determining a low-cost actor's decision regarding proposal. Recall that the satisfaction of Condition 2.1, specified above, is necessary for the likelihood of proposal to be greater than zero. Cells in the "f" columns and rows are situations in which this condition is violated.

To demonstrate the interpretation of Figure 2.5, consider the dyads in which both the first and second mover are high-cost.
**Figure 2.5: Dyadic Outcome Probability Matrix**

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**Notes:**
- \( I = \) low cost
- \( H = \) high cost
- \( E = \) exploitative
- \( F = \) actor is "fearful"; her belief threshold for exploitation is exceeded
- \( \phi = p(1st\ mover\ sponsors) \)
- \( \phi' = p(2nd\ mover\ sponsors) \)
- Regions with highest probability of linkage
Neither actor will sponsor a deal, regardless of her beliefs about the other's type. The set of possible outcomes is limited to \((N)\), the perpetuation of the dispute. In contrast, consider the dyad indicated by the boldly outlined cell in Figure 2.5. This cell represents a dyad in which the first mover is a high-cost, exploitative actor, and her opponent is a low-cost, non-exploitative actor. The actor selected by Nature to move first refrains from proposal, because she is high cost. Her opponent, moving second, sponsors a deal with some probability \((\phi')\), as long as she thinks there is a good enough chance that it will not be exploited (i.e., Condition 2.1 is satisfied). Given the nature of her opponent, this results in a \((\phi')\) probability of the rejection outcome. The second mover refrains from proposal with probability \((1-\phi')\), which, because her opponent has refrained, is the likelihood of the no-linkage outcome. Thus, two outcomes are possible in this dyad: a rejected linkage deal, which occurs with probability \((\phi')\), and the dispute's perpetuation, which occurs with probability \((1-\phi')\).

The three shaded regions in Figure 2.5 represent the dyadic conditions most conducive to successful linkage. Significantly, two of these regions are characterized by an asymmetry between the cost levels of the disputants—one is high-cost, while the other is low-cost. In these two regions, the high-cost actor is always non-exploitative, and variance in the low-cost actor's exploitative tendency is irrelevant. This is the ideal scenario for a disputant who is willing to link. The low-cost actor can offer linkage without worrying about missing an opportunity to free-ride, and without fear of exploitation. In the other region, both actors are low-cost and
non-exploitative, exactly the kind of dyad one would intuitively expect to be most likely to link. In this kind of dyad, the side that ends up sponsoring loses any free-rider benefits, but the fact that either can sponsor in itself makes linkage more likely. In both the symmetrical and non-symmetrical shaded regions, as long as a low-cost actor accurately perceives her opponent's non-exploitative tendency, the chance for successful linkage is as high as it can possibly get.

Even so, the chance for successful linkage remains just that—a chance. An interesting and counter-intuitive result of the analysis is that the no-linkage outcome can occur in every type of dyad. This means that even in those dyads in which the objective conditions (i.e., the actors' types) are most favorable to issue linkage—those in which both actors are low-cost, and neither actor is exploitative—linkage can still be foregone as the result of rational decisions by both disputants. Since by definition each low-cost actor would prefer some linkage deal to the dispute's continuation, this no-linkage outcome is not Pareto-optimal. However, it can be supported in equilibrium if the disputants hold certain beliefs. Examine the range of outcomes in the shaded cell representing this type of dyad (the lower right-hand corner). The no-linkage outcome can obtain in three scenarios. Each actor might believe the chance of the other's exploitation is too great. Or, one actor might be too fearful, and the other, failing to recognize this, could refrain from proposal in the expectation that her opponent will sponsor a deal. Or, each could be confident that sponsorship is safe, but believe the other's probability of proposal is high enough to justify an attempt at free-
riding. In this last scenario, both the objective conditions (the actors' types) and the subjective conditions (the actors' beliefs) are conducive to linkage, but it is still possible that it will not be undertaken.

This analysis demonstrates that even if the bargaining situation is one in which joint gains are possible—a mutually beneficial linkage issue does exist, and at least one of the disputants is capable of searching for and suggesting it—they may not be realized. The objective conditions of the situation, the types of the bargainers, may be more or less conducive to linkage; given this structure, it is the subjective conditions, the beliefs of the bargainers, that determines whether or not it is undertaken. If a bargainer expects her opponent to suggest a package deal, or to exploit any suggestions she makes herself, she has little incentive to invest the time and resources that a search for joint gains requires. Unfortunately, the normative appeal of this method of conflict management does not guarantee either side will be willing to pay its price, even if both can afford it.

CONCLUSION

Ultimately, the specific dilemma associated with the pursuit of issue linkage is an example of the dilemma of conflict management in general. Building "golden bridges" through linked issues is expensive and potentially dangerous for a disputant. Particularly in the context of an international crisis, it may be more prudent to let the opponent undertake their construction, so as to avoid these costs and risks. After all, if either disputant would go
to any lengths to avoid war, there would be no crisis to begin with. In turn, the fact that each side has incentives to behave this way could explain the apparent infrequency of linkage in international crisis bargaining. If both sides can rationally refrain from linkage even when (objectively) the conditions for linkage are as favorable as they can get, linkage's seeming rarity is not so surprising after all.

This result is consistent with experimental findings (mentioned at the beginning of this chapter) which indicated that bargainers trained in decision theory rarely sought joint gains in negotiations with each other. In his discussion of this result, Raiffa (1982) speculates that they just were not used to the idea of sitting down next to each other and working together to solve the problem. Because they did not trust each other, they saw no possibilities for gain through integrative bargaining, even though these gains existed by deliberate experimental design. The analysis presented in this chapter elaborates that idea. Joint gains may be out there, even without the addition of extraneous issues, but that in itself does not guarantee that they will be pursued. Along the lines of Raiffa's suggestion, a disputant may not trust the opponent enough to risk putting potential package deals on the table. There is some chance that doing so could be interpreted as signaling a willingness to bargain, and so encourage the opponent to resort to (or perhaps step up) coercive behavior. Additionally, however, the very act of linkage involves extra costs that it is preferable to avoid. Searching for an appropriate issue consumes time and resources, and could even be painted by domestic adversaries as evidence of political weakness.
Moreover, implementing a linkage deal may require additional side-payments to other interests, domestic or otherwise, that significantly diminish the welfare benefits of the initial package. For these reasons, a disputant who is willing to search for and suggest welfare-enhancing linkages in principle might refrain from acting on that impulse in practice.

Of course, the pursuit of linkage is additionally complicated by the possibility that a disputant might not be willing to search for and suggest welfare-enhancing linkages, even in principle. Especially in a crisis, disputants may be more willing to link for the purpose of leverage than for the purpose of conflict management. Such "tactical" linkages are designed to extract concessions from the opponent by depriving him of benefits, rather than bringing the opponent to agreement by providing him with gains. In contrast to the small number of mutually beneficial package deals that come to mind, it is easy to think of examples of tactical linkages. Nation-states often attempt to project their power in one issue-area to others where they are less powerful (Wallace, 1976; Oye, 1979; Stein, 1980). For example, they employ economic sanctions, cutting off existing trade or aid benefits as "punishment" for policy decisions they dislike (Baldwin, 1985; Doxey, 1989; Kegley and Hook, 1991). A further complication, not considered in this analysis, is that a disputant may not be able to locate an issue that is suitable for trade. The model presented here effectively stacks the deck in favor of linkage by including the assumption that a welfare-enhancing issue for linkage does exist, and that a disputant who searches for it will find it. In reality, the environment of
international relations is very noisy, especially during a dispute. Probing that environment for a linkage issue that is tolerable to one's own constituency, much less to that of the opponent, cannot always be successful. This can only depress the likelihood that a disputant will try to create a package.

On the face of it, the conclusions of the model seem pessimistic. The idea that mutually beneficial gains can be wrung from an acute international crisis is normatively appealing and its proof is mathematically elegant, but there are complicating factors that make it difficult for a disputant to bring it off in reality. Yet the model's conclusions can tell us more than that. The impression of linkage's scarcity is at least in part a function of the way previous research has been conducted. Because that work concentrated on theoretical development, identifying several instances of the subject at hand was not as important as including specific examples for purposes of illustration. Consequently, the empirical content that does exist consists of brief sketches of case studies (see, e.g., Sebenius, 1983; Morgan, 1990; Morrow, 1992). At the same time, existing large-N datasets that survey disputes and their outcomes do not incorporate issue linkage as a particular form of negotiated settlement. Combined, these aspects of past research convey an impression of empirical scarcity that may not be justified. Several more cases of issue linkage are perhaps buried in the historical record. The model presented here makes it possible to uncover those cases. Its conclusions can be interpreted empirically to develop hypotheses about the types of disputes in which we can reasonably expect issue linkage to be pursued. If we can identify
sources of costs and possible bases for beliefs about exploitation, we can translate the theoretical conditions specified in this chapter to empirical expectations. As suggested in the introductory chapter, the empirical contexts of democracy and enduring rivalry may provide plausible empirical analogs for these variables. Such hypotheses tell us where to look for instances of issue linkage, and so provide a direct means of evaluating linkage's (in)frequency. These empirical implications are discussed in the second part of the project.

Even if it does turn out that linkage is rare, the very factors that make it difficult for disputants to engage in it may pave the way for their pursuit of other means of conflict management. In particular, if the disputants are unable or unwilling to resolve their differences on their own, they will be more willing to accept intermediary intervention. It may be, for example, that mediation offers a safer way to gauge the opponent's willingness to pursue conflict management. Accepting intermediary involvement does not signal a lack of resolve the way a direct concession or an offer to bargain might. Instead, letting a mediator probe the bargaining situation for possible solutions can enable the disputant to save face and minimize her own risk. Accepting an intermediary may even provide an alternative means of realizing joint gains. Mediators are often cited for their ability to suggest proposals that, for political or other reasons, the actual disputants cannot or will not suggest themselves. Issue linkage may be an example of such a maneuver. In the terms of the model presented here, mediators could assume the appendant costs of linkage sponsorship. Mediators
can also make side-payments to disputants to offset the costs of concessions, thus reducing implementation costs. Finally, intermediaries also often act as guarantors of the peace. If there are witnesses to a deal who have some capacity (and incentive) to punish defection, defection certainly becomes less attractive as a result. Here, the mediator's involvement effectively mitigates the risks of linkage sponsorship.

Thus, many of the functions traditionally assigned to mediators alleviate the obstacles to linkage emphasized by this chapter. Yet for mediation to be undertaken in the first place, both sides must agree to it, and some third party must offer its services in this capacity. There are potential difficulties with each of these requirements. In a system governed by some overarching legal authority, disputants may be mandated by law to accept intermediary intervention. In a system composed of sovereign nation-states, that acceptance is more problematic. One of the disputants may solicit the services of a mediator, but unless the opponent acquiesces, there is not much the mediator will be able to do. This brings us to the second difficulty. Mediation is voluntary on the part of the mediator as well. International organizations are obligated by institutional mandate to take a role in most interstate disputes, but the level of that involvement varies greatly according to the whims of their constituencies and may ultimately be trivial. Nation-states, on the other hand, may choose to get involved in a dispute as a coalition partner instead of a mediator, or refrain completely from involvement. The problem is not so much that there will be no mediator to be found; for almost any given crisis, offers
of mediation seem fairly numerous. Instead, the problem is whether the right mediator will be found, that is, one that is acceptable to both parties and is willing to do what it takes to bring them to agreement. The kind of actor who is most likely to be a successful mediator may in fact be reluctant to get involved in that role, preferring instead to pursue its interests in a more direct fashion or to remain aloof from the dispute.

The next two chapters focus on this problem. Chapter Three identifies the factors that influence a mediator's strategy choice and how this influences the disputants' willingness to accept its involvement. Chapter Four takes up the question of the third party's decision to get involved as a mediator in the first place. Together with the results of this chapter, these theoretical analyses specify the conditions under which disputants add issues, the conditions under which they add parties, and the relationships between them.
Chapter 3

ADDING PARTIES

The argument of the previous chapter demonstrated that, for the most part, issue linkage is easier said (or prescribed) than done. For a disputant, adding issues is costly and potentially dangerous. The welfare benefits of issue trade-offs can be absorbed by appendant costs, or overshadowed by the risk of exploitation. Even when these costs and risks are minimal, there is no guarantee that either disputant will sponsor a package deal. If she thinks there's a good enough chance her opponent will propose a linkage, a disputant will refrain from sponsoring one herself in an attempt to free-ride. The costs and risks of linkage create an incentive to shirk that reduces the disputants' willingness to add issues, even when linkage could make both sides better off.

These analytical results provide a possible explanation for the meager empirical evidence of issue linkage. The historical record seems to include very few cases in which disputants suggest these package deals, a scarcity that is surprising in light of linkage's theoretical and normative appeal. However, though disputants apparently add issues very rarely in crisis bargaining, they add parties comparatively frequently. In some respects, this is counterintuitive. Given that the actors are unable to reach agreement on the issue under dispute, it seems unlikely they would
be able to reach agreement on the actor to whom they should grant access to (or perhaps control over) their negotiations. More importantly, given the context of crisis, it seems unlikely they would be willing to grant that access in the first place. Yet intermediary intervention is such an accepted fact of world politics that attempts have been made to institutionalize it. In the twentieth century, these attempts have taken the form of organizations like the League of Nations and the UN; but attempts were also made in the nineteenth century, when compulsory mediation was introduced by the Congresses of Vienna and Paris (Princen, 1992:6).

This chapter takes as its starting point the conjecture that the apparent infrequency of issue linkage and the apparent frequency of intermediary intervention are related. In this connection, two possibilities are particularly interesting. First, these bargaining tactics may be substitutable. The same factors that make disputants reluctant to add issues may make them willing to add parties, and vice versa. Second, they may be complementary. Disputants may often add parties because they expect them to add issues. The analysis of this chapter identifies the conditions under which disputants agree on a mediator in order to explore these areas of overlap.

Implicit in the recognition of these possible relationships are important points that require some elaboration. The idea that disputants "add" third party mediators is consistent with the voluntaristic nature of intermediary intervention. Potential intermediaries can only offer their services; the disputants must
agree to or solicit their involvement before they actually become mediators. The fact that mediation requires the mutual consent of the disputants distinguishes it from other forms of third party intervention, but also has implications for the potential of the mediation initiative. It is the disputants who decide whether or not mediation will be undertaken, and the disputants who decide whether or not it will be successful (in terms of bringing about a settlement). If we accept the premise that the disputants agree on a mediator because each expects to be better off as a result, then the success of the mediation initiative depends on whether or not those mutual expectations of gain are met. The basis for disputants' mutual acceptance of a mediator is therefore a key aspect of the mediation scenario. It both sets the mediation initiative in motion and sets the standard for its success. In other words, it establishes the conditions under which mediation will be pursued and the conditions under which it will be successful. As such, it is the main focus of this chapter's analysis.

If we begin with the premise that disputants can reach agreement on a mediator only if each expects to gain from its involvement, we are met with the question of where those expectations come from. In part, whether a disputant expects to gain from mediation depends on what she thinks the mediator will do, i.e., her anticipation of its strategy choice. A disputant's guess about the potential mediator's strategy choice affects what she thinks will follow from its intervention. If the outcome she expects to result from the mediator's strategy choice represents an improvement over the outcome she expects without mediation, she
can expect to gain from the initiative and so has an incentive to accept it. If she thinks the potential mediator will be able to bring something extra to the bargaining table—side payments that will either buy concessions from her opponent, or make her own concessions easier to bear—she may be more optimistic about her chances of gaining from the mediator's involvement. Thus, her willingness to add a particular party may stem from a belief that that actor will add welfare-enhancing issues that will increase the benefits of reaching settlement. Or, a disputant may accept a mediator mainly because she believes intermediary intervention is the only peaceful (and face-saving) way out of a conflict. She may be unable or unwilling to sponsor a package deal, but willing to make concessions as long as she can make them through a third party. If the mediator offers to compensate her for doing so (through a side-payment), then so much the better. In either case, issue linkage is one way a mediator can satisfy the mutual expectations of gain that underlie its acceptance. In some cases, given the expectations of the disputants, it may be the only way. Mediators whom the disputants expect to create package deals may thus have the highest likelihood of acceptance; mediators who actually create these package deals may have the highest probability of success.

Thus, the following argument underpins the possible relationships mentioned briefly at the beginning of this chapter. The disputants must be able to reach agreement on an intermediary in order for mediation to be undertaken. The disputants can reach such agreement only if each expects to gain relative to the outcome she thinks will obtain without mediation. A disputant's expectation of
gain depends on her assessment of the mediator's likely strategy choice. The chance that the mediator will add issues increases the chance that each disputant will do better. In turn, this increases the likelihood that each will accept the mediator's involvement. The success or failure of the mediation initiative then depends upon whether the mediator's actual strategy choice fulfills these mutual expectations of gain.

In light of this argument, the mediator's strategy choice is the logical starting point for this analysis. It matters in a direct sense, in that the disputants' reactions to the resulting proposals determine the outcome of the initiative. It also matters in an indirect sense, in that the disputants' anticipations of that choice affect whether or not the mediation initiative is even accepted. Accordingly, the first stage of this chapter's analysis considers the question of the mediator's strategy choice, including issue linkage as one of the available options. The second stage of the analysis considers how the disputants' anticipations of that strategy choice affect their perceptions of potential gains and consequently their willingness to accept that actor as a mediator. In the final section of the chapter, the conditions underlying the disputants' mutual acceptance are connected to the conditions underlying the mediator's strategy choice to arrive at conclusions about possible outcomes. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the pursuit and success of mediation are identified, and empirical hypotheses based on these conditions are drawn out and discussed.

In both stages of the analysis, I assume the actors behave like expected-utility maximizers. The mediator's strategy choice is
treated as a decision problem, as is each disputant's willingness to accept the mediator. Such formal methods may seem ill-suited to the analysis of an endeavor that is widely considered more of an art than a science. However, many of the assumptions on which they depend are not novel to the study of mediation. In particular, assumptions of cost-benefit calculation on the part of mediators and the mediated are quite common in previous work. To demonstrate this point, I turn to a brief review of the mediation literature.

RATIONALITY AND MEDIATION RESEARCH

The mediation literature is oriented around three elements of the mediation scenario: the mediator, the dispute context, and the disputants. The following review of these research areas is not extensive. Because my aim is to demonstrate that the arguments of many mediation studies are presented in "rational" terms, I touch only on some of the more well-known and representative studies in each branch of the literature. Also, I focus primarily on the literature on international mediation. The lack of an overarching legal system at the international level places special emphasis on the voluntaristic nature of mediation. Much of the literature that deals with mediation in more structured environments does not share that emphasis, which is central to the analysis undertaken here.

Because mediation is often recommended as a good way to "solve" international disputes, many analysts have concentrated on the mediator in an effort to identify the qualities that are most
desirable and the strategies that are most effective. For example, several studies focus on what the mediator has; the resources and capabilities required of a successful mediator have been discussed at length (see, e.g., Lall, 1966; Young, 1967, 1972). Other research focuses on what the mediator does. More than one hundred mediation techniques have been discussed in the literature of the last decade (Wall and Lynn, 1993). Mediators' choices from among these are frequently viewed as "rational", in the sense that the mediator's calculation of costs and benefits broadly determines its course of action (Carnevale, 1985; Carnevale and Wittmar, 1987; Jabri, 1988). Thus, a connection is drawn between what the mediator wants and what the mediator does; its behavior is assumed to be goal-oriented. These goals have also been argued to motivate the mediator's involvement in the first place. Several types of benefits have been argued to accrue to the mediator as a result of its intervention. As a high-level form of involvement in international affairs, mediation can be an important source of prestige. In terms of more tangible gains, distributional benefits to the mediators' constituencies and allies may accrue from the dispute's settlement, and direct rewards can stem from a settlement that advances or protects the mediator's own interests (Zartman and Touval, 1985; Carnevale, 1986; Mitchell, 1988; Princen, 1992).

Another (less prescriptively oriented) set of studies assigns the characteristics and strategies of the mediator a secondary role at best, emphasizing the context of the dispute as a crucial determinant of mediation effectiveness. Factors such as the disputants' prior history, their power relationship, and the issues at
stake in effect set the limits for mediation effectiveness (Ott, 1972; Bercovitch et al, 1991; Bercovitch and Wells, 1993). The mediator's traits and strategies are not unimportant, but can contribute only as much as the structure of the dispute permits. The context of the dispute allows the mediator limited operating room, but even so it is still assumed to behave strategically: "Mediators...make a rational cost-benefit appraisal of the prevailing conditions and adopt a strategy accordingly" (Bercovitch and Wells, 1993:21). The disputants too are assumed to think in terms of costs and benefits. This is reflected by the incorporation of the value to the disputants of the non-settlement outcome as another element of the dispute context. Generally, the argument is that as the dispute drags on, the political cost to each of the quarreling regimes rises, with domestic and international constituencies becoming increasingly convinced of their government's ineffectiveness (Ott, 1972:615). Consequently, as the failure to reach agreement becomes progressively more onerous, the disputants are more likely to accept mediation in the hopes of achieving a more favorable outcome.

The costs of non-settlement are also emphasized when disputant willingness is brought to the fore as a dependent (rather than background) variable, but with less consensus about its effects. For example, dispute intensity has been argued to increase the likelihood of mediation acceptance (Young, 1969; Latour et al., 1976) as well as decrease it (Fisher, 1964; Burton, 1969; Edmead, 1971). Those arguing that the relationship is positive contend that the disputants may have to suffer heavy losses before they open up to the possibility of mediation. Disputants involved in conflicts of low
intensity and limited scope will resist mediation because they believe they can work the problems out themselves. Those arguing that the relationship is negative assert that disputants react to heavy losses as sunk costs, and that this increases their determination to win at any price. If the intensity of the conflict is sufficiently high, and its scope sufficiently broad, the disputants may prefer confrontation to mediation. Empirical evidence for these propositions has been mixed, with some analysts finding no clear relationship between dispute intensity and the disputants' acceptance of mediation (Frei, 1976), and others finding a negative relationship (Bercovitch et al, 1991). Experimental evidence indicates a positive relationship (Rubin, 1980).

The lack of a clear relationship between dispute intensity and likelihood of mediation acceptance implies that, intuitive reasoning to the contrary, this variable may not be an important determinant of disputants' attitudes toward mediation. The debate itself suggests an intervening variable that may be more important. In each argument, dispute intensity affects whether the disputants expect to gain from mediation, and this in turn affects their willingness to accept intervention. Implicitly, the disputants' expectation of gain is the key variable in these arguments; what the analysts really disagree about is how dispute intensity affects this expectation. Other analyses of disputant willingness incorporate this variable explicitly. For example, it has been argued that if the disputants perceive that the probability of achieving their goals through coercion is low, and that the value of conflict goals is decreasing relative to the costs of pursuing those goals, they are
more likely to accept mediation (Stephens, 1988; Merrills, 1991:31-2). Similar logic underlies the analytical construct of the "mutually hurting stalemate" used by Touval and Zartman to motivate disputants' acceptance of intermediary intervention (1989:125).

Acknowledging the role of the disputants' expectation of gain could provide a way to reconcile the conflicting findings regarding dispute intensity. If a disputant thinks she is losing on the battlefield, it may take less to convince her that she can gain from mediation. However, if her opponent thinks he is winning, he may be less inclined toward mediation, with the dyadic result that the mediation is less likely to be pursued. On the other hand, if both disputants feel they are losing, each might expect to be better off with a mediator's intervention. The dispute intensity (in terms of dyadic casualty levels) could be exactly the same in each case, but the disputants' expectations of gain from mediation would differ, and consequently so would the likelihood of the mediator's acceptance.

Thinking in terms of the disputants' expectations of gain has already become the basis for a revision of the conventional wisdom regarding mediator bias. Much of the early work on mediation assumed that the acceptability and effectiveness of so-called "interested intermediaries" would be compromised by the disputants' perception of partiality. The new wisdom is that "a disputant could accept a third party who is clearly against it if its expected outcome is still better than the alternative" (Princen, 1992:62). Disputants may even prefer a mediator who is close to the other side, if they think there is a chance that the mediator will "deliver"
that party (Touval and Zartman, 1989:122; Rubin, 1981). In its simplest form, the argument holds that the acceptance of mediation requires only that each side expect to do better with mediation than without it (Touval, 1975; Zartman and Touval, 1985: 255-6, Princen, 1992).

The language used by these studies in their descriptions of the mediator and the disputants is thus not dissimilar to that of rational choice and expected utility theory. In each branch of the mediation literature, both the mediators and the mediated are usually assumed to be motivated by the expectation of gain. It is argued that in pursuit of those gains, they consider costs and benefits before choosing from among the courses of action open to them. Consequently, this study differs from previous work less in the incorporation of these assumptions than in their formalization.

A more significant divergence is this study’s use of the expected-utility approach to integrate the components of the mediation scenario. The existing literature tends to focus on these components in isolation from each other, often drawing direct links between each one and the likelihood of mediation’s success. (Even the literature focusing on dispute context generally considers each aspect of that context separately; an exception is Bercovitch and Langley, 1993.) Yet the decisions of the mediator and the mediated are clearly interdependent, and this interaction determines both the pursuit and success of any mediation initiative. A potential third party must decide to attempt involvement; whether it thinks mediation is the best way to pursue its interests will depend on how it expects the disputants to respond to mediation and what they are
likely to do otherwise. (This decision is discussed in the next chapter.) For their part, the disputants must decide whether or not to accept an actor's offer to mediate; whether they do so depends on what they think the actor will do for them in that capacity and whether they expect to be better off as a result. Finally, the mediator's actual strategy choice combines with the reactions of the disputants to determine the outcome of the initiative. The mediator's course of action must result in a proposal that satisfies the expectations of the disputants in order for it to be successful.

ANALYZING MEDIATION: AN EXTENSIVE FORM GAME

The "story" of mediation as discussed above is one of interdependent decisions and interlocking choices. The goals and expectations of the mediator and the mediated interact with each other and the dispute context to structure the pursuit of the mediation initiative and its outcome. Making these interrelationships explicit can better illuminate the conditions under which mediation makes a reasonable prescription for conflict management. After all, even the most potent of prescriptions is useless if the patient refuses to take it, or if the dosage prescribed by the physician is insufficient. A disputant who doubts the willingness or ability of the mediator to do what is necessary, or a mediator who balks at too involved a strategy, can each undercut mediation's potential.

I turn now to the mediator's strategy choice as first link in the chain of argument presented here. That strategy choice reflects not
just the mediator's "diagnosis" of a dispute, but the lengths to which
the mediator will go in order to treat its symptoms. In turn, the
disputants' impressions of a potential mediator's skill in diagnosis
and treatment color their willingness to accept its involvement.

The Mediator's Strategy Choice

As noted above, over one hundred mediation tactics have been
discussed in recent literature.\textsuperscript{14} Doubtless many of these reflect
academic differences in semantics rather than distinct strategy
options. Even so, an actual mediator probably does not consider all
of the options that mediation analysts do; and, if it did, a disputant
would have a hard time deciding whether she would be better off
with the mediator's involvement. Instead, it is easier (for the
mediator, the disputants, and those who study them) to think in
terms of ways the mediator could affect the disputants' bargaining
situation. In this respect, there are two basic options. The
mediator can choose either to work within the existing structure of
the bargaining situation, or attempt to modify it.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{14}The cataloguing of mediator strategies has consumed so much mediation
research that one analyst has characterized the literature as consisting primarily of
"laundry lists" of possible tactics, with little attention devoted to their appropriateness
for a given dispute (Princen, 1992). Ironically, this emphasis may compromise the
prescriptive value of the research: "[b]y focusing on mediators' motivation or behavior
alone, one may prescribe innovative strategies of mediation...which simply cannot be
applied to every context" (Bercovitch et al., 1993:24).

\textsuperscript{15}In an obvious sense, the involvement of a mediator automatically alters the
structure of a dispute once it is accepted. Here, the "structure" of the dispute refers to
the issue space associated with the bargaining situation.
The first option I label "facilitation". A mediator pursuing this strategy concentrates its efforts on removing obstacles to bargaining between the disputants, preventing the breakdown of negotiations, and generally making disputants aware of existing possibilities for settlement. As such, it includes many of the functions traditionally ascribed to mediators. At a minimum, facilitation involves activities that are often included under the general rubric of "good offices". A mediator can provide surrogate diplomatic ties, which are often reduced or severed as one of the first steps in an international crisis (Merrills, 1991:34-36). In this capacity, the mediator may serve as a communication channel and information conduit (Froman and Cohen, 1970; Pechota, 1971; Deutsch, 1973), or it may pave the way for negotiations by providing neutral meeting places and organizing summits (Simkin, 1971). At the maximum, the facilitating mediator takes a more active role in the bargaining. Capitalizing on its role as a go-between, the mediator can pool the information it receives from the parties and offer specific proposals on the disputed issue (Podell and Knapp, 1969). Because of the mediator's special role, its suggestions often serve as a focal point or "catalyst" for negotiations that have reached an impasse (Princen, 1992). Moreover, those suggestions may reflect possibilities for settlement that the disputants themselves cannot identify or put forward. The demands of the disputants may in fact be complementary. To borrow a well-known example, two people may be arguing over the division of an orange, each convinced she must have three-fourths of it, and through the course of discussion realize that one is interested in the rind while
the other is interested in the pulp. However, a third party might be necessary to identify such a harmony of interests, especially if the disputants themselves are not communicating. A skilled mediator can recognize and integrate complementary demands and thereby achieve settlement (Carnevale, 1986). Of course, even if some harmony of interests is apparent, it may be costly, in a domestic political sense, for one or both sides to acknowledge that with a proposal. This is another respect in which a "facilitating" mediator is useful. A skilled mediator can make proposals on behalf of a disputant who recognizes possibilities for settlement but wants to save face (Pruitt and Johnson, 1970). Either way, the mediator's special "in-between" position enables it to identify what is really at stake for each side, and this unique perspective may bring settlements to light that the disputants themselves are unable to perceive or unwilling to acknowledge.

Thus, a mediator can pursue several different tactics while working within the existing bargaining situation. All of these specific tactics I include as examples of the general strategy of "facilitation". As another option, the mediator can alter the parameters of the bargaining situation in a direct attempt to make settlement more likely. The main way the mediator can do this is by manipulating the number and kinds of issues involved. Mediators can either subtract issues from or add issues to the negotiation agenda. Issue subtraction, more commonly called "fractionating" (Fisher,

\[16\] Here I have in mind the distinction offered by Bercovitch and Wells (1993:5), in which a mediation "strategy" refers to a "broad plan of action...to achieve some objectives" and mediation "tactics" refer to actual mediator behavior.
1964), involves eliminating those issues (or sub-issues) that are blocking agreement in other areas. Issue addition, usually called "issue linkage" as in Chapter Two, involves the introduction of new issues as a way for the mediator to compensate or "reward" one or both of the parties for making the concessions necessary to reach agreement (Carnevale, 1986; Zartman and Touval, 1985). As the focus of this project is on the addition of issues and parties, the analysis here will be limited to the linkage strategy.

By introducing additional issues, the mediator can create additional bargains that are jointly beneficial and make at least one of the parties better off. These joint gains can be effected in three ways. The mediator may engage in a package deal with one of the disputants. In this case, the disputant makes a concession on the contested issue in exchange for some benefit from the mediator. Her opponent gets what he wants, but she avoids conceding directly to him (her concession is made to the mediator) and she comes away from the negotiating table with something to show for the concession. The joint gains of the linkage are shared by the mediator and that disputant, but the other disputant benefits as well, because of his opponent's concession on the original issue. As another possibility, the mediator may decide to cut two separate package deals, one with each side. Each disputant makes a concession on the initial issue to the mediator, who then compensates each for that concession with some other benefit. In this case, each disputant shares the joint gains of linkage with the mediator, who then exchanges the concessions on the initial issue to bring the disputants to agreement. Finally, the mediator might
choose to suggest and oversee the conclusion of some kind of package deal between the disputants themselves. In all of these cases, the mediator assumes the sponsorship costs of linkage discussed in Chapter Two. It identifies issues (or sub-issues) across which trades are possible, and makes proposals accordingly. Also, if it goes so far as to bring new issues into the mix for use as side-payments, it is effectively helping to offset implementation costs. In addition to mitigating the costs of linkage, the involvement of the mediator also neutralizes the risks. Its suggestions cannot be exploited in the same way those of an opponent can. A linkage proposal coming from one's opponent may encourage coercive bargaining, because it may be interpreted as evidence the opponent is willing to compromise. Coming from a mediator, whose business is compromise, it may actually be anticipated. The mediator can also neutralize the risks of linkage by acting as a witness or guarantor to the deal. To the extent that they have the capacity and incentive to punish exploitation, mediators can discourage disputants from exploiting package deals.

Collapsing the bewildering welter of mediator strategy options into a simple dichotomy may seem like a drastic oversimplification, but it corresponds to a widely cited organizing schema proposed by Kochan and Jick (1978). The facilitation and linkage strategies differ with respect to their "target": facilitation is aimed at affecting the process of the disputants' interaction, while issue linkage affects possible outcomes. In turn, this affects the impact of the mediator's efforts. The tactics associated with facilitation are efforts directed at maintaining or improving the
disputants' bargaining relationship. A mediator who chooses facilitation can be strategic in its filtering of information and ideas, thus dampening escalatory rhetoric. It can clarify or elaborate positions and demands, in order to reduce the possibility of misinterpretation. It can offer suggestions of its own, bringing a fresh perspective to stalled negotiations. It can redefine the issue under dispute, dovetailing the demands of the disputants and realizing potential joint gains. In short, by keeping discussions focused and on track, facilitation can make the disputants aware of existing possibilities for agreement. In contrast, issue linkage creates possibilities for agreement. A mediator who adds issues affects possible outcomes in the sense that it invents bargains that are outside the parameters of the original dispute. As was shown in Chapter Two, if there are no mutually acceptable negotiated settlements in the initial bargaining situation, they can be created through linkage. If mutually acceptable settlements already exist, linkage can make them more attractive to the disputants. Because it enhances the benefits of negotiated settlement, a mediator who adds issues also affects possible outcomes by making settlement more likely. Because each disputant has more to gain from agreement, each disputant is more likely to agree.

This brings us to an interesting question. If mediators want to bring the disputants to agreement, and issue linkage always increases the likelihood that they will be able to do so, why would a mediator pursue any other strategy? There are three possible answers. One is that the mediator's ambitions fall short of negotiated settlement. It may merely be seeking the political
benefits associated with the mediator's role, or trying to bring about a cease-fire. A negotiated settlement would satisfy both of these more limited ambitions, though, and is a more certain means to these ends than the perpetuation of negotiations. It seems reasonable to assume that, from the point of view of a mediator, a negotiated settlement is always at least as good as a cease-fire and is usually better.\footnote{Of course, situations in which the mediator prefers no agreement to a settlement that does not favor its own interests are possible, and concern with this possibility does underlie the argument of some analysts for unbiased mediators. However, admitting this possibility begs the question of why such an actor would become involved as a mediator and not as a disputant. This question is considered briefly in the next chapter.} A more comprehensive answer lies in a factor that also complicates the disputants' pursuit of linkage. Linkage involves extraordinary costs. The mediator pays a price for the restructuring of the bargain, in the form of the information search it engages in and the side payments it makes to the disputants to offset their concessions. This is not to say that facilitation does not require the expenditure of resources also. Providing for the security and travel of the people involved, researching documents and proposals, and arranging meetings all demand the devotion of money, bureaucratic personnel and other resources. However, issue linkage requires all of these and more. Supplying resources for side-payments is directly costly. Particularly if the issues at stake are not that important to the mediator, or if its own resource base is underdeveloped, the mediator may be unwilling (or unable) to finance the extraordinary costs of linkage. Another possibility is that the mediator may not think linkage is really necessary to bring the disputants to agreement. Assume that the disputants
communicate their reservation points to the mediator when they communicate their willingness to accept its involvement. Overlap between these will convince the mediator that a zone of agreement exists. One or both of the disputants may realize there are possibilities for settlement, though each was probably misrepresenting his reservation point in bargaining with the other. In accepting a mediator's intervention, disputants may seek mainly to avoid making direct concessions to the opponent. In that case, the mediator can succeed in bringing about a settlement without bothering to compensate either of the disputants. The mediator's understanding of the dispute context (through the information revealed to it by the disputants) thus also figures into its strategy choice. If it can pursue a less costly strategy that it believes will succeed, there is no reason to consider making side payments.

We can examine these possibilities by treating the mediator's strategy choice as a decision problem. Let the facilitative and linkage strategies each be associated with a lottery over success and failure. That is, each strategy has some probability of generating a proposal that brings the disputants to agreement, and each strategy has some probability its proposal will fail to bring the disputants to agreement. The mediator then compares the values of these lotteries in order to make its choice. The option with the higher expected utility is the one the mediator will select.

The lotteries involved are extremely simple. For each strategy, there is some probability of success. The mediator's estimate of this comes from the information it receives from the disputants about their reservation points. Denote this by \((p')\) for
facilitation, and \( (p^*) \) for linkage. This probability weights the mediator's net utility for a successful outcome. The successful outcomes associated with each strategy differ; the result of a successful facilitation is some outcome on the initial issue under dispute, while the result of a successful linkage is some combination of an outcome on the initial issue and an outcome on the linkage issue(s). Let the utility to the mediator of a successful outcome on the initial issue be \( (m_1) \), and the utility of a successful outcome on the initial issue with linkage \( (m_2) \). (The actual outcomes are labeled \( M_1 \) and \( M_2 \), respectively.) The mediator's utility for each of these outcomes is diminished by the associated costs--\( c \) for facilitation costs, and \( c^* \) for linkage costs--and this establishes mediator's net utility for the successful outcome. Along with the possibility of success, each strategy also has some chance of failure. For facilitation, there is a \((1 - p^*)\) probability the initiative will fail, and for linkage, there is a \((1 - p^*)\) probability the initiative will fail. Though the probabilities of failure may differ across the two strategies, the end result is the same. If the mediation initiative fails to generate a settlement proposal that is acceptable to both disputants, the status quo (disputant stalemate) continues. In addition, the mediator loses the resources it spent on its initiative. However, this resource loss is the same regardless of its strategy choice. The failure of a linkage proposal means the mediator does not have to make the side payments to the disputant(s), but it still pays a price for being an intermediary in the form of the ordinary operating resources required by the initiative. It is only the costs of a successful linkage that are
extraordinary (in the sense of going beyond the "normal" resource expenditure involved in mediation). Thus, a failed linkage looks and costs the same as a failed facilitation. Each results in the perpetuation of the dispute (for which the mediator has utility n), and the mediator's utility for this outcome is diminished by the "ordinary" costs of mediation, c.

Thus, there are three possible outcomes in the mediator's decision problem: a successful outcome with facilitation, a successful outcome with linkage, and the failure of the initiative, which results in the perpetuation of the dispute. Embedded in the existence of the decision problem is the assumption that for all mediators, the perpetuation of the dispute is the least preferred outcome; otherwise, there would be no reason to become involved. However, this is the most that can be said about the mediator's preferences over outcomes. Simply stating that some mediators prefer outcomes with linkage to outcomes without linkage is not interesting, useful, or meaningful. Instead, beginning with the assumption that all mediators prefer success to failure, the question becomes which strategy is the most appropriate means toward success. The answer depends on the mediator's evaluation of the lotteries over success and failure associated with each strategy. Those lotteries take the following form:

\[ EU_{Med}(facilitation) = p'[(m_1) - c] + (1-p')[n - c] \]

\[ EU_{Med}(linkage) = p''[(m_2) - c''] + (1-p'')[n - c] \]
From the above discussion, we know that \( p' \leq p'' \), that is, that the chance of success with linkage is at least as good as the chance of success with facilitation. If the disputant will accept some single-issue proposal generated by facilitation, she will accept the same single-issue proposal with a side-payment.\(^{18}\) Also, we know that the outcome on the initial issue must be at least as good with a successful linkage as it is with a successful facilitation, otherwise the mediator has no reason to propose it. The mediator can get anything with linkage that it can get with facilitation, but the converse is not true. Therefore, we know that in terms of the initial issue, \((m_1) \leq (m_2)\). Finally, the extraordinary costs of linkage imply that \(0 < c < c''\). Given these conditions, the comparison of these two lotteries results in the following statement. A mediator chooses facilitation over linkage if:

\[
(c'' - c) > [(m_2) - (m_1)] \quad \text{(Condition 3.1)}
\]

The amount on the left-hand side represents the marginal costs of a successful linkage strategy, that is, those costs above and beyond what is required by facilitation. Those costs are basically the resources and time expended in the search for an appropriate package and/or the amount of the side payment(s). On the right-hand side, the mediator compares the outcome on the

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\(^{18}\) I assume here that the side-payment is either valuable or worthless as far as the disputant is concerned. A worthless side-payment does not make the disputant any less willing to accept the single-issue proposal; that is, it will not "backfire" in the sense of insulting the disputant's honor so much that it refuses to accept an outcome on the single issue that it would have accepted otherwise.
initial issue that it can get through facilitation with the outcome on
the initial issue that it can get through linkage. The marginal cost
of the linkage effort, relative to the marginal improvement it can
potentially provide, determines the mediator's willingness to link.
Keep in mind that the "improvement" provided by the linkage is not
an increase in the probability of settlement; that was taken as a
given. The improvement provided by the linkage is some positive
qualitative change in the outcome from the point of view of the
mediator. Condition 3.1 simply states that this positive qualitative
change has to be worth the extra expense. Since the extra expense is
always non-negative, the linkage must be able to provide some
benefit over and above what the mediator could achieve through
facilitation alone.

This seems obvious (and therefore not especially interesting),
but thinking about the conditions under which this can and cannot be
ture is instructive. Because facilitation does not alter existing
possibilities for settlement, it can only be successful if there is a
zone of agreement. Thus, whether the mediator thinks a linkage deal
could improve upon a facilitated outcome depends on whether it
believes a zone of agreement exists. If, on the basis of the
information revealed to it by the disputants, the mediator believes
several settlements are already possible on the single issue, it can
bring about the one it most prefers through facilitation alone.
Simply by shuttling between the disputants, the mediator could lead
them to the split-the-difference settlement the Nash (1950)
bargaining solution suggests they would reach if they negotiated
without it (assuming they were equal with respect to bargaining
skill, resolve, etc.). Or, the mediator could take a more active facilitating role, using its control over the sequence of proposals and the prominence of its own suggestions to lead the disputants to a bargained settlement that reflects its own interests. Depending on the location of its own ideal point, this settlement may or may not be different from what they would have reached absent its involvement (Morgan, 1994). The mediator might be committed to a split-the-difference bargaining solution, or it might prefer some settlement to the left or right of that outcome. However, as long as the mediator's own ideal point falls anywhere within the zone of agreement, it can lead the disputants to that as an outcome just by being strategic in its filtering of information and ideas. Regardless of where exactly in the zone of agreement the mediator's ideal point is, there is no way an outcome with linkage could improve on it with respect to the initial issue. The quantity \((m_2) - (m_1)\) would be equal to zero, and, since the marginal costs of linkage are always non-negative, the mediator would have no incentive to link.

What if the mediator's ideal point is outside the zone of agreement, for example, between the reservation point of Actor A and the ideal point of Actor B? The mediator can guarantee the outcome at Actor A's reservation point without having to link. As long as this outcome is acceptable to the mediator, it will orchestrate the negotiations in order to achieve it. However, if the issue under dispute is particularly important to the mediator, and it can locate an issue that is less important that it would be willing to use as a payment, then it might offer a linkage to one of the actors (in this case Actor A) in order to get her to exceed her reservation
point. It runs the risk of being rejected, however, if the compensation that it attempts to provide is not valuable enough to the disputant. (This does not contradict the assumption that \( p'' \) is greater than or equal to \( p' \), because the disputant would have rejected the same single-issue proposal without the linkage.) The linkage deal would be both less certain and more costly than the facilitated outcome at Actor A's reservation point, but it could be worth the risk and extra expense if additional movement on the dispute issue is important enough to the mediator.

The idea that a mediator might deliberately forgo existing possibilities for settlement conflicts with our intuitive notion of what mediators do. However, there might be something wrong with our intuition. A mediator could eschew existing possibilities for settlement, and still achieve a bargained agreement, as long as it provides adequate compensation to Actor A. If that compensation is less important to the mediator than the improvement on the initial dispute issue, all three actors would actually be better off than if the mediator had simply led negotiations to the outcome at A's reservation point.

Thus, a mediator who believes there is already a zone of agreement will only be willing to link if it thinks it can improve upon existing possibilities for settlement, and this is only possible if its own ideal point lies outside the zone of agreement. Of course, linkage does the most good in situations in which there is no zone of agreement. In such a situation, even the most skillful facilitation cannot bring the disputants to a negotiated settlement, because no negotiated settlement is possible. The most a facilitating mediator
would be able to do is let them know they are wasting their time by negotiating, which might have the unfortunate effect of justifying a disputant's decision to escalate. To reflect the scenario in which the mediator believes there is no zone of agreement, let the mediator's estimate \((p')\) of the probability of successful facilitation be equal to zero. The mediator can still choose facilitation if

\[
(c' - c) > [(m2) - (n)] \quad \text{(Condition 3.2)}
\]

A mediator can choose to facilitate, even if it believes the likelihood of its success is zero, if the marginal costs of linkage outweigh its value for the dispute's settlement. This value is composed of the mediator's intrinsic value for the dispute's resolution, combined with any distributional benefits that accrue. If settling the dispute takes too much time and requires too great a sacrifice on some other issue on the mediator's part, the mediator will facilitate, even though it knows that will not be enough. In short, linkage's potential contribution to conflict management can come at too high a price for the mediator. This sounds intuitive (i.e., not particularly surprising), but it suggests limits on the kind of issues the mediator can use for linkage. The more salient the initial issue under dispute is to the mediator, the more the mediator values the resolution of the dispute in itself, and the more resources at the mediator's disposal, the easier it will be to find a suitable issue. If cannot find such an issue, the mediator will choose to facilitate, even though it thinks the dispute will certainly continue.
Thus, the mediator only has an incentive to link if it perceives no zone of agreement or if none of the outcomes in an existing zone of agreement are acceptable to it. Assuming it is willing to link, the mediator's strategy choice then depends upon its ability to link. This is influenced by the salience of the initial dispute issue and the extent of the mediator's resource base. The ends must provide sufficient justification for the means. If there is a zone of agreement, the linkage issue must be less salient to the mediator than the initial dispute issue. (Why make a side-payment using an issue that is of greater importance?) If there is not a zone of agreement, concessions on the linkage issue must be less important to the mediator than the dispute's resolution. If the mediator has some intrinsic value for the dispute's settlement in addition to some stake in its distributional characteristics, that in effect raises the price it is willing to pay to bring the disputants to agreement. Nevertheless, in both situations, the more important the resolution of the disputed issue is to the mediator, the more latitude it has in its search for joint gains. (Of course, the linkage could still fail; just because it is appropriate for the mediator does not mean it will be appropriate for the disputant.) In turn, the more resources at the mediator's disposal, the more modes of "payment" the mediator can choose from. The existence of a zone of agreement influences the mediator's willingness to link; the salience of the dispute issue, and the mediator's resolve to bring about settlement, influence its ability to link.

This rather obvious result has some non-obvious implications for the debate over the impact of mediator bias. One possible
definition of "bias" is in terms of the mediator's level of interest in the contested issue. It is often argued that mediators should be "disinterested", which might mean they should be indifferent between all possible negotiated settlements on the contested issue. If there is a zone of agreement, then according to the model, a disinterested mediator has no incentive to do anything other than facilitate. If there is no zone of agreement, the disinterested mediator's decision to link is based on a comparison of its intrinsic value for the dispute's resolution with the costs of bringing about a negotiated settlement. Because a disinterested mediator derives no distributional benefit from any particular negotiated settlement, its willingness to link depends solely on its resolve to bring about a bargained agreement. The less importance the mediator attaches to the actual resolution of the dispute, the less it will be willing to bring to the table for side-payments. A lack of resolve to bring about agreement does not imply that the disinterested mediator has some stake in perpetuating the dispute. Rather, as mentioned earlier, the mediator's aim could be limited to the control or de-escalation of physical hostilities. While it is unlikely that such an actor would block a negotiated settlement, it has no reason to go out of its way (i.e., through an extraordinary bargaining maneuver like linkage) to bring one about. A "disinterested" mediator thus has little incentive to create novel solutions to the conflict, a result that diminishes the normative appeal of impartiality as a criterion for mediators.

Now, consider an "interested" mediator, defined here as one who has an interest in the distributive nature of the settlement. As
long as the interested mediator's ideal point lies somewhere within the zone of agreement, it too has no reason to do anything other than facilitate. Regardless of whether the interested mediator favors a split-the-difference solution or prefers an outcome that favors one of the disputants (another possible definition of bias), it will make the same strategy choice as the "disinterested" mediator. The interested mediator could only have an incentive to link if none of the outcomes in the zone of agreement is acceptable. Its own preferences must be so skewed in favor of one disputant, and the disputed issue so important, that it would be willing to pay the other disputant in order to get what it wants. In this way, "extreme" bias may be conducive to a willingness to bring resources to the table.

So, in some sense, both sides of the debate are right. Bias in itself does not have clear consequences for the mediator's strategy choice. Ceteris paribus, a mediator has more of an incentive to link if it thinks there is no zone of agreement than it does if it thinks there is a zone of agreement. However, bias does have consequences for the outcome of a successful facilitation. Facilitation enables a mediator to exploit the disputants' ignorance regarding the existence and/or location of the zone of agreement. A "biased" mediator, one with a stake in the particulars of a bargained agreement, might use its influence and its information to bring about a single-issue settlement other than solution that the disputants presumably would have reached without it. The settlement is no less a settlement as a result; that is, the mediator's bias does not influence its effectiveness. However, it
could affect its attractiveness to the disputants. If a disputant suspects the mediator might orchestrate a single-issue settlement that is less favorable than what she could achieve without the mediation, she has no incentive to agree to its involvement. In this connection, a mediator who is committed to a split-the-difference solution would be unattractive to a disputant who thinks it has a bargaining advantage over its opponent and who believes that opportunities for settlement on the original dispute issue do exist. On the other hand, insofar as a mediator's bias raises the "price" it is willing to pay for the dispute's resolution, it could be conducive to its willingness to make side payments. An extremely biased mediator (one whose own ideal point lies outside the zone of agreement, and to whom the dispute issue is particularly salient) might be perceived by a disputant as more likely to spend what it takes to bring about the negotiated settlement that it wants. The fact that the third party has chosen to intervene via mediation could reassure the disputant(s) who would otherwise be wary of its intentions. Ultimately, if a zone of agreement exists, bias could be dangerous if it means the mediator will encourage a single-issue resolution that disadvantages the disputant relative to other existing possibilities for agreement. If there is no zone of agreement, any bias at all (in terms of the mediator's interest in the disputed issue) could help, since a stake in the dispute's resolution raises the price the mediator is willing to pay for settlement and thereby increases the likelihood it will link.

The results of the analysis of the mediator's decision problem thus point both to bias and to the mediator's belief about a zone of
agreement as the main determinants of its strategy choice. These are the same variables emphasized in Carnevale's (1986) model of mediator strategy choice, and they work the same way. A mediator who believes (on the basis of the information revealed to it by the disputants) that possibilities for agreement already exist has little reason to bring side-payments to the table for the sake of settlement, unless it is so biased that none of the existing possibilities are acceptable. Instead, it will concentrate its efforts on remedying disputant misperceptions and/or misrepresentation in their initial bargaining if it is "disinterested", or on manipulating the negotiation process to get what it wants if it is interested. However, the mediator's belief that there is no zone of agreement does not guarantee that it will pursue linkage. It will only link if it can find a linkage that is worth it. "It" may be the dispute's resolution in itself. The mediator's reputation may have become inextricably bound up with the dispute's settlement, increasing the mediator's resolve to end the conflict. Or, "it" could be some change in the status quo on the initial issue that the mediator is willing to pay for. Unfortunately, how much the mediator is willing to pay is not necessarily the same as how much the mediator is able to pay. The mediator's willingness to link is checked by its ability to link. Organizational mandate may prevent it from taking an active role (as is the case with the Society of Friends, for example), or it may be constrained by a limited resource base. In any case, the increased probability of settlement that linkage provides is insufficient to ensure that the mediator will engage in it. A mediator can pursue
facilitation, even if it thinks it will fail to bring about negotiated settlement.

The result that a mediator can rationally choose a strategy it believes will fail may be part of the explanation for the relative infrequency with which third parties manage to bring disputants to negotiated agreement. In the 65 cases of mediation analyzed by Frei, only eight resulted in formal settlement, a success rate of about twelve percent (1976:69). Similarly, only about fourteen percent of the 284 mediation attempts analyzed by Bercovitch resulted in full or partial settlement (1991:10). Of course, the failure to bring about a settlement does not necessarily imply a failure to bring about a cease-fire. It may be that simply getting the disputants to talk can reduce the intensity of physical combat, even if no negotiated settlement results. It has been found that "third party efforts to open or maintain communication between disputants were . . . the most consistently effective technique for preventing the escalation of conflict" (Dixon, 1993:16). A mediator who is unable or unwilling to do what it takes to bridge the gap between disputants can thus aid in the abatement, if not the resolution, of the conflict. This is an important contribution in terms of the lives and resources saved from physical destruction. And, because of the

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19 In part, these low success rates are a consequence of the organization and construction of the respective datasets. Any one dispute could be associated with several mediation attempts, but if the dispute is concluded by a negotiated settlement, not all of the mediators involved are given equal credit for the success. Whether or not mediated disputes are more likely to be settled by bargained agreement than non-mediated disputes cannot be answered by these analyses, since they do not include non-management cases. Alker and Sherman do, and also report a higher rate of successful mediation (about 31%); however, of the unmanaged disputes they examine, 39% end in peaceful settlement also.
political benefits of the mediation role, the mediator may be able to gain from its involvement regardless of whether or not it is successful in achieving a settlement. In the mind of the mediator, these positive effects may provide a rationale for limiting its intervention. It can choose a strategy it knows will not lead to negotiated settlement, because the mediation role is in itself beneficial. The disputants, however, are not interested in what the mediator gains from its involvement. The disputants are interested in what they can gain from the mediator's involvement. This brings us to the second link in the chapter's chain of argument: the disputants' decision to accept a mediator.

The Willingness of the Disputants to Accept Mediation

On the face of it, disputants seem to have little to lose from accepting intermediary intervention. After all, they are free to reject any or all of the solutions a mediator proposes. Accepting third-party conflict management may even signal adherence to particular norms of conflict resolution, demonstrating to the international audience that a disputant is committed to negotiation and bargaining (Raymond and Kegley, 1985). However, disputants do not always accept offers of mediation. In fact, large N empirical studies of mediation have reported fairly high rejection rates. Of the 65 mediation attempts analyzed by Frei, 57% percent were rejected by at least one actor (1976:69). Of the 284 mediation attempts included in Bercovitch's dataset, 22% are cases in which initiatives were rejected and 9% saw no mediation (Bercovitch et al, 1991:10). Clearly, mediation's normative appeal and nonthreatening
consequences are not always sufficient to bring disputants to agreement on the involvement of a third party.

One possible explanation is suggested by the results of the previous section. Mediation's consequences may be non-threatening in the sense that they are non-obligatory, but they are not necessarily completely benign from a disputant's point of view. Part of the reason a disputant considers a mediator stems from her own ignorance of her opponent's reservation point and her uncertainty regarding the existence and/or location of a zone of agreement. If there is a zone of agreement, a disputant can expect a biased mediator to pull the negotiated agreement in its own favor relative to what would have obtained absent its involvement. Moreover, in such a case the mediator is able to do this without having to compensate either side for the concessions involved (though it may choose to if a particular settlement is important enough). This is obviously not a problem for a disputant whose interests coincide with those of the mediator, but the less fortunate disputant could end up with less than she would have if she had managed to continue bargaining with her opponent directly. More generally, disputants who accept third party intervention are implicitly acknowledging that their conflict is a legitimate matter of international concern (Merrills, 1991:30). Disputants may be reluctant to do that for a number of reasons. In situations like civil wars, for example, where the issue at stake involves national self-determination, allowing some third party or parties access to the negotiations seems counterproductive. At the very least, involving a mediator confers some degree of political legitimacy on the demands of the
insurrectionary domestic faction, which is a dangerous thing for the existing government to do. In any case, the context of an international dispute lends national sovereignty a new and particular significance that leaders may be unwilling to compromise. After all, mediation is not the only possible means of conflict management. At least in theory, disputants can add issues instead of adding parties. Under many circumstances, they may be unlikely to do so, for the reasons detailed in Chapter Two. However, linkage is still an alternative to mediation, and the very existence of that alternative may in itself affect the disputants' tolerance of third party intervention. Experimental evidence supports this possibility strongly; bargainers who believe they can work their differences out on their own often forgo the services of mediators when they are offered (Rubin, 1980; Raiffa, 1982:101-2).

Thus, how a disputant views the mediator's involvement depends not just on what she thinks the mediator will do, but also on what she thinks could happen without it. If a disputant thinks the conflict can be resolved in another way to greater advantage, she has reason to reject the initiative. It may be that at least one of the parties is completely uninterested in attempts at conflict management. Neither mediation nor issue linkage will necessarily be attractive to a disputant who believes it can gain more through coercive diplomacy. For example, a disputant enjoying a battlefield advantage has little reason to accept a mediator committed to a "fair", split-the-difference solution. The intransigence of the Serbs in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia is good evidence of this. Nor does a disputant have much incentive to offer a package deal to an
opponent she expects to defeat (Morrow, 1991:164). An opponent on the ropes may be more likely to offer a deal (since it has increasingly less to lose), but the side with the military advantage only has reason to accept the deal if it gives her what she could have gotten through coercion, and at a lesser cost.

This section analyzes the disputant's comparison of its options. It can choose to add a party, add an issue, or add neither. I specify the disputant's value for each of these options, and suggest factors that influence those values. This provides the basis for the comparison; the option with the highest value relative to the others is the one chosen by the disputant. In turn, the combination of the disputants' comparisons determines whether or not mediation is pursued. For mediation to be pursued, it must be the option with the highest expected value for each disputant. This section concludes with a discussion of the conditions under which this is likely to be true.

Disputant Willingness and the Mediation Subgame. Figure 3.1 illustrates the structure of the situation. At this point in the game, some actor (M) has decided to offer its services in the capacity of mediator. It is up to the disputants A and B to decide whether to accept its involvement.

As in Chapter Two, the discussion here is conducted in terms of Actor A's decision problem only; that of Actor B is again perfectly symmetrical. If Actor A accepts the mediator's involvement, then (assuming Actor B likewise accepts the involvement) the mediator chooses between the linkage and facilitation strategy options. The
Figure 3.1
The Mediation Subgame

KEY

- **a** - disputant accepts initiative/offer
- **r** - disputant rejects initiative/offer
- **o** - third party offers mediation
- **f** - mediator facilitates
- **l** - mediator offers linkage
- **M₁** - mediated outcome on initial disputed issue
- **M₂** - mediated outcome with linkage
- **N** - perpetuation of dispute
- **Λ** - the value of the linkage subgame to disputant A
disputants' joint response to the proposal generated by the mediator's strategy choice then determines the outcome; either both accept, in which case the mediation initiative is successful, or at least one of them does not, in which case the dispute is perpetuated. On the other hand, if Actor A rejects the mediator's involvement, then the linkage subgame (\( \lambda \)) begins. The linkage subgame, not represented here for purposes of simplicity, is the game tree analyzed in Chapter Two. The disputant's no-management option is contained within the linkage subgame; assuming the disputant refrains from adding another actor, it then decides whether or not to add another issue. (This aspect of the game structure thus automatically gives the disputants the first chance to resolve the dispute on their own. The third actor only has an opportunity to intervene if the disputants have failed to resolve their differences, through linkage or otherwise.)

The disputant's evaluation of the mediation option depends on her anticipation of the mediator's strategy choice. Of course, the only way she can expect to gain from the initiative is if her opponent likewise decides to accept it. However, in order to assess the likely result of the mediator's involvement, she must presume that acceptance. I assume that there is no cost to rejecting a mediator, and no benefit to accepting a mediator, in and of themselves; if disputant A accepts the mediator and her opponent B rejects it, disputant A ends up with the linkage subgame, but is no better or worse off for wanting to try the mediator. There is thus only one relevant comparison for the disputant to make, and that is between the values of the linkage subgame and the mediation
subgame. Restricting the game in this way has the effect of ruling out the possibility that a disputant might accept a mediator not for its potential contribution to the dispute's resolution, but because she knows her opponent will reject the mediator and she wants to make the other disputant look bad. This "tactical" acceptance of mediation (Rubin, 1981:11-12) is similar to the idea of tactical linkage, in that the disputant engages in it for non-cooperative purposes. The focus of this project, however, is on the addition of issues or parties as sincere attempts at conflict management, not as strategic ploys designed to extract benefits or embarrass the opponent. Consequently, though I recognize the possibility that they may be used for these purposes, I do not include that possibility in the analysis here.

The expected value of the mediation subgame ($\mu$) is composed of three parts, the disputant's expected utility for the outcome associated with the mediator's linkage deal ($M_2$), the disputant's expected utility for the outcome associated with the single-issue proposal generated by the mediator's facilitation ($M_1$), and her value of the perpetuation of the dispute ($N$). (For the calculation of this expected value, see the Appendix.) The disputant's expected utility for the mediator's linkage deal depends on the likelihood $\hat{\theta}$ that the mediator will link, the likelihood $t^*$ that her opponent will accept the deal, and her own value for the deal, $[U_A(M_2) - U_A(N)]$. Similarly, her expected utility for the mediator's facilitative efforts depends on the chance the mediator facilitates, the chance $t^*$ that her opponent accepts the single-issue proposal that results, and her own value for that proposal, $[U_A(M_1) - U_A(N)]$. (The probabilities $t^*$ and
The expected value of the mediation subgame (μ) thus is as follows:

\[ EU_A(μ) = \hat{\theta}''(t^*)[UA(M_2) - UA(N)] + (1 - \hat{\theta})''(t^*)[UA(M_1) - UA(N)] + UA(N). \]

I assume that, for the disputants, the value of M_2 is always at least as high as the value of M_1. That is, given a disputant's value for some outcome M_1 on the initial issue, the mediator's attachment of some compensation to the associated proposal to either disputant (resulting in the linkage outcome M_2) can only increase that value, if it affects it at all. The assumption is not that the outcome with linkage is always better than the single-issue outcome, but that it is never worse. In effect, the disputant either has no value or some positive value for the added component suggested by the mediator; if she has no value for it, this neither increases nor decreases the attractiveness of the single-issue outcome. This appears to run counter to experimental evidence that shows that bargainers will sometimes give an item away for free rather than accept a price for it that they feel is too low (cited in Morgan, 1990:327). The assumption being made here is slightly different, however. It is of course plausible that the mediator might offer a package deal that, say, insults the national honor of one of the disputants. The assumption here is that if a disputant is already willing to make some concession on the initial issue, the mediator's private attempt to compensate her for that concession cannot make her less willing to make it. She can simply turn down the mediator's offer of recompense if she does not value it, and make the indirect
concession through the mediator as if it was never offered. In any case, the mediator has no reason to offer a linkage to a disputant it believes is already willing to concede. On the other hand, if the disputant is not willing to make the concession on the initial issue specified on the package, the mediator's offer of worthless compensation is irrelevant. The mediator's offer of linkage thus has either no effect or a positive effect on a disputant's willingness to settle. This then implies that $[U_A(M_2) - U_A(N)] \geq [U_A(M_1) - U_A(N)]$. Since this is true for both disputants, it also implies that $t^* \leq t^*$; the likelihood that the opponent will accept a linkage deal offered by the mediator is at least as good as the chance he will accept the corresponding single-issue proposal. (The mediator knows this, per the analysis of the previous section. 20) The overall effect of the mediator's linkage is to increase the value of the mediation subgame to a disputant: either the mediator compensates her for her concession, which makes the outcome on the single issue more attractive to her opponent and increases the likelihood of his agreeing to settle, or the mediator compensates her opponent for his concession, which makes the outcome on the single issue more attractive to her and increases the likelihood of her agreeing to settle.

However, the condition that $U_A(M_1) \leq U_A(M_2)$ does not in itself guarantee that the mediation subgame will be worth anything to the disputant. In order for the disputant to expect to gain anything from

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20 Recall that the mediator's estimate of the linkage strategy's likelihood of success is always higher than that of facilitation. Such an assumption requires this relationship as a logical prior.
the initiative, she must prefer either $M_2$ or both $M_1$ and $M_2$ to outcome $N$, the perpetuation of the dispute. That is, there must be some mediator-assisted negotiated settlement, either on the single issue under dispute or embedded in a package deal, that the disputant would prefer to the dispute's continuation, $N$. This point seems trivial, but it is often glossed over in many prescriptive analyses of mediation and conflict management. Disputants have no incentive to cooperate, even with the most skillful of mediators, if they believe cooperation could result in a less favorable outcome than they expect without it. (This point becomes particularly important in the discussion below of the disputant's comparison of her options.)

The only way a disputant could value some single-issue negotiated settlement $M_1$ over the dispute's perpetuation is if she thinks there is some range of mutually acceptable outcomes on the single issue—that is, if she believes that a zone of agreement already exists. In particular, she must already be willing to make a concession herself that she knows would be enough to bring the opponent to agreement. The public position taken by her opponent may be acceptable to her, but she may, for face-saving reasons (domestic political considerations and the like) be unable to acknowledge that. Even if she would rather accept the opponent's public bargaining position than continue the dispute, she still has an incentive to probe for the opponent's own reservation point, since it is probably at least marginally closer to her than his public stance. The involvement of a mediator allows her to do this without having to negotiate directly with her opponent. This is where her
impressions of the mediator's bias (in terms of its preferences on the contested issue) come into play. A disputant who wishes to save face still wants to protect her own interests as much as possible. For this reason she will want either an unbiased mediator or one who she thinks shares her interests in the dispute issue. Given her own preferences (for the dispute's resolution over its perpetuation) she cannot reject a mediator just because she thinks it is biased in favor of her opponent; she does, however, have an incentive to misrepresent her own preferences to that mediator, to ensure that she does not give up more than she has to. For example, she may communicate some willingness to accept outcomes just shy of B's public position, but an inability to accept the public position itself for domestic political reasons. This gives the mediator reason to probe the willingness of the opponent to back off from its public position or, may even motivate the mediator to offer some compensation to Actor A for accepting B's public position.

A disputant who seeks a mediator largely for face-saving purposes has at least some value for a facilitated single-issue proposal in the abstract. However, a disputant who thinks there is no zone of agreement cannot expect to gain from facilitation. The perpetuation of the dispute (N) would be preferable to having to make the concessions necessary for agreement (M1); the quantity \[UA(M1) - UA(N)\] is thus less than or equal to zero. Only some linkage deal, in which either she or her opponent is sufficiently compensated by the mediator for the required concessions on the initial issue, could be of any value. For such a disputant, the value of the mediation subgame then depends solely on her assessment of
the mediator's willingness to offer some linkage deal and its ability to devise one that is acceptable to each side. Factors that influence the mediator's willingness to compensate the disputants were laid out in the previous section: a disputant's impression of the importance of the dispute's resolution to the mediator and the mediator's beliefs regarding a zone of agreement will influence her estimate of the probability the mediator will link. Likewise, her estimate of the mediator's ability to link is affected by her perception of the mediator's stake in the dispute and the resources it can bring to bear on its resolution. The more important the issue is to the mediator, the easier it will be for the mediator to locate something it would be willing to use for compensation. Of course, the compensation must be valuable to at least one of the disputants for the linkage to be successful. In general, mediators with more resources will be able to make sweeter deals, but all that really matters is that the mediator possess resources that at least one of the disputants wants.

These elements influence a disputant's value for the mediation subgame in that as \([U_A(\text{M}_1) - U_A(\text{N})]\) and \([U_A(\text{M}_2) - U_A(\text{N})]\) get larger, ceteris paribus, the expected value of \((\mu)\), the mediation subgame, also rises. The former is influenced by the disputant's willingness to settle on the single issue (i.e., whether \(\text{M}_1\) is preferable to \(\text{N}\)); the latter, by the kind of package deal the mediator is capable of offering. A disputant who is already willing to settle on the single issue thus has more to gain from the mediator's involvement than she would if she was less agreeable, since for her \([U_A(\text{M}_1) - U_A(\text{N})]\) is greater than zero. Regardless of whether or not a disputant is
open to settlement on the initial issue, she stands to gain more the sweeter the deal the mediator is capable of making. In turn, anything that makes a mediator's linkage deal more likely (i.e., anything that increases \( \hat{\beta} \)) increases the value of the linkage subgame to a disputant. For a disputant who is already willing to settle, such compensation (whether granted directly to her or given to her opponent to mitigate his demands) is icing on the cake; a more resolved disputant may believe that is the only way settlement is possible.

Thus, the mediation subgame becomes increasingly worthwhile to a disputant as 1) her value for a single-issue settlement increases and 2) the likelihood and attractiveness of the potential mediator's sponsorship of a linkage deal increases. Factors influencing the mediator's likelihood of linkage were discussed above: its belief that there is no zone of agreement, the importance of settlement, and its resource base. Factors that increase a disputant's willingness to concede on the single issue could include cessation of vital military or economic aid, the outbreak of another dispute in which it is involved, or the involvement of additional parties on the side of the opponent. These are considered in greater detail below.

**Disputant Willingness and the Linkage Subgame.** Instead of adding another party as a mediator, a disputant may choose to add another issue. Doing so can make trade-offs possible that create new opportunities for settlement. As was shown in Chapter Two, such trade-offs are potentially very useful for conflict management purposes. However, as was also shown in Chapter Two, their pursuit
involves costs and risks that may overwhelm whatever benefits a disputant expects to result. In light of these costs and risks, the availability of other options compromises the necessity for a disputant to engage in linkage. The disputant may decide to accept some mediator's offer of assistance, or she may follow the prescriptions advanced by George et al., attempting to "freeze" the dispute. Of course, there is always the possibility that a disputant might choose to refrain from conflict management attempts completely, believing she can outlast (or perhaps coerce) her opponent.

The disputant's no-management option is embedded in the linkage subgame, which (in the world according to Figure 3.1) she reaches if she turns down a third party's offer to mediate. In pursuit of this option, the disputant does not undertake linkage herself; instead, she waits for her opponent to do so (in which case she takes advantage of his offer). In the event her opponent also refrains from linkage, she proceeds with coercive bargaining. Of course, not all disputants who refrain from linkage do so because they wish to exploit the opponent or perpetuate the dispute. A disputant may merely be trying to avoid the costs and risks associated with sponsorship. In any case, the expected value of the linkage subgame (\(\lambda\)) to a disputant A is given by the following polynomial:
(Segment 1)

\[ EU_A(\lambda) = \phi^*(1-q)\{U_a(MAX) - U_a(N)} + \phi[U_a(N) + .5(U_a(MAX) + U_a(\cdot))] \]

\[ \phi[U_a(\cdot) - U_a(N)] + U_A(N) \]

(See the Appendix for the calculation of this expected value.)

This formidable-looking equation actually makes intuitive sense. The first segment is the disputant's expected value for her opponent's proposal. If her opponent proposes, she gets the benefits that proposal provides over the dispute's perpetuation along with what is essentially a free-rider benefit. The second segment is her expected utility for proposing--the value of the proposal lottery over the dispute's continuation, weighted by her own probability of proposal. The final component is her value for the dispute's continuation.

From the results of Chapter Two we know that some disputants are unable and/or unwilling to sponsor a linkage themselves. They may be unable to sustain the combined costs of sponsorship and implementation, or they may mistrust the motives of their opponents. For these disputants, the value of the linkage subgame consists only of the expected utility of the opponent's proposal. As the ability and willingness of the opponent to link rise, so does \( EU_A(\lambda) \). If she thinks her opponent is unlikely to link, and/or that he would offer a lackluster package if he did so, her expected utility for the linkage subgame decreases accordingly. Of course,
the same things that make disputant A unwilling or unable to link
also make her opponent unwilling or unable to link. Thus, if actor A
will not offer a deal herself and believes the dispute is
characterized by mutual distrust she will attach little value to the
linkage subgame. She may be more optimistic if it is the costs alone
that keep her from suggesting a linkage herself; if the relationship
between the disputants was previously cordial, and her opponent is
in a better position to sustain the extraordinary costs of linkage
sponsorship, the chances are about as good as they can get that he
will try to create some package deal.

For a disputant who is able and willing to link, the evaluation
of the linkage subgame is more complicated. This disputant wants
to avoid the perpetuation of the stalemate, but also wants to avoid
the costs of sponsorship if she can. Her goal is to get her opponent
to link. For this reason, once her estimate of the opponent's
likelihood of proposal rises beyond a certain level (the probability
specified by the mixed strategy), her own likelihood of proposal
drops to zero. Because a deliberate free-rider behaves the same way
that a high-cost or fearful actor does (albeit for different reasons),
the free-rider has the same expected value for the linkage subgame
as those actors--her value for the opponent's proposal. The free-
riding benefit in the equation above only accrues to actors who were
planning to sponsor a deal (because they expected their opponents
not to) and are beaten to the table by the opponent. Of course, if a
disputant is not counting very much on her opponent's proposal, the
expected utility of the first segment will be low, but this can be
compensated for by the disputant's expected utility for her own
proposal. For a disputant who is able and willing to link, and whose incentive to free-ride is not triggered by a belief the other will propose, as the value of her own linkage proposal rises, so does the overall value of the linkage subgame.

What might trigger an attempt at free-riding? A disputant's belief that the opponent is especially likely to propose a deal might be inspired by a sudden jump in the costs to the opponent of the dispute's perpetuation. Or, a shift in government may have brought in a new regime eager to wash its hands of the previous administration's foreign policy adventures. Assuming free-riding is not an option, however, it is a disputant's value for her own proposal that determines her value for the subgame. This is determined by the difference in value between the proposal lottery and the perpetuation of the stalemate. In order for her to be willing to sponsor in the first place, the lottery must have a higher expected value than the perpetuation of the dispute; given that condition, anything that increases the value of that lottery relative to the dispute's perpetuation will ceteris paribus increase the willingness of the disputant to link. As mentioned in Chapter Two, if a disputant shares a long history of cooperative interaction with her opponent, she may be sufficiently reassured by that history to believe that exploitation is unlikely. This increases the expected value of the proposal lottery. Moreover, if there is a long history of cooperation, there may be trade and other relationships between the disputants that are interrupted by their conflict. The continued disruption of these relationships would make the dispute's resolution even more valuable, and make its perpetuation even more unpleasant. The
existence of a long history of cooperation, and of valuable pre-existing ties that are disrupted by the conflict, thus increase the willingness of a disputant to link (assuming she believes her opponent will not).

Thus, if a disputant is unwilling to link herself, the linkage subgame becomes increasingly worthwhile as the likelihood and value of her opponent's package deal increases. If she is able and willing to link, and believes her opponent is not, the linkage subgame increases in value as the value of her own linkage proposal increases.

Of course, a disputant who prefers the perpetuation of the dispute will never propose a deal herself, and will always reject an offer from her opponent, using the information contained in the proposal as the basis for renewed attempts at coercion. The only way a disputant will add or agree to add another element for conflict management purposes is if she already prefers some form of settlement to the continuation of the dispute, N. If she does not, then if the opponent undertakes the addition, whether it is of another party or another issue, she will reject the conflict management initiative (to her benefit in the linkage subgame). The disputants' mutual reluctance to perpetuate the dispute is thus a necessary--but not sufficient--condition for either of these conflict management methods to be undertaken.

COMPARING THE MEDIATION AND LINKAGE SUBGAMES

Up to this point, the disputant's conflict management options have been considered in isolation from each other. Yet it is their
relative values that determine a disputant's course of action. The disputant compares what she expects to gain from linkage with what she expects to gain from mediation in order to decide what to do. Because the two subgames have no elements in common, the basis for this comparison is not immediately obvious. What the disputant thinks about is the likelihood and degree of improvement over the dispute's perpetuation that each option is likely to provide.

From the discussion above, we know that the mediation subgame becomes more attractive to a disputant as:

1) her value for a single-issue settlement increases. Factors that were put forth as possible influences on the disputant's value for single-issue settlement were cessation of aid, the involvement of another party on the side of the opponent, and the involvement of the disputant herself in some other conflict.

2) the likelihood and attractiveness of the potential mediator's sponsorship of a linkage deal increase. Factors argued to influence this are the disputant's impression of the importance of the dispute to the mediator, its perception of a zone of agreement, and the kinds of resources it has at its disposal for possible side-payments.

The linkage subgame becomes more worthwhile as:

1) the likelihood and value of the opponent's linkage deal increases (if disputant A is unwilling to link herself). A disputant's own inability to link means her value for the linkage subgame is solely a function of her expected value for her opponent's linkage. If she believes the disputants' relationship is characterized by mutual distrust, she has little reason to expect her opponent to offer a
package deal; but if it is costs, rather than mistrust, that underlie her own restraint, she may be more optimistic about her opponent's willingness to offer a linkage.

2) the value of her own linkage proposal increases (if disputant A is able and willing to link, and believes her opponent is not). A disputant who trusts her opponent (perhaps on the basis of long-standing economic or other ties) but does not expect him to offer a linkage will be more willing to consider offering a deal herself, assuming that she does not value the perpetuation of the dispute. Then, her expected value for the linkage subgame consists only of her value for her own proposal, which of course is necessarily diminished by the costs of sponsorship.

Again, the basis for a disputant's comparison of these options is what each one can provide over the dispute's perpetuation. Ceteris paribus, as the likelihood and attractiveness of the potential mediator's package deal rise relative to what the opponent will offer, the expected value of the mediation subgame rises. So, a disputant who thinks her opponent is unlikely to link (for whatever reasons) compares the expected value of her own proposal to the expected value of a mediator-sponsored linkage. If the mediator is unlikely to come up with a package that is much better than anything she can do herself (even given the extra costs of sponsorship), she could conceivably reject the mediator. On the other hand, if she herself is unlikely to link, and the mediator's linkage deal seems more likely and more lucrative than that of her opponent, she will choose the mediation subgame.
This brings up an interesting overlap. A disputant's acceptance of a mediator necessarily influences her opponent's value for the linkage subgame. Accepting a mediator is a very clear signal to the opponent that one is unwilling or unable to link. If, on the basis of disputant A's acceptance of the mediator, disputant B knows she will not link, his own acceptance of the mediator depends on the value of his own linkage proposal relative to what the mediator can offer and relative to what he expects to result from the dispute's perpetuation. If disputant B is already able to link (i.e., he is low-cost), and disputant A accepts a mediator, that acceptance may reassure disputant B that his opponent is "nice", that is, that she is willing to forsake coercion and engage in conflict management. The effect of this reassurance would be to increase the value of the linkage subgame to the opponent, thereby increasing the likelihood that she would link. The mediator's presence in itself could increase an opponent's value for her own package, insofar as the mediator might serve as a witness/guarantor to any package deal. Of course, if disputant B believes that the mediator is willing and able to sponsor a more lucrative deal than he is himself, he has good reason to accept the mediator's initiative and forgo sponsoring a linkage of his own. Ceteris paribus, as the expected value of the mediator's package deal rises relative to whatever either of the disputants is capable of offering, the value of the mediation subgame rises relative to the value of the linkage subgame. Also, as the expected value of the mediator's package deal rises relative to the value of the dispute's continuation, the value of the mediation subgame rises relative to the value of the linkage subgame.
Another factor that has a major impact on a disputant's comparison of her options is her perception of a zone of agreement. A disputant who is already willing to concede on the initial issue (as long as she doesn't have to do it directly) has more to gain from the mediation subgame than she would if she were less agreeable, since she values both the facilitation and linkage outcomes. Of course, if the disputant thinks there is a zone of agreement, whatever she thinks the mediator can offer must still be better than what she expects to result from the dispute's perpetuation. If she thinks she has some advantage, either on the battlefield or at the bargaining table, she may be wary of a mediator she believes is committed to a split-the-difference solution—unless she thinks that the mediator is willing to provide adequate compensation to her for what she gives up, or is likely to compensate her opponent so much she gets more on the initial issue than she would have otherwise. We know, from the results of the first section, that the mediator's beliefs about a zone of agreement play a significant role in its decision to link. This is the one element of the mediator's decision problem that a disputant has the ability to influence, and insofar as she is trying to get what she can out of the mediator, she always has an incentive to misrepresent her reservation point to any mediator that she accepts. Doing so may increase its willingness to link. Thus, the disputant's perception of potential compensation from the mediator increases her value for the mediation subgame, but also gives her an incentive to appear as ornery as possible. This is the basis for the "chilling effect" suggested by Pruitt (1981:220); one or both of the disputants may decide to postpone making any
concessions in the expectation that the mediator will eventually "pay" them to do so. In itself, this could extend the life of the dispute. To make matters worse, a disputant may even escalate in an attempt to convince the mediator of the seriousness of her position. In this way, the involvement of a mediator with the reputation and ability to make lucrative side-payments could have the immediate effect of exacerbating the dispute with respect to both its duration and intensity. However, a disputant would also have an incentive to mislead a mediator that she thinks may prefer outcomes favoring her opponent. This could not only influence the mediator's perception of a zone of agreement, it could protect her from having to give up more than she really needs to, in the event of a biased facilitation.

The incentive for the disputants to manipulate the mediator's information comes from their need to control for the mediator's ability to manipulate the negotiation process once it has been accepted. However, the mediator might have means of its own to make the disputants more open to its involvement. One of the bases for choosing the mediation subgame is the disputant's value for some single-issue settlement brokered by the mediator. The mediator might try to manipulate this value as a possible strategy, through the use of negative inducements (i.e., its "leverage" over the disputant). It may threaten to cut off existing aid, or to renege on promises of future assistance. The importance of this kind of leverage is emphasized by many analysts (though it is not incorporated in the analysis here), and underlies the possibility that a "biased" mediator might deliver one's opponent. Basically, the
argument is that the mediator's exercise of leverage would have the effect of making the conflict's continuation more costly to the disputant, thereby increasing her value for settlement. There are several problems with this logic, however. First of all, to the extent that the mediator too is receiving benefits from the relationships it is threatening to sever, it runs the risk of hurting its own interests. The same logic that undermines the utility of economic sanctions in general (Morgan and Schwebach, 1993) undermines the ability of a mediator to exercise similar leverage over a disputant. Another serious difficulty with this tactic is that the factors that make one disputant willing to concede on the single issue may make her opponent less willing to make concessions. Anything that augments one disputant's capabilities relative to those of her opponent, or increases her perception that opponent is desperate and willing to bargain, will increase her value for the dispute's perpetuation and encourage her to engage in coercive bargaining instead of mediation. Thus, this is another way the involvement of a mediator might contribute to the dispute's exacerbation. By pressing one of the disputants, the mediator might increase the confidence of the other in its ability to get what it wants through coercion. To avoid this possibility, the mediator must either be able to exercise leverage over both parties, or have its actions complemented by another mediator who exercises leverage over the opponent, in order for the pressing strategy to be successful. The tacit cooperation of the superpowers in controlling their Middle Eastern client states during the late sixties seems to demonstrate that this is possible, but in the absence of another
mediator who is capable of controlling the opponent, a mediator who presses one party may itself be pressed to compensate the other (to keep it from capitalizing on its new advantage).

Another factor that could affect a disputant's value for the continuation of the dispute's perpetuation (and thereby increase her willingness to reject a mediation initiative) is the pre-existing involvement of other mediators. If some mediator is already working with the disputants, they only have an incentive to accept another mediator if it can bring something to the table that the current mediator cannot. Thus, disputants involved with mediators unlikely to link will be more open to mediators who are likely to link; if, on the other hand, the existing mediators are likely to link, a disputant may have little to lose from rejecting another one.

Except for cases in which mediators are already involved, the signaling aspect of accepting mediation does complicate a disputant's assessment of her choices. Above, I considered the possibility that disputant A's acceptance of a mediator could signal that she is sincerely interested in conflict management, and this could assuage any fears of exploitation disputant B might have. What about a disputant's rejection of a mediator? Unless some other intermediary is already involved, wouldn't such a rejection signal a desire to perpetuate the dispute? It need not. A disputant may be convinced that there is no zone of agreement, and also convinced that the potential mediator is either incapable or unwilling to do anything about it. Her opponent's acceptance of the mediator's involvement would only serve to increase the value of the linkage subgame (i.e., her own proposal) to her, and as long as she is
capable of swinging any kind of trade-off, she has little to lose by rejecting the mediator. If the expected value of a package deal sponsored either by the disputant or her opponent is about the same as or lower than the expected value of the mediator's package deal, then a disputant who is open to settlement on the single issue will accept the mediator's initiative. If the mediator's linkage deal is either not as likely or as lucrative as that of the opponent, the disputant can still choose the mediation subgame over the linkage subgame if she attaches enough importance to saving face on the initial issue through the mediator's intervention. If the disputant thinks there is no zone of agreement, and wants to avoid the dispute's perpetuation, she has little to lose from accepting the mediator's initiative unless she wants to undertake a linkage herself. She compares her estimate of her opponent's ability and willingness to link to her own ability and willingness to link, and compares the higher of these to her estimate of the mediator's ability and willingness to link. However, if she expects her opponent to offer a good deal, the disputant can still accept a mediator she thinks will only facilitate. Rejecting a mediation offer is risky for a disputant who is unwilling to link herself, because of the signal it might send to the opponent. Insofar as the rejection of a mediator's initiative could be interpreted as indicative of a preference for the dispute's perpetuation, the opponent might be dissuaded from offering a linkage herself. Thus, a disputant who is mainly interested in saving face cannot reject a mediator's initiative in an attempt to force her opponent into crafting a linkage deal.
Extending these implications dyadically, we can arrive at hypotheses about the types of dyads most likely to accept mediation. The perception of a zone of agreement, and the likelihood and attractiveness of the potential mediator's linkage deal relative to that of the disputants, are positively associated with the value of the mediation subgame. If both disputants perceive a zone of agreement that they cannot acknowledge publicly, their potential gains from mediation (and hence the probability of their mutual acceptance of the mediator) are higher than they would be otherwise. The greater the mediator's resource base relative to their own, and the higher the mediator's stake in the dispute's resolution, the greater the chance it will try to compensate one or both of them and, consequently, the more they stand to gain from its involvement. In contrast, the value of a self-sponsored linkage deal, and the value of the dispute's perpetuation, are negatively associated with the value of the mediation subgame. If the disputant believes she can offer a better deal than the mediator (even considering appendant costs), and she does not fear exploitation, she could reject the mediator's initiative in order to undertake a deal herself. Of course, given that she is free to turn down anything offered by the mediator, and the fact that the mediator could act as a guarantor for her own deal, she may go ahead and accept the mediator anyway, assuming no other mediators are already involved. On the other hand, anything that increases a disputant's belief that she might be able to "win" on the single issue will compromise her willingness to accept a third party that she expects to interfere with her impending victory. Unless she believes
the mediator will make its involvement worth her while, she has little reason to accept it.

If both disputants think there is no zone of agreement, their main incentive to accept a mediator comes from the possibility it would offer valuable side-payments beyond any package deal either of them could sponsor. Even so, if a disputant thinks the mediator is incapable or unwilling to make side-payments, but that her opponent might, she could still accept the mediator in an effort to signal her "niceness" to the opponent. If she thinks the mediator is incapable or unwilling to make side-payments, and that neither she nor her opponent will, she is indifferent between the mediation and linkage subgames. In this case, a disputant might as well accept the mediation on the chance that she could be wrong about the existence of a zone of agreement. At the very least, accepting the mediation could signal to the rest of the international community that the disputant is making a "good faith" effort to resolve the dispute peacefully, and could at least provide her with an excuse to stop fighting. Thus, just as a mediator can pursue a strategy it thinks will not lead to a negotiated settlement, disputants can accept a mediator they do not expect to bring them to a negotiated settlement, as long as they think the linkage option is not viable and do not value the conflict's perpetuation.

Therefore, the best chance for a mediator's mutual acceptance is with two disputants who think there is a zone of agreement and who believe they are mutually incapable or unwilling to sponsor a linkage deal. Disparities between the disputants' beliefs regarding a zone of agreement depress the likelihood of their mutual acceptance
of a mediator, if the "disagreeable" disputant believes there is little chance the potential mediator will make side payments but is optimistic about the potential for its own linkage. The lowest probability of mutual acceptance is with two disputants who think there is no zone of agreement, value the conflict's perpetuation, and are skeptical about the mediator's ability or willingness to compensate them for giving up the fight.

**EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS**

A disputant's expectations of the potential mediator's strategy choice, relative to her expectations of her opponent's strategy choice, her own likelihood of linkage, and her value for the conflict's continuation, influence her relative valuation of the mediation and linkage subgames and her willingness to accept the mediator. The disputant's value for that first element, the mediator's strategy choice, depends upon her impression of the mediator's commitment to the conflict's resolution and its ability to muster resources in support of that commitment. These are largely determined by the nature of the mediator, that is, whether it is a nation-state or an international organization. The values of the last three elements are influenced by her impression of the dispute context: the types of the disputants, the history of their interaction, the involvement of other mediators, the disruption of economic and other relationships, and her ability to prevail in the dispute. This section ties the implications of the model to these empirical referents in order to set the stage for the empirical analysis undertaken in the second section of this project.
The Nature of the Mediator

A major determinant of a disputant's willingness to accept a mediator is her impression of what that mediator has to offer. Does the mediator care enough about the issues at stake to "pay" for the dispute's resolution with resources of its own? Is the mediator even capable of paying for the resolution? Factors that depress a potential mediator's willingness or ability to compensate a disputant for her concessions will depress her willingness to accept its involvement.

The mediator's level of interest in the dispute's resolution was argued above to be a function of its stake in the distribution of the contested issue and its intrinsic value for the termination of the conflict. In this regard, it is easy to argue that nation-states enjoy a considerable advantage over international organizations. Nation-states are more likely to have an interest in the way a dispute is resolved; in fact, it is precisely for this reason that many analysts have argued that their efficacy as mediators is compromised. The argument of this chapter of course is the opposite; the higher the stake in the dispute's resolution, the higher the price the mediator is willing to pay for settlement, and this can only increase its attractiveness to the disputants. Of course, international organizations are composed of nation-states who may have major interests in the distributive nature of a conflict's resolution, but the more universal the organization the more difficult it will be to organize those interests into a coherent position. The most the constituent states may be able to agree on is that the physical hostilities should be lessened, for humanitarian reasons if nothing
else. The same would hold for any coalition of actors attempting some concerted mediation. Consequently, nation-states may be seen as more likely to link than groups of nation-states, and hence enjoy a greater likelihood of acceptance by disputants. (The danger that an interested mediator might sway the outcome merely through facilitation remains, of course, but a disputant can attempt to cover herself by misrepresenting her ideal point to the mediator.)

Of course, given that the settlement of conflict is the raison d'être of many international organizations, their intrinsic value for any given dispute's resolution would seem to be high. Even so, organizational difficulties hamper the ability of these actors to bring whatever resources they have to bear on the dispute's resolution. In this connection, it is difficult to imagine what resources an international organization might be able to offer that a nation-state would not. The strengthening of alliance ties, and the enhancement of economic relations, are examples of possible rewards that a nation-state might offer to a disputant. International organizations might be able to offer monetary compensation, development funds, or perhaps membership in the group. However, if price of peace is not likely to be evenly paid, those who have to bear the brunt of the costs will protest. Moreover, assuming the resources are there, the organization must be able to reach consensus about what exactly needs to be done, and forging consensus on appropriate issue for linkage among a large N of nation-states cannot be easy. The point is not that it cannot be done; rather, the problem is that whatever difficulties of coordination and burden-sharing an individual nation-state faces
when it attempts to compensate disputants for concessions, they are intensified in an international organization.

The model leads to the hypothesis that, ceteris paribus, mediators who are likely to link should have better acceptance rates and better success rates than mediators who are not. The argument of this section is that, largely for organizational reasons, nation-state mediators are more likely to link. Consequently, nation-state mediators should be both more likely to be accepted and more likely to be successful than international organizations.

The Context of the Dispute

Elements of the dispute context—the nature of the disputants, the history of their relationship, the costs to each of the conflict and the likelihood that each will "win"—all affect whether a disputant expects to be able to resolve the disagreement without a mediator's involvement. In general, an atmosphere of trust, fostered by cooperation in the past, will increase the disputants' optimism regarding their ability to resolve their difficulties on their own. However, to the extent that the perpetuation of the dispute entails serious losses (for example, the continued disruption of economic and other relationships that grow out of peaceful interaction) and adding issues carries heavy domestic political costs, the disputants may opt instead to involve a mediator in their negotiations, if only to save face.

For "minor" disputes, i.e., those in which a zone of agreement exists and the disputants are mainly concerned with saving face, the ability of the mediator to bring extra resources to the table for
side-payments is not as crucial. The disputants seek mainly to extricate themselves from a dangerous and painful situation with a minimum of embarrassment, and the involvement of a mediator can make that transition easier just because it is good for appearances. Any resources provided by the mediator to smooth the way are icing on the cake. However, if the disputants are mired in a long and bloody conflict, with a long history of antagonism heightening the perception of sunk costs and the belief that there is no zone of agreement, the disputants may require side-payments to recover those costs. Moreover, a long history of conflictual interactions fosters beliefs that attempts at cooperation and conflict management will only be exploited by the opponent, hampering the disputants' ability to resolve the dispute themselves through negotiation. In such situations, the involvement of a mediator can potentially make a major difference, either through bridging the gap between the two with side-payments or by creating an atmosphere of trust that makes package deals or negotiation in general possible. Finally, to the extent that one actor comes to believe that she can prevail through coercive bargaining—if, for example, there is a serious disparity in capabilities, either automatically or as a result of augmentation by allies, etc.—she has less of an incentive to agree to mediation. Any would-be mediator would really have to make its initiative worth her while for her to forgo her advantage.

Regardless of the dispute context, then, the more resources at the mediator's disposal, the greater the likelihood of its acceptance. This idea is developed more fully in the following chapter.
CONCLUSION

The model presented here offers a way to integrate components of the mediation scenario that are usually studied in isolation from each other. The basis for this integration was provided by an expected-utility framework that emphasizes the expectations of the mediator and the mediated and the interdependence of their decisions. The dispute context does not determine the value of the mediation initiative per se, but rather affects the attractiveness of the disputants' alternatives to it. The value of mediation initiative is determined by the disputant's willingness to settle on the initial issue, and by her expectations of the mediator's strategy choice. In turn, that strategy choice is influenced by the mediator's beliefs about the existence of a zone of agreement (affected by the information provided by the disputants), its resolve to bring about settlement, and its ability to muster resources in pursuit of that goal. Whether or not it is successful depends upon whether or not the strategy choice meets the mutual expectations of gain underlying the disputants' acceptance of the intervention.

In addition to the neat and concise account of the mediation scenario provided by the model, its inclusion of issue linkage as an alternative option demonstrates the idea of "dispute engineering". Just as connections were drawn between the components of the mediation scenario, connections were drawn between mediation and issue linkage as components of conflict management. As discussed in the Introduction, disputants have incentives to be strategic when
it comes to adding issues and adding parties. The analysis of this chapter built upon that of Chapter Two to flesh out our understanding of strategic conflict management. Mediation is not the only conflict management option available to disputants, and so should not be studied in a vacuum. Instead, it complements the functions provided by issue linkage, and is a more reasonable path to pursue in many cases.

This does not mean mediation will always lead to peaceful conflict resolution. However, it does encourage negotiation and enable a disputant to probe (however obliquely) the intentions of her opponent. In this way, it can contribute to effective conflict management, in the policy dilemma sense suggested by George (1984). Through mediation, disputants can avoid both war and direct concessions. By accepting a mediator a disputant can communicate a willingness to bargain, without having to lay any other cards on the table. She safeguards her interests and maintains the appearance of resolve, but leaves the door to the conference room open, if only to the mediator. Moreover, mediation can mitigate the costs and risks associated with issue linkage. The opponent's acceptance of the mediator could alleviate a disputant's fears of exploitation and pave the way for her sponsorship of linkage; or, the mediator itself may bring inducements to the table to create package deals with one or both parties. Mediation does involve some possible risks, in the sense that an information advantage is conferred upon a mediator (much the same way an information advantage is conferred upon the opponent to whom one offers a linkage). However, at least with
mediation, the disputant can exercise some control over whom she will permit to exploit that information and how much.

Yet a disputant does not exercise total control over who gets involved as a mediator. She can only choose from the pool of actors who decide to offer their services in that capacity (either of their own volition or because they were asked). The points the model makes about intermediary intervention—and, ultimately, the range of conflict management options open to a disputant—are moot if an intermediary does not intervene in the first place. There may be advantages to getting involved in the dispute without getting involved as a disputant, but, on the other hand, mediation is a remarkably indirect way of pursuing interests. Just as disputants do not HAVE to turn to mediation, mediation is just one of the ways a third party could attempt to intervene in a dispute. Taking the high road in international politics could be a costly detour, in terms of time alone if not resources; more direct involvement, or even coercion, might be more attractive, particularly if the issue under dispute is near and dear to the third party. Or, a given dispute may just not be worth getting involved in. Even international organizations, whose involvement is largely dictated by institutional mandate, can and do exercise some discretion over the degree of commitment they make to any given dispute.

Because the decision of third parties to act as mediators structures the management options open to disputants, looking at the kinds of disputes in which they do not attempt this kind of involvement can tell us at least as much about conflict management as looking at the kinds of disputes in which they do. The results
provided by the dispute engineering model can provide the basis for such an examination. In the next chapter, I undertake a limited empirical analysis of some of these ideas, tying them to the empirical contexts of the democratic peace and enduring rivalry.
Chapter 4

DEMOCRACIES, RIVALS, AND NEGOTIATION ARITHMETIC

The analysis of the last chapter points to three main elements in disputants' choice of conflict management strategies. The probability and value of the possible linkage deals associated with each strategy, the plausibility and attractiveness of possible single issue settlements, and the value of the no-settlement outcome all affect disputants' evaluation of their options. Moreover, these factors are related in ways that indicate that the two conflict management options are complementary. To the extent that adding a party is attractive, adding an issue is less so and vice versa. Whether a disputant expects to gain from a mediator's involvement depends on what she expects would result in the absence of that involvement; if there's a good enough chance of a disputant-sponsored package deal that is better than anything the potential mediator could offer, there's no reason to accept the mediator.21 On the other hand, if there's little or no chance of a disputant-sponsored issue linkage, but the potential mediator has the means to make such an offer, the mediation initiative may be very attractive. Of course, the attractiveness of each conflict management option is

21There may be little reason to reject the mediator's initiative, either. However, the point here is simply that disputants who think they will do better without the mediator are more likely to reject that intervention than those who expect some benefit.
relative not just to the other one, but to the option of doing nothing. If a disputant's expected value for the no-settlement option is greater than the expected value of the linkage subgame or the mediation subgame, she has no incentive to engage in either conflict management method on her own. Her opponent's conflict management initiative may only provide her with the opportunity to exploit that action.

The relationships suggested by the theoretical framework thus lead to the following hypotheses:

1) Dyads which are most likely to link are the same dyads which are least likely to accept a mediation offer.

2) Dyads which are most likely to accept a mediation offer are the dyads which are least likely to link.

The selection of the linkage option depends upon the expected value of a possible disputant-sponsored linkage deal. This value depends on the ability and/or willingness of a disputant to offer one herself, and her perception of her opponent's ability and willingness. Disputants who have high expectations of the linkage option, for whatever reason, will be more likely to feel that they can afford to reject the initiative of the mediator. Conversely, disputants who have low expectations of the linkage option are more constrained to accept intermediary intervention (assuming in both cases that the dispute's perpetuation is not considered worthwhile in itself). This effect should be stronger the greater the resource disparity between the mediator and the wealthiest disputant. If other factors--the disputants' sensitivity to cost, and their beliefs about the likelihood of exploitation--are already favorable to linkage, then the greater
the margin between the resource base of the more powerful disputant and that of the mediator, the less the mediator has to offer over and above the potential proposal of the other disputant. Consequently, the greater the margin in resource bases, the greater the likelihood of the mediator's rejection. Similarly, if other factors are not conducive to linkage, and the disputants are approached by a mediator with considerably greater resources than either of them, they may feel that they have more to lose by rejecting the mediator.

3) Dyads composed of at least one actor who values the dispute's perpetuation should be less likely to link.

4) Dyads composed of at least one actor who values the dispute's perpetuation should be less likely to accept mediation.

Either disputant can unilaterally guarantee the no-settlement/dispute perpetuation outcome. A disputant can achieve this outcome with certainty by rejecting any initiative proposed by her opponent and by refraining to offer one herself. Therefore, factors that increase the value of this outcome to just one of the actors, relative to her expected value for the other strategies, decrease the likelihood that conflict management will be undertaken.

**EMPIRICAL CONTEXTS**

Obviously, the hypotheses as stated cannot be subjected to direct empirical test. It is impossible to measure disputants' expected values for a potential mediator's package deal, or assess how they value the dispute's perpetuation. However, it is possible to
identify empirically observable factors that probably influence these variables, and use them as rough proxies. An examination of the relationships among these proxies should shed some light on the validity of the theory.

This brings us to the question of identifying proxies. It is easy to come up with many different empirical analogs to the variables of interest here; there are several possible paths along which the hypotheses could be operationalized. However, the particular empirical contexts of "the democratic peace" and enduring rivalry are especially relevant to this project. There are two main reasons for this. First, these two factors are widely held to be important aspects of the post-Cold War world. Several new democracies burst from the shell of the Communist bloc, and the end of the Cold War itself represented the peaceful termination of the most prominent of enduring rivalries. Both topics are thus directly relevant to post-Cold War world politics, and as such have inspired rapidly growing bodies of research in recent years. Second, as noted in Chapter One, these phenomena represent opposite poles on the conflict management continuum. Democratic dyads "manage" their conflicts in the sense that they prevent their escalation; dyads characterized as rivals "manage" their conflicts in the sense that they fail to resolve them. Theoretically, it is important that we understand what factors are driving these very different empirical outcomes, but it is also important for our understanding of what the future holds for conflict management. In conjunction with widespread acceptance of the "democratic peace" phenomenon, the spread of democracy has led to great optimism regarding the frequency of war
in coming years. In order to know for sure how much optimism is warranted, we need to understand as fully as possible the relationship between democracy and conflict management. Likewise, the end of the contest between the Soviet Union and the United States led to much optimism about the future of world politics, but other intense rivalries remain; we do not know what if any effects the Cold War's end will have on those other rivalries. Before discussing the empirical investigation, I first turn to a brief discussion of the relevant literature on each topic.

The "Democratic Peace"

Jack Levy's claim that the apparent lack of war between democracies "comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations" is rarely disputed anymore (1988:662). A wave of recent studies has re-examined the regime type/foreign policy linkage first suggested by Wright (1942; see also Rummel, 1968; Small and Singer, 1976) to establish the robustness of this dyadic result using a variety of different datasets, methods, and control variables (see, e.g., Domke, 1988; Maoz and Abdolali, 1989). Later work moved beyond the identification of the democratic peace toward evaluating competing explanations for it. Research has largely centered on the so-called "structure/culture" debate. The "political structure" argument (advanced by Morgan and Campbell, 1991) emphasizes the political accountability of democratic leaders to the people who die in their wars, and the constraining effect this has on their aggressive foreign policy decisions. The "political culture" argument, in
contrast, points to shared democratic norms that posit negotiation as the preferred means of dispute resolution; leaders of nation-states who share these norms will expect to meet each other at the bargaining table, not the battlefield, and will resolve their conflicts peacefully on the basis of those expectations (Doyle, 1986; Russett, 1989). Critical tests of these arguments have produced mixed results, with some support for the structure argument (Morgan and Schwebach, 1992) and other support for the culture argument (Maoz and Russett, 1992).

Though the existence of the democratic peace seems to be on fairly solid statistical ground, and the structure and culture arguments are intuitively compelling, the prescriptive literature on conflict management tells a different story with respect to democracies. Generally, the warning is of the dangers associated with the freedom of the press, and the lack of control democratic governments have over the presentation of international conflicts and negotiation processes (Deutsch, 1982:25; Merritt, 1982:83). Other dangers of democracy stem from the sensitivity of government leaders to (often ill-informed) public opinion and domestic political pressure (Lebow, 1988). Others cite the rise of domestic political interest groups and the complications this creates for the conduct of negotiations (Winham, 1977). All of this contrasts sharply with recent research by William Dixon (1993a), which points to the strong relationship between the level of democracy in a disputing dyad and its acceptance of third-party mediation.

There is room for both approaches in the model presented here. The arguments of the prescriptivists, warning of the dangers of
democracy, emphasize the structural aspects of democracy that
ehance the accountability of democratic leaders. Dixon's argument,
on the other hand, emphasizes the democratic leader's expectation of
his opponent's behavior. These factors correspond with the very
elements of the linkage subgame that determine a disputant's value
for it. The disputant's value for her own linkage deal is influenced
by the costs she must bear for it; this is, of course, affected by her
sensitivity to domestic political factions who may be adversely
affected by the deal. Moreover, if a democratic disputant faces a
non-democratic opponent, the culture argument informs us that
there is not a perception of shared norms of conflict resolution—in
short, there is no basis for trust. A disputant who fears
exploitation by the other party, and who in any case bears heavy
political costs for sponsoring a linkage, will always tend to refrain
from offering linkage deals. Thus a dyad composed of two
democrats, though each would probably not exploit the other, has a
low probability of linkage because each is so sensitive to the
political costs involved. In contrast, a democracy would be the
perfect recipient of a linkage deal from a non-democracy; the non-
democracy interprets the democratic political structure as a signal
of its high-cost level (and inability to link), and, aware of the
democracy's propensity for bargained dispute resolution, has little
to fear by way of exploitation. Two non-democracies, however, face
a more difficult time. If they do not trust each other, they will not
link even if they can afford it. If they do trust each other, each has
an incentive to attempt to free-ride. The possibility of free-riding
does increase the value of the linkage subgame relative to the
mediation subgame, though. Because anything that increases the attractiveness of the linkage subgame relative to the mediation subgame increases the likelihood of linkage (and vice versa), we are led to the general expectation that the higher the joint level of democracy in a dyad, the lower the likelihood of linkage (and the higher the likelihood of the mutual acceptance of mediation). This is the same expectation generated by Dixon's 1993a argument emphasizing democratic culture; however, the argument here is that democracies add third parties not so much because they want to, but because they have to. Their domestic constraints have the effect of tying their political hands; a third party is necessary to help bring the democracies to agreement, because they lack the latitude to do it themselves.

Enduring Rivalries

Another intuitively appealing empirical basis for level of trust between disputants (and hence their joint value for the linkage subgame) is the history of their interaction. Insofar as their past relationship has been characterized by coercive behavior and mutual antagonism, disputants probably expect the worst from their opponents if they get involved in yet another conflict. Along the lines of this idea, there has been a flurry of recent research focusing upon a small subset of nation-state dyads which, although they only comprise about 8% of the dyad-years in the Militarized Interstate Disputes dataset (1816-1986), are involved in 36% of the
militarized disputes contained therein (Geller, 1993:76). Though the concept of "enduring rivalry" as such is fairly new, the idea that nation-states "learn" from their interactions with each other and carry those experiences into the next round of conflict is not (see, e.g., Singer, 1963). Disputes do not take place in a vacuum, but in the context of ongoing relationships that may be characterized by conflict (Goertz, 1991). How the disputants behave in that string of interactions influences their future behavior. In particular, crisis bargaining behavior in one dispute sets a precedent for behavior in future disputes (Leng, 1983, 1984).

The impact of rivalry is also readily accommodated by the dispute engineering model. As discussed in Chapter Three, mediation is frequently recommended for dispute situations in which negotiations are blocked by the disputants' lack of trust. Rivalry could plausibly lead to such an atmosphere, and the model allows us to trace the resulting effects on conflict management. A history of rivalry will necessarily color a disputer's anticipation of her opponent's response to her linkage proposal. If the set of prior interactions leads her to believe that her opponent will exploit any cooperative move she makes, she will expect to gain little or nothing from suggesting a linkage deal herself. To the extent that the disputants' relationship is characterized by mutual distrust, it will depress the likelihood that either will link, thereby increasing the relative attractiveness of the mediation subgame. Moreover, in

22 Of course, this proportion varies with the operationalization of the concept. For a thorough accounting of the operational evolution of "enduring rivalry", see Goertz and Diehl (1993) and Geller (1993).
conjunction with the conclusions of the linkage subgame analyzed in Chapter Two, the empirical context of enduring rivalry offers a way to explain issue linkage's apparent empirical rarity. The model suggests that issue linkage can most effectively transform a conflictual relationship very early on. A long string of non-cooperative behavior within a dyad (as indicated by the idea of "rivalry") would reinforce mutual distrust, making each disputant even less willing to sponsor. If enduring rivalries characterize 45 percent of militarized disputes (Goertz and Diehl, 1992), and if enduring rivals are very unlikely to engage in linkage, that in itself could account for linkage's seeming infrequency.

**Other Empirical Factors**

The empirically observable factors of democracy and rivalry affect the ability of the disputants to resolve their difficulties on their own. Other important aspects of the hypotheses, however, are the expected values of the mediation subgame and of no-agreement outcome. I turn now to a brief discussion of these.

The value of the mediation subgame depends in part on what the mediator is expected to do. Disputants' beliefs in this regard are influenced in part by the nature and resource base of the mediator. As mentioned in Chapter Three, international organizations have problems of coordination that complicate their ability to offer linkage; additionally, they are less likely to control group-specific resources that are valued by the disputants.\(^{23}\) Nation-state

\(^{23}\) In this connection it is interesting to consider the activities of the World Bank, and other UN development programs. These have been argued to play a major role in affecting the resolution of disputes between developing countries, particularly in
mediators, on other hand, control specific resources that can be effectively used as rewards. This leads to the simple hypothesis that mediation efforts by nation-states less likely to be rejected than mediation efforts by international organizations.

However, there is a problem with this hypothesis. Recall the discussion in Chapter Three of the interlocking components of the mediation scenario. The mediator's strategy choice is contingent on its beliefs about the disputants’ reactions. The anticipation of that strategy choice affects disputant willingness to accept the mediator in the first place. In turn, the decision of some third party to offer its services as a mediator (as opposed to staying out or getting in as another disputant) depends on whether it thinks it will be accepted (since it cannot receive any benefits from the mediation role if its initiative is rejected). Thus, an important (and as of yet undiscussed) implication of the argument presented thus far is that disputes that attract attempts at intermediary intervention involve a serious selection bias. In particular, there must be something

South America, by tying investment and aid programs to the achievement of a negotiated settlement. The monetary institutions simply point out that countries in conflict are not a good financial risk, and state that until the dispute is resolved, any loans or aid monies will be held in abeyance. This is not an example of mediation per se, however, in that the institutions are not directly conducting or affecting the negotiations of the disputants; nor can such behavior be said to be an example of side-payments, since it involves the withholding of resources already promised. Instead, it exemplifies linkage-as-leverage. Consequently, though cases of monetary institutions wielding economic weapons have been argued to have a major impact on dispute resolution, they are generally not included in mediation analyses. One widely cited example of the World Bank actually providing resources for the purposes of dispute settlement occurred in the India-Pakistani dispute over the Indus Waters (Butterworth and Scranton Case #36; included here as Case # 007). Here, the Bank ultimately provided funding to the Pakistanis for their own water-management processes. By paying for the construction of replacement waterworks, the Bank simultaneously satisfied the Indians' need to manage their own water supply and the Pakistanis' need for independence from Indian supplies. However, this was the only incident of an international organization supplying resources for side-payments identified by this author.
about the dispute that makes a would-be manager want to get involved, and equally importantly, get involved as a manager rather than a disputant. Of course, for international organizations, the question is not so much "why" they get involved as a manager/mediator rather than a disputant, but how. In fact, as mentioned in Chapter One, one frequently advanced explanation for the apparent inefficiency for international organizations relative to nation-state managers is their inability to control the disputes in which they get involved. In short, nation-states pick the "easier" disputes (Frei, 1976: 79; Butterworth, 1978:206-212). The argument here is very simple: the value of the mediation subgame cannot be separated from the kind of mediator that is involved, because the kind of mediator that is involved affects the expected value of its linkage deal (and by extension the value of the mediation subgame). If the mediators themselves are strategic about the disputes they choose to get involved in (as previous research indicates), we may draw the wrong inferences from our results. 24

24On a different note, the selection bias issue also has implications for analyses of mediation effectiveness. If one or both parties specifically request intervention, it is a signal that they want to avoid the dispute's perpetuation. For this reason, the very fact of the disputants' mutual acceptance of a mediator could be much of the basis for mediators' ability to arrange cease-fires. The achievement of cease-fires may be more of a function of the reasons the disputants accepted the mediator in the first place than a consequence of anything the mediator actually does. The mediator's involvement provides disputants with a convenient excuse to stop fighting, and since they would not have accepted the mediator in the first place if that was not what they wanted, perhaps the achievement of a cease-fire should rarely be surprising. Of course, the disputants' mutual acceptance of a mediator does not automatically imply agreement on a cease-fire. The point is simply that the fact that the disputants mutually agreed on the mediator's involvement is a good indicator that they do indeed want to mitigate hostilities, and while it is still up to the mediator to figure out workable conditions for that cease-fire, the main obstacle -- the disputants' willingness to continue the dispute -- has already been overcome.
There is a final factor for which empirical proxies have yet to be specified. Recall from the discussion of Chapter Three that the relative value of the dispute’s perpetuation also influences a disputer’s choice. Possible empirical analogs for this variable were mentioned briefly above; here, I focus on two such indicators and offer justification for their inclusion.

The relative value of the dispute’s perpetuation is affected by the costs of non-settlement. This is where the possibility of the "mutually hurting stalemate" emphasized by Touval and Zartman comes in. These hurting stalemates are by definition situations in which the value of the no-settlement outcome is low (or falling) relative to various settlement possibilities. Of course, the perception of a hurting stalemate is purely subjective; as outside observers, we can only identify possible sources of cost that might lead to such a situation. In the context of international crises, there are two widely recognized sources of cost: the use of military force and the application of economic sanctions. Disputants can and frequently do wield these weapons against each other during conflicts in attempts to induce capitulation. However, each of these is a double-edged sword. Both military force and economic sanctions exact a heavy toll on the side that engages in them.\(^{25}\) The use of military and economic weapons hurts both sides; both suffer the destruction of property and the loss of human life, and bear the cost of foregone gains from economic trade. For this reason, the

\(^{25}\) The costliness of economic sanctions to the sender is usually ignored, but given central emphasis in Morgan and Schwebach (1993).
effect of these coercive bargaining measures should be to decrease the disputants' joint utility for the perpetuation of the dispute, N.

Though the use of force variable seems like a reasonable proxy for the value of the non-settlement option, this variable involves a serious operational difficulty with respect to the timing of escalations within a dispute. The use of force could escalate either after or before a given mediator's involvement. On the other hand, empirical evidence suggests that, just by a mediator's facilitating communication, the likelihood of escalation is depressed (Dixon, 1993b). To avoid this problem, I rely on another indicator of capacity to inflict pain. Military parity captures the balance of power between the disputants. If the two are relatively equal in power, neither side is likely to feel great advantage to the dispute's perpetuation and the possibility of war. On the other hand, if there is a disparity in power, the stronger side could conceivably believe that it could do quite well by resorting to arms instead of conflict management. The expectation here then is that parity is conducive to mutually hurting stalemate, or at least that it depresses the value of the non-settlement option, and so has the effect of increasing the likelihood of mediation acceptance and/or linkage.

EMPIRICAL HYPOTHESES

The model presented in Chapters Two and Three indicated the following relationships: anything that decreases the disputants' joint value of the linkage subgame relative to their joint value for the mediation subgame, and the value of the dispute's perpetuation relative to the mediation subgame, will make the mediation subgame
more attractive to the disputants. The discussion above suggested joint democracy and the existence of rivalry as constraints on the value of the linkage subgame, and the employment of economic weapons and the existence of military parity as constraints on the value of the dispute's perpetuation. The value of the mediation subgame was argued in Chapter Three to depend on the disputants' perception of the mediator's ability and willingness to link; one of these, the mediator's ability to link, is of course more visible than its willingness to link; consequently, the capabilities of the mediator (as a proxy for its resource base) affects the value of the mediation subgame. This results in the following sets of bivariate hypotheses:

Linkage Hypothesis #1 (Democracy and Linkage): Dispute dyads composed of two democracies should have the lowest rate of linkage.

Linkage Hypothesis #2 (Rivalry and Linkage): The proportion of rival dyads engaging in linkage should be lower than the proportion of non-rival dyads that do so.

Linkage Hypothesis #3 (Parity and Linkage): The proportion of dyads characterized by parity that attempt linkage should be higher than the proportion of non-parity dyads that do.

Before moving on to the mediation hypotheses, a caveat regarding linkage hypothesis #1 (hereafter LH-1) is in order. The basis for this empirical interpretation of the model's result is the assumption that democracies are more sensitive to the domestic
political costs that stem from linkage. In a purely democratic
dispute dyad, the fact that both members are constrained by this
sensitivity makes it very unlikely that either will offer linkage.
Dispute dyads in which at least one actor is not so constrained are
more likely to engage in linkage. This is not to say that non-
democracies are completely insensitive to these costs. Even non-
democratic states have domestic political problems to contend with.
The fact that linkage deals are also touchy matters for non-
democrats is illustrated by the deliberate lack of publicity they
generally receive. For example, details of a linkage deal around the
year 1974 between Saudi Arabia and the UAE have yet to be
published. In another case, one of the conditions for the Iranian
acceptance of the package deal that ended a long-standing conflict
with Iraq was that the deal itself not be encoded in the treaty (Lieb,
1985)\textsuperscript{26}. All things considered, however, non-democracies should
have less of a problem with this than democracies, if for no other
reason than the strict control over the media that non-democracies
usually have.

Now I turn to the specification of the mediation hypotheses.

Mediation Hypothesis #1 (Democracy and Mediation): Purely
democratic dyads should have the highest rate of mediation
acceptance.

\textsuperscript{26}The deal specified that control over the Shatt-el-Arab waterway be granted to
Iran in exchange for Iran's ending its support of the rebellious Iraqi Kurds.
Mediation Hypothesis #2 (Rivalry and Mediation): Rivalrous disputes should have a higher rate of mediation acceptance than non-rivalrous disputes.

Mediation Hypothesis #3 (Parity and Mediation): Dispute dyads characterized by parity should have a higher rate of mediation acceptance than dispute dyads that are not.

Of course, the disputants have no decision to make if no mediator offers its involvement. As was argued in the beginning of the chapter some of the same factors that influence disputants' relative values for the options open to them also influence the decision of a third party to get involved as a mediator. The joint democracy level of the dispute dyad signals a willingness to bargain to the mediator, but an unwillingness to sponsor linkage. Insofar as this increases the likelihood that the mediator will have to spend its own resources to bring the disputants to agreement, it will depress his willingness to offer mediation to democracies. For enduring rivals, the story changes slightly. There, it is lack of trust and not sensitivity to cost that keeps them from resolving their dispute on their own. Just by being a witness to the negotiations, a mediator may be able to create an atmosphere of trust that enables the disputants to take care of their problem themselves at a minimal cost to the mediator. This brings us two additional hypotheses:
Mediator Hypothesis #1: (Democracy and Mediator): Purely
democratic dispute dyads should be associated with the lowest rate
of mediation offers.

Mediator Hypothesis #2: (Rivalry and Mediator): Rivalrous
disputes should have a higher rate of mediation offers than non-
rivalrous disputes.

TESTING THE HYPOTHESES

A large N dataset has been constructed to test the hypotheses
suggested by the model. Existing conflict management datasets
provide the set of observations that comprise the dataset used here.
A brief review of these follows.\textsuperscript{27}

Existing Conflict Management Datasets

Empirical studies of conflict management are disadvantaged
relative to empirical studies of conflict; tanks, planes, ships, and
bodies are all countable, but it is more difficult to track and detail
the nature of bargaining proposals and the involvement of mediators.
Consequently, existing conflict management datasets are generally
not on par with well-established datasets like those associated
with the Correlates of War Project in terms of the quality or
extensiveness of the data. Nevertheless, important attempts at

\textsuperscript{27}The mediation literature, despite its long tradition, offers very little in the
way of empirical analysis. Wall and Lynn note that of the 150-plus articles they
surveyed, "about 50% are based on the author's ideas, opinions, and informal
observations. Only half are data-based" (1993:187). In the subset of the literature
that deals with international mediation, the dataset used in Bercovitch's (1989) effort
and subsequent work by Bercovitch et al. (1991) and Bercovitch and Wells (1993) is
by far the most comprehensive, in terms of management actors included. The dataset
used by Dixon (1993b) is most sensitive to particular strategies pursued.
collecting several conflict management cases have been made, and three of the most widely cited such sets provided the list of cases used in this study.

The earliest large N conflict management study was conducted by Holsti (1966, 1972). This published dataset includes information on 77 conflicts in the interwar and postwar periods. The range of settlement procedures examined is as follows: bilateral negotiations, multilateral conferences, mediation, international organizations, and international tribunals. A subset of these cases, those in which the UN attempted to bring about a compromise, was broken down into the following activities: mediation, fact-finding, supervisory, interposition, and "other" (1972:481). Because the unit of analysis is a conflict management "attempt", Holsti explicitly excludes cases in which overtures were rejected (1972:476).

This was also true of the initial incarnation of a larger dataset begun by Haas et al (1972), which compared and contrasted conflict management behavior by the UN and the regional organizations during the period 1945-1970. Observations consist of interstate disputes submitted to these organizations that involve clearly defined issues and parties (1972:4). This dataset was subsequently elaborated upon by Butterworth and Scranton (1976), who add management efforts by other international organizations (for example, collective defense organizations like NATO and the Warsaw Pact), concerts of nation-states, individual nation-states, and transnational organizations. The Butterworth-Scranton version also includes 55 "non-managed" cases. Alker and Sherman's most recent update of the dataset (1986) disaggregates its crisis
observations into phases and extends the temporal domain to 1979. This dataset does not differentiate among specific conflict management activities; addressing that lack, Dixon (1993b) folds into it a typology of conflict management practices first presented by Skjelsbaek (1986). The activities included in this typology are public appeals, communication, mediation, observation, intervention, humanitarian aid, and adjudication.

Most conflict management datasets deal primarily with the phenomenon of third-party intervention. In contrast, the International Crisis Behavior dataset developed by Wilkenfeld, Brecher and Moser is not primarily concerned with conflict management in terms of intermediary intervention. Covering 278 international crises from 1929 to 1979, this dataset includes the use of force as a "crisis management technique", and so differs markedly in conceptualization from the other datasets considered here. The dataset does have information on the form of the outcome, the involvement of global organizations, and the cases that comprise it, however, and in this respect it was useful for verification purposes.

The dataset developed by Bercovitch and his associates covers the years 1945-1992, encoding international disputes between two states that resulted in at least 100 fatalities. Very detailed information on the specific identity of mediation teams, and extensive identification of the set of mediation initiatives associated with each dispute, complement a set of variables describing the characteristics of each dispute in the dataset. The number of mediation attempts associated with the disputes included
in Bercovitch's dataset ranges from one to nineteen; cases of adjudication, mediation, bilateral negotiation, and no management are included.

The datasets described here are characterized by a great deal of overlap in terms of the universe of cases. Several discrepancies in the dates and descriptors of disputes and their resolutions were noted; these are due largely to slight variations in the definition of a relevant crisis. Where there appeared to be contradictions, individual case study accounts were used. Keesing's and The Economist also served as backup verification sources for the dates, involved actors, and outcomes of the disputes.

Requirements of This Study

This analysis is predicated on the assumption that disputants' expectations of the benefits of third party involvement influence whether and how that involvement is pursued. Likewise, third parties base their decision to get involved as mediators (as opposed to staying out, or getting involved as another disputant) on similar expectations of gain. Actors, whether they are the initial participants or third-party intervenors, get involved in dangerous disputes because they are attempting to attain conflicting goals. If dispute participants were willing to back down from those goals in the first place, disputes would rarely escalate. If intervenors did not have a stake in the outcome, they would not intervene.

The dataset to be used in this study therefore requires:

1)cases involving third-party managers, and cases that do not. These must be included to test the hypotheses that deal with the
conditions under which disputants will turn to mediators, and the conditions under which third parties will attempt intermediary involvement. The inclusion of non-intervention cases will allow the comparison of conflicts that were "managed" by third parties with the distribution of those that were not. Differences between these distributions will tell us about the types of disputes that attract third party intervention, and the types of disputes where such intervention is likely to be accepted. Since acceptance is necessary for intermediary intervention to have a chance of success, this should tell us indirectly about the kinds of disputes where intermediary intervention stands the best chance. Additionally, including non-management cases are important for the testing of the model's suggestion that the addition of parties and the addition of issues represent complementary strategies. Thus, the dataset must also include:

2) cases involving linkage attempts, by either the mediator or the disputants, and cases that do not. None of the datasets dealing with third-party intervention identifies issue linkage as a category of activity. Thus some researching of the existing cases is required to see if mediation attempts involved this practice. This study requires additional information regarding attempts at issue linkage (successful or not). Synopses, case studies, and diplomatic histories were used for this information. Unfortunately, there are serious data problems associated with the identification of these attempts. Such efforts, rightly or not, often carry with them the whiff of bribery. For this reason, even if these trade-offs save a nation-state from serious physical devastation at the hands of a
much stronger adversary, they can be politically dangerous. For example, a linkage deal whereby Burma was compensated by China for a relatively small area of territory was protested in the editorial of the national newspaper, which claimed that the Burmese were "paying a price in principle, pride and emotion" that outweighed the risk of invasion by the infinitely more powerful Chinese (Whittam, 1961). Even if a mediator brings side-payments to the table, the idea that agreement has effectively been "bought" can undermine the domestic populace's acceptance of it and whatever acclaim the mediator might otherwise receive. Thus, the very political factors that make linkage difficult to put into practice make it difficult to put into print, and therefore difficult to identify for research purposes. Synopses and at least one case study were read for each dispute; even so, very few episodes of linkage (by either the disputants or mediators) were reported, and among those that were, details were difficult to track down.

The unit of analysis employed in this study is the international dispute. Following the criteria for inclusion specified by Butterworth/Scranton, the dataset "included only postwar conflicts that centrally involved specific power-political aims and demands having direct impacts on national behavior, and that were perceived internationally as being focused on political and security affairs" (Butterworth and Scranton, 1976). Consistent with the structure of the model and hypotheses, the cases were organized dyadically.\textsuperscript{28} They were gleaned from three of the four datasets mentioned above:

\textsuperscript{28}For cases involving more than one actor on a side, capabilities were aggregated and the mean democracy/repression score was used.
ICB, Bercovitch, and Butterworth/Scranton. Of the cases in these datasets, only those meeting the criteria specified above and which appeared in at least two of the three sources were included. Therefore, though Bercovitch's dataset runs through 1989, for purposes of verifiability the dataset used here runs from 1945 to 1980. Omitted were civil wars that involved outside intervention; cases like the Greek/Turkish Cypriot dispute, and South African apartheid/minority rule, were therefore not included in this analysis. Wars of independence were likewise excluded, unless they involved opportunistic attacks by an outside power after the target's independence was formally declared. This coding rule excludes some of the most well-known cases of mediation and international organizational involvement, such as the aforementioned Cyprus dispute and the famous conflict in the Congo. The justification for this exclusion follows from this project's focus on international conflict management. When the nation-state status of one of the actors is under dispute (as it is in civil wars and wars of independence) the conflict cannot rightly be said to be international.

The resulting list of 130 conflicts, all of which appear in Bercovitch's dataset and/or the Butterworth and ICB datasets, is contained in Appendix B.

Before moving to a discussion of the dependent and independent variables, the unique nature of this universe of cases should be more fully explained. In an effort to identify what strategies and/or mediators are most effective, much of the previous research has focused on the conflict management attempt as the unit of analysis. This focus has consequences not only for the
way the analyses themselves were conducted, but for the way the
datasets were constructed. The datasets of Bercovitch and
Butterworth/Scranton are organized around specific incidents and
the collections of mediation attempts (if any) associated with them;
each observation is a conflict management attempt. There is
potentially a serious statistical difficulty here, in that these cases
are certainly not independent. The problem is compounded when the
data are disaggregated into dispute phases, though if different
actors are active in different phases it is alleviated somewhat (e.g.,
Dixon, 1993). A similar, but more serious, difficulty arises with
respect to the particulars of the conflict the management attempt is
directed at. For example, Bercovitch's dataset and the ICB dataset
are both organized around specific incidents, which do not
necessarily correspond to well-defined bargaining situations in the
sense outlined by Butterworth and Scranton above: the downing of a
jetliner; a single border incursion. In fact, these individual
incidents are usually symptoms of a broader dispute, and are
likewise not independent. The incidents themselves are not
independent; the observations associated with each incident are not
independent; this compound interdependence necessarily
compromises the soundness of statistical inferences based upon this
data. I address the interdependence problem by treating incidents
occurring within ten years of each other as a single dispute in the
dataset here, unless they involve bargaining situations where a
different issue is at stake. In this dataset, the cases are organized
around the bargaining situations, which begin with a conflict of
interest and end in either negotiated settlement or war. For
example, if five border incursions occur over three years in the same area between the same two actors, that set of incursions is treated as a single dispute, where the relevant bargaining situation concerns territory. Assuming the border incidents are not separated by the conclusion of a negotiated settlement, they are not treated as five separate cases. If, however, the same two nations get involved in a dispute over fishing rights during the same period, that represents a different bargaining situation and therefore is treated as a separate case. Again, the conclusion of a negotiated settlement (not a cease-fire) terminates the dispute; if dyadic hostilities resume the next year, that begins another dispute case.

A further restriction is placed on the nature of the third party agent included in the analysis. The tests here only compare the involvement of nation-states with the involvement of international organizations. Individuals acting as representatives of a state or international organization (Kissinger in the Middle East, for example, or Trygve Lie on behalf of the United Nations) are coded as the respective state or international organization. The efforts of private individuals, interest groups, and the Pope are excluded. (Cases were not excluded on the basis of the identity of the mediator. If a dispute was mediated only by private individuals, and there were no other management attempts, it was coded as a "no-management" case.) Up to three mediators were included for each dispute in which mediation was attempted. If more than three mediators were involved, the three most active (in terms of intensity of involvement) were selected for inclusion. The justification for this selection method is that more active
strategies necessarily presume some facilitation, but the converse is not true. There is also a variable for whether or not nation-states alone attempted to mediate, international organizations alone attempted to mediate, or both types of actor attempted to mediate.

Sources for additional independent variables are as follows:

Democracy: Initially, information on the democracy score of each country was taken from Bercovitch's dataset, which includes a measure of repression based on Freedom House scores. Values range from (1): Free and fair elections; decentralized political power and free subnational elections to (7): Political rights absent or virtually nonexistent. A state with a value of 4 or lower on the Bercovitch democracy variable was coded as a democracy for that year. An alternative indicator for the democracy variable was taken from Russett (1993). Russett uses a measure based on the Gurr Polity Datasets, which compile structural/institutional information for nation-states on a year-by-year basis. Russett uses Gurr's data to define nation-states as democracies, autocracies, and anocracies. For both the Bercovitch and Russett/Gurr indicators, the data was translated to the dyadic level in the following way: a dispute dyad composed of two democracies was coded a "purely democratic" dyad; a dispute dyad composed of a democracy and a non-democracy was coded a "mixed democratic" dyad; and a dispute dyad composed of two non-democracies was coded a "non-democratic" dyad. (The "anocracy" value for the Russett/Gurr indicator was considered indicative of non-democracy.)
Rivalry: The criteria specified by Wayman and Jones (1991:5-6) resulting in the list of cases identified in Table 4.1 define the set of enduring rivalries employed in this dispute.

The collapsing of cases into general disputes seems contradictory in light of the inclusion of the enduring rivalry variable. After all, whole point of enduring rivalry is the interdependence and recurrence of disputes. However, the coding rule used to define the set of disputes here was designed to control for non-specific incidents of a general conflict. A series of conflictual incidents (such as border incursions and the like) does not necessarily constitute a series of discrete bargaining situations. Instead, they are more likely symptoms of a broader, ongoing dispute. The argument suggested by the model is that enduring rivalry, which may be demonstrated by recurring border incursions, provides the context for the bargaining situations around which the dispute cases are organized. After all, enduring rivalry does not in itself cause recurrent conflict; it may contribute to it, if it fosters an atmosphere of distrust, but what drives disputes is a conflict of interest.

Parity: Capabilities data from COW were used to construct the capabilities ratio. This ratio represents Actor A's share of the combined capabilities of the two actors. If the value of this share was less than or equal to .6, and greater than or equal .4, the variable for parity was coded as 1.
Table 4.1
Enduring Rivalries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dyads</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USSR/PRC*</td>
<td>1950-1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US/USSR*</td>
<td>1946-1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US/PRC*</td>
<td>1950-1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece/Turkey</td>
<td>1958-1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile/Argentina</td>
<td>1952-1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador/Peru</td>
<td>1858-1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran/Iraq</td>
<td>1934-1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India/Pakistan</td>
<td>1947-1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt/Israel</td>
<td>1948-1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria/Israel</td>
<td>1948-1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan/Pakistan</td>
<td>1949-1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea/South Korea</td>
<td>1949-1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand/Cambodia</td>
<td>1954-1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia/Ethiopia</td>
<td>1960-1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel/Jordan</td>
<td>1948-1986</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Denotes dyads composed of major powers; all others are minor power dyads.
FINDINGS

The discussion above listed six hypotheses about the effects of political structure, enduring rivalry, and parity on the dyadic pursuit of issue linkage and mediation. Two additional hypotheses were presented relating political structure and enduring rivalry to the mediator's decision to offer its services in the first place.

Of the 130 disputes analyzed, 83 were characterized by at least one mediation attempt on the part of a nation-state or international organization. Of these, there were only eight cases in which all attempts at mediation were refused by one or both parties. These cases appear in Table 4.2. This finding alone seems like good grounds for optimism regarding the usefulness of mediation as a method of conflict management. Since acceptance is the first hurdle to effectiveness, the high rate of mediation acceptance revealed in this dataset suggests mediation has considerable potential. It also explains the dismal rejection rates reported by Frei (1976) and Bercovitch (1989) among others. (Recall from the discussion in Chapter Three that these authors report very high rejection rates for mediation attempts.) The organization of the dataset here demonstrates that those rates are at least in part due to the emphasis on the management attempt as the unit of analysis.

Disputing nation-states who already have a mediator have less to lose from rejecting additional mediators, so high rejection rates cannot be taken as evidence of the futility of mediation. As this
Table 4.2
Cases of Rejected Mediation and Selected Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Starting Year</th>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Force</th>
<th>Parity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>PRC, US</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>TUR, SYR</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>LAO, NVN</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>FRN, TUN</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>UGA, ZAI</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>U.S., CAM</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>PRC, NVN</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>PAK, AFG</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
dataset reveals, if we look at the entire course of a dispute, the bargainers are in fact very likely to accept at least one of the mediators who offer assistance in negotiations.

Unfortunately, what is good news for advocates of mediation is bad news for logistic estimation. With only eight cases of rejection, there is insufficient variance in the dependent variable to permit sound statistical inference using this procedure. There is a similar problem with the number of linkage cases included in the dataset. Only twelve examples of quid-pro-quo deals were found. The resulting lack of variance in the dependent variables (mediation acceptance, linkage attempts) makes logit and probit estimation techniques inappropriate methods for uncovering relationships. Instead, a series of contingency tables was used to examine the hypotheses. Even with this method, the paucity of cases in many of the cells makes it unlikely that significant relationships will be found. We can, however, determine whether the cases available appear to fit the patterns expected by the theoretical framework.

Tables 4.3 and 4.4 show the results of the analyses of the hypotheses relating democracy to the linkage and mediation acceptance decisions. Table 4.3 speaks to L-H1 above, which stated the expectation that purely democratic dyads would be the least likely to engage in linkage.

In Table 4.3., the top element in a cell represents the number of linkage attempts associated with democratic dyad types as defined using the Bercovitch indicator. The number in parentheses represents the same category using the Russett/Gurr indicator of democracy.
Table 4.3
Democracy and Linkage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Puredem</th>
<th>Mixdem</th>
<th>Nondem</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Linkage</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attempted</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(9)</td>
<td>(12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage not</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attempted</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(59)</td>
<td>(57)</td>
<td>(118)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ df = 2 \]
\[ \chi^2 = 3.86 \ (3.35)^* \]

*Significant at the .2 level.
Note that, as the cell frequencies here show, the Russett/Gurr indicator is the more conservative of the two. However, for both indicators, we end up with the finding that purely democratic dyads are the least likely type of dyad to link. In fact, none of the democratic dyads in this dataset attempted linkage. Mixed dyads did engage in some linkage, but linkage was most frequently undertaken by purely non-democratic dyads. This is a little surprising, in that the anticipation of free-riding leads to the expectation that mixed dyads should have a higher linkage rate than non-democratic dyads. However, recall from the table of equilibrium conditions in Chapter Two that the cells associated with the non-democratic dyads (both actors have high costs) who trust each other saw the highest probability of linkage. Thus, Hypothesis L-H1 is confirmed (to the extent possible given the paucity of cases in some of the cells).

Table 4.4 addresses the impact of democracy on mediation acceptance. Recall that Mediation Hypothesis 1 (M-H1) stated that purely democratic dyads should have the highest rate of mediation acceptance. This hypothesis was therefore tested on the subset of cases in which at least one mediation attempt was made.

Eighty-three of the 130 cases in that dataset saw some such attempt; of these, in only eight were all such initiatives rejected. The small number of rejections means that we cannot make too much of the implications; however, as Table 4.4 demonstrates, none of these eight were cases involving two democracies, regardless of the democracy indicator used. Hypothesis M-H1 is therefore also confirmed. Mixed dyads did completely reject mediation at times; however, the highest rate of mediation rejection was associated
Table 4.4
Democracy and Mediation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Puredem</th>
<th>Mixdem</th>
<th>Nondem</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mediation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>accepted</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(32)</td>
<td>(43)</td>
<td>(75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediation</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rejected</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

df = 2
\( \chi^2 = .73 (14) \)
with purely non-democratic dyads. In conjunction with the findings of Table 4.3 (that these dyads were also the most likely to engage in linkage) the broadest implication of the model—that these conflict management methods are complementary—is substantiated.

The model's hypotheses regarding the effects of rivalry are not as clearly supported. Table 4.5, on the following page, shows the analysis of the relationship of rivalry to linkage attempts.

Hypothesis L-H2 suggested that rivals should have a lower rate of linkage attempts than non-rivals, since rivalry would "poison" the bargaining atmosphere and increase the expectation of exploitation. However, as shown in Table 4.5, rivals are apparently more likely to engage in linkage attempts than non-rivals are. A closer examination of the four linkage cases among rivals is instructive. In two of these—the Cuban Missile Crisis between the United States and the Soviet Union, and a border dispute between Kampuchea and Thailand—a mediator was involved in the dispute at the time of the linkage. As discussed in Chapters Two and Three, the presence of a mediator may in itself be enough to offset the effects of distrust in a bargaining situation—and in both of these cases, it was not the mediator that advanced the linkage proposal, but one of the disputants. These cases thus could conceivably be argued to reflect some consistency with the model, if we accept the contention that the presence of the mediator as a witness to the deal in itself decreased the expectation of exploitation. The other two cases are not accommodated as readily. These involve the same linkage proposal between the same two disputants—moreover, a linkage proposal that had already been rejected once and whose rejection
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rival dyads</th>
<th>Non-rival dyads</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Linkage attempted</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage not attempted</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

df = 1
$X^2 = .23$
was accompanied by border incursions. The Chinese apparently interpreted the Indian offer to swap territorial concessions in one region with those in another as evidence of a lack of resolve, and responded by sending troops into the contested area. Why then would the same proposal be made a decade later? The model offers no explanation; however, on the basis of its results, we would expect such repeat offers to occur very rarely and in that sense the model's results are borne out. If we delete the two rivalry-linkage cases that involved the presence of a mediator, the linkage rate among rivals drops to about .06, and the results of the table are consistent with the expectations of Hypothesis L-H2.

Table 4.6, on the following page, shows the effects of rivalry on mediation acceptance. Mediation Hypothesis 2 suggested that rivalrous dyads would be more likely to accept mediation at some point during their conflict than non-rivalrous dyads. The logic behind this expectation was simply that the lack of trust would close off the linkage option, and that this in itself would make the mediation option relatively more attractive. This hypothesis too is supported by the model; the higher of the two rejection rates is associated with the non-rivalrous dyads. If we accept the modifications of Table 4.5 suggested above (deleting the mediated cases of linkage between rivals) then, as was the case with the democracy hypotheses, the general expectation of the model of an inverse relationship between mediation and linkage as means of conflict management is supported.

The final set of disputant-oriented hypotheses dealt with the impact of parity on disputants' choices of conflict management
Table 4.6
Rivalry and Mediation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rival dyads</th>
<th>Non-rival dyads</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mediation</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>accepted</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediation</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rejected</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ df = 1 \]
\[ \chi^2 = .17 \]
methods. L-H3 held that dyads characterized by military parity would be more likely to engage in linkage than those not so characterized. The logic here was simply that dyads characterized by parity were more likely to be involved in (or anticipating) a mutually hurting stalemate; those without parity would involve one actor with a great military advantage who would be less likely to expect such a stalemate. Table 4.7 shows the results of the analysis of this hypothesis.

As Table 4.7 shows, hypothesis L-H3 is not supported by the distribution of cases. Dyads characterized by parity have a slightly lower rate of linkage than those not characterized by parity. Perhaps the weaker side is making linkage proposals in a last-ditch effort to squeeze some benefit out of an unfavorable bargaining situation. However, though this explanation seems plausible, it does not follow from the model. It does not contradict the model—the model simply offers no explanation for this result. An ad-hoc "story" will not be offered here. We are simply left with the finding that dyads characterized by a lopsided balance of power are more likely to witness some linkage attempt.

What about the effects of parity on the disputants' mutual acceptance of mediation? Hypothesis M-H3 stated that dyads at parity should be more willing to accept mediation than dyads without parity. Table 4.9 shows the results. Here again the results are consistent with the hypothesis. Only one of the cases in which mediation was completely rejected involved a dispute between two nations of approximately equal power. The wholesale rejection of mediation was much more frequent among dyads in which one power
Table 4.7
Parity and Linkage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Parity</th>
<th>Non-parity</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Linkage</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attempted</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linkage not</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attempted</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

df = 1
$X^2 = 1.02$
was significantly stronger than the other. This result is intuitively plausible—if a disputant thinks she can do better without mediation, she has no reason to accept it—and it supports Hypothesis M-H3.

On balance, then the disputant-specific hypotheses enjoy a fair amount of support in the analyses here, given the limitations of the data. It appears though that the mediation hypotheses are more clearly supported than the linkage hypotheses. What about the mediator's decision to get involved in the first place? We know from other empirical work that mediators are strategic in their choice of dispute situations. The final set of hypotheses dealt with the strategic behavior of mediators in the contexts of democracy and enduring rivalry. Recall that these two hypotheses were counter-intuitive: they expected the rate of mediation offers to be the lowest for purely democratic dyads, and that rivalrous dyads would be characterized by higher rates of mediation offers than non-rivalrous dyads. The logic behind these hypotheses was driven by the signals that the disputes themselves send to a mediator. When two democracies get involved in a dispute that they cannot resolve on their own, the democratic culture argument tells us that lack of trust is not an obstacle to negotiation. However, the democratic structure argument tells us that increased sensitivity to domestic political cost may narrow the range of bargaining options available to the disputants—in short, that a disputant-sponsored linkage may be so costly as to be largely out of the question. This makes it more likely that the mediator will have to spend resources of its own to bring the disputants to agreement, and therefore represents a
Table 4.8
Parity and Mediation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Parity</th>
<th>Non-parity</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mediation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>accepted</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rejected</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

df = 1
$X^2 = .88$
potentially expensive involvement. With rivals, on the other hand, the obstacle is largely one of lack of trust, something a mediator can alleviate simply through the relatively inexpensive facilitation option. The results for these two hypotheses are shown in Tables 4.9 and 4.10. I turn first to a discussion of the democracy/mediation offer hypothesis.

The results shown in Table 4.9 conform to the expectations of the model (though the results are significant only for the Bercovitch democracy indicator). Regardless of the operational definition of democracy, purely democratic dyads had with the lowest rates of mediation offers. Interestingly, mixed dyads saw the highest rates; more than half of such disputes saw some mediation attempt. This result raises important questions about the relationship of non-democracies and conflict management attempts. If we believe the results presented here, it appears that the results of analyses that disaggregate disputes into phases or treat their component incidents as independent observations may be driven largely by the fact that non-democracies have more opportunities to do reject mediation. Non-democracies are more likely to be the targets of those interventions than democracies are, and they may be more likely to reject. However, it is still the case that the large majority of disputes in which mediation is attempted do involve some mediation at some point. What is more important to remember is that third-party conflict management is not the only kind of conflict management out there. Non-democracies apparently reject mediation efforts not necessarily out of a preference for war, but because there are other conflict management methods out there that
Table 4.9
Democracy and Mediation Offers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Puredem</th>
<th>Mixdem</th>
<th>Nondem</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mediation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>offered</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(36)</td>
<td>(47)</td>
<td>(83)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediation</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not offered</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(26)</td>
<td>(19)</td>
<td>(47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( \text{df} = 2 \)
\( \chi^2 = 6.3^* \ (1.12) \)

*Significant at the .05 level.
may be more profitable for them. The consequence of this argument is not to diminish any optimism about the peacefulness of democracies, but rather to recognize that different paths to peace may be associated with different institutional structures.

The second hypothesis about the strategic behavior of mediators was even more strongly supported, as Table 4.10 shows. Two-thirds of the disputes involving enduring rivals saw at least one attempt at mediation. Almost half of the disputes which did not involve rivals were ignored by mediators. What makes rival dyads so attractive? Again, the model argues that an important obstacle to negotiation and agreement in such cases is the lack of trust. Mediators would rather get involved in conflicts where the main obstacle is trust, in the hopes that facilitation will be sufficient to result in settlement. Also, the likelihood of the disputants' linkage, that is, the likelihood they would be able to solve their dispute on their own, does depend in part on that trust, to which the mediator could contribute by virtue of its involvement alone. The possibility of this overlap was already borne out in the discussion of Table 4.5. The factors that increase the disputants' ability to work things out on their own increase the attractiveness of that dispute to a potential mediator, simply because it looks like it might be an easy job (in terms of whether or not side-payments are necessary to bring the disputants to agreement).
Table 4.10
Rivalry and Mediation Offers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rival dyads</th>
<th>Non-rival dyads</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mediation offered</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediation not offered</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

df = 1
$\chi^2 = 2.7^*$

*Significant at the .1 level.
CONCLUSION

The analysis of this chapter tied model-driven expectations into the empirical contexts of the democratic peace and enduring rivalry. Empirical tests of the resulting hypotheses revealed that while democratic dyads do indeed appear to be more likely to accept mediation than mixed or non-democratic dyads, non-democratic rivals are more likely to be offered mediation in the first place. As these were the same dyads who were shown to be most likely to link, the implication is that mediators do exercise some economy of choice when choosing the disputes in which they attempt involvement. However, that economy of choice leads them not to democratic dyads, which might have been expected on the basis of the finding that such dyads are more likely to accept involvement. Instead, it leads them to those dyads which intuition—and much recent work on rivalry and democracy—would suggest would be the most difficult to resolve. Yet insofar as the main obstacle to dispute resolution in these cases is lack of trust between the parties—perhaps if it wasn’t for the rivalry, one would proffer a linkage—a mediator can reasonably expect to address that obstacle without making side-payments. With democracies the situation is more difficult. The obstacles to agreement are not lack of trust, or suspicion of the opponent. The shared norms of democracies emphasized by the culture argument suggest exactly the opposite. The fact that a democratic disagreement has escalated all the way to international crisis, in spite of those shared norms, may encourage reticence among would-be intermediaries. They know
that democracies will be more likely to accept any offer of mediation, but if the problem is that serious, its solution may not be worth what it takes.

In fact, disputes between democracies, though rare, do recur. In this sense, some democracies engage in what might be called a limited form of rivalry with each other. These never escalate all the way to war, and so are excluded by analyses of enduring rivalry. Nevertheless, the fact that disputes between democracies like the "Cod War" between Iceland and Britain, the Gibraltar conflict between Spain and Britain, and various disputes between European democracies over territorial fishing rights are ongoing is often ignored. The most obvious difference of course between these "democratic rivalries" and others is the level of dispute intensity associated with them (i.e., the fact that while they have involved the threat and sometimes the use of force they have never escalated to war). Yet they also differ with respect to the way they are managed. The democrats deal with theirs by creating another conference or another commission; in contrast to the disputes involving enduring rivals, third parties rarely offer to mediate these conflicts. Yet despite these differences, the result--the persistence of the conflict--is the same.

A broader point of commonality between the conflict management "styles" of democracies and enduring rivals is simply that a wholesale rejection of mediation is very unlikely among both types of dyads. In a similar vein, linkage also rare among both (though it did occur among rivals and not among democracies). So for both types of dyads, mediation is frequently resorted to as a
means of conflict management, and linkage is not. Of course, the infrequency of linkage and the apparent frequency of mediation acceptance is consistent with the expectation of the model that these should be complementary. However, it must be stressed that these findings may be just as reflective of data limitations as they are of empirical support for the model. Just a few changes in the cells could erase much of the support the tables appear to demonstrate, although it is easy to come up with case-by-case explanations for the observations that do not fit into the cells the model says they should. For this reason, I must remain circumspect about the extent to which the model is borne out. However, the results do suggest that the model is picking up something, and it may be that with better data or different empirical proxies the results would be much stronger. In any case, the results presented here indicate at the very least that further research is warranted into the questions and answers suggested by the model.
Chapter 5

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This study opened with reference to the marked divisions among those who study world politics about the implications of the Cold War’s end. The existence of such divisions demonstrates quite clearly that the end of the Cold War, far from justifying academic abandonment of the study of conflict and its management, merely emphasizes how much we still need to learn. Our uncertainty about the future highlights the lack of a solid theoretical backdrop for our questions. Such a backdrop is a necessary first step in the formulation of sound empirical hypotheses. If we can determine the theoretical conditions under which strategies of conflict management are effective, and then translate those conditions into real-world expectations, we can see to what extent strategies that may have worked in the shadow of the Cold War will continue to be effective. This study presents a first attempt at providing the necessary theoretical backdrop.

The framework offered here was based on a synthesis of the ideas of negotiation arithmetic and conflict management as strategic interaction. As noted in the Introduction, much of the prescriptive literature on conflict management involves what Sebenius (1980) calls negotiation arithmetic. Some prescriptions recommend modifying dispute bargaining through addition. The
introduction of new issues and/or third parties to the negotiations can result in joint gains or other unanticipated solutions. Subtraction is also presented as an option; many prescriptions recommend removing some issues and actors in order to simplify agendas and minimize noise. Still other conflict management formulas advocate a kind of division. If complicated issues can be divided into smaller, more manageable sub-issues, agreement may be easier to reach. The idea of negotiation arithmetic is thus implicit in many prescriptions for conflict management.

This project focused on the first "operation" listed above, that of addition. The creation of package deals and the involvement of intermediaries are two of the most familiar prescriptions for conflict management. The analysis undertaken here was not so much of the prescriptions themselves, but of the dyadic conditions under they are likely to be undertaken. The prescriptive literature largely takes these as a given, and therefore discounts the importance of the relationships between them. Yet it appears, on the basis of the analysis undertaken here, that the conditions that block the pursuit of one may often pave the way for the pursuit of the other. Disputants may add issues instead of adding parties, or add parties instead of adding issues. They may even add parties for the sake of adding issues, if they think an intermediary might donate some of its own resources for the sake of agreement. They might even add parties for the sake of making their own issue additions less risky.

The key to these relationships is the element of strategic interaction in conflict management. The very thing that makes conflict management difficult to begin with is the fact that each
disputant is still striving to protect her own interests. As George points out, if the peaceful resolution of the conflict was the primary goal of either actor, there would be no dispute to begin with. The dilemma of conflict management goes even deeper, however. As noted in Chapter One, engaging in conflict management is in itself risky, because it involves a signaling problem. A disputant's desire to minimize escalation and her willingness to bargain can be interpreted as a lack of resolve by several important audiences. A disputant's attempts at conflict management may encourage her opponent to resort to threats and coercion. It may shake the faith of allies and excite the ambitions of rivals. It may even antagonize a domestic populace steeled for the possibility of war by the government's own propaganda. These risks force disputants to be strategic in how they go about conflict management. Different options have different costs and risks associated with them; it is a disputant's evaluation of these that ultimately determines its course of action.

However, the range of conflict management options open to disputants is determined in part by the bases for intermediary intervention. The voluntaristic nature of mediation is a two-way street. Disputants cannot add third party mediators unless the third parties themselves choose to offer their involvement. Moreover, just as disputants have incentives to be strategic in their choice of conflict management strategies, so do potential intervenors have incentives to be strategic with respect to whether or not they get involved and how they get involved.
The theoretical framework of this project brought together two of the three strands of conflict management literature identified in Chapter One. The intent of the dispute engineering model was to evaluate two widely cited prescriptions for conflict management, one of which involves the addition of intermediaries (the third strand). The structure of the model is predicated on the element of strategic interaction associated with these methods, which is strongly emphasized in the first strand, but largely omitted from consideration in the third.

The empirical section of this project tied the implications of the model to two empirical phenomena which have received a great deal of attention in post Cold War scholarship. In the wake of the Cold War, the democratic peace and the persistence of rivalry suggest empirical regularities that will structure the pursuit of conflict management as existing conventions of superpower management (the focus of the second tradition of conflict management research) lose their relevance.

The results of the analysis indicated that while more democratic dyads are slightly more likely to accept mediation initiatives, it is non-democratic, rivalrous dyads that are more likely to be the target of those initiatives. The fact that enduring rivalries tend to be characterized by persistent mediation is less interesting in itself than for what it implies in conjunction with the selection bias identified by the dispute engineering model. In particular, the strategic incentives of the mediators and the mediated here may work against the resolution of the conflict. As an effective response to the policy dilemma of conflict management,
a disputant's acceptance of intermediary intervention makes it possible for it to probe the intentions of the opponent without putting herself at risk. Rivals might accept a mediator for the sake of gaining some breathing room on the battlefield and as a way to gauge each other's intentions. They may agree to mediation, not so much with the aim of resolving the conflict, but in the hopes of buying time to fight another day. For their part, mediators may be attracted to the conflict without being willing to devote the resources necessary to resolve it effectively. They may be attracted to the conflict in large part precisely because they perceive that it is lack of trust that is the obstacle to agreement. The cycle then feeds on itself, as the availability of resource-rich mediators has a "chilling" effect on relations between the disputants. For these reasons, mediation may actually have the effect of facilitating the indefinite perpetuation of the dispute, and may even contribute to the phenomenon of rivalry itself. This is a criticism that is frequently lobbed at international organizations, the UN especially, but it may apply to mediation in general, particularly where the possibility of the mediator's compensation of the disputes is involved (Pruitt, 1981:201-225). It is worth considering that extensive third party management of disputes between rivals may in some sense deprive them of opportunities to resolve their conflicts once and for all. In this regard a consideration of the power status of contemporary rivals (i.e., the nation-state dyads listed in Table 4.1) is instructive. Enduring rivalries composed of strictly minor powers are for the most part a twentieth century innovation. The extent to which this is a legacy
of overzealous management attempts by international organizations and nation-states cannot be established here, but again, the selection bias identified by the model and verified by empirical test suggests there may be some trade-off between conflict management (by third parties) and conflict resolution. The post-Cold War world may rarely involve dangerous major power tensions on the order of those we saw between the United States and the Soviet Union; but, it may be characterized by several ongoing minor power conflicts for years to come.
REFERENCES


APPENDIX A
MATHEMATICAL CALCULATIONS

CHAPTER TWO

Let:

\[ p = \text{probability A is high-cost} \]
\[ q = \text{probability B is high-cost} \]
\[ r = \text{probability A is exploitative} \]
\[ s = \text{probability B is exploitative} \]
\[ \phi_i = \text{probability of actor i's proposal, } i = \{A,B\} \]
\[ \phi^* = \text{Actor j's estimate of } \phi_i, \ j = \{A,B\}. \]

**Belief Threshold for Opponent's Exploitative Tendency**

For \( EU_a(\text{proposing}) > EU_a(\text{~proposing}) \) it must be the case that, for low-cost A, the expected utility of the proposal lottery is greater than the expected utility for the dispute's perpetuation:

\[
(s)U_a(Ra_b)+(1-s)U_a(Lab) > U_a(N)
\]

\[
(s)U_a(Ra_b)-(s)U_a(Lab) > U_a(N)-U_a(Lab)
\]

\[
s[U_a(Ra_b)-U_a(Lab)] > U_a(N)-U_a(Lab)
\]

\[
s < \frac{U_a(N)-U_a(Lab)}{U_a(Ra_b)-U_a(Lab)} \quad \text{(Condition 2.1)}
\]

Recall from the restrictions on preferences that \( U_a(Ra_b)<U_a(Lab) \). This implies that the quantity \([U_a(Ra_b)-U_a(Lab)]\) is negative; division by this number thus requires the reversal of the
inequality. Similarly, the definition of a low-cost player implies that the quantity $[U_a(N) - U_a(Lab)]$ is also negative. Thus, the ratio in Condition 1 is non-negative and establishes the upper bound of the beliefs that will allow low-cost actors A to rationally offer linkage. A will not propose if her beliefs about A's exploitative nature exceed this threshold.

**Belief Threshold for Opponent's Probability of Proposal**

The threshold for actor A's probability of proposal is given by the beliefs required for her own mixed strategy, i.e. the point at which she is indifferent between proposing and not proposing. She can only be indifferent between proposing and not proposing if she expects her opponent to play a mixed strategy, to which her own mixed strategy is the best response. For purposes of simplicity, let the prescript $(U_b)$ be understood to precede all outcomes. (This simplifies the writing of the equations.) Let $(\cdot)$ denote the proposal lottery, the quantity $[r(R_{ba}) + (1-r)L_{ba}]$. Also, let the quantity $[\text{MAX}[U_b(L_{ab}), U_b(R_{ab})]]$, the value for the other's proposal, be denoted by $(\text{MAX})$. The calculation of B's mixed strategy is as follows:

$$\text{EUB}(\text{proposing}) =$$

$$0.5(\cdot) + 0.5\{[(1-p)[\phi \text{MAX} + (1-\phi)(\cdot)] + p(\cdot)]$$

$$\text{EUB}(\sim \text{proposing}) =$$

$$0.5\{(1-p)[\phi \text{MAX} + (1-\phi)(N) + p(N)] + 0.5\{(1-p)[\phi \text{MAX} + (1-\phi)(N)]}$$

Setting these equal, and multiplying by 2, results in:
\[(\cdot) + (1-p)[\phi_{\text{MAX}} + (1-\phi)(N)] + p(\cdot) = 2[(1-p)[\phi_{\text{MAX}} + (1-\phi)(N) + p(N)].\]

Simplifying, we get:
\[
\phi_{\text{MAX}} + 2(\cdot) - \phi(\cdot) - p(\phi_{\text{MAX}}) - p(\cdot) + p(\phi(\cdot)) + p(\cdot) = 2p(N) + 2\phi_{\text{MAX}} + 2N - 2\phi N - 2p(\phi_{\text{MAX}}) - 2p(N) + 2p\phi N.
\]
Continuing to simplify, this reduces to
\[
\phi_{\text{MAX}} - \phi(\cdot) - p(\phi_{\text{MAX}}) + p(\cdot) - 2\phi_{\text{MAX}} + 2\phi N + 2p(\phi_{\text{MAX}}) - 2p\phi N = 2N - 2(\cdot)
\]
which reduces to
\[
\phi [p(\cdot) - (\cdot) - (\text{MAX}) + 2N + p(\text{MAX}) - 2pN] = 2N - 2(\cdot).
\]
Continuing the simplification, the above reduces to
\[
\phi = \frac{2[N - (\cdot)]}{[(\cdot)(p-1) + \text{MAX}(p-1) + 2N(1-p)]}
\]
which reduces to
\[
\phi = \frac{2[N - (\cdot)]}{[(p-1)[(\cdot) + \text{MAX} - 2N]]}
\]
and finally,
\[
\phi = \frac{2[(\cdot) - N]}{(1-p)[(\cdot) + \text{MAX} - 2N]}
\]

As B becomes increasingly confident that A is high-cost, i.e. as (p) increases, \(\phi\) increases.
CHAPTER THREE

Let:

\[ p' = \text{probability that facilitation will be successful} \]
\[ p'' = \text{probability that linkage will be successful} \]
\[ c = \text{costs of facilitation} \]
\[ c'' = \text{costs of linkage} \]
\[ (m_1) = \text{the mediator's utility for a successful outcome on the initial issue} \]
\[ (m_2) = \text{the mediator's utility for a successful outcome with linkage} \]
\[ (n) = \text{the mediator's utility for the dispute's perpetuation} \]

The Mediator's Strategy Choice

Recall that

\[ \text{EU}_{\text{Med}}(\text{facilitation}) = p'[((m_1) - c) + (1-p')[(n) - c]] \]

and

\[ \text{EU}_{\text{Med}}(\text{linkage}) = p''[((m_2) - c'') + (1-p'')[n) - c]]. \]

\[ \text{EU}_{\text{Med}}(\text{facilitation}) > \text{EU}_{\text{Med}}(\text{linkage}) \text{ when:} \]
\[ p'[((m_1) - c) + (1-p')[(n) - c] > p''[((m_2) - c'') + (1-p'')[n) - c]]. \]

Simplifying, this reduces to

\[ p'(m_1) - p'c + n - c - p'n + p'c > p''(m_2) - p''c'' + n - c - p''n + p''c, \]
which reduces to
\[ p'(m_1 - n) > p''(m_2 - n) - p''(c'' - c). \] (*)

Given the assumption that \( p'' > p \), for (*) to hold, it must be true that:
\[ (m_1 - n) > (m_2 - n) - (c'' - c), \]

which implies
\[ (c'' - c) > (m_2 - m_1). \] (Condition 3.1)

If the mediator believes that there is no zone of agreement, then \( p = 0 \) and the comparison becomes:
\[ (n - c) > p''(m_2 - c) + (1-p'')(n - c), \]

which implies
\[ p''c'' - p''c > p''m_2 - p''n, \]

which implies
\[ (c'' - c) > (m_2 - n). \] (Condition 3.2)

**Comparing the Mediation and Linkage Subgames**

Let the mediation subgame be designated by \((\mu)\), and the linkage subgame by \((\lambda)\).

Also, let:
\( \hat{\beta} = \) disputant's estimate that mediator will link
\( t^* = \) the probability the opponent accepts a single-issue proposal
\( t^* = \) the probability the opponent would accept a linkage proposal
\( M_1 = \) the single-issue proposal generated by the mediator's facilitation
\( M_2 = \) the mediator's linkage deal.

The expected value of the mediation subgame is calculated as follows:
\[
\mathbb{E} U_a(\mu) = \hat{\beta}''[(t^*) U_a(M_2) + (1-t^*) U_a(N)] + (1-\hat{\beta}'')[(t^*) U_a(M_1) + (1-t^*) U_a(N)]
\]

Simplifying gives us:
\[
\begin{align*}
= \hat{\beta}''(t^*) U_a(M_2) & - \hat{\beta}''(t^*) U_a(N) + (t^*) U_a(M_1) + U_a(N) - (t^*) U_a(N) \\
& - \hat{\beta}''(t^*) U_a(M_1) + \hat{\beta}''(t^*) U_a(N) \\
= \hat{\beta}''(t^*) [U_a(M_2) - U_a(N)] + t^* [U_a(M_1) - U_a(N)] \\
& - \hat{\beta}''(t^*) [U_a(M_1) - U_a(N)] + U_a(N).
\end{align*}
\]

The calculation of the expected value of the linkage subgame is calculated as follows (the prefix \( U_\lambda \) is dropped for purposes of simplicity):
\[
\mathbb{E} U_\lambda(\lambda) =
.5\{q[\phi A(\cdot) + (1- \phi A)N] + (1-q)[\phi^*(\text{MAX}) + (1-\phi^*) [\phi A(\cdot) + (1-\phi A)N]]
+ .5[\phi A(\cdot) + (1- \phi A)qN + (1-q)[\phi^*(\text{MAX}) + (1-\phi^*) N].
\]

Simplifying the first half of the polynomial results in:
\[
.5[\phi^*(\text{MAX}) + \phi A(\cdot) + N -\phi A(N) - \phi A(\phi^*) (\cdot) - \phi^*(N) + \phi A(\phi^*) (N)
- q(\phi^*) (\text{MAX}) + q(\phi A)(\phi^*) (\cdot) + q(\phi^*) N - q(\phi A)(\phi^*) (N).
\]

Simplifying the second half results in:
.5(\phi_A(\cdot) + (\phi^*)(\text{MAX}) + N - (\phi^*)(N) - q(\phi^*)(\text{MAX}) + q(\phi^*)N - \\
\phi_A(\phi^*)(\text{MAX}) - \phi_A(N) + \phi_A(\phi^*)(N) + q(\phi_A)(\phi^*)(\text{MAX}) - q(\phi_A)(\phi^*)(N).

Adding these gives us:

.5[2\phi_A(\cdot) + 2(\phi^*)(\text{MAX}) + 2N - 2(\phi^*)(N) - 2\phi_A(N) - 2q(\phi^*)(\text{MAX}) + \\
2q(\phi^*)N + 2\phi_A(\phi^*)(N) - 2q(\phi_A)(\phi^*)(N) - \phi_A(\phi^*)(\cdot) + q(\phi_A)(\phi^*)(\cdot) - \\
\phi_A(\phi^*)(\text{MAX}) + q(\phi_A)(\phi^*)(\text{MAX}).

Simplifying,

\phi_A(\cdot) + (\phi^*)(\text{MAX}) + N - (\phi^*)(N) - \phi_A(N) - q(\phi^*)(\text{MAX}) + q(\phi^*)N \\
+ \phi_A(\phi^*)(N) - q(\phi_A)(\phi^*)(N) - .5[\phi_A(\phi^*)(1-q)(\text{MAX} + (\cdot))]

Further simplification:

(\phi^*)(\text{MAX})(1-q) - (\phi^*)(N)(1-q) + \phi_A(\phi^*)(N)(1-q) + \phi_A(\cdot) + N - \phi_A(N) \\
- .5[\phi_A(\phi^*)(1-q)(\text{MAX} + (\cdot))]

Finally:

(\phi^*)(1-q)[(\text{MAX} - N) + \phi[(N) + .5(\text{MAX} + (\cdot))] + \phi_A((\cdot) - N) + N.

Reintroducing the \text{UA} prefix,

EUA(\lambda) = \phi^*(1-q)[\text{UA}(\text{MAX}) - \text{UA}(N)] + \phi[\text{UA}(N) + .5(\text{UA}(\text{MAX}) + \text{UA}(\cdot))] \\
+ \phi[\text{UA}(\cdot) - \text{UA}(N)] + \text{UA}(N).
APPENDIX B

LIST OF CASES

Table 4.1: Dispute Cases

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<th>Description</th>
<th>Disputants</th>
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<td></td>
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<td>Vietnam</td>
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<td>Yugoslavia; US</td>
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<td>Pakistan;</td>
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<td>1947-63</td>
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<td>Case number</td>
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<td>Description</td>
<td>Disputants</td>
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